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SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

by

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This thesis is my own original work
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

PART ONE

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

| The Approach | 2 |
| 'Theories' of Regional Integration | 5 |
| The 'Region' of Southeast Asia | 11 |
| Salient Aspects of International Relations in Southeast Asia | 14 |

Chapter 2. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASA AND ASEAN

| The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) | 31 |
| The Character and Structure of ASA | 51 |
| The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | 57 |
| The Character and Structure of ASEAN | 71 |

PART TWO

Chapter 3. REGIONAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

| The First Sabah Crisis | 85 |
| The Second Sabah Crisis | 105 |
| ASA and the Sabah Dispute | 121 |
| ASEAN and the Sabah Dispute | 127 |
| ASA, ASEAN, and Regional Peace and Conflict | 142 |

Chapter 4. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ETHNO-NATIONALISM

| Background | 156 |
| The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia | 158 |
| Ethnic Minorities in Burma | 168 |
| Ethnic Minorities in Thailand | 174 |
| Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines | 180 |
| Some Numerical and Territorial Considerations | 182 |
| Majority-Minority Differences in Level of Development | 186 |
| Minority Unity-Disunity | 190 |
| Ethnic Consciousness | 194 |
| Relations between Majorities and Minorities | 196 |
| The External Factor | 205 |
| Regional Integration and Minorities | 220 |

Chapter 5. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL THREATS

| The Notion of Threat | 232 |
| Threats and Foreign Policies in Southeast Asia | 238 |
| Burma | 239 |
Chapter 6. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY

Foreign Policy Establishments in Southeast Asia 306
Style of Diplomacy. Personalities and Personal Characteristics 311
Negotiations Southeast Asian Style 318
Summitry 324
Methods of Diplomacy 331
The Institutions of ASEAN 339
Regional Integration and Regional Diplomacy 343

Chapter 7. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL FORCES

The United States and Regional Cooperation 349
The Soviet Union and Regional Cooperation 353
China and Regional Cooperation 356
Japan and Regional Cooperation 359
The EEC and Regional Cooperation 361
Extra-Regional Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation 364

PART THREE

Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS. PROCESSES OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Cooperative and Integrative Processes and Theories of Regional Integration 385

BIBLIOGRAPHY 405
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ABSTRACT

Southeast Asia has historically been an area of much turmoil and perhaps more so during the last three decades than any other region. Certainly the conflicts that have occurred have tended to be of a more spectacular kind than those elsewhere, and the spectacular and contemporary usually leave a great imprint on people's mind. But while other regions have their conflicts, simultaneous processes of cooperation and integration at various levels have taken place. It is in this context sufficient to mention developments in Western Europe, Latin America, and East Africa. As a result of a combination of factors such as traditional rivalries, internal instability, external intervention and so on, the countries of Southeast Asia have been slower in developing the cooperative side of their relations than other parts of the world. The latter have experienced a development towards what Karl Deutsch and others have called a 'sense of community', that is, 'a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this one point; that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change". By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures without resort to large scale physical force.'

Whatever else Southeast Asia may be said to be, the region does not constitute a security community in the sense referred to by Deutsch. Nor have any two or more countries within the region reached such a level in their relations.

What then is the situation in Southeast Asia? Is there a trend towards increased cooperation, a greater sense of community and
integration? What are the most significant factors urging such processes along? What are on the other hand the factors hampering such developments?

The answer to these and similar questions may for those familiar with experiences in Western Europe in particular seem rather straightforward. Once the conditions which existed and exist in Western Europe and elsewhere, for that matter, obtain in Southeast Asia, the region is firmly set on the path to community and integration. But apart from the fact that these conditions may never obtain in Southeast Asia, those that do exist today would seem to be the very negation of those assisting the integration process in Europe. Conditions such as advanced economies, near to similar levels of industrialization, pluralism, and democratic political systems are not on the whole characteristics of Southeast Asian societies. Must one, then, conclude that developments akin to those taking place in other regions cannot eventuate in Southeast Asia?

In order to throw some light on this question this study will examine some of the conditions and processes in Southeast Asia favourable and unfavourable to integration and community formation, and it will seek to relate the findings to the already existing body of knowledge about regional integration. Such an analysis has interest both in terms of the light it may throw on regional processes in Southeast Asia, and the contribution it may make to knowledge about regional integration in general either by confirming, modifying, or dis-confirming existing hypotheses, or by generating the formulation of new ones.
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THE APPROACH

In order to make the purpose of this study quite clear it is necessary to start with a conceptual clarification. As Ernst Haas has
argued, there is a need to distinguish between the study of regional integration on the one hand and the study of phenomena such as regionalism, regional cooperation, regional organization, regional systems, and so on on the other. Regional cooperation may be studied in isolation from the concerns that direct the student of regional integration and the same may be said about regionalism, regional systems, and regional organization. But they may also be studied with a view to the particular problems that preoccupy the student of regional integration and in this capacity they may yield 'valuable data or a relevant variable ...' by providing material 'on important activities of actors or on their beliefs'. Regional organizations, for example, 'through which integrative/disintegrative activity is carried on are properly considered intervening variables which may help explain our real concern, the attainment of the possible later conditions in which the region may find itself'.

In Haas' words the 'study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves'. The states of Southeast Asia have not surrendered any of their powers and authority to any regional or other supra-national body. In relation to the distinctions and the definition of regional integration given above this

study, therefore, is essentially an examination of some of the processes involved in regional cooperation and organization in Southeast Asia and their relationship to an eventual integration/disintegration process. In other words, to what extent can cooperative and organizational processes among the countries of Southeast Asia be said to be contributing to the eventual loss of attributes associated with their sovereign status? Are the countries mostly involved in these processes any nearer such a surrender of authority and power than they were, say, fifteen years ago, in the early 1960's?

There are essentially two routes by which to approach this inquiry. One can start with specific generalisations and hypotheses taken from the body of already accumulated knowledge about integration in general and then proceed to test them within the context of Southeast Asia. The alternative route is, of course, to do it the other way around, that is, to analyse the conditions and processes existing in Southeast Asia and then relate the findings to relevant elements of the wider body of theoretical knowledge.

When in this study the latter approach is chosen it is for one important reason; little or nothing of the evidence on which present theories of regional integration are built is based on studies of Southeast Asia. Whatever the reasons for this state of affairs - and one can think of many - the fact remains that in the overwhelming number of cases the focus has been on Europe, Latin-America, and Africa. It seems therefore advisable to retain an initial but open-minded skepticism in regard to the relevance of the theories to the conditions prevailing in Southeast Asia.

In the 1970 summary by Haas, *ibid.*, of findings related to regional integration there is hardly any mention of evidence from Southeast Asia. This is not due to any accident on the part of Haas but reflects both the actual state of affairs within the region itself as well as the scant attention paid to this aspect of regional affairs by scholars.
Asia. Moreover, the empirical generalizations put forward until now deal with processes and conditions the outcome of which are associated with levels of integration not reached in any parts of Southeast Asia. For this reason they may indeed be considered 'ideal' type outcomes as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, and there is no a priori reason to believe that they will ever be attained within the region. Furthermore, to rely on these outcomes as the starting point may lead to acts of oversight not only in regard to possible other outcomes but as well to the rejection or neglect of factors and variables unique to the region. Finally, to argue why levels of integration achieved elsewhere have not been reached in Southeast Asia, which would be the case if the first approach was adopted, would necessarily involve a considerable amount of speculation concerning possible intervening factors about which one can have at best only well informed guesses. Thus to estimate the extent to which such ideal (in the Southeast Asian context) outcomes may be reached in the future involves extrapolations from the past and the present which can neither be used to confirm nor disconfirm existing hypotheses.

'THEORIES' OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

There are essentially three modes of explanation which compete for the attention of the student of regional integration. These are the federalist, the communications, and the neo-functionalist which each in its own way purports to explain the formation and the maintenance of supranational communities. If by theory is meant 'a set of hypotheses structured by the relation of implication or deducibility', none of

7. For an explanation of this term, see ibid., p. 614.
these modes of explanation is a theory because 'they do not now provide
an explanation of a recurring series of events made up of dimensions
of activity causally linked to one another'. This uncertainty about
the relationship between the variables or factors involved has prompted
the integration theorists to talk about 'pretheories' as the more proper
term to attach to the most developed modes of explanation.

The federalists approach the study of political communities in
a number of different ways which makes it difficult to argue that there
is one particular federalist approach. The outstanding example of the
institutional approach, Wheare, based his study on the four governmental
systems - the United States, the Swiss, the Canadian, and the Australian, -
which were then regarded as federal. He isolated the common features
of these systems on the basis of which he constructed a kind of model
'which led observers to describe [these systems] as federations. These
features were defined in terms of constitutional law and then in terms of
political relationships which had developed on the basis of the constitu-
tional provisions'. The heavy reliance of this approach on legal
and institutional aspects coupled with its limited usefulness in relation
to investigations of political systems other than the four on which it
was based, lost it favour with many students of federalism. Partly as a
reaction against this mode of analysis some researchers, in particular
Livingston, employed an approach essentially sociological in character.
It argued that federalism was a reflection of social diversity rather than

10. Ibid.
constitutional dynamics. Since all countries are characterized by more or less social diversity, they all display a tendency towards federalism. Doubts were raised about the utility of this approach too, mainly on the grounds that generalizations about the members of a category whose membership is undefined, cannot be made, and that through the inclusion of a wide variety of social and political phenomena, nothing very precise can be said about federalism as a phenomenon. In other words, there is a tendency to consider everything federalism.

A third approach argues that federal constitutions are the result of political bargains which take place in historically unique situations. Two conditions have nevertheless always been present, namely the existence of politicians who wish to expand the area of territorial control either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression, and a willingness of politicians to surrender part of their independence, again either because they desire protection from a military threat or participation in the potential aggression of the federation. As far as the maintenance of federal systems are concerned, William Riker, the main exponent of this approach, came to the conclusion that the crucial factors were the structure of the political parties and the nature of the party system.

A fourth approach, exemplified by the work of Carl Friedrich, sees federalism as a dynamic process. Although the attention paid to

the institutional and legal aspects of federalism has not been abandoned by this approach, their status as the paramount elements has been considerably reduced as can be seen from these remarks by Friedrich.

A federal system should not only be considered statically, i.e., in terms of a fixed pattern of a particular and precise division of powers between governmental levels. Instead "federalism" seems the most suitable term by which to designate the process of federalizing a political community, that is to say, the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint decisions on joint problems; or, reversely, the process through which a hitherto unitary political community, as it becomes differentiated into a number of separate and distinct political communities, achieves a new organization in which the differentiated communities, now separately organized, become capable of working out separately and on their own those problems they no longer have in common. Friedrich's view of the importance of values, interests, and beliefs as well as the emphasis on economic, social, and cultural factors tend to put considerable distance between him and such students of federalism as Wheare.

The second pretheory of regional integration is that which has Karl Deutsch as its most prominent advocate, and its chief arguments revolve around and are derived from the concept of social communication and interaction. In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch and his collaboraters arrived at several conclusions related to this concept such as 'unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata', 'mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata', and 'a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction'.

which were found inter alia to be essential conditions for amalgamated security-communities.

Some time later Deutsch provided a more succinct and comprehensive summary of the communications approach to integration. 24 By looking 'upon nations and governments as communication systems, impersonal, verifiably evidence can be obtained to check general descriptive or qualitative assertions about nationalism, about sovereignty, and about the merger of states'. 25 Such impersonal, verifiable evidence can be found by paying 'attention to the question of perception, as well as to questions of communication, transmission of messages, distortion of messages, speed of response to messages, and memories that are being brought to bear upon messages for interpretation'. 26 To serve as indicators of integration or disintegration, a whole range of communications and transactions may be used such as the flow of mail, trade and so on. 27

A crucial element of the communications approach deals with loads and capabilities, that is, the load of transactions and communications that the systems involved are called upon to receive and process efficiently and the capabilities of these systems to meet the demands put upon them in this respect. A predominance of loads over capabilities is in this view seen as disintegrative. 28

Several problems attach to this approach of which the most important is centered on the uncertainty about the causative links between an intensive pattern of communications and transactions with loads and capabilities in balance and the posited closer community. 'Communications

24. See chapters II and III in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.N. Lippincott, 1964).
25. Ibid., p. 49.
26. Ibid.
27. See Deutsch in Jacob and Toscano, op. cit., ch. III, for examples of indicators and their various dimensions.
28. Ibid., ch. II.
theorizing rests content with the demonstration of covariance among variables at the systemic level" without, however, explaining how transactions of various kinds are clearly related to human perceptions and motives. 'The approach does not tell us the content of the messages and their imputed relationship to the evolution of capacity on the part of regional institutions. It does not explain when and how trust and responsiveness among actors, elites as well as masses, are to occur.' As has been pointed out, the evidence is ambiguous as to the relationship between presumably so important an indicator as trade and the existence of community.

The third approach to regional integration, neo-functionalism of which Ernst Haas is the leading proponent, lays much emphasis on actor perceptions and beliefs, especially those of the various elite groups. It shares with the communication approach

a commitment to a certain number of independent variables considered of great salience: regional transactions and the gains and losses associated with them by actors; verbal and symbolic communications between crucial elites; mutual expectations of elites; mutual responsiveness between elites; the adequacy of institutions to handle the transactional and communicational load. But they differ in the way they treat the load: Communications theorists consider all types of transactions equally salient and therefore measure whatever the statistics permit to be measured; neo-functionalists, however, argue that welfare-related and foreign and defense policy issues are most salient for actors. ...[Neo-functionalists] prefer to observe bargaining styles and strategies as their basic data rather than to stress the volume and

Much of the neo-functional analysis 'has drawn a good deal of its explanatory strength from using concepts which are rather close to the categories used by the decisionmakers, and it has often scored actor perceptions of facts rather than the facts themselves'.

THE 'REGION' OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Whether or not Southeast Asia constitutes a region is not an uncontroversial question. Much will in this respect depend on the criteria employed. At a superficial level one could be forgiven for defining it by default, as it were, that is, once the extent of East and South Asia has been determined, what lies in between is Southeast Asia. It could also be argued that the countries involved distinguish themselves as a separate area more in terms of their propensity for intra-state instability and conflict than inter-state cooperation. Without constituting serious definitional criteria both arguments point, however, to factors which have long been part of Southeast Asian existence, the former by indicating the pressures and pulls of extra-regional forces and the latter by pointing to unresolved problems and conflicts, many of long standing.

In the real world 'regions are what politicians and peoples want

32. Ibid., p. 628.
them to be'. The empirical diversity implied in this remark is reflected in the academic literature on the subject in which the reasons for considering a group of countries a region vary from writer to writer according to his interest and purposes. We are nevertheless not confronted with a completely fluid situation in academic writings as to the nature of regions. Common to most, though not all, definitions is the notion of geographic contiguity, largely because to dispense with it would open up 'the possibility that any entities related to each other with respect to one or more attributes will meet the requirements for consideration as a region. This leads to a situation in which the term "region" is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless'.

Instead of attempting a precise definition of Southeast Asia qua region a position of convenience will be adopted by drawing a line around a particular group of geographically contiguous states and calling it a region for the purposes of this study. This approach is advantageous.


37. For an elaboration and justification of this approach, see David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 30-34. See also Oran R. Young, A Systematic Approach to International Politics, Princeton University, Center of International Affairs, 1968, pp. 15-16.
in that it does not prejudge the issue of whether or not Southeast Asia constitutes a region in any meaningful sense of the word. But the choice of this alternative should not be taken to mean that in approaching the group of states called Southeast Asia one is without any indications of an entity of sorts. The use of this term to designate the area north of Australia, east of India and Bangla Desh, and south of China and Japan, although of relatively recent standing, is alone a sign that at least to outsiders the area displays commonalities of sorts. Known to the Chinese and the Japanese as Nanyang and Nanyo respectively, which means the South Seas, and labelled Südostasien by German and Austrian geographers and anthropologists in the inter-war period, the term Southeast Asia only gained wide currency after it was used to designate the theatre of war commanded by Lord Louis Mountbatten in World War II. 38 The list of countries included under the name has on occasions varied but it is now most commonly agreed that Southeast Asia comprises the following countries: Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia (The Khmer Republic), North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It also includes Portugese Timor and the Sultanate of Brunei - a British Protectorate.

Equally as important as the perceptions of outsiders are those of the peoples within the area. As there will be opportunities to observe later in this study, the people within increasingly consider the countries in the area a region distinct from others.

A study such as this cannot hope to do justice to all the aspects of cooperative and integrative conditions and processes in a region the

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38. The term was in fact used already in 1900 in its English form in a British Parliamentary Paper, Trade and Shipping in Southeast Asia. Other terms have also been used such as Further India, the Far Eastern Tropics, and the Tropical Far East. See Charles A, Fisher, "A View of Southeast Asia", Southeast Asia, An International Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1-2 (Winter-Spring, 1971), esp. pp. 5-11.
extent of Southeast Asia. A selective approach is necessary and this study will concentrate on what are deemed important and salient aspects of the international politics of the region in the belief that these to a great extent reflect underlying and basic structures and processes. A prominent feature of inter-state relations in Southeast Asia, for example, has been the questions associated with frontiers and minorities. Such issues at the international level point to issues related to the level of internal integration within the individual states. Moreover, in the initial stages at least, processes of cooperation and integration are but part of or an extension of such relations that exist between sovereign states under conditions of peace. Taking place within the framework of normal interaction they are profoundly influenced by political relations and decisions.

SALIENT ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Although not exclusively so because of the continued independence of Thailand throughout the period of colonial rule, the international relations of Southeast Asia are principally a story about inter-state relations in the post World War II period. The reason is, of course, that with the exception of Thailand, all the countries in the area gained their independence after the Second World War.

This contemporaneity of the relations should not obscure the extent to which they are a mixture of new as well as old factors. The new arise out of the demands for modernization and the difficulties associated with co-existence in an international environment in which power, influence, and wealth are unevenly distributed among numerous sovereign entities. The old derive their obstinate existence from historical memories the roots of which in many instances can be traced back to pre-colonial times. Indeed, one cannot but be impressed by the strong impress of the past on
The Western colonial influence, 'though diverting much of Southeast Asian life from its peculiar, indigenous course, did not necessarily cancel out age-old traditions and institutions'. Nor did it cancel out age-old enmities and conflicts between various national groups and peoples. Sometimes also exacerbated by it, colonialism temporarily suppressed existing hostilities only for the present generation to see them surface again once the colonial powers relinquished control.

In contemporary Southeast Asia such hostilities are often expressed in terms of conflicts over frontiers and territory. On the other hand, not all frontier and territorial conflicts owe their existence to traditional, indigenous enmities. Some are primarily a legacy of colonialism and they have 'resulted from arbitrary arrangements among the Western powers' who, in Southeast Asia as elsewhere, paid only scant attention to the requirements of the peoples concerned. Many boundaries failed to follow clear ethnic or cultural divides often incorporating groups with no feelings of common identity or tradition.

Whatever their origin inter-state rivalries re-emerged with the departure of colonial control. Thailand, who with Japanese support had taken advantage of the weakness of the Western powers by reclaiming 'lost territories', was forced after World War II to divest herself of these territories when the colonial powers for a brief period arrived back on the scene. With the final departure of colonial control, however, Thai

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40. _Ibid._, p. 159.
territorial ambitions were again activated, or so at least it seemed to her neighbours. Nurtured by traditional fears and suspicions Thailand's relations with Cambodia became especially embittered. 42

More serious was the conflict centered on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Apart from the war of words that erupted this conflict also involved regular and guerilla warfare between Malaysia and her allies (most notably Britain) on the one hand and Indonesia on the other. Overt hostilities ceased only in 1966 when the new rulers in Indonesia moved toward reconciliation with Malaysia. Behind this conflict lay anti-'neocolonialist' and colonialist sentiments.

Related to this conflict was the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah, for the moment a dormant but not extinct dispute. 43 This last conflict was instrumental in virtually destroying the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a later stage. Chapter 3 is an examination and comparison of the effect of ASA and ASEAN on the 'resolution' of the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. The analysis may also be able to tell us something about the extent to which these regional organizations have been instrumental in bringing about 'islands of peace' in the region.

In some senses related to the frontier question but with wider and unique implications is the problem of minorities. No country in Southeast Asia has avoided the difficulties associated with a multiplicity of ethnic or national groups within their boundaries. As the various territories in Southeast Asia gained independence political power and the control of government passed to the majority groups which were charged with the responsibility of transforming what to a large extent still were traditional

42. Ibid., pp. 168-170 and 181-182, Bastin and Benda, op.cit., p. 160.
43. Bastin and Benda, ibid.
societies into modern ones. This was in many cases thought to entail the assimilation or integration of the minorities into the larger political, economic, and social structure, a task toward the fulfilment of which the colonial powers for a variety of reasons had taken no or only rudimentary steps. 44

Growing ethnic consciousness and the resulting opposition to majority group rule among minorities in Southeast Asia have been expressed in various ways, including violence, and in this respect no country has suffered more than Burma. 45 Ethnic rebellions played a major part in bringing the Union to the brink of collapse in the first couple of years after its independence in 1948. 46 In the ensuing years the government has at no time been in complete territorial control. Rebellion has ebbed and flowed without ever ceasing to exist. 47

In Thailand a similar problem exists although not as widespread as in Burma. Much opposition to Thai rule has surfaced over the last decade especially among the Meo of north Thailand, the Lao-Thai (ethnically related to the Thai) of the north east, and the Malays of the southern provinces and instances of armed revolt and conflict have increased in number,

44. Ibid., pp. 161-166.


46. Tinker, ibid., pp. 49-50.

especially in the north and the northeast. 48

In the Philippines the ancient conflict between Muslims and Christians has erupted into serious violence and large scale armed clashes in recent years. At least some factions among the Muslims are advocating secession. 49

Malaysia has not avoided ethnic conflicts either. The most serious in recent years was the rioting which followed in the wake of the May 1969 elections. 50

Indonesia has over 350 ethnic groups each with its own cultural identity. But with the exception of violent conflicts immediately following independence and the conflicts between the indigenous population and the Chinese minority, Indonesia's ethnic divisions have on the whole tended to be overshadowed by the division between the centre (Djakarta and Java) and

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the various regions (the Outer islands) as well as the socio-political conflicts that followed in the wake of the so-called Gestapu affair in October 1965.51

Many more examples could be cited to indicate the magnitude of the problem. One of its main features has been its intractibility and defiance of nearly any solution. Apart from its internal significance, the existence of unevenly and poorly integrated groups at the domestic level may have considerable influence on the ability of states to participate in cooperation at the international level. While this problem cannot properly be considered a part of the cooperative and organizational processes it has nonetheless considerable potential as a disruptive force in relation to these processes. This question will be explored in detail in chapter 4.

A further set of questions to be explored in chapter 5 concerns the relationship between threats and security and regional cooperation. Violence and insecurity have long been part of everyday life in many countries in Southeast Asia.52 In the postcolonial era the issue of security has rarely receded to the background in the minds of the political leaders. It has instead been for long periods a daily preoccupation of theirs, sometimes to the exclusion of nearly all other business. Whether or not these feelings of threat and insecurity, real or imagined, have contributed more than any other single factor to the flavour of international politics in Southeast Asia is debatable. What is fairly certain though is that they have profoundly influenced processes of cooperation and integration.


52. For an instructive overview of the role of revolts and violence in Southeast Asia in the past and the present see Milton E. Osborne, *Region of Revolt, Focus on Southeast Asia* (Adelaide: Pergamon Press Australia, 1970).
All the countries in the region have felt and still feel they have a more or less serious security problem arising from one or more sources of threat. But the intensity of the insecurity experienced, the conclusions drawn, and the policies adopted to counter this threat have varied considerably from country to country depending on the circumstances, historical factors, the direction from which the most serious threat was thought to come, and so on. Some countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have relied heavily on the Western powers, especially the United States, for their security, whilst Malaysia and Singapore have looked to Britain until relatively recently. Other countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia, each in its own way, have sought to steer a neutral or non-aligned course. All these different perceptions and policies have influenced and lent a distinctive flavour to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Yet another set of questions to be explored in chapter 6 is related to the influence of diplomatic processes on regional cooperation. Diplomatic processes refer in this context more to the style and techniques of diplomacy than to actual policies.

Processes of cooperation and integration are, at least in the initial stages, but a part of normal inter-state relations and they take place within and are subject to the modes and conduct of conventional diplomacy as practised by the states concerned. In the advanced stages, however, which begin with the first effective transfer of functions and decision-making powers from the member governments to regional decision-making bodies, these processes gradually cease to be part of normal inter-state relations as well as subjects of conventional diplomacy. Decisions

concerned with these processes are increasingly made within bureaucratic and institutional structures at the regional level in much the same ways decisions concerning similar processes at the domestic level are made within more or less centralized domestic institutions. Cooperation and integration processes in Southeast Asia have as yet plainly not effectuated any transfer to regional bodies of functions and powers which previously rested exclusively with the individual states. For this reason these processes in Southeast Asia must still be considered to be in their initial stages and therefore subject to the mode and conduct of diplomacy as practised by the countries in the region.

A final group of questions to be analysed in chapter 7 concerns the influence of the international environment in general and particular extra-regional actors on regional cooperative processes. The tendency of these extra-regional forces to influence and even exacerbate indigenous conflicts should not make us blind to the possible positive influence they have had on cooperation within the region be it by their example or by more direct methods, whether intentional or unintentional. An important part of this chapter will consist of an analysis of the perceptions the various leaders have of the nature of the international environment in general and their influence on cooperative and integrative processes. A segment of this problem is dealt with in chapter 5 as a separate issue, namely the international environment as a source of threat to the security of the countries involved.

In chapter 8 the various threads will be drawn together and an assessment made of the state of cooperative and integrative processes in Southeast Asia.

But before the analysis turns to the substantive issues outlined above an account will be given in the next chapter of the motives and aspirations underlying the formation of the two most significant attempts
at regional cooperation and organization in Southeast Asia - ASA and ASEAN.
Roughly speaking one can say that the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia has gone through three phases the last of which has not run its full course. ¹

In the first phase, from 1945 to about 1959-60, most of the initiatives and much of the impetus came from outside the region, the lead being provided by such non-Asian powers as Britain and the United States, and Asian powers such as India. Part of the explanation may be sought in the fact that by 1950, for example, there were only four independent countries in the region, namely Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Of these Burma experienced considerable internal upheavals ² and tended anyhow to look outside the region for meaningful relations, especially to India and Britain. Thailand and the Philippines entered into close relations and alliances with the Western powers, especially the United States, for security reasons as well as for reasons of economic assistance. After independence Indonesia increasingly began to steer a non-aligned course and with the ascent of Sukarno to a dominant position she saw her primary role as one of leadership within the so-called Third World countries, epitomized by the staging of the Bandung conference in 1955. ³

¹ I owe this division to Peter Lyon. See his "ASEAN and the Future of Regionalism", in Lau Teik Soon (Ed.), New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973) pp. 156-164.

² See chapter 4 below.

The most significant economic organizations with Southeast Asian membership to emerge in this period were the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), established in 1947 with headquarters in Bangkok, and the Colombo Plan which started as a Commonwealth project, initially with a membership of seven but now drawing its membership, at present twenty-four, from outside the Commonwealth as well. Both organizations were to a large extent reliant on and sustained by British and American support.

In the military and security field the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was launched in 1954 largely on the initiative of the United States. In Southeast Asia only Thailand and the Philippines joined. Another significant security arrangement from this period was the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) which came into effect upon the independence of Malaya in 1957. This agreement ceased to function in November 1971 when it was replaced by the Five-Power Defence Agreement (ANZUK) involving Malaysia and Singapore as well as Britain, Australia and New Zealand. On the whole, however, during this first period Southeast Asian initiatives and sustaining actions in relation to regional organizations and associations were, as Peter Lyon has observed, "either nonexistent, negligible, or merely rhetorical".

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The second phase lasted from about 1960 to 1967. This period saw some notable initiatives on the part of one or more Southeast Asian countries which had by now all, save Singapore, become independent. 8 The two most important were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) involving Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines and Maphilindo with Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia as members. 9 The significance of these two initiatives from a Southeast Asian point of view was that they originated from within the region and that the membership was likewise drawn exclusively from Southeast Asia. However, barely after being launched both associations became victims of conflicts between the members. Maphilindo, officially ushered into existence in June 1963, did not survive the ensuing conflict over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September that year and was for all practical purposes still-born. Instead of a Greater Malay Confederation, the hope of Filipino President Macapagal, came Konfrontasi (Confrontation), an armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia not officially brought to an end before August 1966, and the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the right to exercise sovereignty over Sabah (British North Borneo). 10 ASA's lifespan was somewhat longer. Established in July 1961 in Bangkok it too, however, collapsed or at least ceased to function because of the Sabah dispute. 11

Apart from these unsuccessful attempts at regional organization the countries of Southeast Asia joined various other organizations with

8. The two Vietnams (North and South), Cambodia and Laos became independent in 1954.
an Asian, and sometimes wider, base. Thus Thailand, Malaysia, the Philip­
pines and South Vietnam joined the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in
1966 together with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan and the non-Asian powers
Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia opted for
observer status. Originally meant as a security pact of non-communist
countries by its initiator, South Korea, it became, especially on the
insistence of Japan, a non-military organization devoted to the preser­
vation of national integrity and independence and the promotion of
economic growth. 12 Throughout its existence, however, ASPAC has been
enveloped in an atmosphere of strong anti-communism which has tended to
dissipate its attractiveness, especially after the changes in China's
foreign policy over the last years.

The second phase also saw the establishment of a number of poten­
tially significant and more durable organizations and associations than
those mentioned. The most important was the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
established in 1966 with headquarters in Manila. As of March 1973 it had
18 members of which 7 were Southeast Asian countries (the exceptions being
Burma, North Vietnam and Indonesia). 13 Others established in this period
with membership from Southeast Asia include the Asian Productivity Organ­
ization (APO) of 1961, the Asian Institute for Economic Development and
Planning (AIEDP) of 1964, and the Asian Industrial Development Council
(AIDC) of 1966. Still others were established on a Southeast Asian regional
basis such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
(SEAMEO) in 1965 which promotes cooperation among the member countries


1735 for a comprehensive list of Asian regional organizations.
See also Lau Telk Soon, op. cit., pp. 203-205 for a similar
list as well as Haas, ibid, especially pp. 507-510.
through education, science and culture; the Southeast Asian Central Bank Group (SEACEN) in 1966, an annual conference of governors to discuss monetary policies, banking, capital market development and so on; and the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA) in 1966 which holds annual meetings to discuss economic progress and regional problems.  

The second phase is significant in that, firstly, the countries of Southeast Asia only in this period started to involve themselves in international organization on a broad scale. Previously membership had been largely confined to the United Nations and its various specialized agencies. Secondly, in spite of the failures the period is also significant in that the Southeast Asian countries themselves started to take the initiative. It was as if they only in this period began to realize that they were masters in their own house. Thirdly, and most significantly, attention began to be focused on the region itself, that is, the countries of Southeast Asia began to think in terms of purely regional organizations. Especially important in this context was the budding involvement of Indonesia in the affairs of the region. By far the largest country in the area Indonesia under Sukarno had in the preceding period been primarily interested in playing a role on the world 'stage' through her aspirations to leadership of the non-aligned group of countries, a position she was not alone in seeking. Without, however, giving up her more ambitious aspirations she began in the early 1960's to direct more of her attention to the region of which she was herself a part.

The third and current phase of the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia began in 1967. More precisely, it commenced with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in

Bangkok in August that year. The members were Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. On account of its membership as well as the interest its members have taken in it, ASEAN is the most important of the initiatives to have come out of Southeast Asia so far. To a great extent one is justified with Bernard Gordon in considering ASEAN an enlarged version of ASA with a different name. ASA, which in 1963 had ceased to function because of the break between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, had not ceased to exist. In March 1966 the association was reactivated together with some of the recommendations and projects proposed and initiated between 1961 and 1963. Shortly after ASEAN was founded in 1967 ASA was dismantled but most of its ongoing activities were incorporated into ASEAN.

Apart from ASEAN the growth in intergovernmental organizations and agencies has continued after 1967. Purely Southeast Asian initiatives include the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDC) of 1970, located in Bangkok; the Intergovernmental Co-ordinating Committee for Southeast Asian Cooperation in Family and Population Planning (SEARCFPP) of 1971, and the Southeast Asian Agency for Regional Transport and Communications (SEATAC) of 1972, set up to serve the Coordinating Committee of Southeast Asian senior officials on Transport and Communications (COORDCOM) of 1967.

The countries of the region continued to involve themselves in extra-regional organizations. Thus a number of projects spawned by ECAFE included the formation of commodity arrangements such as the Asian Coconut

Community (ACC), established in 1969 and with a permanent secretariat in Djakarta, and the Asian Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC), set up in 1970 with a permanent secretariat in Kuala Lumpur. Among the members of the former are Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and of the latter Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam. In fact the bulk of the membership of the last two organizations is Southeast Asian. 18

This involvement in transnational activities was not confined to governments alone. In 1971 and 1972 respectively two non-governmental associations were set up, both with links to ASEAN. The first was the Southeast Asian Businessmen's Council (SEABC) which is concerned with intra- and extra-regional business in general, and the second was the Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI), associated with the ASEAN Permanent Committee on Commerce and Industry, and established to organize trade missions and participation in trade fairs. 19

Generally speaking the trend toward increasing involvement in international organization started in the second phase has continued throughout the current phase thus linking the countries of Southeast Asia more firmly to the global network of governmental and non-governmental organizations. However, some more specific points are in order. Firstly, the involvement in international organization is by no means uniformly spread throughout the region. Some countries such as Burma, Laos, Cambodia and the two Vietnams have been on the whole considerably more reticent than others to involve themselves. In this respect the conflict in Vietnam with its ancillary conflicts in Laos and Cambodia have played

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18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.
an obvious role. But other reasons discussed later have also influenced the situation. Whatever the explanation, this uneven involvement has had the effect of dividing the region into two camps, as it were, of states with a high level and a low level of participation and involvement. This is particularly so viewed from the regional angle. This fact alone raises the question of how appropriate it is to consider Southeast Asia a 'region'.

Secondly, among the countries with relatively high involvement - essentially the ASEAN states - the attitude of Indonesia has undoubtedly been the most significant in this current phase. From a position of scant attention to regionalism in the preceding phases she made a volte face which spiralled her into a position where she became perhaps the leading proponent of regionalism in Southeast Asia. She not only took an active part in the formation of ASEAN but has since played an active and leading role within the association. The immediate cause for this change in her attitude was the so called Gestapu affair in September 1965 that ushered in a new leadership signalling the demise of Sukarno as a political force in Indonesia.

