VOLUME II

END NOTES, TABLES, APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1 Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1968.


See also U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971, p. 34.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1 See Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford University Press, 1954), and Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued, The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, (Princeton University Press, 1961) for accounts of the factors behind the Japanese surrender. Hiroshima was bombed on 6 August 1945, Nagasaki on 9 August. As a result of agreements made with the United States and Great Britain in February 1945 the Soviet Union abrogated its neutrality pact with Japan, declaring war on 8 August. Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles were quickly overrun and within a matter of days Soviet forces had occupied the four islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai and Shikotan, all within easy striking distance of Hokkaidō. By 16 August, two days after the surrender, Stalin was proposing to Truman that Hokkaidō be divided into Soviet and American zones. (Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 1; Years of Decisions ( Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), pp.372-ff). Both Butow and Feis attribute American nuclear attacks and Soviet entry into the war with equal influence on the Japanese decision to surrender. Both writers tend to emphasize the unity and cohesiveness of Japanese society and give little weight to fear of domestic revolution in producing the surrender decision. Yet Yoshida recalls that Prince Konoye told him on 13 February 1945 that

...what we should fear most is the possibility of a Communist revolution following defeat. The radical elements in the army may not necessarily be aiming at a Communist revolution, but the civilians and those in the civil service who are aligned with those elements definitely have that objective in view and are utilising the simplicity and ignorance of the Army men to that end.

Yoshida expressed his 'complete agreement' and the Prince outlined these views to the Emperor the following day. (Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, (Heinemann, 1961) p.25). This attitude not only explains why Soviet entry into the war had such a shattering effect but throws light on the thinking of post-war governments about security in general.

2 Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan (Signed at San Francisco, 8 September, 1951 Entered into force, 28 April 1952.) According to Article IV the Treaty would expire Whenever in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Apart from the fact that the prospect of such alternative arrangements was remote, it is significant that both Governments had to recognise
their efficacy before the Treaty could lapse. Generally speaking
Japanese writers have concentrated on the impact of the Security
Treaty on Japan's internal politics, economic system and international
relations. Little attention has been paid to the legal aspects of
successive Treaties. Various legal aspects of the 1951 Treaty are
discussed in Hirano Yoshitarō, "Nichī-Bei Anzen Hōshō Jōyaku to Kenpō", Kaizō, November, 1951; Kuroda Hisao, "Anzen Hōshō Jōyaku e no Kig".
Sekai, December, 1951; Murakawa Toshiyuki, "Nichī-Bei Anzen Hōshō
Jōyaku no Mondaiten", Sekai, November, 1951; Tabata Shigejirō,
"Nichī-Bei Anzen Hōshō Jōyaku no Kentō", Hōritsu Jihō, February, 1952
and Takano Yūichi, "Nichī-Bei Anzen Hōshō Kyōtei to Nihon no Dokuritsu".
Shakai Shugi, Number 4, 1951. Most of these writers however were
interested in throwing light on other matters. More recently, legal
aspects of both the 1951 and the 1960 Treaties have been examined in
Kurahara Koreki, Nichī-Bei Ampō Jōyaku no Shōten(Asahi Shimbun Sha,
1967) and Kamimura Shinichī, Sōgo Kyōryoku Anzen Hōshō Jōyaku no
Kaisetsu, (Jiji Tsushin Sha 1965) Kamimura was attached to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington in 1953-54 and later served as Ambassador
to Turkey. He had access to Foreign Ministry files in preparing his

Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. Article I.
The legal and administrative aspects of the stationing of American
forces in Japan were the subject of a separate Administrative Agreement.
This lengthy document, negotiated in the winter of 1951 and first made
public in February 1952, dealt mainly with the legal status of American
troops, base personnel and their dependants, taxation, customs
regulations, procurement of goods and labour, contracts, transport and
communications. The Administrative Agreement extended considerable
legal and financial privileges to American military personnel and their
dependants. It also affected Japanese labour laws. As a result it
was an obvious target of criticism not only for left wing opponents
of the Security Treaty but also for the conservative opposition
Democratic (Progressive) Party. The legal details of the Administrative
Agreement attracted much more attention than those of the Security
Treaty. In 1952 alone almost one hundred lengthy articles analysing
the Agreement appeared in the major monthly and quarterly magazines,
quite apart from articles in newspapers and popular weekly journals.
See Imanaka Tsugimaro, "Gyōsei Kyōtei no Ikensei", Keizai Ōrai, April,
1952; Katō Osao, "Gyōsei Kyōtei to Nihon no Dokuritsu", Shakai Shugi,
November 1952; Kiyose Ichirō, "Gyōsei Kyōtei ni Kansuru Mittsu
no Mondai", Keizai Ōrai, April 1952; Kuroda Hisao, "Nihon no Dokuritsu
to Gyōsei Kyōtei", Ekonomisuto, 30 August 1952; Suzuki Yasuzō,
"Gyōsei Kyōtei no Ikensei", Shakai Shugi, November 1952,
Takano Minoru, "Gyōsei Kyōtei to Rōdō Kaikyū", Shakai Shugi, November
1952; Taoka Yōichi, "Nichī-Bei Gyōsei Kyōtei no Hihan, Kokusaikhō no
Tachiba Kara", Keizai Ōrai, April 1952; Yokota Kisaburō, "Gyōsei Kyōtei

Such forces may be utilised to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far East and to the security of
Japan against armed attack from without.....
The Japanese were thus given no unequivocal guarantee of protection.
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty signed over two years earlier stated clearly
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'

Article IV of the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, Article III of the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, and Article V of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China all stipulated that an armed attack against either Party in the [West] Pacific area would be regarded by the other Party as 'dangerous to its own peace and safety'. In the event of such an attack each Party 'would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes'. These too were stronger guarantees than those given Japan. The reasons for the difference will be discussed later in this chapter.

While Yoshida maintained that stationing American troops in Japan would not limit Japanese sovereignty and independence, he never claimed that the Treaty gave Japan the right to approve America use of bases on a case by case basis. See, for example, his reply to Matsumoto Ryūzō in the House of Representatives Budget Committee, 15 February 1951, as reported in the official Boei Nenkan, 1955, p.21.

It was specified that the 'large scale internal riots and disturbances' that the Japanese Government might request the Americans to suppress had to be 'caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers'. It could clearly be interpreted with considerable latitude.

The American 'expectation' was referred to in the Treaty preamble. However the Foreign Minister Mr Ōhashi told the House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee on 13 February 1952 that:

The dispatch of the Police Reserve Force overseas in order to implement the right of self-defence is theoretically possible but according to the actual terms of the Police Reserve Force Order the force is vested with responsibility for maintaining internal security. We interpret this to mean that extension of the operations of the Police Reserve Force, or of its successor the National Security Force, overseas, would not conform to the internal laws of the country. Any request to send the forces overseas would, therefore, be refused, no matter where it came from. See Boei Nenkan, 1955, pp44-45.
Foreign Minister Ōhashi assured the House of Councillors Local Government Committee on 2 February 1952 that

Article 5 Clause A of the Peace Treaty, which lays down the duty of assisting the United Nations, means rendering all aid possible within the limits of Japan's internal laws. Therefore even in another nation were to request the dispatch of the National Security Force Overseas, we could refuse the request.

After his talks with Dulles in January 1951, Yoshida publically expressed his misgivings about the concept of a Pacific Alliance or similar regional collection security arrangement. See his reply to Katsumata Seiichi (Socialist Party) in the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 15 February 1951, as reported in Bōei Nenkan, 1955, p.21.

Because the United States and Great Britain could not agree on the question of Peking's representation at the Peace Conference, neither the Peoples' Republic nor the Chiang Kai Shek régime were invited to attend. Burma and India were invited but refused to come on the grounds that Japan was being forced into the American camp. They subsequently concluded separate agreements with the Japanese. The Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia attended the Conference but refused to sign the Treaty.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, Chapter 2, Article 2.

Japan agreed to 'concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations' to place those territories under a trusteeship system 'with the United States as the sole administering authority'.

Exchange of Notes, 8 September 1951. For comments on Japan's contribution to the Korean war effort see William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, a Personal History of the Occupation, (W.W. Norton, 1965), p.197ff. Sebald was American Ambassador in Japan (accredited to SCAP) from 1947 until the end of the Occupation.

Great Britain and the United States, unable to agree on Peking's representation at the Peace Conference, had left Japan free to determine her own policy after the Occupation. During a visit to Japan in December 1951 Senator Sparkman announced that 'any agreement between Tokyo and Peking would seriously endanger the Senate's ratification of the San Francisco Pacts'. Dulles later came to Tokyo to discuss China policy with Yoshida, after which the Japanese Prime Minister announced his decision to conclude a treaty with Taipei. This Treaty, 'applicable [in respect of the Republic of China] to all the territories which are now, or which may be hereafter, under the control of its Government', was signed on 28 April 1952. See Lewe Van Aduard, Japan From Surrender to Peace (with a forward by John Foster Dulles), (Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), p.248. Yoshida later revealed both his unhappiness at the necessity for a decision and his strong feeling of obligation towards Chiang Kai Shek. See Fukui Haruhiro, Party in Power: the Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy Making, (Australian National University Press, 1970), pp.236-237.
The Russians remained in Japan, ignored and without legal status, for many months after the Allied Council was dissolved. They maintained a regular Embassy, complete with a red flag and a score of officials, but were shunned by the Japanese Government and barred from the diplomatic life of the capital. General Mark W. Clark believed these fifteen or twenty Russians directed the policies of Japan's 'well organised Communist minority'. He recalls that 'the Russians went nowhere openly, but moved about the city like conspirators, furtively, secretly'. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, (George G. Harrap 1954), pp.132-133.

Discussions of the importance of Japanese bases in American Far Eastern strategy are to be found in Kyokutō no Kiki to Beigun Kichi (Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1969); Shiomi Toshitaka, Yamada Akira, Hayashi Shigeo (editors), Ampo Kokusho (Rōdō Junpō Sha, 1969), p.109 ff; and in Nihon Heiwa Iinkai (ed.), Nihon no Kokusho (Rōdō Junpō Sha, 1967). All three works concentrate on the 1960s, but there are occasional references to earlier developments. The Mainichi Shimbun's volume is a popular journalistic survey. The Nihon Heiwa Iinkai (Japan Peace Committee)'s work is especially valuable, being a detailed compilation of available information and current speculation on the role of individual American bases. It is, of course, written from a strongly anti-Treaty, anti-base position. Most Japanese writings on American bases concentrate on their alleged unconstitutionality, their roles as public nuisances and the social and political implications of the anti-base struggle. A good example of the latter approach is Aoshima Shōsuke and Nobuta Chūji, Kichi Tōsō Shi, (Shakai Shimpō, 1969).

The view that American policies were imposed directly on Japan is common among Japanese opponents of the Treaty. It is frequently expressed in the context of a general theory about the origins of Cold War. Thus the socialist historian Koyama Kōken sees the unconditional surrender as having accomplished America's aim of eliminating her imperialist rivals and establishing her military and economic supremacy in the Pacific. America's next task was to encircle the Socialist camp and prevent the spread of national liberation movements. For this Japanese bases were of immense strategic importance. 'Before the United States had even begun the Occupation of Japan she had decided to use Japan's entire territory as a forward base for a future Soviet American war'. The Yoshida Government was merely America's obedient instrument. (Koyama Kōken, Ampo Jōyaku Ronsō Shi, (Shakai Shinpō, 1969), p.14.) In an inverted form, this thesis is also adopted by some American writers. Dunn, for example, while recognising Yoshida to have been 'generally quite pro-American', gives the Japanese no active part in the decisions that led to the Treaty. Until he was finally persuaded by Dulles in 1951, Yoshida is seen as having had 'no concrete program' and being 'unwilling to commit himself on bases'. (Frederick S. Dunn, Peace Making and the Settlement with Japan, (Princeton University Press, 1963), p.104).

Miyazawa Kichí, a close associate of Yoshida who was directly involved in the early negotiations, believed the Treaty to have been an American response to Japanese requests. See Miyazawa Kichí, "Ampo Jōyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu", Chuō Kōron, May, 1957, p.67 ff.

See the comments of Robert Murphy who, as a member of the Allied Control Council in Berlin and later America's first post-Occupation Ambassador to Japan, was in a position to compare the two situations. (Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, (Collins, 1964, p.419.) See also W. MacMahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally? (Cassell and Company, 1948), p.16 ff. MacMahon Ball represented jointly Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom on the Allied Council for Japan, 1946-47 and for a time was concurrently Head of the Australian Mission in Tokyo. He found very few opportunities to influence or even, at times, to discern the direction of American policies.

See Koyama Kōken, op.cit., p.11ff. Also Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, Fujiwara Akira, Shōwa Shi (New Edition), (Iwanami Shoten, 1967), p.270ff and two historic studies published under the auspices of the Japan Communist Party, Kawabata Osamu, Ampo Jōyakuka no Nihon, (Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1969), p.104ff, and Katō Bunzo, Nishimura Hanko, Yoneda Sayoko, Satō Nobuō, Yashiro Kazuya and Honda Kimie, Nihon Shi (Volume 3), (Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1969) p.207ff. It is perhaps natural that Marxist writers should take a mechanistic attitude to decision making. What is surprising is that few conservative writers, even those who, like Miyazawa Kiichi, were actual parties to the negotiations, understood the complexity of American decision making.

Truman's letter to Byrnes on 5 January 1946, declaring that '...Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making ... we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific ... I'm tired of babying the Soviets,' seems of great significance in the light of developments after mid-1949. (David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, (Penguin 1967), p.59.) There is no doubt that ideas of this kind were afloat at an early date. The problem is, however, to decide when such ideas came to determine policy. As it stands, this letter reveals more about Truman's political pathology than about American policy towards Japan in 1946-47. It can be regarded on the same level as the Kaiser's famous marginal notes on dipomatic correspondence.

Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953, (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), p.111ff. The Truman Doctrine was announced before a joint session of Congress in the context of a request for aid for Greece and Turkey, two nations threatened, it was claimed, with conquest by the forces of Soviet imperialism. Truman's request was made in terms of general principles: the struggle about to begin was not confined to Greece and Turkey but embraced the entire globe; all nations were faced with a choice between two ways of life, between freedom and tyranny, democracy and totalitarianism. It was 'the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures'.

Over eighteen months after the Truman Doctrine Secretary of State Marshall wrote to the American Ambassador in Nanking that: ...
The United States Government must be exceedingly careful that it does not become committed to a policy involving the absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent as would be the case if the obligations are assumed of a direct responsibility for the conduct of the civil war in China or for the Chinese economy or both .... It would be impossible to estimate the final cost of a course of action of this magnitude .... It would involve the United States Government in a continuing commitment from which it would be practically impossible to withdraw, and it would probably involve grave consequences to this nation by making of China an arena of international conflict. Present developments make it unlikely that any amount of United States military or economic aid could make the present Chinese Government capable of re-establishing and then maintaining its control throughout all China. The China White Paper, Volume I, (Stanford University Press, 1967), p.281.

General Wedemeyer commented towards the end of the war that 'conditions here could best be handled by a benevolent despot or a military dictator, whether such a dictator be a Communist or a Kuomintang matters very little'. (Truman, II, op.cit., p.67.) On 28 October 1948 the American Ambassador in Nanking wrote to Marshall that 'what we really object to in Communism is not its admittedly socialist reforms but its intolerance .... Evil in Communism is moral or political rather than military.... (The China White Paper, I, op.cit., p.286.)

Which were, of course, the chief theatres of the Cold War during these years. The Truman Doctrine, despite its universality, was formulated in the context of military aid to Greece and Turkey. The Communists gained complete control of Hungary shortly after Truman's speech. The summer and autumn of 1947 saw both the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of Cominform. The Czechoslovakian coup occurred in February 1948 and the long Berlin Blockade (June 1948 - May 1949) preceded the formation of NATO. In the Far East, the Russians maintained formal relations with the Kuomintang until the summer of 1949, gravely underestimating the strength of the Chinese Communists. Mao Tse Tung's victory probably came as a greater surprise to Moscow than Washington. See Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951, (Oxford University Press, 1953), Chapters II, III and IV.

This is not the view of many Japanese historians, who give more weight to America's changing strategic priorities. See Yanaihara Tadao (editor), Sengo Nihon Shōshi, (Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1960), Volume II, p.383ff, and Katō Bunzō, et.al., op.cit., p.184. From February 1947, when MacArthur invoked the threat of armed force to prevent a railway strike, until the summer of 1950 when he ordered a purge of left wing leaders, the Occupation grew increasingly hostile to the demands of
organised labor. At the same time the United States reversed its original policy towards the Zaibatsu, ultimately dissolving about 9 of the 1200 corporations designated in the December 1947 'Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power'. After the summer of 1949, global Cold War strategy probably played a central role in Occupation political and economic decisions. Whether this was entirely so before is doubtful. It was frequently claimed that the Occupation cost the United States 'a million dollars a day'. The amount of economic aid extended to Japan had escalated from 108 million dollars in 1945–1946 to 357 million dollars in 1947–1948. This quite apart from the military expenses of the Occupation. There were growing demands in Congress that these figures be drastically reduced.

It was argued that many Occupation reforms, although favourable to the growth of democracy, impeded economic recovery. Zaibatsu dissolution was seen in Washington as a prelude to Japanese economic paralysis and an intolerable increase in the American aid burden.

The degree to which the so-called 'reverse course' was unrelated to Cold War strategy is shown by the fact that the Secretary for the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, whose 1949 statement that Japan was indefensible and should be abandoned caused such uproar, 'hit the ceiling' in 1947 when he heard about the plans to dissolve the Zaibatsu. (Lewe Van Aduard, op.cit., p.85ff.) MacArthur, significantly, describes his action against the unions in the following terms:

I did not want to stand in the way of newly organised labourers attempting to assert their rights, but I was not going to let a few communist leaders use the strike as a political weapon and in so doing wreck the whole economy.


MacMahon Ball remarked that 'General MacArthur's purpose in directing reform measures seems to spring mainly from the desire to eliminate those features of Japan's economy that are inconsistent with the philosophy of American individualism. He tends to equate what is unAmerican and what is undemocratic'. (MacMahon Ball, op.cit., p.154.) MacMahon Ball also recalls that there was 'a good deal of difference of opinion' on Zaibatsu dissolution 'before the surrender', with one school of thought portraying the corporations as the pillars of the economy and bulwarks of moderate, anti-militarist conservatism. He concludes that the change in American policy was 'largely due to a clearer perception of the real difficulties in the way of carrying out the original programme' and to ensure Japanese economic stability 'in the light of the international situation'. (Ibid., p.145ff.)

Robert Textor, a former civilian Occupation official, believes that the 1947 reversal of economic and labour policy was due to the machinations of the strongly entrenched Zaibatsu group, pressure from sympathetic American big business and those who gave first priority 'to get Japan off the backs of the American taxpayer'. He does not see the reverse course in the light of the Cold War. (Robert B. Textor, Failure in Japan, (The John Day Company, 1951), p.48ff.)

27 Dunn, op.cit., Chapter II.

Radioed to General MacArthur on 29 August 1945, the day before his arrival in Tokyo. (Dunn, op.cit., p.57-58.)

The members of the Far Eastern Commission were Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Burma and Pakistan later joined the Commission. The body had very little actual power but the fact that the United States associated itself with this decision is significant. (Lewe Van Aduard, op.cit., Appendix I.)


New York Times, 30 May 1950. MacArthur had first enunciated his views in an interview with G. Ward Price, the London Daily Mail correspondent in Tokyo, on 2 March 1949. In his talk with Sulzberger MacArthur stressed that he was talking 'in long range terms'. In the 'immediate future' the United States might be obliged to protect Japan and maintain bases on her territory. MacArthur's conversion to this idea must have been a recent one, since three weeks earlier he had told a group of visiting Australian correspondents that

...he did not anticipate any Japanese rearmament after the peace treaty was signed, and believed Japan should remain neutral in any future war, filling the same role that Switzerland and Sweden had played in Europe. The General said there was not the slightest ground for the suspicion that the United States wanted to build up Japan so she could be an ally in any future war against the Soviet.

(Canberra Times, 8 May 1950.)

Dunn, op.cit., p.58

Ibid., p.59

Dunn refers to a 'widely circulated Navy Department memorandum advocating a base at Yokosuka but gives no date for this document. Ibid. p.56.

Lewe Van Aduard, op.cit., pp102,103,104. Royall had been accompanied to Japan by General Wedemeyer and the Special Financial Adviser to SCAP Mr Dodge. The mission was among the most prestigious to be sent to Japan since the surrender.

Dunn, op.cit., p.86ff.

There is, of course, very little evidence on trends in Pentagon thinking.

For example of the kind of activities in which the Central Liaison Office was engaged, see Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., pp.57,149,152.


This was more true of Yoshida's Liberal Party than of the Progressives (Democrats). Early in 1947 the Progressive Party, which had been founded by somewhat disparate groups of prewar politicians in 1945, split into two rival factions, the Taiyō Kai and the Shinshin Kai. The former group embodied the ideals of traditional conservatism and pressed for union with the Liberals against the Socialists and Communists. The latter group espoused an economic philosophy in some ways akin to the right wing Socialists and also contained a strong "nationalist" strain. It consistently opposed union with the Liberals. A split took place in the spring of 1949, as a result of which some of the right wing group joined the Liberals. Nevertheless, even in the Progressive Party, factions activity was at a low ebb during this period. (Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.41ff.)


For an interesting discussion of Yoshida's public life and views see Kōsaka Masataka, "Saishō Yoshida Shigeru Ron", Chūō Köron, Yoshida's own memoirs are, of course, invaluable as a source of information and comment.


Ibid., p.15

Ibid., p.16ff.

Ibid., p.24ff.

Ibid., p.8.

Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., especially chapters 22 and 23. Yoshida considered the Occupation release of Communist political prisoners to have been a 'tragic mistake'. In 1945 he urged Hatoyama to make anti-Communism one of the 'chief features' of the new Liberal Party, since 'Communism was going to pose problems everywhere, both in Japan and in the world at large...' (Ibid., p.164.)

Ibid., pp.8, 52-53, 56-57, 81, 111-112, 115, 175 and generally throughout his memoirs. According to Yoshida, Japanese neutrality was impossible because 'events in the East European satellite states of the Soviet Union have demonstrated conclusively that the independence of a country provides no sure shield before an invasion by powerfully armed foreign forces'. Yoshida was alarmed by Soviet attempts to gain a sphere of influence in Hokkaidō and by Soviet activities on
the Occupation Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission. He believed
the Japanese Communist Party was controlled directly from Moscow and
that left wing school teachers 'desired a revolution along the lines
of the Russian revolution of 1917'. On his visit to Italy in 1954
he found himself 'in complete agreement with the Italian leaders over
the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the enigmatic
Soviet Union'. In contrast, Yoshida's attitude to China was characterised
by aloofness rather than fear or hostility, although he does refer,
in passing, to the Tibetan affair. He believed, however, that Communist
China 'need not be Communist'. (p.286). Yet independent efforts
to bridge the gap between Moscow and Washington, were frowned upon
because 'it was only natural that Soviet Russia should seek to entice
other free countries away from America - and unthinkable that free
countries should permit such a manoeuvre to succeed'. (p.112).

See note 52 above. In general, Yoshida believed that Japanese policy
towards the 'third world' should be based on recognition of 'the
differences existing today between the position of Japan and most of
the newly established nations of Asia'. He emphasised that other
Asian countries

...are what we are forced to recognise as backward
nations, which as yet have little to do with
international economic relations.... We can both
understand and sympathize with their present
policies, but that is not to say we should rate
them as being more important - internationally -
than they actually are, and still less than Japan
should model its foreign policy on their largely
negative philosophy.

Ibid., p.10-11. He naturally confined his foreign travel almost
exclusively to Europe and America.

He professed to believe that it was 'the extremist
minority among them which finally brought both them and the entire
Japanese people into a disastrous war'. (Ibid., p.224.)

To me, the idea of rearmament has always seemed
to be one verging on idiocy. A nation such as
the United States may possess sufficient arms
and equipment to call herself armed, but this is
made possible by the untold wealth of the
American people....For Japan to attempt anything
which could be considered as rearmament, even
on the smaller scale warranted by the differences
in national wealth...between our two countries,
is completely out of the question....The necessary
wealth is lacking, and, even more than wealth,
the necessary psychological background, which is the
desire of the people to rearm, is just not there.
The miseries and destruction of the Pacific War
are still actualities for a large majority of
the Japanese people; they remember only too vividly what war is like and they want none of it again.

(Ibid., pp.191-192.) Yoshida's close associate Miyazawa Kiichi recalls that Mr Yoshida was generally very lukewarm on the question of defence. In his view Japan could not really defend herself until she had recovered from the scars inflicted by the defeat. My experience was that he consistently believed that the people did not desire it and that the nation's economic strength could not support it. At the 1951 Peace Conference and when we went to America for talks with President Eisenhower in 1954, Mr Yoshida often said to me, half jokingly, 'The argument that we should revise the constitution and rearm is madness. Possession of armaments would not bring the slightest advantage to Japan. It is because of Article 9 that we can employ American troops (to defend us)', or word to that effect.

(Miyazawa Kiichi, "Ampo Jöyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu", op.cit., p. 71-72.)

58 Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.263. This is corroborated by the testimony of Okazaki Katsuo, Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry at the time of the Katayama Cabinet and later Foreign Minister under Yoshida, before the Commission on the Constitution, 6 May 1959. (Kenpö Chösa Kai, Dai San Iinkai, Dai Sanjukkai Sōkai Gijiroku, p.2-3.)

59 Ibid., p.3. See also Weinstein, op.cit., pp.19-20.

60 Kenpö Chösa Kai, op.cit. p.3.

61 For Ashida Hitoshi's views, see his 'Jiei Busö Ron', Daiamondo, 1 February 1951 and the various other writing referred to below.

62 The fact that Chinese and Russian activities in Korea provoked Japanese intervention and led directly to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars is a constantly recurring theme in Ashida's writings. So too is the view that the Korean War placed Japan in a 'more dangerous' situation than either of these earlier conflicts. The overthrow of South Korea, he believed, would lead directly to armed Communist attack and domestic revolution in Japan. ('Jiei Busö Ron', p.386). Weinstein maintains Yoshida's position was the same but gives no evidence to support this view. (Weinstein, op.cit., p.55-56.)

63 The authorities in charge of SCAP purges made the following report on Ashida:

Review of the Japan Times and Mail between July,1937 and January, 1940 reveals that Ashida Hitoshi [President of the newspaper from 1933-1940] is subject to removal from public office and exclusion from government service as an undesirable person....However much or however little the Foreign Office
imposed its views upon the Times and Mail, Ashida as principal official of that newspaper must bear partial or full responsibility for an editorial policy which consistently and enthusiastically supported the government's program of naked aggression and ruthless exploitation in Asia, assumed a bellicose and threatening attitude towards the Western powers, dutifully reported the distortions and falsehoods of Nazi propagandists and by glorifying militarism assisted in the creation of a war psychology among its readers....

(Baerwald, op.cit., pp.95-96.) Abundant evidence to support these contentions was supplied. Ashida managed to escape the purge because his conversion to democracy seemed sincere and because it was felt that without his support the Progressive Party could never have revived as a conservative opposition.

64 Ashida Hitoshi, 'Jiyū to Heiwa no tame no Tataki', Bungei Shunjū, March 1951, p.33.

65 Ibid., p.33. See also Ashida's 'Eisei Chūritsu Fukanō Ron', Bungei Shunjū, (Kinkyū Zōkan 1950) p.4 for his views on Stalin's use of Asian Communist movements. The importance of Japan in Russian strategy is discussed in 'Jiei Busō Ron', Daiamondo, 1 February 1951, p.387.

66 Ashida Hitoshi, 'Jiyū to Heiwa no tame no Tataki', p.35. See also his article in Mainichi Shimbun, 14 January 1951.

67 'Jiyū to Heiwa no tame no Tataki', p.34.

68 This is a constant theme in all the articles referred to above.

69 Weinstein, op.cit., p.21. The Socialist component in the coalition was in a weak position from the beginning. In the 1947 General Elections the Socialists, while emerging as the largest single party with 143 seats in the House of Representatives (in contrast to the Liberal's 132 and the Democratic Party's 126), failed to gain an absolute majority. As the price for a coalition, Ashida insisted on exclusion of left wing socialists from the Cabinet and six Cabinet posts (including the Treasury, Foreign Affairs, Welfare and Transport) for his own Democrats (compared with the Socialist's seven posts). See Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.85ff and also Koyama Kōken and Shimizu Shinzō, Nihon Shakai Tō Shi (Hōga Shoten, 1965) p.50ff.

70 Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit. p.3. For details of the memorandum see Okazaki's reply to Nakasone, p.23.

71 Weinstein claims Katayama was consulted but gives no evidence. Okazaki, when questioned on this point by Nakasone at the Commission on the Constitution hearings could only reply that he 'did not know whether the Prime Minister's co-operation or approval had been obtained'. He thought that Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, who knew
of Ashida's plans, might have spoken to Katayama, but stressed that this was pure speculation. (Ibid., p.24.) Okazaki himself was certainly consulted and Suzuki's revelations to Weinstein about Yoshida's role may be regarded as reliable. (Weinstein, op.cit., p.22).

72 Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.3.

73 One copy of the memorandum, for example, was given to the Australian Minister for External Affairs Dr Evatt when he visited Japan later in the year. Ibid., p.3.

74 See Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.265. The contents of the memorandum were elucidated by Okazaki in his testimony before the Commission on the Constitution. See Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.4. See also Weinstein, op.cit., p.25.

75 Mr Suzuki Tadakatsu, later Ambassador to Australia.

76 Weinstein, op.cit., p.25.

77 Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.265. Yoshida's claim that there were 'no further developments' until January 1951 is, of course, quite untrue.

78 Dunn, op.cit., p.82.

79 The increasing influence of Kennan's views was reflected in the November 1948 National Security Council decision to strengthen Japan economically and socially so that it would be 'friendly to the United States' after the peace settlement. This decision seems to have been based on Cold War assumptions. Dunn regards it as 'the turning point in America's post-war policy toward Japan'. However, Dunn's account of the details of the decision reveals no American interest in a security treaty with the Japanese. (Ibid., p.77.) It must be assumed that this decision was made later.

80 MacMahon Ball wrote in 1948 that

...it is a mistake to argue from the kindness and charm of the individual Japanese to the peacefulness and friendliness of the Japanese nation as politically organised. I was one of those people who nearly fell into that kind of error in Germany after World War I....In my view, the people who, within the limits of the Occupation, rule Japan today, belong to the same groups and retain the same outlook as those who ruled Japan before 1941....Our first task... is to resolve at all costs to prevent the resurgence of an expansionist Japan.

81 Dunn, *op.cit.*, p.83.


83 *Ibid.*, p.85ff. This is corroborated, from the Japanese side, by Miyazawa Kiichi, *'(Ampo Jöyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu', p.68) and by former Head of the Foreign Ministry's Treaties Section, Nishimura Kumao, in his testimony before the Committee on the Constitution. Nishimura maintains that even as late as October-November 1950 Japan did not know how the American inter-departmental conflict had resolved itself.

84 See James Reston's article in the *New York Times*, 12 May 1950.


87 Miyazawa Kiichi, *'(Ampo Jöyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu', *op.cit.*, p.68.

88 Dodge was presumably chosen not only because of his previous connections with Japan but because his relationship with both the State and Defence Departments suggested a means to resolve the conflict on the question of a Japanese treaty.

