THE HAHALIS WELFARE SOCIETY OF BUKA

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This thesis describes my original research

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Chapter 1

THE APPROACH TO THE STUDY

One of the two reasons I first became interested in Buka was matrilineal kinship. I had read much of the work of English anthropologists in British Central Africa, as they then called it. Turner's arguments on the political instability in Ndembu society caused by the conflict between matrilineality and virilocality and by the related conflict between adjacent generations had especially fascinated me.

The other reason - and this would be harder to recall and relate in any detail - was a general interest in whatever it is that is called cargo cult. I was stimulated to read on the subject by Bettison's paper on cargo cults as a manifestation of a Melanesian genius for innovation and experimentation. As a resident of Papua-New Guinea while working on an earlier project, I had heard something of the reports about the notorious Hahalis Welfare Society, which was, and is, a subject of fairly widespread gossip in the urban centres of the colony, especially because of its Baby Garden and its involvement in tax riots in 1962.

Buka then seemed to provide the facilities to satisfy two curiosities...to find and solve a case of 'the matrilineal problem' - the more social conflict the better - and to investigate a cargo cult, although before I left for the field I was already strongly inclined to the view that the cargo cult label was not appropriate to the Welfare Society. I remember that I remained

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1 R. Crocombe and the late Charles Julius were the first to draw my attention to Buka as an interesting area for various kinds of research.
unconvinced by the prediction, made to me by Professor P. Lawrence at the time, that however much I looked for secular economic and political innovation in the Welfare I would find that cargo cult was at the bottom of it. This reluctance to accept the utility of the concept of cargo thinking was a preconception easier to identify than to analyse, which must have 'informed' much of the research which I have carried out.

A. Sinclair, an Australian psychiatrist, and two psychologists visited Buka briefly in 1964 and prepared a well-researched and convincingly argued report on the Welfare for the Australian Administration. I read this before fieldwork and noted with interest the report's conclusion that the Welfare was many steps removed from a cargo cult; it was an attempt to organise 'an orthodox political movement' led by dedicated and honest men aiming at 'social betterment by means of active work within a new economic and political framework rather than passive dependence on the supernatural' (Sinclair 1964:31).

Lawrence's interpretation of his Madang data proposed as a general explanation of Melanesian movements seemed to me to place undue emphasis on stability and uniformity in society and on conservatism in 'cargo' ideology. 'Native society is said to be homogeneous and static even after eighty years of contact and the "integration, consistency and continuity" of traditional values and epistemological systems was carried over to the cargo movement. Similarly, Lawrence believes, the cult leaders were not charismatic figures but men whose role as policy-makers was determined by the traditional values and assumptions which they shared with their followers. The book reduces the question of participation in cults to one of the dissemination of irreducible dogma which was a pragmatic elaboration of the ideas of the past and the general treatment of the problem of how
similar interests somehow become common interests is inadequate. Lawrence touches only on the minor cultural barriers to the diffusion of the cults throughout an otherwise homogeneous population* (Rimoldi 1965:401).

This for a start was less attractive than Schwartz's (1962) analysis of the Paliau movement as a process of 'transformation of culture'. I agreed with Schwartz that 'it would be interesting to see whether [the] process, in which a series of recurrent cults occurs, each taking form in a matrix that includes its predecessors and their failures, becoming somewhat more open as systems, settling on a level of commitment capable of extending through time, and institutionalised as they attain perpetuable forms, could be generalised beyond the historical sequence of belief systems he analysed (1962:406). Here was an argument, like Bettison's, which reflected the view that 'Melanesian cultures are generally characterised by openness to change, eclecticism, and an ability to add and subtract whole blocks of culture' (ibid:407).

I was interested not only in change and development of cognitive-evaluative constructs, so fully treated by Schwartz, but in the dynamics of a social movement seen as a political system, which have a less important part in his analysis. The question of differential participation in 'cargo movements' seemed especially important as I could not see how, if we accepted Lawrence's account of the continuity and uniformity of epistemological assumptions of a given population, we could convincing explain why some joined and others opposed an emergent movement. The answers would be found, I suspected, only through greater analytical emphasis on the plurality and diversity of specific values held by various sections of the population and related to their political interests as members of particular groups or occupants of particular statuses. What was needed was a sociology dealing with the social
elements in allegiance to those ideological movements and with its confinement to one or another existential perspective.

To develop the political analysis of the matrilineal groups and of the social movement on offer at Buka as a single theoretical problem was perhaps a natural step to take, one which was encouraged by the reasonable expectation of my professors that I should come out of the field with an argument which would not be too incoherent for a thesis.

In outlining research proposals to a seminar before leaving for the field I suggested that there was an uncritical tendency in anthropological accounts of cargo cults to assume 'a process of spontaneous formation of monolithic groups, who, to a man, subscribe to a unitary and immutable body of dogma.' This could be attributed to the legacy of Weber's theory of charisma. As a corrective I adduced Shils' (1957) argument that 'the ideals of prophets and saints can take root only when they are attenuated, moderated and compromised with other contradictory ideals, with the demands of the situation and with the needs of "the old Adam." Ideals and beliefs can only influence conduct alongside of personal ties, primordial attachments and responsibilities in corporate bodies.'

A reading of Sinclair's report on the Welfare indicated a number of points. The hereditary leaders, called tsunaun by Blackwood and tsunono on Buka, had retained much of their traditional power. The Welfare's inaugural meeting (see below, Chapter 4) might be interpreted, as Sinclair did, as demonstrating a conflict of interest in the Society between this more conservative, landholding class and the younger, better educated men. By 1964 institutionalisation of reform had come a long way and the organisational structure was well consolidated to the extent that the Welfare operated as a governmental
structure independent of and parallel to the administrative structure of the colony.

The most promising model for the operation of the Welfare as a political system seemed to be that sketched by Hobsbawm (1959:41-6) for the mid-nineteenth century Sicilian Mafia: 'For the feudal lords [the Mafia] was a way of safeguarding property and authority; for the rural middle class a means of gaining it....So long as it provided a means of defense against the foreign exploiter and a method of national and local self-assertion...Mafia's character as a national conspiracy of non-cooperation gave it a genuinely popular basis....Rivalries between the powerholding generation of illiterate, parochially-minded men and the "outs", the generation of higher "status" and education but with few jobs broke up the crucial family cohesion' of Mafia and in time led to what Moutalbane referred to as 'the strange dialectic' in the process of control. The young men had no alternative other than to compete with the older controllers, who 'used' the police but in the end failed and were forced to compromise.

Whereas many accounts of cargo movements had indicated either ephemeral or episodic phenomena, the Welfare perhaps would provide an example of a stabilised and continuously developing social structure. This led to a focus of attention on Weber's theory of the routinisation of charisma. From there I developed a scatter of hypotheses derived from organisation theory which might relate to the institutionalisation of Welfare activities within a formal structure. These ideas, suggested by writings of Blau, Etzioni and Selznick especially, were however concentrated on the area of 'subinstitutional' processes - systematic adjustments following informal internal patterns of influence and dominance, the dynamics of elite structures, bifurcation of interest, the succession and displacement of goals. These of course are not exactly the processes described by Weber as transformation of charismatic authority. His
analysis deals instead with the shared value systems which assimilate and legitimise the prophet's status.

The organisation studies could be seen as taking Weber's analysis of charismatic domination further by investigating the structural constraints which regulated allegiance to positions of authority. Blau's argument (1963:309ff) that Weber focuses primarily on the beliefs that legitimate authority while neglecting the structural conditions that give rise to it was seen as a necessary correction to Weber's preoccupation with the increasing 'rationality' involved in routinisation. It is also the other side of the coin to Worsley's critique (1968:269-71) of Weber's assumption that charismatic authority emerges in the first place as a result of social tensions which are the product of fundamental elements of irrationality in social life. Like Blau, Worsley gives analytic priority to the plurality of 'rational' conflicting interests in the situation generating submission to charismatic authority and he queries the nature of the 'affectual' (non-rational) ties uniting the communal organisation centred on the prophet.

As well as an allusion in the seminar paper to the possibility of investigating the preexisting sectional interests and political conflicts of the society giving rise to a charismatic leader, the suggestion was made that Turner's point about his matrilineal groups applied also to ideological groups: intense attachment to shared ideals which brings people together in intimate relationships commonly divides them at the same time into aggressively competitive units with conflicting sectional interests.

It was interesting to consider the fissiparity of movements discussed by Worsley (1968:68, 241). Perhaps the same process was involved as in the fissiparity of

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1 Closely related to Simmel's sociology.
matrilineages analysed by Turner. Fundamental contradictions could be expected within the value system of the ideological community, conflict between the principles of organisation which brought them together. Unaware of these conflicts factional units could develop within the group claiming to aspire to common goals, each unit able to justify its position (in fact determined by particularistic interests) by reference to a principle drawn selectively from the shared value pool and used as a weapon against rivals.

The seminar paper concluded: 'The dominant interest of my proposed work is to examine the Buka matrilineal group and the Hahalis Welfare Society and to examine the interaction of values and power relationships within and between both types of group.' In spite of the studied vagueness of this statement, the mixture of theoretical interests on which it was based and which I have sketched above carried me through my first field trip (December 1965-November 1966) and into the start of the second (January 1968-January 1969).

My fieldwork was planned according to the understanding that this would be a comparative study of a traditional village and Hahalis, which had discarded much of the culture which it had received. I anticipated that it would be necessary first to gain an understanding of the 'basic', older political systems in a Local Government Council village where they had been conserved and then, armed with this, to tackle the politics of the Welfare. This priority was reinforced by two assumptions, both of them in fact dubious. First that it might be easier to gain entry into the Welfare after I had had a while to become known in Buka villages. Second that it would be easier to pass from a Council village to the Welfare than vice versa.

I had been forewarned that Welfare and Council were two antagonistic camps so as soon as I had ascertained
that I could settle immediately at Hahalesala, a settlement at Hagus, a Council village, I approached John Teosin, President of the Welfare, at Basbi, his headquarters. I proclaimed my political neutrality as an academic and Teosin stated his readiness to accept me at Hahalis when I decided to move from Hagus.

With Blackwood's monograph 'Both Sides of Buka Passage' as background, I had thought it possible to acquire a working knowledge of traditional society in less than six months. But at Hagus I encountered social and political systems of a richness and vitality which I had not anticipated. With some claim to objectivity I suggest that Blackwood's account, for all its fine ethnography of a wide range of cultural forms and institutions, provides but a few leads to the understanding of the workings of political systems on Buka.

My fieldwork of course was carried out in a different village and dialect area but, following Blackwood, I believe that my account too holds good for 'both sides of Buka Passage.' I spent no time on the Selau Peninsula where she worked but all my informants claimed that the system I describe for Buka was even more in evidence among the Selau, who are regarded as the more faithful custodians of a common heritage. And I cannot seriously consider any argument that the modern system is essentially a postwar development.

The prospect of being able to formulate an analysis of the dynamics of the political life which to my surprise was so evidently engaged in with vigour and so greatly enjoyed because of the continuity of the local cultural heritage, led me to stay at Hagus longer than anticipated and longer probably than the results warranted. Although

1 From the linguistic evidence contained in the monograph it would appear that Blackwood, in choosing a field site, may have happened on the only group of Tinputz-speaking people amongst the Selau.
I maintained amicable relationships with the Welfare leaders, there had been no stampede to get me to move to Hahalis, so it was not until September 1966 after more than nine months at Hagus that I moved to Monkoto, a settlement at Hahalis. I lived there ten weeks in 1968, anticipating a much longer stay on my second field trip.

Between the two periods of fieldwork I prepared the following thesis outline which shows not only the heavy reliance on data on traditional political organisation but more importantly the influence of the set of postulates formulated before fieldwork.

Chapter 1. The aims of the study

Part I: The Structure of Authority

2. Morphology of groups of the older order
3. The Regime of the tsunono in Council villages. The forms of authority
4. The regime: bases of legitimacy

Part II: Political Processes: The Arena in which the Welfare emerged

5. The mobilisation of support by the tsunono. Group formation and positions of power
6. Structural ambiguity and structural change
7. The Development of Welfare and Council as factions in the same political fields

Part III: The Welfare as a Political Field

8. The new order - systems of communication
9. The two structures of legitimacy within the Welfare
10. Conclusions

The chapters 2-5 presented an analysis of the traditional political system, moving from values, concepts and ideals associated with authority to the dynamics and conflicts of political processes. Chapter 6 dealt with the limits of integration within the maximal political
unit, the district under one chief. The basic structural fault was traced to the frailty of the alliance between two blocs, the Nabouin and Nakarib moieties, ideally endogamous and almost discrete territorial subdivisions of the district. In an intermediate position, in politics and on the ground, was a buffer-zone populated by the Nakas, a category described by the Buka as 'halfcaste' between the two moieties. Unfortunately the Nakas had eluded certain identification during my first period in the field but this I attributed to the stigma of this categorisation and there seemed to be evidence enough that further investigation would unmask them. The chapter emphasised the basic hostility between moieties and the divided allegiance of the Nakas.

I believed that I could establish that in the 1950s 'the line at which these structural contradictions occur' became the boundary between the Welfare (Nabouin) and those who joined the Local Government Council (Nakarib) with the Nakas split between them. The precipitating event might prove to have been the inability or reluctance of the Nabouin to maintain their marginal place in the cycle of clubhouse feasting. At the time this cycle seemed to reach a peak amongst the Nakarib, the Nabouin dropped out, took up communal cashcropping and abandoned the customs of the old political system. The rest of the chapter discussed 'the development of the substantive issues over which this new form of structural opposition came into play.'

Back in the field I tried but never did find the Nakas and there proved to be no substance to the idea that the Nabouin boys had not quite made it in the clubhouse league and had set up a new game of their own.

Chapter 7 in outline dealt with the Welfare-Council opposition as it later developed in the broader arena beyond district boundaries. It suggested that there was an 'antithetical response of one group to the other in
spite of or because of shared attitudes...and similar interests.' Until 1959 Anton Kearei of Lonahan had been Buka's foremost advocate of new forms of economic association, opposition to headtax and to Councils. He failed to unite the east coast because regional differences had overridden ideological unanimity. The coast was split because Kearei made 'expanded leadership claims as spokesman after a 1958 tax rebellion.' In the north John Teosin's consolidated Welfare Society grew as a 'parallel development, at the same time, to the Council, Kearei's newly chosen instrument of power.' Then followed analysis of similar interests in the same resources: land, cashcrops, members and government support and assistance.

The analysis of 'the Welfare as a political field' opened with a discussion of the maintenance of identity and unity, its orientation to traditional forms and European models as sources of ideology. The two structures of legitimacy were then distinguished and the interaction established between the elite of the *tsunono* and the elite of the young men. Just as the opposition between Welfare and Council was to be explained as essentially a translation, into a new context, of particularistic interests discernible in traditional politics, so within the Welfare the cleavage between *tsunono* and the traditionally disfranchised and powerless was presented as the factor explaining whatever appeared to be new policy or ideology. The *tsunono*, I thought, proposed programs of direct benefit to themselves but the young educated men elaborated on these ideas, turned them against their less sophisticated *tsunono*, subverted their authority and became the new leaders of the Welfare with wider popular support.

Here was the contrast between nominal convergence and community at the level of ideology and the realities of divergent political interests between groups intent
on maximising their own gains by using appropriate versions of the ideology against one another.

This then was the form of analysis pursued until the second period of one year at Hahalis. It was an approach which I had virtually wholly rejected before the year was out. I will now attempt to indicate the severe limitations of this type of investigation. For in the organisation of material for later chapters I will try to underscore the class of phenomena which this form of analysis not only would leave out of account but would easily obscure.

Stretton (1969) has presented a convincing demonstration of the many ways that the social scientist's values may determine the selection of an explanation of a certain type. The value of his arguments lies not so much in the way that he shows the effect of evaluation on perception and observation of phenomena which present themselves but in his clarification of the part that evaluative 'selectors' play both in the discrimination of subjects for investigation and consequently in the type of causal analysis considered sufficient to explain the effect which is of interest.

The present discussion too is concerned with the choice of explanations as much as their truth. For I would not claim that the type of enquiry into the set of interrelated topics outlined above was based on any hypothetico-deductive method by which middle-range propositions could be systematically confirmed or discarded in the light of a steady accumulation of hard facts. It could be said with some truth that the 'hypotheses' were incapable of falsification. By this I mean not that their truth was relative, dependent on the means of their validation, but that they were really a set of axioms concerning connections between values, ideals, ideologies and on the other hand political interests given in the preexisting social context.
These axioms gave rise to a collection of lower-level propositions which were selected and appraised less on their merit as causal explanations of behaviour that 'demanded' investigation than for their utility in demonstrating the validity of the axioms, namely the presumed significance of primordial political conflicts in the formation and organisation of an ideological community.

Given that certain theoretical anthropological interests 'selected' the strategy of research it becomes a major tactical problem to discriminate between the reasonable and the untenable lower-level propositions. I am thinking here of assertions that moiety membership foreshadowed Welfare allegiance or that the development of Welfare ideology followed the dialectic of the struggle between the tsunono and the younger leaders.

Evidence for and against accumulated but I was not prepared to admit that it was disproportionately negative until I reconsidered the axioms and adopted other evaluative criteria for the selection of problems for investigation.

Gouldner (1955) has pointed out that 'a commitment to a theory may be made because the theory is congruent with a mood or deep-lying sentiments of its adherents, rather than merely because it has been cerebrally inspected and found valid. So too with the theory of organisation' which is inspired by a 'pathos' of pessimism and fatalism. Selznick for instance suggested that organisational behaviour must be interpreted 'not so much in terms of the ends that administrators deliberately seek, as in terms of the organisational 'needs' which their pursuit engenders' and, in selecting data for analysis, he chose to focus on social constraints which thwarted aspirations and neglected to consider constraints which enable organisational goals to be realised. Gouldner recommends an alternative 'ideological'
focus on processes of adjustment 'oriented to problems of change, of growth, of challenging contingencies and unsettling encounters' instead of the organisational needs of security, continuity and bureaucratic stability with which Selznick was preoccupied.

Political anthropology, in so far as it is dominated by an exclusive concern with 'local level politics', factional opposition and with 'situational analysis' (the extended-case method), shares with organisation theory this conservative predeliction for an essentially unhistorical study of equilibrium systems and formal constraints as against a theoretical interest in issues of policy and ideology and in purposive political change. Of course the choice is not open to every anthropologist but it seems to me that selection of research strategies is regularly made in favour of the prevailing conservative paradigm of political behaviour.

Sahlins (1961) says of Tiv and Nuer lineage segments: 'They are not permanent, absolute social entities, but relative ones. Called into being by external circumstances, the level of organisation achieved is in direct proportion to the social order of the opposition....The lineage segment cannot stand alone but can only stand "against".' The segmentary lineage system develops where a tribe formerly composed of self-sufficient and autonomous groups expands into a 'contested domain' and political opposition between newly-consolidated coordinate groups develops in the course of 'predatory expansion.'

This model of political process can be seen clearly reflected in my original formulation of an explanation of the emergence of Teosin's Welfare and Kearei's Council as opposed factions. They were relative political groups mobilised simply for competition with each other, simply 'instruments of power' for their leaders. Given the
many attitudes to economic and political development which members of the two groups had held in common, their differing stated ideologies and programs which might give them the appearance of 'absolute' social entities, were less important than their competition as predatory factions in the expanding political field.

As regards the structural fault within the Hanahan district, attention was to be directed not towards any program which united the incipient Welfare Society as a political entity in its own right but to the division created by the centripetal tendencies of the district political system. These created fission and, it was suggested, the two groups only subsequently found a series of new substantive issues to express this opposition. The form of political conflict, in this analysis, was primary and the content secondary.

The analytic reduction of emergent political organisation to a process of contraposition of self-seeking factions is seen also in the early emphasis on cleavage within the Welfare. Its formulation of a program and ideology was seen not so much as an adaptive response of the unit to problems of its environment, as the structuring of a new political field within which conflict between tsunono and the young men worked itself out.

Appropriate though it may be for the politics of lineage segmentation, the Sahlins model of opposition has, I suggest, become the usual selector for strategies of anthropological research into political action of all kinds. The characteristics of factional competition turn out to be the distinctive features of most political systems on which attention is currently focussed.

The question arises in the analysis of power relationships: what is the unique feature of factional opposition which distinguishes it from other types of political competition? Occasional note is made by
students of factions that there seems to be wide
disagreement on the definition of the subject matter.
Certainly there is no explicit consensus but I believe
that there is a recognisable class of phenomena that
have been described so far. In defining these as
factions anthropologists have marked off an area of
power relationships where there are no policy issues
involved. The relationships occur within a community
where there is a stable set of values agreed upon by
all members, even if this set does not constitute a
logically coherent system.

People come into conflict with one another in
pursuit of these values. The political activities within
the community are not concerned with modifying its
principles of organisation, purposes or policy; nor are
they designed to alter the general nature of internal
competition. These are the conclusions that I maintain
are entailed in the typical paradigm of local level
politics. Yet we are told quite often that with factions
we are dealing with dynamic systems or with the phenomena
of social change that cannot be handled by the techniques
of the structuralists.

The study of factionalism and the 'situational
analysis' of conflict on which much of it draws are
characterised by a supposedly tough-minded definition of
political activity as manipulation and pragmatic
formulation of selfish strategies. They are characterised
also by the avoidance of political change and the ideational
and affective content of policies of change. Turner claims
that the analysis in Schism and Continuity reveals the
'integrational deficiencies of a politically unstable
society' but where is the political instability when the
schism is of groups and relationships whereas there is
continuity of society and principle and value? I think
that it is characteristic of studies which insist on the
treatment of political activity as a process that the
more political action changes the more it remains the
same. As Deutsch (1963:35) says of the theory of Heraclitus, in relating it to current studies of political dynamics, the 'implied notion of structure is as essential to the models of processes as is their well-known emphasis on change.'

The paradigm which is implicit in current factionalist studies is an equilibrium model which describes the range of variation, personal choice, opposition and intrigue which is possible within a community with a stable set of values. The same model is the main theme of Gluckman's writings on politics.

He asserts that the study of stateless societies focusses attention onto principles which operate in all forms of groups, ranging from modern states, through universities to recreational societies. 'The more members of these groups are associated with one another through a variety of ties, linking different sets of persons, the less can factional dispute and intrigue destroy the general consensus of major group membership' (1965:115).

I suggest that this is a specification of the 'closed system' within which anthropological analysis of political systems generally operates. The approach reached its most sophisticated development in Turner's (1957) monograph on the Ndembu; further methodological implications were spelled out by Barnes (1958) and Van Velsen (1967); its axioms have been adopted, more or less explicitly, in the majority of studies of political anthropology. The extent of its diffusion has been shown in the publication of two recent symposia, Political Anthropology and Local Level Politics.

The type of analysis developed as the extended case method (or situational analysis) is, I believe, incorporated generally in the study of factionalism. The one is virtually the formulation of the methodological assumptions with which the other operates. The extended case method as discussed here has been employed most
extensively in the course of study of political systems of small communities, where political behaviour was found to be a functional aspect of religious, economic and kinship roles; relationships were shown to be 'multiplex' and cross-cutting ties related different people in different fields of interest.

It is on ideas developed for analysis of processes in these communities that factionalist analysis depends - the interest in evanescent coalitions, the focus on quasi-groups instead of corporate groups, on the maintenance of the unity of the inclusive group, on the diversity of assorted principles of political mobilisation and recruitment of factions through individual ties, the element of individual manoeuvre and selection and manipulation of norms to further personal interest.

The current emphasis is on choice, manipulation and individual strategy in a game-theory type of matrix. Social systems are seen as sets of balanced transactions; choice is canalised by constraints and incentives and this process is analysed in terms of an economic model. Barth (1966) has explored this approach so far that he appears to suggest that commitment to moral and political values is generated by this process of interpersonal bargaining and 'mutual steering.' He treats values as epiphenomena, a sort of 'spin-off' of the bargaining process.

Political change, even in the case of the Lappish nationalist movement, is analysed as an incidental product of balanced transactions ('activation of commitments' in return for 'presentation of relevant results') between leaders and follower, each acting in his own interest. Little attention indeed is paid to the analysis of change generated by political ideology (Eidheim 1968).

Consistent with his interest in factions, Nicholas (1968:50-1) suggests that political anthropologists in general will make advances only when they focus on
'areas of choice' within a social structure, such as the process of formation and dissolution of temporary alliances between lineage segments for particular conflicts.

Barnes (1958:126) asserts that situational analysis is 'concerned with choice in social action (with) the problems of why in a specified context a man chooses one course of action rather than another.' It would be a little more accurate to say... 'with the problem of specifying the context in which a man chooses one course of action rather than another', for these analyses deal with the structuring of alternatives for choice not the dynamics of individual motivation.

It would be quite misleading to suggest that this type of analysis deals as, for instance, Chomsky apparently does, with the diversity of an individual's behaviour which enables him to adapt constructively to a novel situation. It seeks rather to establish the rigid parameters of every course of action available. The range of choice, it is argued, is minimal - the novelty of any one of a series of situations is illusory and what is real is the ultimate futility of the sequence of manoeuvres performed by the actor. Barnes says that 'the outcome of any particular crisis [in the Ndembu village] is never completely predictable' (1958:16). Indeed, for situational analysis is fundamentally interested only in showing that a person is 'continually forced to choose' between a number of alternatives and that the actual consequences of whatever decisions he happens to make further restrict possible courses of action at a later date. This is hardly an explanation of decision; it is negation of choice.

The prediction of the outcome where an actor is faced with choice apparently would require the demonstration of a game theory strategy. Situational analysis, like game theory, necessarily posits the instrumental view of human
behaviour - rational maximisation of gain or reduction of loss defined in terms of ends which are given in the nature of the system.

For Turner the actor's interests can be inferred from the situation or a series of them. The underlying social structure of the village imposes the limits within which situations can develop. The wants and claims of protagonists are given in terms of the persisting principles of social organisation. Anyone who sets his sights on goals which lie beyond the political storm in a teacup are dropouts from the system and from the monograph.

Turner makes the significant point: 'The situation in an Ndembu village closely parallels that found in Greek drama where one witnesses the helplessness of the human individual before the Fates: but in this case the Fates are the necessities of the social process' (1957:94). Both Barnes (1958:16) and Gluckman (1965:302; Foreword to Turner 1957) are impressed by the pathetic frustrated creatures who people Turner's universe. These are the 'personalities in the round' which we are told situational analysis reveals.

Among the Ndembu, it seems, few men live up to the standards of the ideal type headman: generosity, impartiality and unselfishness. Turner (1957:202) suggests - without demonstrating - that 'training and tradition uphold and produce among the majority of men a very different cast of personality' - that of the hunter: withdrawn, fierce, independent, domineering, footloose and partial to alcohol and women, wherever they may be found. Why is it that 'the hunter' is turning up in more and more studies in political anthropology. Perhaps it is because 'the closer we come to the political grass roots the closer we have to consider such 'motivations' as self-interest and ambition' (Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966:27).
Turner's analysis is based on the axiom that, in politics, schism and crosspurposes, variance and disorder are in a sense more real and pervasive than solidarity, persistence unanimity and other structural realities, any of which are conducive to the realisation of collective purposes. There is no doubt that the analysis of conflict is central to any sociological interest in political process, but this does not mean that strife or contradiction as such is politics or is the only proper concern of political anthropology.

We find this suggestion in Turner's belief that the 'real' political organisation of the community becomes apparent at times of crisis and open conflict within it. During the intervals between successive confrontations, political relationships are latent. The acceptance of the 'politics=fuss' formula leads to the analytic construct which equates 'the unit of political action' with the processional form of the crisis situations described by Turner; according to the editors of Political Anthropology, the phases of political action are mobilisation, breach of peace, crisis, development of countervailing tendencies, deployment of adjustive mechanisms and restoration of peace - which usually means readjustment to the status quo. The concept that divisiveness, deviance and conflict are the primary concerns of political anthropology is also found in models of factions as the 'fundamental' elements of political action.

This may sound rather anarchic until we remember that situational analysis and faction studies come the full circle and postulate the structural containment of the significance of conflict. And the emphasis on individual choice and personal interest needs to be seen in the perspective of the fact that more fundamental to the analysis is the attention given to the constraints imposed by the social process. Likewise the interest in a certain degree of variation in opinion and behaviour
is entailed by the focus on an enduring consensus, but one so diffuse as to be incapable of providing a basis for concerted political action.

Criticism of the equilibrium bias of anthropologists interested in conflict is not new. Here I would like to draw attention to a doctrine of structure-functionalism popular since the appearance of *African Political Systems*: that, in order to draw cross-cultural comparisons of the social functions of political institutions, form—whether structural or processional—must consistently be separated from content; I suggest that this has the unfortunate effect that political anthropology is moving to establish a paradigm which equates political action with conflict processes—whatever the conflicts are about. But in fact the conflicts which are generally dealt with are conflicts within any institution which are compatible with and indeed entailed by the persistence of institutional values, fixed in the enduring structure of society. They are conflicts within a limited system, not conflicts about the system. I would have thought that, in order to show that a struggle for advantage has some political content, it would be necessary to argue that it was related to the determination or furtherance of public policy.

Jayawardena (1968:764-6) has shown that the conceptual apparatus of Swartz, Turner and Tuden in *Political Anthropology* is closely associated with the sociology of Parsons and the systems analysis of Easton. An extreme equilibrium bias, he pointedly comments, has been developed in the course of analysis of community power structures and this sort of model is 'worlds away

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1 Cf Stretton (1969:330-1) who indicates the lack of content in the 'conflict as such', which Dahrendorf singles out as the cause of 'change as such' which he values as an end in itself, whatever the direction of change and whatever the point of the conflict.
from the dilemma, aspirations and bitterness of the political universe of, say, a Franz Fanon. ... Parsonian doctrine is most suited to the study of parish pump politics and it is unlikely that significant political issues will be fought out on the playing fields of Easton."

A similar point has been made by Bay (1965) in his critical evaluation of 'the behaviorally oriented conservatism' of recent political science, which, he says, extends the referent of 'political' to trivial issues unrelated to public purpose. Disputation over these issues is 'pseudo-political behaviour', which 'resembles political activity but is exclusively concerned with either the alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting private or private interest-group advantage, deterred by no articulate or disinterested conception of what would be just or fair to other groups' (1965:40). Bay points out that these studies fail to articulate their very real value biases, in defining politics 'in a simple institutional or behavioural manner, unrelated to normative conceptions of any sort.' They ignore perceived and felt needs, which are considered less measurable and therefore less real than other needs inferred from economic and political behaviour. The conservatism is reflected in the anti-political 'assumption, explicit or implicit, that politics, is and must always remain primarily a system of rules for peaceful battles between competing private interests, and not an arena for the struggle toward a more humane and more rationally organised society... the tendency toward affirming the status quo and, what is worse, toward disclaiming the importance and even the legitimacy of political ideology, and ideals, is discernible in... leading behaviourally oriented works' (ibid:44).
Firth (1964:208-9) suggests that anthropologists generally infer the meaning of action by observation of its antecedent and consequent. They treat values as significant because of the systematic social operations which express them. There may be no way of ascribing meaning beyond the closed system, but within it behaviour can be "explained" in so far as it can be given a context. Whether or not there are alternative methods, this ascription of meaning and the inference of motive from the context of action is surely common practice in political anthropology. For the most part it is inspired by the judgement that, like the 'group theorists' of political science, we need only observe and describe what people do and can infer their real motivations from the means that they employ; it is not our primary aim to establish their reasons for action or their stated goals; their own feelings about their actions need to be treated with caution for their real interest is a simple fact observable in their behaviour.

As Winch has shown, 'there is a powerful stream of thought which maintains that the ideas of participants must be discounted as more likely than not to be misguided and misleading' (1958:95). Of course anthropologists for decades have exercised methodological caution in relating ideal norms to actual behaviour but in recent years the question of discrepancies between informants' views and social reality has, in some theories, ceased to be simply a matter for empirical investigation and has become a cardinal postulate on which research strategies are based. Nowhere is this form of behaviouralism more apparent than in the political studies I have mentioned, where the actor's interpretation of his own behaviour is regularly ruled out of court. Thus Van Velsen (1967:147) in appraising situational analysis: 'For the sociologist interested in social processes there are no right or wrong views; there are only differing views representing different interest groups, status, personality and so forth.'
The participants' views on events are nothing but value judgements which Van Velsen contrasts with the 'sociological evaluation' by the expert outsider who puts them in their existential perspective (ibid:13). Barnes (1958) drew attention to Turner's exemplary 'emphasis on actors rather than informants.'

Any type of analysis incorporating the a priori judgement of the irrelevance, futility or the merely relative truth of informants' views, must surely actively inhibit the discovery of the subjective meaning of social action and the actor's own definition of the situation. They assume that 'the ideas which people have, in behaving as they do, influence the nature and outcome of their behaviour far less fundamentally than is usually thought; and that, therefore, the sociologist must develop his own concepts de novo and pay as little attention as possible to the ideas of participants.'¹ Against this I would suggest an alternative emphasis on 'interpretive understanding', which, as proposed by Weber, hinges on the conviction that some acts directly reflect the express intention of the actor so that we can immediately understand their meaning in terms of the purpose the actor had in mind.

The understanding of meaning in this sense is quite different from such causal hypothesis as Van Velsen pursues in relating the stated views of informants back to their inferred sectional interests - a relationship of which they are unaware. The tradition of phenomenology developed by Schutz (1962) insists that, instead of treating the subjective definition of a situation simply as a response to forces which play on the actor (e.g. structure, situation, process or norm), social scientists should attend to the fact that interpreting a situation is an essential part of social action. By so doing, actors in fact

¹ Winch (1958:95) in his outline of the theory of Pareto.
structure the situation for political action. Here I am suggesting not the need for empathy or intuition but the methodological priority of the task of eliciting the reasons people have for their own action.

I have carried this critique far enough to show what I believe to be the limitations of the behavioural approach to political analysis. What might seem to be a polemic against recent anthropological work has been in effect an attempt to evaluate, by association, my early attempts at analysis of the Welfare. I have gone to some lengths to give a synoptic view of a general approach because I was led to revaluate it as such and not as a series of discrete hypotheses invalidated by the cumulative results of empirical enquiry.

In order further to indicate the evaluative criteria which guided later analysis, I wish to mention a factor in the personal equation which was partly responsible for the change in strategy. I will do no more than allude to this, as I realise I have already burdened the reader with a first person account of the history of this research. During my 1968 stay at Hahalis, I became intensely involved in the activities of the Welfare as a group and developed friendships with some of its leaders, which are of singular personal importance to me. As the year progressed I had fewer pretensions to disinterested enquiry and for the first time had real doubts about the meaningfulness of this concept. I can imagine that someone might argue that my participation was so great that my observation was accordingly reduced. But I could not accept this argument because I am convinced that the 'value-freedom' of my earlier research interests obscured as much as my commitment to the Welfare helped to reveal.

Within a few months I ceased to protest my political neutrality to the Welfare and admitted my sympathy in their

1 Cf Blumer, 1962.
attempts to solve day to day political problems. I describe one series of events below (Chapter 5) in which I became closely associated with the Welfare over a very contentious issue, but there were others and, although Welfare leaders and I were agreed that any public declaration of support would be unwise politically, I was faced with the fact after a while that many of the Welfare's enemies had become my personal foes and I tasted just a little of the vilification and political persecution which the Welfare has for so long endured. In time I had come to take the Welfare seriously and to understand their attitudes and intentions more fully. I found that I received valuable feedback when I proposed my analyses of situations for their consideration and they suggested alternative interpretations. Open and honest discussion with close friends was the scientific method by which I came to revaluate my earlier theories for relevance and accuracy.

The account of the organisation and role of the Welfare which follows is an attempt to show that its program is an adaptive response to problems of development in pre-independent Buka society, not a reflection of the needs and interests of a section of the population. Whereas the referent of 'political' in my earlier theories was restricted to power relations between factions amongst the Buka themselves, I suggest that the genesis and development of the opposition between Welfare and Council is intelligible only if we focus attention primarily on the wider arena in which real power rests with the Marist priests and the Australian kiaps.\footnote{I use this Pidgin term as a useful abbreviation for an officer of any rank in the Department of District Administration, as it was known when I was in the field. I use it, without pejorative intent, because it is used universally by the blacks and commonly by the whites on Buka.} I think it best to consider the Welfare as a populist movement which emerged
out of the turmoil of the late 1950s to meet a 'crisis of development' in the modernisation of economic, social and political institutions.

Another crisis was the tax riot of 1962. As long as my attention was absorbed by the internecine conflicts among the Buka, this confrontation with the whites was an irregularity, an accident which shed little light on the political behaviour of the blacks. I will discuss it below in some detail because I now believe it to be one of the most crucial developments in race-relations and a watershed in the history of recruitment to the Welfare.

In the sketch I give of the subsequent methodical consolidation of the Welfare, I have not found it useful to refer to the supposed dialectic between the tsunono and the young men. On the contrary I believe the viability of the Welfare's reforms to be largely due to their wide acceptance by a culturally homogeneous population and I suggest that the effectiveness of the leadership is due to its populist basis, not least in the sense that it is legitimised by the universally accepted criteria pertaining to the traditional regime of the tsunono.

The Welfare to a large extent has structured its own political environment. This is not to say that it has been able to control the reaction to the program of revolution it has mapped out for itself. But many routine organisational problems are efforts to cope with the response of its enemies. So too in considering the development of attitudes and elaboration of ideology it is best to adopt an interactionist position; what the Welfare has done is neither a merely defensive reaction to some affliction of cultural disintegration, as might be suggested by some analyses of Melanesian crisis cults; nor is it an autistic millenial dream acted out without reference to the demands of political reality. In the following account I assume a continuing dialectic
involving action by the Welfare and reaction from its enemies resulting in successive synthesis of programs for political action.

The analysis will assume a significant role in social change for the ideology developed by the Welfare and in this sense I emphasise the adequacy of explanations taking the form of the reasons given by the actors for their own behaviour. I suggest that the choices which the Welfare has made are real, not illusory and that to a very significant degree their action has been effective when evaluated by the intention expressed. To this extent the phenomenon of the Welfare requires no further explanation than an account of its purposes.
Three distinct languages are spoken on Buka. Petats (on the western offshore islands - see Map 1) had about 1350 speakers in 1966, Solos (mainland central villages from Poka, Bei through Kohiso, Gagan to Telatu and Nova) about 2300 and Halia with 9000. Halia is also the language of the villages of the Selau Peninsula (from Manob to Ruri) with 1800 people.¹

The Summer Institute of Linguistics described 4 dialects of the Halia language (more correctly 3 dialects and the Selau sublanguage but the difference is very slight):

1. **Haku**, spoken by a resident (1966) population of 2500 in the north east villages from Lontis to Elutupan
2. **Halia proper**, or 'Hanahan', spoken by the 3800 from Tohatsi to Sing and by the 700 Cartaret Islanders
3. **Hangan** with 1400 in the villages Lonahan to Ieta
4. **Selau** on north Bougainville.

The people themselves do not systematically distinguish between Hangan and Halia proper although they recognise gradual changes as one moves within the area of the 2 dialects.

The Petats speakers refer both to the east coast people and to their language as **Teitasi** ("the side of the open sea") and are known in turn as **Teitolo** ("the side of the island").

The area that I will call the Hanahan district includes the population of 1900 of settlements on the shores of Hanahan Bay on the east coast, plus 250 at Tohatsi just to the north.

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¹ With the exception of Tsundawan, which now apparently includes the population of Kurtatchi with whom Blackwood stayed in 1930.
Separated by heavy forest the Hanahan people and the Haku referred to each other as Teilatu ('the bush side'). The Hanahan people were the only islanders whose domain extended the width of the island - to the small west coast settlement of Banis, a colony to which seasonal hunting and fishing expeditions are made from Hanahan.

This territory is bounded on the south by the Solos people of the interior, who also have land reaching to the sheltered west coast. The Teitasi and Solos people are known to each other as 'rough-water' and 'calm water' people, respectively. This ecological distinction is believed to be reflected in conversation styles, the Solos speaking with an even drone while Teitasi conversation comes as waves that break on the reef. The Solos people have close cultural and diverse social links with both Teitasi and Teitolo, but are regarded by them as conservative and backward.

The Hanahan people through trade and colonisation were the dominant Buka influence on Tulon (the Cartaret Islands) to the east and the Haku and Hanahan people have strong kinship links with Nissan Island to the north.

Before attempting an account of the organisation of the Hanahan district as a political unit under the chief (monihil), it will be necessary to describe the pattern of land development and location of settlement so that I can provide a preliminary sketch of relationships, at the level of the parish, between tsunono, hereditary leaders of rank, with the right to build and maintain tsuhana (clubhouses or men's houses) associated with that rank.

The Halia-speaking people spend almost as much time fishing as on cultivation and all their settlements are confined to the seaboard. A cliff runs the whole length of the coast at a height of 150 to 200 feet with only occasional breaks. In recent history houses were divided in numbers between sites on the intermittent larger expanses of beach below and on the cliff top.
The general term for land or ground is *tsikitsiki*. Two categories are distinguished: settlement sites on the one hand and land used for cultivation, hunting and collecting. A settlement site, *punluma*, may be held by an individual or by a matrilineal group. They vary in size from a house and its immediate surrounds to a settlement of perhaps a dozen houses. A person who is granted *punluma*, e.g. a man living with his wife's kin, may confirm permanent rights by giving a length of *paiou* (ceremonial currency) or a live pig. It may be then inherited by his matrilineal kin but may not be further alienated.

The second category of land is spoken of in terms of 'roads' or 'ways', *maroro* - usually abbreviated to *mar-*. A *punluma* is a clearly bounded area bearing the name usually of some topographical feature there. Gardening lands are named after the roads traversing them, i.e. the road followed in exploiting the particular area. Each settlement has an elaborate pattern of occupied and vacant house sites, some of them including others.

The status of a member of the local group is partially reflected in the nature of his land-rights - whether he holds only *punluma*, its location in relation to the clubhouse (*tsuhana*) or the direction and length of his road.

One type of road is *mar-matsko*, 'straight' (or 'real'). Almost always they are owned by *tsunono*. These roads start from the beach roughly at right angles to it and follow a direct course inland. Some take their names from a local feature at the seaward end, e.g. *marisoa* (passage in the reef), while others have names derived from an area they reach inland, e.g. an area noted for sago or possums.

A second category after *marmatsko* is *marisohi* 'a wandering road'. This is a minor road which covers only a short distance before 'ending nowhere'; it may either start from or lie near the *marmatsko* of the people upon whom, it is implied, its owners were dependent.
Another type of gardening road is *taniapekona* which 'breaks at the start'. It starts either at the village or at another road and leads to yet another road. Paths in the area set aside for settlement or paths leading down to the beach are *haliena*. With a network of connecting roads and paths it is not always agreed as to what category a road falls into. The main area of disagreement seems to be the distinction between *marmatsko* and *marisohi*.

Cutting almost at right angles across all these east-west oriented roads and running parallel to the coast is the *kalana* (or *marigara*), the thoroughfare linking Tohatsi with Hahalis. The present vehicular road roughly follows its route. Further inland and parallel to this was the *hiarohi*, an irregular track stopping before each *maroro* and starting again beyond it. It was a path beaten by people with no business to be in the area or for some reason wished to avoid contact with groups along the *kalana*.

The narrow strip of land bounded by the *kalana* and the clifftop was set aside for settlements (together with the beach below the cliff). It is known as *ielelina*, 'the inside area'. Any settlements lying on the far side of the *kalana* were *igilesela*, 'on the outside'.

Most *marmatsko* are known as *martetenei*, 'small roads' because they carry only as far as the inland margins of cultivation at most. They were separated by a _tolo_, bush standing within the general area of cultivation. After feuding ceased the different groups spread out and developed new *marmatsko*. (Nevertheless today gardening groups are designedly 'mixed' in order to forestall the use of magic by outsiders to destroy the garden.) Most of the new *marmatsko* lead to one of the original roads but

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1 or marihis.

2 _Tolo_ is distinguished from _sule_, bush standing in 'the inside area' along the axis of settlement.
some of them disappear when they reach the bush, suhupeko.\footnote{This seems to be taken as an indication that their owners have longer established land claims in the village than the owners of other new roads have.} Other marmatsko again have a pronounced bend (lahalata) which bring them a short way into the bush and up to one of the major roads.

A narrow strip of a tolo is left standing between marmatsko and to my knowledge no more precise boundary is marked until two neighbouring roads of cultivation make contact. The named groups commonly known as villages are rarely discrete or nucleated, except where they are located on the beach. On the north coast of Buka the height of the cliff decreases steadily from east to west. On this beach there are several local groups to each village but they are nucleated and larger than elsewhere on the coast. Only in the larger villages is any pattern immediately discernible in house alignment. On the north coast in particular a characteristic division into parallel lines of houses is more pronounced. Elsewhere clusters of from two to several dozen houses occur at fairly regular intervals along the road.

The only sizeable streams on Buka run down to the west coast. The small streams which drain towards the east are subterranean and the water is generally accessible only through sink-holes. The Local Government Council formed in 1961 supplied each member village with 3 or 4 water tanks set next to the councillor's meeting-house on the cliff-top. This is known as the 'haus-tank' (it is seldom used for meetings). Also in the early 60s a large increase in the scale of cash cropping was already well under way and in 1962-4 an all-weather coronas road was extended from Lonahan along the whole east and north coasts of Buka. In many villages these changes resulted in a large scale movement of settlement from the foot of
the cliffs to the roadside. The people had occupied both kinds of site until forced to shelter on the beach during the Japanese occupation 1942-5. Most apparently chose to stay on there after the war.

By 1957 six villages were located almost entirely on the clifftop. They were Malasang, Tahetahe, Hahalis, Tohatsi, Elutopan and Hanpan. These are some of the less favourable beach sites. Convenient house sites or ease of access to the road seem to be the reasons for the persistence at Hanahan and Lonahan of large beach villages, but another is Gogohe where the cliff is somewhat precipitous. In 1957 Hagus and Ketskets had problems of overcrowding on the beach but there was no general move from there to the clifftop before 1962.

Settlement occurred almost entirely within the area bounded by the road and the sea.\(^1\) This phenomenon has important implications in social organisation. Direction inland, whether the distance is a foot or a mile, is denoted by *palsesei*, as opposed to *palgagala*, in the direction of the sea. The other axis, along the strip of settlements, dominates concepts of social space within the district. For the structuring of the most important intergroup relationships can be and is expressed in physical terms of polarisation along this axis. This I hope to show in a later discussion of the interrelations of clubhouse groups.

The smallest local group is a *han*. This is best here translated as 'a settlement'.\(^2\) It is to be contrasted

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1 The recent construction of a good vehicular road has made a difference. Some people who moved from the beach found house sites on the inland side of the new road. Many of those who settled a little further inland have done so to keep their children away from traffic.

2 It is sometimes used less precisely for an area of human habitation.
with the *punluma*, settlement site, which means only the block of land currently or formerly carrying settlement. There is an incredibly intricate patchwork of overlapping punluma dividing the land on which even the smallest settlement is established. A *han* refers to any discrete cluster of houses, anything from a handful to well over 100. It can refer to the local group sharing allegiance to a clubhouse as well as to any of the clusters into which this group might be divided.

All settlements are named. The name may describe a topographical feature, local flora or fauna (*Kioupan*, 'big hole'; *Munkoto*, 'the foot of the Koto tree'; *Kulu*, 'doves'), a foreign place once visited (*Bapitalai*; Africa) or an historical event (*rongkot*, 'wrong court'). It seems that the named settlements which together support a single clubhouse may not properly be referred to as *u han* (pl. form); the clubhouse is the house of 'a single settlement' (*a toa han*).

This is clearly the diacritical usage. The people who are members of this collectivity are the *palabasa* (the *abasa* - unit - a less exact term for 'clubhouse' than *tsuhana*). If there is currently no *tsunono* present in the settlement to run a clubhouse, the people there will usually be described according to their relationship to an active *tsunono* nearby, very often as his or his male matrikin's 'children'.

*U hanana* connotes a unit larger than *a han*. It refers to a group of settlements and is used to refer to the unit I shall call a parish.

The parish territory contains the settlements and land of up to perhaps 5 *tsunono*, one of whom possibly has a nominal and untested right to all parish land by virtue of supposed descent from its earliest occupants. He is the

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1 *Abasa* properly refers simply to a bachelor's dormitory. On Nissan however *abasa* means clubhouse.
man with rights to the clubhouse known as lumankessa, a clubhouse which is 'of the ground'.\footnote{1} Human and animal images were carved and stored in this clubhouse and were shown at initiation and marriage. A clubhouse for the storage of bows and other weapons (lumanhusul) was paired with the first house, as a male-female pair. Although the images are no longer carved and bows no longer strung, the houses are still differentiated by these criteria.

The groups owning this pair can be said to constitute the core of the parish. They merge as one unit which jointly erect and maintain one of the clubhouses in turns, never in competition. If either clubhouse was currently maintained it would receive the support of the other tsunono of the parish. Each of these men however has title to a clubhouse of his own\footnote{2} and in turn each could receive the support of the coregroup, who in the meantime would forego the activities associated with their own house.

The tsunono who holds the house which is the current focus of attention is the tsunono pan, the big tsunono. His authority for the while embraces the whole parish to the extent that the other tsunono 'hide' and accept his initiative. His temporary pre-eminence owes little indeed to the sorts of skills in competition and acquisition which are said to help the typical Melanesian bigman in his climb to power. He is first among equals for a time by the agreement of his peers and even through their exertions.

The members of a parish are ideally united as 'friends who help each other'; they have 'one work', which means they

\footnote{1}{Even this is relative to the status of the houses of other tsunono present, for there is no contradiction in asserting also that the lumankessa was imported. For each Nakarib lumankessa there is probably a man somewhere with a story telling of an earlier occupancy by the Nabouin.}

\footnote{2}{Of various kinds which I describe below.}
regularly contribute jointly to the support of a single clubhouse for the whole parish; they may sometimes maintain two houses which either 'face each other' and so were restrained from competing or are in some other way interdependent and subject to coordination. Accordingly the members of the parish are *mummuntolana*, 'a group of brothers.' The only other theoretically possible extension of this term to a group wider than the parish is to all local members of the moiety.

On these bases I would distinguish two parishes within the present Ketskets (Ketskets and Piob), one in Hagus, two each in Hanahan and Hahalis, one combining Telelina and part of Hanahan and another with parts of Hanahan and Hahalis. This would give an average population of about 200 for a parish.

It would be wrong however to place too much emphasis on the parish as a discrete and self-contained political unit. Its unity was due partly to needs of defense, though not primarily against its neighbours, and to a greater density in the network of ritual ties which spread over the dozen or so parishes in the district. The borders of the parish territory were flexible and adjoining settlements could easily enter or withdraw from the production unit and localised ceremonial system which the parish constituted. Possibly one of the main factors producing the division into parishes was not political but ecological: the parish may have been about the largest unit which could develop a block of gardens which achieved optimum productivity under the system of shifting cultivation.

In the past gardens were clustered together. A much larger group cooperated to make contiguous gardens in the days before pacification, the easier to set a guard for women while they were at work. This cooperative group would develop a cultivation strip leading inland from the sea, known as *marigogogogono*, 'road of gathering (of gardens).'' Doubtless a stable parish would develop several consecutively over the course of time but in all the parishes
that I know only the most recent one is apparently remembered.

It should be remembered that the important geographical distinction between parishes was their separate gardening areas. Along the seabord axis the string of settlements was almost continuous between one parish and the next. In several cases there was no physical separation of residential areas at all.¹

The village, among the Teitasi at least, seems to be a unit created for administrative purposes under the colonial government. In some cases the names do coincide with regions roughly distinguished traditionally within the district but not with corporate groups except in the rare cases where the parish has become a village. Just as commonly the parish is divided by village boundaries and often the meaning of village names is not known.

The strip of settlements along the shores of Hanahan Bay, from Hahalis to Kotopan, are i hanana i Hanahan, the group of settlements of Hanahan. Similarly, further along the coast are the settlements i hanana i Gogohe, i hanana i Lonahan and i Malasang. These units coincide almost exactly with the maximal political groupings - the districts. (Lonahan and Malasang may have had a fairly constant alliance with each other.) Informants from Ieta said that the area of the coast that their group controlled was not such as to warrant the term i hanana i Ieta.

The Hananan group of settlements has its eye (hamatan) to the south. It also has its middle (hahagus)²

¹ I am told that settlement now is somewhat more nucleated than before the arrival of Australian Kiaps. There was also probably less settlement on the beach before contact.
² The same applies to Gogohe and almost certainly to the other districts.
at the area known as Hagus village. It is notable that there is apparently no corresponding term such as 'back' for any of the settlements to the north of Hagus.

The people from Hahalis to Tohatsi inclusive refer to each other as ara hoboto, 'we (inclusive) together' or katun itarara, 'our people'. Even though people at either end of this district may not have so regarded each other quite so readily as others, this usage expresses the unity of a political organisation whose members were all ideally on friendly terms (nigana) in the days before pacification. And they were set off from enemies (pakou) across the borders, the Gogohe, the Solos and the Haku. Again, at the margins of Hanahan territory there were groups which had closer ties with adjacent districts than did groups at the centre - Hahalis with Tahetahe (Gogohe district) and Solos villages; Hanahan hamatana with the Solos; Tohatsi with Haku villages to the north.1

There are 3 formal categories of rank status. The least important and most common is the tsunono. In the second, more select, category are those tsunono who are tsunono mau, 'tsunono to be mourned' conspicuously. Each had the right to construct the lumankessa clubhouse. They are said to be so ranked whether or not their own clubhouse is maintained by the parish as the centre for ceremonial or feasting. Greater respect is paid to the tsunono mau than to an ordinary 'big tsunono' because, people say, the sorcery he has inherited is greater. Of highest rank was the tsunono who holds the position of monihil, the chief of the district.2 This man alone is

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1 The people of Tohatsi speak the Haku and Halia dialects equally fluently.

2 Very few people today can even make an attempt to explain the meaning of monihil. A literal translation is 'stem of the blackpalm' which, as the few point out, was the material of bows and arrows and other weapons.
known as *tsunono mal*, usually explained as 'the tsunono whose bitter words are fulfilled.'

It is said that the *monihil* has no sorcery of his own and will not abet the irresponsible use of sorcery. He knows whichever person has it. The type of sorcery referred to is *matouna* (*matoutu* = 'to fear') which is controlled by *tsunono*. There are contradictory views however as to whether all *tsunono* themselves have *matouna* now. It is associated with the *lumankessa*. The most powerful sorcery of all was associated with the head of the *ruko* figure hold at Togolo in Hanahan (see *monaruko* below). This and the secrets of other sorcery of earlier *tsunono* is said to have been learnt by the man who, as a boy, was their messenger. He came from Nissan Island to Hanahan and is the most notorious sorcerer in the Hanahan district and is treated almost as a pariah.

However, he is said to be only the agent of the *tsunono* who must meet with the chief and reach unanimous agreement before the sorcerer or his agent is sent to fetch something associated with the victim's person. A *tsunono* who wishes to protect the victim supposedly declares that they must kill 'over his dead body.' People complain that the procedure, since the arrival of whites, is secretive whereas in the past the *tsunono* would publicise their decision at a singsing called *matemaho*, 'death tomorrow.'

Some people rather than emphasise the *monihil*'s discretionary role insist that sorcery was the essence of his power. To punish any direct or indirect challenge to his authority he could call on any sorcerer or all or could command any man to spear the offender.

