JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY,


A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.

by

John Barnett WELFIELD

I certify that this thesis is my own original work

[Signature]
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PREFACE

This thesis was written between 1967 and 1971, in the Department of International Relations of the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. The period from March 1967 until April 1968 was spent acquiring a knowledge of Japanese at the Japanese Language School of the International Students' Institute (Kokusai Gakuyū Kai Nihongo Gakkō) in Tokyo. From May 1968 until September 1969 I was attached in an informal way to the Tōyō Bunka Kenkūjo at the University of Tokyo. In September 1969 I returned to Canberra to continue the formidable task of interpreting the mountain of material gathered during my stay in Tokyo.

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CONVENTIONS AND NOMENCLATURE

(i) All Japanese names have been written in the original fashion, with the family name first and personal name second.

(ii) The word 'Jiyūtō' has been rendered into English as 'Liberal Party'. The second Conservative Party that existed from 1945-1955 was subject to frequent changes of name and factional composition, being known first as the 'Shinpōtō' ('Progressive Party'), later as the 'Kaishintō' ('Reform Party') and subsequently as the 'Minshūtō' 'Democratic Party'). To avoid confusion, it has been referred to throughout this work as the 'Democratic (Progressive) Party'. The Jiyūminshūtō' that resulted from the merger of the two Conservative Parties in 1955 has been referred to in this thesis as the 'Liberal-Democratic Party'.
INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Occupation, the defence policy of the Japanese Government has been based on a bilateral security treaty with the United States. Japan has also built up substantial ground, sea and air forces. Yet the Japanese have taken no active part in regional defence organizations. In spite of her intimate connections with the United States, Japan has not been directly involved in hostilities with any of America's antagonists. In the twenty-five years since the end of the Pacific War, not a single Japanese soldier has served outside Japan.

The 1960s saw Japan's final emergence as a great economic power. By the end of the decade she ranked third after the United States and the Soviet Union in the global hierarchy of gross national products. Her international involvement reached new levels of complexity. Decisions taken in Tokyo had world wide repercussions. In innumerable ways, and through a variety of channels, Japan's ability to sway the affairs of the world had probably never been greater. Yet her direct military influence in Asia and the Pacific seemed as slight as it had been during the Heian era.

The twenty years after the fall of the Japanese Empire in 1945 saw a floodtide of American military and political influence in Asia. The Vietnam War seemed to mark the beginning of an ebb. One of the assumptions of the Nixon Doctrine appears to be an expanding military role for Japan. Before his election in 1968, Mr Nixon outlined his views to reporters from a major Japanese newspaper. The future President stated that

I think it certain that as Japan becomes a leading economic power she will come to play still greater roles, diplomatically, economically, politically and also militarily, for the maintenance of a sound balance in Asia.¹

Mr Nixon's various statements on Japan since assuming the Presidency suggest that he still entertains these hopes.² Indeed, by 1970, most powers in Asia and the Pacific were anticipating, for better or for worse, a more assertive Japanese role. According to an editorial in the Peking Review (24 September 1971),
At present, the Japanese reactionaries are accelerating their pace in arms expansion and war preparations....They are working actively for revising the existing constitution to pave the way for dispatching troops abroad. With increasing vigour, they are creating counter-revolutionary public opinion....To get out of its predicament in Asia and revamp its counter-revolutionary global strategy, U.S. imperialism is eager to use Japanese militarism as its storm trooper in launching aggression in Asia.  

This thesis endeavours to paint an overall picture of the development of Japan's post-war defence policy. Attention has been focussed on Japanese-American relations under the Security Treaty system and on the origins and development of the Self Defence Forces. To set the policies of successive Conservative Governments in perspective, attention has also been paid to trends in public and informed opinion. Japan's nuclear policy and the question of the non-Proliferation Treaty have also been examined.

Basically, the thesis is an attempt to answer two questions. First, how did Japan and the United States come to conclude a security treaty, and why? What were American expectations of Japan? To what extent were the Japanese prepared to satisfy these expectations? How were the attitudes of both parties influenced by the radical changes in the international situation after 1960? Second, what were the origins of the Self Defence Forces, what role have they played in the defence of Japan and in American Far Eastern strategy? What has been the actual scale and character of Japan's post-war rearmament? What kind of men command her forces, how have decisions on the concrete details of defence policy been made, and by whom?

The past is often an unreliable guide to the future. Relations between states, the balance of forces within individual societies, factional movements in parties and governments are in a constant state of flux. New policies are often formulated as new opportunities become available. Nevertheless, no government can ignore the past, especially the very recent past. An examination of Japanese defence policy over the twenty years since the Occupation may, therefore, suggest whether President Nixon's expectations, and China's fears, have any basis.
Chapter I


The keystone of Japan's post-war defence policy under successive conservative governments, has been the Security Treaty with the United States. The emergence of a Japanese-American alliance was perhaps one of the most surprising developments in recent history. The first Security Treaty was signed at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951, six years after the combined effects of American nuclear attacks, the threat of Russian invasion and fear of domestic revolution had precipitated the unconditional surrender of Imperial Japan.1 Under the terms of the Treaty, which was to be, in effect, of indefinite duration,2 Japan granted the United States the right to maintain military bases in the Japanese homeland and adjacent areas.3 The United States could use these bases both to protect Japan from attack and to pursue its own independent objectives in the Far East.4 The Japanese were given no influence on American decisions to use the bases for any purpose.5 The United States was also given the right to intervene and suppress disturbances in Japan if requested by the Japanese Government.6 Japan was 'expected' to build up her own forces but was neither formally committed to rearmament nor to active military support for American policies in Asia.7 There were no provisions requiring Japanese participation in regional security arrangements.8

The Security Treaty was the most important of a series of agreements aligning Japan with the United States. The San Francisco Peace Conference itself emphasised Japan's adherence to the Western camp. The Soviet Union, the East European powers, Peking, Taipei and some important members of the emerging Afro-Asian block had either not been invited, declined to attend or refused to sign the final Treaty.9 By the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced all claims to her former colonial possessions in Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin and the Kuriles.10 At the same time she recognised temporary but absolute American authority over the island of Okinawa which, under continued military administration, was rapidly becoming one of the United States' greatest offensive bases in the Far East.11 Moreover, the Yoshida-Acheson exchange of notes after the Peace Treaty pledged Japan's continued support for American military operations against the Communists in Korea.12 Two months after the
San Francisco Conference Japan announced her decision to conclude a separate peace treaty with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Chinese régime in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, when the Allied Council disbanded in April 1952, all formal diplomatic contact between Japan and the Soviet Union ceased.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus when the Occupation came to an end in April 1952, the new Japan was firmly, if passively, anchored in the Western camp. The 260,000 American troops manning a total of 2824 military establishments in Japan under the Security Treaty were playing a vital role in the protracted and bloody struggle against Communism in Korea and other parts of Asia.\textsuperscript{15} Much water has flowed under many bridges since that time, but Japan's present defence policies still bear the indelible imprint of the agreements concluded in 1951.

Six points should be noted about the first Security Treaty. First, the Treaty was not strictly the outcome of Japan's defeat, the Occupation and the Cold War.\textsuperscript{16} Requests for a treaty came first from Tokyo, at a time when the United States was reluctant to import the Cold War into Asia and take Japan under its protection. Second, the Japanese exponents of the Treaty thought principally in terms of a potential threat from the Soviet Union, not from China. Third, on the Japanese side, all the vital decisions on the Treaty were taken by a small number of people. This reflected the unique and, in the context of traditional Japanese decision making, abnormal political conditions created by the Occupation. Fourth, the eventual American decision to conclude a treaty was not made in response to Japanese appeals.\textsuperscript{17} Washington's decision was made independently, in her own time, for her own reasons. Fifth, despite this, Japan was not without bargaining power. The substance, if not the form, of the final agreement reflected Japanese rather than American thinking. Finally, while the Security Treaty was embraced by the conservative parties and the business community, it was attacked by the Opposition, failed to win complete popular approval and drew bitter criticism from the dominant groups in Japan's academic establishment. This complicated both Japanese internal politics and relations with the United States. It also had an important influence on the subsequent evolution of Japan’s foreign and defence policies.\textsuperscript{18}
A. The diplomacy of the first Security Treaty


Throughout the Occupation the United States dominated Japan in a way she could not dominate Germany, where the interests of other allies were represented by separate occupation zones and large armies.\(^{19}\) This made it inevitable that the development of America's relations with other powers, both on a global scale and in the Far East, would have a decisive influence on Japan's own external relations. Yet the number of options open to Washington and the degree to which policy makers there were divided over Japan's future, is sometimes not understood by Japanese writers.\(^{20}\) There was no early consensus on a security treaty with Japan. Despite the onset of the Cold War, the idea of balancing Communist power in Asia with a rearmed and allied Japan was slow to develop.\(^{21}\)

The Truman Doctrine, which the former President himself regarded as 'the turning point' in American policy, towards the Communist powers, was enunciated on 12 March 1947.\(^{22}\) Yet whatever the Doctrine implied for Soviet-American relations in Europe, it was not clear for some years how it would be applied to Asia. In the Far East the shift in American policy after 12 March 1947 was tentative and ill-defined. In China, the focus of American interest in the area, the United States was not so closely identified with the Nationalists as has sometimes been supposed. American officials were convinced neither of the viability of the Nanking régime nor of their own ability to influence the course of events.\(^{23}\) There was little feeling that the Chinese Communists posed a threat to vital American interests and a strong desire to avoid involvement in the civil war.\(^{24}\)

Since the Soviet Union also appeared preoccupied in Europe and the Middle East,\(^{25}\) the view that a reconstructed, rearmed and allied Japan was an essential link in the chain of American global security was not dominant in Washington. The 1947 'reverse course' of the Occupation was merely an attempt to solve economic problems.\(^{26}\) During the Pacific War the United States had assumed that Japan would remain the principal threat to her interests in the Far East.\(^{27}\) The Potsdam Declaration\(^ {28}\) and the Initial Post Surrender Policy Directive for Japan\(^ {29}\) had thus envisaged the total destruction of Japan's war potential.
and the reformation of her society. Despite the Truman Doctrine, and at a time when relations with Europe were increasingly influenced by the NATO concept, when the ground work for an European alliance was being actively prepared, United States policy towards Japan still bore the imprint of these ideas current at the time of the surrender. Four months after the Truman Doctrine, on 19 June 1947, the eleven nations of the Far Eastern Commission, including the United States, adopted practically unchanged the policies enumerated in the Initial Post Surrender Policy Directive for Japan. The Far Eastern Commission stated that peace and stability in the Far East

...depend first, upon the complete destruction of the military machine which has been the chief means whereby Japan has carried out the aggressions of the past decades; second, upon the establishment of such political and economic conditions as would make impossible any revival of militarism in Japan.

In Washington, responsibility for planning future policy towards Japan lay chiefly with the State Department and the Pentagon. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan General MacArthur was also in a position to exert considerable influence. Not only did MacArthur treat Japan as his private realm, but his Headquarters dominated communications between Tokyo and Washington and virtually monopolised the outflow of military intelligence from North-East Asia. For several years MacArthur, the State Department and the Pentagon were pulling in different directions, planning different peace treaties to realise different objectives.

MacArthur's ideal was a neutral and unarmed Japan, the Switzerland of the Far East. In May 1950, on the eve of the Korean War, he told the New York Times correspondent C.L. Sulzberger that

...Neither side would profit by the arming of Japan. We don't care to use her as an armed ally but we don't want to see Russia or China use her against us. Japanese neutrality would be a benefit to everyone, including not only Japan but also the United States, Russia and China.

In the State Department opinion was divided. The first drafts of a Japanese peace treaty were drawn up in March 1947, August 1947 and January 1948 by a committee headed by Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. The Borton draft treaties were essentially vehicles to implement the
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan. In contrast, George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff, formed within the State Department in April 1947, saw Japanese-American relations in a Cold War context, concluding as early as the autumn of 1947 that Japan should be allied to the United States after the peace.

Similar divisions presumably existed in the Pentagon. However by the beginning of 1949 the Army and Navy Departments had concluded that the main threat to American interests in the Far East came not from Japan but from the Communist powers. Paradoxically, this view did not immediately lead to interest in a Japanese-American alliance. For some time discussions centred merely on the strategic value and defensibility of the Japanese archipelago. In February 1949 there was a strong opinion that Japan was indefensible and should therefore be abandoned. On 11 February 1949 the Secretary for the Army Kenneth C. Royall, on an official visit to Tokyo, told the press that 'Japan had to be written off in the event of a war with Russia'. Various strategists held that America's interests lay in Europe, not in the Far East and that Japanese bases were a liability.

These remarks were later withdrawn and the Pentagon subsequently concluded that Japan had great strategic value to the United States. Yet this merely led to the conclusion that the Occupation should be indefinitely prolonged. There is no indication that anyone in the defence departments saw the solution in terms of drawing a rearmed and independent Japan into the Western camp.


During this period of American indecision, interest in a Japanese-American security treaty was confined to a few leading personalities in the Japanese Government.

Two facts should be noted about the Japanese Governments under the Occupation. First, while they preserved some domestic autonomy they could theoretically conduct no independent foreign relations. They were entirely dominated by MacArthur's Headquarters although at times they managed to circumvent the General's restrictions. The successor to the Foreign Ministry, the Central Liaison Bureau, concerned itself exclusively with dealings between the Japanese Government and SCAP.
The American Ambassador in Tokyo was not accredited to the Japanese Government but to MacArthur's Headquarters as a State Department adviser. Second, the defeat and the Occupation purges had profoundly influenced the character of Japanese political life. In the wake of the purges, whereby over 200,000 political leaders, bureaucrats, businessmen, journalists and academics associated with the pre-war government were excluded from public life, political parties and the bureaucracy were flooded with new and inexperienced men. Leadership was assumed by a few strong personalities whose views had ostracised them from the mainstream of pre-war political life and who for this reason were acceptable to the Occupation. These two factors had a decisive impact on the way political decisions were made, temporarily eliminating those characteristic features of all Japanese organisations, factional conflict and the importance of consensus. Not enough prominent leaders remained for normal factional organisations to develop and party leaders were therefore able to take decisions in relative isolation.

The views of Japanese leaders on future peace and security arrangements at the time of the Higashikuni (September - October 1945) and Shidehara (October 1945 - April 1946) Cabinets remain unknown. It is probable that little attention was given to these matters during the first months of the Occupation.

Serious study of future security began towards the end of the first Yoshida Cabinet (16 May 1946 - 23 April 1947), after the Truman Doctrine and MacArthur's call for an early peace settlement.

Yoshida Shigeru, President of the Liberal Party from the purge of its founder Hatoyama Ichirō in 1946 until his retirement from active politics in 1954, was an ex-diplomat associated with the Foreign Ministry's 'Anglo-Saxon faction'. He had been known as an advocate of good relations with Great Britain and the United States before the war. His views had excluded him from the 1936 Hirota Cabinet and his opposition to the anti-Comintern Pact (not because it was anti-Communist but because it was 'against Britain and France and so, inevitably, against the United States') had led to his recall as Ambassador to London and his retirement from the diplomatic service in March 1939. On the eve of the Pacific War he had attempted to prevent a conflict with the Western powers and it was his suspected participation in secret peace
negotiations that led to his arrest by Japanese military police in April 1945.

On the one hand Yoshida believed that Japan's position as an industrial and commercial island nation, without resources and dependent on the sea, made it fatal to ignore Anglo-American naval supremacy. On the other hand he was extremely anti-Communist, preoccupied with fear of domestic revolution and tended to regard the Soviet Union, in a sense, as Japan's traditional enemy, the successor state of Imperial Russia, committed to the same expansionist policies. After the formation of the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949 he did not appear to regard Peking as an independent military threat but, adopting the Olympian attitude towards other Asian peoples characteristic of many Japanese conservatives, was not anxious to establish relations with Asian Communist capitals.

At the same time Yoshida was, paradoxically, strongly anti-militarist, blaming the army for Japan's erratic pre-war policies and the downfall of the Empire. His unpopularity with the army and his reputation for being 'something of a pacifist' had frustrated his early career. He believed that Japan's insularity and Anglo-American naval supremacy, among other factors, removed any necessity for Japanese rearmament. Shorn of her empire, and without her continental entanglements, a disarmed Japan protected by American naval might could busy itself with the task of economic reconstruction. In 1947, however, the possibility of concluding such an ideal arrangement seemed remote. The Potsdam Declaration, the Basic Post Surrender Policy for Japan and various documents published by the Far Eastern Commission suggested a punitive peace treaty with severe restrictions on Japan's future international activities. This was, indeed, exactly the kind of treaty the Borton Group in the State Department were then preparing. Yoshida and his advisers agreed that should a punitive treaty materialize, Japan would declare perpetual neutrality and request a security guarantee collectively from the United States, the Soviet Union, China and the nations on the Far Eastern Commission. Plans were drawn up on the basis of these assumptions but their details are unknown. At the same time, Soviet-American estrangement suggested opportunities for negotiating a more favourable treaty and the Japanese made discreet inquiries about the possibility
of 'an alliance with a third power'. These overtures aroused no interest among the SCAP authorities who were approached.

The next step was taken after the emergence of the Socialist-Democratic (Progressive) Party coalition government in the summer of 1947, in which Ashida Hitoshi, the Democratic (Progressive) Party President held the post of Foreign Minister.

Like Yoshida, Ashida Hitoshi was hostile to Communism, antipathetic to the Soviet Union and an ardent advocate of alliance with the liberal democracies against the Socialist camp. Unlike the Liberal Party leader, Ashida urged large scale Japanese rearmament and active participation in the struggle against Communism. In particular he seems to have believed that maintenance of a friendly government in Korea was essential to Japanese security. Before the war, Ashida had been noted for his leanings towards the Axis powers and had only narrowly escaped the 1946 purge. His sudden interest in forging connections with the United States probably contained an element of opportunism, but it was also directly related to his Russophobia, his belief in the balance of power and the inevitability of war. He held that the collapse of Germany and Japan, whose powerful positions in Central Europe and the Far East had contained Russia and preserved stability in the first part of the twentieth century, had upset the global balance of power. It was this that had led to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Union, the onset of the Cold War, the polarisation of the world around Moscow and Washington. The Soviet Union had gained direct control of Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, China, North Korea and Vietnam. To dominate the Far East and strike at the heart of American power control of Japan was essential. Ashida believed that Moscow would attempt to wrest Japan from the United States by violent means in two stages. First she would use Kim Il Sung to unify the Korean Peninsular under a pro-Communist government. Next, Japan itself would be invaded from Korea by a National Liberation Army supported by Korean and Chinese units. These would be welcomed by the Communist fifth column already active in Japan. If these forces were insufficient the Soviet Union itself would intervene. This would make a Soviet-American conflict inevitable, and the outlook for Japan was bleak.
In the war between the Soviet Union and the United States the four Japanese islands, whether we like it or not, will inevitably become a battlefield. This is a condition imposed by Japan's geography and our situation is in no way different from that of Belgium or Holland in Europe.67

Neutrality was impossible, disarmament an absurdity. Japan's only hope lay in alliance with the United States, massive rearmament and an active foreign policy as a member of the Free World. Ashida's role in surreptitiously altering the new constitution in 1946 to permit rearmament will be examined in the next chapter. He placed particular emphasis on rearmament, urging that ground forces of 200,000 men, a navy and air force be built up as soon as possible, even at the risk of impairing economic recovery.68

Ashida had agreed to the coalition with the Socialists on the understanding that he would be given considerable freedom of initiative in foreign policy matters.69 After assuming office he at once prepared a memorandum proposing a Japanese-American security treaty. Japan would offer the United States bases in return for a guarantee against external attack. Japan would maintain a police force and be responsible for internal security but the plan did not envisage immediate large scale rearmament. Copies of the memorandum were given to the American Ambassador Acheson and to General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section of SCAP.70

Before composing the memorandum, Ashida had consulted Yoshida and a number of Foreign Ministry officials. It is not clear, however, whether the Socialist Prime Minister Katayama knew of the démarche.71

The Ashida Memorandum evoked no interest either at MacArthur's Headquarters or in Washington. General Whitney returned it to Ashida on the grounds that Headquarters did not handle such documents. Ambassador Acheson, carrying the document with him, was killed in an aircraft crash in Hawaii on 17 August. His copy was thus lost.72 Yet similar proposals were made to various American and Allied statesmen from time to time.73 All, without exception, proved abortive.
In September 1947 another security treaty plan, this time drawn up jointly by Ashida and the Socialist Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio Suehiro was entrusted to General Eichelberger, Commander of the United States Eighth Army, to be delivered to Washington when he left Japan on leave. This step was presumably taken to prevent the memorandum falling into the hands of General MacArthur. The Ashida-Nishio proposal consisted of an offer of bases around Japan, probably in the Ryūkyū's and Bonins, in return for a promise to defend the country against external attack. Provisions were to be made for the stationing of American forces in Japan in an emergency. There was also mention of increased Japanese police strength.74

This memorandum, like its predecessor, aroused no interest in Washington. On his return to Japan, Eichelberger told the Director of the Central Liaison Office75 over whose signature the document was written, that the United States was not considering separate peace treaties with Japan or Germany.76 There is no evidence to suggest that Borton's group, Kennan's Policy Planning Staff and later Mr Dulles were ever aware of the Ashida-Nishio Memorandum. On the other hand, the memorandum had a decisive influence in Japan, making a particularly strong impression on Yoshida. The former Liberal Party leader recalls that:

There did not seem to me to be any other possible policy and after I resumed the position of Prime Minister again in October 1948, it was adopted by my Cabinet without change, although actually there were no further developments in that direction until the coming of Mr Dulles to Japan in January 1951.77

3. The British suggest a Japanese-American security treaty, September 1949

The first proposal of a Japanese-American security treaty to have any detectable impact on Washington came not from the Japanese but from the British, at the Bevin-Acheson talks in September 1949.78 The favourable American response suggests that Kennan's Cold War view of the Japanese peace settlement had now become dominant in the State Department.79 The British, on the other hand, were prompted to advance the idea partly as a result of pressure from the Pacific Dominions, where fear of a Japanese revival was perhaps greater than fear of Communism.80 At the Bevin-Acheson talks the British, expressing sympathy with the United States' desire to contain Communism and explaining Commonwealth fears of Japan,
suggested that both parties might find their objectives realised by a Japanese-American alliance. Japanese interest in the scheme does not appear to have been mentioned and the details of the Bevin proposal are unknown.

This conference, not the Ashida-Nishio Memorandum, led directly to the first American drafts of a peace treaty conceived in the Cold War context and also to the first attempts to draw up a security treaty with Japan. Acheson promised Bevin to prepare a written statement of American objectives and security proposals to show the Commonwealth nations at the Canberra Conference in November 1949. On his return to Washington he directed the State Department and the Secretary for Defence to begin work on these documents. The State Department's draft peace treaty was ready by 13 October. Radically different from the previous Borton draft, it offered Japan generous and conciliatory terms with the explicit objective of aligning her 'with the United States in world affairs'. Security treaty planning, however, failed to advance because the State Department, the Pentagon and MacArthur's Headquarters were still at loggerheads. While the State Department now favoured a Cold War settlement, MacArthur still advocated neutrality for Japan. On the other hand, once it became clear that the United States intended to stay in Japan, opinion in the Pentagon moved rapidly from the Royallist thinking of January 1949 to the other extreme. It was now argued that militarily, a continued Occupation was the most, perhaps the only convenient arrangement. A peace settlement itself was therefore premature. The Pentagon reportedly believed that the strong American presence in Japan under the Occupation, on the Soviet Union's vulnerable eastern frontier, deterred Russian advances in Europe and the Middle East. Any weakening of the American position in Japan would thus have unforeseeable global consequences.

The State Department and Pentagon thus remained deadlocked. Acheson was unable to provide Bevin with the promised statement of American thinking on security in time for the November 1949 Canberra Conference. The statement was still not ready by the time of the British Commonwealth Conference in May 1950.
Yet it was now clear that American policy towards Japan had changed dramatically since the previous year. MacArthur was a voice crying in the wilderness and his vision of Japanese neutralism was being eroded by policy decisions beyond his immediate control. The United States was rapidly assuming a commitment to stay in Japan. The only question was, in what capacity, under what arrangements? On 12 January 1950, a year after the Secretary for the Army had told the press that 'Japan had to be written off in the event of a war with Russia', Acheson announced to the National Press Club in Washington that America's Pacific defence perimeter ran from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. He went on to assert that:

…the defeat and disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defence of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interests of our own security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area, and in all honour, in the interests of Japanese security....I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan...

Acheson's speech, ironically, revealed the hierarchy of factors lying behind the American decision - the ascendancy of the Cold War factions in the State Department, pressure from the British Commonwealth for American protection both against Communism and against Japan and finally, as an apologetic afterthought, the knowledge that some Japanese leaders, too, saw their future security in ties with the United States. Yet American reaction to Japanese moves stimulated by the Acheson speech itself revealed the limited importance of this latter factor.


In May 1950, believing that the United States might now be prepared to conclude the long desired security treaty, Yoshida dispatched a secret mission to Washington to make a formal offer. The decision to send the mission at this time was made by Yoshida alone. The three members of the delegation - Ikeda Hayato, Minister for Finance and Yoshida's most trusted Cabinet associate, Miyazawa Kiichi and Shirasu Jirō - all believed, right up to the time they boarded the aircraft bound for Washington, that they were visiting the United States
to discuss economic problems. This extreme secrecy was probably intended to keep the offer hidden from the neutralist General MacArthur.

In Washington, Ikeda gave the following message from Yoshida to Joseph M. Dodge, formerly Special Financial Adviser to SCAP and at that time working as an adviser to both the State and Defence Departments:

The Japanese Government herein formally expresses its desire to conclude a peace treaty with the United States as early as possible. In the case of such a peace treaty being concluded, the Japanese Government thinks it will be necessary to station American forces in Japan in order to preserve the security of Japan and the Asian area. If it is difficult for the United States to make such a request, the Japanese Government is itself prepared to make the offer. As far as this point is concerned, we have been asking the opinions of Japanese constitutional scholars. They tell us that the problems will be minimal if reference to this course of events is included in the peace treaty. Yet even if this is not done and the Japanese-American covenant is concluded in a separate arrangement, it will not be contrary to the Japanese Constitution.

The Japanese then explained that the Royall Statement, American indecision on Taiwan, the growth of Communist power in French Indo-China and the state of affairs in southern Korea had created the impression that the United States might be unwilling to make a stand in Asia. This had given rise to widespread interest in Japanese neutralism. If the Soviet Union now came forward with a generous peace offer, including the return of Chishima and Sakhalin, America might be placed at a grave disadvantage.

Dodge promised to pass the message on to the appropriate authorities. He then told Ikeda that there was a strong opinion in Washington against leaving Japan unprotected after the peace treaty and that reduction of American military capability in the Far East would be to the advantage of neither the United States nor Japan.

Copies of the notes taken at this meeting, together with the text of Yoshida's message, were subsequently sent to the Assistant Secretary of the State Department, the Assistant Secretary of the Defence
Department, to Dulles and to General MacArthur in Tokyo. MacArthur was reportedly incensed by the news of Ikeda's visit.\(^92\)

Miyazawa believes there was a direct causal connection between the Yoshida Note and the Peace and Security Treaties concluded in 1951.\(^93\) He considers that after the Japanese position had been thus clarified by the Prime Minister, the State Department and the Pentagon rapidly reached agreement on the security issue and Dulles was sent to Japan to negotiate the details on the basis of Yoshida's offer.

This is not true, although developments after the Korean war and Yoshida's tendency to keep secrets even from his closest associates may have made it seem so. First, Dulles' appointment by President Truman as chief negotiator for the Japanese settlement (9 June 1950) was made against a background of continuing disagreement between the Pentagon and State Department.\(^94\) Truman's tacit support for the State Department line of 'an early peace treaty' merely caused the Defence Department to dig in its heels. In the Pentagon, opinion against an early peace treaty hardened and there was a temporary resurgence of Royallist thinking.\(^95\) It is difficult to predict where this would have led had not the Korean War intervened. Second, Dulles' first memorandum on the Japanese peace treaty (completed 6 June 1950) obviously took no account of the Yoshida Note or earlier offers of a bilateral security arrangement.\(^96\) While aiming to incorporate Japan into the Western camp and discussing the political, economic and psychological means thought necessary to achieve this objective, the memorandum was vague on the question of Japanese security. There was reference to a 'security treaty' including 'all the nations participating in the preliminary conference'. This could presumably have included the Soviet Union and China.\(^97\) Dulles thus appears to have been moving away from the British and Japanese concepts of a bilateral treaty towards some kind of broader framework. This was perhaps linked with the resurgence of Royallist thinking in the Pentagon and reinforced by advice from General MacArthur. Thus the visit of Dulles, the Secretary for Defence Mr Johnson and the Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley to Tokyo on 22 June 1950 for talks with MacArthur was not, as Miyazawa believed, an indication of the Pentagon-State Department agreement that had followed naturally in the wake of the May Yoshida Note. On the contrary, it was merely another attempt to solve the apparently insoluble Pentagon-State Department-MacArthur
conflict on the Japanese peace treaty and future security arrangements.\(^9^8\) No concrete decisions had yet been taken. Yoshida doubtless expected a formal reply to his 3 May offer but if so he was disappointed.

'The talks we had with Mr Dulles were confined to general topics', he recalls in his memoirs.\(^9^9\)

5. The Impact of the Korean War on American and Japanese thinking

Fighting broke out in Korea on 25 June 1950, three days after Dulles, Bradley and Johnson arrived in Tokyo. Two days later President Truman ordered American military intervention. It was Truman's decision to intervene in Korea, not the Yoshida Note, that solved the conflict between the Pentagon, the State Department and General MacArthur. Maintenance of bases in a Japan closely allied to the United States was now America's minimum demand. MacArthur abandoned his hopes for Japanese neutrality. Dulles discarded his earlier idea of a multilateral treaty guaranteeing Japan's security. In the Pentagon the Royallist position automatically collapsed. Moreover, Dulles and MacArthur were able to convince the Defence Department that a quick and generous peace settlement would secure Japanese co-operation.\(^1^0^0\)

The outbreak of the Korean War had even more far reaching effects on American thinking. The United States now saw a rearmed Japan as the future pivot of an American orientated Asian-Pacific regional security organisation modelled on NATO. This was a radical departure. Shortly after the outbreak of war MacArthur ordered the creation of the 75,000 man National Police Reserve Force.\(^1^0^1\) More significantly, the terms of reference for Dulles' second mission to the Far East in the winter of 1950-51, this time as Special Representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador, gave him authority not merely to negotiate a Japanese peace treaty but also to organise a collective defence agreement embracing the offshore island chains of Asia, including Japan. He was also to persuade the Japanese to rearm.\(^1^0^2\)

These changes had two important effects in Japan. First, Yoshida now knew that a security treaty would be concluded and went ahead to prepare detailed plans. Second, the Prime Minister was determined to avoid rearmament and involvement in regional security. He began an intensive campaign against both and laid out an elaborate strategy in preparation for his talks with Dulles.
In his campaign against rearmament, sustained throughout the autumn of 1950 and the winter of 1950-51, Yoshida concentrated on three points: the fears of Japanese militarism still prevalent in Asia and the Pacific, the incompatibility of massive rearmament with economic recovery (and, implicitly, internal security) and the state of public opinion. No opportunity was lost to ensure that Washington understood his position.103

Late in 1950, after consultations in August and September with a small number of intellectuals, business leaders and former military men,104 Yoshida had the Foreign Ministry compose two draft treaties. The first, drawn up in October, envisaged an arrangement of fifteen years duration whereby the United States would maintain bases in Japan to protect the country from external attack. Japan was to enjoy a right of self defence and would co-operate militarily with the United States to safeguard the Japanese archipelago. There were no provisions for large scale rearmament, participation in regional security or overseas military service. Only in the fifteen year time limit and mention of Japan's right of self defence did the treaty draft differ from Yoshida's secret 3 May offer. The second draft treaty, completed in November, was based on radically different principles. It envisaged demilitarisation and neutralization of Japan and Korea and guarantees of security from the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. The forces that all these powers could maintain in and around the demilitarized area were to be strictly limited.105

Weinstein believes the second draft was prepared in case the United States should suddenly change its Far Eastern policy and abandon Japan and Korea.106 This is scarcely credible. The Korean War had made future large scale American military commitments to North-East Asia inevitable. Yoshida's objective was much more likely to have been to ensure that Japan did not become too involved in United States' Far Eastern strategy. The Foreign Ministry official who composed the two drafts recalls Yoshida's remark that 'he would produce either the first or the second draft' during his talks with Dulles, 'depending on the time and circumstances'.107 What Yoshida probably meant was not that he would decide on alliance or neutrality 'depending on the time and circumstances' but that if the expected pressure for Japanese
rearmament and participation in Asian-Pacific regional defence became too strong, he would produce his neutrality plan and refuse to budge until Washington changed its attitude, hoping all the while that his bluff was not called. The Americans would then have to face either the prospect of a continued Occupation, with the probability that political unrest and leftist agitation would grow, or accepting the Yoshida line of a security treaty without rearmament and without Japanese participation in regional defence. Yoshida knew that the Korean War and all it implied for the future of American Far Eastern policy made Japan so valuable that Washington would choose the latter.


Dulles arrived in Tokyo on 25 January 1951 and spent the first few days of his visit conferring with General MacArthur and other Occupation officials. His first of five meetings with Yoshida took place on 30 January. Agreement was quickly reached on concluding a security treaty separately from the peace treaty. There was probably no conflict over permitting the proposed American bases to be used to further American policies in Asia as well as protect Japan. Yoshida's secret 3 May 1950 offer had envisaged American bases in Japan 'to preserve the security of Japan and the Asian area'. Nor was it likely that Yoshida demanded such luxuries as the right of prior consultation and power of veto over American actions from Japanese bases. The Ashida Memorandum, the Ashida-Nishio proposal and the secret Yoshida Note had requested no such control and Japan was given none in the final Treaty. These early Japanese proposals had, however, all envisaged autonomous responsibility for domestic security. Mishimura told Weinstein that the 1951 Treaty clause giving the United States a right to intervene to put down insurrection in Japan was inserted at Dulles' request, despite Yoshida's strong protest. This may be so. Yet the Liberal-Democratic Party's opposition to removing the clause at the time of the 1958-60 Treaty revision negotiations suggests Yoshida might not have protested too much.

The main points of controversy in the 1951 Dulles-Yoshida talks were Japanese rearmament for regional security and the question of an explicit American guarantee to defend Japan. These two questions became
 inextricably intertwined. At the talks on 30 January Dulles, as anticipated, strongly urged large scale Japanese rearmament (mention was allegedly made of a 350,000 man army) and participation in a regional alliance. Yoshida refused to consider either matter. After ninety minutes of futile discussion the two referred the problem to General MacArthur. Yoshida had apparently consulted MacArthur beforehand and the General supported him against the President's Special Ambassador, maintaining that Japan could best contribute to the security of the Free World by non-military means. After this confrontation, Yoshida ignored the questions of rearmament and regional security altogether. After discussing Japan's economic demands at the peace conference with Foreign Ministry officials on the night of 30 January, he retired to his seaside villa at Oiso, apparently declining to take part in further talks with Dulles. This inflexible attitude and two or three more days of fruitless negotiations with Foreign Ministry officials at last convinced the Americans that Japanese participation in regional security was, for the time being, impossible. Dulles made one last plea at a dinner given by the Japan-American Society on 2 February. The matter was then dropped. When the Foreign Ministry produced the plan for a simple Japanese-American treaty drawn up in October 1950 the Americans temporarily abandoned the idea of a regional organisation.

Dulles was still determined, however, to commit the Japanese to some measure of rearmament. Yoshida eventually showed him 'a project, long under consideration, for increasing both our land and sea forces and placing them under the control of an embryo Ministry of Defence'. This did not satisfy Dulles and the Special Ambassador insisted that reference to America's 'expectation' of Japanese rearmament be included in the Treaty preamble. While subsequent events made it impossible for Yoshida to avoid rearmament, it is significant that the Treaty, in its final form, referred only to America's 'expectation'. Rearmament was not included as a Japanese duty. To this extent, Yoshida's initial resistance to American pressure was successful. As a result of Yoshida's refusal to rearm, Dulles argued that the United States could undertake no definite obligation to defend Japan. He referred the Japanese Prime Minister to the Vandenberg Resolution, adopted by the Senate in June 1948, stating that the United States would join only such
'regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid'. An unarmed Japan was in no position to give 'mutual aid'. Dulles refused to accept Yoshida's argument that Japanese contributions of bases, labour and industrial power were important to American and Free World security. At the same time Yoshida was not worried by America's refusal to extend an unequivocal guarantee to defend Japan. It was clear that the United States intended to remain in the Far East and that bases in Japan would continue to be vital to American strategy. Yoshida was satisfied that 'if Japan were invaded while United States forces were actually stationed in that country they could hardly adopt a neutral attitude'. A written guarantee was therefore unnecessary.

By 9 February substantial agreement on the shape of the future Security Treaty had been reached. Minor adjustments were made at the time of Dulles' third visit to Japan in April and in June a few amendments suggested by the Allied Powers were introduced. The Security Treaty signed on 8 September was, however, essentially the issue of the Dulles-Yoshida talks in January. The somewhat 'unbalanced' character, in particular the American failure to give Japan a clear guarantee of protection, was not the result of Japanese capitulation to overwhelming American pressure. It was, in fact, a result of the United States having failed to impose its views on Japan. The differences between the two allies, so clearly revealed at the negotiations and in the text of the Treaty itself, were also evident at the signing ceremony. Dean Acheson, representing the United States, declared that the Treaty with Japan represented the first step towards security in the Pacific. Yoshida, in his reply, remarked simply that 'the Treaty safeguards a Japan deprived of her own defences'. These fundamental differences in attitude towards the Treaty provide a key to the understanding of Japanese-American relations for the next two decades.

B. Japanese reactions to the Treaty

Several points should be made about Japanese reactions to the Treaty. The left wing Socialists and the Communists opposed alignment with the American camp, advocating policies based on disarmament and neutrality. The right wing Socialists supported the Treaty but opposed large scale rearmament. Discussion of Opposition attitudes lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, it should not be forgotten
that the Opposition parties represent a large minority of the Japanese population and that it is against them that conservative governments have had to fight successive elections.\textsuperscript{127}

Within the conservative camp the Security Treaty was widely accepted, despite the secrecy of the moves leading to its conclusion. Yet there were important differences of nuance. In the Liberal Party, Yoshida's dominance ensured virtual total acceptance. In the Democratic (Progressive) Party the situation was more complicated. The party was made up of widely disparate elements and Ashida's early ascendancy proved transitory. The fall of his Cabinet in 1948 amid economic troubles and rumours of his implication in the Shōwa Denkō scandal led to his rapid political demise.\textsuperscript{128} The Democratic (Progressive) Party thereafter split into three main groups of factions, the 'Radicals', 'Neutrals' and 'Conservatives'.\textsuperscript{129} Their membership, policy objectives and mutual relations were based on both ideological and personal factors. The Radicals centred around two large factions led respectively by Kitamura Tokutarō and Miki Takeo. Associated with these factions were such personalities as Matsumura Kenzō and Nakasone Yasuhirō. Powerful also were the two Neutral factions, including figures such as Furui Yoshimi. The Conservatives consisted of a small and declining group around Ōasa Tadao and Ashida's remaining followers. On the one hand, the Conservatives urged union with Yoshida's Liberals against the Socialists. On the other, they advocated an active Japanese foreign policy as a member of the Free World. In contrast, most of the Radicals and some of the Neutrals, while supporting the general concept of a security treaty with the United States, opposed the view that good relations with Washington necessarily restricted Japan's relations with continental Asia, especially with China. Japan's destiny, they believed, was inseparable from that of the continent. Behind this view lay both pragmatic and emotional considerations. Kitamura believed that Japan's economic independence could only be based on close and continuous relations with Asia. The Peace and Security Treaties, in their existing forms, placed these relations in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{130} For Matsumura Kenzō, later criticised by Pravda as an 'exclusive Asianist',\textsuperscript{131} more fundamental issues were involved. Japan and China, he argued, had a common civilization and relations between the two countries were like relations between Great Britain and the United States. Japan was, moreover, an Asian
country. The grand ideal which should move her statesmen and inspire her youth was to contribute to the renaissance of Asia and to form a bridge of understanding between East and West. Good relations with the Americans were vital, but only in this broader context. This stream of thought, with roots deep in the Japanese past, continued to exercise an important influence on foreign and defence policies during the succeeding decades. The immediate result of the controversy in 1951 was that while both Yoshida and the Democratic Party delegate Tomabechi Gizō signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Democrats declined to be associated with the Security Treaty as it stood.

Japan's organised business community responded favourably to both Treaties. Support for the Security Treaty soon became the official policy of Keidanren, Nikkeiren, Dōyūkai and Nisshō, Japan's four largest employers organisations. It might be argued that the business community had been presented with a fait accompli and had no choice but accept. To some extent this is true. Yet the generous terms of the Peace Treaty, especially the absence of economic restrictions demanded by the British Commonwealth, had exceeded the community's wildest dreams. Moreover, orthodox business leaders felt instinctive sympathy with Dulles' efforts to roll back the Communist tide in Asia. With the outbreak of war in Korea, American procurement in Japan played a vital role in the Japanese economic recovery. In some quarters the lost Chinese market was regretted but a replacement was seen in trade with America's client states in South-East Asia and the Pacific. As subsequent events were to show interest in trade with China remained latent. Yet it was only in the relatively unimportant shipping, textile and fisheries industries that good relations with the Communist block were regarded as imperative. The more powerful heavy and chemical industries, as well as trading and financial circles, generally felt that highest priority should be given to relations with Washington. In the context of the 1950s this meant minimal ties with the Communist Asian mainland.

On the other hand, opposition to the Treaty was strong in the intellectual world, articulate support being confined to a relatively small minority whose links with the political establishment compromised them in the eyes of their peers. In 1949 MacArthur's remarks on Japanese neutrality had touched off a vigorous debate on future defence...
The main issue was whether the Cold War made Japan's permanent neutrality impracticable. In March 1949 the magazine Sekai published a statement on the causes of war by some sixty prominent Japanese scholars. A year later a second statement, drawn up by the newly formed Peace Problems Discussion Council (Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai) and signed by thirty-five leading academics, urged conclusions of a peace treaty with all the allied powers, including the Soviet Union and China. A treaty with the American block alone was opposed. A third, more strongly worded statement appeared in December 1950, on the eve of the Dulles-Yoshida talks. The Dulles visit, then the conclusion of the Peace and Security Treaties unleashed a flood of statements, books and articles denouncing Japan's military involvement with the United States. There were also articles defending the Government's policies. Yet as far as numbers were concerned, the Peace Problems Discussion Council and its sympathizers occupied the dominant position. For the next two decades they constituted, in a very real sense, the Japanese intellectual mainstream.

The currents in the anti-Treaty movement at this level were many and varied. Some writers saw no end to war and power politics but believed Japan's strategic position in the Far East was similar to that of Switzerland and Sweden in Europe. Others held that modern weapons, especially nuclear development, made warfare impracticable as an instrument of national policy. There was also a belief that ideologies, the concept of immutable national interests, division of the world into rival power blocks and the arms race had traditionally been the causes of war. By signing a peace treaty with all the former allied powers and avoiding military ties with either of the two camps Japan would not only improve her own security but could contribute to a general relaxation of tensions. A variety of schemes for realising these objectives were advanced. In view of the circumstances, all centered on opposition to the Security Treaty and the presence of American bases. The Peace Problems Discussion Council was not a Marxist organisation. Few of its members were particularly pro-Communist, few were anti-American. At the same time it should be remembered that much anti-Treaty literature was also produced by the Socialists, the Communists and by some sections of the extreme right wing. Some right wing literature struck a strident
anti-American, anti-Western note absent from the ideologically formulated literature of the left.¹⁴⁴

Opponents of the Peace Problems Discussion Council concentrated on the impracticability of neutrality, the concept of preserving peace through the 'balance of power' (which was held to necessitate Japan's rearmament and alignment with the West), the inherent expansionism of the Soviet Union and the evils of Communism.¹⁴⁵ Unlike their opponents in the anti-Treaty camp, many of those who held these views were not scholars and scientists but retired diplomats, admirals, politicians and men still active in public affairs.¹⁴⁶

Occupation press censorship and faulty polling techniques make analysis of public opinion in this period difficult. On available evidence the following conclusions can be drawn:

i) The Security Treaty negotiations coincided with a popular war psychosis stimulated by Russo-American tension, the civil conflict in China and hostilities in Korea. In August 1949 36.6 percent of those interviewed in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll thought World War III was imminent. Only 28.1 percent believed a global conflict could be avoided. Over 52 percent considered the outbreak of war would naturally involve Japan; only 18.6 percent believed Japan would be permitted to remain on the sidelines.

ii) There were strong feelings of friendship for the United States and much popular antipathy towards the Soviet Union. In an August 1950 Yomiuri Shimbun poll 65.7 percent of those interviewed voted America as their 'favourite country'; 67.9 percent declared Russia as the most disliked foreign country.¹⁴⁸

iii) There was, nevertheless, a feeling that a peace treaty with all the former allied powers would be preferable to one with the American camp alone. Yet there was little confidence such an all-round treaty could be arranged. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll in April 1951 found 57.1 percent in favour of an all-round peace, 21.2 percent supporting a peace exclusively with the Western allies. Yet only 5.5 percent thought an all-round treaty was possible.¹⁴⁹

iv) There was no consensus on postwar security and no overwhelming enthusiasm for American bases. A substantial minority positively favoured the presence of bases, another minority regarded their presence as unavoidable. At the same time another large minority favoured
neutrality, was hostile towards foreign bases and therefore presumably, opposed the Security Treaty. A Mainichi Shimbun poll in November 1949 found 48.4 percent in favour of neutrality, 20.5 percent advocating reliance on the United States and 14 percent favouring collective security. Another Mainichi Shimbun poll in September 1950 found 10.9 percent supporting total reliance on the United States, 32.7 percent in favour of reliance on America and an independent defence build-up, 9.6 percent in favour of reliance on the United States and 26 percent supporting reliance on the United Nations plus independent defence efforts. Another 7.4 percent believed Japan should build up her own forces and rely on no one. This can probably be taken as 43.6 percent in favour of a security treaty with the United States, and 43.0 percent in favour of some sort of neutrality. The same poll, significantly, showed 40.4 percent opposing the presence of American bases, 31.1 percent in favour. The results of some other polls are shown in table 1:(i).

The deep division on positive alignment with the West, despite the enthusiasm for America and the antipathy towards the Soviet Union reveals, perhaps, another dimension of the Security Treaty debate. Ashida's vision of Japan as an active member of the Free World, Yoshida's policy of passive alliance with the United States and the academic attacks on the Government were all attempts to solve problems posed by the interaction of Japan's history and geography with international events beyond her control. Japan was a vulnerable island chain in the strategic canyon between two mutually hostile nuclear superpowers. Yet the Japanese are not Cartesians. Emotional and psychological factors were also at work. Since the nineteenth century, relations with Asia and relations with the West have provided the two axes for the development of Japanese political thought and action. Since Meiji, the dominant official doctrine has been 'Datsu A', the escape from Asia, associated with modernization, technological advance, the recreation of Japanese society in the image of the West. Parallel to this, in a nebulous, indefinite fashion, developed the rival doctrine of 'Saku A', the approach to Asia, which saw Japan as an Oriental power, the last bastion of the East against the inroads of the Occident. Was Japan part of Asia or was she part of the West? Could she identify completely with Western Europe and North America, or was her destiny inseparable from that of Asia, the source of so much of her spiritual and intellectual tradition? The defeat, the
Occupation, the Cold War and the Security Treaty posed these old problems in a new form. If the interminable factional conflicts on defence and foreign policy described in the following chapters have any deeper significance, it lies, perhaps, in the attempt to solve a problem that has plagued Japan for the past hundred years, the problem of her identity and appropriate role in international society.
Chapter 2


The second pillar of Japan's post-war defence policy has been the Self Defence Forces, formally established in 1954 as a safeguard against external attack and internal revolution. In 1970, on the eve of the Fourth Defence Plan, Japan maintained a 179,000 man army, a 125,000 ton navy (including eight conventional submarines, 24 destroyers, 16 frigates and a small naval air arm) and an air force of about 1,000 aircraft, including 450 modern front line jet fighters. There were no nuclear weapons and no military nuclear program, no strategic bombers, no long range missiles and no aircraft carriers. A total of 250,000 men were under arms. Recruitment was voluntary. A unanimous resolution of the House of Councillors on 2 June 1954 opposed the dispatch of forces overseas on constitutional and other grounds. The Defence Agency Establishment Law (Bōei Chō Setchi Hö), the Self Defence Forces Law (Jieitai Hö)(June 1954) and the Law Concerning the Structure of the National Defence Council (Kokubō Kaigi no Kösei-to ni kansuru Höritsu) (July 1956) formulated the legal framework of the forces and defined defence policy decision making machinery. The keynote of these laws was the principle of 'civilian control'. Defence planning and day to day administration of the forces were the responsibility of a civilian dominated National Defence Council (Kokubō Kaigi) and a Defence Agency (Bōei Chō) headed by a Minister of State (Bōei Chō Chōkan) responsible to the Prime Minister. Despite the existence of a Joint Staff Council (Tōgō Bakuryō Kaigi) military men were given no active role in defence policy decision making at any level. Mobilisation was to be decided by the Prime Minister after obligatory consultation with the National Defence Council. Subsequent Diet approval of the Prime Minister's action was necessary.

