The Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, 1890-1949

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A thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University

September 1995
Statement

This thesis is based on my original research during a PhD course in the Division of Pacific and Asian History in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies of the Australian National University from 1992 to 1995. To the best of my knowledge, the thesis does not contain previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made.
Acknowledgment

God's word is true: 'of making many books there is no end: and much study is a weariness of the flesh' (Ecclesiastes 12:13, Holy Bible, King James version). But God is merciful. He has blessed my research and all other things during my PhD course. God gave me many trials to increase my faith, but he is always faithful. I thank God for answering my prayer and giving me strength to complete this thesis.

I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor Donald Denoon and adviser, Professor Hank Nelson, for instructing me how to conduct my research and how to write a thesis in English. I also thank Mr David Sissons for bringing me attention some but important archives. I thank many other people—staff in the Division of Pacific and Asian History, librarians, archivists and those who answered my interview in Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia. My fieldwork in the three countries is the most pleasurable and unforgettable part of my research. I thank my parents, Töyö and Sanae, for their care from Japan. Finally I thank my brothers and sisters in the body of Jesus Christ for encouraging me spiritually and helping me practically.
Abstract

Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the turn of the 19th century, as an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl divers on Thursday Island. An adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi, explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner, for new shell fishing grounds. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in 1901 to meet Governor Hahl. Komine managed to develop a good relationship with the German administration. In 1910 he acquired a lease in Manus Island and Rabaul and began operating a copra plantation, trochus shell fishing and boatbuilding. More importantly, he began to bring in Japanese employees.

However, after the outbreak of World War I, immigration policy and trade restriction by the Australian military administration and later by the civil administration blocked the expansion of the Japanese settlement. The Japanese population declined from 109 in 1914 to 36 in 1939. At the outbreak of the Pacific War Japanese residents were all arrested and interned in Australia just before the landing of Japanese troops. The internees from Papua and New Guinea were never allowed to return, on security grounds. Thus the Japanese settlement vanished.

The national policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. Japanese *nanshin-ron* (southward advancement theory) advocates and Australian officials created the image of the settlers pawns of *nanshin* (southward advancement). However, their perceptions, based on each national interest, are partial. In this thesis I aim to present wider perceptions on the settlers in order to construct a more comprehensive history. I set my analysis in the contexts of Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, attempting to conceptualise the position of these migrants in a European colonial apparatus.
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Abbreviations

AA     Australian Archives
JDR    Japanese Diplomatic Record
MP     Military Police
PNG    Papua New Guinea
POW    Prisoner of War
R.A.A.F Royal Australian Air Force
US     The United States of America
Introduction

1. Overview

A massive exodus of people was a world-wide phenomenon during the 19th century. About 50 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas and 47 million Chinese and Indians emigrated to Asia-Pacific. However, the scale of Japanese emigration was small. Rough estimates of Japanese emigrants before the Pacific War are at least 1.6 million: from 1868 to 1941, 776,304 Japanese emigrated in areas except Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, and from 1936 to 1940, about 820,000 people emigrated in Manchuria. Comparative figures were 23.1 million in Britain, 4.3 million in France, 7 million in Holland, 33.9 million in Germany and 22 million in Italy from 1851 to 1950. The number of Japanese emigrants to Papua and New Guinea was even tinier: it was never above 200.

The smallness of Japanese emigration is attributed mainly to its exclusion policy which prohibited overseas emigration until 1868 and to its timing of integration into the world capitalism. Destinations of Japanese emigration were limited, because by the time Japanese modernisation began, most Pacific-Asian countries had been colonised by European powers. Although Japan's rapid modernisation from the late 19th century with colonisation of Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia created space for emigration, this was only possible in a short period of 50 years until the end of the Pacific War.

Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the turn of the 19th century. It was an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl divers on Thursday Island where they were squeezed out by Australian restrictions on migration and by the exhaustion of pearl beds. The migration was also a result of a series of searches for new beds and a place to settle, by an adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi. From 1890 to 1894, Komine explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner for shell fishing and for a new shell fishing ground. In November 1894 he made a second voyage with Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa immigration company on Thursday Island. After this voyage, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea in a schooner for shell fishing and for a new shell fishing ground. In November 1894 he made a second voyage with Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa immigration company on Thursday Island. After this voyage, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea as a possible emigration destination and he approached the British New Guinea administration unsuccessfully. Komine's application for naturalisation in Queensland was also refused in 1898. Those events drove him to German New Guinea. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in October 1901 to meet Governor Hahl.

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1Tsunoyama Sakae, 1981, ‘Sekai shihon shugi to ajia no shihon—19 seiki kōhan kara 20 seiki shotō—[World capitalism and Asian capital—late 19th century to early 20th century—], Sekai keizai shi gaku [Socio-Economic History], Vol.47, No.4, Shakai keizai shi gakkai, Tokyo, p.1
2Kokusai kyōryoku jigyō-dan (Japan International Cooperation Agency), 1991, Kaigai ijū tōkei [Overseas emigration Statistics], Tokyo, p.p.9-12; Gaimu-shō ryōji ijū-bu (Consul-Immigration Section, Foreign Ministry), 1971, Waga kokumin no kaigai hatten, ijū hyaku-nen no ayumi [Overseas development of Japan, the footprint of one hundred-year immigration], Vol.1, Tokyo, p.97
3Gaimu-shō ijū-kyoku (Emigration Bureau of Foreign Ministry), 1964, Kaigai ijū tōkei [Overseas emigration statistics], Tokyo, p.72
Their relationship developed based on mutual benefits—Komine's search for a place to settle down and Hahl's need of a vessel. After that, Komine was able to acquire leases in Manus Island and Rabaul and began operating a copra plantation, trochus shell fishing and boatbuilding. More importantly, he was allowed to bring in Japanese employees.

Komine was successful in all his business and its expansion contributed to the increase of Japanese population. As a result, a Japanese settlement of about 100 emerged in the last years of German rule. Most migrants came from the rural areas of the south-west Japan—Kumamoto, Nagasaki and Wakayama. Close observation shows that most migrants were from coastal areas (Amakusa in Kumamoto, Shimabara in Nagasaki, southern Wakayama, Miura peninsula in Kanagawa). However, after the outbreak of World War I, immigration policy and trade restriction by the Australian military administration and later by the civil administration blocked the expansion of the settlement. The Japanese population declined from 109 in 1914 to 36 in 1939. At the outbreak of the Pacific War Japanese residents were all arrested and interned in Australia just before the landing of Japanese troops. The internees were never allowed to return on security grounds, and the Japanese settlement vanished.

National policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. The Japanese government was indifferent to them, until the late 1930s when *nanshin-ron* (southward advancement theory) advocates started beating the drum of *nanshin* (southward advancement), and portrayed the settlers as patriot pioneers. Again, the government was indifferent after the war. On the other hand, the Australians, except those in New Guinea, always perceived them as part of *nanshin*: the settlers were all spies. The Pacific War intensified the perceptions and the settlers were eliminated from New Guinea. Did those perceptions tell all about the settlers? How did the settlers identify themselves? Did they think they were pioneering the undeveloped land for Empire building? What did those who actually interacted and observed think about them? Were the Australians in Papua and New Guinea always suspicious about their activities? If not, why was that? How did Papuans and New Guineas perceive them? Vice-versa, how did the settlers perceive Papuans and New Guineas? Without attempting to answer those questions, the settlers' image remains that of the *nanshin-ron* advocates and Australians officials who had never been to Papua and New Guinea or seen the settlers. Therefore, the public history of the settlers remains partial.

In this thesis I aim to present wider perceptions of the settlers in order to construct a more comprehensive history. In each chapter, I analyse the Japanese interest in the South Seas in terms of policy, trade, emigration and ideology for two purposes: to set the migration to Papua and New Guinea in the context of overall Japanese involvement in the South Seas; and to examine the validity of the perceptions of both *nanshin-ron* advocates and the Australians in Melbourne. I devote the main part to empirical accounts of the settlers from both written materials and oral evidence. I analyse them in terms of demographic trends, diplomacy of both Japan and Australia, Australian colonial polices,
settlers' economic activities and their relations with other races. To conclude, I focus on the implications of the Japanese presence in Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, conceptualising the position of the migrants in a European colonial apparatus.

2. Theory

There has been no interdisciplinary approach to explain international migration. Social geographers present demographic analyses; anthropologists and sociologists focus on ethnological aspects, mainly migrants' adaptation to their new environments; historians relate migration to diplomacy; economists are mainly concerned with the migrants' economic impacts on both their origin countries and destinations; and scholars in political economy attempt to conceptualise the patterns of migration in colonisation. In this thesis, I test the political economy approach.

The political economy approach is relatively new and its emphasis is on the role of migrants as labourers in the international labour market. In the case of Japan, her integration to world capitalism in the late 19th century caused the development of ambivalent migration; it had a disposition as a colonial power sending emigrants or colonists like other European colonial powers as well as a disposition as a 'peripheral' nation to supply labour to Western powers. An example of the former is the emigration to Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia, and that of the latter is to Hawaii, North America, Australia and South America.

Tsunoyama also uses the notion of the 'peripheral' nature of Japanese emigration, adopting the world-system model presented by Wallerstein which divides the world into core, semi-periphery and periphery, in which the economic development of the core is only possible by the exploitation of periphery or semi-periphery. In this model, Asian emigration was the response to the reformation of labour market in peripheries in the process of colonisation or semi-colonisation of Asian countries by European powers. Although Japan was not colonised like other Asian countries, its role as a supplier of labour to Hawaii, North America, Australia and South America put it in the category of periphery. At the same time, Japan began to play a role as 'core' with the beginning of its colonial control over Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia.

I test this model in the case of Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea, based on the hypothesis that the emigrants came from peripheral Japan to Papua and New Guinea as part of rural-urban migration that happened in the process of Japanese economic development; they came to the periphery of Australia to supply labour to the Australian

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4Hayase Shinzō, 1989, 'Bengetto imin' no kyoza to jitsuzō: kindai nihon tonan ajia kankei shi no ichi kōsatsu [Image and reality of 'Benget migrants': thought on modern Japan's relations with Southeast Asia], Dōbunkan, Tokyo, p.34

5Tsunoyama Sakae, 1981, op.cit., p.5
core; but as Japan began to emerge as a core from the early 20th century, they began to serve the Japanese core exploiting local labour. Incidentally, I have to note that the result of the testing would not provide a general model for Japanese emigration, because the number of emigrants is extremely small compared to those to other regions.

3. Methodology

In the case of the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, the vast majority of sources have been written by officials (both Australian and Japanese) and nanshin-ron advocates, and scarcely any by the settlers themselves. Therefore, if I present the history of the settlers only relying on those written sources according to my own selection, it is merely a display of onlookers' perceptions (including mine). No voices of the settlers or of those who actually interacted with them will be unheard. In order to overcome the unevenness of the sources, I have used interviewing—collecting oral evidence. I consider interviewing as useful as researching archives and literature in collecting information, and I use oral evidence as valid as written evidence.

There are advantages and disadvantages in collecting and using oral evidence. The major advantage is that informants can provide information which is not recorded in written sources. The major disadvantage is that the information can be biased: it can be exaggerated; the informant may be telling only one side or part of the event deliberately. That is because, as Neumann argues, interviewing is a 'dialogue' between researchers and informants who expect their stories to be written down. As a result, selection, omission or dramatisation can happen according to the interest of the researchers and informants. However, this can be an advantage, as Denoon claims:

Where a real difference crops up, is that the writer does not know who will read the book a hundred years later: the oral informant does know his or her questioner, and will probably change the form (or the substance) of a story to meet the requirements of that questioner. Now, this is not always a disadvantage. An oral historian can, with great efforts, see how the informant is moulding the story, and can ask more questions: but you can't ask questions of a book's author, who has set the evidence out once and for all time. In other words, it is possible to understand some oral evidence better than some written evidence.

The argument of both Neumann and Denoon suggests the importance of interaction between researchers and informants. The role of researchers in collecting information is greater than in collecting from written sources. Therefore, researchers, when presenting the

6I prefer using the term 'oral evidence' to 'oral tradition' for two reasons. First, 'oral evidence' generally indicates the information derived from an illiterate society. Papua New Guinea society was largely illiterate when the Japanese settlers were there, and historians and anthropologists generally acknowledge that Papua New Guineans did not have a tradition to write down their history. But quite a few of my informants are literate and have ability to write down their history if they want to. Second, my Japanese informants are all literate.
8Neumann, Klaus, 1992, Not the way it really was: constructing the Tolai past, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, p.249
9Denoon, Donald, 1981, 'Introduction', Denoon, Donald and Lacey, Roderic (eds.), Oral Tradition in Melanesia, University of Papua New Guinea and Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, Port Moresby, p.6
results of interviewing, need to clarify their backgrounds as well as those of informants so that readers can assess the researchers' or informants' influence on the information.

I am a single Japanese in my early thirty's. I was born and grew up in Kyūshū in Japan and went to a university in Osaka, worked in a mountain cottage in Nagano, in a farm in Hokkaido and for a company in Tokyo. After that, I came to Australia for more university education and started my research on Papua New Guinea as part of an honours degree course in Flinders University in South Australia. My honours thesis is about Japan-Papua New Guinea economic relations after the independence of Papua New Guinea in 1975. Apart from academic activities, I like mountaineering and believe in God and go to a Pentecostal church every Sunday. I do not drink or smoke. I became a Christian in Australia.

My informants are Japanese, Papua New Guineans and Australians. They are ex-settlers, descendants or relatives of the settlers and elders who knew directly or indirectly about the settlers. Their details by locations are shown in Table I-1. Other details are in footnotes.

Table I-1. The number of informants by locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>locations</th>
<th>descendants</th>
<th>non-descendant elders</th>
<th>ex-settlers</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East New Britain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyushu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source : interviews by the author with descendants, non-descendant elders and informants in Japan from June to July 1993, Papua New Guinea from November 1993 to March 1994, Australia in March 1994

I recorded most interviews in tapes and also took notes. Usually I brought a small gift (biscuits, cakes, green tea, etc.). I could not afford cash due to a small field work budget. Apart from my native language, I am fluent in English but my Pidgin English is limited. Most interviews with Papua New Guineans were conducted in English, but when the informants could not speak English, I had an interpreter. I approached all informants with utmost politeness. All informants responded amicably. Quite a few wanted to offer a meal or accommodation or to keep contact. Most interviews were conducted at informants' homes or cool places such as shade under trees in Papua New Guinea. In most cases of interviewing non-settler elders in Papua New Guinea, the interviews were public, and other villagers gathered and listened.

Iwamoto Hiromitsu, 1990, *Japan-Papua New Guinea economic relations in the postwar period: analysis from dependency perspective*, honours thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide
At the interviews I normally started with introducing myself and my research and briefly told them what I knew about the settlers from my research on written sources. In most cases, I knew more than the informants about biographical information of the settlers and events, so I could avoid collecting inaccurate information. However, I knew that the major problem would be that informants would tell me what they thought I would be pleased to hear, as two anthropologists, Zelenietz and Saito, experienced in interviewing Kilenge people about their wartime experiences: Zelenietz (American) got many stories about good Americans and Saito (Japanese) got many of good Japanese. The two found that:

The narrator sizes up his audience and then delivers an appropriate recital, secure in knowing that no other Kilenge will openly contradict the account......Story telling is a leisure activity, meant to entertain, and "facts" are much less important than the sense of conveying a "good story". ......No one is openly insulted. No one publicly takes offence. Only when the stakes are high, only when 'facts' count (as in ownership of an important resource) is public disputation and resultant social tension deemed worth the cost.\(^{11}\)

To avoid this problem, I always challenged informants about the accuracy of the information and asked whether they knew bad stories about the Japanese settlers. I also tried to avoid intimidating them and to maintain a relaxed atmosphere. Occasionally I got negative stories, such as brutal Japanese masters or low wages, from New Guinean informants.

4. Demographic information

In each chapter, I introduce relevant statistical data about the settlers. However, as I divide my thesis into five chapters, the trends over half a century can be obscured. Therefore, I introduce most data here.

As Table I-2 shows, numbers of travellers declined sharply after 1914. Most Japanese migrated in the late German period when no migration restriction was applied as in Australian military and mandate periods.

Migrants to Papua and New Guinea were overwhelmingly males. Out of 172, only 31 were females (18.0 percent). The distribution of age groups is shown in Table I-3. The average age of the migrants is 25.5 years: 26.7 for males and 25.8 for females. The proportion of young working people (15 to 29) is the largest (69.2 percent), whereas the proportion of dependent children (0-14 years old) is significantly low (only 3.2 percent). That indicates that most migrants came without their families or that they were single.

With the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, a class system was reformed to three social conditions—kazoku (peers), shizoku (descendants of samurai) and

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Table 1-2. Japanese migrants and travellers to Papua New Guinea 1894-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Population in Papua and New Guinea</th>
<th>Number of Travellers to Papua and New Guinea from Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>109 (103)**</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Eastern Division only
**From a different source, AA, A518/1-0918/2, 1939, 'Admission of Japanese'
n.a.: no data available


Table 1-3. Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25), J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)
heimin (commoners). The social status of migrants in Papua and New Guinea is not so clear, for Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo does not always clarify social status. Only 45 people's status are recorded. Out of these 45, only 4 were shizoku, while 42 were heimin and there were no kazoku. From these limited data, the majority of migrants may be assumed to be commoners.

Most migrants were central members of a household. Three groups—household heads, first-born sons and wives accompanied by a household head—occupy almost half of the total; respectively 19.1 percent, 17.4 percent and 9.3 percent (Table I-4). Although the proportion of second-born sons is relatively high (12.7 percent), the proportions of other family members like third-born son, fourth-born son and first-born daughter are quite small (respectively 4.6 percent, 3.4 percent and 2.9 percent). This pattern contradicts the general perception that 'migration occurred mainly due to poverty, and second-born or third-born sons, who became economic burden in poor peasant families, migrated overseas to attempt to improve their economic situation.' It is presumed that Papua and New Guinea provided a strong attraction even for central members of a household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I-4. Household status</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>household head</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first-born son</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife accompanied by household head</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second-born son</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brother to a household head</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-born son</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourth-born son</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first-born daughter</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopted child</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25), J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)

A pattern of chain migration, which 'moves sets of related individuals or households from one place to another via a set of social arrangements in which people at the destination provide aid, information, and encouragement to new migrants,' can be seen from birth places. Table I-5 shows that groups of migrants came from particular towns or villages.

Kinship also demonstrates chain migration (Table I-6). The number of migrants who are related to each other is 59 (34.3 percent); they include a high proportion of married couples—31 out of 59.

---

12 A minor problem arises in computing household status. The social status of some migrants changed as they revisited Papua or New Guinea. In such cases, the household status for the first visit is counted, ignoring the changes of status in later visits.

13 Hayase, op.cit., p.121


15 Administrative zones of Japan consists of, from the largest, ken or fu (prefecture), shi (city), gun (county), chō(town) and mura (village).
Table 1-5. Birth places of migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>birth places</th>
<th>number of migrants (% in total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-ken</td>
<td>40 (23.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amakusa-gun</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki-ken</td>
<td>39 (22.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita-takaki-gun</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki-shi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minami-takaki-gun</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-sonogi-gun</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-sonogi-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-takaki-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minami-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama-ken</td>
<td>24 (13.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-muro-gun</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-muro-gun</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuchikata-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiyoshi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga-ken</td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naka-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga-shi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyaki-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harumoto-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa-ken</td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miura-gun</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-ken</td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aki-gun</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-shi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurioka-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyouchi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka-ken</td>
<td>8 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuma-gun</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onga-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurume-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyako-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka-fu</td>
<td>6 (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka-shi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima-ken</td>
<td>5 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aira-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izumi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo-fu</td>
<td>5 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo-shi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niijima-moto-mura</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba-ken</td>
<td>3 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimitsu-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awa-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama-ken</td>
<td>3 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oda-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kojima-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12 (6.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)

Table 1-6. Kinship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>no. of cases</th>
<th>no. of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>couple (no children)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couple (accompanied by children)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blood relations of other kind</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)
A distinctive characteristic can be found in the occupational pattern. Most migrants were artisans. As Table I-7 shows, the largest occupational group was shipwrights, followed by carpenters, traders, fishermen and planters. This pattern clearly reflects that most migrants were recruited specifically for Komine's business—boatbuilding, collecting shell, and plantation management.

**Table I-7. Occupation of migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of migrants</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shipwright</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawyer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draftsman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straw mat maker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried bonito processor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>172</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This group mostly include people accompanying the migrants, such as wives and children.

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)

Occupations are closely associated with birth places. Table I-8 shows nearly half of shipwrights came from Kumamoto-ken, more than half of sawyers came from Nagasaki-ken, most carpenters from Nagasaki-ken and Osaka-fu, and half of planters from Wakayama-ken. Furthermore, most migrants with the same occupation came from the same *mura* or *cho*: for example, out of 23 shipwrights from Kumamoto-ken 13 came from Goryō-mura; out of 6 traders of Wakayama-ken 4 came from Ōshima-mura; out of 4 planters of Wakayama-ken 3 came from Kushimoto-cho; all fishermen from Kanagawa-ken came from Misaki-cho; and out of 5 carpenter from Osaka-fu 4 came from Imaki-cho.16

**Table I-8. Relation between birth places and occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth places</th>
<th>Shipwrights</th>
<th>Carpenters</th>
<th>Sawyers</th>
<th>Traders</th>
<th>Fishermen</th>
<th>Planters</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-ken</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki-ken</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga-ken</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa-ken</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-ken</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka-fu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima-ken</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo-fu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)

16*JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)*
The migration of a particular occupational group from the same neighbourhood concentrated in a particular year. For example, as Table 1-9 shows, a group of shipwrights migrated from Kumamoto in 1912 and from Hiroshima in 1914, a group of carpenters migrated from Nagasaki in 1912 and from Osaka in 1914. Likewise, sawyers from Kumamoto in 1912 and fishermen from Kanagawa in 1914.

Table 1-9. Relation between birth places and occupation from 1901 to 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>birth places</th>
<th>shipwrights</th>
<th>carpenters</th>
<th>sawyers</th>
<th>traders</th>
<th>fishermen</th>
<th>planters</th>
<th>other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by ken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Fukushima</td>
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<td>Aichi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Intermarriages are another major characteristic: 18 cases can be confirmed (Table I-10). In all cases Japanese males married local females. At the time of writing this thesis, there are about 200 mixed-race offspring, including second and third generation (Table I-11).

Table I-10. List of the Japanese who married Papua New Guinean females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Japanese</th>
<th>Date of birth/migration/marriage</th>
<th>Occupation*</th>
<th>Birth place of wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arata Gunkichi</td>
<td>1877/1916/n.a.</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asanuma Ichimatsu</td>
<td>1883/1917/1933</td>
<td>mechanic</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endō Shigetaro</td>
<td>1892/1913/1931</td>
<td>shipwright</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagiwara Hikota</td>
<td>1892/1913/1934</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeshi Tokuyoshi</td>
<td>1891/1913/1932</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izumi Eikichi</td>
<td>1894/1914/1930</td>
<td>shipwright</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawamura**</td>
<td>n.a./before 1921/1921</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuchi Ichisuke</td>
<td>1892/1918/1930</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>West New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura Hidechihiro</td>
<td>1897/1916/1939</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koto Jimmy</td>
<td>n.a./before 1900/1900</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murakami Heijiro</td>
<td>1877/1901/1918</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakamura Sōshichi</td>
<td>1902/1917/1932</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>West New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakane**</td>
<td>n.a./before 1924/1924</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasaki Hikokichi</td>
<td>1893/1917/1936</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>Madang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabuchi Yoshimatsu</td>
<td>1899/1917/1925</td>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamiya Mabe</td>
<td>n.a./before 1910/1910</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanaka Taichirō</td>
<td>1875/1902/1906</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yamashita Shichinosuke</td>
<td>1903/1913/1920</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.: no data available
*At the time of marriage
**Their first names are unknown.

Source: JDR 3.8.5.8; AA, A367 C72533-C72588, A373/1 11505/48, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533; Admission 1901-63 (boys and girls), Vunapope Catholic Mission School; oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG.
Table I-11. The number of mixed-race descendants (exclude the deceased) by birth places

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>3rd generation</th>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>East New Britain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Britain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>209</td>
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</table>

Source: oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG

5. Defining the South Seas

Modern Japanese perceptions of the 'South' date back to the early 15th century when a new geographical term nanban (the South), which meant mainly the Southeast Asian region, was added to the traditional Japanese idea of the world hitherto restricted to Nippon, Kara (China), and Tenjiku (India). In the Meiji period (1868-1912), the Japanese perception of the South extended to the Southwest Pacific centred on Micronesia and a new term 'nan'yō' was created. The term 'nan'yō' is elusive in Japanese literature. It can include all South Pacific islands but it can also include Southeast Asia. Also in English literature, as Peattie points out, it is ill-defined. In this thesis, I define nan'yō as a region that contains islands in Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and Southeast Asia, and I use it with flexibility according to the context.

Map 2. Papua New Guinea
Chapter 1. Exploration, 1890-1901

Introduction

From the mid-1880s, European entrepreneurs operating mines and plantations 'tapped the long-established Asian labour market' to overcome the shortage of labour supplies from Melanesia. Among the Asian workers were Japanese, most of whom were brought to mines and plantations as labourers, and some were recruited for shell-fishing in Torres Strait as skilled divers and tenders. The latter are generally known as pearl divers on Thursday Island. In the 1890s they began to dominate the pearl industry and provoked anti-Japanese feeling from their European counterparts. As a result, Australians restricted Japanese migration. In addition, the exhaustion of shell beds encouraged the Japanese search for an alternative location for shell-fishing and settlement.

An adventurous and energetic Japanese skipper, Isokichi Komine, began to explore the waters of New Guinea in the 1890s. His exploration took place from the Japanese settlement on Thursday Island. After a series of voyages to new beds and a place to settle, Komine eventually reached East New Britain in German New Guinea in 1901 and there he ushered in a period of Japanese migration.

1. Japanese interest in the South Seas

Policy

Until the late 19th century the Japanese government had no policies towards the South Seas. The government was preoccupied with domestic affairs, while Germany, the United States (US), Australia, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Britain were involved in the acquisition and exchange of tropical islands. The government's primary concern was to centralise governance in order to build a strong empire which could not be colonised. External affairs were secondary concerns, in which the government was mainly preoccupied with the removal of unequal treaties imposed by western nations and the promotion of national prestige. Although Japan's expansionism was shown in the 1870s in Saigō Takamori's claim to invade Korea, Ōkubo Toshimichi's decision to send a military expedition to Taiwan and the government's declaration that the Ryūkyū Islands and Sakhalin were parts of Japan, they were limited to East Asia. As a result, the government's

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involvement in South Seas affairs was marginal and largely confined to matters of national prestige and the rights of citizens abroad.

Japan's first involvement in the South Seas was an embarrassing episode involving emigrants to Guam. In 1868, about 40 Japanese emigrated as contract labourers to work on a plantation, where a Spanish employer treated them harshly. The Japanese were treated no differently from locals and the employer did not pay their promised wages in full. Their complaint to a Spanish administrator was ignored. In 1871, after some had died due to harsh work conditions, three managed to return to Japan to report their plight. The government was astonished and the matter was discussed, but it is unknown whether they took any action to save these migrants or protested to the Spanish administration. In 1868, 153 contract labourers in Hawaii suffered a similar experience. These incidents embarrassed the government which was acutely sensitive about its national dignity, but probably the government, which was just managing to survive by pacifying rebels, chose not to protest in order to avoid conflicts that it could not handle confidently. The government could only ban emigration by enforcing tight regulations to avoid further national 'disgrace'.

However, the issue of sovereignty over the Ogasawara (also known as Bonin) Islands provided an opportunity to stimulate Japanese interest in the South Seas. Although the Tokugawa government hardly resisted when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of Japan and proclaimed US possession of the Ogasawara Islands in 1853, some vocal Meiji officials in 1875 'emphasised the urgency of return of the islands that could connect Japanese interests to the South Seas'. The report of the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister explained that 'the islands were a strategic point in the Pacific sea route, which was extremely important in Japan's advancement in the South Sea'. Then negotiations began and the US compromised. The islands would be returned to Japan because the US considered that strong Japan would counter the expansion of Russia and Britain in East Asia. The issue signalled the beginning of the government's awareness of its interests in the South Seas. It was also significant in that the government promoted national dignity by recovering territory. However, it also demonstrated Japan's subordinate position in international affairs, since the outcome of this territorial claim was dependent on other powers' strategies.

As the incidents in Guam and Hawaii showed, the government was aware of its weak international position and tried not to provoke other western nations in the South Seas until the 1880s. Such a naive posture was typified when a Japanese sailor was murdered by local people on Lae Island in the Marshals in 1884. The government sent Suzuki Tsuneteru and Gotō Takeitarō (both prominent nanshin-ron advocates) to investigate. They found the

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3 Irie Toraji, 1943, *Meiji nanshin shi kō* [A short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era], Ida shoten, Tokyo, p.p.10-16
4 Ibid., p.32
5 Ibid., p.34
murderers and reached a settlement with a local chieftain on condition that the chieftain would apologise and allow a Japanese flag to be raised on the island. However, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru rebuked Suzuki and Gotō, explaining that raising a flag on the island would provoke displeasure from other western powers. Suzuki was sent back to the island to lower the flag.7

The government's prudent attitude began to change when Enomoto Takeaki, a diplomat posted in Russia, advocated Japanese involvement in the South Seas. He was the first government official to draft a blueprint for Japan's territorial expansion and in 1877 proposed to colonise New Guinea. During his posting in Russia, he observed western powers competing for colonies all over the world and proposed to the Prime Minister, Iwakura Tomomi, that the government purchase the Mariana and Caroline Islands from Spain. The Japanese government would send officials to those islands from an office at Guam which would be a branch office of an administration centre in the Izu Islands (about 100 kilometres south of Tokyo). The colonists would plant kina (for quinine), tobacco and coffee, using convict labour. He then proposed to colonise Papua, New Guinea and the Solomons as a second step, and to acquire all small islands in the South Seas to make them bases for Japan's maritime enterprise that, he expected, would extend as far as India and Australia.8 He also proposed to purchase Borneo.9 However, his proposals were not accepted. The government could not address external affairs, being 'burdened with rising domestic problems'.10 The rebellions of peasants and anti-government former samurai were at their peak in the 1870s. In the nine months from July 1869, 98 rebellions occurred: most were organised peasants demanding the reduction of tax.11 In 1973, over 100,000 people (mostly peasants) uprose in the south-west Japan such as Okayama, Tottori, Shimane Hiroshima and Fukuoka.12 In 1876, the dissatisfaction of former samurai, who lost their privileges and became wage labourers under the new government, erupted. They also rebelled in the south-west (Kumamoto, Fukuoka and Yamaguchi), which led to the Seinan War (1877)—the last major samurai rebellion against the government. The government pacified the rebels quickly but the cost was enormous, which caused a severe inflation in the next decade.

After the centralisation of the governance was achieved with the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, the government began to probe for opportunities to expand its territory. Although the major concern was East Asia where Japan had to fend off Russian expansion for its own security, and the acquisition of territories looked possible, the government also pursued interests in the South Seas under Enomoto's initiatives when he

7Yano Tōru, 1979, Nihon no nan'yō shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas], Chūōkōron sha, Tokyo, p.36
8Enomoto Takeaki Monjo 6-13 shi 1877
9Ueno Hisashi, 1983, 'Enomoto shokumin-chi' no hikari to kage [The light and darkness of 'Enomoto Colony]', Nakayama Yukio (ed.), Gendai shiten sengoku bakumatsu no gunzō Enomoto Takeaki [Contemporary view, protagonists in at the Civil Wars era and the end of Edo era], Ōbun sha, Tokyo, p.129
10Irie., op.cit., p.37
12Ibid., p.55
was appointed Foreign Minister from May 1891 to August 1892. During his term of office, he established the Emigration Section in order 'to send Japanese to the South Seas to expand maritime enterprise and commercial interests and also to solve Japan's overpopulation problem'. He also introduced the bill that enabled the government to send teams to investigate destinations for emigration. From 1891 to 1894, teams visited New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Fiji, the Philippines, Australia, Malaya and Thailand. He also played a pioneering role in stimulating intellectuals. He established the Tokyo Geographic Society (Tokyo chigaku kyōkai) in 1879 and Colonisation Society (Shokumin kyōkai) in 1893. Both Societies published journals and urged that Japanese take an interest in the region. The members of the Societies included leading nanshin-ron advocates such as Inagaki Manjirō, Taguchi Ukichi, Shiga Shigetaka and others. However, victory in the Sino-Japanese War distracted the government's attention from the South Seas, and the Enomoto's initiatives did not develop into consistent policies towards the South Seas.

Trade

Japanese trade with the South Seas was small compared with that with other areas such as China or North America. The trade figures of Micronesia were so minuscule that they did not appear in Japanese statistics. Those of Southeast Asia and Australia were similarly small, although they increased rapidly. Exports to Australia increased from 0.1 million yen in 1880 to 2.5 million in 1900 and imports from 0.03 million yen to 2.4 million. Although sufficient data on Southeast Asia are not available, exports to India and Thailand were 0.1 million yen in 1880 and imports were 1.7 million, while in 1900 exports to French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and Dutch East Indies were 16.3 million yen and imports were 10.9 million. The proportion of trade with Southeast Asia and Australia in overall Japanese trade increased from 0.2 percent in 1880 to 3.5 percent in 1900.

The development of the South Seas trade owed much to individual traders, and little to government. Taguchi, a practical nanshin-ron advocate, initiated the trade with Micronesia. He established the Nantō Shōkai (South Islands Company) in 1890 and asserted that:

There are many who insist on profits from trading with the South Seas. However, none of their opinions are convincing. The reason I established the Nantō Shōkai is that advocates of South Seas trade lack practice.
Although Taguchi's company was short-lived; it was liquidated in 1892 upon his return from the first trip to Micronesia. But its impact was considerable. It initiated a rush to establish small trading companies by other nanshin-ron advocates in the 1890s. In 1892 Omida Toshiyoshi bought Taguchi's company and established the Ichiya Shōkai (Ichiya Company), which was amalgamated to become the Nan'yō Bōeki Hiki Gōshi Kaisha (The South Seas Trade Hiki Company) in 1893. At the same time, Yokoo Tōsaku, a leading nanshin-ron advocate, established the Kōshin-sha (Kōshin Company) with strong encouragement from Enomoto. Previously Yokoo had unsuccessfully advocated the establishment of Nan'yō Kōkai (the South Seas Society) in 1885 to promote Japan's involvement there. Thus, Micronesia provided a testing field for nanshin-ron advocates to put their ideas into practice, although the scale was very limited.

Larger-scale trade relations developed with Southeast Asia and Australia. As in Micronesia, the development of the trade owed much to individuals. However, in contrast to the Japan-Micronesia trade, most traders in Southeast Asia were not nanshin-ron advocates but petty traders who worked in partnership with karayuki-san (Japanese prostitutes overseas). Their main business activities was to sell Japanese-made miscellaneous goods to karayuki-san who spearheaded Japanese presence mainly at Singapore. Similarly, Japan-Australia trade was developed not by nanshin-ron advocates: a 'determined' trader, Kanematsu Fusajirō, pioneered the Australian trade, foreseeing a potential in importing wool. He was an executive of the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (Osaka Trade Company) and of the Osaka Nippō (The Daily Osaka). He established the Kanematsu Shōten (Kanematsu Company) at Kobe in 1889 and went to Sydney in the following year to engage in trade.

Emigration

Like trade relations, Japanese migration to the South Seas was small in scale. The number of migrants to South Pacific Islands, Australia and Southeast Asia, mainly as labourers, was much smaller than to Hawaii, Peru, Brazil and Mexico in the same period. The number going to the South Seas can be counted by hundreds whereas the numbers to other areas exceeded 10,000. The small scale can be attributed to the limited land size and economic activities in the South Pacific Islands, migration restriction in Australia, and the availability of a cheap local work force in Southeast Asia. The migration was also short-lived because most ended in failure due to unexpected harsh treatment by employers and the hostile tropical environment to which the migrants were not accustomed.

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19) His company was liquidated in 1892 upon his return from the first trip to Micronesia.
20) Irie, op.cit., p.73; Ōgimi, Asanori, 1937, Nantō gunto an'nai [Guide to the South Seas Islands], Kaigai kenkyū sho, Tokyo, p.10
21) Yano Tōru, 1975, 'Nanshin' no keifu [The Genealogy of 'southward advance'], Chūkōron sha, Tokyo, p.81
22) Frei, Henry, 1991, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p.57
23) Irie, op.cit., p.94
Systematic migration to the South Pacific and Australia started from the 1880s. The Japanese migrated to Thursday Island, sugar cane fields in Queensland and Fiji, and to a mine in New Caledonia. Most migrants were *keiyaku imin* (contract emigrants) who were recruited by European brokers or by Japanese emigration companies to work for European employers. The only exceptions were the majority of Japanese on Thursday Island, who were *jiyū imin* (free emigrants) and engaged in shell-fishing.

The migration to Thursday Island began when an Englishman, John Miller, recruited 37 Japanese in 1883. They were the first migrants with endorsement from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, in 1888, one hundred Japanese peasants were recruited as labourers for work on a sugar cane plantation in Queensland. In 1891, the first Japanese emigration company, the Yoshisa Imin Kaisha (Yoshisa Emigration Company), was established by Yoshikawa Taijirō and Sakuma Sadakazu. Yoshikawa was president of Nippon Yūsen Kaisha (Japan Mail Steamship Company) and Sakuma a well-known businessman with many strong connections with industrialists. The company played a central role in sending Japanese to the South Pacific Islands and Australia, but it neglected to investigate the work conditions, which was disastrous for the migrants going to Fiji and constituted one of the reasons for the discontinuance of South Seas migration. In 1892, the company sent six hundred migrants to New Caledonia as labourers in a nickel mine. The migrants complained to the company that their work conditions were too harsh and their wages were lower than those of local labourers, but most completed their five-year contract. However, a disaster occurred when the company sent 305 migrants to Fiji on the request of Burns Philp in 1894. 111 migrants died due to beriberi, dysentery and tropical fever.

The end of the migration was also attributable to restriction by the Queensland government in the late 1890s. By that time, the Japanese population on Thursday Island had grown rapidly. In 1891 only 12 arrived, but 100 arrived in 1892 and 264 in 1893, and the population reached 376 by the end of 1893 and increased to 1,500 by 1897. The Japanese worked diligently and dominated the shell-fishing industry. Inevitably, they threatened their European counterparts in the industry and eventually led the Queensland government to legislate to restrict Japanese migration.

In response, the Japanese government proved to be compliant, and spontaneously stopped the emigration to Queensland in 1897. Nevertheless the Queensland government continued to tighten restrictions. In 1898 it banned Japanese ownership of fishing boats for pearl and bêche-de-mer fishing. Finally, the enforcement of the Immigration Restriction

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25 Imano Toshihiko and Fujisaki Yasuo, 1985, *Imin shi II: ajia oceania hen* [History of emigration II: Asia and Oceania], Shinsen sha, Tokyo, p.239
26 Irie Toraji, 1938, *Hōjin kaigai hatten shi* [History of Japanese overseas development], Vol.1, Ida shoten, Tokyo, p.p.102-103
27 Irie, 1943, op.cit., p.127
28 Ibid., p.130
29 Ibid., p.135
30 Ibid., p.399; Hattori Tōru, 1894, *Nankyū no shin shokumin* [A new colony in the southern hemisphere], Hakubun sha, Tokyo, p.p.18-19
31 Sissons, David, 1977, 'The Early Japanese Influence on the Northern Territory', *Northern Territory Newsletter*, November, Department of the Northern Territory, Darwin, p.19
Act of 1902 by the Commonwealth of Australia virtually shut the door on further Japanese migration. It was the entrenchment of the White Australia Policy by which Australians aimed to establish their nation free from coloured race. The Act included a notorious dictation test which was devised to refuse non-English speaking people, mainly Asians.

Meanwhile, sporadic migration proceeded to Southeast Asia but largely failed. Nanshin-ron advocates, Iwamoto Chitsuna and Ishibashi Usaburo, established the Shamu Shokumin Kaisha (Thailand Colonisation Company) and sent about 50 peasants there as agricultural labourers in 1895. Their venture failed because the company did not pay the promised wages and the migrants cancelled the contract. Many of them went to work in a nearby mine where most got sick and died. In 1896, Ishihara Tetsunosuke, a wealthy landlord from Aichi prefecture, sent about 30 peasants to British Malaya as agricultural migrants, after reading promising reports about migration to the western coast of Malaya in Shokumin Kyokai Hokoku (Colonisation Society Report). This migration also failed due to harsh work conditions and a series of heavy floods. The migration of karayuki-san shows a striking contrast. It is estimated that nearly 1,000 karayuki-san were engaged in prostitution in Singapore alone by 1900 and Japanese and Chinese entrepreneurs exploited them.

Ideology

Some intellectuals began to show an interest in the South Seas from the late 1880s, although the concept of the South Seas was not new and goes back to Toyotomi Hideyoshi's plan to invade southern China in the 16th century. The major characteristic of nanshin-ron in this period was their non-militarist approach and the assertion of free trade, reflecting Japan's vulnerable international position. Japan wanted to remove unequal treaties, avoiding direct conflict with western nations because it lacked economic and military strength.

Enomoto's plan to develop colonies in the South Seas was a typical example. Kamo argues that 'Enomoto's attempt to purchase South Seas islands from Spain did not come from imperialistic intention, but from the situation that Japan had to develop its international trade and maritime enterprise [in order to develop its economy]. Similarly, Tsunoyama claims that Enomoto thought that territorial problems among colonial powers should be solved peacefully; Japan should seek colonies where there were few problems, and should assist the economic development of the colonies through development of natural resources and trade links with Japan. Territorial expansion in Enomoto's view did

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32Irie, 1943, op.cit., p.p.137-156
33A journal of Enomoto's Colonisation Society
34Hara Fujio, 1987, Wasurereta nam'yö imin: Malaya tokô nihon-jin nômin no kiseki [Forgotten South Seas migrants: the footprint of the migration of Japanese farmers to Malaya], Ajia keizai kenkyû-sho, Tokyo, p.p.64-87
36Kamo Giichi, 1988, Enomoto Takeaki, Chûôkôronsha, Tokyo, p.p.494-495
not mean colonisation by invading other countries but the purchase of undeveloped areas and the investment of capital for development.\(^37\)

Enomoto’s idea of peaceful maritime-oriented colonisation was articulated in the prospectus of the Colonisation Society in 1893:

1. The way to prevent over-population in our nation is to promote emigration and colonisation today.
2. Japanese topography, which is surrounded by the sea on its four sides, makes sea transport so useful and it also helps to promote emigration and colonisation.
3. In order to gain our nation’s maritime right, we have to expand our sea routes.
4. If colonisation proceeds, the demand for our goods will increase from colonists as well as foreigners and thereby it will greatly promote our commerce.
5. The heart of our people has been dispirited because of the seclusion policy for many years. Colonisation will greatly uplift our spirits against the outside world, widen our view, and help import new knowledge, and thereby it is an urgent task for pursuing our open policy that should change the minds of our people.\(^38\)

Largely coinciding with Enomoto’s term in the Foreign Ministry and the return of his investigation teams, other intellectuals also began to express an interest. The publications by leading *nanshin-ron* advocates were concentrated from the late 1880s to the early 1890s. Some were also products of the Imperial Navy’s training voyages which started in 1875. The voyages carried civilians, some of whom became *nanshin-ron* advocates such as Shiga and Yokoo.\(^39\)

Like Enomoto, most *nanshin-ron* advocates asserted the need to promote Japanese mercantile activities in the South Seas. For example, Shiga, in *Nan’yō jiji* [Current Affairs in the South Seas], emphasised the promotion of trade, introducing Australia as a favourable trade partner and writing five chapters out of eighteen about Japan-Australia trade and Australia.\(^40\) Similarly, Hattori Tōru concluded in *Nihon no nan’yō* [Japan's South Seas] that ‘Japan can enjoy great benefit from the South Seas through developing an economic relationship’.\(^41\) Suzuki was more idealistic, stating that the purposes of Japan’s expansion was to assist the independence of the islands and to raise the national prestige of Japan.\(^42\) Taguchi, a prominent liberal economist, pointed out the example of the benefits derived from Japanese migrants in Hawaii, and emphasised that the development of a mercantile fleet was a key to promoting trade and emigration.\(^43\) Suganuma Teifū was one of few advocates who introduced a militaristic aspect. In *Shin nihon no tonan no yume* [Dream of new Japan’s expansion to southern lands] written in 1888 but published in 1940, he predicted an easy victory over western colonial powers in the South Seas, comparing

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\(^{37}\) Tsunoyama Yukihiro, 1986, *Enomoto Takeaki to Mekishiko ijū* [Takeaki Enomoto and immigration to Mexico], Dōbun-kan, Tokyo, p.9

\(^{38}\) Shokumin kyōkai [Colonisation Society], *Shokumin jihō* [Colonisation Times], 1901, Vol.85, Tokyo, p.p.1-2 [1-2]

\(^{39}\) Yano, 1979, op.cit., p.14

\(^{40}\) Shiga Shigetaka, 1887, *Nan’yō jiji* [Current Affairs in the South Seas], in 1927, *Shiga Shigetaka zenshū* [the complete works of Shigetaka Shiga], Vol.3, Shiga Shigetaka zenshū-kankō-ka, Tokyo, p.p.1-111

\(^{41}\) Hattori Tōru, 1888, *Nihon no Nan’yō* [Japan’s South Seas], Nan’yō-dō, Tokyo, p.158

\(^{42}\) Inoue Hikosaburō and Suzuki Tsuneteru, 1893, *Nantō junkō ki* [Record of a cruise in the southern islands], Keizai zasshi sha, Tokyo, p.253

\(^{43}\) Taguchi Ukichi, 1890, *Nan’yō keiryaku ron* [How to expand into the South Seas], *Tokyo keizai zasshi* [Tokyo economic journal], Vol.21, No.513, Tokyo, p.p.351-353
Japanese military strength with that of western powers. He also argued that the seizure of the islands would demonstrate Japan's superior naval power.44

However, *nanshin-ron* in the late 19th century was never an influential ideology. None of the advocates were graduates of the Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial University and were then hardly recognised in the academic circle.45 Nor did they (except for Enomoto) hold positions in the government. The number of publications about the South Seas was small: only 17 books and articles were published from 1868 to 1901, compared to hundreds of those about East Asia.46 Moreover, the publications of the leading *nanshin-ron* advocates were mostly personal recollections like Shiga's short accounts, Taguchi's brief essay, Suzuki's three books on his trips, Suganuma's draft which nobody heeded at the time of writing. These works were unjustly overvalued by *nanshin-ron* advocates of a later period, particularly from the late 1930s to the early 1940s to justify Japanese aggression in the South Seas.47

2. Japanese perceptions of New Guinea

From the 1880s, intellectuals intermittently introduced Japanese readers to both German and British New Guinea and contributed to creating perceptions. However, New Guinea was always an appendix to their central interest in other places such as Micronesia and Australia. Descriptions of New Guinea were mostly brief and some were simply translated from western sources. Probably few people except *nanshin-ron* advocates, the South Seas traders and agents of emigration companies could find it on a map. In general, New Guineas was described as a tropical land of cannibals, that was colonised by western nations.

In the 1880s *nanshin-ron* advocates described the nature and the people of New Guinea mainly to suggest Japanese colonisation. That indicates that New Guinea was already embraced in an overall framework of *nanshin*. For example, Sasaki Taketsuna, a member of Enomoto's Tokyo Geographic Society, emphasised the necessity of acquiring New Guinea:

> Life [in New Guinea] is not so difficult, as the climate is of the best kind and there is a sufficient supply of food. The only problem is sometimes we have attacks from natives. The islands [of New Guinea] are located at a distance of only a 10 day-

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44 Suganuma Teifū, 1940, 'Shin nihon no tonan to yume' [Dream of new Japan's expansion to southern lands], *Dai nihon shōgyōshi* [Commercial history of Great Japan], Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, p.p.657-659

45 Yano, 1979, op.cit., p.65


47 Yano, 1979, op.cit., p.p.57-58
voyage from Japan. It is to our advantage to gain these islands both from a strategic and a commercial point of view. Today is the opportunity to acquire these islands.48

Yokoo also urged Japanese colonisation of South Seas islands. In 1887, he returned from an exploration voyage on the Meiji Maru. He reported that Germany and Spain had shrewdly acquired New Guinea and the Philippines respectively, and suggested that Japan should urgently acquire other islands.49

In the same year, Shiga mentioned German New Guinea. He briefly described the 'extremely hot climate and violent natives in the Admiralty Islands, New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons'.50 Although Shiga did not refer to colonisation, he might have aroused public awareness of German New Guinea, as his description was in his best-selling book, Nan'yuō jiji which 'sparked a boom' in public interest in the South Seas.51 He wrote it after a ten-month cruise on a naval training ship, Tsukuba, as a civilian passenger cruising the Carolines, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa and Hawaii.