As Parkinson (1907:587) first noted, 'the whole population of Buka is divided into two great moieties.' Nabouin has the sea eagle (*manu*) as its emblem and is regarded as senior to Nakarib, the fowl (*keriou*). There seems to be firm ground for the popular belief that the Nabouin are much less numerous than the Nakarib.
Either unit is referred to as 'one bird' (a toa apena) or, less frequently, as 'one matrilineal group' (a toa pinaposa).

Members of the one category are found in local blocs of over 1000 members. The two categories are not absolutely exclusive territorially - one or two small pockets of Nabouin landholders might be located at intervals among a dominant Nakarib population and in each Nakarib parish one would usually find a few Nabouin matricentric families living patrilocally or attached to the local group for other reasons. Nevertheless it is commonly accepted that Nabouin and Nakarib form separate local units, having 'gone their separate ways' (lukata) at a certain point in mythological time.

This territorial division and its mythological explanation are clearer among the Haku than elsewhere. The whole north coast is more symmetrically divided: from Lemankoaa to the west is the Nakarib stronghold and to east of them are the Nabouin. The Hanahan district on the east coast is seen as a Nakarib area from Tohatsi south as far as Hanahan, with Hahalis, further south on the district border, as the major Nabouin bloc together with smaller settlements nearby, notably the dominant hamlet of Ielelina.

The folk concepts which characterise Nabouin - Nakarib relationships as dominated by feelings of envy, hostility and sorcery contributes a great deal to explanation of the legitimacy of the chief. Ielelina is occupied by two main groups Nabouin and Nakarib. The first chief or monihil, Saka, is said to have migrated with a group of matrikin from N.E. Bougainville (Hoeis). Travelling from Banis on the west coast of Buka to join their Nakarib clansmen at Ielelina they were seized by the Nabouin tsumono. Saka was singled out to occupy a position as intermediary between the antagonistic Nabouin and Nakarib factions in the district. To ensure his impartiality his close kin were killed with the
exception of his sister who was declared teitahol i.e. mother of heirs to his office. In turn the teitahol of the Nabouin of Ielelina was sacrificed as an act of expiation on behalf of all Nabouin.

Any tsunono wishing to carry out a raid on enemy territory was expected first to obtain the chief's permission (for a length of ceremonial currency). In theory it was then the chief's responsibility to send a messenger to warn the enemy though this was not always done. The chief on occasion exercised his right to command the assistance of other tsunono in his district in an attack on his enemies. Early European observers attest to the occurrence of the resulting pitched battles in which large forces were engaged at a place and time agreed upon beforehand. These attacks were led by the monahiraku, a tsunono at Hagus, who had the most effective war magic; he was also asked by the chief to inspect and advise on the omens on behalf of the war party.

The range of co-ordination in these cases was the whole district.

Another unifying principle in the organisation of this wider group engaged in conducting warfare is the interrelation of rainshrines throughout the district. Apart from subsidiaries there were four dominant shrines - two at Hagus and Ketskets (a male and female pair) and two held by the one group of matrikin, one near either end of the district. The custodians of the rainshrines had the important role of helmsman/navigator (tson tau) of the large seagoing war (and trading) canoes. For the safety of any substantial expedition it was necessary for all custodians to embark and return at the same time.

1 The custodians of subsidiary shrines were also able to act in this capacity, though less than the others.
Their ritual techniques were complementary and before both outward and return trips their co-operation in ceremonies to ensure a calm passage was essential. This co-ordination was supervised by the chief.

Political integration is indicated by the expressions of further behavioural principles expected to apply amongst tsunono. If a tsunono was refused the chief's permission to organise a war party, he would often, it is said, become impatient and set out on his own. A body brought back to be eaten should, if the victim were a tsunono, be taken to the chief's settlement at Umahe in recognition of the failure to give notification. If the victim were a man of no importance, his body could be eaten at the home of the slayer but the chief's share (binau) had to be sent.

Victims of any expedition organised by the chief were also brought back to his settlement to be cut up under a large Carophyllum tree. The spot is generally avoided, forbidden especially to women and children, because the spirits of victims inflict sickness on trespassers. The name of the chief's settlement, Umahe, in fact may be a dialect variant of umate, 'the dead'.

The concept of nitsunono defies translation into English. If we accept for the moment the analogy the Buka like to draw between 'tsunono' and 'king' then

\[
\text{tsunono:nitsunono:: king : royalty} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:: king : regal power} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:: king : kingdom.}
\]

This lack of terminological differentiation in the case of Buka is not due to vagueness. It reflects a symbolic system which makes a closer association between the various attributes of the position of authority.

The power of the tsunono, according to his importance, rests either on his head or his shoulders. It rests also on the roof of his clubhouse and at its palsingiol, the
wall associated with the pillow of his bed. It even rests on anything constantly above his head, such as overhanging trees near the clubhouse. This is nitsunono in the most abstract sense - something like the essence of his power. But there are functionaries serving each tsunono and they are also 'on his head' in one usage. Further symbolic expression of this idiom is found in some ceremonies where the guardian would be physically elevated on the tsunono's shoulders or climbs up to set the ridge-pole of a new clubhouse. The functionaries are said to be the nitsunono of the office-holder. And so too are the ordinary rank and file members of the tsunono's group.

The guardian mentioned above is known as peits. He is one of a general category of functionaries who 'lay the way' or 'go first' for the tsunono and do his dirty work. There is a regular association made between them and the category Nakas, of which I will talk again later. The Nakas were scouts and fighting men of the tsunono. They carried the fight to the enemy and won the ground for the tsunono who established the settlements and brought order to them. Yet they also provoked unnecessary conflict of their own accord. They collect hair or betel nut for sorcery at the bidding of the tsunono; they 'hear his talk' and carry his messages (susutaranga) and announce and police his decisions.

Peits is responsible for the personal well-being of the tsunono and is said to look after his new work. He protects the tsunono's group's gardens from the magic of others. He tastes the tsunono's food for poison when they are away from the village. He is spoken of as a selfish man because as the tsunono's mentor, he holds in rein his master's benevolent enterprises. He is a 'rubbish man' 1

1 On behalf of the tsunono he supervised much of the activity during initiation ceremonies in the role of amro described by Blackwood (1935:198f).
and is expendable. The Nakas in general are indeed spoken of as marginal men yet their marginality and baseness are established by their proximity to the seat of power. By acting on the tsunono's behalf in facing the doubts and hazards involved in the acquisition and exercise of power, peits is socially worthless at the same time as being the 'right hand' of the tsunono. The responsibilities are displaced onto peits and other functionaries but it is the tsunono's own power, as it were, 'in becoming'. The Nakas are rubbish and they are the nitsunono of their master.

Closely associated with the concept of nitsunono is nimal, lit. bitterness. The nimal of the tsunono is also on his head but nimal of some tsunono is thought of as somehow higher than others. The practice of hamal, lit. 'to cause bitterness' - 'to use bitter words' is possibly the most important feature of the ritual behaviour which is seen as controlling relationships between tsunono and between them and other people.

Hamal is involved whenever an unauthorised person is found in a position physically higher than a tsunono's head - or the equivalent. For instance a single woman who walked past a tsunono without warning him to stand while she passed or who approached the 'pillow-side' of his house was thereby 'put on his head' and married without marriage payment.

One variation of hamal known as sipi is a method by which a tsunono obligates others to provide goods or services which he nominates; in theory he needs only to manoeuvre himself so that an object he values is in a position just above his head, and he may appropriate it without the owner objecting. At least in instances where demands are made on persons, for instance to provide services as a rainmaker (kikeits), the tsunono must be accompanied by at least one of his fellows for it is a general rule that a tsunono cannot hamal on his own behalf. One tsunono is supposed to conceal himself beneath the door of the house of the kekeits so that the
kikeits will unwittingly pass higher than the tsunono's head. The second tsunono will then place the kikeits' hand on the other's head and inform him of his obligation. If he fails to meet this obligation he must provide a pig for husil; if the demands of the tsunono are met they must provide the pig. Husil is a meal shared by all the tsunono so it is said, and the pig must be consumed in entirety there and then. A necessary part of the meal is uhats, the offering to the dead. Every occurrence of hamal must be expiated by husil. Until this is done the irregularity is in some way thought to remain associated with the tsunono's head. Husil is designed to suppress (huharus - 'to let drop') any further comment 'on his head'. The offender who provides the pig is not supposed to eat any of it.

To intervene in or prevent fights the tsunono in the past would approach the antagonists with a bow or arrows held over his head. Aggression would then imply aggression towards the tsunono and would be punished with resources commanded by his peers.

An important form of hamal is katokato ('mime'). If a man assaults a tsunono word is sent to other tsunono. They stage mock fighting with sticks from a particular species of tree, eventually leaving one of them under the house of the offender as notice that he is expected to husil. It is said that the tsunono in so doing are identifying themselves with their fellow so as to shame the person who insulted him. A 'standard' libel used by man who withholds his support from a man claiming to be tsunono is to liken him to kulu, 'the dove', which gives itself its own name by crying it aloud. Other tsunono will then perform the appropriate katokato before the man and demand husil.

1 Cf below, p.89 at Bougainville's arrival.
Two forms of katokato also serve to cancel the effects of actions by tsunono which are considered other than the norm. The first is associated with the ritual known as tsutsu, 'pouring': after a tsunono or a likely successor has visited a distant place for the first time his people will throw seawater over him, especially over his legs but never on his head. (They also throw water over one another.) His journey seems to be thought to constitute hamal, so the katokato singles out some feature of his absence. The whole procedure is cited as the means by which a group makes one of its members tsunono (hatsunono). The other form of katokato is called for if a tsunono is witnessed in an action which is considered unfitting for his status, in effect any menial act, especially one which is a woman's task. The katokato for the chief is especially severe. If he is seen carrying anything from his garden the other tsunono will organise a party to plunder all of his garden.

A tsunono who wants a peaceful community for himself and his followers must hahana a han - maintain a settled place. Hahana involves the exercise of restraint, the refusal to antagonise or sometimes even to retaliate where retaliation would have been justified. For instance Sangin of Hahalis is regarded in some quarters in the Welfare as a tsunono who places such a high value on peaceful relations that he will break off any discussion which looks like developing into an argument. Hahana means in general to maintain goodwill and a strong community by not publicly asserting private claims which would assuredly provoke others. In traditional inter-community relationships a very important aspect of hahana for the tsunono was that he should be well versed in the proper traditions, history and ritual of his own lineage vis-a-vis others and should ensure that these were imparted to the proper person - and only to him. Some aspects of his traditions would be communicated only to his successor on his deathbed.
A concept indirectly related to hahana is ginata han. Literally, this means 'to stir the settlement(s) up'. The tsunono themselves would act as 'agents provocateurs' in order to bring into the open known tensions between a number of groups. The purpose of the exercise is to gauge the extent of potential conflict in a situation where the tsunono feel assured that they can ultimately contain the process. The only instances given to me were confrontations contrived during Kohi/Kuma\(^1\) competitions at clubhouses. The group with whom I discussed this assured me that this was more than a game for the tsunono's amusement; it was a practise to 'try' the community, to weigh its faults and its capabilities; it was an end in itself in the sense that a dull and apathetic existence is to be avoided as generally unproductive. The chief who died in 1963 is said to have played this role to the fullest.

In discussing the regime of the tsunono within the district, I have emphasised shared characteristics and common principles or expectations said to underly their behaviour as people of rank. But I have mentioned the 'big tsunono' whose clubhouse is currently the rallying point for corporate parish activities involving exchange with other parishes. Also in each parish the 'tsunono to be mourned', who may build the clubhouse which ranks above any other and is of the ground, retains a higher ranking title which is associated with sorcery unsurpassed in power by any other. At the district level the chief outranks all, obeyed by both Nabouin and Nakarib whom he represents, one to the other. Not the least of his bases of power is his ability, as principal of the elite association of tsunono, to call upon the sorcery practised by the others.

There appears to be no persistent structuring of intergroup relationships around positions of authority at any intermediate level between the tsunono mau, dominant

\(^1\) Described below, Chapter 5.
within the parish, and the monihil of the district. However one other position, again associated with dreadful sorcery, should be considered because around it a cult association was organised which embraced the whole district.

At Hanahan and Hagus there were three groups with a title analogous to the office of monihil: the monalangits, 'stem of the rainshrine' (its most able practitioner), monahiraku, 'stem of war magic' and monaruko, 'stem of the initiation ceremonies'. The two first are never said to have achieved, by virtue of their pre-eminent magic, a formal position with powers greater than other tsunono. But the monaruko is very occasionally spoken of within the district - and somewhat more frequently outside - as having been the most important tsunono. The evaluation of his position is complicated by his appointment as Paramount Luluai and his marriage to the sister of the monihil. Her son was the next (and last) Paramount Luluai.

This high priest of the initiation cult clearly exercised power through his position as brother-in-law and father of chiefs as well as his position as government appointee. The focus he provided for ceremonial grouping demonstrates an important mechanism for the unification and internal structuring of the district.

Ruko is the name which was given to the bullroarer (the voice of ruko), to those spirits of the dead who killed and resurrected the initiates, to the mask-figures representing the spirits and to the complex of ceremonies all of which took place on cleared ground at named sites in the bush. Blackwood (1935:194-247) gives an invaluable account of the elements of the ritual performances which

1 Parkinson (1907:582f) gives a brief account of the Buka ceremonies of the nineteenth century which he called rukruk. The kokorra in bark coverings which he describes were in no way similar to the later mask-figures according to the Buka of today. They were probably not exclusively associated with the initiations but were general 'bogey-men' enforcing the tsunono's edicts. Cf Thomas (1931:227 and Plate II) who says that similar covering was worn by all initiated men.
were dropped by the Buka islanders after the Japanese occupation, not apparently entirely as a result of intermittent mission pressure. Three settlements at Hanahan controlled the major ruko figures. Togolo (the 'swallower') was the name of the figure and associated sorcery which the monaruko bought at Numanuma (Bougainville) when he was working there in the early 1920s. It was also the name of his settlement. Notsi ('withers' skin like bark) the younger brother of Togolo was brought from Bougainville about the same time by the chief's lineage. Bahun ('fans' a breeze that kills) was held by the tsunono of Russia, between the settlements of the other two. Other tsunono held ruko but these appear to have been names of ceremonies or dramas - often erotic - which antedated the arrival of the 3 figures with poison (sorcery) (cf Thomas 1931:230).

The organisation of the cult was reflected in the orderly movement of the principals through the territory it embraced. There was an intransitive ordering of the bush sites (Halia: hihiol, Haku: koriena) such that in the series from Togolo (the monaruko) north to Hagus each site ranked above its neighbour to the north. The ruko slept at the one which the chief designated for the tsunono and for the appearance of the main figures. The many pigs demanded by the ruko (and eaten by the tsunono) were kept and cooked by the novices in seclusion at the adjacent, lesser, clearing. The ruko would not occupy a clearing beyond the second last at Hagus even though initiates from Ketskets, and any other parish in the district, could be shown the figures. If the last clearing at Hagus was occupied this would mean calling on pigs and

1(continued)

The Hanahan people say that the most important of the series of ceremonies was hisuleke, Blackwood's wasipsip (1935:239 ff), the cutting of the initiate's hair. The Hanahan district united for this, not for the preceding stages.
initiates from the Haku. This was rarely done but tsunono from all over Buka would attend the ruko's clearing. In the past the ceremonies were conducted during a mandatory suspension of all feuding.

From Togolo to Hahalis at the end of the district a mirror image series ran from north to south, with that order of ranking. The people of Hahalis may have sometimes sent initiates to the ruko of Gogohe.

As noted earlier, although the parish works together in supporting one clubhouse, this is changed from time to time. The parish of the chief is unique in that its 4 clubhouses, including the chief's, are permanently combined in one 'superhouse' and the 4 groups 'share rooms.' This symbolic amalgamation is said to have two functions. It gives a stable caste to the relations between the chief and his neighbours and it affords the chief security in relations with tsunono of other parishes. The 3 lesser tsunono in preordained sequence take turns to hold the 'front.' Normally this is the position of honour but the occupant also invites the hostility and jealousy of other tsunono in the district, if they feel he presumes too much by this act of self-assertion. Meanwhile the chief is sheltered in the middle of the house.

Having given an account of the district organisation under the chief, I turn now to the 'structural fault' mentioned in Chapter 1, which it will be remembered was found to exist at the dividing line between the Nabouin and the Nakarib, at the 'buffer zone' occupied by the Nakas, the half-castes. Here was to be discovered the traditional cleavage which developed into the boundary between the Welfare and its opponents.

The idea that in other cultures moieties are very often exogamous made no sense to the Buka I talked to and I could not find the 'any native' who according to Blackwood 'will say that a man should marry a woman of a
clan other than his own' (1935:41). The people of Hagus, surrounded by other Nakarib people, assert categorically that a man would be stupid to look for a wife in the territory of the Nabouin for she would act as agent for the sorcery of her kin. Data from the Nabouin of Hahalis are perhaps a corrective to the prohibition as expressed in this way. At Hahalis approximately one in three Nabouin marriages are with the Nakarib. Nevertheless these unions are mostly either with Nakarib enclaves at Hahalis or with Nakarib groups of Ielelina and Hanahan which have established close ties through coresidence with the Nabouin 'brothers' of Hahalis. Moreover the frequency of marriage between the Nabouin groups of Ielelina, Hanahan and Hahalis separated as they are by several Nakarib settlements, is greater than would occur in marriage between settlements so widely situated in the uniformly Nakarib bloc in the district.

My interest in the Nakas was aroused by models which I heard elaborated on the north coast. There it was said by some that the Nakas are the offspring of intermoiety unions living in Nakarib territory. A similar marginal group in the Nabouin camp were the Natasi. The Nakas and Natasi, physically different types from the Nabouin and Nakarib (who were not distinguishable from one another) lived as a group at the front of their respective territories, either acting as intermediaries between Nabouin and Nakarib or bearing the brunt of the fighting between the moieties.

Relentless investigation at Hanahan, undeterred by overwhelming negative evidence, unearthed a few settlements

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1 What I call moieties Blackwood calls clans.

2 Later accounts gave me both marginal categories as allies of the Nakarib - the Nakas safely closed in at the centre of moiety territory, the Natasi moving about on the fringes. The two were supposed to occupy the same position among the Nabouin.
at Hanahan Hamatan, which a few people thought might be Nakas. It was only after considerable wasted effort, that I was finally convinced that the Hanahan people were not concealing the counterpart of a localised group of Nakas, such as could be found on the north coast.

Among the Hanahan, Nakas is a category not a group with a recognised place in the district. The term stereotypes individuals in a pejorative way and is one of the worst forms of personal abuse. Although Hanahan people offer the general formula that a *tsunono*'s functionaries (scout, messenger, *peits* etc.) are Nakas, they will not venture to identify as Nakas any specific functionary.

The main cause of my insistence on locating the Nakas at Hanahan Hamatana was the misconception that these settlements should be considered realistically as the last group in the district and that, beyond them, Hahalis was a group probably outside the borders. This misconception was based on a misunderstanding of the concept *hamatana*, 'eye'. As these settlements were the 'eye' of the district I had imagined that they looked across the border to hostile territory beyond. In fact - and here I anticipate later discussion of this form of organisation - the concept is applied at several levels of organisation, not to define the outside limit of a unit but to provide internal structure, coordinating the groups distinguished as facing each other eye to eye. For instance the parish as such has no eye which relates it to its neighbours. But its current internal structure may be adequately stated in terms of the relationship of equality between clubhouses which are set against each other 'eye to eye'.

The significance of the designation Hanahan Hamatan is that these settlements are thereby grouped with the other Nakarib of the district and that this group in turn is related as a coordinate unit to the Nabouin of Hahalis. It is not the case, as I had imagined, that it indicates a gradual falling off of political unity as one moves
towards Hahalis, with Hamatan the last group that could reasonably be included in a wholly Nakarib district.

The place of Hahalis within the district is certainly not easily explained. The people there say that they were 'on the fringe' or 'at the edge' (i harerere) of the district. A figurative meaning of the term hahalis which is said to be apposite in this context is something like 'leftovers': when a tsunono gives a feast and has distributed shares to the appropriate people, the amount remaining for consumption by the host is hahalis. The term also is used (reciprocally) to refer to wife's classificatory kin of senior adjacent generation but I found much disagreement about whether this usage was relevant. Those who felt it was, argued that the primary divisions within the district were made with reference to the chief's place at Hanahan, which itself meant 'inside place'; those who drift by sea, like the koto nut, around Kotopan point are taken to the chief for refuge; Hagus, literally the geographical 'centre' of the chief's people; Hahalis, the place where the chief can take wives.

I think it can reasonably be argued that the extreme social distance between the Nabouin of Hahalis and the Nakarib of Hagus for instance had some part to play in their divergent allegiance - to Welfare and Council respectively. But the moiety opposition will not do as an explanation of the formation of the Welfare. For as I shall show later it was John Teosin, son of a Nabouin father and Nakarib woman, who consolidated initially the Nakarib of Hanahan and the Nabouin of Ielelina. The Hahalis Nabouin were at that stage independent but as a

1 Or the amount left over for individual consumption after each supporter has met his tsunono's demands for corporate feast giving.

2 Not 'does take'. Although the present chief is married to a Nabouin woman of Hahalis, this has not been the usual practice of his immediate predecessors.
result of Teosin's personal efforts made tentative overtures to the other groups. The Welfare leaders claim that, once this happened, the mission, long suspicious of Hahalís' politics and morality, reacted so strongly that it reinforced previously tenuous links between Ielelina, Hanahan Hamatan and Hahalís. They say clearly that these groups came together to form the Welfare because the mission forced unity upon them.

I will now concentrate attention on the network of relationships between clubhouses which provides the framework for political interaction in traditionally organised parishes.

Generally speaking the intergroup relationships linking parishes as such, apart, that is, from their members' common membership of one district or one moiety, are no more and no less than the relationships between the individual clubhouses which the parishes severally support. These links form a changing network from which no combination of parishes emerges as a group.

Clubhouses, today as before, are symbolically divided up into unequal parts, shared out and the parts combined with other clubhouses. As I will indicate later, the dynamics of political relationships between tsunono within the parish and in separate parishes are conceptualised in terms of the process of differentiation, relative ordering, orientation and recombination of elements of clubhouses.

The flow of this redistributive process involving clubhouses follows the personal network of kinship and ritual ties between tsunono. It cannot follow a pattern of matrilineal group segmentation ordered according to genealogical criteria because there is no such pattern. As a principle of recruitment to corporate groups matrilineal kinship is but a secondary elaboration on the process of formation and internal ordering of groups around the position of the tsunono with his clubhouse. The Buka
BASIC TIES BETWEEN HAGUS GROUPS

Groups A1-A4 hold Tabunakul settlement: A = Ketei; B1-B2 = Tanobi, Hahalesala;
B3 = Hahalesala, Hatapa; C = Huela; D = Monlus.
Numbers after letters indicate agreed ranking (A = peits of A1)
All living males are householders
\(\Delta\) : Not resident at Hagus
themselves recognise that matrilineal groups are contrived to suit the primary requirements of constituting a unit mobilised in support of the tsunono and the clubhouse. The shallow lineages within this group are distinguished and related and ranked not according to genealogical criteria but according to the functions they perform for the tsunono.

A toa apena ('one bird') is sometimes spoken of as a toa busu, 'one umbilicus' or a toa ngorngorere, 'one womb'. Recruitment is by matrilineal descent. The moiety is also said to be one pinaposa. The term is used in three senses, to mean either,

(a) the matrimoiety (named),
(b) the local groups within the parish whose members are spoken of and treated as actual matrilineal kinsmen of one tsunono (this group has no common name unless it is the current name of the settlement it shares), or,
(c) each of the shallow matrilineages within (b) together with the lineage's members living elsewhere. If part of the lineage occupies its own land elsewhere it is known as hapalanapinaposa 'the other (another) part of the pinaposa'. Women of the lineage who have married elsewhere and borne children there are known as muntsinana, 'the mothers' (grouped by reference to the lineage).

If some context warrants a distinction being made between (b) and (c), then (b) is referred to as hunhaposa and the several lineages within it as hunhapose kalakala.

1 The busu is seen as physically continuous through one generation after another whereas the 'patrilineal' tie between father and son or daughter is likened to another 'rope', the stem of a gourd (or any fruit) already detached from the vine.
to a lineage (or lineages) among the local hunhaposa which has been welcomed into the group by the dominant lineage by positing shared matrilineal kinship.

The 'authentic' group is known as pinaposa matsko\(^1\) (...straight) while the group which has come into the hunhaposa is known as pinaposa sal. Sal refers to anyone who sets out for some destination but fails to arrive and ends up somewhere else.

This is distinct from the group descended from a woman who was bought outright by the lineage (sakaheis), i.e. ad genetricem (sakaheis is used also for the purchase of pigs, land, etc. and, in the case to point, is distinguished from sanahana 'to pay brideprice for a woman'). They are pinaposa matsko. So too are matrilineal kin 'asked to come to help effectively occupy' the settlement (las'hagumkap) even if the precise relationship is not known.

The members of one sungut (= local hunhaposa) are also known as (mun)hisungitsi ('all, together, of one sungut'). Spouses and the children of male members are again excluded. The important thing about this word is that qualifying terms are sometimes added. It is said to be a serious insult\(^2\) if a man rashly refers to some hisungitsi as turu hulu, 'by the hair' or hisungitsitun, 'only hisungitsi',\(^3\) while reserving for his own group the term hisungitsi turu busu, 'by the umbilicus'. Part of the significance ascribed to the distinctions results from the idea that the hair can be cut or fall out whereas the umbilicus cannot be changed - in fact it is said to be the only part of the flesh that will not burn.

\(^1\) Or pinaposa tara u tsiktsiki ('...of the ground').
\(^2\) This kind of talk twice involved men of Hagus in brawls with each other a few years before my visit.
\(^3\) Another term to describe them is sukusuku, 'close'.

At the same time, it is a distinction between means of recruitment: a toa busu signifies descent from one woman whereas the nitsunono of a headman rests on his hair and turu hulu implies dependence on the tsunono and nothing more.

Hasungsungut is more likely to be reserved for a person or group elsewhere with whom a bond has been created. All the groups in a local hunhaposa are necessarily accepted as a toa busu. The tsunono must 'love them as his own' (pakoko). If he were to throw in a man's face the fact that he is a toa busu haniga, '...by alliance' (ha-niga = make good, friendly), that day the tsunono might well lose a supporter, so it is said.

The local hunhaposa is strictly exogamous. It is said that marriage between known matrilineal kin is more strongly proscribed. However the only marriage preference that is voiced is between persons spoken of and treated as distant matrikin.

Marriage is ideally virilocal and the people explain that although this means that a traveller can receive a welcome from matrikin over a wide area, it also means that a man retains the memory only of the parents of his mother and some of their siblings. People say explicitly that virilocal marriage is the reason why they are not able consistently to apply the rule that recruitment to the pinaposa is by the umbilicus. About one in 5 marriages is at some stage uxorilocal.

Full brothers should live together in the same settlement and this appears to be the normal situation. But brothers are prone to squabbling and their houses should be separated by another house, preferably that of a sister if one is living there for they may not quarrel with her once she is married.

Marriage is in practice predominantly patrivirilocal at least until the death of the father when most men return to their matrikin. They are more likely found to be living
with their father - and to stay on after his death - if he is tsunono. About 20 per cent of men spend all of their married lives with matrilineal kin but once his household is established it is thought most improper for a man to move from one group of matrikin to another.

A man is most likely to marry a woman from close to his own settlement. At Hagus for instance in about 20 per cent of marriages both spouses were born in the parish and another 70 per cent of marriages occur with spouses from parishes in the 2 adjacent villages.

Wherever a woman marries it is thought desirable that her children return regularly to stay with their matrilineal kin for several months. It is especially important to bring back at least one of the daughters in anticipation that she will marry a man from a settlement close to her mother's kin.

Polygamy is still practised by a few tsunono although residential arrangements are made to conceal this from the local missionary. Sororal polygamy is rare at Hanahan. The junior sororate is approved, especially if the first wife bore children, but I noted only 4 instances at Hanahan and Hagus. There were 15 junior leviratic marriages, 10 of them by tsunono whose privilege it was in the past.

If a settlement has a clubhouse (tsuhana) it is the centre of all corporate activity. If the group cannot provide a successor to its leader, the tsunono, the house is closed or if the tsunono cannot muster a following of kinsmen he cannot establish or maintain a clubhouse and is thus debarred from participating as a tsunono in the exchanges (bau or binau) between clubhouses of other groups.

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1 It is disliked because any married sisters are liable to argue. Hanahan people say that it is practised at Petats and Blackwood (1935:107) noted that it was common amongst the Selau.
If a clubhouse is not currently maintained it is said to be 'lying down'.

Women may not enter the clubhouse. The notable exception is the occasion of the *soma*, at the initiation of any ceremony at a house, when the *teitahol*, the woman who has borne the children who ensure the continuity of the *tsunono's* matrilineage, is publicly led right round the interior of the house. At one end of the front wall of the *tsuhana* is *koahu tara hats*, 'the ashes of the sacrifice', a fireplace at which offerings are made to the dead to ask their co-operation and blessing on the activities centred on their clubhouse (any man of the *tsunono's* lineage can perform the ritual). Slit drums are also housed in the *tsuhana*.

Blackwood drew a distinction between the class of people known as *tsunaun* and those whom she called commoners. This is the Selau equivalent of the *tsunono* of Buka. The lesser class is known variously as *palabasa*, *pinolasa*, or *tsekotsekokala*. The *abasa* literally means 'the place for single or unattached men' (e.g. men who are visitors but are not accompanied by their wives). These men are strictly forbidden to sleep in the house of a *married* couple. They must sleep and eat in the *tsuhana*. The married men and women of the *tsunono's* group are all required to *hamusa*, 'to prepare food (for giving)' for meals, feasts, or food exchanges at the *abasa* and are therefore known as *palabasa*, the *abasa* unit - or as *abasana katun* ('people').

*Pinolasa* means 'weak' or 'feeble' and the most common usage otherwise is for a lethargic child whose parents have failed to observe the proper restrictions on sexual intercourse after his birth. *Tsekotsekokala* are 'those who fetch betel-pepper' for the *tsunono* - in fact 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'.

Among the Hanahan people, at least, it is not true, as Blackwood claims (1935:46) that all members of the
lineage of a tsunono are ascribed this title in common.\(^1\) The status is the property of the lineage but only one man dare claim it at a time. No other man would thrust himself forward, it is said, not for fear of a member of his own group but because other tsunono would be jealous and he would die by sorcery.

Lineages are ranked and the dominant group provides the tsunono. The contrast between Tabunakulu and Hahalesala (two settlements of Hagus village) is informative. The tsunono of Tabunakulu died in 1965. He has many adult classificatory sisters and sister's sons among his followers, but the last female member of his lineage has joined the Welfare Society and there was talk that the clubhouse of Tabunakulu would be closed unless she provided an heir. For she alone now is teitahol (literally 'the side of the women'), the women who provide heirs for the dominant lineage.

The present tsunono of Hahalesala is not a member of the dominant lineage. He was the man most fitted by age to succeed, but the point to emphasise (because the people do so, however discreetly) is that he was trained to be the temporary custodian of an important rainshrine held by the lineage.\(^2\) He acquired additional 'title' from his father (nitsunono).

The tsunono lives at Hatapa at the border of Hagus and Ketskets. The man marked A on this genealogy of the lineage is occupying a place considered more appropriate to a tsunono (at the left-hand side of the clubhouse at Hahalesala).

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1 The tsunaun tsan (= 'big') - (tsunono pan in Halia) - is not the senior male of the lineage but the man with the house currently supported by the other tsunono of the parish.

2 He is now training the oldest member of the lineage to whom it will revert.
He is descended from the line of elder sisters and it is often said that the activities of the clubhouse are on his behalf. The present tsunono is 'standing by' for him (peitokap). But A dare not claim the 'name' (a solo) until his mother's younger brother, B, is dead. For the time being he must 'hide'. The title teitahol is apparently used a little more freely and is applied to all four living women on the genealogy.

Elaborate ritual and the most lavish feasting involving pigs are associated with the building of a clubhouse. Fortunately, I witnessed the opening of a new clubhouse at Hahalasela. The main procedures lasted from 1 January to 2 May 1966. They may be referred to by the term for the climaxing ceremony, kinalala.

Each time a delapidated clubhouse is replaced the same procedure is necessary. On each occasion the tsunono is entitled to add another pillar, a tul, and so lengthen the house. Some versions say that a house has two pillars when starting from scratch, others say three. The goal is to achieve ten posts. The number seems to become fixed at five for many years until a jump is suddenly made to eight or ten.

The building of clubhouse is seen openly as a contest, the basic means by which a tsunono competes with others of

1 Of tsunono. A solo is a generic term for all common and proper nouns.
the same rank. Significantly it is seen as the occasion by which he invites the envy and sorcery of his fellows. The victim may be one of his supporters. The procedure also courts disaster if the spirits of the dead do not approve of the way it was conducted - then the fortunes of the tsunono and his group will overturn (supana). Not only are material resources and supporters in number a prerequisite but there must be agreement on the principles for conducting the procedures. The essentials of the performance must be correct.

In theory an ordinary man may not become tsunono. Only the son of a teitahol should have the title. A man cannot hatsunono-peisana paisa 'make his own skin tsunono'. But people say that pigs 'give a man his title'. A man qualified to become tsunono must kill pigs to establish and develop his clubhouse or to succeed the tsunono of an existing clubhouse. He must be lavish enough without 'carrying it too far' (katosoa).

It is essential that he be well tutored in the procedures appropriate to the building and rebuilding of this particular house. To ensure this the tsunono's local matrilineal group and his matrilineal kin from Malasang to Lemankoa, say, in the case of Hagus will convene beforehand to reach agreement on the way the ceremonies should be conducted.

There are several types of clubhouses (tsuhana), not all of them easy to identify.

The lumankessa: the posts of this house were carved with male and female figures, kessa. 'Portable' kessa were also kept there. As the figures are not now commonly used their significance is uncertain but kessa were part of the paraphernalia of initiation ceremonies and were carried at the marriage ceremonies for a teitahol.¹

¹ See Blackwood (1935:95). These are the 'Tanzkeule' described by Parkinson (1899 and 1907).
The lumanke ssa is the 'original' type of tsuhana. It was held by a tsunono but is said to be 'for women'. It is contrasted with the lumanhusul, 'the house for bows' which is said to be male, and strong by comparison. In the past the teitahol of a lumankessa bore more elaborate cicatriced patterns than any other person.

The tsunono of the house was known as a tsunono mau, a man 'to be mourned' with proper respect - even more than most other tsunono because part of the work of the lumanke ssa was sorcery second only to that of the monaruko.

The lumankessa are not currently built, it is said, because an excessively large number of pigs should be provided for the feast to open it.

The lumanhusul for bows and arrows and other weapons: These were kept on a platform under the roof and if the tsunono wished he could examine omens here with his fellows and work war magic, hiraku, to guarantee the success of a raid. This is essentially the same type of house as the lumanhiraku at Tabunakulu but the magic and prowess of this house stood out from other lumanhusul. Moreover, after the chief's settlement, Tabunakulu was the most important place for dividing the corpses of the enemy and distributing shares to other tsuhana. It was monahiraku.

The lumangoum: this is a clubhouse, in which the cicatriced patterns were cut on the skin. The goum could be cut in any tsuhana or in any house where a tsunono has died.

Today the plank canoes, mona, on the east coast are used only for deepwater fishing and carry only three men usually. In the past when canoes were used for warfare or for long trading expeditions to the Cartaret Islands, etc. the canoes were much larger and had up to ten seats each wide enough for two men. These canoes are spoken of as 'the same as tsuhana'. This means that the canoes could be owned only by a tsunono. He had an elevated
seat in the centre known as *poana goa-gono*, 'seat tabu' (*poana* is the rib frame on which a seat rested, cf. Blackwood (1935:377), who also noted that women were not allowed to ride in certain types of canoe). Each seat of a *tsunono*’s canoe had to correspond with a pillar in his clubhouse.

**Lumanlangits**

There are several rainshrines in the Hanahan area, each associated with a clubhouse known as *Lumanlangits* 'rain house'. They are not all of equal status. The *teitaho* of Hahalasela is known as *monalangits*, 'the stem of rain (magic)'. The *tsunono* of her lineage controls a stone pillar known as *u asa* with its associated 'talk', which gives him the unique power to produce a drought. The lineage holding the clubhouse at Monarotsil, Ketskets holds a stone with which they can cause pigs to destroy food gardens.

Both Hahalesala and Monarotsil also have the technique of rainmaking described by Blackwood (1935:321f) - though special clay pots, *tabeli*, are used instead of coconut shells. The *lumanlangits* of Hahalesala, Tanopuna, is 'male'. That of Monarotsil, *Lagono* ('go in company') is its female counterpart. The ritual of the one is complementary to the other and must be co-ordinated with it. Each has its distinctive rain - the male, short downpours and the female, a rain which gradually sets in.

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1 It is strictly forbidden for anyone other than the man who knows the 'talk' to touch the stone. This applies even to the *teitaho* because women may have nothing to do with rainmaking. If she goes near the stone her body will waste away.

2 The present *tsunono*’s predecessor was allegedly responsible for the legendary famine said to have caused the evacuation of Buka many years ago. A great deal of secrecy surrounds the stone partly due to fear of punishment by the government.
There are two other important *lumanlangits* at Hanahan and at Kotopan. The ritual of the first (Galotukana) and of the other (Lunabubu) are identical. They straddle the other two shrines and their characteristic rain develops in an encircling storm out to sea (all rainmagic is said to have come from the Cartaret Islands).

At certain periods, mainly when more garden-food is needed, the rainshrine of Hahalesala or that of Monarotsil has a sacred branch of a dead tree, *halil*, placed before it and surrounded by small stones, *hahahe*, each associated with a particular crop. The appropriate words of the man controlling the house then 'calls for' the taro, breadfruit, etc. The branch is dangerous to touch and is usually hidden away. These are the two original (male and female) *halil* among the Hanahan people. The branch of Hahalesala is part of the same tree as the branch used by their matrikin at Malasang and Lemankoa (the *lumanlangits* are said to be divisions of one house q.v. below) while the branch of Monarotsil is of the same tree as those of their kin at Hahalis and Malasang. If a person throws away a scrap of taro in the sight of members of these groups, this is seen as an expression of ungratefulness or animosity.

Besides the four major rainshrines in the Hanahan area mentioned above several other men know the ritual and talk for rainmaking. Any man who has these skills is known as *Kikeits*. It is a common practice for the *kikeits* to teach his son the ritual associated with his house, lest there be none of his matrikin suitable. 'Teach!' is not entirely correct because whether the pupil is the *kikeits' son or sister's son, he must pay for his acquisition of the secret of rain by contributing pigs for sacrifice. This is known as *husil*, the practice employed in many contexts for expiating some wrong done either to or by

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1 A tree which has been struck by lightning, a phenomenon which can be invoked by the custodian.
a tsunono or to signify in advance that the person will not overreach himself.

It is usually said that the shrine may not be moved away from the lineage's house and that if a member teaches his son, the son may not teach anyone else. But the present kikeits of the Monarotsil shrine is said to have been 'messenger' for other kikeits.¹

Moreover, at Hanahan is a kikeits who has a shrine inherited from his mother's brother who in turn received it from his father, a Hahalesala man. It is said that after the 'gift' Hahalesala and Kotoarara became one sungut because they had 'one work'.²

The kikeits' services can be commanded by other tsunono and receives payment of ceremonial currency. Apart from control of weather and crops the kikeits have another important role. On request they are able to make a tabu on the harvesting of tree crops in specified areas except by authorised persons. Anyone trespassing on the affected area will be victims of the dead ancestors of the kikeits. The tabu of a male rainshrine is said to be more powerful than that of the female.³

Strictly speaking, the tsuhana is analytically distinct from other types of lumanpan (big house). It may be a 'transformation' (hapalis) of either a

¹ Note also that the most notorious sorcerer in the Hanahan area is said to have been 'carrier of talk' for the tsunono when they practised sorcery. He is not a member of any matrilineal group whose tsunono is said to 'have sorcery'.
² But I have also heard the cause and effect reversed.
³ The spirits of the dead kikeits, called lihantau, together with the dead tsunono and spirits of women who have died in childbirth seem to be the three main categories of spirits distinguished from the ordinary dead. The kikeits was always buried at sea lest the secrets in his mouth upset the land.
lumanlangits, lumanhiraku, or lumanruko (or possibly transforms of two types whose tsunono work in close association). A tsunono whose lineage has long been renowned for the magic of his rainshrine, \(^1\) for instance, may add a tsuhana to it and the two houses then ideally should have their 'pillow sides' adjacent hihasingiol, but out of humility he will take advantage of the ambiguity regarding what status it has - or how much status it derives from other tsuhana. The lumankessa apparently is a tsuhana in itself. This and the other houses mentioned have each their own 'work' (e.g. for rain) but there is said to be another type of house which has no work and is simply a meeting and feasting place. It is known as solontsuhana, '-of the name' built by a group which has always had the title of tsunono.\(^2\)

Each house, including the clubhouse, has a front, pori (palpori = the pori side) which is avoided by women, especially in the case of the clubhouse. The back, palbiau, is the women's side. The side where a man's head lies while sleeping is the 'pillow side', palsingiol, and is avoided by cross-cousins (and by all women in the case of the tsuhana). The fourth side is palkokolu.

If two clubhouses face each other and share one dancing ground (always at the front) it is said that they 'put their fronts together' (hiaporopori). The two houses are ideally equal in status. They hihimatani, i.e. each is hamatana (eye) of the other.\(^3\) If a new clubhouse is to

\(^1\) And who has descendants, supporters and adequate resources of pigs.

\(^2\) Another house with no 'work' is a type of 'weapon house' (lumanhusul) at the border of a district where warriors simply regathered and rested after a pitched battle. Some claim that these were owned by a tsunono, others that they were 'collective' houses.

\(^3\) Hamatana means 'to reciprocate', 'return in kind'. Hihimatani means 'to exchange' and sometimes, 'to exchange sisters in marriage' (also = hiahihitul).
be built the tsunono arranges a meeting, attended only by his supporters, called 'tie knots'. They there fix the number of pigs which can be provided for feasting. If this and another house face each other and the second tsunono proposes to build a new house in his turn, the 'knots' must be supervised by other tsunono so that the same number of pigs is provided.

The terms hiaporopori and hihimatani also apply to houses (or lines of houses) in one settlement which face the clubhouse from different directions (except at the front of the clubhouse).

When asked whether the location and orientation of the clubhouse may be freely changed, people may say that it is done. However there was unfavourable comment when a clubhouse at Ketskets was built facing inland (= matesose). A clubhouse 'facing the beach' is known as metegolala. Either way the house is said 'to lie askew' - the same word is used for a garden road which instead of running straight inland cuts into another road obliquely.

It is said to be irregular if, in two adjacent settlements of a parish, the back of the clubhouse of one faces towards the front of the other. This is known as front to back (porinibiau) and implies that each house would forever be competing to attract crowds to its dancing ground (at the front) at the expense of the other.

If a settlement of the Nabouin adjoins one of the Nakarib on the east coast (as at Sing) and the two have clubhouses they should face each other. The houses of the two groups may form parallel lines east and west but not north and south because, some say, one would close the other off from the sea and from the wind which blows sickness from the houses. The reason given by others is that fishermen from one group would not be able to reach

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1 A pig must be killed for each part of the house (pillars, rafters, etc.).
the beach without passing the back of the houses of the other thus risking pollution from women.

The most useful approach to the general problem of group-formation seems to be to examine the growth, fusion and segmentation of men's houses. At least two main processes are involved and these sometimes merge: hatapekona luma, 'to divide the house' or 'the parts of a divided house' and hihipekona luma, 'to share rooms in one house' or 'to divide a house and take separate parts'. There are interesting contradictions among people when it comes to the explanation of these terms but it seems clear that on this depends the clarification of the concept hatsunono, 'to make .. tsunono'.

The most common use of the term hatsunono is for a tsunono to confer a status (nitsunono) on his son.

(Hatsunono can - more rarely - mean the ritual, especially tsutsu, by which a group affirm their recognition of a potential matrilineal successor to their tsunono.) This suggestion that office is inherited from the father is reconciled with the dogma that the title of tsunono is transmitted only by strict matrilineal succession by giving the strictest possible definition to what is implied by hatapekona luma. I shall now use 'house division' as a translation of this term.

Initial questioning about the meaning of hatsunono, 'to make tsunono' produced the formula that the Nabouin hatsunono the Nakarib (the Nabouin being the original occupants of the land). In any particular instance, however, it is almost always found that a tsunono who claims to be Nakarib is 'made tsunono' by his father who also claims to be Nakarib. The son receives a house division.

Even if his father is tsunono a man cannot receive nitsunono if his mother is not teitahol. But he may, nevertheless, receive a house division, viz. a part of his father's clubhouse. In fact the gift is figurative - he
does not physically take a part of the clubhouse. The gift enables him to build a larger house for himself and his wife and children than would otherwise be justified. The gift is given only if he, or more accurately his mother, 'cooked pigs' for his father's house.

If the recipient is the son of a teitahol he already has nitsunono and the gift 'increases it'. If other circumstances allow, he may build a clubhouse using the part he received from his father's. His father may give him either a rafter, halhai, or a pillar, tul, or wall-peg, korik (q.v. Blackwood 1935:382). The gift of a rafter allows him to widen the clubhouse which he inherits matrilineally. A pillar enables him to add to its height. If he receives a wall-peg, he can make his house longer.

The discrepancy between dogma and practice is regularly revealed in such statements as: the nitsunono of the house division received from another group is not powerful; the father's group may act as guardians (peits) for the clubhouse of the son's group because it is only newly founded - or: the son's group (which does not have its own nitsunono) cannot use the house division 'immediately' - it must first build soapili, a house with a conspicuously flimsy roof.

Men who are very specific about the limited status conferred with a house division will go on to speak as if the recipients are virtually always matrilineal kin at any rate (a significant point in itself) and therefore have a right to the nitsunono.

The members of one Hagus group claim that the ancestors of Tabunukulu were immigrants from the north who were accepted as allies and provided with a place to live. A current land dispute is associated with this claim. The opinions expressed by men of Hahalesala on this subject alluded only to their own lesser status in relation to Tabunukulu. It was another group again that disclosed that tsunono of Tabunakulu had given
nitsunono and a house division to their children at Hahalesala and maintained that the new house must submit to a degree of control by Tabunakulu and must have exactly the same number of posts as the senior house. The men of Hahalesala later (indirectly) dismissed this idea and quietly denied that the gift of a house division was incorporated into their own house, which, they claim, is a 'transform' of their rainshrine.

A complicating factor in the analysis of relations between these two clubhouse groups is the cross-cousin relationship between them. The children of uterine brother and sister are always hahinasuna whether or not they were born and reared in the same settlement. The circumstance in which hahinasuna is used in practice instead of hahatolana, 'classificatory brother' between classificatory cross-cousins is where either child is a member of the lineage of the tsunono in the settlement in which they live (or have lived).

Marriage between cross-cousins is forbidden and I noted only one such marriage (between distant kin) among all the unions which were said to be irregular. Mild joking is permissible between hahinasuna but most behaviour is centred on the avoidance of bodily contact with special emphasis on the hair. This is extended to include strict avoidance of the pillow-side of the other's house and of contact with tsilotsilo (literally 'the top'). This means any tree in the settlement which overhangs the path taken by one's hahinasuna but refers especially to those on the pillow-side of the tsuhana of one's father's group.

The notable feature of the hahinasuna relationship seems to be the fact that it can apply to intergroup relations. A matrilineal group of one settlement may be

1 No objective check was possible because both clubhouses are now permanent non-traditional structures without pillars.
2 In practice, this is avoidance within sight of one's cross-cousin.
hahinasuna to the group occupying another settlement. It is difficult to discover the principles of the relationship from considering one instance but as far as I know the relationship between Tabunakulu and Hahalasela at Hagus is the only example of a current intergroup relationship of this nature in the district.

The present tsunono of Hahalesala (and his predecessor) and the teitahol of its dominant lineage are children of tsunono of Tabunakulu, which to date seems to have taken nine wives from the other group and to have given possibly one in return (even the status of her husband in Hahalasela is dubious). Although the question was subject of debate which antedated my arrival, it appears that both the tsunono and the teitahol were given house divisions by Tabunakulu. Until these two persons die all members of the one group are hahinasuna of the other because the people of Hahalasela are children whom Tabunakulu 'made grow up in the settlement' (hatuhana) - there are of course other children of Tabunakulu, collectively, ahinpien. I should add that it is in order for the two groups and indeed the whole parish to refer to themselves together as munmuntolana; the tsunono of Hahalasela (i.e. the 'children') can refer to the junior generation of Tabunakulu as hahapien ('child') but in behaviour the hahinasuna relationship is dominant in theory and practice. It is said to derive from the fact that Hahalesala received house divisions from their fathers.

There is often disagreement about hihipekonaluma (to share rooms of a house). I was first made aware of the practice by accident. Ketei and Tabunakulu are adjacent settlements and, knowing that both had clubhouses formerly and that both had their 'eye' to the south, I asked what, if any, relationship could be assumed to exist between two groups if the back (palbiau) of one faced the palpori of the other (this is porinibiaw, as I learned later). I was told that the two tsunono would then share
rooms of one house, one taking the back of the house, the other the front. This was hihipekonaluma.

Later I found that some of the instances where two groups had been spoken of as having divisions were in fact examples of this sharing of front and back. Some people were now saying that the clubhouse of Tabunakulu had been 'cut in half' and the back given to Hahalesala.

It was not clear from these cases whether hihipekonaluma constituted fission or some type of amalgamation. It is probably true to say that it is both. The house is split so that it can be shared, the recipient being incorporated with the donor in a group jointly supporting part of the house.

The one principle on which there was agreement is that group A allots to B, a 'subordinate' group (the specific relation varies) the right to maintain a clubhouse on behalf of both groups. B is said to have the back, i.e. the women's side, by way of which food is brought to the house. Group A retains the right to the front where exchanges with other groups are conducted.

The clubhouse held by B and the houses of A must face each other. If group A were not situated at the front this would imply a reversal of the proper order of seniority.

In all of the six possible examples recorded at Hagus and Ketskets the two groups were adjacent. Even if group B has rights only to a settlement site near the clubhouse and has its own land (its 'road') a few hundred yards away, its households are located near the clubhouse.

I found that, when the subject of hihipekonaluma is first raised, people take it to refer to the sharing of house divisions by two or more children of the tsunono or by children of successive tsunono. Full brothers may not both take divisions of a house. Half brothers must take different divisions: the son of a first wife is said to take a rafter, the son of a second receives a pillar, the third receives a wall-peg.
In discussions in which stress was laid on the need for a recipient of a house division to have his own nitsumono if he is to build a clubhouse, people further emphasised the point that the several recipients of parts of one clubhouse cannot simply 'reconstitute' the original by amalgamating them.

However the groups of two tsunono who received divisions of the one house may, because of the bond between the two men, jointly maintain one clubhouse. The co-operation is said to end once either tsunono dies but the father's group should continue to assist both.

Co-operation to maintain one house in this way is known as watching over one another (hiapepeito). The term also applies to the same type of relationship obtaining between two separate parts of what is said to be one matrilineal group, between 'father's' and 'son's' group (and/or between a group holding the front of a house and that holding the back - where this is distinguished from the above relationships). The relationships between tsuhana and all their changes is always an area of significant conflict of opinion. In examining the changes, in time and in context, in what group is said to constitute one hunhaposa or sungut, the one covariant to be noticed is change in relationships between clubhouses.

The only clearcut marriage preference is with matrikin resident elsewhere, the reason given is that the husband will then be fed well by his wife and that she will be working hard to cook for his clubhouse.

Two groups, one 'father' and one 'son', are quite properly referred to as sungut if one has a house division of the other and both watch over each other (hiapepeito). Two groups maintaining one house but living apart might be said to hihatshoboto, 'make offerings together'. It is not clear whether this needs to be distinguished from hihipekonaluma or hiapepeito but the link between them in
any case is given as a good reason for intermarriage. In these cases it seems impossible to discover whether marriage occurs because they are one matrilineal group or vice versa, Hianiga is a term with the same connotation as hasungsungut and is used to cover co-operative groups formed by accretion to the pinaposan by patrilateral connection or shared paternal ties with a third group.

Making offerings together involves both joint preparation of pigs for feasting and sharing meals of the pigs at the initial feast at a clubhouse, the ruhunaluma, and also at husil for its construction. This is distinguished from 'carrying for each other' (hiasakasaka) which involves two pinaposan in regular mutual assistance only in the preparation for feasting. 'Carrying...!' means that two groups essentially have a reciprocal arrangement for one to take the pigs of the second and to cook them on its behalf at the time of a feast arranged by the second. People say 'carrying' is characteristically practised by groups standing in the relationship of 'crosscousin'. It is of interest here that a tsunono (or any person) who is crosscousin to the group holding the opening feast for their clubhouse may not join his fellows in this feast but may share in food distributed from the house at the climax of the clubhouse ceremonies, the Kinalala.

One general point of regular disagreement is the question of the alternation of clubhouses. Various types of groups are said by some to co-ordinate their activities so that while the house of one group is standing, a second group will help to maintain this house and its own will

1 Although, as I mentioned earlier, two houses which hihimatani should assist each other's feasting, hihimatani in the sense of 'interchange' should be confined to special occasions involving simultaneous reciprocity which thereby cancels further obligation on the part of either party.
'sleep', opu, until its turn comes to be the house of both groups. This is essentially the arrangement arrived at by groups which 'watch over each other' (hiapepeito). There is uncertainty whether the same applies to 'making offerings together' or to 'carrying for each other'.

It is usually said that the group holding a lumankessa and the group holding a 'companion' house (e.g. at Tubumakulu, A2 with the lumankessa and A1 with the lumanhiraku) were in fact one group with the same house. People maintain that the lumankessa should be alternated with the other clubhouse.

The practice of 'alternation' is also uncertainly imputed to clubhouses which are 'front' (palpori) and 'back' (palbiau) one to another. The issue here is essentially whether the group with palpori is using as palbiau a house which has always been held by the other, subordinate, group; whether it has granted to the other temporary rights to a new clubhouse; or whether it has granted the other the right eventually to construct its own house and to erect it at the same time as the house erected by the group with the palpori. These problems are related to the question of the pre-existing relations between the two groups. I was once told by an outsider that the clubhouse of Hahalesala was the result of a grouping together of 3 alternating houses. The 3 were supposed to have originated at Lemankoa, Lonahan and Lontis. However at other times Hagus people dismissed out of hand the possibility that three clubhouses of different origins could amalgamate in one place.

A view several times put forward was that it is the prerogative of the chief to amalgamate clubhouses but it

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1 A complication arises when opu is used not only to refer to a house which has actually been demolished for the time being but even to describe a house currently standing but which is not the scene of a current cycle of feasts.
was once suggested to me that there is no difference in principle between this and several examples of hiipekeonaluma which we had discussed.

Groups which are invited from elsewhere and given a settlement site on which to build a palbiau are regarded as recruits to the sungut (probably until then declining in strength). The accreted groups called on for support may with the passing of time even be called on to provide the next teitahol or tsunono. Assertions of pre-existing matrilineal links between host and 'guests' appear rather transparent. Shared patrilateral ties to the same group are common features of groups so organised.

