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ADVÂITÂMODA

(A STUDY OF ADVAITA AND VISISTADVAITA)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of The Australian National University

July, 1986

by

Michael Comans
This thesis is the result of my own research carried out while enrolled as a Ph.D. candidate at The Australian National University, 1983 – 1986.

Michael Comans
ABSTRACT

This work consists of (a) a translation of the Sanskrit text Advaitāmoda and (b) my own supplementary comments to the discussion contained in the text. The work is divided into four chapters, corresponding to the Anandāśrama publication of the text. The Sanskrit text has been further divided into sections with the translation following directly under each section in double spacing. My comments upon the text are in 1.5 spacing and have been placed under the translation of the relevant section.

The first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita" (Advaitamātan) gives a detailed overview of the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta. The second chapter: "the teaching of Viśiṣṭadvaita" (Viśiṣṭadvaitamātan) outlines the philosophical view of the Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta. At the conclusion of the second chapter, the author summarizes what he considers to be the fundamental differences between Advaita and Viśiṣṭadvaita. The third chapter: "the logical untenability of the Viśiṣṭadvaita teaching" (Viśiṣṭadvaitamatānupapattiḥ) and chapter four: "the logical tenability of Ignorance" (avidyopapattiḥ) constitute the major part of the text. These chapters consist of a detailed reply to Rāmānuja's critique of Advaita in the Laghusiddhānta and the Mahāsiddhānta portions of his Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. The procedure followed in these chapters is that the author firstly cites the Śrībhāṣya passage and then takes up that passage for discussion. In this manner, the major part of the above sections of the Śrībhāṣya are systematically discussed.
Dedication

FOR MY PARENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A list of acknowledgements indicates, quite rightly, that no piece of work is a creation ex nihilo. On the contrary, a completed work is the result of a number of causes— instrumental as well as material—and I now have the welcome opportunity to acknowledge these "causes", which took the form of the assistance I received during the course of my studies.

Firstly, I wish to thank my principal supervisor, Professor J. W. de Jong, who allowed me the freedom to pursue my interests while guiding my research with an expertise derived from his vast experience. If I have completed my studies under his supervision by developing a value for textual precision and scholarly detail, then I think he will consider his task satisfactorily accomplished. I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Tissa Rajapatirana who kindly read through the entire work— Sanskrit and English— in its final stages and eliminated many of my errors of commission and omission.

I would like to express my gratitude to Pt. T. S. Śrīnivāsaśāstrī of Deccan College, Pune, who effortlessly answered whatever questions I cared to raise with regard to my difficulties in understanding this text. I value the memory of the time I spent with him. I would also like to thank Mr K. Venugopalan of Deccan College who freely gave his time to clarify my understanding of certain arguments in the text and who has indeed been of great assistance at the latter stages of my work. I wish to record my gratitude to Śrī Dayānandaś Sarasvatī who teaches the bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara with immense clarity and insight. I would also like to thank Dr N. Ramaswamy for providing a solid foundation in Pāṇinīya grammar and for stimulating my interest in this area. To such people, I cannot do better than to quote Śaṅkara's introductory verse to the Taṅtirīyopaniṣat:

vair ime gurubhiḥ pūrvaḥ padavākṣayamāṇataḥ /
vākhyātāḥ sarvavedāntās tān nityaṁ praṇato'smy aham /

I would like to thank Dr R. Balasubramanian of the Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for initially suggesting Advaitāmoda for translation and for reading some passages of the Śrībhāṣya with me, in spite of his heavy schedule. I wish to express my thanks to Mr Mahādev Apte of Anandaśrama Publications for his permission to incorporate the text of Advaitāmoda along with the translation. I would like to express my
appreciation to Mr G. K. Abhyankar for assisting me with the biographical details of his grandfather Śrī Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar. I would also like to thank Dr and Mrs Ashok Tulpule for assisting me with the Marāṭhī biography of Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar.

Apart from my supervisors whom I mentioned above, I would like to thank the other members of the South and West Asia Centre: Dr Luise Hercus, Dr Richard Barz and Mr Yogendra Yādav, for the friendliness and help which they showed daily. Also, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the other Ph.D. students, all scholars of Buddhism, with whom I had the good fortune to share an office at various times: Akira Saito, Yasuo Tsukada and Richard Stanley. They all proved themselves to be kalyāṇamitras' in one way or another. I wish to thank Miss Betty Kat, venerated secretary of the South and West Asia Centre, for her patience, consistent good humour and constant willingness to be of assistance. I, like all previous Ph.D. students of this department, will remember her fondly.

Finally, I would like to thank the Faculty of Asian Studies for providing a pleasant environment conducive to work and The Australian National University for the use of the excellent facilities and also for the material support.

विद्यादेश्युपनामकं
द्यानन्दमहेषुरुण्म्।
हल्लणपदेश्यविद्वांसं
श्रीनिवासं च वन्दे त्रयम्।।
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VASUDEVASASTRI ABHYANKAR (1863-1942)

Vasudeva Sastrī was born into a family prominent in the field of Sanskrit scholarship. His grandfather, Bhāskara Sastrī Abhyankar (1783-1871), was a student of Nīlakaṇṭha Sastrī Thatte of Pune who had studied Sanskrit grammar at Vāraṇasī. Bhāskara Sastrī founded a school of traditional learning (pāṭhasālā) at his home at Sātārā in Mahaṛāṣṭra. When Vasudeva Sastrī was less than two years old his father died and Bhāskara Sastrī became responsible for the welfare of his grandchildren. Living in the home of Bhāskara Sastrī and surrounded by his grandfather's students, by the age of seven Vasudeva Sastrī had memorized such texts as: Amarakośa, Rūpāvalī and the Aṣṭādhvāyī of Pāṇini.1

After the death of Bhāskara Sastrī, the education of Vasudeva Sastrī was continued by Rāma Sastrī Godbole, a principal student of Bhāskara Sastrī. Each day, Rāma Sastrī would travel from his own residence at Mahooli, some three miles from Sātārā, to teach at the pāṭhasālā in his teacher's home. He did not receive a salary for teaching and the pāṭhasālā was funded through grants. Rāma Sastrī taught at the pāṭhasālā from 1871-1906. He generally taught about twenty-five students at any time and classes were conducted in the mornings from 9 until 11 o'clock and in the afternoons from 1 until 4. Vasudeva Sastrī studied under Rāma Sastrī from the age of eight until he was twenty-four. His education was traditional: he primarily studied Sanskrit grammar for twelve years beginning with Siddhāntakaumudi and concluding with portions of the Mahābhāṣya. The remaining four years were devoted to the study of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa, Advaita Vedānta and works on poetic composition. He received no "secular" education and he studied subjects such as mathematics, history and geography on his own. His course of study with Rāma Sastrī was as follows:
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</tr>
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After completing his formal studies, Vāsudevaśāstrī married and, in 1891, he travelled to Pune to gain employment. He carried with him a letter of recommendation from Rāmaśāstrī to Justice M.G. Ranade. He began his teaching career at a Sanskrit pāṭhasāla founded in 1885 by Viṭṭhalasāstrī, a former student of Bhāskaraśāstrī. He continued to teach at the pāṭhasāla until 1942, a career which spanned more than half a century. In 1892, upon the recommendation of M.G. Ranade and Namdar Gokhale, he was appointed a śāstrī at Fergusson College when the Sanskrit department was depleted by the death of V.S. Apte in that same year. He taught at Fergusson College until 1927. His daily routine was to teach at the pāṭhasāla from 7.30 until
9.00 am., and at Fergusson College from 11.00 until 2.00 pm.

Vāsudevaśāstri was connected with the Bhandarkar Institute from the time of its foundation and he served on its Regulating Council for more than two decades. In 1921 he was awarded the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya by the Imperial Government.² The publications of Vāsudevaśāstri are listed below:

1. **Tattvādarśa.** (1886) Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. A grammatical work. It is a commentary upon Nāgojībhāṭṭa's *Paribhāṣenduṣēkhara* based upon notes Abhyankar made while he was tutoring the text.

2. **Gūḍhārthapraṅkāśa.** (1888) A grammatical work. It is a commentary upon Nāgojībhāṭṭa's *Laghūsabdenduṣēkhara*. It is not available in its complete form.

3. **Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya.** (1900) Advaita Vedānta. It is a Marāṭhī translation of Śaṅkara's commentary upon the *Brahmasūtras*.

4. **Samāsokti.** (1904) Śaṃskṛta-pāṭhasālā, Pune. Viśiṣṭādvaita. A brief commentary upon the *Śrībhāṣya-catusūtra*. It paraphrases Sudarśanasūrī's *Śrutaprakāśikā* in a lucid manner.

5. **Prakāśa.** (1906) Ānandaśrama. Viśiṣṭādvaita. A commentary upon the Viśiṣṭādvaita text *Yaṭindramatadīpikā*.

6. **Śrībhāṣya-prathamasūtra.** A commentary, prepared for students, upon the first sūtra of the *Śrībhāṣya*.

7. **Viśiṣṭādvaitamata.** Śaṃskṛta-pāṭhasālā, Pune. An original work in Marāṭhī, of approximately thirty pages, explaining the teachings of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

8. **Kāvyaprakāśa** of Mammaṭa. (1911) Ānandaśrama. Alankāra. This is a work of six hundred pages containing an edition of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* with the commentaries *Udyota* by Nāgojībhāṭṭa and *Pradīpa* by Govindāṭhakkur.

9. **Śrībhāṣya-vivṛtti.** (1914) Bombay Sanskrit Series. Viśiṣṭādvaita. This work is in two parts. The first contains an edition of the *Śrībhāṣya* and the second part contains an explanation of difficult portions of the text.
10. **Pātañjalayogasūtrāni.** (1917) Bombay Sanskrit Series. A large work of four hundred and fifty pages bringing together commentaries on the *Yogasūtras* by Vyāsa, Vācaspatimisrā and Nāgoji Bhāṭṭā. For the preparation of this critical edition, Abhyankar used eight manuscripts of Vyāsa's commentary, five of Vācaspati's commentary and three manuscripts of Nāgoji's commentary.

11. **Advaitāmoda.** (1918) Anandāśrama. Advaita and Viśisṭadvaita. In this original work, Abhyankar firstly portrays the teachings of Advaita and Viśisṭadvaita and he then gives a detailed critique of the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta portions of the Śrībhāṣya from the standpoint of Advaita.


13. **Sūtrāntarasparigrahavicarā.** (1922) Anandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work attempts to resolve differences between the followers of the Ṛgveda and followers of the Kṛṣṇa-vaijñavaveda concerning the recitation of certain texts during the performance of *vajña*.

14. **Darsānakūra.** (1924) B.O.R.I. This work is a commentary on Śaṭya-Mādhava's *Saṅdarśana-saṅgraha*.

15. **Saṅskārapaddhati.** (1924) Anandāśrama. A work on dharmaśāstra, dealing with the karmakāṇḍa.

16. **Nyāyakośa.** (1928) B.O.R.I. A dictionary of technical terms used in Indian philosophical traditions. Abhyankar revised and re-edited this work.

17. **Binduprapāta.** (1928) B.O.R.I. Advaita. A commentary upon the *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdanarasarvasvātī.

18. **Dharmatattvanirṇaya.** (1929) Anandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work deals with topics such as changes in social and religious customs which relate to inter-religious marriages, widow remarriage etc.

19. **Kundārkodavā.** (1931) Anandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work is a commentary upon the treatise Kundārka which deals with the
mathematical proportions of a Vedic altar.


24. Kavaparīsuddhi. (1939) Anandārama. Vedānta. A discussion about liberation from the "three bodies", i.e. the physical (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma) and causal (kāraṇa) bodies.

ADVAITĀMODA

Abhyankar published five works dealing with the philosophical tradition known as Viśiṣṭādvaita. After the publication of one such work, Viśiṣṭādvaitamata, it is said that:

...some of the sāstrī's friends started saying jokingly that his views have changed and he has become a follower of Viśiṣṭādvaita...to clear the misunderstanding that he had changed his views to that of Rāmānuja, in 1918 he wrote Advaitāmoda ...in which he put a very strong case in favour of the teachings of Śaṅkara. After this book, the misunderstanding was cleared.3

The word "Advaitāmoda" can be resolved as a Karmadhānya, a Bahuvrīhi, or as a genitive Tatpurusa compound. The latter is most likely, in which case the word means: "the fragrance of Advaita". The work can be conveniently divided into four chapters. The first and second chapters
are useful descriptions of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy respectively. In the first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita", the author has based his exposition largely upon the Vedāntaparībhāṣā though he has also drawn upon a number of sources which I have tried to identify where possible. The second chapter: "the teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita", closely follows the Viśiṣṭādvaita manual of instruction, Yatindramatadīpikā, upon which the author had written a commentary. At the conclusion of this chapter, Abhyankar lists what he considers to be the major differences between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita; these are arranged as thirty three points.

Chapter three: "the logical untenability of the Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching" and chapter four: "the logical tenability of Ignorance (avidyā)" constitute the major part of the work. These chapters attempt to refute Rāmānuja's criticisms of Advaita as expressed in the "Small Conclusion" (Laghusiddhānta) and the "Great Conclusion" (Mahāsiddhānta) of the Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Abhyankar's method is to firstly cite a passage from the Śrībhāṣya and then to direct his arguments against statements contained in that passage. The text proceeds in a systematic manner and the most important parts of the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta are quoted in their due order and then discussed. Abhyankar has sometimes paraphrased the Śrībhāṣya text and such occasions have been noted. However when he has done so, there has been no compromise with the original meaning.

As far as I am aware, Advaitāmoda is the first Advaita work to discuss the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta portions of the Śrībhāṣya in such a detailed manner. Rāmarāya Bellāṅkoḍa's Śrīsaṅkarāśaṅkarabhāṣyavimārāh is a later work (1953) which masterfully discusses Rāmānuja's and Sudarśanasūrī's arguments as presented in Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. and the commentary Śrutaprakāśikā. However it does not follow the text of the Śrībhāṣya as closely as Abhyankar does in Advaitāmoda. A Viśiṣṭādvaitin's
reply to Advaitamoda: Paramārthaprakāśikā by U. Viśrāghavacārya, was published in 1940. I have occasionally consulted the latter text, which is of a comparable size to Advaitamoda, in the preparation of this work. However the limitations of time and the size of this work have meant that the Paramārthaprakāśikā could not be utilized to any significant extent and I must leave the analysis of the counter arguments to Advaitamoda to another student of the subject.

At this juncture, it is necessary to make some remarks about the contents of the first chapter which are, I feel, open to some criticism. Firstly, the author has devoted considerable attention to a topic of relatively minor importance like the combination of the five elements (pañcikaraṇa) at the expense of more significant matters in Advaita teaching such as the analysis of the three states of experience: waking, dream and deep sleep. Nor does Abhyankar devote sufficient consideration to the discrimination of the real meaning of "I", a topic which is of such importance to Advaita that it forms the subject matter of Śaṅkara's celebrated introduction to Brahmasūtra 1.1.1. Secondly, there is an inadequate presentation of how the sacred texts, i.e. the Upaniṣads, operate as the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for Brahman. The author does not discuss the usage of essential definition (svarūpalakṣaṇa), such as Tai. 2.1.1., for ascertaining the nature of Brahman. Nor does he explain the use of implication (lakṣaṇa) in the comprehension of the mahāvākya: "tat tvam asi" (Ch.6.8.7.). Such omissions can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that Abhyankar was trained primarily as a grammarian, by teachers who were themselves essentially grammarians and not Advaita preceptors. While the study of logic and grammar are certainly helpful for understanding all disciplines of knowledge (Kāṇḍaṇa Pāṇiniyaṁ ca sarvasaṁstropakāram) it does not necessarily mean that other disciplines can be fully understood without undergoing instruction from within the
methodological framework established by their respective traditions.

Thirdly, his description of the various views concerning the nature of māyā (1.23-25.) cannot be clearly associated with particular Advaita authors. Finally, his discussion of the theory of a single individual soul (ekajīvavāda) (1.29-30.) should be treated with circumspection as it contains a factual error and it is given undue emphasis in relation to the style of the rest of the chapter, which is a useful compendium of Advaita philosophy.

In chapter one, I have added a fairly extensive commentarial portion with the object of supplementing the main text with a more detailed portrayal of certain facets of the Advaita teaching. I have drawn upon a number of well known Advaita texts but have kept the writings of Śaṅkara as my primary source. The comments to the second chapter again attempt to provide a more detailed supplement to certain parts of the main text. The comments are principally drawn from the Netindramatadīpikā and sections of the Śrībhāṣya and Siddhītraya. In chapters three and four, the commentarial portions have a twofold purpose: (a) to explain some of the more difficult passages in Abhyankar’s writing and (b) to supplement the discussion. In order to do the latter I have chiefly drawn upon the writing of Rāmānuja Bellaṅkoṭa in the Śrīśaṅkarāśaṅkarabhaṅṣavimārṣāḥ.

The arguments contained in Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya and Abhyankar’s responses to them form the bulk of the subject matter of Advaitāmoda. Rāmānuja, writing in the twelfth century A.D., and Abhyankar in the twentieth century, illustrate the subtlety of argument and depth of scholarship which characterize much of the philosophical literature composed in Sanskrit. It is hoped that the translation and study of Advaitāmoda provide a glimpse of the richness which is the Sanskrit philosophical tradition.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION.


EDITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TEXTS CITED.


NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION.

(1) Sanskrit authors employ the word "knowledge" (jñāna) in a number of different senses. In the translation, the initial letter of the word "knowledge" is not capitalized when the word stands for the object of knowledge (jñāvate iti jñānam), or when it refers to the means whereby an object is known (jñāvate anena iti jñānam) such as in the case of perceptual or inferential knowledge etc. When knowledge is used in the sense of cognition (jñaptir iti jñānam), I have capitalized the initial letter. Even in regard to cognition, or Knowledge, the Advaitin makes a distinction between cognition occurring as a mental function (vṛtti jñāna) and awareness per se (svārupajñāna) which is the essence of the individual soul and identical with Brahman. Both the latter meanings are rendered as "Knowledge" and the distinction between them will be made evident through the context.

(2) When the Advaitin employs the word "ignorance" (avidyā / ajñāna) to denote the power which brings about the appearance of the world, I have capitalized the initial letter.

(3) With regard to the Advaita conception of the self, I have not capitalized the initial letter of the word "self" when the word refers to the individual soul (jīva). When the word refers to the "essential Self", I have capitalized the first letter. On one or two occasions such a distinction has been difficult to maintain since, for the Advaitin, the essence of the individual soul is nothing but the supreme Self.

(4) With regard to the Viśiṣṭadvaita conception of the self, I have not capitalized the initial letter when the word "self" refers to the individual soul. I have capitalized the initial letter when the word refers to the Lord i.e. the supreme Self.

(5) Sanskrit words are cited in their stem (prātipadika) form. However the word "karma" is more familiar in its nominative singular form; "karma" and it has been cited in this way. When the word "karma" stands for "ritual action" it has been translated as such. When it has the moral sense of the result produced by previous good or bad actions, I have not translated the word and it appears in the text as "karma."
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

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3.137. (a) Expressions of "I-ness" in the statements of sages are because they transact according to the understanding of the people. (b) In liberation free from the body (videhamukti), there is no appearance of "I-ness".

3.138. Verse no. XV.

3.139. Though the scripture does not have absolute reality, it reveals the truth.

3.140. Continuation of the topic.

3.141. Though depending upon unreal difference, the scripture does not communicate what is false as being true.

3.142. The method of communication in the Upaniṣad texts.

3.143. The scripture removes the false view of difference and then negates the difference centred upon itself.

3.144. What is required is only that the instructor is not in error concerning the thing to be taught.

3.145. Scripture has no defect concerning what is to be taught. Perception has a possible defect.

3.146. The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently negated.

3.147. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that the dream-knowledge is not false since it is not negated.

3.148. Continuation of the topic.

3.149. Continuation of the topic.
The knowledge of the real from what is unreal can be illustrated by the knowledge of a real letter from particular printed lines.

Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that, in the case of the letter and a line, the real arises only from what is real.

Reply to the objection: if the scripture is false, its object, i.e. Brahman, would also be false.

Continuation of the topic.

Reply to the statement: if the knowledge of fire is false, then the fire—which is the object of that false knowledge—is also false.

Continuation of the topic.

Criticism of Rāmānuja's statement: it is incorrect to say that the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently negated. Because it is negated by the statement: "reality is emptiness".

Does the sentence: "reality is emptiness" negate itself or not? Reply to the first alternative.

There is no fault even though the scripture operates in itself.

Reply to the second alternative, i.e. "reality is emptiness" does not negate itself.

Verse no. XVI.

The meaning of the text: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning..." (Ch.6.2.1.).

The word "existence" in this text means the Self.

Reply to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins statement: texts which teach Brahman as the material cause must be interpreted in a figurative sense.

The contradiction in the Viśiṣṭādvaitins interpretation of: "My dear, this was existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) and "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self" (Ai.1.1.).

Difficulties in upholding the view that "existence" and "Self" have the meaning that the Self is qualified by a body.

Difficulties in upholding the view that the words "existence" and "Self" refer to the Self without connection to a body.

Continuation of the topic.

In the sentence: "By which what is unheard becomes heard..." (Ch.6.1.3.), the word "by which" refers to the object i.e., the Self.

Objection that: in the sentence "By which what is unheard becomes heard...", is the knowledge to be gained something
different from the Self or not?

3.170. Reply to the objection.

3.171. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of "...this was existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.).

3.172. Interpretation of the text according to Advaita.

3.173. Refutation of the view that the word "existence" (sat) refers to the subtle primary matter (pradhāna).

3.174. Explanation of the text: "The wise behold that which cannot be seen..." (Mu.1.6.).

3.175. Continuation of the topic.

3.176. Explanation of the text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.).

3.177. Continuation of the topic.

3.178. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "real".

3.179. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "Knowledge".

3.180. The use of the three words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless" in the definition of Brahman.

3.181. Grammatical apposition (sāmanādhikarāpya).

3.182. Verse no. XVII.

3.183. Criticism of Rāmānuja's explanation of the word "without a second" in Ch.6.2.1.

3.184. The word "through which" (yena) in Ch.6.1.3., must signify only a single entity.

3.185. The use of the example of the pot and clay (Ch.6.1.4.).

3.186. The meaning of the text: "My dear, this was existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.).

3.187. Continuation of the topic.

3.188. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.).

3.189. The teachings of (a) Emptiness, (b) that there is solely an efficient cause, (c) that there are multiple material causes, or (d) the cause possesses distinction, cannot establish the proposition: "through the knowledge of the one, there is the knowledge of everything".

3.190. Summary of the topic concerning the proposition: through the knowledge of the one, there is the knowledge of everything.
3.191. Verse no. XVIII.

3.192. Brahman is in reality free from distinction.

3.193. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "...whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" (Ch.8.1.5.).

3.194. Continuation of the topic.

3.195. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.).

3.196. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "He attains all desires, together with the wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1.1.).

3.197. Continuation of the topic.

3.198. Interpretation of the text: "For whom [Brahman] is not thought..." (Ke.2.3.).

3.199. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "From which words return..." (Tai.2.4.1.).

3.200. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "You cannot see the seer of seeing" (Bṛh.3.4.2.).

3.201. Rāmānuja's view is that the sacred texts do not deny real diversity. Criticism of this view by means of an explanation of what is meant by the word "different" (bhinna).

3.202. Continuation of the topic. Seeing oneness in diversity is possible only when there is a single material cause.

3.203. Continuation of the topic with reference to the text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Bṛh.4.4.19.).

3.204. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "All this is indeed Brahman...Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate" (Ch.3.14.1.).

3.205. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "For when he makes the slightest interval (antara)..." (Tai.2.7.1.).

3.206. Continuation of the topic.

3.207. Explanation of B.S.3.2.11: "There is no twofold characteristic for the supreme, even on account of place, because everywhere it is taught otherwise]."

3.208. The purport of the Bhagavadgītā is that Brahman is free from distinction.

3.209. The purport of the Viṣṇupurāṇa is that Brahman is free from distinction.

3.210. The falsity of the world is taught in the Viṣ.P.

3.211. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin position that the etymological derivation of
the word "bhagavat" shows that Brahman is an object of speech.

3.212. Criticism of the above view. Distinctions are admitted only in the sphere of ordinary relations (vyavahāra).

3.213. Discussion of the meaning of the verse: "The nature of Knowledge..." (Viṣṇu P. 1.2.6).

3.214. Explanation of the questions in Viṣṇu P. 1.1.9. concerning the nature and cause of the world and the explanation of the reply in Viṣṇu P. 1.1.35., to those questions.

3.215. Rāmānuja's interpretation of Viṣṇu P. 1.1.9. and 1.1.35.

3.216. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the above two verses. The word "from what" (yatalḥ) in Viṣṇu P. 1.1.9. cannot refer to both the efficient and the material cause.

3.217. Continuation of the criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses.

3.218. Critique of Rāmānuja's objections to the Advaita interpretation of these verses.

Chapter Four: AVIDYOPAPATTIḥ

4.1. Rāmānuja's seven objections to the Advaitins conception of Ignorance (avidyā).

4.2. Verse no. XIX.

4.3. Reply to the first objection concerning the locus of avidyā.

4.4. Reply to the second objection concerning the concealing by avidyā.

4.5. Reply to the third objection concerning the nature of avidyā.

4.6. Continuation of the topic.

4.7. The statement: "I am ignorant" refers to avidyā which is something positive in nature (bhāvarūpa). This is a partial reply to the fifth objection concerning a means of proof for avidyā.

4.8. The meaning of the negative particle in the statement: "I am ignorant" (aham ajñāḥ).

4.9. Reply to the fourth objection concerning the indeterminable nature of avidyā.

4.10. Brahman as such does not have the experience of avidyā.

4.11. Reply to the objection: if unreal error is based upon an unreal avidyā, there is the possibility of error without a real substratum and the result would be Emptiness.

4.13. Rāmānuja's objection to the use of inference as a means of proof for avidyā. The first interpretation of Rāmānuja's objection.


4.15. The second interpretation of Rāmānuja's objection and the reply.

4.16. The applicability of the example in the inference under discussion.

4.17. Rāmānuja's nine counter-inferences against the concept of avidyā.

4.18. Critique of the nine counter-inferences.

4.19. The destruction of a positive entity can occur through knowledge.

4.20. Reply to the objection: since Knowledge is momentary, upon the apprehension of fear there would be the cognition of multiple fears.

4.21. Continuation of the topic concerning the use of inference in regard to avidyā.

4.22. Verse no. XX.

4.23. The material cause of the false world can only be false.

4.24. Discussion of the objection: only what is perceived is the object of cognition, error and sublation.

4.25. The apprehension of the indeterminable (anirvacanīyakhyāti).

4.26. There is no appearance of one thing in another manner.

4.27. Criticism of Rāmānuja's mode of refuting the Advaitin.

4.28. Reply to the objection: why does a thing having an indeterminable reality become an object of the idea and the word "silver" and not something else?

4.29. Criticism of the apprehension of the real (satkhyāti).

4.30. Continuation of the topic.

4.31. Continuation of the topic.

4.32. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that in dream the Lord creates the dream objects for each soul.

4.33. Continuation of the topic centred upon the discussion of the śūtra: "But [the dream creation] is mere māyā..." (B.S.3.2.3.).

4.34. Further criticism of satkhyāti.

4.35. Criticism of satkhyāti through a discussion of the examples of the crystal and the China rose and the yellow conch-shell.
4.36. Discussion of the examples of the circle caused by the turning of a fire-brand and the appearance of a face in a mirror.

4.37. Discussion of the example of the confusion of direction.

4.38. Rāmānuja's explanation concerning the sight of a double moon.


4.40. The relation of negated and negating.

4.41. Verse no. XXI.

4.42. The text: "enveloped by the untrue (anṛta)" (Ch.8.3.2.) is a means of proof about avidvā being positive in nature.

4.43. The meaning of the word "ṛta" in Kaṭha.1.3.1.

4.44. Continuation of the topic.

4.45. The nāsadasīya hymn (Tai.Bṛ.2.9.3.4.) is a means of proof about avidvā whose nature is indeterminable as real or unreal.

4.46. Criticism of Rāmānuja's explanation of the nāsadasīya hymn.

4.47. Continuation of the topic, with reference to Rāmānuja's use of the words "sat" and "tyat" (Tai.2.6.1.).

4.48. Sāyaṇācārya's commentary upon the nāsadasīya hymn.

4.49. Continuation of Sāyaṇa's commentary.

4.50. The meaning of the word "maya".

4.51. The nature of maya as described in the Devipūrāṇa, Pañcadaśī and the Viṣṇupūrāṇa.

4.52. Explanation of the texts cited in the Śrī.B. with reference to maya.

4.53. The text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of proof about an indeterminable avidvā.

Question: does the word "you" refer to Brahman (a) as qualified by the individual soul, or (b) as an attribute of the soul? Criticism of the first view.

4.54. Criticism of the second view.

4.55. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that all words finally denote the supreme Self.

4.56. Continuation of the topic.

4.57. Quotations from the Vāyupūrāṇa and the DevĪgītā.

4.58. The Viṣ.P. text: "The stars are Viṣṇu...what exists and what does not exist" (Viṣ.P.2.12.38.).
4.59. Reply to the objection: identity statements such as "The stars are Viṣṇu" refer to the relation of body and the one embodied (śarīraśarīrabhāva).

4.60. Further criticism of the concept of śarīraśarīrin. Interpretation of words such as "body" occurring in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

4.61. Explanation of the words: "...what exists and what does not exist" (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.38.).

4.62. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the words: "what exists", "what does not exist".

4.63. Explanation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa verse: "Because the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge" (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.39.).

4.64. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the above verse.

4.65. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa verse: "But when Knowledge is pure..." (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.40.) and the critique of that interpretation.

4.66. Continuation of the topic.

4.67. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.41 and 42.

4.68. Interpretation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa verse: "Therefore...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever..." (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.43.) and the criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation.

4.69. Interpretation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa verses: "Knowledge is completely pure..." (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.44.) and "I have thus told you what is reality..." (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.45.).

4.70. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses on the grounds that he has connected the subject of some verses with the predicate of others.

4.71. Criticism of Rāmānuja's statement that these verses do not denote Brahman as free from distinction, or māyā, or a world superimposed by māyā.

4.72. Further criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses.

4.73. Reply to the sixth objection concerning an agent for the cessation of avidyā.

4.74. Verse no. XXII.

4.75. Reply to the seventh objection concerning the cessation of avidyā.

4.76. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.6.47 and 48, with the commentary of Śrīdharaśvāmin.

4.77. The subject-object distinction occurring in the text: "...the Self should indeed be seen" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5.) must pertain to a limiting adjunct because non-difference is explicitly taught by the text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.).
4.78. The nature of avidyā.

4.79. Illustration with reference to the above explanation.

4.80. Avidyā is immediately dispelled by knowledge.

4.81. Brief concluding statement.
Introductory Communication

The supremely compassionate Lord, desirous of saving the people immersed in the ocean of worldly existence experiencing pleasures and sorrows in accordance with their own individual actions, set forth various knowledges. For there is the sacred text: "the Lord of all knowledges". In regard to those knowledges, each particular knowledge is on account of the difference of the subject matter to be taught. Although at first glance a contradiction appears to exist among some, nevertheless that can be removed because there is a difference among those who are qualified [for each knowledge]. And so the praise of a particular knowledge is for the engagement of the respective person who is qualified. Even the condemnation seen somewhere about a certain [knowledge] is for the non-engagement there of a person who is not qualified for that [particular knowledge]. Just because of this [condemnation] it should not be suspected that a particular knowledge has no validity. This alone is the purport of even the condemnation of action: "what is uncreated is not [gained] through an action". For this very reason, even though
action has been condemned, the Lord taught it to Arjuna having observed his qualification: "therefore you must certainly perform action".

A qualified person is one who has experienced the condition prior to that. For example, a person qualified for investiture with the sacred thread is one who has undergone the purificatory rite of tonsure. A person who is not qualified is of two types: one who has not experienced the condition prior to that and one who has experienced that condition [i.e. the end result itself]. For example, a person who is not qualified for investiture with the sacred thread is one who has not undergone tonsure or one whose investiture with the sacred thread has already been done.

With regard to the second person who is not qualified there, the condemnation is specifically employed for the non-engagement there once again.

Although the knowledges have been taught as fourteen in the Vissamurāṇa:

Indeed, these knowledges are fourteen: the [six] limbs [of the Veda], the four Vedas, the mimamsa [divided into two] which is an elaborate system, the treatises concerning dharma and the Purāṇas still, only a twofold grouping is primarily seen. For there is the sacred text: "there are two knowledges which should be known, the higher and the lower". Having shown there the lower [knowledge] by: "the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-
Veda" etc., the higher knowledge is shown: "Then there is the higher [knowledge], by which that Imperishable is attained". The pre-eminence of the higher knowledge is indicated just by the word "higher" (para). This higher knowledge is certainly more esteemed than the others because it is the means for the highest human goal which is the attainment of Brahman. In the Mundakopanishad, having commenced with: "Then there is the higher", the result -which is the attainment of Brahman- is taught by: "...by which that Imperishable is attained" etc. certainly prior to showing the nature of the higher knowledge. Because there would especially be an engagement towards seeing the nature of something when the greatness of the result is already known.

This sacred text attracts people toward the higher knowledge with more affection than even thousands of parents. In the expectation: "and what is the mode of procedure there?", Śrī Śaṅkara-cārya says sacred texts such as: "the one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indeed", which show that liberation is at that very instant following the knowledge of Brahman,
remove [the notion] that something else must be done in between [the knowledge of Brahman and the gain of liberation]. But Rāmānujaçārya says that devotional meditation has to be performed after knowledge.

The primary difference between these two teachings is the acceptance of the teaching of māyā on the one side and, on the other, the non-acceptance of it. And in this matter, being uncertain as to which of the two should be accepted and which of the two should not, as soon as I was desirous of knowing the truth, at that very time I was instructed by the sacred text: "what is uncreated is not [gained] through an action" flashing before the eyes and revealing that: to attain liberation there is no scope for even a trace of something to be done. For if the manifest world is absolutely real, something would have to necessarily be done in order to bring about its cessation. Therefore that [world] is certainly without absolute reality. And that is difficult to be stated without the teaching of māyā. Thus the mind of myself — who was considering that the intended meaning of the sacred texts is that the teaching of māyā alone is superior and who was accompanied by the thought: "how can this error of the people be removed?" — engaged in writing Advaitāmoda.

Although the mind turned back a little due to its deficiency in being very sharp, it proceeded again with an abundance of enthusiasm due to the urging of the venerable Śrī Śaṅkarācārya which was awakened within it [the mind]. Having become bound to the faith that the very feet of the teacher [Śaṅkara] and the grace of a true preceptor will provide the assistance here, [the mind] placed his feet in this work and even though sinking now and then into an ocean difficult to cross, it somehow or other reached the further shore mounted upon the raft of faith.
This work was accomplished due to the feet of the teacher [Śaṅkara] and they alone can bring about the engagement of the learned people here. In whatever manner the author of the Śrībhāṣya, having restated the view of the Advaitin, is seen to make an effort in refuting that, in that manner, my own effort—which has the removal of that [refutation] as its object— is only in accordance with that [refutation]. Hence it has happened that a repeated investigation of the very same subject has to be done at some places. For this reason, the learned people must not regard it as affected by the defect of repetition etc. And those whose minds are controlled by clinging [to a certain view] cannot smell that fragrance. My wish is that among those [who say]: "faults are certainly easily acquired by a human being", some critics who are disposed to love only good qualities, though they are impartial, will point out the faults.

Vāsudevasāstrī Abhyankar
Pune, 1840.
(1918. Christian era.)
1.1. Indeed here in the world, people should primarily endeavour only to obtain the goals of mankind. Although the human goals are fourfold, consisting of religious and social values (dharma), worldly prosperity (artha), satisfaction of legitimate desires (kama) and liberation (moksa), nevertheless, among those, liberation alone is the ultimate human goal. The other are not, because they do not last. The transience of worldly prosperity and of the satisfaction of desires is understood just by direct perception. [The result gained from] religious and social values is also in the same manner, for there is the sacred text:

Just as here, the world which is acquired by action perishes, in just the same way the other world which is acquired by merit perishes (Ch. 8.1.6.).

However, liberation is not like that, for it is understood to be eternal on account of the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch. 8.15.1.). In the Bhagavadgītā also [liberation is understood to be eternal]: "but having reached Me, O Kaunteya, there is no further birth" (G. 8.16.).

The introduction to Advaitāmoda is based upon that of the Vedāntaparibhāsā.
1.2 In matters which are not within the scope of sense perception the Veda alone is the means of knowledge. And there [in the Veda], because of the elaborate teaching of ritual actions such as sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇa section, the understanding of the people would be like this: "having performed ritual action such as sacrifice, obtaining the result such as heaven is alone the primary human goal". The manifestation of the Upaniṣads in the sacred text is for the removal of that [false belief]. In the Upaniṣads, Brahman is revealed by a twofold method according to the capacity of people for the knowledge of Brahman: by means of positive statements and by means of negative statements.

**Comment**

The scope of the Veda is delineated to be the revelation of what cannot be ascertained through the operation of an ordinary means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Perception and such perceptually based means of knowledge as inference require the relationship between sense data and the respective sense organ. According to the orthodox (āstika) view metaphysical truth falls outside this relation:

for this entity [i.e. Brahman] is not an object of perception since it is without form etc. And since it has no inferential mark etc., it is not an object of inference, etc. But like dharma, this entity can only be attained through the scriptures [i.e. the Veda] alone.¹

Thus there are two orders of knowledge: concerning ordinary relations (vyāvahārīka) and metaphysical truth (pāramārtika) and two corresponding levels of pramāṇa.² The Veda is solely a means of knowledge for "matters which are not within the scope of sense perception".³

The Advaita analysis of the Veda distinguishes sharply between the karmakanda such as the brähmaṇa portion dealing with ritual observances and the jñānakanda, specially the Upaniṣads, which reveal the nature of reality, Brahman. In his introduction to the Rg Veda, Sāyaṇa specifies that:
dharma and Brahman are, respectively, the subject matter of the prior and later portions in the Veda. The knowledge of them both is directly the purpose of the Veda. To the Advaitin both portions of the Veda are a valid pramāṇa. They differ, however, in that the karmakāṇḍa is within the world of "becoming" (samsāra) while the jñānakāṇḍa teaches the liberating knowledge of Brahman. Śankara held the view that: it is reasonable that just as [the scripture] teaches the true means such as the agnihotra sacrifice for a person desirous of heaven etc., so too it teaches the Self in its real nature to the person desiring liberation (through texts like) "That is the Self. You are That, O Śvetaketu."

The perceptually based means of knowledge and Vedic revelation each relate to a separate domain and as a consequence it is held that they do not conflict. They do, however, appear to come into contradiction because Advaitins consider that the śrutī reveals the falsity of perceptual plurality:

there is no diversity whatsoever here [in Brahman]. He who sees diversity here, as it were, goes from death to death.

The Advaitins then argue that Vedic testimony possesses greater validity than perceptual experience. The śrutī does not negate the cognition of duality (dvaitapratīti) but it sublates (bāḍha) by knowledge the assumption of reality which is based upon that cognition. The position of the Advaitins is that the perceptually based means of knowledge are, and continue to remain, valid within their own sphere of operation though that sphere is sublated by knowledge from Vedic revelation:

the mere validity pertaining to ordinary relations is not negated by the scripture dealing with non-duality, but their validity as pertaining to reality is negated. Abhyankar mentions a "twofold method" of the Upaniṣads: the use of positive statements (vidhi) and the use of negative statements (nīśedha). By the word vidhi, the author refers to various forms of meditation (upāsana) prescribed in the sacred texts and passages which present Brahman as possessing attributes. The subsequent negation of the ultimacy of upāsana and attributive statements is nīśedha. Śaṅkara considered that in the Upaniṣads:
Brahman is understood to have two aspects—qualified by the limiting adjuncts which are different modifications of name and form, and, contrary to that, being free from all limiting adjuncts... There are texts by the thousand showing that Brahman has two aspects according to the difference between the sphere of knowledge and ignorance.¹¹

Advaitins see in the śrutī a deliberate method of revealing Brahman, taking into account the different degrees of understanding on the part of the student. Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana both refer to this method (adhyātropāpavādābhyaṁ niṣprapañcāṁ prapañcate, i.e. "Brahman] free from the manifest world is explained by means of superimposition and negation")¹² which is the false ascription of attributes (avastvyāropah) upon Brahman (vastuni)¹³ followed by the negation (apavāda) of those attributes to reveal Brahman as free from all duality. This method can be illustrated by the arundhatipradarśananyaya¹⁴ which describes how the tiny star known as Arundhati is indicated by firstly pointing out larger, nearby stars as Arundhati and then successively negating them until the eye is able to apprehend the more subtle form of the real Arundhati.

In his commentary towards the end of the Brhadāraṇyaka, Śaṅkara makes a significant statement concerning the application of the method of adhyātropāpavāda. While explaining the sentence: "Brahman is indeed free from fear. The one who knows in this manner certainly becomes Brahman free from fear", he states:

The one who knows the Self described above to be Brahman which is free from fear, he certainly becomes Brahman free from fear. What has been told is the compressed meaning of the whole Upaniṣad. For the correct understanding of this very meaning, the idea of origination, maintenance, dissolution, etc., and the superimposition of action, its factors and results have been brought about on the Self. And again, in the negation of those, by means of the elimination of the superimposed distinctions [by the process of] "not this, not this", the truth is communicated.¹⁵

¹.3. श्रुतिश्वर्तवत्ते दुर्ववोधा यतः श्रुतिवाच्यं सौसिद्धं संसारितर्वश्रवस्यं भाष्यो विरहिते च. भाषा पातुतेव तथाद. लोकाधीरोपरहि बन्धुवदयं। श्रुतिवद्वितैः मार्गं श्रद्धायां विषयेऽस्मिन महत्तत्त्वव्ययं लोकायां ज्ञानमूलं सम्मानं च महतिः शिबिश्या समजने। अमुक्षितवस्मरे नातिविखं भार्तक्षुण्डनुनु। नतो वेदाध्येयाव्य ऋषयत्सपीहं। तत्परमात्र लघुसाधन्यं ऋषयं पद्मदीनि व्यक्तिरणि निरुक्त भावितायथायं च मणियं। इत्यत् कालेन च तथव्यातिनात्र-ढाश्यायी समन्त। तत्वस्य शंदुर्गायं समजन। यस्ततेत्तवां शन्तर्गायं भक्ति-
The sacred texts are exceedingly difficult to understand because the sentence of the sacred text is concise and it is generally bereft of sentences supplying a connection. And the language is very ancient. And people are successively of mediocre intelligence. Even though the faithful were confidently engaged upon the path shown by the sacred texts, among other people there was a slackening in enthusiasm for the path of knowledge and the path of action. At that juncture, disbelievers appeared. Then the sages performed austerities to know the meaning of the Veda. Because of the strength of their austerities the sages gained the capacity [to comprehend the meaning] and they composed grammatical treatises beginning with Aindra, etymology and the rules concerning phonetic changes. Later, in just the same way, Pāṇini composed the Astādhyāyī and because of that there arose the knowledge of the meaning of words, for the division of words into the stem (prakṛti) and the terminal affix (pratyāya) was shown in it. And Jaimini composed the Dvādasādhyāyī and because of that there arose the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, for many rules were contained in it which
were useful in determining the meaning of a sentence. A grammarian is one who knows the meaning of a word and a Mīmāṃsaka is one who knows the meaning of a sentence. Then, when the people gained the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda, there was an attentive engagement in the ritual actions. And successively [the engagement in ritual] occupied the supreme position. Accordingly, the thought of the people was in such a manner: "this Upaniṣad portion is not the pinnacle of the sacred texts. On the other hand, by teaching that the individual self has an imperishable nature and thus by means of generating faith in the other worldly happiness such as heaven, it only confirms the ritual portion dealing with sacrificial offerings etc. and so it is subsidiary to that."

The path to liberation shown by the Upaniṣads became impassable to people, like it was full of thorns. Even the Vedāntins came to be looked upon with sharp glances of the Mīmāṃsakas as the disbelievers [were looked upon]. It has been told that:

> when an inquiry into the meaning of sentences is begun, the Mīmāṃsakas thwart the understanding of the people as they impede the sight of the people with the dust in the form of deceptively clever statements.

At that juncture, it was as though a time of the non manifestation of the Upaniṣads and once again the firm opinion of the people was recognised as: "having performed ritual action such as sacrifice, obtaining the result such as heaven is alone the primary human goal."

1.4.

एते लोकानां निराकारप्रमाणं च लोकानां प्रहोत्ति जनवन्मेत्वानवाद-रायणो व्हासुवाणि प्रमिविनाय। जैन्मिनिमित्यादिपतिव वात्योषपथयोगिनो न्यायां सर्वे वादार्थणस्य संवृत्ता एव। उपनिषदः पद्धत: कार्यकार्यास्वकृत इत्यावाचारो भर्त्र वादार्थणस्यारस्मत। वादार्थणाः जैन्मिनिमित-पादिपारं न्यायंस्वनिविषयं विप्रयाच तत्सवृतविषयमार्थ्य धार्म-दार्मिका विवाचारं नकार। उपनिषदःपविद्वित्तिवोऽवधार्मेऽवधिकर्ष: संवृत।
1.4. The revered Bādarāyana, refuting this common opinion and engendering an enthusiasm on the part of the people for the path of liberation, composed the Brahmāsūtras. All the logic, [i.e. syllogistic reasoning] taught by Jaimini which was useful [for understanding] the meaning of a sentence was certainly accepted by Bādarāyana. But the part which comprised this much: the Upaniṣad portion is subsidiary to the ritual portion, was not accepted by Bādarāyana. Having taught the meaning of the Upaniṣads only through the methods taught by Jaimini and having established that [the meaning of the Upaniṣads] to be the portion which is the pinnacle of the sacred texts, Bādarāyana made the door to liberation free from obstruction. And the path to liberation shown by the Upaniṣads became free from thorns.

1.5. After a long time had passed in this way, once again a difficult time was at hand. The mind of the people was assailed by a lack of faith. Only the name remained of the followers of the path of knowledge and the path of ritual. Just as before, once again disbelievers, known as "materialists" (cārvaka), appeared. For they spoke in this manner: "there is no one known as an individual soul distinct from the body. There is no liberation. There is no other world. Revelation is no means of knowledge. There is no one known as the Lord who is the ruler. This world arises and perishes out of its own nature."
1.6. According to the maxim of the turning of the wheel, once again in the course of the revolution of time the prevalence of the materialist view was reduced to complete disgrace by the followers of the path of ritual with assistance obtained from the king of that time. Beginning with Maṇḍana Miśra, the leaders of the Mīmāṁsakas gained eminence in the assembly of the king and fancying themselves to be learned, they then regarded even the followers of the path of knowledge to be fools as they did the disbelievers [as fools]. Conditions were observable everywhere like at the time of the non-manifestation of the Upaniṣads and like at the time prior to the composition of the sutra.

1.7. At this juncture, Lord Śiva, desirous of saving the people, descended in the form of Śaṅkara-Śāriya and having composed the Śārīrakhaṇḍaḥ in the form of an exposition of the Brahma-sūtra, like the author of the sūtras (Bādarāyana) he made the door to liberation once more free from obstruction. This incarnation as Śri Śaṅkara-Śāriya was solely for reviving once again the Vedānta scriptures.
Abhyankar follows traditional hagiography in portraying Śaṅkara to be an incarnation of the god Śiva.\(^{19}\)

1.8. Śrī Śaṅkara, whose feet are worthy of veneration throughout the world, composed a commentary on the basis of the teaching of māyā upon the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahmaṣūtras. He is ever pre-eminent. 1.

1.9. Now, the teaching which has come from Śaṅkara is being portrayed for easy understanding.

In the sacred texts, the statements of freedom from qualities always aim at discarding all qualities. Expressions of the possession of qualities have a figurative meaning because of the superimposition of auspicious qualities on the supreme Brahma. The sacred texts [teaching] non-duality refer to what is the fact. An expression of difference relates to limiting adjuncts. Therefore the teaching which has come from Śrī Śaṅkara, being in harmony with all the sacred texts, is supreme. 2.
The validity of the Vedas as a means of knowledge is contingent upon the pre-supposition of the internal consistency of their teaching. Yet there are passages which describe Brahman as possessing qualities (saguna), while passages also denote Brahman to be free from qualities (nirguna). Some passages portray Brahman as "other" while some teach that there is "nothing other". If Vedāntins are unable to explain these contradictions the status of the Vedas as a pramāṇa cannot be upheld. Vedāntins, however, refuse to admit inherent contradiction in the Vedic texts and expend immense exegetical effort in demonstrating the mutual concord (samanvaya) of all passages.

Śaṅkara recognises a seeming contradiction in the texts and he argues that a solution cannot be found by granting saguna and nirguna statements equal status:

the supreme Brahman cannot logically have, of itself, both characteristics. Because one and the same thing cannot be ascertained as naturally possessed of qualification such as form and as the opposite of that on account of the contradiction.

Therefore an order of primary (mukhyartha) and secondary, figurative (gaunārtha) texts must be determined:

when there is a contradiction, this is the principle for a decision between the two alternatives: those that have that [formless Brahman] as their object are more authoritative than those which do not have that [formless Brahman] as their object.

According to Śaṅkara, the purport of the Upaniṣads is contained in those statements which denote Brahman to be free from quality and non-dual. However contrary passages which teach the possession of qualities or the distinction between Brahman and the soul are not without meaning, since:

it is not correct to admit some sentences of the Veda as having meaning and some as meaningless, because the status of a means of knowledge is common.
Rather, the passages which present Brahman as saguna are with reference to a limiting adjunct (upādhi)\(^{24}\); they are for the purpose of worship and meditation (upāsana)\(^{25}\) and are subsequently negated by the texts teaching non-duality.\(^{26}\)

If the question is raised as to why nirguna statements such as "not this, not this" (neti neti)\(^{27}\) are more authoritative than saguna passages, Śaṅkara answers that the nirguna statements negate the saguna passages.\(^{28}\) In order for there to be negation, a relationship of prior (pūrva) and posterior (apara) must exist between the two types of texts. A negative statement such as "neti neti" pre-supposes the presence of its counter correlate, in this case the saguna statement, and then only it is able to negate. The nirguna statement is more authoritative precisely because it is logically subsequent to the saguna passages.\(^{29}\) Śaṅkara maintains that texts denoting difference (bheda) and qualities can be interpreted as a preparation for teaching the ultimate truth whereas the nirguna texts do not lend themselves to another meaning.\(^{30}\) Moreover Śaṅkara considers that the texts which reveal unity convey a knowledge which is complete in itself (nirakaṅka) but saguna and bheda statements do not have the capacity to put an end to further seeking.\(^{31}\)

1.10.
1.10 Among the means of knowledge beginning with perception, verbal testimony is primarily able to reveal Brahman. Then subsequently, in conformity with that [verbal testimony] the other means of knowledge also begin to reveal that [Brahman]. Verbal testimony such as: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, non-dual" (Ch. 6.2.1.) very clearly states that reality is one alone and is of the nature of the Supreme Self.

That Supreme Self is of the nature of "Seeing". Although a three-fold category of seer, seen and Seeing is undoubtedly experienced by everyone from young to old, still, the seer is the locus of Seeing and the seen is the object of Seeing. So because both of these, the seer and the seen are with regard to Seeing then the ascertainment of their essential nature is dependent upon the ascertainment of Seeing. Seeing alone is, in actual fact, reality. The seer and the seen, however, are certainly superimposed (kalpita). Seeing is Knowledge. That Seeing is of two types: without reference to limiting adjuncts and with reference to limiting adjuncts. The Seeing without reference to limiting adjuncts is Knowledge which is of the nature of pure existence, without locus or object. That Seeing which is without reference to limiting adjuncts does not depend upon anything in regard to the obtaining of its own nature. This [Seeing] is indeed what is expressed by the word Brahman and by the word supreme Self. The seeing which has reference to limiting adjuncts is with regard to a locus and an object and it is in the form of knowledge which is produced by the ordinary means of knowledge etc., which have a locus and an object. So it is certainly superimposed like the seer and seen.

And so, as the locus of all superimposed things is the substratum of the superimposition, Brahman is therefore the root [cause] of the whole world. The definition of Brahman as: Brahman is the root cause
of the whole world, is taught in the sacred text: "from which, indeed, these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) and in the sutra: "The birth etc. of this [world] is from which" (B.S.1.1.2).

Comment

Sāṅkara's position on the relation between reasoning and verbal testimony is unambiguous. He considers that reason is unable, by itself, to reach finality on issues of metaphysics:

because reasoning which is independent of the Vedas depends merely upon the conjecture of people and lacks conclusiveness, for conjecture has no limit. 32

Reasoning should be in accord with what is ascertained to be the conclusive teaching of the scriptures and in this role it serves as "a subsidiary means" 33 to realization. Although the position of reason is solely supportive, its utility should not be disregarded. The Veda employs "argumentation and demonstration among its own modes of expression and communication." 34 Reasoning is used to expose fallacious argument and to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages. 35

Importantly, Advaitins rely on methods of reasoning such as separating the variable from the constant (anvayavyatireka; vyabhicāra- avyabhicāra) to ascertain the true nature of the individual self, which is an indispensable condition for the understanding of the mahāvākya. 36

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate the Advaita conclusion regarding the nature of consciousness through a method of reasoning based upon such Upaniṣad texts as: "there is no loss of the seeing of the seer." 37 Proceeding upon the basis of common experience that all cognitive activity reveals a seer, the object seen and Seeing or awareness which connects the two, he argues that both the seer and seen can only be denoted with reference to awareness. Since seer and seen are never cognised without relation to awareness they are dependent upon awareness: for the determination of their existence is dependent upon their being ascertained by means of awareness. Reality is equated with awareness because the latter is invariable whereas both the seer and seen are inconstant and are, therefore, adventitious. 38

There are two "types" of awareness: 39 the first can be expressed by the word Brahman and it forms the essence of the individual. This awareness is not the knowledge of "such and such" (Idrśam tādrśam) but
it is awareness as such: identical with the existence and essence of the sense of self (svarūpacaitanya). It is self-fulgent (svaprakāśa) in the sense that it does not depend upon another thing for its illumination (ananyapraṃkāśya). In relation to mental states this awareness is known as saksicaitanya and it constitutes the real referent of the word "I" (ahampratyaya). Without relation to the limiting adjunct of the mind it is mere, unchanging, awareness in which both subject and object are superimposed.

Awareness conditioned by the modes of the mind (sopādhika) constitutes the second type. The Vedānta-paribhāṣā specifies this awareness to be of three kinds: as associated with the object (visavacaitanya), with the means of knowledge (pramaṇacaitanya) and with the knower (pramāṇacaitanya). The first is awareness limited by the object (ghatādyavacchinna caitanya), the second kind is awareness limited by the mode of the mind (antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinna caitanya) and the third is awareness limited by the mind (antaḥkaraṇavacchinna caitanya).

This means pure awareness, conditioned by the mental modes, assumes the functions of knower and the means of knowledge, and it also modifies to represent objects in perception. These forms of particularized awareness depend upon the limiting adjunct of the mind and hence have beginning and end.

Abhyankar has argued that the seen objects and the sopādhika seer and act of seeing have no reality independent of awareness. Awareness constitutes the substratum upon which all else is superimposed. The substratum is equivalent to the root cause, in the same manner as a rope is the root cause for the superimposition of a snake form. The author cites the definition of Brahman (Tāt. 3.1.1. B.S.1.1.2.) which Advaitins consider to be an incidental definition (tatasthalaksana) and which seems to connect Brahman with causal agency. Abhyankar, however, demonstrates that this definition need not imply causal agency since it can equally refer to Brahman as the mere substratum of superimposition. In this sense it becomes a definition of Brahman as cause only in the manner of an apparent transformation (vivarta).
1.11. With reference to the effect the cause is subtle and pervasive.

This has been told in the *Upadesasahasri* (9.1):

Subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood successively from [the series] beginning with smell, on account of abandoning each preceding one up until the inner Self.

Here [in the verse] earth is expressed by the word smell: because qualities are not perceived separately with regard to the possessor of qualities, therefore only the absence of difference between
qualities and their possessor has been accepted in the final conclusion.
"Up until the inner Self", means extending as far as the Supreme Self.
"Abandoning" means giving up the form of the effect. Subtlety and
pervasiveness should be understood by giving up the form of the effect
in due order as [all] things extending as far as the Supreme Self are
successively cause with regard to the preceding effects: earth, water,
fire, etc.

It should not be said: if the cause is subtle with regard to the
effect, then because it is of a lesser size how could it pervade the
effect? Because although the essential nature of the cause exists in
the effects it is not clearly evident in its own nature since it is
hidden in the form of the effect. For this reason subtlety is said
here but not as a consequence of being of a lesser size. So because
only what is accompanied by all the modifications is the material cause,
the cause pervades the effect through being in a greater position
with regard to the effect. Therefore it is established that earth is
subtle and pervasive with regard to its effects. Water is subtle and
pervasive with regard to earth. Because there is the perception of
sweat in the body and of springs within the rocks of mountains and
within the earth. And because everywhere on the earth there is the
perception of taste which is the special quality of water. And because
there is the experience of the penetration of water everywhere on earth
without obstruction.

Fire is subtle and pervasive even with regard to water. Because
the entry of the sun's rays and of the minute particles of fire is seen
without splitting the water. And because although fire is able to be
extinguished by water, the portions which enter into warm water are seen
to be not extinguished by the water. Indeed there, subtlety alone with
regard to the water is the reason for the non extinguishing of those
portions. Air is subtle and pervasive even with regard to fire. Because the passage of air is certainly seen when sunbeams are present. Space is subtle and pervasive even with regard to that. Because the perception is just so. For separation is observed even for a stone and without accommodation there is certainly no possibility of separation. In this manner subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood [in all things] up to the Supreme Being.

*comment*

The author's explanation of this topic is largely derived, in form and content, from Ramatīrtha's commentary upon this verse in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*.

Abhyankar explains that Śaṅkara uses the word "smell" instead of earth because qualities are not perceived separately from their locus and since smell is the special quality (*asādhāranaguna*) of earth it can be used to refer to the latter.

The idea of this passage is that a material cause is more subtle and pervasive than its effect, for example clay is more subtle and pervasive with respect to all the products derived from it. Based upon the description of the origination of matter presented in Tai.2.1.1. ("From that [Brahman], i.e. from the Self, space was produced. From space, air [was produced]. From air, fire. From fire, water. From water, earth.") each preceding element is said to be more subtle and pervasive than its product. This discussion of subtlety and pervasiveness is intended to show the Self to be the most subtle and pervasive since everything has originated from it. Ramatīrtha sums up the purport more clearly than Abhyankar:

'all this [world] is experienced as certainly pervaded by existence and manifestation, thus pure existence-awareness is the material cause of everything ... since the entire collection of visible [things] is consumed by pure existence-awareness, there is nothing at all existing separate from that.'

*45*

*46*

*47*
1.12. Indeed because of pervasiveness the cause is universal with regard to the effect. That means it is free from the distinctions belonging to the effect. Because the distinctions such as potness and dishness which belong to the effects such as a pot and a dish are not seen in clay which is the causal state. For this very reason, Brahman, which is the root cause of all effects, is free from all distinction. Suppose there should be some distinction there [in Brahman], then there should be some other root cause even for Brahman which is free from that particular distinction. If that also possesses distinction then once again there should be another root [cause] of that which is free from that particular distinction, so there would be the consequence of an infinite regress. For the removal of that [fallacy] the root cause must necessarily be said to be free from all distinction and that alone is our Brahman.

**comment**

The relation between the universal (सामन्य) and the distinction (विशेष) is an important argument which Abhyankar will later use against the Viśiṣṭadvaitins.

The author attempts to demonstrate that Brahman must be free from all distinctions on account of being the root cause (मूलकारण) of everything. He argues that an effect must inhere in its material cause. The cause, however, is universal in relation to the effects, which means that it must be free from the distinctions of those effects.
For if a material cause such as clay intrinsically possessed the
distinction of a given effect such as potness then it could not also
take the form of another effect such as a dish. Thus the cause must
inherently be free from the qualities of its effects. Extrapolating
from this, Abhyankar argues that the primary cause of the world must
be devoid of all distinction. Should the mulakarana also possess
distinction, then such a distinction must inhere in its universal
which in turn must be free from that distinction. To avoid infinite
regression, the primary cause should be accepted as free from all
distinctions. Śaṅkara has also made reference to such an argument. 49

1.13.

विशेषहितादेव च न तत्र यथात्क्षमादिपि सतात्वादििजातात्वादि-
tाबैं भेदं सूनावति। सतिशेषसौच भेदाधिक-
शब्दि मेदत्रसाधि

लाम्

1.13. Indeed because of being free from qualification, no difference
is possible there [in Brahman] from anything whatsoever of the same
class, of another class, or residing in [Brahman] itself. Because
only what possesses qualification is subject to difference. Therefore,
there is nothing different [from Brahman]: neither a sentient being
belonging to the same class as Brahman, nor [something] insentient
belonging to a different class from Brahman, nor an attribute belonging
to Brahman. In every way Brahman is established as free from
qualification, without the three-fold difference, pure and non-dual.

comment

The structure of the argument is as follows: (a) the cause is more
subtle and pervasive than the effect and as Brahman is the primary cause,
Brahman is the most subtle and pervasive. (b) On account of its
pervasiveness of the effects the cause is the universal: which means
it is free from the qualifications inhereing in the effects. Therefore
the primary cause must be free from all qualification. (c) Because the
primary cause has no distinguishing characteristic it is free from
(1) the difference which belongs to members of the same class (sajatiyabheda), (2) the difference which belongs to members of a different class (vijatiyabheda), (3) internal difference (svagatabheda) and hence it is non-dual.

This verse in the Pañcadaśī vividly portrays the three-fold difference:

For a tree there is difference within itself because of the leaves, flowers and fruits etc., There is difference within the same class on account of another tree. There is difference from another class due to rocks etc.

The negative prefix "a" in the word advitiya indicates the complete absence of duality. This is a more precise term than "monism" because the negative particle eliminates the possibility of svagatabheda.

1.14. That alone is Brahman, undivided, free from distinction, pure - free from distinction and limitless - without a cause or an example. (Br.B. 8.9.)

Thus in the sacred text Brahman is very clearly said to be free from qualification on account of the word "free from distinction" (nirvikalpa). Furthermore, if Brahman possesses qualification [then] in keeping with that qualification Brahman would be able to be taught by a word in the manner of being "such and such". If that was the case, the sacred text: "from which words return" (Tai.2.9.) and the tradition: "not the object of words" (Viś.P.6.7.53.) would be contradicted.
Moreover the sacred text: "free from quality" (Atma. 1. Āu. 7.2.) negates all qualities universally with regard to Brahman, the auspicious as well as those that must be given up. This is correct. For if Brahman possesses quality then due to that quality Brahman must necessarily possess qualification and therefore that [Brahman] could not be the root cause of the world according to the reason which was previously mentioned.

However the sacred texts [denoting] the possession of qualities such as: "He is omniscient" (Mu. 1.1.9.), "one whose desire is true, one whose resolve is true" (Ch. 8.7.1.) teach qualities which have been superimposed. Accepting that there are, in reality, qualities in Brahman, but in justifying the sacred text [denoting] freedom from qualities in so far as [Brahman] is free from qualities that are to be given up, then even the individual soul would be able to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since it is free from qualities such as form and taste which can be apprehended by the external senses. Even the elements such as earth would be able to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since they are free
from qualities such as pleasure and pain. When that is so, by [using] the term "free from quality" nothing additional would be said by the previously cited sacred text: "free from quality". So in reality there are certainly no qualities in the supreme Brahman, even those that bestow good.

Furthermore, the qualities which bestow good and which are accepted as abiding in the supreme Self are useful for individual souls only in the state of being an individual soul. And that state has been superimposed by Ignorance. So even the qualities of the supreme Self which are useful there are only superimposed. Even the chariot, which is useful in the action of going superimposed by the one who resides in the dream state, is only superimposed.

**Comment**

The mention of "qualities which must be given up" (heyaguna) is in reference to the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins who interpret the word nirguna to signify the absence of any inauspicious qualities.52 Advaitins consider saguna statements such as: He is omniscient" to refer to Brahman possessing the attribute of omniscience due to the limiting adjunct of maya.53 As previously mentioned, the nirguna statement ultimately sublates its saguna counterpart.

On account of the sentence: asserting that the "qualities which bestow good ... are useful ... only in the state of being an individual soul" it would be incorrect to assume that Advaitins believe the Lord (Īśvara) to be a conscious fiction projected for the purpose of worship and of a lesser order of reality (pratibhāsīka) than the worshipper. Rather, the Lord, the world and the soul possess an equivalent ontological status in so far as they partake of the same vyavaharika reality.54 This state is negated in toto as the creation of Ignorance (avidyā) from the paramarthika standpoint relating to Brahman, where there is neither a Lord, nor a world or a soul. In his example of the dream chariot the author shows that objects existing in a particular state possess the same degree of reality while from another standpoint they are equally false.
1.16. Moreover, Knowledge is the essential nature of the supreme Self, not its quality. Because this is in accordance with the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Bṛh. 2.4.12.), "real Knowledge" (Tai.2.1.), "Brahman is consciousness, bliss" (Bṛh.3.9.28.). But the mention of knowership in the sacred text: "[by what] my dear, [should one know] the knower" (Bṛh.2.4.14.) is figurative. Because the relation of attribute and its possessor, which is based upon difference, is an impossibility in the supreme Brahman which is without a second, therefore there is no possibility of that [Brahman] being, in reality, the locus of Knowledge. In the very same manner, because the relation of cognition and its object which is based upon difference is also an impossibility there [in Brahman], in reality that [Brahman] is not to be known.

comment
The author presents the established conclusion of the Advaitins that Brahman is identical with pure Knowledge, or awareness as such. Śaṅkara states: "The śrutī says Brahman is pure consciousness, devoid of other aspects contrary to this and free from distinction." 55

The statement: "in reality, that [Brahman] is not to be known" means that Brahman can not become an object of cognition, like a pot, because Brahman is the awareness which illumines cognition itself: "that which one does not think with the mind, by which, they say, the mind [itself] is thought, know that alone to be Brahman. This is not [Brahman] which people meditate upon as "this"." 56 Suresvara argues against the view 57 that the Self can become its own object:
What is seen in a locus by the seer is a quality of that [locus] alone but not [of the seer]. Because what belongs to the seer, like the consciousness of the seer, never becomes the object of perception.\textsuperscript{58}

1.17. There is certainly unanimity of thought among almost all in that the supreme Self is eternal. However, disbelievers such as the Cārvākas do not think that there is indeed a supreme Self, even less its eternity. Therefore they belong to a different category. Whereas for those who rely solely on the sacred texts its eternity is certainly accepted because of sacred texts such as: "That great, birthless Self is undecaying, undying, immortal Brahman" (Bṛh.4.4.25.), "eternal among the lasting" (Śv.6.13.). Inference also finds scope here: Brahman is eternal. Because [Brahman] is the root cause. What is non-eternal is not the root cause, like a pot, etc. If the root cause was non-eternal there would be the occurrence of the production of an effect without a cause and that is impossible. In this way, the reasoning here conforms [to the sacred texts].

That eternity is not the eternity of what is subject to transformation, like gold. Gold, even though transforming into the form of various ornaments, does not perish like the ornaments and thus it is
eternal with reference to the ornaments. The supreme Self is not like that. Because there is the mention of that [Brahman] being free from change in the sacred texts: "without parts, without action" (Śv.6.19.) etc. so there is no possibility of transformation. Rather, Brahman has unchangeable eternity. Unchangeable eternity is always existing in one and the same form.

comment
Abhyankar's inference is based upon kevalavyatirekavyāpti. 60
Parināma is the causal explanation where both cause and effect have the same degree of reality (samasatta) 61 and the cause transforms into the effect (purvāvasthāpāyena-avasthāntarāpattih) 62 like gold transforms into the form of various ornaments.

According to Advaita, only what is free from change is absolutely real: "a thing is real when it does not change the nature that is ascertained to be its own" 63 and consequently if Brahman transforms into the world then Brahman could not be eternal. Advaitins accept Brahman as the cause of the world only in the manner that the world is an apparent transformation (vivarta) of Brahman. Vivarta means that the cause and effect have different degrees of reality (visamasatta) 64 and the cause, without undergoing change, appears in the form of the effect (purvāvasthānapāye' vasthāntarāpattih). 65 The standard Advaita illustration is the case of a rope mistaken for a snake. The snake appearance has no separate existence apart from the rope, its material cause. The rope, however, has undergone no change to appear as the snake and so they both possess a different order of reality. The rope is the vivarta cause and Ignorance (avidyā) is the transformative cause which accounts for the appearance of the snake. Similarly, Brahman is the vivartakāraṇa for the appearance of the world and avidyā is the parināmikāraṇa.

Though the word vivarta belongs to post-Śaṅkarā Advaita, Śaṅkara clearly considers the world to be only an apparent transformation of Brahman. 66

1.18. 

18. तदविषयः | भाषणमं संबंधम् तद्विषयं तत्तत्त्वमं तदस्वभूतं | तदपेश्वरं बाह्यार्थिकत्रिष्ठिपि नाति। "सर्वं खलिल् श्रापं" (िा ३। १४। १) “इदं सर्वं यद्यमानम्” (िा ५। १४। ५) "प्रत्यात्मानं सर्वम्" (िा ६। ८। ७) इत्यादिविश्वसंस्कारवै। ब्रह्मदेव्य-भिन्नति परिवर्तनोपरिवर्तिते सांपरिवर्तिते संस्कृते। भाषणम् वस्तुं केनापि पक्षारण द्वैतस्माभास्तु। अत एवोद्दयत्तत्त्वात् स्वविवृत्ति गीयते।
1.18. Brahman which is of this nature is without a second. There is nothing at all which is connected with Brahman, or not connected with it, which is its body, or a part of it, or an attribute of it. Because of the conformity with the sacred texts such as: "indeed all this is Brahman" (Ch.3.14.1.), "all this is this Self" (Brh.2.4.5-6), "all this [world] has This for its self" (Ch.6.8.7.). Even what is well known in this teaching: that Brahman is non-dual, agrees with the correct view. Because in reality there is no duality in Brahman in any manner whatsoever. For this very reason, this is celebrated as the teaching of non-duality.

1.19. Brahman is of the nature of pure existence. It is only possible to say that "it is" but not that it is "such and such". But upon mentioning a distinguishing characteristic such as "like this", because of the rule that a distinguishing characteristic excludes, then upon the occurrence that Brahman has the one that is excluded as its second, there would be contradiction with the non-dual texts.

comment

On the basis of Upaniṣad texts such as: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second", Advaitins consider that existence as such is Brahman and "indeed, everything is based upon existence, because the idea of existence persists everywhere." Existence is held to be unsublatable for both affirmative and negative statements occur in reference to "is" which, in itself, is not negated even upon the denial of the substantive to which it refers.

To denote Brahman as "such and such" means that Brahman possesses some qualification and a qualification invariably excludes one thing from something else: red excludes all that is not red. If Brahman has a
1.20. Because Brahman, whose essential nature is Knowledge, is of the nature of pure existence, therefore Knowledge is also of the nature of the pure existence of that [Brahman]. But pure existence is not an object there [in Knowledge]. If [Knowledge] has either a locus or an object like ordinary knowledge, because that [Brahman] would not have the nature of existence in general, therefore Knowledge would not be the essential nature of Brahman. In that case, there would be contradiction with the texts cited previously such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Bṛh. 2.4.12.).

comment

Brahman is awareness which is identical to pure existence. Śaṅkara remarks on this identity in the sūtrakāśyapa:

It cannot be said that Brahman only has the characteristic of existence and not the characteristic of awareness. Because the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness only" would be meaningless. How could Brahman which is bereft of consciousness be taught as the Self of the conscious individual soul? Nor even can it be said that Brahman only has the characteristic of awareness and not the characteristic of existence. Because the sacred texts such as: "[the Self] is to be apprehended as existing" would be meaningless. And how could awareness which is bereft of existence be accepted?

1.21. ननु ब्रजाधिते

जीवं ईशो विदुधा चिच्छया जीविशेषयोभिदा ।
अभिविषय तत्तत्त्वम् कर्तव्यवर्तनां ॥

इत्यभिषुकोपालितविषये। अन (१) जीवं (२) ईश्वरं (३) ब्रजं (४) जीविशेषंसंप्रभृती (५) चित्मोऽविभावसंक्षेपयोंन् पर्याप्ता-

नादित्यसङ्क्षेपने ईश्वरं स्फूर्तं भविष्यति विभावसिद्धि च चै-उच्चते । तत्स दि तिथिष्ठा

पारामाथिकी व्याघात्की भाषितमालिकायाच । तत्र पारामाथिकी सम्म ब्रह्मण

एव नान्यस्य कर्माचितं । तस्य कदाचित्वा यथानत्वात् । व्याघात्की सम्म
1.21. [objection] If Brahman is non-dual, the statement of the learned is contradicted:

For us, there are six which are beginningless: the individual soul, the Lord, pure awareness, the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the association of that [Ignorance] and awareness.

Because duality has been very clearly demonstrated by mentioning the beginninglessness of these six here: (1) the individual soul, (2) the Lord, (3) Brahman, (4) the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, (5) Ignorance and (6) the connection of Brahman with Ignorance.

[reply] Existence is threefold: concerning what is absolutely real, what is empirically real and what appears real. In regard to those, the existence concerning what is absolutely real is only for Brahman, not for anything else. For that [Brahman] is not able to be negated at any time. The existence concerning what is empirically real is for the whole world consisting of the elements and their products. For although that [world] is negated in the state of liberation, it cannot be negated in the state of ordinary relations. The existence concerning what appears real is that of silver etc. which appears upon a pearl-oyster etc., because that is negated even in the state of ordinary relations. It exists only at the time of its appearance.

comment

In Advaita, the definition of truth is linked to unsublatability. What is real cannot be subject to negation and what is negated cannot be fully real. In the case of a pearl-oyster mistaken as silver, the sublation of silver results from a closer inspection of the object. The silver exists only at the time of its appearance (pratibhasika), whereas the pearl-oyster persists in everyday life.
The world, however, is not absolutely real since it too is sublated. In relation to the enlightened standpoint of the liberated person the world ceases to exist as world and is seen to exist as Brahman appearing in the form of the world. The world is said to have empirical (vyāvahārīka) reality since its validity persists until liberation. Advaitins confer the status of absolute reality (paramārthika) only to Brahman: pure awareness, existence, which is never sublated. This is further explained in the verses:

1.22. 

That has been told:

Objects are considered to have three types of existence on the basis of the absence of negation [respectively]: in the three periods of time, at the time of the knower and during the period of [mere] appearance. Brahman's existence is considered to be absolute. The existence of space etc. is empirical and the existence of the class of things such as silver [seen upon a pearl-oyster] is considered to relate to what is an appearance.
What can be sublated by a common means of knowledge when the occasion relates to common life, that existence which relates to appearance can be sublated when there is a knower. What can be sublated by a scriptual means of knowledge when the occasion concerns what is scriptural, that empirical existence can be negated together with the knower.

The statement that Brahman is non-dual should be understood to mean the absolute existence. In the verse cited, [beginning with] "the individual soul, the Lord" the supreme Brahman is expressed by this: "pure awareness". Excluding that [Brahman] the existence of the five such as the individual soul does not relate to what is absolutely real but to what is empirically real. The enumeration of the six there is because of beginninglessness being common. The absolutely real Brahman is beginningless as well as endless. That means it cannot be sublated in the three periods of time.

Although the other five such as the individual soul are beginningless, they are not endless. Because although they exist as long as there is the cycle of worldly existence, they are destroyed in the state of liberation. Moreover among those, there is the destruction of these three totally: the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the connection of Brahman with Ignorance. But it is not in the same manner for the individual soul and the Lord. But there is the destruction only of the limiting adjuncts which bring about the status of an individual soul and a Lord. Because of this [the argument] is set aside that: if the individual soul has [only] an empirical existence, then because of the necessary destruction of the individual soul in the state of liberation which is beyond the empirical state, no one would strive for the attainment of liberation.

**comment**

Ramanuja advances the same objection:

If that [non persistence of the individual] was the case, then "liberation is only self destruction" would be postulated in another manner.
Abhyankar counters this objection by stating that liberation is the removal of what is false, not the destruction of a real thing. For the Advaitin, individuality has only an empirical reality brought about by the adventitious connection of the Self with the limiting adjunct of the subtle body (sūkṣmaśārīra). When the limiting adjunct ceases, the unconditioned self remains.

1.23. The limiting adjunct which brings about the status of the individual soul and the Lord is beginningless Ignorance which is positive in nature, composed of three qualities and which cannot be designated as existent or non-existent. That Ignorance is twofold due to the distinction of mayā and avidyā. Predominantly pure sattva can be expressed by the word mayā and predominantly impure sattva can be expressed by the word avidyā. The Lord is consciousness conditioned by mayā. The individual soul is consciousness conditioned by avidyā.

comment

This is according to the Vivaraṇa school of thought.
1.24. Alternatively, Ignorance is essentially just one. But it has a twofold power: the power of knowledge and the power of action. The power of knowledge is sattva which is not dominated by rajas and tamas, for there is the traditional text: "knowledge arises from sattva" (G.14.17.). That [power of knowledge] is the cause of the knowledge relating to words etc.

The power of action is twofold: the power of concealing and the power of projecting. The concealing power is tamas which is not dominated by rajas and sattva. That [concealing power] is the cause of the expression such as "there is no pot, it is not visible". The projecting power is rajas which is not dominated by tamas and sattva. That [projecting power] is the cause for the origination of the world beginning with space. Because the Lord is the material cause of the world only through the nature of being conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the power of projection. The sacred text such as "just as a spider emits and withdraws [its thread]" (Mu. 1.7.) is the means of knowledge in this matter. Urnanabhi is the insect which is a spider. The Lord is said to be the creator of the world through the nature of being conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the power of knowledge.

According to the view here, Ignorance which predominantly has the power of concealing is said to be avidya and Ignorance which predominantly has the power of projecting is called maya. The limiting adjunct [which brings about] the status of the individual soul and the Lord should be understood just as before.

comment

This is according to the view of Vidyaranya in the Pañcadasī. 75

1.25. Alternatively, the two words maya and avidya are only synonyms commonly expressing Ignorance endowed with the twofold power. The
distinction between the individual soul and the Lord should be understood
in this manner: the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by
avidyā. The individual soul is consciousness which is a reflection and
which has been reflected in avidyā.

comment
It has been suggested that this view is Abhyankar's own. The author
now proceeds to discuss the principal conceptions of the nature of the
individual soul.

1.26. अवेदं वृद्धयष्ठ । वेदित्वाल्लसत्वपापितये चावच्छेदवाद । आभासवादः प्रति-
विभासादेयेनेकं पश्चः संभविन्ति । तत्वा—
चावच्छेदवादः आभासः वार्तिकस्य ।
संकेतस्यार्थः प्रतिविभागं संभवितं ॥

रोचकस्यार्थः अवच्छेददार्जः भवेषाः । तत्वोत्सर्ववच्छेदः । यथा
जलवाद्विभिभवमित्यते । यथा ज्ञात्वाद्विभिभवमित्यते ।
अन्यवस्मानायत् भास्मानार्थं आभासः । यथा जनानुसरणोक्यादर्शगतीके
भास्माना रत्क्षमः । अंगस्यविपदितं इत्यते । प्रतिविभागं मयसिद्धम् ।

1.26. Here, this should be understood. Several views are possible with
regard to the nature of the individual soul and the Lord: the teaching of
limitation, the teaching of appearance and the teaching of reflection.
That is [stated] like this:

It is considered thus: the "limited" is for Vācaspati,
"appearance" is for [the author of the] Vartikas and for
the author of the Saṃkeśapārītraka there is "reflection".

Avaccheda means immanence. What has that is limited (avacchinnā). For
example the space immanent in water is said to be limited by water. A thing
appearing elsewhere because of the connection with something else is
"appearance". For example redness appears in a crystal because of the
proximity with a red rose. This [crystal] is indeed said as "conditioned".
The "reflection" is well known.

comment
The theories of "limitation" (avacchedavāda), "appearance" (ābhasavāda)
and "reflection" (pratibimbavāda) constitute attempts to provide a
systematic explanation of the nature of the soul, the nature of God and
their relation.
Each theory is linked to a particular mode of illustration. The **avacchedavāda** utilizes the example of space limited by a pot in relation to the total space. Vacaspati writes:

just as the space within a pot is not different from the total space, or is as though different as long as the pot persists...in the same manner the individual soul, superimposed through the limiting condition which is a distinction in the imposition of beginningless, indescribable Ignorance, is not in reality different from the supreme Self.

The **abhāsavāda** is illustrated through the example of a crystal which appears to be red due to a red rose. On account of its proximity to the crystal, the rose imputes its colour to the crystal and the latter is mistaken as red so long as the crystal is not discriminated from the appearance of redness. Similarly, Ignorance which is the limiting adjunct (like the red rose) of consciousness (represented by the crystal) gains identity with the latter. As a result, consciousness gains the status of the Lord (like the redness of the crystal) owing to the non-discrimination of the appearance from the pure consciousness (like the non-discrimination of the redness from the crystal). In the same way, consciousness conditioned by the intellect and becoming identified with it gains the status of an individual soul owing to the absence of discrimination between the appearance of consciousness in a certain form (like the redness of the crystal) and pure consciousness. According to the **abhāsavāda**, the appearance of consciousness (**cidabhāsa**) is neither identical with pure consciousness nor is it different from it.

**Pratibimbavāda** is linked to the illustration of the sun reflected in water, or a face reflected in a mirror. It differs from the **abhāsavāda** in maintaining that, while the reflection is false, the reflected image is identical to the original and hence real. Just as the reflection of a face in a mirror is false because it is a reflection, while the reflected image is as real as the original. Thus the soul, as reflected consciousness, is identical to Brahman. The above verse ascribes this view to Sarvajñātman who maintained that consciousness which is reflected in Ignorance becomes the Lord and consciousness reflected in the intellect becomes the soul. A similar view is advocated by Padmapāda and the later Vivaraṇa school of thought. The difference between the position of Sarvajñātman and the Padmapāda-Vivaraṇa description will be mentioned below.

Śaṅkara did not exclusively propound any of these views. He refers to the concept of **avaccheda** principally to show that a distinction between the soul and Brahman is only due to the limiting adjunct. He utilizes
the illustration of a reflection when discussing how Brahman appears as the individual self and in order to demonstrate that the defects affecting the reflected image do not pertain to the original. He also employs the word "abhāsa", though often in the sense of a reflection.

1.27. According to the view of Vacaspatimiśra who holds the "limitation" theory, the Lord is consciousness objectified by Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance. According to the view of the author of the vārtikas (Suresvara) who holds the "appearance" theory, the Lord is consciousness which is conditioned by Ignorance and become one with Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness conditioned by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance and become one with the intellect. Some, however, accepting only the "appearance" theory, say that the Lord is consciousness conditioned by collective Ignorance and the individual soul is consciousness conditioned by individual Ignorance. They say that Ignorance, in its essence, is manifold. Comment

In the view of Vacaspati, consciousness which is the object of Ignorance is the Lord and consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance is the individual soul. For example, in the situation that "I do not know the pearl-oyster" "I" is the locus of Ignorance and the pearl-oyster is the object of Ignorance. In the same manner, "I" is the locus of Ignorance (ajñānāśraya) and Brahman is the object of Ignorance (ajñānaviśaya). When Brahman is not known, then Brahman conditioned by the limiting adjunct of Ignorance is the Lord. According to Vacaspati, the Ignorance of the pearl-oyster residing in the individual and having the pearl-oyster for its object creates the appearance of silver. Similarly, Ignorance located in the individual soul and having Brahman for its object creates the world.
as the pearl-oyster appears as silver without undergoing transformation, in the same manner, Brahman appears in the form of the world (vivartopadānakārana). Ignorance is the efficient cause (nimittakārana) for the appearance of the world.

Vācaspati holds that Ignorance is manifold and resides in each individual soul. In this respect, as in other fundamental matters, he follows the view of Maṇḍanamiśra. Vācaspati maintains that each Ignorance is the efficient cause for the creation of its own world. Just as a flame is constantly different though accepted as single, so too on account of their similarity the different worlds experienced by each soul are accepted to be identical. In the view of Vācaspati, the individual soul is consciousness conditioned by the mind and because Ignorance and minds are manifold there is a multiplicity of souls. The Lord is consciousness which has gained omniscience and omnipotence on account of being conditioned by Ignorance. Because the Ignorance located within the soul creates the world, the Lord is referred to as the creator by way of courtesy in the sense that the Lord is the substratum of the individual Ignorance and all worldly phenomena.

According to Sureśvara, the Lord is the appearance of consciousness which results from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and identified with Ignorance. Like the redness of the crystal conditioned by the rose flower. The individual soul is the appearance of consciousness arising from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and identified with the intellect. The last view referred to: "some, however..." conforms to the Vedāntasāra though Sadānanda does not appear to accept that Ignorance is actually manifold.

1.28.
1.28. According to the view of the author of the Sāṅkṣepaśārīraka who holds the "reflection" theory, the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in the intellect. However, the author of the Vivaraṇa considers that there is the "appearance" theory in regard to the Lord and the "reflection" theory in regard to the individual soul. He says the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which has been limited by the inner organ and its impressions. According to this view of the author of the Vivaraṇa, there is no superimposition of the subject who is a reflection. However on the individual soul who is the subject and who is certainly not superimposed [but] reflected in Ignorance, there is the superimposition of the attribute in the form of being different from Brahman.

(objection) Then if the subject, which is of the nature of the individual soul who is a reflection, is not superimposed, it would be real.

(reply) It is acceptable. But its reality is only in having the form of the original, not in having the form of a reflection. Because the reflection is not seen to have a reality separate from the original. Just as the pot does not have reality in the form of a pot but only in the form of clay. It is like that.

However Bharatītīrtha says that there is indeed superimposition of the subject, who is a reflection, in Ignorance. Moreover everything beginning with the difference from Brahman is indeed superimposed there [in Ignorance]. Thus he says that the nature of the individual soul is false.

comment

Sarvajñātman considers the Lord to be consciousness reflected in Ignorance and the individual soul to be consciousness reflected in the intellect. Ignorance associated with the Lord is denoted as māya and in relation to the soul it is called avidya. Sarvajñātman maintains that the Self, pure awareness, is the locus and the object of Ignorance while the individual soul is the locus only in the sense that the soul manifests the Ignorance.
Prakāśātman is of the view that the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by Ignorance while the individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which is limited by the mind and its impressions. Unlike Vācaspati, Prakāśātman maintains that Ignorance is single in nature and has pure consciousness as both its locus and object, just as darkness abides in and conceals the same locus. He argues that it is not contradictory for Ignorance to have consciousness as its locus because the witness consciousness (sākeśicaitanya) illumines Ignorance.

According to the Vivarāṇa, Ignorance resides in consciousness as conditioned by the object. For example when the pearl-oyster is mistaken for silver, the Ignorance of the pearl-oyster is located in consciousness conditioned by the form of the pearl-oyster (śuktyavacchinnacaitanya). This Ignorance covers the pearl-oyster and transforms itself into the silver. The pearl-oyster appears as silver without itself undergoing change (vivartopādānakāraṇa) and it is also the efficient cause for the appearance (nimittakāraṇa). Ignorance is the material cause for the transformation into the form of silver (parināmyupādānakāraṇa). Similarly, Brahman is both the efficient cause of the world and the vivarta material cause (abhinannimittopādānakāraṇa) while Ignorance is the material cause which transforms into the form of the world.

For Padmapāda-Vivarāṇa the reflected consciousness which is the essence of the individual soul is real and non-different from the original consciousness. The author of the Vivarāṇa specifies that the soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance.

1.29. अन्तः थेप्त्वा बनेनविश्यया संतुक्तं चैतन्यं जीवं सः च, तत्तत्त्वमिच्छेत् उपहितः।

1.29. Here, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul is consciousness united with Ignorance - and that [individual soul] is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] - in their view
the individual soul is single even in the state of being an individual soul. Because of Ignorance being single. This is the theory of a single individual soul. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts.

However, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul is consciousness united with individual Ignorance or with the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance – and that [individual soul] is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] – in their view there are many individual souls. This is the theory of a plurality of individual souls.

In this matter, according to the view of Vacaspatimiśra there is a single individual soul. According to the view of the author of the Vārtikas, the author of the Vivaraṇa and the author of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka there are a plurality of individual souls.

\[\text{comment}\]

In the Siddhāntabindu, Madhusūdana portrays the theory of a single individual soul:

...... the individual soul alone is the material and the efficient cause of the world on account of its own Ignorance. All that is seen exists [only] in cognition. There is the delusion of a difference of souls because of the difference of bodies. Liberation is for the one [soul] alone, when there is the direct apprehension of the Self from the firmness of listening, reflecting and contemplation assisted by the teacher and the scripture etc. which are [the souls'] own superimposition. The hearing of the liberation of Suka etc. is only a eulogy.98

According to this view, there are only two states of existence: the absolute (paramārtha) and the apparent (pratibhasika).99 Śaṅkara, however, accepts the practical reality of ordinary relations (vyavahāra)100 and in accord with that perspective, it is more natural to admit the transactional distinction of a plurality of souls. Śaṅkara's use of the plural form in regard to souls would indicate his acceptance of the common sense view.101

In Advaitāmoda, Vacaspati is said to propound the theory of a single individual soul. This does not appear to be correct. Vacaspati, as we have seen, considers Ignorance to be manifold. If the reason for propounding a single individual is "because of Ignorance being single" then Vacaspati cannot uphold the ekajīvavāda. In the Siddhāntabindu, Madhusūdana writes
that Vācaspatī upholds the view of a plurality of souls (ajñānānātātvajjīvānanatvam). In a later commentarial work upon the Siddhāntabindu, Abhyankar's explanation of this passage shows that he does not dispute Madhusūdana's statement. Accordingly, the following discussion should be viewed with circumspection.

The theory of a single individual soul is contained in the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktaṃ. Sarvajñatman also discusses it favourably in the SaṅkeṣepāśāIraka.

1.30. Here, this is the reality. The theory of a single individual soul is regarded as the definitive view. In reference to the theory of a plurality of souls, whose Ignorance was transformed into the form of the world? If it is [the Ignorance] of Devadatta, there would be the absence of a world from the standpoint of Yajñadatta. It should not be said that numerous Ignorances, having combined, are transformed into the form of the
world like a cloth made from many threads. [reason] Because when some people such as Suka and Vāmadeva were liberated, on account of the extracting of their respective Ignorances, there would be the diminishing of the world: like the diminishing of a cloth when some threads have been extracted from the cloth.

Furthermore, the individual soul is all pervasive. Otherwise, there would be no origination of an object to be experienced by Devadatta in another place by the merit and demerit of Devadatta. Because a minute individual soul lacks pervasiveness in another place, therefore the merit and demerit belonging to him will not be present there at the place and time of the origination of the effect.

Furthermore, in a multitude of bodies there can be no recollection in another body of the happiness or sadness experienced in one body. Many bodies simultaneously supported by only one individual soul, on account of his strength of asceticism or capacity in Yoga, are called kāyavyūha. That is certainly well known in the Purāṇas, etc.

Furthermore, in the case of its [the soul's] minuteness, there would be the non-cognition of happiness etc. pervading the body. In the case of [the soul] being of the size of the body, because the body has undetermined dimensions due to such different states as childhood and youth and because of the differences between ants, men and elephants etc., therefore the individual soul would also have an undetermined dimension and there would be non-eternity on account of the defect of undergoing modification. Therefore, the all pervasiveness of the individual soul is established.

Also, in the case of the theory of a plurality of individual souls, there is the logical impossibility in that case of the diversity of happiness and sadness etc. For there is no restricting cause for a certain individual soul to have a certain body, a certain action and a certain merit and demerit because of the unavoidability of the connection of all the all pervasive, all pervading individual souls with all bodies, all actions and all merit and demerit. So because of the economy of explanation only the
theory of a single individual soul should be accepted. Whereas the diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is logically possible due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts such as the physical body. So the proponents of the theory of a plurality of individual souls: the author of the Vārtikas, the author of the Vivarana and the author of the SāṅkṣepaśārIraka, have been refuted.

1.31. Furthermore, the statement of the beginningless nature of the individual soul which has been told [in the verse] beginning with "the individual soul, the Lord" is contradicted in conforming to the view of the author of the Vārtikas in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness conditioned by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. In the same manner, it is contradicted in conforming to the view of the author of the SāṅkṣepaśārIraka in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness reflected in the intellect. As the intellect is an effect of Ignorance and as it is not beginningless, therefore what is conditioned by that or reflected in that has no possibility of being beginningless. Thus [the contradiction]
can also be inferred in conforming to the view of the author of the Vivarana in the case of the individual soul who is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which has been limited by the inner organ and its impressions.

The beginningless nature of the individual soul is correct. It has been told in the *sutra*: "but that very [individual soul]..." (B.S.3.2.9.) that although the individual soul resolves into the supreme Self in the state of deep sleep, because there is no destruction of the limiting condition which brings about the state of being an individual soul, that very [soul] rises up again in the waking state. Similarly, it should certainly be said that even upon the dissolution [of the world], prior to the state of liberation, there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct which brings about the state of an individual soul. Otherwise, just as the water in a vessel which is being thrown, without the vessel, into a mass of water is unable to be extracted again, so too, because there is no possibility of that [same individual soul] rising up again at [the time of] creation the liberation of all could be easily attained.

However, if there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct which brings about the state of an individual soul, like the water in a sealed vessel though thrown along with the vessel into a mass of water is able to be extracted again, so too, the appearance of that same individual once again at [the time of] creation is easily attained. This agrees only with the beginningless nature of the individual soul. However, if [the individual soul] has a beginning, because the limiting adjunct of the individual soul is the effect of Ignorance and because there is the destruction of the effect of Ignorance at the dissolution [of the world], therefore there is no possibility of the continued existence of the limiting adjunct of the individual soul. Thus there could be no rule about the appearance of that very same [individual soul] once again.

**comment**
Abhyankar's critique of Sureśvara's, Sarvajñātman's and Prakāśatman's views on the nature of the soul can be summarized as follows: the soul
cannot be beginningless if it is consciousness conditioned by or reflected in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. Because it is the product of an effect. As a result of this, at the time of cosmic dissolution when all the effects of Ignorance perish, the limiting adjuncts will also perish and the cessation of the soul will occur. Thus there can be no assurance that the same soul will emerge at the commencement of the following cycle.

This argument is based upon the view that the effects of Ignorance are destroyed at the time of cosmic dissolution. However, if the effects merely resolve into their cause - Ignorance - in a latent condition, then the continued existence of the same soul can be explained. According to this view, the subtle body (sūkṣmaśāriṇī), of which the intellect is a constituent, remains in a subtle form during the period of dissolution. This would appear to be the accepted position in Advaita, for the subtle body is considered to be beginningless and to persist until liberation.106

Śaṅkara affirms this position, for he states that:

As long as the soul continues to transmigrate, as long as its transmigratory state does not come to an end through correct insight, its connection with the intellect does not cease ... In reality, there is no individual soul apart from the nature which has been superimposed due to the connection with the limiting adjunct of the intellect.

In Brahmaṣūtra 2.3.31, Śaṅkara replies to an objection of a similar import to that put forward by Abhyankar:

This contact with the intellect certainly exists in a state of latency during deep sleep and dissolution and again appears during waking and creation ... Therefore this is established: the contact with the limiting adjunct such as the intellect continues as long as [the individuality] of the Self.107

Accordingly, we may conclude that the views of the three authors can be upheld.

1.32.  

&ānāya muchaśāriṇī evaśāriṇītāthāpi tāraṇcchedāvādā:  

As long as the soul continues to transmigrate, as long as its transmigratory state does not come to an end through correct insight, its connection with the intellect does not cease ... In reality, there is no individual soul apart from the nature which has been superimposed due to the connection with the limiting adjunct of the intellect.

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Accordingly, we may conclude that the views of the three authors can be upheld.
1.32. Although Vacaspatimisra has only resorted to the theory of a single individual soul, nevertheless he has accepted the theory of limitation. With regard to that, the reflection theory is certainly superior in the case of the individual soul. Because it is observed that individual souls have total dependence upon Ignorance. That is logically possible only in the case of the theory of reflection.

Furthermore, just as no person is liberated when one foot is bound with an iron chain, even though it is absent on the other foot, similarly, in the case of the limitation theory although there is identity with Brahman because of the destruction of one Ignorance for the person who has been limited by that [Ignorance], there will still be bondage for that very [person] because of the portion limited by another Ignorance. However, this is not a defect in the case of the reflection theory. Because in the original there is not even a touch of the impurities etc. which belong to the reflection.

Furthermore, here in the antaryāmibrahmana: "He who inhabits the self, who is within the self ... who controls the self from within ..." (Bṛh.3.7.22.) the location of the controlled and the controller has been mentioned as at the very same place and that [location] agrees in the case of the reflection theory. Just as space is twofold in the very same location in water: space limited by water and space reflected in water, similarly, consciousness is twofold in the limiting adjunct in the form.
of Ignorance. There [in the limiting adjunct], the consciousness reflected is the individual soul who is controlled. Whereas [the consciousness] which has been "limited" is the Lord who is the controller. Just as the space limited by a pot is not different from the total space, the consciousness which has been "limited" should be understood as not different from the original. Thus the previously stated view alone remains the definitive doctrine: the individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance and the Lord is the original consciousness which has been conditioned by Ignorance. Pure consciousness, however, is certainly unconditioned by Ignorance.

Moreover, among all these views which have been stated that alone is constant: Brahman is non-dual. Because it is not correct that the consciousness which is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" has a separate existence in relation to pure consciousness. Duality cannot be established in Brahman even by an inert object. Because the entire inert world beginning with space is false (i.e. it has no independent existence) since its material cause is Ignorance which is a positive entity.

*comment*

The view which the author finally favours is that of Prakāśatman in the Pañcarātikāvivāraṇa (cf. 1.28.). Abhyankar concludes the discussion by stating that although there are various opinions concerning the nature of the Lord and the soul, the different authors are not in dispute with regard to the principal teachings of the Advaita tradition. Suresvara has aptly written:

> By whichever [method] people can develop understanding of the inner Self, that method should certainly be known as good and as consistent [with the main teaching].

1.33. 

अद्वानं चेदं सदद्विद्यामिनिवचनीयं तिरुगुणात्मकं भावरूपं ज्ञानिनत्यं।

अत्र मयापरं ब्रह्म न जानामतयतुमयं द्वावे- अविधा

समाचे स्वगुणिनिगुणार्थं “मुक्तश्चान्ते विषमया- निमृत्ति: “पराश्या शक्तिविविधैः शूराते”

(षेन ६ |८) इत्यादाः युतः।
1.33. This Ignorance cannot be stated as existent or as non-existent, it consists of three qualities, it is a positive entity and is removable through knowledge. The means of knowledge in this matter is the experience

"I do not know Brahman" and the sacred texts such as: "[they saw] the power of the divine Self concealed by its own qualities" (Śv.1.3.), "and again at the end there is the cessation of the entire illusionary world" (Śv.1.10.), "the supreme power of this [Lord] is heard of as being indeed various" (Śv.6.8.) and also the tradition such as:

When which [Brahman] is placed in the heart, the Yogi, who possesses a Self which cannot be measured, crosses mayā which is an extensive Ignorance. Salutation to that [Brahman] whose nature is Knowledge.

... knowledge is concealed by Ignorance, due to that people are deluded. (G.13.15.)

But for whom that Ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of the Self... (G.5.16.)

It should not be objected: how is this Ignorance, which is denoted by the
word *ajñāna*, produced and for what reason is its connection with Brahman brought into being? [reason] Because Ignorance and its connection are accepted as beginningless.

If [it is asked]: "what is the nature of the connection?" It is said: fire, for example, although directly unable to enter into water which is contrary to itself, enters into water in a subtle form by such means as a [heated] pot and having removed the coldness belonging to that [water] it manifests its own heat there as belonging to it [the water]. Similarly, this Ignorance is unable to directly enter, [but] having entered there [in Brahman] in its own root form which is more subtle and having concealed the essential nature belonging to that [Brahman] i.e., being free from object and location and being the supreme limit of what is universal, it manifests there its own form which is distinguished by the possession of location and object. Because the power of Ignorance itself possesses location and object. The object there [of Ignorance] is the Lord and the individual soul is the locus. This duality and the mutual distinction of both are indeed beginningless.