The statement of Tsuneya Seifuku, a prominent economist and advocate of emigration, is a typical example showing a stereotyped image of New Guineans as an inferior and savage race. Although he never visited New Guinea, he wrote in Kaigai Shokumin-ron [Overseas colonisation theory] of 1891:

Natives do not know the way to establish trade relationships and they have a ferocious nature. They like fighting and find the best pleasure in killing enemies and eating the enemy's flesh.52

In the 1890s, the resentment of the nanshin-ron advocates that Japan had missed out in acquiring territories subsided, but a realistic assessment of the German monopoly of commerce emerged. Tomiyama Komakichi brought first-hand information about German rule in New Guinea. As a member of the Colonisation Society and of the investigation team to New Caledonia, he was on board a navy training ship, Hiei, that visited Kokopo in New Britain for a week in 1891 on the way to New Caledonia, and in 1892 on the way back.53 He reported on the colonial administration, the population, and how the New Guinea Company dominated commerce and sold coal to his ship for an extortionate price. He also reported that a German administrator had expressed his concern about the Japanese intention of colonising the South Seas.54 Interestingly, he also alluded to the possibility of Japanese migration in New Guinea in ancient days:

According to a scholar who wrote a book about the South Seas, he dug out Japanese swords, bows and arrows in some place in New Guinea and he suggested the Japanese

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48Sasaki Taketsuna, 1881, 'Honpō oyobi nyūginia no kankei [The relation between Japan and New Guinea]', Tokyo chigaku kyōkai kōkoku [The Report of Tokyo Geographic Society], Vol.2, No.8, Tokyo chigaku kyōkai, Tokyo, p.402
49Asano shim bun [Asano Newspaper], 23 November 1887
50Shiga, op.cit., p.71
51Frei, op.cit., p.39
52Tsuneya Seifuku, 1891, Kaigai shokumin ron [Overseas colonisation theory], Hakubun sha, Tokyo, p.254
53Irie, 1943, op.cit., p.113; Tomiyama Komakichi, 1893a, 'Kōnan Nikki [The diary of the voyage to the South]', Shokumin kyōkai kōkoku [The report of the Colonisation Society], No.3, Shokumin kyōkai, Tokyo, p.110
54Irie, 1943, op.cit., p.113; Tomiyama Komakichi, 1893b, 'Kōnan Nikki [The diary of the voyage to the South]', Shokumin kyōkai kōkoku [The report of the Colonisation Society], No.6, Shokumin kyōkai, Tokyo, p.90
might have migrated there in ancient days. He also found native behaviour similar to that of Japanese.55 However, this has not been proved by any contemporary archaeologists. Hirose Takeo, a naval Sub-Lieutenant, was on the same ship and also commented on the high price of coal, in his Kōnan shiki [Personal record of a southern voyage].56

The Japanese saw British New Guinea as more accessible than German New Guinea because of its proximity to a thriving Japanese community on Thursday Island. They assessed the possibility of migration and mounting a shell-fishing operation from Thursday Island. Nakayama Katsuki, a member of Enomoto's Tokyo Geographic Society, was the first writer who introduced Port Moresby and neighbouring areas in Nyū ginia no moresubi kō oyobi kinbō no chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru kiji [Report on topography and natives of Port Moresby and neighbouring areas in New Guinea].57 Although it was simply a translation into Japanese of Octavius Stone's A few months in New Guinea (1880), it was published in the Society's journal. Three years later, Hattori, a leading nanshin-ron advocate, wrote about the possibility of Japanese migration from Queensland to Papua, pointing out the convenience of the established sea route from Australia to Port Moresby and New Guinea.58

Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on Thursday Island and also a member of the Colonisation Society, introduced the economy of British New Guinea in Toresu kaikyō tanken nikki [Diary of exploration in Torres Strait] which was published in the Society's journal in 1895.59 Tsuji reported the promising shell-fishing in British New Guinea waters but also warned of the danger of the operation due to rugged sea-beds which had already caused the death of some Japanese divers. He also pointed to the abundant bamboo and emphasised the potential for making huge profits in cane work.60 Thus, Japanese perceptions of New Guineas developed with a territorial desire in the 1880s and with practical assessments of commercial potential in the 1890s.

3. Australian and German perceptions of Japanese

Australians perceived Japanese with fear and racial prejudice. That was manifested in the eruption of strident statements about 'Yellow Peril' in the late 19th century. Although the 'Yellow Peril' had originally referred to Chinese migration in the mid-19th century, it was extended to the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) in which China and

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55Tomiyama, 1893a, p.110
56Hirose Takeo, 1904, Kōnan shiki [Personal record of a southern voyage], Shūei sha, Tokyo, p.60
57Nakayama Katsuki, 1881, 'Nyū, giniya no moresubi kō oyobi kinbō no chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru kiji [the article about Port Moresby in New Guinea and the geography and natives nearby], translation from A few Months in New Guinea by Octavius C. Stone, 1880, Tokyo chigaku kyōkai hōkoku [The Report of Tokyo Geographic Society], Vol.3, No.7, Tokyo chigaku kyōkai, Tokyo, p.p.41-69
58Hattori, op.cit., p.47
59Tsuji Ken'nosuke, 1895, Toresu kaikyō tanken nikki [Diary of exploration in Torres Strait], Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku [The Colonisation Society Report], No.30, Shokumin kyōkai, Tokyo, p.p.15-24
60Ibid., p.p.18-19
Japan fought over the territory in Korean peninsula. The war lasted about eight months and the Japanese forces, equipped with modern weapons, defeated the Chinese. The Japanese victory proved that Japan now possessed military strength sufficient to expand in Asia. After the war, the Shimonoseki Treaty was concluded. Japan gained Shantung Peninsula and Taiwan and China acknowledged that Korea was independent nation, and accepted treaties in trade, navigation and extraterritorial rights—all favourable for Japan. Japan practiced the precedents that western powers had done to Japan half a century ago. However, western powers were alerted by the Japanese expansion and intervened (generally known as the Tripartite Intervention). Russia, France and Germany advised Japan to give up Shantung Peninsula because it threatened the stability of East Asia, in exchange of additional indemnity from China. The Japanese government, which had spent a huge expenditure for the war by issuing public bonds, obliged to accept the advice.

Although the victory 'did not greatly influence Australian thought—Japan was added by some sections of thought to the list of possible threats and excluded by others [and] all Governments cut down the defence expenditures and the press in general concurred,' the alarm of the 'Yellow Peril' was intensified when the trade union movement in the 1890s 'adopted economic racism' to defend the interests of white labourers from the competition of non-whites. In Queensland particularly, anti-Japanese feeling was predominant in public opinion. A local newspaper, *The Settler and South Queensland Pioneer*, reported:

The Japanese are a menace to this colony....The Japanese is [sic] so patriotic that there is no room for European labourer, mechanics, or merchants; he ousts them all....The British Empire is not China; Thursday Island is not Port Arthur.63

There were more sympathetic and realistic views of the Japanese migrants, like that of Noel Burton, an official of the South Australian government, who denied that the Japanese were a threat to Australian labourers in north Queensland. He insisted:

There is needless alarm about the Japanese flooding the country. Their numbers are greatly over-estimated. Only about 1100 workers are on the sugar plantations and the Thursday Island Government Resident says that they do not increase....Most of them are doing work which Europeans would not do. Whether in pearl-fishing or sugar work, they are competing with other coloured labour.64

However, the fierce competition in the pearl industry due to the increased tempo of Japanese arrivals at Thursday Island and the exhaustion of beds provoked the Queensland Government to pass laws which tightly restricted Japanese influence. The Pearl Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery Act (1898) aimed at stopping Japanese domination of the industry by limiting licences to British subjects only. The Aborigines' Protection Act Amendment Act (1899) virtually prohibited Japanese fishing operators from employing local labourers. Moreover, the Sugar Works Guarantee Act Amendment Act (1900) which guaranteed the

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63 *The Settler and South Queensland Pioneer*, 15 May 1897, in JDR, 3.8.2.33
64 *Bulletin*, 8 October 1896, ibid.
government's preferential treatment of sugar mills which employed only white labourers prevented the industry from employing non-white workers.65

The legislation of those acts were also reflected Australian attempts to set their 'white' boundary. North Queensland and Torres Strait was a melting pot of various races—Asians, Pacific Islanders, Torres Strait Islanders and Australian Aborigines, and was a periphery to the Australians who were attempting to establish a white nation in the Far South. As Denoon argues, the officials in Brisbane and Melbourne viewed this area 'in the light of the aspiration to achieve a 'white Australia', devising fresh techniques of social control for problems quite unlike those of the rest of the continent'.66 The laws against the Japanese were part of the techniques. Similarly Australians legislated laws against other non-Australian races: the Aboriginals and Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act of 1897 'not merely to segregate black from white Australians, but to isolate both from Asian influence'67 and the Pacific island labourers Act of 1901 to protect white workers in sugar industry from competition from islander labourers. Finally the Commonwealth of Australia enacted the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, and placed its northern periphery under the 'White Australia'.

In contrast, German officials showed little hostility. The Annual Reports recorded frequent appearances of Japanese boats in New Guinea. In 1893 seven Japanese sailing boats (three to Herbertshöhe, one to Matupi, and three to Nusa) were reported.68 The Germans were also aware of some Japanese in New Guinea. In the 1891-93 period, although exact numbers are unknown, 'twenty-six of Chinese, Japanese or unknown origin with three women and six children' were identified in Kaiser Wilhelmsland.69 German accounts showed little anxiety. This indifference was probably due to the smaller number and the much smaller scale of economic activity of the Japanese than their counterparts in Queensland and the absence of a white working class. The Japanese presence in German territory was too inconspicuous for the Germans to form any perceptions.

4. From Thursday Island to New Guinea

From the mid-1890s, over-exploitation of shell-fishing became a serious problem to Japanese operators on Thursday Island. A Japanese consul at Townsville reported pessimistically:

The pearl industry—the only industry to collect marine products on Thursday island—has so far lasted for twenty years. As a result, most beds around the Island

66Denoon, Donald, 'The Boundaries of Australian Cultural Studies', unpublished
67Ibid., p.3
68Sack, Peter and Clark, Dymphna (eds. and translation), 1979, German New Guinea: The Annual Reports, Australian University Press, Canberra, p.84
69Ibid., p.83
were fished out and these days divers have to dive in difficult spots as deep as thirty to thirty five fathoms.70

Some enterprising Japanese began to search for an alternative location for shell-fishing and settlement in New Guinea. Among them was Komine Isokichi. Komine was born in Shimabara in Kyūshū in 1866, the ninth child of a peasant, Komine Hisazaemon.71 At the age of sixteen, Komine went to Korea to be employed by a trade company, Fukushima-ya (Fukushima Company), which sold goods to the Japanese navy stationed there. According to Captain Kamijō Fukashi, during his employment in Korea, Komine revealed his stout hearted character and was liked by the navy officers.72 Kamijō’s statement should be treated with caution as his book has a strong tone of wartime propaganda. It is likely, however, that Komine learned about the South Seas and the high wages of divers on Thursday Island from navy officers.

In September 1890, he arrived at Thursday Island. Initially he was employed by an Englishman and spent two years on his boat. During this period, he went fishing as far as German New Guinea and made a very good catch of shell. Probably the good catch brought him sufficient capital to stimulate his spirit of enterprise. In 1892, he discussed with other Japanese on the islands, Matsuoka Kōichi and Okamura Hyakutsu-sūchi, a plan to establish a trading company to export marine products to Japan. They quickly agreed, and Matsuoka and Okamura returned to Japan to find associates in their venture—but in vain. Although the plan was aborted, Komine’s spirit did not subside. He learnt how to build a boat and built two shell-fishing boats with Taguchi Tastu-zō in 1892.73 Then his search for a new paradise began.

Until 1894 he was intermittently exploring the waters of New Guineas, occasionally returning to Thursday Island. Later he reported his explorations in *Shokumin Kyōkai Hōkoku*.74

I planned this South Seas exploration in 1890. On 14 September I departed Hong Kong and on 27 September arrived at Thursday Island in Australia. On 5 October I was employed by the Mogg Outlet Company owned by an English man and left Thursday Island [for shell-fishing] on 9 October. We sailed to the west, and until 2 January next year we collected shell in the water over an area of about seventy square miles and we caught a huge quantity of shell. From 8 January of the same year we sailed to the northeast and stayed in northern New Guinea for a few weeks for shell fishing and exploring for other marine products. Then, on 2 February we returned to Thursday Island....From 5 to 26 July 1892, I went searching for pearl shell with my employer to Motu Motu Island which is located on the coast of central British New Guinea....From February 1893 I was engaged in shell fishing as well as other various explorations for one year between Thursday Island and New Guinea....In October 1894, we explored the water 130 miles toward Dutch New Guinea from the British
New Guinea. However, these waters were so shallow that sailing was not easy. We returned to Thursday Island, but it took us three weeks.

In November 1894 he made another exploration. This time he explored the Fly River 50 miles upstream.\textsuperscript{75} Also this time he was with Tsuji, a member of the Colonisation Society and an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on Thursday Island.\textsuperscript{76} Interestingly, Tsuji joined the Colonisation Society in 1894 with the introduction of Tsuneya who commented on New Guineans in his book (see above).\textsuperscript{77} Even more interestingly, just before he came to Thursday island he had met Matsuoka, who was in Japan to find associates for the company that Komine planned to establish. At his encounter with Matsuoka, Tsuji suggested that they establish a deep-sea fishery company together, but the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War caused them to give up the plan. Then Tsuji decided to do something himself and came to Thursday Island.\textsuperscript{78}

Tsuji met Komine on the island on 9 November 1894. Only six days later, they went exploring. They sailed first to Lebrun, a small island in the Engineer Group in British New Guinea, and camped there for a week, then returned to Thursday Island.\textsuperscript{79} The following year, they made another expedition to Torres Strait and British New Guinea.\textsuperscript{80} Tsuji was excited by these explorations and reported them in the journal of the Colonisation Society, in terms which were ‘thrilling and made the blood boil.’\textsuperscript{81} This encounter with Tsuji was significant because it acquainted Komine with \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates. After the voyage, he joined the Association on Tsuji’s introduction in 1895. More significantly, he was introduced to Enomoto. Tsuji wrote to Enomoto about Komine.

The owner of the shell-fishing boat, \textit{Shishi}, I got on is from Nagasaki and one of the most competent divers. His name is Isokichi Komine. This person has a nationalistic ideology with a strong interest in fishery and agriculture. He is a promising person for the future.\textsuperscript{82}

It was an unexpected but lucky turning point in Komine’s life. A mere pearl diver from the poor countryside had a chance to be acquainted with Tokyo intellectuals and even with the Foreign Minister. Probably Komine was thrilled to realise that he was practising the ideas of the \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates, and this possibly gave him a sense of national mission in his business venture. Although his piece in the journal was merely an account of the conditions of shell-fishing and his explorations, and had no \textit{nanshin-ron}-like statements such as Japan’s need to develop economic links with the South Seas, most likely Komine became aware that his desire to make a fortune in the South Seas was compatible with the ideology of Tokyo-based intellectuals.

After the exploration with Komine, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea as a possible migration destination and the two decided to establish Nichi-gō Boeki Kaisha

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., p.87
\textsuperscript{76}Shokumin kyōkai, 1894b, \textit{Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku} [The Colonisation Society Report], No.17, Tokyo, p.69
\textsuperscript{77}Shokumin kyōkai, 1894a, \textit{Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku} [The Colonisation Society Report], No.14, Tokyo, p.89
\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., p.69
\textsuperscript{79}Komine, op.cit., p.86
\textsuperscript{80}Tsuji, op.cit., p.15
\textsuperscript{81}Irie, 1938, op.cit., p.402
\textsuperscript{82}Irie, 1943, op.cit., p.p.182-183
[Japan-Australia Trade Company] to promote Japanese migration to British New Guinea after the purchase of land and to develop trade between Japan and Australia specialising in marine products from the Torres Strait.\(^{83}\) Tsuji approached the British New Guinea administration over the purchase of land. In December 1895 he managed a half day talk with Governor Sir William MacGregor on the possibility of transferring land to Japanese settlers. However, evidently Tsuji's request did not get a favourable response, because MacGregor's major concern in land policy was to protect the interests of Papuans from aliens\(^{84}\) and he adopted the same migration policy as in Queensland. Consequently the company did not get off the ground, although Tsuji and Komine won Japanese investors.\(^{85}\)

Nevertheless the move to acquire land in British New Guinea was continued by Ogirima Gonzaemon, a general manager of the Kōsei Emigration Company. This attempt also failed. On 11 May 1900, Ogirima asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry for permission to expand emigration to New Guinea, saying that the Company's agent, Satō Torajirō, who was also a leader of the Japanese community on Thursday Island, had discussed the possibility of a shell-fishing venture with a manager of Burns Philp and got an encouraging impression. Satō also met Lieutenant-Governor George Le Hunt of British New Guinea and elicited a favourable comment on Japanese emigration.\(^{86}\) The matter was discussed between Iijima Kametarō, the consul at Townsville, and Eitaki Hisakichi, the consul-general at Sydney. Eitaki wrote to Iijima after some investigation that he found that Le Hunt opposed migration and Burns Philp denied any possibility of involvement, although the premier of Queensland, Robert Philp, gave a rather favourable answer, saying that he was considering Japanese migration to British New Guinea but faced opposition from the Labor Party: perhaps about 450 Japanese could be sent to Samarai.\(^{87}\) Nevertheless, Iijima supported Ogirima's request and wrote a recommendation to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzo.\(^{88}\) But at the same time Iijima was concerned about unfavourable aspects. He also wrote to Sugimura Fukashi, the director of the Commerce Bureau, that the company's proposal was promoted mainly by Satō who was trying to retrieve his failure to introduce a batch of settlers to Thursday Island; if emigration became possible the Japanese government should advise the company to warn migrants of the high cost of living in New Guinea; and the government should avoid the scenario that migration would be prohibited due to European jealousy aroused by speculative Japanese migrants.\(^{89}\) In the event, Iijima's concerns soon became unnecessary as he found that Satō had made false statements about the responses from Le Hunt and Burns Philp and that the Queensland Government's refusal was based on the judgement that shell-fishing in New Guinea waters was too dangerous even for Japanese

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\(^{83}\) Shokumin kyōkai, 1896, *Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku* [The Colonisation Society Report], No.40, Tokyo, p.83


\(^{85}\) Iijima to Aoki, 5 May 1900, Japanese Diplomatic Record (hereafter JDR), 6.1.5.6-32

\(^{86}\) Ogirima to Aoki, 11 May 1900, JDR 3.8.2.67

\(^{87}\) Eitaki to Iijima, 30 August 1900, Ibid.

\(^{88}\) Iijima to Aoki, 3 September 1900, Ibid.

\(^{89}\) Iijima to Sugimura, 4 September 1900, Ibid.
As a result, Ogirima's plan did not materialise, and the Japanese who were being squeezed out of Queensland found no back-door to British New Guinea. In addition, Komine's application for naturalisation in Queensland was refused in 1898. Then, in 1901, Komine knocked on the door of German New Guinea.

5. Relevance to Japanese social history

The modernisation of Japan started with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 under the banner of *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the nation, strengthen the army) and the introduction of western capitalism and ideas. It coincided with rapid population growth, from approximately 33 million people in 1872 to 45 million in 1900 at an average five-yearly rate of nearly 10 percent. However, the government's economic policy impoverished the majority of the growing rural population. In 1873, the government executed the land tax reform (*chisokaisei*) in order to remove feudalistic restriction or the development of capitalism. Matsukata Masayoshi, who took the Finance Minister's office in 1881, rigorously carried out a deflation policy to counter the inflation caused by the over-supply of banknotes in order to fund the expenses of the Seinan War of 1877. Those policies replaced the payment of taxation in kind with payment in cash, and substantially increased the tax burden on tenant farmers. Many small farmers sold their land to pay their tax. Combined with poor harvests caused by floods and droughts, the economic conditions of the farmers deteriorated and forced them to make further sales of their land. As a result, impoverished farmers, with ex-*samurai* who did not receive the benefits from the new government, revolted and initiated a period of social instability from the 1870s to the end of the 1880s. The revolts were strong in rural areas which were largely excluded from the benefits of rapid modernisation that were enjoyed by urban elites in Tokyo and some other major urban centres, and by landlords in rural areas.

In addition to this social instability, the economic condition was one of the major 'push' factors to encourage many rural people to migrate to urban centres in Japan and even overseas. The birth places of the Japanese on Thursday Island confirm this pattern. In 1984, out of 346 Japanese, 254 came from Wakayama, 22 from Nagasaki and 15 from Hiroshima. Both Wakayama and Nagasaki lack flat land for rice cultivation, further limiting the opportunities of farmers to earn an income. A case study on Wakayama's emigration also shows that the rapid population increase, lack of arable land and low

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90Iijima to Kata, 29 October 1900, Ibid.
91Queensland State Archives, Home Secretary's Department, Inwards Correspondence, 1898/11159
92Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1929, *Meiji taishō kokusei sōran* [Comprehensive bibliography of the state of Japan in Meiji and Taishō periods], Tokyo, p.634
93Matsunaga Shōzō, 1976, 'Shakai mondai no hassei' [The occurrence of social problems], Asao, Naohiro et al (eds.), *Nihon rekishi 16 kindai 3* [Japanese history 16 modern era 3], Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, p.246
94Hattori, op.cit., p.p.20-21
income from fishing were main causes of overseas emigration. Another but older case study based on intensive interviews with returned migrants reinforces the importance of the economic motivation. As Iwasaki Kenkichi concludes the main motivations for emigration were stimulation by neighbours who made fortunes overseas and the tradition of emigration, the emigrants sought economic opportunities which would never have been attainable in their impoverished home villages. Their primary motivation was the high wages from shell-fishing on Thursday Island, probably compounded by the uncertainty and social instability of late 19th century in Japan.

6. Relevance to Australian colonial history

The development of a Japanese settlement on Thursday Island and the attempts of some Japanese to move to New Guinea illuminates the beginning of Japanese colonisation in the South Seas and provoked Australia's firm opposition. The Japanese on Thursday Island in the 1890s essentially differed from those who worked for European entrepreneurs as labourers in sugar cane fields or mines in Queensland and on South Seas Islands. Nor were they like traders who were scattered on the islands in Micronesia and Southeast Asia. Within limits they were allowed to have independent businesses. Some owned their own schooners and boats, employed local crews and remitted their profits to Japan. Some Japanese traders also purchased marine products (pearl shell, trochus shell and sea cucumber) and exported them. A typically colonial relationship thus developed: the Japanese exploited the resources using local labour.

Australians did not allow such Japanese masters to prosper in their territory. Racism based on their Anglo-Saxon supremacy was one reason, and the rising union movement was another. Northern Australia had to be under strict white control, and Australians devised a mechanism of control by legislating. However, despite this Australian mechanism, the Japanese settlement continued to function as a Japanese colony, partly because the Japanese were successful in recruiting local crew by offering generous work conditions and partly because Australians needed Japanese expertise in developing marine resources. Australians could only limit the scale of the Japanese operation so that white operators could always make larger profits than the Japanese. Thus a unique dual colonial apparatus existed in Thursday Island. The Japanese masters prospered in the white masters' territory. This was, of course, acceptable under the strict racial hierarchy that Japanese masters were always subordinate to their white counterparts and that the white masters were richer than their Japanese counterparts.

95 Wakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture], 1957, *Wakayama ken imin shi* [History of emigrants from Wakayama prefecture], Wakayama, p.93
96 Iwasaki Kenkichi, 1938, 'Kii hantō nangan ni okeru kaigai dekasegi imin no kenkyū, dai 2 hō [Study on overseas emigrants from southern coastal areas of Kii peninsula, II]', *Chirigaku hyōron* [Geographic review], Vol.13, No.3, Nihon chiri gakkai, Tokyo, p.p.183-200
Conclusion

The Japanese, responding to growing demand for cheap labour in European plantations and mines, migrated to the South Seas in the hope of improving their economic conditions. Social instability in the impoverished rural areas following modernisation in the late 19th century also encouraged migration. However, their arrivals were individual ventures, because the Japanese government had no policies towards the South Seas and its main concern was its national prestige: the government had no policy to facilitate its economic or territorial expansion. Only some intellectuals showed a strong interest in Japan's involvement in the South Seas, and they mostly claimed that such involvement should be achieved peacefully, reflecting Japan's subordinate position in the western-led world. Australian reactions to Japanese migration was entirely negative due to the 'Yellow Peril' syndrome and rising unionism. As a result, Australians stopped further expansion of the Japanese settlement on Thursday Island and in Papua. It reflected the Australian attempt to establish themselves as a white nation in the international system. Similarly the Japanese protest against the migration restriction, although they took no substantial actions, expressed the naivety of a young modern nation seriously concerned about national dignity. The outcome of this was ironic. It was the Australians themselves who facilitated the birth of the colony in German territory (which Australians later feared) by squeezing the Japanese on the Island too hard.
Chapter 2. Golden age, 1901-1914

Introduction

In 1901 Komine, after being squeezed out of Thursday Island and rejected by the British New Guinea administration, knocked on the door of German New Guinea. The door was ajar. He found employment with the German administration and some years later established an independent business for which he recruited about a hundred workers from Japan. Consequently a sizeable Japanese community emerged and enjoyed a brief golden age in the last years of German rule. Meanwhile, in British New Guinea (later Papua), some Japanese traders and divers married Papuan girls and settled down. Because of the small scale of their migration and businesses, the Japanese settlements in both British and German New Guinea attracted little attention from the Japanese government. The settlements show the unique pattern of Japanese involvement in the South Seas in the way that their presence was entrenched in European colonies.

1. Japanese interest in the South Seas

Policy

After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the Japanese government's attention was still directed primarily to East Asia where Japan's immediate security was at risk and the region's economic potential—markets and sources of raw materials—was recognised. It was also the period in which Japan emerged as a colonial power. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan acquired Taiwan and established there a Governor-General's Office in June 1895. After the Russo-Japanese War, it acquired southern Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Territory in 1905. Western nations also acknowledged Japan as a colonial power in East Asia, recognising a Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1910. In the same year, the Japanese government established the Colonisation Bureau under the direct control of the Prime Minister and constructed the administration to function as a colonial nation.

Meanwhile, Japanese attention was distracted from the South Seas. This was made all the easier by Enomoto's retirement from politics when he resigned the post of Minister of Agriculture and Commerce due to the Ashio Copper Mine Incident in 1897. The incident was one of the best known of modern Japan's environmental disasters. The Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi prefecture discharged acidic pollutants into rivers and contaminated wide agricultural areas in the north of Tokyo. Local farmers, politicians, journalists, socialists and Christian humanists began large-scale protests.
enthusiasm for emigration also receded when his private venture to promote emigration to Mexico failed in 1898. Thus the government lost one of those most concerned with directing Japan towards the South Seas. As a result, the government took no initiatives to promote South Seas involvement until the outbreak of World War I.

Trade

Despite the lack of government initiatives, Japanese trade with the South Seas expanded rapidly, particularly with Southeast Asia and Australia. Although complete data are not available, in 1900 exports to French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and Dutch East Indies were 16.3 million yen and imports were 10.9 million, then in 1913 exports to those countries plus British Malaya increased to 23.4 million yen and imports to 80.9 million. Similarly, exports to Australia and New Zealand increased from 2.5 million yen in 1900 to 8.6 million in 1913 and imports from 2.4 million yen to 14.9 million. The trade figures for Micronesia were still too small to appear in statistics. But the proportion of the trade with Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand in the total Japanese external trade dramatically increased from 3.1 percent in 1900 to 9.3 percent in 1913.

Although minuscule, Japanese trade with Micronesia, pioneered by small traders, expanded during the Spanish period. By 1906, the Japanese controlled more than 80 percent of the total trade of Micronesia. Japanese commerce was so strong in the Western Carolines that their German counterpart, the Western Caroline Company, had to close its Koror branch. The only place where Japanese traders could not dominate was the Marshall Islands where the German administration firmly refused the establishment of branches of Japanese companies. As Peattie explains, 'The Japanese activities to expand their commercial presence in the South Seas and the German efforts to limit it became an episodic struggle of prohibitions and confiscations by local German colonial authorities and evasions by Japanese traders.' The German administration strictly controlled Japanese trade as shown in an incident in which Japanese traders were accused of supplying firearms to local people to assist their fighting and the administration closed the Japanese business and deported their staff to Japan. Nevertheless Japanese trade expanded, with the establishment of a new company. In 1906, the Hiki Company was amalgamated with the Murayama Shōkai (the Murayama Company) to establish the Nan'yō Bōeki Kaisha (the South Seas Trade Company), which soon dominated Japan-Micronesia trade. However,
generally those companies in Micronesia were initiated by small individual capitalists and none were related to leading industrial or financial capitalists, reflecting the lack of government promotion.

In the Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, a significant change was seen in the rapid increase in imports of raw materials—rubber mainly from British Malaya and wool and wheat from Australia and New Zealand. Exports of silk and ceramics to Australia also increased rapidly. The expansion was promoted by private enterprise. Officials showed little interest except that the government proposed to the Australian colonies to join the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1894), but the Australians refused, mainly because of migration issues.

**Emigration**

Small-scale emigration to the South Seas continued. The number of Japanese in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and other South Pacific Islands increased from 8,140 in 1904 to 20,219 in 1914, while the total number of Japanese residing overseas also rose from 138,591 in 1904 to 358,711 in 1914 with a rapid increase mainly in North America and Manchuria. As a result, the proportion of the Japanese in the South Seas in the total Japanese abroad decreased slightly from 5.8 percent to 5.6 percent.

In the South Pacific, it was private emigration companies that kept on sending Japanese emigrants. The Töyö Imin Kaisha (the East Seas Emigration Company, a new name for the Yoshisa Company) sent a few thousand labourers to New Caledonia. The company also sent 410 workers to Ocean Island [Banaba] from 1905 to 1909 and 350 to Makatea in 1910. The vice-president of the British Phosphate Company in Ocean visited Japan to recruit workers. Similarly the workers to Makatea contracted to a French phosphate mining company. The emigrants to both islands were not labourers to dig phosphate but were artisans such as carpenters, shipwrights, blacksmiths and cooks. In Micronesia, tens of traders settled down and had control of most trade in the islands. In 1912, '73 of 122 foreigners living in the Marianas and the West Carolines were Japanese, and approximately one-third of the foreign trade was with Japan.'

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9Yanaihara Tadao, 1937, *Nan'yō guntō no kenkyū* [Study on the South Seas Islands], Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, p.14
10Narita Katsusírō, 1971, *Nichi-gō tsūshō gaikei shi* [The diplomatic history of commercial relations between Japan and Australia], Shinhyōron, Tokyo, p.p.82-83
11It includes British Malaya and Borneo, Sarawak, India, Burma, Iriyan, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Guam.
12Ishikawa Tomonori, 1972, 'Tōkei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from statistics], *Chiri kagaku* [Geographic science], Vol.16, Chiri kagaku gakkai [Association of Geographic science], Hiroshima, p.p.25-31
14Irie Toraji, 1943, *Meiji nanshin shi kō* [Short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era], Ida shoten, Tokyo, p.265-269
Seventeen emigration companies sent 3,233 skilled and unskilled labourers to Benguet in the Philippines where the US administration increased demands for cheap labour 'to build roads, to construct railways, to erect barracks for the garrison and to improve harbour facilities'. They were soon followed by hundreds more Japanese workers sent to hemp plantations in Davao. Those workers were recruited by the Ōta Kogyō Kaisha (the Ōta Development Company), established by Ōta Kyōzaburō, a Manila-based Japanese entrepreneur. In British Malaya, two enterprising Japanese began to operate a rubber plantation in 1902 and initiated a rush of Japanese investment in rubber plantations. The number of the Japanese plantation increased to 79 by 1911. As the plantation operators brought in Japanese labourers and trade increased, the number of Japanese residents in Southeast Asia increased from 4,671 in 1904 to 13,558 in 1914. By contrast, in Australia, due to the 'White Australia Policy', the number of Japanese declined slightly from 3,554 in 1901 to 3,489 in 1911.

Nanshin-ron

After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, public attention was diverted from the South Seas and the nan'yō fever of the 1890s cooled. Nevertheless, the idea of nanshin was implanted in the minds of a few prominent scholars and politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi (who became the Prime Minister in 1931) and Nitobe Inazō (a scholar who took office as Vice-Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1927). After the Russo-Japanese War, Inukai argued that 'there should be no further advance north...Japan should now shift her attention to the region of South China and Southeast Asia'. Similarly, Nitobe 'showed a marked interest in the South'. However, the Russo-Japanese War was a major drawback to nanshin-ron, for the army then took the initiative in deciding defence policy. The army's tairiku seisaku (continental policy), which was often opposed to the navy's kaiyō kokka ron (maritime nation theory), began to dominate Japan's external policy. Consequently nanshin-ron declined, being rebuffed by the army's hokushin-ron (northward advance theory).

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17 Yano Tōru, 1979, Nihon no Nan'yō shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas], Chūōkōron sha, Tokyo, p.p.140-141
18 Imano Toshihiko and Fujisaki Yasuo, 1985, Imin shi II: ajia Oceania hen [History of emigration II: Asia and Oceania], Shinseisha, Tokyo, p.p.244-145
19 Ishikawa, 1972, op.cit., p.27
21 Yano Tōru, 1975, 'Nanshin no keifu' [The Genealogy of 'southward advance'], Chūkōron sha, Tokyo, p.68
22 Peattie, op.cit., p.68 Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australasia, Melbourne, 1991, 68
2. Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea

Reflecting the decline of nanshin-ron, less public information about Papua and New Guinea was introduced in the 1901-1914 period than in the late 19th century. Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans did not change from the late 19th century, but a more realistic interest such as the establishment of a trade-link was emphasised, while the reference to territorial ambition disappeared. Kawasaki Ryōzo and Maruba, Shigeru24 who travelled to Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago just before the outbreak of the World War I, wrote Taiheiyō jō no hōko, Doku ryō nan'yō shotō [The treasury of the Pacific: German South Seas islands]. In the first section of the book, they described in diary-style the multi-ethnic milieu of Rabaul and the popularity of a Chinese hotel as a drinking spot. About New Guineans, like other early writers, their description maintained stereotypes:

Although these natives have ugly and vicious appearances, they are very obedient, easy to get angry and easy to grieve. Their thinking is very simple as if they were eight to nine year-old Japanese children.25

They also reported on Komine's boat building and copra planting, and the presence of over ten Japanese migrants as well as a few Japanese prostitutes, stating 'we were surprised by the intensity of the development of the Japanese prostitute population overseas'.26 The rest of their book covers a wide range of topics in German New Guinea and Micronesia in terms of geography, climate, population, race, commerce, trade, imports and exports, transport, industry, and politics. Characteristically, in the sections on German New Guinea, most space is devoted to the economy. First, they pointed out that trading copra would bring huge profits and that turtle shell, trochus shell, and pearl shell would also be important imports. They claimed that Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago had treasures of undeveloped natural resources such as fertile soil, thick forest with red sandalwood, ebony, parrots, birds of paradise, gold, silver and nickel.27 They also predicted conflict between Japan and Germany in the Pacific over their competing national interests, warning Japan that Germany was trying to achieve 'Pan-Germanism' in the Pacific.28

At the official level, the Japanese government kept few records. Official indifference was seen in the ad hoc arrangements for jurisdiction over German New Guinea. In 1906 the Foreign Ministry let the Japanese consulate at Townsville take charge of affairs of German territories in the South Pacific.29 Then in 1909 the Consulate-General at Sydney took

24Neither Kawasaki or Maruba were well-known writers, but the contents of the book and the name of the publisher 'Nan'yō dōshi kai' (The Society of South Seas Comrades) made them look nanshin-ron advocates.
25Kawasaki Ryōzo and Maruba Shigeru, 1913, Taiheiyō no hōko, doku-ryō nan'yō shotō [The treasury of the Pacific: German South Seas islands], Nan'yō dōshi kai, Tokyo, p.12
26Ibid., p.3
27Ibid., p.p.71-99
28Ibid., p.p.157-159
29Appointment of Consul Narita, 2 March 1906, JDR 6.1.5.6.-32
charge of German New Guinea affairs probably because of the incident in which Komine was attacked by the people on Manus. Indifference was also shown in response to the attack. The report of the incident was pre-empted by a non-official source. The *Kobe Herald* reported with a headline 'The Killing of a Japanese Trader in the South Seas—Identity of the Victim':

In connection with Reuters' cable of the 19th inst, reporting that Admiralty Island natives had attacked and killed Captain Komine, a Japanese trader of New Guinea, and two of his native crew, the Nagasaki Press now learns that the victim of the tragedy was Mr. Isokichi Komine, aged 42, of Jujenji, Nagasaki. The deceased originally went to the South Sea Islands some fifteen years ago and engaged in pearl fishing until about 1900, when the beds gave out. Since then he had been in employ of the German Colonial Government service in exploring in the interior, where he is said to have exercised a wonderful influence as an overseer over the natives connected with the expedition, and with whom he was very popular as their 'captain'. The report of his death is deeply lamented in Japan, particularly at Nagasaki, as he was a distinct factor in the trade between Japan and the Islands, in addition to being highly popular with compatriot traders and emigrants, to whom he often proved a [sic] willing help and a friend in need.

In response to the news, the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo requested all consuls in Southeast Asia and Australia to investigate the incident. Quick replies came from the consulates in Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney and Batavia, who all confirmed that Komine had been attacked but he had escaped and was alive. Similarly, Papua hardly attracted official attention. In 1909, Iwasaki Mitsuo, a Consul-General at Sydney, submitted a report to the Foreign Ministry, only four pages long, introducing directory-like information such as administrative divisions, the acreage of land, population, native languages, Papuan life-style, relations between Papuans and the whites, agriculture, forestry, and mining.


**Australian attitudes towards Japanese**

Some Japanese seamen on Thursday Island found no door closed to them in British New Guinea, despite the fact that the administration prohibited Japanese migration. Some traders and shellers were operating in the Milne Bay area and adjoining islands even before 1900. We can only speculate whether officials granted them permission to operate, but it seems that the administration was not as concerned about Japanese as its Queensland counterpart. Although the Resident Magistrates of the Eastern Division and the South-Eastern Division occasionally presented reports about Japanese activities, they were about the conditions of local labourers employed by the Japanese for shell fishing rather than the

30Kakkoku chūzai ryōji ninmen zakken shidō nō bu [Miscellaneous matters on the appointment and resignation of consuls in overseas countries, the section of Sydney], 1909, JDR 6.1.5.6-38
31*Kobe Herald*, 28 April 1909
32Komine Isokichi doku-ryo nyū giniya adomiraruchi is ni oite sōnan no ken [Report about the accident of Komine Isokichi on the Admiralty Islands in German New Guinea], 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240
33Iwasaki Mitsuo, 1909, 'Eiryō nyū gini jiishō kōoku' [Report on conditions in British New Guinea], *Imin chōsa hōkoku* [Report on investigation on emigration], Gaimu-sūshō tsūshō kyoku [the Foreign Ministry, the Commerce Bureau], Tokyo
Japanese themselves. Probably the administration just acquiesced in the small-scale Japanese presence which never exceeded ten in number.

The first record of Japanese activities appeared in a simple form in the correspondence of the Lands Department of 1902—it listed all trade stations in the South-Eastern and the Eastern Divisions. Five Japanese traders were named among other non-indigenous coloured traders (e.g. Manila men, Malays, South Sea Islanders and Chinese). The names and locations of their stations are shown in Table 2-1. Probably Australian officials wrote the names phonetically.\(^{34}\) The names in Table 2-1 may be corrected: Tanati to Tanaka, Kimostha to Kinoshita, Mirioka to Migioka, Nekshy to Negishi, and Siganiatu to Shigematsu. Among those traders, Tanaka and Shigematsu can also be identified from Japanese archives and oral histories. Probably the other Japanese were trading only temporarily. Although it is not clear where the five Japanese came from, most likely they came from Thursday Island, because such a movement is noted in the records of the Department of External Affairs which gave permission to twelve Japanese to land in British New Guinea from Queensland in 1902.\(^{35}\)

Table 2-1. Japanese trading stations in the South-eastern Division and the Eastern Division in 1902

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanati</td>
<td>Hemenahei island near Joannet (South-eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimostha</td>
<td>Konaware, Basilaki island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirioka</td>
<td>Rita island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekshy</td>
<td>Boiadi island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siganiatu</td>
<td>Wari, Sanaroa (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AA Territory, C.P.T.(T.), Set.38 General Correspondence of Lands Department 1889-1942

Table 2-2. Non-indigenous populations in British New Guinea (later Papua)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Other coloured*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905**</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906**</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907**</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes Malays, Chinese, Filipinos, Solomon Islanders, Samoans, Fijians, West Indians, Javanese, South Sea Islanders, Rarotongans, and others

** Eastern Division only

n.a.: no data available


\(^{34}\) The Japanese may not have known the English spellings.

\(^{35}\) Department of External Affairs to the Collector of Customs at Brisbane, 13 May 1902, AA A8/1-02/116/194
The administration's official record on the Japanese population was not available until 1905. As Table 2-2 shows, the number of Japanese was never above ten and most lived in the Eastern Division which included Milne Bay, Samarai, Normanby Island, Fergusson Island, Goodenough Island and other small islands. The Japanese were a very small ethnic group among other non-indigenous coloured people; their proportion hardly reached ten percent. In contrast to the European population, which increased gradually, the Japanese population remained static like that of other foreigners (except a large inflow of Samoan mission workers in 1912) before World War I.

The administration also recorded six brief reports about the Japanese in the Annual Report. Three were in medical reports and the other three in the context of conditions of native labourers. In 1907, Chief Medical Officer Noel Beaumont reported an insane Japanese, who 'was ultimately removed to Thursday Island', in the section 'The Native Population'. In 1910 the Resident Magistrate of the Western Division, Charles Higginson, reported that a Japanese suffered from dysentery, in the section on 'Native Labour':

It must be remembered that during the year a dysentery epidemic raged through the fleets, and the Japanese suffered very heavily. It is a matter for congratulation that the Papuans proved themselves good patients when attacked, and were in a [sic] marked contrast to the Japanese, who seemed to give way to it at once.

A medical officer, Charles Garrioch, happened to encounter a Japanese trader called 'Jimmy' during his visit to Sudest Island on 16 May 1909 and wrote a report about him:

When we cruised round the islands, Mrs. Mahoney kindly allowed one of her employees, a Japanese, to accompany us, as he knew the coast thoroughly and spoke the native language as well. He was also personally acquainted with most of natives we met. His services were consequently invaluable, as his presence gave the natives more confidence in giving information and coming forward for treatment. I respectfully recommend some remuneration be allowed him in consequence.

Garrioch also noted in his diary:

A Japanese, called Jimmy, kindly put at our disposal by Mrs. Mahoney, acted as guide. This man proved invaluable on account of his local knowledge of the coast and his ability to speak the native dialect.

As Garrioch was making a medical report, he did not include much detail about Jimmy, but his knowledge of the waters and local languages show that he had lived there for a long period. His role as agent of Mrs Mahoney, a well-known trader and planter, also suggests an amicable relationship with Australians.

The administration's other accounts were included in the reports on the conditions of indigenous labourers. Lieutenant-Governor Hubert Murray commented on the conditions of labourers employed by the Japanese from Thursday Island:

Since the appointment of a Protector, the condition of these natives has no doubt improved, but as Japanese are in charge of the boats in which Papuans are employed, it is impossible either for the white employer or for the Papuan Government to know exactly what takes place in these boats when they are at sea. For instance, the most ample and varied ration may be, and in fact, is supplied by the European employer.

36Papua Annual Report, 1907, Melbourne, p.104
37Papua Annual Report, 1910, p.56
38Papua Annual Report, 1909, p.92
but the share which the Papuan gets of it depends upon the goodwill of the Japanese skipper.\textsuperscript{39}

Murray's concerns were repeated two years later, when he suggested the prevention of Japanese from employing local labourers, although he was informed that their conditions were satisfactory:

Those of the Papuans whom I questioned told me that they got plenty of food and that they were well treated by the Japanese, and the Protector, Mr. Curtis, informs me that he thinks this is the case now, as the Japanese recognise that the Papuans have someone at Thursday Island who will take their part. It is, however, impossible to know what goes on in the boats when they are at sea, and it would be indefinitely better, at any rate from the Papuan point of view, if the Japanese element were eliminated.\textsuperscript{40}

As a result of these speculations, the employment of Papuans by Japanese was stopped. The Acting Commissioner of the Department of Native Affairs and Control, Leslie Bell, wrote:

The reports received from the Protector from time to time are to the effect that the relations existing between the Japanese and Papuans are on the whole satisfactory. No more natives are now being recruited for the pearl luggers.\textsuperscript{41}

The Japanese vice-consul at Townsville, Miho Gorō, also reported to Foreign Minister Jutarō Komura, that about 200 Papuans had been employed by the Japanese but such employment would discontinue due to the prohibition:

From August this year [1911], New Guineans will be returned to New Guinea Island by the order of the government of the island [Papua administration] on the ground that labourers are in short supply on the island.\textsuperscript{42}

Several reports indicate the Japanese presence in the Western Division, an area which covers the coast line facing Torres Strait. Most likely those Japanese were shellers operating from Thursday Island who recruited their crews from the villages in the Western Division, as the Division's population statistics did not record any Japanese residents.

The Papua administration's attitude towards the Japanese shows a contrast to their Australian counterparts in Queensland. Unlike the Queensland government, the Papua administration hardly took any notice of the Japanese monopoly of the shell-fishing industry. That probably indicates the smallness of the Japanese operation which posed little threat to Europeans. It also reflects the thoroughness of Murray's philanthropic policy toward Papuans which extended to monitoring Papuans employed by a small number of the Japanese. Thus, in Papua, the Japanese were an insignificant and marginal group.

\section*{Japanese settlers}

Five Japanese settled in Papua before World War I and led humble, quiet lives with Papuan wives, being almost unnoticed by either Australian or Japanese officials. Although the number is small, memories of these Japanese are still alive among their descendants and elders of villages and islands. At present there are at least 28 mixed-race people in Milne Bay Province who are descended from Japanese fathers—Jimmy Koto, Tamiya Mabe,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p.13
\item \textsuperscript{40}Papua Annual Report, 1911, p.p.7-8
\item \textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p.149
\item \textsuperscript{42}Miho to Komura, 2 March 1913, JDR 3.8.2.33
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Murakami Heijirō, Tanaka Shigematsu and Tanaka Taichirō, who all married Papuan women. Whether their marriages were official (registered by European authority) or de facto relationships is unknown, but oral evidence suggests that the villagers recognised them as marriages.

The intermarriages had significant implications, for the Japanese effectively evaded the administration's restrictions on migration and land sales. They were able to fulfil a dream which Tsuji and Komine had pursued unsuccessfully—finding a land to settle in. We can only speculate whether these Japanese married only to achieve such a dream, or they had romances, or both. But the effects of their marriages were that they had a right to live there, and they were able to own land if the wife's clan followed a matrilineal tradition—common practice in the Eastern Division. Consequently, they did not have to go through formal procedures with the administration on land acquisition and they were able to evade controls over the sales of native land.

Another important factor for their successful settlement was their ability to adapt to local environments. They all learnt local languages, followed local customs and did not force any Japanese traditions or religions on their families. They kept their Japanese identity only in their names, but showed no interest in converting to Christianity. They all successfully engaged in trading, copra planting and boat building. Probably their zeal to improve their life, having all come from poor rural areas in Japan, was the most fundamental factor in their successful adaptation. Moreover, oral testimonies, which confirm their happy marriages and friendly relationships with Papuans, may suggest that the Japanese simply loved the people and the place, and thereby were accepted comfortably in their adoptive communities.

Jimmy Koto was the oldest Japanese resident. His arrival dates to 1889, when he came to the Louisiades as a diver employed on a pearl lugger, and later chose to be a trader. In 1913 he applied for naturalisation in Australia with no success. Presumably before 1900 Koto married a local girl called Maegar from Sabari Island, about twenty kilometres north west of Sudest Island, and had two children named George and Florence. He became familiar with the local waters and some local languages, developed a relationship with islanders to 'a much more intimate level than did his European counterparts'. He traded from his base at Sudest Island and frequently stopped at Samarai. He spoke English well and used to come to the hotel at Samarai for a drink. At the hotel he once had a fight with an Australian after an argument over the Russo-Japanese War.

He established good relations with Australians, especially with Elizabeth Mahoney, wife of John Mahoney (a successful business man in gold mining and copra planting),

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43 Interview by the author with Koto, Jessie (grand daughter of Jimmy Koto), 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea (PNG)
44 Roe, Margaret, 1961, A History of South-East Papua to 1930, doctoral thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, p.488
45 Interview with Koto, op.cit.
46 Interview with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami Heijirō), 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG
although the development of the relationship might have owed much to Mrs Mahoney's character as 'a modern Lady Bountiful'.