Three men with the status of guardian (peits) mentioned earlier served the three tsunono who appear to have had the widest influence (the monahiraku, monaruko and the monihil). The role of peits of lesser tsunono appears to be allocated less certainly. The peits of the monahiraku also looks after the clubhouse of Hahalesala who claim, hesitantly, that their own peits is provided by lineage B2 (see genealogy).

Each teitahol has the equivalent of the peits of a tsunono. She is known as Korikori ('possum' - from the role she has to play at the teitahol's first menstruation ceremony, described in Blackwood, 1935: Ch.XII). The successor to the teitahol must bring her own 'possum' with her. It is said that if the teitahol's lineage cannot provide a successor, then, and only then, the 'possum' may become teitahol and her son tsunono. In theory the same lineage cannot fill both the role of 'possum' and of peits.

However there is not always a clear distinction between the province of each. The group marked A3 has the Korikori of Tabunakulu (while A is peits). The last tsunono of the dominant lineage, A1, died in 1965. His widow and married son continue to occupy the ground at the back door of his clubhouse while the houses of A3

But, as is proper when the father dies, have moved further away from the clubhouse.
and the tsuhana face each other. This is correct, it is said, because they 'cook pigs' for the house and sweep the rubbish away from it. The word used is hamusa or, alternately, husil (the act of expiation).

At Hahalesala the group B3 is generally said to be the lineage of the 'possum' there. Yet by all accounts it ranks third at Hahalasela, below B2 (peits). One of two explanations is that B2 'cooks pigs', and the term used is husil. This refers especially to their duty to ensure that pigs are provided for each phase of the building of the clubhouse. The construction may cause jealousy among other tsunono or anger among the spirits of the dead so husil is performed to 'put an end to talk.' (The second explanation of the higher status of B2 was that the tsunono of A1 who married into this group was the elder brother of the tsunono who married a woman of B3. This view does not have wide support.)

I recorded the construction of 28 clubhouses in 6 parishes at Ketskets, Hagus, Ielelina and Hanahan in 22 years since the Japanese occupation (1946-68). Two tsunono had each built 3 tsuhana and 4 others (2 of whom had died by 1962) built 2 apiece during this period. Three of the 14 tsunono who had each built one had died by 1963. All but one of the tsunono were Nakarib.

I was told that in earlier times clubhouses were built and replaced at a much greater rate. People said that the first signs of delapidation were seized upon by tsunono as a pretext for demolishing and reopening their houses. I often heard the expression that this was all part of a 'race' in which each tsunono could progressively add posts until the final goal of a 10 post clubhouse was reached. It appeared to me a somewhat fruitless and circular design when the successful tsunono then returned to 'tors' to restart the series while his rivals were continuing their advance towards ten. There was no apparent inclusive competition in which the relative
scores of all members of the league could be compared. There was some truth in my surmise that the process of escalation, involving the sacrifice and distribution of increasing numbers of pigs, showed an affinity with the 'classical' Melanesian pattern of acquiring prestige by competitive feasting and distribution. Pigs indeed 'give a man his name' but the fact remains that in the final analysis of a man's status, it is not quantitative but qualitative factors which are invariably taken into account - a man's hereditary title, his nitsunono, the type and 'work' of his clubhouse and its structural relationship with others and its relationship to the ground. The killing and distribution of pigs elicits voguish respect - or envy - but this is a gloss on his hereditary rank. Tsingoli of Hanahan distributed 90 pigs from his house in 1952 but he is remembered not as an openhanded entrepreneur but as the holder of a title vested in a ranking lineage holding the lumankessa 'of the ground' in that part of the village - and 'everyone knows' that the opening of this type of house requires the sacrifice of many score of pigs.

It was not until towards the end of fieldwork that I picked up what seems to be the clue to the 'race' for 10 posts. With the possible exception of the tsunono with a lumankessa, every tsunono holds a house which has received a division of one or more other clubhouses (hatapekonaluma) and to that extent his nitsunono is derivative - his power is limited in some degree by the control of the donor of the house division. The donor is entitled to some say in the conduct of the affairs of the recipient's house - until such time as the house has been built up to 10 posts. Thereafter the recipient is free to conduct his own affairs having had the benefit of the nitsunono conferred by allied groups.

1 This man was also a big businessman by the standards of the Buka cash economy but this is very rarely mentioned.
Each link in the changing network of such relationships between *tsunono* has two aspects: it involves both a temporary structuring of dominance and subordination as well as common responsibility for support of a clubhouse which sets the alliance against groups supporting other clubhouses. The elements of common responsibility in external relationships and status differentiation within the unit are two sides of the same coin.

This is perhaps expressed most clearly in relationships between clubhouse groups within the parish and between lineages within the clubhouse group. Within both units we note the structuring of relationships in the spatial terms of 'front' and 'facing' of houses or clubhouses. But this is not simply a way of delimiting social space within the unit. The use of the idiom expresses the solidarity of the unit so organised in relation to outsiders. The ascendant group within the unit is said to hold only the status which is accorded it by its subordinates. Outsiders must recognise that one group is pre-eminent because the others agree to defer to it and the others admit responsibility for using the leading group as someone to act on their behalf. They 'hide' behind their leader but exercise power by pushing from behind.

In traditional Buka society the burdens of office are great and assumption of power is an affliction. I have tried to show that the structure of political offices within a district is delineated by elaborate formal requirements which rule out the candidacy of the merely ambitious, aggressive, competent or wealthy. Yet no *tsunono* can exercise the power to which his formal qualifications entitle him without access to the human resources of his dependents. I have been told several times that this relationship of interdependence between the *tsunono* and his subordinates is the heart of Buka culture and is accordingly difficult to analyse.
One of the key elements of the relationship is the responsibility of the tsunono for those in his care. In return for respect (matsingolo) the dependents receive love (pakoko),\textsuperscript{1} protection and security. This respect, shown in marked deferential behaviour and solicitude for the tsunono's personal wellbeing, is strongly reinforced by the awesome recognition of the dangers he will face as their protector.

By their public recognition of his status and by their continuing support for enterprises he undertakes, they force him into a position of power from which he acts on their behalf. It is thus felt that giving support is an active process of control over the tsunono and supporters have de facto responsibility for the results, which is occasionally acknowledged\textsuperscript{2} to others. But he acknowledges de jure responsibility in relations with outsiders and the ancestors. They 'push him to go in front' and then hide behind him.

In this way they thrust nitsunono upon him by imposing themselves on him. The responsibility is then on the head of the tsunono. In connection with this transfer of nitsunono it is of interest to note that the clubhouse of a warrior in one sense was without nitsunono: his position originated not from the accumulation of legitimacy from below but from his imposition of power through his own exertions.

The chief's settlement is a place for rubbish (pipiu)\textsuperscript{3} because, it is said, upon him the people throw

\textsuperscript{1} The word is apparently used only in the context of this relationship.
\textsuperscript{2} See the symbolic identification with a tsunono assuming power in the case study, Ch.5 below.
\textsuperscript{3} The Pidgin term rabisman, referring to inconsequential men with no wealth or social standing, is not used on Buka. This indicates the relative insignificance of personal wealth or other quantitative differential amongst the majority of people who are qualitatively distinguished as the tsunono's inferiors.
the things they want to enjoy but don't want responsibility for - pigs and other foods used in feasting, in the past corpses of the enemy. His is 'a place for throwing away nitsunono.'

Each public feast and ceremony is focussed on the tsunono and indirectly on the chief as the supreme tsunono. They are a celebration of the status of the hereditary leader and ordinary men, through each festivity in which they participate, bestow prestige on him or rather advance his claim to recognition. It is a bitter thing that the tsunono finds thrust upon him. With the assumption of the power which his group believes is his of right, the tsunono is said to alalata which was explained to me as 'to accept the title and die with it.' His dependents have the uncertain hope that the tsunono, by accepting responsibility on his own head for their assertiveness, hides them from the envy and sorcery of other tsunono. He may have to lay down his life for his supporters.

Although I admire the sophistication of Buka systems of political control and find them extremely efficient and viable, I also had frequent occasion to note the associated consuming fear of jealousy and sorcery and the guilt associated with the assumption of power. Ideas about authority seem to me to be thus interwoven in awkward paradox: nitsunono, the powers and responsibilities reluctantly taken up by the tsunono are declared to be rubbish; his power is supreme yet it is of no worth; the position of the powerful is invidious but because of this burden they merit respect and command obedience; the very security of the position of a tsunono or the chief in relation to his supporters is a function of his willingness to face the unpleasantness believed to follow on the enjoyment of the good things of life.

The Buka moral concept of the relationship between tsunono and dependents implies that power is a two-way
process. The dependents assert their power by public acts of self-abasement. In this way outsiders are called upon to witness that the power that the dependents invest in their tsunono is rubbish, not worthy of the trouble it may cause. They declare that they have a part in his pushing forward and seek the favourable reaction of those that recognise it; this is sharing in carrying the burden (hagegaha). By self-abasement they demonstrate to their tsunono that they may be held responsible by others for giving him power, that they have become helpless by divesting themselves of power and that he should admit his responsibility to help them by means of the power they have passed on.

Later I will refer in more detail to the selective reforms of custom which the Welfare have instituted. Let me simply note here that their tsunono no longer build clubhouses and have surrendered many of their economic powers to the Society. They have had a vital role in the leadership of the Welfare. Some told me that the continuing importance of the moral relationship between tsunono and dependents which I have just described has helped guarantee the trust between leaders and followers within the Welfare. This concept of mutual moral obligation in unequal power relationships and the implicit coercion in self-abasement is also said to have been a significant influence on the behaviour of the Buka in the 1962 crisis over tax refusals but I will return to this below.

There is of course a wide range of cultural elements which I have not touched on in attempting to sketch the clubhouse system and the regime of the tsunono and I refer the reader to Blackwood's monograph for a fuller coverage. There are many rites and feasts which are still observed in Welfare and Council villages alike - on occasions such as launching a new canoe, making a new garden, clearing a formerly occupied settlement site,
feasting those who have helped build a married couple's house, finishing quarrels and so on. One of the shared practices considered most important is 'sacrifice to the liahan' (hatsinliahan), an act of propitiation for a non-human chthonic spirit. This seems to exist in universal (or collective) and particular forms, associated with the land in general and with specific major 'roads' owned by the several hunhaposa. The latter spirits, liliahanei, may take the form of animals, snakes or fish, which are associates and helpers of their human kinsmen. The sacrifice to the general or particular spirit is performed immediately after some critical development (e.g. life-crises or major human enterprise such as kinalala) and a 'five-day feast' (bonglima) and 'ten day feast' (bongmaloto) are held subsequently. These are frequent occurrences in both Welfare and Council areas.

In conclusion I wish to emphasise what seem to me the great liveliness and endurance of the cultural forms which I have outlined in this chapter. Unless I have indicated otherwise the practices described are central to modern life in Council villages. The major change under Australian rule has been the abandonment of initiation ceremonies since 1945 but some Buka say that after 1920 they had become a perversion of the regime of the tsunono. The most important move against them came from leaders of the movements of 1932-42 and they were dropped apparently with general approval. The most obvious change perhaps has been the almost total loss of Buka's material art forms whereas music and

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1 Each hunhaposa has a liliahanei which can usually alternate between the form of a land species or a sea creature. Although they have kinship with humans, people claim that there is no totemic interdependence. Plant emblems, especially taro species, are also owned by each matrilineage. Birds, although usually diacritical emblems of moieties and Nakas etc., are also occasionally associated with lower order groups but are sharply distinguished from liliahanei.
oral traditions have thrived. Housing styles have changed. Virtually all are now built with four walls of hewn timber and thatched gable roof and about half the houses are built on piles. In the past few years several groups, including Hagus, have chosen timber frame and sheet iron construction for their clubhouses and these permanent structures, without the traditional elements of posts, rafters and wall-pegs, will obviously add confusion to the specification of relations between clubhouses for some years to come.

On the whole, however, such modifications have left essentially intact a social system and ritual life in which the cardinal political role of the tsunono is unimpaired. No sound evidence can be found to argue that the Welfare emerged in response to increasing disintegration of traditional culture or systems of value. Its policies in some respects represent an attack on basic faults perceived in the old system, in others an attempt to hold firm and emphasise elements which are positively evaluated and to relate them to modern needs.
Chapter 3

THE ENTRY OF BUKA INTO THE COLONIAL POLITY

In 1768 Louis de Bougainville sailed up the east coast of the island later to be named after him and on 4 July anchored off the east coast of Buka which he found to be a beautiful flat island 'garnie d'un grand nombre d'habitations' (Martin-Allanic 1964:751-2). The natives were a 'beautiful black, of fine physique...with short hair, completely naked, with pierced and elongated ears', their teeth red from chewing betel nut. They approached cautiously, half a dozen in each light plank canoe, holding arrows above their heads in a traditional gesture to ensure peace. Enticed alongside by the offer of a red flag they began to barter bows and arrows and coconuts for 'a knife which they called bouca-bouca', pieces of calico and 'a thousand other things'. Within 15 minutes a dispute had broken out, either because one of the crew tried to back out of a deal or because some of the Buka contested a piece of cloth thrown to them. One was restrained from drawing his bow by his companions but all left immediately 'to bring more coconuts' and the arrow was let fly from a distance. They failed to return and Bougainville sailed north.

The Frenchmen had differing interpretations of the meaning of bouca. Two of the company thought it meant 'coconut', a third 'knife'. Bougainville himself wrote 'Ils répêtaient souvent le mot suivant iboucca. J'ai donné ce nom à leur île' (ibid). This tends to support the belief of the Buka today that the first whites mistook for the island's name the conversational bōka, meaning 'eh' (seeking attention and/or confirmation).

1 There are conflicting versions (Martin-Allanic 1964:751-2).
The visitors in their turn became to(n)lala, 'wanderer' or skuna, '(men of) schooner'. Only later, skinwait or masta.

The people of Buka today refer to the administrative district as Bougainville but the island named after the explorer is to them 'big Buka'.

In July 1792\(^1\) came the second meeting with a white man, d'Entrecasteaux, who sought anchorage on the west coast and found the people there keen to barter.

The English whaler Sarah under Captain Bristow spent at least 2 days at Buka in July 1812. Apparently at the north of the island he lay-to 'and notwithstanding the fresh winds, the canoes and catamarans ventured to trade with us. The natives were entirely naked, consequently clothing was in no request with them. But, for empty bottles and bits of iron-hoop, we procured about 300 cocoa-nuts, and some of their implements of war, bows, arrows etc. They trade very fairly; four cocoa-nuts allowed for a bottle, and bits of iron in proportion. At sunset they left us very well pleased; and when at a distance of three miles from shore, we could distinctly hear something that they had as a substitute for a drum beating' (quoted by Purdy 1816:103).

One or two earlier ships had therefore been enough to establish on Buka an eagerness to trade, especially for iron. Referring to Buka and coastal Bougainville of about 1880 Parkinson (1899:3) noted that stone axes 'are not actually used any longer. They have been replaced completely by axes and knives of steel...on the coast the old tools have to be hunted out with effort and the older people can no longer demonstrate the old way of hafting'.

\(^1\) Mourelle (1780), Dalrymple (1787) and Hunter (1791) had meanwhile passed within sight of the island (Jack-Hinton 1969:283, 289, 313).
I would be surprised if the transition to subsistence economy based on steel tools had not progressed a long way within two generations from the time of their introduction before 1812. In the years from 1820 to 1860 French, British and American whalers had introduced large quantities of 'metal tools and weapons, cloth, tobacco and matches' (Corriss 1970:4-7). Sperm whales were hunted in these waters and the ships either traded for provisions with canoes which came to meet them or landed at a few well-known anchorages such as Mono island of Bougainville. 'The waters of the northern [Solomon] islands, around Bougainville and Buka in particular, were much frequented despite the many occasions on which whaling boats were attacked by warriors whose arrows could pierce sheet-iron, and whose capacity to fight bravely from their canoes became notorious' (ibid). A few of 'the coastal people of San Cristobal, and to a lesser extent of Buka and Bougainville...had travelled far afield' to Australia and beyond as crew on the whalers (ibid:61).

Ignoring these effects, Zoeller (1891:304) complains that the visits of whalers were of 'not the slightest value' to Bougainville and other islands; although they had the foresight to be reasonable and prudent in their dealings with villagers, they introduced disease and created a desire for liquor. Corriss (1970:5) also notes that they infected populations with new diseases 'especially venereal disease, which seems to have reduced the coastal population of San Cristobal in the nineteenth century and may have had a similar effect elsewhere'.

About 1870 Buka and Bougainville islanders began to 'sign on' with labour-recruiting vessels. It is probable that the introduction of steel tools to some extent had

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1 Note Bunting (1966:19) 'It is thought that the introduction of steel took place in Bougainville about 1903'.

freed labour so that young unmarried men were available as recruits (cf Zoeller 1891:48).

In 1871 the master of the 256 ton 'Carl', from Melbourne, seems to have already formed the opinion that Bougainvilleans were among the most capable workers in the Pacific when he visited Buka Passage to find workers for Fijian plantations. He captured the crew of a number of canoes which came to meet the ship and set out for Fiji with 85 captives. Then followed incidents which Dunbabin describes as 'the most ghastly of all the red history of the blackbirding trade' when more than half of the men were systematically slaughtered after an abortive attempt to escape from the hold. The 'Carl' episode apparently did not deter the Buka for long for they were recruited 'in fairly large numbers, especially to Fiji' (Corriss 1970:61) during the 1870s and to a lesser extent afterwards until Bougainville became a German possession in 1886 (cf Zoeller 1891:49-50). British ships also took smaller numbers to Queensland. The next major labour trade took the Buka to Samoa. Godeffroy & Co. established itself at Rabaul in 1874 and soon set about recruiting for Samoa and the Buka were some of the first to go (ibid:40). The D.H.P.G. Co. of Samoa took over Godeffroy's interests and until the end of German rule Captain Peters of the 'Samoa' specialised in recruiting Buka and Bougainville labour for the company's plantations (P.I.M. November 1961:48).

Farrell too, in association with 'Queen Emma' Forsyth, began recruiting operations in 1879 from a base at Mioko and took people from Bougainville to Samoa and later New Britain. On Queen Emma's advice that Europeans had found them trustworthy employees, Parkinson in 1882 spent months recruiting 150 Buka as 'boss-boys, police-boys and pace-setters' for the plantation he was establishing at Ralum, Rabaul, and selected a dozen to act as his personal bodyguard.
It is clear that on occasions the recruited men did not leave Buka voluntarily. For a while when ships appeared off Hanahan the people on the coast would take refuge in the bush.¹ There are stories of a chief of Hanahan who would have reluctant young men in the area bound hand and foot and hand them over to the ships' masters in return for steel axes. Zoeller (1891:46) confirms that in the German Solomons it was the practice of a chief to bring youths on board in expectation of axes. On the other hand there were instances of Buka war captives escaping to the freedom of recruiting ships (Corriss 1970:124). Captain Rabardy, associated with de Rays' 'Port Breton Colony' described by Reed (1943:Appendix II), tried to augment his power over the New Irelanders 'by bringing 11 war captives from a Buka village whom he fashioned into a slave bodyguard'. Six whites trying to escape from the aborted colony by canoe drifted to Bougainville. Five were welcomed as dinner and the sixth, perhaps just as typically, was later sold to a white trader for two axes.

The first white resident on Buka was the trader Schmidt who settled at Kessa in 1884. But he soon became involved in a dispute with local people who, says Zoeller (1891:305), instead of killing him, as they would have done earlier, had him taken away by the next visiting ship. Farrell's company set up a permanent trading station at Pororan in 1885. Parkinson also pointed out that a persisting white stereotype of the Buka as wild savages belied the true situation. The greatly increased contact with whites had made it possible in 1885 for an American castaway to enjoy three months of hospitable treatment on the east coast of Buka before being picked up at Carola Harbour. There were

¹ Legends of the ignorance and cowardice of these Buka of a century ago are very popular in the villages today.
still feuds however between the coastal people and the Solos and cannibalism occurred.¹

About this time Captain Stalio of the 'Golden Gate' was making frequent trips to Buka to recruit for Farrell. When Zoeller visited in 1888 he noted that many Buka were returning from Samoan and New Guinea plantations laden with European goods (1891:42, 305) and met many youths who could speak Pidgin English or Fijian (ibid:312, 315).

An incident of 1884 indicates that there were not a few Buka who by this time were conversant with the ways of white recruiters and planters. A number of Buka canoes went out to meet the recruiting vessel 'Ethel' with yams and other produce which they intended to barter. The government agent supervising recruiting by the 'Ethel' wrote that 'the Capt'n. declines to purchase, saying it is boys not produce he wants - he is informed by a native in fair English, that the King will not allow anyone to go with him - that he, the Capt'n, is no good... upon which all the canoes left the vessel' (Journal of C. Mills, quoted in Davidson and Scarr 1970:245). The Buka response indicates also the authority of the tsunono in the question of the export of labour and perhaps shows the Buka's increasing selectivity as to where and with whom he would go.

The Neu Guinea Kompagnie initially imported Malays to serve as police for the new colony but by the time Bougainville was annexed half of the police were Buka and they came increasingly to dominate the force which numbered 100 by 1900.²

¹ Parkinson noted (1907:422) that, although the Solos and coastal people were still fighting at this time, war on the coast was becoming less common because members of different groups had worked together as labourers.

² Zoeller 1891:45; Parkinson 1899:5; Reed 1943:141; G.A.R. 1900 - 1:3.
Buka Island, Nissan and parts of the east coast of Bougainville were the first in the district to be drawn into the colonial economy.

The role of central government in the German era was essentially to preserve Buka as a source of labour for police and private enterprise outside Bougainville. This changed after 1907. The Buka then provided some of their manpower for the growing colonial economy of the Bougainville (then 'Kieta') district.

About 1904 'the old feuds between the mountain and shore inhabitants of Buka Island broke out afresh. The appearance of a section of troops in the mountains was sufficient to enforce cessation of hostilities. Consideration for the unhindered progress in the recruiting of labourers was the primary motive for intervention in Buka' (G.A.R. 1904-5:1-2). I am inclined to wonder whether the conflict itself was not a direct result of the pattern of recruiting. Feuding had long before begun to disappear amongst the coastal people themselves (Parkinson 1899:2-5; 1907:422). The reason for its prosecution against the Solos of the mountains may well have been the adoption by many coastal people of the role of middleman between the recruiter and the inland people who were increasingly sought as fewer recruits from the coast were prepared to sign on (cf Corriss 1970:80).

After 1906 when a government station was established at Kieta following the establishment of a Marist mission there (1901), the district fell into two administrative spheres, Kieta and Buka.

By 1908 a large white plantation enterprise had arisen around Kieta. 'The growing disinclination of

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1 Cf Zoeller 1891:307.
2 In its first year Kieta Station was visited by 8 steamers, 12 sailing ships and 1 warship.
the natives to recruit for overseas and their readiness to take work as day labourers for short contract periods, frequently repeated throughout the year in their own district, has given further assistance to the decentralisation of settlement." (G.A.R. 1907-8:17). The east Bougainville coast from Numa Numa to the southeast tip of the island had been pacified and constituted Kieta's 'organised district'. The villages were forced to construct the coastal roads used by the whites to maintain control over the population and establish communications between planters and government. Peace was 'needed to assure the prosperity and progress of the numerous newly established enterprises on [the] island' (G.A.R. 1912-13:4). As well as roadwork, a 'system of compulsory labour as taxation equivalent' was introduced in 1907 and a total of 1297 worked on Kieta station during the year. Any able-bodied male over 12 years of age, other than indentured labourers, could be taxed.

While the hinterland of the east Bougainville plantations was controlled from Kieta, Buka could not be reached because there was no boat at the disposal of Kieta until 1911 (G.A.R. 1907-8:1; 1911-12:4). Instead, the cruises of the government steamer Seestern out of Rabaul served to secure 'a lasting influence over the population...on the island of Buka' for the protection of trade, to assist in recruiting and to extend public peace (G.A.R. 1907-8:6).

As soon as the new government steamer Buka was placed at the disposal of Kieta, Buka Island came under the control of the station there. Within two years a road around the island was constructed and this was

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1 The alternative Poll Tax was 5 marks in Bougainville.
2 Replaced in 1909 by Komet.
followed by the first census of the population in 1914 and this, in turn, by the first imposition of headtax.

The Germans had appointed village officials and chiefs of Buka districts became 'Paramount Luluai,' as the Australians designated them, or waitbus as they were popularly known in reference to the white cap which was their mark of office. There were four paramountcies established on Buka (and one for the Selau) based on Gagan, Lemaumanu, Hanahan and Ieta but each of these seems to have consisted of two chiefdoms.

Zoeller (1891:324) estimated that in 1888 the population of the island was 'at least 12000 to 15000' (cf 11000 in 1965). He believed that the western offshore islands alone supported three or four thousand people (cf 1300), including Pororan with 'at least 800' (cf 300). He was aware that the two largest concentrations were on the north and northeast coasts and that the Solos, who had less contact with Europeans, were also less populous than the coastal Buka. Even allowing for a large margin of error in Zoeller's figures, which he arrived at after a visit to the west coast and often discussion with labour recruiters and with some of the Buka chiefs, the impression given is that disease and labour recruiting had not at that stage made serious inroads.

The low figure of 6800 revealed by the census of 1914 must be taken as indicating a drastic population decline in the intervening 25 years. This may have been due in part to an epidemic of dysentery occurring about 1905 (cf Corriss 1970:330).

The reluctance to sign on for plantation work outside the district noted in 1908 became more pronounced in the years following (cf G.A.R. 1910-11:16) and the

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1 The terms 'Luluai' and 'Kurkurai' are used interchangeably on Buka.
proportion of casual (or 'free') to indentured labour increased. From 1910 to 1912 an average of 433 Buka
signed indentures each year and a similar number would
have taken casual employment with the district. In 1913 the German government expressed fears that the
extension of village coconut plantations 'would make
people more than ever inclined to remain at home' rather
than work for the European enterprises so anxious to
secure them (G.A.R. 1912-13:26).

The first plantation established by whites on Buka
was Dewau (420 acres). This was started about 1909 by
Gustav Thurm financed by the German New Guinea Company
(P.I.M. July 1960). There was other plantation land on
Buka taken up by white interests including Burunatoui,
where the Marist mission soon planted coconuts, but the
only other plantations then actually developed by whites
were on Bougainville, including Inus, Tinputs, Namanuma,
Aropa and a few others. In 1912-3 the Burns Philp
company bought 12500 acres for five large plantations on
Bougainville which were soon developed.

The development of one of these, Soraken near Buka
Passage, brought continual conflict in 1912-15 between
the neighbouring population and the whites and their
employees. The luluai of one village boasted that he
would kill all the whites and labourers at Soraken and
ruin the plantation. After surviving a punitive
expedition from Kieta in 1914, he was killed by a force
of 60 soldiers sent from Rabaul in 1915, together with
three other conspirators. As the rebellion had 'a
tremendous influence' over the people of their district,

1 A reasonable commercial shipping service was available
within the district. The log of the Nord Deutsche Lloyd
ship Federal shows closely-spaced trips to Buka and
Bougainville ports at this time carrying labour recruits.
Thomas claimed that NDL ships' service was far more
adequate than that of the period 1946-50.

2 The others were Kunua, Baniu, Teopasino and Arigua.
two other chiefs who had tried to kill the Soraken planter were deported from the district, one for a term of five years, the other for a term of two years (Mackenzie 1927:307-10).

The tightening administrative grip on neighbouring Buka after 1911 brought unrest there too. Although few details of the people's intentions are known, it seems that the movement was ruthlessly suppressed. Eckert (1937:138) notes that the Australian Administration reported in 1936 that 'a religious movement' occurred on the north (Lontis) coast in 1913, led by Novite and Muling, but Eckert adds that the report was denied in a letter from Doellinger, who was in charge of Kieta government station at that time. Fr Montauban (n.d.:2; 1948:135) says that several of the 'prophets' on the Lontis coast at the time were taken to Rabaul and hanged. The Australian government's report states only that there was a religious movement among the Haku and that the Germans took Muling and Novite to Morobe, where Novite died. Mission reports make it clear that the priest on Buka in the period 1910-15 attempted to establish good relations with the people by intervening with the Kiap on their behalf. However, about 1911 a chief of the east coast had been hanged in Rabaul for murder and this led to 'a resentment of Europeans throughout the area' (H. Laracy:personal communication).

The evidence then indicates that in the last years of German rule, with the rapidly increasing intrusion of planters, missionaries and Kiaps in the Buka-Selau area,

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1 Worsley (1968:114) notes the communication from Doellinger but wrongly takes this to be a refutation of the claim that the leaders were executed - a claim that Eckert does not make.

2 Lommel (1953:34) states that the prophets claimed kinship with the moon and prophesied the extinction of the whites and the arrival of a ship bringing 'allen Güttern der Zivilisation' but he does not give his source.
a wave of anti-white sentiment was felt in the area associated with movements which were considered of such political significance as to warrant violent reaction by the colonial authority.

When the Australian expeditionary force received the peaceful surrender of the German Kiaps in Bougainville in December 1914, there was a white population in the district of about 50 planters and 25 missionaries. ¹ On Buka were two priests, two traders and one planter. The new military administration reimposed headtax in Bougainville (partly to force people 'to enter into the service of the white settlers, the missions or government'. See Mackenzie 1927:305) and immediately Malasang villages on Buka refused to pay their 10/- on the grounds that they had no money. They finally paid under threat of prosecution (Bunting 1966:8).

About 1918 the military administrator established a government station on the south shore of Buka Passage as a supplementary administrative point in the district (Mackenzie 1927:343). From here the Kiap toured Buka enforcing the compulsory plantings of coconut groves a few acres in area in each village.

In its first annual report (1921-22) the Australian Government noted that 'the natives of Buka are much sought after as plantation labourers and as police in the Government service; they are eager for this employment and a large proportion of them have been engaged'.

In the first decade of Australian administration of Bougainville alienated land was quickly planted up: the 3000 acres of Carola, Madehas and Bonis, the 1000 acres that the Forsayth Co. ² had bought at Kessa and 1000 acres

¹ There had been a white population of four in 1904.
² This company, legatee of Queen Emma, also had the huge area of land developed as Raua plantation and, also on Bougainville, Mabiri.
which had been held by the DHPG on Iame and Sale Islands and at Tulaen. All this in the Buka-Selau area by 1922.

By this time the Roman Catholic mission had acquired most of its 1500 acres in the Buka-Selau area, 1200 at Teop-Tinputs and 800 on Nissan Island. With over 12000 acres altogether it became one of the biggest landholders in the district.

By 1960 about a dozen areas totalling 6000 acres on Buka and its offshore islands had been alienated for plantations, 850 acres freehold land were held by the missions and about 400 by the government. The islanders, who in most cases feel they were tricked into parting with large areas for plantations, can consider themselves fortunate in that there were no other areas of flat land which were both mangrove-free and close to safe anchorages to induce more white settlers.

A Marist Brothers mission was established at Kieta in 1901, before the German administration set up its district headquarters there. It was not until 1910 that a mission was set up on Buka, on the west coast at Burunatoui. The priest there was Fr Flaus. While en route from Kieta accompanying Fr Flaus on 3 January 1910 Fr Binois' boat was struck by a severe thunderstorm sent by an irate Satan, wrote the priest, 'seeing that his dominion was to be taken from him; he tried to frighten us and rolled his thunder at us the whole morning but to no effect!' (Binois 1910). The Catholics visited the Hanahan district later in the year and found the people there very hospitable and interested in the mission but reluctant to send their children to school at Burunatoui. The mission by 1912 had won some friends by intervening with the Kiap on their behalf. By 1915 the missionaries claimed good relations with the people due to mission

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1 The C.S.I.R.Os estimated total of 6000 acres alienated on Buka is slightly low.
advocacy of their interests with the German authorities but complained that there was not a scrap of interest in religion.\footnote{Much of the detail on the Buka conversion to Catholicism is from Dr H. Laracy, personal communication.}

But in 1915 the first Buka Catechists were appointed at Hahalis and Gagan, followed shortly by Hanahan and, in 1920, by Tohatsi, Hitau (island) and groups on the north coast.

Fr Montauban arrived at Burunatoui in 1913 and paid long visits to a number of villages. His base on the east coast was Hahalis but in 1922 when a full mission station was established with a resident priest, the site was Hanahan. Permanent stations were set up at Lemanmanu and Gagan in the same year.

It was also in 1922 that the Methodists arrived at Skotolan on the west coast of Buka to set up their mission. A long history of opposition between the Methodists and Catholics seems to have started immediately. The Methodists were accused of trying to get adherents by promising to teach them English and to exempt them from the headtax. Whether or not this was used as device for luring members, the appeal of these specific promises is interesting with hindsight.

Another innovation of 1922 provides a different point for consideration. This was the introduction, by tsunono of Sing, of novel initiation ritual and sacred figures, which, as the government noted, were imported from Bougainville and lifted the Buka ceremonies to a new level of activity (T.N.G. 1922-3). Gordon Thomas, one of two whites\footnote{The other was a Catholic priest from Hanahan.} who actively participated in Buka ruko ceremonies, confirms that this was a decade of renewal for the ruko (cf Thomas 1931:230; T.N.G. 1923-4:51). I wish only to draw attention to the
possibility of a connection of some sort between the simultaneous spurt of activity of the Catholics, the Methodists and the ruko. Add to this the presence, from 1918, of the first permanent government station at Buka Passage associated with a rapidly expanding estate economy; this almost certainly provided increased opportunities for extensive intermixing in Bougainville, of groups from different parts of Bougainville. Small groups of Buka for instance would spend long periods in association not only with other plantation labourers on Big Buka but also with villagers in the neighbourhood of the estates. It was in these circumstances that the Paramount Luluai of Hanahan, working at Numanuma, bought rights to the ruko considered to be the most powerful ever known in the Hanahan district.

All these phenomena can be admitted as indications of cultural ferment about 1920—5. In addition there was possibly a drastic population decline over this period, probably due to a 'flu epidemic and emigration of labour and the island was temporarily closed to recruiting shortly afterwards.¹ Then the first large numbers of converts to Catholicism appeared in 1924.

The decade 1910—20 brought only 320 converts. In 1922 there were 530 Catholics and 6170 pagans but by 1925 the priests had recorded 2000 baptisms and in 1928 there were 3700 Catholics and 550 Methodists. In 1929 a visiting priest wrote: 'I baptised a bunch of women and girls that a catechist had prepared [at Hanahan].... Imagine the souls of those Kanaka girls, each pure and absolutely unstained after baptism'. Father Servant was in charge of Hanahan 'where there is also a convent of the Third Order Regular of Mary' (McHardy 1935:25-7). At a catechist school at Burunatoui 80-100 boys were

¹ H. Laracy, personal communication. The government census of Buka gives 7576 in 1921, 6207 in 1923 and 7270 in 1924. The fluctuation is hard to account for.
receiving two or three years' instruction in theology and English and 'in addition most of the village catechists "make school" teaching the children of the village very well' (1935:36).

By 1930 there were over 4000 Buka Catholics. As there were 6188 Catholic converts in 1935 out of a population of 7000, the two missions between them must have claimed the whole population as converts by that time.

In 1930 there were 3100 Bougainvillean indentured workers, 28 per cent of them working in other districts. These were almost exactly the average figures for the preceding eight years. It is impossible to tell how many of these were Buka. In the last few years of the German regime about 44 per cent of the Bougainvilleans under indentures were from Buka but this proportion may have declined as new areas of Bougainville were brought under government control.

There were over 500 Bougainville workers in the Rabaul area throughout the 1920s\(^1\) and in 1929 they were involved in the general strike there. In general their wide experience gained as workers away from their home island must have contributed much to the formation of the political attitudes of the Buka. Worsley considered it worth noting the possible engagement of Buka troops in the suppression of the Maji-Maji rebellion by the Germans in Tanganyika several years before the Buka movement of 1913. Here I could add that several Bougainvilleans domiciled in Samoa are reported to have been repatriated following their involvement in the Mau rebellion there (cf P.I.M. October 1933:40).

About 1930 workers returning from New Britain spoke of three beings who had appeared to people near Rabaul

\(^1\) On average 70 per cent of those working in other districts were at Rabaul.
and had predicted that a new era would be seen when the whites would be servants of the blacks (Montauban 1934:184). One man who returned to Buka at this time after wide work experience was Pako of Malasang. He built a distinctive European style house on the beach at a distance from other houses. He was a tsunono and although 'already aged' had not become a Christian, perhaps because he was a polygamist (O'Reilly 1937:145).

In 1932 Pako reported a series of dreams he had had. He is said to have claimed to have contacted either his ancestral spirits or St Peter and had received a crucifix, medallions and other religious objects (ibid:147; Montauban 1934:185). Late in the year he had gathered a large number of followers who were exhorted to attend chapel regularly and practise Catholicism faithfully. Affinal avoidances, polygamy and ceremonial currency were all to be abandoned and the medicines and spells of sorcery were brought into the open and attempts made to suppress its practice. At the same time the ancestor cult was emphasised, large crosses were placed on each grave and cemeteries were cleaned and decorated with crotons and palm fronds. People besought the ancestors to pity the living. Pako also proposed that initiation ceremonies be given up and the ruko figures shown to the women.

The divine inspiration for Pako's mission had in fact come to him at the time of the movement of 1913, twenty years previously (P.I.M. December 1932:46). Another sure indication of ideological continuity with the earlier movement was the major role played by Muling of Lemanmanu in 1932. A cousin of Pako, he was one of two northcoast men taken to gaol at Morobe in 1913. Novite had died in prison but Muling returned and was Pako's counterpart among the Haku. Together with Terasim, a Catholic catechist of Pororan, these men held the allegiance of virtually the whole of Buka and some,
at least, of the Selau and Hahon of north Bougainville by November 1932 (Montauban 1934:187). Until then the whites had known nothing of the movement (ibid; P.I.M. December 1932:46) but within a month these three leaders had been arrested and sent to gaol on the New Guinea mainland.

The government noted that the leaders had 'stimulated considerable anti-European feeling before the movement was checked' (T.N.G. 1935-6:21).

One of the prophets of 1932, Pako, had urged his followers 'to rid themselves of native money and to insist on higher wages and the levying of tolls on the white residents for the use of roads and [wharves]' (P.I.M. December 1932:46). The other (Muling) predicted 'the extinction of the white race' (ibid). Montauban (1934:184) reported that Pako taught that it was necessary to 'do away with native money, exact higher wages from the whites and obtain all the tools necessary for work demanded by the government'. He prophesied that 'social status would be reversed...all would share in the good life, except the whites who would gradually become the vassals of the blacks.' There was a 'vision, of great attraction to them, of the day to come when they would be the equals, even the masters, of the whites. Does not all this - and the famous and well-executed Rabaul general strike two years ago - show that the Bolshevist spirit has spread and coloured our kanakas? Doubtless somewhere those really responsible are there to be found.'

In 1946 it was claimed that the Haku had always been pro-German and that in 1932 'during the cults the North Coast people said that the Germans would help them overthrow the English [= Australians] with warships and arms' (P.R. No.1 of 1946).

1 Note that this was the same as the area affected by the unrest during the last few years of the German regime.
Pako and Muling are said to have predicted a great earthquake and tidal wave and the arrival of ships with cargoes of provisions, tools and arms for the blacks. This would bring about the overthrow of the whites. Some sort of structures were built at Malasang, reported to be 'hangers' for the reception of cargo. 'About this time the natives had to be forcibly prevented from boarding a trading vessel' (Worsley 1968:116) and vehicles were expected 'from Australia, via Germany, and thence to Buka, and one White man passing through Buka Passage was attacked' (ibid).

With the leaders of the movement in exile, early in 1934 their mantle was assumed by Sanop of Gogohe, a former tultul, assisted by five villagers, Komkal, Has'hos, Butaka, Sora and Tsivana (T.N.G. 1933-4:22-3). However the identity of the real prophet of Gogohe, Holabus, seems to have been concealed from the whites for two years (Montauban n.d.:5). Sanop and his five helpers intimated that they would establish a new political regime for Buka centred on Gogohe and that, if the whites challenged them, the police would be repelled by force (T.N.G. 1933-4:22). Sanop prophesied that at Easter a ship would arrive bringing the blacks provisions, axes, horses and dogs and guns.

About April the 6 Gogohe leaders were arrested and sentenced to six months' gaol. Unlike the 1932 prophets, Sanop's following was confined to his own district. Sing, Suhin and Tahetahe (the other villages of the district) attended his meetings although they told the whites they disbelieved his message (T.N.G. 1933-4:22).

Pako and Terasim died while under detention in New Guinea (Montauban 1934:187) and after two years Muling was released again and returned to Buka with the news in November 1934.

Within months Pako had become the popular martyr for a cause which again united the whole of Buka, the
Selau and Hahon. Between April and August 1935, when the rebellion was discovered by the whites, the villagers were told that Pako had died on their behalf, executed by his gaolers. After ten days his spirit had risen and had returned to his old house at Malasang, which his disciples had kept in good condition during his absence. His voice was heard from inside the house: 'A formidable cargo was foretold, especially arms and ammunition. The keynote of policy was: "The whites are all our masters. Why shouldn't we be our own masters?" It was proposed that they should board the next steamer to go and massacre the government at Rabaul where Pako had died in exile and then return to do the same kindness to Buka's whites. Some added by way of exposition: "the missionaries as well as the others". Each village kept a squad of police on the beach, which drilled with wooden batons while awaiting the real weapons. Many people along the coast cried: "Into the sea with all the whites".' (O'Reilly 1937:151).

As in 1932 people made special efforts to clean and decorate the graves of ancestors. 'In the cemeteries they erected crosses covered in red ochre and sometimes they made rough carvings of a crucified man. This was Pako who gave his life for the kanakas' (O'Reilly 1937:149). Although the Catholic priests were condemned along with other whites, the movement encouraged people to be devout and moral Christians. But they were turned out of church by the mission because their enthusiasm was considered cargoism. The priests were accused of

1 Worsley (1968:118), following the government report and Eckert's and Lommel's summaries, suggests that the movement did not spread to Bougainville until 1935 but Montauban (1934:187) makes it clear that Pako's influence was as widespread in 1932 as in 1935. It should be noted that Lommel's account (1953:35) is a confused summary of the data which derives from the local priest, Fr Montauban, and from the government report.
withholding the essence of their religion so the blacks practised this religion as they thought best, with Pako its prophet and martyr, and catechists used the village chapels to preach his message. More marriages were consecrated in church and baptisms were frequent. Methodists too were welcomed into the fold of the reformed church. In the cemeteries flagpoles 30 feet high were erected to fly the banner of Pako, a white cross on red ground with the single initial P. Several writers have speculated on the function of these as an attempt to reach toward heaven, the source of cargo, and have drawn attention away from the more straightforward, political, interpretation of the use of a symbol such as a flag.

Attempts were renewed to realise Pako's 1932 program for the reform of Buka society, a program which had had little impact by 1935 (O'Reilly 1937:148). The evidence is not clear as to imputed policies of destruction or consumption of garden produce, pigs and other traditional forms of wealth. Sanop's teachings had in 1934 resulted in increased involvement in feasting and pigs consumed on these occasions could hardly be said to be destroyed in readiness for the arrival of the cargo and higher forms of wealth, as missionaries claimed. Worsley (1968:116-7) observes that there was an emphasis on the abandonment of social distinctions, that the wealthy villagers were urged to share their wealth in communal feasts and that individual property in money was abolished. However it is not so clear when he goes on to equate the sharing of property and the renunciation of all worldly wealth of the past such as pigs and taro. The picture is complicated further when O'Reilly notes that in 1935 the people abandoned the lavish consumption of ceremonial feasts (in order to acquire cargo) and conserved their food supplies (1937:152).
Sanop was again prominent in the 1935 disturbances, having moved to Malasang near the house of Pako. The government took the movement seriously after its discovery by the missionaries and in November and December 100 people were arrested. Sanop and Holabus escaped the police for some weeks but were eventually caught and given 30 months' gaol.

The Buka were deeply resentful of the Kiap's investigations (Montauban n.d.:5) and in 1936 all of the villages on the island were resited below the cliff to impede access by the whites. At the same time copra prices which had reached an all-time low in 1934 began to climb again and production increased sharply. The tsunono of some villages were organising communal production and the half dozen Chinese traders now established at Buka Passage competed to become their 'agents' (ibid:7).

The following years were quiet from the government's point of view although 'faint signs of a recurrence of the quasi-religious outbreak mentioned in previous reports were detected early in 1939 and steps were taken to deal with the situation.' This outbreak was an attempt by tsunono of Hanahan and Hahalis to introduce sexual reforms under the auspices of the scriptures and the priests (see below, Ch.4). Several leaders were gaol for six months.

In January 1942 the white population of Buka was evacuated, except for priests and coastwatchers. The Japanese army arrived late in March and immediately represented themselves as liberating the Buka from the white colonialists. They dropped the word 'native' for 'brother' and told the Buka that they would be taught to be their own masters (O'Reilly and Sédès 1949:165-6).

Many believed that the Japanese, like the British, would soon leave also. It was decided to get rid of government-appointed native officials and to elect new governments of young men unafraid of Administrations' (Worsley 1968:120).
But the Japanese were careful to work through the tsunono and the chiefs were regularly called in for news conferences and each provided with two or three Kaigun ('marines') as a personal guard. By December each village had its own military organisation with wooden guns or spears and organised bodies of soldiers, messengers and police. The Japanese camps were thrown open to visitors and the blacks sat at the same table as the soldiers.

A school was set up in each village as well as a Kamisama, a shrine at which the Japanese encouraged the Buka to venerate the remains of their ancestors morning and evening (ibid:182f). The Catholic priests were not taken into custody until August 1942 but contact with the people was discouraged and when it did occur it sometimes led to physical conflict.

By 1943 the first tensions between Buka and Japanese became apparent. This was directly associated with the soldiers' fear of divided loyalties among the Buka especially after an allied submarine reconnoitred the west coast and had the whole population of Petats lifted off the island and taken out of the war zone (cf Long 1963). In May 1943 dozens of men from the east coast were interrogated, and imprisoned by the Japanese and the three accused by their fellows of being most 'pro-Australian' were beheaded on 17 May. These were a man and a woman of Hahalis and a man of Malasang.

American air raids on Buka are reported as early as January 1943. These were at Gagan and attacks on Buka Passage installations probably began earlier because the

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1 Ryan (1969:286) asserts that this was a 'cargo cult uprising wrongly regarded as an anti-Japanese plot' but there is no evidence at all for this belief popular amongst whites but categorically refuted by the Buka.
airstrip there was the closest operational base for the Japanese air attacks on Guadalcanal in late 1942.\(^1\) (Shaw and Kane 1963:447).

In preparation for the American landing at Torokina, Buka and Bougainville garrisons were bombed and strafed. On 26 August the Buka strip was attacked by carrier-based divebombers. Until the successful American invasion of New Georgia in September, Buka was the only Bougainville airstrip relatively immune from regular raids by heavy bombers as it was beyond the range of fighter escort bases. But in October it was one of the Bougainville bases which were bombed and strafed by Liberators, Mitchells, divebombers and fighters on 21 days of the month. By the end of the month all the Japanese airstrips in Bougainville were out of operation. The Torokina invasion took place 1 November.

On 31 October four American cruisers and eight destroyers steamed close inshore to Buka Passage and raked Buka and Bonis (Selau) airfields for 30 minutes and retired at midnight 'harassed but unscathed. Two hours and 60 miles later the Buka planes were still visible to the task force.' Almost immediately the carriers Saratoga and Princeton moved in, escorted by two cruisers and ten destroyers, and dropped twenty more tons of bombs before retiring (Shaw and Kane 1963:187).

By 10 November the Japanese capability to threaten the Torokina beachhead had been partially restored and they were 'constructing extensive defenses in the Buka area to keep their one remaining airfield in operation. The Allies reasoned that if the enemy was committed to a defense of Buka then he was not likely to withdraw troops from there' (ibid:247). The Japanese 17th Army,

\(^1\) In September a coastwatcher reported twenty planes based at the Buka strip.
anticipating invasions of Buka and Buin to follow the fall of Torokina had prepared defensive positions. In November and December most of the American aircraft available were busy attacking Japanese bases on Bougainville rather than Rabaul. In late September the Allies estimated that there were 154 Japanese planes operating from the Bougainville airfields and 'only repeated strikes against the fields at Buka, Kahili and Ballale kept the Japanese airthreat below the danger point.' Of 322 planes in Rabaul 167 had arrived in October, to be thrown into the Bougainville struggle because the increased attacks on Buka and the Shortlands convinced the Bougainville defenders that these were the threatened areas.

The concentration of the American airforces against the Bougainville bases in late 1943 meant that seattle traffic between Rabaul and the Solomons garrisons was almost wiped out (within two months Rabaul itself became isolated). The Torokina foothold on Bougainville was established by the Americans primarily as an airbase from which to attack Rabaul. The first raid was made on 17 December. On the 18th the second large attack from Torokina was diverted from Rabaul by weather and Bougainville's garrisons were attacked instead. This was to happen repeatedly.

One of the threats which Buka posed for the Americans was the radar there which could give Rabaul an hour's warning of air attacks. On 24 December the Buka-Bonis area again suffered a cruiser-destroyer bombardment (the Japanese, fearing a subsequent invasion of Buka, moved most of their fighter planes from Kavieng to Rabaul). In spite of their efforts to consolidate Buka as a forward airstrip, the air power of the Solomons Japanese was decimated over the next couple of months and, after the Allied attack on the base at Truk, all planes (consequently ships) were withdrawn from Rabaul and the Solomons on 19 February 1944.
On 16 February Buka was further isolated by the Allies' island-hopping to Nissan, to the north. A garrison of 120 was wiped out by a New Zealand force and an airstrip was built. During 1944 Nissan and Emirau (New Ireland) carried out most of the attacks on Rabaul while the bases at Torokina incessantly bombarded the bypassed Japanese garrisons on the Solomons, including Buka. In July Allied planes flew 8000 sorties against bypassed areas as against 3000 against targets in forward areas. These strikes 'blasted and burned areas in a systematic destruction pattern' so that by November the commander of Torokina stated 'practically all the good targets in these areas have been destroyed' (Shaw and Kane, 1963:532). In November four Australian brigades replaced American infantry on Bougainville and moving north and south from Torokina conducted search and destroy operations. In a drive to shut the northern Japanese off in the Selau-Buka area, they reached Kunua in January 1945, cleared the Soraken Peninsula, Saposa and Taiof (per the P.I.B.) in March, took Ratsua on 4 May and established a line across the Selau Peninsula on 11 May. This was essentially the situation when hostilities ceased 14 August. The commander of the Japanese 17th Army defending Bougainville came from Buin to surrender at Torokina on 8 September.

In 1943 one Allied estimate of Japanese troops on Bougainville was 35000 with 5000 of these in the Buka-Selau area. However it was established after the war that at the time of the American invasion of November 1943 there had been over 60000, about a third of them naval forces (Long 1963:103, Odgers 1957:passim). During the war the strength of naval troops was greatly

1 Guided by Lieutenant Archer, an Australian planter of Iame Island, Buka, who later conducted the first postwar patrol on Buka.
2 Shaw and Kane 1963:172.
underestimated. In November 1944 the 87th Garrison Force was in the Buka area, representing 4000 of the 7500 Japanese naval troops then in Bougainville. In addition there were several thousand civilian workers, mainly Koreans and Indonesians. In February 1944 Lt Col Nakamura of the XVII Army removed his forces to Numa Numa leaving Captain Kato, commander of the naval garrison, to defend Selau and Buka. Kato collected a force of 1400 naval men and 2000 civilians to defend Selau (Long 1963:215). In June 1945 these were thought to be 1780 men of the Japanese army still in the Buka-Selau area, in addition to the naval troops (Long 1963:217).

The Buka went through great hardships during the war. Allied bombing began in mid-1942 and intensified toward the end of 1943. The villagers were warned by both sides not to stay near the Japanese forces during bombardment but there was no real choice open to them. The coastal settlements were also strafed and occasionally subjected to naval bombardment. The Buka suffered severe losses especially amongst gangs leveed by the Japanese to labour on gardens, fortifications and the airstrip. For the first half of 1944 the occupying force divided the island into village sectors, each producing vegetables under the supervision of a resident officer called sambuka. Heavy bombing of garrisons and depots, notably Hutjena, forced the Japanese to withdraw to a single central camp near Telatu about July 1944. This was set up and serviced for a year by resident labour forces drawn from the villages in rotation.

Although there were major engagements on Bougainville, Buka and its garrison were bypassed. With the imminent defeat of the Japanese armies, the labour forces were sent back to their villages in June 1945 'to prepare for guerrila warfare.' At the height of the bombardments

1 Long 1963:113.

2 This account is based on O'Reilly and Sédes, 1949.
the Buka were forced to live in caves in the cliff – as were many Japanese. The houses were destroyed at an early stage and gardens too were wiped out. Gardening in the villages became even more difficult because of a lack of tools. Fishing by canoe was too dangerous but the soldiers provided some dynamite for fishing. The Australians found no lines, hooks or nets after the war. They believed that the pig population had been lost but the Buka deny this. Pigs that were not eaten roamed wild in the bush. All the dogs were said to have been eaten, the sago resources were almost gone and the Buka say that many more people would have died at the height of food shortage had it not been for the bananas available and especially the pawpaw, which is propagated without human intervention.

As a result of destruction of the gardens by bombing, the fungus Phytophthora colocasiae was introduced and wiped out taro, which had been the staple food on Buka before the war. The people told me that the taro was destroyed when the American planes sprayed the crops with poison – an allegation about which I was dubious for some time; however Shaw and Kane (1963:532) say that American planes operating from Torokina sprayed oil on gardens in Japanese occupied areas.

On the dozen or so occasions when I have discussed with them their wartime experiences, the Buka have not mentioned starvation as a direct cause of death. Several blamed unsanitary crowded living conditions in the caves and especially contaminated water for fatal diseases. But all gave the impression that most deaths were a direct result of aerial attacks. I heard of a couple of cases of Buka brawling with Japanese soldiers; no mention was made of Japanese brutality in day-to-day contacts but I would think that most Buka today know, and believe, the story that the Japanese commander, possibly in January 1945, set a trap to kill many of the Buka men by mining a dancing ground at Telatu to
which he had invited them. The alleged plan was disclosed beforehand by one of the commander's subordinates and the Buka returned to their villages. Those who told me the story offered no clear reason for the plan.

The report of the first postwar Australian patrol found that 'brutal threats' had been made by the Japanese as punishment for treason but the patrol collected names of those 'who allegedly took up arms against Allied Forces or who were outstandingly anti-British.' I do not know if any action was ever taken against these people. The Australian officer found the Buka silent, stubborn and resentful and thought that they anticipated the return of the Japanese in from three to five years. 'The Japanese bow, naval salute and greeting-form persist even when ordered dropped.' He believed that the people were hiding weapons. None were ever found. The people either could not or would not any longer communicate in Pidgin.

The economic plight of Buka was obvious - no permanent housing, shortage or lack of gardening and fishing implements, depletion of natural resources including livestock - and the officer felt that the government would have to provide rations to ensure an adequate subsistence for at least six months.

The village of Lontis, cited as an example had a population of 367 at the time of the patrol. There people stated that 100 villagers 'of all ages died from various causes - sickness, bombing and strafing - during the past four years.' All the villages still had numbers in hospital and 'the number of cases of partial and complete blindness was noticeable.'