**comment**

"Ignorance" (*ajñāna, avidyā*) is a metaphysical principal to account for the appearance of the world. If the sacred texts reveal Brahman as pure being, pure awareness, actionless and free from all qualities, then Brahman cannot do any action to originate a world. The existence of a world is, in fact, a logical impossibility. Yet the appearance of a world is undeniable. Advaitins attempt to account for such a contradiction by maintaining that the Vedas reveal the existence of a cosmic power which, though not ultimately real in itself and depending upon Brahman, becomes the transforming principal whereby Brahman as though appears in the form of the world.

Advaita authors such as Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Sarvajñātman, Maṇḍanamiśra and Vacaspatimiśra consider Ignorance to be a positive entity (*bhāvarūpa*) endowed with a creative capacity which is responsible for the appearance of the world. However, some authors do not accept that Ignorance possesses such a function. Nāgেśabhaṭṭa argues in the
Vaiyākaranasiddhāntalaghumaṇījūsā that Śaṅkara only uses the term Ignorance in the sense of erroneous knowledge (bhrāntijñāna) and its impressions. 115 Thus Ignorance means superimposition (adhyāsa) and its effects. More recently, Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī and his supporters have brought this interpretation into greater prominence. They are also of the opinion that the Pañcapādīka is a distortion of Śaṅkara’s teaching and, among all the early post-Gaudapāda Advaitins, only Sureśvara is faithful to Śaṅkara’s intent. 116

The central issue is to discover in which sense Śaṅkara uses the term. In the introduction to the first Brahmaṣūtra, Śaṅkara states that Ignorance is equivalent to superimposition (evam laksānam adhyāsaṁ pandīta avidyā-itī mayante). 117 Throughout the sutrabhāṣya Śaṅkara frequently uses such expressions as "superimposed through Ignorance" (avidyākalpita) 118 and "manifested by Ignorance" (avidyāpratyupasthapita). 119 These phrases are not in themselves conclusive evidence, for they can be interpreted according to either perspective. In his other commentarial works Śaṅkara often employs the word Ignorance in the sense of a fundamental error which conceals 120 the truth and thus lies at the basis of worldly life characterised by sorrow and delusion. 121

However, in the commentary upon Brahmaṣūtra 1.4.3. 122 Śaṅkara indicates that his conception of Ignorance possesses another dimension. The passage deserves close examination. He commences with the statement that the Lord requires a "primary power" (bījaśakti) for the purpose of creation. Such a power, he says, is of the nature of Ignorance (avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktīḥ) and can be expressed by the word "unmanifest" (avyakta). It depends upon the supreme Lord, it possesses wondrous powers (mayaṁayi) and it is a type of sleep: "in which the transmigrating souls are sleeping without awakening to their essential nature". 123 Śaṅkara then specifies that the avyakta is sometimes designated by the word "space" (ākāśa) or by the word "imperishable" (aṅkara) or by the word māya and he states that: "that māya is indeed unmanifest, because it cannot be ascertained as real or otherwise." 124 Thus far Śaṅkara has equated the power, whose nature is Ignorance, with the word avyakta and declared it to be synonymous with indefinable māya.

Śaṅkara then states that the sentence "the avyakta is higher than the mahat" means the mahat, the cosmic intelligence associated with Hiranyagarbha, originates from the avyakta (avyaktaprabhavatvān mahataḥ). Śaṅkara then gives an alternative explanation whereby if the mahat refers
to the individual soul the sentence "the avyakta is higher than the mahat is still congruent because the state of becoming an individual soul depends upon the avyakta. For the avyakta is Ignorance and it is only through being possessed of Ignorance that all the transactions of the individual soul continue (avidyāḥ avyaktam. avidyāvattvena-eva jīvasya sarvāḥ sanvayavahārahāh santataḥ varate). Finally, Śaṅkara states that the body can also be referred to by the word avyakta since it is the modification of the avyakta (tadvikāre śārire parikalpyate).

This passage reveals that, for Śaṅkara, the conception of the avyakta possesses a double significance. The first sense, clearly in evidence through the expression of its nature as Ignorance, refers to a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of things which is the basis of the cycle of transmigration. Secondly, Śaṅkara mentions that the mahat and the physical body are the products of the avyakta. This indicates the positive aspect of the avyakta as the transformative cause for the world. Although Later Advaitins do not refer to the word avyakta as much as to its characteristic of Ignorance or to its synonym mayā, nonetheless we can see in this passage a legitimate basis for the later specification that Ignorance possesses both the power of concealing (āvāranaśakti) and the power of projecting (vikṣepaśakti). 125

In discussing the locus and the object of Ignorance, Abhyankar follows Vācaspatimīśra. Suresvara, Sarvaṅgānīśa and Prakūṭānīśa maintain that Brahman is the locus and the object. Śaṅkara does not concern himself with the issue. 126

1.34.
134. This [Ignorance] indeed manifests in Brahman, whose nature is Knowledge, the possession of a locus and object as belonging to that [Brahman]. The Knowledge which appears as possessing locus and object is the mahattattva. Beginning with this [mahattattva] everything has a beginning and is not beginningless. Thereafter, though Brahman is one and of the nature of Knowledge, it appears as though divided due to the relation of attribute and its possessor and subject and object. The meaning is that it appears in the form of the knower and the known. In regard to that, the knower is the "I-notion". The known is the subtle element of sound and so forth.

All this which appears is a transformation with regard to Ignorance. But with regard to Brahman it is only a false appearance. Transformation is the gain of another state, preceded by giving up the prior state, by one and the same object. Just as milk becomes fit for use as curd having given up its fitness for use as milk. False appearance is the appearing in another state only without having given up the prior state. Just as a substance which actually exists as a rope appears in the form of a snake.

The subtle elements are said by the word tanmātra. Subtle space is the tanmātra of sound. From that [tanmātra of sound] comes the tanmātra of touch, i.e., the subtle air. In this manner there is the successive origination of the five subtle elements. There is the origination of the respective gross element from the respective subtle element.

comment
The mahattattva refers to the subtle body of Hiranyagarbha. Hiranyagarbha is consciousness associated with the sum total of all minds, just as the individual soul is consciousness associated with a particular mind. It is referred to as the first soul and as the "effect-Brahman" which is Brahman identified with the entire subtle universe. Cf. Mu.Ś.1.1.9. (kārya-āksāṇaḥ brahma hiranyagarbhaḥ khyātā).

The tanmatras are subtle elements originating from the Lord at the time of creation. Cf. Tai.2.1.1. (tasmād vai-etasmaē atmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ, ākāśād vāyuḥ, vāyor agnīḥ, agner āpaḥ, abhyāḥ prthivī.).
The five subtle elements are: space, air, fire, water and earth. Their respective qualities are sound; sound and touch; sound, touch and form; sound, touch, form and taste; sound, touch, form, taste and smell. Advaita authors, including Śaṅkara, favour the description of the creation by means of five elements rather than the three elements mentioned in the Chandogya.

1.35. Because Ignorance consists of three qualities, everything which is a transformation of that certainly consists of three qualities. Thus the five elements also have the three qualities. In regard to that, the sense of hearing arises from the portion of space associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of touch is from the portion of air associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of sight is from the portion of fire associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of taste is from the portion of water associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of smell is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of sattva. The internal-organ arises from the combined portions of the five elements which are associated with the quality sattva. That [internal-organ] is fourfold. It has been told in the Vartika:

[The internal organ] is fourfold: mind, intellect, the ego-sense and recollection. The mind is called decision [and indecision]. The intellect has the
nature of ascertainment. Likewise, the ego-sense is declared to consist of wrong presumption and memory is said to have the nature of recollection.

(Paścikaṇavārttika 33,34.)

1.36. Similarly, the organ of speech arises from the portion of space associated with the quality of rajas. The hands are from the portion of air associated with the quality of rajas. The feet are from the portion of fire associated with the quality of rajas. The organ of generation is from the portion of water associated with the quality of rajas. The organ of excretion is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of rajas.

The life-breath arises from the combined portions of the five elements which are associated with the quality of rajas. Moreover, that is fivefold because of the difference in function. Praṇa has a forward motion and resides at the tip of the nose. Apāna has a downward motion and resides in the organ of excretion etc. Vyāna has motion in all directions and resides in the entire body. Udāna has an upward motion and resides in the throat. Samāna brings about the assimilation of such [things] that are eaten and drunk and it resides in the entire body.

comment

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā locates the samāna in the navel. The Vedāntasāra, too, says that it resides in the middle of the body. 135
1.37. These elements become visible by their fivefold combination. These are the portions of the five beginning with space which are associated with the quality tamas. There is a mutual combining of those five. That has been told in the Pañcadaśī:

Having divided each one into two and again having divided the first part into four, they each contain five [elements] on account of joining with the second portion other than their own. (1.27.)

This is the meaning: having divided space equally into two, one portion of the two should again be divided into four. In the same way each one of the four such as air should also be imagined as having five portions. Among the five, one portion is one half. The other four are one eighth portions. There [in the one eighth portions], there is the combining of the four one eighth portions of space in the four half portions of air etc., which are distinct from space. Similarly, there is the combining of the four one eighth portions belonging to air in the four half portions of
space etc. which are distinct from air. In the exact same manner, there is also the combining of the one eighth portions of fire, water and earth in the four half portions which are distinct from their own [element]. This is the procedure for the fivefold combination. When the gross elements have become visible by the fivefold combination, where there is the half portion of an element there is the expression by that word [designating that element]: "this is space", "this is air". That has been told: "but because of the preponderance there is the corresponding designation, there is the corresponding designation" (B.S.2.4.22.). In regard to this, the origination which has been mentioned from the portions of space etc. associated with the quality of sattva etc. should be understood to be from all those parts which are subordinate to the other two and not from one single [part]. These gross bodies of all beings certainly consist of the modification of the elements which have been made fivefold.

**comment**

The result of the process of *pañcikatana* can be shown as follows:

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1.38. The five sheaths which are well known thus: the modification of food, the modification of the life-breath, the modification of the mind, the modification of intelligence and the modification of bliss, are indeed included here [in the topic of the elements]. The sheath which is a modification of food is the physical body. The sheath which is a modification of the life-breath is the life-breath together with the organs of action. The sheath which is a modification of mind is the mind together with the organs of knowledge. The sheath which is a modification of intelligence is the intellect. The sheath which is a modification of bliss is the Ignorance within that [intellect] or it is the Self.

The doership and enjoyership in the individual self only pertains to the limiting adjunct. The limiting adjunct of doership can be expressed by the word intellect and it is the inner organ which has a modification in the form of ascertainment. The limiting adjunct of enjoyership is the inner organ which has a modification in the form of happiness etc.

The subtle body is the combination of seventeen factors: the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths, the mind and the intellect. This is the very same as the सुक्ष्माशारिर.

*comment*

The description of the five sheaths occurs in the Tai.2.1.1-2.5.1. The physical body (स्थुलाशारिर) is equivalent to the अनन्तमयकोष. The pranamaya, manomaya and vijnanamaya sheaths are included within the
subtle body (suksmaśarīra). The ānandamayakośa is the causal body (kāraṇaśarīra), which has the nature of primary Ignorance. In the Vedāntasāra, Sadānanda explains the viṣṇumayakośa differently from Abhyankar by linking both it and the manomayakośa with the organs of knowledge.

According to Advaita, the sense of doership and enjoyership only pertain to the limiting adjunct of the inner organ and are falsely imposed upon the actionless Self: "Similarly, [one superimposes on the Self] the attributes of the internal-organ such as desire, resolve, doubt, determination etc. In the same way, having superimposed the "I-thought" on the inner-Self who is the witness of its entire activities, conversely, one superimposes the inner-Self who is the witness of everything on the inner-organ etc." Doership and enjoyership are said to be extrinsic to the essential nature of the Self because their reality is contradicted through their cessation in the state of deep sleep.

Abhyankar gives two meanings for the ānandamayakośa. Only the first is congruent with the view of Saṅkara who maintains that the ānandamaya does not refer to the Self but only to the sheath which is a modification of bliss.

1.39. The group of eight consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the fourfold inner organ, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths, the five subtle elements, ignorance, desire and action is called the puryaṣṭakam. Here, ignorance should be seen as an effect. That [ignorance] is the perception of that in what is not that. For example, the perception of eternity in heaven etc. which is non eternal, the perception of purity in the body, etc. which is impure, the perception of pleasure in [what is really] pain and the perception of the Self in the body etc. which is not
the Self. Desire (kama) means passion. Action is of three types: accumulated (sañcita), impending (agami) and what has begun (prarabdha). Sañcita exists in an unseen form, having not yet given a result. Agami is what will happen. Prarabdha is that [action] the result of which is currently being experienced. At the time of liberation there is the destruction of the sañcita due to the knowledge of the truth. As for the agami, it certainly does not originate. The destruction of the prarabdha, however, is through the experience of the result.

comment
The purya-stakam is mentioned in the Sāṅkeśa-pārāśāra 3.16 ff.

1.40. All the bodies etc. which are a collection of insentient materials, are composed of the five elements. The gross body perishes at the time of death, but not the subtle body. However, at the time of the cosmic dissolution there is the destruction of the subtle body. But there [in the state of dissolution] the Ignorance which is the cause of the subtle body remains. This is what is called the causal body. In the state of liberation there is the destruction of that also due to the knowledge of the truth. Although in the "fourth state" there is no wrong presumption of a connection to the three types of bodies, nonetheless the connection to the three bodies certainly cannot be avoided. There is the wrong presumption on the part of the causal body in deep sleep. Whereas in dream [the wrong presumption] is for the subtle body as well. But in the waking
state it is for the three types. The "fourth state" is the instant that comprises the union between deep sleep and waking.

**Comment**

It was previously mentioned that other Advaita authors consider the subtle body to persist until liberation, not just until the cosmic dissolution. Cf. comment to 1.31.

The "fourth state" (turīyāvasthā) is often popularly and erroneously believed to be a transcendent state separate from the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The correct understanding is that the turīya is the locus of the three states and while it is intrinsically free from the state of waking, dream and deep sleep the three states are in no way separate from it: "Just as the differences of a snake, a streak of water, etc. are superimposed upon a rope etc. [the states of waking, dream and sleep] are unreal because they are mutually discrepant, though they are without any difference from the witnessing consciousness." Abhyankar exemplifies this by referring to the turīya as the instant between sleep and waking. At the time of waking the mind and the ego-sense reappear from their absorption in the pure awareness and at the time of sleep the mind and ego-sense resolve and what persists is pure awareness: "The witnessing consciousness is real because it is everywhere without deviation." 142

1.41. [question] What is the distinction between the "fourth state" and the state of a person who is liberated while living?
The essential nature of Knowledge, the pure universal free from distinction, remains even in both states. Because the prior mental impressions are not destroyed in the "fourth state" that universal nature of Knowledge is daily ready for modification, like the physical body in the womb. Whereas in the state of a liberated person, because the prior mental impressions are mostly destroyed, [the universal nature of Knowledge] is ready to relinquish all modifications. Just as the physical body of a person who is about to die is ready to relinquish the modifications which are the means for all enjoyments. It is like that.

In the state of a liberated person, the seeing of sense objects such as garlands, sandal paste and women is not in the form of the effect but in the form of Brahman possessing the power of Ignorance which is the cause. Therefore it is not able to produce a mental impression connected to that effect. Nor even does it call to mind such a previous mental impression. Hence the prior mental impressions ready to perish at that time are mostly destroyed. Because the effect does not exist without the cause, the person who is endowed with knowledge does not see objects in the form of effects. Whereas the bound soul sees [them] in the form of effects. 1.42.
1.42. Therein [in relation to objects] there is only the apprehension of the indeterminable everywhere. Because an effect is unable to be stated as real or as unreal. Just like the silver appearing upon a pearl-oyster. That is certainly not real, because there would be no logical possibility of the sublation: "this is not silver". Nor even is it unreal, because there would be no logical possibility of the cognition: "this is silver". Therefore it is said to be indeterminable. When the pearl-oyster is known as "this" but not as pearl-oyster then that ignorance of the pearl-oyster which is an effect of the primary Ignorance, being assisted by the knowledge arising as "this" and aided by the impressions of silver recalled by the lustre etc., transforms into the form of silver.

Just like that, this entire world is not real, because there would be no logical possibility of its sublation through the insight of the person endowed with knowledge. And because there would be contradiction with the sacred texts such as: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Bṛh 4.4.19.). Nor even is it unreal, because there would be no logical possibility of its cognition. Therefore it is certainly indeterminable. That [indeterminable world] is the effect of the basic Ignorance which possesses the power of projection by means of the mahāttattva, the ahaṅkāra, space etc. The effect of the basic Ignorance which possesses the power of concealing is the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. which is well known in the world. So the cognition of the indeterminable world is indeed the anirvacanīyakhyāti. But [the cognition] is not the apprehension of the real (satkhyāti). What is cognised is not real and what is real, Brahman, is not cognised: because that [Brahman] is not an object of cognition as it is of the nature of cognition. Therefore the apprehension of the real is difficult to be stated.

Even the apprehension: "this is a sacred treatise" is only an apprehension of the indeterminable. For even the sacred treatise is indeterminable since it is included in the indeterminable world which is
the effect of Ignorance. Because the scripture itself has proclaimed its own indeterminable nature thus: "... the Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh 4.3.22).

**Comment**

According to Advaita, the ontological status of the world is strictly indeterminable (anirvacanīya) as either real or unreal. This position is the outcome of applying an uncompromising definition as to what constitutes real and unreal. For the Advaitin, what is real must be free from change. If an object is perceived to be determined by certain characteristics and if those characteristics change then the former state of the object cannot be fully real since it is sublated by the latter condition. If the latter condition undergoes change then its reality is sublated by the new condition. Thus the absence of change, or more precisely, non-sublation is the determining factor for the definition of reality. The Advaitin adopts an equally uncompromising position with regard to what constitutes unreality. What is unreal is totally devoid of an objective content, such as the son of a woman who has never given birth.

The ontological status of the world cannot be subsumed under either of these definitions. For example, if a clay pot is taken as the symbolic representation of any physical object, the Advaitin argues that according to the above definition its ontological position is indeterminable. The pot cannot be called real because it is sublatable through breaking etc. Nor is it unreal since there is the empirical presentation of a pot. It cannot be both real and unreal simultaneously because that is mutually contradictory. Consequently the Advaitin concludes that a pot, or any object, cannot be categorically determined as real or as unreal.

Abhyankar illustrates the anirvacanīyakhyāti with the well known instance of the silver appearing on the pearl-oyster. This example has considerable instructive value for the Advaitin. Firstly, the silver appears upon the locus of the pearl-oyster which does not undergo any change to appear as silver. Also, when the pearl-oyster is cognized as "this is silver", the "this" element refers to the locus which is the pearl-oyster and which is not recognized as such because of the concealing power (āvarapāśakti) of Ignorance. The appearance of the silver is due to the projecting power (viksepaśakti) of Ignorance which transforms into silver due to some ocular defect, assisted by the prior mental impression of silver which was called to mind due to the brightness of the shell. Finally, the silver which appears cannot be determined as real or as unreal. Similarly, the world appears upon Brahman, pure awareness and
existence, which undergoes no change in order to appear as the world. Like the silver, the phenomenon of the world is a product of the twofold power of Ignorance. The āvaraṇaśakti is evident in the statement "I do not know myself" and its function is to conceal the truth and thus provide the opportunity for error. The vikṣepaśakti brings about the appearance of the world which is indeterminable as real or as unreal.

The author states why the cognition of an object is not the apprehension of the real (satkhyati). What is real, Brahman, is not the object of a cognition. The nature of Brahman is awareness which is the very essence of cognition itself and awareness cannot itself be objectified since everything is its object. The Self, according to Advaita, is pure subject free from any objectification. 147

Abhyankar now elaborates on the relation between the scripture as anirvacānīya and its function in revealing truth.

1.43. Although it is like that, it [the scripture] is certainly the cause of the knowledge of the truth. For example, the elephants and horses etc. in a dream, though they are themselves unreal due to being superimposed by the individual soul, produce a real knowledge and indicate a real auspicious or inauspicious result. It is like that. Furthermore, the scripture is the cause of the knowledge of the truth only in that it removes Ignorance. The scripture is certainly not unreal like a sky-flower. Rather, it only has no status of being absolutely real. So even though the scripture is not absolutely real, it removes Ignorance because Ignorance too has no absolute
reality. To this extent the scripture possesses validity, even though it has no absolute reality. This is the position not only of the scripture but of all the means of knowledge. That has been stated:

Just as the idea that the body is the Self is approved as correct knowledge, so too, this ordinary means of knowledge, but only until the Self is ascertained.

The division is a *atmeniṣṭayāt*. It means "till the ascertainment of the Self."

**Comment**

Śaṅkara too uses the analogy of dream to illustrate how a false phenomenon can give rise to real knowledge. Although the dream is sublated by the waking state, the knowledge relating to the content of the dream is not sublated upon waking and hence it is a real knowledge. On the basis of the *Chāndogya* text 5.2.8, Śaṅkara argues, like Abhyankar, that dream can portend a real future event. Since Brahman alone is absolutely real the scripture cannot possess the same ontological status for then there would be a plurality of absolutely real entities, a position unacceptable to the Advaitin. However, the scripture is also not unreal like a flower imagined in the sky. Therefore, though its position is highly exalted, it has only the same empirical reality (*vyāvahārikāsattā*) as the rest of the phenomenal world.

The function of the scripture is to reveal the knowledge of the truth. Śaṅkara argues that there would be no scope for enjoining the knowledge of a particular thing if there was no ignorance of that thing. Therefore the scope of the scripture lies in revealing the truth through eliminating the ignorance relating to it. Once this is accomplished, the efficacy of the scripture is complete and when Śaṅkara's opponent suggests that scriptural instruction is then meaningless, Śaṅkara agrees: "certainly, let it be meaningless, when [the truth] is known."

The verse quoted above ("just as ...") is cited by Śaṅkara at the conclusion of his commentary on B.S. 1.1.4. It is also quoted in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. The author has been identified as Sundarapāṇḍya.
1.44. Those means of knowledge are six, due to the difference of perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-cognition.

When the perception of an object such as a pot is produced through the eye etc., at that time the inner-organ, which is in the form of the heart [i.e. the locus of thought and feeling] and which is endowed with the reflection of consciousness existing within it, without indeed giving up its original location it goes out by means of the visual faculty etc. and having gone to the location of the object such as the pot it transforms into the form of the respective object. This transformation is said to be a mental modification (vṛtti). Then, the object such as the pot is pervaded by the mental modification and by the reflection of consciousness existing within it. The pervasion by the mental modification is said to be the capacity of being pervaded by the mental modification. The pervasion by the reflection of consciousness within the mental modification is said to be the capacity of being pervaded by the result. The reflection of consciousness within the mental modification is called by the word "result". The consciousness [limited by the] object which is being
reflected in that mental modification is not different to the reflection of consciousness within that mental modification. Because when both limiting adjuncts exist at the one location there is no possibility of a difference in what is to be limited. Then, for the pot etc. which is produced from the *tamas* [aspect of the five elements] the concealing, which is of the nature of *tamas*, is destroyed by that mental modification. The reflection of consciousness within the mental modification, manifesting when the concealing is destroyed, manifests in the form of the object since it is non different from the consciousness [limited by the] object. This is indeed said to be perceptual knowledge. It is exactly in the same manner even in the case of internal perception such as "I am happy".

However, in the case of the direct apprehension of the Self which is produced from the "great sayings" such as "you are That", because the oneness of the individual soul and Brahman is concealed by Ignorance the pervasion by the mental modification of the inner-organ having the form "I am Brahman", which is produced by the sentence, is required for the cessation of that Ignorance. Because oneself certainly has the nature of being self evident the pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is not required for that purpose.

**comment**

Śaṅkara's works provide the foundation for the later elaboration of the Advaita theory of perception. In the *Upadeśasāhasrī* and in the *Taittirīyopanisādbhāṣya* Saṅkara enunciates the view that perception occurs because the mind pervades the sense object by means of the respective sense organ and transforms into the shape of the particular object. The immediacy of perceptual experience is due to the modification of the mind into the form of the object and the illumination of that modification by the ever present consciousness.

This view is further developed in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*. The author, Dharmarājādhyāvarin, specifies that consciousness, though in reality undivided, is apparently limited in a threefold manner: in the form of the object (*visayacaitanya*), in the form of the means of knowledge (*pramanacaitanya*) and in the form of the cognizer (*pramātṛcaitanya*).
In response to the question as to what is the defining feature of perception, Dharmarāja firstly discusses the defining feature of a perceptual cognition and then discusses what is the defining characteristic with regard to the perception of an object. The criterion for a perceptual cognition is the non-difference of the consciousness limited by a mental modification in the form of the object from the consciousness limited by the object, given that the object currently exists and is capable of being apprehended. \(^{157}\) This means that for there to be perceptibility with respect to a cognition it must have identity with the object of perception. For example, in the perception of a pot the internal-organ becomes externalized by means of the eye and assumes the form of the pot. This mental modification is called a \(\text{vṛtti}\). When the mental modification has taken on the form of the pot the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the form of the pot and the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the form of the mental modification occupy the one location and are therefore in effect identical. The identity of the two limiting adjuncts is the defining feature in respect of a perceptual cognition.

Dharmarāja considers that the defining characteristic for the perception of an object is the absence of the object having a separate existence to the consciousness limited by the cognizer. \(^{158}\) This means that when the pot is cognized the mental modification in the form of the pot connects the cognizer with the object. Both the pot and the cognizer are limiting adjuncts of consciousness which is their common substratum. So the existence of the pot is not separate from the existence of the cognizer since they share the same substratum. The author specifies that the object has no separate existence from "consciousness limited by the cognizer" because in the case of inference the internal-organ does not have contact with the object and so cannot assume the form of the object. Thus the object is not connected with the cognizer and although it has no existence apart from consciousness which is its substratum, it cannot be said as having no separate existence to that of consciousness qualified by the cognizer. Hence the latter is the determining factor in respect of the cognition of an object.

Abhyankar incorporates another factor in the explanation of perception, the "reflection of consciousness" (\(\text{cīdabhāsa}\)) in the mental modification. This is discussed in the \(\text{Pañcadaśī}\). \(^{159}\) The reason for the mention of the reflection of consciousness in the mental modification
is because the mind is not by nature conscious but is illumined by the reflection of consciousness from the Self. The mental modification (vr̥tti) is a subtle material substance which is pervaded by the reflection of consciousness. The mental modification does not have the capacity to illumine the object, rather its illuminating capacity is due to the reflection of consciousness within it. The mental modification assumes the form of the object and removes the concealing ignorance of the object while the reflection of consciousness reveals the object. Because the reflection of consciousness is what reveals, it is called the phala or "result" and its pervasion of the object is called phalavyāpti. Apart from the distinction between the function of the mental modification and the reflection of consciousness, Abhyankar's explanation does not substantially differ from that of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā.

With regard to internal perception, the consciousness limited by the emotion of happiness etc. and the consciousness limited by the mental modification having that form occupy the one location and are not separate from the consciousness limited by the cognizer. So the cognition "I am happy" is perceptual knowledge. 160

The author now takes up the question of liberating knowledge arising from the apprehension of the meaning of certain scriptural statements such as the "great sentence": "you are That". Some Advaita authors, notably Maṇḍānamiśra and Vācaspatimīśra, maintain that verbal testimony can produce only mediate (parokṣa) knowledge which must be incessantly contemplated in order to produce a mental impression which assists the mind in producing immediate knowledge. 161 Śaṅkara, however, states in the Upadeśaśīhāśrī 162 and in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 163 that the immediate (aparokṣa) knowledge of the Self as Brahman can arise at the time of hearing the Upaniṣad texts, provided that the listener is endowed with the necessary qualifications such as discrimination and dispassion etc. 164 In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Śaṅkara states:

repetition would be meaningless for one who can realize the Self as Brahman after hearing "you are That" once only. But for one who is unable, repetition is certainly proper. 165

Like Śaṅkara, his principal disciples who have left substantial writings: Suresvara, 166 Padmapada 167 and Tōtaka 168 uphold the view that verbal testimony can produce immediate knowledge. Abhyankar's expression: "the direct apprehension of the Self which is produced from the great sayings ...." shows that he follows the view of Śaṅkara and his disciples,
a view which became an important characteristic of the later Vivarana school.169

In the case of perceptual knowledge arising from scriptural statements, there is the requirement of the pervasion by a mental modification in the manner of the apprehension "I am Brahman" in order to remove Ignorance. However, a pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is not necessary to manifest the object because the Self, which is the content of the sentence such as "you are That", is of the nature of pure awareness.

1.45. तच वर्त्यर निृविकल्पकार्निविकल्पकं वेदन्द्विविधम्।
धतर्मसे जानार्याण्ति विद्विकल्पकार्निविकल्पकं।
"तत्तत्वसे"(छात्र ५.६.१३) श्रवणां विनिमित्तान्विकल्पकम्।
प्रक्षालवानन्तरमेषः। शास्त्रवाच विनिकल्पकं।
सत्यमेव ज्ञातां पदार्थसंसारगृहितेन कर्म विनिमित्तान्विकल्पकं।
प्रत्येकानां पदार्थसंसारगृहितेन निमयम्।
"तत्तत्वसे"(छात्र ५.६.१३) श्रवणां
"सत्यमेव सम्बन्ध"(छात्र ६.१.११) इति पूर्वक्षालवानन्तरमेषः।
तथा चास्य निविकल्पकर्त्य सिद्धम्।

1.45. Perception is twofold, on account of the difference of determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). Vikalpa means relatedness. The knowledge which apprehends relatedness such as "I know the pot" is determinate, for there is the apprehension of a knowledge qualified by the qualifying attribute in the form of the pot. The knowledge "I am Brahman" which is produced by the great sentences such as "you are That" is indeterminate. With regard to the totality of causes for perceptual knowledge, perception is produced even from a word. In this very same knowledge there is certainly the nature of being perceptual and the nature of being produced from words on account of the difference of the respective causes.

It should not be said: if perceptual knowledge is produced from a word, how can it have an indeterminate nature since the knowledge produced
from a word apprehends the relation between the meanings of the words? [reason] There is certainly no rule that everywhere knowledge produced from a word only apprehends the relation between the meanings of the words. But there is a rule that [verbal knowledge] only relates to the object of the speaker's purport. In the case of "you are That", Brahman, free from distinction and relation, is alone the object of the purport of the sacred text in agreement with that which precedes: "dear boy [in the beginning this was] existence alone" (Ch. 6.2.1.). So it is established that this [knowledge produced from the sacred text] is indeterminate.

**Comment**

Determinate (savikalpaka) perception apprehends the relation between what is qualified (viśesya) and the qualifying attribute (viśesana). With regard to the statement "I know the pot", "I" is qualified by the attribute of the pot. All perceptions other than those constituting identity judgements come under the category of determinate.

Indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is free from the qualified-qualifying relation. With regard to statements like "this is that Devadatta" or the Upaniṣad sentence "you are That", indeterminate perception arises from a previous determinate perception and the negation of the qualifying attributes brings about the apprehension of identity characterizing indeterminate perception. For example, in the statement "this is that Devadatta" (so'yāṁ Devadattah) "this" refers to Devadatta qualified by the present time and place and "that" refers to Devadatta qualified by a past time and place. There is the perception of a single Devadatta due to the negation of the two sets of attributes relating to the different times and places since these do not constitute the essential part of the person. Thus the non-relational (akāndārtha) knowledge of identity is brought about by setting aside the non essential features of the statement. With regard to the scriptural statement "you are That", non-relational knowledge of identity arises in the same manner. This statement will be explained in detail in the following section dealing with verbal testimony.

In reply to the objection that verbal testimony cannot be non-relational since it apprehends the relation between the meanings of
the words, Abhyankar states that verbal knowledge does not solely depend upon the word meanings. For if that were the case, when a cricketer says "bring me a bat" someone could conceivably bring a flying quadruped. It is the speaker's intention which determines the meaning. Similarly, Abhyankar argues that the intention of the sacred text indicates that statements such as "you are That" have only a non-relational sense.

1.46. \begin{quote}
अनुमितितु स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः स्यायः
\end{quote}

1.46. Inferential knowledge is between the two, the pervaded and the pervader. It is the knowledge of the pervader through what is pervaded. For example [the knowledge] of fire through smoke. Or just as this visible world is known to be false because it is different from Brahman. The particular means for that [inferential knowledge] is inference.

\textbf{comment}

Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is acquired through inferring the presence of what is to be proved (vyāpaka, sadhya or major term) by means of the observation of the instrument of proof (vyāpya, hetu or middle term) which is present in the subject (pakṣa or minor term) where the major term is to be proved. The necessary condition for inference is the previous knowledge of the pervasion (vyāpti), or invariable concomitance, between the middle and the major term. The standard illustration of an inference is: there is fire on the hill. Because there is smoke. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen. Here, fire is to be proved and smoke is the means of proof. The hill is the subject where the smoke is present. Fire is called the pervader (vyāpaka) because what is to be proved must exist in all cases when the instrument of proof exists. Hence the latter is said to be pervaded (vyāpya) by the former. The knowledge of invariable concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader - wherever there is smoke there is fire - coupled with the observation of smoke on the hill constitutes the means for inferring the presence of fire on the hill.

The \textit{Vedāntaparibhāṣā} defines invariable concomitance as the co-existence of the major term with the middle term in all the locations where the middle
term exists. The knowledge of invariable concomitance can be derived by repeated observation or even by a single observation provided there is no instance of inconstancy.

Abhyankar's second example of inference: "the visible world..." is from the Vedantaparibhasa where it is elaborately treated.

1.47. Having seen an ox in a forest and having known the similarity to a cow there [in the ox], the similarity to the ox which is known in the cow is knowledge based upon comparison. Because the knowledge of similarity is only based upon comparison. The particular instrument for that [knowledge], which is the knowledge of the similarity to a cow, is comparison (upamāna).

This knowledge based upon comparison is not included in perception because the cow is not in sense contact. Nor even is it knowledge based upon inference. Because the similarity to the cow, which is the reason, exists in the ox and the similarity to the ox, which is the thing to be proved, exists in the cow. Thus there is no co-existence between the reason and what is to be proved. And there is no requirement here of the recollection of pervasion etc.

comment

Comparison (upamāna) is the particular instrument for acquiring valid knowledge of similarity. For example, a person who owns a cow is travelling through a forest where he sees a wild ox. He thinks "this thing is similar to a cow" and then subsequently he thinks "my cow is similar to this". The first statement where he perceives the similarity
of the ox to the cow is a statement of comparison. Because of this statement he acquires the resultant knowledge based upon the comparison, i.e., "my cow is similar to this".

Abhyankar maintains that knowledge acquired from comparison is not perceptual because the cow is not in sense contact. Nor is it a matter for inference because the similarity of the ox to the cow is the reason (hetu) to infer the similarity of the cow to the ox (sādhyā) and the locus of the reason is the ox while the locus of what is to be proved is the cow. Thus the reason and what is to be proved by it are not co-existent which is a criterion necessary to formulate a rule of pervasion (vyāpti). He also argues against inference on the grounds that the cognition "my cow is similar to this" does not require the recollection of pervasion in the manner: "what corresponds to the similarity belonging to a thing is similar to that thing". The use of the word "et cetera" could refer to memory, for although the cow is recollected in the judgement "this is similar to a cow", the similarity is not recollected and so it is not a case of memory.

The author of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā appears to accept the possibility that inference could account for this knowledge but he argues that the knowledge "my cow is similar to this" can be acquired without the formation of an inference and consequently comparison is a separate means of knowledge.

1.48. A sentence is a collection of words. The knowledge which is produced from that is born of words. The particular instrument for that [knowledge] is the word. In regard to that [verbal testimony], the Veda has validity because it is composed by the Lord. At the beginning of creation the Lord arranged the Veda which has the same sequence as the sequence of the Veda existent in the previous creation.
The traditions, legendary histories etc. have validity in that they are based upon the Veda. But there is no validity for what is opposed to the meaning of the Veda. In respect of those [traditions and legendary histories] which are not of contradictory meaning to it [i.e. the Veda], but when the Veda text serving as their basis is unknown, their validity is construed by inferring such a Vedic text.

When the purport is not logically possible, there is certainly validity even in teaching another meaning by implication. Just as there is [for the scriptural statement] "you are That" etc.

**Comment**

Advaitins believe that the Lord is the revealer of the sacred texts and, on that account, they seek to ensure the validity of the texts as the source of trans-empirical knowledge. However, the Lord is not the author of the content of the Veda. The Lord reveals the eternal Vedic knowledge at the beginning of each cycle of creation. The Veda has an unbroken continuity in the sense that it is always the same Veda which is revealed in each cosmic cycle. For the Advaitin, the origin of the Vedic knowledge, like the origin of the individual soul, the origin of the Lord or the origin of their material cause, maya, cannot be ascertained through speculation and for this reason they are all said to be beginningless.

Words can reveal their meaning either through their primary expressive power (sakti) or by implication (laksana). The "great sentences" (mahāvākyā) such as "you are That" (tat tvam asī) are interpreted as revealing their meaning through implication. Advaita treatises delineate three varieties of implication. The first is exclusive implication (jahallakṣāṇa) which occurs through giving up the express meaning and substituting an implied meaning. For example, in the expression "the cowherd village is on the Ganges" the express meaning is unintelligible and the sentence can only be understood by completely abandoning the literal sense in favour of the implied meaning of "on the bank". The second type is known as non-exclusive implication (ajahallakṣāṇa). In this case there is the cognition of an implied meaning without abandoning the primary meaning of the sentence. For instance in the expression...
"protect the curd from the crows" the primary sense is retained and the implied meaning of "and anything else" is incorporated. The third type is exclusive non-exclusive implication (jahadajahallaksana or bhāgatyāga-laksana). Here, a word expressing something qualified gives up one portion and refers to the other portion. For example, in the expression "this is that Devadatta" the express meaning - the Devadatta qualified by a past time and place is identical to the Devadatta qualified by the present time and place - is unintelligible without giving up the contradictory factors relating to time and place and resorting to the implied meaning of Devadatta as the unqualified substantive.

Later Advaita authors interpret the statement "you are That" by means of exclusive non-exclusive implication. Śaṅkara does not use this term though his method of interpreting the sentence is in accord with the latter type of implication. According to Śaṅkara the word "you" in the sentence primarily refers to the ego sense, the self-conscious knower, and it is able to imply the true inner Self after there is the exclusion of the ego portion which has been erroneously identified with the Self. Śaṅkara refers to the method of discriminating the Self from the non-Self by the term of "continuity and discontinuity" (anvayavyatireka). In Advaita, the method of continuity and discontinuity is especially used in the manner of distinguishing a constant factor, the Self, from its association with other variable conditions such as physical and mental states. This is done by means of ascertaining the continued presence (anvaya) of the Self in the absence (vyatireka) of the variable conditions. Śaṅkara exemplifies this method with reference to the state of deep sleep. During sleep there is the negation of all objective conditions but there is no negation of "Seeing" or awareness as such. What persists through the variable states of waking, dream and sleep is awareness, the Self, and what is discontinuous, such as knowership, is an extrinsic condition of the Self.

The discrimination between subject and object is also included within the method of continuity and discontinuity. According to this mode of reasoning, subject and object are mutually exclusive: the subject cannot be objectified nor can the characteristics of the object belong to the subject. Through the application of this principle the body, senses and mental faculties are successively distinguished from the Self because they are objects of the seer, the subject. Even the subject, the "I", is said to have an objective portion (idam añña)
and a portion which is the pure subject (śūkṣma). The objective portion is the ego, the self conception of "me", brought about by the identification of awareness with the internal organ. The remaining portion is the pure subject, awareness, which is the implied meaning of the word "you". According to Śaṅkara words cannot directly denote the Self since it cannot be objectified. However, following the indispensable discrimination of the Self by the method of continuity and discontinuity, the Self can be implied through the word "you" because the ego is not spacially separate from the Self.

The word "That" denotes existence (sat) associated with maya. Śaṅkara states that the verb "are" (asi) conveys the meaning of identity between the words "you" and "That". Thus there is a relation of qualified and qualifier between the two words and their meanings: the express meanings of the words "you" and "That" should be mutually relatable. The express meaning of the word "you" is the individual who is subject to sorrow and who is immediately present (aparokṣa) in experience. The word "That" expresses what is free from sorrow and is remote (parokṣa). On account of their grammatical apposition the express meaning of the two words is brought into opposition. Through the implication of their essential identity in the common substratum of Being, the word "you" gives up the meaning of sorrow which is contrary to the meaning of the word "That" and "That" relinquishes the meaning of remoteness contrary to the meaning of the word "you". Thus the two words indicate an essential identity on account of their grammatical apposition and qualifying each other they signify that the Self is free from sorrow and what is denoted by the word "That" is not separate from the Self.

Sureśvara's explanation of the sentence in the Naiskarmyasiddhi is a detailed elaboration of Śaṅkara's method of instruction. Sureśvara, like Śaṅkara, is emphatic that the comprehension of the import of the sentence is contingent upon understanding the true meaning of the word "you". For that purpose he too employs the method of continuity and discontinuity and he argues that the Self can be implied through the word "I" after negating the objective portion of the "I" notion. Sureśvara observes that when all the objective relations with the "I" have been excluded it may seem as though the Self too has been given up. Sureśvara specifies that the function of discrimination is to exclude what is not essential to the nature of the Self while the scope
of revelation through the sentence "you are That" is to positively reveal the nature of the Self. Thus both discrimination and the mahāvākya are a necessity for the fruition of understanding. 206

Sureśvara provides a technical analysis of the sentence meaning:

For the words, their meaning and the inner Self there is [respectively] grammatical apposition, qualifier - qualified relation and the connection of what is to be indicated and the indication. 207

Firstly, there is grammatical apposition (samanādhikaranya) between the word "you" and the word "That". Because of grammatical apposition the meaning of the word "you" is qualified (vīśesya) by the meaning of the word "That" (vīsesana) 208 and because of the contradictory attributes the two words cannot denote identity according to their express meanings. The word "you" expresses the individual possessing the characteristics of limitation and sorrow. The word "That" expresses what is non-dual but remote. Because of the grammatical apposition the word "you" is identical to "That" and so the contradictory factors must be adventitious. 209 By resorting to implication the contradictory characteristics of the two words are negated while their essential aspect is retained and in this manner the identity of the two is implied in the common substratum of Being - awareness. 210

1.49. "Devadatta who is fat does not eat during the day." Here, the eating at night which is postulated for the logical possibility of fatness is postulation. This is not understood through inference. Because when a person who is fat and who does not eat by day is first seen, there is no possibility of pervasion of co-presence and illustration.
Although the pervasion is possible: wherever there is the absence of eating at night, there is the absence of fatness on account of the co-ordinate relation with not eating by day, just as he does not eat by day and at night, still, that [pervasion] is not between fatness and eating at night, i.e. between the reason and what is to be proved, but between their absence. Moreover, the requirement of the recollection of pervasion etc. is also not seen here. Thus postulation must certainly be established as another means of knowledge.

**comment**

Arthāpatti means the postulation (अपत्ति-कल्पना) of some fact (अर्थ) in order to make an already ascertained fact logically possible.\(^{211}\) For example, Devadatta is known to be fat but he is also known not to eat during the day. The fact of his fatness and not eating in the day becomes unintelligible if it is not postulated that he eats during the night. Arthāpatti rescues a known fact from seeming contradiction through postulating the only other fact which can explain it.\(^{212}\)

Advaitins consider that only instances of pervasion of co-presence (अन्वयाव्याप्ति, i.e. "where there is smoke there is fire") constitute a valid inference.\(^{213}\) They argue that if the case of arthāpatti is formulated as an inference there will only be pervasion of co-absence (यवतीर्काव्याप्ति) between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term.\(^{214}\) Abhyankar has given an example of this. Advaitins maintain that pervasion of co-absence is not a cause for inferential knowledge.\(^{215}\) Rather, it is a case of postulation which forms a separate means of knowledge. Importantly, Abhyankar mentions that in such instances as "Devadatta is fat..." there is no requirement for the recollection of pervasion and so it is not a matter of inference.

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā delineates a twofold form of postulation, in reference to what is seen (द्रष्टार्थापत्ति) or hear (श्रुतार्थापत्ति).\(^{216}\) Advaitins utilize the latter type for the interpretation of the sacred texts. For example, the text "the knower of the Self crosses sorrow" (Ch. 7.1.3.) would be logically untenable if sorrow were not false, since only knowledge is specified as the means for its removal.\(^{217}\) Śaṅkara argues by śrutārthāpatti when he says that the sacred texts would not have enjoined the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman if there had been no superimposition of Ignorance upon Brahman.\(^{218}\)
1.50. So too, non-cognition is also another means of knowledge. If a pot were to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the ground. In this manner the non-existence of a pot etc. is known because of the non-cognition of the pot etc. Here, the sense organ is not the particular cause [for the knowledge of non-existence]. Because that is absorbed in apprehending the location and because it [the sense organ] has no connection with what is non-existent. Moreover, even if the knowledge is accepted here as perceptual there is certainly no confusion of the means of knowledge because there is the difference of the means of knowledge for that [perceptual knowledge] - which is non-cognition - from the sense organ.

**Comment**

Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is the particular means for apprehending the non-existence of an object. Abhyankar specifies the criterion for non-cognition to be considered as a means of knowledge: "if a pot were to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the ground." This means that only competent non-cognition (yogyanupalabdhi) i.e., an object which is not cognized would have been cognized if it were present, is the valid means for the knowledge of non-existence. Competent non-cognition excludes instances where something may or may not be present but is unable to be perceived.

The cognition of the non-existence of a pot on the ground is perceptual because its non-perception and the knowledge of its non-existence are immediately experienced. However, the means for that knowledge is not perception because the latter requires contact between the sense organ and the sense object. In the case of the non-cognition
of a pot the sense of sight only contacts the bare ground. It cannot
come into contact with a pot which is not present. Therefore, although
the knowledge is perceptual the means of knowledge must be separately
classified, hence non-cognition is treated as a distinct means of
knowledge.

1.51. The worldly knowledge which is produced in this manner by the
means of knowledge possesses a location and an object. The internal-organ
manifests that [knowledge]. Because worldly knowledge is only a
modification of the internal-organ. For this reason the knowership there
[in respect of worldly knowledge] is for the internal-organ or for the
individual soul having that [internal-organ] as its limiting adjunct,
but not for the pure Self. For that [Self] has no possibility of
knowership since it has Knowledge as its essential nature. Even the
knowership appearing in the manner "I know" is not for the Self but it
is for the sense of "I". The sense of "I", however, is not the Self
but the I-notion which is included within the transformation of Ignorance.
The nature of the Self which appears in the I-notion has been superimposed,
it is not real. In the same manner, the nature of the Self which appears
in the mind, in the senses, in the vital breath and in the body etc.,
has certainly been superimposed on account of error. Liberation is not
possible without the removal of such error and the removal of the error
is only through the knowledge of Brahman.
According to Advaita, consciousness is of two types. The first is consciousness in its essential nature, identical with the Self and Brahman and manifest in relation to the mind as the unchanging witness of the presence and absence of all mental states. 220 This consciousness is not opposed to Ignorance but illumines both knowledge and Ignorance. The second type is consciousness reflected in and qualified by the internal organ (vrtilvisiṣṭā caitanyam). 221 This consciousness manifests in two forms: in the form of the subject (ahānvṛtti) or I-notion (ahaṅkāra) and in the form of the various mental modifications which are objects (idamvṛtti) of the I-notion. 222 It is the reflected consciousness which is operative in all epistemological activities, whether relating to sense objects or to spiritual matters. Because the gain of any knowledge requires a knowing subject as the locus of knowledge and also the object of knowledge which is revealed to the subject by the appropriate mental modification. 223

Śaṅkara states that the Self, as pure awareness, cannot possess the quality of knowership. Nor does the intellect, insentient by nature, intrinsically possess knowership. 224 Knowership is the property of the reflection of the Self in the intellect. The reflection of the Self, which is the I-notion, acquires the status of a knower on account of its identification with the attributes of the intellect. Śaṅkara attempts to illustrate the subtle relationship of the Self and its reflection in the intellect through the example of a face reflected in a mirror. 225 The Self is compared to the face and the intellect to the mirror. The reflection of the Self in the intellect is like the reflection of the face in the mirror. Just as the reflection conforms to the attributes of the mirror, so that a defect in the mirror appears upon the reflection also, so too the reflection of the Self naturally assumes the attribute of knowership on account of its conformity to the intellect. 226 Just as the reflected properties of the mirror may be falsely ascribed to the face, similarly the Self is erroneously considered to be a knower because it is not distinguished from its reflection in the intellect. 227

From the preceding it is clear that even the sense of being "so and so", i.e., the I-notion, is not the essential Self but is included among the effects of Ignorance 228 because it is the product of the Self
reflected in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. The Self, however, is in no sense spatially remote from the I-notion but is its locus and so the Self is the subject while the I-notion is its object. Thus the "I" is a combination of the I-notion and the Self as such. For this reason Śaṅkara, Suresvara and other Advaita authors specify that the object portion of the "I" should be distinguished through discrimination from the remaining portion which is the real Self:

The learned should abandon the "this" portion in what is called "I" as not the Self. ["I" in the sentence of the sacred text] "I am Brahma" must be the remaining portion in accordance with the above teaching.

The origin of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the intellect cannot be traced. The consequential effects of this superimposition are the false ascription of the attributes of the body, senses and mind upon the Self and the erroneous imputation of Selfhood to the body etc. Because this superimposition is said to have Ignorance as its fundamental cause, it can only be removed by the liberating knowledge of the true nature of the Self.

The author now proceeds to state the indispensable pre-requisites for such knowledge.

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The author now proceeds to state the indispensable pre-requisites for such knowledge.
1.52. The person eligible for the knowledge of Brahman is only such a one who is endowed with the fourfold qualifications. Because there is no hope of inquiry into Brahman in the absence of the accomplishment of the fourfold means and because there is the sure expectation of the inquiry into Brahman following that [gain of the fourfold means]. The fourfold qualifications are: the discrimination between the permanent and the impermanent, dispassion towards the enjoyment of the results [of action] here or hereafter, the acquisition of the group of six beginning with control of the mind and the desire for liberation. That has been told in the Varāhopanisad:

[Through a life of ethical activity] the fourfold means such as dispassion should arise for people. [They are]: the discrimination between the permanent and the impermanent, dispassion [towards objects of enjoyment] here and hereafter, the acquisition of the group of six [values] beginning with control of the mind and the desire for liberation. One should cultivate that. (Va.2.3.)

The group of six beginning with control of the mind are: the control of the mind, control of the sense organs, renunciation, endurance, faith and single pointed concentration of the mind. Control of the mind is the cessation of the mind from worldly occupations. The control of the sense organs is the restraint of the external senses. Renunciation is the relinquishment of action. Endurance is bearing the opposites such as heat and cold. Faith is the intellect having trust [in the teacher and the scripture]. Single pointed concentration of the mind is the abiding of the mind through giving up sleepiness, want of energy and carelessness. The sacred texts, too, teach that control of the mind etc. are the means for the direct apprehension of the Self:
Therefore, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring and possessed of faith a person should see the Self indeed in the self [the body]. (Brh.4.4.23.)

The person who knows is calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring, well-behaved and equal [to all]. (Śa.5)

These are the internal means. Whereas action is a means for knowledge through purification of the mind and so it is an external means.

**Comment**

In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya Śaṅkara states that possession of the fourfold qualifications is a necessary pre-condition for the knowledge of Brahman. Later Advaita treatises which elucidate some aspects of the tradition (prakaranagrantha) generally commence with a description of these fourfold means.

According to the Advaita conception of liberation, action (karma) has an important though limited function. Śaṅkara is emphatic that action can have no direct role in bringing about liberation. However, actions in the form of duties, charity, the performance of permanent rites such as agnihotra and the practice of austerity, undertaken with the correct attitude, are accepted as a means to liberation in so far as they prepare the mind to receive the teaching. The purpose of action is to facilitate a proper mental disposition by removing the "impurities" (durita) such as desire and aversion (rāga, dveṣa) which stand in the way of knowledge.

1.53.
1.53. However, the means which is more internal is the triad consisting in hearing, thinking and meditation. For there is the sacred text: 
"My dear, the Self should indeed be seen; it should be heard about, thought about and meditated upon" (Bṛh. 2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means it has to be made direct in the manner: "I am Brahman". The means for that is hearing etc. which has been told by "it should be heard about" etc. Hearing is the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedānta sentences in regard to the non-dual Brahman. Thinking is the consideration of what has been heard through reasonings of logical possibility. Meditation is establishing a continuous flow of thoughts of the same type through setting aside dissimilar thoughts. That has been told:

The wise say that hearing is determining the signification of a word by means of reasoning. 
Thinking is said to be determining the truth of the thing by means of reasoning.

Those who are versed in the Vedas say that meditation is where the mind has only pure awareness remaining. This internal means has thus been told. You should engage in that for the knowledge of the Supreme Self. (S.S. 3.344-345.)
1.54. In regard to the above, the doubt whether or not the Vedānta sentences are the means of knowledge for the non-dual Brahman is removed by hearing. Many doubts are removed by thinking. They are, for example:

- is the world real or unreal? Does the Self consist of bliss or not?
- Is the Self distinct from the body or not? Is the identity of the individual soul with the supreme Self possible or not?
- Is Self-knowledge the means of liberation or not? Even if it is the means for liberation, is it the means for liberation through being combined with action or on its own? Does the Self consist of Knowledge or does it have Knowledge as its quality?

For what is known as "thinking" consists of reasoning. The idea of reality in regard to the world is removed by reasoning: if the world were real then there would be contradiction with the non-dual texts. Reasoning is the means of knowledge about the Self being of the nature of bliss: if the Self does not consist of bliss, no one would be engaged to attain it. If the body alone is the Self, then because of the absence of another birth the consequence would be the destruction of what has been done and the arrival of what has not been done. If there is difference between the individual soul and Brahman there would be
contradiction with the sacred texts such as "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.). If Self-knowledge is not the means for liberation or if it is the means for liberation combined with action, the conclusion would be absence of validity for the sacred text: "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv. 3.8.). If the Self has Knowledge as its quality, the sacred text "without quality" (Cū. 7.2.) would not agree. Thus such reasonings should be properly investigated for oneself. By meditation the error such as "I am Ignorant" is removed.

comment
In the Brhadāranyakopanisad (2.4.5., 4.5.6.) the sage Yajñavalkya teaches that the Self should be seen (drastavya), it should be heard about (śrotavya), thought about (mantavya) and meditated upon (nīdidhyasitavya).

Abhyankar explains that "should be seen" means the Self is to be directly apprehended and the principal means for that are hearing, thinking and meditation. According to Śaṅkara the nature of the Self must firstly be heard from the sacred texts and the teacher. Then the Self must be thought about or reflected upon, i.e., what has been heard should be investigated by means of suitable reasoning. Then the Self should be meditated upon with certainty. Śaṅkara states that when these means become as one, i.e. when there is no separation between what has been heard, reflected upon and ascertained to be true to one's experience then the knowledge of Brahman is clear.

Śaṅkara accepts the utility of the meditative practices (dhyāna, pranidhāna) prescribed in the Yogasūtras. However, he parts company with the Yoga school by rejecting the view that the practice of yoga, without the Vedāntic revelation, can lead to the ascertainment of the truth. Śaṅkara is emphatic that "the knowledge of reality is only from the Vedānta sentences" and he does not accept that yoga, independent of Vedānta, can give liberation. In regard to the practice of meditative absorption (samādhi), which is the aim of yoga discipline, Śaṅkara considers it a means for the clear ascertainment of the Self which is known from the Upaniṣads. However, he does not consider that meditative absorption is of itself a sufficient condition for knowledge:
Even in deep sleep and meditative absorption there is the natural gain of non-distinction, however at the time of waking [from sleep and absorption], there is once again distinction just as before because false knowledge has not been removed.\textsuperscript{245}

It is a misreading of Śaṅkara to consider that hearing and reflection are merely the preliminary stages to meditation. For Śaṅkara accepts that the mahāvākyas can, in the case of highly qualified aspirants, bring about immediate knowledge which requires no further fulfilment.\textsuperscript{246} In the thought of Śaṅkara, hearing the scriptures from a teacher, reflection and meditation are all to be repeated as long as required\textsuperscript{247} and the scope of the latter two is essentially to help the ascertainment that the meaning of the Vedānta passages is true to experience.

Padmapāda provides a more extensive definition of hearing, reflection and meditation. He says hearing is inquiry into the Vedānta passages for the knowledge of the Self.\textsuperscript{248} Reflection is the consideration of illustrations, reasonings and descriptive statements contained in the sacred texts and it is also the consideration of inferences not opposed to the meaning of the texts. Meditation is the establishing of the mind in the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages which have been supplemented by reflection. "Seeing" or realization (dārśana) means the experience of the unity of consciousness which is free from the appearance of all worldly phenomena, on account of being established in the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages.\textsuperscript{249} In the view of Padmapāda, the role of the sacred texts is of primary importance for the knowledge of Brahman while reflection and meditation are supportive.

This question, as to the relative importance of hearing, reflection and meditation, is taken up by Padmapāda's main commentator Prakāśātman who seeks to establish that hearing is the principal member (aṅgī) and the other two are auxiliaries (aṅga) of it. Prakāśātman contends that even if verbal testimony produces only mediate (parokṣa) knowledge of Brahman which gains immediacy (aparokṣa) on account of assistance from reasoning and meditation, still, verbal testimony is primary because the scope of the other two is to assist hearing. If it is suggested that all three are of equal importance, Prakāśātman disagrees by arguing that verbal testimony must be the principal cause for the knowledge of Brahman since it, as the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), is in contiguity ("the Self should be seen, heard about...") with what is to be known, i.e. the Self (prameya). Again, if it is accepted that
verbal testimony produces immediate knowledge which, however, remains mediate on account of the unprepared nature of the mind, then reflection and meditation are the auxiliaries to verbal testimony because they serve to assist the result of verbal testimony in so far as they bring about establishment in immediate knowledge by removing the obstructions existing in the mind.

Prakāśātman maintains that immediate knowledge is not possible solely from meditation without verbal testimony because it would lack validity since meditation is not a means of knowledge. If it is argued that the immediate knowledge gained from meditation has the scriptural knowledge of the Self and Brahman as its subject matter and acquires validity on account of the connection with that, Prakāśātman replies that the validity of such meditative knowledge is dependent upon ascertaining the truth of the subject matter which is itself dependent upon another means of knowledge, i.e. verbal testimony. Therefore extrinsic validity (parataḥ prāmāṇya) would be accepted in the case of verbal testimony while the other means of knowledge are said to be intrinsically valid (svataḥ prāmāṇya). Prakāśātman concludes that reflection and meditation assist in bringing about the result of hearing and hence they are its auxiliaries.

Vācaspatimiśra, however, has a different interpretation regarding the relative importance of hearing, reflection and meditation. He considers that hearing and reflection give rise to meditation which causes immediate knowledge after being practised with attention and without interruption for a long time. According to Vācaspati, verbal testimony produces only mediate knowledge which gains immediacy through a mental modification (vṛtti) assisted by the mental impression (sāṁskāra) of non-duality acquired by repeated meditation upon the meaning of the Vedaṇta passages.

As mentioned previously, Vācaspati adopts certain views of Maṇḍanamiśra. In this matter also he appears to follow Maṇḍana who maintains that repeated meditation (prasaṅkhya) is a necessary practice for the gain of immediate knowledge. Also, Vācaspati links hearing, reflection and meditation with the Yoga term samyama which incorporates the three stages of concentration (dharana), meditation (dhyāna) and meditative absorption (samādhi). He equates hearing and reflection with concentration, meditation upon the meaning of the Vedaṇta
passages (nididhyāsana) with yoga meditation (dhyāna) and direct apprehension of the Self (in the sentence "the Self is to be seen", etc.) with meditative absorption.\textsuperscript{258} Along with Vācaspati's use of Yoga terminology there would appear to be an acceptance of the soteriological dimension embodied in those terms. This suggests a certain conceptual eclecticism is operative in Vācaspati's interpretation of the Vedānta means to liberation.

The Vivaraṇa and Bhāmati are in agreement regarding the fundamental importance of the Upaniṣad sentences. They differ, however, concerning the role of the Upaniṣads in the gaining of liberation. Padmapāda and the Vivaraṇa maintain that the Upaniṣad passages can generate immediate knowledge while according to Bhāmati the texts produce only mediate knowledge. The consequence of this difference is a dissimilarity in attitude toward the gain of the knowledge of Brahman. In the view of Padmapāda and Vivaraṇa, the function of reflection and meditation is negative in so far as their purpose is to remove the obstructions to the clear apprehension of the Self which is revealed in the Upaniṣads. For Bhāmati, however, immediate apprehension must be produced through the practice of meditation upon the meaning of the texts.

What has been discussed indicates that the Padmapāda-Vivaraṇa tradition accords more closely with the tenor of Śaṅkara's teaching than the method laid down by Vācaspati.

\textsuperscript{1.55.}
1.55. When doubt and error have thus been removed by hearing etc. and when there are no other obstacles then the immediate, true and certain knowledge arises that "I am Brahman". Other obstacles are of three types on account of the distinction of past, future and present [obstacles]. An obstacle from the past is the repeated remembering on account of absorption in previously experienced sense objects. This can be prevented: in remembering the sense objects one must give up, like husk, the name and form belonging there and take, like grain, the reality which exists within that [name and form]. Here, giving up means not pondering. Taking means pondering.

A future obstacle is the remainder of the action which has begun to produce its effect. The remainder of action ceases only after experiencing the result. In regard to that, if there is a remainder of very strong self-interested action then it is an obstacle to knowledge. If there is a remainder of weak self-interested action, even though it brings about the general preservation of the body it is not an obstacle to knowledge. In the same manner, the remainder of obligatory action, whether producing a result or not producing a result, is not an obstacle but indeed is favourable to the knowledge of reality by means of the cessation of the liking for sinful actions. Even the desire for the world of Brahma which arises for someone and which is attendant upon particular meritorious actions that procure the world of Brahma is certainly a future obstacle. However, the person who goes to the world of Brahma is liberated along with Brahma. Though the person who is not desirous of that does not wait for such a long time.
A present obstacle is of many types on account of the distinction of attachment to sense objects, fallacious reasoning, dullness of the intellect etc. In regard to that, attachment to sense objects can be prevented by control of the mind etc. practised repeatedly. Fallacious reasonings can be prevented by hearing etc. [i.e. hearing, reflection and meditation] practised repeatedly. Food that has the qualities of rajas and tamas must be given up for preventing dullness of the intellect. Nevertheless the cessation of those [obstructions] would be only by degrees or in another birth. However, even in that birth [the cessation] is through the grace of the teacher etc.

**comment**

Hearing, reflection and meditation have been told as the direct means for the knowledge of Brahman. Of these three, hearing is the principal member since verbal testimony is considered to be a means of knowledge. If there is the correct operation of the means of knowledge supported by reflection and meditation the immediate knowledge of Brahman must occur. If this is not the case, Advaitins postulate the existence of obstacles which hinder the realization. Suresvara states that such obstructions may either be from the past, the future or the present.

In the Upadeśasāhasrī, Śaṅkara teaches a form of meditation called parisaṅkhyaṇa for the purpose of removing obstructions such as the influence of the sense objects upon the self. This meditation is based upon the distinction between the subject, the Self, and objects, i.e. everything else. Its method is to contemplate the Self as intrinsically unaffected by sound, touch, form, taste and smell because the Self is unable to be objectified by any of them.

It may be asked in what way parisaṅkhyaṇa meditation differs from prasaṅkhyaṇa meditation which Śaṅkara rejects. The aim of prasaṅkhyaṇa is to produce Self-knowledge on account of the repeated meditation upon the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages. Parisaṅkhyaṇa meditation, however, has no such aim. It is practised in order to clearly appreciate the knowledge which has already been gained through hearing but which has not been fully received in understanding and
experience. At the conclusion of the comment upon the previous section it was mentioned that there is a difference between the production of knowledge from meditation and the use of meditation to remove obstructions preventing the clear appreciation of what is already known through hearing. Parisaṅkhyaṇa meditation exemplifies the latter approach.

Two commentators upon the Upadeśasāhasrī, Ānandagiri and Rāmatīrtha, explain parisāṅkhyaṇa in terms of removing the obstacles to clear knowledge. Rāmatīrtha says:

.... if the knowledge on the part of some, though they have knowledge, is not steady like a lamp in a windless place on account of the strong mental impression of difference, then for the firmness of their knowledge what is known as parisāṅkhyaṇa is about to be explained ...262

1.56. Thus when there is the absence of any obstacle and when Ignorance is removed by the unimpeded direct apprehension in the manner: "I am Brahman" then the person desirous of liberation remains as Brahman, undivided, of a single nature, existence, awareness and bliss.

For example, Karṇa, though born into a royal family, was brought up ever since birth only in a hunter's family. He considered himself to be Rādheya due to ignorance characterised by the error brought about by
belonging to that [hunting community] and dwelling together etc. and he did not experience his nature as the son of Kuntī even though existing as self-established. Then, deprived of the good fortune resulting from being born of Kuntī, everywhere he gained many types of sorrow characterised by various sorts of curses, disrespect, etc. At one time the Lord Sun caused him to recall his own nature by imparting the instruction: "Karṇa, you are born of Kuntī, you are not Rādhaya". On account of that recollection, when there was the cessation of being a hunter, being Rādhaya etc., which was manufactured by ignorance, he gave up the sorrow caused by being a hunter etc. and gained the good fortune which resulted from being born of Kuntī.

So too, even Brahman, its own nature being concealed by the ignorance which belongs to it and which is established as beginningless, has gained the state of an individual soul. And being deprived of the self-established experience of the nature of being eternal, unsurpassed bliss, [Brahman] transmigrates. That transmigrating Brahman, when at some time its Ignorance which was the criterion for the state of being an individual soul etc. is removed through the knowledge about itself [a knowledge] produced by a teacher and a scripture superimposed through its own Ignorance, then it remains in its nature of unsurpassed bliss which is eternally established.

comment

Śaṅkara also narrates this story in his commentary on the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 2.1.20. (p. 738).

1.57.

इन्चे च मुक्तिन्वतोऽधिभवति धार्मिकाववत्। हयजन्व जीवन्युक्तः।
जीवन्युक्तः तदुत्तरे वर्गावपनिदिः—
थर्मच्छोऽवि सत्त्वात्मानं योगी ज्ञाति केत्तन्त्रः।
तथाव्यक्तीलिङ्गम जीवन्युक्तं सेवेदति || (३४७) इति।
1.57. This liberation is even for one who is living. Because there is nothing to contradict it. This is indeed liberation while living. It has been mentioned in the Varāhopaniṣad:

At which time the Yogi knows his own Self to be the whole, beginning from that time he would be liberated while living. (Varā. 2.42.)

Similarly, the state of the person who is liberated while living has been described in detail in the sacred texts such as:

The person whose radiance of mind does not rise up in happiness or diminish in sorrow, who remains in the state he happens to be in, he is said to be liberated while living. (Varā. 4.22.)

And in the Ātmopaniṣad:

This person who is the best of the knowers of Brahman is directly Śiva himself. The best among the knowers of Brahman has accomplished his purpose, while living he is always liberated. (Ātma. 20.)

1.58. जीवनसहायस्यामवायोजनानि तु जानन्दा तथो विस्तादभावो हृदाहिन्नति: सृजाविधायोक्षेत पञ्चायो उत्पत्तिसाकारस्य पुरुषस्य पुनः संवेदिनिपप-यानुमथितानन्दा। सा च “संवेदिनाया विनाशिति” (गी ४ १ ४०) इत्यत तथा संवेदायस्य तनुप्रभुमाध्यमपुलेरणायाध्यक्षीयी जीवनसहायस्याया गुलमा। तथा तत्प्रायवक्षिद्विकृतायात्मायद्याचिबाचारिः भवति। तद्रूप ततः।
1.58. There are five aims of the state of liberation while living: the protection of knowledge, austerity, the absence of disagreement, the cessation of sorrow and the manifestation of happiness. Protection of knowledge is the non-origination once again of doubt and contrary views on the part of a person who has gained the immediate apprehension of Brahman. In the existence of a doubt, that [protection of knowledge] is necessary for preventing the loss which is incurred based on that [doubt] because it is said: "the doubting self is ruined" (G.4.40.) and that [protection of knowledge] is very easily gained in the state of liberation while living.

Also, in that state there is the concentration of the mind upon a single object because of the non-arising of all thoughts. That alone is austerity, for there is the statement: "the highest austerity is the concentration of the mind and the senses" (Mbh. Śā. 250.4.). The welfare of the world is produced by that, for there is the statement: "whatever
a great person does, that indeed the other people do" (G.3.21.).

Also, in the state of not being engaged in contemplation, even when a reproach has been made by someone there is no disagreement on the part of a person who is liberated while living because there is no appearance of a mental modification of that type. That has been told:

Having known completion in the truth we are certainly joyful. We can only grieve for others, we do not dispute with those who are deluded.

So too, even while he experiences the result of action which has begun to operate, the person liberated while living has complete cessation of sorrow since error has been removed and because his mind has only the form of the Self. Accordingly, there is the sacred text:

If a person should know the Self as "I am this",
then desiring what and for the desire of whom
would he worry about the body? (Śā. 22.)²⁶⁴

So too, in the state of liberation while living there is the manifestation of happiness due to the experience of the perfect bliss of Brahman on account of the complete cessation of the concealing caused by Ignorance through the practice of the Yoga of knowledge. Accordingly there is the sacred text:

The happiness that must be for a mind which has been placed in the Self and whose impurities have been dispelled by meditative absorption cannot be described through speech. At that time, that [happiness] is apprehended for oneself by the inner-organ. (Maitri. 6.54.)
1.59. Then, upon the decease of the body on account of the completion of the results of action which had begun to operate, liberation free from the body follows. That also has been told in the sacred text:

They become liberated while living until the destruction of the result of action which had begun to operate. Then, when the result of action which has begun to operate has reached its end in the course of time, they attain my liberation free from the body. As to that there is no doubt. (Mukti.43.)

Having given up the state of being liberated while living when his body has been overcome by time, he enters the state of being liberated free from the body like air enters the state of not moving. (Mukti. 76.)

Also in the Atmopanisad:
Just as when a pot is destroyed the space [within
the pot] itself becomes space alone, in the same
manner, upon the dissolution of the limiting
adjunct the knower of Brahman himself becomes
Brahman alone. (Atma. 1.22.)

Because the reflection [of the Self] which is based upon Ignorance
is completely absent in liberation [free from the body] there is not
even a trace of I-ness there. Because I-ness is a particular
transformation of Ignorance. In the same manner, the difference
between the individual soul and Brahman also, which is based upon
Ignorance, most certainly does not appear there. That has been told:

When the Ignorance which produces division has
passed into final destruction, who will make a
distinction of one's Self from Brahman which
does not exist [after its destruction]? (Viṣ. 6.7.94.)

1.60.

1.60. Because liberation is merely remaining in one's own nature, at
that time there is neither happiness nor sadness. For something else,
which is the cause of happiness and sadness, does not exist since the
previously mentioned threefold difference is absent there [in liberation
free from the body]. And because experience is not possible due to
the destruction of the inner-organ which is the limiting adjunct
[bringing about] the state of the experiencer.
Therefore, liberation, which is characterised as the state of being Brahman and which is taught by the sacred text: "the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu. 3.2.9.) is thus established.

1.61. The illustrious Śaṅkarācārya appeared in the year 710 [788 of the Christian era] in the era of Śālivāhana. When he unfolded everywhere the teaching of the non-duality of the Self the other views had, for the most part, little currency. No one who laid claim to another view dared to dispute before the feet of the illustrious teacher which possessed great power. In a very short time, having travelled just about everywhere accompanied by a group of pupils and having established centres of religious life in the four directions he appointed students in various places who were proficient in communicating the teaching of the non-duality of the Self. And having reached completion in what was to be accomplished in his own incarnation, the feet of the teacher gained their own nature in the year 742 [820 of the Christian era] in the era of Śālivāhana.
However, others say the birth of the illustrious Śaṅkarācārya was on the fifth day of the bright half of the month in April-May in the era of Yudhiṣṭhira measured as 2631. Accordingly, they say the teacher went to the nature of light on the day of the full moon in the bright half of the month in October-November in the era of Yudhiṣṭhira measured as 2663.\textsuperscript{267}

Thereafter his group of pupils, even immersed in the deep darkness of delusion, through the assistance of the light of knowledge acquired by the grace of the teacher's feet, like a light when the sun has set, was able to destroy the mass of the darkness of Ignorance which had entered the mind of the multitudes of living beings under the influence of action. The teaching of the non-duality of the Self grew to have unshaken prevalence just about everywhere. This very teaching of the non-duality of the Self is celebrated in the world as the teaching of \textit{maya}.\textsuperscript{266}
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: ADVAITAMATAM.

1. B.S.S. 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f.
2. V.P. p.113.
3. Śāṅkara is without equivocation with regard to the necessity of Vedic revelation for the knowledge of reality:
   B.S.S. 1.1.2. p.50, line 3 and p. 51, line 1; 1.1.3. p.58, line 2;
   1.1.4. p.65, line 2f; 2.1.3. p.354, line 10; 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f;
   2.1.11. p.368, line 7 and p.369, line 6; 2.1.14. p.379, line 6 and
   p.380, line 2f; 2.1.27. p.400, line 13f; 2.1.31. p.404, line 8;
   2.2.1. p.412, line 6f; 2.3.1. p.499, line 5f; 4.4.8. p.897, line 7.
   Mu.Ś. 1.1.5. p.144, line 25f; 1.1.6. p.145, line 7.
   G.Ś. 18.66. p.294, line 22f.
   U. 1.17.8. 1.18.216, 217.
4. vede pūrvottarakāṇḍayoh kramena dharmabrahmaḥ viṣayah ...
   veda bhavaśajñāṇam vedasya sakṣat prayojanam.
5. B.S.S. 1.1.7. p.111, line 1f. Also, Brh.Ś. 2.1.20. p.743, line 4f.
7. Brh. 4.4.19.
8. U. 1.18.7, 8, 183. Brh. 3.3.1. p.802, line 22f.
9. vyāhāriṣkaprāmāṇyaśāstram...sa-advaitāgamena bādhvate, tu tattvikam
   prāmāṇyam. Advaitasiddhi, quoted in W. Halbfass, Studies in Kumārila
10. Śaṅkara states that ultimately all differences created by Ignorance
    are to be negated, cf., B.S.S. 1.1.4. p.79, line 1f. He says that
    the presentation of saṃyog statements in the śruti are sometimes
    specifically intended for negation while on other occasions they
    are for the purpose of meditation, cf., B.S.S. 3.2.14. p.643, line4f;
    3.2.15. p.643, line 12f; 3.2.21. p.647, line 12f.
    also utilizes this method, cf., p.133f.
13. advāropah -vastunyavastvāropah. Cited in Gaurīśaṅkara (ed), Sarva-
16. Aindra is the name of a pre-Pāñinīya grammatical treatise and it is also the name of a school of grammar based upon that text. The work is not available. Cf., K.V. Abhyankar and J.M. Shukla, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar. Baroda, 1977, p.102.

17. Prātiśākhya are treatises on Vedic grammar dealing specifically with euphonic changes based upon sandhi. Originally, each Vedic recension possessed such a treatise, ibid., p.267f.

18. Dvādasādhyāyī. The name of the sūtra work by Jaimini consisting of twelve chapters.


20. Halbfass, op-cit., p.70, considers that in relation to Saṅkara: "it is... impossible to understand his thought in its philosophical as well as its historical dimensions without fully recognizing and respecting its fundamental commitment to the Vedic revelation".

21. B.S Ś. 3.2.11. p.641, line 2f.


23. B.S Ś. 3.2.15. p.643, line 13f.


27. Bṛh 2.3.6.


29. As an illustration of this point there is the case of the "apacchedanyāya" referred to by Jaimini, cf., J.S. 6.5.54., which states that where there is a relation of earlier and later the earlier is weaker. In Pāñinīya grammar too there is the rule: "vipratiṣedhe paraṁ kāryam" P.S. 1.4.2., which means that in the case of a conflict of rules of equal applicability the subsequent operation is to be performed. These illustrations do not constitute a proof on their own, rather they exemplify the logical priority of the subsequent over the preceding.


31. ibid

32. B.S Ś. 2.1.11. p.366, line 1f.

33. B.S Ś. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2.

34. Halbfass, op-cit., p.49.
35. In refuting other schools of thought, cf., B.S.S. 2.2.1. p.412, line 1f. In determining scriptural purport, the use of reason is demonstrated through the importance of the śāliṅgas: the beginning (upakrama) and the conclusion (upasāṃbhāra) being in harmony, the use of repetition (abhyāsa), originality (apīrvatā), the result (phala), the use of eulogy (arthavāda) and logical demonstration (upapatti), cf., Vs. p.12, line 11.

36. Śaṅkara discusses the method of discriminating the invariable Self from its limiting conditions in B.S.S. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2f. Advaitins use the method of anvayavyatireka in two ways. The first follows the mode of the Naiyāyika where anvaya and vyatireka establish the invariable concomitance in presence and absence between the reason (hetu) and the thing to be proved (sādhyā). Cf., Y. Athalye (ed), Tarka-Saṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Poona. 1974. p.40, 281f. The author of the Pañcadasī uses anvayavyatireka in this manner in 4.32. The second mode of usage is to distinguish the invariable from the variable: X is and Y is, X is not and Y is. This usage is found in Pañcadasī 1.37-42. The Advaitins utilize this latter method to discriminate the Self from adventitious conditions. In N.S. 2.1., Suresvara states that the meaning of the word "you" (tvam) must be correctly understood in order to comprehend the mahāvākyā.

37. Brh. 4.3.23.


39. Śaṅkara uses the word "drśi" in the sense of awareness. Cf., U. 1.10. Also, 1.12.vs.6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15. 1.13.vs.8, 9, 1.14.vs.44, 49. 1.15.vs.18. 1.17.vs.29, 35, 39. 1.18.vs.26, 83, 84, 97, 202.

40. "The mental modes which assume different forms are, indeed, pervaded at the beginning and end, and also in the middle, by the one undifferentiated consciousness which experiences none separate from it," R. Balasubramaniam (ed. and trans.), The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika of Suresvara. Madras. Rev. ed. 1984. 2.123. Also, 2.94, 411, 666.


42. ibid.

43. ibid., p.8.

44. ibid., p.115.


46. Tai. 2.1.1.

47. Rāmatīrtha's gloss, op-cit., p.150.

48. The concept of "sāmānya" is a category in the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika where it is divided into higher and lower with reference to its extensiveness. The highest sāmānya is existence (sattā). Abhyankar utilizes the concept of sāmānya to the advantage of Advaita. Cf.,
50. P.D. 2.20.
51. B.S.Ś. 1.3.1. p.206, line 4f.
58. ibid., 2.25. p.67.
59. It appears that Abhyankar is following the Mādhvantina recension.
60. sādhyābhāvahetvabhāvayor vyāptiḥ vyatirekavyāptiḥ (Nyāyabodhini), T.S. p.41, line 14.
61. V.P. p.37.
63. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 8f.
64. V.P. p.37.
66. Śaṅkara clearly indicates his acceptance of the apparent transformation of Brahman into the form of the world. Cf., B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.380f, line 10f; 2.1.27. p.400, line 6 and p.401, line 5f; 2.1.28. p.401f, line 15f.
67. Ch. 6.2.1. Also, Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 27f.
69. ibid., 2.16. p.14, line 22f.
70. B.S.Ś. 3.2.21. p. 646, line 10f.
71. V.P. p.3, 5, 35. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 8f. In B.S.Ś. 3.2.4. p.626, line 15. Śaṅkara mentions sublation as the criterion of falsity: \textit{vaitathyaḥ bādhyamānatvād ityabhīprāyah}.


73. ŚrīT.B. Para.44.p.78.


75. \textit{ibid.}, p.xii.

76. Communication by R. Thangaswami.

77. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 3.2.9. p.637, line 26f.

78. \textit{tattvam iti bimbasthāniyabrahmasvarūpaṇata pratibimbastrāhamsvarupāya ṇivasya upadiśvate}. "The reality, i.e., the nature of Brahman which represents the original, is taught for the individual soul who represents the reflection." \textit{Pañcapādikā}. Cf., S. Rāmāsastrī (ed.), \textit{Pañcapādikā} with two commentaries and \textit{Pañcapādikāvivarana} with two commentaries. Madras Govt. Oriental Series CLV. p.127.


80. In B.S.Ś. 3.2.34. p.663, line 10f., Śaṅkara employs illustrations of both reflection and limitation.

81. B.S.Ś. 1.2.20. p.186, line 9f. Also, B.S.Ś. 2.1.22. p.394, line 17f; 3.2.34. p.663, line 10f; 3.2.35. p.663, line 17f.

82. Ch.Ś. 6.8.1. p.521, line 25f.

83. B.S.Ś. 2.3.46. p.557, line 10f; 3.2.20. p.645, line 13f.

84. B.S.Ś. 2.3.50. p.561, line 2f. U. 1.18, vs.43, 63, 87.

85. Rāmāsastrī, \textit{op-cit.}, p.130.

86. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 1.1.3. p.57, line 23f., (\ldots\textit{anādyavidyopadhānalabdha- sarvasaktijāhānasvāpi paramātmānāḥ}...).

87. S.B. p.29.

88. \textit{ibid.}, p.26f.


90. However he also accepts that the Lord is the pure consciousness. Cf., N. Veezhinathan (ed. and trans.), \textit{The Saṅkaśeṣopādītāra of Sarvajñātmak}. Madras. 1972. 2.176.

91. \textit{ibid.}, 2.190.
92. ibid., 1.20, 319.
93. ibid., 2.192.
94. S.B. p.28.
95. Vivarana cited in Ramaśāstrī, op-cit., p.129.
96. ibid., p.130.
97. ibid., p.129, (brahmaivāvidyāpratibimbam iti vadāmāḥ).
98. S.B. p.29.
101. B.S.Ś. 2.3.50. p.561, line 3.
102. S.B. p.29.
104. Ramaśāstrī, op-cit., p.131, (...eka jīvavādinām īśtasiddhikārānam...).
105. S.Ś. 2.128f.
106. The subtle body is said to be the "beginningless limiting adjunct of the Self" (anādīdīr upādhir ātmanah), cf., S. Madhavananda (trans.), Vivekaśūdāmani of Śaṅkarācārya. Calcutta. 9th ed. 1974. p.35. The subtle body is also said to "persist until liberation" (mokṣaparyantaṁ sthāyī), cf., V.P. p.123.
107. B.S.Ś. 2.3.30. p.539, line 14f.
108. B.S.Ś. 2.3.31. p.541, line 3f.
109. Bṛh.B.V. 1.4.102. yayā yayā bhavet puṁsāṁ vyutpattiḥ pratyaśātmani/ sā saiva prakriya jñeva sādhvi sa ca vyavasthitā//
110. Sureśvara uses the expression "primary Ignorance" (avidyā...mauli), Bṛh.B.V. 1.2.136. Cited in Ramaśāstrī, op-cit., p.53.
111. Padmapāda interprets Śaṅkara's expression: mithyājñānānamimittah (B.S.Ś. p.9, line 2.) as a bahuvrīhi compound containing the karmadārāva compound: mithyā meaning "indeterminable" and: ajñāna which refers to a positive entity. The compound is understood in the sense that there is an indeterminable power known as ajñāna which is the material cause (nimittah) of worldly dealings (lokavyavahāra): mithyā ca tād ajñāna ca mithyājñānam, mithyā- iti-anirvacanīyata-ucyate. ajñānaṁ iti ca ādiṣṭaṁ sā vidyāsaktīḥ, jñānaparvudāsena-ucyate. tan nimittah tad upādāna iti-ārthāḥ. ibid., p.18.
113. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.130, line 28f.
115. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.21, line 19f.
117. B.S.Ś. p.19, line 2.
119. B.S.Ś. 2.1.22. p.395, line 3f; 2.2.2. p.419, line 9; 2.3.40. p.547, line 7; 3.2.6. p.629, line 3; 3.2.11. p.641, line 6; 3.2.15. p.643, line 16.
120. GŚ. 13.2. p.192, line 1f.
121. Iśa Ś. Introduction, p.2, line 3f.
122. B.S.Ś. 1.4.3. p.297, line 5f.
123. ibid., line 6f.
124. ibid., p.298, line 1.
125. S.Ś.1.20.
127. V.P. p.124.
129. V.P. p.126.
130. ibid., p.120.
131. In Mu.Ś. 2.1.3. p.156, line 1f, Saṅkara mentions the five elements and their respective qualities. Mayeda is of the opinion that Saṅkara accepted the pañcikaṇa rather than the triṣṭikaraṇa, cf., introduction to U. p.27.
133. Vs. p.5, line 1, specifies that the nature of the mind is a modification of the internal-organ having the form of vacillation.
136. p. 3, line 18.
137. ibid., p. 5, line 4f.
138. B.S.Ś. (adhyāsaḥbhāṣya) p. 25, line 1f. Also, cf., U. 1.12. vs. 16, 17.
139. Ś.S. 3.113, 114.
142. ibid., line 18.
144. V.P. p. 3. B.S. (Bhamati) 1.1.4. p. 65, line 27, (abādhītānadhigata- asandigadabodhajanakatvaḥ hi pramāṇatvaḥ, pramāṇāṇaḥ tacc ca svata ity upapāditam). Also, cf., P.D. 3.29.
145. Śaṅkara's purvapakṣaś cites an amusing verse illustrating what is meant by "unreal", cf., Tai.Ś. 2.1.1. p. 284, line 6f.
146. V.P. p. 36f.
149. ibid., p. 379, line 1f.
151. ibid., p. 670, line 10f.
152. V.P. p. 5.
153. ibid., p. 176, note 3.
156. V.P. p. 6.
157. ibid., p. 20.
158. ibid., p. 25.
159. P.D. 8. vs. 1–16.
161. B.S. (Bhamati) 1.1.1. p. 31, line 26 (na ca-śa sākṣātkāro...). Regarding the means to realization, cf., 1.1.4. p. 70, line 21f.
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162. U. 1.18 vs. 188, 189.
163. B.S.Ś. 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f.
164. ibid., 1.1.1. p.36, line 3f.
165. ibid., 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f.
166. N.S. 3.22, 67. Suresvara also cites Śaṅkara on this matter (U. 1.18. 188–90.) in N.S. 4.31–33.
168. Śrutisārasamuddharaṇāṃ of Śrī Toṭakaśārya with the commentary of Śrī Sačchidānanda Yogi. Srirangam. (no date) Verses 93–106.
170. Abhyankar's explanation follows that of the V.P. and his expression is identical to that of the commentator Śivadatta. Cf., Vedāntaparibhaṣā with the commentary Arthatīpikā by Śivadatta. Varanasi. 1968. p.32, line 20f.
173. V.P. p.28.
174. Madhavananda gives this example, op-cit., p.36, note 2.
175. According to V.P. p.57, three members are sufficient to form an inference instead of the five members required by the Naiyāyikas. Also, a negative instance is unnecessary since only pervasion in co-presence is accepted, cf., V.P. p.55f.
176. V.P. p.55. Also, cf., Datta, op-cit., p.205.
177. V.P. p.55.
178. ibid., p.57f.
179. The Advaita usage of upamāna follows that of the Bhaṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsā and differs from the Nyāya school. For an explanation of the latter view, cf., T.S. p.49f, 327f.
180. V.P. p.62.
181. Cf., the definition of vyāpti in V.P. p.55.
182. V.P. p.63. Also, cf., Madhavananda, op-cit., p.84.
183. V.P. p.63f.
The Veda has a relative eternity (pravahanityata) which means that the same Veda is revealed by the Lord in each cycle of creation. Only Brahman has unchanging eternity (kutasthanityata). Abhyankar, like the author of the V.P. p.87, uses the word "same" (samana) which could mean either identical or similar. The author of the Ratnaprabha p.55, line 23f., maintains that the Veda is identical in each cycle. In the Bhāmatī p.57, line 18f, Vacaspati presents the analogy of a dancer who repeats the same dance as the instructor but does not repeat the identical movements. In this manner, the Veda is the same but not identical in each cycle.

The Self is able to be implied through the word "I" which directly denotes the ego. Cf., U. 1.18.28, 29, 58. For an explanation of the discrimination between the Self and the objective attributes considered to be the Self, cf., B.S. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.4, line 1f. U. 1.18.64, 65.

Sureśvara refers to the discrimination between subject and object as "another example of continuity and discontinuity" N.S. 4.26., prose portion. Anandagiri and Rāmatīrtha, commenting upon U. 1.18.96., illustrate continuity and discontinuity with reference to subject-object relation.

The Ch. 6.3.3. : "That [existence] perceived" (tat aikṣata), indicates that the pure Existence (sat) referred to in 6.3.1. has the power of creation. For this reason, later Advaitins specifically interpret the word "That" in the sentence "you are That" as primarily signifying the Lord, cf., V.P. p.74; Vs. p.9, line 9; P.D. 1.44. Such an interpretation makes the use of jahadajahallaksana more explicit since both the adjuncts i.e. the nature of being an individual soul and the nature of being the Lord, are given up through the implication of their identity in awareness. Śaṅkara and
Suresvara, however, do not appear to specify the word "That" as expressly signifying the Lord.

200. U 1.18.194.
201. ibid., 1.18.169, 170, 195.
202. ibid., 1.18. 90, 180, 193. N.S. 2.1. 4.21.
203. N.S. 3.28., (prose), 54., (prose), 64., (prose). 4.9., (prose),
           26., (prose).
204. ibid., 3.98, 100, 102.
205. ibid., 4.9f. Also, 3.5, 113.
206. ibid., 3.5, 33, 34, 113. 4.18.
207. ibid., 3.3.
209. ibid., 3.78., (prose), 79.
210. ibid., 3.75-80.
211. V.P. p.90. Dharmarāja alternatively interprets arthāpatti as a
           bahuvrīhī compound referring to the reason for the postulation, i.e.
fatness.
213. V.P. p.55.
215. V.P. p.56.
216. ibid., p.90.
217. ibid., p.91.
218. Bṛh.Ś. 1.4.10. p.670, line 1f.
220. P.D. Ch. 10.
221. V.P. p.8. See comment to 1.10.
223. Cf., comment to 1.44.
224. U 1.18.54. Intellect (buddhi) is used here in the same sense as
           internal-organ (antahkarana).
225. ibid., 1.18.43.
226. ibid., 1.18.53.
227. ibid., 1.18.63, 64.
228. G. 13.5.
229. S.Ś. 1.27, 159. P.Ś. 7.8.
230. U. 1.6.6.
231. B.Ś.Ś. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.25, line 3.
232. The Kāṇva recension differs from the above. Cf., Bṛh. 4.4.23. p.936.
233. B.Ś.Ś. 1.1.1. p.36, line 3f.
238. Cf., Tai.Ś. 1.11. p.279, line 14f.
239. Bṛh.Ś. 2.4.5. p.760, line 19f; 4.5.6. p.941, line 22f. Ke.Ś. 2.1. p.25, line 14f. Śaṅkara explains the word "niśidhyāsana" as "the desire to meditate with certainty", Bṛh.Ś. 2.4.4. p.759, line 16.
240. Bṛh.Ś. 2.4.5. p.760, line 20f. When Śaṅkara says: "not otherwise, by mere hearing" (p.760, line 21.), it must mean hearing which is unsupported by inquiry, i.e. the discrimination of the Self from the non-Self through the method of anyayavatireka etc., as mentioned in U. 1.18.96, 176, 178, 179, 180, 189. Śaṅkara states in B.Ś.Ś. 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f, p.830, line 5f., and in U. 1.18.188, 189., that direct knowledge can be gained through hearing the Vedānta texts.
244. B.Ś.Ś. 2.3.39. p.545, line 10. G.Ś. 2.39. p.27, line 16. In the Gitābhāṣya (ibid., p.27, line 16.), Śaṅkara states that both the performance of action (karmayoga) and the practice of samādhi (samādhiyoga) are yoga. Here, Śaṅkara places the practice of meditation on the same level as karmayoga, i.e. as secondary means to knowledge.
245. B.S.S. 2.1.9. p.365, line 5f.
246. B.S.S. 4.1.2. p.830, line 5f. U. 1.18.174, 188, 199.
247. B.S.S. 4.1.1. p.826, line 7f; 4.1.2. p.829, line 16f.
250. ibid., p.125, line 1f.
251. ibid., p.125, line 21f.
252. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 3.4.26. p.801, line 26f.
253. ibid., 1.1.1. p.31, line 25 (na ca-eṣa sākṣātkāro...).
254. ibid., 1.1.1. p.32, line 6f. 1.1.4. p.70, line 21f.
255. See comment to 1.27.
257. Y.S. 3.4.
258. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 2.3.39. p.545, line 28f.
261. ibid., 1.18.9-18., is the objection. The reply is from verse 19f.
262. Gokhale, op.cit., p.96, line 14f.
263. This verse could not be located.
264. This verse could not be located under the given reference. However it occurs in the Bṛh., cf., Bṛh. 4.4.12.
265. See text 1.13., and comment.
266. The Mu. text is: brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati (Mu. 3.2.9.).
267. A number of mnemonics have been cited in the text with reference to Śaṅkara's dates. The first is kha (space) = 0, indu (moon) = 1, haya (horse) = 7 on account of the seven horses of the sun. The second mnemonic is pākṣa (half) = a symbolical expression for the number 2, veda (the Veda) = 4, ṛṣi (sage) = 7 which is given as a traditional number. The third mnemonic is śaśin (moon) = 1, agni (fire) = 3 because of the three types of sacrificial fire, rasa (taste) = 6 on account of the six types of tastes, vugma (pair) = 2. The fourth mnemonic contains symbols previously mentioned.
Then after three hundred years plus an additional seven, Ramanujacarya appeared in the era measured as 1049 [1127 of the Christian era]. Not tolerating the teaching of māya, his activity was towards the refutation of the teaching of māya. This was made evident, because having delineated in various places the view of the exponents of māya in works such as the Śrībhāṣya which he composed, he certainly showed his displeasure there. However the learned should clearly determine to what extent his effort was successful.

Ramanujacarya was born in the village of Bhūtapurī in the region known as Tricanapalli, of Kantimati and the Draviḍa brāhmaṇa whose respected name was Keśavabhaṭṭa and who was born in the lineage of Hārita.¹ The tradition about him is that he was an incarnation of Seśa.²

The tree of Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching was made into an immediate cause through the initial effort produced by the Vyṛtti [i.e. commentary] of Baudhāyana. It sprouted into the commentary written by Dramiḍacarya and the vārtika composed by Taṅkacarya. It blossomed into books such as
Siddhitraya prepared by Yāmunācārya etc. and it bore fruit through the Vedārthasaṅgraha etc. written by Rāmānuja.

In the Vedārthasaṅgraha the meaning of the sacred texts has been ascertained by Rāmānuja according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Even so, thinking that the view of the people would be: "this teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita is not in agreement with the author of the Brahmasūtra", for the refutation of that [view] he composed the treatise Śrībhāṣya which took the form of an explanation of the Brahmasūtra. In that [treatise] the Brahmasūtras were explained according to the teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is well known that Rāmānuja composed other works also, beginning with Vedāntasāra, Vedāntadīpa, a commentary upon the Gītā, Nityārādhanavidhi and Śrīgadya.

2.2. 

श्रीमद्भागवतांतार्ये विशिष्टद्वाविद्वाचः ।
चक्रुरायानाथाभिन्न प्रसादन्तस्योनन्नम् ॥ ३ ॥

2.2. Śrīmat Rāmānujaścārya, the exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, brought about a union of the three systems [Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgītā and Brahmasūtra] without having recourse to māyā. 3.

2.3. 

अथ खङ्कोशाय रामानुजदशीन्म प्रदश्यते ।
नित्यं हेयगुणावधुनपरः नैर्गुण्यवादः: श्रुतं
स्पष्टाः: समुपोक्ष: शुभगुणप्रदप्यनाद्वक्ष्य: ।
अवैद्यवत्यो विशिष्टद्वितियया निन्फङ्ङसाध्यः
णेवेचिस्वतिदिस्तिदृश्यतिन्तिदिन्तिदिव रामानुजोऽद्य मुतम् ॥ ४ ॥

2.3. Now, the teaching of Rāmānuja is shown for easy understanding.

In the sacred text, the statements pertaining to freedom from qualities are always meant for
discarding qualities that must be given up. The expressions relating to the possession of qualities have a clear meaning, because they communicate that Brahman possesses auspicious qualities. The sacred texts dealing with non-duality refer to what is qualified. An expression of difference has its basis in a determined form. The view here belonging to Rāmānuja has been placed upon the entire sacred texts. 4.

comment

Rāmānuja, like Śaṅkara, considers that the role of the Vedic scripture is to reveal truths which cannot be known either through perception or perceptually based means of knowledge such as inference. In his commentary upon Brahmaśūtra 1.1.3., Rāmānuja argues against the followers of Nyāya who maintain that the existence of God can be demonstrated through inference based upon consideration of the world as an effect. In contrast to this, Rāmānuja asserts that both the existence and nature of God are knowable only through scriptural testimony. Reason cannot, of itself, generate conclusive proof in the domain of metaphysics and its legitimate function is supportive: to assist in elucidating scriptural purport and to demonstrate that the ascertained purport is alone logically possible.

Rāmānuja recognizes two basic categories of Upaniṣad texts: those which teach a distinction between the individual soul and Brahman and passages which teach their unity. This contradiction strikes at the root of the validity of the Veda as a means of knowledge and consequently the mutual concord (samanvaya) of all the Upaniṣad texts is a matter of fundamental importance. Rāmānuja states that: "when there is contradiction between two equally valid texts, their scope must be discerned through non-contradiction." Rāmānuja rejects Śaṅkara's method of interpretation, for he considers it ridiculous that the sacred texts should firstly teach that all plurality is connected to Brahman and then subsequently negate its own teaching. Rāmānuja attempts to bring about the mutual concord of all the Upaniṣad texts by interpreting them in accordance with passages which denote a qualified relation between the self and Brahman, analogous to the
relation between body and soul.

The body-soul relation (sarīrasārītribhāva) is the primary conceptual model for Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Upaniṣads. He relies particularly upon the section of the Brhadāraṇyaka known as the Antaryaṁibrāhmaṇa:

He who dwelling in the earth is different from the earth...whose body is the earth, who being within controls the earth...He who dwelling in the self is different from the self...whose body is the self, who being within controls the self...11

Rāmānuja maintains that Brahman is the Self of the whole universe comprising all souls and matter and all sentient and insentient things are the modes of Brahman and constitute His body. Rāmānuja defines this body-soul relation as:

...the relation between the substratum and the dependent entity which is incapable of existing separately, the relation of controller and controlled and the relation of principal and subsidiary.12

With respect to this position, Rāmānuja explains that there is no contradiction between passages which teach that Brahman is free from qualities (nirguna) and passages expressing possession of qualities (saguna).13 He considers that nirguna statements mean only that Brahman is free from qualities which must be given up (hevaguna)14 and, on the basis of the analogy of body and soul, he argues that Brahman is untainted by the defects of the souls and matter just as the soul is untouched by the defects of the body.15 He holds that saguna passages should be accepted just as they are.16 Texts indicating non-duality are to be interpreted in a qualified sense because the individual souls and matter, which constitute the body of Brahman, possess the relationship of qualifying attributes (viśeṣa) to a substantive (viśeṣya).17 Just as attributes inhere in their substantive and are incapable of being established independently of it, in the same manner, the souls and matter exist in Brahman as attributes to a substantive and they have no separate existence from Brahman. Passages signifying duality can be explained on the basis of the inherent distinction between body and soul. The souls and matter, as the body of Brahman, are essentially other than Brahman.18

When Rāmānuja's opponent (pūrvapakṣa) inquires whether Rāmānuja holds the position of a dualist, non-dualist, or accepts both duality and non-duality simultaneously, he replies that all these views are valid...
since they can all be found in the Veda. Ramanuja then proceeds to bring them into mutual concord by showing their correspondence to a particular feature of the body-soul model. Non-difference is established because Brahman alone exists, having everything as His body. Difference is established since the Lord, souls and matter are mutually distinct in essence and in attributes. Difference and non-difference is also established because Brahman, though one, exists as many in so far as He has all things as His attributes.

Thus we can see that Ramanuja seeks to explain all the Upaniṣad texts on the basis of the analogy of body and soul. This analogy provides the fundamental model for the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the relationship between the Lord, souls and matter: Brahman alone exists (advaita), but Brahman is qualified (viśiṣṭasya) by all sentient and insentient things which are dependent upon Brahman and exist in an attributive relation to Brahman. According to Ramanuja:

In explaining identity through the relation of self and body, all the sacred texts are properly demonstrated...