According to Nelson, some Japanese worked on Mahoney's plantation on Sudest or served in the Cosmopolitan Hotel which Mrs Mahoney opened on Samarai about the end of 1900 — 'a substantial two-storied building with twenty-two bedrooms, capable of accommodating some forty boarders or more.'

Probably Koto was one of those Japanese in Mahoney's employ.

Tamiya Mabe was probably the second Japanese to arrive. Although his descendants use Mabe as a family name, judging from the normal Japanese usage, Tamiya was most likely his family name, and Mabe (or Mabei) his first name. His grandchildren were told that Tamiya was from Tokyo or a part of Tokyo. Very likely he came from one of the islands of Izu or Ogasawara which are included in the Tokyo prefecture, as sporadic Japanese migration (mostly fishermen) took place from these islands to New Guinea (see Chapter 4). Before 1910 he came to Basilaki Island, near Samarai, and married a Basilaki girl, Kalele. His appearance impressed locals, as he had one short arm. He was a trader and a boat builder. According to Billy Tetu, his grandson:

Tamiya was a trader operating both in Papua and New Guinea. He was not a boat builder initially, but Tom Tanaka [another Japanese who came to Milne Bay] taught him how to build a boat. He built luggers. He had 3 boats. First boat was named Maru. He taught local people how to build boats and he employed local people. He was based at Gogolabia and operated trade business, buying shell and copra to sell them to other Japanese traders. He had no business partner.

Another grandson, Joseph Tetu, added more detail:

Tamiya was trading copra and shell. Copra was collected from local people. He sold tobacco, rice, biscuits to local people. He dived for trochus shell, pearl, green snail and sea cucumber. He dived as far as to the waters around Misima, and Barrier Reef. He dived only in shallow water, because he did not have diving gear.

Joseph says Tamiya's shell-fishing operation was on a small scale. He did not operate like those on Thursday Island who had large crews and sophisticated equipment. Joseph explained that the marriage was the most important element that made Tamiya settle on Basilaki, because he was able to own land through his marriage:

His wife, Kalele, was a pretty girl and she was a daughter of a big man. She inherited [her] father's land. Kalele also bought customary land in Gogolabia from her father for Tamiya, because Tamiya looked after her well.

Presumably in the 1910s, three boys were born; Tetu, Hagani and Namari. Tamiya apparently named them after Japanese names of metals: Tetu (correct pronunciation 'Tetsu') means iron, Hagani (Hagane) means steel and Namari means lead. All his descendants

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47 Roe, op.cit., p.486
48 Nelson, Hank, 1976, Black White & Gold: goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1938, Australian National University, Canberra, p.25
49 British New Guinea Annual Report, 1901, Melbourne, p.78
50 Interview by the author with Tetu, Joseph (grandson of Mabe Tamiya), 24 December 1993, Kanadamada Village, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG
51 Interview by the author with Tetu, Billy (grandson of Mabe Tamiya), 25 December 1993, Gogolabia Village, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG
52 Interview with Tetu, Joseph, op.cit.
confirmed that Tamiya followed local customs and did not enforce any Japanese customs on his family.  

Murakami Heijirō was one of the few Japanese migrants in Papua whose personal file is kept in the Australian Archives, as he was interned in Australia during the Pacific War. According to Murakami's dossier and the interview by the internment officer, he was born in Wakayama on 1 January 1874. He also went to Thursday Island around 1894 and worked as a pump tender, then around 1900 he came to Milne Bay. The curious internment officer observed that both his arms and chest were heavily tattooed.

According to his only son, Kalo, Murakami came to Samarai with other Japanese men—Tamiya, Matoba and Koto. Kalo's story may be partly incorrect, as Koto's arrival was well before 1900. Probably Murakami and Tamiya arrived around the same time and Koto accompanied them only. Today nobody but Kalo remembers the Japanese called Matoba (he was a diver according to Kalo) and no official documents record his name. Probably he did not settle in the area and soon returned to Thursday Island or Japan. Murakami married a Papuan girl from Naiwara village (at the end of Milne Bay) and led a humble life with her, operating a small trading business in the Milne Bay area. Kalo stated:

He had a little store and he was trading only within Milne Bay. He was trading by himself. He must have brought some capital from Thursday Island to start his trading business. He did not employ locals. He was trading goods like tobacco, calico, but not many varieties.

Tanaka Taichirō was known as Tom Tanaka among the locals. According to his nephew in Japan, Tanaka Noboru, he was born in a small fishing village, Obama, in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki on 17 October 1875. His family had been merchants for generations. Around 1902 he went to New Guinea with Komine and Nagahama Taichi. He boarded a steamer from Nagasaki as a cook and took 80 days to arrive at New Guinea via Singapore. Probably he separated from Komine and Nagahama in German New Guinea and came to Samarai, where he acted as a diver, a boat builder and a trader. His daughter, Mary Tanaka, recalls:

My father was a diver. He was collecting trochus shell and green turban [a kind of shell]. He had 6 luggers. He dived with locals but he was the only one who actually dived. He dived in the water as far as Barrier Reef near Tagula Island. He had a business partnership with Shigematsu Tanaka. Tom was a nickname. He was not a Christian.

Joseph Bam, an elder of Yaloga in Walalaia village about 10 kilometres west from East Cape, also remembers Tanaka:

53 Ibid.
54 'Dossier for MJ18500, internee, MURAKAMI, Heijiro' and 'Interview with Japanese internees at Camp No.4, Taura, On 22.7.46, Case No.67, MURAKAMI Heijiro', AA A367 C72588
55 Interview with Murakami, op.cit.
56 The author speculates that he could have been an outlaw-type if he had been tattooed in Japan, as such a practice is common mainly among yakuza (Japanese gangs).
57 Interview with Murakami, op.cit.
58 Interview by the author with Tanaka Noboru (nephew of Taichirō Tanaka), 1 July 1993, Tomitsu-chō, Shimabara, Nagasaki, Japan
59 Interview by the author with Tanaka, Mary and Arthur [a daughter and grandson of Tanaka Taichirō], 22 December 1993, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG
Tom based at Mohiwa and dived for trochus shell. He was also building boats. He employed villagers. He went diving as far as Misima. He was a very wealthy man. He built many boats (sailing boats). He was also trading. He went as far as Misima and Sudest. Bam recalls Tanaka as very friendly towards Papuans and he married a local girl, Didiloiloi, from Mohiwa (a village near East Cape on the Goodenough Bay side), a daughter of an ordinary villager. In 1906 the couple had a daughter, Mary. The family lived in Mohiwa which became Tanaka's base for business. According to Mary, he also had a good relationship with Europeans and was respected by the local people.

Tanaka Shigematsu was called by his first name so that he could be distinguished from Tanaka Taichirō. The local pronunciation is 'Sigemata'. Both Tanakas were born in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki. Shigematsu's daughter presumes they were related. According to kaigai ryoken kafu hyō [list of overseas passport issues] of 1901 of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Shigematsu was the firstborn son of Jūkichi from a small coastal village, Ariie, in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki, the same village where Komine was born. He was thirty three years old when he came to Samarai on business. Another record in kaigai ryoken kafu hyō of 1914 listed the purpose of his revisit to Papua as agriculture and fishery, indicating that he was a planter and sheller. His daughter, Honor Isikini, recalls:

Shigematsu was a trader and had a small copra plantation at Modewa [a village near East Cape in Milne Bay], and had a couple of schooners. He had a store, selling tobacco, rice, biscuits, and tinned fish. He was very successful in his business because he was a hard worker, working non-stop. He was also careful about his money: he used to put hair on the door of his safe so that he could check if somebody opened it while he was away.

He married a local girl, Lily, before 1912. Honor continues:

Shigematsu's wife was a local girl called Lily. Her real local name was Garunaidi. It was her second marriage. Her first husband was a trader from Samoa or Tonga. Shigematsu had four children—Paul, Shino Margaret, Honor, Shigeto. I was born in 1912.

4. Japanese in German New Guinea

Population

The Japanese population, which the German administration included in the European population, is shown in Table 2-3. Due to inconsistency in statistical computation by the administration (some statistics included the whole German territory including German Micronesia and New Guinea while some included only the Bismarck Archipelago, and some counted only non-officials), the statistics give only an approximate idea to around 1910. The Japanese population increased rapidly around 1910, but its proportion in
the total non-indigenous population remained small. Compared to 578 Germans and 555 Chinese, the Japanese numbered only 20 in 1910 (Table 2-3).

Table 2-3. Non-indigenous populations of German New Guinea by nationality 1894-1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>21**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bismarck Archipelago only
** Admiralty district only
n.a.: no data available


The scanty information can be supplemented from Japanese sources. According to a naval officer who visited Rabaul in 1919, the number of the Japanese in 1914 was 109.64 The Japanese Foreign Ministry's records of passports issued for migrants bound for German New Guinea also provide information. In 1912 passports were issued to 50 Japanese, in 1913 to 22, and in 1914 to 33.65 The sum of the passports coincides with the naval officer's report. From these records it can be estimated that the Japanese population had increased to about 100 by 1914. Comparison with the total population in Rabaul including Namanula and Matupi, which was 3,271 in 1914 (266 whites, 452 Chinese, 79 Malays, 27 Micronesians and 2,447 Melanesians),66 shows that the Japanese had grown to a recognisable group. The increase is also significant in that the Japanese population of German New Guinea overtook that of German Micronesia. The number of the Japanese in the whole German territories, which reached 17267 containing about 100 Japanese in German New Guinea, shows that those Japanese in New Guinea exceeded those in Micronesia by about 20.

German attitudes towards Japanese

The materials related to the Japanese in the German administration's Annual Reports show that the administration's concern about Japanese did not greatly differ from that of the Australians in Papua. German reports are also brief and do not extend beyond one

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64 A telegram to Vice-Admiral Takenaka, 8 July 1919, JDR 7.1.5-10
65 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, 1912-14, JDR 3.8.5.8
66 Sack, Peter and Clark, Dymphna (eds. and translation), 1980b, German New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1913-14, Department of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, p.16
67 Ibid.
paragraph. Judging only from the amount and contents of those reports, the German administration did not seem to be greatly concerned.

Leniency in legal status and caution in granting land rights were the main characteristics of German attitudes towards the Japanese. The Germans granted the Japanese European status around 1905. Until then the Japanese had no legal status.\textsuperscript{68} Granting European status was not confined to the Germans, as the Dutch granted the same status in the East Indies in 1899.\textsuperscript{69} Threlfall argues that Komine's usefulness to the administration as well as the effect of the emergence of Japan in international politics after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War facilitated the granting of European status.

The German administration recognised Komine's usefulness in his encounter with Albert Hahl, the Vice-Governor and Governor from 1896 to 1914. The encounter happened almost accidentally. According to Hahl's diary, in 1902 Komine reached Herbertshöhe from Torres Strait when Hahl had been facing a serious shortage of government vessels to perform administrative tasks. The appearance of Komine solved this problem:

A chance incident helped to solve my dilemma. One fine morning there was a small schooner flying the Japanese flag to be seen riding at anchor in the Herbertshöhe Harbour. The skipper, Isokide [sic] Komine, told me that his water and provisions had run out on his voyage from Torres Strait, where he had been engaged in pearl-fishing. He had no money to purchase supplies and asked me to employ him. I inspected his little ship, found it suitable for my purpose, and chartered the vessel.\textsuperscript{70}

Komine capitalised on this chance, and Hahl used his schooner for later trips around the Bismarck Archipelago.\textsuperscript{71}

However, Komine later wrote a different story about the encounter. According to his petition for financial assistance to the Consul-General in Sydney in 1916, he reached Rabaul in October 1901 and accidentally met Governor Hahl who had been under siege from 'little barbarians':

I left Japan at a young age, and explored Korea, north China and Hong Kong. Then I advanced to Australia. After my investigation, Australia proved to be promising for trading and I decided to stay. However, in the last ten years, anti-Japanese fever took place and I got suspicious about my future in Australia. Then I decided to purchase two schooners — Zapura and Hafua — and explored the New Guinea main island and Dutch islands, taking risks and hardships which were beyond description. Nearly at the end of my exploration I anchored at Rabaul in October 1901. At that time the place was German territory and the natives were strongly resisting German rule. The punitive expeditions were suffering failures. When I arrived there, Governor Hahl and his staff had narrowly escaped the tight siege of the little barbarians and they were holding this small place. Their vessels, which were their only resort, were wrecked on the reef. They tried all measures unsuccessfully and were just waiting to be slaughtered. However, when they found my accidental arrival, they were overjoyed as if my arrival was God's will and begged me for the charter of my ship. My righteous heart was heating up, seeing their hopeless situation, and I willingly agreed to their request. At the same time I joined their punitive forces. Sharing uncountable

\textsuperscript{68} Threlfall, Neville, 1988, \textit{From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain}, unpublished, Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University, Canberra, p.118
\textsuperscript{70} Sack and Clark, 1980a, op.cit., p.91
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p.92
hardships with them and applying various tactics all successfully, we finally conquered and pacified the little barbarians.\(^7^2\)

Apparently Komine dramatised the encounter in order to win assistance from the Japanese government, for there was no such incident either at Herbertoshöhe or at Rabaul. Nonetheless Komine's description verifies two facts: the administration was suffering from a lack of seaworthy vessels; and he accompanied Hahl on his trips to other places. Indeed, Hahl found Komine very useful. Hahl continued in his diary:

Both parties benefited. To begin with, I was now able to repatriate the labourers and soldiers whose contracts had expired and who had been waiting for a long time for a passage home, and to arrange for new men to be recruited. The Japanese skipper proved to be very adept at this. From one of his trips to central Neu Mecklenburg Komine brought back coal which he had found at the mouth of a small stream in the Umudu district. This coal looked quite good, but seemed to be a type of brown coal. The schooner also brought some natives who complained of heavy attacks on their villages by inland tribes, against whom they were unable to defend themselves because their own young men were away working for Europeans.\(^7^3\)

Thus Komine started working for the administration. Then he established a relationship with Germans, which contributed to practical and mutual benefits—Komine's search for a place to settle and Hahl's need of a vessel. The men's characters might also have contributed to some extent. Komine's agile nature which had been cultivated from his experiences in Korea in his late teens and Thursday Island in most of his 20s might have appealed to Hahl who 'was interested in individuals as individuals' of any race.\(^7^4\) Thus the usefulness of Komine and the development of his personal relationship with Hahl was probably an important reason for granting European status to the Japanese.

However, the European status was merely nominal. When court cases involving the Japanese arose, they were not heard in the European courts in a separate court constituted only for the Japanese.\(^7^5\) Similarly, the Germans were cautious about giving commercial advantage. The administration did not grant the right to purchase freehold to the Japanese. Indeed, the administration introduced a discriminatory law to restrict non-indigenous coloured people to acquire land: 'Land could not be purchased from the government by natives or by persons who had not equal rights with Europeans; and land could neither be bought nor leased by persons unable to read and write a European language'.\(^7^6\) Therefore the Japanese, who could not pass a European language test, were not equal to Europeans in respect of land acquisition. In addition, the Germans limited the land rights of the Japanese, and of the Chinese, to leases only for a term not exceeding 30 years.

This reluctance to concede equal land rights to the Japanese was manifested in the timing and location of a lease granted to Komine. It was in 1910 that Komine acquired a 1,000 hectare lease on Pityilu Island, Papitelai, Sou, Kali Bay, and Rambutyo Island in the

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\(^7^2\) Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3
\(^7^3\) Peter and Sack, 1980a, op.cit., p.92
\(^7^4\) Ibid., xii
\(^7^5\) Threlfall, op.cit., p.118
\(^7^6\) Report on Territory of New Guinea, 1922, Canberra, p.15
Eight years had passed since his arrival. It was a late acquisition, considering that the Japanese had enjoyed European status since 1905.

The location of the lease in Admiralty Islands also suggests the administration's unwillingness to transfer safe and profitable land. The Admiralty Islands were a frontier about 600 kilometres from Rabaul, where resistance to German rule was still strong and where few Germans were keen to settle. Indeed, Komine was attacked by islanders one year before he acquired the lease at Kali Bay, at the western end of Manus Island. The 1910-11 Annual Report reported the attack and unsuccessful punitive expeditions:

The natives had attacked a station on Kali Bay belonging to a Japanese called Komine and manned by seven native labourers. They had killed all the labourers and eaten some of them, and gained possession of two Mauser guns and forty cartridges. Unfortunately the expedition did not succeed either in retrieving these firearms or in finding the guilty parties. The punitive expeditions against the mountain people who had taken part in the previous year's attack were unfortunately also ineffective.78

Kali Bay remained an uncontrolled area until 1914.79 Although it is possible to speculate that the adventurous Komine spontaneously sought this pioneering role, he was after all acting for the benefit of the administration which was happy to send settlers to undeveloped frontiers.80

But Komine also capitalised on this chance. In 1911, he won a concession for pearl-fishing.81 In the same year he expanded his business in Rabaul and in 1912 he established a trading company. From 1912 onwards he was able to get permission to bring in Japanese employees for his expanding business in boat-building, trading, and coconut planting. Suddenly a relatively large number began to arrive. The administration raised no objection as far as they were labourers or artisans.82 The administration welcomed the Japanese because they alleviated the shortage of labour for the administration's public work. Some Japanese were even employed on road construction on mainland New Guinea. The sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island reported:

I hear the German authorities are using Japanese assisted by Chinese to construct roads to outlying posts and especially one long road which is opening up their territory towards the N.E. border of Papua. The Japanese are on a 2 year Indent.83

The Australian naval officer probably referred to road construction in the Morobe District which bordered north-east Papua. The 1913-14 German Annual Report also reported:

In the Morobe District, in addition to the existing inland road from Morobe to Piowaria, work has been started on a second inland road starting from the village of Mayama and running via Garaina to Ono at the foot of the Central Range....The construction of this road has proved very difficult because it passes in some places through uninhabited country and as the male population of the villages on and near

77 Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3
78 Sack and Clark, op.cit., 1980b, p.321
79 Ibid., p.62
80 Firth, Stewart, 1973, German Recruitment and Employment of Labourers in the Western Pacific before the First World War, doctoral thesis, Oxford University, Oxford, p.313
81 Sack, Peter and Clark, Dymphna (eds. and translation), 1979, German New Guinea: The Annual Reports, Australian University Press, Canberra, p.346
82 Report on Territory of New Guinea, 1922, op.cit., p.15
83 Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary of Navy Office, 17 November 1913, AA MP1049/1 1913/0326
the coast has been greatly reduced by labour recruitment, they could supply very little requisitioned labour.\(^8\)

Although no Japanese or Chinese labourers were mentioned in the German report, the location of the road construction is identical to that in the Australian report. It is very likely that the Japanese and Chinese were used to make up for the lack of local labour.

Thus, unlike their counterparts in Australia, the Japanese were accepted in the German colony. Komine's ability to seize the chance to serve German interests in order to entrench his own, was probably the main contributing factor. Fortunately, his desire was consistent with the administration's urgent task to ameliorate the 'unceasing demands for labour\(^8\) to develop its territory.

**Australian fear of Japanese in German New Guinea**

In the early 1910s, the Australian government was nervously monitoring Komine's activity in the Admiralty Islands for fear of any Japanese expansion in the South Pacific. The Australian fear was instigated by a newspaper article which warned about Japanese expansion in the central Pacific:

> It was from Hawaii that the Japanese first began to enter California in large numbers and it appears likely that they will use the same island as a starting point for their trade with South American ports and with the islands of the Pacific....Already a new steamship service has been started from Hilo to trade with the South America coast....and a Japanese syndicate obtained control of the Admiralty Islands.\(^8\)

Responding to the article, the Governor-General requested the Prime Minister to investigate the matter, which was passed to the Defence Department and finally to the sub-district naval officer on Thursday Island.\(^8\) The naval officer revealed Komine's presence in the Admiralty Islands in his third report:

> Several Japanese who went over to the Admiralty Islands from Thursday island did remain there. A Japanese named Komini [sic] went in for trading and as far as I can ascertain is there now. I have recently heard rumours that the Japanese are encouraged to go to German New Guinea but can get no further information as to any concession having been granted to a Japanese Company in the Admiralty Islands.\(^8\)

Faster than the naval officer, the British Ambassador in Tokyo carried out an investigation. His report confirmed the operation of a small Japanese enterprise, the Nanyō Kōgyō Kaisha (the South Seas Industry Company) in the Admiralty Islands. He also noted the smallness of the company's operation and its weak connection to the Japanese government:

> The Nanyo Kogyo Kaisha is a very small concern, newly started, with a capital of only £5,000 and one schooner....It is true that the ventures referred to above appear to be more in the nature of private enterprises than of Government undertakings, but it seems as if the Japanese, finding themselves more and more excluded from the well

\(^8\)Sack and Clark, 1980b, op.cit., p.p.35-36  
\(^8\)Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1913  
\(^8\)Memorandum from the Governor-General to the Prime Minister, 10 July 1913; Prime Minister to the Secretary of the Defence Department, 22 July 1913; Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 27/ July 1913, AA, MP1049/1 1913/0326  
\(^8\)Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 10 September 1913, ibid.
favoured countries already in the possession of white people, were casting about for outlets for over-population in climates congenial to their physical conditions. As regards German possessions, I am assured although it is true that there are a number of Japanese labourers employed in New Guinea, yet it seems tolerably certain that no Japanese control has been secured of any place either in the Admiralty Islands or in the Bismarck Archipelago. 

However, the ambassador also stressed the growing Japanese interests in the South Seas quoting an ambitious statement by Naval Commander Hosaka, the captain of a cruiser, despatched to the South Pacific by the government to search of suitable places for emigration.

Commander, Hosaka, of the Imperial Navy, who recently completed a tour of some of the South Seas Islands, has reported to his Government that they are most suitable for settlement, and have great resources still unexploited...In the islands under British control the aggression of a Japanese or a Chinese population is not permitted, but in those under French, German, and Dutch authorities Asiatic immigration is encouraged as the demand for labour increases.

As explained earlier, Hosaka did not represent the policy of the Japanese government, for no government officials or influential intellectuals showed much interest in the South Seas in this period. And Australian investigations hardly substantiated the existence of systematic Japanese expansion. However, the Australian government, having a traditional fear of invasion from the north, picked up every tiny matter which seemed to be connected to Japanese expansion. Australians, relieved by squeezing out the Japanese on Thursday Island, continued to be annoyed by the same Japanese in the German territory.

Japanese settlers

There are several episodes of Komine known both from written and oral sources. Most recount his heroic feats of fighting against New Guineans and of reconciling tribal disputes to assist the administration's punitive expeditions. The report of Tatsue Yoshinobu, the directing manager of an emigration company, the Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha (the Overseas Industry Company Co. Ltd.), indicates that Komine was actively involved in fighting rather than merely providing his vessel. Based on Komine's story as told to him, Tatsue wrote about Komine's fighting against islanders at Tahara village near Namatanai in New Ireland in the early 1900s:

The house of Tancornan [a chieftain of Tahara village] was well fortified with a sheer mountain at its back and with many fences at the front. When Komine subjugated the village, he sneaked up to the top of the mountain bypassing the forest and from there he started shooting his rifle. This surprise attack scattered many villagers. But Tancornan did not run away and was looking around trying to find the enemy. In the moment he paused to stare, he was shot and fell down, but he rose up furiously and tried to fight with his spear. But he was shot again and he was killed with his daughter.

Komine's actions on behalf of German punitive expeditions were also recorded by an anthropologist, Francis Bell. During his field research, Bell discovered the story of Komine's

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89 Report by Conyngham Greene, 8 July 1913, ibid.
90 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 October 1913, 'The Islands. Japanese Aggression. Menace to Australia'
91 Tatsue Yoshinobu, 1925, *Nyūginia bankai tanken kikō (3)* [Accounts of exploration to barbarian world in New Guinea], *Shokumin* [The Colonial Review], Vol.4, No.1, Nihon shokumin tōshin-sha, Tokyo, p.p.112-119
peace-making among the people in Boieng, an island about 70 kilometres west-north-west of Namatanai:

About twenty years ago the island of Boieng was visited by a Japanese trader named Komini [sic]. Apparently on behalf of the German Administration, for he assembled all men of the island at a place named Angfara, and there held a huge peacemaking feast. The ovens, which were specially made for this feast, can still be seen, and the coconut palms which he induced the leaders of the rival clans to plant still flourish today. The main feature connected with the feast was the destruction of all fighting weapons. I am assured by men who were present that thousands of spears and clubs were destroyed on this occasion.92

This feat probably owed much to Komine's competence in languages: he could speak eight languages—English, German, Spanish, Pidgin and several indigenous languages.93 Most likely this ability as well as navigation skill proved useful to punitive expeditions, which encouraged the pragmatic Hahl to use him.

Not only his practical skills but also his strong character contributed to establishing relations with Germans. Komine was extremely disciplined and industrious. He used to sleep only three hours a night, studied and checked all his premises before breakfast. His obsessiveness is shown by the following episode:

When my father, Mantoku [Mantoku Komine, Isokichi's nephew], went to Rabaul to help with Uncle Isokichi's business, my father was scolded because he went to the toilet before breakfast. To Uncle Isokichi from the time of getting out of bed, people should do something productive. Going to the toilet before doing something was a sign of laziness. My father told me Uncle Isokichi used to tell my father, 'If you remembered one word of a foreign language a day, you would be pretty fluent in one language in one year.'94

Hahl also might have acquired some fondness for the Japanese after his holiday trip to Japan in 1910. He wrote in his diary: 'In Japan we spent our time in Nara and Kyoto, as these beautiful centres of ancient Japanese art and religion held far more appeal for us than the hurry and bustle in the port.'95 Coincidentally, Komine's acquisition of a lease in the Admiralty Islands occurred in the same year.

Until 1910, Komine seems to have been not only employed by the administration on various duties but also acting as an agent for German companies. In 1907 he acted for Hernsheim and Co to start a plantation on Ponam Island, in the north of the Admiralty Groups.96 Then in 1910 the administration granted him a 1,000 hectare lease on the Admiralty Islands, where he began operating a copra plantation with more than ten Japanese foremen supervising several hundred native labourers. In the same year he set up a ship building yard on Manus and employed more than ten Japanese shipwrights. In 1911, he expanded his ship building business to Rabaul on a one hectare waterfront lease. This business prospered. He received many orders for building ships from the administration

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93 Interview by the author with Saô Yachiyo (daughter of a nephew of Isokichi Komine), 1 July 1993, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki, Japan
94 Ibid.
95 Sack and Clark, 1980b, op.cit., p.p.133-134
96 German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. Suzuki, 5 August 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240
and recruited more Japanese shipwrights. His yard produced two large sailing ships with full fittings every three months and the annual profit exceeded 50,000 yen. In the same year he also started trading. In 1912, he invested the profits from ship building and trade in copra plantations and completed planting trees on all his 1,000 hectares on Manus.97

In 1912 he established the Nanyo Kögyō Kaisha after he gained further concessions from the administration—a 500 hectare lease (location unknown), rights to fish and collect marine products, and the Company's right about bringing in Japanese employees with the condition that he comply with the administration's law on labour contracts, living standards, health, payment of wages, return to home country, protection and so on.98 The Germans seems to have funded, at least partly, the establishment of the company. Komine had a deal to repay the debt by providing services (mainly repairing government vessels) to the administration.99 The company's headquarters were at Kobe in Japan where he bought materials for ship building and sent his shell and copra from New Guinea.100

The establishment of the company elevated Komine to a higher social status, as he won the support of Samejima San'nosuke, who was a descendent of the samurai of Satsuma and more importantly an acquaintance of Admiral Kamimura Hikonojō.101 Kamimura seemed to have heard about Komine somehow, and he recommended Samejima to work for Komine.102 Thus, although indirectly, Komine was acquainted with the Admiral. Like Enomoto, Kamimura was enthusiastic about Japan's nanshin and inspired Samejima, saying:

New Guinea is an important point in the Pacific. To establish a Japanese fort in New Guinea is a necessity for the defence of Japan. Your company is not merely a profit-seeking company. Your company is serving our nation.103

It is quite conceivable that the words of encouragement from the Admiral stimulated Komine's patriotism. Probably it was also around this time that Komine's patriotism began to be manifested, as in the following episode:

One night Uncle Isokichi was invited to dinner with the German Governor. During the dinner, the Governor remarked, 'the Japanese are poor, because you use wooden chopsticks to eat food, but Germans use silver cutlery'. After the dinner, Uncle Isokichi came home, indignant, and at once ordered thousands of chopsticks from Japan. Then at the next dinner with the Governor, Uncle Isokichi said, 'Germans use the same cutlery every time, but we use chopsticks only once and throw them away to make sure we use new ones all the time.'104

97Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3
98Concessions of the German administration with Japanese translation, 18 May 1913, JDR 3.5.2.201
99Samejima San'nosuke, date unknown, 'Senji zaizai jōkyō hōkoku sho' [Report on the local situation during the war], Komine Shigenori's possession, Nagasaki, Japan, p.1
100Kamijō, Fukashi, 1941, Sensen ichi man kairi: Zen sekai taisen ji nan'yō no sen-shi [War front in a thousand miles away: war history in the South Seas in the previous war], Nan'yō guntō bunka kyōkai, Tokyo, p.184
101Kaihō ryōken kafu-kō, January to March 1914, JDR 3.6.5.8; Toyama, Misao, 1984, Riku-kaigun shōkan jinji sōran (kaigun hen) [The personnel list of Army and Navy officers (Volume for Navy)], Fuyō shobō, Tokyo, p.29
102Fuji Ken, 1939, Nyūginia sono fukin tōsho no dozoku hin [Artefacts of New Guinean and adjacent islands], Gohachi, Tokyo, p.5
103Kamijō, op.cit., p.184; Ōno Yoshicharu, 1942, Tōa kyōei-ken to nyūginia [The East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and New Guinea], Tōe shoin, Tokyo, p.169
104Interview with Satō, op.cit.
In the last year of German rule, Komine began to make his way to becoming a business tycoon. In 1913, he returned to Japan to arrange for further expansion of his business. He successfully approached leading Japanese businessmen—Baron Tsuji Shinji, Lord Matsukata Kōshirō (an owner of Kawasaki Ship Building Company), Lord Shimura Gentarō, Murai Yoshibe (a president of the Imperial Hotel), Ōkura Kihachirō (a member of the Japan Trade Association) and Fukushima Namizō (auditor of the Asahi Life Insurance Company). Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I wrecked the plan. However, during his visit, he also met Admiral Kamimura. It was a memorable meeting to Komine, and a photograph was taken, showing Komine in a smart western coat standing with Kamimura in uniform with many medals. It was symbolic of Komine's success. A former pearl diver was now standing with an Admiral like equal partners.105

New Guineans also remember Komine. Several stories have been handed down from generation to generation. The elders on Ponam Island tell the story of when Komine's schooner 'Zabra' was stranded on the reef of their island in 1907. The story was also mentioned in the correspondence from the German Consul-General.106 The islanders relate:

Komine's boat was wrecked on the reef near the island, but he and his crew were frightened to land on the island because they thought we would kill him. They collected stones, laid them on the reef, built a hut and stayed there for two months. Finally the luluai of the island invited them to the island, then Komine agreed to settle on the island. After his boat was repaired, he went back to Pityilu where his plantation was. Komine was a big man and we thought he was an administrator at Rabaul. Komine was respected like a kiap. He was a hard man, too. When he got sick in Rabaul, he asked Ponam people to catch a turtle so that he can drink its blood. He told his employees to keep good relationships with the locals, otherwise they were dismissed and sent back to Japan.107

The story tends to confirm that Komine was working for the administration or at least had some close association with it as he was thought to be an administrator. Although the story also suggests that he had a plantation on Pityilu Island (near Lorengau in the Admiralty Islands), it could be that the memory of islanders about the time is incorrect, or that Komine was working for other planters on the island, because the administration had not yet given him a lease at this time. Komine's footprint also remains in the name of an island. In Kali Bay, Komine named a small island 'Nihon Island' ('Nihon' means Japan in Japanese) and the island still retains that name.108

Elders of Sou, a village on the north coast of Manus, also relate the coming of Komine.

Komine and other Japanese came to Sou in 1912. Master Komine and 2nd boss, Sisiki-san (Sasaki) came from Rabaul in an engine boat. They dived for shells. They built a small shed for building a boat and built one boat from bush materials and brought an engine from Japan. The name of the boat was 'Kurti Andru' [a name of

105The photograph is possessed by Shigenori Komine, a grandson of Komine's nephew, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki, Japan
106German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. Suzuki, 5 August 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240
107Interview by the author with Sohou, Alphonse Kawei and Mohak, Pious Pweleheu (elders), 11 February 1994, Ponam Island, Manus, PNG
108Interview by the author to Posman, Michael (a local from Kali Bay), 12 February 1994, Lorengau, Manus, PNG
the district. He started a plantation at Ndromalmal. In the plantation, Komine employed plenty local people on contract. He brought some labourers from Rabaul. He paid the wages by tobacco, food and dog teeth. He bought land from locals by axes, beads and laplap. He used to just come to the plantation to inspect the management and go back to Rabaul. He spoke Pidgin.109

Komine's Japanese wife, Chō, was also assisting in his business. The issue of her passport for New Guinea was recorded from 1908 and the second was issued in 1910 with the stated purpose of commerce.110 She was born in Jūzenji-chō in Nagasaki City in 1871. She was a beautiful and elegant lady and, like Komine, very diligent and particularly fussy about the way money was spent.111 The couple was exceptionally outgoing for Japanese. Their formal appearance at Government functions, Chō in traditional kimono and obi, attracted the curious eyes of other white residents in Rabaul.112 A flamboyant and dedicated wife was a perfect match for a tough and determined businessman and her presence made him more eminent in the social life of cosmopolitan Rabaul.

Komine's memory overshadows other Japanese, as most were his employees and their activities were under his business operations. As a result, information about other Japanese in official records and oral sources are relatively scarce. However, records were kept on four Japanese who remained in New Guinea until the outbreak of the Pacific War. They are Izumi Eikichi, Endō Shigetarō, Hagiwara Hikota, and Ikesaki Tokuyoshi. Significantly they all married New Guinean girls in the later period.

Izumi was born in Goryō village, Amakusa, Kumamoto prefecture in 1894. He came to Rabaul in 1913 as a boat builder,113 with his younger brother, Torakaku, who was a carpenter.114 Eikichi's nephew, Takashi, also came to New Guinea in 1937.115

Endō was born in Tokushima prefecture in 1892. He came to Rabaul on 5 April 1914 to work for Komine as a boat builder.116

Hagiwara was born in Teno village, Amakusa, Kumamoto prefecture in 1892.117 He came as a sawmill hand to work in the Admiralty Islands.118

Ikesaki was born in Goryō village, Amakusa, Kumamoto prefecture in 1895.119 He came as a boat builder but worked on a plantation in the Admiralty Islands.120 Tokuyoshi

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109 Interview by the author with Ndrahok, Andrew, Kereng, Paul Menei and Tondrih, Gabriel (elders), 17 February 1994, Sou, Manus, PNG
110 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, July 1908 & April 1910, JDR 3.8.5.8
111 Interview with Satō, op. cit.
112 Threlfall, op. cit., p.119
113 Interview with Japanese Internees at No.4 camp, Taura, Case No.88, IZUMI, Eikichi, 23 July 1946, AA A367 C72538
114 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, January to March 1913, JDR 3.8.5.8
115 Ibid., July to September, 1937, JDR 3.8.5.8
116 Interview with Japanese Internees at No.4 camp, Taura, Case No.90, ENDO, Shigetaro, 23 July 1946, AA A367 C72539
117 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, August to December, 1912, JDR 3.8.5.8
118 Interview with Japanese Internees at No.4 camp, Taura, Case No.69, HAGIWARA, Hikota, 23 July 1946, AA A367 C72534
119 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, August to December, 1912, JDR 3.8.5.8
120 Interview with Japanese Internees at No.4 camp, Taura, Case No.65, IKEZAKI, Tokuyoshi, 23 July 1946, AA A367 C72537
came with three other relatives of the Ikesaki clan—Yūtarō, Tsunekuma, and Masashichi—from the same village.121

5. Relevance to Japanese social history

As the analyses in the previous chapter show, migration in this period also reflected Japanese social history. They kept on coming from the rural south-west where underdevelopment continued as industrialisation was entrenched in urban centres. Rural depression intensified, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, when industrialisation gained momentum with the rapid growth of the export-oriented industries such as silk and cotton. The major impact on rural areas was the destruction of self-sufficiency as agricultural production was integrated into the development of export commodities.122 As a result, rural-urban inequality increased, which accelerated the tempo of the emigration of the rural people to urban centres and overseas. The statistics verify this. In only ten years from 1904 to 1914, the number of overseas emigrants increased nearly threefold—from 138,591 in 1904 to 358,711 in 1914.123 The same tendency was seen in migration to Papua and New Guinea. The number increased from a mere 2 in 1906 to 109 in 1914 (see above) and most came from Kyūshū; 33 from Kumamoto, 28 from Nagasaki, and 8 from Saga.124

Most migrants were dekasegi-sha (literally 'people leaving to earn money') on three year contracts,125 the same type of people seen in urban factories. The largest occupational group were artisans: 41 shipwrights, 18 carpenters and 13 sawyers. Many of them were from Goryō village and Oniike village in Amakusa. These villages were famous for boat building from the Edo era, but in about 1907 many shipwrights lost their jobs due to the recession in the shipping industry.126 Eleven fishermen were another significant group. They came from fishing villages such as Isahaya-chō (Kita-takaki-gun, Nagasaki prefecture) and Jōgashima (Misaki-chō, Miura-gun, Kanagawa prefecture). The general trend in fishing villages in this period was also a loss of jobs due to the development of modern capital-intensive fishery and thereby the decline of small fishermen.127 Thus, the migrants' employment situation constituted a 'push' factor for emigration. Inevitably, like the migration to Thursday Island, the high wages in New Guinea became a major 'pull' factor.

In addition, the German administration's different treatment of the Japanese relative to other Asians possibly became a 'pull' factor. The granting of European status delighted

121Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, August to December, 1912, JDR 3.8.5.8
123Ishikawa, 1972, op.cit.
124Data from the information Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, 1912-1914, JDR 3.8.5.8
125A correspondence of German ambassador at Kobe, 25 September 1912, G2 Item V.II, folio 66, AA German Microfilm
126Motoda Shigeo, 1926, Amakusa an'nai [Amakusa Guide], Ushio-kai, Kumamoto, p.135
the Japanese who had been rejected in Australia because they were Asians. The migrants very likely felt that the Germans recognised their national identity as subjects of an emerging empire which was, they perhaps thought, distinctive from other Asian countries. Although in reality the migrants were the victims of empire-building which increased the poverty of rural Japan, the improvement of their status from poor rustics to 'Europeans' satisfied their pride. Of course, such a pride was merely an illusion which would vanish as soon as they returned to their impoverished villages, but it was a sweet illusion that attracted the migrants to the land of 'dojin'.

6. Relevance to colonial history of New Guinea

Within the German colony where people's lives were strictly governed according to race, the Japanese presence was anomalous. The Japanese community developed into a 'mini' colony. The Japanese were colonial masters in their relationships with New Guineans. Like their German counterparts, they were traders, boat builders, shell collectors and planters, recruiting and employing islanders as crew and labourers. Yet their economic activities were largely independent of their German counterparts. Mainly through Komine's Nan'yo Sangyo Kaisha, the Japanese exported copra, shell and marine products to Japan and imported miscellaneous goods from Japan. Thus the Japanese developed a colonial relation between Japan and New Guinea in that Japan extracted primary products by means of a cheap indigenous labour force and provided light manufactured goods in exchange.

The development of the mini colony can be ascribed to the German acceptance of the Japanese as having a place among the rulers in their colonial apparatus. The Germans had two reasons. First, the Japanese alleviated the skilled labour shortage. Second, they assisted in maintaining and reinforcing the colonial structure. In helping contain New Guineans' challenges to the colonial structure, the Japanese were useful, particularly Komine who was willing to assist in punitive expeditions. It is even possible that the administration granted the Japanese European status partly to reinforce the colonial apparatus. That may also show how their national identity (as subjects of an expanding empire) facilitated the entry of migrants to the ruling group, considering that the Chinese were excluded and largely remained in an intermediate position between the whites and New Guineans. Thus the Japanese 'mini' colony functioned to consolidate German rule, although that was, of course, on condition that the Japanese posed no threat to German interests.

The emergence of the Japanese community at Rabaul also contributed to the development of its landscape. Rabaul expanded rapidly after the administration decided to shift its capital from Herbertshöhe in 1910. Buildings, roads and wharves were constructed for a well-planned township. New arrivals from Japan also increased the demand for new

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128 The Japanese term which literally means indigenous people and often used with contempt.
129 McCarthy, J.K., 1972, New Guinea: Our Nearest Neighbour, Cheshire, Melbourne, p.73
dwellings. The 1912-13 Annual Report reported the extension of Komine's boat-building yard by the construction of a number of dwelling-houses for his new employees.\textsuperscript{130} However, as in the case of land rights, although Europeans in legal status, the Japanese were not accepted in the European residential areas. Some Japanese lived on Komine's waterfront lease while others lived in Malayatown and Chinatown. As those towns were for non-Europeans, the Japanese European status was in reality nominal.\textsuperscript{131}

The emergence of a sizeable Japanese population was even accompanied by a Japanese brothel.\textsuperscript{132} Generally, as Yano argues from his analysis on the patterns of Japanese business expansion in Southeast Asia, particularly at Singapore, the presence of karayuki-san can be considered a barometer of Japanese prosperity.\textsuperscript{133} However, their presence at Rabaul shows a different pattern. In Southeast Asia, karayuki-san spearheaded Japanese business expansion, and they were followed by traders who mainly sold sundries to them. In contrast, in New Guinea, Komine was the first Japanese to arrive and to initiate business activity, and independent of Komine, the karayuki-san arrived. Indeed, it was Ah Tam in 1904, a wealthy and successful Chinese businessman at Rabaul, who brought the first karayuki-san to make them serve 'the need of Chinese and European men'.\textsuperscript{134} Later Japanese migrants, mostly artisans employed in Komine's business, were also different from those traders in Southeast Asia. Thus, the presence of karayuki-san in New Guinea does not conform to the Southeast Asian pattern, but demonstrates Ah Tam's entrepreneurship.

According to Threlfall, in the social life of Rabaul, the Japanese largely remained an isolated group except for the formal appearance of Komine and his wife at administration's functions.\textsuperscript{135} He also emphasises their religious alienation and secretiveness: 'Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese remained totally unreceptive to Christianity, but the practice of their Shintō religion, like their own forms of entertainment, was a private matter which outsiders were not invited to witness.' His observation is probably correct but does not explain why the Japanese distanced themselves from the wide social life. Since most were from rural areas where very little western culture was introduced, Rabaul was the first place of contact with the West for most of them. As a result, it is likely that difficulties in language and manners, in addition to their transient nature, caused them to distance themselves and encouraged them to form their own 'alienated' group. However, as Threlfall observes, the white population saw this situation as a sign of Japanese secrecy. This view was possibly reinforced, especially after seeing the Chinese practice of noisy New Year celebrations which were obvious to every resident of Rabaul.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130}Sack and Clark, 1979, op.cit., p.370
\item \textsuperscript{131}Threlfall, op.cit., p.118
\item \textsuperscript{132}Kawasaki and Maruba, op.cit., p.3
\item \textsuperscript{133}Yano, 1975, op.cit., p.43
\item \textsuperscript{134}Wu, David, 1982, \textit{The Chinese in Papua New Guinea 1880-1980}, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, p.52
\item \textsuperscript{135}Threlfall, op.cit., p.119
\end{itemize}
Conclusion

Japanese migration to both Papua and New Guinea was an offshoot from the settlement on Thursday Island. The migrants came from impoverished rural Japan (such as southern Wakayama and Kyūshū) and engaged in the pearling industry which promised a far better income. This economic incentive made the Island prosper and created a Japanese community, but Australians began to restrain the Japanese operations from the late 1890s.

Consequently some Japanese moved to Papua and New Guinea. The overall presence of the Japanese in Papua and New Guinea shows a sharp difference from other migrants in other South Pacific Islands (Fiji, New Caledonia and Makatea), in that they were not indentured labourers. The Japanese in Papua and New Guinea were independent businessmen and their employees. Particularly in German New Guinea they developed a settlement which came be a colony. Its growth owed much to Komine's personality and endeavours.

However, the Japanese colony's development differed greatly between Papua and New Guinea. In Papua the Japanese had almost no relations with Japan and they were outside the concerns of the Australian administration. Papua was an extension of a white periphery from northern Australia, and the administration rigorously restricted Asian migration. As a result, only a small number of the Japanese managed to settle. However, unlike in Thursday Island, they were not working class which could threaten their Australian counterparts. They were not masters, either: they almost melted into a village life and lived like village-based artisans or at best petty traders. In the racial hierarchy, they were closer to Papuans than to the Australians, so the Australian officials had no reasons to be concerned about them.

By contrast, the Japanese in New Guinea had interacted both with the German administration and with Japan. There was a space for them. The administration was suffering from chronic shortage of labour and vessels to develop the territory. The practical Germans regarded the Japanese as one of the means to solve these problems. The Germans were happy utilising the Japanese labour (not as labourers but as skilled artisans) or using Japanese vessels. Demand for the Japanese was made, and more Japanese came. And as an incentive, the Germans granted the Japanese an European status although nominal—a welcome gesture for those who experienced a bitter discrimination in Thursday Island. the Germans were successful in utilising the Japanese to reinforce their rule over New Guineans. They devised a mechanism. They were generous in giving concessions to Komine and allowed him to be a master (he became a planter). But his establishment of the business was funded by the administration, which he had to repay by serving the administration. Komine often acted as an agent of the administration in trading copra, recruiting labourers and pacifying New Guinean resistance. He also made and repaired boats for the administration. Komine's business prospered, but he was always subordinate to the Germans. His prosperity meant German prosperity. The mechanism worked well, because no Japanese industrialists
or officials showed strong interest in New Guinea. Komine had no choice but to rely on the Germans to realise his business ambition. Thus Japanese imperial policies, which were mainly directed to East Asia, and German colonial policies created the subordinate position of the Japanese with nominal master's status.
Chapter 3. Turning point, 1914-1918

Introduction

Until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Japanese migration to New Guinea was constantly increasing. The number of passports issued before August was 32 compared to 22 of 1913. The war impeded further increase. In 1915 no passport to passengers bound for New Guinea was issued.1 The battle in New Guinea was so small that no Japanese were injured nor their property damaged, but the uncertainty about the future of the colony affected Komine's business greatly. No new orders for shipbuilding came and trading stopped. Under Australian military rule, the Japanese faced the challenge to create good relations with them, abandoning the long-term relations with the Germans. Japan was allied to Britain, which meant fighting alongside Australia against Germany. Therefore the war obliged the Japanese to switch their relations with white rulers from the Germans and to the Australians.

1. World War I

The outbreak of World War I on 1 August 1914 brought an unexpected blessing for Japan. Marquess Kaoru Inoue wrote to Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and Prince Field Marshal Yamagata Airtomo that the war in Europe was tenyō (heaven-sent help) and the best opportunity to entrench Japanese interests in East Asia for the future.2 Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki also saw the war as a chance to 'sweep away German bases in the East'.3 The inability of western powers to engage in a war on two fronts—Europe and the Pacific-Asia—also encouraged Japan to enter the conflict. Britain, being 'unable to keep control of the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time',4 invited Japan to neutralise the German forces in China and the South Pacific that were threatening British interests at Hong Kong and Weihaiwei.

Although Britain suspected the Japanese of territorial ambitions and intended to limit Japanese actions, Japan refused to accept any restrictions and declared war on 23 August on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.5 Japan's primary object was to acquire the Kiaochow Bay Leased Territory in Shantung Peninsula which Germany had taken after

1Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō [The list of overseas passport issues], 1913-1915, JDR, 3.8.5.8
3Ibid.
intervening in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 in which Japan acquired the area as spoil after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, but Russia, France and Germany, fearing Japanese expansion in East Asia, intervened and Germany took the area and developed it as a base of its East Asian interests. On 27 August, the Japanese navy blockaded Kiaochow Bay and the army sent in 29,000 soldiers. Combined with 2,800 British soldiers, the Allied forces attacked the German fortress at Tsingtao, defended by 7,000. Surrounded by overwhelming forces, the Germans capitulated on 7 November. The Japanese advanced and seized the Shantung Railway. Meanwhile the navy had occupied German Micronesia by October and joined the British navy in chasing the German East Asian squadron that was destroyed off the Folkland Islands on 8 December. The navy also assisted the Allies in escort duties: helping guard the Australian and New Zealand convoys crossing the Indian Ocean. Later they were deployed in the Mediterranean.

The Germans in the Pacific were poorly prepared for the war. They had no forces capable of fighting in Samoa, the Marshalls or the Carolines. Their only garrison, at Rabaul, consisted of 240 native soldiers and 61 Europeans but had no fixed defences or field artillery, and one machine gun was in Madang in New Guinea. The Germans were 'fully aware of their own military weakness' and attempted in vain through diplomacy to exclude China and the Pacific from the fighting zone.

