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The Radicalization of the Indian and Irish Nationalist Movements, 1914-1922: A Comparison

by

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Declaration

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts at the Australian National University. It is the result of my own original research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no copy or paraphrase of material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgements are made in the text of the thesis.

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October, 1984
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<tr>
<td>AICC</td>
<td>All-India Congress Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi</td>
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<td>DMP</td>
<td>Dublin Metropolitan Police</td>
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<td>H. C. Debates</td>
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<td>Indian National Congress</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Irish Republican Brotherhood</td>
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<td>MP</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-co-operation</td>
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Preface

I initially conceived of this research when I was an honours student at the University of Tasmania. It was then that my supervisors, Dr. Asim Roy and Dr. Richard Davis, painstakingly showed me that the interaction of the Indian and Irish nationalist movements during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a much neglected field of research. Dr. Davis himself has already done some substantial work in this field. Other historians such as Dr. Mary Cumpston, Dr. J.V. Crangle, and Dr. Howard Brasted have also contributed significant studies to this fertile area of academic endeavour.

However, most of the work on this rare domain of comparative studies is concentrated in the nineteenth century. Dr. Cumpston, for instance, discusses the nature of Irish nationalist advocacy of Indian interests during 1851-1906.\(^1\) Dr. Brasted, in two well-documented articles which establish the Irish Home Rule influence on the development of Indian national consciousness, also confines himself to the 1870s and 1880s.\(^2\) Dr. Crangle, who analyses Irish nationalist diatribes against the imperial administration of India,

too, focuses his attention on the period 1880-1884.¹

While the main area of research of Davis is early twentieth-century Ireland, apart from a comparative study on the non-violent resistance movements of Griffith and Gandhi,² he chiefly looks at the propaganda use made of each other by Indian and Irish nationalists and their conceptions of their counterpart's struggle for freedom.³ Thus, there is as yet no serious attempt to analyse and compare the internal dynamics which propelled the Indian and Irish nationalist movements to a more radical course during and after the First World War.

The primary objectives of this thesis are to compare the reasons for the political radicalization of the Indian and Irish nationalist movements between 1914 and 1922, to assess the Irish influence on the formulation of tactics and objectives of the Indian National Congress, and to reveal the propagandist exploitation of Indian and Irish events by the nationalist press of the two countries. The period chosen for comparison is full of intriguing parallels and striking contrasts, especially in respect of political styles, political cultures and perceptions of goals. Both the parliamentary Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates favoured constitutional

politics, for they shared the same faith in parliamentary democracy. To them, Ireland and India could best recapture their grandeur and glory through evolutionary change. Hence, they adopted peaceful agitation, petition, and delegation as their means. On the other hand, militant Irish nationalists and Indian Extremists shared the same impatience with evolutionary progress and resorted to violent methods to assert Ireland's and India's claim to separate nationhood. During the war, moderate nationalism was swept aside in India as well as in Ireland and unconditional co-operation with the British authorities was declared unpatriotic. Redmond and Dillon gave way to Griffith and de Valera in Ireland, Banerjea and Sinha gave way to Tilak and Mrs. Besant in India. To what extent did the war occasion the rise of political radicalism in India and Ireland? Was the collapse of the Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates a result of their own ineffectiveness or British insensitivity to the precarious position in which the war had placed them? Were Indian Home Rule radicals who edged the Moderates out of the political scene in 1918 identical with the Irish radicals who annihilated the Irish Nationalists at the polls in 1918?

After the war, Dail Eireann (the Irish National Assembly) was set up in Ireland and the Sinn Fein (we ourselves) policy of self-reliance was practised in earnest. But why did the Irish struggle take a radical turn towards violence shortly after the electoral victory of Sinn Fein? Was Griffith's policy of passive resistance too weak to be effective or was British military coercion too provocative to the pugnacious Irish militants?
In India, Congress leaders on the whole accepted dyarchy as a gesture of British good will. But why did Gandhi, who was a staunch loyalist before the Amritsar massacre (1919) turn into an irreconcilable opponent of the British Empire in 1920? Indian Muslims, who had always adopted a pro-British and anti-Congress attitude before the war, also turned their back on their erstwhile protector and sided with the Hindus in opposition to the British raj (rule). Why did the Indian Muslims suddenly revoke their allegiance to the Crown and join the Hindu agitation for swaraj (self-rule)? Was it because of the coming of age of Indian nationalists, whether Hindu or Muslim, or because of injudicious British actions? As the Anglo-Irish war had popularized the nationalist ideal and demonstrated the means of political mobilization, to what extent did the Indians, who closely monitored Irish developments, seek guidance from the Irish experience in launching non-co-operation in India? How great, in fact, was the impact of the Irish nationalist movement on its Indian counterpart?

Although the parallels and the interplay between the two movements will be analysed, the contrasts must also be explained. The policy of boycott and abstention of Griffith was similar to the non-co-operation movement of Gandhi. Yet why did the former tacitly condone IRA (Irish Republican Army) atrocities? Was Griffith a tactical rather than a doctrinal pacifist? Was the tradition of political violence stronger in Ireland than India? Was Griffith's peaceful stance merely high-flown rhetoric solely for the sake of propaganda? Was Irish attention to India during 1914-1922 based on self-interest or a genuine sympathy for all oppressed nationalities? Was the Irish Sinn Fein movement similar to Gandhi's satyagraha
(truth-force, soul-force) campaign?

In the case of the Indian nationalist movement, were there any circumstantial factors apart from Gandhi's personal sway over the Congress that explain its adherence to non-violence?

Was peace and non-violence really intrinsic to Indian culture as Gandhi claimed? How did other Indian nationalists see satyagraha? Why was Gandhi so determined to repudiate Irish revolutionary influence in 1919-1922? Was his attitude towards the Sinn Feiners typical of Indian radicals? Why, given widespread support, did civil disobedience in India eventually collapse in 1922? Did Gandhi ask too much of human nature as his critics claimed? Was he, as Tilak suggested, more an idealist than a realist?

As this is a study of the radicalization of nationalist politics, what, then, are the criteria of a radical? So far this thesis is concerned, the word 'radical' is used to denote those Indian and Irish nationalists who, by temperament or conviction, wanted greater measures of autonomy, were more virulent and uncompromising in their denunciation of the British authorities than their colleagues or predecessors, were more impatient with the tempo of constitutional reforms, were more prepared to weaken the connection with Britain, and were not averse to the use of unconstitutional means, even violence, to achieve their goals. It is a definition based not so much on ultimate aims as on the manner in which dissatisfaction was expressed and the means which were employed. Thus the Indian Home Rulers/Extremists were radicals in the sense that they were critical of the Moderates' inactivity and
subservience, took on a more hostile and defiant attitude towards the government, and were prepared to launch passive resistance to wring concessions from Britain, despite the fact that they shared the Moderates' ultimate objective of attaining self-government within the British Empire. The same can be said of the Irish Sinn Feiners. Although they propounded the concept of dual monarchy which preserved Ireland's constitutional link with England, they were nevertheless radicals because they opposed the Irish Nationalists' policy of collaboration and were prepared to set up a rival government in Ireland unilaterally. Likewise, although political radicalism usually connotes violence in the Irish context, political extremism in India by and large means the adoption of a non-co-operative attitude towards the government, and not necessarily a resort to political terrorism. Of course, there is verbal/rhetorical violence in the speeches of Indian and Irish nationalists, as well as moral coercion in Griffith's Sinn Feinism and Gandhi's satyagraha. These traits are taken as elements of political radicalism in this thesis. Thus, the word 'radical' is used in a relative and comparative sense in separate Indian and Irish contexts. Barring the Indian Moderates and the Irish Nationalists, all nationalists in this thesis were radicals at least for some time, even if some of them such as Mrs. Besant, who started her political career as a radical, later joined the Moderate camp.
CHAPTER 1

Irish and Indian Nationalism Before the First World War

'The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but does not remove the necessity of subduing again, and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.'

These statements of the great Irishman, Edmund Burke, on conciliation with America in 1775 might well be applied to British domination over India and Ireland as well. Since the union with Britain in 1800, moderate Irish nationalists had never ceased to agitate for legislative independence, and radical militants had seized every opportunity to achieve complete separation. Indian nationalists, who were slow to develop a sense of nationhood, also began to show signs of a political awakening in 1885 by organizing the Indian National Congress (hereinafter INC) as an organ for nationalist agitation. Like the Irish separatists, Indian militants also favoured political violence as a means to their end, but like their Irish counterparts, they were weak and ineffective. In fact, the dominant stream of both movements before 1914 was represented by the Irish Parliamentary Party and the INC: moderate in their objectives, which generally rejected complete independence, and constitutional in their methods, which in practice meant deputation and agitation. Yet, despite the over-all moderation of both

2. Burke, E., 1729-1797; political writer and orator; in 1787, he instigated the impeachment of Warren Hastings, G-G of India.
3. INC — founded on 28 December 1885; largest political organization in India; met annually in December to discuss current problems.
movements, the Irish nationalists were sufficiently in advance of their Indian counterparts to make them a source of inspiration and emulation for the Indians. Irish nationalist leaders frequently spoke out on behalf of India. Irish precedents were often cited by Indian leaders to support their demands or positions; Irish tactics were discussed and sometimes followed; and, on several occasions, Irish help was sought and the Irish struggle was linked to India's.

The man who gave leadership and substance to Irish constitutional nationalism was Daniel O'Connell. A Catholic nationalist who introduced mass agitation and monster demonstrations to Irish politics, O'Connell dominated the Irish political scene from 1810 to 1847. His campaign for Catholic emancipation and his Repeal movement brought a large number of clergy and peasantry to the political arena. A staunch loyalist and constitutionalist, he wanted to achieve legislative independence through strictly constitutional means and strongly disapproved of the glorification of violence by the Young Irelanders, who were greatly influenced by the revolutionary tradition of contemporary Europe.

Despite their differences over the means and ends of the Irish nationalist movement, both O'Connell and the Young Irelanders nevertheless took particular pleasure in arousing Irish opinion to

2. Catholic emancipation — civil rights movement for Irish Catholics in the 1820s.
3. Repeal movement — nationalist movement aimed to repeal the union with England in the 1830s and 1840s.
4. Young Irelanders — members of a nationalist movement in the 1840s led by Thomas Davis, C.G. Duffy and J.B. Dillon.
condemn British misdeeds in the colonies, especially India, and making colonial grievances an Irish concern. Although India was nominally not subject to the Crown until Queen Victoria's Proclamation in 1858, O'Connell had already pleaded for 'Justice for India' and spoke of adopting 'the Natives of India as my clients'. Thomas Davis, a leading figure of the Young Irelanders, wrote of the British annexation of Indian states as 'the triumph of crime' and strongly repudiated the British notion of 'civilizing mission'. His follower, John Mitchel, also had no doubt that Britain was fed on the flesh and blood of India and Ireland to the extent that Britain 'could not now stand a week without India, could not breathe an hour without Ireland ...'

Intensely dissatisfied with O'Connell's peaceful agitation and eager to follow the footsteps of Wolfe Tone, the Young Irelanders rose in arms in 1848. The rising, however, was easily put down by the British authorities. The establishment of the Irish Republican

1. Queen Victoria; 1819-1901; Queen of the United Kingdom, 1837-1901; Empress of India since 1876.
4. Davis, T.; 1818-1845; founder of Nation and the Young Ireland movement in 1842.
6. Mitchel, J.; 1815-1875; editor of United Irishman; transported to Australia after the failure of the 1848 revolt.
8. Tone, T.W.; 1763-1798; father of Irish republicanism and theorist of its ideology; revolted in 1798; failed.
Brotherhood (hereinafter IRB)\(^1\) in 1858 by James Stephens,\(^2\) one of the most relentless rebels of 1848, also failed to deflect the nationalist movement from its moderate constitutional course. Striving to set up an Irish Republic through physical force, this secret revolutionary body, with its American branch - the Fenian Brotherhood (later Clan na Gael)\(^3\) - was ineffective and devoid of popular support. The Fenian risings of 1865 and 1867 were sporadic and were nothing short of fiascoes. In fact, throughout the nineteenth century, militant nationalism remained essentially an undercurrent beneath the broader stream of liberal constitutionalism. Its fortunes hinged fortuitously upon the ebbs and flows of the Repeal movement and the Irish Parliamentary Party.

The Irish Parliamentary Party, or the Nationalist Party, grew out of the Home Rule League founded by Isaac Butt\(^4\) in 1873. A liberal body, it sought to secure Ireland's political autonomy through parliamentary agitation, persuasion and the force of public opinion. Its influence grew tremendously when in 1879, in face of increasing agrarian distress, its leader, Charles Stewart Parnell,\(^5\) and the leader of the Land League,\(^6\) Michael Davitt,\(^7\) forged an alliance so as to harness rural agitation to the political campaign

1. IRB -- 1858-1924; chief organization of Irish militant Republicans.
2. Stephens, J.; 1825-1901; Young Irelander; participant of 1848 rising; chief founder of the Fenians.
4. Butt, I.; 1813-1879; founder of the Home Rule movement in 1870s.
5. Parnell, C.S.; 1846-1891; leader of the Home Rule movement in the 1880s; 'Uncrowned King of Ireland' in that period.
6. Land League -- organization of tenant farmers founded in 1879 to promote and protect their interests against the landlords.
and widen the social base of the Home Rule movement and the agrarian struggle. From the political point of view, this 'New Departure'—as the policy of uniting the revolutionary and constitutional nationalists was called—brought much vigour to the Home Rule movement which enjoyed further success by aligning with the British Liberal Party. It also firmly established the Irish Parliamentary Party as the most powerful organization, and constitutional liberalism the dominant passion, in the Irish nationalist movement.

From the mid-1870s to mid-1880s, when the influence of the Irish Parliamentary Party was at its zenith under the leadership of Parnell, many Irish MPs, notably Frank Hugh O'Donnell, Justin McCarthy and Arthur O'Connor, also defended Indian interests in the House of Commons and considered themselves the 'natural representatives and spokesmen of the unrepresented nationalities of the Empire.' In 1883, a proposal was made that an Irish seat should be allocated to an eminent Indian statesman, Dadabhai Naroji, so that 'Ireland would thus have the honour of giving a direct voice in the House of Commons to countless millions of British subjects who were ruled despotically and taxed without votes.' Alfred Webb,

1. O'Donnell, F.H.; 1848-1916; journalist; MP, 1873-86; favoured parliamentary obstruction.
2. McCarthy, J.; 1830-1912; novelist & historian; MP, 1879-1900; leader of the anti-Parnellites.
4. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', p. 16.
treasurer of the Irish National League,\(^1\) also advised the Irish not to participate in Britain's plundering in India and felt that if Ireland and India did not rise both would fall together.\(^2\) Although Parnell himself was less outspoken than his lieutenants on fraternity with India, he nevertheless thought that every member of the British Empire, including India, should 'manage their own internal affairs'.\(^3\)

Though the strength of the Irish Parliamentary Party was gravely sapped by the internecine feuds and personal rancour after the death of Parnell in 1891, the cause of political moderatism was not lost as the revolutionary movement was also plagued by political division and inactivity. Despite the establishment of rival political bodies such as Sinn Fein\(^4\) in 1905, the Irish Parliamentary Party remained at the helm in the Irish political arena. In 1914, it even secured Home Rule on the statute book, thus bringing centuries-long Irish nationalist aspirations to a consummation.

The eclipse of the Irish Parliamentary Party after Parnell's death, however, weakened its role as sentry of the oppressed nationalities.\(^5\) But fortunately for India, Sinn Fein had taken up where the Irish Parliamentary Party had left off. In issue after issue, Arthur Griffith\(^6\), founder of Sinn Fein, hurled his scorching

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1. Irish National League — inaugurated by Parnell in 1882 to replace the Land League. It was the constituency organization of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
2. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', pp. 15-6.
3. Quoted in ibid, p. 17.
4. Sinn Fein — a political party which advocated dual monarchy, self-reliance and passive resistance.
criticisms at British exploitation of India and Ireland and accused Britain of causing widespread famines in both countries in the nineteenth century.\(^1\) To Griffith, the partition of Bengal in 1905 was a divisive tactic of the Viceroy, Lord Curzon,\(^2\) to demolish the burgeoning Bengali identity. As for the establishment of the All-India Muslim League\(^3\) in 1906, Griffith argued that it was deliberately created to promote Hindu-Muslim enmity. The Muslim League, he said, resembled 'in its worst aspects the Orange (Protestant) body in Ireland'.\(^4\) All these were indisputable evidence of British tactics of 'divide and rule'.\(^5\) He was particularly delighted by India's swadeshi (use of home-made goods) movement and regarded it as the Indian Sinn Fein.\(^6\)

Irish nationalists' sympathy for India greatly heartened politically conscious Indians. Though thousands of miles away from Dublin and relatively late in developing a sense of nationhood, Indian statesmen looked to the Irish struggle as a source of inspiration and emulation. For instance, Surendranath Banerjea,\(^7\) editor of the Calcutta Bengalee, responded eagerly to O'Donnell's endeavours after 1875 to form an all-India organization to represent Indian interests.\(^8\) O'Donnell was regarded by many indigenous

1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 69.
2. Lord Curzon; 1859-1925; Under-secretary for India, 1891-2; Viceroy of India, 1898-1905.
3. Muslim League — founded in 1906; aimed essentially to protect and promote the political interests of the Muslims.
4. Sinn Fein (Dublin), 12 January 1907.
5. ibid., 15 September 1906; 12 January 1907.
6. ibid., 2, 30 March 1907.
newspapers as a 'teacher in constitutional agitation' in 1882. As for the Irish nationalist leader Parnell, he was venerated by young Indian nationalists as the equal of Mazzini, Cavour, Kossuth and other eminent Western statesmen.

Parnell's tremendous success in harnessing rural discontent to the Home Rule agitation through the Land League in the 1880s also alerted the more advanced Indian leaders to the political potential of the peasants. However, the timid Indian peasants in the 1880s were too frightened to 'try extreme measures' and their urban middle-class patrons were equally averse to rural violence. When the INC was established in 1885, its founders, like early Indian nationalists also resolved to follow the Irish Nationalists' policy of alignment with the Liberal Party in Britain, to be supplemented with determined agitation and vigorous self-help. When Alfred Webb, then an Irish member of the Indian Parliamentary Committee, presided over the annual Congress session at Madras in 1894, he also told the Congress delegates not to rely too much on the British. 'Catholics would never have been emancipated in Ireland, the Church would not have been disestablished, or the franchise extended', he said, by the British imperialists 'under the present institutions'.

1. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', p. 23.
2. Mazzini, G.; 1805-1872; Italian patriot; organized Young Italy in 1832; worked for the unification of Italy.
3. Cavour, C.B.; 1810-1861; leading figure in the unification of Italy.
7. ibid., pp. 55-6.
Despite its founders' enthusiasm and expectations, the Congress remained for many years 'a halting, half-hearted political movement depending on the sympathy and good will of the British government'. Instead of being a strong political organization pressing the British authorities for reforms and concessions, it became a 'safety-valve for the escape of great and growing forces' in the imperial machine. Its torpidity and ineffectiveness eventually alienated many younger nationalists such as B.G. Tilak, B.C. Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai and Aurobindo Ghose, who rose to prominence after the partition of Bengal in 1905. Styling themselves the 'New Party', these Extremists offered political India a new goal and a new programme of action which were completely different from those of the loyalist Congressmen or Moderates.

The Moderates, who were imbued with British humanitarianism and liberalism, considered constitutional gradualism the best means to attain colonial self-government. They disliked the inequities and debilities of Hindu society and deemed British rule a providential spur to India's socio-political modernization. Thus, despite the tardiness of constitutional advancement, they still worked patiently with their imperial master to introduce British institutions and

3. Tilak, B.G.; 1856-1920; leading Extremist in Maharashtra; helped found Kesari and Mahratta.
4. Pal, B.C.; 1858-1932; Bengali journalist & Extremist.
7. They called themselves 'Nationalists' but their critics nicknamed them 'Extremists'.
ideas to India so as to make a modern, liberal democracy feasible in the Indian setting.¹

In contrast to the Moderates' rational, Western-oriented secular nationalism, the nationalism of the Extremists was emotional, nostalgic, religious (Hindu), and militant -- attributes which characterized the militant Gaelic nationalism of Irish revolutionaries such as P.H. Pearse.² In their view, Western innovations were anathema to Indian culture and British rule a predatory foreign incubus over the future of India. They sought to revive indigenous norms and values, and buttress the position of the traditionally dominant castes from which most of them came and whose interests were being seriously threatened by the British raj.³ Contrary to the Moderates' insistence on political apprenticeship, the Extremists maintained India's fitness for immediate self-government and argued for complete independence as a prerequisite to all national development.⁴ They criticized the Moderates' timidity and 'mendicancy' as futile and contemptible and rejected their faith in British justice and liberalism as a myth and a farce. Instead, they advocated passive resistance, boycotts and refusal to pay taxes.⁵

2. Pearse, P.H.; 1879-1916; poet, school master and Republican; editor of An Claidheamh Soluis (The Sword of Light), 1903-9. infra., pp. 31-34.
G.K. Gokhale and B.G. Tilak typified these two streams of Indian nationalism. Both Western-educated Chitpavan Brahmins, Gokhale and Tilak were greatly influenced by the Irish nationalist movement. Gokhale often spoke of Irish history since the union as somewhat similar to that of India, and he never lost an opportunity of impressing on the minds of his people the long course of steady work and disinterested sacrifice which the Irish leaders have shown during the whole century. The tireless endeavour of the Irish Nationalists impressed him most and he always took in the Dublin Freeman's Journal and The Times of London so as to keep himself informed of current British political thought. The perseverance of the Irish people in their struggle for Home Rule also impressed the leader of the Bengali Moderates, Surendranath Banerjea, who acknowledged his ideological debt to the great Irish statesman Edmund Burke.

As for Tilak and the Extremists, they were 'slavish imitators of the West', especially Irish Fenianism and Russian anarchism. Tilak borrowed his no-rent campaign in the Deccan from Ireland and the Bengalees were taught to believe in the power of the boycott by

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1. Gokhale, G.K.; 1866-1915; Bombay university teacher and leading Moderate; founded Servants of India Society, 1905.
2. Chitpavan Brahmins — Caste of Maharashtrian Brahmins, traditionally dominant in Maharashtra since the rise of the Peshwa from among them.
4. Ibid.
5. Bengalee (Bengal), 21 December 1907.
illustrations taken from contemporary Irish history. The examples of Irish terrorists who replenished their financial support by political robberies were cited to justify political violence in India. Indian revolutionaries in America had also found 'ready helpers amongst the Irish-American Fenians'.

When Sinn Fein was set up in 1905, Griffith's policy of self-reliance, self-strengthening, superseding British politico-administrative apparatus with Irish institutions, and not falling back on British justice or mercy captured the imagination of Indian Extremists. Griffith's inaugural speech on Sinn Fein policy was published in full by the Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), and pamphlets on the history of the Irish movement were distributed in political meetings. One nationalist newspaper equated Sinn Fein with swadeshi and argued that Griffith had provided Indians with a valuable precedent for implementing their boycott movement. Tilak, with his usual vigor and virulence, urged his compatriots to do what Griffith had asked the Irish to do and endorsed the pro-Irish New York Gaelic American's suggestion of a three-pronged attack on the British by Ireland, South Africa and India. Jawaharlal Nehru,
while visiting 'this green and beautiful island' in 1907, had attended a Sinn Fein meeting in Dublin and wrote to his father, Motilal, telling him that Sinn Fein resembled 'very closely the Extremist movement in India'. Like Griffith, he thought that the Protestant-Catholic enmity in Ireland was largely the result of 'an amazingly clever imperialist move' of Britain. Speaking of the political creed of the New Party (Extremists), the Bengali Moderate, Rashbehary Ghose, said in his 1907 Congress presidential address: 'Like the Sinn Fein party in Ireland, it has lost all faith in constitutional movements .... All its hopes are centred in passive resistance of a most comprehensive kind, derived, I presume, from the modern history of Hungary, the pacific boycott of all things English'.

At the annual Congress session at Surat in 1907, Tilak joined hands with other Extremist leaders such as Lajpat Rai of the Punjab (The Land of Five Rivers) and B.C. Pal of Bengal in an effort to capture the Congress. They failed and were expelled from the Congress. A new Congress constitution was drafted which laid down the goal of the Congress as colonial self-government to be attained by strictly constitutional means. This provision was binding on every delegate to the Congress. To the added dismay of the

5. Ghose, R.; 1845-1921; jurist and scholar; pleader of the Calcutta High Court; president of INC 1907 & 1908.
Extremists, the authorities, in pursuance of law and order, imprisoned Tilak and Pal, deported Lajpat Rai and harassed other leaders into submission. The rank-and-file Extremists, lacking an effective organization and a competent leadership, were effete and disorganized, and so they remained in 1914.

Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, Irish militants and Indian Extremists were still marginal to the political scene. But they were growing in strength as the Irish Parliamentary Party and the INC became increasingly moribund and failed to broaden their appeal to other social groupings. As nationalist organizations, they allowed their bases to become too narrow and their aspirations too limited. This failure proved fatal to the constitutional cause and facilitated the comeback of the radicals during the war.
CHAPTER 2
India and Ireland in the Early Years of the First World War: the Twilight of Constitutional Moderatism

Few international events in the twentieth century have been more influential on modern Indian and Irish history than the First World War. Before the war, the mainstream of Indian and Irish nationalism was represented by the Indian Moderates and Irish Nationalists. Their means were constitutional agitation within the parliamentary framework. Their end was self-government within the British Empire. After the war, both the Indian and Irish political scene were dominated by the radicals who adopted passive resistance and talked of severing the imperial connexion. The erstwhile peaceful agitation for concessions had been transformed. In its stead was a strong claim to self-determination as a natural human right. Indian nationalists in particular had divested themselves of their colonial mentality and vindicated their national dignity by a strong assertion of radical nationalism. They no longer saw themselves as inferiors to Europeans, but as their equals in every aspect. This process of radicalisation did not begin immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. On the contrary, the initial effect of the war was to strengthen pro-British feeling in both countries. It was not long, however, before the strains imposed by the war had produced widening cracks in the facade of Irish and Indian loyalty to the Empire.

Before hostilities commenced in Europe, Ireland was on the brink of civil war. In 1913, the Ulster Unionists, under the leadership of
Edward Carson,¹ had denied British legal authority to impose Home Rule on all Ireland and revived the physical force concept by organizing the Ulster Volunteers as extra-parliamentary support for Ulster unionism. Encouraged by the Liberal government's connivance at the arming of Ulster and Eoin MacNeill's² provocative article 'The North Began', the IRB countered the move by organizing the Irish Volunteers to back their claim to separate nationhood. Gun-running and drilling took place in open defiance of government bans. In addition, James Connolly,³ an Irish trade unionist and socialist, had transformed the Citizen Army, which had originated as a strike defence force during the great Dublin lock-out in 1913, into a militant workers' brigade and preached socialist revolution with increasing vehemence. Thus by 1914, there were no less than three private armies in Ireland fully prepared to use force if necessary.

By contrast, India in 1914 was politically very sluggish. The Congress was very much 'an English-knowing upper-class affair' and its annual session a social gathering 'with no political excitement or tension'.⁴ Many regions in British India were politically inert and in areas which were active -- Bengal, the Punjab and Maharashtra (partly in the Bombay Presidency) -- political life was poorly organized.⁵ The Moderates, who dominated the political scene, were

1. Carson, E.H.; 1854-1935; Protestant MP, 1892-1921; leader of Ulster unionism, 1911-21; retired from active politics, 1921.
2. MacNeill, E.; 1867-1945; scholar & patriot; Chief of Staff of the Irish volunteers; against Easter insurrection in 1916.
3. Connolly, J.; 1868-1916; organizer of Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, 1911-1916; socialist thinker.
reasonably content for the moment with Lord Hardinge's\(^1\) policy of trust and conciliation.\(^2\) They, like the Irish Nationalists, could hardly have foreseen that the European conflict, which was generally expected to be over within a year,\(^3\) heralded the demise of their party.

When the war broke out, there was a spontaneous outburst of loyalty in India and Ireland. Most Indian and Irish nationalists firmly believed that Britain was fighting for a just and righteous cause and enthusiastically came to the aid of the government in its hour of peril. In doing so, each side thought that a grateful Britain would give a sympathetic hearing to the claims of her staunch subjects after the war. 'Comrades in arms', wrote the Calcutta Bengalee, 'it will be difficult to treat them as helots in politics'.\(^4\) Jyoti of Chittagong also demanded that after sharing Britain's war burden the British government should seriously consider the 'proper reward' for India's loyalty.\(^5\) Gandhi,\(^6\) who just arrived in London from South Africa, wholeheartedly encouraged his compatriots to think imperially and help the Empire unconditionally.\(^7\) After organizing a handful of overseas Indians into a Field Ambulance Training Corps to serve in the European battlefields, he returned to

1. Baron Hardinge of Penshurst; 1858-1944; Viceroy of India, 1910-16.
2. Hardinge's policy — re-unified Bengal in 1911; supported the cause of Indians in South Africa; supported provincial autonomy.
3. Freeman's Journal (Dublin), 15 September 1914.
4. Bengalee, 9 September 1914.
5. Jyoti, 12, 17 December 1914.
India to promote recruitment.¹

British statesmen had hitherto worried that British military involvement elsewhere would induce Indian unrest;² and deemed it necessary to meet the potential threat by reinforcing the imperial defence establishment in India with additional British regiments. Yet, to their surprise, the Indian public responded well to the recruitment call, the Indian princes and men of wealth offered generous financial aid, and the political atmosphere remained amazingly serene. The general tranquillity rendered it possible to denude India of both troops and officials so that at one time only 15,000 British soldiers remained in garrisons and the higher administrative posts in the Indian Civil Service were filled by Indians. The Moderates, then dominant in the Congress, passed a resolution in December 1914 declaring 'its profound devotion to the Throne, its unswerving allegiance to the British connection, and its firm resolve to stand by the Empire at all hazards and at all costs'.³ In reply, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, remarked that India's loyalty had touched him deeply and that its enormous financial aid had filled him with satisfaction. Britain, he promised, would never forget 'the deep-seated patriotism and whole-hearted loyalty of the people'.⁴

In fact, British suspicion of Indian disaffection, shared by the Germans, was chiefly due to a misreading of the nature of the nationalist movement and Britain's shallow understanding of India. Basically, India was still content with British rule, for the majority of Indians believed that they had 'nothing to gain by German victory' and that British rule was vital to Indian interests. In seconding the 1914 Congress resolution in support of the British war effort, Surendranath Banerjea enthusiastically elaborated the Moderates' loyalist sentiments and political creed:

We are loyal because we are patriotic ... we feel that with the stability and permanence of British rule are bound up the best prospects of Indian Government ... that under the aegis of British protection we are bound in the ordering of Providence and in the evolution of our destinies, to enter that confederacy of free states rejoicing in their indissoluble connection with England and glorifying in the possession of her free institutions.

S.P. Sinha, President of the INC in 1915, described this patron-client relationship analogically by depicting Britain as a doctor whose services were indispensable to an India with fractured limbs in splints and bandages.

To the Moderates, the policy best suited to India in 1914 was colonial self-government. 'Absolute independence' was regarded as 'not only practically unattainable but even ideally undesirable'.

4. Sinha, S.P.; 1864-1928; Bengali Moderate and lawyer; created first Baron of Raipur in 1919.
'It would only please their conceit', proclaimed the pro-Moderate Bengalee, 'but would not really further the prospects of India's highest national self-realization ...'¹ Like the Nationalists in Ireland, Indian Moderates did not anticipate full separation from England. Theirs was the same as the Irish demand — 'national autonomy for India inside the Empire', a 'joint partnership on equal terms' with England.² Their methods, too, were similar to the Irish Nationalists — collaboration, agitation, deputation and peaceful evolution. Like the Nationalists again, they gave their full support to the war and were anxious that nothing should be done that could possibly embarrass the government. Likewise, many Moderates reckoned that by loyally supporting the Empire in its campaign against autocracy, the freedom for which they fought outside their country would not be denied to them in their motherland after the war.³

As for Ireland, the exigency of a world war had averted an imminent civil war which had been fomented by the arming of the Ulster and Irish Volunteers. When the war started, Unionists reacted with a high level of enlistment in the British army and a commensurate spirit of sacrifice. The Nationalists, though somewhat reserved in their attitude towards recruitment, also eagerly pledged their unfailing support to the war 'in defence of the highest principles of religion and morality and right'.⁴ In order to forge a united front in the European crisis, Carson and Redmond⁵ reached a

1. Bengalee, 29, 30 December 1914.
2. ibid.
5. Redmond, J.E.; 1856-1918; Catholic Nationalist MP, 1881-1918; leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party since 1900.
compromise whereby Home Rule was enacted but was temporarily suspended until a new Amending Bill safeguarding Ulster interests could be introduced after the return of peace. Heartened by the apparent success of the Home Rule agitation, Redmond, at a Volunteers parade at Woodenbridge, revoked his former position of committing the Irish Volunteers only to the defence of Ireland against foreign invasion, and unreservedly urged the Volunteers to serve the Allied cause wherever the firing line extended.\(^1\) Such a \textit{volte face} immediately split the Irish Volunteers into two opposing camps, a pro-war majority of about 170,000 which stayed with Redmond to form the National Volunteers, and an anti-war minority of approximately 11,000, consisting essentially of diehard militant Republicans, which retained the name, Irish Volunteers.\(^2\) The motive behind Redmond's sudden change of front is still subject to speculation, but one reason stands out quite explicitly. Through common participation in the war, he hoped that a reconciliation between the Nationalists and the Unionists might be possible.\(^3\) His lieutenant, John Dillon,\(^4\) though more cautious than Redmond about enlistment, nevertheless assured Prime Minister Asquith\(^5\) of the Nationalists' determination to prove themselves 'brave and efficient friends to the British Empire and to England in this struggle'.\(^6\) Like their Indian counterparts,

3. \textit{H. C. Debates}, 5th series, vol. 64, cols. 1828-9, 3 August 1914. \textit{Honesty (Dublin)}, 4 December 1915. This idea was shared by other Nationalists such as Joe Devlin, see \textit{Freeman's Journal}, 18 August 1915.
4. Dillon, J.; 1851-1927; Catholic Nationalist; leader of the Nationalist Party after Redmond's death in 1918.
the Irish Nationalists thought that what they had fought to achieve for Belgium and other small nations would be conferred on Ireland after the cessation of hostilities.¹

However, Indian and Irish reactions to the war were by no means uniform. Many younger and more uncompromising nationalists in both countries consistently denied that it was their country's war, and contended that they had no quarrel with Germany.² They sullenly resented being 'dragged unwillingly into this war' and insisted that no Indian or Irishman should aid England in the continental conflict as a mercenary.³ The newspaper of the militant IRB, Irish Freedom, predicted that without Irish support England would definitely suffer at the hands of Germany as she would have suffered in the Boer War 'had not the Irish fought her battle in South Africa'.⁴

In India, since the outbreak of the war, Bengali terrorists had stepped up their campaign of political assassination and sabotage. Many Sikh emigrants who were forced to return on board the Komagata Maru after being refused entry by the Canadian authorities also became the nucleus of a revolutionary movement in their home province — the Punjab. These Sikhs had strong connections with Indian expatriates in the United States. Like the Irish revolutionaries and their accomplices in America, these Indian dissidents at home and abroad saw the war as a golden opportunity to launch an armed

¹. Freeman's Journal. 8 March, 4 April, 2 July 1915.
². Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914; Irish Worker (Dublin), 8 August 1914; Irish Freedom (Dublin), September 1914. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 667.
⁴. Irish Freedom, September 1914.
insurrection. In the manner of the Clan-na-Gael, the Irish-American revolutionary organization founded in 1867, the American-based Indian terrorist Ghadr (Mutiny) Party sought foreign aid to finance subversive activities in India.¹ Like the Irish, they looked on Germany as 'the land of hope' and went there 'full of great expectations'.² When the German government had promised the Indian Revolutionary Committee at Berlin arms and money for its revolutionary programme, the Indian political exiles all thought that the emancipation of India was just 'round the corner'.³ Likewise, an Indo-German mission had been sent to Afghanistan to counter British influence in Kabul, and an intelligence centre was established to stir up anti-British feelings in India. Several German-aided conspiracies were fomented, but none of them gained enough support and all fell through. By the summer of 1915, the Ghadr Party's activities virtually fizzled out in its stronghold — the Punjab.

Though the terrorist campaign failed, Indian radicals still claimed that 'there was little sympathy with the British in spite of loud professions of loyalty'.⁴ Privately, they wished Britain to 'get a hard knock from Germany', and claimed that even Moderates 'learned with satisfaction' of British defeats.⁵ They admitted that they had 'no love for Germany', but watching their imperial master being humbled was 'the weak and helpless man's idea of vicarious revenge'.⁶

3. ibid.
By comparison, Irish radicals did not view the war with such 'mixed feelings'. To the Socialists, Sinn Feiners and Republicans, their 'paramount allegiance' was to Ireland and they knew of 'no foreign enemy of this country except the British Government ...' As bearers of the Irish destiny, their prime duty was 'to stand for Ireland's interests, irrespective of the interests of England or Germany or any other foreign country'. Their position was succinctly expressed by a banner hung across the facade of Liberty Hall - the centre of Dublin trade unionism - which stated, 'We serve neither King nor Kaiser but Ireland'. Redmond's suggestion of safeguarding Home Rule by military service overseas was regarded as totally unjustifiable. This was not only because England had been Ireland's perennial foe but also because the Home Rule scheme itself was totally unacceptable. In reply to Redmond's appeal to defend Ireland, Griffith cynically asked, 'What had Ireland to defend and whom has she to defend it against? She had neither a native constitution nor a national government to guard; and the power to which Redmond proffered the service of the National Volunteers was the very authority which deprived Ireland of her nationhood. Thus Redmond's proposal to defend Ireland for Ireland effectively meant the defence of Ireland for England. It would only perpetuate Irish thraldom. Redmond had embraced the Volunteers, the radicals said, but his was the kiss of Judas.