2.4. An object which is established by a means of knowledge is called
by the word "real". That reality is threefold, due to the distinction of the inert, the individual souls and the Lord. The inert is well known to be the entire world composed of the five elements and consisting of the physical body etc. That is indeed the means for experience. With regard to that [physical body etc.], the individual self is completely distinct in essence and in attributes and is the inner controller of that [body etc.]. That [individual self] is of three kinds: bound, freed and eternal [i.e. eternally freed]. The Lord is the inner controller of even the individual soul. This [Lord] is completely distinct with regard to the individual soul due to being free from all qualities which must be abandoned and on account of being absolutely auspicious. The Lord pervades the categories i.e. the individual souls and the inert things in all their conditions. Having become the inner controller of the inert objects and the individual souls, He is their ruler. Accordingly, there are the sacred texts: "He who dwelling in the earth is other than the earth...who being within controls the earth" (Bṛh.3.7.3.), "He who dwelling in the self is other than the self...who being within controls the self" (Bṛh.3.7.22.), "Nārāyaṇa exists, having pervaded all that is within and without" (M.Nā.13.5.), "The Lord of matter and of the souls, the Lord of the qualities" (Śv.6.16.).

It should not be thought that this distinction between the individual soul and the Lord is brought about by a limiting adjunct. [reason] Because even in the state of liberation, the individual soul, who is free from the limiting adjunct consisting of all ignorance, is taught as being different with regard to the Lord in the sacred texts: "Then the one who knows, having shaken off good and evil and being without taint, attains the highest similarity" (Mu.3.1.3.), in the [Brahma] sūtras: "And on account of the designation that it is to be approached by the released" (B.S.1.3.2.) and in the Gītā: "Having
resorted to this knowledge, they reach an equality of attributes with me" (G.14.2.). [Comment upon words in the preceding quotations]: there is certainly no "similarity" (sāmyam) of oneself with oneself. Nor can oneself "be approached" (upasṛpya) by oneself. "Muktopasṛpya" means that it is to be approached by the liberated. Which is to say that it is to be gained by the liberated.

2.5.

Again, according to another mode, reality is twofold: substance and quality. The nature of a substance is being a material cause, or being the locus of qualities, or existing in another place with respect to its locus, or being the locus of the states of contraction and expansion. Substance is sixfold: the Lord, the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", Knowledge, matter and time.

Comment

With regard to the definition of substance (dravya), the statement "existing in another place with respect to its locus" means that a substance, unlike a quality, is able to be separated from its locus. For example, a book is a substance since it can exist separately from its locus such as a table. However the colour of the book cannot be separated from the book and hence it is a quality (guna).

The expression "according to another mode" refers to the exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaita as presented in the Yatīndramatadīpikā. Abhyankar follows this text closely in his description of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. The fundamental schema of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as delineated in the Yatīndramatadīpikā, is as follows:
Everything can be divided, firstly, into a twofold category: means of knowledge and object of knowledge.

means of knowledge (pramāṇa)  object of knowledge (prameya)
1. perception.
2. inference.
3. scripture.

substance (dravya)  non-substance (adravya)

means of knowledge (pramāṇa)
1. perception.
2. inference.
3. scripture.

object of knowledge (prameya)
1. sattva, rajas, tamas.
2. sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potentiality.

means of knowledge (pramāṇa)
1. perception.
2. inference.
3. scripture.

object of knowledge (prameya)
1. sattva, rajas, tamas.
2. sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potentiality.

Abhyankar now proceeds to explain each of the six substances.

2.6. परमात्मा प्रकाशन्त्वाच्च: सर्वानां सर्वातः। जीवो निम्नविभूतः। 
पुनः। कालशेतिः। क्रमचंतुष्मयेनवर्द्धस्य शरीरभूतम्। प्रारंभज्ञानविन्यासं 
वर्णमेव। स च भौः। चायति प्रायः।—पर्यूज्यंभवन्तरायं 
म्यच्छान्तात्मेदात्। तत: परं चेतुसे थिया 
व्यासेदेहः। साहित्यान्यादिपरिवर्तकथाविचः। सह क्रीडा 
भास्ते। अयुपेश मुक्तायः। पर परीपारस्य वायुदेशसंयुक्तप्रमाणेव सत्त्वविभिन्नस्य च 
तुष्यं सरिदिकेत। व्यूहं इत्यवच्यं। जागरण 
जनेन्द्रगुणकातामः। संसारिक्षणं चार्येऽवं कृत्यं। तत: वायुपुर्ण:। पर्युपुर्णः। 
शानाविचलरूपस्य भावेनिवेदतांसि पद्धताः। ज्ञानं नाम सत्त्वं सर्वविपर्ययात्स्त्रां 
स्माकाशो गुणाविशेषः। वाक्ष्यविज्ञातिर्यन्ती। अयुपेशः सपार्ष्यविद्याय 
ष्टां जागत्कारणरूपमुक्तमहाभावः। सक्तहस्त्वादर्शसामायवायः 
ष्टां अभ्यासनान्तरमुक्तमहाभावः। सक्तव्यास्त्वादर्शसामायवायः 
ष्टां उपाध्यायोऽभ्यासकिन्नरश्च 
ष्टां वर्णस्युपरात्मेश्वरविभिन्न 
ष्टां जागरणशिरश्रवणशिरश्रवण 
ष्टां अभ्यासनान्तरमुक्तमहाभावः 
ष्टां उपाध्यायोऽभ्यासकिन्नरश्च 
ष्टां वर्णस्युपरात्मेश्वरविभिन्न
The Lord is the supreme Self, who can be denoted by the word Brahman. He is the supporter of all and the agent of all. The group of four substances: the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", matter and time are the Lord's body. Moreover the group of three: the [Lord's] essential nature, Knowledge and body are certainly invariably concomitant with the Lord.

The Lord exists in a fivefold way, due to the distinction of Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arcavatāra. In regard to that [fivefold distinction], the Para dwells in Vaikunṭha enjoying along with Śrī and accompanied by the eternally [liberated] souls such as Ananta and Garuḍa. This [Para] is indeed what is to be gained by the liberated. The Para himself, abiding for the purpose of worship in a fourfold manner due to the distinction of Vāsudeva, Saṅkarśaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, is called the Vyūha. The activity of that [Vyūha] is indeed creating the world, assistance to the worshipper and protecting the transmigrating soul.

In regard to that [Vyūha], Vāsudeva is replete with the six qualities. The six qualities are: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour. What is called Knowledge is a particular quality which is self-effulgent and which illuminates all objects at all times. Potency is the state of being the material cause of the world, or the capacity for accomplishing the unaccomplished. Strength is the absence of fatigue arising out of being the cause of the world, or it is the capacity to support all things. Lordship is independent agentship, or the capacity to control all souls and inert things. Valour is the
absence of a change in essential nature, even though being the material cause of the world. Splendour is the absence of dependence upon an assistant, or it is the capacity to subdue another. Among Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, there is an abundance of Knowledge and strength in Saṅkarṣaṇa. There is an abundance of lordship and valour in Pradyumna and there is [abundance] of potency and splendour in Aniruddha.

The Vibhava are the [ten incarnations] such as the fish and the tortoise. The Antaryāmin abides in the region of the heart of every living being and can be contemplated in their own hearts by Yogis. This [Antaryāmin], though existing with the individual soul, is not tainted by the defects belonging to the soul. The Arcāvatāra accepts for its body an object such as an image fashioned by a devotee, it is a particular image existing in temples etc., enduring all and depending upon the worshipper for baths etc. Among the four commencing with the Vyūha, only the Para exists with the possession of his potency at one place and the possession of his essential nature elsewhere. This "possession" is the existing in completeness at one place and as a part elsewhere.

comment

Visisṭādvaita teaching incorporates aspects of the Pañcarātra tradition. In the body of texts known by that name, the Lord is described as manifesting in a fivefold way: (1) as the Supreme (Para) possessing a divine form and dwelling with Śrī, his śakti; (2) as his four emanations (Vyūha) i.e. Viśuṣṭeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; (3) in the form of incarnations (Vibhava); (4) as the soul's inner controller (Antaryāmin) and (5) as incarnate in images used for worship (Arcāvatāra).

A distinctive feature of the Pañcarātra system is its conception of a progressive emanation of the Para in the form of the Vyūha. The Vyūha is none other than the Para and possesses the same six qualities, though Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha each highlight two of those six qualities. The Para is called Viśuṣṭeva at the time he is about to commence the creation of a new cosmic cycle. Saṅkarṣaṇa originates from Viśuṣṭeva and has the twofold function of revealing the scriptures
and the destruction of the world. Pradyumna is an emanation from Saṅkarṣaṇa and possesses the dual function of revealing spiritual practice and also creation. Aniruddha proceeds from Pradyumna and has the two functions of bringing about the result of spiritual practice and the sustaining of the universe.²⁶

The orthodoxy of the Pañcarātra system has been vigorously upheld by Viśiṣṭādvaīta authors.²⁷ Rāmānuja, however, makes only one reference to the Pañcarātra, in his commentary on Brahmasyātra 2.2.39-42 where he seeks to prove that its doctrines are not in conflict with the Veda.²⁸

Abhyankar's explanation of each of the six qualities accords with the traditional interpretations given in the Lakṣmi Tantra and the Viśiṣṭādvaīta text Tattvatraya.²⁹

2.7. The attributes which determine the essential nature of the supreme Self are existence, Knowledge, bliss, purity etc. These persist in all meditations. That means these attributes form the object of devotional meditation in all the meditations. When the essential nature is determined by the attributes mentioned, attributes such as Knowledge, strength etc. are the distinguishing features of that [essential nature]. Attributes such as excellence of disposition etc. are extensions of the attributes such as Knowledge etc. Attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence etc. are useful for the creation of the world. Affection, excellence of disposition, easiness of attainment etc. are useful for providing refuge [to devotees]. Worshippers resort to the supreme Self only having perceived [the qualities of] affection etc. Attributes such as compassion are useful for protecting the devotee.³⁰
Visishtādvaitins make a twofold distinction with regard to the Lord's attributes. Firstly, the attributes which constitute the essential nature (svarūpa) of the Lord and secondly, all other attributes characterizing the nature (svabhāva) of the Lord.17

In Śrībhāṣya 3.3.13., Rāmānuja delineates two categories of attributes. The essential nature of Brahma is derived from the Upaniṣad texts: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1.) and "Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.). Rāmānuja considers that these statements reveal the essence of Brahma's nature. In addition to these, Rāmānuja specifies the additional attribute of purity (amalatva) and thus five attributes constitute the essential nature.

According to Rāmānuja, the distinction between the two categories is made on the basis that the attributes which make up the essential nature are inherently connected with the very idea of Brahma. Whereas the other attributes are not necessarily inherent to the conception of Brahma.32 For this reason, the essential attributes are included in all meditations. The other attributes, though in no sense separate from Brahma, are only emphasized through certain functions and relations such as omniscience with regard to the creation of the world and compassion etc. in relation to the devotee.

2.8. Jīvaḥ: bhūtaśeṣeśvamāṇeśvamāṇaḥ: svamānyamāyo niśāच | abhyarūpamāya- 

The individual soul is different in each body, the size of an atom, self-effulgent and eternal. Its agentship is dependent upon the Lord. That [soul] is of three types, due to the distinction of the bound, liberated and eternally [freed]. The transmigratory souls, beginning from the god Brahma down to a clump of grass, are bound. The souls which have relinquished their subtle bodies and dwell in Vaikuntha due to their worship of the supreme Self are liberated. Their experience of Brahma is indeed endless, it has no final limit.
The group of eight qualities which have disappeared in the bound state become manifest in the liberated state. The group of eight qualities are the non-material sound, touch, form, taste, smell, potency, Knowledge and bliss. The eternally [liberated] souls are Ananta, Gaurā, Viṣṇu etc.

Comment

In the following verse, Yāmunaśčārya presents six defining characteristics of the individual soul:

The self is different from the body, sense organs, mind, vital breath and intellect. It does not require another means [for its manifestation]. It is eternal, all pervasive, different in each body and blissful by nature.33

(1) The author of the Yatindramatadīpika seeks to demonstrate the essential distinction of the self from the body etc through the discrimination of subject and object, similar to the method employed by the Advaitin. He considers that the body cannot be the self because the statement such as "my body" reveals a relationship of possessor and possessed. In a similar manner, the statement "I see with the eye" indicates difference between the subject and object since there is a knower, known relation between the self and the attribute of seeing. Similarly, the cognition "I know by the mind" denotes a distinction between the self and its instrument of knowledge. So too, the expression "my vital breath" reveals a relation of subject and object through the inherent difference of possessor and possessed. Even the statement "I know" distinguishes the self from its attribute, awareness.

(2) Not requiring another means for its manifestation means that the soul is by nature self-effulgent, for consciousness is its intrinsic attribute.34 The soul is inherently a knowing subject possessing agentship. However, as Abhyankar points out, the soul's agentship is dependent upon the Lord. This means that the soul exercises free will over all actions only because the Lord, who is the inner-controller, permits freedom of action to the soul.36

(3) The soul is eternal, for the scriptures reveal that it is without birth (aja) and constant (nitya).37

(4) The soul is all pervasive by means of its attributive consciousness (dharmaḥ-bhūtaḥ). However, in essence the soul is the size of an atom (anu) and it enters into the body of a god, human being or animal on account of its connection with beginningless karma.39
(5) Though all souls share the same nature, they are different in each body. Their uniqueness, however, is so subtle that it cannot be expressed and can only be known by the soul itself.

(6) The soul is by nature blissful and pure. The sorrows of transmigratory existence are brought about due to the soul's connection with karma.

In addition, Rāmānuja specifies another important characteristic of the soul i.e. its utter dependence upon the Lord who is the Self of the soul, its inner controller and sustainer.

2.9. **नित्यविभूति** शुद्धसत्त्वतः स्वयंभकासो देवविषयः। इवं च शुद्धसत्त्वं नियात्तमकः गुणसत्त्वादिलक्षणः गुणसत्त्वनिविभूतिः। स्वात्माथमपूर्वः। देवविषयवायिष्यः परिचितः। इवं त्वम त्वमेकादेव न विचिते। वर्मात्मानो मृदानां नित्यगीतानां च मयोगस्वामित्वः।

2.9. What is known as the "eternal manifestation" (nityavibhūti) is a particular location which is self-effulgent and composed of pure sattva. This pure sattva is of the nature of a substance, it is distinct from the quality sattva and is the locus of the quality sattva. This particular location means it is limited in the lower regions but it is without limitation in the higher regions. This is the place of enjoyment for the supreme Self, the liberated and the eternally liberated souls.

**comment**

The "eternal manifestation" (nityavibhūti) is considered to be a special substance (see comment to 2.5.) which is by nature self-effulgent (svayamprakāśa). Its effulgence, like that of consciousness, is only for the sake of someone else i.e. the Lord and the souls. Nityavibhūti is composed of pure sattva (suddhasattva) which means sattva free from any contact with rajas or tamas and hence it is bereft of any imperfection.

The Lord utilizes this substance nityavibhūti in order to provide a location, objects and means of enjoyment for Himself, the liberated and the eternally liberated souls. His divine form, the bodies of the two classes of liberated souls and the celestial abodes such as Vaikuntha are all made from nityavibhūti.

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2.10. Knowledge means awareness. That means it illumines the object. That [Knowledge] always possesses an object, it is self-effulgent and all pervasive. This [Knowledge], while remaining a substance, also has the nature of a quality. Because its operation is necessarily as one or the other for the individual soul and the Lord. For example the effulgence of a light, though it is a substance, is a quality of the light. It is like that.

However the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the individual soul and the Lord is different from this. That is solely a substance, not a quality. Because the individual soul and the Lord are solely substances. In that regard, just as: "a light shines only for itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another", so too, the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the individual soul and the Lord shines only for itself.

However the Knowledge which is a quality shines for itself and for another. The Knowledge which is a quality is always fully manifest.
for the Lord and the eternally [liberated] souls and is never concealed. Whereas for the bound souls it is partially manifest. But following the gain of liberation it becomes entirely manifest, like manhood in the state of youth. That [attributive Knowledge] is certainly eternal. But an expression such as: "Knowledge has been produced, Knowledge has vanished" can be justified by accepting that there is a state of contraction and expansion for Knowledge. At the time of perception of an object such as a pot, this Knowledge which is located in the individual self does out by means of the sense organ and comes into immediate contact with the object such as pot. Because this Knowledge, even though a quality of the self, is accepted as a substance, the motion elsewhere from its own locus and the possession of the activity of going out etc. is not contradicted. That has been told by Yāmuna-caūrya:

Knowledge can be both a substance and a quality. Because a mental modification exists elsewhere than its locus and has conjunction with the locus. 51

comment

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the meaning of the word "I" (ahamartha) directly denotes the self which is revealed by the first person in statements such as "I know" etc. 52 The self has awareness as its nature (cidrupa) 53 which means that it possesses self-effulgence (svayamprakāśat). 54 Rāmanuja, following Yāmuna, defines self-effulgence as: "illuminating solely through its own existence for its own locus". 55 This means that the self is manifest to itself through its own being independent of any factor. 56 Though the self intrinsically possesses consciousness it is not mere consciousness as the Advaitins maintain. For Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the self is an eternal, self-effulgent, knowing subject.

While the self is always manifest to itself as "I", it is only revealed in relation to objects through the presence of its attributive consciousness (dharmabhūta-jñāna). This is an intrinsic attribute of the self who is its witness. 57 Rāmanuja and Yāmuna define consciousness as "the manifesting of an object through its own existence for its own locus". 58 This statement differs from the above definition regarding
the self-effulgent nature of the self because in the latter the self only illumines itself for itself. Attributive consciousness, however, manifests the object to the self.

The attributive consciousness is by nature all pervasive when it is unobstructed by the effects of karma. In the case of the Lord, the liberated and the eternally liberated souls it is all pervasive, whereas for the bound souls it is in a contracted state. All mental states: happiness, sadness, memory etc. are particular modes of attributive consciousness. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, attributive consciousness is both a quality and a substance. It is a quality because it depends upon the self which is independently existent. Yet it is also a substance because it can go beyond its substrate. Rāmānuja seeks to illustrate this through the example of a light and its quality of effulgence. The light's effulgence is dependent upon the substance light, yet the effulgence is a substance in its own right because it can leave its locus in illuminating objects and since it possesses the quality of colour. Analogous to this, Rāmānuja considers that the self, like the light, is self-effulgent and, just as the light manifests objects through its effulgence, so too, the attributive consciousness manifests objects to the self.

It may be useful to briefly contrast the fundamental distinction between the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita concept of self. In the view of Advaita, the empirical self, denoted by the word "I", is composed of two aspects: an objective portion (vyūsamārdha) containing any predicative conception of "I" as "such and such". The remaining portion is the pure subject (anidamānā), awareness, which is the essential Self. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the conception of the self is just the reverse. The inner self is the knower who is directly expressed by the word "I". Awareness is external (paruk) to the "I" and exists in an attributive relation, qualifying the self. Viśiṣṭādvaita does not admit the Advaitins pure consciousness. The self is the empirical "I" who possesses attributive consciousness as an intrinsic quality.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the self will be critically examined in the following chapter.
2.11. The primary material possesses a group of three qualities in the form of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is eternal and consists of twenty-four principles. This [primary material] is designated by the word "māyā" because it brings about the manifold creation. So too, it is designated by the word "avidyā" since it obstructs knowledge and by the word "aksara" because it is eternal. This is indeed the primary material for the whole world.

The twenty-four principles are: prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, manas, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements. In respect of the primary material composed of the three qualities, the state of being on the verge of becoming the effect because of the inequilibrium of the qualities, which is dependent upon the will of the Lord, is expressed by the word "āvyakta". The principle known as mahat is produced from
that ayyakta. The principle mahat is a technical name for the genus intellect. That [mahat] is threefold; possessed of sattva, rajas and tamas. The ahaṅkāra is produced from the principle mahat. This [ahaṅkāra] produces the false presumption that the body is the self etc. This is also threefold, due to the distinction of possessing sattva, rajas and tamas. The eleven organs: the group of six organs of knowledge and the group of five organs of action are produced from the ahaṅkāra possessed of sattva assisted by the ahaṅkāra possesses of rajas.

The organs of knowledge are sixfold, due to the distinction of mind, the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch. Among these six, the mind is the internal organ. The five beginning with the sense of hearing are external organs. In respect of that [i.e. the organs of knowledge], the mind is the cause of volition, memory etc. and it is the instrumental cause for the activity of the external senses among the sense objects. This mind is indeed the cause of bondage when in the state of attachment to sense objects like sound etc. But when it becomes attached to the object in the form of the self, having relinquished the [attachment to] external objects such as sound etc., then that very [mind] is the cause for liberation. The five organs known as the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch apprehend respectively sound, form, smell, taste and touch. The organ of touch and the organ of sight are suitable even in apprehending substances. The five great elements beginning with space are, respectively, the supporters of the five sense organs known as the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The sense organs, having dependence on the body, are like jewels upon an ornament.

The five organs of action are: the organ of speech, hands, feet, anus and organ of generation. These respectively produce the effects consisting of speaking, taking, walking, evacuation and pleasure.

The five great elements are known as: space, air, fire, water
and earth. These same elements, existing in a subtle state prior [to the effect], are called by the word "tānmatra": sound-tānmatra, touch-tānmatra, form-tānmatra, taste-tānmatra and smell-tānmatra. Like the transformation of milk through an embryonic stage prior to the state of being curd. 67

comment

The Viśiṣṭādvaita description of prakṛti follows the model given in the Śaṅkhāyāna. 68 They differ, however, in some respects: according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, prakṛti is the locus of sattva, rajas and tamas whereas in Śaṅkhyā they constitute the very substance itself. 69 In Viśiṣṭādvaita, prakṛti does not extend into the divine regions which are composed of nityavibhūti, pure sattva. Also, for Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the evolution of prakṛti depends upon the will of the Lord whereas in Śaṅkhyā it is an independent principle.

2.12. There is more than one teaching about the origination of the elements and the tānmatras. In regard to that, one [view] is that the five tānmatras are produced from the śaṅkāra possessed of tamas and the five elements are produced from them [the tānmatras i.e. the subtle
elements] in due order. A second [view] is that the sound—tānmatra is produced from the ahaṅkāra possessed of tamas. Space originates from the sound—tānmatra. Touch—tānmatra is produced from space. Air originates from touch—tānmatra. Form—tānmatra is produced from air. Fire originates from form—tānmatra. Taste tānmatra is produced from fire. Water originates from taste—tānmatra. Smell—tānmatra is produced from water. Earth originates from smell—tānmatra. A third [view] is that sound—tānmatra is produced from the ahaṅkāra possessed of tamas. Both space and touch—tānmatra are produced from sound—tānmatra. Similarly, air and form—tānmatra are produced from touch—tānmatra. Fire and taste—tānmatra are produced from form—tānmatra. Water and smell—tānmatra are produced from taste—tānmatra. Earth is produced from smell—tānmatra.

Among the five elements beginning with space, there is a preponderance for each one successively of the five qualities beginning with sound. So [the quality] sound is in space. Sound and touch are in air. Sound, touch and form are in fire. Sound, touch, form and taste are in water. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are in earth. Here, there is certainly a distinction of the five qualities beginning with sound from the sound etc which are the essential nature of the five tānmatras: sound—tānmatra, touch—tānmatra etc. It should not be mistaken that there is no distinction because of identity in name.

What is known as the origination of the effects beginning with mahat is only the cause changing into another state, not the commencement of a new effect like it is for the Naiyāyikas. The procedure for the fivefold division and combination of the five great elements should be understood as before (see 1.37. and comment).
2.13. Time is a particular substance which is inert and all pervasive. It is of two types: divided and undivided. The divided time consists of nimeśa, kāstha, kala, muhūrtā etc. and it is non-eternal.70 This [divided time] is the cause of the designation "simultaneous", "quickly" etc. and it is the cause of the designation "past" etc. The undivided time, however, is eternal. The Lord, in the supreme location, the world of Vaikūṭha, brings about the creation etc. while being dependent upon time. Because the origination of the class of each modification is certainly restricted to a particular time in the manner that: "the appearance of flowers is only in the spring." The Lord produces all effects only in accordance with the limitation of time which He has willed. This alone is the independence of time here [in respect of the creation]. Whereas in Vaikūṭha, though time exists there on account of being all pervasive, it is certainly dependent upon the Lord's will and in no way has independence. For there is the declaration: "time is certainly not the Lord there." For this reason, the Lord at all times creates everything there [in Vaikūṭha] spontaneously.

2.14. ईश्वरो जीवो नित्यनिर्मूलितां महत्त्व: कालवेषयंपुर्वेक्षु पद्ध्व द्विधेष्यां- श्रद्धारिष्टुपमतज्ञमिदु:। महत्त्व: कालवेष्यो द्विवेष्यां \n\n\n\n
स्त्राणि भासामन्तः मत्यन्त्रयः। परस्मा एव भासामन्तः पराक्ष्यः।
2.14. Among these six substances that have been mentioned: the Lord, the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", Knowledge, primary matter and time; the group of four beginning with the Lord are not inert. The pair: primary matter and time, are inert. The pair: the Lord and the individual soul, are said to be "internal". The pair: the "eternal manifestation" and Knowledge, are said to be "external". The nature of being internal means illumining for oneself. The nature of being external means illumining only for another. 

Comment

This statement summarizes the preceding discussion of substance (dravya). The nature of "illumining for oneself" and "illumining only for another" has been mentioned in the comment to 2.10., in respect of the nature of the self and its attributive consciousness.

The author now explains the Visishtadvaita category of non-substance (adravya).

2.15. The qualities are tenfold, due to the distinction of sattva, rajas, tamas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potentiality. The group of three qualities: sattva, rajas and tamas, are not perceptible to the senses and are to be inferred through their respective effects. The quality sattva produces the illumination [of objects], happiness, lightness etc. in its locus. That sattva is of two types: pure and mixed. Pure [sattva] is untouched by rajas and
tamas. It is located in two types of substance: it exists in the world of Vaikūṭha and in the supreme Lord on account of His connection with the world of Vaikūṭha. Mixed [sattva] is in contact with rajas and tamas. This is also located in two types of substance: it is located in the primary material which is composed of the three qualities and in the individual soul on account of its connection with the primary matter. The group of three qualities beginning with sattva which have just been mentioned are certainly distinct from sattva etc. which constitute the essence of the primary matter. The quality rajas produces desire, greed and activity etc. in its locus. The quality tamas produces delusion, carelessness and inactivity etc. in its locus. The two types of qualities: rajas and tamas, exist in the primary matter and in the individual soul on account of its connection with that [primary matter].

The quality sattva is in the form of correct knowledge, it is the cause of happiness etc. and it bestows liberation. The quality rajas is in the form of desire etc., it is the cause of attachment to action, sorrow etc. and it bestows heaven etc. The quality tamas is in the form of ignorance, it is the cause of laziness etc. and it bestows hell. 71

2.16. ॐ त्रित्रिग्राणां बन्द: | स च पञ्चसूत्वतः | तन्निपन्दित्रामायाग्रः सप्तः | स च पृथिविसमेव मायंसा | चहुतिन्द्रोऽऽभूति | तत्पृथिविसमेव मृत्यु | तद्पृथिविसमेव मृत्यु | र्ष्ट्रीन्द्रायाग्राः रासः | स च पृथिवीजलमुद्रा | प्राणोत्सुक्त्रायाग्रः गन्ध: | स च पृथिव्याधि | सत्त्वजस्तमस्ति | श्रद्धार्थे स्त्राथ्यामर्गसमन्यादेशे भवेऽर्थे | द्वितिपुः—पञ्चमदाहूर्द्धानान्यूत्तर्वदुनादानान्यूत्त | आर्थ द्वन्द्वचतुर्द्वायु | द्वितिपुः | सत्त्वर्जस्तमस्ति | महत्त्वयव | एव | श्रद्धार्थे | तु महत्त्विकारसुपुंस | चुहर्विवाहितवचधान्त | तमावस्त्रवचधाम | अत्यन्त: तु पञ्चमदाहूर्द्धानिष्ठ | गुणश्वाध्यायायान्त: | 71

2.16. Sound is able to be apprehended by the faculty of hearing and it exists in the five elements. Touch can only be apprehended by the sense of touch and it exists in earth, water, fire and air. Colour can only be apprehended by the faculty of sight and it exists in earth,
water and fire. Taste can be apprehended by the sense of taste and it exists in earth and water. Smell can be apprehended by the sense of smell and it exists only in earth.\textsuperscript{72}

This group of eight: sattva, rajas and tamas and sound, touch form, taste and smell is each twofold: as the material cause of the five great elements and not as being their material cause. The first can be expressed by the word "substance" and is included only among the substances. In that regard, sattva, rajas and tamas are indeed the parts of the primary material. Whereas the group of five commencing with sound is a modification of the primary matter, it is included within the twenty-four principles and can be expressed by the word "tanmātra". However the last is located in the five great elements and has been told here as expressible by the word "quality".

\textbf{comment}

Abhyankar makes the additional specification that the eight qualities beginning with sattva are not only the qualities of prakṛti but are also constitutive of the substance itself.

2.17. \textit{संयोजनतः संयोगः} | अर्थ प्रदेशप्रृच्छिद्धः सामान्यमुपयोगोऽस्यचिरनिर्मयः | निपुनामपि संयोजोऽस्येऽव | वायुक्तामालम् |

2.17. Conjunction is the cause of knowledge as conjoined [i.e. knowledge that this or that are conjoined]. It is a universal quality existing in the six substances. Its condition does not pervade [the whole substance] and it is non-eternal. There is certainly conjunction even for all pervasive [substances], because there is nothing which invalidates it.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{comment}

Conjunction (sādyoga) is a temporary connection between two things which can exist separately. It does not pervade the whole substance (avyāpyavṛtti) which means that the conjunction is only between the parts which are in contact. For example a book can be in conjunction with the table, but it is only in contact with a part
of the table. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not accept conjunction between all pervasive substances, whereas the Viṣṇuadvaitins accept it. 74

Conjunction is different from the other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category of relation called "inheritance" (samavāya). 75 In the former, the relation is between two substances and is temporary (anitya) whereas samavāya is an eternal relation (nityasambandha) 76 which pervades the whole entity. Samavāya exists in these five relations: the product and its parts, a quality and its possessor, motion and the possessor of the movement, the individual and its class character and particularity and an eternal substance. 77 Samavāya is eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without the production or the destruction of the whole entity. 78

2.18. सर्वेक्षणानि कारणस्तनिविधाक्षणिः | शक्तिरपि पद्यन्यूतिः: सामान्ययुगः | इं चानित्वमाकायः नमः | ।

2.18. Potentiality brings about the causality on the part of all causes. Potentiality is also a universal quality existing in the six substances. This [potentiality] is non-eternal and can be inferred through its effect. 79

comment

Potentiality (śakti) is a principle which brings about causal efficacy. The Mīmāṃsakas seek to prove its existence through postulation: even though there is no defective nature in the cause, in the presence of an obstructing factor it does not produce its effect and this can only be explained by assuming that a potentiality exists in all causes. 80

2.19. नन् कथं द्रष्टव गुणां इति | तदविरिक्तस्य ज्ञानस्तरस्य गुणस्य जीविकाश्रयः-पद्यन्यूतस्य सहवादिति वेदम् | पुज्ञानं द्रष्टव गुणस्य ज्ञानस्तरस्य द्रष्टवणायायः उपेक्षेऽर्थं। तथय संधृविकाशातकस्य पायसाक्षयं द्विलक्षस्य सप्तयं भविष्यत्यालोऽपि।

2.19. [objection] How are there only ten qualities? Because there exists the quality known as Knowledge, which is located in the
substances in the form of the individual soul and the Lord, and which is other than those [ten].

[reply] No, because this Knowledge has already been mentioned in the enumeration of substances. Since that [Knowledge] is the locus of the states of contraction and expansion, therefore its nature as a substance has been very clearly demonstrated. There is the apprehension as a quality because that [Knowledge], though existing as a substance, is located in the individual soul and the Lord and because its nature is always dependent upon another. In the same manner, the apprehension as a quality should be understood [for light] since light, though it is a substance being included within the substance fire, has a nature which is always dependent upon another fire other than itself.

2.20. जीवो तीन्त्रिती: चढ़ति: वाल्क्षेति चुंटपरिभाषरस्य सरीरस:। यथात्मा
शरीरसः (बृऽ ३।७।२२) यथ: श्रीवक्षी शरीरसः (बृऽ ३।७।३)।
इत्यादिकः। यथ: च यत:चरिर्यस: स तस्य शरीरस्यात्मा नव:। यथार्थवर्णी-
शब्दै: हि त्र्याम्योंवायुम्वुद्गतांवविनिविधायं
शरीरस्यारम्भः: आत्मः शरीरः शरीरस्यार्थेऽति। अत: त्यात्मा-
निर्वाच!। यवः यथायते तस्य शरीरसः।
$\text{रूपः हि सनीचं सम्ब प्रात्र्यवियमि सम्यपते। न तु पत्तनः कश्चनन्त्यः}
$\text{यथ: शून्य व्याप्ति। अत: त्यः परमात्मावःोऽनुस्यते। जीवात्मायेने}
$\text{नैताः प्रभव:। श्रीरस्य जीवात्मायमित्वात्। त्यः केन्द्रमायेने न तु}
$\text{कर्मचरे शरीरसुः। जीवस्त्रीत्वरस्य शरीरं भवति जहाय चात्मा भवति।}
$\text{ज्ञाते तु शरीरश्च न तु कर्मस्यात्माभ्युत्तमः।}$

2.20. The group of four: the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", primary matter and time are the body of the Lord. For there is the sacred text, such as: "whose body is the self" (Bṛh. 3.7.22.), "whose body is the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3.). The one who has a body is the self of that body. Indeed the two words "self" and "body" signify the possession of a relation like the words master and servant: the self's body, the body's self. [The etymology of the word] self (ātmā) is "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpmoti). What
is pervaded by a thing is the body of that. Indeed the entire world, together with the individual soul, is pervaded by the Lord in the form of the inner controller. But there is no other thing which, having become the inner controller, pervades that [Lord]. Therefore the Lord is called by the word "supreme Self". There is no such supremacy in regard to the individual soul, for the Lord is the inner controller of the individual soul. The Lord is solely the self and does not exist as the body of anyone. Whereas the individual soul is the body of the Lord and is the self of the inert matter. The inert matter, however, is only a body and does not exist as the self of anyone.

comment

As mentioned, the body-soul analogy between the souls, matter and the Lord forms the dominant model in Rāmānuja's teaching. See comment to 2.3. Also, cf. Rāmānuja's defence of this model in Śrībhāṣya 2.1.9.

2.21. शरीरस्वरूपिणीश्च तादात्म्येन व्यवहारस्य यथा पद्धते यथा मुन्योऽसं गौरवाः स्वैपनीयताय यथापि स व्यवहारस्य गौरवं एव। शरीरस्वरूपर्ववन्धनम् आत्मनो करतं: शरीरस्वरूपमा भिक्षावत्। परमात्मवरीरं च चेतनतेन सजातियं जीवरूपाभितेन विजातियं च जन-शरीरस्वरूपेऽर्थेदं:। तथा च परमात्मिन सजातियाद्विजातियं याच भेदं सिद्धवति। तथा च यूक्ति सदान्तावीक्ष्णे देव एकं (भौ १।२०) हति। अव परमात्मद्वायत्वोऽयादीके-योगस्वरूपस्य देयत्वद्वायत्वं परमात्मनं तविप्रयातनेन शरिरप्राप्त्वायं परमात्मनी भेदं स्वपं एव। सूक्तादारस्यस्य पुनः प्रदेशं न भेदिन्द्रंश्च (भौ सू २। १। २०) इत्यदि जीवंहरतर्योऽषु उक्तं। तथा झानात्मकस्वरूपवीयसारभोजीन-रूपं युप्तपूर्व न परमात्मस्वप्त्वात्त्वें किं तु परमात्मविद्यमति तत्समादिपि परमात्मा भिषं एवेति परमात्मिन स्वस्तादेण: सिद्धवति। तथा च परमात्मि न सजातियभेदिन्द्रिजातियभेदस्वं भेदज्ञ य सिद्धम्।

2.21. Even though there is a common designation observed in the world on account of the identity of the body and the embodied, in the manner that: "I am a man", "I am white", "I am fat" etc., nonetheless, that designation is only figurative. Because the self, which has a close connection to the body, is in reality different with regard to the body.

The body of the supreme Self, in the form of the individual
soul, belongs to the same class [as the Lord] on account of being sentient and in the form of the inert material it belongs to a different class on account of being insentient. So a difference is established in the supreme Self because of what belongs to the same class and because of what belongs to a different class. Accordingly, there is the sacred text: "the one God rules over the perishable and the self" (Śv.1.10.). Here, because the inert matter and the individual soul, which can be expressed by the words "perishable" and "self", are taught as being controlled and because the supreme Self, who can be expressed by the word "God", is taught as their controller, the difference of the supreme Self from these two is very clear. The author of the śūtras has also told the difference between the individual soul and the Lord: "But [Brahman] is additional, on account of the declaration of difference" (B.S.2.1.22.) etc.

So too, the group of six qualities: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour are not included within the essential nature of the supreme Self but are located in the supreme Self, thus the supreme Self is certainly different from that [group of six qualities] also. So a difference is established in the supreme Self from what belongs to itself. Accordingly, a threefold difference in the form of difference belonging to one's own class, difference belonging to another class and difference belonging to oneself is established in the supreme Self.

2.22.
2.22. [objection] According to this manner [of explanation] the sacred text: "He desired, 'let me be many, let me be born!'" (Tai.2.6.1.) is contradicted. Because there, the resolve of the supreme Self is seen: I will become many. But it is not that having indicated something other than Himself, that [other thing] would become many. Also, the absence of difference of the world from the supreme Self is established by the rule concerning the non-difference of cause and effect. But upon the acceptance of the difference which has been mentioned, the contradiction with this sacred text is clear.

[reply] True. The resolve for becoming many: "let me become many" is certainly not directly, but by means of the body. Thus that resolve refers to the manner of becoming many: for what abides in a single form, having as its body the subtle sentient and insentient things which are incapable of division into name and form, and [then] having as its body the sentient and insentient things which have become divided into name and form. Through accepting the purport of the sacred text, thus there is no contradiction.

comment

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman is eternally qualified by individual souls (jīva) and primary matter (prakṛti) which have a dependent existence upon Brahman as attributes to a substantive or as a body to a self.

At the time of periodic cosmic dissolution (pralaya) the souls and primary matter remain in a subtle, almost undifferentiated condition in Brahman. Brahman exists in the state of being the cause (kāraṇāvasthā) when He is qualified in this manner. At the time of creation, Brahman does not transform Himself into the world nor does He undergo any essential change. Brahman causes the ever existent primary matter to evolve from its subtle condition into the physical world and He causes the bound souls to assume appropriate bodies in accordance with their karma. Brahman exists in the state of being the effect (kāryāvasthā) when qualified by souls and matter in their manifest condition.

This view avoids the difficulty inherent in Brahman directly becoming the material cause of the world. For if that were the case,
Brahman would be subject to change and the unwelcome consequence of non-eternity. However the Upaniṣad text such as: "let me become many" (Tai.2.6.1.) reveals that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause and the task for Rāmacūṇja is to reconcile the immutability of Brahman with the teaching that the efficient and the material cause are not distinct. He seeks to do this through the explanation that Brahman is the efficient cause when qualified by souls and matter in their subtle condition and Brahman is also the material cause when qualified by souls and matter in a manifest condition. Thus one unchanging Brahman exists in two states, both as cause and as the effect or material cause, depending upon whether He is qualified by His attributes, souls and matter, in their subtle or gross state. This teaching is summarized in the Yatindramatadīpikā:

The traditional teaching of the Viśistadvaita Vedāntins is that Brahman is the cause [of the world] being qualified by the sentient and insentient in their subtle state and Brahman is the effect being qualified by the sentient and insentient in their gross state. Thus the effect is non-different from the cause.

2.23. नमु यदा केशोर एवतंस्वदर्मन्तरं कुलरे | अथ तस्य भर्म भवति (तैं २। ७। १) इति नूती भर्तो निषिद्धंते | य एवत्सति स्त्रापमिः चेदी गत्याति तस्य भर्म भवतीति तद्यायदिशीत चेदी। शुच्यायं-यदा वेदायत्वः: झानाति | तत्र श्रान्त्रमा व्यक्तवाक्ष्यः | प्रशो-पासनाया अवकाशे विनेत्रे सति भर्म भवती-त्यं | करनुमूते क्षण वापि बाहुदेशी न शिष्यते | सा हृस्थात्मन्त्रहितायं सा आलित: सा च शिष्यिता।

इति महापर्वमन्त्रायुः प्राप्तमायेऽनिश्चिते।

2.23. [objection] Difference is negated in the sacred text: "When he makes just the smallest difference in this, then there is fear for him" (Tai.2.7.1.). Because the meaning of that is: he who thinks there is even a slight difference in this Brahman, there is fear for him.

[reply] No. For there is ignorance of the meaning of the sacred text. Because there, the word "antara" expresses an interval. The meaning is: there is fear when there is an interval, a break, in the worship of Brahman. This meaning has been ascertained due to the
augmenting by the saying of the great sage:

When Vāsudeva is not contemplated upon for a short time, or even for an instant, that is a loss, that is a great defect, that is error and that is an altered condition.

comment

Rāmānuja interprets this Taittirīya text in this manner in Śrī-bhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.51.p.99.

2.24. एकेववाद्वितीयम् ( छा० ६ । २ । १० ) इति श्रुत्यप्रमृत्त नामांनीयम्। नवं एकेवविद्यविद्याकारं विद्यते। अद्वितीयकारं निषिद्धवते। कार्यमंगलविद्युतस्वा कार्यं नुसरणं कारणं श्रवणं कल्पना स्वाच्छचित्तुच्ये अनुगचितामविद्यनन्न च व्रद्धाविद्यात्सं जगतं उपायकारणं निषिद्धते।

2.24. Non-duality cannot be established even by the sacred text: "one alone, without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.). Because there, an efficient cause of the world other than Brahman is negated by the word "one". The state of multiplicity which belongs to the effect could be imagined in Brahman, the cause, in accordance with the effect. The word "alone" is for the removal of that [wrong supposition]. A material cause of the world other than Brahman is negated by this: "without a second".

comment

In Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.49.p.91., 1.1.2. Para.86.p.197., and in Vedārthasaṅgraha Para.16.p.80., Para.33.p.90., Rāmānuja interprets "one alone" as referring to the material cause and "without a second" as denoting the absence of another efficient cause.
2.25. This is the meaning of the sacred text: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Bṛh.4.4.19.). There is no such thing whatsoever which is different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause and also the inner controller. But the negation of the world, which is the effect of Brahman, is not taught because causality in respect of the world has been taught in the sacred text itself. Also, the sacred texts: "where there is duality, as it were..." (Bṛh.2.4.14.), "He who sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Bṛh.4.4.19.) etc. are to be construed in just the same manner.

**Comment**

Rāmānuja maintains that throughout all the sacred texts: "no word is seen anywhere expressing a negation of the fact that Brahman possesses distinction". Accordingly, he interprets Bṛh.4.4.19. as denying any diversity which does not have Brahman as its Self.

2.26. Because this supreme Self is the locus of the causality in...
respect of the world and of the attributes such as omniscience which are applicable for causality, therefore, He certainly possesses distinction. Distinctions such as "reality" have been taught even in the sacred text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.). To explain. In the sentence "real, Knowledge...", the words beginning with "real" are seen to have grammatical apposition, just as here: "Devadatta has an umbrella, ear-rings and clothes". Grammatical apposition is the use of words, which have different reasons for their employment, in respect of one and the same object. So Brahman is established as possessing distinction because attributes such as reality, which are the reason for the use of the words "real" etc., are not able to be denied as belonging to Brahman. This is correct.

Brahman being the cause of the world is established without any contention in sacred texts such as: "from which these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.). Accordingly, a special capacity applicable for producing the effect in the form of the world must necessarily be acknowledged there [in the cause, Brahman]. Because in the world, a potter and a weaver etc. who produce the effects such as pots and cloth are seen to possess the special capacity applicable for the production of the respective effects. So Brahman too is inferred to have a special capacity through which He is the material cause of the creation by means of a body in the form of the subtle sentient and insentient things. And through which [special capacity] He creates for people in the state of dream, for a mere instant, objects such as elephants which can be experienced only by the respective person and which last for a particular time. Thus the supreme Self has been established as possessing distinction.

Ramanuja cites the following definition of grammatical apposition (sāmāṇḍhikaranya), it is: "the application of words, having different reasons for their use, to one and the same object." For example in
the sentence: "Devadatta (Devadattaḥ) has an umbrella (chatrī), earrings (kundalī) and clothes (vāsasvi)". Devadatta is the one substantive qualified by three words employed adjectivally, each denoting a particular distinguishing attribute which is the reason for its usage (pravṛttinimitta). According to Rāmānuja, the function of words placed in grammatical apposition is to show that an independent substantive exists in a qualified manner, possessing the distinguishing features expressed by the other words which share the same case relation as the substantive and hence qualify it adjectivally.86

Rāmānuja interprets the sentence: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) in the same manner as the sentence referring to Devadatta is to be understood i.e. Brahman is the independent substantive who possesses the attributes of reality, Knowledge and limitlessness. According to Viśiṣṭadvaita, Brahman must possess the above attributes since they are the reason for the usage of the words "real" etc.

Rāmānuja considers that the sentence: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" constitutes a definition of Brahman and so serves to distinguish Brahman from all other things.87 The word "real" signifies that Brahman possesses unconditioned existence and this distinguishes Brahman from change, inert matter and the souls which are connected with matter. The word "Knowledge" denotes that Brahman has the nature of uncontracted awareness. This distinguishes Brahman from the liberated souls whose attributive consciousness (dharma-bhūta-jñāna) is sometimes in a contracted state. The word "limitless" communicates that Brahman is free from any limitation: relating to space, time, or objects.88

The Advaita interpretation of this passage, together with a more detailed discussion of grammatical apposition, will be presented in the following chapter.

As Abhyankar mentions, according to Viśiṣṭadvaita the Lord is the creator of dream events:

in dream, the Lord creates, in accord with the merit or demerit of living beings, objects of a special nature which can be experienced only by the respective person and which last for a certain time.89
2.27. That supreme Self certainly possesses qualities, He is not free from qualities. Because causality in respect of the world is all the more impossible in that which is free from qualities. Some qualities are connected with the cognition of the essential nature. For instance bliss, existence, etc. which are taught in sacred texts such as: "Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.), "Brahman is existence, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.). Because these [qualities] are applicable in the very ascertainment of the essential nature of Brahman. For what is indeed being distinguished by qualities such as bliss etc. is Brahman, and therefore those [qualities] are included in the essential nature of Brahman. For this reason, these are recognised at the very time of the cognition of the essential nature of the object [i.e. Brahman]. Just as in the world when some person is seen, at that very time the qualities of being small, being tall etc. are recognised as belonging to that person. Because these are included in the essential nature, they persist in all meditations.

Whereas qualities such as compassion, even though they never deviate from the supreme Self, still because they are not included in
the essential nature they do not persist in all meditations. However they are certainly to be conceived where they are mentioned. Even the group of six qualities: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour are, just like compassion etc., not included in the essential nature of Brahman. However they are eternally connected to Brahman. At no time does Brahman remain without connection to those qualities and they do not remain even an instant without connection to Brahman.

Whereas qualities belonging to Brahman such as joy being the head are not eternally connected to Brahman but are imagined in a particular meditation. Those too are to be conceived in that very meditation where they are mentioned. Where no particular qualities are specified in a meditation, the qualities included in the essential nature of Brahman are certainly to be conceived in that meditation as well. Thus in all meditations Brahman is to be found only as possessing qualities.

2.28. The sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.) is to be thought of in connection with the meaning: free from qualities which are to be given up. The qualities which are to be given up are sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst etc. For this reason, those qualities have been specifically negated in the Chandogya: "free from sin, free from old age" (Ch.8.1.5.). And subsequent to that, auspicious qualities are told: "whose desire is true, whose resolve is
true" (Ch.8.1.5.). Indeed this sacred text: "whose desire is true"
is contradicted if there is the negation of all qualities. Thereforein accordance with that [sacred text], the only meaning which can beaccepted for the sacred text: "free from qualities" is: free from thequalities which are to be given up.

comment

See comment to 2.3.

2.29. Knowledge is also only a quality of the self. It should not besaid: if Knowledge is a quality of the self, then there is contradictionwith the sacred text: "a mass of consciousness" (Bṛh.2.4.12.).

[reason] Because there, the Knowledge which is the essential natureof the supreme Self is being specified. The Knowledge which is theessential nature of the self is accepted by us as being differentfrom the Knowledge which is a quality of the self. Consciousness isrecognized as identical with Brahman in the sacred texts such as:"a mass of consciousness" (Bṛh.2.4.12.), "Brahman is consciousness
and bliss" (Bṛ. 3.9.28.). The difference of consciousness from Brahman is recognized in the sacred texts such as: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Bṛ. 2.4.14.), "this Being indeed knows". The acceptance of two types of Knowledge is certainly more correct for the establishment of the two types of sacred texts. The sacred text is explained in a twofold manner even in regard to bliss, on account of this; "bliss is Brahman" (Tai. 3.6.1.) and "the bliss of Brahman" (Tai. 2.8.4.). This is because bliss is not different from Knowledge. For a pleasing state of consciousness is said by the word "bliss".

The self is not established as a knower according to the view of those who do not accept Knowledge which is a quality as being different from Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self. For knowership means just being the locus of the quality of Knowledge. Knowership has certainly been established in the sacred texts, such as: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Bṛ. 2.4.14.), "for the knower's function of knowing is not lost" (Bṛ. 4.3.30.), "this is indeed the seer" (Pr. 4.9.). It has been told by the author of the sūtras also: "For this very reason, [the soul] is a knower" (B.S. 2.3.19.). A knower (jñāṇaḥ) means that "one knows" (jānati), which means being the locus of Knowledge.

**comment**

When Brahman is defined as "consciousness and bliss" (Bṛ. 3.9.28.), these are not two different attributes. Brahman has consciousness as His essence and that consciousness is of the nature of bliss. Since consciousness is both the essential nature of Brahman and His attribute, bliss is also the essence and the attribute of Brahman. See Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para. 51. p. 97.

The statement that the knower is "the locus of the quality of Knowledge" indicates that the self, though a knower by nature, is free from change. All modifications are through the knower's attributive consciousness. See Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para. 40. p. 69f.
2.30. The supreme Self is certainly an object of knowledge. Because there is nothing to invalidate it. The supreme Self being of the nature of Knowledge or being a knower is not at variance with being knowable. Because the individual self, the "I", who is of the nature of Knowledge and a knower, has the experience of being an object of mental perception. By observing the signs of motion etc. in a body, people infer an individual soul who is its inner controller. So the nature of being an object of inference cannot be avoided. Thus nothing invalidating is seen in regard to the supreme Self being an object of His own perception and in being the object of perception and inference belonging to the liberated souls and those whose liberation is eternally accomplished. Moreover, if the supreme Self is not an object of knowledge, why would the sacred text have commenced to teach about the supreme Self in the Upanishads? Because there is an even greater impossibility of being understood through the scripture.

2.31.
2.31. It should not be said that if the supreme Self is an object of knowledge, there is contradiction with the sacred text: "That which one does not think with the mind" (Ke.1.6.) because there would be the necessity of being understood by the mind. [reason] Because there is no contradiction on account of the acceptance of the purport of the sacred text by supplying [the word] "entirely" in the sacred text: "That which i.e. Brahman, one does not think in its entirety with the mind". For this reason, the injunction about the knowledge which has Brahman as its object: "know that alone to be Brahman" (Ke.1.6.) is correct.

Also, the statement that Brahman is inconceivable: "This one is unmanifest, unthinkable..." (G.2.25.), "This one is unmanifest, ageless, unthinkable, unborn, changeless" (Vig.P.6.5.66.) etc. should be understood as intending inconceivability in its entirety.

It should not be said that upon the acceptance that the supreme Self is an object of knowledge, there would be the result that the supreme Self is inert, on account of the inference: the supreme Self is inert. Because of being an object of knowledge, like a pot. [reason] Because the reason i.e. being an object of knowledge, is not the determining factor. For some favourable logic based upon the relation of cause and effect or upon the relation of universal and particular etc. is not observed in the formation of the invariable concomitance:

whatever is an object of knowledge is inert.

comment

Passages such as Ke.1.6. are to be interpreted in the manner that Brahman is unable to be comprehended in His entirety by the mind. The word "entirely" (sākalyena) is used by Raṅgarāmānuja in his commentary upon this verse in the Kenopanisad.92

The formation of a rule of invariable concomitance requires a
necessary relationship between the factors concerned. For example in the case of fire and smoke there is the relation of cause and effect. But there is no cause-effect relation between being an object of knowledge and being inert. Nor can the reason in the syllogism be established on the basis of universal (sāmānyā) and particular (viśeṣa) as for example between the universal "humanity" and the particular of being an individual member of the human race, so that one could formulate the rule: without the universal there is no particular.

2.32. That supreme Self is eternally unchangeable. Unchangeable is said to be: always existing in the very same form.

[objection] The established position is that the supreme Self is indeed the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. The nature of being a material cause is possible only for a substance capable of modification like clay etc. Hence if the supreme Self possesses modification, how is it unchangeable?

[reply] No. The supreme Self is not directly the material cause of the world, but by means of a body. The subtle body of the supreme Self, which can be expressed by the word "primary material" (pradhāna), transforms into the form of the physical world. So therefore the essential nature of the supreme Self, who is the inner controller of the body, has no loss of its unchangeable nature even though the subtle body of the supreme Self undergoes transformation into a physical form. But there is no fault even though the supreme
Self who is qualified by a body possesses modification in the manner described.

2.33. The teaching of identity of the individual souls and the inert objects with Brahman through sacred texts such as: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) and "all this which is, is this Self" (Bṛh.2.4.6.) is only figurative, being based upon the relation of a body and its possessor, but it is not a fact. A statement of non-duality is to be thought of as having the intended meaning: the supreme Self who is qualified by a body is one alone. The purport is that there is no such thing different from Brahman which is not the body of Brahman. This very non-duality of what is qualified (Viśistādvaita) is called the non-duality of the possessor of modes. Because the boundless individual souls and inert objects are the modes of Brahman and even though they are manifold and even though they are different from Brahman, Brahman who is the possessor of the modes and qualified by them is one.

This is the intended meaning of the expression: "the identity
of individual souls. The individual souls are, in reality, mutually different. However the expression "the identity of individual souls" is because even though they are different they belong to the same class in having Knowledge as their essential nature. Identity means similarity. Just as here: "that and this grain of rice are indeed identical", "that herb and this herb are indeed identical" here also [in regard to individual souls] the word "identical" has the meaning of "similar". This is certainly the purport of even the expression: "the non-duality of souls". Because even though the souls are mutually different, the mode to which they belong is identical. This is said to be the non-duality of the modes.

The statements which reject the difference among individual souls do not reject the real difference belonging to the soul. However the difference based upon the difference of bodies has been imposed upon the souls and has the form: "this is a man", "this is an animal", [the statements rejecting difference] should be understood as rejecting that [imposed difference].

2.34. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is logically possible only because the individual soul is different in each body.
Moreover, if there is one individual soul, an object experienced by Devadatta would be recollected by Yajñadatta also. If there is no recollection [by Yajñadatta] because of the loss of the mental impression, then there should be no recollection for Devadatta also. If [it is objected] the mental impression belonging to Devadatta is not lost, [it is replied] in the view that there is one individual soul it is not possible to say: "the mental impression of one person is lost and for another it is not lost".

Furthermore, if there is one individual soul, the distinction that someone is bound, someone is freed, someone is a student and someone is a teacher is not established. And the inequality of creation with the difference of gods, men, animals etc. is not logically possible. But it is not that the creation is unequal because of the difference of karma, because in the view that there is one individual soul the rule is not possible that: "this is the karma of one person and not of another person". In the same manner, even the difference of internal organs [i.e. minds] is not the determining factor for the inequality of happiness and sadness etc., because in the view that there is one individual soul even this rule is not possible: "this internal organ is only for one person and not for another". Moreover, the minuteness of the individual soul will be told. So the connection with endless bodies is all the more impossible for one minute individual soul. The difference of individual souls is proved by inference also; the self of Devadatta is different from the self of Yajñadatta. Because of the absence of recognition of the happiness etc. experienced by Yajñadatta.
2.35. It was said that the supreme Self has Knowledge as His quality. That Knowledge is not of the nature of mere existence. For mere existence is mere "is-ness". And in the knowledge: "the pot is" etc., the "is-ness" of that [pot] is an object just like the pot etc. The distinction between subject and object is certainly well known in the world. For nobody believes that an object such as a pot is of the nature of Knowledge. Accordingly, the difference of Knowledge, the subject, from the object in the form of "is-ness" must necessarily be accepted.

**Comment**

The Advaitin maintains that pure awareness is identical to pure existence and constitutes the nature of Brahman. The Visishtadvaitin, however, considers that there is neither pure awareness nor pure existence. Awareness is always in relation to a knowing subject and refers to some object. Since "is-ness" too is an object of awareness it cannot be identical to awareness.

2.36. The physical world and the subtle world which is the cause of that [physical world] always constitute the body of the supreme Self. It has been mentioned that the supreme Self is the material...
cause of the world, though only by means of a subtle body, not directly. Directly, however, the material cause of the world is only the subtle world which is the body of the supreme Self and which consists of primary matter etc. The primary matter etc. changes only because of the connection with what is sentient, in the form of the inner controller, not independently. The primary matter is composed of the three qualities and even though it can be expressed by the words "avidyā" and "māyā" it is not indeterminable. Because the two words "avidyā" and "māyā" are not employed in the manner of being indeterminable in regard to an object in the form of the primary matter. But the reason for their usage was certainly mentioned previously (2.11). Therefore, though the world is a modification of the primary matter, this is certainly real and the falsity of the world, as being an appearance, should not be imagined. Furthermore, because this world which is a modification of primary matter cannot be sublated even by the opinion of a person who has knowledge, its falsity is no way logically possible.

2.37. This teaching of modification is understood from the sutra: "On account of modification" (B.S.1.4.27.) to be the accepted view of the author of the Brahmāsūtra. Because that sutra was composed for the removal of the doubt: it is not logically possible that the supreme Brahman, who is by nature free from all defects and who consists
solely of unsurpassed knowledge and bliss, becomes manifold in the form of the manifest world which is the location of endless wrong human endeavours and hence the sacred text which makes known the resolve to become many: "He desired, 'let me become many, let me be born' " (Tai.2.6.) is contradicted. The purport of the sūtra is that Brahman, who has an extremely subtle body in the state of cosmic dissolution, resolves: "I shall have as a body the manifest world consisting of the material sentient and insentient entities, just as before" and He transforms Himself into a material form by means of a body. Thus the supreme Self does not have even a whiff of wrong human endeavour.

2.38. नन्देव श्राप्य सत्यते तत्म्याविवेत्स्व आनिर्देशति तत्त्वानेति तत्सपा नानोष्य न प्रायदिति वेदिद्यापि:। तत्सच्चाणं तु न व्ययम्।

तत्स्थानोपेयों: देवशामस्याभावानन्त्वाभावानीं सचने तत्त्वाराध्यात्मायामर्गितप्रयोगेऽ च तत्सच्चायकः। तथा हि। देवशामस्याभावान्त्वाभावानप्राप्ति तत्त्वाल्पविद्विद्विष्योऽही। देवोहिम्नियाकारका आनिर्देश। अयेथिव देवशामस्य इयुच्चयेऽ। अनात्मिनि

देव आत्मात्वविद्विष्योऽही। देवशामस्य:। न न्यादेव आत्मानि। देवशामविद्विष्येन।

जीवात्मिनि परमात्मदेववसय वस्तुतः एव सच्चातः। भर्तुवत वसय तत्स्थानान्तः गैतर्ववसयक्तेऽस्य। तेन हि। जीवे स्वात्मवसयाः विनवित्ते। जीवस्य तत्त्वाराध्यात्मायात्मायात्मायात्। अनात्: भविष्य: शास्त्राः। (७० आ० ३। २२। १४। २) य आत्माजित्वा: विद्यु:। (७० मा० २। ७। २२) सर्वस्य चाहु इदं संविद्या: (गी० ६५। १५) इन्द्रताः सर्वभूताः। हेतुविद्यु: विद्याः। (गी० ६५। २६। ६२) इवत्रिद्यात्मितप्रस्थितिः। परमात्मो जीवात्मानन्त्वविद्विष्येन। तत्सपातिः। (७० स० २। ३। ४५) इति सूक्ष्यवाः सृवकाराणामल्पितसप्तवेदः।

2.38. [objection] If the manifest world is real, the cognition of that [world as real] is not an error and there would be no destruction of that [cognition] by the knowledge of reality.

[reply] That is the desirable conclusion. However the knowledge of reality is not without use. Since an error that the body is the self and the error of independence etc., exists, therefore that
[knowledge of reality] is necessary for the purpose of removing that [error] and for the purpose of the ascertainment of the essential nature of the self. To explain. Although the body has connection with the self, since it is not the self the cognition of selfhood there in the form: "I am a man", "I am a god" is certainly an error. This is said to be the error that the body is the self. For the error that the body is the self is the cognition of selfhood in the body which is not the self. However the cognition of being a body in regard to the self which is not the body is not the error that the body is the self. Because in regard to the individual self, the nature of being the body of the supreme Self certainly exists as a reality. Rather, that [i.e. seeing oneself as the body of the supreme Self] is certainly necessary since it is included in the knowledge of reality. For due to that, the error of independence is removed in respect of the individual soul. The agentship of various actions on the part of the individual soul is certainly dependent upon the supreme Self who has entered within that [soul].

For the sacred texts and the tradition teach very clearly that the supreme Self, after entering within the individual soul, does the controlling of that [soul]: "the ruler who has entered within" (Tai.A.3.11.2.), "He who dwells in the self" (Bṛh.3.7.22.), "I am seated in the heart of all" (G.15.15.), "Arjuna, the Lord dwells in the heart of all beings" (G.18.61.). This is certainly the accepted view of the author of the sūtras as well, who composed the sūtra: "But that [agentship] is from the Highest, on account of the sacred text" (B.S.2.3.40.).
2.39. Even the modification which continually occurs for inert objects such as milk is certainly dependent upon the Lord who is the inner-controller. The modification of the body is twofold. One occurs for the living body due to the difference of stages such as childhood etc. The other occurs for that same body after death. This modification, though of two types, is certainly dependent upon the Lord. Even though the first occurs due to the connection with the individual soul, it is not dependent upon the individual soul. Because such modification is an object of the Lord's will only due to the connection with the individual soul. An individual soul or an inert object has no independence at all distinct from the supreme Self.

When the error that the body is the self and the error of independence has been removed by the knowledge of reality a person engages in the adoration etc. of the Lord who is independent, not otherwise. So only the error that the body is the self etc. is able to be removed by the knowledge of reality. But the reality of the manifest world is not able to be removed. Because the entire manifest world, which is a modification of the primary matter, is real.

2.40. शुचिकायां महतियमां रजतमां सदेव महतीयते। असत: महतिरसभवात्।

इतरथा किंमिति शुचिकायां रजस्तमां महतीयरे न प्रमाणादर्व॥ सादर्यतर्कवर्ग

महत्यक्त हति तु न संभवति। तत: शुचिकायं

स्वप्नाति: रजसादर्य रजस्तमांस्तम्कोवः कुस्त्रितत्वा स्नायेण तु ज्ञातानां

शुचिकायं रजस्तमां सर्वं चित्तिमां। पवार्याः पुरुष-व्याधीनाः पुजार्याः पवित्रकरपेन सर्वं

सर्वं सभेन् शुचिकार्य-वृत्तिः तेजसो रजस्तमांगतः सत्सत्। किं प्—
2.40. Even the silver which is perceived in a pearl-oyster is recognized as certainly real. Because cognition of what is not real is impossible. Otherwise, why is it that silver alone is recognized in the pearl-oyster and not a pot or a cloth etc.? It is not possible that: "silver is recognized on account of similarity". Because the similarity of the pearl-oyster to silver would produce the recollection of silver by means of recalling to memory the mental impression of silver. But it would not produce the perception of silver.

However the existence of silver in the pearl-oyster is in this manner; because all the five elements such as earth exist everywhere [i.e. in each other] due to their fivefold combination, therefore silver, which is fire, exists partially in earth which is in the form of the pearl-oyster. Moreover according to the method which has been told:"whatever possesses a part of a substance is similar to it" the existence of itself partially in a thing similar to it is unavoidable. The existence even of a snake etc. perceived upon a rope etc. is to be understood in just the same manner. However the expression: "the cognition of silver etc. in a pearl-oyster etc. is error" is because the portion of silver is minute with regard to the portion of pearl-oyster. But it is not because the silver, even partially, does not exist.

2.41. जपाकु-सम्बन्धप्रवचितस्मार्काम् शतीप्रविष्टो
रक्षितापि सत्य एव | यथा जयानमश्मचन्द्रदश्यायं सत्य एवोणस्येनः
संयुक्तसम्प्रवेशेऽवल्हो भासत उपम जनभिभिः तथा स्मार्कसंयुक्तायो जपाकु-सम्प्रबायाय विविधायाः सत्य एव रक्षिता स्मार्कस्मिन मासेन रक्षः स्मार्क स्मारकि इति |
2.41. Even the redness perceived in a crystal situated close to a red flower is certainly real. Just as the real sensation of heat belonging to the substance fire which has entered into water appears in the water, due to the inherence in what is conjoined, so that: "the water is hot", in just the same manner, the real redness existing in the lustre of a red flower which is in contact with a crystal appears in the crystal so that: "the crystal is red". This does not result in the unreality of the object. Though the lustre of the red flower is diffused in all directions, because the crystal is a transparent substance it is clearly perceived there alone and not elsewhere.

Even the yellow colour perceived in the cognition: "the conch shell is yellow" is certainly real. That [yellow colour] belongs to the substance bile. [The perception of the yellow conch shell is] because the rays of the eyes, which are connected to the substance bile located within the eyes of the person seeing, have conjunction with the conch shell.

Even the objects such as elephants and horses etc. seen in dream are certainly real, as they are produced by the Lord. Although those objects are experienced only by the person who sees them and not by others and in that same way are destroyed in an instant, still there
is no defect because the Lord, who has inconceivable power, possesses the capacity to produce such objects.

Even the face perceived in a mirror is certainly real. Because the rays of the eyes which have struck the mirror are reversed from it and are connected with one's own face. Thus there is the apprehension, i.e., the cognition, everywhere of an object which is certainly real. There is nowhere cognition of the unreal. This is indeed designated as: "the apprehension of the real."

**Comment**

The Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition upholds the view that: "all cognition is true to its object."\(^{95}\) This means all knowledge is intrinsically valid since it always has, as its object, something which really exists. Such a position is called: "the apprehension of the real" (satkhyāti) or "the apprehension of the object as it is" (yathārthakhyaṭi).\(^{96}\)

If all cognition is true to its object, the possibility of error would seem to be precluded. Rāmānuja, however, does not deny the fact of perceptual error for he considers that: "the existence [of one thing] in another manner must be accepted."\(^{97}\) His use of the expression "in another manner" (anyathā) suggests that Rāmānuja's position is in accord with the Naiyāyika explanation of error as: "the apprehension in another manner" (anyathākhyāti). However the similarity is only in so far as Rāmānuja agrees with the Naiyāyikas' that one thing, such as a pearl-oyster, can appear in another manner in the form of a piece of silver. He accepts anyathākhyāti to this extent, but he does not consider that the object of error, such as the silver, is something illusory. In accordance with satkhyāti, Rāmānuja maintains that all, even erroneous, cognition has a real entity for its object.

On account of the threefold combination of the elements described in Chāndogya 6.3.3. or the fivefold combination enumerated in Taittirīya 2.1. (see text 1.37), each element contains lesser portions of the other elements. When a pearl-oyster is seen as silver, the perception is true because real silver is perceived. This is because minute portions of silver, which are of the nature of the element fire or light (tejas), actually exist in the pearl-oyster which is of the nature of the element earth. Due to an ocular defect the predominant shell portion is not recognised and only the minute silver is seen.
Thus there is error in so far as the pearl-oyster is apprehended as silver, however the cognition of silver is not illusory since it is real silver that is perceived. In the case of the erroneous perception of two moons, Ramanuja explains that the visual apparatus of the eye becomes divided through such causes as cataract or by pressure of the finger upon the eye. One apparatus apprehends the moon in its own location. The other moves at a tangent and apprehends a place near the moon and also the moon disassociated from its actual location. Because there is a real division of the visual apparatus, there is a real twofold apprehension and on account of the reality of the two apprehensions the double aspect of the object, the moon, is also real. While there is error because the moon appears double, the second moon is not illusory because it is the real moon which is being cognized.

Although Ramanuja accepts that objects appear in a different manner, he does not make an ontological distinction between a valid and an erroneous cognition. The object perceived in each case is real. Viśiṣṭadvaitins, however, explain that knowledge is valid when it is: "in accord with practical life as it really is." Thus while all knowledge is true since it has a real object, valid knowledge must accord with the ordinary relations of life.

2.42. Because the manifest world is certainly real, therefore the scripture too, which is included within that [world] is real. The knowledge produced by that [scripture] is called "true knowledge". Because otherwise even the knowledge which is produced from an unreal scripture is unreal and thus that [the scripture] is a means for liberation would be difficult to demonstrate. For there is no satisfaction through sweets which are [merely] hoped for, nor is an action such as bathing accomplished with mirage water.
2.43. Thus everywhere, the cognition which arises about an existing object is produced by the group of three means of knowledge. The group of three means of knowledge are: perception, inference and verbal testimony. In regard to these, perception is the instrument of valid knowledge which causes direct apprehension. Valid knowledge is the knowledge which is in accord with practical life as it really is. There is the exclusion of inference etc. by distinguishing valid [perceptual] knowledge as: "causing direct apprehension". Because in the case of inference etc., valid knowledge does not cause direct apprehension. The sense organ is the instrument of valid knowledge in regard to the perceptual knowledge of a pot etc., which is in contact with the sense organ. That is indeed the means of knowledge through perception. The knowledge produced by that is called "perception".

It is figurative that Knowledge, which is eternal, can be produced by a sense organ. Just as the birth of an eternal soul is figurative on account of its connection with a body, so too, the production of Knowledge is figurative when its expansion occurs due to the connection with a sense object.

Comment

The definition of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) as: "knowledge which is in accord with practical life as it really is" can be found in the Yatindramatadīpikā, Para.7,p.5. This is the definition given by Vedānta Deśika in his work, Nyāyaparipūṣṭhi.101
2.44. Perception is twofold, due to the distinction between being indeterminate and being determinate. The knowledge of an object distinguished by its qualities, configuration etc., which occurs firstly, is indeterminate. The configuration is the particular arrangement of the component parts. For example, when a cow is first seen there is the knowledge: "this is a cow". Because here, even though there is knowledge of the object cow, distinguished by cowness which has the form of a particular arrangement of the component parts, the persisting form of cowness is not recognized in the manner that: "this cowness is common to another individual cow". Therefore, because a determination in the manner of a persisting form is not perceived here, it is called "indeterminate". Whereas the knowledge of a second [cow] etc. is "determinate". Because there [in determinate perception], cowness is known as having a persisting form so that [one knows]: "the cowness which is in this manner is common to another individual cow".

However the definition of indeterminate told by the Naiyāyikas
is not correct: "indeterminate knowledge does not apprehend an attribute, substantive, or a relation [between attribute and substantive], it is bereft of the connection with name, class etc.". Because such a type of knowledge does not exist anywhere. The perception of a mere class or a mere individual is not possible, because a class, in the form of the configuration, and an individual, are to be known through the same causal apparatus.

The self is united with the mind. The mind is united with the sense organ. The sense organ is united with the object. From that, there is perceptual knowledge. Perception never takes place without the connection between the sense organ and the object. Because, as a rule, the sense organs bring about the illumination of attainable objects. The connection between the sense organ and the object is twofold: conjunction and dependence upon what is conjoined [with the sense organ]. In regard to those, the connection between the sense organ and an object in regard to the perception of a substance is "conjunction". Whereas in regard to the perception of qualities etc. located in the substance, [the connection] has the form of "dependence upon what is conjoined". Because qualities etc. depend upon a substance which is conjoined with the sense organ.

Comment

Rāmānuja's explanation of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception follows that of the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara. The first instant when an object is perceived is said to be "indeterminate". At that time, the specific features of the object and its generic character are perceived, however the generic character is not recognized as common to all other individuals of the same class. The perception of another cow at a later time is called "determinate" because there is the recognition that the generic character i.e. the "cowness" of the cow perceived firstly, is common to all cows.

Indeterminate perception does not apprehend the mere generic character, or as the Naiyāyikas and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas maintain, the mere individual (vyakti) possessing specific features and a generic
character which has not yet been discriminated. Prabhākara and Rāmānuja maintain that all cognition apprehends the individual qualified by the relation with the specific features and the generic character.

According to Rāmānuja, the generic character (jāti) is nothing but the configuration (saṃsthāna) of the object. The configuration is "the particular arrangement of the component parts". For example the generic character of cowness is the configuration common to all cows such as having a certain type of dewlap and other common features.

2.45. According to another mode, perception is twofold: ancient and recent. The first occurs for the eternal souls [i.e. the eternally liberated souls], the liberated souls and the Lord. Whereas the "recent" occurs for people such as us who are in dependence upon the sense organs. However the "recent" which is not dependent upon the sense organs is twofold: self-accomplished and divine. "Self-accomplished" is for Yogis, whereas the "divine" is for the Lord's devotees and is produced through the grace of the Lord.

The knowledge produced by a sentence such as: "you are the tenth", "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) etc. is only verbal knowledge, not perception. Because that [knowledge] cannot be produced from the cause which has been told, as it is being produced from the respective words.

comment
Saṅkara considers that verbal testimony can produce the immediate (aparokṣa) knowledge of Brahman free from distinction (see comment to 1.48. and 1.53.). Rāmānuja disagrees and argues that a sentence cannot
Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of the pervader from the knowledge of the pervaded as being pervaded. Inference is the means for that [inferential knowledge]. Here [in the inference]: "the hill is possessed of fire, because of smoke", because the smoke existing on the hill is remembered as being pervaded by fire in the manner: "smoke is pervaded by fire", the knowledge of fire which is the pervader of that [smoke] arises. That is indeed inferential knowledge. The means for that is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire and the knowledge of [smoke] existing in the subject [i.e. on the hill]. That is indeed inference.

When, after the knowledge of the invariable concomitance and the attribute [i.e. the existence of smoke] on the subject [the hill], the
inferential knowledge arises, no requirement whatsoever is seen for the subsumptive reflection of the sign in the form of the knowledge of the attribute existing in the subject qualified by invariable concomitance, which is accepted by the Naiyāyikas in between [(a) the knowledge of concomitance and the knowledge of the attribute in the subject and (b) inferential knowledge]. Because subsumptive reflection is not the determining factor since the sequence relates to the apprehension: firstly there is the perception of smoke on the hill, then there is the knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire and subsequently there is inferential knowledge.

Invariable concomitance is the invariable relation in the manner: where there is smoke there is fire. That [concomitance] is twofold due to the distinction between co-presence and co-absence. Pervasion of co-presence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the affirmation of what is to be proved upon the affirmation of the ground [i.e. the reason]. For instance: whatever has smoke has fire. Pervasion of co-absence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the negation of the ground upon the negation of what is to be proved. For instance: what has no fire has no smoke. So because two types of invariable concomitance exist, smoke is a reason which possesses co-presence and co-absence.

Some types of reason have only co-presence. For instance: Brahman can be expressed by a word, because it is a thing, like a pot. Here, any illustration of the pervasion of co-absence: what cannot be expressed by a word is also not an object, is impossible.

A reason which has only co-absence is not seen anywhere. Because in a case such as: the earth possesses smell on account of being earth, there is no possibility of pervasion in co-absence since what is to be proved i.e. the possession of smell, is not known anywhere else and so the invariable concomitance of its absence is difficult to be apprehended.
The technicalities of inference are explained in Athalye’s Ed. of Tarkasaṅgraha. Also, cf. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic.

2.47. Inference is of two types due to the distinction of being for oneself and being for another person. With regard to those two, the Naiyāyikas [consider] that a sentence communicating an inference, in respect of inference for another person, is endowed with five members: the proposition, reason, illustration, application and conclusion. Those members can be understood from the books of the logicians. The Mīmāṃsakas teach three members: the proposition, reason and illustration. The Buddhists teach two members: the illustration and the application. In reality, however, there is no rule about the number of members. Because people of slow intellect require five members. For people of sharp intellect, [the inference] is accomplished by only three members. Whereas for people of sharper intellect, by only two members.

2.48. अनात्मकभिषाधिकारायज्ञायामां तदर्थायामां ज्ञात्वात्सनम् । तत्कारण वाक्यायः गृहः । चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं वाक्यायागतायामां न भवति । अत आत्मकारिण्यज्ञात्वायामां अभिषालिङ्गोऽनुभवति । त च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं न भवति । ज्ञात्वात्सनम्, ज्ञात्वात्सनम् अभिषालिङ्गादिवृत्तिः । अभिषालिङ्गादिवृत्तिः, ज्ञात्वात्सनम् अभिषालिङ्गादिवृत्तिः । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति । न च चेतनापूर्वकतार्थिकं भवति ।
2.48. Verbal knowledge is knowledge whose meaning is produced from a sentence different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person. The means for that [knowledge] is a word having the form of that type of sentence. The Veda is not uttered by a trustworthy person since it is not composed by the Lord, because it has no personal origin. Therefore having not said: uttered by a trustworthy person, it was said: different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person. The Veda is not uttered by an untrustworthy person, therefore it is certainly a means of knowledge.

Manusmṛti, Bhārata etc. are a means of knowledge on account of being different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person, for they are uttered by trustworthy persons such as Manu etc. In regard to those texts, the whole Veda is the means of knowledge. Because invalidity is known from the defect of the agent or from the validity of a sublating knowledge. There is no possibility of a defect on the part of the agent because the Veda has no agent as it is eternal. Nor is there a sublating knowledge anywhere which is a means of knowledge for a meaning which has been taught by the Veda. The traditions etc. which teach a meaning contrary to the Veda have no validity in that portion. However there is certainly validity in the other portion.

The scripture known as the Śrī Pañcarātra has validity in its entirety because there is no contradiction to the Veda anywhere. There is not even the possibility of a defect of the agent in it, on account of the expression: "Nārāyaṇa himself is the teacher of the entire Pañcarātra". Hence it has been told in the Varāhapurāṇa:
In the want of the Veda mantras, those people will gain Me who act according to the practice communicated by the Pañcarātra.

2.49. The prior part of the Veda teaches about ritual action. The latter part teaches about Brahman. The prior section teaches the action of worshiping. The latter section teaches the object of worship.

In the prior part there is an investigation of action. In regard to that, there is a sūtra work of Jaimini consisting of twelve chapters. In the latter part there is the investigation about Brahman. In regard to that, there is a sūtra work of Vyāsa consisting of four chapters. Both investigations being united, there is a single scripture. Because even in both places, only dharma is being taught. For dharma is the supramundane means of liberation. That [dharma] taught by the prior part is action etc. which has the nature of something to be accomplished.

Whereas the dharma taught by the latter part is of the nature of Brahman which is already an existing fact [not to be accomplished].
A sentence is of two types: scriptural and secular. This sentence, of both types, communicates its meaning through a primary or secondary denotation. If the purport is not logically possible when the meaning is communicated through the primary denotation, then the secondary denotation must be accepted. For example, the implied meaning of the word "Ganges" here: "the cowherd village is on the Ganges" is "on the bank". Similarly, the implied meaning of the word "That" which denotes Brahman here: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is in the sense of "the body of Brahman". Implication is everywhere only "exclusive implication". In the case of the sentence: "the insects are entering, the curd must be protected from the crows", when there is the implied meaning of the word insect in the sense of "like an insect" and the implied meaning of the word crow in the sense of "spoiling of the curd" there is certainly the relinquishment of its own meaning in an implied sense. Because even if there is the entry of an insect or a crow, which is the literal meaning, there is no entry in a manner which is restricted to the literal meaning.

Ramanuja employs two principles in interpreting the sentence: "you are That" (tat tvam asi). The first is according to his conception of the meaning of words. The other relates to the rule of grammatical apposition (samanadhikaraṇya) (see comment to 2.26). Ramanuja maintains that all words finally denote the supreme Self because He has all souls and matter as His body. Just as the word "man" really denotes the indwelling soul, so too even the word "I" ultimately expresses the supreme Self who is the indweller of the soul. In the sentence: "you are That", the word "That" denotes Brahman who is the cause of the world and the possessor of all auspicious qualities. The word "you" also expresses Brahman, who has as His body the individual soul possessed of a body. Because both the words "you" and "That" refer to Brahman, Ramanuja considers that his interpretation
agrees with the principle whereby grammatical apposition is meant to express a single object existing in a twofold manner.\textsuperscript{110}

2.51. In the inclusion of the group of three means of knowledge: comparison, postulation and non-cognition, in the three which have been told. To explain. Some person who does not know about an ox hears a statement from a forester that a cow is just like an ox and having gone to the forest he remembers the meaning of the statement. When he sees an object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, there arises the knowledge of the object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, assisted by the recollection of the meaning of that statement. That [knowledge] is called comparison. It is included within perception, because it is of the nature of recollection. It is included in inference, because it depends upon the apprehension of invariable concomitance. It is included within verbal testimony, since it is produced by a statement. Knowledge which consists of recollection is only a variety of perception.

2.52. In the inclusion of the group of three means of knowledge: comparison, postulation and non-cognition, in the three which have been told. To explain. Some person who does not know about an ox hears a statement from a forester that a cow is just like an ox and having gone to the forest he remembers the meaning of the statement. When he sees an object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, there arises the knowledge of the object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, assisted by the recollection of the meaning of that statement. That [knowledge] is called comparison. It is included within perception, because it is of the nature of recollection. It is included in inference, because it depends upon the apprehension of invariable concomitance. It is included within verbal testimony, since it is produced by a statement. Knowledge which consists of recollection is only a variety of perception.
2.52. Postulation is the supposition of a fact which logically establishes itself due to a fact being [otherwise] not logically possible. For example, if fatness is observed in Davadatta who does not eat by day, since thereby fatness is not logically possible, there is the supposition of the fact of eating at night which logically establishes itself. This [postulation] is included within inference. Because that which makes [something else] logically possible i.e. eating at night etc., is seen to be indeed the pervader of the fatness etc. which is to be made logically possible: "wherever there is fatness co-ordinate with not eating during the day, there is eating during the night". Hence it is said:

There is no unintelligibility for what is not controlled [i.e. pervaded]. Nor does a non-controller [i.e. non-pervader] make [something] logically possible (Nyā.Ku.3.19.).

"What is not controlled" (aniyamya) means what is not pervaded. Intelligibility means logical possibility. "Unintelligibility" (ayukti) means there is no logical possibility. If there is no logical possibility of the postulating factor [e.g. fatness] in the absence of the thing to be postulated [i.e. eating at night], then that [postulating factor] becomes the postulator for that thing [which is to be postulated i.e. eating at night]. But if the postulating factor is not pervaded [i.e. fatness is not pervaded by eating at night], then that [postulating factor] certainly has no logical impossibility even in the absence of a thing to be postulated. Similarly, a "non-controller" (aniyantya) i.e. a non-pervader, does not make [the postulating factor] logically possible. That is the sense. Thus the establishment is only through inference, because the thing to be made
logically possible and what makes [it] logically possible necessarily have a pervaded-pervader relation. So postulation should not be admitted as separate.

2.53. एवंमुख्यविद्या: ज्ञात्वे‌न्तरकार्यरति. अनुपलब्धिमाणेन हि सत्यभावन्तः ग्रहणं न भावसः। तथा इत्यं मनुष्योपपलब्धिमाणेन गृहः मनुष्याभावः झालेति। परं त्वमावो न भावस्तति: कथन पदार्थं:।
अनुपुक्षितवां मनयणा: किं तु भावात्तरस्तरस्त: पुरुषः। तथा हि। इत्यं नस्तरः। मनुष्यावाहि केवलमुहूर्तस्य:। केवलमूर्तैं शून्यतं:। तव: भावसः भवात्तरायोपकार्येत। पुरुषं यत्माद्भावाः शुद्धं। यत्नस्वस्त: कवाल्मेन। यत्नेद्भूष पदार्थस्तं तत्त्वस्तवार्थस्वस्वकेलिश्च पुनः।

2.53. So too, non-cognition is included within perception. Because through the means of knowledge known as non-cognition there is everywhere the apprehension of only non-existence, not of existence. For example, the non-existence of a man in the house is known through the absence of cognition of a man in the house. Non-existence, however, is not some category different from existence. Rather, it is only the nature of another existence. For instance, the non-existence of a man in the house is the nature of only the house. "Only the house" means the empty house and that is an existent entity cognized only through perception. Similarly, the prior non-existence of a pot is only clay and the destruction of the pot is only the pieces. The difference of a pot from cloth etc. is only the particular arrangement of the component parts.

2.54. विशृष्टिः ममाङ्कुपर्यावरोतनं द्वारस्त्रविपयाणं ज्ञानं वस्तुतं एव् जीवनिः। जीवमूर्तम्। न तस्मान् ममान्तमन्ग्राहास्य गुणभूतानोपेतिः: जीवस्त्रवमूर्तवाहनं गतार्थवतं बहुः शब्दं। अर्थानाधीनि ज्ञानं च ज्ञातस्त्रवेऽवाचमूर्तत्त्वस्य।
तथा यथासततमस्माणिन्यस्य: तत्वाविविधेयं वा। यथानुस्त्रवाधिकृत्विविधेयं तदपर्यर्थीदिद्रमूर्तत्त्वस्य। इत्यर्थात् यथा अक्षरं ( २० २ २ २ २ ) इत्त्वादिशृङ्ख्विपुरुस्वविद्यमानं ज्ञानिविशेषस्य:।
परमस्त्रतरायोपकार्यं द्वारस्त्रविपयाणस्वविद्यमानं। न हि कार्यं कृत्तं किम्। भवितं। न च जीवोऽज्ञानस्त्रवमूर्तः। सर्वस्त्रतरायं ज्ञान-अय इति। भास्त। इति। वाच्यमृ। नां ज्ञानाभ्यं किंतु ज्ञानस्त्रवमूर्त्वेऽवाचमृ।
2.54. The knowledge of seen and unseen objects arising through the three means of knowledge which have been mentioned is, in reality, located in the individual soul as a quality of the soul. It is not possible to say that this knowledge produced by a means of knowledge is [already] referred to by the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the soul. Because there is the experience of that knowledge [arising from a means of knowledge] as separate from the individual soul in the mental perception: "I know", "knowledge has arisen in me". Similarly, when the knowledge relating to what is favourable or unfavourable is inferred in Davadatta etc. due to the brightness of countenance or by a troubled countenance, or by movement in such a manner, then too, the knowledge which is to be proved is inferred as indeed separate from the subject, Devadatta etc., as it is located in that [subject i.e. Devadatta]. Similarly, the vision of the supreme Self etc., which is a particular knowledge taught in the sacred texts such as: "my dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Bṛh.2.4.5.), is taught as certainly separate from the individual soul who is the seer. Because the agent certainly does not become the action anywhere.

It should not be said that the individual soul, being only of the nature of Knowledge, appears as a locus of Knowledge due to error. [reason] Because a sublating knowledge in the manner that: "I am not the locus of Knowledge, but only of the nature of Knowledge" is not seen at any time. Furthermore, the knowersh of the individual soul, which
is established by the sacred texts etc., is logically demonstrated because Knowledge is certainly separate from the individual soul as it is located in that [soul]. For instance there are the sacred texts: "then he knows" (Ch.8.12.4.), "the one who knows [Brahman] situated in the intellect" (Tai.2.1.1.), "this person indeed knows", "the one who sees, does not see death" (Ch.7.26.2.), "Thus indeed...for the all seeing person" (Pr.6.5.). There is also the tradition: "He who is undeluded knows me thus, the Highest Person" (G.15.19.). The knowership of the individual soul is established [by the words]: "for this very reason [the soul] is a knower" (B.S.2.3.19.) and this is in agreement with the essence of the sūtras.

comment
See 2.10. and following comment.

2.55. अहं ज्ञाति प्रथये ज्ञानमहिकारिः भास्ते नवकायविद्यत तु न-वचनायम्। आत्मन एव तथाक्षर्द्वारं विश्वं। तथा हि। अहंकारस्तेभव्या द्वाराय अहंकारो ज्ञाति मिने। इद्वादेनीयपन्यानां मिथों मित्रों। तत्त्वाकारो गोबंद्रानाम यदौवृत्तविश्वेष्य। अर्थ च विश्व-विरोपित्वानुसर्युणां स्वाभाविक एव। अन्येन्त्राक्षरः सेवनमुप्रत्तवेन गीताया महामहूत्तमकारः (G.10 13 4) इत्येक्कः। अहंभवस्तु न विश्वार्थोषी।
एकालोक्यो इत्यद्वैता आत्मस्वप्नं परावशाति। अस्याद्विभागं जायत् । सम्म सुपूर्तिः मोक्षेऽस सर्वत्र वार्तेः अर्थ च न केवल जीवसंगम। किं तु परमात्मनोपरि।
हन्तामभिमतिस्वतः देवता। (7.6 3 2) इत्यायु जगदगच्छोऽहृतं तत्त्वान्यतेयम्यस्तस्तिशोषस्तস्वरुपवस्तः।
पूर्वभृतात्मकाययोग्यो गीतायायाम। इत्यते न लेभक्तः (G.10 2 12), अहं लक्ष्मणस्य (G.10 7 6) इत्यादी। एवं चाहै ज्ञाति प्रथये इत्यद्वैता आत्मस्वप्निनिधिस्स्ये। श्री ज्ञानमहिकायमेव न स्वंकारगतिम्यस्मि सिद्धम्।

2.55. It should not be said that the Knowledge in the cognition: "I know" appears as located in the I-notion, but it is not located in the self. [reason] Because the self alone is the meaning of the word "I" there [in the sentence: "I know"]. To explain. Though the two, the I-notion and I-ness, are referred to by the word "I", they are mutually distinct. In regard to those two, the I-notion is another name for pride and it is a particular modification of the mind. This is
certainly to be given up by a person who desires liberation because it is contrary to knowledge. This very I-notion has been told here in the Gītā: "The great elements, the I-notion..." (G.13.5.) as being included within the field [i.e. the non-self].

However "I-ness" is not contrary to knowledge. The word "I", which directly denotes this [I-ness], refers to the essential nature of the self. This I-ness exists indeed everywhere: in waking, in dream, in deep sleep and in liberation. This exists not only just for the individual soul, but also for the supreme Self. Because the use of the word "I" which shows the essential nature of His own self can be seen in the sacred text here: "I, [having entered] these three deities..." (Ch.6.3.2.), in regard to the resolve of the supreme Self, prior to the origination of the world, relating to the origination of the world. The use of the word "I" in that manner is seen in the Gītā also: "Never did I [not exist]" (G.2.12.), "I am [the source and dissolution] of the entire [world]" (G.7.6.). So the word "I" in the cognition: "I know" points out the essential nature of the self. Thus it is established that Knowledge is indeed located in the self but it is not located in the I-notion.
2.56. The Knowledge which is a quality of the individual self does not pervade only its locus, like colour etc. Just as the qualities of a light [i.e. a lamp flame] such as colour, sensation, number, dimension etc. occur only as the essential nature of the light, Knowledge does not exist in that manner i.e. only as the essential nature of the soul. But just as the lustre of a light, though existing with dependence upon the light, pervades the entire house which is the location of the light, so too, even though Knowledge exists with dependence upon the individual soul it pervades the whole body which is the location of the soul.

It should not be thought that the individual soul itself pervades the whole body. [reason] Because that [soul] is of a minute size. Accordingly, there is the sacred text: "...for [the soul] is seen to be even less, merely the point of an awl" (Sv. 5.8.).

The individual soul is to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundredfold. And that [soul] is capable of limitlessness. (Sv. 5.8.9.)

Also, the sacred text concerning the departure [of the soul]: "the self departs from the eye or the head" (Bṛh. 4.4.2.) agrees for this very reason. The author of the sūtras has also demonstrated that the individual soul is certainly of a minute nature, through sūtras such as: "On account of [its] departure, moving and returning" (B.S. 2.3.20). It need not be doubted that if the individual soul is minute, the experience of happiness etc. pervading the body is impossible. [reason] Because that [experience] is logically possible even through the pervasion by the attributive consciousness.
2:57. This Knowledge which is a quality of the individual soul has a contracted nature in the state of bondage because of karma. It becomes expanded in the state of liberation when there is dissolution of the bondage characterized by karma by reaching the supreme light. Therefore, effort must necessarily be applied for that end [liberation].

In regard to that, the sequence has been indicated in this manner: at first, subsequent to investiture with the sacred thread, there is the undertaking of studying the Veda along with its auxiliaries in accordance with the injunction: "one should study one's own portion". Then, having understood the meaning of the Veda in a general way, he undertakes listening to the Pūrvamīmamsā for the ascertainment of that [meaning]. Then he ascertains: "the nature of action is like this and its result is of this type". Having observed there in the sacred texts that the result of actions is insignificant and transient: "just as here, the world which is acquired by work perishes, in just the same way there in the other world, the world which is acquired by merit perishes" (Ch.8.1.6.) etc. So too, having
observed in the sacred texts that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is not insignificant and is permanent: "the knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tai.2.1.1.), "the one who sees, does not see death" (Ch.7.26.2.), "he becomes self-sovereign" (Ch.7.25.2.) etc., he undertakes listening to the Uttaramāmāsā for the ascertainment of that [Brahman].

Not only is there no attainment of what is desired i.e. liberation, from work which is performed with the intention of a result such as heaven, on the contrary, there is the attainment of what is not desired i.e. the contraction of Knowledge. Therefore, giving up such work, the supreme Person should be worshipped with a mind endowed with devotion. [The soul] who is accepted by Him as His own enjoys limitless enjoyments along with Him.

2.58. This state is not for one who is living. Because as long as this body which is acquired by karma exists, the happiness and sadness which are to be experienced by it are not to be avoided. And because divine enjoyment is not possible through that ordinary body. Moreover the sacred text: "there is a delay for him only so long as he is not liberated [from the body], then he will attain" (Ch.6.14.2.) excludes liberation while living by saying that the liberation of a person who possesses knowledge, who remains in the knowledge of the real, depends only upon the fall of the body.
2.59. After the fall of this body, the liberated soul assumes a divine body and he remains experiencing the supreme Self as He is; bereft of even a speck of blemish, endowed with boundless happiness, consisting of all auspicious qualities together with possessing great power and he experiences countless divine enjoyments which are willed by the supreme Self and he thinks that: "I am the servant of the supreme Self".

[objection] If the liberated soul is a servant of the supreme Self, the happiness of liberation would not be a human goal because sorrow cannot be avoided in service. And there is no logical possibility of activity on the part of the people for liberation, on account of what has been said by the tradition: "service has been called the condition of a dog, therefore one should avoid it" (Manu. 4.6.).
[reply] That is not so. Because there is not even a trace of sorrow when service has been brought about by the love between both the one to be served and the servant. Hence it has been told in the Paramāṣadhitā: "my servants are always free from affliction".

There is no identity of the individual self and the supreme Self in liberation. Because there is no possibility of non-difference for two things which are distinct. The difference between the individual self and the supreme Self, while in the state of bondage, has certainly been demonstrated before. In the Viṣṇupurāṇa too, it is said that non-difference is impossible: "because one substance does not become [another] substance" (Viṣ.P.2.14.27.). And because difference has been established in the state of liberation as well, on account of the sacred text:

"knowing the self and the Mover to be separate, then being blessed by Him, he [the self] attains immortality" (Sv.1.6.). And the state of liberation is free from a final limit with regard to time. Because by the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch.8.15.1,) it is made known that the liberated soul has no further return to worldly existence. This very thing has certainly been taught by the Brāhmaśūtra: "non-return according to scripture" (B.S.4.4.22.).
Thus the categories have been taught according to the view of Rāmānuja. With regard to those, there are categories which appear to be different and which are also accepted as different categories by the logicians. In reality, they are not different but are included in what has already been told. To explain. There is the inclusion of earth, water, fire, air, space and mind in the primary matter since they have their basis in the primary matter. Darkness, however, is not different as it is only earth. There is the inclusion of the directions such as east, south etc. in space, because east etc. have the nature of being different parts of space distinguished according to the connection with the sun. Disjunction is only the absence of conjunction. Separateness is also the same. Number, size, fluidity and viscosity are the nature of their respective locations. Remoteness and proximity, which are brought about by location, are the characteristics of location. Remoteness and proximity, which are brought about by time, are the characteristics of time.

Merit is the love of the Lord. Demerit is the absence of such love. Love is only a particular type of Knowledge. Intelligence, happiness, sadness, desire, aversion, effort and reminiscent impression are only particular types of Knowledge. Speed is a particular type of action. Elasticity is a particular type of conjunction. There is the inclusion of upward motion, downward motion, contraction and expansion within motion. And motion is only a particular type of conjunction. Weight is a particular type of potency.

The generic attribute of potness etc. are the particulars of
the respective forms. Attributes such as being knowable, spaciousness, Lordship, being Devadatta etc. are the characteristics of the locus. It was demonstrated previously that non-existence is not [something] different, but is only another form of existence (2.53.). So too, the inclusion of the means of knowledge as well, such as comparison etc., has been mentioned previously (2.51, 52, 53.).

The qualities of the individual self such as desire, anger etc. are only particular states of the attributive consciousness of the individual self. But the sacred text: "desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shyness, intelligence and fear: all these are just the mind" (Bṛh.1.5.3.) must be understood as figurative because desire etc. necessarily accompany the mind.

**comment**

In this manner, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins subsume the nine substances and twenty-four qualities enumerated by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (cf. Athalye's edition of Tarka-Samgraha, p.73f.) into their own schema. See comment to 2.5. Also, cf. Yatindramatadipika, Para.17 and 18. p.151f. The mention of darkness (tamas) is with reference to the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā which holds that darkness is a substance.
The teaching of Śrī Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja has been explained. Now, these two types of teachings are concisely told for the ease of understanding the principal conclusions set out here.

The teaching of the exponents of non-duality, who follow the views derived from Śaṅkara:

(1) Reality is one alone, it is the Self. There is nothing other.

(2) Anything at all other than the Self is not real: whether it belongs to the same class as the Self, to a different class from the Self or is located in the Self. The Self is indeed bereft of the threefold difference: internal
division, having something belonging to the same class or something belonging to a different class.

(3) The Self is free from distinction. It cannot be said in any way that it is "such and such".

(4) For this very reason, that [Self] is free from qualities. Even the qualities which produce what is good do not exist there [in the Self] in reality.

(5) A quality, even in the form of Knowledge, does not exist there [in the Self]. That [Self] produce what is good and which belong to Himself.

(3) The Self possesses distinction. Endowed with such distinctions as omniscience, eternity, pervasiveness etc., it is able to be expressed by words such as: "all knowing", "eternal", "pervasive" etc.

(4) The Self is by nature the locus of many groups of qualities which produce what is good, such as being free from sin etc. Qualities which are to be given up do not exist there [in the Self].

(5) Though that [Self] is Knowledge by its very nature, it is the locus of the quality of Knowledge. The
Knowledge which is a quality is indeed different from the Knowledge which characterizes the essential nature.

(6) Therefore, in reality there is certainly knowership for that [Self]. For this very reason, He is designated to be a "knower".

(7) That [Self] is certainly also an object of knowledge. Since the Knowledge which is a quality is different from the Self, therefore it is possible to have the locus of that [Knowledge which is a quality] and its object in the Self.

(8) The supreme Self is unchangeably eternal in His own nature. But He is eternal while
is without a second.

(9) For this very reason, it is said that Brahman is "non-dual".

(9) Brahman is non-dual, but it is not non-duality of the modes but rather non-duality of the possessor of the modes. Because even though the individual souls and inert objects, which are the modes of Brahman, are many, Brahman who possesses the modes is one.

(10) Because the supreme Self is of the nature of pure existence, Knowledge which is non-different from that [supreme Self] is also only of the nature of existence. It does not have existence as its object.

(10) That Knowledge which is a quality is not of the nature of pure existence, but has existence as its object.
The supreme Self alone is the Lord, having māyā as its limiting adjunct and [the supreme Self] is the individual soul, having avidyā as its limiting adjunct. What is inert exists only in appearance and is certainly false. Thus reality is one alone.

The power of the supreme Self, which has three qualities and can be expressed by the words ajñāna etc., though it is non-different from the supreme Self, it is as though different. The supreme Self, conditioned by that [power], is the primary material of the world.

The primary matter (pradhāna), which consists of three qualities and which is different in reality from the supreme Self, is the primary material of the world.
(13) This world appears just in the supreme Self on account of Ignorance. This is the teaching of apparent transformation.

(14) This world which is an apparent transformation of the supreme Self and exists only in appearance is certainly false. It is not real.

(15) This world which appears due to the defect of Ignorance is inexplicable. Thus there is the apprehension of the inexplicable.