Consequently, suffering very light military losses (about five hundred dead), Japan took over the German interests in the Shantung Peninsula and entrenched their rule over southern Manchuria by acquiring the lease of the Kwantung Province and the Manchurian Railway after forcing the infamous Twenty-One Demand china in 1915. Simultaneously the navy, led by an aggressive group anticipating future war with the US in the Pacific, acted swiftly in occupying German Micronesia. The Japanese occupation was hardly publicised. Hirama rightly argues that the navy knew that possession of Micronesia would be decided at the peace conference after the war and thereby tried to achieve a swift action. The Japanese followed a western precedent that the first to establish a military presence could claim possession.

In the decade prior to the war, Australian anxieties about its security against Japan were increasing, particularly after Britain withdrew its naval forces from the Pacific to the North Seas. As a result, the new Commonwealth government was resolved to improve its defence capacity by developing an Australian navy, introducing compulsory military training and increasing defence expenditure 'which quadrupled in the five-year period prior to the outbreak of World War I'. However, Australia's main commitment to the war was

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7Barclay, op.cit., p.150
8Ibid., p.32
10Camilleri, J.A., 1975, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, second edition, Jacaranda Press, Sydney, p.45
directed to Europe rather than the Pacific. That was largely due to the smallness of German
forces in the Pacific, but it was also affected by the traditional Australian perception that
the maintenance of British power was vital to its security. Australia's political, economic and
racial ties with Britain promoted its imperial commitment, with the emergence of
Australian nationalism which was 'strongly overlapped by an imperial spirit'. Australia's
commitment in Europe increased in September 1914 when William Hughes 'took the
portfolio of Attorney-General and soon began to dominate cabinet and caucus by the force
of his personality'. In October 1915 Hughes became Prime Minister and pursued his
policy to assist Britain by trying in vain to introduce conscription. Nevertheless, Australia
kept sending troops to Egypt, Gallipoli and the western front in France. The cost was
enormous: 59,342 were killed and 152,171 were wounded and 364 million pounds were
spent between 1914 and 1919.

Australians were quick in occupying the German territories south of the equator:
Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarcks and Nauru. They fought a small battle in New Guinea
more than two weeks before a Japanese warship anchored off Jaluit on 30 September. The
Australian government dispatched the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force
consisting of six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, a battalion of infantry at
war strength (1.023 strong), two machine-gun sections, a signalling section, and a
detachment of the Australian Army Medical Corps. The destruction of a German wireless
station at Bitapaka near Kokopo and the occupation of German New Guinea were their
major tasks. The Germans in New Britain surrendered shortly after the wireless station was
taken. On 12 September, the Australians occupied Rabaul, then Madang on 26th. The 'only
real fight' of the operation was the battle for the Bitapaka station which incurred casualties
of only '2 officers and 4 men killed'. The Australian occupation was easy, like the
Japanese occupation of Micronesia.

Although the war was essentially a European event for both Japan and Australia,
their occupation of the Pacific islands had important strategic significance—for Japan to
counter the US naval force and for Australia to keep the Japanese from expanding further
south. What is more important in terms of colonial history in the Pacific was that the defeat
of Germans 'ushered in a new era' with a new 'political map'. New colonial masters took
over German interests with superior military strength: the Japanese in Micronesia,

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11 Nearly 400,000 Britons migrated to Australia between 1906 and 1914, Millar, T.B., 1991, *Australia in Peace
and War*, second edition, Australian National University Press, Canberra, p.27
12 Ibid., p.28
14 Ibid., p.213
15 MacKenzie, S.S., op.cit., p.23
17 MacKenzie, op.cit., p.73
19 Nelson, Hank, 1995, 'Sacred trust and self-interest: Australia, Rabaul and beyond', Wilcox, Craig (ed.), *The
Great War: gains and losses—ANZAC and Empire*, Australian War memorial and Australian National University,
Canberra, p.90
Australians in New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealanders in Samoa. The new map was finally endorsed in 1921, a result of the Paris Peace Conference.

2. Rise of nanshin

The Japanese occupation of German Micronesia revived nan'yō fever which had been cooling towards the end of the Meiji period (1868-1912). Nanshin-ron advocates quickly expressed their enthusiasm in literature. As early as December 1914, Nan'yō bōkei chōsa-kai (the South Seas Trade Investigation Society) began to promote emigration to the islands:

Among the South Seas islands, Japanese flags are raised high on the Mariana Islands, closest to Japan, on the Marshalls and Carolines. Is not today the time easiest to emigrate to those islands?...Go, go, go and develop that heaven-sent treasure in the Pacific.20

Their enthusiasm is shown by the number of publications. According to the bibliography of the Nihon takushoku kyōkai (Japan Colonisation Society), the number of publications even for general references to the South Seas was phenomenal: in only three years from 1915 to 1918 28 pieces were published—a remarkable contrast to the 30 pieces published in the previous 46 years from 1868.21

Ideas about nanshin also changed. Shimizu argues that the outbreak of the war was a turning point in the evolution of nanshin-ron, from the Meiji nanshin-ron which emphasised peaceful economic expansion to the Taishō nanshin-ron which was a blatantly expansionist ideology.22 Taishō advocates expressed their territorial desire and proposed to establish a Japanese block in the South Seas. They almost ignored the idea of peaceful economic expansion and instead asserted Japanese right in the South Seas emphasising the geographical proximity (compared to the western powers) and Japan's historical linkage. The Japanese occupation of Micronesia made such evolution possible. Southeast Asia and Melanesia were now immediate neighbours. Japanese vessels could reach Singapore, Manila and Rabaul in much less days from Ponape than from Yokohama or Kobe.

Tokutomi Sohō23 and Inoue Masaji were the leading advocates who facilitated the ideological evolution. Tokutomi played a crucial role. His interpretation that 'nanshin-ron was an ideology to supplement nanboku heishin-ron [the theory of simultaneous advance to the south and the north] and hokushin-ron [the northward advance theory] reconciled the conflict between the navy-led nanshin-ron and the army-led hokushin-ron. Until then
the army's *hokushin-ron* had been overwhelming the navy's *nanshin-ron*. The *hokushin-ron* meant the advancement to the continent in East Asia, and had been a pillar of Japanese imperial strategy after its victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Tokutomi also introduced Pan-Asianism, calling it Japan's 'moral imperialism', in which Asians had to be freed from white rule by Japanese. In this, he included the South Seas as the region where the white rule had to be removed. Thus he subtly combined *nanshin* with Pan-Asianism, and appealed to the nationalists who had been asserting Japan's stronger role to lead Asia. Tokutomi was also practical and influential. He virtually controlled *nanyō* publications, supervising and publishing them through his publishing company Minyū-sha.

Inoue was more impressive. He advocated a stronger and simpler form of expansionism than Tokutomi, although he did not follow Tokutomi's argument on the combination of *nanshin* and *hokushin* or 'moral imperialism'. In 1915 Inoue published *Nanyō*, one of the best known *nanshin* books which he emphasised that the South Seas were a natural sphere of Japanese territory, using the word 'dai nihon-shugi' [Great Japanism]:

*With Asianism as a final object, in order to achieve Great Japanism, although it is necessary to acquire the territories north of Korea, expansion towards the south is more important and natural. Historical relations between Japan and the South Seas as well as geographical relations concede and promote Japan's southward advancement.*

The same argument was introduced by Nitobe Inazō, a well-known liberal. In 1915, he wrote an article titled 'Bunmei no nanshin' [The Southward advancement of civilisation], in which he introduced a unique but baseless idea that the Japanese were attracted to the South Seas because they had Malay ancestry.

*What was more characteristic about *nanshin-ron* in this period was that ideological evolution was followed by commercialism. The trend is obvious from the titles of mainstream publications, which had hardly been seen before the outbreak of World War I, such as *Nanyō kane-mōke hyaku-wa* [A hundred stories about how to make money in the South Seas], *Nanyō tokō an'nai* [Guide book to go to the South Seas], *Nanyō no yashi saibai nitsuite* [About planting rubber in the South Pacific], *Nanyō ni okeru honpō shōhin gaiyō* [General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas] and so on. In 1915, *Jitsugyō no Nihon* [Business Japan], one of the most widely read business magazines, published a special issue, 'Nanyō-gō' [Issue for the South Seas]—'a 170-page issue, twice as thick as normal issues, was filled with information about the South Seas.*

The opening article was a landmark for the emergence of commercial *nanshin*:

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25Ibid.  
26Inoue Masaji, 1915, *Nanyō* [The South Seas], Toyama-bō, Tokyo, p.15  
27In Kamiya Tadataka, 1991, 'Nanyō shinwa no keisei' [The formation of the South Seas myths], Yano Tōm (ed.), *Tōnan ajia-gaku 10 Tōnan ajia to nihon* [Southeast Asian Studies, vol.10, Southeast Asia and Japan], Kobun-dō, Tokyo, p.56  
28Umori Shinjirō, 1914, [publisher unknown]; Yoshida Harukichi, 1915, [publisher unknown]; Arima Hikokichi, 1915, *Nanyō keizai kenkyū-jo* [Japanese Historical View of the South Seas], Chūōkōron-sha, Tokyo  
29Jitsugyō no nihon-sha, 1915, No.7, Tokyo  
30Yano Toru, 1979, *Nihon no nanyō shi kan* [Japanese Historical View of the South Seas], Chūōkōron-sha, Tokyo, p.100
In the South Seas, there are blessings from the sun in the sky and there are unexploited treasures on the land. The South Seas welcome us and do not deter us from exploiting their resources. They are nothing but the places which heaven has provided for us for the development of our race.31

Thus, early Taishō nan shin-ron began to develop perceptions that the South Seas had a rich and accessible economic potential. That had an important impact on the Japanese interest in the South Seas, because the perceptions were widespread not only among intellectuals but also in business circles.

The establishment of private organisations and companies followed and expressed the rise of Japanese economic interest. On 30 January 1915, the Nan'yō kyōkai (South Seas Society) was established. Although it was a private organisation, the Society's membership included leading nan shin-ron advocates, politicians and officials influential in making policies about the South Seas. The president was Earl Yoshikawa Akimasa, a prominent politician32, and the Vice-President was Uchida Kakichi, the Governor of Taiwan. Inoue was also a foundation member. The Society had two main objectives—promotion of trade and popularisation of the South Seas. The Society exhibited Japanese goods in Southeast Asia, promoted language study, sent commercial trainees to the area and held public lectures. It also published countless literature about the South Seas. One of the most well-known of its publication was the journal, Nan'yō kyōkai zasshi [The Journal of the South Seas Society] (later changed to Nan'yō [The South Seas]), which was widely read and became a major source of information.

As a result, businessmen hurried to take advantage of the opportunities. From 1914 to 1918, fourteen new companies were established,33 ushering in a new-company rush that continued until the outbreak of the Pacific War. Businessmen's eyes were fixed on the rich natural resources in Southeast Asia. New companies mostly undertook plantations—eight companies were involved in rubber (reflecting the increased demand for rubber in Europe), and three each in hemp, jute and copra. The other companies engaged in trading. A giant commercial firm, Mitsubishi, was also established and expanded its interests into Southeast Asia.

The government was active in promoting economic activities. It financed the Kaigai Kōgyō Kaisha [Overseas Industrial Company] of 1917 by amalgamating several other emigration companies. The company, cooperating with the Taiwan Ginkō [Bank of Taiwan],34 became a major financial institution for promoting emigration, industry, investment and education. Although later the company's major interest turned to emigration to Brazil, it first established an extensive network in the South Seas. Agents were posted to

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31In ibid., p.207
32He took office as the Governor of Tokyo in 1884, then took various ministerial positions in the Japanese government such as the Minister for Education, Home Affairs, Law, and Communications.
33Nan'yō dantai rengō kai [The Federation of South Seas Organisations] (ed.), 1942, Dai nan'yō nenkan [the Year book of the South Seas], Tokyo, p.p.797-828
34The Bank of Taiwan is a semiofficial bank established in 1899. Initially it served as a central bank in Taiwan, a Japanese colony, to assist resource exploitation and economic development. After World War I, it began to promote the economic development of Micronesia and the expansion of trade between Taiwan and South China and South Seas islands.
Thursday Island, Darwin, Broome, Manila, Davao, and Singapore. The company was equivalent to the Töyö Takushoku Kaisha [Oriental Development Company] which was formed in 1908 with government funds in order to facilitate the colonisation of Korea and later Manchuria. As Irie argues, the establishment of the Kaigai Kōgyō was the first step towards the government's direct involvement in the South Seas.35

3. Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea

The Japanese officials did not show much lively interest in Papua or New Guinea, despite their proximity to Micronesia. Attention was mainly directed to Micronesia and Southeast Asia. The number of publications demonstrates clearly Japanese indifference. Only three books dealt with Papua and New Guinea, out of tens of new South Seas titles published from 1914 to 1918. Similarly, out of the fourteen companies established in the war period, thirteen were in Southeast Asia and one in Micronesia.36 The government did not take much interest, either, except the officials in the Foreign Ministry who had to respond to Komine's financial petition.

Although there was no specific reference to Papua and New Guinea, the Nan'yō Bōeki Chōsa-kai [South Seas Trade Research Society] published Nan'yō no hōko [Treasure in the South Seas] in December 1914.37 The book included general information (geography, climate, people, culture, industry, economy and Japanese relations) about Micronesia, Southeast Asia, New Caledonia and New Guinea. In the section on the 'former German islands', the book emphasised the islanders' general good feelings towards the Japanese and alluded to the validity of the Japanese occupation:

The islanders had been receiving cruel treatment under the oppressive German colonial policies and [had been exploited] by foreign traders who had enjoyed their privileges as colonisers. As a result, the islanders despise them and seem to be welcoming the Japanese. Our navy's occupation was greeted by extremely overjoyed islanders.38

However, the islands had a low economic profile. In the view of the Society, the islanders had no industry except copra production and there were few benefits in trading:

However, there are few items we can import, because the natives have no industry. They do not produce anything....The only natural product we should import from them is copra—a speciality of all Pacific islands. [At present] the copra trade occupies about ninety percent of the total trade [of the islands] and the rest consists of a small quantity of marine products.39

36Nan'yō dantai rengō kai, op.cit.
37Nan'yō Bōeki Chōsa-kai [South Seas Trade Research Society] (ed.), 1914, Nan'yō no hōko [Treasure in the South Seas], Mankan-dō, Tokyo
38Ibid., p.p.12-13
39Ibid., p.14
Likewise the Japanese navy's attention was directed to Southeast Asia. *Nan'yō tsūran* [The survey of the South Seas], a huge volume (926 pages) written by Captain Hosaka Hikotarō in 1916, gave the most detailed information on the South Seas, but he wrote mostly about Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia, and devoted only one page to Papua and two pages to German New Guinea. Hosaka briefly mentioned Komine and his business and said that Rabaul would be a promising place for Japan's economic development, although he pointed out the uncertainty about the future of New Guinea until the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The lack of interest was greatly regretted by Japanese residents in New Guinea. Fujikawa Masajirō, a manager of Komine's Nan'yō Kögyō Kaisha, wrote in his book.

> Recently studying the countries and people in the South has become very popular. However, the region that the people call Nan'yō is usually Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Some people even believe only the area around Singapore is Nan'yō. Although some people think that Nan'yō includes a wider region than those, they widen it in the direction of Burma, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. Few people know about New Guinea, which lies massively to the north of Australia, and the thousands of small islands surrounding New Guinea.

Partly due to lack of information, the stereotyped perception of New Guineans remained unchanged. Shibata Tsune'e, an anthropologist of Tokyo University, wrote in the introduction of Fujikawa's book.

> German New Guinea, the northeast area of New Guinea, maintained its characteristics. The level of civilisation is extremely low. The natives are mostly at the stage of the Stone Age, using stone implements. Cannibalism was still prevalent.

4. Japanese in Papua

**Australian perceptions of Japanese**

The impact of World War I was scarcely felt in Papua. Murray reported:

> Probably there is no part of the Empire where it is so difficult to realize that a state of war exists. There is no recruiting in Papua, no military display, no bands, no processions, no return of wounded men—none of the innumerable things that bring the war home to the most dull-minded elsewhere.

In these circumstances, Australian perceptions of the small number of Japanese in Papua remained unchanged. *The Papua Annual Report* from 1914 to 1918 had no comments on the Japanese, except for giving their total population figures. As Table 3-1 shows, the Japanese population stayed static. All still lived in the Milne Bay area. Similarly the number

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40 Hosaka made a tour to some of the South Seas islands in 1913; Hosaka Hikotarō, 1916, *Nan'yō tsūran* [The survey of the South Seas], Kakusei-sha, Tokyo
41 Hosaka, op.cit., p.906
42 The date of Fujikawa's arrival at Rabaul was not clear. According to his book, it was either 1901 or 1903.
43 Fujikawa Masajirō and Maruba Tamotsu, 1914, *Nyū ginia papua zoku sakuhin shū* [Collections of works of New Guineans and Papuans], Marufuji-ya, Tokyo, p.1
44 Ibid., introduction (no page number)
45 *Papua Annual Report 1914-15*, 1917, Melbourne, p.8
of other non-indigenous coloured population showed little change, indicating successful migration restriction. Also there were little change in the number of the whites, indicating that the stagnant economy was significant.

Table 3-1. Non-indigenous populations in Papua, 1914-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>South-Eastern</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Other coloured*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*non-indigenous


There are only two events related to the Japanese and recorded in official documents other than *Papua Annual Report. The Territory of Papua Government Gazette* reported the death of Nagahama Sorgi, a Japanese carpenter, at Yapoa on the north-east coast. In the following year, his name appeared again in the 'Return of Estates Administered'. The list shows that the scale of Nagahama's business was far smaller than most European entrepreneurs. The Japanese sources have no records about him.

The other one was a surprise visit of a team from the Japanese mining company, Fujita Gumi (Fujita Company), to Port Moresby in 1916 to investigate copper mining on the Astrolabe Field near Port Moresby. The five-man team arrived at Port Moresby without prior notice but managed to interview an Australian official, who immediately sent a report to Melbourne. According to his report, the Japanese seemed to have detailed information about the mine and made concrete proposals:

The points on which these gentlemen wished to consult me were—
(1). whether in regard to copper mining any distinction was drawn between Europeans and Japanese,
(2). whether, assuming that they took over the mines, they would be allowed to bring in Japanese to act as their higher officials—such as managers, engineers, and clerks—or whether all such persons must be Europeans,
(3). whether they would be allowed to use the ROUNA Falls, a waterfall some 18 or 20 miles out of Port Moresby, for the purpose of generating power for the service of their mines.

The Japanese proposal did not materialise, and it is unknown whether the Australians rejected it or the Japanese withdrew. However, the event indicates that there were some speculative Japanese industrialists who were stimulated by the increased demand for copper.

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48 Fujita Gumi was then one of the giant mining companies, competing with Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. It operated the Kosaka copper mine in Akita—one of the largest copper mines then in Japan.
49 Government House, Port Moresby to the Minister of State for External Affairs, Melbourne, 6 March 1916, A1/1 1626203
due to the war in Europe and cast their eyes on mineral resources in Papua, despite the fact that most industrialists showed stronger interest in Southeast Asia.

**Japanese settlers**

There are no written records about the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Information is available from oral evidence only. A major characteristic of the oral sources is the lack of recollections related to the war, confirming Murray's comment. The Japanese carried on their business in trading, diving, and copra planting as before. They raised their families and kept on entrenching their presence in the local communities.

The following information concerns events memorable within the Japanese community. Jimmy Koto married a local girl from Sabra island, Maegar, although the exact date cannot be established. The couple had two children—Florence and George. Kalo Murakami, the only child in the Murakami family, was born in 1916. Kalo's real name was Kalaupi in the Misima language, which means 'a little boy'. But his father, Heijirō, could not pronounce it properly and called him Kalo. Tanaka Shigematsu seems to be the only one who went back to Japan when the war broke out, and he died in his home village in Nagasaki in 1917.

5. Japanese in New Guinea

**Impact of Australian military operations**

The outbreak of war was an unexpected tribulation for the Japanese who had just begun to prosper under German rule. But their response showed their agility. The report of Samejima San'nosuke, a clerk of Komine's company, is the only Japanese written source to give a detailed account of the impact of Australian military operations on the Japanese. It is titled 'Senji zaïjū jōkyō hōkoku sho' [Report on the local situation during the war]. The

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50 The oral evidence provides the information for only six Japanese—Koto, Mabe, Murakami, Matoba, Taichirō Tanaka and Shigematsu Tanaka, although the statistics of Papua Annual Report shows the presence of eight to nine Japanese in this period. The author speculates that other Japanese were traders operating either from Thursday Island or Rabaul and regularly visited Papua and stayed temporarily.

51 The interview by the author with Koto, Jessie (grand daughter of Jimmy Koto), 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG

52 Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami, Heijirō ), 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG

53 Interview by the author with Isikini, Honor and Fred (daughter and grandson of Tanaka Shigematsu), 21 December 1993, Nigila Village, Milne Bay, PNG

54 According to the report, Komine's company was called 'Komine Shōkai' [Komine Company], although German and Australian record say its name was 'Naunyō Kōgyō Kaisha' [South Seas Industry Company]. 'Naunyō Kōgyō Kaisha', which was formed in 1912, was a new name for 'Komine Shōkai'. It seems that Komine was using the name, 'Komine Shōkai', until 1915 in Japanese official documents.

55 The report was privately kept by Komine's descendant, Komine Shigenori in Nagasaki. The date of the writing of the report is unknown, but judging from the content, it seems to have been written and submitted in mid-1915. To whom it was submitted is not recorded, but most likely it was the Japanese consul-general in Sydney, as official correspondence from German New Guinea was normally sent to Sydney then to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo.
report shows how the Japanese at Rabaul managed to reconcile their relations with both Germans and Australians.

On 8 August, upon the German declaration of war, the Germans at Rabaul prepared hastily. Samejima wrote:

[On 9 August] the German residents, who were on the military list, were drafted to form a volunteer Corp and to defend [Rabaul]. However, the Germans had built no military facilities here. Although they had three hundred native soldiers, they were mostly labourers and had little capacity to fight. Out of those natives, a hundred and fifty were posted to the administration at Rabaul and the rest were sent to other administrative stations in the territory to be used as labourers to clear land or as cleaners. In the morning on the same day, the volunteers and the native soldiers were summoned. In the afternoon five officers, a hundred volunteers and a hundred and fifty native soldiers were all armed. The Germans shifted their administration from Rabaul to Toma, a place in the hills thirty miles west of Rabaul. Those men were sent to Toma to defend the new administration.56

On the same day, the Germans detained the British and French, and restricted the movement of Japanese residents.

In the morning, the Namanula, a boat owned by Komine, was about to sail to New Ireland in order to collect logs for boat building. But the German officials stopped and moored it at the pier of the Lloyd Steamship Company. They also removed and confiscated the Namanula's auxiliary engine, although in the morning on the following day the Germans sent guards to Komine's shipyard and returned the engine. On the same day five British and one French man were detained at Baining (twenty miles west of Rabaul), and an order was given that the Japanese should not go north beyond the hill behind [Rabaul] nor sail more than one mile to the south. In these days, the town was restless. Not only German shops but also small Chinese shops were closed. The townsfolk gathered here and there and spent time in endless discussions.57

At dawn on 11 August, three Australian destroyers, the Yarra, Warrego and Parramatta, appeared in Simpson Harbour and surprised the German residents who were expecting the German squadron to rescue them. The appearance of the Australian ships also panicked other Rabaul residents.

Some Germans hid their furniture, buried valuables, packed their luggage, and ran away into the bush. Many Chinese stayed in their houses. All townsfolk raised their own flags to show their nationality. We raised the Rising Sun on the mast of the Namanula and at our shipyard. Soon the destroyers of the British-Australian squadron anchored opposite our shipyard and one moored at the wharf of the Lloyd Steamship Company. About ten sailors, led by one commander, landed and went to the post office and destroyed the telephone. They did not do anything else and soon the squadron left the harbour, and since then we heard nothing about them.58

At this stage Japan had not yet declared war against Germany, and Komine cooperated with the Germans who assured the Japanese residents of their safety.

In the afternoon of the same day [11 August], the administration requested a 25 horse-power motor from our shipyard in order to set up a wireless station near Toma. Fortunately we got one and sold it at wholesale price to the administration. Until then, Komine's shipyard had been doing work for the administration. The payment for our boat building, repair, construction work and sales of furniture used to be made after tax was deducted in the end of the financial year. The sales of the motor then made the total payment twenty thousand Deutsch mark. Although the operation of the

56 Samejima San'nosuke, date unknown, 'Senji zaijū jōkyō hōkoku shō' [Report on the local situation during the war], Komine Shigenori's possession, Nagasaki, Japan, p.1
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
Australian squadron ended without achieving much, the townsfolk speculated a great deal and were unable to lead a normal life. Most [German] residents, being recruited as officials and soldiers, moved to Toma. As a result, Rabaul fell to near anarchy. But the administrator [sic: he was an acting administrator] sent his officials, who came riding horses, and visited the remaining Germans and the Japanese in the shipyard. He sent us a message that the administration would provide food from the administration’s storage whenever requested so that we could do our work as usual without difficulties. The administrator's treatment was due to Komine's service to the administration in the last ten years since the administration had been established. The administration always respected and protected the Japanese residents.59

The 'anarchy' in Rabaul was also felt among the European residents; a German postal official noted on 10 August that there were fears that the Chinese might be dangerous because of threatened food shortages and because of unemployment among them.60 Then, according to Samejima, in order to cope with the dangerous situation, the acting-administrator, Eduard Haber, suggested that Komine form an armed Japanese militia.

On 16 August Komine sent a message, as a representative of the Japanese residents, expressing sympathy for the administrator [sic] in this difficult situation. The administrator sent his official to reply to Komine's message with deep gratitude, and requested, 'Our situation depends on the war in Europe and our home government did not acknowledge the need to send troops to its colonies. We are resigned to surrender our territories to the enemy without resisting if we are attacked. Therefore we are not worried. However, I am most concerned about two thousand Chinese most of whom became unemployed because of this war. They do not have enough food due to the stopping of sea transport and very likely they will become vagrants and steal things and may rebel. That will be most grievous event but there not many Germans left in Rabaul to prevent it from happening. But if you lead your employees [to form a militia], such an event can be prevented. The administration will supply weapons immediately if you need any. My worry will end if you cooperate.'

We can only speculate whether Haber really made such a request, as no German or Australian records mention it. Although it is possible that the request was made secretly and no records were kept, the following part of Samejima's report suggests that Komine was keen to eliminate the Chinese, rivals of Japanese businessmen in the South Seas, and that Komine saw the outbreak of the war an excellent opportunity to 'wipe out' Chinese influence.

Komine is a brave man not being afraid of death. He thought he could contribute to Japanese development overseas if he could wipe out all Chinese from the earth on this occasion, and in doing so he could serve his country because the Chinese had been impeding Japanese business activities abroad. He immediately summoned all his eighty employees and spoke about his idea, saying that the administrator [sic] also asked him to do so. His employees were all excited and unanimously agreed with Komine's proposal. Then Komine called upon the vice-administrator to express his idea. The vice-administrator was over-joyed and shook his hands.61

Thus, the proposal to form a Japanese militia had two advantages for Komine: it could satisfy his business ambition and his patriotism.

However, the plan was wrecked, when the Japanese government, using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declared war against Germany on 23 August. Hearing the news, Komine quickly notified Haber of his withdrawal of the proposal to form a militia.62 Unexpectedly,

59 Ibid.
60 Threlfall, Neville, 1988, From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain, unpublished, Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University, Canberra, p.139
61 Samejima, op.cit.
62 Samejima mistakenly stated the date of the Japanese declaration of the war 18 August.
however, the Germans did not become hostile towards the Japanese. According to Samejima,

Komine quickly called upon the administrator [sic] and said, 'Although I promised [to form a militia] according to your request, I would like to inform you of the cancellation of my promise because today Japan declared war against Germany and I, being a Japanese subject, cannot serve an enemy country.' The administrator accepted Komine's cancellation and said, 'It is impossible to change our home country's foreign policies, but nations and individuals are different. Even if our nations are fighting each other, you can carry on your business as before. Our administration provides you with as much protection as possible.'

Haber's words proved true. The administration did not keep Komine in custody (although the British were imprisoned) and provided food for the Japanese as promised.

Nevertheless, the Japanese declaration of war provided a profound dilemma for the Japanese in New Guinea. They would be disloyal if they kept good relations with Germans who were showing genuine friendship. When they decided to cooperate with the Australians, they had two basic reasons. The first reason is natural: they chose to be loyal to their home government. But the second one is compelling. They needed to rely on the Australian force for the supply of food, because they were suffering from extremely serious shortage of food and had nobody but Australians to rely on because the regular shipping service of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company ceased at the outbreak of war. Local produce was also short due to severe drought. The situation was so serious that Komine had to cut down rations for his employees to the extent that non-labourers had only one meal a day. Samejima noted that the food situation worsened around the time when the Australian expeditionary force arrived and occupied Rabaul on 12 September.

Therefore, in order to survive, Komine had to start establishing friendly relations with the Australians. In doing so, Komine had luck. The pilot of the Australian fleet happened to be Komine's acquaintance who had worked in Rabaul about five years earlier, and on 13 September he came to Komine's shipyard without knowing it was Komine's and asked him to install wireless facilities for the Australian force. Komine accepted the job and started working for the Australians on 14 September.

Samejima, on behalf of Komine, then asked the captain of the Australian warship, which was returning to Sydney, to deliver an urgent message to the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney to ask for food. It was not Komine but Samejima who went to the Australian captain to ask for help. Considering the urgency of the problem, it would be natural for Komine, being a leader of the Japanese community, to ask the Australian captain, but he did not. His hesitation may reflect his long-established good relations with the Germans. Also the undisciplined behaviour of the Australian landing force might have made him hesitant to rely on them. Samejima continued:

63 Samejima, op.cit. p.1
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Lieut-Commander Jackson, 2 January 1915, AA, MP472 3/15/575
67 Samejima, op.cit., p.2
The Australian soldiers had no military discipline. They frequently broke into the houses not only of the Germans but also of Chinese and natives and stole money and valuables. They came to Komine's shipyard and demanded drinks, and some soldiers even did so by threatening with their bayonets. As a result, the Australian commander put guards at our shipyard for about two months.68

Samejima's report is correct. The commander of the Australian force, William Holmes, also wrote to the Minister of Defence, Melbourne: 'I regret to have to report there has been a good deal of crime amongst the Troops since they settled down to routine Garrison duty here.'69

Nevertheless from late September to early October, Komine acted swiftly for the Australians. He salvaged the German steamer *Kolonial Gesellschaft* which had stranded on the reefs at Cape Lambert. The Germans had set fire to the boat on the reefs, but the Australians wanted to use it for military purposes and asked Komine to salvage it. On 4 October, Komine headed for the wreck in his schooner *Namanula* with four Japanese and fifty natives.70

When he was about to salvage it, he took up a more important mission—piloting the Australian expedition force to capture the German steamer *Komet*.71 Although Lieutenant-Colonel J. Paton, the commander, only wrote that Komine 'volunteered' his services,72 Samejima explains that there was a profound reason for that.

The harbour-master Jackson called upon Komine and asked him about where the *Komet* could be hiding. He also mentioned that recently the *Komet* captured a Japanese sailing boat in the East Caroline Islands and stole goods. Having heard this, Komine was very angry.....and said that Lulu was the only possible port that the *Komet* could enter on the north coast of New Britain. He also said that the Australians would be able to capture the Komet without using many soldiers because of the topography where it was hiding. Then he said he would volunteer to assist the expedition and jumped on the *Nusa*.13

Samejima's accounts may not be reliable. There is no official report about the *Komet*'s attack on a Japanese ship in either Japanese or Australian sources, although it was possible, as the *Komet* sailed between Angaur in the Palau Group and New Britain from 14 August to early October.74 Again, it is most unlikely that Jackson knew of any attack, because he did not know the movements of the *Komet* until he got information that it was hiding on the north coast of New Britain on 4 October.75

Samejima's explanation suggests two possible scenarios. First, Jackson lied to Komine because he needed his knowledge of local waters and people. Secondly, Samejima fabricated the story. The Japanese at Rabaul needed a pretext to assist the Australians, because overt assistance would anger the Germans who had protected them even after the

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68Ibid.
69Colonel Administrator William Holmes to the Minister of Defence at Melbourne, 13 November 1914, AA, AWM33 11
70Samejima, op.cit.
71Although the *Komet* was not a battleship, the Australians feared that its wireless facilities could be used to coordinate the operation of the German Pacific fleet.
72Lieutenant-Colonel Paton's correspondence, 12 October 1914, in MacKenzie, op.cit., p.133
73Samejima, op.cit., p.2; the *Nusa* was an Australian boat with the expedition.
74MacKenzie, op.cit., p.p.127-128
75Ibid., p.129
outbreak of war. The Japanese had to maintain good relations with the Germans in order to continue their businesses, because the Germans still controlled most commerce in New Guinea, and the Australian forces were inexperienced in colonial administration and left most economic operations in their hands. Whatever the truth, the first several months after the Australian occupation was the most trying period for the Japanese.

The following is Samejima's account about the capture of the Komet.

The South Seas rarely get misty, but the mist was so thick that the Komet neglected to set a watch and none of their crew noticed the Nusa's approach. The Nusa's crew waited until daybreak, preparing to launch a small boat if they found the enemy boat. The harbour-master persistently cautioned Komine to capture the Komet, and Komine led three British sailors and approached the Komet, raising a white flag in case of being attacked. The boat reached the stern and Komine and others climbed onto the deck. A Chinese boy noticed them and rushed to alert the German commander. Although the commander immediately came out on the deck, still wearing pyjamas, it was too late. The British sailors were standing by the Komet's cannon. The German crew and native fighters were too frightened to resist. The commander looked resigned, although reluctant. Komine told him, 'We have been good friends for a long time, but my action today is not a personal action. I acted so because Japan and Britain are at war against Germany. Please surrender immediately.' Komine led the commander into his bedroom and locked the room from the outside and placed a guard. Then he ordered the German crew to prepare for sailing and commanded the ship on its way to Rabaul. The Komet arrived in Simpson Harbour on 11 October. The [Australian] governor and other people were rejoiced to hear of the unexpected feat and admired Komine's bravery. Komine went home, but the governor sent a car to pick him up to hear his full report. I accompanied him, carrying souvenirs—captured documents from the Komet, her flag and a painting of the German emperor. The British governor and his staff officers celebrated the capture of the Komet, welcoming Komine as the main guest. They held a big banquet and cheered Britain and Japan. Komine cheered banzai three times. On the same day, the Japanese squadron radioed to the administration to inquire after the safety of Komine and other Japanese. I hurried to the administration headquarters and replied by radio, saying, "The Japanese and their properties were all safe but we were suffering from a shortage of food. We request supplies of rice and soya sauce urgently." On the following day, the governor granted the title of captain to Komine with a letter of appreciation for his assistance and declared that Komine was no longer required to take off his hat to salute except for saluting the governor.76

Jackson's report to Holmes on the capture of the Komet also verifies reports of Komine's bravery and Australian appreciation.

I would point out the following additional points for your consideration:—

(1) Mr. Komine (Japanese) of Rabaul was on board Komet [sic; it should be Nusa], and thanks to his help and knowledge of natives Komet was exactly located. Mr. Komine showed great enterprise and an absolute indifference to the probability of Nusa receiving Komet's fire; he also showed his great anxiety to help us by abandoning his occupation of salvaging a wreck off the Talele Islands in order to accompany the expedition.77

The Australian records show the invitation to Komine to the official dinner.78 However, there are no records to confirm Samejima's accounts of Komine's persuasion of the German

76Samejima, op.cit., p.2
77Jackson, 12 October 1914, in MacKenzie, op.cit., 135
784 December 1914, Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD. 10 August 1914—22 February 1915, AA, AWM33 10/1/1
commander, the granting of the title of captain and his privilege not to have to take off his hat—except for several letters that referred to 'Captain' Komine. Probably Komine's persuasion was Samejima's exaggeration and the granting of the title of captain and the privilege was unofficial.

Komine also assisted the Australians by providing them with the information that 'a German trader [Heninrich Wahlen] in Rabaul was communicating to Germans in America information regarding the movements of the Australian naval and military forces in and around Rabaul, by means of documents concealed in bales of merchandise shipped by him to America.' Due to this service, Komine was granted Wahlen's fishing rights in the Western Islands.

The capture of the Komet provided Komine with an excellent opportunity to initiate friendly relations with the Australians. And his assistance continued. He piloted the expedition to the Admiralty and Hermit Islands from 19 to 30 November. His participation was strongly motivated by self-interest. Komine was anxious about his wife and employees and plantations in the Admiralty Islands, as communications with the islands had been cut since the outbreak of war. Samejima wrote:

Komine's wife was in the plantation on Admiralty Islands where there were about ten Japanese employees and four hundred native labourers. However, after the outbreak of war, Komine had not been able to visit the islands and was anxious about their safety. Then on 10 November, the British Military Administration requested Komine to make a trip to the islands, as the German officials there had not been contacted yet. Komine loaded provisions onto the steamer Siar for the Japanese on his plantations. The expedition force left on 13 November. When the Siar arrived at the Admiralties, the German district officer attempted to escape into the bush with native fighters carrying weapons and provisions. Komine stopped him, explained the situation at Rabaul and told him that his resistance would hardly affect the whole situation. The officer capitulated willingly and surrendered the office building and documents at Lorengau...Komine checked his plantation, supplied food [to his employees], and returned to his shipyard at Rabaul with his wife and child on 8 December. Presently about ten British [sic] soldiers are stationed in the Admiralties and keeping the peace.

Most of Samejima's account accords with the Australian official dairy, except for Komine's persuasion to the German officer. The diary does not mention Komine's involvement in the German surrender.

22nd November: ....The arrival [at Lorengau] was a complete surprise, and as soon as the Government Officials noticed soldiers they gathered all the Native Police, and taking arms, ammunition and provisions made for the bush. Captain Travers was successful in capturing the head Official, and explained the form of capitulation to him, and directed him to go out and bring the other officials and Native Police. At first he refused to do this, but finally consented, and being placed on parole was sent out to bring the whole force. During the interval all building were seized and placed under guard; the German flag was hauled down and the British flag hoisted in its place. Within half an hour the whole force had returned and were disarmed. Government books and money were handed over.

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79Ibid.; Report by an intelligence officer, Captain J. Travers, 3 December 1914, AA, AWM33 10/4
80Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth to Japanese consul-general, 13 July 1921, A457/1 690/3
8119 November to 30 November, Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD. 10 August 1914—22 February 1915, AA, AWM33 10/1/1
82Samejima, op.cit.
83Diary of events in connection with expedition to Admiralty and Hermit Islands, AA, AWM33 10/1/1
Again Samejima seems to have exaggerated the significance of Komine's actions. The expedition satisfied Komine's self-interest. The first destination was Rambutju Island (21 November) where Komine owned a plantation. On the following day, having made the Germans capitulate at Lorengau, the force reached Pityilu Island where Komine had another plantation. The following morning Captain Travers breakfasted with Mrs Komine. And just before returning to Rabaul, the expedition force salvaged Komine's auxiliary schooner wrecked on Korat Reef three months previously.84

Thus, Komine was extremely successful in establishing good relations with the Australians. Consequently, the shortage of food was temporarily alleviated by the help of Burns Philp. The Japanese residents rejoiced to see the arrival of the Japanese squadron at Rabaul on 28 December.85 Komine and Samejima explained the shortage of food to the Japanese captains and received ample rice and soya sauce. Samejima's report then concludes with a business report for the 1914 financial year and noted that the outbreak of war did not greatly affect business that year, as most orders for shipbuilding had been contracted in the previous year. New contracts were made with the Australians—the repair of the Madang, Samoa and Kolonial Gesellschaft.86

**Australian attitudes**

Japanese participation in the war as an ally of Britain encouraged the Australians to be friendly. The Australians showed genuine hospitality when two cruisers (Chikuma and Yahagi) and two destroyers (Yamakaze and Umikaze) visited Rabaul on 28 December 1914. Holmes entertained the Japanese captains at dinner at Government House and the Japanese reciprocated.87 On 5 April 1915, the cruiser Nisshin arrived at Rabaul and Pethebridge took the Japanese captain Kanahara sightseeing around Rabaul and held an official dinner.88 The development of mutual respect was illustrated in the report of the Australian district officer at Madang, when the Nisshin visited on 11 April.

The [Japanese] officers and men were duly entertained by the [Australian] officers and men of this garrison....Both nationalities fraternised, and my men showed the sailors the sights of Madang and surrounding district....I took particular care that the troops here were smart, soldier-like, and well dressed. They turned out a credit to the 3rd Battalion. Although some 500 Japanese sailors had the run of Madang for two days, I place it on record that I heard not a single complaint, and nothing was touched in the town or surrounding plantations.89

Furthermore, when an official dinner was held to celebrate the King's Birthday on 3 June,90 the Japanese captain and officers of the warship Manshu, which arrived on the same day,
were invited. Similarly, when the Japanese Training Squadron visited Rabaul in the end of July 1915, the acting administrator, ‘made their stay here [at Rabaul] as enjoyable as possible under the circumstances’. The administrator's hospitality was greatly appreciated: the Japanese Rear Admiral commented that ‘I cannot be too much grateful for your hospitality and warmth you have extended to the officers and men under my command and I am sure they will carry about the most delightful remembrance of their visit to this fair territory.’ Indeed, the Training squadron had received a warm welcome in Australia before coming to New Guinea, and the Japanese Consul-General Shimizu Seizaburō at Sydney reported it to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo, and later the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu sent an official letter of appreciation to the British Ambassador at Tokyo.

Australian friendliness was also directed to the Japanese residents. Pethebridge reinforced the European status of the Japanese by introducing regulations for the burial of Europeans and Japanese in the European cemetery at Rabaul.

I, the Administrator during British Military Occupation of the Colony of German New Guinea, do hereby make the following regulations for the burial of Europeans and Japanese in the European Cemetery at Rabaul, to come into operation forthwith....

No European or Japanese shall be buried in any place in Rabaul other than in the Cemetery above described.

This shows a clear contrast to the Australian attitudes towards the Chinese. The Chinese residents were to be buried in an area in the Botanic Gardens separate from the European and Japanese cemetery.

Japanese relations with the Australian administration continued to develop, and the way they developed resembles that of their relations with the German administration. Just as Komine's relations with the Germans had been established by the administration's need of Komine's vessel for administrative purposes, his relations with the Australians developed due to their lack of vessels to patrol the outstations. First, the Australian force assigned Komine to repair the former German steamer Nusa and hired Komine's launch Banzai for general naval purposes. Komine exploited the situation to improve his business which had been badly affected by the war. Upon Komine's request, Holmes urged Melbourne to pay for his repair work.

Komine has asked me to personally urge the payment of his accounts as early as possible, as owing to War conditions, he has been unable to obtain funds from his country, and is considerably short of money. Komine has been of great assistance to the Navy and the Administration, and I ask that his request be complied with.

91 Memorandum for the Hon. the Minister of State for Defence, Melbourne, 2 August 1915, AA, AWM33 12/8
92 Rear Admiral Chisaka's letter quoted in ibid.
93 Shimizu to Katō, 16 July 1915, JDR, 5.1.3.4.
94 Ōkuma to the British Ambassador, 1 September 1915, in ibid.
97 Pethebridge to the British Ambassador, 1 November 1915, ibid.
98 Jackson, 2 January 1915, AA, MP472 3/15/575
99 Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 2 January 1915, ibid.
The Australians also gave exceptional protection for Komine's trading. Komine was allowed to export a small shipment of copra and marine produce directly to Japan in Japanese ships, although after the Australian occupation all products from New Guinea were to be sent to Sydney by Burns Philp.

Despite this protection, however, by the end of 1915 Komine's business suffered acutely from the war, and in November he had to assign 'all right, title, estate, interest, claim and demand in his Leasehold Lands in the Admiralty Group (Manus) to the Neu Guinea Compagnie of Rabaul, New Britain, by way of security for debt.' Komine asked the Australians for help, and they did.

In 1916, the Australian Administrator advanced money to Komine to protect him against foreclosure by his mortgagee, the Neu Guinea Compagnie. This was done in consideration of the damage Komine had suffered in his business through Germans withdrawing their custom on account of his friendship with the British. From that time on, the Administrator continued to assist Mr. Komine by making him advances against shipments of trocas shell, copra, & etc.

At the same time, Komine petitioned the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney for financial support from the Japanese government. It was a long letter extending over nine pages, in which the first half explained how he came to New Guinea and established good relations with the German administration, and the latter part related how the war affected his relations with the Germans and his business operations. He wrote that he lost all trust from the Germans after he assisted the Australians to capture the Komet, and that the Germans now hated him so much that he could no longer conduct business with the Neu Guinea Compagnie and Hernsheim & Co. In addition, he listed a number of difficulties:

The cargo that I ordered from the Japanese agent did not arrive because of the lack of vessels. My shipyard received no new orders from planters—my major clients—who were uncertain about their future after the outbreak of the war and hesitated to build new ships. The shipyard is very quiet and has almost no work except for small repair works. Before the war I had ordered a huge amount of shipbuilding materials expecting more orders, and they were just stored in the warehouse and only increasing interest payments. The situation is so serious that I have no funds to operate my business. I cannot even pay the wages of the artisans whom I recruited from Japan, promising high salaries. Most of my 1000 hectare [coconut] plantations is still at the stage of planting and produces only small quantity of fruit. But I have to pay handsomely for food and other things for native labourers and for the wages of the Japanese foremen. Although I had some profits from fishing, they hardly met the deficits in trading, shipbuilding and copra planting.

Surprisingly Komine's petition was accompanied by two letters from Pethebridge. The first shows that the Australian administration attempted to save Komine's business operations from being taken over by the Germans.
I have also arranged for liabilities to the extent of £11,000, to be met by the Administration on Komini's behalf, to assist him in his business and to prevent the German firms here from obtaining full control of all Komini's assets. I consider that the Securities held by the Administration, in connection with these matters are amply sufficient to cover Komini's liabilities.\textsuperscript{105}

His second letter explains why the administration was so generous: 'Since the War started and during British Occupation of the Colony, Komini [sic] has on all occasions, given us valuable assistance in many ways, and I regard his presence in the Colony as an important factor during the future development.'\textsuperscript{106} The Australians had another reason to help Komine. They were afraid of a German monopoly of commercial interests, and the rescue of Komine's business was necessary to limit German influence.

Having received these letters, Consul-General Shimizu wrote to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo. Shimizu sympathised with Komine and urged the government to assist him, introducing him as 'a rare entrepreneur in the South Sea Islands'.\textsuperscript{107} However, the Foreign Ministry declined to assist because of the delicate international situation, pointing out that the disposal of former German territories was still uncertain.\textsuperscript{108} The reply was relayed to Komine, who wrote a second petition in which he expressed his deep dismay and emphasised the Australian administrators' friendly attitude.\textsuperscript{109} Shimizu also wrote to Tokyo again but had no success.\textsuperscript{110}

Help came through Komine's relatives. They managed to persuade Minamikata Tsunekusu, a millionaire in Wakayama prefecture and the president of the Nanyō Sangyō Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Industrial Company), to purchase and re-structure Komine's company. Minamikata agreed to buy the company for 800,000 yen, retaining Komine as a managing director. The official re-structuring was endorsed by the acting administrator Seaforth MacKenzie on condition that: the company pay all its debt to the administration, pay outstanding wages immediately to all employees, and guarantee the payment of the former company's promissory notes to the administration and appoint a manager (or representative) proficient in English and British commercial regulations.\textsuperscript{111} MacKenzie's endorsement was based on his consideration of the 'international policy' that Japan was the ally of the British and the risk that 'Mr. Komine should be in danger of being absorbed by a German company.'\textsuperscript{112} On 10 October 1917, the Company officially took over all Komine's business interests and registered his company as a branch at Rabaul.

There is another example of international politics working favourably for Komine. The Australians took no action against him when they suspected that he removed some

\textsuperscript{105}Pethebridge to Shimizu, 22 May 1916, ibid.
\textsuperscript{106}Pethebridge to Shimizu, date unknown but marked No. 2 in Japanese, ibid.
\textsuperscript{107}Shimizu to Ishii, 10 June 1916, ibid.
\textsuperscript{108}The Foreign Ministry, date unknown, ibid.
\textsuperscript{109}Komine to Shimizu, 24 October 1916, ibid.
\textsuperscript{110}Shimizu to Terauchi, 9 November 1916, ibid.
\textsuperscript{111}The report by Arata Gunkichi, March 1921, Komine shōkai baishū shimatsu [Settlement of the purchase of the Komine Company], JDR, 3.5.12.12.
\textsuperscript{112}MacKenzie to the Minister for State of Defence, 8 March 1918, AA, AWM33 55/2
parts from a German steamer. The incident happened when Komine and his employees were found suspicious of 'wrongly removing certain articles from German steamer MORWE'. But no evidence was found and no actions against Komine were followed, because Pethebridge thought that the conviction would cause an international problem and 'considered that unless conviction absolutely certain unwise at that time proceed further.'