89 This document throws doubt on Weinstein's hypothesis that it was the outbreak of the Korean War, together with Yoshida's view that Korea was vital to Japanese security, that prompted the Prime Minister to request American bases in, rather than around Japan. (Weinstein, *op.cit.*, p.52ff.) The phrase 'Amerika no Guntai o Nihon ni Chüton saseru Hitsuyō ga Aru' can only mean 'it is necessary to station American forces in Japan'. This was over a month before the outbreak of the Korean War, an event which caught everyone, including General MacArthur, by surprise. For the text of the document see Miyazawa Kiichi, *'(Ampo Jöyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu', *op.cit.*, p.69.


95 See James Reston's article in the *New York Times*, 18 June 1950.


97 Significantly, Dulles intended at this stage to invite both Communist China and the Taiwan régime to the Peace Conference. The two were to be given one vote each in case of disagreement and one vote collectively in case of agreement. (*Ibid.*, p.101.)
In his January 1951 New Year Message MacArthur made a strongly worded appeal for some measure of Japanese rearmament. A few days later (10 January 1951) Yoshida told a Foreign Correspondents' Club Dinner that he did not...think this is a question to be treated lightly. There are many countries abroad that fear a revival of Japanese militarism and everything possible must be done to prevent those fears from growing. (Moreover) the expenditure necessary for rearmament would defeat our plans for economic recovery.

On 25 January, the day of Dulles' arrival in Japan for the second and most important round of talks, Yoshida told both Houses of the Diet that while...

...it is only natural that Japan's safety should be secured and preserved by the strength of the people themselves, I do not take the position that this idea leads us straight to rearmament.... The debate about rearmament has already caused unnecessary suspicions in the outside world and it is, moreover, clear that post-war Japan cannot support the burden of great armaments. A nation's independence and security is not a question of arms and military strength'.

For the full text of MacArthur's speech see the 1955 ホイニンカン, p.16. Extracts from Yoshida's speech and the Foreign Correspondent Club appear on p.28 and his Diet speech is given on p.18.

Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.12. Nishimura Kumao's testimony. See also Weinstein's discussion based on an interview with Nishimura in March, 1968. (Weinstein, op.cit., p.55ff.) Weinstein's talks with Nishimura appear to have given him the impression that Yoshida wanted American bases in Japan to protect Japanese security interests in South Korea. The lack of evidence for Yoshida's alleged interest in Korea has already been noted. It should also be pointed out that in his testimony before the Committee on the Constitution, Nishimura did not mention concern over Korea, as a factor influencing either the original concept of the Security Treaty or the subsequent negotiations. Perhaps Yoshida later confided his secret motives to Nishimura, who felt free to reveal them to Weinstein after the former Prime Minister's death in 1967. Perhaps Nishimura was projecting his own views onto the Prime Minister. Yet it should be recalled that Weinstein's interview with Nishimura took place against the background
of the Okinawa negotiations, at a time when it was important to show Washington that Japan was not oblivious to the security of America's other Asian allies, in particular South Korea. It should also be remembered that Weinstein was then the only American scholar working on Japanese defence problems, and that his publications would probably, therefore, be referred to by the occasional senator.

106 Weinstein, op.cit., p.53.


108 This is certainly the impression Nishimura gave the Committee on the Constitution.

At the time, the Prime Minister often said that when we began negotiations on the Peace Treaty the Americans would undoubtedly come demanding [Japanese] rearmament. He himself would take the line that rearmament was impossible. The Americans would then undoubtedly ask whether, in the present international situation, Japan was confident of preserving her security and by what means she hoped to preserve it without rearming. At that point, he said, he would produce the first or the second plan, depending on the situation.... After the negotiations began, the reasons for the Japanese [side] producing the first treaty plan were extremely simple...the American forcefully explained the necessity of rearmament, the Japanese maintained to the last that rearmament was impossible. We moved along parallel lines. Finally, the Japanese side presented the first plan as a means of preserving security without rearmament.

(Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., pp.13-14.) The Japanese clearly saw the two plans in the context of their negotiations with the United States, not in the context of the general Far Eastern situation. See also Nishimura Kumao, 'San Furanshisuko no Omoide', Chūō Kōron, May 1957.

109 Weinstein, op.cit., p.58. It is difficult to determine the number of meetings from Nishimura's testimony before the Committee on the Constitution and from his other accounts.

110 Ibid., p.62. See also Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.13.

111 See chapter 4.

112 Kenpō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.15 and Nishimura Kumao, op.cit., p.76.

113 Weinstein, op.cit., p.59.


115 This was revealed by Yoshida in an NHK television interview on 29 August 1965. See Weinstein, op.cit., p.61.

This is, at least, the impression one has from Nishimura's account. Nishimura Kumao, op.cit., p.76.

Ibid., p.76.

A summary of Dulles' speech given in the 1955 Bōei Nenkan, p.20.

Nishimura Kumao, op.cit., p.76.


Nishimura Kumao, op.cit., p.76. See also Nishimura's testimony before the Committee on the Constitution in Kempō Chōsa Kai, op.cit., p.15 and Yoshida's own account, (Yoshida, op.cit., pp.266-267.)

The Vandenberg resolution had been adopted as the basis for American participation in NATO.


Ibid., p.263.


Lewe Van Aduard, op.cit., p.91.


Pravda, 27 August 1963.

See Matsumura's articles in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 May 1964, (evening edition) and in the Mainichi Shimbun 3 January 1963, for two eloquent statements of his beliefs. Matsumura was a student of Chinese literature at Waseda University and later a confident of the Minseitō China specialist Nagai Ryūnosuke. His first of many visits to China was made in 1904. He has had a long personal acquaintance with several Chinese Communist leaders. (See Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.248.)
The first Japanese academic proponent of permanent neutrality was Professor Taoka Ryōichi, who believed that Soviet and American interest in maintaining a Pacific 'balance of power' could lead them to support the concept of a neutral Japan. Taoka considered Japanese neutrality would be advantageous to the Soviet Union but that it could only be maintained against a background of American naval and air supremacy in the Pacific. See Taoka Ryōichi, 'Nihon Shotō no Chūritsuka', Jiron, May 1949. These views are elaborated in the author's 'Eisei Chūritsu no Tachiba kata', Zenshin, September 1949; 'Eisei Chūritsu no Gendai-kei Igi', Hōritsu Taimuzu, January 1950; 'Eisei Chūritsu no Kiin', Kokusai Hō Gaiō Zasshi, 48, number 6. Taoka was particularly interested in case studies of European neutrality. His views were first attacked by Professor Yokota Kisaburō, who remained, for many months, the only academic opponent of neutrality in Japan. Yokota believed the Cold War made guarantees of Japan's security on the part of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States impossible. 'Neutralism, moreover, was merely a historical legacy from the 19th century and therefore 'inappropriate' to the present age. It was also rare for Great Powers to respect neutrality in wartime. Yokota saw the solution to Japan's dilemma in collective security. See Yokota Kisaburō, 'Eisei Chūritsu o Hihan Suru', Zenshin, July 1949. The Taoka-Yokota debate touched off a wide ranging controversy to which academics, government officials, former diplomats and military men contributed.

In view of the bulk of literature on the subject it is impossible to give detailed statistics to demonstrate this. No one, however, can leaf through the major monthly magazines without being made acutely aware of the balance of forces.

This was Professor Taoka's position. See also Tanaka Shinjirō (of the Asahi Shimbun editorial staff), 'Nihon wa ikani shite Sensō no Kengai ni tachiuru ka - Nihon no Eisei Chūritsu ni Kanren shite', Sekai Hyōron, June 1949. Tsunetō Hiroshi, 'Tai-Nichi Kōwa no Hōshiki to Anzen Hoshō no Keitai', Sekai, April 1950. Tsunetō believed contemporary Russo-American tension was similar to Anglo-German tension prior to World War I, Japan's position resembling that of Belgium rather than Switzerland. Just as German violation of Belgian neutrality was the cause of British entry into the war and so, ultimately, of Germany's defeat, so too a violation of future Japanese neutrality would provoke world wide reaction. This itself would act as a deterrent. Ryū Shintarō ('Chūritsu Taisei e no Michi', Bungei Shunju, January 1950) also saw similarities between the position of...
Sweden and Switzerland in Europe and Japan in Asia. He stressed, however, that the permanent neutrality of these countries was not a geographical and historical accident, but the result of continued efforts on the part of their governments and peoples.

This was, of course, a very common view. See for example, Shimizu Ikutaro, 'Sensō to Heiwa no Risō to Genjitsu' Sekai, April 1954. The same view, interestingly enough, seems to have been held by a former Head of the Foreign Ministry's Treaties Sections, Hagiwara Tōru, who also took an anti-Security Treaty position. See Hagiwara Tōru, 'Shūdan Hoshō ka Eisei Chūritsu ka', Chuō Kōron, August 1949.

These views were embodied in the successive statements issued by the Peace Problems Discussion Council. For a concrete analysis of the problems involved see Tsuru Shigeto, Futatsu no Sekai to Nihon, (Wakō Sha, 1953). Professor Tsuru was a prominent member of the Council and later wrote extensively on military and diplomatic problems.

For a comprehensive discussion of this literature up to the autumn of 1951 see Terasawa Hajime, 'Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru Zasshi Rancho', Kokusai Ho Gaiko Zasshi, 51.1. See also Hidaka Rokurō's recollections of the early period of the anti-Treaty movement in 'Gensoku to shite no Chūritsu', Sekai, October 1965.

There was however much criticism of America's global policies, especially her attitude to national liberation movements and Socialist parties in the Third World. See Shimizu Ikutaro, 'Watakushitachi ni mo Nanigoto ka wa Nashiuru', Sekai, June 1953. Also Tsuru Shigeto, op. cit.

This was particularly true of the writings of Tsuji Masanobu, a pan-Asianist ex-Colonel who flung himself into Conservative politics after his return to Japan from South East Asia at the end of the Occupation. See his Jiei Chūritsu (Atō Shobo, 1952).

See for example, Kase Toshikazu 'Chūritsu no Kanōsei ga nakereba', Chuō Kōron, April 1950; Nomura Kichisaburō, 'Nihon wa dō naru – Kowa Jōyaku ni yori Shin no Dokuritsu Koku to naru ka', Chuō Kōron, November 1949; Ichikawa Tsunezō, 'Anzen Hoshō no Genjitsuteki Hoto', Kaizō, May 1950; Koizumi Shinzō, 'Heiwa Ron', Bungei Shunjū, January 1952; and the same authors 'Watakushi no Heiwa Ron ni tsuite', Sekai, May 1952. Kase and Nomura, while strongly anti-Communist, attempted to demonstrate the strategic and economic impossibility of Japanese neutralism. Koizumi and, to a lesser extent Ichikawa, were preoccupied with the horrors of Communism and the devious international conduct of the Russians. Koizumi believed Americans were more moral than Russians, having a greater regard for human life.

For example Koizumi Shinzō, sometime President of Keio University, was an Adviser to the Imperial Household Agency; Nomura Kichisaburō was a former Admiral and Ambassador to the United States; Kase Toshikazu a former diplomat; Ichikawa Tsunezō, at the time of writing, was Deputy Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun's Political Section.
The writer was provided with details of this poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun staff; questionnaires were sent to 3,500 respondents throughout Japan, and 3,320 replies were received.

Details of this poll were also furnished by the Yomiuri Shimbun. Respondents were also asked which country they believed to be most powerful: 40.4% mentioned America, only 27.2% were willing to put their money on the Soviet Union. Only 10.8% believed the Soviet Union would be stronger than America in the future.

The Yomiuri Shimbun also furnished details of this poll.

Mainichi Shimbun, 21 November 1949.

Mainichi Shimbun, 3 September 1950.

This question is discussed briefly in Kösaka Masataka, 'Ka iyō Kokka Nihon no Kōsō', Chūō Kōron, September 1964.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1 According to the provisions of Article 5 Clause 13 of the Defence Agency Establishment Law (Böei Chö Setchi Hô) the Defence Agency (Böei Cho) was empowered to 'take action to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression, to protect Japan's peace and independence and to preserve national security'. Clause 14 empowered the Agency to 'take action, in cases of special necessity, to preserve the public peace'. (Böeichö Setchi Hô; Law 164; promulgated 9 June 1954; Article 5, Clauses 13,14). Similarly Article 3 of the Self Defence Forces Law (Jieitai Hô) defined the 'principal mission' of the forces as the 'defence of Japan against direct and indirect aggression'. In addition they were empowered to 'preserve the public peace' 'where necessary'. (Jieitai Hô; Law 165; promulgated 9 June 1954; Article 3).


3 The resolution read:
   On the occasion of the establishment of the Self Defence Forces, this House, in view of the provisions of the present Constitution and the ardent love of the Japanese people for peace [Waga Kokumin no Shiretsu Naru Heiwa Aikõ Seishin ni Terashi], strongly affirms [Sara ni Aratamete Kakunin Suru] that the forces will not be sent overseas [Kaigai Shutsudô wa kore o Okonawanai Koto]. Kampô, (Dai Jükyü Kai Kokkai, Sangiin Kaigiroku, Dai Gojüshichi Gô, 2 June 1954), p.35ff.

4 Article 62 of the Defence Agency Establishment Law established the National Defence Council as 'an organ for deliberating important matters relating to national defence'. The Prime Minister was required to consult the Council on basic defence policy, defence planning, questions relating to defence industries and on mobilisation. He was not necessarily obliged to follow its recommendations. The separate Law Concerning the Structure of the National Defence Council (Kokubô Kaigi no Kôsei-tô ni kansuru Hôritsu; Law 166, promulgated 2 July 1956) stipulated, rather incongruously, that the Council was to be chaired by the Prime Minister and made up of the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Defence Agency Director General and the Director of the Economic Planning Agency. When necessary other Cabinet members and the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council could be invited to express their views. For a detailed discussion of the Defence Agency and the National Defence Council see Chapter 8.

5 Article 25 of the Defence Agency Establishment Law stipulated that the Joint Staff Council could merely 'assist' (hosa suru) the Defence Agency Director General in defence planning and other matters. See Chapter 8.
Except in 'especially urgent' circumstances, Diet approval was to be obtained before mobilisation. If the Prime Minister mobilised, then subsequently failed to obtain Diet support, he was required to order recall of the forces. (Self Defence Forces Law, Article 76.)

This section closely follows the account given in D.C.S. Sissons, 'The Pacifist Clause in the Japanese Constitution', International Affairs (Volume 37, No.1, January 1961), to whom the writer is indebted for introducing the problem.

Detailed discussion of popular attitudes to the Constitution lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, some newspaper polls taken during the 1960s showed an increasingly large majority opposed to revision of the pacifist clause. See Kawaguchi Kunihiko in Nanajū Nen Anpo no Shin Tenkai (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1969), p.303 and also Chapter 8 of the present work.

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session; Part I, p.223. See Sissons, op.cit., p.46.

For an interesting account of Baron Shidehara's views and public life, see Shidehara Kijūrō, (Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan Ed., 1955), especially Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.


Article 6 of the Potsdam Declaration stated:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.


Part III of the Basic Post Surrender Policy Directive for Japan stipulated that:

Japan is not to have any Army, Navy, Airforce, Secret Police Organisation, or any Civil Aviation, or Gendarmerie, but may have adequate Civilian Police Forces.

(See Lewe Van Aduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1953) Appendix I.

25

15 Ibid., p.183.


18 Sissons, op.cit., p.47.

19 Ibid., p.48.

20 Ibid., p.48.

21 W. MacMahon Ball, Japan Enemy or Ally (Cassell and Company Ltd., 1948), p.126.

22 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, op.cit., p.305.

23 Ibid., p.305-6, p.1090-1094.

24 Ibid., p. 1090.

25 Ibid., p.1092.


The proposal that Japan should rearm was first advanced in earnest immediately before the outbreak of the Korean War...I objected to the suggestion for reasons already outlined...Soon after this decision the Japanese Government received General MacArthur's directive to establish a National Police Reserve...and thus the first step towards the provision of some means of defence for Japan by the Japanese was taken at the instance of the Occupation authorities. [italics my own].

(Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.192.)


28 How closely the Japanese followed SCAP's directives can be judged from the account given by Masuhara Keikichi, the first Director General of Police Reserve Headquarters. The Government was at first unaware of what MacArthur had in mind but received detailed instructions from SCAP on the organisation of the new force and its relation to the existing police forces. See Masuhara Keikichi, 'Jieitai no Enkaku to Nihon no Anzen', in Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo , Kaijima Kenkyūjo Hen, Kaijima Kenkyūjo Shuppan Kai, 1964), p.405.
Prime Minister Yoshida was apt to attribute most of the ills of post-war Japan to the activities of professional Communist agitators, either working in conjunction with radical elements in SCAP or taking orders from Moscow. He believed that the zeal of the Occupation was never more apparent than in connection with this question of the liberation of the nation's workers. And the evil effects of that fact are still being felt in my country today.

(Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.211). He develops his views at length in Chapters 21, 22 and 23 of his memoirs.

Yoshida believed General Derevanko took 'a certain part in directing the activities of the Japanese Communist Party'. (Ibid., p.56.) He did not consider, however, that the General accomplished much. General Mark Clark, on the other hand, believed the Soviet mission in Tokyo to wield much greater and more sinister power. See Chapter 1, note 14 of the present thesis.

For a good brief discussion of the prewar police system and Occupation reforms, see Kawai Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude, (University of Chicago Press, 1960) p.107ff.

For Yoshida's views on Occupation police reform see Chapter 17 of his memoirs, p.176ff.


the subsequent changes in policy. Suppression of the Party is, rather, linked to its electoral successes. (Katô Bunzo, Nishimura Hanko, Yoneda Sayoko, Sato Nobuo, Yashiro Kazuya and Honda Kimie, Nihon Shi (Volume 3), (Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1969) p.210-216.

42 Scalapino, op.cit., Chapter 3.


44 Yoshida recalls that the outbreak of war in Korea gave rise to 'fears that Communist activity in Japan would increase still more with the advance of the North Korean army into South Korea' and gave grounds for 'anxiety regarding the ability of our enfeebled police force to maintain order in the country'. (Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.180).

45 Scalapino, op.cit., p.296ff.

46 See Asahi Shimbun, 9 August 1951, for details of dispositions.


48 Ibid., p.35. See also Asahi Shimbun, 12 October, 1951.

49 According to the account of an Asahi Shimbun reporter who visited a Police Reserve Training Camp near Sendai in September 1950. See Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 1950. The Training Camp was apparently a recently vacated American army barracks and the reporter also observed that the morale of the new force was undermined by unfamiliarity with showers and western style lavatories.

50 For the text of this pledge see Böei Nenkan, 1955, p.13.

51 Masuhara Keikichi, op.cit., p.407.

52 Ibid, p.408.

53 Ibid., p.408-409. See also Asahi Shimbun, 19 October, 1950.

54 Böei Nenkan, 1955, p.11. See also Asahi Shimbun, 5 September, 10 September, 13 September 1950.

55 See Asahi Shimbun, 21 March 1951. The Government sent personal enquiries to 3,036 men recently released from the purge; of these 567 expressed interest in joining the new force and 300 were eventually selected on the basis of a written examination and interviews. More former officers entered later in the year. See Böei Nenkan, 1955, p.35.

The core of Hattori's agency was formed by a dozen or so former Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels. In addition there were estimated to be about three hundred members in the provincial chapters. Ibid., p.219.


Ibid., p.410.

Ibid., p.410-411.

See Chapter 1 of the present thesis.

It was reported that Ridgeway began requesting Yoshida to strengthen the Police Reserve as early as June 1951. See Asahi Shimbun, 4 July 1951.

There is, however, no published record of what passed between Dulles and Yoshida on this occasion.

Boei Nenkan, 1955, p.54. See also Asahi Shimbun, 6, 7, 13 January and 9 February 1952. No detailed account of the contents of the talks is available.

Boei Nenkan, 1955, p.54.

Ibid., p.54. See also Asahi Shimbun, 1 February 1952.

Boei Nenkan, 1955, p.50-54.

Ibid., p.56.

Ibid., p.54-56.

Ibid., p.57-59.

Ibid., p.57. See also Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.187-188.

Opponents of rearmament all advocated retention of the pacifist Constitution and were hostile to the view that Article 9 in fact permitted rearmament for defensive purposes. There were, however, differences of approach and emphasis. Some, like the Shidehara Cabinet's some-time Education Minister and noted philosopher Abe Yoshishige and the Christian economic historian Yanaihara Tadao, took a pure pacifist position, arguing that defeat was nobler than resort to violence. Both, however, considered it possible for a peaceful Japan to live unmolested by the great powers. (Abe Yoshishige, 'Shinzen to Fusō to Dokuritsu to', Sekai, December 1949, and 'Futatabi Heiwa e no Ketsui o Nobu', Kaizo, October 1949; Yanaihara Tadao, 'Minzoku no Kachi to Heiwa no Kachi', Sekai, January 1952).
Kuroda Hisao, the Socialist politician, lawyer and polemicist adopted the pessimistic view that Japan's fate in a future world war depended merely on how the principal contestants regarded its strategic value. Whether Japan was armed and allied or unarmed and neutral made little difference. (Kuroda Hisao, 'Busō Naki Heiwa', Kaizō, April 1951). The radical economist and one time Vice-Minister of the Economic Stabilisation Board (during the Katayama Cabinet) Tsuru Shigeto argued against the 'power vacuum' theory propounded by supporters of rearmament. (Tsuru Shigeto, 'Koizumi Hakushi no Heiwa Ron ni Tsuite', Sekai, March 1951, and 'Heiwa Ron no Zenshin no Tame ni, Kasanete Koizumi Hakushi ni Tou', Sekai, June 1952). Nakano Yoshio attempted to demonstrate that the Korean War had not been the result of a 'power vacuum' but that its cause lay deep in the nation's past. (Nakano Yoshio, 'Heiwa Ron no Ōutsu, Bungei Shunjū', March 1952). Royama Masamichi, the diplomatic historian Irie Keishirō and Nambara Minoru, the President of Tokyo University, all stressed the fears of Japan's Asian and Pacific neighbours and the dangers of latent fascism and militarism in Japanese society. (Royama Masamichi, 'Nihon no Chūritsu to Saibusō, Nihon Hyoron', September 1951; Irie Keishirō, 'Nihon no Jiriki Jiei wa Kanō ka', Sekai Shühō, 2.7.1951; Nambara Shigeru, 'Minzoku no Kiki to Shōrai', Sekai, January 1951). It could safely be said that the overwhelming majority of magazine articles on rearmament during these years opposed a military build up. The views of the small group of rearmament advocates will be examined in the next chapter. In contrast, two of the three great Tokyo newspapers adopted a very hawkish stand on rearmament. The Mainichi Shimbun began urging rearmament as early as 29 August 1950; by 16 December the Yomiuri Shimbun had taken up the cry. Only the Asahi Shimbun remained consistently opposed to rearmament.

73 Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 August 1950.

74 See Bōei Nenkan, 1955, p.45. For the views of several prominent Conservative politicians on rearmament, as presented to the public on the eve of the election, see Asahi Shimbun, 2 October 1952.

75 Asahi Shimbun, 3 October 1952.

76 Asahi Shimbun, 3 October 1952. The Party increased its representation from 67 to 85 seats.

77 Asahi Shimbun, 3 October 1952. The Right Wing Socialists increased their representation from 30 to 67 seats, the Left Wing Socialists from 16 to 54 seats. Communist representation dropped from 22 to zero seats.

78 Asahi Shimbun, 14 November 1952.

79 Asahi Shimbun, 20 November 1952.

80 Asahi Shimbun, 23 November 1952.

81 Yoshida Shigeru, op.cit., p.188.
82 Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 1953.

83 Asahi Shimbun, 28 May 1953.


85 Ibid., p.65.

86 See his answer to questions from Sugihara Aratarō as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 14 July 1953.

87 Asahi Shimbun, 17 July 1953.

88 Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1953.

89 Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 1953.


91 The fact that the two Socialist Parties were also engaged in merger negotiations added a note of anxiety.

92 Asahi Shimbun, 27, 28 September 1953.

93 Asahi Shimbun, 27 September 1953. For Shigemitsu's comments on the results of the talks see Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 1953.

94 Böei Nenkan, 1955, p.89. For a discussion of the terms on which the talks took place see Asahi Shimbun, 11, 14 November 1953.

95 For an account of Matsumura Kenzō's views on rearmament and the pacifist Constitution, see Mainichi Shimbun, 3 December 1964.

96 See Chapter 1 of the present thesis.

97 In the Liberal Party, Yoshida was strongly opposed to co-operation with the Democrats (Progressives), although on occasion he found it necessary to pay lip service to the ideal. Among the Democrats (Progressives) it was the hawkish right that aspired to union with the Liberals. The left wing was hostile to merger. Thus, if Yoshida's interest in unity were to be aroused on the one hand and the support of the Democratic (Progressive) Party left obtained on the other, Ashida and the right could not appear as extreme advocates of large scale rearmament, closer ties with United States' Asian policy and overseas service for Japan's defence force. For details of factional attitudes towards merger in both Parties see Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.46ff.
The Party platform drawn up by the Democrats (Progressives) in February 1952 referred to 'creation of a National Defence Army' and transformation of the Security Treaty into a 'mutual defence system'. (Asahi Shimbun, 8 February 1952). In the spring of 1952 a Special Committee was formed within the Party to discuss security and defence. This committee seems to have been dominated by the Ashida group. By the end of March it had formulated a plan for raising defence expenditure to 3.5 per cent of the national income, creating an army, navy, air force and home guard. The forces were to be permitted to serve abroad in United Nations peace keeping operations. The predictable reluctance of young men to enlist was to be overcome by the ingenious system of 'voluntary selection'. Village heads and town mayors were to 'voluntarily recommend' suitable young men from their localities and these youths would then be 'selected' for service. This plan, which was never adopted as official Party policy, provoked a clash between Ashida and the powerful radical factions led by Kitamura Tokutarō and Miki Takeo. (Asahi Shimbun, 21 March, 1 April 1952.) The defence plan that became official Party policy on 6 June 1952 contained no reference to overseas service in any form and also endorsed the voluntary system (Asahi Shimbun, 5, 7 June 1952). By the time the Party's Defence Sub-committee (the successor to the earlier Special Committee) met in September 1953 to discuss modifications to the National Security Agency Law further changes had taken place. The drafts for a proposed National Defence Army Organisation Law and a Defence Ministry Establishment Law drawn up by the Committee revealed the degree to which Ashida's influence had declined. After a preamble presenting Japan as a 'peaceful nation' earnestly desiring 'world peace', yet recognising the fact that the right of self defence was 'recognised throughout the world', the draft listed five principles on which national defence policy was to be based. First listed was the principle that Japanese forces could not be dispatched overseas. Second was the principle of voluntary service. Third was that the size of the force would be limited according to 'national strength'. Fourth was the principle of civilian control and the fifth principle concerned the 'spiritual education of the army'. This was a far cry from the first reports of the committee's predecessor in March 1952. (Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 1953.)}

The discussion that follows is based on analysis of the successive texts of draft laws and accompanying commentaries, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 23 November, 14 December, 15 December, 16 December, 26 December, 31 December, 1953, and 14 January, 20 January, 28 January, 2 February, 6 March, 7 March and 9 March, 1954.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1 Dōba Hajime, Nihon no Jieiryoku, Jieitai no Uchimaku, (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1963), p.120-128.

2 Ibid., p.103ff. Dōba gives the following statistics for officers sent to the United States:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ground Self Defence Forces</th>
<th>Maritime Self Defence Forces</th>
<th>Air Self Defence Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 980 | 693 | 1200 | 2873 |

3 Miyazawa Kiichi, 'Amerika no Tai-Nichi Bōei Yōsei', Sekai, July 1957, p.49. Miyazawa does not reveal the Japanese reply, if there was one. He does, however, stress Yoshida's unwillingness to undertake further military expansion.

4 Asahi Shimbun, 23 November 1952.

5 Asahi Shimbun, 24 November 1952.

6 Asahi Shimbun, 7 September 1953. The Americans seem to have been speaking only in terms of ground forces.

7 Bōei Nenkan, 1955, p.61. See also Asahi Shimbun, 6 April 1953.

8 Asahi Shimbun, 4 May 1953.

9 See Yoshida's speech as reported in Asahi Shimbun, 5 March 1953.


11 Miyazawa Kiichi, 'Amerika no Tai-Nichi Bōei Yōsei', op.cit., p.49.

12 Asahi Shimbun, 9 May 1953. It is also clear from Miyazawa's account (Ibid., Sekai, July 1957, p.49) that the Dulles announcement caught Japan by surprise.
See Uemura Kōgorō, 'MSA Kyohi wa Keizai no Hametsu', Ekonomisuto, 11 July 1953. This article had particular importance in view of Uemura Kōgorō's position as Vice-President of the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren). Business attitudes to MSA aid are discussed at length in Yanaga Chitoshi, *Big Business in Japanese Politics*, (Yale University Press, 1968) p.254ff. Yanaga appears to believe that the Government's decision to apply for MSA aid was more a result of pressure from the Japanese financial world than from the United States. The evidence advanced to support this conclusion seems, to the present writer, insufficient.

MSA aid did not become a public issue in the same way as the Security Treaty and rearmament, perhaps because it was regarded as inseparable from these two wider questions. In 1953-1954 only about 30 articles on MSA aid appeared in the major magazines, compared with over 70 on the rearmament issue. Acceptance of aid was opposed by writers such as Tsuru Shigeto and Irie Keishirō (see Chapter 2, Note 72), who argued that MSA would bind Japan more closely to America's Far Eastern policies, accelerate rearmament and facilitate United States interference in Japan's domestic affairs. See Tsuru Shigeto, 'MSA to Nihon', Sekai, August 1953; Irie Keishirō, 'MSA Enjo no Seikaku to Nihon', Chūō Kōron, July 1953.

13 See Uemura Kōgorō, 'MSA Kyohi wa Keizai no Hametsu', *Ekonomisuto*, 11 July 1953. This article had particular importance in view of Uemura Kōgorō's position as Vice-President of the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren). Business attitudes to MSA aid are discussed at length in Yanaga Chitoshi, *Big Business in Japanese Politics*, (Yale University Press, 1968) p.254ff. Yanaga appears to believe that the Government's decision to apply for MSA aid was more a result of pressure from the Japanese financial world than from the United States. The evidence advanced to support this conclusion seems, to the present writer, insufficient.

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14 *Boei Nenkan*, 1955, p.62.

15 See his remarks as reported in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1953.

16 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 May 1953.


18 On 16 June Foreign Minister Okazaki announced that acceptance of MSA aid would be desirable if it contributed to strengthening defence power and to economic development. (*Boei Nenkan*, 1955, p.63). On 20 June the Foreign Ministry, in the first issue of the magazine *Sekai to Nihon*, urged acceptance of aid on the grounds that compared to Korean War special procurements, MSA was long-term and stable. It would thus give considerable security to enterprises associated with it.

19 It is significant, however, that the Government decided to publish the text of its correspondence with the Americans. See *Asahi Shimbun* 26 June 1953. The text of the Government's enquiry and the American Embassy's reply also appears in *Boei Nenkan*, 1955, p.64.

20 The new American Ambassador Allison told a meeting of the Nichi-Bei Kyōkai on 12 June that the United States did not want to force MSA aid on Japan - the decision should be made by Japan herself. (*Asahi Shimbun*, 12 June 1953).

21 *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 June 1953.

22 See Okazaki's speech as reported in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 June 1953.

23 *Boei Nenkan*, 1955, p.65.
The MSA negotiations were extremely involved, touching on issues ranging from the status of American military advisers to restrictions on Japanese trade with China. Only the main points are dealt with in this discussion, which is based on the account of daily progress in the talks given in the official Böei Nenkan, 1955 p.65ff. For a statement of the general principles motivating Yoshida during the negotiations see Miyazawa Kiichi, op.cit., (Sekai, July 1957), p.49.