(16) The objects which appear in the case of silver upon a pearl-oyster and in dream etc. are certainly inexplicable.
17 (17) Even the scripture is indeed unreal, because it is included within the world. Still, it is certain the means for the knowledge of reality, like an object belonging to a dream.

18 (18) The means of knowledge, which are the instruments for the knowledge of a thing, are six: perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-cognition.

19 (19) Where knowledge arises by the means of knowledge, the internal-organ manifests the knowledge.

20 (19) The knowledge which arises by the means of knowledge is in reality located in the individual soul.
(20) Even the individual souls, who are non-different from the supreme Self, are of the nature of Knowledge just like the supreme Self but they are not, in reality, the locus of Knowledge. Knowership, however, has the internal-organ as its adjunct.

(21) The sense of "I" which appears as the locus of Knowledge is not the individual self but the I-notion which is a mode of the internal-organ.

(22) The individual soul is pervasive.

(23) That [individual soul] pervades in all the limbs of the body by its very nature.
The individual soul, who has Brahman as its very nature, is thus only one. Whereas the multiplicity of souls pertains to a limiting adjunct.

There is the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman following the accomplishment of the fourfold means.

Verbal testimony also produces perceptual knowledge in the presence of the totality of causes for perception.

The cessation of ignorance is indeed immediate upon the direct apprehension of the essential nature of the Self through the "great statements" etc.

The individual souls are in reality manifold. But the non-duality of souls is the non-duality of the mode.

There is the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman following the knowledge of the nature of works.

The knowledge arising from verbal testimony is only mediate, never perceptual.

The supreme Self is pleased by the strength of meditation which is produced by the "great statements" etc.
(28) Upon the immediate apprehension of the Self which is beyond pleasure and pain there is liberation for one who is living, even though the earthly body exists.

(29) When there is relinquishment of the body upon the destruction of the actions which have produced their results, there is abiding in one’s own nature.

(30) This is liberation free from the body.

(31) In liberation [which is free from the body] there is no "I-ness".
(32) In liberation there is no difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

(33) In this state there is no pain, not even slightly, nor is there pleasure.

(32) The difference between the individual soul and Brahman certainly exists even in liberation.

(33) An abundance of pleasure is experienced in this state, unconnected with even a trace of pain.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO: VIŚISTADVAITAMATAM.

1. The name of the author of a code of law. Cf., Apte, p.1755.

2. Śeṣa, or Ananta, is the name of the serpent upon which Viṣṇu reclines. Cf., Yamunācārya's Stotraratna, vs. 38-40.


5. ibid., 1.1.3. Para.87. p.200, Para.94, 95. p.213.


7. ibid., 2.3.42. Para.353. p.745; 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748.


9. See comment to 1.9.


14. ibid.


16. Ved. S. Para.84. p.121f (sarvaprakāra...)

17. ŚrīṬ. B. 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748.


20. ŚrīṬ. B. 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748. The term "Viśiṣṭādvaita" can be resolved in two ways. (1) viśiṣṭasya advaitaṁ i.e. the non-duality (advaita) of Brahman who is qualified (viśiṣṭa) by all sentient and insentient things, (2) viśiṣṭayor advaitaṁ i.e. there is non-duality between two qualified Brahman's : Brahman in the causal state qualified by all sentient and insentient things in their subtle condition, and Brahman in the state of effect qualified by all sentient and insentient things in their gross condition. This means that there is non-duality of Brahman qualified by both states. Cf., V. Varadachari, "Antiquity of the term Viśiṣṭādvaita" The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. xxvi, parts 3-4, 1962. p.177ff. Also Śrīdharaśāstra Pāṭhak, Kenopaniṣat with the commentaries of Śaṅkaraśārya, Rāgarāmanuja and the commentary Bālabodhini. Poona, 1919. Introduction, p.15.


25. ibid., p.135.


27. Cf., van Buitenen, op-cit. Vedānta Deśika has also written a work on the Pañcarātra called Pañcarātrarakṣā.

28. Rāmānuja states that the Pañcarātra literature was composed by the Lord Himself. Śrī.Ś. 2.2.42. Para.326. p.700.


33. S.T. vs. 3, p.10.


37. Cf., Kaṭha. 1.2.18.


42. Ved.S. Para.5. p.74.

43. ibid.

44. Ved.S. Para.79. p.116, Rāmānuja cites Viṣ.Ś.


47. Yatī. Para.1. p.79.
48. ibid., Para.2. p.79f.
49. ibid., Para.3. p.80.
50. ibid., Para.3f. p.80f.
51. This verse has not been located in the Siddhitrayam.
55. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.36. p.60. S.T. p.31, line 16.
56. S.T. p.62, line 8f.
58. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.36. p.60. Also, p.61. S.T. p.31, line 15.
59. Ved.S. Para.43. p.98.
62. S.T. p.32, line 16f; p.39, line 7; p.62, line 8ff.
64. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.38. p.64.
65. ibid. 
67. This section largely follows the more lengthy exposition in the Yatī. p.33ff.
69. ibid., p.37. However it must be said that according to Abhyankar's later explanation, the three qualities are both the constituents and the attributes of prakṛti.
70. For an elaboration of this topic, cf. Yatī. p.75ff. For an explanation of these divisions of time, cf. ibid., notes to p.187.
71. This explanation is largely based upon the Yatī. p.141ff.
72. ibid., p.144ff.

73. In the T.S. (Athalye's Ed.) section 27, p.18, conjunction is defined as the "cause of the common designation of two things being joined" (saṁyuktavyavahāraḥ) which is, in effect, the same as the Viśiṣṭādvaita definition; saṁyuktapratyayaniṁtiḥ saṁyogaḥ. Cf. Yatī. Para.14. p.148.


75. Viśiṣṭādvaita does not accept the category of samavāya. Instead, they maintain that the perception of a quality in its locus is "dependence in what is conjoined with the sense organ". Yatī. Para.15. p.10.

76. T.S. Para.79. p.61.

77. ibid., p.96.

78. ibid., p.97.


82. Yatī. Para.11. p.130.


84. ibid.

85. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.48. p.90. Also, cf. the Kāśikāvatī on the Aṣṭādhvāyī 2.1.49.


87. Śrī.B. 1.1.2. Para.86. p.198.

88. ibid.


90. Cf., Tai.2.5.1.


92. Cf., the commentary of Raṅgarāmānuja in Paṭhak, op-cit., p.16. See fn. 20.


94. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.66. (verse) p.144.

95. ibid., Para.66. p.143. Sudarśana Śūri, in commenting upon this
section, states that Nathamuni, Yamuna etc. held this view.

96. The Yati, Para.24. p.14, refers to this view as satkhyāti. Sudarsana calls it yathārthakhyāti.


100. Yati. Para.7. p.5.


105. Cf., Yati. Para.1. p.38. The same definition has been given by Vedānta Desika in his Nyāyaparisuddhi, cf., Anantharangachar, op-cit., p.278.

106. The Yati. Para.47. p.48, makes a subdivision within secondary denotation: implication (iākṣaṇā) and figurative expression (gaunī).

107. Abhyankar states that Viśiṣṭādvaitins interpret the sentence: "you are That" (tat tvam asi) by resorting to "exclusive implication" (jahallakṣaṇā). He says the word "That", which directly expresses Brahman, has the implied meaning through "exclusive implication" in the sense of the "body of Brahman". According to Abhyankar, the sentence means: "you" (tvam) i.e. the individual soul "are" (asi) "That" (tat) i.e. body of Brahman. This explanation does not seem to be correct. In the view of Viśiṣṭādvaita there is no use of implication in the sentence: "you are That". They interpret the sentence in the following manner: the word "That" denotes the omniscient Brahman who is the cause of the world. The word "you" makes known -just through its express meaning- the supreme Self qualified by the individual soul because the word "you" directly expresses the supreme Self qualified by a body in the form of the individual soul. The word "are" (asi) has the meaning of "is" (asti).


3.1. The teaching of the exponents of *māyā* and of the exponents of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* has been explained. It should not be mistaken that this teaching of *māyā* was produced by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya through his own imagination as [something] that was indeed quite new. [reason] Because Rāmānujācārya, though not tolerating the teaching of *māyā*, has accepted that this teaching of *māyā* existed even prior to the author of the *sūtras*. Accordingly, in the *Śrībhāṣya* (Para.159. p.335.), a prima facie view was shown to have been aimed at in the mind by the author of the *sūtras* who composed the *sūtra* presenting the established conclusion: "Everywhere, because there is taught what is known" (B.S.1.2.1.) [by the statement]:

this individual self, which is itself Brahman as its nature is unlimited, exists as a god, animal, human being or a plant due to beginningless Ignorance.

Similarly, in that same place (Śrī.Ś.Para.205. p.473.) a doubt was shown to have been admitted by the author of the *sūtras* since it is to be removed by this *sūtra*: "On account of difference in deep sleep and departing" (B.S.1.3.43.) [the doubt is expressed by the words]:

there is certainly no other Self which is a different entity from the Self within; because of the teaching
of identity and because of the negation of duality.

Because the inner-Self, in its pure state, is designated as the "supreme Self", the "supreme Brahman" and the "supreme Lord".

Thus it is established that this teaching of maya existed even prior to the author of the sutras.

3.2. However it should not be supposed that this teaching of maya was not accepted by the author of the Brahmasutras. Because there is mention of the teaching of maya in the sacred text itself: "one should know that the primary matter is maya and that the great Lord is the possessor of maya" (Śv.4.10.). And the teaching of maya has been very clearly mentioned by the author of the sutras in the sutra: "maya and the possessor of maya" (B.Si.1.1.2.) in the Siddhāntadarśanam. It should not be said that the real primary matter alone can be expressed by the word maya, since it brings about the creation of diverse objects. [reason] Because the word maya is well
known as having the meaning of "indeterminable". And because of the contradiction with the sacred text referred to by the Nirañjana-bhāṣya\(^2\):

"in it [Brahman] the primary matter was indeterminable, possessing the qualities red, white and black and having the qualities in equilibrium, just like water, silver, a man or a streak etc. upon a desert, a pearl-oyster, a post or a crystal etc.". So because māyā is indeterminable [as real or unreal], Brahman is established as the material cause of the world which [i.e. the material cause] is in the form of a false appearance.

This teaching of a false appearance has been very clearly told by the author of the sūtras. Accordingly, there is the sūtra: "Possessing real transformation and false appearance" (B.Si.1.1.7.). This is the meaning:

a material cause is of two types: possessing real transformation and possessing a false appearance. In regard to those two, clay etc. possesses real transformation in the production of a pot etc. Whereas a pearl-oyster etc. possesses a false appearance in the case of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. Real transformation is the attainment of another state by abandoning the previous state. False appearance is that [attainment of another state] without abandoning that [previous state].\(^3\) So in the production of the manifest world, primary matter (praṇīti) possesses real transformation whereas the supreme Being (puruṣa) possesses false appearance.
3.3. The very supreme Being who is the material cause through false appearance is designated by the word Brahman. Brahman has the sense of "expanding". Expanding means pervading. Because the material cause certainly pervades the entire class of effects. But what has been stated (Śrī. B. Para.2.p.3.):

Everywhere, the word Brahman [is understood] as being connected to the quality of greatness. Where greatness has unlimited pre-eminence in essential nature and through qualities, that is the primary meaning of this [word Brahman].

That is not so. Because Brahman who is free from qualities has no possibility of the greatness which is brought about by qualities.

[objection] But we accept that Brahman is indeed the possessor of qualities.

[reply] Greatness is a particular type of transformation. The greatness which has unlimited pre-eminence is certainly the supreme greatness. That is possible only in the essential nature, but not in respect of qualities. Because there is no possibility of greatness in qualities. Even the Vaiśeṣikas certainly do not accept qualities within qualities. If [you object] that qualities are possible by means of dependence upon qualities also, then [our reply is] that there is the termination [of such a regress] only in the greatness belonging to the essential nature of that [Brahman]. Thus the statement: "and through qualities" does not establish a special meaning.

It should not be said; because the followers of Rāmānuja accept Knowledge, though a quality located in Brahman, as a substance, there
is the possibility of greatness there [in Knowledge]. [reason] Because even so, there is the same situation on account of the incongruity of the plural number: "through qualities". [objection] Suppose the greatness [in respect of qualities] is only the nature of what is worshipped. [reply] No, because such greatness is unknown in the world.

comment

Abhyankar argues that the explanation of the word "greatness" (brhattva) refers only to the essential nature and not to qualities, because there is no possibility of greatness in qualities. For example, the colour blue is a quality but it has no "greatness" of its own. Also, the mention of qualities does not establish anything new because qualities refer to their locus and when the locus i.e. Brahman is established as possessing greatness in its essential nature there is no need to mention qualities separately.

3.4.

For the etymology of the word Brahman must be stated only in accordance with the root bhr the meaning of which is well known in the world, because there is the maxim: "a word which can possess a meaning that is understood in the world communicates [such a meaning] in the Veda also". But a usage that is [only] met with occasionally does not establish the intended meaning.

"Where greatness has unlimited pre-eminence, that is the primary meaning of this [word Brahman]" is also incorrect. Because the portion
"unlimited pre-eminence" is not included in determining the capacity [of the word "greatness"]. Because the reason for the usage of words which express qualities is only the respective quality in general. But "pre-eminence" etc. are not included there [in the reason for the usage of the word]. Even though the greatness in elephants and palaces etc. does not have pre-eminence like [it has] in space, expressions such as: "the great elephant", "the great palace" are accepted by all as only primary, not as figurative. Thus it is established that Brahman has the sense of "expanding".

The said Brahman, as the material cause of the false appearance of the world, is indeed designated by the word "Self". This [Brahman] alone is the one reality. There is nothing other than that [Brahman]. There is liberation upon the knowledge of this very Self.

**comment**

Expressions such as: "unlimited pre-eminence" are not included in the reason for the usage of the word "greatness", because the word "greatness" alone has been told and there is no need to add these adjectives to it. The etymological meaning is sufficient of itself.

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3.5.  

ननु कीर्त्यि मुखः | उच्यते |  
अत्मज्ञानात्मजिकः | शरीरहितस्थिति: |  
असृवतदिगिरा सेव श्रृंगार समाधिपियते || ॥ ॥

3.5. **What kind of liberation? That is told:**

Liberation, which is continuance free from a body, must take place from the knowledge of the Self. That very [liberation] has been called in the sacred text by the word "immortal" etc. 5.
3.6. All happiness arising in the state of possessing a body is certainly connected with unhappiness. Even though some, such as the sons of kings etc., are seen to enjoy pre-eminent happiness, still, there is no such happiness anywhere which is not unconnected with even a trace of unhappiness. Even if there is no unhappiness anywhere today, the unhappiness brought about by seeing the future state is certainly inevitable everywhere. Even in heaven it is just the same. Because thinking about the unhappiness produced by the inevitable death of the body exists everywhere for those who keep in mind that the body has a nature which is decaying day and night. There is no possibility of unhappiness, even slightly, in a state where there is no body. Because the experience of unhappiness is dependent upon a body. And on account of the sacred text: "pleasure and pain do not touch the one who is indeed bodiless" (Ch.8.12.1.).

Even though the sensation of pleasure does not exist in that state, still, there is no fault. Because with regard to the happiness which is connected to unhappiness, where there is no
unhappiness, even slightly, the absence of that type of happiness is also to be desired. Because even the absence of nectar is preferable with regard to nectar which has been defiled by a drop of poison. The bodiless state is established only from the validity of the sacred text which has been cited (Ch,8.12.1.) and so it cannot be disputed there [in the text] by a follower of the Mīmāṃsakas or by anyone else.

This very state is called by the word liberation. Only one who has gained the state of liberation is liberated. Whereas even one who enjoys the happiness of heaven is not said to be "liberated". And only the one who is liberated is referred to by the word immortal in the sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Ny.,Pu.6). Because the one who is liberated is bodiless and only the one who is bodiless is immortal. Because death is certain if the body exists.

3.7. भयानीमा मुनुरिति हि तोर्जातः। मोक्षस्य तु अर्जस् च ब्रह्म भवति (२० ४ ४ २५) इति शुद्धा भयानीमाण्नाभवत्तै बोधयते। द्वितीय-स्वतंत्रस्वत्तंत्रमीत्यस्मतः कथापि विषया भयानीमाण्नाभवति तत्र द्वितीयवः-स्वतंत्रस्वत्तंत्रमीत्यस्मतः कथषोज्ज्वल वर्णीयं। साचं मन्नादिकृत्य स्वतंत्र पर-द्वितीय चैति द्विविध। पुरुषक विदेशपुरुषकं च मुनुरिति द्विविध। द्वितीय-स्वतंत्रस्वत्तंत्रमीत्यस्मतः कथनृद्वितीयस्तुचून प्राप्यं प्राप्यं क्षणमस्तुचूनं गद्ध्विषितमर्गनिः स्वतंत्रस्वत्तंत्रमीत्यस्मतः कथापि तत्त्ववाचार्यनि तद्विविध। तद्विविध द्वितीयस्तुचूनिः पर-द्वितीय चैति द्विविधमाति: पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्यन्त जीवनस्तुचूनिः पर्य...
3.7. There is a popular statement: "the limit of fear is death". But liberation is made known by the sacred text to be the total absence of fear: "he certainly becomes the fearless Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.). There is the possibility of fear in some manner if the appearance of a connection to a second object exists. Thus the absence of the cognition of a connection to a second object there [in liberation] must necessarily be stated. That cognition is twofold: according to his own view on the part of one who is liberated and according to the view of others. And liberation is twofold: liberation free from the body and liberation while living. The absence of the cognition of a connection to a second object is threefold: (1) on account of the absence of a second object anywhere, (2) even if an object exists somewhere, on account of the absence of a connection to it, (3) even if the connection to it exists somewhere, on account of the absence of the cognition of that [connection]. Thus there are twelve modes due to joining each of the two types of cognition: according to his own view and according to the view of others, in a fourfold division on account of their having a twofold nature due to the distinction between the state of liberation while living and liberation free from the body, and then each one [among those four] in a threefold manner on account of the threefold absence of the object, the connection [to the object] and the cognition [of the connection to the object]. With regard to those, it is being investigated: are they actually possible or are they not?

Among those, a second object certainly does not exist according to the view of the one liberated in the state of liberation free from the body. So how can there be a connection to that and how can there be the cognition of a connection to it? However according to the view of another [one who is not liberated] the absence of a second object is utterly impossible. Because it is certainly accepted by all that just as transmigratory existence is beginningless so also it is endless.
Whereas the view that there is liberation of all is not accepted by anyone. So even though some such as Śuka, Vāmadeva, etc. are in the state of liberation free from the body, because innumerable bound souls still exist, a second object necessarily exists according to the view of those [bound souls]. Nevertheless, the connection with that second object is impossible for one who is liberated free from the body, so how can the liberated soul be recognized as having a connection with a second object, even according to the view of another bound soul? Just as a face does not appear in the form of a reflection when there is no mirror, so too, in liberation free from the body there is no appearance of oneself or of another in the form of an individual soul which is a really existing reflection, because of the absence of a limiting adjunct such as the intellect which represents the mirror. Therefore how could there be the cognition of a connection to a second object?

**Comment**

The "twelve modes" can be represented as follows:

1. Absence of a second object.
   - Liberation free from the body — ref. to liberated soul and to another.
   - Liberation while living — ref. to liberated soul and to another.

2. Absence of a connection to a second object.
   - Liberation free from the body — ref. to liberated soul and to another.
   - Liberation while living — ref. to liberated soul and to another.

3. Absence of a cognition of a connection to a second object.
   - Liberation free from the body — ref. to liberated soul and to another.
   - Liberation while living — ref. to liberated soul and to another.
3.8. Whereas in the state of liberation while living, the appearance of even a liberated soul in the form of an individual soul who is a reflection cannot be avoided, because of the existence of a limiting adjunct such as the intellect which represents the mirror. A second object certainly exists, so the connection to that also cannot indeed be avoided. Because one who is liberated while living appears as an individual soul even to himself and because the connection to a second object exists, even though the cognition of that [connection to a second object] also cannot indeed be avoided according to the view of the one who is liberated and according to the view of another, still, an investigation has to be made as to: “what is the nature of that cognition?”.

In regard to that, just as for bound souls an individual soul does not appear in the form of a reflection, though existing as a reflection in reality, but only in the form of a mere individual soul, for one who is liberated while living it is not like that. Just as a bird such as a sparrow, though seeing its own reflection in a mirror...
does not know that "this is a reflection" and goes toward it with the idea that there is another sparrow, similarly, a bound soul, though himself the nature of a reflection, does not know that "I am a reflection" and transacts in the world with the idea that there is another self with regard to himself. And in respect of the Self, which is the original [i.e. not a reflection], not knowing that "this is the original" he worships it or disregards it with the idea that there is another Self there [with regard to himself].

Just as a man etc., who is superior in knowledge with regard to a sparrow etc., sees his own reflection in a mirror and knows "this is a reflection" and seeing in the reflection the colour black, white etc., and the particular characteristics of the form such as length, because the knowledge exists that "this is a reflection" he begins to do the investigation: "do the attributes perceived there [in the reflection] belong to the original [i.e. the face] or do they belong to the mirror?" Similarly, one who is liberated while living, who is superior in knowledge with regard to a bound soul, sees himself to be a reflection of the supreme Self in the limiting adjunct of the intellect etc. and knows "this individual soul is a reflection" and seeing in the individual soul who is a reflection: consciousness, I-ness, action and experiences of happiness and unhappiness etc., because the knowledge exists that "this individual soul is a reflection" he begins to do the investigation: "among consciousness, I-ness, action, happiness and unhappiness etc. which are perceived there [in the individual soul], what belongs to the supreme Self who is the original and what belongs to the limiting adjunct such as the intellect?"
In regard to that [investigation], their conformity is to be understood in this manner:

I-ness is from the I-notion, action is due to sattva etc., so too, happiness and unhappiness are on account of the mind and consciousness is from the supreme Self.

Just as a person, though seeing blackness and crookedness somewhere in his own reflection in a mirror, is not troubled, knowing: "the blackness and crookedness do not belong to the original [the face] because they are absent there, but they belong to the mirror", in the same way, the one who is liberated while living is not troubled, perceiving that indeed everything else which is different from consciousness persists in the individual soul who is a reflection, because the original has the nature of pure consciousness free from distinction.

Just as boys at some time due to ignorance might be mistaken thinking that the blackness seen in a reflection, although it persisted [only] in the mirror, persisted in the original [the face], and for the
removal of that mistake] an adult person, though not mistaken himself, cleans the mirror and the reason for that is: "the boys too, having cleaned the mirror in this way, can remove their mistake". In the same manner, a liberated person such as Janaka performs the correct action without attributing the result [to himself]. This is the reason for it: "the other bound souls too, having performed the correct action in this way without attributing the result [to themselves] can remove their own error through purification of the mind".

Also, as long as the knowledge of reality is mediate, a person is not liberated while living. That [person is liberated while living] only when the knowledge is perceptual. Even after the direct apprehension of one's own essential nature the reflection cannot indeed be avoided, because the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect exist in accordance with prior mental impressions up until the time of death due to the existence of the karma which has begun to produce its result (prārabdhā-karma). Like the blackness in the mirror is in the reflection, the I-ness belonging to the I-notion also certainly appears. Thus an expression preceded by the sense of "I" is seen somewhere even for a person who is liberated while living. On account of this, what Rāmānuja has said: "there is certainly no liberation while living" is rejected. Also because the state of liberation while living is taught very clearly by the word "here" in the sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nṛ. Pu. 1.6.).

**comment**

For Rāmānuja's view see Śrībhāṣya 1.1.4. Para. 105. p. 228f.

### 3.10.

अथ भूतः कर्म करोति न वा। यदि किंचित्रिष्यति तादृश करोति यदि न पश्यति तादृश न करोति। अथ पश्यति न वा पश्यति। विदेश्वरको न किंचिदिपि पश्यति। तदेदिपुक्त्व यज्ञ त्वस्य सर्ववाच्याभ्यु-सुलभ वैधा कर्म चतुर्द्वारे कर्म चतुर्द्वारे पश्येत्। (२० २१ ४ १४) इति।
3.10. Now, does one who is liberated perform action or not? If he sees something then he acts, if he does not see then he does not act. Then does he see or does he not see? The one who is liberated free from the body does not see anything at all. That has been told: "but when everything has become the Self for this one [the knower of Brahman], then what would one see and through what?" (Bṛh.2.4.14.). Whereas the one who is liberated while living certainly does not see anything while in meditative absorption but at another time it looks like he is seeing. He performs action at that time.

Action is twofold: with the intellect and without the intellect. With the intellect is twofold: for the sake of oneself and for the sake of another. For the sake of oneself is also twofold: for the sake of the maintenance of the body and for the sake of the attainment of what is much more exalted. The first is going about for food etc. because of the affliction of hunger. That is possible for one who is liberated while living. The second, however, consists of sacrifices etc. performed with the aim of heaven etc. That is impossible for one
who is liberated while living, due to the fact of being free from
desire. For the sake of another is twofold: the first consists of the
service of others etc. The second is performing action with the idea:
"the people too, seeing the action done by me, will act in the same way".
This is indeed said to be for the sake of the welfare of the world.
Though twofold, this is possible for one who is liberated while living.
Performing action, this [liberated person] looks like he is doing it for
his own sake, according to some ignorant people. But this is a different
thing.

Without the intellect is twofold. Some action is not able to be
known at the time of the action. For instance the moving etc. of the
hands and feet during sleep. Some [action], however, is able to be known
at the time of the action but there is no rule that it is indeed known.
For instance inhalation and exhalation etc. for just keeping alive. This
twofold group is also possible for one who is liberated while living.
Whatever action is possible, all that is only in the state of coming out
of meditative absorption. That [whatever actions he does] also does not
become [a means] for bondage in transmigratory existence because there is
no false presumption that: "I am doing". So the one who is liberated
while living certainly does not perform action like another bound soul,
but it is just that "action takes place". Because though it has been done
by the one liberated while living it is certainly not done, though seen
it is certainly not seen.

comment
The state of "actionlessness" is mentioned in the Gita, cf. 4.18., 5.
8, 9, 13., 13.29. An interesting exposition upon liberation while living
(jivanmukti) can be found in Pañcadasī ch.7.

3.11. तस्य तिन्य विनिति- त्वाति सूतिग्नी (ख २ । ८ ) नितिकृति: | तत्रावृ नान्य: पद्वा विवत्वपनाय
(ख० ३ । ८ ) नायने नायन्यस्य मोक्षसाधनय: स्पष्टेऽविवेचनादः |
3.11. The knowledge of the true nature of the Self is the means for such liberation, not anything else. Because there is the sacred text: "having known That one alone, he goes beyond death" (Śv.3.8.). Also, because in the same passage there is the very clear negation of another means of liberation, by this: "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv.3.8.).

3.12. [objection] The conclusion that liberation is only from the knowledge of reality is granted. But is that reality, through the knowledge of which there is liberation, knowable or not? In the first case, if it is knowable, there is duality even in the state of liberation because the relation of subject and object exists and so there is just the same situation [i.e. duality]. In the last case, the knowledge of reality is difficult to demonstrate.

[reply] Here, some construe in this manner: the word "tattvajñāna" is not a determinative compound where the first member is in the genitive case (gaśthītatpurūṣa), but it is an appositional compound...
(karmadhāraya), in accordance with economy of expression due to the maxim: "the chief who is a Niṣāda". So the sense is that Knowledge is reality and liberation is from that [Knowledge]. The meaning is that Knowledge, which is the nature of reality i.e. the source of everything, is in the form of awareness free from distinction and that alone is the fundamental nature of all the individual souls. Hence liberation is through the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the fundamental nature].

[objection] Even if that is the case, there is the relation of the attainment and what is to be attained in regard to liberation and so there is the occurrence of duality. Moreover, if that [Knowledge] is the fundamental nature of individual souls then it is certainly always attained, so how is the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the fundamental nature] being described in regard to the state of liberation?

[reply] No, because the defect, though twofold, does not exist because this: "attainment of the fundamental nature" has its final conclusion in the meaning: "the non-cognition of what is other than the fundamental nature". In reality, however, only the meaning produced by the genitive tatpurusa firstly occurs to the mind and so there is no fault even in the acceptance of that.

[objection] There is the occurrence of duality, since the relation of subject and object exists even in the state of liberation.

[reply] You are confused. For the existence of the cause at a time prior to the effect is a necessity. But at the time of the effect there can be no insisting: "that [cause] must either exist or not". Accordingly, knowledge which has reality as its object is the cause of liberation and so the existence of that [cause i.e. knowledge having reality as its object] prior to the state of liberation is a necessity. Then [subsequent to the knowledge of reality], the occurrence of duality is not a defect because the appearance of duality is admitted.
Then in what manner is the knowledge of reality the cause for liberation? In this manner: liberation means freedom. In regard to the determination: that [freedom] is from what? It is gained only from the meaning that because liberation is the opposite of bondage, due to which there is bondage, liberation is from that. This bondage is the bondage due to transmigratory existence. Transmigratory existence comprises this whole world, animate and inanimate. Liberation from that [transmigratory existence] has to be demonstrated. Moreover, transmigratory existence is based upon action. And so liberation from action too, certainly has to be demonstrated. Thus in the expectation: "the reality of what must be known for the sake of liberation?", because liberation is the opposite of bondage, it has to be demonstrated that the reality of transmigratory existence which is the means of bondage and the reality of action which is the basis of that [transmigratory existence] must be known.

Furthermore, even the popular expression observed in the world: "liberation is from the knowledge of the Self", has its basis in the
sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nṛ. Pu.1.6.). So it also must be definitely demonstrated that the reality to be understood by the word "reality" here: "liberation is from the knowledge of reality" is only the nature of the Self.

Therefore it is said that "reality", "truth" and "absolute truth" are synonyms. The cause is the reality of the effect and the supreme Self alone is the cause of everything. Therefore, that [supreme Self] alone is the reality of everything.

3.14. Now, how is the cause the reality of the effect? That is being told. It is stated in the sacred text⁵: "just as through a single ball of clay which is known in reality to consist of clay, all that is made of clay such as pots, dishes and pitchers etc. would be known, so too, through the one supreme Self which is known, the entire world is known". In regard to this, [if it is objected] even if the knowledge of the ball of clay has arisen, there is no knowledge that "this is a pot" when the pot is not seen⁶, therefore how could the pots and dishes etc. be known?, [our reply is] still, this is not a defect. Because a pot certainly becomes known through the knowledge of the ball of clay. In regard to a pot, the knowledge that "this is a pot"
is called "knowledge" (jñāna). In regard to the same pot, the knowledge that "this is clay" is called "knowledge" (vijñāna). Vijnāna means a particular knowledge. Though when the knowledge of the pot has arisen it is possible to do an action such as fetching water, still, that is not vijnāna. The particularity in knowledge is the bringing about of a particular action by keen observation. But the fetching of water etc. is not like that. For instance, when a tree is known, there is rest below it. But when that tree is known to be a certain type of medicinal plant, a particular action is performed such as the removal of sickness.

comment

The Advaitin maintains that when the material cause is known, all its effects are as good as known. Abhyankar raises the objection that even if the material cause is known how can there be knowledge of all the unseen effects? He answers this by distinguishing between two types of knowledge: jñāna or the ordinary knowledge such as "this is a pot" and vijnāna which is a particular knowledge such as the apprehension that all the products of clay, seen or unseen, must be nothing but clay in a particular form.

Advaitins generally use the words jñāna and vijnāna as synonyms, however where they occur together as in Gītā 3.41; 6.8 and 7.2, they are distinguished in a manner similar to Abhyankar's division.
3.15. That which is the principal part of a thing is alone the reality in regard to that thing. In regard to a pot, the part which is the essence is only the clay. For example. A small bamboo box is made for the purpose of safe-keeping jewels etc. and in regard to that, when the upper part of the receptacle is removed from the lower part of the receptacle the jewel is seen. But the small bamboo box is [just] a type of cane. Similarly, the pot is [like] the bamboo box which consists of name and form and just as in the case of the cane, when there is the separation of name and form the mere clay alone is seen in regard to the pot.\(^8\) Therefore, the part which is the essence in regard to the pot is only the clay. In the same way, even in regard to clay etc. the part which is the essence is indeed the cause of that [clay etc.]. The sacred text too, communicates this very thing: "what is within those two is Brahman" (Ch.8.14.1.).\(^9\) By this [word] "those two" there is the recollection of the previously mentioned name and form.

Although doing an action such as cleansing a vessel with a pot, like with clay, is ridiculous to people, still those people are certainly ignorant in that matter. Because the principal action is only being done with a form of clay. For that is always able to be done, whether the pot is destroyed or not destroyed, full or partly full, containing holes or without holes, new or old. But not fetching water etc. In another case, in regard to the twitching of the eye, doing the work of gold, in the form of connecting the gold to the eye, even with a golden ring belonging to the finger, is not to be ridiculed. The pre-eminent greatness of holy people who look equally on a jewel or a clod of earth, a snake or a garland is described in various places and that [greatness] is only based upon the knowledge of reality, which is their respective cause. Because holy people transact only
with their vision in the cause of those things. So it is established that the cause is the reality of the effect.

comment

The illustrations of cleansing the vessel with a clay pot, instead of with just clay, and touching the gold-ring to the eye are meant to show that because the material cause is the reality of the effect, the effect can be utilized for the sake of the cause.

3.16. Granted, the reality of the effect is its material cause. But by the knowledge of that [reality being the material cause], how can there be the destruction of the effect? Because a pot is not destroyed by the knowledge of the clay. Accordingly, even upon the knowledge of the Self which is the reality of transmigratory existence, being the seed of transmigratory existence, how is there logical possibility of liberation since transmigratory existence still exists? Furthermore, destruction possesses continuation indeed everywhere.

Because even upon the destruction of a pot etc. its continuation is
seen in the form of pieces etc. Even when a log of wood is burnt the ashes and charcoal etc. are seen. Through these illustrations it can be inferred that even the destruction occurring instantly for a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron certainly possesses continuation. Hence it has been told:

the nature of water does not differ in a drop of water and in the ocean. Even when a drop is evaporated from iron, its continuation is in the ocean.

So liberation is all the more logically untenable because even upon the destruction of transmigratory existence its continuation exists in the form of its seed.

[reply] It is not so. Because the destruction of transmigratory existence is not in the manner of a separation of the component parts like the destruction of a pot etc. It is granted that destruction of that type possesses continuation. But the destruction of an object existing only in appearance, which takes place through knowledge, is certainly without continuation. Because when a snake which exists only in appearance is destroyed by the knowledge of the rope, the continuation, even slightly, of some part of the snake—whether internal or external, in its own form or in another form—is not seen on the rope. This destruction is only through the knowledge of reality. Because the reality of a snake existing only in appearance is just the rope. Although the pot is not destroyed by the knowledge of clay, still, destruction has certainly almost happened from the knowledge: "this is only the existence of clay, the existence of the pot is not different from that". Because destruction is only the absence of the cognition of having a separate existence.

3.17.
3.17. [objection] Upon the destruction of a pot, continuation is seen in the form of clay, so destruction possesses continuation. Similarly, upon the destruction of a snake existing only in appearance, continuation is seen in the form of rope, so destruction certainly possesses continuation there also.

[reply] Let it be so. Because when the destruction of transmigratory existence is accepted as possessing continuation in the manner mentioned, although the continuation of that [transmigratory existence] exists in the form of the Self, there is no logical impossibility whatsoever in regard to liberation. This very point has been taught by the sacred text: "all this which is, is this Self" (Bṛh. 2.4.6.).

In this way, by the knowledge of reality, when it is understood that a mere effect everywhere in transmigratory existence has no separate existence with regard to the existence of the cause, the existence of Ignorance—which is the primary cause—remains. And so far, the threefold factor of knower, knowledge and the thing to be known remains. Following that, upon the investigation: "what is the reality even with regard to that [threefold factor]?", mere Knowledge remains, but not the knower, nor an object to be known, nor even Ignorance. This will be demonstrated later on. And this very Knowledge: free from distinction, without an object and a locus, is the nature of Brahman. This is indeed liberation.
3.18. An investigation about Brahman must be undertaken for bringing
about the knowledge of Brahman which is the means of liberation. If
it is asked: "who is the qualified person with regard to that
[investigation]?", it is said:

The desire to know Brahman is of use, like
a boat upon the ocean of transmigratory
existence, only for the one who has gained
the fourfold means. 6.

3.19. The fourfold means have been previously explained (1.52.). The
word "then" in the sūtra: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman"
(B.S.1.1.1.) has the meaning of "immediate succession". The desire to
know Brahman, on account of the strength of compatibility of meaning,
requires a pre-requisite, the word "then" communicates the immediate
succession to that [pre-requisite]. The pre-requisite is only the
fourfold means which have been told. Because when that sūtra is studied
as a detached subject, the pre-requisite implied by "immediate
succession", which is taught by the word "then", is to be ascertained
only from the strength of the compatibility of meaning.

comment
Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja interpret the word "then" (atha) in the
Immediate succession pre-supposes a prior event, so the *sūtra*: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman" indicates that the desire to know Brahman will arise as a consequence of the gain of a prior condition. Śaṅkara considers the prior condition to be the attainment of the fourfold qualifications (*sādhanacatustaya*), but not the study of the ritual portion of the Veda which forms the subject matter of Jaimini's *sūtras*. These *sūtras* elucidate dharma and so have a different subject matter and result from the *sūtras* of Bādarāyana which inquire into the nature of Brahman.  

Rāmānuja maintains that the *sūtra* works of Jaimini and Bādarāyana constitute a single scripture and just as the Veda is a single sacred text possessing two sections, dealing with action and knowledge, so too there is one scripture of Vedic analysis (*mīmāṃsā*) which treats of each of these two sections. Accordingly, Rāmānuja holds that the study of the ritual portion of the Veda, as embodied in the *sūtras* of the Purvamīmāṃsā, must be the pre-requisite to enter into the inquiry concerning Brahman.
scripture" (Śrī. B. Para. 3. p. 4.). It has been told in the same manner in the Śrībhāṣya also. The word lakṣaṇa here [in the above quotation]: "ṇaḍaśalakṣaṇena" signifies a chapter. Together with the Sañkarṣakāṇḍa, [the treatise] belonging to Jaimini consists of sixteen chapters.

The nature of being a single scripture is correct, because dharma alone is being taught even in both places. Dharma which consists of action etc and is of the nature of what is to be accomplished is taught in the prior māṇḍāsā. Whereas in the later māṇḍāsā, the dharma is accomplished and is of the nature of Brahman. The particular connection of the two [types of dharma] has been explained in the Śrībhāṣya (Śrī.B. Para. 4, 5. p. 5f). That is as follows: having understood at first glance that actions produce results such as heaven, because one's own portion [of the Veda] has been apprehended according to the injunction of study: "one's own portion has to be learnt", a person naturally applies himself to hearing to the prior māṇḍāsā for the ascertainment of the particular nature and mode of those [Vedic passages]. There [in the Veda], having ascertained that actions have an impermanent result and because it is understood at first glance, in the passages of the Upaniṣads which form a part of one's own portion, that the knowledge of Brahman has a result which is permanent, he applies himself to hearing the later māṇḍāsā for the ascertainment of that [result]. Accordingly, the nature of being a single scripture is correct.

3.21. अन्योच्ये नावेद्येक्षत्वं संभवति | पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रकर्ता जैमिनिलचर- | मीमांसासूत्रकारार्थ वादारणति इत्येव सुन्त्तकारार्थात् | न केवले सुन्त्तकारार्थः | किं तु मतिपाध्याययथ भिष्यः | पूर्वमीमांसायं केवलोऽविपयः भविष्यः | उत्तरमीमांसायं हु विनास्यः | परस्परविरोधवावायः कर्मश्रावोद्वियतः | आत्म- | क्षणे कर्मणु: सुत्तारामभवतः | किं च वै चाचर्म- | बौद्धमार्गीबाध्येऽवेक नेतृकादेव लम | स्वात्रियायाविद्वेगः विज्ञानविलयं इति। जैमिनिलचरम् | अपि व दिनाया मीमांसादिवाली नागानुक्रिया रूपमेक-
3.21. [reply] As to this, it is said: the nature of being a single scripture is impossible here. Because there is a difference of authors of the śūtras: Jaimini is the author of the prior mīmāṃsā śūtras and Bādarāyaṇa is the author of the later mīmāṃsā śūtras. Not only is there a difference of authors of the śūtras, but the subject matter to be taught is different. The subject matter to be taught in the prior mīmāṃsā is action. Whereas in the later mīmāṃsā it is knowledge. And a mutual opposition is seen between these two: action and knowledge. Because action is all the more impossible in regard to the knowledge of the oneness of the Self. Moreover, the subject matter to be taught in the later mīmāṃsā is certainly not accepted by Jaimini. Because the view of Jaimini is that the attainment of heaven etc. is alone the ultimate human goal. Furthermore, what is the one form which persists in the twofold mīmāṃsā and is the determining factor for a single scripture? If [you say] it is the nature of being an investigation, [our reply] is that grammar, logic etc. should also constitute a single scripture. Accordingly, just as there is a difference among scriptures such as grammar and logic on account of the difference of the subject matter to be taught, so too the difference between the prior and later mīmāṃsā is also certainly correct.

3.22. 

अयोभयतापि: परःपत्रण प्रतिपाद्यमानेन- त्वेनेक्लास्तत्तत्त्वमिति चेतः || श्रद्धानो: धर्मर्षभावायू ||
| येच बेदविदः विषयं येचाध्यायाविद्यैर्जनाः || तेन बदर्तन्महामां || कुष्णं धर्मम्य समावनम् || ( महो भार २८०२८२३ )
| हृदयश्रीकृष्णपरमात्मानि पर्यंपद्योपद्यं पर्यंपसोज्जलवनपर्यथि: ||

शास्त्रयोजनम्।विचारतत्त्वमिति सत्वनायकपुरस्वत्वलयप्रतिगुणस्वत्वलयः।

तपा च यथा प्रतिपाद्यविषयप्रेत्न व्याकरणन्यायाविद्यां शास्त्राणि भेदस्तव पूर्वांतस्मात्तत्त्वस्यरुपं भवेत पोतित: ||
3.22. [objection] Then there is a single scripture because dharma alone is being taught even in both places.

[reply] No, because Brahman does not have the characteristic of dharma. However the use of the word dharma in regard to the supreme Self, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, here:

The sages who know the Veda and the people who know the Self say that Kṛṣṇa is the great Self, the eternal dharma (Mbh.A.3.86.22.)

is figurative because he is the instigator of dharma. For the supposition of another direct meaning is incorrect since there is no ample usage. Because a usage that is met with occasionally has logical possibility only by implication. Otherwise implication has no scope.

Furthermore, Brahman having the characteristic of dharma is certainly not accepted by the author of the prior mīmāṃsā sūtras. Because the definition of dharma taught by Jaimini is: "dharma is a thing characterized by a scriptural injunction" (J.S.1.1.2.) and that
is all the more impossible in regard to Brahman. If a single scripture would have been agreeable to Jaimini on account of there being [a single] investigation of dharma, then because of that difference between "accomplished" and "to be accomplished" a definition of dharma should have been made which was common to both types of dharma. So where a single scripture is not accepted by the very author of the scripture, when others make a proclamation there, even many times: "the scripture is one, the scripture is one" it does not prove anything. Having kept in mind that very meaning of the word dharma taught by Jaimini, it is said in the Viveranaprameyasangraha: "if there could be an injunction in the Vedanta [ie., Upaniṣads], then only one investigation about dharma, consisting of sixteen chapters, should follow."

It should not be said that there is a single scripture because the name "mīmāṃsā" is just one. [reason] Because although the name "grammar" is one, there is a difference between [the grammatical treatises] Aṁdra, Cāndra etc. On account of this, what has been said by the author of the Vṛtti: "this [treatise] dealing with the embodied soul is connected with the sixteen chapters belonging to Jaimini, thus there is establishment of a single scripture" is rejected. For this very reason, the enumeration in the Śāstraśāṭkasaṅkalana agrees with the difference between the prior and later mīmāṃsā:

They say that the scriptures are only six: of Kapila, Kapāda, Gautama, Patañjali, Vyāsa and of Jaimini also.

c omment

Advaitins conclude that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini and the Uttaramīmāṃsā of Bṛdarāyaṇa are different scriptures because (1) the qualified person (adhikārin) is different in each case. For the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the qualified person is one who is desirous of performing ritual actions and seeks to attain results such as heaven. With regard to the Uttaramīmāṃsā, the qualified person is free from other desires on account of the desire for liberation. (2) There is a difference of
subject matter (viṣaya). In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā the subject matter is dharma which is something to be accomplished and which is characterized by the performance of rituals such as Jyotiśṭoma. In the Uttaramīmāṃsā the subject matter is Brahman which is already accomplished and which cannot be enjoined. This difference is clearly evident in the first sūtra of each treatise: "Then, therefore the desire to know dharma" and "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman". (3) There is a difference of result (prajñājana). With regard to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the result is the knowledge of what is to be done, or the gain of heaven etc. through the performance of the rituals. For the Uttaramīmāṃsā, however, the result is the knowledge of Brahman which is liberation.17

3.23. The investigation of the particular connection has no result. Because connection is not the determining factor for a single scripture, what is it then? It supports a single scripture. Because when a single scripture has been ascertained through another means of knowledge, then if there is the objection: "how can there be a single scripture without a connection?", the investigation of the particular connection is useful for the removal of that [objection]. So when the difference of scripture is established, this [sūtra]: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman" (B.S.1.1.1.) is established as being studied as a detached subject. Accordingly, having perceived that the desire to know Brahman will occur subsequent to the pre-requisite implied by "immediate succession" which is to be taught by the word "then", something conformable to that [desire to know Brahman] is to be ascertained only from the strength of compatibility of meaning.
3.24. [objection] Why is knowledge of action not taken to be the pre-requisite, as it is also understood on account of the strength of compatibility of meaning?

[reply] This would be so, if liberation could result from knowledge combined with action. But that is not the case. For action and knowledge have no possibility of combination on account of their opposition. Even in the sacred text: "they desire to know through sacrifices, charity..." (Brh.4.4.22.), because of the use of the desiderative affix (\(\text{s}an\)) the actions such as sacrifice are recognized as the means for the desire of Self-knowledge, not as the means of knowledge. There is never a means of liberation which depends upon a time subsequent to knowledge.

But the investigation of the chanting of the Veda etc. in respect of the desire to know Brahman is done as something incidental, not as primary. The knowledge of action cannot be assumed to be the pre-requisite [just] because that [investigation of chanting etc.] is in accordance with it [the desire to know Brahman]. Just as in the sūtra: "Or [the world must originate from Brahman] like the great and long..." (B.S.2.2.11.), the mention of the size such as great and long is on account of being an illustration about the origination of an effect different from the cause. So the knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika...
scripture is not assumed to be the pre-requisite because this much [big and long triads being produced from minute and short dyads] is in accordance with that [the production of an effect different from the cause]. It is like that [with regard to the mention of chanting etc and the pre-requisite of the knowledge of ritual action].

3.25. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 2. p. 2):

For the person who has studied the Veda along with its auxiliaries and along with what is at its head [the Upaniṣads] and whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a result which is trifling and transient, the desire for the knowledge of Brahman—the result of which is limitless and permanent—is sure to follow immediately afterwards.

3.25. यदृच् अभिधिऽपूर्वकेतुविद्याधिशिष्यात् इति अनप्रानि अनाशीत्यतो न तद्विद्या रहस्याद्वितीयानि। (श्रीभा ५ ७ १३) इति। अन्यायत्मिकतामान्त्याः प्राचिन्यादिक साहि यो ब्रह्मालिका नानादेशादिक ॥ तदाय तथा नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादिक ॥ नानादेशादि-
In regard to that, it is said: "immediate succession", which is to be taught by the word "then", is ascertained in regard to the desire to know Brahman. His [Ramanuja's] statement is meant to show the pre-requisite to that [immediate succession]. And in the sūtra (B.S. 1.1.1.), the author of the sūtras has shown that the thing which will occur subsequently is the desire to know Brahman. And because that [desire to know Brahman] is associated with "immediate succession", which is to be taught by the word "then" which is connected to itself [i.e. the meaning of "immediate succession"], the postulation of a pre-requisite has to be made. And what is the invariable cause of that [effect] is alone able to be postulated by that [effect], but not what has deviated. The knowledge of ritual action has certainly deviated, because the desire to know Brahman is possible even without the knowledge of ritual action. And because in the world it is seen to be the case.

Although an invariable rule is made known by the text:

whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a result which is trifling and transient, the desire for the knowledge of Brahman—the result of which is limitless and permanent— is sure to follow immediately afterwards

nonetheless, that invariable rule is not applicable to the topic. Because the desire to know Brahman would be established subsequent to such a rule, but such a rule is not established prior to the desire to know Brahman. If the author of the sūtras would have specified such a rule here and because of that [rule] the postulation of the desire to know Brahman, which would occur subsequently as it is connected with itself [i.e. the rule], could have been made then there would have been application for such an invariable rule, but it is not in the topic under consideration.
Furthermore, without the desire for liberation, the knowledge of such ritual action does not bring about the desire to know Brahman. This has certainly been accepted even by you who have said: "whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a result which is trifling and transient". But without the knowledge of such ritual action, the desire for liberation certainly brings about that [desire to know Brahman]. So by continuity and discontinuity, only the desire for liberation is understood to be the pre-requisite. And that is certainly included within the fourfold means told by us.

3.26. वचू 'नयायमुग्हीतस्य वाज्यस्याधिशायधक्षडाचारात्मतात्तोष्पायः संशय- 
विपिर्यायो नातिवप्तेऽ अत्तस्त्रिष्णयाय वेदान्ताचारस्याचार: कर्त्तव्य: श्रुति: पैच- 
कृत्वा वर्णविवर्णविवर्णारायणविवर्णारायण: कर्त्तव्यः श्रुति प्रस्तुतवत्वात् (श्रीमान ४७ ४ पृ २००) 
इत्युत्तरं नातीस्य य वेदान्ताचारस्य कर्त्तव्यः श्रुति पैच- 
कृत्वा वर्णविवर्णारायणविवर्णारायण: कर्त्तव्यः श्रुति प्रस्तुतवत्वात् (श्रीमान ६ ४ पृ २००) 
इत्युत्तरं नातीस्य य वेदान्ताचारस्य कर्त्तव्यः श्रुति प्रस्तुतवत्वात् (श्रीमान ६ ४ पृ २००)

3.26. But what has been said (SrI.B.Para.6.p.7.):

[objection by Advaitin] Because a sentence supported
by reasoning is what determines the meaning, a
meaning, though understood at first glance, is not
above doubt and error. Therefore an
investigation of the Vedānta sentences has to be
done for the ascertainment of that [meaning].
[reply] You should see that an investigation of
dharma, too, has to be undertaken in just the same
way.

In regard to that, it is said: although by this example the necessity of
an investigation of dharma is arrived at, still, that the investigation of dharma has necessarily to be undertaken prior to the investigation of the Vedânta sentences is certainly not established. Indeed, when that is not established, the postulation of it as the pre-requisite is certainly difficult to be achieved.

Moreover, because of the idea that ritual action has a transient result, the investigation of ritual action is not a necessity and indifference to it arises for people. Among those, if someone has the idea that the knowledge of Brahman has a permanent result, then to ascertain that [result] the undertaking of an investigation about Brahman is possible even though such a person has not studied the prior mîmāṃsā scripture. Therefore it is established that the fourfold means are alone the pre-requisite.

3.27. Following the acquisition of the fourfold means, knowledge arises from the "great statements" etc. If the knowledge is merely verbal then it does not remove Ignorance. But the perception of the Self arising from the "great statements" etc. removes Ignorance. But the mixture of what is verbal and what is perceptual, which are two classes pervaded by knowledge, does not lead to a defect. Because even though there is the mixture in the locus [knowledge] there is no mixture of the attributes [perception and verbal testimony]. Even a sentence is certainly the cause of perceptual knowledge, just as in the case of "you are the tenth" etc.

There is an unstated objection here. Perceptual knowledge reveals
an object directly, such as the perception of a book. However verbal knowledge produces only indirect knowledge, such as the book is over there on the table. If you say that verbal testimony gives direct knowledge then there would be confusion of the two means of knowledge.

Abhyankar answers by saying that all varieties of knowledge such as perceptual knowledge, verbal testimony, inferential knowledge etc. are pervaded (vāpya) by knowledge which is the pervader (vāpaka). Though they all share the common locus (upādheya) of knowledge, there is no mixture of the attributes (upādhi)i.e. the varieties of knowledge. Just as, for example, individuals retain their separate characteristics while sharing the common locus of humanity. So while knowledge is common to all types of knowledge, each particular type remains separate and thus there is no confusion between perceptual knowledge and verbal testimony.

Advaitins consider that verbal testimony can generate mediate or perceptual i.e. direct knowledge depending on whether the thing to be denoted is remote (parokṣa) or immediate (aparokṣa). In the case of the statement "heaven exists", verbal testimony can only produce mediate knowledge since heaven is something remote. However if the thing to be revealed is immediate to experience, then verbal testimony can give direct knowledge. In the case of the boy who was seeking the tenth member of his group, having forgotten to count himself while he was counting the other nine, the statement that: "you are the tenth" should cause direct knowledge. In the same way, Advaitins maintain that the "great sentences" of the Upaniṣads have the capacity to generate immediate knowledge because Brahman is the very essence of the individual.

3.28.

एतदेव महावाक्यs

दिर्घो जायामनात्मत्वक्षात्मा पुरुषा अरे दीष्यः (२० \( \frac{2}{14} \) \( \frac{5}{14} \)) हस्तनाय शूर्या विच्यपेते। दीष्यः साक्षाक्षरीयः। दीष्यः स्वयम्, परस्तु कर्म सत्यकोतिभवन्त्यथा यथावत् शूर्यादि पद्माकरणिः। सद्विद्यांसिद्धविद्याः।

(२० \( \frac{2}{14} \) \( \frac{5}{14} \)) हस्तन शाराणान्दिकिर्ष्यपेते। न त श्च श्च नादपक्षात्मानं न दर्शनशक्त्यहीतिमिति कर्म दर्शनशक्त्यहीतिमिति वाच्यम्। जवायमपि

शरमस्थानोत्तरेण भवेन म्युस्तुमेवोक्ततात्। एतेऽ ‘अविभाविवुप्ते वेदात्मायांमेविचित्रितं रेखामयं वाच्यर्थं भास्यम्।’ वाच्यर्थं भास्यमिति वाच्यर्थम्। तस्य स्वामर्थमन्तरे प्रथमस्वामिति वाच्यादेव सिद्धं। वाच्यर्थायांमितिभवेत्तुमेवव्यवस्थितम्।

स्वामिति भास्यमिति वाच्यर्थायांमितिमेवव्यवस्थितमिति। वाच्यर्थायांभास्यमिति वाच्यर्थायांभास्यमिति। अर्थायांमितिभवेत्तुमेवव्यवस्थितमिति।

तथा भूतत्वायामविण्यातार्थायां महावाक्यादिभोविण्यातार्थायां।
3.28. This very perceptual knowledge of the Self which arises from
the "great statements" etc. is enjoined by this sacred text: "the Self,
my dear, should be seen" (Bṛh.2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means that it
should be made directly evident. With regard to the expectation that:
"should be seen" has been said, but how should it be seen?", listening
etc. is enjoined as the means for seeing: "it should be heard, thought
about and meditated upon" (Bṛh.2.4.5.). It should not be said: listening
is the means for verbal knowledge it is not a means for "seeing", so
how can there be the prescription of listening as the means of
"seeing"? [reason] Because what you have just said is immediately
after [what we have shown]: "even a sentence is certainly the cause
of perceptual knowledge" (3. 27.). On account of this, [the following
statement in the Śrībhāṣya, Para.12. p.12] is refuted:
the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedānta
sentences for the removal of Ignorance is not merely
the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences,
because that is accomplished just from the sentence
even without an injunction and because there is no
perception of the removal of Ignorance merely by
that [knowledge of the meaning].

Because an injunction is necessary for the sake of engaging in listening,
though when the sentence is heard there is no requirement of an
injunction to understand its meaning. However we also certainly accept
that there is no removal of Ignorance by merely verbal knowledge which
is not possessed of immediacy.

Having raised the doubt: when the mental impression of difference has not been dispelled, there is no production of knowledge from the "great sentences" etc. which removes Ignorance. What has been said [by way of reply] (Śrī B. Para. 12. p. 12.): "because there is no logical possibility of the non-production of knowledge when the means [for its production] are present" is accepted as the desired conclusion. But when knowledge has arisen, there is no rule that liberation free from the body takes place immediately. Because the knowledge of difference continues to persist until the completion of the experience of the result of action which has begun to operate (prārabdhakarma) which is not destroyed even by knowledge. Just like the knowledge of a second moon persists if the defect of the eye is not eliminated, even upon the ascertainment from the statements of competent people etc. that there is a single moon. But that knowledge of difference, though remaining, does not lead to bondage because its root [i.e. Ignorance] has been cut.

3.29. 

यतु ‘सत्यपि वाच्यायेऽनादिवसनया भेदज्ञानमुस्वते त्वत् भवति न शरयते वर्तमान; | भेदज्ञानसमाध्या अपि वासनया मिथ्या-रूपवेण ज्ञानोपनये निवृत्ततात्। | ज्ञानोपन्यानि मिथ्यारूपायात्मकाः अनि-गृही निवर्तकानाराध्यात्मकादिपि नावर्त वासनया मिथ्यतिः।’ (श्रीभाष्य ५० ७ ५० २०) । इत्यर्थं तत्। ज्ञानेन या भेदवासनया । नीतिचिन्तवति सा न ज्ञानसमकालं सर्वेऽथ मिथ्यतः। कितु । ज्ञानसप्तकालं मिथ्यारम्भेत। ततो भेदवासनया न वृद्धिनांचं पूर्वविरंधलितः। कारणाभावायर्। दर्शनं कृमेयं श्रीयमाणं स्थतं एवं सर्वथा विनम्यते न निवर्तकानाराध्यात्मकेऽन्तिहर्दपेते। 

यतु ‘वासनाकारं भेदज्ञानं छल्लुमयथ चारुवल्लवं सति: वास्तवाभितिमय्।’ (श्रीभाष्य ५० ८ ५० १) । इत्यर्थं तद्वर्त्य वास्तवाभितवल्लवं यथेष्ठ। यतो यथा छल्लुम्यः वृहद्भेदसमकालं न ज्ञानो भवति कितु । चेदसप्तकालं म्यादिरम्भे जाते ततः वेदविद्वारेलं सर्वेऽथ ज्ञानो भवति गुणोऽभवति पुनः-परोहयोग्यं भवति तथात्र स्वीकारं भाष्काराय। यतु ‘भेदवासनया आनादिकारणेऽनादिवसनपरिवृत्तवाद्विकिर्क्षिवाभवनाध्यात्मकालवादनया तत्तिरिस-नानुपचे।’ (श्रीभाष्य ५० ८ ५० ९) । इत्यर्थं तविष्यम्। ऋषिद्वर्गस्या भूपर-
3.29. But what has been said (Śrī.Śāṇ.ī.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.Śā.
the cutting but the commencement of withering certainly occurs at the
time of cutting and then, after some time, it becomes completely
withered and dried and incapable of sprouting again, it is similar
here [with regard to the removal of the knowledge of difference]
because there is nothing to negate its acceptance.

But what has been said (ŚrīT.B.Para.12.p.13.):

because the mental impression of difference is
immeasurable as it has accumulated from
beginningless time, and because the
contemplation contrary to it is insignificant,
there is no logical possibility of its removal
by this [contemplation].

That is questionable. Because even a small lamp brought into some
underground room etc. instantly removes the darkness even though it
pervades the underground room and even though it has been present
there a long time, similarly, there is the possibility of the removal
of the mental impression of difference. Thus it is established that
there is cessation of Ignorance on account of the direct apprehension
of the Self brought about by the "great sentences" etc.
3.30. The direct apprehension of the Self brought about by the "great statements" etc. is due to the continuous contemplation of the Self. This direct apprehension is taught by words such as: "he understands", "having understood" and "should be seen" in the sacred texts such as: "having found out, he understands" (Ch.8.7.1.), "having understood that [Self] he is freed from the jaws of death" (Kaṭha.3.15.), "the Self, my dear, should be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.). It is the same here also: "having known, he should bring about wisdom" (Brh.4.4.21.). Knowledge which brings about the completion of the desire to know the Self is said by the word "wisdom". The meaning is: [wisdom] makes the direct apprehension of the Self steady. The continuous contemplation of the Self which is the means for that [steady knowledge] is said by words such as: "you should meditate" etc. in the sacred texts such as: "meditate upon the Self as Ṡm" (Mu.2.2.6.), "contemplate upon the Self [as your own] world" (Brh.1.4.15.), "the Self...should be meditated upon" (Brh.2.4.5.). This is indeed told by the sutra also: "repetition [is necessary] since [the texts] instruct repeatedly" (B.S.4.1.1.). Thus the syntactical unity of these sacred texts is properly obtained. On account of this, [the statement in the Śrībhāṣya, Para.12.p.13.] is refuted: the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedānta sentences can be expressed by such words as "meditation", "contemplation" etc. and is certainly different from the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences. Because the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, which has acquired immediacy, was previously mentioned as the means for liberation.
The production of direct knowledge through "continuous contemplation" is in accord with the views of Vācaspatimisra as expressed in the Bhāmati, see comment to 1.54.

3.31. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.13.p.15.):

this knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means for liberation is understood to be contemplation. Because the verbal roots vid and upās are seen in the beginning and at the conclusion to be used without distinction: "contemplate upon the mind as Brahman" (Ch.3.18.1.), "the one who knows in this manner shines and warms with glory, fame and divine splendour" (Ch.3.18.3.). Etc.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner; it is true that an identity of meaning between vid and upās is necessary for the syntactical unity of the beginning and the conclusion. But that [identity of meaning] is established either because knowledge (vid) has the meaning of contemplation or even because contemplation (upās) has the meaning of knowledge. Hence for this [proposition]: "knowledge is understood to be contemplation", this reason: "because the verbal roots vid and upās are seen in the beginning and at the conclusion to be used without distinction" is not possible. Furthermore, what is known as contemplation is only knowledge which is repeated, not anything else. But in accordance
with that [meaning of *upāsana*], we also certainly accept that *vid* has the meaning of knowledge which is repeated.

3.32. The continuous contemplation told in the sacred texts by words such as: "you should meditate" (Mu.2.2.6.) is said to be "steady remembrance". Because meditation, which is the meaning of the verbal root *dhyāi* in accordance with the meaning of the root: "*dhyāi* in the sense of thinking", is in the form of a continuity of remembrance uninterrupted like the flow of oil. What has been said: "steady remembrance. Upon the gain of remembrance there is the release of all knots" (Ch.7.26.2.) must be thus: steady remembrance is the means for the release of all knots through the direct apprehension of the Self which is to be produced by itself [i.e. by steady remembrance]. Because only the direct apprehension of the Self is heard as the means for the release of the knots, by this [statement]: "when that One is seen" occurring in the sacred text:

> When that One who is high and low is seen, the
knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are dispelled and his actions are destroyed (Mu.2.2.8.).

But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 14, p. 16) is that steady remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" in accordance with the sacred text: "[the knot of the heart] is untied" (Mu.2.2.8.):

and that remembrance has the same form as "seeing".

That is not so. Because when there is no syntactical unity in the manner previously mentioned, the supposition that remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" is not correct. And what has been said as a support in that matter (Śrī B. Para. 14, p. 16):

remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" because of the intensity of contemplation.

That is also not the case. Because "seeing" there [in regard to remembrance] has the nature of being a semblance of "seeing". Moreover, in regard to the existence of the means of "seeing", even if the "seeing" is real, steady remembrance would be a cause of "seeing" by giving assistance to the causes of "seeing", but it is not of the nature of "seeing". Furthermore, in regard to the existence of the means of seeing, it is a great wonder that verbal knowledge, which is produced by the "great sentences" etc. and which is certainly a mode of experience, is not accepted as perceptual experience by you who accept that remembrance, though different from experience, ²² is a perceptual experience.

3.33. चतु ्र एवं प्रस्तवस्त्रास्मादपरंमसाधनं स्मृति विशिष्टेणः

नायमात्मा अवश्यन वभो न मेधया न वहुः थुतेन।

यमेन् वृज्जे तेन लभ्यस्तम्याय आत्मा विवृत्वे तदृथं स्वामु॥ (कादृच्छ १२३)

इति। (श्रीभास ४० १०।४) इत्युन्क्तं तथित्त्वम्। अस्यं अतः स्मृतं

ऋक्षेताभावेन 'स्मृति विशिष्टेण' इत्युक्तरसाधस्य।

3.33. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 15, p. 17):
In this manner [the sacred text] distinguishes remembrance, which has acquired the status of direct perception, as the means of liberation:
"this Self cannot be gained by exposition, nor by intelligence, nor through much hearing. Whom this [Self] chooses, by him it can be gained. This Self reveals its own form to him" (Kaṭha.2.23.).

That is questionable. Because the statement: "[the sacred text] distinguishes remembrance" is inaccurate since there is no mention of remembrance in this text.

3.34. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.15.p.18.):

Steady remembrance of this kind is expressed by the word devotion. Because the word devotion (bhakti) is a synonym for contemplation.
(upāsana). For this very reason, it is expressed by the sacred texts and the tradition in this way:

"Having known Him alone, one passes beyond death" (Śv.3.8.), "The one who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nyāyop.1.6.), "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv.3.8.), "Not by Vedas, nor by austerity, nor by charity, nor by sacrifice can I [be seen]" (G.11.53.), "But by undivided devotion, O Arjuna destroyer of your enemy, I can, in this form, be known and seen in reality and entered into" (G.11.54.), "But that supreme Person, O son of Pṛthā, can be gained by undivided devotion" (G.8.22.).

That is not correct. Because "steady remembrance of this kind" means remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception (supra. 3.33. Śrī.Ś.). But that [remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception] is not devotion. Because there is contradiction with the Gītā passage which you have just cited: "But by undivided devotion". There, devotion is pointed out as the means for knowledge, for seeing in reality and entry. But if only remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception is devotion, because that [remembrance] is of the nature of "seeing" there is no possibility of it being the means for "seeing". Then if [you ask] "what is devotion?", [our reply is] understand it to be a mental modification having the form of a particular type of love.

Furthermore, what is the meaning of this: "For this very reason" (supra.) which you mentioned? Is it because only steady remembrance is expressed by the word devotion, or because only the word devotion is a synonym for contemplation? Even both ways, the mention of the sacred texts: "Having known Him alone" etc. is not applicable for proving them since there is no allusion to devotion in [these] sacred texts.
3.35. But what has been said (Srī.B.Para.16.p.18.):

because knowledge—which is in the form of meditation, being performed daily, whose excellence is kindled through repetition and which continues until death—is the means for the attainment of Brahman, for the production of that [knowledge] all the actions relating to the stages of life are to be performed as long as one lives.

In regard to that, it is said: the knowledge which is the means for the attainment of Brahman is said to be continued until death, is that [continuation] necessary everywhere or occasionally? Not the first, because there is the possibility of the direct apprehension of the non-dual Self even prior to death and since, following such direct apprehension, difference does not exist in reality according to the vision of that person who has such knowledge, therefore the knowledge mentioned is not possible. [if you say] Because the limiting adjuncts such as body, mind etc. exist even at that time [after the
direct apprehension of the Self], the knowledge, having the person possessing knowledge as its agent, is possible according to the vision of other bound souls. [we reply] No. Because that [knowledge] would relate to a time subsequent to the attainment of Brahman and so it is not the means for the attainment of Brahman. However in the case of the last [alternative], it is certainly the desired conclusion. Because obstructions exist for a person there is no direct apprehension of the Self in this birth, therefore the repetition of knowledge is necessary for him until death in another birth. This has been told: "Until the moment of death, because it is seen there also [in the scripture]" (B.S.4.1.12.). The meaning is that knowledge [ie., meditation] is seen to exist for someone until the time of death or even in another birth following that, because the repetition of knowledge is necessary until the direct apprehension of the Self just as the threshing of grain is necessary until the disappearance of the husk. Alternatively, that sūtra does not refer to Self-knowledge but is to be understood as referring to another knowledge whose result is [worldly] prosperity.23 Thus the repetition of knowledge until the direct apprehension of the Self has been established.

3.36. After the direct apprehension [of the Self] the [prescribed] action has no use whatsoever. Not only is it of no use, but there is certainly no possibility of action because difference does not appear
to be real at that time. And action which, according to the view of
the people, is being done for the sake of the welfare of the world
does not impart anything special to knowledge or to liberation which
is the result of that [knowledge]. Whereas in the state of the bound
[souls], action is useful for the production of knowledge through the
desire for Self-knowledge due to the purification of the mind. This
has certainly been told by the sūtra also: "But Agnihotra etc. are
certainly for that result, for it is seen to be so [in the Upaniṣads]"
(B.S.4.1.16.). The meaning of that [sūtra] is: "certainly for that
result" means certainly for the result known as knowledge. "For it is
seen" to be so in the sacred text: "they desire to know through
sacrifice..." (Bṛh.4.4.22.). This is certainly the purport of the
sūtra: "Also on account of co-operativeness" (B.S.3.4.33.) as well.
The meaning of that [sūtra] is: "And" (ca) has the sense of "also".
"Also on account of co-operativeness" to knowledge i.e., the obligatory
actions are to be performed also on account of being means to
knowledge through purification of the mind.

3.37. The sevenfold means beginning with discrimination which have been
mentioned (Śrī. B. Para.16.p.19.) are included, according to suitability,
in the means such as the "fourfold means" accepted by us. There is the
inclusion of freeness of mind (vimoka), in the form of absence of
attachment to desires, in control of the mind (śama). There is the
inclusion of repetition (abhyāsa) in meditation (nididhyāsa). There
is the inclusion of non-dejection (anavasāda), in the form of an absence
of dejection, in single pointed concentration of mind (samādhiṇā). Non-exultation (anuddhāraṇa), in the form of absence of excessive satisfaction, is also included in single pointed concentration of mind. And because purification of the mind is a means for knowledge, on account of that [purification of mind], the postulation of discrimination (viveka) in the form of purification of the body which is a means for itself [purification of mind] and the postulation of ritual action (kriyā) in the form of the performance of the five great sacrifices etc. and the postulation of virtues (kalyāṇa) such as truth, straightforwardness etc. is certainly feasible.

3.38. Thus for a person who is possessed of the means, the performance of stipulated actions produces the desire for Self-knowledge through the purification of the mind. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.17.p.21.):

Thus what has been said is that there is the production of knowledge only through the performance of actions stipulated according to the stages of life, on the part of a person who observes the prescribed rules.

That is not so. Because the performance of [ritual] actions, which is based upon the appearance of duality, has no possibility of use in any manner whatsoever for the production of knowledge of the oneness of the Self which is the means of liberation. According to your view, that of
an exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, even though action in the form of contemplation upon the Self is the means for Self-knowledge, stipulated action such as Agnihotra etc. is possible to be a means for Self-knowledge only through purification of the mind. Thus the statement: 
"there is the production of knowledge only through the performance of actions stipulated according to the stages of life" is certainly questionable. So even though action is a means for the knowledge of the oneness of the Self through purification of the mind, because it is not directly the means for that [knowledge], knowledge does not have action as a component, even less is [knowledge] combined with action.

3.39. [objection] The combination of knowledge and action is indicated by the word "together" (saha) in the sacred text:

He who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together, having crossed over death through
non-knowledge, attains the immortal through knowledge (Isa. 11).

Because action is referred to by the word "non-knowledge".

[reply] You are mistaken. For there is no word "together" here. Because here, the pair of words: "sa" and "ha" is alone correct. Because the word yat in: "He who knows [both] these" invariably requires the word tat. [if you say] Even in the absence of the word "together", the combination is certainly made known by the twofold occurrence of the word "and". [we reply] The combination of knowledge and action which is made known by the word "together" or by the twofold occurrence of the word "and" is only in knowledge. Because there is the specification: "He who knows [both] of these". But [the combination] of those two is not for producing a result. And even in knowledge their combination only occurs for someone by chance. Because there is the specification: "He who knows". But there is no rule that: knowledge for all people is only through combination.

The purport of the sacred text is that he who truly knows this pair accomplishes their respective effects by this twofold means. In regard to those two, [ritual] action is the means of crossing over death. Knowledge is the means for the attainment of the immortal. Impurities of the mind such as desire etc. are understood by the word "death" as they lead to death. This is what has been told: having removed the impurities of the mind such as desires etc. through [performing] the stipulated action without attachment to the result, having purified the mind and become qualified for liberation, he gains liberation through knowledge. So this sacred text does not prove the combination of knowledge and action. On the contrary, it is understood from this passage of the sacred texts that the use of action is only for the purification of the mind.
3.40. [objection] Then for what purpose did Janaka, who possessed knowledge, perform action?

He who had recourse to knowledge, even though abiding in the knowledge of Brahman, he performed many sacrifices to cross over death by non-knowledge (Viṣṇ. P. 6.6.12).

[reply] Janaka's impurities of mind were nearly all previously burnt by knowledge. Still, those that remained were like cooled charcoal and he performed action such as sacrifice to put an end even to those. That is the purport. 24 By this it is made known that such impurities of the mind too are impediments. Moreover it is also to be understood that undertaking action is possible even for one who possesses knowledge: for the steadfastness of his purity of mind or for the welfare of the world.
3.41. But what has been said (ŚrīB. Para. 18.p.22f.):

The discrimination between what is permanent and what is impermanent etc. will not be accomplished without the study of the mīmāṃśa. Because the nature of [ritual] action, its result, its constancy or inconstancy, the permanence of the self etc. is difficult to be understood without the ascertainment of the particular result, means, procedure and qualified person.

That is not so. Because a person who has heard from his teacher etc. about the permanency or the impermanency etc. of a thing and on account of trust considers that it is indeed ascertained, has the possibility of being endowed with the "fourfold means" even without the ascertainment of the nature of action etc. and even without the study of the mīmāṃśa written by Jaimini. And because in the world such people are seen to have the desire for Self-knowledge. For what does trust not accomplish?

For example, for a person who has heard from his teacher etc. that: "action such as sacrifice is the means to heaven etc.", even his performance of the action is observed by people as done without study of the mīmāṃśa on account of his trust there [in the words of the teacher].

3.42. नन्दे धर्मिनां साधनचतुष्टयं साधनचतुष्टयं श्रब्धञ्जलिसाधनं भीमांसात्यज्ञ-मन्त्रं न संपत्तये। शुचीमययो दि विनियोजकोनि शृङ्खलांकिर्मि भवान-पाण्यवहुच्छयानस्तवेदविच्छायातो द्रात्त उपरतस्तिथिहृदि सबदिनहो भुवमकान-स्मरन्येवत्तां पश्चये (वृं ४।४।२३) इत्यतः शार्मादीनामात्मादेवेनि विनियोगम् करुः श्वेतोति नायान्दीति जयिति शेषेषु। शुचीदीनां विनियोजकतः दि न जैभिनि नूर्यः भविष्यते। किं तु लोकसिद्धमेवं नूतन। अन्यथा भाणान्याहार्दैव द्वितीयाश्च श्रवणस्तवेदविच्छायात्मिकृतौ श्रवणीयोऽसतं अत्यत्तथ्या वषयान-नाद्यता न करुणेति च वषयानुकूली स्यात। तथा च शब्दस्विस्मिष्टभविष्यद् एत विनियोगम् इति साधनचतुष्टयं जिज्ञासासाधनं व्युत्पन्न जैभिनिकत-
3.42. [objection] Even upon the accomplishment of the fourfold means in the manner mentioned, the fourfold means will not become the means for the desire to know Brahman without the study of the *mimamsa*.

Because one who has studied the *mimamsa* and who understands the things which bring about the employment [i.e. the use of a certain thing such as a mantra for a certain purpose] i.e. the means of knowledge such as direct scriptural statement, inferential signs etc. is able to undertake the employment of [the values] such as control of the mind etc. in [the sacred texts] such as: "Therefore he who knows as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring and concentrated, should see the Self in the self" (Bṛh.4.4.23.) for the apprehension of the Self. But another person [who has not studied the *mimamsa*] is not able to do that.

[reply] It is not so. Because direct scriptural statement etc. which bring about the employment [of a certain thing for a certain purpose] are not taught as something new by Jaimini. But only what is established in the world is being referred to. Otherwise, in the case of [a statement] such as: "bring the horse", the horse being the ancillary of bringing would not be understood even by one who has heard this sentence because he has not studied the *mimamsa* that the horse is ancillary to bringing since an accusative is stated. Hence there would be much confusion. Accordingly, the employment is only established by the nature of the signification of the word. So one who is proficient [i.e. one who knows the connection of a word and its meaning] is able to know that the fourfold means are the means for the desire to know, even without study of the *mimamsa* written by Jaimini.

On account of this, [the statement in the Śrī B. Para.18.p.23]:

"..."
That these [the fourfold means] are the means has to be determined from their employment. The employment [has to be determined] from direct scriptural statement, inferential signs etc. and that is contained in the third [chapter of the Purva-mimāsā]
is refuted.

3.43. [objection] In the same way, could there be knowledge of the Self from the teacher etc. even without the study of the later mimāsā?

[reply] Certainly. On account of this, the mimāsā of action written by Jaimini is not necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to the desire for Self-knowledge. It should not be said; how can control of the mind etc. be understood as the means for the desire to know? Because having referred to Self-knowledge by this: "he who knows as such" in the sacred text: "Therefore he who knows as such" (Bṛh.4.4.23.), it is subsequently said that one should directly apprehend the Self by the means such as control of the mind etc. [reason] Because even in the statement in the sacred text cited i.e. that control of the mind etc. are the means for the direct apprehension of the Self, they are not rejected as means for the desire to know. [The statement] "having referred to
Self-knowledge" is also not correct. Because the word "as such" (evam) calls to mind what was previously said, therefore the meaning of this: "he who knows as such" is knowing at first glance [i.e. in a general way] that the Self is free from the connection to action and its result.

Furthermore, control of the mind etc. is very clearly mentioned as the prior condition to listening [to the teaching], in the sacred text: "[to him who approaches properly], whose mind is calm and who is possessed of tranquility" (Ma.1.2.13.). For that reason, those [fourfold means] are established as the pre-requisite with regard to Self-inquiry. Self-inquiry is in the form of listening etc. Control of the mind etc. are certainly necessary at the time of listening etc. and even after that. But that is another thing.

3.44.

The contemplations upon the Udgītha etc. are admitted by all to be dependent upon the understanding of the nature of [ritual] action.

That is granted. Still, how is the prior mīmāṃsā written by Jaimini necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to Self-inquiry? Because an understanding of the nature of [ritual] action, in a general way, is possible even without that [Pūrvamīmāṃsā]. And because the investigation of the Udgītha [i.e. the chanting of the Veda] is incidental it cannot determine the pre-requisite, so what has been previously mentioned too (3.24.) is not to be forgotten.
3.45. The one who has acquired the fourfold means has been shown to be qualified for the desire to know Brahman. And by that person, Self-knowledge is to be accomplished for the attainment of liberation. With regard to that, if [you ask]: "what is the nature of the Self?", it is told:

The Self has been taught as being free from distinction, māyā is said to be its power.

The individual soul must be a reflection in that [māyā], the Lord is considered to possess a limiting adjunct. 7.

comment

The author states the view of the Vivaraṇa with regard to the nature of the soul and the Lord. See 1.32. and comment.

Abhyankar now commences the examination of Rāmānuja’s Mahāsiddhānta.

3.46. The conclusion of the exponents of māyā is that the supreme Self is free from distinction. But what has been said (Sūra.B.Para.28.p.45.):

The exponents of a thing free from distinction are
not able to say that "this is the means of knowledge"
in regard to a thing free from distinction. Because
all means of knowledge have as their object a thing
possessing distinction.

In regard to that, it is said: are the means of knowledge accepted as
being the object of another means of knowledge or not? In the first
case, even those other means of knowledge must be said as the object
of another means of knowledge and so there is an infinite regress. In
the latter case, the means of knowledge would not have the nature of
being a means of knowledge since they are not the object of another
means of knowledge. If that is the case, there would be the failure
of ordinary relations.

[objection] Suppose the means of knowledge have no invalidity,
but are certainly established as the nature of being a means of
knowledge. And for that purpose there is no requirement of another
means of knowledge, but like a light is self-luminous, the means of
knowledge are certainly themselves a means of knowledge.

[reply] Then why is the supreme Self, who is the support of all
the means of knowledge, not accepted as having self-validity?

comment

Against Rāmānuja's objection that there is no means of knowledge
(perception, inference or verbal testimony) for an entity free from
distinction, Abhyankar raises the question; does a means of knowledge
need to be verified by another means of knowledge or is it intrinsically
valid? If a means of knowledge like perception requires demonstration
by another means of proof such as inference, then the validity of the
inference would also need to be demonstrated by yet another means of
proof etc. However if a means of knowledge is not demonstrated by
another means of knowledge then on what grounds can we say that it is
a means of knowledge? For example if, as Vedāntins accept, the visual
sense organ operating through the material eye is of a subtle nature
and hence unknown, then how does one know that it exists? It can be
proved to exist since it is the object of inference: the visual sense
exists because it illumines an object and whatever illumines an object
must exist.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin responds by stating that knowledge should be accepted as intrinsically valid and a means of knowledge does not require verification from another source of knowledge. The Advaitin accepts this, since it is his own position, and argues that if a means of knowledge is inherently valid, the existence of Brahman is all the more validated since Brahman is by nature self-evident (svayamprakāśa) awareness without which there could be no operation of a means of knowledge.

This is an initial argument. Strictly speaking it does not answer Nāmaṇuja's objection that a means of knowledge does not apprehend anything which is free from distinction. Abhyankar now addresses this point.

3.47. Furthermore, the means of knowledge do not reveal the supreme Brahman as their object. That has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa:

The means of knowledge, on the part of those who possess the means of knowledge, are not capable of the determination of Brahman the abode of all power... (Viṣ.P.6.8.57.)

The meaning of that is: māninā are those who possess the means of knowledge, māṇuṇī are the means of knowledge, niṣṭhāvai means for determination, na prabhavanti signifies that they [the means of
knowledge] are not capable. But because the means of knowledge have gained existence [from Brahman], therefore, while remaining at a distance, they indirectly indicate as their own root cause that there must be something which is the support of all empirical transactions consisting of the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge etc. That [i.e. the sacred texts] are certainly not invalid merely because of this. Just like a light, which has the capacity to illuminate a thing possessing colour, while itself remaining at a distance indicates that darkness also has [black] colour. It is similar to that. Accordingly, it is said in the sacred text: "beyond darkness" (Śv.3.8.). And just as the light of a firefly is unable to illumine the sun, so too, even the sun which illumines everything is unable to illumine the supreme Brahman. With the same purport as this it is said in the sacred text: "light of lights" (Bṛh.4.4.16.).

Comment

Rāmānuja argues that all means of knowledge only make known an object which possesses distinguishing characteristics. Perception reveals its object as possessing the attributes of colour etc. Because inference is based upon perceptual data, it too can only give knowledge of a thing possessing distinction. Verbal testimony is derived from words which can denote either a class concept (jāti) such as the word "cow", or a quality (guna) like "white or blue", or an action (kriyā) such as "moving", or a name (sāmāñā i.e. as revealing a substance, svarūpa) like "Devadatta". So verbal testimony too is incapable of denoting something free from distinction.

Advaitins accept that words cannot communicate an entity which is free from distinction through their primary expressive power (śākti). The texts such as: "from which [Brahman] words return..." (Tai.2.9.) also convey this meaning. However apart from the primary expressive power, words can also communicate through a secondary or implied signification (laksanā). Advaitins consider that Brahman, free from distinction, can be directly revealed through certain Upaniṣad statements which function by way of implication, subsequent to the establishment in the texts of the necessary context for the implication to be understood. For example the "great sentence": "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) communicates by means of an implied signification (see
Similarly, the scriptural statement defining the nature of Brahman: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (satyam jñanam anantam brahma. Tai.2.1.) conveys its meaning through implication. The words "real" (satyam) and "Knowledge" (jñanam) are in grammatical apposition (śanānādhikaranya) with the word "limitless" (anantam). Because of such apposition, the words "real" and "Knowledge" relinquish the limited meanings generally associated with these words while still retaining their root sense (satya from as "to be" and jñāna from jña "to know"). So the word "real" in association with the word "limitless" cannot signify something finite and hence it implies only the root meaning free of all limitations i.e. existence per se (sannātra). So too the word "Knowledge" directly denotes mental states which are an attribute of the intellect, but on account of apposition with the word "limitless" it gives up this limited meaning and implies only the root sense of the verb free from any other ascription, i.e. awareness per se (cintātra). Thus the nature of Brahman is implied, but not directly denoted, by the sentence: "satyam jñanam anantam brahma.30

3.48. The supreme Brahman possesses a power which is non-different from itself and it is the locus of that power which is non-different with regard to itself. [Brahman] is one, in the form of existence, free from qualities and free from distinction and is unable to be stated as "such
and such" because its power has not been manifested. At the time of creation, that power, which has been manifested depending upon its own locus, becomes as though different like bubbles from water. For this reason, the individual soul who is reflected in that power considers the Self to be different from the supreme Self, even though the supreme Self is himself. In the same manner, he considers the world, which is the transformation of such a power, to be different from the supreme Self. Brahman, possessing the power which has been manifested, can be expressed by the word Lord. On account of the manifested power, this Lord is superimposed as possessing quality and distinction.

[objection] One thinks: why has this Lord been superimposed by the power? This Lord alone must be principal. There is nothing different from Him which is free from quality and free from distinction. For the accomplishment of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world is only through Him.

[reply] No. Because the essential nature of the supreme Self can be understood only through the sacred texts and it has to be accepted only according to the sacred texts. In the sacred text, at some place the freedom from qualities is stated and at some [other] place the possession of qualities is stated. The way that has been told is certainly more correct for adherence to the two types of sacred texts.

Comment
See comment to 1.9.

3.49.
नन्दु निर्गुणश्च गुणश्च गुणात्मकपथ गुणसहितायां तत्त्वं बालसिंहितविशिष्टं वेषं।
गुणश्च गुणसहितायाः परमात्मानां गुणानां निमित्तान्त सशिरवणेऽ
निमित्तान्त सशिरवणेऽ विनिमित्तान्त विनिमित्तान्त विनिमित्तान्त विनिमित्तान्त।

to 1.9.
3.49. [objection] The purport of the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from qualities must be in the absence of qualities which are to be abandoned.

[reply] No. Because the word "quality" which is used in a universal and primary sense has no authority to be used in a restricted meaning. Moreover, the negation of qualities in the supreme Self is taught by the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities. And because negation is preceded by attainment, the attainment of qualities in the supreme Self has to be stated. That [attainment] is not through perception, because the supreme Self is not an object of perception. But it is through inference. Having known the supreme Self to be the agent of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, due to that reason, the inference of qualities such as omniscience which are useful for creation etc. is possible there [in the supreme Self]. But there is no possibility of an inference there [in the supreme Self], in any manner whatsoever, of qualities which are to be abandoned. So because there is no attainment of qualities which are to be abandoned, how can the purport of the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities be supposed to refer to their negation?

3.50. Furthermore, freedom from distinction is certainly established even by inference which is based upon the pervasion: any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the nature of clay which is their universal. That has been told by the venerable Vyāsa: "inference is entirely used up in comprehending the mere universal, it has no capacity to ascertain a distinction" (Y.S.B.1.25.).
3.51. There is harmony with the sacred text: "from which [Brahman] words return along with the mind, having not reached" (Tai.2.4.) only because of the acceptance of Brahman as pure and free from distinction. Otherwise, because Brahman possesses qualities it is therefore an object of speech and because the followers of Ramanuja accept it in that manner there would be incongruity with that [text].

It should not be said that the purport of that sacred text is the absence of being an object of speech in totality, for there is the absence of being "just so much" since the qualities are innumerable. [reason] Because there is the consequence of the loss of self-evidence of the word "having not reached". But the explanation: "having not reached the limit of qualities" is artificial because of the acceptance of the need to supply an ellipsis. And because in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word] "having not reached", there is the attainment through contiguity only of what has been specified by the
word "which" i.e. "from which" (yatah) since it is the limit for the return of speech.

It should not be said that in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word] "having not reached", there can be the postulation only of the supreme Self who is distinguished by all qualities and who is specified by the word "which". In regard to that, the absence of attainment of the agency of speech is negated in the supreme Self who is the substantive and it is negated even in the qualities which are the distinguishing attributes of that [supreme Self] and it will terminate in the attribute of an attribute i.e. in the totality belonging to the qualities. For there is the maxim: when the substantive is negated, the positive statement and the negation terminate in the distinguishing attribute.31 [reason] Because the supreme Self, as distinguished by all qualities, is not relevant to the topic there. And because the final explanation through the maxim which was stated is a last resort. On account of this, [the explanation]: "from which (yatah) means from the bliss of Brahman, there is the return of speech and mind having not reached (aprayya) the limit of that [bliss of Brahman]" is refuted.32 And because the bliss of Brahman is accepted as an object of speech by the sacred text itself: "the bliss of Prajāpati one hundred [times] is one [measure of the] bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.8.). And because human bliss is experienced by individual souls, therefore the bliss of Brahman is able to be conceived by the mind by way of multiplication hundreds of times higher and higher. But Brahman free from qualities cannot be conceived by the mind, for there is no experience anywhere in the world of a thing free from qualities.

3.52.  

न च तद्भिमातस्य नितिशेषप्रक्रियापौर्णमि ‘नियुण्मण’

(च०५) इति श्रुत्या प्रतिपादित्वेत्य वाच्यनितिशुचितरस्मिनीति वाच्यम्। वाच्यो नित्रतेन हस्तस्य वाच्यो नित्रित्युपेतेत् प्रतिपादितुं न भववनत्त्वथात्। नियुण्मण- 
मिति शृणुस्तु मेत्राशमिति मतिपादयति। किं तु केवलं गुणाविशेषाति। अवस्यं
3.52. It should not be said that the sacred text [denoting] the return of speech is inconsistent since even Brahman free from distinction, which you accept, is taught by the sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cū.7). [reason] Because the meaning of this: "words return" is that words are unable to teach by way of a positive statement. But the sacred text: "free from qualities" does not teach [that Brahman] is "like this" but it negates qualities entirely. This must necessarily be understood. Otherwise the sacred text: "words return", itself teaching Brahman in a form while it is not an object of speech, would be contradicted like the statement "I am mute". 7.

3.53. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.45.):

The tenet relating to their own school, that an entity free from distinction is established by one's own experience, is also refuted. Because there is only the experience of what possesses distinction with the self as the witness.

With regard to that, it is said:

Universal knowledge is not free from distinction, because it is knowledge. Scripture must be the means of knowledge for what is free from distinction. That [scripture] too is of an
3.54. We do not deny the experience possessing distinction, which is of an ordinary nature such as "I saw this", as it is included within the world which is a modification of the power of the supreme Self. But because a distinction has the nature of the universal, it is most strange that you deny the experience free from distinction which has the nature of being the basis of the experience of an ordinary nature possessing distinction. The pervasion is everywhere certainly without deviation; any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the nature of clay which is their universal.

Ordinary knowledge is a particular mental modification and its special nature is that it possesses a locus, an object and is determinate. With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus, an object and is indeterminate. With regard to that, the universal is without an object and possesses a locus. Because knowledge depends firstly upon a location and then upon an object. Even with regard to that, the universal is without a locus. And here, knowledge just has the nature of being knowledge [as such]. Even with regard to that, the universal is in the form of existence and it is where even knowledge as such does not exist. The conclusion based just upon this
is that awareness is indeed existence. This experience free from distinction is well known in the "fourth state".

Comment

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate that knowledge (ādi), which is a particular mental modification, has its substratum in awareness (anubhūti) which is free from distinction (nirviśeṣa) and of the nature of existence (sadrūpa). He enumerates five "stages", each of greater universality than the preceding.

(1) ordinary knowledge which possesses a locus (āśraya), an object (viśaya) and is of a determinate nature (sāvikālpa). For example the knowledge relating to Brahman possessing qualities (sagūṇabrahman) possesses a locus i.e., the thinker and an object i.e. Brahman with qualities. It is determinate since there is knowledge of the relation of attribute and substantive (viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhava).

(2) With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus and an object but is indeterminate. For instance the knowledge relating to Brahman free from qualities (nirgūṇabrahman) possesses a locus i.e., the thinker and an object i.e. Brahman. It is indeterminate because Brahman is without quality and so there is no attribute-substantive relation.

(3) The third stage possesses a locus but has no object. In the cognition: "I have knowledge" (ādīmān) the "I" is the locus but there is no object of knowledge.

(4) The universal with reference to that is just that knowledge as such exists.

(5) Finally, the absolute universal is in the form of self-evident existence. Because the mental modification has entirely resolved (as in deep sleep) even knowledge as such does not appear. The conclusion is that mere awareness which is of the nature of existence remains as the substratum of all mental activity.

With regard to the "fourth state", see comment to 1.40.
3.55. What has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 28. p. 45.):

an experience free from distinction, which is
distinguished from what possesses distinction
by some semblance of reasoning, has to be
distinguished by natural distinctions peculiar
to itself which are different from existence.
So the possession of distinction certainly
remains due to natural distinctions peculiar
to itself which are different from existence
and which are the reason for distinguishing.

That too is questionable. Because distinguishing means separating. Like
[separating] an animal from a bird. That [separating] is due to the
nature of being an animal or due to the absence of wings. For there
is no royal decree that distinguishing is only through some nature
which exists. In regard to that [distinguishing of an animal], an
animal cannot be said to possess distinction due to the absence of
wings. That [possession of distinction] is due to the nature of being
an animal. This is another matter. Thus in separating an experience
free from distinction due to the absence of a distinction, how does
the possession of distinction occur? When air which has no form is
distinguished due to the absence of form with regard to fire, water
and food, even a child does not believe that there is the possession
of form there [in air] due to the very absence of form. But if the
possession of a distinction is accepted even due to the absence of
distinction, then in the occurrence of what is non-existent becoming
existent, there would certainly be loss of the essential nature. For this reason, the venerable Vyāsa has said in the commentary upon the Yogasūtras: "the puruṣa has the attribute of not being born', the mere absence of the attribute of being born is understood. Not an attribute connected to the puruṣa" (Y.S.1.9).

**Comment**

The purport of the argument is that distinguishing between things can be brought about either through the presence of an attribute or through the absence of an attribute. Hence a cow can be distinguished from a bird due to the absence of having wings. However an entity cannot be said to possess a distinction merely on the ground that it does not possess an attribute.

3.56. It should not be said that because awareness free from distinction is accepted by the exponents of mayā as having the distinction of being the material cause, a distinction in the form of the distinction of being the material cause cannot be avoided. [reason] Because there is the fault of infinite regress; if the distinction of being the material cause is a distinction, then once again such a
distinction which is the nature of being the material cause is [yet] another distinction. And so, like in the view of Rāmānuja, although Brahman possesses distinction it has to be accepted that the possession of distinction is not a distinction in order to avoid the infinite regress: if the possession of distinction is itself a distinction, the possession of such a distinction is [yet] another distinction, in just the same way, according to the view of the exponents of māyā as well, the distinction of being the material cause is accepted as not being a distinction.

If [you say] that the possession of distinction is not a distinction, but it is merely the absence of being devoid of distinction, [we say] that you must accept that the distinction of being the material cause too is merely the absence of not being the substratum of the distinctions which appear. Thus the quality of being knowledge is not a positive attribute, but it is merely the absence of being inert. Similarly, self-luminosity too is merely the absence of being illumined by another. Due to this, the establishing of the possession of distinction (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.46.): "because knowledge has the quality of being knowledge and the quality of self-luminosity" is refuted. In the same way, it is to be understood that the quality of being eternal is merely the absence of destruction. The quality of being one is merely the absence of a second. The scripture, such as: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.), "without taint" (Śv.6.19.) is the means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

comment

The purport of the discussion about the distinction of being the material cause, is that if the nature of being the material cause is considered to be a distinction, then there should be a cause for that distinction and again a cause for that distinction and so there is no finality.
3.57. But what is being taught by this text (SrI.B.Para.28.p.46.):

Verbal testimony, especially, has the capacity of denoting only an entity possessing distinction.

Because it functions through words and sentences.

Now a word is due to the connection of the stem and the affix. Since the stem and the affix have a difference in meaning, the imparting of a qualified meaning on the part of the word itself cannot be avoided. And the difference among words is based upon the difference of meanings. Because a sentence is a collection of words, it denotes a
particular combination of the meanings of several words and therefore has no capacity for teaching about an entity free from distinction. [Hence] verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

is that an entity which is free from distinction does not have verbal testimony as its means of knowledge. That is when a word undertakes to teach about something through primary signification, by way of a positive statement and from essential definition. Not otherwise.

To explain. A word is seen to have many ways of teaching a meaning. Because a word teaches a meaning at some place by way of a positive statement and somewhere [else] by way of negation. So too, somewhere by way of an essential definition and somewhere [else] through an incidental definition. In the same way, somewhere through the primary signification and at some place through implication. Although suggestion is another type of signification, still, it necessarily gives either of the two: the express meaning or an implied meaning, so it does not illustrate anything different.35

There [in respect of the usage of words], an entity free from distinction cannot be said as: "such and such", so although a word is unable to teach an entity free from distinction through a positive statement, still, it is certainly able to teach through negation. For instance: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.), "without taint" (Śv.6.19.), "without sound, without touch" (Kaṭha.1.3.15.) etc. Here [in respect of negation], a word communicates Brahman free from distinction through secondary signification [i.e. implication]. Because even the primary meaning of the words "free from qualities" etc. does not exist there [in Brahman] in reality. So too, although a word does not teach an entity free from distinction through an essential definition, still, it is certainly able to teach through an incidental definition. For example: "from which these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) etc.
It must be understood that although this incidental definition is for Brahman who possesses a limiting adjunct and has distinction, still, by means of that [Brahman possessing distinction], it is possible to be for [Brahman] free from distinction which is the support of that [Brahman possessing distinction]. This [incidental definition] taught by the scripture has to be understood according to the ordinary view, because even the scripture is of an ordinary nature. For the absence of absolute existence in regard to the sacred texts is taught by the sacred text itself: "the Vedas are no longer Vedas..." (Bṛh.4.3.22.).

Abhyankar states that Brahman cannot be directly denoted through the primary signification of a word (vācyavṛtti), for a word primarily expresses either a class concept, a quality, an action, or a name (see comment 3.47). He also maintains that a positive statement (vidhi) is unable to reveal Brahman, for such a statement would communicate by way of a subject-predicate construction denoting the relation of an attribute and its possessor. A positive statement has no applicability since Brahman is said to be free from attributes.

Abhyankar also considers that the nature of Brahman cannot be revealed through an essential definition, i.e., a definition by means of the essential nature (svarūpalakṣaṇa). Such a definition requires that the essential nature of the thing be offered as the definition (svarūpan eva lakṣaṇam). The essential nature can itself be the definition if there is an assumed distinction between the defining characteristics and the thing to be defined, so once again there is a relation of attributes and their possessor. Although this relation is only a conceptual formulation for the purpose of the definition, Abhyankar presumably classes svarūpalakṣaṇa along with the previous two modes because of the above reason.

However the principal view is that the nature of Brahman can be revealed through an essential definition. In his commentary upon the passage: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1.), Śaṅkara states on six occasions that the passage is intended to provide the definition of Brahman. Śaṅkara considers that such a passage reveals the essence of Brahman through the implied meaning of the words (see comment to 3.47).

Rāmānuja's contention is that verbal testimony cannot be a means of knowledge for something free from distinguishing characteristics since it
functions through words which possess a distinct meaning and sentences which express a particular relation between the different meanings of the words. Advaitins reply that even if a sentence does express such a relation, there is no rule that the object of the purport of the sentence must possess: the distinctions belonging to the various words. The purport of a sentence can be different from what is denoted by the relation of the words. For instance, if I express disapproval at my friends plan of dining with my enemy by telling him: "go eat poison" (viṣam bhūkṣya), the intention is not that he should eat poison but that he should not eat with such a person. A sentence can also express a non-relational meaning. For example: "this is that Devadatta" conveys a non-relational sense because the relation denoted by "this" referring to the present place and time and the relation expressed by "that" referring to a past place and time are both negated so that the sentence points to the bare substantive. Thus while a sentence can convey a relational meaning, it need not always do so. The deciding factor is the purport.

3.58. यतः 'सत्यसत्य निरिक्षणसत्यविद्वानुसारसत्य न निरिक्षणसत्यनिः सामायिकः' (अन्नाति २९ ५० १) स्तुतिः तत्वावधे—
सत्याक्रमशः समोकर्षति सत्यसत्य निरिक्षणकसम्मान
मेधसंभावनान्नित्वानां नाश्योन्यार्थकवते भवेत् ॥ ९ ॥

3.58. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 29. p. 47.):

Perception, which is divided due to the difference between indeterminate and determinate, is not a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

In regard to that, it is said:

Perception which is indeterminate is declared as apprehending pure existence. Difference, configuration and the generic character cannot be mutually of the same nature.