2. Irish Volunteers (Dublin), 5 December 1914; Irish Worker, 8 August 1914.
3. Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914.
4. Irish Freedom, April 1914; Sinn Fein, 28 March, 18 April 1914.
5. Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914.
6. ibid.
7. Irish Freedom, September, October 1914.
Redmond's expectation of softening Ulster intransigence by comradeship in the trenches also failed to convince the hardliners. Recognizing the virulent Ulster resistance to Home Rule and its threat of secession as no mere bluff, the IRB concluded that civil war was the only alternative to partition.¹ They were particularly bitter about Redmond's advocacy of unqualified enlistment in the British forces and repudiated his call 'to offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and Irishwomen to the service of the British Empire ...'² The single duty of the Irish Volunteers, they maintained, was 'to secure and to guard the rights and liberties of Ireland'.³ It would be a grave departure from the 'historical Irish national position' to accept 'duties or responsibilities within the British Empire'.⁴ Instead of battling for England's survival in the front line, the Irish should fight for their own emancipation at home.⁵ They contended that the war had been unfairly 'forced upon' Germany by those 'jealous of her military security' and 'envious of her industrial and commercial capacity ...'⁶

This line of reasoning was very close to that of the Socialists who interpreted British statesmen's high-flown rhetoric as 'mere subterfuge' to hide their capitalists' determination to nip Germany's industrial and military challenge in the bud.⁷ Before and after the

1. Irish Freedom, August 1914; Nationality (Dublin), 16 October 1915.
3. Eire-Ireland, 26 October 1914.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
7. Irish Worker, 29 August 1914.
war had started, the Socialist leader James Connolly vehemently pleaded against socialist participation in it and urged his European comrades to disrupt the imperialist war by denying their service to the 'kings and financiers'. It was a pity, he said, that the workers would be sacrificed in this imperialist war so that a handful of tyrants and arms dealers might 'sate their lust for power and their greed for wealth'. Through the Labour paper, Irish Worker, Connolly incessantly denigrated England as the champion of small nationalities by exposing her oppressive policies in India, Egypt and South Africa and condemning her reticence on Russian repression in Finland, Poland and Persia. Siding with Sinn Fein and the IRB, he accused the Irish Parliamentary Party of betraying the nationalist movement. Thus, when the Irish Volunteers split over Redmond's Woodenbridge speech, it sent 'a thrill of joy' through him, as he felt that once the Volunteers had been released from the 'clutch of the Empire', the ground was 'cleared' for a duel for 'a real republican liberty'.

Although Labour was extremely hostile to Sinn Fein, Connolly agreed with Griffith that England was in the war for 'self-preservation', not for any noble ideals of championing the rights of small nations or Christianity. On the other hand, although the IRB disliked Labour's being too universalistic and much preferred to couch its socialist ideas in vague Gaelic co-operative terms rather
than outright Marxist metaphors, and despite Sinn Fein's severe criticisms of Labour strikes and violence, they found in Labour a useful ally in challenging the Nationalist Party's policy of collaboration.

The challenge, however, came later as the Irish radicals, like the Indian Extremists, though restless, were still too weak to be effective during 1914-1915. Like the Moderate-Extremist split in India in 1907, the split in the Irish Volunteers in 1914 testified to the strength of the moderates vis-à-vis the radicals in the Irish nationalist movement. Although Home Rule was postponed until the return of peace, the prospect of self-government seemed secure. The shelving of Unionist hostility to nationalist agitation also lent credence to the view that out of war-time co-operation some understanding would be reached between the two contending parties.2

In India, the Extremists, since their expulsion from the Congress at Surat in 1907, and with the imprisonment, retirement and exile of their main leaders, were deprived of a vigorous central leadership and an effective organization. Indian radicals of the younger generation such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Shankarilal Banker3 and Rajendra Prasad4 were still in the making. The Moderates, firmly in control of the nationalist movement since 1907, were able to carry

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1. For Gaelic co-operativism, see Irish Freedom, February, March and November 1913; April 1914; For Griffith's criticisms of Labour, see Sinn Fein, 3, 4 July 1909; 9 September 1911.
3. Banker, S.; 1889-?; Home Rule activist in Bombay; publisher of Young India, organized the Ahmedabad Majur Mahajan in 1918.
4. Prasad, R.; 1884-1963; Home Rule activist in Bihar; co-operated with Gandhi in Champaran; first President of the Indian Republic.
the Congress in support of the war.

Thus, during 1914-1915, Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates were reasonably assured of their dominant position in their own country. Yet, if the war had occasioned a manifestation of their strength, it had also opened up new opportunities for the radicals to reassert themselves, a reassertion which neither the Nationalists nor the Moderates were able to check. Indian radicalism at this stage was clearly far less extreme than its Irish counterpart. This was partly due to lack of organization and leadership, as well as the absence of agrarian and proletarian participation in nationalist politics. At the beginning of the war, the Congress was still very much an upper-class body with little middle-class support, let alone popular participation at grass-roots level. There was no working class movement in India which was comparable to the Labour movement in Ireland. Neither was there any Indian 'Land League' which could stir the Indian peasantry. On the other hand, Irish militant radicalism received a new lease of life from an uneasy liaison between Connolly and the Republicans. This liaison was soon turned into an alliance which finally brought about the demise of Irish constitutional nationalism.
For the Irish militants, the First World War provided an opportunity not just to forge an alliance with the Labour movement but to assert by armed force their belief in Irish separatism. The Republican-Labour united front was made possible by the ideological rapprochement of the militant and Labour leaders, notably Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, who believed that an insurrection during the war was vital to the separatist cause. The resultant Dublin rising in April 1916, though unsuccessful, nevertheless eliminated the Irish Parliamentary Party from the political scene and united the different streams of the radical camp under the reorganized Sinn Fein which expanded dramatically into a mass organization after the rising.

The Origins of the Republican-Labour Coalition.

Since its inception in the 1860s, when circumstances permitted, the IRB had never shrunk from violent opposition to its perennial foe – the Irish Parliamentary Party. Its persistent efforts to seek complete independence from Britain, though hitherto abortive, were nevertheless a source of inspiration. Likewise, its motto that 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity' had ever since been a truism for militant Republicans.
The return of the Fenian veteran, Tom Clarke, in 1907 and the acquisition of some talented new recruits such as Bulmer Hobson, Denis McCullough and Sean MacDermott rejuvenated the IRB which had lapsed into inactivity for a few decades. Though still too moribund to be either politically or militarily a threat to the Irish Parliamentary Party, this coterie of radicals continued to work for an Irish Republic. Even before the war had started, they had already collaborated with the Irish-Americans, especially John Devoy, to foment subversive activities in Ireland. When the war broke out, the IRB’s decision to use the Irish Volunteers, without the knowledge of the Executive of that body, to stage a rising before its end was also endorsed by Devoy. Arrangements were made to send Sir Roger Casement in late 1914 on his fateful journey to secure arms from Germany for the coming insurrection.

Back in Ireland, Tom Clarke and Sean MacDermott had infiltrated into the Irish Volunteers, using the latter as a peaceful front for their secret plotting. And it was essentially the work of these undercover IRB agents in the Irish Volunteers, who later included

3. McCullough, D.; 1883-1968; Republican; joined IRB, 1901; member of Supreme Council, 1906; Director of IRB in Ulster.
Thomas MacDonagh,¹ Joseph Plunkett² and Patrick Pearse, all Gaelic enthusiasts and intellectuals, that was responsible for the shape of things to come.³ To this handful of romantic revolutionaries we may add yet another radical of an entirely different persuasion and outlook - a Socialist, James Connolly.

Of the three IRB poet-intellectuals, Pearse was not only the most influential in defining the new Gaelic republican nationalism, but also the most eloquent in elucidating the notion of blood sacrifice. As a youth, he had already had a strong admiration for tragic heroes and their feats.⁴ The pagan hero Cuchulainn⁵ and the Christian saint Colmcille⁶ were his favourite models. To Pearse, Cuchulainn's words 'Better is short life with honour than long life with dishonour'; 'I care not though I were to live but one day and one night, if only my fame and my deeds live after me'; together with Colmcille's 'If I die it shall be from the excess of the love that I bear the Gael',⁷ perfectly exemplified the devotion that could inspire others 'to dare all and suffer all'.⁸

In his view, the nationalist revolution remained unfinished

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¹ MacDonagh, T.; 1878-1916; joined Irish Volunteers, 1913 and IRB, 1915; co-editor of Irish Review.
² Plunkett, J.M.; 1887-1916; co-editor of Irish Review; member of both IRB and Irish Volunteers.
⁴ Pearse, P.H., Political Writings and Speeches, Dublin, Talbot Press, 1916, p. 38.
⁵ Cuchulainn was a legendary Ulster hero who fought to death against the invaders.
⁶ Colmcille, Saint; 521-597; one of the three patron saints of Ireland.
⁸ New Ireland (Dublin), 14 June 1919.
because the leaders of past generations were too reluctant to strike at the critical moment. Such indecision had rendered the past nationalist movement 'a hopeless attempt of a mob to realize itself as a nation'. Serious nationalism, he argued, meant militant and aggressive nationalism. Thus he acclaimed the Volunteer movement and the coming of the guns to Irish politics. In his view, freedom could not be attained or safeguarded otherwise than in arms, for 'unarmed men cannot make good their claim to anything which armed men choose to deny them'. Bloodshed, he wrote, 'is a cleansing and a sanctifying thing, and the nation which regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood. There are many things more horrible than bloodshed; and slavery is one of them'.

As for the present war, Pearse welcomed it wholeheartedly as 'the most glorious in the history of Europe', for 'millions of lives' had been given gladly 'for love of country'. The 'old heart of the earth', he said, direly needed to be invigorated 'with the red wine of the battlefields'. Ireland too should not shrink from participating in this bloody purgation; winning through it, Ireland should experience great joy.

Being a devout Catholic, Pearse was obsessed with religious imagery. He saw the role of the rebel as 'the perfect imitation of Christ', and couched his messianic notion in allegorical, scriptural

1. Freeman's Journal, 26 November 1913.
4. ibid., p. 216.
5. ibid.
6. ibid., p. 218.
Since Christ had shed his blood 'to redeem the world', he wrote, it 'would take the blood of the sons of Ireland to redeem Ireland'. In his plays The Singer and The King, this concept of an expiative purgation through a martyr's death was most telling. 'One man can free a people as one Man redeemed the world', declared MacDara in The Singer. Pearse undoubtedly saw himself as Ireland's redeemer and his mission as a holy crusade.

It was certainly blasphemous for a devout Catholic to urge his fellow co-religionists to resort to violence and seek a collective blood sacrifice for the redemption of Ireland. But the nationalism of Pearse, like that of Gandhi, had a distinct religious and mystical flavour of its own:

Like a divine religion, national freedom bears the marks of unity, of sanctity, of catholicity, of apostolic succession. Of unity, for it contemplates the nation as one; of sanctity, for it is holy in itself and in those who serve it; of catholicity, for it embraces all the men and women of the nation; of apostolic succession, for it, or the inspiration after it, passes down from generation to generation from the nation's fathers.

Joseph Plunkett was also noted for his 'mystical contemplation' and was deeply influenced by the writings of Catholic mystics such as

4. Pearse, Plays, Stories, Poems, p. 44.
5. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 226.
St. John of the Cross\textsuperscript{1} and St. Teresa\textsuperscript{2}. In his poem 'The Little Black Rose Shall Be Red At Last', Plunkett, in the role of a lover of the dark rose, the traditional symbol of vanquished Ireland, proclaimed his affection for his conquered motherland with explicit sacrificial imagery.\textsuperscript{3} Likewise, the writings of MacDonagh were imbued with a spirit of sacrifice, violence and hate, whereas heroism and retribution were recurrent themes in many of his poems such as 'Wishes For My Son' and 'Of A Poet Patriot'.\textsuperscript{4}

Such passionate advocacy of a holy violence and a just vengeance found no parallel in India. To some extent, the Punjabi nationalist Lajpat Rai came close to Pearse's ideas. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, anticipating a protracted struggle for independence, he had already asked the Indians to 'take a lesson out of the history of the Irish struggle'.\textsuperscript{5} In his opinion, for a subject nation 'peace unalloyed by repression would be fatal'; and it was 'incumbent' upon every patriot to rouse the masses from their 'slumber'.\textsuperscript{6} Using metaphors similar to Pearse's, he stated that liberty could not be won without great sacrifice or be defended by unarmed men.\textsuperscript{7} But unlike Pearse who contemplated enlisting German assistance, he

1. St. John of the Cross; Juan de Yepes; 1542-1591; Spanish mystic; rebelled against the laxity of the Carmelite order; wrote the Dark Night of the Soul setting forth a connected mystical doctrine.
2. St. Teresa or Theresa; 1515-1582; Spanish Carmelite nun, 1534; founded reformed order of Carmelites, 1562; famous for mystical visions.
believed that liberty won by foreign aid would put India at the mercy of that helper.¹ He applauded the Indian terrorists for their patriotism, valour, and sacrifice; and predicted that a 'day will come when people will take wreaths of homage to their statues'.² The Irish public, however, did not have to wait long for their chance to express their veneration to the Irish militants.

As the war dragged on, expectation of an early result dissipated. The military defeats of Russia in 1915 further dimmed the prospect of a speedy victory. Growing war casualties and weariness had steadily dampened Irish enthusiasm for the war. Irish opinion was further alienated when in May 1915 the Conservative Party leader Bonar Law³ was invited into the coalition war ministry, taking with him the Unionist stalwarts Edward Carson and J.H. Campbell,⁴ whose refusal to comply with the verdict of Irish Home Rule had led Jawaharlal Nehru to view them as rebels against parliamentary democracy,⁵ as respective Attorney-Generals of England and Ireland. At once Home Rule, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, 'was as far off as ever'.⁶ The coalition government's decision to introduce a Conscription Bill added to the general disenchantment.⁷ The Nationalists were embarrassed by the Bill as their co-operation with the British government in the prosecution of the war had increasingly

1. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 262.
2. Lajpat Rai, Autobiographical Writings, p. 5.
6. ibid., p. 583. Spark (Dublin), 19 September 1915.
7. It was revealed in January 1916 that the Conscription Bill would not be applied to Ireland, but Irish opposition had already been hardened.
offended nationalist opinion in Ireland and the United States. In a letter to Redmond, the Bishop of Killaloe, Michael Fogarty, tersely summed up the prevalent mood:

Home Rule is dead and buried and Ireland is without a national party or national press. The Freeman is but a government organ and the national party but an imperial instrument. What the future holds in store for us God knows — I suppose conscription with a bloody feud between people and soldiers. I never thought that Asquith would have consented to this humiliation and ruin of Irish feeling. There is a great revulsion of feeling in Ireland.

This feeling of revulsion against the Nationalists was most intense among the militant IRB who had always been sceptical of Redmond's ability to reconcile the Unionist opposition to Irish Home Rule. Worried that further inaction would jeopardise Ireland's cause, Pearse openly preached the sanctity of war against Britain. Connolly, who was frustrated by the lack of solidarity in European socialism and saw that the working classes in Europe had attached greater significance to the political than the economic struggle, also closed ranks with the radicals in their fight for Irish freedom.

But it was the militants rather than the pacifists that Connolly turned to. This was perhaps due to a long standing feud between Labour and Sinn Fein, arising from differences in priorities in

1. Fogarty, M.; 1859-1955; Bishop of Killaloe, 1904-53; widely recognized for his nationalist sympathies.
3. Forward (Dublin), 15 August 1914.
economic development as well as means and ends in political advancement. Griffith had long advocated unilateral abstention of Irish representatives from the British parliament and passive resistance to British rule in Ireland. In his view, the very presence of Irish representatives at Westminster negated Ireland's claim to independence. Instead, Irish parliamentarians-elect should constitute a national assembly at home and establish a parallel government to supplant the British edifice. By tacit non-co-operation with the British authorities and at the same time cultivating a spirit of national self-reliance, Griffith trusted that Ireland could become the de facto mistress of her own house. Moreover, Griffith perceived that Ireland and England could be linked together by the British Crown while retaining their own autonomy. In his view, this concept of Dual Monarchy offered a welcome escape from the Home Rule-Unionist dichotomy. It conferred self-government on all Ireland while preserving the British Monarch as the Irish head of state, thus reconciling the conflicting claims of both camps.

This pacific Dual Monarchism of Griffith was in direct opposition to the militant republicanism of Pearse and Connolly. Furthermore, Griffith had a great distrust of radical socialism which he considered inimical to the precious growth of Irish capitalism. Irish Labour's gravitation toward British trade unions and its

1. Spark, 28 February 1915.
2. United Irishman (Dublin), 23 July 1904.
emphasis on class interests also repelled him as he considered the English dictation of Irish trade unionism a foreign intervention, hostile to infant Irish industrial development. Likewise, he thought that political independence should take precedence over socio-economic struggle.  

Griffith's scathing criticisms of the Labour movement, especially its leader Jim Larkin, had naturally made him a much hated figure in Labour circles. An indignant Larkin once dismissed Sinn Fein's nationalist front as nothing but a smoke screen for Irish capitalism. Connolly, who took over Labour's leadership after 1913, also inveighed against Griffith's obsession with gross national production rather than the distribution of wealth. An able organizer of the union movement and an eloquent socialist theoretician, Connolly always insisted that the Irish question was 'a social question', and that the whole Anglo-Irish struggle was in fact a fight 'for the mastery of the means of life, the sources of production in Ireland', that all nationalist movements of the past two centuries had failed simply because 'the political remedies proposed were unrelated to the social subjection at the root of the matter'. But he was far from being a socialist doctrinaire, and was shrewd enough to view the nationalist movement in its political and social perspective:

1. Sinn Fein, 30 June 1906; 30 March 1907.
2. Spark, 28 February 1915.
4. The Harp (Dublin), February 1910.
7. ibid., p.215.
The struggle for Irish freedom has two aspects; it is national and it is social. The national ideal can never be realised until Ireland stands forth before the world as a nation, free and independent. It is social and economic because no matter what the form of government may be, as long as one class owns as private property the land and instruments of labour from which mankind derive their substance, that class will always have it in their power to plunder and enslave the remainder of their fellow creatures.¹

Although the IRB spoke out against this concept of material basis of freedom and the Socialist's concept of international brotherhood as it did against Griffith's Dual Monarchism and passive resistance,² it nevertheless agreed with Labour that 'a nation cannot be built up on underpaid Labour ...'³ Generally taking a more sympathetic stand than Sinn Fein towards Labour, it agreed with Connolly that the nationalist and socialist movements were complementary to each other:

Additional force and stability are required for a movement for political freedom when joined up with its prototype in industry — the movement for the emancipation of workers. The two movements rest upon the same foundations — they are but different manifestations of the same principles, and would form a natural and mutually helpful alliance.... Behind every attempt to oust the foreigner from this country the mighty instinct of nationalism has been allied to a desire for better economic conditions for the industrial and agricultural workers .... ⁴

The men who were to bring about this alliance were Pearse and Connolly. Though Pearse rejected the Marxist concept of class struggle and dreaded the prospect of a free Ireland ruled by a

1. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., p. 274.
2. Irish Freedom, April, October 1911.
3. ibid., November 1910.
4. ibid., January 1913.
triumphant class that viewed social relationships in economic terms in an atheistic society, he did agree that the state should have complete control over the nation's material resources and wealth to enable each individual to live a free and happy life. Furthermore, he shared Connolly's belief that the root of social injustice lay in foreign domination, and that the 'men of no property' were the vehicle of the coming socio-political revolution. The sharing of these basic premises was important as it enabled Pearse to bridge the IRB's differences with Labour, however ambiguously. Moreover, although each side still adhered to its own distinct vision of an independent Ireland — for Connolly it was to be a Workers' Republic with every trait of a modern collectivist state pledged to safeguard the interests of the workers through public ownership of national resources; for Pearse it was to be a Gaelic Republic, Catholic as well as socialist-democratic — both deemed it necessary to realize their republican dream by physical force against considerable odds. The organizations they represented, the IRB and Labour, both had their military establishments — the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army. They drilled openly, advocated violence, and contemplated an armed rising during the war.

In fact, Connolly had become more and more impatient with what

2. Pearse, ibid., pp. 335-7, 276.
3. ibid., pp. 180, 345. Workers' Republic, 20 August 1898, 8 October 1898.
he saw as the Volunteers' procrastination and determined that if his bourgeois partner did not strike, the working class would do the job on its own.¹ For fear that a premature action by Connolly would ruin their plan, Pearse and his accomplices had co-opted the Labour leader into the IRB's Military Council in early 1916 and informed him of the impending insurrection. With the help of Connolly's Citizen Army, these romantic revolutionaries decided to stage the rising during Easter week 1916 to mark its theological symbolism.²

The coalition of Labour and IRB signified not only the subordination of socialist considerations to the political movement, but also Connolly's acceptance of Pearse's blood sacrifice idea. Connolly was a pragmatic revolutionary who saw no glory or glamour in war the way Pearse did; and had once branded Pearse as an 'blithering idiot' for his glorification of a 'humane or civilized war'.³ But in the February 1916 issue of the Workers' Republic, he apparently changed his attitude. In this issue, he accused the Irish workers of selling their country for 'a few paltry shillings' and wrote that since Irish society had sunk to such a degraded state, 'no agency less powerful that the red tide of war on Irish soil will ever enable the Irish race to recover its self-respect'.⁴ This brief article reflected Connolly's disenchantment with the working-class response to his anti-imperialist call, and his determination to make common cause with the militant nationalists. In announcing the coalescence of Labour and IRB interests, Connolly wrote:

1. Workers' Republic, 30 September, 13 November 1915.
3. Worker (Dublin), 30 January 1915.
The cause of labour is the cause of Ireland, the cause of Ireland is the cause of labour ... Labour seeks that an Ireland free should be the sole mistress of her own destiny, supreme owner of all material things within and upon her soil ... 

The Easter Uprising and the Demise of the Irish Parliamentary Party.

What was going on in nationalist circles could not be hidden from Dublin Castle. But the Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell believed that on the whole the political climate was calm and that the separatists were 'too weak to be dangerous'. In his view, so long as political activities remained low-keyed, it was inexpedient to disarm the Volunteers or tighten government control, as such action would only intensify separatist activities or create martyrs. The assurance of political contentment given by Redmond and Dillon further strengthened this false sense of security.

However, the prospect of an imminent rising by the Irish Volunteers had alarmed their Secretary, Bulmer Hobson, and their Chief of Staff, Eoin MacNeill. So far these two men had been committed to using violence only if the government took the offensive to disarm the Volunteers or impose conscription on Ireland, and only if there was a fair chance of success.

1. Workers' Republic, 5 February 1916.
2. Birrell, A.; 1850-1933; MP, 1889-1900, 1906-18; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1907-1916.
In order to lure MacNeill and Hobson into believing theirs was a defensive insurrection, Pearse and his colleagues had to forge a 'Castle Document' purporting to be an official directive disbanding the Irish Volunteers. MacNeill was also persuaded by Pearse, who was Director of Operations, and MacDonagh, who was Commandant of the Dublin Brigade, to sanction simultaneous manoeuvres coinciding with the anticipated arrival of German arms off the Kerry coast during Easter. But later when MacNeill had learned the truth, and when the German cargo ship with the arms and Sir Roger Casement on board had been intercepted by the British, he pleaded with the instigators to drop the plan and issued orders countermanding the Easter Sunday manoeuvres. The orders and countermanding orders had caused lots of confusion between Dublin and the provinces, and had certainly undermined the plan of a concerted national rising. Yet, despite the adverse circumstances Pearse was resolved to persevere with the plan. He agreed with MacNeill's and Hobson's contention that the impending rising had no chance of success, but blandly ignored their conclusion that therefore it was morally and practically unjustifiable.¹ Instead, Pearse concocted a concept of moral triumph and hinged the rationale of the rising on a retrospective justification.² Furthermore, Pearse, Connolly and their associates had long ridiculed the Sinn Feiners and the Nationalists as idle talkers.³ For them, patriotism was 'at once a faith and a service'.⁴ A patriot had to prove his faith by some positive actions. Their attitude was

¹. Miller, D.W., Church, State and Nation in Ireland, 1898-1921, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1973, p. 320.
⁴. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 65.
represented by Tom Clarke who, with a relentless hatred of England, firmly adhered to the Fenian idea that violence was the only means to sever the English connection. Though the IRB's constitution sanctioned the waging of war on England only if the majority of Irish approved it, this coterie of extremists was upset by the slackening of the revolutionary fervour of the Irish public and was convinced that some dramatic action, regardless of the chance of success, was necessary to resuscitate the cause of Irish separatism.¹

Certainly the insurgents intended to trade their lives for a moral rather than a military triumph. If they succeeded, they could possibly achieve a retrospective justification of the rising and purge it of any stigma of failure. This gamble was, of course, risky.² Indeed, the immediate public response to the rising was extremely hostile. To the Irish public the rising meant civil disorder and looting. To the Irish Nationalists this 'insane revolt' was less an insurrection against the British connection than it was an armed assault against the general will of Ireland 'constitutionally ascertained through its proper representatives'.³

2. When the insurgents 'rose' on Easter Monday, Dubliners were too familiar with the Volunteers' parades and sham attacks to take any special notice of the manoeuvres. When Pearse proudly proclaimed the establishment of a republic on behalf of the Provisional Government of Ireland at the doorsteps of the GPO, which was seized as the rebels' headquarters, he was greeted with jeers and bewilderment. It was only some time later that the government came to realize that it was not a hoax. The rising was put down after five days of fighting. The Republican Proclamation was signed by the seven members of the IRB Military Council - Tom Clarke, Sean MacDermott, Patrick Pearse, James Connolly, Thomas MacDonagh, Eamonn Ceannt and Joseph Plunkett. All were executed later.
To the British the rising was nothing but a 'carefully arranged plot' fabricated by 'Irish traitors' and their 'German confederates'.\(^1\) To the Unionists it was a clear and decisive indication of the 'malignant growth' in the corrupt body of nationalist Ireland and a refutation of the nationalists' professed loyalty. The time had come, they said, for a resolute suppression of seditious bodies and papers in Ireland. 'Strength and firmness', they added, were required to make any repetition of 'rapine and bloodshed' impossible 'in the generations to come'.\(^2\) To the Church, this 'terrible mischief' was an act of criminal folly and insanity; and the insurgents had not elicited 'a shred of public sympathy'. Little effort was made to appeal for compassion or clemency.\(^3\)

But the time-lagged executions of the rebels, the imposition of martial law, and the deportation and internment of many innocent citizens seemed vindictive revenge to the Irish and aroused strong sympathy for the insurgents. This reaction, together with the shooting without trial of the pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington,\(^4\) the Irish-Americans' support for the rebels, the divided and somewhat reticent ecclesiastical attitude to the rising, and later the breakdown of Home Rule negotiations, the hanging of Sir Roger Casement, and above all the threat of conscription, led to a change of mood against the British authorities.\(^5\) Redmond and Dillon were

\(^1\) The Times (London), 26 April 1916.
\(^2\) Irish Times (Dublin), 28, 29 April 1916; 1 May 1916; quoted in P.S. O'Hegarty, op. cit., pp. 704-705.
\(^3\) Irish Independent (Dublin), 4 May 1916.
\(^4\) Sheehy-Skeffington, F.; 1878-1916; writer, socialist; his only part in the rising was an effort to organize citizens to stop looting.
well aware of the potential backlash of wholesale executions in such a highly volatile situation; and had warned the government of the susceptibility of Irish feeling to dramatic posture and emotional appeal. Dillon was particularly irritated by the imperviousness of the authorities to his advice. Exasperated and disappointed, he complained to the House of Commons that Britain's mishandling of the situation had in fact canonized the rebels; driven the Irish to the radical Sinn Fein camp; and worst of all washed out the Irish Home Rulers' 'whole life work in a sea of blood'. Augustine Birrell, whose 'weak and callous administration', was blamed for bringing about the rising, also saw Dillon's point. Writing to Prime Minister Asquith on 30 April 1916, he stated, 'It is not an Irish Rebellion - it would be a pity if ex post facto it became one, and was added to the long and melancholy list of Irish Rebellions'. A dramatic demonstration of a passionate faith would easily override rational judgement. It was on this possibility that Pearse had staked his soul.

Although the rising had failed, it had convinced the British government that the Irish problem had to be quickly solved. The task was all the more urgent as the politically powerful Irish-Americans were actively lobbying against Great Britain in the United States.

1. When the rising broke out, Griffith did offer his service to the insurgents, but was told that his work as a propagandist and astute nationalist would be more vital to Ireland's cause after the rising. Thus technically Griffith had not been 'out' in the rising. Infra, p. 54–5.
3. The Times, 26 April 1916.
which was direly needed as an ally but still neutral in the continental conflict.\textsuperscript{1} Therefore, immediately after the rising, Asquith assigned Lloyd George\textsuperscript{2} to initiate negotiations with the contending parties, hoping that a speedy settlement would facilitate a smooth prosecution of the war. What Lloyd George proposed was the immediate application of the 1914 Home Rule Act to Ireland regardless of the war, but that six Ulster counties with a Unionist majority, i.e. Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone should be excluded from its operation. Initially, Lloyd George was able to persuade both Redmond and Carson to accept his scheme, but differences on the question of exclusion soon wrecked the whole plan. For Redmond, the exclusion of Ulster counties was only to be a temporary measure, but Carson maintained that it was a permanent one. When in July the cabinet decided to go for the permanent exclusion of Ulster from Home Rule, Redmond rejected the scheme and hopes of reconciliation were dashed. But whereas the Unionists had succeeded in defending their position, Redmond's acceptance of even temporary partition had done untold damage to himself and his party.\textsuperscript{3} Immediately after his attitude towards partition became known, doubts as to his capability as leader were raised within the rank and file of the party.\textsuperscript{4} Suggestions were also made that a new national body should be set up from those nationalists who had 'lost confidence in the leaders of the so-called Nationalist Party'.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} Lloyd George, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 416, 418.
\textsuperscript{2} Lloyd George, D.; 1863-1945; Prime Minister, 1916-22; created Earl in 1945.
\textsuperscript{3} Irish Volunteer, 3 April 1915.
\textsuperscript{4} Irish Independent, 6 July 1916.
\textsuperscript{5} ibid.
Likewise, to many Irishmen, the collapse of the dialogue had confirmed the Republicans' suspicion that Home Rule was impossible to obtain without substantial concessions to the Unionists. Redmond's failure to avert partition also seemed to indicate the bankruptcy of constitutionalism. Redmond had told the Volunteers to man the European battlefields in order to make Home Rule safe for all Ireland. What they got in return for their voluntary sacrifice was a divided Ireland.

It was this failure of the Irish Parliamentary Party - the failure to bring Home Rule to all Ireland at a critical juncture created by the rising - that led to its rapid decline. Though Redmond seemed quite unaware of the party's waning influence, Dillon gauged its predicament with deadly accuracy. Reviewing the political plight of the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1916, Dillon admitted that the party's influence had been dwindling since the inception of the coalition war cabinet in 1915. That the ailing party had been able to hold out until then, especially after the rising, had been due not so much to its vigour or appeal as to the lack of alternative either in policy or leadership. But, he concluded, 'enthusiasm and trust in Redmond and the party is dead so far as the mass of the people is concerned'.

The Reorganization and Growth of Sinn Fein.

In order to dispel the impression that 'the British government attached no weight to the wishes of the Irish people expressed

through their parliamentary representatives, the Nationalists were anxious to secure the release of all the internees who had not been court-martialled but were being held in British camps after the rising. As a gesture of reconciliation and an inducement to the United States to enter the war, the untried internees were released by the new Prime Minister Lloyd George. Among those released were Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins.

Compared with Griffith, Collins was relatively unknown in Irish political circles. He had been a member of the IRB since 1909 and had actively involved in its activities. During the rising, he served as aide-de-camp of Joseph Plunkett in the GPO. Although he admired the heroism of the leaders, he did not personally approve of the idea of a blood sacrifice. In his view, the rising had been badly organized and poorly co-ordinated. Such failings, coupled with the romantic idealism and 'poetic' actions of the leaders, had rendered the whole attempt something like a 'Greek tragedy'.

Yet the situation which Collins and Griffith faced on their return was certainly disheartening to these two political realists; for there was no effective leadership, coherent organization, or national policy under which the radicals could work together. Therefore their first task was to revive their respective organizations which had been temporarily shaken by the rising and the

2. Collins, M.; 1890-1922; guerrilla leader; leader of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War.
subsequent government suppression. Sinn Fein was reorganized and its organ *Nationality* re-published in February 1917. Likewise, the IRB and the Irish Volunteers were revitalized by Collins. Week after week, Griffith attacked the 'treachery and corruption of Redmondite party', and called for a concerted effort to deliver the final blow to the moribund party.¹ Britain's intention to divide Ireland was constantly attacked as a repetition of the policy of divide-and-rule employed by Lord Curzon (now a War Cabinet member) in the partition of Bengal in 1905 when he was Viceroy of India.² When the Indian government had successfully imposed a tariff on cotton imports to the detriment of British manufacturers' interests, *Nationality* of 17 March 1917 credited the success to the work of the Indian nationalists.³ As there was still no Indian MP representing India's interests at Westminster, the success of tariff reform lent weight to Sinn Fein's insistence on abstentionism.⁴

On the other hand, Republicans like Cathal Brugha⁵ and Michael Collins were prepared for a renewed armed struggle, either in open or otherwise. The rhetorical violence of the Indian radicals was useful to the Irish militants on two counts, firstly as a source of analogous inspiration, and secondly as a means of diverting Britain's full military might away from Ireland.⁶ Thus the spreading of revolutionary activities in India and the outbreak of civil

¹. *Nationality*, 17 February 1917.
². Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 76.
³. ibid.
⁴. ibid.
⁵. Brugha, C.; 1874-1922; Second-in-command at South Dublin in 1916 rising; Chief of Staff of IRA, 1917-1919.
⁶. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 75-76.
disturbances in Dacca in June 1916 were greeted by the Irish militants with satisfaction, hoping that these incidents augured the coming of violent revolution in the subcontinent.¹

Although the differences in temperament and emphasis between the Sinn Feiners and the Republicans were still great, they were by no means unbridgeable. In fact, the chance of co-ordination soon appeared in a by-election in Roscommon in February 1917. The election campaign provided a golden opportunity for the returned men to clear up their differences, however haphazardly, and hammer out some sort of a consensus on which they could stand against the Irish Parliamentary Party. Although Sinn Fein's candidate, papal Count Plunkett,² did not openly commit himself to the Sinn Fein policy of abstention until he was elected,³ his eventual success heralded the collapse of the Irish Parliamentary Party. After the Roscommon by-election, Colonel Maurice Moore,⁴ Inspector-General of the now-defunct National Volunteers, told Dillon that the people on the whole had lost faith in Home Rule and would like to see the Nationalists 'more active and determined - not in talk only'.⁵ The 'serious state of affairs', he said, would not be altered by sheer 'speech-making in Parliament'. He went on to suggest that Dillon should seriously consider employing the Sinn Fein tactics - abstention from British Parliament and the convocation of an Irish conference to resolve the

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¹ Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 76.
² Plunkett, G.N., Count (papal, hereditary); 1851-48; father of J.M. Plunkett; MP for N. Roscommon, 1917-22.
³ Irish Independent, 31 January 1917.
⁴ Moore, Colonel, M.G.; 1854-1939; soldier; instructor of the Irish Volunteers; supported Redmond and Home Rule.
Irish problem. 'This policy will not be acceptable to cautious men', Colonel Moore concluded, 'but the dangers are imminent ...' Moore's predictions, though pessimistic, were nevertheless proved accurate by the victory of an imprisoned volunteer in another by-election, this time in South Longford in early May.

The defeats in what had been deemed safe constituencies conveyed a grave message to the Redmondites. In order to salvage the party from oblivion, Redmond was keen to break the political stalemate. Likewise, Lloyd George was eager for an early settlement. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent collapse of the eastern front had imposed severe strains on British resources. Lloyd George was anxious to introduce conscription to Ireland, but such a proposal would receive no support without first settling the Home Rule question. Furthermore, as the United States had finally entered the war in April, it was necessary for Britain to show her new-found ally that the war was really being fought for the self-determination of small nations. Even President Wilson himself stressed the need for an early settlement of the Irish question in order to placate American public opinion.

After Redmond had refused Lloyd George's renewed offer of immediate Home Rule for twenty-six counties, the latter announced in May that an Irish Convention was to be convened under the

3. Wilson, T.W.; 1856-1924; Governor of New Jersey, 1911-1913; Twenty-eighth President of the United States, 1913-1921.
It was hoped that out of the deliberations in the Convention a compromise might be reached among the principal contending parties. As a gesture of good will, the British government had also released the prisoners currently serving penal servitude for their part in the rising. The effect of the releases was, however, the further strengthening and consolidation of the surviving revolutionary forces. As another by-election was approaching in East Clare in July, Eamon de Valera, just released from life imprisonment because of the amnesty, was chosen to stand against Redmond's nominee. Shrewd and subtle, de Valera was the only surviving commandant of the rising. With a firm resolve to establish the ideals of the 1916 Republican Proclamation and a flexible attitude regarding the means to be employed, he based his election appeal chiefly on the inviolability of Irish nationhood and the indivisibility of a Gaelic independent Ireland. In a campaign speech at Ennis, county Clare, de Valera urged his audience to indicate their approval of the separatists' aspirations by their support at the poll. Any vote against him, he said, would constitute a repudiation of the republican principles for which the 1916 heroes had made the supreme sacrifice. He asked them to prove to England and the world, as Roscommon and Longford did, that Irish wanted 'Ireland as a sovereign state, not a province in slavery'. Though de Valera's opponent was a parliamentary veteran, the dead weight of

2. Irish Independent, 15 June 1917.
3. De Valera, E.; 1882-1975; revolutionary; leader of Fianna Fáil; for many years Taoiseach (PM) of Ireland.
the rising was too great. De Valera won the election with a landslide majority — a success which he described as a 'monument to the brave dead'.\(^1\) The victory of yet another Sinn Fein candidate, William Cosgrave,\(^2\) in the Kilkenny by-election in August seemed to seal the fate of constitutional nationalism in Ireland.

Despite its diminishing influence the Irish Parliamentary Party attended the Convention in July in order to formulate a solution with other forces. But it was soon apparent that such a strange agglomeration of heterogeneous opinions, which included Churches, county councils and others, was bound to end up in confusion and disagreement.\(^3\) From the outset, Sinn Fein had boycotted it, leaving only those who were either out of touch with the dominant political mood like the county councils or politically powerless like the southern Unionists to settle the matter.\(^4\) Divisions of opinion also occurred within the Irish Parliamentary Party, especially between Redmond and Dillon. In any case, the opposition of the intransigent Ulster Unionists to any proposed solution short of the exclusion of the north-east from Home Rule had rendered the whole enterprise fruitless.

While the Irish Parliamentary Party had painted itself into a corner in the Convention, Sinn Fein maintained its manoeuvrability by abstaining from the Convention and consolidated its position by the

failure of its opponent. As an organization opposed to the use of violence, the Sinn Feiners naturally had not taken part in the rising. But due to the British public and government's misunderstanding of the Irish political situation, the 1916 rising was erroneously dubbed 'The Sinn Fein Rising', much to the disgust of its leader, Griffith. After the insurrection, different strands of the radical nationalist movement continued to be broadly referred to as Sinn Feiners by the press and the government. This misnomer had caused considerable confusion. Militant Republicans who had been 'out' in 1916 were also indignant at erroneous references to the insurrection as a Sinn Fein plot, and to themselves as Sinn Feiners, for they were scornful of Griffith's monarchical stand and Sinn Fein's unpatriotic pacifism.\(^1\) In order to integrate the fragmented political forces into an organized opposition to the Irish Parliamentary Party for the next general election, a convention had been called by Count Plunkett in April 1917 at Dublin Mansion House. By early June, a tentative merger was achieved among the militant Republicans, Plunkett's Liberty League,\(^2\) and other nationalist groupings disappointed with the performance of the Redmondites. The gap between the two dominant groups — the militant separatists and the pacific Sinn Feiners — was further bridged by de Valera's consent to stand in the East Clare constituency on a Sinn Fein platform. Likewise, upon de Valera's suggestion, the original Sinn Fein constitution was also revised to embrace the militants' republican objectives. Henceforth, Sinn Fein aimed 'at securing the


\(^{2}\) Liberty League — founded in early 1917 by Count Plunkett who hoped that it would replace both Sinn Fein and the Irish Nation League; by mid-1917 the League had disintegrated.
international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic', after achieving that status 'the Irish people may by referendum freely choose their own form of government'.