Thirdly, perhaps no less compelling in their significance than intra-regional events have been changes in the nature of the involvement and the attitudes of extra-regional forces, especially those with the capacity to greatly influence regional affairs - the big powers. Especially important has been the cessation of active military participation in the Vietnam and Cambodia conflicts by the United States, who also has reduced her military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia such as Thailand and the Philippines. The greatly reduced British presence east of Suez is also significant in spite of the existence of the Five-Power Defence Agreement. Equally important as these developments have been the change in China's foreign policy and the establishment of
relations between China and the United States. Encouraged and, indeed, perhaps compelled by these developments the ASEAN countries have had to review their attitudes and policies toward China. From a position of outright hostility at the official level they have moved cautiously to improve their relations with China who on her part has shown herself willing to reciprocate. Taken together these and other developments stemming from extra-regional influences have greatly changed the environment in which Southeast Asian regionalism is currently operating.

Having in broad terms sketched the development of regional organization in Southeast Asia the rest of this chapter will be taken up by an analysis of the formation and development of ASA and ASEAN. The reasons for selecting especially these two are as follows. Both are regional organizations, that is, the membership is confined to states within Southeast Asia, and unlike the many functionally specific organizations, of which a few have been mentioned above, both ASA and ASEAN are functionally inclusive organizations in that they were created with the fulfilment of many purposes and functions in mind.

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (ASA)

The first suggestion of a regional association would appear to have been made by the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman. At the 10th anniversary celebrations of Ceylon's independence in Colombo in February 1958 he called for a meeting of Southeast Asian leaders in the 'not far distant future' to forge unity in the region. 20

The impression quickly formed that what the Tunku had in mind was a broadly based regional, anti-communist association of some kind. This impression was not without foundation. Only a few days before his

Colombo appeal he had expressed concern that numerous Southeast Asian countries had not taken a definite stand against communism. 'I think they will have cause to regret it', he said. 22 When a New Delhi newspaper a couple of months later carried a report that the Tunku had proposed the formation of a defense organization outside the framework of SEATO 23, an announcement from the Prime Minister's office in Kuala Lumpur in response to this report only denied that a formal proposal had been made. It went on, however, to say that the Tunku had been 'toying' with the idea of a collective security pact outside SEATO. 'The idea has been in the Tunku's mind for some time and he merely wished to sound out other nations on the suggestion'. 24 Such a defence pact should, according to the Tunku, include Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam and the Philippines.

The anti-communist sentiments of the Tunku were echoed in Manila. In December 1958, on the eve of a visit of the Tunku to Manila, President Garcia spoke to the Overseas Press Club in Manila about 'the relentless drive of Communism for world domination...' as '...something that cannot be ignored by any free Asia'. 25 Whilst SEATO's deterrent effectiveness was beyond dispute Garcia maintained that among 'the members of the free Asian community there must develop a broad and sympathetic understanding of each others' thinking, problems and national objectives. Only with such understanding can we explore the common ground upon which a common economic, political and spiritual defense may be based and collective action undertaken... against Communist economic and political aggression...' 26

26. Ibid.
When the Tunku came to Manila in January 1959 he had already responded to Garcia's ideas by commenting; 'It will be a good thing when we Asians can defend ourselves against external aggression and I agree with President Garcia that Asian nations should try to get together and consider ways and means of defending ourselves'. However, in spite of this comment the Tunku, on his arrival in Manila, would appear to have turned away from the idea of a regional security pact to some kind of cooperative arrangement that would serve as an example in combatting 'infiltration of ideas'. The arrangement he had in mind and to which he wanted to elicit the Filipino reaction, had already been under consideration for months in Kuala Lumpur. It was referred to as a 'Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty' - SEAFET, for short.

The move from suggesting a possible security or defence organization to stressing economic cooperation did not so much reflect a softening in the Tunku's anti-communist sentiments as a shift from one to another way of combatting communism and communist infiltration. Tactival considerations were involved as well. In order to get the support of the countries he had in mind he realized he had to tone down the anti-communist aspects of his ideas. An anti-communist pact 'would antagonize many other Asian countries', and would serve to divide the Southeast Asian countries many of whom pursued a neutral or non-aligned policy. Largely due to the strong anti-communist pronouncements of the Tunku and

Garcia during this initial period, however, the ensuing efforts at forming a regional grouping became closely associated with an attitude of anti-communism which was eventually to rub off on ASA when it was established in July 1961. No amount of public denials and stress on 'non-political' cooperation could dissipate this image and its direct result was to severely limit the membership of the association as well as to render futile all attempts at later extending this membership.

The joint communique issued at the close of the meeting between the Tunku and Garcia reflected the new emphasis on non-military cooperation. It talked about the urgent need for ways and means of elevating the standard of living and improve the welfare of their peoples, and urged that as soon as practicable representatives of the Philippines and Malaya should meet in either country to discuss ways and means of achieving the above mentioned goal. However, nothing was said about what 'ways and means' might entail.33

Ostensibly in full agreement the two leaders would nevertheless appear to have entertained different ideas as to the nature of the proposed cooperation. While the Tunku had come to the conclusion that it would be best to play down the anti-communist theme in the interest of more inclusive participation, Garcia continued to emphasize the combatting of communism. Thus when in late January he announced his intention of visiting South Vietnam and Malaya, the purpose of the visit was inter alia to discuss the idea of a non-military alliance of Asian countries to counteract the encroachments of communism.34 The Tunku, on his part, continued to stress economic and cultural cooperation35. The somewhat divergent views did not, however, prevent the two governments from keeping the idea of regional cooperation

35. See, for example, Straits Times, 18 February, 1959.
The next important step in the process leading to the formation of ASA came as a result of Thai involvement. In April Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, expressed his country's interest. It is, indeed, likely that the Thais already were occupied with the idea because in July that year they were able to circulate to all regional capitals, except Hanoi, a carefully formulated proposal for regional cooperation, titled a 'Preliminary Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia'.

At the general level the Thais argued against limiting the cooperation to the economic and cultural fields, as the proposals of the Filipinos and the Malayans did. Any practical and concrete problems affecting the region, be they political, economic, or otherwise, ought to be considered. As to the particular field of cultural cooperation the Thais were nevertheless more sceptical. In a region in which each state tended to be either exclusively Buddhist, Muslim or Christian such cooperation might create more division than cohesion. Cultural cooperation should therefore be replaced by educational, artistic and technical cooperation. Moreover, since so many of the region's difficulties could be attributed to economic problems the Thais' proposal argued that the emphasis should be on economic cooperation. Because of the dependence of the economies on agricultural exports the proposal sought to make specific recommendations based on this fact such as market arrangements and commodity pricing.

The working paper also outlined what the Thais thought ought to be the shape of the institutional structure of the proposed cooperation. No permanent headquarter was envisaged. On the contrary, the administrative

36. See Ibid; and the following issues of Manila Bulletin; 18 February, 14 March, 4 April, 25 April, 5 May, 1959.
39. Ibid, pp. 169-68
machinery should be kept at a minimum geared to 'informal' and 'practical' cooperation. Meetings should be conducted in private with press and public attendance confined to formal, opening sessions. No record should be kept of the meetings of prime-ministers and foreign ministers.  

The significance of the Thai proposal, as Gordon has pointed out, lies in the fact that this was very much along the lines ASA later developed.

The next initiative came from Kuala Lumpur. In October 1959 the Tunku sent letters to all the countries in the region, except North Vietnam, asking for comments on his regional proposal and suggesting a meeting. However, apart from the countries already involved, Thailand and the Philippines, who as expected reacted favourably, the response was generally muted throughout the rest of the region. Indonesia's president Sukarno replied that although close cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia might be desirable, a new association would only become a stumbling bloc. Instead he suggested bilateral arrangements, and to the extent wider cooperation was desired this could be undertaken within the Afro-Asian context. Other non-aligned or neutral countries such as Burma and Cambodia showed no enthusiasm either. This negative reception of his proposal did not deter the Tunku who continued to push his SEAFET scheme. In April 1960 he sent a special envoy, Inche Mohamed Sopiee, to Manila and Bangkok for

40. *Ibid*. One might add, from any researcher's point of view, an unfortunate policy.


44. See Gordon, op. cit., p. 171, footnote 24, for points of Sukarno's reply.


further talks on the proposal. 47 The result of these talks was the establishment of working parties in the three countries to further coordinate the preparations for the formation of a regional organization. 48 At the end of the talks Sopiee again stressed that the grouping would be neither 'political' nor identified with any ideological blocs and existing defence arrangements in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. 49

In July 1960 the Tunku changed the name of the proposed organization to the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASAS) 50, and it was thought that the planned state-visit of President Garcia to Malaya in September would result in the launching of the association. 51 This was not to be, however, partly because Garcia's visit did not take place and partly because events in Laos took a turn to the worse diverting the attention of Thailand and the Philippines as members of SEATO. 52

The theme of an anti-communist security organization had for some time now taken a back seat in the discussion about regional cooperation. The situation in Laos changed this when it caused the Philippines to again revert to the idea of a broadly based security alliance thus for a time bringing into sharp relief the extent to which the Philippines and Malaya differed on the subject of regional cooperation. On Filipino initiative a conference of Asian anti-communist powers was hurriedly convened in Manila in January 1961. The intended participants were Pakistan, Thailand, Malaya, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Philippines.

49. Straits Times, 9 April, 1960.
52. On SEATO and the Lao crisis of 1960-62, see Models, SEATO, Six Studies, esp. parts I and III.
As it happened the meeting derived more of its significance from the absence of the three first countries on this list than from the presence of the rest. The Thais concealed their lack of enthusiasm behind the excuse that they had been given too short notice and that their foreign minister would be preoccupied with the return of the King and Queen to Thailand. However, it is more likely that the Thai leaders felt that little or nothing worthwhile would accrue from such a conference as long as the United States was not involved, and that, at any rate, action in relation to the situation in Laos would have to come through SEATO.

The Malays, on their part, had not been particularly concerned with Laos, a problem in which they did not wish to become involved. With an excuse identical to the Thais—insufficient notice—they too declined the invitation apparently because they wished to prevent the inclusion in the discussion of the ASAS scheme any ideas of an anti-communist alliance. 'In the absence of detailed information it would appear that the Manila talks were concerned mainly with Laos, but there are other matters which require the attention of Southeast Asian countries', commented the Tunku. When the Philippines' Foreign Minister Serrano declared his intention of discussing the result of the Manila meeting with his counterparts in the three countries which stayed away, the response in Kuala Lumpur was cool. Officials there were said to be 'mystified' by the reports from Manila about consultations on common security problems and to know nothing of these talks.

The state visit of Garcia to Malaya, originally planned for September 1960 but postponed, did finally take place in February 1961. The month that lapsed between the Manila meeting and the Garcia visit witnessed new efforts on the part of the Filipinos to involve the Malayans in a security arrangement. In the beginning of February Serrano went to Kuala Lumpur apparently in an attempt to change the Tunku's mind about an anti-communist alliance. The Filipinos considered the visit the 'second phase' of the Manila talks.

Serrano's second objective was to discuss the ASAS proposal and again speculation mounted that the association would at last be launched. When the talks ended it was clear that the Filipino foreign minister had not extracted any promises from the Tunku as far as the first objective was concerned. The most he obtained was to have the topic included on the agenda of the talks between Garcia and the Tunku which were to follow a few days later. As to his second objective Serrano found, not unexpectedly, the Malayans more receptive. It was tentatively agreed to go ahead with ASAS, the final decision to be made during the Garcia visit to Kuala Lumpur. However, as it turned out the meeting between the Tunku and Garcia was far from conclusive in respect of ASAS. The two leaders confined themselves to agreeing to the formation of the association but only if Thailand also joined. Thus everything came to depend on the Thai who would appear to have been reluctant and apprehensive about being put in this position. Nevertheless, no sooner had the Garcia visit ended

59. Ibid. 60. The Nation, 8 February, 1961.
before Thanat Khoman went to Kuala Lumpur where he met the Tunku and Serrano. This meeting proved to be the turning point. The three ministers decided to proceed with the formation of a regional association, and, in pursuance of this goal, to set up working parties in each of the three countries to work out concrete proposals. The working groups would then meet in Bangkok within two-three months to consider the findings and to arrive at a joint proposal which would be discussed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries. The 'non-political' character of the association was again stressed.

Events developed rapidly from now on and the 'schedule', as set down in the Kuala Lumpur agreement, was followed. The expert committees from the three countries met in Bangkok in June where they formed a Joint Working Party to consider the proposals from the individual countries. The result was a 100 page report which went back to the various governments for consideration. In late July the foreign ministers of the three countries met in Bangkok where, on the 31st, they issued the Bangkok Declaration formally establishing the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). The aims and purposes of ASA were as follows:

1. To establish an effective machinery of friendly consultation, collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative fields.

64. Straits Times, ibid.
66. Straits Times, 1 August 1961; Bangkok Post, 1 August, 1961. The name ASAS, short for the Association of Southeast Asian States, was introduced and initially preferred, by the Malayans, because in Malay Asas means 'foundation'. However, the Tunku would appear to have had second thoughts when it was pointed out that ASAS could be pronounced in English as "Asses". See Bangkok Post, 29 July, 1961.
2. To provide educational, professional, technical, and administrative training and research facilities in their respective countries for nationals and officials of the associated countries.

3. To exchange information on matters of common interest or concern in the economic, cultural, educational and scientific fields.

4. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast Asian studies.

5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in the utilisation of their respective natural resources, the development of their agriculture and industry, the expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities, and generally raising the living standards of their peoples.

6. To cooperate in the study of the problem of international commodity trade.

7. Generally to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve aims and purposes of the Association as well as to contribute more effectively to the work of existing international organizations and agencies. 67

In pursuance of these goals the joint communique issued at the end of the meeting outlined the organizational and administrative structure to be set up:

a) Annual meeting of Foreign Ministers which shall be by rotation;

b) Annual meeting of the Joint Working Party which shall take place about a month prior to the meeting of Foreign Ministers;

c) Establishment of a Standing Committee under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his designated representative and having as its members accredited ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between meetings of the Foreign Ministers;

d) Setting up of a number of ad hoc and permanent committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects, and

e) Creation of a national secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country.  

The communique also announced that the Standing Committee would be set up in Kuala Lumpur at a special meeting of Foreign Ministers on 1 December 1961. The regular annual meeting of the Foreign Ministers was to be convened in Manila in August 1962.  

After much talk and rhetoric accompanied by intermittent and spasmodic planning the cooperative venture, first publicly mooted by the Tunku some three years and a half earlier, had finally come into being.

Many ideas and plans had been put forward, some tentatively, others more assertively. When one considers the end result and the process of formation leading to it, it is not an exaggeration to say that the question of the nature of the cooperation to be undertaken and the identity of the initiators became the pivot on which turned a number of other important issues not the least of which were the membership and structure of the association.

From an early stage the proposals for regional cooperation became identified with strong anti-communist orientations and 'bloc' politics. This is not how it was perceived and understood by the leaders of the non-

68. Ibid; see also Bangkok Post, 1 August, 1961.
69. Ibid.
aligned or neutral countries only. Their view was shared in the Western countries as well although without the associated misgivings. In an editorial which generally approved of ASA the *New York Times* on 7 August, 1961 called the association 'anti-communist but non-military' and commented on the 'anti-communist and pro-Western orientation of the founders'.

As indicated above the responsibility for the link between regional cooperation and anti-communist 'bloc' politics must be attributed in the first instance to the Tunku who initially had 'toyed with the idea' of a collective security pact directed against communism. The Tunku's preoccupation with communism is understandable against the background of the Malay experience. Ever since it started in 1948 the Malays had been fighting a communist insurrection. This period, the so-called Emergency, was not to end officially before 1960, and although the insurrection had been largely defeated by 1958-59, the memories of it were still very much alive in the minds of the Malay leaders, including the Tunku. Nevertheless, by early 1959 the Tunku would appear to have given up the idea of a security pact, and in the ensuing time he and other Malayan leaders tried repeatedly to divorce the idea of regional cooperation from the idea of an anti-communist military alliance. Behind this change of mind on the part of the Tunku was a belief that the spread of communism could ultimately only be stopped if the conditions on which it fed were removed. To this end economic development and the raising of the standard of living of the peoples were necessary.

But there were other reasons as well. The Tunku realized that if he was to be successful in forming a broadly based organization, an anti-communist security pact would not achieve this aim. In January 1959, while in

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70. The New York Times editorial is quoted is Gopalan, *op. cit.* p. 552.

71. See above this chapter.


73. See above of this chapter.
Manila, he mentioned the following countries as possible members (apart from Malaya and the Philippines); Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Taiwan. 74 On this list were two countries, Indonesia and Cambodia, which professed a neutral or non-aligned policy and to which participation in an anti-communist pact together with Taiwan and South Vietnam was ruled out. However, if, as we must assume, the intention of the Tunku was to keep the proposal of a regional association separated from all ideas involving cooperation within the field of military security, he was not entirely successful. Despite vehement protestations to the effect that the regional cooperation proposal was 'non-political' and not directed at anybody, the Tunku had the unfortunate tendency on certain occasions to mention regional economic and cultural cooperation in the same breath as he lamented the evils of communism and advocated the necessity of an ever vigilant opposition to it. Thus, in November 1959, for example, on the arrival back from a visit to Australia he talked about the time when the various pacts, defence and others, between Britain and Malaya would be abrogated thus making collaboration in Southeast Asia essential. 75 And in a speech to the annual conference of the United Malayan National Organization (UMNO) in April 1960 he warned the delegates against communist subversion. 'Having had little success through propaganda they are now trying other means like trade'. 76 He revealed that the Malayan Government recently had refused permission to a communist trade mission, which visited Singapore, to enter Malaya for this reason. '[We] cannot deal with the Communists because their ambitions know no bounds. They have no other aim but to rule', said the Tunku. 77 However, 74. *Manila Bulletin*, 7 January 1961. 75. *See Straits Times*, 18 November, 1959. 76. *Bangkok Post*, 18 April 1960. 77. *Ibid.*
only a few moments earlier he had outlined the goals of the SEAFET scheme stressing that 'such cooperation is not directed at anybody...'. On the occasion of the Garcia visit to Malaya in February 1961 the Tunku again linked the threat of communism and regional cooperation when he asked, 'Is it not obvious... that if we do not get together... in the economic sphere... we shall always be the prey and the prize for those who seek power by world domination'.

But whilst the Tunku himself no doubt contributed, perhaps unwittingly, it was nevertheless the Filipinos who more than any others tainted ASA with the anti-communist connotations it so clearly seemed to possess in the eyes of the rest of Southeast Asia. The repeated talk of President Garcia and Foreign Minister Serrano about the need for a common defence against communism and, indeed, their efforts in the pursuit of this goal, could not but lead to the impression that when the Filipinos talked about regional cooperation in general, they really meant cooperation in the fields of defence and security. The meeting in Manila in January 1961 and the visit of Serrano to Kuala Lumpur just prior to the Garcia visit to Malaya in February did nothing to dispel this impression. Coming as it did a bare six months before the establishment of ASA, it was yet another attempt on the part of the Filipinos to involve Malaya in some kind of security alliance.

The efficacy of what appeared to the rest of Southeast Asia as collusion between anti-communism and regionalism on the part of Malaya and the Philippines, received further confirmation with the involvement of Thailand who was the only Southeast Asian member of SEATO apart from the Philippines. Thus the three countries most involved in the planning of

78. Ibid.
80. See above this chapter.
regional cooperation were seen as not only strongly anti-communist but also as perhaps the most pro-Western countries in the region. This was the factor that perhaps more than any other came to decide the membership of ASA in that the attitude of the other countries to ASA, both in the planning stages and after, came to a great extent to be determined by reference to it. Because of her intrinsic importance to the region the position of Indonesia was especially important.

From the very start the Tunku's proposal for regional cooperation was received with considerable coolness by Indonesia. Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister, was reported to have said that he could see no point in the proposal. Sections of the Indonesian press were said to see the sinister hand of 'certain foreign powers'. The continued coolness of the Indonesians and others would seem to have irked the Tunku, because when it was reported that Manila had intensified its campaign to convince Indonesia of the advisability of joining the proposed SEAFET, he reacted by indicating the desirability of other participants and then went on to say, '... but far be it from the truth that we are going out of the way to woo anybody'. The Philippines would indeed seem to have been particularly active in trying to bring Indonesia into the scheme. In May 1960 the Philippines' Minister to Malaya expressed his optimism in these terms (in reference to Burma, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), 'It is significant that none of the Southeast Asian countries has spoken against this concept for closer economic and cultural relations among the countries in this region. It is a matter of time before these countries decide to join and openly declare their support for the treaty'.

82. Reported in Straits Times, 18 February, 1959.
83. Ibid. 28 April 1960, Malay Mail, 28 April, 1960.
84. Straits Times, 13 May, 1960.
Formulated in terms such as these the Filipinos may indeed have been right. No country would appear to be opposed to regional cooperation in principle. But already in December 1959 Sukarno, in his reply to the Tunku's letter of October, had declared his opposition to this particular scheme by stating his preference for bilateral arrangements. Moreover, repeated attempts by the Filipinos to entice Indonesia to join met with no success. In February Dr. Subandrio declared that although Indonesia could not support ASAS this was not because

'we are afraid or suspicious as if (sic) ASAS will become an alliance against any ideology or a defence pact.
We in Indonesia only consider ASAS as being unrealistic (sic) endeavour as long as bilateral relations between states have not yet been given its full contents so that this alliance can easily be used as a forum to discuss political issues.

What we ought to note is that at the present time Indonesia indeed does have a policy which is rather different from those of our neighbours'.

Indonesian newspapers were less guarded in their comments one of them asking, 'What's the use of setting up a small SEATO?', and labelling the proposed scheme a 'protest military pact'. Suluh Indonesia, the newspaper of the party with which Sukarno was most closely associated, the P.N.I., urged more attention to be paid to Asian-African solidarity than to the forming of new associations. Serrano was quick to respond to Subandrio's statement when a few days later he assured that ASAS would

86. For references to Filipino initiatives directed at Indonesia see Times of Indonesia, 1 July, 1960; Straits Times, 26 August, 1960, Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September and 1 December 1960, p. 596 and 505 respectively, Manila Chronicle, 2 February, 1961.
88. Quoted in Bangkok Post, 8 February, 1961.
89. Ibid.
not become a forum for political discussions, but to no avail. In April Subandrio commented that ASAS would be an organization without substance and that it might give rise to political ambitions despite denials to the contrary. The most outspoken and revealing statement came from Kusumowidadjo Sumito, Secretary-General of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs. In an interview with the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in July 1961 he said inter alia,

>'Frankly public opinion in Indonesia tends to take the ASAS idea as the SEATO countries' efforts to make a subtle link between SEATO and non-SEATO countries in Asia. The public suspicion is understandable.

We certainly canvass the idea of greater Afro-Asian development on a large canvas but not minor regional groupings which may tend to develop into small blocs. We want to refrain from these multilateral arrangements even though it is only an economic bloc.

The spirit behind the ASAS is any way anti-this and anti-that (as revealed by many statements of Tunku Abdul Rahman) and Indonesia does not want any part in a negative policy in international affairs; we want to be positive, constructive'.

From the various utterances of Indonesian spokesmen it can be seen that they were far from convinced by the stress on non-political cooperation and the denials of any anti-communist bias as far as ASA was concerned.

To understand the Indonesian misgivings about ASA it is necessary to look beyond the perceived danger on their part of being involved in an anti-communist alliance of sorts. As Dr. Subandrio himself had said in

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92. 13 July, 1961, p. 55
93. See above this chapter.
his statement in February, Indonesia's policies differed in important respects from those of her neighbours 93, and the main exponent and inspiration behind these policies was Sukarno. The formative period of ASA coincided with the introduction of the so-called Guided Democracy in Indonesia, and the rise of Sukarno to a dominant position, especially as far as foreign policy was concerned. In terms of foreign policy Sukarno's aspirations had a global rather than a regional focus, and his many travels abroad to conferences of non-aligned nations and elsewhere, and his strong advocacy at this time of the causes of the non-aligned or Afro-Asian world were the overt manifestations of this policy. His ideological convictions, including strong anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiments, were expressed through concepts such as the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) and the clash between them. They led him also to view with suspicion such countries as Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines, partly, but not exclusively, because of their links with colonial and former colonial powers. 94

The formative period of ASA also coincided with two other events in Indonesia, and by occupying the attention of Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders they may have contributed in a lesser and more indirect fashion to the rejection of ASA. The first was the regionalist rebellions to which outside forces such as the United States and Britain would appear to have extended support. The Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno, also harboured strong suspicions of Malayan support to the rebellions which

93. See above this chapter.

lasted from early 1958 to 1961. The second event was the West Irian campaign. The recovery of West Irian from the Dutch had been high on the priority list of Indonesian leaders for many years, and on none more so than Sukarno's. Although the final stage of this process of recovery, or 'confrontation', started only in December 1961, that is, after the establishment of ASA, it had nonetheless been preoccupying Sukarno for a long time. It was finally settled in August 1962 when the Dutch agreed to relinquish control.

Burma was the other non-aligned country to figure prominently in the discussion of prospective members of ASA. Like Indonesia she too was cool to the whole idea and like Indonesia she refused the invitation to join. Again as in the case of Indonesia the close identification of the sponsors with the West - especially the membership of Thailand and the Philippines in SEATO - was the immediate and most obvious factor influencing Burma's decision. However, her attitude to the international affiliations of ASA's sponsors and, therefore, to ASA itself was a natural, even inevitable, extension of her own particular brand of non-alignment which was very much formulated with the dominating existence


96. Bunnell, op. cit, pp. 45-54. See also Legge, ibid, pp. 359-60 and Weinstein, ibid, pp. 135-39.

of China in mind. Cambodia was yet another non-aligned country often appearing in the membership discussion. Although for different reasons she displayed much the same attitude as Burma and refused as well to join. 98

THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF ASA

The other issue to be greatly influenced by the identity and the general foreign policy outlook of the initiators was the nature of the cooperation to be undertaken and the administrative and organizational structure of the association.

The first plan to be put forward was the idea of a 'Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty' (SEAFET) which the Tunku brought with him to Manila in January 1959. For reasons discussed above the Tunku had at this time discarded his earlier idea of a security alliance as impractical. However, the main aim of SEAFET was, as in the case of the security alliance, to eliminate or at least to contain what he perceived to be the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Only the means by which to achieve this aim had changed.

When this is said it should also be noted that there is no reason to believe that the Tunku was not also motivated by a genuine desire to promote the welfare of, firstly, his own people as well as the other peoples of the region. Regional economic cooperation was a means among many by which this aim could possibly be achieved. What is argued here, in other words, is that the Tunku considered the kind of cooperation envis-

aged in the SEAFET scheme a good in itself, and that in this sense he was an internationalist. It is significant in this context that the Tunku would appear to have been impressed and influenced by the various regional organizations and associations established in Western Europe and elsewhere in the post-war period. His favourite example was the Nordic Council to which he referred on several occasions as a model for Southeast Asia.

What, then, did the Tunku have in mind when he put forward his proposal? In his treatment of it Bernard Gordon merely says that the Tunku saw in SEAFET a 'non-political' group functioning largely in the fields of economic and cultural cooperation. Granted that the proposal was characterised by a degree of vagueness it is, however, possible to piece together a reasonably accurate picture of what it entailed. The first indication appeared in the communique issued after the talks between Garcia and the Tunku in Manila in January 1959. SEAFET was a main topic of discussion in these talks, and in view of the fact that Garcia would appear, at least in general terms, to have concurred with the idea of regional cooperation, it is not an unreasonable assumption that the communique to some degree reflected the ideas contained in the Tunku's proposal. The communique listed six points on which the two leaders had agreed including the urgent need for finding ways and means of elevating the standard of living and the material welfare of their peoples. To that end closer economic and cultural cooperation was needed


100. Straits Times, ibid. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 July, 1960, p. 52. Also the Filipinos referred to the Nordic Council as well as to the Organisation of American States (O.A.S.), See Malay Mail, 9 August 1960 and see Bangkok Post, 11 February, 1961.

101. The Dimensions, p. 166.

102. Ibid., p. 167.
as well as frequent meetings between the leaders of the region to discuss common problems. Apart from this the communiqué did not contain any further suggestions as to what 'ways and means' might refer to.

The next indication came with the involvement of Thailand. In July 1959 the Thai circulated to other governments their 'Preliminary Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia'. The Thai were familiar with the SEAFET proposal and it is not unreasonable to view their proposal as an indication that they were not entirely satisfied with the SEAFET scheme. To be sure, on the general question of what kind of cooperation should be undertaken there would appear to have been agreement, that is, apart from the expressed reservations concerned with cultural cooperation, the Thai agreed with the general aim of economic, non-political cooperation. Rather their dissatisfaction may have been directed at the vagueness of the Malayan plan because their own proposal would appear to have been considerably more detailed as to what kind of cooperation ought to be undertaken. But the Thai proposal also argued against any elaborate organizational structure such as permanent headquarters. Instead they suggested that the administrative machinery should be kept at a minimum.

It is not to draw an undue inference to suggest that the Thai argued in this way because either the SEAFET scheme contained provisions for an 'elaborate administrative machinery' or the Malayans had suggested something along these lines in their discussions with the Thai but had not had it incorporated in their proposal. The exemplary influence of European regional organizations coupled with the use of the term treaty in the Malayan proposal was certainly suggestive of an organization along lines similar to

105. See above this chapter.
If the suggestion is correct that the Malayans initially were contemplating a fairly tightly knit organization based on a treaty which stipulated the establishment of a relatively complex administrative machinery, including perhaps permanent headquarters, they were not alone in entertaining such ideas. The Filipinos were thinking in similar terms. Their thoughts focused on a formal organization based on a multilateral treaty with bodies such as a secretariat or central institution of sorts to take care of the day-to-day business and with provisions for decision-making at the ministerial or heads of state level. The similarities between these ideas and the EEC's Council of Ministers and Commission are obvious.

But while the content of the proposed cooperation remained non-political, economic, cultural, etc. and thus much the same throughout the years of discussion, the ideas of the Malayans and the Filipinos pertaining to the institutional and administrative structure changed considerably. From the kind of organizational structure discussed above they eventually moved to a position practically identical to the Thai. From a 'tightly knit' organization bound together by a treaty signed by all the members they switched to the idea of a loosely structured association in which the members' sole contractual obligations were expressed in such bilateral or multilateral treaties concerning specific projects as they cared to undertake. Two factors in particular conspired to make the Malayans and the Filipinos change their minds on this important question. Firstly, there was the influence of Thailand whose participation was seen as essential and

whose pragmatic and incremental approach played an important modifying role. The example of the 'Working Paper' has already been invoked to illustrate her attitude. Her cautious and piecemeal policy was also well reflected in the remarks by her Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. In July 1960, when expressing his approval of the idea of regional cooperation, he urged that

this association be most carefully formed...
We want an association that will surely succeed.
It must not damage itself by haste... Remember,
this is not to be hurried. It will take time.
We want to build our program through mutual cooperation and found it on a solid foundation...
The process may take one to three years to become established. 109

The second factor to persuade the Malayans and the Filipinos was the question of the membership. Realizing that their own foreign policies and persuasions might not be all that palatable to the other countries in the region and that the latter would not like to be so closely associated with the pro-Western attitudes of the sponsors, they sweetened the pill by suggesting cooperation on a less formal basis without a treaty specifying duties and obligations which the neutrals and the non-aligned would find impossible to reconcile with their general foreign policies. 110 It is likely that the Thai early on realized this aspect and that it partially influenced their stand as well.

Thus, two measures - both employed to encourage more members - came to put their indelible mark on ASA as it emerged in July 1961. The nature of the field of cooperation was changed by substituting non-political, economic and cultural for military and security cooperation. The adminis-

trative and institutional machinery and structure had been changed by substituting an informal association without supranational connotations for a more formal, treaty-based organization with supranational overtones reminiscent of regional organizations in Western Europe and elsewhere. Both measures failed to accomplish the broader, more representative membership at which they aimed primarily because of the close identification of the sponsors with one side in the Cold War.
The gradual improvement in relations between Malaysia and the Philippines and the abortive coup in Indonesia paved the way for the commencement of a new phase in Southeast Asian regionalism, the former by providing for the reactivation of ASA and the latter for ushering in new leaders in Indonesia with a different foreign policy outlook in general and a different attitude to regional cooperation in particular.

The last months of 1965 witnessed tentative hints related to the possible revival of regional cooperation. In September Thanat Khoman and the Philippines Foreign Minister Mauro Mendez held talks in Manila during which ASA was discussed. According to Thanat the Filipinos had expressed their desire to revive the association. In December similar hints came from an unexpected source only this time they related to Maphilindo rather than ASA. The Indonesian Defence Minister General Nasution said Indonesia still yearned for a Maphilindo association with Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore and the North Borneo territories. Nasution's choice of terms did not escape the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak who characterized them as an interference in the internal affairs of Malaysia, and the Tunku, predictably enough, rejected the idea while at the same time calling for the revival of ASA. In the opinion of the Tunku Maphilindo ought to be scrapped altogether because it had failed to achieve peaceful relations based on equality and mutual respect.

The intensified discussion which now ensued about a possible revival of ASA was facilitated by the continuing improvement in relations

111. Bangkok Post, 10 September, 1965.
112. Straits Times, 10 December, 1965. See next chapter about Maphilindo.
113. Ibid., 11 December, 1965.
between Malaysia and the Philippines. When the Marcos administration was inaugurated in December 1965 the Tunku sent as his special representative the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs Dato Dr Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman. The new administration wasted no time in confirming its previously expressed intentions of moving toward a full normalization in relations with Malaysia as well as its support for the revival of ASA.

As it happened the revival of ASA preceded the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In March 1966 the association was officially again in business when the Standing Committee met in Bangkok. This was followed by a meeting of the Joint Working Party in April, another meeting of the Standing Committee in June, and finally a meeting of the Joint Working Party in July in preparation for the meeting of the foreign ministers which was held in August.

On 3 June the Philippines recognised Malaysia. The process leading to this decision involved not only Malaysia and the Philippines but also Indonesia. In the three first months of 1966 the Indonesian government would appear to have exerted considerable pressure on the Philippines even to the extent of threatening to break off diplomatic relations with Manila if the latter recognised Malaysia. These pressures must be attributed to Sukarno. Although his influence in this period was slowly being eroded Sukarno nevertheless retained a measure of control and influence over foreign policy. However on 11 March 1966 Sukarno's influence came to an end when he was forced to step aside by General Suharto. The new Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik immediately started on a process of reorientation of

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Indonesian foreign policy. One of his early acts was to get in touch with the Philippines government requesting that it delay its recognition of Malaysia so that Indonesia and the Philippines could coordinate their policies. Malik's aim was not only the recognition of Malaysia but also the end to confrontation, and in April he met his Filipino counterpart Ramos in Bangkok where they agreed to the timing of the Philippines' recognition of Malaysia and Indonesia's recognition of Singapore. The termination of confrontation was also discussed. And after a number of difficulties had been overcome Malik and Razak agreed on the means to end confrontation at a meeting in Bangkok on 30 May. Thus by mid 1966 the stage was set for a new beginning in the relations between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines as well as Singapore who also had been embroiled in the turbulent events of the previous three years.