Public Law 165, Chapter 47a;
An Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interests of international peace and security.
United States Statutes at Large, 1951, Volume 65, p.373ff.

By the third round of discussions (24 July 1953) agreement had been reached on tax exemptions for aid material, preservation of secrets, handling of patents and so on. Agreement on duration of contracts, channels for continuing consultation and re-examination of clauses was reached by 27 July. From then on the negotiations made heavy weather.

Asahi Shimbun 11 August 1953. Yoshida had apparently offended Dulles by omitting reference to the expected boons of MSA aid in his speech of welcome for the Secretary of State.


Details of the proposed appendix can be found in Böei Nenkan, 1955, p.67ff.

On 1 September the Prime Minister told a meeting of Liberal Party Dietmen that economic conditions would not permit rearmament, and Japan's most pressing task was the reconstruction of her economy and society.


Matsumoto Saburō, 'Hoshu Renkei to MSA', Chūō Kōron, November 1953. See also Asahi Shimbun, 25 September 1953.

The relevant sections of the Böei Nenkan (1955 p.68) read as if agreement had been reached on more fundamental issues. However the subsequent evolution of the Ikeda-Robertson negotiations casts doubt on this claim.

Miyazawa Kiichi, 'Ampō Jōyaku Teiketsu no Ikisatsu', Chūō Kōron, May 1957, p.72. Miyazawa was, of course, a member of Ikeda's delegation.

This session was attended by about twenty representatives from the United States State, Defence, Trade and other departments, as well as by Ikeda and his own large party. Ikeda presented a number of documents analysing the Japanese economy and made efforts to explain
the political background to the defence problem in Japan. 
Asahi Shimbun, 6 October 1953.

37 Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1953.
38 Asahi Shimbun, 13, 16, 19, 23, 30 October 1953.
39 Asahi Shimbun, 16 October 1953.
40 Asahi Shimbun, 17 October 1953.
41 Asahi Shimbun, 20 October 1953.
42 Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1953.
43 Asahi Shimbun, 1 November 1953.
44 Asahi Shimbun, 23 October 1953.
47 Ibid., p.133. Eisenhower frankly admits that budgetary considerations produced
...a change in American defence: a greater reliance on deterrent nuclear weapons which could be delivered by the Strategic Air Command and later by intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles.
48 The shortcomings of air power were particularly evident after entry of Chinese troops into the war in the winter of 1950, and later, after the Communists developed the technique tunnelling artillery positions and defensive works deep under hill sides. The lessons of this were not lost on Eisenhower - 'obviously [the Communists] had undertaken a laborious task, but just as obviously they had plenty of manpower to use' (Eisenhower, op.cit., p.94). General Mark Clark complained that 'manpower was their long suit and superior technology was ours. I would not and could not afford to swap U.N. and Communist lives man for man'. (Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1958) p.92.
49 Asahi Shimbun, 23 October 1953.
50 An excellent introduction to this literature is to be found in Terasawa Hajime, 'Saigunbi Sansai Ron, Hantai Ron no Tenbō', Chūō Kōron, November 1952. One of the most interesting things about the early literature on rearmament is that so much of it was written by Americans. Indeed, if the writings of a few Japanese like Ashida Hitoshi are excepted, it appears that local exponents of rearmament were only prepared to emerge from the shadows after American publicists had
lighted the way. Among the prominent American advocates of Japanese rearmament at this time were Hansen Baldwin (Asahi Shimbun 26 July 1950), Walter Lippman (in Sekai Shūhō, August 1950), Bill Ross (in Daiamondo, November (1st issue) 1950), General Eichelberger (Newsweek, December 1950) and Ex-President Hoover (Mainichi Shimbun, 22 December 1950).

51 Ōno Shinzō, as quoted by Terasawa Hajime, op.cit., p.24.

52 Two documents, Bōei Ryoku Seibi ni Kansuru Ichi Shian and Bōei Seisan ni Kansuru Chōsa Shiryō, propounding these views were released by the Committee in February 1953. See Nakada Minoru, et.al., Nihon no Bōei to Keizai (Asahi Shimbun Anzen Hoshō Mondai Chōsa Kai), (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1969), p.172ff.

53 See Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.96-97.

54 I.I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, A study of post-war trends, (Oxford University Press, 1960), p.445. Nabeyama, who renounced Communism in 1933 after five years in prison, was one of the earliest advocates of rearmament against the Soviet Union. Another Communist renegade and former cell-mate of Nabeyama, Sano Manabu, was also an early proponent of a heavy arms build up. (Sano Manabu, 'Sei-Ō Saibusō to Nihon', Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin, December 1950).

55 Nabeyama Sadachika, 'Buryokuteki Jiei no Soshiki o', Sekai Shūhō, number 154, 1950, p.28ff. See also Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.96-97.

56 Watanabe Tetsuzō, Ware Saigunbi o Shuchōsu, (Watanabe Keizai Kenkyūjo Hen) February 1951. See also Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.96-97. Watanabe, unlike most other exponents of rearmament, had been opposed to the policies of the wartime government and had spent time in prison for his defeatist views. See Morris, op.cit., p.452. Connected with his research institute were not only figures such as Hattori and Nomura, but also former Vice-Admiral Hoshina Zenjirō (later prominent in LDP politics, see Chapters 5 and 6), former Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, former Lieutenant-General Inada Masazumi and ex-Colonel Imoto Kumao. See Morris, op.cit., p.221.

57 See Nomura Kichisaburō, Kokudo Hozen no tame', Keizai Ōrai, 2.9.1950 and Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.96-97.

58 Morris, op.cit., p.217, 221.

59 Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.97-98.


61 Tsuji, for example, despite his reputation as an old style ultra-nationalist with marked pan-Asianist and anti-Western proclivities, warned against naval and air power of a type that would offend the sensibilities of Australia and various South-East Asian countries. (Ibid., p.205). The Federation of Economic Organisation planners and the Systems Research Committee discussed later in this chapter were apparently troubled by no such scruples.
For other examples of military planning and arguments in favour of rearmament see (ex-Lieutenant-General) Andō Kisaburō (former Minister of Home Affairs in the Tōjō Cabinet), 'Nihon Saigunbi o Kentō suru', Jitsugyō Tenbō, February 1951; Itō Masanobu, 'Nihon Kokubō no Saizen Hoshiki', Bunrei Shunju, October 1950; 'Aete Saigunbi o Tōian suru', Bunrei Shunju, October 1951; Ōno Shinzō, 'Nihon no Saibusō Ron Nihon Shūhō', 1 January 1951; 'Yobitai de wa Bōei dekinai - Jiei Soshiki Ron', Nihon Shūhō, 22 January 1951; 'Saigunbi o dō suru ka', Gekkan Yomiuri (Kiki no Nihon), February 1951; Takagi Sōkichi (some-time Head of the Research Section, Imperial Japanese Naval Ministry), 'Nihon Jiei no Gunbi to Senryaku', Nihon Hyōron, February, 1951; 'Nihon wa dō Gunbi sareru ka', Jitsugyō no Nihon, 1 March 1951; 'Nihon ga Kokubōgun o motsu to shitara', Mainichi Jōhō, April 1951.

See Masuhara Keikichi, op. cit., p.416-417. The work of the Committee is also described in Dōba Hajime, op. cit., p.89ff and Sakanaka Tomohisa et.al., Nihon no Jieiryoku (Asahi Shimbun Anzen Hoshō Mondai Chōsa Kai), (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967), p.87. Although the Systems Research Committee was supposedly secret, the fact of the existence and the nature of its activities soon became fairly common knowledge, as is the way with such things. The first to spill the beans was, ironically, the then Director-General of the National Security Agency Kimura Tokutaro. Kimura on an inspection tour of defence facilities in Kyūshū told the press on 9 June 1953 that 'a five year defence plan, including provisions for military strength on land, sea, and air has already been prepared'. He stressed that it was very different from the Federation of Economic Organisations' draft (Mainichi Shim bun, 9 June 1953). Kimura's revelations caused uproar in the Diet. The Government adopted the attitude that the plan was Kimura's own, although it was not denied that the Prime Minister might have seen it. (Asahi Shim bun, 10 June 1953). Within a few days, however, the press was full of plans and rumours of plans and the Asahi Shim bun (10 June 1953) announced the existence of the Systems Research Committee.

Masuhara Keikichi, op. cit., p.419. Masuhara, whose few writings reveal him as a patriotic but guileless soul had long experience in the police force. Yet it has been suggested he was selected as Director-General of the Police Reserve principally because no one else acceptable to Yoshida would take the job. On hearing of the creation of the Police Reserve Masuhara, at that time Governor of the remote rural prefecture of Kagawa, sped to Tokyo in the hope of convincing the Government to make use of certain abandoned army facilities in the important prefectural centre of Zentsūji. Much to his surprise the Attorney General Ōhashi Takeo pounced on him in the National Diet Restaurant and persuaded him to become chief of the new force. The near impossibility of finding a suitable candidate had discomfited Yoshida and Ōhashi for some weeks and the unexpected intrusion of this rustic interloper into the Diet Restaurant must have been a welcome sight. See Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.17-18. Masuhara's own account of the circumstances surrounding his appointment is more abbreviated. (Masuhara op.cit., p.403). For an account of the background of Masuhara and other civilian officials, see Asahi Shim bun, 19 October, 1950.

See Chapter 8.
Sakanaka Tomohisa et al., *Nihon no Jiei Ryoku*, p. 88 and Dōba Hajime, *op.cit.*, p. 91. Dōba's table of successive defence plans is particularly useful (p. 92-93). The Systems Research Committee had previously estimated that without the Security Treaty Japan's defence would require an army of 1,000,000 men, 1,500,000 ton navy and an airforce of 10,000 aircraft. (Ibid., p. 90.) Masuhara explained this plan to the Executive Board of the Liberal Party in October. (*Asahi Shimbun*, 7 October 1953.)

Sakanaka Tomohisa, et al., *Nihon no Jiei Ryoku*, p. 88. Dōba Hajime, *op.cit.*, p. 92-93. The Democratic (Progressive) Party left wing Dietman Kawasaki Hideji obtained one of the early drafts of this plan and announced its contents in the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 8 July 1953 (*Asahi Shimbun*, 8 July 1953). The National Security Agency immediately denied that such a plan was in preparation. For Yoshida's attitude to the scale of planning, see Masuhara, *op.cit.*, p. 420. For the Finance Ministry's views, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 September, 11 November 1953.

For the contents of successive drafts see Dōba Hajime, *op.cit.*, p. 92-93. For rumours of the stage reached in planning at various time see *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 September, 7 September, 7 October, 11 November, 24 November, 27 November, 29 December 1953.

*Asahi Shimbun* 22, 29 December 1953.

*Asahi Shimbun*, 1 February, 3 March 1954. See also *Bōei Nenkan* (1955) p. 85.

The Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.

The French military position had deteriorated rapidly and by February 1954 Paris agreed to accept a negotiated settlement. The United States was unhappy with this prospect and encouraged the French to make a stand at Dien Bien Phu, where their forces were surrounded by the Viet Minh early in March, and overrun by mid-April.


...and if they [the French] do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratio throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous...

Ibid., p. 347. The Japanese, of course, were not included in the proposed allied interventionist force, which was to be made up of the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines.


See Okazaki's speech as quoted in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 March 1954.
Statement by Ambassador Allison, Press Release 119, dated March 8, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, Number 771, 5 April 1954, p.519. Allison stressed that 'In spite of what has been said and is still being said, you will look in vain for any requirements in the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement that Japan send its young men abroad'.

Ibid., p.521.

Ibid., p.523.

Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Regarding the Guaranty of Investments, Ibid., p.524.

Yanaga Chitoshi, op.cit., p.262.


Eisenhower, speaking of his meeting with Wilson, Anderson, Generals Ridgway, Twining, Shepherd, Colonel Goodpaster and Admiral Carney in December 1954, recalls that

I stressed that the United States would not employ the same policies and resources to fight another war as were used in the Korean conflict. I saw no sense in wasting manpower in costly small wars that could not achieve decisive results under the political and military circumstances then existing.

(Eisenhower, op.cit., p.454.)

Moreover, in the matter of brush-fire wars I pointed out that we would not try to maintain the conventional power to police the whole world. . . . The Communists would have to be made to realise that should they be guilty of major aggression, we would strike with means of our own choosing at the head of the Communist power.

(Ibid., p.454.)

Details of this reorganisation as it affected Japan and the Far East can be found in the Böei Nenkan, 1957, p.192ff; 1958, p.168ff; 1959, p.177ff. A useful breakdown of American ground, naval and air strength in Japan at various periods is to be found in the appendix of Jieitai (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1968), p.266.
On 27 June 1955 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru told the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee that he had been assured by the American Ambassador first, that United States forces in Japan were not armed with nuclear weapons, second, that such weapons would not be brought in without Japan's consent. (Böei Nenkan, 1956, p.163). On 1 January 1957 the United States announced its intention of dispatching nuclear support units to various parts of the world, in accordance with its new strategic thinking. At a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on 8 February it was decided that if the United States asked permission to station such a unit in Japan, the Japanese Government would have no alternative but to refuse the request. (Böei Nenkan, 1958, p.173). This naturally did not apply to Okinawa, where the Japanese Government exercised no authority. On 17 March 1959 Prime Minister Kishi told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that

...as far as the armaments of the American forces stationed in Japan are concerned, the American forces, under the present Security Treaty, can determine them unilaterally and we cannot prevent them from bringing in nuclear weapons. The provisions of Article 9 of the Constitution do not apply to the United States, so that the import of United States nuclear weapons is not a question that concerns the Constitution.

He assured the House, however, that the Government would attempt to prevent the United States bringing in such weapons. (Böei Nenkan, 1960, p.132.)


See Sakanaka Tomohisa, Amerika Senryakuka no Okinawa (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967), p.38ff. The American military government of Okinawa began large scale purchase of land in March 1954 to enlarge runways to accommodate B-47 bombers. The decision to install nuclear weapons in the form of medium range ballistic missiles was taken towards the end of 1957. Medium range 'Thor' missiles were installed early in 1958, 'Nike-Hercules' anti-aircraft missiles in 1959. Construction of sites for 'Hawk' missiles began early in 1960. In March 1961 the 'Thor' missiles were replaced by nuclear tipped 'Mace B's'.

For a useful breakdown of the aid extended to the three Japanese forces between 1954 and 1962 see Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.122ff.


The existence of this agreement remained virtually unknown to the public until it was taken up by the Socialist Party Diet member Okada Haruo at the time of the Pueblo Incident in March 1968. The Government, while admitting its existence and continued validity, refused to table its contents, although its general character became clear in the course of discussions in the Diet. The Opposition claimed the agreement allowed Japan no room for autonomous decision and manoeuvre should hostilities break out in the area served by the Fifth Air Force. The Government maintained this was not so, but the lack of concrete evidence produced by both sides makes assessment of the real situation difficult. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 March 1968.

For details of stationing of units see Böei Nenkan, 1956, p.155ff; 1957 p.187ff; 1959, 164ff.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4.

1 A total of 37 Liberal-Democratic Party members of the House of Representatives absented themselves from the Diet during the crucial session of 19 May, 1960. These included 13 members of the Miki-Matsumura faction, 6 members of former Prime Minister Ishibashi's group, 5 members of the Kōno faction, one member of the Ishii faction and a single member of the Ōno faction. Eleven other members, including former Prime Minister Yoshida, alleged 'sickness' or 'travel commitments' as their reason for not putting in an appearance. (Tokyo Shimbun, 20 May 1960).

Matsumura Kenzo later told reporters that he had gone to the Diet but, seeing the place crowded out with police, decided that he wanted no part in the proceedings and left (Shūkan Asahi, 5 June 1960). He heard the details of the voting from his car radio and was said to have exclaimed, "Ah, what will happen to Japan now!".

Miki left the Chamber as soon as proceedings began, heading for the Diet restaurant. Kōno, too, put in a brief appearance, then left. Ishibashi did not bother to attend. His supporter Utsunomiya Tokuma went along to have a look but took no part in the proceedings. For details of the activities of various faction leaders and Party personalities on this crucial day, see Mainichi Shimbun, 21 May 1960; Sankei Shimbun, 20 May 1960; Tokyo Shimbun, 20 May 1960; Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 May 1960; Shūkan Asahi, 5 June 1960; and Sandō Mainichi; Ekonomisuto (Kyōdo Henshū), Ampo ni Yureta Nihon no Kiroku - 1960 - (May-June). A superlative scholarly account of these events, on which the present writer has drawn freely, is to be found in Shinobu Seisaburō, Ampo Toso Shi, (Sekai Shoin, 1961, 3rd Edition) p.174ff.


3 Voting took place after the Socialist opposition and their secretaries, who had staged a sit down to prevent the entry of the Speaker and thus delay proceedings, were bodily removed by 500 police officers. Thus only those Government members attending the session voted in favour of the Treaty. The exact numbers are unknown, the Proceedings (Dai Sanjūyōn Kai Kokkai, Shūgiin, Honkaiigiroku, Dai Sanjūsan Gō, 20 May 1960, pp.553-54) merely record that 'all present rose'. Outside 5000 police guarded the Diet compound from crowds of demonstrators, who had numbered some 15,000 only a few hours before the voting took place. For details see Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., Part 2, Chapters 1,2 and 3 and Packard, op.cit., p.237ff.

4 For the circumstances surrounding Prime Minister Kishi's resignation, and a detailed analysis of the pressures brought to bear on him, see Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., Part 3, Chapter 7 and also the relevant sections of Part 8.
For a complete discussion see Shinobu Seisoburō, op.cit., Part 3, Chapter 6. Packard's section on the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit (Packard, op.cit., p.285ff.) is also very interesting.

Asahi Shimbun, 12 October 1960. See also Chapter 8 of the present thesis.

See Itō Masami, 'Gikaishugi no Hametsu o Fusegu Tame ni', Jiyū, July 1960; Shinohara Hajime, 'Gikaishugi no Kokufuku', Jiyū, July 1960; Yanaihara Tadao, 'Minshushugi o Mamoru Yūki o', Shūkan Asahi, 3 July 1960 and 'Minshushugi no Genri wa Ko Shite Yaburareta', Gekkan Shakai Tō, July 1960. Other observers, in contrast have seen the 1960 crisis as a boisterous affirmation of democracy, a sure indication that its principles have been understood if not by sections of the political elite, at least by the Japanese people as a whole. This is Packard's view, (Packard, op.cit., p.343ff.) and it is one for which the present writer has considerable sympathy.

Sakanaka Tomohisa, 'Jieitai no Jittai', in Sakanaka Tomohisa, et al., Nihon no Jiei Ryoku (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967) p.44. Mr Akagi himself merely recalls that

...at the time the leaders of the Defence Agency were extremely reluctant to see the Self Defence Forces go into action. The atmosphere in the Defence Agency was rather gloomy...and we had steeled ourselves to go out and fight to the death if the Prime Minister called us out.

(Asahi Jūnaru 12 January 1969). For a first hand account of the preparations in the Ground Self Defence Forces, see Sugita Ichiji (then Chief of the Ground Staff), Wasurerarete Iru Anzen Hoshō, (Jiji Tsūshin Sha, 1967) p.90ff. It has also been claimed that the Self Defence Forces themselves refused to march against demonstrators in 1960, despite urgent pleas from political leaders (Asahi Shimbun, 14 December 1967; the source of this information is said to be 'high ranking uniformed officers'). In view of the attitudes of the then Chief of the Ground Staff (discussed in Chapter Eight of this thesis) this claim seems difficult to believe.

As at the time of the 1951 Treaty, most commentators showed little interest in the legal aspects of the new arrangement, preferring to discuss its broader strategic, diplomatic, social, political and economic implications. The extraordinary conduct of the 1960 Diet proceedings, the widespread interest in neutralism and the mass movement against the Treaty also tended to divert attention from the agreement itself. There was also, of course, a widespread belief that the text of the new Treaty was deceptive and that little could therefore be gained from a close study of its provisions. The most authoritative works on the legal aspects of the 1960 Treaty remain Kamimura Shinichi, Sōgo Kyōryoku Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku no Kaisetsu (Jiji Tsūshin Sha, 1969 and Kurahara Koreaki, Nichi-Bei Ampo Jōyaku no Shōten (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967). (See also Chapter 1, Note 2). The historical survey of the Treaty negotiations and explanation of clauses by Kotanaka Satoki, Shimizu Makoto, Ikejima Yukihiro, Kawai Kenichi, Yamazaki Masuhide, Hokari Kōzō, Yoshida Yoshiaki, Sumino Takanori, Igarashi Keiki, Kazahaya Futaba and Matsui Yoshio in Hōritsu Jihō, May 1969, p.121ff. are also particularly useful. Also interesting are


11 Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. Article X.

12 For details of the provisions of the NATO Treaty and of the Treaties between the United States, South Korea, the Taiwan régime and the Philippines, see Chapter 1, Note 4.

13 Agreed Minute to the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security (Dated at Washington, 19 January, 1960). The Japanese plenipotentiary, while noting that

...the status of the islands administered by the United States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan has not been made a subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations...

emphasised the 'strong concern' felt by 'the Government and people' of Japan for the islanders, stressed Japan's 'residual sovereignty' and stated that

In the event of an armed attack, [on Okinawa or the Bonins] it is the intention of the Government of Japan to explore with the United States measures which it might be able to take for the welfare of the islanders.

The United States agreed to accede to these requests.


15 Changes in the deployment of forces already stationed in Japan, or the withdrawal of ground, air or naval units from Japanese bases were not, of course, the objects of prior consultation under these arrangements. Large scale withdrawal of American forces from Japan could, however, be the subject of consultations under Article IV of the Treaty. 'Major changes' in deployment were later defined by the
Japanese Government as the movement into Japan of one United States Army Division (about 13,000 men) or its air force equivalent, or the stationing in Japan of one naval task force. However, forces passing through Japan, or calling briefly at Japanese ports and bases for repairs, rest and recreation, were not the subjects of prior consultation. Nor were, for example, naval forces passing briefly through Japanese waters. During the course of the negotiations, it was understood that 'major changes in their equipment' referred to the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, long or medium range ballistic missiles, or the construction of such missile sites. The bringing in of aircraft able to carry nuclear weapons (but not actually carrying them) was, however, not subject of prior consultations, regardless of the size, character or capability of the aircraft involved. Long and medium range missiles were always to be the subject of prior consultations, since these weapons were invariably nuclear equipped. For a detailed discussion, see Kamimura Shinichi, op.cit., p.75ff. The question of use of Japanese bases for combat operations outside Japan is discussed later in this Chapter.

15 See Chapter 1.

17 For the Matsumae-Burns Agreement see Chapter 3. According to Article 24 of the 1952 Administrative Agreement the Japanese and American Governments, in the event of actual or imminent hostilities in the Japan area, were to immediately consult 'with a view to taking necessary joint measures for the defence of that area and to carrying out the purposes of Article 1 of the Security Treaty'.

18 See the report of the Committee's proceedings in Asahi Shimbun, 8 May 1960. See also Böei Nenkan, 1961, p.127.

19 See the record of an interview with former Prime Minister Kishi in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 19 May 1968. As far as the present writer knows no such consultations were held between this date and the time of writing (November 1971). In his interview with the Tōkyō Shimbun, Kishi admitted that prior consultations could only be held at the request of the United States. The Japanese side had no right to propose prior consultations. Consultations under Article IV, however, could be held at the request of either Party.

20 Kishi told the House of Representatives Security Treaty Special Committee on 14 April 1960 that while 'the political significance' of the Joint Communiqué was 'great' he did not think it had 'the same legal force as a treaty' ('Hōritsutekina Jōyakutekina Kōka o Motte Iru Mono to wa Omowanai'). He considered that 'the interpretation of the Exchanges of Notes legally binds the two countries and the significance of the Communiqué is that it politically recognises their efficacy'. For extracts from the proceedings of the Special Committee, see Asahi Shimbun, 15 April, 1960. While Kamimura maintains that the Exchanges of Notes had, in international law, the same force as the Treaty, he appears less certain about the Joint Communiqué, declaring merely that it recognised the understanding on prior consultations reached 'in the process of negotiations on the Treaty'. (Kamimura Shinichi, op.cit., p.70-71.)
21 See Chapter 3.

22 For a discussion of the character and functions of this committee, see Böei Nenkan, 1958, pp.166-168.

23 On 19 April 1960 the Defence Agency Director General Akagi Munenori made it clear to the House of Representatives Security Treaty Special Committee that military activity by the United States Fifth Air Force stationed in Okinawa or South Korea, even if undertaken on the orders of Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Tokyo, could not be a subject for prior consultations. (For a record of Committee proceedings, see Asahi Shimbun, 20 April, 1960). It is thus possible to imagine a situation where units of the Fifth Air Force stationed, say, in Korea, become involved in a local conflict which rapidly escalates, automatically drawing in the Fifth Air Force in Japan and, unless the Matsumae-Burns Agreement contains a special clause respecting Japanese autonomy, the Japanese Air Self Defence Forces as well.

24 Nishi Haruhiko, 'Nihon Gaikō o Urēru', Chūō Köron, February 1960, p.99. Nishi added that 'over the past year I have listened to people in various fields, including the Defence (Agency) authorities, and no one has denied this'. See also his remarks in 'Nihon Gaikō o Urēte Futatabi', Chūō Köron, April 1960, pp.39-40.

25 See Asahi Shimbun, 15 April 1960 (Evening Edition). See also Watanabe Yōzō and Okakura Koshirō, Nichi-Bei Amo Jōyaku, Sono Kaisetsu to Shiryō, (Rōdo Junpō Sha, 1968) p.457. This is also the interpretation advanced by Kamimura Shinichi. (Kamimura Shinichi, op.cit., p.78.)

26 Asahi Shimbun, 5 May 1960. See also Watanabe Yōzō and Okakura Koshirō, op.cit., p.464.

27 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 17 March 1969 (evening edition) Mr Kusumi's exact words were

Shikashi Amo Jōyaku o Yoku Yonde Miru to,
Jisen Kyōgi ga Okonawaretemo Beikoku no Rōdō
o Subete Soshī Suru Koto ni wa Natte Inai. Ichi
Bu no Hitotachi wa Amo Jōyaku no Jisen Kyōgi wa
Sensō ni Makikomarenai Yōi Suru Tame no Hadome
Da to Iwareru. Shikashi Hadome wa Jisen Kyōgi
Sono Mono de wa Nakute, Amo Jōyaku Sono Mono ga
Kyokutō ga Dai Sensō ni Makikomareru Koto ni
Taisuru Jūyōna Hadome ni Natte Iru no Desu.
[Italics my own].

28 Excellent discussions of Conservative Party factionalism are to be found in Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., pp.8-46, and elsewhere throughout the work; in Fukui Haruhiro, Party in Power, the Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy Making (Australian National University Press, 1970) Chapter V; and in Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (University of California Press, 1962).
29 On 19 May 1968 Kishi told the Tōkyō Shimbun of his fear of the Soviet Union, adding that 'if Communist China were to change in the future, I would personally feel much closer to her than to the Soviet Union'. (Tōkyō Shimbun, 19 May 1968). In April 1970 Fujiiyama, on a visit to China, told Chou En Lai that the Security Treaty had been concluded with Soviet-Japanese relations in mind. Its purpose was not confrontation with China. Mr Chou laughed heartily at this suggestion. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 April 1970.)

30 For details of Kishi's background, career and connections, see Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., pp.16-18, p.11, p.29ff; Packard, op.cit., p.47ff; Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan, (Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1960) and Yoshimoto Shigeyoshi, Kishi Nobusuke Den (Tōyō Shokan, 1957).

31 Kishi told Kurzman that 'Kita was indeed one of the persons who profoundly influenced me during my university days'. (Kurzman, op.cit., p.92.) For details of Kita's background and philosophy, see George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki 1883-1937 (Harvard University Press, 1969). Although Wilson shows how evaluations of Kita have changed over the past two decades, Kita is still widely regarded as one of the 'fathers of Japanese fascism'.


33 See Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.113, and also Chapters 5 and 6 of the present thesis.

34 For the views of these politicians see Chapters 5 and 6.


36 See Chapters 5 and 6.

37 See Chapters 5 and 6.

38 See Chapters 5 and 6.

39 Nakasone had been a member of the National Territory Defence Research Association (Kokudo Bōei Kenkyū Kai), established in 1950 by the Communist renegade Oyama Iwao to promote rearmament, popular defence consciousness and to defeat left wing strategy in Japan. This organisation allegedly had connections with ultranationalist groups such as the Japan Sound Youth Association (Nihon Kensei Kai). See I.I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, A Study of post-war trends (Oxford University Press, 1960) p.198, Note 3. Nakasone was also a member of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League. (Tōkyō Shimbun, 24 September 1962, Evening Edition). At the same time, Nakasone manifested occasional interest in improved relations with China and was apt, like many politicians, to change his views according to the circumstances.

40 For an interesting discussion of the Kōno faction and its connections, see Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., p.22. For the development of Kōno's views and his later activities, see Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
See Chapters 1, 5 and 6 of the present thesis.

See Chapter 1 of the present thesis.

See Shigemitsu's speech at a dinner given by the National Press Club, as reported in Asahi Shimbun.

U.S. Department of State, 'Joint Statement of August 31, 1955', Department of State Bulletin, Volume 33, Number 846, 12 September, 1955, pp.419-420. The Asahi Shimbun (3 September 1955) alleged that the 'Western Pacific' clause was not included in the draft communiqué drawn up in consultations with the United States Embassy before Shigemitsu's visit to Washington. It had been inserted at the insistence of American officials in Washington during the course of the talks.

Asahi Shimbun, 1 September 1955 (Evening Edition).


Asahi Shimbun, 14, 15 September 1955.

Asahi Shimbun, 3 September 1955; Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 September 1955.

Mainichi Shimbun, 3 September 1955.

Asahi Shimbun, 1 September 1955.

Asahi Shimbun, 15 September 1955. See also Bōei Nenkan, 1956, p.146.

In the Communiqué, however, 'the President and the Prime Minister confirmed their understanding that the Security Treaty of 1951 was designed to be transitional in character and not in that form to remain in perpetuity'. U.S. Department of State, 'Joint Communiqué of June 21, 1957, issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi', Department of State Bulletin, Volume 37, 8 July, 1957, pp. 51-53.

The main problem lies in the fact that the writer of the only authoritative account of the 1958-60 negotiations, Nishimura Kumao, former Head of the Foreign Ministry Treaties Bureau, while not himself attributing Kishi with a plan to conclude a genuine mutual defence treaty, includes in his work, without comment, the Yomiuri Shimbun article on which the following account is largely based. The present writer has taken this to mean that Nishimura considered this an accurate account but was, for personal, political or other reasons, reluctant to make the revelations directly. See Nishimura Kumao, Anzen Hoshō Jöyaku Ron (Jiji Tsüshin Sha, 1960) p.122ff. and also Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 January 1959. The raising of the Western Pacific issue at the Japanese-American talks in October, and the movements within the Liberal-Democratic Party in September and October, also suggest, but do not necessarily prove, that the Prime Minister had earlier been speaking in terms of a treaty with greatly enlarged Japanese responsibilities.

56 Ibid.


59 Ibid.


61 *Asahi Nenkan*, 1959, p.188ff.

62 See *The Times*, 22 May and 31 May 1958.


64 *Asahi Shimbun*, 24 June 1958. See also *Asahi Nenkan*, 1959, p.173ff.


68 The Chairman of the Council at the time was the militantly anti-Communist Funada Naka, of the Ōno faction.

69 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 September 1958.