This compromise temporarily eased the tension between inveterate Republicans such as Brugha and staunch Sinn Feiners such as Griffith, but differences about the nature of an independent Irish government were to plunge the radicals into civil war four years later.

The formal amalgamation of the different groups took place in October 1917 at Sinn Fein's tenth annual Convention (Ard-Fheis) in which Griffith and Plunkett magnanimously stood down so that de Valera could be elected president of the reorganized and expanded Sinn Fein.

The formation of a united front seemed a magical moment to those whose immediate concern was independence. 'This is not the time for discussion on the best forms of government', said de Valera at the Convention, 'but we are all united on this -- that we want complete and absolute independence. Get this and we will agree to differ afterwards.'

How precisely de Valera intended to achieve his professed goals was deliberately left vague, though he played down the possibility of another rising. Instead, emphasis was given to Griffith's tactic of pleading the Irish case at the peace conference.

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4. Irish Independent, 14 July & 10 December 1917. Although de Valera had played down the possibility of another rising, he did not completely rule out the use of violence. He told the Convention that if necessary the Irish 'will draw the naked sword to make her (England) bare her own naked sword ...', see de Valera, op. cit., pp. 7-8; Henry, op. cit., p. 242.
The synthesis of different forces under the Sinn Fein banner was immediately followed by a reorganization of the Irish Volunteers in November. As a gesture of unity between the political and the military wings of the revolutionary movement, de Valera was also elected President of the Volunteers while Brugha, Vice-President of the Sinn Fein, was named Chief of Staff. To facilitate co-ordination between Sinn Fein, the Volunteers and the IRB, IRB members like Collins was made Director of Organization for the Volunteers, Diarmuid Lynch^2 Director of Communication; and Sean McGarry^3 General Secretary. Thus the IRB regained the influence it had enjoyed in the pre-rising period by becoming firmly entrenched in the reconstituted executive of the Volunteers. Since de Valera and Griffith had disassociated themselves from the IRB^4 and Brugha had now become a convert to open warfare as distinct from IRB's traditional tactics of assassination and ambush,^5 Collins and his IRB comrades, by their effective control of the Volunteers' executive, had steadily transformed the Volunteers into an effective and disciplined republican army increasingly independent of the directives of its political partner. In some cases, even the central executive of the IRB at Dublin was unable to discipline the conduct of its local companies which translated Sinn Fein's policy of self-reliance and

1. Irish Independent, 25 June 1917; also Hepburn, op. cit., p. 106.
2. Lynch, J. ('Diarmuid'); 1878-1950; Republican; joined IRB 1908; participant of the rising; opposed the Treaty.
3. McGarry, S.; ?-?; Secretary of the Volunteers and President of the IRB, 1918.
4. Irish Independent, 26 October 1917.
5. Irish Independent, 26 October 1917.
passive resistance into raiding houses for arms for the Irish army and ploughing up private grass land for food cultivation during the winter of 1917-18.¹

After consolidating the centre, Sinn Fein went on to widen its appeal to the periphery. Various local Sinn Fein clubs were formed and Sinn Fein's policy was widely publicized by *Nationality* and *New Ireland*, the party's twin press organs. Recruitment to the Volunteers also increased dramatically, chiefly because republican propaganda had a great appeal to the young who would have emigrated to the United States or England if the war had not blocked emigration to the former and threatened conscription of immigrants to the latter. Michael Collins himself was one of those youths who had returned home when conscription was enacted in England.

Although the Irish Parliamentary Party warded off the Sinn Fein challenge in three by-elections in early 1918, its success did little to check the erosion of its support. None of these by-elections could be said to reflect fairly the political temper of the country as a whole. This was because two were in Ulster (South Armagh and East Tyrone) where the Irish Parliamentary Party, in face of strong Unionist opposition, had maintained better electioneering machinery than in other places of Ireland. The third, in South Ireland (Waterford), was occasioned by Redmond's death in March 1918; and the Nationalist candidate, Redmond's son, was able to command the

strongest personal loyalties of the party and its supporters. All three elections were, moreover, contested before the extension of the franchise to all males of twenty-one and to all females of thirty, so that Sinn Fein was unable to elicit its undoubted support among the young.¹

John Dillon's accession to leadership after Redmond's death hardly altered the balance of nationalist power which was tilted heavily in favour of Sinn Fein. To the Irish it was a time when policy counted more than leadership. They were disappointed with the Nationalists' failure to avert partition and increasingly attracted by Sinn Fein's policy of self-reliance, passive resistance, and its rejection of partition.

Yet it was Lloyd George's government rather than Sinn Fein that was to administer the coup de grâce to the ailing party. Ireland had been excluded from the conscription act of 1916, but due to the German breakthrough on the western front in early 1918, there was a serious shortage of man-power. Although Carson and his colleagues had warned Lloyd George that conscription in Ireland would provoke a political crisis, domestic opposition in England, especially from trade unions, to the exclusion of Ireland from future conscription was also rising.² In Lloyd George's view, compulsory service could be applied to Ireland if it was preceded by a reasonable measure of Home Rule.³ And he hoped that a solution to the deadlock would

3. ibid.
sooner or later be evolved out of the Irish Convention or from his own initiative. On this assumption, he introduced in April a Military Service Bill which empowered the government to impose conscription on Ireland by Order in Council without further debate. Although Lloyd George had simultaneously pledged that a Home Rule scheme would be introduced before conscription would take effect, his promise was totally ignored. Irish opinion was entirely united under Sinn Fein on the conscription issue.

Lloyd George's policy of concession-cum-conscription had left the Irish Nationalists at a complete loss. When the Bill passed through parliament on 16 April, they withdrew from Westminster en masse in protest and returned to Dublin. Back home, they immediately joined hands with other bodies, Sinn Fein or otherwise, in what amounted to a national protest against compulsory military service. With the exception of Ulster, Ireland had never been so united since the outbreak of the war.

On 18 April the Lord Mayor of Dublin summoned a conference at Mansion House with the representatives from Sinn Fein, Labour, the Irish Parliamentary Party and the All-for-Ireland League. After adjourning to confer with the Catholic hierarchy which was meeting at St. Patrick's College (the national seminary) at Maynooth, de Valera,

1. Irish Independent, 10 April 1918. The Irish Parliamentary Party's alliance with Sinn Fein was, however, ephemeral, for in the following month they were foes again in the East Cavan by-election.
2. All-for-Ireland League — founded by William O'Brien in 1910; its motto was 'Conference, Conciliation, Consent'; against partition; became effete after its abstention from 1918 election.
who was one of the delegates to the conference, drafted a statement
which vehemently condemned conscription as a 'declaration of war on
the Irish nation', and called upon 'all Irishmen to resist by the
most effective means at their disposal'. \(^1\) The Catholic bishops, with
the blessing of Cardinal Logue, \(^2\) also issued a separate statement
declaring that 'conscription forced in this way on Ireland is an
oppressive and inhuman law which the Irish have a right to resist by
every means that are consonant with the laws of God'. \(^3\)

In order to undermine the anti-conscription movement, Griffith,
de Valera and some other Sinn Fein and Volunteer leaders were
arrested and interned without trial for their alleged collusion with
Germany in another highly improbable armed insurrection. \(^4\) There is
strong evidence that due to a tip-off the Sinn Fein leaders had been
informed of their impending arrests. \(^5\) But they made no attempt to
escape as they reasoned that their arrests would be generally
beneficial to the Sinn Fein cause, and particularly to the coming
East Cavan by-election in which Griffith himself was the Sinn Fein
candidate. Polling on 19 June proved their calculations right. In
what had been expected to be a closely balanced contest, Griffith won
the seat by a majority of over a thousand votes.

1. Irish Independent, 19 April 1918; de Valera, op. cit., p. 13.
2. Logue, M.; 1840-1924; cardinal, 1893; critical of the Nationalist
   Party since Parnell's fall; accepted 1921 Treaty.
3. Irish Independent, 19 April 1918. Macardle, D., The Irish
4. Historians have generally doubted the authenticity of the charge
due to tenuous evidence. See Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp.
The failure of the 'German plot' to wean popular support from Sinn Fein and the fervour of the anti-conscription campaign finally led to the suppression of Sinn Fein, the Volunteers, and even the Gaelic League in July. Public processions, meetings and assemblies were also banned. But arrests and internments only added to the growing popularity of the suppressed organizations. In a letter to T.P. O'Connor, Dillon blamed the spiritual intimidation of the younger clerics and the injudicious action of the government for his party's defeat in East Cavan. Intimidation, he wrote, combined with the gaoling of Griffith, the relentless hatred of Lloyd George and the government constituted forces which were 'impossible to overcome'.

These forces were also beyond the control of the British authorities, for Lord French's drastic measures had merely driven Sinn Fein underground without destroying it. Unlike the political leaders of Sinn Fein who had deliberately courted imprisonment to arouse public sympathy, the military men decided to avoid arrest. These included significant IRB men like Collins, Brugha, and Griffith's lieutenant Harry Boland. They had not only managed to preserve the Sinn Fein organizational framework but even made it more cohesive and menacing. Thereafter, beneath the open political facade

2. O'Connor, T.P.; 1848-1929; journalist; founded The Star, T.P.'s Weekly; MP since 1880 until his death.
4. French, J.D.P.; 1852-1925; soldier and Lord Lieutenant, 1918-1921; created Earl of Ypres in 1922.
5. Boland, H.; 1887-1922; joined IRB in 1904; fought in Easter week; Republican envoy and secretary to de Valera in the United States.
of Sinn Fein led by Griffith and de Valera, an underground militant and intractable republican leadership, dominated by Collins, was in the ascendancy. It was also Collins, now practically 'on the run', who built up a valuable intelligence network which proved to be indispensable in the times to come. With the help of Brugha (Chief of Staff of the Irish Volunteers), Richard Mulcahy¹ (Brugha's deputy), Rory O'Connor² (Director of Engineering of Volunteers), Piaras Béaslaf,³ (editor of the re-constituted Volunteers' journal An tOglach (The Volunteer) which resumed publication in August 1918), and Harry Boland, the revolutionary movement continued to expand against considerable odds.

With most of its political leaders in gaol, and with the militants in control of the situation, it was not surprising that the movement took a more violent turn. British suppression backed up by physical force bred violent resistance.⁴ 'It is our duty', wrote Béaslaf in An tOglach, 'to resist conscription actively, working together as an armed, organized and disciplined body ... in an emergency every true Volunteer should know how to act for himself; it is his duty to resist to the death ... to make his death or capture dearly purchased by the lives of his enemies'.⁵ A few weeks later,
in an unsigned article entitled 'Ruthless Warfare' in An tOglach, Ernest Blythe, then in prison, urged that conscription should be met by violent resistance:

If England decided on this atrocity, then we, on our part, must decide that in our resistance we shall acknowledge no limit and no scruple. We must recognize that anyone, civilian or soldier, who assists directly or by connivance in this crime against us, merits no more consideration than a wild beast, and should be killed without mercy or hesitation as opportunity offers. Thus the man who serves on an exemption tribunal, the doctor who treats soldiers or examines conscripts, the man who voluntarily surrenders when called for, the man who in any shape or form applies for an exemption, the man who drives a police-car or assists in the transport of army supplies, all these having assisted the enemy must be shot or otherwise destroyed with the least possible delay.

The ruthless opposition to conscription advocated in this article was never implemented as within a month the war was over and the threat of compulsory military service had disappeared. Although conscription was never applied to Ireland, the spirit of solidarity generated by the anti-conscription campaign had hardened Irish opposition to British rule. In championing the anti-conscription cause Sinn Fein had gained many followers and much public esteem. On the other hand, the Irish Parliamentary Party, by its withdrawal from Westminster, had implicitly admitted its impotence and tacitly yielded ground to Sinn Fein's policy of passive resistance.

As a general election was announced for December, the major task for Sinn Fein was how to enter the contest with all possible means.

1. Blythe, E.; 1889-1975; IRB member; the only northern Protestant to become a cabinet minister in the south.
2. Quoted in Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 397-8.
Despite political harassment and intimidation by the government, Sinn Fein candidates were confident that they would win at a time which they described as the 'twilight of empires'. As for the Irish Parliamentary Party, Nationality predicted that the coming election would be the 'swan song' of this once formidable establishment. In its election manifesto Sinn Fein declared its determination to achieve for Ireland an independent republic in four ways:

1. By withdrawing the Irish representation from the British parliament...
2. By making use of any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise.
3. By the establishment of a constituent assembly ... as the supreme national authority ...
4. By appealing to the Peace Conference for the establishment of Ireland as an independent nation.

The manifesto went on to accuse the Irish Parliamentary Party of bartering away 'the sacred and inviolate rights of nationhood' in the 'Hall of the Conqueror', and for contemplating the 'mutilation of our country by partition'.

Sinn Fein's strenuous campaign paid dividends. Of the 105 Irish seats, Sinn Fein increased its share from 7 to 73; the Unionists somewhat strengthened their position from 18 seats to 26; but none of the Independents or the O'Brienites who formerly held 10 seats were returned; and the Irish Parliamentary Party which had dominated the Irish political scene for over thirty-five years could only retain 6

1. Nationality, 16 November 1918.
2. ibid.
3. Macardle, op. cit., p. 955
of its 68 seats.¹ Of these six seats only those of Joseph Devlin² and Captain William Redmond,³ son of John Redmond, were won by the Parliamentary Party's own efforts.⁴ The other four were held in border constituencies in Ulster which Sinn Fein had agreed not to contest in order to pre-empt Unionist victories.⁵ Even John Dillon, who had been returned to parliament by his constituency at East Mayo in every election since 1885, lost his seat to de Valera by a majority of two to one.⁶

Sinn Fein's sensational success at the polls swept the once formidable Irish Parliamentary Party out of the Irish political scene, and demonstrated to the world that independence was the steady passion not of a handful of idealists but of the Irish people.⁷ The trebling of the Irish electorate in the 1918 election by the enfranchisement of men over twenty-one and women over thirty further strengthened Griffith's contention that Sinn Fein had the grass roots support of the Irish people. To what extent the Irish electors voted for Sinn Fein because of their conversion to its policy was a matter of guesswork. But Father Michael O'Flanagan,⁸ a Vice-President of Sinn Fein, was sure that many voters did not understand what Sinn Fein stood for. In a post-victory speech, he remarked that 'The

1. Due to redistribution, there were altogether 105 Irish seats at the 1918 election, not 103 seats as previously.
2. Devlin, J.; 1871-1934; Catholic Nationalist in Belfast; active organizer of National Volunteers.
3. Redmond, W.A.; 1886-1932; soldier; MP for Tyrone, 1910-18, for Waterford, 1918-22; entered Dail Eireann in 1922 as Independent.
5. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 398.
7. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
8. O'Flanagan, M; 1876-1942; priest and Republican; managed Count Plunkett's successful campaign in Roscommon by-election.
people have voted for Sinn Fein. What we have to do now is to explain to them what Sinn Fein is.¹

P.S. O'Hegarty,² a nationalist publicist, also thought that what the 1918 electorate voted on 'was not Sinn Fein ... but Easter Week'.³ Therefore, Sinn Fein's victory 'was not a victory of conviction, but of emotion'.⁴ It was occasioned less by its doctrinal appeal than the ineffectuality of the Nationalists to make Home Rule a reality, the erosion of faith in British justice, and most of all the emotional repercussions of the Easter rising.⁵

Yet, if the rising and its aftermath had finally broken the Irish people's adherence to constitutional nationalism, and enabled Sinn Fein to capitalize on the Irish Parliamentary Party's decline, the militants were equally indebted to Sinn Fein for offering revolutionary republicanism a modus operandi.⁶ For without a strategy or a policy, the sacrifice of the 1916 insurgents, however heroic, would have got the radicals nowhere. The Sinn Fein's emphasis on passive resistance, moral force, civic organization and legitimation of radical actions by popular endorsement at the polls was in fact indispensable to the extremist movement if further

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2. O'Hegarty, P.S.; 1879-1955; supported Treaty; blamed de Valera for inciting civil war.
5. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 725.
progress was to be made. The fusion of the violent and pacific movements had already begun when militant Republicans stood as Sinn Fein candidates in the post-rising by-elections. It was consummated late in 1917 when de Valera formally became President of Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers, thus creating in effect two wings — one political and the other military — of a new separatist united front. This new separatist coalition, having annihilated the Nationalists at the polls, became the most formidable political force in post-war Ireland. The Nationalists' policy of collaboration was discarded. In its stead came Sinn Fein's politics of passive resistance and civil disobedience, with the IRB's revolutionary violence lurking in the background.

1. MacDonagh, States of Mind, p. 67. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
2. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
The Advent of Constitutional Radicalism and the Retreat of Constitutional Moderatism

While the Irish nationalist movement was becoming more aggressive, its Indian counterpart was also being radicalized. During the war, it became increasingly critical of British rule, more uncompromising in its demands, and more truly national as it spread to new regions 'under a more genuinely all-India leadership'.¹ The war and events in Ireland, the provocative nature of British policy in the war years, the influence of the doctrine of self-determination, the February and October Revolutions in Russia in 1917 and the unsatisfactory Montagu-Chelmsford reforms all contributed to these developments. The growing restlessness of the Muslim middle classes about the war against Turkey, and the vigorous agitation of the Maharashtrian Extremist, Tilak, and the World President of the Theosophical Society, Mrs. Annie Besant,² were even more important in causing the radicalization of Indian politics. However, despite increasing middle-class participation, the nationalist movement during the war remained an elitist concern as compared with its mass-based Irish counterpart.

The Growth of Home Rule Radicalism

Compared with Ireland, India in 1914 was politically rather calm

1. Owen, op. cit., p. 159.
2. Besant, A.; 1847-1933; British theosophist; President of the Theosophical Society, 1907-33; went to India in 1895.
and inactive. Yet, beneath this tranquillity, there was a growing restlessness and dissatisfaction with the political inertia. For one thing, the reform and revival movements of recent decades had steadily enhanced Indian self-awareness. Japan's victory over Russia (1904-5) and the nationalist revolutions in Persia (1910), Turkey (1908-9) and China (1911) had raised hopes of an imminent resurrection of Asian powers. More significantly, the Extremist movement during 1904-8, though suppressed, had deeply stirred the younger generation, especially the students both abroad and at home.¹ Immensely impressed by the Extremist condemnation of British rule, these young men began to view Britain's paternal benevolence as thinly disguised foreign exploitation. The paltry reforms handed down from Westminster further strengthened their doubts about the sincerity of their imperial overlord. 'The feeling, thus ever present, of there being a watching and protecting Government above us vanished at one stroke with the coming of the nationalist agitation in 1905', wrote N.C. Chaudhuri,² an eminent Indian man of letters. 'After that we thought of the Government, in so far as we thought of it in the abstract, as an agency of oppression and usurpation'.³ Gandhi's passive resistance campaign on behalf of the ethnic Indians in South Africa between 1906 and 1914 also greatly influenced Indian youth.⁴ To this energetic and romantic generation, the self-sacrifice of the Extremists and the suffering of Gandhi were sublime manifestations of the national soul. By contrast, the Moderates

². Chaudhuri, N.C.; 1897--; Bengali author and journalist.
appeared feeble and their politics futile. The British, in the young radicals' view, 'could never be talked out of their imperial position'.\(^1\) Only a more aggressive and active policy, such as passive resistance, could meet India's need.\(^2\)

Likewise, many Congressmen also felt that in rejecting the violence of the Extremists, it was unnecessary to fall back on the caution and inactivity of Gokhale and Mehta.\(^3\) Bishan Narayan Dhar\(^4\) spoke for them all in his presidential address to the INC at Calcutta in 1911. 'I know that Moderation sometimes means indifference, and caution timidity', he said, 'I hold that India needs bold and enthusiastic characters -- not men of pale hopes and middling expectations, but courageous natures, fanatics in the cause of their country'.\(^5\) In 1914, in a letter to the Bombay Moderate leader, Gokhale, Bhupendranath Basu,\(^6\) a Bengali Moderate, told the former that Moderates outside Bombay would 'accept any means to lift the Congress out of the present bog'.\(^7\) Many Western-educated intellectuals and local businessmen, notably the Tamil Brahmins\(^8\) in Madras, shared Basu's view.\(^9\)

2. ibid.
4. Dhar, B.N.; 1864-1916; Barrister-at-law, Lucknow; editor of The Advocate (Lucknow).
6. Basu, B.; 1859-1924; President of INC, 1914; member of Secretary of State's council, 1917-24; Attorney-at-law, Calcutta.
7. Quoted in Owen, op. cit., p. 164.
8. Tamil Brahmin -- Caste of Brahmins from the Tamil-speaking peoples of southern India; inhabited chiefly in the Madras Presidency, parts of Mysore, northern Ceylon, and present-day Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.
9. New India (Madras), 22, 24 October 1914.
The release of Tilak in June and the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 steered Congress politics in the direction Basu wanted. Tilak, whom Chirol called the 'father of Indian unrest' in 1910, was now more cautious, national and peaceful in his political outlook. Yet he did not lose any of his political insight during his six years in gaol for inciting violence. He knew that the Moderates' demand for limited self-government, like the Irish Nationalists' espousal of modest Home Rule, would not be satisfied as long as Britain was at war. Rather like the Sinn Feiners, he knew that excitement and growing expectations generated by the war could be easily turned into bitterness and disappointment. Therefore, his task was to exploit this discontent for the benefit of his re-entry into Indian politics.

In order to placate the Moderates, Tilak publicly disavowed violence and urged his countrymen to help Britain which had 'been compelled to take up arms in defence of weaker states'. Assuring the Moderates of his pacific stance, he reiterated that his policy was no more radical than that of the Irish Nationalists and his method was strictly constitutional. He saw in Mrs. Besant a useful ally both as a shield of respectability and as a source of potential

1. Chirol, V.; 1852-1929; journalist and author; in charge of The Times foreign department, 1896-1912; visited India 17 times.
2. Chirol, Indian Unrest, p. 41.
Although by political conviction and temperament a Moderate believing in constitutional evolution, Mrs. Besant argued the case for Indian Home Rule with rare vigour and strength which had been lost since the Surat split. India would 'no longer accept benevolent patronage with gratitude', she wrote in May 1914, 'and she earnestly desires to have her place within the circle of the Empire, under the aegis of the Crown'. To Gandhi and the Moderates who maintained that India's loyalty to Britain was unconditional, she replied that 'the price of India's loyalty is India's Freedom'. Fearing that the case for Indian self-government would attract little attention in Britain amidst the tension created by the Irish Home Rule movement, she repeatedly argued that the satisfaction of Indian yearnings was by no means less vital to the Empire than 'the pacification of the militant unrest in Ireland'.

Admitting herself a newcomer to Indian politics, Mrs. Besant assigned herself to rousing Indian political awareness. 'I am an Indian tomtom', she said, 'waking up all sleepers so that they may wake and work for their motherland'. She was convinced that India was already fit for self-government and refuted the Moderates'

5. Besant, India and the Empire, p. 11.
contention that India still required British tutelage.¹ 'India is no sick man', she replied to Sinha's doctor-patient analogy in the 1915 Congress. 'She is a giant who was asleep and is now awake'.²

In order to lift India out of her lethargy, Mrs. Besant recommended an agitational campaign supported by monster meetings and intensive publicity in the manner of the Irish Home Rule movement.³ She was eager to forge a united front of the Extremists and the Moderates in the INC, as a means to reinvigorate the Moderates and to wean young Indians away from passive resistance, which in her view was likely to degenerate into violence.⁴ But the Moderates were reluctant to re-admit Tilak lest his policy of Irish obstruction would turn the INC into an Extremist body,⁵ offend the government,⁶ and, most vital of all, weaken their leadership in the INC.⁷

Disappointed with the 1914 INC's refusal to re-admit the radicals into the Congress fold, Mrs. Besant and Tilak decided to build up their own political organizations and launch an all-India agitation in order to apply additional pressure on the Moderates to compromise with the Extremists⁸ and on the British government to grant Home Rule to India within the Empire.⁹

1. Besant, Bond or Free, p. 162.
Several factors, mostly caused by the war, worked in their favour. To begin with, although the influence of the young radicals was still relatively weak at this stage, their impatience with 'the politics of talk' and their 'insistent demand for action' had nevertheless imparted a sense of urgency and a radical mood into the nationalist movement.\(^1\) Jawaharlal Nehru well expressed their feelings when he wrote:

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\ldots \text{the idea that we must not tamely submit to existing conditions and that something must be done began to obsess me more and more. Successful action, from the national point of view, did not seem to be at all easy, but I felt that both individual and national honour demanded a more aggressive and fighting attitude to foreign rule.}\(^2\)
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Their impatience was quite understandable. When Prime Minister Asquith emphasized in November 1914 that henceforth Indian questions would have to be approached from a different angle, Indian nationalists had construed his speech as 'a pledge of the deepest significance'.\(^3\) Likewise, for two years, young Indian nationalists had been imbued with the heady doctrine of liberty and the ideals of democratic government. They were proud of India's immense contribution to the war and the flattering compliments they earned from British statesmen.\(^4\) All these things had created 'a new self-consciousness' among them and made them 'think more highly of

2. ibid., p. 43.
themselves. Consequently, there was 'a demand for greater recognition' of their political status and importance within the British Empire.

Yet, despite the British statesmen's lavish compliments, there was not 'an iota of deeds'. Two years had elapsed and there was still no sign of constitutional reform. Not only was India hardly mentioned in any discussion of the post-war settlement, in 1915 the House of Lords even rejected the proposed creation of an Executive Council for the United Provinces which had been strongly recommended by the Government of India. And when it was hinted that after the war, in an Imperial Federation, India and other dependencies should be co-governed by an Imperial Parliament, consisting of members from Great Britain and the Dominions, India reacted furiously to such an insult to her national pride and sovereignty. When it was pleaded that Britain was too involved in the present conflict to attend to Indian aspirations, Indians argued pointedly that the same government seemed to have no trouble in sparing time for the discussion of Irish Home Rule, suffragettes and the like.

The importance of placating Indian opinion at this critical juncture was perceived by Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay.

5. Chirol, India, Old and New, p. 144.
In 1915 and 1916 he had repeatedly informed several statesmen at home and the Prime Minister, then Lloyd George, that 'a big and generous move in the way of legislation both in economic and administrative matters' was both necessary and expedient not only because of India's loyalty and unfailing support in the war, but also because a handsome reward at this opportune moment would definitely bind India 'in the bonds of amity and Imperial Unity'. But regrettably he 'either got no answer or no encouragement' from the British government which had increasingly taken India's services for granted. Little effort was made to propitiate Indian feeling or channel enthusiasm effectively to the war effort. The Indian nationalists, 'somewhat rebuffed and with nothing to do', again took to politics.

To make matters worse, this lack of vision coincided with the revolutionary transmutation of India's attitude towards Western military supremacy and moral prestige which had been occurring since Japan's victory over Russia but was precipitated most of all by the war of 1914-18. Hitherto, Britain and Russia were regarded by the Indians in general as two impregnable world powers. Other European countries and the United States were vaguely perceived and were deemed irrelevant to India. Moreover, Europe was thought to be more or less monolithic, self-disciplined, with better socio-political institutions, and a more civilized culture. But the war revealed that Europe was divided, self-seeking, unruly and belligerent.

1. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 1030.
2. ibid.
Atrocities, carnage, and strife claimed by the British to be oriental phenomena were now matched by the suicidal slaughter of the warring states in the West. Given better military equipment, these occurred on an even greater scale. In view of such colossal destruction and wanton aggression British rhetoric about benevolent paternalism over India seemed only a thin mask for European hypocrisy. To Gandhi, who saw no sanctity or meaning in such bloody slaughter as Pearse did and blamed the European nations for allowing themselves to become 'votaries of brute force', the war in Europe clearly revealed that modern civilization, glorified by the West, only represented 'forces of evil and darkness'.

Britain's image as the guardian of oppressed nationalities was further tarnished when news of the Easter uprising reached India. Initially, the Indian press condemned what they described as the intrigues of the Germans in Ireland. Many congratulated the Irish for holding firmly to their constitutional stance and considered the executed Irish rebels 'properly punished'. But public opinion in India, like that in Ireland, swung in late 1916 to sympathy with the leaders of the abortive insurrection. This rising, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, was a courageous gesture by the 'bravest and finest' Irish youth to show that Ireland 'still dreamt of a republic' and could not be cowed into submission. Sir Roger Casement's 'extraordinarily moving and eloquent' statement at his trial for treason, Nehru

5. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 3.
6. ibid.
continued, had laid bare 'how a member of a subject race should feel'.\(^1\) It was a fine testament to 'the passionate patriotism of the Irish soul'.\(^2\) As for the rising, 'in its very failure it triumphed', for it had demonstrated to the world that 'no physical might could crush the invincible spirit of a nation'.\(^3\) New India of Madras, under the direction of Mrs. Besant who often said that 'three-quarters of my blood and all my heart are Irish',\(^4\) virtually came to the conclusion that the rising was wholly justifiable, though not so much for its violence as for its heroism and patriotism.\(^5\)

Likewise, echoing Pearse's idea of blood sacrifice, the Punjabi nationalist Lajpat Rai described the undying spirit of Indian nationalism as 'a seed that is richly fertilized by the blood of martyrs' and eulogized the concept of a national purgation through a martyr's death.\(^6\) But unlike Pearse, he considered that it was 'sheer lunacy' to encourage bloodshed where there was no chance of success.\(^7\)

With regard to the Home Rule negotiations after the rising, local Indian newspapers complained that Britain seemed more willing to concede Home Rule to a rebellious Ireland than to a loyal India.\(^8\) Tilak also wondered that while Irish Home Rule was being seriously negotiated, the Government of India could pretend to be so 'upset' by

1. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 691. Also Toward Freedom, p. 44.
2. ibid.
3. ibid. Also Toward Freedom, p. 44.
4. Mrs. Besant's mother and paternal grandmother were Irish. Quoted in Majumdar, op. cit., vol. II, p. 360.
6. Lajpat Rai, Young India, p. 244. Supra, pp. 34-35
7. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 263.
8. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 3.
India's 'philosophical discussion of Home Rule'. The rising in Ireland, if nothing else, had added much fervour to Indian nationalist politics in mid-1916.

As political agitation mounted, the Indian economy was also deteriorating. Although the war had initially created an increasing demand for Indian products at rapidly rising prices, the boom did not last long. Foreign trade was brought to a standstill, causing shortages in essential commodities and inducing an exorbitant rise in the prices of imports. The collapse of German trade also deprived India of many cheap manufactured goods, as well as what had been by 1914 India's second largest overseas export market. Industries connected with German trade suffered badly. Food hoarding and black marketeering soon became rampant and food prices sky-rocketed.

The commercial classes were under government pressure to contribute to the Red Cross Funds and to invest in war bonds, and were bitterly opposed to war-time restrictions on their activities. Realizing that unless they had power in their own country, they would suffer heavily in the trade war after the armistice, a nascent industrial protectionist group was being increasingly drawn into the nationalist movement, bringing to the latter much needed financial support.

5. ibid., pp. 325-6. Chirol, India, p. 185.
and the return of the wounded also had a tremendous influence. Some of the returned soldiers reported on the prosperity of Europe and the high living standards of the French peasantry; and others brought back stories of heroic nationalist struggles on the continent.¹

In the midst of these economic difficulties and political disillusionment came the surprising defeat of Anglo-Indian troops at Kut-el-Amara in April 1916 in the campaign to capture Mesopotamia. The subsequent findings of the Royal Commission revealed tactical miscalculations and military mismanagement which greatly discredited the government.² By the end of 1916, the mood of India had changed 'from enthusiasm to one of critical impatience, restlessness, and expectation of change'.³

It was in this volatile atmosphere and amidst the uncertainty regarding India's political status in the future, that Tilak and Mrs. Besant started their separate Home Rule Leagues in April and September 1916 respectively.⁴ The aim of the Home Rule movement — self-government within the British Empire — was in fact as modest as its Irish counterpart. But Mrs. Besant's advocacy, unlike Redmond's, was fierce and vituperative. Contrary to Gandhi's idea that 'England's difficulty should not be turned into India's opportunity', and that Indian nationalists should not press their demands 'while

the war lasted', Mrs. Besant urged the Indians to strike while the iron was hot. In her opinion, cessation of political agitation during the war might be taken as silent acquiescence in India's political status. Unless Indians clearly stipulated their political demands before the war ended, they might miss out in any post-war Imperial settlement. She was amused at Gandhi's conviction that India's contribution to the British war effort and its show of loyalty to Britain would enable India to attain self-government after the war. In her opinion, only a Britain hard-pressed by a world war could be persuaded to concede self-government to India. Conversant with Irish history, she asked the Indians to read 'the Penal Laws against Roman Catholics in Ireland, and ask if the English, who enacted and enforced them, were fit for self-government'. Furthermore, she argued that the Moderates were quite naive in believing that India was bound to prosper under British rule, for Britain was only doing in India what she had done in Ireland—destroying her native industries and reducing her to an agricultural and raw-material exporting country. The 'impoverishment of India', she said, went 'hand-in-hand with the rise of English industrialism'. Apart from economic degradation, she argued that India's discontent, again like Ireland's, also had a spiritual aspect. It was due to the 'wounding of national self-respect',

6. Besant, India, Bond or Free, p. 139.
through such measures as the prohibition of bearing arms in both countries, which carried with it 'a sense of humiliation, helplessness and self-contempt'.

As a result of an agreement between the two leaders, Tilak confined his activities to western and central India, leaving the rest of the country to Mrs. Besant. Week after week, Tilak argued India's case for Home Rule in his two weeklies, Mahratta and Kesari (Poona). In his opinion, as Irish Home Rule was being considered despite the war, the same should be done for India. Later, he embarked on extensive lecture tours, instructing the masses on the meaning of Home Rule within the Empire. As for Mrs. Besant, she began an active propaganda campaign in New India and Commonweal (Madras). The existing organizational network of the Theosophical Society, with its branches all over India, had undoubtedly given her much advantage over Tilak in spreading the message of Home Rule. Though some theosophists objected to her mixing of theosophy with politics, many others nevertheless joined her All-India Home Rule League and were responsible very often for the setting up of the branches of the League. In fact, the strength of the Home Rule movement in each area was closely related to the local strength of the Theosophical Society. For instance, in the Madras Presidency, the United Provinces and Bombay, the theosophists had played a

1. Besant, For India's Uplift, pp. 325-6. Strengthening Mrs. Besant's Irish analogy, Lajpat Rai also argued in 1917 that whereas there was vocal opposition to conscription in Ireland, it was generally well received in India. The 'prejudice of colour', therefore, should no longer be a pretext for refusing autonomy to India. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 270.
leading role in promoting and organizing Home Rule activities. Of course, many non-theosophists supported Mrs. Besant's Home Rule movement as well. For instance, in December 1917, the total membership of the Indian Theosophical Society was only one-fifth of that of the All-India Home Rule League, and many Home Rule League activists such as Jawaharlal Nehru in Allahabad, Shankarlal Banker in Bombay, Ramaswami Aiyar in Madras and B. Chakravarti in Calcutta, were not theosophists.

The political momentum generated by the Home Rule movement greatly impressed the nationalists, especially the young. 'The atmosphere became electric', recalled Jawaharlal Nehru many years later, 'and most of us young men felt exhilarated and expected big things to come in the future'. The support given to Tilak and Mrs. Besant also reflected the growing political consciousness and restlessness of the middle- and lower-middle classes who were the main targets of proselytizing. Even the Moderates, who thought that the Home Rule Leagues would only create divisions in the nationalist movement, admitted that Mrs. Besant had 'stirred the country by the spoken as well as the written word as scarcely anyone else could

3. Ramaswami Aiyar, C.P.R.; 1879-1966; pleader of Madras High Court; Congress All-India Secretary, 1917-18.
Alarmed by the danger besetting their cause, the Moderates, whom the Dublin Honesty had contemptuously equated with Irish pro-war parliamentarians, were eager to persuade the British authorities to announce their intention of granting India self-government at an early date. In this way, their position would be strengthened and the steady constitutional progress of India would be ensured.

Had the British authorities acted promptly, the cause of the Moderates might not have been lost. But official hesitation and reticence about constitutional aspirations had weakened their position. The death of Gokhale and Mehta in February and November 1915 further sapped their strength by removing the foremost opponents of the readmission of Tilak and his followers to the INC. The Moderates, thus weakened, were forced to accommodate the Extremists who in 1916, after nine years of exclusion, finally rejoined the INC. Their leader, Tilak, was greeted with a tumultuous ovation when he made his way to the rostrum.

The Growth of Muslim Radicalism

The reunion of the Moderates with the Extremists coincided with a rapprochement with the Muslim League. Since the Indian Mutiny of

2. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 75.
1857, the Islamic reformer Syed Ahmad Khan, had advised Indian Muslims to stay away from the Congress which, in his view, did not take into consideration that India is inhabited by different nationalities... In order to safeguard Muslim interests against the tyranny of representative government, which meant the rule of the religious majority, Syed Ahmad Khan recommended his co-religionists to seek protection under the British authorities. The latter, anxious to allay Muslim disaffection and play off the Muslims against the Hindus, were eager, especially after 1870, to show the Muslim elites that 'they had more to gain by collaboration than by opposition', and keep the Muslim modernists away from the influence of the Islamic fundamentalists who argued against Syed Ahmad Khan's Islamic reformism and the modernists' acceptance of the conquerors.

Contrary to Syed Ahmad Khan's denunciation of the Congress, the fundamentalists, chiefly represented by the Muslim leaders at the dar al-ulum (an Islamic seminary founded in 1867 at Deoband near Delhi for the study of traditional Islamism), argued against rapprochement with the British and ruled that co-operation with Hindus in secular matters such as Muslim participation in nationalist politics was permissible.

1. Sayyid (Said, Syed) -- A chief. Also a name used by those who claim descent from Husain, the son of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima. Khan, A.; 1817-1898; educationalist & reformer; founder of Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875.
4. ibid.
7. ibid.
Despite the admonition of the Deoband leaders, Syed Ahmed Khan's ideas were closely followed by the All-India Muslim League which was run by Muslim aristocrats, titled gentry and landlords. Established in 1906 with a view to represent upper-class Muslim interests and to divert the new generation of Muslims away from the Congress, the Muslim League fulfilled its role as a counterpoise to the nationalism of the Westernized middle classes represented by the Congress. Its leadership was conservative, even feudal, and was prepared to support the Muslim cause only if it did not threaten their interests. Several incidents in the 1910s, however, greatly estranged Muslims from the British and considerably weakened the Muslim conservatives vis-à-vis the rising Muslim radicals.