Melbourne's attitudes

From 1917, in contrast to the administration's friendly attitudes towards the Japanese, Australian officials in Melbourne, then the Australian capital, began to take restrictive measures. Melbourne's policy reflected international politics over the disposal of German territories in the South Pacific. Their main concern for Melbourne was to secure New Guinea as their spoils, just as Tokyo was determined to take over Micronesia. In those circumstances, the Japanese government restricted the entry and trading of non-Japanese in Micronesia. As retaliatory measures, the Australian government restricted Japanese migration and trading in New Guinea. On 31 March 1917 the Australian Defence Minister George Pearce, informed the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney that 'the number of Japanese employees in New Guinea should not at any time exceed the number at the commencement of the military occupation.' In the same year, the Australian government restricted direct copra trade between Rabaul and Japan. The restriction was maintained despite repeated protests by the Japanese Consul-General. In his letter to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, Shimizu pointed out that one of the reasons for the trade restriction was the Australian fear that the Australians would lose their monopoly of the copra trade, because the German would sell all copra to Komine if the trade was permitted, as they hated the Australians. This fear was also shown in Pearce's letter to the Prime Minister, although he feared the Japanese monopoly because Australians traders had fewer vessels than their Japanese counterparts. Komine also attempted to open the trade unsuccessfully. He offered to purchase the government ship Samoa when it was for sale, provided that trade with Japan was permitted, but it was refused.

Melbourne's policies also reflected public feeling in Australia. Edmund Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence (1916-1919), and the Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department (1919-1921), reported:

The instant participation of Japan in the war, and the assistance given in escort for the first convoy of Australian troops, brought about during the first few months of the war, a much warmer feeling towards Japan than had existed for many years

113Pethebridge to Defence, Melbourne, 24 July 1917; Trumble to the administrator, 20 July 1917, AA, AWM33 45/2
114Pethebridge to Defence, 25 July 1917, ibid.
115Ibid.
116Prime Minister Department, op.cit., p.11; The military administration in New Guinea was placed under the Defence Minister at Melbourne.
117Shimizu to Defence Department, Melbourne, 4 December 1918, AA, AWM33 46/6
118Shimizu to Uchida, 9 December 1918, JDR, 3.4.2.50-13-2
119Pearce to Prime Minister, 20 April 1918, AA, MPI049 1918/073
120Johnstone to Defence, Melbourne, 8 May 1918, AA, AWM33 46/3
previously. But the Japanese occupation of the islands north of the equator in September and October 1914 caused anxiety as soon as it became known to the public. It was not seen that these islands were required by Japan for her own defence, and their commercial value was trifling; their occupation seemed then to point some aggressive purpose.\textsuperscript{121}

Thus the 'warm' feelings towards the Japanese changed to suspicion and that caused Melbourne to apply restrictive measures.

\textbf{Japanese settlers}

The Japanese population in New Guinea began to decline, mainly because the outbreak of the war had caused uncertainty about the future of New Guinea. Although complete yearly statistics are not available either in Japanese or Australian sources, according to a telegram from the Japanese navy, there were 119 Japanese (98 males and 21 females) in 1914, but this total was reduced to 77 (55 males and 22 females) in 1916.\textsuperscript{122} However, there was still a steady, although decreasing, inflow of Japanese from 1914 to 1918. The number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese bound for New Guinea was 33 in 1914: 32 before August and one on 4 August. No passport for New Guinea was issued in 1915, and in 1916 the number was 16, half what it had been in 1914. In 1917 and 1918, only three were issued each year.\textsuperscript{123} That indicates that the decline in the Japanese population in New Guinea was due to the increase in Japanese departing. The bad management of Komine's business encouraged his employees to return after their contracts and he attracted few migrants. However, although the number was declining slightly, the Japanese community was the second largest civilian 'white' population. There were 680 Germans, 92 Japanese and 66 British.\textsuperscript{124}

The Japanese population mainly consisted of professional migrants such as artisans (boat builders and sawyers), fishermen, traders, planters and prostitutes. In 1917, the largest occupational group was 33 male 'artisans, labourers and etc.', followed by 13 female 'others', 12 male 'settlers and planters', 10 male 'sailors and fishermen', 8 male 'business and traders' and 8 female 'private'.\textsuperscript{125} The 13 female 'others' were very likely prostitutes working in the brothel owned by Ah Tam and the 8 female 'private' would be wives who accompanied their husbands.

\textsuperscript{121} Australia & Japan, note of statements made by Major E. L. Piesse in a conversation with Mr. Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. S. Shimizu, Consul-General for Japan at Sydney, Gwaimusho, 25th December 1919', MS882, Piesse Papers, Series 5. Japan, Folders 1, Manuscript Room, National Library of Australia, Canberra

\textsuperscript{122}The Vice-Minister of the Navy to the Vice-Admiral Takeshita, 8 July 1919, JDR, 7.1.5.10. However, the census by the Australian military administration shows different figures; there were 236 (201 males and 36 females) in December 1914 (\textit{Government Gazette, British Administration—German New Guinea}, Vol.I, No.3, 15 September 1914, Rabaul, p.p.4-5) and 92 (69 males and 23 females) in 1917 (\textit{Government Gazette, British Administration—German New Guinea}, Vol.IV, No.6, 15 June 1917, Rabaul, p.69). The Australian figure of 1914 seems to be inaccurate because the number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese bound for New Guinea by 1914 was about 100. See the section of 'population' in '4. Japanese in German New Guinea' in 'Chapter 2'.

\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō} [The list of overseas passport issues], 1914-1918, JDR, 3.8.5.8

\textsuperscript{124}\textit{Government Gazette, British Administration—German New Guinea}, Vol.IV, No.6, 15 June 1917, Rabaul, p.69

\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.
Japanese community

The Japanese were developing from a mere group of artisans to a self-contained community with amenities such as stores, restaurant, barber, brothel and cinema. The community had now grown into the type seen in major towns in Southeast Asia, and was accompanied by internal changes. The monolithic community under Komine's leadership began to crack, as other Japanese established businesses and started competing with him. The largest competitor was Okaji Santarō's Okaji Shōkai (the Okaji Company). The company seems to have been established in May 1914 on Buka Island, Bougainville, and operated a general store and copra plantation and exported marine products, although its scale was much smaller than Komine's. In 1917 the Okaji Company's capital was 15,000 yen, its annual profits were 30,000 yen, the number of Japanese employees was 5 and there were 40 natives, while Komine's company's corresponding figures were 300,000 yen, 700,000 yen, 45 and 500. Another company was established on 15 May 1915. Three Japanese ship builders (Mori Seizaemon, Hamasaki T. and Nishikawa Zen'ichi) set up S. Mori and Co. after acquiring a leasehold from the administration. The scale of S. Mori and Co. is unknown. The establishment of new companies facilitated a dramatic increase in trade between Japan and New Guinea, although it was a negligible amount in the total external trade of Japan. Imports from Japan tripled from £10,650 in 1915 to £31,064 in 1918, and exports to Japan increased almost fourfold from £12,188 in 1915 to £48,546 in 1918.

In 1918, the Japanese community received the addition of a unique Japanese, Imaizumi Masao, who acquired half an acre leasehold and opened a picture theatre, New Britain Pictures. Before coming to Rabaul, he was in the Dutch East Indies where he had been hunting birds of paradise and exporting them to London. His cinema screened both Japanese and western pictures for Japanese and Australian residents, and employed Australian technicians. More interestingly, the way he had gone to the Dutch East Indies shows his distant connection to Enomoto Takeaki, the first Japanese official who advocated colonising New Guinea. Imaizumi came to the Dutch East Indies with Jutarō Hosoya, a close associate of Enomoto.
friend of Imaizumi and a son of Jūdayū Hosoya, a samurai of Sendai-han. Jūdayū had fought alongside Enomoto in the Boshin War of 1868. Jūtarō, being a son of Jūdayū who had admired Enomoto, was influenced by Enomoto's idea of southward advancement and came to Dutch New Guinea with enthusiasm to develop the South Seas for Japan. As Jūtarō and Imaizumi were close friends, Imaizumi was possibly influenced by Jūtarō's enthusiasm. The rumour of Komine's bravery in New Guinea as well as the chance of success in starting a new business may have motivated Imaizumi. Thus Imaizumi was the second Enomoto-influenced Japanese at Rabaul after Komine. Like Europeans, the Japanese were not immune from malaria and other tropical sickness. Although it was not fatal, Komine developed black water fever and was hospitalised in Namanula Hospital on 14 February in 1917, where MacKenzie went to see him. Some other Japanese were also hospitalised where their behaviour annoyed the Australian medical officer. It was reported that: 

This I regret to say has not been as successful as was anticipated, owing to the Japanese not being amenable to hospital discipline; the hospital has become a rendezvous for all Japanese after dark, with the result that the patients were neglected and did not improve as rapidly as desired.

How many Japanese died from tropical sickness is unknown. Only the death of a shipwright, Hamasaki Tomoshiiro, can be confirmed.

Racial relations

Generally the Australians at Rabaul, apart from the administrative staff, did not pay much attention to the Japanese. Other than official reports related to Komine, there are a few Australian accounts of the Japanese and those accounts are all brief and none of them mention any individual (not even Komine). Captain Jens Lyng, the administrative staff, was the only Australian who observed the Japanese relatively closely and published his impression. He wrote about the Japanese women in the section describing Rabaul's China town, introducing them as part of the landscape that added an oriental flavour.

......and the dainty Japanese women in the fascinating dress of their native land, tripping ungainly about on their wooden clogs and threatening every moment to topple over; or half sitting, half standing mamselles outside some of the restaurants, fixing their slanting in-expressive eyes on the passers-by.

The articles in the newspaper, The Rabaul Record, also shows Australian indifference. There were only three articles on the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Besides, unlike the public in Australia who were anxious about the Japanese influence in the South Pacific, the articles show that local Australians did not relate the local Japanese to the general fear of Japanese
aggression. The first article described how the Japanese fishermen removed the live fish from inside the trochus shell, the second was about the poor quality of Japanese matches, and the third gave lively news about a Japanese wrestling tournament between visiting sailors and the local Japanese.\textsuperscript{141} It seems that most Australians at Rabaul saw the Japanese merely as part of local scenery in an exotic territory.

There are few records to show Japanese relations with New Guineans. No intermarriage took place, and oral evidence is generally not sufficiently specific to identify the period between 1914 and 1918. However, one event, recorded by the administration, may tell something of Japanese attitudes to New Guineans. Nakayama Bukachi, an employee of Komine, was murdered by a local young man, Sapo, at Kali Bay in Manus in late November 1916. The Australian District Officer found that the murder took place because of the brutality of Nakayama's treatment of the man. He reported,

I am also convinced that the boy was cruelly beaten by the Japanese [Nakayama] who not only beat him but tried to throttle him, he also beat his head on the hatch. The marks on the boy's body plainly shows the rough treatment that he received and there was no doubt that the boy was thoroughly frightened, so picking up the bamboo struck the Japanese the one fatal blow.\textsuperscript{142}

At the court, Sapo's act was regarded as 'self-defence' but he received a sentence of 'six months imprisonment to be served in Rabaul'.\textsuperscript{143} Although the cause of Nakayama's brutality was not reported, the event shows that some Japanese accepted the use of violence to New Guinean employees, as the murder happened on a schooner while other Japanese crew were also on the boat.

**Conclusion**

Multiple layers of relations over nations and races are major characteristic of this time and place. Japan formed a military alliance with Britain (and thereby Australia) and fought against Germany, so the Australians were temporarily less hostile to the Japanese than before the war. Soon, however, they became suspicious of Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Germans in New Guinea had continued to protect the Japanese interests until they cooperated with the Australian invasion forces. The Japanese had to sacrifice their long-term relations with the Germans in order to ensure their presence in New Guinea, and the Germans resented the agile Japanese.

In these intricate circumstances, the Japanese encountered a challenge to keep their presence under new white rulers and also saw a chance to promote their status. First, to ensure their presence and retain their assets, they had to establish friendly relations with the Australians who would be new rulers of the colony. This was easily done, because formally the Japanese were allies to the Australians. In terms of status, the Japanese were temporarily

\textsuperscript{141}Rabaul Record, 1 March 1916, 1 October 1916, 1 September 1917, Rabaul
\textsuperscript{142}Captain Webster to the Administrator, 25 November 1916, AA, A2/1 17/3714
\textsuperscript{143}Memorandum for the Administrator, 4 December 1916, Ibid.
more equal to their western counterparts under Australian military rule than under the Germans. Such was reflected in Australian courtesies in greeting Japanese naval visits. Dinners and other functions were held and Komine and some residents were invited. And administrators generously assisted Komine's business. These Australian attitudes were, of course, greatly affected by Komine's assistance to their military operations. But also the ignorance of the Australians about the colony (because they were all military personnel) and their lack of vessels contributed to their leniency. The Japanese were willing hands who knew much better about the colony.

However, the Australians in Melbourne would not acknowledge the Japanese as masters and as equals to their Australian counterparts. Their new territory had to be an extension of a white-controlled periphery. Migration and trade restrictions were soon applied. On the other hand, the Japanese government's indifference to the settlers was reinforced, because the government's main concern was to secure Micronesia and to avoid unnecessary conflict with Australia which was determined to control New Guinea. Thus, Japanese status in the colony hardly changed: they remained subordinate to white masters. Komine's agility only helped the settlers to keep on living in New Guinea.

The temporary leniency of the Australians brought about some development in the Japanese community; trading with Japan increased and business activities diversified. However, as the Australian government began to reinforce restrictive policies towards the end of the war, partly in response to similar policies taken by the Japanese government in Micronesia, the Japanese were no longer able to enjoy the full protection of the white rulers. The 1914-1918 period was a turning point from prosperity under German rule to the beginning of decline under Australian rule.

In Papua, Japanese experienced no impact. They were almost invisible to the Australians, because their number was small and their village-based life style, which was more identical with the Papuan than with white settlers', hardly aroused Australian concerns. They hardly had any influence to the maintenance of white rule.
Chapter 4. Decline, 1919-1940

Introduction

The Australian civil administration was established in 1921 and inherited policies established during the military period. The administration continued to restrict Japanese migration to New Guinea and also trading for several years. As a result, Japanese influence became marginal: some Japanese left and Komine died. By 1940 their population had shrunk to about 40. The nature of the community also changed. They were mostly businessmen, unlike the earlier period when most Japanese were artisans or labourers. In this chapter, I start by examining the position of New Guinea in the international context, then I examine Japanese interest in the South Seas and Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea so that I can place the Japanese settlers in a broader context. In the major part of this chapter, I analyse the demographic changes and economic activities of the community in relation to the attitudes and policies of officials in Tokyo, their Australian counterparts in Melbourne (later Canberra) and the Australians in Rabaul. Lastly I explore racial relations between Japanese and other people in order to conceptualise the position of Japanese settlers within the Australian colonial apparatus. In doing this, I limit the definition of the Australian apparatus as the entity which consisted of Australian masters and non-Australian servants, although the apparatus was not always consistent in policies or homogeneous in races.

1. Japan, Australia and New Guinea in international politics

The international situation changed rapidly in the interwar period. Bargaining, appeasement and war were arrayed in the process of constructing and de-constructing the international collective security systems. However, there was also continuity in the colonial powers' struggle from the late 19th century to gain more colonies. New Guinea increased its strategic value to Australia and was used as a bargaining chip by Japan, which was determined to secure Micronesia.

Paris Peace Conference

At the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1921), the victors of World War I bargained to divide German colonies, and tried to secure their spoils through the League of Nations. A new colonial map was drawn in the Pacific-Asia region—German colonies vanished but more colonies accrued to Japan and Australia.
To Japan, the Conference was a milestone, in that the western powers accepted her as a major colonial power: she was counted as one of the Five Powers (with Britain, France, the US and Italy). Newspapers reported daily discussions of Japanese delegates with their western counterparts and excited the public. Similarly, the Conference was significant to Australia: her representation as a Dominion represented the acknowledgment of nationhood.1 As a result, discussions were affected by the pride and prestige as young modern nations. That reinforced their perceptions of each other: the image of racist Australians was imprinted on Japanese memories, while Australians increased their suspicion of expansionist Japanese looking at every opportunity to take white men's lands.

Although silent on European affairs, the Japanese were vocal on Pacific-Asia matters: especially the cession of German rights in Shantung Province, their claim to German Micronesia and the abolition of racial discrimination. Of those three, the Shantung Province was the issue of which they were most determined not to compromise. The province was a gateway to Japanese expansion in East Asia and a shield against the Russians' southward expansion. The government instructed its delegates not to sign the treaty if their claim was rejected.2 The Japanese also had a strong claim to German colonies north of the equator, reinforced by a secret treaty made with Britain during the war. The Japanese insistence on the insertion of a racial equality clause in the charter of the League of Nations was a matter of prestige: they saw the discriminatory treatment of Japanese in the US, Canada and Australia as a disgrace.3 The Japanese had to be treated equally as their western counterparts, as citizens of a modern independent nation, not like other Asians colonised by western powers.

Against those claims, the leading Australian delegate, William Hughes, strongly opposed the last two matters, because both challenged the essence of Australian defence and foreign policy—the White Australia Policy. However, his main opponent in the German territory issue was not the Japanese but the US President, Woodrow Wilson, who proposed the mandatory system in which all countries should have the same right of access. His proposal was based on his idealistic Fourteen Points, but in effect it was also aimed at countering other colonial powers' expansion in the Pacific. Hughes thought that this proposal would threaten Australia's exclusive right to German New Guinea, as it would allow Japanese access. To Hughes, New Guinea was a buffer against Japan's southward expansion: 'The ring of these South Pacific islands encompasses Australia like a chain of fortresses.... and any Power which controls New Guinea, controls Australia.'4 He vigorously resisted Wilson's proposal. The Japanese also objected, although less vigorously, being concerned about their commercial rights in New Guinea. After lengthy discussions and compromise,

1Latham, John, 1920, *The significance of the Peace Conference from an Australian point of view*, Melville & Mullen Pty. Ltd., Melbourne, p.3
3Wakatsuki Yasuo, 1972, *Hainichi no rekishi* [History of discrimination against the Japanese], Chuokoron-sha, Tokyo, p.138
agreement was reached finally: Class 'C' Mandates—virtually exclusive colonies—were applied to all German Pacific territories.

In the eyes of Hughes, the 'mandate' issue was closely associated with the Japanese proposal of racial equality which, he saw, was manipulation whose ultimate purpose was to send migrants to New Guinea as well as to Australia.\(^5\) Hughes frantically opposed it, because 'to allow coloured immigration was to risk social suicide, to jeopardise a society.'\(^6\) Although the Japanese 'had no wish to dispatch immigrants' to Australia and their proposal was 'essentially a matter of prestige',\(^7\) Hughes was relentless despite the objection of Edmund Piesse, the Director of the Pacific Branch in the Prime Minister's Department. Piesse suggested that:

But even if there are reasons for maintaining racial discriminations against Asiatics, we must face the facts that these discriminations give great offence in Japan, and to a less extent in other Asiatic countries, that they contribute to the maintenance of strained relations between Japan and the white races, and they are used in Japan as a justification for armaments—the existence of which contribute in turn to the maintenance of armaments in Australia and other white countries. Are racial discriminations so vital to us that it is worthwhile to maintain them when they produce these results? Surely the answer is that they are not.\(^8\)

However, the White Australia Policy was a sacred cow which most Australians would not sacrifice for anything. John Latham, one of the delegates, wrote:

The principle of White Australia is almost a religion in Australia. Upon it depends the possibility of the continuance of white democracy—indeed, of any democracy, in a real sense—in this continent. Any surrender of the policy is inconceivable—it rests upon the right of every self-governing community to determine the ingredients of its own population. If that right is surrendered, the essence of self-government disappears.\(^9\)

It was a 'moral imperative'\(^10\) for Hughes to scrap the Japanese proposal, even if it was watered down eliminating any reference to migration. Finally, the Japanese gave up their proposal, and used it only as a bargaining chip for western acknowledgment of Japanese rights in Shantung.\(^11\) Thus the Australian objection facilitated the Japanese expansion in China. Similarly, the Australian objection consolidated Japanese exclusive control of Micronesia, as the Japanese could use the same argument to prevent non-Japanese from entering. As Nelson rightly argues, it was a dilemma for Australians that 'every time they asserted the right to keep what they held and to impose their unfettered right on their new

\(^{7}\) Sissons, David, 1971, 'The Immigration question in Australian diplomatic relations with Japan 1875-1919,' paper presented to the 43rd Congress of the Australia and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Brisbane, p.38
\(^{8}\) Piesse, Edmund, 9 January 1920, draft for 'V. Future Policy, 19. The racial discrimination should be reduced to the utmost possible extent,' p.12, in AA, A5954 1203/2
\(^{9}\) Latham, op.cit., p.9
\(^{11}\) Wakatsuki, op.cit., p.153
possessions, they were by implication strengthening the case of the Japanese to have their way in Micronesia.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Washington System}

The Paris Conference led to the establishment of the so-called 'Washington System' in which major western powers and Japan concluded several treaties at Washington in 1921 and 1922. It reinforced the 'Pax Anglo-Saxonica',\textsuperscript{13} establishing a collective security system to maintain the status quo set at the Paris Conference. Limitations on the race for naval armaments were agreed, although it virtually gave Japan naval superiority against the US in the Pacific. And the Four-Power Pact was concluded among the US, Britain, France and Japan, replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been antagonising the US.

In concluding the treaties, Japan was obliged to cooperate with the western powers because of the 'dual' nature of the development of her imperialism: militarily Japan was catching up with the west but economically she was still heavily dependent on the US and Britain for raw materials and markets.\textsuperscript{14}

Australia, although not represented at the Conference, initially objected to the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, fearing that Britain would not be able to restrain Japanese from expanding in the Pacific. However, seeing the collective security system established, Hughes, as Prime Minister, ratified the treaties, saying,

\textit{This Treaty establishes an equilibrium in the Pacific. As far as any action of man can do so, it insures peace for the next ten years for Australia.}\textsuperscript{15}

Hughes's optimism proved right. In the 1920s Japan and Australia enjoyed relatively relaxed relations. Their trade steadily grew and the shift of the destination of Japanese emigration to South America mitigated the Australian fear of the 'Yellow Peril'. Piesse observed that 'the danger to Australia from an increase of population in Japan seems remote, and should not affect Australia's attitude toward her'.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed the mid-1920s was a temporary 'golden period' in Japan-Australia-relations.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Collapse of the Washington System}

The Great Depression of 1929 initiated the collapse of the Washington System. 'Have not' nations such as Japan, Germany and Italy began to challenge the System set up by 'have' nations such as Britain, the US and France and sought opportunities to expand

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}Nelson, Hank, 1995, *Sacred trust and self-interest: Australia, Rabaul and beyond*, Wilcox, Craig (ed.), \textit{The Great War: gains and losses—ANZAC and Empire}, Australian War memorial and Australian National University, Canberra, p.111
\item \textsuperscript{13}Hosoya Chihiro, 1988, *Ryō taisen kan no nihon gaikō* [Japanese diplomacy between the two wars], Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, p.2
\item \textsuperscript{14}Eguchi Keiichi, 1994, '1910-1930 nendai no nihon–ajia shihai eno michi' [Japan from 1910s to 1930s—the path to rule Asia], Asao Naohiro et. al. (ed.), *Nihon Tsūshi dai 18 kan kindai 3* [History of Japan, Vol.3, modern period 3], Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, p.31
\item \textsuperscript{15}Commonwealth of Australia, 1922, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol.XCIX, Melbourne, p.789
\item \textsuperscript{16}Piesse, Edmund, 1926, *Japan and Australia*, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol.4, New York, p.488
\item \textsuperscript{17}Frei, Henry P., 1991, *Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p.114
\end{itemize}
their colonies in order to overcome their economic stagnation. In the 1930s, Japan sent troops to Manchuria, Germany to the Rhineland, and Italy invaded Ethiopia. But until the end of the decade, Britain, the US and France exercised 'appeasement' policies against those aggressive actions, attempting to maintain the colonial map drawn in Paris.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930, which aimed at balancing the naval strength of major powers (including Japan), was a vain attempt to keep international peace. In the following year, Japan began to invade Manchuria and set up a puppet government. The League of Nations, which was supposed to assure collective security, was useless to stop Japanese aggression: it did not take any concrete measures except condemning the action and recommending withdrawal from China. In Japan, some navy and army staff and right wingers expressed their indignation against the western objection to Japanese rule in Manchuria, and began to gain public support and gradually began to influence foreign policy. Consequently Japan left the League of Nations in 1933 and the London Naval Treaty in 1936—her apparent denial of the Pax Anglo-Saxonica.

In Australia, fear of Japan increased, and was manifested in her foreign policies. First, Australians followed Britain's appeasement policy toward German aggression in Europe, presuming that open hostility, which might result in a British pact with Russia against German aggression in Poland, would make Japan co-operate closely with Germany, because Japan had been perceiving Russia as her most likely enemy in northeast Asia. Appeasement would prevent 'a war in the Pacific simultaneously with one in Europe—a situation in which Britain could not send sufficient strength to Singapore, and Australia would be left to defend itself.'

Australians applied a similar appeasement policy against Japanese aggression in China, based on the optimistic assumption that so long as Japan was occupied in China, she would not advance south and would not threaten Australian security. However, when the Washington System collapsed in 1936 by the Japanese abrogation of the London Naval Treaty, Australians attempted to neutralise the Japanese threat by establishing a collective security pact in the Pacific. They proposed the 'Pacific Pact' in 1937 and lobbied Russian, Chinese, French, Dutch, American and Japanese ambassadors in London and their governments, to no avail.

In the late 1930s, the Australians desperately pressured Britain to reinforce the garrison at Singapore, seeing her defence capability as insufficient against possible Japanese invasion in the South Pacific. The government also adopted the 'trade diversion policy' which favoured British textile manufacturers and impeded Australia-Japan trade in wool and textiles. The policy was an 'irrational exercise in economic nationalism', as Australia-Japan trade was growing and was substantially in Australia's favour. More significantly, the

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19 Frei, op.cit., p.127
20 Hudson, William, 1967, Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914-1941, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, p.67
policy undermined Japanese good feelings towards Australia and revived anti-Australian sentiment in Japan where feelings bred of hostility to Hughes had apparently been softening.22

In 1938 the Japanese government declared the Tōa shin chitsujo [New Order in East Asia] to find a solution to the prolonged war in China, but the declaration failed to alleviate Chinese resistance and invited US economic sanctions. And Japanese isolation intensified. Then the government concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. The pact was aimed at facilitating southward aggression in Southeast Asia, presuming that the US would diminish her desire to be involved in Asian affairs and thereby Japan could avoid a head-on collision with the US.23 The Japanese military predicted that German victories in Europe would prevent Britain, France and Netherlands from being involved in conflicts in Pacific-Asia if Japan invaded their colonies.

Micronesia was another reason for Japan to conclude the Tripartite Pact. Germany in the late 1930s, under Hitler's dictatorship, began to reclaim territorial rights in former colonies. At that time the strategic importance of Micronesia to Japan was increasing because of the possibility of naval operations in the south-west Pacific: Japan was building bases on the islands. The Japanese secretly negotiated with the Germans a 'scheme for a public Japanese acknowledgment of the right of Germany to her former colonies accompanied by an agreement on Germany's part to sell her former Pacific islands mandated to Japan to the latter power.'24 In later negotiations, the Japanese insisted upon their exclusive control of the South Seas and even proposed the division of Australian territories—Papua to Japan and New Guinea to Germany.25 In the end, although excluded from the clauses of the Pact, verbal agreement was made: Japan would retain Micronesia; other former German Pacific territories would be returned to Germany after the war; and then Germany would sell some territories to Japan.26

Meanwhile the Australians rebuffed the German claim. Pearce, then Minister for External Affairs, said:

British policy, including Australian policy, is based on peace and international law and order, for which the League[of Nations] offers the only safe foundation. Therefore, any re-adjustment or general settlement in the interests of world peace must be within the framework of international justice and order, and not the result of a demand of right......In effect, it [re-adjustment] amounts to a submission to blackmail—the temporary buying-off of any aggressive nation. For this reason alone,

22Ibid., p.25
23Hosoya Chihiro, 1979, Nihon gaikō no zuhyō [Coordinates of Japanese diplomacy], Chūōkōron sha, Tokyo, p.75
26Japanese Foreign Minister to German ambassador at Tokyo, 27 September 1940, German ambassador at Tokyo to Japanese Foreign Minister, 27 September 1940, in Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai [Japanese Association of International Politics], 1963, Taiheiō sensō eno michi, dai 5 kan, sangoku dōmei, nisso chūritsu jōyaku [The road to the Pacific War, Vol.5, Tripartite Pact, USSR-Japan Non-Aggression Pact], Asahi shimbun sha, Tokyo, p.p.224-225
it is unthinkable that Australia should even consider the handing over of any territory.27

However, Australians were hardly prepared to defend such an important strategic area because of their traditional military dependency on the British.28 Indeed, Australia's whole defence capability was inadequate. Its air force was unsuitable for modern combat. The army had several thousand regulars supplemented by 80,000 militiamen but mainly equipped for the combat style of World War I. Although the Australian navy had six cruisers, they were insufficient to defend a long coastline.

The Japanese military was planning operations from Southeast Asia to the South Pacific. At the same time the government was making last ditch efforts to derive US concessions over China. However, the Tripartite Pact hardened US attitudes contrary to Japanese expectation, and the US reinforced its embargo on oil and froze Japanese assets. That was a severe blow to Japan which was heavily dependent on the US for oil supplies—essential fuel for naval operations. Thus, Japan had to find alternative sources of oil and other raw materials, and resource-rich Southeast Asia became a primary target. Consequently, shortly after the declaration of the Dai tōa kyōei ken [Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere], Japan launched her attack against Pearl Harbour.

2. Maturation of nanshin

The acquisition of German Micronesia made nanshin no longer a mere theory and it gave a new concept to intellectuals, policy makers and businessmen—'Micronesia and Taiwan would function as bases for the advance to Southeast Asia.'29 A new geographical concept—'Southeast'30—also appeared in a school text book in 1919, reflecting increased attention to Southeast Asia. Similarly new terms—uchi or ura-nan’yō [inner or back south Seas] (Taiwan and Micronesia) and soto or omote-nan’yō [outer or front South Seas] (India, Southeast Asia, Australia, Melanesia and Polynesia)—emerged around this time, showing the development of the Japanese conception of the South Seas: it placed Japan in the centre of the south-west Pacific.

Numerous intellectuals advocated Japan's southward advance and the military joined their advocacy in the late 1930s. The military had to gain natural resources in Southeast Asia (particularly oil in Dutch East Indies) in order to continue their war in China, as the US and Britain imposed embargoes, responding to the Japanese aggression in China. At the same time the government introduced policies to facilitate Japanese trade with Southeast

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27 Quoted in Hudson, William (ed.), 1974, New Guinea Empire : Australia's colonial experience, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, p.6
29 Shimizu Hajime, 1991, 'Nihon shihon shugi to nan’yō [Japanese capitalism and the South Seas], Yano Toru (ed.), Köza tōnan ajia gaka dai 10 kan tōnan ajia to nihon [Southeast Asia Studies, Vol.10, Southeast Asia and Japan], Kōbun-shū, Tokyo, p.92
30 Tōnan ajia' in Japanese. It literally means 'east-south Asia'.
Asia, and included *nanshin* in the national policy in the late 1930s. Private companies and migrants followed this southward tide. The public was agitated by the bombardment of *nan'yō* literature, which increased drastically: even for general references, the number increased fourfold from 99 in 1920-29 to 405 in 1930-39.31

**Ideology, government policy and organisation**

The main reason for the upsurge of Japanese interest in *nan'yō*, particularly Southeast Asia, was economic: new sources of raw materials and markets were needed for the development of heavy industry in order to catch up with western economies, and to diversify export markets to rectify heavy dependence on US and Chinese markets.32 Thus the ideological background to the 1920s was a vast commercial interest in Southeast Asia. The government led the commercial promotion, which was demonstrated in the number of government publications. Taiwan sōtoku kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Chief Secretary of Taiwan Governor-General], the leading government research institution of the South Seas, published about a hundred reports (Minami-shina oyobi nan'yō chōsa [Survey of South China and the South Seas] series) on trading, investment, management of plantations, fishery, mining and so on.

In the mid-1920s the Department of Foreign Affairs took an initiative. In 1926 the Department held the Nan'yō Boeki Kaigi [South Seas Trade Conference], inviting officials of other departments and representatives of various industries, to promote South Seas trade. The main items on the agenda at the Conference were investment, trade, transport, customs and commercial treaties. It was a significant milestone showing the beginning of the government's involvement: it was the Foreign Ministry not private organisations such as the South Seas Society or the Chamber of Commerce and Industry that took the lead.33

The Department of Foreign Affairs remained active. In 1928 it presented a report entitled 'Bōeki, kigyō oyobi imin yori mitaru nan'yō [The South Seas in view of trade, companies and emigration]',34 in which the Department proposed policies to promote trade, establish organisations to facilitate export and investment, and a special fund to assist emigration. Although none of the proposals were put into practice, the report was significant. The necessity for national commitment was acknowledged, as the Department used the term 'nan'yō kokusaku' [national policy towards the South Seas] for the first time in official reports.35

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31Iwamoto Hiromitsu, 1995, Taiheiyo senso sen no papua oyobi nyūgānia eno dekasegi imin — nanshin to hakugō shugi to nan'yō kokusaku [Japanese Migrants to Papua and New Guinea before the Pacific War: People caught between the 'Nanshin' Policy and the 'White Australia' Policy], *Inmin Kenkyū Nenpō [Annual Review of Migration Studies]*, Vol.1, Japanese Association for Migration Studies, Tokyo, p.95
32Shimizu, op.cit.
33Shimizu Hajime, 1986, '1920 nendai ni okeru 'nanshin ron' no kisu to nan'yo boeki kaigi no shiso [The trend of southward advancement theory in the 1920s and the ideology of the South Seas Trade Conference], Shimizu Hajime (ed.), *Ryō taisen kan ki nihon tōnan ajia kankei no shisō [Various aspects of Japan-Southeast Asia relations between the two wars]*, Ajia keizai kenkyū sho, Tokyo, p.p.24-25
34Gaimu-shō tsūshō-kyoku [Commerce Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs], 1928, *Bōeki, kigyō oyobi imin yori mitaru nan'yō [The South Seas in view of trade, companies and emigration]*, Tokyo
35Ibid., p.1
Nanshin-ron advocates raised their voices in the early 1930s, responding to the collapse of the Washington System. They began to focus on the strategic argument, that nan'yō was Japan's life line, although carefully emphasising the necessity to avoid conflict with western colonial powers. Fujiyama Raita, Vice-President of the Nan'yō Kyokai [South Seas Society], argued:

Nan'yō is our life line. It is at the forefront of our national defence. We should always consider this concept in our southward advance. However, we should not misunderstand. The Omote-nan'yō is all western colonies.....The western rule of Southeast Asia assures our national defence, and the development of their economies and relations with us facilitates the security of our life line and thereby our national defence.36

The mid-1930s was the most significant period for the development of nanshin-ron, which began to turn militaristic. The navy set out with a concrete nanshin plan. In 1935 the aggressive group, 'han-jōyaku ha' [anti-(London) Treaty faction], set up the Tai Nan'yō Hōsaku Kenkyū-kai [The Study Committee for Policies towards the South Seas]. The Committee studied both economic and military expansion; it advocated the promotion of trade and emigration through the Takumu shō [Department of Colonial Affairs] and the Nan'yō Kōhatsu Kaisha [South Seas Development Company] and emphasised the military role of Taiwan and Micronesia as advance bases.37 The navy was already militarising Micronesia. In the early 1930s, after the western powers restricted Japanese naval capability at the London Treaty of 1930, the navy secretly started building bases in Palau, Tinian and Saipan. In order to evade the western powers' monitoring, they were camouflaged as places to dry fishing nets or farms, and the South Seas Development Company assumed the responsibility for construction.38 Although the Study Committee at this stage avoided outright hostility against western powers, it strongly argued for the opening of markets and natural resources in Southeast Asia, particularly in the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies.39

In 1936 the government took a crucial step. It integrated the nanshin in the national policy. After abrogating the London Naval Treaty in January, the government held the Five Ministers Conference (attended by the ministers of the departments of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Navy and Army) in August and announced the Guidelines for National Policy that included resolution to advance south 'peacefully':

The government will pursue national and economic development in the South Seas, particularly in the outer South Seas, avoiding threats to other nations, and will expand our influence progressively by peaceful measures in order to reinforce national strength with the construction of Manchukuo.40

36 Fujiyama Raita, 1933, 'Umi no seimei sen to waga nan'yō hatten [Sea life line and our South Seas development], Shokumin [The Colonial Review], Vol.12, No.9, Shokumin tsūshin-sha, Tokyo, p.p.7-8
37 Hatano Sumio, 1984, 'Shōwa kaigun no nanshin ron [The southward advancement theory of the navy in the Showa period], Zōkan rekishi to jinbutsu [Special issue, History and People], Chūōkōron sha, Tokyo, p.279
38 Ibid., p.282
39 Gotō Ken'ichi, 1986, Shōwa ki nihon to indoneshia [Showa Japan and Indonesia], Keisō-shobō, Tokyo, p.p.35-36
40 Appendix No.16, in Yano Tōru, 1979, Nihon no nan'yō shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas], Chūōkōron sha, Tokyo, p.212
In November the policy was executed. The Nan'yō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha [South Seas Colonisation Company], a giant national company comparable to the Taiwan Colonisation Company, was established. The company's main venture was the development of phosphate mining on Angaur and Fais.

Coinciding with the government declaration, some intellectuals began to focus on Japan's long historical connection with nan'yō, starting from the 17th century's active trading, called Goshuinsen böeki,41 to the Meiji period explorer-traders. Iwao Seiichi, a historian and professor of the Taipei University (the leading academic institution in South Seas studies), played a central role. In 1936, he wrote Kinsei shoki nihonjin nan'yō hatten no rekishi [History of Japanese development in the South Seas in early modern times].42 In 1939, he published an article 'Nan'yō ni okeru nichī-ō kankei no suii [The change of Japan-European relations in the South Seas]' in which he contrasted western colonisation, which was strongly backed up by their governments, with Japanese emigration which had no government support.43 Then in 1940, Iwao published the best-known book in the study of Japan-South Seas relations, Nan'yō nihon machi no kenkyū [Study on Japanese towns in the South Seas]. He wrote in the introduction:

Japanese development in the South Seas, which started in early modern times, is an epochal phenomenon in our national history. It is a topic to be examined thoroughly to understand the current international relations in the South Seas where Occidentals and Orientals are in conflict.44

Other historian-writers are Irie Toraji and Kakei Kiyosumi. Irie, an archivist of the Foreign Ministry, wrote two volumes of Höjin kaigai hatten shi [History of Japanese overseas development] about Japanese emigration since 1868, in which he devoted a considerable section to the South Seas.45 Kakei, although not a well-known writer, wrote Nanpō shohō ni okeru öseki nihon jin no katsuyaku [Japanese activities in the southern area in old times].46 Although all those are purely academic publications and have few references to government policies, the timing of their publication precisely coincides with the beginning of Japanese military actions in the late 1930s.

The navy initiated the military nanshin. In February 1939, naval forces occupied Hainan Island, an iron ore-rich island, on the pretext to cut off the southern support route.

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41 The first shogun of the Edo Era, Tokugawa Ieyasu, encouraged the South Seas trade, before the shogunate government adopted sakoku [seclusion] policy. In order to protect trading ships, he institutes the system to issue shuin-jö [red-seal permits] which were the letters of official endorsement of trade to the countries that the Japanese traders were dealing with. The trading was so active in the early 16th century that approximately 100,000 Japanese settled in Southeast Asia mainly for business purpose and created Nihon machi [Japanese town].
42 Iwao Seiichi, 1936, Kinsei shoki nihon-jin nan'yō hatten no rekishi [History of Japanese development in the South Seas in the early modern times], Taïpeï University, Taipei
43 Iwao Seiichi, 1939, 'Nan'yō ni okeru nichī-ō kankei no suii [The change of Japan-European relations in the South Seas]', Tōzai kōshō shi ron [Theory on the history of East-West contact], Tomiyama-bō, Tokyo, p.p.509-556
44 Iwao Seiichi, 1940, Nanpō nihon machi no kenkyū [Study on Japanese towns in the South Seas], Chijin-shokan, Tokyo
45 Irie Toraji, 1938, Höjin kaigai hatten shi [History of Japanese overseas development], Imin mondai kenyū kai, Tokyo
46 Kakei Kiyosumi, 1938, Nanpō shohō ni okeru öseki nihon jin no katsuyaku [Japanese activities in the southern area in old times], Nettai bunka kyōkai, Tokyo, p.1
to Chiang Kai-shek, then in March the Spratly Islands. Both islands were strategic bases for
the advance to Southeast Asia. The navy's actions were quickly followed by the cabinet's
policy statement: the Konoe cabinet decided the Outline of the Basic National Policy,
declaring 'the construction of the New Order in Greater East Asia based on the solid
consolidation of Japan, Manchuria and China' on 26 July in 1940.47 This 'New Order',
being modified from the 'New Order in East Asia' of 1938, included the South Seas.48

Shortly after the cabinet decision, the Imperial Headquarters announced nanshin by
force. On 27 July, it produced the 'outline of measures taken in response to changing
international situation.' Under the clause of 'the use of force against southern area', it
stipulated that 'in case China problem cannot be solved, .....the use of force is possible in
order to solve the problem in the southern area.'49 The outline was the unambiguous
endorsement of the military invasion of Southeast Asia.

The army saw it best opportunity when Germany defeated France and Netherlands
in Europe in mid-1940. In September the army quickly sent forces to occupy the northern
French Indochina in order to secure the naval base in Camranh Bay and the airfield at
Pnompenh. Thus the army, the traditional advocate of the northward advance, finally joined
nanshin.

In the last year before the outbreak of the war, intellectuals completed the
justification for nanshin on three main grounds: independence from the western economies,
national defence and nationalism. Iizawa Shōji gave an elaborate explanation in Nanpō kyōei
ken [South Co-Prosperity Sphere] in 1940:

Because there are correlations and interdependency between the continental policy
and southward advancement policy, it would be impossible to implement both
policies simultaneously if we attempted to achieve each policy individually. Japan has
been deploying forces on the continent and their military supplies come from Japan:
they are not available locally as expected initially. And most supplies are dependent
on imports from the US and Britain. We have been clearly shown that this is a grave
obstacle to our war efforts. If we were freed from this dependency, we would be able
to complete our continental policy. The reason why people look at the south is that
the region is rich in the resources which are in short supply on the continent.
Therefore, the policy to gain those resource must be considered an essential matter to
implementing the continental policy.50

Nihon Keizai Kenkyū Kai [Japanese Society of Economic Studies] emphasised national
defence:

Colonisation by western countries was motivated mainly by territorial desire or by the
desire to acquire precious metals and pepper. They did not hesitate to go to war to
gain territories. On the contrary, Japanese expansionism was based entirely on
national defence not on such purposes as territorial expansion or acquisition of
economic interests. Japanese southward advancement was indeed the manifestation of
this kind of [defensive] expansionist policy.51

47 Quoted in Bōei-chō bōei kenshū sho senshi shitsu [War History Office, Defence Training Institute, Defence
Agency] (ed.), 1968, Dai hon'ei rikugun bu (2) shōwa 16 nen 12 gatsu made [The Army Section of the Imperial
Headquarters (2) until December 1940], Asagumo shinbun sha, Tokyo, p.55
48 Ibid., p.56
49 Quoted in ibid., p.59
50 Iizawa Shōji, 1940, Nanpō kyōei ken [South Co-Prosperity Sphere], Takayama shoin , Tokyo, p.189
[Japanese merchants advancing south], Itō shoten, Tokyo, p.164
Finally some nationalists stimulated anti-western feelings in their publications. Goto wrote in the introduction titled 'For the freedom of the South Seas':

A new stage of the century is set up on the land of the South Seas, being spotlighted from the East. The stage where the Western Imperialists tried to achieve world hegemony is now going to be a stage to show their fall. This is nothing but historical inevitability.\(^\text{52}\)

The liberator from the western imperialism would, of course, be the Japanese. Thus \textit{nanshin-ron} matured ideologically, integrating a basic premise—economic development—to nationalism. However, it was a different form of \textit{nanshin-ron} from the one that Enomoto and other Meiji \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates asserted about half a century earlier: they were fundamentally non-militaristic free-trade advocates, but those Meiji \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates were exploited by their later counterparts. The new \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates 'deformed' the Meiji \textit{nanshin-ron},\(^\text{53}\) by exalting the Meiji advocates as national heroes despite the fact that the \textit{nanshin-ron} had attracted far less attention in the Meiji period, and created the image that the Japanese had had long-term interaction with the South Seas.

**Investment and Trade**

Japan's economic relations with the South Seas developed steadily. The growth in the overall Japanese economy, government promotion of South Seas trade and the international situation facilitated Japanese investment in the South Seas. As Table 4-1 shows, between 1919 and 1941, 78 companies were established. It was a remarkable increase, compared to only 32 companies established between 1870 and 1918. Most companies were in Southeast Asia and directed toward resource-development such as minerals, oil, rubber, lumber, jute, cotton, copra and fishery, reflecting the general focus of interest of \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates and the government.

**Table 4-1. The number of Japanese companies established in the South Seas, 1919-1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Micronesia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>South Pacific</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>unknown</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nannya dantai rengō kai [The Federation of South Seas Organisations] (ed.), 1942, \textit{Dai nannya nenkan} [the Year book of the South Seas], Tokyo, p.p.797-828

The timing of the investment, which concentrated in the 1930s, shows the association with the international situation: the US and Britain raised tariffs against Japanese products in the early 1930s; China, the second largest trading nation after the US, began to boycott Japanese products after the Japanese invasion in 1931; and the prolonged war in China forced Japan to find alternative sources of raw materials to meet increasing military demands.

\(^{52}\)Goto Isamu, 1941, \textit{Nannya kōbō shi} [History of rise and fall in the South Seas], Tōkō sha, Tokyo, p.13

\(^{53}\)Yano, op.cit., p.187
Consequently Japan-South Seas trade increased dramatically. As Table 4-2 shows, total exports increased from 252.5 million yen in 1920 to 474.2 million yen in 1937 and imports from 188.3 million to 540.4 million. Southeast Asia was the largest trading area, followed by Australia and New Zealand, while Micronesia remained marginal. However, the proportion of the South Seas trade in the total Japanese trade remained small; it only increased from 10.2 percent in 1920 to 14.5 percent in 1937.54

Table 4-2. Japanese trade with the South Seas from 1920 to 1937 (million yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Micronesia export</th>
<th>Micronesia import</th>
<th>Southeast Asia* export</th>
<th>Southeast Asia* import</th>
<th>Australia** export</th>
<th>Australia** import</th>
<th>Total export</th>
<th>Total import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>184.8</td>
<td>125.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>252.5</td>
<td>188.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>130.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>225.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>382.6</td>
<td>325.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>213.8</td>
<td>474.2</td>
<td>540.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. no data available

*The countries of Southeast Asia varied by year due to the availability of statistics:
1920: British Malaya, Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand
1930, 1937: British Malaya and Borneo, Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand

** Includes New Zealand


Similarly, the position of Japan in the total South Seas economy remained marginal. In 1939, the Japanese proportion of the trade was only 6.7 percent, while the US, Britain, China, and Netherlands occupied about 90 percent.55 As Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economies admitted, 'the fundamental reason [for Japan's backward position in Southeast Asia] is......the result of our [weak] industrial strength' compared to western economies.56

Migration

Emigration to the South Seas increased more than threefold from 31,811 in 1919 to 95,528 in 1936 (Table 4-3), although the proportion in the total Japanese emigration remained marginal: it was only 8 percent in 1936.57 The increase was mainly due to emigration to Micronesia that drastically increased in the 1930s. The government assisted emigration: the Nan'yō chō (the South Seas Government), the Japanese colonial administration in Micronesia, leased land and the Nan'yō Kōshatsu Kaisha (South Seas Development Company), the private company part-funded by the government, recruited thousands of labourers for its sugar plantations. Emigration increased especially after Japan resigned from the League of Nations in 1933.