70 *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 September 1958.


72 *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 October 1958.

73 *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 October 1958.


75 *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 October 1958.

76 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 November 1958.

77 See *Bōei Nenkan*, 1960, p.120; *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 November 1958.

78 *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 December 1958.

Kishi's decision to amend the Police Duties Performance Law (Keisatsukan Shokumu Shikkō Hō) to widen police powers probably stemmed, like his interest in a mutual security treaty with greatly enlarged Japanese responsibilities, from his background and ideological outlook. There was also a widespread suspicion that the two issues were closely connected. It was alleged that the Prime Minister intended to make use of the new police powers to crush opposition to the revised Treaty, paving the way for a restoration of the ancien régime, with its military commitments abroad and authoritarian police state at home. The issue touched off a hitherto unparalleled confrontation with organised labour and the Opposition Parties, both of whom alleged that their own rights and activities were directly threatened. It also precipitated a major factional struggle within the Liberal-Democratic Party itself, with more moderate groups alarmed at the implications of the Bill and other elements prepared to use the issue to advance their own rather narrow interests. Such was the scale of the opposition both inside the Liberal-Democratic Party and outside it that the Bill was eventually shelved. For a comment on the influence of these events on the new Treaty, see Asahi Shimbun, 13 November 1958.

Kōno clarified his views on 29 January 1959, during the course of a visit to the United States Embassy to discuss Treaty revision with Ambassador MacArthur. See Asahi Shimbun, 29 January 1959.

For a good summary of these events, see Bōei Nenkan, 1960, pp.132-135.

The vote was Kishi, 320; Matsumura, 166.

Fujiyama's first draft Treaty, presented to Kishi, Akagi and Fukuda on 18 February, had definitely excluded Okinawa and the Bonins. (Asahi Shimbun, 18 February 1959). For the text of the second, amended draft, see Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 1959. Kōno remained dissatisfied with the new expression and opposition from his supporters threatened, for a time, to prevent its adoption as official Party policy.

Thus Funada Naka's attempt to denigrate the significance of this draft

It's just something for use in the elections.
It would be ridiculous to believe that just because this draft has been drawn up we will sign (a treaty) on the basis of it before the House of Councillors election

would appear to be misplaced. (For Funada's comment, see Asahi Shimbun 9 April 1959.) For the reopening of negotiations with the Americans, see Asahi Shimbun, 13 April 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 29 May 1959.
Revision of the 1952 Administrative Agreement had apparently not been discussed during the first official exchanges between Japan and the United States in the winter of 1958. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was allegedly hostile to the idea (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 December 1959) and the United States later showed that it regarded the prospect with distaste. There is no evidence of Kōno's having raised the question of the Administrative Agreement at the time of his visit to the United States Embassy in January 1959 (Asahi Shimbun, 29 January 1959). However, on 15 February, in a dramatic announcement made during a tour of the Kansai region, Kōno declared that revision of the Administration Agreement was, in fact, more important than revision of the Treaty itself, since it had a 'direct relationship to the everyday lives of the people'. (Asahi Shimbun, 15 February 1959). Kishi's opponents quickly seized onto the issue, seeing in it a chance to thwart the Government's plans. In a speech at Hiroshima on 23 February Ikeda, after questioning whether the time was 'ripe' for revision and recommending a 'cautious' approach to the entire question, stated that whatever happened, the Administrative Agreement would have to be revised. This would 'take time'. (Asahi Shimbun, 23 February 1959). Two days later the question was discussed at a meeting of the twenty 'sponsors' of the dissident Diplomatic Problems Research Council, dominated by the Ikeda, Miki-Matsumura, Ishii and Ishibashi factions. (Asahi Shimbun, 26 February 1959). On 4 March Miki officially joined onto the Administrative Agreement bandwagon, urging that the arrangement be 'completely revised'. (Asahi Shimbun, 5 March 1959). The following day Kōno, encouraged by these developments, telephoned the Chief Secretary Mr Fukuda (at the time confined to bed because of illness) and 'advised' him that the Party should decide its attitude to the Administrative Agreement before settling its views on revision of the Treaty. He was not intimidated by Foreign Ministry claims that renegotiation of the agreement would be a long and involved process. After telephoning Fukuda he assured the press that the matter of revising the Treaty was not originally taken up because of urgent military necessity but with the object of restoring Japan's autonomy and eliminating the inequalities of the present arrangement. Therefore the first thing that should have been decided was the complete revision of the Administrative Agreement, which has the greatest influence on the everyday lives of the Japanese people....Foreign Ministry officials tell us that revision of the Administrative Agreement will take two or three years, but if we want to hurry things up, we can. (Asahi Shimbun, 6 March 1959.) A few days later the Diplomatic Problems Research Council officially decided that the Administrative Agreement should be completely revised, that it should be revised at the same time as the Security Treaty, but that revision of the Treaty was not itself 'a pressing issue'. (Asahi Shimbun, 8 March 1959.) Kōno could well be satisfied with the results of his démarche. If the dissident factions now saw a new opportunity to delay negotiations, the Government, anxious to assure itself of Kōno's support, announced its willingness to make concessions. After a Cabinet meeting on 13 March Fujiyama told the press that while there was no need for 'complete revision' of the Administrative Agreement, the Cabinet had concluded ('after a close study of the text') that 'certain points' of the...
agreement did in fact require modification. (Asahi Shimbun, 13 March 1959.)

If these concessions to Kôno were politically necessary, they had an unfortunate effect on the attitude of the United States. On 19 March the Director of the Defence Agency visited MacArthur at the United States Embassy and was told that 'minimal' revision of the Administrative Agreement would be desirable. Any revision of the Agreement, MacArthur declared, should be carried out while the Treaty itself was being revised, not afterwards. (Asahi Shimbun, 21 March 1959.) Since it was well-known that revision of the Administrative Agreement would be a time consuming process, this was tantamount to stating that if Japan desired early revision of the Security Treaty it would be advisable to abandon plans to alter the Administrative Agreement.

Confronted with this firm American stand, Fujiyama attempted to retract his concessions to Kôno. On 22 March the Foreign Minister, speaking in Sapporo, assured his audience that the evil effects of the Administrative Agreement had been over-rated. There had certainly been much dissatisfaction with the agreement, but this had arisen merely because the stationing of American troops in Japan inevitably created problems. It did not follow that just because the Security Treaty was being revised, the Administrative Agreement would also have to be altered. Indeed, the Foreign Minister declared breezily, the problems arising from the presence of American bases in Japan had largely been 'solved'. He was, however, considering the possibility of revising Clause 24 (joint action in emergency) and Clause 25 (defence sharing costs). (Asahi Shimbun, 23 March 1959.) Thus while pressure from Kôno forced him in one direction, the reaction of the United States drove him in another. The inevitable result was that the Government was obliged to adopt a formula which neither Kôno nor Washington regarded as satisfactory, but which was eventually transformed into policy and emerged, in the form of a shaky compromise, as part of the 1960 agreement.

Confronted with the necessity of unifying opinion before the House of Councillors election in May, a meeting of Party leaders decided on 2 April that Fujiyama would have no alternative but prepare a draft for revision of the Administrative Agreement. (Asahi Shimbun, 3 April 1959.) At the next meeting of the Foreign Affairs Research Council and the Diplomatic and Defence sections of the Policy Affairs Research Council, the Foreign Minister showed greater willingness to consider extensive revision of the Agreement. The draft Treaty presented to Party leaders on 3 April provided for revision of the Agreement (stating, in part, that 'with the revision of the Security Treaty, and having in mind the example of nations participating in NATO, giving thought to Japan's own autonomy, comprehensive discussions on all the clauses of the Administrative Agreement will be carried out'), specific reference being made to Articles 24 and 25. The rest was left rather vague, although it was stated that 'all the clauses' would be 'discussed' with a view to 'carrying out the necessary revision'. (Asahi Shimbun, 4 April 1959.)

This did not satisfy Kôno and while Fujiyama's draft was approved by the Party Leaders Meeting, the Advisers Meeting and the Cabinet, it was rejected by the Executive Committee and the Foreign Affairs Research Council after strong objections had been raised by Kôno and his supporters. Kôno, of course, maintained that the draft was not 'concrete enough' and the Executive called for a complete rewriting of the section.
dealing with the Administrative Agreement. (Asahi Shimbun, 9 April 1959.) The Government was left with no avenue of escape. The draft as amended on 10 April referred not only to Articles 24 and 25 but also to renegotiation of the provisions dealing with facilities, labour, procurement, customs, entry permits and so on. (Asahi Shimbun, 11 April 1959.) Once again, the importance of this draft cannot be overlooked. It was on this basis that negotiations with the Americans began three days later. Thus the exigencies of the intraparty factional struggle had again committed the Government to a policy it had not originally intended to follow. After prolonged and difficult negotiations with the United States agreement was eventually reached on revision of Articles 3, 9, 11, 12, 24 and 25 of the original arrangement. These changes appeared in the new Administrative Agreement that went into effect in 1960.

92 Asahi Shimbun, 13 February 1959.
93 Asahi Shimbun, 18 February 1959.
94 Asahi Shimbun, 20 February 1959.
95 Asahi Shimbun, 21 February 1959.
96 Asahi Shimbun, 4 April 1959.
97 Asahi Shimbun, 3 April 1959.
98 Asahi Shimbun, 4 April 1959.
99 Asahi Shimbun, 8 April 1959.
100 For a discussion of these changes, see Böei Nenkan, 1960, pp.121-22, p.135.
101 Asahi Shimbun, 29 July 1959.
102 Asahi Shimbun, 8 September 1959.
103 Asahi Shimbun, 9 September 1959.
104 Asahi Shimbun, 8 September 1959.
105 Article VI of the Treaty granted the United States facilities in Japan 'for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East'. Yet there was no agreement on the area encompassed by the term 'Far East'. The early definitions proffered by Government spokesmen included China, North-East Asia, South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific in the Far East. This was later narrowed to encompass the area 'north of the Philippines', 'centering around Japan' and, apparently, including part of China and the maritime provinces in Siberia. Korea, Quemoy and Matsu all apparently fell within the area. Government explanations later specifically excluded the maritime Provinces and the Chinese continent but the status of Korea, Quemoy and Matsu remained obscure. For discussions of this problem, see Kamimura Shinichi, op.cit., p.61ff; Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., p.33-34 and Böei Nenkan, 1961, p.123-124.
See Asahi Shimbun, 28 July, 3 August, 13 August, 25 August, 6 September, 15 September 1959.

He had not publically raised the issue until after the Cabinet reshuffle that frustrated his ambitions.

Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 8 October 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 14 October 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1959.

Asahi Shimbun, 27 October 1959.

For a detailed account of the attitude of the business community during the crisis, see Shinobu Seisaburō, op.cit., p.495ff. and generally throughout his work. See also, Yanaga Chitoshi, Big Business in Japanese Politics, (Yale University Press, 1968), p.273ff. for a more generalised narrative.

Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.163.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1 The Pentagon Papers, as published by the New York Times (Bantam, 1971) p.128.


4 For a general survey of American Far Eastern policy during these years, especially as it affected Japan and the surrounding region, see Kishida Junnosuke, Amerika no Kyokutō Senryaku (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967), especially parts V and VI. Other works of interest are Kishida Junnosuke, 'Anzen Hoshō no Gensoku wa Nanika', Tenbō, August 1966; Kishida Junnosuke, 'Ajia ni Okeru Kaku no Kasō Kōsō' Sekai, January 1966.

5 See the interviews with General Pierre Gallois, one of the architects of the French nuclear program, in the Mainichi Shimbun, 30 January, 20 October 1964.

6 The Liberal-Democrats actually increased their number of seats from 283 at the time of dissolution to a total of 296. The percentage of the national vote cast for the Conservatives remained stable at 57.8 per cent. Altogether the Socialist Parties lost 3 seats. The Democratic Socialist Party, which had split from the main body of Socialists over the Security Treaty issue in 1960, won 16 seats (compared with a total of 40 held before the election). The orthodox Socialist Party, which was strongly opposed to the Treaty, increased the number of its seats from 122 to 145. The Communists increased their representation from 1 to 3 seats. See Asahi Shimbun, 21 November, 1960 (evening edition).

7 For details of the Cabinet, see Asahi Shimbun, 8 December 1960.


10 For accounts of the decline of the Kishi faction and the movements of the derivative groups, see Asahi Shimbun, 13 December 1961; Asahi Shimbun, 25 February 1962 (evening edition); Mainichi Shimbun, 1 November 1962 and Asahi Shimbun, 4 November 1962. Kishi officially dissolved his faction in November 1962, ostensibly because of his interest in the structural reform of the Party, in reality because the faction could no longer hold together. By 1963 it was clear Kishi was trying to establish himself as an elder statesman, remote from factional strife. However, his association with various extremist groups alienated him from moderate opinion in the Party and his influence suffered further eclipse.


13 Hirota Yōji, writing in the Tokyo Shimbun (6 July 1962), characterized Kōno as one of the 'national bourgeoisie' cultivated by the Communist camp. There was an element of truth in this. In July 1962, after his third visit to the Soviet Union, Kōno recalled that 'Mr Mikoyan, at a party given in my honour, stated that 'our friend Kōno (Kōno Kun) is a nationalist. He will not become pro-American, nor is he anti-Communist. We can talk together easily. I was satisfied to hear it put that way" (Watakushi wa sore de jūbun manzoku de aru)'. See Kōno Ichirō 'Nisso Kōryū ni Tsuite Kokumin ni Uttaeru', Chūō Kōron, July 1962, p.197.

14 After his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1962, Kōno explained his ideas on Communism, Democracy, war, and peaceful coexistence in a number of articles contributed to newspapers and monthly magazines. In January 1963 he told the Asahi Shimbun that both Communism and Democracy were legitimate forms of government, each being a response to certain economic, social and political circumstances. Japan's conditions made liberalism and a free economy the most appropriate roads to national prosperity and the happiness of her people. However, it was wrong to confront China and the Soviet Union merely because they were Communist. See Asahi Shimbun, 3 January 1963. See also Kōno Ichirō, 'Nihon no Iiwake, Soren no Iiwake', Bunsei Shunju, July 1962. In many quarters this tolerant attitude towards Communism was not regarded sympathetically. Early in July 1962, representatives of the Soshinkai, an ultraconservative organization within the Liberal-Democratic Party, urged Prime Minister Ikeda to crush 'neutralist' views in the Government, to establish his administration on firm anti-Communist principles and ensure that these were rigidly enforced. (Mainichi Shimbun, 7 July 1962). In July 1963, Kōno's private residence at Hiratsuka was burnt to the ground by right wing gangsters. One of Tokyo's more conservative daily newspapers, the Sankei Shimbun, while condemning this act as 'foolish', recommended that the gangsters concerned be handled 'lightly'. Too severe an attitude on the part of the authorities would encourage more right wing 'heroism' (presumably new house burning incidents and the like). 'Heroism' itself, however, was not necessarily bad. Kōno's views were strange and it was understandable that many were alarmed by the policies he advocated. Yet 'heroism' should be accompanied by a sense of 'responsibility'. For the text of this extraordinary article, see Sankei Shimbun, 16 July 1963.

15 Throughout the 1950s, and even at the height of the 1960 Security Treaty crisis, Satō had avoided taking a public stand on defence and foreign policy questions. The first clear indication of his views came in February 1962, when his close associate Tanaka Kakuei, then Chairman of the Party Policy Affairs Research Council, suggested to Robert Kennedy that the United States encourage Constitutional revision and rearmament in Japan. The Attorney General, Yamanaka Sadanori (Kōno faction) was also present at the talks with Kennedy and hastened to assure the President's brother that Tanaka has
only expressed a personal view, and it is not shared by us'. In the uproar that followed, Satō strongly defended Tanaka and made no attempt to dissociate himself from these views. See Asahi Shimbun, 7 February 1962 (evening edition); Mainichi Shimbun, 8 February 1962; Tōkyō Shimbun, 8 February 1962; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 February 1962. For factional reactions to the Tanaka statement, see Tōkyō Shimbun, 11 February 1962 (evening edition).


Mainichi Shimbun. 1 November 1962, 4 November 1962. The Satō faction was reportedly split on the issue of co-operation with Ikeda. One group, led by Tanaka Kakuei, advocated co-operation. The other group, dominated by Hori Shigeru, Aichi Kiichi and Matsuno Raizō were anxious to overthrow Ikeda and install Satō as Prime Minister. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 April 1963).

20 Mainichi Shimbun, 7 July 1962.

24 For a concise but relatively comprehensive survey of post-war Sino-Japanese relations, see Takaichi Keinosuke and Tomiyama Eikichi, Nitchū Mondai Nyūmon (Iwanami Shinsho, 1966) (Fifth Edition). See also Fukui Haruhiro, op. cit., Chapter 9.


26 Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 May 1962. Ogawa Keishirō, the Consul-General in Hong Kong, advanced the view that China was preoccupied with internal problems and would have little freedom of manoeuvre on the international scene, except perhaps on the Sino-Indian border. Hasumi Yukio, Japanese Ambassador to Laos, held that the key to the Laotian situation was held not by China but by the Soviet Union. The Ambassador to India Mr Matsudaira saw no immediate probability of Sino-Japanese confrontation. Indeed, one of Japan's chief problems, as seen by the Ambassador, was not China but the rapid Western economic advance into South-East Asia which, it was held, Japan should make efforts to check.

27 For an outline of this report, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 July 1962 (evening edition).

28 The full text of this situation analysis appears in Dōba Hajime, Nihon no Gunji Ryoku, (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha 1963), p.66ff.
Even in these circles, however, attitudes to China were extremely complicated. Some sections of the ultra-conservative Soshinkai had apparently not given up hope of Chiang Kai Shek's reconquest of the mainland. (Asahi Shimbun, 2 June 1962). Yet in June 1961 Utsunomiya Tokuma had taken Hasegawa Takeshi, an active member of the Soshinkai, together with two other Conservative Dietmen, on a visit to Peking. the Four had chatted for three hours with Chou En Lai. Hasegawa was much impressed, announcing on his return to Japan, that the Liberal-Democrats should take the lead in promoting 'a mood of friendship with China'. (Mainichi Shimbun, 5 July 1961).

When hostilities on the border broke out in October, Indian diplomats in Tokyo reportedly claimed that Japan was 'not supporting India's stand very strongly'. (Mainichi Shimbun, 24 November 1962 (evening edition)). United States Assistant Secretary of State Harriman, at a press conference in December, called for more Japanese aid to India (Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 December 1962). These pressures had little effect. After the first full scale Chinese offensive of 20 October, Ikeda had sent a note to Nehru saying how he 'sympathized' with India's difficulties and would support efforts to settle the problem 'by peaceful means'. However, the Japanese Foreign Ministry declined to recognize the MacMahon line, and there were reportedly some who recalled India's attack on Goa in 1961. China's unilateral suspension of hostilities also created a favourable impression in some quarters. (Mainichi Shimbun, 24 November 1962 (evening edition)). Japanese aid to India was not on a large scale and was strictly limited to non-military goods (Tōkyō Shimbun, 7 December 1962).
Asahi Shimbun, 9 December 1962. Ohira's exact words, which are somewhat difficult to translate directly into English, were 'Nihon wa Belkoku to Dōmei Kankei o Musubi, Kōhanna Kyōryoku Kankei o Motte Iru. Dakara Nichi-Bei Kankei ni Sashitsukaenai Hanide Nihon wa Chūgoku ni Taisho shi, Keizai, Bunka Kōryū ya Boeki o Yattemo Ikko ni Kamawanai. Kono Yöna Seifu no Kagaekata wa Kongo mo Kaeru Hitsuyō wa Nai'.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 November 1962.


Nihon Kōgyō Shimbun, 18 April 1963.

Nihon Kōgyō Shimbun, 18 April 1963.


Chiang Kai Shek reportedly sent a letter of protest to former Prime Minister Yoshida, who, in his reply, is said to have assured the Generalissimo that deferred payments did not constitute economic aid and that Japan's overall China policies remained unchanged. See Mainichi Shimbun, 10 September 1963.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 September 1963.

Mainichi Shimbun, 9 October 1963.


Mainichi Shimbun, 3 September 1963. In making its decision the Danish Government had apparently supported the contentions of the Atomic Energy Commission, directed by the Nobel Prize winning nuclear physicist Dr Niels Bohr, against the advice of the Defence Ministry.

Concrete plans for the construction of this vessel had actually been drawn up by July 1963, although work did not begin until 1967. See Genshiryoku Iinkai (Ed.), Genshi Ryoku Hakusho, (Okura Shō Insatsu-kyoku, 1968), p.11ff.

These views were said to be particularly strong in the Foreign Ministry. See Tōkyō Shimbun, 3 June 1962 (evening edition).


Tōkyō Shimbun, 24 January 1963. See also Bōei Nenkan 1964, p.110.

The Yomiuri Shimbun (9 February 1963) reported that the Defence Agency and Foreign Ministry saw the Gilpatric visit as an American attempt to stem the tide in favour of peaceful coexistence in the Ikeda Cabinet. No evidence was advanced to support this conclusion. Indeed, Government statements on the contents of the talks with Gilpatric were very vague (see Asahi Shimbun, 8 February 1963; Mainichi Shimbun 7


61 Asahi Shimbun, 12 April 1963.


63 Asahi Shimbun, 28 March 1963.

64 Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 April 1963.

65 Asahi Shimbun, 27 April 1963.


68 Mainichi Shimbun, 30 December 1963.

69 The Liberal-Democrats won a total of 283 seats, compared with 296 in the 1960 General Election and 286 seats actually held at the time of dissolution. Their percentage of votes cast for the Conservatives dropped from 57.8 per cent in the 1960 election to 55.6 per cent. The Socialist Party won 144 seats, compared with 145 in the 1960 election and 137 held at the time of dissolution. The Democratic Socialist Party won 23 seats, compared with 16 in the previous election and 14 actually held at the time of dissolution. The Communists increased their representation from 3 to 5 seats. The percentage of votes cast for the Renovationist camp (the two Socialist Parties and the Communists) decreased from 39.3 per cent in 1960 to 38.3 per cent, although the percentage of votes cast for the Socialist Party and the Communist Party registered a slight increase. See Asahi Shimbun, 22 November 1963.

70 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 December 1963.

71 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 December 1963.

72 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 December 1963.

73 Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 1963.

74 Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 1963.

75 Asahi Shimbun, 31 May 1964 (evening edition).
For details of the election, see Asahi Shimbun, 10 July 1964 (evening edition).

Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1964.

For details of the reorganized Cabinet, see Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1964.

See Asahi Shimbun, 10 November 1964; Mainichi Shimbun, 10 November 1964.


Satō saw Japan's principal task as being the adjustment of relations with Taiwan. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 January 1964.

For the full text of Ikeda's speech see Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1964 (evening edition).

Sankei Shimbun, 22 January 1964.

See Ikeda's speech as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 31 January 1964 (evening edition). The Prime Minister's words were Shina Minzoku ni Taisuru Nihonjin no Kimochi wa, Beikokujin to wa Chigau. Ima no Chūkyō Seiken wa, Wareware to Seijiteki Tachiba o Koto ni Suru ga, Mukashi kara Shinkinkan o Motte Iru no wa Jijitsu da. Beikoku wa Chōsen Jihen, Tōnan Ajia no Heiwa ni Taisuru Kyōsanshugi no Shinryaku nado de, Atama ni Kite Iru ga, Wareware wa Sō Iu Tachiba de wa nai.

See Óhira's speech as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 6 February 1964 (evening edition).

From the report of Óhira's speech in the Asahi Shimbun, 13 February 1964.

China was, according to Óhira, preoccupied with agricultural and industrial reconstruction. See the Foreign Minister's speech as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 18 February 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 1 March 1964 (evening edition).

Tōkyō Shimbun, 8 March 1964 (evening edition).

See his remarks as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 20 February 1964 (evening edition).

Mainichi Shimbun, 20 February 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 4 March 1964 (evening edition).
For a detailed analysis of the 'Unified View' and lengthy extracts from the text, see Sankei Shimbun, 3 March 1964. For a more abbreviated version, see Asahi Shimbun, 5 March 1964 (evening edition).


Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 March 1964.


Mainichi Shimbun, 10 February 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 10 August 1964 (evening edition).

For details of these visits see Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 September 1964; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 September 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 28 August 1964. Japan's recognition of port calls was not, however, unconditional. Only Nautilus-type nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional weapons were allowed to call freely at Japanese ports. Visits by submarines equipped with 'Polaris' or 'Regulus' missiles were not to be permitted. Nor, apparently, were visits by Thresher-type submarines equipped with 'Subroc' nuclear missiles. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 September 1964.

Asahi Shimbun, 17 October 1964.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 October 1964.

Sankei Shimbun, 4 November 1964.


'Wagakuni no Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru Chūkan Hōkoku'. For the full text see Watanabe Yōzō and Okakura Koshirō, op.cit., p.148ff. In general, external military threats did not disturb the Committee as much as the allegedly precarious state of internal security. After discussing the Chinese nuclear program, the first report outlined above went on to lament the fact that there existed, within Japan, numerous groups working as the agents of anti-Japanese Communist plots. Measures to curb the influence of these unpatriotic elements were strongly recommended. Subsequent reports developed this theme. A document prepared in May 1965, for example, advanced the view that while Chinese nuclear weapons had 'practically no threat value', China was already engaged in an ambitious campaign of subversion in Japan. Peking had already succeeded in establishing 'an important political base' in the Japanese mainland. She had built up centres of influence in the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, in industry, the mass media, and, alas, in the Liberal-Democratic Party itself. ('Kyokutō Jōsei to Wagakuni no Anzen Hoshō', as reproduced in Watanabe Yōzō and Okakura Koshirō, op.cit., p.126ff). The 'Interim Report' of 1966 followed similar lines.
Matsumura Kenzō, for example, believed that China's nuclear program made the necessity of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations 'greater than before'. (Asahi Shimbun, 20 October 1964).

For details of factional alignments in the first Satō Cabinet, see Mainichi Shimbun, 10 November 1964 and Tōkyō Shimbun, 22 February 1965. Significantly Matsumura Kenzō, Kawasaki Hideji, Furui Yoshimi and others interested in Sino-Japanese reconciliation broke with Miki in November 1964 over the issue of co-operation with Satō. See Asahi Shimbun, 22 November 1964 (evening edition) and Sankei Shimbun, 24 November 1964.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 27 November 1964.


Sankei Shimbun, 2 December 1964.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 December 1964.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 December 1964 (evening edition). (A report of the Prime Minister's remarks to the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 28 November.)


Asahi Shimbun, 24 January 1965.


Asahi Shimbun, 4 June 1965; Tōkyō Shimbun, 4 June 1965.


See Chapter 4, note 39.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 March 1966.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 March 1966.

The American Ambassador singled out two reporters, Mr Ōmori of the Mainichi Shimbun and Mr Hata of the Asahi Shimbun, for particular criticism. Reischauer alleged that the Japanese press gave 'one sided' and 'unbalanced' coverage of the war, and that Ōmori and Hata were guilty of transmitting North Vietnamese propaganda directly and uncritically to the Japanese public. See Asahi Shimbun, 9 October 1965. Ōmori subsequently replied at length to these criticisms, see Ōmori Minoru, Ishi ni Kaku, Raishyawā Jiken no Shinsō, (Ushio Shuppan Sha, 1971).

As reported in Mainichi Shimbun, 25 December 1965 (evening edition).


Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 4 January 1966.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 March 1966.

See Satō's speech as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 25 November 1965.

See the Prime Minister's remarks as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1965.


Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 March 1966.

Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 1966 (evening edition).

See Shiina's speech as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 1966 (evening edition).

See the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Councillors Special Committee on relations with the Republic of Korea, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1965. Satō's words were Tada Kyōi o Kanjite Iru to Ittemo, Tadachi ni, Sore o Seisaku ni Arawasu Koto wa Nai.

Wakaizumi Kei, 'Makunamara Bei Kokubō Chōkan Tandoku Kaiken Ki', Chūō Köron, September 1966.

See the report of Gilpatric's alleged statement in Sekai Shūhō, 7 May 1963.

Asahi Shimbun, 29 September 1965.

For a good discussion of the Mitsuya Kenkyū (Three Arrows Research) and its implications, see Sakanaka Tomohisa, et.al., Nihon no Jiei Ryoku (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967), p.72ff. As far as can be judged from the public record, these war games did not envisage direct Japanese military intervention in the Korean peninsula.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 11 January 1963.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 11 January 1963.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 11 January 1963.


In September 1962, for example, Kaya Okinori told a meeting of the Foreign and Domestic Situation Research Council (a body organized by Hasegawa Saiji, Chairman of the Jiji Press) that maintenance of
the status quo in Korea was vitally necessary for Japanese military security. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 September 1962). Yet in March 1963 Kaya told the Yomiuri Shimbun that it was 'for historical reasons' 'proper and necessary' for Japan to prohibit overseas military service, oppose conscription and reject nuclear weapons. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 March 1963).


Tōkyō Shimbun, 13 October 1965.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 June 1965.

Asahi Shimbun, 15 October 1965.

See the statements of Prime Minister Satō and the Director of the Legislative Bureau Mr Hayashi to the House of Representatives Special Committee on Relations with the Republic of Korea, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 6 November 1965.

See Foreign Minister Shiina's statement in the House of Councillors Special Committee on Relations with the Republic of Korea, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1965 (evening edition).

See the remarks by the Defence Agency Director General Mr Matsuno in the House of Councillors Special Committee on Relations with the Republic of Korea, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 4 December 1965. See also note 151 (above).

See Satō's television interview of 13 May 1966, as reported in the Sankei Shimbun, 14 May 1966.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 23 June 1965.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 23 June 1965.

But not, however, if the experience of countries like Italy, and Japan herself, are any guide to future developments. If these countries increasing prosperity, urbanization and industrialization has brought in its wake an increase in support for the Parties of the left.


Mainichi Shimbun, 10 June 1965. The Mainichi refers to an interview with former Prime Minister Yoshida in the English language magazine East. In a later television interview Yoshida complained that China's problem was her tendency to regard herself as the Middle Kingdom and that the same was true of the United States. See Mainichi Shimbun, 1 September 1965.

Asahi Shimbun, 1 July 1966.

Mainichi Shimbun, 29 October 1966.
For the views of these individuals see Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 June 1965; Asahi Shimbun, 7 July 1966 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 February 1968.

See Shiina's statement to an Asahi Shimbun reporter in London, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 18 January 1965.

Asahi Shimbun, 1 April 1965.


For estimates of the strength of this group, see Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.251ff. and Uchida Kenzō, 'Jimintō Daigishō no Chūgokukan', Chūō Kōron, July 1965.

For the antecedents of this group and the moves leading to its formation, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 December 1964 (evening edition).

For the size, character and objectives of this organization, see Uchida Kenzō, op.cit., and Fukui Haruhiro, op.cit., p.251ff.

Mainichi Shimbun, 29 November 1966.


Tōkyō Shimbun, 27 September 1966.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 October 1966.

Mainichi Shimbun, 29 November 1966.


Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 June 1966.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 7 June 1966.

Mainichi Shimbun, 2 November 1966; Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 December 1966.


For examples of this kind of writing, see the editorial comment in the major Tokyo newspapers after the revelation of the Mai Lai massacre in 1969. (Asahi Shimbun, 1 December, 8 December 1969; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 November 1969; Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 December 1969; Sankei Shimbun, 2 December 1969; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 December 1969.) Not only was there strong condemnation of the whole trend of American policy and the premises on which it was based, but also insinuations that the incident was typical of the white man's wars in Asia. Yet in 1962 even the Asahi Shimbun, the most radical of the great Tokyo dailies, had generally supported American policies. (See Asahi Shimbun, 28 February 1962). See also Honda Katsuichi, Hokubaku

Kishida differed somewhat from the others in that he did not completely reject military power. However his strong interest in disarmament, peaceful coexistence and neutrality placed him closer to the 'neo-idealists' than the 'neo-realists'.