Buka's population in 1888 was an estimated 12-15000. Allowing for an (unlikely) exaggeration, it was probably far in excess of 10000. In 1914, when the first census was attempted, the population had dropped to 6800 and the masculinity ratio reached 1.29.
The Buka numbered 7576 in 1921, 7270 in 1924 and 7560 in 1930.\textsuperscript{1} The island was closed to recruiting in 1934 as the population declined again to below 7000 in 1935. It had climbed back to 7600 in 1940. The first postwar patrol made a census of 7464 but the drop was probably greater because the war had caught many people working away from Buka and after four years their fate was still unknown at the January 1946 census in which they were included. The masculinity ratio had dropped from 1.24 in 1921 to 1.07 after the war.

Dysentry was still prevalent in 1946 and caused about 150 deaths that year. Whooping cough was epidemic in 1946-8. It was not until 1950 that the number of Buka at last surpassed the 1921 total. Thus, in the thirty years before 1950, recruiting, war and disease prevented any population increase. In the twenty years since 1950 the population has doubled. It was probably not until the 1960s that the 1880 figure was regained.

In 1946, possibly in response to a Kiap's promise of improved living conditions (cf Montauban 1948:138) many meetings were held on Buka to organise demands for increased wages. At the forefront of this agitation were returned soldiers of the New Guinea batallions.\textsuperscript{2} The Rabaul strike of 1929 was heatedly discussed. Proposals ranging from 4/6 to £1 per day were made but 'of the nature of work or its duration hardly anything was said.' Wages were fixed eventually at 15/- per month - 'hardly sufficient to buy 2 calicos...'[they

\textsuperscript{1} These statistics from T.N.G. reports do not include indentured workers.

\textsuperscript{2} Sagolo of Tohatsi was probably Montauban's 'boy ambitieux, ancien soldat décoré, et qui, grâce à sa médaille, savait en imposer' (ibid).
complained] bitterly about conditions - "why does the government make prices so high and wages so low? What the whites give us with one hand they take away with the other." The unrest and discontent was felt everywhere (ibid). A few drifted back to work reluctantly and even then a go-slow policy was adopted by government labourers. In 1947 or 1948 workers at Skotolan on Buka's west coast went on strike for 5/- per day (Worsley 1968:197).

The Buka appear to have initiated the withdrawal from work under the whites. In December 1946 they were described as apathetic and uncooperative and not keen to work for the government and plantations and their attitude was contrasted with that encountered on north Bougainville. But before long it was clear that the reluctance was widespread within the district. Whereas before the war the Bougainville people had contracted into this work by the thousands, by 1950 'a very small percentage [were] working for European plantations' and almost 1000 labourers had to be brought in from mainland New Guinea (P.I.M. September 1950:10; September 1951:82). Bougainville had been closed to recruiting for work in other districts (ibid).

Worsley (1968:197) saw the above developments as an example of the transition from 'millenium to politics' in the advanced regions of the colony. They had passed 'from the Cargo cult to the strike.' Missionaries and planters on Buka however saw in the social unrest the more sinister stirrings of cargo cult, 'le grand reve Buka' and feared that Japanese arms were being stored to overthrow the whites (Montauban 1948; Lenormand 1949). In 1952 a Patrol officer after a tour of Buka reported: 'many accusations have been made in the immediate postwar years about the natives of this area. The

1 In 1963-4, before the flood of workers to the Bougainville Copper 'development', there were 2853 imported labourers in the District (Scott et al. 1967:157).
accusations were to the extent that they were planning rebellion, storing arms and indulging in Shintoism and cargo cult. Apart from the "Solos cash collection" the allegations were absolutely unfounded. It would appear that these rumours were instigated to force action by the Administration, perhaps with the result that labour would be readily forthcoming for plantations of this area.'

The 'Solos cash collection' was reported in May 1949 as a cargo cult which embraced the Solos villages, some on the west coast and 'some of the Hanahan paramountcy, which has long been partial to this kind of thought' (P.R. 7 of 1948-9). Contributions were collected by a village official of Kohiso who is reported to have claimed that he could make money grow by putting '5/- on a table in a cemetery [with] a saucer over it and with a piece of bone from the forehead of a tsunono.' The leader was said to have been tutored by Roho of Hahalis who made similar claims during or immediately after the war. The village of Kohiso was the only one reported to have stopped copra production in anticipation of their dividends. Although this was said to be a 'mild cult' (Bunting 1966:20) six people were arrested and charged under Section 82(b) of the Native Regulations. The investigating officer mentioned in passing that the leader was motivated by an 'underlying desire for his own tradestore.'

It is interesting that this collection came to light in the same month that the government completed assessment of claims for war damage compensation which Australia paid to Buka villagers. The evaluation had been completed in 1948 on the east coast and, even after an unpopular delay, some individuals had 'already received £1000 and even

1 Hahalis and Kohiso have close kinship connections across district boundaries.
Quite large amounts were received by Buka villages in the short period to 1952 when payments were completed.

It was not until early 1948 - 2½ years after the Japanese surrender and about two years after the Buka received their first rations - that copra production got under way in the villages of east Buka. Although the price was considered good at the time, the only marketing point seems to have been at Buka Passage. About six months later when production continued to increase a Chinese trader established the first of a number of depots more central to the majority of Buka's population.

Before copra production resumed after the war, the people had already begun construction of clubhouses and were conducting kinalala. But for some years to come all efforts to establish taro gardens were wasted. It was also early in 1948 (in a monthly report of the agricultural office) that food crops were noticed to be increasing in quantity and variety. The people were planting more tapioca and yams. The pig population was also beginning to grow again. However for the rest of the year there was clearly some doubt about whether crops of sweet potato - now the staple diet - would be anything more than 'adequate'.

By December 1948 European planters at Kessa and Carola had begun to buy copra and production continued to increase. Late in 1949 all coconut groves on Buka were being worked and the Chinese traders alone were buying 30 tons each month.

Four years after production of copra started, the Buka were marketing 120 tons in some months, over half the rate they were to achieve 10 years later. An

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1 Not £100 and £200 as quoted by Worsley (1968:121).
Agricultural census of the north and east coasts about this time recorded 137,000 palms (about 2000 acres) in those areas, with well over 10 per cent immature trees. Agriculture officers had been actively assisting in the reconstruction of the rural economy and in 1950 a new office was established at Kubu near Buka Passage.

Cooperative marketing societies were introduced to Buka in the early 1950s. In 1952 there were 14 groups affiliated to the Bougainville Cooperative Society Association and most of its interests were located on Buka. In 1954 there were 12 cooperatives in the Buka Subdistrict. The societies handled over 40 per cent of the copra produced on Buka, the other outlets being Chinese traders and European planters. At this time there were also eight retail stores on Buka run by cooperatives.

Government officials were noting 'a haste to produce copra' and one found it necessary to 'point out the foolhardiness of overconcentration on copra production and neglecting their gardens and other aspects of their physical welfare.' (P.R. 2 of 1951-2). About 1500 tons were being produced annually but production fluctuated a good deal as a result of physical difficulties in the way of marketing. The road along the east and north coasts badly needed developing and the unprotected fringing reef below the cliff made handling difficult for shipment by sea. There were occasional trucks on the road but in 1955 marketing was still 'mainly dependent on good weather off the east and north coasts'.

Beginning in 1950 and reaching a peak in 1955 the Buka experimented with bakeries and tea-houses as a commercial enterprise, although an observer noted that 'prestige rather than profit seems to be the objective of their owners.' Much of the capital seems to have come from receipts from War Damage Compensation and to have been organised by tsunono supported by their clubhouse group. There were 45 bakeries on Buka in 1955 and larger
villages had three or four as a result of 'competition between clans' which was discouraged by the Kiap. The owner was 'the idle capitalist who employs a baker and one or two hands for supplying firewood and cleaning up. Naturally the profits are small' (P.R. 9 of 1954-5).

By 1953 the dramatic expansion of cashcropping had brought an increase in land disputes. The right to plant permanent crops was being refused to people with uncertain tenure and 'the hereditary landlords of various places are beginning to assert their complete ownership.... If these people insist on their complete ownership of large tracts of land there is likely to be a big landless class in future' (P.R. 6 of 1952-3). The tsunono in some villages - by no means all - admitted the right of some dependents to an allocation of land for subsistence purposes but reserved the right to withhold land which could be used for coconuts. Increasingly land near the road along the coast was highly valued.

Another main development in the rural economy at this time was the emergence between 1950 and 1955 of a class of 100 or more 'licence men' who bought dry coconuts from the owners of palms at a rate of about 12 for 1/-.

They processed the copra in their own hot-air driers, using occasional labour (paid at 6/- a day) or kinsmen whose assistance was rewarded by a share in the proceeds from sale to Chinese traders. The Kiaps considered licence men to be more efficient than the main form of copra production which was by local matrilineal groups under their tsunono exploiting their own plantations.

During the same years private trade stores were developed. From three in 1952 the number grew to 23 in 1955, competing with seven cooperative stores.

A disproportionate number of these were found to occur on the north coast. The Haku still appear to be afflicted with more land problems than other areas but the reason for this eludes me.
The flourish of bakers, licence men and storekeepers (few of whom survived the end of the decade) led the government to believe that this indicated the emergence of a class of younger and better educated entrepreneurs who were achieving a grip on the local economy and posing a threat to the political hegemony of the tsunono (Bunting 1966:27).

The Buka showed a keen interest in mission schooling in the 1950s and there were good attendances at the facilities available. From the start, when applications from Bougainville were especially numerous for positions at the German government school at Namanula (Rabaul), the Buka have sought out western education especially in government schools, but the standard of formal schooling on Buka remains low. In 1958 the Catholic mission had four station schools and 22 village schools handling 85 per cent of the Buka school population of 3200. From 1910 to 1950 their few schools seem to have been geared to the training of catechists who, after two years of English and Theology, conducted classes in the village. Only after receiving government subsidies did the mission begin training certificated teachers in 1953 and most of these have been qualified to teach only to Standard 2 (Sinclair 1964:23ff; Laracy 1969).

As a result there has been a serious wastage of pupils with little provision for upper primary and secondary courses. Sinclair noted that in 1963 due to a Catholic policy of expansion rather than consolidation 91 per cent of the school population was in Standards 1 - 4 with 1.5 per cent in Standards above 6 (cf Laracy 1969:371). This created a social problem where 'drop-outs at lower and middle primary go home and "just sit around"

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1 I am not speaking of the good secondary government school established at Hutjena in 1963 which accommodates most of the needs of the small Buka elite, as well as pupils from throughout Bougainville.
divorced from and uninterested in the informal training
and work of the village.' Sinclair argued that the wide
projection of European values into education in New Guinea
meant that education fails to meet villagers' real needs
and he felt that this applied strongly to Buka.

Although alienated from village life to this extent,
even the better educated rejoined the traditional social
system for there was no alternative on offer whereby
they could put new skills to work. Their ability in
writing and arithmetic was of advantage ultimately to the
**tsunono** whose traditional control of material and human
resources was if anything reinforced by the increasing
availability of cash. It was the **tsunono** in fact who
were in the best position to take risks in new forms of
commercial enterprise and to develop cash crop estates
through and on behalf of their dependents. Men without
traditional status who were able to use new economic
opportunities to their advantage through enterpreneurial
skills remained at the interstices of village society
and posed no threat directly or indirectly to the authority
of the **tsunono**. The new educational and managerial skills
acquired by younger men had their most far-reaching effect,
as I shall show later, when put to use in new forms of
political association which the **tsunono** themselves
subsequently initiated.

The Buka were receiving a peak price of 5d per pound
(or £3 per bag) for copra in 1955 and agricultural officers
complained that once the physical obstacles to transportation
were overcome even the poorest quality copra found a ready
buyer. A Chinese trader by now had built a centrally
located drier at Hanahan and copra produced by the Buka
was regularly shipped from Karola and Kessa plantations.
These outlets became increasingly important in the
following years and the Agriculture Office reported in
1958 that little improvement could be expected in the
Buka copra industry until 'uniform pricing and a bonus
for quality' were introduced. 'Native producers seem to
have no trouble whatever in selling their copra no matter what condition it is in because numerous European and Chinese traders are competing with the Cooperative organisation.'

Bunting (1966:7) notes that whereas 'local [non-Buka] traders handled all grades of copra for sale', the cooperatives were 'unable, through staff problems, to handle poor grades of copra which required reconditioning.'

Moreover in 1959 the Cooperative Association, which had bought the vessel 'Chebu' for £5000 in 1954 for marketing copra, was forced to dispose of it to a Chinese trader, who used it for the identical purposes it was acquired for by the Association.

By 1959 the percentage marketed through cooperatives had fallen from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. There were now only five societies on Buka and in 1962 the number was further reduced to four - two of them 'poorly supported'. They had a combined membership of 1000. There are now only three surviving on Buka.

The history of Bougainville Cooperatives is summed up by the District Annual Report of 1961/2 as 'a sad one. Societies have been torn apart by internal jealousies, misunderstandings of the concept of cooperation, under-capitalisation, poor communications, inefficient and dishonest employees, high overhead, destructive opposition by some short-sighted individuals, lack of shipping points and lack of a Copra Marketing Board Depot closer than far-away Rabaul. Too often because of irregular shipping, impassable roads and human frailties, copra is allowed to pile up and the Association's liquid resources are strained beyond reasonable limits. To illustrate this point, the position during March 1962 can be cited as an example; during this month copra in transit to Rabaul and copra blocked at Society stores amounted to £5162. Situations such as this are a regular feature of the District and the under-capitalised Association, which has an average
of £5500 cash on hand at the end of each month, is strained close to breaking point. The monies tied up like this limit store goods, stock and cash advances to the Societies.'

By the late 1950s the cooperatives had become a target for bitter criticism and 'became the symbol of the Administration's inability to assist in material progress' (Bunting 1966:7). This was a time when the general credibility of the colonial power was again being questioned publicly and absence of trust was shown by Buka attitudes to 'local government'.

Within a year of the first postwar Australian patrol on Buka (January 1946) 'the proposed introduction of Village Councils was discussed' between the Assistant District Officer and villages of the Buka Subdistrict (Patrol Report of 20/1/47). On North Bougainville at least, the proposal was 'apparently accepted'. I do not know what the reception was like on Buka - perhaps less favourable, because the government officer remarks on apathy, lack of cooperation and an 'untoward degree of sophistication on the part of Buka Island'.

Fr Montauban writing in 1948 speaks of the Buka desire to rid themselves of the appointed officials 'who are accused of servility to the Kiap'; of the dissatisfaction especially of the younger men with their elders 'who are too afraid to say what they really think in the presence of the Kiap'; of a general desire for authoritative leadership and strict sense of discipline - something that they admired in the Japanese occupying forces. Shortly after the war, says Montauban (1948:138), the Kiap told them that among other things 'the villages would have native "Councils" chosen by them

1 Probably the councils which were spoken of were the local government bodies eventually legislated for in the Native Village Councils Ordinance 1949.
to govern according to their wishes; some of the boys would be trained in schools to enable them to take part in government beside the whites; finally, they would be able to construct their villages where they wished. And the Kiap encouraged them to come to him to submit their suggestions without fear.

The question of Councils was never seriously taken up, says Montauban (1948:139) because it was 'too new and too little understood; the government doesn't seem to be too interested any more. In one case I know of, at Ieta, the chief formed a Council for himself without consulting the people as he should. At the first meeting it was decided to impose a penalty of £1 on anyone guilty of fornication or adultery - making it the privilege of the more affluent; this was the only reform they could think up for their community: the Kiap laughed at them.'

After this brief episode - probably due less to concerted government policy in the Territory than to the initial postwar enthusiasms of a local kiap, which were widespread at that time\(^1\) - the Buka heard nothing more about local Councils for the island for a decade. When the offer was made again, it was rejected.

In 1956 senior government officials proposed the introduction of Local Government Councils, or 'Area Administration', to Buka. Council had already been established among the Motu, Manus and Tolai.\(^2\)

The government had observed the increasing prosperity of Buka resulting from copra production. The islanders

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2 Five Councils had been established in these areas by late 1952. There was a lapse then until April 1956 when the Higaturu Council was proclaimed (Northern District) and Ambenob (Madang), But-Boiken (Sepik) and Tikana (New Ireland) Councils were proclaimed towards the end of the year.
were far better off in this respect than other Bougainvilleans and it was apparent that at least some policymakers considered the Buka to be as 'sophisticated' as the Tolai.

It is clear too that the adoption of area administration was intended, not as a change from centralised control to local autonomy, but as a way to increase the scale of the effective unit being directly administered...the luluai was to be nudged out by the Council President. Area machinery was promoted as the better way to work out the basis for an individualistic cashcrop economy and to work with the class of entrepreneurs who, it was thought, were emerging to challenge the leadership of traditional headman, and even more, of the luluai.

In the years following, the government tried persistently to persuade the Buka to form, and be taxed by, a Local Government Council but the idea was firmly rejected by the islanders.

Sinclair's conclusion from the evidence of government documents was that 'the people's basic independence and suspicion of the administration were indicated by the main reason given by villages who stayed out: doubt of the administration's motives, doubt whether a Council could in fact do much for them and dislike of the idea because they could not understand it' (1964:25). The District annual report of 1958-9 mentions 'amazing, false, erroneous ideas of Administration aims and policies which seem to spring up with unfailing regularity on Buka Island' and a 'complete absence of trust and confidence in the Administration'.

The original impetus for the most effective opposition mobilised against the campaign for local government was a meeting of tsunono at Malasang about 1957. Today this is remembered as an occasion when Buka asked themselves the question 'has the government done
anything for us in the past and have we anything to expect of them in the future? Their answer was negative and they sent an emissary to the other villages of Buka to ask the question of them. My informants indicated that there was no more specific intent than to drum up opposition to the government and its policies.

Sinclair (1964:29) observed that about this time 'a common hostility to the Administration united contesting factions and gained the general support of the villages. For several years they had complained amongst themselves and to the Administration that:

1. they were no better off than their grandparents despite long Australian rule;
2. natives had helped Australia during the war; therefore Australia should pay the native, not tax him;
3. after the war government officers had said that there would be no more taxes.'

Malasang sent Anton Kearei as its emissary to other villages. Kearei, of Lonahan, was well-educated, had been a Catholic seminarian for eight years and a schoolteacher but was now hostile towards the mission. He had worked for the Education Department in preparing publications and then was employed by a Chinese trader as a truckdriver.

The most notable event of Kearei's campaign was his ritual promise (tokei), made to the people of Hanahan, that he would never have anything to do with introducing Local Government Councils. Should he ever be found to break this promise, he said, the people could tie him hand and foot, take him to sea in a canoe and throw him

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Welfare members claim that the tsunono had appointed Magum of Malasang and that Kearei preempted him.
The promise is notable partly because of the later importance of Hanahan as a centre of tax resistance. It is more significant in view of Kearei's later acceptance of the Presidency of the Council for its first seven years. In years to come the Welfare never tired of citing Kearei's volte-face to Kiaps who urged them to join 'his' Council.

In 1957 the Administration introduced a yearly headtax in T.P.N.G. of £2 per adult male (over 18 years of age). One reason for this move was to clear up the anomaly whereby any village which decided to enter a Council (entry was theoretically, but not in fact always, voluntary) was thereby imposing a tax on itself. The government intended that everybody, not only Council members, should be taxed and that payment of Council tax would cancel the obligation to pay headtax. The first collection of headtax, in 1958, was not entirely successful - nor, apparently, was it attempted everywhere that it could have been.

It was attempted on Buka and among the Tolai, where an anti-Council minority had persisted since 1951. In August 1958 it was reported that 'the most stubborn resistance to the tax has been in the Tolai section of New Britain (but there has been some also on Bougainville) where some villages, including Taviliu and Navuneram, said they would not pay up' (P.I.M. xxix No.1:13). The result had been that, on 4 August, there was a clash between the Tolai and a government and police party. Two Navuneram men were shot and killed and a third wounded.

In the Legislative Council in September 1958 non-official members attacked the Government for continuing the £2 headtax on the grounds that it was not uniformly

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1 Cf Kiki (1988:112) who was told that Kearei had invited the people of Hahalis and Itelelina to cut off his head, if he broke his promise.
applied but varied from one district to another. The method of collection and of granting exemptions or reductions according to circumstances was not satisfactory according to the Government's critics.

Twenty villages on the east coast of Buka (Bunting 1966:8) firmly refused to give their 1958 tax to a number of government patrols which visited them. About the end of the year senior officials flew from Port Moresby for talks on Buka. A deputation led by Anton Kearei met the Assistant Administrator, Dr Gunther, at Sohano and, according to one report (P.I.M. xxix, 7:14) said that they would continue to refuse. Kearei complained that the Administration was not doing enough for the people. He stated that his people believed in taxation but had insufficient money to pay tax, and that the Chinese were profiteering in their trading (Bunting 1966:24). The people sought £5 a bag (on beach) for copra — equal to £70 a ton on the beach (P.I.M. xxix, 7:153). They also wanted a road network to open up land for coconut plantings and to provide transport of their produce to market (Nation 91:9). The District annual report stated that people had refused tax 'on the grounds that they would not get £2 worth'.

The tax issue came to a head on Buka in January 1959 when Saharia, Paramount Luluai at Hanahan, 'harangued his people as to the advisability of paying the tax' (P.I.M. xxix, 7:14). They allegedly 'went for him, with knives and axes, and he fled to Sohano to report. A.D.O. Kimmorley left for the scene with all the available police' — about 18. The Editor of Pacific

1 The report of the Court of Inquiry conducted by Chief Justice Mann after the Navuneram deaths noted that in Papua-New Guinea 'only half of the adult male population were in fact paying the full personal tax'.

2 The best they had ever received was about £3 a bag.
Islands Monthly (ibid) said that, according to a later message, 'Mr Kimmorley's visit was a success and that last year's tax will now be paid, but the report does not make it clear if all villages will pay. This year's tax is not paid.' After his discussions with Dr Gunther, Kearei appears to have begun to waver, as he is reported to have been threatened during the crisis at Hanahan.

I have not been able to establish whether or not these taxes were ever collected. Bunting (1966:8) states: 'After detailed and careful explanation by the Administration, all tax was paid for the year [1958]. The 1959 and 1960 personal tax was collected in all Buka villages, including those villages now participating in the Welfare movement....' Yet Mr Hasluck on 21 February 1962, in reply to Mr Cameron, said explicitly that it was only after the formation of the Buka Council in 1961 that the Administration 'imposed a personal tax...on the Hahalis people. It was a device frankly adopted to force these Hahalis people, under sanction of the personal tax, to drop the opposition to the local government council, to join the council and to pay taxes to it...' (Hansard 1962:98).

Again, whereas Bunting says that the personal tax introduced in 1958 was assessed at 5/- in the Bougainville District, Hasluck makes it clear that the tax imposed on the Hahalis people in 1961 was £2.

No further attempts were made to collect personal tax from the Tolai who opposed the Councils and were involved in the 1958 Navuneram incidents (Dr Scarlett Epstein: personal communication).

Anton Kearei was pre-eminent as spokesman for the 1958 rebellion on Buka. One of the most conspicuous results of the confrontation was that Kearei was co-opted by the government. Early in 1959 he was sent to Port Moresby as a delegate to a Cooperative Society congress. ¹ Before he left some villagers collected money which was

¹ Although by all accounts he was at the time opposed to Cooperative Societies.
given to him *to hand to the Administrator in order to 'buy' the government* (Bunting 1966:25). It had been reported earlier (P.I.M. xxix, 7:135) that the people of 'central Buka' were organising a collection on the island to finance Kearei's trip 'to put the natives' case to him [the Administrator] - how they are exploited etc.' Kearei was also sent to the local government training school at Vunadidir and the South Pacific Conference, Rabaul, May 1959.

In December 1959 he visited Rabaul and had 'quite an interview with Mr Hasluck' (P.I.M. xxxi, 1:59). By 1960 he had been appointed to the District Advisory Council and about the time of the Hahalis tax troubles he was chosen as a member of the Territory delegation to the 1962 South Pacific Conference in Western Samoa. 

Early in 1959 he was given an appointment with the Administration - officially as a clerk, but, as he said in 1960, 'I don't think that's the point. The idea is to get me working like a patrol officer' (P.I.M. xxxi, 2:61). Originally based at Sohano he carried out liaison work on Buka, addressing groups of villagers, submitting reports and had some sort of juridical role.

He moved across to Hutjena when the Subdistrict Office was set up there in 1961. Indeed I have been told that the Hangan people agreed to part with their land for the Hutjena government station because they were under the impression that Kearei would virtually control the governmental functions of the Office. Bunting (1966:26) notes that during this period Kearei was believed to 'have greater authority in the District than any other person.'
In this chapter I attempted a general historical account of developments on Buka as part of colonial society. The data presented suggest that for a period of nearly 40 years Buka exported labour on a large scale while having to submit to only minimal control from a remote central government. After about 1910 the advent of planters, missions and a more effective government presence elicited an immediate response in the form of a movement which apparently expressed the blacks' resentment of the intrusion by the whites. In 1932 Pako renewed the movement of resistance and rejection of the whites but retained and developed a black man's Christianity which had taken root in the meantime. Some of his attempts at reordering society were taken up again in later movements for reform and in several respects they anticipated policies of the Welfare.

I have indicated a critical development in the political attitudes of the Buka when the Australian government resumed control of the Colony after the Japanese occupation and the account of subsequent events has been an attempt to sketch the economic and political climate in which the Welfare took root. This was a climate of considerable and increasing involvement in the cash economy, although this was not notable for any effect upon the extant political order centred on the tsunono, except to reinforce their control. The period was marked by the inability of the government to provide a viable infrastructure of services for the expanding economy and by an increasing distrust of the sincerity of the whites in their attempt to introduce new economic and political institutions.
Chapter 4

THE WELFARE: CRISIS AND CONSOLIDATION

The Welfare was formed publicly in January 1960, having been foreshadowed by a combination of groups at Ielelina and Hanahan. Joined by Hahalis in 1959 these groups, all of which had participated in the movement originating at Malasang in 1957, withdrew as soon as Kearei changed its course. The rest of the villages of the Hanahan district also withdrew in 1959 but these by 1961 had all, except for Hanahan, agreed to join the Council formed in that year under Kearei's leadership.

The Welfare, more faithful to the principles of the earlier movement continued to resist the imposition of Councils, asserted its independence of the cooperatives and gave new emphasis to a communitarian and egalitarian ethic. Although not intent on open revolt against the church and government it was determined to pursue the reform of its own society as it saw fit. By 1961 they had learnt that this was not what the priests thought fit and they were excommunicated. They insisted that the government recognise their right to structure economic and political development in their own way and the insistence led to physical confrontation in 1962. I will now describe the course of events in more detail.

Teosin received his primary schooling at Hanahan Mission and at a government school in Buin, which was attended also by Matthias Makosi. Teosin then attended the secondary school at Malaguna (Rabaul) for two years before returning to teach at Hanahan mission during 1955, while resident at Ielelina. In 1956 he began, but did not complete, a teacher's-certificate course conducted by the mission at Talena (Bougainville). Soon after he returned to Buka he took up residence with his maternal kin at Basbi (then known by another name). He was then
a Nakarib man just turned 20. About a year later he married Elizabeth, a Nabouin girl of Hahalis, whose mother was Tahena, one of the three rebels executed by the Japanese army in 1943.

While living with the Nabouin of Ielelina before his father died, Teosin established a market garden and experimented with a few new crops such as peanuts. The vegetables produced were carried across to Carola plantation and sold to Mr Babbage, the manager there. Teosin was one of the first on Buka to introduce cocoa as a cash crop — the first plantings on Buka occurring about 1955. One of Teosin's most significant efforts in his early adult life was to assist in the ordering of the financial affairs of a number of groups producing copra from three old groves of coconuts, compulsory plantings ordered by a Captain Cardew, a government official of the early 1920s. These palms were exploited on a wok bung basis probably because they were originally established — on the land of the least reluctant owner — as property held in common by a whole village. As the best-educated man available, Teosin was soon entrusted with the bookwork of the two wok bungs at Ielelina and Hanahan and under his influence the two merged into one productive unit within a couple of years. In the early stages the Hahalis group remained apart.¹ Teosin, however, through his personal relationship with its members and especially its leader, Koruats, certainly played some part in its activities.

According to all reports, including his own, Teosin was acting under instructions of Ielelina and Hanahan tsunono when he left school and returned to Buka and worked as their kuskus; though I did not establish

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¹ I am here referring to Basbi, a Nakarib settlement within Hahalis village, as part of the (Nakarib) Hanahan group. The Hahalis group was Hahalis proper, mainly Nabouin, to the south of Basbi.
clearly whether the reference was to the course at Rabaul or at Talena, the former seems likely. The claim sometimes made by Hahalis villagers that it was Koruats, their tsunono, who summoned Teosin to work for him seems to be inaccurate.¹

The wok bungs apparently concentrated originally on production of copra and, although their efforts to plant new areas were much more concerted in the late 1950s after Teosin returned, these too seem to owe little to Teosin's personal initiative. His early contribution was his ability to arrange marketing and to keep on honest book of the profits. Until the late 1950s he had only an indirect role in the organisation of production. His presence was valued because it ensured the accumulation of a little capital, however meagre, and it sustained the link between the Ielelina and Hanahan groups.

Some of their money went into the establishment of a small trade store at Basbi. Still more, they claim, went into donations to the Catholic mission at Hanahan. By 1958 Teosin had established a 'model' hamlet among the people at Basbi, well constructed and maintained. He had a chapel built there and was appointed Catechist. The missionaries remember the Teosin of this period as most co-operative and helpful to the Church and the mission school and hospital.

In March 1957 the first curia of the Buka praesidium of the Legion of Mary was established at Hanahan. Teosin was prominent from the start in this...

¹ See New Guinea, March/April, 1969, pp.15-20 for a fanciful story, under a pseudonym, of how Teosin's mission while at school was to discover for Sawa Koratsi the secrets of 'the cargo.' The author is certainly not a Buka, as claimed. L. Morgan (pers. comm.) believes the author to be Glen Mola, an Australian university student, visitor to Buka and adopted son of Donatus Mola, M.H.A. Others assure me that this identification is indisputable.
lay organisation designed to maintain the standard of religious observance and moral life in the villages. The 'legionaries' were told by the priest that they were 'olsem liklik patere.'

A 1958 meeting of the Buka members is said to have disclosed the intrusion of 'cargo elements' in the organisation at least among the Solos where it was thereafter banned. The Hanahan curia was perpetuated for some time. One priest recalls that its military style of regimentation elicited the ardour of many villagers, including several who later became the younger leaders of the Welfare.

During these years Teosin was closely associated with Anton Kearei and the people of the Hanahan district were some of Kearei's strongest supporters until late 1958.

While campaigning against Councils in 1957-8 Kearei introduced plans to form the 'East Coast Buka Society.' One of his most important aims was to organise communal production of copra and to market it independently of the co-operatives and, if possible, of Chinese traders. Feeder roads and shipping points were prepared at several points including Hanahan. There was an ultimate aim to 'divide the land', which was seen to be tied up by many tsunono with a surplus of land and with estates established with the labour of landless dependents. As well as freeing the labour of those without access to their own land, communal production was believed to be more efficient economically.

The program of this movement came to be known as Kearei's 'new ideas.' These, as reported by Bunting (1966:25), 'consisted of harvesting existing crops and extending coconut plantings, building better homes, and

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1 Dr Hugh Laracy: personal communication.
dressing cleanly after the manner of Europeans, particularly when away from the village. These actions were aimed at having Europeans socially accept the villagers.'

In 1958-9 Kearei and the Malasang tsunono collected a considerable amount of money directly or indirectly from sales of copra produced by villages in the Society. It cannot be denied that there was little honest effort made to keep records of the source of this income or of its expenditure. Eight years after the demise of the Society the government still held about $4,000 of these funds which could not be redistributed in the absence of evidence about its source. Money collected in 1959 for Kearei to hand to the Administrator in Port Moresby was returned to the subscribers by the government.

The government believed the 'new ideas' to be 'strongly cultist' (Sinclair, 1964:29). It is difficult to evaluate the little detailed evidence for this. Certainly Kearei himself was already espousing heretical quasi-Christian dogmas. It was indeed partly an anti-Christian cult involving the destruction of crosses, seen as the physical symbol of white obstruction to the 'new ideas' and villages as far north as Hahalis — though not, apparently, Hanahan — were at least temporarily involved, according to Teosin.

The extent of intrusion of specifically cargo elements is uncertain and the issue complicated by the government's readiness to accept as positive evidence the alleged calling of meetings 'in or near cemeteries' in 1960 (Bunting 1966:25) or even a sharp rise in cashcropping activities in 1959, seen as a move to curry favour with the ancestors, who would send cargo. Members of the Welfare, as a gesture of reciprocity, now readily label Kearei's 'new ideas' as a cargo cult but their accounts, carrying the emotional charge of a decade of political animus, were not specific enough
to indicate more than diverse heterodox theological beliefs held personally by Kearei. In material terms the Welfare leaders assert over and over again: 'If you want to see a cargo cult, look at Anton Kearei. He collects money from his followers with the promise that he can make it grow when he has no idea of how to even save it.' This for the Welfare was cargo cult thinking.

Bunting's assertion (ibid) that 'by 1959 the Buka islanders had expanded their conception of cargo to include not only material possessions but all aspects of western culture which they were unable to explain but which were considered desirable' serves only to underline the lack of evidential support for the accusation of cargo cult but also the vacuousness of the concept.

I accept as probable that Kearei claimed divine right for his position as leader into the new ways, having been given a golden rod in a cave at Punene (Mt Bei), the highest point on Buka and the mythological site of original settlement on the island. Long known to be strongly anti-Catholic he seems the probable sponsor of the episodes when crucifixes were destroyed. Knowing the vitality of Buka's ancestral cult I feel that a meeting in (or near) a cemetery is meagre evidence indeed for the existence of a cargo cult.¹

It must in the end be conceded that the East Coast Buka Society, whatever Kearei's relations with the supernatural, was concerned with capital and not with 

¹ Burials always occur within the area of settlement (ielelina). Even when grouped in cemeteries, very many grave sites are eventually built on. See Blackwood (1935:487f) for burials in or near houses. Note also the comment of La Barre (1971:16) on the 'white misunderstanding of the native misunderstanding' of Christianity on Buka in 1935. He suggests that the whites persecuted Pako for cleaning cemeteries, carried out in the belief that the ancestor cult was a logical extension of the Christian concept of the immortality of the soul.
cargo. It was largely a secular and pragmatic attempt at economic reform concerned with the factors of production and with the re-organisation of marketing. The concern Kearei expressed to the government in 1958 was with Chinese profiteering, low copra prices and poor services, especially roads.

But it is clear that Kearei was hard put to produce significant results. The organisation of communal cashcropping along the entire east coast would have been beyond any man at that time - as was any head-on attempt to circumvent the established marketing outlets. The chronically chaotic state of the Society's books was in the long run the most damaging organisational failure.

Yet it was only when Kearei returned from his government sponsored trip early in 1959 that the Society began to crumble. In that year it became evident that for some reason Kearei had decided that he would be able to work more closely with the central government, had accepted that its policies were well meant and that he expected to achieve reforms through the exercise of power delegated by the government. This does not mean that he immediately declared his acceptance of a Local Government Council but Welfare people today claim that he was indoctrinated at Rabaul in 1959 and that this was the turning point from opposition to agreement.

It was a few months after Kearei's return that John Teosin had mobilised enough support to declare that the villages north of Tahetahe had seceded from the East Coast Buka Society. This occurred at a public meeting Kearei organised at Ieta and the reason given was Kearei's financial corruption and inability to lead. Kearei then set about re-organising the villages from Ieta to Tahetahe to produce copra communally. He again tried to form a Marketing Society outside the Co-operative Society, but was prevailed upon to establish it on a conventional basis' (Bunting 1966:25). It was in fact
just at this stage that what Bunting calls the desire to be socially accepted by Europeans became evident.

1 After Kearei returned from Rabaul in 1959 there was a remarkable increase in European clothing sales - one Chinese trader reported takings increasing from £80 per day to £450 on the day after Kearei's return and remaining steady since that time at £200 per day. These increased takings resulted from increased clothing sales (ibid). The Welfare leaders' historical account equates this period of behaving 'olsem masta' with the inception of the Council.

As Kearei told me in 1968 the offer of local government was taken too literally in 1959. Kearei believed that he was being prepared to head a regional governmental body whose power would within a year or two supercede that of the kiaps. There can be little doubt that in their efforts to overcome intransigent opposition to Councils, some kiaps at least came very close to making this sort of empty promise, for Kearei's followers indeed believed that either the kiap's role would be assumed by the local government body or that the kiaps who remained would be there to do its bidding. Hence their belief that Kearei had become the most powerful man in the area. The adoption of symbols of a European life-style was in no way a ritual technique for the acquisition of cargo. Perhaps they acted like 'mastas' because they felt they were about to perform as their own masters.

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1 See above for Bunting's description of the 'new ideas'.
2 Or £50 (typescript not clear). Bunting does not specify how long this upsurge in sales lasted.
3 According to Ryan (1969:288,316): 'They were now dressing and, to their minds, acting and talking like Australians but the cargo had not arrived.' A more reliable observation is his 'The Australians at Buka Passage laughed and swapped ribald jokes about Kearei's teachings.'
Was this not the fulfilment of Pako's prophecy of 1932: social status would be reversed and the Buka would be the equals, even the masters, of the whites?

In 1960 Kearei as heir apparent to the kiaps extended his interests beyond Buka, realising that, if not his authority, then at least his influence could begin to establish the new ideas on Bougainville. The impact of his ideology was felt all along the north coast, around Kieta in the east, among the Kunua and Keriaka on the west coast and on Saposa Island. Among the Selau, Buka's closest neighbours, the greatest result was increased interest in communal production and 15 of the villages withdrew from the Salau Co-operative Society. Many of these however at this time developed closer ties to Teosin than to Kearei and, as with Ratsua, a Hahon village, these ties have persisted without leading to full membership of Teosin's group.¹

By February 1961 the Administration was convinced that most of the Buka had come round to accepting the introduction of Native Local Government Councils. On 2 November 1961 the formation of a council for Buka was gazetted. Tax was to be £2 for adult males (over 18 years) and 5/- for females and there were to be 24 Councillors, including one each for Taiof Island and Manob, a Selau village. This covered a population of six or seven thousand in over 30 villages.

But just before this announcement about 1500 villagers of Gagan, Lontis, Gogohe and Hanahan decided to withdraw and the Administrator approved their

¹ See Ryan (1969:204): "By early 1964 some of the Ratsua people near Soraken announced that they wanted to join the Hahalis movement... A Ratsua leader, Bokar, became a violent Hahalis supporter but within a year he was in gaol." Bunting (1966:33) says that it was in April 1961 that 44 Ratsua people joined the Welfare but Teosin, while he confirms the expression of interest, does not consider them or the Selau as members of the Welfare.
exclusion by proclamation on 23 November. Tahetahe village also tried to withdraw but these people were not included in the proclamation; they persisted in their refusal to participate in Council activities including elections.

On 10 February 1962, 132 men and women of Tahetahe had paid their membership of the Welfare. Yet in October the same year the government still thought that there were almost no Welfare members at Tahetahe and gave all their attention to Hahalis, Hanahan and Ieileina nearby. The kiap hoped that a recent land dispute between Hahalis and Tahetahe would alienate the latter from the Welfare. However all of Tahetahe except the settlement of Sapas was finally officially excluded from the Council in November-December 1965.

After the Council began operations, some of the villagers of Gogohe asked that they be included. In February 1962 (roughly the same time) about 150 people of Gogohe came into the Welfare, just before its leaders were arrested. The village was later split for administrative purposes into Gogohe 1 and Gogohe 2 and on 9 May 1963 the entry of Gogohe 1 into the Council was officially recognised.

At the end of 1963 Gagan village changed again and successfully sought membership of the Council. At the same time Saposa Island and 800 of the 2000 Selau people on Bougainville were admitted, as was part of Hanahan village.

In December 1962 the Paramount Luluai on the east coast, Saharia of Hanahan, had died of cancer at Sohano hospital. Probably as a result of his death some of the Hanahan people decided in May 1963 to join the Council. As at Gogohe the village was divided officially into Council and Welfare groups and Hanahan 1 was admitted to the Council in December 1963. These additions to the Council during 1963 brought a total of over 2000 new members.
In January 1965 some of the 2500 Haku people of the north coast asked to be admitted to the Council and 300 gained membership in June 1965.

Having followed the make-up of the Council for the first few years, let me now return to Teosin and the group that parted company with Kearei to form the Welfare.

Until 1959 Teosin had been one of a number of clerical assistants to Kearei with whom he had been on good terms personally. Before he made a stand against Kearei his political control over the Hanahan and Teelina groups was by no means complete. He claims that in 1957-8, in association with Gerald Balai of Lemankoa, he was an open advocate of local government. To that extent his own people were closer to Kearei than himself. However their financial support of the mission suggests that, on questions of religion, they accepted Teosin's leadership. Only Hahalis followed Kearei's strongly anti-clerical line at the time.

In 1959 the relationship between Teosin's group and the mission had already begun to sour. Teosin has alluded to a certain initial tension between himself and the more anti-mission leaders of Hahalis which was eventually worked out to a fruitful compromise. Welfare leaders say that mission opposition to Teosin began when the suspect Hahalis people turned their attention from Kearei to him. This opposition, they say, drew Hahalis and the Teelina-Hanahan group together into a unified group which still felt that its program was proposed in the best spirit of Christianity.

Teosin tried unsuccessfully in 1959 to have a mission-teacher stationed at a school built by the people at Hahalis. For most of the year the Hanahan

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1 Balai, still a staunch Council man and critic of the Welfare, confirms Teosin's claim.
priest was insisting - against the opposition of Teosin's group - that about a dozen local girls get properly married. Another indication of developing tension in the same year was the cessation of financial support from Teosin's group, previously a generous giver. The priest had asked his parishioners for a £300 contribution toward a new medical aidpost but there was virtually no response. At the end of the year Francis Hagai, Teosin's lieutenant, and his wife (who is Teosin's sister) unexpectedly withdrew from teaching jobs with the mission.

The meeting in the new year at which the Welfare was formed was reported by Teosin and a copy of his minutes, in English, was passed on to the kiap.

Hahalis meeting, 23 January 1960:

1. The meeting was talking about headmen. They are people of ancient time and they are people who everyone in the village ought to obey. As in ancient times everything can be done well if they say and agree together. Still nowadays they have the same manners.

2. Kurkurais and tultuls. They are groups of people appointed by the government and natives to do a special job:
   a) to take care of village people so they do not quarrel with others
   b) to advise the people to do good work for the purpose of helping them in their living and so on
   c) to take care of the road so that the government can go to every village and encourage the kurkurais and tultuls to do good with natives.

3. Educated boys and girls. They are people of school and they have learnt many things there e.g. religion, reading, writing, arithmetic, hygiene and social and general knowledge. What they know about these things they should talk about, so that the school can influence the people for good e.g. good health habits.

4. The audience were all agreed together to have the 3 kinds of people in a group with a friendly meeting, working as a community. Also they have appointed John Teosin to be Chairman of their meeting and his
helpers will be Mathias Makosi, Francis Hagai and Adreas Tsarike. These have been in school.

5. The meeting appointed 3 men to rule the villages, under the control of the government. They are headmen, kurkurais and tultuls and educated boys and girls. These 3 men will try to follow Mr Active's law and try to fight against the law of Mr Passive and Mr Bad. Mr Passive is a man who does not offer active assistance and Mr Bad is a man who is bad, having lost something. The Headmen and kurkurais and tultuls would be Mr Passive and Mr Bad. Because they are people not offering assistance or men having lost something, as a man called Mr Bad.

6. Members who had this meeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Title 1</th>
<th>Title 2</th>
<th>Title 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iteleina</td>
<td>Kurkurai</td>
<td>Tultul</td>
<td>Educated boy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanahan</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Educated boys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hahalis</td>
<td>Kurkurai</td>
<td>Tultuls</td>
<td>Educated boy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These 3 villages want to live in groups with the same meeting or ways of working and to be friendly with others. They have put together headmen, kurkurais and tultuls and educated boys of these 3 villages with the same idea of living, not following Mr Bad's law. When we say Mr Passive or Mr Bad, we mean those who cannot be active or who appear to be unfriendly with one another or who force others to stop doing things with good [intentions ?]. So whatever kind of work is done is going to be allowed by headmen, kurkurais and tultuls of these 3 villages. No one is to stop them by doing no work, by disobedience, selfishness, untrue statements, unkindness or jealousy of others. These things are done by those who are passive or bad. The 3 villages [insert ?] them in groups and do as a man who is active.

The reference is to J.R. Bunting (1959), a text used in Local Government training centres. The character of Mr Active, the ideal citizen, is helpful, selfless, interested, cooperative, honest etc.
7. The meeting was talking about land. All headmen and Kurkurais and tultuls will allow the land to be used for growing things. For example, Tom is the first man who owns the land, his son is Jordan and his friend is Allan. Jordan and Allan will grow things on Tom's land, such as coconuts and cocoa, but they are still under the control of Tom. He will like them and accept them and what they have planted... or let them have what they have planted. Everyone will work together for their living and avoid bad things and keep good ones. They will be hardworking and friendly, unselfish and obedient. They will have ventilated houses and hot clean food daily. They will make latrines and better villages, etc.

8. The money. It was received from Ielelina, Hanahan and Hahalis copra. Each village had 20 bags to make up 60 bags together giving us £100. All headmen kurkurais and tultuls of the 3 villages said the money will be given to the government with a reason.

The meaning of parts of the document is obscure and it is hard to say how much of it is an accurate record and how much reflects Teosin's own attitudes at the time. The most important concrete item of policy seems to me to be the indication that land would be freed for use by members of the community working together. From the start of the Welfare this was a concession made in principle by the tsunono and there is no indication that it was extracted from them. The change was seen not simply as involving greater generosity shown by landlords to individuals seeking land. As subsequent developments show the meeting had in mind the principle of community use of land and organisation of production while the land remained the property of the owner.

Sinclair (1964:28) believes that the drift of the report of the meeting is an attack by the young men against the tsunono and village officials. The inclusion of the headmen in the Welfare leadership is seen as a concession made by Teosin either because

i) their resistance was stronger than Teosin reports and they had to be included to obtain their cooperation or
in order to gain control of the Welfare, he had to work through them and convince the kiaps that they supported his reforms, or

the headmen submitted to his attack thinking they could use him for their own ends and accepted him as a figurehead leader.

This analysis, I believe, is based on the 'private-interest' view of politics and it places unwarranted emphasis on factional conflict, for which the evidence is slight. Item 5 of the minutes might be taken as an explicit criticism by Teosin of the 'passive' headman and 'bad' kurkurai but the educated boys and girls are nowhere identified as Mr Active. Although Teosin is the author of the minutes, there is no other evidence to suggest that this is not the resolution of the headmen themselves to follow Mr Active's law. As the item given prominence at the head of the minutes says: 'everything can be done well if they say or agree together.' External evidence suggests that the tsunono were involved from the start in the vigorous pursuit of the Welfare's reforms, including those that directly affected the nature and scope of their own power. The election of Teosin as chairman meant that the tsunono believed this to be to the good of the Society not that they saw him as an antagonist whom they could still use to further their own interest.

Sinclair's emphasis on conflict of interest, reflected also in my earlier research design (see above pp.11,15) draws attention away from the central theme of the Welfare's meeting - the assertion of the reality of community, the suppression of conflict, division and obstruction (including resistance to the headmen and kurkurai, Item 6) and the equality of the three kinds of people having something to contribute irrespective of their rank (and sex).
Whereas Sinclair discerns an assertion by Teosin that the 'educated boys and girls' are better informed than the older leaders and says that 'it is necessary to recall the quasi-magical belief native people have in education', I believe there is a far greater need to remember the simple statement: 'What they know about these things they should talk about so that the school can influence the people for good.' This is a clear reflection, in fact, of an anti-intellectual position which the Welfare shares with many other populist movements. I will refer again later to the Welfare's evaluation of education by the criteria of its relevance to the people.

The money offered to the kiap after the meeting was not accepted. It was regarded as 'a bribe of £100 for the Administration to place its seal of approval on the Society' (Bunting 1966:26). This is a rather gross interpretation even though the commitment of the government was a consideration. It is worth noting the parallel of husil, whereby a payment serves to forestall trouble in a changing situation, when a person assumes powers and does not wish to appear to reach too far.

For some months after the public formation of the Welfare in January 1960 Teosin continued to market copra, on behalf of his productive group, through the Tulhatu (Hanahan) Cooperative Society. By June he held £560 in cash for the Welfare but the 'District Officer caused this to be deposited in a trust account, requiring three signatories. Accounts were examined in August 1960 but there was no way of proving the accuracy of the records. By November 1960 Teosin was in absolute control of the Society's finances and business affairs and had ceased marketing their copra through the cooperative.' (Hasluck 1962:1)
In months following government officers tried without success to induce the Welfare to market through the cooperative. Three features of this exchange stand out. First, the whites presented their case in such a way that their offers of assistance in marketing were easily interpreted as insistence on guidance of the Welfare's enterprises.

Second, the government officers distrusted and attacked the wok bung method of production which the Welfare much preferred to the individualistic methods endorsed by the sponsors of the cooperatives. The Welfare categorically rejected these policies.

Third, the Cooperatives Officers admitted to the past failures of their Societies while insisting that they had begun to retrieve their losses. But the Welfare accepted only the first point. By now they were prepared to give vehement expression to their lack of faith — doubts which they shared with many non-Welfare people. They rejected promises and scoffed at Tulhatu members by asking how much tinned duck they had eaten recently - a sarcastic allusion to the alleged promises of the whites that cooperatives were an assured means to achieve a European-style standard of living. Puns on the word 'society' (i.e. cooperative) were popular — it was referred to by a Pidgin construction, sisaitim, meaning that the cooperatives office-bearers slipped the profits out the side — or by a vernacular homonym referring to the way a cripple can make painful progress by using hands and buttocks.

On the first point Welfare leaders claim — honestly, it seems to me — that they did not object to European assistance, as distinct from control. They attached much blame to their fellow members (when the Welfare people were members of the Tulhatu Society) who disputed the payments made to Teosin and
his group and allegedly prompted the whites to cut Teosin down to size.

They attached blame to the white Cooperatives Officers for their autocratic control of the Societies, for their failure either to explain to Buka officials and members the principles and problems of cooperatives or to allow the Buka to participate meaningfully in the direction of the enterprise.

In October 1960 the Welfare collected a £2 membership fee from 90 men and women of Hahalis, 73 of Ielelina and 63 at Hanahan, leaving a large number at Hanahan village uncommitted. Four months later 64 Tandeki villagers contributed £2 and these were the only new members to pay fees until 1962.

In 1960 members of Teosin's group had become engaged in quarrels, mainly with non-Welfare Hanahan people, about rights to the old copra groves at Ielelina and Hanahan. This added to tensions about the fairness of rebates from the cooperatives. A temporary solution was found late in the year when the Ielelina grove was divided down the middle between the Welfare and their opponents; Keali of Hanahan bought out the grove there for the Welfare for £160.

This deal however was not to the liking of the chief who was still sitting on the fence, interested in but not committed to the Welfare. He was a bitter opponent of the Welfare leader Marata, whom he accused of sorcery on his death-bed. About this time too he was involved in heated dispute with his neighbours at Ielelina over cocoa plantings in the village. This led to a remarkable scene at which young men of the Welfare, led by Teosin's younger brother, Pomis, publicly rejected the chief's authority, shouted him down and called him a selfish old man. This revolt went unpunished even by husil and this is attributed
to the fact that Pomis was supported by the tsunono of Ielelina and other Nabouin tsunono.

Early in 1960 rituals were performed 'to bury the old customs that are bad.' These were said to be analogous to the feasts at clubhouses (either pitanlan or kinalala) at which the 'dirty things' (koriena) - a few intimate personal belongings - of a deceased tsunono were got rid of, if he had exercised any degree of control over the affairs of the clubhouse. By 1960 the Welfare had taken it upon themselves to suspend the construction of clubhouses in their area, had abolished the use of ceremonial currency and rejected the traditional forms of arranged marriage. For these acts, husil was performed to expiate by Welfare tsunono their presumption. The evidence is not clear as to whether the act was considered to involve making Teosin tsunono. One version has it that Teosin accepted nitsunono from the Welfare as its leader and that his assumption of power constituted hamal because the bad customs which the Welfare changed were 'put on his head.' The principle of communal production was also considered to constitute hamal because, even though strong traditional precedents were claimed for it, the Welfare all along has believed that it was innovating by selecting worthwhile traditional institutions and adding new meaning while corrupt and shameful customs were left to fall into disuse.

One of the elements refurbished and developed according to the Welfare was the ideal of freedom of association between the sexes on the basis of disinterested love. Sometimes the term hatoatong is used to refer to this ideal behaviour. The meaning and origins (even the spelling) have become complex issues in the process of change and in political debate between the Welfare and its critics. It is not entirely clear whether the disinterested love expected is sexual or asexual. Certainly the latter is the more common meaning, and
in this case the expected ideal is the proper respect for the other's human worth irrespective of one's real or imputed sexual interest in the other. Thus a man loves a woman if he is not preoccupied with exclusive possession of her as a sexual object. A wife who is loved should be allowed to associate with other males in the village, for instance, who are prepared to care for her and her children in the absence of her husband.

It is enough to say, in the present context, that this love drives out sexual jealousy and breaks down the strict sexual segregation which, although somewhat less marked since the war, is felt by the Welfare to be a serious flaw in the fabric of Buka society.

In the second half of 1960 frequent reports of sexual immorality began to reach the mission and government. The government was told by Anton Kearei that the Welfare had sent 10 couples into the bush to have sexual intercourse 'to propitiate the spirits in order to be rewarded by a revelation of the great secrets' (Bunting 1966:29) but in September a patrol established that the pairing off had occurred without 'pressure or persuasion' (Hasluck 1962:2). Rumours of immorality filtered through to the Hanahan priest until, late in the year, he banned choir practice in the villages at night lest the girls be seduced by the Welfare. Hagai persisted in choir practice and during a violent argument was told by the priest that his confessions would therefore not be heard. In January 1961 Matthias Makosi, Teosin's assistant, had a temporary falling out with the Welfare, denounced promiscuity amongst the leaders and announced that the revived custom of hatoatong was a licence for Welfare leaders to take part in sexual orgies.

Early in 1961 the Baby Garden was instituted as part of the Welfare's sexual revolution. About a dozen girls were assembled in special quarters which
could be visited by any man looking for a sexual partner.

From the time the Welfare was formed the number of its members attending confession and taking communion declined steadily and had dropped by 75 per cent by the end of 1960. Teosin accepted communion only twice during the year - both times from a visiting priest.

The final break with the mission came in July 1961, precipitated by bitter exchanges about sexual immorality. At a public meeting the Hanahan missionary declared that there could be no compromise on the question of the Baby Garden which was against the laws of God, of the government and of their own ancestors and he condemned Welfare leaders as devils or Satan. There is very intense feeling of resentment about the priest's use of this form of insult. Their answer at the meeting was recorded by the priest: 'Maski, mipela i laikim peccato na mipela i laik go long hell.'

On July 16, 1961, the opening of the Welfare's own church was announced. As Francis Hagai told the Catholic priest: 'we know that our practices are sinful, that we cannot get communion, and that we are on the road to hell, so we pray to God in our own way so that He will be sorry for us when we die.' The members of the Welfare had already excommunicated themselves by placing themselves in a state of mortal sin and by this time the Welfare had withdrawn its children from the mission school and its sick from the mission hospital. Their claim is that the mission turned them away from both.