The actual operation of civilian control will be examined in a later chapter. For the present, five points should be noted about the Self Defence Forces. First, a legal basis for the present forces was surreptitiously laid by the Government Section of SCAP and by the Democratic (Progressive) Party leader Ashida Hitoshi at a time when General MacArthur and the Japanese Government were attempting to realise...
Japan's total and constitutional disarmament. Second, all the steps leading to the creation of the Self Defence Forces were the result of heavy American pressure on the unwilling Yoshida Government. Japan's decision to rearm was thus fundamentally different in character from her decision to conclude the Security Treaty. Third, the character of the 1954-56 defence laws was not the result of American pressure but of talks between Yoshida's Liberals and the Democratic (Progressive) Party. Fourth, before these talks began, internal changes in the Democratic (Progressive) Party had to some extent undermined the position of Ashida Hitoshi and the hawkish right. This caused the Party to abandon some of the more extreme points of its defence policy. As a result the defence laws that eventually emerged reflected the Yoshida view rather than the Democratic (Progressive) Party's original program. Fifth, while organised business generally supported the Self Defence Forces, public and informed opinion was as deeply divided on the issue of rearmament as on the Security Treaty itself.


In October 1946 an American inspired Constitution, the enduring popularity of which has caused successive governments to approach the question of revision with caution, was approved almost unanimously by the Japanese Diet. Article 9 of this Constitution states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.

The idea of a pacifist Constitution originated with the then Japanese Prime Minister Baron Shidehara Kijūrō and General MacArthur. Before the war, Shidehara's policies as Foreign Minister successively with the Katō, Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi Cabinets, in particular his advocacy of disarmament, non-interference in China and good relations with the Western powers, had aroused the hostility of the extreme nationalists and the military, earning him the 'reputation of being a pacifist'.

Despite the references to disarmament and demilitarization in the Potsdam Declaration and the Basic Post Surrender Policy Directive for Japan, neither the American State Department nor the State-War-Navy Department Co-ordinating Committee seem to have envisaged a Japanese constitutional renunciation of war. In October 1945 the American Ambassador George Atcheson who, at MacArthur's suggestion was discussing a new Constitution with Prince Konoye, received instructions from Secretary of State Byrnes clearly envisaging the future existence of Japanese armed forces. Instructions on drafting a new Constitution sent to MacArthur on 11 January 1946 by the State-War-Navy Department Co-ordinating Committee made no provision for the permanent, constitutional demilitarization of Japan.

On 3 February 1946, less than a month after receiving the above instructions, MacArthur directed his Government Section to prepare a draft Constitution for the 'guidance' of the Shidehara Cabinet. After an informal talk with Baron Shidehara MacArthur drew up a three point draft to guide the Government Section. The second point of MacArthur's draft stated

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling disputes and even for preserving its own security. [italics my own]

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorised and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.

MacArthur thus envisaged total and permanent Japanese disarmament. However, the pacifist clause drafted by the Government Section and handed to Shidehara on 13 February was significantly different from that drawn up by the Supreme Commander. In MacArthur's original draft Japan abandoned war 'as a sovereign right of the nation' 'even for preserving its own security'. In the Government Section draft

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation. [italics my own]

The 'threat or use of force' was now not explicitly forbidden in cases where the objective was not 'settling disputes with any other nation'. It might therefore perhaps be regarded as permissible in cases of crushing domestic revolution or defending the nation from external attack.
The Government Section's modified draft underwent a further change during discussions between SCAP and representatives of the Japanese Cabinet on the night of 4 - 5 March 1946. After this meeting it read 'War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations'.

Now 'war' as well as the 'threat or use of force' was not explicitly forbidden as a means of advancing objectives other than 'settling disputes with other nations'.

MacArthur, preoccupied with other duties, was probably unaware of these changes. There is no evidence to suggest the alterations were made to facilitate Japanese participation in an anti-Communist military alliance. It has already been shown that this concept appeared only in the spring of 1947 and did not become dominant until the summer of 1949. Presumably the hard headed men in the Government Section were alarmed by the novelty of MacArthur's pacifist clause. They considered Japan could no longer threaten a United States in complete command of the Pacific and maintaining powerful bases in the Ryūkyūs and the Marianas. At the same time they saw no end to war as a fact of human existence. If Japan were constitutionally demilitarized as a result of American pressure, the United States might be morally obliged to protect her. In order not to tie America's hands, some way had to be left open for the Japanese to rearm and defend themselves.

The radically altered 'pacifist clause' underwent further transformation at the hands of a Japanese Select Committee at the time of its passage through the Diet. At the suggestion of Ashida Hitoshi the two phrases

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order...

and

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph...

were added to the revised draft. Ashida later claimed that he had devised these two phrases to make it clear that war potential could be maintained for defensive purposes - 'the aim of the preceding paragraph' referring to 'war as a means of settling international disputes'. Ashida's role was particularly significant, not only because of his prewar record but also because of his 1947 attempts to ally Japan with...
the United States against the Communist powers and his strong stand on rearmament in the 1950s.


While Ashida thus played an important role in establishing a constitutional basis for rearmament, Occupation policy frustrated immediate realisation of his objectives.

After formation of the Katayama Cabinet in 1947 Ashida, as Foreign Minister, made several attempts to interest the allies in rearmament. At the time, under the terms of the 1947 Police Law (see below) Japan maintained decentralized municipal and rural police forces totalling 125,000 men. Early in 1947 informal approaches were made to allied representatives about the creation of an additional 100,000 man army and a small air force. Later, when the Occupation authorised establishment of a coast guard to combat smuggling, Ashida attempted to exploit the opportunity to promote rearmament, officially proposing in October 1947 the creation of an armed, uniformed maritime force without limitations as to size.

These efforts proved unsuccessful. The Maritime Law sponsored by the Occupation in March 1948 fell far short of Ashida's objectives, permitting only a 10,000 man uniformed Maritime Safety Force (Kaijō Höantai) equipped with sidearms. By the law vessels under the control of the Maritime Safety Board (Kaijō Höan Chō) were limited in number to 125 and to a gross total of 50,000 tons. No individual vessel was to exceed 1,500 tons and stringent restrictions were placed on speed and equipment. It was explicitly stated that

Nothing in this law shall be construed so as to permit the Maritime Safety Board or its personnel to be trained or organised as a military establishment or to function as such.

The first concrete step towards rearmament was, ironically, taken on General MacArthur's initiative. On 8 July 1950, shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea, MacArthur ordered the Yoshida Government to create a Police Reserve Force (Keisatsu Yobitai) of 75,000 men. He also ordered the Maritime Safety Force to be strengthened by 8,500 men. After an urgent Cabinet meeting held to discuss MacArthur's order the Yoshida Government announced that the Reserve would be established outside
the existing police framework. It was to be a highly centralized force administered by a specially established Headquarters (Keisatsu Yobitai Honbu) directed by an official responsible to the Prime Minister. Detailed plans were drawn up over the next few weeks in close collaboration with SCAP. On 10 August 1950, a month after receiving MacArthur's instructions, the Japanese Cabinet proclaimed the Police Reserve Force Order (Keisatsu Yobitai Rei). A supplementary Police Reserve Force Enforcement Order (Keisatsu Yobitai Shikō Rei) was proclaimed on 23 August and a Police Reserve Force Organisation Order (Keisatsu Yobitai Soshiki Rei) on 26 August 1950. Appointments of high ranking officials to Police Reserve Headquarters were announced in October, following which recruitment and training of officers and men began almost immediately. By May 1951 units of the new force had been disposed in a state of readiness throughout the country.

The Police Reserve and the expanded Maritime Safety Force formed the basis for all Japan's subsequent rearmament. Three points suggest that in establishing the Police Reserve MacArthur and Yoshida intended, as they claimed, to create no more than a paramilitary police force to preserve internal security. They were not consciously laying the foundation for rearmament.

First, while the outbreak of the Korean War provided the opportunity, the Police Reserve was in fact established against a background of increasing political and social unrest in Japan. Second, while former Imperial army and navy officers eventually entered the Police Reserve, MacArthur and Yoshida declined to accept the services of an organisation, supported by powerful elements in SCAP, that would have provided the highly trained, experienced, professional officer corps necessary for rapid, large scale rearmament. Third, even after creation of the Police Reserve MacArthur and Yoshida continued to oppose Washington's pressure for rearmament.

The role played by fear of domestic Communist revolution in the 1945 unconditional surrender decision was noted in the previous chapter. Fear of subversion continued to preoccupy Japanese governments throughout the Occupation period. Official anxiety was naturally intensified by the release of Communist and Socialist political prisoners in 1945, the growth of militant trade unions, the increasing
restlessness of organised labour, deteriorating economic conditions and the activities, real or imagined, of General Derevyanko's large Soviet mission in Tokyo. Whether these fears had, prior to 1950, any real basis, how far they were a result of the Japanese Conservatives' unfamiliarity with democratic society lies beyond the scope of this thesis. However, existing police strength and internal security arrangements were considered inadequate to counter the threat of subversion. The character of the 1947 Occupation inspired Police Law caused particular concern. Before the war Japan had maintained an efficient and highly centralized police force under the control of the Home Ministry (Naimu Shō). This force, acting on an empire-wide scale to eradicate political unorthodoxy and crush dissent had been one of the bastions of the prewar social and political system. The 1947 law completely demolished this totalitarian institution, establishing independent, decentralized police forces under the control of elected Municipal Public Safety Commissions (Jichitai Keisatsu) and a separate National Rural Police Force (Kokka Chiho Keisatsu) for duty in sparsely settled areas. The law limited the total number of municipal police to 95,000 and the rural police to 30,000 men. Yoshida, alleging an internal Communist menace, made several attempts to persuade MacArthur to strengthen the police force and widen police powers. In November 1948 the United States National Security Council also officially resolved that a 150,000 man Japanese National Police Force be established, presumably to help counter the influence of the country's radical camp.

For a time MacArthur declined to be diverted from his wider objectives. The beginning of the end of his bold experiment in decentralized democratic police control came in January 1950 when the Japanese Communist Party, despite its astonishing 1949 electoral advances, bowed to pressure from Moscow and abandoned its previous policy of working for change within the system. The ballot box was rejected, the Occupation and the Conservatives were to be forcibly overthrown by a Communist led Democratic Front. In the spring of 1950 the Party began a campaign of violent demonstrations, strikes and industrial sabotage. This in turn led to the June 1950 Occupation purge of Communist leaders, a month before the creation of the Police Reserve. The Communist campaign subsequently intensified, reaching a peak in 1951-1952. Police stations were attacked, factories sabotaged. Desultory attempts were made to create rural liberated areas on the Chinese model.
These efforts ultimately ended in failure. The occupied Japan of 1950 was not the defeated Russia of 1917 or the China of the 1930s. By 1953 Communist electoral support had temporarily evaporated. Yet in the summer of 1950 it was no clearer to MacArthur and Yoshida than it was to Moscow and the Communist leadership that the Party's new tactics would fail. The United States and the Japanese Government had seen what had happened in China. More recently, and closer to home, they had witnessed the appearance of left wing peasant and worker movements in southern Korea. There was also the example of French Indo-China. In the tense situation created by the outbreak of war in Korea and the hasty departure of American Occupation troops for the battlefronts, MacArthur and the Yoshida Government may well have feared imminent domestic Communist revolution. That the Police Reserve was created primarily to back up the ineffectual municipal and rural police in countering internal urban guerilla warfare was evident from the distribution of units, the equipment and ideological instruction given the force.

Support for the Japanese Communist Party was strongest in the industrial cities of the Kantō plain, the Kinki region and North Kyūshū, weakest in Hokkaidō and the Tōhoku district. After 1952, when a genuine army came into being, powerful Japanese forces were stationed in Hokkaidō and in northern Honshū. Their purpose was to counter an anticipated Russian attack on these areas in the event of war. However, of the thirty units making up the four District Forces (Kankutai) of the Police Reserve, only seven were sent to Hokkaidō and only one to northern Honshū. Only four were placed along the entire exposed western coast of Honshū. In contrast, five units were located in the immediate vicinity of Tokyo; two more were within easy reach of the capital. Another seven units (as many as in the whole of Hokkaidō) were stationed around the Kinki area, near the industrial cities of Ōsaka, Kobe and Nagoya and the ancient capital of Kyōto, renowned as a centre of left wing activity. Three units were stationed around the city of Hiroshima, two others within easy reach of either Hiroshima or the Kinki region. Another seven units were placed near the mining and industrial belt of North Kyūshū. Only one unit was stationed on the remote southern coast of this island.
Until the autumn of 1951 the only weapons issued to the Reserve were carbines and light machine guns. Early in October 1951 units were supplied with 60 mm mortars and 75 mm bazookas. These light weapons would have been useless if the force were intended to have a counter-army role and, say, oppose amphibious landings on Japanese territory. Moreover the Police Reserve pledge, recited by the entire force at 6.00 a.m. every morning, referred merely to the duty of 'maintaining peace and order in our country and preserving the public welfare'.

Despite this the Police Reserve Force looked like an army and there were many both in MacArthur's Headquarters and in the Japanese political world who either regarded it as such or hoped to make the final transformation as rapidly as possible. Masuhara Keikichi, the first Director General of the Police Reserve, recalls that,

My friends and various others believed that now, after the tragedy of defeat, an army should be established. In particular they believed that an army should be built up with the Soviet Union in mind...it was a matter of life or death. There were many serious people who kindly came and gave me advice to this effect.

He also recalls that Major-General Shepherd, Chief of the United States Army Civilian Affairs Section, who acted as principal American adviser to the Police Reserve

...from the first considered the Police Reserve Force to be an army. He used the words "police, police", but as far as adopting a military type organisation was concerned he spoke without the slightest reserve.

Thus whatever MacArthur's and Yoshida's original intentions may have been, strong internal pressures tended from the beginning to transform the Reserve psychologically, if not physically, into an army. The problem of staff appointments provoked an early clash between the two opposing tendencies. MacArthur, probably supported by Yoshida, insisted on the principle of civilian supremacy. A staff of 100 civilians at Police Reserve Headquarters was given complete administrative and operational control of the organisation. All appointments to this staff were made from among former police officers and civil servants. However, since conduct of operations to suppress large scale civil disorders would require considerable military experience, this policy
could not be followed in all appointments of uniformed officers. Thus when applications for the 800 uniformed officer posts were called in September 1950 unpurged former officers of the Manchurian National Army were specifically invited to apply. (Others eligible for officer postings were police superintendents, police inspectors and certain classes of civil servants.) Moreover, with the release of former Imperial army and naval officers from the purge in 1951, many of these men entered the new force.

Those bent on genuine, large scale Japanese rearmament, however, favoured staffing the Police Reserve with members of the so-called Hattori Agency, headed by ex-Colonel Hattori Tokushirō. Hattori had been Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff at the outbreak of the Pacific War. He was later appointed Private Secretary to General Tōjō Hideki, and became a close confidant of the wartime Prime Minister. With a handful of other officers he escaped the purge through association with the Demobilisation and Repatriation Bureau, where he cultivated the acquaintance of Major-General Willoughby, MacArthur's virulently anti-Communist Chief of Intelligence. While officially engaged in winding down the Japanese military establishment Hattori, with Willoughby's encouragement, built up a large informal association of former officers with the specific objectives of preserving the military values of Japanese society and furnishing the nucleus for a resurrected army.

In August 1950, at Willoughby's suggestion and through the agency of Major-General Shepherd, Hattori approached the Director General of the Police Reserve Force and offered his services. Several conversations were subsequently held between Hattori, Masuhara and Foreign Minister Ōhashi. Willoughby and Shepherd, for obvious reasons, insisted there was no reason for Yoshida to know the substance of the talks. Masuhara, however, reported the matter to the Prime Minister, who flatly refused to deal with Hattori. Yoshida in turn approached MacArthur and obtained the Supreme Commander's support. The upshot was that Yoshida and MacArthur, after some weeks of tortuous negotiations, agreed to sponsor the candidature of Hayashi Keizō as uniformed head of the Police Reserve. The fact that Hayashi, an official of the Imperial Household Agency (Kunai Chō), had neither military nor police experience demonstrates the attitude of MacArthur and Yoshida to the new force at this stage.
That this was not simply a matter of personal hostility to Hattori was shown by the lively resistance put up by Yoshida and MacArthur to Dulles' demands for large scale Japanese rearmament in January 1951, six months after establishment of the Police Reserve (see Chapter 1).


Despite this setback for those favouring genuine rearmament it is conceivable that the internal pressures described above could eventually have propelled the Police Reserve towards regular army status.

The next concrete step towards rearmament, however, came in 1952, again as a result of American pressure. While MacArthur and Yoshida successfully resisted Dulles' more extravagant demands at the January 1951 talks, the Japanese had been obliged to show the Secretary of State 'a project...for increasing both our land and sea forces and placing them under the control of an embryo Ministry of Defence'. Yoshida had also been unable to avoid a reference in the Security Treaty to America's 'expectation' that Japan would 'increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence'.

Rearmament was not written into the Treaty as an explicit Japanese duty. However, MacArthur's dismissal in April 1951, a mere two months after the Yoshida-Dulles talks, probably destroyed any illusions the Prime Minister may have entertained about shelving implementation of the 'project'. He had now lost his most powerful American ally. Ridgeway, unlike MacArthur, did not share Yoshida's opposition to rearmament and participation in regional security. Dulles probably did not fail to impress the significance of these changes on Yoshida when he visited Japan in April 1951, immediately after MacArthur's fall. A number of long discussions were held between Yoshida and General Ridgeway in January and February 1952. Some time in January 1952 it was decided to expand the Police Reserve from 75,000 to 110,000 men. On 31 January, in a radical policy shift, Yoshida announced that 'with the internal situation and the state of affairs abroad in mind', the Police Reserve would be transformed into 'something along the lines of a Self Defence Force'.
Early in March Yoshida announced plans to establish a National Security Agency (Hōan Chō). Details were drawn up by Cabinet in April, presumably in close collaboration with SCAP. Like Police Reserve Headquarters the new Agency was to be dominated by civilian bureaucrats. An Outer Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, headed by a Minister responsible to the Prime Minister, it was charged with 'preservation of Japan's peace and order and, where special need arises, protection of life and property'. The military character of the National Security Agency was emphasised by the fact that its Director-General and five Internal Bureaux (the Equipment, Administration, Personnel and Security Bureaux, and the Secretariat) administered the affairs not of a constabulary, but of forces headed by the so-called First and Second Chiefs of Staff (Dai-Ichi to Dai-Ni Bakuryō Chō), the First Chief of Staff commanding an enlarged and transformed Police Reserve, the Second Chief of Staff commanding a re-organised, re-equipped and expanded Maritime Safety Agency. The National Security Agency was clearly the 'embryo Ministry of Defence' in the 'project' shown to Dulles in 1951.

The forces controlled by the First and Second Chiefs of Staff were themselves very different from the Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Force. From the spring of 1952 the National Security Force was equipped with both field (105mm) and heavy (155mm) artillery, medium tanks (20 ton class) and a variety of military vehicles obtained from the United States. Much of this equipment was clearly unsuitable for suppressing purely domestic disturbances. One of the functions of the National Security Force was in fact to protect Japan from a hypothetical Soviet invasion from Sakhalin and the northern islands. Many units were still concentrated on the Kantō plain, in the Kinki region and near the industrial cities of North Kyūshū in readiness to put down internal disorder. Yet the most heavily armed and highly mechanised units were organised into a special Northern Regional Force (Hokubu Homentai) with headquarters at Sapporo in Hokkaidō. The impressive array of tanks and heavy artillery maintained by the Northern Regional Force was not intended merely to overawe the disaffected Hokkaidō proletariat, if, indeed, one existed.
The National Security Force was thus an army. Equally remarkable was the transformation of the Maritime Safety Force into a navy under the name of the Maritime Patrol Force (Kaijō Keibitai). In March 1952 the 1948 Maritime Safety Law was amended to abolish limits on the total number of personnel and tonnage of vessels. On 26 April the new Maritime Patrol Force was formally established within the Maritime Safety Agency of the Ministry of Transport. With the creation of the National Security Agency in August the Maritime Safety Agency was transferred to its administration under the Second Chief of Staff.70 To equip the new force eighteen 1,500-ton frigates and fifty 250-ton landing craft were obtained from the United States under the terms of a Charter Party Agreement (Nichi-Bei Senpaku Taishaku Kyōtei) signed on 12 November 1952 and approved by the Diet towards the end of December.71

The National Security Agency established, Yoshida considered the rearmament question closed. While some sections of the business world welcomed the prospect of a heavy arms build up, there was evidence that the small scale rearmament so far undertaken was alienating wide sections of the public from the Conservative camp. The dominant groups in the academic community opposed rearmament in the same way as they opposed the Security Treaty. Rearmament was claimed to be a threat to peace in Asia and the Pacific, the first step towards revival of Japanese militarism and restoration of the prewar system.72 These views were shared by many outside the universities. A Yomiuri Shimbun public opinion poll taken in August 1950 showed 37.4 per cent of respondents supporting rearmament, 34.8 per cent opposed.73 While later polls showed a clear majority supporting the establishment of military forces (but strongly opposed to overseas service), a substantial minority remained opposed to rearmament and hostile to unconditional expansion of the existing forces (see table 2:1). The October 1952 General Elections, conducted two months after establishment of the National Security Agency, were fought partly on the rearmament issue.74 The Liberal Party suffered heavy losses, reducing its representation in the House of Representatives from 285 to 240 seats.75 The pro-rearmament Democratic (Progressive) Party made marginal gains76 but the two Socialist Parties, campaigning with variations from left to right on a disarmament platform, increased their representation almost three fold from 46 to 111 seats.77
Thus when the Director of the National Security Agency Kimura Tokutarō at a Cabinet meeting on 14 November 1952, urged a 'more positive' attitude to defence, Yoshida rebuffed him, claiming that the international situation was tending towards relaxation of tensions.78 A week later, after a reconciliatory meeting between Yoshida and Kimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Ogata Taketora told the press that the time was not ripe for rearmament. Emphasis should be placed on improving the lives of the masses, giving them a nation worthy to defend. Ogata referred approvingly to Yoshida's opposition to rearmament on political, diplomatic and economic grounds. He stressed there were no differences on this question between Kimura and the Prime Minister.79 Three days later it was reported that Japan had turned down American requests for further increases in the National Security Force.80


Throughout the spring and summer of 1953 Yoshida continued to oppose further defence expansion. Yet in March 1954 his Government submitted the Defence Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defence Forces Bill to the Diet, thus initiating the most radical changes in Japan's defence policy since the creation of the Police Reserve Force in 1950. When the two bills became law in May 1954 Japan was provided with the de facto Ministry of Defence, National Defence Council, army, navy, air force and Joint Staff Council described earlier in this chapter.

Once again, the Government's decision to initiate these drastic changes is attributable to American pressure. The 1954 defence laws were closely linked with the 1953 decision to accept MSA military aid from the United States (see Chapter 3). This decision had been made reluctantly. Indeed, it had not been made until it was clear that Washington was virtually insisting that Japan avail herself of the benefits of the scheme.

The following is Yoshida's own explanation of the background to the 1954 laws:

In order to benefit from the provisions of MSA Japan had to undertake to fulfill the obligations set forth in the (MSA) law. And this had been primarily designed to apply to
countries possessing an army and a navy, to which Japan alone happened to be an exception. Something needed to be done in order to bring Japan into line with the law's requirements...and...it was decided to include among the duties of the new Security Forces [i.e. the National Security Force and the Maritime Patrol Force] that of repelling foreign invasion, and to frame a new law for that purpose.81

What Yoshida does not reveal is that the Japanese Government, when applying for an MSA grant in 1953, was apparently unaware that 'something needed to be done to bring Japan into line with the law's requirements'. The Americans only explained this during the first round of MSA negotiations in July 1953, when it was too late for the Japanese to back out. Japan was, of course, aware of the provisions of the MSA act. However, until the first round of negotiations the Japanese believed the Americans would be willing to modify the act to suit Japan's special needs. Thus on 24 April 1953, after Ikeda Hayato's first visit to Washington to discuss MSA aid (see Chapter 3), Kamimura Shinichi declared on his return from a diplomatic posting in the United States that

As regards the MSA plan, which is linked to the question of Japanese rearmament,' the United States is going ahead with plans to amend the law so that the scheme can also be applied to Japan.82

This impression subsequently took firm root. Later Government statements gave no indications of plans to alter the status of the National Security Agency. On 28 May 1953 a high ranking Foreign Ministry official told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that he believed Japan, like Iran and Yugoslavia, would be able to accept aid without incurring additional military responsibilities.83

The Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasised the economic and technical rather than military aspects of the MSA scheme. Nor did the American Embassy's reply to Yoshida's later enquiries about MSA aid suggest that acceptance would necessitate legal changes. On the contrary the Embassy assured the Japanese that they could fulfil their duties under Article 51 Clause 1 Part A3 of the MSA Act merely by 'carrying out [their] obligations under the Security Treaty.84
Although the communiqué issued after the Japanese-American MSA talks on 15 July gave no indication that a new legal framework for the National Security Force had been discussed, it was only after this meeting that the Government began to speak of impeding legal changes.

The policy shift after 15 July was striking. The day before Foreign Minister Okazaki had told the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee that it would be 'correct' to assume Japan's duties under the MSA agreement would not be of a military character. Two days after the first round of MSA talks Okazaki told the House of Councillors that in accepting aid Japan would, in fact, incur duties different to those already undertaken in the Security Treaty. These new duties would necessitate establishment of defence forces able to resist both direct and indirect aggression. The following day the Director General of the National Security Agency announced that acceptance of MSA aid would inevitably change the character of the existing forces. Because of this alterations in the National Security Force Law would become necessary.


The character of the 1954 defence laws, in particular the provisions concerning the role of the forces, the functions of the National Defence Council and the Joint Staff Council, the principles of civilian control, voluntary service and the ban on duties overseas, took shape during the 1953-54 talks between the Liberal Party and the Democratic (Progressive) Party. These talks were not the outcome of American pressure but of unconnected events in the Japanese political world. In particular they were a response to three trends that dominated the political scene during the first part of the 1950s - the growth of popular support for the Socialist Parties, the corresponding decline in Conservative electoral strength and the increasing factional fragmentation of the Conservative camp. As a result pressure for Conservative unity mounted, not only in the two Parties themselves but also among their sponsors in the business and financial world. The MSA negotiations and the imminent necessity of framing new defence laws
made agreement on defence policy a convenient starting point on the long and difficult road to Conservative merger, which was finally achieved in November 1955 with the formation of the Liberal–Democratic Party.

The Liberal Party's heavy losses and the astonishing Socialist gains in the October 1952 General Elections were noted earlier. The April 1953 House of Representatives elections saw further increases in Socialist strength (from 111 to 138 seats) and a continued decline in support for the Conservatives (the Liberals lost 10 seats, the Democrats lost 12).89

Equally significant was the emergence of disruptive factionalism in the Conservative camp. The early appearance of factionalism in the Democratic (Progressive) Party was examined in Chapter 1. The situation was further complicated by the return en masse of prewar politicians after their release from the purge in 1952. The reappearance of the old guard, with their strong personalities and extensive connections, had its most divisive effect in the Liberal Party, where Yoshida's dominant position was rapidly eroded.90

After the April 1953 elections a major crisis was precipitated when the depurged founder of the Liberal Party, Hatoyama Ichirō, unable to co-operate further with Yoshida, left the Party with a group of 35 followers. As a result Yoshida found himself at the head of an isolated, minority Government.

Throughout the summer of 1953 moves to promote political stability through Conservative merger gathered momentum.91 Secret talks between representatives of both Parties took place in August, reportedly through the offices of such business leaders as Katō Takeo, former President of the Mitsubishi Bank.92 On 27 September Yoshida met the Democratic (Progressive) Party leader Shigemitsu Mamoru and discussed the defence problem as a step towards Conservative collaboration.93 Formal defence talks between the Liberals, the Democrats (Progressives) and Hatoyama's group began on 3 December, continuing over 19 sessions until 8 March 1954, just before the Defence Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defence Forces Bill were submitted to the Diet.94 The basic principles and individual provisions of both bills were hammered out in the course of these discussions.
Under Ashida Hitoshi's influence the Democratic (Progressive) Party had, for a time, emerged as the Party of rearmament. The appointment of General Tōjō's former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru as Party President after his release from the purge in 1952 reinforced this image, despite the fact that internal factional changes were actually propelling the Party in the opposite direction. Nevertheless if the views of a few near pacifists like Matsumura Kenzō are excluded, defence remained an important issue for the Democrats. The Party's right saw a heavily armed Japan as the leader of the anti-Communist camp in Asia. The left saw rearmament as a means to assert some degree of independence from Washington and pave the way for rapprochement with the continent. These two views, one stressing involvement in American Far Eastern policy, the other inclining to autonomy, embodied different concepts of the character and role of Japan's armed forces. The decline of Ashida's influence, the increasing strength of the Party's radical factions, awareness of the trend of electoral opinion and the prospect of merger with Yoshida's anti-militarist Liberals all combined to modify the Party's defence platform. By the time of the Yoshida-Shigemitsu talks in September 1953 the Democrats had abandoned their earlier interest in a large scale military build up, with de facto conscription, establishment of a home guard and provisions for overseas service. They had emerged instead as the champions of balanced, autonomous forces (i.e. not completely integrated in American Far Eastern strategy), the voluntary system and a ban on overseas service. They also maintained, like Yoshida, that rearmament should not take priority over economic reconstruction.

Although events had thus brought the two Parties closer, differences still remained. The most important of these concerned the role of the forces to be created by the new laws, the status of the controlling agency and the character of defence policy decision making machinery. The latter centered around the fundamental issues of civilian control and Cabinet responsibility. During the Liberal-Democratic Party defence talks, Yoshida made substantial concessions on the first point but eventually managed to impose his own views on the second and third.

While the National Security Force and the Maritime Patrol Force constituted, in effect, an army and navy physically capable of engaging in hostilities with foreign powers, Yoshida opposed all but minimum legal recognition of this fact. Despite his gradually
The escalating interpretation of Article 9, the Prime Minister still maintained that possession of 'war potential' was unconstitutional. In his view, to placate the Americans and make Japan eligible for MSA aid it was merely necessary to amend the existing National Security Force Law, adding provisions for an Air Self Defence Force and changing the Security Force and Maritime Patrol Force respectively into Ground and Maritime Self Defence Forces. The amended law should indicate that the forces were to oppose both foreign attack and domestic disorder. There was no need to elevate the National Security Agency to the status of a full Ministry. Nor was there need for such institutions as a National Defence Council or a Joint Staff Council.

The Democratic (Progressive) Party, in contrast, held that Article 9, as amended by the Government Section of SCAP and Ashida Hitoshi, was compatible with the maintenance of regular military forces. Two entirely new laws, one creating a National Defence Force and the other a Ministry of Defence, both clarifying that the principal objective of these new institutions was resistance to foreign attack, were thus preferable to piecemeal amendments of existing legislation.

The Democrats also proposed radical changes in the existing defence decision making machinery. A powerful Joint Staff Council was to be established and a National Defence Council was to be set up separately from the Cabinet and Ministry of Defence. The Joint Staff Council, made up of the three Chiefs of Staff, was to be charged with co-ordinating the strategies of the three services and was also to be invested with certain rights of command. The National Defence Council, made up of the Chiefs of Staff, leading members of the Defence Ministry, the Cabinet and certain private individuals 'of learning and experience' appointed by the Prime Minister, all sitting with equal status, was to be given extensive direct influence on defence planning, defence industries and the vital question of mobilisation in time of crisis.

These proposals were resisted by the Liberals on the grounds that a strong Joint Staff Council and active participation of the Chiefs of Staff in a National Defence Council would undermine the principle of civilian control and constitute a dangerous step towards restoration of the prewar system. It was also feared that inclusion of private individuals of 'learning and experience' in the National Defence
Council would enable various pressure groups to exert direct influence on defence and foreign policy outside the normal democratic process. In particular the Liberals feared the possibility of extremist former Imperial officers gaining influence by this means.

Towards the end of December 1953 the shape of the final compromise began to emerge. The Liberals accepted the Democrats' scheme for two new laws instead of partial amendments to the old. In return the Democrats abandoned their insistence on creation of a full Defence Ministry. Both Parties agreed that the new Self Defence Forces should be equipped and trained to counter direct and indirect aggression. There was to be no indication of where their principal duties lay. The Liberals were prepared to recognise a Joint Staff Council provided its functions were confined to 'assisting' the Defence Agency Director General in drawing up of defence plans and related matters. These concepts were all incorporated into the final laws.

The Liberals also showed willingness to recognise a National Defence Council provided the Chiefs of Staff sat in a subordinate, advisory capacity and there was no participation by 'persons of learning and experience'. On this point immediate agreement with the Democrats proved impossible and while the 1954 laws provided for a National Defence Council there was no mention of its role or structure. Negotiations continued until 1956, long after Yoshida's fall and the merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties. The Law Concerning the Structure of the National Defence Council promulgated by the Hatoyama Government in July 1956 represented, perhaps ironically, a triumph for the Yoshida view. The National Defence Council established by this law was chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised the Foreign Minister, the Treasurer, the Defence Agency Director General, the Director of the Economic Planning Agency and so on. The Prime Minister was obliged to consult it on all matters relating to national defence. However, since the Council differed little, structurally, from the Cabinet itself, its existence could not be claimed to undermine the principle of Cabinet responsibility or facilitate penetration of outside undemocratic influences. 'At times when the necessity was recognised' the Council could 'hear' the opinions of the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, but he was to sit in a subordinate capacity and have no part in decision
making. The idea of having civilians of 'learning and experience' as permanent full members of the Council had been abandoned. The principle of civilian control was thus firmly established. How it was applied in practice, how the Self Defence Forces thus created at the behest of the United States, administered by laws which, while embodying real and important principles, were nevertheless the outcome of Conservative Party factional struggles, subsequently developed will be discussed in a later chapter.
Chapter 3

MSA AID, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST DEFENCE PLAN

Under the United States-Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed on 8 March 1954 the Self Defence Forces were furnished for most of the next decade with American weapons and guided by American military advisers. The new Japanese forces also dispatched many of their most talented officers for prolonged periods of training in the United States.

By 1962 Japan had accepted American MSA aid totalling U.S.$1,202,900,000. It was estimated that in 1962 MSA aid accounted for 98 per cent of the weapons held by the Self Defence Forces, 99 per cent of their ammunition, 82 per cent of their communications equipment and 70 per cent of their vehicles; 78 per cent of Japan's military aircraft and 60 per cent of her naval vessels had also been obtained from the United States under the MSA and related agreements. Between 1954 and 1961 almost 3000 Japanese army, navy and air force officers were trained at American military schools and academies. Moreover, the Self Defence Forces themselves developed along guidelines drawn up in conjunction with the 1953-54 MSA negotiations and formalized in June 1957 as the First Defence Plan. By 1962, despite continued Japanese refusal to participate in regional security arrangements, the three services had entered into relations of varying intimacy with American forces in the Far East, the closest connections existing between the Air Self Defence Force and the United States Fifth Air Force.

It has been shown how pressure from the United States in connection with the MSA negotiations was directly responsible for the 1954 defence laws. In this chapter it will be argued that American pressure was also primarily responsible for Yoshida's decision in 1953 to accept MSA aid itself. However, in concluding the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement Yoshida endeavoured to ensure that Japan's additional military responsibilities would be minimal. His efforts were not altogether unsuccessful and despite the ambiguous phrasing of parts of the final agreement Japan's actual military build-up in the period 1954-1962 was only a fraction of that
originally demanded by the United States.

Acceptance of MSA aid also obliged Japan to compile her first official post-war defence plans. These plans were not imposed directly by the United States but reflected the Japan-centered thinking of former Imperial army and naval officers taken into the National Security Force after their release from the purge in 1952. Because of this the defence plans taken to Washington in the autumn of 1953 and which the United States, albeit reluctantly, eventually accepted, were not tailored to suit the dictates of contemporary American strategic orthodoxy. They were based on somewhat different premises, designed to achieve somewhat different objectives. With later changes in American strategic thinking these differences became less important but the grounds on which they were based continued to exist.

1. Japan's decision to apply for MSA aid, September 1952- June 1953

The prospect of a Japanese-American Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was first raised in September 1952, some months after the creation of the National Security Force, when Yoshida's close associate Ikeda Hayato conferred with United States Secretary for the Treasury Sneider and State Department Special Adviser Dodge in Mexico City. The Americans urged expansion of the National Security Force from 110,000 to 180,000 men by the end of 1952, with the ultimate object of creating a 325,000 man army by 1954-55. Dodge and Sneider expressed their willingness to request U.S.$300,000,000 from Congress in the next budget to arm and equip the enlarged Japanese force.  

As was to be expected, Yoshida reacted unenthusiastically to these overtures. On 21 November the Director-General of the National Security Agency reportedly told American military officials that it would be difficult to increase the strength of Japanese forces beyond the existing level of 110,000 men. The Prime Minister's policy speech at the new session of the Diet in November had little to say about rearmament. Nevertheless in January 1953 the Director of the Foreign Ministry's International Co-operation Bureau (Kokusai Kyōryoku Kyoku) was sent to Washington
to explore American intentions. He was reportedly told the United States would like to see at least 150,000 Japanese under arms (presumably by the end of the year). Early in March Yoshida sent Ikeda to Washington for further exploratory talks. While no account of these discussions has been published, Ikeda apparently returned convinced that acceptance of MSA aid would necessitate formulation of a detailed defence plan. This news was probably responsible for Yoshida's continued negative attitude towards the question. On 5 March he told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that Japan would not participate in a Pacific alliance and that, in view of Japanese public opinion, the Americans would not propose such a scheme. This was not a direct refusal to accept MSA aid but it showed the United States that since Japan would not undertake greater military responsibilities expansion of the National Security Force would serve no useful purpose.

From the summer of 1953, however, strong pressure was exerted on Yoshida from two directions. On 5 May Dulles told a joint Senate-Representatives Foreign Relations Committee hearing in Washington of a plan to extend MSA aid to Japan. The American Secretary of State later gave the Japanese to understand that the aid would enable Japan to establish ten army divisions and place 350,000 men under arms. The Japanese Government, taken by surprise immediately instructed its Ambassador in Washington to sound out American intentions. Yet Washington's attitude was increasingly clear. The Japanese were not simply being invited to avail themselves of the benefits of MSA aid. Even though Yoshida's attitude to further defence expansion was known to be hostile and no formal negotiations had taken place, Japan's participation in the scheme was regarded as a foregone conclusion. Budgetary provisions were already being made and the United States had formulated plans for Japanese use of the aid to be extended.

At home, deteriorating economic conditions associated with the end of United States Korean War special procurements prompted business leaders to urge acceptance of MSA aid. On the one hand it was felt that a properly negotiated agreement could direct much aid into economic rather than strictly military channels, raising the
level of Japanese technology and improving industrial competitiveness. On the other hand it was felt that refusal of MSA aid would damage Japanese-American political and, ultimately, economic relations. It might also adversely affect Japanese trade with America's client states in South-East Asia and the Pacific.¹³

Despite these pressures, Yoshida held his ground for some time. A week after Dulles' announcement, Foreign Minister Okazaki told a meeting of foreign correspondents in Tokyo that it would be 'premature to say anything definite about MSA aid'.¹⁴ On 26 May Yoshida told the House of Councillors that 'we are not at present considering increasing the strength of the National Security Force, nor do we wish to do so'.¹⁵ On 29 May, in an obvious reference to the Dulles speech, the Prime Minister told the House of Councillors Budget Committee that since there had been 'no formal communication' from the United States Government on the question he could not speculate about the possibility of Japanese participation in the MSA scheme.¹⁶

The following day, however, Senator Everett Dirkson, a prominent member of the Senate Budget Committee, arrived in Japan for talks with Yoshida.¹⁷ What passed between the two men has not been revealed. Yet the Senator's visit seems to have convinced Yoshida that the long term cost in American goodwill of refusal to accept MSA aid might be greater than the price of a carefully negotiated acceptance. Whatever the reason, Yoshida's position gradually changed from about the time of the Dirkson visit.¹⁸

Enquiries at the American Embassy suggested there could be considerable flexibility in negotiating the quantity and type of aid. The Americans gave Yoshida to understand that the MSA scheme would have favourable effects on Japanese-American economic relations. They stressed they were not insisting on a degree of rearmament beyond Japan's economic and political capacity to absorb. Japan could comply with the requirements of the MSA act by maintaining internal security, fulfilling her duties under the Security Treaty and effectively exercising her right of individual and collective self defense. Thus the Japanese gradually formed the impression that MSA aid would have as much economic as military significance and would not involve them in new military responsibilities.¹⁹ After further promptings from the
United States they announced their 'inclination' to accept MSA assistance, although Okazaki took care to tell the Diet (16 June) that he was thinking of the 'economic' rather than the 'military' aspects of the scheme. Cabinet finally decided to apply for aid on 30 June and the first round of negotiations began a fortnight later (15 July) in the Foreign Ministry.

2. The first round of MSA negotiations, July 1953 - September 1953

When the negotiations opened it became apparent that American demands were more far reaching than had been expected. The Japanese soon found themselves committed to instituting legal changes affecting the status of the National Security Force and its administrative agency. They were, however, extremely reluctant to make concessions on other grounds and the negotiations that began in July 1953 continued for more than eight months, until the spring of the following year. Although the final agreement committed Japan to a defence expansion program that Yoshida would have preferred to avoid, it did not represent an unconditional capitulation before American demands.

As in January-February 1951 the Americans appeared anxious to involve Japan in heavy rearmament and wider responsibilities. Conflict soon arose on how to express the relationship between MSA aid and Japanese economic stability. There was also disagreement on how to express Japanese military duties. The United States hoped to see explicit reference to Section 511 part (a) of the MSA Act incorporated into the text of the final agreement. Point four of part (a) obliged the aid-receiving country to make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.

The Japanese opposed this, on the grounds that it would be tantamount to committing their forces to overseas service. On this fundamental point the talks remained deadlocked, despite the fact that agreement was soon reached on a number of peripheral technical matters.

As time passed and the negotiations made little headway Japan's attitude caused much annoyance in Washington. A week after the inconclusive end of the fifth session of talks Dulles, during a
stopover in Tokyo (8 August 1953) on his way home from South Korea, strongly urged Japan to view her membership of the Free World more positively. The Secretary of State compared Japan's contributions to Free World security unfavourably with those of Italy and recalled that even South Korea, economically weak and beset with internal problems, already supported seventeen army divisions and was preparing to raise another three. Yoshida's response was unsatisfactory and when Dulles returned to the United States he publically gave vent to his extreme dissatisfaction.

Pressure of this kind failed to weaken Japanese resistance. Three days after the Dulles-Yoshida confrontation, with the opening of the sixth session of MSA talks (14 August 1953), the Japanese presented the Americans with a draft appendix they hoped to attach to the final agreement. The appendix quoted the text of sections of the MSA law, as the Americans desired, but added that Japan 'will fulfill her obligations within the limits permitted by her Constitution'. At the same time a vast battery of economic demands were advanced, apparently in an attempt to broaden the MSA talks into general economic discussions. The United States was requested to procure as much MSA aid material as possible in Japan and to assist in establishing domestic Japanese defence industries. Japan's interest in the output of raw materials in various parts of Asia was stressed and mention was made of a general technical assistance program. So wide ranging were the Japanese demands that at the next session of the talks (19 August 1953) the United States negotiators felt obliged to point out that the MSA program was basically concerned with defence, not economic development. The Americans suggested that Japan's economic demands should, therefore, be omitted. The Japanese declined to back down and no conclusion was reached.

The negotiations dragged on throughout September with no significant progress on basic issues. Yoshida's attitude continued to provoke the Americans. On 3 September Dulles delivered another blast from Washington. When Foreign Minister Okazaki and the Director General of the National Security Agency Kimura Batarō met General Clark on 24 September their reluctance to discuss long term defence plans was so obvious that the General repeatedly banged the table in anger. Thus by the time the twelfth session of talks ended on 30 September no
more than a tentative agreement on a number of technical issues had been reached, although the Joint Communiqué spoke of 'complete accord'.

3. The Ikeda-Robertson talks, October 1953

Discussion of Japanese military responsibilities, the amount and character of aid to be received and the details of defence planning was reopened at the Ikeda-Robertson talks in October 1953.

The Ikeda mission left Japan on 29 September after receiving strict instructions from the Prime Minister to make as few concessions on rearmament as possible. Serious talks began on 5 October with Ikeda assuring the Americans that 'there were certain special circumstances that made increased defence outlays difficult for Japan'. These pleas made little impression on the Americans, who devoted the next session of talks (8 October 1953) to an analysis of the world situation, then proceeded to outline their views on the future development of Japan's defence forces (12 and 15 October). They spoke in terms of a Japanese army 'some three times the size of the present National Security Force'. The Chief of the Combined General Staffs Admiral Radford suggested expansion of Japanese ground forces to 300-350,000 men over a five year period. The Japanese naturally refused to consider rearmament on this scale. Ikeda's modest counter-proposal of 180,000 men (only 70,000 more than the National Security Force) built up over five years caused the Americans to express 'extreme dissatisfaction' and the talks came to an uneasy deadlock.

For a time the Japanese avoided discussion of military matters, expressing 'interest' in the fact that whereas the MSA aid earmarked for Japan was strictly military in character, assistance extended to various European countries under the ECA scheme (the forerunner of MSA) had been partly economic. The Americans offered no more than a 'useful explanation' of this point.

At his press conference of 16 October 1953 Ikeda made no attempt to conceal his differences with the United States. America and Japan were agreed, he said, that present Japanese military strength was insufficient. There had been, however, no agreement on the scale of the planned expansion. Moreover, while maintenance of strictly defensive military power could be reconciled with the Constitution, establishment
of armed forces for overseas service was prohibited. Expansion of the existing forces could not be taken to the point where they become potentially aggressive.\textsuperscript{40}

Ikeda's stubborness brought the talks with Robertson to a premature end. The Americans felt nothing could be gained by further discussion. Just before the opening of the sixth session (scheduled for 19 October) the United States informed the Japanese that it was pre-occupied with the Korean problem and would like to conclude the talks as quickly as possible. The Japanese accordingly drew up a summary of their views and handed it to the State Department.\textsuperscript{41} This memorandum emphasised Japan's interest in the economic aspects of MSA aid and contained no concrete reference to future military responsibilities and planning. In response the United States, on the pretext that Robertson was obliged to leave Washington 'on a trip' cancelled another meeting scheduled for 22 October.\textsuperscript{42} The final session of talks on 30 October failed to break the deadlock and Japanese Government spokesmen, in assessing the significance of the negotiations, were reduced to declaring vaguely that they had 'deepened mutual understanding'.\textsuperscript{43}

4. Japanese defence planning - the origins of the First Defence Plan September 1952 - October 1953

The principal reason for the breakdown in the Ikeda-Robertson talks was Japan's failure to produce a long term defence plan that the United States could regard as satisfactory.

Despite its continuing efforts to establish a small Japanese navy the United States was, at this stage, chiefly interested in large scale expansion of the Japanese ground forces.\textsuperscript{44} There was little discussion of sea power at the MSA talks and no pressure was put on Japan to establish an air force. Washington's attitude had been evident since Ikeda's talks with Sneider and Dodge in the autumn of 1952, when the Americans apparently confined discussion entirely to expansion of the National Security Force.