As Eto Shinkichi remarked in 1965

Modern Japanese youth will not easily swallow American style military education designed to inculcate missionary zeal to protect freedom and democracy.... The great majority of the Japanese people are probably opposed to Communism. But if they were faced with a choice between Communism and war, I wonder whether they would not choose Communism.

(Etō Shinkichi, 'Nihon no Anzen Hoshō Ryoku o Dō Takameru ka', Chūō Köron, May 1965, p.112-113.)


For Kösaka Masataka's view of the Chinese nuclear program and its effects on Japan, see, in addition to the articles listed in note 184, his contributions in the Mainichi Shimbun, 19 June 1967 and the Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 May 1966 (evening edition) - 31 May, 1966 (evening edition) (a series of five articles). Nagai Yonosuke, in addition to the monograph mentioned in note 184, also outlined his views in the Mainichi Shimbun, 18 April 1966; Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 May 1966; and in a discussion with Inoki Masamichi reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 January 1968. For Etō Shinkichi's views on Chinese nuclear weapons and Japan's security see, in addition to the article referred to in note 184, the record of a round table discussion with Saeki Kiichi, Itagaki Yōichi, Ōno Katsumi and Okita Saburō in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 January 1966; the record of another panel discussion with Kotani
Hidejirō, Nakamura Seitarō and Arakawa Hiroshi in the Sankei Shimbun, 19 June 1967 and Etō's individual contributions to the Mainichi Shimbun, 19 April 1966; Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 April 1968; Mainichi Shimbun, 14 August 1968; Sankei Shimbun, 16 September, 1968. Even Wakaizumi Kei who stressed, more than any of the neo-realists, the potentially adverse effects of the Chinese bomb on Japan, maintained that Japan should avoid actions that could be construed as a threat by Peking. (Wakaizumi Kei, Chūgoku no Kaku Busō to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, Chūō Kōron, February 1966, p.79. For the views of the older generation of realists, see Saeki Kiichi, Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1966), especially pp. 30, 31, 33-37, 62ff and 82ff. Saeki also contributed articles on the Chinese nuclear program to the Sankei Shimbun, 10 March 1967 (evening edition); 11 March 1967 (evening edition); 25 April 1967 (evening edition); 26 April 1967 (evening edition); 30 June 1967 (evening edition); 27 November 1967 (evening edition) and in the Asahi Shimbun, 28 October 1966. See also the record of a round table discussion among Saeki, Terasawa Hajime and Inoki Masamichi, as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 March 1967, and of a dialogue between Saeki and Yamada Hisanari in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 October 1966 (evening edition). Other articles of interest are Toga Hiroshi, 'Chūkyō no Kaku Busō to Nihon', in Kaku Jidai to Nihon no Kaku Seisaku, (Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, 5,Hara Shobō,1968) and the record of a round table discussion among Kusumi Tadao, Ishikawa Shigeru and Ureshino Masao in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 June 1967. For a more detailed discussion of the reactions of intellectuals and strategic studies experts to China's emergence as a nuclear power, see the present writer's Japan and Nuclear China, Japanese Reactions to China's Nuclear Weapons, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 9, (a publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Press, 1970).

186 See Wakaizumi's contributions to the Mainichi Shimbun, 15 May 1967 (evening edition) and 17 May 1967 (evening edition).

187 See Kōsaka's article in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 May 1966 (evening edition); Nagai's articles in the Mainichi Shimbun, 18 April 1966, in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 May 1966 and the same author's 'Beikoku no Sensōkan to Mōtakutō no Chōsen' in Heiwa no Daishō, op.cit., p.64-66. For Etō's views on this aspect of the subject, see his 'Nihon no Anzen Hoshō Ryoku o Dō Takameru ka', Chūō Kōron, May 1965.

188 Nagai Ynosukō, 'Nihon Gaikō ni Okeru Kōsoku to Sentaku', in Heiwa no Saishō, op.cit., p.119-120.

189 Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 April 1968.

190 Asahi Shimbun, 5 January 1969.

191 Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 April 1968.

192 For a detailed analysis of this subject see Hayashi Chikio, 'Chōsa: Betonamu o Dō Miru ka', Jiyū, October 1965. An English summary of this important article can be found in the Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, Volume IV, Number 2, August 1966.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6.

1 For a discussion of the Ōtsu speech and its repercussions, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 February 1967. The Ōtsu Statement caught the Liberal-Democratic Party by surprise, adding confusion to an already complex situation. Despite the interest of successive Governments in Okinawan reversion, the Party had never unified its views on how the island was to be returned or what was to be done about the bases. In 1965 Tokonami Tokuji, then Chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem, proposed that recovery of administrative rights be treated separately from the question of bases. Administrative rights were to be recovered step by step, beginning with education, social security and so on. This was still the official policy of the Committee at the time of the Ōtsu Statement. Shortly after the appearance of the Tokonami plan, Nakasone began to advocate regional recovery of administrative rights. Japan was first to recover Miyako, Yaeyama islands, where there were no American bases, then gradually, at some uncertain future date, extend her control to the main islands of the Ryūkyū group. The Director General of the Prime Minister's Office Mori Kiyoshi had advanced a plan for separate recovery of educational rights. Satō's call for the reversion of all administrative rights was thus, in the context of Conservative Party policy towards Okinawa, a radical departure.

2 Sankei Shimbun, 3 February 1967.

3 For separate reports of this statement, see Asahi Shimbun, 23 March 1967: Mainichi Shimbun, 23 March 1967; Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 March 1967; Sankei Shimbun, 23 March 1967.


5 See Chapter 1, note 4 of the present thesis.

6 For a detailed examination of Okinawa as a military base, see Sakanaka Tomohisa (Ed.) Amerika Senryakuka no Okinawa, (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967).

7 See Chapter 4 of the present thesis.

8 For a detailed examination of the factional situation in the Liberal-Democratic Party at this stage, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 31 January 1967.


10 For a comprehensive discussion of these electoral trends, see Sankei Shimbun, 18 April 1967.
For Fukuda's views, see Sankei Shimbun 18 April 1967. Fukuda lamented that the Liberal-Democrats 'could not even put up an election poll' without having assistance, while the Communist Party had 'hundreds of young men' willing to devote their time and energy to advancing its cause.

See Tokyo Shimbun, 20 April 1967.


Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 July 1967.

The Prime Minister later assured reporters that the four nation conference had been no more than 'a morning tea party, a social get together'. (Mainichi Shimbun, 3 July 1967).

For accounts of the domestic and international repercussions of this visit see the Asahi Shimbun, 9 September 1967; Sankei Shimbun, 8 September 1967 and Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 September 1967.

Asahi Shimbun, 8 October 1967. For the controversy in the Liberal-Democratic Party preceding Satō's visit, see Asahi Shimbun, 14 July 1967.

Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 1967.


For accounts of Miki's speech and its internal repercussions, see Tokyo Shimbun, 7 July 1967 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 July 1967 (evening edition). While Satō was in Seoul and Miki in Bangkok, representatives of the Party left wing were in China. In July Utsunomiya Tokuma returned from a visit to the Peoples' Republic full of praise for the discipline, vigour, youthfulness and humanity of the Chinese army. On these qualities, Utsunomiya declared, the Peoples' Liberation Army was far superior to the Japanese Imperial Army at the height of its power. Mainichi Shimbun, 10 July 1967.

See Miki's interview with the Mainichi Shimbun, 25 July 1967.

For a faction by faction, group by group breakdown of Liberal-Democratic Party attitudes to this problem, see Tokyo Shimbun, 11 October 1967. For the strong line of Defence Agency Director General Masuda on the question of nuclear bases, see his statement in the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee (6 October 1967), as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 7 October 1967. From the Japanese side, perhaps the strongest pressure for retaining American nuclear bases intact came from the Ambassador to the United States, Mr Shimoda Takezō. For Shimoda's views, see his interview with the Mainichi Shimbun, 4 October 1967, Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 October 1967.
See Miki's statement after discussions with Satō on 3 October 1967, as reported in the Asahi Shim bun, 3 October 1967 (evening edition).


Tokyo Shim bun, 6 October 1967.


Sankei Shim bun, 15 November 1967.

Satō-Johnson Joint Communiqué, Article VII, as reproduced in U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, Volume XLVII, Number 1484, 4 December 1967, p.744-747.

Ibid., Article VII.

Mr Satō 'emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands'. President Johnson agreed that 'the status' of the Ryūkyūs should be kept under 'joint and continuous review', with 'the aim of returning administrative rights...to Japan'. It was agreed to establish an advisory committee to promote social and economic identification of the Ryūkyūs with the Japanese mainland. (Ibid., Article VII). After the conference, however, United States spokesmen stressed that President Johnson had not agreed to reversion of Okinawa within a few years. This had merely been a hope expressed by Prime Minister Satō. Moreover, Mr Sato had not hoped for actual reversion within a few years, only that agreement could be reached in that period. See Asahi Shim bun, 16 November 1967 (evening edition).


Mainichi Shim bun, 31 December 1967.


For details see Mainichi Shim bun, 16 January 1968.

Satō-Johnson Joint Communiqué, Article III.

Ibid., Article IV.


Asahi Shimbun, 19 December 1967. See also Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 December 1967 for a more colourful version of this speech.

Kokkai Ampo Ronsō, Sokkiroku to Yoten Kaisetsu (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1968), Volume 1, p.206.


For details of these manoeuvres, see Mainichi Shimbun, 26 November 1967 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 November 1967 (evening edition).


See Defence Agency Director General Masuda's statement to the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee on 18 January 1968, as reported by the Mainichi Shimbun, 19 January 1968.

For details of these events, see all the major Tokyo newspapers for the period 19-23 January 1968.


The Government had, in fact, distributed some 60,000 pamphlets in support of the visit within the city of Sasebo. For details of the Government's public relations campaign, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 January 1968.


Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 February 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 8 February 1968 (evening edition); Asahi Shimbun, 9 February 1968; Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 February 1968.

See the Prime Minister's statement as reported in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 3 April 1968 (evening edition).

Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 April 1968.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 2 April 1968 (evening edition). See also the report of Nakasone's remarks to a gathering of new students at Takushoku University (of which he was President) on 10 April 1968, in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 10 April 1968 (evening edition).
See the Foreign Minister's reply to questions by Kawasaki Kanji (Socialist Party) in the House of Representatives Special Committee on Okinawa and the Bonins, 19 April 1968 (as reported in the Mainichi Shimbun 20 April 1968). See also Miki's remarks in a round table discussion with Hanyū Sanshichi, Kosaka Tokusaburō and Ishikawa Tadao, as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 April 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 9 February 1968. The timing of the meeting was, of course, quite accidental. For further details, see Mainichi Shimbun, 11 March 1968.

Sankei Shimbun, 26 March 1968. For details of the proceedings at various meetings, see Sankei Shimbun, 11 April 1968, Mainichi Shimbun, 11 April 1968.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 April 1968.

For a more detailed discussion of factional movements, and of the complicated divisions of opinion within individual factions, see Asahi Shimbun, 25 April 1968 (evening edition).

Asahi Shimbun, 14 May 1968. On 13 May the Prime Minister suggested to the Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Sharpe that nuclear submarine visits be suspended until the cause of the radioactivity had been found. (Sankei Shimbun, 14 May 1968 (evening edition)).

The Foreign Ministry, however, took a strong line against the view that the Swordfish had been responsible for the radioactivity. This attitude was publicly rebuked by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Mr Kimura. See Kimura's statement in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 May 1968.

Asahi Shimbun, 14 May 1968.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 May 1968.

However, one of the chief problems during the subsequent Japanese-American investigations into the incident was the unwillingness of the United States to furnish adequate data. Washington apparently feared that military secrets might be leaked in the process. Thus the link between the Swordfish and the abnormal level of radioactivity could not be conclusively established. See the report of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura's press conference on 29 May 1968, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 1968.

The details of these negotiations are, of course, unknown to the present writer. It would appear, however, that the joint Japanese-American committee set up after the incident failed to agree on the causes of the contamination (see note 68, above). The Americans then assumed the position that the Swordfish had not, during its stay in port, violated the provisions of the August 1964 Note Verbale and Aide Mémoire, which formed the basis of the original Japanese-American agreement. The Aide Mémoire apparently permitted materials in port, provided the discharge was 'safe' in accordance with the procedures and standards of the United States Navy's radioactivity control system. (Asahi Shimbun, 24 May 1968). The Japanese eventually announced
that efforts to discover the cause of contamination had been frustrated by the inadequacies of Japan's own inspection system and the reluctance of the United States to furnish relevant data (Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 1968). This was widely, and incorrectly, regarded as a capitulation to the United States. On 31 May, after hearing a written report from the Atomic Energy Commission, the Cabinet decided to request that nuclear submarines refrain from discharging primary coolant while in Japanese ports and that, in general, stricter control on emission of radioactivity be applied (Asahi Shimbun, 31 May 1968 (evening edition)). The United States assumed a more inflexible posture than expected. Ambassador Johnson, who returned to Tokyo on 18 June after consultations in Washington on what was now regarded as a minor crisis in Japanese-American relations, gave no more than a promise that the United States would 'exercise restraint' on coolant discharge (Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 June 1968 (evening edition)). It was rumoured that Foreign Minister Miki, after consultations with the Prime Minister and the Director of the Science and Technology Agency, refused to accept the Ambassador's reply (Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 June 1968 (evening edition)). There was talk of a 'cooling' in Japanese-American relations. The following day (19 June 1968), perhaps as a gesture of annoyance, the United States sent the 30,000 ton aircraft carrier Yorktown and five destroyers into Sasebo with only 2 hours notice. Since it was the rule to announce such arrivals at least 12 hours beforehand (so that adequate preparations could be made), the port of Sasebo was thrown into confusion. (Asahi Shimbun, 19 June 1968). These signs of American displeasure, however, failed to move the Government. Negotiations dragged on indecisively for another four months. In the end, the Americans made the considerable concessions on the coolant issue referred to in the text of this thesis.

70 Sankei Shimbun, 4 September 1968.

71 For Liberal-Democratic Party reaction to the incident, see Asahi Shimbun, 4 June 1968 (evening edition); Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 June 1968 (evening edition); Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 June 1968; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 4 June 1968 (evening edition) and Sankei Shimbun, 4 June 1968 (evening edition). In the Cabinet, it was right wing personalities like Education Minister Nadao and Defence Agency Director General Masuda who, along with Transport Minister Nakasone, emerged as the principal proponents of the view that some relocation of bases was necessary.

72 Mainichi Shimbun, 6 June 1968.

73 Tokyo Shimbun, 16 June 1968.

74 Sankei Shimbun, 19 June 1968.

75 Nakasone clarified his views before an audience in Maebashi (Gunma Prefecture) on 18 June 1968. (See Tokyo Shimbun, 19 June 1968). Maeo revealed his position at a youth seminar organized by his faction in Hakone in August. (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 August 1968).

76 See Fukuda's interview with the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 July 1968. Fukuda had apparently come to the conclusion that non-nuclear bases with free take-off for American forces was the most workable formula.

77 Asahi Shimbun, 12 June 1968.

Sankei Shimbun, 14 May 1968.

For details of the election and factional alignments before and after, see Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1968 (evening edition).


Asahi Shimbun, 1 December 1968 (evening edition).

See the Prime Minister’s reply to Maekawa Tan (Socialist Party), in the House of Councillors Budget Committee, as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 March 1969.

Mainichi Shimbun, 26 February 1969.

Mainichi Shimbun, 3 October 1967.

Mainichi Shimbun, 12 May 1969.

Apart from Kusumi Tadao, the Committee included Eto Shinkichi, Hayashi Shinzō, Kishida Junnosuke, Kamiya Fuji, Komiyama Chiaki, Kōsaka Masataka, Kotani Hidejiro, Miyoshi Osamu, Nagai Yonosuke, Ohama Nobumoto, Nakamura Kikuo, Suetsugu Ichirō, Saeki Kichi and Wakaizumi Kei. For other details, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 February 1968.

The recommendations of the Kusumi report was summarized in the Sankei Shimbun, 9 March 1969 and in the Asahi Shimbun, 9 March 1969.


Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1968.

See, for example, the editorial in the Mainichi Shimbun, 7 November 1968, the editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 November 1968 and the Tōkyō Shimbun editorial of 8 November 1968. See also the gloomy articles in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 7 November 1968 and 8 November 1968.

See Ohira’s remarks as reported in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 7 November 1968.

For the views of the former Japanese Ambassador to the United States Asakai Kōichirō, see the Mainichi Shimbun, 7 November 1968. For the prognostications of Takeuchi Ryūji, another former Ambassador to Washington, see Asahi Shimbun, 8 November 1968. Iwasa Yoshizane, the then President of the Fuji Bank, expressed his opinions in Nikkan Kogyō Shimbun, 8 November 1968.
95 See Satō's press conference of 15 November 1968, as reported in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 15 November 1968 (evening edition). In his administrative policy speech, the Prime Minister later stressed that ASPAC would 'definitely' not become a military alliance. (Sankei Shimbun, 11 December 1968, (evening edition)).

96 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 December 1968.

97 See Takatsuji’s reply to Maekawa Tan (Socialist Party) in the House of Councillors Budget Committee, 10 March 1969, as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 March 1969.

98 For detailed reports of these important discussions, see Asahi Shimbun, 29 April 1969 (evening edition); Asahi Shimbun, 30 April 1969; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 April 1969 (evening edition); Sankei Shimbun, 29 April 1969 (evening edition) and Sankei Shimbun, 30 April 1969 (evening edition).

99 Tōkyō Shimbun, 30 April 1969.

100 Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 May 1969 (evening edition).


102 Sankei Shimbun, 20 May 1969.


104 For a report of the Aichi-Nixon talks, as a result of which the Japanese Foreign Minister received a golf ball personally signed by the President, and an assurance that 'no President has been better informed on Japan and Asia than I', see Asahi Shimbun, 3 June 1969, Tōkyō Shimbun, 4 June 1969 and Asahi Shimbun, 8 June 1969. For the Aichi-Rogers talks, see Asahi Shimbun, 5 June 1969 (evening edition), Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 June 1969 (evening edition) and Tōkyō Shimbun, 6 June 1969 (evening edition).

105 For the Aichi-Meyer talks, see Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1969.

106 Mainichi Shimbun, 30 July 1969.

107 For the Aichi-Rogers talks, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 September 1969; Mainichi Shimbun, 16 September 1969; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 September 1969.


109 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 October 1969.

110 Tōkyō Shimbun, 2 November 1969.

111 Asahi Shimbun, 17 November 1969.

112 Asahi Shimbun, 17 November 1969.
Interest in firm enforcement of prior consultations centred around the Nakasone faction (for Nakasone's views see his statement at Maebashi, Gunma Prefecture, as reported in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 19 June 1968). Nakasone's demands were similar to those made by his patron Kōno Ichirō in 1959-60. For the views of Fukuda, Kaya and Kishi, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 July 1968 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31 March 1969 (evening edition).

As reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 10 March 1969.

For examples of joint South Korean, Formosan and South Vietnamese efforts to influence the Japanese-American negotiations, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 June 1969.


See the report of an interview with Hori in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 15 March 1963.

According to a report in the Sankei Shimbun (28 April 1969), the Prime Minister was only informed of the incident three hours after it occurred, and some time after both American forces based in Japan, and the Japanese Air Self Defence Force, had gone on the alert. The Prime Minister had, according to this report, been informed not by the United States, but by the Defence Agency. The Sankei Shimbun did not give the source of its information.

Sankei Shimbun, 30 April 1969. See also Mainichi Shimbun, 2 May 1969 (evening edition); Asahi Shimbun, 6 May 1969 (evening edition); Mainichi Shimbun, 6 May 1969 (evening edition); Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 May 1969 (evening edition).


See Aichi's reply to Kawasaki Kanji (Socialist Party), in the House of Representatives Special Committee on Okinawa and the Northern Islands Problem, on 19 June 1969, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 18 June 1969.
See Satō's reply to Oide Shun (Socialist Party) on 19 June 1969, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 20 June 1969.


Ibid., Article 8.

See Satō's press conference of 26 November 1969, as reported in the Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1969. See also Aichi's comments in a round table discussion with Ishibashi Masashi, (Socialist Party), as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 December 1969.

See Aichi's explanations in the course of a round table discussion with Kuroyanagi Akira (Kōmeitō), Fuwa Tetsuzō (Communist Party) and Kosaka Zentaro (Liberal-Democratic Party), as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 December 1969. For Kimura's comments, see Nihon Keizai Shim bun, 23 November 1969.


Asahi Shimbun, 27 November 1969.

See Aichi's explanations in the round table discussion with Kuroyanagi, Fuwa and Kosaka, referred to in note 133, above.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1 For detailed discussions of the Japanese civilian nuclear program see, in English, Victor Gilinsky and Paul Langer, The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program (The Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-5366-PR, August 1967) and, in Japanese, Genshi Ryoku Iinkai (Ed.), Genshi Ryoku Hakusho, 1968, (Okura Shō Insatsu Kyoku, 1968). The present writer has drawn heavily on both these sources in compiling this chapter.


4 'Genshi Ryoku Kaihatsu Riyō Chōki Keikaku no Kettei ni Tsuite', (13 April 1967), as reproduced in Appendix II of the Genshi Ryoku Hakusho, op.cit., p. 142-3. For details of completed nuclear power stations, and of stations planned in the immediate future, see Genshi Ryoku Hakusho, op.cit., p.31-37.

5 The words 'jishu kaihatsu e no shinro' appeared, curiously enough, on a detachable strip of paper on the cover of the report, but not on the title page of the book itself.


7 Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 March 1968.

8 Gilinsky and Langer, op.cit., p.18-19.


10 See in particular, the hostile editorial in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun 18 May 1968.

11 Mainichi Shimbun, 20 July 1968.

12 Newsweek, 11 August, 1969.


14 For the texts of these statements, see Boei Nenkan, 1958, p.174 and Boei Nenkan, 1960, p.132.


17 Mainichi Shimbun, 26 October 1967 (evening edition).
18 Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 March 1968.
20 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 22 April 1966.
21 Mainichi Shimbun, 15 November 1969.
22 Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 March 1968.
23 Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 February 1968.
24 Mainichi Shimbun, 24 February 1968.
26 For details of this interesting episode, see the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 March 1969.
27 Genshi Ryoku Hakusho, op.cit., p.137-141.
30 Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 January 1968.
31 See Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 February 1968.
34 Maeda Hisashi, 'Kaku Kakubō Jōyaku to Nihon no Kaku Seisaku', Kokubō, August 1968.
35 Sekino Hideo, 'Kaku Heiki Kaihatsu no Jōkyō to Soño Eikyō', Kōmei, August 1968.
38 Ibid., p.32ff.
39 Ibid., p.17ff.
40 Ibid., p.52.
41 Ibid., p.81.
42 Ibid., p.19-20.
43 Ibid., p.53.
44 Ibid., p.75.
45 Ibid., p.76.
46 Ibid., p.52.
47 Ibid., p.68.
48 Ibid., p.65.
49 Ibid., p.67.
50 Ibid., p.63.
51 Ibid., p.64.
52 Ibid., p.70.
53 Sankei Shim bun, 10 February 1967.
54 Sankei Shim bun, 10 February 1967.
55 Sankei Shim bun, 10 February 1967.
57 Mainichi Shim bun, 10 March 1967 (evening edition).
Sankei Shim bun, 10 March (evening edition).
59 Asahi Shim bun, 20 April 1967.
60 Yomiuri Shim bun, 12 April 1967.
61 Tōkyō Shim bun, 22 April 1967.
63 International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, op.cit., p.146-149.
64 Ibid., p.83-86.
Ibid., p.81-82.

Ibid., p.90.

Ibid., p.86ff.

Ibid., p.89-90.

Ibid., p.150-154.

Ibid., p.155.


See the attitude of Foreign Ministry spokesmen, as reported in the Mainichi Shimbun, 9 March 1968.

See Sato's statement to the House of Representatives Budget Committee (6 February 1968), as reported in the Mainichi Shimbun, 11 February 1968. See also Sankei Shimbun, 30 April 1968 and Asahi Shimbun, 1 June 1968, (evening edition). For the detailed objections of the Atomic Energy Commission, see Asahi Shimbun, 2 February 1968.

Sankei Shimbun, 30 April 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 11 February 1968.

Sankei Shimbun, 12 June 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 3 July 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 3 July 1968.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 September 1968.

Asahi Shimbun, 18 September 1968.


Tōkyō Shimbun, 16 September 1968.

Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 1968.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 May 1969 (evening edition). See also Aichi's reply to Nishimura Kanichi in the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee on 19 June 1969, as reported in the Sankei Shimbun, 20 June 1969.
For the attitude of the Socialist Party, see the article by Narita Tomomi in the Mainichi Shimbun, 6 November 1969. Nishimura Eiichi outlined the views of the Democratic Socialist Party in the Mainichi Shimbun, 6 November 1969. For the views of the Kōmeitō, see the article by Takeiri Yoshikatsu in the Mainichi Shimbun, 6 November 1969. For Communist Party attitude, see Akahata, 8 November 1969.

Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 1967.

Asahi Shimbun, 28 June 1969.

For details of the complicated manoeuvres in the Liberal-Democratic Party prior to Satō's departure for Washington, see the report of the joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Research Council, the Security Research Council and the Special Committee on Science and Technology, held on 7 November 1969, in the Sankei Shimbun, 8 November 1969; and the report of the Party Executive Council resolutions in the Tōkyō Shimbun, 15 November 1969.

Asahi Shimbun, 9 January 1970.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 26 January 1970.

Asahi Shimbun, 4 February 1970.

Kaku Heiki Fukakusan Jōyaku Shomei no Sai no Nihon Seifu Seimei.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8


2 Sakanaka Tomohisa, et.al., op.cit., p.66ff.


4 For a general discussion of the army's role, see Sakanaka Tomohisa, et.al., op.cit., p.42ff. For an extremely detailed account of Self Defence Force activities in Hokkaidō, see Hokkaidō Haibō Iinkai (The Hokkaidō Peace Committee), Hokkaidō Kokusho, Ampo Taisei ka no Jieitai (Rōdō Junpō Sha, 1969).

5 This is the usual explanation for the 1960-62 reorganization and is the one adopted by Sakanaka. It is also, interestingly enough, the view adopted by the Communist Party. See Okazaki Masuhide, Jinmin Danatsu Butai to shite no Jieitai, in Nihon no Guntai Jieitai (Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Iinkai Kikanshi Keiei Kyoku, 1969) p.46ff. The writings of the former Chief of the Ground Staff General Sugita Ichiji (discussed later in this chapter) also reveal an overwhelming preoccupation with internal security. At least one writer, however, believes that the reorganization was a prelude to equipping the Self Defence Forces with tactical nuclear weapons. See Yoshihara Köichirō, Nanajū-Nen Ampo to Nihon no Gunji Ryoku (Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1969), p.30ff.

6 Hayashi Naomichi,'Nihon Gunkokushugi Fukkatsu no Keizaiteki Kiso', Gendai to Shisō, October 1970, p.234.

7 The Australian, 8 May 1971.

8 Nakada Minoru, et.al., Nihon no Bōei to Keizai (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1967) op.cit., p.107ff.

9 In December 1961 the monthly salary of a Grade 2 Private (Nitō Shi), the rank comprising the greatest number of personnel in all three services was ¥8,000 (approximately U.S.$22.2). By January 1967 this had risen to ¥15,000 (U.S.$41.9). (Ibid., p.110.)

10 In 1960 the average cost of paying, administering, clothing, housing, feeding, training and repairing the equipment of one ground soldier was ¥347,000 (U.S.$963.9). By 1967 this had risen to ¥851,000 (U.S.$2369.9). In the same period the equivalent costs for naval personnel rose from ¥709,000 (U.S.$1969), to ¥15,160,000 (U.S.$4211). Costs for air personnel rose from ¥896,000 (U.S.$2488.9) to ¥1,813,000 (U.S.$5036.1). (Ibid., p.110.)
Annual maintenance costs for the Harukaze were estimated at ￥306,000,000 (U.S.$850,000). The Amatsukaze annually cost an estimated ￥6,696,000,000 (U.S.$18,600,000) to maintain.

The picture is, however, complicated by the fact that the fighters for the Japanese air force have either been imported directly from the United States or constructed in Japan under licence from American firms. In the case of domestic construction under licence, the ratio of the Japanese contribution in equipment, technology and labour to that of the United States has been extremely complicated and subject to sudden fluctuations. The Japanese role in construction of the F86 was negligible. In the case of the F104-J it has been estimated that in the domestic construction of the first 200 aircraft, 52 per cent of the body, 48 per cent of the engines, 61 per cent of the communications equipment was of Japanese manufacture. The firing control and automatic guidance systems were totally imported from the United States. In the construction of the next batch of 30 aircraft, 65 per cent of the body, 82 per cent of the engine, 78 per cent of the communications equipment and 52 per cent of the control and guidance systems were of Japanese manufacture. Annually varying amounts of American aid further confuse the picture. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Takase Shōji, 'Gunji Gijutsu to Bōei Seisan', in Nakada Minoru et.al., Nihon no Bōei to Keizai, op.cit., p.184ff.

This discussion is based on the statistics given by Nakada Minoru in Nihon no Bōei to Keizai, p.109-110.

For the National Defence Council Secretariat's estimates see Ibid., p.107. The concrete calculations are based on the statistics given in the relevant issues of The Military Balance.


For a summary of Amano Yoshihide's career see Tōkyō Shimbun, 17 March 1964. He discussed his views on defence in an interview with Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 2 May 1966 (evening edition), but the brevity and caution of his comments makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions.

Jinji Köshin Roku, 1970.

Asahi Shimbun, 11 August 1964.

For a brief summary of Nakayama Sadayoshi's career see the introduction to his article in Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, op.cit., p.529.

Mainichi Shimbun 10 August 1964 (evening edition).

24 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 April 1964.

25 For the circumstances surrounding Hayashi Keizo's initial appointment to the Police Reserve Force, see Chapter 2. Hayashi's background is discussed in the Mainichi Shimbun, 10 August, 1964 (evening edition).

26 For a brief biographical sketch of Omori Kan see Tōkyō Shimbun, 4 March 1962 and 10 January 1965.

27 Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.23.

28 These sentiments appear throughout Sugita's memoirs. See especially the text of his speech to the heads of various units on 31 March, 1960 (Ibid., p. 66.) According to the former Chief of Staff, the allies correctly realized that Japan's rise to great power status was the result of her Imperial institutions, military forces and patriotic education system. The allied weakening of the Imperial system, the trial of war criminals, the dissolution of the military forces, fostering of popular pacifism reorganization of education institutions, imposition of an 'ethical charter' on the Japan Teachers' Federation, revision of the constitution, recognition of the Communist Party, revision of the police system and attempts to undermine the family were all intended to emasculate Japan, to prevent her revival as a great power. In the character of their aims and the scale of the damage inflicted these events were, in Sugita's view 'comparable to Stalin's 1940 Katyn forest massacre of 20,000 loyal and brave Polish officers because of fear of a Polish revival'. Although the onset of the Cold War forced the Americans to realize the error of their ways and promote Japan's economic reconstruction and rearmament, no efforts were made to correct the damage to Japan's spiritual, social and political order.

29 Ibid., p.127.

30 Ibid., p.459.

31 See especially Ibid., Chapter 7, p.90ff; Chapter 9, p.110ff. (where the links between the left wing opposition parties and international Communist conspiracy are exposed) and Chapter 14, p.186ff (which discusses the Asanuma assassination).