3.59. रामानुजीयः'यतःतत्त्व निरिक्षणकसम्मानस्यायामयायात्मकः तत्त्व निरिक्षणसत्यः
Because the indeterminate [perception] accepted by Rāmānuja is something constructed by his own imagination it most certainly could not be a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction. But in actual fact, indeterminate means free from distinction. A distinction is just the particular name, generic character etc., so the perception free from that is indeterminate [i.e. free from any distinction].

For example. Prior to the particular knowledge "this is Devadatta", there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e., "this is a brahmaṇa". Prior to that, there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e., "this is a man". Even before that, there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e., "this is a tall thing". Even before that, [there is the idea] "this is something". There is the mention of the word "something" only because somehow or other it has to be shown by a word. But not because the knowledge of that [indeterminate thing] has the attribute of "somethingness" as its mode. The purport of the use of the words "this is something" is just that in the initial knowledge no attribute whatsoever appears. Because experience is exactly in that manner. This alone is what is known in reality as indeterminate. And this is certainly possible to be a means of
knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

For perception is exactly in that manner in the fourth state. The momentary experience, prior to the distinct knowledge "I and this" on the part of the person who has awoken from sleep, in which there is no cognition of even the knower or the known separately from Knowledge is indeed that ['fourth state'].

3.60. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.29.p.47.):

Indeterminate [perception] is the apprehension of the first object among things belonging to the same class. Determine is said as the apprehension of the second object etc. Upon the apprehension of the first object, the "cowness" etc. is not recognized as a form which persists [in other cows]. There is the cognition of it persisting only in the case of the apprehension of the second object and so on.

That is not correct. Because the well known cognition free from distinction such as "this is something" has no connection with concealment. And because there is no means of knowledge for the word
"distinction" (vikalpa) in the word "indeterminate" (nirvikalpaka) to have the meaning of persisting.

Furthermore, an expression of the twofold difference of that type of perception is correct only through the two words: not having [something] persisting and having [something] persisting, but not through the words: indeterminate and determinate. Moreover, for a person whose mental impression produced by the first cognition [of the object] has vanished, its persisting even in the second cognition is not recognized and so even the second cognition would be indeterminate. Moreover, upon the acceptance of the way of the Vaiśeṣikas: that there is the extraordinary perception of all individual cows through contact with the universal characteristic in the very first cognition of a cow etc., that [perception] would be determinate. So this is a mere trifle.

Comment

Advaitins criticize Rāmānuja's explanation of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception (see text, 2.44.) because his interpretation does not coincide with the meaning of the word "indeterminate". When a cognition has as its object a distinction such as a name, generic character etc. then it is a determinate perception. When it is without such distinction, it is an indeterminate perception (see text, 3.59.).

According to Rāmānuja, the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception lies in the fact that in the former the generic character is not recognized as persisting in other members of the same class whereas in the latter perception it is known to persist. However in both types of perception there is the cognition of such distinctions as name and generic character etc., so that even in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension: "this is Devadatta", "this is a brāhmaṇa" etc. Advaitins argue that due to the cognition of such distinctions, Rāmānuja's "indeterminate" perception is only determinate perception and the use of the word "indeterminate" to characterize it is incorrect.

The mention of the "way of the Vaiśeṣikas" i.e. the explanation employed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for the determination of the generic character or an invariably concomitant relation (vyāpti), is not applicable here since the Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not hold this view.
3.61. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 29. p. 49.):

Because perception refers to what possesses distinction, inference also refers to what possesses distinction because its object is qualified by the connection to what has been seen through perception etc.

That too is questionable. Because the universal is established as free from distinction when a distinction is inferred to have the nature of the universal, due to the existence of the pervasion previously mentioned (3.54): any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as the differences such as a pot, earthenware dish etc. have the nature of clay which is their universal.

comment

The particulars have the nature of their universal, but the universal is inherently free from the attributes of the particular. While a pot has the nature of the clay, its universal, the latter is not inherently connected to the form of a pot. The clay too has the nature of its universal, i.e., its material cause such as atoms etc. That universal has the nature of its universal and so on until there is the termination in the highest universal: pure existence which contains all distinctions and yet possesses no distinction.
3.62. But those who ridicule (Śrī. B. Para. 29. p. 49.):

[a person] who says that the very thing is free from
distinction on account of the natural distinctions
belonging to the thing does not know the
contradiction in his own speech. It is like the
assertion about the barrenness of [one's own] mother.

They must certainly be asked: this ridicule is about whom? The
exponents of maya say that an entity is free from distinction merely
through the absence of not being the substratum of the distinctions
which are appearing. But not because of some natural distinction.

It was just mentioned (3, 59.) that such a Brahman, free from
distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception in the
fourth state. Here, there is certainly no appearance of even the
knower or the known. But this perception apprehends pure existence. It
does not have difference as its object. And here, even the difference
of apprehended and apprehending does not exist, what to speak of
difference belonging to the object. The statement: "apprehends pure
existence" is figurative. So too, even the statement: "Brahman, free
from distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception" is
figurative. This very non-duality is taught by the sacred texts such
as: "Existence alone..." (Ch. 6.2.1.), thus there is certainly no
contradiction between scripture and perception. This Brahman, whose
nature is awareness free from distinction and which has as though
acquired another nature associated with the knower and the known because its power in the form of beginningless Ignorance is manifested, is the indeterminate etc. perception of an ordinary nature such as: "that which appears, that is something". But in the ordinary perception such as: "this is a pot, not a cloth", the difference of apprehended and apprehending and the difference between the pot and the cloth etc. certainly appears.

comment

Advaitins also consider deep sleep to be a perceptual experience free from distinction. For upon waking there is the recollection: "I did not know anything" and the cause of such a recollection can be inferred to be indeterminate perception since there is no recollection without an experience. 47

3.63. [objection by Rāmānuja's opponent] 48 Difference is difficult to determine since it does not admit [definite] alternatives. To explain:
in the first place, difference is not the essential nature of the object. Because when the nature of the object is apprehended, just as there is the expression of its nature, there would be the expression of its difference from everything. It should not be said that even when the essential nature is apprehended, because the expression "different"
depends upon a counter correlate, there is no expression of difference at that very time because there is no recollection of that [counter correlate]. [reason] Because the requirement of a counter correlate is not able to be observed for one who holds that difference is nothing but the essential nature. For the essential nature and difference are in essence the same. Just as the expression of the essential nature does not require a counter correlate, the expression of difference too should be just the same. And "pot" and "different" should be synonyms like "hand" (baste) and "hand" (kara).

Nor even is [difference] an attribute. If it is an attribute, its difference from the essential nature has to be necessarily accepted. Otherwise it would be the same as the essential nature. In the case of difference, there would be difference even for that [first difference] which is an attribute of that [first difference] and for that [second difference] also. Thus there would be an infinite regress. But if there is no supposition of another difference, there could be no expression that the initial difference is different from its own locus. For there is no possibility of a cause for the expression [i.e. that it is different] for itself with regard to itself.

Furthermore, there is the apprehension of difference when there is apprehension of the object qualified by attributes such as generic character etc. and there is apprehension of the object qualified by attributes such as generic character etc. when there is the apprehension of difference. So there is mutual dependence. Thus difference is difficult to determine.

[reply by Advaitin] So be it.

comment

The position of the Advaitins, as represented by Maṇḍānamiśra, is that perception does not have difference for its object. The object of perception is pure existence (sannātra). Difference, as a reality, cannot be proved through any means of knowledge. Conversely, Rāmānuja maintains that a thing qualified by the generic character is the object
of perception. The perception of the generic character is the cause for a statement of difference about the object itself or something else, because the generic character requires a counter correlate.\footnote{51}

According to the Advaitin, perception simply reveals the object, it has no capacity to differentiate one object from another. A perception such as: "this is a pot", "this is a cloth" apprehends mere being defined by the form of pot or cloth. The perceptual objects are limiting adjuncts of existence which persists as the reality in all cognitions.\footnote{52} The Advaitin contends that a statement about the difference of a pot from cloth is not within the scope of a perceptual means of knowledge since perception apprehends only the bare object. Nor can it be established through another means of knowledge such as inference.\footnote{53} Though difference is something well known in the world (lokaprasiddha), the Advaitin maintains that it is not proved through a means of knowledge (pramanaprasiddha).\footnote{54}

The argument presented in the text to demonstrate the difficulty in arriving at the nature of difference can be exemplified by a statement like: "the pot is different from the book". Is the difference which belongs to the pot identical with the essential nature of the pot or is it an attribute of the pot? If it is the essential nature, then upon the mention of its nature there would be the mention of its difference from everything and the further statement that it is "different" would be unnecessary. Also, the essential nature cannot be identical with difference because the mention of the essential nature i.e. pot, does not require the mention of a counter correlate. However the mention of "difference" does require a counter correlate for it creates the expectation of something which there is difference from. Hence they cannot be identical.

Nor is difference an attribute of the pot. For if difference (d) is an attribute of the essential nature then there must be another difference (d¹), which is an attribute of the first difference, in order to distinguish the first difference from the essential nature. Otherwise it would be identical to the essential nature. So too, another difference (d²), which is an attribute of d¹, is necessary in order to distinguish d¹ from d. To distinguish d² from d¹ another difference has to be postulated and so there would be an infinite regress (anavastha).

Finally, the argument is put forward that an attempt to establish difference involves the fallacy of mutual dependence (anonyāsraya) because difference is established when there is apprehension of the
object qualified by its generic character, but without first apprehending the difference of a pot from a book it is not possible to know that "this has the generic character of a pot".

3.64. It should not be said that if [difference] is difficult to determine, how is the appearance of difference logically possible in the manner that: "this is a pot, not cloth" etc.? [reason] Because in an appearance there is no requirement for the thing to be absolutely real. For there is no logical possibility of the appearance of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. You also have accepted it to be exactly the same by saying (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86): "because cognitions invariably have an object". Moreover, the difficulty of determining difference proves that it is an effect of Ignorance.

But what has been said with the intention that difference is not difficult to determine (Śrī.B.Para.30,p.50.):

Just as awareness and colour etc. are accepted by the exponents of māyā to be the cause for a particular expression elsewhere and the cause for an expression even in regard to themselves,
it is certainly possible for difference as well.

That is not so. Because there is dissimilarity. Because colour produces visibility in a pot which is its locus and it produces visibility even in regard to itself. But that very colour, though producing the expression "possessing colour" in regard to the pot which is its locus, it does not produce such an expression about itself. In the same manner, Knowledge also is the cause for the illumination of the pot which is its object and it is the cause for its own illumination. But that very Knowledge, though producing the expression "possessing Knowledge" in regard to the Self which is its locus, it does not produce such an expression about itself. Because the state of locus and its possessor, which is dependent upon difference, is impossible in oneself, like mounting upon one's own shoulders. Similarly, this difference belonging to the pot which has cloth as its counter correlate, though producing the expression "different from cloth" in regard to the pot which is its locus, it cannot produce the expression "different" about itself. What is known as "different" is only what possesses difference.

comment

The Advaitin has argued that if difference is identical to the essential nature there is no need to use the word difference at all. If it is an attribute, then an infinite regress would occur. In reply, Rāmānuja states that there is no fault of infinite regress because just as colour reveals its locus as possessing colour and reveals itself, or just as awareness reveals its locus as possessing awareness and also reveals itself, so too, difference reveals difference and reveals itself as well.

Abhyankar answers that the illustration of colour or awareness does not establish the point. Colour, for example, reveals its locus as possessing colour: "this pot has colour" but it cannot reveal itself as having colour. So too, even if difference is able to reveal another thing as possessing difference such as a pot, it is not able to reveal itself as having difference.
3.65 But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 30 p. 51.):

the configuration is itself the generic character. The
generic character such as cowness etc. is itself
difference.

That is questionable. Because the configuration indicates the generic
caracter. What is known as "configuration" is the particular
arrangement of the component parts. That is certainly not itself the
generic character. Because there is the experience that the
configuration of various types of pots: those which are minute, large,
have long necks, projecting mouths or broad bellies, is different
with regard to each individual. It is quite another matter that there
is a mutual similarity of the configurations due to some attribute.

Because even though the configuration of two Kārṣāpana coins has very
great similarity it is not identical. When one Kārṣāpana coin is chipped,
only the form belonging to that is chipped and not [the form] belonging
to another Kārṣāpana. But the generic character of being a Kārṣāpana
coin is just one in all Kārṣāpana coins.

"The generic character is itself difference" is also not correct.
Because the generic character reveals difference, it is separate with
regard to that. Moreover if the generic character is itself difference, there is no logical possibility of the usage: "this is a pot, not cloth". Because since the generic character of potness is said just by the word pot, there is no possibility of the usage of a negative particle which again has that meaning [i.e. the generic character].

**Comment**

Ramanuja considers that the configuration (saṃsthāna) i.e. the distinctive form of the object, constitutes the generic character (jāti) of the object: for it is only the particular configuration, such as the dew lap of a cow, that is seen to inhere in all members of the same class. Moreover, Ramanuja equates generic character with the determination of difference, because upon the apprehension of the generic character such as cowness there is exclusion of all other classes like buffaloes etc.

In reply, it is argued that the configuration reveals the generic character but they are not identical. Though all the members of a class partake of a very similar configuration, their respective configurations are not identical: the configuration of Devadatta's cow does not itself exist in Yajñadatta's cow. The generic character, however, is identical.

Nor is generic character identical with difference. Rather, it is what reveals the difference of members of one class from those of another class. If the generic character and difference were identical then they should be synonyms and in the expression: "this is a pot, not cloth" the use of the negative particle is redundant since it too would refer to the generic character. Moreover, when the statement is uttered: "there is difference of a pot from a piece of cloth", nobody understands it to mean: "there is the generic character of a pot from a piece of cloth". The mention of the configuration such as: "this is a wide brimmed pot", or the generic character: "pot" does not require the statement of a counter correlate. However the word "difference" requires a counter correlate (because of the expectation: "different from what?"), so the configuration or the generic character cannot be identical to difference.
Furthermore, are these three meanings: cowness, difference and the cessation of non-difference known to be mutually different respectively? Or are the three just one? Alternatively, are cowness and difference one and is the cessation of non-difference separate? Or perhaps there is the identity of these two; difference and the cessation of non-difference and cowness is separate? Thus there are these four alternatives. With regard to those, the first alternative is that those who rely upon cognition accept the three meanings to be different. The second is that the meaning is just one, on account of simplicity. The cognition is like that due to the natural character of words. The third and fourth are for those who follow both cognition and simplicity. With regard to those, the third is the view of Ramanuja since it is very clearly accepted to be so by his saying (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51.): "cowness etc. is itself difference", and (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52.): "Because there is the cessation of non-difference only through the apprehension of difference". But with regard to that, the fourth is correct. Because non-difference is the absence of difference. The absence of that [non-difference] is the cessation of non-difference. The meaning is: the absence of the absence of difference. The absence of an absence is certainly well known to all as the nature of being a counter correlate. With regard to that, having given up the identity of difference with the cessation of non-difference, which is
well known, the identity of cowness with difference is accepted even though it is not well known. Thus what is this doctrine of Rāmānuja?

3.67. Furthermore, because the generic character does not require a counter correlate and because difference requires a counter correlate the difference [between the two] is certainly unavoidable. It should not be said that just as the one Devadatta is not seen to require a counter correlate if addressed by the word "Devadatta" and he is seen to require it if he is addressed by the word "father" etc., it could be just like that here [in the illustration], even though the individual is one there is difference of the adjuncts of being Devadatta and being a father. But here [in the topic], in one individual pot you accept only the non-difference of the adjuncts of potness and difference which are the reasons for the usage of the words "pot" and "different". Thus the two words "pot" and "different" should be synonyms. Moreover, the dependence upon a counter correlate is not able to be observed for one who is the exponent of difference being nothing but the generic character.

Furthermore, if the generic character such as potness is itself difference, then in the expectation of a counter correlate for that difference, what is the counter correlate? Is it qualified by potness, or not qualified by it or both? In the first case, there could be no
cognition of a difference from cloth. And that is because it is not possible to say that: "potness is itself difference" if the counter correlate of that [potness] is qualified by potness. For this very reason it is not the third. Whereas in the second case there could be no cognition of the difference of one pot from another pot.

**Comment**

If the generic character of potness is itself difference, and difference requires a counter correlate, is the counter correlate qualified by potness or not? If it is, then one cannot say that a pot is different from something else because the pot has itself as the counter correlate. If the counter correlate is not qualified by potness, then one could not say that "this pot is different from that pot" because the pot does not have potness as its counter correlate. So the generic character and difference cannot be the same.

3.68. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.30.p.50.):

Moreover, if [perception] apprehends bare existence, the cognition referring to what is qualified such as: "the pot is", "the cloth is" is contradicted. And if difference, characterized by the generic character etc.
in the form of the configuration of the object and which is different from bare existence, is not apprehended by perception, why does a person who seeks a horse turn away upon seeing a buffalo? If bare existence alone is the object in all cognitions, why are all the words which are associated with the objects of those cognitions not remembered in each particular cognition? Furthermore, since the two cognitions, referring to a horse and an elephant, have the one object, and since there is no distinction because the latter [cognition] apprehends what has [already] been apprehended, there would be no difference [of the latter cognition] from memory. If a distinction is accepted for each cognition, then perception is accepted as referring only to what is qualified. If all cognitions refer to the one object, the result would be the absence of being blind or deaf since everything is apprehended by just one cognition.

Bare existence is not apprehended by the eye. Because it apprehends colour, the possessor of the colour, and things inherently connected with the same object as the colour. Nor by the sense of touch. Because its scope is objects possessing tangibility. The sense of hearing etc. too do not have bare existence for their object. But their objects are only things distinguished by the characteristics of sound, taste and smell. Therefore nothing is seen here which apprehends bare existence.

That is worthless. Because it has been told that the perception which is not of an ordinary nature apprehends bare existence. But we certainly accept that the perception of an ordinary nature refers to what is qualified. So why is there so much prolixity for the sake of
showing that?

comment

The Advaitin does not deny the perceptual distinctions pertaining to ordinary relations (vyāvahārika), which are brought about by limiting adjuncts. What is denied, is the ascription of an absolute status to such perceptions.61

The "perception which is not of an ordinary nature" (alaukika) refers to the indeterminate perception of the "fourth state" (turīya-avastha) (see 3.62.) and to the non-relational knowledge acquired from the sacred texts (see 1.45. and comment).

3.69. यदु 'नित्यायस्मात्र च प्रत्येकंशं ग्रहणं तद्वियमयम् केतनेनविद्वस्तमेव स्यति। समाज्यवर्गः प्रमुख्यावर्गः' (श्रीभा.पू. 32 पृ. 7) इत्युत्तः तत्रादः

सत्यात्म न प्रमेयं स्यायतनः परमार्थताः।
संबिदेय सव च न परेण प्रकाशिते॥ १० ॥

3.69. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51.):

If bare existence free from distinction is apprehended just by perception, then the scripture, whose object is [to reveal] that, would be only a repetition since it refers to what is [already] attained. And Brahman, which is bare existence, would be an object of knowledge.

In regard to that, it is said:

Pure existence cannot be an object of knowledge.
The world does not have an absolute reality.
Awareness is identical to existence and that [awareness] is not manifest by another thing.10.

3.70. नित्यायस्मात्र श्लोकिकानिविर्लकर्मस्वाधीनः न तु लोक्षेपं सत्यार्थमेव निर्विर्लकर्मानि निविर्लकर्मेन ब्रम्हव्याप्ते। तथापूर्वं च ततः व्याप्तसाधनः

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3.70. Pure existence free from distinction [i.e. Brahman] is indeed established by indeterminate perception which is not of an ordinary nature. But it is not apprehended by ordinary perception whether determinate or indeterminate. And such a thing [indeterminate perception not of an ordinary nature], which is certainly unknown prior to such a perception of that [Brahman, pure existence free from distinction], is made known by the scripture. Thus the scripture does not repeat what is already known. According to your view also, the supreme Self who is certainly unknown as the inner-controller of all, is made known by the scripture such as: "He who abides in the self" (Ś.Bra.14.6.7.30.). Thus the situation is certainly the same. It was mentioned previously (3.62) that the indeterminate perception which is not of an ordinary nature is completely free from the relation of subject and object of knowledge. Thus Brahman, which is pure existence, is not an object of knowledge.

**Comment**

The Veda is the means of knowledge about matters which fall outside the scope of the perceptually based means of knowledge. If Brahman, pure existence free from all distinction, can be revealed by ordinary perception then the Veda would only repeat what can be acquired through another means of knowledge. The Advaitin could reply that ordinary perceptual experience reveals pure existence qualified by adjuncts such as a pot etc. But Brahman, free from all distinction, can only be apprehended through the non-relational knowledge produced by the immediate apprehension of the Upanishad texts which teach the nature of Brahman and its identity with the individual soul. At such a time, the apprehending mental mode (antahkaranaypttyavacchina caitanyam) attempts to assume the form of the object of apprehension i.e. Brahman, awareness as such. Since awareness is not an object as everything is its
The mental mode cannot objectify Brahman. It is said to be non-relational or impartite (akhandakāra) because there is no a knower-known relation but only the knowledge that the object of that mental mode is the essence of the knower.

3.71. But what has been said by those who do not tolerate that pots etc. have no absolute reality (Śrī. B. Para. 31, p. 52f.):

For when there is a contradiction between two cognitions, there is the relation of sublated and sublating and there is certainly the exclusion of what is sublated. Here in regard to pots and cloth etc. there is certainly no contradiction because there is a difference of place and time. If the existence of a thing is ascertained at a certain place and time and its non-existence is ascertained at that [same] place and time, because of the contradiction there the stronger sublates and there is exclusion of the sublated.
There is no contradiction if that which is experienced as connected with a certain place and time is known to be non-existent at another place and time. So how is there the relation of sublated and sublating in this case? Or how is it said that there is the exclusion at one place of what has been excluded somewhere else. But in the case of the rope-snake etc., there is contradiction, sublating and exclusion because the cognition of non-existence certainly has connection with that [same] place and time. So what is seen at a certain place and time being excluded at another place and time is not seen to be invariably concomitant with falsity. Thus mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner: although there is a difference of view between the followers of Rāmānuja and the exponents of māyā in regard to whether the individual soul and Brahman is different or non-different and as to whether Brahman possesses distinction or is free from distinction, there is no dispute that the category of consciousness does not undergo change in its essential nature and that it is eternal. Similarly, [there is no dispute] that the category of the inert, consisting of the elements and elementals etc., undergoes change in its essential nature and is non-eternal. So too, it is also undisputed that the chariots etc. existing in a dream and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are certainly inert and last for their respective times and can be experienced by the respective persons. Thus when there is no dispute about reality, the dispute is only in the mere name. That [dispute] is for instance: can the three [categories] "consciousness", "the inert things" and "chariots etc. existing in a dream" be expressed by the word "not absolutely real", or can the three be expressed by the word "absolutely real"? Alternatively, can a certain one among the three be expressed by
the word "absolutely real" and can another be expressed by the word "not absolutely real"?

3.72. Among those, the first alternative belongs to the Madhyamikas who are the exponents of emptiness. And that [first alternative] is not correct. What now is "not absolutely real"? If [you say] that it is different from what is absolutely real, then what is some thing which can be expressed by the word "absolutely real"? Because the compound of a negative particle with the word "absolutely real" [i.e. a-paramarthata] is logically possible when there is some thing which is absolutely real. Not otherwise. Moreover in the teaching of emptiness, nothing could be seen anywhere by anyone. So the cancellation of all worldly transactions follows. And the teaching of random origination does not withstand reason.

The second alternative belongs to the followers of Rāmānuja. That too is not correct. To elaborate. What now is "absolutely real"? If [you say] it is the nature of being imperishable, then there is inadequate pervasion of the proposition in regard to pots etc. and
chariots etc. existing in a dream which you accept as absolutely real.

If [you say] that absolutely real consists in being perceived, then absolutely real, which has being perceived as another synonym, should certainly continue in regard to pots etc. and chariots etc. existing in a dream. We do not lose anything. We certainly refer to "being perceived" by the word "not absolutely real". Although Brahman also is perceived, nevertheless it is only as the nature of cognition and that is absolutely real. But what is perceived possessing distinction pertains to a limiting adjunct and is not absolutely real, like the nature of being an individual soul. For there is the sacred text:

"it [Brahman] is unknown [as an object] for those who know well" (Ke.2.3.). If [you say] that truth is absolute reality, what then is truth? If [you say] it is the absence of untruth, then there is mutual dependence; truth is dependent upon the knowledge of untruth and untruth depends upon the knowledge of truth.

3.73. अथ भिन्नतावाचः परमार्थत्वभित्ति चेतिकिंचिं विद्यतायः।

बाधितर्मेचः विद्यतात्मकति चेतिकि सृज्ञानर्य वाधितर्मेच रूपसृज्ञानवंद्रियति।

त्रिपल्लो कृत्यार्थकार्ये सम्बन्धाशिवाय। (श्रीमान २० २३ १० १३) इत्य ग्रहणे तैतत्त्विकता सर्वसृज्ञानस्य विद्यतात्मिक।

हृदयोऽको कृत्यार्थकार्ये सर्वसृज्ञानस्य वाधितर्मेच रूपसृज्ञानवंद्रियति। (श्रीमान २० ५६ १० १२) इत्य तद्वावेशैविकऽविकृत्य।

किंतु रूपसृज्ञानस्य कृत्यार्थ वाधितर्मेचिं रूपसृज्ञानवंद्रियति।

अयं तद्वावेशिते सर्वसृज्ञानस्य सर्वार्थार्थितश्च न सिद्धाति।

अन्येय विद्यतात्मकेऽविद्यतायः (श्रीमान २० ५६ २६) इत्युत्क्रिर्योऽपि।

किंतु सर्वार्थसत्त्वमेते रूपसृज्ञानवंद्रियवेशिते सर्वार्थार्थितेऽविद्यतात्मकार्थेति तद्वावेशिते सर्वार्थार्थितेऽविद्यतात्मकार्थेति।

श्रीमती भाष्यायाम् २४६।

3.73. If [you say] that absolutely real is the absence of falsity, what is this falsity? If [you say] falsity is just the nature of being negated, then in the case of the rope-snake, you yourself have said in the text (Srī. B. Para. 31. p. 52f. Supra.): "But in the case of the rope-snake etc." that the knowledge of the snake is negated. Thus the
knowledge of the snake would be false. But in regard to the desired conclusion, your very own statement (Śrī B. Para. 47. p. 86.): "the knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc. is definitely real, being the cause of fear etc." is contradicted.

Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, is the snake which is the object [of the cognition] considered to be negated or not? In the first case, the "apprehension of the real" which you admit is not established there [with regard to the snake]. In the latter case, there is the contradiction of the statement (Śrī B. Para. 47. p. 85.): "only the objects [of the cognition] are false".

Furthermore, according to your view, that of an exponent of the "apprehension of the real", because the snake etc. also exists in the case of rope-snake etc. therefore there is no falsity and since falsity is not established anywhere the absence of falsity is difficult to be stated. Because knowledge of an absence is dependent upon the establishment of a counter correlate. Thus it is difficult to say that absolutely real is the absence of falsity.

3.74. किंच 'न व्यावसायिकत्वायमायारुप भाष्ये' (श्रीभाष पृ 33 पृ 16) इति बद्वतः स्वयमायायारुप प्रेमोपारणारुप हेंद्रनेव एव। व्यावसायिकत्वविवेचन तत्त्वार्थस्वाय व्याकरणारुप रूपेण स च रजस्यादेवतित कुर्ष्ठ सत्त्वात: सिद्धयति। किंच रजस्यादेवतितां सिद्धाः विवेचनारूप में स्व भाष्यस्यारुपा विभ्यद्वारेण वाच्यः। स न संबंधति। तत्त्वेत बुध्यारुप सांलन्त्वायनारुपमेन बुध्यारुपाययातित्वायमपायारुपसत्तात:। द्वयाविवेचनारुपस्त्रयुक्तचर्चारुपमें विभ्यद्वारेण इति वेच्छ रजस्यादेवतितां सिद्धाः विवेचनारुप कुर्ष्ठ विभ्यद्वारेण। किंच रजस्यादेवतितानावर्त्तेत गंगासार को विभ्यद्वारेन। रजस्यारुपा पूर्णानु पर्यायः। भक्तिवतिता। केवलानु पर्यायः। पार्श्वरमें गंगासार नायं नाय:। इति वाच्येत। गंगासारनायकं कन्यावयनायां 'नायं घटः' इति वाच्येत। 3.74. Furthermore, for you who say (Śrī B. Para. 31. p. 53. Supra.): "mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality", a particular type of exclusion is certainly accepted as the reason for unreality. The
particular type of exclusion is in the form of an exclusion which "certainly has connection with that [same] place and time". And that [particular exclusion] is for the rope-snake etc., so how is the "apprehension of the real" established?

Furthermore, the contradiction between the cognition of the rope and the cognition of the snake can be said only by means of the object. That [contradiction] is not possible. Because according to your view cognitions invariably depend merely upon an object, therefore a cognition does not necessarily depend upon the existence of that object. If [you say] there is contradiction of the two cognitions because of the impossibility of [both] existing at a single instant, then there is want of a decision between the two alternatives here, i.e. the knowledge of the rope is what sublates and the knowledge of the snake is what is sublated.

Furthermore, what is the distinction between the rope-snake etc. and a pot etc? The snake upon the rope did not exist previously and will not exist later. It is only recognized in between. The pot etc. is also exactly the same. The snake upon the rope is subsequently negated: "this is not a snake". The pot etc. is also negated: "this is not a pot" in the condition of the fragments following its destruction.

3.75. [objection] Because of the negation: "this is not a snake" which
arises subsequently, even what relates to the time of the cognition is negated in the manner: "this snake did not exist even at the time of the cognition". The pot is not like that.

[reply] Since that existence relating to the time of the cognition is equivalent to an instant, the absolute reality of a pot etc. cannot be ascertained through that \( [i.e., \text{the momentary existence at the time of cognition}] \). But in reality, there is certainly the negation of a pot etc., even at the time relating to its cognition, due to the insight through the knowledge of reality. If \( [\text{you say}] \) that there is no negation according to the insight of a bound soul, \( [\text{we reply}] \) what is the use of that? Because even in the case of the rope-snake, the absence of negation exists according to the observation of deluded persons.

Furthermore, is that snake real just by this alone: "there is no negation on account of going elsewhere due to fear etc. through the observation of the snake upon the rope"? If there is indeed the capability of negation there, only because of running elsewhere there is no knowledge of the rope as it is and so there is no negation, then for a bound soul \( [i.e., \text{who does not seek to know the truth}] \) there is no knowledge of the supreme Self as it is and therefore there is no negation \( [\text{of the world which is capable of being negated}] \). So it is equal.

3.76. नन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानिहृदय यथादेवश्रोत्तीत्वत् किं मानाणिधिति चेतुस्थिते। मानतिभीक्षिकोद्भृत्य हि सर्वः प्रक्षाचनायामायायामित्येव। जगती बाधः। भवतीत्वत् कारणं हि प्रत्येकलोकं सर्वस्य सर्पस्य-रूपमानस्वमु। सर्पेष्य सचा हि रहस्यस्वम नान्याः। यथा मृत्स्वेच्छ घटस्वा नान्याः। नाहि सन्तानां प्रतियेते। न या घटकाले भृत्ता-चाया भाष्यो ब्रह्म स्वयः। एवं यदादित्तुचारिहि तत्कारणसचावतो नातिरित्ता। भवति। तथा ज मानीत्वकालिकत्वाय घटेर्यस्यो युक्तं एव। किं च भजनस्वप्नमदे। आत्मतिकालिकः। सर्वं प्रति बाध्येते न तु सर्वतिमानीयें। तत्वं सत्यत्वस्य लच्छेऽव्यक्तित्वात् (अवभा 50 पू ५६ पू ६९)। यदादित्तुचारिहि तु न केवल तत्त्वज्ञानीय घटेर्यस्य चतुर्दशैष्येष्य। किंतु यथार्थात्मायिरिपि बाध्येते। यतो यथार्थतिमाय प्रक्षालोणं हि तत्त्वस्य सर्पस्य सारास्त्यम् -
3.76. [objection] [You say] that there is the negation of a pot etc. due to the insight of a person who knows reality. What is the means of knowledge in this matter?

[reply] Indeed a snake, though relating to the time of cognition, becomes the object of the negation arising subsequently. Now the cause here is that the snake does not exist as a snake even at the time of cognition. Because the existence of the snake is only the existence of the rope, not something different. Similarly, the existence of a pot is only the existence of the clay, not something else. A twofold existence is certainly not recognized. Nor can it be said that the existence of the clay is absent at the time of the pot. In the same manner, even the existence of the clay etc. is certainly not different than the existence of its cause. Thus the negation of a pot etc., even relating to the time of the cognition, is certainly correct.

Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, only the snake relating to the time of the cognition is negated, but the cognition of a snake is not negated. Because you yourself have stated the reality of that [cognition] (SrI.B.Para.47.p.86.). But in regard to a pot etc., not only is the pot etc. negated following the knowledge of reality but the cognition of a pot etc. is also negated. Because what is known as the cognition of a pot is the form of the pot, which is a modification of the internal-organ. And that [modification of the internal-organ which has the form of a pot] does not exist following the direct apprehension of the essential nature of Brahman on account of identity. Thus if there is no absolute reality where only the object is negated,
to a still greater extent there must be no absolute reality where the object is negated along with the cognition.

Furthermore, is there some thing which is not absolutely real or not? The first is difficult to be said. Because according to your view, existing is concomitant with being absolutely real and therefore there is no possibility anywhere of what is not absolutely real. In the second case, what more can be done since there is the mention of the word "absolutely real" in: "imperishable and absolutely real" (Viş.P.2. 14.24.) etc.

**comment**

In the case of the cognition of a rope as a snake, Rāmānuja says that the snake which is the object of the cognition is negated, but the knowledge of the cognition of a snake is not negated. Abhyankar states that after the knowledge of Brahman, both the object and its cognition are negated because there is no longer the cognition of a pot etc. as a pot since there is the knowledge of identity i.e. the absence of anything having a separate existence apart from Brahman.

3.77. The third alternative belongs to the exponents of māyā. Brahman free from distinction is absolutely real and what is other is not absolutely real. Because that alone is absolutely real which is not negated anywhere at any time. You also have certainly said (Srī.B.Para.31.
"existence is absolutely real since it persists, is certainly established." There is greatness and the possession of unlimited pre-eminence in an object having the form of existence. Because there is no negation of existence anywhere at any time. All things such as pots etc. are seen to be counter correlates of negation in the manner: "the cloth is not a pot", "the pot is not cloth". What has no contact with negation, even a fraction, is alone entitled, in reality, to the word "absolutely real". Thus everything which is perceived to be different from that is certainly not absolutely real. Consequently it is established that mere exclusion is indeed the reason for unreality. On account of this, [the statement] (SrīB. Para.31.p.53):

"mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality" is refuted. Because even by contact with negation the loss of greatness is unavoidable. By saying that even what is negated is absolutely real, the very reason for the use of the word "absolutely real" is not understood.

Comment

See comment to 1.19. and 1.21.

3.78. But what has been said (SrīB. Para.31.p.53.):

Because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation and since the difference is established by perception and is not negated, this [statement] too: "awareness is identical to existence" is refuted.
In regard to that, it is said: because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation, we certainly accept that difference is established by the perception which is of an ordinary nature. We do not say that the awareness in the form of ordinary perception is identical to existence. Because the perception of an ordinary nature contains mental constructions. In the case of the rope-snake, the snake is not identical to the rope. But the rope is the substratum of such a snake. Accordingly, the awareness free from objects, which is the substratum of all ordinary awareness which relates to objects, is identical to existence.

3.79. Furthermore, by saying: "because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation", is a subject-object relation accepted between awareness and universal existence or not? In the first case, the mention of the word "particular" in: "a particular existence" would be meaningless. In the second case, in the absence of a subject-object relation between awareness and universal existence and in the absence, according to your view, of universal existence having the nature of awareness, then universal existence cannot be established through a means of knowledge. Because that alone is established by a means of
knowledge which is an object of a means of knowledge or is itself a means of knowledge. If [you say] that universal existence is indeed accepted as not being [itself] a means of knowledge, then if such is the case the mention of the word "particular" in; "a particular existence" is meaningless and there is the same situation as before.

Furthermore, what is the reason for the absence of a subject-object relation between awareness and universal existence? Generally, every entity possesses the state of being an object of awareness. Even if this is so, because universal existence does not possess the state of being an object of awareness, therefore a clear minded person must accept, even though not wishing to do so, that the reason for that is only the non-difference of universal existence with awareness.

Furthermore, is this awareness, whose object is a particular existence, in the form of existence itself or not? In the first case, it must be accepted that "awareness is identical to existence". In the last case, not existing itself, how could it possess the state of being a means of knowledge for a particular existence?

3.80. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 32, p. 53.)⁶⁵: although the awareness of the self, the knower, is self-luminous at the time of illumining the object, there is no rule that it is like that at all times
for all people. Because the experience of another
person is an object of knowledge by inference,
having as its sign [their] rejecting and accepting
etc. And because even for one's own past experience
the expression is seen: "I knew".

That is worthless. The exponents of māyā certainly do not say that
there is a rule as to the self-luminosity of the awareness which
possesses an object and is of an ordinary nature. If such was the case,
this refutation would be correct. Similarly, there is no rule that the
awareness possessing an object is unable to be experienced. But the
awareness free from objects, which is the substratum of everything and
can be expressed by the word Brahman, cannot be illumined by another at
any time and can never be experienced. On account of this, what has
been said (Śrī B.Para.32,p.53.):

because one's own past experiences and the experiences
belonging to others are able to be experienced, the
result is that [such experiences] would not be of the
nature of awareness

etc. is refuted.

comment

Abhyankar states that Rāmānuja's argument is irrelevant. The
Advaitins position is that awareness illumines the prior non-existence,
presence and subsequent disappearance of all mental states (vṛtti-jñāna).
Therefore the Advaitin does not contend that mental states consisting
of cognitions such as "I knew", memory, etc. are not eternal, not
self-luminous and are able to be experienced. The Advaitin maintains
that the awareness which illumines mental activity is self-luminous
and cannot be objectified by the mental modes. If awareness could be
illumined by another awareness then an infinite regress (anavasthā)
would be unavoidable. There are also difficulties if it is accepted that
awareness can be experienced. For if awareness is experienced by another
awareness then an infinite regress would result. If that is sought to
be avoided by postulating that awareness is experienced by another
awareness and the second awareness is experienced by the first, then
there would be mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). If awareness knows itself, then there is the contradiction of the simultaneous relation of subject and object (karmakartrabhāavyāghata). Hence the Advaitin considers that mental states are illumined by awareness, but awareness is self-evident and cannot be objectified.

A remark concerning the aptness of Rāmānuja's argument is necessary. In the Mahāpurvapakṣa, Rāmānuja presented the Advaitins views with admirable perspicuity. However in his refutation of the pūrvapakṣa, Rāmānuja does not always confront the position he has described but argues, as in the present case, against a position which the Advaitins do not seek to dispute. Further instances of this will be noted in the following pages.

3.81. What has also been said (Śrī.B.Para.32.p.54.)

If awareness is unable to be experienced, the non-contradiction to ignorance certainly follows, like for a sky-flower etc.

In regard to that, an invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained between the inability to be experienced and non-contradiction to ignorance. Because there is no conformable reasoning. And the illustration is not correct. The sky-flower, which possesses the attribute [of non-contradiction to ignorance], is itself not known so the non-contradiction to ignorance etc. which are its attributes are far removed. Because non-contradiction to ignorance is only the existence at the time of ignorance and nothing else. With regard to that [existence at the time of ignorance], the flower certainly has no existence so how does its attribute exist and how a fortiori is there knowledge of it?
3.82. What has been said (SrI.B.C.33.p.55.)

It cannot be said that there is no prior non-existence of awareness since there is no apprehender [of the prior non-existence]. Because there is the apprehension by awareness itself.

In regard to that, it is said:

The awareness which is universal is eternal, it is one and without an object. There is no appearance of "I-ness" in deep sleep and there is certainly no transmigration in liberation.

3.83. Does universal awareness or a particular awareness apprehend the prior non-existence of awareness? Not the first, on account of contradiction with the essential nature of universal awareness. Because the awareness which apprehends some object is a particular awareness. Nor is it the second. Does this particular awareness which apprehends prior non-existence apprehend its own prior non-existence or the prior
non-existence of universal awareness? The first is the desired conclusion. We certainly do not dispute about the impermanence of a particular awareness. In the last case, this particular awareness which apprehends the prior non-existence of universal awareness can apprehend its prior non-existence only having objectified universal awareness. Because the knowledge of non-existence depends upon the knowledge of the counter correlate. But if universal awareness can be apprehended, there is contradiction with its essential nature being universal. Because the awareness which is an object of knowledge is a particular awareness.

**comment**

With regard to the apprehension of the prior non-existence of awareness, the Advaitin can put forward a number of other possible alternatives: is the prior non-existence apprehended by oneself or by another? Not by oneself, because if one exists it is not possible to apprehend one's own non-existence. If one does not exist, there is no possibility of apprehension. Nor by another, because awareness is not the object of another and it cannot be apprehended by anything other than awareness since everything else is insentient.

Furthermore, the prior non-existence of universal awareness certainly does not exist, so the apprehension of it is far away. This is what is said: the awareness which is the substratum of everything, without a location, without an object, which can be expressed by the word Brahman, is alone universal awareness. It is the supreme limit of
what is universal. With regard to which, there is no other universal whatsoever. For this very reason, even the threefold difference, whether known or unknown, in the form of difference which belongs to itself, pertains to its own class or to another class, does not exist there [in universal awareness] in reality. Because distinctions create difference. A distinction is certainly preceded by the universal, whereas the universal is the prior condition for a distinction. Where a distinction, even very slightly, does not exist, how could the threefold difference have existence there? On account of this, the manifold nature of universal awareness has been replied to.

Comment

Because awareness as such is without distinguishing characteristics, there is no factor to establish that awareness is manifold by nature.

3.85. The prior non-existence of that universal awareness cannot even be said. Because prior non-existence is only for what has been limited by time. A limit by time is only for a distinction, not for the universal. Because just as a distinction exists brought about by the object and the location, so also it is caused by time. Time, in the form of a particular entity, certainly does not exist in universal awareness, so how can a distinction be caused by time and how a fortiori can there be the prior non-existence of awareness which is based upon
that? For in universal awareness there is no heaven, no sky, no earth, nor the lower regions, there is no sun, no lightning, nor the moon and stars, there is neither darkness nor light, nor air, neither day nor night, nor the two twilight times, there is no time, no body, no sense organ, no vital breath, no mind, no form, no species, no connection, no ocean, no hills, neither knowership nor object of knowledge, no possessor of attributes nor an attribute, nor any distinction whatsoever. Nor can that universal awareness be apprehended [as an object] by someone, nor does it apprehend something.

3.86. [objection] In the absence of all distinctions there could not even be the expression "universal awareness", because a universal requires a particular.

[reply] This is true. This entity has to be shown by some word by those who are explaining. So this expression exists only to this extent, but there is no obstinacy in that matter. Accordingly, how could universal awareness reveal its own prior non-existence, its own impermanence or its own multiplicity etc? And what is unrevealed certainly does not exist, since there is no means of knowledge for its existence. Then [if you say] that universal awareness could not reveal
its own permanence, its own oneness and its own self luminosity etc. also, [we reply] this is accepted as indeed desirable. But just because of this, it must not be at all suspected that universal awareness is impermanent etc. The purport of this: "awareness is permanent" is only that it is not impermanent. Similarly, the purport of this: "awareness is one and self-luminous" should be understood in the sense of the absence of multiplicity and the absence of being illumined by another. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī B. Para. 34 p. 56): "prior non-existence is established just by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]" is refuted. And because Rāmānuja does not accept the means of knowledge known as "non-cognition". Even if that [non-cognition] is included within perception, perception has no application here because of the absence of an object at the present time.

**Comment**

Abhyankar puts forward three reasons against Rāmānuja's contention that the prior non-existence of awareness can be known by the non-cognition of what is fit to be perceived (yogyanupalabdhi) (see comment, 1.50).

The first argument is of a rather technical nature. Non-cognition of what is fit to be perceived is the apprehension of the non-existence of an object, such as a pot, due to the knowledge that if the pot were present it could be perceived and since it is not perceived it cannot be present. The absence of the pot has the existence of the pot as its counter correlate (pratiyogin) and the knowledge of the pot's non-existence depends upon whether the counter correlate, i.e. the pot, is capable of being perceived if it were present. So the knowledge of the absence of the counter correlate is the reason for the non-cognition of the pot. With regard to the prior non-existence of awareness, Abhyankar states that the intended meaning of the statement "awareness is permanent" is that awareness is not impermanent. To say that awareness is permanent means that awareness has permanence as a positive attribute. However to say that there is the absence of impermanence in awareness does not denote a positive attribute, for the absence of something is not itself a distinction (cf., 3.55.). Hence the absence of an attribute cannot serve as a counter correlate, which must necessarily be capable
of being cognized in order that its non-existence can be stated. Abhyankar reasons that the impermanence of awareness cannot be proved by non-cognition because the counter correlate is not capable of being apprehended.

A statement as to the absence of a thing directly refers to the locus of the absence. For instance when it is said: "there is no pot on the table", the non-existence of the pot refers directly to the table, i.e. the locus (anuyogin). Advaitins consider that the statement such as: "there is no attribute of impermanence in awareness" refers directly to the locus, i.e. awareness, in the manner that; the absence of impermanence is in awareness.

3.87. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.34.p.56.):

Furthermore, the perceptual knowledge which proves that its object, such as a pot, exists at the time of its own existence is not seen to make known the existence of that [pot etc.] at all times. Thus the existence of the pot at a prior and subsequent time is not recognized.

And the non-cognition of that is because perceptual consciousness is cognized as limited by time. If perceptual consciousness, which has pots etc. as its object, is itself cognized as not limited by time then the object of perceptual consciousness such as the pot etc. is also recognized as not limited by time and so
it would be eternal.

That is worthless. Because there is no negating factor [in regard to our stated position] even though the particular modes of awareness which possess objects are limited by time.

Furthermore, you yourself have subsequently taught that Knowledge is permanent (Śrī B. Para. 40 p. 70):

In the state of the knower of the field [i.e. the body], Knowledge has a contracted nature due to karma on account of the state of gradation according to the various actions. And that [state of expansion or contraction] is regulated by means of the senses. The designation as to the rising and setting [of Knowledge] occurs having regard to this flow of Knowledge by means of the senses.

Thus there is contradiction between the earlier and later portions of your own work.

3.88. यदु ' न निर्विषय भवित्वा विद्युः। अनुपलयः। विद्यमहान-स्माभवत्योपपले वहि संदिद। स्माभवत्यां वां सर्वमिति। (विद्वं २६ वृ ५० १०) इयर्य तद्बन्ध
विद्वेषा हि सामान्य-प्रभावी एवेनि नियमस्य लोक-परिश्रात्युपदोक्तात्स्र्यनंनामक न्यायत्तवात्। विद्यमहानात्त्वात्त्वन्ययोगस्फूर्तवाच।

3.88. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 34 p. 57.):

Awareness is not without an object at any time.

Because such a thing is not known. Indeed, awareness is established as self-luminous only because apprehension itself has the nature of illuminating objects.

That is questionable. Because the rule which is well known in the world and which has just been mentioned previously; distinctions are certainly preceeded by the universal, cannot be denied. And because
It cannot be said that in sleep, intoxication and swoon, awareness shines forth completely alone, free from all objects. Because [this view] is negated by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]. If awareness is experienced in those states also, there should be the recollection of that [awareness] at the time of waking. And that is not the case.

That is incongruous. Because this awareness, which is itself free from objects, is not the object of another awareness, there is the non-cognition of it [i.e. awareness]. But not because that [awareness] does not exist. Even upon the non-cognition of a demon, which is not an object of perception, they do not consider it to be negated by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]. For the word "fit" means "this can be done". That has been told in the Bhāṣāparicchodā.
Where it follows that: "if it exists it should be experienced", that would be non-cognition fit [to be perceived] and that is the cause for the knowledge of non-existence. (Bha.P.62.).

Because the awareness free from objects is not the object of another awareness, therefore there is no applicability [for the statement]: "if it exists it should be experienced". And this awareness is not experienced. Because it is not the object of another awareness. So having forcibly imposed on this awareness the nature of being experienced, which the exponents of maya do not accept, how could the effecting of recollection at the time of waking: "if awareness is experienced in those states also, there should be the recollection of that [awareness] at the time of waking" gain congruity?

3.90. Furthermore, this awareness does not produce a mental impression [during sleep] because it is without an object. For awareness produces the mental impression of its object in its own locus. No locus whatsoever appears for this awareness at that time, nor even an object. Therefore how could this [awareness] produce a mental impression? Due to this, [the statement] (Sri.B.Para.35.p.57.): "there is a rule that non-recollection proves only the absence of experience" is answered. Because the rule about non-recollection is based on the absence of a mental impression. Even in regard to cognitions possessing objects there is no rule that everything produces a mental impression. Because in
regard to the houses, trees, fields and gardens etc. seen by a person going unconcernedly on the road, there is no rule seen as to the memory of everything.

3.91. But what has been said (Sri. B. Para. 35, p. 57f.):

Not only is absence of experience on account of the rule of non-recollection. Because [absence of experience] is established by the very reflection of a person who has risen from sleep: "during that time I did not know anything".

That is not correct. For there is the logical possibility of such a reflection because the knowledge obtained in sleep does not possess an object. Although the negative particle [not, na] is grammatically connected to the meaning of the verbal root "know" (jñā), the negation
relates to its object. Just like: when Devadatta goes to the forest, Devadatta did not go to the village. It is just like that. Moreover, just as there is no appearance of an object in the knowledge obtained in sleep, there is no appearance of a locus also i.e. the sense of "I". For that reason too, there is the logical possibility of such a reflection.

[objection] It is said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.58.)

the non-experience of one object and the non-existence of another object cannot possibly be the cause for the non-recollection of yet another object which was experienced.

[reply] You are confused. Because awareness is the cause for recollection only by producing the mental impression of its object in its own locus. So when there is no experience of one object and no existence of another object, awareness is certainly incapable of producing a mental impression. [Hence] the non-experience of that one object and the non-existence of that other object is indeed the cause for non-recollection. When there is no experience of an object and no existence of a locus, of what could awareness produce a mental impression and where?

Furthermore, is the absence of the reflection with regard to knowledge, which has the form: "I did not know anything", intended to prove the absence of experience obtained in sleep, or, is the reflection of the absence of knowledge having the form: "I did not know anything" meant to prove that [i.e. the absence of experience while in sleep]? In the first case, what has already been said (Śrī.B.Para.34.p.57.Supra.)

"there is no recollection at the time of waking" would be said again. So there is incongruity of the text: "Not only...". In the second case, if there is reflection of the absence of knowledge, the absence of knowledge in deep sleep is certainly experienced.
Reflection means recollecting. And that is only for what has been experienced. If the absence of knowledge is experienced in deep sleep, then experience in deep sleep is established. So, on the contrary, you [Rāmānuja] alone are negated. This is the maxim of "day-break near the toll-station".76

3.92. Because the awareness which is free from objects has no origination, there are no other modifications also.77 Because other modifications are not possible if there is no origination since they are pervaded by origination. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 35. p. 58): "because there is deviation in regard to prior non-existence." That is not so. Because the destruction of prior non-existence is not a modification. For a modification is the gain of another state and another state is not possible for what is non-existent.

Furthermore, according to the teaching that the effect exists in the cause (satkāryavāda), prior non-existence is certainly difficult to be stated; because there is existence in the form of the cause even prior to the origination of the effect. How could deviation be there [in prior non-existence which is not itself a valid concept]? And the teaching that the effect exists in the cause is certainly accepted by Rāmānuja too.

comment

The Advaitin maintains that what has no origin is free from the sixfold modifications78 commencing with birth and ending with
destruction. Advaitins consider that since the prior non-existence of awareness cannot be proved, awareness is free from all modifications which depend firstly upon origination. Rāmānuja argues against this view by saying that even what has no origination, such as prior non-existence, can certainly perish. For the prior non-existence of an object, though beginningless, is destroyed at the moment the object comes into being. The Advaitin replies that the argument cannot be supported by the illustration of prior non-existence because modifications are possible only for things which exist. If something which does not exist is able to be destroyed, then even the non-existent horns of a rabbit would be able to be destroyed. 

Rāmānuja puts forward another argument. Advaitins hold that unlike prior non-existence, Ignorance (avidyā) is something positive in nature (bhāvarūpa). But they also maintain that Ignorance is beginningless yet capable of being destroyed. Therefore the Advaitins position that what is free from origin is free from destruction is contradicted. Abhyankar now takes up this point.

3.93. यदृ 'भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावपञ्च भावप...

3.93. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 35, p. 59.)

Ignorance, which is accepted by the exponents of māyā as a positive entity, is certainly unoriginated, it is the seat of manifold modifications and it comes to an end because of the knowledge of reality. So there is inconclusiveness of reasoning in respect of that [Ignorance].

That is incongruous. To elaborate: Brahman, which is of the nature of universal awareness, is free from distinction. The power of that [Brahman] may be expressed by the word "Ignorance" (avidyā). And that [power] is not different from that [Brahman]. Because difference is based upon a distinction. For this reason, that power, having Brahman as its nature, is indeed eternal. The Unmanifest etc. is the modification of such a power. And that [modification] is based upon karma. The defect of mutual dependence cannot be brought about even though the modification of such a power and karma have a mutual cause-effect relation. Because even both of them are a beginningless series according to the maxim of the seed and the sprout. Even in regard to the origination of both the seed and the sprout, "which is the first to originate?" is not determined. Therefore a beginningless series has to be accepted since there is no other recourse.

A beginningless series does not mean the absence of origination. But the non-ascertainment of a time of origination. The non-ascertainment of a time of origination is twofold; due to the ignorance of it even though the time exists somewhere and due to the ignorance of it because
of the very absence of the time [of origination] anywhere. The first is with regard to the seed and the sprout. The second is with regard to the Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of the power of Brahman. Because the origination of particular things such as the directions, time etc. is only after the origination of the Unmanifest, Mahat and Ahankara.

Even in the state of liberation the power which has Brahman as its nature is certainly eternal. The Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of that [power], is destroyed. The destruction of Ignorance is said in the state of liberation and there [in liberation] the Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of that power, is what is understood by the word "Ignorance". The destruction of the modification beginning with the Unmanifest, which occurs due to the knowledge of reality, is in the form of the non-appearance of such modification. Non-appearance is because (1) the object itself does not exist anywhere, (2) even though the object exists somewhere it does not appear, (3) even though the object appears somewhere its appearance is false. Even the appearance which occurs as something which is false is certainly non-appearance. The first is just like the non-appearance of the snake following the knowledge of the true nature of the rope. The second is just like the non-appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep. The third is just like the appearance of one's face in a mirror. In regard to liberation while living, the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of the power of Brahman, is just like the appearance of one's face in a mirror. But in liberation free from the body, [the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc.] is like the non-appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep.

When the established conclusion exists in this manner, [the opponent] brings about a deviation in regard to Ignorance because of the invariable concomitance: "what is unoriginated is without
destruction". In respect of that [deviation], is the power of Brahman intended by the word "Ignorance" or is the Unmanifest etc., which is its modification, intended? In the first case, that [power] has no end. In the last case, that [Unmanifest etc.] is not unoriginated. Therefore how can deviation make an impression here?

3.94. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 35. p. 59.):

Though [it was said] (Mahāpūrvavaksa. Para. 27. p. 42) that awareness does not admit division within itself on account of having no beginning, that too is not logically possible. Because the Self, which is certainly without beginning, is differentiated from the body, sense organs etc. And because the Self has necessarily to be accepted as different from Ignorance which is accepted as beginningless.

All that has been answered (see 3.84.). And by the text (Śrī. B. Para. 36. p. 60.):

Consciousness is the illumining of some object to its own locus solely through its own existence. Whereas self-luminosity is the nature of illumining for its own locus solely through its own existence. Illuminating
[in the previous two definitions] is common to all things sentient and insentient in conformity with everyday usage. Eternity is existing at all times.

Oneness is limitation by the number one.

A difference of essential nature is said for consciousness, self-luminosity, illumining, eternity and oneness. That [difference of essential nature] is in the state of the particulars but not in the nature of the universal which is the basis of those [particulars]. The difference among pots, earthenware dishes, lids etc. is certainly not able to be shown in the state of clay.

Abhyankar’s response to both these objections is to restate that the awareness pertaining to mental activities, i.e., vrtti-jñāna, can be seen to possess distinctions. However distinctions exist only in relation to a universal. Advaitins maintain that awareness which is universal, i.e. awareness which is free from all mental modifications such as memory etc., is the unchanging substratum of all particular awareness. This awareness is not differentiated by anything because everything has been superimposed on it.

With regard to the second quotation, Rāmānuja argues that awareness must possess distinction since Advaitins themselves say that awareness is self-luminous, eternal, one by nature etc. and hence these must constitute the attributes of awareness. Apart from the argument of the particular in relation to the universal, Advaitins can also respond to this objection by affirming Rāmānuja’s own prima facie view. Advaitins maintain that a thing which is known cannot be an attribute of the knower, because it is an object of knowledge. Since awareness is not the object of another awareness (cf., 3.80.comment) it cannot be seen to possess distinguishing features. Any distinguishing attributes perceived in awareness are objects of knowledge and not identical to awareness. Hence awareness must be free from distinction. What the Advaitin means by "eternal" etc. is only that the absence of being non-eternal exists in Brahman (cf., 3.86.comment, final para.).
3.95. What has been said (Śrī B. Para. 36, p. 60):

But if the opposite of being inert etc. is not accepted as an attribute of awareness—whether of a positive or negative kind—as something different from the essential nature, then nothing would be said by its negation.

That is questionable. Because a negative entity is not an attribute. An attribute is a form which is subtle with regard to the possessor of the attribute and its condition is universal to the possessor of the attribute. For this very reason, in the treatise of the Sākhyā the origination of the particulars such as space etc., is said to be from the tannāstras of sound etc., which are subtle with regard to the particulars like space and have a condition which is universal to them. And it is generally accepted as such by others. So how is it said that an attribute can be of a negative kind?

3.96.

किति ' सम्बन्धो जडत्वाद् प्रेमाय।' श्रवणेन न सन्ति '। झसि शास्त्रायः गृहवर्गेन धारण यथा भवन्ति निर्देश्यते नायामानयः। किति 'न सशीतलाय। प्रभवोऽर्थध्ययनः। प्रसृति तद्भष्ये। प्रयोगः विशेषतः परावर्तेऽर्थध्ययनः। परस्परसंग्रहः कित्वा शास्त्राय।' यति नातीत्यः वट्यास्त्रवैष्णवः। तत्त्व वाच्यः। प्रयोगः संबन्धाय। धारणामाहस्ययतः। तत्त्व वाच्यः। प्रयोगः संबन्धाय। वाच्यमेये। तत्त्ववर्गाय। प्रयोगः संबन्धाय। धारणामाहस्ययतः। तत्त्वाय।
3.96. Furthermore, by the sentence: "there are no knowable attributes, such as inertness etc., in awareness" no positive attribute whatsoever is enjoined nor a negative one. But attributes such as inertness are completely negated. This alone is the meaning of that sentence.

The difference in meaning between these two sentences is certainly well known: "the pot does not exist", "the non-existence of the pot exists". The meaning of a sentence is the syntactical connection between the meanings of the words. In "the pot does not exist", the grammatical connection of the pot is in the sense that "it exists" and there is the connection of that [pot existing] with the meaning of the negative particle. But in "the non-existence of the pot exists", the grammatical connection of the pot is in non-existence and [there is the connection] of that [non-existing pot] in the sense that "it exists". Thus the difference in the meaning of the sentences is certainly unavoidable since the express meaning is in regard to a difference in the syntactical connection.

Implication, however, is only if a contradiction exists. So an identity of the meaning of the sentences cannot be suspected here even through implication. For this very reason, the respective difference for a person: "you do not exist", "your non-existence exists" and the respective difference of the sayings: "the pots do not exist", "the non-existence of the pots exists" is correct. And it is for this reason that the knowers of the meaning of sentences [i.e. Māṃṣakas] consider a prohibitive statement separately from an injunctive statement.

Comment

Abhyankar has argued that a negative entity i.e. the non-existence of a thing such as a pot upon a table, does not constitute an attribute of the locus. Moreover a statement which negates attributes such as: "there are no knowable attributes like inertness in awareness" does not admit attributes of any kind in awareness, but is only intent upon negating their existence. For the negative particle "not" (na) only refers to the attributes of inertness etc. and then negates them, but it
does not affirm their absence.

3.97. Furthermore, it is well known in the school of the grammarians that a negative particle which is not in a compound is correct only in grammatical connection with an action. Accordingly, they say:

This eightfold group can be determined as correct only [through connection] with an action; at the end of the vocative case, the meanings of "so many times", the grammatical cases expressing an action, the primary attribute of similarity, what is derived from the governing rule about the connection of the meaning of verbal roots, a negative particle which is not in a compound, so also the group of two said as the locative and the genitive absolute. (Vai.Bbu.Sāra.16-17.)

So in "the pot does not exist", how is there the cognition of the absence of the pot? On account of this, what is said in the Siddhitraya:

It was previously said: what is known cannot be an attribute of Knowledge. Even by this, is anything established by you about awareness or not? If it is, there would be partiality [toward your own
views] If not, your effort has no result (Sam.Si.Para.37.p.113.)
is set aside.86

3.98. But what has been said (Srī. B. Para. 36.p.60.):

Is awareness established [as existent] or not? If it is established, it must possess attributes. If it is not, it is bereft of existence like a sky-flower etc.

If [you say] awareness is itself the proof, [we reply] that [the proof] is to be said for whom and in reference to what? If that [awareness] is not for someone and in reference to something then it is not the proof.

In regard to that, it is said: the proof which can be spoken of as indeed "for someone" and "in reference to something" is a particular proof conformable to ordinary relations. And the universal proof, which is the basis and the giver of life to all particular proofs, is indeed awareness. That [awareness] has no dependence upon a locus. Nor does it depend upon determining [an object]. The Self is identical to universal awareness. Awareness is not an attribute of the Self. Because the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be said in the state of the universal since even a relation of locus and located exists only
in the state of the particular. And because distinctions are invariably preceded by the universal, the nature of the universal which has been told must be necessarily adhered to and certainly cannot be denied. That has been previously mentioned (3.50.) and should not be forgotten. So what has been said about awareness being an attribute etc. of the Self by the text (Śrī B. Para. 36.p.61.): "Awareness is that which... in reference to its locus" etc. should all be understood as accepted in the state of the particular but not in the state of the universal.

3.99. The Self is indeed awareness which is universal.

That [Self] is not said to be the sense of "I".
"I-ness" must be superimposed. In liberation there is neither the notion of "I" nor happiness.12.

3.100. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 37.p.62.):
Something known as awareness, without a locus or an object, is not possible because there is the absolute non-cognition [of such a thing].

That is not so. Because universal awareness, without a locus and an object, must be necessarily accepted according to the manner previously told (3.84.f.). Moreover, what is this non-cognition which proves the non-existence of universal awareness? If [you say] it is the absence of perceptual knowledge, [we reply] since there is no perception of the individual souls in other bodies, they would be non-existent. But if [you say] this is not absolute non-cognition, because there is the cognition of an individual soul there [in another body] by an inference due to the motion of the body. [reply] Here too [in respect of awareness], why does the means of knowledge by inference; "because distinctions are invariably preceded by the universal" not occur to your mind?

The awareness which is without an object and a locus certainly persists in all ordinary cognitions such as "I know". The Knowledge which is universal persists. The particular locus and the particular object are only superimposed. So even the sense of "I" which appears as the locus of Knowledge is only superimposed and hence it is not the Self. But the Self is just in the form of consciousness, without a locus and an object. [The word] Self (ātman) is derived from "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpnoti). Because the universal pervades the distinctions, just as the clay pervades pots, earthenware dishes etc. Therefore that which is universal with regard to everything is alone, in reality, the essential nature of the Self.
3.101. If [you ask] what is a distinction and what is a universal? [reply]

It is said: the minute particles (paramāṇu) are the universal. The dyads (dvāpakā) etc. are the distinctions. The qualities such as colour and
taste etc. are the universal. The possessor of qualities is the
distinction. So also the attributes elsewhere are the universal and the
possessor of attributes is the distinction. What is subtle is universal.

What is gross is a distinction. An internal object [i.e. a thought] is
universal and an external object is a distinction. Mere Knowledge
without form is universal. Knowledge which has form, i.e. which possesses
a form which has been superimposed, is a distinction. For there is the
statement; "a distinction is only due to an object, because cognitions
have no form" (Nyā. Ku. 4.4.). So that which is the universal with regard
to everything is alone the Self.

To explain: it is indeed well known that the modifications of clay,
such as pots, earthenware dishes etc., are the distinctions and clay is
the universal. Similarly, the minute particles are the universal with regard to clay etc., because they are subtle. Even among minute particles the minute particles of water are universal with regard to the minute particles of earth, because they are more subtle. And among the great elements space is universal because it is absolutely subtle. With regard to the great elements like space, their qualities such as sound and touch etc. are universal. Because the *tanmatras* of sound etc. are subtle even with regard to space etc.

In the same manner, with regard to all the possessors of attributes their attributes are universal. Even in respect of those five great elements and their attributes, the internal objects [i.e. thoughts] are universal with regard to external objects. And the internal objects are superimposed on the intellect, so they are only particulars of Knowledge. With regard to those [particular modes of Knowledge] the Knowledge which is universal is what cannot be said as "such and such" and that is the Self. It is where even the relation of attribute and its possessor certainly does not appear. For this very reason it is said that the Self is pure consciousness free from distinction.

That very [Self] pervades all the attributes belonging to the intellect, by means of those it pervades the possessors of the attributes. By means of the internal it pervades the external objects. Even among those [external objects] it pervades the gross by means of the subtle. And even there [in regard to gross objects] it pervades everything such as pots etc. by means of clay etc. Because the universal is the [material] cause of the distinction, therefore the Self is the [material] cause of everything. Hence the definition of that [Self] is established: "the birth etc. of this [world] is from which [Brahman]" (B.S.1.1.2.).

Because the external object is based upon the internal object and because the supposition that the effect belongs to the same class as the cause is alone proper, it is correct that the external object, i.e. the
entire world, is certainly superimposed just as the internal object which is the cause [is superimposed]. Thus it is proved [that the world] is not absolutely real. And it is similarly established that the Self is Knowledge which is universal.

3.102. The particular types of Knowledge [i.e. particular Knowledge], which have a locus as their adjunct and an object as their adjunct, are all only superimposed and so the locus and the object are only an object. In reality, the definition of an object is only: an object is established by a particular cognition. This object does not depend upon an "I" like the conventional expression "you". But if there is an insistence of that ["I", i.e. the need for a subject] then let it be said that the "I" is only cognition in general ready for the state of the particular. But the "I" relating to conventional expression is established by the cognition "I" and the object is established by the cognition "you" thus there is no dispute in this matter.

comment

The topic now under discussion is whether the word "I" reveals the true nature of the Self, as the Viśiṣṭādvaitins consider, or whether it only indicates the essential Self as the Advaitins claim.

According to Advaitins, the word "I" has two meanings: a primary (mukhyārtha) and a secondary or implied meaning (lakṣyārtha). The primary meaning reveals the knower (pramāṇa) qualified by the superimposition of identity with the intellect, mind, senses and body in the manner: "I know", "I hear", "I am happy", "I am fat", "I am thin", "I am a man" etc. The implied meaning of the word "I" is the unchanging awareness which is the "witness" (sākṣi) of the presence and absence of all mental events. It is only this implied meaning which is expressed in
such statements as: "I am Brahman" (Bṛh.1.4.10.)⁸⁷ (see comment, 1.47., 1.50.).

According to the Advaitin, the primary meaning of "I" is objectified by the Self and hence, like other objects, it is not the essential Self. Abhyankar defines this objective portion of the Self as whatever is "established by a particular cognition". With regard to the following sentence: "This object (yugmadartha) does not depend upon an "I" like the conventional expression "you"", the meaning is that the word "you" (yugma literally means "you") does not possess this sense in the present context but is used to express the idea that everything other than awareness is an object and hence is not the Self. However if, for the purpose of argument, one insists that because there is the use of the word "you" i.e. yugma, there is necessarily the requirement of a counter correlate i.e. the relation to an "I", then the author says let that counter correlate be only cognition in general prior to any particular knowledge i.e. "I have knowledge".

3.103. त्रिविशिष्टरूपमस्तथाप्यः 'विविष्येपिंद्रो गुप्तर्थः' द्वैतं द्वैतविविष्येपिंद्रो गुप्तर्थः एव' दत्त मायाविन्ययिनीयिनी। एतन 'विविष्यो निस्त्रो ज्ञाता गुप्तर्थ' द्वितीय चर्चा जननी वन्देदित्रिविप्रायां नामा द्रवविनाम्। (आभार्य पृ २०१७७६८६) द्रवविनाम्। उक्ताभिमायाग्नानालः। व्यासारिकसः याइ नामात्मकी विविष्येपिंद्रो गुप्तर्थः न सत्तु आत्मसत्यः। तस्य स्वितेश्वरविप्रायाः स्वसामायाविन्यतेन सवेयाविन्यसाम्बन्धः। अत्य तस्य न मन्त्रसत्यः।

3.103. But even the "I" relating to conventional expression is certainly possessed of the definition of an object: an object is established by a particular cognition. So the statement of the exponents of mayā (Śrī.B. Para.37.p.62.): "the sense of "I" which is established [by the cognition] "I know" is only an object, different from pure consciousness" is certainly without negation. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B. Para.37.p.63.):

The statement that the knower, who is established [by the cognition] "I know", is an object is contradicted
just like [the saying] "my mother is barren"

is set aside. Because of the ignorance of the intended meaning which
has been told [above]. And the sense of "I" relating to conventional
expression, which is established by the particular cognition "I know",
is not in reality the Self. Because even though that [sense of "I"]
pervades its own distinctions, it does not pervade everything since it
does not pervade its own universal. For this reason, that [sense of "I"]
is not inner [i.e. innermost].

comment

Ramanuja's view is that the sense of "I" is none other than the
inner-Self (Srī.B.37.p.62.): "If the sense of "I" is not the Self,
the Self would not be inner. Because the internal is separated from what
is external by the idea of "I"." Abhyankar's statements about whether the
sense of "I" is "inner" (pratyak) are with reference to the above verse.

3.104. "Inner" (pratyak) is derived from "turns towards" (prati + aṅcati)
and means all pervading. The word "inner" is only a synonym for the word
Self. Although pervasion by the Self exists in all things immovable and
movable, the pervasion gains the realm of experience in the form of an
individual soul, who is a reflection of consciousness in the bodies
beginning from Brahma and ending with immovable objects. Therefore the
individual soul is designated in the world by the word "inner" and by the
word Self. That soul, on account of proximity to the "I-notion" which
manifests Knowledge, imagines itself to have acquired "I-ness" and
considers itself to be the knower. Because of that, the immediate
cognition "I know"—which is a particular cognition relating to conventional expression and which arises through the relation of attribute and its possessor—is not contradicted. Thus it is established; the sense of "I" is certainly not the Self, nor is it inner.

3.105. The "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, has also the logical possibility of being the "I-notion" [literally the "I-maker"] for this very reason. Because this "I-notion", on account of its proximity, manifests the individual soul as having acquired "I-ness" although in reality it has not acquired "I-ness". Because the etymology of the word "I-notion" has certainly been shown by you also (Śrī B. Para. 45, p. 81): "having quoted the affix cvi in the sense of becoming what was not previously". The "I-notion" is a direct modification of the mahattattva. The mahattattva is the intellect. "I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions of the intellect. Therefore it is correct that this "I-notion" which has acquired "I-ness" quite innately, on account of its proximity, makes the individual soul acquire "I-ness" even though in reality it has not acquired "I-ness".
3.106. If [you say] that in reality the individual soul has acquired "I-ness" and in reality the body etc. has not acquired "I-ness". And the "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, makes the body etc. acquire "I-ness" on account of the proximity [of the "I-notch"] to the individual soul who has acquired "I-ness".

[reply] Does the "I-notch", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, have "I-ness" or not? If it does not, how could that particular modification of the Unmanifest exhibit "I-ness"—which does not exist in itself and which is located in the individual soul—in the body etc.? Turmeric [which is yellow] certainly cannot reveal the redness—which does not exist in itself and which belongs to a flower of the China rose—even in a crystal which is placed near the flower of the China rose.

If it does, is that "I-ness" innate or the result of a cause? In the first case, when there is the logical possibility of "I-ness" in the individual soul and in the body etc., just because of that [its innate character], what is the point of "I-ness" being located separately in the individual soul? There is cumbrousness in the supposition that "I-ness" is innate even in both places: in the individual soul and in the "I-notch" which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest. Furthermore, if
that is the case [i.e. "I-ness" is innate to the soul and the "I-notion"],
[then one could say that] the "I-ness" being seen in the body etc. on
account of reasons such as proximity is in reality only located in the
particular modification of the Unmanifest and is not located in the
individual soul. Thus there is no determining factor here. But if such
is the case [that there is no determining factor], even the individual
soul would be able to be expressed by the word "I-notion". And that is
not desired by you also. But if it is desired, because you hold that
there is the destruction of the "I-notion" in liberation, the result
would be the destruction of the individual soul.

If it is the result of a cause, it has to be said that "I-ness"
is because of the proximity to the individual soul. The particular
modification of the Unmanifest, qualified by "I-ness" which is the result
of such a cause, is what exhibits the "I-ness" in the body etc. Does it
[exhibit the "I-ness"] in proximity to the individual soul who is the
real locus of "I-ness", or not in proximity to it? In the first case, the
"I-ness" which is only located in the individual soul can be exhibited
in the body etc. So what is the use of the superfluous "particular
modification of the Unmanifest" in the middle? In the last case, how
would it be able to make clear the "I-ness", which does not exist even
in itself, in the body etc? And there is no logical possibility of being
able to be expressed by the word "I-notion" [literally the maker of "I"].
3.107. Furthermore, if there is no proximity to the individual soul there is also no continuance of the "I-notion". Because the "I-notion" is not seen when the body has deceased. Moreover, even according to this view the individual soul would be able to be expressed by the word "I-notion". So the defect previously mentioned is just the same. Moreover there is no determining factor here that the "I-ness" located in the individual soul is recognized in only a certain particular modification of the Unmanifest [i.e. the "I-notion"] and not in all [the modifications].

Therefore, like "this-ness", "I-ness" too is superimposed just by the intellect. So in reality that ["I-ness"] must be accepted as only located in a particular modification of the Unmanifest. The "I-notion" is indeed the particular modification of the Unmanifest and it is the locus of that "I-ness". And that ["I-notion"] alone exhibits "I-ness" in the individual soul also, just as in the body etc. This is correct.

Because the mahattattva is the modification of the Unmanifest and the mahattattva is the intellect. "I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions of the intellect. Therefore it is not correct that there is real "I-ness" in the individual self.

3.108. 

3.107. पोशाकवाय पाहे जानामीऽणि परीतिति प्रस्तुते । तारुपाति: 
प्रतिपिनिधिरः प्रतिवर्णोऽन्तर्गततयाः । किं च चाहे 
प्रत्येक नामात्मा: 
जानामीति प्रतिपिनिधिरः प्रतियोगिता नास्ते । प्रत्येके तु 
धर्माभावावृत्ति प्रस्तुते । यतो धर्माभिनिदिः 
स्वात्त्वात् भो भासने । भेद व भेदनकल्याणस्वत्विनियम: प्रसिद्ध पुनः । भर्यः 
तात्सम्यैसि कालिनहलकिविमृद्धयः कालिन्यूणरूपः कालिन्युगस्तरूपः कृषिदुदृंगोऽक्रियत्वं रूपः। यत्र हृ भेदस्यं भविषोऽपि नास्तिति दुःस्मृतम् । यत: पुच्छस्य 
पुच्छस्य भर्यः दश्ये । स्वरूपात्मादिः दश्ये: स्वरूपात्मायमनुष्ठाये । स्वरू 
पुच्छस्य न भर्यः दश्ये । यथा: 'तथाभिनिविष्टः प्रथ मुलाके सन्न्यास निर्माणस्तीति न जाने । अतः गमणमैव न गुञ्यसि' हि तः हृ लोके प्रतिति: । 'द्वितीय 
पुच्छस्य भर्यः नास्ति: हृ त्रिविशिष्टते एव संगठते । पोशाकवायं च 'अथर्यः वै जनस 
प्रतिवर्णोऽपि प्रतियोगिता नास्तिति दश्ये: । तत्साधनमेव प्रतियोगिता वस्तुमनासे । अत एव तत्र श्लोकस्वावृत्ति: ऋषिविश्व 
धर्माभिनिदिः न।
3.108. In the state of liberation there is certainly not even the
cognition "I know". Because such a cognition is superimposed as it is
a particular cognition. Moreover, the cognition "I know" has dependence
upon the relation of attribute and its possessor. But in liberation
even the relation of attribute and its possessor certainly does not exist.
For an internal difference is evident in the relation of attribute and
its possessor. And the rule that difference is pervaded by the
generation of fear is certainly well known. It is another matter that
fear is in different degrees: somewhere great, somewhere middling,
somewhere less, somewhere even less, at some place perceptible and at
some place imperceptible. But in the case of difference it is difficult
to be said that even a trace of fear does not exist. Because fear even
of [one's own] son is seen. Fear of teeth and nails etc. is experienced
even though they are part of one's own body. And even the fear of one's
own words is seen. For there is a conviction in the world like: "I do
not know: what words will come forth from my mouth while I am obstinate
there? Hence the very going there is not proper." The statement: "fear
is certainly on account of a second" is for this very reason correct.

But in the state of liberation, the sacred text: "Janaka, you
have attained what is free from fear" (Bṛh.4.2.4.) shows that even a
whiff of fear does not exist. Therefore the relation of attribute and
its possessor cannot be said there [in liberation]. For this very reason,
there is no knower-known relation and subject-object relation there.

3.109.

नवेर्व तत्र सुलभन्तन्त्वादि न स्यात् ।
कस्तीले शुक्लमुद्र- 
विज्ञानमहीर्मितम्, सुहासिन्यत्रोढ़स्यात्मुत्तान, 
शुद्धस्वयंविविधविचिन्तितान् 
विख्यात यत् ।

कः तस्मात् कर्तितः कालात्मकमिधानं नामितः 
को बृह्द्विन्दुं 

योजनान्नाथम् निरतिश्यायेत्क्रमेत्क्रमे निरहितमिति 
चेद्वात्तत्त्वान्वित इति गृह्वायं 

तत् सुविक्रितत् भावात्रेमे सूची संगतोऽहिमितं 
दुःखनिरृपण्यं धर्ममायेण बोध्यया ।

योजनाः पुष्पकित्सु दुःखनिरृपण्यं एतेन

निरतिश्यायेत्क्रमेत्क्रमे निरहितमिति 

वेष्णाति श्रद्धार्थं दश्यामि 

अवेष्णाति मैथिलमिति दश्यामि ॥
3.109. [objection] According to this way, even the experience of happiness would not exist there [in liberation]. Because in the cognition of that [happiness] a relation of attribute and its possessor exists between awareness and the experiencer, a relation of known and knower exists between happiness and the experiencer and a relation of subject and object exists between happiness and awareness.

[reply] This is true.

[objection] How then does not even a trace of happiness exist there?

[reply] Who says "it is"? If [you say] what is the reason for the unsurpassed excellence of the state of liberation? [we reply] Understand it to be the total absence of sorrow. But the statement of happiness there should be understood as having the intended meaning: happiness is used figuratively in the sense of the absence of sorrow, like "upon the removal of the burden I have become happy". But the activity for the sake of liberation has only the cessation of sorrow as its object. Due to this, [the verse] (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.):

The person desirous of liberation undertakes listening [to the scriptures] etc. [with the idea]: "may I be freed from all sorrow, the enjoyer of limitless bliss, self-resplendent"

is set aside. Because as a rule, that type of resolve is not seen for a person who desires liberation. But in the insistence that a resolve like that is seen somewhere, it has to be thought of in connection with a false impression about the limitless bliss there. Because the total absence of sorrow is happiness in a figurative sense.
3.110. [objection] Even so, because there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation in the way previously mentioned, how is the resolve: "may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss" logically possible?

[reply] You are confused. For establishing a resolve such as this, the entity cognized as "I" at the time of the resolve is only required to be indeed existent at the time of liberation but there is no requirement of the cognition as "I" at the time of liberation. There is no requirement of cognition itself, how much less as being "I"? So there is no fault even though the sense of "I" cognized at the time of the resolve does not persist in the state of liberation.

The resolve is only: "may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss", but not: "at that time, may I think of that sort of Self as enjoying limitless bliss". Even in the world, the resolve is seen somewhere prior to sleep: "may I experience the happiness of sleep". But even there, at the time of deep sleep, the recollection is not seen: "I am now experiencing happiness". So there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation. And because the persistence of the sense of "I" is difficult to be demonstrated since the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be stated due to the absence, in any way, of difference in liberation according to the way previously mentioned. Thus
it is established that an undertaking toward liberation is only for the total absence of sorrow.

3.111. Even in the world, the parrots etc. living in cages, although eating tasty food at the proper time, desire liberation from the cage through the mere fancy that: it will gain some fruit at some time in the forest. The effort observed there is solely for the purpose of the cessation of the sorrow of bondage. And the state of liberation which is of this kind alone conforms to the meaning of the verbal root: \textit{µuc}, in the sense of releasing. Because liberation means freedom. And that [freedom] is in the form of getting away from something. But there is no attainment of something else there.

Furthermore, because bondage and liberation are mutually opposed, the meaning of the word liberation must be said only like that: which is the nature of being opposed to bondage. And bondage is invariably connected with sorrow, so liberation is invariably connected with the total absence of sorrow since it is what is contradictory to sorrow. Happiness is certainly not contradictory to sorrow. Because happiness and sorrow are seen to possess co-existence. For this very reason, the
Vaiśeṣikas made a separate designation of both happiness and sorrow as qualities. Otherwise, like darkness is the absence of light, they would have conceived happiness to be the absence of sorrow or sorrow to be the absence of happiness. And the total absence of sorrow is impossible if even a trace of sorrow exists. So it [liberation] alone is contradictory to sorrow. Therefore liberation is proved to be the total absence of sorrow even from the natural sense [of the word].

3.112. The cessation of sorrow is remaining in one's own nature upon relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable and disagreeable. It has been explained in exactly that manner by Rāmānuja too (Śrī B. Para. 82, p. 190). The relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable and disagreeable is because the object itself which has innate duality
and which is agreeable or disagreeable does not exist, or because even though such an object exists there is no connection to it, or because although the connection exists there is no appearance of the connection.

According to the view of the dualists in that matter, the absence of a second object in liberation is difficult to be demonstrated. There [in their view], although there is the possibility of fear because of the maxim: "fear is certainly on account of a second", the total absence of fear in liberation has to be supposed as the blind adherence to one's faith on account of only resorting to the sacred text: "Janaka, you have attained what is free from fear" (Bṛh.4.2.4.).

However according to the view of the non-dualists, the total absence of fear in liberation taught by the sacred texts is made logically possible by reasoning alone. Because even the possibility of fear does not exist in the absence of a second. So because the absence of a second object is in accordance with the sacred text: "Janaka, you have attained what is free from fear" how can the supposition of pre-eminent happiness in liberation be correct? Because happiness has dependence upon a second.

Furthermore, the exalted pre-eminence of liberation can be said as the total absence of sorrow but not likewise as pre-eminent happiness as well. Because it is well known in the world that even great happiness is overcome by just a little sorrow. Similarly, the overpowering of happiness by sorrow which is even of a figurative nature is well known in the traditional legends etc. Sorrow which is of a figurative nature is the absence of happiness. Prior to the birth of Śrī Rāmacandra, Daśaratha considered even all the splendour of the kingdom etc. to be worthless due to such sorrow arising from childlessness even though it was figurative.

If [you say]: where there is no sorrow, even of a figurative nature and even a small amount, that alone is pre-eminent happiness,
[we reply]: then if that is the case, because ascertaining pre-eminent happiness is dependent upon ascertaining the total absence of sorrow, when the logical possibility only through the total absence of sorrow is agreed upon by both of us what is the use of the supposition about pre-eminent happiness being different there [in liberation]?

3.113. Thus because even a whiff of duality cannot be said in the state of liberation, the persistence of the sense of "I" is impossible there. Because cognition as the sense of "I" has dependence upon the relation of attribute and its possessor which is based upon difference. So it is indeed proved that an undertaking toward liberation does not have happiness as its goal but its goal is only the cessation of sorrow. Just as for a person who is pierced in the foot by a thorn there is an undertaking for its removal. It is like that. But there is a distinction to this extent: the cessation of sorrow is recognized following the removal of the thorn. But in liberation even that [cessation of sorrow] is not [recognized]. On account of this, [the objection]: although the undertaking has the cessation of sorrow as its goal, because the cessation of sorrow is
cognized in liberation the relation of knower and known exists at that time. Hence difference is difficult to be prevented

Furthermore, the cessation of sorrow is certainly not wished for as "agreeable". But sorrow is "disagreeable", so it is desired to remove that. You [Ramanuja] too have certainly accepted this when you said (SrI.B.Para.82.p.90.): "because sorrow is disagreeable its cessation is desired, not because [its cessation] is agreeable." On account of this, the illusion conjured up by his own fancy which has been told beginning with (SrI.B.Para.37.p.62.):

If the sense of "I" is not the Self, the Self would not be inner...

is set aside.

3.114. यथा

'हन्मैदिलाम हार्षम, सत्सारिविधिवादिति।
स्वशासनन्तराय स इस्पतिः न सिर्वति।
पशुपालन च चापेव चेतनसंदिग्धस्तु।' (श्रीमा० त० २०, २१)

इस्येन यन्त्र्यन्मृत्युभोजायस्यीपत्येव ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानत्वप्रियतेः चेतुः वचीरः

3.114. By this text (SrI.B.Para.37.p.63.):

This [consciousness] has existence and the nature of being consciousness etc. just on account of its connection to oneself. But upon separation of the connection to oneself, consciousness itself is not established. Just as there is no establishment of the act of cutting etc. in the absence of the cutter and the thing to be cut

what has been said is that Knowledge has the nature of being Knowledge and has existence only with reference to the sense of "I" who is the locus.
In regard to that, it is said:

3.115.

Awareness has no dependence upon a locus. Thus the Self does not have knowership. The Self has only Knowledge as its essential nature. The knower must be the internal-organ.

3.116. It is granted that Knowledge has dependence upon a locus with respect to the particular Knowledge concerning ordinary relations. The awareness which is universal and which is the basis of all Knowledge is all the more impossible to be dependent upon a locus. It has been declared more than once that if the establishment of that is with reference to a locus, the result would be the destruction of the nature of Knowledge which is universal.

Furthermore, even in regard to conventional reality, the origination of the "great elements" from the tanmātras of sound etc. subsequent to the beginning of creation and their dependence upon them
[the tanmātras] has been told by the Śaṅkhya and is accepted by you too. With regard to that, how is there the establishment of those [tanmātras] without reference to a locus? But if [you say] that sound etc. are qualities and knowledge is not like that. But knowledge is an action like cutting etc. [we reply] If that is so, because action is invariably impermanent, knowledge too would be impermanent and your very own conclusion: "the Lord is the locus of eternal knowledge" would be contradicted.

3.117. Therefore it is ascertained that the sense of "I", who is certainly the knower, is the inner Self.

With regard to that, is the individual self intended to be expressed by the word "inner Self", or the Lord, or Brahman which is pure consciousness free from distinction? In regard to the first and second, there is proving of what is already proved. Because the individual soul and the Lord are in proximity to the "I-motion" which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, therefore knowership for both [the
individual soul and the Lord] which are the locus of "I-ness" is accepted by us as well. Nor is it the third. Because you do not accept that. And because that [Brahman] is free from distinction, therefore being the locus of "I-ness", being a knower etc. is impossible. Brahman is not a knower in its essential nature because knowership etc. is superimposed and therefore the nature of being a knower is perishable.

The sacred text: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Bṛh. 2.4.14., 4.5.15.) says that Brahman has knowership. But what is the object of the purport of the sacred text is that the knowership there [in Brahman] is only superimposed. Knowledge, even about what is qualified by the knowership which is superimposed, is not possible by any means. How much less about what is pure, free from knowership etc.

If knowership is real, there would be contradiction with the sacred text: "Brahman is Knowledge" (Bṛh. 3.9.28.).

3.118. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 38, p. 64, 65.):

Just as one and the same substance fire exists in the form of effulgence and what possesses effulgence,... in the same manner, the self has only consciousness as its nature and has consciousness as its quality.
In regard to that, it is said: is the meaning of this "one and the same" (1) belonging to the same class or (2) distinguished by the numeral denoting the fact of being one? In the first case, the meaning would be: just as fire, which belongs to a single class as the nature of fire, is seen to have both forms: as light and its effulgence, so too Knowledge belongs to a single class as the nature of Knowledge and has both forms: the self and its quality. If that is so, because both types of Knowledge, i.e. the attribute and its possessor, belong to a single class, a locus and an object must be stated even for the Knowledge which is the possessor of the attribute just like for the Knowledge which is an attribute. According to the view of the dualists, though an object can somehow be stated, a locus is certainly difficult to be demonstrated. Because the locus of Knowledge can only be said to be the self. Thus there is self-dependence: Knowledge which is the possessor of the attribute is the essential nature of the self and the self is its locus.

Comment

According to Rāmānuja, the nature of the self (see text and comment, 2.10.) is analogous to a light and its effulgence. Light is a self-luminous substance possessing the quality of effulgence which illumines objects. Though the effulgence is a quality of the light, it is also a substance since it can exist elsewhere than its locus. The light is comparable to the substantive consciousness (dharmaḥ bhūtajñāna) of the self and its effulgence is like the self's attributive consciousness (dharmaḥ bhūtajñāna) which is a quality of the self and yet is also a substance as it can exist elsewhere than its locus.

Advaitins consider that this twofold conception of consciousness is based upon a false analogy. The substance known as fire (tejas) does not exist in the twofold form of effulgence and its possessor. On the contrary, fire is solely of the nature of effulgence. Even if effulgence is experienced separately from the light of a lamp or the sun etc., the latter are never experienced apart from effulgence and it is not possible to apprehend a possessor of the effulgence which is different from the effulgence. Hence Advaitins conclude that light is not other than effulgence itself.

Even if a difference is allowed between light and effulgence, it is
further argued that the analogy is inapplicable because fire (tejas) possesses the component parts (avayava) of effulgence and its possessor. But if consciousness is in the form of the self who has consciousness as its essence and its attribute, then the self possesses parts and therefore would be subject to change and consequent impermanence.93

In addition to this, Abhyankar raises a series of arguments against the Viśiṣṭadvaitins view that consciousness has a twofold nature. Firstly, he asks whether Pāṇini's expression "one and the same" (ekam eva) means that the substantive consciousness and the attributable consciousness belong to the same class in being consciousness, or whether it means that they are really one. If the former is the case, because there is no qualitative difference between the two they should possess the same characteristics and just as the attributable consciousness requires an object and a locus the substantive consciousness, too, would require an object and a locus. If it is said that the substantive consciousness, which is the self, has the self as its locus then there is the fallacy of self-dependence. Abhyankar proceeds to put forward further arguments to show that the conception of a substantive and an attributable consciousness is untenable.

3.119.

3.119. But if there is a difference between the self who is the locus and the self whose essential nature is Knowledge, does the self who is the locus have Knowledge as its essential nature or is it inert? In the first case, once again there is another locus even for that Knowledge. Thus there is an infinite regress. In the last case, there is the loss of your own viewpoint.

But if the Knowledge which is a quality and the Knowledge which constitutes the essential nature belong to a different class, there is contradiction with the statement: "one and the same". Moreover, upon
accepting that the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self and which is the possessor of the attribute is without a locus, due to the acceptance that it belongs to a different class, what is the fault of the exponents of māya who teach that Knowledge is without a locus and free from distinction?

comment

If the substantive consciousness, which constitutes the essential nature of the self, is qualitatively the same as the attributive consciousness, then the former would require a locus like the latter. Thus all consciousness requires a locus. To avoid self-dependence, it could be said that the substantive consciousness and the self which is its locus are distinct. But if the self is not inert then it must have consciousness as its nature and consciousness requires a locus, so what is its locus? If another self is postulated as the locus, then it can be asked whether that self has consciousness as its nature or whether it is inert. If it has consciousness as its nature then that consciousness requires a locus and thus there would be an infinite regress.

If it is said that the substantive consciousness does not require a locus because it is qualitatively different from attributive consciousness, then there is the acceptance of the Advaitins position that consciousness does not require a locus.94
Furthermore, by the text (Śrī. B. Para. 36. p. 61.):

Awareness is the nature of bringing about some object to be in accord with conventional expression, solely by means of its own existence and in reference to its own locus. It is also known as "Knowledge" (jñāna), "comprehension" (avagati), "awareness" (saśvid) etc. It has an object, it is a particular attribute of the self who is the experiencer and it is well known to all as having the self as its witness: "I know the pot", "I understand this matter", "I am aware of the pot".

what has been established is that Knowledge possesses a locus. All that here [in the quotation] would be contradicted for one who accepts that the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is without a locus. Moreover in accepting that the twofold Knowledge is mutually distinct, the word "Knowledge" would have different meanings because there is no reason for a single usage [of the word "Knowledge"] persisting in both of those [two types which are mutually distinct].

Furthermore, the Knowledge which is a quality pertains to the nature of the Self and is eternal and is not at all different from the possessor of the attribute. So when absence of inertness is established for the self by that alone, what is the reason that you again accept a Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self? If [you say] it is accepted because of want of recourse for the logical possibility of the sacred text: "Brahman is Knowledge, bliss" (Brh. 3.9.28.), [we reply] if the sacred text is the resort, then when there is establishment by that alone [i.e. the self is proved to be not inert just through the substantive consciousness] there is no need of the Knowledge which is a quality. For
example, both kinds of expression: "the pot is white", "there is a white quality in the pot" are logically possible by just the one quality white which is a qualification of the nature of the pot. It is like that. Moreover, if the sacred text had intended the word "Knowledge" to have a twofold meaning: Knowledge which is a quality and Knowledge which possesses the attribute, then for the ascertainment which is free from doubt the very same word "Knowledge" would not be used in both places. Therefore the difference, i.e. Knowledge which is an attribute is separate and the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is separate, is not accepted by the sacred texts.

But if [you say] that the meaning of this: "one and the same" [supra] is "distinguished by the numeral denoting the fact of being one", [we reply] that what transpires is that the relation of attribute and its possessor is superimposed there [in awareness]. And then your conclusion, i.e. the relation of attribute and its possessor is real, would be contradicted.

3.121. But what has been said (SrI.B.Para.38.p.66.):
The knowers of words and their meanings [grammarians] say that the words "awareness" (saṃvid), "consciousness" (amuhūti), "Knowledge" (jñāna) etc. are words which express relationship. In the world or in the Veda, the usage of "he knows" etc. is certainly not seen to be without an object and without a subject.

That is trifling. If that was the case, there could be no use of the word "Knowledge" in the sense of Knowledge which is the essential nature [i.e. the substantive consciousness]. If [you say that the use of the word "Knowledge" in respect of the substantive consciousness is] by convention, [reply] it is exactly the same for me as well. It has certainly been told previously that the Self is indeed awareness which is free from distinction.

The usage [i.e. a syllogism] is: awareness is the Self, because it is not inert. The reason has only negative concomitance: what is not in this manner [i.e. not the Self] then it is not thus [i.e. not not inert] like a pot etc. "Not being inert" means having a nature which is manifest without being dependent upon another thing. A pot, a light, happiness etc. are not by nature manifest. Their manifestation depends upon the knower. Even the knower is not by nature manifest. Its manifestation is based upon a locus of Knowledge which is superimposed. Therefore that [knower] too is not the Self. But the Self is only in the form of Knowledge. Whereas the knower, which is superimposed as the locus of Knowledge, is only the "I-notion" which manifests Knowledge. On account of this, that refutation which was done by conceiving another explanation of "not inert" in the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.39.p.67.):

If [you, the Advaitin, say that "not being inert"] is: being manifest resulting from its own existence, [reply] if that is so, there is inconclusive reasoning [due to over extension] in respect of the light of a lamp etc.
has been answered. Thus the cognition which refers to the Self in the manner: "I know" is only error. Knowership is certainly false, because its appearance is only for the one who has the false presumption that the body is the Self.95

**Comment**

In the Mahāpurvapakṣa (Para.27,p.41.) it is stated that awareness, which is self-manifest by nature, is the Self because awareness is not inert (aṇḍa). The meaning is that everything which is other than awareness is insentient and so awareness alone can constitute the nature of the Self. In the Mahāsiddhānta (Para.39,p.67.), Rāsaṇuṇa inquires as to what the Advaitin means by "not inert" and he suggests the following definition: being manifest resulting from its own existence. He then proceeds to argue that such a definition is invalid because there is over extension in the case of the light of a lamp, for that too is manifest solely on account of its own existence.

However this definition is not acceptable to the Advaitin. Abhyankar explains that what is meant by "not inert" is; having a nature which is manifest without being dependent upon another thing.96 There is no over extension in the case of the light of a lamp because its manifestation depends upon cognition on the part of the knower. Abhyankar also argues that the knower is not the Self because the manifestation of knowership is dependent upon superimposition.97
3.122. Awareness, in reality being without an object and a locus, appears as a knower on account of error just as a pearl-oyster appears as silver. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.39.p.67,68.):

This is not correct. If that was the case, the sense of "I", i.e. the experiencer, would be recognized in co-existence with experience: "I am awareness". Just as silver etc. are in the form of the shining substances etc. existing before the eyes. But here, this awareness certainly appears as separate and qualifies another thing, the sense of "I", like a staff qualifies Devadatta. To elaborate: there is the cognition "I experience". Such being the case, how can the apprehension "I experience", which manifests the sense of "I" as qualified by awareness, be declared to depend upon mere awareness which is the qualifying attribute? It is like the apprehension "Devadatta has a staff" relates to the mere staff.

That is at first glance. The effecting of the cognition: "I am awareness" is certainly not correct at the time of error. Because at the time of error there is no cognition of the substratum in its essential nature. Likewise, it is also incorrect that: "the sense of "I", i.e. the experiencer, would be recognized in co-existence with experience." Because the sense of "I" who is qualified by experience and who is falsely imposed, is recognized as only in co-existence with the substratum. To elaborate: in the cognition "I experience" how is it understood by you that the cognition of the sense of "I", the experiencer, is without co-existence with awareness which is the substratum? Because the experience which is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" in: "I
experience" is certainly not the substratum. But the substratum is only awareness which is pure existence. The experience which is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and it is certainly included in what is apparent.

[objection] Just as the cognition of the substratum here: "this is silver" is as "this", so too, in what form is the cognition of the substratum here [in "I experience"]?

[reply] Understand that it is in the form of existence. Because finally, "is-ness" exists everywhere. And for existence, there is cognition only in co-existence.

cross reference

Rāmānuja says the sense of "I" in the statement "I experience" is in co-existence, i.e. apposition (samanādhihkaraya) with experience. Abhyankar states that the sense of "I", which is superimposed, cannot be in co-existence with existence but can be co-existent only with the substratum of the superimposition. In the case of a statement based upon the superimposition of silver upon a pearl-oyster: "this is silver", the silver is in co-existence with the substratum "this". The experience qualifying the "I" in "I experience" is not the substratum, for it is of an apparent nature (pratibhāsika). This means that an experience cannot be the substratum because it exists only at the time of the knowledge of it. For instance after eating one cannot say: "what I experienced at the time of the meal I will experience now." Pratibhāsika, which is negated at the time of everyday life (vyavahāra), is of two types: the experience of happiness etc. which is real and the experience of silver on a pearl-oyster which is unreal.

Existence is the substratum because "is-ness" persists in all cognitions. In the case of existence, there is always the cognition of it in a relation of co-existence: "the pot is", "the cloth is".
3.123. Furthermore, it is all the more impossible to say that there is the cognition of the substratum as knowledge which is the qualifying attribute of the sense of "I". Because the substratum is in the form of mere existence free from distinction, therefore it is not suitable to become the qualifying attribute of another thing. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 40, p. 68):

> Even the awareness which is accepted as the Self would be false. Because the cognition [that awareness is the Self] is only for one who has the false presumption that the body is the Self is set aside. Because the falsity of the awareness which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and which is perceived as a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I": "I know", is accepted. But not this awareness which is the substratum. Because that [awareness] is not perceived since it is not cognizable as it exists in the form of mere being. For this very reason, that [awareness] is not sublated by the knowledge of reality. What is perceived, whether it is the locus of the notion of "this", or the locus of the notion of "I", is an object which is capable of sublation. But the cognition itself is not negated. Even cognition, which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and which possesses a locus and an object, is certainly capable of sublation. But [awareness] which is in the form of pure existence free from distinction is not sublated in any state whatsoever.