Emigration to Southeast Asia remained largely static in the 1920s, because the government adopted a foreign policy to cooperate with other powers in the framework of

54 The same source of Table 4-2.
55 Iimoto Nobuyuki and Sato Hiroshi (ed.), 1942, Nan'yō chiri taikei dai 1 kan nan'yō sóron [Outline of the geography of the South Seas, Vol.1, Introduction to the South Seas], Daiyamondo sha, Tokyo, p.p.137-138
56 Mitsubishi keizai kenkyü sho [Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economy] (ed.), 1933, Tōyō oyobi nan'yō shokoku no kokusaibōeki to nihon no chii [International trade of Oriental and South Seas countries and the position of Japan], Shūei sha, Tokyo, p.1
57 Data from Ishikawa Tomonori, 1972, Tōkei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from statistics], Chiri kagaku [Geographic science], Vol.16, Chiri kagaku gakkai [Association of Geographic Science], Hiroshima, p.p.27-28
the Washington System and discouraged emigration to Southeast Asia, which might cause friction with the western powers. The Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, stated at the South Seas Trade Conference of 1926 that 'the agenda of this conference does not include immigration issues.'\(^{58}\) Although emigration began to increase in the 1930s, the increase was far less dramatic than in Micronesia. The main reason was that there was little demand for Japanese labourers unlike in Micronesia, as cheap labour was locally available. As a result, migrants were mainly company employees and their numbers were subject to fluctuations of in the economy.\(^{59}\) Also the Dutch administration applied restrictions on foreign labourers from 1935. The Japanese population in Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific islands declined, as Australia continued to restrict Asian migration and this affected most Japanese in this region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-3. Japanese population in the South Seas, 1919 to 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Asia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Southeast Asia includes British Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and Guam

Source: 1919-1925: Ishikawa Tomonori, 1972, 'Tokei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from statistics], *Chiri kagaku* [Geographic science], Vol.16, Chiri kagaku gakkai [Association of Geographic Science], Hiroshima, p.p.27-28

3. Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea

Corresponding to the rise of the militaristic *nanshin-ron*, Japanese interest in Papua and New Guinea increased in the late 1930s. The number of publications demonstrates this. As Table 4-4 shows, most publications appeared in the same period. Only one book was published before 1923, according to *Zōho nanpō bunken mokuroku* [Biography of the South Literature, revised edition]. However, interest in Papua and New Guinea was extremely marginal compared to Southeast Asia. In *Zōho nanpō bunken mokuroku*, the list of publications on Southeast Asia occupies 144 pages, while that of Papua and New Guinea occupies only 3. Thus, the increase of interest was relatively a trickle.

A sharp contrast to Japanese interests in Southeast Asia can be seen in the contents of the publications. The Japanese were not so interested in the economy of Papua and New Guinea. Table 4-5 shows that almost half of the publications were about the general situation and travel, and only 8 out of 42 were on industry and natural resources.

Although marginal, the information on Papua and New Guinea increased dramatically. The government was the initiator. In 1938 the Department of Foreign Affairs

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\(^{58}\)Quoted in Shimizu, 1986, op.cit., p.28

\(^{59}\)Shimizu Hajime, 1985, 'Tokushū ni atatte [Introduction of the special issue]', *Ajia keizai* [Developing Economy], XXVI-3, Ajia keizai kenkyū sho, Tokyo, p.4
published *Eiryō papua* [British territory of Papua] and *Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyūginia* [Australian mandated territory New Guinea], and the Department of Colonisation published a book with the same title.\(^{60}\) Then in 1939 the administration in Micronesia published two massive volumes—400-pages long *Nyūginia jijō (gōshū inin tōchi ryō)* [The situation in New Guinea (Australian mandated territory)] and 145-pages long *Nyūginia jijō (papua ryō hen)* [The situation in New Guinea (territory of Papua)].\(^{61}\) Those books introduced history, population, religion, education, climate, hygiene, geography politics, etc. And they were based on information from English sources such as *New Guinea Handbook*, *Pacific Island Year Book*, *Pacific Islands Monthly*, *Rabaul Times*, *Gazette of Papua*, *Annual Report of Papua*, *Papuan Courier* and the ordinances of the Australian administrations.

Table 4-4. The number of South Seas publications, 1923 to 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4-5. Classification of publications on Papua and New Guinea, 1923 to 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biography</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General situation and travel account</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and culture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and foreign relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and economy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: same as Table 4-4

Until the early 1930s, Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans remained the same. Tatsue Yoshinobu, who travelled with Komine in the early 1900s, wrote that 'fierce natives' were impeding development,\(^{62}\) and Miyoshi Hōjū called New Guinean women

\(^{60}\)Gaimu shō 6a kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs], 1938, *Eiryō papua* [British territory of Papua], Tokyo; Gaimu shō 6a kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs], 1938, *Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyūginia* [Australian mandated territory New Guinea], Tokyo; Takumu sho takumu kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation], 1938, *Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyūginia* [Australian mandated territory New Guinea], Tokyo

\(^{61}\)Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], 1939, *Nyūginia jijō (gōshū inin tōchi ryō)* [The situation in New Guinea (Australian mandated territory)], Koror; Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], 1939, *Nyūginia jijō (papua ryō hen)* [The situation in New Guinea (territory of Papua)], Koror

\(^{62}\)Tatsue Yoshinobu, 1924, 'Shokujin shu seisoku suru nyūginia tanken dan (1)' [Accounts of exploration in New Guinea; land of cannibals (1)], *Shokumin* [The Colonial Review], Vol.3, No.11, Shokumia tsūshin sha, Tokyo, p.99
the ugliest in the world. However, in the late 1930s perceptions sharpened. The government publications presented the 'tribal' diversity (e.g. coastal people were peaceful but inland people were still rebellious), and the effectiveness of Australian rule through administration and missions which produced some educated Christian natives.

The introduction of New Guinean artefacts also improved the stereotyped perceptions. The Minami no kai [Society of the South] published Nyūginia dozoku hin zushū [Illustrated New Guinean artefacts] which introduced collections of artefacts and their relations with native religions and customs. Interestingly Matsue Haruji, the Directing-Manager of the South Seas Developing Company, was the owner of the collections in the book, and he had bought them from Komine. A similar book was written by Fujiki Yoshihiro, an anthropologist. His book, Nyūginia sono fukin tōsho no dozoku hin [Artefacts of New Guinea and adjacent islands], had introductory sections written by artists and anthropologists who appreciated the high quality of the artefacts, commenting 'New Guinean artefacts are excellent' or 'New Guineans are artists.'

Although weak, there was some government interest in the economy. Muramatsu Kaoru, an official of the Research Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, compared the economic potential of Australian New Guinea with Dutch New Guinea, and pointed out that 'Australian New Guinea was superior to Dutch New Guinea in various points' such as in copra planting and coastal shipping. The Nan'yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho (Research Institute of the South Seas Economy), a government research organ specialising in the economy of the South Seas, reported the oil search in Papua. The Institute also reported the shortage of labour, industries and the Australian exploration in the highlands. All those publications seem to be mere translations from English sources.

The government was also aware that Australians placed great strategic importance on Papua and New Guinea. Nagatsuka Jirō pointed out that Australians had always regarded

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63Miyoshi Höjü, 1933, 'Nan'yō no ou'na samazama' [Variety of the South Seas women], Shokumin [The Colonial Review], Vol.12, No.12, Shokumin tsūshin sha, Tokyo, p.100
64Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], 1939, Nyūginia jiijō (papua ryō hen) [The situation in New Guinea (territory of Papua)], Koror, p.18
65Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], 1939, Nyūginia jiijō (gōshū inin tōchī ryō) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian mandated territory)], Koror, p.40
66Minami no kai [Society of the South], 1937, Nyūginia dozoku hin zushū [Illustration of New Guinean artefacts], Vol.1 and 2, Nan'yō kōhatsu kabushiki kaisha, Koror
68Matsuoka Kaoru, 1937, 'Raanyō nyūginia gaikan [Outlook of Ducth New Guinea]', Kaigai ijū [ Overseas emigration], Vol.10, No.6, Imin mondai kenkyü sho, Tokyo, p.17
69Nan'yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho [Research Institute of the South Seas Economy], 1939c, 'Kaitaku jidai no niuginia sekiyu jiijō [Situation of oil in New Guinea: development stage]', Kenkyū shiryō [Research Materials], Vol.2, No.11, Tokyo, p.p.49-51
Papua and New Guinea as an important defence line, explaining that their attempt to annex Papua and New Guinea was the manifestation of this recognition.\textsuperscript{71}

The increase in references to Japanese migrants was an important trend from the mid-1930s. It stressed the fact that Japanese had had a long linkage with New Guinea, although until then nobody had demonstrated much interest. Most major government publications, such as the ones of the Department of Colonisation and the South Seas Government, devoted many pages to the history of Japanese migration (mainly about Komine) and commercial activities.\textsuperscript{72} Although the information was a plain description of events and accounts of the migrants, it was the first time that the migrants were taken up by officials with such intensity.

_Nanshin-ron_ advocates played a more important role. They exalted Komine as a national hero. In 1935 _Sandē mainichi_ [Sunday Everyday], a popular weekly magazine, published an article titled 'Shōwa no Yamada Nagamas, Nihon-to o sasagete tanshin doku-kan o ikedoru: Nan'yō no kaitaku-sha Komine Isokichi' [Nagamas Yamada of the Showa period, captured a German ship alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Isokichi Komine].\textsuperscript{73} The article began: 'This is the story that impressed Debuchi Gen, a special envoy to Australia, who said "This is the most appropriate episode to promote Japan-Australia relations"' and described Komine's relations with Germans and Australians dramatically. He rescued the German governor who was being attacked by natives on a jungle track: 'Mr Komine jumped off a seven-meter high cliff like a bird into the fighting and saved the life of the governor by a close shave.' The article said that the capture of the _Komet_ was proposed by frustrated Komine who saw the Australians could not do anything because they were unfamiliar with the local geography, and that Komine organised the expedition and when he found the _Komet_, he climbed onto the deck by himself just carrying a Japanese sword and successfully persuaded the German commander to surrender. Because of this feat, he was given the chronometer of the _Komet_ and a title of both naval and army captain. The article also emphasised that Komine was a good friend of the German commander and looked after his family at Rabaul while the commander was in custody, and later the commander thanked Komine, saying 'I now learnt the greatness of the Japanese.' Most accounts in the article were exaggerated (see Chapter 3, 1. World War I). No other written records and oral evidence can confirm that Komine flew like a bird or carried a sword or the German commander thanked him (generally the Germans resented Komine's

\textsuperscript{71}Nagatsuka Jiro, 1939, 'Niuginia (gōshū inin tōchi ryō) papua gappei mondai no ichi shinten [Development of the issue of the annexation of New Guinea (Australian mandate) and Papua], Kenkyū shiryo [Research Materials], Vol.2, No.7, Nan'yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho, Tokyo, p.p.10-11

\textsuperscript{72}Takumu-shö takumu-kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation], op.cit., p.p.83-93; Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], op.cit., p.p.314-318

\textsuperscript{73}Mainichi shinbun-sha [Mainichi Newspaper Co.], Sandē mainichi [Sunday Everyday], 8 July 1935, 'Shōwa no Yamada Nagamas, Nihon-to o sasagete tanshin doku-kan o ikedoru: Nan'yō no kaitaku-sha Komine Isokichi' [Nagamas Yamada of the Showa period, captured a German ship alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Isokichi Komine], p.30; Yamada is a popular legendary figure believed to have served the Ayutaya dynasty in Thailand as a military commander in the 17th century. _Nanshin-ron_ advocates from the late 1930s to the early 1940s regarded him as a symbol of Japanese pioneers in the South Seas.
action). At the time of writing the article, Komine was already dead and nobody (except for those who actually knew about Komine) could challenge the accuracy of the accounts. Thus the writer could say almost anything to dramatise the events.

More significantly, the article was reintroduced in April 1941. Captain Kamijō Fukashi wrote Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisen ji nan'yō no rekishi [The war front of ten thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during World War I] and inserted the article fully in his book. Kamijō added a detailed account of the capture of Komet, although the addition seems to be his translation from MacKenzie's The Australians at Rabaul which had been published in 1927. Similarly, in August 1941 the Nanpō sangyō chōsa kai [Society of the South Seas Industry Research] published Nyūginia, a book introducing general information on Papua, Australian New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea, and repeated the story about Komine's feat, although briefly. Thus just before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the government and nanshin-ron advocates began to popularise the Japanese in New Guinea, obviously intending to propagate and justify the nanshin. The Japanese in New Guinea, who had attracted little public attention in Japan, were suddenly and comprehensively integrated into the vast scheme of Japanese expansionism.

4. Japanese in Papua

Australian attitudes

Australians scarcely noticed the small number of Japanese. An official report in the late 1930s stated that 'with regard to the Territory of Papua, there are no Japanese.' The smallness of the Japanese population and the scale of their business which threatened no Australian interests was one reason why the Australians were not concerned in Papua. The limited activities of the Japanese was another reason: Japanese business operations were confined in Milne Bay and had little interaction with the Japanese in New Guinea. Consequently no reports about the Japanese appeared in the Papua Annual Report or the Government Gazette between the two wars.

However, Australians were concerned about the Japanese who attempted to enter the territory. In 1939 Nan'yō Bōeki Kaisha (South Seas Company) sent trade envoys to Samarai and Port Moresby and entertained the residents with films of Japanese industries and tourist attractions. The Pacific Islands Monthly reported the visit uneasily: 'in spite of wars and the echoes of wars, and the manifest distrust of all British communities in the Central and South

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74 Kamijō Fukashi, 1941, Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisen ji nan'yō no rekishi [The war front of ten thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during World War I], Nantō guntō bunka kyōkai, Tokyo, p.p.182-193
75 Nanpō sangyō chōsa kai [Society of the South Seas Industry Research] (ed.), 1941, Nyūginia [New Guinea], Nanshin sha, Tokyo, p.148
76 'Territories of New Guinea and Papua', Date unknown (possibly around 1939), AA, A518/1 O918/2
77 Interview by the author with Tanaka, Mary [daughter of Tanaka Taichirō], 22 December 1994, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG
Pacific, the Japanese continue with their program of commercial penetration—part of their campaign to secure economic domination of the Pacific.\(^78\)

Similarly, when Nan'yō Bōeki purchased the steamer *Papuan Chief*, wrecked and lying on a reef near Port Moresby, and sent a Japanese crew to salvage it, the Prime Minister instructed the Papua Administration to restrict the movements of the crew. Although the entry of the crew to Port Moresby was granted in July 1941, the Department of Defence Co-Ordination had strongly objected, insisting that: 'the view of the Department of the Army is that it is undesirable for Japanese at Port Moresby, particularly having regard to movement of troops and other defence measures now taking place'.\(^79\) However, the Department of Foreign Affairs supported admission provided that the crew stay at Port Moresby for a limited period. Finally the Prime Minister decided to grant entry and advised Murray: 'No doubt you will be able to restrict movement of crew at Port Moresby to a minimum, without this being obvious to the crew.'\(^80\)

It was a delicate time just before the outbreak of the war. Prior to that, there was an incident which embarrassed the Australian government and could have worsened its relations with Japan. In June 1937, the Australian patrol boat *Larrakia* 'wrongfully and without lawful authority, and by force of arms seized and took possession' of the Japanese fishing vessel *New Guinea Maru* on the high seas in the Arafura Sea and imprisoned the captain and the crew.\(^81\) The Japanese appealed to the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, which ordered the government to pay compensation.\(^82\) Possibly the incident affected the attitude of the Department of Foreign Affairs and made it more diffident in the case of the *Papuan Chief*.

Another major concern for the Australians was the possible effect of the war on Papuans. Australians feared that their authority would be undermined by war against a non-white race. Just one month before the war, the government anthropologist, F.E. Williams, wrote explicitly anti-Japanese articles in his newspaper *The Papuan Villager* which circulated among Australian-educated Papuans. The article introduced the Japanese as 'not white men...[but] very warlike people...[who] have made a number of cruel wars against their neighbour, China,' and concluded that:

> Japan is like a very snappy little dog, barking at three big dogs that just lie down and look at her. The three big dogs are Great Britain, America and Russia. If this little dog ever begins to bite, then the three big dogs will jump at her and tear her to pieces.\(^83\)

\(^78\) Nationwide News, *Pacific Islands Monthly*, November 1939, Sydney, p.59
\(^79\) Telegram quoted in 'Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of External Affairs', 8 July 1940, AA, A981/1 PAPUA 3
\(^80\) Prime Minister to the Lieutenant-Governor, 9 July 1940, ibid.
\(^81\) Statement of claim in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 18 June 1938, AA, A1/1 1938/20320
\(^82\) Japanese lugger actions in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 8 November 1938, ibid.
\(^83\) *The Papuan Villager*, October 1941, No.10, Vol.13
Japanese settlers

The pre-war Japanese population was last recorded by the administration in 1920, when six lived in the Eastern Division and one in the South-Eastern Division. From 1921 to 1948, the administration did not record the non-Papuan coloured population. The 1947-48 Annual Report listed the coloured population only for 1921 and 1933: no Japanese were recorded in either years. However, the census by the Australian government shows that there were two Japanese who were 'not able to read and write English, but able to read and write a foreign Language' and 14 Japanese 'classified according to race'. The two Japanese are undoubtedly Tanaka and Murakami, although the census was misleading as both spoke English and Pidgin English. The 14 Japanese most likely include mixed-race Japanese. The inaccurate reports suggests that a few Japanese was simply insignificant to the Australians.

As a result, most information about the Japanese in this period is from oral evidence. Most early Japanese settlers died between the two wars, and their mixed-race children took over their trade. The children continued to keep Japanese names and their businesses mostly prospered.

Jimmy Koto died at an unknown date. His son George inherited Jimmy's trade and became a trader, boat builder and planter. He was the only boat builder on Misima Island and had large plantations (Palanean plantation in Motorina island and another in Kimuta Island). He started boat building on Motorina. He also dived for trochus shells, sea cucumber and turtle. His trading covered Milne Bay, having a business partnership with Tanaka Taichirō. Jimmy's good relations with Mrs Mahony seem to have been continued by his daughter, Florence. Mrs Mahony once took her for a trip to Sydney. Tanaka Taichirō made a success of his trading business and owned six luggers by the outbreak of the war.

Murakami Heijirō moved from Naiwara, a village at the end of Milne Bay, to Kuyaro, a village opposite Samarai to work in the plantation owned by Whitten Brothers before 1927. In 1927, his son Kalo left Kuyaro to attend the mission school at Dogura in Goodenough Bay. Honor Shigamata, a daughter of Tanaka Shigematsu, was in the same school. After schooling, Kalo came back to Kuyaro then went to Samarai to work for a freezing company. In 1939 he went to Misima to look for a job in the gold mine.

Tamiya Mabe tried to return Japan by himself some time before the Pacific War, but died on the way. His three sons—Tetu, Hagani and Namari—all became boat builders. Tetu worked with Hagani in Kanamadawa village on Basilaki Island, and they also dived for shell

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84 Papua Annual Report, 1920, Melbourne, p.13
85 Papua Annual Report, 1949, p.34.
86 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1933, Vol.1, Canberra, p.573-574
87 Interview by the author with Koto, Jessie [grand daughter of Koto, Jimmy], 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG
88 Telegram received from Judge Murray, Sydney, 4 January 1923, AA, A457/1 C115/9
89 Interview by the author with Mary Tanaka, op.cit.
90 Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo [son of Murakami Heijirō], 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG
and traded. Tetu married a Basilaki girl and Hagani married a girl from East Cape.91 Namari married a girl from Wagofufu village on East Cape and stayed there and built boats by himself. He owned a sailing boat and named it *Papua*. Later he returned to Basilaki and died there around 1930.92

All informants relate that Japanese relations with Australians, Papuans and other Asians were good. Kalo Murakami recalls that Charley Wisdel, who also worked for Whitten brothers in Samarai, was a good friend of his father. Also a Chinese cook called Maxim, and some Filipinos, were good friends of Japanese. But no informants suggest that the Japanese kept a high profile in the community.

5. Japanese in New Guinea

**Melbourne's (later Canberra's) attitudes**

Officials in Melbourne perceived the Japanese in New Guinea very explicitly as part of Japanese expansionism. Atlee Hunt, a member of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea (and the Secretary of the Department of Territories), regarded the development of Japanese commercial activities in Taiwan, India, Dutch East Indies and the Philippines as 'no doubt part of a vast [expansive] system'.93 At this time there was a diplomatic dispute about the Australian restriction on direct trade between Rabaul and Japan. The Australian government stopped the Japanese trading in New Guinea from 1919 to 1920 on two grounds—to monopolise trade in New Guinea and to retaliate against Japanese restriction on Burns Philp's trade in Micronesia. In 1919, the government refused to grant permission to the Japanese vessel *Nanking Maru* to ship copra, discharge and load cargo at Rabaul. Similarly in 1920, the government refused the application of the *Madras Maru* to discharge cargo at Rabaul. The Japanese government protested and the Japanese press condemned the Australian actions.94

As a result, diplomatic relations were strained, and rude behaviour by the Australian military staff at Rabaul receiving the Japanese crew of *Madras Maru* added to the tension. It was alleged that Australian soldiers, under the influence of alcohol, abused and used violence against the Japanese returning to the ship.95 Hearing of the incident, the administrator immediately reported to the Prime Minister, who quickly expressed regret to the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, saying 'I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to inform the Japanese Government of the regret of the Commonwealth

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91 Interview by the author with Tetu, Joseph (grand son of Tamiya Mabe) 24 December 1993, Kanadamada village, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG
92 Interview by the author with Namari, Kesaya (grand daughter of Tamiya Mabe), 30 December 1993, Biwa Village, Milne Bay, PNG
93 Activities of Japanese and Germans in Rabaul, date unknown (definitely after 1919; Hunt was appointed the Commissioner of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea in 1919), AA., CP661/15/1 BOX 1
94 The Japan Advertiser, 23 May 1920; The Japan Weekly Chronicle, 27 May 1920
95 Prime Minister, S.S. 'Madras Maru' Incident at Rabaul, 7 December 1920, AA, A3932/1 SC397
Government at this occurrence. The soldiers were punished and the Japanese government did not take up this matter publicly.

Nevertheless the Australian government kept a firm attitude on the trade issue, in spite of Piesse's suggestion that hard-line policies would affect diplomatic relations:

I would suggest for consideration that the Commonwealth might suffer no serious loss, if, in the period before the mandate is issued, during which our legal right to restrict trade is doubtful, we ceased to hinder Japanese ships from engaging in this trade. Such a policy would avoid our getting deeper into a position which we have difficulty in making good, diplomatically; it might be regarded by Japan as a friendly act, and it might even make easier the securing of Japan's concurrence in the issue of the mandate.

However, Hughes bluntly replied to the Japanese official protest:

Although there is no intention on the part of Commonwealth Government to exclude Japanese vessels from having access to the port of Rabaul, any more than there is any intention to exclude British, French, or American vessels, we claim the right to make such laws in respect to trade as we please, and trade includes navigation; therefore cannot give undertaking in this respect.

And Hunt thought that all those Japanese activities were 'calculated to bring about one result i.e. grave embarrassment to Australia...[by] making Australia's position as difficult as possible.'

Japanese traders sought in vain for a loophole. The Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (Osaka Merchant Ship Company) applied for permission to open trade with the Solomons. The company planned to purchase copra from a Japanese trader, Okaji, in Bougainville, and he would act as a middle man between Rabaul and Japan. But the application was refused, for Australian officials thought that 'it seems obvious that Japanese frequentation of ports in the British Solomons is as dangerous to Australian interests as Japanese trade with Rabaul.'

Regarding the Japanese residents in New Guinea, the Royal Commission recognised 'the desirability of adopting any policy which would free the Territory from Japanese influence' and considered MacKenzie's proposal to purchase all Japanese properties. However, the Commission turned down that proposal on the ground that:

The result of the sale of Komine's properties to the Government would simply be that he would part his present interests and would be provided with capital which, after liquidating his liabilities to the Japanese Company named or otherwise, would be available for the purchase of other interests, so that the general situation would be left much as it was before.

From the late 1920s, officials in Canberra began to consolidate their perceptions of fear of Japanese attack. They suspected that Japanese migrants in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia were part of government-organised Japanese expansionism. The Australian

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96Prime Minister to Tamaki, 22 July 1920, ibid.
97Memorandum for the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 16 April, 1920, ibid.
99Ibid.
100The Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 24 January 1920, AA, MP1049 1920/047
101Royal Commission on (late) German New Guinea, 6 December 1919, AA, B197/0 2022/1/3. It is doubtful whether MacKenzie really attempted to free New Guinea from Japanese influence, as his relations with Komine were cordial and good during the war. His proposal to purchase Japanese properties, which were indeed all Komine's properties, seemed to be aimed at assisting Komine who was short of funds to run his business.
102Ibid.
Navy was monitoring the activities of the Japanese in New Guinea, Netherlands East Indies and Thursday Island intensively.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, Australian officials thought that Japanese fishing vessels operating illegally in waters north of Australia had some connection with espionage. Naval Intelligence collected detailed reports of Japanese poaching in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Ninigo Group, Solomon Islands, and so on.\textsuperscript{104} The Commander of the Royal Australian Navy predicted 'the landing of the [Japanese] armed force somewhere on Cape York Peninsula' in the event of war.\textsuperscript{105} And a naval expert pointed out the significance of Micronesia as Japanese advanced bases and emphasised the vulnerability of Rabaul, comparing the distance:

- Rabaul to Sydney—1850 miles.
- Rabaul to Darwin—1736 miles.
- Rabaul to Singapore—3186 miles.

The proximity of the Japanese Mandated islands—which can be used by the Japanese as an intermediate base—to the Australian Mandated Islands in not generally realised. The distance from Truk, in the Caroline Islands, to Rabaul is only a matter of 800 miles.\textsuperscript{106}

Australian fear increased towards the end of the 1930s. The Prime Minister's Department studied Japan's southward advancement policy\textsuperscript{107} and monitored the entry of every agent of Japanese companies in New Guinea; in 1937 the giant Nippon Mining Co. sent a geologist to investigate the copper ore deposit in the Nakanai District on north-west coast of New Britain, and in 1939 the Nanyō Bōeki Kaisha sent four Japanese to investigate the goldfields at Wau. Their activities were thoroughly reported to the Department by the administration at Rabaul,\textsuperscript{108} although none of those activities could not be substantiated as spying. The acting administrator reported: 'It is believed that every Japanese is a potential intelligence officer for Japan, but unfortunately it is not practicable to substantiate that belief by quoting incidents in support.'\textsuperscript{109}

**Rabaul's view**

The Australians at Rabaul were also alarmed by the development of Japanese Micronesia. The secrecy of the Japanese administration aroused their suspicion. The seriousness of their concerns was illustrated by an amazingly detailed report in the *Rabaul Times* by Gordon Green, an Australian traveller who made a trip to Japan via Micronesia in...
He reported high tariffs imposed on imported goods and strict restrictions on his travel by the police.

The Australian concerns turned to fear in the 1930s, when they learnt that the Japanese population in Micronesia was increasing rapidly, and when militarisation was rumoured. Numerous articles, about Japanese Micronesia in The Rabaul Times, which were mostly long and detailed, indicate their fear. In 1932, the newspaper reported:

Japanese had fortified the more strategic points in the Carolines, and was also Japanising the natives of her mandated territory in a wholesale manner by inter-marriage with the women of the islands. In 1920 there were some 3,600 Japanese; when the 1930 census was taken the number increased to nearly 20,000!

When another Australian traveller reported Japanese naval exercises in Micronesian waters, the editor immediately wrote an alarming article:

The ever-smiling little Jap has become a force in the Pacific with whom the nations of the world must reckon at present time....The once urbane Jap-man, now that he has thoroughly mastered the intricacies of western civilisation by out-westering the West, resembles nothing so much as a youth strutting about with his first loaded revolver eager to display his prowess with his instrument of slaughter.

A month later, the editor repeated the alarm: 'Japan is endeavouring to present an amicably-inclined face to the nations of the world', and criticised the inability of the League of Nations to keep Japan and Germany in the League. Rabaul's anxiety increased when a well-known German journalist, Herbert Rittlinger, stopped at Rabaul from his trip to Micronesia but declined to comment about the fortifications. The Rabaul Times reported, 'Perhaps he has seen things, and has given his word not to divulge the information which he has collected'. Their anti-Japanese feelings were heightened by anger against the frequent appearances of Japanese poachers in New Guinea waters. At the same time they felt that Canberra was neglecting to protect them, and condemned the Federal Government.

However, Rabaul's fear seems to have been directed mainly towards Japanese in Micronesia and Japanese poachers. Economically the Japanese hardly threatened Australian interests. Griffiths reported to Melbourne:

There [sic] businesses are so small compared with the large Companies here, and they are so few in numbers that they are not seriously considered as business competitors. They have been most successful against all competition in shell-fishing, because they bring skilled divers to carry on the work, and give the work their close personal attention.

As a result, the Rabaul Times did not express any hostility against local Japanese except for one article about the death of a Japanese suspected of spying. The article was brief (one paragraph) compared to the articles about Japanese Micronesia or poachers. The whole article says:

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110 The Rabaul Times, 18 January 1929, Rabaul
111 The Rabaul Times, 22 April 1932
112 The Rabaul Times, 15 September 1933
113 The Rabaul Times, 22 September 1933
114 The Rabaul Times, 27 October 1933
115 The Rabaul Times, 22 December 1933
116 The Rabaul Times, 19 January 1934 and 17 May 1935
117 Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 September 1920, AA, AWM33 57/5
A prominent Japanese merchant by the name of Y. Nishimura, died here suddenly whilst in a detective's office undergoing questioning. Other prominent Japanese have been questioned and later deported. Many documents have been seized and it is rumoured that a gigantic espionage system has been discovered. It is doubtful that Nishimura was a spy. If any gigantic espionage system had existed, the incident must have attracted the attention of Canberra or Naval Intelligence, but there was no official record in Australian sources. The name of Nishimura cannot be found in the list of passports issued for travellers bound for New Guinea in the Japanese Foreign Ministry record, which suggests that he was a merchant based outside New Guinea. Possibly he acted suspiciously in New Guinea and was caught by the police, then his sudden death provoked a rumour that he was a spy. The incident may simply show the nervousness of Australians in Rabaul against non-local Japanese.

Despite its anxiety about Japanese expansion, generally the Rabaul Times wrote about the local Japanese in a respectful and friendly way. The editor praised Komine's carpenters' 'very clever piece of work' to shift Burns Philp's bangalow without causing much disturbance. When the arrest of a New Guinean called 'Komini' for stealing was in the news, the editor noted 'not our esteemed Japanese fellow townsman'. At the death of Komine in 1934 he was written about as one held in high esteem. He was 'one of the oldest and best-known identities in the 'Territory' and 'the whole [Rabaul] community extends its deep sympathy' to his widow.

The Rabaul Times' warm comments on the film show held by the Rabaul branch of the Nan'yō Bōeki suggest that personally Australians remained friendly to the local Japanese even after the outbreak of war in Europe. The branch was run by Tashiro Tunesuke, a long time resident. The show was held twice in October and December 1939. The newspaper reported that the 'films showing the industrial and agricultural life [of Japan] were exceedingly interesting' and that 'a crowded house fully appreciated the interesting portrayal of Japanese social and industrial life.' The second show was even combined with fund raising by local white women (Ethel Smith and Tootsie Hamilton) for the Red Cross. The absence of hostility was probably because of the smallness of the local Japanese population and their long personal acquaintance with white residents.

Japanese population

The Japanese population declined gradually under Australian migration regulations: unless Japanese men were married when they first came to New Guinea, they could not

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118 The Rabaul Times, 14 December 1934
119 All intelligence files (including secret files) related to Japanese activities in New Guinea, Micronesia and waters north of Australia in this period seem to be open to the public, but the author could not find a record related to Nishimura's death.
120 The Rabaul Times, 8 July 1927
121 The Rabaul Times, 26 April 1929
122 The Rabaul Times, 5 October 1934
123 The Rabaul Times, 20 October 1939 and 15 December 1939
bring their wives. This regulation effectively reduced the number of Japanese who were mostly single males on two-to-three year contract. Also the restriction not to allow the population to increase higher than the number in 1914 stopped new Japanese from migrating. Some left New Guinea and even fewer came in. As Table 4-6 shows, the number decreased by about half from 87 in 1921 to 38 in 1940. The decline of the female population was high, suggesting that quite a few married couples left New Guinea.

Table 4-6. Population of Japanese by gender in New Guinea, 1921-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4-7. Population of Japanese and other non-indigenous groups in New Guinea, 1921-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>2,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>3,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>3,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>3,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>3,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>3,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>4,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>4,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>2,594</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>5,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>5,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>5,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>5,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>3,329</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>5,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>6,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>6,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>6,498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: same as Table 4-6

Consequently, in terms of numbers, the Japanese became an extremely marginal group. As Table 4-7 shows, they were far fewer than other non-indigenous groups and their proportion among these groups declined from 2.7 percent in 1921 to 0.5 percent in 1940.

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124 Territories of New Guinea and Papua, Date unknown (possibly around 1939), AA, A518/1 O918/2
The occupational composition also changed. As Table 4-8 shows, by 1938 artisans (carpenters and sawyers) and labourers disappeared, whereas the number of traders and trading company agents and fishermen increased. The increase of those two occupations is important when the total population decreased by more than half. As a result, the proportions of traders and trading company agents and fishermen increased from 3.8 percent in 1921 to 13.9 percent in 1938 and from 7.7 percent to 23.2 percent respectively.

| Table 4-8. Occupation of the Japanese in New Guinea, 1921 and 1938 (number and percentage) |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                  | trader & trading company's agent | planter & plantation manager | boat builder | carpenter | sawyer | fisherman | barber | factory hand* | other | total |
| 1921 no. | 4 | 2.7 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 11 | 25** | 103*** |
| 1921 % | 3.8 | 26.2 | 9.7 | 11.6 | 2.9 | 7.7 | 2.9 | 10.6 | 24.2 | 100.0 |
| 1938 no. | 6 | 13 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 43*** |
| 1938 % | 13.9 | 30.2 | 16.2 | 0 | 0 | 23.2 | 6.9 | 0 | 9.3 | 100.0 |

*This seems to be labourers in boat building yard.
**This includes 13 accompanied family members (mostly wives and children).
***These figure from the Japanese source contradicts those from the Australian source in Table 4-6. The Japanese figures seem to be accurate, and are more detailed than the Australian ones.

Source: Nan'yō chōkan kanbō chōsa (Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government), 1939, Nyūginia jijō (gōshū inin tōchi ryō) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian mandated territory)], Koror, p.p.318-319

Japanese economic activities

The change in the occupational structure was caused by the emergence of new small businessmen. The largest company, Komine's Nan'yō Sangyō, was liquidated in 1931 and some of his business was bought by Nagahama. At the same time, small fishing companies and a new branch of a trading company were established. Consequently, as Table 4-9 and 4-10 show, the number of businesses increased from 2 in 1919 to 12 in 1940. Those new companies did not require many employees, except for Nagahama's plantations, because they were mostly run by family members. As the scale of shipbuilding was reduced, the demands for employees declined, and the costly Japanese employees were replaced with cheap New Guinean ones. Thus the Japanese community changed to a group of small businessmen.

Although the population had declined and a large company disappeared, Japanese trade with New Guinea increased. After the restriction on trade was lifted, exports increased rapidly from £458 in 1923 to £34,921 in 1939 and imports from £525 in 1925 to £7,266 in 1939 (Table 4-11). The total trade (exports and imports) increased from £3,373 in 1925 to £42,187 in 1939, at a rate of 1,000 percent. However, this increase was not so astonishing in the total New Guinea trade which increased by 820 percent in the same period. The proportion of Japanese trade remained extremely marginal in the total New Guinea trade, although it increased very slightly from 0.6 percent in 1925 to 0.9 percent in 1939 (even at its peak in 1937 the proportion was only 2.3 percent).

125JDR, E.4.0.0.11
Table 4-9. Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name of businessmen</th>
<th>company name</th>
<th>type of business</th>
<th>capital (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Komine Isokichi</td>
<td>Nan'yō Sangyō</td>
<td>general store, boatbuilding,</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fishery, copra planting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Okaji Satareö</td>
<td>Okaji Company</td>
<td>general store, copra planting</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaimushö tsūshö kyoku [Bureau of Commerce, Department of Foreign Affairs], 1919, Zaigai honpō jitsugyō sha shirabe [Report on overseas Japanese businessmen], Tokyo, p.213, in JDR, Tsū 189

Table 4-10. Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name of businessmen</th>
<th>company name</th>
<th>type of business</th>
<th>capital (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nakamura Shōichi</td>
<td>Nakamura Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kimura Hidechiro</td>
<td>Kimura Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kikuchi Ichisuke</td>
<td>Kikuchi Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tsujii Shigeru</td>
<td>Tsujii Mano Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ikeda Kunizō</td>
<td>Ikeda Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ishibashi Umakichi</td>
<td>Ishibashi Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tsurushima Sōkichi</td>
<td>Tsurushima Company</td>
<td>general store, retailer</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wholesaler, trader of marine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>products and trochus shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ishimoto Terunari</td>
<td>South Seas Trading</td>
<td>trading</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(representative)*</td>
<td>Company, Rabaul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Asanuma Ichimatsu</td>
<td>Asanuma Factory</td>
<td>ship repair</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Izumi Eikichi</td>
<td>Izumi shipyard</td>
<td>shipbuilding</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nagahama Taichi</td>
<td>Kali plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with Ali Tam)</td>
<td>Sau plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rambutjo plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pitelu plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Papitelai plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nagahama Taichi</td>
<td>Uraputor plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with Shin Loon)</td>
<td>Kabil plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tashiro Tsunesuke was a local agent.

Source: JDR, E.4.0.0.11

Table 4-11. Japanese trade with New Guinea, 1919-1939 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>export</th>
<th>import</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>3,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10,303</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>18,805</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>23,103</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>27,050</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>31,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>13,947</td>
<td>3,633</td>
<td>17,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>22,046</td>
<td>4,243</td>
<td>26,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>25,369</td>
<td>7,783</td>
<td>33,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>42,757</td>
<td>9,839</td>
<td>52,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>76,030</td>
<td>12,035</td>
<td>88,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>73,747</td>
<td>10,027</td>
<td>83,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>98,585</td>
<td>8,620</td>
<td>107,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>46,627</td>
<td>7,445</td>
<td>54,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>34,921</td>
<td>7,266</td>
<td>42,187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the total trade was slight, it was lucrative and the balance always greatly favoured Japan. A typical Japanese trade pattern developed—exporters of light manufactured goods and importers of raw materials. Their major exports were tinned fish, clothes and textiles (Table 4-12)—common Japanese exports in the pre-war period. Tsurushima and the Nan'yō Bōeki, retailers of Japanese goods at Rabaul, used to advertise the sale of kimono, silk underwear and even Sapporo beer. The major Japanese import was shell (mainly trochus), followed by copra and bêche-de-mer (Table 4-13), reflecting the businesses engaged in those industries (Table 4-9 and 4-10). The demands for those products were, however, slight in Japan: even copra, one of the major exports from the South Seas, occupied less than one percent in 1937 in the total imports of Japan.

Table 4-12. Major items of Japanese exports to New Guinea, 1928-1939 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tinned fish</th>
<th>Apparel &amp; attire</th>
<th>Textiles</th>
<th>Cement</th>
<th>Matches</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>9,196</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>18,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>5,045</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>12,415</td>
<td>23,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>8,772</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>13,939</td>
<td>27,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>8,505</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>13,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>14,418</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>22,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2,789</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>11,379</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>6,725</td>
<td>25,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>21,791</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>11,781</td>
<td>42,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7,325</td>
<td>6,580</td>
<td>39,083</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>19,470</td>
<td>76,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>11,426</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>26,641</td>
<td>2,962</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>26,610</td>
<td>73,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>12,008</td>
<td>6,959</td>
<td>50,526</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>26,821</td>
<td>98,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7,002</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>22,024</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>11,508</td>
<td>46,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>13,256</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>3,352</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>10,641</td>
<td>34,921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the same as Table 4-11

Table 4-13. Major items of Japanese imports from New Guinea, 1931-1939 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copra</th>
<th>Shell</th>
<th>Bêche-de-mer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,595</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,816</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>9,520</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,040</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>7,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the same as Table 4-11

The trade and investment pattern also shows a classic pattern of colonial trade. In the plantations and shipyards, the Japanese used New Guinean labourers. As Table 4-14 shows, all fishermen employed New Guinean crews; all plantations had New Guinean labourers; and the shipyard and even general store had New Guinean employees. In total 324 New Guineans were employed by about 40 Japanese. The Japanese recruited New Guineans widely from Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville. Like white settlers, the Japanese also suffered from the shortage of labour and even went to the area

126*The Rabaul Times*, 16 November 1934 and 31 December 1937
127*Naikaku tökei-kyoku [the Statistical Bureau of the Cabinet] (ed.). 1938, Dai Nihon teikoku tökei nenkan [Statistical yearbook of the Great Japan Empire], Vol.57, Tokyo, p.214
128Various oral evidence collected by the author (from November 1993 to March 1994 in PNG) confirms this.
along the Ramu River in mainland New Guinea to recruit.\textsuperscript{129} Thus, the Japanese invested capital in primary industries and used New Guinean labour for production, while expanding the local market for their manufactured goods.

Table 4-14. New Guinean labourers in Japanese businesses, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>company name</th>
<th>no. of New Guinean employees</th>
<th>no. of other non-Japanese employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nakamura Company</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura Company</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuchi Company</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsuji Mano Company</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda Company</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi Company</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsurushima Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 (Malays)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Seas Trading Company</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 (Filipino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ananuma Factory</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izumi Shipyard</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 (Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kali plantation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sau plantation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rambutjo plantation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitelu plantation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papitelai plantation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uraputor plantation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabil plantation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td><strong>324</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, E.4.0.0.11

Japanese settlers

Japanese settlers were, as the Australians in Rabaul perceived, no menace to the security of New Guinea. They lived their day to day life like other ordinary townsfolk. Unlike in Micronesia or Southeast Asia, they formed no political organisations or religious groups. They formed the Japanese Society in 1932, but it was a social club used only by the Japanese. They knew the Australian fear of Japanese development in Micronesia, as it was often rumoured and reported in the newspaper. And they knew about developments in Micronesia because Nan'yö Böeki's liner came regularly to Rabaul from Ponape bringing news. Probably they felt neglected by their own government, knowing of the 'Japanisation' of Micronesia: the establishment of schools, shrines, temples and even education of Micronesians. However, they also knew that any public expression of admiration for development in Micronesia was detrimental to good relations with the Australians. What they could do was just hide their patriotism and concentrate on their daily business, hoping that one day their government would praise their development of New Guinea.\textsuperscript{130}

The Japanese divided into three groups—businessmen at Rabaul, plantation managers and planters on Manus, New Ireland and Bougainville, and mobile fishermen. Most lived in Rabaul and others often visited there. Rabaul was a meeting place for business transactions, socialisation and gathering precious information about Japan. In Rabaul, the

\textsuperscript{129} Fujiki, op.cit., p.6

\textsuperscript{130} Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright from 1937-1940), 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan. Hatamoto was interned in Australia during the Pacific War. He proudly told the author that the Japanese at Rabaul were sangyö kaihatsu-in [industrial development staff] and therefore Australian treatment in the internment camp was good. That indicates they thought that they were contributing to the development of New Guinea, even though it was for Australia.
community, although small, was well known. They had stores, a garage, shipyard and barber's shop, most of which advertised in the local newspaper.131 Although the precise number of the Japanese in Rabaul throughout the period is unknown because of the lack of a local population census except for 1933 and 1940, on average about 20 Japanese seem to have resided in the town. In 1933 the Commonwealth census recorded 17 according to nationality (i.e., allegiance) and 29 according to race.132 The first figure is very likely the actual number of the Japanese and the latter seems to include mixed-race Japanese. In 1940 when all Japanese were interned, 16 out of total 29 internees were arrested in Rabaul.133

Their material possessions made them visible, out of proportion to their numbers. They had nine motor vessels, three motor cars (two latest model Plymouth sedans and one Ford V-8 sedan 1938 model), two trucks and one motor cycle, and most owned houses.134 However, their social status did not equal that of white residents. They were still not accepted in European quarters as in the German period. Most Japanese lived in the area now called Malaytown and Malaguna, and Japanese stores and Imaizumi's cinema were in Chinatown.135 The Japanese quarters in Malaytown were officially called 'Japantown'.136

Komine remained a leader of the community until he sold his business in 1931: his copra planting business was severely damaged by the fall of prices at the time of the Great Depression. In 1920, he visited Sydney to petition the Australian government to lift trade restriction between Rabaul and Japan.137 He also unsuccessfully sought permission from the Prime Minister to raise £10,000 to £15,000 by mortgaging his plantations to a Sydney company, George Morgan & Co. Ltd.138 At Sydney he was interviewed by the Daily Telegraph. A short article appeared with a photograph. Probably Komine exaggerated his experiences in New Guinea deliberately in order to impress Australians. He was a 'Pacific Pioneer' and 'built a row-boat....to navigate 360 miles of the Fly River....by permission of Sir William MacGregor'. His assistance to the Australian forces at World War I was admiringly reported and the article concluded that 'he did a heap of service generally, for which the [British] Empire stands in his debt.'139

As on his visit to Sydney, Komine sometimes acted like an official to represent the Japanese in New Guinea. Some Australians in fact thought that he was an official. An Australian traveller, Lilian Overell, mistakenly thought him a consul:

Farther on [from Malaytown] is the Japanese quarter. The Japanese Consul is said by some to be the richest man in Rabaul. When Lord Jellicoe arrived here, he called at

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131 The Rabaul Times, 17 June 1927, 1 May 1936, 16 November 1934 and 31 December 1937
132 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1933, Vol.1, Canberra, p.581
133 AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533
134 Ibid.
135 Various oral evidence collected by the author, January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
136 Rabaul Gazette, 1919, Vol.6, No.2, Rabaul, p.28
137 Komine to Prime Minister, 12 July 1920, AA, A3932/1 SC397
138 Piesse's report, 26 May 1921, AA, A457/1 673/8
139 Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1920, Sydney
Government House and then at the Japanese Consul's, where he left a present to smooth someone's ruffled feathers.\textsuperscript{140}

The Manus people thought he was a Japanese \textit{kiap}.\textsuperscript{141} Indeed, Komine led the Japanese economic activities until just before the Great Depression. In 1929, his company made £26,000 profits and employed 14 Japanese and 362 New Guineans, while Nagahama, who had the second largest business among the Japanese, made only £3,000 and employed one Japanese and ten New Guineans.\textsuperscript{142}

The Great Depression savaged all planters in New Guinea:

By 1931, the price of copra had fallen to £11.10s. a ton, half of what it had been in 1925-6. It was to fall much further in the next three years, reaching £4.11s. a ton in 1934....Within five years the value of copra exports fell from £1,176,040 in 1928 to £618,298 in 1932. The new owners, who had expected to live in a style appropriate to men who control the wealth of a country, found themselves with an intolerable burden of debt and no prospect of discharging that debt. The properties were unsaleable.\textsuperscript{143}

Komine was no exception. His businesses made large losses and his debt to Burns Philp increased to the extent that he could not pay wages. In this crisis he asked the Consul-General, Inoue \textit{Kōjirō}, in Sydney for financial assistance. Inoue wrote to the Foreign Minister, Shidehara \textit{Kijirō} regarding Komine's request to borrow funds at low interest.\textsuperscript{144}

Shortly afterwards Hanaoka Masaichi, the directing manager of the \textit{Nan'yō Sangyō Kaisha} headquarters, sent a formal petition to Shidehara.\textsuperscript{145} Prominent white residents in Rabaul also radioed to Tokyo to ask for assistance for Komine. They included the administrator Wisdom, Catholic Missionary Society, Methodist Church and Anglican Bishop.\textsuperscript{146}

However, Tokyo was reluctant to respond. Inoue pressed Shidehara again saying, 'unless the Japanese government took some measures or gave credible guarantee on the payment of his debts, it would be very conceivable that Japanese businesses, which had been firmly built on the islands, would be overturned from the foundation.'\textsuperscript{147} Komine was frustrated and wrote a long letter to Inoue, emphasising that he started his business because he was encouraged by the admirals of the Imperial Navy, and appealed to national prestige. More importantly Komine clearly indicated his imperial ambition:

\textbf{My purpose [in starting the business] was not to make profits but to lay a foundation for the development of the Empire in future. Therefore I kept good relations with German administrators and, of course, with Australian administrators. As imperial subjects, I and other Japanese have endured difficulties until today so that we should not disgrace the Empire. [If I do not get assistance] it would not only force my very dedicated employees, who have worked for me for many years, to suffer from losing jobs, but it would be a national disgrace as all people of other nationalities [in New...}
In response, Inoue appealed to Tokyo more strongly but in vain. Even the Bank of New South Wales recommended 'favourable consideration of his [Komine's] application' to Tokyo, but the government declined any assistance. Japan could not intervene in the affairs of the Australian mandate, because it would have caused a diplomatic problem with Australia; Japan had been excluding non-Japanese economic activities, particularly the operations of Burns Philp, in Micronesia. Consequently, although Loxton (sympathetic honorary consul in Brisbane) intervened and succeeded in postponing the foreclosure for two months, Komine's business (including properties) was auctioned on 30 December 1930. At this time he was sixty four years old, probably too old to run a business, as Inoue wrote in his letter to Shidehara that Komine had reached old age and needed able advisers.