32 Ibid., p.190-191.


34 Asahi Shimbun, 16 October 1960.

35 The former Chief of Staff painted a gloomy picture of Korea under the Chang Cabinet and portrayed its overthrow as the work of 'middle ranking military officers who had saved their ancestral land during the critical period of the Korean War'. (Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.272.)
Sugita was prepared to admit that the military leaders of the Taishō and early Shōwa eras had 'misused' their power and set in motion the chain of events that led eventually to the Pacific War. He protested that he had 'no objection' to the system of civilian control and acknowledged that in any modern state 'military affairs must be absolutely dependant on politics'. (Sugita, op.cit., p.157). However, his complaints that the system had been 'misinterpreted' to mean that civilian bureaucrats should take precedence over military men (Ibid., p.124, 125) and his passing remarks in a letter to Prime Minister Ikeda (Ibid., p.278-279) that 'the balance between civil and military has not been found' put the matter in a somewhat different light. The former Chief of Staff regarded many of the Defence Agency's civilian bureaucrats as time serving, uninspired, ignorant, disinterested in defence, unsympathetic in their attitude towards the Self Defence Forces and prejudiced against former Imperial officers (Ibid., p.118, 124, 125, 129, 135 and generally throughout his memoirs). It is clear that many of the changes he regarded as desirable would in fact have undermined the civilian control system as it had operated since 1954. He maintained that the shortsighted and obstructionist personnel in the Defence Agency's Internal Bureaux should be replaced by men with greater defence consciousness and a more suitable general attitude. Former Imperial officers and serving defence force members should not be excluded from the Bureaux (p.118, 124-5). A system should be established whereby high ranking military officers could work in close and continuous association with the Prime Minister and other policy makers, 'assisting' them with diplomatic and defence matters (Ibid., p.184, 185). Moreover, since 'half the cause of Japan's security having been forgotten lies with the faults of the existing [decision making?] organizations and the elitist attitude of the Finance Ministry towards defence', responsibility for compiling the budget should be taken out of the hands of that Ministry and entrusted to an independent National Budget Compilation Agency. According to Sugita this would enable the Prime Minister (presumably 'assisted' by high ranking officers) to determine the size of defence and other appropriations 'from a broad national standpoint'. (Ibid., p.454 ff).

In April 1960, a few weeks after Sugita's appointment as Chief of Staff, the South Korean Syng Man Rhee Government collapsed in the wake of popular unrest and was succeeded by the Chang Cabinet. The Kishi Government, taken by surprise and preoccupied, in any case, with its own domestic problems, adopted an attitude of complete neutrality. This policy was continued by the Ikeda Government. Despite this the former Chief of Staff recalls that ...

...in the [Japanese Ground] Staff, from about 8 April onwards, preparations were carried forward for the command exercises to be observed by the Ground Staff Inspectorate (Chief Inspector Vice-Chief of Staff Hosoda). The exercises began in earnest on 15 April. The exercises (kunren) were carried out taking into consideration (kami shitsutsu) the global situation and of the state of affairs in various neighbouring countries, particularly South Korea. (Ibid., p.270-272.)
Before the exercises began, South Korean press and radio reports indicated that Sugita had expressed concern over events in Seoul. Sugita promptly informed United Nations Headquarters in Korea that his statements had been 'misunderstood', but if one is to judge from the character of General MacGruders' reply his letter was couched in terms that revealed his anxiety. (Ibid., p.271). Since the exercises, involving 11,000 men with tank, artillery and helicopter support, took place in Kyūshū, just across the straits from South Korea, their potential impact, quite apart from Sugita's alleged statements, may well be imagined. However, the Kyūshū exercises were planned before Sugita took office. They merely happened accidentally, to coincide with the unrest in Korea. They were significant for events in Seoul only because of Sugita's cryptic announcements. Thus the Kishi Government would have found it difficult to discipline the Chief of Staff, even if it had been aware of his activities.

Events in Korea took their own course. Early in May student leaders proposed talks on reunification with North Korean students at Panmunjong. This evoked a favourable response from Pyongyang. Within days of this overture right wing army officers occupied Seoul and, to Sugita's relief, overthrew the Chang Cabinet and installed their own military régime. While the American role in this coup has never been made clear, Sugita's activities certainly cannot be credited with any influence on the course of events.

Sometime over the next ten months the Joint Staff Council prepared a memorandum on Korea's importance to Japanese security. This memorandum clearly envisaged the possibility of Japanese military intervention in certain circumstances. This is evident from Sugita's comment that

The dominant view (in the Government on reading the memorandum) was that it would be sufficient for the Ground Self Defence Forces (to carry out exercises)(with a view) to fighting within Japan itself. However, if one thinks dispassionately (it is clear) that at the present time, a nation's defence is dominated by the global situation. In particular, the basis of its national defence can be totally demolished by the trend of events in neighbouring countries. (Ibid., p.275). Shortly after Sugita's return from a visit to the United States (24 March 1961) the memorandum was submitted to Prime Minister Ikeda by the Defence Agency Director-General Esaki Masumi. A photographic copy was subsequently returned to Sugita by the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council General Hayashi. The view in the highest echelons of the Government had been that 'defence means the defence of Japan and events outside the country are of no interest'. (Ibid., p.275).

Sugita was not, however, a man easily diverted from his long term purposes. Three months later, on 15 June 1961, in extreme secrecy, he met the South Korean Defence Minister General Sŏ in Tokyo. Sŏ had made a stopover in the Japanese capital en route to Seoul after a visit to the United States. The two discussed 'the situation in Korea' and parted 'promising to keep in touch in the future'. Contacts were kept up, although it is not known by what means. (Ibid., p.275). In view of the fact that General Sŏ had many friends in the United States military establishment and was trusted in Washington it is possible
that the contacts were maintained, perhaps even originally arranged, by the Americans. The main point, however, is that in all probability the Japanese Government knew nothing of the contacts until some days later, when Sugita, at the request of former Prime Minister Yoshida, prepared another memorandum on the Korean question for Ikeda. (Ibid., p.275).

The second memorandum adopted the same hawkish positions as the first. That its recommendations failed to impress the Prime Minister is shown by the fact that when, three months later, General Sō invited Japanese military representatives to attend the South Korean Armed Forces Day celebrations in Seoul, as the first step towards future co-operation 'to oppose the infiltration of Communist power in the Far East', the Japanese Government declined to accept. This despite Sugita's urgent pleas to the Defence Agency Director-General and the Joint Staff Council. (Ibid., p.280).

39 For Genda's views see, in addition to the articles referred to elsewhere in this thesis,'Sonae Areba Urei Nashi - Nihon Bōei Sai Kentō no Toki' Sekai Shūhō, 22 August 1967, 'Kokubō o Kataru (Mishima Yukio to no Taiwa)', Kokubō, April 1968 and 'Nihon no Bōei ni Tsuite' Yoron, June 1969.

40 Genda Minoru, 'Tōkai no Rakuen, Anitsu wa Bōkoku no In', Sekai Shūhō, 30 July 1968.

41 Nakayama Sadayoshi, op.cit., p.540.

42 Ibid., p.542.

43 Ibid., p.533ff.

44 Ibid., p.536.


46 See note 26.

47 For samples of Inoki Masamichi's views on a variety of subjects see his contributions to the Asahi Shimbun on 20 December 1965 (evening edition); 21 December 1965 (evening edition); 25 January 1966 (evening edition); 26 January 1966 (evening edition); 21 February 1966 (evening edition); 22 April 1966 (evening edition); 22 August 1966 (evening edition); 25 October 1966 (evening edition); to the Tōkyō Shimbun on 20 March, 1967; 8 May 1967; 13 July 1967; to the Yomiuri Shimbun on 29 August 1967 and 3 April 1968 and to the Sankei Shimbun on 29 November 1966 (evening edition); 30 November 1967 (evening edition); 16 March 1968 (evening edition). All these articles were written while Inoki was a Professor at Kyoto University, before his appointment to the Defence Academy.

48 Maki Tomoo's views on military education and society are expressed in his book Bōei no Tsutome (Koyō Shobō, 1968).
For Saeki Kiichi's views, see his works referred to earlier in this thesis and also his contributions to the Sankei Shimbun, 10 March, 1967 (evening edition); 11 March 1967 (evening edition); 25 April, 1967 (evening edition); 26 April 1967 (evening edition); 30 June, 1967 (evening edition); 1 July, 1967 (evening edition); 27 November, 1967 (evening edition); 28 November, 1967 (evening edition) and to the Mainichi Shimbun, 25 May 1968. All these articles were written after Saeki's retirement from the Defence Academy.

For a general, impressionable survey of the attitudes of young post-war officers and men, see Jieitai, op.cit., p.193ff. The Asahi Shimbun reporters responsible for this collection of articles claim that at the time of writing (1968) an atmosphere of informality and relaxation pervaded Self Defence Force barracks. Little emphasis was placed on old style 'moral education' and the curriculum of the National Defence College differed little from that of other tertiary education facilities in Japan. While certain text books allegedly justified some of the slogans used during the Pacific War (such as Kokutai no Hongi, Aikoku Kōshin Kyoku, Hakkō Ichiu, Susume Ichō Oku Hi no Tama da) as being 'quite natural in time of national emergency' (Oyoso Kokka Kikyu Sonbō no Sai Tozen no Koto), there was stress on the fact that patriotism demanded a spirit of tolerance and willingness to settle disputes peacefully as well as love for one's fellow countrymen. It was reported that there was little sense of extreme anti-Communism. At the same time it was alleged that most Self Defence Force members, young or old, were hostile or mistrustful towards politicians, believing the government did not attach sufficient importance to defence.

Ito Hirofumi 'Nihon no Bōei wa Do suru ka', Ronsō, May 1962.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 July 1962.


Tokyō Shimbun, 4 September 1962. In view of rumours that the civilians in the Defence Agency had deliberately not been informed of contacts between the plotters and uniformed men, the Director-General Shiga allegedly ordered the Ground Staff Office to prepare a full report. Shiga was said to believe that the attitude of the Imperial officers clique was a 'cancer' in the new forces, and major personnel changes were reported to be imminent.

Tokyō Shimbun, 13 December 1961. It is difficult to know what credence can be given to such reports.

Momoi Makoto, Japan's Defence Policies, a paper submitted to the Australian Institute of International Affairs Conference, 'Japan and Australia in the Seventies' (June 12-14, 1971, Sydney). Momoi's publications in Japanese are few and far between. At the Conference he argued that 'basically Japan's strategic limitations themselves - smallness, closeness (to the continent) and long shorelines - are too attractive for a rational potential aggressor to forego indirect approaches first'.


60 See for example, Secretariat Chief Kaihara Osamu's criticisms of the initial draft of the Fourth Defence Plan as reported in *Sankei Shimbun*, 27 October 1969 (evening edition).

61 Maeda Kotobuki, op.cit., p.240ff.


63 For some interesting observations on the operation of the National Defence Council, see Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.116.

64 For discussions of the principles and practice of civilian control at this level see Sakanaka Tomohisa, *Jieitai no Jittai*, in Sakanaka Tomohisa, *et al.*, *Nihon no Jieitai Ryoku*, p.38ff. Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.118ff, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 December 1967. Another interesting article is Katō Shunsaku, *Jieitai to Shibirian Kontroru, Seidoké Hokumen o Chūshin ni Shite* (Kantō Gakuin Daigaku Keizai Gakkai Kenkyū Ronshū, Keizai Kei, Dai-70 Shū, November 1966). All these materials are of a very general character (Katō Shunsaku, for example, bases his discussion purely on an analysis of the laws, rather than their operation) and a thorough study of the subject apparently remains to be done.


66 *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 December 1967. The present writer has, however, verbal information to the effect that the system of temporary assignment to the military sections has subsequently been reviewed.


68 Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.122.


70 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2 August 1963.

71 Ibid., 2 August, 1963. Further details of Miwa Yoshio's background and interests can be found in the *Sankei Shimbun*, 18 November 1964.

72 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2 August 1963.

73 Ibid., 2 August 1963. From 1949 until 1954 Obata Hisao had been Chief of the Maritime Safety Agency's Political Section.
Details of new appointments and former incumbents in these two important Bureaux are unknown to the present writer.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 August 1963.

For a good discussion of this subject see Sakanaka Tomohisa, 'Böei Ryoku Seibi Keikaku no Suii', in Sakanaka Tomohisa, et.al., Nihon no Jiei Ryoku, p.87ff and Nakada Minoru, 'Genzai no Nihon no Böehi', in Nakada Minoru, Nihon no Böei to Keizai, op.cit., p.83ff.


Ibid., p.94ff. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 March 1963.

Sakanaka Tomohisa, 'Böei Ryoku Seibi Keikaku no Suii' p.95. See also Tökyö Shimbun, April 1966.


Ibid., p.96.


Asahi Shimbun, 7 February 1967.

Tökyö Shimbun, 17 February 1967.


Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.234.

Two useful discussions of popular attitudes towards the Self Defence Forces and other matters related to security are Kawaguchi Kunihiko, Saikin no Kokumin Ishiki no Döko, prepared for limited distribution by the Asahi Shimbun's Shakaï-Anzen Hoshö Mondai Chōsa Kai in August 1968 and Kawaguchi Kunihiko, Nanajû-Nen Ampo to Kokumin Ishiki, in Nakada Minoru, et.al., Nanajû-Nen Ampo no Shintenkai (Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1969) p.299ff. Much interesting material is also to be found in Kokkai Ampo Ronsō, Sokkiroku to Yōten Kaïsetsu, (Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1968), Volume 2, p.175ff and in the various opinion polls referred to in Table 8.8. See also 'Böei Mondai o Meguru Kokumin Yoron no Döko', an anonymous article in Chōsa Geppō, July 1969, published by the Naikaku Kanbō Naikaku Chōsa Shitsu. The subject is immense in its scope, and no attempt will be made to examine it fully in this thesis.
Asahi Shimbun, 5 January 1969.

Shukan Asahi, 5 April 1968.

Asahi Shimbun, 5 January 1969.

See Kawaguchi Kunihiko, Nanajū-Nen Ampo to Kokumin Ishiki, in Nakada Minoru, et.al., op.cit., p.325.

Ibid., p.302. See also Kawaguchi Kunihiko, Saikin no Kokumin Ishiki no Dōkō.

For an interesting commentary on Japanese reactions to the American experience of the late 1960s, see Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Le Japon, Nouveau "Grand" sur la Scène Mondiale', Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1971.

Kawaguchi Kunihiko, Saikin no Kokumin Ishiki no Dōkō. Kawaguchi unfortunately gives no date for this poll.

Shukan Asahi, 5 April, 1968.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 June, 1967. Morris, op.cit., remains the best work in English on these groups. Unfortunately it deals only with the period 1945-1959 and there has been, as far as the present writer knows, little subsequent large scale research on the subject, either in Japan or abroad. Theses published by certain Communist writers (such as Okazaki Masuhide, 'Gunkokushugi Fukkatsu to Uyoku no Jittai', Zenei, December 1963; and 'Uyoku Bōryokudan to Bōryoku Taisaku no Honshitsu', Zenei, June, September 1964) contain much interesting and well documented information, but the reader suspects a natural tendency to exaggerate the importance of the extreme right wing in contemporary Japanese society.

Morris, op.cit., p.443-444. Kishi and Kodama have also appeared together on public platforms to promote extreme nationalist causes. See, for example, The Australian, 24 July 1970, in a report from its Tokyo correspondent.

For Kishi's connections with Uesugi Shinkichi, see Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan, (Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1960) p.95.


For details of the organisation and connections of the Youth Thought Research Association and the Japan Youth Seminar, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 June 1967.


For a full account of the Mishima affair, see Asahi Shimbun, 26 November 1970.
Mainichi Shimbun, 20 May 1960.

Boei Nenkan, 1956, p.167. A complete list of the former officers involved is provided.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 April 1962.

Tokyo Shimbun, 17 May 1962.

Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.45.


Tokyo Shimbun, 4 September 1962.


For a comprehensive account of the Japanese weapons industry see Takase Shōji, 'Boei Sangyō no Saiken'; 'Gunji Gijutsu to Boei Sangyō'; Shōhin to shite no Heiki'; 'Heiki no Kokusanka', in Nakada Minoru, Nihon no Boei to Keizai, op.cit., p.157ff; 184ff; 210ff and 244ff respectively. Dōba Hajime, op.cit., p.120ff is also useful as a general outline of the development of the weapons industry up to 1962. So too is Suzuki Shigeru, 'Nihon no Boei Sangyō', Bōei Ronshū, July 1962, p.52ff. Sugita's comments (Sugita Ichiji, op.cit., p.325ff) also refer principally to the period covered by the first and the second defence plans. For Marxist and New Left analyses of the defence industry see Hayashi Naomichi,'Nihon Gunkokushugi Fukkatsu no Keizaiteki Kiso', Gendai to Shisö, October 1970; Uehara Keizō, 'Satō Naikaku no Tōnan Ajia Enjo Seisaku no Jūzokuteki, Gunjiteki Seikaku', Zenei, May 1966; Ōbassy Kenji, 'Nihon Keizai no Jūzokuteki, Gunjiteki Seikaku no Jittai', in Fukkatsu suru Nihon Gunkoku-shugi (Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō Iinkai Kikanshi Keieikyoku, 1966, p.258ff); Yokote Fumio, 'Nihon Gunkokushugi Fukkatsu no Sangyōteki Kiban', Zenei, September 1966; and Yoshihara Köichiro, Nanajū Nen Ampo to Nihon no Gunji Ryoku (Nihon Hyōron Sha, 1969) p.303ff. In the latter part of the 1960s articles of special interest on the Japanese military industry appeared in the following newspapers. Asahi Shimbun, 21-23 June 1966 (a series of four articles) Sankei Shimbun, 3 December 1966; Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 May - 2 June 1967 (a series of nine articles). Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 March 1967; 20-21 February 1968 (a series of two articles) and Tokyo Shimbun 28 July 1967. All these articles are of a popular and informative rather than scholarly character.

Takase Shōji, 'Boei Sangyō no Saiken', in Nakada Minoru, Nihon no Boei to Keizai, op.cit., p.178 (Table 8).

Ibid., p.179 (Table 9).

Ibid., p.179.

Takase Shōji, 'Shōhin to shite no Heiki', in Nakada Minoru, et.al., Nihon no Boei to Keizai, p.220-221.

These calculations are based on the data given in Jieitai (Asahi Shimbun Sha Hen 1968) p.278ff and Hayashio Naomichi, op.cit., p.251.
Nisshō the oldest of the four organizations, adopted, under the leadership of Nagano Shigeo (then President of Fuji Iron and Steel), a close associate of former Prime Minister Yoshida, a noticeably moderate position. Nagano maintained that Japan needed no more than the minimum power necessary to repel a direct attack on her shores, and that such an attack was extremely unlikely. (Mainichi Shimbun, 27 October 1969). Keidanren, the largest and perhaps the most influential of the four organizations, also adopted a relatively moderate public position stressing the traditional Yoshida policy of gradually increasing defence power within the context of the Security Treaty. On 23 May 1969, for example, the thirtieth General Meeting (Sōkai) of Keidanren officially resolved merely to 'consolidate the Security Treaty system and strengthen Japan's autonomous defence'. In his opening address the organization President spoke vaguely of 'firmly upholding the Security Treaty system', 'gradually increasing Japan's autonomous defence power' and 'contributing to the maintenance of peace in the Far East'. There was a general reference to increasing military expenditure, but no specific targets were set. (Keidanren Geppō, June 1969). It should be recalled that the hawkish Keidanren Defence Production Committee existed somewhat on the fringe of the orthodox business world, receiving its working funds not from Keidanren itself but from a relatively small group of about 100 affiliated companies. (Mainichi Shimbun, 21 May 1969). In striking contrast, the top leadership of Nikkeiren adopted a rather aggressive posture, stressing not only the need for greater military expenditure but emphasizing 'autonomous defence' rather than 'collective security'. At the Twenty Second General Meeting of Nikkeiren (23 April 1969) it was resolved that 'at this time, the entire nation...infused with the spirit of autonomous defence, should unite to meet the new situation' (Hayashi Naomichi, op. cit., p.242). Nikkeiren's Representative Standing Director Sakurada Takeshi has complained that Japan's inferior military strength makes her no more than 'a semi-state' (Ibid., p.242). However, hostile public and governmental reaction to Sakurada's attack on Article 9 of the Constitution caused the Director to explain that while he hoped for Japan's eventual cooperation with United Nations' peace keeping activities, he supported the principle of purely defensive forces, opposed overseas service, was in favour of the voluntary system and civilian control and doubted the wisdom of hasty Constitutional revision. (Nikkeiren Taimuzu, 30 October 1969; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 25 December 1969). The most hawkish position was adopted by Kikawada Kazutaka, Secretary of the influential Industrial Problems Research Council (Sangyō Mondai Kenkyū Kai), President of the Tōkyō Electric Company and one of the leading executives of Köyükai. The American débacle in South-East Asia, British withdrawal from East of Suez, Soviet penetration of the Indian and Pacific Oceans necessitated large scale expansion of the Japanese navy and a willingness 'not to let Japan's defence stop merely at efforts to put down insurrection and resist (direct) aggression'. The Malacca Straits and the Pacific Ocean were Japan's lifeline and she must develop an interest in all that happened around their shores. (Hayashi Naomichi, op. cit., p.242). Fujii Heigo, Dōyūkai's Vice-Secretary and the President of New Japan Steel told a television audience on 12 June 1970 that Japan's defence expenditures should occupy 15 per cent of the national budget, as compared with 7-8 per cent in the latter part of the 1960s. (Ibid., p.243).
For an excellent discussion of this question, see Fukui Haruhiro, *op.cit.*, p.144ff.


The President of the Japan Weapons Industry Association (Nihon Heiki Kōgyō Kai) Ōkubo Ken, for example, urged spending 4 per cent of the Gross National Product (over four times the level of the 1960s) on defence and promoting Japanese weapons exports to South-East Asia. He also made ambiguous remarks about the possibility of a nuclear weapons programme. See Hayashi Naomichi, *op.cit.* p.243.

Mainichi Shimbun, 29 May 1969.

Mainichi Shimbun, 10 June 1969.

Okano Yasujirō, Chairman of the Keidanren Committee, was formerly with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, as were most of the Committee's leading members. Ōkubo Ken was President of Mitsubishi Electric. The Chairman of the Aviation Industry Association was also President of Mitsubishi Heavy industries. See Hayashi Naomichi, *op.cit.* p.251.

For an example of these links, see Mainichi Shimbun, 10 June 1969.


The revelations were made after the questioning of an ex-Major Aoki, the arrest of a Colonel Kawasaki and the sudden suicide of a Major-General Yamaguchi in connection with alleged leakage of defence secrets to private firms. A full list of all former Defence Agency personnel in private firms appeared in *Tōkyō Shimbun*, 6 March 1968.

Tōkyō Shimbun, 6 March 1968.

For example Sejima Ryūzō, a relative of the former War Minister Hayashi Senjirō, honours graduate of the Imperial Military Academy and former Staff Officer at Imperial Headquarters, had been barred from the Self Defence Forces because of his war record and close association with Hattori Tokushirō. He subsequently became Managing Director of Itōchū, a firm with considerable interest in defence procurement. Sejima's former classmate at the Imperial Military Academy, Hara Shirō, had managed to enter the Self Defence Forces, where he eventually rose to be Chief of Intelligence in the Air Force. On his retirement he took, at Sejima's invitation, a post at Itōchū, (Mainichi Shimbun, 12 March 1968).

Mainichi Shimbun, 6 March 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 6 March 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 6 March 1968.

Mainichi Shimbun, 6 March 1968.
These observations derive from perusal of issues of Gunji Kenkyū (published by the Gunji Kenkyū Sha) between January or December 1966. To what extent defence industries were involved in promoting such tough minded children's magazines as Shōnen Sandē, whose semi-fascist colouring caused such outrage in educational and academic circles in 1968, remains, of course, unknown. (Tokyo Shimbun, 19 April 1968). It would, however, be a mistake to see in every editorial idiosyncracy evidence of a vast and centrally directed conspiracy.
TABLE 1: (i) SAMPLE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON THE EVE OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY TREATIES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Positively desire American bases</th>
<th>Support if Temporary</th>
<th>American bases unavoidable</th>
<th>Positively oppose American bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>August 1949</td>
<td>46.4% question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22 April 1950</td>
<td>19.0% 52.9%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>15 August 1950</td>
<td>28.5% question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>15 November 1950</td>
<td>29.9% question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>3 January 1951</td>
<td>11.3% question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>31.2% 41.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>26 March 1951</td>
<td>18.5% 34.5%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>3 March 1951</td>
<td>17.7% 59.5%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>April 1951</td>
<td>19.0% 52.9%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>15 August 1951</td>
<td>18.3% question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>33.6% 29.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Yomiuri Shimbun polls have been emphasized because they probably give a conservative estimate of the numbers favouring neutrality. Throughout this period the Yomiuri Shimbun was close to the Government and editorially followed a strongly pro-Security Treaty line. The Yomiuri Shimbun President was among the small group that discussed the treaty problem with Yoshida in the autumn of 1950. See Katō, op.cit., p.106. Thus the fact that the 15 August 1951 Yomiuri poll shows almost 30% opposed the American bases is particularly significant.
TABLE 2: (1) SAMPLE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF REARMAMENT *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Support rearmament</th>
<th>Support rearmament conditionally (i.e. depending on scale and character)</th>
<th>Support rearmament after economic recovery</th>
<th>Oppose rearmament under any circumstances</th>
<th>Support overseas service</th>
<th>Oppose overseas service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>15 August 1950</td>
<td>(i) 37.4%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>(i) 34.8%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) 38.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) 32.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>3 September 1950</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The 42.7% in column (1) supported rearmament only for home service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>15 November 1950</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22 December 1950</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>3 March 1951</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>26 March 1951</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22 April 1951</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>15 August 1951</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question not asked.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Support rearmament</th>
<th>Support rearmament conditionally (i.e. depending on scale and character)</th>
<th>Support rearmament after economic recovery</th>
<th>Oppose rearmament under any circumstances</th>
<th>Support overseas service</th>
<th>Oppose overseas service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>16 September 1951</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>20 September 1951</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>2 March 1952</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>21 September 1952</td>
<td>Support transforming Police Reserve into regular army 38.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>Oppose transforming Police Reserve into regular army 33.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>14 February 1953</td>
<td>Support Government's gradual strengthening of existing forces 38.0%</td>
<td>Support conditionally 12.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>Oppose Government's gradual strengthening of existing forces 20.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>22 June 1953</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: The writer has taken certain liberties with the forms of questions in order to prepare this table. In general, expression of belief in the 'necessity' of military forces has been taken to mean support for rearmament. Conversely, expression of the view that military forces are 'unnecessary' has been interpreted as opposition to rearmament.
Miki Takeo  
Matsumura  
Kishi  
Gasa  
Ashida  
Kitamura  
Miki Bukichi  
Hatoyama  
Ishibashi  
Ogata  
Ōno  
Yoshida  

After Unification in 1955.


TABLE 4:(i) LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTIONAL ORIGINS.
### TABLE 4: (ii) APPROXIMATE FACTIONAL STRENGTHS IN 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Kishi Faction</td>
<td>75-80</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satō Faction</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Ishii Faction</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda Faction</td>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ono Faction</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kōno Faction</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissident Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td>30-50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi Faction</td>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table appears in Shinobu Seisaburō, Ampo Tōsō Shi, (Sekai Shoin, 1968) p.14. It has been compiled as follows:

- **I**: Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1960
- **II**: Mainichi Shimbun, 22 June 1960
- **III**: Chubu Nihon Shimbun, 24 June 1960
- **IV**: Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 June 1960
- **V**: Shukan Bunshun, 11 July 1960
TABLE 4: (iii) SAMPLE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE 1960 SECURITY TREATY*

(a) **Alignment with the United States on Neutrality**

Ways of guaranteeing Japanese security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Support Alignment with the United States</th>
<th>Support Neutrality</th>
<th>Support Alignment with Socialist camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō Shimbun</td>
<td>19 July 1959</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>4 October 1959</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>18 January 1960</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>Rely on United Nations</td>
<td>Japanese neutrality Security through good relations with Socialist camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Support for Revision of the 1951 Security Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Favour Immediate Revision</th>
<th>Favour Eventual Revision</th>
<th>Favour Status quo</th>
<th>Favour Immediate Abolition</th>
<th>Favour Eventual Abolition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō Shimbun</td>
<td>19 July 1959</td>
<td>31.1% in favour of revision</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>16.9% in favour of abolition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>26 August 1959</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Support Revision</th>
<th>Oppose Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>18 January 1960</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Satisfied with New Treaty</th>
<th>Dissatisfied with New Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 April 1960</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Hope the Diet ratifies the New Treaty</th>
<th>Hope the Diet does not ratify the New Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>3 April 1960</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) The revised Treaty and involvement in war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>The new Treaty increases likelihood of involvement in war</th>
<th>There is no such risk/or the new Treaty guarantees Japan's security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō Shimbun</td>
<td>19 July 1959</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>18 January 1960</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Certain liberties have been taken with the exact forms of questions to facilitate preparation of this table.
Table 5: (i) Sample Public Opinion Polls on Neutrality and the Security Treaty in the 1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office Poll (as reported in Tokyo Shimbun)</td>
<td>31/1/63</td>
<td>38.0% favour general co-operation with Western powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.0% favour neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>18/6/65</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>13/6/66</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shukan Asahi</td>
<td>5/4/68</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>19.6(16.1)%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>66.0(65.0)% for neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>6.6(5.9)%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>1/7/68</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5/1/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>56.0% for neutrality.</td>
<td></td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>12/5/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>43.0% for various types of neutrality</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>1/6/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>1/10/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>4/11/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>33.0% for various types of neutrality</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Shimbun</td>
<td>10/12/69</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper or Organ</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>The Treaty is (has been) necessary for (contributes to) Japan's security</td>
<td>The Treaty is (has been) unnecessary for (has not contributed to) Japan's security</td>
<td>The Treaty is (has been) dangerous.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>3/10/67</td>
<td>28.2% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary.)</td>
<td>28.4% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary.)</td>
<td>19.7% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22/4/68</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>1/7/68</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5/1/69</td>
<td>28.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>56.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5/1/69</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>12/5/69</td>
<td>33.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>59.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>12/5/69</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankei Shimbun</td>
<td>13/5/69</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chūō Chōsa Sha</td>
<td>20-25/5/69</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>1/10/69</td>
<td>41.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>45.0% (respondents were asked whether U.S. bases were necessary).</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>1/10/69</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 5: (III) Factional Changes, 1960

- Death of Ikeda (August 1965)
- Death of Ono (May 1964)
- Death of Kono (August 1965)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Japan should equip herself with nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Japan should not equip herself with nuclear weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shūkan Asahi</td>
<td>5 April 1968</td>
<td>21.2% in Tokyo 26.5% in Kagawa Prefecture</td>
<td>68.9% in Tokyo, 55.7% in Kagawa Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō Shimbun</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1969</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 Jan. 1969</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>12 May 1969</td>
<td>Immediately 2.0% In the near future 16.0% Eventually 27.0% Total 45.0%</td>
<td>Must never 46.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankei Shimbun</td>
<td>18 May 1969</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 8: (i) JAPANESE AND OTHER ARMED FORCES, 1969-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total full-time regular armed forces</th>
<th>Para-military forces</th>
<th>Trained reservists</th>
<th>Total men of military age (18-45 years)</th>
<th>Percentage of regular armed forces to men of military age.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Japan</strong></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,500,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Comparable NATO powers.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>405,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>10,700,000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>98,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>4,060,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>503,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>10,600,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>465,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>11,760,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>11,650,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Comparable Warsaw Pact powers.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>3,180,000</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2,870,000</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>6,800,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>4,450,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Comparable Neutral and Non-Aligned Powers.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>925,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>674,000</td>
<td>1,620,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Asian and Pacific States.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>87,150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43,350</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>142,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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TABLE 8: (i) Continued

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<th>E. Asian and Pacific States. (Continued)</th>
<th>Total full-time regular forces</th>
<th>Para-military trained reservists</th>
<th>Total men of military age (18-45 years)</th>
<th>Percentage of regular armed forces to men of military age.</th>
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F. Soviet and American forces in the Far East.