To begin with, in 1910, the Muslim League moved its headquarters from Aligarh, where Syed Ahmad Khan had set up in 1875 a Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College as a training ground for the culturally progressive and politically pro-British Muslim intelligentsia, to Lucknow. In December of the same year and January 1911, talks were also held between Congress and Muslim League leaders on Hindu-Muslim questions. General Muslim disaffection set in with the revocation of the partition of Bengal in December 1911. To the Indian Muslims in general, the Bengali Muslims in particular, the revocation of partition meant the restoration of Hindu dominance in the

3. Khaliquzzaman, C., Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, Longmans, 1961, p. 137. Throughout subsequent changes and developments, and even when large numbers joined it at later days, the Muslim League never shed its upper class feudal leadership. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 391.
reconstituted province of Bengal and signified that Muslims could no longer count on the British as their protectors.¹

Feeling betrayed, many prominent Muslims such as Muhammad Ali² and Shibli Nomani (or Numani)³ began to question the political wisdom of Syed Ahad Khan's loyalism and urged the Muslim League to seek a political understanding with the Hindus.⁴ In 1912 anti-British feeling was further deepened by Britain's participation in the first Balkan War which was seen by Indian Muslims as Islamic Turkey's struggle for survival against the concerted attacks of European Christian powers.⁵ The fact that Turkey was the greatest surviving independent Muslim state and its Sultan still the Khalifa (Caliph)⁶ in the eyes of sixty-million Indian Muslims made the predicament of Turkey all the more pertinent to the Indian Muslims and the adversaries of Turkey, including Britain, more detestable.⁷ Therefore, any Muslim who gave or professed his support or loyalty to the enemy of Islam, such as the Muslim Leaguers or the Aligarh modernists, should be condemned. In his journal Al-Hilal (The Crescent) and other public speeches, A.K. Azad,⁸ an eminent Muslim Pan-Islamist journalist, bitterly attacked the Aligarch modernists as reactionaries, heretics and hypocrites who had in the last forty years collaborated with the 'satans of Europe to weaken the influence

5. Smith, op. cit., p. 196.
6. Khalifa - the temporal and spiritual leader of the Islamic world.
7. Hardy, op. cit., p. 182. Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 117.
of the Islamic Caliphate\(^1\) and Pan-Islam\(^2\). Adding to Azad’s invective, Shibli Nomani criticized the Aligarh College as ‘an institute for training in slavery’\(^3\).

The Muslim League too could not evade the attacks of the Pan-Islamists. But here the criticisms were tinged with the nationalist spirit and economic interests of the expanding Muslim middle classes of which Nomani, Azad and Muhammad Ali were the principal spokesmen. Growing political awareness among the middle-class Muslims was already visible in their responses to the Young Turk movement of 1908-9 and their nationalist spirit had been heightening ever since.\(^4\)

The nationalist writings and speeches of Muhammad Ali and Azad further enhanced their assertiveness. Increasingly aggressive and nationalistic, the middle-class Muslims became very critical of the pro-British attitude of the Muslim conservatives in the Muslim League and insisted that bolder steps should be taken in the direction of Indian self-government.\(^5\) As for the Muslim League leaders, they criticized them for being politically and socially too conservative and self-seeking. This so-called all-India Muslim organization, they argued, did not adequately represent the interests of Muslim middle classes.\(^6\)

1. Caliphate (Khilafat) — ‘Sovereignty’, the office of Caliph.
3. ibid., p. 137.
6. Pandey, B.N., The Break-up of British India, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 84. Despite its grand title, the Muslim League could hardly represented the Indian Muslim community because it was poorly supported and deeply divided against itself. Between 1915 and 1916, it probably had only about 500-800 members. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, p. 30.
Viceroy Hardinge was aware that upper-class Muslim support for the raj was being undermined by the growing radicalism of the middle-class Muslims. But official support for the loyalists was not forthcoming. In fact, the Muslim conservatives suffered a grievous blow when in July 1912 the British government disapproved of a scheme to establish a Muslim university lest it should be used by impetuous young Muslims to propagate Pan-Islamic ideas. This injudicious decision led to a further decline of the Muslim conservatives and provoked growing political activism on the part of nationalist Muslims. Even the Muslim League, which was founded especially to pre-empt restlessness by isolating the Muslims from the nationalist movement and was controlled by politically and socially 'reactionary and semi-feudal elements', bowed to the pressure of the Muslim radicals. In January 1913, a demand for self-government was incorporated in the Muslim League's political platform despite its profession of continuing loyalty to the British Crown. This decision led directly to the resignation of its conservative and very pro-British president the Aga Khan, whom the Gaelic American (the IRB's mouthpiece in the United States) regarded as the Indian counterpart of a loyal Protestant or pro-British leader in Ireland.

Muslim discontent was further intensified when part of a mosque at Cawnpore in the United Provinces was demolished as a result of a

1. Hardy, op. cit., p. 183.
3. Ikram, op. cit., p. 137.
5. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda...', p. 75.
road-widening scheme in July and August 1913. But it was the First World War that was responsible for the alienation of Muslim loyalty from the raj and the change of Muslim attitude to the Congress from opposition to co-operation.

Whereas Belgium as a Catholic country had helped arouse considerable Irish sympathy and the Catholic clerics had generally subscribed to Redmond’s judgement that Ireland’s cause was best served in Flanders, the war against Turkey, like the Balkan War, had caused considerable anxiety and anti-British feeling among the Indian Muslims. Hardinge was well aware of the sympathy for Turkey especially among the Muslim middle and lower classes. In order to allay Muslim anxiety, he had assured them of the immunity of the holy places of Arabia and Mesopotamia from military attack, and of the inviolability of the Islamic religion. But when Britain supported the Arab revolt against Turkey under the leadership of the grand sharif al-Hussein of Mecca in June 1916, it was clear to the Indian Muslims that Britain was bent on dismantling the Muslim establishment in the Mohammedan world. Earlier in 1913, when General Sir George Richardson, who had been commandant of the Poona division in India, took over the control of the Ulster Volunteers, Capital of Calcutta

3. Hussein (Husain), sharif; 1853?-1931; protégé of T.E. Lawrence; King of the Hidjaz, 1916-24; leader of the Arab princes. Sharif — means ‘noble’
5. Richardson, Lt.-Gen. Sir G. (Lloyd-Reily); 1847-1931; joined Indian Army, 1869; commanded 6th Poona Division, 1904-8.
remarked that 'if General Richardson Sahib¹ is applauded for leading a revolutionary army to protect indefensible Orange principles', why should not the Muslims do the same to protect their holy places.² The Calcutta Englishman also admitted that the Ulster Unionists' cause had provided justification for the use of violence by Indian nationalists.³ Although Indian Muslims eventually did not take up arms against their imperial master, the British campaign against Turkey had evoked a serious conflict of loyalties among them and it was no surprise that 'a good deal of unrest' in the Muslim native regiments was reported to the Government of India.⁴ The dilemma of the Muslims was epitomized by the presidential speech of the Muslim League in 1915, in which it was stated: 'It is a sore point that the Government of our Caliph should be at war with the Government of our King-Emperor'.⁵ A year later, in his presidential speech to the Muslim League at Lucknow, Jinnah⁶ concluded his plea for greater mutual understanding between India and England by quoting a recent speech of Prime Minister Lloyd George on the Irish situation. In that speech Lloyd George regretted that the Irish situation was created and aggravated by a mutual misunderstanding, partly racial and partly religious; that England and Ireland were moving 'in an atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust'. Every word of this speech, said Jinnah, 'literally applies to the conditions in India'.⁷

1. Sahib — former title of address to Europeans in India; (colloq.) gentleman.
2. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 72.
3. ibid.
4. Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 117.
Growing middle-class Muslim disaffection and politicization finally resulted in an entente with the Congress in December 1916. Under this famous Lucknow Pact, the Muslim League accepted the principle of representative government whereas the Congress conceded separate electorates to the Muslims. Henceforth, Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority provinces such as the United Provinces, Bihar, Bombay and Madras were given increased representation in the legislatures and other elective bodies whereas the same privileges were enjoyed by the Hindu minorities in the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab.\(^1\) A scheme of proposed reforms was also put forth which, while safeguarding British control in military, foreign, and political affairs in India, demanded provincial autonomy and greater power-sharing at the centre. It also expressed its hope that the British government would 'confer self-government on India at an earlier date'; and that in any reconstruction of the imperial system India would be 'lifted from the position of a dependency to that of an equal partner in the Empire with the self-governing Dominions'.\(^2\)

Although the Lucknow Pact was hailed as a milestone in the nationalist movement, growing Muslim communalism after 1922 clearly revealed that the union of hearts was rather tenuous. Jinnah, who was one of the chief architects of the Lucknow Pact, was ironically to spearhead Muslim separatism in later years. By conceding communal representation to the Muslims, the Congress had tacitly accepted the former as a separate political entity and the Muslim League its

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principal spokesman. The latent threat of Muslim separatism of course could not be foreseen in 1916 by the Congress leaders who, in view of the Hindu-Muslim fraternity and Moderate-Extremist unity, were only too glad to see the nationalist movement becoming more truly representative of all Indian communities. At the present moment, the Moderates, who had failed to secure even a modicum of provincial autonomy,¹ claimed that they still controlled the nationalist movement, but they were fast losing their grip.

The British Response and the Limitations of Indian Radicalism

Alarmed by the return of Extremist politics, Reginald Craddock,² Home Member of Viceroy's Council, warned the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford³ in January 1917:

The position is one of great difficulty, the Moderate leaders can command no support among the vocal classes who are being led at the heels of Tilak and Besant. The great figures among the Moderates have passed away and so far they have no successors. Home Rule is pressed for not so much as constitutional reform now becoming due, but as the only salvation from innumerable wrongs and grievances under which India is suffering ....⁴

No sooner had Lord Chelmsford pressed the Secretary of State for

1. Jinnah, M.A., Speeches and Writings, 1912-1917, Madras, Ganesh, 1918, pp. 79-82. Jinnah compared the 1912 Irish Home Rule Bill with the 1909 India Council Bill and concluded that although both conceded autonomy, be it 'national' in Ireland's case or provincial in India's case, the concessions were more in name than in substance.
2. Craddock, R.; 1868-1937; Home Member of Viceroy's Council, 1912-17; Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, 1917-22; MP, 1931-7.
India, Austen Chamberlain,\(^1\) to strengthen the Moderate position by a formal declaration of post-war policy, than two international events occurred which added fuel to the nationalist fire. The first was the entry of the United States into the war and the formulation of President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination:

> The world must be made safe for democracy and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts -- for democracy, for the rights of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.\(^2\)

The American President also made it quite clear that responsible government should not be built on the material interests of an outside nation, but on the consent of the governed; and that no people should be forced to recognize a sovereign under whom it did not wish to live.\(^3\)

This emphatic declaration on government by the consent of the governed stirred 'the Irish, the Indians, and other subject peoples greatly'.\(^4\) Indians noted that while the President talked about self-government as an integral part of the rights of man, the British referred to democratic ideals as if they were constitutional and

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1. Chamberlain, A.; 1863-1937; Liberal Unionist MP, 1892-37; Secretary of State for India, 1915-17.  
legal concessions. The former appeared to the Indian public as a champion of small nationalities, while the latter seemed to be a European arch-imperialist. Wilson's concern with the Irish question was also well known among educated Indians. They generally believed that American military intervention was delayed until a workable solution to the Irish question could be found. Hoping that Wilson would render the same service to India as he had to Ireland, Dr. Subramania Aiyar, Honorary President of the Home Rule League, had sent a letter to him asking for his support for Indian Home Rule but met with little success.

If the Wilsonian principles provided doctrinal ammunition against autocracy, the February Revolution in Russia was a working example of liberalism. The fall of the Tsar was hailed in India as the collapse of the greatest surviving despotism and a momentous victory for liberalism and nationalism. The Abhyudaya, a Hindi nationalist weekly in Allahabad, declared that the Russian Revolution had aptly reflected the irresistible force of nationalism in the making of a new world; whilst the Maryada, a Hindi nationalist monthly in Allahabad, warned the existing autocratic governments that their tyrannical rule was insupportable in a period in which human rights, freedom and equality were the order of the day.

2. Aiyar, K., 1842-1924; one of the founders of the INC.
   Maryada (Allahabad), March 1917.
In his reminiscences, Satis Pakrasi, a left-wing revolutionary, recalled that 'the fall of the tyrannical Russian Emperor and the rise of the Russian republic made our future more bright and realistic .... We welcomed the abolition of Tsarism and it inspired us to abolish the British imperialism. The February Revolution's ideas matched with those of the Indian Revolution'. Pakrashi confessed that he and his colleagues knew very little about ideological developments in Russia, but the lesson of a patriotic and liberal-democratic revolution was not lost to the Indians of different political persuasions. 'Autocracy is destroyed in Russia; it is tottering in Germany; only under England's flag it is rampant ...', wrote Mrs. Besant in *New India*. The change of political mood in India perhaps found the most succinct expression in Lajpat Rai's 'Open Letter to Edwin Montagu' on 15 September 1917. In this he wrote:

India of 1917 is also quite different from India of 1907. Hindus and Mohammedans have sunk their differences and are making a united stand in their demand for political liberties. The Anglo-Indian plans of creating an Indian Ulster have miscarried and never before during the British domination was India so united in its political and economic ideals as today. In 1907, we were yet babies "crying for the moon". We had not yet grasped the fundamentals of the situation. Our horizon was clouded by sectarian boundaries and we were fighting for crumbs. In 1917 we are a united people no longer praying for

1. Pakrasi, S.C.; 1893-7; Bengali revolutionary; joined the secret society called Anushilan Samiti in 1908.
3. ibid.
5. Montagu, E.S.; 1879-1924; Liberal MP, 1906-22; Under-Secretary of State for India, 1910-14; Secretary of State for India, 1917-22.
concessions, but demanding rights.¹

In order to check the rising chorus of discontent, the Government of Madras had ordered the internment of Mrs. Besant and two of her lieutenants in June 1917. Such an indiscreet action precipitated nation-wide condemnation and resulted in many prominent politicians, including Moderates such as Motilal Nehru, joining the Home Rule Leagues.² Assessing the effect of the incident, Gandhi wrote:

In my humble opinion, the internments are a big blunder .... India as a whole had not made common cause with Mrs. Besant but now she is on a fair way towards commanding India's identity with her methods. I myself do not like much in Mrs. Besant's method. I have not liked the idea of the political propaganda being carried on during the War. In my opinion, our restraint will have been the best propaganda. But the whole country was against me .... The Congress was trying to 'capture' Mrs. Besant. The latter was trying to 'capture' the former. Now they have almost become one.³

When Edwin Montagu, who was well known for his deep sympathy with Indian aspirations, was appointed Secretary of State for India after his predecessor Austen Chamberlain had resigned over the Mesopotamian debates,⁴ Indian radicals went on to the offensive,

¹. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 287.
³. CW, vol. 13, p. 464. J. Nehru also recalled that the internment added greatly to the excitement of the intelligentsia and vitalized the home rule movement all over the country. It stirred even the older generation, including many of the Moderate leaders'. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
⁴. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 95, cols. 2199-2205, 2209-10, 12 July 1917.
demanding a quicker and firmer declaration of British intentions and threatening to launch a campaign of passive resistance should their demands be ignored.¹

Recognizing 'the gravity and urgency of the situation' in India, Lord Chelmsford repeatedly warned Montagu that speedy legislative reforms were necessary to arrest the further weakening of moderate opinion in India and to keep Extremist politics within bounds. In his opinion, any over-cautious delay or hesitiant action would be 'fatal'.² As a result, Montagu announced in the House of Commons in August 1917 that in future the 'policy of His Majesty's Government ... is that of ... the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'.³ As a gesture of good will, Mrs. Besant was released in September 1917.

Although the hasty character of this declaration led to speculation that it was born of expediency rather than conviction,⁴ for the first time in British Indian history the Indians were promised responsible self-government rather than good government.⁵

¹ Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 372-4.
³ H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 97, cols. 1695-6, 20 August 1917.
⁵ Bengalee, 30 August 1917.
'This pronouncement', said Jinnah, 'is understood in India as recognizing the aspirations of the Indian people of (sic) the early grant of Self-Government within the Empire ...'¹ To the Moderates, the August declaration was 'a positive response' to the demand for self-government laid down in the Lucknow Pact and proof that India's long 'cherished ideal' of national autonomy was 'within the realm of materialization'.²

After his fateful declaration, Montagu proceeded to India in November 1917 to confer with Lord Chelmsford and Indian leaders in order to substantiate his proposed reforms. His visit coincided with serious communal rioting at Arrah and a financial crisis in Bombay. But the effects of these incidents were negligible when compared with the impact of the October Revolution in Russia. Leading Indian newspapers reacted favourably to the revolution and stressed particularly its anti-imperialist aspect. Administering a grim warning of unrest to the government, the nationalist Bengalee predicted that as in Russia so in India reforms 'indefinitely postponed' would only prepare 'the ground for revolt'.³ When the Soviet government issued its provocative appeals to 'the toiling, oppressed, and exhausted masses' between 24 November and 7 December 1917, renounced secret treaties, relinquished its claim to Constantinople, annulled the partition of Persia and Turkey, declared its intention to withdraw Russian troops from Persia, and upheld the right of self-determination, it seemed to the Indians that at last

¹ Jinnah, Speeches and Writings, p. 184.
³ Bengalee, 25 November 1917.
the erstwhile citadel of despotism had turned itself into a bastion of human emancipation. Mrs. Besant, whose popularity had swept her into the presidency of the Calcutta Congress in December 1917, compared the nature of British rule in India with that of its 'free and self-ruling' Asian neighbours 'beyond the Himalayas', and warned that 'in future, unless India wins Self-Government, she will look enviously at her Self-Governing neighbours, and the contrast will intensify her unrest'. Reiterating Tilak's oft-quoted aphorism, she said that freedom was the birthright of every nation and India should have it.

This was Mrs. Besant's finest hour, even though her triumph was to prove short-lived. She had widened the social basis of the Home Rule movement, thus rendering it into a quasi-mass movement, though within a restricted zone in India. Even Gandhi, who refused to join her Home Rule League, praised her immense contribution to the political awakening of India. It was due to her, he said in late 1917, that swaraj was 'on the lips of hundreds and thousands of men and women'. As for Tilak, who was 'at the moment probably the most powerful man in India', his intention to make the Congress 'more

progressive, more militant, more active — active all the year round’ was being fulfilled.\(^1\) The Moderates, who had successfully prevented Tilak and Lajpat Rai from becoming President of the Congress in the past, now capitulated before Mrs. Besant. Their fear that the Congress would be radicalized by the re-entry of the Extremists also proved justified.\(^2\) Amid the deafening applause with which the Congress greeted Tilak in 1916 and Mrs. Besant in 1917, the Moderates receded to the background. Even if Gokhale or Mehta had been alive they could not have prevented the nationalist movement from taking its more radical course. Thus in 1917 at Calcuta, the Extremists avenged their defeat ten years ago at Surat.\(^3\) John Morley’s\(^4\) prediction immediately after the Surat split that the Congress would become an Extremist body in due course,\(^5\) like Austen Chamberlain’s belief that Irish radicals would win in the long run,\(^6\) proved only to be too true.

The prodigious upsurge of political radicalism greatly alarmed the Government of India which, owing to Germany’s successful counter-offensive in March and April 1918, was hard pressed by the British government to step up the Indian war effort. To take advantage of British troubles to agitate for Home Rule, Lord Ronaldshay\(^7\) told the

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4. Morley, J.; 1838-1923; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1886 and 1892-5; Secretary of State for India, 1905-10.
7. Ronaldshay, Lord; 1876-1961; MP, 1907-16; Governor of Bengal, 1917-22.
Indian nationalists, would greatly offend British opinion and weaken British war morale. In reply, Indian radicals pointed out that such consideration did not stop the Irish Home Rule agitation which was far more violent than India's. Indian radicals' assertiveness was further strengthened by Lloyd George's recruitment speech in April 1918 in which he said that when the Irish were mobilized into the war, 'it is imperative that they should feel they are not fighting for establishing a principle abroad which is denied to them at home.'

Indian nationalists wistfully drew the same conclusion for India. Even Gandhi was exploiting the critical war situation to bargain with the government for greater concessions. In a letter to the Viceroy on 29 April 1918, he wrote:

I recognize that, in the hour of its danger, we must give - as we have decided to give - ungrudging and unequivocal support to the Empire, of which we aspire, in the near future, to be partners in the same sense as the Dominions overseas. But it is the simple truth that our response is due to the expectation that our goal will be reached all the more speedily on that account - even as the performance of a duty automatically confers a corresponding right .... I feel sure that nothing less than a definite vision of Home Rule - to be realized in the shortest possible time - will satisfy the Indian people ....

It was in the face of this 'seething, boiling, political flood raging across the country' that Montagu and Lord Chelmsford worked out their reform scheme. Although the senior members of the Indian Civil Service were unresponsive to his tour, Montagu was content that

2. Irish Independent, 10 April 1918.
at least he had 'kept India quiet for six months at a critical period of the War'.\(^1\) The resultant Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published in July 1918. It recommended a limited devolution of power to Indians at the provincial level by a scheme generally known as 'dyarchy' or the division of provincial administration into two parts—'reserved' and 'transferred'. In this scheme, the irremovable provincial executive would go on retaining its control over 'reserved' matters such as law and order, and finance, while the governor was supposed to act on the advice of Indian ministers elected from, and thus responsible to, the provincial legislatures in areas such as education, agriculture, and public health.\(^2\) At the end of the Report, Montagu and Chelmsford revealed their conception of India's future as 'a sisterhood of States, self-governing in all matters of purely local or provincial interest'; presided over by a central government which was representative of and responsible to the people of India and represented the 'interests of all India on equal terms with the self-governing units of the British Empire'.\(^3\)

In the words of a contemporary Indophile, Valentine Chirol, the Report was the first authoritative survey of the state of India since the 1857 Mutiny.\(^4\) It marked a devotion to the spirit of Macaulay,\(^5\)

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3. ibid., p. 220.
5. Macaulay, T.B.; 1800-1859; legal adviser to Supreme Council of India, 1834-38; famous for his 'minute' on education.
Bentinck,^ Munro,^ and Elphinstone^ who had almost a century ago conceived England's mission in India as the dissemination of British ideas and institutions; and the guiding of India on the road to self-government.^ It also resembled Lord Durham's^ Report which, while introducing responsible government into the Canadian provinces, insisted that such a measure could not be tried at the national level until it had been experimented with successfully in the provinces.

The Report received wide publicity and provoked divergent responses from Indian nationalists. The radicals believed that if they accepted the reforms and implemented them as the British instructed, it would not help promote national autonomy as this would be just 'a new form of the old dependence'.^ To achieve independence, they had to reject what was offered. 'I find myself', said Mrs. Besant, 'unable to accept the Scheme as it stands .... The Scheme is penetrated with distrust of Indians, and the desire to keep all real power in the hands of the English .... It is petty where it should have been large, banal where it should have been striking.

1. Bentinck, W.C.; 1774-1839; Governor of Madras, 1803; Governor-General of Bengal, 1828-33; first Governor-General of India, 1833.
2. Munro, T.; 1761-1827; Anglo-Indian general; Governor of Madras, 1819-24; promoted education of natives & championed their rights.
3. Elphinstone, M.; 1779-1859; Governor of Bombay, 1819-27; founded system of state education; compiled code of laws.
4. Chirol, India, Old and New., p. 151. All the aforementioned statesmen endeavoured to raise Indian character through progressive Anglicization, social reforms and English education; hoped that one day Indians would be able to govern themselves; anticipated evolutionary changes.
5. Lambton, J.G.; first Earl of Durham; 1792-1840; Governor-General of British provinces in North America, 1838; submitted in 1839 a Report on the Affairs of British North America to Colonial Office; a blueprint for all his successors.
There is about it no vision for India of even future evolution into freedom'. In short, the reform proposals were 'unworthy to be offered by England or to be accepted by India'. Likewise, Motilal Nehru, who was by this time slowly drifting away from the Moderates, ridiculed the latter's opinion that India must learn to stand before she could walk.

Although the reform scheme also fell short of the Moderates' expectations, they nevertheless concluded that it 'represented a definite advance towards responsible government ...' Like Gandhi, they considered it impolitic to reject the proposed reforms: this would bring no immediate benefit. Instead, by making the best use of these reforms, they could 'qualify for more' and 'press for more'. The Moderates also thought that as there was no alternative scheme to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, its rejection would postpone the 'prospects of responsible government' indefinitely. Furthermore, they were worried that the Indian outcry against the Report might be exploited by the British 'anti-reformers' as an excuse to drop the scheme altogether. After all, so far the Moderates were concerned, Montagu's belated redemption of Asquith's pledge was the most tangible proof of their political influence, of Britain's responsiveness to their pleas, and of the value of

6. ibid.; *CW, vol. 15*, p. 31; *vol. 16*, p. 341.
7. *ibid.* (Banerjea).
8. ibid., pp. 306, 313.
constitutional vis-d-vis militant nationalism. In this sense, the reform scheme was a tribute to their success.

This division of opinion regarding the reform scheme immediately provoked a schism in the Moderate-Extremist united front. In fact, the readmission of the Extremists to the Congress had been a reunification without reconciliation. Most Moderates, especially the Bombay clique, never accepted the Extremists and what they stood for. The rift, therefore, still existed, even if it had been obscured by the euphoria at the time of the Extremists' re-entry. Moreover, many Moderates from Bombay and Bengal were jealous of Mrs. Besant's meteoric rise to prominence in the nationalist movement. The virulence of the Home Rule agitation and Mrs. Besant's apparent support for passive resistance also frightened them. They had readmitted the Extremists to the INC in 1916 because Britain's unfavourable response to their request for constitutional reforms had pushed them into a tight corner. But since Montagu's August declaration, their faith in constitutional evolution was substantially revived and they were prepared to part company with their Extremist partners.

In order to placate the Moderates and keep the nationalist movement intact, Mrs. Besant changed her strategy after her release from internment by repudiating passive resistance. The fact that there were no well-organized trade unions and peasant associations

3. ibid.
through which she could organize mass action on a peaceful plane might have been the major reason for her reluctance to start passive resistance.\(^1\) During the war, there was still no Indian Connolly who could give substance and direction to the nascent Indian trade unionism. Compared with the Irish nationalist movement which was dramatically boosted by the Republican-Labour coalition and the recruitment of a large number of non-union workers and peasants to the Volunteer force,\(^2\) the Home Rule campaign in India failed to attract mass support and retained its elitist and bourgeois character.\(^3\) Abhorrence of violence and social dislocation was an understandable reaction of the socially conservative. Thus, while Griffith favoured direct action, especially in the form of commandeering grazing land for tillage, as an excellent means of securing the support of rural proletariat,\(^4\) Mrs. Besant was reluctant to launch passive resistance lest the masses should get out of control. But her hesitation and then repudiation of passive resistance alienated her young supporters who were greatly roused and wanted direct participation in nationalist politics. Her popularity suffered further when, in an effort to retain both the loyalty of the young radicals who bitterly criticized the reforms and demanded action, and the good will of the Moderates who welcomed them and called for restraint, she adopted an increasingly ambivalent attitude towards the reform scheme.\(^5\) Such inconsistency pleased no one and

agonized most of her supporters. Thus, barely a year after her rise to national leadership, she found herself isolated from the forces which she had brought together in 1916.

The Moderates, knowing well that 'hasty and extreme views' would prevail at the special Congress session at Bombay in August and at the annual Congress session at Delhi in December, and fearing that their presence would be interpreted as support for radical views, decided not to attend either session. Instead, a separate All-India Moderates' Conference was convened at Bombay in November to decide their attitude toward the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. To many Moderates, secession from the Congress was 'a painful wrench', for they had nurtured it with their 'life-blood'. But they had 'counted the cost' and reckoned that the 'fundamental' differences between the Extremists and themselves was too great to be bridged. As there was no common understanding, they had no choice but to secede.

In his presidential address to the Conference, Banerjea, who shared Edmund Burke's aversion to revolution, emphasized that there was 'no short-cut to constitutional development in politics', and reminded his audience that the forefathers of the Congress had never doubted that only through a prolonged period of training under British tutelage could Indians become competent to stand on their own

1. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 234.
5. ibid., pp. 142 & 313.
feet.\(^1\) Revolutionary movements had been tried and failed in Bengal, he said. Even if revolutions succeeded, they would only bequeath 'a trail of blood, and the memories of ruins and devastation' would take generations 'to efface and to repair'.\(^2\) In justifying the Moderates' acceptance of the reform scheme, he stressed that:

The ideal must be subordinated to the practical, governed by the environments of the situation, which must be slowly, steadily developed and improved towards the attainment of the ideal .... Evolution is the supreme law of life and of affairs. Our environments, such as they are, must be improved and developed, stage by stage, point by point, till the ideal of the present generation becomes the actual of the next.\(^3\)

Sir S.P. Sinha, at this time a delegate of the Government of India to the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, also 'unhesitatingly believed' that the reform scheme laid 'the foundations of an Indian Constitution' which would contribute to the 'solidarity and unity of the Empire'.\(^4\)

As the Moderates' Conference drew to a close, news of the armistice arrived, and the war had ended. At the annual Congress session at Delhi, the Extremists and the young radicals rejected the wilting leadership of Mrs. Besant and reiterated their demand for the early conferment of responsible government on India. Although the pronouncements of Lloyd George and President Wilson about self-determination were not made with reference to India, Congress

leaders, like the Sinn Feiners, nevertheless argued that the principle should be applied to their country as well. The Congress also resolved that in any restructuring of the imperial relationship, whether within or without the Empire, 'India should be accorded the same position as the self-governing Dominions'; and that 'in justice to India' she should be represented at the Peace Conference 'to the same extent as the self-governing Dominions'. Like Sinn Fein, the Congress elected three representatives — Tilak, Gandhi, and Hasan Imam — to plead India's case at Paris.

At the same time at Delhi, moderate leaders in the Muslim League also yielded to the Pan-Islamist radicals at its annual session. In a powerful speech, Dr. Ansari, a prominent Delhi Muslim, argued that 'a good Muslim was also a good nationalist' and commended Gandhi as a 'dauntless champion of our rights'. More significantly at this League session was the entry of a group of ulema (the Muslim clerisy) into politics. The alliance between the modern- and traditional-educated Muslims, which the British authorities and the pro-British Muslim conservatives had tried to prevent, finally materialized. In announcing their coalition with the 'Editors and Barristers', the ulema made it clear that religion could not be separated from politics and when need be, 'they were only too glad to join in the

2. ibid, pp. 133-5.
3. Imam, S.H.; 1871-1933; President of All-India Home Rule League; Khilafatist; President of Special Congress session. September 1918.
6. A term used by Muslim League conservatives to refer to the Muslim radicals whose main professions were editors and barristers.
political body'. In the years to come, they were to play a prominent role in Indian politics.

'The Extremist of today', said Tilak at Calcutta in January 1907, 'will be Moderate tomorrow, just as the Moderates of today were Extremists yesterday'. Tilak's political wisdom was aptly vindicated by the growing radicalism of Congress politics during the war. This process of progressive radicalization began with Tilak's return to and Mrs. Besant's entry into active politics in 1914, was accelerated by the intense agitation of the Home Rule Leagues and the capture of the Congress by the Extremists in 1916, and culminated with the defection of the Moderates from Congress in 1918.

There was no doubt that the Indian Moderates, like the Irish Nationalists, were victims of the political restlessness created by the war, of their own ineffectiveness, and most of all of the British government's delay in implementing constitutional reforms. All these factors gave much impetus to Indian and Irish radicals who thought that a more uncompromising and aggressive attitude was necessary to serve the nationalist cause. The Home Rule movement in India, playing the part of the Easter rising in Ireland, had imparted a sense of urgency and impatience into nationalist politics and administered the coup de grace to the Moderates. The secession of the Moderates from the Congress in 1918, like the electoral defeat of the Irish Nationalists in the same year, signified their retreat from

1. Quoted in Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 158.
the nationalist movement, however unwillingly. Prominent moderate leaders such as Banerjea in India and Dillon in Ireland remained notable for their service and devotion to the nationalist cause, but were devoid of influence, power and followers. After 1919, it was extra-parliamentary opposition, not constitutional co-operation, that counted in India and Ireland. 1918 thus closed the era of constitutional politics in both countries.

The Home Rule movement had failed in that India did not attain self-government after the war. But this failure was relatively negligible when compared with its influence on subsequent developments of the nationalist movement. To say the least, the Montagu declaration in August 1917 was largely a result of its intense agitation. Moreover, it had provided India with a definite scheme of self-government divested of the verbiage with which the Moderates had clouded this goal.

In terms of organization, the Home Rule movement bequeathed a rudimentary network of communication which covered much of British India. Consisting essentially of loosely-linked local political committees, this organizational infrastructure could be easily turned into a vital apparatus for co-ordinating a mass movement on a national scale. For the first time too, political agitation, a well-tried technique in Ireland since the Repeal movement in the 1840s, was launched and sustained continuously for years and was

4. Repeal movement — campaign in the 1840s led by Daniel O'Connell for the repeal of the union between Britain and Ireland. Supra, p. 2.
adopted by the Congress as a standard technique. This political style, transmuted later by Gandhi into mass civil disobedience, governed the development of the Indian nationalist movement for the next thirty years and helped keep the latter on a peaceful path.\(^1\)

Despite their non-violence, the Home Rule radicals were nevertheless virulent in their denunciation of the British authorities and radical in their advocacy for immediate Home Rule. India wanted 'Home Rule not by instalments', Mrs. Besant wrote in New India on 9 May 1917, 'but Home Rule complete and immediately after the war'. The effect of this impatience was to make swaraj henceforth an overriding concern for Indian nationalists. This anxiety was best shown by Tilak's acceptance of communal representation for Muslims at Lucknow in 1916 in return for the latter's support for the nationalist cause. Tilak, who was the leading Hindu revivalist of the 1890s, had obviously by the 1910s realised that Hindu-Muslim unity was indispensable to the nationalist movement, and the attainment of freedom should take precedence over any other considerations.\(^2\) Many nationalist Muslims also shared Tilak's view. In his presidential address to the Muslim League session at Calcutta in 1917, the Raja\(^3\) of Mahmudabad* said:

The interests of the country are paramount. We need not tarry to argue whether we are Muslims first or Indians. The fact is that we are both, and to us the question of precedence has no meaning. The League has inculcated in the Muslims a spirit of sacrifice for this country as much

3. Raja — ruler, king, prince; a title also borne by landlords.
4. Raja of Mahmudabad. Mohamed Ali Mohammad Khan; 1877-1931; President of the All-India Muslim League, 1917-18, 1928.
for their religion.¹

The political potential of the Hindu-Muslim alliance was still obscure during the Home Rule era. It was only after 1919 that its full strength was progressively tapped and channelled into the nationalist movement by a leader whose philanthropy had won the affection of Hindus and Muslims alike.

The vigour of the Home Rule movement also overshadowed the timidity of the Moderates. 'People who were considered mean, docile and subdued', wrote Jamnadas Dwarkadas,² had become 'wide awake, strong, fearless and standing up to demand their rights'.³ Indian radicals now realized that in order to be effective, the nationalist campaign should be aggressive and assertive. Nationwide agitation had to be supported by an extensive publicity campaign. Newspapers, posters, vernacular pamphlets, illustrated leaflets and kirtans (religious songs adapted for political propaganda) all had to be used.⁴ The Congress leaders could no longer be arm-chair politicians attending to national issues only when leisure-time permitted. Instead they had to be full-time workers devoting their whole time and energy to the nationalist cause.⁵

The greatest significance of the Home Rule movement, however,

2. Dwarkadas, J.; 1890-?; theosophist, 1912; Bombay Home Rule activist; able lieutenant of Mrs. Besant; later worked under Gandhi.
was its ability to carry the nationalist campaign to the middle strata of Indian society and to hitherto politically inactive areas.\footnote{Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.}

By the end of 1917, the two Home Rule Leagues had altogether about 60,000 members. This of course would hardly make them mass political parties. But when compared with the number of delegates to the Congress in earlier years, it was a great leap forward.\footnote{Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 27.} Moreover, people who were influenced by the Home Rule Leagues did not necessarily become members,\footnote{Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation...', p. 185.} and the contribution of these unregistered converts could not be gauged accurately. But one thing stands out clearly. Most of these newcomers came from castes and occupations which had previously played little part in nationalist politics. For instance, in the Khandesh district (Bombay Presidency), the Home Rule League consisted essentially of Gujar\footnote{Gujar — A great agricultural and pastoral caste in north and north-western India; some have converted to Islam.} and Marathas\footnote{Maratha — A warlike community of western India. The term 'Maratha' in its wider aspect is used to indicate a number of castes from Brahmins downwards.} who together outnumbered Brahmin\footnote{Brahmin (or Brahman) — The highest, or priestly caste among Hindus.} members. In Poona and Nasik (a holy city for the Hindus near Poona), while a majority of the Home Rule League members were Brahmins, the Gujaratis\footnote{Gujarati — Inhabitant of Gujarat, mostly traders and agriculturalists.}, Marwaris\footnote{Marwari — A native of Marwar (Rajasthan); settled widely in other parts of India, usually following business of banker, broker, merchants; mostly of Jain religion.} and Marathas were also significant minorities.\footnote{Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 27.} Likewise,

4. Gujar — A great agricultural and pastoral caste in north and north-western India; some have converted to Islam.
5. Maratha — A warlike community of western India. The term 'Maratha' in its wider aspect is used to indicate a number of castes from Brahmins downwards.
6. Brahmin (or Brahman) — The highest, or priestly caste among Hindus.
8. Marwari — A native of Marwar (Rajasthan); settled widely in other parts of India, usually following business of banker, broker, merchants; mostly of Jain religion.
it was the petty cloth merchants of the Marwari community who heavily subsidized Tilak's Home Rule deputation to England in summer 1913 to counteract British conservative opposition to granting responsible government to India.¹

Among the new social groups which rallied to the Home Rule movement, the industrial and commercial sections of the expanding middle classes were most enthusiastic in their response and forthcoming in their financial support.² During the war, the large decrease in foreign imports and the urgent wartime demands of England had induced a marked expansion in local manufacturing and mining industries such as jute, cotton, iron, steel, coal, light engineering works, munitions and war materials of all kinds.³ This war-generated economic activity greatly accelerated the growth and prosperity of the industrial and commercial sections of the Indian middle classes.⁴ Influenced by the heady doctrines of liberty and democracy and the more immediate concern with economic expansion and tariff protection,⁵ these nouveaux riches and parvenus provided numerous fresh recruits and the much needed financial aid to the nationalist movement.⁶ For instance, many active members of the Bombay Home Rule League belonged to the Bhatia⁷ and other Gujarati trading castes engaged in the cotton industry of Bombay city. Through their business and social connections they had successfully enlisted many

7. Bhatia (Bhatiya) -- A trading caste found chiefly in Bombay & Sind.
professional and industrial men into the League, as well as drawing the workers from the cloth mills and markets to their political gatherings and demonstrations. It was also through them that the message of Home Rule was able to disseminate to their native regions and take root among the otherwise ill-informed masses. Similarly, the Amils, the outstanding revenue collecting caste of the Hindu minority in Sind, were responsible for establishing the Sind branches of the All-India Home Rule League.