American interest in the creation of a powerful Japanese army was closely linked to the military and political lessons of the Korean War. In the 1953 presidential elections Eisenhower had
campaigned on a platform calculated to appeal to the public's desire to avoid direct involvement in future conflicts. Moreover, while the Republicans adopted a tough line on Communism, they were also anxious to reduce government expenditure. The attempt to reconcile Eisenhower's election promises, Republican parsimony and maintenance of a world-wide containment of Communism policy led to official enshrinement of Dulles' massive retaliation strategy. Reliance on overwhelming nuclear superiority, air and naval power was supposed to permit reduction of American ground forces stationed abroad to a level acceptable to the public. At the same time Communism would be held in check, America's allies comforted.

Yet if the post-Korea political climate in the United States necessitated reduction of American ground forces overseas, the Korean war itself had made American military planners acutely aware of the importance of these forces. In the Far East reliance on nuclear weapons, air and sea power alone was inadequate. If Communism were to be checked it was also imperative that the immense Soviet and Chinese ground forces, and those of their allies, be confronted by substantial Free World armies. As with the later Nixon Doctrine, Dulles' new strategy meant in practice that the United States would provide the nuclear shield, the air and naval power. The hand to hand fighting was to be done, as far as possible, by her Asian allies. It was, of course, explained to Japanese reporters in Washington that the United States was not thinking of a potential combat role for the forces of its allies. Rather, their political value in negotiations with the Communists was stressed. There was doubtless some truth in these protestations. Yet the important role played by ground forces in the Korean conflict, the imminent reduction of United States forces overseas, Eisenhower's election promise that wars for Asian freedom would be fought by Asians, and the real possibility of a major East-West confrontation in French Indo-China made it clear that Washington saw other uses for the great armies of its Asian allies.

The Japanese were unwilling to accept such a dependent and specialized role. The intellectual and, to some extent, the social climate of post-war Japan was, of course, hostile to rearmament (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, creation of the Police Reserve and the National
Security Force was followed by the appearance of a few writers and private organisations actively interested in defence planning. In the business community activity centered on the special Defence Production Committee (Bōei Seisan Iinkai) set up by the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) in 1952. Private plans were also drawn up by certain defence conscious politicians, academics and former Imperial army and naval officers. All these unofficial defence planners concurred that domestic and foreign Communism and, in particular, the Soviet Union, constituted the chief threats to Japanese security. The majority supported the Security Treaty, although there were a few proponents of Swedish style armed neutrality. All were agreed, however, that Japan's military forces should not become a mere vehicle of American Far Eastern policy. There were stern warnings against creation of 'a deformed, ambiguous and fragmented defence organisation' dependent on the United States. Japanese-American military relations were to be based, as far as possible, on co-operation, not dependence.

To achieve the desired degree of autonomy within the Security Treaty system Japan needed powerful air and naval as well as ground forces. The Fédération of Economic Organisations group envisaged a navy of 290,000 tons (manned by 70,000 men), an air force of some 3750 aircraft (including 900 medium range bombers) as well as an army of 300,000 men organised into 15 divisions. Hattori Tokushirō proposed a 225,000 man army, 387,000 ton navy and an air force of 1800 aircraft. The prominent Communist renegade Nabeyama Sadachika, who had wide connections in the business world and ties both with Hattori and the ultra-nationalist ideologue Kodama Yoshio, advocated a 200,000 man army, a 180,000 ton navy and an air force of 2500 aircraft. The conservative economist Watanabe Tatsuzō (whose Watanabe Economic Research Institute was connected with Hattori and ex-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō) envisaged a 200,000 man army, a 300,000 ton navy and an air force of 2000 aircraft. Ex-Admiral Nomura himself proposed a navy of 387,000 tons, 1800 aircraft and a 225,000 man army. Ex-Lieutenant-General Inada Masazumi, also associated with Hattori, Nomura and Watanabe, advocated a 250,000 ton navy, an air force of 1500 aircraft and a relatively small army of 100,000 men. Ex-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, an opponent of the Security Treaty whose views somewhat separated him from...
other exponents of rearmament, hoped for a 200,000 man regular army, a substantial navy and an air force of 1000 fighter bombers. There were differences of opinion on whether possession of long range air and naval strike capacity would complicate relations with Australia and South-East Asia, but the common emphasis in all these plans was on balanced, potentially autonomous land, sea and air forces.

Official defence planning began in September 1952, with the establishment of a special secret committee within the National Security Agency. While pressure for research into defence planning had probably existed in the National Security Agency for some time, this Committee (euphemistically called the Systems Research Committee, Seidō Chōsa Iin Kai) was presumably set up after Ikeda's talks with Dodge and Sneider convinced Yoshida that further wide ranging American demands were imminent and could only be resisted by a well prepared case.

The Systems Research Committee was chaired by the Director General of the National Security Agency Masuhara Keikichi. Its members included the Agency's Secretary General, the various sectional chiefs and other important civilian officials. However, on Masuhara's own admission the civilian members of the Committee were 'mere novices' as far as military matters were concerned. They had no alternative but to entrust the actual planning to the former Imperial army and naval officers who had entered the new forces in 1951-52.

The character of Japan's post-war military leaders will be examined in a later chapter. Suffice it to remark here that some of the most articulate of those with pre-war backgrounds have been characterized not only by extreme anti-Communism but also by lack of commitment to liberal democracy and by a complex of ultranationalist beliefs reminiscent of the early Shōwa era. That they shared the preoccupation of the unofficial planners (including some of their former colleagues who had remained aloof from the new forces) with balanced, potentially autonomous forces, is evident from the character of the Systems Research Committee's successive draft plans. The first draft, completed late in March 1953, placed particular emphasis on the development of air and sea power. The plan envisaged an army of 300,000 men, a navy of 455,000 tons (367 vessels, 112,000 men) and a powerful air force of 6744 aircraft (202,000 men) built up over thirteen years.
While the size of the proposed army was the same as that recommended by the Americans and the Federation of Economic Organisations group, the huge air force and navy exceeded the wildest expectations of even the most ambitious private defence planners. As far as defence expenditure was concerned, it was planned to devote 3.8 per cent of the national income to defence during the first year of the plan and increase this to 8.3 per cent by 1965, on the assumption that the national income would increase at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent. It anticipated that about 25 per cent of Japan's defence requirements would be met by American MSA aid.66

This plan was too ambitious for Yoshida and too expensive for the Ministry of Finance. Thus within two months the Systems Research Committee compiled another, more modest draft. The new plan envisaged a 205,000 man army (100,000 men less than the force Dodge suggested to Ikeda in 1952), a 142,960 ton navy (32,000 men) and an air force of 1536 aircraft (46,000 men).67 Since it was now clear that Washington was not particularly interested in a Japanese air force and navy it must be assumed that Yoshida encouraged those members of the Committee who aimed at balanced rearmament and autonomy rather than dependence on the United States.

In the circumstances this attitude was, paradoxically, not inconsistent with Yoshida's basic policy of ensuring United States protection but avoiding military commitments outside Japan. The creation of the National Security Force had not satisfied America's 'expectation' and it was evident that the healthy condition of the Security Treaty could only be preserved by greater Japanese defence efforts. Yet to succumb to American pressure and concentrate exclusively on building up large ground forces was perhaps to bring closer the day when Washington would request the deployment of these forces to other parts of Asia. On the other hand, investment in naval and air forces geared exclusively to home defence somewhat reduced the possibility of direct Japanese participation in limited wars in other parts of Asia. Thus the antimilitarist Yoshida, impelled on the one hand by a desire to preserve American goodwill and on the other by the hope of avoiding involvement in American Far Eastern strategy, had no alternative but to support the balanced, autonomous forces concept expounded by the representatives
of an officer class with whom he had clashed bitterly in the past, to whose ideology he was fundamentally opposed and whose domination of the Police Reserve he had resisted in 1950.

During the course of 1953 this draft was revised numerous times. At the insistence of the Finance Ministry, presumably with Yoshida's backing, the estimates for the size of the three forces and the scale of defence spending were progressively reduced. While the project Ikeda showed Robertson at the October 1953 talks, and which formed the basis for the later First Defence Plan, envisaged balanced development of ground, air and sea power, the combined efforts of Yoshida and the Finance Ministry had drawn the teeth from the Systems Research Committee's original blueprint. The army had been cut in half, the navy reduced by two thirds, the air force slashed to a fraction of that originally planned.

5. The character of the final MSA agreement, March 1954

After Ikeda's return from the deadlocked Washington talks early in November, no further negotiations took place until the arrival of Robertson and the Chief of the Combined General Staffs Admiral Radford in Tokyo in December. Further unpublicized negotiations took place in February 1954 and led directly to the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in March.

The two months between the breakdown of the Ikeda-Robertson talks and the opening of the new series of negotiations saw a shift in official American opinion towards acceptance of the Japanese position on military responsibilities and the amount and character of aid. This was a result of the Yoshida Government's stubbornness, not of changes in the international situation. The Korean armistice had been signed on the eve of the Ikeda-Robertson talks but it was clear that a state of extreme tension would continue indefinitely along the 38th parallel. While the final Japanese-American negotiations were in session, the stage was being set for the battle of Dien Bien Phu. A month after the signing of the MSA agreement in Tokyo the French position in Indo-China collapsed, Eisenhower enunciated the domino theory, Dulles and Radford began examining a plan to intervene in Vietnam in association with forces from America's Asian and Pacific allies. Unfortunately it is not possible to trace this important shift in American policy towards Japan since no record of the December 1953 - February 1954 talks has yet been published.
Nevertheless the preamble of the 1954 agreement, while 'reaffirming' that 'Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self defence' and 'recalling' America's expectation that 'Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence', recognised that

...in the planning of a defence assistance program for Japan, economic stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its defence capacities, and that Japan can only contribute to the extent permitted by its general economic condition and capacities.

The importance of economic stability was again stressed in Article I. Moreover Article 8, while committing Japan to fulfil the requirements of Section 511 part (a) (4) of the MSA Act, was immediately followed by a provision stipulating that 'The present Agreement will be implemented by each Government in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the respective countries.'

Although no clause specifically prohibited dispatch of Japanese forces overseas, Foreign Minister Okazaki explained at the signing ceremony on 8 March that

...in carrying out the duties and contributions promised in this agreement, adequate consideration must be paid to the conditions that exist in, and the separate interests of the two countries. As was made clear in the course of the negotiations, the duties undertaken by Japan on the basis of this agreement will be completely fulfilled by her carrying out the commitments already undertaken in the Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Security. There are no new and separate military duties. Overseas service and so on for Japan's internal security force (jian butai) will not arise.

His words were echoed by the American Ambassador Allison, who signed the agreement on behalf of the United States.

Moreover, although no formal agreement was published, United States MSA aid was subsequently extended to Japan on the basis of the defence plan shown by Ikeda to Robertson in October 1953. After minor modifications this plan was officially adopted as the First Defence-Power Consolidation Plan by the National Defence Council on 14 June 1957. As a result it formed the basic framework for Japanese defence expansion and American military aid to Japan during the next decade.
Japan was thus able to limit her military obligations under the scheme. Her efforts to channel MSA aid into economic development also met with some success. In Annex A the United States promised to 'give every consideration' to the extent that other factors will permit to procuring supplies and equipment in Japan. The United States also undertook to provide information and facilitate the 'training of technicians from Japan's defence production industries'. It could be expected that the techniques and skills thus acquired would stimulate the development of non-military industries. A separate Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan regarding the Purchase of Agricultural Commodities gave Japan access to large quantities of cheap surplus grains. Another agreement encouraged flow of American capital into Japan. The conclusion of these agreements activated the defence and related industries and allegedly had far reaching effects on the Japanese economy as a whole, helping overcome the stagnation brought on by the end of the Korean War.


The ink had hardly dried on the MSA agreements when developments at home and abroad produced important changes in American strategic thinking. In most respects the Radford Strategy, which first began to take shape in the winter of 1954-55, although it was not completely accepted until 1957, was nothing but Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine modified to suit a domestic situation demanding further cuts in military spending and an international situation where unco-operative allies refused to raise armies to stem the Communist tide under the protection of America's nuclear umbrella. Since neither the American public or President would tolerate direct involvement in foreign wars, Radford was forced to do without armies. America's overseas ground forces would be reduced to a minimum. As under Dulles' original scheme, Communism was to be held in check by the threat of instant nuclear retaliation launched from air and naval bases around the periphery of the Eurasian continent. Yet now even localized brushfire wars were apparently to be dealt with by massive nuclear strikes. More than ever before, the emphasis was on the foreign based strategic bomber, the missile and the naval air arm.
Implementation of this 'new look strategy' necessitated sweeping changes in the deployment of American forces all over the globe. In Japan, as elsewhere, the level of American ground forces was rapidly reduced.\textsuperscript{85} When the Radford strategy was first formulated there were 210,000 American military personnel in Japan. The first large scale withdrawals were announced in December 1955 and by the end of 1957 only 77,000 men remained. Over half of these were air force personnel. By 1960 only 48,000 Americans, of whom 30,000 were attached to the air force, remained in Japan. At the same time the entire Far Eastern command structure was reorganised. By July 1957 responsibility for the vast area stretching from the west coast of the United States to the rimland of continental Asia was vested in a single Pacific military command located in Hawaii. Within this framework, responsibility for aerial operations from Japan, Korea and Okinawa was vested in the American Fifth Air Force, with headquarters at Fuchū, near Tokyo.

The Japanese refused to permit the entry of American nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{86} but in November 1956, to 'fill the vacuum' left by the departure of the ground forces, supersonic F100 Super Sabres capable of carrying such weapons were stationed at Japanese bases.\textsuperscript{87} Moreover Okinawa, the importance of which had suffered a minor eclipse since the end of the Korean War, began to be transformed into a huge air base,\textsuperscript{88} eventually equipped with nuclear weapons.

These developments profoundly modified Washington's attitude towards Japan's armed forces. After 1955-56 the United States abandoned her previous preoccupation with the Japanese army and, in a complete reversal of policy, directed her efforts towards the creation of Japanese air and naval forces. This change naturally affected the volume and character of aid channelled into Japanese rearmament. In 1954 more than 80 per cent of MSA aid to Japan went to the ground forces. The fledgling Japanese air force had received only 4 per cent, the navy 15 per cent. With the application of the Radford doctrine in 1956-57 the change was dramatic. Aid to the Japanese army underwent a sharp decline, falling to 15 per cent of the total in 1956, 6 per cent in 1957, rising briefly to 25 per cent in 1958, dropping to 6 per cent in 1959 and standing at about 20 per cent of the total at the time of the 1960 Security Treaty crisis. In contrast, aid to the air force rose from a mere 4 per cent
of the total in 1954 to well over 60 per cent in 1956. Aid to the navy increased from 14 per cent of the total in 1954 to 50 per cent in 1957, 28 per cent in 1958, 50 per cent in 1959. These trends continued until the aid program itself gradually trailed out in the mid 1960s.89

In view of the early interest in 'balanced' forces, the changing emphasis of American policy was welcomed by most Japanese political leaders and defence planners. The spring of 1960 saw Japan in possession of an air force of 1050 aircraft (including trainers and miscellaneous craft) and a navy of 99,400 tons. Yet the air arm at least was not the autonomous force that the defence planners of 1953-54 had hoped for. It was, in fact, an integral part of the new American strategic system in the Far East. No one was more acutely aware of this than the first Chief of the Air Staff, Genda Minoru:

At the present time...the Air Self Defence Forces make their preparations within the framework of an extremely intimate co-operation with the United States forces....The greater part of the American forces stationed in Japan - at Mitaka, Yokota, Atsugi and Iwakuni and the Seventh Fleet around Japan - are offensive in character and very different from Japan's Self Defence Forces. Their exercises are carried out with the greatest emphasis on attack....The main objective of Japan's air defence network is to protect America's retaliatory power, to guard the bases from which America's retaliatory power will take off. Our radar network and so on have the same function.90

The character of the new Japanese air force became evident as early as 1957, when its headquarters was moved from Hamamatsu to Fuchū, where the headquarters of the American Fifth Air Force were located. Indeed, the Air Self Defence Headquarters were installed in the same building as those of the Fifth Air Force. English, not Japanese, became the operational language of the Japanese force and the interdependence of the two allies was deepened by reliance on the same radar network.91 Finally, on 2 September 1959 Lieutenant-General Robert W. Burns, Commander of the United States Fifth Air Force and Lieutenant-General Matsumae Masuo, Commander of the Japanese Air Defence Command, signed a secret agreement establishing procedures for joint action in case of emergency and arranging exchange of information with aerial warning and other facilities in South Korea and Okinawa.92 It is not clear what this agreement implied for Japan's autonomous decision making power in the event of hostilities in these two areas.
Close links were also forged between the Japanese and United States navies, although the details remain unknown. At the same time the Ground Self Defence Forces, neglected as they were, increasingly assumed a counter-army role against the Soviet Union. Northern defences were further consolidated and from 1955, with the establishment of the Western Region General Inspectorate in Kyūshū, some effort was made to strengthen military preparedness along the southern part of the Japan Sea coast, in the areas closest to Korea. The greatest concentration of strength, however, remained in Hokkaidō. Less emphasis was placed on dispositions to suppress internal disorder, although these functions remained important. Of the six Regional Forces (Kankutai) (each of 12,700 men) and four Mixed Brigades (Konseidan) (6000 men each) established by the end of 1959 only one Regional Force was stationed around Tokyo, the Kantō plains and the Kōshinetsu area. Only one Regional Force and one Mixed Brigade were stationed in the Chūbu, Kinki, Chūgoku and Shikoku area. To what extent these dispositions were made after consultation with the United States is uncertain.

Thus, changes in United States strategy succeeded, for a time, in resolving Japanese-American differences of opinion on the character and role of the new armed forces. The Japanese, with their developing army, navy and air force, had at least the appearance of military autonomy. Since they regarded the Soviet Union as the chief potential threat, intimate relations with the United States were regarded as unavoidable. The Americans, on the other hand, had a Japanese air force to help protect their own offensive power in North-East Asia, a Japanese navy able to co-operate against the Russians in the North Pacific and a Japanese army able to hold the line in Hokkaidō. The only loser was Yoshida, who would have preferred to have nothing at all. Yet even Yoshida had not lost altogether, since the military build up begun by his Government in 1954, on the basis of the agreements he had so skilfully negotiated, was only a fraction of that demanded by the Americans and the Japanese advocates of rearmament,
Chapter 4

THE 1960 SECURITY TREATY AND LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTIONAL POLITICS

The character of the Security Treaty negotiated by Yoshida in 1951 and the events that led to its conclusion have been examined in an earlier chapter. On 19 January 1960 another Japanese Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke, in very different circumstances, signed a new Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between Japan and the United States of America to replace the 1951 agreement. The signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House climaxed eighteen months of Japanese-American negotiations and months of acrimonious debate within Kishi's Liberal-Democratic Party on the kind of relationship with the United States necessary to preserve Japan's security and advance her national interests. It took place against a background of mounting hostility to the American connection not only among the Opposition parties but also among large sections of the Japanese public. Within the Liberal-Democratic Party there was much doubt about the wisdom of the new Treaty, if not about the American alliance itself.

Exactly four months later, with all the Opposition parties and important elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party (including former Prime Minister Yoshida) boycotting the proceedings, amid scenes of public tumult unprecedented in post-war Japan, the new Treaty was approved by the Diet and automatically went into effect one month later. It was ratified by the Japanese Cabinet on 21 June and approved by the United States Senate the following day. Immediately after the exchange of ratifications with the United States, Prime Minister Kishi, under pressure not only from the Opposition, the demonstrators, the press and wide sections of the public, but also from within his own Party and from its supporters in the business community, announced his resignation. A week earlier, lamenting that this was 'not the appropriate time to welcome a state guest', Kishi had been forced to cancel President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Japan. Later in the year, in the wake of these events, the Socialist Party Secretary General Asanuma Inejirō, who had played a leading role in the anti-Treaty struggle, was assassinated by a right wing youth.
The 1960 Security Treaty crisis left an indelible impression in Japan. It marked the beginning of new chapters both in the evolution of her defence and foreign policies and in the development of her society and political life. In the six months between the signing ceremony in the White House and Kishi's resignation, the tactics employed by both Government and Opposition to advance their objectives were such that many observers began to speak of the impending collapse of Japanese democracy. At the height of the crisis many Conservatives genuinely feared a revolution, Progressives feared a military coup d'etat. Both sides could find ample evidence to justify their fears. From the winter of 1959-60 elements of the Ground Self Defence Forces began intensive anti-riot training. Plans for calling out the forces were drawn up. It has been alleged that Liberal-Democratic Party leaders actually requested mobilization against student demonstrators on 19 June 1960 but that the then Director General of the Defence Agency, Akagi Munenori, flatly refused to call the forces out.

In retrospect, the claim that Japanese democracy was a lost cause would seem to have been exaggerated. Yet it would be true to say that the 1960 Security Treaty crisis had both more immediate impact and more lasting significance than any other political crisis in post-war Japan. Throughout the 1960s its implications and its lessons, real or imagined, exerted an important influence both on the defence policies of the Government, the stand of the Opposition and on popular attitudes to the question of national security.

In this chapter it will be contended that, despite all the commotion, there were actually few important practical differences between the 1960 Treaty and the 1951 Treaty as it had actually been applied. The most significant developments in the revision crisis in fact took place long before the issue became one of public concern, when almost all factions and shades of opinion within the Liberal-Democratic Party, supported by the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Agency, combined to oppose Prime Minister Kishi's attempt to negotiate a genuine mutual defence treaty with the United States. The Prime Minister's subsequent efforts to negotiate a treaty significantly different to the 1951 arrangement, by bringing Okinawa and the Bonins into the sphere of common responsibility, were also frustrated by opposition from the
General opposition from the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Defence Agency was later to thwart the Government's attempt to have provisions for American intervention in time of internal strife completely removed from the new Treaty. Once these broad limits had been set, once the faction leaders and the bureaucracy had brought Kishi to understand that additional Japanese military responsibilities would not be tolerated, the entire question of revision became entangled in a major party factional struggle, the outcome of which had an important influence on the final shape of the new Treaty. These events occurred, first, because a treaty with wider Japanese responsibilities did not recommend itself either to the Liberal-Democratic Party or to the bureaucracy, second, because the nature of Japanese politics and, with it, the way decisions could be made, had changed fundamentally since the high noon of the Yoshida era in 1950-51. The age of one man rule had ended, the age of factional politics was already far advanced. The locus of decision making on major defence and foreign policy issues had shifted from the Prime Minister and a few trusted advisers to the powerful faction leaders in the ministerialist Party and, to a lesser extent, to the bureaucracy. This pattern continued to prevail throughout the 1960s.

A. The character of the 1960 Security Treaty and related arrangements

A cursory glance at the texts of the 1951 and 1960 Security Treaties suggests that the two agreements were very different in character. Certainly the new Treaty, like the old, was essentially a base lending agreement. The United States was granted facilities in Japanese territory for its land, sea and air forces which, as before, could be used both to 'contribute' to the defence of Japan and in pursuit of America's wider Far Eastern policies. Yet the 1960 Treaty had a definite time limit and could be abrogated by either party after ten years at twelve month's notice. There were no provisions for Japan to call on American military assistance to suppress domestic disorder. Moreover, Japan was given the unequivocal promise of American protection against attack that Dulles had refused to extend to Yoshida in 1951. Article V of the 1960 Treaty stated that:
Each Party recognises that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

This involved the United States in a formal commitment to Japan that differed little from the guarantees extended to her other Asian and Pacific allies. Conversely, it involved Japan in a formal commitment to contribute to the defence of American installations on her territory. An Agreed Minute initialled by Kishi and the United States Secretary of State Christian Herter implicitly excluded Okinawa and the Bonins from the area of mutual responsibility but established a basis for Japanese support for the 'welfare' of the islanders in the event of armed attack. The Kishi-Herter Exchanges of Notes recognised continued validity of the 1951 Yoshida-Acheson Notes on Japanese support for United Nations forces in Korea. However, nothing in the new Treaty required direct Japanese military support for South Korea or Japanese participation in regional security organisations.

Finally, Article IV of the new Treaty, the Kishi-Herter Exchanges of Notes and the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communiqué established various provisions for Japanese-American consultation, apparently giving Japan a degree of control over American dispositions, weapons and use of bases in Japan not enjoyed under the 1951 arrangement. According to Article IV of the new Treaty

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

In the Kishi-Herter Exchanges of Notes it was agreed that

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

Regarding this agreement, the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communiqué stated

In this connection the Prime Minister discussed with the President the question of prior consultation under the new treaty. The President assured him that the United States government has
no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government with respect to matters involving prior consultation under the treaty.

The ten year time limit and the new provisions governing abrogation of the Treaty were real and significant changes. Yet while the lack of hard evidence on contingency planning and the day to day operation of the Security Treaty makes definitive statements difficult, it is possible that the other three major changes - enunciation of the United States duty to protect Japan and of Japan's obligations to protect American bases on her territory, removal of clauses enabling Japan to call on Washington to suppress internal disorder and the various arrangements for Japanese-American consultation did not, in fact, represent genuine innovations.

It will be recalled that in Yoshida's view the size and importance of American military installations in Japan was in itself a sufficient guarantee of American protection. The former Prime Minister had been willing to sacrifice the security of a written assurance in order to avoid large scale rearmament and involvement in regional defence.16 At the same time the close links forged in the 1950s between the Self Defence Forces and United States forces in Japan, in particular the provisions of Article 24 of the 1952 Administrative Agreement and the ties between the Air Self Defence Force and the American Fifth Air Force under the 1959 Matsumae-Burns Agreement, made it virtually inevitable that Japan would give armed support to the United States in the event of an attack on American facilities in her territory.17 Article V of the new Treaty can thus be regarded as merely formalising arrangements already in existence.

While the growing strength of the Self Defence Forces made American military intervention to suppress 'large scale internal riots and disturbances' highly improbably, the 1960 Treaty, despite appearances to the contrary, did in fact leave a way open for such intervention. In the event of internal insurrection either Party could presumably have requested consultations under Article IV, raising the matter as a question affecting 'the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East'. The 'armed attack' of Article V was not necessarily armed attack from without. Government spokesmen usually claimed that the 'armed attack' mentioned in the new Treaty was the same as that referred to in the NATO Treaty. This was particularly
significant. On 7 May 1960 the Director of the Foreign Ministry
Treaties Bureau told the House of Representatives Security Treaty
Committee that while the NATO Treaty did not provide for joint military
action against 'ordinary [domestic] upheavals' it did go into force in
cases of 'revolutionary uprisings' and 'attacks by armed groups
instigated from outside.' If this represented the Government's official
interpretation, the new Treaty theoretically permitted exactly the same
kind of American military intervention under exactly the same circumstances
as provided in the old Treaty.18

The most problematical features of the 1960 Treaty and
its concomitant statements were the provisions for Japanese-American
consultation. As explained above, two kinds of consultation were
established. Article IV of the Treaty itself provided for periodic
consultation on the implementation of the agreement and, at times of
crisis, on questions affecting the security of Japan or the Far East.
The United States was not bound to follow Japanese recommendations in
either instance. In contrast, the Kishi-Herter Exchanges of Notes and
the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communiqué implicitly committed the United
States to obtaining Japan's prior consent for major changes in the
deployment of her forces into Japan, major changes in their equipment
and the use of Japanese bases for combat operations outside Japan. At
the same time, no prior consultations were necessary if these changes
or operations were undertaken to protect Japan herself, or American bases
in Japan, from external attack.

Since the provisions for prior consultations have never
been invoked,19 it is perhaps idle to speculate on what would happen
if they were. Certainly, it would seem difficult for the United States,
having entered into an agreement with Japan, to disregard its provisions
entirely. The fact that prior consultations are not guaranteed in the
Treaty, but in the Exchange of Notes, and that the American intention
not to act contrary to the wishes of Japan is merely enunciated in the
Joint Communiqué, perhaps has some legal significance.20 Yet the long
term effectiveness of treaties and alliances depends to a large extent
on the feelings of trust and mutual confidence entertained by the
parties involved. The Security Treaty with Japan was one of the lynchpins
of American Far Eastern strategy. Refusal to act according to the spirit
of its provisions might quickly make it cease to be so.
This said, a number of important points should be noted. First, despite the absence of consultations clauses in the 1951 Treaty, the firm stand of the Japanese Government, backed by public opinion, had, throughout the 1950s, deterred the United States from instituting certain major changes in the equipment of its forces stationed in Japan. In particular, America had been unable to introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. Since August 1957 a Japanese-American Committee on Security had existed to examine problems arising out of the Treaty, including the disposition of United States troops stationed in Japan and the use to which they were put. This Committee was composed of the same personnel (the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Director-General of the Defence Agency, the United States Ambassador to Japan and the American Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific), had the same authority and examined, as far as can be judged from the public record, essentially the same problems as the Security Consultative Committee established in the Kishi-Herter Exchanges of Notes on the basis of Article IV of the 1960 Treaty. On the basis of the limited evidence available, one is drawn to the conclusion that Japan's actual ability to influence the weapons and equipment of American forces in her territory was no greater in 1960, as a result of the new Treaty, than it had been under the 1951 arrangement.

Second, what of Japan's ability to influence American use of bases for combat operations outside Japan not directly related to Japanese security? Setting aside the difficult questions of whether, in an age of push-button warfare, meaningful prior consultations could always be arranged, and of whether the links between the United States Fifth Air Force and the Air Self Defence Forces might not, by chain reaction, involve Japan in conflicts begun in Korea or Okinawa, without prior consultations ever being invoked, two points should be noted.

First, as the former Ambassador to the United Kingdom (and previously to Australia) Nishi Haruhiko pointed out at the time

It is simply not possible for Japan to stand on the same power level and negotiate with the United States...it is easy to imagine situations where Japan would be obliged to follow the United States.
The chief reason for this was that Japan has no access to independent military intelligence with which it could counter [the contentions] of the United States side, and, putting aside all questions of forms and theories, what will in fact happen [at prior consultations] is that Japan will, in the end, perhaps reluctantly, defer to the views of the Americans.24

Second, the Japanese interpretation of the Treaty left numerous loopholes enabling the United States forces to take action outside Japan without prior consultations being invoked. During the Diet debates preceding ratification of the Treaty Government spokesmen made it clear that

(a) The 'United States armed forces' referred to in the Treaty and subject to prior consultations were 'those forces stationed in Japan, using Japanese bases and facilities'. They were thus distinct from 'forces stationed in Japan for short periods for other objectives, or forces passing through Japan'.25 It was thus theoretically possible for forces usually stationed in other areas to stopover briefly in Japan en route to military combat operations, without the right of prior consultations being invoked.

(b) The departure of American forces stationed in Japan to other areas, regardless of the size of the transfer, could not become a subject for prior consultations unless the forces were bound for an actual area of combat. On 4 May 1960 the Director of the Legislative Bureau explained that even this latter provision might be overcome by altering the posting of the forces prior to departure.

If, when the forces set out from Japan, they have been invested with the responsibility of engaging in military combat operations, they will become the objects of prior consultation, even if (for example) they refuel at Okinawa. However, if they change their posting to Okinawa or Taiwan, then leave, there is no need for Japan to say anything. After the military combat operations are over, these forces will be subject to prior consultations in another sense if they then change their posting once again to Japan.26

It is thus difficult to see what effect Japanese protestations could have had on a United States committed to certain objectives in Korea, the Taiwan Straits or South-East Asia, defined without reference to Japanese interests, and determined to pursue them to a logical conclusion. It was perhaps for these reasons that
Kusumi Tadao, Chairman of the Okinawa Base Problems Research Council (Kichi Mondai Kenkyū Kai) (see Chapter 6) and one of Prime Minister Satō’s closest private defence advisers, told the Nihon Keizai Shimbun in 1969 that

...if you read the Security Treaty carefully you will see that it does not say that all United States actions can be checked, even if prior consultations are held. Some people consider that prior consultations under the Security Treaty provides a check against involvement in war. However, the check is not provided by prior consultations. Rather, the Security Treaty itself provides the vital check preventing the Far East from being drawn into a great war.27

If the actual differences between the 1951 and 1960 Treaties were so small, why did the Kishi Government, at such enormous political cost, bother to raise the issue of revision in the first place? Perhaps the formalization of existing arrangements and understandings had some advantages. Probably the scale of opposition to the new Treaty was not foreseen. However, the thesis that will be advanced here is that the Treaty Kishi eventually signed in January 1960 was not the Treaty he had set out to negotiate in July 1958. Before the diplomacy of the 1960 Treaty can be examined in detail, it is necessary to discuss one aspect of Japanese politics that had a profound influence both on the shape of the Treaty and the course of the ensuing political and social crisis.

B. Factionalism in the Liberal-Democratic Party and its role in policy making28

The early appearance of factionalism in the Democratic (Progressive) Party and the erosion of Yoshida’s dominant position in the Liberal Party after 1952 have been mentioned in earlier chapters. The effects of this process on the 1954-56 defence laws have been examined in some detail (see Chapter 2). After the merger of the two Parties to form the Liberal-Democratic Party in November 1955, institutionalized factionalism emerged as one of the principal and most durable characteristics of Japanese Conservative politics. By the winter of 1956-57 it was evident that the Liberal-Democratic Party was dominated by no less than eight large factions made up of members of the House of Representatives organised around various prominent political personalities, the 'eight generals' of contemporary popular
journalism. These eight factions, led respectively by Ikeda Hayato, Ishibashi Tanzan, Ishii Mitsujirō, Kishi Nobusuke, Kōno Ichirō, Miki Takeo and Matsumura Kenzō, Ōno Bamboku and Satō Eisaku, had all grown directly out of the former Liberal and Democratic (Progressive) Parties. The Ikeda and Satō factions were the issue of the Yoshida faction, which had split in December 1956 on the question of Ishibashi Tanzan’s election as Party President. The Ōno, Ishibashi and Ishii (formerly Ogata) factions had all developed in the Liberal Party as Yoshida’s influence declined. The Kōno faction was essentially a coalition of Hatoyama’s followers and the Democratic (Progressive) Party factions formerly led by Miki Bukichi and Kitamura Tokutarō. The Kishi faction, too, was based in the Democratic (Progressive) Party, where it had absorbed the groups formerly led by Ashida Hitoshi and Ōasa Tadao. The Miki-Matsumura faction represented an amalgam of various conservative and radical elements of the Democratic (Progressive) Party (see tables 4:1 and 4:2).

These factions, with their own headquarters, their own sources of funds and connections with the business community, their own research committees and academic advisers, often their own publications, and with a membership that fluctuated according to the fortunes of the leader, functioned virtually as separate political parties, competing openly against each other in elections and engaging in prolonged and bitter struggles for the fruits of office in Party and Government. The ultimate goal was, of course, the Party Presidency and Prime Ministership. Since one faction alone could not hope to dominate the stage the result was a continually shifting pattern of transitory alliances and the division of the Liberal-Democratic Party into opposing camps, with the temporary ascendancy of one factional coalition challenged by a hostile alliance of other groups. At times the leader of the dominant coalition might be in a position to distribute Party and Government posts only to members of those factions that had supported his election. At other times he found it inconvenient to disregard the demands of some of the opposing groups. In either case, as far as actual policies were concerned, it was usually found impossible to ignore the views of the dissident coalition altogether.
Factionalism itself had roots deep in Japanese social psychology and its reappearance in the mid-1950s may perhaps be regarded as a return to traditional patterns of behaviour after the abnormal conditions created by the Occupation. At the level of practical politics, membership of a faction provided the individual Diet member with much needed electoral funds and with opportunities for advancement that might otherwise not have been available. Possession of a large faction gave its leader assured support in Party Presidential elections and a means to make his influence felt in the quotidian activities of government.

Generally speaking, factions were based on personalities rather than policies. Factional conflict should be seen as a contest for office rather than as a struggle to realise certain ideals. At the same time most factions, either through their leaders or because of strong internal pressure groups, tended to be associated with certain policies. Analysis of factional attitudes to revision of the Security Treaty must take these basic orientations into account.

As far as attitudes towards foreign and defence policies were concerned, the Kishi faction was identified with extreme anti-Communism, in particular hostility towards the Soviet Union, and a complex of attitudes towards the internal opposition faintly reminiscent of pre-war Japan. Indeed, none of Japan's post-war Prime Ministers had been so closely associated with the anti-Communism, ultra-nationalism and imperialist policies of the pre-war era so much as Kishi himself. As a student he had been a protégé of the intellectual super-patriot Uesugi Shinkichi, a keen reader of Kita'ikki and a member of the Gokoku Dōshi Kai, a right-wing organisation founded to combat the ideas of liberal and radical intellectuals. After graduation Kishi had entered the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and by 1936 was occupying one of the highest administrative positions in the Japanese Manchurian Empire. In October 1941 he entered the Tōjō Cabinet (his signature appeared on the declaration of war against the United States) where he occupied various portfolios until his resignation in 1944. In 1946 he was interned by the Occupation as a Class A War Criminal, re-entering politics only after his release from the purge in 1952. In the post-war period Kishi maintained ties with several rightist organisations, being a member of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League and an associate of the ultranationalist ideologue Kodama Yoshio (see Chapter 8).
The incorporation of Ashida Hitoshi and his followers into the Kishi faction in 1956 probably increased its anti-Communist, anti-Soviet colouring. Among Kishi's other political colleagues, Fukuda Takeo was also known as a hard line anti-Communist. The views of this group were, however, counter-balanced by the presence of more moderate elements in the faction, especially by Fujiyama Aiichirō, Akagi Munenori Kawashima Shōjirō and their followers.

Among the other factions the Ishii group was also regarded as extremely anti-Communist (Ishii Mitsujirō was, like Kishi, a member of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League) but the ebb and flow of Conservative factional struggles almost invariably placed Kishi and Ishii in opposing camps. (Ishii had unsuccessfully contested the 1956 Party Presidential Election against Kishi).

The Ōno faction, too, was sometimes associated with a hard line on Communism, largely because of the activities of such zealots as Funada Naka. Ōno's own tolerance, however, was probably a more than adequate counter-balance to these influences.

Ikeda and Satō were regarded as sharing Yoshida's views on defence and foreign policy, although later events suggested Satō was more prone to doctrinaire anti-Communism than Ikeda.

Kōno's group, on the other hand, later came to be identified with the view that while relations with the United States remained the keystone of Japan's defence and foreign policies, 'national interest' was also important and every effort should be made to cultivate relations with China and the Soviet Union. This despite the presence in the faction of extreme anti-Communist and defence conscious elements centering around Nakasone Yasuhiro. Kōno himself was noted for a rather naive and flamboyant nationalism but one suspects he was not above using high sounding slogans to advance his own factional interests in the narrowest sense. At the same time, Kōno's connections with the fishing industry, his absorption of the Hatoyama faction, which had a special interest in Japan-Soviet relations, and of Kitamura Tokutarō's group with its special interest in China, probably predisposed him to oppose confrontationist policies towards the Asian Communist powers.
Finally, the Miki-Matsumura faction and Ishibashi's group, while anxious to maintain the Security Treaty as a defensive alliance, were positively committed to improving relations with Peking as a first step to reducing international tension in the Far East.\footnote{41}


At the time of negotiating the Security Treaty in 1951 Dulles had made it clear that an unequivocal promise of American protection would only be extended if Japan committed herself to large scale rearmament. He had also expressed strong interest in Japanese participation in regional defence.\footnote{42} This would almost certainly have meant overseas service for Japanese military forces.

After the fall of the Yoshida Cabinet in December 1954 it became evident, first, that the United States had not abandoned interest in a regional defence organisation centered around Japan, second, that Washington was preparing to link Japanese participation in such a scheme with the question of Treaty revision. The United States perhaps imagined that with Yoshida's political demise the Japanese would be increasingly prepared to assume wider military commitments. In August 1955 Shigemitsu Mamoru, Foreign Minister in the new Hatoyama Government, went to Washington lamenting the 'imbalance' of the 1951 Treaty and expressing strong interest in revision.\footnote{43} The Joint Communiqué issued after his talks with Dulles suggested that Japan had promised not only to assume primary responsibility for her own defence, but also to undertake certain unspecified military commitments for 'the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific'. The Communiqué implicitly linked Japan's assumption of such responsibilities to revision of the 1951 Treaty, stating, in part, that 'when such conditions were brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality'.\footnote{44} That is to say, the United States considered a Treaty of 'greater mutuality' to be one by which Japan contributed to 'the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific'. After the Shigemitsu-Dulles talks, senior American State Department officials actually told the press that Japanese forces were now available for overseas service\footnote{45} and the story was prominently featured in the New York Times.\footnote{46}
This interpretation was firmly rejected by Shigemitsu himself and the Communiqué caused uproar in the Japanese Diet. Government spokesmen gave the press to understand that Prime Minister Hatoyama was opposed to overseas service. Subsequently, opposition to the kind of mutual defence treaty envisaged by the United States was expressed by the Cabinet, Foreign Ministry and Defence Agency. When the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee resumed its hearings on 14 September 1955 the Government explained that the Communiqué merely meant that Japan would contribute to the security of the Western Pacific by accepting increased responsibility for her own defence. The Committee then resolved unanimously that

In view of the fact that the Joint Communiqué published after the recent Japanese-American talks has invited misunderstanding, both at home and abroad, this Committee recognises once again the 2 June 1954 House of Councillors' resolution against the Self Defence Forces being sent abroad.

Nevertheless, the United States position had also been made clear and there is no evidence to suggest that it changed before Kishi's overtures on Security Treaty revision in 1957 and 1958.

D. Prime Minister Kishi and Security Treaty revision, February 1957 - August 1958

No new developments took place under the short-lived Ishibashi Cabinet established after Hatoyama's retirement in December 1956. Kishi, who succeeded Ishibashi as Prime Minister in February 1957 raised the question of Treaty revision during his first visit to Washington in June. President Eisenhower and Dulles refused to countenance immediate revision but agreed to set up the important Japanese-American Committee on Security mentioned earlier in this chapter. In July 1958, however, shortly after the establishment of the second Kishi Cabinet, the United States agreed to further Japanese requests to renegotiate the 1951 Treaty.

The evidence is as yet far from clear but there are indications that what, in fact, happened in July 1958 was not, as most Japanese writers have supposed, that the United States changed its previous position on Treaty revision, but that Kishi, in an astonishing reversal of all previous Japanese policy since 1951, offered to conclude a full mutual defence treaty on Washington's own terms. On 9 July,
Kishi's new Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō met the American Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II (General MacArthur's nephew) and broached the subject of revision. On 19 July, Kishi and Fujiyama again discussed the matter with MacArthur, who suggested three ways in which revision might take place. A revised Treaty could take the form of a simple base lending agreement, it could be a mere verbal reorganisation of the old arrangement, or Japan and the United States could conclude a full mutual defence treaty. On 25 July, Kishi and Fujiyama again met MacArthur and the Prime Minister, allegedly acting against the advice of the Foreign Ministry, told the Ambassador that he wanted to conclude a full mutual defence treaty. Unless, unknown to the general public, the United States concept of a mutual defence treaty had changed since the Shigemitsu-Dulles talks of 1955, this presumably meant that the Prime Minister wanted an arrangement whereby Japan would 'be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific'.

On 29 August, Fujiyama again met MacArthur and basic agreement was reached on the character of the new Treaty and the procedures to be followed in the negotiations. The intention of both parties to embark on a renegotiation of the 1951 Treaty was first made public on 11 September 1958, after Fujiyama, visiting the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly, conferred with Secretary of State Dulles. Kishi's interest in active Japanese participation in an anti-Communist mutual defence treaty with the United States flowed naturally from his ideological position and background. His decision to begin laying the groundwork in July 1958 was probably influenced by two factors. First, election results since the end of the Occupation had shown a gradual erosion of support for the Conservatives and an equally gradual increase in the strength of the Socialists. The May 1958 elections, however, appeared to have stabilised the situation. The Liberal-Democrats won a total of 287 seats in the House of Representatives, only three less than the number they had held before dissolution. The Socialists gained only eight new seats, bringing their total to 166. Of the 12 Independent members elected, 10 were associated with the Liberal-Democrats and only two with the Socialists. The trend away from the Conservatives had not been reversed but it had lost momentum. Newspapers in the United States and Great Britain optimistically predicted the
beginning of an era of 'stable government' in Japan. Second, the election appeared to have strengthened the factional coalition supporting Kishi's rule and the Prime Minister felt confident enough to exclude the dissident elements almost completely from Cabinet and Party posts. The Ishibashi Cabinet, in which Kishi had served as Foreign Minister, had been based on a coalition of the Ikeda, Ishibashi, Ishii and Miki factions, Kishi, Kōno, Ōno and Satō forming the dissident group. Kishi's accession to the Prime Ministership had, of course, meant that the roles of the dominant and dissident factions were reversed. Nevertheless, Kishi's first Cabinet had been to a large extent inherited from Ishibashi and the Prime Minister had not always been in a position to impose his views. After the 1958 election the situation changed radically. The second Kishi Cabinet, details of which were announced on 12 June, was overwhelmingly dominated by the factions supporting the Prime Minister, in particular by the Kishi and Satō factions. Only three representatives from dissident and neutral factions were included. Ikeda was present as Minister without portfolio, Miki was appointed Director of the Economic Planning Agency, Nadao Hiroyoshi (from the now neutral Ishii faction) became Minister for Education. Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Construction and Transport all went to members of the Kishi faction. Satō's supporters were installed in the Ministries of Finance and of Justice. One member of the Kōno faction and one of Ōno's supporters also received Cabinet posts. Ishibashi and his supporters were totally excluded. Kishi's distribution of posts in the Liberal-Democratic Party followed a similar pattern. The Prime Minister's success in installing his supporters in vital Cabinet and Party posts doubtless convinced him that opposition to his policies would be ineffectual.

E. The reactions of the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Bureaucracy to Kishi's démarche

If Kishi imagined that electoral trends and his redistribution of Party and Cabinet posts had opened a new era of 'one man rule', giving him a virtual carte blanche in defence and foreign policy matters, he was gravely mistaken. His efforts to negotiate a genuine mutual defence treaty with the United States provoked two successive waves of reaction within the Liberal-Democratic Party. From early September 1958 until the end of November almost all factions
in the Party, both dominant and dissident, supported by the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Agency, exerted intense pressure through a variety of channels to persuade the Prime Minister to abandon his project. Towards the end of November, with the success of these efforts, interest turned to the details of the proposed new Treaty. This provided a fertile field for factional manoeuvre and intrigue. The character of the extremely complicated struggle that ensued had significant effects on the character of the Treaty that eventually emerged. The result of this process, together with the stand taken by the United States once it became evident that the desired mutual defence treaty could not be negotiated, was that the two parties were forced to conclude a treaty that differed, in fact, little from the 1951 arrangement. One of the few points of agreement was that the new Treaty should be of ten years duration and even here factional wrangling at one stage threatened to delay the negotiations indefinitely.

On 4 September 1958, the day of Fujiyama's departure for Washington for preliminary discussions with the United States, a group of 22 Liberal-Democratic Party Dietmen from the dissident factions gathered at the Grand Hotel in Suidamachi and established a Diplomatic Problems Research Council (Gaikō Mondai Kenkyū Kai). The sponsors of the Council at once declared themselves hostile to Kishi's plans for Treaty revision. The Council's first general meeting, attended by representatives of the Ishii, Miki-Matsumura, Ikeda and Ishibashi factions and also, surprisingly, by Ashida Hitoshi, was held two weeks later, after the contents of Fujiyama's talks with Dulles had become known through the press and other channels. There was opposition to a mutual defence treaty with increased Japanese military responsibilities and a general note of caution on revision of the 1951 arrangement.

Alarm over Kishi's projected mutual defence treaty was not confined to the dissident factions. On 2 September, two days before Fujiyama left for the United States, the Foreign Affairs Research Council (Gaikō Chōsa Kai), a formal organ of the Party's Policy Affairs Research Council and strongly under the influence of the dominant factions, announced that while 'ideally' the 1951 Treaty should be revised, as 'an actual question' the time was 'not yet ripe for revision'. It would be 'inappropriate' for Fujiyama to raise the matter during his
talks with Dulles and other American officials. The main source of anxiety appears to have been the possibility of involvement in wider defence commitments at a time when Sino-American tensions were increasing because of the offshore islands crisis. As far as this was concerned, the Council recommended that American views should be 'listened to' but that a 'cautious approach should be adopted'.

At another meeting on 18 September the Council closely questioned the Director of the Foreign Ministry's North American Bureau Mr Tanaka. Tanaka also adopted a 'cautious' attitude towards Treaty revision and the Council, while declaring its support for 'rationalization' of certain features of the 1951 agreement, endorsed his stand. Alarm at the possibility of overseas service for Japanese troops was also expressed at this meeting. On 24 September the Foreign Affairs Research Council, after hearing the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council General Hayashi Keizō, again drew attention to its 'reservations' on Treaty revision. What General Hayashi said at this meeting has not been revealed. Yet since the Defence Agency was later reluctant to include Okinawa and the Bonins in the area of the new Treaty, on the grounds that Japanese military strength was insufficient to undertake additional burdens, it is likely that he opposed Kishi's plan for a mutual defence treaty.