Indonesia's new foreign policy outlook and apparent desire to get on good terms with her neighbours raised the question of what her place in the scheme of things should be, especially her role in regional cooperation. References have already been made to General Nasution's tentative hint of a possible resurrection of Maphilindo and of the Tunku's flat rejection of this suggestion. However, the idea was more favourably received in Manila where foreign minister Mendez welcomed the Tunku's plea for a revival of ASA while at the same time taking him to task for his negative attitude to Maphilindo.

Whether the Indonesians felt a real attachment to the Maphilindo concept or not is difficult to say. However, to the extent they were genuinely interested in participating in regional cooperation it might be

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120. See Abell, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
121. The agreement to end confrontation was rectified on 11 August, 1966. The delay was partly due to opposition on the part of Sukarno who still nominally was the President of Indonesia.
argued that it was only natural for them to use Maphilindo as the vehicle rather than ASA of which they were not a member. As to the Filipinos it should be borne in mind that it was the outgoing administration of Macapagal, to which Mendez belonged, which had been the driving force behind the Maphilindo idea in the first place.

In spite of the Malaysian opposition, to which the Thai lent their support, Maphilindo did not disappear from the discussion of regional cooperation in the months ahead either.

After the effective revival of ASA and the political demise of Sukarno in March the discussion that ensued revolved around the role of Indonesia and the ways and means of bringing her within the regional cooperative framework. The Indonesians themselves gave encouragement to this debate by indicating their interest in regional cooperation. The issue was in all probability raised in the meeting in late April between Ramos and Malik and again in the meeting in Bangkok between Malik and Tun Razak during which the end to confrontation was agreed on. After a three days visit to Indonesia in August Ramos returned to Manila predicting that Maphilindo and ASA would merge. It is likely that Ramos was referring less to an organizational merger than to a future organization with the countries involved in ASA and Maphilindo as members. His characterization of the talks as exploratory and his comment that the Indonesians would prefer an expanded Maphilindo to an expanded ASA are indications that no formula for Indonesian participation had been found during the

123. See Straits Times, 4 January, 1966 where Thanat Khoman is reported to have expressed his misgivings about Maphilindo's racial and ethnic connotations.
125. Straits Times, 3 June and 4 June 1966.
127. Loc. cit.
talks. However, only a few days later Thanat Khoman visited Djakarta. According to Bernard Gordon his talks with Indonesian leaders were successful in that a format and a procedure would appear to have been found. The approach to be followed stipulated that Malik would make his views known to Thanat, who would then issue a Thai invitation to the ASA members. In this way it would appear that Indonesia had not 'asked' for ASA membership. Consequently in December 1966 a 'Draft Joint Declaration' was sent from Bangkok to the various capitals. 128

However, the Thanat-Malik understanding - if one can term it so - did not erase all the problems. Throughout the period the Malaysians remained rather aloof to the developments as they unfolded and the problem became increasingly one of overcoming Malaysian, and especially the Tunku's suspicions of Indonesian motives. Indeed, throughout 1967 the most prominent feature of the process leading to the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967 was the reconciliation and adjustment of Indonesian and Malaysian attitudes and sensitivities in a manner conducive to the participation of both countries in one regional organization. The difficulties involved and the obstacles to be overcome were epitomized in the attitudes to Maphilindo and ASA.

To the Malaysians Maphilindo was far too closely associated with confrontation and the Sabah issue. In their eyes it had miserably failed as an instrument through which these conflicts could have been solved. As has been noted when the first hints of a possible revival of Maphilindo appeared in late 1965 the Tunku was adamant in his rejection of the idea. In the ensuing time the Malaysians were not to waver in their attitude, a point brought out in unmistakable terms when Tun Razak in January, 1967

declared Maphilindo 'dead and buried'.

To the Indonesians, on the other hand, Maphilindo would appear initially to have had certain attractions. However, the eventual abandon­
ment by the Indonesians of the idea of a resurrected Maphilindo would seem to suggest that these attractions were related to tactical considerations rather than any deeply felt attachment to the idea. There are several reasons why this may be so.

As already suggested the Indonesians may have considered Maphilindo a suitable stepping stone from which to approach the whole problem of Indo­
nesian participation in regional cooperation. Once the initial contacts had been made thus facilitating the discussion of other ideas Maphilindo could be discarded. The Indonesians must also have realized that Maphilindo was anathema to Malaysia. Domestic political conditions in Indonesia itself may also have been responsible for this initial advocacy of Maphilindo.

A striking feature of the domestic scene in Indonesia was the caution with which Suharto and the new leadership went about changing internal as well as external policies as long as Sukarno could be expected to wield any pol­itical influence. The changes that occurred did so gradually and with increasing pace as Sukarno's influence was eroded and eventually destroyed. Hence, the hints of a possible resurrection of Maphilindo may have been nothing but a concession in the foreign policy field to the transition from the old to the new policies which Suharto and the other leaders were eager to implement.

After the visits of Ramos and Thanat to Djakarta in August no further talks took place during the remainder of 1966 about Indonesian


participation in regional cooperation. But as 1967 progressed the
Indonesians themselves began to take an increasingly active role and
apart from the occasional reference to it, usually by the Filipinos,
Maphilindo gradually disappeared from the discussions about regional
cooperation. The talks came now to centre around the possibility of
expanding ASA to include Indonesia.

To the Thai and the Filipinos an extension of ASA to include
Indonesia was a proposition they on the whole could readily accept. The Malaysians, however, would appear to have been much more ambivalent. The statements and messages emanating from Kuala Lumpur during much of
the first half of 1967 were not only ambivalent but also contradictory,
and would seem to point to considerable differences of opinion within the
Malaysian political leadership as far as Indonesian membership in ASA was
concerned. The Tunku would appear to have been the most sceptical. In
his reply to Thanat Khoman's letter of late December 1966 he warned against
a too close relationship with Indonesia, especially as long as Sukarno was
still around. He also stressed the danger to ASA if a country was admitted
whose past behaviour suggested that she would leave any organization if it
served her. But in late February 1967 Tun Razak disclosed that he had
extended an invitation to Indonesia to join ASA the previous August. At
the same time he made clear that the matter rested with Indonesia. By
March, however, a further complication had been added to the already con­
fused picture. Indonesia, so it appeared, was not interested in joining
ASA. In an interview with an Indian newspaper Malik declared that within

132. See, for example, statements by Thanat and Ramos in Bangkok World,
1 March 1967 and Straits Times, 6 March, 1967, respectively.
three months Indonesia would sponsor a conference of several Southeast Asian countries to discuss regional cooperation. It was evident that he did not contemplate an expanded ASA, or Maphilindo for that matter, but rather a new larger organization which would include Burma as well as Cambodia.

The Malaysian response was again ambivalent and inconsistent. In mid April Tun Dr Ismail declared that Malaysia was not opposed to the Indonesian proposal and that such a new organization need not be built around or on ASA, only to be contradicted the following day by the Tunku. Indeed, the Tunku appeared very reluctant to give up ASA in favour of the Indonesian proposal. In mid March he stated that ASA was open to any country in Southeast Asia who would accept the goals of the association. When during April the Indonesians started an intensive campaign in support of their proposal, the Tunku's answer was negative in the extreme. On 13 April he expressed his disapproval of the Malik proposal. 'We already have our regional organization in ASA. I don't see the need to set up another regional economic grouping' he was quoted as saying. He then went on to extend an invitation to Indonesia to join ASA emphasizing his belief that ASA must be made a success before the establishment of another regional organization.

In a comment a few days later Malik appeared anxious to play down the effect of the Tunku's remarks by suggesting that they had been uttered for internal consumption and that, in fact, Malaysia did support the Indonesian proposal. Such assurances had been given by the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Department in Malaysia, Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie.

Toward the end of April there were signs that the Malaysian government was arriving at an outwardly more consistent policy in relation to the Indonesian proposal. A foreign affairs spokesman in Kuala Lumpur said that Malaysia was not adopting a rigid position and was open to any new suggestions concerned with regional cooperation. However, the most important contribution to the clarification of the Malaysian stand came when the Tunku finally relented. On 22 April he said, '...if Dr. Malik has something new, we will always listen. As it is, I don't know anything about it, but we have never said it was a bad idea'.

The attempts at forming the new regional organization were spearheaded by Thanat and Malik. The latter concentrated his efforts on persuading Burma and Cambodia to join whilst the former concentrated on persuading the Tunku to accept the idea. Of the two Thanat was most successful. On 23 May he brought Malik, on the way to Burma, and the Tunku, on the way to Japan, together in a meeting at Bangkok airport at which the Tunku stated his willingness to go along with whatever new grouping was proposed. Malik, on the other hand, was less successful in his missions. The Burmese as well as the Cambodians politely refused the invitation arguing that membership in the proposed organization was incompatible with their general policies.

After his visits to various countries in the region, rounded off by a three day stay in Manila from May 27 to 30, Malik was able to announce on

144. On this 'division of labour' between Thanat and Malik, see Gordon in Tilman, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-518.
146. *Asian Almanac*, *ibid.*
his return to Jakarta that five countries would soon meet to discuss the regional cooperation. This meeting, which led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), took place in Bangkok between August 5 and 8, 1967. Attending it were the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, the Philippines Foreign Secretary Narcisco Ramos, the Singapore Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Rajaratnam, the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman and the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak.

To say that the process leading to the formation of ASEAN was greatly influenced by the involvement of Indonesia is not very illuminating. In what follows, therefore, closer attention will be paid to the attitudes she in particular brought to bear on this process. This is all the more important because these attitudes to a considerable degree determined the policies of especially Malaysia and the Philippines.

In March 1967 it had become quite clear that Indonesia would not join ASA. Indeed, there had been several previous indications coming from Indonesian spokesmen to that effect. For example, at the signing of the agreement in Kuala Lumpur in August 1966, which officially ended confrontation, Malik explicitly said that Indonesia would not join ASA.

The Indonesian rejection of ASA and the insistence on a completely new organization are related to some commonly held attitudes to the external world and Indonesia's position within it. In the first place Indonesian political leaders both during Sukarno and Suharto tend to view the international system as essentially exploitative and hostile in nature and it is consequently viewed with suspicion and scepticism. The consequence of such attitudes is a foreign policy with strong emphasis on the independence

147. Straits Times, 1 June 1967.
aspect. But the external world is also the necessary source of needed assistance to the economic development of Indonesia. Such assistance however brings with it the danger of undue Indonesian reliance on the external world. To ward off this danger it is therefore necessary that Indonesia plays on the conflict between the big powers extracting roughly equal assistance from both camps which are unable to cooperate to exploit Indonesia. The dilemma is thus seen to lie in the need for a balance in the foreign policy between the desire for independence on the one hand and economic development on the other. 149

The second set of attitudes which represents a continuity between Sukarno and Suharto is related to Indonesia's position in the world, especially her position and role in regional affairs. As the largest and most populous state in Southeast Asia, Indonesian leaders consider, she has a natural right to play a leadership role in regional affairs. 150 In relation to these attitudes membership in ASA was not an acceptable proposition. The strongly pro-Western image of ASA could not be reconciled with the ideas of an independent and neutral foreign policy even to a leadership which had undertaken a major reorientation of Indonesian foreign policy away from the communist camp and China in particular. Furthermore, membership in ASA, which after all was the creation of lesser regional powers, could not easily be adapted to the role of leadership Indonesia saw for herself. To enter ASA would mean participation in an organization which Indonesia had not herself built up and molded.


There were other reasons as well. From an early stage Burma and Cambodia figured in the Indonesian plans for regional cooperation, and Malik spent considerable effort in an attempt to persuade these two countries to join. But they were unlikely to do so if this was to be accomplished through membership in ASA, an organization they had both refused to join some six or seven years previously when it was being formed. Neither country had changed the general tenor of their foreign policies nor their political leaders in the meantime.

These Indonesian attitudes notwithstanding, the Tunku and Ramos continued to talk in terms suggesting that they considered ASA the only viable alternative. As late as the middle of March Ramos was still talking about the expansion of ASA and on 13 April the Tunku insisted on the preservation of ASA rather than the formation of a new organization.

Why this insistence on ASA on the part of the Tunku and the Filipinos? As far as the former is concerned it should be remembered that ASA was his brainchild first and foremost, and the Tunku undoubtedly felt a certain attachment to it. The thought also could easily have come to his mind that the Indonesian insistence on a new regional organization was just another means by which they sought to circumvent and dismantle ASA, an organization towards which the Indonesians in the past, after all, had been none too favourably disposed.

But there was another, more specific reason for the attitude of the Tunku and the Filipinos. The proposal for a new regional organization, first distributed by Bangkok in December 1966, was known as the SEAARC (Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) scheme. This

151. See Manila Times, 6 March 1967.
152. See above this chapter.
proposal contained references to security matters which neither the Malaysians nor the Filipinos could have found very palatable. It began with these words:

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and Malaysia, The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines... and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand...

Believing that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the area,...

Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian countries, and that arrangements of collective defense should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers. 154

About the same time as the SEAARC proposal was being studied in the various capitals the Indonesian Lt-Gen Mokoginta, on a visit to Malaysia, expressed his belief that a military alliance between Indonesia, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries 'might soon become a necessity'. 155 In December Lt-Gen Panggabean, the Deputy Commander of the Army, had stated that such an alliance might be needed to face the threat from China who would have nuclear weapons in operating condition in 1968. By then Indonesian armed forces must be able to operate in any neighbouring country needing defense assistance and 'also be ready to operate with nuclear weapons'. 156 Shortly afterwards Panggabean was reported to have said that the Southeast Asian states should have the ability to take care of the defense and security of their territory on their own thus abrogating the need for outside powers to station military forces in the region. 157

To a man as sensitive to anything Indonesian as the Tunku these statements from prominent military circles, taken in conjunction with the formulations of the SEAARC proposal, must have been profoundly disturbing. It is not unlikely that he may have been interpreting them as confirming his fears of Indonesian motives, and that he may have viewed the SEAARC proposal as just another way of promoting Indonesian ambitions and institutionalising her quest for dominance in Southeast Asia. More directly, Malaysia still had extensive defense ties with Britain and other extra-regional powers and the SEAARC proposal may have been interpreted by the Tunku as an indirect criticism of these links.

Similar considerations are also valid as far as the Philippines was concerned. The Marcos Administration may also have interpreted the passages of the SEAARC proposal quoted above as an implied criticism of the security policies it and preceding administrations had been pursuing. Although they shared the views of the Indonesians of the threat from China and communism, they nevertheless saw their interests best served by close military cooperation, especially with the United States, because they believed the countries of Southeast Asia not as yet capable of fending for themselves militarily. In an interview with The New York Times in early March Marcos stressed the need for SEATO to counteract China whose military forces no one nation or group of nations in Asia could hope to equal. At the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers in Washington in April Ramos said that the Philippines was 'convinced more

158. For a similar, though not identical, assessment, see R.O. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign Policy, McLean; Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, Report RAC-R-63-2, March 1969, pp. 48-49. See also the Tun Razak's comments on the defense ties with Britain during his visit to Australia in April 1967, reported in Straits Times, 21 April, 1967.

than ever before of the validity of the SEATO idea' and 'of the continuing pertinence of the existence of SEATO as a defensive shield for our region'.

In the light of these considerations the continued Malaysian and Filipino stress on ASA was partly a demonstration of their opposition to what they considered objectionable aspects of the SEAARC proposal. However, by the end of May the Malaysians and the Filipinos had ceased to insist on an expansion of ASA to accommodate Indonesia. The persuasive influence of Thanat Khoman would appear to have played no small part in this process especially as far as the Tunku was concerned. 161

THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF ASEAN

As already mentioned, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 162 was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok when the representatives of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines signed the Joint Declaration, also called the ASEAN Declaration.

The most difficult obstacle to overcome in the negotiations leading to the founding of the Association would appear to have been the questions related to security matters. Although the Philippines and Malaysia had stopped insisting on Indonesian membership in ASA as her only real alternative, the Philippines in particular was not satisfied with the provisions in the SEAARC proposal dealing with the security and defense links of the members. Ramos went to Bangkok with a draft proposal which omitted all references to foreign bases and security matters in general whilst the


162. It was ASEAN rather than SEAARC apparently because Ramos objected that the latter could be construed to sound like 'shark'. See Straits Times, 8 August 1967.
Indonesian draft, presented by Malik, contained the following specific reference to these matters:

Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of their countries, and that the arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers; 163

This formulation was nearly identical to that contained in the SEAARC draft and contained as well passages which had also been part of the Manila Declaration of August 1963 which established Maphilindo. On that occasion the passages had been included on the insistence of Indonesia, whose initial influence on the SEAARC proposal is obvious when a comparison is made.

Once in Bangkok the Filipinos were not willing to accept the Indonesian draft in full and considerable hard bargaining followed. In his statement after the signing of the Declaration Ramos alluded to the difficulties (he was the only one to do so) when he said; 'The Declaration we just signed was not easy to come by; it is the result of a long and tedious negotiations which truly taxed the goodwill, the imagination, the patience and the understanding of the participating ministers'. 165 As indicated by the text of their proposal, the Filipino position was that, rather than accepting the formulations of the SEAARC proposal as well as the nearly identical Indonesian draft, they would prefer no mention to be made of security matters at all. In this they would appear to have been supported

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163. For the text of the Filipino and the Indonesian drafts, see Abell, op. cit, appendix IV and V, pp. 427-431.
164. For the text of the relevant passages of the SEAARC draft and the Manila Declaration see Gordon in Tilman (ed.) op.cit., p.516.
by Singapore and somewhat less strongly by Malaysia and Thailand who would appear to have occupied a position somewhere in between. 166 Malik, however, found this unacceptable and appealed to the others to include the paragraphs on the ground that it was necessary for the political survival of the 'new order' in Indonesia. 167 A compromise was found to the effect that the part of the Indonesian draft proposal which referred to 'arrangements of collective defence which should not be used to serve the interest of any of the big powers' was deleted while the rest was included. Hence, the ASEAN Declaration began with the following preamble;

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and co-operation;

DESIRING to establish a firm foundation or common action to promote regional co-operation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;

CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture;

CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external inter-

ference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development;

DO HEREBY DECLARE: 168

The discussion at the Bangkok meeting, especially the controversy between the Philippines and Indonesia about whether or not to include the references to security questions, should not be understood to mean that one or the other of the participants were not profoundly motivated by basic considerations of security and threat. The last two paragraphs of the preamble bear witness to this. It was rather a matter of arriving at a wording which allowed for somewhat different perceptions and above all different ideas as to how best to cope with defense and security problems.

The transformation from the 'old' to the 'new order' and the ascent of the military to power in Indonesia had led to some drastic changes in Indonesian foreign policy. These were particularly concerned with a new emphasis on economic development and the complete reversal of the pro-communist and pro-China policies of Sukarno, both of which made for a markedly more pro-Western policy compared to the Sukarno days. But whilst the new leadership denounced the so-called Peking-Djakarta axis of Sukarno, which they saw as an aberration of the traditional Indonesian policy of non-alignment, they were not therefore prepared to go to the opposite extreme and throw themselves into the arms of the Western powers.

Being fundamentally suspicious of the external world and foreign interests and believing that outside powers, both 'East' and 'West', will remain intent on dominating Southeast Asia, the Indonesian leaders are determined on a policy of self-reliance especially in security and defense matters. They also believe that so should other Southeast Asian states behave. 169 In this view, then, the paragraphs in the ASEAN Declaration are a reminder that the region has a security problem and that eventually (and in the not too distant future) the countries of the area must take care of it themselves if they are to retain their independence and avoid foreign domination. It goes without saying that Indonesian leaders envisage a dominant role for themselves in regional affairs. 170

The Filipinos see the problem differently. Ever since it gained its independence from the United States in 1946 the Philippines has had intimate defence contacts and agreements with the United States, and the latter has operated a number of military bases in the islands. Apart from their common membership in SEATO this defence cooperation has been based on three bilateral agreements; the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the Military Assistance Pact, also of 1947, and the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. 171 If there is one recurrent theme in particular in Filipino foreign policy it is anti-communism and a preoccupation with security. These twin factors have led her foreign policy to, at times, oscillate between a strong reliance on the alliance with the United States and a search for security alternatives within Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular. In the end, however, her policy has always tended

169. Reference has been made above to these Indonesian attitudes. See above this chapter. See also Polomka, op.cit., Leifer, op. cit. and Weinstein, "The Uses", op. cit., and in Wilcox, op. cit.

170. Ibid.

171. For details about these agreements, see Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-58, pp.60-63 and pp.68-69.
to revert back to reliance on the United States in security matters. The preference of Ramos at Bangkok for the deletion of the paragraphs in the Indonesian proposal referring to the security of the prospective memberstates was not, therefore, a sign that the Filipino government considered these matters unimportant or less urgent than the Indonesians, but rather that to Manila they were an indication of prejudice towards the particular security policies pursued by successive Filipino governments.

As far as Singapore was concerned similar motives were behind her objections. She too had extensive defence links with a Western power, in her case Britain. In fact Singapore provided space for the biggest base by far Britain had in the area. Although her leaders realised that she could not forever rely on Britain, prime minister Lee Kuan Yew as late as March 1966 spoke confidently of having ten to fifteen years before Singapore would have to fend for her own defence. Despite the fact that there were indications by August 1967 that this period might be somewhat shorter than anticipated, the Singapore leaders were still banking on British protection, and with good reason because as late as November 1967 the British defence minister Denis Healey assured Singapore and Malaysia that Britain would maintain her forces until the middle of the 1970's.

Hence, at Bangkok, Rajaratnam, Singapore's foreign minister, probably tended to see the security paragraphs of the Indonesian proposal as an implicit criticism of Singapore as well. Moreover, as an overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese state, Singapore was sensitive to the fact that she must survive in a 'Malay sea', that is, on all her sides she is surrounded

172. See Abell, *op. cit.*, for a comprehensive review of the policies of the Philippines towards Southeast Asia in the 1960s. For the period 1954-61 see Vellut, *op.cit.*, For a relatively recent and general, but short and rather superficial, overview of Philippine foreign policy, see Robert O. Tilman, in Wilcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-225.

by states predominantly or wholly Malay in terms of ethnicity. Being very much aware of the latent and frequently manifest anti-Chinese sentiments throughout the region her feelings of insecurity stem not only from communism but this fact as well. To the extent that the Indonesian proposal implied a reliance, albeit in the future, on her Malay neighbours for her security this was only adding to her feeling of uneasiness.

The position taken in Bangkok by Malaysia and Thailand, both of them countries with extensive defence links with Britain and the United States respectively, is somewhat more difficult to explain insofar as their opposition to the security paragraphs would appear to have been less strong than that of the Philippines and Singapore. One possible explanation is simply that they refrained from too vocal an opposition for tactical reasons. As long as there was somebody to fight the battle for them they were content to take a back seat. But there were other likely reasons not necessarily incompatible with the previous explanation. Notwithstanding the Tunku's suspicions and reservations about relations with Indonesia a number of agreements and new cooperative measures had been established between the two countries following the official end to confrontation in August 1966. These included the setting up of a joint commission for defence and security, announced on 16 August 1966; the stationing of liaison teams on each other's territory in Borneo for the purpose of coordinating anticommunist activities, announced three weeks later; closer telecommunication links, announced in December; also in December the announcement of the planned loan of Indonesian teachers to Malay language schools in Malaysia, a measure given formal substantiation in the Indonesian-Malaysian Education Agreement of 3 June 1967; an agreement normalising trade relations in May 1967 and so on. 174

174. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 56-57.
1967 a substantial number of ties had been formed between Indonesia and Malaysia. The responsibility for these developments on the Malaysian side rested not so much with the Tunku as with Tun Razak and Tun Ismail who, together with Ghazali Shafie, the influential permanent head of the Foreign Affairs Department in Kuala Lumpur, were not hampered by the same reservations about everything Indonesian as the Tunku. Indeed, these men quickly developed considerable rapport with Malik as well as Suharto and other Indonesian leaders. Despite Malaysia's and Singapore's substantially similar defence links with Britain, the security paragraphs in the Indonesian proposal did not appear in quite the same obnoxious light to these Malaysians as to the Singaporeans, especially since they were not on the whole burdened with inter-ethnic suspicions and animosities in their relations with Indonesia in anywhere near the same degree as Singapore. The role of Tun Razak in Bangkok strongly suggests that the Malaysian opposition to the SEAARC proposal during the first half of 1967 wholly or to a substantial degree originated with the Tunku who only may have been persuaded to give his consent by Thanat Khoman with whom he had close relations.

As in the case of the Philippines the United States occupied a prominent role in the calculations the Thai leaders made when they viewed the world around them. Since 1950 the relationship between Thailand and the United States, in spite of high and low points, had tended to become closer and more mutually committed with each passing year. By 1967 their relationship amounted to a factual, if not formal, bilateral alliance

175. On the initiatives and the personal relationships between various leaders, see Mahathir bin Mohamad, "Trends in Foreign Policy and Regionalism", in Patrick Low (Ed.), Trends in Malaysia: proceedings and background paper of seminar on trends in Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, July 1971, p. 37.

176. Ibid. See also Gordon in Tilman, op. cit., p. 58.
oriented towards the war in Indo-China. However, since the middle of last century Thailand has sought to establish a more or less clearly defined position in world affairs. During the period of expansion of European imperialism she developed an active and resourceful diplomacy which enabled her to survive as an independent state. The fact that she was never colonised alone gave her a position of importance in the regional context. More relaxed and self-confident about her sovereign status she is less prone than other Southeast Asian countries to see threats to her independence where perhaps none exist. Her Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman had a long standing commitment to regional cooperation and had been deeply involved in the creation of ASA. But unlike the Tunku he was prepared to forego ASA if this could bring Indonesia closer to the rest of the region, and as noted he was intimately involved in the preparation and 'selling' of the SEAARC idea. He did not share the Tunku's misgivings about the Indonesians, and Thailand had at any rate not been directly a victim of Sukarno's policies during the preceding years. More concerned with the overriding objective of accommodating Indonesia, Thailand's objections to the security paragraphs were at best muted, and her role would appear to have been of a conciliatory nature more than anything else.

Thus the discussion in Bangkok was between Indonesia who believed that the Southeast Asian countries at the earliest opportunity should take steps to ensure their own security and defence without resort to alliances with any of the big powers, and the rest who, in varying

177. See David A. Wilson, "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia", in Wilcox et al. (eds.) op. cit., pp. 185-186.
degrees, believed their own security to be best safeguarded by defence arrangements with the Western powers at least for some time to come. Hence, to the extent the discussion was primarily centered around the efficacy of existing alliances, bases, and defence commitments, it was concerned with the means with which the individual countries sought to achieve an acceptable degree of security. In this respect there were differences between Indonesia and the others but perhaps not so sharp or clear cut as the debate in Bangkok would seem to indicate.

If one, however, looks at the other facet of security, threat, in particular the perceptions of the direction from which the most immediate and serious threats were thought to come, then the differences between the ASEAN countries are somewhat less obvious and do, at any rate, not divide the countries along the same lines as did the question of means.

The discussion about security and the related paragraphs in the ASEAN Declaration are indications that the member states were motivated by more than a desire to cooperate to enhance their economic and social well being. Since the whole question of the role of threat and security as a motivating force will be dealt with in a later chapter suffice it here to say that there are other indications as well of a preoccupation with these matters.

Whether or not the leaders who met in Bangkok were fundamentally motivated by considerations of security and threat, the organization they set up was nonetheless not a defence organization. The aims and purposes of ASEAN were the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region. They also included the promotion of regional peace and stability through respect for justice, the rule of law and the adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. To these ends cooperation should be undertaken such as in the economic, social, cultural, technical,
scientific and administrative fields. The institutional machinery at the disposal of the members consisted of a) an annual meeting of Foreign Ministers as the highest decision-making body. This ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was to be rotated between the capitals. The calling of special Meetings of Foreign Ministers was also provided for; b) a Standing Committee under the chairmanship of the foreign minister of the host country or his representative and the accredited ambassadors of the other member countries. This committee was charged with carrying on the work of the association in between meetings of the foreign ministers; c) Ad Hoc or Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects; and d) a National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the organization on behalf of their country and to assist the other bodies.

The similarities between ASA and ASEAN are striking enough to justify Gordon's claim that ASA, rather than having been supplanted, had simply been enlarged and given a new name. 181

The question of the institutional and administrative structure would not appear to have given rise to the same amount of debate in the case of ASEAN as it did when ASA was being formed. On that occasion the countries involved had had little or no experience pertaining to the formation of regional organizations, and it had taken a considerable effort to arrive at a structure to which all could agree. In 1967 the countries which established ASEAN - three of which had participated in the formation of ASA - could look to the latter as a model for the new organization. There is also evidence that some of the considerations which had motivated the members of ASA in 1961 and before were present also in 1967. Indonesia's insistence on a new organization rather than an expansion of ASA was partly

caused by the desire to attract Burma and Cambodia as members. The refer-
ence in the preamble of the ASEAN Declaration to the temporary nature of
extra-regional military bases in the region would likewise appear to have
been inserted partly to make ASEAN a more palatable proposition to countries
such as Burma and Cambodia. 182 Several attempts were later made to attract
especially these countries but without success.

Without prejudging the issue, especially in the light of later
developments, it can safely be said that the formation of ASEAN in August
1967 was by far the most important attempt at regional cooperation ever
undertaken in Southeast Asia. The fact that it outweighed ASA must be
attributed to the participation of Indonesia. Apart from including a
country well-endowed with natural resources Indonesia's membership in
ASEAN meant that about 68 per cent of the total area and about 72 per
cent of the population of Southeast Asia were included within the ASEAN
framework. 183 Thus, to the extent they would be able to act and speak
together the ASEAN countries possessed an authority in regional as well
as world affairs well beyond that of ASA.

182. See a report to this effect in Manila Bulletin, 9 August, 1967.
183. See Tilman, Man, State and Society, table 13, p. 586.
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

It is impossible to approach the study of Southeast Asia without immediately becoming aware of the prevalence of conflict both within and between states, both violent and non-violent. Some have their roots in historical events long passed, others in processes of colonization and decolonization, and still others in modern ideological cleavages.

The difficulties involved in solving these conflicts are notorious, something to which the whole story of the Vietnam conflict bears tragic witness. It has been suggested on more than one occasion that regional organization is one way by which international conflicts can be kept within limits and perhaps resolved. To the extent interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia have been directly related to regional organization this has been done mostly in terms of the impediments to closer cooperation created by specific conflicts. In other words, the approach has been one according to which the assessment has been made of the impact of a particular conflict on the prevailing relations between two or more states. ¹ In the following an attempt will be made to analyse the relationship between regional organization and member state conflict from the opposite angle, that is, the point of view will be one whereby an assess-

¹. This is the approach of Michael Leifer, *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1972). Ch. 8. It is also essentially the approach of Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions*, op. cit., passim.
ment is made of the influence of organizations such as ASA and ASEAN qua organizations on conflicts between member states.

Southeast Asia is rich in conflicts and this chapter cannot deal with all of them. Given the approach just outlined neither would all conflicts be suitable subjects of analysis. From the point of view of regional organization intra-regional conflicts can be divided into mainly three categories. Firstly, there are conflicts between states outside the regional cooperative framework dealt with in this study. The entire complex of conflicts in Indo-China belongs essentially in this category.

Secondly, there are conflicts between states inside and states outside this framework. The more or less overt state of hostility between Thailand and Cambodia which lasted throughout the entire 1960's belongs to this second category.

The third category of conflicts are those between states chiefly involved in the regional cooperation under study here, that is, conflicts between the member states of ASA and ASEAN. Only the conflicts within the third category readily lend themselves to analysis according to the approach of this chapter, and only one conflict will be chosen as subject of study. The specific conflict to be examined is the dispute over Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines. The reasons for selecting this particular dispute are two. Firstly, the dispute is at present dormant but on two previous occasions it was a critical issue in the relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, and it did pose a threat to the existence of two different regional organizations. Secondly, the fact that the Sabah dispute twice flared up and that it affected two regional organizations means that an examination of it offers excellent opportunities for comparison.
THE FIRST SABAH CRISIS

The origin of the Philippines' claim to Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) is a long and complicated story of which only a heavily abbreviated version will be recapitulated here. Reduced to its bare essentials the historical antecedents to the claim are as follows. In 1877 Baron de Overbeck, operating as agent for the British firm of Dent Brothers, concluded an agreement with the Sultan of Brunei according to which the former was granted a portion of the territory of North Borneo by the Sultan. However, having learned that some of the territory referred to in this agreement had been ceded in 1704 to the Sultan of Sulu by the Sultan of Brunei, Overbeck concluded an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu in January 1878 for the purpose of acquiring a clear title to the lands included in the 1877 agreement. In 1881 Dent and Overbeck received a Royal Charter and in March 1882 the British North Borneo Company was formed. The area became a British Crown Colony in 1946 when the North Borneo Company sold its interests and gave up all its rights in North Borneo to the Crown. The essence of the dispute lies in the interpretation of the January 1878 agreement which, according to the Philippines, merely provided for a lease of the territory and not, as argued by Britain initially and Malaysia subsequently, a transfer of sovereignty.

In the years after 1946 successive Philippine governments did nothing to pursue the claim. In late 1961, however, shortly after Diosdado

3. Ibid.
Macapagal had been elected President of the Philippines there appeared in the Philippines Free Press a series of articles the main theme of which was that North Borneo belonged to the Philippines. About six months later, in June 1962, it was announced that the Philippine government, as the successor to the Sultan of Sulu, intended to claim North Borneo as a part of the Philippines.

The motives behind the Philippine claim would appear to be numerous. Firstly, there were the activities of the heirs to the Sultan of Sulu. As just mentioned, soon after the election of Macapagal to the Presidency, the Philippines Free Press carried a series of articles the crux of which was that North Borneo rightly belonged to the Philippines. These articles would appear to have been instigated by the activities of Nicosia Osmena, an attorney to the heirs of the Sultan. The call for an official claim was soon echoed in other newspapers. An initially hesitant response on the part of the Government received encouragement by resolutions passed in the Congress of the Philippines urging the President to take the necessary steps to 'recover' North Borneo. Despite apparent disagreements within the administration, Foreign Minister Pelaez being notably less enthusiastic about the claim, the Government in a note of 22 June 1962 to the British Government made official what already had been evident but unofficial for some time, namely that the Philippines laid claim to British North Borneo.