The political awakening of the women cheered Mrs. Besant particularly. In her words, their participation had made the strength of the Home Rule movement 'tenfold greater' and had brought to the nationalist movement 'the uncalculating heroism, the endurance, the self-sacrifice of the feminine nature'. Although the Congress remained 'a national organization of the bourgeoisie' and the Home Rule movement did not make much headway among the masses, at least the ground had been tilled. The field awaited a cultivator who would sow the seed of Indian nationalism among the teeming masses and 'reap a great harvest of support'.

Apart from laying the groundwork for a mass movement in the years to come, the Home Rule movement had also trained a new generation of assertive and vocal radicals among them many who were

2. Ibid., p. 183.
to become prominent national figures. It was due to the strenuous efforts of these young men who ventured into new areas which had been hitherto relatively untouched by the Congress activities, notably Gujarat, Berar, the Karnatak, Central Provinces, Bihar, the United Provinces, Sind, Delhi, the Madras mofussil, and southern India that the nationalist movement had steadily taken on an all-Indian dimension by stretching geographically out of the confines of Bengal, Bombay, Maharashtra and the Punjab. These enthusiastic lieutenants were greatly inspired by Mrs. Besant's endeavours, but were equally frustrated by her repudiation of passive resistance when their blood was up. Disappointed by Mrs. Besant's increasing conservatism, they revolted against her and looked for a new leader who would tender anything that was stronger than the weapon of constitutional agitation offered by Mrs. Besant. As Tilak was in England during late 1918 and mid-1919 suing Valentine Chirol for libel and C.R. Das was still too new to political circles to command a following, the nationalist movement was without a leader at a time it most needed one. The power vacuum was ready be filled by a new leader who could invoke the frustrated radicals' respect and release their pent-up feelings in a programme of direct action.

2. Mofussil (mufassal) -- country districts as opposed to the principal town.
The general election in 1918 undoubtedly testified to the immense popularity of Sinn Fein's political objectives, but the question of the means to these ends immediately created tension between the Republicans and the Sinn Feiners. The former considered passive resistance ineffective whereas the latter regarded brute force as completely futile. Britain's repressive policies, however, worked in the militants' favour and lent much weight to their conviction that force alone could wrest concessions from Britain. Such an ingrained belief in the efficacy of violence launched the radicals into a civil war when the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty fell short of the die-hard Republicans' ideal.

Sinn Fein and the IRB.

While the Indian Congress was earnestly pleading for the right of self-determination, Sinn Fein had already taken steps to establish a Dáil Éireann and lobby for international recognition of the 'new-born state'. At this time the people at large was with Sinn Fein and did not expect anything in the shape of violence. Yet, the alliance of the IRB and Sinn Fein in 1917, which culminated in the latter's electoral victory in 1918, was only a marriage of convenience, not a

1. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 735.
fusion of ideologies or goals. Apart from their common dissatisfaction with the Nationalists and the Home Rule scheme, they were incompatible.\(^1\) Sinn Fein was pacific and sought to set up a Dual Monarchy whereas the IRB was militant and wanted a republic. Electoral success in 1918 did not in any way bring the militants closer to Sinn Fein and the political and military wings of the radical coalition remained in a large measure independent of each other's control. The 'physical force men', reported the London Daily News in mid-January 1919, were exceedingly contemptuous of the 'moral force' movement and held steadfast to their doctrine of the sword. 'They are never in the ascendant except at times of extraordinary national emotion', it continued. 'Such a time it is only too plain to see we are rapidly approaching now'.\(^2\) Such an observation was in fact not too wide of the mark. What it underestimated was the extent to which the physical force men were entrenched in the main body in Dublin\(^3\) and were unhappy to remain 'merely a political adjunct to the Sinn Fein organization'.\(^4\) For the time being, however, they were prepared to leave Sinn Fein free to build a new Ireland.

In accordance with their election promises, the newly elected Sinn Fein representatives ignored Westminster and summoned a Dáil Eireann in January 1919. This body unequivocally and unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Ireland, ratified the establishment of the Irish Republic of 1916, and adopted a Democratic Programme of

1. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
socio-economic reforms along the broad lines of Patrick Pearse's last political work *The Sovereign People*. Furthermore, a 'Message to the Free Nations of the World' was drawn up pleading for support of Ireland's claim to self-determination and of her right to representation at the Paris Peace Conference.¹

Although the declarations were proposed, seconded, and carried without extensive debate or discussion,² the Dail was far from being an extremist body. It did not seek to end the dialogue with Britain forthwith, nor was it prepared to resort to open warfare with her.³ Its policy henceforth was concentrated on the replacement of British civil rule in Ireland by its own government and lobbying for international recognition of Ireland's national independence. To this end, a parallel administrative apparatus was steadily built up and three delegates — de Valera, Griffith, and Count Plunkett — were appointed to plead Ireland's case at Versailles.

Yet as Griffith and de Valera were in jail, the Dail was devoid of a prudent leadership which would assess rationally whether a separate Irish Republic was attainable before committing the nation absolutely to this goal and nothing less.⁴ Writing thirty-three years later, P.S. O'Hegarty, a contemporary IRB member close to Collins, regretted that passions had run so high. The country as a whole was 'emotion-drunk', he recalled. The young men and women were wrapped up in 'a furious nationalism'. They did not consider

1. For the text of the constitution and the declarations of the Dail, see Macardle, op. cit., pp. 284-5. apps. 9 & 10 (pp. 959-962).
2. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 726.
3. ibid., p. 735.
4. ibid., p. 729.
realistically whether the professed goals of Sinn Fein were feasible, they just reacted to rhetoric, clamour and slogans. 'It was unfortunate', he said, 'that this assembly took place with so little of the intelligence of the Dail being present.' Unrealistic political claims, O'Hegarty argued, betokened troubles in the years to come.

Despite the Dail's exuberance, its campaign for international recognition as Ireland's de jure government received a mortal blow at Versailles. The Irish radicals' open flirtation with Germany during the war was well known to the Allies: they had described Germany as their gallant ally in Europe and had hoped fervently for a German victory. This 'treasonous' attitude inevitably offended Allied statesmen, including President Wilson himself; and it subsequently weakened Ireland's claim for admission to the Peace Conference. In fact, the Nationalists, by serving the Allied cause unflinchingly in the trenches, were far better placed to present Ireland's case in Paris. Moreover, as this was a conference of the victors, it was naturally the subject nations of the losers, not those of the winners, that were to be emancipated. Like other delegates, Wilson had no intention of compounding his already onerous task by interfering with what Lloyd George had insisted was a domestic dispute within the United Kingdom. Thus, despite the intensive lobbying of leading Irish-Americans in the United States, and of a

Sinn Fein envoy, Sean T. O'Kelly, in Paris, Ireland failed to secure a hearing at the Conference. After all, it was the victors, Britain being among them, who dictated terms.

Ireland's 'apparent defeat in Paris' left Sinn Fein at a complete loss. Passive resistance and the appeal to the Peace Conference were the twin election pledges which led to its electoral success in 1918. Now, as the abortive mission to Paris revealed, Sinn Fein was as impotent internationally at Versailles as the Irish Parliamentary Party had been 'nationally' at Westminster. The bankruptcy of this election promise subsequently made the task of harnessing popular support for its passive resistance programme more difficult. Though the Dail members and most of the Irish radicals at this time were generally referred to by observers as Sinn Feiners, many of them, notably the members of the Irish Volunteers or the IRB did not subscribe to Sinn Fein's 'moral force' philosophy. In the view of these militants, although Sinn Fein had brought Ireland's long-cherished aspirations closer to the realm of realization, a belligerent posture had to be maintained lest the republican cause should suffer. 'The position is intolerable', Michael Collins complained in May 1919, 'the policy now seems to be to squeeze out of any one who is tainted with strong fighting ideas or I should say I suppose ideas of the utility of fighting'.

2. Freeman's Journal, 2 June 1919.
too many 'of the bargaining type' among the Dail members would render 'official Sinn Fein ... ever less militant and ever more political and theoretical'.\(^1\) Just as Pearse had claimed the right of a revolutionary minority to interpret the national will in the national interest, and had proclaimed the duty of protesting with armed force against any departure from popular ideals, the militants subsequently saw themselves as the trustees of Irish destiny, always on the alert to remonstrate with or rectify any deviation, by force if necessary.\(^2\)

'The Army', said one of the most brilliant militants of the time, Liam Lynch,\(^3\) 'has to hew the way for politics to follow'.\(^4\)

Thus while the Dail was building up the skeleton of an alternative government, the militant Republicans were busily strengthening their own organization and replenishing their military resources by raiding local farm houses or, more often, by ambushing police arms consignments. Coincidentally, on the very day the Dail met, two unsuspecting police constables were shot dead in a skirmish for dynamite by Volunteers at Soloheadbeg in county Tipperary. This was the opening of a sequence of irregular attacks on Crown forces by independent activists. Two leaders of the Soloheadbeg raid, Dan Breen\(^5\) and Sean Treacy,\(^6\) soon emerged as resolute guerrilla leaders in what progressively became the Anglo-Irish war, 'a kind of

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3. Lynch, L.; 1890-1923; Commandant of Cork No. 2 IRA Brigade, 1919; Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty IRA during civil war.
4. O'Donoghue, op. cit., p. 86.
non-co-operation with violence thrown in', as Jawaharlal Nehru described it.¹

Though the Tipperary Brigade had acted entirely on its own initiative,² the Dáil and the Volunteers General Headquarters were reluctant to censure its operations. This was partly because of their ineffective control of local commandants and partly because of their ambivalent attitude towards the use of violence. In fact, shortly after the Soloheadbeg incident, Cathal Brugha, who was Acting President of the Dáil and Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, sanctioned the official position of the Volunteers laid down by Piaras Béaslaf in An tÓglach. The directive of Béaslaf reaffirmed that England and Ireland were 'in a state of war'; assured the Volunteers throughout Ireland that 'the authority of the nation' was behind them as 'the Army of Ireland'; and authorized every Volunteer 'morally and legally, when in the execution of his military duties, to use all legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and policemen of the English usurper, and to slay them if it is necessary to do so in order to overcome their resistance.'³ Darrell Figgis,⁴ editor of the separatist journal The Republic (An Phoblacht), also recalled that in a Sinn Fein executive meeting in the spring of 1919, Collins had told the Sinn Feiners that 'the sooner fighting was forced and a general state of disorder created through the country,

3. An tÓglach, 31 January 1919.
the better it would be for the country.\(^1\)

The militants' restiveness certainly alarmed the Dail members, especially Brugha who, as Minister for Defence, was trying to bring the Volunteers under civil control. Although in August 1919 he had succeeded in inducing individual Volunteers to take an oath of allegiance to the Irish Republic and Dail Eireann,\(^2\) thus transforming them into an Irish Republican Army (IRA), this new organization remained responsible to its own executive. If it was controlled by the Dail at all, it was through the person of Collins, who was the Adjutant-General, Director of Intelligence, and Director of Organization of the IRA.\(^3\) The IRB, whose influence within the Volunteers had long been a source of uneasiness for Brugha, remained an independent body answerable to no one but its Supreme Council which Collins also dominated.\(^4\)

Circumstantial factors also encouraged centrifugal tendencies. In September 1919 the Dail was declared illegal and its members and sympathizers were systematically arrested. With the Dail driven underground and its deputies practically on the run, there was understandably little scope for implementing or co-ordinating any

2. For the oath of allegiance, see Macardle, op. cit., p. 317.
3. ibid., p. 318; some of the Volunteers would not take the oath seriously, see O'Malley, op. cit., p. 145. For the lack of liaison between the Dail and the IRA Headquarters see O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, pp. 46-48.
nation-wide policy. Much of the initiative therefore had to be
delegated to local areas.\(^1\) Most of the clashes between the
Republicans and the Crown forces during 1919 were in fact isolated
and unco-ordinated episodes, owing more to the initiative of local
commandants than to the directive of Dublin General Headquarters.

That the military was unamenable to civil authority was further
reflected in the implementation of the policy of ostracizing the
police which de Valera proposed after his escape from gaol. Although
its main purpose was to thwart police efforts to act as 'the eyes and
ears of the enemy', and to inculcate a sense of shame among its rank
and file,\(^2\) this policy was also intended as an alternative to
physical violence. In the latter respect it was ineffective, since
although the police were socially boycotted, violent attacks on them
continued.\(^3\)

That the police force, the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) in
Dublin and the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in the rest of
Ireland,\(^4\) was the first to bear the brunt of the Sinn Fein onslaught
was not at all surprising. Firstly, the twin pillars of British
ascendancy in Ireland, as in India, were the civil bureaucracy and
the disciplinary forces. The police, being one of the latter, was

\(^1\) Tom Barry revealed that Dublin GHQ hardly knew the movements and
intentions of local Volunteers or later the flying columns. None of
the senior GHQ staff ever visited Cork, the most heavily
engaged county of all after 1920. Barry, op. cit., pp. 182-3,
O'Donoghue, op. cit., p. 35.

\(^2\) Macardle, op. cit., p. 300; Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 23-4.

\(^3\) Moynihan, op. cit., p. 23.

\(^4\) The DMP was not armed whereas the RIC was. But the former
included a special branch of plain clothes detectives engaged
solely in political intelligence work.
primarily responsible for maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which the civil bureaucracy could function smoothly. Therefore, if Sinn Fein was to render the British administration unoperational in Ireland, it had to debilitate the police force in the first instance. The weaker the police force, the greater the scope for the Dail to assume civil power. Furthermore, as the police barracks housed plenty of arms and ammunition which the Irish fighters sorely needed, these stations and the arms convoys naturally became prime targets, and policemen the main casualties, of Volunteers' attacks.\(^1\)

Likewise, with the help of double agents in his service in the DMP, Collins had also organized a special coterie of assassins known as the Squad whose chief duty was to eliminate the G-men, the plain clothes detectives of the DMP whose spying activities on the Volunteers had become increasingly 'officious'.\(^2\)

At this stage, the Irish Catholic hierarchy, moderate nationalists, and the popularly elected bodies such as county councils, had drawn a clear demarcation line between the attempt of Sinn Fein and Dail Eireann to achieve an Irish Republic, and the cold-blooded murders being committed by independent Volunteers acting irresponsibly.\(^3\) Supporters and even unsympathetic observers of Dail Eireann generally believed that 'the leaders of the popular movement were far too logical and god-fearing to countenance such

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1. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 410. In 1908 the Supreme Council of the IRB had already resolved that the 'neutralization' of the RIC was vital to any real attempt to free Ireland by physical force. See O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 738.
and that if violence was unavoidable, the leaders 'were prepared to meet their enemies by open day and would not hide themselves or act as assassins'.

However, as time went on, it became apparent that such a distinction could hardly be made. Collins, in his capacity as Minister for Finance, channelled much of the Republican Loan Fund to the resistance campaign; and he, Brugha, and Richard Mulcahy were also responsible for ordering the 'execution' of many RIC constables or G-men of the DMP. Civilian informants or non-sympathizers with the Sinn Fein were also 'liquidated' or harassed.

De Valera's attitude to the IRA's campaign of killing remained unknown because during most of the Anglo-Irish War he was in the United States promoting Ireland's cause. But Griffith, whose moral force philosophy Gandhi freely admitted to have been a vital influence in the formulation of his satyagraha principle, remained surprisingly reticent about the IRA murders and outrages. Though the castigation of the Church and the recrudescence of violence 'had sickened his soul', he continued to defend the Irish movement

1. Irish Independent, 27 January 1919.
2. ibid., 10 April 1919.
4. Breen, op. cit., pp. 142-4. In December 1919 the entire printing machinery of the Irish Independent was destroyed by the IRA for criticizing the IRA's assassination attempt on Lord French, the Viceroy.
5. Griffith was released from jail in March 1919 and was Acting President of the underground government in de Valera's absence.
6. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 77.
through the press.\(^1\) It is still a matter of conjecture as to what extent Griffith questioned his colleagues about the rationale for violence when the passive resistance campaign was beginning to bear fruit. What is known is that on at least one occasion, in May 1920, when warned by P.S. O'Hegarty of an imminent IRA operation planned in Cork, he did successfully intervene with Brugha to prevent it.\(^2\) That Griffith's pressure for peaceful methods went unheeded was perhaps, as O'Hegarty suggested, due to either his weak influence in the Dail or his failure to attempt to bring the militants into line with his policy.\(^3\) Perhaps Griffith was only a tactical pacifist, and not a doctrinaire conscientious objector like Gandhi. After all he had been a member of the IRB until 1910.\(^4\) His objection to the use of violence was only a qualified one, owing more to his assessment of the non-feasibility of armed struggle in the Irish context than to any moral conviction.\(^5\) Such pragmatism helped him to evade the psychological and moral dilemma which confronted Gandhi when the Indian crowd was let loose in 1919 and again in 1922. Such adaptability also facilitated his adjustment to the Irish situation in 1919 when it was clear that the military campaign was what counted. Unlike Gandhi, at no time did Griffith seriously consider calling off his passive resistance campaign simply because violence set in. Like Pearse and other Volunteers, Griffith was pre-occupied with the establishment of an independent Irish state, and considered the end would justify the means, regardless of ecclesiastical

\(^1\) Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 78.
\(^2\) O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein., pp. 46-8.
\(^3\) ibid., p. 48.
\(^4\) The date is disputable. See Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 249 (footnote); Kee, op. cit., p. 660.
\(^5\) Lyons, ibid., p. 249 (footnote).
condemnation. Thus, as O'Hegarty testified, the apparent success of the rising and its aftermath in bringing the Irish people to the separatist camp — a success which Griffith knew 'could not have been obtained in two generations by ordinary propaganda' — had muted Griffith 'in so far as questions of policy involving physical force were concerned ...' Moreover, Michael Hayes, a Volunteer who became the Minister for Education in 1922, also affirmed that after the suppression of the Dáil, Griffith had considered it legitimate to employ violence against the British regime and, when consulted by the Volunteer leaders on their intention to attack the barracks, told them to go ahead with their plans. He might still have had reservations and misgivings about the use of violence, but he rode with the tide and allowed himself to be pulled along in the wake of violence.

British Coercion and the Irish Response.

Apparently unaware of Griffith's inability and unwillingness to curb the behaviour of the extremists, the British government tried to keep him out of jail as long as possible, hoping that his predilection for a peaceful solution would stem the rising tide of Irish terrorism. But Griffith was deprived of what little room he

1. As late as 1920 Cardinal Logue and the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Walsh, had maintained that 'the end, no matter how noble, does not justify immoral means'. Freeman's Journal, 16 February 1920.
2. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, p. 46.
3. Hayes, M.; 1889-1976; joined Volunteers in 1913 and fought in the rising; Minister for Education, 1922.
had to manoeuvre by British coercion. For despite public indignation about nocturnal assassinations and bloodshed, it was the British authorities who ordered the imposition of martial law that became the focus of Irish complaint.\(^1\) Even the British press, including the usually hostile \textit{Morning Post}, also condemned Lord French's 'system of coercion' of this 'determined' and 'honest' movement.\(^2\) Irish dissatisfaction was tersely summed up in an ecclesiastical statement in June 1919. In this, the Catholic bishops portrayed the British regime as 'the rule of the sword, utterly unsuited to a civilised nation, and extremely provocative of disorder and chronic rebellion'. The deplorable incidents of bloodshed in the past few months, they said, sprang 'from this cause and from this cause alone'.\(^3\) British repression, they argued, only incited Irish violence.

Irish guerrilla leaders certainly welcomed the bishops' indictment of Dublin Castle as it gave them an excuse to argue their case against the moderate nationalists and provided an ostensible justification of their 'defensive violence'. As Britain had not played by the rules of the constitutional game in refusing to confer self-government on Ireland after the majority of Irishmen had voted for it during the 1918 election, and was now bent on using force to destroy the Irish Republic, there could be no doubt that the Republic would perish unless the Irish people was prepared to fight in defence of what they believed.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Kee, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 662.  
\(^3\) \textit{Freeman's Journal}, 25 June 1919.  
\(^4\) Barry, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5.
Britain's high-handed policy in India was often compared with her efforts to muzzle Irish discontent. When the government of India passed the Rowlatt Bills, which approved the trial of political cases without juries and granted the provincial governments power of internment, Griffith duly compared it with the Defence of the Realm Act which served similar purposes. When British repression was relieving sectarian tension between Hindus and Muslims in India, Griffith hoped that British coercive policy would also bring the Unionists over to the Sinn Fein camp. Unfortunately, his hope did not materialize as the Unionists considered Britain's policy of suppressing nationalist agitation absolutely necessary to their interests. This Griffith attributed to the 'divide-and-rule' tactic of the British government. Jawaharlal Nehru thought likewise. British rulers, he argued, profited by the division between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ireland.

Furthermore, Griffith and many radicals suspected that Lord French, acting in conjunction with certain British cabinet ministers, was deliberately provoking the Irish passive resistance movement into an aggressive rebellion so as to provide an excuse for wholesale persecution of Sinn Fein. A repetition of the Amritsar massacre in India, in which 379 innocent participants of a prohibited meeting

1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
were killed by British Gurkhas in April 1919, would happen in Ireland before long.¹

From the propagandist angle, the Amritsar massacre was a godsend to Griffith because the shooting down of inoffensive civilians by British troops doubtlessly dwarfed the selective assassinations perpetrated by the IRA. Likewise, it furnished him with a weapon against British coercion in Ireland, in that mass slaughter might well be the British response to political agitation, be the latter non-violent or otherwise.²

The hero's acclaim accorded to General Dyer,³ the perpetrator of the Amritsar massacre by opponents of Indian and Irish nationalism in the House of Lords,⁴ the Dublin Irish Times, the London Morning Post, and the Calcutta Statesman, became the subject of derision in Young Ireland. Indigenous inhabitants of a British colony, Griffith wrote, were 'governed, taxed, whipped, robbed, and, if needs be, shot by an Englishman'.⁵ Passages from W.H. Russell's⁶ Diary in India were quoted to document the appalling British behaviour during the Indian Mutiny of 1857.⁷ When it was revealed that General Dyer's superior in the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer,⁸ who countenanced

² Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
³ Dyer, Brigadier-General R.; 1864-1927; active service, 1886-1908; resignation required after Amritsar.
⁵ Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 81.
⁶ Russell, Sir W.H.; 1820-1907; journalist; special correspondent of The Times to report the India Mutiny of 1857; accompanied the Prince of Wales to India, 1875-6.
⁷ Young Ireland, 19 June 1920; Sinn Fein, 17 October 1915.
⁸ O'Dwyer, Sir M.; 1864-1940; entered Indian Civil Service, 1885; Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1913-9.
Dyer's action, was an Irish Catholic from Tipperary, Old Ireland suggested that the Irish Catholic Church should excommunicate Sir Michael rather than the Irish Socialists whom it vehemently chastised.¹

George Bernard Shaw,² the great Irish dramatist of this time, was also profoundly stirred by the events in India and Ireland. He had always been critical of Sinn Fein,³ and the Republicans' unrestrained bellicosity, yet in the light of British repression in India 'which made every citizen of the world who valued liberty and human dignity see red', he found the attempt to assassinate the Viceroy, Lord French, not surprising at all.⁴ When the eminent Indian novelist Rabindranath Tagore,⁵ Nobel laureate for literature in 1913, renounced his knighthood in protest against British condonation of General Dyer, Irish nationalists were delighted by this symbolic denunciation.⁶

With the appointment of Sir Nevil Macready⁷ as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Ireland and the arrival of 7,000 Black and Tans and 1,400 Auxiliary police, whom the British recruited mainly from war veterans and despatched to Ireland in March 1920 to reinforce the demoralized RIC and check the disintegration of British

1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda', p. 80.
2. Shaw, G.B.; 1856-1950; Fabian socialist and dramatist, writer and critic; Nobel laureate for literature, 1925.
5. Tagore, R; 1861-1941; poet and philosopher; advocated synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures.
rule in rural Ireland, the long threatened Anglo-Irish war was in full swing. It was generally assumed by the British press that General Macready had been given a free hand by the British cabinet to use whatever means requisite to crush the Irish rebellion.¹ But once in Ireland, Macready and his men immediately found themselves not only the targets of an intense social and economic boycott but also the prey of assassins who were sheltered, willingly or reluctantly, by the Irish populace.

Worse still, their arrival coincided with the IRA's change in tactics. In March 1919 the IRA was informed by its executive that the days of trench warfare had gone, and that guerrilla tactics were now to be used. And in May the concept of an active service unit or flying column was conceived and enthusiastically put into operation in rural Ireland. The flying column, a body of approximately fifteen to thirty men on full-time active service for specific periods, reinforced when necessary by part-timers who otherwise remained peaceful law-abiding civilians, was now the spearhead of the IRA onslaught.²

The hostile and dangerous conditions under which the new contingents of the police force had to operate inevitably created intense personal strains and preyed on their nerves. Likewise, as a makeshift device, they were less responsive to discipline than the regular police force. Composed mostly of callous young men and ex-servicemen who were accustomed to bloodshed and brutality, they cared

1. Daily Mail, 3 April 1920; Morning Post, 3 April 1920.
little for life and property and were easily prompted to extremes of cruelty.¹

Thus when they were increasingly on the defensive and frustrated at failing to locate or catch the real culprits, they were disposed to answer terrorism with reprisals.² Police retaliations, authorized or unauthorized,³ became increasingly common as 1921 wore on. The object of retribution was naturally innocent and helpless people who had done nothing to offend either the IRA or the Crown force. Thus suspects or prisoners were harassed, tortured, murdered in their cells, or 'shot while trying to escape'.⁴

This random vengeance further solidified national opinion behind the IRA. Irish passions were aflame when, after shooting incidents by the IRA, police indiscriminately destroyed creameries, factories, and buildings at Tuam, co. Galway, at Newport and Templemore in Tipperary, and at Balbriggan, co. Dublin.⁵ When the Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence MacSwiney,⁶ who had been court-martialed for possessing unpublished seditious documents, died on 25 October 1920

1. General Crozier, who was in command of the Auxiliary, later resigned because the unscrupulous conduct of his men was tacitly extenuated by the government. In his book written ten years later, Ireland for Ever, he pleaded for justice for Ireland.
2. Crozier, op. cit., p. 91.
4. The victims were usually prominent Sinn Feiners, e.g. Thomas McCurtain, Lord Mayor of Cork; George Clancy, Lord Mayor of Limerick; Michael O'Callaghan, Clancy's predecessor. For testimonies of police brutality, see Deasy, L., Towards Ireland Free, Cork, Mercier, 1973, app. D (pp. 335-47).
5. Russell, G.; 1867-1935; eminent Irish writer and strong advocate of rural co-operativism, was particularly bitter against police attacks on creameries, see his letter to The Times, 24 August 1920.
in Brixton Jail after a seventy-four-day hunger strike, overseas and local observers were profoundly touched by Ireland's spirit of defiance. Seven days after MacSwiney's death saw the execution by hanging, despite a public appeal for clemency, of Kevin Barry\(^1\), an eighteen-year-old medical student and Volunteer member, for his part in an IRA affray. The fact that Barry had been beaten during interrogation aroused deep sympathy.\(^2\) His execution, the first since 1916, together with MacSwiney's self-immolation, symbolized Ireland's determination to take on the British Empire for the cause of Irish freedom.

Yet the worst was still to come on 'Bloody Sunday', or 'the Irish Amritsar' as pro-Republican papers dubbed it.\(^3\) On 21 November, the Dublin Volunteers Brigade, with the approval of Brugha and under the direction of Collins, shot dead in cold-blood eleven intelligence agents, killed two 'Auxis' and an officer during the operation. Later in the afternoon, Black and Tans avenged their murdered comrades at a Gaelic football match in Dublin's Croke Park by firing indiscriminately on the players and spectators, killing twelve and wounding over sixty. At the close of November, a large part of Cork city was burnt in reprisal to the killing of eighteen 'Auxis' near Kilmichael.

Irish nationalists in Ulster were no more fortunate. Accounts

1. Barry, K.; 1902-1920; medical student at UCD; member of IRA; scores of his fellow-students joined the IRA on the day of his execution, 1 November 1920.
2. For Barry's affidavit, see Macardle, op. cit., pp. 408-9.
3. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 79-80.
of Catholic persecution of southern Protestants and the threat of revolutionary republicanism had whipped the Protestants into a frenzy and inflamed a Protestant mob backlash in Ulster which was most pronounced in mid-1920 and 1922. Indiscriminately viewing the Ulster Catholic and nationalist minority as the fifth column of the south, Protestant militants exacted vengeance from the Catholic populace for IRA killings. Particularly notorious sectarian riots — prodigious destruction of Catholic residences and properties leading to mass evacuation — occurred at Banbridge, co. Down and Lisburn, co. Antrim in August 1920 after two police officers were shot dead by the IRA.¹

Although Protestant Unionists like Sir James Craig,² the lieutenant of Sir Edward Carson, whitewashed these outrages, unbridled mob violence was nevertheless as disturbing to the Unionists as republican killings were to the Sinn Feiners. On one hand, the Ulster Covenanters³ were worried that excessive harassment of Ulster Catholics would estrange British public opinion, thus weakening their case against Home Rule. On the other hand, they were exasperated by the Tories' diminishing ability or even willingness to safeguard their interests. The best course open to them then seemed to be to buttress their own position by themselves while at the same time pressing the British government for a speedy settlement.⁴

1. For a journalistic account of the Lisburn progrom, see Macardle, op. cit., pp. 399-401.
2. Craig, J.; 1871-1940; organizer of Ulster Volunteers; succeeded Carson as leader of Ulster Unionism in 1921. For his vindication of Protestant violence, see Macardle, op. cit., p. 402.
3. In September 1912, the Ulster Unionists and their adherents signed an Ulster Covenant pledging to refuse Home Rule on all Ireland.
The British government wanted an early resolution of the struggle as well. Reconciliation had long been the twin brother of coercion in British colonial policy. As the police state in Ireland proved ineffective, Lloyd George finally came up with a more positive solution in the form of a new Government of Ireland Bill. The Bill, which was enacted in November 1920, partitioned Ireland by the creation of two separate Irish parliaments for the twenty-six southern and six northern counties. Though the Covenanters disliked being cut off from the rest of Ireland and other Irish Unionists, their ascendancy in the truncated Ulster and their 'union' with the United Kingdom was preserved. Henceforth, as Churchill wrote, 'the position of Ulster became unassailable'. The remaining task, Lloyd George believed, was to 'scourge' the Republicans into accepting the fait accompli.

Yet Sinn Fein proved adamant. It rejected the scheme and continued to denounce the concept of partition. In fact, by mid 1920, with the help of the 'murder gang' where necessary, Sinn Fein was able to assert its authority in twenty-one of the thirty-two counties of Ireland. Republican police, republican courts, and various republican commissions were in operation, sometimes in the open. Griffith's life-long dream of a self-reliant government, with

1. The war had imposed severe strains on British resources. By 18 December 1919, there were 43,000 troops in Ireland and their monthly cost was around £860,000. Figures from Macardle, op. cit., p. 328 (footnote 1).
2. The Home Rule Act of 1914, which had been suspended during the war, never came into operation.
3. Churchill, W.; 1874-1965; Secretary of State for War, 1919-21; Colonial Secretary, 1921-2; Prime Minister, 1940-5 and 1951-5.
5. The Times, 12 November 1920.
an independent judiciary and a self-sufficient economy, became something of a reality. All that was needed was 'a little more patience and then a bracing up for a final tussle'.

The form of fighting in the final tussle, which lasted about eight months until mid 1921, was similar to its earlier phases, except that it was considerably more reckless and savage. The frontiersman's law of an eye for an eye seemed to have become common practice. Those IRA assassins who slew spies and policemen in raids and ambushes were seldom brought to justice, any more than policemen who butchered suspects and civilians in revenge. 'The whole country runs with blood', the Irish Times wrote. 'Unless it is stopped and stopped soon every prospect of political settlement and material prosperity will perish and our children will inherit a wilderness'.

The atrocities committed by the Crown forces also disturbed the British conscience. Since the autumn of 1920, eminent ecclesiastics of different denominations, the Labour Party, Asquithian Liberals and publicists like G.K. Chesterton and G.B. Shaw, unanimously condemned the 'hellish policy of reprisals' connived by the 'Greenwood Government'. Speaking in the House of Lords in February 1921, the Archbishop of Canterbury pleaded earnestly with the Lords not to exonerate Lloyd George's misguided Irish policy. '(Y)ou cannot justifiably punish wrong-doing by lawlessly doing the like', said Dr.

1. Irish Times, 4 February 1921. Quoted from Kee, op. cit., p. 699.
5. Macardle, op. cit., p. 460. Sir Hamar Greenwood (1870-1948) was Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1920-22.
Davidson,¹ 'Not by calling in the aid of the devil will you cast out devils, or punish devilry'.² Independent Tories such as Lord Robert Cecil³ and Sir E.P. Strickland⁴ also publicly expressed their disapproval of the unruly behaviour of the police in Ireland, and were joined by newspapers of various political persuasions. Even King George V,⁵ at the inauguration of the newly elected Northern Ireland parliament in June 1922, also made a moving appeal to all Irishmen 'to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and forget, and to join in making for the land they love a new era of peace, contentment and goodwill'.⁶

With this 'greatest service performed by a British monarch in modern times',⁷ the long-awaited truce finally came on 11 July 1921. It was a welcome respite for the IRA as it had barely 3,000 men in the field and was hopelessly short of arms and ammunition.⁸ After long-drawn-out negotiations, a treaty was signed on 6 December 1921. The Treaty conferred on Ireland dominion status within the British Commonwealth, with the title of Irish Free State. It enjoyed the

1. Davidson, R.T.; 1848-1930; Archbishop of Canterbury, 1903; elevated Baron Davidson of Lambeth after his resignation in 1928.
5. George V; 1865-1936; second son of Edward VII, Prince of Wales, 1901, succeeded to throne, 1910.
same constitutional rights as other self-governing dominions such as Canada, subject only to certain conditions regarding defence, trade, and finance. Members of the Free State parliament were to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown. Northern Ireland, if it so wished, could be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Free State and retain its constitutional status in the United Kingdom accorded to it by the Act of 1920. In that case, a Boundary Commission representing the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, and Britain would be appointed to readjust the boundaries between the two parts of Ireland in keeping with demographic, economic and geographical considerations. This provision was significant as Lloyd George had lured the Irish delegates into believing that after the re-adjustment of the boundaries, Northern Ireland would be too truncated to be either politically or economically viable. Furthermore, a Council of Ireland, acting as intermediary between the two Irelands, was also provided for to promote re-unification in the future. It was in the belief that Ireland's territorial integrity was implicitly preserved that the Irish plenipotentiaries assented to the partition clause.

The Civil War

Though the Treaty promised neither the sovereign Republic nor

1. For the text of the Treaty, see Macardle, op. cit., app. 21 (pp. 990-5).
2. The Irish delegates were Griffith, Collins, E.J. Duggan, R. Barton, and G.G. Duffy. Erskine Childers was secretary. The British delegates were Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead, L. Worthington-Evans, Hamar Greenwood and Gordon Hewart.
the united Ireland that many Irishmen had striven for, the Irish delegates and many others thought that it embodied the best terms that the British would concede. During the Treaty debates, Dail cabinet members like William Cosgrave and Robert Barton\(^1\) also agreed that the Treaty was in Ireland's best interests and argued that its merits far outweighed its defects and, as it was not a final settlement, it did not prevent Ireland from pursuing her ultimate goal by further constitutional advancement. As Collins declared, it was a stepping stone which gave Ireland freedom to achieve freedom.\(^2\) Its rejection, they warned, would mean the renewal of war in which a war-weary Ireland would not be able to endure.\(^3\) In a plea for political realism, Griffith reaffirmed that dominion status gave Ireland the substance of freedom, and reminded his Treaty opponents that generations of Irish nationalists had not struggled and fought for symbols, forms, phrases or abstractions, but for the reality of freedom which the Treaty now bestowed.\(^4\)

Yet the dogmatic Republicans, impregnated with the Fenian yearnings for complete separation, accused Griffith and Collins of being traitors to the national cause,\(^5\) and asserted that Ireland was able to go 'another round with England'.\(^6\) It was a flat surrender of

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1. Barton, R.G.; 1881-1975; Dail Minister for Agriculture and later Minister for Economic Affairs.
4. The Irish Free State (Dublin), 25 February 1922.
Ireland's sovereignty, argued Brugha and Austin Stack, to commit Irishmen wilfully to be British subjects and pledge fealty voluntarily to an English king. De Valera, knowing only too well 'that a Republic was out of question', nonetheless repudiated the Treaty on the ground that continuing affiliation with the British Empire was inconsistent with Ireland's national aspirations. In his view an independent Irish state 'externally associated' with Britain would reconcile Republican and Unionist susceptibilities and uphold Ireland's sovereignty. As for Griffith's invective against the Republicans' fetishism about the chimerical Republic, Liam Mellows, a young Republican commandant, retorted with a passionate conviction. 'To my mind the Republic does exist', he answered. 'It is a living, tangible thing, something for which men gave their lives, ... [and] are still prepared to give their lives.' He mentioned the 'crucifixion of India and the degradation of Egypt', and asked the pro-Treatyites whether they were now prepared to join the Empire in its exploitation of the subject peoples.

2. Irish Independent, 23 March 1922.
3. From an extract from Roger Casement's brother, Tom. Quoted in Forester, op. cit., p. 196. See Pakenham, op. cit., pp. 223-4 for de Valera's republican concepts.
5. By that de Valera meant that Ireland would recognize the British Monarch as head of the Commonwealth but not head of the Irish state; and therefore being a member of such an association would not require an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. The idea was flatly rejected by Britain as a republic within the British Empire was unthinkable. For de Valera's ideas on 'external association', see Macardle, op. cit., apps. 16 (p. 974) and 22 (p. 996).
6. Mellows, L.; 1892-1922; organiser of de Valera's American tour, 1919-20; Director of Purchases in the IRA.
Liam Mellows' statement was significant on two counts. Firstly, it faithfully reflected the anti-Treatyites' steadfast adherence to the Republic which could be neither bargained for a Free State nor shelved by persuasion or exhortation. Secondly, it accurately foreshadowed the anti-Treatyites' readiness to prevent the subversion of the inviolable Republic by force.