Despite his age, he took a schooner to sea fishing and died like a pearl diver, not like a businessman. He was poisoned by a lobster he ate. His funeral revived his past glory. Hundreds of New Guineans from Manus, New Ireland, and Bougainville, Chinese and Europeans, including the Acting-Administrator Wanliss and other officials attended. And Tatsue Yoshinobu, Komine's old friend since his exploration days, erected a monument in the European cemetery. His body was cremated and his wife went back to Nagasaki with his bones.

However, Komine's death did not end Japanese business activities. At the time of liquidation, Komine persuaded Nagahama Taichi, a shipwright from Goryō village in Amakusa, to take over his business. Komine recruited Nagahama in the 1910s because Nagahama's family in Amakusa were well-known as master shipwrights for generations. In Rabaul, Nagahama worked for Komine for some years, but soon became independent and set up his own shipyard and coastal shipping business. Fortunately Nagahama's business was not much affected by the fall of copra prices because he was not a planter. Komine told Nagahama that successors of Ah Tam, a wealthy Chinese resident in Rabaul and Komine's long-time friend, would provide as much assistance as possible for the purchase of Komine's businesses. What Komine feared was that his assets would be taken over by Burns Philp, extinguishing Japanese influence in New Guinea. Nagahama bought all of Komine's plantations with Ah Tam's successors (Lee Tam Tuck, Tee Chee Wee, Tse Dong, Ah Tam Tuck's successor)
See To Fat Whye). Consequently Nagahama, now the most wealthy Japanese in New Guinea, took over the leadership of the community. In 1932 he became the founder and first president of the Rabaul Japanese Society. His nephew, Yukiyoshi, was also working in his shipyard. Although he did not have a history of bravery like Komine, he had an air of dignity cultivated by his upbringing in his master shipwright's family where the master-apprentice relationship was strictly maintained. Like Komine, he lived in Malaguna.

Nagahama also bought Komine's shipbuilding business but sublet it to Izumi Eikichi, another shipwright who came to Rabaul around the same time as Nagahama, from the same village in Amakusa. He was also a competent diver. The shipyard was close to Ah Tam's area. Business became very busy after the eruption of Matupit and Vulcan in 1937. He had so many orders that he went back to Japan and recruited three more shipwrights and expanded into a second dry dock at Timbur in Kokopo. Izumi had to offer high wages to attract shipwrights to this unknown land. One of the new shipwrights, Hatamoto Otosaku, remembers the offered wages as almost three times higher than those in Japan. In fact, after only two months, he paid all his debts which he had made to buy new tools before coming to New Guinea, and began to remit money handsomely to his family. Izumi's shipyard had a good reputation; his good repair work to the Australian vessel *China Maru* was reported in *the Rabaul Times*. Izumi married Nataman, a New Ireland girl, in 1929 and had four children by the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Nozaki Tsunejirō was another well-known boatbuilder. Unlike other boatbuilders, he came from Shizuoka, a prefecture close to Tokyo, and started his boatbuilding by purchasing the business from an Australian boatbuilder, R.D. Pye in 1930. He worked actively for the administration. He repaired the government vessels *M.S. Hermes* in 1930 and *M.V. Thetis* in 1933. He performed 'extremely credible' work in salvaging the motor schooner *Marina* which had sunk off Matupi. He also acted as an accountant for Izumi.

Tashiro Tsunesuke and Tsurushima Sōkichi were probably the most common faces among the townsfolk, as they had stores in Chinatown. Tashiro was an old resident. He was the eldest son of Otomatsu who came to Rabaul to trade before 1916 and in that year...
brought his wife and Tsunesuke. Tsunesuke began to work as an agent of the Nan'yō Bōeki and lived in the house opposite the store. Nan'yō Bōeki expanded its trading in the mid-1930s. Its Rabaul branch was opened in 1936 (promotion from just an agency) and supplied Japanese goods wholesale to Burns Philp and Carpenters. Tsunesuke did most of the work in Rabaul, although the company appointed another manager at its opening of the branch office. Tsunesuke's brother Kiyoshi, who was born in Rabaul in 1922 and was sent to Japan for education from 1925 until re-joining Tsunesuke in June 1939, also worked for the company. Arata Gunkichi, a descendant of samurai from Kagoshima, also worked for the company. He came to New Guinea in 1916 to work for Komine as a secretary. He married a Manus girl and had three daughters.

Tsurushima Sōkichi, the store owner, was an old resident. He came to Rabaul to work for Komine as a sawyer from Shimabara in Nagasaki in 1912. Soon he was involved in trading and opened a two-story store around 1935. He had many Chinese friends and his store was popular among them. He imported mainly sundries from Japan. One time he brought back a neon lamp which was so bright that it created a sensation in the town: 'Tsurushima has brought back civilisation from Japan'.

Tabuchi Yoshimatsu came from Okayama in 1917 when he was eighteen years old with the officially stated purpose to make a commercial inspection. He was a unique figure, well-known among Europeans. In New Guinea he took up a career very different from other Japanese. He became a clerk of Irwin Cromie, a solicitor at Rabaul, and assisted in legal matters mainly dealing with the Japanese. He was also an agent of Nan'yō Bōeki. He and Tsurushima were probably the most trusted among the Japanese. Sasaki Keisuke, a fisherman on Manus, left a will to distribute all his assets between the two.

Tabuchi married a very attractive mixed-race girl from Thursday Island, Carmelita. Her father was a Portuguese pearl diver and her mother a Torres Strait islander. They married in Rabaul on 3 January 1925 in the Catholic Church. They had four children, but he went back to Japan on 5 October 1938, thinking that war was about to break out. In 1940, he re-married a Japanese woman and had two children in Japan.

170 October to December 1916, JDR 3.8.5.8
171 Takumu-shō takumu-kyoku, op.cit., p.93
172 October to December 1917, JDR, 3.8.5.8
173 Interview by the author with Asanuma, Michael (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
174 October to December 1912, JDR, 3.8.5.8
176 A letter to the author from Satō Sadako (grand daughter of Tsurushima), 4 June 1993
177 October to December 1917, JDR, 3.8.5.8
178 Threlfall, op.cit., p.360; Interview by the author with Tabuchi, Philip (son of Tabuchi Yoshimatsu), 4 February 1994, Kavieng, PNG
179 Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka, op.cit., p.318
180 New Guinea Gazette, 1931, No.286, p.2193
181 Interview by the author with Tabuchi, op.cit.
There was a Japanese barber shop servicing mainly Europeans and Japanese. The barbers were Yamaji Fujigorō, Itō Matsutarō and his wife Tsuru.182 Yamaji was the oldest barber and started his business around 1920. He was also a tortoise-shell craftsman.183 Itō joined the business later and closed the shop for some time and re-opened it on 25 April 1936 at Paatzch's Chambers.184

Asanuma Ichimatsu was a popular mechanic and did general engineering and blacksmithing.185 He came from Hachijō-jima, an island near Tokyo, in 1915. Until 1922 he worked for various people and then started his garage in Chinatown between Malaguna Road and the cemetery.186 He fixed any sort of machinery such as boat engines, cars and even aeroplanes. He was diligent and did not drink but liked all kinds of sports. He married Louise, a Japanese girl who was adopted and raised by a Filipino family in Yap in the Caroline Islands. The family came to New Guinea in 1914. Louis could not speak Japanese. The couple had three children.

Tsujii Shigeru was an another engineer.187 He had his business in Malaguna but sold it to Wong Fat, a Chinese businessman in 1929.188 Later he started a fishing business.

Imaizumi Masao, the owner of the cinema in Chinatown, screened both Japanese and English films. His cinema also had a billiard saloon.189 Sometimes when Japanese sailors visited Rabaul, he set up an arena in his cinema and organised a wrestling tournament to entertain the townsfolk.190 He sold the business and left New Guinea in 1925.191

The fishermen operated widely from the Ninigo Group to Bougainville and fished mainly for trochus shell. They worked for Komine until the liquidation of his business. After that, most formed companies and sold their catch to Tsurushima and the Nan'yō Bōeki. They all owned at least one schooner and employed many Manus people.192 Most lived in Rabaul, except for Kikuchi Ichisuke and Nakamura Shōshichi because of their marriages to New Guinean girls. Both lived in Talasea.

Kikuchi came to New Guinea as a transport worker in 1917 when he was twenty five.193 He then married a New Guinean, Mongai, and lived on Kapo Island in Talasea where she came from.194 Mongai was the daughter of a village head man, and the couple had five children. He first owned the Marukin Maru, a small five-ton boat, and then the

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182 Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka, op.cit., p.319
183 Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 September 1920, AA, AWM33 57/5
184 The Rabaul Times, 1 May 1936
185 The Rabaul Times, 17 June 1927
186 Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 September 1920, op.cit.; Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 23 July 1946, AA., A367 C72533
187 He came from Nara; January to March 1932, JDR, J.2.2.0.J13-7
188 The Rabaul Times, 19 April 1929
189 Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 September 1920, AA, AWM33 57/5
190 Telephone interview by the author with Imaizumi Kōtarō (son of Imaizumi Masao), 23 June 1993, Japan
191 New Guinea Gazette, 1925, No.104, p.695
192 Manus people were renowned for their seamanship and navigation.
193 Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 22 July 1946, AA., A367 C72546
194 Interview by the author with Kikuchi, Pius (son of Kikuchi Ichisuke), 18 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
*Ebisu Maru*, a thirty-ton schooner. In 1899 Nakamura had originally gone to Thursday Island\(^{195}\) from Wakayama and later he went to New Guinea, where he married a Kilenge girl, Mapole, around 1928 and had six children. He owned a schooner *Kilenge*\(^{196}\).

The other fishermen, based at Rabaul, were Kimura Hideichirō, Tsujii Shigeru, Mano Kisaburō, Ikeda Kunio and Ishibashi Umakichi. Kimura came to New Guinea in 1916 and married Josephine, a Filipino girl in 1939.\(^{197}\) Tsujii and Mano had a business partnership and they seem to have fished actively in the Ninigo Group: they applied for special leases on Ami and Lau island in the Group in 1938.\(^{198}\) Ikeda and Ishibashi came in 1914 from a famous fishing town, Misaki in Kanagawa.\(^{199}\) Both seemed to be determined to live in New Guinea, because they brought their wives and children in 1939 when everybody was sensing the outbreak of war.\(^{200}\) In Rabaul, Ishibashi experienced an unfortunate accident. Reginald Reed, a young single Australian man, tried to hijack his schooner *Namanula* in order to leave New Guinea. Ishibashi resisted and was shot in his shoulder. His Chinese and Manus crew overpowered Reed and brought him to the police, and Ishibashi was sent to the hospital.\(^{201}\) Later he recovered and resumed fishing.

Plantation managers and planters were the last major group. Most worked in Manus either for Komine or Nagahama. However, originally they came to New Guinea as fishermen or boatbuilders. Probably they were hard workers and won credit from Komine or Nagahama (both well-known for their strictness towards their employees). Their ability to form good relations with New Guineans probably helped in being appointed managers. Most married local girls, which indicates that they were liked and accepted by the local communities.\(^{202}\) That was an important factor in managing plantations where hundreds of New Guineans had to be employed.

Yamashita Shichinosuke was a manager of the plantation on Pityilu Island in Manus. He came to New Guinea in 1913 probably as a fisherman. He was twenty years old and had just passed an examination for conscription. His home was Shikine Jima, a small island in Izu Islands south of Tokyo. He went to Misaki in Kanagawa to look for a job and knew about New Guinea from local fishermen and decided to come to New Guinea.\(^{203}\) In the 1920s Yamashita married Samaruesu, a girl from Nyada Village on the north coast of Manus and the couple had three children.\(^{204}\) On Pityilu he also ran a store and the schooner *Pityilu*. However, towards the end of the 1930s the management began to suffer great

\(^{195}\)January to March 1899, JDR, 3.8.5.8

\(^{196}\)Interview with Nakamura, Andrew (son of Nakamura Sōshichi), 23 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG

\(^{197}\)Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura’, 23 July 1946, AA., A367 C72540

\(^{198}\)New Guinea Gazette, 1938, No.525, p.3979

\(^{199}\)January to March 1914, JDR, 3.8.5.8

\(^{200}\)January to March 1939, JDR, 1.2.2.0.J13-7

\(^{201}\)The Rabaul Times, 9 November 1928; 7 December 1928

\(^{202}\)Generally inter-racial marriages take place with acknowledgment of the community. They rarely take place based on individual decision.

\(^{203}\)Interview by the author with Yamashita Midori (daughter of the niece of Yamashita Shichinosuke), 21 June 1993, Tokyo, Japan

\(^{204}\)Interview by the author with Yamashita, Johnny (grandson of Yamashita Shichinosuke), 28 January 1994, Kimbe, West New Britain, PNG; Keksan, Kamui; Pokupeal, Sotil; Ngapen, Amos; Pombuai, Hendry; Kahu, Kaspar; Simon Sandrel (elders), 14 February 1994, Pityilu Island, Manus, PNG
deficits and accumulated large debts to Burns Philp. Yamashita could not bear the heavy pressure and committed suicide in 1940, detonating dynamite in a toilet on the beach.205

Ikesaki Tokuyoshi, who had a Kimbe wife, ran the plantation on Momote. He came to New Guinea at the age of seventeen as a sawyer from the same village as Nagahama in 1912.206 However, in New Guinea he became more interested in diving for trochus shell, which gave him more income. As well, he began to do some plantation work. He was a man of many romances. By the 1930s, he had contracted three marriages all with New Guinean girls (the second was with Manus girl, Ipam).207 After he married the third wife, Gela (a daughter of the village chief of Bulunuri village near Kimbe in West New Britain), he came to Manus and was appointed manager of Momote plantation.208

Hagiwara Hikota, a manager of Pak Island plantation, came to New Guinea from Amakusa in the same year as Ikesaki. He was also a sawyer and was twenty years old.209 He married Phirai, a Manus girl, and had three children.

Endō Shigetaro was a small planter on Anir (Ambitle) Island in New Ireland.210 He came to New Guinea from Tokushima in 1914 as a shipwright to work for Komine.211 In the 1920s he married Nataman, a girl from Anir Island, then he moved to her island and began to plant copra and build small boats for the islanders.212 The couple had three children.

Okaji Santarō kept operating a plantation and store in Bougainville. Unlike others, he did not marry a New Guinean. But he was successful. From Buka Island where he originally started his business, he expanded into copra planting at Kieta. He had a 50-hectare lease north of Kieta.213 However, he died in 1924 and his brother came to New Guinea to arrange his affairs.214

Racial relations

The Japanese managed to form amicable relations with members of the main races in New Guinea. In the colonial structure which was strictly hierarchical by race, the Japanese precariously secured a position equal to the Australians, in formal terms, but in reality they did not enjoy the full privileges which Australians had. The Japanese held a position as business partners to the Chinese, and as masters to New Guineans. Their peaceful relationship with the Australians was partly attributable to their numerical and economic

205Death certificate for Yamashita Shichinosuke, 25 July 1945, Niijima Moto Village office, Tokyo
206October to December 1912, JDR, 3.8.5.8
207Interview by the author with Ikesaki, Francis (son from the second wife of Ikesaki Tokuyoshi), 25 February 1994, Perc, Manus, PNG
208Interview by the author with Ikesaki, Peter (son from the third wife of Ikesaki Tokuyoshi), 26 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
209October to December 1912, JDR, 3.8.5.8; Interview by the author with Kochir, George (elder), 7 February 1994, Andra Island, Manus, PNG
210Takumu-shō takumu-kyoku, op.cit., p.91
211Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 23 July 1946, AA., A367 C72539
212Interview by the author with Asanuma, Michael (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
213Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 September 1920, AA, AWM33 57/5
214July to September 1924, JDR, 3.8.5.8
marginality. The Australians could maintain their friendliness, because the Japanese hardly affected their interests. This contrasts with Australian uneasiness with the Chinese when their number increased and their business expanded. If the Australians had not restricted Japanese migration and trading, the Japanese could have experienced the same fate as they did on Thursday Island from the 1890s and eventually been driven out of New Guinea. The amicable Japanese-Australian relations developed in this artificial circumstance.

The administrators always respected Komine. That was demonstrated at the times of Komine's financial difficulties and funeral. Other Japanese also made personal friends. Nozaki, the boatbuilder, and his wife had been friends of John Thurston, a prominent planter, for many years. In fact, the childless couple adopted Josephine, a daughter of Thurston. Asanuma and Izumi were 'great friends' of Gordon Ehret, a Rabaul trader, and did much repair work for him. Similarly, ex-Rabaul shipwright, Hatamoto Otosaku, recalls good relations with his Australian counterparts. He was building boats for the administration with Australian boatbuilders and they used to go to the beach in Kokopo with them.

The Japanese knew that their presence was at the mercy of the Australians. Outward shows of Japaneseness or patriotism were almost non-existent. Unlike in Micronesia, they built no Japanese shrines or temples. There was no New Year celebration in a Japanese style, unlike the Chinese. Nor was there a Bon Festival in mid-August. Probably these Japanese events were celebrated privately among themselves in Izumi's house which was unofficially called the 'Japan Club' and most Japanese used to meet there. The Club was their only sanctuary in New Guinea, and they thought it wise to confine their activities to themselves in order not to offend any Australians, even though that in itself might have invited suspicion.

In order to keep friendly relations with the white settlers, the Japanese followed western customs. They celebrated Coronation Day, putting their own entry in the procession. Similarly, most inter-racial marriages were celebrated in Christian churches, although the Japanese did not accept the Christian faith. They hardly taught the Japanese

215 Official trade restriction was lifted in 1923, but the migration restriction, which stopped the coming of new Japanese, virtually blocked the Japanese business expansion.
216 Various articles in the Rabaul Times verify this: 14 March 1930; 5 August 1932; 2 June 1933; 19 March 1937; 23 April 1937
217 Administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 21 October 1937, AA, A518/1 W834/1
218 Interview with Oehlerich, op.cit.
219 Interview by the author with Ehret, Gordon (ex-Rabaul trader), 22 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
220 Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright from 1937-1940), 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan
221 The New Year day celebration and the Bon Festival (day for remembering ancestors' souls) were most common annual events in Japan. They are equivalent to Christmas and Easter.
222 Interview by the author with Asanuma, Michael (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
223 The Rabaul Times, 16 April 1937; 14 May 1937
language, or Japanese customs or religions to their mixed-race children. And most mixed-race children were sent to Vunapope Mission School run by German Catholics. Japanese relations with New Guineans had two aspects. The Japanese were masters. Like their white counterparts, most Japanese kept master-servant relationships. They were well aware of the racial hierarchy and considered themselves equal to white masters. Some regarded New Guineans as mere labour and treated them cruelly: there was a violent master, called Narumi, who always ill-treated his New Guinean crew. However, what distinguished the Japanese masters from their European counterparts was their cordial efforts to cultivate good relations, because the formation of good relations, which assured a supply of cheap labour, was essential to their economic survival. They had little capital (none were large capitalists and all were artisans or fishermen when they arrived); they could not attract investment from large Japanese capitalists who were far more interested in Southeast Asia; and the Japanese government never provided assistance due to the delicate diplomatic relations with Australia.

Komine set an example in forming such cordial relations. All oral evidence confirms that Komine brought many gifts and the islanders were happy to provide their labour in exchange. He also instructed other Japanese, particularly plantation managers, to treat the islanders well, otherwise they were brought back to Rabaul. More importantly, Komine faithfully fulfilled reciprocal obligations with the islanders. That was extremely important in Melanesian traditions and was often neglected by white settlers. The following episode from elders of Ponam Island, where Komine's schooner was wrecked and he was helped by the islanders in 1907, is a good example. When the luluai of the island died in 1925, Komine came from Rabaul bringing a concrete grave and buried him. The grave, which has Komine's name on its lower part, is still in the island's cemetery and the story of friendship between their luluai and Komine has been handed down from generation to generation.

Forming family relationship through marriages and the adoption of children was another important tradition in Melanesian society, which Komine also followed. He adopted a New Guinean boy and sent him to Tokyo for education in the 1920s. The boy attended a private junior high school but got sick and died after a year. A shipwright from Amakusa

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224 Various oral evidence collected by the author, November 1993 to March 1994, PNG and Australia
225 Admission 1901-63 (boys and girls), Vunapope Catholic Mission School; the book was shown to the author by courtesy of Sister Bernadette. According to the registration, 14 boys and 4 girls attended the school from 1901 to 1963.
226 Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
227 Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pokomo, Poloat (elders who worked on Japanese schooners in young days), 6 February 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG
228 Various oral evidence collected by the author, January to March 1994, Rabaul, Kavieng, Manus, PNG
229 See the section of Komine Isokichi, Japanese settlers, 4. Japanese in German New Guinea in Chapter 2
230 Interview by the author with Sohou, Alphonse and Mohak, Pious (elders), 11 February 1994, Ponam island, Manus, PNG
231 Telephone interview by the author with Imaizumi Kōtarō (son of Imaizumi Masao), 23 June 1993, Japan. The boy had a Japanese name, Tařō or Ichirō.
also adopted a boy and brought him back. As seen in the previous section, some Japanese, who came to New Guinea at a young age, married local girls. The marriages of course reinforced relations with the islanders.

The Japanese also formed good relations with the Chinese. It was another requirement for their survival, although Komine once regarded the Chinese as formidable rivals. The Japanese, since their migration and trading had been restricted, could not compete with the Chinese who were far more numerous and had a more extensive trading network extending to Southeast Asia. To make the Chinese their rivals in business was an unwise choice. As a result, the Japanese had many business deals with the Chinese. As described earlier, Tsujii sold his engineering business to Wong Fat in 1929, and Komine's business was bought by Nagahama and the successors of Ah Tam in 1930. Nagahama also bought a Chinese plantation in Namatanai when the planter, Lum Fook, died in 1928. Indeed, Bernard Chan, a prominent ex-Rabaul Chinese businessman, recalls his good relations with the Japanese, despite the fact that the Chinese generally disliked the Japanese due to their invasion in China:

After the Japanese invasion into China, some Chinese started to boycott the Japanese goods, but this was in a small way, because without Japanese goods, these shops were unable to operate. The second reason of the Chinese not against the local Japanese, because Nagahama and the other Japanese national are friendly people. Some oral testimonies confirm Chan's memory. Tsurushima had many Chinese friends and used to play mahjong with his best Chinese friends, members of the prominent Seeto family. The Japanese were always on the side of the Chinese when Australian racism against Asians was strong: for instance, Nakamura used to stand up to the Australians when they harassed the Chinese.

Conclusion

In the rapidly changing international situation between the two wars, the Japanese influence in New Guinea gradually declined because of the policies of both Australia and Japan. Australians reinforced their perceptions of an ever expanding Japanese Empire towards the south and their recognition of the strategic importance of New Guinea. New Guinea, Australians believed, had to be an Asian-free white bastion. The Japanese in Tokyo considered the small number of Japanese in New Guinea expendable in order to secure their exclusive control of Micronesia. Only some nanshin-ron advocates from the late-1930s were interested in using narratives about the settlers for propaganda. Thus the

232 By the request of the informant, detailed information about the boy cannot be revealed. The boy grew up in Japan, served in the Pacific War, married a Japanese girl and is still alive in Amakusa.
233 New Guinea Gazette, 1929, No.221, p.1815
234 A letter to the author from Chan, Bernard, 8 August 1994
235 Telephone interview with Croydon, op.cit.
236 Interview with Kai Chew, op.cit. ; interview with Nakamura, Andrew (son of Nakamura Sôshichi), 23 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
Japanese in New Guinea were deserted by their own government and restrained by the Australian government.

In these discouraging circumstances, nevertheless, the Japanese settlers were able to realise the dreams of Meiji nanshin-ron advocates—peaceful economic expansion. Although the Japanese economic activities were marginal in the overall economic growth of New Guinea, they expanded the trade dramatically, exporting copra and shell and importing textiles: in terms of trade relations, Japan secured raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods. Thus the pattern of postwar economic relations between Japan and Papua New Guinea already existed in this period. In developing such economic relations, the Japanese community was transformed from a group of artisans to a group of businessmen. And such a transformation was possible because the Australians provided a colonial apparatus expedient to the Japanese. The Australians granted the Japanese the position of honorary colonial masters and allowed them to use New Guinean labour, that is, in effect, they relieved the Japanese of the cost of bringing in their own labourers. Consequently, the Japanese were able to develop colonial relations with New Guineans within the Australian colonial apparatus. Thus, although they declined numerically and their total economic activities were relatively slight, the Japanese were indeed able to colonise New Guinea.

For the postwar economic relations, see Iwamoto Hiromitsu, 1990, *Japan-Papua New Guinea economic relations in the postwar period: analysis from dependency perspective*, honours thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide.
Chapter 5. Elimination, 1941-1949

Introduction

The Pacific War enabled both Japanese and Australians to consolidate their perceptions of the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea. To the Japanese, they were patriots who pioneered the development of the tropical islands for the Empire. To the Australians, they were spies subtly mingled with the natives in order to prepare the way for the Japanese invasion. The settlers were caught between those perceptions and experienced one of the most cruel and tragic events during and after the war.

1. Internment

Internment policy

Although the Australians always feared a threat from the north, they were not prepared to defend their country until late 1941. Their traditional reliance on Britain for the defence of Australia hindered the development of its own defence capability. In fact, they had never changed their allegiance to the British Empire since World War I. Australia declared war against Germany on 3 September 1939, because Britain did so. Then Australia sent her troops to Middle East and the Mediterranean to support British operations. That was because there was always public acknowledgment that 'support of Britain in time of war as a fundamental of Australian patriotism',¹ and that Britain would help Australia when she in turn faced crisis. Consequently, until the last moment of the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Australian defence policy was based on how much support she could gain from Britain and also from the US to supplement the overall inadequacy of the defence against Japanese invasion in the South-West Pacific. However, Britain was so heavily committed in the war in Europe that she could not divert her strength to Southeast Asia, and the US adhered to a 'Beat Hitler First' policy. Then, 'the disaster so clearly foreseen had become reality,'² when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, wrecking the main US Pacific fleet. And when the Japanese occupied Singapore, after sinking two of Britain's newest warships (the Prince of Wales and Repulse), 'Australians came from complacency or confidence to the threshold of fear for their own survival.'³

In contrast, the Australians were well prepared to execute the internment of enemy aliens. They promptly interned Germans and Italians upon the outbreak of war in Europe

¹Hasluck, Paul, 1952, *The government and the people 1939-1941*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p.155
²McCarthy, John, 1976, *Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, p.147
and later Japanese and others. It was the reiteration of the exercise at the time of World War I when Germans 'were arrested, often at gunpoint in their homes or at work, and immediately imprisoned without knowing what offence they were supposed to have committed.' At this time the wide concept of 'enemy aliens' developed, which included naturalised or even Australian-born people who had 'enemy origin' one or two generations back.

In the late 1930s, the internment policy further developed with a wider concept of enemy aliens and stronger government power. The internment was one of the 'Special Internal Security Measures' and was executed not under the National Security Regulations but as the prerogative of the Minister:

The draft National Security Regulations include provisions for the making of orders imposing on any person such restriction as may be necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Commonwealth. These restrictions could be applied to any suspected person, irrespective of his nationality; but they would be applied only to the individuals as such, and the internment of enemy aliens as a class would be carried out, not under these Regulations, but under the Prerogative.....Restriction orders and detention orders would be issued under the authority of the Minister, or by officers to whom this power may be delegated by the Minister.

Japanese *nanshin* in French Indochina greatly affected the internment policy. The Australians regarded the Japanese as most dangerous enemy aliens and set a policy different from those for Germans and Italians. The Japanese did not receive the consideration on account of old age, although the government 'had previously decided not to intern enemy aliens over 70 years old or those who had resided in Australia more than 20 years.' The strict policy was based on the War Cabinet's view that 'their well-known fanaticism and devotion to their country would probably lead to attempts at sabotage on the part of any Japanese here in a position to do this.' Consequently, the rate of Japanese internment was the highest among enemy aliens in Australia and its territories: the Japanese 97 percent, Italians 31 percent and Germans 32 percent.

**Internment in New Guinea**

Australian attitudes towards defence and internment were manifested well in Papua and New Guinea. Australians were not prepared to defend Rabaul. The defence line was 'so thin that it was stretched to invisibility,' although that was mainly because the government adhered to the stipulation of the League of Nations which prohibited militarisation of the mandate territories. As a result, no major military forces had existed,

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6Department of Defence, 1939, *War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, Canberra, p.2 (Chapter II)
8Memorandum for the War Cabinet, 9 May 1941, AA, MP729/6 65/401/135, 'Internment of Japanese—Policy'
apart from the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, comprising of about eighty militiamen trained from the outbreak of the war in Europe, until March 1941 when the 2/22 Battalion arrived. Although in September the 17th Anti-Tank Battery was added, the total defence capability remained only two 6-inch guns, searchlights and three out-dated 3-inch anti-aircraft guns.\(^{12}\) Then the War Cabinet, seeing the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, decided to reinforce Port Moresby but deserted Rabaul, arguing that 'it was important to retain the garrison at Rabaul as 'an advanced observation line', but its reinforcement was not possible because of the hazard of transporting a force from the mainland and of maintaining it.'\(^{13}\)

In the last two months before the Japanese invasion, 'leaders of the Rabaul community tried to maintain an appearance of normality.'\(^{14}\) But the coming of the war was obvious to all townsfolk. From early December, Japanese reconnaissance planes appeared, which forced the War Cabinet to order a compulsory evacuation of civilians from Papua and New Guinea. At the evacuation, the colonisers revealed their ugliness. They left New Guinean servants and labourers without any instruction and rejected the evacuation of about several thousand Chinese 'regardless of their request.'\(^{15}\) They also distrusted New Guinean policemen and disarmed them.

As in Australia, the administration interned enemy aliens promptly in Papua and New Guinea. Germans were the first. They were interned no matter how long their residence was, as John McCarthy, a patrol officer, recollected:

> Now suddenly their nationality was important. Whether they supported Hitler didn't matter; they were different from other men.\(^{16}\)

The same principle was applied to the Japanese, although some Japanese had already left New Guinea, because they knew the war was about to break out. The Japanese government secretly informed them of the likelihood of the war in the near future.\(^{17}\) They were told that the arrival of Nan'yō Bōeki's liner *Takachiho Maru* in March 1941 was the last chance for evacuation.\(^{18}\) Just before the war, the Japanese government set up the Evacuation Committee in the Department of Foreign Affairs and began to advise the Japanese in the South Seas to return to Japan. The government kept the actions top secret in order to prevent the leakage of war preparation.\(^{19}\) Despite that, most Japanese (33 people) remained in New Guinea.\(^{20}\)


\(^{13}\)Ibid., p.396

\(^{14}\)Threlfall, Neville, 1988, *From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain*, unpublished, Australia National University, Canberra, p.361


\(^{16}\)McCarthy, op.cit., p.179

\(^{17}\)Interview by the author with Tabuchi, Philip (son of Tabuchi Yoshimatsu), 4 February 1994, Kavieng, PNG

\(^{18}\)Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku, 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan

\(^{19}\)Gotô Ken'ichi, 1986, *Shōwa ki nihon to indoneshia* [Japan in the Showa period and Indonesia], Keisô shobô, Tokyo, p.317

\(^{20}\)Australian archives present inconsistent figures on the Japanese; the Commonwealth Investigation Branch in Queensland recorded 29 Japanese (27 from New Guinea and 2 from Papua) (Japanese internments, 9 Dec. 41, AA, BP242/1 Q39362, while the Prisoners of War Information Bureau recorded 34 Japanese (33 can be confirmed coming from Papua and New Guinea but one file is misplaced) (AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533). The author uses 33 as most accurate figure.
Most were long time residents for more than thirty years and had established businesses. Above all, ten of them had New Guinean or local wives and had children.

Early in the morning on 8 December 1941, as soon as the news of Japanese attack against Pearl Harbour and Malaya reached Rabaul, the internment of the Japanese, who were scattered in New Guinea, began. At eleven o'clock, all twenty two Japanese in Rabaul were arrested and interned in the Rabaul jail.\(^{21}\) On the following day, two plantation managers in Manus, Ikesaki and Hagiwara, were arrested.\(^{22}\) On the same day, Kikuchi Matsukichi, a fisherman, was captured in Buka Island in Bougainville.\(^{23}\) On 10 December, ten Japanese (Ikeda and Ishibashi families) were arrested on the same Island.\(^{24}\) On 12 December, Nakamura was arrested in Talasea.\(^{25}\) The last Japanese was Sasaki Hikokichi, a fisherman and a plantation hand and the only Christian Japanese (Anglican), who was arrested at Madang on 7 May 1942.\(^{26}\)

The internment was a dreadful event particularly for the ten Japanese who had local wives. They were separated from their families. The administration imprisoned the husbands in the Rabaul jail with other Japanese, while keeping their wives and children in a separate compound.\(^{27}\) Then the administration sent the Japanese husbands with other Japanese to Australia for internment. It also tried to take some grown-up mixed-race Japanese children, following the policy decided by the War cabinet in June 1940 to intern 'all Japanese males over 16 years within Australia and its territories, except those with diplomatic or consular privileges.'\(^{28}\) The administration regarded the mixed-race children as Japanese. But the administrations' attempt failed, as their mothers resisted desperately. Mapole Nakamura was one of brave mothers. She resisted the officials trying to take her first son, John, to Australia, threatening to kill herself if they took her son away.\(^{29}\)

The internment agonised Nagahama who just married in Japan and his wife was due to join him in New Guinea soon. He married Fusae, a girl of his home village Goryö, whom he met when he was back home on a holiday from May 1938 and December 1939. But he alone came back to New Guinea because Fusae was pregnant. She delivered a baby girl in April 1940. But while she was preparing to come to New Guinea, the international situation deteriorated and finally the war broke out and she could not come to her husband.\(^{30}\)

The internment caused complicated feelings to the Japanese. Although they felt that they were betrayed by the Australians with whom they had been in good term for a long

\(^{21}\) Diary kept by Nagahama Taichi, 8 December 1941; Nagahama's figure of the Japanese contradicts with that of Australian record. It was sixteen, according to AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533

\(^{22}\) AA, MP1103/1 MJ18508 and MJ18511

\(^{23}\) Ibid., MJ18514

\(^{24}\) Ibid., MJ18525, MJF18526, MJF18526A, MJ18526B, MJ18527, MJ18528, MJ18529, MJ18530, MJ18531, MJ18532

\(^{25}\) Ibid., MJ18519

\(^{26}\) Ibid., MJ18533, Dossier, AA, A367 C72587

\(^{27}\) Interview by the author with Andrew Nakamura (son of Nakamura Sōshichi), 23 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG


\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentarō (Foreign Minister), September 1960, possession of Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan
time, they still had a deep attachment to New Guinea where they had lived for over thirty years. Probably those who had experienced World War I expected that the battle would be small in scale and soon over and they would resume their civilian life. At the same time, their patriotism was aroused, hearing air-raid sirens and actual bombing. Some hoped in vain that Japanese troops might come to rescue them, then New Guinea would be a Japanese territory and they would enjoy all privileges their white counterparts had. Some wrote on the wall of the jail that they would help the troops as interpreters in Japanese so that the troops would try to free them from the internment.31

However, without seeing the Japanese troops, they were loaded in the Malaita with other white evacuees at five thirty p.m. on 8 January 1942. The ship sailed during the night to avoid Japanese planes and arrived at Sydney on 11 January via Kieta, Samarai, Cairns and Brisbane.32

In Milne Bay, Tanaka and Murakami, the only Japanese in Papua, were interned on 9 December. The recollection of J. Gill, an Australian intelligence officer, is symbolic of the internment policy. He recalled that 'I had met both Tom Tanaka and Murakama [sic] and whilst I do not think they were part of the Japanese war machine I suppose it was necessary in the interests of national security to intern them, especially as the Japanese had begun bombing Nauru and Ocean Island.'33 Both were sent to Australia by R.A.A.F. aeroplane.34

2. Pacific War

Battles in New Guinea

On 23 January 1942, the Japanese South Seas Force, led by Major-General Horii Tomitarō, crushed a small Australian force at Rabaul 'in a matter of hours'.35 It was the first and last major victory of the Japanese in New Guinea. Their main aim in New Guinea and the Solomon campaigns was 'to cut the US-Australia line' in the south-west Pacific in order to defend Japanese positions in Micronesia and the Philippines.36 However, the Japanese forces were 'entirely unprepared for the geography' of New Guinea, because the army had had few interest in the area until the outbreak of the war.37 Like their counterparts, they knew little about jungle warfare and a tropical climate.

31 Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
32 Diary of Nagahama Taichi, 8 to 26 January 1942, op.cit.
34 Memorandum for the Director of Prisoners of War and Internees, Department of the Army, 26 May 1947, AA, A518/1 BM836/1
35 McCarthy, op.cit., p.197
36 Böei chō bōei kenshū sho senshi shitsu [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History Office], 1967a, Minami taiheiyō rikugun sakusen [The army's operations in the South Pacific], vol.1, Asagumo shinbun sha, Tokyo, p.56
37 Böei chō bōei kenshū sho senshi shitsu [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History Office], 1967b, Tōbu nyūginia kōmen rikugun kōkū sakusen [Eastern New Guinea area: the army's air operations], Asagumo shinbun sha, Tokyo, p.5
The Allied forces defeated the Japanese at Milne Bay and pushed back their advance on Kokoda Trail. Since mid-1942, Allied forces mopped up retreating Japanese from Morobe to West Sepik, while re-taking Manus and air-raiding Rabaul. Although the Japanese constructed a strong fortress at Rabaul and occupied some other parts, most of Papua and New Guinea remained under Allied control. Japanese losses were enormous: about 60,000 were killed in battle and 110,000 died of sickness and starvation, whereas the Australians lost about 14,500.38 However, most suffering was by Papuans and New Guineans who were killed by bombing and forced to work for the troops (both Japanese and the Allied) and their gardens were ravaged by starving soldiers. Their suffering was immeasurable but the decline of their population in the early postwar period can show the scale of the impact of the war.39

Propaganda war

Both Japanese and Australians waged propaganda war. Nanshin-ron advocates reinforced the justification of Japanese southward invasion, while the Australians were busy depicting an evil image of barbarous and brutal 'Japs'.40 Both Japanese and Australians propagated everything useful to lift their morale. Common to both was that they had scarcely been interested in their propagated subjects until the war broke out. The Japanese writers repeated the heroic story of Komine and introduced the story of a mixed-race Japanese boy who supported the Japanese invasion, while Australians reported the dedication of 'Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels' (Papuan carriers) who assisted the Australian troops.41 As a result, the images of patriotic Japanese residents in New Guinea and supportive Papuans were created and both became the basis of postwar perceptions.

In Japan, publication of nanshin literature reached a climax. Although there is no data to cover the period from 1941 to 1945, according to the bibliography published by the Nihon takushoku kyōkai [Japan Colonisation Society] in 1944, the number of pieces (books and articles) for general reference on the South Seas published in 1942 alone occupies 37.9 percent of the ones published from the Meiji period.42 Similarly, the literature about Papua and New Guinea increased. The Society listed 40 books and articles for 1942 and 1943 against the total 84 from the Meiji period.43

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42 Nihon takushoku kyōkai [Japan Colonisation Society] (ed.), 1944, Zōho nanpō bunken mokuroku [Bibliography of the South Literature, revised edition], Daidō-shoin, Tokyo; the total number of books and articles for general reference published since the Meiji period to the early 1943 was 2104, and the figure for 1942 was 798.
43 Ibid., p.p.233-235, p.p.318-319. The author found about 50 more literature published from 1942 to 1945, but uses the listing of the Japan Colonisation Society because it indicates the general interest of the Japanese during the wartime.
Nanshin-ron advocates continued to emphasise historical linkages. Irie wrote Meiji nanshin shi kō [History of southward advancement in the Meiji period] in 1943, in which he re-introduced Enomoto's plan to colonise South Pacific islands, in addition to introducing Meiji nanshin-ron advocates and the stories of all Japanese who migrated to Southeast Asia, South Pacific islands and Australia. He concluded that 'we have to express our sincere gratitude to our pioneers who devoted their lives to the South Seas and left their footprints after suffering from many hardships.' Similarly, Sawada Ken wrote Yamada Nagamasu to nanshin senku sha [Yamada Nagamasu and pioneers of southward advancement] in 1942 and introduced Japanese traders and entrepreneurs who were successful in the South Seas since the 15th century. He argued that 'the Great Asia War is the expression of our national strength that our ancestors have build in the last two thousand and six hundred years since the foundation of the Empire.' Suganuma Teifū, one of the few militaristic Meiji nanshin-ron advocates who had been almost unknown until then, became popular. In 1942 two books were written about him: Eguchi Reishi's Nanshin no senku sha Suganuma Teifū den [Autobiography of Suganuma Teifū, a pioneer of southward advancement] and Hanazono Kanesada's Suganuma Teifū. Ōta kyōzaburō, a successful entrepreneur who owned a large Manila hemp plantation in Davao in the Philippines, was also admired. Nomura Aimasu wrote Dabao no chichi Ōta kyōzaburō [Father of Davao, Ōta kyōzaburō].

The Japanese in New Guinea were no exception. Komine was repeatedly introduced in five books and one journal article which devoted whole or some part to Komine and other Japanese. Ōno and Nagakura highlighted Komine's bravery in assisting both German and Australian pacification of New Guineans and the Australian navy at the capture of the Komet.

Even a mixed-race Japanese was highlighted. Okada Seizō, a special correspondent of the Asahi newspaper, devoted a chapter to introduce mixed-race boys and wrote that just before the Japanese landing at Rabaul, Wakao Yamashita paddled from Rabaul to Manus to tell the islanders to assist the Japanese, and the islanders came to Rabaul on five hundred canoes full of provisions and surprised the Japanese. Okada also wrote about Kai Chew, a Chinese boy, who had been waiting for a chance to take revenge on the British because his father was killed brutally by a British official. After the Japanese occupation, Kai Chew

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44Irie Toraji, 1943, Meiji nanshin-shi kō [History of southward advancement in the Meiji period], Ida-shoten, Tokyo, p.300
45Sawada Ken, 1942, Yamada Nagamasu to nanshin senku sha [Yamada Nagamasu and pioneers of southward advancement], Chōbunkaku, Tokyo, p.2
46Eguchi Reishi, 1942, Nanshin no senku sha Suganuma Teifū den [Autobiography of Suganuma Teifū, a pioneer of southward advancement], Chōbunkaku, Tokyo, p.2
47Nomura Aimasu, 1942, Dabao no chichi Ōta kyōzaburō [Father of Davao, Ōta kyōzaburō], Kaisei sha, Tokyo
joined the Japanese troops and served on the Kokoda Trail and was killed. Oral evidence as well as common sense denies these stories. Wakao never went back to Manus during the war and the islanders never paddled five hundred canoes. Kai Chew was forced to work for the Japanese but he never went to Kokoda and he is still alive.

New Guineans were also used as propaganda. They were grateful for the Japanese who liberated them from Anglo-Saxon rule. Umino Jūzō, a naval correspondent, described New Guineans as 'shin kōmin [new Imperial subjects]':

*We had been interested and also very worried to see what attitudes Papuans [and New Guineans] would take towards us when we appeared in front of them all of a sudden. But, contrary to our anxiety, they showed strong friendliness from the day we landed, and cooperated with us. In other words, they were waiting for the Imperial Force, and when they saw us they rushed to see us. Why did this happen? One of the reasons is the brutal treatment of their former rulers, Anglo-Saxons. Another reason is that the Japanese pioneers who had lived there over thirty years treated the natives well. Because of that, the natives respect Japan, the country of those pioneers. The third is the strength of the Imperial Force that overwhelmed the Australians whom the natives had thought the strongest race. The gentleness of the Imperial Force towards the natives also helped. The native were deeply impressed by those things, because they are simple.*

Asahi gurafu [Asahi Photograph], a photographic magazine, conveyed a visual image of cooperative New Guineans. It showed smiling faces of local children learning Japanese in a school established by the navy at Kavieng, and of adults constructing roads: some of those New Guineans were wearing caps with the emblem of the rising sun.

**Lives of families of the Japanese settlers**

Contrary to the propaganda, the mixed-race Japanese were not always loyal to the Japanese forces. In Rabaul the Japanese occupation caused mixed feelings to the remaining families, particularly to the mixed-race children. They saw their fathers' country's army defeat and ill-treat the Australians who were their or their fathers' long time friends. Perhaps some older ones rejoiced to see some friendly and kind Japanese soldiers and willingly helped them. But most children feared the Japanese, seeing or hearing about public beheading or other punishment, and obeyed them. Phillip, a son of Yoshimatsu Tabuchi, recollects: 'we were told to work for the Japanese, or see the consequence.' Small ones did not understand what was happening and just did they were told by the Japanese or white missionaries. In contrast, New Guinean wives had a different view. They simply did not want to be involved in the war, and kept away from the Japanese or went to bush to hide like other New Guineans.

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50 Oral evidence collected by the author, January to March 1994, Rabaul, Kimbe, Manus, PNG
51 Umino Jūzō and Yoshioka Senzō, 1944, *Papua*, Kitamitsu shōbō, Tokyo, p.118
53 All oral evidence confirm that the Japanese soldiers treated well the mixed-race Japanese children.
54 Interview with Tabuchi, op.cit.
55 Interview with Nakamura, Andrew (son of Nakamura Sōshichi), 23 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
The sons of Yamashita, Sakane and Ikesaki, were staying at Nagahama's residence at the time of the internment. They were the oldest group of the mixed-race children. Nagahama was looking after Wakao Yamashita after his father, Shichinosuke, committed suicide in Manus. He attended the Mission School in Rabaul. Nagahama also looked after Phillip Sakane after his father died in 1934. Phillip also attended the Mission School and took a carpentry class but was dismissed from the class because of his misbehaviour. After that, he was learning boatbuilding at Izumi’s yard. Nagahama told the two boys to take care of his five houses when he was taken to Australia. After the Japanese landed at Rabaul, Wakao and a son of Ikesaki collaborated with the Japanese. They went to Wide Bay with the Japanese troops and worked as clerks to record particulars of Australian soldiers and civilians who escaped from Rabaul. In March 1942, Wakao was ordered to work as a driver. Probably he was working reluctantly and disobeyed the order. He was imprisoned with the Allied prisoners from January to May in 1944. During his imprisonment, he often witnessed the Japanese beating prisoners.

Eleven mixed-race Japanese children stayed in the Vunapope Catholic Mission. Soon the Kempei (Military Police) found them and demanded that the Mission give them better treatment. The Bishop Leo Scharmach reluctantly agreed:

The Japanese children and the Sisters in charge of them were called up to the Kempei. The major [Sakakibara] was present too. The police declared that they were going to provide better food for the part-Japanese children. The youngsters got one bag of rice between them and a tin of bully beef or fish each. The Kempei impressed on the Sister: ‘this food supply is exclusively for the Japanese children.’ The Sister stated bluntly: ‘It all goes into the one pot. I am sure the Japanese children get their share.’ And off she went.

Later the Japanese removed the five boys, telling the Father that they would educate them in the Japanese language and way of life with a qualified teacher. But they left six girls.

Pius Yukio Kikuchi, the third child of Kikuchi Ichisuke, was among the five boys. At the Japanese camp, he did not receive much education but spent most time working for the Japanese. It was not a hard life for him. The Japanese were kind and taught many thing about Japan, and the new life was an exciting time for a young boy. He recalls:

From 1943 to 1945, I worked for the Japanese force. All mixed-race Japanese children were told to work for the Japanese force. I looked after horses and pigs and dig tunnels. I worked for the gunshuku-han butai [Accommodation Unit] in Toma. Bonny Shigeru Nakamura, Jo Kisaburo Nakamura, Paul Izumi and Endo were there, too. Bonny was a cook and once ran away, but caught, and beaten by the back edge of katana [Japanese sword] as punishment. I worked for Sergeant Kanai and Watanabe. Watanabe was higher than Kanai. Kanai is the one who beat up Bonny Nakamura, but usually he was a very kind gentleman. He beat Bonny to show the...
seriousness for disobeying the order. I also worked for Major Sakakibara. Japanese soldiers treated children well and were never cruel.63

Three sons of Asanuma Ichimatsu (Michael, Felix and Anthony) worked in the MP headquarters. They were put in a school and were taught Japanese language and songs, and their major work was to fix boots for the soldiers.64 It was alleged that the MP used the boys to punish others. At the Rabaul War Trial a white civilian witness stated that 'a [New Guinean] boy was flogged insensible by Felix Asanuma, a half-caste resident of Rabaul, then in Japanese uniform working for the Ramale Kempei.65 However, no oral evidence from either New Guineans or mixed-race Japanese can confirm the flogging.