A second factor was President Macapagal himself. Early in his public career he had taken an interest in the case, and after having been an official in his country's foreign service he entered the Congress where

he initiated a resolution in 1950 urging the then government to press the claim. Although this attempt to activate the claim was unsuccessful and he did not mention the matter publicly for another twelve years, Macapagal had not forgotten it. 8

A third factor was the nature of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Ever since the Philippines gained her independence from the United States the relationship between the two countries had been very close. In fact, the relationship was such that it laid the Philippines open to accusations of being an American 'stooge' and still a virtual colony of the United States. 9 Sensitive to such accusations the Filipinos have tried for this reason and others to do away with this image and to cultivate more intimate relations with other Asian and Southeast Asian countries. These relations such as they were have nevertheless on the whole been subordinate to her relations with the United States. However, notwithstanding the closeness of ties with the Americans numerous irritants and problems have occurred in the relationship from time to time. Not unexpectedly in such an unequal but close relationship the weakest party will now and then attempt to assert its independence vis-a-vis the stronger. During the first two years of the Macapagal Administration the relationship between the two countries was characterized by a degree of Filipino self-assertion and search for a separate 'identity' which expressed itself in disagreements with the United States over such issues as Laos where the Philippine Government supported the right wing elements and opposed Souvanna Phouma and the neutralists, latterly preferred by the Americans. 10 The Sabah question likewise became an issue in relation to

which the Philippines could demonstrate her independence of the United States. In a communication to the Philippine Government in February 1962 the Americans appealed to the Filipinos to maintain good relations with Britain, a 'mutual friend' and ally. At the same time the United States adopted the position that the Sultan of Sulu had indeed relinquished sovereignty over North Borneo and that the territory was now a British Protectorate. As suggested by several observers this American disapproval of a Philippine claim to Sabah may have had an effect quite contrary to what was intended.

Linked to the idea of a separate Philippine identity was a fourth factor involving some more or less strong Pan-Malay sentiments among certain Filipinos. Submerged, but never far from the surface, these sentiments acquired a new significance as the Philippines sought to demonstrate her independence from the United States by moving closer to Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. More importantly, the Pan-Malay sentiments could be exploited and made to work in the interest of the Sabah claim. The scheme whereby this was to be done was the 'Greater Malay Confederation' proposed by Macapagal in a press conference on 27 July 1962. Macapagal's proposal stemmed from a University of the Philippines study commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. The primary purpose of the proposal was 'to prevent the British from unilaterally transferring sovereignty over North Borneo to a federation which excludes the Philippines' and 'to keep open the avenue to a negotiated settlement of the status of North Borneo'. In his press conference Macapagal depicted

11. Ibid., p. 131.
13. See Gordon, Ibid., pp. 22ff for a detailed discussion of this scheme.
Malaysia as a colonial scheme concocted in Britain. At the time it was proposed that the participants in the confederation should be Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. However, after the revolt in Brunei in December 1962 when Indonesia came out strongly against Malaysia, Macapagal changed his proposal to include Indonesia as well.

On 1 August 1962 representatives of Britain and Malaya reached agreement in London on the formation of Malaysia the official establishment of which would take place on 31 August 1963. On 7 August the British Government replied to the Philippines note of 22 June in which the claim had been officially made. In its reply the British Government flatly rejected the claim as well as the request for discussions on the matter.

In late 1962 this rather rigid British position softened somewhat. The immediate cause was the revolt in Brunei and on 29 December a joint communique between the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy in Manila announced that consultations would take place between the two governments. The talks began in London on 28 January 1963 but did not reach any conclusive results. Follow on discussions in Manila in March proved equally fruitless and with that the door was for all practical purposes closed for further discussions between Britain and the Philippines.

This did not mean that the Sabah question had disappeared. In March 1963 Manila had already embarked on another course of action the main feature of which was the attempt to pursue the claim within a Southeast

Asian context. In an aide-memoire of 2 August 1962 to the Malayan Government the Philippine Government had directly involved the Malayans in the dispute. This aide-memoire was a response to the London agreement of the previous day, and in its reply, dispatched on 3 October, the Malayan Government made clear that it did not accept the idea of a claim and that under any circumstances, the dispute over North Borneo was a matter between the Philippines and Britain. 19 These communications, apart from involving the Malayan Government directly in the exchange about the claim, were significant also in that both the Philippine and the Malayan notes contained references to ASA. The Philippine note thus ended:

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs requests the Malayan Ambassador to convey to his Government these views and considerations of the Philippine Government as well as the hope that the actions and decisions of his Government in regard to the disputed territory of North Borneo will in no way affect adversely the fraternal relations existing between the two countries as evidenced by the strong support they have given to ASA.

In this note Manila held up, indeed threatened, the possibility of the Sabah issue disrupting ASA if Kuala Lumpur did not behave in a more forthcoming manner.

The Malayan reply of 3 October was not dissimilar. After a reference to a public exchange of statements between the Tunku and the Philippine Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lopez, in which the Sabah

19. Ibid., pp. 31 and 34.
issue and ASA were linked together by both 21, the concluding paragraph of the Malayan note stated:

It may be pointed out that there has been no intention on the part of the Federation of Malaya to link the issue of the Philippine claim to North Borneo with ASA. However in view of the fact that undue excitement has been aroused in the Philippines over this matter the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya does not consider it advisable for him personally to attend ASA Conference in which case the Federation of Malaya will be represented by another Minister unless of course the excitement will have died down by then. 22

No less than the Philippine note, the Malayan served warning that ASA was a possible casualty if the Philippines persisted with the claim. The meeting referred to in the Malayan note was the ASA Ministerial Meeting scheduled to take place in December in Manila. However, in the beginning of that month an event took place which was to lend a new complexion, not to say complexity, to the situation. This was the revolt in Brunei. 23

Since 1888 Brunei had been a British Protectorate ruled by a Sultan who until 1959 was theoretically an absolute monarch. He was, however, by treaty bound to accept British advice on all matters other than religion and custom. In 1959 a new constitution was introduced which left Brunei self-governing but with Britain responsible for defence and foreign affairs. When Malaysia was first conceived the British were anxious that Brunei - rich in natural resources, especially oil - should join Malaysia. In December 1961 the ruler of Brunei, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin, announced a provisional decision to join Malaysia, although he would appear to have

22. For text of the Malayan note, see Boyce, op.cit., pp. 117-118.
been less than completely enthusiastic about the idea. The main opposition, however, came from the Party Ra'ayat and its leader A.M. Azahari. Founded in 1956 by Azahari the Party Ra'ayat (Borneo People's Party) fought the elections in August 1962 inter alia on a platform which opposed the entry of Brunei into Malaysia and advocated the formation of Kalimantan Utara, a federation which would consist of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. The Party Ra'ayat won a landslide victory by capturing all the sixteen elected seats in the thirty-three-man Legislative Council. 24

The first meeting of the Legislative Council was scheduled for 5 December 1962 and the Party Ra'ayat announced that it would introduce motions which rejected Malaysia, requested the restoration to Brunei of sovereignty over Sarawak and North Borneo, and called for a British grant of independence to a Borneo federation. By this time the situation in Brunei had been growing increasingly tense and the meeting of the Council was postponed. As early as May the Borneo Bulletin reported that an Indonesian led liberation army was hiding in the jungle near the border of Sarawak ready to advance into North Borneo. 25 Azahari, who allegedly had contacts with the communist parties in Indonesia, Singapore and Sarawak, went to Manila in November where he sought support for Kalimantan Utara. On 7 December he returned again to Manila where reportedly he told Philippine officials that a revolt was being planned. 26 The same day the Party Ra'ayat led a revolt against the Sultan, and from a Manila hotel Azahari proclaimed the new state of Kalimantan Utara. 27 This proclamation was, however, somewhat premature since only a few days later the rebellion was defeated by British troops sent from Singapore.

As time passed by Azahari's presence in Manila began to be an embarrassment to the Philippine Government. On 14 December he appealed for Philippine recognition of his Kalimantan Utara government but on 18 December Macapagal announced that his government was not ready to extend such recognition. This refusal was probably less due to any desire to avoid antagonising Malaya than to the fact that Kalimantan Utara would include North Borneo. 28 It is difficult on the whole to avoid the conclusion that the Philippine government in its fairly extensive, though unofficial, dealings with Azahari was out to embarrass Malaya rather than further the cause of Azahari and Kalimantan Utara. To argue the latter would be to overlook the glaring incompatibility between the Philippine claim and Azahari's federation.

The Tunku requested a postponement of the ASA Ministerial Meeting in Manila in January 1963, one of the likely reasons being irritation over the continued presence of Azahari in Manila. 29 A contributing and perhaps more important factor may have been the possibility, indeed the certainty, that the Sabah claim would be raised at the meeting. Lopez had already expressed the intention to bring up the matter when he stated that the Philippines wanted to take advantage of the Malayan Prime Minister's presence in Manila by putting forward the Filipino point of view, the basis of the claim, and asking him to take these considerations into account. 30 In view of the Malayan aide-memoire of 3 October in which the Malayans made clear that in their opinion no basis for a claim existed and that, under any circumstances, the dispute was one strictly between the Philippines and Britain, it would seem likely that the

Tunku wished to avoid a situation in which he may have been compelled by the circumstances to discuss the claim directly with the Philippines.

Although the revolt in Brunei had been a failure it had at least shown that genuine opposition to Malaysia existed. This served to harden the determination of the Philippines. It also had the result of provoking the active opposition to Malaysia on the part of Indonesia who until then had displayed a somewhat ambiguous, but not altogether hostile attitude towards Malaysia. The period which now follows is one during which there is increasing association between the Philippines and Indonesia because of their common opposition to Malaysia.

In a speech in Jogjakarta on 20 January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio announced that Indonesia would 'pursue a policy of confrontation against Malaya'. \(^{31}\) As reasons for this policy he gave the hostile attitude of Malaya and her role as a tool of colonialism and imperialism. \(^{32}\) On 1 February the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Jani, said the army was awaiting orders to move in support of the people 'struggling for independence in North Borneo'. \(^{33}\) The Indonesian attitude was further underscored by the moral, political and eventual military support for Azahari and his state of Kalimantan Utara. \(^{34}\)

The Philippine attitude was at this time spelt out on two occasions in particular. These were the talks in London between the Philippines and Britain which started on 28 January, and President Macapagal's State of the Nation address delivered before the Philippines Congress, also on 28 January. As it happened the talks in London derived their sig-

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31. For the text of the speech see Boyce, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-70.
nificance not so much from their results, which were negative, as from what they revealed about Philippine policy.

In his opening statement 35 Vice President Pelaez, the leader of the Philippine delegation, made it clear that the Philippine Government considered the settlement of the dispute basic to the stability and security of Southeast Asia. After having spelled out the communist threat he argued that Malaysia was not the answer to the stability of the area and that North Borneo would be better protected from the communist menace if a part of the Philippines than of Malaysia. He then went on to propose a short-range and a long-range solution. The former would consist of an arrangement 'concerning the island of Borneo which Indonesia and the Philippines, the two countries most directly concerned, would not actively oppose. The long range solution would call for a more permanent accommodation among the three Malay countries, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, so that together they may be able to achieve a better life in larger freedom for their peoples through a new found spirit of unity and cooperation'. 36 For the first time the idea of a Malay Confederation had been extended to include Indonesia.

President Macapagal's address to the Congress the same day repeated much the same arguments contained in the statement of Pelaez. 37 Again the argument was that North Borneo was vital to the security of the Philippines, and consequently, the territory must not be placed under the sovereignty of a state on the Asian mainland such as Malaya, since should Malaya succumb to the communist threat, the Philippines would have a

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., pp. 5-7 for the relevant parts of President Macapagal's address.
If they had not been certain before, the London talks must have convinced the Filipinos that little or nothing was to be gained by dealing with Britain. This conviction coupled with the newly declared, strong Indonesian opposition to Malaysia combined to provide the necessary incentive for a shift in Philippine tactics. In the months ahead increasing emphasis was put on the attempt to convene a tripartite conference between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. The idea of such a conference had been raised even before the London talks and after initial discussions between Lopez and the Indonesian Ambassador to Manila in late February, a subministerial meeting between Indonesia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito Kusmowidagdo, Malaya's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ghazali Shafie and the Philippine Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lopez, started in Manila on 9 April. Only a few days before, from 2 to 9 April, the postponed ASA ministerial meeting had taken place, also in Manila. The attendance of the Tunku and his meetings with Macapagal, served to pave the way for the subsequent sequence of meetings. Although the basic position of the three countries did not change, the subministerial meeting agreed on a very general agenda for a ministerial meeting in May. In fact, the communique after the meeting made no mention of the dispute between the countries.

In the subsequent weeks none of the parties changed their basic attitude. If anything Indonesia stepped up her campaign verbally, as

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40. Ibid., p. 46.
43. Leifer, op. cit., p. 49.
44. Far Eastern Economic Review, op.cit.,
well as militarily, by making their first armed raids into North Borneo
and Sarawak. As the tension grew between Malaya and Indonesia it fell to
the Filipinos to step into the role as mediator in order to get the planned
conference off the ground. In late May, when Sukarno made a brief stopover
in Manila on his way to Tokyo for a vacation, Macapagal urged him to meet
the Tunku who also was heading for the Japanese capital. Sukarno refused
but when in Tokyo, he changed his mind. The result was more successful
than the more skeptical observers had anticipated. The two leaders agreed
that a ministerial meeting should be held in Manila on 7 June. They further-
more decided to take steps to dampen and stop the acrimonious propaganda
war between their respective governments. 45

The ministerial conference took place in Manila as planned and
was attended by Pelaez for the Philippines, Tun Razak for Malaya and Sub-
andrio for Indonesia. Pelaez stressed the determination of the Philippines
to pursue the claim by peaceful means and again he put forward Macapagal's
idea of a Malay Confederation as the means best suited to solve the dispute. 46
As in the London talks he rested much of the Philippine case on the security
and defence needs of the area. The final communiqué revealed that the con-
ference had accepted Macapagal's confederation idea and to that end it
recommended to the forthcoming summit meeting, which was to take place in
Manila no later than the end of July, 'the establishment of machinery for
regular consultations among their governments at all levels on problems of
common concern, such as security, stability and economic, social and
cultural development'. 47  The Sabah claim received only a brief mention

45. Leifer, op. cit., p. 49, Abell, op. cit., pp. 201-202. See also
46. Leifer, Ibid., p. 49.
which stated that the ministers had arrived at 'a common understanding and agreement on how this problem should be resolved justly and expeditiously'.

The precariousness of this deceptively consensual agreement was soon demonstrated when disagreement arose as to what had really been decided by the ministers, especially as to what mechanism to be adopted in order to ascertain the views of the peoples of the Borneo territories.

The event that most seriously threatened to wreck the planned summit was the Malaysia Agreement, concluded in London on 8 July, 1963 between Britain, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo. The agreement stipulated that Malaysia would come into existence on 31 August. Sukarno immediately condemned the agreement and characterized the Tunku as 'a man who does not keep his word'. The Indonesian position was that the Malaysia Agreement should have come after the will of the peoples of the Borneo territories had been ascertained. Again Sukarno reiterated the Indonesian opposition to Malaysia and expressed doubts about the usefulness and success of the forthcoming summit meetings. The Tunku's answer to the Indonesian allegations was that 'I have done nothing to the best of my knowledge, to break any word or promise I have given to President Sukarno in connection with Malaysia'. The exchange between Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta became so heated that in order to rescue the summit meeting President Macapagal felt compelled to send cables to the Tunku and Sukarno requesting both to use 'moderation' in their statements.

48. Ibid. 49. See Abell, op. cit., pp. 207-209.
51. Ibid., p. 190. 52. Ibid., 18 July 1963, p. 148.
The tension between the parties notwithstanding, on 30 July the summit conference commenced in Manila with Macapagal, the Tunku and Sukarno as the main participants. At the end of the summit three documents were released which summarized the results of the conference. These documents were the Manila Accord, the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement. From paragraphs 4 to 7 of the Joint Statement, which dealt with the establishment of Malaysia, it was clear that the Tunku no longer insisted on 31 August as the formation date of Malaysia. Sukarno's contribution to the compromise consisted in the relinquishing of his demand for a referendum in the Borneo territories. Instead it was agreed that the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative should ascertain the wishes of the people of the Borneo territories prior to the establishment of Malaysia. The Malayans undertook to consult the British Government and to request from it the cooperation necessary for the UN mission to carry out its task, which was to be observed by representatives of the three governments. The Philippine claim to Sabah was dealt with in paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement and paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Manila Accord. In calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute these paragraphs did not go beyond what previously had been agreed to by the foreign ministers in June.

However, the summit gained added significance by another decision. Inspired by Macapagal's idea of a Greater Malay Confederation the three leaders decided to establish an association to be known as "Maphilindo". Referred to in both the Manila Accord, and the Joint Statement and the Manila Declaration, Maphilindo was envisaged as a grouping of three nations which

55. For text of these documents, see Malaya/Philippine Relations, *op. cit.*, appendices VII, IX and X, pp. 28-34. The documents are also reproduced in Wolfstone, *The Malays*, *op. cit.*, p. 189 and pp. 192-193. See also Boyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-74 for the text of the Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration.
would work 'together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty'. To that end it was decided that each country should initially establish a National Secretariat for Maphilindo affairs which would consult with each other until such time a more permanent machinery could be established. Not much was said about the tasks to be performed by the association. Paragraph 9 of the Joint Statement refers to frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo as did paragraph 6 and the last paragraph of the Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration respectively. The Declaration states the determination of the three countries to strengthen cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields whilst all three documents state the primary responsibility of the three countries for the maintenance of stability, peace and security in the area.

Maphilindo was based on the assumed existence of a sense of community among peoples of Malay origin which were thought to be bound together by ties of race and culture. However, the fragile nature of these shared sentiments soon became evident, as did the apparent agreement on the establishment of Malaysia. The first difficulties arose between Britain on the one hand and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other. The British Government had not liked the idea of a referendum and a delay in the formation of Malaysia, Duncan Sandys the Commonwealth Secretary, telling the House of Commons that both were a 'mistake'. British officials

58. See chapter 6 below on the concept of mushawarah as a method of diplomacy.
59. The Manila Accord, paragraph 4 and 5.
were also dismayed that the Tunku had not extracted a firm date for Malaysia and had agreed to the inclusion of Indonesian and Philippine observers on the UN team. On the question of observers the British were not prepared to allow more than two from each country whilst Indonesia and the Philippines requested many more. Difficulties also arose over the Indonesian demand for landing rights and the status of the 'clerical assistants' of the Indonesian and Philippine observers. When all those difficulties had been resolved and the observers joined the UN team on 1 September the latter had already been at work for several days. But on 29 August the Malayan Government announced that Malaysia would be established on 16 September irrespective of the result of the UN mission's findings. The Malayans argued that this was fully consistent with the spirit and letter of the Manila Accord according to which the ascertainment would be done prior to the establishment of Malaysia. Since the UN Secretary-General had indicated to the parties concerned that the conclusion of this process would be made known by 14 September the Malay Government considered it had acted in accordance with the Manila Accord. Apart from pressure exerted by the British Government in the person of Duncan Sandys, who had come to Kuala Lumpur ostensibly to 'direct' the formation of Malaysia, much pressure would seem to have been put on the Malayans to set a date for Malaysia's inception by the political leaders of the Borneo territories and Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, showed his displeasure with what he considered the weakness of the Tunku, by declaring Singapore independent on 31 August, the date of the original Malaysia day.

The Indonesian and Philippine reactions to this move on the part of the Malayan Government were not unexpected. On 3 September the Indonesian Government deemed the Malayan decision 'reckless and premature' and from Manila, Lopez, now Secretary of Foreign Affairs, expressed similar sentiments. Three days later Subandrio declared that the UN mission's findings would only be on the basis of a superficial survey in the Borneo territories and his government dispatched a protest note to Kuala Lumpur only to have it rejected by the Malayan Government.

On his way to the United Nations, Lopez was also reported during a stopover in Manila to have criticised the manner in which the UN team had carried out its task.

The Secretary-General's report on the ascertainment was published on 13 September used stated inter alia that

'It is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories ... wish to engage with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia...'

The earlier hints by Subandrio and Lopez now assumed the status of official policy when both the Indonesian and the Philippine Government refused to accept the findings of the Secretary-General's report. On 15 September the Malayan ambassador in Manila was called to the Foreign Office in Manila where he was informed that the Philippine Government had decided to defer action on the question of recognition of Malaysia. The Philippine ambassador in Kuala Lumpur would be recalled for immediate con-

68. See Boyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78 for the text of the Secretary-General's report. The quote is from p. 76.
sultations until such time that the President made a decision about recognition. In the meantime the Philippine Government proposed that relations between the two countries be maintained at the consular level. This, however, was unacceptable to the Malaysian (previously Malayan) Government which proceeded to sever completely all diplomatic ties with Manila. 70 When a similar attitude was adopted by Indonesia the Malaysian Government broke off diplomatic relations with her too. From now on the Thai Government looked after Malaysian interests in Indonesia and the Philippines.

The situation which in the eyes of the Philippine Government had to be avoided if the claim to Sabah was to be realized, had now been brought about. 71 The last and only remaining measure at the disposal of the Filipinos was the threat of withholding recognition. On the very eve of the establishment of Malaysia this last card was played without success. Malaysia was now an established fact and Malayan and Filipino common membership in ASA and Maphilindo had done little or nothing to prevent the break or indeed solve the dispute over Sabah.

Relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, broken off on 17 September 1963, were not restored at the ambassadorial level for nearly three years. The Philippines demanded that Malaysia agree to a definite procedure for the settlement of the Sabah claim. This included a demand for a promise on the part of Malaysia to submit the case to the International Court at the Hague, and the Philippines made this a condition for resumption of diplomatic relations. The Malaysians, on their part, demanded recognition of Malaysia in return for which they would see that the Philippine claim would be brought to a just and expeditious solution

71. Leifer, op. cit., p. 55.
by peaceful means which was a euphemism for discussions and nothing more'. 72

By the end of 1963 the matter had reached a deadlock and in the ensuing time numerous efforts were made by various mediators to bring an end to the dispute. These efforts partly ran parallel with and partly were mixed up with attempts to bring an end to confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia which now rapidly escalated. 73 The persons most actively involved as mediators were Thailand's Thanat Khoman, Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, the United States' Robert Kennedy, the United Nations' U Thant, Japan's Sato and finally even the Philippines' Macapagal.

Sihanouk arranged a meeting in Phnom Penh in February 1964 between the Tunku and Macapagal but not much progress was made on the Sabah issue. However, the meeting eased the atmosphere somewhat and led to an agreement between the two leaders to establish consular relations, a decision which came into effect the following August. 74

The most active of the mediators and in the end the most successful was, however, Thanat Khoman of Thailand. Under his auspices several meetings were held between the parties to the Sabah dispute and confrontation. When full diplomatic relations were agreed to between Malaysia and the Philippines in June 1966 this was in no small measure due to his efforts and consummate patience. 75 Nonetheless, the main factors were the obvious failure of Macapagal's policies 76 and the change in the leadership in the

75. See Ott, ibid., pp. 609-610.
76. See Abell, op. cit., pp. 281-288.
Philippines brought about by the elections in 1965 ushering in Ferdinand Marcos as the new President. In his first State of the Nation address in January 1966, Marcos declared that 'we intend to set arrangements in motion for the normalization of our relations with Malaysia without, however, prejudicing our claim to North Borneo and impairing our friendship with other countries'. When relations at the ambassadorial level were established some six months later it appeared that the new administration had relegated the claim to a more unobtrusive place on the list of priorities, an act many hoped was only a prelude to its removal altogether from the list of Philippine foreign policy goals. This, however, was not to be the case.

THE SECOND SABAH CRISIS

During 1966 and 1967 Malaysian and Philippine interaction was dominated by the re-establishment of relations, the reactivation of ASA, and later, with the negotiations and preparations leading to the formation of ASEAN. These were developments with which Thailand and Indonesia also were closely associated and they have been dealt with in chapter 2.

The Sabah issue, which for some time had been absent from the scene, did, however, reappear. So little had been heard of the matter that until the elections in Sabah in April 1967 many thought the issue had died a quiet death. As a gesture to the Philippines the Malaysian Government invited the Filipinos to send observers to the Sabah elections which had been promoted inter alia as a test of territory's desire to remain within Malaysia. Marcos was apparently at first tempted to accept but he did none-theless in the end refuse the invitation. Instead the Philippine Government indicated that it would be willing to invite a Malaysian delegation to

77. Quoted in Leifer, op. cit., p. 65.
Manila to discuss possible modes of settlement. Barely had this offer been made when the Philippine Consul-General in a letter to the Straits Times on 1 April charged that free elections were not possible in Sabah. The Malaysian foreign ministry reacted immediately and asked for 'urgent clarifications' while hinting that further public debate would adversely affect relations between the two countries. 78

The Sabah elections resulted in an overwhelming re-affirmation of the state's wish to remain within Malaysia. This did not, however, cause the Philippines to have second thoughts about the claim. As late as June 1967 there would appear still to exist a measure of reluctance on the part of elements within the Marcos Administration to give up the idea of a revival of Maphilindo lest this would in some way weaken the Philippine claim. 79 In an early version of a charter for SEAARC the Philippines would appear to have included a reservation related to the Sabah claim. However, when Ramos went to Bangkok to attend the conference at which ASEAN was established, the Philippine Government's position was then that the claim was safeguarded by the Manila Accord of 1963 as well as the exchange of notes normalizing relations between Malaysia and the Philippines the previous year. 80 Again, when Ramos later in August went to the ministerial meeting of ASA, not yet dissolved in favour of ASEAN, it was reported that he had been instructed by Marcos to impress on the Malaysian Government the continued existence of the claim. 'We are pursuing the claim firmly and without let up' he was reported to have told Ramos. 81

Despite these indications it would appear that the Philippine Government throughout 1967 was intent only on avoiding actions that could in any way jeopardize her claim rather than actively pursue the matter with the Malaysian Government. This interpretation gained added credence as a result of Tun Razak's official visit to Manila in December during which it was agreed that a date and place to settle the Sabah claim should be kept open. 82 As a result of this attitude on the part of the Philippines the Sabah issue did not play a significant role in the events and discussions leading to the formation of ASEAN.

In the following year, however, this rather tranquil situation was to change abruptly. The year began inconspicuously enough with a state visit to Kuala Lumpur by Marcos in January 1968. According to Marcos himself, the Sabah claim was not discussed 83 apart from re-affirming previous understandings to the effect that talks should be held as soon as feasible on a date to be mutually agreed upon by the two governments. 84 It appeared that neither government was in a hurry to set a date for such talks.

Then, in March, the Corregidor affair all of a sudden broke into the open. Based on the testimony of Muslim recruit, Tibin Arula, who claimed to have participated, Manila newspapers carried reports that a 'secret army' had been in training on the island of Corregidor with the purpose of invading Sabah. Although government involvement was denied congressional investigations were set in motion to establish the facts of the case. Leaders within the opposition party accused Marcos of having

Only two days after the affair became public knowledge Malaysia dispatched a protest note to Manila on 23 March declaring that she regarded such activities as a most serious breach of good faith and friendly relations. The Philippine Government was asked for a full explanation in the interest of continued peaceful relations between the two countries. At the same time Malaysia's representative at the United Nations was instructed to bring the matter to the attention of the Secretary-General of the UN. On 24 March the Philippine Government rejected the Malaysian note on the grounds that the Corregidor affair was an internal matter. Marcos also let it be known that he had instructed the Philippine representative at the UN to seek the good offices of the UN Secretary-General to persuade the Malaysian Government to agree to a settlement of the dispute, preferably through the International Court of Justice. The relations between the two countries rapidly deteriorated especially after the appearance of what turned out to be inaccurate reports about a Malaysian seizure of a Filipino motor boat and intrusions of Malaysian naval boats and aircraft into Philippine territory.

Thus, barely six months after the establishment of ASEAN the Sabah dispute again raised its unwieldy head to threaten the existence of yet another attempt at regional organization. To the Malaysians this was certainly one important implication of the revival of the claim as can be gauged from the Tunku's comment 25 April that the situation between the two countries was tense and that the Sabah dispute could ruin ASEAN.

86. *Asian Almanac*, ibid., p. 2790. 87. Ibid.
'Tense' relations notwithstanding, on 18 April the Philippine Government accepted a Malaysian suggestion that talks be held in Bangkok in June. On the eve of tense talks, which started on 17 June, the leaders of the two delegations reiterated the position of their countries. The Filipinos again argued that the dispute should be brought before the International Court of Justice whilst the Malaysians came to Bangkok with the intent of seeking clarification of the Philippine case and already rejecting the court in the Hague as a mode of settlement. The conference lasted for nearly a month with numerous adjournments and interruptions due mainly to the need of the Philippine delegation to obtain fresh instructions from Manila. The results were in the end non-existent with the two delegations not departing from their initial negotiating stand throughout the entire month. In the end the Malaysian delegation rejected the Philippine claim outright and walked out of the conference. A few days after the collapse of the conference on 16 July, the Philippines informed Malaysia that she would recall all but one of her embassy staff in Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysians responded by recalling their ambassador in Manila for 'consultations'. The Philippine embassy staff, however, remained in Kuala Lumpur and the Tun Razak declared that the Malaysian move was not to be regarded as a break in diplomatic relations.

In August two opportunities arose for the two parties to come together. The first was the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in Canberra from 30 July to 1 August at the start of which the Japanese

92. For developments during the falls see, *ibid.*, 7 September 1968, pp. 2900-2903.
93. For the concluding statement by the leader of the Malaysian delegation, see *Malaysia's Stand on Sabah*, (Department of Information, Malaysia n.d.)
delegation announced the willingness of their Foreign Minister, Miki, to act as a third party to arrange a meeting between the two protagonists. Such a meeting did not eventuate however, and the Filipinos and the Malaysians left Canberra without having discussed their dispute. The other opportunity was the second ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta which started on 6 August. On his arrival in Djakarta Ramos stated his willingness to meet the Malaysians on an informal level to which Tun Razak responded positively. During a meeting on 7 August the two leaders agreed to a 'cooling-off' period after which a meeting of reconciliation could be discussed. As a further concession Ramos declared that the decision to withdraw the embassy staff from Kuala Lumpur would be reconsidered and on 14 August Marcos announced that 'on second thought' he had decided to retain the Philippine ambassador to Malaysia. When asked about the length of the cooling-off period, Tun Razak on his part, refused to be drawn merely stating that this would depend on both countries keeping quiet on the dispute.

As it happened the cooling-off had been just declared when the relations again began to heat up. On 28 August a bill redefining the territorial limits of the Philippines to include Sabah was passed by the Philippine Congress. In reply to a Philippine note which deplored comments made by Tun Razak about the bill, the Malaysian Government said in a note of 4 September that the promulgation of the bill would bring about a new situation in Malaysian and Philippine relations. The note sought an affirmation from the Philippine Government that the bill did not deny that Sabah was a constituent part of Malaysia and that the Philippines continued to

96. Straits Times, 6 August, 1968.
recognise and respect Malaysia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In its reply the Philippines Government refused to give such an affirmation and deplored what it termed 'the highly abusive and provocative language used by the Malaysian Government in the note...'. When on 18 September Marcos signed the bill, the Malaysian Government decided to recall all its embassy staff from Manila. After a lengthy wrangle about how and when diplomatic relations were really broken the Philippine Government on 21 November ordered the withdrawal of the embassy staff in Kuala Lumpur.

As though the inclusion of Sabah within the territory of the Philippines had not been enough, insult was added to injury when the Filipino delegation to the September 1968 ASEAN conference on commerce and shipping declared that:

'The Philippine Delegation, mindful of the present situation in Philippine - Malaysian relations, is constrained to manifest and record its reservations on the authority or competence of the Malaysian Delegation to represent Sabah in this conference.'

Prior to this meeting Marcos had on 24 September instructed Ramos to arrange a preparatory meeting with Tun Razak as a preliminary step to a summit meeting between himself and the Tunku. However, the Philippine reservation now became the great obstacle in the way of renewed talks. On 12 October Tun Razak declared that he would be going to Tokyo to meet Ramos on 22 October to discuss ways and means of easing the tension and

100. Quoted in Barbara French Pace, Kathryn Young, Kathryn Rafferty, with Bernhard K. Gordon, Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The First Years of ASEAN 1967-69, McLean, Virginia; Research Analysis Corporation, Report RAC-R-98-2, October 1970, p. 112. See also Manila Bulletin, 30 September and 3 October 1968.
exploring the possibility of a summit meeting. 101 In the meantime, however, the Filipinos had on 15 October requested the UN General Assembly to place on record that pending settlement of the dispute the Philippines would not recognise Malaysia's authority over Sabah or her right to speak for Sabahans. 102 On 16 October Tun Razak responded by declaring that he would not go to Tokyo unless the Philippines recognised him as the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia of which Sabah was a constituent part. The same day the Acting Foreign Secretary of the Philippines declared that his country could not affirm Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah since this would be tantamount to abandoning the claim. The Philippine reservation was 'inflexible'. 103 Then, finally, on 19 October Tun Razak declared that he would not go to Tokyo because no useful purpose could be served. 104

The dispute was not confined to a 'war of words' only. One of the casualties was the Anti-Smuggling Agreement between the countries which had come into effect in December 1967. On 19 September Malaysia abrogated this agreement and asked the Philippines to withdraw her custom officials she, according to the agreement, had stationed in Sabah. 105

The next step of some consequence in this increasingly acrimonious sequence of events was a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok in December. The meeting as such was not on the ASEAN calendar and the ministers came to Bangkok to attend a ministerial conference of ECAFE. Their attendance at the meeting was brought about by an invitation from Thanat Khoman in an attempt to break the impasse which had developed in the wake of the severance of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines.