After the Dáil had ratified the Treaty by a narrow majority, anti-Treatyites accused Griffith of deserting Ireland's allies such as India by becoming a member of the British imperial system.1 Aodh de Blacam,2 an anti-Treaty Sinn Feiner, complained that Ireland had accepted the dominion status in 'the murder machine' which was presently 'doing Indians to death, and so release Black and Tans from this country to carry on in another'.3 New Ireland, which adopted an anti-Treaty line, subsequently printed a satirical cartoon showing Ireland slinking away while India and Egypt continued to fight against England on their own.4

Tension between the pro- and anti-Treaty IRA members steadily escalated as each side absorbed more followers and took over barracks from the retiring British forces. In a proscribed General Army

1. The fact that the Treaty was ratified only by a narrow majority of seven, Batt O'Connor argued, could hardly make the anti-Treatyites to accept it as the final settlement. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 184.
2. De Blacam, A.; 1890-1951; journalist; active Sinn Feiner; wrote nationalist propaganda during the Anglo-Irish war.
3. Quoted in Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 87. This accusation seemed justifiable when the Governor of Bengal (1927-32), Sir Stanley Jackson, 'was assumed to have been sent because of a ruthless record in the Irish 'Black-and-Tanism'. See Thompson, E.J., A Letter from India, London, Faber and Faber, 1932, pp. 70-71.
4. Davis, loc. cit., p. 87.
Convention held in March 1922, the anti-Treaty IRA forces formally renounced their pledge of allegiance to the perfidious Dáil, reaffirmed their devotion to the Republic, and swore their loyalty to a newly elected IRA executive which consisted of diehard Republicans like Rory O'Connor, Liam Lynch, Liam Mellows, and Ernie O'Malley. In order to replenish their resources, these IRA dissidents raided banks and seized the Four Courts of Justice in Dublin as the anti-Treaty IRA's General Headquarters in open defiance of Free State authorities.

The repudiation of the Dáil and the forceful occupation of the Four Courts were privately disapproved of by de Valera, though publicly he admitted that he shared the rebels' political aims and that force could be legitimately used to deliver Ireland from the disasters which were bound to follow the acceptance of the Treaty.

During the inauguration campaign in mid March 1922 for his new party, the League of the Republic (Cumann na Poblachta), he warned the audience that acceptance of the Treaty would not bring peace but civil war to Ireland. On St. Patrick's Day he told his audience at Thurles that Volunteers in the future 'would have to wade through Irish blood, through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish Government, and through, perhaps, the blood of some of the members of

2. Republic of Ireland (Dublin), 20 April 1922.
3. The new party sought to galvanize support against the Treaty and to establish the Republic by peaceful means. Republic of Ireland, 22 March 1922.
4. Irish Independent, 18 March 1922.
the Government in order to get Irish freedom'.

These speeches were severely criticized by the press and the pro-Treatyites at the time; and have often been quoted since then by those historians who attribute the outbreak of civil war mainly to his inflammatory statements. To do him justice, the anti-Treaty IRA accorded to de Valera as little authority as it did to the Dail or the Provisional government. In fact, he had done everything possible to avert fratricidal strife. Earlier in December 1921, during the Treaty debates, he had told the public that there was 'a definite constitutional way of resolving our political differences', and urged them not to 'depart from it'. When a clash between the two camps of the IRA was imminent in Limerick in March 1922, he had begged General Mulcahy to do his best to defuse the highly-charged atmosphere. In defence of his constitutional stance, he accused his opponents of deliberately misinterpreting or distorting the 'plain argument' of his speeches.

1. Irish Independent, 18 March 1922, also 20 March 1922 for his speech in Killarney.
2. ibid., also 21 March 1922.
3. ibid., 17, 20 March 1922; Freeman's Journal, 20 March 1922; Separatist, 4 May 1922 et seq.; O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 782.
4. A Provisional government was set up under the stipulation of the Treaty. The Dail continued to exist too, partly to preserve unity in the Sinn Fein party and partly to symbolize Ireland's unilateral declaration of independence. The Provisional Government was under the chairmanship of Collins and about half its members were also Dail ministers. MacDonagh, Ireland, pp. 103 & 105.
6. Mulcahy succeeded Brugha as Minister for Defence in January 1922 after de Valera's resignation of his presidency and Griffith's election to that office.
8. Irish Independent, 23 March 1922.
As neither side was willing to precipitate a civil war, many looked to the coming general election in June for a peaceful settlement. In May a Collins-de Valera Pact was signed in which both signatories agreed that the existing balance of power between the supporters and the opponents of the Treaty in the new Sinn Fein parliament 'was not to be disturbed by any contest between members of the Sinn Fein party'. Moreover, the Pact also prescribed that after the election a coalition government with five pro-Treaty ministers and four anti-Treaty ministers should be formed. As this 'agreed election' prevented free expression of opinion on the Treaty, Churchill successfully pressed Collins to repudiate the Pact so that the electorate could vote according to its free will. Likewise, although Collins had recommended the IRB members to accept the Treaty, they were allowed to vote in conscience. The election, as expected, gave the Treaty a popular mandate. The last ditch effort to heal the rift in the army by peaceful means was thus dashed.

If the extremists had heeded de Valera's plea to solve their differences constitutionally and stood by the final decision, Ireland after June 1922 would have rested in peace. But reluctant to face hard realities, they once again resorted to arms. Calling the June plebiscite a 'national apostasy', they refused to acknowledge the

3. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, pp. 769-770. It is doubtful whether the IRB members would vote otherwise. Many of them shared the view that what was good enough for Collins was good enough for them. O'Malley, The Singing Flame, p. 85.
4. For the election results, see Macardle, op. cit., app. 33 (p. 1020).
6. New Ireland, 6 May, 17 June & 1 July 1922.
general will and sought to revive their lost cause and restore Republican unity by deliberately provoking the British army into offensive actions.¹ The troubles in Ulster, they reckoned, augured well for their operations.

This provocative behaviour had greatly alarmed the Ulster Unionists who had hitherto worried that sectarian conflicts in the north would lead to 'the resurgence of pure Republicanism with a re-united rebel Ireland behind it'.² Their fears were justifiable because for a while the IRA's immediate aim of restoring unity was successful as pro- and anti-Treaty IRA in Ulster did not hesitate to close ranks to protect the Catholic and nationalist minority against Protestant attack and against the assault of the recently created and exclusively Protestant paramilitary force — the Ulster A and B specials.³ Collins even supplied them with arms irrespective of their stand on the Treaty.⁴ But to the Unionists' relief, the anti-Treaty IRA's diversionary tactics were partly foiled by a Collins-Craig agreement signed earlier in March by which Collins agreed to call off the Ulster boycott and IRA provocations in return for Craig's protection of the Catholics and nationalists in the north.⁵

The prospect of revitalizing the Republican cause by intensifying IRA activities in Ulster was further frustrated by the

¹ O'Malley, The Singing Flame, p. 81.
² Irish Independent, 23 March 1922. For Craig's remarks on the IRA activities in Ulster, see Younger, C., Ireland's Civil War, New York, Taplinger, 1968, p. 301.
⁴ Kee, op. cit., pp. 734-5.
⁵ Macardle, op. cit., app. 24 (p. 1003). The boycott of Ulster goods was launched in reprisal to ill-treatment and discrimination of Catholics.
outbreak of civil war in the south.¹ In June 1922, Sir Henry Wilson,² a relentless Unionist partisan, was assassinated in London by two members of the London battalion of the IRA. Britain held Republicans in Dublin responsible for the murder and impelled Collins to take action.³ To soothe British susceptibilities and also to assert Free State authority, Collins took advantage of British military assistance to bombard the rebel garrison at the Four Courts. The attack immediately wiped out whatever opportunity remained for bridging the gulf in the army by peaceful means. Likewise, the anti-Treaty politicians like de Valera who had hitherto disassociated themselves from the anti-Treaty IRA were forced to make a stand.⁴ After the death of Brugha in street fighting in Dublin in July 1922, de Valera eventually joined the splinter IRA forces in the south in opposition to the Provisional government which he thought was functioning at the behest of Britain.⁵ Sinn Fein, which had never effectively controlled its military wing, was powerless to stop the approaching civil war.

When hostilities commenced, the Republican contingents, or the Irregulars as they came to be called, enjoyed some initial success in the south, but in late July and August severe losses in some direct confrontations forced them to abandon their municipal strongholds.

1. The Morning Post argued that the best prospect for peace in Ulster was to see the pro- and anti-Treatyites at loggerhead with each other — 'to see Collins locking horns with de Valera' while making peace with Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Macardle, op. cit., p. 732.
2. Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir H.H.; 1864-1922; Chief of Imperial General Staff and Member of War Cabinet since 1918.
4. Irish Independent, 14 September 1922; Lyons, op. cit., p. 462.
5. Plain People (Dublin), 2 July 1922.
From then on they retreated to the remote mountain areas and resorted to their accustomed guerrilla tactics which had been so successful against the British. The major difference now, however, was that the local communities were no longer willing to shelter them from their enemy — now the Free State army. ¹ Robert Brennan,² a Republican propagandist who followed Liam Lynch and de Valera to the Irregulars' Southern Headquarters in Clonmel, was fully aware of their unpopularity. 'The majority of the people was against us', he said, and 'looked at us as sullenly as if we belonged to a hostile invading army.'³ Their position was further weakened by clerical condemnation. In a Joint Pastoral Letter in October, the Catholic bishops, who had supported the Treaty from the very beginning,⁴ stigmatized the rebellion in the severest terms and excommunicated those who refused to recognize the Free State government as the legitimate power in Ireland.⁵

De Valera, elected in October by his deputies and the Irregulars as the President of a rival Republican government, fully recognized the sterility of the resistance campaign. But his promptings for a ceasefire were always overruled by the intransigent militants, notably the Irregulars' Chief of Staff, Liam Lynch.⁶

On the other hand, the Free State government was resolved to

stamp out the rebellion with ruthless severity. In justifying the need for a sterner policy to break the guerrilla war of attrition, Ernest Blythe, Free State Minister for Local Government, declared that the Republic was a castle in the air and described the Irregulars' leaders as mere criminals.\(^1\) Newspapers sympathetic to the Provisional government also deprecated the extremists for ignoring the will of the Irish people and trying to coerce the people into accepting a minority view at gunpoint.\(^2\) Others, like Truth, asked their readers to support their elected government and warned that continuing anarchy and violence would only wreck hard-earned independence and invite British military intervention.\(^3\)

As the war dragged on, it was clear that the weary country overwhelmingly wanted peace. With the public unsympathetic and with the Irregulars' resistance campaign patently collapsing after the death of Liam Lynch in April 1923, de Valera, who as the political chief of the dissident movement had commanded little influence on the militants during the war, was finally able to persuade the Republican diehards to relinquish their forlorn revolt. 'The Republic can no longer be defended successfully by your arms', he told the Republican soldiers in May. 'Further sacrifice of life would now be vain and continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in the national interest and prejudicial to the future of our cause .... Seven years of intense effort have exhausted our people .... If they have turned aside and have not given you the active support which alone could

2. The Irish Free State, 5, 11, 20 July 1922; see also Kevin O'Higgins' statement in Irish Independent, 18 November 1922.
3. Truth (Dublin), 5 July 1922.
bring you victory in this last year, it is because ... they are weary
and need a rest. A little time and you will see them recover and
rally again to the standard.'¹ War-torn Ireland, north and south,
finally reposed in peace.

Though nationalist Ireland had won her coveted independence, it
was an independence for which she had to pay a high price.
Notwithstanding the supreme sacrifice of the moderate and radical
nationalists in past centuries, of the insurgents in the Easter
rising, and of those who perished in the Anglo-Irish war, the killing
of old comrades-in-arms during the civil war must have been an agony
for those concerned.² The civil war, which lasted barely a year, was
far more ferocious than the Anglo-Irish war, which lasted about two
and a half years. During the last six months of the fratricidal
strife, seventy-seven Republican prisoners were executed by the Free
State government in retaliation to the Irregulars' killings, whereas
only twenty-four had been executed by the British during the entire
Anglo-Irish war.³ Victims in this internecine feud included many
brilliant soldiers and politicians who had left an indelible
impression on Ireland's nationalist history and whose service to the
infant Free State would have otherwise been invaluable.⁴

As for the Ulster Unionists, the partition of Ireland was their

2. See Collins' attitude to the death of Boland and Brugha, Forester,
op. cit., p. 329; Taylor, Collins, p. 236; for Childers' tribute
to Collins, Republic of Ireland, 24 August 1922.
4. Among them were Cathal Brugha, Michael Collins, Harry Boland, Rory
O'Connor, Liam Mellows, Erskine Childers and Liam Lynch. Others
like Ernie O'Malley were seriously wounded or, like Dan Breen and
Constance Markievicz, felt alienated in the Free State.
triumph as well as their failure. They began their campaign against Home Rule for all Ireland and they succeeded by excluding themselves from the south. Yet by that very success they failed to prevent what they had threatened the British government with for years — a Home Rule government in Northern Ireland. By that very success again, they had shifted the Irish question from its former all-Ireland context to a new setting in Ulster. The British statesmen, who might have wanted to believe that they had solved Britain's perennial 'Irish question' once and for all,¹ soon found that this same old problem was once again knocking at the door.

That violence was so prevalent in Ireland after 1918 was not at all surprising. It is undeniable that the element of violence in the Irish political tradition was too deep-rooted to be eradicated by Sinn Fein's electoral success. The militants, true to the Fenian tradition, were still very sceptical of the efficacy of parliamentary politics.² This distrust, ingrained in the IRB since its inception in the 1860s and increasingly shared by the Irish Volunteers as the Irish Parliamentary Party foundered during the First World War, was reinforced by Pearse's forceful counter-blast against constitutionalism and his passionate eulogy of violence. Thereafter, physical force, consecrated by the heroic feats of the 1916 martyrs, had become a threatening alternative to Sinn Fein's pacific defiance as the latter had been to constitutionalism. Sinn Fein's fruitless attempt at Versailles, if any thing else, only further strengthened the militants' belief that political claims had to be ultimately

2. Breen, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
Though Griffith had tried to prevent the outbreak of violence whenever possible, he was unable to control the militants and, when the military campaign was becoming increasingly effective, tacitly allowed himself to be pulled along. After all, previous experience had shown that combined actions by different forms of Irish pressure had always been most effective.\(^1\) In justifying Ireland's resort to violence, Béaslabh insisted that 'it was forced solely by the violence of the English government'. He also stated that except at a meeting in January 1921, on no occasion did any deputy or minister of the Dáil ever oppose the 'war policy of the Volunteers'. As for Collins, Beasláí claimed that the latter always favoured a 'forward' policy, and had 'contributed far more than any other man to the waging of an effective war against the English'.\(^2\) Likewise, Tom Barry,\(^3\) whom Dan Breen regarded as 'the best leader of a flying column',\(^4\) also attested that never throughout 1920 and 1921 'did General Headquarters repudiate or reprimand any Unit for its aggressiveness or its activities. On the contrary, Headquarters encouraged and urged the Army to fight and to keep on fighting.\(^5\)

However, if it was violence, Irish as well as British, which actually determined the course of Irish history from mid-1919 onwards, Sinn Fein's policy of passive resistance and usurpation of

1. MacDonagh, *States of Mind*, p. 66.
British authority in the Irish countryside probably exerted as much pressure on the British government as the campaign of killing. Moreover, the primary aim of guerrilla warfare was to break Britain's nerve and force negotiations, for which Sinn Fein was well equipped with a well-formulated policy which the militants lacked. The Irish nation-state created in 1922 was essentially the brainchild of the pacifist Griffith, not of the militant Pearse, although the latter's Gaelic Republican ideal has continued to be a source of inspiration to diehard Irish Republicans to the present time. But regardless of whether Sinn Feinism or military republicanism could claim more credit for bringing the Irish nation-state into being, as far as the years 1919-1922 are concerned, they constitute a milestone in Anglo-Irish history, as they do in Anglo-Indian history.

1. MacDonagh, States of Mind, p. 68.
2. ibid., pp. 66-67.
India was in a state of rising expectation when the war ended. Trade prospered and the burgeoning capitalist classes were greedy for more wealth and power. The middle classes were anticipating great constitutional changes in the direction of Home Rule and the masses were looking forward to a lightening of war-time burdens. The Muslims, who resented the war against Turkey, were anxious to protect the Islamic interests of the Ottoman Empire. Instead of heeding the general demand for freedom and relief, the British authorities introduced a series of repressive measures which greatly alienated Indian public opinion. Resentful but effete, Indian nationalists seemed to be at the mercy of their imperial master. Then Gandhi came, not as a paternal overlord, but as an equal to all Indians. Behind his teaching of fearlessness, non-violence and adherence to truth, there was courage, action and an unflinching determination not to submit to injustice. Thus, in the place of the Moderates’ submissiveness and the Extremists’ violence, there came a quiet revolution which gave new shape and content to political freedom. Gandhi’s ideas about non-violence was not whole-heartedly shared by all Indians. Many thought that as a political method non-violence had several limitations. Others opposed it on ideological grounds. Gandhi, however, maintained that satyagraha was the panacea for all problems. If it failed, it was not because of its intrinsic weakness, but because the people were ill-prepared for it.

1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
The armistice brought as much exasperation and expectation to India as it did to Ireland. Indian capitalists were greedy for more wealth and power whereas the middle classes were expecting great constitutional changes and 'talked with assurance of self-determination and self-government'. But unlike Irish radicals who began to practise the Sinn Fein policy in earnest, Indian radicals still spoke of their loyalty and attachment to the British Empire. In direct contrast to the rebellious declarations of Sinn Fein after the establishment of Dail Eireann, the resolutions of the INC were overwhelmingly subservient and suppliant. Obviously, the ascendancy of the Extremists since 1916 and the precipitate defection of the Moderates in 1918 did not immediately render the INC irretrievably radical. Barring their insistence on India's fitness of self-government, their impatience with the slowness of constitutional advance, and the truculent way in which they expressed their discontent, the Home Rule radicals were in essence very similar to the Moderates. Both were constitutional nationalists aiming at self-government within the Empire.

Unlike the Irish Republicans, the Indian Home Rule radicals had never toyed with the notion of an Indian republic. In fact, like the Irish Repeal and Home Rule movements of the nineteenth century, the primary objective of the Home Rule movement was to foster

3. ibid.
5. Besant, India, Bond or Free, p. 162.
Anglo-Indian friendship and to preserve India for the Empire. Mrs. Besant's goal was akin to O'Connell's and Parnell's — legislative independence with some form of constitutional link with Great Britain. She was certainly aware of the growing militancy in the post-rising Sinn Fein and the Indian Home Rule agitation, and she wanted to wean her impetuous followers away from the thought of adopting passive resistance which in her view would easily degenerate into violence. Thus, whereas Sinn Fein had in practice been serious about passive resistance since Griffith's release from jail in December 1916, direct action was rarely put to the test during the Home Rule era in India, much to the disappointment of Mrs. Besant's young supporters.

However, despite their loyalty, Congress radicals were nevertheless very restless and assertive. For one thing, socio-economic changes borne of the war and the Home Rule agitation had brought a new range of people into social, political and economic prominence. The emergence of these newcomers in politics had imperceptibly altered the balance of power in the nationalist movement and brought about a new dimension of political radicalism which, although partly the child of the Home Rule campaign, even Tilak and Mrs. Besant were unable to contain. One manifestation of this political radicalism was the persistent war-time demand for immediate self-government and adoption of extra-parliamentary methods.

1. Commonweal. 2 January 1914.
2. New India. 4, 5 January 1915.
4. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 194. This radicalism was best illustrated by C.R. Das who strongly supportedMrs. Besant as President of the INC in 1917, but revoked his loyalty to her in 1918 as a result of her growing moderatism. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 527.
such as passive resistance and all-round boycott as legitimate political techniques. But while nationalist passion was gathering momentum, Mrs. Besant's failure to provide adequate outlets for the pent-up feelings of the Home Rule radicals resulted in leaving post-war India 'in a state of suppressed excitement'.\(^1\) The frustrated radicals, who were greatly roused, desperately wanted 'a way out of the tangle'.\(^2\) Some of them were prepared to use violence, but the majority did not consider that armed insurrection was feasible.\(^3\) As for passive resistance, there was still no competent leader who would goad the radicals into a non-violent struggle against the British. 'We had become a derelict nation', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru. 'We seemed to be helpless in the grip of some all-powerful monster; our limbs were paralyzed, our minds deadened'.\(^4\)

Added to this 'all-pervading gloom' was the seething discontent of the masses, especially the peasants.\(^5\) For the Indian ryots, the months after the cessation of hostilities did not in any way alleviate their existing hardships, but rather accentuated them.\(^6\) An influenza epidemic in 1918-1919 resulted in some twelve to thirteen million deaths.\(^7\) The poor harvest of 1918 and the sharp rise in the price of daily necessities such as salt, foodstuffs and cotton cloth brought tremendous wealth to the rising peasant-proprietors and merchants, but at the same time aggravated the plight and discontent

1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
2. ibid., p. 48.
5. ibid.
of the urban and rural poor.¹ A partial break-down of the railway and transportation system created opportunities for speculation, hoarding and black marketeering for merchants and middlemen. Though manufacturing industries were flourishing, wages were low. No adequate measures were taken to help hastily demobilized servicemen to adjust to the post-war situation. Having 'grown mentally' by their service overseas, they became a critical and discordant element in the villages.² The acute distress occasioned by this economic hardship created a volatile atmosphere in rural India, leading to a series of industrial strikes in 1917-1918 in the major cities.³ The economic dislocation caused by the war was perhaps the most vital factor in mobilizing the masses to the nationalist movement under a competent leader who would attend to their grievances.⁴

It was 'this quagmire of poverty and defeatism' upon which Gandhi capitalized.⁵ He was forty-five when the triumph of his passive resistance movement in South Africa won him respect in the British Empire and earned him the title of Mahatma (Great Soul) in India.⁶ A follower of Gokhale, he firmly believed in British justice and was convinced that the oppressor could be won over by moral persuasion instead of brute force.⁷ 'We want to win, not by striking terror in the rulers', he once told his audience, 'but by awakening

6. Imam, op. cit., p. 47.  

⁸ Wallbank, op. cit., p. 143.  
⁹ Gandhi, CW, vol. 13, pp. 65 & 520.
their sense of justice. The Extremists 'would never obtain (Home Rule) by force of arms', he wrote in 1909, for those 'that take the sword shall perish by the sword'. The Moderates were no better for the job either, for mere petition was 'derogatory' and thereby confessed 'inferiority'. In his view, real Home Rule was 'self-rule or self-control'. It did not mean the forceful expulsion of Britain from India as the Extremists had it, or the limited power-sharing to which the Moderates aspired, but an India free from foreign political and cultural domination, free from the tyranny of the rich or the powerful, and most vital of all, free from superstition, ignorance, communal strife, social injustice, and the vices of modern civilization. The means to this end was non-violent passive resistance or satyagraha (soul-force or truth-force) as he preferred to call it.

Contrary to the general conception that satyagraha was a weapon of the weak, Gandhi maintained that it was 'an unfailing source of strength'. It did not mean resignation or inability to fight. Instead, it entailed voluntary suffering and deliberate restraint from vengeance as a means of making a moral indictment of injustice.

3. CW, vol. 10, pp. 60.
4. CW, vol. 10, pp. 39, 49, 64.
8. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
and iniquity. Non-violence, Gandhi argued, was 'infinitely superior to violence' as forgiveness was always 'more manly than punishment'.

This self-inflicted suffering should not be mistaken as a 'meek submission to the will of the evil-doer ...' Instead, it was 'the conquest of physical might by spiritual strength'. Clinging to satyagraha, India could defy the whole might of an unjust empire 'at all times and under all circumstances'. Like Griffith, Gandhi wanted his motherland 'to recognize that she had a soul that cannot perish and that can rise triumphant above every physical weakness ...' Moreover, although he differed from Pearse on the means of achieving freedom, he agreed that a people who had abnegated its manhood because of cowardice or complacency did not deserve to be free.

In order to practise satyagraha, 'Swadeshi in every sense is necessary'. In practical terms, swadeshi was very similar to the demands made upon the Irishmen by economic nationalists such as Griffith and cultural nationalists like Pearse. In the domain of economics, swadeshi, which Griffith regarded as the equivalent of Sinn Fein, encouraged the use of domestic goods at the expense of foreign imports and fostered the growth of indigenous industries.

1. CW, vol. 10, p. 49.
2. CW, vol. 18, p. 132.
3. CW, vol. 18, p. 133. When there was only 'a choice between cowardice and violence', Gandhi would 'advise violence'. CW, vol. 18, p. 132.
4. CW, vol. 18, p. 133.
5. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
8. CW, vol. 10, p. 64.
The country of which the people could not be self-sufficient or appreciate as much beauty in local products as in foreign goods, he wrote in 1919, 'was not at all fitted to enjoy swaraj'.\(^1\) Gandhi shared Griffith's opinion that in order to be self-reliant, 'stiff protective duties upon foreign goods' were necessary to protect the domestic economy from the 'mad and ruinous competition' generated by British free trade.\(^2\) But, unlike Griffith, who considered industrialization indispensable to Ireland's future, Gandhi considered it more a curse than a blessing. In *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Home Rule), which was published in 1909, Gandhi criticized modern machinery as 'a great sin' and admonished his readers to get rid of their unwarrantable fetish of industrialization.\(^3\) In his view, modern industrialization was alien to the spirit of India and would not solve India's pauperism and penury. Hand-spinning, however, would do so as it was in keeping 'with the special conditions of India'.\(^4\) And this was not just for economic, but also for spiritual reasons. Like the *khadi* (hand-spun cloth), the *charkha* (spinning wheel) was 'a symbol of kinship' between the upper classes and 'the hunger- and disease-stricken poor'.\(^5\)

In the cultural realm, *swadeshi* shared much of the Gaelic

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4. *CW*, vol. 21, p. 390. Gandhi's condemnation was not against machine *qua* machine, but because it, being part and parcel of the industrial system, was a symbol of exploitation and oppression. He argued that what suited India most was the point. *CW*, vol. 16, pp. 134-135; vol. 19, p. 553; vol. 21, p. 390.
revival's romantic eulogy of the past.\(^1\) It was Gandhi's conviction that modern civilization, symbolized by what Britain had brought to India — railways, machinery, English education, modern professions and English institutions — had stunted the spiritual and material growth of his motherland.\(^2\) Like Pearse, he wanted to wean his compatriots away from 'a blind imitation of Europe' and clung 'to the old Indian civilization'.\(^3\) He shared Pearse's condemnation of English education because it meant Anglicization and the erosion of native culture\(^4\) and urged his fellow countrymen to use their vernacular languages\(^5\) as a way of expressing their nationality.\(^6\) Like Pearse again, Gandhi insisted that he bore 'no enmity towards the English', but only rejected their civilization.\(^7\)

In Gandhi's view, the Indian elite's adoption of British culture had disastrous repercussions in the political realm. The English-educated, he said, knew more about England than India and were strangers to their fellow countrymen.\(^8\) Though they had tried to reach the masses, their English education 'had created a wide gulf'

7. CW, vol. 10, p. 64; vol. 13, p. 316; vol. 15, p. 489. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 105-106.
between the two. Therefore, it was not surprising that the nationalist movement had so far made little headway. He refused to join the Home Rule movement because he reckoned that the 'new-fangled politicians' would follow the footsteps of the Congress and carry the message of freedom and with it political power 'only to a handful among the intelligentsia leaving more than 80 per cent of the population unapproached, and unhelped'. On the contrary, he wanted to galvanize the masses to the nationalist movement and improve their lot through their participation in it. In his opinion, only if the masses and women were enlisted could the struggle for freedom be successful. 'We have to demand swaraj from our own people', he wrote in 1907, 'when the peasantry of India understands what swaraj is, the demand will become irresistible'.

In order to bring the nationalist message to the people, the Congress leaders should go to the masses, attend to their grievances and win them over. Gandhi's campaigns against exploitation and unjust taxation on behalf of the peasants in Champaran (Northern Bihar) and Kaira (Gujarat), and on behalf of the textile mill workers in Ahmedabad, earned him much support and provided with him a springboard to the national political arena.

The Impact of British Policy

However, Gandhi's emergence as a national leader was

2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., pp. 18 & 144.
5. Ibid., p. 55.
precipitated by the actions of the British government. In March 1919, while the details of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were still under consideration, the Government of India, in view of the impending release of many Indian terrorists and political activists interned or imprisoned during the war, introduced the two Rowlatt Bills which gave the authorities emergency powers to intern and to conduct summary trials for sedition by special tribunals. As with Lloyd George's coercive measures in Ireland, such indiscreet action at an inopportune juncture threw Indian nationalists of every political persuasion into a state of 'tremendous agitation'. To the majority of Indians who were expecting 'more liberty' and 'more contentment' after the war, these Bills undoubtedly made a mockery of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and clearly revealed British ingratitude and duplicity. To Gandhi who as late as August 1918 still argued in the fashion of John Redmond that 'the most becoming manner' of gaining 'full responsible government' was to help the British in their war effort, the Rowlatt Bills were a striking demonstration of the settled policy of the raj to 'retain its grip on our necks'.

The fact that while India was given special representation at the Paris Peace Conference and was treated on an equal footing with

1. These Bills were drawn from the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee which was set up in 1917 to investigate and report on the seditious movement in India.
3. ibid.
other Dominions, \(^1\) but was flatly denied self-government, \(^2\) was the cause of bitter indignation. Indian nationalists, wrote Indulal Yajnik, \(^3\) once an admirer of Mrs. Besant and now a follower of Gandhi, 'felt now more keenly than ever the shame and the disgrace of continuing to be ruled by a foreign power even while a lot of hypocritical lip-service was being paid to bumptious phrases like 'the freedom of small nations' and 'the right of self-determination'.\(^4\)

To the Moderates too, the 'Black Bills', as the Rowlatt Bills were called, \(^5\) were absolutely unnecessary as they believed the advent of constitutional reforms would muzzle seditious movements. Moreover, in view of the great expectations that had been roused by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the restriction of liberty at this critical moment would alienate public opinion and destroy whatever confidence the people had in the sincerity of the government. Worse still, it would weaken their position in a movement which they now barely controlled. It was now clear that India's generous

1. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, pp. 238-9. At the Peace Conference, special representation was given to the four chief Dominions in the British Empire delegation. India was one among the four. But the Congress delegation was denied access to Paris. Instead, an official delegation representing India was sent under the leadership of Montagu. The official delegation later signed the Treaty of Versailles and other Peace Treaties, and became a separate member of the League of Nations. Indian nationalists, however, complained that the official delegation did not genuinely represent the interests of India. See Karandikar, S.L., L.B.G. Tilak, Poona, The Author, 1957, pp. 570-574 for Tilak's efforts in this respect.
4. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 73.
contribution to Britain would not be duly rewarded with limited self-government as the Moderates had promised. Instead, what she got for her loyalty was repression.¹

As Tilak, Mrs. Besant and many prominent Congress leaders were either in England or England-bound in order to give evidence before the Joint Committee of the British parliament about the Reform Act, Gandhi subsequently became 'one of the most prominent leaders left in India'.² His success in South Africa, Champaran, Kaira and Ahmedabad had convinced many radicals of his ability to alleviate Indian grievances and negotiate a settlement with the authorities. Moreover, the radicals, who had been aroused by the Home Rule movement, wanted to vent their pent-up feelings in a determined fight against the government. Undoubtedly Gandhi and satyagraha provided them with experienced leadership and a programme of direct action which they sorely needed.³

When the first Rowlatt Bill was enacted on 22 March 1919, Gandhi called for a general hartaI⁴ on 6 April. This was to be a day of prayer, fasting, and self-purification. All shops and business establishments were closed as a sign of mourning for the national humiliation. Workers in Bombay and other industrial towns also went on strikes, demonstrating thereby their growing political

¹. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 73. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 360.
². Yajnik, op. cit., p. 74.
⁴. A hartaI is a cessation of all activities for a special period, usually a day, in protest against some actions (usually of the government).
However, the hartal soon degenerated into riots when a mob clashed with the police in Delhi and nine Indians were killed. Violence also broke out in Bombay, Ahmedabad, North-West Frontier Province, and even in Calcutta. For some weeks in the Punjab there had been rumblings of revolt. Those killed at the Delhi riots were glorified as martyrs and posters had appeared warning the government that there would be a great ghadr (mutiny). Rumours of Gandhi's arrest and the deportation of two popular nationalist leaders from the Punjab precipitated serious riots in the cities of Amritsar, Lahore and Kasur. On 13 April, a prohibited public meeting in Amritsar was fired upon without warning. Some four hundred people were killed and many more wounded. Two days later martial law was proclaimed in Amritsar and neighbouring cities under which flogging and other humiliations were imposed upon the inhabitants. Like the other nationalists, Gandhi was greatly shocked by the government brutality in the Punjab. But he was more upset by the inexperienced satyagrahis' (pl. those who practised satyagraha) inability to keep their campaign on a non-violent plane. Calling it his 'Himalayan miscalculation' to call on the people to launch civil disobedience 'before they had thus qualified themselves for it', he suspended the movement on 18 April.

2. The Independent, 5 April 1919.
3. ibid., 11, 12 April 1919.
4. ibid., 18 April 1919.
Though satyagraha against the Rowlatt Bills ended unexpectedly, it was by no means a complete failure. The remaining Rowlatt Bill never became law and the surviving Rowlatt Act was never put to the test. The tragedy at Amritsar also fanned the fire of Indian nationalism to a new height. In the words of an eminent Assamese Muslim nationalist, 'on the ashes of the Bagh martyrs phoenix-like rose a new India'. In his autobiography, Surendranath Banerjea wrote that the Amritsar massacre and the Punjab atrocities had 'kindled a conflagration throughout India .... and invested the Reforms with a sinister hue'. In his view, government coercion and military brutality provoked rather than stifled popular discontent. 'The Rowlatt Act', he wrote 'was the parent of the Non-Co-operation movement'.

When the Government of India Bill received royal assent on 23 December 1919, it was no triumph for the Moderates, for it had come too late and conceded too little. Taken together with the Rowlatt Act, the Government of India Act made very odd reading and convinced the nationalists that beneath the policy of reconciliation lay the iron hand of repression.

At the annual Congress session at Amritsar, Motilal Nehru accused Sir Michael O'Dwyer of 'striving to make the Punjab a kind of

2. The massacre took place in an enclosed open space called Jallianwala Bagh.
5. ibid., p. 300.
Ulster in relation to the rest of India, a bulwark of reaction against all reform [sic].\(^1\) As to the warnings of Lord Midleton,\(^2\) leader of the Southern Irish Unionists and a member of the Irish Convention, that continuing agitation would be 'absolutely fatal to the future of India', Motilal simply asked Indians to ignore them.\(^3\)

Given the volatile atmosphere created by the Amritsar massacre, it was generally expected that the Congress would reject the reforms outright as it had done before in 1918. But sensing the reforms would 'lend a ray of hope'\(^4\) to India's cause and expecting the Congress could make good use of the new councils for securing justice in the Rowlatt Act and ill-treatment of the Punjabis, Gandhi urged the INC to accept the reforms and 'settle down quietly to work so as to make them a thorough success ...'\(^5\) In a heated debate with the Extremists and their supporters such as Tilak and C.R. Das who contemplated adopting Parnellite obstructionism in the provincial councils,\(^6\) Gandhi eventually succeeded in carrying the resolution approving co-operation.\(^7\) 'My stubborn opposition to some acts of the British government', he told a friend shortly before the Congress meeting, should not be 'mistaken for unfriendliness'.\(^8\) Within a year, however, Gandhi spurned the reforms and called for non-co-operation (hereinafter NCO) against a government he termed 'Satanic'.\(^9\) Two events, namely, the Khilafat question and the Report

2. Midleton, Lord; 1856-1942; Fermanagh landowner; Secretary of State for India, 1903-05; member of Irish Convention, 1917-18.
8. CW, vol. 16, p. 344.
of the Hunter Commission on the Amritsar massacre, were mainly responsible for Gandhi’s volte-face.

As forementioned, Britain’s war with Turkey had aroused considerable anxiety among Indian Muslims and the latter rendered their assistance to Britain only on Lloyd George’s promise to safeguard the Islamic interests of Turkey after the armistice. However, at the Paris Peace Conference, there was mounting evidence that the Allied Powers, particularly Britain and France, were bent on driving Turkey bag and baggage out of Europe and divesting the Khalif of his suzerainty over Muslim sanctuaries. The British delegates' anti-Turkish attitude was seen by millions of Indian Muslims as a breach of faith and alienated nearly all sections of Muslim opinion in India. Whipped into a pan-Islamic furore, modern- and traditional-educated Muslims, whom Britain had tried to keep apart, closed ranks in November 1919 to form an All-India Khilafat Committee at Bombay in order to secure a peace settlement to their satisfaction. The ulema, who usually adopted an anti-British stance, also joined them to protest against the humiliation of Islam by the Christian powers.

Gandhi welcome the Khilafat movement for its righteousness. He also saw in it a golden opportunity to promote Hindu-Muslim unity.

2. The Independent. 22, 23 July 1919.
3. Hardy, op. cit., p. 189.
By lending a helping hand to their Muslim brethren in their hour of need, he fondly hoped 'to buy their friendship'¹ and enlist their support for the nationalist movement from which the majority of Muslims had so far distanced themselves. To his Hindu colleagues' misgivings over his support for a purely Muslim cause, he retorted that nothing tangible could be gained if Hindus and Muslims were divided on the political front. The British raj, he said, was sustained by a policy of 'Divide and Rule'.² As she was in Ireland, England was playing one community against the other. Like Griffith who claimed that 'the so-called "Ulster Question" in Ireland possessed 'no reality',³ Gandhi maintained that the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy was also 'unreal'.⁴ Like the Irish, Indians became slaves because of their mutual distrust,⁵ and it was only by adjusting their differences and determining 'to live as friends bound to one another as children of the same sacred soil' that India would regain her freedom.⁶ Swaraj, he said, would not come 'with petitions and speeches', the only requisite was 'amity among us, and strength'.⁷ Divided, we lost, united, we won.⁸ If Indians wished to live as one nation, 'surely the interest of any of us must be the interest of all'.⁹ Many Hindus answered Gandhi's call and duly observed an all-India harta on 17 October 1919 and 19 March 1920 respectively to mark the first and second Khilafat Day.

5. CW, vol. 19, p. 20; vol. 20, p. 103.
9. Young India, 3 December, 1919.
The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey were published on 15 May 1920. Turkey was deprived of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan. Eastern Thrace was given to Greece, most of her Arab territories were divided between France and Britain as mandatories, and certain Aegean islands were given to Italy. Sharif al-Hussein, Britain's Arab ally who rebelled against the Sultan, was to control Mecca and Medina. Although under the pressure of Indian public opinion, His Majesty the Sultan-Caliph was allowed to retain Constantinople, he was a puppet in all but name. Real power in fact was vested in the High Commissioners of the Allied Powers.