After Fujiyama's return from Washington some attempt was made to win over Party opinion. On 30 September, Kishi and Fujiyama discussed their plans with Matsumura Kenzō and on 2 October the two leaders conferred with Ashida and Ishii. On the afternoon of 2 October, Fujiyama addressed the Foreign Affairs Research Council and the Diplomatic Section of the Policy Affairs Research Council. These efforts apparently met with little success. A few days later, on 7 October, a meeting of Liberal-Democratic Party Dietmen of both Houses, while expressing 'understanding' of Kishi's efforts to have the Treaty revised, resolved that the final form of the new Treaty would have to be recognized by themselves. It was noted that at this meeting the Foreign Minister did not stand up well to close questioning about the character of the proposed Treaty. When Kawasaki Hideji asked Fujiyama specifically whether revision would lead to dispatch of the Self Defence Forces overseas, Fujiyama apparently avoided a direct reply, declaring
merely that the new Treaty would 'tend to strengthen Japanese-American ties even further'.

The strength of the opposition within the Liberal-Democratic Party seems to have made Kishi reconsider his stand. On 22 October, when Fujiyama again met Ambassador MacArthur to discuss details of the proposed new Treaty, MacArthur, who had doubtless prepared for the interview on the basis of impressions formed at the earlier talks, requested that the arrangement be made applicable to the entire Western Pacific region, as far south as Guam. Fujiyama declined to consider this proposal and, stressing the limits placed upon Japan by the Constitution, expressed a desire for a smaller area of joint responsibility. Shortly afterwards Kishi, too, declared himself opposed to a mutual security treaty covering the Western Pacific. The Prime Minister's original scheme thus collapsed and the idea of a joint mutual defence treaty with new and wide-ranging Japanese military responsibilities was not raised again during the course of the negotiations.

While the Prime Minister had thus been forced to abandon his original idea of a Western Pacific mutual defence treaty, he still appeared interested in including Okinawa and the Bonins within the sphere of joint responsibility. On 23 October he told the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee that 'constitutionally' there would be no objection to joint Japanese-American defence of Okinawa. Indeed, Japanese military responsibilities in the islands under a new treaty 'should be interpreted as a partial restoration of administrative rights'.

These remarks provoked strong reactions from the Defence Agency and the dissident groups in the Liberal-Democratic Party. On 31 October the Director General of the Defence Agency told the press that the Agency was 'not enthusiastic' about inclusion of the islands. Japan's existing defence capability was inadequate even for the defence of the homeland. Responsibilities extending beyond the four main islands would lead to greater military expenditure and the necessary funds did not seem to be available. Moreover, since United States treaties with Taiwan and South Korea also referred to the defence of Okinawa, incorporation of the islands into a new Japanese-American security treaty would be tantamount to the establishment of a NEATO alliance. Within the Liberal-Democratic Party Miki, Matsumura and Ishibashi, predictably,
opposed inclusion of the islands on the grounds that confrontation with
China and the Soviet Union was undesirable. Opponents of including
Okinawa and the Bonins strengthened their hand when former Prime
Minister Yoshida told Fujiyama on 8 December that his own attitude to
revision was 'cautious'. (He later told the American historian
Packard that he had opposed revision of the Treaty from the beginning). Yoshida declared that instead of pressing ahead with the revision issue
the Government should devote itself to strengthening Party unity.

Kishi's original position was thus rapidly eroded. By 3
December, within a week of his initial pronouncement, he and Fujiyama
had agreed that it would be prudent to exclude Okinawa and the Bonins
from the area of mutual responsibility.

No sooner had this decision been made than Köno, whose
relations with Kishi had become strained during the intraparty factional
struggle touched off by the Police Duties Performance Bill, (which
had reached a climax in November), announced that Okinawa and the Bonins
should be included in the Treaty area. He later stressed, however,
that Japan should have no actual obligation to defend the islands
until full administrative rights had been returned. There was thus
little practical difference between Köno's position and that groups
opposed to inclusion of the islands. As the Chief Cabinet Secretary
Mr Fukuda told a Nagoya audience on 1 February, 'no one' in the Party
considered Japan should actually be responsible for the defence of
Okinawa. The problem was merely one of 'expression'.

Nevertheless, Köno's stand had important consequences.
The Police Duties Enforcement Bill controversy had weakened Kishi's
control over the Party. With the resignation of the three Cabinet
members from the dissident and neutral factions (Ikeda, Miki and Nadao
[Ishii faction]) in the autumn of 1958 the internal cohesion of the
Liberal-Democratic Party became precarious. Köno had been critical
of Kishi during the November crisis and had acted with considerable
independence. Yet he had not broken with the dominant coalition and
his supporters continued to occupy their posts in the Party and Cabinet.
The gravitation of the Ishii faction from a position of neutrality to
one of opposition made Kishi more heavily dependent on Köno's support
and the Prime Minister found himself obliged to consult closely with
Kōno before the January 1959 Party Presidential Election. After his re-election for a second term (the substantial vote obtained by the dissident candidate Matsumura Kenzō showed how delicate the Prime Minister's position was) Kishi continued to rely on Kōno. This made it difficult to disregard entirely Kōno's views on Okinawa and the Bonins. With the approach of the House of Councillors election in May, Fujiyama's statements on the Treaty area became more and more equivocal, then moved ambiguously towards the Kōno position. The draft Treaty drawn up by Fujiyama and approved by Cabinet on 9 April stated vaguely that the new arrangement would be applicable to 'all Japanese territory' (Nihon zen ryōchi). It was on the basis of this draft, and the understanding of Party opinion gained in the process of compiling it, that negotiations with the Americans were reopened. Fujiyama and Ambassador MacArthur discussed the area to be covered by the new Treaty at the second meeting in this series of talks (23 April 1959). Basic agreement on the text of the new Treaty seems to have been reached by the end of May, just before the House of Councillors election. During the course of the negotiations it was decided to limit the Treaty specifically to 'territories under the administration of Japan' (in accordance with majority opinion in the Party) but to exchange notes clarifying that Okinawa and the Bonins were Japanese territory and would be incorporated into the Treaty after the return of administrative rights. This formula, almost certainly adopted to satisfy Kōno and reflecting the factional balance in the Liberal-Democratic Party between the Police Duties Enforcement Bill crisis and the 1959 House of Councillors election, was eventually adopted in the Treaty signed in January 1960.

Pressure from Kōno, supported by some of the dissident factions, also forced the Government during this period to request partial renegotiation of the 1952 Administrative Agreement, a step which the Kishi Administration had not at first contemplated and which the Americans were extremely reluctant to take.

On the other hand there was an almost universal disinclination in the Liberal-Democratic Party and Defence Agency to have the 'large scale internal riots and disturbances' clause removed from the new Treaty. Kishi's original plan for a mutual defence treaty would presumably have eliminated provisions for American intervention
in Japan's internal affairs. The United States had apparently told Fujiyama that it would have no objection to removing the clause. The draft Treaty shown by Fujiyama to Kishi, Fukuda and Akagi on 18 February 1959 contained no such provisions. Doubts on removing the 'internal riots' clause were first openly expressed at a combined meeting of the Foreign Affairs Research Council and the Diplomatic and Defence Sections of the Policy Affairs Research Council on 19 February, the day after Fujiyama released his draft. Then on 21 February the Director General of the Defence Agency called on Fujiyama and strongly urged that provisions permitting Japan to request American military assistance in cases of 'large scale indirect aggression supported by a foreign power' be included in the new Treaty. Fujiyama was non-committal about leaving the provisions in writing but agreed that even if the old clause were eliminated some avenue for obtaining American assistance should be left open. On 3 April the Liberal-Democratic Party Executive Council also expressed strong opposition to plans to eliminate the clause. Kozawa Sadōki, Funada Naka, Hamada Yukio, Yamamoto Katsuichi, Kimura Batarō and Tomabechi Hideyuki, many of them stalwarts of the dominant factional alliance, all argued that removal of the clause was 'premature' since it was difficult to draw a sharp distinction between 'insurrection', 'indirect aggression' and 'direct aggression'. The day before, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Research Council and the Diplomatic and Defence Sections of the Policy Affairs Research Council had agreed that while simple 'insurrection' might be dealt with by the Self Defence Forces, Japan would have no alternative but request help from the United States in cases of 'indirect aggression'. Thus, unlike Fujiyama's 18 February draft, the Treaty proposals drawn up by the Foreign Minister and shown to Party leaders on 3 April, apparently envisaged retention of provisions for American assistance in cases of riot and insurrection. This draft was approved by the Party 'Leaders Meeting' and 'Advisers Meeting' on 8 April. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the text of the 1960 Treaty can be interpreted as permitting Japan to appeal for American assistance in time of internal crisis.

After the May 1959 House of Councillors election, a number of factors conspired to frustrate further attempts to influence the shape of the new Treaty. First, Fujiyama and MacArthur had reached substantial agreement on the provisions of the Treaty just before the
election. For any factional confederation or individual faction leader to have forced major alterations after June 1959 would have necessitated substantial renegotiation. The United States may have been disinclined to take such a step and the Japanese Government would certainly have been reluctant to propose it. Second, after the House of Councillors election, factional alignments within the Liberal-Democratic Party underwent radical modification. Kishi, in an apparent effort to reorganise the dominant coalition and replace the truculent and unpredictable Kōno with a more amenable ally, refused to accede to Kōno's request for the Party Secretary Generalship. Kōno consequently withdrew from the dominant alliance and joined the neutral and dissident factions. In place of Kōno, Kishi brought Ikeda into the Cabinet (as Minister for International Trade and Industry) and appointed Ishii as Chairman of the Executive Council. Ikeda's opposition to the Government temporarily subsided with his appointment to the Cabinet and Kōno's ability to exert direct pressure was for the time being circumscribed. Third, after the election Kishi began to take an increasingly firm stand on the revision issue. An extremely hostile attitude was adopted to any form of opposition. National wide opposition to the new Treaty, led by the Socialist and Communist Parties, began to take shape in the summer of 1959. To counter this the Liberal-Democratic Party embarked on a massive public relations campaign. Once the battle to convince the nation of the wisdom of the Government's policies had begun, many faction leaders hitherto sceptical of these policies rallied to the cause. By September Kishi was declaring that all opposition to the new Treaty had been inspired by the sinister forces of international Communism and that even the dissident groups in the ministerialist Party were being 'used' by China and the Soviet Union. Personalities like Nomura Kichisaburō, who had earlier been critical of the new Treaty, were now urging that, if necessary, it be forced through the Diet, regardless of the opposition. At the same time the factions that had opposed the Treaty from the beginning became increasingly subdued. They realised the Government was determined to go ahead with its plans and decided to withdraw and await developments.

After the election, Kōno began a desultory campaign to ensure that American rights under the 'Far Eastern clause' of the new Treaty were also accompanied by a Japanese right of veto on a case by case basis. He also asserted that the proposed ten year limit was
'too long', advocating 'flexibility' so that Japan could abandon or renegotiate parts of the Treaty at will, 'in accordance with the international situation'.

Whether Kōno had been aware of the dangers of the Far Eastern clause, or the disadvantages of a ten year time limit, before his failure to obtain the Party Secretary Generalship in May, is uncertain. Yet however this may be, the new circumstances frustrated his efforts to initiate further changes. Kishi eventually gave Kōno to understand that something might be done about the time limit. After his return from the United States on 4 October Fujiyama also expressed a willingness to consider this matter. He declined to be specific about a Japanese right of veto. Yet Kōno himself gradually lost interest in the question, perhaps because he realised his opposition was becoming less and less effective. Complicated negotiations dragged on throughout October, but in the end no conclusion was reached. The final report of the Security Treaty Revision Subcommittee (Ampo Jöyaku Kaitei Sho Iinkai) set up by the Party to investigate Kōno's proposals was vague about the meaning of 'prior consultations' and, while stating that the time limit of the Treaty would be ten years, merely referred to a 'strong request' in 'some quarters' for greater flexibility.

This report was accepted by the Liberal-Democratic Party Executive Board on 21 October and approved by a meeting of Diet members of both Houses on 26 October. Kōno's last efforts to influence the shape of the Treaty thus ended in failure.

F. Public reaction to the new Treaty

Japan's organised business community, viewing the Security Treaty not only as the chief pillar of the nation's defence policy, but also in the broader context of political and economic relations with the United States, initially gave strong public support to the Government's plans for revision. To what extent business leaders were aware of Kishi's original project, how far they influenced the groundswell of opposition in the Liberal-Democratic Party and bureaucracy that eventually frustrated the Prime Minister's plans, remain unknown. However, with the growth of large scale popular opposition to the new Treaty in 1959-60, financial circles became increasingly divided in their views. There was no questioning the necessity of the Treaty. Yet in many quarters there
were grave doubts about Kishi's methods, especially his apparent contempt for the Opposition and the forcing of the Treaty through the Diet. Once it became apparent that the continued existence of the Kishi Administration was endangering stable Conservative government, financial circles channelled support away from the Prime Minister and urged his resignation.\textsuperscript{113} The attitude of organised business probably played a decisive part in Kishi's overthrow and the subsequent disintegration of the Kishi faction.\textsuperscript{114} However, in view of the host of other factors involved, it would be difficult to prove this conclusively.

The virtual mobilisation of the intellectual world against the new Treaty in 1959-60 and the character of the debate that ensued have been described by other writers.\textsuperscript{115} For almost a year before Kishi's visit to Washington in January 1960, and for many months afterwards, a seemingly endless stream of books, pamphlets, articles and manifestos denouncing the new agreement poured from printing presses across the nation. Only a handful of intellectuals were prepared to publically support the Government and argue in favour of the new Treaty. There was a general belief that the Treaty would mean closer involvement in American Far Eastern strategy, large scale rearmament, and, ultimately, overseas service for the Self Defence Forces. Japan would be forced into closer co-operation with the Chiang Kai Shek régime, South Korea and America's other client states in the Far East. She would be prevented from opening a meaningful dialogue with China and the Soviet Union. As in 1950-51, it was argued that Japan could best preserve her own security and make her contribution to world peace by forming a neutral bridge between East and West. Once again, neutrality, peaceful co-existence and disarmament were the slogans of the day. This was, of course, only a natural development of the situation that had existed in 1950-51, at the time of the first Security Treaty. Indeed, while there were many new faces, some of the principal luminaries in the 1960 debate had also been active in the earlier controversy.\textsuperscript{116}

Public opinion remained deeply divided on the question of security and Japan's relations with the United States. It could certainly not be claimed that the Government had a popular mandate to revise the Treaty, or that it had been forced to do so by public opinion.
While polls showed much popular confusion about the issues involved in revision, it was clear that the Treaty itself did not have overwhelming popular support. As in 1950-51, one large minority supported the alliance with the United States, another substantial minority opposed it and advocated some kind of neutralism. There was evidence in some quarters, however, of the strong swing towards neutralism that was to be a feature of many polls taken in the 1960s. (see table 4.3).

The 1960 Security Treaty crisis confirmed in a more dramatic fashion and on a more grandiose stage, the lessons of the 1951 Dulles-Yoshida talks. The Japanese Conservative Government and the Japanese public were fundamentally opposed to participation in regional defence. The Government was determined to maintain the Security Treaty. The public was deeply divided. Yet both the Government and the public were united in their opposition to any arrangement involving the dispatch of Japanese forces overseas. Supporters of the Security Treaty were grateful for American protection. Yet there was little desire to provoke America's opponents unnecessarily. In 1951 Yoshida had told Dulles that to accede to American demands on security and rearmament would lead to the collapse of his Government and his own assassination. The fall of Kishi in June 1960 demonstrated the soundness of Yoshida's judgement.
The 1960s saw the most profound changes in the pattern of international relations since the end of the Second World War. After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union moved, first towards an uneasy détente, then towards increasing co-operation in a number of fields. Ironically, it was just at this time that the Sino-Soviet split, Franco-American estrangement and the emergence of France and China as nuclear powers heralded the dissolution of the Cold War alliances, the formation of a new, multi-polar world order. Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, American interest shifted increasingly to the Far East. Sino-American tension emerged as the most salient feature of the international scene. In May 1961 Vice President Johnson urged Kennedy to 'consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defence of their freedom'. This concept appealed strongly to the new President. In June, Kennedy told General de Gaulle of plans to intervene directly in South-East Asia, to build a bulwark against China's expanding influence. Installation of Mace-B missiles on Okinawa in March 1961 had already brought the greater part of eastern and central China within the range of American nuclear strike power. After the Sino-Indian border clashes and the Chinese nuclear test, 'containment of China' became an official policy. Elaborate strategies were drawn up to counter the Chinese menace. From March 1964, B-52 strategic bombers were stationed on Guam. After the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, American Polaris submarines appeared in the Pacific. This was followed by the attachment of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Seventh Fleet and the strengthening of air bases in Taiwan and Thailand. Finally, in 1965, the United States intervened directly in the Vietnamese civil war, setting off a chain of events that was to produce even greater changes in the pattern of world politics.

Post-war Japanese Governments had hitherto viewed the Soviet Union, not China, as the chief threat to their security. Indeed, throughout the 1960s, as in the 1950s, the Ground Self Defence Forces were disposed to counter a Soviet attack from Sakhalin, not a Chinese
thrust across the Yellow Sea (see Chapter 8). Within the Conservative camp there were powerful factions actively interested in improving relations with Peking. Opponents of this policy had been characterized, on the whole, either by ideological anti-Communism, acute sensitivity to the possible reactions of the United States, or a belief that backward nations like China were unsuitable associates for Japan on the international stage.

The new direction of American policy thus caused considerable confusion. In the West, it was speculated that China's emergence as a nuclear power would radically alter traditional Japanese attitudes. The fact that Sino-Japanese relations, despite American discouragement, gradually improved up till about the time of the first Chinese nuclear test, then rapidly deteriorated, seemed to confirm these predictions.

In the present chapter, it will be argued that the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations after 1964-65, Japan's subsequent closer alignment with the United States and the rapprochement with South Korea, were largely uninfluenced by China's nuclear weapons. Neither the Japanese Government nor any major group in the Liberal-Democratic Party, viewed the Chinese nuclear program as a threat to Japan's security. The crucial factors behind the changing emphasis of Japanese foreign policy were the ebb and flow of factional politics in the Liberal-Democratic Party and direct pressure from the United States and her Asian allies, especially Taiwan. From Kishi's fall in the summer of 1960 until Ikeda's retirement in the autumn of 1964 the dominant factional coalition was one which enabled groups traditionally interested in improving relations with China, or in a more independent foreign policy, to exert considerable influence. Increased Sino-American tension, the Chinese nuclear test and the beginning of the Vietnam War happened, quite fortuitously, to coincide with a major shift in the factional balance. This factional upheaval, while not itself a reaction to the changing international environment, weakened the position of groups interested in promoting relations with Peking. The influence of pro-Peking elements was further undermined by the sudden deaths of several important faction leaders in 1964-65. Yet the changes that flowed from these developments were not as far reaching as Washington might have desired. First, events conspired to ensure that the Satō Administration was not based exclusively on the right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party. Second,
while the anti-Peking forces were prepared, as occasion demanded, to proclaim the existence of a Chinese threat, there was no interest in Japanese participation in regional defence. The traditional policy against overseas involvement remained unchanged. Third, with the intensification of the Vietnam War, anxiety about the direction of American policy mounted, even in the more conservative factions of the Liberal-Democratic Party. There was also a rallying of groups interested in improving ties with the Peoples' Republic. By the end of 1966 the Liberal-Democratic Party was effectively polarized on foreign policy and defence issues.

There was little fear of Chinese nuclear weapons among Japanese strategic studies experts. On the other hand, the Vietnam War caused an erosion of sympathy for the United States even in the more conservative sections of the academic world. The upheavals of the 1960s also had a profound impact on public opinion.


The fall of Kishi and Ikeda's accession as Prime Minister in June 1960 led to the formation of a weak government, whose main task was to repair the damage done by the 1960 upheaval. After the 1960 General Elections, from which the Conservatives emerged better than expected, Ikeda attempted to promote political stability through formation of an 'all faction Cabinet'. In the reorganized Cabinet announced on 7 December 1960, four posts were occupied by members of Ikeda's own faction, two each by followers of Kishi, Satō and Fujiyama. The Miki-Matsumura faction and various neutral groups obtained one post each. Members of the House of Councillors were given another three portfolios. This arrangement was necessary to harmonize purely factional interests. Yet it also represented an approximate balance between the groups favouring closer ties with the United States and elements opposed to an exclusively anti-Communist foreign policy.

The reorganization of the Cabinet in July 1961 preserved this factional balance. However, by the winter of 1961–62, several developments had marginally strengthened the position of groups advocating contacts with the Communist camp. Ikeda himself was not hostile to Communism. Moreover, the Kishi faction split and went into
rapid decline. Two of its derivative groups, the Fujiyama and Kawashima factions, gradually dissociated themselves from the extreme anti-Communism of their former leader. Later years were to see Fujiyama and, to a lesser extent, Kawashima, in the vanguard of efforts to improve relations with Peking. The other offshoot of the Kishi faction, that led by Fukuda, remained a bastion of Cold War ideology.\textsuperscript{10} After 1960 the right wing Ishii faction also entered a period of attrition, stagnation and decline.\textsuperscript{11} These developments offset the break-up of the Ishibashi faction, which began to occur about the same time.\textsuperscript{12} In contrast, the Kōno and Satō factions grew rapidly after 1960. Kōno, like his spiritual father Hatoyama, liked to think of himself as a 'nationalist'.\textsuperscript{13} He urged a Japanese foreign policy based on 'national interests'. Japanese national interests, according to Kōno, demanded firm adherence to the Security Treaty. Neutrality was 'unrealistic'. Yet confrontation with the Communist block was also unrealistic. Kōno professed to look on Communism with an indulgent eye, advocating increased trade and other contacts with the world behind the iron and bamboo curtains.\textsuperscript{14} Satō, on the other hand, identified himself with former Prime Minister Yoshida's attitude of aloofness towards the Communist world and general support for American policies in Asia. Unlike Yoshida, he also showed a strong interest in Constitutional revision and rearmament.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1961 tension gradually developed between the Satō and Kōno factions. This was to some extent a result of policy differences, partly a continuation of the old Yoshida-Hatoyama rivalry. It was widely believed that Yoshida, who had by now assumed the position of the Party 'elder statesman', hoped to establish Satō as Ikeda's successor.\textsuperscript{16} The appointment of Satō as Deputy Prime Minister during Ikeda's 1961 Asian tour was particularly galling to the other faction leaders.\textsuperscript{17} By the end of the year it was apparent that Kōno, Ōno, Fujiyama and Kawashima were attempting to organize anti-Satō coalition to frustrate Yoshida's plans.\textsuperscript{18} In retaliation a group centering around the Kishi, Fukuda and Satō factions established a 'League for the Uplifting of Party Morale' (Tōfū Sasshin Renmei), ostensibly for the purpose of combatting factionalism, in reality as a move to isolate Kōno. The new League was also critical of Ikeda, accusing the Prime Minister of excessive reliance on Kōno.\textsuperscript{19} These criticisms were increasingly echoed by Satō himself.\textsuperscript{20}
Early in July 1962, the ultra-conservative Soshinkai requested Ikeda to crush 'neutralist' views in the Party and establish his Government on firm anti-Communist principles. Ikeda, anxious to avoid alienating Satō yet not wanting to precipitate a conflict with the anti-Satō group, adopted a non-committal attitude. The polarization of the Party continued through the spring and summer of 1962, with Ikeda striving to maintain his 'all faction structure' and preserve a precarious balance between the two camps.

The crisis came with Ikeda's Cabinet reorganization in July 1962. Satō, accusing Köno of policies favourable to China and the Soviet Union, refused to participate unless his rival were excluded. Fukuda, Ishii, Miki and Fujiyama, either because of hostility to Ikeda's policies, opposition to Köno or in the hope of securing more bountiful rewards for their eventual support, also declined direct association with the new Cabinet. Satō's lieutenant Tanaka Kakuei was eventually installed as Minister for Finance. One of Ishii's supporters was appointed Minister for Justice. Representatives of the Miki and Fujiyama factions were installed in the Defence Agency and in Transport. By and large, however, the dissident factions received only minor Cabinet and Party posts. For support, Ikeda relied on his own faction, on Köno, Ōno and, to a lesser extent, on Kawashima. Ikeda's close associates Ōhira Masayoshi and Miyazawa Kiichi who, like the Prime Minister, had never been associated with crusading anti-Communism, were appointed Foreign Minister and Director of the Economic Planning Agency. Fukuda Hajime (Ōno faction), who later revealed strong interest in Sino-Japanese trade, was appointed Minister for International Trade and Industry. Ōno's supporters took two other Cabinet posts. Köno and his followers also installed themselves in two. Kawashima retained his previous position as Director of the Administrative Management Agency. That is to say, despite its weak position and the existence of powerful restraining influences, the new Cabinet was dominated by elements generally favourable to promoting better relations with the Communist block.


Although Yoshida had shown little interest in improving ties with China, Hatoyama and Ishibashi had both made efforts at least to promote Sino-Japanese trade. Trade between the two countries, although
relatively small in volume, steadily expanded until its sudden disruption after the Nagasaki flag incident in 1958, shortly after Kishi's accession to office.\textsuperscript{24} Kishi's retirement in June 1960 was followed by an immediate improvement in Sino-Japanese economic relations. By 1961 Japanese exports to the Peoples' Republic had reached U.S. $17 million, her imports from China had risen to US $31 million.\textsuperscript{25} This was only half the volume of trade with the Chiang Kai Shek régime and a mere fraction of Japan's vast trade with the United States. Nevertheless the potential for expansion was thought, in some quarters, to be great. Pressure for increased trade and other contacts continued to grow. At the same time, despite American revelations of the Chinese nuclear program, there was little belief that China posed a military, political or economic threat to Japan.

The dominant view at the conference of Japanese Ambassadors in Asia and the Pacific held in May 1962 was that the Chinese economic situation was serious and China's influence had reached its limits.\textsuperscript{26}

Two months later a detailed report on the situation in China prepared by the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet Research Room was submitted to the Government. This report laid heavy emphasis on evidence of China's internal difficulties. It was also predicted that Sino-Soviet tension, based on historical, geographical and strategic rather than ideological factors, would increase. China was seen to fear creation of a NEATO-alliance and was expected to make overtures to neutral countries in South-East Asia.\textsuperscript{27} The possibility of a Chinese threat to Japan does not seem to have been discussed in this report. However, a situation analysis prepared by the Defence Agency in June 1961, while predicting increased Sino-Soviet friction, concluded that 'the possibility of direct military aggression against Japan is practically unthinkable' (hotondo kangaarrarenai).\textsuperscript{28} In January 1963, four months after Japanese-American discussions of the Chinese nuclear program at the Security Consultative Committee meeting in August 1962,\textsuperscript{29} another Defence Agency report dwelt at length on China's difficult domestic situation, alleging erosion of popular support for the régime and needless dissipation of military strength along the Sino-Indian border. There was said to be mounting pressure for revolution within China itself.\textsuperscript{30} All this presumably meant that China was, in the view of the Defence Agency, incapable of posing a military threat to Japan.

It is difficult to say how far these predictions of China's imminent collapse were believed by the Ikeda Government. Reports of China's political instability and military impotence, however, perhaps comforted sections of the Liberal-Democratic Party right wing, reinforcing the view held in these quarters that China was a country of no great consequence in world affairs.31

However this may be, in August 1962, a month after Ikeda's Cabinet reorganization had precipitated Satō's withdrawal, the Prime Minister revealed his 'positive' stand on Sino-Japanese trade. This despite the growing tension on the Sino-Indian border and the sympathy for India's predicament in Washington.32 In the autumn of 1962, at the invitation of the Chinese side, a large unofficial Japanese delegation led by Matsumura Kenzō and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, both MHRs and members of the Liberal-Democratic Party, left for Peking.33 Despite the strictly unofficial character of the mission, Prime Minister Ikeda, as a gesture of support, included a member of his own faction among the thirty-three delegates. The result of this mission was the signing, on 9 December 1962, of the Takasaki-Liao Memorandum on Trade. This laid the basis for most of the commercial exchanges between the two countries over the next five years.

4. The Cuban missile crisis and changing American policies, October 1962 - January 1963

The Cuban missile crisis occurred on 23 October 1962, three days before Takasaki and Matsumura left for Peking.34 Once the storm had passed it became evident that there had been a profound change not only in American policy towards the Soviet Union, but also in policy towards China. Within weeks of the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, the United States, flushed with new confidence, shifted its attention to the Far East and began a campaign to rally its Asian and Pacific allies for a confrontation with the Peoples' Republic. At a meeting of the United States - Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in December, President Kennedy strongly requested Japanese cooperation in policies to 'contain' Communist China. The Americans criticized Japan's indulgent attitude towards Peking and attacked her lack of enthusiasm for improving ties with South Korea and the Chiang Kai Shek régime.35 A week later the Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr Harriman, told correspondents from the Mainichi Shimbun that the United States could not approve of Sino-Japanese trade. On 9 January 1963 the United States renewed a request first made unsuccessfully in 1961 that American nuclear-powered submarines be permitted to call at Japanese ports. Finally, at the Security Consultative Committee meeting of 19 January 1963, the United States urged Japan to think out the implications of the Chinese nuclear program and co-operate more positively with the Western camp. In particular, the United States hoped to see increased Japanese economic aid to South Vietnam and other nations engaged in the struggle against Communism.

The Kennedy and Harriman statements were the opening shots in a campaign whose ultimate objective was to align Japan more closely with American policies in Asia. This campaign, conducted against the background of Chinese nuclear development, succeeded in aggravating the factional strife already existing in the Liberal-Democratic Party. Yet it did not produce concrete results until the unrelated play of factional politics brought about new alignments, and illness or death removed from the scene the principal opponents of fuller co-operation with the United States.

5. Initial Japanese reactions to the new emphasis in American policy, December 1962 - October 1963

The Japanese Government at first pretended to misunderstand the new direction of American policy. The Foreign Ministry's official translation of Kennedy's speech to the Joint Committee on Trade and Economic affairs avoided use of the usual Japanese word for 'contain' (fūji komu), replacing it by 'soshi suru', 'to limit' or 'to check'. After the Kennedy statement, Ikeda told the press that while it was 'natural' for Japan to join hands with the other nations of the Free World, the President had actually been speaking of 'checking the expansion of Stalinism'. This should not be linked to the question of trade with China, which was a matter for Japan to settle independently. On his return from the Joint Committee meeting in Washington Foreign Minister Ōhira, explaining how United States hostility to China had increased because of the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian border conflict, stated that
Japan has an alliance with the United States and extensive ties of co-operation with that country. Therefore there will be no problems at all even if Japan, to a degree not inimical to these relations, sorts out her affairs with Communist China, conducts trade, establishes cultural and economic ties. This is the Government's view, and there will be no need to change it in the future.  

While it was 'natural' to oppose further expansion of Communist power, there were no plans for Japanese-American consultations on future policy towards the Peoples' Republic.

These were the attitudes of Ikeda, Kōno and the dominant coalition. The impact of Kennedy's stand on the dissident right wing factions was significantly different. Shortly after the Trade and Economic Affairs Committee meeting, Satō returned from a tour of Europe and North America stressing the intensity of the East-West conflict, the need for Free World unity and the desirability of 'caution' in relations with China. By the spring of 1963 controversy over Sino-Japanese relations was becoming acute within the Party's official organs, above all in the Foreign Affairs Research Council. The right wing argued that the 'world trend' was to make approaches to the Soviet Union and isolate China. Japan should, accordingly, abandon efforts to improve ties with Peking. She should co-operate faithfully with the United States. Naturally, a line was drawn at actual military co-operation. The pro-China factions, in contrast, maintained that for historical, geographical and economic reasons Japan would be obliged to improve relations with Peking, whatever the trend of American policy.

Apart from the fact that anti-confrontationist views were strong in the dominant factional alliance, certain international developments in the spring and summer of 1963 improved the position of those favouring a flexible China policy. The visit of the American special envoy Christian Herter in April made it clear that the United States was not interested in increasing imports from Japan. Washington declined to recognize any 'special relationship' with Tokyo, announcing that her foreign trade policy was determined 'from a global standpoint'. Many Japanese business and political leaders were also disturbed by the rapid growth of Chinese trade with Western Europe and the United Kingdom. The visit of the British Foreign Secretary Home in April provided an
opportunity to exchange views on the China question with another American ally. Home reportedly made a favourable impression by appealing for joint efforts to persuade the United States that a more positive approach to trade with the Peoples' Republic was ultimately in the interests of the Free World.45

It was these factors that lay behind Ikeda's epoch making decision of August 1963 to permit the export of a vinylon plant to China on a deferred payment basis,46 despite American threats that the provisions of the Export Control Act would be applied to Japan if the negotiations were carried through.47 Within months a number of similar contracts were either being negotiated or examined. Despite the explosive reaction of Taipei,48 the hostile attitude of Washington and the cautious stand of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, trade continued to expand during the autumn and winter of 1963. In September the Japan Economic Research Council (Nihon Keizai Chōsa Kyōgikai), an influential research organ operated jointly by Keidanren, Nikkeiren, Nisshō and Dōyūkai, released a report explicitly recommending increased trade with Communist block nations.49

In October 1963, in symbolic culmination of these developments, the largest Japanese trade fair ever held in China was opened in Peking. The president of the sponsoring organization, which employed a staff of over 300 Japanese in the Chinese capital, was the former Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan. More than 500 companies contributed exhibits to the value of 170 billion yen. Over 1000 Japanese visited Peking for the fair itself, including representatives of political parties, religious groups and cultural organizations. The grand opening banquet was attended by 400 Japanese and 600 Chinese guests. In the company of Ishibashi Tanzan, the Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En Lai and other distinguished Chinese leaders moved among the guests, shaking hands, chatting with visitors and drinking toasts.50 Yet what appeared to be the beginning of a new era in Sino-Japanese relations was, in fact, the end of a brief Indian summer.

6. Postponement of visits by American nuclear powered submarines, December 1963

Parallel to the debate on relations with China a conflict developed within the Government on the advisability of permitting port calls by American nuclear-powered submarines. Generally speaking,
factions supporting one cause adopted a cautious attitude towards the other. The American request put Ikeda in a difficult situation. The 1960 Security Treaty provided no grounds for refusing such port calls. The only condition Japan could place on the entry of naval vessels and aircraft was that they be not equipped with nuclear weapons, which would constitute a 'major change in equipment'. (see Chapter 4). Washington had made it clear that the nuclear submarines in question were not of the Polaris type, equipped with nuclear weapons, but carried only conventional warheads. There were precedents for American allies refusing to permit port calls. In 1958, for example, Denmark had barred the entry of nuclear submarines on safety grounds. In Japan's case, however, continued refusal to permit port calls on these grounds would have been difficult. Japan herself was planning construction of a nuclear-powered merchant vessel. There was also the view that, in the aftermath of the 1960 crisis and Japanese-American friction over a number of issues during the first years of the Ikeda Government, closer cooperation was necessary to restore American confidence in Japan. On the other hand, recognition of port calls would, in view of the new emphasis in American policy, inevitably complicate relations with China. The only solution to Ikeda's dilemma was to placate the Americans with a promise that port calls would be permitted, but to postpone the actual decision as long as possible.

Thus, in announcing Washington's request the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated (24 January 1963) that there was 'no reason to reject the United States representations', adding that a Japanese-American agreement would soon be drawn up. However, despite discussion of the Chinese nuclear program at the meeting of the Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee in January 1963 and the firm attitude reportedly shown by the Deputy Secretary of Defence Mr Gilpatric when he visited Japan in February, the Ikeda Government intimated its final decision would depend on Washington's furnishing adequate proof of the vessels' safety. Various enquiries on safety were subsequently made but the American replies apparently failed to satisfy the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Atomic Energy Commission. On 11 March the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced that the Japanese decision would be delayed for some time.
Refuge in the safety question was a fortunate stratagem. Within less than a month one of the newest of America's Nautilus type submarines, the Thresher was lost in the Atlantic. In the Atomic Energy Commission opinion against the visits hardened. At the same time, opposition gathered momentum not only in the Socialist and Communist Parties, but also in scientific circles. Several of Japan's most eminent nuclear scientists publicly protested against the proposed port calls, emphasizing the hazards of radio-activity and the dangers of contamination. On 25 March a committee of nuclear scientists appealed directly to the Government. On 27 March another 154 leading scientists issued a joint statement condemning the visits. On 19 April the President of Tokyo University handed Ikeda a note of protest and on 26 April the Japan Science Council (Gakujutsu Kaigi) announced its opposition to the proposed port calls. At the same time, there was every indication that the mounting wave of popular protest could precipitate a national crisis on the scale of the 1960 upheaval. These ominous developments proved a boon to opponents of the visits in the Liberal-Democratic Party and the bureaucracy. Towards the end of April the Government moved towards the view that negotiations could not advance until the reasons for the sinking of the Thresher had been disclosed. This shift in opinion corresponded with the emergence of a view in Washington that it was unwise to provoke Japanese opinion and the decision on port-calls should temporarily be postponed.

The debate continued inconclusively throughout the summer and autumn of 1963. In December a new complication arose with the United States' Navy's announcement that its nuclear submarines were to be fitted with Subroc anti-submarine offensive missiles. These projectiles could be fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads. It was soon revealed, however, that all Subrocs would be nuclear tipped. Thus the question was now not merely one of safety, but of whether nuclear weapons could be admitted to Japan.

7. Factional realignments and outside pressures. An erratic policy towards China and the decision to permit port calls by nuclear powered submarines. November 1963 - October 1964

The period extending from the General Election in November 1963 (a month after the opening of the Japanese trade fair in Peking) until Ikeda's retirement in October 1964 (just after the first Chinese
nuclear test) was characterized, on the domestic front, by an intensified factional conflict and the first signs of an important shift in the Liberal-Democratic Party factional balance. On the international front the period was marked by French recognition of China and the beginning of large scale American involvement in Vietnam. These events were followed by an increase in pressure on Japan from Taipei and Washington. The result was an erratic China policy and the decision to permit the entry of American nuclear-powered submarines, subject to certain conditions.

The rise of Kōno and the temporary isolation of the Satō faction have already been traced. Despite Satō's readmission to the Cabinet in June 1963 and the partial return to the 'all-faction' structure of 1960-61, Kōno's influence continued to grow. The 1963 General Election, in which the Liberal-Democrats effectively lost a total of 13 seats, saw a further erosion of Satō's strength. The number of MHRs associated with the Satō faction decreased from over 50 to 45 or 46. In contrast the Kōno faction recruited some 15 new members and now surpassed both the Satō and Ikeda factions in size and potential influence. After the election, Ikeda moved closer to Kōno than ever before and found it necessary to obtain his understanding on every issue.

Kōno's very success proved to be his undoing. The reaction it inspired undermined not only his own position but also the Ikeda Government and its policies. When Satō had been powerful and seemed destined as Ikeda's successor, faction leaders such as Miki and Fujiyama had, in varying degrees, inclined towards rapprochment with Kōno. Now that it seemed probable Kōno would be the next Prime Minister, these factions gradually increased their reserve towards the Ikeda-Kōno-Ōno axis and began to repair their relations with Satō, Fukuda and Ishii. The smaller factions saw their future in support for the weaker contender for Party Presidency.

Thus within a week of the General Election 117 representatives of the Satō, Ishii, Miki and Fujiyama factions established an organization grandly styling itself the Headquarters for the Renovation of the Peoples' Minds and Dissolution of the Factions (Jinshin Ishhin Habatsu Kaishō Suishin Honbu). The ostensible objective was 'renovating' Cabinet personnel and liquidating internal factions. The real purpose was to remove Kōno from the Cabinet and undermine the Ikeda Cabinet.
The Ikeda structure was dealt its first major blow with the sudden death of Ōno Bamboku, just before the July 1964 Party Presidential election. Ōno, along with Köno, had been one of the chief pillars of Ikeda's Administration. After his demise, his faction divided into pro- and anti-Satō elements, although it did not officially break up until some months later. The significance of these developments was clearly spelled out in the July elections, when Ikeda, with 242 votes, was re-elected Party President by a slender majority of 10. Satō gained 160 votes, Fujiyama, who made a last minute decision to run, polled an unexpectedly high total of 72.

Ikeda's precarious victory would have been impossible without the support of the Köno faction. In view of the balance of forces revealed by the election, Ikeda hoped to return to the 'all faction structure' established in 1960. Köno resolutely opposed this. As a result, the Party and Cabinet posts of Ikeda's last, ephemeral administration, were monopolized by the dominant factions. Ōno's absence meant that Köno's weight had increased out of all proportions. Appointed Minister without Portfolio, he emerged as virtual Deputy Prime Minister. Paradoxically, this ensured that the Ikeda Cabinet, had it lasted, would have been unable to undertake important new policy initiatives, in view of the intense resistance to be expected from the now powerful dissident groups.

Ikeda's resignation because of ill health on 26 October 1964, and Satō's accession as Prime Minister, radically altered the factional configuration in the Party. The changes were, however, no more than the reaction to Köno's dominance described above would have led one to expect. Miki made strenuous efforts to smooth the path for Satō's accession to power. The Ikeda, Kawashima and former Ōno factions also threw in their lot with Satō. Fukuda and Ishii, who had supported Satō faithfully during his months in the political wilderness, rode with him into power, insistent that they, too, receive a place in the sun as a reward for their fidelity. It was now Köno's turn to wander in the pathless waste of political dissidence.

The basis for the anti-Köno coalition had already been formed when, in January 1964, it became increasingly evident that France intended to recognize the Peoples' Republic. On 11 January 1964, shortly
before the French decision was announced, the Chiang Kai Shek régime proclaimed its intention to 'suspend imports from Japan as far as Government purchases were concerned'. This was officially in retaliation for Japanese trade with Peking. It was also meant as a warning to Japan not to follow the French example. These two events hardened the divisions in the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Ikeda Government, attempting to satisfy first one camp, then the other, made a series of wildly divergent statements on China policy.

The first news of the French decision threw the Government into confusion. The Chief Cabinet Secretary Mr Kurogane told the press 'it puts me in a difficult position, a difficult position'. He kept repeating this phrase throughout the interview. Yet apparently no one changed his position. Leaders favourable to Peking expressed support for the French decision. Those hostile to China made no attempt to conceal their view that the French move was 'premature'.

Ikeda's administration policy speech at the opening session of the new Diet became the focus of the controversy between the two groups. The Prime Minister referred to the 'stern reality' (genzen taru jijitsu) that the Chinese continent, 'inhabited by over 600 million people', was separated from Japan by 'only a narrow strip of water'. It was reported that when the draft of this speech was being studied by the Cabinet, anti-Peking elements had asserted that 'it was not especially necessary to say that there were over 600 million people on the Chinese continent'. The speech announced no new policy (the factional balance made a new policy virtually impossible) but its final form perhaps represented a marginal victory for the pro-Peking forces.

Over the next three weeks Government spokesmen made a number of statements interpreted as conciliatory to Peking. On 31 January the Prime Minister told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that while Japan's views were 'different' to those of Peking, Japan entertained 'friendly sentiments' towards the Chinese people. Relations between Japan and China were 'different' from Sino-American relations. On 6 February Foreign Minister Öhira told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that Peking was 'not adventurous' but 'cautious' and 'pursuing realistic policies'. On 12 February Öhira announced that Japan would normalize relations with China if that country were admitted to the United Nations. It was stressed, however, that Japan still
intended to support the United States resolution regarding China's admission as an 'important question'. Finally, on 18 February, Ohira told the House that he did not think Communist China was 'a threat to Japan either militarily or economically'.

These statements provoked a vigorous reaction from the anti-Peking camps. It was said that after his speech of 12 February Ohira was summoned before the Party Executive Council and the Foreign Affairs Research Council and told that it was 'monstrous' (tondemo nai hanashi) to say that China posed no threat. The reason allegedly given was that 'such statements undermine the very foundations of the Security Treaty system'. That is to say, fear of the effect of Ohira's statements on Washington was apparently greater than fear of China. The Foreign Ministry was reportedly divided but the dominant view was that nothing should be done to jeopardize relations with the United States and Taiwan.

On 20 February, almost certainly in response to these pressures, the Government's statements suddenly changed direction. Ohira told the Diet that he did not think there was 'no possibility of aggression by the Communists' and stressed that he had never used the phrase 'normalization of relations'. In an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun the following day the Foreign Minister displayed marked hostility towards Peking and went to some lengths to establish himself as a man aware of the importance of relations with Taipei. Finally, Ikeda told the House of Councillors Budget Committee on 4 March that Japan would have 'no obligation' to recognize Communist China even if that country were admitted to the United Nations.

Yet while the Ikeda Government had retreated from its position of 12 February, the anti-Peking forces were far from gaining total victory. Their views could not be ignored, they effectively frustrated new diplomatic initiatives. Yet they were not themselves strong enough to determine policy. A barometer of the situation in the Party at this stage was 'Unified View' on China policy announced on 5 March 1964. This 'view' was not 'united' in the sense that it incorporated any logically consistent strain of thought. It was, in fact, no more than an attempt to reduce tensions within the Party by stating, side by side, the contentions of the two camps. To satisfy the
right wing China was first described as 'a Communist régime which aims eventually at communising the world'. It was noted that Asian nations, including Japan, were feeling 'uneasy' about Communist China's military, ideological, political and economic expansion. Yet whether China's actual policies were aggressive was 'a different question'. China appeared, in fact, to be taking a 'prudent' attitude towards the outside world. There was little possibility of her direct, military intervention on the Sino-Soviet border, in Korea or the Taiwan Straits. Chinese military intervention in Laos, Vietnam and South-East Asia was 'hardly conceivable'. Moreover, 'at the present stage', China was considered not to harbour 'any intention of direct, armed aggression against Japan'. This despite her long term objective of destroying the Security Treaty system.

As for Japan's policy towards China, it was argued that Japan had concluded a peace treaty with Chiang Kai Shek and maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. Yet Japan's special circumstances demanded 'various kinds of virtual relations' (jisshitsuujō no kankei) with the Chinese mainland. China's population of 600 million was again specifically mentioned. So too were Japan's historical links with China. Because of these factors Japan's position was 'fundamentally different' from that of the United States, which need not have 'any relations with the Chinese continent at all'. At the same time, Japanese recognition of Peking would 'impair the solidarity of the Free camp' and thus 'endanger the peace and stability of Asia'. This would be 'contrary to Japan's national interests'. Since the solution to the Peking-Taipei conflict was not in Japan's hands, it was recommended that Japan continue her policy of maintaining 'formal' relations with Taipei and 'virtual' relations 'in trade and other fields' with Peking. Japan would continue to regard China's entry to the United Nations as 'an important matter', and would therefore continue to support the American sponsored resolution based on this premise. However, if China were admitted to the United Nations, Japan would 'consider' the question of recognition.96

Two days after publication of the 'Unified View' the Government announced plans to permit the export to China of a vinylon plant by the Dai-Nihon Bōseki Company, presumably on the deferred payment basis with Export-Import Bank credit that had been resisted by the Party right since the Kurashiki Rayon Company plant decision of 1963.
This proved to be one step too far. Japanese relations with Taiwan sank to a nadir. On 18 March, Vice Foreign Minister Mori returned from an overseas trip with the warning that if the Dai-Nihon Böseki decision were officially made, relations with the Chiang Kai Shek régime would 'reach a point of complete break-off'.

Kishi and Ishii immediately protested to Ikeda. More ominous were indications that the anti-Kōno forces backed by former Prime Minister Yoshida, were planning to use the China question to overthrow the Cabinet. These moves, coming on the eve of the Party Presidential Elections, inclined Ikeda to caution. No official announcement on the Dai Nihon Böseki plant was made. The idea was, presumably, to announce the deal after the election had confirmed Ikeda in power and the subsequent Cabinet reshuffle reduced the influence of the right wing groups.

The feeble Cabinet formed after Ikeda's narrow victory was, however, in no position to embark on controversial new policies. All the more so since the weeks before and after the election were marked by a series of portentous international developments. Just before the election President Johnson appointed the former Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor as Ambassador to Saigon. The Tonkin Gulf incident occurred on 2 August and Johnson's announcement of retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam heralded the beginning of the Second Indo-China War. These events gave force to the right wing contention that now was not the time to improve relations with Peking. In the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee the new Foreign Minister, Mr Shiina repeated the American version of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, expressing his full 'understanding' of President Johnson's reaction. The Foreign Ministry Treaties Bureau Director hastened to assure the House that the Gulf of Tonkin was not in the Far East so that events there could not become the object of prior consultations under the 1960 Security Treaty. In rapid succession high ranking American officials visited Japan, emphasizing the need for greater Japanese awareness of the Communist threat and expressing dissatisfaction with Japan's trade with China.