**Comment**

In the Mahāpurūṣapākaṇa (Para. 27, p. 43.) the Advaitin has argued that...
knowership is false because it is superimposed upon the Self due to the erroneous idea that the body is the Self. In the Mahāsiddhānta (Para. 40, p. 68.) Rāmānuja contends that if the idea that the Self is a knower is false because it is based upon the erroneous presumption that the body is the Self, the idea that awareness is the Self would also be false since it arises in the same way as knowership.

Abhyankar replies that the awareness in the statement "I know" is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" and is not sought to be upheld as absolutely real. But the awareness which is the substratum of the mental mode of knowership is not an attribute of the knower and so it does not follow that because knowership is false the awareness which is the substratum is also false. To argue that awareness is false, because the idea that awareness is the Self arises for a person who has the erroneous presumption that the body is the Self, is not correct. Because the conviction that: "awareness is the Self" occurs only to one who does not have that erroneous presumption. 100

Rāmānuja further states (Para. 40, p. 68.) that if the Advaitin says awareness is not false because it is not negated, then knowership is not false because it too is not negated. Abhyankar responds by saying that any object of knowledge, whether external or internal, is capable of being negated. Knowership is negated at the time of deep sleep. 101 Awareness, however, cannot be negated because it is not the object of another awareness (cf., 3.80. comment.). Only what is the object of awareness is capable of being negated.
3.124. But what has been said (Śrī B. Pāra. 40, p. 69.)

Knowership is not logically possible for the "I-notion" which is of the nature of the internal-organ. Because like the body, the "I-notion" which is of the nature of the internal-organ is associated with insentience, it has the nature of being a modification of prakṛti, it is an object of knowledge, something outward, for the sake of others etc. And because the nature of knowership is specific to what is sentient.

That is not so. Because the ordinary Knowledge relating to pots etc. is an action pertaining to the mind, it is a particular mental modification and it is a transformation of the mind in the form of the respective object. Knowership is the nature of being the locus of the action of Knowledge. And that is possible only for the mind, not for the Self. On account of this, the inference: "the internal-organ is not the knower, because it is insentient, like the body" is refuted. Because [ordinary] Knowledge is a particular transformation of the mind, therefore there is the possibility of that [Knowledge] only in the mind. And the absence of knowership on the part of the Self is established by the inference: "the Self is not a knower, because it does not undergo transformation."

Knowledge is not the nature of being the locus of the quality of Knowledge. In grammar, the agent affix (trg) is said to be in the sense of the locus of the verbal root because it directly expresses an action. If [you say] that only the action of Knowledge is said by the word "quality of Knowledge", [we reply] then it is accepted. Still, that [action of Knowledge] is only for the mind which is characterized by change, not for the Self which is free from change. Although the mind has similarity to a pot etc. due to the many attributes such as insentience, being a modification of prakṛti, being an object of knowledge, being outward and for the sake of others etc., nevertheless, there is no
negating factor in the acceptance of its dissimilarity as a knower. For example, although the body has similarity to a pot etc. due to those very attributes [just mentioned], there is dissimilarity in being the locus of the sense-organs and in being the locus of motion. It is like that.

**comment**

In respect of knowership, the Advaitins position (see 1.51. and comment) is that the Self is not in reality a knower. Knowership occurs due to the mutual superimposition of the Self and the internal-organ (antahkarana). The internal-organ possesses a twofold modification: the first is a mental modification in the form of the subject (ahashvrtti) and the other is the transformation into the various cognitions (idaashvrtti) which are objects to the knowing subject. The internal-organ possessing the modification in the form of the subject is called the "I-notion" (ahañkāra) and the internal-organ possessing the modification in the form of other cognitions is called "mind" (manas). The statement that "I know" is the result of a mutual superimposition: the "I-notion" acquires sentiency on account of the superimposition of the awareness which is the Self and the Self becomes referable by the individual sense of "I" due to the superimposition of identity with the "I-notion". This superimposition is the pre-condition for all ordinary relations (vyavahāra). Following this fundamental superimposition, an expression such as: "I am happy" is due to the mutual superimposition of the Self, qualified in the above manner by the "I-notion", with the mind. The expression: "I am a man" is due to the mutual superimposition of the Self, qualified by the "I-notion", with the body.

Rāmānuja maintains that knowership is intrinsic to the self. Abhyankar replies that knowership cannot be intrinsic, for knowership means "being the locus of the action of Knowledge". Because cognitions are constantly changing in accord with their objects, the locus of these real cognitive changes could not be itself free from change. If the Self can undergo any transformation then it would not be a permanent entity.

Rāmānuja will now proceed to argue that knowership cannot be identical to the "I-notion" because the latter is an object of knowership in the same way as the physical body is an object of knowledge. Abhyankar responds by saying that a single entity can be both the knower and the object of knowledge if it possesses parts. Since the internal-organ consists of mental modifications, there is no contradiction in the relation
of knower and known with respect to the mental modes.

3.125. Such an action of Knowledge, which is in the form of a mental modification, is certainly divided as it belongs to respective minds either because minds in reality are many or because of difference due to the distinction of limiting adjuncts. Even belonging to a single mind it [the action of Knowledge] is certainly different due to a difference of time. Thus the mind which is the agent with respect to one action of Knowledge is certainly not contradicted in being the object of another action of Knowledge. On account of this [the statement] (Śrī B. Para. 40. p. 69.): "there is no knowership [for the "I-notion"] because of the very contradiction of being an object of knowledge" is set aside. Because there would be contradiction between knowership and being an object of knowledge which are both ascertained in respect of the one action [of Knowledge]. But there is no [contradiction for the two] which are both ascertained by a different action [of Knowledge]. Otherwise, even according to your view the absence of knowership would be difficult to be prevented because of the very contradiction that the Self is an object of knowledge.

3.126. The "I-notion" can manifest Knowledge which is non-eternal and of an ordinary nature. There is
no "I-ness" in sleep. Even so, the Self is the witness there. 14.

3.127. That action of Knowledge is certainly non-eternal, because it is an action. On account of this, [the statement] (Sri.B.Para.40.p.69.)

Knowledge is eternal, because it is a natural attribute of this eternal self

is set aside. The expression that "Knowledge is produced", "Knowledge is destroyed" is logically possible only because the action of Knowledge is non-eternal. It should not be said that: Knowledge is certainly eternal. But the expression "produced" and "destroyed" is figurative, as it is based upon the expansion and contraction of Knowledge. The contraction and the expansion of Knowledge is due to karma. [reason] Because there is no means of knowledge for it to be a figurative expression when the logical possibility exists [i.e. for the expression to be understood in its primary sense]. Moreover, "contraction and expansion" mean only "decrease and increase", so because Knowledge undergoes change it must be non-eternal and so there is just the same situation as before.

Furthermore, according to the above reasoning, the individual soul too would be non-eternal. Because you yourself have said [supra] that
Knowledge is a natural quality of the self. For the increase and
decrease of a natural quality is certainly not possible without an
increase and decrease of the locus. Because in regard to the elements
which are effects, it is seen that there is an increase of the corporeal
nature upon an increase of the quality.107

3.128.

3.128. This ordinary Knowledge, which is in the form of a particular
modification of the mind, is certainly included in what has an apparent
nature. The "I-notion" which manifests only this [ordinary Knowledge],
manifests it as located in itself [i.e. in the "I-notion"]. Like a mirror
e.tc. For this is indeed the nature of the things which bring about a
manifestation, i.e., the manifesting of what is to be manifested as
located in themselves. We do not say that the "I-notion" manifests the
supreme Self which is of the nature of awareness. Because the suprse
Self is not able to be manifested by the "I-notion". On account of this,
[the verse] (SrI.B.Para.41.p.71.):

That the "I-notion", which is insentient by nature,
manifests the Self which is self-luminous is without
reason. Like [a statement that] a spent coal
manifests the sun (S.T.p.35.)
is set aside.

It should not be said that: even the ordinary Knowledge, which is in the form of a particular modification of the mind, certainly exhibits the nature of being luminous. So how is that [Knowledge] manifest by the insentient "I-notion" which is by nature not luminous? [reason] Because this is not a rule: "there is certainly no manifesting of what is luminous by nature by what is not luminous by nature." The manifestation of the sun which is by nature luminous, is seen by means of water etc. even though [water etc.] are by nature not luminous.

3.129. न चेंद्र लांकिकसिपि शान्त यथथ यथानां सत्याकारः
कर्मस्वीत्व तथ्य सत्यवाच्यांकर्त्तव्यं कर्मभविष्यतिर्गतिः वाल्यम्।
वर्तमानः न नियमे वर्तमानहायन्ति वर्तमानः
अन्यकारणं वर्तमानः केनचित्तसुपपराेंग्रेः अपि विक्षिप्तायां
स्वभृत्यकर्त्तेऽपि साधितामिति यतु् कर्तनमाहिरतायो हि रसम्यो विशेषः
स्वभृत्यसुपपराेंग्रेः द्विय वर्तमानसाधितां कर्तनेऽपि साधितामिति।
(श्रीभाष्य २-४३४) ।

3.129. It should not be said that: even this ordinary Knowledge illuminates all insentient things. So how is there the manifestation of that [Knowledge] by the "I-notion" which is illumined by [Knowledge] itself? [reason] Because this too is not a rule: "there is no manifestation of itself [e.g. of A] by what is to be illumined by itself [by A]." Because the manifestation of the sun's rays, which have entered through some small cavity into an inner apartment enveloped in darkness, is seen by the palm of the hand which is to be manifested by [the rays] themselves.

But what [has been said] (Srī B. Para. 41, p. 72.):

For the rays, which are obstructed in their motion by the palm of the hand, become numerous and are perceived
very clearly of their own accord. Thus the palm of
the hand does not manifest [the rays] since it is
the cause for their abundance only.

That is not so. Because there is no experience of an abundance of rays
even though the palm of the hand is held a long time. For rays are
objects of visual perception. Therefore if their abundance exists, that
abundance must certainly be visible. But the increasing inability to
endure [the rays] is because of the excessive penetration of the rays
into the palm of the hand by means of the subtle perforations [on the
skin]. Or let there be abundance. Still, [the manifestation of the rays
by the palm of the hand] is not impaired: the palm of the hand manifests
the rays only by bringing about an abundance.

3.130. यदृच् अस्य सत्यमभावस्वलोकनिविषयविभाविचः हि रूपः। न ततेजु-
रतिः। सत्यमभावस्वलोकनिविषयविभाविचः हि रूपः। नापि ततेजुenerated text
शतापीत्तकालोकनिविषयविभाविचः हि रूपः। नापि ततेजुgenerated text
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शतापीत्तकालोकनिविषयविभाविचः हि रूपः। नापि ततेजुgenerated text

3.130. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 41 p. 72.):

Of what nature is the manifestation which is brought
about by the "I-notion" for this Self whose nature is
awareness? It cannot be origination. Because it is
accepted that [the Self] is produced by no other
thing on account of being self-established. Nor is
there illumination of that [Self whose nature is
awareness]. Because that [awareness] cannot be
experienced by another experience.

That is not so. Because we do not accept the manifestation of the Self whose nature is awareness. And the Knowledge which is a particular modification of the mind is certainly able to be experienced by another experience. So the manifestation of that [Knowledge which is a particular mental modification], in the form of the illumination of that, is certainly feasible.

Just as the sun's rays, though they have entered into an inner apartment through some cavity, are not illumined as long as they are without a locus; or just as the tanmatra of sound etc. do not manifest when they are without a locus but only when possessing a locus; it is the same for this Knowledge also which is a particular modification of the mind. And just as the palm of the hand, having itself become the locus of the sun's rays and itself being manifested by those very rays, reveals them; so too, the mind alone in the form of the "I-notion" has become the locus of such Knowledge and itself being manifested by that very Knowledge it reveals that Knowledge.

Comment

Abhyankar considers that Ramanuja's objection is invalid because the Advaitin does not hold that the Self is manifested by the internal-organ. What Abhyankar states is that the Self, i.e. awareness as such, becomes reflected in the internal-organ and it is this reflection of awareness (cidadbhāsa) which illumines the internal-organ and is also manifested by the internal-organ in the form of the cognizer (ahāmyṛtti) and the various types of cognition (idāmyṛtti).

Ramanuja proceeds to argue (Para. 41 p. 73) that because awareness is not the object of another experience there is no means to assist the experience of that awareness, such as by the removal of any obstructive impurity (kalmasa). Abhyankar will reply that the mental modification (vṛtti), although itself a product of the primary Ignorance (ādījañāna), is able to remove the obstructive impurity consisting of the ignorance of the Self. Hence the effecting of the experience of the Self is actually the removal of the ignorance of the ever present Self by means of an appropriate vṛtti.
3.131. This Knowledge which is manifested removes the obstructive impurity centred on the knower. This obstructive impurity is not the Ignorance which is a positive entity and which is the basis of the entire world. But these [e.g. obstructive impurity etc.] are particulars of Ignorance, which are as it were minute particular modifications of that very [primary Ignorance] and are parts of it. The ignorance of the rope which is the cause for the appearance of the snake, etc. are of this nature. Even this knowledge, such as the knowledge of the rope etc. which removes a particular ignorance, is only a particular modification of the primary Ignorance which is a positive entity. For example, even the waking which removes a second dream which is [itself] contained in another dream is only included within the first dream. It is like that. So just as the waking, although included within the first dream, is capable of removing the second dream, so too, the ordinary Knowledge, though included within the world of appearance, is in the form of a particular modification of the mind i.e. these actual particular parts of Ignorance, and it is certainly capable of removing those. The "I-notion", having become the locus, is said to be the manifesting agent of this ordinary Knowledge. The nature of manifesting agents is to manifest
But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 42. p. 74.):

This is not the nature of manifesting agents, because it is not seen in the case of a light etc.

That is not so. Because a light is not the manifesting agent of a pot etc., but rather its effulgence. That has been told: "a light shines only for itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another."110

3.132. A mirror etc. too manifests a face etc. only as located within itself. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 42. p. 74.):

A mirror etc. is not the manifesting agent of a face etc. But it is the cause for the fault in the form of the reflection of the ocular light.

That is not so. Because there is no impairment for [the mirror] being the manifesting agent of the face etc. by means of the reflection of the ocular light. In the same way, the "I-notion" is the knower because it manifests Knowledge through being the locus of Knowledge. The individual soul too is the sense of "I" and the knower only on account of proximity to the "I-notion", but not in reality. The Self, however, is only pure consciousness. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 42. p. 75.):

In the absence of "I-ness", consciousness is not established as being "inner".

That is not so. Because even though there is no illumining for oneself due
to the absence of "I-ness" in consciousness, being "inner" exists in
the form of the essential nature which illuminates without dependence
upon another thing.

3.133. कि चार्माता नात्मक: स्वरूपः। सुपुर्व्यादी व्यवहारात्। सुपुर्व्य ज्ञानसेवेतः निराधार्यतः ज्ञानसेवेतः सुपुर्व्यात् नात्मकः। न च सुपुर्व्यप्रत्ययस्तः विपरीतत्वात् न्यायः स्वरूपः प्रतिभाश्च इति वाच्च। प्राणायामायामायः। अज्ञानंविचारस्य मर्यादः। अहंकरश्च ज्ञानाध्ययनः विचारसंयमः। ज्ञानं व्यवहारस्यपेशते न ल्याङ्यः साधारणपेशते। कि च ज्ञानं प्रथमादृश्यमातः ततो विपरीतत्वादिविद्याधिकारस्यभ्रातरामाश्च आध्यात्मिकः कथः विपरीतमात्तिकः चित्तृतं। न च चुरूणात्तिरं ‘सुपुर्व्यप्राप्तिः’ इति पराध्यायस्यप्राप्तिः सिद्धतिः अभिविद्युः। योगानन्दो विद्यार्थिः विद्यार्थिः शीत्याधिकारे भीताभ्यस्य चिन्तित्वात् सत्यं सिद्धेन तु तद्दौत्तमप्रेषेन्न्यात्मां तस्मात सत्यी। योगानन्दो ब्रम्हचार्यो तपस्तिष्ठतुः कार्तवर्मीश्च ज्ञातो ज्ञातो ज्ञातो ज्ञातो चिन्तित्वेन प्रत्यक्षायुपर्यथानि द्वार्यते न तु तदाद्वादु सत्य शिल्पित्त्वः। न तु तदाद्वादु सत्य शिल्पित्त्वः। न तु तदाद्वादु सत्य शिल्पित्त्वः।

3.133. Furthermore, "I-ness" is not the essential nature of the Self.

Because there is deviation in the case of deep sleep etc. Although
Knowledge exists in deep sleep, there is no clear appearance because
Knowledge is without a locus due to the absence of the sense of "I". It
should not be said that: though the sense of "I" exists in deep sleep
there is no appearance in a clear manner because it is without an object.
[reason] Because there is no means of knowledge [to prove its existence in
deep sleep]. And because an object exists in the form of ignorance. And
because the sense of "I", which is the locus of Knowledge, does not
depend upon an object. Because Knowledge depends upon a locus and an
object but the locus does not directly depend upon an object. Moreover
how could the locus, which appears prior to the connection with an object
on account of the experience: Knowledge depends firstly upon a locus and
then upon an object, have a cognition which depends upon the object?

It should not be mistaken that: the sense of "I" is established in
deep sleep because of the reflection on the part of the person risen from sleep: "I slept happily". [reason] Because by this reflection, the existence of the individual soul who was cognized as the sense of "I" at the time of the reflection can be established at the time of deep sleep. But the cognition of that [individual soul] as the sense of "I" cannot be established at that time [during deep sleep]. In the statement: "in another birth, Śīkhaṇḍin practised penance for killing Bhīṣma", the mere existence of the one who had been cognized as Śīkhaṇḍin in a later birth is seen at the time of the performance of penance in the previous birth. But at that time he was not "Śīkhaṇḍin".

3.134. Furthermore, by the reflection: "I did not know anything", even the sense of "I" is established as not being an object of cognition at the time of deep sleep. Because there is the negation of everything: "not anything". But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 43, p. 76):

If the negation "not anything" refers to everything,
even the awareness which you accept must be negated.

That is not so. The negation of even awareness, as something knowable in deep sleep, is certainly accepted. For awareness is not experienced in deep sleep as the object of a perceptual judgement. Because the negation "not anything", which relates to the universality, negates as an object of knowledge indeed everything: pots etc., the sense of "I", knowledge and ignorance. The meaning is that nothing whatsoever is an object of knowledge in deep sleep. For this very reason, the non-remembrance of even the sense of "I" is recognized at that time in the manner: "I did not know even myself". On account of this, the logical possibility which Ramanuja somehow or other made for this: "I did not know even myself" through the supposition of the meaning (Śrī B. Para. 43, p. 77) is refuted. Thus intelligent people must decide whether the ridicule made by the text (Śrī B. Para. 43, p. 76.):

In the knowledge "I did not know anything", having reflected that the "I" is the knower, the self, the sense of "I", who has continued existence even at the time of deep sleep, then upon the negation of that, one proves by this very reflection "I did not know anything" that the knowledge being denied at that time is established and that the knower, the sense of "I", who persists is not established. Only a person who is beloved of the gods [i.e. a fool] could establish this meaning is, on the contrary, for the ridicule only of himself [Ramanuja].

3.135. यत् । सङ्कुचात्मकांश्चाणानसाक्षिकतेनात्तथृत्रिमात्रायः । साक्षिकविक ।
| साग्धित । काठाध्यात्मकम् । न सङ्केतकः साक्षित ।
| अनानुसारिकाः । श्रीत्र खोक्षेपत्योऽसास्त्रीयोऽवपनित्वम् न शास्त्राय ।
| समुदाय । स्मरणात्मकः ध्वनिधातिः । सास्त्राकर्षणोऽसास्त्री ।
3.135. But what has been said (Śrī.Śr.43.p.77.):

The doctrine of the exponents of māyā is that in deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of ignorance. To be a witness means just to be a direct knower. Because one who does not know is not a witness. In the world and in the Veda, only a knower is designated as a witness. Not mere knowledge. The venerable Pāṇini teaches that the word "witness" is only in the sense of a direct knower: "direct (saksat) in the sense that the seer is designated" (Pā.Śū.5.2.91.). And this witness is only the "I" who is recognized [in the cognition]; "I know", so how could the sense of "I" not be recognized at that time [during deep sleep]?

In regard to that, it is said: it is certainly true that: "in deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of ignorance". But the nature of being a witness there [in deep sleep] does not consist in the resemblance which has as its object ignorance in the manner: "this ignorance". But it is only in the manner: "I did not know anything".
For in the world, the witness of what is absent is of two types. Here [for example]: "there was only a quarrel between Caitra and Maitra, nobody was beaten by anybody", Devadatta etc. who remembers the absence of beating at the time of the quarrel; "this was merely a quarrel between Caitra and Maitra and nobody beat anybody" is the witness of the absence of beating. But somewhere, even in the absence of remembrance in this way at the time of the quarrel, there was no remembrance of beating at the time of the quarrel in the manner that: "this one beat that one". The witness is only to this extent. Similarly, in deep sleep, even though there is no remembrance in the manner: "this ignorance", there is no remembrance of any object at that time in the manner: "this is so and so". That [Self] is the witness of ignorance only to this extent in deep sleep.

Although the primary Ignorance is a positive entity, still, the nature of being the witness in the manner which has been told is easy to be demonstrated because the particular modification of that Ignorance which is situated in deep sleep exists only as possessing the power of concealing. Knowership certainly does not exist in deep sleep when there is the logical possibility of being the witness of ignorance in this way. So cognition as the sense of "I" at that time is certainly very difficult to be demonstrated.

**comment**

In Advaita, the rational demonstration of the nature of the Self rests upon the cornerstone of the analysis of the state of deep sleep. The premise of such reasoning is: only what is not subject to negation is absolutely real.\(^{113}\) The mode of reasoning is based upon the principle of "continuity and discontinuity" (\textit{avayavatireka}).\(^{114}\) In the state of waking the individual sense of "I" is manifest, while in dream it is partially manifest. During deep sleep, however, the sense of "I" is negated because at that time it is unmanifest. On account of negation, the sense of "I" cannot be the Self. Yet a continuity of existence during deep sleep cannot be denied: for upon waking there is no sense of prior non-being but rather there is a natural sense of the continuity of being even though self-consciousness did not exist prior to waking. This
experience can be explained because the Self, as awareness, remains unchanged through the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The Advaitin argues that in deep sleep the mind resolves along with the sense of "I" which is a constituent of the mind. But the Self persists because upon waking there is a recollection such as: "at that time, I did not know anything". Since a recollection depends upon a previous experience, the Advaitin states that the Self exists in deep sleep as the witness of the absence of cognition.

Just as the Self is conditioned by the limiting adjunct of the internal-organ during waking and dream, so too, in deep sleep the Self is conditioned by the limiting adjunct of Ignorance (ajñāvacchinnacaitanya). The Self, conditioned only by Ignorance at the time of sleep, is known as Prājñā.\textsuperscript{115} If the Self did not have Ignorance as its adjunct, the state of deep sleep would be the same as liberation and there would be no return to the waking state.\textsuperscript{116}

Rāmānuja holds that during sleep the individual sense of "I" persists, though it is not clearly manifest due to the absence of external objects and because it is overpowered by the quality of tāmas.\textsuperscript{117} The Advaitin considers that the experience of deep sleep does not support Rāmānuja's view. Because upon waking there is the apprehension of the total absence of knowledge during deep sleep and so there is no means to demonstrate that the individual "I" exists at that time in a type of muted condition.

From reasoning based upon a comparison of the state of deep sleep with the states of waking and dream, the Advaitin concludes that the sense of "I" is not the Self because it is negated at the time of sleep. The awareness which persists through all the three states constitutes the actual Self.
In regard to the state of liberation, a cognition as the sense of "I" is indeed all the more non-existent in liberation which is free from the body. There, the relation of knower and known certainly does not exist so how could there be a cognition as the sense of "I"? But in the state of one who is liberated while living, even though the sense of "I" appears, nevertheless that [sense of "I"] is only according to the vision of another person. But according to the vision of that [liberated person] there is no negating factor for him [that there is the appearance of the sense of "I"] like there is for a bound person [i.e. the bound person may believe that a liberated person should not have the sense of "I"], because there is the ascertainment: though this "I-ness" appears in the individual soul, it is not innate as it is only based upon the connection with the "I-notion". The ordinary relations of those [liberated souls] are as such: the ordinary relations with people must be done only according to the vision of the people.

[Objection] Ordinary relations are certainly not possible.

[Reply] Do you say there is no possibility of them due to the absence of a cause or on account of the absence of a purpose? It is not the first. Because the accumulated karma which has begun to operate is not destroyed by knowledge, therefore the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect exist until death in accordance with previous mental impressions. But the absence of a purpose is indeed accepted. Still, the ordinary relations are only for the welfare of the world, being solely due to the influence of compassion.
[objection] Just as the ordinary relations are seen in this manner for Janaka etc., they are not seen in that manner for Śuka etc. What is the difference?

[reply] Just as even among bound souls a difference is seen in accordance with previous mental impressions; only some show the right path to others, some are indifferent and some even show the wrong path, so too, even among liberated souls a difference is certainly proper since a mental impression is not destroyed until death. And those who show the wrong path in the state of bondage are certainly not qualified people for the knowledge of the truth. Thus among those who know i.e. those who are liberated while living, there are only two types: some show the right path to others and some are indifferent.

3.137. The sense of "I-ness" such as: "I was Manu" (Bṛh.1.4.10., cited in ŚrīB.Para.45,p.79.) etc., is logically possible for Vāmadeva etc., in this manner. Just as for children, the ordinary relations of adults with them is only through language, in just the same manner, the relations on the part of people liberated while living and on the part of the Lord are only
according to the way of the world. Thus the conventional expression preceded by "I-ness", which has been taught in the sacred texts: "Indeed, I [having entered] these three deities" (Ch.6.3.2.) etc. and in the traditions: "Because I transcend the perishable" (6.15.18.) etc., is logically possible.

It was demonstrated previously (3.110.) that a resolve which is preceded by "I-ness" in the state of the person who is desirous of liberation does not establish "I-ness" in the state of liberation. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 44 p. 78.):

If there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation, the destruction of the Self would only be stated in another manner etc., is set aside.

But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 44 p. 78.):

The inner-self manifests only as "I" even in liberation. Because it is luminous to itself.

That is certainly not possible in liberation free from the body. Because the relation of illumined and illuminating certainly does not exist due to the abandoning of the limiting adjuncts such as the body. If [you say] that it is so in liberation while living, [we reply] granted. But even there [in the state of liberation while living], that [liberated person] does not again enter into the cycle of transmigration because the mentioning of "I-ness" is to relate ordinarily with others only according to the vision of others. But in liberation free from the body there is no appearance of difference in any way.

3.138. शास्त्रभाषणकर्तव्र शास्त्रभाषणकर्तवीः पञ्चवड़विषकर्तवीः।
अस्त्रयायिद तत्त्वम् शास्त्रं स्पष्टिमस्तववते ॥ १५ ॥

3.138. Brahman has scripture as its means of knowledge.
The scripture negates perception. There is a real cognition even from what is unreal. The scripture operates in itself. 15.

3.139. ‘नेह नानासित किंचित्’ (इ० ४० १९ २६, काः १९ २१२) इत्यादिश्रास्मापेक्षेऽवलयितविषयं। ननु भेदस्य सर्वावलयितविषयं प्रत्येकस्य चिन्तयातादिमात्रेऽवलयितविषयं च । भेदादिति शाखं प्रमाणम् गृहीतवा भवृत्ति शाखं स्वयमस्वतंत्रगतयमेव स्पाधिदि वेदस्तु। तत्त्वादि कथव शाखं प्रमाणं भैतिकदिति चतुर्दशमये यथा चैतमये प्रयाणं गन्तु मुदति। तत्र चैतमये मनो भविष्यं अभेदं प्रशास्तागतिभिः सत्यसत्यं भविष्यं गन्तु मुदति। तत् च दूसरो दृष्टं तेनेवर्थं प्रमाणं प्रभृतिे मत्रं। केनक किमथाणि। ‘नायं प्रयागंगामं गायं’। केनकं किर्मशेषवतं सत्यमेव सत्यागमं भवेत्। स्वयमस्वतंत्र शास्त्रादिति तेनेवर्थं गतवतेव गतसत्यागमं यथा यथा शास्त्रादिति। केनकं कित्रियं भवेत्। ततं गतसत्यागमं गतवतेव गतसत्यागमं यथा यथा जीवात्मकालीनमात्रागतिभिः। शाखं जीवात्मकालीनमात्राय तत्समपर्यं गतवतेव सत्यं गृहीतवा जीवात्मकालीने समागमं तत्त्वादि किंचित्तः। प्रयागं गायं गतवतेव गायं गतसत्यागमं यथा यथा जीवात्मकालीनमात्रात्। केनकं कित्रियं.
Prayāga and he went far away. Having seen him in the distance, Maitra proceeded along that same path and he was informed by someone familiar with the path: "this path does not go to Prayāga". Maitra, in order to bring back Caitra to the right path, set out himself by that same path even though it was known to be wrong as there was no other recourse and going near to Caitra he turns him back from the wrong path. Similarly, the scripture, to turn back the bound souls—who had set out to go along the wrong path and not only just set out but had gone a great distance—from the wrong path; in order to teach the souls, it has itself accepted difference, though unreal, as there is no other recourse for going near to them and having come near to the souls it teaches them.

comment

See the statement of Saṅkara, at the conclusion of the comment to 1.2.

3.140.

A teacher of such a kind is rare: one who teaches, having announced the faults which belong to himself. But the reason for this can be taught
through the knowledge of the fault, i.e. having become indifferent to the faults, one would follow all other paths belonging to him. Similarly, the scripture has operated to show the true path having accepted difference in the form of the relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc., even though in reality it is unreal, and having announced the fault in the form of unreality with respect to itself, by its own mouth: "the Vedas are not Vedas" (Bṛh.4.3.22.), it communicates non-duality. The reason there is that a person desirous of liberation follows the path belonging to the scripture. But a person who knows the truth certainly considers even the scripture as unreal. Otherwise the understanding of non-duality would not be firm. Thus the scope of the scripture only extends as far as the door to liberation, but not in the state of liberation. This is the position of the Veda which is the crest-jewel of the means of knowledge, what to talk of the other means of knowledge?

All means of knowledge have the status of being a means of knowledge only extending as far as the door to liberation.

This non-duality, which is established by the scripture which is the means of knowledge, is conformed to by reasoning as well. Because distinctions such as pots, earthenware vessels etc. are seen in the world to be preceded by their universal which is clay, Brahman is established as free from distinction, the basis of all distinctions.

Thus the scripture is ascertained as communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed. So on account of that, perception, which depends upon all kinds of difference, is negated. Due to this, the effecting of mutual dependence (Śrī. B. Para. 46.p.82.):

there is the ascertainment that the innate impression of difference is a defect when the scripture is ascertained as communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed and there is the ascertainment
that the scripture communicates an entity from which all distinctions are removed when the innate impression of difference is ascertained as a defect must be understood as incongruous.

**Comment**

In the *Mahāpurvaṇaṇga* (Para.19.p.30f.), the Advaitin states that the reality of the perception of difference is sublated by the non-dual statements in the Upaniṣad texts. The criterion which is given for the relation between sublated and sublating is that while the former can be accounted for in another way (śamhāvyamāṇānyathāsiddhi), the latter cannot be accounted for in any other manner. Scripture, which is the means of knowledge in non-empirical matters (cf., comment to 1.2.), sublates perception because it operates subsequent (para) to perception and negates the erroneous conclusion of real duality which is based upon perception. Thus perceptual duality can be accounted for in another way i.e., as apparent, but the non-dual texts cannot be accounted for in any other manner. The Advaitin maintains that the conception that duality is real is based upon a "defect" (dosa) called Ignorance which is in the form of a beginningless, innate impression of difference.

Rāmānuja responds (Para.46.p.82.) by stating that the Advaitin has committed the error of mutual dependence: the innate impression of difference can only be established as a defect when the sacred texts have been ascertained to teach non-duality and the latter can only be ascertained when the innate impression of difference is proved to be a defect.

The Advaitin replies that there is no mutual dependence because while the innate impression of difference is established as a defect on the basis of the non-dual texts, the latter are ascertained as "communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed" solely through their own meaning. The method of reasoning is as follows. It is axiomatic that the Veda is a means of knowledge free from error. Because Vedic passages such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Bṛh.4.4.19.) teach that non-duality is true and duality is false, it is ascertained that this duality which is of an apparent nature is produced from some "defect". Advaitins consider this defect to be Ignorance assisted by the beginningless, innate impression of difference.119
3.141. But the effecting of the defect (Śrī B. Para. 46. p. 82f.) 120:

If perception is of a contrary nature because it is based upon the innate impression of difference, the scripture would also be to no purpose because it is based upon that [innate impression of difference] is not correct. Because the requirement of the validity of the scripture only extends as far as the door to liberation. There is no impairment even though the scripture is subsequently useless.

Furthermore, even though the scripture is based upon the innate impression of difference, it does not have a contrary nature. What is known as a "contrary nature" is making known an object which in reality is unreal, as being real. Like the ordinary perception of pots etc. [is of a contrary nature]. But the scripture does not make known anything whatsoever in that manner. But the innate impression of difference is required 121 for the sake of the operation of the scripture. Because the operation of the scripture is impossible without the connection of the relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and the connection in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc. And because the cognition of a connection is based upon the innate impression of difference. So even though the scripture requires the innate impression of difference as there is no other recourse for its operation, it is not of a contrary nature.
3.142. न च 'यः सङ्गेः' (मु.१.१.९) इत्यादिहृदुः: सत्यवेत्ता-संमतसून्दरजातिपरवर्तिनि विद्वानायांभुविति वाच्यः। सूक्ष्णानामविद्वादन्-शुद्धीति निमृग्यज्ञानजानांतः तत्तपयतः पर्यवसातात्। एकस्य निमृग्यज्ञान-सात्त्विकारसंवेदः।

'असते कर्मिन्ति रिहिता तत: सत्य समाहे'।

इति न्यायेन मयादा: शुद्धीयोऽस्मेषापने मृत्तिः। तत: सूक्ष्णानामविद्वाने। ततो निमृग्यज्ञानापि नैवेद्यित्वंसूक्ष्णानामविद्वादने वा शुद्धिबिद्वी-तार्थतम। अतः नैवेद्यित्वं सूक्ष्णानामविद्वाने। लोकोनामिति तथा मृत्तिः।

सूक्ष्णानामविद्वानिः 'अतः ब्रह्मात्ति व्यज्ञानात्' (मृ.२.२) ह्यादिनेतरित्येषु गति: पाण्डवरणीयः। न हि खला ब्रह्मयथापि

हृदात्मां सात्त्विकाम् संपत्तम्।

3.142. It should not be said that: the sacred text: "He who is all knowing" (Mu.1.1.9.) etc. has a contrary nature because it makes known Brahman who possesses qualities and who is not accepted as real. [reason]

Because the sacred texts which teach about Brahman who possesses qualities are ascertained as having their purport only in communicating Brahman free from qualities. For there is no possibility of the direct apprehension of Brahman free from qualities in a mere instant. According to the maxim: "having stood on the untrue path, then one endeavours to gain the true", the operation of the sacred texts is firstly in teaching ritual action. Then in teaching Brahman who possesses qualities. Then in teaching Brahman free from qualities. The sacred text does not have a contrary nature just because of teaching ritual action or just because of teaching about Brahman who possesses qualities. Because an operation in that manner is seen even on the part of the people, for the easy comprehension of the listener according to the maxim of the "large Arundhati". Even an exponent of Brahman possessing qualities must resort to this very course since there is the sacred text: "he knew food to be Brahman" (Tai.3.2.) etc. For nobody accepts food to be Brahman.

3.143. एवं च देवमूलपेतः संभवमानान्य-शासिदिविशेषसमन्यथासिद्धेन पञ्चारुपस्थिति-
Thus perception, whose establishment in a different way is made possible due to it being based upon a defect, is negated by the scripture of non-duality which is not established differently and which is later i.e. it applies subsequently. But what [has been said] (Sri.B.Para.46.p.83.):

When [scripture] is known to be based upon a defect, the fact that it is later does not prove anything. Because when there is fear caused by the knowledge of a snake upon a rope, no cessation of fear is seen even upon being told: "this is not a snake, do not be afraid" by some person who is recognized as: "this one is confused". And that the scripture is based upon a defect is known at the very time of listening.

That is not so. Because differences are of many kinds, the scripture is certainly able to remove all differences other than the difference which depends upon itself. But the difference which depends upon the scripture, having removed the others, ceases instantly just of itself. Because in the scripture itself it is said: "the Vedas are not Vedas" (Bph.4.3.22.). For example the powder of the cleaning nut123, which is tossed into dirty water to bring about clarity, goes down of itself along with the dirt. It is like that.

comment

The Upaniṣad texts which have their purport in non-duality are said to negate the truth of perceptual duality because they operate subsequent
(para) to perception. Texts such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Bṛh. 4.4.19.) pre-suppose the existence of duality and subsequently negate it. Advaitins consider that the Upaniṣad statements operate as the final means of knowledge, because when the truth of duality is negated, nothing is able to subsequently negate the knowledge of oneness revealed by the Upaniṣad passages. (See comment to 1.9.)

3.144. There is certainly no rule that: the one who shows the path must indeed be free from defect in every way. Even a lame man and even a deaf man is the guide for a blind man. The dirt contained in the water is removed by the powder of the cleaning nut which is itself a particular type of dirt. Thus the teacher is required to be free from error concerning the matter which is to be taught. But it is not necessary in respect of everything.

Error is seen to be of many kinds. For the causes are numerous, such as separation from women etc., the loss of all capital, demonical possession, bile etc. In regard to those, the error caused through bile does not relate to the object but it relates to the colour belonging to that [object]. Because the error that: "the conch-shell is yellow" does not relate to the conch-shell but only relates to its yellow colour. So the cessation of fear is certainly seen upon being told: "this is not a snake, do not be afraid" by some person even though he is recognized as: "this one is confused" due to having error caused through bile. Because he
3.145. Thus the scripture of non-duality, though dependent upon difference for its operating, can be a means of knowledge because it is free from defect in respect of the non-duality which is to be taught. Even a trace of a defect is not possible for the sacred text, which is established as beginningless and which is taught by the supreme Lord at the beginning of creation and which is the primary means of knowledge for the words of men i.e., the traditions, legendary histories etc.

But perception has a possible defect. Because it is experienced to be so in the case of the snake upon the rope etc. Even Ramanuja must accept it in this very manner. Otherwise, how could the sentient souls and insentient matter be relied on as being the body of the supreme Self?

Because it is not experienced to be so through perception, though they [Viṣistadvaitins] accept it since it is taught by the sacred text. So too, although there is no requirement of a defect for the purpose of the
cognition of what is unreal—since they accept the "apprehension of the real" (satkhya) everywhere—still, in the case of the cognition of the snake upon the rope etc., they certainly say that the absence of the cognition of the real rope etc. is based upon a defect. Thus they too certainly accept that perception has a possible defect. On account of this, what has been said (Sri.B.Para.46.p.83.):

Moreover, by what means do you know that this scripture has no possible defect whereas perception has a possible defect? etc. is set aside. Because both are equal. That has been told by the learned people:

The defect being the same for both, the confutation is also the same for them.

Upon the examination of such a meaning, one [of the two] should not be accused [of having defective logic].

Thus even though in the final conclusion it is established that non-duality alone is the reality taught by the scripture which is without even a trace of a possible defect concerning what is to be taught, still, because the appearance of difference exists extending as far as the door to liberation, the ordinary relations pertaining to the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are certainly not negated until then [liberation].

3.146. शाखाविविधयां सद्धिविविधयाः पश्चात्तत्त्वार्दर्शनेन निविविधयानुमूलिन्—मातिव तु परमांथाः। यतु 'एतद्युक्तम्। असाधितस्यमे त्रिपूलः। स्थापत्याश्च समाधिवर्यात्। (श्रीमाण ५० ५९ ५० १४।) इत्युतः तद् शाखात् श्रेयस्तिः। देहयाया दोपुष्कवव्यै रुचि मष्टो भक्तग्रेशाः। तस्य भावायं तत्सर्वं न्यपदेशाऽकः। मिति न पुनसंहोच्यते।। परेतेन 'बिवदाधायासिन्यं देव तिथ्या विविधाभवुद्धष्व। शाखानिविविधत्वसम्पन्नः। देहा दिद्धं सिद्धम्। दिद्धयाज्ञानविविधत्वसम्पन्नः। देहा दिद्धं सिद्धम्। (श्रीमाण ५५ ५५ २१।)
3.146. Brahman, pure awareness free from distinction, is alone the highest reality because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which is existence without a second, is not seen to be subsequently negated.124

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.84.):

That is not correct. Because what is based upon a defect is ascertained as not absolutely real, even though it is not negated.

In regard to that, "in what way is the scripture based upon a defect and in what manner does it have validity?", all that has been told just preceding so it is not mentioned again here. On account of this, the syllogisms told in this manner are refuted (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.85.):

(1) The Brahman under dispute is false. Because it is the object of knowledge produced for one who is possessed of Ignorance. Like the phenomenal world.

(2) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of false knowledge.125 Like the phenomenal world.

(3) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of knowledge produced by an unreal cause. Just like the phenomenal world.

Because the reason is not the criterion [for establishing the proposition]. And because there is deviation. For it is seen in the world that there is a real cognition even from what is unreal.

Comment

The reason does not establish the proposition because Advaitins do not accept that Brahman free from distinction can be an "object of knowledge". They accept that Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct, i.e. sagunabhāraman, is an object of knowledge and is ultimately false. But even there, Brahman only becomes an object of knowledge due to the
limiting adjunct and so only the adjunct is false, not Brahman who is qualified by the adjunct.¹²⁶

³.147. Even though the knowledge of elephants etc., which belongs to a dream is unreal, it is the cause for the ascertaintment of what is really auspicious or inauspicious.¹²⁷ But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 47 p. 85.):

Because the knowledge belonging to a dream is not unreal. For it is only the objects which are false there. Because negation is seen for them alone, not for the knowledge.

That is not so. Because the perceptual knowledge of elephants etc., which belongs to a dream does not exist in the waking state. Because the person who has awoke merely just remembers the dream elephants etc. and the perceptual knowledge of elephants etc., which belongs to the dream. But he does not experience [the elephants etc.].

Even though the knowledge arising in dream only consists of the
nature of recollection—because just as recollection in the waking state depends upon a mental impression, so also the knowledge which belongs to dream—still, that [dream] recollection is different. And the recollection arising in the waking state of an object experienced in the waking state or of an object which belongs to a dream is different. Although both are similar in being recollection, the knowledge which belongs to dream and which consists of the nature of recollection is not recognized as recollection at that time. But the recollection arising in the waking state is recognized as recollection even at the time of the recollection. That is the distinction. Thus the knowledge which belongs to a dream is certainly unreal because it does not exist in the waking state. And because Rāmānuja accepts only perceptual knowledge in dream.

Furthermore, the knowledge which belongs to dream is not the cause for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious in being of the nature of knowledge, but only through being associated with the particular object respectively. And that knowledge is not seen in the waking state to be associated with the particular object in that manner. So [the knowledge belonging to dream] is all the more unreal. Moreover, if the knowledge which belongs to a dream is real, then it certainly cannot be avoided that there is a real cognition from what is unreal, because the production of that [knowledge] is only from the dream elephants etc. which are unreal.

comment
The context for this discussion is the Advaitins view that the scripture is not ultimately real, though it reveals true knowledge. Brahman alone is ultimately real. The scripture has a "relative eternity" (pravāhanītyatā) in so far as the Lord reveals the same Veda at the beginning of each cycle of creation. Although the Veda too is ultimately within the operation of māyā, Advaitins consider that the Veda reveals the true knowledge of Brahman. Thus true knowledge can arise from what is unreal. The illustration cited in support of this (Śrī B. Para. 47, p. 85) is that while the knowledge which arises in dream is false, since it is
found to be so upon waking, it can nonetheless give rise to the ascertainment of real auspicious or inauspicious future events. Hence the real can arise from the unreal.

To disprove this proposition, Rāmānuja seeks to show that the illustration of dream does not lend support to the Advaitins views. Rāmānuja maintains that the dream knowledge is not unreal, only the dream objects are unreal. Thus the real arises only from the real because the ascertainment of a real auspicious or inauspicious event is based upon the real dream knowledge. The discussion continues, centred upon the use of the illustration of dream.

3.148. यथौ ‘हस्यार्दीनामाभ्यं कर्ष्य कदनुद्रयं सत्य भवन्ति। नेतम्। दु:धिर्मा साध्वन्तस्वामार्थविवासैद्य। अयोध्य प्रतिभासमानत्वकेष्व ग्यायज्ञन्तर्प्रेक्षितसौ। प्रतिभासमात्मा वास्तव देवप्रकार। सु दु:धिर्मा वृत्तिस्य व्यवस्थयते। अवश्य हि दुधिं सत्यवाः (रीःए० पृ० ५६ पृ० १६) इत्यैव कर्म। साध्वन्तस्वामार्थविवासैद्यसवास्तव: न साक्ष्यत्वां क्यों? प्रेक्षितसौ। दु:धिं साध्वन्तस्वामार्थविवासैद्य साध्वन्तस्वामार्थविवासैद्य विवासैद्यसवास्तव: न साक्ष्यत्वां क्यों? प्रेक्षितसौ। । तथा त्वर्यस्य प्रतिभासमानत्वकेष्व ग्यायज्ञन्तर्प्रेक्षितसौ। किंचिद् साध्वन्तस्वामार्थविवासैद्यन्तर्प्रेक्षितसौ। साविक्ष्यां व्यवस्थयते न वा। अथैव ‘वृत्तिः सवास्तव: सवास्तव:। सवास्तव:। अवश्य हि दुधिं सत्यवाः (रीःए० पृ० ३६ पृ० २०) इति त्युन्तिकिरिष्टेः। अवश्य हि ‘हस्यार्दीनामाभ्यं कर्ष्य कदनुद्रयं सत्य भवन्ति। इति कृत्तस्यौत्पत्तिस्थितिः। यथौ।

3.148. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 47, p. 86.):

[objection by Advaitin] In the absence of the elephants etc., how can the cognitions of them be real?

[reply by Rāmānuja] This is not so. Because cognitions as a rule merely require a support. Indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support and the manifestation certainly exists on account of the defect. But that [object] which is negated is determined to be unreal. The cognition which is indeed not negated is certainly real.

That is not so. You accept the possession of a support and not the
possession of a locus here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support". Because for demonstrating that a cognition possesses a locus there is no requirement for the manifestation of an object. Whereas you say: "indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support".

Furthermore, by the word "merely" here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support", is the possession of an object excluded or not? In the first case, there is contradiction with your own statement (Srī B. Para. 34. p. 57.): "there is no awareness whatsoever which is without an object, on account of its non-apprehension". In the last case, this is not a possible answer to the question: "in the absence of the elephants etc., how can the cognitions of them be real?".

comment

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate that the explanation of a "support" for cognitions is vague and untenable. A "support" (ālambara) can mean a locus or an objective support. If Rāmānuja intends the word in the sense of a locus then there is no requirement for a dream object. For example, in the cognition: "I experience" there is a locus but no object. So Rāmānuja uses the word in the sense of an objective support. However the use of the word "merely" in the statement: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support" must exclude something. Abhyankar seeks to show that whatever is excluded involves Rāmānuja in contradiction.
3.149. But if the possession of a support just means the possession of an object, then by the word "merely" here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support" is the possession of a locus excluded or is the requirement of a real object excluded? In the first case, there is contradiction with the statement (SrI.B.Para.37.p.62.): "something known as awareness which is without a locus or an object is not possible, on account of total non-apprehension". In the last case, if a cognition possesses an object due to the mere manifestation of the object even though the real object does not exist, is that manifestation real or unreal? In the first case, a real cognition from an unreal object must be accepted. But if the object is not accepted as the cause of the cognition, then there should always be the knowledge of a pot etc. even when the pot etc. do not exist. Whereas in the last case, a real cognition which is the cause for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious must be accepted from an unreal manifestation.

Furthermore, the statement (SrI.B.Para.47.p.86.): "indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support" is not correct. Because the cognition is itself the manifestation, it is not something different from that. Because there is no apprehension [of the manifestation of the object as being different from the cognition]. Moreover, the statement (SrI.B.Para.47.p.86.): "but that [object] which is negated is determined to be unreal" is not correct according to your view, that of an exponent of the "apprehension of the real".

3.150. असत्यसत्यसत्यार्थज्ञतेनिर्दयमयुद्धारणं रेखाघोषार्थादर्शारस्तरार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्}
3.150. This is another example of a real ascertainment from what is unreal: the ascertainment of a real letter [i.e. a sound like "a", "i" etc.] is seen to be from a letter which is unreal i.e. which is in the form of a line [i.e. the written character]. Although the line is certainly real, still, it is not the cause for the cognition of the letter through being a line, but only through being of the nature of the letter. But being of the nature of a letter is certainly unreal.\footnote{130} But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.47.p.86.):

[That is not so], because the nature of being a letter, which is unreal, cannot be the means [for the apprehension of the letter]. Because what is unreal and indefinable is not seen to be a means nor is it logically possible [to be a means].

That is not so. Is there some reason why what is unreal cannot be a means, or not? If there is not, what is the point of that mere statement [i.e. without logical grounds]? If there is, what is the reason? If [you say] the reason is that it is not seen anywhere, [we reply] that is not so. Because it is seen here itself [in the case under discussion]. And in dream, because the fact that it is seen in that manner has been mentioned just previously. The logical impossibility too does not exist, according to the maxim: "because when it is seen, it is certainly not logically impossible".\footnote{131}

[objection] How is it ascertainment here that a real knowledge is produced from what is indeed unreal?

[reply] How have you also made the ascertainment that it is certainly not produced from what is unreal? Therefore the dispute which is under
discussion here is only concerning whether it is seen in that manner, so the answer: "because what is unreal and indefinable is not seen to be a means nor is it logically possible to be a means" is incongruous. Even the indefinable horn of a hare etc. is certainly the cause for its imagination.

3.151. But if it is said (Srî.B.Para.47,p.87.)\textsuperscript{132},

Just as there is the convention of using the word "Devadatta" etc. in relation to a particular physical form, a particular line is the cause for the cognition of a particular letter on account of the convention that a particular letter which is apprehended by the ear is associated with a particular line apprehended by the eye. So there is a real ascertainment from what is indeed real. Because the line and the [phonetic]
convention are real.

Then there is contradiction with the experience of the identity of a letter with a particular line, in the manner: "this is the letter 'k', this is the letter 'kh'."

Furthermore, that there is a real ascertainment from what is unreal cannot be avoided even in the illustration which you have told: "just as there is the convention of using the word "Devadatta" etc. in relation to a particular physical form". Because the words "Devadatta" etc., though they are real in the nature of being a word, they are certainly unreal as identified with the respective particular physical form. Only in that manner [through the imposition of identity] do they make known the respective particular physical form. Otherwise, why is there no ascertainment of cloth from the word pot? Even the convention on the part of the Lord: "this meaning is to be understood from this word" only has the intention of the imposition of identity between the word and the meaning. The revered Pāṇini too, who brings about the usage between the word and the meaning through grammatical apposition in the sūtras dealing with technical terms such as: "ā, ai and au are called vyddhi" (P.S.1.1.1.), intends only the imposition of identity.

And in the world, an appearance of emotion is seen on the face upon pronunciation of words like: kvacit, cīcā etc. Even though the face is not burnt upon pronunciation of the word "fire", nevertheless there is no defect because there is no rule that what has been imposed causes an action having an effect. And the exponents of the eternity of sound, who consider that there is the ascertainment of an eternal sound from an unreal sound which is a particular sound that has been pronounced, certainly accept a real ascertainment from what is unreal.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.37.):

The cognition of a real ox is even from the outline of an ox, being based upon similarity.
That is not so. Having shown the outline of an ox, someone making known a real ox teaches: "it is similar to this". And somebody teaches: "this is an ox". There is certainly a real ascertainment from what is unreal in the second case there. Because the particular outline, qualified by identity with the ox, is unreal.

3.152. Furthermore, having stated this [the Advaitins position] (Sri.B. Para.48,p.88.):

The scripture is not unreal like a flower in the sky. Because prior to the knowledge of non-duality it should be understood as something which exists. Indeed when the knowledge of the truth has arisen, the scripture [is seen to be] unreal. Then the scripture is not the means for the knowledge of Brahman which is pure awareness, from which all difference has been removed. When it is the means, then it certainly exists and there is the knowledge that: "the scripture exists".

But what has been said [by way of reply] (Sri.B.Para.48,p.88.)

It is not so. Because when the scripture does not exist, the knowledge that: "the scripture exists" is false. Then because the knowledge produced by
a scripture which is false is [itself] false, the
object of that [knowledge] also, i.e. Brahman, is
false.

That is not so. For instance in the text (Śrī. B. Para. 47, p. 85.): "for it
is only the objects which are false in dream. Because negation is seen
for them alone, not for the knowledge" you yourself have said that even
though the objects are unreal the knowledge relating to them is real.
Similarly here, even though the scripture is unreal the knowledge that:
"the scripture exists" would certainly be real.

3.153. Establishing the falsity of Brahman on account of being an object
of knowledge which is false is also not correct. Because Brahman is not
the object of any knowledge whatsoever. For Brahman is pure awareness:
free from location, free from an object and free from distinctions. But
the scripture, while remaining at a distance, only shows the clear path
to the essential nature of such a Brahman.134 But Brahman is not an
object of the knowledge produced by it. And the path is the means for the
removal of Ignorance. Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct is expressed
by words, which is mediate knowledge. And this means, is such mediate
knowledge etc. The two things: the scripture and the means shown by that
[scripture], although false, are certainly able to remove Ignorance.
Because Ignorance too is false. Just like the removal of a thorn by a
thorn. It has been indeed previously told (cf., 3.139-140.) that the scripture is valid only to this extent.

3.154. The mention of the illustration [in the reply: "because the knowledge produced by a scripture which is false...", cf., 3.152.] (Srī. B.Para.48.p.88.):

because just as the knowledge of fire, which is produced by mist [wrongly] apprehended with the idea that it is smoke, is false; the fire which is the object of that [false knowledge] is also false

is incongruous as well. Because smoke is not the means for the knowledge of fire. But the knowledge of smoke [i.e. when it is recognized to be smoke then it is a means]. Because it has been told:

The inferential mark being known is certainly not the means for an inference. (Bhā. P.67.)

And the knowledge of the inferential mark is knowledge which has the determining of causality as its qualifying attribute. And that knowledge
has as its qualifying attribute the quality of smoke which is the
determining factor of causality in regard to the inferential knowledge of
fire by means of smoke. And if the knowledge which has the quality of
smoke as its qualifying attribute has smoke as its content then that
[knowledge] is certainly real and so there is no dispute in this matter.
If [the knowledge which has the quality of smoke as its qualifying
attribute] has mist as its content, even then, you who are an exponent
of the "apprehension of the real" cannot say: "that [knowledge] is unreal".
Because according to your view, portions of smoke exist in mist which is
of a similar nature to smoke.

Furthermore, you say (Śrī.Śr.Para.47.p.86.):
The knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc.,
which is produced by a defect in the object and
in the sense organ etc., is certainly real and
the cause of fear etc.
so the knowledge of smoke which is produced even in respect of mist has
to be said to be certainly real. So if the knowledge of smoke is real,
how can it be the cause of the unreality of the knowledge of fire? Much
less can it be the cause for the unreality of fire which is its object.

comment
Rāmānuja has argued that if the means is false the result must be
false, i.e. if the inferential mark (liṅga) is false then what is to be
proved (sādhyā) by means of the inferential mark should also be false.
Abhyankar responds by saying that the Viśiṣṭādvaitins maintain that
knowledge is always real and so they are in the untenable position of
holding that the means is true but the result can be false.
3.155. The unreality of fire is not known through the unreality of the knowledge of that. Where a negation is subsequently seen, in the manner: "that did not exist even at the time of its cognition", that negated object is unreal. Therefore the fire which is negated is ascertained as unreal. Thus when some matter has been taught by the teacher etc. and there is the cognition on the part of the student etc. in the form of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood", even when it is not understood by the student etc., and later when it is taught again there is the subsequent cognition: "now this matter is understood, but not previously": the prior knowledge which is the object of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood" is unreal even at the time of the cognition, because the negation is seen subsequently.

But the knowledge of the snake, in the case of the snake upon a rope etc., is certainly real in its mere essential nature [i.e. as knowledge]. But it is unreal as the particularity of the object. In regard to the case previously mentioned, even the knowledge in the form of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood" is just the same [i.e. as knowledge it is real until it is negated, though its object is unreal]. And so unreality is twofold: knowledge is somewhere unreal in its very essential nature [as in the statement: "the matter is understood" when it is known to be negated] and somewhere though real in its essential nature
it is unreal as the particularity of the object. But because the
knowledge of fire, which is produced by mist apprehended with the idea
that it is smoke, is real in its essential nature, unreality has to be
said only as the particularity of the object. And unreality as the
particularity of the object is based upon the unreality of the object. So
the unreality of the knowledge of fire is based upon the unreality of the
fire. But the unreality of fire is not based upon the unreality of the
knowledge of fire. Because there would be the occurrence of mutual
dependence. And so the statement (Srī. B. Para. 48. p. 33.): "because the
knowledge of fire is false, the fire which is the object of that is also
false" is incongruous.

**Comment**

There would be mutual dependence since the object is said to be false
because the knowledge is false. But if it is asked: how do you know the
knowledge is false? The reply would be: because the object is false.

3.156. व तु 'श्‌य्यकार्यस्य सदाधिकृत्वा पञ्चांक्तवाचार्येर्न निष्टेषैः
क्षेपस्मृतियाचित्रं व्रक्षाय पण्य': श्य्यकार्यस्य सदाधिकृत्वा
पञ्चांक्तवाचार्येर्न निष्टेषैः क्षेपस्मृतियाचित्रं व्रक्षाय पण्यः
(श्रेयस्य पु. २० ८ १०) स्लु्वं तत्र। हद्दं व्यवस्यम् | श्रुतात्मर्ना
वचनाधिकृतं युक्तमूलं किमित्रं समाहरणायं ज्ञेयमित्रं शिक्षात्ममू।
तथा श्रुतात्मिकाः शिक्षात्मग्रं भावण्यात् च व्यवस्यम् ॥
स्वपनमन्यमन्यं च तच्चात्मिकान्तिपत्रमात्रानी ब्रह्म वाचिते न भवति। यें
च शून्यपदाधिकृतं भाववृत्तिः भवलयं वा | आयोधं विन्ययतोऽपि भाववृत्तिः
विन्ययतो द्वीप्यु पुत्रायायायं सर्वमित्रिपायायं सामान्यप्रवृक्तिकारणेऽपि
कालायायं ब्रह्म कर्मेन वाचिते भवति। सामान्यपुत्रायं ब्रह्म वाचिते न
प्रकृति भवति। सामान्यपुत्रायं ब्रह्म वाचिते न भवति। शून्यपदाधिकृतं ब्रह्म
वाचिते श्रुतात्मिकान्तिपत्रमात्रायं यथाभवति ॥

3.156. But by way of refuting the view of the exponents of non-duality
[who say]: because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which is
existence without a second, is not seen to be negated subsequently,
Brahman which is pure awareness free from distinction is alone the highest
reality; what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 48. p. 88.):

The absence of seeing a negation subsequently is not established. Because the negation is seen even for that [knowledge of Brahman without a second] by the sentence: "reality is only emptiness".

That is not so. This sentence is not unoriginated by mankind. Because it is not seen in the sacred texts. In the chapter on the means of knowledge, Jaimini has taught that the validity of the statements of a human origin is based upon the sacred texts. And so when the sacred text is not shown to have this meaning, how can this sentence be a means of knowledge? And not being a means of knowledge of itself, it is not able to negate the Brahman without a second which is taught by the scripture.

Furthermore, does the meaning of the word "emptiness" signify something existent or non-existent? In the first case too, does it signify a particular or a universal? If it is a particular, because all particulars—substances and qualities etc.—are preceded by their universal, then how could Brahman which is the supreme limit of all the universals be negated by that [particular]? But if it is a universal, that is indeed Brahman, so the dispute is in the mere name. But if it signifies something non-existent, the mention of the word "reality" there is incongruous. Because that alone is reality which can be said as: "it is" and which is not negated. If [you say] that emptiness can be said as: "it is", [we reply] then it can only be something existent.

-3.157. ।किं च 'शून्यमेव तरस्मै' इति वाक्यं स्वेतं स्त्रयं वापितं भवति न था। आये वापितस्य कर्म वापितो भविष्यन् | न नूतं यस्तु नूत्तरार्थं रज्जोस्थर्धं ब्रह्म भवति।। ॥ ततो नाये तथा भूतलन-मेतदित्र तपस्या। । ततो नेत्रेण भूतलन किः तु रज्जुपेति । भ्रान्तसिद्धं वापितेनापि भूतलनं यथा सर्वं वापितं ततो राजनार्यनेन भव्यन्य वापितं भविष्यन्।।

श्रीयते इति जेशु वेदपातु। । वापितेः हि वापितभावस्य विश्ववेयस्य।। सौरभस्य कलाकृतं भूतलनं न वापितमिति तदा भूतलनं सर्वं भविष्यन्।।
3.157. Furthermore, is the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" itself negated just by itself or not? In the first case, how can Brahman be negated by this sentence which has been negated?

[objection] The mistake of a snake has arisen upon a real rope. Then there is the mistake: "this is not a snake, this is a cleavage in the earth". Then there was the knowledge: "this is not a cleavage in the earth but this is a rope". Just as the snake is negated by the cleavage in the earth which is also negated, so too, Brahman can be negated by this sentence which is also negated.

[reply] No. On account of the dissimilarity. Because at the time of the negation, what negates is required to be indeed not negated. The cleavage in the earth is not negated at the time of the negation of the snake and so at that time the snake is able to be negated by the cleavage in the earth. In this same way, the scripture such as: "My dear, the Self should indeed [be seen]" etc., though of a false nature [i.e. having the same "apparent" status as all empirical things], is not negated at the time of showing the means to the path of the knowledge of reality and so it is certainly able to make known the path. But here, the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" is itself negated just by itself, so it is certainly negated even at the time of the negation of Brahman and hence Brahman can in no way be negated by it.
3.158. [objection] Even the sentence: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Bṛh.4.4.19., Kaṭha.4.11.) is itself negated just by itself and so the manifest world cannot be negated by that.

[reply] No. This sentence does not negate anything. But it is made known that whatever is seen here is not different from the Self. The meaning is: everything, having the Self as the substratum, appears only in the Self. And so although the sentence: "there is no diversity..." operates in itself, it can have an apparent nature but it is not fictitious like the horns of a hare. Therefore that [sentence] is certainly able to make known the apparent nature of the manifest world.

But if [you say] only the apparent nature [of the world] is made known by this also; "reality is only emptiness", [we reply] that there would be the occurrence of the teaching of māyā which you do not accept. If [you say] that the fictitious nature [of the world] is what is said, [we reply] then even [the statement] itself must be fictitious and so that sentence is not able to negate Brahman.
3.159. But if the second view [cf., 3.157.] is accepted, i.e., this sentence is itself not negated by itself, [we ask] what is the reason for the absence of negation? If [you say] self-dependence, [we reply] you are confused. Where the operation of a sentence is helpful for the meaning of the sentence, the operation of itself [i.e., of the statement] in itself is not because of self-dependence. Because the operation [of the statement in the statement] only takes place subsequently to the meaning of the sentence. And therefore even though the operation of itself [i.e., of the statement] has occurred in itself subsequent to the meaning of the sentence, how could it be helpful for the meaning of the sentence? Because [the operation of the statement in the statement] is affected by the defect of self-dependence necessarily prior to the operation of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore that [operation] is indeed useless there [in the sentence].

For this very reason, in grammar, there is no operation of the *amudit śūtra* (P.S.1.1.69.) in itself. Because the *amudit śūtra* is a treatise dealing with technical terms. And the operation of a treatise dealing with technical terms is only helpful for the meaning of a sentence. But where the operation is to make known something else, but is not helpful for the meaning of the sentence, in that case there is the possibility of the use of the operation which occurs subsequent to the meaning of the sentence even in itself just as elsewhere. So the operation [in itself] is certainly difficult to be avoided. Because like another, that too does not differ in being possessed of the distinguishing
characteristic of what is to be explained. For this very reason, in
grammar, the revered Pūṇini made the operation of śūtras such as: "for a
final 's' and for the 'ś' of sajūṣ, 'ru' is substituted at the end of a
word" (P.S.8.2.66.), "a visarga is substituted for 'r' before a hard
consonant or when there is a pause" (P.S.8.3.15.) and "an affix" (P.S.
3.1.1.) in itself [i.e. the grammatical rule taught by the śūtra is also
operative in the śūtra]. In this very way, the operation of these two
sentences of the sacred texts: "one's own portion is to be studied",
"there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Bṛh.4.4.19., Kaṭha.4.11.) is in
itself.

Furthermore, if there is no negation of itself by the sentence:
"reality is only emptiness", this very sentence which is distinct from
emptiness is left remaining and so the meaning of the sentence: "reality
is only emptiness" would be contradicted.

**Comment**

This passage, of a rather technical nature, is in response to the
opponent's statement that the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" does
not negate itself because the sentence is self-dependent. The sentence is
thought to be self-dependent because it is both what negates (bhādhaṇa)
and what is negated (bhāhyan) and hence it is both the cause and the effect.
If the meaning of the sentence is dependent upon the prior operation of
the sentence in respect of itself, then when the sentence is understood it
is already an effect. And so if what negates is itself negated, it cannot
negate since the cause of the effect is included in the effect.

Abhyankar replies that the sentence is not self-dependent because the
operation of the sentence in itself only occurs subsequent to the meaning
of the sentence being understood. The meaning of the sentence: "reality is
only emptiness" is firstly known and then one thinks: "this sentence must
also be included in the meaning" and so the operation of the sentence in
itself takes place after the meaning is known. Therefore the sentence is
not self-dependent and so negates itself.

Rāmānuja now shifts the focus of the discussion to the consideration
of scriptural passages from the prasthānatraya: the Upaniṣads, the
Bhāgavatīṣṭa and the Brahmaśūtras and also from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. Abhyankar
accordingly takes up the examination of these passages.
3.160. But what has been established by the text (Srī.B.Para.48.p.39.)
beginning with: "by the knowledge of one thing...", is that the sacred
texts such as: "My dear, existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) etc. teach about
an entity possessing distinction. In regard to that, it is said:

These sacred texts; "My dear, existence alone",
"Then there is the higher" and also "real,
Knowledge" are not said to have as their aim
Brahman possessing distinction.16.

3.161. "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone,
without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) is cited in the Chandogyopaniṣad. "Then
there is the higher [knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained"
(Mu.1.1.5.) is cited in the MLooperiṣad. "Brahman is real,
Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) is cited in the Teiṭṭirīṣayopaniṣad. In
the sacred text; "existence alone" an entity which is pure "is-ness" is
said by this [word] "existence" (sat). With regard to which [is-ness],
there is no universal whatsoever. Where there is the supreme limit of a universal, the essential nature of that [universal] is indeed that [is-ness]. For this very reason, [is-ness] cannot be said as "such and such". And for this very reason, that [is-ness] is extremely subtle, free from distinction and all pervasive. The first [of the sentences cited] has the meaning: "this" (idam) refers to the entire visible world, "in the beginning" (agre) means prior to origination, "was existence alone" (sad evāsīt). The state prior to the world is made known by this sacred text through the statement: "this was...in the beginning".

3.162. [objection] Is this entity which has acquired the state prior to the origination of the world, and which can be expressed by the word "existence", the same as the Self or is it something different? In the first case, that [Self] alone has this transformation into the form of the world and so the Self would be liable to change. In the last case, the sameness of meaning with another sacred text making known the state prior to the origination of the world is not attained, i.e. with this: "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Aī.1.1.) and with this: "In the beginning, this was indeed Brahman" (Bṛh.1.4.10.). Because there the word "Self" and the word "Brahman" are mentioned. In accordance with
that, here too, only the Self is fit to be understood by the word "existence".

[reply] The sacred text teaching very clearly: "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and "In the beginning, this was indeed Brahman" (Bṛh.1.4.10.) is required to employ the word "existence" in the Chāndogya only as having the meaning of "Self". So there is no dispute. But the Self being liable to change cannot be established. Because the Self is taught as being free from change by the sacred text: "This great, birthless Self which is undecaying, immortal and without fear, is Brahman" (Bṛh.4.4.25.). And those who rely solely on the sacred texts must accept everything only according to the sacred texts.

3.163. [objection] How could the sacred text then tell a mutually contradictory meaning [i.e., that the Self is the material cause and yet is without change]? But when a contradiction appears, one of the two is to be interpreted as teaching a figurative meaning. The sacred text [teaching]
freedom from change cannot be interpreted as having a figurative meaning. Because in being liable to change there is the occurrence of the defect of non-eternity etc. and hence there would be contradiction with many sacred texts such as: "eternal among the eternals" (Śv.6.13.) etc. But in accordance with the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, the sacred texts [teaching] that the Self is the material cause of the world must teach a figurative meaning. The purport of the sacred texts which teach the nature of the material cause of the world, such as: "from which [Brahman] indeed..." [Tai.3.1.] etc., is that subtle primary matter (pradhāna) is directly the material cause of the world and by means of that [primary matter] the supreme Self is the material cause of the world.

It should not be said: what connection does the subtle primary matter which is directly the material cause of the world have with the supreme Self, due to which the supreme Self is said to be the material cause of the world by means of that [primary matter]? [reason] Because it is accepted by Rāmānuja that there is a connection which consists in the relation of body and soul.135 In the topic under discussion, i.e. "existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.), the indistinct name and form which is directly the material cause of the world only as qualified by a subtle body, is said by the word "existence".

[reply] A material cause is of two types. The material cause which undergoes transformation and the material cause which is an apparent transformation.136 If the Self is accepted as being the material cause which undergoes transformation, there would be contradiction with the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, but there is no [such contradiction] upon the acceptance of the material cause which is an apparent transformation. When there is the logical possibility through non-contradiction in this manner, the supposition that one of the two has a figurative meaning is not correct.
3.164. Furthermore, the loss of the sameness of meaning [referred to in 3.162.] between the two sacred texts: "In the beginning this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.) which teach the state prior to the world, is just like before. Because only the Self within the body is understood by the word "Self" and [the Self] qualified by a body is understood by the word "existence". Even though the cognition of non-difference between the body and the possessor of the body is conventional in the world, still, a oneness of meaning between the two words "existence" and "Self" is not logically possible.

To elaborate. The Self [i.e. the supreme Self] is the possessor of a body. The sentient [souls] and the insentient [matter] are its body. In the view of those who accept the body-soul relation in this manner, what is the single meaning for the two words "existence" and "Self"? Is it (a) qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and insentient, or (b) alone [i.e. without qualification]? If [the single meaning of the two words] is "qualified", then a meaning of the word "Self" which is not established has to be imagined. Because their [Viśiṣṭādvaitins] view is that the word "self" is meaningful in relation to a body. And so just as the word "father", which is meaningful in relation to a son, tells the
meaning of indeed being distinct from the son, so too, the word "Self"
must also teach the meaning of indeed being distinct from the body. It
should not be said that; the connection between the body and the Self
must be only the relation that exists between part and whole. [reason]
Because it is not known in that manner in respect of the individual self.

Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the
Self, Knowledge must be a quality of a part of the Self and not a quality
of the whole Self. And that is not a desired conclusion. Because by the
sūtra: "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is..."
(B.S.2.3.30.137 the quality of Knowledge is said to pervade the whole
Self.

[objection] By this: "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists
wherever the Self is...", just like the Self is eternal, the Knowledge
which is its quality is made known as being eternal, but not the
pervasiveness [of that Knowledge].

[reply] Even so, if what is qualified is considered to be the Self,
the occurrence of defects such as being liable to change etc. is
certainly difficult to be avoided.

Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the
Self, although there is the logical possibility of what you accept, i.e.
that the Self has Knowledge as its quality since [Knowledge] is located in one part, there is no logical possibility that the Self is of the nature of Knowledge, which has been told by the sacred text: "a mass of Knowledge" (Bṛh.2.4.12.). But you too have certainly accepted that.

Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the Self, the injunction: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Bṛh.2.4.5.) etc. would be meaningless. Because the perception of the Self has been established without effort. But in the meaning of the word "Self" to be: "a part of the Self" there would be implication.

3.166. But with the desire of removing these defects, if [you say] the meaning of the two words "existence" and "Self" is just [the Self] alone who is within the body. [reply] There is less of the proposition. It is said in the sacred text [i.e. the purport of Ch.6.1.3. is told]: through the one Self being known, all else becomes known. With regard to that, the knowledge of the individual souls and inert objects is not possible through the knowledge of the supreme Self. The body [of the supreme Self] in the form of the sentient and insentient is certainly not a transformation of the supreme Self like a pot from clay. And for this very
Further, the supreme Self being the material cause of the world, which is taught in the *sūtra*: 
"[Brahman] is the material cause..." (B.S.1.4.23.)\(^1\), is not possible if that which is alone [i.e., without connection] is considered to be the Self. For a material cause is of two types: according to the teaching of "apparent transformation" and according to the teaching of "[real] transformation". The first, is a rope being the material cause of an apparent snake. The last, is clay being the material cause of pots etc. In regard to those, the first is not possible for the supreme Self according to the view of Ramanuja. Because Ramanuja does not accept the teaching of apparent transformation. Nor even is the second [possible]. Because although the body undergoes transformation, there is no transformation of the Self alone who is within that. But being a material cause, on account of being merely internal, is difficult to be said. Because the space which is internal to the ball of clay is not the material cause of a pot. So too, nobody accepts that the individual soul is the material cause of the physical body, which [in fact] has the subtle body as its material cause.

3.167.

Furthermore, if that which is alone [i.e., without connection] is considered to be the Self, there is contradiction with the sacred text:
"My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.) because prior to creation the subtle body of the supreme Self, which is the material cause of the world, exists as distinct from the supreme Self. And there is no logical possibility of the grammatical apposition taught by the sacred text: "all this which is, is this Self" (Bṛh.2.4.6.). Because although the visible world recalled by the word "this" is the body of the supreme Self, it is not the essential nature of the supreme Self. Although the usage is seen: "I am fat", "I am thin" etc. due to the grammatical apposition between the body and its possessor, there is no identity between the two in reality. Even though the world is in a state of indistinct name and form prior to the creation and is extremely subtle, it is the body of the supreme Self, and so it is certainly different in reality from the supreme Self according to your view.

It should not be said: there is an implied meaning of the word "this" in the sense of "the inner controller of this". Or there is the implied meaning of the word "existence" and the word "Self" in the sense of "the body of that [inner controller]". And so there is the logical possibility of grammatical apposition. [reason] Because there is no authority for an implied meaning. And because there is cumbrousness [in such an explanation].

3.168. किं च 'परेत्र' (छाँ ६। १। २) इति वाक्यं हि 'चेनाक्षुतं शुंदं भक्ति-मेतं पत्तमित्रांत्र विज्ञातम्' (छाँ ६। १। २) इति पूर्वमविज्ञातार्यवर्त-नायोपालम्। तत्र गैतेयनेन 'तमदेवसमाम्यः' (छाँ ६। १। २) इति-पुर्वविज्ञातार्यवर्तमथेनस्मिन परामर्शः। बादेववशा भावानाथ उपदेशवाची। कर्मसाधनोपिदमानात्मकृत्तवस्तुतावै। कर्मसाधनोपिद-देशसाधनीभूतालस्तावानी। त्रिभागोपिदानवाचि कर्मसाधन पत्तात्र गवित्तु-मितः। तत्र उपदेशस्वस्तार्य बादेववशा जननिकैव सर्वं वाच जनयेव। किं च कर्माकारणे गृहीतं सर्वेतृत्वालवर्येलं शुद्धवस्त्वस्य। आसानं खल्वरे द्वेषं शुद्धं मतं विज्ञातं हृदं सर्वं वित्तुवस्यं। (छाँ ६। १। २) इत्यस्य वाक्यं समानार्थवै सर्वनेत्रे। तत्र बुधविद्विद्वानात्मस्वात्मवस्तुतानात्रात्मज्ञनात्रं सर्वेतृत्वालवित्त स्पष्टेषेऽक्षमं। तदनुपालेन 'वेनाक्षुतम्' (छाँ ६। १। २) इति प्राण्याय-
3.168. Furthermore, the sentence: "existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) is mentioned to logically demonstrate the meaning of what had been previously stated: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought of, what is unknown becomes known" (Ch.6.1.3.). There [in the above sentence], by this [word] "Through which" there is the recollection of the instruction connected with the word "that" in the previous sentence: "did you ask for that instruction?". The word "instruction" is a functional derivation [i.e. it has the meaning of the verbal root] signifying teaching. And it gives the meaning of the object, i.e. it signifies the entity—the Self— which is being taught. And it is an instrumental derivation signifying the scripture which is the means of instruction. Though there is the logical possibility that the meaning too is in three parts, it is proper here to accept only the derivation which gives the meaning of the object. Because teaching or the means for that can produce the knowledge of everything only by producing the knowledge of what is to be taught.

Furthermore, only when the derivation which gives the meaning of the object is accepted is the sameness of meaning gained with this sentence: "indeed my dear, when the Self is seen, i.e. when it is heard, reflected upon and known, all this is known" (Bph.4.5.6.) which is located within another sacred text and which has this [meaning of the object] as its purport. Because there, it is very clearly told that the knowledge of everything is to be gained from the knowledge of an entity in the form of the Self which is being taught. In accordance with that,
the sameness of meaning in the manner that: the knowledge of everything
is to be gained from the knowledge of the Self, is logically possible
upon accepting that the Self is what is being taught by this [word]
"Through which" even in the Chandogya sentence: "Through which, what is
unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.). Because only upon accepting that the word
"instruction" gives the meaning of the object is the recollection of the
entity in the form of the Self which is being taught gained by this
[word] "Through which". Not otherwise. And for this very reason, the
Mushaka sacred text too: "Revered sir, when what is known does all this
become known?" (Mu.1.1.3.) is conformed to. Because there, only the
object of the knowledge which is the means for the knowledge of everything
has been asked: "when what is known?".
be gained, non-different or different from the Self which is the object of the knowledge which is the means and which is indicated by the word "which" here: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard" (Ch.6.1.3.)? If it is non-different, nothing whatsoever is taught by this sentence. For nothing whatsoever is told when it is said: through the pot being known, the pot is known.

But if it is different, then between two things which are mutually distinct, by the knowledge of one the knowledge of the other is difficult. For through the pot being known the cloth is not known. The same applies to two things which, though mutually connected, are in reality different. For when Devadatta is known his son is not known. Or when the [potter's] stick is known the pot is not known.

Even though when the stick is known as the cause of the pot the pot becomes known as the effect of the stick, still, that knowledge does not make known the essential nature of the thing. The knowledge which makes known the essential nature is indeed said by the word "knowledge" (vijñāna). The knowledge which makes known the essential nature [of a thing] is the basis of all knowledge. Because without knowledge of the essential nature there is no possibility of knowledge by having a connection to another. Even when the stick is known as the cause of the pot, the pot which is not known in its essential nature as having a conch-shaped neck etc. cannot be known as the effect of the stick even though it is seen right before the eyes. And in the sacred text it is said: "[what is unknown] becomes known (vijñāta)". So too, the verbal root vid ["to know"] only signifies the knowledge which makes known the essential nature. Because it is seen in that manner in: "The one who is omniscient and all knowing" (Ma.1.1.9.) and in: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.) etc. For this very reason, "all this is known" (Brh.4.5.6.) is said in the Brihadāraṇyaka sacred text which was previously cited [cf., 3.168.]. Thus what is the scope of the sacred text:
"Through which, what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.)? Because even the
twofold alternative in the form of difference or non-difference between
the object of the knowledge which is the means and the object of the
knowledge to be gained cannot be stated.

3.170. [reply] In this matter, it is said: everything, which is the
object of the knowledge to be gained and which exists in reality as
certainly non-different from the Self which is the object of the
knowledge which is the means, appears as different. Because of the
existence of the appearance as being different there is no meaninglessness
like there is for the sentence: through the pot being known, the pot is
known. The requirement of the meaning of the sentence concerning the
declaration which was told [i.e. "Through which, what is unheard..."] is
only at the time of the appearance as being different, not after the
knowledge of reality.

Nor even is a defect said through the alternative of difference.
Since all things are in reality non-different from the Self, therefore
only the knowledge of the Self is the knowledge which makes known the
essential nature of all things such as a pot, cloth etc. Although through the knowledge of the Self there is no knowledge of things like a pot, cloth etc., in terms of the essential nature of the respective object such as having a conch-shaped neck etc., still, there is no defect. Because the essential nature of a pot as having a conch-shaped neck etc., which appears as reality according to the ordinary view, is not real in reality. But only the clay, which is the essential nature of the pot, is real. Accordingly, it was said in the example: "the clay alone is real" (Ch.6.1.4.). In accordance with that, in the subject matter of the example too it has to be acknowledged that the essential nature of every thing appearing now is not real. The reality of even the essential nature which is clay is with regard to the pots etc., which are its effects. But with regard to [its] cause, [clay] has no reality. But the statement: "the clay alone is real" must be understood with regard to the effects such as pots etc., in accordance with what is well known.

3.171. When that is so, the meaning which was stated: "Through which, what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.), which has been rendered as a statement having possibility by the sacred text having shown the examples of the
clay etc., is logically proved by this: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.). But in the view of Ramanuja who teaches in this manner: "the world is real, it is the body of the supreme Self and it is different from the supreme Self", even though there is the logical possibility of grammatical apposition of the word "existence" or the word "this" through implication in the sacred text: "existence alone", the meaning which was previously stated ["Through which, what is unheard becomes heard..."] is not logically proved.

Because by the knowledge of the Self there is no possibility of the production of the knowledge which makes known the essential nature of the world. Nor even is there congruity with the examples of the clay etc. For the pot is not the body of the clay.

Although according to the view of the exponents of non-duality there is dissimilarity between the example and the subject matter of the example in the manner: the world is not a transformation of Brahman. Because Brahman is without change. But [the world] is an apparent transformation. Pots etc., however, are transformations of clay.

Nevertheless, there is no impairment. Because the similarity between the example and the subject matter of the example is not required in all aspects. For if that was so, there could be no example at all about anything. Because a similarity in all aspects occurs for itself [A] with itself [A] alone, but not with another. But the example is required to be similar in that aspect by reason of which one wants to teach it.
3.172. But in the topic under consideration, the example is intended to be told in this aspect: by the knowledge of one thing there is the knowledge of everything. And the reason for that is the object of the knowledge which is the means is real, whereas the object of the knowledge to be gained is certainly unreal. Because the purport of the sacred text in that manner is demonstrated very clearly by the sentence connected with the word "alone": "the clay alone is real". Thus in order to show that: "the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect is dependent upon the knowledge of the essential nature which is the material cause belonging to that [effect]. Just as it is seen in the case of clay and pots etc., so too, the knowledge of the real portion of the world is dependent upon the knowledge of the material cause of the world"; the state prior to the origination of the world is shown by the sacred text: "existence alone" for the knowledge of the material cause of the world.

Regarding all the distinctions appearing in the world, the state of the universal which is preceded by the removal of those [distinctions] is in the form of pure "is-ness", which is the supreme limit of the universal, and that is what is said by the word "existence". And that alone is Brahman, in the form of pure existence free from distinction. And by the word "alone" [in the sentence: "existence alone...] all distinctions are removed. Hence this sentence certainly indicates Brahman which is pure existence free from distinction. In whatever manner there is the origination of the world, in that manner distinctions appear. So Brahman possessing distinction is only in relation to a limiting adjunct.
The sentences [denoting] the possession of distinction teach that [i.e., Brahman possesses distinction in relation to a limiting adjunct]. Thus no sacred text whatsoever is contradicted.

3.173. But some say: the material cause of the world said by the word "existence" here: "existence alone" is only the subtle primary matter which is in a state of unmanifest name and form. And by the word "alone" there is the exclusion of the manifest name and form seen now. [reply] That is not so. Because the word "existence" (sat) is brought about by the affix sat [i.e., at] to the verbal root asa ["to be"]. The reason for the usage of that [word "existence"] is [to signify] pure "is-ness". But not a distinction of that [existence] in the form of unmanifest name and form. It should not be said: "in the beginning" (agre) is said in the sacred text. The meaning of that is: prior to origination. And at that time, because of the mentioning of the word "in the beginning" [as having the meaning]: "there was only indistinct name and form", there is the understanding of the particular meaning of "unmanifest name and form". [reason] Even so, there is no separation of manifest name and form.
by the word "alone" [supra.]. Because this rule is established by etymology: what is separated by the word "alone" is only what has not been qualified by the attribute which determines the reason for the use of the word connected to itself and that [what is separated] is indeed connected by the word "also". Even in the understanding of a particular brāhmaṇa such as Devadatta through the context etc. here: "this one alone is a brāhmaṇa", Yajñadatta is certainly not separated by the word "alone". Because he too is qualified by the attribute of being a brāhmaṇa which determines the reason for the use of the word "brāhmaṇa". Similarly, in the topic under discussion, because manifest name and form is qualified by "is-ness" which determines the reason for the use of the word "existence", how is there exclusion of that [manifest name and form] by the word "alone" [in the sentence]: "existence alone"? Thus the word "existence" signifies pure "is-ness" and so the sacred text: "existence alone" is established as teaching Brahman free from distinction.

3.174. 'अथ परा' (मु ० ७ १ १ ५) इति श्रुतिरवि निविशेषप्रावधानविवर्धितेन। अथ परा यथा तददशरथित्वेन। अथ परा
अथ विद्यामाध्यसमिकुल्यचेत्तु। न सताथिष्ठ सताधिष्ठ विनाथि। अथरूढः रूढः विनाथिः पृथ्वीनिः
विनाथिः। विनाथिः हृदि बालू। तथा च परा विद्यामध्यस्य वस्तुनो निम्नमुलेन। पथयत च्चेतः। अंकन तदस्तु निरक्षे
शेषातिसूचयेत। ततः कर्मपूर्त तद्विषयसायामाहोऽदाधिष्ठयत।
यत्र देशप्रायस्याग्रयतामथथेत्तो तस्पतिपादृथ।
तत्र निर्मु सर्वगत सुपूर्वं यद्यत्वातानि परिवर्धितं दीर्घः।
अदेशं परस्परायः। अथायमुपायः। कर्मचित्रायः। अगीकभ्रमायः। अथायमुपायः। कर्मचित्रायः।
अयायमायः। कर्मचित्रायः। चकुः। ऋषिवस्तुः। ऋषिवस्तुः। ऋषिवस्तुः। ऋषिवस्तुः।
The sacred text too: "Then there is the higher" (Mu.1.1.5.) only teaches that Brahman is free from distinction. "Then there is the higher [knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained." Here, what is to be gained by the higher knowledge is said as: "Imperishable". Imperishable (akṣara) means it does not perish (na kṣarati), i.e. it is indestructible. Indestructibility is the reason for the use of the word "imperishable". The meaning is: the absence of destruction. And so the mention of the entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is firstly only by way of a negative statement. On account of this, that entity is indicated to be free from distinction.

Then, in the expectation: "of what nature is that entity?", [the sage Aṅgiras] says:

The wise behold that which cannot be seen, cannot be grasped, which is without a source, without colour, without eyes and ears, which has neither hands nor feet, which is eternal, all pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle and which is the source of [all] beings (Mu.1.1.6.).

"Cannot be seen" means that it is not within the scope of perception. "Cannot be grasped" means that it is not within the scope of inference etc., or that it is not within the scope of the organs of action. "Without a source" means that it is without a name. "Without colour" means that it is free from colour such as blue etc. "Without eyes and ears" means that it is without the organs of knowledge. "Having neither hands nor feet" means that it is without the organs of action. The organs of knowledge
are implied by the words "eyes and ears" and the organs of action are implied by the words "hands and feet". So in the first two quarters [of the verse] the entity to be gained is taught by way of negative statements.

The procedure of the sacred text is to allude thus: although the description of some entity by way of a positive statement which is done in the manner: "such and such" is what makes known the essential nature of the object as it is and the description by way of a negative statement does not do so and hence only the description by way of a positive statement is proper at the beginning, still, in the topic under discussion, the description of the entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is certainly not possible, in reality, by way of a positive statement.

In the latter half, even though the description by way of a positive statement appears at the outset in the third quarter [of the verse]: "eternal", "all pervasive", nevertheless, the final conclusion is only in the manner of a negative statement. "Eternal" means free from the limitation due to time. "All pervasive" means free from the limitation due to location. "Omnipresent" means free from the limitation due to objects. On account of this, freedom from the three types of limitation has been told. Therefore no attribute whatsoever is made known here by way of a positive statement.

3.175.
3.175. [objection] If freedom from distinctions such as the quality of being visible etc. is told by: "cannot be seen" etc., then that entity cannot indeed exist.

[reply] He says there: "extremely subtle". The meaning is that fictitiousness is not the reason for not being visible etc., but rather extreme subtlety [is the reason]. Here too, the final conclusion is only in an operation by way of a negative statement. Extreme subtlety is not the direct reason for not being visible. But rather the absence of being gross is invariably concomitant with not being visible. Because being gross is the criterion for visibility. And so the purport of this: "extremely subtle" is freedom from being gross.

[objection] Though the final conclusion is in the operation by way of a negative statement here: "eternal, all pervasive", why has the operation by way of a positive statement been accepted at the outset?

[reply] No. Because there is the acceptance of that [a positive statement] in order to indicate this: the immediate apprehension of the entity free from distinction is through the medium of the knowledge of the Lord who possesses distinction. Because that [operation by way of a positive statement] is possible with regard to the Lord who possesses a limiting adjunct. He [the sage Āṅgiras] shows this: "which is the source
of [all] beings". "The source of [all] beings" means the cause of the world. The purport is: what is seen by the wise as possessing distinctions such as being the cause of the world etc., that entity, in reality, is indeed free from distinction. "The wise" means those who are endowed with steadiness. Steadiness is the firmness of intellect that; in this manner there will be the immediate apprehension of the entity free from distinction in due course. Having superimposed the distinction of being the cause of the world etc., meditation upon the entity possessing distinction is certainly the means for the immediate apprehension which is free from distinction. And so there is no contradiction between these two; "cannot be seen" and "they behold". Due to superimposition they see the entity which, in reality, certainly cannot be seen. But it must not be mistaken that; an entity free from distinction certainly does not at all exist. [reason] Because there is contradiction with the sacred text: "cannot be seen" etc. But the explanation: "the wise behold what cannot be seen by the unwise" does not produce admiration in the mind. Because the result is the loss of the natural flow of the sentence: "that which cannot be seen, cannot be grasped, which is without a source" etc. Thus it is established that the entity is free from distinction.

Even further on, an entity which is certainly free from distinction is taught by way of negative statements in the sacred verse:

There is nothing higher and lower than which,
there is no one smaller or greater than which (Mu.1.1.7.).

Although this sacred verse is not seen in all books, nevertheless it is certainly seen in some. And so it is established that the sacred text: "Then there is the higher..." teaches that Brahman is free from distinction.

3.176. ‘तत्त्रं ज्ञातमभवं ब्रह्म’ ( यात्र २०२११ ) इत्यिष शृद्धितंविशेषब्रह्मपरं
मवधानान्तव्यविनिर्सितः स्वीकृतंमिति प्राप्त

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3.176. The sacred text too: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) only relates to Brahman free from distinction. The nature of being indestructible is the reason for the use of the word "limitless" there. The meaning is: the absence of destruction. And it was certainly told previously (3.55.) that a thing does not possess distinction because of the absence [of an attribute]. There is no cognition of the possession of distinction even on account of the word "real" (satya). To explain. It was mentioned just previously (3.172.) that the word "existence" (sat) has pure "is-ness" as its reason for use. Where there is the supreme limit of the universal, it refers to such pure existence free from distinction. This is correct. Because the sentence: "My dear, existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) makes known the state prior to the world. If the entity which has gained the state prior to the world, which is the primary cause of the world, should possess distinction, then it is not possible to be the primary cause. Because distinctions are preceded by a universal, therefore the primary cause must be necessarily said as free from distinction. But the possession of distinction cannot be stated by "is-ness". If that was so, its distinction is indicated by the universal, therefore in our view that [universal] alone can be expressed by the word "is". Because among the things which indicate [existence], this word "is" directly expresses the entity which is the universal of
The statement: "among the things which indicate (nirūpaka) [existence]", refers to expressions like: "the pot is", "the cloth is", "the pot has existence" etc. In such statements, the pot is the substantive (viśeṣa) while existence is the qualifying attribute (viśeṣāna) which is universal to all the particulars such as pot and cloth etc.

3.177. The word "Brahman" too is exactly the same. "Brahman" has the sense of "expanding". Expanding means pervading everything. Because the distinctions are pervaded by the universal, not the universal by the distinction. And so Brahman does not possess distinction even on account of vastness. If vastness is a distinction, the universal which would indicate such a distinction could not be pervaded by Brahman who is the locus of vastness and thus Brahman has no possibility of pervading everything.

The word "Self" is also the same. Because the etymological derivation of the word "Self" is: the Self (ātman) means "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpanoti). The word "Brahman" and the word "Self" are used by the sacred text only with this intention [i.e., to denote that they pervade all distinctions and hence are free from distinction] in the sentence which makes known the state prior to the
world: "This was indeed Brahman" (Bṛh.1.4.10.), "This was indeed the Self" (Āi.1.1.). When that is so, having commenced with: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.), how could the sacred text: "real, Knowledge" (Tai.2.1.1.) which is engaged to teach the definition of such a Brahman, make known Brahman as possessing attributes? And so the purport of the word "real" is only in the sense of: excluded from what is unreal.

Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity qualified by the attribute of being real, the result would be a contradiction. Indeed, because the distinctions are mutually excluded, they are considered to be false. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. are false with regard to the clay which is their universal. And this is established by the sacred text: "the clay alone is real" (Ch.6.1.4.). And so if "being real" is a distinction, then Brahman possessing distinction, who is qualified by "being real" in that manner, can only be false. Thus the statement: "real,
Knowledge" is contradicted.

Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity possessing distinction, then just as a human being is a particular type of living being and is separated from another type of living being such as an animal etc., so too, it must be told; real is a distinction of what? And from which other distinction is it separated? If [you say] "being real" is a distinction of existence, [we ask] from what other distinction of existence is "real" excluded? For "real" is excluded from what is false. But what is false is not another distinction of existence. Because what is false does not exist. And so the universal of everything is what can be said only as just: "it is" and that alone is real. So "being real", which is invariably concomitant with pure "is-ness", is only another synonym for "is-ness". Hence just like the word "existence", the word "real" too does not make known an entity possessing distinction. You [Ramanuja] too have certainly accepted that the two words "is" and "real" are synonyms when you said (Sri.B.Para.70.p.159.): "Here, "real" and "unreal" (Vig.P.2.12.45.) is the conclusion of what was begun: "what is" and "what is not" (Vig.P.2.12.38.)."
3.179. The word "Knowledge" too does not make known an entity possessing distinction. Because that awareness which is free from object and location was previously demonstrated (3.78,79) to be of the nature of pure existence. Moreover, if the word "Knowledge" makes known an entity possessing distinction, is Knowledge itself the distinction or Knowledge-ness [i.e. the class of Knowledge, the jāti]? In the first case, the cognition of the Self qualified by the distinction in the form of Knowledge should occur from the word "Knowledge". And that is not possible. Because the affix lyuṭī is not prescribed in the sense of an agent. But the statement of the author of the Vīśvavākyadīpika: "the word "Knowledge" (jñāna) is at [a] ending, among the class of words beginning with arāsā does not conform to the letter of the sacred text. If that was so, the sacred text would specify the word "knower" or the word "possessing Knowledge".

But in the second case [i.e. if the class of Knowledge is the distinction], in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean the Knowledge which is a quality (guṇabhūtajñāna), the distinction in the form of Knowledge-ness is in the Knowledge which is a quality but not in Brahman whom you accept as the locus of such Knowledge which is a quality. So the cognition of Brahman possessing distinction is not possible from the word "Knowledge". But if [you say]: the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman (svarūpabhūtaṁ jñāna) is what is understood by the word "Knowledge", not [the Knowledge] which is a quality of Brahman, [we reply] If that is the case, the word "Knowledge" would certainly be meaningless. Because what Rāmānuja has intended [by the word "Knowledge"] is (ŚrīT.B, Para.86.p.198).
There is a single definition of Brahman consisting of the group of three words, having connected: "real, Knowledge, limitless". There, the word "Knowledge" has the meaning of Knowledge which is always uncontracted. On account of that, there is the exclusion of the liberated souls. Because prior to the state of liberation, the liberated souls have only contracted Knowledge. Hence there is the exclusion of them.

But in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean Knowledge which is the essential nature, there cannot be an exclusion of the liberated souls. Because even in the state of being bound there is no contraction of the Knowledge which is the essential nature. But if the Knowledge which is the essential nature is accepted as having contraction and expansion, then the self would be liable to change and the result is the defect of non-eternity etc.

comment

The context of the statement: "the affix lyut is not prescribed in the sense of an agent" is that if the word Knowledge (jñāna) makes known an entity possessing distinction and if the word Knowledge is itself the distinction, then the word Knowledge should make known that entity as qualified by the distinction in the form of Knowledge, i.e., as possessing the attribute of knowership. Abhyankar states that the word "Knowledge" does not denote knowership. The affix lyut (āna) in the formation of the word jñāna (jñā + āna = jñāna) is used in the sense of the verbal root (bhāye): "what is known is knowledge" (jñāyate iti jñānam) or in the sense of the instrument of an action (karaṇa): "knowledge is what is known through which" (jñāyate anena iti jñānam). However the affix is not specifically prescribed in the sense of knowership.
3.180. However according to the view of the non-dualists, there are three definitions in the sentence "real" etc.: Brahman is real, Brahman is Knowledge, Brahman is limitless. Although this sentence "real" etc. teaches a single meaning through grammatical apposition according to the express sense, still, the purport of this sentence is understood as teaching a threefold definition. Otherwise, if there is accomplishment by one word, the other two would be meaningless. There is certainly nothing whatsoever which is real which is distinct from Brahman, nor [anything] in the form of Knowledge, nor [anything] imperishable: on account of which the group of three words must have meaning.

[objection] What is the reason for expounding more than one definition?

[reply] Because a definition at some place [i.e., in some instance] excludes and at some place it brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature. For example, when it is said: "Caitra, bring the cow", Devadatta who has heard that and who sees the cow brought by Caitra and for this reason knows: "this animal can be expressed by the word
'cow', could still have the idea of a cow in another animal on account of similarity in being a quadruped etc. There, the definition which is made: "a cow possesses a dewlap etc." excludes another animal. And for a person who has no knowledge at all of an individual cow, the definition is made: "a cow possesses a dewlap etc." for the knowledge that: "this animal can be expressed by the word 'cow' " That [definition in the second instance] brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature for that person. Even though excluding too brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature and the accurate determination of the essential nature is what excludes and so this twofold difference is not mutually unconnected, nevertheless, the twofold purpose in the form of exclusion or conventional expression [i.e. definition], which is intended in espousing the definition, is certainly mutually free from confusion. And so where the accurate determination of the essential nature is principally intended in espousing a definition, even espousing more than one definition is certainly correct. Because there is greater facility [in understanding] on account of that. In regard to the topic under discussion, Brahman can in no way be comprehended through perception since Brahman has no form etc. and so espousing more than one definition for the accurate determination of its essential nature is certainly meaningful.
3.181. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.48.p.89f.):

Grammatical apposition means the reference [of several terms] to a single object with a difference of reason for the application [of the several terms to the one thing]. A difference of reason for the application of the words in the very same object must necessarily be admitted because of the primary meaning of the words "real", "Knowledge" etc. [as denoting qualities] or because of being opposed to what is contrary to those particular qualities [i.e. opposed to "unreal" etc.]. That is not so. Because grammatical apposition is without an authority in respect of a rule involving the difference of reason for application.

Establishing Brahman as possessing distinction on account of the attributes such as "real" etc. is certainly hard to be stated, because the purport of the words "real" etc. has been told just above to be in the sense of: "excluded from what is unreal" etc. It was also certainly demonstrated previously (3.95., also 3.55.) that because exclusion is in the form of absence, in no way is there a possession of distinction due to that [exclusion].