The peace terms confirmed the Indian Muslims' worst fears and inflamed the Islamic passion of Muslim India. As the cry of 'Islam in danger' was raised, the Hunter Report was also released and added much fuel to the fire. Although the Hunter Report condemned General Dyer's action as unduly harsh, it nevertheless emphasised the provocation of the mob and implausibly exonerated Dyer's ruthlessness on the ground that drastic measures were indispensable to suppress revolutionary or mutinous agitation. To most Indians, the Hunter Report was a shameful attempt to exculpate the culprits. They were further infuriated when they knew that 129 British Peers, including Sir Edward Carson, eulogized Dyer as the 'Saviour of India' and the

2. The Independent, 16 May 1920.
3. ibid., 18, 19, 22 May 1920.
4. ibid., 29, 30 May 1920.
British press had raised £26,000 for the aggrieved officer as a 'full token of debt the empire owes to you'.

The Hunter Report and British popular support for General Dyer astounded Indians. 'My blood is boiling', wrote an angry Motilal Nehru to his son Jawaharlal in May 1920. 'We must hold a special Congress now and raise a veritable hell for the rascals'. Gandhi too was dumbfounded. Airing his indignation in Young India, he condemned the Hunter Report as 'an attempt to condone official lawlessness' and a 'thinly disguised official whitewash'. 'So far as I am aware', he told Lord Chelmsford later, 'Mussulmans and Hindus have as a whole lost faith in British justice and honour.'

The Non-co-operation Movement

Early in February 1920, Gandhi had already suggested a NCO campaign and in late May 1920 he had successfully persuaded the All-India Khilafat Committee to adopt it as the most appropriate means to press for a satisfactory solution to the Turkish question. To an indignant people, he now suggested the NCO campaign be also employed to redress the Punjabi wrongs. By blending the Punjabi grievances

1. Quoted in Chaudhary, op. cit., p. 6.
4. CW, vol. 17, p. 482.
5. Ibid., p. 503.
6. CW, vol. 17, p. 478. When under persecution, Muslims usually resort to jihad (holy war) or hijrat (wholesale migration) as means of self-preservation. With India's disarmed condition, jihad was impossible. Likewise, with the closing of the frontier by the Afghan Amir (governor, prince, commander) in later 1920, hijrat was out of the question.
with the Khilafat demands, he hoped to gain the support of the Hindus in general and the Congress in particular for his NCO campaign on a truly national scale.

Under the guidance of Gandhi, NCO was formally inaugurated on 1 August 1920. The campaign included the surrender of titles and honorary offices, and the boycott of government schools and colleges, law courts, foreign goods and the council elections due at the end of 1920. Addressing a letter to the Viceroy on the same day, Gandhi told Lord Chelmsford that the Imperial Government's betrayal of the Indian Muslims, the Government of India's exoneration of the Amritsar culprits, and the widespread British sympathy for General Dyer, 'have filled me with gravest misgivings regarding the future of the Empire, have estranged me completely from the present Government and have disabled me from tendering as I have hitherto whole-heartedly tendered my loyal co-operation'. 1 After this, the Ali brothers, 2 leaders of the Khilafat movement, declared a Hindu-Muslim entente and toured India with Gandhi appealing for support. In September 1920, at a special session at Calcutta, the INC passed Gandhi's NCO resolution, which Young Ireland regarded as India's reply to Dyerism, 3 despite the virulent opposition of Lajpat Rai, B.C. Pal, Mrs. Besant, Jinnah, Malaviya 4 and especially C.R. Das who favoured Parnellite obstructionism both inside and outside the legislature. 5

1. CW, vol. 18, p. 105.
3. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 83.
It was Gandhi's most astounding victory since his return from South Africa. Echoing Daniel O'Connell's speech at Mullingar on 14 May 1843, he told the Congress that should his programme receive unfailing support from the people, India would attain swaraj in a year.

The All-India Muslim League and the Central Khilafat Committee of India also held their special sessions at Calcutta in the same month and both bodies unanimously endorsed Gandhi's NCO movement. Like Dail Eireann which initiated a policy of social ostracism of the police, the Muslim League also resolved to enforce a social boycott on any Muslim who failed to observe its decision. Gandhi's campaign received further support when the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind (Society of the ulema of India) sanctioned NCO in a 'Mutafiq Fatwa'. In the fatwa, the ulema declared it impermissible and sinful for any Muslim to maintain friendship or co-operation of any kind with the enemies of Islam and made it religiously incumbent for every Muslim to abide by their decision. Signed by 900 eminent ulema and learned Muslims of India, the fatwa was without doubt the most significant religious directive since the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and gave the NCO movement

1. O'Connell said that 'if the people unite with me and follow my advice it is impossible not to get the repeal'. The Nation, 20 May 1843.
2. CW, vol. 18, pp. 247, 257.
4. This society, though 'traditional and conservative in its general outlook, and necessarily religious', was yet 'politically advanced and anti-imperialist'. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 391.
5. Fatwa is an opinion on a point of Islamic law given by a mufti, a person qualified to do so.
the 'imprimatur of high theological approval'.¹ Many Muslim civil servants, especially police officers, resigned and joined the NCO campaign.²

However, despite the ulema's blessing on the movement, many Muslim leaders considered NCO unviable and detrimental to their cause. Among them were regional elite leaders such as Fazl-i-Husain³ in the Punjab and Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri⁴ in Bengal who argued that if Muslims could 'cautiously utilize the responsibilities' to which they had been 'entrusted under the Reforms', the 'downtrodden condition to which the Mussalmans have fallen' would undoubtedly be improved 'by degrees'.⁵ The Ali brothers' pugnacity also disturbed many Bengali Muslims such as Fazlul Haq,⁶ President of the pro-Congress Bengal Muslim League, who was worried that violence would come as a result of NCO and he would accept NCO only in principle.⁷ There were also some Muslims, particularly the theologians, who thought that India was still ill-prepared for such a radical campaign as NCO and objected to a Hindu leading the Muslims.⁸ Many nationalist Muslims, whose attitude was typified at this stage by

3. Fazl-i-Husain; 1877-1936; lawyer; Minister for Education, the Punjab, 1921-3 and 1924-5.
4. Chaudhuri (Chowdhuri), A.; 1863-1929; Bengali zamindar; Muslim communalist; against Lucknow Pact & NCO. Nawab— a deputy, applied honorifically to Muslim of high rank.
5. The Bengalee, 31 October 1920.
8. Taunk, op. cit., p. 198.
that of Jinnah, the 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity', also opposed the NCO's appeal to religion as obscurantist and socially divisive.

Opposition against NCO mounted within the Congress as well, and was perhaps even more determined. As with the Muslims, many Congress leaders were extremely dubious of the practicability of NCO. Added to their doubt was their dislike of marrying the nationalist cause to a specifically Muslim issue. In fact, many nationalists were afraid that the NCO campaign, being so emphatic on Muslim religious sentiment, would thwart the secular image of the Congress. Shaukat Ali's open call for an Afghan invasion of India to topple the raj also alienated many Hindus.

Personal and elite rivalries were also important. C.R. Das and Tilak were undoubtedly jealous of Gandhi's rising power and were vying with him for national leadership. Furthermore, many Congress leaders and regional elite groups regarded certain features of NCO, notably the boycott of council elections and social uplift of the oppressed classes, as a Machiavellian design to undercut their influence in the Provincial Congress Committees and that of the socially-dominant groups they represented. For instance, Gandhi's political radicalism, which insisted on mass involvement irrespective

1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 68.
5. Young India, 23 June 1920.
of religious or class differences, and his social radicalism, which condemned India's rigidly inegalitarian socio-economic structures, were seen by the Bengali elites, many of them Hindu bhadralok and landholders, and the chitpavan Brahmins, who were socio-politically dominant in Maharashtra, as a direct threat to the social order and their existence as a privileged class in their respective regions.

As for the Moderates, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, however 'inadequate and unsatisfactory', were by far their greatest political achievement. To boycott the council elections on the eve of their success as Gandhi demanded was therefore tantamount to undoing their whole life work. In their view, self-government would be conferred on India only as a result of whole-hearted co-operation with Britain. Boycotting the council elections would only deprive India of able councillors and precipitate violence as in 1919. Mrs. Besant shared the Moderates' view on these points and echoed the Bengali leaders' abhorrence of the chaos and anarchy which it was feared would follow NCO.

Beneath these practical considerations was an ideological conflict as well. To the Western-educated elites, urban or rural,
conservative or radical, Gandhi's traditionalism, which eulogized what they considered obsolete and regressive and condemned what they believed to be good and progressive, was a challenge to their vision of India and their psychological make-up. It was a challenge to the means and the end — to their political style as well as to the fundamentals of Indian nationhood. A modern industrial nation-state in the European mould and a people imbued with Western socio-political ethics, which the Congress leaders had so long striven for, were categorically denounced by Gandhi as devilish, undesirable and out of keeping with the spirit of India. In its stead, Indians were urged to accept a traditional India 'purified and cleansed, but nevertheless premodern and preindustrial'. The call therefore was for the abandonment of the 'new fangled notions' of Western civilization, and 'a radical reorientation of national life'.

In practice, this would have meant the boycott by the elites of the political, educational, and legal institutions which had long been their springboard to social and political prominence. Perhaps to those who shared Gandhi's vision of India, such as Motilal Nehru, such actions were deemed necessary and hence the psychological adjustment was less painful. But for those who did not, such as Jinnah, the boycotts were not just a supreme personal sacrifice but

2. Embree, op. cit., p. 73.
5. J. Nehru recalled in his autobiography that 'temperamentally' Jinnah 'did not fit in at all with the new Congress. He felt completely out of his element in the Khadi-clad crowd demanding speeches in Hindustani'. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 68.
an agonizing act of self-denial. Speaking for the intelligentsia, Rabindranath Tagore condemned Gandhi's primitivism and populism as being anti-rational, anti-intellectual, and anti-establishment. The boycott of colleges, said the great Indian poet, would not lead 'to a fuller education, but to a non-education'. The doctrine of NCO 'has at its back a fierce joy of annihilation which at its best is asceticism, and at its worst is that orgy of frightfulness in which the human nature ... finds a disinterested delight in an unmeaning devastation'. In Tagore's view, Gandhi's vainglorious ethnocentrism and narrow-minded nativism would thwart their forefathers' effort to build a prosperous India based on reason and intellect. In a letter to C.F. Andrews, he criticized Gandhi's call 'to alienate our heart and mind from the West' as 'an attempt at spiritual suicide', and later publicly warned the people not to accept the Mahatma's 'fictitious moral dictum' without any verification. 'We have had enough magic in this country...', he said, and we should no longer 'accept as our ally the illusion-haunted, magic-ridden, slave-mentality that is at the root of all the poverty and insult under which our country groans'.

Despite the poet's admonition, Gandhi was fast becoming the

7. de Bary, op. cit., p. 795.
8. ibid., pp. 794-5.
 undisputed leader of the nationalist movement, especially after
Tilak's death in August 1920. Though many leaders disliked Gandhi's
pro-Muslim and aggressive attitudes, they found it very difficult to
reject his leadership or his programme without appearing to be anti-
Muslim or crypto-Moderate. In fact, owing to the rank and file
dissatisfaction with Mrs. Besant's soft stance towards the
government, Gandhi was able to replace her as President of the All-
India Home Rule League in April 1920. In October, he even succeeded
in changing the All-India Home Rule League's name to Swarajya Sabha, with a revised constitution which, while omitting any reference to
the British connection, clearly permitted peaceful but
unconstitutional activities to achieve the organization's new
objective — complete swaraj.

Opponents of Gandhi saw this development with misgivings, but in
view of his popularity and the Calcutta Special Congress resolution
in favour of NCO, most of them, except Jinnah, had to make some kind
of accommodation with Gandhi lest they would lose their influence in
the nationalist movement. As for the Muslims, many were reconciled
to the NCO movement because their most aggressive leader, i.e.
Shaukat Ali, had adopted it as an additional weapon to jihad (holy
war) and hijrat (wholesale migration) and browbeat others into

2. Young India, 28 April, 1920.
4. Jinnah's "idea of politics was of a superior variety, more suited
to the legislative chamber or to a committee-room. For some years
he felt completely out of the picture and even decided to leave
India for good". Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 365. Jinnah
left INC in 1920.
acquiescence by deriding them as 'bad Muslims'.¹ At the annual sessions of the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Khilafat Conference, which were held at Nagpur, both bodies also reaffirmed their adhesion to NCO and made it a religious duty absolutely binding on every Muslim in India.²

When the Congress met for its annual session in Nagpur in December 1920, it was clear that NCO was the order of the day. Gandhi's chief opponents — C.R. Das, Lajpat Rai, and N.C. Kelkar³ — themselves having boycotted the council elections and failed to offer any clear alternative to Gandhi's programme, capitulated and flocked to the NCO camp.

Following the reaffirmation of NCO,⁴ Gandhi also succeeded in changing the old Congress programme. Henceforth, the 'object of the Indian National Congress is the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means'.⁵ Like the Swarajya Sabha's new constitution, the new Congress programme made no reference to the British connection and to the methods of political agitation. Such omission Gandhi argued, enabled India to employ satyagraha as a means to attain 'swaraj within the empire if possible and without if necessary'.⁶

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¹ Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 177.
² Indian Annual Register, 1921, pp. 236-40.
³ Kelkar, N.C.; 1872-1947; Maharashtrian journalist, editor of Mahratta, 1896-1918; follower of Tilak.
⁵ ibid., pp. 159, 190.
⁶ ibid., pp. 159, 166, 199, 206.
Gandhi's triumph at Nagpur, the largest Congress so far held, clearly revealed political India's change of mood at the end of the 1910s. The 'Congress have given up Egyptian methods in favour of Sinn Fein methods', reported the Intelligence Bureau in Delhi.¹ The somewhat suppliant tone of war-time India had gone. In its stead came a strong assertion of the right of self-determination. The Congress leaders unanimously agreed that if India remained in the British Empire, or the British Commonwealth, she would not 'remain at the dictation of anybody or by fear', but by her 'own free choice and free will ....'² Though not yet a disavowal of the British connection or a unilateral 'declaration of complete independence',³ the revised Congress programme nevertheless showed that a majority of Indians no longer accepted the Moderates' fetish of the imperial connection.⁴ Ten years earlier, Gandhi had condemned in Hind Swaraj the Moderates' insistence that British rule was indispensable to India.⁵ In 1920, the rank and file of the Congress finally came to the same conclusion. To the young radicals who swamped the Congress for the first time in 1920, the once fascinating word 'Empire' no longer connoted justice and benevolence, but subjection and exploitation. The Nagpur Congress was thus a decisive and definite break with the Moderates.⁶

1921 was a year of great expectations for the Indian

³. ibid., p. 54.
⁵. CW, vol. 10, p. 60.
⁶. Bose, op. cit., p. 46.
nationalists. 'India's heart', wrote Yajnik, 'palpitated with a new hope and new faith'.

Recalling the intellectuals' exhilaration, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in his autobiography:

Many of us who worked for the Congress programme lived in a kind of intoxication during the year 1921. We were full of excitement and optimism and a buoyant enthusiasm .... We worked hard, harder than we had ever done before, for we knew that the conflict with the Government would come soon .... We had a sense of freedom and a pride in that freedom. The old feeling of oppression and frustration was completely gone. There was no more whispering, no roundabout legal phraseology to avoid getting into trouble with the authorities. We said what we felt and shouted it from the house tops.

This buoyant enthusiasm prompted many an Indian to sacrifice personal interests in the service of the nationalist cause. Thousands answered the call of the Congress for hartals or demonstrations against the visit of the Duke of Connaught who came to inaugurate the reformed councils in January 1921. A number of eminent lawyers such as C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Rajendra Prasad, relinquished their lucrative practices. In Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam, thousands of students walked out of the government educational institutions and joined the national colleges set up by the Congress.

As with the Home Rule movement, women were drawn into the nationalist struggle. Apart from hand-spinning, Gandhi called upon

3. Connaught, Duke of; Prince A.W.P. Albert; 1850-1942; held command in India, 1886-90; Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, 1900.
4. Patel, V.; 1875-1950; Gujarati lawyer, joined Gandhi in Kaira satyagraha and rose to become leading Congress organizer.
5. The Independent, 23 January, 2 February 1921.
them to burn and not to buy foreign clothes for themselves or for their children as their contribution to the NCO campaign.1 'Love of foreign cloth', Gandhi once said, 'brought foreign domination, pauperism and what is worse, shame to many a home'.2 To consign foreign garments 'to the flames' was to Gandhi an act of self-purification.3 As for the educated women of upper and middle classes, they became Gandhi's most ardent supporters, providing him with intelligence, skill, unpaid assistance and a body of female satyagrahis.4

For the first time too, many peasants joined the nationalist movement. For if Gandhi was a shrewd politician to the educated, he was a saint to the downtrodden. His compassion for the poor, the humble, the sinners and the exterior castes (the 'untouchables' or 'depressed castes'), together with the call for non-payment of land revenue to the government, won NCO a huge following.5 Thousands of miserable ryots tramped from afar to listen to his exaltation of simple rural life and his condemnation of rack-renting landlordism.6 To the toiling masses, NCO was a fight against the excessive exactions of the government and the zamindars (landlords), and Gandhi was the messiah to deliver them from their plight.7 The NCO

4. Embree, op. cit., p. 78.
7. Ibid. In his memoirs, Swami Shraddhanand stated that in a meeting with Montagu, Gandhi had asked for a reduction of taxation as a reward to India's service during the war. Swami Shraddhanand, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
movement, wrote Rajendra Prasad many years later, 'shifted politics from the drawing rooms of the educated and the businessmen to the huts in the countryside, to the tillers of the soil'.\(^1\) Industrial workers in the cities too, answered to Gandhi's call and 'strikes of all kinds became as common in India as in England ...

It was Gandhi's prime concern that NCO, like the Irish Sinn Fein policy, should be as destructive of the imperial order as it was constructive of an indigenous one. Therefore, he took special care to ensure that the dismantling of government institutions should be accompanied by the building up of alternative bodies. For instance, panchayats (traditional Indian village courts) and national colleges were set up in the place of government law courts and schools. Likewise, the boycott of foreign cloth was to be matched by the promotion of hand-spinning and khadi.\(^3\) There was thus, as in Ireland, no vacuum following the 'collapse' of government institutions. His lieutenant, Vithalbhai Patel,\(^4\) also insisted that NCO should be launched systematically and progressively. Shunning the inception of violence in the Sinn Fein movement, he warned Indians against the danger of unnecessarily provoking British repression which would nip NCO in the bud.\(^5\)

2. Chirol, *India*, p. 215. There were about 200 strikes in India during 1920 and no fewer than 400 in 1921. CW, vol. 19, p. 365. In all, during the first six months of 1920, there were strikes involving one and a half million workers. Imam, op. cit., p. 47.
4. Patel, V.; 1870-1933; Bombay lawyer & politician; brother of Vallabhbhai; President of Indian Legislative Assembly, 1925-30.
Likewise, although Gandhi welcomed the political awakening of the workers and peasants, he did not want the nascent mass movement to develop along Marxist lines. In his view, socialism begot anarchy and the doctrine of class struggle was inimical to the united front of all classes in the nationalist movement. In his public speeches, he earnestly pleaded for capital-labour harmony and vehemently condemned the Bolsheviks' destruction of authority, social and judicial sanction, and most of all, private property. 'India does not want Bolshevism', he wrote in 1921. 'The people are too peaceful to stand anarchy'.

Thus, whilst Gandhi sanctioned the non-payment of taxes to the government, he scrupulously advised the peasants to pay their rent to the landlords, fulfil their obligations regardless of whether they were 'wrong or unfair, from custom', and not to plunder the estates. By the same token, he argued that the kisan (peasant) movement, besides ameliorating the plight of the peasants, should also try to improve tenant-landlord relations. Should any dispute arise, the peasants should not resort to violence or any unilateral action but should seek 'a friendly discussion' with the landlords in order to arrive at a settlement.

As for the industrial workers, Gandhi advised them to obtain their employers' permission before joining hartals. It would be 'a most serious mistake', he wrote in February 1921, to make use of

1. CW, vol. 15, p. 163.
3. CW, vol. 15, p. 163. Young India (Ahmedabad), 2 April 1919.
5. CW, vol. 20, p. 106.
labour strikes for political purpose. And it was 'a most dangerous thing to make political use of labour' until labourers understood the political condition of the country and were 'prepared to work for the common good'. ' Strikes, therefore, for the present should only take place for the betterment of the labourers' lot, and, when they have acquired the spirit of patriotism, for the regulation of prices of their manufactures'.

This insistence on performing one's duty, patron-client relationship, class harmony, peaceful consultation, together with his social philosophy idealizing poverty and love to the opponent, endeared Gandhi to many industrialists who considered him the best antidote to industrial unrest. Many indigenous manufacturers also welcomed Gandhi's espousal of the swadeshi movement which freed them from foreign competition and provided them with a lever to bargain for greater political and economic concessions from Britain which were beneficial to them. Thus, despite Gandhi's eulogy of handicrafts and deprecation of industrialization, many an Indian capitalist helped promote hand-spinning and even subsidized the All-India Spinners' Association. Gandhi's popularity among the burgeoning capitalists was best illustrated by their disapproval of the All-India Trade Union Congress which, like the Irish Trades Union Congress and Labour Party, interpreted capital-labour relationship in

terms of class conflict;\(^1\) and their endorsement of the Majur Mahajan which, being a Gandhi-sponsored trade union organization of the Ahmedabad textile workers, fostered the principle of class collaboration and harmony.\(^2\) Wealthy industrial magnates of Western India, notably the cotton manufacturers, also supported the Congress under Gandhi's leadership and financed its programme.\(^3\) With the younger generation of Indian nationalists strongly under socialist influence, it was Gandhi who largely diverted the nationalist movement away from the communist path.\(^4\)

The rapid progress of NCO caused considerable anxiety among government officials, especially Lord Reading\(^5\) who succeeded Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1921. The revolt of the Muslim fanatics, namely, the Moplahs, in August 1921 in Malabar and the Muslim leaders' call on the Muslim policemen, soldiers and civil servants to resign further alarmed the authorities.\(^6\) In order to dampen the seditious movement, the Ali brothers and five other NCO leaders were arrested in September 1921 for inciting violence and fomenting discontent against the government.\(^7\) Gandhi, like Griffith in Ireland, remained free as the government feared that his arrest would provoke intense agitation and make him a martyr.\(^8\) Native newspapers too had repeatedly warned the government 'against creating

2. ibid.
3. ibid., p. 187.
5. Reading, first Marquess of; 1860-1935; Liberal MP, 1904-1913; Viceroy of India, 1921-1926.
6. The Independent, 24 July, 23 August, 1 & 2 September, 1921.
7. ibid., 18 September 1921.
a second bellicose Ireland in hitherto quiescent India.

Yet the conviction of the Ali brothers was sufficient to bring NCO to a new crest of excitement. Muslims and Hindus alike became very restive and demanded the immediate inauguration of mass civil disobedience. Within the Congress there was also growing impatience with Gandhi's hesitation. A coterie of radicals was greatly inspired by the contemporaneous struggle in Ireland which they thought was 'a complete parallel to that of India'. Jawaharlal Nehru himself was also very impressed by Ireland's 'extraordinary' and 'unique' struggle against 'fantastic odds'. This 'brave and irrepressible country' which rose against 'a great and organized empire', he said, could neither be crushed in spirit nor cowed into submission. Irish revolutionary violence, which the young Nehru considered a 'periodic occurrence in Ireland', also convinced many Indian militants that physical force alone could bring Britain to her knees. Others, like Jawaharlal Nehru, desired to adopt both the violent and non-violent tactics of Sinn Fein which had obviously helped spread the Irish struggle 'like a forest fire'. Gandhi, however, maintained that the Indian struggle was not 'an armed revolt', but 'bloodless revolution'. In many public speeches, he emphatically disapproved of the idea that NCO could proceed hand in hand with violence. Like the Irish clerics who denounced the IRA's murders, Gandhi condemned

1. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 9.
2. The Independent, 27 September 1921.
3. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 9.
5. ibid., p. 578.
the 'organized assassination' in the nationalist movement and argued against the eulogy of physical force for the emancipation of mankind.\footnote{Freeman's Journal, 3 November 1919. Irish Times, 22 December 1919.} The use of violence for the sake of one's own country, he said, 'would be a poor defence of honour'.\footnote{CW, vol. 13, p. 229.} Although he shared Pearse's belief that his country had to undergo a purgation, he argued that it should be a purification through peaceful NCO, rather than violent death.\footnote{CW, vol. 17, p. 488, vol. 19, p. 488.} 'Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone by the sufferers', he wrote in 1920. 'The purer the suffering, the greater is the progress. Hence did the sacrifice of Jesus suffice to free a sorrowing world'.\footnote{CW, vol. 17, p. 488.} Subsequently, he asked Indians to refrain 'from bending the wrongdoer to our will by physical force as Sinn Feiners are doing today....'\footnote{ibid.}

Many Indian radicals, including Gandhi's lieutenants such as Dwarkadas and Jawaharlal Nehru, did not share the Mahatma's high opinion on non-violence which they thought would be easily rendered ineffective by agents provocateurs.\footnote{Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 303. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 80.} But they concealed their disagreement through respect for the Mahatma and followed him.\footnote{Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 72.} When Irish revolutionary violence became increasingly effective and 'righteous' in face of Black-and-Tan reprisals, Gandhi still maintained that violence, though successful in Ireland, would be impracticable in a vast and disarmed country like India and repellant...
to the peace-loving Indian people. My 'argument today against violence', wrote Gandhi in *Young India* on 10 March 1920, 'is based upon pure expedience, i.e. its utter futility'. If Indians followed the example of the Irish, he warned, 'we shall invite hell when the Government puts forth its full might ...

In order to placate the restless radicals, the All-India Congress Committee (hereinafter AICC) finally promulgated the strict conditions under which every Provincial Congress Committee could initiate its own civil disobedience campaign, including the non-payment of taxes. The AICC's decision was by no means welcomed by Gandhi who felt that Indians were not yet 'disciplined, organized, and ripe for the taking up of civil disobedience'. The fear of his inability to control the masses was reinforced by the peasant revolts and industrial unrest in 1920 and 1921. The violent outbreaks in Bombay during the visit of the Prince of Wales in late November 1921, and the fact that NCO-Khalifat propaganda was clearly traceable in more than forty disturbances in various places of India throughout 1921, also confirmed Gandhi's fear of possible anarchy.

2. *CW*, vol. 17, p. 75.
4. *CW*, vol. 21, pp. 411-416. 'The programme of the movement did not include, except for the item of land tax, distinct economic demands of the masses such as increased wage and social legislation for the workers, and reduction of rent and debt for the agrarian population.' See Desai, op. cit., p. 322.
6. Prince of Wales, 1894-1972; Prince of Wales from 1911; King Edward VIII; abdicated, 1936; created Duke of Windsdor, 1936.
But the failure of the peace parleys with the government and the latter's systematic prosecutions of NCO workers in late 1921 and early 1922 prompted Gandhi to take the risk. The choice, Gandhi later explained, was between 'mass civil disobedience with all its undoubted dangers and lawless repression of lawful activities of the people'.

In January 1922 Bardoli in Gujarat was chosen to spearhead civil disobedience under Gandhi's direct supervision. Even at this point Gandhi still tried to seek peace with the Viceroy by urging the latter to release the imprisoned NCO workers and restore freedom to the people. When Lord Reading flatly refused his demands, Gandhi concluded that he had no choice but to take action.

But barely had Gandhi made his move when news reached him of a violent confrontation between the police and a mob of two thousand, headed by a group of satyaagrahis, in the village of Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces. In the incident, twenty-one policemen were burnt alive in their besieged station. Gandhi was greatly shocked by the tragedy and was convinced that 'there is not yet in India that non-violent and truthful atmosphere which and which alone can justify mass civil disobedience ...' Totally convinced that the Congress

2. NCO leaders imprisoned were: Lajpat Rai, C.R. Das, S.C. Bose, the Nehrus, and Abul Kalam Azad.
6. Ibid., pp. 344-50.
7. The Bombay Chronicle, 8 February 1922.
had not yet obtained 'the necessary control over the masses', he subsequently revoked the whole campaign.

The Limits and the Achievements of Gandhian Radicalism

The abrupt suspension of mass civil disobedience at a time when the nationalists seemed to be consolidating their position and advancing on all fronts caused considerable resentment and disappointment among Gandhi's allies, particularly those from outside the three Presidencies. In consternation, Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai wrote long letters from jail criticizing Gandhi's decision. 'We have been defeated', wrote Lajpat Rai, 'not because the country did not rise equal to the occasion but because Mahatma pitched his standard too high for the possibility of achievement'. The Bardoli resolutions (which annulled mass civil disobedience), he said, 'have conclusively established that there can be no campaign of Civil Disobedience under Gandhi's leadership'. C.R. Das shared Lajpat Rai's anger with 'the way Mahatma Gandhi was repeatedly bungling'. His prison mate, S.C. Bose, also felt that to 'sound the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling-point was nothing short of a national calamity.'

1. CW, vol. 22, p. 413.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 79.
5. ibid., p. 95.
7. Bose, S.C.; 1897-1945; resigned from ICS in 1921 to join NCO; President of the INC in 1938 & 1939; formed the Indian National Army, 1943.
8. Bose, op. cit., p. 73.
Jawaharlal Nehru also saw no logic in calling off the movement simply because of a stray incident. Speaking for the Congress, he argued that 'the non-violent method was not, and could not be, a religion or an unchallengeable creed or dogma. It could only be a policy and a method promising certain results, and by those results it would be finally judged. Individuals might make of it a religion or incontrovertible creed. But no political organization, so long as it remained political, could do so.'

The Chauri Chaura incident, he continued, 'made us examine these implications of non-violence as a method, and we felt that, if Gandhiji's argument for the suspension of civil resistance was correct, our opponents would always have the power to create circumstances which would necessarily result in our abandoning the struggle'.

At the meeting of the AICC, Gandhi also faced bitter attack from all sides. Many members considered the retreat a complete rout for the nationalist movement and made nonsense of all the sacrifice in the past two years. As for the Muslims, they felt betrayed and 'reeled under the blow, and it was never again possible to restore the confidence and fraternity that had united the two communities during this brief period of alliance.'

Peasant workers and labour activists also saw Gandhi's retreat as a gross betrayal of what they thought a mass revolutionary

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 82.
2. ibid.
From the very beginning, many of them had regarded the insistence on non-violence as a tactical design of the Congress bourgeoisie to keep the peasants and workers at bay. The latter's involvement in nationalist politics, they argued, was welcomed by the Congress as far as their participation would strengthen the struggle for political freedom. The Congress leadership's aversion to and criticisms of Bolshevism further confirmed their belief that the Congress had no intention of transforming the nationalist campaign into an agrarian or proletarian movement. 'It is evident ...', wrote Yajnik who was critical of some of Gandhi's political and economic ideas, 'that Mr. Gandhi was really determined not only not to allow Labour to participate in the political movement, but not even to fight any wage wars against the capitalist classes, while he was trying to united all sections of the Nation in a political struggle against the foreign Government'. To Yajnik and his colleagues, the Bardoli resolution, which severely criticized the peasants' refusal to pay rents to the landlords and assured the latter that the Congress movement was 'in no way intended to attack their legal rights', was a triumph of the bourgeois element in the Congress leadership which 'was closely aligned to the vested interests like zemindari and was apprehensive of any mass movement

which would jeopardize their interests'.

Although there is little evidence to substantiate the claim that the Chauri Chaura incident was a concrete manifestation of the revolutionary rumblings of the masses, Gandhi's obsession with law and order, together with his ultimate sensitivity to the fears of the socially conservative nationalist elite made him a petty bourgeoisie 'reactionary' in the eyes of many Marxists such as M.N. Roy. Other socialist critics such as Yajnik also concluded that Gandhi 'had really designed to secure the pecuniary and moral support of the whole capitalist class in the Congress Movement by virtually condemning unheard all the fights that Labour sought to wage against his newly found friends'.

Such were the criticisms Gandhi provoked from his indignant followers. Few critics, however, could see that the Chauri Chaura episode was not the cause but the occasion for Gandhi to end the whole movement. Since the outburst of mob frenzy in 1919, Gandhi had been aware that there was an undercurrent of violence in the country which was likely to explode under strain or provocation.

1. Desai, op. cit, p. 322. Madan Mohan Malaviya and M.R. Jayakar were generally accused of prevailing upon Gandhi and pressed him to suspend NCO. See Choudhary, 'Post-war Awakening ...', p. 265.
4. Yajnik said that in 1921 Gandhi 'began to show signs of nervousness on seeing Labour rise its head proudly against the factory owners'. Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 195 & 198.
Conscious of the inherent risks, he always reminded the people to proceed slowly and insisted NCO be followed step by step according to the level of discipline and commitment shown by the people in a district or in the country as a whole. But not many nationalists or Khilafatists shared his policy of 'stirring while restraining'. The Khilafat movement, while considerably widening the social basis of NCO by bringing in the Muslim masses, also brought an element of recklessness into its leadership. The conflict in Ireland had undoubtedly encouraged much talk about violence among the Muslim leaders such as the Ali brothers. Some of Gandhi's lieutenants also welcomed the possibility of India being provoked by British repression into ruthless terrorism characteristic of Sinn Fein. By May 1920, widespread disorder prompted the Director of the Central Intelligence Bureau in Delhi to conclude that 'Gandhi, in order to lead, has to follow ...' Indeed, the NCO movement was so supercharged by this Muslim restlessness that the Congress-Khilafat coalition, under the pressure of the Maulanas, moved towards a demand for immediate independence at the Nagpur Congress of 1920.

The danger of losing control over the headstrong elements in the NCO movement became even more real after the Nagpur Congress when 'the people had the reins in their own hands and drove the leaders'. Many local NCO organizers, who adopted the policy as a political

3. Taunk, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
5. Gallagher, loc. cit.
6. Maulana — Title of a learned Muslim, teacher.
expedient, were increasingly bent on taking initiatives which suited their parochial needs.\textsuperscript{1} Even at the national level, nationalists and Muslim leaders such as C.R. Das and Hasrat Mohani\textsuperscript{2} felt that Gandhi was too cautious and conciliatory. At the Congress Working Committee meetings in late 1921, they tried to force the pace of NCO and wanted to start mass civil disobedience simultaneously in various centres.\textsuperscript{3} By the beginning of 1922, news from the United Provinces had shown that in many places NCO was clearly 'out of central control' and the people was 'under little discipline'.\textsuperscript{4} Reports from Bengal also revealed that the movement 'is now so decentralized that local Congress councils are the only ones that count in their own area and even their influence is uncertain in direction of restraint'.\textsuperscript{5} Thus Gandhi was facing in India the same situation which Griffith had experienced in 1917-1919 in Ireland, namely, an increasingly decentralized movement with increasing violence. But unlike Griffith, Gandhi refused to be carried along even when the use of force was yielding desirable results. Conversely, more like Daniel O'Connell who considered Ireland's emancipation should not be 'purchased at the expense of a single drop of human blood',\textsuperscript{6} Gandhi insisted that there should be absolutely no violence even under the severest provocation.\textsuperscript{7}

Originally, it was because of Gandhi's desire to prevent Indians

2. Mohani, F.H.; 1877-1951; Pan-Islamic journalist closely connected with the militant ulema in the Khilafat movement.
5. ibid.
from emulating the Irish 'assassin or incendiary' that he 'advised non-violent non-co-operation regarding the Khilafat'.

His non-co-operation, he reminded his followers, was different from Sinn Feinism, for it was 'so conceived as to be incapable of being offered side by side with violence'. The Irish Sinn Feiners, he said, practised 'murder and other forms of violence'. Theirs was 'a "frightfulness" not unlike general Dyer's'. In his view, the Irish Sinn Feiners were wielders of brute force who did not 'question the propriety of means' if they could somehow achieve their purpose.

Echoing the opinion of the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Walsh, he stressed that the end, however noble, could not justify immoral means. Violence, he said, would only perpetuate hatred and revenge. Subsequent events in Ireland after independence, especially in the north, proved Gandhi right.

When the death of Terence MacSwiney elicited deep sympathy from Indian nationalists, Gandhi, who was popularly regarded as a potential Indian MacSwiney, singularly condemned the Lord Mayor's fast as 'an error'. In his view, MacSwiney's action against the British authorities who did not heed Irish demands was no more prudent than that of children who fast against a parent for a fine.

1. CW, vol. 18, p. 218.
2. ibid., p. 134.
3. ibid., pp. 218-220.
4. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
5. Walsh, W.J.; 1841-1921; Archbishop of Dublin, 1885-1921; strong supporter of the Republican leaders from 1918 until 1921.
7. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
9. CW, vol. 27, p. 49.
dress'. And although Gandhi would have been pleased by the Lord Mayor's insistence on forbearance, forgiveness and magnanimity, he condemned the latter for exploiting the hunger strike as a means to exact concessions from Britain. The basis of the hunger strike, he said, 'must be penance or purification'. It should not be directed against an enemy, 'for it will be as a piece of violence done to him'. Instead, it should be resorted to against a friend, 'not to extort rights but to reform him, as when a son fasts for a parent who drinks'. So far his fastings were concerned, such as those at Bombay and Bardoli, they were not directed against the British, but against Indians themselves for their resort to violence. Even after the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Gandhi still argued that it was not owing to Irish violence, but to England's change of heart in view of Irish sacrifice that Ireland was eventually able to attain her freedom.

... it is not the blood that the Irishmen have taken which has given them what appears to be their liberty. But it is the gallons of blood that they have willingly given themselves. It is not the fear of losing more lives that has compelled a reluctant offer from England but it is the shame of any further imposition of agony upon a people that loves its liberty above everything else. It is the magnitude of the Irish sacrifice which has been the deciding factor .... And England has yielded when she is able no longer to bear the sight of blood pouring out of thousands of Irish arteries .... Only instead of repeating South African and Irish histories non-co-operators are learning from the living examples of these nations the art of spilling their own blood without spilling that of their

4. ibid.
6. ibid.
opponents. If they could do that, they could attain swaraj within a few days or a few months. But if they want slavishly to follow South Africa and Ireland, then there is no swaraj during the present generation.¹

In his view, India and Ireland could counter England 'on the ground of spiritual power in which they excel'.² And in order to preserve a peaceful front, like Daniel O'Connell's retreat at Clontarf in 1843,³ Gandhi was prepared to drink 'the bitterest cup of humiliation' by bringing NCO to an abrupt end.⁴

Thus, so far as Gandhi was concerned, Chauri Chaura was a godsend as it was 'the last straw'.⁵ Gandhi's attitude toward the recrudescence of violence in his movement, as compared with Griffith's, was succinctly epitomized in his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru shortly after Chauri Chaura.