The escalating tension in the Far East and the new balance of power in the Liberal-Democratic Party had two results. No decision on the Dai Nihon Böseki plant export was announced, although Sino-Japanese trade continued to expand. More importantly, on 28 August 1964,
it was announced that Japan would welcome port calls by American nuclear powered submarines.\(^{103}\)

8. **Reactions to the Chinese nuclear test, October 1964**

China conducted her first nuclear test on 16 October 1964, a week before Ikeda’s retirement. China’s emergence as a nuclear power had, as far as one can judge from the public record, no impact on the Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party, either among those who opposed ties with China or those advocating better relations with Peking. The Party right did not consider the Chinese test posed a new direct military threat to Japan’s security, the left did not believe China’s image as a cautious and realistic actor on the international stage had been destroyed. Nor was there any particular alarm in the Defence Agency or Foreign Ministry.

Immediately after the test the Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement regretting the Chinese decision to become a nuclear power. He emphasized, however, that China’s nuclear weapons posed no threat to a Japan protected by the United States.\(^{104}\) Similar statements were made by Defence Agency spokesmen.\(^{105}\) Newspaper reports suggested that within the Foreign Ministry it was held that China, her sense of security now increased, might adopt a more flexible and conciliatory attitude to the outside world.\(^{106}\)

Two months after the test the Liberal-Democratic Party Security Research Committee (Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru Chōsakai), an organ virtually dominated by the anti-Peking right wing factions, sent a report on the Chinese nuclear program to the Party Executive. This report stated, in part, that

The success of China’s nuclear test does not mean we are faced at once with a Chinese military nuclear threat. Moreover, even if the Chinese do, after several years, succeed in developing some kind of nuclear weapons system, this will increase only slightly the threat to which Japan has previously been exposed by Soviet military power. There should be no cause for alarm or agitation.\(^{107}\)

This attitude remained one of the most striking features of reports compiled by the Committee from 1964 onwards. The long 'Interim Report on Japan's Security' (Waga Kuni no Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru Chūkan Hokoku) prepared in June 1966, for example, followed broadly similar lines. China’s military power, including her nuclear arsenal,
was dismissed as a factor of little significance in world affairs. Noting with satisfaction the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States the Committee observed that

Even if China, after ten years or so, were to possess strategic nuclear strike power in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles, these, like the present Soviet intercontinental missiles, will be effectively prevented from threatening the American continent...

China's conventional power, according to the 1966 report, was even more limited. Her armies were poorly equipped, her naval and air forces antiquated, her industrial base backward and exposed. The nuclear weapons program would affect economic growth and jeopardize her future as a great power. She could pose no direct military threat to areas beyond her immediate borders.

This relatively sanguine assessment did not lead the Committee to recommend establishment of normal ties with Peking. On the contrary, the reports outlined above all manifested acute ideological hostility towards China, extreme fear of Chinese directed political subversion in Japan and a desire to see Japan play a more active, but not necessarily military, role in America's Far Eastern strategy.  

If Chinese nuclear weapons failed to overawe the right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party, they did not, as later events were to show, cause any lessening of interest in improved Sino-Japanese relations on the left.  

9. The emergence of the Satō Cabinet, American pressure, factional reorganization and the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations

The factional realignments that followed Ikeda's retirement on 26 October might have had greater repercussions had not reaction to Kōno's growing power impelled the Ikeda, Miki, Kawashima and Ōno factions to co-operate in the transfer of Party leadership to Satō. While the new Prime Minister was able to find places for representatives of the Kishi, Fukuda and Ishii factions, his first Cabinet contained many elements inherited directly from the Ikeda Administration. The nucleus of the new structure was formed by Satō and his followers, and by the Miki, Ikeda, Kawashima and former Ōno factions. Kōno, of course, played no part, but took up a position with his huge faction on the
flanks, ready to take advantage of the first signs of internal dissention.\footnote{110}

This had important effects on Satō's initial policies. Just as Ikeda had been obliged to act cautiously so as not to antagonize basically conservative elements, like Ōno, in his own camp, nor to provoke Satō and the powerful dissident factions on the right, so too Satō had to satisfy the demands of his rightist supporters without alienating Miki, Kawashima and Ikeda, or giving Kōno an opportunity to make a comeback. Thus, the first few months of the new administration saw a continuation of the erratic policy towards China that had characterized the last eight months of the Ikeda Government. The bias was, however, towards an anti-Peking position. Less than a month after taking office the new Prime Minister refused to permit the entry of a Chinese delegation headed by the then Mayor of Peking, Peng Chen.\footnote{111} The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement condemning the decision. The People's Daily attacked the Satō Cabinet's 'reactionary policy hostile to China' and 'aggressive policy towards South-East Asia'.\footnote{112} In retaliation China rejected the entry of Kuno Chūji, the Satō faction's only 'China specialist'.\footnote{113} Liao Cheng Chi (signatory of the 1962 Takasaki-Liao Memorandum on Trade) cancelled plans to visit Japan and it soon became apparent that an all party Japanese parliamentary delegation scheduled to visit China in December, would not be invited.\footnote{114} At the same time, Satō denied viewing China with hostility\footnote{115} and in December the Chief Cabinet Secretary spoke in terms of the Government's hope for increased Sino-Japanese trade, personal and cultural exchanges.\footnote{116}

After the Prime Minister's return from talks with President Johnson in January 1965, there was a perceptible hardening in policy towards Peking. Within a week of the talks the Japanese Government announced that Export-Import Bank finance would not be available for the proposed Dai Nihon Bōseki vinylon plant export to China.\footnote{117} Shortly afterwards the Government disclosed that Export-Import Bank funds would also be denied to the Hitachi Company for the export of a freighter to China.\footnote{118}

The Prime Minister's first major Cabinet reorganization announced on 6 June 1965, strengthened the position of the Satō, Kishi-Fukuda and Ishii factions. Fukuda's appointment as Finance Minister and
Ishii's appointment as Minister of Justice were particularly significant. Yet with Fujiyama's installation as Director of the Economic Planning Agency, Miki's appointment as Minister of International Trade and Industry and Akagi's elevation as Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, it could not be said that groups advocating a conciliatory policy towards Peking were not represented.\(^{119}\)

The decisive blow to the cause of improved Sino-Japanese relations at this stage was dealt shortly after the Cabinet reshuffle, with the sudden deaths of Kōno in July and Ikeda in August. The break up of the former Ōno faction was also not without significance. The Kōno faction was immediately paralyzed by internal dissension. One group of more elderly members, led by Shigemasa Seishi, gravitated towards cooperation with Satō. The others, led by Nakasone Yashuhiro, opposed Satō and advocated continuation of the Kōno tradition.\(^{120}\) Yet Nakasone's long time association with anti-Communist organizations,\(^{121}\) despite his interest in China, made it seem probably that the Kōno tradition would undergo some modification. The Ikeda faction was subjected to little internal stress after its leader's demise. Maeo Shigesaburō was at once appointed Ikeda's successor.\(^{122}\) Yet the removal of Ikeda's personality made the faction incapable, for a time, of playing its traditional role of a channel of communication between left and right in the Party. The effects of the split in the Ōno faction (which became open in August 1965, about the time of Ikeda's death\(^{123}\) were more problematical. Yet it would seem that this also affected communication between the Party left and the right. These events left the right wing factions temporarily in command of the field. Advocates of improved Sino-Japanese relations in the dominant alliance, like Miki and Fujiyama, found their freedom of manoeuvre increasingly restricted.

It was just at this time that the United States, perhaps sensing its opportunity in the changed complexion of the Liberal-Democratic Party, began a major drive to bring Japan more into line with American policies in the Far East. The Japanese were subjected to an intensive campaign of official and semi-official American criticism. The American barrage began early in October 1965 when Ambassador Reischauer publically attacked the coverage of the Vietnam War given by two leading Japanese newspapers, the Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun.\(^{124}\) This incident was followed up by a speech attacking Japan's
'dangerously mistaken views' on China given by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy at a meeting of the American Assembly in New York. A few days later Bundy again criticized the Japanese view of China in a speech to the Japan-United States Mayors' Conference. Then on 22 December James Reston in the New York Times strongly criticized Japan's refusal to help lighten the American burden in South-East Asia. More significantly the January 1966 edition of Foreign Affairs (released on 22 December 1965) carried a long and bitterly critical article by the Editor-in-Chief, Philip Quigg, attacking Japanese attitudes towards China, Vietnam, defence and the American alliance. Even more alarming was America's reported disinterest in promoting Japanese candidature for non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. There were fears in business circles that the rising tide of criticism might adversely affect Japanese-American economic relations.

The Japanese Government was quick to get the message. Shortly after Reischauer and Bundy had delivered their initial volleys, the Prime Minister told the House of Councillors Special Committee on Relations with the Republic of Korea that China's attitude was 'very worrying'. A nuclear armed China was a 'threat' to Japan. He developed this theme at greater length the following day. Sa's remarks were followed up on 11 December 1965 by an interview with Foreign Minister Shiina published in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Shiina spoke of China's 'expansionist policies' presenting 'a serious problem for Japan'. He prognosticated gloomily on the future of Sino-Japanese trade (there were not many items Japan wanted to purchase from China; Chinese coal and iron ore were of 'poor quality'; her foreign currency reserves were 'weak'). Then on 29 March 1966 the Government refused to issue entry permits for members of a Chinese delegation invited by the Socialist Party. This was the first time an entire delegation had been summarily barred. After the Chinese hydrogen bomb test in May 1966 the Defence Agency Director General spoke with the press about 'the Communist Chinese threat' and the necessity for 'strengthening the Security Treaty system'. At the same time Foreign Minister Shiina was telling the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee that while the Security Treaty would be upheld, Japan would take no part in American strategic planning. As the Prime Minister had remarked some months earlier, 'Just because I said I feel threatened, this does not have to be reflected in our immediate policies'.
It is thus difficult to know whether the Japanese were relieved when the United States Secretary for Defence Mr MacNamara assured the strategic studies expert Wakaizumi Kei in September 1966 that there were no limitations on the kind of weapons America would use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Japan. Japan's decision to regard China as a threat had, after all, been made solely with an eye to the effect it would produce in Washington.

10. Relations with South Korea

Japanese unwillingness to become militarily involved in the American 'containment of China policy' was nowhere more evident that in relations with South Korea. Throughout the period under consideration, the efforts of pro-Peking elements in the Liberal-Democratic Party to normalize ties with China were paralleled by the exertions of anti-Communist factions to foster relations with South Korea. These efforts met with some success. After months of desultory and inconclusive negotiations during the Ikeda Administration, a Basic Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea was initialled in February 1966, eighteen months after Sato took office.

In the context of its new Far Eastern policy, the United States made little secret of its desire to see Japan militarily involved in Korea. In January 1963 the Deputy Secretary for Defence Mr Gilpatric stated that the United States expected Japan eventually to be responsible for the defence of a region 'including part of the Korean peninsula'. This expectation was also shared by the South Korean Government. Some months after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty the South Korean Prime Minister Mr Chong reportedly told the National Assembly that he 'expected' co-operation of the Japanese Self Defence Forces with United Nations forces in Korea. This was also the view of the then Defence Minister of South Korea, Mr Kim.

Ashida's view that maintenance of a friendly government in Korea was an essential condition of Japanese security was mentioned in an earlier chapter (see Chapter 1). This belief was strongly held by some high ranking officers in the Self Defence Forces. In the early part of the 1960s, unsuccessful attempts were made by them to forge military links with the South Korean régime (see Chapter 8). Their continued interest in Korea became apparent in February 1965, when the
contents of research carried out by the Joint Staff Council in 1963 (Mitsuya Kenkyū) was revealed in the Diet by the Socialist member Okada Haruo. In the Liberal-Democratic Party the Kishi faction, Satō's group, the Ishii and Ōno factions and their successors were all associated with the view that the integrity of South Korea was of vital concern to Japan. On the other hand, the Ikeda and Kōno factions, and their offshoots, were not publically identified with this attitude. Nor were Miki, Matsumura and Fujiyama. There were, however, occasional surprising combinations of opinion. Kawashima Shōjirō, generally known as an anti-confrontationist as far as relations with the Communist camp were concerned, could state in October 1969 that

...the establishment of a powerful, stable government in the Republic of Korea is an indispensible condition for the peace of the Far East and the prosperity of Japan.

Yet it was doubtful whether the exponents of this theory in the Liberal-Democratic Party thought in terms of Japanese military support for South Korea. The Basic Treaty itself was concerned merely with questions such as fishing rights, economic co-operation and the status of Koreans resident in Japan. Prior to initialling the Treaty the then Foreign Minister Mr Shiina told the Tōkyō Shimbun and Nihon Keizai Shim bun that Japanese participation in any NEATO-type military pact would be unconstitutional. He later told the Asahi Shimbun that he had rejected South Korean proposals for a 'free Asian foreign minister's solidarity meeting' on these grounds.

In the course of the Diet proceedings before the initialling of the Treaty the Opposition claimed that while the Treaty itself might be devoid of references to military co-operation, Japan's obligation to co-operate with the United Nations (as stipulated in Article 98 of the Constitution), the Security Treaty and the Yoshida-Acheson Exchange of Notes, would eventually make military involvement inevitable.

Satō categorically denied this. By the winter of 1965 it was evident that the Government's position was

(i) that Japan's co-operation with the United Nations forces under the Yoshida-Acheson Notes was limited to the supply of material.

(ii) that Japan could only co-operate with the United Nations provided she did not violate her own Constitution in doing so. The Constitution prohibited use of force to settle international disputes and Japan could not dispatch military forces abroad.
As the Prime Minister told a television audience on 13 May 1966

We cannot give [military] assistance to the United States because of our Constitution. Nor can we enter into a multilateral security treaty. We cannot enter something like NATO. It is not possible for Japan to join with the Philippines, the Republic of Korea or Taiwan.154

Conclusion of the Treaty with South Korea seems to have brought neither Japan nor the United States particular military advantage. Saeki Kiichi, the noted military critic and former commandant of the National Defence College, considered that such mutual exchanges of information that took place would be of 'little direct benefit'.155 Shortly after conclusion of the Treaty a Japanese military attaché was posted in Seoul. Yoshie Seiichi, the then Chief Secretary of the Joint Staff Council, believed this would enable Japan to obtain a better view of the situation in North Korea, to assess the strength of the South Korean forces and profit from their experience.156 The concrete benefits obtained from this sort of thing would seem, however, rather peripheral. The principal result of the Treaty was Japan's establishment of diplomatic ties with Seoul and the subsequent inflow of Japanese capital and technology to Korea. This was partly responsible for that country's economic recovery in the late 1960s, a recovery which might, if successful, limit the appeal of Communism and allay the fears of the Japanese right.157

11. The Vietnam War and the polarization of the Liberal-Democratic Party

From the beginning the Sato Government, as a faithful ally of the United States, publicly justified virtually every aspect of American policy in Indo-China. Yet as Ambassador Reischauer was quick to perceive, the Vietnam War made close association with the United States seem 'less desirable to many Japanese, and the confrontation between left and right...took on new heat'.158 The strongest opposition to the war came, of course, from the Socialists, Communists and Komei Parties. In the Liberal-Democratic Party, American policies aggravated existing tensions. More significantly, the war alienated some of America's fervent admirers in the Conservative camp. Ironically, one of the first to speak out was former Prime Minister Yoshida, the doyen of the old Foreign Ministry Anglo-Saxon set.159
After the bombing of Hanoi Yoshida's close associate Miyazawa Kiichi issued a bitterly critical statement. Some months later, Miyazawa wrote an impassioned personal appeal to the new American Ambassador Mr Johnson. Less surprising was the opposition of such figures as Fujiyama Aiichirō, Matsumura Kenzō and Utsunomiya Tokuma. In January 1965, Foreign Minister Shiina compared American policies in Vietnam with those of the Japanese army in China in the 1930s. In April 1965 high level anxiety was increased when Matsumoto Shunichi, former Ambassador to Great Britain and Special Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, returned from a Government sponsored fact finding mission to Vietnam and publicly attacked the whole direction of American policy.

It was against the background of America's escalating containment of China policy, characterized above all by the Vietnam involvement, that the Liberal-Democratic Party gradually polarized around two organizations. The largest of these organizations was the Asian Problems Study Association (Ajia Mondai Kenkyū Kai) formed in December 1964, two months after Satō became Prime Minister. This body centered around the Satō, Ishii, Fukuda and Kishi factions. Estimates of the size of its membership varied. Some observers put the figure as low as 70, others spoke in terms of 140, 150 or 170 members. The Asian Problems Study Association gave general support to American Far Eastern policies, advocating continued exclusion of Peking from the United Nations, preservation of the status quo in Taiwan and minimal contact with the Chinese mainland.

In January 1965 a rival organization, the Afro-Asian Problems Study Association (Ajia-Afurika Mondai Kenkyū Kai), was established by groups opposed to uncritical support for American policies in Asia. Founded initially by some 24 members of the Matsumura, Fujiyama and Utsunomiya factions, this organization eventually attracted a membership of 100 or 120 Diet members. All of Matsumura's small group, most of the former Kōno faction and a significant number of Miki and Fujiyama supporters associated themselves with the organization.

Once established, the rival bodies began a campaign of protracted trench warfare designed to discredit the views of their opponents and win new support both within and outside the Party. Debates and seminars were organized, fact finding missions dispatched to various countries.
In September 1966 the Afro-Asian group sponsored a tour of China led by Furui Yoshimi, the former Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō, the former Defence Agency Director General Esaki Masumi and former Finance Minister Fukuda Hajime. The delegates talked with Chou En Lai, Chen Yi and other dignitaries. Kosaka returned full of enthusiasm for Japan's role in easing Sino-American tension. He announced a plan to visit Washington armed with an 8mm cinematographic record of his experiences in the Peoples' Republic. Chou En Lai told Esaki that while China objected to the revival of 'reactionary military cliques', it was 'only natural' for Japan to defend herself. Esaki inspected military installations near Tientsin and returned with the conviction that the Peoples' Liberation Army was trained 'solely for defensive war'. Fukuda was optimistic about the future of Sino-Japanese trade. After their return to Japan Kosaka, Esaki and the others made efforts to establish links with the American Senate 'doves' led by Senator Fulbright.

While the Afro-Asian team was in Peking a party of nineteen members from the rival Asian group visited South Korea to attend a meeting of the Asian Parliamentary Union.

In the summer of 1966 the two groups clashed over the question of the 'Interim Report on Japan's Security' drawn up by the Party's Security Research Committee (see part 8, above).

So acrimonious did these disputes become that there were rumours of possible defections from the Party. In March 1966 there were reports that Esaki Masumi, Furui Yoshimi, Ishida Hirohide, Mori Kiyoshi, Nakasone Yasuhiro and Sakurauchi Yoshio, all associated, in one way or another, with the Afro-Asian group, were involved in secret negotiations with members of the Democratic Socialist Party. There were also rumours that some of the old Ikeda faction, in particular Kosaka and Miyazawa, were interested in these discussions. There was speculation that Conservative Diet representation could drop below 260 seats after the next General Election. If only 20 or 30 members left the Party in these circumstances, the Government would lose control of the Diet. There was another tremor of apprehension in June 1966 when Matsumura began to speak openly about formation of a second conservative party. His sentiments were echoed by Furui and Nakasone.
Predictions of a split in the Liberal Democratic Party eventually proved to be unfounded. Yet the situation demanded caution. The partial redrafting of the 'Interim Report' and the reorganization of the Foreign Affairs Research Council were the first of a series of steps taken by the Party leadership to appease the internal opposition. The situation became delicate in the months preceding the Party Presidential Elections in December 1966. The Government was thrown into turmoil by a succession of corruption scandals. The groups most active in the Afro-Asian Problems Study Association formed themselves into a new Party Rectification Group, with the objective of 'purifying' the Party by opposing Satō in the election. Satō's victory in December was comfortable but not overwhelming: 289 votes were cast in favour of the Prime Minister, 89 for Fujiyama and 47 for Maeo. The post electoral scene was characterized by the formation of a Cabinet completely dominated by the factions that had supported Satō's re-election. Members of the Satō faction took four posts, Miki received three, the Kishi-Fukuda faction two and Ishii, Kawashima and Funada one post each. The new Cabinet was, as before, confronted by powerful and well organized dissident forces. This, together with Miki's strong position in the Cabinet, led initially to the adoption of an aloof but not markedly hostile attitude to Peking and an attempt to placate exponents of greater autonomy by concentrating on issues that aroused less hostility in Washington. In particular Miki, as Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet, saw in the promotion of 'Asian-Pacific diplomacy' a means to rally an increasingly fragmented Party.

12. The development of informed and popular opinion

The 1960s were characterized by important changes in the Japanese intellectual climate and a pronounced, if temporary, shift in public opinion. By the end of the decade, genuine enthusiasm for the American alliance had all but disappeared from even the most conservative academic circles. The Security Treaty was no longer regarded as a positive good, but as a necessary evil. In parts of the centre and on the left, what had originally been no more than opposition to a treaty was rapidly becoming alienation from a society seen as rampantly racist and militarist. At the same time, public opinion inclined increasingly towards support for Japanese neutrality, although the percentage in
favour of neutrality declined from an all time record in 1968 to more normal proportions in 1970.

Containment of China and the Vietnam War coincided with the emergence in Japan of a new generation of defence and foreign policy thinkers. From the mid-1960s two new groups, the so-called 'neo-idealists' and 'neo-realists', dominated the foreign policy debate, making the greatest and most original contributions to its development. The neo-idealists centered around such figures as Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Seki Hiroharu, Ishida Takeshi and Kishida Junnosuke. The leading lights among the neo-realists were scholars such as Kōsaka Masataka, Nagai Yōnosuke, Etō Shinkichi and Wakaizumi Kei.

The neo-idealists, like their mentors in the preceding generation, opposed rearmament, advocated peaceful coexistence and espoused unarmed neutrality. What distinguished them from their forebears was not so much the substance of their ideas but their mode of expression, which was strongly influenced by new developments in the social sciences in the United States and Western Europe. The break-up of the Cold War alliances and China's emergence as a nuclear power caused some initial confusion, tending, perhaps, to destroy the romantic illusions that some of the idealists, both old and new, fostered about the Communist block. Yet the view soon emerged that while the international environment had become more complex, Japan's interests and responsibilities lay in continued efforts, as a neutral and unarmed state, to reduce Sino-American-Soviet tensions. In view of the circumstances, the neo-idealists naturally directed their efforts against the Vietnam War and America's containment of China policy. Japanese ties with South Korea and the continued presence of American military bases in Japan and Okinawa were also opposed.

The most striking changes occurred in the realist camp. The neo-realists regarded military power as a vital factor in international relations and rejected the unarmed neutrality proposals of their opponents. What distinguished them from their predecessors was the rejection of anti-Communism as an ideology, a new belief in the importance of a balance of power, a new emphasis on 'national interest' and a far more conditional support for the Security Treaty. China's nuclear weapons were not seen, either by the new realists or by the old,
as constituting in themselves an immediate military threat to Japan's security. Most of the new realists, divested of the anti-Communism that had determined the views of many of their predecessors, were strongly guarded against unnecessarily making an enemy of the Peoples' Republic.  

A minority, typified by Wakaizumi, saw a nuclear China with great power status as a potential long-term political, diplomatic and eventually military threat to Japan. They recommended, as a temporary measure, closer ties with the United States. They also urged massive investment in space research and civilian nuclear energy programs. There was also interest in economic, political and, perhaps, military co-operation with Asian and Pacific nations seen hostile to China, such as Australia and India. However a majority of the neo-realists, typified by Kōsaka, Etō and Nagai, considered that association with American policies was driving Japan needlessly into a position of confrontation with the Peoples' Republic. They urged greater Japanese autonomy within the Security Treaty system. This necessitated a weakening of military ties with the United States and a substantial independent defence build up. At the same time, there was little feeling that the American connection should, or could, be abandoned. As Nagai Yōnosuke remarked, every ally is a potential enemy, every enemy a potential friend. Wise diplomacy consists in winning over the most dangerous opponents through ties of friendship and co-operation. The links between Japan and the United States were not as strong as the ties that bound the White House and Downing Street.

We must always bear in mind that the first principle of Japan's defence and diplomatic policy is to ensure that the United States does not become an enemy....If we put it in the language of the left wing camp, the question becomes is Japan comparatively safer as the first line of defence against 'American imperialism' or as a target for attack by 'peace-loving' China? This problem is, for me at least, the greatest lesson of the Vietnam War. 

By the spring of 1968 an overwhelming majority of the public was in favour of Japanese neutrality. The 5 April 1968 Shūkan Asahi poll found 66.0 per cent of respondents supporting some form of neutrality and only 19.6 per cent in favour of the Security Treaty. The 1 July 1968 Mainichi Shimbun poll found 20 per cent in favour of the Security Treaty, 38.0 per cent advocating armed neutrality, 28.0 per cent
supporting unarmed neutrality. By the end of 1969 interest in neutrality had declined so that the division of opinion was approximately equal. A Tōkyō Shimbun poll in December 1969 found 37.4 per cent in favour of security through ties with the United States, 33.5 per cent supporting neutrality. This was roughly the same division of opinion that had existed in 1949-51, on the eve of the first Security Treaty (see Table 5:(i)). Polls on the contribution of the Treaty to Japan's security yielded more erratic results, but by 1970 large, approximately equal minorities were apparently convinced either that the Treaty had a beneficial effect, or that it was unnecessary or dangerous. (See Table 5:(ii)).

The number of variables involved makes it virtually impossible to isolate the causes of the pronounced swing to neutrality in the mid-1960s and the return to the traditional distribution of opinion by 1970. The rise of neutralist sentiment took place against the background of both China's nuclear development, the Cultural Revolution and the escalation of the Vietnam war. The swing away from neutralism coincided not only with de-escalation of the war, but with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the student struggle in Japan. The latter in particular may have alienated large sections of the public from causes espoused by the left. It could not be conclusively shown that the changes were caused either by the Chinese nuclear program or by American Far Eastern policies. Two general points, however, are worthy of attention. First, while a majority of the public felt 'threatened' by the Chinese bomb (35 per cent of those interviewed by the Yomiuri Shimbun in April 1968 felt the danger 'strongly', 37 per cent felt it 'a little', only 17 per cent felt 'no danger'), there was, apparently, little belief that China posed a military threat comparable with that of the Soviet Union or even, according to one poll, the United States (See Table 8 (viii-(a))). Fear of Chinese nuclear weapons was, in fact, fear of nuclear weapons, not of China. The January 1969 Asahi Shimbun poll revealed that only 12 per cent of respondents 'felt at ease' to know Japan was protected by the American nuclear umbrella. An overwhelming majority of 67 per cent feared the nuclear umbrella would lead Japan into nuclear war. At the same time, there was an overwhelmingly strong popular interest in promoting friendly relations with the Peoples' Republic. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll of 14 April 1968
showed 35 per cent advocating 'more friendly' relations, 34 per cent in favour of normalizing diplomatic ties. Only 10 per cent believed the existing situation to be satisfactory and a mere 8 per cent wanted to avoid involvement with China. Second, there was very strong popular opposition to the Vietnam War, no widespread belief that American policies in South-East Asia contributed to Japanese security and considerable fear that escalation of the conflict could eventually involve Japan. This suggests that the interest in neutralism may have been a reaction to American policies but the complexity of the situation makes definitive conclusions impossible.

However this may be, the polarization of the Liberal-Democratic Party, mounting popular interest in neutrality and the alienation of large sections of public and informed opinion from the United States exerted an important influence in the defence and foreign policies of the Government in succeeding years. This influence was especially evident in the Japanese-American negotiations on the return of Okinawa, which had far reaching implications not only for Japan's defence policies, but also for the American position in the Far East.
Chapter 6


On 19 January 1967 Prime Minister Sato, in the course of a campaign speech at Ōtsu on the eve of the General Election, announced his intention to strive for recovery of all administrative rights over Okinawa.¹ Eleven days later, in Washington, the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of his private view that Okinawa should be returned to Japan as quickly as possible.²

On 22 March 'a high Foreign Ministry Source' gave the press to understand that Washington was insisting on retention of nuclear weapons in Okinawa and free use of other bases on the island. Reversion would be possible only if these conditions were recognized by Japan.³

The background to the Okinawa problem and the rise of mass movements dedicated to securing the island's return have been described by other writers.⁴ Okinawa was the military lynch pin of American Far Eastern strategy, intimately connected with the 'containment of China' and Washington's commitments to Chiang Kai Shek, South Korea and South Vietnam. Provisions implicitly covering the island's defence were included in the separate Treaties between the United States, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea.⁵ Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations Okinawa had developed into the greatest offensive nuclear base in the Far East. Vital training, communications and intelligence gathering facilities had also been established. With the outbreak of the Vietnam War Okinawa's role as a strategic bomber base came to the forefront. So too did its importance as a rear base, a giant island storage depot and staging point for troops bound for South-East Asia. By the autumn of 1967 some 10 per cent of American military supplies for Vietnam were reportedly passing through Okinawa. This amounted to some 450,000 tons of material per month.⁶ The conduct of operations from Okinawa was, of course, greatly facilitated by the fact that the island lay outside the scope of the 1960 Security Treaty and was under direct American military administration.⁷
All this made it virtually inevitable that the prospect of reversion would force Japan to examine once again, as in the period 1950-51 and 1958-60, the basic character of her relations with the United States, its Asian client states and the great Communist powers on the continent. In view of the trend of American policy, interest centred, in particular, on three issues. First, would the return of Okinawa at last herald the establishment of the Japan-centred anti-Communist Asian regional defence system that Dulles had attempted to create in 1951? Would Japan inherit not only the American administrative rights, but also, perhaps unwittingly, Okinawa's military role and the policies on which this was based? Was the return of Okinawa compatible with a policy of peaceful co-existence with China, or would Japan be drawn, despite her traditional policies, into closer diplomatic and, ultimately, military co-operation with South Korea and the Chiang Kai Shek régime? Second, even if a regional alliance were not immediately established, would Japan agree to facilitate the conduct of American Far Eastern policies by formally surrendering, as far as Okinawa was concerned, her rights of prior consultation under the 1960 Treaty? The uncertainties surrounding prior consultations have been examined in an earlier chapter. The existence of the huge Okinawa bases, close to Japan but outside the scope of the 1960 Treaty, had enabled both Tokyo and Washington to avoid testing the reality of the consultations clauses. (see Chapter 4). What would happen when Okinawa once more became, legally and administratively, Japanese territory? Would Japan make a special exception permitting virtual free use of the Okinawa bases to further American policies in the Far East? Would she attempt to assert her theoretical right to approve or reject American military action from Japanese bases on a case by case basis? The former solution would inevitably deepen the rift between Japan and China. The latter raised the possibility of serious friction with the United States on the one hand and the undying enmity of America's opponents on the other. Third, would Japan abandon her traditional hostility to the entry of nuclear weapons and permit retention of American nuclear bases on Okinawa after reversion?

After almost three years of tortuous negotiations, an American promise to return Okinawa was secured at the talks between Prime Minister Satō and President Nixon in November 1969. Much obscurity surrounded the precise terms of the agreement. However, from the text
of the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué and the subsequent explanations of Japanese and American spokesmen it seemed clear that

(i) The return of Okinawa would not involve Japanese participation in a regional defence system. There was no possibility of Japan undertaking military responsibilities in Korea, the Taiwan Straits or elsewhere in Asia.

(ii) Japan apparently reserved a right to approve or reject American military action from her territory on a case by case basis. However, by declaring that 'the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security', and that 'the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan', Mr Satō suggested a flexible attitude towards American military action from Japanese bases in these two areas.

(iii) American nuclear weapons were to be removed from Okinawa before reversion. Nuclear weapons could only be re-introduced in cases of extreme tension, when the security of Japan herself was threatened. Any other American requests to bring in nuclear weapons would be refused.

In this chapter, it will be argued that although Washington remained interested in a Japan centred regional defence organization and gave no indication of willingness to remove nuclear weapons until the Satō-Nixon talks, political conditions in Japan made wider responsibilities impossible. Pressure from the public, the Liberal-Democratic Party and an influential committee of academic advisers, dominated by representatives of the neo-realist school, persuaded the Prime Minister to demand removal of nuclear weapons and full application of the Security Treaty to bases remaining on the islands. Within the Government, opponents of reversion with nuclear bases intact strengthened their position in the wake of violent public reaction to a number of incidents involving American vessels and aircraft that occurred, fortuitously, at crucial stages in the negotiations. Important also were the far reaching changes in the international situation in 1968-69, notably the American de-escalation in Vietnam. The strength shown by dissident groups in the 1968 Party Presidential Election, then the overwhelming victory of Opposition candidates in two vital Okinawan elections finally made nuclear attached reversion impossible, at least from Mr Satō's point of view. The American position, however, remained
unclear. Moreover, South Korea and Taiwan were determined to ensure that reversion of Okinawa in no way jeopardized their own interests. The fate of Japan's two anti-Communist neighbours was a matter of concern for several groups within the Liberal-Democratic Party. However, the Pueblo incident and the later EC-121 affair had caused much alarm in Japan. The Japanese negotiators, therefore, while stressing the importance of South Korea and Taiwan to Japan's own security, directed their efforts towards ensuring that the Americans were not given a free hand, that Japan reserved the right to approve or reject American take-off for Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The apparent success of the Japanese in avoiding involvement in regional defence, securing removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and claiming, albeit in an equivocal fashion, some degree of control over American use of bases, is probably to be attributed to the strength of their bargaining position. In particular, it seems likely that signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was deliberately postponed until after the Satō-Nixon talks had secured return of Okinawa on terms acceptable to Japan.

1. Liberal-Democratic Party factionalism, foreign policy and the Okinawa issue, January - November 1967

The polarization of the Conservative Party over co-operation with the United States, China policy and the Vietnam War was described in the preceding chapter. From the winter of 1966-67, the stalemate within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the onset of the Cultural Revolution in China and public hostility to American policies in South-East Asia combined, for a time, to frustrate attempts either to improve relations with Peking or to align Japan more unequivocally with the United States. In the Liberal-Democratic Party the anti-Peking organizations continued their ritualistic denunciations of China's policies. The groups sympathetic to China continued to call for improved relations with Peking. Yet chaotic conditions in China made visits there difficult. The pro-China elements thus turned their attention to consolidating their political base at home and establishing contacts with American Congressmen of similar views. The road to better relations with China was seen to lie through Washington, not directly to Peking.
Despite Satō's victory in the 1966 Party Presidential Elections, the dominant factional coalition was not unchallengable, although the Prime Minister's position was made somewhat more secure by the factional proliferation that continued as a result of the breakup of the Ōno and Kōno groups. However, by the January 1967 General Election the dominant coalition (now composed of the Satō, Miki, Fukuda, Kawashima and Ishii factions) was confronted by virtually equal numbers of neutral and dissident Dietmen. The Funada, Mori-Shigemasa and Murakami factions (all derivatives of the Ōno and Kōno groups) and the large Maeo (former Ikeda) faction all stood aloof from the Cabinet. The Nakasone, Fujiyama, Akagi-Ishida and Matsumura factions actively opposed Satō. This factional configuration was not a simple case of dominant-conservative versus dissident-radical. Each camp contained both right and left wing elements which could, when factional interests permitted, be expected to press for implementation of their ideas. Within the dominant coalition Satō, Fukuda and Ishii inclined towards the right, Kawashima and Miki towards the left. Among the neutral and dissident groups the Funada faction was identified with extreme hostility to Communism, Nakasone now looked both right and left, Maeo carried on the Ikeda tradition of tolerant pragmatism and disinterest to ideological controversy, either on a local or global scale. The Mori-Shigemasa and Murakami factions were of indeterminate colouring. Fujiyama, Akagi and Matsumura continued their traditional advocacy of reconciliation with China.

A series of electoral reverses in the first quarter of 1967 embarrassed the dominant coalition, paving the way for an eventual split on ideological lines within its ranks. The performance of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the January 1967 General Elections was uninspiring. The percentage of the national vote secured by Conservative candidates dropped, for the first time, below 50 per cent, reaching an all time low of 48.8 per cent. The Conservatives succeeded in maintaining the number of seats (278) held prior to the election and Socialist representation actually declined from 141 to 140 seats. Yet these figures were deceptive. Just before the election the number of seats in the House of Representatives had been increased by 19, of which the Liberal-Democrats had expected to win 15. The fact that they succeeded only in maintaining their previous position meant, in reality, a loss
in Diet strength. The Party was dealt an even more devastating blow in April when, for the first time in the twenty years since the institution of gubernatorial elections, the Liberal-Democrats lost the Governorship of Tokyo to a candidate sponsored by the Socialists and the Communists. This development, like the gradual decline in the Conservative vote at General Elections, reflected trends evident for some years. In 1959 the Liberal-Democrats had polled an average of 53.0 per cent of the vote in elections for the 44 Prefectural Assemblies. This had subsequently dropped to 50.7 per cent, then finally to 48.3 per cent in the April 1967 elections.10

These events naturally aggravated the intra-party factional policy conflict, intensifying the controversy that had already effectively polarized the Party.

Fukuda and the right wing elements in the dominant coalition saw, behind declining Conservative electoral fortunes, the sinister machinations of the Japanese Communist Party, and, beyond that, the leviathan tentacles of an international conspiracy directed from Peking. The rot could only be stopped and the balance rectified by an immediate, far reaching confrontation with the radical camp.11 The left-wing component of the dissident coalition, on the other hand, alleged that the Government's policies themselves were at fault.12 Fujiyama, Furui, Matsumura and even Nakasone, bitterly attacked the Sato Cabinet's attitude to China and its support for the Vietnam War, which were claimed to be alienating the electorate from the Conservative camp.13

It was against this background that a split over defence and foreign policy developed in the ruling coalition itself. By the summer of 1967 it was clear not merely that the Liberal-Democrats were increasingly divided, but that the Prime Minister Mr Sato, and his Foreign Minister Mr Miki, were actually pursuing different policies. While the Prime Minister gave vociferous support to the American stand on China, Korea and Vietnam, the Foreign Minister thrust himself forward as the apostle of peaceful co-existence with the Peoples' Republic. Early in July Sato visited South Korea, the first visit to Korea by a Japanese Prime Minister since the Pacific War.14 While in Seoul he participated in an unscheduled conference with high ranking officials from South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.15 In September he visited Taiwan for talks with Chiang Kai Shek.16 In October he left for
a tour of South Vietnam, amid some of the most violent popular demonstra-
tions since the 1960 crises. On 13 October, during the course of a
visit to Australia, he openly expressed his support for the bombing of
North Vietnam. Finally, in November, at Mr Satō's invitation, Chiang
Kai Shek's son and successor, the Nationalist Chinese Defence Minister
Chiang Cheng Kuo visited Japan, making a series of fiery speeches
on reconquest of the mainland.

While the Prime Minister jetted between the capital cities
of Washington's Asian allies, the Foreign Minister, at the ASPAC meeting
in Bangkok in July 1967, propounded a policy of peaceful co-existence
with China. Elsewhere he stressed the folly of pursuing military
goals in South-East Asia, decried the tenacity of the Cold War mentality,
emphasized new trends and other possibilities in the world situation.
This stand was maintained throughout the summer and autumn of 1967, despite
the intensification of the Cultural Revolution, reports of Sino-Soviet
border clashes, Sino-British tension in Hong Kong and the virtual break-
down in relations between China and several South-East Asian countries,
particularly Burma and Indonesia. Quite apart from the fact that Miki
had always seen efforts to reduce Sino-Japanese-American tension as the
best guarantee of Japan's long term security, the Foreign Minister
clearly judged that Satō's pro-American stance had reached a degree
unacceptable to the Party as a whole. He was therefore manoeuvering
to capture the Party Presidency with the support of the dissident left
wing and neutral forces.

The reversion of Okinawa could not, in view of the basic
assumptions of American policy, be considered apart from the China
question. Thus, on this issue too, the Liberal-Democratic Party gradually
split along the familiar lines of cleavage. On the right, those groups
giving exclusive priority to relations with the United States inclined
towards retention of nuclear weapons and free use of bases. On the left,
groups well disposed towards Peking hoped for removal of nuclear weapons
or advocated postponing the island's return until this should prove
possible. Within the dominant coalition, Miki emerged as a proponent
of the latter alternative. For a time, however, the great mass of the
Party, including the powerful Maeo and Nakasone factions, gave no
indication of their stand.
Miki's talks with Secretary of State Rusk and other American officials early in October introduced a new element. Rusk apparently made it clear that Washington hoped Japan would undertake wider defence responsibilities after Okinawa's return. American interest in a North-East Asian collective security system appeared to be reviving. These revelations precipitated a complete fragmentation of opinion. Throughout 1967 the struggle swayed back and forth indecisively. No conclusion had been reached by the time of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in November.

A consensus was, however, established on two points. The first was that Japan would not, and because of her Constitution could not, alter her traditional policy of declining military responsibilities outside home territory. The second was that if agreement on an acceptable formula for Okinawa's reversion were impossible, the problem should be temporarily shelved and negotiations carried forward for separate return of the Bonins. These islands had no nuclear bases and were of little military value either to Japan or the United States. These views were conveyed by Miki to the United States Ambassador Mr Alexis Johnson on 11 October 1967. The question of the Bonins offered a temporary respite for all parties. Just before Prime Minister Satō's visit to the United States, American naval authorities told former Vice-Admiral Hoshina Zenjirō that there was no reason why the Bonins should not be returned quickly to Japan, separate from Okinawa. This information, it was said, was secretly conveyed to Satō on the eve of his departure for Washington.


Satō returned from the United States on 20 November 1967 with a promise that negotiations on the return of the Bonins would begin immediately, taking into account 'the intention of the Government of Japan...gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defence of the area'. Although the Okinawan problem had been discussed 'frankly', and President Johnson had expressed his 'understanding' of the Japanese position, it was 'recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East'. The American intention
eventually to return administrative rights to Japan was expressed more strongly than ever before, but no time table was given, no concrete formula enunciated.30

The Washington talks gave Satō the impression that return of Okinawa would be facilitated by a less hostile attitude to American nuclear bases, a more positive approach to defence and a China policy more closely aligned with that of the United States. It is probable that the Prime Minister did not, personally, find it distasteful to move in these directions. After his return to Japan Mr Satō began to speak with unparalleled enthusiasm on the twin themes of 'eradicating the nuclear allergy' and 'increasing popular defence consciousness'. There was also much discussion of 'the China threat'. Mr Satō fired the first volleys of the new campaign as soon as he stepped from the aircraft that had brought him from Washington. Remarking that 'if the people resolve to stand up and defend this nation, Okinawa can be returned within three years' and stressing that 'return...with nuclear bases intact is something that should be discussed hereafter', the Prime Minister stated

The Japanese Peace Constitution binds Japan alone. I am not thinking of any hypothetical enemies, but the Socialist Party's view that the Peace Constitution is an effective counter to the threat of Chinese and Soviet nuclear weapons is mistaken.

To make it clear this was not a call for an independent nuclear force but a reference to the deterrent power of American nuclear bases on Okinawa, the Prime Minister reiterated his opposition to a Japanese military nuclear program.31

Taking the lead from the Prime Minister, Government spokesmen expounded and developed the new themes throughout the winter of 1967-68. At the meeting of the Liberal-Democratic Party Executive Council on 14 December Fukuda urged that the time had come to remove the Japanese peoples' 'nuclear allergy'.32 This provided Mr Satō with a new slogan and by the end of the month the Prime Minister was telling the House of Councillors Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem that 'the people must have an accurate knowledge of nuclear power and rid themselves of the nuclear allergy'.33 Education Minister Nadao stressed the need to increase infant defence consciousness, outlining plans to incorporate
lessons on national security in a revised primary school syllabus. He later spoke of projected alterations to history textbooks, the object being to reveal 'clearly' the good points' of the national past. This, he believed, would increase children's 'self confidence'. The Liberal-Democratic Party's Draft Action Policy published on 16 January 1968, was characterized by a heavy emphasis on defence and related topics. This document decried the 'confusion of thought', 'the decline in public order and salutary customs' and the 'loss of the innate features of the Japanese nation' brought about by the post-war education system and leftist propaganda. These pernicious influences were directly responsible for the spiritual deficiencies of modern youth. Firm action was necessary to resurrect the Japanese spirit which, according to the Draft Action Policy, was based on the five pillars of 'human love', 'public spirit', 'love for the homeland', 'national spirit' and 'defence consciousness'. The document also noted China's emergence as a nuclear power and her 'uncompromising foreign policy'. This was described as 'a serious impediment to peace in Asia'. (Other problems facing Japan were the existence of the Socialist and Communist Parties which, along with the General Federation of Trade Unions (Sōhyō) were described as 'anti-parliamentary bolshevist forces', needing strict supervision and control. From January 1968 the Government began preparation for a massive publicity campaign to stimulate public 'defence consciousness'.

These developments were accompanied by a renewed emphasis on 'the China threat', discussion of which had somewhat subsided since 1966. The Satō-Johnson Joint Communiqué had spoken of 'the importance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China'. The Japanese Prime Minister had also endorsed President Johnson's conditions for a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and spoken of 'widespread support' in South-East Asia for American policies. At a general meeting of Conservative Dietmen on 24 November the Prime Minister spoke at some length on China's nuclear development. On 7 December Mr Satō told the House of Representatives that his greatest 'responsibility and duty' was to 'ensure the security of Japan'. Reviewing his recent South-East Asian tour the Prime Minister recalled the 'great interest' shown in Chinese nuclear development. It was 'natural' that Japan, too, should share this interest. On 18 December the Defence Agency Director General Mr Masuda told the House of
Councillors Budget Committee bluntly that Mao Tse Tung is, just as Khruschev said, an expansionist and a militarist [uproar in the House]. So I say that (China?) (Mao Tse Tung?) is a threat.  

These statements did not mean, however, that the Satō Government had at last come to regard China as an actual military threat to Japan. In his statement to the House of Councillors Budget Committee on 18 December, Mr Masuda was careful to explain that Chinese nuclear weapons are primitive....Judging from her national strength and internal situation, China is in miserable shape. That China, whose national strength [Masuda was presumably thinking in terms of gross national product] is only half that of Japan, should use these weapons is a ridiculous proposition...  

As Miki explained to the House of Councillors Budget Committee on 21 March 1968 [The Satō-Johnson Joint Communiqué, in referring to the threat of nuclear China] was speaking in an abstract way, about the psychological side of things. It was not referring to any concrete reality.  

As in the period 1965-66, references to the China threat were, basically, expressions of ideological hostility to China as a revolutionary power reinforced by fear of Chinese inspired subversion in Japan. More importantly they were, as before, made with an eye to their impact in Washington.  

The new policy emphasis also had far reaching implications for the intraparty factional struggle. The Satō-Johnson Joint Communiqué, with its clearly enunciated hostility towards China and virtual endorsement of American policies in Vietnam, was a direct challenge both to the left wing dissident factions and to Foreign Minister Miki in the dominant alliance. There was every indication that the Party's right wing was preparing for a head on clash with its opponents. The closely related issues of Okinawa, nuclear bases, defence and China policy would be used to antagonize, divide and break the dissident forces, to dominate the Party and Government, restore public confidence in the Conservative camp and, ultimately, purge society of left wing influence and the more undesirable legacies of the Occupation.
On his return from the United States the Prime Minister, as preparation for the anticipated upheaval, embarked on a major cabinet reorganization. Dissident factions regarded as basically amenable were given Cabinet and Party posts, factions regarded as intractible were isolated. Thus Nakasone was appointed Minister for Transport and Communications, Ogawa Heiji of the Maeo faction became Minister for Labour and Maeo's close associate Ohira Masayoshi was appointed Chairman of the Party Policy Board. Fujiyama and Matsumura were, naturally, left in the wilderness. More importantly, no new posts were given to Miki's supporters and the Cabinet reorganization seemed intended, in part, to circumscribe the Foreign Minister's influence within the ruling coalition.44


Satō's decision to eradicate the 'nuclear allergy', prepare the way for the return of Okinawa with nuclear bases intact, align Japan more closely with the United States and confront the dissident forces proved particularly inopportune. The tumultuous events of 1968, especially the aggravation of the base problem, tension in Korea, and the development of the Vietnam War, revealed the tenacity of the 'nuclear allergy', increased anxiety about close co-operation with the United States, made even Satō's closest supporters doubt the wisdom of nuclear attached reversion and enabled the dissident forces to launch a counter-offensive that proved a formidable challenge to the Prime Minister's position. By the end of the year it would have been politically difficult for Satō to open negotiations with the United States on the basis of nuclear attached reversion, all the more so because of indications that Washington's position was not as inflexible as previously thought.