But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.48.p.90.):

The grammarians say that grammatical apposition is
the reference of words, which have different reasons
for their application, in the one object. 146

That is not so. Because in the Śabdendusekhara, the foremost among
grammarians, Nāgojībhaṭṭa, has very clearly refuted grammatical
apposition as involving a difference in the reason for the application
[of the words]: "Grammatical apposition only produces the knowledge which
has a single object as the thing to be distinguished, it is not the basis
for the difference of reason of application [of several terms to the one
thing]." 147

The author of the Vyākaranasamkhābhāṣya has given the counter
illustration: "O Aghnye, goddess Sarasvatī" for this [word]: "expressing
a common property" in the sūtra: "A preceding vocative, when it expresses
a common property, is not to be considered as if non-existent for the
purpose of the subsequent vocative which stands in apposition with the
former" (P.S.3.1.73.). 148 Because "Aghnye" etc. are synonyms there is no
difference of reason for their application and therefore in the way you
[Rāmānuja] said there is no grammatical apposition and so upon the
occurrence of the deficiency of two members there must be incongruity of
the commentary relating to the counter illustration. In that place,
Kaiyāṭa 149 too has accepted grammatical apposition even in the absence of
a difference of reason for application when he said: "because synonyms
too have grammatical apposition, a grave accent is the result on account
of the negation of possessing non-existence." 150 Thus the sacred text:
"real, Knowledge" is established as teaching an entity which is free from
distinction.

comen

Rāmānuja maintains that grammatical apposition (sāmānadhikaraṇya)
requires a difference of reason for the application of each word.
Abhyankar controverts this view by showing that grammatical apposition
primarily means the reference of the words to a single locus.

According to Rāmānuja, the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless"
should be understood in their primary sense as denoting the attributes of Brahman. Advaitins, however, consider that these words define Brahman through implication (lakṣaṇā). Implication is only applicable when the express sense is not logically tenable and Advaitins hold that such is the case with regard to the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless". The word "real" primarily signifies something existing, however there is no existing object which is limitless. If it is said that space is both real and limitless, space nonetheless does not have the nature of Knowledge. The word "Knowledge" primarily signifies mental states and the latter have both a beginning and an end and they are limited in terms of a division between the knower and the known object. Hence Knowledge is neither real nor limitless. On account of such contradiction in the express meaning, Advaitins maintain that the statement: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" can only be understood through the implied meaning of the words. For an explanation of the implied meaning, see the comment to 3.47., final paragraph.

3.182. अद्वितीयश्रुतिनेत्र सहवे सद्विदंताम् ||
द्येन केनापि भर्मण सम्भवे परस्मात्मनि || १७ ||

3.182. The sacred text [teaching] "without a second" certainly does not allow the possession of duality, through any attribute whatsoever, in the supreme Self who is pure existence. 17.

3.183. भव्यो निर्विशेषप्रज्ञाते च तस्याद्वितीयतं सिद्धयति। सत्योपवेसे तु विनीते-परम द्वितीयस्य सत्यस्य 'अद्वितीयम्' (छा ६ २ १ १) इति शुद्धिभव्या स्वातः। येनु 'जागतिक्यप्राच्य भव्यः। तत्वप्रतिंकाविश्वास्नन्तरिनवाप्रणि विनिर्विश्वास्कियोगमतिविधिनपरस्ततद्वितीयपद्यः' (ओभा ५० ६० ५० ६) हर्षतुक्त नात्मकार्यस्योपमामुण्यन्तात्। तथा हि—द्येनाशुरुं श्रुतं महत्तरम् महत्तरितंश्च निष्कामः (छा ६ १ १ ३) इति हि महत्तमः महत्तमः। तथाशुरुं कंविक्तस्य शुरुं भवतीति नार्थः। तथास्ति कविक्तस्य महत्त्या विशेषाचा उक्तस्य भवतुष्याः। श्रुतिकाविभामेव नवनाम नवनाम:। श्रुतिकाविभामेव नवनाम नवनाम। श्रुतिकाविभामेव नवनाम नवनाम:। श्रुतिकाविभामेव नवनाम नवनाम:।
3.183. Because Brahman is indeed free from distinction, it is established as being without a second. But if there is the possession of a distinction, the sacred text: "without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) would be contradicted since a distinction, which is a second thing, exists. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.49.p.91.):

because the word "without a second" aims at teaching the union with various powers for Brahman, who is the material cause of the world, by denying another ruler distinct from Himself.

That is not so. Because this meaning does not conform to the commencement [of the topic]. To elaborate. The proposition was introduced: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought of, what is unknown becomes known" (Ch.6.1.3.). The meaning there is not: some thing which is unheard becomes heard. If that was so, would a particularity, a thing, be said by this proposition? Because even though there is no possibility of the knowledge of cloth etc. through the knowledge of clay, there is the possibility of the knowledge of some things such as pots and earthenware dishes etc. Therefore the meaning must be said as: all that is unheard becomes heard through which. But things such as clay etc. are not like this. Because there is no possibility of the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of that.

3.184. तथा भविष्यै: गौतमेन्य सच्चन्द्रवचयेत्केन किंचिददुः श्रवयं न तत्वेकस्य। अपूर्जनेन पूवेवदेत नागापुरोत्तेऽः कथितुकम् स्पर्शित। युद्धविषष्ठ संबंधन। युद्धे ज्ञानेन तद्कार्यात्मककाराविद्यान्त्वे जानते तत्ज्ञानेन तद्भावमुद्विद्याविद्यान्त्वे जायते इति श्रीदेवेन। अतः भविष्यान्य निकालमयी नैसा स्वतःम्। तथा चैत्यस्तुज्ञानेन सर्वद्रवीणीपरि मृत्युश्च: ध्येयछिन्त। तद्राहृत्यस्तुज्ञानेन तद्र्बहुतज्ञानात्मकाचित्त्वाधिकारिपापित्तः न स्वप्तु। युद्धद्विज्ञानानुभूत्तः न ना मृत्तिकायं कार्यंस्वलं ज्ञातयं यत्स्य गृहयतेन ज्ञातं संभवति। न ना मृत्तिकायं मृत्तिकालेन ज्ञातयं यत्स्य
Similarly, the meaning of the word "which" here in the proposition: "Through which" is to be understood as some thing which is one alone, not more than one. In accepting more than one, just like before, some thing previously unknown could not be said here. Because there is the possibility even with regard to clay etc. It is certainly well known that by the knowledge of clay, the knowledge arises about its modifications such as pots, earthenware dishes etc., and that by the knowledge of thread, the knowledge arises about its modifications such as cloth. Therefore nothing additional would be said by this proposition. And so the meaning of the proposition is established as: through the knowledge of the one thing, there is the knowledge of everything.

There [in the previous sentence], by the word "knowledge" here: "through the knowledge of the one thing" and by the word "knowledge" here: "there is the knowledge of everything" the knowledge which is certainly real is to be understood, not [knowledge] which is common to what is unreal. If that was so, because the knowledge which is unreal is based upon a defect, there could be no mention of a supramundane meaning in the proposition. And because there is conformity with the examples of the clay etc. Because when clay is known as composed of cotton there is no possibility of the knowledge of a pot as composed of clay. Or when clay is known as clay there is no possibility of the knowledge of a pot as a piece of cloth. But when clay is known as clay there is the knowledge of a pot as clay. And so the very clear mention is seen there by the word "real" in the manner: "the clay alone is real".

Comment

The "knowledge which is certainly real" means the pure awareness which persists in all knowledge and is therefore real. The knowledge
"which is common to what is unreal" refers to the knowledge which is qualified by an object. Such knowledge is unreal because it is based upon the defect of Ignorance (ajñāna). Only the knowledge which is the basis of all knowledge, i.e., awareness as such, is in agreement with the supramundane meaning of the proposition: "through the knowledge of the one thing, there is the knowledge of everything".

In reference to the examples of clay and cotton, the meaning is that unless you know clay you cannot know what is made of clay. When the cause is not known as it is, there is no true knowledge of the effects. When the cause is correctly known there is no false knowledge regarding the effects but only the true knowledge of the effects.

3.185. Although since clay has no absolute reality even the knowledge of that [clay] as being clay is only unreal, still, these examples are mentioned having recourse to conventional reality in accordance with ordinary cognition. Because in the world, reality is recognized in different degrees. The knowledge of a pot as a piece of cloth is unreal. Because the nature of cloth in regard to a pot is impermanent since it only remains as long as there is a defect. With regard to that, the knowledge of a pot as a pot is real. Because with regard to the nature of the cloth, the nature of the pot continues at a later time. But even such a knowledge of a pot as a pot is certainly unreal with regard to the knowledge of the pot as the nature of clay. Because with regard to the nature of the pot, the nature of the clay continues at a later time.
For the nature of the clay remains prior to the origination of the pot and subsequent to the destruction of the pot. Even the knowledge of clay as clay would be certainly unreal with regard to the knowledge of the nature of its cause. That is another thing.

3.186. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.171.) that having shown this proposition to be a statement which has possibility through the examples of the clay etc., for the subsequent proving of that proposition it is said: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second". This is the intended meaning: here, the state prior to the world is made known. The material cause is indeed the state obtained prior to the world. That very material cause, obtaining another state, is the effect. And by the knowledge of the material cause the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect is easily gained (cf., 3.172.). In accordance with the meaning previously stated, the single entity understood by the word "which": "Through which", forming part of the proposition "Through which, what is unheard" etc., is said by the word "existence". Similarly, every object, which is what is understood by this; "what is unheard becomes heard", is comprehended by the word "this". And that which is gross or subtle, near or remote, capable of perception etc. or incapable of it, is to be understood as
indeed everything [referring to the previous sentence]. Otherwise there would be the failure of the proposition, because what is not understood [by the word "this"] is not said to be the effect of existence here [in the sentence: "My dear, this was existence alone..."] and therefore there is no possibility of the knowledge of that through the knowledge of Brahman. And because without authority there is no proof for a restriction [in the meaning].

3.187.

The word "this" presents the subject here. The word "existence" presents the predicate. Because it is connected with the word "alone". That has been told:

The word "that" and the word "alone" (e\(\text{va}\)) would be the distinctive mark of the predicate.

The two words "one", "without a second" relate to the predicate. There too [in reference to those two words], the subject is only what is expressed by the word "this". Not what is expressed by the word "existence". Because the predicate, which is conceived as being the subject, is not
authoritative. Although being one and being without a second, which are enjoined with reference to pointing out the meaning of the word "this", resolve only in the meaning of the word "existence" on account of making known the identity of the meaning of the word "this" with the meaning of the word "existence": "My dear, this was existence alone", still, according to the expressed sense the meaning of the word "existence" is not established as the subject there. And "in the beginning" (agree) is also connected to the threefold predicate.

(a) This world was existence alone prior to origination. (b) Similarly, this world was one alone prior to origination. (c) So too, this world was indeed without a second prior to origination. In the first sentence, the teaching of an existent cause is established through the refutation of the teaching of Emptiness. And existence is established as the material cause on account of the designation through grammatical apposition: "this [was] existence". In the second, the teaching of a single cause is established through the refutation of the teaching of multiple causes. In the third, by this: "without a second" the teaching that the cause is free from distinction is established through the refutation of the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Thus the cause is established as being free from the threefold differences.

3.188.

3.188. It should not be said that: "a second" is only by means of
something similar to oneself, but not on account of some attribute belonging to oneself. So how is there an exclusion of the difference belonging to oneself through the word "without a second"? [reason]
Because the possession of a second is seen even through something belonging to oneself in: "accompanied by a sword he followed the Parjáva", "when my father, together with a bow, bears the brunt of the battle, what is the occasion for fear?" (Vegśam.3.7.) etc. The declaration of the exponents of non-duality that: the word "without a second" does not allow the possession of a second even due to a quality, is only based upon this.
The absence of the threefold difference is shown in the Tejobindurāṇisad also:

There can be no threefold difference for me:
there is nothing whatsoever belonging to the same class as me, there is no member of another class anywhere for me and there is no internal [difference] whatsoever for me (Tejo.3.47.).

3.189.
3.189. There would be failure of the proposition in the teaching of Emptiness, in the teaching of only an efficient cause, in the teaching of multiple causes and in the teaching of a cause possessing distinction. Because the proposition of the knowledge of everything through the knowledge of the one is established only when, with regard to the mere effect, one without distinction is the material cause. Not otherwise.

In the teaching of Emptiness, a cause which is a positive entity indeed does not exist, so how is there knowledge of the one? The knowledge of everything through [knowing] that is far removed. Similarly, if that [one to be known] is only the efficient cause, how is there the knowledge of everything through that? Because the knowledge of a pot does not arise through the knowledge of a [potter's] stick. So too, in the teaching of multiple material causes, how is there the knowledge of everything through the knowledge of a single cause which is included in such multiple causes? Because a pot made with multiple metals such as gold, silver, copper etc. cannot be known through the knowledge of the single [metal] gold. Or pots made separately with those metals cannot be known through the knowledge of the single [metal] gold.

Similarly, there can be no establishment of the proposition even in the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Because a thing which possesses distinction can be said to be "like this" [A] on account of that distinction. And because being like this [A] is contrary to being like that [B], something else which is like that [B] must be necessarily admitted to be a thing. If the thing like that [B] is the cause with reference to some effect, the knowledge of the thing like that [B] and its effect is hard to be gained through the knowledge of the thing like this [A]. So the previously proposed knowledge of everything is not accomplished.
By this: "one alone" there is the removal of the difference which has another cause as its counter correlate, which belongs to the one cause and is included in that and which results through the supposition of multiple causes. Whereas by this: "without a second" there is the removal of the difference belonging to the cause even though it has a counter correlate which is not active. And that [removal] is even for the difference belonging to oneself, in the way that was told.

**comment**

A pot, for example, has many causes such as the pot maker, the stick used in fashioning the pot, etc. The statement: "one alone" removes the idea of multiple causes. The word: "without a second" removes the idea of difference belonging to the cause which is "not active" i.e. which does not have anything to do with causality.

3.190.

When it is so established, wise people should certainly ascertain that if, according to the statement of Ramanuja, the word "without a second" aims at teaching the union with various powers, how is the knowledge of such powers applicable for the establishment of the proposition? Or how could there be the failure of the meaning which was proposed if there is ignorance of such powers?

Furthermore, according to the view of the Visishtadvaitins who think that the whole world consisting of the elements and elementals is real, the knowledge of all things is certainly difficult to be gained.
through the knowledge of the entity expressed by the word "existence". And there is incongruity with the example; even when clay is known as the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as having the nature of potness is certainly difficult to be gained. But according to the view of the Advaitins who are the exponents of falsity in the manner: "a pot is certainly unreal as having the nature of potness", when clay is known as the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as the nature of clay—which is real with regard to the nature of a pot—is easily gained and so there is congruity with the example. And there is establishment of the proposition: through the knowledge of the pure existence which is the cause of the world the knowledge of the existence-portion which is the reality in the world is easily acquired. So what has been previously demonstrated should certainly not be forgotten.

3.191.

Statements about qualities are seen in the sacred texts, traditions and legendary histories. The purport of those [statements referring to qualities] is indicated elsewhere in the same sacred texts etc. 18.

3.192. यदू ‘समस्तेन्द्र स्माभ्युगता नित्यन्त्वत्साधन निषिद्धः स्मुः’ (श्रीभा्) विरुध्धे न न हि भावावधिकर्षय व विकाप्यायविवेच न न भवह्युगस्चान्ति। नित्यात् हृदयिनिविवस्थायनित्यात्र एव। अभवेन च न सत्रिष्ट समस्त गौरवादितम् (पू ६१)। यदू ‘समस्ताभावातप्यायभाष्युत्तम भवती विषयवत्। सहस्तायां दृष्टान्तय भावावधिकर्षय निषिद्धय भवह्युगस्चान्ति। नित्यात् हृदयिनिविवस्थायनित्यात्र एव। अभवेन च न सत्रिष्ट समस्त गौरवादितम् (पू ६१)।
3.192. But what has been said (Srī B. Para. 49. p. 91.):

Indeed, if there is the negation of everything
[by the word "without a second"], [qualities]
such as eternity etc., which you accept, must
be negated.

That is not so. Because it is the desired conclusion. For the exponents
of māyā do not accept any positive attribute whatsoever in Brahma.
"Eternity" is only the absence of possessing origination and destruction.
It was demonstrated previously (3.55.) that there is no possession of
a distinction due to the absence [of possessing a quality].

But what has been said (Srī B. Para. 49. p. 91, 92.):

The maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda]
teach the same meaning\(^{154}\) has a contrary result
for you. Because it is the reason for bringing
together here [in the sentence "existence alone..."]
qualities such as omniscience etc. which are
connected with the cause [of the world] in all the
recensions.

That is questionable. Brahman, who is accepted as the cause, is in
reality indeed free from distinction. Even causality is only superimposed
there [in regard to Brahman]. Because it is our established position that
even qualities such as omniscience etc., which are applicable for such
causality, are only superimposed there [in Brahman]. And so now does
the maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda] teach the same meaning
have a contrary result here? Because even in bringing together qualities which are superimposed, there is no negation in reality of the nature of being free from distinction. On the contrary, according to that maxim, Brahman being free from distinction is certainly recognized to be a fact everywhere in the sentences [which teach] a cause.

But what has been said (Śrī Bh. Para. 49, p. 92.)¹⁵⁵:

a statement [teaching] freedom from qualities relates to the qualities which are to be given up as they pertain to prakṛti [i.e. "nature"].

That has indeed been answered before (3.49.). It has also been previously stated (3.48.) that the sacred texts beginning with: "The one who is all knowing" (Mu. 1.1.9.) which are shown (Śrī Bh. Para. 49, p. 92.) to teach the qualities such as knowership etc. in Brahman, are employed as connected with qualities which pertain to a limiting adjunct. Otherwise, there would be contradiction with the sacred text: "free from qualities" (Gūḍ. 7.).

3.193.

यतु 'निर्गुणशास्त्राय়ঃ' সমুদায়বায়ঃ চ বিষয়মূলত্তয়প্রভেদায়বিপিনাস

র্তনেন হেয়াগ্রাণাংবিপিচ্ছ সত্যকাম: সত্যঃক্রম শৃতি ব্রহ্মণ: সত্যঃ

গুণানির্দিষ্টকীন শ্রুতিরেতি বিবিধকীনি সমুদায়বায়বিরোধাবীনন্দন্তত্ব

তস্য বিভাজিততাভাব্যপায় নাত্মকগুণাঃ (গৌযাঙো ৫০ ৬১ ৫০ ৬৭)

ইত্যাদি তর্সংশেষ। 'অশ্রুতেন বিহরে নির্গুণ গুণানিদ্ভায়কে--

বিভাজিতে শ্রুতিকিন্তু সত্যকামার্থভাবায় সত্যকাম: রিভোঃ

সত্যঃক্রম: (চার ৮ ১ ১১) শৃতি।

শুচি: সমুদায়বায়বিপিনাস নির্গুণ শাস্ত্রায়: মানো শুচি শুচি শুচি শুচি শুচি

সত্যকাম: মাত্রপ্রিয় ইতি মানো শুচিশুচি শুচি। শুচি ইতি তথদধি

মাত্রপ। তথা সংবাদিত। পাতক্ষারামণীভূত গুণবায় কাযপিসংশ্লোকত।

সত্যকাম ইত্যাদিনা চ সমুদায়বায়িনো দৃষ্টি ইতি ন সম্পর্ক। সমুদায়বায়ভূত ইহ ন সমুদায়বায়বিপিনাস মাত্রাদেহতাভাব: গুণানির্দিষ্টকীনি

কিং তু ব্যাক্তিতা-তিকানো বিধিবিচিত্রতু স্থায়ীত্বর্তু হৃদয়তু। তথা ইতি এব নিমিত্ত।

সত্যকাম ইত্যাদি চ সত্যকামনায় গুণবায়সূলু মানো মানো মানো মানো মানো

তথা চ গুণানিদ্রাত্ত্বপ্রভেদানির্গুণানির্গুণবিচিত্রত্বাদর্শতালোকাধিকাংসুত্র ইতি বিষয়মূলত্তন্ত্র ভবস্তীতি প্রশ্নত্ব এব বিভাগ্রতু।

¹⁵⁵
3.193. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 50. p. 93.):

This sacred text (Ch. 8. 1. 5.) certainly distinguishes the scope of the statements [teaching] freedom from qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities. Having negated the qualities which must be given up beginning with "who is free from sin" and ending with "who is without thirst", it enjoins auspicious qualities for Brahman: "whose desire is true", "whose resolve is true". So because there is no contradiction between the statements [teaching] possession of qualities and freedom from qualities, it must not even be suspected that one of the two depends upon an object which is false.

That is incongruous. For you accept that the sacred text:

[This is the Self], who is free from sin, ageless, without death, without sorrow, who is without hunger and thirst, whose desire is true, whose resolve is true (Ch. 8. 1. 5.)

distinguishes the scope of the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities and freedom from qualities. There, the scope of the sacred text [teaching] freedom from qualities is shown by the part beginning with "who is free from sin" and ending with "who is without thirst". The scope of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by the part: "whose desire is true", "whose resolve is true".

That is not possible. Because sin, old age, death etc. are not known anywhere as being a quality. It is also not correct that the scope of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by: "whose desire is true" etc. Because the sacred texts [teaching] the possession of qualities do not enjoin qualities keeping the general quality in the forefront through words such as "possessing qualities", "the
possessor of qualities" etc. But [they enjoin qualities] keeping the particular quality in the forefront such as knowership, divinity, lordship etc. You too have certainly specified those [sacred texts]. In "whose desire is true...", only particular qualities are taught such as the nature of true desire etc. And so wise people must indeed ascertain: how is there a demonstration of an object [of worship] for the sacred texts teaching particular qualities through a sacred text which teaches other particular qualities?

**Comment**

Abhyankar firstly argues that statements such as "who is free from sin" etc. cannot denote freedom from qualities since sin, old age, death etc. are not accepted as qualities of the Self.

Abhyankar then argues that the sacred texts denoting qualities do not state in a general manner that Brahman "possesses qualities" (saguna) or is the "possessor of qualities" (gunavīna). For if that was so, qualities could be connected to such statements in the same way as one could say: "think of Mr. X. endowed with these virtues". But the sacred texts denote only particular qualities such as "knowership", "divinity" etc. If for the purpose of worship, the divinity mentioned in the text: "That divinity reflected" (seyam devataikṣata) (Ch.6.3.2.) is connected with qualities such as "whose desire is true" (satyakāma) (Ch.8.1.5.) then there are just two sets of statements denoting particular qualities. Abhyankar argues that the object of worship is not revealed by merely stating the qualities.

3.194.

कि च सत्यकामं सत्यसंकल्पं इति-

इति तपस्या गृहस्थाः परमायते। तथा सत्यसंकल्पं इति सत्यकामं।

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3.194. Furthermore, the nature of true desire etc. taught by the sacred text: "whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" are not inherent qualities of the Self. Because the sacred text itself clearly tells that desire etc. are particular modifications of the mind:

Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadiness, lack of steadiness, shame, intelligence and fear: all this is only the mind (Bṛh.1.5.3.).

Knowership too is only a particular modification of the mind. Because Knowledge [i.e. cognition] is denoted by the word "intelligence". And so it is indeed correct that the sacred text: "Desire, resolve..." certainly brings about the non-contradiction between the statements [teaching] freedom from qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities. Here, the Knowledge possessing a locus and an object is a particular modification of the mind. But the Knowledge without an object and a locus is indeed the essential nature of the Self. So on no account does the Self possess qualities. Bliss too is only a particularity of Knowledge. You also have certainly accepted this when you said (Śrī.B. Para.51.p.97.): "Because Knowledge which is itself agreeable is said to be bliss". And so Brahman does not possess a quality even on account of that [bliss].

3.195. यतु 'अनन्दं बहारो विद्यते (तैं रू २१ ९ २१) इति ब्रह्मः कल्याणंगुणानन्यप्रत्यायार्यं वरदायं श्रुतिः' (श्रीमान् पूं ६२ पृ २४) इत्युर्जय। 'अनन्दं विद्य्यतुस्नुत्त्वं ब्रह्मः अानन्दं विद्युष्युक्तव्यमुख्यं भावार्गो वोधितं' इति तत्तद्विध। परं तु नैतवादवशस्त्रं वासाविष्ठं ब्रह्ममुखं सिद्धितं। गुणवेण गृहं स्रीवेणे भूल्ललकापत्यार्यार्यवलोकने भूताचार्यं वस्यप्रभुत्वक्षेत्र हृदयवेणीं।

-3.195. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.94.):

This sacred text: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.) tells with great attention
that Brahman has limitless auspicious qualities.

The purport of that text is that the attention to the qualities of Brahman is made known, because having not said: "He who knows Brahman" it is said: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman". But just by this, bliss is not established as a real quality of Brahman. When a woman's clothes are worn by a man, although the spectators are engaged in looking on with great attention, he is seen as only relating to a limiting adjunct.

3.196. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.94.):

The statement making known the result of the knowledge of Brahman: "He attains all desires, together with the wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1.1.) tells that the supreme, wise Brahman has limitless qualities. [the prose order is]

vīpācitā brahmāṇa saha saryān kamān asnute. "Desires" are [the objects] longed for, i.e. the auspicious qualities. The meaning is that he attains, together with Brahman, all the qualities of that [Brahman].

That is questionable. Concerning this, what is this word which directly expresses qualities? Or how is there a connection of such qualities with
Brahman? The word "desire", however, is not conventionally used in the sense of qualities. You too have certainly accepted this by showing the etymological connection: "Desires (कामाः) are [the objects] longed for (काम्यंते)". When the etymological connection is kept in the forefront, the word "desire" does not directly express qualities in the sense of qualities. Even in the denotation of qualities in the form of what is desirable, qualities certainly cannot be accepted here. Because it is possible for objects of enjoyment to be desirable [things] other than qualities. For this very reason, [qualities] are not even able to be postulated here. Because the universal is postulated through a distinction but not distinctions through the universal. Although there is a rule that there is no universal without a distinction, still, it cannot be ascertained by the universal that "so and so is indeed the distinction there".

3.197. How is there the ascertainment that those qualities here indeed belong to Brahman? Because there is no word seen here which ends in the sixth case, i.e., "of Brahman" and is connected with [the word] "desires".
But the expectation "whose desires?" does not invariably arise. Because the word "desire" does not always possess expectancy. Because even in such a case where there is the usage of the word "always possesses expectancy" in the manner: "he obtains a son", the cessation of the expectancy is customary just through the supposition: "only for the agent himself".

Furthermore, the qualities of Brahman certainly cannot be obtained by the individual soul. But qualities which are similar to the qualities of Brahman. Hence this zeal of Rāmānuja for establishing Brahman as possessing qualities is certainly out of place. Because the word "desire" does not denote a quality. Even in the denotation of a quality, there is no expectation due to that. Even in the expectation, there is no connection to Brahman. Even in the connection, there is no possibility of the attainment of the qualities of Brahman.

But if [you say] there is the possibility of the attainment of the qualities of Brahman through the intended meaning of the identity between the individual soul and Brahman, [we reply] you have come to my path. Accordingly, the meaning of the sacred text is correct in this manner: saha is in the sense of "simultaneously" (yugapad). Sa means "he who knows, who is of the nature of Brahman", attains simultaneously all desires on account of being the very nature of Brahman. Since those particular pleasures which are accepted as being able to be experienced in the limiting adjuncts of Hiranyaagarbha etc. are not distinct from the bliss of Brahman, the one who knows —being of the nature of Brahman— attains indeed all bliss. Even becoming the nature of bliss is only a particular desire [i.e. bliss. kāma = ānanda, supra.] belonging to the state of the person desirous of liberation. And so [in the state of liberation] being the nature of Brahman which is unbroken bliss is arrived at.
This is indeed the state of liberation. There is no knower-known relation in this state. Because Brahman is not an object of knowledge.

That has been told:

For whom it [Brahman] is not thought, for him it is thought. For whom it is thought, he does not know. It is unknown for those who know and it is known for those who do not know (Ke, 2.3).

The meaning of the sacred text is: "for whom" (yasya) Brahman is "not thought" (amatam) i.e. there is the ascertainmen: "not an object of knowledge", it is correctly understood by that person. But "for whom" (yasya) Brahman is "thought" (matam) i.e. accepted as being an object of knowledge, "he does not know" (sa mu veda). Because Brahman is certainly "unknown" (avijñatam) "for those who know" (vijñatam) in the manner: "Brahman is known by us as an object of the knowledge depending upon us". Because a subject-object relation is not possible in the non-dual Brahman. Brahman is "known" (vijñatam) "for those who do not know" (avijñatam) i.e. for those who know: "Brahman is not an object of knowledge".

However in the state of being a seeker, the assumption of the
relation of knower and known certainly exists. And in accordance with
that, the "knower of Brahman" is told here: "The knower of Brahman attains
the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.). Due to this, [the statement] (Srî.B.Para.50.
p.95.)

if Brahman is not an object of knowledge, there
could be no teaching that liberation results
from knowledge: "The knower of Brahman attains
the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.). "The one who knows
Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu.3.2.9.)
is refuted.

3.199. But what has been said (Srî.B.Para.50.p.95,96.):

"From which words return, along with the mind,
having not reached" (Tai.2.4.1.). Through hearing
that the limitless Brahman, who has immeasurable
qualities, is incapable of being limited as
"so much" by speech and mind; [we understand that in the Kena text] Brahman is said to be "unknown" (avijnatam) and "not thought" (amatam) for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the manner: "Brahman is so much". Because Brahman is without limit.

There [in the Kena text], it is certainly true that Brahman is unknown for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman. But that is not the purport of the sacred text which is under discussion. Because there is no authority for this [word]: "for those who know" as having the meaning: "for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the manner: "so much" ".

Even the sacred text: "From which words [return]" does not have that as its purport. Because limitlessness of qualities has not been specified there in the sacred text as the reason for the return of speech and mind. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.51,) that in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word]: "having not reached", Brahman alone, who is specified by the word "which" and heard as the limit for the return of speech, is proper to be connected. But not the limit of qualities etc. which are elliptically supplied. You [Ramanuja] too have certainly accepted this way when you said (Śrī.B.Para.518. p.1007.157:

because in the expectation of a locus of separation, i.e. "from what do they rise up?" in relation to the sacred text: "his prānas do not rise up" (Bṛh.4.4.6.) occurring in the sūtra: "If it is said on account of the denial, no..." (B.S.8.2.12.), the self alone, which is heard as having connection [with the prānas], is to be understood even as the locus of separation because it is [more] contiguous than the body which is
And so because Brahman is just of the nature of Knowledge which is free from distinction, the return of speech and mind is from that.

3.200. Accordingly, the sacred text: "You cannot see the seer of seeing" (Bṛh.3.4.2.) negates a seer distinct from seeing. But the explanation of this sacred text (Srī.Ś.B.Para.50.p.96.)

Having thought that ignorance is the essential nature of the knower, [a view] established by fallacious reasoning on account of [the knower] being connected with the adventitious quality of consciousness, [the sacred text tells]: "you must not see the self in that manner, but you must see that even the seer has only seeing as its nature" is contrived. Because being insentient, which is the determining factor for the negation ["you cannot see..."], has not been specified in the sacred text. For the sacred text is suitable in the negation only of the nature of being a seer. It has certainly been told previously that the expression of knowership: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Bṛh.2.4.14.) is figurative.
Furthermore, if knowership is real according to the view of Rāmānuja, then the meaning of the sacred text: "[by what], my dear, [can one know] the knower?" is certainly not congruous. Because the word "what" here does not have as its purpose a question relating to a means. Because an answer "by such and such means" is not subsequently seen. But it has the sense of a doubt. Because the means for the knowledge relating to knowership only has its purpose in a doubt, through that, even such knowledge is doubted. But that is certainly undesirable for Rāmānuja. Because he accepts that the self is knowable.

3.201. There is no scope for even a trace of difference in Brahman who is of the nature of Knowledge free from distinction. Because the negation of difference is seen in various ways in the sacred texts: 159 "There is no diversity whatsoever here. He who sees diversity, as it were, here, goes from death to death" (Bṛh. 4.4.19.), "Because where there is duality, as it were, then another sees another... but where everything has become the Self alone for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one
see and through what?" (Bṛh. 4.5.15.) etc. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 51, p. 98.) 160:

Since the entire world is an effect of Brahman and has that [Brahman] as its inner ruler and because there is oneness on account of [the world] having that [Brahman] as its Self, the diversity which is contrary to that [oneness] is negated in the sacred texts cited. On the other hand, the manifold nature of Brahman which is established in the sacred texts and which is preceded by the resolve to become many: "May I be many, may I be born" (Ch. 6.2.3.) is not negated.

That is questionable. To explain. The expression "different" is of two types: (1) based upon difference which has another [thing] as its counter correlate and (2) based upon internal difference. The first is like earth is different with regard to water. Here, difference is the reason for the use of the word "different". And that [difference] is located in earth and has water as its counter correlate. The second is like earth is different due to the difference of pots and cloth etc. Here, difference is not the reason for the use of the word "different". Because the difference which has pot as its counter correlate does not exist in the pot and the difference which has cloth as its counter correlate does not exist in the cloth, therefore difference does not exist in earth as there is the characteristic property of earth-ness. But variety, which is based upon internal difference, is the reason for the use of the word "different" in this case. And this alone is the reason for the use of the word "diversity" too.
3.202. Seeing the world in this very manner [as having variety], which is well known in the world, is negated by the sacred text repeating: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". Because there is the recollection of the whole world [by the word] "here" in the sacred text, just as there is by the word "this" in: "All this is indeed Brahman" (Ch.3.14.1.). The negation of the seeing as being diverse amounts to seeing as being one. But the sacred text does not have its purport in the negation of mere seeing. If that was so, it would say only: "He who sees here goes from death to death".

Moreover seeing the diverse objects as being one is possible only when they have a single material cause. And that alone is what is taught by the sacred text: "May I be many" (Tai.2.6.1., Ch.6.2.3.). This world, although being experienced as diverse, is made known by that sacred text in a manner which was unknown: as possessing origination preceded by a resolve which has as its agent [one who is] the single material cause. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.51.p.98.) 161:

Having taught that Brahman has diversity, which is
unknown through all the means of knowledge like perception etc., and which is difficult to comprehend, then that very [diversity] is being negated — this is ridiculous.

If [you say]: this diversity is certainly not known through perception etc., as belonging to Brahman. [we reply] The purport of the sacred texts is to be conceived only in teaching the connection to Brahman. And that connection is not negated by the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". But only the seeing as being diverse is negated, so what is ridiculous here? On the contrary, the sacred text: "May I be many", having shown that the world has a single material cause, is certainly applicable for seeing oneness which is the object of the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here".

3.203. Furthermore, the negation taught by the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here" is all the more logically impossible according to the view of Ramanuja. Because he accepts the diversity in
the world as real. In his view, no sacred text can be connected with the intended meaning that there is no diversity in Brahman. Because there is no cognition of such a meaning due to the expression "here" in: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". And because he accepts diversity on account of the difference of the threefold reality consisting of the sentient, the insentient and the Inner-controller, which [difference] belongs to Brahman who is qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and the insentient.

But if [you say] that the intended meaning [of the text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here"] is that there is no such object whatsoever different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause or the Inner-controller. [we reply] There must be implication in the word "diversity". Because there is no reason for the usage which was told before [supra., "...he accepts diversity on account of the difference..."]. For we mentioned just previously that difference is not the reason for the use of the word "diversity". Nor is difference the reason for the use of even the word "duality". But duality is based upon internal difference. It is to be understood that having repeated the seeing etc. which is well known in the world as having some agent and some object and which is the effect of the duality belonging to such a world, by this: "Because where there is duality, as it were, then another sees another" (Brh.4.5.15.) etc., it is negated by: "But where everything has become the Self alone for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one see and through what?" (Brh.4.5.15.) etc.
3.204. The attainment of fear has been taught on account of seeing diversity: "For when he makes the slightest difference in this [Brahman], then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.). And so it is indicated that seeing diversity is not desired on the part of a person seeking freedom from fear. Thus the purport of that sacred text too is only in the negation of seeing diversity.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.51.p.98.) 162:

The recollection of the manifold nature of that [Brahman] is taught as the cause of peace: "All this is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman].

Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate" (Ch.3.14.1.).

That is questionable. To explain. The word "thus" here: "Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate", having recalled what was previously said, it makes known that [recollection] to be the cause of peace. The pair of words "Brahman" and "tajjalān", occurring in the prior portion: "All this is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman].

With reference to all this world [which is the subject], the nature of being Brahman and its having origination etc. from that [Brahman] is enjoined [as the predicate]. Born from that (tajjam) means it arises from that
Brahman. Lam means "it resolves". An means "it breathes" in the sense that "it lives". The origination of the world is only from Brahman and the dissolution is only in Brahman. So too, the activity of the world is only through Brahman. When everything is made known as being Brahman by the first positive statement here, in the expectation: "how does everything have the nature of being Brahman?", the second positive statement: "The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman]" is begun for demonstrating that. And peace is easily acquired upon the recollection that everything is only of the nature of Brahman: because there is no desire and aversion due to the absence of the recollection of diversity. And so the recollection of diversity is certainly not enjoined here. So how could there be the instruction that it is the cause of peace?

3.205. But the diversity made known by the word "all", which denotes the subject, does not present a cause at all. On the contrary, upon the recollection of diversity, even though peace was existing previously it is thwarted due to the possibility of desire and aversion. Perhaps there is the possibility of the decrease of aversion upon the recollection of
diversity even as consisting of the nature of Brahman. But there would certainly be an increase of desire. And so peace is indeed difficult to be acquired.

On account of this, having taken the word "antara" as having the meaning of "an interval" in the sacred text: "For when he makes the slightest interval in this, then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.), the establishing of that [meaning] (Srī. B. Para. 51, p. 99.) is replied to. The word "antara" even having the meaning of "a hole" must be understood as refuted in just the same way. Because no one is able to make an interval or a hole in Brahman. So his fear is far away. In the expectation: "where does he make a difference (antara)?", only "in this"—which is mentioned in the sentence itself—can be connected there. But not the "stability" in Brahman which is mentioned in the previous sentence. And because the word "stability" in the previous sentence: "...he finds stability in this invisible..." (Tai.2.7.1.) does not end in the seventh case. But there is certainly trouble in changing it to a seventh case ending. And there is no possibility of the connection of this: "in this" which belongs to this sentence ["For when he makes the slightest difference in this..."] to the meaning of the word "stability" which has persisted [in the sentence: "For when..."] because there is the maxim: "Between what has been heard and what is inferred, the connection with what is heard is stronger".

3.206.
3.206. It should not be said that: the connection of Brahman as being the meaning of the word "this" ["For when he makes the slightest... in this"] is not possible when the meaning of the word "antara" is heard in the sense of "an interval" or "a hole". So there is no scope of that maxim here. Because that maxim is applicable only upon the possibility of a connection in both places. [reason] Because the connection is possible when the meaning of the word "antara" is heard in the sense of "difference". For there is no restrictive rule here: "difference cannot be accepted as the meaning of the word "antara" here".

Furthermore, because the word "in this" is in the previous sentence also, there would be the connection of the "stability" connected with that [previous "in this"] in the latter sentence. So the sacred text certainly need not utter the word "in this" again in the latter sentence. And so the intended meaning of the sacred text is understood as: the word "in this" occurs again only for the purpose of the cessation of "stability".

3.207.
3.207. This teaching of Brahman free from distinction is certainly accepted by the author of the śūtras also. That has been told: "There is no twofold characteristic for the supreme, even on account of place, because everywhere [it is taught otherwise]" (B.S.3.2.11.). The meaning of that is: "place" means a limiting adjunct. The "twofold characteristic" (ubhayaliṅgam) i.e. the characteristic of possessing distinction and being free from distinction, "for the supreme" (parasya) i.e. Brahman, certainly does not inherently exist. But it does not exist "even on account of place" [i.e. due to a limiting adjunct] (sthanato'pi). Because "everywhere" (sarvatra) in the sacred texts such as: "Soundless..." (Kaṭha.1.3.15.) etc., Brahman is taught only as having all distinctions set aside.

It should not be said: then how can there be the declaration of the non-dualists that "Brahman is free from distinction"? [reason] An expression by words such as "free from distinction", "non-dual" etc. is for those who ascertain there only that: Brahman, which is indeed utterly inexpressible [directly], has to be said somehow. But in reality, Brahman cannot be directly expressed by the word "free from distinction" or by the word "non-dual" etc. That has been told in the Dakṣaṃśrīti:

This is in relation to the highest truth: there is no duality and nor even is there non-duality (Dakṣaṃ.7.46.).

But the explanation of that śūtra (B.S.3.2.11.), (Śrī.B.Para.401. p.810.)¹⁶⁴:

Not even a trace of imperfection is possible "for the supreme" (parasya) Brahman, "even on account of place" (sthanato'pi) such as earth etc. Because "everywhere" (sarvatra) the supreme Brahman is told as having this "twofold characteristic" (ubhayaliṅgam) of being free from defect and possessing qualities.

That does not bring about admiration in the mind. Because this śūtra is
a statement of negation. What rule is this: "what is to be negated there is only what is accepted as being supplied through an ellipsis"? And so Brahman is certainly free from all distinctions. It must be understood that the distinctions which are recognized in the world are all together certainly without absolute reality.

3.208. By way of refuting the view of the exponents of non-duality [who consider that]: "pure Knowledge free from distinction is alone the absolute reality", a collection of sentences from the Gita beginning with: "He who knows me, the great Lord of the worlds, to be unborn and beginningless" (G.10.3.) have been cited (SrI.B.Para.52.p.100.) as teaching that Brahman possesses distinction. With regard to that, it is said; the nature of being unborn is not some attribute which is a positive entity, But it is the absence of birth. In the same manner, the nature of being beginningless is the absence of having an original cause. And
consequently how is the Self established as possessing distinction on account of these two negative conditions?

Although qualities such as being the support of living beings are recognized in the sentences such as: "All beings dwell in me" (G.9.4.) (SrI.B.Para.52.p.100.) etc., nevertheless they are only based upon connection with the primary matter (prakrti) but they are not actually real. For this very reason, freedom from qualities has been very clearly told there: "This supreme Self is without change because of being beginningless and because of being free from qualities" (G.13.31.). Similarly, being the support of all and the enjoyer of qualities here too: "Unattached and indeed the supporter of all, free from qualities and the enjoyer of qualities" (G.13.14.) are only based upon connection with the primary matter. Indeed the sentence in the Gita: "Know that modifications and qualities are born of the primary matter" (G.13.19.) distinguishes the scope of the sentences [teaching] possession of qualities and the scope of the sentences [teaching] freedom from qualities. So in no way can qualities be suspected as being innate.

3.209. The collection of sentences beginning with: "O sage, He transcends the primary matter of all beings, its modifications and defects such as..."
qualities etc." (Vig. P.6.5.83.), which are located in the Vīṣṇupurāṇa, have been cited (Srī. B. Para. 52. p.101.) as teaching Brahman possessing distinction. Even for that [collection of sentences], no purport is seen in teaching Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions such as the nature of transcending beings etc. pertain to a limiting adjunct.

Because the Self is taught as being free from distinction in the Vīṣṇupurāṇa itself:

That which is unmanifest, undecaying, inconceivable, unborn, changeless, indescribable, formless and which does not possess hands and feet etc. (Vig. P.6.5.66.).

In which differences have vanished, which is pure existence, not an object of words and which can be known by oneself — that Knowledge is known as Brahman (Vig. P.6.7.53.).


मूर्त्योऽनियमितव्यासम् न वास्त

विक्रम | नगातो विन्यासाबुद्धि | तदुपरि विष्णुपुराण पद् —

वास्तविन्यासायतनं जगतात्मादिविन्यासायतनं; |

अर्थितस्तथा परस्परां सभास्व भोजसंगोऽसि। (वि 10 पु 114 116)

विन्यास परमात्मा हि वैविशिष्याविद्वेदिनः। (वि 10 पु 214 116)

सोदे व च च च सर्वभूतवामस्वहस्य वज्ञ ज्ञेयस्यम्।

इति विदेश्यते स राजायत्त्वाय भेरे परमाःहि:।

(वि 10 पु 2 19 27) हि ।

आत्मि मूर्त्योऽनियमितव्यासियोऽवासायतनं ‘मूर्त्योऽनियमितव्यासम्’ (वि 10 पु 6 15 67) इत्यतः मूर्त्योऽनियमितव्यासायतनाविद्वेदिनं संगठिते।

च न निदिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यासरूप व्रजस्व नियतम्। तथा ज्ञात्मा निदिष्टम् निराकरणस्य चेति मायुक्तकर्मः (पु 70 1 पु 4)। सरस्यवस्तु साधनस्व ब्राह्मचर्य सर्वनियमितव्यासम् भावनात्। सर्वनियमितव्यासम् विन्यासम् परमाःहि: दैत्यस्वत्त्वदिश्यत्यागि नाशाभास्य परमाःहि:सर्वरुपस्मयेऽसि—

विन्यास परमाः हि वैविशिष्याविद्वेदिनः। (वि 10 पु 214 121)

हि भागदाइत्वस्वत्त्वदिश्यत: ‘दैत्यिष्याविद्वेदिनः’ हि दैत्यिष्याविद्वेदिनः सङ्कल्पस्यात्।
3.210. Even the nature of being the source of beings is not an actual reality in the Self. Because the world is false. That has been told in the Visṇupurāṇa itself:

The ignorant, seeing this entire world which has Knowledge for its essential nature as being of the nature of objects, are whirled around in the flood of delusion (Viṣṇ.P.1.4.39.).

Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The dualists see things falsely (Viṣṇ.P.2.14.31.).

"He is I and he is you and he is everything. This [universe] has the Self as its essential nature. Give up the delusion of difference." That excellent king, instructed by him [the brāhmaṇa], had the understanding of the highest reality and abandoned [the view of] difference (Viṣṇ.P.2.16.24.).

The statement "not a cause" immediately following "the source of beings" here: "the source of beings, not a cause" (Viṣṇ.P.6.5.67.) is in agreement only because the nature of being the source of beings has no actual reality in the Self. Thus it is established: Brahman is free from distinction and of the nature of pure Knowledge. And that Knowledge has certainly been previously stated (3.54.) as being without an object and without a locus. Because the Knowledge which possesses an object and a locus necessarily possesses distinction. If the Knowledge which possesses distinction is the highest reality, because there is the possibility that such Knowledge is the highest reality even according to the view of those who see duality as real, then the statement containing the reason: "The dualists see things falsely" in the previously cited text of the Visṇupurāṇa: "Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The dualists see things falsely" (Viṣṇ.P.2.14.31.) must be incongruous.
3.211. [objection] A distinction in the Self, in the manner of being an object of speech, is taught in the **Vignapurāṇa**. For instance (Śrī B. Para.52.p.101,102.):

> O Maitreya, the word "**Bhagavat**" is used to denote the pure, highest Brahman, known as the one of mighty powers, the cause of all causes (Vig. P.6.5.72.).

The letter "**bha**" is endowed with a twofold meaning: "**preparer**" and "**supporter**". So too, O sage, the meaning of the letter "**ga**" is the "**leader**", "**mover**" and "**creator**" (Vig. P.6.5.73.).
[The two syllables] "bhaga" indicate the six [qualities] in their entirety: sovereignty, heroism, glory, prosperity, knowledge and dispassion (Viṣṇu P.6.5.74.).

The meaning of the letter "va" is that beings dwell there in the Self of beings, in the entire Self and he [dwell] in all beings and hence [the meaning of the letter "va"] is "imperishable" (Viṣṇu P.6.5.75.).

The meaning of this [is as follows]: teaching the meaning of the component parts of the word "bhagavat", he [the sage Parāśara] tells the meaning of the letter "bha" as "preparer". The word "bha" is established in the affix "da"[being added] to the verbal root bhṛ. The twofold meaning of that [word "bha"] is; "preparer" and "supporter". "Preparation" means arranging the necessary paraphernalia. The "preparer" is said to be the one who makes the primary matter etc. capable of the production of effects. The "supporter" means the master. He [Parāśara] tells the meaning of the letter "ga" as the "leader". The word "ga" is established in the affix "da"[being added] to the verbal root gam which ends in [the causative] "hi". "Leader" means the one who causes stability. "Mover" means the one who brings about the destruction [of the cosmos]. "Creator" means the one who brings about the origination [of the cosmos]. The verbal root gam has the meanings of origination, sustenance and destruction.

He tells the meaning of the two syllables which have been united: "bhaga" as "sovereignty". The word "entirety" is connected everywhere. "Glory" means fame through the possession of qualities. "Prosperity" means good fortune. "Dispassion" means indifference.

He tells the meaning of the letter "va" as "they dwell". The word "va" is established in the affix "da" [being added] to the verbal root vas(a) in the sense of the location or in the sense of the agent. "In the Self of beings" means in the Self of [all] beings. "In the entire Self"
means in its entire body. In the addition of the affix "kvip" to the verbal root tvaj(a) in the sense of "he gives up the qualities to be abandoned", the mere consonant, in the form of the letter "t", remains upon the elision of the portion beginning with "t" on account of being included in the group of words beginning with pradara. And that letter "t" is the final for the word "bhagavat". And so because the supreme Self can be directly expressed by the word "bhagavat", the possession of distinction must certainly be accepted in reality.

3.212. [reply] This is certainly not the case. Because there is the statement that the word "bhagavat" has a figurative meaning here:

0 twice born, the word "bhagavat" is indeed a figurative expression used in the worship of Brahman even though that [Brahman] is not an object of words (Viṣ.P.6.5.71.)
in the very preceding verse contiguous to this: "...the pure, known as the one of mighty powers..." (Viṣ. P.6.5.72.). How did you, while directing your sight upon the series [of verses] commencing with: "...the pure, known as the one of mighty powers...", have feebleness of sight in the very preceding verse contiguous to that? It is a great wonder. Hence it has to be adhered to that the description of the Self as possessing distinction, which is seen in the Purāṇas or elsewhere, is effected only having accepted that the distinctions appearing in the Self are according to an understanding which pertains to ordinary relations, but it is not so in absolute reality.

Even the colour which is taught in the sacred texts such as: "the colour of the sun" (Tai.A.3.11.) only pertains to ordinary relations. Because that is of use only according to an understanding which pertains to ordinary relations. Although that [colour] pertains to ordinary relations it is certainly possible to be an "auspicious locus" for concentration. "Concentration" is fixing the mind at one place in the object of meditation through giving up other objects. The object to be meditated upon there is said to be an "auspicious locus". On account of this, the demonstration that the supreme Self possesses distinction in absolute reality, by the text beginning (ŚrĪ.B.Para.53.p.106.):

In this context [Viṣ. P.6.7.], having declared yoga as the sole remedy for worldly existence and having stated the component parts of yoga up to the withdrawal of the senses from external objects (pratyāhāra), in order to mention an "auspicious locus" for the purpose of the establishment of concentration, [it is taught] that the supreme Brahman, Viṣṇu, [has two forms]...

and ending with (ŚrĪ.B.Para.53.p.106.):

the embodied form, which is established by Vedānta [passages] such as "the colour of the sun" etc., is
said to be the "auspicious locus"

is set aside. Because there is no negating factor in accepting that even what pertains to ordinary relations can be an "auspicious locus".

3.213.

[3.213.]

Here too:

[I bow to that Viṣṇu] who is, in reality, of the nature of Knowledge and who is absolutely pure.

That [Viṣṇu] is indeed determined to be a physical entity on account of erroneous vision (Viṣṇu, P.1.2.6.)

Brahman is in reality of the nature of pure Knowledge and seeing that [Brahman] as the nature of a physical entity is said to be error. The nature of being a "physical entity" is the nature of being a knower and
the nature of what is known. And so the "nature of Knowledge" which possesses distinction and has a locus and an object is established as something not really existing.

But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 54, p. 108):

Even here [in the passage]: "the nature of Knowledge" (Viṣṇ. P. 1.2.6.), the entire collection of things different from Knowledge is not taught as being false. Because the statement is only to this extent: the appearance of the Self, who is of the nature of Knowledge, in the form of objects such as gods, human beings etc. is erroneous. When it is said that the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error, the entire collection of silver objects in the world is certainly not false.

That is not so. Because here: "That [Viṣṇu] is indeed [determined] to be a physical entity", there is no possibility of accepting the particular meaning "gods, human beings etc." by the word "entity" which has a universal application since it is mentioned as contrary to the Knowledge which was mentioned in the prior half [of the verse].

From the statement: "the rope is determined to be the nature of a snake on account of erroneous vision", no body believes that a particular snake is real in the manner that: "the white snake is certainly real there, only the black snake is indeed false". Although when it is said that the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error, the entire collection of silver objects in the world is not false, still, some particular silver on the pearl-oyster is certainly not real. That the truth or falsity of silver elsewhere can be established to any extent by another means of knowledge is not the purport of this sentence there ["the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error"]. If like "That [Viṣṇu] is indeed [determined] to be a physical entity" it is said; "the pearl-oyster is
indeed recognized in the world as silver" then it would certainly be the 
purport there also [in relation to the sentence: "the appearance of the 
pearl-oyster..."]. And so here¹⁷⁰: when it is said that because the world 
and Brahman are cognized as identical due to grammatical apposition [in 
the scriptures], Brahman, whose nature is Knowledge, having the form of 
an object, is erroneous, then the entire collection of objects is said to 
be false.

3.214. Furthermore, the falsity of the world is indeed indicated at the 
very beginning of the Viṣṇupurāṇa by teaching the identity [of Viṣṇu 
with the world] through grammatical apposition: "and he is the world" 
(Viṣ. P.1.1.35.). To explain. A twofold question was put forward by 
Maitreya: "O Brahman, what does the world consist of, and from what is 
this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?" (Viṣ. P.1.1.9.). 
The affix mayā in: "consists of what?" is in the sense of modification.¹⁷¹ 
Or it is used in its own sense [i.e., only as conveying the sense of the 
word to which it is connected]. This question is about the material cause 
of the world i.e. "of what is this world a modification?", or "what is
the nature of this world?". And the question: "and from what has this world consisting of the moveable and the inert been produced?" relates to the efficient cause which is remaining. And for that double question, Parāśara has given a twofold answer: "That [Viṣṇu] brings about the sustenance and destruction of this world, and he is the world" (Viṣṇu. P.1. 1.35.). The efficient cause of the world is stated: that supreme Self brings about the sustenance and destruction of this world. The material cause of the world is stated: and he alone is the world.

It is established by hundreds of sacred texts that the supreme Self is free from change and it is repeated by Parāśara in a later verse here itself: "[Salutations to Viṣṇu] who is without change, pure..." (Viṣṇu. P.1.2.1.). So the Self cannot be accepted as the material cause which undergoes transformation, but only as the material cause which is an apparent transformation. And so the falsity of the world which is appearing is established.

3.215.

But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 54, p. 110.):

because the efficient and the material cause have been asked: "and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?", by this: "consists of what?"

it is asked: what is the nature of the world which is
the object of creation, sustenance and destruction? The answer to that [latter question] is: "and he is the world". This identity is brought about by the invariable association through being the Self [of the world] in the form of its inner ruler. But it is not brought about by the oneness of substance between the pervaded [world] and the pervading [Viṣṇu]. Because the grammatical apposition: "and he is the world" is the answer to the question: "consists of what?". The affix maya in "consists of what?" does not have the sense of modification. Because a separate question is meaningless [as the material cause was asked in the first question]. Nor even does it have its own meaning [i.e., conveying only the sense of the word to which it connected] as in the case of praṇamaya [which is taken as meaning praṇa only] etc. Because there is no logical possibility of the answer: "and he is the world" [for the question would only mean "the world is what?"]. Indeed then, the answer would be: "Viṣṇu alone". Therefore maya is in the sense of "abundance" according to: "The affix maya is used wherever an abundance of a thing is to be expressed" (P.S.5.4.21.). And the entire world certainly has an abundance of that [Viṣṇu] since it is the body of that [Viṣṇu]. Therefore it is ascertained that the grammatical apposition "and he is the world", which is the answer to this: "consists of what?", is based upon the relation of body and soul between the world and Brahman.
3.216. That is questionable. Because the fifth case "from what" [in the sentence: "and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert"] can be logically demonstrated in the technical term denoting the locus of separation [i.e. apādāna, the ablative case]: "The prime cause of the agent of the verb jan 'to be born' is in the ablative case" (P.S.1.4.30.) having accepted that the action of production is elliptically supplied. Alternatively, [the fifth case] can be logically demonstrated in the technical term of the ablative: "The source of the agent of the verb bhu 'to become' is in the ablative case" (P.S.1.4.31.) having accepted that the action of arising is the "first manifestation". Because by that, the technical term of the ablative is enjoined for the locus of the "first manifestation". In the first case [with reference to P.S.1.4.30.], the question ["and from what..."] can relate only to the material cause. Because [the word] "prakṛti" is used in the sūtra. And the word "prakṛti" signifies only the material cause. Otherwise there would be the consequence that: a pot is produced from a [potter's] stick. But in the case of "joy arises from a son", the fifth case is to be understood upon the elision of the affix iva: "having beheld the son". In the Brahmasūtra too: "[Brahman is] the material cause (prakṛti) as well..." (B.S.1.4.23.), the
word "prakṛti" is seen to signify only the material cause. You too have accepted it there in that very manner.

But in the second case [with reference to P.S.1.4.31.], the question ["and from what..."] can relate only to the efficient cause. Because the locus of the "first manifestation" is not the material cause. 174 But no authority is known for bringing about the twofold meaning [i.e. "from what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause] by resorting to tantra or āvṛtti. And so [the statement]: "because the efficient and the material cause have been asked: 'and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?' " is incongruous.

comment

The terms "tantra" and "āvṛtti" (repetition) are used in Mīmāṃsā texts to denote the performance of auxiliary rituals. For example, if the same auxiliary ritual is to be performed for two principal rituals, the performance of the auxiliary ritual once only is called tantra. 175 The repetition of the auxiliary ritual, once for each of the principal rituals, is āvṛtti.

Abhyankar states that Rāmānuja cannot demonstrate that the word "from what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause. Because either of the two sūtras: 1.4.30 or 1.4.31. cannot be applied in both senses. Nor would it be correct to apply both of the sūtras to the one word in order to derive the two meanings.

3.217. "यन्मयमिति मय्यन
vācyārtho | पृथ्वमशैवयोऽयते | इत्ययसंगतम् | पृथ्वपश्चोपकतीत्योपययते: | "यन्मयमितिनेन जनात्क्रियात्मिति पृथ्वम् इत्ययसंगतम् | किमात्मकत्वमस्य क आत्मा यस्येत्थि: | तत्र चालयश्च: शरीरातत्त्वसः शरीरातत्त्वादिशोऽपि न तु लक्षणपार्थः | मय्यमय्योऽथ शुश्रुतात्मिति नालोयभाय: | शास्त्राय भावने भाष्यायात्मिति | तद् च किमात्मकत्वमस्य पश्चाय इति निष्क्यार्थमेन | अते च तदानुभावार्था तदानुभावार्थोऽन्निष्क्यार्थाः | कत्वे श्रुतम् इति 'यन्मयमिति प्रभावस्य मय्यमय्ययोऽथ इति साप्तानाथार्थस्य जग्नीयाय: | शरीरालालात्मिति किमात्मकत्वमस्य | चिन्ताय जग्न स इत्तुजय शरीरालालात्मायेद्य साप्तानाथार्थेऽमात्मिति | सिद्धवृद्धौप्तीता तदानुभावे: शास्त्राय मय्यमिति मय्यमय्ययोऽथ स्वार्थिक्षितात्माअसाधनम् पराशम् | किं च मय्यमय्ययोऽथ स्वार्थिक्षितात्माष्ट्रदेविं न जग्न स इत्तुजय: | मात्रे यदुदेवे ज्ञात्मार्थं सर्वनासिकर्तव्यां पुनस्कर-
3.217. [The statement]: "The affix $maya$ in 'consists of what?' does not have the sense of modification. Because a separate question is meaningless" is also incongruous. Because a separate question is logically possible in the way that was told (3.214.). [The statement]: 'by this: 'consists of what?' it is asked: what is the nature of the world...?' is incongruous as well. The meaning of this: "what is the nature?" is "who is the Self of which [world]?". And the word "Self" there is accepted by you as having the meaning of being connected with a body, not as having the meaning of the essential nature. However the meaning of being "connected with a body" is not obtained through the affix $maya$. Even if the affix $maya$ is used in the sense of "abundance" there is no rule: abundance is only through the nature of being the Self. And so because there is no ascertainment that: " 'what is the nature?' is alone the meaning of the question", the ascertainment of the meaning of the reply on account of its congruity with that [meaning of the question] cannot be done. And so [the statement]: "it is ascertained that the grammatical apposition 'and he is the world', which is the answer to this: 'consists of what?', is based upon the relation of body and soul between the world and Brahman" is incongruous. On account of this, having accepted it to be as though established that the grammatical apposition in the reply: "and he is the world" is only based upon the relation of body and self, the demonstration, in conformity with that [above view], that the affix $maya$ in "consists of what?" is not used in its own meaning [as conveying only the sense of the word to which it is connected], is refuted.

Furthermore, even though the affix $maya$ conveys its own meaning there is no logical impossibility for the answer: "and he is the world". Because in the question ['what does the world consist of?'], "world" is the
subject and there is no negating factor in specifying that again as the subject in the reply. Just as in the question: "what is gold?", [there is the reply]: "gold is fire". On the other hand, if the affix mayā has only the meaning of "abundance", there is no logical possibility of the reply: "and he is the world". Because even in the relation of body and the one embodied there is no grammatical apposition in reality.

3.218. But what has been said (SrI.B.Para.54,p.111.):

if the scripture is accepted as aiming at teaching an entity free from distinction, all these questions and answers do not agree. And the entire scripture which is in the form of an exposition of that [entity free from distinction] does not agree. Because if that was so, for the single question: "what is the substratum of the erroneous world?", there should be only a single
That is worthless. Because the cycle of worldly existence is based upon a beginningless mental impression, therefore formulating questions again and again, successively in a different way, is meaningful for accomplishing the steadiness of intellect: "Brahman is real, what is other is false" which is for the purpose of the removal of that [mental impression].

Although it is said (Śrī. B. Para. 54, p. 111.):

If the grammatical apposition [in the statement "and he is the world"] relates to the oneness of substance between the world and Brahman, then the nature of being the sole resort of auspicious qualities such as "having true resolve" etc. and the nature of being opposed to everything which should be abandoned would be negated. And Brahman would be the abode of everything impure.

That too is not so. Because in regard to what is free from qualities, the negation of qualities is acceptable. And on account of resorting to the teaching of "apparent transformation" there is no possibility of demonstrating [Brahman] to be the abode of everything impure.

And what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 54, p. 111.):

This grammatical apposition has its primary sense only in the relation between a self and its body.

That is also not the case. Because you must necessarily say that there is an implied meaning of the word "world" in the sense of "its inner ruler", or that there is an implied meaning of this "he" in the sense of "[the world] has that [Viṣṇu] as its Self" and therefore there is no primary signification.

But those statements in the sacred texts, śūtras and Purāṇas such as: "Two birds..." (Mu. 3.1.1.) etc., which are adduced as the means of
knowledge for the difference between the individual soul and Brahman (Śrī B.Para.57.p.116f.), are engaged only having accepted the difference pertaining to ordinary relations in the way that has been told. So no contradiction among those [texts] can be suspected. Thus the non-duality of Brahman, free from distinction, is established.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: VIŚISTĀNYAṬTA-MATAṆUPĀTĪ.

1. The Siddhāntadāsana is a sutra work which attempts to reconcile the view of Saṁkhya and Vedānta. It is said to have been composed by Vyāsa, though M. Lal Sandal in his introduction to the text dismisses this opinion and suggests that the work was composed after the fourteenth century, cf., M. Lal Sandal (trans), The Siddhānta Dārsanam of Vyāsa. The Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol. XXIX. Allahabad. 1925. The text with a commentary by Visvadevaśārya is published in the Anandaśrama Sanskrit Series. No. 134. Poona, 1907.

2. The name of the commentary upon the Siddhāntadāsana.

3. This explanation is based upon the commentary to the Siddhāntadāsana, 1.1.7.


6. Read adṛṣṭe. The avagraha in the text has been added by the translator.

7. In the Gitābhāṣya 6.8, Śaṅkara distinguishes between jñāna and vijnāna in this manner: "jñāna is the thorough knowledge of the things told in the scripture. Vijnāna is bringing about the experience for oneself that what has been known from the scripture is 'indeed in that manner'."

8. The separation of the pot from the name and form is for the purpose of understanding through imagination. According to the Advaitin there is, strictly speaking, no pot separate from the name and form.

9. This is in agreement with Śaṅkara's alternative explanation. Cf., Ch.Ś.8.14.1. p.604, line 4.


11. B.S.Ś.1.1.1. p.34, line 2.


15. Abbreviation of the ŚrīṬ. B. text.

17. Rāmārāya, op-cit., p.4, line 15f. p.6, line 25f.
19. ibid., 1.18.159.
20. Adaptation of the Śrī.B. text to convey the meaning more succinctly.
21. This statement is based upon Bṛh.Ś. 4.4.21, p.928, line 27.
22. "Remembrance is knowledge which is produced only through a mental impression caused by a previous experience." Yatī.Tara18. p.11.
23. The latter interpretation is according to Śaṅkara. B.S.Ś. 4.1.12.
25. Cf., gloss upon this verse by Śrīdharaśvāmin.
26. These are enumerated in J.S. 3.3.14.
27. Slight adaptation of Śrī.B. "tecām" has been substituted by udgītādyupāsanāhānām.
30. ibid., line 14.
31. The meaning of the maxim is that a positive statement (vīdhi) or a negation (niṣedha) resolve in the attribute of the substantive if they are not applicable to the substantive. For example, a positive statement is that "the individual soul is an agent". But according to Advaita, the individual soul is consciousness qualified by the internal-organ. If it is accepted that consciousness, the substantive (viśeṣya), is without agentship then the ascription of agentship must go to the internal-organ which is the attribute (viśeṣana). The example of a negation could be a person qualified by a walking stick. If the person is standing without the stick, then a statement that "the man with the stick is not here" the substantive is negated i.e., the man qualified by the stick. But since the man is there, the negation resolves only in the attribute i.e. the stick.
33. This statement is made by Rāmānuja in the Mahāpūrvaśākṣa. Para.24.
34. p.40.
35. Adaptation of the Śrī.B.
36. Suggestion (vyākhyāna) is considered to be a separate mode of signification in the poetic treatises. The Naiyāyikas include it within implication (lakṣaṇa). Cf., Vedāntakalpalatikā, op-cit., p.77.
36. "the scripture is of an ordinary nature" means that (a) it has no absolute reality like Brahman. (b) It employs methods of reasoning which are in accord with the modes of reasoning established in the world.

37. V.P. p.114.

38. ibid., p115.


40. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.282, line 10f, line 15; p.283, line 1f, line 4f; p.284, line 8; p.285, line 18.

41. ibid., p.285, line 16, 18.

42. The remarks on "purport" are derived from Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.35, line 8f. See also, V.P. p.28.


44. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.33, line 4f.

45. ibid., p.33, line 6f. Balasubramanian, ibid., p.11f.


47. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.31, line 23f.

48. This passage occurs in the Mahāpurva-pakṣa section of the Śrī.B., Para.23.p.37f.

49. The portion: "But if there...with regard to itself" has been added by Abhyankar.


52. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.43, line 5f.

53. ibid., p.43, line 23f.

54. Balasubramanian, Some Problems, op-cit., p.36.


57. Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52.


59. ibid., p.45, line 30f.

60. ibid., p.46, line 3f.
61. ibid., p.47, line 14.
62. Cf., 1.2. and comment.
63. V.P. p.12.
64. Slightly adapted, Rāmānuja's use of the word "siddham" refers to the acceptance of the pūrṇapāṇin's statement in Para.24. p.39.
65. Slightly adapted to convey the context of the quotation.
66. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.58, line 13f.
67. Rāmarāya also refers to this matter, ibid., p.72, line 7f.
68. "anubhūteḥ" has been added for clarity.
69. "anubhūtiḥ" has been added for clarity.
71. "karmapāṇ" in the quotation is better read as "karmaṇa" which is found in the Karmakar ed. and the ed. by Virarāghavacārya, op-cit., p.160.
73. The text of this verse cited here and the text of other editions i.e. Madhavananda and Röer, are mutually discrepant.
74. Slightly adapted.
75. Slightly adapted.
76. This maxim illustrates the failure to accomplish the desired object and the occurrence of what one strenuously tried to avoid; a person who seeks to avoid paying the road toll takes another path but loses his way in the dark. At day-break he finds himself in the vicinity of the toll-gate he had sought to avoid. Cf., Jacob, Maxims, op-cit., p.26. Also, Gode and Karve, op-cit., Appendix E. p.60.
77. The sixfold modifications of an object are: it originates, exists, grows, modifies, declines and perishes. Cf., B.S.Ś. 1.1.2. p.48, line 2. They are quoted from the Nirukta of Yāska.
79. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.77, line 22.
80. Slightly adapted.
82. Brh.Ś. 2.4.9. p.762, line 3; 2.4.13. p.767f, line9f.
83. Rāzarāya, op-cit., p.80, line 22f.
85. The illustration of: "the pot does not exist", which was previously discussed, is mentioned by Kaunṣabhaṭṭa in his comments to verse 16. in the Vaiyakaranabhuṣaṇasāra.

86. This verse is cited in the Śrutapraṇakṣikā, Vīrarāghavācārya (ed.), op-cit., p.144, line 4f.

87. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.84, line 24f.

88. Rāmānuja maintains that the Advaitins view contradicts the knowledge of the attribute and its possessor which is immediately evident in a cognition such as: "I know". Cf., Śrī. B. Para.37.p.62.

89. Abhyānkar has made a word-play upon Rāmānuja's verse: "If the sense of "I" is not the self, the self would not be inner...".

90. P.S. 5.4.50.

91. Cf., 1.34., and comment.

92. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.90, line 29.

93. ibid., p.91, line 3f.


95. Cf., Mahāpūrvapakṣa. Para.27.p.43. Rāmānuja presents a very accurate account of the Advaitins view: "ato manuṣyō'ham ...".

96. Cf., also Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.92, line 22f.


98. This is Rāmānuja's pūrvapakṣa.

99. Slightly adapted. Tadvata is explained as deḥātmabhimānavata.

100. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.95, line 22.

101. ibid., p.95, line 26.

102. Slightly adapted.

103. P.S. 3.1.133.

104. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.96, line 16f.

105. ibid., p.96, line 21f.

106. Slightly adapted. The word ātmanah added for clarity.

107. Space has the quality of sound. Air has the qualities of sound and touch. Fire has the qualities of sound, touch and form. Water has the qualities of sound, touch, form and taste. Earth has the qualities of sound, touch, form, taste and smell.

108. Cf., comment to 1.51.

109. Adapted.
110. Cf., text, 2.10.
111. This sentence is Rāmānuja's opponent's objection (Śrī.Ś.B.Ś. Para. 43. p. 76). Abhyankar has utilized it as the conclusion of his own argument.
112. Adapted.
113. Cf., comment to 1.19.
114. Cf., comment to 1.10., and fn. 36. in ch. 1.
115. Cf., Ma. vs. 5. Also, Rāmarāya, op-cit., p. 114, line 9f.
116. Rāmarāya, ibid., p. 114, line 17f.
117. Śrī.Ś.B.Ś. Para. 42. p. 75.
118. Slightly adapted.
120. Slightly adapted: "tathāiva" changed to "ṛthā".
121. Read as the passive form: "apeksyate".
122. Cf., comment to 1.2., final para.
123. Cf., Ātmabodha., vs. 5.
124. This sentence is given by Rāmānuja as the objection.
125. Vīrārāghavācārya (ed.), op-cit., p. 177., reads: "jñānavigayatvāt" instead of "mithvājñānavigayatvāt".
127. This sentence is based upon Rāmānuja's opponent's objection.
129. Cf., B.S.Ś. 3.2.4.
130. This sentence is based upon Rāmānuja's opponent's objection.
132. Slightly adapted. The first sentence of the quotation is a prima facie view. In the following sentence, Rāmānuja shows that it is in accord with his own position.
133. Slightly adapted.
134. Cf., comment to 3.47.
135. Cf., comment to 2.3.
136. Cf., comment to 1.17.
137. "And there is no fault, since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is, because that is seen" (B.S.2.3.30.). In keeping with the topic, the translation of the sutra follows the Visishtādvaïta interpretation.

138. "[Brahman] is the material cause, since this is not in conflict with the declaration and the examples" (B.S.1.4.23.).

139. In the verse cited, the words: "that which is imperishable" (tad avyayam) have been omitted.

140. This mantra has not been located in the texts consulted.

141. P.S.7.1.1. See comment to 3.179.

142. This text has not been located.

143. The statement is an attempt to bring the word "jnāna" under the class of words beginning with arsas. However it does not appear in the list supplied by Vasu. Cf., P.S.5.2.127. The meaning of that sutra is: "The affix ac (a) is used in the sense of possession (matup) after the words 'arsas' etc."

144. The text is adapted.

145. P.S.7.1.1.

146. In Kaiyāţa's commentary upon the Mahābhāṣya (P.S.1.2.42.), grammatical apposition is defined as: bhinnapravṛttinimitaprayuktasya anekasya śabdasya-ekasmaṁnarthe vr̥ttiḥ samanābhikaraṇyām ucyate.


148. Patañjali, Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya. With the Pradīpa of Kaiyāţa and the Udvyota of Nagojibhaṭṭa. Rohatak. 1961. p.352. The context is that sutra 8.1.72. states that a preceding vocative is treated as though it does not exist so that the following word receives the accent it would have taken had the vocative not existed. Sutra 8.1.73. prevents the operation of the previous sutra in the case where two vocatives are in grammatical apposition and the second qualifies the first. In this situation the second vocative loses its accent. Patañjali then gives a counter example: "O Aghnye, goddess Sarasvatī" to show that if the vocatives are in grammatical apposition but are synonyms, the rule does not apply and the second vocative retains its accent. Abhyankar cites this example to show that grammatical apposition does not depend upon a difference of reason for the application of the words to a certain thing, for then even synonyms would not have grammatical apposition.

149. Kaiyāţa is the name of the principal commentator upon the Mahābhāṣya.


151. Śrī B.Para.48.p.89,90.

152. Rāmarāya, op.cit., p.157, line 3f.
153. Slightly adapted: "siṣādhavīṣitā" is omitted.


155. Slightly adapted.

156. Slightly adapted.

157. Slightly adapted: "kasmād utkramanti" has been added.

158. Slightly adapted.

159. Rāmānuja has cited these texts as his pūrva-pakṣa, Śrī. B. Para. 51.p.97.

160. Slightly adapted: "uktasrutiṣu" has been added.

161. Abhyankar reads: "anavagatanānātvaṃ". Karmarkar reads: "avagatanānātvaṃ". Thibaut's translation follows the latter reading while the translation by Rangacharya and Aiyangar follows the former reading. "Anavagatanānātvaṃ" would appear to be more correct in view of the subsequent discussion. The edition by Vīrārāghavacārya reads: "anavagatam nānātvaṃ" which would confirm Abhyankar's reading.

162. Slightly adapted.

163. "Kurvadrūpa" is used in Buddhist thought to designate the cause that exists just prior to the effect. For example, because everything is momentary in nature, the seed that gives rise to the sprout is different at every moment. The seed which exists just before the production of the sprout is the "kurvadrupa". Cf., Nyāyakośa, op-cit., p.238. In the topic it means "not a cause at all".

164. Adapted, without deviation of the meaning.

165. The reading in the Viṣ.P. is: "dvaitino tattvadarsīnāḥ.

166. This explanation is based upon the Śruti-prakāśikā. Cf., Vīrārāghavacārya, op-cit., p.123, 124.


168. The affix "kvip" modifies the verbal root while adding no form of its own, cf., Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary, op-cit., p.135.


171. P.S.4.3.143.

172. P.S.1.4.24., 2.3.28.

173. The fifth case is used in the position of the object when the affix lyap (ya) is elided. For example: prāşādaṃ āruhya prekṣate = prāşādaḥ prekṣate. Cf., S.C. Vasu, Siddhānta Kaumudi of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita. Delhi. 1970 [?]. p.358.
174. In the sentence: "the Gaṅgā originates from the Himalaya", the word "Himalaya" is the "first manifestation".

175. Cf., Nyāyakośa, op.-cit., p.319, line2f.
4.1. All this world, consisting of mountains and oceans etc., is of an apparent nature and is certainly false because it is the effect of Ignorance. The exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita have shown seven types of logical fallacy in regard to the teaching of Ignorance: [1] the logical fallacy concerning the locus, [2] the logical fallacy of "concealing", [3] the logical fallacy concerning its essential nature, [4] the logical fallacy of being indeterminable, [5] the logical fallacy concerning a means of proof, [6] the logical fallacy of an agent for its cessation and [7] the logical fallacy of its cessation. Those [types of logical fallacy] can only be pleasing on account of not being investigated, but they are incapable of withstanding scrutiny. To explain:

4.2. Commencing with the "locus", the "concealing" and the "essential nature" and likewise being "indeterminable" are [all] logically possible for Ignorance which is the power of Brahman. 19.

4.3. अङ्गीकृतप्रत्येकाया जीव एवात्मायः | जीवश्रेणिः तस्यत्माः भवत्यात् | पवित्रप्रत्येकायेः पवित्रत्वं तत्साथायं स्वरूपं अप्रत्यायाय मनोविभाषा अत्योपरि: | तत्स्थाय अर्थवस्तुभावि तत्र तस्यः कार्यकारितः। | यत्र जीवक्रात्मायः अवियोगेऽविद्वैपश्च्या विनिर्देशोत्तरकङ्कालवत्स्तः तस्याः जीव आश्रयः संभवितः (श्रीष्ट्वा पु.)
4.3. [1] According to the view of the non-dualists, the individual soul alone is the locus of Ignorance. Because the individual soul alone has the cognition: "I am ignorant". Although the supreme Self has the power in the form of Ignorance and so that [supreme Self] too is the locus of that [Ignorance], still, that [Ignorance] does not cause any effect there [in the supreme Self].

But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.59.p.125.)¹:

because the state of the individual soul has been superimposed by Ignorance, the individual soul cannot possibly be the locus of that [Ignorance] since [the soul] comes into being at a time subsequent to Ignorance.

That is not so. Because there is no defect of mutual dependence here between Ignorance and the individual soul. For instance according to your view, the individual soul, who is the body of the supreme Self and whose nature is contracted just because of karma, is [nonetheless] the locus of karma. For being the locus of karma [i.e. the locus of good and bad unseen results] is impossible for a nature which is uncontracted such as a liberated soul. If [you say] there is no defect because [the connection between the soul and karma] is beginningless according to the
maxim of the seed and the sprout, [we reply] then it is the same for me also.

According to your view, does the individual soul perform karma while having a nature which is [already] contracted or while having a nature which is uncontracted? Not the first, because the contraction of its nature is produced by karma and therefore there is no possibility of the contraction of that [nature] prior to doing karma. Nor the second, because there is no possibility of engaging in karma which causes the contraction of one's own nature. Indeed, no wise person who is able makes a prison house for himself and enters it unless it be under duress. 2

What has been said (Sri.B.Para.59.p.125.) beginning with:

Nor even depending upon Brahman, because that [Brahman] is of the nature of self-luminous Knowledge and therefore is contrary to Ignorance.

That too is refuted. Because we certainly do not accept that Ignorance is dependent upon Brahman. For we do not accept that Brahman, who is unmanifest as having gained the state of an individual soul, is the locus of Ignorance.

Comment

For the Advaitin, the metaphysical principal of Ignorance (avidyā) is necessary in order to account for the appearance of the phenomenal world (see comment to 1.33.). Rāmānuja contends that if avidyā has no independent existence, which the Advaitin must accept, then it must depend upon something else. Rāmānuja asks whether the individual soul (jīva), or Brahman, is its locus. He argues that both alternatives are untenable. The jīva cannot be the locus of avidyā since the jīva is itself a product of avidyā. The effect cannot exist prior to the cause in order to serve as the locus for the cause. Moreover, Brahman cannot be the locus of avidyā because Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge i.e. self-luminous awareness, and avidyā is what is opposite to knowledge and is considered to be sublated by knowledge and hence avidyā cannot have what is contrary in nature as its locus.

In his reply Abhyankar upholds the view espoused by Maṇḍana-miśra and
Vācaspati that the jīva is the locus of avidyā. Be then argues that there is no mutual dependence in the manner that the jīva is due to avidyā and avidyā exists because of the jīva. Because neither can be ascertained to have a beginning just as in the case of the seed and the sprout. Abhyankar points out that the Visiṣṭādvaita criticism of the jīva as the locus of avidyā does not carry weight because the Visiṣṭādvaitin has the same difficulty explaining the connection between karma and the existence of a body. There is no possibility of karma without a body, but without karma a body is not possible. The Visiṣṭādvaitins seek to avoid this mutual dependence through the postulation of a beginningless series. Advaitins maintain that the same explanation can be employed in the case of the jīva and avidyā.

According to the view of Sureśvara and the Vivaraṇa, Brahman is the locus of avidyā. This view is acceptable because Brahman is of itself not opposed to avidyā. Brahman, as the witness-consciousness (sāksīcaitaṇya) of all mental states, illumines both knowledge: "I know" and ignorance: "I do not know" and so because Brahman is not opposed to ignorance there is no untenability in Brahman being the locus of avidyā.

Advaitins distinguish between the consciousness which is the essential nature of Brahman (śvarupajñāna), which is not opposed to avidyā, and consciousness in the form of a cognition i.e. a mental modification (vṛtti-jñāna), which is contrary to avidyā and hence is required in order to remove avidyā. Rāmanuja argues against this distinction. He says it is not correct to distinguish between the cognition: "Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge" which is considered to negate avidyā and the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman. Because both kinds of Knowledge are of the same nature i.e., the nature of illumination which is Brahman. If a mental modification is opposed to avidyā, the consciousness which is the nature of Brahman should also be opposed to avidyā.

Rāmanuja's objection attempts to blur the important distinction between consciousness per se and the consciousness occurring in a cognition. Consciousness per se merely illumines the presence and absence of all particular cognitions such as memory etc. Consciousness is opposed to neither knowledge nor ignorance since it illumines both. Cognition, however, is consciousness in a specific "form" which is conditioned by the content of the cognition. A valid cognition is opposed to ignorance since it is a matter of experience that: "previously I did not know this, now I know it". A cognition is contrary to ignorance when both ignorance and knowledge have the same content (vīṣaya). Ignorance, like knowledge,
is about some thing for upon inquiry it can be ascertained that: "I do not know this". If ignorance and knowledge have the same content then they are brought into opposition and the ignorance of the particular thing is sublated by the knowledge of that thing, just as one may say: "I did not know the pot, now I know it". So too, the ignorance and the knowledge of Brahman have the same content, i.e. Brahman and so the ignorance of Brahman can be sublated by a particular cognition arising from the appropriate means of knowledge.

Rāmānuja also argues (Śrī B. Para. 59. p. 126.) that a cognition such as: "Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge" would invalidate the Advaitins position that Brahman, being experience per se, is not the object of another experience. However, what the Advaitin means by the "knowledge of Brahman" is that the true nature of Brahman is experienced, but Brahman is not experienced as an object. For if Brahman is experienced there would be the contradiction between the experiencing agent and the object of experience which is none other than the Self. Even in nirvikalpaka-samādhi there is no objective experience of Brahman. The wise person remains as Brahman alone due to the absence of any experience of duality and because of that reason it is said: "he experiences Brahman".

4.4. 

4.4. [2] In order to establish the logical fallacy of "concealing", the refutation has been said by dividing the meaning of the word "concealing" in the text (Śrī B. Para. 60. p. 128.):

What is known as the concealing of light, is the obstruction to the origination of light or the destruction of existing [light].

That is worthless. Because there is no understanding of the real meaning of the word "concealing". What is known as the concealing of light, is the
non-manifestation of the light which is indeed existing but not the
destruction of light. For nobody believes that when the light of the sun
is concealed by clouds the light is destroyed.

**Comment**

In Rāmānuja's third objection, which will be discussed below, he
seeks to prove that the Advaitin cannot explain the ontological status
of avidyā. Rāmānuja asks whether avidyā is real (paramārtha) or unreal
(sparamārtha). The Advaitin cannot accept the first alternative since it
would result in duality. Rāmānuja then attempts to demonstrate that the
second alternative too cannot be accepted. Briefly, he argues that the
Advaitin considers the unreal world to consist of the three factors of
seer, seen and seeing. If avidyā is unreal then it should be in the form
of one of these factors. But if avidyā is either the seer, the seen, or
the unreal seeing which is conditioned by the seer and the seen, then it
too would require a cause to account for it and that too would require a
cause and so there would be an infinite regress.

4.5.  

This awareness, which is self-luminous and without an
object and a location, on account of a defect [i.e., avidyā]
located within itself, it experiences itself as having
endless locations and endless objects. It must be
discerned here: is this defect which is located in itself
That is not pleasing. Because according to our view, that of the mayā
Vedāntins, the supreme Self is of the nature of knowledge. For there is
the statement:

Knowledge is certainly not an attribute of the Self,
or is it in any way a quality. The Self, who is only
of the nature of knowledge, is eternal, all pervading,
auspicious. (Yoga.vr).¹⁰

And the power of that [Self] is Ignorance which is a positive entity. The
occurrence of duality should not be suspected, because a power has no
separate existence with regard to the possessor of the power. And because
the power is of an apparent nature, it has no existence in reality.

4.6.
4.6. That [power] is indeed the material cause of the world. This very [power] is expressed by words such as "prakrti", "maya", "tamas" etc. because it is a particular type of modification. That has been told in the Vasisthasamrti:

Some call that [power] prakrti, some call it maya,
whereas others say it is minute particles (Yoga.vr.).

The transformation of this very [power] is in the form of the pradhana, mahat, shakara and the five great elements and it is in the form of their respective aggregates. The subtle primary matter (pradhana) is the state of equilibrium of the three qualities sattva, rajas and tamas. The mahattattva is indeed the intellect. Because the intellect is translucent by nature, pure consciousness—which is the essential nature of Knowledge—reflects there. The Lord is consciousness reflected in the total intellect. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in an individual intellect.

Some say that the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance.

Although the Knowledge which is the Original is without an object and a location, still, the Knowledge which is the reflection—in the form of the individual soul and the Lord—appears to possess an object and a location on account of the Ignorance which is a positive entity which is located in itself [i.e. in the reflection]. Because Ignorance, just by its own nature, has something as its object and is located in something. For example, because of the dirt [i.e. avidyā] on a mirror, the face reflected in that appears to be dirty. It is like that. And so the Knowledge which is the reflection—in the form of the individual soul and the Lord—experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects on account of the defect in the form of Ignorance which is located within itself [i.e. in the reflection]. But not [the Knowledge] which is the
Original [i.e. consciousness as such does not "experience itself"].

The Ignorance which is a positive entity has no independence in regard to its own transformation and in regard to apprehending the Original. Nor even does the pure Brahman induce that [Ignorance to undergo transformation etc.]. But depending upon the pure Brahman which is its locus, it transforms and apprehends the reflection. A mirror, for instance, does not apprehend the reflection due to the impulse of the face, but naturally. Just because of this, that [mirror] does not have independence. Because there is dependence upon proximity to the face. This individual soul, who is a reflection of Knowledge, experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects because of the defect in the form of Ignorance which is a positive entity and that defect is certainly without absolute reality. Just because of this, that [Ignorance] does not have dependence upon something else. Just as a light, through illuminizing pots etc., illuminates itself too just of its own accord without depending upon another light, so too, this defect in the form of Ignorance which is a positive entity, depending upon Brahman, it superimposes the world and superimposes itself just of its own accord. Therefore there is no infinite regress. On account of this, [the statement] (Sri.B.Para.60.p.128):

"there must be infinite regress due to the requirement of another primary defect" has been answered.
4.7. Although it has been said (Srī B. Para. 62 p. 133.):

only the prior non-existence of knowledge is
experienced in the case of "I am ignorant".

That is not so. Because prior non-existence is invariably cognized only
as what is limited on account of time. But if [you say]: the cognition
"I am ignorant" must relate to absolute non-existence, or if temporary
non-existence is different then it could relate to that, but it does not
refer to ignorance which is a positive entity. [we reply] Certainly not.
Because we do not accept that there is some "non-existence" which has
absolute reality. But [we accept non-existence] as a reality which pertains
to ordinary relations. And the reality pertaining to ordinary relations
is of a fictitious nature and so the unreal construction which is the
basis is only the Ignorance which is a positive entity. Thus the maxim of
"day break near the toll-station" occurs. Because the Ignorance which
is a positive entity is alone the basis of the absence of knowledge which
pertains to ordinary relations.

Furthermore, according to the system of you, Rāmānuja, the cognition
that "I am ignorant" occurs for a bound soul. Is the knowledge which is
the meaning of the verbal root jñā, which is being denied there, the
knowledge which is universal or a particular knowledge? Not the first,
because if there is no denial of a particular knowledge then such a
cognition which is included in the knowledge which is universal exists,
therefore there is no possibility of the denial of the knowledge which
is universal. Because without the universal there is no possibility of
establishing the particular.
In the second case, is that particular knowledge about the essential nature of the supreme Self, or about the qualities of the supreme Self, or does it have the supreme Self for its object? It is not the first and second. Because if that was the case, there would be the cognition in that manner even for a liberated soul and that [type of cognition] is not accepted even by you.

**Comment**

The sense is that if the knowledge being denied in "I am ignorant" refers to the essential nature of the supreme Self or to His qualities, then even a liberated soul would have to say "I am ignorant". Because although a liberated soul can objectify the Lord he can not completely comprehend His essential nature or His endless qualities. Therefore the knowledge which is denied is that which relates to the supreme Self.

4.8. But in the third case, in regard to the knowledge having the supreme Self for its object, what has been superimposed—which is indicated by the negative particle—can be demonstrated somehow with difficulty. Because a liberated soul is one for whom knowledge has arisen having as its object the supreme Self as it really is. And a bound soul
is one who has the false presumption that such knowledge has arisen as it really is, even though it has arisen erroneously, and he believes "I am not ignorant". But for whom such knowledge does not exist to an even greater degree, he alone believes in that manner ["I am ignorant"]. In regard to that [latter case], in the absence of that very knowledge, how is the nature of it being superimposed able to be demonstrated? But the superimposition of the nature of knowledge relating to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc. is not logical because those two are completely distinct.

But according to our system, since there is no knowledge having the supreme Self as its object and since there is no knowledge concerning the qualities of the supreme Self, the knowledge concerning the essential nature of the supreme Self is alone the meaning of the verbal root jña. And that knowledge [concerning the essential nature of the supreme Self], is in reality without location and without an object and so the knowledge which arises for a bound soul and which possesses a location and an object is easily said to be just superimposed. Because the possession of a location and an object in knowledge is superimposed due to Ignorance. The superimposition of having a location etc., which belongs to Ignorance, upon the knowledge which is a reflection is reasonable, like [the superimposition] of movement etc. belonging to water—which is the limiting adjunct—upon the reflection of the sun. It is well known in the assembly of the grammarians that the negative particle indicates what is superimposed. Moreover, in not accepting the Ignorance which is a positive entity there would be the occurrence of tautology in the usage: "I am ignorant, I do not know anything" because even both of these words "ignorant" and "I do not know" have the meaning of the absence of knowledge.
4.9. [4] What has been said (Sri.B.Para. 60 p. 129.) for establishing the logical fallacy of being indeterminable:

indeed the whole totality of things has to be established according to cognition.

In regard to that, it is said; every colour such as "this is white", "this is yellow" has to be established by light. Even the black colour of darkness is just the same. Although there is no direct dependence upon light for the ascertainment of the colour of darkness, still, because [the ascertainment of the colour of darkness] depends upon the absence of light, there is certainly a dependence upon light as the counter-correlate of its absence. When something exists at some place, where it does not exist, there is the counter-correlate of its absence in that place. If there is the total absence of the existence of light in the world, just as the colour of other objects could not be ascertained so also the colour of darkness could not be ascertained, just as it could not be ascertained by one who is blind from birth. And so just as the colour of darkness, though not an object of light, is able to be established by light, similarly, the essential nature of the Ignorance which is a positive entity, though not an object of the twofold cognition in the form of "existent" or "non-existent", is certainly able to be established by the cognition in the manner of being "indeterminable".

comment
In regard to the logical fallacy concerning the essential nature of
avidya (cf. 4.5. and preceding comment), Rāmānuja stated that avidya has to be determined as either real or unreal. The Advaitin, however, considers that there is a third alternative: avidya is indeterminable as real or as unreal. In response to this view, Rāmānuja argues that all cognitions are in a twofold form: either a thing exists or it does not exist. When all cognitions are restricted to the form of existent (sat) or non-existential (asat) it is untenable to argue that there can be the cognition of an entity which is distinct from both sat and asat.14

The Advaitin can respond to Rāmānuja's critique by applying an uncompromising definition of what constitutes real and unreal. What is not cognized at any time is totally unreal, like the horns of a rabbit. What is not negated is real, such as Brahman.15 On the basis of this definition, avidya cannot be totally unreal because it is perceived in statements such as "I am ignorant". Nor can avidya be real since it is sublated by knowledge. Avidya cannot be both real and unreal because it is a contradiction to hold that the same entity can be simultaneously existent and non-existent. Therefore the ontological status of avidya is distinct from what is real and unreal (sadasadvilakṣaṇa) and hence it is said to be indeterminable as either real or unreal. The world too, as the effect of the primary avidya, has an indeterminable status (see comment to 1.42.).

4.10. Although the exponents of māyā do not accept that, in reality, the pure Brahman who is the Original has the experience of Ignorance, it is taught as accepted by the exponents of māyā and then for the refutation of that [view which the Advaitins do not accept] a great net of logic has been stated by the text beginning (Śrī B.Para.62,p.133.):

The experience of Ignorance is not possible for Brahman whose sole nature is eternal, free, self-luminous consciousness,
Nothing whatsoever is said by way of reply there. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept it to be so.

4.11. But what has been said (Śrī B. Prā 63 p. 136):

Moreover, the exponent of an error being based upon an unreal defect has difficulty in proving the impossibility of error without a substratum. For there is the logical possibility of error even in a substratum which has no absolute reality, just as when the defect which is the cause of error and the locus of the defect [are both unreal]. Therefore everything would only be emptiness.

That is based upon the denial of the discrimination between the nature of being not absolutely real and the nature of being fictitious. To explain. Indeed the discrimination of the nature of those two is thus:
what is unreal and appears to be real is "not absolutely real". What
does not appear at any time is "fictitious". With regard to those two,
fictitiousness can possibly be the reason for the emptiness of everything,
not the nature of being not absolutely real. But by the word
"therefore" you specified being not absolutely real to be the reason for
the emptiness of everything. So what is this throwing dust into one's
eye?

But if [you say]: perhaps there cannot be the demonstration of the
emptiness of everything, but the absolute reality of Brahman accepted by
the exponents of maya is not established; for there is the possibility of
error even in a substratum which has no absolute reality. [we reply]:
Certainly not. Because this defect, which can be expressed by the word
"Ignorance" which is something positive, is beginningless and depending
upon Brahman it has superimposed itself by itself alone in the form of
being the power of that [Brahman]. Depending upon that [Brahman] alone,
the individual soul has itself [Ignorance] as its locus and being a
reflection of that [Brahman] in itself [in Ignorance] is superimposed as
the knower of itself [i.e. the knower of Ignorance, in the manner that:
"I am ignorant"]. Having depended upon that alone [i.e. being the knower
of Ignorance] and having superimposed there [in Ignorance] the nature of
being an object of knowledge, that very [Brahman, who is unknown] is
superimposed as the object of itself [of Ignorance]. In the statement: "I
am ignorant", ignorance is the object of the jiva. In the statement: "I
do not know Brahman", Brahman is the object of that ignorance]. And
depending upon that alone [Brahman who is the object of Ignorance] and
having that [Brahman] alone as its basis, [Ignorance] itself transforms
into the manifest world beginning with space on account of the connection
[of Ignorance] with that [Brahman]. If Brahman were to be fictitious or
not absolutely real, then the operation of this defect would depend upon
what? But if there is no operation, nothing whatsoever could be seen
anywhere at any time. And because the world is seen, therefore it has to be necessarily accepted that Brahman is neither fictitious nor without absolute reality.

4.12. This beginningless Ignorance, which is the defect, is established by inference also (Śrī B. Para. 61. p. 131.)

The knowledge gained by a means of proof, which is the subject of dispute, is preceded by another entity which is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge, which conceals the object of knowledge, which is able to be removed by knowledge and which exists at the same place as knowledge.

Because [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not revealed before.

Like the light of a lamp first lit in the midst of darkness.

In regard to [the word] "knowledge" which is mentioned here, because the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman is not preceded by another entity, for the purpose of the exclusion of that [Knowledge], the specification of the subject (paksas) was made as: the knowledge gained by a means of proof. The specification of what is to be proved (sāthya) begins with: [preceded by another entity which is different from] the prior non-existence of knowledge. The meaning is: the other entity which
precedes is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge, conceals
the object of knowledge, is able to be removed by knowledge and exists
at the same place as knowledge.

4.13. What has been said here in regard to the inference proving the
Ignorance which is a positive entity (Śrī R. Para. 63, p. 136f.):

Because the reason is contradictory since it proves
another ignorance which is not accepted even in
regard to Ignorance.

If this is the intended meaning of that [statement]: the exponents of māyā
have demonstrated the Ignorance which is a positive entity through an
inference, having introduced as the reason (hetu): revealing a thing which
was not revealed before. That very reason would prove that the knowledge
gained by a means of proof, in the form of such an inference, is preceded
by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity
which is the object of that [other ignorance]. Because the Ignorance which
is a positive entity, which was not revealed previously, is revealed by
that very inference. The exponents of māyā certainly do not accept another
such ignorance. Because if the Ignorance which is a positive entity is
concealed by another [ignorance], liberation is indeed established of its
own accord and so there would be no worldly existence. Therefore the
reason is contradictory.
4.14. Then [if that is the interpretation], it is examined in the following manner. This reason is not contradictory. Because a reason is contradictory when it is pervaded by the absence of what is to be proved. But the meaning: "it is contradictory according to the view of the exponents of maya" is contrived. Moreover, this inference does not reveal a thing which was not revealed before. Because the Ignorance which is a positive entity is revealed through the direct perception: "I am ignorant". Moreover, even though the knowledge gained by a means of proof, which establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity, is demonstrated to be preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever. The Ignorance which is a positive entity is concealed by another ignorance, but it is not destroyed. And in the absence of its destruction, how could liberation be established of its own accord?

It should not be said: if the Ignorance which is a positive entity is concealed, because that [Ignorance] is not recognized, how can it be the cause of the effect in the form of the manifest world? Because what is not recognized and what is not absolutely real is not the cause of an
effect. [reason] Because fire etc., though not recognized and not absolutely real, is seen to be the cause of effects such as burning etc. Its effect too must be without absolute reality, but that is another matter. Furthermore, an apparent snake which is indeed not recognized [since it does not exist] certainly produces even knowledge which is not of an apparent nature. Moreover, even a cause pertaining to ordinary relations, though not at all recognized, possesses causality. For example, a fire—which is indeed existing though it is not recognized—produces burning. And where a tiger etc., which is certainly recognized, produces fear, the tiger is not the cause of the fear but rather the knowledge of the tiger. But the tiger is figuratively referred to in the world as the cause of fear since it produces fear by means of knowledge [of its effects].

4.15. But if this is the intended meaning [of the statement "Because the reason is contradictory...", supra] \(^{18}\); just as the knowledge gained by a means of proof is established as being preceded by another entity due to the reason that [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not revealed before, so too, because that other entity, though it is Ignorance, reveals an object in the form of the manifest world which was not revealed before, then in the consequence of it being preceded by another entity, another ignorance would be established. And the exponents of \(māyā\) certainly do not accept that, Because if the manifest world is indeed concealed by another
ignorance, liberation is established of its own accord. [refutation] Even then, just as before, the reason is certainly not contradictory. Moreover, the Ignorance which is a positive entity is the material cause of the manifest world but it is not the revealer of the manifest world. The clay certainly does not reveal the pot. You yourself have said (Śrī B. Para. 63, p. 137.): "Because everywhere it is Knowledge alone which reveals".

The discussion which follows is in response to Rāmānuja's objection to the example given in the syllogism, i.e. "Like the light of a lamp first lit in the midst of darkness". Rāmānuja states that it is cognition alone which reveals things. The senses only cause the origination of the cognition which reveals the object and the light of a lamp merely assists the senses through the removal of darkness. Rāmānuja maintains that what is meant by "revealing" is not a mere removal of something but the accurate determination of the object, which can only occur through cognition.