Teosin claims that, when the Hanahan priest told the Welfare people that they were excommunicated, he took £100 to the mission and said: 'I am buying the priest to allow my people to go back to the church and he said: "your money is dirty with sin."' I said:
Alright, I am buying my children to go back to school and he said: "We will not get your money because it is the work of a lot of sin" and I said: Alright, the last thing I'll ask is for my people to get treatment in the hospital. And he said: "No, you cannot get treatment and I cannot get your money because it contains sin" and I said: Alright, we do not trust you. You are only the priest but God is there in heaven. Now you have taught us that God is everywhere. O.K., we have to keep away from everything that you don't want us to join you in and we have to make our own religion. But of course our religion now is still following the Catholic Bible - all that we read from the book telling us about God and Jesus and we have to follow it ourselves."

In 1962, Teosin says, the Welfare resisted overtures made to them by Seventh Day Adventists and Methodists to get them to become Protestants.

The events at Hanahan mission were paralleled on the north coast towards the end of 1961. The Haku villagers came under attack from the priest at Lemanmanu, who allegedly called them 'followers of Satan' because of their association with the Welfare. Their children had not been attending the Catholic village schools for six months and they claimed that the children had actually been turned away from the mission school at Lemanmanu station.

The Haku complained of the mission's demands for supplies of vegetables and the monthly fee of 2/- required for schoolchildren. For their part they refused to renew village school buildings which the mission insisted be located away from the village, on the clifftop for ease of access. Relations had also been strained for some months through the priest's habit of shooting any village pigs which he found troublesome.
The priest had refused sacraments to those believed to be involved in Welfare activities and at the end of 1961 church attendances were less than half the usual numbers. Both parties remained intransigent. The priest refused to encourage the people to return to church and school lest he appear to condone their actions. The Haku were convinced that, with the stigma of 'followers of Satan', they were no longer wanted in the Church. After some months the kiap intervened in order to establish some means of gradual rapprochement.

The clergy's explanation of the Haku's alienation from the church was that they had regarded the current local priest as a reincarnation of a popular priest of former years from whom they expected 'cargo' by means of a development project which the priest was planning in 1961. When plans fell through for lack of finance, the Haku, it is said, turned to the Welfare (H. Laracy: pers. comm.).

The crisis in relations with the government was developing at the same time and taxation was the central issue. The Welfare clearly intended to bring about a confrontation with the government. They were insistent on establishing a bargaining position from which they could force the whites to accept their terms. But when they decided in 1961 to withhold their tax payments they were not aware of the extent to which the contest would be escalated.

The choice of refusing to pay tax was most likely considered early in 1961 because by August the kiap became aware that a consensus of opinion for refusal had been formed. During these months the Welfare shifted its headquarters from the road (the site of the present store) into the bush a few hundred yards inland. This was seen by the whites as a somewhat sinister move and their imagination fed on rumours supplied by some Council people that the motive was to establish a site
for performing human sacrifice. Although the motives are uncertain, this was not one of them. Most likely was an intention to establish privacy from their Buka foes and also to make it easier to avoid whites arriving by road (the usual resort of the Buka to beach sites being unavailable on a large scale at Hahalis). It is of interest also to note that similar clearing inland from the road was at that time taking place, for Kearei's benefit, to establish the Council and Subdistrict Office at Hutjena. Mention could also be made of the way that tsunono formerly retired for lengthy periods of secret deliberation at bush sites associated with the ruko.

It should be remembered that this was the period between the declaration by Kearei's followers of their acceptance of the Council in February 1961 and the first Council meeting a year later. These people were persuaded by the Administration's arguments that the Council was the only possible path towards political and economic development and that to assist the people the government henceforth would work through the Council. The obvious corollary of this was that the Welfare would be left out in the cold if it did not accept the chosen instrument of the government, the touchstone of prosperity. What direct sanctions might be imposed if they refused to join, the Welfare could not yet know. However, the government realised that 'personal tax was [seen as] a means to pressurise the area into Local Government' (Bunting 1966:10) - not without reason, as this was the policy stated by Hasluck (Hansard 1962:98).

It is reasonable to conclude that questions asked about the benefits to be gained by paying headtax to central government were the same as questions asked about the government's intent and ability to perform when it introduced local government.

In withholding tax money the Welfare argued that the government was doing nothing in the villages with
the money it received. They argued that there was not enough money available to give to the government without a guarantee of worthwhile returns. They had at least two specific demands: that the government staff and supply an aid-post if the Hahalis people built one, and that it provide a teacher for a village school. Kiki (1968:110) adds a third: that the government build a road along the coast. This was a long-felt need, but I am not certain that it was a stipulated prerequisite of payment of taxes. It was certainly the most immediate tangible result of the Welfare's rebellion.

One of the reasons the Welfare had established something of a reputation for being anti-social, even before the 1962 confrontation, was their reluctance to do the weekly work expected by the government to maintain the coastal road, which the Buka considered unsatisfactory in any case. This dated back at least to 1959 (Sinclair 1964:28). In 1960 the Welfare had also refused to join other Buka in giving their labour free to develop a new road across the island to open communications between Hanahan on the east coast and Burns Philp's Carola plantation on the west coast.\footnote{A rough road here 'was cut about 1932 by the D.O. McMullen' (P.R. 1 of 1946) but was overgrown by the time of the Japanese occupation.} The inducement offered was that a new and closer copra marketing outlet would be opened up for them at Carola, presumably giving the lone white planter with his limited resources a monopoly there, although there may have been some plan - unacceptable to the Welfare - to provide a Cooperatives marketing outlet too. A poorly surfaced road was eventually opened up and its only regular user, throughout the 1960s was the white planter at Carola, who made no regular buys of copra from the east coast.\footnote{In 1968 the government was paying wages for labour to surface the road.}
The demands for health and education services stemmed directly from the Welfare's alienation from the mission, which, with financial support from the government, had control of the only facilities locally available. The government anthropologist claimed that in 1961 he warned senior government officials not to try to force the Welfare back into the arms of the mission. He believed that the crisis of 1962 was due to the government's attempt to do this (C. Julius: pers. comm.).

I think it unwise to place too great an emphasis on the few specific demands which were mentioned in exchanges with the kiaps. The protest was as much expressive as instrumental and the Welfare's deep-seated dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic order was shown by the extent to which they were prepared to press their opposition to tax, when the maximum amount payable by Welfare members was a mere £188.¹ The mood was shared by the Welfare's allies in large numbers, of whom tax was not demanded. They went as far as the tax-defaulters in their expression of opposition.

The sense of crisis in the course of economic and political development extended also to the issue of the failure of the government-sponsored and dominated cooperative societies. Late in 1961 the Welfare chose to bring this too to a head. A year after their withdrawal from cooperative society marketing and with the impending confrontation with the Administration over payment of headtax, large numbers of Welfare members began to besiege the staff at the Cooperative Association Office at Buka Passage and demand the return of their share capital. They refused to be put

¹ Cf the £100 offered to the kiaps when the Welfare was established in 1960.
off by any conciliatory proposals and chorused that they wanted money not promises.

Eventually 'a meeting of the Tulhatu Cooperative was convened by a Cooperative Officer on 5th January 1962. Teosin and other Welfare Society members attended to demand the return of their capital' (Hasluck 1962:3).

The government's position was that the Welfare should either pay headtax or join the Council and pay local government tax, preferably the latter. There was to be no negotiation towards other alternatives. The Welfare pressed for its case to be heard by an independent tribunal. As was pointed out in the discussion in the Australian parliament, in New Guinea the tasks of assessing tax, collecting it and penalising failure to pay, all fell to the same officials of the government who were police officers and tax evasion was a criminal charge in the colony.¹

The district officer, two patrol officers and fifteen other police visited Hahalis on 7 December to collect the tax (Hasluck 1962:3). Seven hundred people assembled and refused to pay and 'an attempt to arrest a tax defaulter resulted in a show of force by the natives...the district officer desisted from further action. The two patrol officers and twelve police remained at Hahalis to watch developments. During the next two months special efforts were made to attempt to persuade the people to honour their obligations. Leaflets in Melanesian Pidgin and the Hahalis dialect were distributed. Carefully prepared special messages were broadcast by the Administration from Rabaul...[on] the reasons for the payment of personal tax and the functions and purposes of local government.' Two New

¹ See Cameron, Beazley and Whitlam in Hansard, 21-2-62 and Johnson, 27-2-62.
Guinean members of the Legislative Council were flown in but their persuasions were rejected at Hahalis on 6 January 1962.

In 1961 all non-Council villages except Hahalis, Hanahan and Telinelina had paid their headtax but on 10 January 1962 over 250 people from Tahetahe, Sing and Elutupan paid £2 contributions and joined the Welfare.

On 15 January the Welfare was issued with the patrol officers' ultimatum that unless the tax was paid within three weeks the police would move in. Within the next three days about 310 men and women of Lemanmanu, Lontis and Tandeki paid their £2 to Hahalis and became members and about this time further collections amassed £1,845 at Lamankoa. All contributions were recorded in detail. On 20 January a very large meeting was held at Basbi (by this time the rest of Hahalis was deserted) with many representatives from every north coast village as well as from overtly pro-Council villages from Gogohe to Malasang and more £2 contributions were made. The pro-Council section of the Hanahan district were conspicuously absent. The Hanahan missionary heard reports that the meeting wanted neither the Christian missions nor the government because they had done nothing for the people; they wanted their own form of worship and their own morality, especially the Baby Garden and all present resolved to join the Welfare and to resist headtax.

Late in January the mission Sisters were evacuated from Hanahan to safer areas. The immediate initiative to violence was taken by the government, for the police had been practising baton charges before 6 February, the day which had been nominated three weeks earlier for the police action. No published account mentions this fact. The date is of singular interest. By design or by accident it was the day after an eclipse.
of the sun. A story subsequently popular amongst whites and supposedly accounting for Welfare 'aggression' was that Hahalis had expected cargo to arrive from heaven on 5 February and, in bitter disappointment, turned on the government force in the area for having prevented its arrival.1

The Welfare leaders, on 5 February, are also said to have sent a message to the kiap 'that they would kill a child and place the blame on the Administration if the police came to their village.'

At 9 a.m. on 6 February about 70 more police moved into Hahalis. At 11 o'clock, when police were 'drawn up, drilling with batons as a show of strength' (Willey 1965:101), a crowd estimated at about 2000 approached the camp. When Teosin and Sawa and others seemed to be about to be taken into custody as tax evaders, about 300 women joined by old men and children surged forward, led by Teosin's father's brother's wife. They took up the cry: 'You are taking our men away from us. How will we live without them? You want to kill us all. Don't take my husband to kill him. Kill me now. Kill my children first.' The police 'formed two lines and wielded batons trying to force the women back. Several natives were struck about the head and shoulders and arms...at no time did the young men and ringleaders reply with force' (South Pacific Post, 9-2-62).

The violence lasted about 10 minutes during which Teosin and Sawa were dragged away by the women. The advance by the women was their own initiative, according to Ryan (1969:53-4;292) 'At the height of the anti-government uprising on Buka Island in 1962, the rebel leaders were sitting cross-legged facing the eastern sun, copying the wartime Japanese. But the cultists were waiting for shiploads of cargo, not the inner peace of religion. The sun cult became so bad that the leaders - John Teosin, Francis Hagai and the old men including Sawa Koratsi - developed eye troubles and began wearing dark glasses.'
to Teosin. The Assistant Administrator saw it as a deliberate tactic of the Welfare — 'a cowardly practice' — and ordered 75 more police in 'to protect the women' and to arrest the people flouting the law and adopting 'disgusting social practices.'

The police made no attempts at arrests and the crowd dispersed within an hour after some jeering. Willey (1965:101) reports cries of 'We don't want your doctors. We don't belong to your government. Your laws are not our laws.'

About this time Hahalis was declared closed to press-men.

The Welfare and its friends immediately held a large meeting at Basbi to discuss tactics. Some argued strongly for retaliation if the police again used violence but after long debate the meeting supported the position represented by Sangin, an influential tsunono of Hahalis. He is said to have argued: 'We must not retaliate. If they want to hit you just accept it. When Jesus was carrying his cross, they spat on him and hit him and he did nothing. We must do the same. Never mind if they spit on the Welfare or hit us, don't return it.'

A meeting was arranged with the District Commissioner for 8 February at Hahalis. The men set about making wooden batons, the same as the police were armed with, and at the appointed hour 'at least a thousand' of them approached the camp and threw their weapons at the feet of the police, saying: 'You see we have clubs too to fight you with but we are throwing

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1 South Pacific Post, 20-2-62 and Ryan (1969:294), who also suggests that, when the police could not be forced into killing a child 'Hahalis was stunned. The plan had gone wrong.'

2 Willey 1965:102.
them away in front of you. Go ahead and pick them up and hit us with them if you want to. Then the shame will be yours.¹

Sawa and Teosin on this occasion are reported to have agreed that all tax-defaulters would give themselves up on 12 February but there would seem to be little point in the invitation to the police to resolve the situation by violence if a simple surrender had been genuinely contemplated. The government indeed learned the next day that the people did not intend to follow their gesture with submission to arrest. On 10 February the people began to move down to an encampment on the beach at Sohiena and in the next few days supporters arrived from the north coast bringing provisions. Hasluck reports that 'the women were strongly opposing any change in the stand taken up to that time.' The leaders refused to talk with the kiaps.

The 75 extra police under three white officers arrived on 16 February bringing the number to about 160. 'After a conference of Administration officers, it was decided that a Police Superintendent should take charge' (Hasluck 1962:4).

The small stretch of beach at Sohiena to which the people withdrew measures only about 60 feet at its widest point and is protected by a steep 200 ft cliff. It was the most natural defensive position in the area, and was accessible to the reinforcements and provisions

¹ Hasluck (1962:4) and Willey (1965:102) both note that on this occasion many carried 'clubs shaped like police batons.' Willey says that they lay down their weapons under threat from the police. Some of the batons ended up as court exhibits, described by Ryan (1969:298).
arriving by canoe from the north. At 10 a.m. on 19 February, the police, led by the Superintendent and with a rifle squad of ten, marched from their camp down to Sohiena. There they confronted a crowd of perhaps 1000 men and a similar number of women. The men had formed themselves into a solid square with one side against the cliff. The front ranks, again mainly old men, are variously reported to have stood placidly with arms folded or clasped behind their backs - defiant but unarmed.

The police officer called for Teosin, all tax defaulters and those involved in the earlier melee to present themselves for arrest. None did so. When John Teosin was called for hundreds of voices cried 'We are all John....Where are the leaders?....We are all leaders.' The Inspector then made an apparently arbitrary choice of a man to arrest. When the police seized him and others rushed to his defense the violence started. The police laid in with batons and the Welfare tried to disarm them, pinion their arms or hold them to the ground. The police were soon in danger of being overwhelmed and, as they tried to retreat, the officer in charge of the rifle squad fired two shots to seawards and the engagement was broken off.

The many stories which have appeared in the press telling of the vicious armory of the Welfare in this engagement are misleading, to say the least. Bushknives, axes, lethal spears and arrows, clubs and slingshots have all been mentioned. Yet the police outnumbered about ten to one sustained only minor injuries compared

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1 Ryan (1969:295) asserts that the area was chosen because it was 'alongside the cemetery of their ancestors' who were expected 'to leap out [of their graves] to their assistance carrying rifles and shotguns'. He says that they later admitted that this was Teosin's tactic but the Welfare reject the story.
with the Welfare casualties. Moreover it must be noted that the most serious charges brought against the Welfare people were riotous behaviour and obstructing police.

I have no doubt that not a few Welfare responded to violence with violence but this was not the plan. Nor was it the behaviour of most. I would like to note here that, as I had considered the conflict of 1962 as a brief dramatic episode of marginal interest, I had not enquired too closely into it until the last months of fieldwork. The received version had been rehashed by a succession of journalists and I had not suspected the discrepancy between it and the Welfare's version. I was unable to gain access to any detailed reports written by government officers present during the crisis and have had no opportunity to discuss the Welfare's version with them in person. The received version depicts a scene of mob violence contrasted with noble restraint on the part of the police - a vicious attack by the Welfare intent on killing in a fight to the finish.¹ For instance Ryan's sensationalism is typical: 'The hysterical Hahalis men continued to dart forward, cutting and thrusting' as is the Bulletin's: 'Police entered the story only when it was apparent that the islanders were preparing to repel authority with violence. Natives attacked the police patrol...The reinforced patrol...would have been fools to go without arms. A terrible ambush awaited the police in a narrow pass and only an act of God made the police take a different track at the last moment.'

I was surprised to discover that the Welfare's account of a policy of determined - but passive -

resistance was supported by all the Buka I talked to, including the Welfare's worst enemies. Consider the most reliable data on the physical results of the conflict. The Sister who took over medical treatment at the mission aid post at 6 p.m. on 19 February said 'about 11.30 a.m. 9 policeboys were brought up to the mission for first aid. Some had large cuts on the legs, head etc.' There were 'over 80' Buka men injured 'and about 5 women...90% of all the injured were old men....By morning we had 65 patients in the 2 wards' - others presumably receiving outpatient treatment. Twenty-four of the patients were later sent by a doctor to have X-rays for possible fractures. Some of the Buka injured - I have no idea how many - refused medical treatment from the mission. One of the Welfare patients was so badly injured that he was given the last sacraments.

At 11 p.m. on the day of the fight the Welfare leaders sent Francis Hagai to the Hanahan priest with £124 tax money and a request for a meeting with the government at the mission station. 'The meeting was refused by the District Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police as riotous behaviour and obstructing the police were now the issues instead of only taxation. A message was sent back that the leaders and their followers could come to the police camp voluntarily to give themselves up at 10 a.m. on 22nd February' (Hasluck 1962:5).

Administrator Cleland the next day directed the move of 400 policemen to Buka within a 24-hour period 'to maintain law and order in a very difficult situation....Had I had to refer back to Canberra' wrote Cleland, 'the situation could have been lost because of the time factor' (Cleland 1969:215). Welfare leaders claim that there were troops deployed in the area in the aftermath of the conflict and an
independent report mentions the presence of army officers at Hanahan on 20 February.

The 400 police were flown in and marched across from Carola on 21 February.¹

According to Hasluck's press release of 27 March 'on 22nd February Teosin and some 200 followers, including over 50 women and children, voluntarily came to the police camp. The women and children were sent back to their villages and the men were placed under arrest. On 23rd February, 1962, the leader, Sawa, was arrested. The 166 Hahalis prisoners were then walked to Sohano....The Superintendent, two police officers, a patrol officer and 117 police moved north to Lemankoa on 24th February, 1962, and made 158 arrests from six villages in the area. Eighty prisoners were sent by sea to Sohano the next day.'

The following day, 26 February, Mr R.G. Ormsby, S.M., from Madang, flew to Buka to preside over a Court of Native Affairs. The first day's sitting was 27 February at Sohano. By this time, by Mr Hasluck's statement, 246 of the 324 people so far arrested were living under canvas at Sohano.

On 28 February (the second day of the court's sitting) '43 more arrests were made in the northern villages.' These, together with the 78 previously arrested (24 February), were sent to Sohano by boat the same day.

This adds up to 367 arrests (22-28 February) but the press statement does not mention the time or place of 50 more arrests to reach the 'total of 417 native people...arrested on Buka Island.' These are quite apart from at least 44 other people who 'were implicated in the incidents' and made their own way to Sohano or

¹ The cost of air-transport alone was estimated to have cost the government £15000.
'were transferred from Hanahan Mission Hospital, where they had been receiving treatment for injuries.'

Between 27 February and 4 March 461 people appeared in court. Hasluck gives these details:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>No. of Charges</th>
<th>No. Withdrawn</th>
<th>Not Guilty</th>
<th>Conviictions</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to pay tax</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fined $1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obstructing police</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>167 three mnths</td>
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<td>1 one month</td>
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<td>104 fined $2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riotous behaviour</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>171 six mnths</td>
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<td>10 two mnths</td>
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<td>78 one month</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>48 fined $4²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escaping from custody</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1 six mnths³</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1 four mnths⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only two defendants had pleaded not guilty but the magistrate, in ensuring that the interests of the defendants were protected, directed that 187 pleas of not guilty be entered.

The possibility of laying further charges against a similar number of Buka was considered but discarded as impracticable. Ryan (1969:298) adds his interpretation, unsupported by evidence and unrelated to the charges laid against the Hahalis people in court: 'In any case, many of the allies had been duped into the beach fight.

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1 Not 588 as stated in Pacific Islands Monthly (March 1962:130), which confuses the number of defendants with the number of convictions.

2 $10 according to Pacific Islands Monthly.

3 Sawa Koratsi.

4 John Teosin.
with threats of sorcery and bashings, so the government quietly forgot its promise to arrest all of the 1000 rebels.1

During May 1962 a number of villages including two on the north coast expressed their objection to the Council by removing and destroying wooden notice boards which the Council had erected on the road and anti-Council feelings were expressed in Tohatsi village where it was rumoured that the Council was incapable of providing any services as it was already heavily in debt.

About this time the government-appointed village officials at Lemanmanu and Lemankoa were dismissed because of their alleged involvement in the troubles at Hahalis. While under detention at Sohano Teosin sent a message to the Welfare women in their villages instructing them to keep the ideas of the Welfare alive, to continue to produce copra on a communal basis and to resist the encroachment of outsiders trying to steal coconuts. Teosin's wife sought and was given the assurance of the kiap that property of Welfare members would be protected while the men were serving their sentences - there were only five men left in Ielelina village, for example.

On 10 March the newly formed Buka Council resolved that its members 'on behalf of the people in the council are very happy about the way the Administration handled the people of the Welfare Society from Hahalis, Ielelina and Hanahan villages. The people in the council area know that the Hahalis people have broken the law and are happy that no-one was seriously injured in the trouble between Hahalis village and the police.'1

1 Note the highly selective attribution of responsibility, excluding both the pro-Council people involved and the Haku, who were not yet considered lost to the Welfare. My personal judgement is that the resolution bears all the marks of being extracted from the first meeting of Council by the government to establish a popular basis for its action.
On 2 May, a month after the conviction of the Welfare people, the 1962 United Nations Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot met a gathering of Buka near Hutjena. Members of both the Buka and Tinputz Councils told of the shame which the Welfare 'cargo-cultists' had caused them and spent much of the meeting explaining this behaviour as due to ignorance of European industrial society.

By this time the Welfare members' appeals to the Supreme Court had been prepared. An offer of legal counsel was made by the Victorian Branch of the Builders Labourers' Federation but the prisoners were represented by the Public Solicitor from Port Moresby. The choice seems to have been made by the Welfare themselves.

Most commentators have asserted that the Welfare people got off on legal technicalities. This is not so.

There were three distinct sets of appeals:

1. The Chief Justice on 7 May 1962 upheld 49 appeals against convictions for obstructing the police. Ryan (1969:302) incorrectly says that these men were 'ordered to be released'; they were also serving six months for riotous behaviour. On 17 May the Administrator stepped in to remit sentences on 221 other men on identical charges.

Justice Mann said that no such charge could be heard in a Court of Native Affairs and that proceedings were not conducted as required by regulation. 'There were obvious procedural defects but I do not consider that in themselves they would have entitled the appellants to decision. The practice of dealing with large batches of natives accused of like offences, addressing them by way of explanation and then calling on anybody who does not understand or does not admit the offence or wants to raise some other matter, is to be thoroughly condemned.
It is rather like telling a company of soldiers that anybody who is not prepared to volunteer for extra duty must leave the ranks and stand to one side of the parade ground. In view of the very nature of the case and of the element of community action which was an essential feature, it might have been extremely difficult for an innocent individual to come forward and deny the complaint.

S.M. Ormsby at Sohano in March 'did not consider that legal representation should be provided' (Hasluck 1962:6). Justice Mann, in the Supreme Court said that experienced legal counsel should have been available 'for Teosin and the rest of the Hahalis men.'

The only people who could have been released after the first appeals and remission were 118 who had been sentenced to three months for obstructing police only. The remainder of the 221 whose sentences were remitted were not prisoners but people who had been fined £1.

The 118 people released had already served $2\frac{1}{2}$ months of their three months. Mann noted in his judgements that there were no bail provisions where there was an appeal from Court of Native Affairs. 'This could result in the accused, who had good ground for appeal serving a good part of his sentence before the appeal could be dealt with by the Supreme Court.'

2. The second set of appeals.

Between 11 and 18 May the Public Solicitor lodged appeals on behalf of those convicted of riotous behaviour:

- one for a man who was twice on the same day convicted on this charge
- others for 60 sentenced to 6 months after pleading not guilty
- others for over 90 sentenced to 6 months after pleading guilty

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1 See also Whitlam in House of Representatives, 7-3-62, on the 'remarkably expeditious hearing' at Sohano.
The appeal of Towasi Kulapai was upheld 21 May. Three days later the Administrator said 'In view of the Court's decision in relation to the appeal by Towasi Kulapai, I have decided to remit the sentences of the remaining 157 to 3 months.'

The Chief Justice in the appeal by Towasi is reported to have ruled that the Buka riotors could be classified in two groups - those who were active aggressors and those who had been merely lending support to their leaders. 'He said a sentence of 6 months imprisonment on the active aggressors was not unreasonable. But he felt a lesser penalty of 3 months was enough for the others.'

The Administrator later said that 14 of the 171 people gaoled for riotous behaviour would serve their full 6 months.

3. Teosin's successful appeal against conviction for escaping from custody. This was upheld about 28 May.

Ryan says (1969:294) that on 8 February Teosin admitted 'that he knew he had been formally under arrest.' In fact there was a fair amount of doubt about it and the government conceded that Teosin had not been under arrest.

Altogether the Welfare people between them must have served over 60 man/years.

While most of the Welfare prisoners had been held at Sohano, about 20 including Michael Keali were gaoled at Kerevat (Rabaul), several including Rikaha at Lae, Sawa and Anton Hatobu were taken to Wewak and Teosin and Hagai to Bomana (Port Moresby). Whereas those at Kerevat felt themselves well-treated, the pairs at Bomana and Wewak were both split up. This caused Hagai and Hatobu very great anxiety and both feared that they would never see their partner again. Hatobu claims that he and Sawa were constantly crossexamined to discover who or what was behind the Welfare.
On 31 May and 1 June the last successful appellants were released from gaol — 63 from Kerevat and Sohano and 9 from mainland prisons. Teosin and Hagai and several others spent until 7 June being shown around Moresby, including the Hanuabada Council, by government officers, including Albert Maori Kiki, whose Kerema Welfare Society provided the visitors with money to 'help them on their way.' This was repaid later in the month. After a few days' tour of Rabaul Teosin and Hagai returned to Hahalis on 11 June, accompanied by Kiki, who had served as a medical assistant during the crisis at Hahalis in February. At his own insistence he was appointed to act as Welfare Assistant at Hahalis 'to find out the meaning' of the Welfare and 'to help these people to achieve their aims without coming into conflict with the administration' (Kiki 1968:108).

Until Teosin arrived, the members of the Welfare declined to discuss their plans with the kiaps except to show their continuing resistance to the Council. They said that they could not be pressured into acceptance and would simply await Teosin's return. The people of Ielelina refused to replace Council notice boards which they had thrown out of the village.

Teosin had given reporters the impression that he was prepared to reconsider his rejection of Councils and, when he returned with Kiki, he was told that the people had heard of this on ABC radio. At daily meetings between 13-16 June, attended by Kiki, the majority of people made it clear that Councils were out of the question and that, if Teosin, Hagai and Kiki did not agree, they could take a canoe and paddle back to Moresby.

The government had instructed Kiki not to push the subject of Councils at Hahalis but once the people had insisted on clarifying the issue Kiki became involved
in many arguments because he openly advocated local government\(^1\) (1968:116). Teosin and Hagai appeared to be considering the possibility and there was a suggestion that the Welfare should form its own Council distinct from Kearei's. This was rejected. Teosin told Kiki that he regretted the negative attitude shown by the people and that he might even seek employment away from Buka. This sounds very much like the traditional performance of a government-appointed luluai disassociating himself from his disobedient charges for the benefit of the kiap. Even so there are indeed indications that Teosin toyed with the idea of forming a Council after talking to the Administrator. Whether or not he persisted with this - the members' intransigence was no surprise to him - there were rumours for the next few months of conflict between the younger leaders, especially Teosin, and the older tsunono, especially Sangin. The government suspected that Teosin's power within the Society was declining, partly because Teosin himself claimed that he was not the leader but simply the spokesman for the Welfare in dealings with the government.

By August the Welfare had resumed the performance of their own church services and had re-established the Baby Garden. In the last months of the year meeting after meeting was held with people on the north coast. The Haku were fully committed by this time and insisted that Teosin keep the money found by the government at Lemankoa in February and returned for redistribution.

In October after a show of reluctance, leaders of the Welfare paid the headtax on behalf of their members on the east coast. The Haku were not yet incorporated

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1 The government withdrew Kiki from the Welfare area after a few weeks. Cf Ryan (1964:305) who claims that Teosin told him he 'ordered Maori Kiki out of Hahalis - he was a government spy.'
into the Welfare's organisation of production but Teosin sent representatives to buy copra from Haku producers at 4d a pound and then organise its shipment through Chinese traders. The District annual report (1962-3) observed that 'taking into account their freight costs, it would be difficult for them to produce any profit. However it seems that as far as the members are concerned such an organisation does not need to be an economic success. The main feature to them appears to be that it is an organisation run, controlled and created by indigenous people and there are no Europeans telling them what to do.' The east coast leaders still marvel at the amount of time and number of meetings required before the Haku fully appreciated the Welfare's message and fitted into its organisation. Late in 1962 the most significant sign of conversion to Welfare orthodoxy among the Haku was a Baby Garden set up at Lemankoa.

A few months after their return from prison the leaders were laying plans for a reception for the Administrator who had told them in Moresby that he would pay a visit to Buka later in the year. The Catholic mission soon learnt that the Welfare expected to be the only host. Mission teachers from Hanahan told the Welfare that the priest there would not hear of the Administrator favouring Hahalis with a visit and had demanded that the government arrange that the only meeting be held at the Hanahan station. The Welfare insisted on Hahalis to no avail. The visit was made by the Assistant Administrator, Dr Gunther, in November 1962.

The Welfare had anticipated an opportunity to demonstrate, for his approval, the activities and intentions of the Society. The occasion instead proved to be a heavy blow to the Welfare's image. He denounced its sexual morality and economic policies and pointed out
that at any time the legislature could introduce measures to compel people to join Councils. He reproved the Welfare for its behaviour in February but pointed out that it was not government policy to punish offenders indefinitely. The Welfare had £750 ready to hand to the government but Gunther considered the offer an affront and refused it.

At Hahalis the Welfare had built its school and accepted a mission teacher. In January 1963 school attendances everywhere were returning to normal but at this time the Hanahan priest refused to staff a school proposed for Basbi because he wanted the children kept away from Welfare headquarters.

The new year also saw the successful introduction to the Haku area of communal production controlled by Welfare headquarters. 'Report men' were appointed by the tsunono as intermediaries with the leaders at Hahalis. These were the forerunners of 'spokesmen' representing the villages in the Welfare's policy making body and responsible in the villages for implementing the central meeting's decisions. As with the east coast villages cashcropping was proceeding at a vigorous rate but unlike the others, the Welfare Haku refused to plant cocoa. A Rural Progress Society was planned for Elutupan for the agricultural officers to organise cocoa processing on the north coast but encouragement to plant cocoa was seen by the Haku as a device to force them into the Council. Meetings were still held constantly well into 1963 and Sawa Koratsi was the representative most frequently sent to Haku to expound the policies of the founding group.

The government was still not convinced that the Haku were fully committed to the Welfare but the inception of communal production directed by the Welfare leadership marked the final stage of the incorporation of the north coast villages. One or two matrilineal
groups were taken out by their tsunono, notably at Elutupan, but by the end of 1963 the division of Buka's population into Welfare and Council had been completed¹ leaving the Welfare with about 4000 members. The essential situation had remained stable until the time of my fieldwork.

I will now turn to an account of the policies and principles of organisation which have governed the activities of the consolidated Welfare Society. The best way to introduce this is to quote the Welfare's own restatement of policy in 1966. This does not represent a departure from practices obtaining until then.

¹ Except for the admission of the 300 non-Welfare Haku to the Council in 1965. A few score of people have resisted pressures to join either group. These are generally less critical of Welfare policies than Council people appear to be.
ORDER OF MEETING OF

THE HAHALIS WELFARE SOCIETY

MEETING STARTS

ROLL CALL: President asks the Vice-President to call out the names of the elected members in the attendance roll. He then asks about the absent members.

MINUTES: President asks the Secretary to read the minutes of the last meeting. He then asks the elected members if the minutes are correct, and if they agree. President then signs his name and dates the minutes.

TREASURER: President asks the Treasurer to read his book, and tell us what money he has received and spent at or since the last meeting. And what balance he now holds in the box.

REPORTS: President asks the elected members to give or make report about the works they were given at the last meeting.

DISCUSSION OF REPORTS: President asks the members if there's any discussion about the reports or ask any question relating to the reports given.

ACTIVE WORKS: President now gives out the works for next month.

GENERAL BUSINESS: President asks if there's any general business, and any members may then give any useful information of interest to the Welfare Society works or rules.

END OF MEETING: President to give any of his speech before the meeting will close.

LAWS & RULES

If past experience is an indication and no branch of the Welfare Society will fail which is worked faithfully according to rules.

Welfare Society is a system which can be thrown out of balance by suppressing or altering any of its parts.
So, if unprepared to work the system exactly as described in the Welfare Society's meeting, and please do not start at all.

Do not have to become a leader unless you have to be elected by the Villagers and a leader must do what his peoples like and not only doing what he thinks is right. Make sure always come to the meeting and discuss the way to lead.

Do not have any other way or hidden ideas which is not the same as the Welfare Society Laws and rules, and the laws or rules must be liked and formed by everyone and will be followed.

Be punctual in the attendance roll call of the Welfare Society's meeting, and then pass your agendas to the President before the meeting goes on.

HAHALIS WELFARE SOCIETY
LAWS & RULES

1. Ol headmen, meris na members bilong Welfare Society ol ibin formim pinis ol haphap ground bilong ol long mekim wanpela ground tasol. Ol leaders i mas lukluk strong tru long dis wanpela ground i bilong members bilong Welfare Society i work ontop longen, na arapela man ino ken spoilim. Sapos wanpela i laik kisim hap ground orait em imas askim Welfare pastaim long tok orait long givim or no givim.

2. Ol man, meri ol i member long Welfare Society ol ibin formim ol pinis long kamap olosem wanpela lain pipol tasol. Na imas work wantaim long halivim narapela long painim gutpela bilong ol wantaim.

3. Ologeta samting ontop long dis wanpela ground i bilong Welfare members olosem coconut trees, cocoa na ol kain samting i grow or plantim ontop long wanpela ground i bilong Welfare members i work longen long kisim halivim longen, ol wantaim or tinktink longen long kamapim bikpela redi long bihain taim bilong ol.

4. Ol man, meri imas hard work tru long plantim ol kain samting ontop long ground bilong ol long redim plenti rout long kisim moa mani longen bihain, long gerap strong na lukautim gut ples bilong ol long stap gut oltaim.
5. Taim ol man, meri work long plantim nupela coconut trees, cocoa, gardening, work long haus, new clearing, grass cutting under new crops na ol kain work olosem em i nogat pei longen. Work halivim na work halivim em tasol i pei or wei bilong bihainim. Komiti imas mekim lain long ologeta morning na singautim nem long rolkol na bihain salim ol man, meri igo out long work. Tu yumi mas save gut sapos yumi mekim work long samting i save kamapim mani long taim bilong nau, orait em tasol yumi ken kisim pei longen, na samting yumi work long redim long kamapim mani bihain, yumi no ken kisim pei longen taim em ino kamapim mani yet.


7. Taim mani ikamap long copra, cocoa na ol kain work yumi mekim long Welfare Society nau, orait ol leaders i mas sindaun wantaim na dividim or sharim long nem bilong ol members wanpela, wanpela na iken putim long Bank wantaim nem bilong em yet. Ol leaders imas tinktink long dispela na mekim long pinis bilong wanpela, wanpela mun.

8. Ol man, meri members bilong Welfare imas tinktink strong long helpim narapela, narapela bilong ol, long wanem ol i member wantaim long wanpela Society tasol. Sapos wanpela member i laikim help orait leader long ples bilong em imas bringim tok insait long miting na baimbai miting iken markim hamas tru iken givim long halivim em. Sapos miting em i markim 6d or 5c orait ol leader imas collectim long wanpela, wanpela member bilongen 6d or 5c na givim long halivim em. Example:- Sapos 4,000 members i givim 6d or 5c wanpela, wanpela na halivim em iken kamap olosem £100 or 200 dollars.

9. Sapos wanpela member i laik go out long Welfare Society em i mas kisim pei wankain olosem ol arapela i member yet long Welfare. Olosem sapos wanpela igo out na yumi i givim em long pei liklik baimbai dispela i member yet i kisim pei ontop moa long dispela igo out, natu sapos yumi givim pei bikpela long dispela igo out bihain baimbai dispela i member yet i kisim pei liklik long taim i laik kisim or tu bai mani ino enap long husat istap. Yumi i mas bihainim tasol rule namba sikis itok long laik bilong yumi i formim insait long Welfare Society na dispela laik ibin kam yet long yumi wanpela, wanpela.
10. Ol man, meri ol ibin putim ol pikinini bilong ol wantaim long wanpela hap long changim pasin bilong baim meri pastaim, na bihain ol i marit. Olosem nau na ologeta girls istap wantaim long wanpela hap olosem ol i Baby Garden. Sapos pikinini kamap long Baby Garden em i orait i pikinini bilong yumi na yumi imas lukluk gut longen na helpim. Sapos man i laik givim hap mani olosem i helpim meri longen i orait, bai olosem i present bilong em tasol.

11. Taim wanpela man na meri tupela i laik marit, em yet tupela imas pas wantaim long wanpela laik tasol. Olosem yu arapela man ino ken putim tinktink bilong yu igo insait long tupela. Nogut yu givim tinktink bilong yu igo insait ino stret or wankain olosem ol, na em i pain nogut na marit i save bruk long wanem ino laik bilong tupela long marit. Yumi no ken singautim pei long taim tupela or wanpela man na meri i laik marit tasol sapos pikinini kamap bai tupela i ken spendim mani long lukautim em, na yumi arapela imas hamamas na givim help taim pikinini kamap.


13. Sapos man, meri mekim liklik trabol yu arapela imas traum long keep long stretpela pasin na noken putim yu insait long skruim dispela liklik rong long kamap bikpela. Tasol yu mas putim yu insait long gutpela rout na halivim dispela i rong, long kam bek long gutpela pasin olosem yu noken traum long painim tasol ol samting i rong na litimapim. Yu mas lukluk forward tasol long gutpela samting bilong helpim man, meri long stap gut oltaim, oltaim long kantri.

14. Ol headmen na leaders imas lukluk strong long ol liklik trabol imas pinisim long ples olosem local court yu mas mekim longples. Na sapos kiap i laik kisim wanpela man bilong Welfare igo long kot orait em i mas askim headmen or leaders pastaim na bihain man igo long kot wantaim wanpela leaders na headmen longples, long harim kot wantaim na bihain i nogat kros or tinktink nogut ikamap long time man i kalabus or ino kalabus. Em pasin olosem baimbai yumi save gut long lo na long stretem samting or putim gut yumi yumi long stret oltaim.
15. Taim bikpela trabol i kamap long yumi em imas go long District kot na long Supreme cot. Olosem sapos man i stilim bikpela mani, kukim haus bilong arapela man wantaim ologeta samting bilong em na yu lukim long ai bilong yu, kilim dai man na bikpela pait long ologeta man na planti i dai pinis. Em ologeta kain trabol bikpela olosem imas go long District kot na Supreme kot.


In 1968 the formal structure of the Welfare centred on the offices of President (Teosin), Vice-President (Hagai), Secretary (Mathias), Treasurer of the east coast (Ragu) and Treasurer of the north coast (Sagolo). Ragu also kept the monthly accounts of cashcropping for the Welfare as a whole. Makosi controlled the finances of the stores other than the Company's, and was responsible for their stock. There is a longstanding division of the Welfare into Development Committees, one for each coast. The chairman of each committee is joined by the spokesman of his area in meetings convened ideally once a month to organise production and check it against a 'project list' of works planned by the Welfare. The two committees should unite on the alternate fortnights to form the General Meeting with Teosin in the chair.

In practice there are few powers still delegated by the general meeting to these bodies and the review and planning of the activities which spokesmen direct are carried out in the general meeting. Nevertheless the two committee Chairmen (Keali and Hamanu in 1968) are very powerful officials with authority second only to the President's. Teosin delegates important executive powers to them in the implementation of decisions of the general meeting. The Chairman of the north coast committee assumes even more important political power as the senior resident Welfare official in the area most remote from headquarters. Decisions entrusted to him are of a kind which, on the east coast, are more likely to be referred to Teosin than to the local Chairman.

The General Meeting is held about once a month (in fact 9 or 10 times a year), alternating between Hahalis and Lemanmanu, if practicable. It may be attended by up to 75 people who are recognised members of the meeting. Average attendance would not be more than 50. There are about 20 spokesmen and up to two tsunono or other villagers from each group represented
by a spokesman. Also present are the seven officials named above, as well as the Director and Secretary of the Welfare's registered company and a man with the full-time job of collecting data on land rights held by Welfare members and preparing reports on land disputes with Council members. These regular meetings are usually concerned with recurring administrative matters but policy issues are often raised. Critical political issues are often attended to immediately by slightly less representative ad hoc meetings, whose decisions are not necessarily reviewed by the General Meeting as a matter of course.

Meetings of tsunono of the Welfare are often convened by the Welfare leaders and, although I never attended such a meeting, I was told that they proposed items for the Agenda of General Meetings. It was said that, although the leaders not infrequently found the initiatives of the tsunono to be vague and impractical, they made every attempt to translate them into proposals actionable by the General Meeting.

Apart from this canvassing of the ideas of tsunono for future action, there have been two major meetings of the tsunono since 1960 - and a third proposed in 1968 - which Teosin considers vital. These were reviews of the Welfare's long-term policies and the seal of approval given by the tsunono on these occasions is seen by Teosin as the most significant criterion of the popular acceptance of the Welfare's institutions and achievements to date.

Since 1961 one of the principles underlying the allocation by the Welfare of money received as joint profits or as 'donations' has been a rotating credit system. In 1960 funds had been controlled and disbursed

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1 For a good example of the minutes of a meeting see Appendix.
on behalf of the Society by its President - until the District Officer demanded that the money in hand be deposited in a trust account requiring three signatures. At the end of the year £400 remained in the account and a further £430 had been accumulated by the President.

Early in 1961 the three core villages began to take turns to receive the profits from each sale of their combined production - about £300 a time. But at some time during the year each adult was expected to contribute £2 in 'tax' to the Society - the group claimed about 700 members, men, women and children.

In 1963 when the Haku adopted the Welfare policy of communal production the system of allocation of profits from copra to successive villages was not extended beyond the founding group. On the north coast each tsunono or 'report man' organised and marketed his group's production, set aside their tax (£2 for both the Welfare and the government), distributed petty cash according to immediate needs and deposited the balance in the Welfare 'bank' at Hahalis.

In 1964 a 'donation' system was instituted by which each village was required to contribute £100 twice a year. A general meeting was to select an appropriate village each time to receive £1000 with another £200 to be allotted to two sub-groups within the village. From this time on marketing was to be controlled by two 'agents', one each for the north and east coasts. The agent delivered the donations to Hahalis and either delivered the rest of the money to the villages or banked it if this was their wish. The office of 'spokesman' seems to have been formalised with the introduction of this system, to integrate communal production by the several tsunono and kin groups within

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1 About this time members of the Welfare completed their withdrawal from the Co-operative Society marketing system.
a village. The spokesmen apparently have considerable say in the distribution of cash among *tsunono* and even in the decision as to whether it should be distributed or banked.

In March 1965 the donation required of each of the 12 member-villages was changed to 10 bags of copra per month (probably = £230 p.a.). In 1966 the Society adopted the policy of moving spokesmen from their own village to supervise production in other villages. One or two Europeans saw this as a response to an allegedly increasing deviation from the rule against individual marketing of copra. However, I believe that the relevant development was not a trend away from communal production and distribution but a consolidation of a regional difference as a legitimate variation in communal production methods. In the case of north coast villages a distinction was set up between 'community funds', i.e. those destined for the Society, and 'village funds.' The cash held in each village fund seems to be controlled by the spokesmen to the exclusion of the *tsunono*. The interchange of spokesmen gives them the weight of central support as against local allegiances and ensures smoother interaction between the *tsunono* and the spokesmen whose role has eroded their hegemony in economic matters. The circulation also enables stricter controls to be exercised over the activities of successive spokesmen.

Not all cashcrop production is carried out communally. Many settlements have areas of coconuts set aside from which individuals may produce copra if they need ready cash. A spokesman may also occasionally authorise a local group to have a 'round' at harvesting an area which he designates and they share the proceeds. It is simply not true that there is 'no longer any semblance of individual ownership of anything among society members' (Hasluck 1962:2) or that Welfare members have 'organised a primitive version of the Chinese
They renounce private possessions, handing over everything they own to the society' (Willey 1965: 109).

Household arrangements remain essentially unchanged and all products for domestic consumption and use are the property of the householder, although it is true, as the Welfare themselves point out, that a Council member is better off for consumer goods, including clothing. One important source of ready cash which Welfare members have is wage earnings either from kin working elsewhere or from employment on a casual basis. By 1968 the major industrial development at Kieta and Panguna was attracting many young men and money which they brought back was of no interest to the Welfare.

Although small scale individual copra-harvesting is carried out I know of no development of new areas for private interest. Plantings are all a communal enterprise. One distinction which has been used when new groups became members of the Welfare was between coconuts already planted by individuals before entering the Society and palms which they had inherited. The latter category became the property of the Welfare. The distinction seems to be still operative as the reason for the preservation of some small groves as a source of individual cash income but it is not universally applied. Indeed the apparent flexibility of the system makes it difficult to make neat generalisations as to how small-scale individual enterprise is fitted in to the system. It is not seen by the Welfare as a threat to the methods of the community. More serious administratively is the occasional attempt by unauthorised individuals to market some of the copra produced by and for the community and pocket the money (see Appendix below).

1 A few tsunono have remained in the Welfare on the express condition that their commitment extend only to contributions to the 'donations' and their resources remain generally outside the communal production system.
I should make a distinction between community funds for which entries are recorded according to their origin and funds from the donations. These are monies which are divided up according to their destination. The community funds, which are of much larger proportions, are not committed for redistribution in the same way as the donations. From this revenue, derived from the general commitment of land and labour to the community, comes the money for ordinary expenditures by the Welfare.

In the period 1963-5 the Welfare operated a Bedford truck, two utility trucks and a station sedan. At least two of these were doubtful secondhand bargains and inadequate maintenance reduced their economic life. In 1968 the Welfare acquired a Holden utility and a Landrover in more satisfactory secondhand deals. By 1969 they had made payments on a new light tractor and were preparing to buy a light truck.

Their biggest single investment in equipment till then had been a timbermilling plant, acquired in 1967 but unused through 1968 because the Welfare lacked the technical expertise to operate it. Other equipment includes a small generating plant bought about 1965 and currently used to light the main store; a stencil-copying machine, two adding machines, taperecorders and several typewriters. Before 1965 some villages received 400 gal. water tanks and catchment iron but, as the Council found, these have a short useful life and none has been replaced by the Welfare.

In 1965 the Welfare Society was operating eight small trade stores scattered throughout its territory. About $4000 was invested in 1965 in construction of the store operated by the Welfare's company. More than

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1 The Council, having committed itself on a large scale to the provision of a water supply, has switched to much larger and stronger reservoirs.
$5000 was spent on iron and timber for six smaller stores in 1967-8. Three of these, at Lemankoa, Ielelina and Tahetahe, were in use when I left the field and the others were almost complete.

Apart from Teosin's house, which is used for meetings, the only other corporate structures currently maintained by the Welfare are two copra depots, a meeting 'chamber' and residence for the north coast chairman, both at Lemanmanu, and uncompleted dormitories for Baby Garden girls at Tegele.

At the start of each year the Welfare's economic activities are for a while given over to cashcrop sales to find money for fees, expenses and living allowances for students from the Society's membership. Another annual commitment of funds from communal production was to pay headtax on behalf of members until 1967 when headtax was dropped in readiness for the implementation of a tax on personal income.

Quite large sums have been spent in buying up Council members interests in disputed coconut plantations. In 1968 for instance almost $3000 of Welfare funds were invested in groves on the north coast and at Tahetahe. Once the palms are bought, the Welfare organises labour and all revenue from the copra goes direct to headquarters. About 1965 it also bought up a small plantation close to Kieta township. The Welfare also occasionally gives loans to individuals or lineages within the Buka Council who turn small areas over to the Society for copra production. Usually these people pay a membership fee to the Welfare while remaining in the Council.

I am not free to disclose here everything I learned about the finances of the Welfare. It is the one aspect of the Welfare's affairs on which open discussion is most severely inhibited even amongst members. Virtually nobody except at most the half-dozen people closest to Teosin has been kept informed of the overall state of
affairs. This, I can safely say, is not due to duplicity on Teosin's part and the few in the know are certainly not unhappy about the state of finances. The secrecy is maintained partly to forestall unrealistic evaluation of the situation by people if they learn the facts and to emphasise that there is a greater need for continuing industry than for simple reliance on the existence of the Welfare as a guarantee of prosperity. Far more, the knowledge of the overall situation is kept from the majority of members in order to prevent leaks to outsiders. It is felt that most members could be guaranteed to boast to Council people if they knew the facts.

Teosin realises that there is nothing that interests the kiaps more than the question of how much money the Welfare has and he is convinced that, armed with the knowledge, they could make renewed attempts to interfere in the Welfare's affairs. I told Teosin of the fact that before coming to live with the Welfare I was offered a bribe by a kiap to ascertain the state of its books and pass on the information.

I must emphasise that I have been talking about the overall finances of the Society and that the Welfare guarantees the right of individual villages or productive groups to have an accurate record of what they themselves have contributed to the Welfare's coffers. Indeed one of the most impressive things about the Welfare is the care it has taken to document the contributions made, being keenly aware of Kearei's failings as leader of the East Coast Buka Society.

The picture I have is very fragmentary, being based on comparison of partial and unverified perspectives of individuals. Even this information was received in return for solemn commitments to secrecy which I intend

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1 See for example Teosin's comments in concluding the meeting reported in the Appendix below.
to maintain. One of my concerns is that I should not create unnecessary suspicions among Welfare people that one or another of their fellows is a security risk, for I refused to press for information which I knew my informant felt might have this result.

I am aware of a few examples of carelessness and of human error in accounting but am sure these are not of serious proportions. I know of only one case of individual corruption - on the part of a minor official who ran up an individual account of several hundred dollars payable by the Welfare.

In 1963 or 1964 the Welfare made an ambitious attempt to organise a specialised division of labour between its villages on the east coast. There were at least three local groups set up, charged with the task either of cashcrop production, subsistence gardening or house construction (fishing was perhaps a notable omission). The scheme foundered, the leaders explained, because the transport system was inadequate. It was abandoned after the first subsistence crop. They added, with amusement, that the cashcropping group was further subdivided in order to carry the day in arguments with Council people about the ownership of coconuts. While one task force kept the opposition fully engaged in argument, another applied the Buka equivalent of the maxim that possession is nine points of the law.

The attempt to form all landholdings into 'one ground' to which all members of the Welfare had rights in common was one of the reforms towards which the Welfare has most consistently worked since the late 1950s. In 1966 three elements of the Welfare's program were described to me as areas of solid achievement, unlikely to cause dissent over fundamental policy issues. These were the formation of one ground, the Baby Garden and the Welfare's lotu.
Although it is agreed that rights to land are distributed equally throughout the Society, the tsunono have not entirely surrendered their former pre-eminent position in the control of land. Within most parishes it seems that tsunono readily assert - and receive recognition of - the rights ordinarily associated with their rank. Subsistence production is still carried out by traditional work groups. Although it is not so closely directed by the tsunono now that the corporate requirements of clubhouses are not the cardinal consideration, the distribution of usufructary rights largely follows from de facto recognition of the control of land by individual tsunono.

The concessions made by the tsunono involve the use of his land for planting permanent crops. He concedes to the spokesman, as the Welfare's representative, the right to use his land for cash crop development by the community. In line with the Welfare's advocacy of a new freedom of residential movement between member settlements or for those attracted into the Society from elsewhere (e.g. Nissan or migrant labourers), the community directed by the spokesman now includes individuals who either might nor normally be admitted by the tsunono or whose rights to cashcrops might otherwise be uncertain.

Clearly the powers of tsunono and of spokesman respectively must often require mutual adjustment but I am not aware of any cases of serious conflict. The spokesman every morning supervises the allocation of labour to community tasks and carefully records absences on days set aside for communal production. He has power of discretion in indicating which days are free for family subsistence production after reviewing recent contributions to community projects. He may also have to roster labour to assist on foodgardens for Teosin or the families of other leaders as required.
The leaders of the Welfare readily acknowledge a subsisting pattern of land distribution among tsunono within the Society. These rights are most often discussed during the formulation of plans to effect their legal transfer eventually to the Society, as represented by a company registered under the ordinance and consequently a recognised legal entity. The Welfare asserts a claim to all land from Hahalis to Ielelina inclusive. This has yet to be tested out, on the assumption that it will be upheld, the Society, much to the annoyance of Council villages, has proceeded with its plan to mark a continuous boundary between land held by its members and land held by Hagus villagers to the North and by the Solos people inland. Its ultimate plan is to form an uninterrupted tract of land held by the Society and occupied exclusively by its members and as a means to this end hope to persuade the Council people of Gogohe to exchange all of their land for that of the Welfare members at Sing to the South. The villages would then be physically interchanged and the southern boundary of the Welfare bloc drawn between Sing and Gogohe. The prospect of transferring rights over a consolidated territory to a legally recognised arm of the Welfare was a spur to the formation of a public company eventually registered in June 1966 as Hahalis Welfare Pty. Ltd. (H.W.P.L.).

In 1961 a government officer found that in January the Welfare had purchased £430 of trade goods for its store at Hahalis but within a month one-third of this stock had been given to members of the Welfare on credit - about 75 per cent of total turnover. His advice that it was essential to run the store as a separate venture from the Society, which then might be authorised to give cash loans, was apparently well received and was acted on. This was one of the moves leading to the eventual decision to form a registered company, formally independent of the Welfare Society but controlled by members within it.
One other important reason for wanting the company registered was that it made possible an affirmative response to the Welfare's request for a liquor trading licence, which was granted early 1967.

One of the more important reasons for dissatisfaction with cooperative societies had been the problems of marketing, with returns for copra especially uncertain because of very inferior transportation and storage facilities before shipment to the Copra Marketing Board in Rabaul. The Welfare gave its business first to one Chinese trader, then another but were intensely dissatisfied about the profits taken by these middlemen. Once the company began operations it began to buy copra direct from the Society's agents at a flat rate of 4d a pound and to ship the copra to Rabaul. It has since also begun to handle cocoa produced by Welfare members. It has not been altogether successful partly because of transport costs and partly because of uncertain management of the retail side of its affairs. It does not have the benefit of the services of some of the best managers in the Welfare Society, who have scrupulously avoided interference in what they think should be run as an entirely separate enterprise.