Within the Liberal-Democratic Party, erosion of support for nuclear attached reversion began after the visit of the American nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise in January 1968. The Enterprise visit, approved shortly before Satō's trip to Washington,45 was widely interpreted as an American attempt to cure the Japanese 'nuclear allergy' by shock innoculation. Its effects were counter productive. Despite Government denials that nuclear weapons were on board,46 widespread suspicion that the vessel was, in fact, nuclear armed,
together with its role in the bombing of North Vietnam, aroused the 
Opposition Parties, the press, academic circles, students, the labour 
movement and large sections of the public to a pitch of hostility 
comparable to the 1960 crisis. Local authorities also opposed the 
visit. When the vessel entered Sasebo naval base, a stone's throw 
from Nagasaki, massive demonstrations brought the city and the surrounding 
region to a standstill. Demonstrations of sympathy were staged across 
the nation. The Enterprise was still in port, its crew unable to proceed 
ashore, when an American B-52 bomber, laden with nuclear weapons, crashed 
in Greenland, scattering its bombs onto the ice. The incident was 
prominently reported in the press and popular fear of nuclear weapons 
reached new levels of intensity.47 These events were not unnoticed 
by the Prime Minister. At the Cabinet meeting on 23 January Mr Satō 
complained, according to one report, that 'even housewives participated 
in the demonstrations or made statements sympathetic to the students'.48 
His conclusion at this stage was merely that the Government's public 
relations campaign had been inadequate.49 Nevertheless, on 22 January, 
after five days of continuous riots and demonstrations, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Mr Kimura announced that while Japan, because of her 
obligations under the Security Treaty, was prepared to welcome future 
visits by the Enterprise if requested,

...both the Japanese and American Governments must 
take cognisance of the fact that the Enterprise visit 
precipitated a popular reaction different to that 
caused by the earlier visits of nuclear submarines. 
Although there may have been many who went along 
merely out of curiosity, the Government must attach 
importance to the fact that the citizens of Sasebo 
showed a certain degree of hostility to the police 
(keibi jin ni aru teido no ugoki o shimeshita). 
Friendly relations between the two peoples is the 
basis of the Japanese-American Security Treaty 
system. It is the belief of both Governments that 
incidents damaging to future friendly relations should 
be, if possible, avoided.50

This announcement split the Government along the usual 
lines.51 Pressure from Satō, Fukuda and Kishi eventually forced 
Kimura to retract his statement. At the very moment the Fujiyama, Maeo, 
Matsumura, Miki and Nakasone factions were planning a counter attack, 
the United States naval intelligence vessel Pueblo was seized by North 
Korean patrol boats off Wonsan and taken into custody. The Enterprise, 
which had just left Sasebo, was diverted to the Sea of Japan, nuclear armed
B-52 bombers flew in large numbers into Okinawa, American air bases in Japan went on the alert and President Johnson announced a call up of reservists.

These events caused unparalleled alarm in Japan. On 25 January 'a high Foreign Ministry source' announced that 'depending on the development of the situation', Japan might request prior consultations with the United States. After the Cabinet meeting of 30 January the Chief Cabinet Secretary, in a carefully worded statement, told the press that while Japan 'had no alternative' but support the American version of the incident, 'the Japanese Government had no way of verifying the facts'. The reports on which Japan based her judgement had come, it was stressed, entirely from American sources. In response to questioning, Mr Kimura further emphasized that

support for the United States version of the facts of the incident is not support for the intelligence gathering activities of the Pueblo or for the threatening actions (shii kōdō) of the United States after the Pueblo's capture.

This was perhaps the strongest stand taken by Japan towards the United States on any foreign policy issue since the end of the Pacific War. It was also the signal for the beginning of a major Government level reappraisal of the Okinawa base question. On 7 February, disturbed by the new trends in the Liberal-Democratic Party, a 'high Foreign Ministry spokesman' warned that insistence on non-nuclear bases and full application of the Security Treaty would make reversion of Okinawa 'difficult'. The Chief Cabinet Secretary promptly requested the 'high source' to exercise more discretion.

The Enterprise visit and the Pueblo incident took place against the background of the 1968 Viet Cong Tet offensive. The destruction of numerous South Vietnamese towns and cities, the occupation of the American Embassy by Viet Cong commandos and Saigon's reverses in the countryside made, in their own way, as deep an impression in Japan as Japan's own victories over Imperial Russia had made in Asia some sixty years before. The impact was heightened on 1 April by the announcement of President Johnson's decision to begin de-escalation of the American war effort and not to run as a candidate in the next Presidential elections.
The Johnson statement threw Satō and his supporters into disarray. While explaining that there would be no changes in Japanese policy, the Prime Minister did nothing to retrieve the situation by claiming, quite untruthfully, that he had never supported the bombing of North Vietnam. For the most part, however, the right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party fell silent. In contrast, the dissident forces basked in the balmy light of vindicated prescience and reflected glory. The new turn of events was believed to herald the emergence of a more reasonable climate of opinion in Washington, a general relaxation of tensions, the dawn of an age of peace and harmony in the Far East. Former Foreign Minister Ōhira told the press that 'we have come to a turning point in world history'. The Vietnam War had taught Washington 'a valuable lesson'. The Americans would lose their crusading mentality, become less willing to intervene in the affairs of other countries. Nakasone saw the end of the Pax Americana, a new era of independence for the nations of Asia and the Pacific. Miki predicted American de-escalation would reduce Chinese fears of encirclement and attack. Peking would respond with a more flexible foreign policy, tensions would be reduced throughout the Far East.

The Tet offensive and the Johnson statement had important effects on the balance of power within the Liberal-Democratic Party. Miki openly dissociated himself from the Government. Maeo and Nakasone, whom the Prime Minister had attempted to win over in the November 1967 Cabinet reorganization, gravitated towards the dissident camp. By the middle of the year a powerful anti-Satō coalition had emerged.

It was, ironically, the very day the Viet Cong occupied the United States Embassy in Saigon that the dissident forces established a New Policy Discussion Council (Shin Seisaku Konwa Kai) to spearhead the attack on Satō's foreign and defence policies. The new organization was closely linked with the Afro-Asian Problems Study Association and similar bodies. What made the New Policy Discussion Council a more formidable challenge to the Party leadership than the earlier dissident organizations was the fact that it was virtually dominated by the powerful Maeo, Miki and Nakasone factions. Of the 74 Dietmen who joined in the first few weeks, 17 were from the Maeo faction, 13 from the Miki faction, 18 from the Nakasone faction.
Fujiyama dispatched 8 representatives, the Matsumura, Murakami, Kawashima and various neutral factions 4 each. Some weeks later a related organization, the Domestic and Foreign Situation Research Council (Naigai Seikyoku Kenkyū Kai) was set up by a group of about 30 Dietmen drawn mainly from the Matsumura, Miki, Nakasone and Fujiyama factions. Thus, by the summer of 1968, positive support for Satō and his policies centred around his own faction and the Fukuda and Ishii groups. The centre of active opposition had shifted from the smaller Fujiyama, Matsumura and Akagi-Ishida factions to the large factions led by Maeo, Miki and Nakasone.

These changes in the Liberal-Democratic Party factional balance coincided with the mounting public interest in neutrality described in the previous chapter. They also occurred at a time marked by Japanese-American conflict on a number of economic issues, and signs that two key American allies, Italy and Canada, were preparing to recognize the People's Republic of China. What the new factional balance implied for Japan's orientation within the Security Treaty system and, in particular, for the future of the Okinawa question, gradually became apparent in the succeeding months. The development of the Government attitudes to the base problem provided the most reliable barometer of the new climate of opinion.

In May 1968 abnormal levels of radioactivity were detected in Sasebo harbour during the visit of the American nuclear submarine Swordfish. This touched off a national outcry on the now familiar pattern. What was different this time, however, was the quick response of the Government to public sensitivity. The Prime Minister hastened to assure local authorities that port calls by nuclear submarines would be suspended until the cause of contamination became clear. Within the Government there was apparently little opposition to the Prime Minister's démarche. An expert committee from the Science and Technology Agency reported that contamination had been caused by the Swordfish discharging primary coolant water in the port. The United States, while acceding to the Japanese request to temporarily suspend nuclear submarine visits, appeared to deny this. The twenty weeks of tortuous Japanese-American negotiations that followed were marked by considerable friction and ill-feeling on both sides. By the end of October, however, the Japanese had received a promise that nuclear submarines would not, in future, discharge primary coolant in port, except in cases of emergency.
At the height of the Swordfish controversy an American F-4 Phantom interceptor based at Itazuke crashed into the campus of Kyūshū University, a few yards from the University's nuclear research institute. There were no injuries, although considerable damage was caused to university buildings. Yet in the emotionally electric atmosphere generated by the events of the preceding months, the incident touched off a reaction all out of proportion to its real significance. Even the right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party began to question the wisdom of locating American bases near heavily populated areas. The radical factions advanced one step further. On 5 June 1968 the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced that he did not think American bases were 'an absolute condition' for Japanese security.

Kimura was rebuffed by the Foreign Ministry and the Government hastened to assure the United States that it had no intention of requesting retrenchment or withdrawal of bases. There can be no doubt, that a major shift in opinion had taken place. In the aftermath of the Swordfish and the Phantom affair, Maeo and Nakasone moved from generalized criticism of Satō's diplomacy to explicit opposition to nuclear attached reversion of Okinawa. More significantly, perhaps, the Party Secretary General Mr Fukuda, who had been one of the first to attack the 'nuclear allergy', now announced his conviction that nuclear attached reversion was 'not very desirable'. There was also evidence that another pillar of the right wing, Funada Naka, Chairman of the Security Research Committee (see Chapter 5) was also wavering. The Prime Minister still maintained that reversion without nuclear weapons would be 'difficult'. Yet support for nuclear attached reversion was clearly fading, even in the Party's right wing.

This trend was accelerated by the growth of a view that American reliance on Polaris submarines and new developments in air transport were reducing Okinawa's importance, both as a nuclear and strategic base. During a visit to the United States in May 1968, Ōhama Shinsen, Chairman of the Party's Okinawa Problems Deliberation Council, became convinced that the United States would, if pressed, consider removal of nuclear bases from the island. This position was subsequently adopted by the Council, despite the fact that the Prime Minister continued to stress the 'important role' played by Okinawa nuclear bases in the security of the Far East.
Three elections in November 1968 further restricted the Prime Minister's freedom of manoeuvre. In the Liberal-Democratic Party Presidential Election Satō was elected for a new term with 249 votes. Miki and Maeo, who stood against him, received a total of 205 votes. This represented an increase of 20 per cent in the anti-Satō vote since the 1966 election. The Prime Minister could hardly regard this result as an endorsement of his policies, especially in the light of the changes taking place in the outlook of his own supporters. The Cabinet organized after the election represented, to some extent, a return to the 'all faction' Governments of the early Ikeda years. Miki, Maeo and Nakasone refused to participate directly, but 2 members of the Miki faction, 2 of Maeo's followers and one member of the Nakasone faction received Cabinet posts. Satō reduced the number of posts given to his own followers from 4 to 3. The Fukuda faction received 2 posts, other offices went to members of the Ishii and Kawashima factions. The dominant factions could ill afford to antagonize the now powerful dissident groups. Least of all could it confront them on Okinawa policy. Just before the Liberal-Democratic Party Presidential Election, Yara Chōbyō, a candidate supported by the Opposition Parties, was returned as Okinawan Chief Executive. His minimum demand was non-nuclear reversion with homeland level bases. Three weeks later another Opposition candidate, Taira Ryōshō, emerged victorious in the Naha mayoral elections. This seemed a clear indication that Okinawans endorsed the Opposition platform of non-nuclear reversion, full application of the Security Treaty and eventual removal of all bases. The swing to the left in Okinawa was also, perhaps, a sign that the political situation there could become uncontrollable if these expectations were not satisfied.

4. The Prime Minister decides to aim for nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa with full application of the Security Treaty, March 1969

On 10 March 1969 Satō announced his intention of negotiating with the United States on the basis of non-nuclear reversion of Okinawa with full application of the Security Treaty to the bases remaining on the island. This momentous decision was the logical outcome of the events described above. It was also influenced by two new factors. First, Government sponsored opinion polls apparently confirmed the impression, gained from the events of the previous year, that the public was overwhelmingly opposed to return of Okinawa with nuclear bases intact.
Towards the end of February, the Prime Minister reportedly saw the results of an unpublished opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Information Office. This poll allegedly showed 45 per cent respondents opposed to immediate reversion of Okinawa if homeland level, non-nuclear bases could not be realized; 25 per cent favoured immediate reversion even if bases remained in their existing state; the other 30 per cent were uncertain. This poll confirmed the results of earlier newspaper surveys. A Mainichi Shimbun poll of 3 October 1967 had shown only 1.6 per cent in favour of nuclear attached reversion, while 32.8 per cent of respondents demanded homeland level bases. Another 14.6 per cent had advocated complete removal of all bases. Another Mainichi Shimbun poll taken in May 1969 showed 3.0 per cent in favour of nuclear attached reversion and free use of bases, 9.0 per cent advocating removal of nuclear weapons and free use of bases, 52.0 per cent supporting non-nuclear, homeland level bases and another 25 per cent demanding complete removal of all American installations from the island. Polls taken later in the year showed basically similar results.

Two days before announcing his final decision on the reversion formula, the Prime Minister received a lengthy report prepared by the Okinawa Base Problems Research Council (Okinawa Kichi Mondai Kenkyū Kai). This unofficial advisory organ, chaired by a former naval officer, Kusumi Tadao, and dominated by representatives of the neo-realist school of strategic thinkers, came out strongly in favour of non-nuclear return of Okinawa, although it recommended flexibility in applying the prior consultations clauses of the Security Treaty. In the view of the Council, nuclear war in the Far East was highly improbably, conventional war, even in Korea unlikely. Okinawan nuclear bases were of no importance in the overall power balance in the Far East. Their role had been usurped by Polaris submarines and nuclear bases in the United States. Conventional bases in Okinawa had considerable, but declining, importance. The Okinawan problem was not, in essence, a strategic problem, but a problem of political relations between Japan and the United States. An amicable settlement would lay the basis for harmonious and co-operative relations between the two countries. An unsatisfactory settlement could give rise to Japanese-American tension and create, ultimately, an unstable situation in Asia and the Pacific.
5. The implications of Nixon's victory in the United States Presidential Election, November 1968

Just as developments in Japan were making nuclear attached reversion of Okinawa politically impossible, Richard Nixon's victory in the United States Presidential Election made it inevitable, not only that Washington would give increasing emphasis to Okinawa's military role, but that pressure would mount for Japanese participation in regional security organizations, directed specifically against China. Nixon's article in the October 1967 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, advocating the militarization of ASPAC had already caused considerable alarm in Japan.90 Towards the end of October 1968 Nixon outlined his views on Japan's role in Asia and the Okinawan negotiations to a reporter from the *Asahi Shimbun*. The then Presidential candidate made two points. First, without referring specifically to the question of Okinawa's nuclear bases, Nixon stressed that

...it must be recognized that the United States facilities on these islands are fulfilling an important role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the other Free Nations in Asia. My administration will pay attention to ensuring that no agreement [on the future of Okinawa] undermines in any way the position or the security of Free Asia.

Nixon's second point was that Okinawa would be returned ('eventually', not necessarily immediately) in correspondence with Japan's continuing leadership in Asia, in the direction of mutual dependence and regional co-operation'. What this meant in concrete terms was spelt out clearly.

"The question of the return of Okinawa", Nixon declared, "is not unrelated to the question of Japan's role in the collective security of Asia...I think it certain that as Japan becomes a leading economic power, she will come to play still greater roles, diplomatically, economically, politically and also militarily, for the maintenance of a sound balance in Asia". [italics my own].91

Nixon's electoral victory was thus the cause of much apprehension in Japan. There were gloomy predictions even in the more conservative sections of the press that the new President's schemes, if carried to fulfilment, would be detrimental to the peace of Asia.92 As in 1958-60, all sections of the Liberal-Democratic Party, were united in their opposition to involvement in regional security. Former Foreign
Minister Ōhira, speaking for the dissident factions, remarked that Nixon is well aware of Japan's situation and is supposed to know that to raise questions embarrassing to the Japanese Government will not be in the interests of the United States. ... What the United States has learned in Asia, at dear cost, is that Asian problems cannot be settled militarily. There is no choice but to settle them politically.

A military role for Japan, Ōhira declared, was 'impossible'.

In the weeks that followed Nixon's election, these views were reiterated by a distinguished collection of Conservative politicians and former diplomats. Sato, speaking for the dominant factions, commented merely that 'there are things which Japan cannot do'. The new Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi elaborated on this in an interview with the Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Japan would firmly maintain the three non-nuclear principles (see Chapter 7), there would be no conscription, no dispatch of troops overseas. ASPAC would not become a military alliance. Aichi emphasized this point strongly, a number of times. Finally, in mid-March 1969, the Director of the Legislative Bureau told the House of Councillors Budget Committee that participation in collective defence was, for Japan, unconstitutional.


Contact with the political realities of Japan had little immediate effect on President Nixon's flights of oratorical fancy. However, the new administration's vision of Japan's immediate role as a military power gradually faded in the course of 1969. It was otherwise with the President's hope to preserve the nuclear status quo on Okinawa. Right up until the Sato-Nixon talks in November, there was every indication the Americans would insist on retaining nuclear bases. Towards the end of April 1969 Tōgō Fumihiko, Director of the Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau, was told by Sneider and Halpern (both working, at the time, as assistants to the National Security Council), that, while no decision had yet been made, nuclear-free homeland level reversion of Okinawa would be 'difficult'. Nor was American comment on the Kusumi report, circulated privately among State and Defence Department officials in April, encouraging. The former Director of the State Department's East Asian Bureau Mr Yager reportedly asserted that
'nuclear devices were necessary'. This view was also allegedly shared by the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Mr Rowen.99

Early in May the Democratic Socialist Party Dietman Aso Yoshikata had talks in Washington with Sneider, the Senate Minority Whip Mr Scott (Republican) and the Director of the State Department's Japan Desk Mr Finn. His impression was that while the Americans were now resigned to the fact that no military help could be expected from Japan, Washington would insist that nuclear weapons remain on Okinawa. They would also demand that American use of bases be untrammelled by prior consultations.100 This view was seen to be general among Congressmen, and particularly strong in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Two weeks later a special envoy was sent to the United States to explain Japan's position to Congressmen. The envoy was given instruction to concentrate his efforts on the Chairman of the two Armed Services Committees and on Senator Scott.101 His exertions had little immediate effect. About this time the Washington Bureau of the Sankei Shimbun circulated questionnaires on the Okinawa problem to 100 Senators. Only 10 replies were received. Of these 10 only one (unsigned) supported the Japanese position of nuclear free, homeland level bases. There were 4 opinions in favour of removal of nuclear weapons and free use of bases. The remaining five were in support of the status quo.102 Sone Eki (Democratic Socialist Party) could thus receive little comfort when Kissinger told him, enigmatically, towards the end of May, that 'there is nothing which is absolutely necessary'.103 The Presidential adviser could, after all, have been referring to the Japanese Constitution.

Talks between Foreign Minister Aichi and President Nixon in June, and the subsequent Aichi-Rogers discussions, produced no clarification of the American attitude. The Americans reportedly adopted a hard line on the Chinese nuclear threat, rejecting Japan's indulgent view of Chinese capabilities and intentions. They also refused to accept Japan's optimistic view of the Korean situation. All this suggested a strong interest in preserving the Okinawan status quo.104

In the last six months of 1969 Japanese-American agreement was reached on most aspects of reversion. Yet the American position on nuclear weapons showed no signs of changing. Japanese efforts to persuade the United States at the Aichi-Meyer talks in mid-July,105 at the meeting
of the United States-Japanese Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs towards the end of that month, then at the Aichi-Rogers talks in mid-September met with no apparent success. Aichi was so disturbed by the inflexible attitude shown by the Americans in September that, just before his departure for Japan, he reportedly telephoned Rogers to make a last minute appeal on the nuclear question. Despite this he was obliged to report to the Party Foreign Affairs Research Council on his return that he had failed to reach agreement with the Americans.

Finally, the talks between Aichi and the new American Ambassador Meyer before Satō's visit to Washington in November, while reaching agreement on most of the clauses in the Joint Communiqué, remained deadlocked on the nuclear question. The very day the Prime Minister arrived in Washington for the final negotiations, 'a United States Government source' told the press that 'no commitment' had been made on the nuclear base question. This was to be settled between President Nixon and Mr Satō.


The negotiations prior to the Satō-Nixon talks also failed to reach agreement on the question of whether the prior consultations clauses of the 1960 Treaty would be fully applied to Okinawa. Reversion of Okinawa would inevitably reveal the true character of prior consultations. Would Japan permit the United States to exercise the carte blanche it had actually enjoyed because of Okinawa's exclusion from the 1960 Treaty? Or would the Japanese attempt to give substance to the right of veto they legally possessed? The issue was inextricably linked both with the credibility of American guarantees to South Korea, South Vietnam and the Chiang Kai Shek régime in Taiwan, and to Japanese perceptions of their own security interests in these areas. The United States had shown, from the beginning, strong interest in free use of bases. Washington's position, as explained by an unidentified 'Government source' on the eve of the Satō-Nixon talks, was that while bases would be returned on 'the homeland level',
...the Japanese Government's attitude to prior consultations has been, up till now, always to say "no". It is thought that this will undergo a substantial change in future, so that the application [of the concept] "homeland level" will be different. In particular, it will be extremely important for Prime Minister Satō... to explain clearly that Japan will adopt an attitude to prior consultations different from that followed hitherto.112

The view that maintenance of the status quo in Korea was essential to Japanese security was strong in some quarters. (see Chapters 1, 5 and 8). There was, however, little feeling that Taiwan or South Vietnam had similar importance. The anxiety caused by initial American over-reaction at the time of the Pueblo crisis has already been noted. After the Pueblo incident, some sections of the Liberal-Democratic Party began to display an interest in revising the Security Treaty to include a clearer statement of Japan's right of veto at prior consultations. The sensitivity of the issue made it difficult to discern how widespread this interest was. It was certainly not universal. The Party Secretary General Fukuda Takeo, Kaya Okinori and former Prime Minister Kishi all argued strongly in favour of an American right of free take-off, untrammelled by prior consultations.113

Strong pressure was also applied by America's various Asian allies. On 4 March 1969 South Korean President Pak Chung Hi warned a group of visiting American Congressmen that return of Okinawa to Japan would cause a serious flaw in North-East Asian defence.114 The same day he suggested to a group of American journalists and businessmen that pressure be put on Japan to rearm and join an Asian collective defence organization.115 Shortly afterwards an editorial in the semi­official Taipei 'Central Daily News' expressed similar sentiments116 and Satō revealed to the Diet that he had been approached by the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador Chen Chi Mai.117 It was not long before the South Vietnamese became engaged in similar manoeuvres.118

The Japanese appeared at first willing to make concession. In March it was reported that the Government had been considering a plan whereby American forces could be deployed from Okinawa without consultations in cases of large scale conflict in areas around Japan. Korea and Taiwan were specifically mentioned as examples of 'areas around Japan'.119 The Kusumi report, presented on March 8, also recommended a
flexible attitude to prior consultations. This was difficult to reconcile with the growing desire in the Liberal-Democratic Party for some measure of real control over American actions. After the presentation of the Kusumi report the Chief Cabinet Secretary told the press that 'the principle of prior consultations is to put on a brake. The policy hitherto taken towards prior consultations will not change at all with the reversion of Okinawa'. In an interview with the Tōkyō Shimbun in March 1969 the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced Japan would decide her attitude at prior consultations 'autonomously' and on the basis of 'national interest'. Japan would probably exercise her power of veto in the case of American action 'in far away places', for example, 'outside the scope of the Far East'. This suggested an indulgent view of American deployment to South Korea and the Taiwan area, but not necessarily of American actions in Vietnam, which fell outside the scope of the Far East as defined in 1960.

On 15 April 1969, five weeks after these indications of the shape of the eventual compromise, an American EC-121 intelligence aircraft based at Atsugi was shot down over North Korea and a situation similar to the Pueblo incident threatened to develop. While the approach of the final Okinawa negotiations demanded greater support for American actions than previously, this incident revived a number of old fears. The positions of the two allies moved further apart. The Americans, urged on by the South Koreans, insisted on preserving the right of free take-off. The Japanese worked to assert their right to examine American actions on a case by case basis.

Immediately after the EC-121 incident the South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Pak Chung Hun conferred with President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers. He subsequently announced that while Okinawa was a question to be settled between Japan and the United States, South Korea 'could not but be concerned'. The same day (1 May 1969) the Democratic Socialist Party Dietman Asō Yoshikata announced, after talks with high ranking American officials, that the United States attached 'great importance' to the EC-121 incident. Washington intended to make Japanese co-operation in the defence of South Korea a condition for the return of Okinawa, although a direct Japanese military contribution to the security of the area was regarded as impossible.
Sone Eki received the same impression from his talks with American officials towards the end of May. After his talks with President Nixon and Rogers in June, Foreign Minister Aichi confessed to the press that 'the United States seems insistent on free use of bases'.

American inflexibility caused the Japanese to dig in their heels. On his return from Washington, Aichi told the Diet that the American bases on Okinawa would, after reversion, be considered on exactly the same level as bases in the homeland. They would cease to have any connection with agreements between the United States and the other Asian allies, such as South Korea and the Philippines.

Satō assured the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee that advance agreements on Japan's attitude at prior consultations were impossible. This was repeated by Aichi at a press conference on 20 June 1969. On this occasion, however, the Foreign Minister implicitly warned Washington about its future use of Japanese bases. It was 'desirable to create a situation where prior consultations were not used'. The United States knew that Japan was 'making an issue of this question', and would therefore be careful about using Japanese bases 'for matters which do not concern Japan over much'.

Talks on the problem continued, apparently without agreement, throughout the summer and autumn of 1969.

8. The Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué and the basis for the final agreement.

The Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, which laid the basis for the final agreement on the return of Okinawa, was an extraordinarily ambiguous document, subject to widely differing interpretations both at home and abroad. The only clearly enunciated agreement was that Okinawa would be returned in 1972, 'subject to the conclusion of... specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support'. However, viewed in the context of the Japanese-American negotiations prior to November 1969, and in the light of subsequent Government explanations, the Communiqué seemed to mean that nuclear weapons were to be removed from Okinawa before reversion. Japan agreed to facilitate American fulfilment of Treaty obligations in South Korea, Taiwan and other areas in the Far East. However, there was no unequivocal guarantee of prior approval for all American action in these areas. More importantly, there was no
indication that Japan herself intended to assume wider military responsibilities. Her only new defence commitments were to Okinawa itself.

(a) Nuclear Weapons

According to the Communiqué, the Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultations system under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government, as described by the Prime Minister. 

Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Aichi explained this as a pledge on the part of the United States to remove all nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the time of reversion. Subsequent explanations by Aichi and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Mr. Kimura clarified that while the phrase 'without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultations system', permitted the United States to raise the subject of re-entry of nuclear weapons, Japan would not permit such weapons to be brought back in unless her own existence were in jeopardy. At all other times, American requests to bring in nuclear weapons would be refused.

(b) South Korea and Taiwan

In article 4 of the Communiqué the Prime Minister '...stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security'.

After President Nixon reaffirmed America's intention to honour its treaty obligations to Taiwan, Mr Satō also '...said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan'.

Article 7 stated that the provisions of the 1960 Security Treaty and related arrangements would be applied 'without modification' to Okinawa after reversion. However, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East....
was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above [i.e. with full application of the prior consultations and other provisions of the 1960 Treaty] should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defence of countries in the Far East, including Japan.

The references to South Korea and Taiwan in article 4 caused much misunderstanding in Japan and abroad. The Government subsequently stressed that Japan had not agreed to participate actively in regional defence, was undertaking no military commitments in these two areas and that the constitutional ban on overseas service for the Self Defence Forces still remained. On 17 February 1970 the Prime Minister, after explaining the importance of South Korea and Taiwan to Japanese security, assured the House of Representatives that

...the duty of the Self Defence Forces is to protect Japan from aggression. The provisions of the Constitution make overseas service impossible (kaigai ni shutsudō suru koto wa kenpō no tatamae jō kara mo ariemasen). 135

Thus, as far as can be judged from the public record, the Joint Communique was speaking of the Japanese attitude, at prior consultations, to American requests to use Okinawa-based forces in the defence of South Korea and Taiwan.

After his talks with Nixon, Sato told the press that he would handle such situations 'in a forward looking manner' (maemuki no taido o motte jita ni taisho suru).136 This suggested virtual advance approval of American action in these areas. However, later explanations indicated the Government believed it still had a right of veto. After his return to Tokyo, Sato told the press that despite the phrase 'forward looking', Japan would not necessarily 'co-operate at all times'.137 Foreign Minister Aichi later elaborated that while it was 'important for the security of the Far East' that the United States fulfil its obligations to Soeul and Taipei, Japan reserved the right to approve or reject American action at prior consultations on a case by case basis. Japan's attitude would be decided 'in accordance with her national interests'.138 The important differences in nuance between these statements and the Joint Communiqué suggest that Sato and Nixon had failed to reach complete agreement on the consultations problem.
However this may be, it would be difficult to maintain the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué represented an unconditional Japanese capitulation to American pressure. Okinawa was to be returned without nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government felt able to claim some degree of control over American action from Okinawan bases. More importantly, on some important matters of principle, Japan appeared to stand in 1970 exactly where she had stood in 1951 – protected by the United States, but with no military commitments beyond her shores. It is possible that this favourable outcome was not unrelated to Japan's having postponed signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until after the Satō-Nixon talks. It is to the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that we will now turn.
Chapter 7

JAPAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1955-1970

On 3 February 1970, after a long period of hesitation, Japan signed, with significant reservations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty sponsored by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

While the desire not to sacrifice a vital bargaining point in the last stages of the Okinawan negotiations was, perhaps, a factor behind Japanese hesitation on the Treaty, it was not the only, nor necessarily the most important element. In this chapter, it will be argued that the Japanese attitude to the Treaty was influenced mainly by the stand of other nations and fear of the effects of a non-proliferation agreement on civil nuclear development. Fear of the Treaty's consequences for national security and the desire to preserve a nuclear weapons option were probably of little importance. Despite the emergence of a small academic 'nuclear weapons lobby', the Government remained disinterested in an independent deterrent. Opposition to nuclear weapons remained the dominant note of public and informed opinion. In the last years of the 1960s, there was no widespread desire, at any level, or in any significant section of the community, to see Japan's emergence as a great nuclear power.

1. The Japanese civilian nuclear program and its military implications

Partly because of the country's delicate international position, partly because efforts were directed towards more basic economic construction, development of nuclear energy received little attention in Japan in the early 1950s. It was not until 1955-56, during Hatoyama's Prime Ministership, that the Atomic Energy Basic Law was passed by the Diet, the Atomic Energy Commission established and a modest civil nuclear program begun. Two years later, Japan's first reactor, a small research model obtained from the United States, went into operation. Yet it was only in 1961 that a concrete long term plan for the development and use of nuclear energy was completed by the Atomic Energy Commission. In the early 1960s, on the basis of this plan, considerable advances were made. The first Japanese made nuclear reactor
went into operation in 1962. The following year an experimental electric power reactor obtained from the United States, then a full scale commercial nuclear power station of the Calder Hall variety, imported from the United Kingdom, went into operation at Tōkaimura. Shortly afterwards, construction of another nuclear power station was begun at Tsuruga. July 1963 saw completion of plans for the construction of a nuclear powered merchant vessel.¹

Interest in nuclear energy during these years had little direct connection with Chinese nuclear development. The main centre of concern was Japan's future as an advanced industrial nation with a rapidly increasing demand for electric power, the production of which had been, since 1950, increasingly dependent on outside sources of oil supply. In 1956 oil imports accounted for 25 per cent of Japan's primary energy supply. By 1967 this had risen to 55 per cent. It was expected to reach 80 per cent in the 1980s. It was argued that large scale development of nuclear power stations would reduce the cost of electricity and, since 90 per cent of Japan's oil supplies were imported from the politically unstable Middle East, increase the security of supply.² Indeed, if any one factor were to be isolated as having had a decisive influence on official Japanese attitudes to nuclear energy, it would not be China's development of nuclear weapons, but Japan's increasing reliance on expensive foreign oil supplies imported from a politically unstable region. The 1969 report of the Security Research Council (Anzen Hosō Chōsa Kai), an unofficial auxiliary organ of the Defence Agency, devoted an extraordinary amount of space to this problem (125 pages out of a total of 324 pages of text).³ The corollary of anxiety over this problem is, of course, to avoid similar dependence on foreign supplies of nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

Considerations of this sort, perhaps influenced by rising tensions in the Middle East, led in April 1967 to the revision of the 1961 long term plan and large scale reorganization of the machinery established to implement it. Despite the fact that in 1967 Japan had only a single 160 megawatt commercial nuclear power plant in operation, and another nearing completion, the new plan provided for a total operating capacity of 6000 megawatts by 1975, 15-20,000 megawatts by 1980, 30-40,000 megawatts by 1985. Two new nuclear power stations were to be in operation by 1970, another 7 by 1975, a score or so by 1980.⁴ Few nations have formulated such ambitious schemes for nuclear
power development. Yet in view of Japan's virtual total lack of natural resources, and her position as one of the world's great industrial nations, few countries have been faced with such a pressing need for a vast civilian nuclear program.

The Atomic Energy White Paper (Genshi Ryoku Hakusho) issued in 1968 was, significantly, subtitled 'the road to autonomous development' (jishu kaihatsu e no shinro). Autonomous development was a constantly recurring theme in official publications and pronouncements since at least 1961. The desirability, first of moving into the field of uranium mining abroad, then of developing an independent domestic capacity to perform all the steps associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, had been much discussed. Since the mid-1960s, there were increasing signs that concrete steps were being taken to realize these objectives.

From the beginning, the United States acted as Japan's sole supplier of enriched uranium. Because of the military significance of enrichment technology Japanese interest in this matter, like that of West Germany, caused problems in her relations with Washington. Of the three available isotope separation methods (the gaseous diffusion formula, the centrifugal method and the chemical separation method), the centrifugal method aroused most interest in Japan. Ironically, it was the proliferation of this method that the United States was apparently most concerned to discourage. However, studies reportedly revealed that the cost of electricity produced by centrifugally enriched uranium would be a fifth or a sixth the cost of that produced if the gaseous diffusion method were employed. It thus seemed inevitable that Japanese interest in centrifugal diffusion would continue to grow.

Again, because of its potential military significance, much interest also centred on Japanese production of plutonium. Plutonium is produced as a by-product in the normal course of operations in uranium fuelled power reactors. The Tōkaimura power station had an annual output of about 80 kilograms of plutonium and it was predicted that Japan's total production of the element in 1980 would be about 5000 kilograms annually. It was expected that much of this would be used for research into fast breeder reactors, in which Japan showed considerable interest, or used in place of enriched uranium in ordinary thermal reactors.
Nevertheless, other possibilities did not escape the attention of observers. Shortly after the Atomic Energy Research Institute Tōkai Research Plant announced the successful extraction of 18 grams of high quality plutonium 239 on 16 May 1968, the Director of the Institute told the press that Japan was in a position to produce her own atomic weapons. These remarks were given wide, if unfavourable, publicity. Nevertheless, one month later, the annual report of the Security Research Council (Anzen Hoshō Chōsa Kai) referred, for the first time, to Japan's latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It was remarked that while production to hydrogen bombs would be difficult, Japan's technological level and existing nuclear facilities were sufficient to produce both uranium and plutonium bombs. It was estimated that the Tōkai facilities could, if converted to military use, manufacture about 20 plutonium type atomic bombs per year. As for missile development, the Council saw no marked difference between Japan and France. A little over twelve months later the American magazine Newsweek reported that the Japanese Government was undertaking a secret study of whether production of nuclear weapons would be in the national interest. This was promptly denied by Japanese Government spokesmen. Nevertheless, the Newsweek article heralded the beginning of speculation, both in the West and in the Communist block, on the subject of Japan's nuclear policies.

2. The attitude of successive Governments to nuclear weapons

Examination of interest in an independent deterrent runs the risk of giving the matter more prominence than it deserves. While it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that discussion of nuclear weapons was not a new phenomenon in Japan, and that it was unconnected either with the Chinese bomb or Japan's development of a potential nuclear capability, it would also be misleading to regard enunciation of principle as a declaration of intention. If the views of a few isolated individuals are excepted, there was not, up till 1970, any significant feeling in the Government that an independent deterrent was a realistic alternative or a necessary adjunct to the Security Treaty. At the same time, some Conservative leaders were anxious to establish the principle that Japan could, if future, yet unforeseen changes in the international situation placed her security in jeopardy, manufacture and possess her own nuclear weapons.
As early as May 1957, almost seven years before the first Chinese nuclear test, the then Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke told the House of Councillors Cabinet Committee that 'there would be nothing against using nuclear weapons if it were within the limits of self defence'. His view, as later elaborated in the House of Councillors Budget Committee, appeared to be that since the right of self defence was guaranteed by the Constitution, it was permissible to employ all the discoveries of modern science for this purpose. Most existing nuclear weapons were, however, 'offensive' in character and were thus incompatible with the Constitution. Yet in March 1959 Kishi told the Diet that possession of certain types of nuclear weapons (nuclear tipped Honest John missiles were cited as an example) could be reconciled with Article 9. He stressed, however, that as a matter of policy his Government would not attempt to transform Japan into a nuclear power. The circumstances under which Japan might decide to develop nuclear weapons were not elucidated, but the possibilities would seem limited to a breakdown in the effectiveness of the American nuclear deterrent or a Japanese decision to break with the United States and embark on the road to great and, perhaps, rival power status. Neither of these eventualities seemed probable in 1957. As far as can be judged from the public statements of the Japanese Government on the Soviet and Chinese threat, and the efficacy of the American deterrent, neither seemed probable in 1969-70.

Formalization of the Japanese position on nuclear weapons did not take place until December 1967, when Prime Minister Satō enunciated 'the three non-nuclear principles' (hikaku san gensoku) and the 'four nuclear policies' (kaku yon seisaku). Taken by themselves, the three non-nuclear principles - that Japan would not manufacture, possess nor permit the entry of nuclear weapons - represented a significant retreat from the Kishi position. The corollary of the three non-nuclear principles, however, were the four nuclear policies. These were that Japan would adhere to the three non-nuclear principles, make efforts to promote nuclear disarmament, give high priority to her civil nuclear program and depend on the American nuclear deterrent for protection against 'international nuclear threats'. This seemed to imply that Japan would adhere to the three non-nuclear principles and remain a non-nuclear power so long as the American deterrent continued to function. This was,
however, merely an explanation of the assumptions on which the Security Treaty system had always rested. The only difference was that in 1951 Japan had probably been incapable of moving rapidly to nuclear power status, whereas she was capable of doing so in 1967-68.15

On the eve of the non-proliferation negotiations there were, within this general framework, various shades of opinion within the Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party on the question of an independent deterrent. On this, as on most other issues, different views tended to be associated with different factions or supra-factional organizations. Yet discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, up till 1970, touched off none of the intense factional struggles so characteristic of Japanese decision making. This was partly because Okinawa and related issues provided ample opportunity for internecine warfare, partly because the main problem with the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not thought to be Japan's right to preserve a nuclear weapons option, but whether the inspection clauses would hinder Japan's civil nuclear development program.

The increasing opposition, both in the nation at large and within the Liberal-Democratic Party, to American nuclear bases on Okinawa has already been described. In general, factions opposed to the presence of American nuclear bases on Okinawa were also alarmed by mention of an independent deterrent. This applied particularly to the Fujiyama, Maeo, Matsumura and Miki factions.16 The possible exception was the Nakasone faction. While Nakasone had a long reputation of opposition to Constitutional revision, he was also known as a promoter of 'defence consciousness' and a strong anti-Communist. He had occasionally been associated with efforts to improve relations with Peking, but unlike some other groups in the Liberal-Democratic Party, did envisage the possibility of a Sino-Japanese conflict. Yet what Nakasone apparently feared most was Sino-American rapprochement carried out in disregard of Japanese national interests. To ensure that Japan could not be ignored when Washington and Peking eventually decided to settle their differences, Nakasone proposed not immediate military nuclearization, but heavy investment in civilian nuclear technology and space research. He did not explain what steps should be taken if these moves failed to preserve Japanese interests.17 Yet while Nakasone was interested in preserving a nuclear option, he could hardly be
described as an advocate of a Japanese nuclear weapons program. Further to the right, personalities such as Kaya Okinori, who urged retention of American nuclear bases in Okinawa, were, somewhat paradoxically, strongly opposed to development in a Japanese deterrent.18

The small factions on the extreme right of the Liberal-Democratic Party, centering around Kishi, Fukuda and hawkish personalities such as the former Chief of the Air Staff Genda Minoru (see Chapter 8) combined an apparently unshakeable belief in the efficacy of the American nuclear umbrella with a view that Japan's own nuclear weapons option should not be surrendered lightly.19 These views were reportedly popular in section of the Foreign Ministry.20 In view of the fact that, throughout the 1960s, no group appeared more confident of American military power, and more anxious to forge closer ties with the United States, it must be assumed that the interest in an autonomous option was, during this period, largely academic. When, in November 1969, Foreign Minister Aichi decried the 'dangerous arguments' of 'people on the extreme right' about nuclear weapons,21 he was probably not thinking of Kishi, Fukuda or Genda.

There were, however, within the Liberal-Democratic Party, one or two forceful advocates of an independent nuclear deterrent. On the left Utsunomiya Tokuma, son of a radical pan-Asianist general and long time enthusiast for better relations with Peking, was said to believe that nuclear weapons were necessary to achieve independence from the United States.22 Further to the right, the patriotic novelist Ishihara Shintarō and Kuraishi Tadao, sometime Minister for Agriculture and Forests, both appeared as positive exponents of nuclear weapons.

At the time of the Pueblo incident in January 1968 Kuraishi, upset by the fact that Soviet and American naval vessels were repeatedly fouling Japanese fishing nets, told the press that Japan would not be treated so lightly if she had nuclear weapons and a 300,000 man army. These remarks threw the Diet into uproar. After three weeks of governmental chaos the Minister was forced to resign. The Prime Minister assured the House of Representatives Budget Committee that 'there is no change in the Cabinet's policy of upholding peace and maintaining the present Constitution'.23 Kuraishi was unrepentant and told the press that Japan was now 'a first rate power', and there
were many things to be reconsidered.24

There can be no doubt that Kuraishi meant what he said. Yet the Kuraishi statement was not Government policy. The former Minister's explanation of the circumstances surrounding his outburst has the ring of truth, and reveals much about his character.

After the Cabinet meeting the other day I had to go and face this press conference in the cafeteria for Members of the House of Representatives. Well, as far as my own province of agriculture was concerned there was nothing to say. There was nothing at all to say. However, at the press conferences held in the cafeteria they always bring out oranges and coffee and so on. Well, I looked at my watch and found there was still some time before the Budget Committee meeting, so I chatted on about general matters. Just then the Director-General of the Fisheries Agency popped in with something about a report and one of the journalists asked what was happening in the Japan Sea. So I told him that Japan was making representations to Russia, America and South Korea. Then I came out with these other statements.25

In March 1969 Ishihara made his position clear in the House of Councillors Budget Committee. The three non-nuclear principles were 'products of ignorance', Japan was destined to become a great nuclear power. The latter part of Ishihara's discourse was drowned by heckling from the Opposition and gasps of astonishment from lady admirers in the gallery. After the former novelist had resumed his seat, Foreign Minister Aichi replied

I am old and my thinking is somewhat old fashioned, but there exists a nuclear allergy in the good sense of the term. It is the belief of a majority of the Japanese people that we should persuade ourselves never to be armed with nuclear weapons and I myself share these sentiments.26

The actual administration of Japan's civil nuclear energy program was vested in the Science and Technology Agency. The 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law also gave the Atomic Energy Commission a powerful voice in all decisions on nuclear policy. This Commission, whose six members were all appointed by the Prime Minister, included both representatives of the scientific community and a few former bureaucrats and administrators.27 As far as the present writer knows, no member of the Commission, from its establishment in 1955 until the time of writing, has been identified with advocacy of a nuclear weapons program. The international consequences of appointing an exponent of
autonomous deterrence would be immense. Such an appointment would undoubtedly herald a radical change in Japan's traditional policies.

The Japan Science Council (Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi) also occupied an important, though less formal position in nuclear policy decision making machinery. This body, composed of eminent scientists and other academics, elected independently by the academic community, had originally been established as a governmental advisory organ on science and education. While it had no legal authority to participate in decisions, its views could not be ignored. In a very real sense, it was the representative of Japan's scientific establishment. No major project in any field requiring the services of advanced technology could be carried out without the co-operation of this body. Under the leadership of Japan's most eminent nuclear scientists, the Japan Science Council adopted, throughout the period under consideration, a position extremely hostile to use of atomic energy for military purposes. Especially notable was the declaration against nuclear weapons issued by the Council in April 1962 and the resolutions of the second and third congress of Japanese scientists at Kyoto in May 1963 and February 1966. An important source of the 'nuclear allergy' regretted in some political circles was, in fact, the Japanese scientific community. Conservative military critics occasionally lamented the fact that even if a decision to become a nuclear power were made, it would be virtually impossible to find the four or five hundred scientists necessary to implement the project. The views of the younger generation of scientists are, however, unknown to the present writer.

During the 1960s, articulate proponents of a nuclear weapons program in the academic community and among the public at large were few in number. Public opinion remained overwhelmingly opposed to nuclear weapons (see table 7(i)). In January 1968 the Yomiuri Shimbun sought the views of one hundred leading intellectuals and military critics. Only four were in favour of an autonomous deterrent. Among the handful of individuals advocating a nuclear weapons program were former Lieutenant-General Doi Akira, Kamigawa Hikomatsu (honorary lecturer at the University of Tokyo), Kuramae Yoshio (lecturer at Asia University), Maeda Hisashi (writer for the Asahi Shimbun), Sekino Hideo (former naval officer and military critic) and Tamura Kōsaku (lecturer at Kokushikan University).

Talks on non-proliferation had been in progress for some years before any reaction was evident in Japan. This was perhaps understandable. The focus of negotiations up to 1966 had been whether West German 'access' to nuclear weapons under American 'control' (as part of a NATO nuclear sharing arrangement) would constitute proliferation. Japan was not interested in multi-lateral security arrangements. There was no possibility of Japanese participation in any North-East Asian multi-lateral nuclear force sponsored by the United States. Thus the Japanese, while supporting the general principle of non-proliferation, remained for a time aloof from the negotiations.

During the latter part of 1966, the focus of the non-proliferation debate in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (of which Japan was not a member) and the United Nations General Assembly moved away from the question of West German access to nuclear weapons. There were clear indications that some measure of Soviet-American agreement on non-proliferation was imminent.

Since the submission of the separate Soviet and American draft treaties to the Disarmament Committee in the autumn of 1965, it had been evident that the nuclear super-powers had little interest in linking non-proliferation to a nuclear test ban or measures for overall disarmament. Moreover, it soon became clear that the United States and the Soviet Union were anxious to bring 'peaceful nuclear explosions' within the scope of the proposed treaty. From the summer of 1967 it also became apparent that while the United States and the Soviet Union hoped to see all the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapons states open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Commission, the Soviet Union would oppose similar scrutiny of her own installations, both civilian and military.

Thus the interest of non-nuclear weapons states, both neutral and aligned, increasingly centred on three questions. First, was participation in a treaty that restricted their own activities but placed no limits on military nuclear research, development and stockpiling by existing nuclear weapons powers, either in their own national interests or a genuine contribution to world peace? Second, what effects would the proposed ban on peaceful nuclear explosions have on civil nuclear
development? Third, was it reasonable that non-nuclear weapons states be subjected to intensive supervision, while the facilities of established nuclear powers remained immune from scrutiny?