Louise Asanuma, a wife of Ichimatsu, was in Rabaul when the Japanese landed, but she fled to her Filipino father's plantation at Wide Bay to avoid the battle. Louise's sister Josephine, who married Kimura Hidejirō, was also with them. However, soon the Japanese forces advanced in Wide Bay, chasing retreating Australians. The family was caught in an awkward situation. The Japanese commander asked them about the Australians. The family probably knew where the Australians went, but they said they did not know. The Japanese believed it because they considered the family was pro-Japanese after finding out that the two ladies were married to Japanese. The Japanese treated the family well and provided food.66

In Manus, the remaining families went to the bush to hide and local people looked after them. Ikesaki family was looked after by Dipon family (a large clan in Momote).67 Yamashita family left Pitiylu Plantation for the bush in the mainland Manus.68

In Papua, the remaining families were ill-treated by the Australians who feared the possibility of their assistance to the Japanese. Adults were taken to a compound at Gili Gili and were forced to construct the airfield or to do other manual labour. Children were kept in a compound at Baraga throughout the war.69 Mary Tanaka was probably the worst treated. Some villagers alleged that she looked after a wounded Japanese. The Australians believed this without investigating and locked her up in a cell until the end of the war despite her plea that it was other Papuans who helped the Japanese.70

63 Interview by the author with Pius Kikuchi (son of Kikuchi Ichisuke), 18 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
64 Interview by the author with Michael Asanuma (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia
65 Full statement of atrocity or crime by Alfred Creswick, 12 October 1945, AWM54 1010/4/172
66 Interview by the author with Anthony Asanuma (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 19 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia; the same episode was introduced by Mizuki Shigeru, a Japanese veteran who became one of the best-known comic artists, in his factual comic, 'Lemon kahan [By River Lemon], 1993, Yūrei Kanchō [Ghost Captain], Chikuma shobō, Tokyo, p.p.55-102
67 Interview by the author with Lopar, John; Churuwas, Angus; Chokoni, Lucas; Nabraposiu, Joseph and Lopra, Matilda (elders), 28 February 1994, Papitelai, Manus, PNG
68 Interview by the author with Keksan, Kamui; Pokupeal, Sotil; Ngapen, Amos; Pombuai, Hendry; Kahu, Kaspar and Sandrel, Simon (elders), 14 February 1994, Pityilu Island, Manus, PNG
69 Interview by the author with Namari, Kesaya (grand daughter of Tamiya Mabei), 30 December 1993, Biwa village; Tetu, Billy (grandson of Tamiya Mabei), 25 December 1993, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG
70 Interview by the author with Tanaka, Mary (daughter of Tanaka Taichirō), 22 December 1993, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG.
Return of Tashiro

Tashiro Tsunesuke was the only Japanese resident who came back Rabaul during the war and experienced the war in Papua and New Guinea. Probably he had the same dilemma as Komine had at the outbreak of World War I, caught between patriotism and relations with local people. Although it is hard to know how strong his patriotism was, both written and oral evidence show that he cherished his good pre-war relations and saved lives of New Guineans, white missionaries, Chinese planters and Australians.

In March 1941 he went back Japan in the last Nan'yō Bōeki liner. As soon as the war broke out, he was called up to serve the navy as a gunzoku [civilian]. At that time the navy was recruiting Japanese civilians who had an experience in the South Seas. On 26 December he was posted to the 2nd Nazuru Naval Special Landing Party at Saipan. On 1 February 1942 he was transferred to the 8th Base Force which was commanding the operations in New Guinea. Then on 10 April he was back in Rabaul, being assigned an additional post under the command of the minsei-bu [civil administration department] in New Britain. Until the end of the war, he worked mainly as an interpreter, because he spoke fluent English and Pidgin English and had local knowledge extremely useful for the navy which knew little about New Guinea. He was dispatched to Milne Bay, Bougainville, Nakanai, Talasea, Nakanai and Manus.

Tashiro impressed Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jin'ichi, supreme commander of the naval forces in New Guinea. Kusaka wrote about Tashiro's outstanding service in his memoir. Kusaka praised his service which saved the naval land unit in the Milne Bay and quoted Tashiro's diary fully over three pages. The following is his dairy.

On 24 August [1942], I left Buna. I was assigned to the landing operation of the Sasebo 5th Special Land Battle Unit which was to attack Rabi. On the way, at midday on 25th, we stopped at Goodenough Island in the north of Rabi and were attacked by ten enemy fighters. All our seven landing boats were sunk with most of our food, ammunition and radios, and about ten were killed. Since then, 350 officers and men were isolated on the island. Every day enemy planes machine-gunned us. We maintained our strength by food from the natives, although not enough, while investigating the island and collecting information about the enemy. Then we planned to contact the main force at Buna by despatching a party on a canoe; the party had to paddle 130 miles. About one week later, we managed to obtain a canoe from the natives and despatched three men on it. However, we did not hear anything from them for a week and sent a second canoe. Around this time, the men began to die one after another because of the lack of food and medicine. Many got weak and fell down by malaria. Still we did not hear anything from Buna and began to prepare a third dispatch as a last resort, this time by a cutter with a sail. Then our fighter came and dropped a communication cylinder saying 'Stick it out' and two packets of kō (cigarettes). At least one of our previous dispatches was successful. The whole unit overjoyed. From this time, however, the enemy intensified their raid. The fighters machine-gunned us from the daybreak to the sunset. But our planes also appeared from time to time and dropped supplies of ammunition and biscuits. Meanwhile,
malaria patients increased and died daily. To cremate their bodies in the jungle at night when the enemy reconnaissance plane was not in the sky was the most saddest and difficult task. Soon later, our submarine arrived and unloaded a radio, chart, rice and landing boat, and picked up about sixty injured and the seriously ill men. Unfortunately, the second submarine only unloaded a boat and left, as the enemy night reconnaissance plane noticed its arrival. Later, while radio-communicating with the 18th Unit early in the morning on 24 October, the Australian forces landed the island. We fought for two days and finally rebuffed the enemy, although we lost a platoon leader and other ten men. At night on 16th, we got aboard the two boats and reached the adjacent Normandy [sic] Island. At eleven o'clock at night on 27th, we were picked up by the battleship Tenryū, and in the morning on 28th, 200 of us returned Rabaul.

Since then, Tashiro engaged in the tasks such as investigating the construction site for airstrips, recruiting and placating New Guineans mainly at Rabaul and Bougainville. One time he was successful in recruiting a thousand New Guineans. Kusaka expresses deep gratitude for Tashiro's hard work.

Although he was working for the Japanese military, he did not betray his local friends. In Bougainville, he acquiesced in the presence of Lieutenant Mason, an Australian coast watcher, and the leaking of information by Wong You, a Chinese planter at Kieta.

He [Wong] states that he owed his life to Tashiro, Japanese Intelligence Officer, who had told the officer in charge, who had accused of withholding information concerning myself, that 'this man has known Mason twenty years. You he has known only a day. You cannot expect him to betray a lifelong friend to a stranger.' Tashiro did not do harm to locals and was indeed instructing the islanders to take a neutral stand for their safety lest other Japanese officers could understand. Similarly, in Rabaul he was protecting the interests of the mixed-race people and Chinese and visited the Vunapope Mission to see that children were well-treated.

**Internment life in Australia**

Australians treated the internees well, abiding by the letter and spirit of the Geneva Convention; the internees received the same amount of rations as the camp guards and were similarly housed. Most Japanese internees had no bitterness about their treatment by the camp authorities and conditions in the camps. It was also the Australian expectation of good treatment of their prisoners of war and internees kept by the Axis that gave the camp authorities a sense of responsibility in their conducts.

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75 This is undoubtedly Normanby.
76 Kusaka, op.cit., p.p.75-77
77 Ibid., p.77
78 Ibid.
80 Interview by the author with Pulau, Joseph (elder from Bougainville; the first Bougainvillean doctor and now lives in Rabaul), 25 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
81 Read to Commander, H.Q. 8 M.D., 19 September 1946, AA A471/1 81211
82 Interview with Asanuma, op.cit.
83 Bevege, op.cit., p.194
84 Nagata, op.cit., p.192
85 Bevege, op.cit., p.144
Upon their arrival at Sydney, the Japanese from Rabaul were entrained to Hay Camp in a grazing area about 750 kilometres inland. They arrived at the camp on 27 January and met Tanaka and Murakami from Samarai and the Japanese from the New Hebrides. In the camp there were already about 900 hundred Japanese mainly from Australia and New Caledonia. On the following day, the camp officers body-searched the new Japanese and confiscated all cash and other belongings.86

Mixing with other Japanese was a new experience to those from New Guinea. A small group, whose main social contact had been with non-Japanese, was suddenly swallowed up in a large group of the same race. Naturally that gave them have a new and clear sense of their national identity, and the news of Japanese victories stimulated their patriotism. They needed no longer hide their practices of Shinto or Buddhist nor their admiration of the Empire. Hearing about the fall of Singapore, the Japanese in the camp gathered and worshiped towards the direction of Japan and prayed silently for the souls of the Japanese soldiers who perished in the battle. They also heard that the Allied bombers raided Tokyo and other cities, but presumed the news was propaganda. They celebrated the Emperor's Birthday on 29 April, singing a national anthem and praying for Japanese soldiers. They had a feast and enjoyed a sumo tournament. In the camp the Japanese considered the Battle of Coral Sea a Japanese victory and held a celebration with a gorgeous dinner. The news of the Japanese abortive midget submarine attack against Sydney and Newcastle was solemnly conveyed. And from time to time, they organised lecture series, entitled kokusei taikai [Conference on National Situation], delivered by academic internees in the camp and designed to keep their morale high.87

On 12 April 1943, the Australian government made a new decision on the status of Japanese internees. It classified merchant seamen as prisoners of war (POW) and distinguished them from 'internees'. After this, it decided that Hay Camp hold only POWs and Loveday Camp in South Australia only internees.88 The new status was inconsistent in the case of the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea. Technically all were engaged in maritime industry, because even planters or plantation managers had to operate vessels to transport copra. At this stage only Izumi, a boat builder, was considered a merchant seaman and thereby a POW,89 while other boatbuilders or fishermen were considered civilians.

On 10 May 1943, 350 Japanese were transferred from Hay to Loveday Camp in South Australia. All the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea except Izumi were among them.90 The Australians thought the Loveday area was 'one of the best locations chosen for the purpose of internment camps' with 'its temperate climate and its abundance of reticulated water.'91 On the contrary, Loveday did not impress the Japanese. When they arrived, a sand storm was raging. Their first impression of the camp site was that they were

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86Diary of Nagahama, 27 and 28 January 1942, op.cit.
87Ibid., 11 November to 20 July 1942
88Nagata, op.cit., p.164
89Diary of Nagahama, 10 May to 4 July 1943, op.cit.
90Ibid., 12 May 1943
91Advertiser South Australia, 1946, Internment in South Australia, Adelaide, p.21
brought to the middle of the desert. About two months later, the camp authority rechecked the occupation of the Japanese and re-classified Endō, Onoue, Hatamoto, Nakamura and Kimura as POWs and sent them back to Hay Camp with about a hundred other Japanese.

The Japanese found camp life satisfactory. Nagahama recalled no complaints about the treatment and Hatamoto recalls the good treatment. Although they were forced to do various work (farming, carpentry, wood cutting, etc), they were not too hard. They were fed well; they could receive medical treatment in the camp hospitals; and they had time for their own pastimes such as sports or organising other entertainments. For instance, Hatamoto used to enjoy making toys for the children in the camp in his spare time.

The Australians observed that the Japanese were the most placid and many were not security risks. A Loveday camp official described:

The Japanese: Subservient, were model prisoners. Their fanatical desire to maintain 'face' made them easy to handle in their eagerness to obey all orders and instructions to the letter.

However, the camp authority were concerned about Nagahama who had managed to keep handsome cash and was lending it to others. In Loveday, the Japanese suffered from minor financial hardship. Their pocket money was so little: they received only 'six shillings per week on signing allegiance to the Emperor and his regime.' The camp official interviewed Nagahama about his lending and reported:

NAGAHAMA stated that he had unexpectedly been allowed to bring the money from his estate at Rabaul, and he considered that he ought to help others who had not been so fortunate and had little or no money. He lent the money without interest, and on the word of the camp leader (IJ.51736 ANYEI Morio) that those receiving loans would repay him the sums received when they returned to Japan.

Then the camp authority banned transfer of money among internees, although admitting that Nagahama's lending was a bona fide action and did not appear to represent an attempt on his part to gain for himself "political" influence in the Compound. The authority did not approve of his lending of £40 to Tsurushima, which Nagahama attempt to send in exchange for three rings. He also tried to send money to Onoue at Hay Camp in vain:

About money it is most disturbing but on application to the Authorities, we were told it was absolutely impossible to send money over there, so inconvenient situation though it is, please try to bear up. Even here we have been in an awkward situation over money for 2 or 3 months—we can no longer transfer to any person more than £1 in a week. Everyone here, too, is inconvenienced, but as it is a Military Order we can do nothing about it.

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92 Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
93 Diary of Nagahama, 4 July 1943, op.cit.
94 Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
95 Bevege, op.cit. p.150. One exception was the uprising at Cowra Camp in August 1944. But the incident did not affect the Japanese in other camps: the Japanese in Loveday Camp indeed assured the camp authority that they did not follow suit.
96 Advertiser South Australia, op.cit., p.10
97 Ibid., p.p.14-15
98 MJ.18518 NAGAHAMA Taichi—lending of money to internees,’ 25 August 1943, AA, A367/1 C666777
99 Ibid.
100 Ref these HQ memo 8267 of 21 Aug 43,’ 10 November 1943, AA, D1901 N2781
101 Nagahama to Onoue, 16 November 1943, ibid.
The authority kept watching for Nagahama's money lending with deep suspicion and even refused his offer to pay for the poultry for New Year's Day on the ground that 'this apparent generosity is really intended to extend Nagahama's influence in the compound.'

We can only speculate how Nagahama managed to possess a large sum of cash, because usually internees' money had been confiscated at the time of internment. He might have had savings in an Australian bank and made a special arrangement with the camp authority to withdraw cash or he might have been running an unauthorised business like trading rations or gambling which was very common among Allied POWs in Japan.

Many Japanese died at Loveday, because quite a few Japanese were interned in spite of their old age: 108 Japanese died compared to 18 Italians and 7 Germans. Tanaka Taichirō was among them. He got sick and was hospitalised. In the Barmera Base Hospital his name was placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 30 May 1945. Then he recovered for some time and his name was moved to the 'seriously ill' list on 10 July. However, his condition deteriorated once again and his name was placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 20 November: the cause was unresolved pneumonia. Then he finally succumbed to the illness. He developed an cerebral vascular accident and passed away on New Year Eve in the 64 Camp Hospital. His burial was held at eleven o'clock in the morning on New Year Day in 1946. He was 68 years old.

Some Japanese experienced accident and sickness, although not fatal. At Loveday, Kikuchi Ichisuke was struck by a truck and admitted to the camp hospital, suffering from fracture of his left ankle. At Tatura, Ikeda Kunizō's wife, Toshie, got sick and was taken to the camp hospital on 19 October 1945.

Those who had been separated from their families in New Guinea were anxious about their safety, hearing the news of the Allied bombing of Rabaul and other areas and the battle in Manus. Bad communication increased their anxiety, except Kikuchi and Asanuma who were lucky enough to receive letters from New Guinea. Others could not hear anything from their families despite they wrote many times. Nakamura's letters never got through, and a sympathetic official of the International Red Cross Committee sought advice from the Minister of State for External Affairs on Nakamura's communication with his family. Similarly Hagiwara and Sasaki got no replies from their families.

102Ref. this H Q memo 10044 of 10 Nov 43', 28 January 1944, ibid.
104Advertiser South Australia, op.cit., p.25
105War Diary of Intelligence Summary, 14CD Loveday camp,' 30 May 1945, AA, AWM52, 8/7/42
10610 July 1945, ibid.
10720 November 1945, ibid.
10831 December 1946, ibid.
109Coroners ACT, 1935, South Australia,' date unknown, AA, A518/1 BM836/1
110War Diary of Intelligence Summary, 14CD Loveday camp,' 24 October 1944, op.cit.
111Tatura Internment Group Routine Orders No.294. Part I,' 21 October 1945, AA, AWM52, 8/7/43
112Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 23 July 1946, AA., A367 C72533
113Morel to Evatt, 5 February 1945, AA, A1066 IC45/16/2/2
114Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 22 July 1946, AA., A367 C72534; A367 C72587
In 1943 the negotiation over exchanging internees began between Japan and Australia. The Japanese government nominated 678 Japanese including four from New Guinea: Hatamoto, Mano, Nagahama and Tsurushima. The Australian government refused the exchange of the four for the obvious reason that they were very likely to pass their knowledge of New Guinea to the Japanese military.

3. Deportation

Australian policy

The end of the war was good news to the internees. They expected to be freed from the confinement for three and half years and go home to see their families. However, through newspapers and correspondence with their families, they knew of the devastation of Rabaul. Probably they knew about a huge number of Japanese POWs and their trials. They also knew the devastation of Japan—atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the occupation by the Allied forces. It is unknown whether they all wished to return to Papua and New Guinea. But the Australians were determined to make New Guinea a Japanese-free area for the defence and governance of New Guineans. The Australians regarded the pre-war Japanese presence as part of nan Shin: the Japanese were all associated with espionage activities. The Japanese occupation undermined the Australian authority, therefore any Japanese influence had to be eliminated in order to restore the pre-war colonial rule.

The repatriation of Japanese internees began in late February 1946. At least seven (Murakami, Asanuma, Hagiwara, Ikesaki, Kikuchi Matsukichi and Ichisuke and Sasaki) formally applied for release in Australia, although it is not known whether other Japanese applied for their return to Papua and New Guinea. Then six out of the seven (leaving Kikuchi Matsukichi), who applied for the release in Australia, were transferred to Tatura Camp.

At Loveday, on 21 February 1946, 18 Japanese internees from New Guinea were deported to Japan with over 2,000 other Japanese, according to Regulation 20C of the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations. They included families of Ikeda and Ishibashi, Arata, Kikuchi (Matsukichi), Mano, Mori, Nagahama, Segawa, Tashiro, Tsujii and Tsurushima. The rest of the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea, in total ten, could not be deported because the Australian government could not refuse their applications to return to Papua and New Guinea. They had local wives in Papua and New Guinea who were

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115 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London to Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, 22 July 1943, AA, A1608/1 AF20/1/1 Part 2

116 Memorandum for the camp commandant, Loveday, S.A., 8 February 1946, AA, A1066/4 IC45/1/11/5. Some petitions of ex-residents in Australia to release in Australia are kept in the same file.

117 Nominal roll: internees marched out to Tatura Internment Group; 28 February 1946, AA, AWM52, 8/7/42

118 Order for repatriation under Regulation 20C of the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations;

119 Minister for Immigration to Attorney-General, March 1946, ibid.
technically British subjects, and their release had to be negotiated with the Attorney-General.120

Roland Browne, the Acting Director-General of Security, interviewed the ten who were then moved to Rushworth Camp, following the instruction of the Attorney-General. At the interviews they all expressed their strong desire to go back to live with their families.121 Browne found that 'in all of these cases there is no objection to release'122 and reported no objection to their return provided that approval be granted by the Department of External Territories. About Kimura, however, he thought, 'is an intelligent type and has a very good knowledge of New Guinea waters and it may be thought desirable that he should be required to return to his own country.'123

However, the Department of External Territories objected, supporting the view of Administrator Murray who was firmly against their return because of the possible 'ill-effect' on the natives:

The fact that the Territory of New Guinea has been occupied for three years by a Japanese army as conquerors makes it highly undesirable to enable a native population to be in contact with Japanese nationals, both in their interests as well as in the interests of the Japanese themselves.124

The administration's first task after the war was restoration of the pre-war relationship between white masters and black servants. Any Japanese influence that undermined the authority of white masters had to be removed. White planters were also afraid of the destruction of the pre-war colonial relations and petitioned the Minister of External Affairs:

In putting forth this request, we have taken into consideration the fact that great numbers of native inhabitants who have been under Japanese control in the occupied areas will be unfit to take on employment for some time, and, by adopting the action submitted, it will be possible to give these natives a rest period to allow them to reinstate themselves in their pre-war way of life.125

The rejection of their return meant separation from their families. Murray was aware of this ethical issue, but he argued that:

In considering the separation from their families that the long war separation will act as a shock absorber and moreover it must be recollected that in some instances the bonds of affection are no greater that would be expected of the general run of irregular unions as no doubt many are.126

Oral evidence denies Murray's argument. Their wives and children were all longing to see the return of their husbands and fathers.127

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120 Col. Lloyd to Attorney-General, 24 January 1946, ibid.
121 'Interview with Japanese internees,' 22 July 1946, AA, A367 C72533, C72534, C72537, C72538, C72539, C72540, C72546, C72587 and C72588
122 Browne to the Secretary of the Department of External Territories, 23 August 1946, AA, A373/1 11505/48
123 'Case No.91. KIMURA Hideichiro,' date unknown, ibid.
124 Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 September 1946, op.cit.
125 Secretary of the Pacific Territory Association to Minister of External Affairs, 18 August 1945, AA, A518/1 BB836/2
126 Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 September 1946, op.cit.
127 Interview by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Izumi, Endō, Nakamura, Murakami and Tanaka families, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG and Australia
Browne objected to Murray's view and emphasised the point that 'they have been away from Japan for many years, ranging from 29 to 45, and to separate them permanently from their wives and families now in my opinion [can] be wrong,' and recommended that 'to return them to their home surroundings, from which they were taken into custody, is the only reasonable solution to the problem.'\textsuperscript{128}

Browne and Murray kept on pressing their arguments to the Attorney-General's Department.\textsuperscript{129} However, Browne's view met overwhelming opposition from the Director-General of Security, Murray, Deputy Administrator Phillips and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories. The Director-General of Security reiterated a traditional Australian fear of Japan's nan shin:

Japanese who were in the islands pre-war, can only be regarded as having been part of the Japanese system of infiltration and espionage related to their so-called "southward expansion movement"...The South West Pacific area is a vital strategic region in which unremitting vigilance is a constant requisite. Clearly, no Japanese should again be allowed anywhere within such strategic zone....Upon all material counts the re-entrance of any Japanese would be of ill-effect and it is strongly advised that none be allowed to proceed to any of the areas referred to.\textsuperscript{130}

When Browne argued that the Japanese never exhibited anti-British sentiments before the war,\textsuperscript{131} Phillips countered saying that they simply had no chance to express such sentiments and emphasised that 'the loyalty of Japanese to their Emperor and country is so notorious that I find it hard to imagine that these Japanese would not have immediately rallied to Nippon had they still in the Territory when the Japanese forces arrived.'\textsuperscript{132} Phillips also pointed out that 'their return may constitute an extreme provocation to European, Asiatic and native residents who suffered terribly at enemy hands during the occupation.'\textsuperscript{133}

The Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories was more aggressive. He firmly denied the ethical case, regarding the intermarriages as 'all part of the espionage and infiltration plan' and presented a blatant racist view that 'Japanese have amongst other many undesirable characteristics, a complete lack of any sense of gratitude and certainly no sense of affection or even liking for any others than their own people.' More importantly, he made a point, which was quite persuasive then, that their return would be a betrayal to the Australians killed in war in Papua and New Guinea.

Finally, and remembering the actions in New Guinea itself, of the Japanese forces before they were ejected, any permitted entrance or re-entrance of any Japanese to the Islands would be likely to be regarded by every Australian in the territory (and in Australia as well) as an affront—particularly to those bereaved as a result of Japanese aggression.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{128}Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 2 October 1946, AA, A373/1 11505/48
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid.; Murray to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 20 February 1947, ibid.
\textsuperscript{130}Japanese Internees Ex-islands', 5 September 1947, AA A472 W32123
\textsuperscript{131}Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 5 March 1947; Murray to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 20 February 1947, AA, A373/1 11505/48
\textsuperscript{132}Re Return to the Territory of Japanese Internees' by Phillips, 12 January 1948, ibid.
\textsuperscript{133}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134}Notes taken from telephone conversation with the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories for inclusion in a Minute to the Minister for External Territories, 29 September 1947, ibid.
Meanwhile the Department of the Army was eager to close the camp due to the cost of maintaining it. As a result, the issue was left to the jurisdiction of the administration, and the Japanese were to be returned to Papua and New Guinea, although their release was yet to be decided.\footnote{135}{Browne to Colonel Griffin, 15 April 1947, ibid.}

The Department of the Army prepared transport for their repatriation. At the last moment, Murakami changed his mind and applied for repatriation to Japan.\footnote{136}{New Guinea Japanese Internees,' 1 August 1947, AA, A437 46/6/72} Probably he knew he would not live long due to his old age (70 years old then) and wished to see his home country again before his death. But his application was rejected. All ten were sent back to Papua and New Guinea. Cynically, only Murakami was released at Samarai upon his return, while other nine were kept in custody in Rabaul.

Murray still resisted the release of the nine. They were held in a compound next to the one for the Japanese war criminals who were waiting for trial or serving their sentences in Rabaul. It was an illegal detention, and the Australian officials were aware of that. Cyril Chambers, Acting Minister of External Territories, wrote to the Cabinet:

The six civilian internees were held in pursuance of the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations and orders for their release were signed on 27th November, 1946, and the Regulation in question expired on 31/12/1947, five of these appeared to be held illegally...It is not clear whether the three who are regarded technically as prisoners of war who are still held...are legally held.\footnote{137}{Chambers to the cabinet, 6 January 1949, AA, A6006/1 2nd CHIFLEY NOV.46-DEC.49}

While they were in the compound, Izumi died of sickness. He was 54 years old, and was buried in the cemetery near Talwat where Japanese war criminals were buried. He was not allowed to be buried in the European cemetery like other pre-war Japanese, because anti-Japanese feelings were so strong among residents, particularly those who had been interned. Some greatly resented the pre-war presence of the Japanese in the town and pulled out all Japanese graves (including Komine's memorial erected by Tatsue) in the European cemetery and threw them into the sea.\footnote{138}{Interview by the author with Uradok (elder from Matupi, a tour guide for Japanese veterans), 17 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG; only two graves were not thrown into the sea and are now kept in the Kokopo Museum.}

Most families of the Japanese visited the compound, but the Japanese were never allowed to return to their homes even temporarily. For this illegal detention, the Australians even fabricated a story. The District Officer in Rabaul reported that 'only one wife of the Japanese internees wished for their husband's return, the native wives of their internees having re-married.'\footnote{139}{Chambers to the cabinet, 6 January 1949, op.cit.} Oral evidence contradicts this. Most families were anxious to see the Japanese back home, and the re-marriages took place some years after the Japanese were deported to Japan.\footnote{140}{Interview by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Nakamura, Endö and Izumi, January to March 1994, PNG and Australia}

However, some Australians were sympathetic. Gordon Ehret, a long time friend of Asanuma, was back in Rabaul from his military service in the Middle East. He requested the administration to release them, explaining that they had nothing to do with the Japanese...
forces. His request was not accepted. In fact, Ehret experienced 'the most unpleasant job'. He was appointed as a guard for the compound, as he was one of the few civilians who had military experience. Over the fence, Asanuma begged Ehret for his release. Asanuma's voice still lingers in Ehret's ears:

We are mates, aren't we? Why do you do this to me?141

Also in Manus, some Australian planters tried unsuccessfully to release the Japanese. Whitely and Edison, planters in Momote, requested the administration to return Ikesaki and Hagiwara to their plantations in Manus.142

The administration officials knew that they had no statutory right to deport the Japanese: 'the eight still held cannot be deported as prohibited immigrants owing to their long residence in New Guinea and in regard to the five civilians there is no war-time legislation under which they could be removed from the Territory.'143 But finally the officials managed to find a loophole. Under the Expulsion of Undesirable Ordinance 1935 of New Guinea, they could be deported by the discretion of the administrator. Section 2 reads:

Where the Administrator is satisfied that any person who was not born in the Territory—

(a) has since the commencement of the Laws Reprisal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 been convicted in the Territory of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer: or
(b) is a person whose presence in the Territory is injurious to the peace, order, or good Government of the Territory, or whose presence in the Territory is prejudicial to the well-being of the natives of the Territory,

the Administrator may make an order for the deportation of that person.

The eight Japanese were deported in 1949, after the longest internment suffered by any of the Japanese—in total seven years.

In contrast, Murray did not object to the release of Murakami in Samarai. Probably his age (72 years) was considered, but the main reason is obvious: Milne Bay did not suffer Japanese occupation and the damage to the Australian authority was minimal. The Australians rebuffed the Japanese landing, and in Buna-Kokoda the Australians eventually pushed back the Japanese advance. The postwar administration saw little physical damage or need for rehabilitation.144 And within only two years 'almost complete rehabilitation to pre-war standard' was achieved.145 Thus by the time Murakami was back, pre-war conditions were restored.

Murakami rejoiced to meet his wife and son, but he had to bring bad news to Mary Tanaka: her father Taichirō had died in Loveday. He also brought a bunch of Taichirō's hair and gave it to Mary. It was his only legacy left to her. Murakami was fortunate to enjoy the last moment with his family and also to have support from Timperly, a sympathetic

141 Interview by the author with Ehret, Gordon, 22 March 1994, Brisbane, Australia. Ehret was sobbing when he was telling this to the author. He now has very good relations with Asanuma's sons in Brisbane who migrated to Australia.
142 Interview by the author with Pearse, Dick (ex-administration official and now an agent of customs in Manus), 14 February 1994, Lorengau, Manus, PNG
143 Chambers to the cabinet, 6 January 1949, op.cit.
144 Territory of Papua Report 1945-1946, Canberra, p.13
145 Territory of Papua Report 1946-1947, Canberra, p.14
Australian official, who was helping him by providing food. Murakami died in Kuyaro in the same year that he returned.146

Life after deportation

A hard life was waiting for those deported from Australia and New Guinea. They went back to poor villages and islands where they had found no bright future and had left decades before. Most had never returned for a long time. They had no means to make a living as all their assets and properties and even petty belongings were confiscated by the Australians on internment and after the war. Moreover, chaotic social conditions in the early postwar Japan made them difficult to adapt to the new life. Even more depressing, their losses of assets in New Guinea were never compensated.

Nagahama suffered the worst financially. His lost all the wealth which he had accumulated by hard work during almost forty years in New Guinea. The administration seized, liquidated and distributed his assets, which amounted to £21,602, for the benefits of former Australian POWs of the Japanese, according to Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and to Section 13F of the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939-1957.147 He passed away at his home village Goryō in September 1960 while his wife was watching. His family suffered severe financial difficulties because Nagahama came back without any money and he often became sick. After his death, his wife and daughter sent a petition to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to inquire about the possibility of compensation for the loss of his assets in New Guinea.148 The government did not reply.

Some were fortunate to carry on their occupations, although they had to start again from scratch. Tsurushima opened a new store in Shanghai.149 Ishibashi found a job as captain of a sightseeing boat in his home Misaki in Kanagawa, and Hatamoto managed to start a boat building business in his island in Goto in Nagasaki.150 Very likely most others sought support from their relatives and suffered hardships. Some of those who were separated from their families in New Guinea kept on writing for some years, but some later re-married in Japan.151

In New Guinea, most wives of the Japanese went back to their home villages. In some cases, their mixed-race children were looked after by the Vunapope Catholic Mission in Kokopo. Oral evidence indicates that the local population showed little bitterness against them. Most were treated like before the war. New Guineans knew that those wives and mixed-race children were different from the Japanese forces. New Guinean elders often distinguish the Japanese before the war from the ones during the war and relate their cordial

146 Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami Heijirō), 4 January 1994, Misima, Milne Bay, PNG
147 'War damage to property regulations: claims of Taichi Nagahama, D.J. Hill, Delegate of the Controller of Enemy Property,' 11 September 1961, AA A1379 EP/851 Sect O
148 A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentarō (Foreign Minister), September 1960, possession of Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan
149 A letter to the author from Satō Sadako (grand daughter of Tsurushima), 4 June 1993
150 A letter to the author from Hatamoto Otosaku, 26 May 1993
151 Asanuma, Ikesaki and Nakamura re-married in Japan.
relations with the former. For, example, villagers of Momote remained loyal to their former plantation manager, Ikesaki, and kept the plantation intact until his son, Peter, told them that the land was no longer Ikesaki's and would be returned to the villagers.

Like those in Japan, generally those left in New Guinea also suffered from severe financial hardships. Their breadwinners were taken away and never came back and their pre-war assets and properties had all been destroyed or confiscated either by the Japanese or the Australians since the outbreak of the war. Some years after the war, some children grew old enough to ask about war compensation for their losses of their fathers' assets, seeing other people began to receive it. Andrew Nakamura inquired of the officials at Rabaul, then the Australian High Commission at Port Moresby, but received a blunt a reply that he should ask the Japanese government because he was part-Japanese. He then asked an official from the Japanese Embassy, who visited Rabaul after the independence of Papua New Guinea. The official promised to consider the matter but never contacted Peter again.

Conclusion

The Japanese in Papua and New Guinea were victims of imperial policies. They lost everything—wealth, families and friends. It was a tragedy of a minority who were always powerless against the great nations, and were often unknown to or ignored by majority people. Japanese nanshin-ron advocates created the image that they were patriots serving the expansion of the Empire. That exacerbated the Australian fear of the 'Yellow Peril' which came true at the outbreak of war. As a result, the Australians eliminated the Japanese from New Guinea. They bitterly recognised New Guinea's strategic importance and thereby the importance to keep their colonial rule tight, even though they knew the elimination would separate the Japanese families for ever. It was probably the least known Australian cruelty committed against Japanese civilians. More cruelly, the Japanese government simply ignored them. Indeed, this was one of the unknown atrocities of the war.

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152 Oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG and Australia
153 Interview by the author with Peter Ikesaki (son from the third wife of Ikesaki Tokuyoshi), 26 January 1994, Rabaul, PNG
154 Interview with Nakamura, op.cit.; the author also inquired to the Japanese Embassy in Port Moresby about the compensation but have not received a reply, either.
**Conclusion**

Empirical investigation shows that both Japanese *nanshin-ron* advocates and Australian officials in Canberra perceived the migrants as an intrinsic part of an expanding empire. As a result, both developed perceptions of a mythical world where the migrants never lived. Most migrants actually left Japan to escape their poverty and they were hardly a menace to the Australians in Papua or New Guinea, economically or militarily. However, stuck between those perceptions, the migrants were obliged to play contradictory roles. Their presence gave moral support to Japanese expansionism through *Shōwa nanshin-ron*, and it was wrongly connected with the Japanese invasion during the Pacific War and provided Canberra with grounds to eliminate them. It is ironic that the migrants developed friendly relationships with individual Papuans, New Guineans, Chinese, Australians and Germans. Their only enemy was a mythical monster called *nanshin*, created by the nations against which powerless individuals had no weapons to fight, for they scarcely knew of the distorted perceptions of them created in nations to their north and south.

Theoretical analyses suggest that the application of the conceptualisation based on the word-system to the settlers is also possible. Firstly Japanese migrants were pearl divers from Thursday Island in the 1890s: they were professional divers paid high wages by white employers and they remitted their money to their homes. At this stage they were simply a labour force for white masters, not different from Chinese or Indian coolies in European plantations or mines. Although they were paid well and engaged of their own free will, pearls were sent to European markets as a result of non-white labour used by white masters, so their presence reflects Japan's peripheral role as labour within a Europe-centred world system. Biskup and Moore also largely stand on this view in their analyses of Japanese migrants in New Guinea and other South Pacific islands.1

However, the conceptualisation based on the world-system model becomes complicated when some Japanese pearl divers moved to German New Guinea and set up their own business (trade, ship building, copra plantation and shell fishing), bringing in Japanese employees and using native labourers. Consequently they formed an almost self-contained Japanese settlement in the early 1910s. The complication arises from the fact that they served two cores—the European metropole and Japanese metropole. They built ships for the German administration and later for the Australian administration, which means they still functioned as a labour force to maintain European colonial structures, however professional or well paid. Meanwhile, they invested the profits from ship building in copra plantation using hundreds of native labourers, and exported copra to Japan. That indicates

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that the Japanese settlement began to function as an ultra-periphery to Japan. The reason why it is an ultra-periphery is that its economic importance is negligible and its location within the political and economic sphere of Germany or Australia where Japanese influence was almost nil. It is comparable to the ultra-peripheral role of Papua to Australia in Amarshi's conceptualisation.\textsuperscript{2}

However, this conceptualisation is derived only from economic factors such as labour market and labour mobility. Therefore its analysis is simplistic, as Simmons and Guengant argue: the world-system model is only valid in its analyses on the political economy with its major focus on global market competition and its interaction with international labour mobility. Its major weakness is the lack of analysis of cultural and ideological forces.\textsuperscript{3} The same argument can be applied to the case of the Japanese in Papua and New Guinea. The model hardly explains a cultural factor that is characterised by localities of their birth places—coastal areas (Shimabara, Amakusa, and southern coastal Wakayama) where people were maritime-oriented. Nor does the model explain an ideological factor that is identified with \textit{nanshin-ron} that promoted migration to the South Pacific.

The term 'culture' is vague. I define it as the sum of characteristics by localities of emigrants' birth places that make them distinctive from people in other areas. 'Cultural factor' here means the characteristics of people peculiar to particular regions. The common economic and demographic conditions from the late 19th century to the early 20th century of those coastal areas were the low productivity of agriculture and rapid population increase; and local historians agree that these conditions stimulated overseas migration.\textsuperscript{4} If the economic and demographic conditions had been the only factors, the world system model based on the assumption of reformation of labour market and international labour mobility could fit nicely.

However, local historians also stress other factors. In the case of emigration from Amakusa, Hamana attributes the motivation to 'Amakusa's proximity to Nagasaki, one of the few international ports of Japan for hundreds of years, that made Amakusa people feel overseas countries were close.'\textsuperscript{5} Kitano, having acknowledged the same cause, suggests that their characteristically strong affection towards parents that was partly affected by their Catholic belief caused Amakusa youths to emigrate abroad to help their parents.\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{4}Kitano Norio, 1985a, \textit{Amakusa kaigai hatten shi} [History of overseas development of Amakusa], Vol.1, Ashi shobō, Fukuoka, p.313; Wakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture], 1957, \textit{Wakayama ken imin shi} [History of emigrants from Wakayama prefecture], Wakayama, p.125


\textsuperscript{6}Kitano, op.cit., p.311; Kitano, 1985b, \textit{Amakusa kaigai hatten shi} [History of overseas development of Amakusa], Vol.2, Ashi shobō, Fukuoka, p.p.370-371
In the case of emigration from southern coastal Wakayama, Iwasaki also concluded that 'the cause for overseas emigration cannot be found in the poverty of the local economy but in factors such as stimulation by neighbours [who made a fortune in overseas] and tradition.' A later study of the emigration from Wakayama adds the 'development-oriented character (hatten-sei) of Wakayama people' to the economic factors and other motives pointed by Iwasaki.

These explanations make sense in each case and are to some extent common to all the birth localities of emigrants to Papua and New Guinea. However, what typifies the emigrants is that they are maritime people. This is clearly indicated by their occupational background; shipwrights, traders, fishermen and so on. The relation between maritime culture and emigration is also suggested by Gotō who points out the nature of the maritime race (kaiyō minzoku sei) of Okinawans as well as the desire to escape from poverty as one of causes for their emigration. This outward looking maritime nature can be one stimulus for the people to emigrate from coastal places where their attachment to land-based economic activities, such as agriculture, is weak or restricted due to the lack of plain land.

The transformation of their social status was another 'pull' factor to New Guinea. In their home villages they were impoverished artisans or farmers or fishermen severely affected by the development of capitalism. In New Guinea, like Germans and Australians, they were treated as Europeans and as mastas, even though most migrants were generally prejudiced against the people in New Guinea. Such status was a dream to most migrants in their home villages. Moreover their national identity as Japanese, whom the Europeans in New Guinea perceived as people of a rapidly expanding empire, although in reality the migrants were the victims of empire-building which increased the poverty of rural Japan, possibly provided them with pride that they were ittō kokumin (No.1 nation). Although such pride was merely an illusion which would vanish instantly back in their impoverished villages, it was a sweet illusion that kept migrants in the land of 'dojin' (literally aborigines but often used with contempt).

The ideological factor is identical with nanshin-ron, as the ideology specifically encouraged Japan's economic and territorial expansion by trade and emigration to the South Seas (nan'yō), although, as Hara points out, Japanese scholarship has hardly focused on the interaction between nanshin-ron and emigration. There was certainly interaction in the case of Papua and New Guinea. This dates back to Enomoto's unrealised plan of 1877...
to colonise New Guinea. Reference to emigration to New Guinea was made in other nan'yō literature, although the quantum was extremely small. More importantly, Komine was a member of Enomoto's Colonisation Society. In addition, the fact that Komine was a leading figure of Japanese settlement makes the Japanese population in New Guinea partly a product of nanshin-ron.

Close observation of individual emigrants suggests weak interaction with nanshin-ron. Komine in the late 1890s showed little of the character of a nanshin-ron protagonist. In addition, the Colonisation Society became inactive in 1902 and seems to have dissolved. Six years later Enomoto passed away. Thus by the time Komine became an established businessman in German New Guinea in 1910, his linkage with nan'shin was clearly weak. It was in his petition letter of 1916 for financial assistance to the Japanese consul-general at Sydney that Komine first made a statement in terms of nanshin-ron. Fourteen years later, when the Great Depression hit his business severely, Komine again wrote a petition and made a similar statement. However, the fact that Komine's primary motivation to make those statements was to gain assistance from the Japanese government leaves room for suspicion about his commitment.

What made Komine a full-fledged nanshin-ron protagonist was not Komine himself but nanshin-ron literature published from the late 1930s to the end of the Pacific War, when numerous pieces were published as propaganda to justify Japan's invasion in Southeast Asia and South Pacific. Komine was lifted up to the level of Yamada Nagamas (a legendary Japanese who was believed to have served the Ayutaya Dynasty as a military adviser in the mid-17th century). This was of course a response to a national demand to justify Japanese invasion to New Guinea under the banner of 'The Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'. As for other Japanese, the possibility of their interaction with nanshin-ron is even lower. By the time sizeable emigration began in 1912, the Nan'yō fever was cooling. Even if such interactions had existed, most of them were Komine's employees on two to three year contracts, which would have made it difficult to develop a special attachment to New Guinea as an extended territory of Japan, or a sense of being part of a national mission. In addition, as nanshin-ron was a Tokyo-based ideology limited to intellectual elites, it is doubtful that most migrants from the poor rural south-west Japan were exposed to it. The analogy can be found in Hayase's study on Japanese emigration to Benget in the Philippines in the late 1890s, who were recruited for difficult road construction, and in Amano's study of Japanese emigration to Davao in the Philippines. Thus the ideological factor existed mainly where actual emigrants were not directly involved.

Indeed, the settlers had little linkage of any kind with their government. Unlike their counterparts in Micronesia after World War I, they received no governmental assistance or government-backed investment. The lack of interest was illustrated well in that the

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12 Yamauchi Teiun ate Enomoto Takeaki shokan [A letter from Enomoto Takeaki to Yamauchi Teiun], Enomoto Takeaki Monjo 6-13 shi [Enomoto Takeaki Archives 6-13 end], 1877, National Diet Library, Tokyo
13 Hayase, op.cit., p.115
14 Amano Yōichi, 1990, Dabao kuo no matsuei tachi [Descendants of Davao], Fūbai-sha, Tokyo, p.95
government never assisted Komine's business in spite of his petitions of 1916 and 1930. Similarly, in stark contrast to the migration issue in Queensland, the Japanese government did not protest when the Australian government enforced restrictive migration and trade policies in New Guinea. Two reasons can explain the disinterest. The first is economic. Papua and New Guinea were unimportant; their negligible trade with Japan was too small even to appear in the statistics. The second is political. Japan was prudent not to cause any unnecessary dispute with Australia that was determined to retain New Guinea. Japan's major concern was to secure German Micronesia without provoking interference from Australia. Similarly, the migrants had no linkage with large capitalists. The most successful businessman, Komine, attempted to gain financial backers in Japan but failed because of the outbreak of World War I.

It is more difficult to validate Canberra's connection of the migrants with Japanese military operations. First, those who determined to stay and consequently were interned were either long-time residents (20 to 40 years) with entrenched business interests or those who had married local women and had children. Oral evidence suggest that their determination was motivated by their business interests and loyalty to their families rather than by desire to assist the military operation. Second is the Rabaul Military Tribunal hearing of Tsunesuke Tashiro, an ex-Rabaul resident who worked for the minsei-bu (the civil administration department) of the Japanese navy at Rabaul as a navy civilian during the war. At the trial, he was first found guilty of beating a New Guinean to death and sentenced to be imprisoned for ten years. Tashiro lodged a petition and white missionaries also wrote letters to support his defence, claiming that he had acted to protect the missionaries and other indigenous people who were put in camps during the war. The defence showed that Tashiro had an alibi: he was not on the scene when the death happened; and the allegation against him had been made by a New Guinean who worked for a European trade company which had been a rival of Tashiro's. Significantly, an Australian acting-district officer of Bougainville, W.J. Read, also defended him, writing that Tashiro saved a Chinese planter and ordered the indigenes to take neutral attitudes for their safety. Although the petition was dismissed, his sentence was mitigated to five years. Oral evidence confirms Tashiro's good reputation both in the prewar and war period—he was always on the side of the non-whites (especially the Chinese) and helped them during the war. Although Tashiro's attitude may not represent all Japanese settlers, it proves that there was at least one Japanese who was more loyal to local residents than to the military.

However, the above approaches fail to recognise the most unique aspect of the settlers. The establishment of the Japanese colony owed much to the settlers' success in building amicable relations with other races. This is important, because the European

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15 Record of Military Court (Japanese War Criminals) of Tsunesuke Tashiro, promulgated 25 January 1948, AA A471/1 81211
17 Read to Commander, H.Q. 8 M.D., 19 September 1946, ibid.
(German and Australian) colonial apparatus was strictly governed according to race\textsuperscript{18}. The settlers kept amicable relations with Europeans and Chinese, represented by Komine's feat of establishing friendly relations with both the German and Australian administrations. As a result, the Japanese could operate their business, inducing minimum rivalry from their European counterparts. That was manifested in the success of the selling of their goods through European stores and by the growth of trade despite the restrictions. Similarly, the development of Japanese relations with Papuans and New Guineans shows their capability to adapt to the local environment. As the colonial administrations restricted the right to recruit labourers through the licence system, the Japanese could not enjoy utilising local labour to the extent that their European counterparts could. However, this obstacle was removed to some extent by forming cordial relations with New Guineans by means of fulfilling traditional reciprocal obligations in gift exchange. Exchanging not only goods but also people through intermarriages and the adoption of children, the Japanese were able to meet traditional requirements. Europeans largely failed to do that. It is presumable that the Japanese were able to win New Guineans' favour and were thereby able to enjoy their cooperation in recruiting labourers and collecting copra and marine products to the extent that their European counterparts could not.

The last factor contributing to the development of the colony was that the European colonisers accepted and to some extent welcomed the Japanese presence as masters. What Germans and Australians were most afraid of was a challenge to their colonial structure by the native population. The Japanese, who could assist in maintaining and reinforcing the colonial structure, were allowed to be colonial masters. Komine was assisting the German pacification of hostile islanders. Another typical example is the tale of an elder on Lou Island in Manus, who worked for Narumi (a Japanese skipper) with other islanders. The skipper treated local crew so badly, often with violence, that the elder (then a young man) ran away, but he was caught by an Australian \textit{kiap} and returned to the Japanese. The \textit{kiap} warned him that he would be taken to court if he ran away again\textsuperscript{19}. Although such a brutal Japanese master was rare according to oral evidence, the episode can verify that the Australian assisted the Japanese in maintaining their master-servant relation with islanders. The Japanese national identity (being from a nation with an expanding empire) also seems to have facilitated their entry to the colonial ruling group, considering that the Chinese were not allowed to join the rulers and largely remained in an intermediate position between the whites and the indigenes. The Japanese colony thus developed and functioned to consolidate the white rule, although that was, of course, within the limit that the Japanese posed no threat to the European interests. The Japanese were masters, but they were subordinate to the white masters.

\textsuperscript{18}There are many books written about colonial rule of Papua and New Guinea. For the racial aspect, see Wolfer, Edward, 1975, \textit{Race relations and colonial rule in Papua New Guinea}, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney

\textsuperscript{19}Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pokomon, Poloat (elders who worked for the Japanese captain), 26 February 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG
Thus the Japanese presence reflected both Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea. Their migration was closely associated with the modernisation process of Japan. In the context of the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, the community developed into a colony through the capability of its members to adapt to the local environment and to cultivate friendly relationships with other races. Their presence facilitated the maintenance of the European structure as well as contributing to the peaceful expansion of Japanese trade.

It was this type of colony that Enomoto and other *nanshin-ron* advocates of the Meiji period had dreamed of. But when Enomoto advocated colonisation, the pioneers were too poor, too few, too weak politically to achieve either conquest or massive colonies of settlers or even large profits. Even though their hard work, patience and diplomacy enabled them to establish such a colony (on a small scale) by the 1930s, *nanshin-ron* advocates and Australian perceptions destroyed the possibilities of that prosperity. This was the tragedy of people who were caught between *nanshin* and the Yellow Peril.
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