The initial share capital was $6000 contributed by 50 men from various villages of the Welfare. It is hoped that more share issues will be made once the staff and directors of the company have mastered the organisational skills necessary for expansion. There was however a serious contradiction of principle recognised by a large number of people who were not happy with the new enterprise. Some felt that it was against Welfare principles to have individual shareholders and beneficiaries of the enterprise. They objected to the fact that the great numbers of ordinary members who had built up the Welfare from its early days were excluded from financial interest in the H.W.P.L. Teosin and other leaders were presented with
a further political problem - apparently now resolved - when a number of tsunono objected that the Welfare would lose control if it became unnecessarily involved in the esoteric financial procedures of the Australian business world and that it would go the same way as cooperative societies if it submitted to the direction of outside agencies. There may have been a little truth in their prediction because, apparently due to an unnecessary failure in communication with their Rabaul solicitor, the H.W.P.L. ran afoul of company tax law in 1969.

A very different attempt at 'modernisation' was the Welfare's sexual revolution. This in part was inspired by a vision of what they believed to be desirable aspects of the Western way of life. The vision however was articulated in a distinctively indigenous ideology related to the felt needs of their own society. Many of the precepts are Christian but the effects of their literal translation into practice were not as anticipated by the Christian missions. The Welfare has never ceased to wonder why the priests should not have anticipated that the blacks would practice the essence of what the whites preached. The history of these attempts goes back to the 1930s when Pako practised Christianity in his own way.

In 1938 a number of headmen, luluais and tultuls of Hahalis and Hanahan were found to have instituted some sort of new sexual code. I have heard ten names mentioned including that of Saharia of Hanahan, the Paramount Luluai and Sawa who was then a Catholic Catechist. As the Europeans were told at the time and as the Welfare people believe still, Father (later Bishop) Wade had been urging that only a devout Catholic girl should be given in marriage to a devout man.

He realised that these arrangements would run counter to the traditional prescriptions, so it is said, and advised caution. One interpretation of Fr Wade's
suggestion, as told to me in 1968, is: 'If you see a
good Catholic man, tell him of the words of God, and
if you see that a woman is a good Catholic and tell her
too, then they should do God's work - that is copulate
and multiply.'

But, the story goes, the leaders ignored the
missionary's cautionary remarks and rushed headlong
into arranging unions without realising the implications.
Mission reports showed that some of the leaders addressed
much attention to the services at the Hahalis chapel.

However Patrick Soles, Teosin's father and
Catechist at Ielelina, advised the kiap of what was
taking place in the villages and the leaders were
summoned to Sohano. All except Sawa are said to have
been determined to say nothing but Sawa had no
hesitation in disclosing the details of their program
and claimed for it the patronage of the priest.

At least three and probably more were sentenced
to six months which they served at Kieta. Sawa himself,
according to Teosin says that he was not convicted but
elected to accompany the others to gaol as a gesture
of solidarity and humility - for his colleagues were
the most important tsunono of the two villages.

I have heard it said that the 1938 episode marked
the first successful assault on the ancient right of the
tsunono to be first to cohabit with the girl whose
marriage had been arranged with his sister's son. This
was cited to demonstrate that Sawa and the other tsunono
were attacking the norms which had hitherto obtained and
were advocating instead a totally Christian concept of
sexual morality which they had not appreciated before.
This implied that in a community of Christian people,
observing the moral laws against covetousness, jealousy,
hypocrisy and slander, a couple would be encouraged to
come together of their own free will, enjoy a meaningful
marriage and multiply.
But, Teosin says, 'while Sawa was starting this movement, the old priest who was [at Hanahan], Father Servant, said: "You must not demonstrate this from the Bible now, otherwise the people might be excited if we substitute the Bible's teaching or the gospel of Christ. Then the people will hear it, the sound will be different and the faith will be different. Otherwise they might not be able to follow the Church well."' For the Welfare believes that the priests had given direct support to the system of arranged marriage which was a product of colonial society, by introducing only the Catechism, which taught that a man should depend on the tsunono and his community to find his wife for him.

After the attempts to set up new sexual codes in 1938 at Hanahan and Hahalis, both villages again saw a general departure from conventional morality during the interregnum after the departure of the Australians and the effective establishment of the Japanese military regime. Hahalis and Hanahan were not the only places on Buka to experiment in this way.

It was not until 1959 that any concerted attempt was again made to introduce reforms and this was centred on Hahalis. Dates and places and details of the issues under debate at the time are hard to ascertain a decade after the event. However the first instance of a general discussion of the need for a new sexual order which is reasonably well attested was at the settlement of Koruats of Hahalis, where several headmen led the discussion. This was late in 1959.

There had certainly been earlier discussion, here and elsewhere on Buka, in which changes in sexual mores had been anticipated. This was in the wider context of debate about the likely effects of the introduction of a system of local government.

The Buka were in a good position to observe the Councils introduced in Rabaul several years before and
it is clear that very many of those who observed the system in operation among the Tolai drew a firm connection between, on the one hand, the imposition of taxes and fines for infringing Council rules and, on the other hand a high and increasing rate of prostitution seen on the Gazelle Peninsula.

The campaign for liberalisation of sex dated at least from the 1950s but the Baby Garden does not seem to have emerged as an institution until 1961. The name is the Welfare's own even though probably expressed in English originally for purposes of communication with outsiders. Properly speaking one girl is a Baby Garden, as is consistent with Buka concepts of reproduction. It is not so much that the seed is implanted in the womb by the man, for the womb itself (and umbilicus) is the element of continuity between one generation and the next - the woman is not the earth but the plant which requires activation and fertilisation through the act of copulation. It should also be noted that 'to garden' in Halia is tokui, which is also translated as 'work', of any kind. The Baby Garden, or any member of it, is also sometimes referred to as 'the fruit' or 'the tree of everlasting life' (u roei tara nitoatoa nitoa).

There are two grades through which a girl may pass before entering the Baby Garden. They are, first, tsihits, the threshold, entered at about the age of puberty. Here an effort is made to erode the girls' attachment to same-sex peer groups and to make them associate freely with boys without explicit sexual involvement. Second circula, the circle, in which the girls are given instruction in the general program of the Welfare, the meaning of the Baby Garden and the

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1 This is the spelling given when I asked for it. Pronounced sekoo'la.
physiology and hygiene of sex and maternity. While still completing their preliminary training — before the 'circle is closed' — the girls are given the choice of entering the Baby Garden or not. Few refuse according to Teosin. It is definitely only after 'graduating' that the girls may participate freely in sex with men.\(^1\) This is roughly in the late teens. Except for occasional visits of a few days to their parents and periods of domestic service at the household of Teosin or another tsunono, the girls are not often seen in public. Their quarters are in the bush behind the main Basbi settlement. Although they are separate institutions with their own instructresses, the tsihits and circula associate mostly with a fourth group set apart: the single girls who have conceived and borne children as Baby Garden and are not currently members of it.\(^2\) I have heard this group referred to as hunhaposa, denoting that, as members of a group, they have given birth together. The tsihits, circula and hunhaposa maintain gardens together.

Teosin occasionally addresses the circula and Hagai (who holds a medical certificate) formerly gave class-room instruction on sexual physiology. But Sawa Koratsi is the man who retains immediate control of both the Baby Garden and the associated institutions.

In earlier years especially the Baby Garden was referred to as the 'matrimonial club.'\(^1\) The term is rarely heard now but the concept is still one of the foremost reasons given for the institution: to bring young people together, freed of traditional restrictions

\(^1\) Teosin points to ignorance of the activities of circula as the cause of accusations from the kiaps that girls under the age of consent are procured for the Baby Garden.

\(^2\) Not infrequently girls entrust their mother with the daily care of an infant when it is old enough and return to the Baby Garden.
on sexual association, with a view to marriage freed of traditional controls and arrangements imposed by others.

Traditional valuables which change hands at marriage ceremonies are exchanged on terms of near equivalence. The kin of the two spouses matched each other's ceremonial currency (paiou) for length but the man's kin gave one piece longer than the rest, to establish their right to control and discipline the woman without interference. The number of paiou needed to accomplish the exchange has remained fairly constant, usually at between two and five since Parkinson wrote (1899:7).¹

However some inflation has occurred. Since the Second World War money has had a more important part in marriage transactions. On the day of the ceremony (polasa) at which the wife is brought to the man's settlement, his kin make individual payments to his affines - today ranging from a total of $50 to $100 - to cut short affinal avoidances.² I have heard the Welfare refer both to the fact that marriage had to await the availability of paiou and also to the formal establishment of the husband's right to maltreat his wife as objectionable practices that the Society has done away with. I have not heard them condemn the intrusion of money into marriage transactions although they deride recent attempts in the Council to establish a minimum amount of hundreds of dollars payable by non-Buka for Buka brides.

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¹ A similar number of fathoms of beroana shells may be included but only the paiou is vital. See Blackwood (1935:446f and Plate 67) for description of paiou and beroana (Buka's beroana seems to come from the Cartaret Islands, not New Britain etc. as Blackwood reports). The cash value has changed little since 1930.

² This is called 'getting rid of the tohu.' These are pandanus bark capes, used by affines to hide their faces (see Blackwood 1935:401-2).
The reasons given by the Welfare for establishing the Baby Garden give heavy emphasis to the right of free sexual congress as an end in itself and as a means to reasserting the possibility of a natural level of human fertility. They constantly assert that, in the past, by the time most marriages were consummated the woman's breasts had fallen and the man could grow a long beard, had been away to work and had probably been causing trouble in the village for years trying to sleep with girls who were not allowed to him.¹ Younger brothers especially are said to have been kept unmarried for a long time. I met with very few cases of girls in Council villages today passing their late teens without becoming pregnant to their husbands but it is true that very often full marriage ceremonies are arranged to marry a girl of about 15 by proxy to a youth expected to remain alone absent from Buka at work or school for a number of years.

There is a clear ideological emphasis on the role of the Baby Garden in restoring the right of the individual not only to enjoy sexual freedom but also to reproduce, which is the natural correlate of sexual maturity. This focus on the full enjoyment of individual capabilities, reflected in the authentic usage of 'Baby Garden' to refer to one girl instead of the institution, is nevertheless overlain with a concept of fertility in population terms. There is occasional mention of the need to 'fill up the land' and this has been given as an explanation of the function of the Baby Garden.

The Administrator of New Guinea on a visit to Buka after the war is said to have pointed out large areas of unused land to people of Ielelina. 'You have all this

¹ Blackwood (1935:Chapter III) describes a Selau system of betrothal of about 10 years and says that most girls sleep with their husbands 'at or before sexual maturity.' Neither practice seems to have obtained on Buka at least since the war.
land with no population. It is lying idle because you just make a few food gardens. Why don't you try a new kind of garden? This was how Col. Murray was quoted to me when I asked once for the origins of the term 'Baby Garden.' The Welfare recognise that, compared with areas like Rabaul, they have a surplus of land and that contact with whites resulted indirectly in periods of decline in population. Their concepts of economic development entail a fuller use of land resources. On the other hand, whereas I would have thought that, as long as labour intensive copra production continues to be the basis of development, expansion could not continue at the present rate without soon reaching a ceiling imposed by the supply of labour, Welfare leaders did not anticipate having to consider this a limitation in the foreseeable future.

In so far as there is a concern about numbers, this is not concern about shortage of labour. It reflects a 'populate or perish' attitude resulting from comparing Buka's meagre numbers with the world outside. For an independent country, it is felt, power is based on numbers. I think it would be a mistake for analysis to place too great an emphasis on a gross mechanistic function of the Baby Garden in 'filling up the land.' I heard the function referred to but once and read of one reference in the minutes of a meeting. Fertility, as discussed by Welfare leaders, was a correlate of the restoration of human freedom and a reversion to a 'natural' condition unimpaired by convention.

Welfare Society policies have made drastic inroads at other points of the traditional system. After the sexual revolution probably the next most notable change has been the abolition - or, more properly, indefinite suspension\(^1\) - of the competitive system of clubhouse

\(^1\) Although the possibility of a revival is by no means an issue of immediate concern to Welfare officials, several villagers reminded me that the clubhouses were only 'sleeping.'
construction and feasting. The withdrawal started on the
east coast in the late 1950s and was followed up by the
Haku when their villages became Welfare territory several
years later. The reasons for this policy are twofold.
First, the operation of the system was seen as the worst
possible drain on the human and material resources
required for economic development. Second, the concern
for status and self-assertion implicit in the clubhouse
system was singled out as the most consistent cause of
jealousy, dissension and sorcery in Buka communities in
the past.

Members of the Welfare today nevertheless very
often cooperate in ceremonies organised for clubhouses
of Council members and contribute significantly to the
feasting. Teosin himself regularly sends a pig or bag
of rice to one or another Council tsunono and receives
a share of the redistribution.

With the abolition of traditional marriage
arrangements, the Welfare has proscribed affinal
avoidance and this seems to be effective. They have
also dropped avoidance of crosscousins and say that
the relationship is no longer a bar to marriage.
Whereas a child is traditionally named by its mother's
kin, who use the term 'father of X' initially in
addressing their affine, a practice of inviting a person
to name one's child is increasingly to be observed in
Welfare villages and a feast is given for the person
giving the name.

Ceremonial currency is no longer in use for
transactions between Welfare members. Some are retained
by tsunono, either because they have a ritual significance
associated with their status or because, in spite of
Welfare policy, they are needed for instance when a
Welfare man takes a Council member as wife. On one
occasion about 1959 the people forming the Welfare
brought large numbers of paiou together for disposal
to members of other villages who wished to buy it. Pigs too are more freely available in Welfare villages today and Council tsunono often have recourse to them to meet their own commitments for feasting at their clubhouses.

The eradication of sorcery has been a special pre-occupation of the Welfare and in this their concern is shared by all other Buka. Like Pako 30 years earlier the Welfare leaders from the start have tried to get people to bring their spells, medicines and other techniques into the open. Teosin was prominent in these periodic campaigns, the last of which probably occurred about 1965. But at Teosin's insistence people were simply 'invited' to make all their magical techniques available for public scrutiny so that Welfare leaders could decide on their effectiveness or harmfulness. There was to be no search for anything concealed and no accusations leading to a witch hunt. There are some complaints today that the practice of voluntary exposure was not effective in eliminating sorcery because Teosin would not allow an inquisition into practices that were concealed.

In 1968 emotions ran high among the Haku and in the Hanahan district in the train of the work of Raki, a man from north Bougainville, hired at ever-escalating fees, to detect and eradicate 'poison.' He spent five weeks preparing to 'clean' Ketskets, Hagus and Hanahan and created considerable tension by poking at many strained relationships. Teosin and the younger leaders, in accordance with their own tactic within the Welfare, deplored the trouble created by Raki's inquisitorial methods and privately professed disbelief of the power he claimed to devine sorcery wherever it was hidden. Teosin originally refused Raki access to the Welfare

1 He left for Bougainville before making his final analysis.
villages in the district but relented lest the 'cleaned' villages accuse them of harbouring sorcery. His policy was also at odds with the belief many members shared with the Council people – that Raki just might have an answer to poison.

Teosin and Keali and others have been more direct in attempts to eradicate superstition and depose the demons which they claim exist only as beliefs perpetuated by the tsunono for their own ends. In years past they have demanded that tsunono demonstrate the alleged dangers of sacred places or of eating foods which are tabu. They also claim that their interest in investigating esoteric law and exploring hidden places regularly drew the accusation from Council members that there was a cargo cult afoot.

Such an aggressive and critical approach might give the impression that the younger men were intent on reducing the tsunono by exposing them. It is more true to say that Teosin especially was able to make this venture from a position of strength due to a basic mutual trust. Teosin himself has been made tsunono in a number of ways and one of the most important of these is that he has been singled out as the only person to share the kind of esoteric lore that each tsunono would normally impart to his heir apparent.2

A close watch is kept on Teosin's behaviour. He has firm views of his own about the need for a leader's behaviour to be dignified and modest if he is to earn the respect of others. The tsunono also have standards for Teosin which they police themselves. They will not allow him to take physical risks, for instance 'doubling'

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1 Ielelina was the only one searched by Raki before his departure.
2 Even tsunono who are not Welfare members are said to have called Teosin to their deathbed to hear the secrets they want to pass on.
on a bicycle, and strongly disapprove of frivolity and drunkenness. On one occasion when Teosin fell and slightly injured his leg when drunk, the tsunono, led by Sing villagers, performed a mime (katokato) and enforced hamal, which Teosin and his hosts had to expiate. The ceremonial feasting went on for days, spread over three weeks. Wherever he goes there is usually a small crowd of people with him, which includes his two or three guards,\(^1\) who are also rostered to watch his house at all hours. At home and on visits outside Basbi one or two girls are always in attendance in case he wants conversation or needs betel nut, water etc. They are the susuatakohele, 'carriers of [betel nut] basket', who traditionally attended to the personal comfort of important tsunono.

Teosin is surely one of the least mobile persons on Buka Island. His appearances at public occasions outside Welfare territory are few and far between. Whereas the average man his age would visit Buka Passage probably at least once every two weeks, Teosin made the trip four times in 1968, once for a meeting between Welfare and Council, once to attend a Supreme Court sitting, once to attend a farewell for the outgoing Council President and once to conduct business at Ieta. He might spend ten evenings a year at parties in other villages, usually on the east coast and usually Welfare. In 1968 he lived for two weeks at Ielelina and a week on the north coast and while he was there the village became the centre of all welfare activities. He visited half a dozen meetings in other villages on Welfare business but there were many other major meetings which he was content to leave to his lieutenants to handle and report on.

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\(^1\) Tson kahete. These single men spend a considerable amount of time drilling as a body. While a member of the squad a youth is instructed to consider the Baby Garden off-limits.
Unlike Sawa Koratsi, John Teosin displays none of the flamboyant traits which add up to the charismatic personality often attributed to leaders of similar social movements. It would be difficult to argue that he is a fine orator. His public speech is fluent but careful and measured, his voice rather quiet and high-pitched. Normally seated, he uses very few gestures or posturing to gain effect. Sawa is far more capable of an emotive harangue; his style in personal conversation is normally aggressive, using eyes, face and a commanding physical presence with effect. By comparison Teosin appears less assertive, almost diffident.

His performances give the general impression of being low-keyed. This has given rise to recurrent expressions of mild incredulity among whites. They cannot easily see the personal qualities which would give rise to the stature Teosin enjoys within the Society.

I agree with Mead that 'a movement, in contrast to a cult, makes very high demands on the qualities of intelligence and organisational talent in all those who undertake to program concrete change' (Mead 1965: 197). I make no pretense of impartiality in evaluating the personal traits of a man who became a close friend but I would argue that the Welfare found in Teosin a leader of unquestionably high intelligence, great imagination and moral integrity, an astute politician, in the better sense of the term, and a consummate diplomat. On the other hand I would not say he had the indubitable 'tremendous intellectual superiority' over his fellows that Mead attributes to Paliau of Manus. Given his outstanding, but not supreme, qualities he owes his supreme position to the popular character of his leadership, his sensitive cultivation of close relationshhips with a wide range of men who have had much to contribute to his performance in his role and to the overall direction of the Welfare. He seems to me also to have notable qualities of tolerance and sympathy.
which enable him to conscientiously sustain close ties with influential men with contributions to make but with personal qualities which Teosin himself does not regard highly.

Invidious distinctions are invited unnecessarily by the mention of names, but as Mead points out 'the ability of any gifted individual to exert leverage in a society...is partly a function of the exact composition of the group of those on whom he depends for day-to-day interaction and for the execution of his plans' (1965: 181). Although I had intended to investigate in detail the dialectic of the interaction between tsunono and 'educated boys' as two categories of leaders and innovators within the Welfare, I found it very difficult in fact to give an account of change which shows 'how the contributions of each of a group of individuals, each one fully specified, who together make up the unit of sociocultural micro-evolution, are combined to produce the evolutionarily significant innovation' (1965:187). I encountered distinct opposition to any attempt to break down the 'nuclear cluster' and isolate individuals who contributed inspirations (or obstructions) at specific points of time. There was no interest in showing how ideas belonged to individuals because the results achieved by the Welfare were a collective responsibility, not of the leadership but of the membership - 'olgeta man meri ol i bin formim miting wantaim, long tinktink na laik bilong ol.'

It is still possible to specify some early seminal relationships between Teosin and other leaders. Notable among the tsunono and elders were Marata, Rikaha and perhaps Pagus and Sigala of Ielelina and Hanahan and, at Hahalis, Koruats as well as Tsixin, Sangin and Sawa, although the personal relationship with the last three does not seem to have been quite so close as some of the others. Teosin's own father, Soles of Ielelina was clearly influential when the Welfare was emerging and
Masin of the same village although aged has exercised influence as the ranking Nabouin tsunono in the east coast Welfare. There were no doubt others amongst the tsunono but these were the most visible of Teosin's formative relationships as Welfare leader.

These and similar men have contributed much to the impetus to reform and Teosin has drawn on their determination and courage in guiding the Welfare through many crises. In emphasising the intellectual and moral contribution of the tsunono, I wish only to draw attention to the popular basis of the Welfare leadership and its debt to traditions of which the older men are at once guardians and critics.

This is not to say that the younger men, a little further removed from the power centres of the traditional way of life, have had only a minor role in determining the Welfare's direction. People like Keali, Hagai, Anton Hatobu and Mathias Makosi have been at the centre of the organisation since 1960 and Hamanu, Tulu and other Haku men with education have subsequently been a vital link between north and east coasts. The easier grasp of developing organisational skills which these younger men have, has been significant because it has been put to use in the pursuit of values shared with the elders, not imposed upon them.

Studies of charismatic leaders and prophets in Melanesia have suggested that these figures tend to be outsiders or marginal men, better able to articulate a message set against cultural tenets of the past or better able to overcome the particularism inherent in an atomistic and fragmented political order. In the case of the Welfare I would rather stress the role of the leader, Teosin in particular, as a vehicle for a message with strong elements of continuity with traditional values. The great strength of the structure
of communication between leader and follower derives from the persisting cultural homogeneity of the population and a common conceptual apparatus which provides meaning to ideas of change.

The only sense in which Teosin has played a significant role as a person of marginal status is the part he played in 1955-9 in relating and coordinating the groups which formed the Welfare in 1960. But at this time he was very much a 'manager' with little to contribute in the way of a distinctive ideological message of his own. It was only later that he helped significantly in articulating the message of a movement which had carried him with it.
Chapter 5

OPPOSITION AND REACTION

Davenport and Coker make the point that 'some factors cannot be overlooked or understressed' in the study of these social movements. One is that the movement has what may be termed an environment which it explicitly seeks to alter. This context also responds to the pressure of the social action generated by the movement.... Both the course of development of each cult manifestation and the tradition of the general movement will be determined by these contextual responses.' This is the model of operant conditioning which 'asserts that the course of development of a cult or tradition of cults is determined largely by the responses to it of the context in which it occurs' (1967:173). This applies not only to cults but to secular movements and although Davenport and Coker refer only to 'government responses... to activities that are either violent or classed as rebellious or seditious', the behaviour of those who do not join the movement and the stance adopted by missions are also usually vital elements of the context in which a movement such as the Welfare develops.

These authors also suggest that 'the cult or social movement is both an expression of cultural readaption or reintegration and an instrumental attempt (or transitional culture pattern) to reach goals that are clearly seen but are for the moment frustrated.' The differing emphasis given to the reintegrative or instrumental functions is said to be due partly to choices made by the analyst and partly to differences among movements themselves (ibid:123).

It may be already apparent that, for one or the other of these reasons, my account of the Welfare tends
to place greater importance on the instrumental aspect or at least ascribes greater significance to secular goal-directed behaviour and the reasons which actors give for their behaviour. Perhaps it follows naturally from this that I should give special consideration to the reaction of others to the Welfare's practices and proposals. The Welfare's program is not simply a search in a vacuum for a new and satisfying state of equilibrium in social and cultural systems. It has attempted to structure reforms in a way that has brought it into direct conflict with outsiders. The implementation of the reforms has meant a continuous struggle for power in the wider political context.

The 'operant conditioning' model proposed by Davenport and Coker perhaps ascribes more significance to the actions of agents in the political environment than I would intend. It is hardly true to say that the Welfare proposes and the wider society disposes. In spite of frustration, the Welfare has shown itself able to adapt itself to opposition, to recognise conflict in its situation and then consider appropriate courses of action.

In this chapter I consider opposition to the Welfare simply in order to put current aspirations of the Welfare in some sort of perspective. Schwartz (1962:378) makes a point which is significant here: whatever may be said concerning the part played by frustration or deprivation in leading to the formation of a movement, they are not in themselves sufficient causes or an adequate explanation; they must be placed within the context of the changes in culture towards which the movement is working, the goals which are the reference point for evaluating the present state at any time.

The reaction to the Welfare described here may serve to indicate some of the developing problems with
which the Welfare has had to concern itself. The account given in the preceding chapter has described the major crises resulting from stands taken by the Welfare and its forerunners and resulting in the formulation of new policies. To introduce a range of other issues over which the Welfare and others have differed, I will now provide a narrative of a sequence of events during 1968. This is a case study cited simply as an apt illustration. No attempt is made to separate data and commentary.

The first of these events was a day of ceremonies on 15 June at Basbi, organised by the Welfare and attended also by large numbers of Council people. The performance which took up most of the day can be referred to as kohi, a musical contest, in this case between eight teams representing various Welfare villages. The men of a team use bamboo panpipes, large and small, while the women provide a vocal obligato without words (men without pipes may join the women in singing). A team forms itself into two or more concentric rings (women never in the centre) which move slowly anticlockwise in time with the music, an ambling or plodding pace.

Each team has its own musical themes, each divided into three phases. Each team has a leader, tson eitu, 'man of the eitu', who is 'orchestra-leader' (tsen kukumakohi) and controls the two phases of the team’s magic. Normally 'constructive' magic is performed by each team before the singing to strengthen and inspire the pipeplayers. 'Destructive' magic may be performed during the competition to hamper other teams and lessen their endurance. The laurels of the contest go to the team with the most sustained power. The aim is to be the last to finish, usually after an all-night session. The ability to drown out one’s rivals is ultimately a function of volume and longwindedness. This is achieved
partly by magic and partly also by the quality of a team's music. A 'sweet' kohi team will supplement its numbers by attracting members from lesser teams.

The eitu is a long leafy cutting of the hakalaho tree wielded in the fashion of a banner by the team leader or a deputy. This type of tree is used in a variety of 'seducing' magical procedures but all that need concern us here are the facts of its supposed power to summon new members by its waving motion when held by the dancer and also its supposed power to overwhelm women so that they are open to any proposition made by the man of the eitu or, by extension, by any members of his team. This compliance is supposed to end abruptly and automatically once the night's performance is over.

Traditionally the occasion for kohi is the opening ceremony for a clubhouse. The construction - and associated feasting - according to carefully defined procedures was the essential overt index of the tsunono's progressive realisation of his legitimate political status and the index too of his current personal position relative to rival tsunono. The kohi musical competition occurred in the context of the rivalry between different clubhouse groups and Buka folklore treats physical brawling as the usual way in which the kohi competition was brought to a conclusion.

One primary goal of the ceremonies of 15 June was to make John Teosin tsunono on the occasion of the opening of a large new house built for him by the Welfare. (In tradition there is no intrinsic difference

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1 hakalaho means 'beckoning.'

2 kohi is the most loved of Buka musical forms even though tsigul, a livelier music set to words with percussion (see Plate 2), is more common and, to the European ear, more attractive rhythmically and harmonically (as many Buka realise).
between a tsunono's clubhouse and his personal residence.) The real innovation here is that Teosin was being installed, not as a typical tsunono commanding 50 people of his settlement or 200 of his parish but as tsunono of the Welfare Society with about 4000 members.

The second aim of the ceremonies - and Teosin's own initiative entered here - was to introduce modification of the kohi competition and to assess public reaction especially amongst tsunono, of Welfare and Council alike. Teosin was attempting also to eradicate the endemic bitterness of kohi competition and apparently also the mystique of night-long sexual promiscuity induced by the magic of eitu. The policy of the Welfare dictates that tsunono within the Society do not erect clubhouses for the time-being. The kohi of 15 June then represents the re-introduction of a form of festivity into a context which specifically excludes the political and ritual raison d'etre of the festivity.

At about 8 a.m. on the Saturday the first of the kohi teams made its ceremonial entry into Basbi, Teosin's hamlet. This was the Kiopan (Ielelina) matrilineal group (of Nabouin moiety) of which Teosin's deceased father was a member. Teosin is a member of the other moiety, Nakarib.

With them they carried a sapling of hakaloho and a type of taro which is the emblem of their group. These were planted at the rear of Teosin's new house. This was the first step in installing Teosin tsunono: it is appropriate that, in the installation of a Nakarib tsunono, the Nabouin should have a prominent role. This lends to the procedure the confirmation and authority of the Nabouin, which is regarded as the senior category. It is doubly important that the assumption of status by a tsunono should be validated
by an act of his father's group, especially if an important office is held by this group, as is the case with Kiopan. Masin Kiuts, a very old man who is the senior member of the Kiopan group is probably the most important tsunono in the Welfare on the east coast.

The kohi teams form other villages - essentially Welfare groups but with recruits in large numbers from the Council - followed Kiopan onto the dancing grounds and the performance continued, with several breaks for refreshments until about 3 p.m. There was an attendance of perhaps 2000 - well over half of them joining in the singing at some stage.

While some teams were still engaged in their kohi, the Kiopan people diverted their attention to the back of Teosin's house, which was adjacent to the dancing grounds. They had arranged for the Chairmen of each of the Welfare's two development committees, Joseph Hamanu and Michael Kiali, to climb the hakaloho tree that they had planted there, while they supported it. This is a symbolic representation of elevation. The Nabouin man, Hamanu, went up first and the Nakarib man, Kiali, followed.

Immediately after this a large number of men, I could not say who specifically, took hold of Teosin and carried him bodily up the 15-odd steps leading to the front door of his house. While this was taking place, up to 12 men and women of Teosin's lineage standing around the bottom of the house unfastened their laplaps and stood naked, wailing and crying.

The significance of this gesture is seen in the intense wish to disclaim, for themselves and for their kinsman who was the candidate, any arrogant, ambitious or malicious intention. High office can never be sought too openly or assumed too lightly because power and prestige invite the jealousy and malice of others. The sorcery of the rivals of the newly installed tsunono
can be directed either at him or his lineage. He and his office stand for the lineage and some of its members are his potential successors. There is a general and very real dread after the installation of a tsunono as I have seen elsewhere, in the Council area. The nudity in this instance was an act of self abasement - an assertion that they had no pride.

As soon as this happened, the crowd of over 100 which had gathered around the house made room for the three couples who were eventually to be convicted of indecent behaviour in public.

Lying on the ground, the six people, naked, simulated sexual intercourse. None of the men penetrated his partner and none had an erection. The action symbolised the origins of tsunono in general and of Teosin in particular - they are born, not made - or selfmade. In this connection the way the six paired is significant.

They were all members, by birth or marriage, of two adjoining hamlets of Hanahan two associated with the matrilineal group of Teosin.

Call the men A, B and C, the women X, Y and Z.

X and Y were both members of Teosin's (mother's) matrilineal group, which is Nakarib, Z is Nabouin.

1. X lay with A who is Nakarib too but is a member of the category which Teosin calls 'father'
2. Y lay with B who is Nabouin and is also a member of Teosin's father's matrilineal group
3. Z (Nabouin) lay with C, a Nakarib.

Teosin, several tsunono and A, B and C readily and clearly pointed out the distinctions and combinations among the six people. Nabouin and Nakarib are categories normally liable to come into conflict. A propitious

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1 The word used was katokato ('mime'). See above, p.47.
ritual undertaking must involve Nabouin – Nakarib and also paternal-maternal kin in cooperation. Each of the couples satisfies one of these requirements, the second satisfies both (as does the third probably though I am not certain of this). Matrilineal succession (and very often patrilineal inheritance of power) are the cardinal qualifications of any tsunono. The performance of 15 June affirmed that the birthright of all tsunono is based on these principles and has the auspices of these groupings.

By 20 June the Deputy District Commissioner (D.D.C.)\(^1\) at Hutjena had been told about the ceremony by one of his Buka staff who had witnessed it. That afternoon the DDC travelled to Hanahan where he happened to meet me, expressed his indignation at the performance, asked me if I thought that Teosin was responsible and said that he hoped to lay some sort of charge against the people concerned. The same afternoon he had a long interview with Councillor Ratsi and obtained from him the names of other Council witnesses. The DDC had told me of his intention to discuss the incident with the Welfare leaders at Hahalis but he returned to Hutjena, passing Hahalis, without doing so.

No discussion between the kiap and the Welfare took place until 14 October - a month after the trial.

On 21 June the new Council witnesses were collected by a government car and taken to Hutjena where they were interviewed by the DDC.

On 2 July leaders of the Council and Welfare met at Hutjena to discuss prospects of political unity on

\(^1\) The DDC in question had been in charge of Buka Subdistrict since March. He had previously been stationed at nearby Sohano for about two years and had had some contact with Buka people as an officer of District Administration and magistrate.
Buka. The meeting, though not the date, had been decided on at an inconclusive combined meeting on 7 May, the first such since 1966. Mathias, the Welfare secretary, and Francis Hagai pointed to the action of Cr. Ratsi, in 'reporting' the Welfare for practising a traditional ceremony, as but the most recent example of longstanding petty opposition between Welfare and Council, which was at odds with the purpose for which combined meetings were convened. This purpose according to the Welfare was to work towards mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence, ultimately to cooperation and even political unity. The Welfare's complaint drew almost no reaction from Councillors present at the meeting.

The following Friday a police car arrived at Hahalis to take the principals for interrogation at Hanahan patrol post. I followed in my car with several leaders of the Welfare. About 30 other Welfare people followed on foot and bicycle. A European Inspector of Police was at the house of the Patrol Officer, who was absent. The crowd of Welfare people, by now joined by about 15 Council people, assembled about 20 yards from the house.

About 3 o'clock John Teosin was the first to be summoned into the house and was told to take a seat near the Inspector. As soon as he was seated I knocked and entered the house and asked the Inspector if I could be present during the interview. After Teosin had been interviewed briefly in English, I tried to remain but was told by the Inspector that I would have to go.

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1 Ryan's account of this confrontation (1966:312-3) bears only the slightest resemblance to the tapes which I made of the meeting.

2 The European policeman was stationed at Rabaul. I do not know why police enquiries were not left in the hands of the local Inspector in charge of the Buka area, a Tolai man.
while others were questioned. Francis Hagai was allowed to stay to act as interpreter while a dozen people were called and interviewed on the steps of the house out of earshot of the crowd.

Interviews ceased at dusk. I spoke with the policeman as he was leaving and asked what charges were being laid. He said that he could not tell me yet but that there would possibly be none. He stated that he had been impressed by the consistency of the interviewees stories. Several Welfare leaders repeatedly tried to establish whether it had in fact been Cr. Ratsi who had made the first accusation against the Welfare but the policeman would not tell them. Their verbal attacks were directed exclusively at the Buka believed to have betrayed them and at the time the propriety of the action of police and kiap was not questioned.

The interrogation continued the next day at Hahalis. Before the policeman arrived at 10 a.m. (two hours late) I repeated to Teosin and Hagai that no official charges had yet been made and that the people had a right to refuse to make any statement unless they wished but Teosin insisted that there was nothing to hide. Hagai marshalled the people for interviews which the policemen insisted on conducting 50 yards from where Teosin and I were seated. The policeman asked Hagai why I was again present and whether I was helping his people. Hagai said that I was not interfering and was interested only in studying custom and daily life at Hahalis.

At 2 p.m. the Inspector asked Hagai to bring six of the interviewees (three men and three women) in the police car to Sohano, the police headquarters. At Hagai's insistence the trip was postponed till the morning of Monday, the next working day. In the meantime I further warned Hagai that his charges could rightfully refuse to sign any statement. On the Monday,
according to Hagai, they did decline to sign prepared statements and this angered the Inspector. The same day a preliminary hearing was begun and completed the next day, Tuesday 9 July. The six people were charged by the local court magistrate (another DDC) at Sohano for trial in the Supreme Court.

The six returned to Teosin's house the same morning and when I found them there at 5 p.m. they said that they did not know the nature of the charge. The next day, at Sohano, the presiding magistrate outlined the charge to me and added that there was a chance of acquittal if the offending performance was in fact customary. That night at Teosin's house in Ielelina (his father's village where he had been spending most of his time the previous week) a number of tsunono assembled suddenly for a meeting (to which I was not invited).

By the time I arrived at Ielelina next morning (11 July - two days after the charges were laid) Teosin had visited Hagus village to ask his matrilineal kinsmen to evict Cr. Ratsi. According to all reports Ratsi had run away when he heard that Teosin was on his way. The landowners present consented to Teosin's suggestion but were later overridden by an important tsunono in the settlement. The landowners were also to some

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1 Ratsi's land is at Ketskets village (Hagus-Ketskets is his electorate) but he continues to live in the village of his deceased father who was tsunono of the clubhouse owned by the branch of Teosin's matrilineal group at Hagus.

2 There is a dual clubhouse in the settlement. The clubhouse of this tsunono is amalgamated with the landowners' clubhouse (Ratsi's father's) the successor to which will be the child of a Welfare couple living at Hahalis. There is a longstanding conflict between the tsunono and the landowners mentioned.
extent bound by the wishes of their late tsunono who had said that his son must continue to live with them after his death but they would happily have stood by if Teosin could force Ratsi to leave.

From what I heard at Ielelina that day it is clear that Teosin had initially come under criticism for not having identified himself more with the six accused or given some overt sign of responsibility for them. But it was also clear that the meeting of headmen had ultimately decided that responsibility lay not only with the President but also with themselves and with all other members. It was proposed that all men and women of the Welfare should march with the accused to the Supreme Court and present themselves for trial.

The same afternoon I attended a feast for the opening of a new house by a Council member at Hanahan. Teosin was invited (together with ten other Welfare leaders) and given the place of honour. An important Hanahan headman decried the legal proceedings and identified himself with Teosin. Seated around the table, the chief of Hanahan and a tsunono (both Council members) called as witnesses at the preliminary hearing told Teosin they were ashamed that Council people had caused trouble about the ceremony. ¹

A number of points concerning the pattern of communication emerge. At no point after the interview of their first witness did the prosecution, as coordinated by the DDC, consult or question any members of the Welfare. None of the Council members attending the ceremony had at that time anticipated any charges being laid against the performers. On the contrary their leaders had collectively declared their support

¹ The party later at night was marred by a drunken brawl among half a dozen men hurling anti-Welfare/anti-Council insults.
for the renewal of this type of ceremonial performance. The DDC initiated contacts with all witnesses. Some gave evidence willingly against the Welfare whereas others claimed to do so only reluctantly, feeling obliged to follow the kiap's wishes. The Welfare nevertheless believed, at least until official charges were laid, that the entire responsibility for the conflict lay with members of the Council. In spite of this no effort at all was made by the Welfare to interfere with the flow or direction of communication from Council members to the DDC. The attempted specific act of reprisal at Hagus was intended to demonstrate a degree of commitment - an exchange in which the DDC's opinions were not of account. The central point of Welfare policy at the time was for mass confrontation at the time of the trial.

On 12 July after a Council meeting at Hutjena Cr. Ratsi told me that he did not believe the ceremony was traditional but appeared generally amused by it. He conceded that at Basbi after the performance he had said no trouble should come of the ceremony. He did not know whether he would move from his house at Hagus but asked me to tell Teosin that he would like to cook a pig later to atone for the trouble he had caused. (The offer was repeated on 20 September, after the trial.)

Up to this time the DDC had declined to discuss the prosecution of the case with me because he thought it improper to do so before the trial and by the manner of his refusal made it clear that he considered me a supporter of the defendants. After the charges had been laid however the one comment he did make was that it was clear that one of the couples among the defendants were brother and sister to each other and that the prosecution would establish the 'incestuous' relationship in court. As it turned out they made no
such attempt - and the allegation was in fact false, as I suggested to the DDC on that occasion.

Late in August I was notified by the Public Solicitor that he would represent the six Welfare members and I was asked to appear as an expert witness. The lawyer who took the case had gained the impression that the Crown Law Office intended to support its case with an attack on the actions of the Welfare Society since its formation but this did not eventuate. A Justice of the Supreme Court held sittings in Administration Offices at Sohano in the second week of September. The case of Tabuta Nosei and others, the Welfare members, was heard on 12-13 September. Cr. Ratsi, the Lomanmanu chief (for whom a similar ceremony is said to have been performed) and another Council member from Ieta were the main prosecution witnesses. The defense based its case on the newly introduced Native Customs Recognition Ordinance ¹ but Mr Justice Frost, while accepting the argument that the practice was customary, found against the accused because the recognition of the custom was not in accordance with public policy, a requirement of the Ordinance. The six were convicted of indecent behaviour in public. Because the behaviour was customary, they were sentenced only to the rising of the court (a few minutes later) but were admonished that today's community found the custom distasteful and were warned that a repetition would bring a much heavier sentence.

The DDC who had set the legal proceedings in motion expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the trial and several times within the next week extended invitations to the Welfare leaders to discuss the verdict with him once they had had time to consider it properly.

¹ The defense managed to have the three women appear in court bare-breasted. The Court at first observed that they were not properly dressed but accepted this as customary practice.
The Welfare's immediate reaction to the verdict was quiet. Teosin said that he thought it was not too bad; other Welfare leaders present at the trial reacted with relief and happily shook hands with those released at the rising of the court on the Friday afternoon.

I was unable to see any of the leaders until the following Tuesday when I noticed a marked change in their behaviour. Their obvious dissatisfaction seems to reflect the tenor of a meeting convened by Ielelina and Hahalis tsunono on the Monday. It was the headmen who first strongly adopted the anti-verdict position and had no trouble convincing Teosin and the younger leaders that something should be done about it. On Wednesday (16) Teosin and Keali strongly expressed the opinion that a policy of abolishing the custom without introducing a substitute was not good enough. They said that they would call for a meeting of the Welfare with the government and judiciary, from Australia if necessary to work out a compromise.

It was then that I told them of the defending counsel's opinion expressed to me before the trial, that, if convicted, the defendants should appeal to the Australian High Court.

Everyone present seized on this without hesitation. My warnings that an appeal might get them nowhere made no difference at all to their determination to proceed along these lines. Nor were they put off by the prospect of possibly expensive legal costs (I cited a sum of possibly $1000 or more as a guess). They insisted that legal proceedings were first priority and that if they were expensive they would make economic sacrifices elsewhere. I then offered to contact the Public Solicitor to make enquiries on their behalf and they urged me to do so.¹

¹ (Footnote on next page)
I also expressed the wish to make a wider survey of the incidence of the custom and opinions about it. The next day (19 September) I accompanied Teosin to Lemanmanu on the North Coast where, it was said, the tradition is stronger than elsewhere on Buka. Teosin chaired a meeting attended by members of the Welfare and Council. All were agreed that the ritual was customary and heard detailed evidence from both Welfare and Council people on half a dozen instances of the performance of this and related rituals.

The following Monday (23 September) a second similar meeting was held on the North Coast which I was unable to attend. It seems that it was decided that the Welfare should make enquiries throughout Buka to find whether everyone acknowledged the custom as theirs and seek opinions as to possible courses of action.

On 4 October a meeting of the Welfare's East Coast Development Committee was held at Hahalis. The proposed survey did not come up for discussion.

On the evening of 7 October Teosin received an urgent call to attend a meeting at Lemanmanu on the north coast. He went the next day and the headmen there who had called the meeting asked for a report on what was being done to find evidence about the custom elsewhere on Buka. Teosin told me later that he had been taken by surprise by the sense of urgency expressed by the tsunono. They urged that six men be sent out on the survey immediately.

On 8 October three prominent headmen left for north Bougainville where they contacted a non-Council

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1 In later communication the Public Solicitor in 1969 stated that he had formed the opinion that success in an appeal to the High Court would be unlikely and felt that it would be possible for the Buka to retain the ceremony intact while taking precautions that there was no infringement of law.
group with fairly close ties with the Welfare and spent two days discussing this and other issues.

At a general meeting of the Welfare on 11 October two teams of investigators were chosen and their itinerary fixed to cover the Buka west coast and Nissan Island, north of Buka. At the Lemanmanu meeting of 8 October a three point agenda for all meetings on tour was foreshadowed and this was finalised at the general meeting. The points were:

1. Long painim aut sapos ol pipol i gat sampela kain tinktink long old custom i mas senis o sampela idea at all about Buka custom. Na wanem samting ol i tink nau na wanem samting ol i tinktink long tain i kam o future.
3. Long askim sapos ol i kan mekim kamap wanpela Parents' Association na takis long 10 dollars long wanpela wanpela man.

Even before the trial Teosin, in emphasising the important function of the ritual, had spoken in general terms of finding a compromise solution. He was considering the possibility of doing away with the 'dirty part' of the tradition and substituting something more acceptable under modern conditions. He spoke of finding a flag analogous to the Queen's flag which symbolises the power of her government when flown at Administration stations. He wanted something for use

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1. To find out any opinions people might have as to whether old custom should change or any thoughts at all about Buka custom. To find out not only what they think about the present but also what they think about the future.
2. To ask how people regard the common interests of Buka Island and the cooperation of all people of Buka, Council and Welfare alike.
3. To ask if they would form a Parents' Association with individual shares of 10 dollars.
within the villages to represent the authority of the tsunono who were the mainstay of social order at the local level.

Clearly he was troubled by the self-imposed task of discovering a suitable symbolic representation. One possibility he touched on was a moving film of the performance. There was moreover a latent conflict between the attitudes of the younger leaders and the tsunono in this situation. Sawa told me in no uncertain terms that the older people would on no account give up their custom (this was in Teosin's presence) and that he was not going to stand by and let Teosin do away with it. More than one of the other influential younger leaders, on the other hand, in the debate about independence going on at the same time, gave at least a passing thought to the possibility of finding a substitute not simply for the ritual, but for the local authority of the tsunono. But this was not said too loud and the emphasis was very much on gradualism.

The critical issue was seen by the Welfare to be the threat to the system of authority upon which the social order of the villages depended. As Teosin said, in Council and Welfare villages alike, the 'feeling for the tsunono is dominant in the villagers' thinking.' Teosin also summed up the situation at this time: 'This sort of life is hard. People don't know which way to look any more. The old customs have hidden themselves a long way off and the white man's law is the same. We sit here between the two of them. And while we sit, custom sneaks up, hits us and is off again. Then before we know it the law rushes up for a quick blow and has disappeared in its turn. We look and look but see nothing.'

Teosin told me that he found it difficult to convey and explain to me the depth of feeling with which the people of the Welfare approached the issue
of changing this custom. Likewise I find it difficult to set out here a convincing account of the intense concern of which I had personal impressions in discussions with Welfare leaders.

These, for instance, were the only occasions when I found Teosin genuinely anxious and the first occasion after six months' regular contact on which he abandoned a certain formal reserve towards me and unburdened himself.

As for the court decision, said the leaders, it benefitted no one. The six Welfare members were convicted and reprimanded but they were not punished. Justice Frost did not teach them anything. The main prosecution witness, Ratsi, was shown up as liar and perjurer \(^1\) but was not punished. The court found against him on the question of custom and it was established that he was a trouble-maker but he was taught nothing. The Welfare claim that the people see all this happening without rhyme or reason. The people think that the function of law should be correction. The law, they say, must propose courses of action to benefit — and to be approved by — the community as a whole. Yet the court simply condemned without proposing an equally acceptable alternative.

The three point agenda formulated by the Welfare requires a brief explanation. The relation between them is complex and needs to be understood in the context of the controversy over the independence referendum proposed in 1968. The points were formulated two weeks after Donatus Mola, the Member for N.Bougainville, had returned from the sitting of the House of Assembly and begun touring Buka and Nissan explaining and assessing reaction to the

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\(^1\) The Court made special note of contradictions in his testimony and his unreliability as a witness.
referendum proposal. Though an implacable enemy of the Welfare, Mola — for other political reasons — frequently and publicly 'credited' the Welfare with originating local agitation for independence. The Welfare considered this an oversimplification but generally endorsed the referendum proposal while holding that Mola and his colleagues (Lue and Lapun) were advocating independence in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons.

Briefly the usual way of interpreting the three points' meaning in this context was:

1. Do we want to keep our traditions and this custom in particular. Do white men have the right to order us to do away with it.

2. Has Buka reached the stage where it can put aside internal dissension — a stage which must have been reached before independence can be thought of.

3. Money is the basis of national power and talk of independence without selfhelp and grassroots economic preparation is senseless. Council and Welfare must combine to establish a 'development fund' to benefit village level economy.

The term 'parents' association' derives from the interpretation - not presented without some unspoken misgivings¹ - of the two organisations as a married couple...the Council = male, being concerned with regulations and systems of authority; the Welfare = female, concerned with productivity and (economic) fertility.

It is ironic that the Welfare, which saw itself as acting in a more practical, moderate and responsible way than the parliamentarian sponsors of the independence

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¹ When the term was first proposed, some leaders pointed out that, although they would let it stand, the usage seemed to imply that the Welfare had no confidence in itself as an administrative body the equal of the Council.
referendum, was supposed, by the kiaps at least, to have in mind a barefaced confidence trick to get money from non-Welfare people to feather the Welfare's own nest.

The members of several Welfare villages had amassed thousands of dollars themselves by October for contribution to the Association. While on tour in other areas the Welfare simply proposed the plan for consideration and refused to accept donations on the spot. In practice it seems that the second and third points were discussed as one at all meetings. The proposal for something like a parents' association was not new. Teosin had held meetings in March and April 1968 in three Council areas on the N. and N.E. coasts, proposing a similar collection. His plans came to little at the time because of swift government condemnation. The Welfare's own economic energies were less heavily committed in October; this and the talk of independence at that time provided the context in which proposals for a joint enterprise involving Welfare and Council together could be revived.

The government's attitude is shown from the roneoed circular which the District Commissioner, on advice from the Buka kiap, had issued on 11 March 1968:
1. The government has not given power or authority to any society to collect money....The government has certainly not done this. If any man comes to try to trick you out of your money, you must beware...
2. When somebody wants to hold a meeting [in the Council area], if the Councillor and the people are not in favour of it, then he may not hold any discussion. 3. The government does not approve of any man collecting money without good reason...he must explain himself first to the [District] office. 1

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1  Gavaman i no gipim powa or licence long wanpela society long kisim moni....Nogat tru. Sapos wanpela man i kam long yu na i grisim yupela long moni, bai yu mas lukaut (continued next page)
Upon his return from a trip to the District H.Q. at Kieta the DDC told me that he thought the time was now right to hold a discussion about the trial with the Welfare and told me to tell Teosin that he would visit him at Hahalis in a week's time. He went to Hahalis on 9 October (two days before the general meeting) but found that Teosin was 'not available.' The discussion was arranged for the following Monday (14 October) when the 3-point agenda was presented for comment.

The DDC tacitly accepted (or pretended to accept) the ceremony as customary but maintained that 'obscene' customs must be left behind in this day and age. (He likened the ceremony to a practice of the Southern Highlands - where he was stationed before - of publicly inserting a hot stone in the vulva of an adulterous woman.) He was not to be impressed by the desultory efforts of the Welfare to explain the functional importance of the ceremony.

He was clearly taken aback by the third point of the agenda. His immediate reaction was cynical amusement but told them that the government would not stop the Welfare trying to collect money, adding that he thought that they would find no one willing to part with their cash for the scheme.

With grudging 'official' approval the first team of six set out on 16 October on a week's tour of the Buka west coast and Solos (interior) area. I accompanied the other team of three to meetings at two east coast Council villages (17-18 October) and to Nissan Island (21-29 October).

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1(continued) gut....2. Sipos man i laik wokim meeting [long ples bilong Council]...sipos Councillor na pipol i no laik, orait em i no inap gerapim toktok. 3. Gavaman i no orait long man i kisim nating moni long ol pipol...em i mas stretim toktok bilong en long opis pastaim.
Further meetings were held at Hagus (31 October - the same day the Councillor of Tohatsi-Kotopaun refused to allow the Welfare to hold a meeting there), Lonahan and Malasang (23-24 October) Taiof Island (4 November - when Saposa Island rejected a meeting) and the Selau Peninsula of N.Bougainville (4 and 5 November).

A summary of the minutes of all these meetings was presented at a meeting at Hahalis on 9 November. The Welfare spent $600 on the expenses of the people conducting the meetings (including air fares to Nissan). The opinions about custom ascertained at the meetings were summarised:

East coast: vigorous affirmation that the Hahalis ritual was part of a viable cultural heritage common to all Buka.
West coast: affirmation that it was customary in the past in this area - more frequent expression of genuine ignorance about the custom on part of the generation who have not witnessed it.
Solos: more than elsewhere the feeling expressed here was that the progressive (coastal) people were only doing their duty in consulting other Buka before considering the possibility of change in the custom. N.Bougainville (the non-Council population at least): the real seat of the custom is here - 'the Buka Islanders don't really know what the custom is about. They only play with it' (i.e. don't perform the full ritual syndrome) and 'if they're going to try to tamper with it, they will be playing with fire.'
Nissan: it was noted that cultural differences appeared to be of such proportions that the apparent lack of comprehension of the Welfare's account of the Buka custom was probably genuine.

During the survey there seems to have been no general attempt to discuss the white's interference with custom which the Welfare discussed among themselves.
Rather it was assumed that the important decision rested with the Welfare, which had the immediate choice of standing firm or agreeing to abandon the custom.

At about the same time the DDC conducted a few enquiries of his own and, as he told me, found nobody who would admit that the Basbi performance was in any way related to Buka custom. His doubts were confirmed by Donatus Mola, M.H.A., who consistently regarded the Welfare's action as an aberration.¹

General approval in principle — without commitment — was reported from the villages in which the Welfare representatives proposed a cash collection. There were exceptions at the villages which refused them meetings, including some of Nissan, and some of the west Buka people rejected the proposal when it was raised.

Some Catholic missionaries had been upset by the result of the court case and criticised the government because the Welfare got off the hook without punishment. As I learned later some of their hostility was directed at me for defending the Welfare in court and this was intensified when I was associated with the Welfare in its new campaign after the trial.

The Welfare's intention to send a delegation to Nissan in October had been well known to the kiaps. When Donatus Mola learnt of it he sent a letter to a friend at Tungel mission station and this was passed on to the priest. Mola advised that the people of Nissan should not listen to anything the Welfare said and should refuse to give any money to them. The letter was left open in a conspicuous place where we could easily find it when we slept overnight in a house at

¹ Mola has gone on record in public meetings as an advocate of the total abolition of Buka custom, which does not mix well with a western way of life.
Ietsibol village. It had reached Nissan a few days before our arrival and a Sister from Tungel mission had driven at least part of the way around the island carrying Mola's message.

A priest from Sigon mission station who was at the airstrip when we arrived refused us transportation even after we had offered to pay, with the pretext that the road was bad although his truck was empty. Again the next day as we were walking between villages he pointedly passed us on the road without offering a lift. Finally when one of the Welfare men encountered the Sister near the airstrip on the day of our departure she asked 'what sort of masta' was he travelling with, who slept in the villages instead of making himself known to the mission and asking them for hospitality.

Petulant though I thought the missionaries' behaviour at Nissan, it was only after returning to Buka that I learnt the extent of my guilt by association with the Welfare that was currently talked about by missionaries there. At the end of October I was told that this criticism was general and was accused by one of encouraging the unnatural sexual practices of the Welfare and of assisting it in the spread of communism. On behalf of myself and the Welfare I insisted that the remark be withdrawn. It became apparent that even my living at Hahalis was considered reprehensible and the kiap told me that the regular complaints which had come to him from the mission since my arrival reached a new level of intensity at this time.