From the beginning, the non-aligned members of the Disarmament Committee, in particular India, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, had been critical of the allegedly

...unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-nuclear countries, while the nuclear powers continue to hold onto their privileged status or club membership by retaining and even increasing their deadly stockpiles.42

Throughout 1966-67, despite strong British and Canadian support for the Soviet-American stand that it would be 'unnecessary as well as imprudent' to insist on commitments to nuclear disarmament prior to the treaty, there was a strong tendency among non-nuclear nations to view the situation in this light. On 19 August 1966 the eight non-aligned nations on the Disarmament Committee submitted a memorandum urging that a non-proliferation treaty be 'coupled with or followed by' concrete disarmament measures.43 More significant, from the Japanese point of view, was the West German memorandum of 7 April 1967 recommending 'more comprehensive solutions' than a 'limited non-proliferation treaty'. (The Germans suggested, specifically, a halt in the production of fissionable material for military purposes, a ban on production of delivery vehicles and a comprehensive test ban treaty.)44 Eventually the British and Canadians, while not going so far as to link the treaty with disarmament measures, came to the conclusion that some commitment to disarmament was important for the long term stability of the arrangement.45

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions was first raised by the United States at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on 9 August 1966.46 The United States maintained that since there was little distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, both should come under the provisions of the treaty. Established nuclear powers would, however, offer their services to other signatory states, conducting nuclear explosions for engineering and other purposes. The American proposal was strongly attacked by the Indians, who saw it as an attempt to enforce 'non-proliferation of science and technology'.47
This position was adopted by other countries. The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty concluded on 14 February 1967 specifically permitted nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Brazil and Mexico adopted a particularly strong stand on this issue. In March 1967 the Brazilian Deputy Foreign Minister announced that while Brazil was committed to the principle of non-proliferation,

"...we shall not waive the right to conduct research without limitation and eventually to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives that will enable us to perform great engineering works...to ensure the economic development and the welfare of the Brazilian people."49

This was also the West German position. On 1 February Foreign Minister Brandt told the Bundestag that prohibition of peaceful nuclear explosions would affect the civil nuclear program of all non-nuclear weapons states.50 On 27 April, after receiving assurances from Rusk, Brandt announced that while West Germany was 'ready to support everything' to prevent military misuse of nuclear energy, it could not accept restrictions on 'peaceful utilization'.51

The non-nuclear weapons states also objected to the proposed inspection arrangements, which appeared to give established nuclear powers free and unilateral access to the fruits of research and development throughout the world. Great Britain and the United States eventually professed a willingness to place their non-military nuclear installations under an inspection system. The Soviet Union, however, refused to permit inspection on her territory. In addition some nations, while willing to accept inspection, were anxious to be inspected only by friendly powers. This was apparently the position of West Germany and several European nations. Thus the question of whether Euratom safeguards could be regarded as equivalent to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency arose.52

There were, of course, a number of nations concerned either about the effects of the treaty on their security or anxious, for other reasons, to preserve a nuclear weapons option.

It is against the background of these international developments, in the context of the domestic situation outlined in the first part of this chapter, that the evolution of the Japanese position must be understood.
On 9 February 1967, one week after Foreign Minister Brandt revealed West Germany's position to the Bundestag, the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda Takezo announced that Japan, too, was anxious to preserve a right to conduct peaceful nuclear tests. If guarantees on peaceful nuclear development were not included in the final treaty Japan, despite her commitment to non-proliferation, would be obliged to take 'grave decisions'. The Shimoda Statement caused surprise both at home and abroad. There was widespread speculation that Japan's attitude to nuclear weapons had undergone a fundamental change. She was now seen, in some quarters, as being determined to preserve a nuclear weapons option. In order to dispel these suspicions, 'a high government source' hastened to assure the press that Shimoda had merely expressed 'a personal opinion'. The Director of the Atomic Energy Bureau of the Science and Technology Agency announced that the long term plans of the Atomic Energy Commission made no provisions for research into peaceful nuclear explosions. On 18 February 1967 Prime Minister Satō told the press that while Japan generally supported non-proliferation, there were undoubtedly possibilities for employing nuclear explosions in large scale engineering projects, for example, 'in the case of constructing a second Panama Canal'. Satō added, however, that it was difficult to distinguish peaceful and military nuclear explosions. He stressed that 'there is absolutely no possibility of our bringing in or developing nuclear weapons, bound by the Shimoda Statement'. On 9 March the Atomic Energy Commission announced that under present conditions it was 'not desirable for Japan to study or develop nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes'. A fortnight later Foreign Minister Miki repeated this statement in the House of Representatives Budget Committee, adding that the view that Japan should develop peaceful nuclear explosions was 'dangerous'. Japan thereafter went to some trouble to distinguish her position from that of nations such as West Germany and Brazil. Thus on 13 April the Foreign Minister told an audience in the Imperial Hotel that Japan's attitude was 'different to that of West Germany'. Japan's over-riding interest was in nuclear disarmament. West Germany, according to Miki, had been seeking access to nuclear weapons. Japan's interest subsequently shifted from the concrete issue of peaceful nuclear explosions to more general questions related to civilian nuclear development, in particular to the inspection clauses.
During the first part of 1967, as the shape of the eventual Soviet-American agreement began to emerge, Japan, like other interested parties, made considerable efforts to influence the character of the treaty. In April, former Vice Foreign Minister Ōno Katsumi was sent to Washington with instructions to urge the Americans to include reference to concrete disarmament measures in the final draft. He was also to press for a special clause eliminating discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear nations in the peaceful development of atomic energy. He was to explain Japan's hope for some special arrangement whereby established nuclear powers would furnish services and information to non-nuclear weapons states. He was to stress that there should be no difference in the inspection arrangements for nuclear and non-nuclear powers. In addition, a clause permitting reappraisal of the treaty at five yearly intervals should be included. When the treaty came up for reappraisal under this arrangement, non-nuclear powers would attach importance to the disarmament efforts of the nuclear weapons states during the five year period. Finally, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union should do something to ensure the security of the non-nuclear states. Japan's chief concern was, however, with the question of peaceful nuclear development.60

What influence Ōno's visit had on the Americans remains unknown. On 20 April he returned to Tokyo with the news that the United States would 'bear (Japan's contentions) in mind' when negotiating with the Soviet Union on the treaty draft. The United States had not expressed its views on the individual Japanese contentions, but Ōno felt that Japan's position on peaceful nuclear development would be 'fully adopted'. The Americans had not mentioned disarmament but the treaty was bound to take up this issue 'in one form or another'.61 Miki's talks with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in May 1967 were also encouraging. The Foreign Minister was given to understand that clauses guaranteeing 'complete equality' in peaceful nuclear development would be incorporated into the final treaty. At the same time, the United States appeared willing to accept some measure of inspection, although the Soviet Union still refused to have any of its own installations opened for examination.62

The joint Soviet-American draft treaty presented to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference on 24 August 1967 fell short of satisfying the demands of many non-nuclear powers. The draft required
signatory nuclear weapons nations

...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly.

Non-nuclear weapons nations were not to

...manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

A separate article (article IV) referred to the 'inalienable right' of all parties to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. The two super powers had been unable to agree on inspection procedures and the relevant article (article III) was thus left blank. The treaty preamble referred to the interest of the contracting parties in nuclear disarmament as a step to 'general and complete disarmament' under 'strict and effective international control'. There were no special provisions for the security of non-nuclear states. The treaty was to be of unlimited duration, although a review conference was to be held after five years. Provisions could only be amended with the approval of a majority of participatory states, including all the nuclear weapons nations and all members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 63

While there was some satisfaction with the reference to the 'inalienable right' to peaceful nuclear development, Mexico, Egypt and Sweden urged that nuclear weapons states recognize a 'duty' to aid non-nuclear nations in this regard. Brazil and India continued to insist on the right to develop and utilize peaceful nuclear explosions. Nigeria not only hoped that non-nuclear states would have access to peaceful explosions through an international agency, but that scientists from such states, by co-operating with scientists from established nuclear powers, could obtain a thorough knowledge of explosion technology. Such was the character of the amendments proposed by Nigeria that the Canadian representative on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee commented that the Nigerians seemed to be asking for 'information on how to make a nuclear explosive device'. 64 As far as inspection was concerned, nations such as Sweden, Brazil, Italy, India, Burma and Nigeria continued to press strongly for the application of uniform inspection procedures to all signatory nations. 65 There was also criticism of the absence of a time limit and of acceptable procedures
for reassessment and revision. Moreover, the references to disarmament in the preamble were widely regarded as perfunctionary. There were strong demands for some commitment to concrete disarmament measures, and a view that the efforts of the super powers in this direction should be linked directly to the question of treaty revision. Finally there was, in some quarters, anxiety about the absence of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear nations.

After consideration of these criticisms, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a joint revised draft to the Disarmament Committee on 18 January. The articles concerning non-proliferation remained basically unaltered. No exceptions were made for peaceful nuclear explosions. However, article IV was expanded to suggest that established nuclear powers would co-operate in the peaceful programs of non-nuclear nations. Another article (article V) stipulated that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions would be extended to non-nuclear nations on a 'non-discriminatory basis'. The interest of signatories in disarmament was expressed in a separate article (article VI). No concrete disarmament proposals were, however, announced. The previously unlimited duration of the Treaty was changed to 25 years. Amendment and review procedures remained the same as before.

Article III of the new draft stipulated safeguards and inspection procedures. Only the facilities of the non-nuclear signatories were the subject of inspection. However, the wording appeared to permit EURATOM nations to arrange for self inspection, provided they came to an agreement acceptable to the International Atomic Agency.

The new joint draft referred only generally to the security of non-nuclear powers. However, on 7 March 1968 the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union proposed to the Disarmament Committee to offer the protection of their nuclear umbrellas jointly, through the United Nations Security Council, to non-nuclear signatories of the Treaty. This proposal was subsequently accepted by the Security Council.

These amendments satisfied some of the demands of the non-nuclear powers. Yet much uneasiness still remained. Anxiety centred, in particular, around the unequal inspection clauses, the provisions for review and the failure to link non-proliferation with concrete disarmament measures. The United States and the Soviet Union eventually accepted a
Swedish amendment permitting a majority of signatories to call a review conference every five years. This provision was included in the final draft, but much dissatisfaction still remained.71

While Japan, unlike Brazil and India, no longer professed any special interest in the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, Japanese reaction to the successive treaty drafts paralleled that of other non-nuclear weapons powers with important civil nuclear programs. The initial absence of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear nations was noted with regret, but on the grounds that it was desirable to obtain as wide a participation as possible, particularly from the non-aligned nations. There was no mention of threats to Japanese security.72 The tripartate proposal on security assurances of 7 March 1968 was naturally welcomed. Yet it was stressed that this was 'of no particular advantage to Japan, since her security has already been assured'.73 Japan had little direct interest in the security aspect of the problem.

The main thrust of Japanese criticism was directed at the inspection clauses. Japan's stand was very similar to that of West Germany, Italy, and Sweden. Prime Minister Satō and Foreign Minister Miki repeatedly stressed that both nuclear and non-nuclear powers should be subject to inspection.74 Indications that Britain and the United States would permit inspection of their peaceful nuclear facilities were welcomed. Soviet disinclination to follow their example led to an unofficial decision in April 1968 to bar Soviet inspectors on the International Atomic Energy Agency from Japan.75 Moreover, while the inclusion of provisions guaranteeing equality in peaceful nuclear development created a favourable impression in Tokyo, there was considerable uneasiness about how these provisions would be applied. Finally, although there was little objection to the 25 year time limit, there was much interest in arranging reappraisal of the treaty at five yearly intervals.76

Towards the middle of 1968 it became apparent that Japan's final attitude would be influenced by the stand of other non-nuclear nations, in particular by West Germany. Japan, like West Germany and various other nations, voted in favour of the 12 June 1968 United Nations resolution recommending the Treaty.77 yet declined to participate in the signing ceremony on 1 July.78 At a press conference shortly afterwards the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated specifically that Japanese signature of the Treaty would be considered 'after consultations with West Germany'.79
This stand had important consequences. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 West Germany, Italy and several other European nations adopted an increasingly cautious attitude towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Japan followed their example. 'Reserve' towards the Treaty was the dominant theme at the meeting of Japanese Ambassadors in Europe held in Stockholm in September 1968. This meeting was attended by Miki, who afterwards discussed the Treaty with West German Foreign Minister Brandt. Brandt stressed the unpredictability of the Soviet Union. On his return from Europe, Miki addressed the Liberal-Democratic Party Foreign Affairs Research Council, the Security Research Committee and other interested bodies. His report on the talks with Brandt and the conference of Ambassadors moved these bodies to adopt, for the first time, a 'cautious' position on the Treaty. On 16 September 1968 the Chief Cabinet Secretary told the press that the Government had originally intended to obtain approval to sign the Treaty at the next Diet session. However, 'international developments', in particular the Czechoslovakian question, had impelled a restudy of earlier policies. The Chief Cabinet Secretary specifically mentioned the changing attitude of West Germany and Italy. Thus when, in mid-October 1968, the United States Senate temporarily shelved ratification of the Treaty, advocates of 'caution' in Japan strengthened their position. The final decision was postponed until 1969.

By the time the United States Senate approved ratification of the Treaty in March 1969, three new factors had emerged to complicate the situation. First, domestic pressures had forced the Japanese Government to demand return of Okinawa, without nuclear bases, from a new American Administration that was believed to attach great importance to those bases (see Chapter 6). As early as May 1969 an unidentified 'Government source' suggested to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun that signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty might be used as a lever in the Okinawa negotiations. Second, the anti-Treaty campaign conducted by the Opposition Parties since mid-1967 began to reach a climax. Third, within the Liberal-Democratic Party, where interest in the Treaty had hitherto been minimal, a strong movement against unconditional participation began to develop.

Discussion of Opposition attitudes lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to remark that the Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Kōmeitō and the Communists, while rejecting the
concept of an autonomous nuclear strike force, failed to see the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a peace symbol. The Socialists and, to some extent, the Communists and the Kōmeitō considered the Treaty to be, in essence, part of a Soviet-American attempt to dominate and divide the world, to isolate and encircle China. It was thus in no way conducive to peace or the relaxation of tensions.87

Sentiments of this kind perhaps motivated some of the pro-
China factions in the Liberal-Democratic Party. Yet as far as the ministerialist Party was concerned, the crucial factors behind hesitancy on the Treaty were concern over the inspection clauses, interest in the attitude of West Germany, the desire to preserve a trump card for the Okinawa negotiations and pressure from the small nuclear weapons lobby described earlier in this chapter.

One other important factor must not be overlooked. In 1967-68 the Liberal-Democratic Party had shown remarkably little interest in the non-proliferation question. Indeed, in April 1967 it was alleged that when a certain Liberal-Democratic Party Diet member heard mention of the words 'kakusan jōyaku' (proliferation treaty), he believed they referred to an agreement sponsored by the then Secretary General of the Party, Tanaka Kakuei (affectionately known to his colleagues as 'Kakusan').88 The Party Foreign Affairs Research Council studied the issue for the first time in November 1968, after negotiations had been completed and the Treaty was open for signing. Full scale discussions only began in June 1969.89 It was probably only then that the faction leaders and the Party rank and file realized the true character of the agreement. There was thus an element of delayed reaction in the Party attitude, coupled with a pained realization that Party organizations had been bypassed in the negotiations, that the Government and the Foreign Ministry were about to present the nation with a fait accompli.

The strength of anti-Treaty sentiment in the ministerialist Party became apparent early in November 1969. On the eve of Satō's departure for Washington the Party Executive Council resolved that Japanese participation in the Treaty should be decided only after 'careful study'. The Prime Minister did not, therefore, officially clarify his Government's stand during the Washington talks, although the matter was on the agenda.90
Satō was probably not displeased to be confronted with such a revolt on the eve of the Okinawa negotiations. Rather as one might have expected, the Prime Minister's success in securing nuclear free return of Okinawa, then the Conservative victory in the November 1969 General Elections, were followed by a drive to win over opponents of the Treaty within the Liberal-Democratic Party. The formation of a Social Democrat - Free Democrat coalition in West Germany, committed to the cause of non-proliferation, also had an important influence. On 26 January 1970 a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Research Council, the Security Research Committee and the Special Committee on Science and Technology recommended that although the Treaty still contained a number of 'doubtful points', it would be preferable to work for their rectification after the agreement had been signed. The question of signing would be left to the discretion of the Government. On 3 February 1970 Cabinet formally decided to sign the Treaty The Japanese Ambassadors to the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain appended their signatures to the document the same day.

Japan's signature, like that of West Germany, Australia and some other nations, was not unconditional. At the time of signing the Government issued a long and somewhat obscure statement emphasizing its 'deep interest' in steps towards general disarmament, the renunciation of force or the threat of force in international disputes and in security guarantees for non-nuclear nations. The statement also expressed the hope that France and China would become parties to the Treaty. Yet it would seem that the only actual precondition for Japan's ratification was the arrangement of acceptable inspection procedures. 'The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty', the statement declared. However this may be, there is little evidence to suggest that the Japanese attitude to the Treaty was determined primarily by a desire to retain a nuclear weapons option. In 1970 the 'nuclear allergy' remained one of the most salient features of Japanese society, at all levels.
Chapter 8

THE SELF DEFENCE FORCES AND DEFENCE
DECISION MAKING IN THE 1960s.

The origins of the Self Defence Forces and Japan's initial post-war military planning have been examined in earlier chapters. With the completion of the First Defence Power Consolidation Plan in 1960, the Japanese forces developed along guidelines laid down by the Second (1962-66) and Third (1967-71) Defence Plans. A Fourth Defence Plan was scheduled to begin in 1972. The present chapter will discuss Japanese defence planning and the state of the Self Defence Forces in the 1960s. Briefly, it will be argued that during the 1960s the Japanese forces, with some significant modifications, continued to develop within the strategic framework established in the late 1950s. By the end of the decade, Japan's military strength, although substantial in comparison with that of some neighbouring countries, was still relatively small. Japanese defence spending, modest compared to that of the major NATO nations, escalated partly as a result of inflationary pressures and other non-military factors. During the 1960s, at least some of Japan's highest ranking military leaders were right-wing zealots of fundamentally anti-democratic character, dissatisfied with their country's military posture and the state of post-war society. Yet there were indications that the 1954 civilian control system had been consolidated and the influence of the generals on policy making held in check by men of different outlook. There were also indications that the next generation of military leaders might be more willing to accept the system. The Finance Ministry also played an important role in keeping down the level of military spending. Public opinion remained hostile to expansion of the forces and the activities of pressure groups interested in greater military efforts exerted little influence on policy makers. The future role of Japan's emerging military-industrial complex was, however, uncertain.

1. Japanese military strength in the 1960s (see tables 8.(i), 8.(ii), 8.(iii)

In the last years of the Third Defence Plan the total number of Japanese under arms in all three services was approximately half the number of British, half the number of French, West Germans or Italians, twice the number of Dutch, and three times the number of Australians under arms during the same period. In numerical strength Japan's armed
forces were about equal to those of Czechoslovakia or Poland. In contrast to most of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, Japan maintained only a small number of reservists. Only 1.0 per cent of her male population of military age were actually under arms, compared with 3.8 per cent in Britain, 4.7 per cent in France, 4.0 per cent in West Germany, 3.6 per cent in Italy, 4.7 per cent in the Netherlands and 3.5 per cent in Australia. In the area of the Far East, Japan's trained, armed manpower paled into insignificance beside that of the Peoples' Republic of China. It was also only a fraction of that maintained by South Korea or the Chiang Kai Shek régime in Formosa. At the same time the Japanese forces were, numerically, approximately equal to the Soviet or American Far Eastern forces stationed outside combat zones in that area. They were only slightly smaller than those of North Korea and substantially larger than those of many South-East Asian nations.

The extreme flexibility of naval and air power makes regional comparisons difficult. It is often inappropriate merely to compare numbers of submarines, cruisers, destroyers, escorts, bombers and interceptors. Requirements for destroyers, for example, vary with the estimated enemy submarine and air threat to surface vessels, not with the number of enemy destroyers. However this may be, Japan's air and naval power was, by the end of the 1960s, by no means inconsiderable. Despite the absence of long range bombers, aircraft carriers and missile launching submarines her forces had a balance and potential flexibility lacking in the forces of some neighbouring states.

While the gross tonnage of the Japanese navy in 1970 was approximately equal to that of the Australian or Canadian navies, in the actual number and modernity of large vessels it could be more appropriately compared with such middle ranking NATO naval powers as West Germany or Italy. In the Pacific, the Japanese fleet was overshadowed by American and Soviet naval power. Yet it was doubtful whether Chinese sea power was more formidable and the Japanese navy certainly outclassed the maritime forces of small neighbours such as the two Koreas, the two Vietnams, Formosa and the Philippines.

Measured in terms of the number of front-line combat aircraft the Japanese air force was about half the size of the West German, three fifths the size of the Polish or the British, smaller than
the Swedish and about equal to the French or Italian air forces. In the Far East, North Korea and the Chiang Kai Shek régime maintained air strength approximately equal to that of Japan. On paper the Chinese air force was vastly superior but if modernity of equipment is again taken into account Japan was probably, after the United States and the Soviet Union, the third greatest air power in the Far East.

It is difficult to know what all this meant in practice. After all, the 1960s saw Czechoslovakia, a highly industrialized nation with modern ground and air forces similar to those maintained by Japan, crumble overnight after the application of moderate Soviet pressure. In contrast Vietnam, with no industrial base and virtually no sea or air power, precipitated, in recent years, the collapse of one European empire and fought the world's greatest military power to a standstill.

2. Japanese-American co-operation and the strategies of the three services

During the 1960s, within the framework of the Security Treaty and the traditional policy against overseas service, Japan's air and maritime forces and, to a lesser extent, ground forces, continued to develop in close co-operation with those of the United States. Despite the reduction of American bases in Japan the chief functions of the Japanese air force remained the protection of American offensive power and Japanese cities from Soviet attack. Adoption of the BADGE (Base Air Defence Ground Environment) semi-automatic aerial warning control system, linked, through American Fifth Air Force Headquarters with United States installations in Korea and Okinawa, increased the level of Japanese-American military co-operation. What this meant for Japan's decision making autonomy in time of crisis remained obscure but throughout the 1960s Japan, South Korea and Okinawa formed, for all practical purposes, a common air defence unit centered on Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

As yet unpublished agreements deepened Japanese-American naval co-operation in Far Eastern waters. As in the 1950s the Soviet Union was apparently regarded as the chief hypothetical antagonist. It was widely believed that in the event of a Soviet-American conflict the Japanese navy was to block the straits from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific and undertake convoy duty as far southwards as Guam and the
Philippines. Japanese naval exercises placed heavy emphasis on anti-submarine operations, as well as routine coastal patrols, port defence and minesweeping.

For the Japanese army, too, the main hypothetical external antagonist remained the Soviet Union. Thirty per cent of Japan's ground strength, including her only fully mechanized division and her strongest artillery units were concentrated in Hokkaidō, often within sight of Soviet territory. There were no comparable concentrations along the west coast of Honshū, opposite Korea, or in Kyūshū, the island nearest Korea and China.

In the wake of the 1960 upheaval, however, the ground forces paid increasing attention to internal security. It was argued that against the background of growing Soviet and Chinese power and continuing tension in Korea, the strength of the Japanese left wing and the existence of a large urban based and economically depressed Korean minority, increased the possibility of Communist revolution at home, perhaps in conjunction with limited conventional attacks on parts of Japan, or on her shipping lanes. The sweeping reorganisation of the army in 1960-62, the change over from an organisation based on six large Regional Forces and four Mixed Brigades to one based on thirteen smaller, more mobile and more mechanised divisions, was partly designed to counter this alleged threat. So too was the reversion to the Police Reserve Force arrangement of concentrating large forces within easy striking distance of Tokyo and the industrial cities along the shores of the inland sea.

3. Japanese military spending in the 1960s. (see tables 8.(iv), 8.(v),8.(vi))

While Japan's annual military spending in the two decades since the Occupation remained within one per cent of the gross national product (the smallest percentage for any comparable nation) and represented a declining percentage of the national budget (13.5 per cent in 1954, 9 per cent in 1960, 7.7 per cent in 1967,) the annual rate of increase in her actual military expenditure was the highest in the world. In 1955 Japan's total military expenditure (exclusive of MSA aid) was U.S.$368,600,000. By 1960 this had risen almost 140 per cent to U.S.$508,400,000. Defence spending in 1966 totalled U.S.$958,000,000, almost double the 1960 figure. By 1969 it had risen to U.S.$1,344,000,000, three and a half times the size of the 1955 military budget. Japanese
defence expenditure in 1969 almost equalled the combined military budgets of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, the Philippines, the Formosan régime and South Korea. Japan's military spending in 1970 was approximately equal to the entire Thai budget and more than twice the size of the Philippines budget.\(^6\)

Statistics of this kind, however startling in isolation, lose much of their impact when examined in the light of developments in other countries. The increases in the Japanese military budgets, both in absolute terms and relative to expenditure in South-East Asia, were paralleled by increased military spending in most comparable nations. The Japanese increases were steeper than most and Japan's relative position in the international military budget hierarchy certainly changed during the 1960s. Yet the changes were much less spectacular than is sometimes suggested.

In 1955 Japanese defence spending was slightly greater than that of the Netherlands (103.8 per cent), slightly smaller than that of Belgium (94.9 per cent) or Sweden (94.3 per cent). It amounted to 8.6 per cent of the 1955 British defence budget, 14.5 per cent of the French, 16.7 per cent of the West German, 20.2 per cent of the Canadian and 54.7 per cent of the Italian defence budgets. The Japanese spent only 83.2 per cent as much on their armed forces as the Australians and 86.9 per cent as much as the Indians. Precise figures for South-East Asia at this time are difficult to obtain but Japan's military spending in 1955 was almost equal to the combined defence budgets of the Philippines, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia.

During the 1960s the Japanese gradually overtook the Dutch and the Belgians, a development not unrelated to the disintegration of these powers' colonial empires in Asia and Africa. By 1969 the Japanese defence budget was one and a half times as great as the Dutch, over two and a half times as great as the Belgian. During these years the differences between Japan and the major NATO nations tended to diminish. However, the great disparity between the scales of their respective military budgets remained. In 1969 the Japanese spent only a quarter as much on defence as the British, the French or the West Germans. The 1969 Japanese military budget was about 70 per cent of the Italian, 80 per cent of the Canadian. It was approximately the same size as the Indian, Australian and Swedish defence estimates for that
year. That is to say, in the field of defence spending, the 1960s saw Japan move from the bracket comprising such powers as Belgium and the Netherlands into the bracket centering on such countries as India, Australia and Sweden. A vast gap still remained between the military efforts of Japan and the chief NATO powers. Further, what has been said about the differences between Japanese and South-East Asian military spending could also be said about the Australian and South-East Asian defence budgets.

In 1970 the Japanese armed forces were undoubtedly stronger, better equipped, more mobile, better trained and disposed of greater fire power than in 1955 or 1960. However the same could be said of the forces of the two superpowers, the NATO and Warsaw pact nations and most of Japan's Asian and Pacific neighbours. Thus whether the increased defence spending had made Japan relatively stronger as a military power is a difficult question to answer.

Much of the rapid increase had clearly been absorbed by rising costs of manpower, equipment and maintenance. This was, of course, a world wide phenomenon and much of the escalating defence spending of other nations could have been explained in similar terms. The fifth annual report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in May 1971 estimated that sixty per cent of the increase in the world's defence spending in 1970 had been caused by inflation. In Japan the inroads made by inflation were probably greater. Defence Agency studies, for example, revealed that personnel costs absorbed a significantly larger proportion of the annual defence budget in Japan than in comparable European countries. The cost of recruiting, training, feeding, housing, entertaining, paying and insuring military personnel was estimated to absorb 21.2 per cent of the West German military budget, 21.4 per cent of the Swedish, 30.1 per cent of the French, 33.4 per cent of the British and 36.7 per cent of the Italian. In Japan personnel costs of this kind annually consumed 43.5 per cent of the defence budget, more than twice that of West Germany or Sweden. Personnel costs increased drastically during the 1960s. Salaries doubled between 1960 and 1967. By the end of the decade it was two and a half times as costly to recruit and equip one foot soldier and twice as costly to maintain a sailor and an airman than it had been in 1960.
The percentage of the Japanese defence budget consumed by purchase of weapons and equipment (40.9 per cent), while higher than that of France (31.2 per cent) and Italy (29.6 per cent), was roughly comparable with that of West Germany (37.1 per cent), Sweden (40.2 per cent) and Great Britain (41.0 per cent). Here, too, costs continuously escalated. In 1953 domestic construction of the 3400 ton escort vessel Harukaze cost U.S.$5,997,000 (¥2,159,000,000). Annual maintenance costs averaged at that time U.S.$850,000 (¥306,000,000). In contrast, production of the 3050 ton Amatsukaze-type anti-aircraft escort vessel in 1965 cost U.S.$18,600,000 (¥6,696,000,000) three times the price of the Harukaze. Annual maintenance costs had almost doubled. The absolute cost to Japan of the F86 jet fighter during the First and Second defence plans was U.S.$280,500 (¥101,000,000) per machine. Average annual maintenance costs were U.S.$98,600 (¥35,500,000). On the other hand the F104-J, which formed Japan's mainstay fighter during the Third Defence Plan, cost U.S.$1,136,100 (¥409,000,000), with annual maintenance expenses of U.S.$240,900 (¥86,730,000). This represented a four fold increase in the cost of the fighter and a two fold increase in maintenance. Admittedly the F104-J was a superior machine, with greater range, versatility and more sophisticated equipment. In this sense the changeover qualitatively strengthened the Self Defence Forces. Yet, if such things could be measured, it would be interesting to see whether the political and military advantages gained by the changeover increased parallel to the increase in expenditure the changeover entailed.

Another factor contributing to the escalation of the Japanese defence budget was the decline of American military aid. Since the figures for this aid which, in the late 1950s and early 1960s made a vital contribution to the Japanese build-up, were not included in the annual budgets, the scale of Japan's own military spending during these years gave a misleading impression of her defence expansion as a whole. From 1958-60, for example, the Self Defence Forces obtained an annual average of U.S.$416,753,000 (¥150,031,000,000) worth of arms and equipment. Of this U.S.$261,031,000 (¥93,971,000,000) or 62.6 per cent was procured at home, U.S.$10,056,000 (¥3,620,000,000) or 2.4 per cent was imported, U.S.$15,581,000 (¥5,609,000,000) or 3.7 per cent was received as reimbursable aid. These figures were included in the annual
defence budget. However, a further U.S.$130,086,000 (¥46,831,000,000) worth of arms and equipment, or 31.2 per cent of the total, was obtained in the form of non-reimbursable aid from the United States and was thus not taken into consideration in the annual budget.

With the curtailment of the American aid program in the 1960s the ratio of domestic procurement to aid changed radically. Of a total of U.S.$301,700,000 (¥108,612,000,000) worth of equipment obtained in 1961, 64.7 per cent was domestically procured, 5.8 per cent was imported, 5.5 per cent was obtained as reimbursable aid and 24.0 per cent was free American aid and not, therefore, accounted for in the budget. From 1962-65, of an annual average of U.S.$374,828,000 (¥134,938,000,000) worth of weapons and equipment obtained, 80.9 per cent was domestically procured, 5.5 per cent was purchased overseas and 6.1 per cent was in the form of reimbursable aid. Only 7.5 per cent was in the form of free military aid. This is to say, while the average annual value of weapons and equipment obtained from all sources actually fell 10.1 per cent from U.S.$416,753,000 (¥150,031,000,000) in 1958 to U.S.$374,828,000 (¥134,938,000,000) in 1965, the amount included in the budget (that is, not received as free American aid) actually increased 20.9 per cent from U.S.$286,667,000 (¥103,200,000,000) to U.S.$345,825,000 (¥124,797,000,000)\(^{14}\). In the late 1960s Japan received virtually no free American aid and this must be taken into consideration when discussing the expansion of her defence budget in that period.

The meagre annual allocation of resources to research and development was probably an indication of the extent to which the Japanese defence budget was eroded by administrative costs, personnel expenses, rising prices and the effects of decreasing American assistance. The National Defence Council Secretariat estimated that during the 1960s 3.6 per cent of the West German, 4.0 per cent of the Swedish, 9.0 per cent of the British and 21.3 per cent of the French military budgets was absorbed by research and development. In contrast, only 1.0 per cent of the Japanese defence budget was channelled into this field. This was even more significant in view of the great differences in scale between the Japanese and most European military budgets. It meant that in 1964-65, for example, while France spent U.S.$855,833,000 on military research (more than the entire Japanese defence budget for that year), Great Britain spent U.S.$563,889,000, West Germany spent U.S.$175,000,000
and Sweden spent U.S.$30,556,000, Japan spent a mere U.S.$7,500,000, 1.3 per cent of Britain's expenditure and 24.5 per cent of Sweden's. While it could be claimed that this low level of military research merely reflected Japan's dependence on American weapons technology it is difficult to explain how West Germany, where reliance on the United States was of a similar order, managed to spend twenty five times as much as Japan on research and development. Japan's lag in this field was probably best explained in the context of the budgetary priorities described above.

3. Japanese military leaders in the 1960s

For almost two decades after the establishment of the National Security Force in 1952 Japan's new armed forces were commanded and trained mainly by men with pre-war military backgrounds. In 1961 former Imperial soldiers occupied most Self Defence Force officer posts above the rank of captain. By 1968 former Imperial officers occupied no more than about 15 per cent of such posts but the highest positions in all three services virtually remained their exclusive preserve.

The most influential serving Japanese military leaders in the 1960s were probably Generals Hayashi Keizo (Chairman of the Joint Staff Council until 1964), Sugita Ichiji, Ōmori Kan, Amano Yoshihide, Yoshie Seiichi and Yamada Masao (the successive Chiefs of the Ground Staff), Admirals Iohara Mitsugu, Nakayama Sadayoshi, Sugie Ichizō, Nishimura Tomoharu, Itaya Ryūichi and Uchida Kazuomi (the successive Chiefs of the Maritime Staff), and Air Force Generals Genda Minoru, Matsuda Takeshi, Ura Shigeru, Muta Hirokuni, Ōmori Takeshi and Ogata Kagetoshi (the successive Chiefs of the Air Staff). Admiral Sugie Ichizō also served as Chairman of the Joint Staff Council from 1965-66, after which he was succeeded by General Amano Yoshihide (1967), Air Force General Muta Hirokuni (1968-1970) and Admiral Itaya Ryūichi (1970 - ).

Of these eighteen men some, like Amano (a former Staff Officer at Imperial Headquarters), Genda (one of the planners of the Pearl Harbour operation), Nishimura (fleet commander in the Philippines), Nakayama and Sugie (also former naval officers), had served with the Imperial Japanese Forces in China and the Pacific War. Sugita had served as a Staff Officer in Malaya, Sumatra, the Solomons,
Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Ura, like Amano, had been a Staff officer at Imperial Headquarters. Others, like Hayashi and Ōmori, were essentially political generals, former Home Ministry or Imperial Household Agency officials with no wartime experience.

Of these high ranking officers only Sugita, Genda and Nakayama have, as far as the present writer knows, left any lengthy public record of their experiences and aspirations. It is thus difficult to judge whether they were typical of Japan's post-war military leaders or whether their literary activities, like those of Fuller and the younger de Gaulle, were inspired by disagreement with their colleagues. However this may be, some of their views were of a kind that would undoubtedly have alarmed wide sections of Japanese society and disturbed many of Japan's neighbours, both Communist and non-Communist.

On entering the National Security Force after his release from the purge in 1952 Sugita Ichiji, Chief of the Ground Staff from 1960-1962, attended a one month's reorientation course designed to acquaint him with the workings of Japan's new democratic order. This course apparently failed to make a lasting impression. Sugita's unabashed nostalgia for Japan's Imperial (and totalitarian) past was evident throughout his writings. He believed the Occupation reforms had produced a society lacking firm and inspired leadership, served by colourless and often venal politicians, rent by internal political disorders, sapped of its vitality by intellectual egoism and 'confusion of thought', despising time honoured military values, ignorant of its glorious past and unmindful of its global responsibilities.

Sugita's attitude to democracy was at best ambiguous. While he spent much time discussing the evils of Communism and the necessity for 'strong leadership' (believing Japan's defeat in the Pacific War to have been caused by lack of firm leadership) he had little to say about the boons of liberalism and the open society. His ideal was a Japan where

politicians will act correctly as politicians, industrialists correctly as industrialists, scholars correctly as scholars, members of the Self Defence Forces as soldiers, teachers as teachers, workers as workers, students as students.

Proper social order re-established, Japan would reassume her natural role in the world.
Needless to say the former Chief of Staff exhibited extreme hostility towards the Socialist and Communist Parties. The Japan Teacher's Federation, the academic establishment, trade unions, Japan's Korean residents, students and the peace movement were also the objects of vituperative comment. It is difficult to suppress the suspicion that Sugita was antipathetic not merely to the policies of these groups but to their physical existence. Regarding the assassination of the Socialist Party leader Asanuma Inejirō in 1960 by the ultranationalist son of a Self Defence Force officer, Sugita made the following comment:

The Security Treaty crisis created an atmosphere in which laws and regulations were successively trampled underfoot. The responsibility for this lay largely with the Communist and Socialist Parties. Not only that, but Asanuma had gone to Communist China and brazenly announced in a Joint Communiqué with the Chinese that "American imperialism is the common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese peoples". This announcement subservient to Communist China provoked great and numerous repercussions. History frequently shows that in this sort of situation, young people burning with a sense of righteousness and justice are unable to stand things any longer and resort to violent action. Post-war Japanese society gives one the general impression that justice and righteousness are no longer recognised as justice and righteousness, that injustice has become justice, vice has become virtue. In any case, the Asanuma assassination was an unfortunate event invited by Japanese society itself.

It is interesting to compare this attitude, so reminiscent of the 1930s, with the views of such old style ultranationalist zealots as Kageyama Masuharu, organiser of the abortive 1933 'Heaven Sent Soldier's Plot' (Shinpei Tai Jihen) to assassinate the Cabinet and inaugurate the Shōwa Restoration. Kageyama who, after his release from the purge re-emerged as a prominent figure on the extreme right, expressed his views on Asanuma's assassination in the following terms:

Yamaguchi [Asanuma's youthful assassin] fought the pro-Communist and un-Japanese [hanminzokuteki] character of the Socialist Party with the sacrifice of his life. The assassination was a national tragedy, both from the point of view of the assassin and the assassinated. However the growing national consciousness [minzoku ishiki] among the younger generation is an encouraging tendency. Still, we have not yet reached the stage where terror should be practised, [tero o yaru beki daika de wa nai].
Sugita commented approvingly on the 1961 right wing military coup that put an end to South Korea's first tentative and rather disorderly experiment in democratic government.\textsuperscript{35} It was thus perhaps fortunate for the future of Japanese democracy that the Defence Agency Director General Akagi refused requests from Liberal Democratic Party leaders to mobilize the Self Defence Forces against student demonstrators on 19 June 1960.\textsuperscript{36}

The former Chief of Staff was naturally unhappy with the civilian control system as it had operated since 1954.\textsuperscript{37} He also had strong views on several diplomatic issues. In particular, he believed it essential to preserve the status quo in South Korea and Taiwan and, failing the success of other means, recommended military intervention, in Korea at least, to preserve Japanese interests. As far as can be judged from the public record this has not been the policy of any Japanese government since the Pacific War. It was certainly not the policy of the Kishi and Ikeda Governments under which Sugita served. Despite this, during his years as Chief of Staff, Sugita strove not only to promote acceptance of his views through normal channels but also attempted, albeit on a small scale and without success, to circumvent the civilian control system and conduct his own diplomacy, independently of the Government.\textsuperscript{38}

Genda Minoru's efforts to influence Japanese foreign and defence policies as a politician have been discussed in previous chapters. An accomplished military technocrat, Genda had little to say about the past and offered only generalized criticism of post-war society.\textsuperscript{39} Yet one suspects that Genda, no less than Sugita, had his spiritual homeland in the lost paradise of Imperial Japan. As with Sugita, anti-Communism was an overriding passion. While he insisted that the Japanese archipelago would remain inviolate so long as Japan preserved the American connection, he believed Japan's long term interests demanded suppression of Communist insurgency throughout East and South-East Asia, active containment of China and the installation of Western (and Japanese) oriented governments in the ring of non-Communist states extending from Burma to Korea. Maintenance of the Korean status quo was, of course, regarded as a legitimate Japanese interest. Yet Genda considered Japan's military activities should extend far beyond the limited confines of North-East Asia. The spectacle of America defending South Vietnam, he
felt, was 'unnatural'.

First let Japan perform the task and where we cannot do it all, the Americans should help us. As a matter of principle, the freedom of Asia should be defended by the hands of Asians, and Japan should act as the leader.\(^{40}\)

While this view might have commended itself to some Americans, there was probably less enthusiasm in Washington about Genda's interest in an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent. (see Chapter 7).

Apart from a few polite criticisms of the Socialist Party\(^{41}\) Admiral Nakayama had, like Genda, little to say about politics and society. Like Genda he saw the world divided into two camps, the Communist and the Free, and considered the Security Treaty necessary 'so long as Japan maintains the policy of acting in concert with the Free World'.\(^ {42}\) He believed, however, that within the broad framework of the Cold War alliances the trend was towards autonomy and polycentrism.\(^ {43}\) Admiral Nakayama would have liked to see more spent on defence and greater governmental interest in security problems. Yet unlike Sugita he appeared to understand and accept the principle of civilian control and professed complete willingness to have decisions on the military budget and the broader issues of defence policy made by the appropriate authorities.\(^ {44}\)

Genda and Sugita were old men and had their roots in a world that had vanished. Both were born in 1905, the year of the Russo-Japanese War, which marked, in a very real sense, Japan's emergence as a great military power. They had passed their boyhood and youth at a time when Japanese influence in Asia and the Pacific was rapidly expanding. As military men they had believed, more passionately, perhaps, than many of their contemporaries, in their country's imperial mission. It is true that they had lived to experience the bitterness of an unprecedented defeat, but it should not be forgotten that their most formative years had been spent at a time when Japan was the light of Asia, the land of the gods, inhabited by a chosen people, ruled by a divine Emperor and destined to unite the eight corners of the world under a single roof. For these ideas they themselves, their comrades and subordinates, had killed and died. In his declining years Sugita appeared incapable of viewing himself in the context of history but Genda, in a rare moment of candour, cautioned his readers to remember that he was a man 'brought up in a rather special atmosphere'.\(^ {45}\)
During the first half of the 1970s a new generation of officers would gradually replace those whose formative experience was pre-war. The new generation would have only vague memories of Imperial Japan and its values. Many would know only the Japan of the Security Treaty and the Peace Constitution, the Gross National Product and the economic diplomacy, the student movement and the leisure boom.

Before entering the National Defence Academy, whose successive post-war commandants were ex-bureaucrats with no combat experience, like Ōmori Kan, or scholars of relatively moderate views like Inoki Masamichi Maki Tomoo and Saeki Kiichi, the new officers would have been exposed to the influence of the anti-militarist school teachers who so excited Sugita's contempt. Certainly many would have rejected the dominant values of the post-war world, reacted against their education. The fact that they decided to enter the Defence College itself suggests they were not typical products of their generation. Yet many would have accepted the dominant post-war value system. They would enter the Defence College because of its excellent technical training facilities, its sporting attractions or because the military life was thought to offer opportunities for comradeship, reflection and physical exercise denied the businessman and salaried worker. Their links with their contemporaries outside the forces would perhaps be stronger and more enduring than their links with a past they had never known.

In May 1962 Itō Hirofumi, a young lecturer at the National Defence College, argued publically for recognition of the fact that the role of the Self Defence Forces was, within the limits of the Japanese Constitution, to protect the peace and independence of Japan. They were not committed to maintenance of a social and political status quo but should loyalty serve the government freely chosen by the people, even if the government should be Socialist or Communist. Moreover the Japanese Emperor was no more than a historical relic, the last remnant of an order of society destined to pass away. Itō's views outraged the higher officer corps and he was eventually moved to another post. How far he was regarded sympathetically by the younger officers cannot be known. Yet viewed in the light of trends in Japanese society as a whole it would not be surprising if views of this kind gradually came to
predominate, while men like Sugita and Genda find themselves stranded like pieces of archaic human jetsam, swept up onto the shores of history by the flood tide of social change. If this does not happen, the Self Defence Forces will develop into an army of jannissaries, totally isolated from and hostile to the society around them.

3. Defence planning and civilian control. The operation of the 1954-56 defence laws

Whatever the views of men like Admiral Nakayama and the character of the new generation of officers, the fact that personalities like Sugita and Genda have occupied the highest positions in the Self Defence Forces naturally arouses interest in the way decisions on defence policy have been made. The central role of former Imperial army and naval officers, held in check by Yoshida and the Finance Ministry, in preparing the groundwork for the First Defence Plan has already been noted. The basic concepts of this plan were formulated before the passage of the 1954-56 defence laws which, it has been shown, were specifically designed to limit the role of uniformed men in defence policy making and planning. How have the institutions established by the Defence Agency Establishment Law, the Self Defence Forces Law and the Law Concerning the Structure of the National Defence Council actually operated? In particular, to what extent has the principle of civilian supremacy enshrined in these laws been applied in practice?

While the distinction between civilian and military made in the 1954-56 laws generally conforms to the usage of the Anglo-American world, the popular belief that the domination of one by the other will automatically produce certain predictable effects is, of course, questionable. Effective operation of civilian control in a democratic society will perhaps ensure that defence policy is formulated by legally constituted civilian authorities ultimately answerable to the electorate. However, this is not the only problem. Militarism has never been exclusively, or even principally, confined to the class of professional military officers. In its most virulent form it is a condition affecting entire societies and has, as often as not, found its most energetic champions among civilians, while many eminent professional soldiers have been known for moderate and pacific views. Disraeli and Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, Churchill, Jules Ferry, President McKinley
and Theodore Roosevelt probably contributed more to the militarization of their respective countries than any of the generals and admirals who served their governments. In more recent years, it was the accession to power of General Charles de Gaulle that extracted France from the disastrous and costly wars initiated by the civilian dominated Fourth Republic. It was the election of a four star general, Dwight D. Eisenhower, that led to the Korean armistice. The road to Vietnam was paved with the new strategic doctrines instituted by his civilian successors. Civilian control is not necessarily a guarantee that a nation will pursue a peaceful foreign policy.

There is, however, evidence to suggest that the unique social and political conditions of post-war Japan have created a situation in which the civilian-military distinction has some significance. The differences between the two camps have not always been clear-cut, nor is it inevitable that the pattern established thus far will continue indefinitely into the future. Moreover, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn for want of sufficient concrete evidence. If the literary output of former Defence Agency Directors General like Masuhara Keikichi, Nishimura Kumao and Esaki Masumi are considered as being a different category, no high-ranking civilians involved in defence decision making except the former Chief of the Agency's Secretariat Kaihara Osamu and the sometime Administrative Vice-Minister Toga Hiroshi have left any public record of their views. Both Toga and Kaihara stressed the stability and relative security of Japan's international environment, opposing a heavy rearmament program and radical changes in the traditional policy of passive alignment with the United States. Again it is impossible for an outsider to determine whether these represented dominant or dissident views, what motives inspired their proponents, what effect they had on the audience for whom they were intended. Sugita's complaints about the civilian bureaucrats and their frustration of his efforts to form links with South Korea do, however, suggest the existence of a deep rift between the military and civilian components of the Defence Agency. The stern measures taken to reinforce civilian control after the 1961 Sammu incident (when a group of former Imperial soldiers attempted to stage a coup d'état) and the discomfort this reportedly caused some high ranking Self Defence Force officers strengthens this impression. So too does a newspaper report that when the civilian
authorities first learned that a coup was being planned they immediately began investigating not the Communist Party but the Self Defence Force officer corps. The reader will recall Sugita's remarks on the Asanuma assassination. Knowing the character of some of their high ranking officers, it is probable that many Directors General have passed sleepless nights, especially at time of crisis such as 1960.

Most of the senior Defence Agency civilian bureaucrats have been former Home Ministry officials. Until the end of the Pacific War this Ministry, through the agency of the regular and secret police, was responsible for suppressing dissent and tracking down subversion throughout the Japanese Empire. Many of the post-war leaders of the opposition parties, in particular the Communist Party, were once in prison as a result of their activities. It would not be surprising if these former Home Ministry officials, unlike the generals with their global anti-Communist experience, were preoccupied with internal threats to Japan's security, viewing, despite the above episode, the left wing political parties as the principal menace. Several prominent defence intellectuals attached to the National Defence College (Bōei Daigakkō) and the Defence Training Institute (Bōei Kenshūjo) such as Momoi Makoto (a close adviser to the former Defence Agency Director General Nakasone Yasuhiro) have, in fact, within the context of an elaborate system of strategic and tactical scenarios, taken this view. It is thus possible that within the Defence Agency the civilian and military officials are divided not only by legal barriers and considerable mutual hostility and suspicion, but that they also emphasize different aspects of Japan's security. The civilians stress the internal threat, the military men perhaps see the solution to the internal threat and the external Communist menace as inseparably linked.