Abhyānkar's statement, while accepting that cognition brings about the accurate determination of the object, seeks to establish Rāmānuja's prima facie view, i.e. the analogy of light with cognition is apt because their nature is similar in so far as they both remove what is contrary to themselves.

4.16. Although Knowledge alone reveals because it brings about the accurate determination of the object, still, the light is also said to reveal as it is the means for optical knowledge. Because that too, like
Knowledge, removes what is contrary to itself. For "revealing" is said to be the removal of the cause of non-revealing. The light of a lamp was specified only with this intended meaning.

The sense organs, however, produce knowledge by means of the operation consisting of the connection with the sense object. But not by means of the removal of any thing. So because they do not reveal a thing which was not revealed before, there is no impairment even in the absence of being preceded by another entity. But [the statement] (Śrī T. B. Para. 64. p. 137.) such as:

If the auxiliary factors too are accepted as revealing a thing which was not revealed before, then because the sense organs are the most helpful [among those factors] they would have to be accepted as revealing things which were not revealed before. If that is the case, the reason ["Because of revealing a thing which was not revealed before"] is inconclusive because those [sense organs] are not preceded by another entity which they can remove.

That is worthless. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept that all auxiliary factors reveal, but only those which remove what is contrary to revealing.

4.17.

यथ प्रत्युपासाद्विप्राधानम् (भी.० ९३ पृ.० १) वदार्यात्। द्वितीयोऽहि सः प्रतिक्रिया: प्रतिक्रिया:— १ अहां न ज्ञानानि ज्ञानानि सत्यतं। २ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य, अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ३ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ४ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ५ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ६ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ७ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ८ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। ९ अहां न ज्ञानारण्य। १० अहां न ज्ञानारण्य।
4.17. The demonstration of nine contrary inferences (Śrī.Ś.Para.64.p.138f.) is incongruous. Because he [Ramanuja] has shown the counter syllogisms in this manner:

(1) Ignorance does not have Brahman, which is pure Knowledge, as its locus. Because it is Ignorance. Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc. For that has the knower as its locus.

(2) Ignorance does not conceal Knowledge. Because it is Ignorance. Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc. For that conceals the object.

(3) Ignorance cannot be removed by knowledge. Because it does not conceal the object of knowledge [the Advaitin says Ignorance conceals Brahman who is not an object of knowledge]. Whatever Ignorance can be removed by knowledge, conceals the object of knowledge. Just as the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc.

(4) Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance. Because [Brahman] is bereft of knowership. Like a pot etc.

(5) Brahman does not have Ignorance as its concealing factor. Because [Brahman] is not an object of knowledge. Whatever has ignorance as its concealing factor is an object of knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.

(6) Brahman does not possess Ignorance which can be removed by knowledge. Because [Brahman] is not an object of knowledge. Whatever possesses ignorance which can be removed by knowledge, is an object of
knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.

(7) The knowledge gained by a means of proof is not preceded by an Ignorance different from the prior non-existence of knowledge. Because it is knowledge gained by a means of proof. Like the knowledge gained by a means of proof which demonstrates the Ignorance you accept.

(8) Knowledge does not destroy an object. Because it is [only] knowledge when it is bereft of being augmented by a particular power. Whatever destroys an object—whether it is knowledge or ignorance—is seen to be augmented by a particular power. Like the knowledge belonging to the Lord and yogins etc. And like [the ignorance] belonging to a hammer etc.

(9) Ignorance which is a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge. Because it is something positive.

Like a pot etc.
4.18. Among these counter syllogisms which have been stated, the first and the fourth inference are not inimical to us. Because what is to be proved there, i.e., Brahman who is pure Knowledge is not the locus of Ignorance, is accepted by us also. It was mentioned just previously (4.11) that the locus of Ignorance is the individual soul who is a reflection and who is superimposed as a knower.

Thus pure Brahman, although not concealed by Ignorance, still, Ignorance, depending upon that very Brahman and being the power of that [Brahman] has as though entered into that [Brahman] because of being a power and having superimposed in that Brahman the nature of being an object of knowledge, and having superimposed the nature of being an object of itself [of Ignorance], subsequently that [Brahman] is concealed. Just as fire, though able to be extinguished by water, enters into water—even though it is contradictory to itself—in a subtle form and having superimposed the nature of being an object of itself and having superimposed its own quality of heat in that [water], it conceals the coldness belonging to that [water]. It is like that. On account of this, the second inference and the fifth inference are refuted.

The reason is not established in the third and the sixth inference. Because that [Brahman] is concealed by Ignorance, only having superimposed upon Brahman the nature of being an object of knowledge. And in the seventh inference, the example is certainly not possible. Because it was stated just previously (4.14.): "even though the knowledge gained by a means of proof, which establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity, is demonstrated to be preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever".
In the eighth inference there is proving of what is already established. Because we do not accept that the knowledge of Brahman destroys a [real] object. Because in our system, even the manifest world beginning with space is superimposed and is therefore not a real object. Moreover, the reason too is not established. Because being bereft of augmentation by a particular power cannot be ascertained in regard to the knowledge of Brahman.

In the ninth inference the reason possesses a limiting condition. Because referring to what is absolutely real acts as a limiting condition. There is the pervasion of what is to be proved (sādhyā) by: whatever is not able to be destroyed by knowledge certainly possesses absolute reality. There is no rule: whatever is a positive entity certainly possesses absolute reality. Because there is deviation in regard to Ignorance which is a positive entity and in regard to the manifest world beginning with space which is based upon that [Ignorance]. Therefore there is no pervasion of the means (sādhana) [i.e. the reason].

4.19. Furthermore, this reason [in the ninth syllogism] is inconclusive, for the destruction of fear, though it is something positive as it is produced by the knowledge of the snake, is seen to occur through the knowledge "this is a rope". But if [you say]: the destruction of fear is
from the destruction of the cause of fear which is the knowledge of the snake, but not from the knowledge of the rope. [our reply is] Even then [the reason] is certainly inconclusive. Because the destruction of the knowledge of the snake, which is something positive, is seen to occur through the knowledge of the rope.

[objection] There is no destruction of the knowledge of the snake through the knowledge of the rope, but it occurs spontaneously because it is momentary.

[reply] No. Did the supreme Lord indicate to you that "knowledge is momentary"? Rather, knowledge remains as long as there is the presence of the cause such as a sense object etc. Because cognition is just in that manner. It should not be said: still, the destruction of the knowledge of the snake is because of the destruction of the snake, but not because of the knowledge of the rope. [reason] Even then the inconclusiveness is just the same as before, because the destruction of the snake, which is something positive, occurs through the knowledge of the rope.

4.20. What has been said (Śrī, B, Para. 65, p. 140.):

If those fears etc. are not momentary, then the result would be the perception of multiple fears: because in the continuous stream of cognitions which are the cause of fear etc., all the cognitions without exception would be the cause for the origination of fear etc.

That is mediocre. Because the one who accepts that fear is not momentary should accept that Knowledge too is certainly not momentary. And so
because there is no continuous stream of Knowledge, therefore the consequence of the perception of multiple fears is far removed.

4.21. The ridicule made by this text (Śrī.Ś.Para.65.p.140.):

[Your] skill in syllogisms has been revealed by the mention of meaningless qualifications: "preceded by another entity which is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge"

is, however, out of place. Although these words: "different from the prior non-existence of knowledge" and "another" are meaningless when the statement is just: "preceded by an entity" which is established only by the word "entity" which signifies something positive, still, it is told in that manner for the facility of comprehension on the part of the listener. Since the Vaiśeṣikas count even non-existence among the seven categories, therefore there is the possibility of confusing even that as an entity.

Furthermore, how is it that [you], who are causing the ridicule of another in this manner, did not see at the time of showing the nine counter syllogisms that the fourth inference is meaningless since it is established by the first inference? There is only a difference in the arrangement of the words here: "Ignorance does not have Brahman as its
locus" and "Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance". There is no difference at all concerning what is to be proved. It should be investigated in this manner by intelligent people: the fifth inference is meaningless since it is established by the second, the sixth is meaningless since it is established by the third and the ninth is meaningless since it is established by the eighth.

4.22. Although it has been said (Sri.B.Para.65.p.140.):

This [view of the Advaitin] too: "the material cause of a thing which is false ought to be indeed false", is refuted by the reasoning in this section [beginning with the sūtra]: "No, on account of the dissimilarity" (B.S.2.1.4.). In regard to that, it is said:

The material cause of a false thing is false. The world is indeed of an apparent nature. In the case of error, there is certainly no possibility of the "apprehension of the real" anywhere.20.

4.23. 'सिद्धाभूमिस्य जगत उपदाने मिथ्येऽवैभवस्य बहुं योगम्।' तद्वेद भावस्यांतः

यदि जगद्धानुभवस्य 'कार्यकारणोऽवस्य बैलरस्वस्य भवित्वयुः' इति तद्विकरणात्तथाः स्प्याः हि मिथ्याभूतस्य जगतस्तस्तत्तत्तथां सिद्धाभूमिस्य भावस्यांतः न कार्य संभवत्वयाविकाराविभोऽग्नात। किंतु क्रियाविद्युपकार संख्ययथोऽवस्य तद्विकरणात्तथाः।

तथा न कार्यकारणोऽवस्य साल्क्ष्येऽयं बाच्यत्वस्य प्रचलितान्तिवेत्।
4.23. The intended meaning of the exponents of *māyā* is that: the material cause of the false world is capable only of being false. That [material cause] is indeed Ignorance which is a positive entity. If the purport of that section would be: "in every way there can only be dissimilarity between the cause and the effect", then the Ignorance which is a positive entity, and which is something false, cannot possibly be the cause of the false world as it has the same characteristic as that [world]. So there would be contradiction with that section.

But the purport of that section is only: "even though there is some dissimilarity there is no loss of a cause–effect relation". And so the possession of the common characteristics between the cause and the effect must certainly be demonstrated as far as possible. The exponents of *māyā* made this intention very clear by using the word "it ought": "the material cause of a thing which is false ought to be indeed false". Indeed, you too have certainly established the possession of common characteristics between the cause and the effect by saying: "Brahman is the cause, having the subtle sentient beings and insentient matter as its modes, and Brahman is indeed the effect, having the gross sentient beings and insentient matter as its modes".

4.24. यद्वि प्रतीयायनेन हि प्रतीतिध्रान्तिवाचविषयः (श्रीमान्पूरुणपुरोहिता)
हत्यादेह बन्धनायां कार्यापि संयस्तधेरः न तदर्थेन्तरां कार्यावशेषः साधुः भवति। अति प्रतीयायामेवत्यस्य 'अन्यथ तत्त्वस्य' इति ज्यो दृष्टिभावायनेन सत्यविवेचनेन प्रतीयायामेवत्यस्य प्रतीतिध्रान्तिविषयो भवतीत्यस्युः कस्ये तदा यथाश्रयो बन्धवादनेन भूलेन्द्रस्य जगतः सत्यविवेचनेन प्रतीयायामेवत्यस्य प्रतीतिध्रान्तिविषयो ज्योत्त्वम्यूलात्मकस्य जगतः प्रतीतिध्राविषयात्त्वः संभवति तथापेक्षाग्रुप्ते—
शुद्धव्यवस्थानि हि वजरसंस्काराद्विलुप्ततान्तरोपनिवेशनेन जन्मति। तास्य-संस्कारारम्भवित्वानेन सत्यविवेचनेन प्रतीतिरेजसा दृष्टे। शुद्धव्यवस्थानिवेष्ये
Although it has been said (Śrī B. Para. 65. p. 141.):

For only what is perceived is an object of cognition,
error and sublation.

The exponents of māyā too certainly accept that. That is not a negating factor in the acceptance of the world as indeterminable. But having completed the remainder of this "only what is perceived" [with the words] "as real elsewhere", the meaning is constructed as: "only what is perceived as real elsewhere is the object of cognition etc. elsewhere [at another place]. Then even though the world, which has been accepted as indeterminable, cannot possibly be an object of cognition etc. since according to the view of the exponents of māyā the world is not perceived as real elsewhere, still, it is explained in this manner: the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. certainly produces the indeterminable silver, being assisted by the mental impression of silver. The requirement of a cognition being real elsewhere is seen in regard to the origination of such a mental impression. It must be so in the case of the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. But because the primary ignorance is the power of Brahman there is no requirement of any other thing since it acts in dependence upon Brahman. Moreover, even a mental impression certainly exists since the individual souls are beginningless in the beginningless cycle of worldly existence.

**Comment**

Abhyankar fills out Rāmānuja's rather enigmatic statement: "only what is perceived is an object of cognition, error and sublation" by adding the phrase: "as real elsewhere". The argument would then mean that the erroneous cognition of something, such as silver upon a pearl-oyster, is possible only if real silver has been previously experienced. Because of the prior experience of real silver there is the production of the mental impression...
of silver and on account of the mental impression the pearl-oyster can be erroneously perceived as silver. But in the case of the world, this is not possible. For if the world is superimposed upon Brahman, like silver upon the pearl-oyster, the prior experience of a real world would be necessary in order to generate the mental impression of a world which could be superimposed upon Brahman. But according to the Advaitin, the prior experience of a real world is not possible.

The Advaitin agrees that a prior impression is required, but disputes that such an impression must be of something real. According to the Advaitin, even a false mental impression is sufficient: if a nightmare occurs after seeing a horror movie, the impression of the film is required even though the film is itself unreal.

4.25. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.141.)\(^{19}\): because the appearance of one thing in another manner cannot be avoided, even in the imagination of the indeterminable silver in the case of the error of silver on a pearl-oyster etc.

That is worthless. Because silver is recognized in the silver on the pearl-oyster. Then subsequently the sublation is experienced: "this is not silver". And this sublation is not experienced as limited by a certain time in the manner: "this is not silver now". But [it is experienced]
only in a general way: "this silver did not exist even before". And so the sublation certainly exists before. Only it is experienced later. So the silver there [on the pearl-oyster] has no reality, even for an instant, whether pertaining to absolute reality or to ordinary relations and hence it is indeterminable as being real. So too, if it is non-existent like the horns of a rabbit it would not be recognized even for an instant. But it is recognized. Therefore it is indeterminable as being unreal. On account of no other recourse, the silver etc. of this kind must be supposed to have a momentary existence of an apparent nature. Otherwise how could the pearl-oyster appear in the form of non-existing silver? Because there is no possibility of the appearance of the one thing in another manner. And this silver is certainly determinable in the manner of having an apparent nature.

**Comment**

Rāmānuja maintains that the appearance of one thing as something else has to be accepted. He says (Śrī,B,Para.65,p.141f.) that all the different explanations of erroneous cognition must admit that one thing appears in another manner; in asatkhyāti the non-existent appears as existent, in atmakhyāti the "self" appears as something external, in akhyāti some thing, such as "silver", is apprehended as the attribute of something else, such as "this".

The Advaitin considers it is incorrect to hold that one thing appears in another manner, such as a pearl-oyster appearing as silver. Because the silver does not exist. Nor can it be said that there is the non-appearance of what exists. Because the cognition is only "this is silver", but at that time there is no cognition in the manner: "I do not have the cognition of the pearl-oyster".

**4.26.**

यथप्रति रज्ञे वज्रित्वेद्याया भातिबासिकादिविवेत्तेन न भास्ते तथापि न हात: || विद्यान्वयु प्रक्षारे पच्छे बैतलिथानां सर्वपरम्परे देवतारूपम: विनीतिष्ट्येन:। शुक्किन्तवा वन्निश्वाश्चानान्य सर्वे स्वारूपानाम:। न यथान्यसयास्त्यायाम्। अविद्यामये रुष्यार्यामां सि सर्वे सुधावनीयानान्। न च तदानीवंत्यानगरस्य न्यायनिर्वेचणी-यथासिद्धिं प्रतेयो:। अर्थं हु अगास्तंजनविषेष:। (शीर्षाम् पूर १४ १५ १८)
Although this silver does not appear to have an apparent nature at the time of its cognition, still, there is no impairment. Among the modes which exist, the non-appearance of some [modes] is certainly accepted by all the exponents of "apprehension" (khyāti) without exception. Because in regard to the cognition of silver upon the pearl-oyster, everyone accepts the non-appearance of the portion which is the pearl-oyster. This is certainly not the appearance of one thing in another manner. Because that appearance is in a form which does not exist. Nor is it the non-appearance of what exists. On account of this, [the statement] (Sri.B.Para.65.p.141.):

Indeed this [silver] which is assumed [by you] to be indeterminable is not recognized as "indeterminable" at that time but only as real silver is refuted. Because even though [a thing] does not appear as indeterminable, it does not appear in another manner.

It should not be said: there is the appearance in another manner because of the appearance that the silver is real. [reason] Because the reality exists in the pearl-oyster. It should not be said: there is the appearance in another manner because the reality belonging to the pearl-oyster, which is unconnected to the silver, appears to be connected to the silver. [reason] Because the reality, though belonging to the pearl-oyster, has been connected to the silver. For the silver is not a transformation of Ignorance alone. Nor even of the pearl-oyster alone.
But only of the pearl-oyster by means of Ignorance. And the non-cognizance of the pearl-oyster as a pearl-oyster is indeed Ignorance. But the knowledge of the pearl-oyster as "this" is, rather, certainly the cause for the origination of the apparent silver. Thus the mental impression of silver belonging to the knower, and so forth, must be known respectively to be the causes.

4.27.

...Thus when the origination of the apparent silver has been established, [Rāmānuja] commencing [with the statement] (Śrī. B. Para. 65, p. 142.): "the cause of the origination of that [silver] must be told", has assumed that the cognition of silver is the cause of that [origination of silver]—even though the exponents of māyā have not said anywhere that [the cognition of silver] is the cause of the origination of silver— and so he is led to be the receptacle of his own ridicule through jokes in this manner (Śrī. B. Para. 65, p. 142.):

[The cognition] originated without an object and having produced that [object] makes that its object—this is the reasoning of great people.

In the same way, the answer [given in the Śrībhāṣya] to that, which is
the supposition that the sense organs, their [inherent] defects, or defective sense organs are the material cause of the apparent silver and the refutation of that, are certainly worthless. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept [such a supposition] to be true.

But the defects belonging to the sense organs are certainly accepted as the efficient cause. And that is logically possible. Because the defects belonging to the sense organs have the possibility of being connected to the sense object, such as the pearl-oyster etc., by means of the visual rays etc. of the sense organs.

Thus [Rāmānuja], having supposed on many occasions what the exponents of māyā do not accept, there is an elaborate logical refutation of that, but in regard to what is accepted, some answer is given in one line or in a half of it. So this is a new mode of refutation which is seen.

4.28.

Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.66.p.142.):

How does this new and indeterminable collection of things become an object through the idea and the word "silver" etc. and not through the idea and the word "pot" etc? [Advaitin]: Because of the similarity to the silver etc. [Viśiṣṭadvaitin]: Then the cognition and the word should be only: "similar to that".
That is incongruous. Because there is no application here for the knowledge of similarity. But the similarity existing in relation to the object awakens the mental impression of silver. And that awakened mental impression transforms that ignorance of the pearl-oyster only into the form of silver, not into the form of a pot etc. In the sequel to this, the mayā Vedāntins certainly do not accept the net of fallacious reasoning beginning (SṛṬ.B.Para.66.p.142.):

If [you say] that [the similarity] is because of the connection with the generic characteristics of silver etc., then is that [generic characteristic] real or unreal?

So nothing is said by way of reply there.

4.29.

Ramānuja has accepted in all places the "apprehension of the real" (satkhyāti) according to the text beginning (SṛṬ.B.Para.66.p.143.):

The view of those who know the Veda is that all knowledge is true.
In regard to that, it is being investigated in the following manner. The meaning of that [sentence: "R. has accepted in all places the 'apprehension of the real' . . ."] is: "apprehension" (khyāti) means cognition. And that [apprehension] is everywhere only of what is real, nowhere is it of the unreal. If the meaning of this; "of what is real" is: "of what is real, though in a form which is apparent", then we certainly accept the "apprehension of the real". But he [Rāmānuja] does not accept it in that manner. If the meaning is: "of what is real, in a form which is indeed absolutely real", then there could be no cognition of water in a mirage.

[objection] A portion of water certainly exists in the earth due to the threefold combination or due to the fivefold combination.20

[reply] True, [but] the nature of water certainly does not exist in an object qualified according to the threefold combination. Although the nature of water exists in the portion of water belonging to a part of that [object], still, it is not able to be known. Because the threefold combination is a union which is incapable of separate division. Because the elements are not able to be perceived prior to the threefold combination as they are extremely subtle, therefore even after the threefold combination there is no possibility of the perception of only the water which belongs there [in that combination].

Furthermore, it does not stand to reason that this portion of water, though extremely subtle and though far away, is apprehended, while it is not apprehended by those who are nearby. But only those who have faith in that view could accept the statement about that (Śrī B. Para. 67. p. 147.) 21: there is no apprehension of fire and earth on account of the defect of the sense organ and because of some unseen factor there is apprehension only of the water.
4.30. Furthermore, for the one who has gone near, the cognition arises:

"this is not water". And in regard to that, there is the cognition of the water which [Ramanuja considers] is indeed real, as unreal and so the appearance in another manner certainly cannot be avoided.\(^{22}\) On account of this, [the statement]\(^{23}\): "because a portion of fire exists in the pearl-oyster due to the threefold combination, there is the cognition of that [fire] in the form of silver" is refuted.

Furthermore, why is that portion of fire known only in the form of silver? It could also appear in the form of lightning, the sun etc. Because prior to combining, the portion of fire is common to everything: lightning, the sun etc. It should not be said; some portions of fire which have undergone the threefold combination and have transformed into the form of silver appear as combined in the pearl-oyster. [reason] Because there is no means of proof for their existence there [in the pearl-oyster]. It should not be said: the cognition of silver is itself the means of proof. [reason] Because there is mutual dependence: for when that cognition is established as having the nature of the "apprehension of the real" the existence of the portion of silver in the pearl-oyster is established, and
when there is the establishment of the existence of the portion of silver, that cognition is established as having the nature of the "apprehension of the real". It should not be said: there is the assumption that a portion of silver exists in the pearl-oyster because of the experience of the similarity to silver. [reason] Because there is the logical possibility of similarity in regard to the pearl-oyster since it possesses the quality of lustre etc. which is similar to the quality of silver. There is certainly no rule brought about by the restriction: portions of a similar thing indeed exist in the similar object.

4.31. Furthermore, Devadatta has a confusion of ownership with regard to the clothes and ornaments etc. belonging to Caitra, which are similar to the clothes and ornaments etc. belonging to Devadatta. In that matter, there is certainly no penetration of the parts of the clothes etc. belonging to Devadatta in the clothes etc. belonging to Caitra. So how can there be the "apprehension of the real" in that instance? Even when the clothes etc. belonging to Devadatta have been destroyed, Devadatta, not knowing about their destruction, is seen to have confusion of ownership when the clothes etc. belonging to another are seen. The knowledge is well known from a boy to an old man that even between two exceedingly similar
kāraṇa coins the parts of one are similar to the parts of the other but they are not those very [parts]. And the taking of the Putika plant when there is no Soma is enjoined by the sacred texts because it possesses qualities similar to the qualities existing in the Soma, but not because of the actual existence of parts of the Soma. The taking of wild rice when there is no cultivated rice is also due to the same reason.

Moreover, if in the water of the Ganges, which is similar to milk, portions of milk exist, then when milk is given up in some vow even the water of the Ganges must be given up. If even pure food is similar to meat in form then it must be given up because parts of that [meat] exist in it. And the demons would be deathless on account of feeding upon spirituous liquor which is similar to the nectar of immortality. Thus there would be much confusion.

4.32. For the establishment of the "apprehension of the real" in dream, what has been said by the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.66,p.145.):

in dream, the Lord himself creates, in accordance with the merit or demerit of living beings, corresponding objects capable of being experienced only by the respective
person and lasting for various periods of time

is that the objects such as chariots etc. existing there [in dream] are
created by the supreme Lord and are certainly real. That is questionable.

Because fate is the common cause for all things in the world. And so there
is no such object whatsoever from which happiness or sadness is not
produced for some living being. Among those objects which the Lord created
in Devadatta’s dream from which happiness or sadness was not produced for
Devadatta, by whose fate did the Lord produce that object? And many objects
of an indifferent nature are experienced in dream. And so according to
the maxim: "even a fool does not engage [in an action] without aiming at
a result"²⁶, those objects are certainly not created by the supreme Lord
but rather they are superimposed by the individual soul. And this
superimposition is a particular type of memory.

4.33. The author of the sutras has loudly expressed that the objects
belonging to dream are merely māyā, in the sutra: "But mere māyā..." (B.S.
3.2.3.).²⁷ It is well known that the word "māyā" signifies what is
indeterminable. And the nature of being indeterminable means just lasting
for various periods of time when [an object] is capable of being experienced only by each respective person. Even though Rāmānuja has accepted that the objects belonging to dream are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and last for various periods of time, he has said (Śrī. B.Para.68.p.151.): "the word māyā is not seen to signify what is indeterminable". So what is this dislike toward the word "indeterminable"? But there is no suitability with the words of the sūtra ["But mere māyā..." ] in the meaning (Śrī. B.Para.395.p.801f.) 28 : "mere māyā (māyāmātram) means producing a wonder. Because the individual soul 'has a nature which is not entirely manifest' (kārttvyānabhivyaktasvarū- patvāt) [in the state of worldly existence] and therefore that [soul] has no possibility of being the agent of the creation producing a wonder. The creation in dream has the supreme Lord alone as its creator". [reason] Because it is said: "But mere māyā". But it is not said: "But the creation of the Lord".

Furthermore, in the expectation: "what has an unmanifest nature?", [the answer] is only gained through the contiguity: what is merely māyā [i.e. the state of dream, which is the topic], that [has an unmanifest nature]. Having given up that, and having supplied the ellipsis "of the individual souls", the construction of the meaning as: "because the individual souls have a nature which is not entirely manifest" is very clearly not accepted by the author of the sūtras. Even the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and last for various periods of time, just like the objects belonging to dream, and hence they are certainly unreal.
4.34. Furthermore, the power of the supreme Self, whose inconceivable power creates the objects belonging to dream which are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and which last for various periods of time, can in no way be restricted in regard to the creation of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. So why does Ramanuja not accept that the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are absolutely real like the objects belonging to dream? But there is no contradiction with the sacred texts: "For he is the agent" (Bṛh. 4.3.10.), "The one who [is awake] in those who are asleep" (Kāṭha. 2.5.8.) if the objects belonging to dream are superimposed by the individual soul. Because the individual souls are not different from the supreme Self. Although the objects belonging to dream and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are superimposed by the individual soul, because the supreme Self is the common cause everywhere, therefore he must necessarily be the cause there as well.

4.35. In the case of a crystal in proximity to a red flower, the redness occurring in the cognition: "the crystal is red" is not assumed to be unreal. Because that [redness] exists in the red flower. For the origination of a thing having an apparent nature is only accepted in the case where there is no proximity to what is to be superimposed. [refutation] But that redness is unreal as having inherence in the crystal and so there is only
"the apprehension of the indeterminable".

It should be understood in the same manner in the cognition: "the conch-shell is yellow" if the yellow colour belonging to the substance bile exists. But if that is not accepted, even the yellow colour is assumed to be unreal. But according to the view of Ramanuja, "the apprehension in another manner" cannot be avoided because the redness which is not inherently connected to the crystal and the yellow colour which is not inherently connected to the conch-shell appear to be inherently connected to them.

comment

For Ramanuja's explanation of perceptual error, see 2.41. and comment.

4.36. Although it has been said (Sr.B.Para.67.p.147.) \(^{29}\) for the establishment of "the apprehension of the real" in the cognition of a firebrand circle:

the cognition of a circle is logically possible because there is no apprehension of the intervals.

In regard to that, it should be investigated in the following manner. It is true that there is no apprehension of intervals in a circle which actually exists because the intervals do not exist and though the intervals
do exist in a fire-brand circle they are not apprehended because of the 
rapidity of movement. But is the cognition of a circle just the non-
apprehension of the intervals, or is the cognition of a circle something 
other than the non-apprehension of the intervals? Not the first. Because 
the non-apprehension of the intervals is the absence of the cognition of 
intervals and how could that [absence of the cognition of intervals] be in 
the form of the cognition of a circle? For the cognition of a cloth is not 
just the absence of the cognition of a pot. For this very reason, the 
learned people say that the happiness in the absence of sorrow here is 
figurative: "I have become happy upon the removal of my burden". Moreover, 
there is no cognition of a circle in a square even though there is the 
absence of the cognition of intervals. But in the second case, the 
origination of an indeterminable circle has to be accepted because the 
circle in the fire-brand circle does not in reality exist.

In regard to the cognition of a face in a mirror, even though one's 
own face in the cognition is certainly real, because that [face] which is 
unconnected to the mirror has become connected to it, the origination of 
an indeterminable connection must indeed be accepted to establish the 
cognition.

4.37. It is the same in the case of the confusion about direction also. 
To explain. The cognition of the different directions such as east etc. 
certainly has, as a rule, dependence everywhere, i.e. the east is with 
regard to a certain thing. For this very reason, the rule is established:
"one should eat food while facing the east". Otherwise, because all the different directions exist everywhere, there would be incongruity of that [rule]. And so what is east is with regard to which [e.g. person A], for that [east], when there is the knowledge of it being north with regard to that very [person A]—even though the nature of north exists in the east [with regard to another person]—because there is the absence of being north with regard to that [person A], the new occurrence can only be conjectured as indeterminable. On account of this, [the statement] (Sri. B.Para.67.p.148.): "the cognition of another direction is certainly true" is refuted. 30

4.38. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.67.p.148.):

Even in the case of the knowledge of a double moon etc., two sets of means which are mutually independent are the cause for the double apprehension of the moon: because there is the difference of the sets of means due to the difference of the movement of the light of the eye by pressing with the finger, or through cataract etc. One set of means apprehends the moon qualified by its own location. Whereas the second, moving somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the moon separated from its own location after apprehending a location near to the moon. Therefore, due to the two sets of means, when there is the apprehension of the moon qualified by the two locations simultaneously there is the particular [cont. next page]
cognition: "two moons" because there is a difference of the form to be apprehended due to the difference in apprehending and because there is no apprehension of unity. The other location being an attribute of that [moon] is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the other location and of the moon which is not apprehended in its own location.

4.39. That is contrary to experience. For example if a cloth placed upon a peg on the wall etc. in a house is seen with an eye pressed by a finger, not only is that cloth seen as double but even the peg which is its locus is seen as double. The wall which is the locus of that [peg], that house and the earth which is the locus of that [house] are seen as double. Thus there is indeed the experience that the whole world: the space along with the clouds and constellations, is seen to be double. And so [the statement supra.]: "Whereas the second, moving somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the moon separated from its own location after apprehending a location near to
the moon" is not possible. There is certainly no apprehension of a location near to the moon by the second set of means, so the apprehension of the moon separated from its own location is certainly far off the mark. So too, [the statement supra.]: "The other location being an attribute of the moon is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the moon which is not apprehended in its own location and [the uninterrupted apprehension] of the other location" is also not possible. Because even one among these: the actually existing moon, the location which is its locus and the location near to that [moon], is not apprehended by the second set of means. Therefore the whole world which is apprehended by the second set of means must certainly be accepted, even by someone not desirous of doing so, as indeed indeterminable.

Hence what the venerable Śrī Saṅkarācārya has said in respect of the śūtra: "And because of the logical impossibility in every way" (B.S. 2.2.32.) while refuting the views of the followers of the Buddha:

the more this doctrine of the Buddhists is examined for its possession of logical tenability, the more it indeed breaks down like a well in sandy soil. We do not see any logical tenability at all here.37 That certainly strikes the memory upon the examination of Rāmānuja's view here.

4.40. Thus there is the logical possibility of the relation of negated
and negating since it is correct that; what is indeterminable is to be
negated and what is other than that is the negating factor. On account of
this, the supposition somehow or other of the logical possibility of the
relation of negated and negating (Śrī. B. Para. 68. p. 150.):

The relation of negated and negating is logically
possible on account of being an object of the
experience of everyone and on account of being
devoid of that

is set aside. Moreover, it is well known in the world that a thing which
is the object of the experience of even many ignorant students is negated
by something which is the object of the experience of even a single
teacher who knows about the defect. Thus falsity, in the manner of being
indeterminable, is alone the criterion for what is to be negated. And all
this which is seen in the world is certainly indeterminable. Because its
basis is indeterminable Ignorance.

4.41.

4.41. The sacred texts etc. would, accordingly, be the
means of knowledge about Ignorance. There [in regard
to Ignorance], the knowledge of the real substratum
would remove Ignorance.

4.42. मूलभूतमान च 'एते ब्रह्मलोके न विन्दूमप्तेति हि मत्युद्धा'( छाप० १२ ।
2) हत्यादिशिष्टिसिद्धम्। अनुवत्तंस्तेनाभिनव्यभिचारीप्रमाणपुरुषोऽयुत्तुः। यदि 'क्षतः-
भिन्नित्वकर्मयथाचि। श्रव्यं प्रचारोऽयुत्तुः ( काठ २ । १।
भावस्थाभन्यथाप्रमाणोऽयुत्तुः शर्मनाशादि। क्षतं कर्मं फलाभिपरिवर्तवतं
पञ्चपुरुषार्थानां तत्तत्त्वाभिन्नित्वं। अत्र तद्भवं
तिरिक्तं सांसारिकफलं कर्मानुसारं प्रथमार्थाविश्वासी। एते ब्रह्मलोके न विन्दुम-
प्तेति हि गत्युद्धा इत्यं वचनादि। (श्रीचारणौ पृ. १०६। ५० ११।) हत्यात्.
4.42. The Ignorance which is the basis [of the indeterminable world] is established by sacred texts such as: "they do not find this world which is Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue" (Ch.8.1.2.) etc.

Indeterminable Ignorance is spoken of by the word "untrue" (anṛta). But what has been said (Srī.8.Para.68.p.150.):

Eśa signifies [virtuous] actions. For there is the statement: "both drinking the rta" (Kaṭha.1.3.1.).

Eśa is action which is free from attachment to the result, which has as its apparel the worship of the highest Person and has the attainment of Him as its result. Here [in the passage "enveloped by the untrue"],

anṛta is action which is different from that [ṛta], which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result and which is contrary to the attainment of Brahman. For there is the statement: "they do not find this world which is Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue".32

That is not so. Because the word "ṛta" is well known as signifying what is true. Amarasiṣṭha, too, says: "true (śatyaṁ), real (tathyaṁ), ṛṭam" (Amara.1.6.22.). And so anṛta means untrue. And that [anṛta] is indeed this Ignorance which is a positive entity and the cause of the ignorance of the world which is Brahman [i.e. the Self]. The distinction containing the reason for the absence of knowing is: "enveloped by the untrue". And this Ignorance is not [just] the absence of knowledge. But it is a positive entity which is different with regard to the absence of knowledge.
Otherwise, the mention of an̄ta as the cause for the absence of knowing would be incongruous since there is oneness of cause and effect.

comment

Ramanuja does not accept ignorance to be something positive, but he considers it to be the mere absence of knowledge (aham jñānabhāvavan). Abhyankar states that if ignorance is not admitted to be something positive in nature then the word "an̄ta" could not be specified as the reason for the absence of knowledge: "they do not find..., for they are enveloped by the untrue (an̄ta)". Because if an̄ta is itself just the absence of knowledge then there is no distinction between the cause - which is the absence of knowledge - and the effect which is also the absence of knowledge. It would be equivalent to saying that the effect is the cause of the effect.

4.43. 

4.43. Here too: "both drinking the rta", the word "rta" does not signify action. "Both drinking the rta" means that both are experiencing the results of action. Because even though the word rta signifies action there, it has an implied meaning in the sense of the results of action. The usage of the word "rta", which signifies what is true, is easy to demonstrate in the sense of the results of action. Because the result of action is inevitable according to the way which was told: "action does not waste away without [the result] being experienced" and therefore what is true, in the manner of what will inevitably occur, exists in the result of action.
Furthermore, according to your view, does the word "ṛta" signify a particular action or does it signify action in general? Not the first. Because there is contradiction with your own general statement: "ṛta signifies [virtuous] actions". Moreover, in accepting a particular action, is it understood to be preceded by attachment to the result or not preceded by that? In the first case, there would be incongruity with your own conclusion: action which is accompanied by attachment to the result and which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result is understood by the word "anṛta". Because in understanding such a type of action just by the word "ṛta", there would be the consequence of understanding something contrary to that by the word "anṛta". But in the second case [if it is not preceded by attachment to the result], your reason [for showing that the word "ṛta" means action]: "For there is the statement: 'both drinking the ṛta' would be incongruous. Because only action preceded by attachment to the result is understood there [in regard to the reason] since there is the teaching of the experience of the result of action; "both drinking the ṛta".

4.44. 

Furthermore, according to your view, does the word "ṛta" signify a particular action or does it signify action in general? Not the first. Because there is contradiction with your own general statement: "ṛta signifies [virtuous] actions". Moreover, in accepting a particular action, is it understood to be preceded by attachment to the result or not preceded by that? In the first case, there would be incongruity with your own conclusion: action which is accompanied by attachment to the result and which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result is understood by the word "anṛta". Because in understanding such a type of action just by the word "ṛta", there would be the consequence of understanding something contrary to that by the word "anṛta". But in the second case [if it is not preceded by attachment to the result], your reason [for showing that the word "ṛta" means action]: "For there is the statement: 'both drinking the ṛta' would be incongruous. Because only action preceded by attachment to the result is understood there [in regard to the reason] since there is the teaching of the experience of the result of action; "both drinking the ṛta".

4.44. But if the word "ṛta" signifies action in general, then how could the understanding of a particular action, which is what you accept by the
word "anṛita", be established? For no one believes that a thing which is a particular action is from the word "not an action". Because the purport of a word used along with a general meaning is understood from the topic etc. to be used in a particular meaning. But nothing is seen in that manner here.

But [the statement]:

Because the capacity of producing a result, i.e. the absence of the knowledge of the world which is Brahman, exists in an action preceded by attachment to the result; such an action is taught by the word "anṛta". And for the sake of that [knowledge of the world which is Brahman], the action which is free from attachment to the result is intended to be said by the word "ṛta"

is altogether incorrect. Because in the case of a word mentioned along with a negative particle, the intention of a particular meaning is contrary to the derivation. And because it is not seen anywhere. Because the reason for the use of a word expressing a counter correlate is just that it distinguishes the state of being related to the meaning of a negative particle [i.e. it does not give a qualified meaning]. For this very reason, when one pot exists, even though all pots other than that do not exist at that place, there is no usage: the pot does not exist. Otherwise, there could be the usage of the word "abrahmana" in regard to a particular brahmana such as Devadatta etc. Moreover, if by the word "anṛta" there is the understanding of an action accompanied by desire, because the person who is asleep has no obstruction due to the absence of action and because according to your view the sense of "I" is manifest at that time, then why does the knowledge of Brahman, who is [the persons] own Self, not arise?
4.45. The *Nasadasiya* hymn (Tai.Bra.2.8.9.3.) is also a means of knowledge for the Ignorance which is the basis of the world which is indeterminable as existent or as non-existent. Because there [in the hymn], Ignorance is expressed by the word "darkness" (*tamas*): "darkness existed". And for that [Ignorance] the nature of being indeterminable as either existent or non-existent is acquired through the double negation: "non-existence was not, nor was there existence". Although by this: "non-existence was not, nor was there existence" both existence and non-existence are said to have merely a state of non-existence at the time of dissolution, still, at that time, it is taught in that very hymn that darkness exists: "darkness existed". If that [darkness] exists, there is incongruity of the negation: "nor was there existence". If it does not exist, there is incongruity of the negation: "non-existence was not". Therefore, as a matter of course, that darkness is established as indeterminable as either existent or non-existent.

4.46. यथाव 'नासदसीयो सदा चरणीमित्रभत्वाविषय सदसहस्त्रीयो नियतित्वयित्रिव-पृष्ठो । उपाध्येयाय नरं नासदसीयोलितिरसुनसकितिहितिभूतेशस्तु नीरङ्गायय- ताहेदैवसम्भवो न सत्यावेश्ये वस्तुनात्र भावमात्रायात्मन्त्रायस्य नायस्य नाय कार्यतिसदसहस्त्रीयोंस्योऽध्येते (श्रीमाण्डूर् १० १० १० १० १० ।) ईतर्क्क तथा । सदसहस्त्रीयोलितिहितिभवकर्तने भवणाभावाता । अति भावानं सत्य, तत्रित्रदृढ़सम्बन्धत हि विषय: शाब्दिकों: मात्रैत्र। किं च विद्वानित्वमात्रां जीवात्माविज्ञाण्यां हयोह्यो अज जीवात्मामयी । उपाध्येयाय चिदव्यष्टि:नाययोपचारितःतः तनंतरं भवनितितिवित्तिकृष्ण्यात्मात् तनाश्रे भवनितितिविकृष्ण्यात्मात् तथा ।
4.46. But what has been said (Śrī B. Para. 68, p. 150,51.):

Here too [in the text]: "at that time, non-existence was not, nor was there existence", the two words "existence" and "non-existence" refer to the individual sentient and insentient things. Nothing is told here as having a nature which is indeterminable as either existent or non-existent. Because this sentence aims at teaching that the two entities which are the individual sentient and insentient things and which are denoted by the words "sat" and "tyat" at the time of creation resolve, at the time of absorption, into the entity which can be denoted by the word "darkness" and which is the collective insentient material.

That is not so. Because there is no means of proof that the two words "existence" and "non-existence" refer to the individual sentient and insentient things. For the meaning of those two words is well known: existence is what appears as "it is" and non-existence is what is contrary to that.

Furthermore, the disappearance of the individual souls, who are the individual sentient entities, in the collective insentient material is completely impossible. How do you understand from the description of the origination of the individual sentient and insentient entities in the sentence [denoting] origination that the statement of disappearance here [in the sentence: "at that time, non-existence was not..."] is for those very two? The statement about origination: "It became sat and tyat" (Ta...
2.6.1) certainly does not belong to this topic. Nor even are the words the same. Because the two words "sat" and "tyat" were specified in the statement about origination. But here the two words are "existence" (sat) and "non-existence" (asat).

4.47. Furthermore, the word "tyat" has the same meaning as the word "that" (tat). The word "that" indicates a thing which is remote, for there is the statement: one should understand "that" as something remote. Moreover the word "that" there [having the sense of something remote] is common to the world and to the Veda whereas the word "tyat" solely belongs to the Veda. And moreover the words "tyat" and "that" also have the nature of calling to mind what has preceded. And so a thing which is remote is expressed by the word "tyat" here: "[It became] sat and tyat". The meaning [of tyat] is "formless". Because generally there is an association between being formless and being remote. The word "sat" has the meaning of what appears as "it is" and it makes known a thing which has form. For it has proximity with the word "tyat" which has the meaning of "formless". And because generally there is an association between having form and existing. For there can be no doubt about existence in regard to something which has form. Thus the words "sat" and "tyat" certainly do not have the meaning of individual sentient and insentient things in the case of the statement about origination, so the words "sat" and "asat"
having that meaning in the statement about dissolution, on account of
conformity with that [previous meaning], is indeed far off the mark.

4.48. In that very hymn, the Ignorance which is the basis of the world is
expressed by this: "That one [Brahman], motionless, breathed due to its
own nature" and by this: "The world was concealed by falsity". In order
to make this clear, the meaning rendered by Śrī Sāyaśācārya there is
included here since it is more correct.

At that time, non-existence was not, nor was there
existence. ...That one, motionless, breathed due to
its own nature. ...Darkness existed. In the beginning,
knowledge was hidden by darkness. All this was indeed water. The world was concealed by falsity. That [world] produced through the greatness of darkness was the One (Tai, Brā.2.8.9.3-4.

**Commentary of Śaṅkara**

When the previous creation had dissolved and the following creation had not originated, "at that time" (tadānīm) even the two: "existence" (sat) and "non-existence" (asat) were not. The world which is distinctly cognized as qualified by name and form is expressed by the word existence. The non-existent, equivalent to a man's horn etc., is said as non-existence. Both of those "did not exist" (māsīt). ([Abhyankar's addition]: The purport of this 'non-existence was not' is that even what consists solely of imagination bereft of an externally existing nature, such as a rabbit's horn etc., did not exist at that time.) But some unmanifest condition existed. And that is not existing because it is not clearly evident.

Nor even is it not existing, since it exists as the producer of the world...."That" (tat) is Brahman, the reality, well known in all the Upaniṣads. "Due to its own nature" (svadhayā) means endowed with māyā which is the cause of the whole world and which depends upon itself [i.e. upon Brahman]. "It breathed" (māt) means that it was active. Action here does not mean moving, but it is specified as "motionless" (avatām), i.e. having the purport of: pure existence. It means free from wind, i.e. motionless....The primary Ignorance which is the material cause for the transformation into the world and which can be expressed by the words avidyā, māyā, śakti etc. is said by the word "darkness" (tamas). Just as darkness conceals objects, so too, this also conceals the reality which is
Brahman. Hence there is the expression by means of the word darkness. Some such darkness "existed" (āsīt) depending upon Brahman and capable of producing the transformation into the world. The whole world was "hidden" (gūdham) "by that darkness" (tamasa). Just as a pot is hidden within a ball of clay or just as a tree is hidden within a seed. It is like that. For this very reason, the "knowledge" (prakétam) could not be thoroughly understood. Accordingly, it is mentioned by Manu:

This [world] was of the nature of darkness, unknown, without characteristics, incomprehensible by reason, unperceivable, entirely like deep sleep (Manu.1.5.).

4.49. тат ०हान: सलिलमिति। यथा चवें शमिता नर्योपणः सलिल-पावसमेनाविक्षिप्तं तद्या सर्वं जागिरं तत् आसिद्। सया पश्चात्,हिष्ष-मित्येव। अत्र हि काव्यद्वयोस-सकार्यवादिनः कार्यस पूर्ववियवाणायेव कायपुप्पत्तं इत्यहुः। सत्कार्यवादिनस्तु साध्यादेहः पूर्ववियवाणायेव कार्य-मन्ययो सत्कार्यवाणायोपत्यां यथास्मात्तत्त्वतः तत्। सत्कार्यवादिनां भवेत् तथा तमसामृतिति तुह्यात्रिकतमुः। आ समानभूतसुलक्ष्यं इत्यहुः अयत्। तेतद् तुवेनेणिष्ठेहुः। तत्सवामार्येण निवर्त्येत्तर्कारणः मुहार्येत् तुच्छमुः। तेनांतिरहि मधुकृतः आरङ्गितमुः। तादेश् प्रज्ञावीरिकुज्जान्तिकरः सत्य- सैंकंहानल्पालमसः सकार्यवादिनः महेश्वरविभव्यक्तज्ञमूलपेनायतत्वतः। तत्तत्सवामिति तथा नगरार्येण भास्मादानमि परमार्येत् एवं व्रजेविति।

4.49. continuation of Sāṇāṇa's commentary

"Water" (salilam) is the illustration there. Just as hailstones which have fallen in the rain remain as mere water, so too, "all" (sarvam) the world was "this" (idam) darkness. The meaning is that [the world] remained in the form of mere darkness. Indeed here, the followers of Kāpāda etc., who are the exponents of the
prior non-existence of the effect in the cause, say that an effect is produced which certainly does not exist previously in the cause. However the followers of Sānkhya etc., who are the exponents of the prior existence of the effect in the cause, say that the effect, which is unmanifest, certainly exists previously and becomes manifest through the operation of the cause. In that matter, only the view of the exponents of the prior existence of the effect in the cause has been accepted by the sacred text: 'hidden by darkness'. Abhu means "world", [its derivation is]: ā has the sense of 'completely', bhavati 'it becomes' in the sense that 'it originates'. That [world] was indeed "concealed" (apihitam) "by falsity" (tucchena). The primary Ignorance which is the cause of that [world] is false because it can be removed by the mere knowledge of reality. Concealed by that, means [the world] was covered at the time of the dissolution. "Which" (yat) means the world which was in such a manner. "That" (tat) world, which was unmanifest, "was produced" (ajāyata) i.e. it originated, in the form of the manifest world "through the greatness" (mahīñā) "from darkness" (tamasāḥ) which is of the nature of Ignorance and which was mentioned previously.

That [world], though appearing in the form of the world according to the view of ignorant people, is in reality "the One" (ekam) Brahman alone.
4.50. This Ignorance, which is the basis of the world and indeterminable as either existent or non-existent, is expressed by the word "\textit{māyā}". The nature of \textit{māyā} means bringing about the creation of diverse things while being unreal. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 68, p. 151):

For the word "\textit{māyā}" does not everywhere refer to what is false.

Although the word "\textit{māyā}" does not have the sense of falsity everywhere, in accord with the meaning heard for this "everywhere" there [in the Śrī. B.], there is no negating factor in it having the meaning of falsity here [in regard to the texts cited in the Śrī. B., which will be discussed below]. But there is a contradiction with what is well-known if this "everywhere" has the meaning of "anywhere". Even boys at the present time use the expression: "these are unreal (\textit{māyika})", having seen the false things shown by a magician. \textit{Māyā} means [something] is formed (\textit{māyate}) in the sense that it is made to appear as though perceptible by it [i.e. by \textit{māyā}]. The affix \textit{ya} [is due to the \textit{upādī sūtra}]: "the affix \textit{ya} comes after the roots \textit{mā}, \textit{cho} and \textit{gas}".35

4.51. देशपुराणे धार्मिक्याः साध्वापत्तकोऽविज्ञेयः: स्वरूपः॥

'विशेषकारायणतः अविचितततव्रिष्टम्।
सन्तानज्ञानस्वः केवल भावा अवज्ञितम्।' इति।

वारदीभवतित्वाः भावानां। विज्ञेयते कारित्वाः।

माया चर्चयो ततोपह्रयो तात्पर्यं तद्वारा।
अनुपूर्वते तत्त्वं गृहजेऽशुद्दि: स्वरूपः ( प० १९०६/१३६२ ) इति।

तेन पानायितं तद्वारपरायणम्।
वाणपथ रक्षार्थे देशस्थीतिशालिनिः ( ६० प० १२१२ )
4.51. The essential nature of this [māyā] has also been told in the forty-fifth chapter of the Devīpurāṇa:

Māyā was declared by him to be like dream and magic in that it gives unexpected results and brings about wonderful effects in the world.

The Tāpanīyaśruti too is a means of knowledge about this.\textsuperscript{36} There is also the statement of Vidyāraṇya:

This māyā is of the nature of darkness (tamas), for that has been told in the Tāpanīya. The sacred text itself has declared empirical experience to be the proof there (P.D.6.125.).

This is indeed the meaning of the word "māyā" here as well:

The thousand māyās of Śambhara were destroyed one after another by that quickly moving [discus of Lord Viṣṇu] which is protecting the body of the boy (Viṣ.P.1.19.20.).

The meaning is that the thousand māyās dispatched by the demon Śambhara were destroyed one by one by that quickly moving discus of Viṣṇu which is protecting the body of Prahlāda. A false thing, though it can be negated by knowledge, is certainly able to be cut by a weapon. When a rope is being cut by some person carrying a weapon —whether he has the idea that it is a rope or he has the idea that it is a snake— a deluded person standing at a distance knows only that: "a snake has been cut".
4.52. Furthermore, as long as there is no rise of knowledge, the destruction of a false object is seen to be produced by a weapon which is false. The piece of wood in a dream is certainly seen in the dream to be cut by an axe which [itself] belongs to the dream. On account of this, [the statement] (Sri.B.Para.68.p.152.):

Here also various powers are spoken of: "Indra is said to be manifold on account of his māyā" (Bṛh.2.5.19.). Indeed it is for this very reason that it said: "He shines greatly here, [like] Tvāṣṭr" (Ṛ.V.6.47.19.). For no one shines who has a false nature is set aside. The adorned elephants and horses etc. existing in a dream, though false, are experienced by everyone as shining in the dream. The word "māyā" has only its etymological meaning in: "From this [prakṛti] the māvin [i.e. the possessor of māyā] creates this universe and in that [prakṛti] another [the soul] is bound by māyā" (Śv.4.9.), "When the soul, asleep because of beginningless māyā, awakes..." (Gaud.Kā.1.16.), "Indra is said to be manifold on account of his māyas" (Bṛh.2.5.19.), "my māyā is difficult to transcend" (G.7.14.) etc. No negating factor whatsoever is seen there.
4.53. Even the sacred text [revealing] the identity of the individual soul and Brahman: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of knowledge about the Ignorance [previously] mentioned. If there is a difference, in reality, between the individual soul and Brahman then the identity of those two is not possible. Therefore it has to be accepted that the difference is only fictitious. Since there is no logical possibility other than that, an indeterminate Ignorance is established as producing such knowledge of difference. But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.68.p.153.):

But the teaching of oneness is very appropriate because even by the word "you" there is only the mention of Brahman who has the individual soul as His body.

That is not so. Because from [the words] "you", "I" etc. there is no cognition anywhere of Brahman having each individual soul as His body.

Furthermore, from [the words] "you", "I" etc. does Brahman appear
as what is to be qualified by the individual soul, or as the mode [i.e. the attribute] of the individual soul? In the first case, there is no logical possibility of the usage: "you are sorrowful" etc. Because Brahman does not have even a trace of sorrow. It should not be said: the sorrow terminates in the individual soul, who is the attribute, on account of the maxim: "when the substantive is negated, the positive statement and the negation terminate in the distinguishing attribute".37 [reason] The nature of that maxim is that the idea of the listener firstly comes to what is qualified in accordance with that [statement]: "the syntactical relation between words is only in what is qualified", and being negated in regard to the substantive it terminates in the distinguishing attribute. But here in: "you are sorrowful", the idea of the listener does not come to the qualified sense even firstly and so there is no operation of that maxim in this case. Moreover, [the employment of that maxim] is correct in the case of a positive statement and a negation but not in the case of a statement. Because such a usage is generally not seen there [in regard to a statement]. In the same manner, there is incongruity of usage [if you say]: "it was said in this manner by you who are sorrowful" etc. and so the situation is just the same. Furthermore, there is no logical possibility of the use of the second person: "you are That". The usage must be: "That is you" just like here: "Brahman is your Self".

**comment**

Viśiṣṭādvaitins consider that in the sentence "you are That" (tat tvam asi) both the words "you" and "That" directly denote Brahman. The word "That" refers to Brahman as the omniscient cause of the world. The word "you" signifies Brahman, having the individual soul as His body.38

Abhyankar asks whether the word "you" refers to Brahman as the substantive (viśeṣa) of the individual soul, or whether it refers to Brahman as the mode, i.e. the attribute (viśeṣga) of the soul. In the first case, if the word "you" in the sentence "you are That" refers directly to Brahman, then a statement such as "you are sorrowful" would not be logically possible. For the sorrow too must refer to Brahman. It may
be argued that the idea of the listener firstly apprehends the qualified meaning, i.e., Brahman having the soul as His body. Because there is no logical possibility of the sorrow referring to the substantive, i.e., Brahman, then it must only refer to the individual soul who is the attribute. Abhyankar replies to this argument by stating that when the word "you" is uttered the first apprehension on the part of the listener is certainly not in the qualified meaning of Brahman having the soul as His body.

4.54. In the second case [if Brahman is the attribute of the soul], the logical impossibility of grammatical apposition in: "you are That" would be just the same as before. But it should not be said: the Self, who is the mode [of the individual soul], has grammatical apposition with Brahman. [reason] Because potness, which is the mode [i.e. attribute] of a pot, is eternal, the usage is certainly not seen anywhere that: "the pot is eternal" because it has the intended meaning of that [potness].

Furthermore, it is all the more logically impossible that [the words]: "you", "I" etc. have a meaning which terminates in the Self. Because these two designate pronouns. A word which is a pronoun recalls something. Here in: "Svetaketu, you are That", Svetaketu is being recalled by this [pronoun] "you". And the one being recalled and being addressed by the father is only the individual soul, not its inner-controller.

**comment**

In the second case, Brahman is said to be the attribute of the soul. Abhyankar states that if this is so, there is no logical possibility of grammatical apposition. In the first case —where Brahman is the substantive
qualified by the soul— the word "That" (tat) denotes the subject (uddesya) and the word "you" (tvam) denotes the predicate (vidheya). The meaning of the sentence is: "That [supreme Self] is you [the supreme Self having the soul as His body]". In the second case, Brahman is the attribute of the soul and so the word "you" becomes the subject and the word "That" becomes the predicate. But in this case the predicate does not convey any additional information. For example, one can say: "the pot is blue" since the predicate furnishes new information, but it is meaningless to say: "the pot is a pot". Similarly, the statement "you are That" is a tautology if it is said: "you [the supreme Self having the soul as His body] are That [supreme Self]."

4.55. Furthermore, like the word "body", the two words "individual soul" and "inert matter" are the two determining words among [those] which are indicators [of His body]. Otherwise, the usage you accept: "the supreme Self has the individual souls as His body", "the supreme Self has the inert matter as His body" etc. could not be logically possible. Rather the usage should be: "the individual soul is the supreme Self", "the inert matter is the supreme Self". And so "you", "I" etc., mother and father etc., Devadatta and Yajñadatta etc. are words expressing particular individual souls. So too, earth etc. and pots etc. are words expressing particular
inert things. So how would they be able to teach a meaning which extends as far as the Self? On account of this, [the view that] the word "individual soul" has a meaning which extends as far as the Self in the sacred text: "by this individual self" (Ch.6.3.2.) is refuted. But the reason which was told for denoting only Brahman by the word "you" (Srī.Śr. Para.68.p.153.):

[In the text]: "having entered along with this individual self, I shall manifest name and form"

(Ch.6.3.2.) it is said that every object possesses name and form only in so far as it terminates in the supreme Self

is not possible. Because it was stated by the sacred text that the manifesting of name and form is indeed preceded by the entry of the supreme Self. And so they [Visiṣṭādvaitins] must certainly be asked how, on account of this reason, the supreme Self is established as possessing the respective names? For just by this [expression]: "ghee is hidden in milk, without it, milk does not have the nature of being milk" the word "milk" is not able to be called "ghee" which is the "soul" of the milk.

4.56. यदि परमात्मा सर्वस्वात्मिन्द्र इत्यत: सर्वस्वात्मिन्द्रभवनाइं भवनी-स्वरूपतः नाथि गन्तोत्तराद्वै: कृतालोच्चित्व वाचनं भाषनं स्यात्। प्रथमं चिन्त्यति यथे गमनं सर्वस्वात्मिन्द्रां संबंधः परमात्मा कृतं इत्यत: परमात्मा सर्वस्वात्मिन्द्रस्य वाचनं पुनः प्रथैर्यथाऄं विद्यादिकं विवेकेतनाः पिवामिदुपि वर्णमत् भाषनं द्वितिष्ठताः सतात्!

4.56. If it is said that the supreme Self is the producer of all things and therefore He is also the possessor of the words expressing all things, then even a potter, who produces pots, must be the possessor of the word "pot". If the supreme Self brings about the convention of all words in the manner: "this meaning is to be understood from this word" and on account of this the supreme Self would be the possessor of all words, then
even a father etc., who by chance brings about the convention of a word such as "Dittha" [some name] for his son etc., must be the possessor of such words. Let the matter rest here.

4.57. This teaching of knowledge about Brahman is found to be very clear in the Vaṣṇupūrana:

[Like] a snake upon a rope, water in a desert and blueness in the sky, in the same manner, this unreal universe which is superimposed by Ignorance appears in which [Brahman].

This space is divided only being limited by a pot.

In the same way, what has the designation of an "individual soul" is limited by the limiting adjunct of the effect [i.e. the body].

The "egg of Brahma", wonderful, without equal, was deposited, as it were, in a place in which [Brahman]
by māyā who is [like] a painter and whose nature consists of diverse qualities. (Va. P. 104, 39, 40, 41.)

Also in the Devīgītā in the Devībhāgavata:

O Lord of the mountains, I alone existed before. There was nothing other than me. At that time, the nature of the Self has only the names: "consciousness", "awareness", "supreme Brahman".

Of that [supreme Brahman] which is incomprehensible by reason, indescribable, without comparison and free from sorrow, there is some power which is self-established and which is well known as "māyā".

That [māyā] is not existent, nor is it non-existent, nor does it have the nature of both on account of the contradiction. It is something distinct from these and is at all times something substantial. (De. Gi. 1.2.4.)

4.58.

This teaching of Ignorance in relation to Brahman is seen in the Vīṣṇupurāṇa in the twelfth chapter of the second part. To elucidate:

O best among the twice-born, the stars are Vīṣṇu, the worlds are Vīṣṇu, the forests are Vīṣṇu and the mountains and the directions, the rivers and the seas.
He alone is everything, what exists and what does not exist (Viṣ.P.2.12.38).

The word "Viṣṇu" signifies the supreme Self. All the stars etc. are said here as having identity with the supreme Self. If the world consisting of the stars etc. is absolutely real and in the difference of that [world] from the supreme Self, then identity is not possible. Therefore, the world consisting of the stars etc. must be said to be only superimposed. And a superimposition has Ignorance as its basis. Thus the teaching about Ignorance is established. And so the grammatical apposition: "the stars are Viṣṇu" etc. is only for the purpose of the negation of the stars etc. [as having absolute reality].

4.59.

ननेवत्त्वादत्म्यं शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं वर्षायां शरीरम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टप्रक्ष्यिति: शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

विशिष्टम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टप्रक्ष्यिति: शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

विशिष्टम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टप्रक्ष्यिति: शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

विशिष्टम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टप्रक्ष्यिति: शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

विशिष्टम् (२०) ४।२०|३।१४|६।७|३०)

विशिष्टप्रक्ष्यिति: शरीरस्वरूपियामानुभुतम्।

4.59. [objection] This identity is based upon the relation of body and the one embodied. In the sacred text: "whose body is the earth...whose body is water" (Ṛṣ.3.7.3.4.) and in the Viṣṇupūrāṇa: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ.P.2.12.37.), "all that is His body" (Viṣ.P.1.22.84.), "all that, is indeed the body of Hari" (Viṣ.P.1.22.37.) it is said that everything such as the earth, water etc. is the body of the supreme Self.
And in the sacred text: "whose body is the self" (Ś. Brā. 14.6.7.30.) it is said that the individual soul too is the body of the supreme Self. And in the world, the identity between the body and the one embodied is spoken of, as for example: "this individual soul is born, on account of karma, as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god".

[reply] No. Because even upon accepting that the individual souls and inert matter have a connection with the supreme Self consisting of the relation of a body and the one embodied, there remains as before the incongruity of the usage such as: "the stars are Viṣṇu" since an identity does not exist in reality. Because identity means having the same degree of reality. But the usages such as: "this individual soul is born, on account of karma, as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god" are based upon the superimposition of identity. It should not be said; the identity must be superimposed here too: "the stars are Viṣṇu". [reason] Because when the logical tenability is possible, an acceptance of superimposition is not correct.
4.60. Furthermore, the relation of a body and the one embodied—on the part of the individual souls and inert matter with the supreme Self—does not admit of any proof. Because the body is well known in the world as the place for the experience of the results born of karma. And the Lord cannot possibly have the experiences of the results born of karma. And so words such as "body" etc. in: "whose body is the earth" etc. have the meaning of the essential nature. Because it is seen that the word "body" has the meaning of "essential nature" [in expressions like]: "the body of the grinding-stone" [i.e. the grinding-stone itself]. For instance the words "kāya", "vāpu" and "tanu" too [which all denote body] in the Viṣṇupurāṇa: "all that is His body". "The water is the body of Viṣṇu", "all that, is indeed the body of Hari" only have the meaning of the essential nature. Because the word "form" (mūrti), which is well known as a synonym of "essential nature", is seen as having this usage here in the Viṣṇupurāṇa itself: "the entire form [of the world is not absolutely real]" (Viṣ. P. 2.12.39.). For this reason, the mention of the word "form" (rūpa) agrees here in the Viṣṇupurāṇa itself: "the form of the universe, because He is unchanging" (Viṣ. P. 1.2.68.), "That Brahman has two forms [i.e. a twofold nature], formful and formless" (Viṣ. P. 1.22.53.).

Even the two words "power" (sakti) and "greatness" (vibhūti) in: "The supreme power of Viṣṇu has been told" (Viṣ. P. 6.7.61.) etc. only have the meaning of the particular essential nature. Otherwise, there could be no consistency in meaning with statements in the Viṣṇupurāṇa such as: "the entire form", "the form of the universe" etc. On account of this, the etymological interpretation of the meaning of the word "body": a body is that which is solely to be supported, solely to be controlled and which is solely a part,—which is the supposition for the scope of the words "form", "power" and "greatness" as having such a meaning—is refuted. Because the word "body" is well known in the world only as the place for
experience. Thus the Ignorance which is the basis of the superimposition of the world is established due to the grammatical apposition: "the stars are Viṣṇu" which has the meaning of negation.

4.61. Furthermore, having specified some particular things which are well known such as the stars etc. by the three sections of the verse, in the fourth section it was said: "what exists and what does not exist, all that is He alone" with the intended meaning that: what is the need of this statement of particulars? "What exists" is recognized as something which is an actual entity; the entire class of individual souls, which are sentient, and pots etc. which are insentient. "What does not exist" is recognized as something which is not an actual entity, i.e., what is not recognized as "it exists" such as the horns of a rabbit etc. and a kingdom
etc. which is imaginary, a "castle in the air". Although the horns of a rabbit etc. certainly do not have an essential nature and so [it could be asked]: "how does that [non-existent essential nature] have the supreme Self as its essential nature?", still, even though the horns of a rabbit etc. do not have an externally existing essential nature, an internal essential nature certainly exists which is a mental superimposition. For this very reason, because words such as "horns of a rabbit" etc. are meaningful, the technical term "word-stem" (prātipadika) is taught in grammar. And for this very reason, the counter correlate of the negation "the rabbit's horn does not exist" is well known. For the meaning of that is: it does not exist as an externally existing essential nature. This is what is said: the external thing which is visible in the manner "what exists", all that is the supreme Self alone. So what can be said? What does not exist means something internal which is to be conceived prior to the external thing and which is only superimposed by the intellect, that too is He [the supreme Self] alone. On account of this, the supreme Self is said to be endowed with extraordinary greatness. This is indeed what is expressed in the sacred text as well:

Narāyana remains, having pervaded everything that is internal and external (M.Nā.13.5.)

Subsequent to the internal conception, if the apparatus which is the proper means for these respective things exists, then the external nature having such a form is seen somewhere. Just as in the case of a pot or a palace etc. The potter and the carpenter, having firstly considered the appearance of the pot and the appearance of the palace in the mind, subsequently construct the pot and the palace having such an appearance. But somewhere no externally existing nature is seen, just as in the case of a rabbit's horns etc. And that is another thing. The horns of a rabbit etc., which do not exist as an external nature and which are only superimposed by the intellect, have only Ignorance as their basis and so
Ignorance is established.

4.62. Furthermore, the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not possible to be the body of the supreme Self. Because the individual souls are directly the body of the supreme Self. Whereas the insentient things [are the body of the supreme Self] only by means of the individual soul.

For you yourself have said (Sri.B.Para.73.p.167.):

Everything [is taught] as being of the nature of an entity and being expressible through words only on account of the entry of the individual soul who has Brahman as its Self: "having entered along with this individual self, I shall manifest name and form".

And your own established conclusion is: consciousness certainly exists even in a piece of wood or a clod of earth etc., but it is unmanifest. So because the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not the body of the individual soul, there is no possibility of it being the body of the supreme Self. The "non-existent" is in no way possible to be the body of...
the individual soul. Because there is no experience [of such a thing].

But what has been said (Sri.B.Para.69.p.155.):

the sentient portion can be expressed by the word "it exists" here: "what exists", because it is imperishable. But the insentient portion is perishable and so it can be denoted by the word "it does not exist".

That is not so. Because insentient things such as pots etc., which are perceived as something existing, are not expressed anywhere by words such as "it does not exist", "untrue" etc. Even though this meaning is contradictory to what is well known, Rāmānuja has only accepted it for bringing about the logical possibility of this verse according to his own view that grammatical apposition is based upon the relation of body and the one embodied, for he does not accept that grammatical apposition is for the purpose of negation. So how can [this meaning] be trustworthy?

It was mentioned just previously that words such as "body" etc. in: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ. P.2.12.37.) etc. have the meaning of the essential nature, for the logical possibility of oneness of meaning with the words "form" (ruṇa), "form" (mūrti), "power" (śakti), "greatness" (vībhūti) etc.

comment

Rāmānuja maintains that the sentient souls and insentient matter are the body of the Lord which is mentioned in such verses as: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ. P.2.12.37.). Abhyankar's last sentence restates the position that words such as "body" are used in the sense of "essential nature", i.e. the water etc. are of the nature of Viṣṇu.
4.63. What has been told by this verse: "the stars are Viṣṇu" is that everything is the supreme Self alone. That is not established merely by a statement, but a reason has to be shown there. Hence he [the sage Parāśara] says:

Because the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge, He is all forms but not an object. Therefore you should understand that the distinctions of mountains, oceans, earth etc. are displayed in Knowledge (Viṣ.P.2.12.39.).

By this [word] "because", it is made known that this is the reason for the meaning told in the previous verse ["the stars are Viṣṇu"]. [The meaning is]: because this Lord (bhagavān) is, in reality, of the nature of Knowledge (jñānasyarūpah). All forms (asegaṁurtiḥ) means the entire world is His nature in the way that was told: all this is the supreme Self alone, but He is not an object (na tu vastubhutaḥ). Everything, having this [Lord] as its essential nature, is certainly false as it is displayed in Knowledge (vijñānavijñānavibhiti). Knowledge (vijñāna) means: "diversity is known through which [knowledge]" and it refers to the Ignorance which is the basis [for the appearance of diversity]. Alternatively42, [everything] is displayed (vijñānavibhiti)i.e. superimposed in Knowledge (vijñāna) which is the substratum, i.e. in Brahman whose nature is Knowledge. An object consisting of being a superimposition is an effect of Ignorance and is
certainly false. And an object which is false is, in reality, only the [nature of the] substratum. So the meaning told in the previous verse:

everything such as the stars etc. is the supreme Self alone, is established

The Ignorance which is the basis of the false objects is firmly established

here by the statement concerning the falsity of the world: "but not an object", "displayed in Knowledge".

4.64.

4.64. The introduction to the verse "the nature of Knowledge" which was
told (Śrī B. Para. 69 p. 156):

This [the soul] is of the nature of existence and this
[inert matter] is of the nature of non-existence. And

this is the reason for this [inert matter] having the
nature of non-existence, hence he says: "Because the
Lord is of the nature of Knowledge"

is questionable. Because in the previous verse "the stars are Viṣṇu", the
predicate is: "He alone is everything". But "what exists and what does not exist" is a restatement. The nature of being a restatement is made clear through the use of the word "what". The knowers of the meaning of sentences [i.e. Māmasakas] consider that a reason mentioned in a later sentence is only for the predicate portion in the previous sentence, not for a portion being restated. Therefore, this introduction is incorrect. Having accepted what is the reverse i.e. the insentient pots etc., though they are recognized as "what exists", are expressed by this "what does not exist", this effort too for establishing that—which is the mentioning of the reason for a portion being restated—is certainly contrary and so [this effort] is quite meaningless.

For when fate has become contrary, resourcefulness is reduced to uselessness (Śisu.9.6.).

He [Parāśara] indeed confirms what was told in the verse "the nature of Knowledge", which is that the different things such as mountains etc. are displayed by Ignorance:

But when Knowledge is pure, natural and free from defects upon the wasting away of all action, then indeed the differences among objects, which are the fruits of the tree of conception, do not exist in things (Vig.P.2.12.40.).

"Pure" (suddham) means devoid of Ignorance. "Natural" (nijarūpi) means free from the perception of difference. "Defects" (deṣǻh) means attachment etc. "Conception" (sāikalpa) means Ignorance, [the derivation is]: difference is completely (samantat) conceived (kalpyate) due to this.

4.65. गतेत्यक्षौऽक्षौर्यायाम्। समयस्य यदी कृतविनाथस्मिन् यदी प्रतिविनाथस्मिन्। किं प्रभुकाथातः प्रभुकाथातः प्रभु कार्यानि प्रभु कार्यानि।

"Pure" (suddham) means devoid of Ignorance. "Natural" (nijarūpi) means free from the perception of difference. "Defects" (deṣǻh) means attachment etc. "Conception" (sāikalpa) means Ignorance, [the derivation is]: difference is completely (samantat) conceived (kalpyate) due to this.

4.65.
4.65. But the explanation of this verse [above] (Sri.B.Para.69.p.157.)

"Sam" [in the word "saṅkalpa"] has the sense of uniting.

The assumption of the individual soul, having united with the body, is the conception (saṅkalpa) that: "I am a god", "I am a human being" etc. Karma alone is the basis of this [wrong conception]. The differences among objects, which are able to be experienced, are for the experience of the result of karma and they indeed have karma as their basis. Those [differences among objects], though existing in reality, do not exist for experience upon the cessation of the error that the body is the self.

That is questionable. Because according to the understanding of one who knows [the truth], differences among objects do not exist in reality.

Moreover, this meaning is not acquired in a natural way from this verse.

The meaning of the word "conception" (saṅkalpa) which was told is not well known. There is difficulty in supplying the ellipsis: "for experience".

The nature of being able to be experienced is the determining factor in relation to what is to be negated [i.e. "they do not exist for experience"] so how can the word "for experience", which indeed principally reveals that [what is to be negated], be acquired just by an ellipsis? Otherwise, in the case of an injunction ["do such and such"] there would be much confusion upon the assumption of a contrary meaning by supplying the ellipsis "not".
4.66. But what has been said (Śrī. B. Para. 69. p. 157.)

"the differences among objects do not exist", so

an insentient thing is to be denoted by the word

"it does not exist" because it is connected with

states which are occasional.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner: it is not recognized anywhere

in the world that a thing having connection to an occasional state can be
denoted, at any time, by the word "it does not exist". Moreover, it is
true that the differences among objects, being occasional, are destructible.

But intelligent people must certainly discern: how is the occasional nature

or the destructibility of those [differences] directly expressed or indic-
ated by the statement "though existing, they do not exist for experience"?

4.67. In the [following] two verses he [Parāśara] establishes Ignorance
once again, by means of demonstrating the unreality of the differences among objects even according to the way of experience in the world. The essential meaning is expressed by this verse:

Is there an object anywhere which is without a beginning, middle or an end, which has one constant nature? O twice born, what undergoes a change of state does not have that same condition once again. So where and why is it real? (Viş. P.2.12.41.)

The illustration for the essential meaning told in the previous verse is shown by this:

Earth becomes a pot, from the pot come the fragments, the fragments become dust and then minute particles. Say, is there an object here? [Though] it is beheld [as an object] by people whose ascertainment of the Self is impeded by their own karma (Viş. P.2.12.42.).

4.68. Then he concludes that what is other than the supreme Self is false:
Therefore, O twice born, other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever, anywhere, at any time. Knowledge, which is one, is accepted as manifold by those whose minds are divided by the variety of their own karma (Vig.P.2.12.43.). In the first half here, the negation of difference [in respect of Knowledge] with regard to something belonging to another class is indicated. In the latter half, the negation of difference belonging to its own class is indicated. And it is made clear that karma alone is the basis for the Ignorance which is the cause of the perception of difference.

But the introduction which was stated (Srī B. Para.70.p.158.) for this: "Therefore, ...other than Knowledge there is no [collection of objects] whatsoever":

an inert object, which is different from Knowledge, is not able to be expressed solely by the word "it exists".

That is not correct. Because there is no cognition of such a meaning from the verse. This [word in the verse] "is" certainly does not have the meaning of "able to be expressed solely by the word 'it exists' ". Because there is the consequence of implication. Moreover, although an inert object cannot be expressed solely by the word "it exists", it can certainly be expressed by the word "it exists" which has a particular time and a particular place as its adjunct: "the pot exists here at this time". So it is not established that an inert object can be denoted by the word "it does not exist".

4.69. भेदबाय वर्त्तमानस्मृतां ज्ञानकलित सुन । यतो इत्तत्वं विस्तृतः स्वपारो गि
भेदो नास्तीत्वात्—

श्च विद्ययं विनाट विद्वानः क्षेत्रावकर्षितशास्त्रविनि ।
एकं सेविकं परमः पेषं: स वातुः न वतीत्वादिति ॥

(वि १० २ १२ १५४)
All difference, being false, is only superimposed by Ignorance.

Because even an internal difference does not exist, in reality, in Brahman. Hence he [Parāśara] says:

Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint,
free from sorrow, devoid of contact with all
[things such as] greed etc. It is one, always
one and it is that supreme Lord Vasudeva other
than whom there is nothing (Viṣ. P.2.12.44.).

In the first half here, it is indicated that even the difference caused by the relation of attribute and its possessor does not exist. In the latter half, the absence of the three types of difference is restated by the expression "one". "Always one" means free from [the sixfold modifications] such as birth, increase, etc.46 Through making known the falsity of the world by this: "other than whom there is nothing", the Ignorance which is the basis of that [false world] is firmly established.

He sums up what has been said:

I have thus told you what is reality: Knowledge is real, what is other is unreal. And what pertains to ordinary relations, on which the world depends, has been told to you there also (Viṣ. P.2.12.45.).
Here, the falsity of everything different from Knowledge is made known by this: "what is other is unreal". If everything is false, how is there scope for ordinary relations? Therefore he says: "this [which pertains to ordinary relations]". "And...has been told there also" means that the Ignorance which is the primary cause has been told.

4.70.

This is to be understood here: in the verse "the stars [are Viṣṇu]", the words "stars" etc. denote the subject. The word "Viṣṇu" relates to the predicate. Since the stars etc. are of a nature which is visible, their identity with the supreme Self is enjoined to make known their falsity. For the enjoining of identity is only to make known the falsity of the subject in the form of being the determining factor of the state of being the subject. Just as here: "what is silver, that is the pearl-oyster".

And so in the six verses beginning with "the stars", these words: "Viṣṇu"
(2.12.38.), "...the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "...Knowledge is pure, natural" (2.12.40.), "Knowledge, which is one" (2.12.43.), "Knowledge is completely pure... It is one, always one and is that Vāsudeva" (2.12.44.), "Knowledge is real" (2.12.45.) make known Brahman who is of the nature of Knowledge and who is the predicate in the first sentence ["the stars are Viśṇu..."].

So too, these words: "the stars, worlds, forests, mountains, the directions, rivers, seas, what exists and what does not exist" (2.12.38.), "...but not an object... the distinctions of mountains etc. are displayed in Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "...the differences among objects, which are the fruits of the tree of conception" (2.12.40.), "...other than Knowledge there is [no] collection of objects" (2.12.43.), "...other than whom there is nothing" (2.12.44.), "...what is other is unreal" (2.12.45.) make known the false things which are the subject in the first verse. Because the comprehension of the meaning in that very manner is derived in a natural way from the continuity of the verses. On account of this, [the statement] (Śri B. Para. 70. p. 159.)

the conclusion: "real", "unreal" occurring in the sixth verse "what is reality" is for what was begun: "what exists and what does not exist" in the first verse "the stars..."

is set aside. Because there is no comprehension of such a meaning in a natural way. Because this [word] "real" is connected grammatically with this [word] "Knowledge": "Knowledge is real" and because that [word "Knowledge"] makes known the predicate in the first verse, therefore there is no possibility of summing up this: "[what exists and] what does not exist" —which is the subject in the first verse— by this [word] "real". And so the summation of even both: "what exists and what does not exist" is only by this: "what is other is unreal".
4.71. When it is thus established, the sentence (Sri.B.Para.71.p.160.):

Here [in these verses], no word whatsoever is seen which is conformable to the supreme Brahman being free from distinction, and to an Ignorance having that [Brahman] as its locus and which is indeterminable as either existent or non-existent, or to the world being superimposed due to that [Ignorance] is only mere temerity. These words: "...the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge", "...Knowledge is pure, natural and free from defects", "Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint, free from sorrow, devoid of contact with all [things such as] greed etc. It is one..." are conformable to the supreme Brahman being free from distinction. These: "...displayed in Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception" are conformable to Ignorance and to the world being superimposed due to that [Ignorance]. And these: "...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects...", "...other than whom there is nothing", "...what is other is unreal" should be understood as conformable to the world being superimposed due to that [Ignorance]. Ignorance is not non-existent because it produces an effect in the form of the world. And it is not existent
because the world which is its effect is false. Thus Ignorance—which is the cause—has the consequence of being indeterminable as either existent or non-existent. But that is not said here directly by a word. On account of this, [the statement] (Srī.B.Para.71.p.160.):

And because the words "exists", "does not exist", "real" and "unreal" are incapable of directly expressing a thing which is indeterminable as either existent or non-existent

is answered.

4.72.

But what has been said (Srī.B.Para.71.p.161.):

And here, with regard to an insentient thing, the two words "does not exist" and "unreal" are not used to denote fictitiousness or falsity but they refer to destructibility. Because only destructibility is
demonstrated here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot", not a thing devoid of proof or which can be sublated by knowledge.

That is not so. The inert objects are said to be in a different state at every moment on account of the extent [of the meaning] pertaining to the words here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot". And therefore even though destructibility is demonstrated, nevertheless their purport does not lie in demonstrating that. For there is the statement in the same verse there: "Say, is there an object here?". And so what the author of the Purāṇa intended to say is recognized as: being in a different state at every moment is the reason for making known the absence of an object.

"Object" (vastu), "real" (satyam) and "truth" (tattvam) are synonyms. And so the absence of the nature of being an object [i.e. the absence of being a really existing thing] is the absence of reality and unreality means being false. And in the beginning: "the stars are Viṣṇu", the stars etc. are certainly indicated as unreal in the form of stars etc. on account of the statement that the stars and so forth have grammatical apposition with the supreme Self. And in the middle [verses], unreality is certainly expressed by this: "...but not an object", "...displayed in Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception". And here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot", that [unreality] is only confirmed by showing the reason which is the nature of being in a different state at every moment. And in the conclusion, [unreality] has been very clearly told: "...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever" here [occurring in the verse]: "Therefore...no..." (2.12.43.) and "...other than whom there is nothing" here [in the verse]: "Knowledge is completely pure" (2.12.44.). And in summing up it is said: "Knowledge is real, what is other is unreal" here [in the verse]: "...what is reality" (2.12.45.).

On account of that, it is said as a matter of course that what is unreal
is able to be sublated by knowledge. Therefore, the falsity of inert objects is certainly established. Let the matter rest here.

4.73.

Ignorance is the primary cause of all those false objects. And what removes that [Ignorance] is the knowledge of the oneness of the Self which is free from distinction, which is the purport of the Vedānta statements such as: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.), "this Self is Brahman" (Bṛh.2.5.19.), "all this which is, is this Self" (Bṛh.2.4.6.) etc.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.72.p.163.)⁴⁸:

there is no cessation of Ignorance from the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction. Because of the contradiction with numerous passages such as: "I know this great Person, the colour of the sun, beyond darkness. The one who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal here, there is no other path for going [to immortality]" (Tai.A.3.13.1.), "All moments were born
from that Person who is [like] lightning. No one rules over Him, His name is 'great glory'. Those who know Him become immortal" (M.Nā.1.8,10,11.).

In regard to that, it is said; having repeated the knowledge of the Self possessing qualities, which was previously mentioned, although that [knowledge of the Self possessing qualities] was stated as the means for the attainment of immortality by this: "The one who knows...in this manner" and by this: "Those who know Him", still, that is only indirectly, not directly. This was previously demonstrated (3.175.). Moreover, the destruction of Ignorance is not at all possible through the knowledge of Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions have their basis in Ignorance. It should be understood that the knowledge of the Self possessing distinction is a more essential means for the knowledge of the truth.

comment

Rāmānuja's sixth objection: the logical impossibility of removing Ignorance (nivartakānupapatti), seeks to demonstrate that the Advaitin has no means to accomplish the removal of Ignorance (avidyā). According to the Advaitin, liberation is only through knowledge. This liberating knowledge is revealed through a special means of knowledge -the Upaniṣad texts- (see comment to 1.2.) whose purport lies in the knowledge that the Self is one and is of the nature of awareness free from all distinctions.

In this objection, Rāmānuja argues that the sacred texts do not reveal Brahman to be free from distinction. Texts such as: "I know this great Person..." (Tai.Ā.3.13.1.) etc. clearly reveal that Brahman possesses distinguishing characteristics. Moreover, Rāmānuja maintains that no texts teach that Brahman is free from distinction and hence they cannot be the means to remove this avidyā which the Advaitins themselves have fabricated. Abhyankar responds to this objection by resorting to the Advaita distinction between a primary and secondary order of texts. For the Advaita method of interpretation, see 1.9. and comment and the comment to 1.48. For the Viśiṣṭadvaita method, see 2.3. and comment and the comment to 2.50.

Rāmānuja's critique and Abhyankar's reply are based upon their different exegetical methods, though they both ascribe to the axiomatic
belief that the sacred texts do not inherently conflict. The Advaita method of interpretation explains statements denoting qualities as referring to the Lord, i.e. the Self having māyā as its limiting adjunct. Advaitins accept statements denying the reality of distinctions as of primary importance. The Viśiṣṭadvaitins maintain that statements denoting qualities are to be accepted just as they are. However they have difficulty explaining statements such as: "free from qualities" (Sv.6.11.) for such expressions do not appear to deny only evil qualities but all qualities in general. If there is mutual concord (samanvaya) among all the sacred texts, then a statement denoting freedom from distinction must be taken as the final revelation since it is necessarily subsequent to a sentence describing qualities.

4.74.

अतो निगृहितरूपस्या अविबाधा न दुर्भाषा ॥
अविबाधों तत्ततः ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते कर्मचन्द्रात् ॥ २२ ॥

4.74. Therefore the cessation of this Ignorance is also not difficult to state. Having known Ignorance as it is, one is released from the bond of karma. 22.

4.75.

निगृहितरूपस्यानस्यात्मिकानन्दत्वं कल्याणवाचार्यायायाः निगृहितरूपस्यात्मिकानन्दत्वं कल्याणवाचार्यायायाः निगृहितरूपस्यात्मिकानन्दत्वं कल्याणवाचार्यायाः निगृहितरूपस्यात्मिकानन्दत्वं कल्याणवाचार्यायाः

4.75. Because the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction removes Ignorance, there is certainly the cessation of this [Ignorance] by that [knowledge] and so there is no logical fallacy concerning the cessation of Ignorance. And the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction is possible only when there is the knowledge of Ignorance as it really is. And the knowledge of Ignorance as it is, means the knowledge of Ignorance...
as Ignorance. Only when that [knowledge] exists is that [Ignorance] able to be removed, not otherwise. The removal of that [Ignorance] is seeing the falsity in pleasure etc. Seeing the falsity means understanding that pleasure etc. are particular mental modifications, not qualities of the Self. And upon the firmness of such understanding, no activity is possible at any time for the sake of pleasure or for the sake of the cessation of pain. And upon the absence of activity there is also the absence of karma which is based upon that. Thus liberation from the bondage in the form of karma is established. 49

4.76. That has been told in the *Visṇupurāṇa* also:

Therefore nothing is [of itself] the nature of pain and nothing is [of itself] the nature of pleasure. This is a modification of the mind which is designated as pleasure and pain.

The supreme Brahmān is Knowledge alone and Knowledge is required for bondage. This
universe consists of Knowledge. There is nothing beyond Knowledge. (ViṣṇuP.2.6.47,48.).

In the commentary upon that too it is said 50:

"A modification of the mind" means merely a play of the mind, like dream or a fancy. What then is real? Therefore he says: "Knowledge". The completion of the sense is: "Brahman", who is of the nature of Knowledge, is alone the highest reality. Then [if you say]: for what reason does this [Brahman] have bondage and liberation? [It is told]: "Knowledge", which is recognized in the form of the I-notion etc. due to Ignorance, is certainly "required for bondage". "And" Knowledge is certainly required for liberation because the removal of that [Ignorance] is through knowledge. Ignorance and what is superimposed by that and knowledge and what is to be removed through that are Knowledge alone. Therefore he says: "consists of Knowledge".

The meaning is that the entire universe consists of Knowledge. Even the distinction which is made between Śiva and Viṣṇu is only in relation to a limiting adjunct. That too has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa:

O best among the twice born, Śaṅkara [Śiva] is the illustrious Śauri [Viṣṇu] and Śrī [Lakṣmī] is Gaurī [Pārvatī] (ViṣṇuP.1.8.22.).

Thus the cessation of Ignorance is only through the knowledge of the oneness of the Self.
4.77. Although difference between the individual soul and Brahman is recognized due to the distinction between the agent and the object in sacred texts such as: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Bh.2.4.5.) etc., nevertheless, that [difference] pertains to a limiting adjunct. [That must be so] in accordance with the identity taught in the sacred text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.). It should not be said: the identity must pertain to a limiting adjunct in accordance with the sacred text just mentioned [which denotes] difference. [reason] In the manner in which non-difference is taught just by the signification [of the words] here: "you are That", difference is not [taught] in the same manner here: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen". Because there [in the latter sentence], only a seer-seen relation is told by the express signification. But there is the postulation of difference between the two [i.e. the seer and the seen] because there is no logical possibility of it being otherwise. And so because the sacred text which is explicit has predominance, identity alone is the highest truth. And in the knowledge of identity, the knowledge of difference ceases just as a matter of course. So there is certainly the cessation of Ignorance.

4.78.
4.78. Because Ignorance has manifested like bubbles from water at the
time of creation, it is firstly as though different [from Brahman] of its
own accord. This entire manifest world is only based upon such a difference.
For that reason, the individual soul too—who is superimposed by that
[Ignorance] as its locus and who is reflected in that [Ignorance]—
considers the Self to be different from the supreme Self. And [the soul]
considers the world, which is the transformation of such Ignorance, to be
different from the supreme Self.

Not only to this extent, moreover: through the false conception of
various states—in the form of Knowledge and in the form of the Self— in
regard to the supreme Self who is one alone and of the nature of Knowledge,
[Ignorance] manifests difference by falsely conceiving that very [supreme
Self] to be an attribute and the subject in the form of Knowledge and, in
the same manner, by falsely conceiving that very [supreme Self] to be the
possessor of the attribute and an object in the form of the Self. Even
though those two, the attribute and its possessor, i.e. Knowledge and the
Self, exist in reality in a relation of identity, [Ignorance] as though
separates the two by itself coming between them. And having included the
possessor of the attribute [i.e. the Self] as its object and having made
that [Self] its own and having concealed its own false nature in making
that [Self] its own, it reveals that [Self] in itself [Ignorance] in the
form of a reflection. Having falsely conceived that individual self who is
reflected in itself [in Ignorance] as the locus of the Knowledge which is
an attribute, [Ignorance] itself enters there [in the soul] in the form of
an object and by way of a direct modification [i.e., in the manner of the mental modification: "I am ignorant"], because the assumption of the nature of being the subject is correct in regard to knowledge, therefore the entry [of Ignorance] there [in the soul] in the form of an object is easily accomplished.

4.79. For example, a swindler enters into the house of some wealthy person in such a form as appears dear to him. Then, having become his confidant and having made everything belonging to him his own, and having concealed his own fraudulent nature [while] making all that person's wealth his own, he becomes dearer like his [the wealthy person's] second heart which is external. So even though the wealthy person has been deprived of all his wealth, he does not know himself what is to be done about that but on the contrary he appears to consider himself a clever person who has accomplished his object through him who is dearer than even a son. But without him, he [the wealthy person] himself is not able to spend anywhere even a single small coin among all the wealth, even though it belongs to him. It is like that.

4.80. ज्ञानं सा विद्यालेष्यं भिष्यं ज्ञानानं प्रथमं वृद्धिकर्षण तत्परं- रम्बहालोकिपृष्ठं च विरितमात्रः। अविचारं कालिंगेयस्मृतिभवं गौरवयोगमयुपायो च तत्त्वं संसारं च स्वरूपस्वस्वसंसारार्थमे विद्यालेष्यं च विनिमयं च महामायः। यदा च पूर्वसूत्रसागरस्वरूपस्वसंसारार्थमे विद्यालेष्यं च विनिमयं च महामायः।
And in regard to Knowledge, that [Ignorance] which has entered in the form of an object and which has Knowledge as its component, firstly transforms into the form of the intellect and then into the form of the "I-notion" and the "great elements" etc. The individual self, who is reflected in Ignorance i.e. in the limiting adjunct of the intellect etc. which are the transformations of that [Ignorance], exists in conformity with the limiting adjunct which brings about the reflection. That is this transmigratory existence. And this is indeed the nature that Ignorance has. When a mind, which is free from impurity on account of the traditional instruction carried out previously in a thorough manner, is taught by a true teacher, it understands this nature of Ignorance as it really is and then it is liberated at that very instant. Just as [a person] who sees various things in a dream and considering their pleasantness or unpleasantness in accordance with the desire or aversion for those things, and striving for the attainment of what is desired and for the removal of what is unwanted he even begins a Vedic action such as sacrifice etc., which has a very venerable intensity, or he begins a worldly action such as a battle etc., but if he is awoken suddenly then at that very instant -in a single moment- he considers all that to be fictitious. It should be understood to be like that.

4.81.
4.81. Thus because of the connection with Ignorance, the seven types of logical fallacy shown by the author of the Śrībhāṣya must be understood to be refuted. In the same manner, even every other web of reasoning conjectured by Rāmānuja, which is contrary to the oneness of the Self and contrary to the natural meaning of the sacred texts etc., has certainly for the most part been refuted according to the manner told. And that can be investigated personally by intelligent people whose minds do not cling anywhere. Thus it is auspicious.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR: AVIDYOPAPATTI.

1. Adapted. The text of the Śrī.Ś. reads: na tāvājījīvam āśrītvam avidyāparikalpatatavājījīvabhāvavyāv.

2. Śaṅkara also cites this analogy. Cf., B.S.S. 2.1.21. p.393, line 16f.


5. For Suresvarā's view, cf., N.S. Ch.3, sambhādhakti. For the Vivaraṇa view, cf., Rāmaśastri, op-cit., p.129.


7. Rāmārāya, ibid., p.278, line 6f.

8. ibid., p.277, line 26.

9. ibid., p.277, line 27.

10. This text has not been located.

11. Adapted, without deviation of meaning.

12. See ch.3, fn. 76.


An example of a negative particle indicating what has been superimposed is the compound: "not a Brahmāna" (abrahmaṇa). This is a Tatpurusā compound (naṁ tatpurusā) containing the negative particle a and the word brahmāna. In such a compound, the latter member is the principal component (cf. Paramalaghu. p.122., Vaiyakaraṇa. p.346, P. S. 2.1.22., note by Vasu.). If the compound meant "different from a Brahmāna" (brahmānabhīna), then the negative particle, which has the meaning of "different", would be the principal component. For the sake of maintaining the primacy of the latter member, the grammarians say that the negative particle indicates that the latter member is something superimposed. So the compound "abrahmaṇa" refers to someone such as a Kṣatriya etc. who possess the nature of a Brahmāna which has been superimposed (āropitabrahmaṇatvavān kṣatriyadīr iti bodhaḥ).

In the topic under discussion in this section, the third alternative is that the statement "I am ignorant" (aṁma ajnāḥ) refers to knowledge having the supreme Self as its object. As in the above example, "ajnā" is a negative Tatpurusā and so the final member is the
principal component. The final member, jñā, means "one who has knowledge" (jñānavān). The negative particle indicates that the final member has the nature of being superimposed and so the meaning of the compound is: "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self which is superimposed" (āropitaparamātma-viśayakajñānavān). Abhyankar argues that a liberated soul does not say "I am ignorant" and a bound soul, who has erroneous knowledge of the supreme Self, also does not think "I am ignorant". But a bound soul who knows nothing of the supreme Self thinks "I am ignorant". The meaning of "ignorant" (aśīna) is: "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self which is superimposed" and such a meaning is not possible because the bound soul has no knowledge of the supreme Self, therefore knowledge can hardly be shown as superimposed.

In regard to the following sentence: "But the superimposition of the knowledge relating to the supreme Self..." the sense is that a bound soul has knowledge about worldly objects such as pots etc. By superimposing the nature of knowledge about the supreme Self upon the worldly knowledge, the statement "I am ignorant" could mean: "one who possesses knowledge qualified by the nature of superimposed knowledge relating to the supreme Self". But that meaning is not possible because superimposition is possible where an object is qualified by similarity. Since the knowledge of pots etc. and the knowledge of the supreme Self are completely distinct, it is not possible to say that there is superimposition of knowledge relating to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc.

16. The topic of "the logical fallacy concerning a means of proof" is now being discussed in relation to inference. In 4.7. it was introduced with regard to the perceptual cognition "I am ignorant".
17. This inference is given by Rāmānuja as his prima facie argument.
18. This is Abhyankar's explanation which he had previously given in his commentary "Samāsokti" on the Śrībhāṣya-catuhṣūtri, op-cit., p.158, line 12f.
19. Adapted. The text reads: anyasyānythāvabhāṣasyāvarjanīvatvāt.
20. For the explanation of the "fivefold combination" see 1.37.
21. Abhyankar has modified the sentence to indicate that adraṣṭavāsat is to be connected with ambuṇa eva grahaṇam.
22. The sense is that when one ascertains that the water is a mirage the cognition arises: "this is not water", i.e. water does not exist here (atra jalam asat). Even if it is accepted, as Rāmānuja maintains, that there is the appearance in another manner (anyathā-avabhāsa), the statement: "this is not water" means that the cognition of water is being denied and so it is not possible for Rāmānuja to hold the view of satkhyāti that the cognition of the water is real.
23. This appears to be the author's statement describing the
Visitadvaitin position rather than a direct quotation.

24. A species of plant serving as a substitute for the Soma plant in rituals. In Śrī. B. Para. 66. p. 144., Ramanuja presents a verse (supposedly by Dramiḍācārya, the "Bhāsyakāra") stating that the Putilka plant can be substituted for the Soma plant because it actually contains portions of Soma.


27. The complete sūtra reads: "But [the dream creation is] mere māyā, because its nature is not a manifestation fully [of the totality of attributes found in the waking state]."

28. Adapted. The passage does not deviate in meaning from the Śrī. B. But it has not been indented because it is not a direct quotation.

29. Slightly adapted: "rathā" is changed to "cakrapratīti".

30. According to Ramanuja, the nature of all the directions exists in every direction. What is east for one person is west or north in regard to others and all such cognitions are true. Abhyankar accepts that a direction is relative to the position of the respective person, but he seeks to argue that a direction is established with regard to something, such as the position of a particular person. If that person is considered to be facing east but he thinks east is north—even though it may be north with regard to another person—then the person facing east is in error with regard to his direction and the object of his error—the nature of being "north"—is something indeterminable. It is not absolutely unreal because the cognition of "north" exists. It is not real because it is subject to sublation by the knowledge that he is facing east.

The statement: "one should eat food while facing the east" is cited by Abhyankar to show that a direction is established with reference to something. If a number of people sat facing the east, then although they face the east with respect to themselves, in relation to their neighbours they are seated to the west, or the north or the south and so with regard to other people they are not directly east. For practical purposes it is established that a certain person is facing east and therefore everybody else too faces east.

31. B. S. Ś. 2.2.32. p. 479, line 4f.

32. Read "vindanti" in the place of "vindati".


34. The Ānandāśrama edition has the word "ekam", from the Tai. Brā. text, after the word "prasiddam". It is omitted here.


36. Cf. Nrisimhottarātāpanīyopaniṣad ch. 9. "... sarvatra na by asti dvaitasiddhir śūnya siddho' dvitiyo māyāḥ hy anyad iva... māyā ca tamorūpā..."
37. See ch.3, fn.31.

38. Cf. Śrī.B.Para.72.p.163f. Also, see text 2.50. and comment.

39. These quotations have not been located.

40. According to Pāṇini, a "word stem" or prātipadika is: "what possesses meaning but is neither a verbal root nor an affix". P.S. 1.2.45. Also, cf. Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, op-cit., p.275.

41. Adapted.

42. This meaning follows the commentator Śrīdharasvāmin who considers Knowledge to be the substratum: "vijñāne dhiṣṭānāme", Cf. Jīvānanda-vidyāsaṅgarabhaṭṭācārya (ed.), Viṣṇupurāṇam with the commentary Svaprakāśa by Śrīdharasvāmin. Calcutta, 1882. p.307, line 14.

43. This is a substantial reconstruction of the Śrī.B. text without a deviation in meaning. Abhyankar's explanation of "sam" in the word "saṅkalpa" is taken from the Śrutaprakāśikā, op-cit., pt.2. (avidyāthāṅgabhāga) p.46, line 11.

44. Slightly adapted.

45. Slightly adapted.

46. The sixfold modifications are mentioned in the Nirukta of Yāska, they are: birth, existence, growth, transformation, decline and death. Śaṅkara refers to them in B.S.S. 1.1.2. p.48, line 2f.

47. Slightly adapted.

48. Slightly adapted.


50. Jīvānanda-vidyāsaṅgarabhaṭṭācārya, op-cit., p.258, line 9f. In the edition consulted, Śrīdharas's commentary differs to some degree from Abhyankar's quotation, however the meaning is identical.
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