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1 As white residents of New Guinea would recognise, this behaviour is noticeably deviant from the norms of inter-white relationships, especially in areas such as Nissan where whites are few in numbers.

2 I should note that one priest, at least, indicated to me that he dissociated himself with some of the criticism which he thought excessive.
On 30 October Joseph Lue, the Bougainville Regional member in the House of Assembly, visited Basbi during a tour of Buka and was told that the Welfare supported the proposal for a referendum on Bougainville independence. The Welfare also informed him of the proposed Parents' Association which had already drawn criticism. Lue gave a clear indication that he would support the Association's aims and expressed sympathy with Teosin for unwarranted attacks on the Welfare, even making a veiled reference to an occasion when he had intervened to stop the District Commissioner 'putting finish' to the Welfare. Within 24 hours Lue had told a meeting at Gogohe that they should have nothing to do with the Parents' Association and should ignore the Welfare.

Several Welfare leaders and I went to Lemankoa on 5 November, where Lue was staying as the guest of Mola, to discuss the attacks which both members had made on the Welfare. Lue could not be found but Mola admitted that at the time of the Welfare's survey of west Buka and Nissan he had sent messages ahead warning the people that they should have nothing to do with Welfare proposals. He claimed that he had known nothing of the reasons for the proposed collection of money and had feared that it would conflict with proposed collections for a 'Bougainville landholders' fund', which Mola sponsored to help blacks in their contest with Conzinc Riotinto over land.

When we spoke to Mola on 5 November he clearly stated that, now that he had heard of the details of the proposed Parents' Association, he commended the plan in principle and gave what I thought was a firm undertaking to support it at the forthcoming Local Government Council meeting. This was held three days later and was attended by Welfare observers but the issue was not raised.

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1 Lue is a Catholic from south Bougainville.
Instead Mola took up an attack on me, launched by his close associate Balai, and suggested that the 'book' I was writing would be full of lies told to me by the Welfare. He wanted it to include the truth, which was the Council members' version. I replied that I hoped I had some skill in checking statements against evidence and invited him or anyone else to identify and correct any fallacies they thought I might be perpetuating. I pointed out that I had lived both in Council and in Welfare villages for similar periods and, as it was important that my work benefit from as wide a range of evidence as possible, I would be pleased if Council members continued to feel free to enlighten me on whatever subject they wished. There was no more debate and no Councillors subsequently took up my invitation. Mola claimed some months later that what he had had in mind was my acceptance of allegedly false claims that the ceremony at Basbi on 15 June was something more than another bit of perversity invented by the Welfare.

On 10 November a second expedition to Lemankoa finally tracked Lue down at a house he was sharing on the beach. As I felt that he was even less keen to see me than my companions, I stood apart while the Welfare leaders opened discussion but joined in when conversation became heated with an attack by Lue on the immorality of the Baby Garden. The Welfare finally shrugged this off and put it to Lue that he had lied to them by saying that he would not oppose the Association. He then claimed that it was illegal to make such collections of money and I challenged him to cite the law under which the action would be punished. In an attack which was no doubt gratuitiously offensive, I accused him of being manoeuvred into having to act as a mouthpiece for an opposition which the kiaps did not care to express openly themselves.

Shortly afterwards Lue returned to Moresby for a sitting of the House and, according to a Buka kiap
on an official visit there, 'knocked on a lot of important doors' in the Administration to get something done about me.

In the House of Assembly on 29 November the following question1 was asked by Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) who had never met me and, to my knowledge, had not visited Buka or north Bougainville during the year.

Mr Paul Lapun asked the Director of District Administration - (1) What right has Mr Max Rimoldi to live among the members of the Hahalis Welfare Society, on Buka Island, as their adviser? (2) Is it a fact that Mr Rimoldi's presence has caused a lot of dissatisfaction among the local government councillors on Buka and in the Bougainville District as a whole? (3) Is it a fact that the people wish Mr Rimoldi to be immediately removed from the Territory? (4) Will Mr Rimoldi's continued presence on Buka imply that the Administration favours the Hahalis Movement?

Mr Ellis - the answer to the Honourable Member's question is as follows: (1) Mr Rimoldi is a research student with the Australian National University and has permission to undertake research work in the Territory. He also has the permission of the Hahalis people to live and work in their area. (2) I understand that some of the Councillors of the Buka L.G.C. have criticized Mr Rimoldi for his apparent support of the Hahalis people. I know of no such reaction from other parts of the Bougainville District. (3) I have not heard that the people wish Mr Rimoldi to be immediately removed from the Territory. (4) The Administration has agreed that Mr Rimoldi undertake research in the area but does not support him in any other way.

Supplementary Question. Research Student - Buka Island. Mr Ebia Olewale, by leave, asked the Director of District Administration - What is this man's official status and what does he do? Is he a District Administration officer, or what? Mr Ellis - In reply to the Honourable member, Mr Rimoldi is a Lecturer in Anthropology in the A.N.U. He has no connection with the Administration whatsoever. He is a visiting Lecturer and to the best of my knowledge he is at Hahalis at the invitation of the Hahalis people themselves.

1 Question No.1136, House of Assembly Debates II, No.3, p.801. The question was reported in the ABC Territory news and again, on Radio Bougainville, a few days later.
A combined meeting of Welfare and Council representatives, proposed at the previous meeting in July, was finally convened at Basbi in November. Discussion of the proposed collection for the Parents' Association dominated the meeting but was inconclusive. The kiap stated approval of the idea of cooperation between the two groups but warned that, unless the Welfare could specify a project instead of simply proposing capital accumulation, he and others must question their motives in collecting cash. Councillors said that cooperation might be possible if, and only if, the funds were collected and controlled by a white man.

The Welfare argued the impossibility of naming particular economic objectives until the range of participation was established and a genuine desire for cooperation confirmed. They agreed to a tentative plan for a savings-and-loan scheme similar to, but outside, the Societies run by the whites for, against the Councillors, they argued very insistently that the main point of such preparation for independence was to develop a self-reliant, disciplined and united organisation without any dependence relationship with the whites. They could however agree that the Association's accounts should be open at all times to inspection by the kiaps. The Councillors claimed that they could not give assent unless the decision was considered by a regular Council meeting. This was not attempted before I left the field.

The kiap later revealed that he feared that the money the Welfare planned to collect would be used in an attempt to establish some sort of independence of the government. It was also felt that cooperation by the Council would mean conceding a moral victory

This was the first time the Welfare had dared to suggest that the two groups confer within Welfare territory.
to the Welfare who initiated the scheme. The kiap told me that late in the year he was continually visited by Council members considering contributions to the Association but seeking his prior approval.

During this time the behaviour of ordinary Council members contrasted markedly with that of the Councillors. A wide range privately expressed their interest in the Association and many in fact made contributions which were carefully documented and receipted. This was the situation when I left the field. Within a few months Mola's opposition bore fruit when, by developing the threat of legal action (apparently encouraged by the kiap), he enforced the return of money the Welfare had collected on north Bougainville.

I will now turn from the narrative of the 1968 case to consider reactions to the Welfare over a longer period.

In 1968 the antagonisms between Welfare and Council members were not as marked as they had been five years previously, when they featured in daily interaction between the two camps. At that time Welfare visitors were chased out if they tried to get water from tanks supplied to Council villages. The Welfare on the other hand regarded its vehicles as sacrosanct and on no account would their drivers carry Council members.

1963 saw the peak of the conflicts between Welfare and non-Welfare over land and cashcrops. This was triggered by the Welfare's increased implementation of the policy of communal production especially on the north coast. There and at places like Hanahan and Gogohe, the ordinary issues about true versus factitious matrilineal kinship, rights to resources controlled by patrilateral kin and about the relative power of various
tsunono became causes of increased contention. This was because corporate matrilineal groups, initially the basic units of communal production, were very often internally divided between Welfare and non-adherents. The minority pro-Council population among the Haku is quite scattered. Disputes arose about the Welfare's alleged attempts to enforce participation in communal production and about rights to plant or harvest particular areas.

A critical court case in mid-1963 centred on the right of Balai of Lemankoa, an opponent of the Welfare, to rebuild a copra drier on land of his matrilineal group which was politically divided. The decision was given against the Welfare and the government considered this to be 'of deep significance as it leaves open the way for any tsunaun [= tsunono] in the Society to withdraw and reassert his traditional authority over his lands' (Bunting 1966:4).

Later in the year '9 Lontis Welfare members were sentenced to terms of imprisonment for stealing copra from non-Welfare members. A further 5 Lemanmanu Welfare members were sentenced to imprisonment for similar offences' (ibid:28).

One of the things that most incense Welfare leaders is what they see as a government policy to make it not only possible but profitable for tsunono, or anyone else, to withdraw from the Welfare. Teosin claims that this has caused the worst wastage of Welfare funds because kiaps have guaranteed to anyone leaving the Welfare that he is paid a handsome cash profit over and above what he had contributed since joining.¹

¹ There was no Council ward organised among the Haku until 1965.
² Only one kiap conceded to me that there was an element of truth in this claim as it applied to his own actions.
For this reason and for want of concrete evidence I find it difficult to give much weight to the frequent criticisms levelled by Councillors in the presence of the kiap, to the effect that many members would leave the Welfare Society but cannot because Teosin holds fast to the money which has accrued from their years of work for the Welfare.

In 1961 the leaders of the Welfare asked the kiaps for an individual 'T' number, which gives the holder authority to market copra directly to the Copra Marketing Board in Rabaul. A dozen or so had already been held by other Buka for several years. However no arrangements were made to meet this request for at least five years. The government's reluctance was due to the fear that the Welfare executive would be able to market the Society's copra on their own T-numbers. A monopoly of sales - not mediated by Chinese traders - would mean, the government felt, that they had less chance of breaking Hahalis' control of the production by the Welfare's individual members.

The Welfare first applied for a licence to sell liquor at its Basbi store in 1964. Its application was supported by a petition with 700 signatures. It was opposed by the mission, the government and the District Advisory Council and a counter-petition of 2300 was organised. An investigation at this time found that 'the Society could not legally hold a licence, and indeed were illegally operating trade stores as a Society which was not registered as required by the Company Ordinance 1963' (Bunting 1966:33). The successful registration of H.W.P.L. in 1966 was followed

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1 In 1955 there were already three Buka producers holding T numbers.

2 At this time the only licences were held by five Chinese traders at Buka Passage who did an annual trade of about $40,000.
by an application approved by the licencing commissioner in 1967. In 1968 Donatus Mola was attacking the Company itself, complaining to government officials that the shareholding was not controlled according to law (H. Jackman:pers. comm.).

Although official policy in Canberra and Moresby is said to be to treat Welfare and Council alike, without discrimination in the allocation of public services, this has certainly not always been government practice at the local level. One reason of course has been the de facto exclusion of the Welfare from government benefits where the Council is given a monopoly of distribution. Another reason is decision taken personally by officials at the District level. For some years for instance the Agriculture Office refused to carry out extension patrols in Welfare areas. In 1968 I was told by a public health official visiting Bougainville that his Department was in favour of establishing a medical aid-post for the Welfare but its introduction had been blocked by political opposition within the District. An extreme and petty example of the tendency to discriminate against the Welfare for their 'unfaithfulness' to the government came from a high official of the government's Radio Bougainville in 1968. He toured Buka to record traditional music but rejected out of hand my suggestion that he record an outstanding group at Hahalis because they were Welfare.

This sort of discrimination may be due in part to the objection which in 1968 was mentioned to me as the main thing the District Commissioner had against the Welfare: their failure to 'pay their way' in taxation.¹ This was at a time when headtax had been abolished and

¹ In 1965 a senior District official said the government's real objection to the Welfare was to their sexual behaviour.

In justice to the government, I should add that it is perhaps easier to cite services withheld by officials than to describe assistance which might be shown to be generally available, if the Welfare cared to take advantage of it. On occasions Teosin clearly states that Welfare policy is one of self-reliance and there are several areas where he might have sought, but declined, government assistance. This self-reliance follows from a firm and longstanding intention to prepare for selfgovernment by attempting to practise it, an attitude prevalent from the early days of the Welfare and of the East Coast Buka Society. However I have no doubt that the stance of independence has been reinforced by pride wounded by subsequent approaches rebuffed by the government.

In 1968 I witnessed the instant dismissal from government employment of a man who was discovered to be a member of the Welfare. This was a reflection of a personal vendetta against the Welfare conducted by the kiap stationed at Hanahan. He was the kiap in closest touch with villages other than Hahalis and the dismissal indicates the tone of his day to day exchanges with the Welfare. But it cannot be taken as government policy or usual practice, for the Welfare has no complaints about general discrimination against members in the employ of the government.

The kiap in question wanted to be seen to go out of his way to flout rights claimed by Welfare leaders. On hunting expeditions he would deliberately trespass on their land. For this he was eventually called to task by his superiors.
On the occasion of a visit by Teosin and Keali to their kin at Kohiso to discuss land boundaries and the possibility of opening a Welfare store there, the kiap literally pursued the leaders 10 miles to the village, summoned them into his presence, cross-examined and abused them when they disclosed their intentions and declared that they had no right to conduct such business in Council villages without his prior approval. This instruction was not out of keeping with a loosely defined government policy, although on this and other occasions his officiousness exceeded that of other kiaps.

In accordance with advice given in 1962 to Teosin by the Administrator in Moresby, the Welfare leaders have quite regularly sought satisfaction from the higher-ups in the chain of government command, often bypassing intermediate officers. They would go to Hutjena rather than the Hanahan kiap, or skip Hutjena and go straight to Sohano. This applies particularly to Teosin's behaviour. The result has been fairly long periods where contact between kiaps and Welfare leaders has been remarkably rare or non-existent. For the kiaps, on their part, sometimes refuse or neglect to work through the Hahalis headquarters or regional leaders and prefer to deal with tsunono as political representatives of local groups within the Welfare. The pattern emerges where the Welfare tends to disregard the power of the local kiap and goes over his head whereas the kiap often denies the authority of the leaders at Hahalis, in the hope of undercutting their position within the Welfare and their prestige throughout Buka by dealing directly with their subordinates within the Welfare. I noted one period where a Patrol Officer newly posted to Hanahan had pointedly abstained for at least six months from visiting the Hahalis H.Q., not two miles distant, and had never met Teosin. This avoidance is even more marked among mission personnel.
The spokesmen of the Welfare have eventually attained a de facto recognition from the government as representatives of their villages through whom government officers may work. When initially elected the spokesmen were denied any legitimate role as officials in their villages because the kiaps insisted that the government-appointed luluais were the proper local leaders. This situation changed as the spokesmen achieved recognition as the persons with the real responsibility to the Welfare headquarters and as the easiest intermediaries. Nevertheless in cases where the kiaps have wished to deal with a local problem without reference to the Welfare organisation they have appeared to approach tsunono rather than spokesmen. This may be seen either as an attempt 'to get things done' through immediate action or as an attempt to play one office off against the other. Much of the earlier reluctance to afford explicit recognition to spokesmen was due almost certainly to the kiaps' desire to bolster the authority of the luluais, some of whom were notable adversaries of the Welfare in that role before they and their followers joined the Council.

As would be expected in any political contest, the kiaps have been alert for opportunities to divide and rule the Welfare. In 1962 they considered the possibility of driving a wedge between the tsunono and the younger leaders when these seemed to be forming into two camps after their return from gaol. The division between the north and east coasts has consistently been seen as a cleavage to be exploited by encouraging the Haku to see themselves as enriching not the Welfare as such but its headquarters on the east coast.

In 1963, when Sawa was active in consolidating the Welfare's territorial gains among the Haku, he was considered such a disruptive influence that some
government officers proposed that he be deported from Buka. He was imprisoned instead for spreading false reports in August.

The extent to which the existence of the Welfare and its policies are recognised and taken into account in the implementation on Buka of ordinary government policy may be illustrated by the confusions in negotiations to introduce Land Demarcation Committees. These were designed as bodies of Buka people empowered to stake out the land boundaries of those villagers wishing registration after a more exact survey by the Lands Commission. The Commission would also be called upon to settle any disputes arising from the original demarcation by the committees.

A Lands Commissioner from Rabaul came to Buka late in 1966 to introduce the idea. In a chance encounter he told me that he intended to involve both the Council and the Welfare in his discussions. He held a meeting with Councillors in the Council chamber but instead of going then to the Welfare headquarters, he arranged a meeting at Hanahan Patrol Post attended by Welfare and Council members and asked them to vote on whether to accept the demarcation scheme. I missed the meeting but was told later by several disgruntled people that the Commissioner refused to accept the vote which overwhelmingly rejected the idea and several candidate committee chairmen were appointed on the spot for a short tuition course in the Rabaul area.

The kiap in charge of Buka however was aware that the Welfare and at least some Council people were opposed and realised that the scheme, unless well accepted and carefully administered, could well create more disputes than it settled, especially in areas divided in allegiance between Welfare and Council. He expressed the policy that in these areas at least no start would be made without prior approval from
John Teosin. His reluctance was probably due as much to the fact that the Lands Commissioners having proposed the program left it for him to implement and he was reluctant to divert his staff to these duties. He allowed the committees to try out one or two purely Council villages close to the government H.Q. However he was soon called on to sort out a confused situation in a mixed Welfare-Council village where the Councillor had unsuccessfully - and prematurely the kiap felt - tried to get demarcation started.

Early in 1968 this kiap left for nine months' leave. During his absence in June another Lands Commissioner came to Buka and apparently without Teosin's knowledge drove up the road stopping briefly in each village, including those declared by the kiap to be outside the jurisdiction of the committees.

The Commissioner spent only one or two days asking in each village, or whomever he met, who were the important men or local landowners. The names he collected were then on the committees, whether or not the people themselves knew it. When the list for the whole of Buka was published a copy was given to Teosin. He went through the list with me village by village and expressed surprise at 50 per cent of the names mentioned. He claimed that, if the Welfare decided to register any of its lands, there would be no problem because the Welfare had systematically collected and recorded details on landholdings within its territory.

He felt that there was no desire among Welfare members to have small blocks registered under individual title. Although the early government policy statements I heard emphasised flexibility by indicating that the committees could mark out 'clan' land or individual blocks as they wished, there was a suggestion that a start might best be made on the larger, group boundaries. In 1968 the people I talked to in the Hanahan area,
Welfare and Council, felt certain that the committees in operation at the time, mainly in the Lonahan-Solos area, were registering only individual blocks. I do not know if this was true as I have not seen the records concerned and the reports I have heard are conflicting.

The Welfare's attitude - the same is true certainly for many of the Council people - was that this was a dangerous thing for, as most of Buka knew, the land of the island was controlled by relatively few men - the majority of the Buka were 'passengers' on the land of bigger men. To register individual title might leave many people out in the cold, set apart from the tsunono.

This is one of two considerations which made many of the Buka very apprehensive about the scheme. The other was the fear that if an individual registered only part of the land to which he had some claim, he would thereby relinquish rights to the remainder, which would then be taken over by the government. I heard this view independently on several occasions and, when I expressed the view that the government certainly had no such right to the land, the people's fears were not assuaged. My mind went back to the German colonial government's policy of assuming rights to lands which it declared 'waste and vacant' but the people cited more recent examples during the Australian administration when various daring individuals sought registration of one of their parcels of land but allegedly received only the kiap's threat that they would then be deprived of the rest, whereupon they quickly dropped the idea, amid the derision of their fellows.

In August 1968 Teosin asked me to query the setting up of the committees with the replacement kiap on behalf of the Welfare. I did this and attempted a brief exposition of the doubts which I thought were fairly widely held. The kiap acknowledged that the
idea was probably little understood but felt that the introduction of demarcation could not be conditional on complete comprehension. The only thing to do he felt was to impose the system and once the people saw it in operation, they would realise that their fears had been unreasonable.

Not many months later, the permanent kiap returned to Buka and in conversation with me, reaffirmed his earlier attitude. This was shortly before I left Buka.

In the meantime the demarcation committees were increasing their activities in Council villages - on the surface, at least, fairly smoothly. Further north in the mixed areas, several disputes flared up when a Council member with the status of tsunono and a powerful position on the provisional committees, uninhibited either by the kiap's moratorium or by the need to consult all the interested landholders, demarcated his own land and set committees in motion elsewhere. Soon others began to tear out the stakes - a punishable offence which was ignored by the authorities because of the committee man's arbitrary action.

I feel that on the north and north east coast the committees themselves present problems because of the way they were constituted in mid-1968. The kiap thought that my doubts were specious. Committee members were not selected at random nor certainly were they appointed because they volunteered or gave their assent. A glance at the list shows that most of the more important landholders are named in any one village but also included in the half dozen names are occasional well known but landless individuals resident there. By accident or design absentee land-lords are conspicuously excluded in one committee after another. The tsunono of Buka, as the landholders, have always been recognised as the only arbiters in land matters. The Lands Commissioner clearly tried to take this into
account but the attempt was peremptory. It goes only half way and the resulting anomalies seem to me to prejudice the system perhaps more than random selection of committees would have. The kiap however felt that the form of representation on committees was not an important issue as there were no legal requirements that members be landholders and the Lands Commission was the only body whose decision was binding.

I have already referred to the 1961 crisis in relationships between the Welfare and the Catholic priests. A little more needs to be said about the Catholic reaction. Before the 1962 crisis at Hahalis the mission held aloof from involvement in economic enterprises. Following the crisis a large meeting of Bougainville missionaries at Tsiroge reversed this policy. They had almost certainly been aware earlier of widespread discontent about economic conditions on Buka but the rioting convinced them that the mission itself should play a part in economic development and reduce dissatisfaction. By that time the majority of the congregation at Hanahan and Lemanmanu had been lost and at both mission stations there had been bitter exchanges between the people and the clergy.

There can be little doubt that from the outset the new policy was to provide an 'antidote' to the Welfare - to establish prosperous communities of faithful adherents which would entice Welfare members from the Society back to the Church and to ensure that there was no further defection to the Welfare. At Lemanmanu, Hanahan, Gogohe and elsewhere on Buka and North Bougainville the priests have become very actively involved in organising informal savings and loan societies, running small sawmills to provide sawn-timber/aluminium sheeting houses. They have been assisted by massive capital grants from Oxfam, Misereor and the German government. By 1967 the projects run by the mission stations at Lemanmanu, Hanahan, Gogohe and
Gagan had received $23,000 from these sources as against $11,000 contributed by local participants. The missions among the Kunua and Keriaka peoples on Bougainville had received $10,000 from the Freedom from Hunger Campaign and one author (Ryan 1968:320) reports that by 1971 the Catholic stations in the area would have received $150,000 from grants by these and other institutions. Ryan claims that these donations have been solicited in order to prevent the spread of the Welfare's influence onto Bougainville (1968:315ff).

By 1968 most of the Mission stations on Buka had acquired light trucks which were hired out to carry copra or passengers. This mission involvement in commercial enterprise was accepted by the Buka with some misgiving. Very often the complaint was heard amongst both Council and Welfare people, including those who hired the trucks — that missionaries were supposed to be 'men of God' not businessmen. There was a sarcastic pun which was very popular and widely known: 'Bipo ol patere ol i man bilong wokim sol, tasol nau ol i save wokim suga' (sol = salt; soul).

Many of the Welfare bear a grudge against the clergy for what they claim was abuse of the confessional. Sins confessed to the priest, they say, became his cues for public attacks against individuals before and after they left the church.

What seems to be even more important for the Welfare is their belief that celibacy is a sham, an impossible rule to try to contain human nature. This belief is certainly shared by Council members in large numbers. Indeed it is truly remarkable how often conversation returns to the elaborate oral traditions concerning the 'mistakes' of the Catholic priests and nuns.1 As I do not concede that the subject is exempt

1 These include the subject of the introduction of homosexuality to Buka.
from comment by an anthropologist, I would like to add that I do not believe that the Buka are entirely indulging in fantasies on the subject, although many accounts I heard were clearly sensationalist gossip.

The stereotype of the missionary as someone secretly indulging the sexual appetites which he publicly denies has special significance for the Welfare, for they have seen the missionaries in the van of the attacks on Welfare sexual morality. 'They "stick" another man with the wrongs they find in him', they say 'but let them turn their glass on what they do themselves.'

Bunting states the 'the sexual orgies which accompanied the formation of the Welfare Society were aimed at propitiating the ancestors, who would then reveal the secret of obtaining wealth' just as primitive agriculturalists performed 'lewd ceremonies to ensure successful crops' (1966:22).

Some Council members in 1966 described the sexual practices of the Welfare thus: 'Sapos wapelak Welfare man i singaut puspus long meri na meri ino laik, em hia meri i pasim kago long kamap kuik...sapos man em i bihainim oltaim meri bilong em na ino save salim long puspus em ino mekim wok bilong kamap kago....Brata na sista tupela long wapelak mama oli ken puspus bai oli ken kampim Jesus. Ol Welfare ol i toktok kok bilong man em i key bilong Heaven. Na kan bilong meri em i door bilong Heaven. Sapos meri i no salim skin belong em, em i pasim door bilong Heaven na sapos man i no puspus em i no keyim door belong Heaven. Kok em i key na kan em i door. Ol i tok ol waitman ol i kisim mani bilong ol long ol meri bilong ol. Ol i salim ol meri bilong ol olosem copra.'

There is no truth at all in the premise shared by the interpretations of Bunting and of the Council members - that the Welfare supposes that sexual
intercourse somehow generates wealth in the form of cargo. Members of the Welfare readily admit to the conversational use of the phallic metaphor of the key in the door of Heaven and I am told that the usage is current elsewhere in the Pacific without suggestions of cargo cult and the figure of speech is to be found in European literature. The Welfare also resent the accusation that they advocate or practise sibling incest for this or any other reason.

An explanation of the function of the Baby Garden which is current among whites, especially missionaries is that it is a bribe to retain young men as members of the Welfare who would otherwise find nothing to offer in its practices. The argument is thrown into question by the indisputable fact that significant numbers of Council members often enjoy the Baby Garden as a sexual outlet. The periodic dispersal of the girls throughout their home villages facilitates these contacts.

Especially interesting is the remarkable extent to which Councillors visit the girls. This is by no means a secret well kept from the Administration, although it would no doubt like more detailed information. To say that the most voluble public critics of the Baby Garden amongst the Councillors are those who patronise it most would be unfair to certain individuals - perhaps to non-critics, as well as to non-patrons. However the statement is more true than false.

The discrepancy between verbal and sexual behaviour was most notable on an occasion in 1965 when the Council delegation to a 'combined meeting' with the Welfare strongly attacked the Baby Garden in the presence of the kiaps, then retired (not en bloc, but well represented) to the delights of Tegele.

The Administration has to some extent kept watch on the comings and goings at the Baby Garden, especially
where its own staff were believed to be concerned. It has been claimed (with reasonable evidence, I believe) by more than one government officer that evidence collected by the Administration, partly through crossexamination of Baby Garden girls, is taken into consideration in deciding on transfers and promotions of its staff. Evidence allegedly used covers the period 1962-7.

My evidence of visits to the Baby Garden by non-Welfare people is no better or worse than ordinary anthropological reportage on the incidence of sexual liaisons. It derives from personal observation, statements from individuals involved and information emerging from litigation, about disputed paternity especially.

Detailed records of outsiders' visits are kept by the Welfare. These were not offered for my inspection and I did not ask. It had been made clear to me that the Welfare aimed to conceal the identity of individuals concerned. To do otherwise is seen to be a betrayal of the ethic of freedom which is the basis of the Baby Garden. Why, then, keep a secret file? Leaders insisted that there was no clear immediate purpose but 'it is possible that one day it may have to be used.' The possibility of a time of reckoning in the indefinite future applied not to those who simply visited the Baby Garden but to those whose hypocritical attacks the Welfare has had to suffer in silence. The file is intended to relate not to sexual behaviour as such but to the morality of politics.

The suppression of gossip and commitment to secrecy was, to my mind, very impressively maintained. The occasional lapse of course occurs. The two occasions on which information identifying individuals was hesitantly volunteered in confidence were exceptions which proved the rule.
A wide range of non-Buka have sought sex at Tegele - private enterprise and government, whites, Chinese and New Guineans being involved. In ten months of 1968 I observed 18 white men who came for this purpose and there may have been more. Most were employed at the Bougainville copper project, visiting Buka in small groups. Only one came alone. Probably the whites with most frequent access to the Baby Garden were those working on the construction of the east coast road between 1962 and 1965.

The whites who visit Tegele are on the whole readily accepted by the Welfare leaders, some of whom join them for drinking sessions. It is indeed part of the theme of freedom associated with the Baby Garden that irrespective of his race a man may approach the girls without interference. It is said that black birds and white birds alike may come to roost in the tree of everlasting life. Yet some at least of the leaders privately express resentment towards whites who like the Welfare girls for a while but at best only pretend to like the Welfare.

According to Bunting (1966:29) 'Sexual laxity manifested itself in displays of public immorality at the first meetings held by the [Welfare] Society. Men and women disrobed and behaved in a lewd manner in public. Wife exchanges were common. The Administration acted quickly and after 16 members were convicted of indecent behaviour and prostitution, the public displays ceased. Reports of continuing prostitution were received but remained unproved. Baby gardens were then set up near Hahalis and operated for some years. Similar gardens were set up in the Haku area after Haku people entered the Society in 1962.'

In August 1964 further prosecutions were made. One Hahalis woman was convicted of prostitution and a man convicted of procuring.
In 1965 a Patrol Officer went to considerable effort to collect what he considered conclusive evidence of the procuring of under-aged girls in the Haku area. He claims\(^1\) that the District Officer refused to take the case to court because 'he did not want to get his fingers burnt.' At least one other P.O. has made similar enquiries since but I know of no further action taken. Many Welfare people sneer at the methods of these enquiries claiming that the kiap uses his position to obtain sexual excitement from intimate questioning of the girls.

Teosin was appointed a member of the District Advisory Council after his release from gaol in 1962. This provided the other members with an opportunity for direct attack on Teosin's policies and in 1963-4 there was persistent criticism of the Baby Garden which forced Teosin to take some minor corrective administrative action on the north coast which did not satisfy Teosin's enemies and he soon resigned from the Advisory Council.

At the time the Hahalis woman was convicted of prostitution in 1964, eight girls 'were found to be infested with venereal disease and were treated at Sohano hospital!' (Bunting 1966:31).

Ryan (1969:308) relates that 'a government doctor's survey in 1967 at the demand of the District Advisory Council had not revealed the disease, because of an error in laboratory procedures' according to the Sohano medical officer. In May 1968 an official of the Public Health Department (PHD) with female assistance visited Buka briefly to investigate the incidence of gonorrhea at Hahalis. He told me that the medical evidence then available indicated that the incidence of the disease at Hahalis was no higher than elsewhere

on Buka and that the overall level was not exceptional for Papua-New Guinea.

Francis Hagai claimed that he told the Doctor that there was no way the Welfare could ensure that those needing treatment sought it and that the Welfare would welcome medical teams if they included women as well as men and if they covered the non-Welfare population too. He claimed that he was told that there was insufficient staff available for such work.

A month later Fr P. Demers of Lemanmanu was interviewed by the A.B.C. and his comments were broadcast as a news item from Moresby in July. He asserted that gonorrhea was alarmingly prevalent among the Welfare Society, criticised the government for failing to take decisive action to eliminate the disease and claimed that it was Teosin's responsibility, as President of the Welfare, to disband the Baby Garden and end promiscuity. Within a week Hagai and I, independently, had received confirmation from the DDC that Fr Demers' assertions were not compatible with the latest information from PHD.

Early in August Teosin and I visited Lemanmanu mission hospital to establish what evidence Fr Demers had to support his statement. The Sister in charge showed us a list of names of about 20 women patients who she claimed to have found were infected. She had sent slides of the infection to Sohano but they were unconfirmed, she believed, due to faulty clinical techniques. The Sister was most cooperative but Teosin claims that he had a less amicable confrontation the next day with the Sister at Hanahan mission hospital.

Late in August some of the Welfare incredulously told me of a broadcast heard on Radio Bougainville in which the District Commissioner appeared to apologise for Fr Demers' remarks. The DDC confirmed this, telling me that it had been his initiative as he felt that the
record should be set straight. The Welfare, he said, might have had reason to be upset as they were aware of the recent medical reports, which he accepted.

The last word before I left the field came from the A.B.C. Moresby. On 15 October a news item reported the return from a month's visit to the Bougainville District by the Assistant Director of Preventive Medicine, Dr Jameson:

Long mun July 1968 wanpela misinari bilong lotu Katolik long Buka Island, Father Demers, i bin tok olsem plenti pipol belong ples long dispela hap ol i bin wok long kisim dispela sik olsem. Gonorrhea em i wanpela kain venereal disease em ol pipol i ken kisim. Tasol Dr Jameson i bin tok olsem namel long lukluk raun bilong en long dispela distrik em i bin lukluk long ol haus sik na em i bin painim olsem i no bin gat plenti pipol ol i gat dispela sik long dispela hap.

The stance taken by mission and government on any issue involving the Welfare (and there can be no doubt that in many cases one exerts strong pressure on the other) may have a great impact on the opposition of Council members to the Welfare. To clarify the question of Welfare-Council relations I will attempt an evaluation of the spheres of interest and competence of the Council. The two organisations after all emerged to some extent as alternatives, mutually exclusive and embracing virtually the whole Buka population.

The Welfare have many substantial criticisms of the Council as an organ of government. But they do not engage in polemics against the Council in public and they are not concerned with putting its house in order. In all public meetings it is always the Welfare that is under attack from Councillors.

There were open controversies about the Council in the past but for some years past the Welfare's criticisms have been made in private. They say that all Buka knows that Councillors are elected 'to go and listen to the talk of the whitemen.' This seems to me
to be a pertinent criticism of the way the Council functions as an administrative body. The Council adviser is a kiap who is appointed by the administration. In spite of attempts to at least appear unobtrusive his control is direct and extensive and is exercised mainly through the executive and finance committees. The meeting agendas of the full meeting are influenced strongly by what the whites think is relevant. The budgets are strictly controlled and they have to be given the seal of approval by regional government officials in Rabaul. Although the adviser tries, not always successfully, to stay behind the scenes during general meetings, the Chairman and the great majority of members carefully tailor what they have to say to what they think the kiap wants to hear and continually refer matters back to him. These claims are of course hard to substantiate but it is so obvious to others besides myself (and not only to Welfare people) that it is worth noting that almost all of the whites appear to have little understanding of the extent of their domination.¹

The best example of this was the non-debate of 1968 about the proposed referendum of 1970 on independence for Bougainville. This was the most widely discussed issue in the Bougainville District since the Council was formed yet the Chairman, who later told me he very strongly favoured independence for the N.G. Islands (Bougainville, Manus, New Ireland and New Britain including Rabaul), frantically tried to gag discussion in the October Council meeting. The issue was raised by a west Buka man who spoke from a text which was certainly prompted and even partially prepared by a kiap who had visited him the week before. He spoke for several minutes criticising premature proposals for

¹ Cf Crocombe 1968.
independence (Donatus Mola, one of the two MHAs who proposed the referendum, told me that this Councillor secretly advocated it). He was supported by a man from the same area visited by the kiap and, briefly, by a Selau man. Mola himself said a few veiled words in reply which were rebutted by the kiap on the spot. That was the end of the debate, and the issue was not raised again in the two further Council meetings which I attended before leaving the field. Meanwhile the question of the independence referendum was under intense daily discussion in Council villages as well as in the Welfare.

Mola had come under attack from some quarters for lending support to the independence referendum without first consulting the people. This he denied and took the first opportunity to conduct a survey of opinion in the villages of Buka. I visited two of these villages on the day of the meeting but at Mola's suggestion did not attend because 'people are afraid to express their opinions in front of whites.' I received immediate reports however and reliable information from other meetings, all of which indicated that the great majority of Council villages, like the Welfare, had overwhelming majorities in favour of the referendum proposal. Mola gave me confirmation of this at the time and repeated it in Sydney in 1969. However he is since reported to have decided to oppose the referendum proposal which was taken up by the Napidakoe Society and the Buka Council has clearly been used to express to the rest of Bougainville the alleged rejection of the proposal by the majority of Buka.

Only one kiap expressed doubts to me about the effectiveness of the Buka Council as a representative body, saying that its reputation as the best Council

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1 He had not published the results but was awaiting 'the appropriate time.'
in the Bougainville District obscured the facts. As a former adviser he had hoped to make it more democratic, as he believed that there was virtually no worthwhile communication between Councillors and their constituents, that the Council was too remote from its membership and that nearly all the Councillors are intimidated by the formality of meetings. 'They sit there just watching their Ps and Qs and worrying about procedure.' He did not ascribe this to domination by whites.

There was unrest in some Council villages in November 1968 (which the Welfare believed was widespread) when it became known that Jock Lee, a white planter, was considering as a candidate for Council President, Anton Kearei having resigned, partly under pressure from the whites. People said 'The government has told us lies: first they gave us something they called a Native Local Government Council, now it's a "Council belong ol masta" (a whiteman's Council).' Lee had effectively controlled the finance committee for the preceding year. The Council had itself voted to become multiracial in 1967. Lee eventually withdrew his nomination. By that time kiaps had sensed the potential for unrest and did not favour him as a candidate. Bougainville's first Council, Teop-Tinputz, now has a white President, whose 'authority is unchallenged', as Ryan notes (1969:337).

Deepseated resentment of white domination of Councils came into the open in the massive Rabaul unrest in the last half of 1969. In 1968 at least, Buka felt no differently. A friend in the Council area told me that he and the rest of his village were unhappy: 'the government forced councils on us by telling us that

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1 Lee had polled heavily in north Bougainville in the Bougainville regional electorate in the House of Assembly elections in February 1968.
they would replace the kiaps. Now after all these years with Councils there are more kiaps than ever, half of them boys.¹ He wanted to write to Radio Bougainville which broadcasts letters but was afraid to do so.

The Council resembles nothing so much as a shop-front for the channelling of goods and services from the various government Departments to the community and my impression is that the Council has virtually no control over the flow from the government.¹

It receives subsidies from Public Works for vehicles for use initially on P.W.D. projects and regular grants from Public Health for providing medical aidposts and especially water tanks, an important requirement on Buka. They are offered lucrative contracts without tender by D.C.A. and have been in a position to raise substantial loans through the government. The Education Department gives dollar for dollar on schoolbuildings.

The Council apparently was very heavily subsidised to get it off the ground. In its first year it raised less than $5000² in taxes and had no other capital or assets yet its expenditure was almost $14,000 for the year. Government assistance, especially in the form of transport, tractors, etc., is regularly available in the day to day running of Council affairs.

¹ Cf Reay 1964:250f.
² Hasluck (1962) gives a figure of $4400.
### BUKA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL BUDGETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pop.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate Revenue</th>
<th>Estimate Expenditure</th>
<th>Actual Revenue</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6145</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>(10140 Tax) 16144</td>
<td>(11368 wtr 15114)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>13798 (11362 wtr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6766</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>(5200 Tax) 7080</td>
<td>7890</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>(3672 C.A. 7016) (1230 wtr 1236 health)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8854</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>(9316 Tax) 24584</td>
<td>(15200 Non rec. 23720)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>(2500 C.A. 13270) (5200 tr. 3876 health)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9569</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>(Jan.-June) N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>(4720 Tax 6339) (1134 tr. 3219)</td>
<td>(881 C.A. 718 tr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10362</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>(5786 Tax 15000) (5482 Sub 3476 tr. 17673)</td>
<td>(5129 C.A. 3280 health) (2810 tr. 1000 pay loan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10181</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13018</td>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>(11200 Tax 16111) (2500 tr. 15114)</td>
<td>(5000 C.A. 4078 tr. 1500 educ. (1500 wtr 1500 market)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13018</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>(14732 Tax 42030) (7000 loan 6000 Sub) (3680 D.C.A. 6800 spec.)</td>
<td>(15750 tr. 41500) (10500 boat 5550 wtr 6000 C.A.)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non rec = nonrecurrent, incl loans, subsidies; wtr = watertanks & iron; C.A. = Council administration; sub = subsidy; tr = transport (cars, trucks, tractors)

**TAX RATES:**
- 4 dollars, men; 50¢ women 1962 & 3 (over 17 years)
- 5 dollars........1 dollar 1964-68 (over 18 years after 1965)
- 7 dollars........1 dollar 1968-
The select few among the Councillors do receive worthwhile training in budgeting and the making of minor economic choices but this occurs very late in the decision-making process. A more effective policy role could be exercised by the Council if it were to administer funds freely made available by central government to the local body. But in fact development policy is established by the District Commissioner and his District Coordinating Committee, which represents each Department at the District level, and priorities are established by the whites well ahead of any budget meeting of the Council. The Councillors are seen at the fullest exercise of their powers when they get a few hundred dollars shifted from one column to another - an outboard motor for X village instead of a watertank for Y\(^1\) - and these powers do not represent a serious challenge to the whites' determination on allocation of funds. The services provided by the Council in any case have to be determined within the framework of the government's own economic program of expenditure on the area.

In strictly economic terms the Council is an undoubted success and, with the biggest budget amongst Bougainville Councils, it is considered by the government to be the most successful in the District. This is partly due to government assistance and guidance and partly, of course, to its size as compared with the Welfare. Membership increased sharply when the Council became a multiracial body. All Chinese, Europeans and people from the N.G. mainland living and working on Buka, Sohano and part of N.Bougainville became part of the electorate. Two Chinese and two Europeans have been elected, partly by their own labour force (non-

\[^1\] Or fans for the Council chamber as proposed by the adviser.
Buka). The voting power of non-local natives working on local plantations caused some of the trouble in Rabaul in 1969.

Even with a population of over 13,000 covered by the Buka Council the numbers who actually pay tax is less than 2500 (men and women). With administrative costs running at about 40 per cent of tax moneys - far higher in some years - it is unlikely that the Council could have established its present viable economic position without the assistance of subsidies and government-guaranteed bank loans. Without deprecating the economic assistance it is still possible to make the criticism that the Council, from the political point of view, remains an agency of the various Departments and has little access to the policymaking process affecting allocation of funds in its area.\(^1\) Because of its preoccupation, not to say obsession, with minor administrative matters, the Council remains a political cypher. They have developed no tradition of discussion of the social and political problems of Buka. The Council is anything but a forum for the aspirations of its members and the people who have authority in the villages. I feel that it is divorced from the more important values of the great mass of Buka Islanders.

It can be argued that this is partly a result of past government policy in the colony to withhold from Councils any real legislative powers other than those giving additional effect to standard government policy and procedures - to have for instance a toilet built for every house in Council villages, even if it remains unused. The result is that Councillors are merely a link in the top-down direction of the villagers by the

\(^{1}\) Cf Meller's criticism (1968) of the House of Assembly as an organ of administration.
kiap. His authority is merely the side-effect of the kiap's power - the 'officer's' N.C.O. in the village. The authentic leaders with political initiative in the villages are still the tsunono. After the first few years of the Council's operation, when some of the tsunono tried out the new role of Councillor, only occasionally has a Councillor also been a tsunono. There is in fact a high rate of turnover of elected Councillors, producing a waste of the peculiar skills instilled in those groomed for executive tasks on the Council. The absence of the hereditary leaders from the ranks of the Councillors in the neighbouring Teop-Tinputs Council was noted and discussed at a regional conference a few years after the Council's formation in 1957.

People cannot gain power in the village simply because they are elders but it does happen that nearly all the leaders with hereditary office are over 40 years of age. I am not aware of any general belief that younger, brighter or better-educated men are better able to fulfil the requirements of the role of Councillor and it seems to me that in many cases the job is left to those men who have lesser commitments in the village community and, being more mobile, associate more freely in the network of relationships including whites and other Councillors. It is clear that elected Councillors are not 'sent' to the Council by the tsunono as their lieutenants. Where there is any patterned interaction between the two kinds of leader it usually involves the adjustment of the respective claims of tsunono and Council/government upon the time of the villagers. In so far as there is any confrontation between the influence of Councillors and of tsunono, the Councillors are the ones to back down in all cases that I have seen.

The most convincing explanation that I can propose for the indifference of tsunono towards the Council is that Councillors lack credibility; they do not uphold
or present to the people a consistent policy of local government; they do not propose programs which are meaningful in terms of the felt needs of the villagers; they do not canvass opinion on issues to raise in Council as their representatives; they can and often do exercise arbitrary power sanctioned only by ready access to the support of the kiap. In short those who exercise hereditary power tend to ignore the Council as a further avenue to power because they see it as another instrumentality of central government with a 'white man's agenda', to use the Welfare's phrase.

The Buka for many years had resented the way that the appointed village officials were dominated and abused by kiaps because in most cases the people appointed had been tsunono. Their leaders, they felt, deserved more respect than the whites gave. The people wanted less deserving men to be appointed. In spite of this wish I do not think that these were ever many insignificant men amongst the luluais and tultuls. Nevertheless the kiaps seem to have believed perenially that the luluais were men without any traditional influence. This misconception was almost certainly due to the political manoeuvre used by the luluai to stall any of the kiap's unacceptable demands by claiming that, in spite of his insistence, his people would not listen to him. With few exceptions kiaps have shown only a passing interest in traditional power structures and have worked through them only when they could not be ignored entirely.

As well as divorcing the Council from the centre of political power, the lack of a legitimized central political body dominated by Bougainvillians and charged primarily with relating local, Bougainville problems to the policies of central government, or adapting the latter to the former, has the further result that the executive officers of the District administration cannot communicate effectively with such an unorthodox
organization as the Welfare let alone concede it any legitimate role in the local political arena. To 'recognise' the Welfare would be interpreted as total abandonment of the general Tertitory policy of promoting local government councils with carefully circumscribed powers in relation to central government.

The District Advisory Council, even when dominated numerically by non-Bougainvillean, had a very marginal effect on the administration of District affairs. The annual conference of Council delegates from throughout the District has been developed as a public forum but its powers do not even approach those of the recently proposed regional authorities which have been criticised in the House of Assembly for their limited authority.

I feel that the political behaviour of the Councillors is marked by a rigidity which is the very opposite of the ethic of accommodation which strongly influences the actions of Welfare leaders. To some extent this almost ritualistic character of attacks on the Welfare is more marked in Councillor's behaviour in public, of which the whites are part. Some indulge in attacks which seem to be at odds with their real attitudes towards and expectations of the Welfare. These include criticisms of the Welfare's sexual practices and also a tiresome nominal insistence that the Welfare join the Council - tiresome because I am convinced that this is known to all, except probably the whites, to be an unrealistic expectation in the light of known attitudes.

It also blocks the more constructive moves, initiated in every case by the Welfare, for peaceful coexistence and practical cooperation. These moves clearly have had the support in recent years of very many ordinary Council members, who are increasingly prepared to express the view that 'to be a Council member doesn't mean that you can't do anything else',...
by which was meant the continuing either/or allegiance to Council or Welfare does not preclude acceptance of new forms of interaction and cooperation irrespective of this division. The combined Welfare-Council meetings, which have resulted from Welfare approaches to the kiaps, have been intended to explore ways of developing 'unity' and 'mutual understanding' but because the kiaps' policy, as expressed to me, has been refusal to countenance any form of joint enterprise, the meetings have usually degenerated to the point where Councillors elaborate on the theme of 'unity', which is taken to mean total incorporation of the Welfare membership in the Council. In 1968 the increasing use was made of the sophistic argument that, as the Welfare was essentially a business enterprise, its members could join the Council and Council people in turn might even invest capital in Welfare enterprises.

Recourse to formalism in Councillors' opposition to the Welfare is notable in the political behaviour in which dispute settlement becomes enmeshed. I have said nothing so far of the Welfare's juridical system constituted by the local (village) courts referred to in Rules 13 and 14 (see above, p.184). This is because the system is characterised not by a visible institutional complex of codified law, formal courts and mechanisms for punishment but by an operative emphasis on the classical functional requirements of dispute settlement in small-scale societies - the need for mutually acceptable compromise in continuing systems of relationships instead of a need for penalties to uphold general and abstract concepts of law. The Welfare gives special emphasis to the principle of helping the wrongdoer. The person who is wronged does not need to be rewarded simply to reinforce his righteousness. It is the wrongdoer who should benefit from the administration of justice in order to induce him to correct his behaviour.
Attempts are made to suppress litigation and ensure settlement at as low a level as possible. But where principles of Welfare policy are seriously involved, the functionaries who have the formal backing of the authority of the Welfare's 'meeting' are the Chairmen of the north and east coasts. The Welfare also tries to assert its ultimate responsibility in settlement of disputes involving its members by insisting on having representation or at least witnesses in cases settled by the kiap in local courts.

There is indeed a strong theme in Welfare policy that anything less than the 'bikpela trabol' which Rule 15 says may be referred to the District Court or Supreme Court should not be handled by the Buka kiap's local court but left to the Buka to settle for themselves. When asked by a Buka kiap in 1968 what he could do which would most assist in overcoming the recurrent antagonisms between Welfare and Council people, the Welfare insisted that the one essential thing was to leave the settlement of minor disputes in the hands of the Buka.

The Welfare has often in the past insisted on this autonomy but the government has not conceded what appears to be the right to operate with an independent system of law. The greatest difficulty in the way of any adjustment has been the behaviour of the Councillors. They have not at any point conceded the legitimacy of the Welfare's informal courts even if no Council members are involved. Where they are involved their Councillor will often reject a settlement arrived at through negotiations with the Welfare and resurrect the issue either to demonstrate their own authority as delegated by the government or to involve the kiap's power directly in the adjudication of the case.

The impression I gained in 1968 was that complaints by the Welfare, that the kiaps in their dual role of policeman and judge, tended to discriminate against the
Welfare in legal proceedings, were not entirely without foundation. The kiap at the time denied this. He pointed out that he did his best to deter Council members from legal action against the Welfare which he thought would not succeed.

The Welfare feels a special bitterness towards Council members who have made even worse the bad relations between Welfare and whites by making malicious and misleading reports about the Welfare, such as in the court case of 1968. In past years a feature of these have been accusations of cargo cult, for which I can see no reasonable evidence whatsoever. Council members know that nothing more riles the Welfare or pleases the whites than the suggestion that this is the real explanation for the Welfare. Given the political loading which such accusations have carried for years past, kicking the cargo cult can has been a useful way for Council people to mobilise white opposition to the Welfare.

It surprises me that, virtually without exception, accounts of cargo cult in Melanesia have given no consideration to the possibility that much evidence may need critical evaluation in the light of the use of cargo cult stereotypes as a weapon in political confrontations. The Welfare's resentment of the charge is intense and they peruse journalistic accounts of their 'cargo cult' with sheer disgust. I have seen a white visitor, who announced that he had come to Hahalis to find out about cargo cult, come close to being physically assaulted by Welfare members.

I do not intend to grasp the nettle and attempt a thorough analysis of differential participation - why Buka has been neatly divided into two mutually exclusive political camps. As explained in Chapter 1, I once thought that the carry over of primordial tribal allegiances might be a key to the division between
Welfare and Council. I no longer have such a ready answer. I hope that I have at least indicated the issues being debated when the early lines of division were drawn in 1958-61.

Here I will do no more than indicate that the sort of explanation I would now consider would focus not on particularistic interests of traditional groupings but on the wider political issues of development within a colonial society. The workings and distribution of power within the wider arena dominated by whites have been in part the concern of the last two chapters.

It seems clear that large numbers of people who are today Council members were sympathetic to the Welfare cause enough to join with it in its confrontation with the government in 1962. It also seems clear that these people, having escaped a beating and imprisonment were no longer prepared to maintain their support as Welfare members once they had seen the massive physical resources the government was prepared to mobilise against the Society.

After the release of the prisoners in May 1962 the kiap did his best to isolate the Welfare by restricting freedom of movement between their villages and Council areas and tried to deny the Welfare the right to hold its own meetings without consulting him. In Moresby in May Administrator Cleland had given the Welfare leaders the clear impression that, provided only they never again resort to violence to achieve their aims, their attempts at preparation for self-government by self-help would have the government's blessing and would guarantee material assistance if they bore fruit. On Cleland's advice the Welfare was not to be deterred if they did not obtain satisfaction from local kiaps, for he personally guaranteed to meet a cooperative Welfare halfway. This is what the Welfare expected to be confirmed by his visit to Buka later in the year (see above, p.178).
Immediately after Gunther's rejection of the Welfare's gesture of conciliation, rumours began to spread that government was about to send in a force to put an end to the Welfare once and for all. The next year or more saw an incredible succession of rumours and counter-rumours about whether the government intended to take police action against Welfare or Council people for their political stance.

It may have been this period of critical uncertainty about government reaction which was marked by the most bitter and petty antagonisms between members of the two groups for I can think of no other reason for the apparent partial winding down of tension after 1964, by which time concerted government legal action against the Welfare had left less doubt about its predictable attitude. If this is true the point made by Swartz (1968:153) may be relevant. He suggests that increasing conflict is possible when two organisations are expanding into a common political field so that possession of part of the field by one excludes the other. Where there is a sudden expansion of the field so that the organisations have unrealistic expectations of their own rate of growth, conflict is especially likely.

Unlike Sahlins' lineages organising for predatory expansion (see above, pp.14-15), on Buka the bone of contention was not simply the material resources of land, cashcrops and membership numbers, but far more importantly the support of the colonial authority, which for years had been heard announcing that an important devolution of power was in the offing.

The anticipation of government support in this sense was unquestionably a major factor in the early decision of many to join the Council and must remain a question for consideration in relation to such allegiance today. I certainly would not suggest that
the kiap's blessing is the only end sought by Council members and that they have opted without reference to such substantive issues as communal organisation vs private enterprise. But the public and private petitioning of the response of whites is still a conspicuous phenomenon in spite of real similarities in attitude and values with the Welfare.

It is sufficient at any rate to note that the Welfare often points this out. To quote Teosin:

'Some Council follow the old ways without question but in a lot of areas they are starting to change things gradually and this is just because of the Welfare. If we didn't establish these things there is no way that they could bring about any true change in the future. This is not just my own impression that they want to follow us but the Councillors themselves have come to visit me secretly and tell me all the facts - they said "all that you are doing is right and we like it very much but of course we are getting afraid of the government and the mission" - and most of the Catholic teachers have come privately and would tell me "all that you are doing is right because we have studied the Bible telling us all about what you are doing but we just can't do it because of the priest." And a lot of Council members used to come and say to me "all that you are doing in the Welfare is right. We really agree with you but of course we are afraid of the Councillors and the mission teachers and the priest and the government".1

The Welfare regularly contrast their own constructive policies aimed at substituting cooperation for conflict with the negative and aggressive attitudes displayed by Councillors.

In October 1968 the Buka clerk of the Council arrived at Basbi. Knowing that I was at Teosin's house he sent a messenger from the road with an urgent request
for Teosin to meet him there. Keali was sent to talk to him and after a long conversation returned with the clerk and a carton of beer and an invitation to join them for dinner at Hagai's house. During the evening Keali was called away to talk to Teosin who was not present. The clerk was visibly in a state of great anxiety. Keali returned, as I later learnt, with $500 in cash which he gave secretly to the clerk. The money was to make up a deficit in the Council's cash holdings for which the clerk was responsible and which he feared would be discovered in the audit soon to be made of the Council's finances. The Welfare received a receipt for the money as a loan but the terms of repayment were left indefinite. The transaction was completed within three hours and Teosin spoke to nobody apart from Keali before making the decision. The clerk did not want me to know of the loan but Keali and Hagai quickly let me know of it and immediately contrasted the attitude of the Welfare and the Council - 'would Council leaders have been ready to help if a Welfare man had been in similar trouble?'