As far as the machinery established in the 1954-56 laws is concerned, the National Defence Council has apparently replaced the Cabinet as the ultimate decision making organ on defence policy, at least to the extent that its recommendations tend automatically to become Cabinet decisions. This despite the fact that the Council is legally no more than a consultative body (see Chapter 2). Meetings of the National Defence Council, it will be recalled, must be attended by the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, the Director General of the Defence Agency, the Foreign Minister and the Director General of the
Economic Planning Agency, who have the right to participate in the decisions. In addition it has become customary for meetings to be attended by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Director of the Science and Technology Agency and the Minister for International Trade and Industry. The Council is also usually attended by the Chief of its own Secretariat, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council and by various Vice-Ministers and Deputy Directors General. The role of all these officials is purely advisory - they have no right to participate in formal decision making. Given the political climate of post-war Japan it would be rash to assume that the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, in particular, has done anything more than offer advice. At the same time, in a situation where few members of the Liberal-Democratic Party and fewer members of successive Cabinets have been noted for their knowledge of military affairs, it would be wrong to imagine that the recommendations of Japan's highest ranking professional soldier on technical and, perhaps, at times, wider strategic questions, could have continually gone ignored.

From the inception of the Joint Staff Council in July 1954 until the autumn of 1964 the Chairmanship was occupied continuously by General Hayashi Keizō, whose total lack of military experience and connections with the Imperial officers' group have already been noted. Hayashi's successors, Admiral Sugie, General Amano, Air Force General Muta and Admiral Itaya were all former Imperial officers with strong personalities and distinguished records. Amano was said to be an exponent of the 'autonomous defence' concept popular among the pre-war officers group. The civilian members of the National Defence Council probably had more difficulty countering the advice of these men than they experienced dealing with Hayashi. In a sense, Hayashi was a bureaucrat dressed up as a general. After his retirement the National Defence Council had to deal with real generals.

At meetings of the National Defence Council, reliance on the single military representative for technical and strategic information is probably reduced by the presence of the Chief of the Council's own Secretariat. The 1956 law established a Secretariat within the National Defence Council charged with gathering information and carrying out research. This Secretariat consists of twenty permanent
civilian officials responsible to a civilian Chief Secretary appointed by the Prime Minister, ten part time Secretaries appointed from officials in various bureaus, ministeries and agencies, three full time and six part time Councillors appointed from other administrative organizations. Although its true role was not explicitly stated, the Secretariat was designed to act as an informed counter-weight to the views of the joint Staff Council and the military organs in the Defence Agency. The Secretariat has been, at times, highly critical of views emanating from these quarters. While the question of whose advice has been more influential could not be determined without an intimate knowledge of personal and other relations which remain, unfortunately, unknowable, the modest scale of Japan's actual defence expansion in the 1960s strongly suggests the civilians have retained the upper hand.

The National Defence Council may have taken over functions originally vested in the Cabinet, but the infrequency of its meetings suggests that the more important concrete decisions on defence planning and policy are made elsewhere. The National Defence Council met only fifteen times during the eleven years between its inception in 1956 and the final decision on the Third Defence Plan in 1967, that is, an average of 1.4 times each year. Even if the Council's forty three informal discussion meetings held during this period are included, the average comes to no more than 5.13 meetings per year, less than one meeting every two months. Many of the Council's decisions have been of a relatively trivial nature. One of its first acts, for example, was to 'decide' the so-called Basic Policy of National Defence (Kokubō no Kihon Hōshin), which is

To prevent direct and indirect aggression, to resist aggression in the improbable event of its occurrence and to defend the peace and independence of our country, which stands on the basis of democracy.

As specific measures to achieve these goals, the Basic Policy recommended support for the United Nations, reliance on the Security Treaty, stabilization of the peoples' livelihood and gradual strengthening of the Self Defence Forces. Quite a number of the Council's fifteen meetings between 1956 and 1967 were taken up with 'decisions' of this type. The Second, Third and Fourth Defence Plans were all officially 'decided' by the Council after a single, or at the most two or three, meetings, most of which lasted for no more than an hour. The same could be said of the Council's decisions on the successive mainstay fighters for the air force.
Equally significant is the fact that the Council has never discussed many issues directly affecting Japanese security. It has already been seen how the initial decision to renegotiate the 1951 Security Treaty was made by Prime Minister Kishi alone. The National Security Council was not consulted during the entire course of the negotiations nor at any time during the crisis that ensued. Kishi's initial project was frustrated because of opposition from the Liberal-Democratic Party, much of which was of a personal and factional character, totally unconnected with the issues ostensibly at stake. The complex military and diplomatic issues involved in China policy, policy towards Korea, towards South-East Asia and the Pacific and in the Okinawan negotiations have been thrashed out among the ministries and agencies concerned and as a result of the factional-policy struggle in the Liberal-Democratic Party. Never once has the National Defence Council been consulted. Nor was it consulted on the vital question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The decision to extend the Security Treaty automatically after 1970, too, was the product of a gradual unification of opinion within the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Foreign Ministry, and of prolonged consultations with Washington. The National Defence Council played no role.

If the orientation of Japan's defence policy is determined not so much by the National Defence Council as by the complex interaction of the bureaucracy and the Liberal-Democratic Party factional balance, detailed defence planning appears to be carried out in the Defence Agency. The precise level of spending, what aspects of the Agency's plans are essential and what can be sacrificed, are then decided in the course of negotiations with the Finance Ministry.

Within the Defence Agency, power of decision on all matters ranging from the Agency's draft budget to details of operational plans and the promotion of high ranking officers is, under the Director-General, vested in seven Internal Bureaux (the Secretariat, the Defence Bureau, the Educational Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the Medical Bureau, the Paymaster's Bureau and the Weapons Bureau) employing a total of 179 civilian officials, and in the Councillors Meeting, attended by the Director General, the two Vice-Ministers and the seven Bureau Chiefs. At the time of the National Security Agency uniformed men were completely excluded from the internal bureaux. This regulation was subsequently waived but it has become customary not to permit
uniformed men to occupy posts above the rank of Section Chief in these bureaux. The two Vice-Ministers and the seven Bureau Chiefs remain, of course, civilians. Great efforts have been made to ensure that the civilian character of the internal bureaux is not further eroded. Newly recruited civilian officials, for example, were at one time temporarily assigned to Agency organizations staffed by uniformed men. After a period of orientation in military affairs they were then assigned to the internal bureaux. This practice was subsequently abandoned because it was felt that continuous contact with uniformed men had an undesirable influence on the views of the new civilian officials.

It is sometimes claimed that this desire to protect the defence bureaucracy from 'contamination by the military mind' has led to a policy of rapid civilian staff turnover in the Agency. This is believed either to result in effective domination of the Defence Agency by military men or in a complete paralysis of its activities. It is true that until recently the average length of a Director-Generalship was six to eight months, much less than the term a politician could expect to serve in any other Ministry. Many Directors General have displayed appalling ignorance of military matters. In October 1961 Esaki Masumi, a man of commendably broad vision on larger, more general issues, was asked, in his capacity as a former Director-General of the Defence Agency, to comment on the Soviet Union's explosion of a fifty megaton bomb. 'Fifty megatons is fifty million tons and fifty million tons is 13,350 Kan', he gravely told the reporters. 'The thing is very heavy'.

The staff of the internal bureaux is drawn largely from the former Home Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Police Agency, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Whether civilian control is a reality or a slogan will be apparent in the daily operations at this level but no data on the quotidian transactions of the bureaux is, of course, available to the public. Nor is it possible to obtain a wide range of detailed statistics on personnel movements. Nevertheless, the following few examples of key changes over a limited period suggest that the turnover of high ranking civilian officials is not so rapid as opponents of the system claim. If length of service is a guide to expertise, the Defence Agency's civilian employees should lack neither the experience nor the knowledge necessary to make use of their legal supremacy, should they wish to do so.
In the autumn of 1963, with the retirement of Vice-Minister Toga Hiroshi, the Defence Agency's internal bureaux and related institutions were subjected to a major personnel reshuffle. Toga's successor was Kato Yōzō, then the Chief of the Secretariat. Kato, a former Home Ministry official, had entered the Defence Agency about 1960 after continuous post-war service with the Policy Agency. Kato's successor in the vital post of Chief of the Secretariat was Miwa Yoshio, also imported directly from the Police Agency. Before the war Miwa had been a Home Ministry official, specializing in agricultural problems. To an outsider unacquainted with his personality and qualifications, Miwa's wartime experience as a conscript army paymaster in Mongolia, his reputed taste for military songs and the pleasures of the cup, then his service in the police force, would hardly seem to provide the experience necessary to counter pressure from the uniformed men in the Defence Agency and on the National Defence Council. In contrast, the new Education Bureau Director Hotta Masataka had seven years continuous experience in the Defence Agency. Like Kato and Miwa, Hotta was a former Home Ministry official who had entered the Police Agency after the war. In the Defence Agency he had already served as Public Information Section Chief and Counsellor to the Secretariat. The new Personnel Bureau Director Obata Hisao, whose influence on promotions of high ranking officers gave him particular importance, had served ten years in the Defence Agency, to which he had come in 1954 after a closely related career in the Maritime Safety Agency. Finally, Yamagami Nobushige, the new Chief of the Procurement Office who, along with the Chiefs of the Defence Agency's Defence Bureau and Weapons Bureau, could be expected to influence the selection of weapons systems and equipment, had spent thirteen years with the Defence Agency. By the time he became Procurement Office Chief Yamagami had had a year's experience as Chief of the Control and Supply Staff of the Police Reserve Force, two years as Chief of the General Affairs Section of the National Security Agency, three years as Deputy Director of the Defence Agency Construction Office, three years as Deputy Director of the Procurement Office, two years as Deputy Director of the Technical Research Institute and another two years as Deputy Director of the Defence Facilities Agency. All other things being equal, the most determined military officer would have found Yamagami a formidable
opponent in the case of a conflict between the uniformed and civilian components of the Defence Agency. That is to say, of five key appointments made to the Agency at this time, four were of men with long experience in the Defence Agency. The other was a relative newcomer.

4. The Finance Ministry and Defence Planning (see table 8.(vii))

After the Defence Agency has compiled its plans and budgetary estimates, the actual level of expenditure and the final details of the plans are decided in the course of negotiations with the Finance Ministry.76

The role of the Finance Ministry in drastically reducing the scale of the Systems Research Committee's plans in 1953-54 has already been examined (see chapter 3). During the 1960s the Finance Ministry continued to adopt a passive attitude towards defence, a fact which explains why Sugita proposed that power of decision on the level of military expenditure be taken out of its hands.

The Defence Agency's initial draft for the second Defence Plan (released as the Akagi Proposal in October 1959) requested a total defence expenditure of ¥1,300,000,000,000 (2 per cent of the national income) over the five year period 1961-65. This was calculated on the expectation of ¥150,000,000,000 free United States military aid over the same period. Although it soon became clear that American aid would amount only to ¥90,000,000,000 (60 per cent of the original estimate) the plan that was eventually approved by the National Defence Council (on 18 July 1961) after tortuous negotiations between the Defence Agency and the Finance Ministry envisaged only ¥1,150,000,000,000 Japanese defence spending over the five year period, a reduction of about 12 per cent. This amounted to no more than 1.15 per cent of the gross national product, 1.4 per cent of the national income.77

Similarly, the Defence Agency's original estimate of the total expenditure for the Third Defence Plan was ¥3,100,000,000,000. Defence spending was to reach 2 per cent of the national income by 1971.78 By the time the Agency's first drafts were published in April 1966 estimated expenditure for the five year period (1966-71) had been reduced to ¥2,700,000,000,000.79 Even this substantial reduction was not enough for the Finance Ministry, which argued that the projected
expansion rate was too fast and would exert pressure on expenditure in other areas. From early June 1966 the Chief of the National Defence Council Secretariat and officials from the Finance Ministry, Defence Agency, Economic Planning Agency, Ministry of Communications and Foreign Ministry met to discuss the problem but the Finance Ministry remained inflexible and no conclusion was reached. Moreover the Economic Planning Agency was still in the process of compiling a long term economic plan and resistance to the Defence Agency's demands was also felt in these quarters. Prime Minister Sato's statement to the House of Representatives Committee on 19 July 1966 that defence expenditure must be related to the expansion of the economy as a whole, to social security, housing and so on, was an endorsement of the views of these two powerful ministeries. In response to these pressures the then Director General of the Defence Agency Mr Kambayashiyma proposed the original five year plan be converted into a six-year plan divided into two three-year periods. During the first three-year period great efforts would be made to realize the objectives for expenditure and equipment. While the objectives for the second period would be published, operation of the plan thereafter would be 'flexible'. Debate on this and other proposals continued throughout the autumn of 1966. No decision had been reached by the time the generalised outline of the Third Defence Plan was released by the Defence Agency in November. Early in the new year the Prime Minister announced enigmatically that the scale of spending under the third plan should be 'not less than our defence efforts in the past'. This suggested a stand in favour of the Ministry of Finance. It was thus not long before the Defence Agency abandoned its target of ¥2,700,000,000,000 spent over five years and announced it was willing to compromise at ¥2,400,000,000,000. Encouraged by the Prime Minister's attitude the Finance Ministry proceeded to demand a further reduction to ¥2,200,000,000,000. The dispute dragged on until March when the Prime Minister decided that expenditure should be ¥2,340,000,000,000 ± ¥25,000,000,000, approximately mid way between the positions of the two ministeries, but only 75 per cent of the Defence Agency's original demands.

The attitude of the Finance Ministry arises in part, no doubt, from its inherent parsimony. Sugita complained dolefully that in 1961 the Ministry obliged all officers to carry home packed lunches to field exercises, abandoning the earlier practice of permitting them to
dine at local restaurants. Yet it is probably also an indication that the Ministry's dominant factions, brought up under the influence of such pacific conservatives as Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi, have inclined towards belief in economic diplomacy rather than the use of force, in raising domestic living standards rather than in assembling military power to crush dissent. This partly explains why the Ministry has not offered comparable resistance to expenditure on social security, education, science and public works. It also partly explains why expenditure on these items during the two decades since the end of the Occupation increased much more rapidly than defence expenditure and, unlike the latter, came to occupy an increasing percentage of the national budget. In 1950 expenditure on social insurance was about one sixth of expenditure on defence. In 1959 expenditure on these two items was roughly equal. By 1970 twice as much was being spent on social insurance as on defence. This says something for the changing character of Japanese society. It also says much about the Finance Ministry's views about the basis of national security.

5. Public opinion and pressure groups (see tables 8.(viii), 8.(ix), 8.(x))

Throughout the 1960s public opinion remained divided on the issue of rearmament, despite the fact that a majority either regarded some armed force as necessary or accepted the Self Defence Forces as a fait accompli. An Asahi Shimbun poll taken in January 1969 showed 64 per cent of respondents asserting that military forces were necessary to protect the nation; 26 per cent thought military forces were unnecessary. In the 1968 Shukan Asahi poll 51 per cent of those interviewed in Tokyo maintained forces were necessary, 32.4 per cent held they were conditionally necessary (i.e. depending on size and character) and 13.8 per cent asserted they were unnecessary. The figures for rural Kagawa Prefecture were 56.1 per cent, 28.9 per cent and 7.8 per cent respectively. Other polls showed broadly similar results. There were indications that belief in the necessity of forces was strongest among males in the 50-59 age group, whereas men between 20-29 were almost equally divided in their opinions, as were women of any age group. However this may be, a clear majority of the public was opposed to any increase in military strength. The January 1969 Asahi Shimbun poll showed 19 per cent favouring a stronger Self Defence Force, 55 per cent maintaining that the forces
should be kept at their present level, 4 per cent recommending they should be reduced, 9 per cent asserting they were unnecessary and, presumably, ought to be disbanded. Government sponsored opinion polls conducted over the period 1956-66 consistently showed only 17-20 per cent in favour of strengthening the existing forces. Polls generally also showed a large majority opposed to revision of the 'pacificist clause' in the Constitution. There is considerable evidence to suggest that in the last years of the 1960s a majority of Japanese believed that, as a means of preserving national security and advancing national interests, military power is only of limited value. Diplomacy and economic power were thought to be of paramount importance. It was perhaps natural for a proud and self confident people, who suffered such a decisive defeat in a war on which they had staked so much, to feel that military power is, after all, vanity and a striving after wind. All the more so since they have seen their erstwhile conquerors brought low by excessive military burdens and involvement in fruitless conflicts. In the late 1960s an NHK survey asked respondents what was the most important element of national strength. Economic power was stressed by 40 per cent, standard of living by 22 per cent, intellectual ability and 'energy of the people' by 17 per cent, cultural level by 7 per cent. Only 6 per cent mentioned military strength. The 1968 Shūkan Asahi poll asked whether Japan's security could best be protected by military means or by diplomacy and economic strength. In Tokyo 76.7 per cent declared diplomacy and economics to be paramount. Only 6 per cent mentioned military efforts. What is more surprising, only 9.5 per cent were willing to concede that military efforts, economic strength and diplomatic virtuosity were of equal importance. Even in rural Kagawa Prefecture, 61.3 per cent thought diplomacy and economic power were the way to national security and only 7.6 per cent mentioned military strength.

Despite this, there were naturally numerous organisations and individuals actively interested in greater defence spending, larger military forces, a more assertive foreign policy and, in general, a return to the martial virtues of pre-war Japan. The concrete objectives of such organizations differed considerably. So too did the kind and degree of pressure they could exert on the decision-makers.
The pressure groups that attracted the most press attention were undoubtedly the tough minded right wing organizations which, in society at large, in the business world, academic community and among students competed with the left for influence on the uncommitted. In the latter part of the 1960s rightist organizations were greatly expanding their membership and activities. In mid 1967 the Police Agency estimated that there were some 400 right wing organizations in Japan with a total membership of about 110,000. In the previous year total membership of such groups had not exceeded 60,000. In the Tokyo area, there were more than 50 organizations affiliated with National Council of Patriotic Organizations (Zenkoku Aikokusha Dantai Kaigi) chaired by Sagoya Yoshiaki, the assassin of Prime Minister Hamaguchi. Another 20 organizations were connected with the All Japan Federation of Patriotic Organizations Situation Counter-measures Co-operation Committee (Zen-Nippon Aikoku Dantai Rengō Jikyoku Taisaku Kyōgikai) led by Fukuda Motoaki, sometime Chief Editor of the pre-war Ködō (Imperial Way) News Agency. A further 20 groups had links with Kodama Yoshiro's Youth Thought Research Association (Seinen Shisō Kenkyū Kai), the principle vehicle of which was the Rising Sun Youth Corps (Hinomaru Seinen Tai). Twelve organizations were connected with the Japan Renovation Council (Nihon Kakushin Kaigi), centered on the Right Wing Activist Anti-Communism Volunteer Corps (Kōdō Uyoku Bōkyō Teishin Tai). Many other organisations, like Akao Bin's hardy Great Japan Patriotic Party (Dai Nippon Aikoku Tō) were unconnected with any of the above groupings.100

The folly of exaggerating the importance of these organizations need hardly be stressed. They had no detectable influence on defence and foreign policy. As long as the present political climate and decision making machinery survive they are unlikely to enjoy such influence. The total membership of the rightist organizations was less than half that of the Japanese Communist Party and the 400 groups into which they were divided were often at loggerheads with each other. No unified political and defence platform had been produced.

This said, a number of important qualifications should be made. At their lowest level, right wing organizations of the type described above merged into the shadowy empire of the Japanese underworld.
At the highest level, however, some right wing organizations had, in striking contrast to the more numerous Communist Party, direct access to the corridors of power. A single organization could act simultaneously on both levels, maintaining a wide range of contacts in the political, business, military, academic, student and gangster worlds. Kodama Yoshio, whose pre-war activities ranged from involvement in ultra-nationalist terrorist organizations to advising the government of Prince Higashikuni, cultivated close personal relations with such post-war political leaders as Hatoyama Ichirō, Kōnō Ichirō, Miki Bukichi, Ogata Takegora and former Prime Minister Kishi.101 In their student days both Kishi and Kodama were connected with the ultra-nationalist academic Uesugi Shinkichi,102 first president of the National Founding Association (Kenkoku Kai). In 1945 Kodama reportedly supplied Hatoyama's fledgling Liberal Party with vast quantities of much needed funds.103 His Youth Thought Research Association and its offshoot the Japan Youth Seminar (Nihon Seinen Köza) maintained links not only with certain Liberal-Democratic Party Diet members, prominent personalities from Asia University (Ajia Daigaku), Japan University, (Nihon Daigaku) and Kyoto Industrial College (Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku), various conservative clubs and veterans groups, but also with at least two gangster-type organizations, the Gijin Tō (Martyr's Party) and the Tōseikai Society. Hamaguchi's assassin Sagoya Yoshiaki (see above) and Shirai Tameo, who was involved in the 1933 'Heaven Sent Soldiers' Plot' (Shinpeitai Jihen), were also on the Board of Directors of the Japan Youth Seminar.104 Moreover, Kodama's private army, like the late Mishima Yukio's Society of the Shield (Tate no Kai), were permitted to make full use of Self Defence Force facilities for training and, presumably, for the propagation of its views.105 The unsympathetic re-action of the assembled officers and men on the occasion of Mishima's dramatic suicide suggests organizations of this kind were not regarded favourably by the rank and file of the forces.106 However, high level sympathy and protection obviously existed and were strong enough to enable these John Birch Society type organizations to obtain officially endorsed training facilities.

Some right wing groups were thus given a certain amount of official endorsement by their connection with the Self Defence Forces. Yet in view of the generally low reputation of the Defence Forces it would be unwise to exaggerate the benefits either side derived from the
association. The principle roles of such groups were theatrical, propagandist and persuasive. They provided military minded businessmen and politicians with a convenient focus for the desired revival of strong arm nationalism. Any romantic aurora they managed to generate by association with such high powered literary figures as Mishima Yukio might hopefully attract public support. At the same time the splendid muscles cultivated by so many of their members might well prove useful to the extreme right, on the campus, in the streets or even in the Diet, when all other means of persuasion have failed. It will be recalled that many of the 'private secretaries' brought into the Diet by Kishi during the 1960 crisis displayed cuts, bruises and dark glasses that betrayed their gangster origins.107

More problematical were the influence of former Imperial field marshalls, generals and admirals who, while remaining outside the Self Defence Forces for personal or political reasons maintained close contact with erstwhile subordinates who did join. While the major veterans associations remained aloof both from politics and questions relating to post-war security, a number of former high ranking officers took an active interest in both these fields. During the Yoshida era they were given little opportunity to promote their views. After Hatoyama's accession in 1954 it was noticeable that such former officers began to gain easy access to the Defence Agency where they became, in effect, unofficial advisers.108 What advice they gave and how seriously it was taken remain unknown. In view of the way Japan's defence policy has actually evolved it must have been fairly innocuous. Sometimes the advisory conferences centered around rather trivial issues, as when Field-Marshall Hata, General Imamura and other distinguished Imperial officers called on Prime Minister Ikeda in April 1962 to request that the statue of the Russo-Japanese War hero General Öyama, then abandoned in the backyard of the Ueno Art Museum, remain in Tokyo instead of being sent back to the hero's birthplace in Kagoshima.109 Yet a month later three of these inveterate old generals and admirals (Genrals Imamura, Okamura and Admiral Sawamura) were being welcomed at the Defence Agency for a conference with the Chiefs of Staff.110 Such formal meetings were, in fact, rather frequent. Informal meetings were even more regular. Readers of Sugita's memoirs will recall that the Chief of Staff was attending an old soldiers' reunion the afternoon he heard of his appointment. One gathers it was a fairly convivial affair, as many of these meetings probably were.111
In an age of sophisticated technological warfare it would perhaps be mistaken to attach too much importance to the influence of old men like Imamura and Sawamura. Their world was remote from the realities of contemporary society. Nevertheless, ideas and loyalties are often more powerful than more concrete realities and the fact that serving Chiefs of Staff spent time hobnobbing with decrepit old generals was, within the context of the decision making process outlined above, a fact of some significance. At the very least they probably reinforced each others attitudes towards Japanese society and the international environment they believed surrounded it.

The lunatic fringe of former officers involved in the 1961 Sammu plot (see above) were known to some Self Defence Force Officers, whose co-operation they had attempted to secure. The serving officers approached sensibly refused to co-operate. Yet they compromised themselves and the forces by apparently failing to report the approaches immediately and by their alleged subsequent attempts to cover up their contacts. Incidents of this kind created the impression that the former Imperial officers group, both within and without the Self Defence Force, constituted a closely knit, alienated and potentially explosive sub-culture.

It has been seen that in 1953-54 Yoshida's Liberals opposed the Democratic (Progressive) Party scheme for seating private citizens of 'learning and experience' in the National Defence Council on the grounds that this arrangement would undermine the principles of civilian control and cabinet responsibility. When Ikeda first appointed 19 private citizens as 'advisers' to the Defence Agency in June 1962 similar fears were expressed. A cursory glance at the list of 19 citizens appointed by Ikeda, however, would suggest that these fears were groundless. The group had no particular association with the extreme right, the pre-war officers' clique or defence industry circles. Nor were most of its members known for their knowledge of or interest in defence matters. It included the historian and literary critic Ikeshima Shimpei (associated with Keio University and the magazine Bungei Shunjü), the former Imperial cook and television personality Egami Tomi, novelists Shibata Renzaburo, Ozaki Shiro and Sono Ayako, dramatist Hōjo Makoto, poets Fujiura Kō and Nakamura Teijo, critics Sakanishi Shiho,
Shibusawa Hideo and Fukuda Tsunea (a noted translator of Shakespeare) and the patriotic entertainers Tokugawa Musei, Fujiyama Ichirō and Raymond Hattori. It also included Okuno Shintarō, a Keio University specialist in Chinese literature, Rikkyō University social studies lecturer Koyama Eizō and Sugawara Tsūsai, the Kamakura art collector, social reformer and noted man of independent means. Sugawara was concurrently Vice President of the Society for Social Purification (Shakai Junketsuka Kyōkai) and President of the Society for Banishment of the Three Evils (San Aku Tsuihō Kyōkai) (prostitution, venereal disease and juvenile delinquency). It is difficult to imagine that these figures became the vehicles through which outside influences penetrated the Defence Agency. The institution of the advisers system was obviously public relations exercise.

Defence based industries appeared to be in a position to influence the technical details of military planning, if not the overall direction of defence policy. With the increasing trend to domestic production of military equipment their influence will inevitably grow.

The basis of Japan's present defence industry was laid during the last years of Occupation, after the United States abandoned its attempt to destroy the pre-war military-industrial complex. Although the industry was stimulated by the Korean War it has only become significant with the decline of American MSA aid in the mid 1960s. By 1965 it was estimated that 87.2 per cent of the Self Defence Forces' weapons, equipment and other needs were being manufactured in Japan. Defence production more than doubled in the two decades after the end of the Occupation. At the same time its importance in the Japanese economy should not be exaggerated. In the 1960s, as in the previous decade, military production represented a small and declining percentage of Japan's total industrial output. The ¥78,058 million worth of defence equipment domestically produced in 1954, for example, represented 1.2 per cent of the gross national product. In contrast the ¥133,569 million worth of military hardware produced in 1965 represented 0.5 per cent of total industrial production. The figure will probably continue to decline. Moreover, with the exception of the munitions and aircraft industries, both of which were heavily dependent on defence orders, military production accounted for only a tiny fraction of
the output of individual industries. In 1966, for example, Defence
Agency orders reportedly absorbed some 65 per cent of production in the
aircraft industry and 50-70 per cent of the production of certain
munitions manufacturers. Yet it was claimed that no more than 4 per
cent of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry's sales in 1966-67 had been to the
Defence Agency. Even such munitions firms as Höwa Industries were
allegedly selling only 10 per cent of their manufactures to the Agency.119

Perhaps the most significant feature of Japan's post-war
military industry was the fact that ten or a dozen companies monopolized
more than 65 per cent of production and that among these companies a
mere four, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electrics occupied
a dominant position. Moreover, within this exclusive group of four
companies, all of which were concerned with production of aircraft,
aircraft engines, naval vessels and communications equipment, Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries clearly led the field. In 1965 Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries turned out 38.7 per cent of military equipment produced by
the ten leading companies. Ishikawajima-Harima was responsible for 17.5
per cent, Kawasaki for 8.3 per cent, Mitsubishi Electrics for 6.9 per
cent. By 1969 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry's share had risen to 47.9 per
cent, Kawasaki's had risen to 14.6 per cent, Mitsubishi Electrics to
7.8 per cent while Ishikawajima-Harima's had dropped to 13 per cent.120

Despite this extreme concentration and the unimportance of
military production in the Japanese economy the four principal employers
organizations, Keidanren, Nikkeiren, Nisshō and Dōyūkai all adopted public
positions favourable to greater military spending and, of course, larger
domestic defence industries. There were, nevertheless, important
differences in nuance between the four organizations' defence policies,
with Keidanren and Nisshō adopting a comparatively moderate position,
Nikkeiren and Dōyūkai a markedly hawkish stand.121 By the end of the
1960s no common defence and foreign policy front had emerged. Moreover
it is probable that the four organizations were torn by the same kind of
factional-policy conflicts that were so evident in the Liberal-Democratic
Party. Their publicly enunciated positions, therefore, represented
either the views of the dominant factional coalition or an attempt at
compromise between mutually hostile camps.
Keidanren, Nisshō, Nikkeiren and Dōyūkai provide the Liberal-Democratic Party and its various factions with the greater part of their funds. United action by the four organizations has played an important, perhaps decisive role during several crises in Japan's post-war political history. Shinobu and others have shown how the four organizations diverted funds from Yoshida to Hatoyama in 1954, from Kishi to Ikeda in 1960 and how, after Ikeda's retirement, they supported Satō against Kōno and Fujiyama. Yet these were efforts to preserve stable conservative government, not to change established policies. It has yet to be convincingly demonstrated that the combined forces of the four organizations have been able to force a stable government to change its policies against the inclinations of the dominant factional coalition and the advice of the bureaucracy. At the same time it must be admitted that the four organizations, as providers of conservative party funds, and with their connections in the bureaucracy, the defence forces, the academic and criminal worlds, their control of vast sections of the mass media and their network of private and official ties overseas, especially in South Korea, Taiwan and South-East Asia, could exert great pressure on the Government if ever a common defence policy were evolved.

During the period under consideration, however, the strongest business pressure for large scale rearmament came not from Keidanren, Nikkeiren, Nisshō and Dōyūkai but from a number of groups connected exclusively with military production, in particular from Keidanren's Defence Production Committee, the Japan Aviation Industry Association, the Japan Weapons Industry Association and the Japan Rocket Development Council. The extreme statements emanating from some of these organizations stood in marked contrast with the publicly enunciated views of the rest of the industrial world.

On the surface these organizations represented a wide range of defence based industries. There were some 88 companies affiliated with the Japan Weapons Industry Association and over 100 connected with the Keidanren Defence Production Committee. In reality the organizations were dominated by the four leading defence based companies discussed above. Mitsubishi's influence was, as one would expect, preponderant. It would be no exaggeration to claim that the two most important of the four organizations, the Japan Weapons Industry Association and the Keidanren Committee, were no more than
Mitsubishi pressure groups and that the remaining two were strongly under Mitsubishi's influence.\textsuperscript{127}

Fulfilment of production targets associated with successive defence plans requires close and continuous government liaison with these organizations. They thus had well-trodden paths into the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Defence Agency and the Self Defence Forces. On the political level they maintained ties with the Liberal-Democratic Party's Security Problems Research Committee and Domestic Weapons Production Committee.\textsuperscript{128} Both Committees, it will be recalled, have been dominated by the Party's extreme right wing, centering around the 'old soldiers' group'. They have been isolated from moderate opinion and their hawkish recommendations have had little effect on government policy. Thus, as pressure groups at this level the weapons industry organizations were probably relatively powerless. The fact that they represented such an insignificant part of the Japanese economy as a whole probably strengthened the hand of moderate elements in the Liberal-Democratic Party and Government.

The weapons industry groups and associated companies also maintained close ties with the Defence Agency. Before final decisions are taken on the long term defence plans the Agency presumably finds it convenient to know what equipment can be domestically produced, in what time and at what cost. Industry representatives and the top civilian leadership of the Defence Agency thus hold frequent round table conferences.\textsuperscript{129} During the course of these discussions the defence industry leaders are presumably given opportunities to influence the technical details of the Agency's plans. It would also be surprising if they did not explain their views on the overall direction of defence planning. Yet since the rate of Japan's defence build up has fallen far short of industry hopes, these explanations have probably had little effect.

In recent years, however, attention has been drawn to the increasingly intimate connections between defence based industries and the Self Defence Force officer corps. In March 1968 it was revealed that almost 300 former high ranking officers had, after retirement from the forces, found employment in private firms.\textsuperscript{130} Most of the firms involved were associated with military production. Moreover, it was
disclosed that the thirty leading defence based firms were at that time employing a total of 68 retired high ranking officers. Significantly, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries topped the list with two Vice-Admirals, one Rear Admiral, one Ground Lieutenant-General, two Air Lieutenant-Generals and one Air Major-General employed as advisors. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries employed one Vice-Admiral, one Rear Admiral, two Ground Major-Generals and an Air Major-General. Kawasaki had managed to obtain the services of a former Vice-Admiral and a Rear Admiral. Mitsubishi Electrics was employing a Vice-Admiral, a Rear Admiral, two Ground and one Air Major-Generals. Even relatively small firms like Japan Electronics, Kyōdo Oil or Japan Radio had managed to enlist the services of the odd Rear Admiral or Major-General. All the appointments had been made since 1962 and the majority since 1965. Evidence of links between serving officers and former Imperial officers employed in defence based firms also came to light.

There were, of course, economic reasons for Self Defence Force officers to seek employment after retirement. Retiring ages were low (58 for Lieutenant Generals, 56 for Major-Generals, 53 for Colonels, 50 for Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Captains, First and Second Lieutenants), wages were not high by private industry standards, pensions were small. Air Major-General Yamaguchi, whose suicide in suspicious circumstances first brought to light the connections between the defence forces and private firms, was to have received a mere ¥2,000,000 (U.S.$5,500) retirement allowance after 13 years of service. His family was to have received an annual pension of ¥300,000, somewhat less than the sum paid to a single Australian student on a Saionji Scholarship for a year's study in Japan. It was thus natural that as retirement approached, high ranking officers made frenzied efforts to find other employment. For obvious reasons they were drawn to defence based industries. In a technocratic and rather anti-militarist society the prospects for an unemployed officer could be forlorn. In 1963 Major-General Sano Tsunemitsu, Commandant of the Self Defence Force Physical Training School, committed suicide after a futile search for post-retirement employment.

At the present time, it would be difficult to show that these connections had any influence on defence policy and planning. Yet the Government, prompted by the opposition, has occasionally shown
awareness of the potential dangers involved. In 1967, when it was revealed that four high ranking Ground Staff officers had made an overnight trip to Sengokubara (Hakone) for a game of golf with two former Lieutenant-Generals employed by Itōchū and Japan Aviotronics, Defence Agency Director General Masuda warned the officers concerned and prohibited future contacts. Yet such warnings appear to have been relatively ineffective. Throughout the latter part of the 1960s ties of mutual obligation, common interests and ideologies, links of a more pecuniary kind continued to draw Japan's small defence based industries and her new military forces closer together.

A minor industrial complex was thus in the process of emerging. Like its more formidable counterparts in other countries, this complex had its academic supporters and apologists, although the Japanese intellectual mainstream remained hostile to rearmament. Defence based industries promoted publication of hawkish popular magazines such as Gunji Kenkyū (The Japan Military Review) whose monthly issues contained a medley of articles on Japan's past military glories, current issues such as constitutional revision, nuclear weapons, the Self Defence Forces and so on. The contributors were predominantly interested business leaders, retired military men, right wing journalists and strong minded intellectuals, especially from Japan University (Nihon Daigaku), Asia University (Ajia Daigaku), Tokyo Industrial University (Tōkyō Kōgyō Daigaku), the Engineering Institute (Kōgakuin Daigaku) and Kyōto Industrial College (Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku). The links between individual administrators and academics at some of these institutions and the extreme right wing organizations discussed earlier in this chapter will be recalled. What influence this emergent military industrial complex will have on Japanese public opinion, political life and the defence decision-making process remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

In June 1970, amid the now traditional manifestations of widespread popular disapproval, the Japanese Government decided on automatic extension of the 1960 Security Treaty. This meant, in fact, that the arrangement would continue indefinitely, but that it could be terminated by either party after one year's advance notice. This decision represented a victory for the centre and left of the Liberal-Democratic Party. On the extreme right there had been some interest in renegotiating the Treaty in the direction of closer Japanese-American military co-operation, involving, perhaps, wider Japanese responsibilities.

The fact that the choice, as seen by the Government, was between the formulae of 'automatic extension' and 'long term solidification' was, in itself, significant. In 1970 there were, within the Conservative camp, few who believed it either desirable or possible to break with the United States. If the views of some elements on the right were excepted, there remained as little interest as ever in active military co-operation with American Far Eastern policies. In the centre and on the left of the ministerialist Party there had been profound differences with the United States over China and the Vietnam War. There were those who doubted whether American bases were absolutely necessary. Some factions showed interest in greater Japanese independence. Yet the Security Treaty was viewed by all as the cornerstone of Japan's national policy, the chief pillar of national defence. It was believed that all Japanese defence arrangements and foreign policy initiatives would have to be accommodated within its framework.

In 1971 it was too early to assess the impact of President Nixon's economic policies and the tentative American rapprochement with China. Yet it would be surprising indeed if the so-called 'Nixon shock' caused early and radical changes in the views outlined above. The events of 1970-71, however, clarified, once again, an important fact too often obscured under the accumulated mass of slogans that had accreted around the Security Treaty system. This was that the policies of both Japan and the United States were, within a framework of extensive ties of mutual co-operation, guided by their respective 'national interests', as interpreted by the two Governments.
Yet this had always been the case. The 1951 Security Treaty had not been forced on an unwilling Japanese Government by the United States. It was not strictly the logical outcome of Japan's defeat, the Occupation and the American decision to confront the Communist powers. On the contrary, the idea of a Japanese-American security treaty had first originated in Tokyo. There, despite indecision in Washington and MacArthur's interest in Japanese neutrality, the Conservative leaders in power under the aegis of the Occupation had seen a security treaty with the world's greatest naval power as facilitating Japanese access to world trade routes, markets and raw material supplies, providing protection against a traditional external enemy, the Soviet Union, and a check on the activities of revolutionary elements at home. Despite the efforts of these leaders to interest the United States in such a treaty, Washington remained for some years uncertain of her future policies in the Far East. Her decision to conclude a treaty was made independently. Between 1949 and 1950 the United States gradually moved towards a Japanese-American treaty, partly because of a desire to 'balance' Soviet and Chinese power in the Far East, partly because of pressure from the British Commonwealth for protection both against Communist expansion and a rearmed Japan. The decisive event was the United States decision to intervene in the Korean War. Before this Washington still had the option of a neutral Japan, MacArthur's 'Switzerland of the Far East'. After the Korean War such an alternative was, from the American point of view, strategically impossible and politically unacceptable.

The Korean War introduced another element. After Korea, the United States became anxious to enlist Japan's active military co-operation in regional security. Creation of an Asian anti-Communist military alliance centred on Japan remained a consistent American policy from the 1951 Yoshida-Dulles talks onwards. Successive Japanese Governments, mindful of the deep public divisions on the Security Treaty system itself, consistently declined to participate in such arrangements. There was also a strong view that while cooperation with the United States was necessary, it was not desirable to antagonize America's opponents. Yoshida, with General MacArthur's support, ensured that the 1951 Treaty reflected his own, rather than Dulles' ideas. When Kishi, attempting to imitate Yoshida's
independent and secretive political style, endeavoured to revise the 1951 arrangement in the direction of greater Japanese military responsibilities, he met with the virtual united opposition of his own Liberal-Democratic Party, the Opposition Parties, the bureaucracy and the nation at large. His subsequent efforts to negotiate a less radical revision of the Treaty touched off a factional struggle of such magnitude that significant alterations became impossible.

After the 1960 crisis, the Government returned firmly and decisively to the Yoshida policy of adherence to the Security Treaty and refusal to participate in regional defence. In spite of American pressure, Japan declined to participate actively in the containment of China. China's emergence as a nuclear power did not change the Japanese Government's basic threat perceptions. Nor did it modify official attitudes to the American alliance. Japan's failure to improve relations with China after the establishment of the Sato Cabinet in 1964, despite the promising developments of the Ikeda years, was merely the result of the fortuitous ebb and flow of factional politics, not of the October 1964 Chinese nuclear test. China was not regarded as a direct military threat by any important group within the Government of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The change of nuance in China policy after 1965 represented the partial victory of a few committed anti-Communists, allied with factions believing relations with Washington were more important than ties with Peking, over proponents of greater Japanese diplomatic autonomy or efforts to bridge the Sino-American gap. The decision to permit port calls by American nuclear submarines and to normalize relations with South Korea can be explained in a similar fashion. Both decisions kept Japanese-American relations on an even keel, neither involved Japan more actively in America's Far Eastern policies. The submarine visits had purely symbolic value. The Government made sure that relations with South Korea were devoid of military significance.

Even if the traditional Yoshida line had not recommended itself as a national interest, the development of Conservative Party factional conflicts in the 1960s would have imposed a policy of continued passive alignment with the United States. Conflict over China policy and the extreme tensions produced by the Vietnam War split the Liberal-Democratic Party into mutually hostile camps. By the
middle of the decade it was evident that factional relations within the Party were assuming strong ideological and policy overtones. One group saw Japan's long-term military, political and economic security lying in efforts to improve Sino-American-Soviet relations and to persuade the United States to pursue more realistic policies in East and South-East Asia. Japan's natural role was that of a bridge between East and West. The other group, while making light of 'the Chinese threat', stressed the continuity of the Cold War and saw Japan's security lying in continued co-operation with the United States in its struggle against Communism. So profound was the split, so evenly were the two camps matched that foreign policy was effectively paralyzed. While the conflict within the Government and the Conservative Party swayed this way and that, events in South-East Asia, relations between China and the rest of the world, took their own course. Japan exerted no influence on any of the principal actors. The deadlock was partially broken by Satō's decision to negotiate the return of Okinawa. Yet despite the appearance of offering a new departure, it soon became apparent that this issue, too, revolved around the problems first tackled at the 1951 Dulles-Yoshida talks. The United States, for a time, hoped to use the Okinawa negotiations to entice Japan into wider military responsibilities. The balance of forces within the Liberal-Democratic Party, strongly influenced by the movement of popular and informed opinion, doomed these efforts to failure. Political developments in Japan forced Mr Satō to demand complete removal of American nuclear bases from Okinawa. It is possible that Japan postponed signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until after the Okinawa negotiations to ensure that President Nixon acceded to her demands. This was not the only reason for hesitancy on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the desire to preserve a nuclear weapons option was of minimal importance. As a result of the 1969 Satō-Nixon talks Japan secured the nuclear free return of Okinawa and apparently avoided additional military commitments, except so far as the defence of Okinawa itself was concerned. References to the importance of Korea and Taiwan in Japan's security indicated the likely attitude of the Japanese Government to an American request to dispatch American forces to these areas from Japanese bases. The Government and its official spokesmen repeatedly stressed that the Self Defence forces would not be used outside the Japanese homeland. To do so would not
only raise constitutional and legal problems. It would, in view of the domestic climate of opinion and the political balance even with the Conservative camp, precipitate a crisis whose outcome could not be predicted. The United States began the Vietnam War as a relatively united nation. In the foreseeable future, Japan would begin any foreign war as a nation already divided.

Japan's own armed forces, in whose establishment the United States played a central role, have passed through several stages of development. Both Yoshida and MacArthur were opposed to Japanese rearmament. Both planned the Police Reserve Force, created after the Korean War, as a paramilitary police force to preserve internal security. Both resisted attempts to create an army and navy staffed and trained by former Imperial officers.

The first step towards creation of ground and naval forces to defend Japanese territory against external attack came with the establishment of the National Security Agency and the National Security Force in 1952. The new forces, which were not, by international standards, very substantial, represented the maximum degree to which the Yoshida Government was voluntarily prepared to go to satisfy America's 'expectation' that Japan would gradually assume responsibility for her own defence.

Washington's demands for greater Japanese military efforts and larger, more formally organized defence forces did not abate. Yoshida attempted to resist American pressure but was eventually left with no alternative but to accept further American military (MSA) aid, expand the National Security Force, or risk a deterioration in Japanese-American relations that might have placed the Security Treaty itself in jeopardy. After the MSA negotiations had begun, the Americans revealed that acceptance of aid would require far reaching organizational and legal changes in Japan's existing forces - in short, the creation of a regular military establishment and a de facto Ministry of Defence. The creation of the present Self Defence Forces and Defence Agency can thus be attributed directly to American pressure.
The United States, however, exerted little detectable direct influence on the legal and organizational superstructure, including the defence policy decision making machinery, that eventually emerged as a result of this pressure. The 1954-56 defence laws emerged as a result of a compromise between Yoshida's Liberal Party and the Democratic Party. Their most notable feature was the principle of civilian supremacy in defence policy decision making.

Before the establishment of the defence laws Japan was obliged to show the United States a detailed defence plan in connection with receipt of MSA aid. This plan, taken by Ikeda to Washington in 1953, provided the broad framework for all Japanese defence expenditure until 1970. The plan, unlike the later Second, Third, and Fourth Defence Plans, was not drawn up by civilians but by a secret committee of former Imperial army and naval officers who had joined the National Security Force in 1952. Its basic thinking, in particular the emphasis on 'balanced forces' and 'autonomy' in defence arrangements, reflected the Japan-centred attitudes of this group of men. The role they envisaged for Japan in the Far East was different from that envisaged at the time by the United States. The Japanese military leaders hoped to lay the foundation for eventual military autonomy, future co-operation with the United States on a basis of equality. The Americans, in contrast, were chiefly interested in establishing a large Japanese army, presumably for eventual deployment as part of a United Nations force to other parts of the Far East. Yoshida, caught between two equally disagreeable options, played one camp against the other. To avoid the creation of a great army of Japanese mercenaries inextricably locked in America's Far Eastern strategic system he supported the Imperial Officers against the United States. He then had the Finance Ministry drastically reduce all the plans prepared by the secret committee. In this way the groundwork was laid for small, semi-autonomous land, sea and air forces. Later changes in American strategy, however, resulted in the formation of close ties between the Japanese Air Self Defence Forces and the United States Fifth Air Force. The implications of these ties were not clear.

In the military field, the 1960s were characterized by a number of important developments. American pressure for greater Japanese defence efforts continued unabated. Despite this Japan
maintained an extraordinarily low level of military spending, moving in the international military budget hierarchy from the bracket comprising such powers as the Netherlands and Belgium to the bracket centering on Australia, India and Sweden. Much of the increase in the Japanese military budget was a result of inflationary pressures. Throughout the 1960s the Self Defence Forces continued to fulfil the roles established in the latter half of the 1950s - protection of the Japanese islands, within the framework of the Security Treaty system, against limited conventional attack from outside and from domestic revolution. In the aftermath of the 1960 crisis the Ground Self Defence Forces gave increased attention to internal security. As far as external attack was concerned, the main source of anxiety remained the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most important development was the apparent consolidation of the civilian control system in defence policy decision making. Also important, however, was the rapid changeover from reliance on American aid to domestically produced military equipment. This was responsible for the emergence of a military industrial complex creating intimate connections between defence based industries, the Self Defence Force officer corps, the right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party, certain academics, extreme right-wing groups and various gangster organizations. In 1970, the Japanese military industrial complex was still small and had no tangible influence on decision making. The publicity arm was however, making a concerted attempt to win over public opinion. Its future success was uncertain. While public opinion had come to accept the Self Defence Forces as a fait accompli, there remained much opposition to their expansion. There was little evidence to suggest that the increasing self confidence of the Japanese people had stimulated interest in the nation's martial past or any popular demand for a militarily assertive foreign policy. If a revival of militarism occurs, if, for example, the military industrial-complex does manage to arrogate a decisive role in defence decision making, it seems likely that the Japanese people will be unwilling participants or passive spectators in whatever military adventures ensue.