102. Ibid. p. 3120.
103. Ibid., p. 3118.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 3117.
The result of the meeting was an agreement about yet another cooling-off period. However, the precise content of this agreement soon became a matter of further contention. In his statement in Bangkok Ramos had said inter alia, 'I recognize Tun Abdul Razak as the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia including Sabah, subject to the 1966 Philippines reservation that the inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia does not prejudice the Philippines' claim to Sabah'. 106 However, after meetings of the Foreign Policy Council, the Philippines produced a draft counter proposal to the joint communiqué issued at Bangkok. This proposal provided for Philippine recognition of Malaysia's de facto control of Sabah but not her sovereignty over Sabah. Predictably enough the Malaysians rejected this amendment as contradictory to the agreement reached between Ramos and Tun Razak in Bangkok. 107

This is where the dispute stood when 1968 came to an end. The parties were as far apart as ever without any hope of a resolution in sight. Throughout the following year the dispute lingered on but without engendering the same animated and acrimonious exchanges it did the previous year. In March the Indonesian Secretary-General for ASEAN, Sunarso, travelled to Manila and Kuala Lumpur in an attempt to persuade the two governments to again begin attending ASEAN meetings the last of which had taken place the previous October. Both governments responded positively 108 and the Philippines gave an assurance that the Sabah issue would not be raised by her, 109 a condition on which the Malaysians had insisted. 110 This meeting of the Secretary-Generals of the national secretariat of ASEAN took place

106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
at the end of May and it was successful in that the Sabah issue was not raised. 111

Subsequent to this meeting a number of other conferences dealing with various aspects of ASEAN activities took place with Malaysian and Philippine participation. Diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, remained severed. Although the Philippines refrained from raising the Sabah issue within the context of ASEAN, the matter had not receded entirely to the background. On 22 September the Philippines raised the Sabah issue in the UN General Assembly and again argued in favour of submitting the claim to the International Court. This renewal of the claim within an international context did not lead to any appreciable worsening of relations with Malaysia partly because the Philippine foreign secretary, Romulo, went out of his way to stress that the new approach would be 'very low key'. Since Malaysia had 'played it cool' during her general elections and 'with an election here now, we don't want to put the heat back into it', Romulo was quoted as saying. 112

Due to the tense situation caused by the race riots which followed in the wake of the general elections in Malaysia in May and the pending presidential elections in the Philippines, the Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN, originally scheduled for August, was postponed until December. 113

After a visit of the Secretary-General of the Indonesian ASEAN secretariat, Rukmito Hendraninggrat 114, to Kuala Lumpur and Manila, Tun Razak declared

112. *Asian Almanac*, 21 February 1970, p. 3814. Presidential elections were held in November with Marcos being re-elected, the first Philippine president to be elected for a second term.
114. He succeeded Sunarso in his position.
that the Malaysian Government again had been assured that the Sabah issue would not be raised at the forthcoming meeting of the ministers. 115

On 2 December Marcos announced that he would send the former Philippine ambassador to Malaysia, Romeo Busuego, to Kuala Lumpur to restore official contacts. 116 At the ministerial meeting later in the month the announcement was made that diplomatic relations would be resumed at once. 117 Thus, for all practical purposes, the crisis was over.

The second Sabah crisis lasted from March 1968 to December 1969, if the time of the reactivation of the Philippine claim and the resumption of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines are used as the 'start and finishing lines' of the crisis. Looked at from the point of view of ASEAN qua organization it may be more appropriate to consider the period between October 1968 and May 1969 as the cut-off points since at these dates the association's activities were halted and resumed respectively. However, in the present context the period between March 1968 and December 1969 will be considered the proper time-span partly because it coincides with the actual period during which the dispute was an active concern of Malaysia and the Philippines, and partly because ASEAN activities aimed at influencing the dispute started soon after March 1968 and only ended in December 1969.

Appeals to and hints about a possible role of ASEAN in the search for solutions to the dispute appeared soon after the Corregidor affair came into the open. On 24 March Marcos sought to allay fears about the consequences of the dispute by stressing that close regional cooperation was

possible through ASEAN \textsuperscript{118}, and sources in the Philippine Foreign Office were reported to have expressed the belief that a solution to the dispute could be found within the framework of the association. \textsuperscript{119} The Foreign Secretary, Ramos, said the Philippines would appreciate it if Indonesia or Thailand would lend their good offices to the search for a solution within the framework of ASEAN. \textsuperscript{120} Similar hints also came from the Malaysian side. The Tunku appealed to the other members of ASEAN to come together to persuade the Philippines to give up its claim. He also made it clear that if the dispute was not settled soon ASEAN would suffer. \textsuperscript{121}

It soon became clear that the other members were concerned lest the dispute would lead to the collapse of the association. \textsuperscript{122} Their initial response was couched in terms which referred to the importance of the survival of ASEAN and to their belief in its ability to weather the crisis. When the Indonesian ambassador to Malaysia arrived in Kuala Lumpur to take up his post he said, 'I really don't think the problem will result in the break-up of the association. Our aims are much greater than this'. \textsuperscript{123} Indeed, much of this initial reaction of the other members consisted in statements of this kind which sought to diminish the significance of the dispute especially in relation to the overall objectives of ASEAN. Suggestions about the possibility of mediation were rejected on the grounds that Malaysia and the Philippines would and could solve the dispute themselves. \textsuperscript{124} This confident though attentive attitude was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Asian Almanac, 6 July 1968, p. 2790.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Manila Bulletin, 15 April 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Manila Chronicle, 17 April 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Straits Times, 8 June 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 29 April 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{124} See Ibid., and Bangkok Post, 16 July 1968.
\end{itemize}
primarily a cover for the increased concern of the other members. This was especially evident when the Thai Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn, paid a surprise visit to Malaysia where he met the Tunku in Penang on the eve of the Bangkok talks between Malaysia and the Philippines. The meeting was arranged at the request of the Thais, and the Sabah dispute and the future of ASEAN were the main topics of discussion. The Thai Prime Minister declared his willingness to do everything in his power to solve the dispute without being directly involved in the matter. Although Bangkok was offered as the venue for the talks between the two protagonists the Thais denied that they had offered themselves as mediators. 125 It is likely that this wait-and-see attitude on the part of the other members was caused by the desire to await the outcome of the talks in Bangkok.

When these talks eventually broke down after nearly a month of deliberations the dispute gradually escalated. Although there was growing concern in the other ASEAN capitals over the turn of events both Malik and Thanat Khoman continued to profess faith in the ability of the parties to arrive at a solution. Expressing deep concern over the dispute Malik stated that 'that we believe that this problem can be solved provided both states are sincere'. 126 From Bangkok Thanat appealed to the parties to exercise restraint. 127 On the eve of their departure for Djakarta to attend the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in August both Thanat and Singapore's Foreign Minister, Rajaratham, expressed their belief in the possibility of isolating the Sabah dispute from the activities of ASEAN. 128 The reluctance of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia to offer mediation was no doubt

126. Straits Times, 23 and 24 July 1968.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., 6 August 1968.
due in great measure to Malaysia's rejection of the possibility of mediation primarily on the grounds that there was nothing to talk about. In view of the stated willingness of both Tun Razak and Ramos to meet to discuss their relations, it is also likely that the other members staked their hopes on this meeting and whatever combined pressure they could exert on the two parties during their presence at the Djakarta ministerial meeting.

By August the fencing back and forth by both Malaysia and the Philippines provided a more than confused picture. The Philippines had suspended diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the failure of the Bangkok talks but had not put this decision into effect. The Malaysians threatened to abrogate the anti-smuggling agreement between the two countries. Ramos went to Djakarta evidently hoping to discuss the claim itself whilst Tun Razak went there, not to discuss the claim as such, but to talk about the strained relations arising from it and the possibility of 'lowering the temperature between the two countries'. The other members of ASEAN would appear to have gone to Djakarta intent on trying to isolate the Sabah issue from ASEAN activities. This meant in the first instance that a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries had to be avoided.

Given the rather inflexible position of the two parties their meeting in Djakarta was reasonably successful. The relief of the other members was well reflected in a statement by Thanat after the ministerial meeting was over. 'I think few even in this region (of Southeast Asia) realize the significance of this meeting. The fact that we can meet to talk about joint efforts is really a dramatic development, even if no

129. Straits Times, 18 July 1968.
130. Straits Times, 18 July and 6 August 1968.
132. Straits Times, 6 August 1968.
spectacular projects have resulted so far' he said. This apparent optimism did not last long. As a result of the Philippines' decision to formally include Sabah within her territory, her reservations about Malaysia's right to sovereignty over Sabah, and the Malaysian retaliatory action of revoking the Anti-Smuggling Agreement between the two countries, their relationship plummeted to a new low point especially after the threatened break of diplomatic relations finally was implemented.

In the middle of November Thanat Khoman suggested a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers to consider ways and means of getting ASEAN going again. The suggestion was welcomed in the other ASEAN capitals, except Kuala Lumpur. After this initial refusal the Malaysians agreed to attend and at the meeting in Bangkok on 12 December the parties to the dispute agreed to restore the cooling-off period decided on in August. The Philippine Government's belated refusal to accept the joint communique of the meeting and the subsequent Malaysian rejection of the Philippine amendment, again threatened to make short shrift of the cooling-off period. However, the meeting in Bangkok would seem to have had some effect in that the strident and often harsh exchange of words which had characterised the months prior to this meeting was on the whole not resumed afterwards. There were other reasons for this as well. The Philippine election campaign started in earnest in the first half of 1969 and the Sabah dispute did not figure prominently in the campaign of either of the main Philippine political parties.

However, the dispute lingered on and diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines remained severed throughout 1969. Although pledging not to leave the association Malaysia refused to participate in

any further ASEAN meetings giving the Philippine attitude to the Sabah claim as the reason. 136

ASEAN remained moribund during the first months of 1969. The first signs of renewed activity came in March when the other members, obviously concerned about the state of affairs, sought to influence Malaysia and the Philippines. As already noted the new initiative this time came from the Secretary-General of the Indonesian national secretariat, Sunarso. After having conferred with the Thais in Bangkok, 137 Sunarso went on to Kuala Lumpur and Manila where he extracted promises from the Malaysians and the Filipinos that they would attend a meeting of ASEAN secretary-generals at a date to be fixed. 138 The Malaysians made clear, however, that their participation was conditioned by an undertaking from the Philippines that the latter would not raise the Sabah issue. 139 Such an undertaking was given and conveyed to Kuala Lumpur by the Indonesians. 140 The meeting took place at the end of May, was successful, and was immediately followed by a number of meetings of other ASEAN bodies. The ministerial meeting, however, was postponed from August until December for reasons not related to the Sabah issue. 141 After further efforts on the part of the Indonesians to ensure that nothing would go wrong at the last minute, 142 the ministerial meeting took place between 15 and 17 December, at which the Philippines and Malaysia agreed to resume diplomatic relations forthwith. The second Sabah crisis was over.

137. Djakarta Times, 7 March 1969.
138. Ibid., and 17 March 1969.
139. Ibid., 7 March 1969.
141. Djakarta Times, 7 July and 2 August 1969.
142. This consisted in a renewed promise being extracted from the Philippines that she would not raise the Sabah issue. Djakarta Times, 17 October 1969.
ASA AND THE SABAH DISPUTE

ASA, and for that matter Maphilindo, contributed little or nothing towards the resolution of the Sabah dispute or, indeed, towards the prevention of the break in the relations between Malaysia and the Philippines which followed from the dispute. The reasons for this failure were several.

Firstly, in the pursuit of the claim the Philippines had to deal not only with the Malayan government but first and foremost with the British government which had no direct stake in ASA or Maphilindo and whose main interest did not rest with the continued existence of either of these bodies. Indeed, as far as Maphilindo was concerned the British viewed it as a positive hindrance to their plans for the Borneo territories.

The second important factor was the low interest of the Philippine government of the period in ASA. Although the previous administration of Garcia had taken an active part in the formation of ASA, his successor, Macapagal, was far less interested in the association. Alone among the top leaders of the Macapagal administration, Pelaez would seem to have been genuinely committed to ASA. However, in the middle of 1963 he resigned from his position as Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs to be replaced by Lopez who, with Macapagal himself, had pursued a policy of closer relations with Indonesia as well as the idea of a Malay Confederation. Contrary to the Philippine government, the Malayan government retained its interest in ASA. As late as March 1963, Tun Razak declared his belief in the survival of ASA during his attendance at the ECAFE meeting in Manila. However, throughout 1963 the waning

143. See chapter 2 above in the formation of ASA and the role of the Philippines.

144. See Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict, p.25 and Abell, op. cit., chapters 3, 4 and 5.

interest in ASA on the part of the Philippines was accompanied by her increasingly active pursuit of the Malay confederation idea, a scheme the Malayan Government for internal reasons could not but view with considerable skepticism because of its implied anti-Chinese connotations. When the Malay Government eventually went along with the idea and agreed to Maphilindo it did so mainly because it hoped 'it would facilitate the acceptance of Malaysia by the other two states; whereas both the Philippines and Indonesia saw the venture as a means to forestall the new Federation'.

The third important factor was, of course, ASA and Maphilindo themselves. The latter was no more than a loose machinery for consultations between governments the practical necessity of which was doubtful. It is difficult to see what specific functions this machinery could perform that the already established diplomatic institutions of the three governments - their foreign affairs departments and diplomatic services - could not already perform. In the relationship between the three governments there existed no clearly articulated, practical, inter-governmental needs of a functional nature the performance of which called for a separate organizational machinery. Had it in fact been established Maphilindo would, as it were, have been an inter-governmental institution in search of tasks and functions to perform, and not the other way around.

Whatever value derived from Maphilindo was of a symbolic nature. Symbols play a role in all social intercourse but in the case of Maphilindo the symbolic value of a union of Malay peoples became closely associated with and exploited in the interest of the opposing national policies of the participating countries. In the end it evaporated under

the pressure of these conflicting interests. Because Maphilindo was of little or no positive value to Malaya it could not serve the role in the Sabah dispute envisaged by the Philippines.

Contrary to Maphilindo ASA was not a child of the flurry of activity arising from the dispute over Sabah. Whilst whatever value could be attached to Maphilindo could not be separated from the Sabah dispute, ASA possessed an intrinsic value which was not related to the Sabah dispute. Formed in the middle of 1961 ASA had an established organizational machinery which performed specific functions. Its achievements were modest but held out promise for the future. During the first year of its existence it had given the appearance of an 'organization that was trying to accomplish everything at once'. 147 As already noted it had a tendency to accumulate 'projects under study', numerous committees were established and, as Gordon has remarked, as late as April 1962 'the very meaning of co-operation had not lost very much of the vagueness it had in Rahman's early letters'. 148 However, as a result of the second meeting of the Joint Working Party in November 1962 some drastic changes were made based on the experiences accumulated over the first year. At the level of practical co-operation the machinery was revised so that it came to rest on three major committees where there had been seven or eight before; an economic committee, a social and cultural committee, and a technical cooperation and research committee. A rearrangement of the priorities attached to the goals of the association also took place. Realizing that


some goals are more difficult to achieve than others. Deliberate attempts were made to define and identify those that could not be done in the foreseeable future and those that could. A general reorientation took place when the difficulties involved in the establishment of ventures such as an 'ASA shipping line' and an 'ASA airline' were appreciated. Thus by late 1962 and early 1963 there would seem to have been a developing belief on the part of officials in the three ASA countries that benefits were to be had from continued cooperation.

Nonetheless, the shared membership and the cooperation which had developed within the association were not sufficient to prevent the Sabah dispute from bringing the activities of ASA to a rest. The second meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 1963 in Manila was the last meeting of any of the association's organizational bodies for nearly three years. Despite Thanat Khoman's warning at this meeting that the Sabah dispute could disrupt the unity of ASA and that unless wisdom and prudence were shown 'this meeting may prove to be the last one we shall attend together,' his words were apparently not heeded.

When confronted with a choice, nations as well as individuals usually sacrifice that to which they attach lesser value. Both to Malaya and the Philippines, North Borneo mattered more than ASA. To the Malays, North Borneo and Sarawak were indispensable parts of a strategy which involved Singapore as well. In early 1961 the Tunku would appear to have swung around to the conviction that it was essential for the survival of Malaya that Singapore became a part of the Federation. However, only

149. Ibid., pp. 178-187.
150. Quoted in Abell, op. cit., p. 195.
151. See chapter 4 for a more detailed exposition of the Tunku's thinking on this question.
to include Singapore would upset the delicate racial balance within the federation when Singapore's large Chinese majority was included in the enlarged federation. In order to counteract this possibility it was necessary to include the Borneo territories with their non-Chinese majorities.

The lack of interest in ASA on the part of Macapagal and other prominent Filipino leaders has already been mentioned, as well as his enthusiasm for the idea of a Malay confederation. Apart from its role in the pursuit of the Sabah claim this idea also served as a symbol of the 'Asian identity' of the Philippines in a way ASA did not. To Macapagal and Lopez the possession of an 'Asian identity' also involved anti-colonialism, a strand of thinking more closely associated with Sukarno rather than any other of the neighbouring countries' political leaders. Hence to the Filipinos acceptance as an 'Asian' country meant closer association with Indonesia whose hostility towards ASA was well known.

Until late 1962 and early 1963 ASA had been little more than an educational experience for the participants. Involved in the more and more realistic outlook was a realization that no quick and easy benefits could be had. It involved having to shed the initial euphoria and having to lower the horizons. From the point of view of ASA itself this change in attitude was of doubtless benefit but it came at a time when the Sabah claim was well advanced. Moreover, nothing substantial in terms of concrete results had been achieved. Seen from this point of view the collapse of ASA did not mean the sacrifice of present benefits as much as a surrender of future hopes and profit.

Yet another point needs to be made. Relatively small and less developed countries such as Malaya and the Philippines have few assets with which to bargain in international affairs, even in their relations with
each other. Membership in a multi-functional organization such as ASA may have added to as well as detracted from such bargaining strength as the two states possessed. It added to their bargaining strength in holding out a promise of benefits even though these did lie in the future. Both Malaya and the Philippines used their common membership in ASA as a lever, evidently in the hope that the other party's commitment to the association was strong enough to make it change its position on the Sabah issue. However, participation in ASA may also have detracted from their bargaining strength by foreclosing a more selective and incremental use of sanctions. By first threatening, say, trade sanctions to be followed by others if the initial threat failed, both parties would have been in possession of a more flexible bargaining strength. In normal inter-state relations it is possible to isolate in this way one set of relations between two states from others and to use this set in a bargaining situation. Within a multifunctional organizational framework, however, it becomes very difficult to do this without appearing to strike at the very foundation and principles on which the organization is based. It is doubly difficult within an organization such as ASA from which no practical benefits had accrued at the time of the Sabah crisis and whose continued existence still rested on the largely symbolic commitment of its members in lieu of more tangible gains to prove that the initial commitment had been worthwhile. Furthermore, at the time of the Sabah crisis the level of functional specificity of ASA was low, that is, apart from the stated goals of promoting cooperation within the economic, social and cultural fields and so on, little had been done in the way of defining more

precisely which areas of the relations between the members would fall within the functional scope of ASA. Hence, nearly the whole range of relations between the three member states was potentially an area of ASA concern. In these circumstances, for Malaysia or the Philippines to threaten interruption of any of the activities which fell within the actual and potential functional scope of ASA could not but result in considerable doubt being cast on their general commitment to the association. The use of sanctions came to be synonymous with abandoning ASA because few or no sanctions were available which could be isolated and divorced from the activities, real and potential, of the association. Hence, once it was clear to them that Sabah mattered more, and given the narrow range of 'cards' with which to bargain, the sacrifice of ASA on the part of both parties may have been a foregone conclusion.

ASEAN AND THE SABAH DISPUTE

To make an assessment of the influence of ASEAN on the second Sabah crisis it is necessary first to consider the reasons for which the Sabah issue was reactivated.

The Marcos Administration had not renounced the claim despite the fact that it had several opportunities to do so. The first time was when Marcos took over from Macapagal in late 1965. On that occasion the opportunity was there for Marcos to make a clear break with his predecessor's policies. Although he quickly moved to restore relations with Malaysia he did not, however, renounce the claim which had not played a significant role in the presidential elections which brought Marcos into power. During the two subsequent years the Sabah issue lived a quiet existence without the Philippine Government actively pursuing the claim. It was not raised at the meeting which established ASEAN and when Tun Razak visited Manila in December 1967 and Marcos paid a state visit to Kuala Lumpur in
January 1968 it would appear that both parties were content to let the matter rest. Yet barely two months after his last visit the whole issue was again raised and threatened the existence of ASEAN as it had ASA some few years earlier.

The spark that relighted the issue was the Corregidor affair. The recruits at Corregidor were ostensibly there to receive training for later infiltration into Sabah. Whether or not this was the true purpose is not at all clear, and the Philippine Government denied the charges. Whatever the truth of the matter, the affair created an uproar and proved a great embarrassment to the government. Some credence must, therefore, perhaps be given to the interpretation that the Marcos Administration reactivated the claim to divert attention from the affair. The trouble with this interpretation is, of course, that Marcos continued to pursue the claim for a considerable time after the Corregidor scandal had faded from the public and political arena.

A second explanation relates the reactivation of the claim to Marcos' desire to be re-elected. No Philippine President had ever been re-elected for a second term and Sabah's claim provided a convenient issue in the field of foreign affairs for Marcos to establish his 'nationalist' credentials. This interpretation, however, suffers from the fact that Marcos was a little more than half the way through his term of office with the elections to take place in November 1969, more than a year and a half later. As it happened the Sabah issue did not play an important role in the elections which were predominantly fought over domestic issues as they traditionally had been in the Philippines.

A third explanation canvassed has rightly been considered too crude and advocates that a campaign of insurgency in Sabah was, indeed, what Marcos had in mind. 156

Finally, a fourth explanation may simply be that Marcos, as were other Filipinos, was convinced that the Philippines had a just and sound case and that for this reason he was unwilling to give it up. The objection to this explanation is that, if this was so, why did Marcos choose to raise the matter in the rather clumsy manner he did, coming hard on the heels of the Corregidor affair and all the suspicions related to this incident.

Whatever the truth, and it may indeed be that it consists in a combination of all these explanations mixed with a considerable dose of miscalculation on the part of Marcos - the reactivation was a sign that the Marcos Administration apparently put less value on the relations with Malaysia as well as its membership in ASEAN than on the Sabah issue.

After nearly two years of bickering and acrimonious verbal exchanges the Philippines decided to resume relations with Malaysia in December 1969. It is suggested that three main factors in particular contributed to this. Firstly, during the first half of 1969 it became quite clear that the Philippines was unlikely to extract any concessions from Malaysia, who especially after the collapse of the Bangkok talks of June-July 1968, stuck rigidly to her position that Sabah was not a subject of bargaining or negotiations. Hence, if the Philippines wanted any relations with Malaysia at all, the claim would have to take a back seat among her foreign policy objectives.

156. Leifer, op. cit., p. 426.
The second important factor was the lack of international sympathy for the Philippine claim. Whatever support she could muster was related not to the merits of her case but to her policy of submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Such as it was most of this support came from countries outside Asia which under any circumstances had little interest in the dispute. Among the big powers the Soviet Union supported Malaysia and the United States declared it did not wish to take sides. Nor did she receive much support for her claim from any of her regional neighbours. If anything the support that was forthcoming went to Malaysia. This certainly was the case as far as Singapore was concerned and even Malik was reported to have said on 26 October in Copenhagen that the Philippines' claim based on history was destroyed by the fact that Sabah had voted to be incorporated into Malaysia. It should, however, be stressed that the other members of ASEAN, including Singapore and Indonesia, on the whole studiously avoided airing their views on the merits of the Philippine claim publicly. Thus, the Philippines found herself isolated internationally as far as the Sabah claim was concerned, a situation very different from a few years earlier when she had Sukarno's Indonesia on her side.

The third important factor contributing to the removal of the Sabah dispute from the agenda of Philippine–Malaysian relations was the influence of ASEAN. It may be profitable to look at this factor from two angles, firstly in terms of what ASEAN meant to the Philippines and Malaysia and secondly in terms of the pressure brought to bear by the other

Following the reactivation of the claim there was an immediate appreciation on the part of nearly all ASEAN members that the dispute represented a threat to the existence of the association. As noted above the reaction in Manila was to refer to ASEAN as a possible framework within which the parties could seek a solution. There would, however, seem to have been considerable ambiguity in Manila as to what they expected from ASEAN. Sources at the Foreign Office were reported to have expressed the belief that ASEAN as a body could be made to exert pressure on both parties to settle the dispute in a manner at once peaceful as well as harmless to the wider cooperation within the association. In this view it would appear that the other ASEAN countries were seen as possible mediators. However, in view of the fact that official Philippine policy was to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice it is more likely that ASEAN was seen as a body through which pressure could be brought to bear on Malaysia to agree to international adjudication. The action to bring the dispute to the attention of the UN General Assembly must also be seen in this light.

Malaysia's expectations with regard to ASEAN were considerably more straightforward. Given her position that the Philippine claim had no validity ASEAN was purely an instrument through which the Philippines might be persuaded to give up her claim. On the question of mediation Tun Razak declared that he saw no need for it because 'there is nothing more to talk about. The Philippines has no case at all'.

160. See the Tunku's remarks to this effect in Straits Times, 8 June 1969.
Throughout the period March 1968 to December 1969 Philippine representatives expressed their belief that Sabah need not lead to the collapse of ASEAN and that the two were separate issues. The inference was that the Sabah claim could be pursued without damage to the cooperative framework within ASEAN which could go on undiminished. This was their position immediately prior to the Ministerial Meeting of the association in Djakarta in August 1968 and it was repeated on subsequent occasions. To the extent this was a sincerely held opinion it would tend to undermine the position of those who hold that the Philippine reactivation of the Sabah claim was evidence of her low interest in relations with Malaysia as well as ASEAN.

Though it may be that persons involved in the execution of the claim on the Philippine side initially were convinced that it could be pursued without damage to ASEAN, this was a position it became increasingly difficult to maintain in view of other Philippine pronouncements and actions. No less person than Ramos himself implicitly admitted the relationship in his address to the Ministerial Meeting in Djakarta when he inter alia said,

Nonetheless, we cannot close our eyes to existing realities, particularly the political stresses and strains which have lately developed between states in this region. While it is true that difficulties and disputes can and will arise between countries, as is natural in all societies whether of men or of nations, still, it behoves us all to labor, with all our strength, to resolve these without delay, lest they sap the vitality of our association and render regional cooperation amongst us a tragic impossibility.

The division became no easier to maintain when the Philippines

164. This is the position of Leifer. See his "The Philippines and Sabah irredenta".
165. See *Asian Almanac*, 19 October 1968, p. 2978.
chose to introduce her reservations about Malaysia's de jure sovereignty over Sabah at a meeting in October of a committee of the very association from which it had been argued Sabah could be isolated. In November 1968, shortly after the Thais had suggested a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers to discuss Malaysian-Philippine relations and shortly before the final break in these relations, Ramos was considerably more explicit than he had been in August. He said, 'ASEAN is falling apart with Indonesia and Singapore fighting, and Malaysia and the Philippines fighting... The main objective should be to save ASEAN and restore good relations.' 166

Thus, although the Filipinos at the outset may have entertained ideas about pursuing the Sabah claim without thereby damaging ASEAN, their own handling of the claim inevitably led the Sabah claim and ASEAN to be related in such a manner that the existence of the latter became dependent on the outcome of the former.

As far as the Malaysians were concerned it had been their view from the very beginning that the two issues were closely linked. It may, indeed, be the case that the Malaysians to some extent forced the hand of the Philippines by consistently arguing that the two issues were related. The Malaysian Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, accused the Philippines of having killed the prospects of a common market among the members of ASEAN by her attitude to Sabah, 167 and the Tunku talked about the grave concern for the future of the organisation. 168 Malaysia's position was further underlined when she made it a condition for participation in ASEAN meetings that the Sabah issue was not raised and after October 1968, when the Philippine reservation was first introduced, Malaysia refused to take part in

166. *Straits Times*, 12 November 1968.
further ASEAN meetings. Her participation in the meeting in Bangkok in December, at which the restoration of the cooling-off period was agreed, was caused by the fact that the topic of discussion was ostensibly the resumption of diplomatic relations between herself and the Philippines rather than the merits of the Sabah issue. It is significant in this context that apart from the participation of the other ASEAN foreign ministers, the Australian Foreign Minister was also present thus giving to the meeting an appearance of not being an ASEAN affair. 169

Even though the Philippines refused to accept the joint communiqué of the meeting and proposed amendments which proved unacceptable to Malaysia, the fact of her participation in Bangkok was an indication that she had begun to appreciate the full implications of further pursuing the claim. It did not only mean a break with Malaysia but also a halt to the cooperation within ASEAN. The latter was all the more significant because it tended to impair Philippine relations with Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia the last two of which were strongly committed to ASEAN.

In the period which ensued there was a marked reduction in acrimonious exchanges between the opposing parties and in May 1969 both participated in the first ASEAN meeting since the previous October. There were, however, other factors which also induced the Philippines to reduce the fervour with which she pursued the Sabah claim and persuaded her to again participate in ASEAN.

The least significant of these was probably the failure of Marcos' plan for an 'Asian forum' to materialise. This was an idea he proposed in September 1966 in an address to the UN General Assembly and he

envisioned it as a kind of political ECAFE drawing its membership from the same countries as its economic counterpart. However despite all his efforts to promote this idea during 1966 and 1967, Marcos met with little success and by December 1968 the 'Asian Forum' was still merely an idea. Hence, whatever wish the Marcos Administration had about more intimate participation in regional affairs could best be fulfilled through ASEAN, which remained the most available option.

Considerably more significant was the change taking place in the international situation and its effect on Southeast Asia. Even before the advent of Nixon as President there were signs that the United States was reconsidering its role in Asia. The election of Nixon in November 1968 and what was seen as the imminent change in American policies towards less emphasis on Asia, caused Marcos to emphasize the 'independence' of the Philippines and its 'ties with its Asian neighbours'. Romulo expressed similar thoughts in January 1969 upon his official assumption of the position as foreign secretary. During his stay in the Philippines on his world trip in July-August 1969, Nixon himself reiterated the theme of self-reliance and 'independence' as goals towards which the Asian countries should strive. This change in the American policy was doubly significant as far as the Philippines was concerned because of her long-standing reliance on and particularly close relationship with the United States. In these circumstances ASEAN became an important option through which closer relations with other Asian countries could be cultivated.

170. For further details, see Abell, *op.cit.*, pp. 312-317 and 345.
It has been argued that the commitment of the Philippines and Malaysia to ASEAN was not very strong. In the case of the former the argument is based on alleged inconsistencies in Philippine statements and actions and on an ambiguous attitude towards Southeast Asia in general and regional cooperation in particular. It is also alleged that there exists a wide gap between rhetoric and reality in the Philippine attitude towards ASEAN of which the reactivation of the Sabah claim and the attempts to promote the Asian Forum idea are the main indications. In regard to Malaysia her inferior commitment to ASEAN was due inter alia to Commonwealth ties, the Sabah dispute, internal troubles and so on.

Assessments of this kind and the kind attempted in this chapter involve a methodological problem arising from the nature of the data employed. Both studies mentioned above rely nearly exclusively on the fact that both countries have spent time and energy on the promotion of ideas and relations outside the framework of ASEAN. From this fact the inference is then drawn that Malaysia and the Philippines cannot therefore be as committed to ASEAN as others even though their verbal adherence to the aims and purposes of the association left nothing to be desired. More specifically, the two studies have argued that the Philippine pursuit of the Sabah claim and the Malaysian reaction, especially her refusal to participate in further ASEAN meetings until such time as the Philippine reservation about her sovereignty over Sabah was withdrawn, constituted a clear indication that the commitment of both countries to ASEAN left a lot to be desired, especially

175. Pace et.al., ibid., pp. 33-35.
178. Pace et.al., op. cit., pp. 33-35.
179. Ibid., and Abell, op. cit.
compared to that of Thailand and Indonesia. It will be argued that the evidence for this conclusion is at best ambiguous and that such firm judgments must await information not yet available.

It was suggested above that the Philippines thought it possible to raise the Sabah issue without impairment to ASEAN. Initially they were encouraged in their belief by the continued participation of Malaysia in ASEAN meetings well after the issue again had been raised in March 1968. Between March and early October 1968, when the Philippines introduced her reservation about Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah, there were no less than eleven meetings of various ASEAN bodies. Thus, for a considerable time the Sabah question and ASEAN were kept apart although it is more than likely that the atmosphere of the meetings may have suffered as a result of the claim. It is significant nonetheless, that the Malaysians continued during this period to attend meetings of ASEAN despite their statements that the Sabah issue and ASEAN were closely linked. This is suggestive of a willingness on the part of Malaysia to isolate Sabah in order to keep ASEAN going as well as of a commitment not as weak as some observers have indicated.

The Malaysian refusal to participate in further ASEAN meetings after the Philippine reservation has also been used to substantiate the argument about her weak commitment. To assess this argument it is proper at this junction to stress that the Sabah issue was after all a dispute over territory. Any nation is likely to take strong exception to a reservation which puts its territorial sovereignty in question whatever the strength of its commitment to a particular organization especially, as in

180. See Pace et. al., ibid., table B2, p. 56 for a list of ASEAN meetings in the period 1967-1969.
this case, when the reservation is made within the framework of the same organization. In other words, it is suggested that Malaysia had no other choice but to act as she did as long as the Philippines upheld her reservation. In these circumstances it is therefore difficult to consider the Malaysian action an indication of her weak interest in ASEAN. Moreover, Malaysia immediately agreed to the resumption of ASEAN meetings after she had received assurances that the Philippines would not raise the Sabah question in subsequent meetings.

The introduction of the reservation about Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah into the ASEAN meeting in October, carries considerable weight as an indication of a measure of indifference on the part of the Philippines to the fate of ASEAN. However, again one or two points need to be made. The first is that, though the claim may have been used in the domestic political struggle in the Philippines, this does not by itself prove that Marcos and those who pursued the claim on behalf of the Philippines did not also sincerely believe in the justice of the claim. The second point is that, assuming the sincerity of the Marcos Administration, there may have been very few opportunities by October for the Filipinos to put their case before the Malaysians. After the July talks in Bangkok, when the bilateral negotiations over the claim broke down, the latter consistently refused to talk about the merits of the case, only acceding to talks that might help to dissipate the general strain in their relations arising from the claim. Furthermore, contact through normal diplomatic channels was more or less impossible due to the state of flux in which these channels found themselves by early October.

In the end the Filipinos agreed to discontinue the pursuit of the claim and, although this decision was also influenced by factors essentially unrelated to the Sabah issue, it cannot be convincingly argued
that this was done without a measure of concern for the fate of ASEAN.

These observations about the attitude of the Philippines and Malaysia to ASEAN suggest that the actions of the two countries in relation to the Sabah claim cannot by themselves be taken as evidence of a weak commitment. They suggest furthermore that perhaps the statements which emanated from both countries to the effect that they believed in and were committed to regional cooperation in general and ASEAN in particular may have to be taken at more than their face value. They finally suggest that the gap between rhetoric and reality is somewhat narrower than believed.