I assure you that if the thing had not been suspended we would have been leading not a non-violent struggle but essentially a violent struggle. It is undoubtedly true that non-violence is spreading like the scent of the otto of roses throughout the length and breadth of the land, but the foetid smell of violence is still powerful, and it would be unwise to ignore or underrate it. The cause will prosper by this retreat. The movement had unconsciously drifted from the right path. We have come back to our moorings, and we can again go straight ahead.⁶

With most of the able NCO leaders in jail and the country at large in despondency, Gandhi knew that the movement was rapidly

6. ibid.
losing its momentum. The Muslims too lost their confidence in Gandhi's leadership, and resolved to carry on their campaign without Hindu support. But later when the Turkish government started to abolish the office of the Caliph, the whole Khilafat issue, which Gandhi had so successfully exploited to forge a Hindu-Muslim alliance, lost most of its significance. It was at this moment that the Government of India decided to arrest Gandhi. His arrest was well timed as the public, either following Gandhi's advice or feeling dejected, remained calm and peaceful.

During his trial for preaching disaffection to the government, Gandhi explained that the Rowlatt Act, the Punjab atrocities, the betrayal of the Indian Muslims, and the economic exploitation of India, had precipitated his conversion from a staunch loyalist to an intractable rebel. But he did not defend himself and pleaded for the highest penalty. As a result, he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment on 18 March 1922.

Gandhi's first nation-wide offensive against the raj thus ended with his own imprisonment, his colleagues in disarray, and the British still firmly in control of India. To the opponents of Gandhi, particularly the Moderates in the three Presidencies, events

1. The Mussalman (Calcutta), 24 July, 1922.
between 1919 and 1922 confirmed their doubts about the masses 'emulating Gandhiji's example in preserving complete non-violence, much less in adhering to truth in all circumstances'.

To other Western-educated elite who deliberately cut themselves off from the Moderates or Besantites and followed Gandhi, either from political calculations such as C.R. Das, N.C. Kelkar, Lajpat Rai, and Motilal Nehru, or from ideological conviction like Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi's 'bungling' seemed to testify the wisdom of Tilak's remark to the Mahatma that 'Politics is a game of worldly people and not of sadhus (Hindu holy men)'.

With NCO in virtual collapse, these leaders once again had to decide where and how they stood. Some of them, notably C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, reverted to the policy of Irish obstructionism and participated in the second election for the legislative councils in 1923 under a new party label -- the Swarajists.

The Khilafatists, whose support contributed much to the success of NCO, especially in Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, and the United Provinces, were also alienated by Gandhi's blundering. Their leaders saw the alliance with Gandhi merely as a marriage of convenience and not a submission. Like most of the nationalists in the Presidencies, they adhered to Gandhi as long as he commanded the

1. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 286.
4. Quoted in Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 126. See also The Udaya (Amraoti), 21 February 1922. Statesman (Calcutta), 8 February 1922.
support of the majority of Hindus and provided that non-violence was the only viable means to put pressure on the government.1 But when Gandhi ceased to be their best political bet, the alliance collapsed and the Hindu-Muslim antagonism, submerged by the Khilafat movement, reappeared. It was possible, wrote Jawaharlal Nehru, 'that this sudden bottling up of a great movement' had 'aggravated the communal trouble' in later years.2

But the NCO campaign was far from a complete fiasco. To say the least, Indian political aspirations had advanced considerably from representation in the legislature to the attainment of swaraj. In pursuance of this goal, many nationalists were even prepared to sever their connection with Britain if necessary.

The change in the political mood was matched by the change in the political machinery of the Congress. When Gandhi captured the Congress in 1920, he had reorganized its administrative framework so as to make it a 'democratic and a mass organization'.3 Muslims, Sikhs, peasants, workers, and other social groupings were encouraged to join the Congress which 'began to assume the look of a vast agrarian organization with a strong sprinkling of the middle classes'.4 Provincial Congress Committees were revitalized and new ones duly set up on a linguistic basis in order to attract new participants. This structural reorganization survived Gandhi's imprisonment and government repression. Its organizational links

4. ibid., p. 364.
were later used to direct and co-ordinate activities between the centre and the periphery and enhanced the Congress as a disciplined body with mass support in the nationalist struggle.¹

But Gandhi's greatest contribution was the dissemination of the nationalist message to the areas which had been barely stirred by previous agitation or had been active but were not on a large scale.² His power bases, it should be noted, were not confined to the metropolitan areas of the three Presidencies such as Calcutta or Bombay city, but spread out to the outlying places which previously had a relatively low level of political activity before his rise to prominence — areas such as Assam, Gujarat, Bihar, Andhra, United Provinces, and Hindi-speaking Central Provinces.³ In spreading the Congress message throughout the subcontinent, however unevenly, Gandhi had also succeeded in galvanizing new social groups to support the nationalist movement. These newcomers included a hard core of power brokers at the local level — men who received either English or vernacular education, lawyers, peasant proprietors, middlemen, village priests or officials, prosperous cultivators, money lenders and the like.⁴ Gandhi's appeal to this stratum of society was partly ideological, as with the Marwaris of Calcutta and Bihar, and partly

political, as in the case of the Patidars\(^1\) of Gujarat.\(^2\) For the first time, these rare participants in Congress politics found in Gandhi a leader who was concerned with their type of politics, their aspirations, and their interests, and were promised an all-India political future which encompassed their interests alongside with those of the old guard.\(^3\)

Beneath this wide middle sector of 'political subcontractors' were the masses of urban and rural India — mostly illiterate, religious and poor. Gandhi's genius consisted in his recognition that in an India where traditional values, norms and religions were vital elements in the daily life of the people, a skilful exploitation of their socio-economic-religious sentiments such as the Khilafat and NCO movements would strike some resounding chords among the lowly folk. To the poor people, Tilak, though 'homely and familiar in manner', was a Brahmin, a Hindu aristocrat, who appealed to them 'as a superior to his dependents, not as an equal and one of themselves'. In a word, he was aloof and remote.\(^4\) Gandhi, on the contrary, was a vaishya,\(^5\) a low-caste Hindu. By stressing the virtue of hand-spinning, the wearing of khadi, the speaking of local dialects whenever and whichever he could, he was able to identify himself and the whole nationalist movement with the people. 'At a critical juncture at the cottage door of the destitute millions',

1. Patidar: A closely knitted social and commercial group clustering in Anand, Borsad and Nadiad, extremely prosperous due to commercial and agricultural successes.
3. ibid.
5. Vaishya — Generalised term for the third caste in Hindu society.
Tagore wrote of Gandhi, 'clad as one of themselves he stood'.

Unlike the rhetoric of most Congressmen, Gandhi's political vocabulary was simple and straightforward. It could invoke the public response which had eluded the nationalists of past generations. To many of the uneducated, the charismatic Mahatma was an *Avatāra* (incarnation of God) and they flocked to the NCO camp with 'a mixture of religious adulation and millennial anticipation.' Though Gandhi disliked such God-like adoration, his mystique was firmly established and had undoubtedly become the mainspring of his popular support. Furthermore, to these ordinary people, the Moderates' politics of collaboration and the Extremists' politics of violence had a very limited appeal and a restricted area of application. But Gandhi's programme of NCO, which in its simplest form included the wearing of a white 'Gandhi Cap' and the wearing of hand-spun cloth, could be undertaken by anyone at all times and under all circumstances. It cut across class, caste and religious barriers and gave the participants a sense of direct involvement in shaping the nation's destiny.

To these teeming millions, the Congress had always been a concourse of the socially or economically dominant groups — high caste Hindus, Western-educated professionals, local dignitaries, and men with some commercial, industrial or landed background. Speaking

of his own political activities until 1919-1920, Jawaharlal Nehru in fact described the politics of the Congress leadership at the time.

My politics had been those of my class, the bourgeoisie. Indeed all vocal politics then (and to a great extent even now) were those of the middle classes, and Moderate and Extremist alike represented them and, in different keys, sought their betterment. The Moderate represented especially the handful of the upper middle class who had on the whole prospered under British rule and wanted no sudden changes which might endanger their present position and interests. They had close relations with the British Government and the big landlord class. The Extremist represented also the lower ranks of the middle class. The industrial workers, their number swollen up by the war, were only locally organized in some places and had little influence. The peasantry were a blind, poverty-stricken, suffering mass, resigned to their miserable fate and sat upon and exploited by all who came in contact with them—the Government, landlords, moneylenders, petty officials, police, lawyers, priests.1

Socially and politically conservative, the Congress bourgeoisie hardly idealized the Indian masses, or even realized their potential political strength.2 Civil riots in the eighteenth century, agrarian disorder in the Deccan in 1875, and the Santhal rebellion of 1855 had alerted the Indian intelligentsia to the danger of anarchy if the crowd was let loose.3 Subsequently, nobody ever seriously thought of mobilizing the urban poor or the rural peasantry into the nationalist movement.4 Reared in the spirit of British liberalism, the early Congressmen shared their mentors’ aversion to the masses and their opposition to drastic root-and-branch changes. In their opinion,

1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 54.
2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 27. Lajpat Rai, Young India, p. 155; Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 306. The neglect of the masses was bitterly criticized by C.R. Das in his presidential address to the Bengal Provincial Conference in 1917. See Statesman (Calcutta), 24 April 1917.
without adequate political education and sufficient means of mobilization, the galvanization of the masses would lead to mob violence rather than disciplined agitation. What they wanted was a gradual transition in which traditional India would be transformed into a modern, secular, democratic state with a responsible government of the British mould.\(^1\) Therefore, hitherto, the major concern of the Congress had been limited power-sharing, a greater say in the legislature, and greater access to the high positions in the prestigious Indian Civil Service, rather than initiating fundamental changes in the social and economic structure.\(^2\) Like Sinn Fein and the IRB, the Congress thought that social issues should be secondary to political ones.\(^3\) To diverge from the political path would only strain the limited resources of the Congress, create undesirable divisions within its own ranks, and weaken the nationalist movement. After all, any socio-economic reforms would be futile or irrelevant if Indians were not in a position to frame and implement the measures.

Likewise, despite its success among the middle classes, the Home Rule movement regrettably 'did not touch the masses'.\(^4\) It was only at the instigation of Gandhi that the Congress bourgeoisie began to seek an accommodation with the peasants and workers in order to obtain a mass basis for the nationalist movement.\(^5\) Although the workers and peasants had not yet developed a distinct class

1. Nanda, 'Socialism in India ...', p. 2.
consciousness, their participation in NCO nevertheless signalled their coming of age. At the beginning of 1922, for instance, newspapers in various places of India revealed that the 'spirit of non-co-operation has spread into the lower stratum of society' and 'the storm of unrest is blowing over the villages'. Even The Times of London observed:

Formerly the tenants crushed by requisitions of all kinds were in no condition to effectively express their protest, but in connection with the recent awakening of the masses they began to put up a fight for their rights.

No better assessment of Gandhi's contribution to nationalist politics during this period can be found than the following eyewitness account of NCO shortly after its suspension.

Gandhi has, I believe, done his work. He has made India self-conscious. He has given India a new sense of self-respect. His program has been characterized by many negative features .... It has never put forward even a suggestive outline of the government it would substitute for the one it would tear down .... But Gandhi has given a moral basis and a spiritual standing to India's revolution.

If Gandhi failed because NCO had not brought swaraj in a year, at least he succeeded in awakening and bringing to the nationalist movement the hitherto unrepresented groups from all over India. For the next twenty-five years, he remained the lodestar of Indian nationalism.

1. Tippera Guide (Comilla), 24 January 1922. See also Atma Sakti (Calcutta), 5 April 1922.
2. The Times (London), 6 March 1922.
1914-1922 constituted a watershed in Indian and Irish history. During this period, the Indian nationalist movement was revived with renewed vigour and unity and Indian political thought and action underwent a revolutionary transmutation which was exemplified by the ascendancy of the sagacious Mahatma Gandhi in 1919-1922. In Ireland, the reassertion of revolutionary republicanism had dwarfed liberal constitutionalism and, in alliance with Sinn Feinism after the Easter uprising in 1916, finally eliminated the Irish Parliamentary Party from the political scene in 1918 and brought an Irish Free State into existence in 1922.

This remarkable emergence of political radicalism in both countries was largely occasioned by the First World War, injudicious British actions and the internal dynamics of the nationalist movements themselves. The war itself had done untold damage to the authority and prestige of the British Empire and the doctrine of self-determination had provoked a vigorous assertion of Irish and Indian nationalism. In Ireland, from the militants' point of view, the war provided a golden opportunity to assert Ireland's separate nationhood by force of arms. Growing war weariness and the shelving of the Home Rule Act owing to the war further strengthened their determination to act. Although the insurrection failed, the Irish Parliamentary Party suffered a grievous blow as a result of Britain's mishandling of the rising which made martyrs out of rebels and transformed military failure into a moral triumph. Irish nationalism
was irretrievably roused by subsequent British repression, the failure of Home Rule negotiations and the threat of conscription. To many an Irishman in the post-rising period, the Nationalists' co-operation with the British regime was a contemptible policy of appeasement whereas the radicals' spirit of defiance truly reflected Ireland's unflinching devotion to complete separation from Britain. All these developments had drastically changed the psychological make-up of the Irish and strained their traditional loyalty to moderate constitutionalism.

In India, Britain's war with Turkey, rising Indian aspirations stimulated by the war, and the apparent bankruptcy of political moderatism threw the Muslims into the arms of the INC and greatly accelerated the growth of political radicalism. In order to buttress the position of the Moderates and secure Indian collaboration and contribution to the war effort, Britain was forced to concede constitutional reforms. But her belated political concessions did not suffice to stem the nationalist tide. The nationalist movement, under the leadership of Tilak and Mrs. Besant, had become better organized and more widespread. In fact, the Home Rule campaign practically signalled the exit of the Moderates from the Indian political scene and paved the way for the rise of Gandhi. In both countries, pre-war constitutional politics had gone. In their stead were Griffith's Sinn Feinism and Gandhi's satyagraha which, though different in many ways, both worked unconstitutionally.

In the post-war period, the socio-economic repercussions of the war, British repression and neglect of nationalist aspirations also
provoked radical responses from Indian and Irish nationalists. In Ireland, while the bellicosity of the Republicans had changed Sinn Fein's passive resistance into offensive aggression, British reprisals for IRA brutalities did further damage to Anglo-Irish relations and led to inevitable armed confrontation. 'Ireland became one huge field of conflict where both parties vied with each other in violence and destruction', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru. 'Behind one of the parties was the organized strength of an Empire, behind the other was the iron resolve of a handful of men'.

But soon it was clear that 'the more savage became their (British) methods of repression, the more determined the Irish people became to fight to the bitter end'. By the end of 1919, it was clear that the 'prospect of dying for Ireland haunts the dreams of thousands of youths ...', and Britain could 'neither terrify nor bribe Sinn Fein'.

In India, despite carping criticisms, dyarchy was accepted by Indian radicals after the war. Yet the repressive Rowlatt Bills, the Amritsar massacre and British reaction to it greatly offended Indians' national pride and weakened their faith in British justice. Gandhi, who had been a firm believer in the British spirit of fair play, wrote that the 'first shock' came with the Rowlatt Act, 'a law designed to rob the people of all freedom'.

The spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's perfidy in this respect further weakened her image among Indian Muslims. 'One

2. Breen, op. cit., p. 178.
3. The Times, 13 December 1919.
degrading measure upon another', Jinnah said, 'disappointment upon disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people to only one end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It has led Ireland to Sinn Feinism. May it lead India to freedom'.

But whereas political extremism took a violent turn in Ireland, it remained on a peaceful path in India. One of the reasons for this divergence was Gandhi's tremendous influence on the nationalist movement as compared to Griffith's limited authority over the militant Republicans in the post-war era. Gandhi, unlike Griffith, launched NCO largely on his own terms and 'when principle was concerned ..., did not allow what he considered to be the Truth, even an iota of it, to be subordinated to the possibility of a gain, however high it may be in the field of political achievement'.

Griffith, on the other hand, despite Sinn Fein's electoral victory in 1918, was unable to impose on the militants the people's mandate for a peaceful revolution. Moreover, despite his dislike of physical force, he allowed himself to be carried along when violence was yielding the desirable result. Perhaps Griffith, unlike Gandhi, was more concerned with ends than means. Hence, he was more prepared to sacrifice his principles for a speedy attainment of Irish freedom.

Justifying the militants' resort to arms, Béaslaf said that 'all members of the Headquarters Staff share the responsibility, and the

1. Englishman (Calcutta), 8 September 1920.
3. Based on an interview with Professor Liam O'Brain who was an associate and a prison mate of Griffith. V.E. Glandon claims that Griffith rejected physical force not on moral principles, but on practical grounds, i.e. England was militarily too powerful to be subdued by the minute Irish radical contingent, and the Hungarian Policy was the best alternative to turn to. Glandon, op. cit., p. 129.
Ministry and Members of Dail Eireann give it their tacit approval.\(^1\)

From the standpoint of organization and co-ordination, the Irish revolutionary bodies, notably the IRB, had a relatively longer tradition of organized political violence than their Indian counterparts. Irish revolutionary leaders also had a stronger link with the Irish masses than the Indians with theirs. This link with the Irish masses, which infused much success and vigour into the land agitation of the 1880s, was strengthened by the war which prompted a large number of workers, intellectuals, school teachers, shopkeepers, rural labourers and farmers to join the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers and provided the Labour-Republican coalition with a mass base. The Easter rising and its aftermath further solidified the bond among the radicals under the reorganized Sinn Fein and united Irish public opinion solidly behind the coalition. During the Anglo-Irish war, the call for national resistance against British coercion once again brought the IRB, Labour, Sinn Fein, and with them their supporters to an anti-imperialist-nationalist alliance.

By comparison, Indian terrorist groups, such as those in Bengal and the Punjab, although attracted by the Irish example,\(^2\) were much weaker and more isolated than the Irish revolutionary organizations. Regional differences and language barriers often hindered cooperation even at the provincial, let alone the national level. Furthermore, unlike the Irish militants who were more and more radicalized, Indian Extremists became increasingly moderate and

cautious after their release from imprisonment and return from deportation. Tilak, B.C. Pal and Lajpat Rai, who had previously emphasized the ideal of complete independence outside the Empire, were now reconciled to the concept of colonial self-government within the Empire or an Imperial Federation. Moreover, most returned Indian revolutionaries, chiefly Punjabis sent by the Ghadr Party from the United States, met with stern repression by the government of the Punjab and were unable to strengthen the underground organizations as Tom Clarke and Bulmer Hobson did in Ireland. In fact, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, once complained bitterly of the Government of India's 'drifting into what is known as Birrellism in Ireland', that was -- 'truckling to the extremists, encouraging the idea that we are going to hand over the administration to them'. Subsequently, Sir Michael took matters into his own hands and made the Punjab one of the most repressive provinces in British India.

A final reason for the restraint of the Indian nationalist movement was that it lacked a well-organized mass base. The Home Rule movement, despite its popularity, remained essentially a middle-class campaign. Although the workers and peasants were drawn to the nationalist movement under the leadership of Gandhi, the Indian elite's distrust of agrarian and working-class radicalism had nevertheless checked the growth of nascent radical socialism. It did not help that the voice of industrial labour was feeble and that Indian peasants had not yet evolved a class consciousness or

2. Quoted in Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, p. 447.
solidarity like their Irish brethren.¹ The message of socialism was still vague to many of its new converts who, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Lajpat Rai, largely supported Gandhi's non-violent movement.² In his "Message to the Punjabees [sic]" on 15 August 1919, Lajpat Rai wrote:

We are neither fit nor ripe for a militant revolutionary struggle. We want a revolution but not force or violence. Organize the middle class, the peasants and the workers. Imbibe his (Gandhi's) spirit and follow his lead.

Gandhi's social philosophy emphasizing social reconciliation and class harmony, together with India's caste system stressing caste obligations, propagating the theory of reincarnation and allowing collective upward social mobility through sanskritization,⁴ also exerted a quietist pressure upon the destitute so that they accepted social inequality and misery and adopted a generally submissive and docile attitude in politics.⁵

However, despite the contrasts between the two movements, there was considerable interaction between them. Irish radicals were keen to keep themselves informed of what was going on in India. British repression and the growth of political radicalism in India provided valuable propaganda material for the Irish nationalist press to use.

4. Sanskritization - A process of collective upward social mobility that required strict discipline and adherence to norms set by the upper castes.
against the British authorities. Parallels were often drawn between British coercive measures during and after the war such as the Defence of the Realm Act, Defence of India Act and the Rowlatt Act which enabled the British authorities to muzzle Indian and Irish nationalist agitation. Amritsar was cited frequently by Griffith to distract public attention from IRA killings. Sometimes it was also quoted to warn against the idea of pure non-violence as it demonstrated the probable British response to a peaceful movement. Incidents of British repression in Ireland were often referred to as Irish Amritsars.\(^1\) Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington,\(^2\) wife of the Irish pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington,\(^3\) also made ingenious analogies between India and Ireland in their struggle against British militarism.\(^4\)

During the Anglo-Irish war, Irish guerrilla leaders frankly hoped for an Indian rebellion so as to relieve Ireland of the full weight of British military repression.\(^5\) But Indian unrest during 1919-1922 was still too weak to divert British political attention, let alone her military engagement, away from Ireland. Moreover, Gandhi had categorically rejected the IRB's thesis that 'England's difficulty is Ireland's (and likewise India's) opportunity'.\(^6\) His insistence on non-violence naturally earned him the antagonism of Irish revolutionaries. References to him and his pseudo-religious

2. Sheehy-Skeffington, H.; 1877-1946; suffragette; supported Sinn Fein and Irish independence; anti-Treaty.
3. supra., p. 45 & n. 4.
4. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
5. ibid., p. 85.
satyagraha in the Irish revolutionary press were cool and sometimes even sarcastic. When Gandhi suspended his 1919 satyagraha the Irish revolutionary press was unsympathetic. It was only after Gandhi had adopted a more anti-British stance after the inauguration of NCO in August 1920 that the Irish nationalist press opinion on the Mahatma became more favourable.¹

When the Anglo-Irish Treaty was ratified by Dail Eireann, militant anti-Treatyites such as Dan Breen, while accusing the pro-Treatyites of abandoning India, seriously considered migrating to India 'to help those who were fighting the same battle as we had been fighting in Ireland'.² But their offer was refused by Indian leaders who argued that Indians would not welcome any Irish revolutionaries who deserted their own country.³ In despair, the militants went to the United States.

Although the Indians rejected Irish assistance on this occasion, they always regarded the Irish nationalist movement with considerable deference because of its more advanced character. For years, Indian nationalists were attracted by Ireland's 'invincible courage and spirit of sacrifice in the struggle for national freedom'.⁴ To many of them, Irish history was 'a perennial source of inspiration' and 'a running lesson in tactics and strategy'.⁵ Speaking of the Irish influence, N.C. Chaudhuri wrote in his autobiography:

3. ibid., p. 244.
During the war we Indians were looking forward to a great advance in self-government at its end. In those days we called our political demand and goal Home Rule... There was no doubt that this much-aired resolve was prompted by a cue taken subconsciously from Irish history.

Shankarlal Banker, who was the publisher of Young India and was convicted with Gandhi in 1922, was himself an admirer of the Irish Sinn Fein movement in his student days in England and thought of starting such a movement in India. Even a Muslim conservative such as the Aga Khan attested that 'in India there were those who watched the working out of Ireland's destiny and were fully cognizant of the lessons it taught, the message it signalled across the world'.

On the tactical level, the Irish precedent of combining different modes of political pressure on the British was followed closely by the Indian radicals after Mrs. Besant decided to model her Home Rule movement on the Irish precedent. Nationalist politics, then relatively weak and inert under the direction of the Moderates, were revitalized by the complementary agitation of the two Home Rule Leagues. Pressure on the authorities mounted tremendously between 1916 and 1917 when the Extremists and Moderates closed their ranks and the Muslims agreed to co-operate with the Hindus in Lucknow in 1916. Although the Moderates broke away from this tri-partite alliance in 1918, the Hindu-Muslim coalition was strong enough to lift Indian politics to a new height of political radicalism which culminated in the adoption of passive resistance and the demand for

immediate swaraj.

Another Irish tactic followed by Indian radicals was their effort to solicit American support for their cause and encourage Indo-Irish contact during and especially after the war. When the INC failed to secure a hearing at the Paris Peace Conference, Tilak urged his compatriots to launch a publicity campaign in the United States, hoping to obtain American sympathy for India's emancipation. Qualified Indians, he told his Home Rule colleagues in India, should approach prominent American statesmen and enlist their support for India as the Irish nationalists did for Ireland.\(^1\) Given the immense influence of the Irish-Americans, whom Jawaharlal Nehru reckoned had 'carried a bit of Ireland in their hearts',\(^2\) the Home Rule League's American campaign in 1919 was understandably not as successful as de Valera's American tour in June 1919 and December 1920.\(^3\) But Lajpat Rai, who had escaped to the United States from his Indian internment, had successfully persuaded some prominent American statesmen to help promote India's freedom movement.\(^4\) One of them was D.F. Malone,\(^5\) a Democrat and 'a man of Irish origin'.\(^6\) In his statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on 29 August 1919, Malone urged that the Covenant of the League of Nations be so amended as to make it obligatory on every signatory to the Covenant and to the

3. This was quite obvious during the Senate hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations in which the Irish issue was raised several times as compared to India's once. United States Senate Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sixty-sixth Congress. First session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919, pp. 757-879.
5. Malone, D.F.; 1882-1950; President Wilson's aide in 1912-1913; third assistant Secretary of State, 1913; anti-Tammany Democrat.
6. Senate Hearings, p. 750.
Treaty of Versailles to provide democratic institutions for the peoples of India, and other dependencies of the British Empire such as Ireland and Egypt.\(^1\) Malone's Irish compatriots in the United States also showed their fraternity with their Indian brethren. In a letter to Tilak in autumn 1919, Lajpat Rai reported that the Indian question had been raised at an Irish revolutionary meeting held in New York on 8 May, and a leaflet entitled "Rebellion in India" was written by one of the speakers present at the meeting.\(^2\)

In the post-war period, personal contacts between Indian and Irish nationalists were arranged and often took place in the United States where they could confer freely without British harassment. Lajpat Rai was cordially welcomed at the Philadelphia Irish-American Convention in February 1919 where he seconded the resolution in favour of Irish self-determination.\(^3\) During his American tour, de Valera had also spoken on Indian affairs and the Indian Ghadr Party had maintained contact with him through correspondence. Sean T. O'Kelly and George Gavan Duffy,\(^4\) the envoys of Dail Eireann to the United States, had also tried to form an alliance of the oppressed nationalities within the British Empire, including Ireland, India, Egypt and South Africa.\(^5\)

The Irish example also affected the goals of the Indian nationalist movement. During the war, Indian Home Rule radicals

1. Senate Hearings, p. 750.
3. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 82 & 85.
aspired to colonial self-government and did not foresee setting up a republic or advocate complete separation from Britain. However, when Dail Eireann was set up in Ireland and the Indian radicals became more politically advanced, the goal of the Irish nationalist movement became increasingly relevant and instructive to Indian nationalists. Talk of complete independence was frequently heard among the Muslim radicals and the Sinn Fein position was generally supported by Tilak's papers Kesari and Mahratta.\(^1\) Although Gandhi was 'delightfully vague' on the subject of independence,\(^2\) under strong Hindu and Muslim pressure\(^3\) he nevertheless espoused the hazy goal of swaraj either inside or outside the British Empire at the Nagpur Congress of 1920.\(^4\) The constitutionalist M.A. Jinnah certainly dreaded the possibility of breaking the constitutional link with Britain and feared British repression in India would incite violence of the Sinn Fein type.\(^5\) But his was a lone voice in the wilderness.

During the treaty negotiations, the Indian press was particularly impressed by de Valera's uncompromising attitude towards complete independence and took it as a vital precedent for India. The conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921 was hailed by many Indian newspapers as a vital triumph for world freedom and encouraged India's demand for the calling of a round table conference to solve the Indian question.\(^6\) The prospect of transforming the British Empire into a liberalized Commonwealth,

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1. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 5.
5. Davis, loc. cit., p. 5.

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consisting not only of colonies but also of independent nations such as India and Ireland also strengthened Gandhi's conviction that India could attain freedom without breaking her connection with Britain. Shortly after the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, he wrote, 'Let us see clearly what swaraj together with the British connection means. It means undoubtedly India's ability to declare her independence, if she wishes. Swaraj, therefore, will not be a free gift of the British Parliament. It will be a declaration of India's full self-expression. That it will be expressed through an act of Parliament is true. But it will be merely a courteous ratification of the declared wish of the people of India .... The ratification in our case will be a treaty to which Britain will be a party. Such swaraj may not come this year, may not come within our generation. But I have contemplated nothing less'.

Swaraj, Gandhi wrote more explicitly later, meant 'full Dominion status'.

In a nutshell, to the Indian nationalists, Ireland's struggle for freedom was a source of reference and inspiration for emulating tactics and defining objectives in their fight against the British raj. Apart from watching the development of the Irish movement with anxiety and concern, Indian nationalists were open to direct Irish political proselytization through propaganda and sometimes personal contacts. References to Irish examples or precedents were frequently made and many radicals tried to adopt Irish tactics in India especially after 1919. However, Irish nationalists became mentors of

2. CW, vol. 22, pp. 140-141.
their Indian counterparts more through demonstration than by teaching. It was through the 'demonstration effect' of the Irish examples and the 'emulative urge' of Indian nationalists that the lessons of the Irish agitation and rebellion were conveyed to and learned by the latter. Likewise, British repression in Ireland was adroitly exploited by the Indians for immediate propagandist effect, either to encourage the struggle at home or to discredit the British authorities. Political parallels often enabled Indian statesmen to revise their strategy and reframe their goals. To many Indian nationalists, Ireland in the West paralleled India in the East. Both were subject peoples grinding under the British yoke and both were probable allies in an anti-imperialist coalition. If Ireland gained her freedom, so should India. Thus, if John Bull (England) was unable to keep even his 'Other Island', still less could he hold the Indian subcontinent. In 1922, Indian nationalists looked on the Irish lesson and drew their own conclusions.

But, despite the extent of Irish influence, the course of the Indian nationalist movement was ultimately determined by its internal dynamics. This was reflected in the way in which Indian leaders welcomed Irish influence only if it suited their purposes. Gandhi, who disliked violence, vehemently preached against it and warned Indians against following the Irish example. 'Equality attained by means of physical force is of the lower kind', he said in July 1920, 'it is the way of the beast'. The Mahatma's fear was no mere hyperbole. Even after the collapse of civil disobedience in 1922,

3. CW, vol. 18, p. 57.
the influence of Irish revolutionary violence was still prevalent among the young. J.T. Gwynn,\(^1\) correspondent of Manchester Guardian in India, reported at Agra in October 1922:

> Whenever I ask the younger men here what they make of the Irish situation, they all draw the moral that force is the right way to get concessions out of England. Very few of them are at all impressed by the present anarchy in Ireland, or show any anxiety about the result of letting anarchy loose in India. The general attitude was put to me concisely the other day by a critic: "They have been taught that out of chaos comes order. 'Put the whole damn thing in the melting-pot', they say. 'Something better than the present order is sure to come out of it in a few years, more or less'."

I don't think much of this reading of history, but it is undoubtedly all the fashion here.\(^2\)

That Gandhi was able to counter the ebullience of his youthful followers was testimony to the non-violent character of the Indian nationalist movement.

On the tactics of passive resistance, there were also notable differences between Indian and Irish radicals. During the summer of 1920, it was suggested that Indian radicals should follow the Sinn Fein example of vacating the elected seats in the reformed legislative councils. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of those who favoured this type of boycott, but Gandhi was adamantly against it.\(^3\) Neither

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3. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', pp. 8-9.
was Tilak's advocacy of Irish obstructionism approved by Gandhi.\(^1\)

'The disciplined obstruction of the Irish members', Gandhi argued, 'made practically no impression upon the House of Commons. The Irishmen have not got the Home Rule they wanted'. Irish obstructionism was not 'active and aggressive non-co-operation'. It was only a partial boycott whereas NCO was total. 'A minister who refuses to serve is better than one who serves under protest'.\(^2\) Obstruction could only bring 'small favours but nothing substantial'. 'Ireland gained absolutely nothing through the policy of harassment and obstruction', he continued. 'In despair, it has now taken to the method of violence'. In a word, 'obstruction leads nowhere'. Seats in the legislature or places in the administrative machinery were 'mere baits'. They were 'opium pills for keeping us slumbering'.\(^3\)

The Mahatma's caution in following the Irish precedent was further reflected in his hesitation of making a 'New Departure'\(^4\) in the Indian nationalist movement. In September 1920, Motilal Ghose,\(^5\) editor of the Calcutta Amrita Bazar Patrika had suggested that Gandhi

1. Kesari, 20 July, 17 August 1920. Maharratta, 29 August 1920. Tilak was in favour of entering the councils and of following the policy of 'Responsive Co-operation'. By this he meant co-operation on the condition that the Bureaucracy yielded to the demands of the elected representatives of the people on matters of principle. If the Bureaucracy did not, there should be no co-operation but constitutional obstruction.' Quoted in All About Tilak, p. cxii. Leader of Allahabad once called Tilak 'the Parnell of Indian politics'. See All About Tilak, pp. 163-4.
2. CW, vol. 18, p. 42.
3. ibid., pp. 55-56.
4. New Departure — A term in modern Irish history referring to the policy proposed by John Devoy in 1878 for alliance between revolutionaries and constitutional nationalists in land and Home Rule agitation. supra., p. 5
should emulate Parnell by leading a nationalist-cum-land agitation. The Irish leaders, said Ghose, 'failed to rouse the Irish masses till Parnell raised the cry of 'land' which affected every Irishman. The Irish understood it because it was a common grievance. And the Land League was the result which formed the nucleus for Irish nationality'. In reply, Gandhi said that he 'would think over the matter'.

In fact, Gandhi's reluctance to follow in Parnell's footsteps by harnessing rural agitation to his political campaign clearly reflected the major difference between the Irish and Indian radicals. Whereas the Sinn Feiners and Republicans alike welcomed the entry of the workers and peasants to the nationalist movement and exploited their revolutionary zeal to strengthen the demand for independence, Indian leaders on the whole distrusted the peasant and working-class movements in India. Although Gandhi rightly perceived the political potential of the teeming masses, caution and controlled politicization were still his main concerns. The Indian leaders' fear of the disruption of the social order as a result of revolutionary violence further weakened the Irish appeal. Thus, although the Irish example was a perennial source of reference and inspiration, it did not necessarily become a blueprint for action.

1. CW, vol. 18, p. 258.
Glossary

Amil Literally 'revenue collector'; the outstanding caste of the Hindu minority of Sind; they have traditions of scholarship.

Amir Literally 'lord'; used honorifically for 'nobleman' in general, and officials of high rank.

Arya Samajist Member of a social reform body known as Arya Samaj which was founded in 1875 in the Punjab. The Arya Samaj opposed caste restrictions and was aggressively proselytising, especially vis-à-vis the Muslims.

Avtara Incarnation of God.

Bhadralok 'The respectable people' in Bengal, generally drawn from the three upper castes of Hindus.

Bhatia (Bhatiya) A trading caste found chiefly in Bombay and Sind.

Brahmin (Brahman) The highest, or priestly, caste among the Hindus.

Charkha Spinning wheel.

Chitpavan Brahmin Caste of Maharashtrian Brahmans, traditionally dominant in Maharashtra since the rise of the Peshwa from among them.

Clan na Gael Family of the Gaels.

Dail Eireann (Dail) Irish National Assembly.

Fatwa A formal statement of authoritative opinion on a point of Shari'ah (Holy Law of Islam) by a jurisconsult known as a mufti.

Ghadr Mutiny.

Gujar A great agricultural and pastoral caste in north and northwestern India; some have converted to Islam.

Gujarati Inhabitant of Gujarat, mostly traders and agriculturalists.

Guru Hindu religious teacher or spiritual guide.

Hartal Suspension of work or business as a mark of indignation, protest or mourning.

Hijrat Wholesale migration, usually undertaken by Muslims suffering from religious persecution in home country.

Hind Swaraj Indian Home Rule.

Imam A leader of the Islamic community. Among the Shi'as, the descendants of Ali.
Ismaili A branch of Shi'a Muslims. (The Shi'as were the principal minority religious group of Muslims.)

Jihad A holy war against unbelievers.

Khadi (Khaddar) Cloth hand-woven from home-spun thread.

Khalifa (Khalifah) Caliph. Title adopted by the rulers of the Islamic community indicating that, as successors of Muhammad, they were both spiritual and temporal leaders.

Khilafat Caliphate. 'Sovereignty', the office of Khalifa.

Khilafatist Indian who joined the Khilafat movement in India during 1919-1924 to preserve the power and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under Muhammadan rule and the continuance of the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of the Islamic world.

Kirtan Religious song or ballad.

Kisan Peasant, cultivator.

Mahatma 'Great Soul': Hindu title of great respect.

Maratha A warlike community of western India. The word in its wider aspect is used to indicate a number of casts from Brahmins downwards.

Marwari A native of Marwar (Rajasthan); settled widely in other parts of India, usually following business of banker, broker, merchant; mostly of Jain religion.

Maulana Title of respect given to a learned Muslim.

Mofussil (Mufassal) Colloquially used for country districts as opposed to the principal town.

Mufti See fatwa.

Nawab Muslim title of high rank.

Panchayat Panch, 'five'; a council of five or more persons from a caste, village or other body assembled to decide on matters affecting that body.

Parsi Zoroastrians from Persia settled chiefly in Bombay city and Gujarat; distinguished as merchants and industrialists.

Patidar A close-knit social and commercial group, clustering in Anand, Borsad and Nadiad, extremely prosperous owing to commercial and agricultural successes.

Peshwa The Chief Minister (Brahmin) of the Maratha rulers. The office became hereditary and in the eighteenth century the Peshwa became virtually the de facto rulers of Maharashtra.

Raj Government or rule.
Raja  Ruler, king, prince; a title also borne by landlords.

Ryot (Raiyat)  Peasant, cultivator.

Sadhu  Hindu ascetic.

Sahib  Hindu honorific applied to titles and names.

Satyagraha  'Truth-force' or 'Soul-force'; Gandhian passive resistance.

Satyagrahi  One who practiced satyagraha.

Sayyid (Said, Syed) A Chief. Also a name used by those who claim descent from Husain, the son of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima.

Sharif  Literally 'noble'; used to signify a descendant of the Prophet.

Sinn Fein  Ourselves Alone.

Swadeshi  Use of home-made goods.

Swami  Hindu holy man.

Swaraj  Self-rule, self-government.


Tamil Brahmin  Caste of Brahmins from the Tamil-speaking peoples of southern India; inhabited chiefly in the Madras Presidency, parts of Mysore, northern Ceylon, and present-day Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.

Taoiseach  Prime Minister.

Ulema (Ulama) Plural of alim, learned men, used particularly for those learned in Islamic studies or for the theologians who were guardians of Islamic custom.

Vaishya (Vaisya) Generalised term for the third caste in Hindu society.

Zamindar  Landholder, paying revenue direct to government.
India, 1857-1947

Ireland Before Partition

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