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<tr>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>The Soviet Union is believed to maintain ground forces totalling 240,000 men in the Far East.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Exclusive of forces in Vietnam the United States maintains about 126,000 men in her Far Eastern Ground and Naval forces. The number of Air Force personnel is unknown to the present writer.</td>
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TABLE 8:(ii) JAPANESE AND OTHER NAVAL FORCES, 1969-70

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total number of personnel (thousands)</th>
<th>Attack nuclear-powered submarines</th>
<th>Conventional submarines</th>
<th>Missile firing submarines</th>
<th>Anti-submarine, commando aircraft carriers</th>
<th>Attack aircraft carriers</th>
<th>Cruisers</th>
<th>Missle firing destroyers</th>
<th>Survivors (excluding coastal)</th>
<th>Coastal Missile firing patrol boats</th>
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</table>

The Soviet Union maintained a Far Eastern fleet of an estimated 600,000 tons. This fleet comprised some 600 individual vessels, including 20 nuclear powered submarines and 80 conventional submarines. The American Seventh Fleet (total tonnage approximately 550,000 tons) comprised, in all, about 150 individual vessels including 10 or 12 submarines, of which about 3 were nuclear powered.

TABLE 8: (iii) JAPANESE AND OTHER AIR FORCES, 1969-70

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Front Line Combat Aircraft</th>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>United States Far Eastern Air Force</td>
<td>400 aircraft attached to air force, 550 to navy.</td>
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Sources: The Military Balance (The Institute for Strategic Studies) and the relevant issues of Boei Nenkan.
TABLE 8: (v) JAPANESE AND OTHER MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1965-69. PER CAPITA DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, 1969.

<table>
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<th>Defence Expenditure as a percentage of gross national product</th>
<th>Per capita defence expenditure 1969. (Unit : Yen)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Comparable neutral powers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Asian and Pacific States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8: (VII)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Defence Expenditure</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of the National Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures are based on the Military Balance (The Institute for Strategic Studies).
### TABLE 8:(vii) JAPANESE DEFENCE AND OTHER EXPENDITURES, 1950-1967.

(Unit: 100 mill. Yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure</th>
<th>Social Security Expenditure</th>
<th>Education and Science Expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure on Public Works etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>1,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>1,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>1,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>1,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>2,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>2,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>2,567</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>4,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>4,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>3,881</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>5,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,808</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>6,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>5,442</td>
<td>4,931</td>
<td>7,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>6,217</td>
<td>5,433</td>
<td>8,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>7,182</td>
<td>6,245</td>
<td>9,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base 100 at 1957: 269 609 392 568

(a) Existence of Threats to Japanese Security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Feel no Anxiety</th>
<th>Uncertain Anxiety</th>
<th>Feel Anxiety</th>
<th>Source of Anxiety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shūkan Asahi</td>
<td>5 April 1968</td>
<td>66.8 (59.3%)</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>18.8 (17.4%)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>1 July 1968</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 January 1969</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>15.0% 6.0% 5.0% 2.0% not asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sänkei Shimbun</td>
<td>18 May 1969</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>6.0% 1.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Necessity of Military Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Military power is necessary</th>
<th>Military power is conditionally necessary</th>
<th>Military power is unnecessary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>March 1966</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>February 1968</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shūkan Asahi</td>
<td>5 April 1968</td>
<td>51.3% (56.1%)</td>
<td>32.4% (28.9%)</td>
<td>13.8% (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>1 June 1969</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 January 1969</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>question not asked</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Necessity of military power as seen by different age groups, sexes, urban and rural respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister's Office Poll</th>
<th>Male Respondents</th>
<th>Female Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>Japan would be better off without armaments</td>
<td>Armaments are necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shukan Asahi Poll</th>
<th>Both Male and Female Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>The Self Defence Forces are necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Kagawa Prefecture</td>
<td>Tokyo Kagawa Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### (d) Strengthening the Self Defence Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Self Defence Forces should be strengthened</th>
<th>Self Defence Forces should be left at present level</th>
<th>Self Defence Forces should be reduced or abolished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>November 1965</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shūkan Asahi</td>
<td>5 April 1968</td>
<td>25.4 (28.7)%</td>
<td>50.1 (40.2)% were opposed to strengthening the forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainichi Shimbun</td>
<td>1 July 1968</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 January 1969</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankei Shimbun</td>
<td>18 May 1969</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō Shimbun</td>
<td>10 December 1969</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (e) Constitutional Revision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Article 9 should be revised so Japan can possess an army</th>
<th>Oppose revision of Article 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>17 August 1962</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shūkan Asahi</td>
<td>5 April 1968</td>
<td>21.6 (22.6)%</td>
<td>72.1 (60.6)%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi Shimbun</td>
<td>5 January 1969</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(f) Why the Self Defence Forces Exist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>The purpose of the Self Defence Forces is national defence</th>
<th>The purpose of the Self Defence Forces is the preservation of public order</th>
<th>The purpose of the Self Defence Forces is to engage in disaster relief</th>
<th>The purpose of the Self Defence Forces is to engage in public welfare work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office Poll</td>
<td>November 1965</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22 April 1968</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) What the Self Defence Forces should do

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper or Organ</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>The Self Defence Forces should devote their attention to National Defence</th>
<th>The Self Defence Forces should devote their attention to preservation of public order</th>
<th>The Self Defence Forces should devote their attention to disaster relief work</th>
<th>The Self Defence Forces should devote their attention to public welfare work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office Poll</td>
<td>November 1965</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomiuri Shimbun</td>
<td>22 April 1968</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Certain liberties have been taken with the forms of questions in order to prepare this table. Figures in parenthesis refer to Asahi Shimbun polls taken in rural Kagawa Prefecture. In cases where these appear, the unbracketed figure is the result of a poll taken in Tokyo. All other polls were nationwide.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Procurement</th>
<th>Domestic Procurement Value</th>
<th>Imports (B) Value</th>
<th>Percent- age B/F %</th>
<th>Reimbursable Military Aid (C) Value</th>
<th>Percent- age C/F %</th>
<th>Subtotal D=A+B+C Value</th>
<th>Percent- age E/F %</th>
<th>Total F=D+E Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>91,685</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93,223</td>
<td></td>
<td>267,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>43,009</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45,652</td>
<td></td>
<td>141,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>49,768</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>54,198</td>
<td></td>
<td>101,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>57,057</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>60,422</td>
<td></td>
<td>99,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>73,291</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>78,684</td>
<td></td>
<td>145,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>66,174</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7,292</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>76,696</td>
<td></td>
<td>116,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>139,448</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6,923</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>151,241</td>
<td></td>
<td>185,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>70,249</td>
<td>6,311</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>82,532</td>
<td></td>
<td>108,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>97,521</td>
<td>7,645</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4,068</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>109,234</td>
<td></td>
<td>129,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>93,058</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>16,161</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>116,224</td>
<td></td>
<td>125,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>112,027</td>
<td>7,007</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6,024</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>125,058</td>
<td></td>
<td>131,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>135,913</td>
<td>8,158</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>150,554</td>
<td></td>
<td>155,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,029,178</td>
<td>56,463</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>58,077</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,143,718</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,707,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Number of Contracts</th>
<th>Value of Contracts (Unit: 100 million yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Nihon Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shin Mitsubishi Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kawasaki Kōkūki Kōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ishikawajima Harima Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Zōsen (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(Co.,Ltd.) Komatsu Seisakusho</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(Co.,Ltd.) Nihon Seikōsho</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Denki (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fuji Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nippon Sekiyu (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Number of Contracts</th>
<th>Value of Contracts (Unit: 100 million yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shin Mitsubishi Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ishikawajima Harima Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Denki (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kawasaki Jūkōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kawasaki Kōkūki Kōgyō (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nippon Denki (Co.,Ltd.)</td>
<td>253</td>
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Note:

The spelling and conventions employed in these appendices are the same as in the original sources.
APPENDIX I

THE POTS DAM DECLARATION, 1 26 JULY 1945

(1) We - the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

The following directive, serial number 82, prepared by the Department of State to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947 under the provisions of paragraph II,A,1 of its terms of reference has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III,1, of those terms of reference.

This document is a statement of general policy relating to Japan after surrender. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or not fully covered will be dealt with separately.

PREAMBLE

Whereas on September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers and is now under military occupation by forces of these powers under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and

Whereas representatives of the following nations, namely, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, which were engaged in the war against Japan, have on the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers met together at Washington as a Far Eastern Commission, to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished;

The nations composing this commission, with the object of fulfilling the intentions of the Potsdam Declaration, of carrying out the instrument of surrender and of establishing international security and stability;

Conscious that such security and stability depend first, upon the complete destruction of the military machine which has been the chief means whereby Japan has carried out the aggressions of past decades; second, upon the establishment of such political and economic conditions as would make impossible any revival of militarism in Japan; and third,
upon bringing the Japanese to a realization that their will to war, their plan of conquest, and the methods used to accomplish such plans have brought them to the verge of ruin;

Resolved that Japan cannot be allowed to control her own destinies again until there is on her part a determination to abandon militarism in all its aspects and a desire to live with the rest of the world in peace, and until democratic principles are established in all spheres of the political, economic and cultural life of Japan;

Are therefore agreed:

To ensure the fulfillment of Japan’s obligation to the Allied Powers;

To complete the task of physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by measures including total disarmament, economic reform designed to deprive Japan of power to make war, elimination of militaristic influences, and stern justice to war criminals, and requiring a period of strict control; and

To help the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations;

And have adopted the following basic objectives and policies in dealing with Japan.

PART I - ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

1. The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform, are:

a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

b. To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such Government in Japan should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.
2. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:
   a. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.
   b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.
   c. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.
   d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.

PART II - ALLIED AUTHORITY

1. Military Occupation

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the powers that have participated in the war against Japan. The principle of participation in the occupation of Japan by forces of these nations is affirmed. The occupation forces will be under the command of a supreme commander designated by the United States.

2. Relationship to Japanese Government

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

The Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, but only to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers judgment and discretion of
the Supreme Commander, the Japanese Government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration, or the Supreme Commander may in any case direct action to be taken without making use of the agencies of the Japanese Government.

After appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the Allied Powers in the Allied Council for Japan, the Supreme Commander may, in case of necessity, take decisions concerning the removal of individual ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members. Changes in the governmental machinery, or a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be made in accordance with the principles laid down in the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission.

The Supreme Commander is not committed to support the Emperor of any other Japanese governmental authority. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan and not to support it. Changes in the pre-surrender form of the Emperor institution and in the form of government in the direction of modifying or removing its feudal and authoritarian character and of establishing a democratic Japan are to be encouraged.

3. Protection of United Nations Interests
It shall be the duty of the Supreme Commander to protect the interests, assets, and rights of all members of the United Nations and their nationals. Where such protection conflicts with the fulfillment of the objectives and policies of the occupation, the government of the nation concerned shall be informed through diplomatic channels and shall be consulted on the question of proper adjustment.

4. Publicity as to Policies
The Peoples of the nations which have participated in the war against Japan, the Japanese people, and the world at large shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of the progress made in their fulfillment.

PART III - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization
Disarmament and demilitarization are the initial tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people that part
played by those who have deceived and misled them into embarking on world conquest, and those who collaborated in so doing.

Japan is not to have any Army, Navy, Airforce, Secret Police organization, or any Civil Aviation, or Gendarmerie, but may have adequate Civilian Police Forces. Japan's Ground, Air and Naval Forces shall be disarmed and disbanded, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all Secret Police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and the military, naval and civilian aircraft, wherever situated, shall be surrendered to the appropriate Allied commanders in their zones of capitulation of the Japanese troops and shall be disposed of in accordance with decisions of the Allied Powers already adopted or which may be adopted. Inventories shall be made and inspections authorized to insure complete execution of these provisions.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

The restoration, even in a disguised form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part of former Japanese career military and naval officers. Gendarmerie, and former members of dissolved militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and other antidemocratic organization.

Militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.
2. War Criminals

Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who visited cruelties upon prisoners of war or other nationals of members of the United Nations. Persons charged by the Supreme Commander, or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. Encouragement of Desire for Individual Liberties and Democratic Processes

Freedom of worship and observance of all religions shall be proclaimed and guaranteed for the future. It should also be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic, militaristic and anti-democratic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture and the accomplishments of the democracies.

Obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be removed.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion and the formation of trade unions shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discrimination on ground of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required, and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished on appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth herein and it shall be the duty of all judicial, legal and police officers to protect individual liberties and civil rights.
1. Economic Demilitarization

The existing economic basis of Japan's military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others: The immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control designed to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those industries or branches of production which would provide Japan with the capacity to rearm for war; and the prohibition of specialized research and instruction contributing directly to the development of war-making power. Research for peaceful ends will be permitted but shall be strictly supervised by the Supreme Commander to prevent its use for war purposes. Japan shall be restricted to the maintenance of those industries which will sustain the level of economy and standard of living fixed in accordance with principles determined by the Far Eastern Commission, and consistent with the Potsdam Declaration.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with the program, as between transfer abroad and the purpose of reparations, scrapping, and conversion to other uses, will be determined, after inventory, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission. Pending decision, no such facilities either suitable for transfer abroad or readily convertible for civilion production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. Promotion of Democratic Forces

Organizations of labor in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged. Other organizations in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged if they will contribute to furthering the democratization of Japan or other objectives of the occupation.
Policies shall be laid down with the object of insuring a wide and just distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Encouragement shall be given to those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership deemed likely to strengthen the democratic force in Japan and to prevent economic activity from being used in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends; and

b. To require a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations accompanied by their progressive replacement by organisations which would widen the basis of control and ownership.

3. Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction and basically to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions. In accordance with assurances contained in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can, in the judgment of the Supreme Commander, be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs, subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander, which are designed to serve the following purposes:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.
o. To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries.

d. To make such provision for the needs of the Japanese population
    as may be deemed reasonable in accordance with principles formulated
    by the Far Eastern Commission in the light both of supplies
    available and of obligations to other peoples of the United Nations
    and territories formerly occupied by Japan.

4. Reparations and Restitution

Reparations

For acts of aggression committed by Japan and for the purpose of equitable
reparation of the damage caused by her to the Allied Powers and in the
interests of destruction of the Japanese war potential in those industries
which could lead to Japan's rearmament for waging war, reparations shall
be exacted from Japan through the transfer of such existing Japanese
capital equipment and facilities or such Japanese goods as exist or may
in future be produced and which under policies set forth by the Far
Eastern Commission or pursuant to the terms of reference of the Far
Eastern Commission should be made available for this purpose. The
reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment
of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice
the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of a
minimum civilian standard of living. The shares of particular countries
in the total sum of the reparations from Japan shall be determined on a
broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of material and
human destruction and damage suffered by each claimant country as a result
of the preparation and execution of Japanese aggression, and taking also
into due account each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat
of Japan, including the extent and duration of its resistance to Japanese
aggression.

Restitution

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all indentifiable
property, looted, delivered under duress, or paid for in worthless
currency.

5. Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies

While the Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the manage-
ment and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies,
this responsibility is subject to the approval and review of the Supreme
Commander, and wherever necessary to his direction.
6. International Trade and Financial Relations
Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. During occupation and under suitable controls, and subject to the prior requirements of the peoples of countries which have participated in the war against Japan, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparations account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange usable in purchasing imports. The proceeds of Japanese exports may be used after the minimum civilian standard of living has been secured to pay for the costs of non-military imports necessary for the occupation which have already been made since the surrender.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods and foreign exchange and financial transactions. The Far Eastern Commission shall formulate the policies and principles governing exports from and imports to Japan. The Far Eastern Commission will formulate the policies to be followed in the exercise of these controls.

7. Japanese Property Located Abroad
The clauses herein on reparations and references to this subject are without prejudice to the views of governments of the overseas assets issue.

8. Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan
All business organizations of any of the United Nations shall have equal opportunity in the overseas trade and commerce of Japan. Within Japan equal treatment shall be accorded to all national of the United Nations.

9. Imperial Household Property
Imperial household property shall not be exempt from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

1. From Lewe Van Aduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1953) Appendix I.
APPENDIX III
SECURITY TREATY
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

Signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America March 20, 1952; ratified by the President of the United States of America April 15, 1952; ratified by Japan November 19, 1951; ratifications exchanged at Washington April 28, 1952; proclaimed by the President of the United States of America April 28, 1952; entered into force April 28, 1952.

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

ARTICLE II
During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

ARTICLE III
The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV
This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

ARTICLE V
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

DEAN ACHESON
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
ALEXANDER WILEY
STYLES BRIDGES

FOR JAPAN:

SHIGERU YOSHIDA.

EXCELLENCY: Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of 'every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter.'

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its members are taking action. There has been established a unified command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the members of the United Nations, the Armed Forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United
States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

His Excellency
SHIGERU YOSHIDA,
Prime Minister of Japan

[SEPTEMBER 8, 1951]

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume the obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of 'every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter.'

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its Members are taking action. There has been established a Unified Command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the Members of the United Nations, the armed forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of the United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members, of
the forces engaged in such United Nations actions; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services, over and above those provided to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present.

With full cognizance of the contents of Your Excellency's Note, I have the honor, on behalf of my Government, to confirm that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action, the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations Member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States would be at United States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

THE HONORABLE
DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State

APPENDIX V

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT,
WITH ANNEXES, BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

Signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954
Entered into force May 1, 1954

(a)
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan,

Desiring to foster international peace and security, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, through voluntary arrangements which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to develop effective measures for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their belief as stated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Recalling the preamble of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, to the effect that the United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, would maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan as a provisional arrangement in the expectation that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Recognizing that, in the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan, economic stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its defense capacities, and that Japan can contribute only to the extent permitted by its general economic condition and capacities;
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States of America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, which provide for the furnishing of defense assistance by the United States of America in furtherance of the objectives referred to above; and

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Government, consistently with the principle that economic stability is essential to international peace and security, will make available to the other and to such other governments as the two Governments signatory to the present Agreement may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as the Government furnishing such assistance may authorize, in accordance with such detailed arrangements as may be made between them. The furnishing and use of any such assistance as may be authorized by either Government shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to the present Agreement will be furnished under those provisions, and subject to all of those terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory and supplementary thereto, and appropriation acts thereunder which may affect the furnishing of such assistance.

2. Each Government will make effective use of assistance received pursuant to the present Agreement for the purposes of promoting peace and security in a manner that is satisfactory to both Governments, and neither Government, without the prior consent of the other, will devote such assistance of any other purpose.

3. Each Government will offer for return to the other, in accordance with terms, conditions and procedures mutually agreed upon, equipment or materials furnished under the present Agreement, except equipment and materials furnished on terms requiring reimbursement, and no longer required for the purposes for which it was originally made available.
4. In the interest of common security, each Government undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such Government or to any other government, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, or services received pursuant to the present Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government which furnished such assistance.

ARTICLE II

In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Japan agrees to facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of America for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Japan. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements for domestic use and commercial export as determined by the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE III

1. Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed upon between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified articles, services or information furnished by the other Government pursuant to the present Agreement.

2. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under the present Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, make appropriate arrangements providing for the methods and terms of the exchange of industrial property rights and technical information for defense which will expedite such exchange and at the same time protect private interests and maintain security safeguards.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments will consult for the purpose of establishing procedures whereby the Government of Japan will so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any programs of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States of
America so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government, when the Government of Japan is advised by the Government of the United States of America that any such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the program of assistance.

ARTICLE VI

1. The Government of Japan will grant

a. Exemption from duties and internal taxation upon importation or exportation to materials, supplies or equipment imported into or exported from its territory under the present Agreement or any similar agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of any other country receiving assistance, except as otherwise agreed to; and

b. Exemption from and refund of Japanese taxes, as enumerated in the attached Annex E, so far as they may affect expenditures of or financed by the Government of the United States of America effected in Japan for procurement of materials, supplies, equipment and services under the present Agreement or any similar agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of any other country receiving assistance.

2. Exemption from duties and exemption from and refund of Japanese taxes as enumerated in the attached Annex E will apply, in addition, to any other expenditures of or financed by the Government of the United States of America for materials, supplies, equipment and services for mutual defense, including expenditures made in conformity with the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan or any foreign aid program of the Government of the United States of America under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, or any acts supplementary, amendatory or successory thereto.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Government of Japan agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the United States of America who will discharge in the territory of Japan the responsibilities of the latter Government regarding equipment, materials, and services furnished under the present Agreement,
and who will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished by the Government of the United States of America under the present Agreement. Such personnel who are nationals of the United States of America, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relationships with the Government of Japan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to other personnel with corresponding rank in the Embassy of the United States of America.

2. The Government of Japan will make available, from time to time, to the Government of the United States of America funds in yen for the administrative and related expenses of the latter Government in connection with carrying out the present Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of Japan, reaffirming its determination to join in promoting international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace, to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension, and to fulfill the military obligations which the Government of Japan has assumed under the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, will make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world, take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE IX

1. Nothing contained in the present Agreement shall be construed to alter or otherwise modify the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan or any arrangements concluded thereunder.

2. The present Agreement will be implemented by each Government in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the respective countries.
ARTICLE X

1. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application of the present Agreement or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to the present Agreement.

2. The terms of the present Agreement may be reviewed at the request of either of the two Governments or amended by agreement between them at any time.

ARTICLE XI

1. The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a written notice from the Government of Japan of ratification of the Agreement by Japan.

2. The present Agreement will thereafter continue in force until one year after the date of receipt by either Government of a written notice of the intention of the other to terminate it, provided that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article III, paragraph 1 and Article IV shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

3. The Annexes to the present Agreement shall form an integral part thereof.

4. The present Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives of the two Governments, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, at Tokyo, this eighth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four.

For the United States of America:

JOHN M. ALLISON

For Japan:

KATSUO OKAZAKI

[Seal] [Seal]
ANNEX A

In carrying out the present Agreement, the Government of the United States of America will give every consideration, to the extent that other factors will permit, to procurement in Japan of supplies and equipment to be made available to Japan, as well as to other countries, where feasible, and to providing information to and facilitating the training of technicians from Japan's defense-production industries. In this connection, representatives of the Government of Japan stated that the development of Japan's defense capacities will greatly be facilitated if the Government of the United States of America will give consideration to assisting in the financing of Japan's defense-production industries.

The two Governments recognize the advisability of establishing adequate liaison between them to facilitate procurement by the Government of the United States of America in Japan.

ANNEX B

The security measures which the Government of Japan agrees to take pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 will be such as would guarantee the same degree of security and protection as provided in the United States of America, and no disclosure to any person not an officer or agent of the Government of Japan of classified articles, services or information accepted by Japan, will be made without the prior consent of the Government of the United States of America.

ANNEX C

The two Governments recognize the benefits to be derived from the principle of standardization, and agree to the advisability of taking feasible joint measures to achieve that degree of standardization, with respect to specifications and quality, which will promote the effective utilization and maintenance of any assistance furnished under the present Agreement.
ANNEX D

In the interest of common security, the Government of Japan will cooperate with the Governments of the United States of America and other peace-loving countries in taking measures to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ANNEX E

To effectuate Article VI, the Governments of the United States of America and Japan agree as follows:

1. The Japanese taxes referred to in Article VI, paragraph 1b and paragraph 2, are as follows:
   a. Commodity tax;
   b. Travelling tax;
   c. Gasoline tax;
   d. Electricity and gas tax.

2. With respect to any present or future taxes of Japan not specifically referred to in this Annex which might be found to be applicable to the expenditures covered by Article VI, the two Governments will agree upon procedures for granting exemption and refund.

3. Exemption from duties and exemption from and refund of Japanese taxes will be applied upon appropriate certification by the Government of the United States of America.

4. Materials, supplies and equipment imported into or procured by the Government of the United States of America in Japan exempt from duties and taxes under Article VI, shall not be disposed of in Japan except as such disposal may be authorized by the authorities of the United States of America and Japan in accordance with mutually agreed conditions.

5. Nothing in Article VI, or this Annex shall be construed to
   a. Require exemption from import or export procedures provided for by the laws of Japan, or
   b. Affect exemption from duties and internal taxation provided for by the laws of Japan in accordance with existing agreements and arrangements such as the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan.
1. With respect to the facilities to be accorded by the Government of Japan to the personnel of the Government of the United States of America who, pursuant to Article VII of the present Agreement, will discharge in Japan responsibilities of the Government of the United States of America to observe the progress of assistance furnished in pursuance of the present Agreement, the two Governments agree that such facilities to be accorded shall be reasonable and not unduly burdensome upon the Government of Japan.

2. The two Governments agree that the number of such personnel to be accorded diplomatic privileges will be kept as low as possible.

3. It is understood between the two Governments that the status of such personnel of the nationality of the United States of America, considered part of the Diplomatic Mission of the Government of the United States of America, will be the same as the status of personnel of corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States of America in Japan.

Such personnel will be divided into three categories:

a. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States of America, full diplomatic status will be granted to the senior military member and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officer assigned thereto, and to their respective immediate deputies.

b. The second category of personnel will enjoy privileges and immunities conferred by international custom to certain categories of personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America in Japan, such as the immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction of Japan, immunity of official papers from search and seizure, right of free egress, exemption from customs duties or similar taxes or restrictions in respect of personally owned property imported into Japan by such personnel for their personal use and consumption, without prejudice to the existing regulations on foreign exchange, exemption from internal taxation by Japan upon salaries of such personnel. Privileges and courtesies incident to diplomatic status such as diplomatic automobile license plates, inclusion on the 'Diplomatic List', and social courtesies may be waived by the Government of the United States of America for this category of personnel.

c. The third category of personnel will receive the same status as the clerical personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America in Japan.
ANNEX G

1. The two Governments agree to restrict to the minimum necessary the amount of expenses to be made available from time to time by the Government of Japan pursuant to Article VII.

2. The two Governments also agree that the Government of Japan may, in lieu of meeting the expenses referred to in the preceding paragraph, make available necessary and suitable real estate, equipment, supplies and services.

3. The two Governments agree that, in consideration of the contributions in kind to be made available by the Government of Japan, the amount of yen to be made available as a cash contribution by the Government of Japan for any Japanese fiscal year shall be as agreed upon between the two Governments.

4. The contributions by the Government of Japan will be made available in accordance with arrangements as may be agreed upon between the two Governments.

5. The two Governments further agree that, in consideration of the contributions in kind to be made available by the Government of Japan during the initial period from the date of coming into force of the present Agreement to March 31, 1955, the amount of cash contributions by the Government of Japan for such period shall not exceed Three Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Three Hundred Thousand Yen (¥357,300,000).

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN REGARDING THE PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan:

Considering the mutual benefits to be derived from the sale by the United States of America and the purchase by Japan of United States surplus agricultural commodities under the provisions of Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended; and

Desiring to set forth the necessary arrangements therefor;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The two Governments will endeavor to enter into transactions pursuant to Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, aggregating Fifty Million United States Dollars ($50,000,000) during the current United States fiscal year ending June 30, 1954.

ARTICLE II

The particular commodities to be purchased and the terms of particular transactions shall be agreed upon between the two Governments from time to time in accordance with procedures established for the Government of the United States of America by the Foreign Operations Administration.

ARTICLE III

It is understood that the procurement and utilization of the commodities which may be obtained pursuant to this agreement will not cause displacement of or substitution for usual marketings of the United States of America or of other friendly countries.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States of America shall disburse the United States dollars required for the purchases referred to in Article II, and the Government of Japan shall, upon notification of such dollar disbursements, deposit the yen equivalent in a special account of the Government of the United States of America to be established in the Bank of Japan.
ARTICLE V
The rate of exchange of United States dollars to yen to be deposited shall be the official par value established by the Government of Japan with respect to United States dollars prevailing at the time of the receipt of each notification referred to in Article IV, provided there are no multiple official basic rates of exchange.

ARTICLE VI
Detailed arrangements necessary for the operation of this Agreement shall be agreed upon between the two Governments.

ARTICLE VII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the Agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives of the two Governments, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, at Tokyo, this eighth day of March, one thousand nine hundred fifty-four.

For the United States of America:
JOHN M. ALLISON

For Japan:
KATSUO OKAZAKI

[Seal] [Seal]

APPENDIX VI

THE DULLES-SHIGEMITSU JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, AUGUST 1955

Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, has concluded three days of discussions with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other high United States officials.

The Foreign Minister was accompanied among others by Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary-General of the Japan Democratic Party; Ambassador to the United States Sadao Iguchi; Ambassador Toshikazu Kase, Japan's Permanent Observer to the United Nations; and Takizo Matsumoto, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary.

American officials in addition to the Secretary of State who met with the Foreign Minister and members of his party included: Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur W. Radford; Mr John Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration; Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy; Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray; Ambassador to Japan John M. Allison; and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William J. Sebald.

A free and frank exchange of views from the global viewpoint was held concerning more recent international developments, notably the implications of the "Summit" meeting at Geneva, the present United Nations discussion on disarmament, and the impending Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva. The Far Eastern situation was also discussed. Secretary Dulles explained the policy of the United States to support freedom firmly while exploring patiently every avenue which may lead to the enhancement of general peace. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu drew on his experience in the Soviet Union and China in interpreting his nation's policies. The Secretary of State and Foreign Minister concurred in the view that while the immediate danger of major war had perhaps receded there still remain elements of uncertainty in the situation, particularly in the Far East, and that the continued solidarity of the free world is needed to maintain improved prospects of peace.

The Foreign Minister expressed Japan's resolve to maintain cooperation with the United States and the free world as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. In this connection the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, recognizing the desirability of closer cooperation
between their countries for the purpose of securing stability and
enduring peace in the Far East, agreed that consultations between their
Governments should continue on various problems of mutual concern.

The basic problems of Japanese security were discussed. The
Foreign Minister indicated that Japan's defense strength has now reached
a considerable level and expressed the firm determination that the
policy of progressive increase will be continued within the limit of
Japan's capacity. He explained the plans for increasing Japan's defense
capabilities recently formulated by the Japanese defense authorities.
It was agreed that these plans should be studied in the course of the
continuing consultations in Tokyo on United States-Japanese defense
relationships and should be reviewed from time to time in the light of
strategic requirements.

It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on
a cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as
rapidly as possible, assume primary responsibility for the defense of
its homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of inter-
national peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed
that when such conditions are brought about it would be appropriate to
replace the present Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality.

With the conclusion of such a treaty as an objective, it was
further agreed that consultations would take place in Tokyo between
Japanese and United States representatives on defense problems and that
in such consultations consideration will be given to the establishment
of schedules for the progressive withdrawal of United States ground forces
as Japan's own defense capacity increases and taking into account the
related situation in Asia.

On the problem of Japan's financial contribution to the support of
United States forces in Japan, there was agreement on the desirability of
establishing a general formula for progressive reduction over the next
several years.