The fact that the survival of ASEAN was of some concern to the two disputants made the task of the other members, especially Thailand and Indonesia, easier. Nonetheless, considerable efforts were spent by these members to bring the two parties together.

Any attempts by a third party to bring about reconciliation between two conflicting parties will initially have to undergo what may be termed a legitimacy test, that is, the third party must be acceptable to the parties to the dispute. Some regional organizations have special machinery for the resolution of conflicts between member states through which the organization itself or another memberstate can intervene. ASEAN had no such machinery. The initiative thus lay with the individual member states and when Thailand and Indonesia were readily accepted this was in no small measure due to the fact that both had developed fairly close and friendly relations with both disputants for which their common membership in ASEAN was also responsible. The fact that both Malaysia and the Philippines appealed to the other ASEAN members at an early stage bears witness to this.
Equally important was the fact that the other members enhanced the legitimacy of their efforts by almost invariably declaring that they were undertaken in the name of or on behalf of the welfare and continued existence of ASEAN. Apart from the sincerity of these references, they also made it difficult for the two disputants to reject advice and appeals by Thailand and Indonesia in particular without appearing to have only scant regard for the fate of ASEAN to which after all both professed commitment. The Thai Prime Minister's surprise visit to Malaysia just prior to the Bangkok talks in June-July 1968 was made in the interest of and by reference to ASEAN as were the appeals from Indonesia and Thailand to the two parties to show restraint in the tense period that followed the breakdown of the Bangkok talks. The same was the case prior to and during the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta in August where it must be assumed that considerable pressure was brought to bear on the two disputants. Similar references to ASEAN continued to be made throughout the latter part of 1968 when relations between Malaysia and the Philippines were at their worst, especially in connection with the Thai initiative to convene an unofficial ministerial meeting in Bangkok.

A third important point was the habit of Thailand and Indonesia, as well as Singapore, to confer with each other before an approach was made to Malaysia and the Philippines by either of them. This gave an appearance of unity and solidarity to their efforts which made their rejection all the more difficult lest the two disputants were prepared to rebuff not only one but all three fellow members. In a case where no prior consultations would appear to have taken place, such as the Thai suggestion that an unofficial ministerial meeting be held in Bangkok, Indonesia and Singapore did quickly agree with whatever proposals were made.

A prominent feature of the reconciliation attempts of the other
ASEAN members was the concentration on efforts aimed at preventing bilateral relations between the disputants from breaking down. They would appear to have shunned any attempt to influence the merits of the respective parties' case. Given the inflexible attitude of both parties this must indeed be considered a prudent and wise tactic. When they failed in preventing a break in relations between Manila and Kuala Lumpur they concentrated their efforts on bringing the parties together under ASEAN auspices. In this they were successful, first in Bangkok in December 1968 and, later, in May 1969, when the Secretary-Generals of the national secretariats of ASEAN met in Indonesia. Indeed, Malaysia and the Philippines participated in ten meetings of various ASEAN bodies in the period May to December 1969 during which time there were no diplomatic relations between them. Aided in their task by other factors as well, this was in no small measure due to the influence of the three other members.

Another prominent feature of the second Sabah dispute was the extent to which it remained a regional and indeed an ASEAN affair. Apart from a couple of sojourns to the UN General Assembly by the Philippines apparently in the hope of extracting from that body a resolution recommending submissions of the dispute to the International Court, no non-ASEAN country became involved in any reconciliation or mediation attempt. This may be attributable to several factors. Firstly, the other ASEAN countries 'intervened' thus to some extent pre-empting other attempts. Secondly, other countries tended to consider the dispute an ASEAN affair. In this context it is significant that no attempt were made to bring about a reconciliation between the two parties at the ASPAC meeting in Canberra in August which preceded the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta by a few days.

However, before too much significance is attributed to the
existence of ASEAN it is well worth remembering that the Sabah dispute did not erupt into violence although at times belligerent and violent language was employed. Furthermore, the dispute was after all a relatively less significant affair compared to other international disputes of which the war in Vietnam was the outstanding contemporary example. Nonetheless, ASEAN would seem to have played a role in isolating the conflict from outside interference.

ASA, ASEAN, AND REGIONAL PEACE AND CONFLICT

In the remainder of this chapter the efforts of ASA and ASEAN in relation to the Sabah dispute will be discussed by reference to a recent study by Joseph Nye, in which he investigated the relationship between regional organization and peace and conflict. Nye asked, 'Have international regional organizations created "islands of peace" in world politics? Have they "encapsulated" conflicts and prevented them from becoming intertwined with insolvable global conflicts? Will they do so in the future?'

From among the many types of regional organizations, Nye examined the effects of two types on peace and conflict, namely what he termed micro-regional economic organizations (the European Community, the Central American Common Market and the East African Community) and macro-regional political organizations (the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and the Arab League). These two types were selected 'because their alleged effects on integration and conflict control, respectively, offer the most likely prospects for peace-making among the various regionalist doctrines.'

182. Ibid., p. 3.
183. Ibid., p. 10.
While it is not necessary in relation to the terms economic and political, there is perhaps a need to repeat here the meaning of the terms micro- and macro-regional. They refer to degree of geographical contiguity so that in a micro-regional organization the distance between the member capitals furthest apart is shorter than its equivalent in a macro-regional organization. By a regional organization is meant an organization based on formal agreement between the member-governments, possessing diplomatic forums, and assisted by an associated international bureaucracy.

In relation to Nye's definition ASA and ASEAN can be classified as micro-regional economic organizations. Objections may perhaps be raised as to whether ASEAN, as well as ASA before it, fulfils the last requirement to a regional organization. As was the case with ASA, ASEAN possesses no permanent headquarters with an international bureaucracy equivalent to, for instance, that of the European Community. Again as in the case of ASA, the most permanent and in a sense most 'international' of ASEAN institutions are the national secretariats of the members located in the various capitals, and the standing committee which coordinates the day-to-day activities of the association and is rotated between the various capitals on a yearly basis. However, a liberal interpretation would allow for the inclusion of the institutions peculiar to ASA and ASEAN within the accepted meaning of the term 'international bureaucracy', and in the remainder it will be assumed that this is the case.

Then, have ASA and ASEAN contributed towards an 'island of peace' in Southeast Asia as seen through their involvement in the Sabah dispute?

184. Ibid., pp. 8-10.  
185. Ibid., p. 5.
Nye argues that there are essentially three ways by which a micro-regional economic organization can affect the propensity of states to resort to violence. The first is by 'raising the price' of violent conflict through functional interdependence.  

This may be brought about partially by the creation of a degree of economic interdependence, the jeopardizing of which may be considered too costly, the creation of 'groups in national societies with a strong vested interest in avoiding violent conflict and, depending on the various domestic distributions of power, raise the political cost to leaders of resorting to violence. When disputes arise, functional interdependence may make them easier for the two disputants to resolve. The higher each disputant's level of interest in the other disputant's welfare, the greater the incentives to resort to non-violent forms of settlement of a dispute.'

When the Sabah dispute erupted neither ASA nor ASEAN had effected any appreciable level of economic interdependence between their members which did not exist prior to the formation of both organizations. No common projects of a significant value to any of the individual members had been implemented. Hence, neither ASA nor ASEAN could be said to have spawned the kind of economic relations the threat to which or the disruption of which represented a net loss in case these organizations collapsed. By this very fact it cannot be said that there existed in either country groups with a vested interest in avoiding violent conflict with a consequent rise in political costs to the leaders of resort to violence.

However, there remains a sense in which the membership in ASEAN represented a 'raising of the price' to both countries. To its members ASEAN represented a future asset through which they could exercise greater influence internationally. It had potential as an organization through which in the first instance their economic well-being could be enhanced, and, perhaps later, a greater measure of external security achieved. It also had a certain value as a symbol of their independence in international affairs.

These and others are themes which repeatedly appear in speeches and statements of ASEAN leaders and which cannot be dismissed as rhetoric alone. There can be little doubt that in the case of Thailand and Indonesia these were hopes they entertained about the future of ASEAN. As already indicated the behaviour of Malaysia and the Philippines during the second Sabah crisis can be seen as an indication of the presence rather than the absence of such hopes among the leaders of the two countries. This investment of 'ideal' resources caused Thailand and Indonesia to exert pressure on the two disputants to refrain from actions which might prove fatal to the association. It similarly caused the Philippines and Malaysia to refrain from actions from which there was no return. As to ASA it is quite clear that in the sense of an 'ideal' investment or commitment, it meant less to the Philippines than ASEAN and it had therefore little or no effect on the course of the Sabah dispute. This is a point to which a return will be made shortly.

To the extent a micro-regional economic organisation through its activities and achievements can create a 'widespread sense of common identity or community among populations in a region', this can have the effect of making 'recourse to violence seem illegitimate to leaders and
important segments of the population'. 188 This is, of course, essentially Karl Deutsch's 'security community' concept 189 and neither ASA nor ASEAN could be considered to have contributed much since their inception to such a state of affairs. Indeed, the Sabah dispute itself was a sign that such a level of common identity was far from being realised. Though no violence was involved in the course of the dispute, belligerent language and threatening actions were undertaken. 190 However, although the two organizations could not be said to have contributed much to a common identity and a sense of community during their short existence, their establishment in themselves was a sign that the political leaders of the countries involved had come to realize that they had certain interests in common the perception of which is nothing but the first necessary step towards the creation of a security community. It should, however, be added that this perception was something which extended only to a limited elite, mainly political leaders. 191

The 'existing or potential web of interdependence can facilitate a shift in the value images held by political leaders of the two parties in a dispute and make its "integrative solution" possible.' 192 Furthermore, 'a micro-regional economic organization might serve as a symbol of a new integrative relationship on which each party would perceive his welfare to be dependent. In principle, and in contrast to the previous argument about assertion of a sense of regional identity, it is the functional rather than the regional aspects of the organization which

188. Ibid., p. 110.
189. See Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 5-6.
190. See Asian Almanac, 6 July 1968, pp. 2791-2792.
The 'integrative solution' of the Sabah dispute was brought about when the Philippines terminated its active pursuit of the claim. As indicated above this happened when the Philippines realised the full implications of continuing with the claim. She opted for ASEAN because it served 'as a symbol of a new integrative relationship in which she perceived her welfare to be dependent'. In other words, the Sabah claim was downgraded in favour of the relationship within ASEAN.

This brings us to a point touched on above, namely the significance of the international environment and the foreign policy options available to countries such as the members of ASA and ASEAN. It is important because it may throw light on the different roles ASA and ASEAN played in relation to the Sabah dispute. In 1962-63 the Philippines' commitment to ASA was by all accounts low. The Macapagal Administration was considerably more intent on promoting the scheme which later became Maphilindo and which figured prominently in the tactics she employed in her pursuit of the Sabah claim. In these policies the Philippines had the important support of Indonesia. Indeed, the Philippines had several options which otherwise would not have been open to her, had she not seen her interests best served by a close relationship with Indonesia under Sukarno. It is significant that the strength of her own pursuit of the Sabah claim diminished proportionately with her growing disenchantment with the violent methods used by Indonesia in the confrontation with Malaysia. This disenchantment was also fed by Indonesia's own increasing isolation caused by the conflict with Malaysia. As the Philippines began to consider

193. Ibid., p. 111.
194. Ibid.
her association with Indonesia a liability rather than an asset, she began to place higher value on former regional relationships.

In 1968-69 the Philippines found herself a part of an entirely different constellation of forces. This time she was a member of a regional organization with four other countries, including her former ally Indonesia, which now was under a different group of leaders with a completely different attitude towards regional cooperation and organization. The relationship with this 'new' Indonesia was cordial but the big difference now was that she no longer could count on Indonesian support for her claim to Sabah. Nor was there much support from other sources. In this situation the pursuit of the Sabah claim was considerably more risky than it had been some five or six years earlier. Her foreign policy options, especially in relation to Southeast Asia, were to a considerable extent concentrated in ASEAN outside of which a few meaningful regional options existed. The extent to which this was realised in the Philippines is indicated by the frequent references to the Sabah claim as being possible to pursue without damage to ASEAN. And as argued above, an important reason for the termination of the pursuit of the claim was the reduction in value of another important foreign policy option, namely the relationship with the United States. As noted already the Philippine reaction to what was perceived as the imminent change in American policies away from Asia and herself, was to stress her ties with Asia. Hence, by late 1968 and early 1969 ASEAN appeared to the Philippines as well as Malaysia as the only viable alternative for closer regional relations.

The preceding analysis would seem to support at least one tentative conclusion of a more general nature. In a situation where membership in micro-regional economic organization is one among a very limited number of foreign policy options available to a country, this
membership will tend to take on a value it otherwise would not have and will serve as a restraint on its behaviour in a conflict with another country despite the fact that membership in the organization has not yielded any tangible benefits. Apart from the "ideal" or potential value of membership, the scarcity of other options may serve the same purpose as an 'economic web of interdependence' in restraining the conflict behaviour of member states, essentially because of the risk of limiting further an already severely circumscribed number of options in the field of foreign relations.

There is one further point to be made which has special relevance to ASEAN and less so to ASA. Although ASEAN is a micro-regional economic organization and as such would seem to have had a measure of influence on the course of the Sabah dispute, in some respects it nonetheless behaved in a fashion characteristic of a macro-regional political organization.

According to Nye the latter type of organization can play essentially two roles in the control of conflict; '1) the organisation can serve as a forum or place to meet and debate, and 2) the organisation can have an executive role in carrying out operations.' While ASEAN did not possess the 'material resources' and the administrative machinery to act in accordance with the latter of the two roles, it did possess some of the 'ideal resources' necessary to fulfil a function commensurate to the first role. In particular ASEAN possessed an image of impartiality as 'personified' by Thailand and Indonesia and the two disputants could come together under the pretext of attending an ASEAN meeting. This was

195. Ibid., p. 135.
196. See ibid., p. 133 for an explanation of 'material' and 'ideal resources'.
the case in Djakarta in August 1968, and when diplomatic relations between them were ruptured they could still maintain contact by shifting the venue from bilateral channels to the 'neutral' ground of an ASEAN meeting, as in the foreign ministers' meeting in Bangkok in December 1968 and the secretary generals' meeting May 1969. Thus, it would seem that ASEAN in effect managed to play a part in the Sabah dispute which combined features of the roles usually ascribed to one or the other of the two types of organization. In a situation where no macro-regional political organization existed it was perhaps natural that ASEAN should fulfil some of the functions usually attributed to this type of organization. And therein lay perhaps some of the explanation for ASEAN's success, limited though it was. In making up for its deficiency as a micro-regional economic organization by partially 'usurping' the role of macro-regional political organization it was able to exert influences beyond what normally would have been the case. This suggests that the division between the two types of organizations is not all that clear when it comes to conflict resolution and control.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ETHNO-NATIONALISM

Among the many broad trends observable in the present day international system are two which, while being salient, would appear to be contradictory. On the one hand there has been in this century an increasing tendency for the peoples of the world to organize themselves to achieve shared goals. Governments and private groups have come together in organizations and associations the functional scope and variety of which transcend international boundaries and go beyond anything seen before. Looked at from the perspective of international integration this increased cooperation in its various forms constitutes the embryonic first step in a process of international integration and must as such be considered with favour by those for whom international integration is a desirable objective.

At the same time an increased fragmentation of the international system has taken place by the break up of large colonial empires brought about by the process of decolonization. Although this latter process has now largely petered out, new tendencies have become discernable. If carried to their logical conclusion these may, single or in conjunction with others, lead to a further fragmentation of the international system on an unparalleled scale through a process of disintegration and partition of states at present united, at least formally, under one government. These tendencies can

be seen in states with a multiplicity of ethnic or national groups within their boundaries and whose citizens may give their first loyalty to their ethnic or national group rather than to their country. Thus, while integration processes at the international level point to an international system with fewer states or members, disintegration at the national level, often directly traceable to ethnic identification and conflict, may point to a future system with a membership many times that of today.

This chapter will seek to examine the relationship between level of domestic or internal integration and the ability or capacity of the states of Southeast Asia to participate in processes of cooperation and integration at the international level, and it will be done through an examination of the special integration problems posed by the existence of numerous ethnic minorities in all the countries of the region. The analysis will in particular be related to an empirical generalization advanced by Ernst Haas to the effect that '[countries] which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the reluctance of the leaders to further undermine their control at home'.

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2. See in particular Walker Connor, "Self-determination: The New Phase", *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (October 1967). See also by the same author, "Ethnology and the Peace in South Asia", *World Politics*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (October 1969), and "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying", *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (April 1972). The last article contains a telling and instructive criticism of the confusing usage of the terms 'nation' and 'state' in the literature on political development as well as international relations, see pp. 332-336. In this chapter the terms ethnic groups and nation will be used interchangeably. However, since the meaning of the term nationalism, as conveying the idea of an emotion that 'makes the state the ultimate focus of the individual's loyalty', is so well established in the minds of laymen and scholars alike, this chapter will refrain from using this term however correct and logical such usage may be. More cumbersome though it may be, *ethnic or national consciousness* will be used instead to denote those loyalties directed toward the ethnic group or nation.

Before, however, proceeding to examine the role and influence of ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia in detail it is necessary to say a few words towards a clarification of the problem.

Myron Weiner has identified five different uses of the term integration in the literature on internal or domestic development. Following his example national integration means that which '...refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows - or eliminates - subordinate parochial loyalties'; territorial integration that which '...refers to the objective control which central authority has over the entire territory under its claimed jurisdiction'; elite-mass integration that which '...refers to the problem of linking government to the governed', of bridging the gap between the elite and the mass; value integration that which '...refers to the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order' and integrative behaviour means that which '...refers to the capacity of people in a society to organize for some common purpose'. All these definitions are attempts '...to define what it is which holds a society and a political system together'.

These definitions, however, have more in common than the last sentence would seem to indicate. Integration of any kind is, in the final analysis, about the attitudes, values and behaviour of human beings. It is difficult, therefore, to see how people can organise for a common purpose, or how they can possess a sense of territorial nationality, or, indeed, how governments can exercise objective control over their territory without

5. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
6. Ibid., p. 151. 7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 152.
there also being a minimum value consensus. Similarly objective territorial authority can hardly exist without a sense of territorial nationality unless, of course, oppression and violence are used in the pursuit of territorial control. If the latter is the case it is doubtful that one can talk about integration at all since violence caused by such endeavours may at best be a sign of non-integration and at worst a sign of disintegration. Thus the various forms of integration are interdependent; they are different aspects of the same phenomenon.

As long as the commonalities are remembered it may nevertheless be fruitful to split in the above manner the concept of integration into components so that each reflects an emphasis on a particular 'integration problem'. Thus while one may have a relatively high degree of value integration, i.e., a minimum consensus with regard to, for instance, '...what constitutes desirable and undesirable social ends,' 10 or '...the instrumentalities and procedures for the achievement of goals and for resolving conflicts,' 11 one may at the same time have a relatively low degree of territorial integration because the latter is to some extent dependent on physical capabilities which may not be available. Hence, integration is a multifaceted process consisting of a number of components interacting in an interdependent fashion.

To integrate ethnic minorities into the political, economic and social structure of a society is, of course, ultimately to find solutions to all these different integration problems. Thus ethnic integration clearly implies national integration according to the definition above. Ethnic integration also implies territorial integration to the extent the ethnic minorities in question can be said to be territorial, that is, show

a persistent attachment to a specific territory. Accordingly the inte-

gration of the overseas Chinese and Indian communities in Southeast Asia

is much less a question of territorial than national, value, and elite-
mass integration because the Chinese and the Indians are on the whole not
territorial in the above sense. They have by and large settled in the
towns and the cities where they are only two among many ethnic groups and
to which they cannot, reasonably or justifiably, lay any exclusive

claim. Other minorities are in the same situation. The Vietnamese in

Cambodia and the Khmer in Vietnam are also largely without any acknowledged
'title' to particular territories.

Ethnic integration also implies elite-mass integration. Quite

often this means establishing '...a pattern of authority and consent...' between the elite, drawn and recruited from the dominant majority, and the

mass of which the minorities are but a part. Perhaps above all else

minority integration implies value integration, that is, that there exist, at a minimum, '...acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict'.

Finally, ethnic integration also implies a certain amount of integrative

behaviour, that is, a '...readiness of individuals to work together in an

organized fashion for common purposes and to behave in a fashion conducive
to the achievement of these common purposes...'

These integration problems are, of course, not solely connected
to ethnic integration. They are present in the integration of all social
entities. However, there remains a sense in which the integration of
ethnic minorities poses problems different from those arising from the

12. Ibid., p. 152.
13. The exception to this rule is, of course, Singapore.
16. Ibid., p. 158.
integration of other social entities, and the consequences accruing from
the non-integration of ethnic minorities may, indeed, be quite dissimilar
to those which arise from the non-integration of other social entities.

An ethnic group, at least in the context of the developing
countries, is by contrast with other social units often a fairly compre­
hensive and discrete entity whose existence as such is justified in terms
of its dissimilarities to other units and its ability to fulfil certain
needs of its members in a manner other entities cannot. A non-integrated
multi-nation state is a collection of such discrete units each of which
performs a set of functions primarily developed for the purpose of self­
maintenance. In the case of the majority groups these functions coincide
with the functions of maintaining the political system of the state. Inte­
gration may be seen and often is considered to be the process whereby the
various ethnic groups change their functions in such a way that state­
maintenance rather than self-maintenance becomes the primary goal. As will
be seen later state-maintenance is quite often indistinguishable from
majority-maintenance. Hence, the onus for change is on the minorities.

These brief observations related to ethnic minorities and inter­
nal integration will be useful for the understanding of the minority sit­
uation in Southeast Asia to which the discussion now will turn.

BACKGROUND

In sharp contrast to Africa the political map of Southeast Asia
bears some resemblance to the immediate pre-colonial state of affairs as
far as geographical location and extent of the political units are con­
cerned. 17 However, today as distinct from then, a number of ethnic groups find
themselves divided by rigidly drawn boundaries signalling the physical
limits of the polities to which they are expected to give their loyalties.

17. Ibid., p. 163.
This is a heritage of the colonial era during which the imperial powers brought with them alien boundary concepts and arbitrary practices which paid little heed to local factors and considerations. Delimited or demarcated boundaries did not exist but rather fluid frontiers or border zones the territory of which was claimed now by one and now by the other of the states according to their strength, power and intentions of the day. These frontiers were zones of contact and occasional, sometimes frequent, warfare and always subject to change. 'Though the essence of sovereignty was of great importance the territorial aspect of sovereignty was in fact negotiable'. If for one reason or another they felt discontented ethnic and tribal groups could move from the area of effective control of one government to that of another without creating undue concern.

However, even though the boundary concepts introduced by the colonial powers were alien to the region their rigidity compared to indigenous concepts was considerably eased by practice. Through the establishment of boundaries and by providing basic security in the border areas the colonial powers had signalled an end to further territorial expansion on the part of some pre-colonial political units. Cambodia, for example, was facing nearly certain extinction as an independent political entity and was only saved by the intervention of France in Indo-China and the resulting unwillingness of the Thai to face the consequences of a war with the French. But though the colonial powers thus introduced

20. Ibid., p. 3.
security against invasion and also put a stop to the almost constant warfare in many areas, they did not impose any strict border control. The movement of people across the new boundaries continued in much the same way it had across the previously more fluid frontiers. Administratively these border areas were largely left alone. The colonial powers, predominantly preoccupied with the coastal areas, the broad river valleys and deltas, and the regions immediately adjacent to these were not much interested in or found it very difficult to completely control the border areas which in most cases constituted the more remote parts. This situation still prevails in many areas of Southeast Asia today perhaps less because of lack of willingness than for want of capabilities, administrative or otherwise, to enforce effective control and strong government right up to the boundaries. In fact today the governments of Southeast Asia have found that they have to pay attention to their ethnic minorities, especially those located on their borders, because these areas in many cases have taken on a strategic importance they did not possess in colonial times.

In turning to examine specific cases of ethnicity and its significance in the Southeast Asian context a start will be made with a case altogether different in most respects from all the others.

THE SEPARATION OF SINGAPORE FROM MALAYSIA

It is not altogether easy to single out the ethnic component in a situation as complex as that which surrounded both the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia and Singapore's departure from it. The ethnic cleavages and especially those between the major ethnic groups, the


Malays and the Chinese, are the most persistent and important divisions in contemporary Malaysian society. Unlike the situation in all other countries in Southeast Asia, these two groups, neither of which have an absolute majority in terms of population, are roughly equal in size, the Malays (in 1960) comprising about 49 per cent and the Chinese about 32 per cent of the total population in Malaya. The ethnic cleavages are not cut across by other divisions strong enough to somewhat 'defuse' the impact of ethnicity as in so many other pluralist societies but rather reinforced by having religious and linguistic cleavages superimposed on them thereby aggravating the effect. Nearly every political, economic and social question becomes also a question of ethnicity.

Historical developments took place in Malaya whereby the immigrant race, the Chinese, obtained through their efforts a predominant position in the territory's economic life compared to the Malays. The Chinese massed more wealth, acquired on the whole better education and concentrated to a large extent in the urban areas - all factors which gave them a decisive edge over the predominantly rural, less educated and economically less prosperous and less industrious Malays when it came to the competition for political power and economic rewards. The Malays,

by virtue of being the indigenous race, had however, led a somewhat protected life under the British who gave to the Malays special political status by maintaining and ruling through the traditional Malay rulers and by excluding non-Malays from the civil service in the Malay states.  

When Malaya became independent in 1957 her constitution reflected a division of economic and political power between the major ethnic groups which was in some respects the result of a determined campaign on the part of the Malays in the years before independence to hold on to their superior political position. While the Malays were automatically citizens, only the Chinese and Indians born in Malaya were able to claim citizenship. Thus the constitution in effect gave for a considerable time into the future predominant political power to the Malays. Islam was to be the official religion of the state and Malay was granted status as the sole national language after 1967 until which time English enjoyed equal status. In addition Malays were given certain privileges in respect of land, tenure, entry to the civil service, education and the issuance of business permits and licences. The protection and advantages given the Malays were meant to serve as the vehicle by which they would catch up with the non-Malays and join these on an equal basis in the competition for influence and rewards.  

Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malay Prime Minister and other Malay leaders had for a long time been against a union with Singapore for basically three reasons. The two most longstanding ones were on the basis of economics and race. Economically it was believed that the two were too much in contrast Singapore relying nearly entirely on a free trade policy  

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30. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
in order to stimulate entrepot trade while Malaya was essentially a primary and raw material producing country relying on revenues from export and import duties. The most important argument, however, was the racial one. A union would have upset the racial balance by resulting in a slight Chinese population majority over the Malays in the new entity. 31

The third and last reason entered the calculations in the second half of the 1950's. This was what appeared to the Malayan leaders to be the basically unstable and leftward trend of Singapore politics. In the eyes of the Malayan leaders political life in Singapore was increasingly coming under communist influence. 32

The turning point in the campaign for a closer relationship between Singapore and Malaya came in May 1961 when the Tunku in a speech before the Foreign Correspondants Association of Southeast Asia almost casually suggested that Malaya sooner or later should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, Bornoe, Brunei and Sarawak. 33 Although he refrained from spelling out the nature of the envisioned relationship in any detail the Tunku talked about '...a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation'. 34

The acceptance by the Tunku and other Malay leaders on the mainland of the idea of a merger between Singapore and Malaya was a complete reversal of previous policy. Such a reversal can only have come about if

34. Ibid.
the importance the Tunku attached to the maintenance of the balance between
the ethnic groups in Malaya had been superceded by some other immediate
and pressing problem. In fact such an issue had come up. What previously
had been considered an obstacle to a merger by the Kuala Lumpur leaders,
namely the unstable and leftwing nature of politics in Singapore, was now
seen as the most urgent reason for a closer relationship thus pushing
ethnic considerations into the background to the benefit of what the Tunku
saw as the only solution to the security problem of Malaya. Events in
Singapore after 1959 with serious splits in the ranks of the ruling
People's Action Party of Lee Kuan Yew had cast doubt on the ability of
the Singapore government to govern effectively and events during the
first two or three months of 1961 had further served to increase the Mal­
ayan fears and anxieties about what the future might have in store in
regard to both Malaya and Singapore once Britain granted independence to
the latter. To the Malayan leaders who for twelve years had fought a
communist insurgency the thought of a possible communist ruled Singapore
was a bleak one indeed. It was clear to the Malayan leaders that
Singapore's independence would come sooner rather than later. Not only
would British control then be a thing of the past but so would also the
small amount of direct influence the Federation of Malaya had in Singapore
through its membership in the Internal Security Council.

Although having been pushed somewhat in the background ethnic
considerations had not been forgotten. Once the decision to establish
Malaysia with Singapore as a member had been taken it became important to

37. This body was established under the 1958 Singapore constitution and it
was composed of two British, two Singapore and one Malayan represent­
ative of ministerial rank who in the case of deadlock between the
others on internal security matters, would have the casting vote.
soften the impact of Singapore's large Chinese majority as much as possible, hopefully to the extent that the existing racial and political balance in Malaya could be maintained. To achieve this North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak were brought into the Federation scheme and gave it thereby an ethnic ratio fairly similar to that which had prevailed in Malaya. 38

The second step in limiting Singapore's influence in Malaya was, what has been referred to as, the political 'insulation' of Malaya from Singapore. 39 Two means were used to achieve this. Firstly, Singapore was given only 15 seats of the 159 seats in the Federal Parliament in Kuala Lumpur although on the basis of her population she would have been entitled to nearly twice as many. By contrast Sabah and Sarawak with much smaller electorates were given 16 and 24 seats respectively. The reason for this apparent inequity was ostensibly the considerable degree of local autonomy retained by Singapore and her urban character as opposed to the predominantly rural territories of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. Secondly, according to the constitutional provisions citizens of Singapore could neither vote nor stand for federal or state office in the States of Malaya, and, similarly, only Singapore citizens could be elected to office in Singapore.

Malaysia came into existence on September 16, 1963. The relationship between Malaya and Singapore within the Federation became

38. Means, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

increasingly a battle between energetic Chinese leaders in Singapore holding political and economic ideas which in their opinion had applicability not only to Singapore but to Malaysia as a whole, and the more conservative Malay leaders on the mainland whose political ideas and perceptions of the situation in Malaya forced them to vigorously oppose the attempts of the Singapore leaders to make political inroads in Malaya. The issues involved were many and varied indeed. Some originated from the terms of the Malaysia agreement itself, others were due to personal animosities among some of the principal personalities involved. But as time wore on the conflict became increasingly ethnic in character. More and more of it centered around expressions of ethnic origin, loyalties, privileges, rights, relationships, etc. The political, economic and social issues that arose came to be seen increasingly through ethnic glasses.

Among the potentially important issues the economic very quickly became a matter of contention and stress. Apart from the direct bearing such issues had on the end result - they constituted indeed problems whose solutions could make or break any newly established federation - they became important also insofar as they contributed to and augmented the ill feelings and mistrust that came to exist.

40. See, for example, Hanna, op. cit., the chapter on the Tunku. See also Fletcher, ibid., p. 3.

41. Several of the economic and political terms negotiated were rather general and vague in formulation leaving much room for interpretation. On this point see Osborne, op. cit., pp. 60-61 for an anticipation of what happened later. See also Milne, "Singapore's Exit", passim and Fletcher, ibid, passim.

42. See the reference to this factor in Fletcher, ibid., p. 11, Osborne, ibid, pp. 48-49, and Willard H. Hanna, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, American Universities Field Staff, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XIII, No. 21, pp. 3-9.
However, the most important issues to influence the course of events both in their direct role in the separation and in their role in augmenting ethnic feelings and eventually putting these at the center of the dispute were the political.  

Notwithstanding hopes and intentions, the insulation of Singapore referred to above was not complete, as events were to show. There were no provisions prohibiting Singapore's political parties from establishing branches in Malaya and recruiting locals to stand as candidates. By the same token similar arrangements could be made by the political parties in Malaya in regard to Singapore. This had as a matter of fact been the state of affairs in Singapore since the 1950s when the Singapore Branch of the mainland Alliance parties contested the 1955 and subsequent elections in Singapore.

Thus the not-so-perfect 'insulation' provided ample opportunity for both actors to enter each other's territory. Both proceeded to do just that. In the Singapore state elections of 21 September 1963 the PAP emerged as the victorious party by capturing 37 of the 51 seats as against the 13 seats won by its chief opponent, the leftwing Barisan Sosialis. More important still was the loss of all its seats, seven all told, suffered by the Singapore People's Alliance. More humiliating even, in view of UMNO Malaya's wholehearted backing of its Singapore counterpart, was the fact that in three of the constituences the majority of the electorate was


44. United Malay National Organization, the party of the Tunku, and the senior partner in the Alliance in Malaya. The Alliance also have two other members basically ethnic in character, the Malay Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malay Indian Congress (MIC).

The PAP decision to enter the state and federal elections in Malaya in April 1964 was perhaps the most crucial decision it made during the entire period as a part of Malaysia. Ostensibly the PAP participated in the election to oppose the MCA and the Socialist Front and thereby prevent Malaysia from being drawn into the Indonesian orbit. According to PAP calculations a party was needed which could attract the urban Chinese votes now in danger of being lost to the Socialist Front, an anti-Malaysia and pro-Indonesia party. The MCA had previously captured these votes but now, according to PAP analysis, the antipathy for the MCA was strong among the urban Chinese. The PAP, however studiously avoided attacking the UMNO. On the contrary, according to PAP propaganda its primary purpose was to ensure the continued leadership of the Tunku and Tun Razak.

The PAP emerged from the elections as the clear loser in most people's eyes. It gained only one seat of the nine it contested in the federal election.

To the MCA and the UMNO the PAP's intervention was interpreted not only as a challenge to the MCA but also to the entire Alliance Government. It threatened in their eyes to split both the Chinese and the Malay votes and thereby overturn the carefully worked out balance between the MCA and the UMNO in particular.

The PAP participation in the Malayan election inspired a number of events which increasingly brought ethnic tension into the open.

An example was the PAP decision to establish branches in all the Malay states where it had contested elections despite its defeat. 50

In July 1964, not long after the Malayan elections, the UNMO struck back at the PAP by calling a counter-meeting in Singapore to one called by the Singapore Government with a number of non-political, Singapore-based, Malay organizations to discuss the problems of the Malays. 51 When race riots occurred at the end of July and again in September they were blamed on the heated discussions with ethnic overtones that characterized and surrounded these meetings. The PAP and UMNO blamed each other for inciting to violence. 52

The tensions had reached such heights that the Tunku met with Lee Kuan Yew in late September and they agreed on a two year embargo on discussions of issues that could exacerbate ethnic feelings. This truce lasted about a month. 53

The next big issue arose in April 1965 when the Malaysian National Alliance Party was formed by a merger of all the Alliance branches in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. This event speeded up the implementation of a proposal, discussed the previous year by the PAP, to form a united opposition front. Five Malaysian opposition parties met in Singapore on May 9 and formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention. Ostensibly non-communal in character the support of all these parties came nevertheless predominantly from the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. 54

The formation of the Convention came unfortunately a bare six days after another event which brought tempers to near boiling point. On May 3 Lee Kuan Yew in a speech to the PAP had said that none of the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia – the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians could claim to be more native to Malaysia than the others. The reaction was swift and emotional. Tun Razak called the statement mischievous and dangerous. The Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Federation said Lee had humiliated the Malays. The UMNO Secretary General described Lee's statement as a 'slap in the face of the Malays'.