The Welfare retains the willingness to experiment which in the past has reached peaks eliciting condemnation of seditious, revolutionary and unnatural practices. They surely remain convinced that the initiative for social and political change on Buka, within the pre-independence situation at least, rests with them. So long as the central government's attempts at modernisation are mediated by the Local Government Council, they feel that political action initiated outside the Welfare springs merely from interventionism, obscuritanism and misguided legalism.

Most certainly of all, they claim for themselves both the responsibility of establishing the proper and workable balance between progress and conservatism, and the ability to do so. As far as their past efforts
are concerned, they are reasonably satisfied with what they have tried to accomplish. The major difficulties in the implementation of policy are attributed to outside interference.
I propose to turn now to a consideration of aspects of the Welfare's ideology. By this term I mean simply a constellation of ideas which I believe help explain the Welfare's past behaviour and present aspirations. With Worsley I believe that 'human beings can, and do, react against the past. They are affected by the past, in so far as they absorb behaviour-patterns of their culture. But they have also the faculties of imagination and creativity; they innovate as well as receive and absorb, they revolt as well as continue. They step outside the structural framework of the existing social order and the intellectual framework of received ideas to create new ideas and new ways of ordering their relationships with one another' (Worsley 1967:272).

Some of the antecedents of the Welfare were the innovations of the East Coast Buka Society, called 'new ideas' by Kearei. It is of interest here that, when they do not use the English term 'cargo cult', the Buka use their own term hakats, which denotes taking thought implicitly distinguished from accepted belief. I am going to suggest that anthropologists have commonly ignored the faculties of imagination and creativity evidenced in the social philosophies of Melanesian movements and have overdrawn the picture of a pathological state of mind, a helpless cultic reaction to situations of intolerable cognitive dissonance or emotional stress.

The new ideas of the Welfare, which they explicitly contrast with the 'white-man's agenda' of the Council, are not made up into a consistent and codified doctrine. The ideological pronouncements of 1960 and 1966 do scant justice to their own philosophy which is
articulated piecemeal and partially as the situation or mood dictates. I am well aware that the impression of it which I received is based on versions discussed almost exclusively with the leaders. Even if only incompletely understood by the membership as a whole, the ideas which I recount are those which have had greatest impact in guiding the course of the Welfare.

Here I will not even attempt a synoptic view of the ideology because a complete account of the Welfare's thought would include not only observations on the function of law and free-will or man's place in nature but also the progressive elaboration of programs, for instance the development of the registered company or the circulation of spokesmen, as well as negative attitudes, to cooperatives for example. I do not intend to recapitulate and summarise all of the accounts I have already given on these subjects. For the present discussion I wish to select certain themes of Welfare thought for summary treatment. The bases for selection are to emphasise the aspirations which the Welfare themselves believe have been realised and to draw attention generally to the credibility of purposive goal-directed activities and the effectiveness of choices made. Included in these purposes and choices are elements which the Welfare appears to share with earlier Buka movements and with 'cargo cults' elsewhere. This is a positive heritage which the Welfare is proud to acknowledge.

I cannot emphasise too strongly the point I have already made, that, if my impressions are even vaguely correct, the actions of the Welfare have been largely effective when evaluated in terms of their expressed intentions. If deprivation is measured by reference to the goals which people set for themselves, as Schwartz recommends (see above, p.215), then it must be noted that, in spite of the obstacles which have been placed in their way, the people of the Welfare
are not beset by general doubt, frustration and despair. Nor is Buka as a whole, despite the prevalence of the sort of conflict described above, characterised by social disintegration and cultural loss so often said to precipitate this kind of social movement.

Teosin sees the Welfare as the only real agent of change in Buka society. He argues that the Council functions only because it is controlled by whites, that the Buka cannot work through it because its members cannot understand the way the whites operate in this context. They cannot accomplish anything substantial without appropriating it as their own institution achieving their own purposes and this they have not done. He sees the Councillors as merely passive recipients of whatever the kiaps care to dispense, just as they think their own role is to enforce a whole series of regulations to achieve some end which they do not fully grasp. Not a few members of the Council share Teosin's view that their Councillors' performance is so marked by an obsession with law for its own sake that they are more obstructive even than the kiaps, thinking that by being officious they demonstrate their appreciation of the true governmental function of the Council. To this Teosin adds that, by making rule enforcement an end in itself, they deprive the rules of any point. A constant theme in the pronouncements of the Welfare leaders is that no law should be observed unless it expresses the will of the people and that no law can be enforced unless its application to a particular case brings those involved to an appreciation and fuller acceptance of the law. They voice the complaint that the laws of the kiaps and the laws of the Council alike are drawn up 'because of one event, one man.' There is much to this argument which is difficult to explain. But it is clear at least that they see such laws as merely negative reactions to 'unacceptable' and isolated
incidents, reactions not likely to relate to the actual intentions of the majority of people under the law.

The Welfare leaders argue that as long as Councillors operate with this superficial grasp of law handed down by kiaps, they cannot blame the kiap if the law is considered irrelevant by the people.

The same criticism of arbitrary formulation and enforcement of law as an end in itself without reference to individual needs or community feeling is applied also to the behaviour of whites, in their support of over-litigant Councillors and in judgements such as that handed down by the Supreme Court (above, p.232). Time and time again the Welfare repeat - to themselves, if no others wish to hear - the need to observe the principles referred to in Rules 12 and 13: if there is minor trouble between others, you, the third party, must watch your own behaviour and refrain from interference that would only make the minor wrong more serious; on the contrary intervention must be well-intentioned, to assist the wrongdoer along the right path; you are not to be preoccupied with a search for whatever is wrong so that you make it seem important; you must be forward-looking towards whatever contributes to the continual well-being of people everywhere. The legalism of Councillors, kiaps and priests is felt to be alien to this principle. Strict adherence to the Welfare's own laws is seen to preclude jealousy, attacks on others and scandal-mongering.

The Welfare leaders say they refuse to accept laws which are instruments used by the powerful to subjugate others. In the case of tsunono in the past and the priests today, they claim that superstition is encouraged to maintain a privileged order by intimidation. They argue quite clearly that there are different kinds of orders and the law on Buka today does not effectively maintain the order desired by the kiaps and priests because it is little understood and remote from popular values.
One of the most interesting elements in the Welfare's concept of law is the dichotomy which is believed to exist between nature and law. The forces of nature are positive and man is inherently at one with his environment. The laws of man are negative and are introduced to exploit the environment for selfish interests and to interfere with others' enjoyment of the natural good. Man in nature is free and is able to follow the thoughts and feelings which are God-given. His interests can be pursued without infringing the rights of others because the natural state is one of community not only with nature but with one's fellows. Individual freedom is compatible with life within a community. In the golden age of man a sort of social contract was enshrined in customs which included the institution of the tsunono. But his leadership depended on a moral relationship with his followers and expressed a common will. It was not dominance based upon coercion.

The golden age of man on Buka came to an end with the advent of the white-man. The social order was disturbed and the community divided. The legitimate powers exercised by the tsunono on behalf of the community were interfered with. Sorcery had been controlled by the tsunono for social ends and had not been arbitrarily directed. It had been open and public as exercised by the tsunono in concert but was driven underground by the whites, became widely diffused and irresponsibly used. Similarly the pitched battles between districts controlled by the chiefs were outlawed and sneak attacks became the order of the day.

The loss of customary powers accorded the tsunono by the community is believed to have been associated with increased internal disorder and the introduction of powers which were merely legal and which were reinforced by the authority of the kiap and also the
priest. These were merely punitive reactions, designed to interfere with individual rights and divorced from collective purpose.

According to the Welfare sexuality presented no problems to the 'first line' of Buka, the generations who had no contact with the whites. Marriage and reproduction followed on individual initiatives, a meeting of 'thoughts and feelings' of each man and woman, which were both natural and God-given. Only in colonial society did arranged marriage become so-called custom and 'unnatural' interference in the sex-lives of others, jealousy, selfrighteousness and gossip became the norm. The punitive spirit of law in general applied to sexual morality - the singling out of the private affairs of others for condemnation, the selfish and unhelpful obsession with their supposed wrongs. The principle of hatoatong had been lost - the disinterested love based on understanding of the other's rights and worth as a free individual.

In emphasising the social and sexual, over and above the reproductive, aspects of the Baby Garden, the Welfare's leaders like to refer to it sometimes as hagum but this is by no means a widely current usage. Hagum (lit. 'a sitting') here refers to a 'gathering' of a specific kind. In the golden age of Buka the first generations of tsunono had privileged access to some of the women of the parish. It is not clear who these women were but the tsunono's right to them was not contested. The tsunono exercised this right at the hagum, a group of women cloistered in the large house of the tsunono. The arrangement was idyllic until spoiled by the jealousy of a young man of the second generation who became curious about the behaviour of the others, ventured to look through the wall of the house and coveted the women he saw. Another version of hagum is said to have been practiced in historic times, twice between 1952-62 by important tsunono of
Hanahan. Upon the death of such tsunono his successor and men of his own lineage would establish hagum (including his widow and some girls not of his lineage but resident in the parish), and cohabit for at least a month with these women in the deceased's house. Anyone who conceived would be kept inside the house until she gave birth to a child who would then be recognised as the actual offspring of the spirit of the dead tsunono.1

The parallel between the Baby Garden and the hagum model is drawn by claiming that the women of the Baby Garden are ideally enjoyed, like the primaeval hagum, without generating jealousy and competition. For the Welfare, no man without a woman is excluded and once he feels so inclined may approach any of them. He has no need to attack the institution simply because he dislikes the idea or does not participate himself, like the 'second generation' man. If he desires a particular woman he is free to approach her and, if she agrees, establish a permanent relationship.

The parallel with the other aspect of hagum relates to the offspring. The ghost-paternity emphasises the fact that the children fathered by the lineage are a collective responsibility, they are children of the status of tsunono and cannot be excluded from their rights within the community. Its support of the tsunono entails that it protect and care for the children as their own. So with the Welfare, the members of the community which established the Baby Garden have thereby undertaken the obligation to help and protect the offspring, whether the parents marry or not.

1 This is obviously what was happening at the 1935 seclusion of 16 year old girls after the death of the Buka chief 'Banice of Cheerihoo' described in P.I.M. article (October 1935:40-1) although the author did not realise it.
'Welfare iet em i papa bilong ol manki i save kamap long Baby Garden' or as in the rules Nos 10 and 11 'sapos pikinini i kamap long Baby Garden em i orait i pikinini bilong yumi na yumi imas lukluk gut longen na helpim...yumi arapela imas hamamas na givim help taim pikinini kamap.' When accused by Council of neglect of these children, the Welfare has sometimes pushed the argument further by claiming that bastardy is a problem in every society (most of us are 'conceived in the bush') and that the Welfare has faced up to this problem: like the Western state it does not despise the foundling but protects it. There has nevertheless been real apprehension among Welfare leaders that, by aggressively investigating alleged cases of illegitimacy for civil action, the kiaps wish to emphasise the stigma, indicating that in the case of children of the Baby Garden the government will not look kindly on them.

The Welfare's sexual reforms are very often discussed in connection with Christianity: Teosin says:

'What we are studying now in the Bible is different from what we were studying the first time in the Catechism...The missionaries think that if they change the Catechism the whole Church will be destroyed; because they think: "first of all we said that this is the meaning of God and now, if we change it,...".'

Teosin claimed that 'we have established the rule that this idea is to be followed in our Society: we must not be jealous of another man without reason' - a teaching from the Catechism. The mission had wrongly interpreted this as a prescription for unrestricted promiscuity and would not allow the scriptures to be quoted in support of Welfare practice. 'But of course they took it another way because they were thinking about Sawa only - about adultery...you know....'

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1 The government has had a continuing interest in Sawa's sex life. 'Sawa had been imprisoned in 1938 for cult activities, in 1948 for adultery, and in 1950 charged but acquitted of rape' (Bunting 1966:22).
The catechism says: if any person wishes to marry he must first get permission from the village people (eklesia) and the tsunono. It tells us here that we are to do something but not as God's wantok - we are not going to do his will. Because whatever feeling a man gets, this is given to him by God and we have to do everything according to his will. The English prayer says: Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. And it is right to put it this way and the Catechism says something different.

'It says that if a man wants to get married he must get this right from the tsunono, which means he doesn't get the right from God....Some years ago they used to get married in church and after 3 or 6 months or a year the marriage would be destroyed because of the eklesia and the tsunono - they forced us to get married. Put it this way: let a man examine his own mind and make his own decision - and the girl too. God himself has given us the will and if our wills join together - free together - then we can say alright, you are my wife now. And later we can tell the tsunono and make it public...this is what used to happen before - before the arrival of the Europeans - and this is the true way, for a man to follow his feelings given to him by God. But marriage by force does not follow the will of God.'

Just as important as the Baby Garden to the Welfare has been the attempt to create a more open society by lessening sexual tensions where married people are concerned. I found it impossible to document the history of this attempt in detail. The most important move occurred in 1960-1 when the Welfare insisted that members cease to hide their wives and at some meetings directed that each man should be left alone in privacy for a while with the wife of another man. There was to be no speculation or argument about
what the couple did when left to themselves. But there was a clear suggestion from the leaders that the association would be asexual, to demonstrate hatoatong, the possibility of giving love without needing to take the other sexually for oneself, although the opportunity was provided. It fell short of enforced promiscuity.

But the results were calamitous. The leaders say that at this time the Welfare was 'bad' and chaos prevailed. 'We set out to govern ourselves but after we tried this [sexual experiment] we had to put every rule aside.' Accusations from jealous spouses flew thick and fast and the leaders gave up hope of establishing order by mediation or arbitration. The situation they had created had to be left to sort itself out. The individual had no recourse to rules or rulers to settle his grievance but had to make his own personal adjustment.

This phase immediately suggests a parallel with the sequence of old rules - no rules - new rules which Burridge proposes in analysing the scenes of sexual promiscuity which accompany many movements (1969:166-7). Although, in the case of the Welfare, the deliberate setting aside of rules is obvious and it may be true, as Burridge suggests, that 'before the new man can be realised a period of being less than human has to be suffered', there is an important difference. The sequence with the Welfare was simply thesis - antithesis. The free association between the sexes, the antithesis to the old order, was the end state desired.

There was no synthesis, in the sense of a new set of rules introduced to contrast with and put an end to the transitional stage. The no-rules stage in which the people were 'less than human' was the acknowledgement of the inability of the ordinary methods of social control to contain the reaction to the dissolution of the old rules. The state of freedom, which was the antithesis, was expected to prevail in
spite of temporary disorders. The Welfare believes that it has prevailed and that the 'new man' has emerged. Of that they are convinced. On the basis of personal observation of the comparative ease of everyday relations between sexes and the striking freedom from scandal within the Welfare, I believe their claim to that extent is well founded. Of course they do not deny that sexual jealousy exists. And I hasten to add that married life appears to remain unaffected — at least adversely — by the Welfare's liberal policies. The general state of promiscuity, which whites sometimes like to imagine, does not prevail in Welfare villages. Overall, the Welfare feel, they have made significant advances towards a more liberal order of relationships. Teosin says that the reduction in anxiety is great: 'Before the Welfare our people used to hang in the trees like flying foxes thinking about suicide [because of sex]. If the Welfare had done nothing else but achieve this, its work would be enough.'

It is difficult to document the impact on Welfare ideology which Christian doctrines of love and forgiveness, tolerance and equality before God have had. I think the legacy is considerable and this at any rate is what the people claim. They constantly refer such ideals as freedom from jealousy and covetousness back to Christian authority but noticeably absent are any references to apocalyptic or millennial Biblical passages. Teosin says that these have been popular amongst Buka in former years and lays the blame for millennial expectations of past Buka prophets squarely upon Christian teachings. The priests then wrongly claimed that native superstitions were responsible but, says Teosin, why blame the Buka when traditionally they have never had any wrongheaded expectations that simple reliance on the ancestors would get them whatever they wanted?
The Welfare lotu is a fairly inconspicuous institution with a strongly congregationalist organisation which is likened to the Methodists. Small gatherings for hymn-singing are held in each settlement, ideally daily but in fact far less regularly. The songs heard, always in the style of traditional hets (words to the tsigul rhythm), sing the praises alike of the ancestors and of God, the Holy Spirit etc and seek to invoke their blessing and guidance for unworthy sinners - very much in the Christian tradition.

The holy family of Joseph, Mary and Jesus has a vital part in the Welfare interpretation of Christianity. The emphasis reflects not only the central role that Christian, and especially Marist Catholic, ideas have in the Welfare worldview but also the preoccupation with sexuality as the essence of man's nature. For it is clear that Mary has become the archetypal woman and mother. When the Welfare cites the need to 'seek first Mary as the treasurer and administrator of God's graces', Mary is the Pidgin meri. The secret of Mary is God's gift of man's sexuality and fertility, which are therefore necessarily good. Holy communion is a symbol of sexual congress and, in transubstantiation, the bread and the wine become the body and blood of the child. The sending of Jesus means that man may 'have life and have it more abundantly'. Visitation by the Holy Ghost or the good angel means not that inspiration is given by dream or apparition, but that a man is then motivated by any of the 'feelings' which it is natural and good for him to satisfy.

Joseph is revered by the Welfare as its own Saint. He is the figure of the selfless man. There is a clear suggestion that he loved and nurtured his wife and child although the child was not his. At other times he is held up as an example of the giving of care and love to mankind in general as children of God.
It can be seen that there is a special preoccupation with Christianity in relating it to the moral principles which the Welfare considers most important. These are also advocated as ideals which were the essence of the true morality of Buka society before its natural community was lost as a result of contact with whites. The message of Christianity is seen as Buka's own.

The same can be said of the movement inspired by Pako in the 1930s. Although its content is not known in detail, his gospel was largely a black man's Christianity which was to be faithfully observed. This preoccupation with religion was interpreted by whites at the time as part of a syndrome of obsessive ritual practices, a newly discovered secret formula to produce the millennium. It is a common practice on the part of whites - not excluding some anthropologists - to suggest that, wherever participants in a Melanesian movement pay scrupulous attention to the moral rules of Christianity or any other code, this indicates a rigorism which is expected to ensure the success of a new spell for cargo.

I would insist that the Welfare's morality based as it is on concepts of justice and individual freedom within a 'natural' community, and contrasted as it is with mere legalism, in no way indicates rigorism. Nor is there any sense in which the Welfare is seen as ready and complete 'solution' to be advanced against other, false, claims to truth in a ritualistic way. A feature of recent confrontations between members of Council and Welfare has been the insistence by Welfare leaders that peace and harmony can be achieved only if all parties 'drop the names Welfare and Council', because they are formulas which continually confuse instead of resolving issues. Unlike the Paliau movement which attempted to do away with traditional political boundaries by announcing that they did not exist, the Welfare tries
systematically to take them into account. Whereas the Council people, they claim, skate over divisions such as that between moieties, in attempts to settle land disputes along Welfare-Council lines, the Welfare again claims - perhaps justifiably - to be the more flexible party by suppressing the Welfare-Council division and recognising the more intransigent obstacles to settlement. This putting aside of political allegiance has characteristically been a policy of the Welfare in a wide range of dispute settlements.

Ryan (1969) constantly suggests that the Welfare has never desisted from a campaign to incorporate the whole of Buka and beyond. The contrary is true. I know of large groups of Council members who have made secret overtures to the Welfare but have been refused membership. This in large part is due to the Welfare's fear of immediate government intervention and sanctions against either themselves or the groups wishing to join. There are groups on Bougainville, further even than Kieta, who are generally known to be interested in association with the Welfare but its leaders believe that these wish to join for the wrong reasons and would 'dirty the Welfare's name' if not under proper control, which the Welfare feels unable to provide. Teosin feels that he knows the Society's strengths and limitations and he did in fact suggest late in 1968 that it may be time for more open contact with these groups if the kiap permitted. The reason for his interest was his claim that more than anyone else on hand, he knew what good could be elicited from belief in cargo cult - beliefs which the Bougainville groups were reputed to hold.

Generally speaking though the Welfare maintains a remarkably low profile which contrasts with an evangelical obsession with final and rigid formulas, perhaps more characteristic of Councillors. The move
for a Parents' Association indicated an attempt to supersede the Welfare's own role and create a wider unity, perhaps based on similar social principles. Some leaders suggested that it was utopian to imagine that the separation of Welfare and Council would ever be overcome. If it were overcome, they suggested, it would be replaced by another because that was the natural state of Buka - the division between Nabouin and Nakarib had been replaced by the Catholic-Methodist moiety system which gave way in its turn to the present division. This was good, they said, because it stirred the place up (cf ginata han, Chapter 2) and woke people out of complacency. They suggested a functional, not a teleological, explanation of the Welfare.

There are other aspects of the Welfare besides preoccupation with Christianity, which it shares with 'cargo cults' of earlier years and those of other cultures, and which I believe draw misguided allegations of rigorism. Most notable is the sense of a need for discipline which is most easily seen in the drilling of squads of young men and in the emphasis on punctuality and required attendance at the spokesman's roll-call. In discussing the positive legacy of so-called cargo cults the Welfare leaders insist that their social philosophy is the same as that of earlier 'prophets': the need for black men to organise in order to achieve more; the need moreover for organisation as 'one people with one work' within a community which realised pre-colonial solidarities; the need for communal production. They also pointed to other particular reforms which one movement after another attempted and which they feel the Welfare has in part achieved: the abolition of ceremonial currency, affinal avoidance, arranged marriage and social inhibitions of individual sexual needs; the attempts to face the ever-present fear of sorcery.
There are two other areas of Welfare behaviour which I believe show a remarkable similarity with attitudes commonly ascribed to cargo cultists. The Welfare carefully fosters an ethic of saving among its members. Not only does capital accumulation by the community deter individual spending on consumer goods but members regularly disparage what they say is reckless spending by Council people. They ask each other who needs to have a fine house built if he hasn't enough money left over to buy something for use inside it or who needs shoes and long white socks to go to the garden with. This ethic, colleagues have pointed out, could be easily likened to the asceticism and conspicuous self-denial that have been observed in the behaviour of cargo cultists. I know of no other way to counter a charge that the ethic indicates a Welfare millennial design than to suggest that it is an attitude shared with earlier movements, but indicating in neither instance a desire to establish the preconditions of cargo. There is nothing in the Welfare's behaviour which suggested to me a sinister motive for capital accumulation.

The second similarity, which I believe may better indicate an explanation of some 'cargo cult' behaviour than a reinterpretation of Welfare attitudes to a millenialist scale is the notable antipathy towards those whites with whom the Welfare has day to day contact - in spite of which there persists a hope or expectation, tragic though it may be, that among remote and highly-placed whites there are some at least who agree with Welfare policies and in time will make their attitude known. Perhaps these are Burridge's 'moral European' (1960:passim). This has been true of movements of the 1930s and 1940s and the Welfare leaders, or rather some of them, believe that the Bishop really approves but does not want to shame the priests who persecute the Welfare. The same sort of attitude
emerged in 1962 after the Administrator, it is claimed, gave his provisional blessing and promised help eventually, even if there was obstruction from local officers who could be bypassed.

I can best indicate how I understand this situation by referring to the attitude to local missionaries. Nothing was clearer to me during my stay with the Welfare than the antipathy towards the local missionaries, which surpassed all other antagonisms in intensity and persistence. In some instances the disgust was mutual. As I have already indicated the Welfare believes that they were misled as to the gospel of Christianity because they were brought up on the Catechism, which is considered incomplete and misleading now that they have turned direct to the Bible as a source. It is believed that the priests did not transmit the full message because the Buka were not ready for it immediately and Buka language informants allowed mistakes in translation which gave undue emphasis to traditional authoritarian institutions and attitudes.

The Bishops and the better priests cautiously sanctioned the progressive Buka attempts at practising a more liberal morality and theology which were more in accord with the true spirit of Christianity and advanced beyond the Catechism. The one thing that they have against the missions, the Welfare claims, is that the people have now, by their own efforts, reached a fuller understanding of the message of Christianity, and the priest now attacks them for practising the very thing that he preached. And the priest for reasons of his own, has adopted an un-Christian stance characterised by hatred, rejection and persecution, the antithesis of Biblical teaching. Yet they cannot believe that the authority of the Church, the custodian of the real Christian tradition, sanctions this behaviour. Somewhere, higher in the
hierarchy, there are true Christians who do not resent the fact that the Welfare has come independently to the truth which they proclaim.

The 'secret' of Christianity then had been withheld but has been discovered in good time. The message has been dissociated from its carriers, the priests who have rejected them and have been rejected in their turn. I suggest the same appropriation of Christianity and 'unaccountable' alienation from the priests are apparent in the movement initiated by Pako, generally seen as a classic cargo cult (cf Worsley 1968:Ch.6).

This dissociation made between the message and the whites who bring it but corrupt it is, I believe, a central theme in Welfare thought. It may or may not have been generally present in earlier movements, but it is easily seen how such resentment of whites who have so much to offer but withhold so much can be construed as classical 'cargoist' antipathy towards whites for keeping the secret of the cargo. I indeed find it difficult to imagine how cargo thinking could be associated with an ideology such as the Welfare's which makes a clear distinction between the culture of the whites and the whites themselves. For there is a deliberate 'approach' to new technology and learning and careful 'avoidance' of those who seem to offer it too readily, an effort to escape the control of whites who either do not know how to impart useful knowledge in a helpful way or do not fully know their culture themselves.

For the Welfare the ground is one, the fruit of the ground is one and in a sense 'the fruit', the reproducing woman, is one. They are to be enjoyed and worked with by free individuals within a community, 'one people', not appropriated beyond one's needs and at the expense of one's fellows. So too knowledge is one, not the exclusive prerogative of one class of
people. Technology does not 'belong to' man. It is independent of him. It is enough for the Welfare that they should try to take to themselves as much of the techniques of modernisation as they can - as members of a community of equals. There is no anticipation that living or working as a community will in itself guarantee access to some formula known only to the whites.

The rediscovery of community and the gradual but positive efforts towards modernisation are things the Welfare pride themselves on. And they insist that this degree of success has not been achieved simply by accepting ideas from the whites - not even the 'spies' who they say the government has made laughable attempts at uncovering. Their new ideas are their own, they claim, and are arrived at by 'cleaning' Buka culture and European culture and joining the two together.

The freedom from dependence upon whites which they themselves proclaim is associated with a positive orientation toward European culture, which they attempt to relate, if valuable, to community needs. The topic of the value of Western education is usually guaranteed a lively treatment in conversation among the Welfare leaders. Very often the discussion achieves unanimity in their criticism of young men with a formal education who have taken part in the political life of Buka. It is the educated men, they say, who have been responsible for the island's political troubles. They criticise their intervention partly because this education is deficient in Western terms and deeply resent their false pride in their knowledge of European ways. Anyone who, instead of relying on 'tokpisin' at a public meeting, ventures a passage or two of English could be sure that his English comprehension will get a critical going-over amongst the Welfare later.

1(footnote on next page)
But their criticisms go further than this. There is a strong feeling that the education given in mission and government schools is itself inappropriate to modern life in the Buka context. Thus Teosin maintains that the real problem of education is not so much that the young do not fully understand what has been offered them in school — though this is one difficulty — but that the European-educated have no preparation for translating their knowledge into forms which are relevant to the people to whom they return after leaving school. Teosin says that this is what he had to realise when he himself returned from school in Rabaul. Rarely do people blame the uneducated for failure in communication with the educated. Most critics agree that the older generation are slow on the uptake but they are impatient more with those who claim knowledge without acknowledging the responsibility to share it.

I am not saying that the Welfare leaders are the only Buka to claim to find that the content and uses of formal education are not congruent with the needs of villagers. But critics in Council villages express their views in isolation whereas, starting from Teosin in particular and several other leaders, the Welfare has come to incorporate such attitudes as premises of policy. Others make ad hoc complaints, for instance, that after years of mission education children return and instead of teaching, have to be taught to make themselves useful again but the leadership of the Welfare in a purposive, if tentative, way tries for the benefit of younger members to indicate the drawbacks and the

1(from previous page)

Several times among the Welfare I heard the question asked 'What's so special about English anyway? It's only another kind of tokples.' This is a fair reflection of the general attitude that the use of English requires considerable justification by the context to which it is appropriate.
rewards of their educational aspirations; it tries to relate the tutored and the untutored and to lead the elders of the community to an acceptance of unfamiliar but valuable aspects of Western knowledge. It could be argued that, in view of the power of the elders in Welfare affairs, this 'concern' is very much a political necessity. Yet the fact remains that the Welfare is the spearhead of a school of thought that would bring education 'in' to the community rather than educate individuals out of it. There is an explicit attempt too - I do not know how methodical or successful - to apportion students from the Welfare to the various educational courses which would provide the required skills for the Welfare in the future.

Burridge (1960,1969) has made a serious attempt at an understanding of the moral and emotional dimensions which I think are of great importance in these Melanesian movements. I feel however that to some extent his sympathetic account has greater force because it is just that - an account which elicits for us the pathos of ultimately futile attempts to attain integrity and redemption and to sustain a new moral order. The new society which he describes is 'necessarily vague' and the Tangu, for instance, hardly anticipated success in overcoming the half-understood organisational defects of their traditional society (1960:259-63). The mobilisation of politico-economic organisations, even where effective, are but partial solutions according to Burridge and it seems that these fail and are transcended by millennial activities which alone try to come to grips with the fundamental problem of integrity (1969:98-9;108-9).

On this view the new man seems to be virtually an impossibility because moral regeneration is attained only with the help of the 'moral European', who must be incorporated in order for the new order of relationships
Redemption depends on the attitude of whites and the new moral order cannot exist unless it is perceived and acknowledged by them (1960:242-5; 265-9). The emergence of political elements in the movement is associated with anti-Europeanism and is a betrayal of the essence of the new order envisaged.

This model of the ideological system, in my opinion, unnecessarily posits a relationship of extreme dependence upon whites both in the genesis of movements and in the realisation of their aim of a new society. The view that Melanesians can only achieve self esteem if their human value is affirmed in relationships with whites takes an extreme form in Cochrane's analysis (1970), which draws upon Burridge's argument but lacks its sensitive analysis of race-relations.

Cochrane suggests that in the areas of the Solomon Islands¹ and Papua where movements broke out 'there was no institutionalized political system. Everything depended on the impermanent authority of the "big man"... The movements were spontaneous reactions against status deprivation. They were attempts to force Europeans...to recognize indigenous concepts of status' (1970:163). European contact 'completely destroyed the power and status of the "big man". "Big men" had been symbols of their society's cultural integrity....When they went there was little left. Ordinary men lost the ability to establish their manhood in the organisational framework that the "big men" had provided. The natives were unable to establish their manhood in the organisational framework provided by the Europeans. They were also unable to escape the Europeans' influence' (ibid:161).

¹ He asserts that movements did not occur on Bougainville 'where there had been little contact between Melanesians and Europeans' (1970:161).
The Europeans, it is suggested, took over the role of 'big man' in the organisational framework. The movements recognised this and did not try to claim that all natives 'were entitled to the same status as Europeans, but only that existing concepts of status be recognized by the Europeans. Europeans were to recognize "big men" as their equals and were to recognize that the natives were men' - not 'rubbish-men' (ibid:144). The movements 'described status provisionally' - awaiting confirmation by Europeans (ibid:65). This simplistic view of the colonial relationship with which movements were concerned bears a remarkable resemblance to Mannoni's argument that Malagasy society transferred its dependency complex from traditional sources of authority to the paternalist colonial - a view which Fanon analyses as a 'dangerous' oversimplification of the sense of inferiority of the colonised.¹

I do not for a minute wish to deny the existence of the subjective states that Fanon and others discern as results of colonisation and I do not question their association with cargo phenomena in some instances. I do question the possibility of adducing them as direct causes of Welfare ideology and I question the ease with which they are often used as explanations of cargo cults and Melanesian movements in general. It is commonly argued implicitly or explicitly for instance that the 'motivation' of these movements is an attempt by the blacks to prove themselves worthy - the worthiness being either an end in itself as in some of the more sensitive accounts (e.g. Ramstad, 1970) or as a means to ensure that the whites or the ancestors will magically satisfy what Worsley has caricatured as 'the consumer itch' for cargo. Such analyses stop short at the 'need to prove oneself' as explanations of such

¹ F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (trans. C. Markmann), Grove Press, 1967.
phenomena as large-scale communal cashcropping or attempts to establish a communitarian or equalitarian ethic.¹

This can hardly be a useful explanation for Welfare ideology which derived directly from the overtly rebellious movement starting at Malasang in 1957. It is no accident that the text for the minutes of the first Welfare meeting in 1960 was titled 'Civics for Self-Government' (see above, p.148) for the Society has from that time stressed the principle of 'preparation' for independence, following their own outline. The goal is without question independence and not a new dependence upon another colonial power or any moral European. This I believe is quite consistent with the regular attempts to win the approval of highly placed and trusted government officers and to coerce them into the admission of the moral responsibility that would be admitted by tsunono (see above, pp.85-6). What was sought was assistance in their 'preparation', which had indeed been promised for years before the promise was confirmed by the Administrator in 1962. I have argued that the action of the Welfare in the crisis of 1961-2 was not the aggressive revolutionary action it is usually taken for but complete rejection of white authority was clearly countenanced in the face of the threat of force by the whites.²

The analyses of Melanesian movements in terms of the ultimate dependence relationship they are believed to demonstrate distract attention from the purposive—if rarely successful—attempts to implement the sort of social philosophy which I have tried to indicate for the Welfare and which is surely shared with many other movements.

¹ Jayawardena (1969) has outlined an alternative form of explanation of an egalitarian ethic as characteristic of politically oppressed classes.

² Geertz (1969) points out the aggression inherent in acts of passive resistance and discussed the paradox of the moral superiority presumed by those who demonstrate their capacity for superior physical force and then refuse to use it (see above, pp.165-6).
Geertz (1964:52) points out that there have been two main approaches to the study of the social determinants of ideology: the interest theory and the strain theory. For the first, ideology is a mask and a weapon; for the second a symptom and a remedy. In the interest theory, ideological pronouncements are seen against the background of a universal struggle for advantage; in the strain theory, against the background of a chronic effort to correct socio-psychological disequilibrium. In the one, men pursue power; in the other they flee anxiety. As they may, of course, do both at the same time - and even one by means of the other - the two theories are not necessarily contradictory. But in these analyses of the social or psychological contexts of ideological thought 'the subtlety with which the contexts are handled points up the awkwardness with which the thought is handled.'

The interest theory creates an image of society as a clash of interests thinly disguised as a clash of principles and this 'draws attention away from the role that ideologies play in defining (or obscuring) social categories, stabilising (or upsetting) social expectations, maintaining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions' (ibid:53).

Similarly strain theory concentrates on the determinants of ideology and ignores its social and psychological roles. The 'precision in the location of the springs of ideological concern does not, somehow, carry over into the discrimination of its consequences, where the analysis becomes, on the contrary, slack and ambiguous. The consequences envisaged, no doubt genuine enough in themselves, seem almost adventitious, the accidental by-products of an essentially nonrational, nearly automatic expressive process initially pointed in another direction - as when a man stubbing his toe
cries an involuntary "ouch!" and incidentally vents his anger, signals his distress, and consoles himself with the sound of his own voice....This defect of course can be found in much of the functional analysis of the social sciences. A pattern of behaviour shaped by a certain set of forces turns out, by a plausible but nevertheless mysterious coincidence, to serve ends but tenuously related to those forces. A group of primitives sets out, in all honesty, to pray for rain and ends by strengthening its social solidarity...an ideologist sets out to air his grievances and finds himself contributing, through the diversionary power of his illusions, to the continued viability of the very system that grieves him....

[Strain theorists] tend to stress negative outcomes and possibilities rather more than the positive, and they but rarely think of ideology as more than a faute de mieux stop-gap - like nail-chewing\(^1\) (bid:55-6).

I have quoted this brilliant essay at some length because it raises two important points related to the argument of this thesis. First, the interest theory which treats ideology as a higher form of cunning was the basis of my first attempt at analysis of the Welfare, discussed and rejected in Chapter 1; Geertz's strictures are convincing but I will not return to them here. Second, the limitations of the strain theory indicate the reservations I have about much of the current style of analysis of Melanesian movements, preoccupied as it is with status deprivation, cognitive disorientation, cultural loss or social disintegration as causes of attempts at revitalisation.

It cannot be denied that in many cases these studies have considerable validity in pointing to real features of colonial society, although the social and psychological disorder is too often educed from the presumed content of the movement's ideology rather than convincingly demonstrated by independent evidence. On the other hand to the extent that recent studies share with strain theorists a concern with negative,
stop-gap responses to stress at the expense of evidence of the effectiveness and directedness of attempts to cope, they tend to adopt the evaluative conception of the ideology as an unfortunate delusion, 'rational' only in the sense that it can be seen to be logically consistent with certain mistaken basic premises.

La Barre is the most recent example. He sees nativistic crisis cults in Melanesia and elsewhere as examples of 'helpless autism in (cultural) relatively-deprived people under stress-deprived, that is, both of their own traditional explanatory myths and also of appropriate information about the cultural workings of new economic myths' (1970:305). La Barre speaks of the narcissism and sad irrationality of the defenses of the weaker society which is threatened with disintegration (ibid:632). He suggests that, like an individual, 'a whole society can be disoriented too - say, in a cargo cult ideology, with respect to the realities of European economic behaviour, and the European cognitive maps concerning it' and that anthropologists who deny this disorientation may find it too anxiety-arousing to admit that these cultural responses are neurotic and maladaptive (ibid:48-9).

This is perhaps an extreme interpretation but it indicates the tendency of depth analyses of motivation which disregard the overt goals of movements and consider only their symbolic significance. At this level of analysis, even attempts at communal production so common in these movements become merely the same sort of pathetic expressive symbol as the characteristic vase-and-tablecloth of cultist meetings.

Peters (1958:149) points out that the most obvious and usual way of explaining people's actions is to establish the reason they have for it and that to attempt an account of the goals towards which action is directed must surely be the preliminary job of anyone
interested in its explanation. He suggests that 'motives' are reasons for action which are asked for when there is an issue of justification as well as of explanation. We ask for a man's motive when his objective is not immediately apparent because the action follows no standard pattern of rules. Whether or not his reason for action coincides with the motive we accept, the motive indicates the goal which was really intended. These accounts of goal directed behaviour are to be contrasted with causal hypotheses of a mechanical type which explain what made a person behave in a certain way or why certain types or classes of reasons are operative.

Explanations of the purposive type, according to Peters, 'occupy a sort of logical ceiling in explaining human actions' (ibid) and cannot be deduced from higher level theories of a mechanical type. The latter are not theories of motives, as Peters defines the term, and are inappropriate to cases of genuine action (i.e. an act of doing something as opposed to suffering something). 'To ascribe a point to an action is ipso facto to deny that it can be sufficiently explained in terms of causes' (ibid:12, Emphasis in original).

Peters shows that general causal theories in such terms as the drive for power, the reduction of tension or restoration of equilibrium all too often redescribe purposive activity rather than explain it. 'The conditions restored are part of what is meant by the activity to be explained. For instance it might be said that people dominate others because it reduces a need in them to do so. But what is the condition restored apart from that of the presence of others being dominated?' (ibid:19). Similarly as long as there are no independent criteria for identifying the states which result from activities said to reduce tension (i.e. criteria other than the existence of the activities which are the explicandum), the explanatory value of these theories is doubtful.
Worsley's analysis of the typological succession from millenarism to secular politics as the dominant form of Melanesian movements (1968:xliii) and his emphasis on the continuity of this process seems to me to indicate an approach which gives priority to the purposive nature of many of the activities involved. But Worsley stops short of explicit comparison which I believe should be made between these movements and populist movements, although he has made cogent analyses of populism elsewhere.

I wish to draw attention to the more conspicuous features of populism, especially in the Third World, which have been noted by recent authors. Meisner (1971:32) suggests that 'in the broadest sense, Populism can be seen as a protest against modern capitalism and its human and social costs', which are borne by the peasantry, especially where capitalism is introduced from without and is generally perceived as alien. In the case of China he notes a 'distrust of "revolution from above" in favour of spontaneous mass action from below and powerful egalitarian and anti-bureaucratic impulses which are more characteristic of Russian Populism than Russian Leninism' (ibid:30).

Prominent, especially in the African ideologies of populism, are various themes of communal ownership and activity, an emphasis on communitarian values of village society as a sounder basis than capitalism for rural development (Stewart 1969; Worsley 1967). 'The populist commonly holds that the indigenous society is a "natural" Gemeinschaft' (Worsley 1967:165). There is a stress on the homogeneity and solidarity of peasant society and where existing divisions are admitted they may be explained as creations of colonial society or vestigial divisions of tribal society which are overcome within the new community.
A celebration of the values of the peasant masses is the common theme of these movements and Worsley notes the resentment of the order of society imposed from above and the distrust of the over-educated. He also points out that 'populism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality' and subscribes to the principle of a direct relationship between people and leadership unmediated by institutions.  

As Stewart points out (1969:187) 'populist movements are based upon a belief in the possibility of controlling the modernization process. It is their character as "responses to development crises" which gives populist movements their particular "Janus quality"...they share a common characteristic of a search for a synthesis between the basic values of the traditional culture of the society in which they occur and the need for modernization.' Meisner quotes Lenin's description of Russian Populist theory as 'a Janus, looking with one face to the past and the other to the future' and notes a general desire of populist ideology to preserve traditional values and social forms in confronting the demand for modernity (1971:33-4). 'Populistic mobilization represents attempts to revitalise integration on the basis of "traditional" values' and there is a 'stress on moral and social regeneration which one universally finds in populist programmes' (Stewart 1969:182).

This brief summary of characteristics of populism indicates a complex of thought and behaviour which has been shown to be a feature of the Welfare. The existence of this complex of course does not provide a complete explanation of the movement's ideology and program any more than the populist dimension of political behaviour adequately accounts for all the activities of movements

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1 Quoting Shils in 'The Concept of Populism' in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism.
which have been characterised as populist. These ideas however are entailed by central Welfare themes of community and solidarity, the synthesis of values seen as traditional and those selectively adopted as goals of modernisation, the insistence on a direct relationship with those in power so that the processes of government will be controlled by popular participation, the desire to learn but distrust of the educated, the drive for development, but development on the Welfare's own terms. And like populist movements the Welfare 'seeks substantive justice and cares not at all for traditional rules or legal systems.'

If the Welfare needs to be put in comparative perspective, it is here that I think the comparison must be made. The suggestion that populist movements are responses to 'crises of development' is one that can be usefully added to the more popular analysis which suggests that Melanesian movements are responses to crises of disintegration and which stresses the negative outcomes and possibilities. The Buka movement of the late 50s, to which the Welfare is heir, emerged at a time of rapid economic expansion and of intense distrust of the institutions advocated by the whites which contrasted with their own choice of communal organisation. This was the precipitating crisis of development. To emphasise the importance of choice, I have also suggested that the Welfare was not formed in response to increasing disintegration of traditional culture and systems of value, in spite of the loss of integrity and autonomy attributed by the Welfare to colonial rule. To use Worsley's phrase again, they stepped outside the structural framework of the existing social order and their new ideas attacked faults of the old system and refurbished other elements considered appropriate to modern needs.

I have invited comparisons between the Welfare and populism but the people themselves invite comparison
between the Welfare and cargo cult. I have not introduced the concept of populism in order to suggest a general explanation of Melanesian movements but a revaluation in these terms would, I suggest, often reveal positive elements of 'cargo' ideology which are obscured by analyses which for example look for causes only in the supposed materialistic mentality of Melanesians. It would also often reveal in these movements a Melanesian capacity, not only for suffering, but for genuine action.

Perhaps, at the conclusion of this essay on their ideas, I should let the Welfare speak for themselves, in a version of a song still heard today although Friday night meetings no longer provide the occasion (Kiki 1968: 116):

We are a lonely group of people here,
People here, we are a lonely group.
We'll sing the song, the more we sing
and sing, the more we act as a man.
In the past, we were misled.

Friday night, when we will find out
the parts of our faults and the reason
why we not or why we can or will
we think of going to see the hill top
and there we can see everywhere.
Appendix

HAHALIS WELFARE SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE GENERAL MEETING HELD AT BASBI ON THE 2ND OCTOBER, 1966 AT 10 AM.

MEETING STARTS

PRESIDENT: Mr President ibin askim Vice-President long singautim names belong ol elected members insait long rolkol.

Rollcall: Mr Vice-Pre. Ibin singautim names. Members ibin stap long miting enap 38 presented, 2 ibin sik, 20 absent na 5 members excused.

MINUTES: Mr Pre. I bin askim Secretary long readim minutes belong last miting. Mr Sec. I bin readim minutes, na ol elected members ibin agree wantaim longen, Pre. bihain i sainim name belongem na i makim date belong minutes ibin sain.

REPORTS: Mr President ibin askim ol elected members long mekim reports long ol wok President ibin givim ol long last meeting. Spokesman M. Pomis ibin tok, wok pre. ibin givim Lemankoa ibin mekim finis em long wokim saksak long copra shad na long mekim 55 bags copra.

Spokesman Tsaraha said olibin mekim finis 20 bags copra.

President: Mr Pre. Ibin askim Treasurer E. Ragu long mekim report long hamas bags copra ibin kam long wanpelo wanpelo ples.

Treasurer: Mr Treasurer E. Ragu ibin tok copra ologeta ibin kamap belong mun September 1966. (Lukim list andanit)

Lemankoa.....55 Bags Copra.
Lontis........36½ " "
Lemanmanu.....51 " "
Tandeki......10 " "
Hanpan.......14 " "
Elutupan....29½ " "
Jeelina.....6 " "
Hanahan.....17½ " "
Basbi.......30 " "
Sandaun.................
Monrahana.....12½ " "
Hakulu................
Tahetahae........20 " "
Gogohe........30 " "
Sing........20 " "

LUKIM GEN BELOW.

COPRA RECEIPT NO.1

Date 29th Sept. 1966. 180 bags copra to H.W.P.L. 20882 lbs @ 4d a lb £348-0-8d + Copra to W/YOU 130 bags £253-7-10d. Total Amount = £601-8-6d.


DISCUSSION OF REPORTS

President i askim ol members long mekim sampelo toktok long ol reports ibin kamap finis long miting belong today.

Spokesman J. Kurangik em ibin askim Treasurer belong Northern Coast Mr A.R. Sagolo, na emi tok long Bedford ibin kamap long hap belong N.Coast na watfo em inobin mekim wok? Bedford ibin lusim Hahalis long 5 kilok na society ibin peim long £8. Mr J. Kurangik i tok emi no hamamas tru long ripot i tok olosem Truck inobin mekim wok. Mr Sagolo i tok truck inobin mekim wok long ologeta hap long Lemanmanu tasol ibin go mekim liklik wok tasol long Elutupan.
Mr Pre. i tok dispelo pasin em ino stretn sapos yu order long truck na ino kam mekim wok gen. President ibin tokim Sagolo long em imas lukluk gut long taim truck ikam antap hia em imas mekim trupelo wok. Taim truck ikam em society i save lusim money na money em ibelong ol pipol. Taim car ikam imas mekim tru wok bai money belong ol pipol iken kamap bek. Sapos soc.i baim car no inogat wok imekim bai pipol i sori long money belong ol na oli ken sutim yu long sampelo toktok, or mekim kot long yu.

Mr Simon Kunbi em ibin askim long copra 30 bags belong Lemankoa group A and B. Em ibin laik save dispelo copra sapos i belong community or village fund.01 Lemankoan pipol and Spokesman said 22 bags belong group A na 8 bags belong group B baimbai i kisim moni long H,W,P,L. na bai moni i mas go long village fund.

Mr M. Keali bin tok out long wok last miting ibin givim longen long go mekim long Lemankoa ibin mekim finis, na ibin stretn finis tu olosem em ibin fainim £13-18/- istap stretn na ibin kamap gut long ol pipol. Spokesman Bannis of Gogohe ibin askim Keali long dispelo samting ibin stretn olosem wonem? Mr Keali tok, long copra P. Pakits ibin go longen ibin kisim moni enap long £6-18/- na copra Nobin ibin go salim emi ibin kisim £5. longen na money ologeta enap £13-18/-.

Spokesman M. Tulu ibin tok, em pasin olosem long wanpelo man inogat rait long salim copra inogutpe lo no iolosem bai enap long stilim money na bai yumi man i bosim copra iken kisim blame longen long President na members belongen tu enap long Lontis to Sing.01 Spokesmen i agree long tok belong Sn.Tulu na olibin tok orait inogat man moa iken go wantaim copra husat inogat rait long mekim dispelo wok.

GENERAL BUSINESS

Spokesman M. Tulu ibin askim long watfo inogat ripot i save kamap long tokim yumi long cocoa, or payment belong cocoa? Em i tok mi save welfare ibin formim ologeta samting finish bai wanpelo tasol na em tasol watfo mi askim long cocoa. Pre. i tok ating ibin gat wanpelotaim yumi bin harim finish ripot belong cocoa ibin go long Rabaul na pei ibin kamap enap long £351-7/-, na long 2 tons cocoa ibin go long Rabaul last month wantaim 50 bags copra em pei inokamap yet.

Pre. i askim Secretary belong Company J.B. Rau long tok out long 30 bags cocoa ibin go long C.M.B. Mr John Rau i tok, long cocoa beans 30 bags igat weight note tasol ibin kamap na 50 bags copra tu.Long pei belong en inokamap yet.
Spokesman Pomis ibin tok long more yet long copra belong Lemankoa, na em ibin movim wanpelo motion olosem: Milaik long community imas gat 30 bags yet na 25 bags i mas gobek long village fund. Motion moved, second by Sn. Marata motion carried.

Pre. i tok long ologeta hap long Northern Coast mi save igat ol villages fund tasol oli mas lukaut gut tru longen, olotaim mi save harim plenty man isave tok sampelo money long ol dispelo village fund i save kam long mi, Mi tokim miting nau, long dispelo mi nosave. Sapos yu harim tok belong mi nau olosem orait yu mas save na mekim sampelo toktok olosem long fainim sapos itrupele.

Sn. M. Tulu ibin askim long haus belong Sawa long sapos Basbi bin mekim sampelo wok longen or sapos i finis? Pre. i tok Basbi em igat plenty tru long mekim. Yu save haus belong mi oli mas wok longen haus copra, haus belong sawa, na ol kain wok hia klostu. So i think ologeta arapel ples imas givim hand tu long haus belong Sawa.

Sn. M. Tulu i tok watfo long yumi bin makim tupelo man tasol long store, na nau mi ken lukim oloman tu inobin gat rait long store iken wok long store. Mi tink dispelo pasin inobihainim wanpelo law na i lukluk olosem bikhet. President i tok yes sapos man yu makim long wonem kain wok imas mekim, em tasol iwok belongen.

Sn. Marata of Jelelina em ibin muvim wanpela motion long em i laik baimbai ologeta leaders imas change long ol pleses belong ol na kisim ples bilong narapela, narapela leaders. Long dispela tinktink em i laikim belong luk save sapos wok belong ol spokesmen i kamap gut orait wantaim or sapos i wankain. Motion moved and second by Anton Hatobu, all in favours.

Sn. Simon Bena ibin mekim toktok long pasin belong markim graun em itok mi save long Welfare em ibin formim graun belong em wanpela tasol mi no save hamas graun tru ibin formim long wanpela. Long dispela tinktink mi laikim olosem baimbai yumi mas makim graun na putim boundry belong Council na long Solos em olosem bai yumi luk save hamas graun tru yumi bin formim olosem wanpela.

Sn. Bonus of Elutupan em tok long dispela tinktink mi laikim tu long wanem lo belong yumi itok ol leaders imas lukluk gut tru long wanpela graun belong Welfare tasol i tru yumi ino save graun leaders imas lukluk gut longen na lukautim belong ol pipol enap we, em olosem na mi laik bai yumi imas makim.

Sn. Siria em itok, long dispela tinktink i orait yumi mas makim graun belong yumi baimbai yumi save sapos yumi laik mekim wok antap long em baimbai yu mi save stretim graun belong yumi, yumi mekim wok longen. Nogut yumi mekim wok antap long graun belong Council members baimbai igat trabol.
Sn. Tarea of Gogohe itok, long dispela tinktink i gutpala yumi mas makim graun baimbai bihain yumi i free long mekim wok antap stret long em arapela man i noken tok kros bikos yumi wok stret long giraun belong yumi.

Pre. em i askim husat em i laik muvim strong dispela motion Sn. Tsigala i muvim motion em itok mi laik yumi kisim wanpela lain long katim rot igo long bik bus na kamap long Solos bihain yumi toktok wantaim pipol belong Solos long putim boundry igo across towards boundry belong Hagus.

Motion moved second by John Kurangik of Lemankoa all in favours.

ACTIVE WORKS:

Pr. em i givim wok belong next month.

1. Spokesmen belong Northern coast Elutupan to Lontis imas pinisim saksak i kam belong haus copra.

2. Ologeta Spokesmen belong 14 groups imas mekim wok long 30 bags of copra each group.

3. Mr Chairman belong Development Committees Meeting with some spokesmen imas go lukim District Commissioner Mr Mollison at Sohano on Tuesday or Wednesday.

PRESIDENT IBIN GIVIM TOKTOK BELONGEN LONG TAIM MITING I LAIK FINISH

A/ President ibin toktok long ol elected members long oli mas biahinim gut tru ol lwas and rules belong welfare society na noken train long mekim sampelo tinktink inowankain olosem laws and rules. Em i tok sapos yumi biahinim tasol namwan tinktink belong yumi bin formim em baimbai inogat wanpelo hap belong welfare soc. i foldaun, long wonem yumi wok biahinim rule tasol.

B/ Welfare society emi save troweim hap money long gerapim ol wok belongen na long lukautim gut ol haphap belongen long stret oltaim.

C/ Sapos yuno redi long mekim stret olsamting belong yu baimbai Yunonap tru long mekim wanpelo samting ikamap. Olosem sapos yulaik baim car yu mas redi pastaim sampelo money belong baim. Nau ologeta wok mi givim yu ibelong kamapim money na sapos ol dispele wok ino redi orait yu save yet inogat money tu i redi. Orait na noken tok nating long samting imas kamap or kisim without money, or yuken kisim bikos of the society. Yu mas save gut name tasol welfare soc. na name tasol tu council yunoken kisim plenty samting. Em man tasol insait long welfare soc. emi save
hatwok na samting iken kamap tu em man yet imemember long
council em yet i save hatwok na samting ikamap, olosem
man yet imekim samting i kamap gut na i kamap nogut.
Em tasol tok belong mi na miting i finish. Taim nau
2.0,clock pm.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 8,66</td>
<td>John Teosin</td>
<td>President of the Welfare</td>
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PLATE 1

GOGOHE
MALASANG
HUTJENA
HAHELA MISSION
AGRIC. OFFICE

AIRSTRIP

IETA VILLAGE
(PART)

TSUNONO DIRECTS KINALALA DISTRIBUTION AT CLUBHOUSE
PLATE 2

SEARCHING OUT SORCERY
HANAHAN 1 1968

CLUBHOUSE (OLD STYLE)
WITH RAINSHRINE

BRIDEPRICE HUNG AT CLUBHOUSE

DANCE FOR HAMAL
AT CLUBHOUSE (NEW STYLE)
PLATE 4

WELFARE CO. STORE, BASBI

BASBI VOTING FOR HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

DONATION ACCOUNTS ON DISPLAY, LEMANMANU