The Foreign Minister emphasized Japan's need to expand its trade
with other countries particularly in Asia and expressed appreciation for
the help of the United States in assisting Japan to become a full member
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Secretary Dulles expressed current thinking about assistance for
the economic development of the free nations of Asia pursuant to United
States legislation. It was recognized that the measures planned would
facilitate Japan's efforts to improve its economic position and attain a higher standard of living. The Secretary stressed the contribution to economic development which could be made by foreign private investment both in Japan and in other countries of the area.

The Foreign Minister requested the early release of war criminals under United States jurisdiction. The Secretary of State described the complexity of the problem and indicated that the question of the release of the war criminals will be kept under continuous and urgent examination.

It was agreed that no major obstacles remain to settlement for economic assistance rendered to Japan during the occupation and that utmost efforts will be made to bring the negotiations in Tokyo on this subject between the two Governments to an early conclusion.

Throughout these talks the representatives of the United States and Japan recognized that Japan as a major power in Asia, should play an active role in friendly cooperation with other Asian nations in contributing to stability and peace in Asia. They agreed that in view of Japan's efforts to establish internal stability, reconstruct the national economy and strengthen its defense capacity, there is a firmer basis for continuing cooperation between the United States and Japan. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles confirmed anew the determination of their Governments to expand this relationship further so that they together and with others may pursue their work for the consolidation of world peace and freedom.

APPENDIX VII
THE KISHI-EISENHOWER JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, JUNE 1957

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan concluded today valuable discussion on topics of interest to both countries. Their talks focused mainly on United States-Japanese relations but they also discussed international subjects of mutual concern, especially the situation in Asia.

During his three-day visit the Prime Minister and members of his party met at length with the Secretary of State and also met with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President of the Export-Import Bank and appropriate representatives of the President and of the Departments of Defense and Agriculture, and with leaders of the United States Congress. After leaving Washington, the Prime Minister will visit other parts of the United States and meet with leaders of business and other private organizations.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, although the dangers of general war had somewhat receded, international communism remains a major threat. Accordingly, they agreed that the five nations should continue to preserve their strength and their unity. It was mutually recognized that the deterrent power of the free world had, in recent years, been effective in preventing overt aggression in the Far East and the world.

The President and the Prime Minister are convinced that relations between Japan and the United States are entering a new era firmly based on common interests and trust. Their discussions covered the many mutual advantages and benefits of close relations between the United States and Japan. The President and the Prime Minister decided, therefore, that it would be appropriate to affirm the following principles of cooperation between the two countries:

(1) Relations between the United States and Japan rest on a solid foundation of sovereign equality, mutual interest and cooperation beneficial to both nations. In the years ahead, this relationship will provide a vital element in strengthening the Free World.

(2) Both nations are dedicated to peace based on liberty and justice in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. They are resolved to work toward the establishment of conditions under which
peace and freedom can prevail. To this end they will support the United Nations and contribute their best efforts to preserve and enhance the unity of the Free World. They will oppose the use of force by any nation except in individual or collective self-defense as provided in the United Nations Charter.

(3) In the interests of continued peace, the Free World must maintain its defensive capability until armaments are brought under effective control. Meanwhile, the free nations need to intensify their efforts to foster the conditions necessary for economic and social progress and for strengthening freedom in Asia and throughout the world. Free Asian nations, which desire assistance, should be aided in carrying forward measures for economic development and technical training.

(4) The United States and Japan reaffirm the desirability of a high level of world trade beneficial to free nations and of orderly trade between the two countries, without unnecessary and arbitrary restrictions.

(5) The two countries fully agree that an effective international agreement for the reduction of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, is of crucial importance for the future of the world. They will continue in close consultation on this important problem.

Within the context of these principles the President and the Prime Minister reviewed the great changes which have taken place in Japan in recent years, including Japan's extensive economic recovery and admission to the United Nations, both of which the President warmly welcomed.

II.

Existing security arrangements between the United States and Japan were discussed. It was agreed to establish an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces. The committee will also consult to assure that any action taken under the Treaty conforms to the principles of the United Nations Charter. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed their understanding that the Security Treaty of 1951 was designed to be transitional in character and not in that form to remain in perpetuity. The Committee will also consider future adjustments in the relationships between the United States and Japan in these fields adequate to meet the needs and aspirations of the peoples of both countries.
The United States welcomed Japan's plans for the buildup of her defense forces and accordingly, in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Security Treaty, will substantially reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces. The United States plans still further reductions as the Japanese defense forces grow.

The President, while recognizing that Japan must trade to live, stressed the continuing need for control on exports of strategic materials to those countries threatening the independence of free nations through the extension of international communism. The Prime Minister, while agreeing with the need for such control in cooperation with other Free World governments, pointed out the necessity for Japan to increase its trade.

The Prime Minister emphasized the strong desire of the Japanese people for the return of administrative control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan. The President reaffirmed the United States position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands. He pointed out, however, that so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East the United States will find it necessary to continue the present status. He stated that the United States will continue its policy of improving the welfare and wellbeing of the inhabitants of the Islands and of promoting their economic and cultural advancement.

Economic and trade relations between the United States and Japan were discussed at length. The President and the Prime Minister mutually confirmed not only the desire for a high level of trade but also the need for close relations between the two countries in other economic fields. The Prime Minister, while expressing his deep concern over certain movements in the United States for import restrictions, explained that in consideration of the predominant importance of the United States market for Japanese trade Japan is taking measures for an orderly development of her exports to the United States. The President confirmed that the United States Government will maintain its traditional policy of a high level of trade without unnecessary and arbitrary restrictions. He expressed his hopes for the removal of local restrictions on the sale of Japanese products.

The Prime Minister described his recent tour of certain Asian countries and said that he had been deeply impressed with the serious efforts these countries are making toward economic development. He
expressed his conviction that further progress in the economic development of these countries would greatly contribute to stability and freedom in Asia. The President expressed his full agreement with the Prime Minister. The President and the Prime Minister discussed ways in which free Asian countries might be further assisted in developing their economies. The views of the Prime Minister will be studied by the United States.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the early cessation of both the testing and the manufacture of nuclear weapons as part of a first step in a safeguarded disarmament program. The President told the Prime Minister that the latter’s views are being taken into account in formulating the United States position at the current United Nations disarmament session in London.

The President and the Prime Minister are convinced that their exchange of views will contribute much to strengthening mutual understanding and to agreement on fundamental interests which will further solidify the friendly relations between the two countries in the years to come.

APPENDIX VIII

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN.1

Signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America June 22, 1960;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America June 22, 1960;
Ratified by Japan June 21, 1960;
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo June 23, 1960;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America June 27, 1960;
With Agreed Minute and Exchanges of Notes.

The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and

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security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

**ARTICLE II**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

**ARTICLE III**

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

**ARTICLE IV**

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

**ARTICLE V**

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**ARTICLE VI**

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

**ARTICLE VII**

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**ARTICLE VIII**

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

**ARTICLE IX**

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 2ND
J. GRAHAM PARSONS

FOR JAPAN:

NOBUSUKE KISHI
AIICHIRO FUJIYAMA
MITSUJIRO ISHII
TADASHI ADACHI
KOICHIRO ASAKAI
AGREED MINUTE TO THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY

Japanese Plenipotentiary:

While the question of the status of the islands administered by the United States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan has not been made a subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations, I would like to emphasize the strong concern of the Government and people of Japan for the safety of the people of these islands since Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands. If an armed attack occurs or is threatened against these islands, the two countries will of course consult together closely under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In the event of an armed attack, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to explore with the United States measures which it might be able to take for the welfare of the islanders.

United States Plenipotentiary:

In the event of an armed attack against these islands, the United States Government will consult at once with the Government of Japan and intends to take the necessary measures for the defense of these islands, and to do its utmost to secure the welfare of the islanders.

C.A.H.
N.K.


EXCHANGES OF NOTES


EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today, and to inform Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.
I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

NOBUSUKE KISHI

His Excellency

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 19, 1960

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today, and to inform Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

"I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America. 
"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Secretary of State of the United States of America

HIS EXCELLENCY

NOBUSUKE KISHI, 
Prime Minister of Japan.
EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on February 19, 1954, as well as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understanding of my Government that:

1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force so long as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan remains in force.

2. The expression "those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America" in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Agreement is understood to mean the facilities and areas the use of which is granted to the United States of America under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces under the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their status in Japan are governed by arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the foregoing numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government and that this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at Washington on January 19, 1960.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Secretary of State of the United States of America

His Excellency
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on February 19, 1954, as well as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understanding of my Government that:

1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force so long as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan remains in force.

2. The expression 'those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America' in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Agreement is understood to mean the facilities and the areas the use of which is granted to the United States of America under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces under the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their status in Japan are governed by arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the foregoing numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government and that this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at Washington on January 19, 1960."

I have the honour to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration

NOBUSUKE KISHI

His Excellency
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America

DEAR SECRETARY HERTER:

I wish to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today. Under Article IV of the Treaty, the two Governments will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of the Treaty, and, at the request of either Government, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. The exchange of notes under Article VI of the Treaty specifies certain matters as the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

Such consultations will be carried on between the two Governments through appropriate channels. At the same time, however, I feel that the establishment of a special committee which could as appropriate be used for these consultations between the Governments would prove very useful. This committee, which would meet whenever requested by either side, could also consider any matters underlying and related to security affairs which would serve to promote understanding between the two Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations between the two countries in the field of security.

Under this proposal the present "Japanese-American Committee on Security" established by the Governments of the United States and Japan, on August 6, 1957, would be replaced by this new committee which might be called "The Security Consultative Committee". I would also recommend that the membership of this new committee be the same as the membership of the "Japanese-American Committee on Security", namely on the Japanese side, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will preside on the Japanese side, and the Director General of the Defense Agency, and on the United States side, the United States Ambassador to Japan, who will serve as Chairman on the United States side, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, who will be the Ambassador's principal advisor on military and defense matters. The Commander, United States Forces, Japan, will serve as alternate for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

I would appreciate very much your views on this matter.

Most sincerely,

NOBUSUKE KISHI

His Excellency
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America
DEAR MR PRIME MINISTER:

The receipt is acknowledged of your Note of today's date suggesting the establishment of "The Security Consultative Committee". I fully agree to your proposal and share your view that such a committee can contribute to strengthening the cooperative relations between the two countries in the field of security. I also agree to your proposal regarding the membership of this committee.

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

His Excellency
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan.

APPENDIX IX

THE KISHI-EISENHOWER JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, JANUARY 1960

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan conferred at the White House today prior to the formal signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. Their discussions were devoted chiefly to a broad and comprehensive review of current international developments, and to an examination of Japanese-American relations. Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Fujiyama and American Secretary of State Herter also took part in the White House talks. Later the Prime Minister and his party conferred with the Secretary of State on matters of mutual concern to the two countries.

I.

The President and the Prime Minister first discussed the international situation. The President told the Prime Minister of the profound impression made upon him during his recent trip to South Asia, the Near East, Africa and Europe by the overwhelming desire throughout these areas for early realization of the goals of the United Nations, international peace, respect for human rights, and a better life. In discussing the international situation, the President stated his determination to exert every effort at the impending Summit meeting to achieve meaningful progress toward these goals. The Prime Minister expressed full agreement and support for the President's determination.

In this connection, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that disarmament, with the essential guarantees of inspection and verification, is a problem of urgent and central importance to all nations, whose resolution would contribute greatly to reducing the burden of armaments and the risk of war. They expressed the further hope that early agreement can be reached on an adequately safeguarded program for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. They concluded that the world is entering a period affording important opportunities which they have every intention of exploring most seriously, but only on the basis of tested performance not merely promises. Both leaders recognized that all of man's intellect, wisdom and imagination must be brought into full play to achieve a world at peace under justice and freedom. They expressed
the conviction that, during this period and particularly until all nations abide faithfully by the purposes and principles of the U.N. and forego the resort to force, it is essential for free nations to maintain by every means their resolution, their unity and their strength.

II.

The President and the Prime Minister considered the security relationship between the United States and Japan in the light of their evaluation of the current international situation and declared that this close relationship is essential to the achievement of peace in justice and freedom. They are convinced that the partnership and cooperation between their two nations is strengthened by the new treaty which has been drawn up on the basis of the principles of equal sovereignty and mutual cooperation that characterize the present relationship between the two countries. Both leaders look forward to the ratification of the treaty and to the celebration of this year of the centennial of Japan's first diplomatic mission to the United States as further demonstrations of the strength and continuity of Japanese-American friendship.

In reviewing relations between Japan and the United States since their last meeting in June of 1957, the President and the Prime Minister expressed particular gratification at the success of efforts since that time to develop the new era in relations between the two countries, based on common interest, mutual trust, and the principles of cooperation.

Both the President and the Prime Minister looked ahead to continued close cooperation between the two countries within the framework of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. They are convinced that the Treaty will materially strengthen peace and security in the Far East and advance the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. They are convinced also that the treaty will foster an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In this connection, the Prime Minister discussed with the President the question of prior consultation under the new treaty. The President assured him that the United States Government has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to the matters involving prior consultation under the treaty.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed the situation in Asia. They reaffirmed their belief that they should maintain close contact and consultation with relation to future developments in this area. They agreed that Japan's increasing participation in international discussion of the problems of Asia will be in the interest of the free world.
III.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the expansion of trade among free nations, the economic progress and elevation of living standards in less developed countries are of paramount importance, and will contribute to stability and progress so essential to the achievement of peace in the world.

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on the European economic and trade communities and on the role that can be played by the industrialized Free World countries in the economic development of the less developed areas. Both leaders called particular attention to the urgent desire of peoples in the less developed areas of the world for the economic advancement without which they cannot preserve their freedom. They stressed the role which increasingly must be played by the industrialized nations of the free world in assisting the progress of the less developed areas. The President particularly referred to the increasing role the Japanese people are playing in the economic development of free Asia.

In considering economic relations between the United States and Japan, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that trade between their two nations is of great benefit to both countries, noting that the United States is the largest purchaser of Japanese exports, and Japan is the second largest buyer of American goods. They expressed gratification at the growth of mutually profitable trade between the two countries. They reaffirmed their conviction that the continued and orderly expansion of world trade, through the avoidance of arbitrary and new unnecessary trade restrictions, and through active measures to remove existing obstacles, is essential to the well-being and progress of both countries.

The Prime Minister stressed the importance the United States and Japan consulting on a continuing basis with regard to economic matters of mutual interest. The President expressed full agreement to this view.

IV.

The President expressed his particular gratification that the Prime Minister could come to Washington on this occasion so important to United States-Japanese relations. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet again with the President.
The President and the Prime Minister agreed that their talks will contribute to the continued strengthening of the United States-Japanese partnership.

APPENDIX X

THE IKEDA-KENNEDY JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, JUNE 1961

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda concluded today a constructive and friendly exchange of views on the present international situation and on relations between the United States and Japan. Secretary Rusk, Foreign Minister Kosaka, and other U.S. and Japanese officials participated in the conversations.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed various problems confronting the peoples of the world who are resolved to defend their freedom, and they reaffirmed the determination of the two countries to intensify their efforts toward the establishment of world peace based on freedom and justice. The President and the Prime Minister stressed that the common policy of the two countries is to strengthen the authority of the United Nations as an organ for the maintenance of world peace.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their concern over the unstable aspects of the situation in Asia and agreed to hold close consultations in the future with a view to discovering the ways and means by which stability and well-being might be achieved in that area. Their discussion of the Asian situation included an examination of various problems relating to Communist China. They also exchanged views concerning the relations of their respective countries with Korea.

The President and the Prime Minister recognized the urgent need for an agreement on a nuclear test ban accompanied by effective inspection and control measures, agreeing that it is of crucial importance for world peace. They also expressed their conviction that renewed efforts should be made in the direction of general disarmament.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the world economic situation. They agreed on the need for continued close cooperation among the free countries of the world, particularly in promoting the growth of international trade and financial stability. They agreed that both countries should pursue liberal trade policies looking to an orderly expansion of trade between the two countries.

The President and the Prime Minister stressed the importance of development assistance to less developed countries. The Prime Minister expressed a particular interest in this connection in development assistance for East Asia. They agreed to exchange views on such assistance and agreed that both countries would make positive efforts to the extent of their respective capacities.
The President and the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with the firm foundation on which the United States-Japanese partnership is established. To strengthen the partnership between the two countries, they agreed to establish a Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs at the cabinet level, noting that this would assist in achieving the objectives of Article II of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the importance of broadening educational, cultural and scientific cooperation between the two countries. They therefore agreed to form two United States-Japan committees, one to study expanded cultural and educational cooperation between the two countries, and the other to seek ways to strengthen scientific cooperation.

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on matters relating to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, which are under United States administration but in which Japan retains residual sovereignty. The President affirmed that the United States would make further efforts to enhance the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts; the Prime Minister affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end.

APPENDIX XI

THE SATO-JOHNSON JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, JANUARY 1965

1. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington on January 12 and 13, 1965, to exchange views on the current international situation and matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan. They were assisted by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister [Etsusaburo] Shiina and Secretary-General [Takeo] Miki of the Liberal Democratic Party.

2. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the present international situation and reaffirmed the partnership of the two countries which grows out of common beliefs and the shared objective of a lasting peace based on justice, freedom and prosperity for all peoples. They expressed a firm determination that the two countries should cooperate more closely in seeking this common objective. They agreed that for this purpose the two countries should maintain the closest contact and consultation not only on problems lying between them but on problems affecting Asia and the world in general.

3. The President and the Prime Minister recognizing the valuable role of the United Nations in the maintenance of the peace and prosperity of the world, exchanged frank views on the difficult questions now confronting the United Nations, and agreed to continue cooperative efforts to strengthen the functions of the United Nations and to enhance its authority.

4. The President and the Prime Minister recognized the desirability of promoting arms control and a reduction of the arms race as rapidly as possible, and strongly hoped that, following the partial test ban treaty, further steps can be made toward the realization of a total nuclear test ban.

5. The President and the Prime Minister recognizing that the question of China is a problem having a vital bearing on the peace and stability of Asia, exchanged frank views on the positions of their respective countries and agreed to maintain close consultation with each other on this matter. The President emphasized the United States policy of firm support for the Republic of China and his grave concern that Communist China's militant policies and expansionist pressures against its neighbors endanger the peace of Asia. The Prime Minister stated that
it is the fundamental policy of the Japanese Government to maintain friendly ties based on the regular diplomatic relationship with the Government of the Republic of China and at the same time to continue to promote private contact which is being maintained with the Chinese mainland in such matters as trade on the basis of the principle of separation of political matters from economic matters.

6. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their deep concern over the unstable and troubled situation in Asia, particularly in Vietnam, and agreed that continued perseverance would be necessary for freedom and independence in South Vietnam. They reaffirmed their belief that peace and progress in Asia are prerequisites to peace in the whole world.

7. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that the elevation of living standards and the advancement of social welfare are essential for the political stability of developing nations throughout the world and agreed to strengthen their economic cooperation with such countries. They agreed to continue to consult on the forms of such assistance. The Prime Minister expressed a particular interest in expanding Japan's role in developmental and technical assistance for Asia.

8. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that it is essential for the stability and peace of Asia that there be no uncertainty about Japan's security. From this viewpoint, the Prime Minister stated that Japan's basic policy is to maintain firmly the United States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty arrangements, and the President reaffirmed the United States determination to abide by its commitment under the Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside.

9. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed the importance of constantly seeking even closer relationships between the two countries. In particular, they recognized the vital importance to both countries of the expansion of their economic relations sustained by the growth of their respective economies, and agreed that the two countries should cooperate with each other in the worldwide efforts for the expansion of world trade and for effective international monetary cooperation.

10. The President and the Prime Minister confirmed the desirability of maintaining and utilizing the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs where exchange of views takes place at the cabinet level, as well as the United States-Japan Committee on Scientific
Cooperation and the Joint United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange. They further agreed that the fourth meeting of the joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs would be held in July of this year.

11. The President and the Prime Minister recognized the importance of United States military installations on the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands for the security of the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed the desire that, as soon as feasible, the administrative control over these islands will be restored to Japan and also a deep interest in the expansion of the autonomy of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and in further promoting their welfare. Appreciating the desire of the Government and people of Japan for the restoration of administration to Japan, the President stated that he looks forward to the day when the security interests of the free world in the Far East will permit the realization of this desire. They confirmed that the United States and Japan should continue substantial economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands in order to advance further the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of these islands. They expressed their satisfaction with the smooth operation of the cooperative arrangements between the United States and Japan concerning assistance to the Ryukyu Islands. They agreed in principle to broaden the functions of the existing Japan-United States Consultative Committee so as to enable the Committee to conduct consultations not only on economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands but also on other matters on which the two countries can cooperate in continuing to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the islands. The President agreed to give favorable consideration to an ancestral graves visit by a representative group of former residents of the Bonin Islands.

12. The President and the Prime Minister discussed the United States-Japan Civil Air Transport Agreement, the North Pacific Fisheries Convention, private investment in Japan, the Interest Equalization Tax and other economic matters. They agreed on the importance of close consultation and cooperation between the two governments to attain mutually acceptable and equitable solutions to issues pending between the United States and Japan.
13. The President and the Prime Minister, mindful of the many areas of human health which are of great concern to all the peoples of Asia, agreed to undertake a greatly expanded program of cooperation in medical science with respect to such diseases as malaria, cholera, schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, and stomach cancer, in addition to cooperative efforts on problems of air pollution and pesticides. As a first step to implement the agreement, they agreed to convene a conference of the foremost medical scientists from the United States and Japan to work out the details of the new program for discussion with other governments concerned.

14. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their satisfaction with the meeting just held and their desire to continue to maintain close personal contact.

APPENDIX XII
THE SATÔ-JOHNSON JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, DECEMBER 1967

I
President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington on November 14 and 15, 1967, to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan.

II
The President and the Prime Minister declared that the United States and Japan, guided by common democratic principles of individual dignity and personal freedom, will continue to cooperate closely with each other in efforts to bring about world peace and prosperity. They took note of the importance of reinforcing the authority and role of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization, of promoting arms control and a reduction of the arms race, including the early conclusion of a Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as of rendering effective assistance to the developing countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia.

III
The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular emphasis on developments in the Far East. They noted the fact that Communist China is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the importance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China. The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that, while it is difficult to predict at present what external posture Communist China may eventually assume, it is essential for the free world countries to continue to cooperate among themselves to promote political stability and economic prosperity in the area. Looking toward an enduring peace in Asia, they further expressed the hope that Communist China would ultimately cast aside its present intransigent attitude and seek to live in peace and prosper alongside other nations in the international community.
IV

The President reaffirmed the continuing United States determination to assist the South Vietnamese people in the defense of their freedom and independence. At the same time, he made it clear that he was prepared to enter into negotiations at any time to find a just and lasting solution to the conflict. The Prime Minister expressed support for the United States position of seeking a just and equitable settlement and reaffirmed Japan's determination to do all it can in the search for peace. He also expressed the view that reciprocal action should be expected of Hanoi for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. The Prime Minister noted that he had found widespread support during his Southeast Asian trips for free world efforts to cope with Communist intervention and infiltration.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that it is important that the new Government in South Vietnam continue its progress toward stable democratic institutions and the social and economic betterment of its people.

V

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views frankly on the matter of security in the Far East including Japan. They declared it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to maintain firmly the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace and security of the Far East. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that maintenance of peace and security rests not only upon military factors, but also upon political stability and economic development. The Prime Minister stated that Japan is prepared to make a positive contribution to the peace and stability of Asia in accordance with its capabilities. The President stated that such efforts on the part of Japan would be a highly valued contribution.

VI

Referring to his recent visits to the Southeast Asian countries, the Prime Minister explained the efforts these nations are making in a spirit of self-help toward achievement of greater welfare and prosperity for their peoples, but noted their continued need for assistance in their efforts. The Prime Minister stated that it is the intention of the
Government of Japan, in meeting this need, to continue its efforts to provide more effective bilateral and multilateral assistance to the Southeast Asian region particularly in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, transportation and communication, by increasing the amount of assistance and liberalizing its conditions. The Prime Minister described the encouraging trends which he had observed particularly in Southeast Asia toward greater regional cooperation and he cited the promising prospects for the Asian Development Bank and its Special Funds. He further stated that it is the intention of the Government of Japan to make greater use of these institutions by assisting in further expanding their operations. Recognizing the need to strengthen economic assistance to the developing areas, particularly to the Southeast Asian countries, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to maintain closer consultation with each other in this field.

VII

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the return of administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and expressed his belief that an adequate solution should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these Islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions.

The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to
identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents. To this end, they agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan proper. The existing United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo will be kept informed by the High Commissioner of the progress of the work of the Advisory Committee. It was also agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and the United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the status of the Bonin Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Government of Japan, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.
The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on trade and economic policies following the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round negotiations. They considered that a continued expansion of world trade would be in the best interests of both countries and pledged continued close cooperation in pursuit of this objective. They reaffirmed their support for policies which would lead to a freer flow of trade and further liberalization of other international transactions. They agreed that their two Governments should continue to consult closely regarding trade and economic problems between the two countries with a view to finding mutually satisfactory solutions. They noted that early restoration of balance in each of the two countries' worldwide international payments was of basic concern to both and agreed to assist each other toward this end. In this regard, and with a view to making possible the continuation and expansion of mutually beneficial trade and financial relationships between the two counties and promoting the development and stability of the Asia-Pacific area, they agreed to enhance the usefulness of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs by establishing at an early date a subcommittee. This subcommittee will be a forum for consultation on economic and financial matters of importance to both countries, including the short and longer-range balance of payments problems of the two countries.

IX

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their satisfaction with the active and expanding scientific cooperation between Japan and the United States. They especially recognized the contributions made by the United States-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program which was established as a result of their last meeting in January 1965, and the continuing achievements of the United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, and noted with satisfaction the recent entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, a new milestone in mankind's progress towards peaceful uses of outer space. They reviewed space cooperation to date between the United States and Japan, and surveyed possibilities for future
cooperation. They agreed that the two Governments should look more closely into such possibilities, focusing on the development and launching of earth satellites for the scientific research and peaceful utilization of outer space.

The President and the Prime Minister, aware of the increasing importance of the oceans as a source of food for the world's growing population and as a source of minerals, have agreed to seek ways of greatly expanding United States-Japan cooperation in research and in development of technology for the utilization of marine resources through the United States-Japan Conference on Development and Utilization of Natural Resources. For this purpose they have agreed that as part of the United States-Japan natural resources program, there should be prepared a report and recommendations to the two Governments looking to cooperation between the two countries in this field.

The President and the Prime Minister recognized that the promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy has immense possibility of furthering the welfare of mankind and noted with satisfaction that there exists a close cooperative relationship between the two countries in this field. In this connection, the two leaders expressed satisfaction with the smooth progress of the current negotiations to conclude a new agreement for cooperation in this field. The Prime Minister welcomed in particular the intention of the United States Government to increase the supply of such nuclear fuel as U235 and plutonium to Japan.

X

The President and the Prime Minister were satisfied with their second meeting which was extremely useful and expressed their desire that close personal contact continue in the future.

WASHINGTON, Nov.21 - Following is the text of the joint communique issued today by President Nixon and Premier Eisaku Sato of Japan:

President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington on Nov.19, 20 and 21, 1969, to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan.

The President and the Prime Minister recognized that both the United States and Japan have greatly benefited from their close association in a variety of fields, and they declared that guided by their common principles of democracy and liberty, the two countries would maintain and strengthen their fruitful cooperation in the continuing search for world peace and prosperity and in particular for the relaxation of international tensions. The President expressed his and his Government's deep interest in Asia and stated his belief that the United States and Japan should cooperate to contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister stated that Japan would make further active contributions to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the current international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to by the President. He further expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence
of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.

[4] The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Vietnam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two Governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation, at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States' efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.

[5] In the light of the current situation and the prospects in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that they highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed the intention of the two Governments firmly to maintain the treaty on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two Governments should maintain close contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts, for her own territories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also, that the United States would retain, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed
above should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

[8]

The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

[9]

The President and the Prime Minister took note of the fact that there would be a number of financial and economic problems, including those concerning United States business interests in Okinawa, to be solved between the two countries in connection with the transfer of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan and agreed that detailed discussions relative to their solution would be initiated promptly.

[10]

The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two Governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Japanese Government, in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both Governments. They agreed that the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work. The President and the Prime Minister decided to establish in Okinawa a preparation commission in place of the existing advisory committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the government of the Ryukyu Islands. The preparatory commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of
the Ryukyu Islands, with the chief executive of the government of the Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the commission. The commission will report and make recommendations to the two Governments through the United States-Japan Consultative Committee.

[11]

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution of the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which is the last of the major issues between the two countries arising from World War II, would further strengthen United States-Japan relations, which are based on friendship and mutual trust and would make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.

[12]

In their discussion of economic matters, the President and the Prime Minister noted the marked growth in economic relations between the two countries. They also acknowledged that the leading positions which their countries occupy in the world economy impose important responsibilities on each for the maintenance and strengthening of the international trade and monetary system, especially in the light of the current large imbalances in trade and payments. In this regard, the President stressed his determination to bring inflation in the United States under control. He also reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the principle of promoting freer trade. The Prime Minister indicated the intention of the Japanese Government to accelerate rapidly the reduction of Japan's trade and capital restrictions. Specifically, he stated the intention of the Japanese Government to remove Japan's residual import quota restrictions over a broad range of products by the end of 1971 and to make maximum efforts to accelerate the liberalization of the remaining items. He added that the Japanese Government intends to make periodic reviews of its liberalization program with a view to implementing trade liberalization at a more accelerated pace than hitherto. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that their respective actions would further solidify the foundation of over-all U.S. Japan relations.

[13]

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that attention to the economic needs of the developing countries was essential to the development of international peace and stability. The Prime Minister stated
the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia, commensurate with the economic growth of Japan. The President welcomed this statement and confirmed that the United States would continue to contribute to the economic development of Asia. The President and Prime Minister recognized that there would be major requirements for the postwar rehabilitation of Vietnam and elsewhere in South-east Asia. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to make a substantial contribution to this end.

[14]

The Prime Minister congratulated the President on the successful moon landing of Apollo 12, and expressed the hope for a safe journey back to earth for the astronauts. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the exploration of space offers great opportunities for expanding cooperation in peaceful scientific projects among all nations. In this connection, the Prime Minister noted with pleasure that the United States and Japan last summer had concluded an agreement on space cooperation. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that implementation of this unique program is of importance to both countries.

[15]

The President and the Prime Minister discussed prospects for the promotion of arms control and the slowing down of the arms race. The President outlined his Government's efforts to initiate the strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union that have recently started in Helsinki. The Prime Minister expressed his Government's strong hopes for the success of these talks. The Prime Minister pointed out his country's strong and traditional interest in effective disarmament measures with a view to achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
APPENDIX XIV

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

February 3, 1970

The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.

The Government of Japan is signing this Treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.

The Government of Japan is convinced that this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many States as possible will adhere to this Treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the Governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this Treaty will become Parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this Treaty.

This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.

The prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon States in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.
The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.

This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the Treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a Party to the Treaty.

I. Disarmament and Security

1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each State Party undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon States should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.

2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the Preamble to the Treaty there is a provision stating that ...

...in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

It also wishes to emphasize that the nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.
4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.

5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that:

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

II. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other States Parties conclude with the same Agency, either individually or together with other States. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.

2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this Treaty, the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon States, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon States will take similar action.

3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency
will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the States concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.

4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States to which such safeguards are to be applied.

5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this Treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Article IV and V of the Treaty relating to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear material, equipment, or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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