When UMNO held its annual general assembly in mid-May a resolution was passed urging 'strong action' against Lee. There were also those who advocated Lee should be put in detention and Lee's effigy was burnt.

On August 9, 1965, after further arguments, Singapore separated from Malaysia. The Tunku had decided this was the only solution. The fundamental reason given by him was the threat of communal violence.

Thus ethnic nationalism, pushed into the background to facilitate the formation of Malaysia, had again surfaced as the strongest force and served as the fundamental cause for the dismembering of Singapore from Malaysia.

ETHNIC MINORITIES IN BURMA

No central government in Southeast Asia has had so much difficulty with its minorities as that of the Union of Burma. Her inter-

56. Ibid., pp. 1216-1217.
57. The Australian, 14 May 1965; see also Fletcher, op. cit., pp. 62-66.
58. Fletcher, ibid., p. 66.
59. For a fairly detailed description of events involving ethnic minorities from 1948 to 1960, see Tinker, The Union of Burma, esp. pp. 34-61, and Trager, Burma, pp. 95-139. For a description of the population and linguistic affiliations of ethnic groups in Burma, see Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 73-146.
national boundaries with Bangla Desh, India, Laos, China and Thailand, situated in mountainous regions, are occupied by a multitude of ethnic minority groups such as the Chin, Kachin, Wa, Shan, Ka en and Mon who are non-Burmese speakers and who also differ from the majority group, the Burmans, in other aspects of culture. The Burmans never exercised firm political control over these minority groups, a task made more difficult by the fact that some of them rivalled the Burmans in terms of cultural development and political influence. This was recognized by the British who gave groups like the Shan and the Kayah (Red Karen) special administrative status within which traditional patterns of leadership were maintained and sometimes reinforced.

When the Union of Burma was formed as a result of Britain's granting of independence in 1948 some of these ethnic groups formed their own states within the Union. Much of Burma's life since 1948 has been marked by a long and violent struggle on the part of various ethnic minorities to assert their political and cultural independence.

While this struggle nearly caused the Union to break up in the first couple of years after independence the Central Government, never in complete control of the situation, has had ever since to learn to live with the various forms of insurgency and rebellion.


62. It was not until the end of 1951 that the various rebel groups ceased to constitute an alternative to the government and that a certain measure of security returned. See Tinker, *op.cit.*, pp.49-50.

63. In late 1957 a new threat appeared in the shape of Chinese Nationalists in the Kengtung area of the Shan states. These were troops which, after Chiang Kai-Shek's collapse on the main-land and subsequent withdrawal to Taiwan, had withdrawn into Burma where they in the years that followed and even today constitute a problem, albeit today much less so than in the years immediately following 1951. See Tinker, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-55. See also William C. Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge and Harvard University Press, 1963) for an assessment of the effect of the KMT Troops issue on Burma's foreign relations.
The rebellions in Burma have been of two kinds, ethnic and communist. It has not always been easy to distinguish the two from each other since there have on occasions been cooperation between various ethnic and communist groups and also since there are in the communist ranks a considerable number of ethnic minorities.

The basic and most salient feature of the rebel movements in Burma has been their lack of common purpose and inability to cooperate. Not only are there divisions between the various ethnic groups but also within the groups themselves. Thus the Karens, for example, were organized in the early stages into at least two different groups with partially conflicting policies. One group, the Karen Youth Organization, remained loyal to the Government in the time after independence while the other group, the Karen National Union, broke with the Government and launched their insurrection in mid 1948. The Communists are also split. One group, the smaller of the two, exists under the name the Communist Party of Burma, also called the 'Red Flag' communists, and the other under the name the Burma Communist Party (BCP), also called the 'White Flag' communists.

The rebellions in the years 1948-51 were dominated to a large extent by the communists and the Karens. The fact that they did not manage to defeat the Union Government in those years may be attributed to a number of factors among which weaknesses within the insurgent movements themselves were among the most important. Personal rivalry and ideological differences hindered the various groups from ever launching a concerted and coordinated campaign although the overthrow of the Government was the immediate goal shared by all.

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64. See Trager, Burma, op. cit., pp. 103 and 105.
65. Ibid., p. 97.
66. Ibid., p. 106.
67. Ibid., p. 120.
The main thrust of the insurgent movements faltered during 1951. 68 Throughout the 1950s the Government was forced, however, to be on the alert. Military operations of some scale were conducted against the Karen National Union, and the communist groups, especially the White Flags, in 1953, 1954 and 1955. 69

Among the ethnic groups it was mainly the Karens who were in rebellion against the Union government in those early years. Other groups like the Kachin, Chin and Shans remained on the whole loyal to the Union. 70 However, in the early 1960s also elements within these groups rebelled and particularly the military government of Ne Win 71 has had to contend with a multitude of insurgent ethnic movements. Indeed one of the main reasons for Ne Win's coup in 1962 was precisely the rise in insurrectionary activity and what was seen as UN's leniency towards minority demands for autonomy and the right to secede. 72 But in the time since he has not been successful in his attempts to put down the rebellions, neither the ethnic nor the communist variety.

Various means have been used in these attempts. In April 1963 the Revolutionary Council of Ne Win offered amnesty to all rebels if they laid down their arms before 1 July. 73 On 11 June the Council proposed unconditional negotiations with guarantees for safe passage for those

68. Ibid., p. 115.
69. Tinker, op. cit., pp. 54-60.
70. Träger, op. cit., p. 107.
71. In March 1962 the military under General Ne Win staged a coup against the government of U Nu. The country was led from then on by a Revolutionary Council, exercising absolute power under the leadership of Ne Win. See Träger, op. cit., pp. 190-211.
groups who accepted this offer. Over the next few months delegates from the communist groups and the various ethnic rebel groups came forward. In November however it became clear that all the talks, except those with the KNDO which dragged on, had failed. The talks with the Karen went on until March 12 1964 when an agreement was signed that ended all the Karen rebellions. 74

Thus by March 1964 the Government had achieved a limited success but the communist groups were still active, and after the Karens had laid down their arms, the Shans and the Kachins were the significant ethnic groups in rebellion. 75

Throughout the 1960s various alliances were reported to have been formed between different rebel groups. Thus in early 1963 an alliance between the KNDO, Shan insurgents and the Kachin Independence Army was supposed to have established. 76 However, immediately afterwards came the Government's offer of amnesty and its subsequent agreement with the KNDO.

Again in 1965 a 'Council for National Liberation' was formed by some Karen leaders not already jailed by the Government. This group was reported to be considered by the military the single most important threat to their regime. 77 Negotiations were also started with the Shans and the Kachins to have them join the Council which in 1967 was reported still to be in existence. 78

74. Trager, op. cit., pp. 203-204.
75. Ibid.
78. Ibid., 10 September 1967, p. 400.
Events took a slightly new turn in 1967 when the rift in Sino-Burmese relations occurred in June of that year. The White Flag communists stepped up their activities with Chinese encouragement and approval. The Chinese also took steps to elicit the support of ethnic minorities, especially the Kachins which occupy the northern part of Burma, and they appear to have had some success.

The year 1967 also saw the release of many of the civilian political leaders of the pre-coup era, among them former Prime Minister U Nu. In 1969 U Nu left Burma upon the publication of the recommendations of the National Internal Unity Advisory Board. This body had been set up by Ne Win to recommend means of preserving the threatened unity of Burma. It consisted of some 33 former leaders, among them U Nu. A few months after being handed the report Ne Win rejected its recommendations. This convinced U Nu that a return to democracy and constitutional rule in Burma which the report had advocated, was impossible without direct action and resort to arms.

U Nu's first step was to try to induce the various ethnic minorities in rebellion to cooperate and coordinate their fight against the Government. This certainly could be no easy task. It was reported however that he was successful in getting Mon and Karen leaders to sign an agreement to join in an anti-Ne Win Group, the National United Liberation
Front. This took place in late June 1970. He could only have succeeded in this by meeting some of the demands of the minorities. By all accounts all these activities had little outward effect on the situation in Burma as a whole. Apparently U Nu and his allies were building up their strength and biding their time.

Thus rebel activities ebbed and flowed during the 1960s, strong enough to keep the Burmese Army, numbering around 130,000 men occupied most of the time, but not strong enough to really threaten the government nor the Union itself.

ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THAILAND

By consulting Thai census figures one is left with an impression of an overwhelmingly homogeneous country which for all practical purposes may be termed a nation-state in the true sense of this term. Some 97 percent of the people speak Thai, about 98 percent is of Thai 'national origin, and some 93 percent are Buddhists. But this apparent homogeneity is deceptive. There are important regional and cultural differences pronounced enough to have brought some groups into direct confrontation with the Thai government. Important intra-ethnic differences are not


83. See *ibid.*, 20 August 1970, p. 29 for an account of U Nu's changed attitude towards ethnic minorities and 7 November 1970 for minority demands.


reflected in the figures where, for example, the various types of ethnic Thais, among whom there are significant cultural differences, are simply classified as Thai. Similarly not even all the peoples classified as Thais are really ethnic Thais like, for example, the Khmer minority in the eastern provinces. They have been classified so because nominally they are Thai citizens. 88

What follows will concentrate on three groups which in later years have proven to be sources of considerable difficulty for the authorities in Bangkok, namely the Meo of the North, the Lao-Thai of the Northeast and the Malays of the Southern provinces among whom much opposition to Thai rule have surfaced over the last years and instances of armed revolt have increased, especially in the North and Northeast.

Of the three the North was the latecomer in terms of rebellious activities. The region comprises about one fifth of the territory of Thailand and it consists of a number of mountain ranges varying in height from 2000 to 8000 feet and extending south from Burma and Laos with ridges covered with valuable teak forest. 89

There were only few and scattered signs of trouble brewing in the North prior to 1966-67. Some Meo had been recruited by the communists as long back as 1957-59 to serve with the Pathet Lao but only for the purpose of being used against the authorities in Vientiane rather than against the Bangkok authorities. They returned to Thailand in 1962 and took no part in any further military activities. Recruitment of hill people to take part in insurgent activities in Thailand got under way in 1962 and continued in the years after. On their return to Thailand from


training, mostly in Laos and North Vietnam but also in China, they confined
their activities basically to low-key propaganda in Meo villages. 90 They
were under the direction of the Communist Party of Thailand which operated
mostly from Laos, North Vietnam and China. 91

The first armed skirmish took place in early 1967 when one
member of the Thai Border Patrol Police was killed. This was the first
casualty directly due to organized anti-government forces in the north. 92
Further violent incidents followed, not all of them, however, attributable
to communist insurrection. Corruption and extortionate behaviour by local
Thai officials resulted sometimes in violent reactions from the Meo. 93
As the incidents increased and the Thai army, untrained and ill-equipped
for this type of warfare, took heavy casualties, napalm and bombing became
a part of the tactics used by the Thais. They did, however, have a tend-
eney to make enemies out of hill people who had not been so before. 94

The clashes between Government forces and hill people, con-
fined in 1967 to only a part of the North, soon spread to the other regions
as well where a familiar pattern became discernable.

'... once limited violence was begun ... the pattern ...
repeated itself: a conventional army deployment, accompanied
by bombing and napalming of tribal villages: depopulation
of large areas and the creation of a substantial number of
refugees: the driving of the young members of the tribal
communities into the forests where they co-operated with
communist-led activists in operations against Thai troops:
aggravation of pre-existing lowlander-uplander conflicts:
and the stabilization of violence and social disruption at
a high level.' 95

90. Ibid., pp. 92-98.  91. Ibid.  92. Ibid.  93. Ibid.
94. See ibid., passim for an account of the so-called Opium War and
its part in the deteriorating situation in the North. See Far
Eastern Economic Review,
95. Race, Ibid., p. 108.
The number of violent clashes in the North increased from 19 in 1967 to 108 in 1968 and 112 in 1969 and during the first two years of military operations the number of hill tribe people armed against the Government increased somewhere between five and twenty times. A further result of the escalation of violence was an increase in hill tribe refugees from about 6000 to June 1968 to 9000 in January 1969 and more than 10000 in mid 1970.

The northeast region of Thailand has, contrary to the North, a history of political opposition to the Thai government stretching back at least to 1932 when the constitutional regime was introduced. The Northeasterners have usually justified their opposition in terms of the economic neglect shown the region. An expression of their discontent would show itself in the National Assembly where the representatives of the region usually would side with the opposition.

The Government's high level of preoccupation with the region dates back to the period 1958-61 when the significance of the Northeast was redefined from being a minor provincial irritant to one of a potential danger to the existence of the Government and Thailand itself. In the eyes of the Government a number of factors combined in the Northeast to make it an especially sensitive area. Firstly, the region was close to Laos and Vietnam where the communists, most notably the Viet Cong, had stepped up their pressure. Secondly, the population was ethnically Lao.

96. Ibid., p. 104, note 42.
97. Ibid., p. 110.
98. Ibid., p. 109. For an assessment of the situation in 1971, see Morell, "Thailand: Military Checkmate", pp. 159-160.
100. Keyes, Jean: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand, p. 51.
even if it considered itself culturally Thai. Thirdly, what was seen as
the appeal of Lao separatism. Fourthly, its economically undeveloped state
made it fertile ground for subversion. Fifthly, the existence of relatively
large Khmer and Vietnamese minorities, and finally the history of the region
and other evidence suggested that parts of the political leadership were
involved in communist activities. 101

In 1961 the Government took steps which resulted in numerous
arrests among political leaders in the Northeast. 102 There was and is
also a tendency for the Thai leaders to regard any political opposition
eemanating from the Northeast as being insurrectionary in character. 103
The number of troops employed in the region increased partly, according to
the authorities, because of the need to combat insurrection and partly to
protect against a possible invasion of Thailand from or through Laos. 103
There was a slight increase in clashes resulting in killings in the first
half of the 1960s. 105 At the same time the Thai authorities have also
put a great deal of emphasis on developing the Northeast economically. 106

Throughout the second half of the 1960s communist activity
appeared to be on the increase both organizationally and militarily. 107
In 1971 they had extended their hold to the degree of controlling over 150
villages in the Northeast. Each village now had a 'Village Military Unit',
a novelty compared to previous years. The number of armed guerillas was

102. Keyes, ibid., p. 53.
103. Ibid., p. 55. 104. Ibid., p. 54.
107. See for example Darling, "Thailand: Stability and Escalation",
and Neher, "Thailand: The Politics of Continuity", and Morell,
op. cit.
In regard to the South two problems in particular caused difficulties for the Government. Firstly there is the problem of Malay irredentism and secondly the communist threat.

The overwhelming majority of the population of the four southernmost provinces are Thai Muslims. Culturally they are Malay rather than Thai and most of them have little or no knowledge of the Thai language. Periodic violent opposition to the Thais dates back several decades at least. As early as 1923 a movement started which developed into a full-fledged independence movement. This and similar phenomena have been suppressed by severe military actions by the Thais. After World War II a movement developed which among other things drafted a petition to the United Nations asking for secession from Thailand and a union with Malaya. Encouragement has been given to the Muslim separatists from sympathisers in Malaysia although probably not with Malaysian Government blessing.

The communists operating in the region are basically remnants of the fighting force of the Malayan Communist Party from the Malayan Emergency 1948-60. They are using the rugged frontier area between Thailand and Malaysia as a sanctuary and for some years there existed between the communists and the Thai government what seemed to be a tacit understanding of live-and-let-live. Recently, however, this understanding broke down largely because of pressure exerted by the Malaysian Government

109. Fraser, Jr., *Fishermen in South Thailand; the Malay Villagers*, pp. 100-102. See also Suhrke, "The Thai Muslims: Some Aspects of Minority Integration", pp. 531-547.
on the Thais to take action against the communists who were directing their operations against Malaysia. A border agreement was signed in 1971 providing for joint border patrols and permission for Malaysian troops and police to pursue the communists over the border into Thai territory. 111

MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES

In Malaysia, besides the problems involved in the relationship between the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians in the west there are also minorities in Sabah and Sarawak. During confrontation strenuous attempts were made by the Indonesians to induce these minorities to side with Indonesia against Malaysia. However, this proved to be a futile exercise. If anything, confrontation strengthened solidarity within Malaysia. 112

However, as on the Thai border, Malaysia had problems with communist insurgency also on the Sarawak-Indonesia border, and again the communist guerrillas are predominantly Chinese. The problems in Sarawak are of less proportion than on the Thai border and are, according to reports, being reduced in magnitude. 113

Indonesia has over 350 ethnic groups each with its own cultural identity. 114 However, her problem is not so much a matter of ethnicity, although it is present, as it is a problem of regionalism. 115 A number of regional rebellions have occurred in Indonesia, for example the establishment of the Republic of South Maluku in 1950 was crushed only after

111. Suhrke, op. cit., p. 540.


115. Mohammad A. Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of Regionalism: A Lesson from Indonesia", pp. 934-945.
a month of bitter fighting. Then came the rebellion in South Sulawesi in 1951-52 and the Atjeheneese rebellion in 1953. 116 Of these only the first was secessionist in intention. 117 Another regional challenge took place in 1957-58 when the so-called PRRI rebellion took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi. 118 With the exception of West Irian 119, however, regionalism has not been given violent expression in recent years although regionalism as a phenomenon involving strong loyalties continues to exist.

Apart from the communist insurgency, the problems related to the Muslim minority, numbering about 1.8 million people, in the south of Mindanao are one of the most urgent ones facing the Philippine Government. 120 Clashes between Muslims and Christians have become frequent with losses of lives. A secessionist movement has been under way for some years now. 121

Demands from ethnic and national groups for political, economic and cultural autonomy and in some cases, secession, have been heard with increased frequency. 122 Moreover, from the survey of the situation in Southeast Asia it should be clear that the question of ethnic minorities and their integration into the larger society are ones on which hinge the existence and territorial integrity of most states as presently constituted. Thus, while some trends may seem to point towards the

116. Ibid., p. 939. 117. Ibid., p. 945.
118. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in McVey, op. cit., pp. 344-347.
disintegration of some states there are, however, other factors which may mitigate against these trends. These factors are internal as well as external to the countries concerned, and they need to be discussed in order to arrive at a fuller assessment of the minority situation and its relations to processes of cooperation and integration at the regional level. Some of these factors are primarily related to features of the minorities themselves while others are concerned with the relationship between majorities and minorities. Still others are operating at the international level and are not confined to Southeast Asia.

SOME NUMERICAL AND TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The question of minority aspirations for separation and self-determination is to some extent a matter of numbers as well as a matter of territory. Several aspects of these factors need attention.

Firstly, there is the ethnic ratio, that is, the numerical relationship between majority and minority. From the point of view of the majority group the smaller the minority group(s) the better. Should the minorities, in the name of a right to self-determination, resort to armed struggle it is an advantage to have as large a numerical superiority as possible. In Burma, for example, the dominant ethnic group, the Burmans, constitute about 56 percent of the total population while the largest minority group, the Karen, account for about 5 percent. \(^ {123} \) It seems reasonable to suppose that the failure of the various separatist groups to achieve their goal in some measure can be attributed to Burman numerical superiority.

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123. Calculated from table 4 in Kunstadter, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88. All population figures and percentages appearing in this part are quoted or calculated from tables in Kunstadter unless otherwise indicated. Reference will be made to which tables are consulted.
Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to attribute part of the great concern with which the Thai authorities seem to view the situation in the northeast to the sheer size of the largest minority group, the Lao-Thai. This group numbers some 9 millions or about 36 percent of the total population. Should separatist sentiments increase in the future and a separation attempt be made their numerical strength would be one of their main assets.

The supreme example of the importance of ethnic ratios is, of course, the situation in Malaysia and the separation of Singapore. As suggested above ethnic considerations lay at the root of the separation and an important factor in this connection was the fear of the Malays of being outnumbered by the Chinese although they already were outnumbered by the combined non-Malay population, including the Chinese, by a ratio of 2:3. It is conceivable that the Tunku might have chosen a course of action well short of separation had the challenge to Malay political domination come from segments of a group less numerous than the Chinese in Malaysia. In other words, if the ethnic ratio had been much more decisively in favour of the Malays the separation of Singapore might not have happened. But, then, of course, the Chinese in Malaysia, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, possess culturally determined qualities both as individuals and as a group which set them apart from all other minority groups in the region. These qualities make the Chinese a more serious competitor to the majority groups and have possibly caused governments in Southeast Asia to pay them attention beyond that allotted other equally numerous groups.

There is also another advantage from the point of view of the majority in having to deal with small ethnic groups. In any armed conflict there is a residual, non-fighting element. In the kind of conflicts we are talking about here, often insurrectionist in character, this residual element is particularly important. Not only does a small ethnic group mean a comparatively small fighting force but also a correspondingly small residual element from which the combatant element can receive the necessary supplies and support, and the background against which to blend and merge when hard pressed.

From the point of view of the majorities what we have argued so far favour small minorities. Of course, from the point of view of the minorities themselves the reverse is true.

However, all this should not lead us to the conclusion that a relatively small minority group always represent a minor threat. The Meo, which appear to have caused the Thai government trouble out of proportion to their numbers, total only about 45-50000 which is less than 0.2 percent of the entire population of Thailand. 126

Nor should we conclude that, at least up to a certain point, it is always an advantage for a minority to be as numerous as possible vis-a-vis the majority. A numerically large ethnic group usually occupies more territory than a smaller. The larger the ethnic minority is the more population and territory a state stands to lose which in turn may increase its resolve to prevent separation.

Likewise, numerical strength need not be an advantage from the point of view of unity of purpose. Large ethnic minorities usually display greater cultural diversity than smaller minorities and they are frequently

divided into a large number of subgroups. The cultural diversity has its roots in historical experiences and harbours more potential for differences with regard to policies, actions and so on.

All states with minorities attempt in some way or other to accommodate their minorities on terms which fall short of secession. Integration, assimilation, autonomy, cultural pluralism and so on, are just a few labels often attached to majority policies towards the minorities. Different governments have applied different policies and it is not uncommon that the same government has resorted to a variety of different policies vis-a-vis the same minority group. Whatever the nature of these policies, size plays an important role in this context too, because the larger the minority group the more difficult it may be to make a success of such policies.

Because of its size and cultural diversity the integration or assimilation of a large minority group demands more resources, ideas and imaginative thinking than normally would be the case. This is perhaps even more the case where the majority is faced with the task of integrating not only one but many minority groups each of which may need separate consideration, treatment and policies. The ethnic minority component of the population varies a great deal from country to country in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia it is as high as 60 percent while in Cambodia it is about 14 percent. All the countries are, however, multi-ethnic with Indonesia harbouring more than 300 different ethnic groups within her boundaries each with its own identity. The magnitude of the problem is easily grasped.

We mentioned one aspect of the territorial factor above. Another and perhaps more important one in this context is the tendency of the minorities in Southeast Asia to occupy territory the size of which is out of proportion to the numerical strength of the minorities. In Burma
and Laos the dominant groups - the Burmans and the Lao - comprise somewhat more than half the population. Yet more than half the territory is occupied by minorities. The extreme case is Vietnam. The ethnic Vietnamese in North and South Vietnam constitute about 85 and 87 percent of the population respectively but in both cases they occupy a mere 30 percent or less of the territory. In such circumstances separation may mean a disproportionately large territorial loss, something which states in general not willingly suffer.

MAJORITY - MINORITY DIFFERENCES IN LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

Long before the arrival of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia majority groups like the Burmans in Burma, the Central Thai, the Khmer, the Lao, the Vietnamese etc. had all reached levels of political, cultural and economic development which went beyond, sometimes far beyond, similar developments among the surrounding minorities they dominated or sought to dominate. Culturally they were characterized by fairly widespread literacy, a standardized language, the cultivation of arts and crafts, high levels of specialization and the existence of a national religious hierarchy within the 'great tradition' religions, Buddhism and Islam. Politically they were organized into kingdoms and nation-states with a relatively highly organized bureaucracy. Economic activities were organized with a view to both self-sufficiency and commercial sale, and trading, both over land and sea, was a part of economic life.

Among the minorities, generally located in the more remote or isolated lowland areas or in the hills and the jungles of the interior, literacy was only marginal or non-existent; the language was sometimes a dialect of the same language family as the majority but they were often mutually unintelligible; their political organization only rarely extended beyond the village level and their economy was dominated by subsistence wet
and dry rice farming and small-scale trade. 127 Especially the minorities located in the hills remained different from the majority group because of their isolation from influence of a cultural or commercial kind. 128

With the colonial era the 'modern culture', Western in origin and outlook, started to make itself felt throughout Southeast Asia. The degree to which this culture has been imposed, absorbed, adapted or integrated into the different societies varies appreciably throughout the region. 129 However there is not only inter-area but also intra-area variations. It is the latter that are important in this context.

The development of Southeast Asian societies has not done away with the political, economic and cultural gap between the majority groups and most minorities. Indeed in some cases the difference has become even more pronounced. It has been and still is important in providing legitimacy to majority group control of government and state. This gap enabled the majority groups to establish a dominant position in pre-colonial times, it made them the obvious groups through which the colonial powers chose to rule, directly or indirectly, and it also made them the natural groups from which leaders emerged in the struggle against colonialism. In the era of independence it has enabled them to maintain and sometimes even extend their domination over the machinery of the state if not over society at large.

It is a noticeable feature of Southeast Asian societies that by and large it is among the members of the majority groups that 'modernization' has taken place to any considerable extent either because of necessity or because of the receptiveness and adaptability of their traditional culture. The majority groups, by being for so long near or at the center where outside

127. Ibid., table 2, pp. 15-17. See also David Joel Steinberg (ed.) In Search of Southeast Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971) pp. 11-91.
cultural influences were introduced and concentrated, thereby became the main, in some cases the sole, recipients of the modern culture as it was transmitted by the colonial system. Most minorities, often located on the geographical periphery of the colonial territories, had at best only spasmodic contact with the modern culture. 130  

The introduction of the modern culture had some very important consequences for the relationship between majority and minorities. Firstly, it served in some cases to actually widen the gap between them. Politically this meant that where they existed well established relationships were up-rooted. In Thailand, for instance, headmen of the Lua tribe used to report to the Northern Thai Prince in Chiangmai or Lamphun while Karen headmen used to occupy the posts as district headmen, positions now lost to Central Thai civil servants. Tribal village headmen now deal with civil servants mainly concerned with administration. Previously they used to deal with princes who were also concerned with the general welfare of their subjects. 131  

The flexibility which was part of this system of relations has been lost with the introduction of a system of uniform administration and standards. 132  

Likewise, modernization has also meant a breach in economic relations. Functions traditionally carried out by tribesmen are taken over by, for instance, modern transport and modern products are substituted for traditional thereby making products on which the tribes depended for their living obsolescent. 133  

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in terms of ethnic minority integration modernization also has had serious dysfunctional consequences.  

130. See Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 3066.  
131. Ibid., p. 52.  
132. Ibid., p. 673.  
133. Ibid., p. 52.
In the era of independence the majority groups have become nearly the sole agent of change and modernization. Through their control of the machinery of state they have what amounts to a near monopoly on the transmission and dissemination of the modern culture. However, the kind of change and modernization sought and initiated are often tailored to needs and special features of their own culture without adaptations being made in regard to the minorities and their special cultural and other needs.

The majorities also use the modern culture in their efforts to effectively bring the minorities into the fabric of the larger society. Hence, by the minorities modernization is seen as another means by which the majorities seek to pursue age-old policies of domination and subordination. Among the minorities this has led not so much to a rejection of modernization as such as to opposition to the version disseminated by the majority. The minorities often prefer modernization introduced by others than members of the majority group. Highland minority groups in South Vietnam demanded that foreign aid be channeled directly to the highlands rather than through Saigon. Early demands were even for direct highland representation abroad. 134

Through modernization the majority have increased its coercive capability to an extent rarely matched by the minorities. They have thereby also increased their own ability to peacefully or violently control the minorities.

Some minorities have put themselves in a position in which it may turn out to be difficult to catch up with the administrative, organ-

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izational and other capabilities of the majority. While they on the one hand need and desire modernization in order to be able to compete with or eventually separate from the majority, the staging of rebellions have on the other hand had the unintended effect of cutting them off from nearly all available sources of modernization. This would seem to be the case with minorities such as the Shan, the Karen and the Kachin in Burma. Although only segments of these minority groups are in rebellion, they have considerable support from their ethnic kinsmen thereby making these areas occupied by these minorities virtually inaccessible to government authority and administration. While this indeed has been the purpose, it has also had the effect of hindering one of the main agents of modernization, the government, from having much impact. When thus the domestic sources of modernization are denied them because of majority group or self-imposed actions the only sources available to any minorities are often to be found outside the borders of the country of which they are formally a part. However, these sources are unstable and not always forthcoming, a question to which a return will be made later.

MINORITY UNITY-DISUNITY

The failure of those groups which have attempted to achieve separation or self-determination to reach their goals must in part be attributed to their inability to cooperate and coordinate their policies and actions. This has been a feature of inter-group as well as intra-group relations.

The most determined efforts by ethnic minorities to change their status have taken place in Burma. But Burma also provides the clearest examples of ethnic disunity at both the intra-group and inter-group levels. In 1965 there existed no less than seven different ethnically
based rebel organizations. Indeed, throughout the 1960s an outstanding feature of the situation in Burma has been the multiplicity of ethnic rebel organizations. The attempts to unify the groups in their struggle against the government have all been short-lived and of no lasting effect.

From the point of view of individual ethnic groups intra-ethnic disunity must appear to be even more serious. In the 1948-51 crisis the government was mainly facing rebellious communists and Karens both of whom were split on questions of policy. Some Karen advocated and fought for secession while other Karen were working for autonomy within the Union. Still others were passive or neutral because they did not believe anything could be achieved by force. And two of the seven rebel organizations just referred to, the Shan Independence Army and the Shan National United Front, were recruited from the same ethnic group.

Cooperation and concerted action at both the intra- and inter-group levels require the simultaneous existence of a number of factors. It cannot come about without a common outlook with regard to goals and objectives, something which is, admittedly, perhaps less easy obtained at the inter-group level. It also requires agreement as to what tactics and strategies are to be followed in the pursuit of these goals. It furthermore requires strong leaders who are not only clever and perhaps charismatic but also able and willing to subordinate personal ambitions and rivalries to the common cause. Effective cooperation may in addition require previous experience in cooperative efforts and where such experience

136. See section on Burma above.
is lacking it may take some time to acquire.

Again to take the case of Burma it would seem that none of these requirements have been present all the time nor have all of them been present at any one time. There would for example seem to have been considerable differences with regard to both ends and means between the various segments of Karens, Chin and Kachin in the 1948-51 crisis. The Karens constituted one of the dominant military forces pitted against the government while Chin and Kachin troops played a prominent part in the repulsion of the assault on the government. In 1963 there was a similar situation. Following the Ne Win government's offer to all rebellious forces of amnesty and negotiations part of the Karens signed an agreement - admittedly shortlived - with the government while rebellious elements within the Shan, Kachin and Chin minority groups continued their insurrectionist activities.

Although the various minorities, in particular the Karen, would appear to have had many able leaders none of them would seem to have been in possession of the qualities and the stature needed to unite their respective groups and to forge lasting links of cooperation with other groups. The latest effort was that of former prime minister U Nu - significantly enough a Burman. In late June 1970 he signed an agreement with Mon, Karen and Shan leaders in which the common objective was defined as the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Burma and a federalist solution for the minority problem. However, April 1972 U Nu resigned from the leadership of the National United Liberation Front apparently because

140. See section on Burma.
he disagreed with the minority leaders over their demand for right of secession of the ethnic minorities from the Union. What this episode illustrates is, firstly, the difficulties the minority groups have in finding leaders among themselves with sufficient qualities and stature and an ability to rise to the occasion. And, secondly, it points to the difficulties inherent in having as leader of an ethnic minority rebellion not a person drawn from these groups but rather a representative of the majority group against which the rebellion is directed. U Nu is first and foremost a Burman and his primary goal has been the overthrow of the regime of Ne Win while at the same time to preserve the territorial integrity of the Union. The goal of the minorities has also been to get rid of the Ne Win regime but only as a first and incidental step on the way to their ultimate goal, secession. For U Nu to have agreed to such objectives would have been to go against the fundamental interests of not only the state but also the majority group of which he is, after all, a prominent representative.

The factors mentioned so far would appear to be important to any explanation of disunity among and within ethnic minorities. But they are perhaps better considered symptoms of a relative lack of another, more important quality, namely ethnic consciousness. Or, alternatively they may be symptoms of an uneven distribution of ethnic consciousness within and between groups. Whatever the case may be, the factors discussed so far in connection with ethnic disunity can probably themselves be explained, at least partly, in terms of a relative lack of ethnic consciousness or awareness.

ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS

When the Hungarian Serbs confronted Kossuth with demands for recognition of their language - in their view an essential part of the Serb 'nation' - Kossuth asked,

"What do you understand by 'Nation'?

"A race which possesses its own language, customs and culture and enough self-consciousness to preserve them", 143 was the reply.

Although elements like language, customs and culture, to mention a few, are indeed found to characterize ethnic or national groups none of them are essential to the existence of nationality. 144 What is essential, however, is the existence of a consciousness and a will strong enough to preserve whatever common characteristics the group possesses. Nationalism, in short, is a state of mind. 145

This state of mind does not come into existence in a vacuum. It emerges as a result of inter-ethnic contacts. This contact produces, firstly, the well-known 'we-they' syndrome, that is, a heightened awareness among the groups of their distinctiveness. Secondly, it also produces among the members of the group an increased awareness of each other.

The level of ethnic consciousness among the minorities in Southeast Asia is difficult to assess and does under any circumstances vary considerably from one area to another and from one group to another. It is also unevenly distributed within individual groups. The villager in Central Java, for example, who never has been in contact with a non-Javanese Indonesian is less aware of being Javanese than his ethnic kin.

145. Ibid., p. 18.
who migrated to other islands or who lives in an area of Java which has frequent and extensive contacts with other islands. In Burma some segments of the minorities had more contact with the majority, the Burmans, than others. It is noticeable that most of the rebel leaders in Burma were or are persons who at one time or another have been close to the centres of power and exposed to Burman ways for a considerable time. Rarely, if ever, does one hear of leaders who are unknown and inexperienced with majority culture and policies.

One can say with reasonable certainty, however, that inter-ethnic contact is increasing and, more importantly, is bound to continue to do so. To the extent that ethnic awareness and its growth are dependent on contact it follows that awareness will also be increasing in strength. That this is so is very much in evidence.

In Indonesia ethnic loyalties have been increasing in strength throughout this century both under Dutch rule and after. It is, moreover, noticeable that it is those ethnic groups whose members have been most mobile and most exposed to the ways of other groups which harbour the strongest ethnic loyalties.

The same would seem to be the case in northeast Thailand as far as the Lao is concerned, particularly Lao villagers who temporarily migrated to cities like Bangkok where they quickly became aware of their

147. See Tinker, op. cit., Ch. 2. See also biographical notes on 'Men and Women of Burma', pp. 389-400, for the careers of some of the rebel leaders mentioned in Chapter 2 of Tinker's book.
149. Skinner, ibid., p. 7.
own distinctiveness. Indeed urbanization in general seem to serve as a particularly effective catalytic agent in the development of ethnic awareness.

However, growing ethnic consciousness resulting from increased interaction does not necessarily lead to a desire for secession and self-determination on the part of the minorities. Much depends on the content of the interaction between the majority and the individual ethnic minorities. In this respect Indonesia would seem to be in a different situation from most other countries in Southeast Asia in that a measure of identity with the country as a whole have been created which has cut across the ethnic and regional sentiments that threatened the unity of Indonesia.

RELATIONS BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITIES

Ethnic consciousness develops as a response to the degree and nature of inter-ethnic contacts. In the case of majorities and minorities such contact often results from migratory movements and policies initiated by the majorities with the aim of influencing and/or controlling the minorities. Notwithstanding occasional attempts in the past, it is only recently that the lowland (majority) civilizations in Southeast Asia seriously have set out to exercise effective control over the hill areas and the minorities living there. Relations in the past were on the whole characterized by a live-and-let-live attitude sometimes interspersed with majority feelings of superiority and contempt for minority culture and style of living. The application of terms like 'slave' and 'savage'


to some minority groups bears this out. 154

The new interest in the minorities started in the beginning of the 1950s 155, and it received stimulation from two novel developments in particular, namely the achievement of independence among many minorities. Starting with the Philippines in 1946 the territories in Southeast Asia obtained their independence one after the other. Political power and the control of government passed over to the majority groups which now were charged with the responsibility of transforming into modern what to a large extent still were traditional societies. This entailed also the assimilation or integration of the minorities into the larger political, economic and social structure, a task toward the fulfilment of which the colonial powers, for a variety of reasons, had taken no or only a few and rudimentary steps.

The new interest in the minorities was also stimulated by the pressure of increased communist activities and influence. The ascent to power in China and North Vietnam of communist regimes, both willing and able to exploit indigenous discontent and resentment by providing material assistance and ideological guidance, began to make themselves felt. In many cases the efforts of the communists were concentrated on and directed at the 'soft underbelly' of these countries, namely the minorities among whom communist cadres were now recruited.

Nevertheless, the understanding of the importance of coming to terms with the minorities has been unevenly comprehended by the various

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majority groups in Southeast Asia. Some like the communist leadership of the Viet Minh - predominantly Vietnamese - was at an early stage acutely aware of the importance of winning the minorities over to their side in the struggle against the French in Indo-China, and the policies since of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as regards the minorities would appear to enjoy a measure of success not rivalled in many places elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Burmese would likewise seem all along to have been conscious of the significance of the minorities although their policies in this regard have been largely unsuccessful. The Malays have also had a keen sense of the importance of striking a balance especially in their relationship with their Chinese 'minority', a message which was brought home to them in unmistakeable terms during the Emergency in the period 1948-60 when communist elements among the Chinese in Malay rebelled. However, Malaysia is still far from solving the problem of the relationship between the Malays and the Chinese in particular. The Thais, on the other hand, in spite of not having been colonized, have been rather slow in recognizing the significance of the minorities within their borders, especially those in the north and northeast of the country. Not until about 1955 did the government begin to involve itself with these groups when a relatively modest start was made with the establishment of the Border Patrol Police program. In Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam the problem has either been largely ignored or officially denied existence.

156. See ibid., pp. 771-884.
158. See Means, op. cit., p. 418. Communist guerilla activities are still continuing on the border between Malaysia and Thailand, and in Sarawak, on the border between Malaysia and Indonesia.
What kind of policies have the various ruling majority groups instituted in regard to the minorities and what success, if any, have they had? As already indicated the political leaders in Burma realized the importance of striking a balance between the Burmans and the various minority peoples. To that end the constitution of Burma of 1947 provided for the establishment of three subordinate states - Shan, Kachin and Karenni (later renamed Kayah) - and two special districts - Chin and Karen (which in 1953 became the Karen State). 161 In spite of this apparently liberal policy secession has been a right the exercise of which has been strongly opposed by the government although the constitution gave such a right to some minorities. Moreover, the government has through various other policies made it clear that no less than a homogeneous population is the ultimate goal. The hope is to achieve this through the extension of Burman language, Buddhism and Burman cultural characteristics in general to the minority groups. This was the policy in the 1950s and the early 1960s and it would appear still to be so. 162

Of the minorities in Thailand the ethnic Malays in the four southern provinces bordering on Malaysia represent the only ones among whom the demand for secession has been raised, and over the decades sporadic revolts have taken place against Thai rule. Secession from Thailand has sometimes been envisaged as ending in an independent Malay-Muslim state, while on other occasions the secessionists have advocated


162 See Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 76 and pp. 165-190. See also *ibid.*, pp. 637-640.
union with Malaysia. The strength of these sentiments has varied over
the years and largely in response to Thai government policies. Contrary to Burmese policies which are on the whole assimilationist in
color the Thai government's policies toward the Malay minority are
largely integrationist, although not always consistently so. For example,
steps have been taken by the government to meet demands for the preser-
vation of cultural characteristics like religion, but Malay Muslims
who want to join the government bureaucracy can do so only after having
gone through a process of acculturation and education - Thai in character -
that requires significant adjustments in terms of conduct and social norms.

In the north and the northeast the government attention given
to the hill tribes is of a recent date. Although a beginning was made in
the mid 1950s it is under the impact of increased communist activities
that the authorities really have begun to realize the full magnitude of
the problem. A variety of government initiated programs exist but they
would appear to lack a clearly stated goal. The authorities' response
to what they consider communist influence would appear also to have
rendered void much of the positive work carried out by government agencies
like the Border Patrol Police.

163. For a detailed study of a Malay village in southern Thailand,
see Thomas M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in
See also the same author, Fishermen, op. cit. For an assessment
of Thai government policies towards the Malay minority, see
Suhrke, "The Thai Muslims", op. cit. For a brief reference to
these policies, see Lee W. Huff, "The Thai Mobile Development
Unit Program", in Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 480-481.
164. Fraser, Fishermen, op. cit., p. 103.
165. Suhrke, op. cit., p. 545.
166. Kunstadter, op. cit., p. 24. This is also the conclusion Suhrke
came to after having examined the special case of the Malay
muslim minority.
167. See Race, op. cit.
In the northeast a tradition of political dissent from government policies has been in existence for a long time. This dissent had previously been expressed through the parliamentary channels and it had been largely unrelated to communist activities and influence. However, with the advent of communist supported insurrection the Bangkok authorities have tended to view all dissent as subversive activity and a considerable amount of suppression of political expression has been the result. In effect this has led for long periods to the closure of legitimate political channels as far as the northeasterners are concerned. 168

A similar situation would seem to exist in the north as regards the hill people, especially the Meo. The difference here is that the hill peoples have always been outside of the Thai political system proper. The situation changed in the 1960s with the communist supported insurrection but the status of the hill peoples within the state remains ambiguous. Increased governmental attempts largely motivated by the fear of communist influence, to assert authority and bring the hill peoples under the effective jurisdiction of the state have met with considerable resistance from the hill tribes. The government has responded with heavy handed military tactics which to a considerable degree have been counter-productive and lead to a growing alienation of these minorities from the majority. 169

In Laos it is significant that the communist Pathet Lao derives its support mainly from the minorities. Apart from a few Lao like Prince Souphanouvong most leaders of the Pathet Lao are also tribal. This came about chiefly as a result of two factors. Firstly, a realization at an early stage in the struggle against the French of the importance of

169. Race, op. cit., passim.
the tribal peoples, and secondly, the allotment to the Pathet Lao by the Geneva agreement of 1954 of two provinces in northern Laos - Phong Saly and Sam Neua - for the purpose of regrouping, pending integration of the Pathet Lao into the political and military structure of Laos. Both these provinces were, however, nearly exclusively populated by tribal peoples among whom the Pathet Lao now started intensive recruiting. 170

Although not entirely due to neglect only, the Laotian government in Vientiane has proved itself less astute in its dealings with the minorities than have their political opponents, the Pathet Lao. The government attitude towards the minorities has been one of official non-recognition of cultural and other differences between the dominant Lao and the minorities, and the pressure is on the latter to learn the official Lao language and to assimilate with the Lao through the shedding of tribal customs and culture and the adoption of Buddhism and the majority culture. 171

The South Vietnamese have dealt with their minorities in a fashion similar to the Lao. The tribal peoples have in theory been considered citizens subject to the same laws and rules as the ethnic Vietnamese. Tribal custom and culture are threatened by the Vietnamese centred education system and this insensitivity to cultural differences has met with considerable resistance by the minorities. Rebellions going back to 1958 have been staged by the highlanders against what they perceive as a


threat of cultural and economic extinction. 172

The Cambodians have taken the view that a minority problem does not exist because Cambodia does not have minorities, only foreigners. 173 A policy of assimilation in regard to the tribal peoples has been instituted. 174

In Malaysia the central government has recognized the problem of the minorities - not only the Chinese but also the many indigenous minority groups that exist especially in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. By not pressing the religion and language questions too hard the government has been able to establish a relatively satisfactory relationship with the various minority peoples of East Malaysia. The government has at the same time been greatly extending programs designed to improve education, health and agriculture among these groups. 175

An important cleavage in Indonesian society is the division between Java and the Outer Islands of which Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo) and Sulawesi (Celebes) are the largest. This division between the center and the periphery follows roughly the ethnic cleavage between the majority group, the Javanese, on the one hand and ethnic minority groups like the Sudanese, the Madurese, the Minangkabau (in West Sumatra) and the Buginese (in south eastern Sulawesi) on the other. The Javanese are by far the most numerous accounting for nearly half the population of about 120

million. However, in spite of accusations of Javanese domination of government and bureaucracy the Javanese have nevertheless not played a dominant role comparable to that played by majority groups elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Another feature of the situation in Indonesia is that ethnic loyalties, although very much in existence, are in most cases overshadowed by national loyalties the development of which can be traced back to the struggle for independence from the Dutch. Furthermore, such an important factor as language with much potential for arousing ethnic tension has played a role quite different from what it has elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Bahasa Indonesia, the national language developed from Malay, is the property of no single ethnic group and it is the medium of instruction at all levels in the education system. The various ethnic groups have on the whole not objected to learning Bahasa Indonesia a situation which might have been different had Javanese been elevated to the status of national language.

In the Philippines the Muslim minority in the Sulu Archipelago and on the island of Mindanao has defied all attempts ever since the Spanish started their colonization of the Philippines in 1564, to become assimilated with the rest of the population although nearly every conceivable means, including force, have been employed in the endeavour. The government of the Philippines seemed to have realized the futility of such policies and had on the whole opted for a policy of integrating the Muslims into the national structure while at the same time allowing them to retain their cultural identity. Even though a degree of integration, particularly into the political structure, has been achieved this never-

176. See Skinner, op. cit. Liddle, op. cit., and Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as Political Problem, Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958, esp. ch. 5.
theless has not resulted in the disappearance of certain basic tensions and conflicts emanating primarily from cultural differences between the Muslim minority and the Christian-hispanized majority. Lately events would seem to have caught up with parts of government policies. As a result of population pressure and land shortage large numbers of Christians from the northern islands migrated, with government encouragement to Mindanao where they came into conflict with the Muslims who found themselves squeezed out of land traditionally considered theirs. Violent clashes erupted and they increased in frequency throughout 1971-72 also involving the Philippine army. As yet no solution is in sight. 177

THE EXTERNAL FACTOR

As far as the situation in Southeast Asia is concerned the various minorities have on the whole as yet not reached a stage of consciousness, unity of purpose and level of development at which these factors have crystallized into demands for secession and separate statehood. Nevertheless, in Burma such demands are just beneath if not actually on the surface, and in the Philippines they are already part of Muslim minority goals. Moreover, there is a trend toward increasing ethnic awareness as far as a number of groups are concerned, and in most of these cases this trend is facilitated and provoked by a tendency of majority group policies to alienate the minorities. Whether or not this trend will

ultimately lead to more demands for separation in Southeast Asia is, of course, still a matter for conjecture.

Nevertheless, in those instances in which minorities in Southeast Asia have resorted to armed revolt they have largely been unsuccessful. Among the causes of this failure the question of external assistance is of the most crucial.

Although assistance from without on the whole has been rather modest in scope and magnitude it has helped some ethnic insurgents in Southeast Asia to survive and sustain a level of activity sufficient to resist and even repulse government or majority attempts to crush them. In Thailand most of the aid to the insurgents in the north and northeast has come from China and North Vietnam. In Burma most of the ethnic rebellions have sustained themselves on weapons and equipment captured from government troops, depots and so on. Some arms have come from external sources often bought with money raised from the cultivation and sale of opium. This is especially the case in the Shan states of Burma. However, if any of the ethnic insurgent movements are to succeed the level of outside assistance must probably be raised considerably. While very few insurgencies of any kind have succeeded in this century without such external assistance it is not contended that external support is necessary under all circumstances; it is, however, likely to be more important to ethnic separatism than to most other forms of revolutionary movements.

The degree to which ethnic separatists are dependent on external assistance is partly a function of the size of the country and

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the size of the minority. An insurgent movement in a large country can more easily maintain itself with indigenous resources than can a movement in a small country. Likewise, an insurgent movement based on a large ethnic group has less difficulty in keeping up its activities with indigenous resources than one based on a small minority. But whatever the size of the country and the minority, the outstanding difference in this context is that in most other types of insurrection the insurgents can consider the entire population as a potential source of recruits, supplies and support, and the whole country as a potential territory within which bases, depots, headquarters can be located. As a result of the ethnic or national appeal of the movement, ethnic insurgents can under the most favourable circumstances expect only to be able to recruit among members of their own ethnic group. Similarly, they can reasonably only count on the active support of their own ethnic group in terms of shelter and supplies necessary to maintain themselves, and only the territory occupied predominantly by their own ethnic or national group can be considered suitable as location for bases. Indeed ethnic insurgents, even under the most favourable circumstances, have to count on the active hostility of the majority since the whole rationale of their rebellion is based on inter-ethnic hostility and conflict. Hence the greater dependence of ethnic revolt on external sources of support as compared to other types of rebellion. This is so even though the minorities enjoy the advantage of superior knowledge of terrain and commitment to their cause. In the following the factors will be considered which might decide whether such assistance is granted or denied ethnic separatist movements.

At the outset it is important to stress that there are other significant differences between ethnic separation movements and such other types of revolutionary movements as liberation movements of the kinds
usually supported by communist governments. A major difference exists in terms of goals and it is important because it often determines the identity of the various sources of external support.

Ethnic movements aim at the establishment of a new, independent state, that is, the goal is the separation from the state of origin of a distinctive group of people and the territory it occupies. This involves an assault on the territorial integrity of this state. A war of liberation in the communist sense, on the other hand, usually aims at the total overthrow of the political and social system of the state without, however, dismembering part of its territory. In fact, preservation of the territorial integrity of the state becomes an important secondary goal. Contrary to communist liberation movements their ethnic counterparts are not concerned with the overthrow of governments or political and social systems as such but may aim to do so insofar as no other option is perceived to exist in terms of the achievement of the primary goal - secession. This factor makes ethnic revolt a less attractive force to support as far as communist governments are concerned.

As far as ethnic separatism is concerned there are two primary external sources of support to take into account. Firstly, there are private groups or organizations which for some reason or another have an interest in extending support. Prominent among these are members of the same ethnic group living in another country. People of Irish descent in countries like the United States and Australia have given extensive material and moral support to the IRA in Northern Ireland. In Southeast Asia some support for the Malay minority in southern Thailand and the southern

179. See Connor, "Ethnology", on Chinese and North Vietnamese attitudes and practices towards ethnic minority groups.
Philippines would appear at times to have come from segments of the Malay community in Malaysia. The Kachin in Burma have depended to some degree on support from their ethnic brothers on the other side of the border in China. Shan rebels often slip over the border to Thailand where they find shelter among the ethnically related Thai. However, it is important to remember that the overall level of material assistance received by ethnic separatists is probably low. While this may be a function of the separatists' limited capacity, among others, to absorb and utilize material assistance it is perhaps even more a result of the limited capacity of external groups to provide such assistance. If these sources of active support are to have an appreciable impact a great increase in their capacity to supply assistance must take place. But it is difficult to see how such an increase can come about without the active participation or, at least, the passive connivance of governments. There are, of course, governments whose authority and control over territory and population are lacking and many governments in Southeast Asia find themselves in this situation, but few are so powerless that they are not in a position to seriously hamper, even to the extent of rendering ineffective, any activities emanating from their own territory in support of separatist movements in other countries.

Thus the policies of governments towards secessionist movements become the crucial factor and, in fact governments are the second of the primary sources of external support referred to above. But governments are not free to choose policies entirely as they see fit and in this area even less than others. Should a government view with sympathy a particular

180. See, for example, reports in Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 September 1967, p. 462 and 7 December 1967, p. 428.
181. Laos and Cambodia are obvious examples in Southeast Asia.
secessionist movement in another, perhaps neighbouring, country there are powerful constraints circumventing such sympathies which may cause governments to abstain from acting in support of the secessionists and even actively discourage them. It is these constraints, not confined to Southeast Asia but ubiquitously present in the international system, which may determine the fate of ethnic secessionism now and in the foreseeable future.

The first of these constraints concerns the multinational character of the overwhelming majority of contemporary states. As noted above 182 only 12 states, or about 9 percent, can be said to be essentially homogeneous in ethnic terms, and in nearly 30 percent of the states the core ethnic group fails to account for an absolute majority of the population. This means that potentially nine out of every ten states are as vulnerable as their neighbours to demands for secession from one or more of their constituent ethnic groups. The possibility of opening up a Pandora's box may then prove a decisive consideration for most states. The African states, faced with the threat of an eruption of multiple claims and conflicts over territory and peoples, realized this danger and consequently decided, with two exceptions (Morocco and Somalia) to abstain from territorial claims and pledged themselves to preserve the boundaries bequeathed them by the colonial powers. 183

The second constraint is related to the contemporary meaning of self-determination in its role as the paramount criteria of international legitimacy. By international legitimacy is meant 'the collective judgement of international society about rightful membership of the family


of nations, how sovereignty may be transferred, how state succession should be regulated, when large states break up into smaller or several combine into one'.

Since its first recognition in the peace settlements after World War I the meaning of the principles of self-determination has undergone some important changes. Initially the principle referred to the rights of national groups to self-determination. The League of Nations devised an elaborate system for the protection of minorities and their rights, by the creation of a number of instruments whereby the particular state accepted provisions related to the treatment of the minority groups and the recognition of the League of Nations as guarantor. The attention given the minorities under this system was largely inspired by the concern for the peoples in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East who were affected by the collapse of the German, Russian, Austo-Hungarian and Turkish land empires.

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a period during '...which a new rule of legitimacy began to be worked out, or rather a modified version of the popular rule, making it simpler in theory and easier to practice. It asserted two rights; territorial integrity and majority rule.' This change was precipitated as well as facilitated by the much reduced concern given the minorities and their rights after World War II. The Charter of the United Nations made no explicit

reference to minorities or the protection of their rights as such. The Charter '... was drafted without recognition of the minority problem as a significant item on the agenda of international relations.' Not being mentioned, minority rights were only acknowledged to the extent they coincided with the human rights provision of the Charter. 'The result was to leave the individual confronting the state.'

Preceded by this diminished interest in the minorities, the shift in the interpretation of self-determination was also a consequence of the decolonization. It can perhaps best be seen as a recognition of the changed character of the membership of the international system reflecting the interests of the new states without on the whole going contrary to the interests, as these came to be interpreted, of the older, established members of the system.

The colonial territories justified their demands for independence by basing them on a claim to the right of self-determination. However, the organisation of political activities to achieve this aim was not focused on any national or ethnic group in particular but rather on all the peoples living within a certain territory whose borders had been more or less arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. Thus self-determination was claimed on behalf of an administrative and territorial unit and the peoples which happened to reside within the confines of this unit rather than on behalf of any particular national or ethnic group. Once independent, these new states, the great majority multinational, were faced with the task of preserving the territorial unity of the entity they had inherited from the colonial powers. In order to do so successfully it became necessary to restrict the application or alter the meaning

188. Claude, op. cit., p. 113.
of self-determination as a basis of rightful membership in the international system.

Firstly, self-determination was denied to national or ethnic minorities and applied to the inhabitants of territories as a whole. This is the intended meaning of several resolutions of various United Nations' organs such as this passed by the General Assembly. 'Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.' 190 Such a conception of the principle is, of course, contrary to that which emerged in the wake of World War I and implied as well a denial of the right to secession on the part of any national group. 'Once the newly created or newly independent state is in existence, no resort to further self-determination is tolerable.' 191 This principle was made even more explicit by Secretary General U Thant when he said in 1970, 'So, as far as the question of secession of a particular section of the Member State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international organisation, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State.' 192 Moreover, the right to self-determination is only given to territories considered or defined to be in a colonial situation. And here one should be aware that a colonial situation has been construed to exist only in relation to overseas empires. The imperialist adventures of the Soviet Union in her eastward thrust, and, for that matter, the

191. Emerson, ibid., p. 464.
192. Quoted in Emerson, ibid.
United States as well in her expansion towards the west, were not considered to have led them into a colonial situation, although the main factor of this condition - the subjugation of ethnically different peoples to alien rule - was no different in their case. 'It ...became a tenet of the anti-colonialist cause that maritime contact was malignant, since it was by sea that the European colonialists arrived. Territorial contiguity had a superior legitimacy.

The selective application of the principle of self-determination has also resulted in it being abandoned altogether when it would appear to conflict with the objective of dismembering the overseas possessions of colonial powers. British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar has not prevented the United Nations from urging Britain to relinquish these two possessions to Argentina and Spain respectively, notwithstanding the fact that the population in both territories are overwhelmingly in favour of retaining their present ties with Britain. In both cases the relevant U.N. organs defined the relationship between these two territories and Britain as being colonial in character and at the same time opposed the holding of referenda.

Lastly, self-determination is not thought to have anything to do with democratic or representative institutions. The logical relationship that existed between self-determination and the democratic concept that popular opinion should determine political allegiance has dissipated. Rhetorical adherence to self-determination has not produced any corres-


ponding willingness to let democratic processes decide the question of the ultimate fate of minorities. 196

None of these 'applications' of the principle of self-determination offer much support for ethnic or national minorities bent on secession and self-determination. The right to self-determination does no longer belong to the national groups but becomes the exclusive prerogative of the state. Within such a conception secession has no place and self-determination ceases to be a revolutionary principle and becomes a principal supporting the status quo. 197

The third constraint concerns the relationship between governments themselves. Governments will hesitate to support movements in another country whose strength they are seldom able to assess accurately, whose future is unknown and whose activities are directed against the authority of a neighbouring government with which they may have a wide range of friendly and advantageous relations. This, of course, becomes a less powerful argument the more governments are removed from each other both in terms of geography and relations, and it may even be irrelevant to governments which are fundamentally hostile to each other. However, in so far as present actions may prejudice future relations this constraint may have some effect even in the latter case. And for most states the ability to extend effective assistance decreases rapidly with increasing geographical distance between themselves and the object of assistance.

The fourth constraint concerns the willingness of the international system to accept as new members a number of entities, which inevitably will be small in size and population and whose likely viability


and ability to survive as independent entities must be seriously questioned. It may be, however, this is a potential rather than an actual constraint since it is doubtful that there exists any consensual attitudes, let alone policy, among the existing members of the international system to the effect that an increase in the membership by the inclusion of such 'unviable' entities is undesirable. Indeed, until now the evidence would seem to support the opposite contention insofar as the system would appear to have willingly accepted a number of new states, especially the socalled 'micro-states', whose population and size are as small or even smaller than those of the potentially new states. However, the circumstances under which these states entered the system were different since with few exceptions nearly all these states were the creations of the colonial powers, and they came into existence as a result of the decolonization process. The emotional power of this process has been such that it made nearly every demand for independence a valid one as long as it was justified in terms of casting off the colonial yoke. Furthermore, for the metropolitan power to grant independence did not mean dismembering parts of their own territory proper. At most it represented a decline in their global power and role which on the whole they had come, however reluctantly, to accept as inevitable. The decolonization process is now largely over and demands for independence cannot convincingly be formulated in terms related to this process, unless the term 'colonization' is given a new meaning more in keeping with the situation ethnic minorities find themselves in.

An awareness of the problem of micro-states is not totally absent as seen in the words included in the annual report of Secretary General U Thant in 1967, '...it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right to independence and the question of full membership
in the United Nations. Such membership may, on the one hand, improve obligations which are too onerous for the 'micro-states' and, on the other hand, may lead to a weakening of the United Nations itself."

Should there, however, exist an attitude of opposition to 'unviable' candidates among the members of the system there still remains the problem of implementing policies based on such sentiments. States are more prone to unilateral than joint action, and since would-be members are not likely to knock on the membership door all at the same time we may see some of them individually and at different times stumble willy-nilly through the doorway because of a lack of collective action on the part of existing members.

As a final constraint, statehood in the international system requires a number of essential characteristics among which are a stable population, a reasonably well-defined territory and a stable political community. Apart from being the principles of recognition they are attributes the existence or non-existence of which serve as criteria for the formulation of policies between states. The existence of ethnic minorities demanding secession, perhaps even rebelling in pursuance of this goal, is a sign that the stability of the population and the extent of the territory are in doubt. Not only that, they tend to cast a shadow over the viability and equilibrium of the entire political and social order in the state concerned. Peaceful relations between states - at the governmental as well as the non-governmental level - thrive and grow best in a climate of at least minimum intra as well as inter-state stability and order. From this point of view it is not strange that

198. Quoted in Emerson, op. cit., p. 469.
governments on the whole treat ethnic rebellions none too kindly and set a high premium on stability and order.

There may also be a connection between stability, order and status in the international system in the sense that a state enjoying high status and prestige does so inter alia because it displays certain characteristics which are indicative of a highly stable and ordered political and social system. Stability and order become ends in themselves. Ethnic secessionism is therefore something to avoid or eliminate.

Taken together these five factors or constraints of a general nature add up to a formidable barrier against successful secession.

Nonetheless, a qualification must be made. Political principles, including rules of international legitimacy, '...are guides not masters. There are occasions when it is prudent to subordinate them to overriding interests.' 199 India's intervention on the side of Bangla Desh (then East Pakistan) in the internal affairs of Pakistan is such an instance. The opportunity to destroy the territorial integrity and dismember a part of the territory of an enemy and rival and thereby drastically weaken it could not have been met with regret in India.

It has been argued that '[the] general antipathy of governments toward self-determination of nations (peoples) as a general principle should not be confused with their common practice of supporting specific movements.' 200 The reasons for extending such support are many of which internal pressures are among the most important. But more often, as perhaps in the case of India, '...the explanation lies in strategic

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199. Wight, op. cit., p. 27.
opportunism and the inability to resist the temptation to ride Trojan horses that graze within another's gate." There is no doubt more than a kernel of truth in this observation. However the most remarkable aspect of the support given is not that it has taken place at all but rather its limited magnitude. Few countries have been in a better geographic, strategic and material position to extend support than China in relation to the ethnic rebellions in Burma. China would appear to have given only very limited material support and it is likely that the bulk of this assistance went to the communist rather than the ethnic rebellions. The actual support, such as it is, can probably be more accurately considered the minimum price a strongly ideological regime has to pay to preserve its ideological credibility.

The case of Biafra raised the possibility of intervention based on humanitarian considerations. However, in humanitarian intervention as in all other types of intervention it should be remembered that the burden of proof usually lies with the intervening state. Intervention represents a violation of state sovereignty and the state usually takes precedence over individuals and groups. Hence, one suspects that humanitarian factors must be so strong as to overshadow all others before being the real cause of effective intervention in support of ethnic rebellions. Humanitarian intervention comes as a result of strongly repressive, often brutal, actions by the majority against the minorities. It would seem, then, that it will depend on the ruling majorities to what extent an ethnic minority can base its appeal for external support on humanitarian considerations. But the minority groups are not entirely powerless. By itself

201. Ibid., p. 15.
202. See Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia, op. cit., esp. the chapters on Burma's relations with China.
resorting to cruel and brutal actions against members of the majority group it may provoke the kind of oppression against itself needed to stir world opinion and governments sufficiently. Given the tendency of people and even governments to attribute moral superiority to the weak, the ethnic separation movement may, if determined enough, in this manner and largely by its own initial action, provoke external intervention in its own support.

These are some of the factors at the international level which may influence events and be instrumental in preventing a great influx of new states into the international system. Taken individually they do not mean that we may not have to welcome the occasional new member into the system - political expedience has its own ways independent of accepted rules and principles - but rather that we are unlikely to see a massive extension of the membership of the international system suggested by the ubiquitous presence of national minorities and rising national consciousness.

Nonetheless, the strength of the social forces involved is such that secessionism cannot be lightly dismissed. In the past peoples have shown themselves capable of sustaining great sacrifices in pursuance of separate state and nationhood, and there is no reason to believe that this will not continue to be the case. It may well be, therefore, that in the not too distant future the choice will be between an international system with a membership many times that of today on the one hand, and the application of a much higher level of violence and suppression than today to prevent this from eventuating on the other.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MINORITIES

The discussion of the minority problem in Southeast Asia has revealed two important conclusions. Firstly, there would seem to be a
rising awareness on the part of many minorities of their own distinctiveness. Furthermore, to the extent the governments in the region have been able to cope with this problem their success has on the whole been imperfect and modest. Whatever the final solution, it would take time to accomplish. The second conclusion is that secessionism is unlikely to be the answer to the problem for reasons outlined above. Hence it would seem a safe bet to assume that the minority problem will continue to cause difficulties for the governments of Southeast Asia for a long time to come. Some of these governments are, however, at the same time involved in processes of cooperation and integration at the international level. Is there a relationship between the two phenomena? If there is what does it consist in?

Based on some evidence Haas has advanced the hypothesis that "[countries] which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home". If this argument is accepted, the states of Southeast Asia would on the face of it have to be placed within this category of 'poor partners' because they would, as the examination of the minority situation indicated, seem to be poorly integrated internally. However it will be argued that on closer examination the relationship between quality of participation in integration processes at the international level and the state of internal integration will reveal itself to be more complex than indicated by Haas.

Although the hypothesis as formulated is ambiguous its significance is nevertheless fairly evident. Should it be true it would render futile all attempts among developing countries to enter into arrangements

which in any way would involve a surrender of state sovereignty or parts thereof. However, the hypothesis calls for closer scrutiny.

It consists of two parts. There is, firstly, the link between the power of the leaders and the state of internal integration, that is, the less integrated a state is the less power its leaders presumably possess. Secondly, there is the posited link between leadership power and the quality of participation in regional integration schemes. In this regard the hypothesis would seem to say that the quality of participation, insofar as it means surrender of any part of state sovereignty, would suffer because the leaders are reluctant to detract from their already limited domestic power.

The hypothesis does not make clear if the reasoning in connection with the latter of the two links applies to leaders of countries already engaged in regional integration schemes or to leaders still pondering whether or not to engage their countries in such schemes. If the former is the case the hypothesis does not explain the paradox whereby political leaders, unwilling to give up powers in the first place, still have involved themselves and their country in processes in which the surrender of power is a significant element unless, of course, the same leaders were unaware of the full implications of their country's involvement.

If, on the other hand, the reasoning implied in the second link refers to a pre-involvement situation it would seem that the question of whether or not to join a regional integration process is a foregone conclusion. The leaders will decide not to do so because of the consequent loss of power. But if they nevertheless decide to involve their country it must again be because they do not know what they are doing or, alternatively and more likely, they do indeed understand the implications
of their move and by taking the step are willing to suffer a loss of personal and state power. Since there are developing countries presently engaged in integration processes at the international level one must assume that there are leaders in some internally less integrated countries who are ultimately willing to surrender at least some power - perhaps for the sake of sharing (greater) power at the regional level.

On the basis of the analysis of the minority situation in Southeast Asia the examination of the link between leadership power and state of internal integration will be centred on three types of situations. In the first two cases or situations the minorities are not integrated and in the last case they are partially integrated. The obvious fourth case in which the minorities are fully integrated can be dismissed as uninteresting in this context since should there in this case be weak leadership power, this cannot per definition be due to lack of integration.

The first case is one in which the minorities are not integrated according to any of the meanings of the term identified by Weiner. They are outside and uninvolved in the functions of maintaining the state and the political, economic and social system on which the state is primarily based. Their status is at best ambiguous and at worst unrecognised, and they are usually not represented in the political system in any other than perhaps an informal way as when a person or a group take it upon itself to be their spokesman. 'We should do something for these people', is a statement indicative of the attitude. There is little or no attempt on the part of the government to mobilize the minorities nor is there much attempt on the part of the minorities themselves to gain participation in the system. The country is split into two camps, so to speak - the majority and the minorities, the former constituting both the government and the governed, the elite and the mass, while the latter is neither. The
two social units, as they were called at the beginning of this chapter, function largely, though not entirely, independently of each other. Under these circumstances the powers of the leaders emanate from within the majority group itself. Appeals for the support of the leadership are directed at the members of the majority and especially at those members who are mobilized and who participate in the political processes. The minorities, passive and excluded from participation in the political system, are irrelevant to the processes which generate leadership power. Whatever powers the leaders possess are dependent on factors internal to the majority group. The minorities in this situation neither detract from nor add to the power of the leaders because they are not perceived by the leaders, nor indeed by the majority group as a whole, to be a part of the political equation. Hence, whether the leaders have 'poor' or 'strong' control and power at home is not dependent on the fact that segments of the population - the ethnic minorities - are not integrated. The quality of the participation in international integration schemes might well be poor because the leaders are afraid of undermining their power at home but this will have to be attributed to factors other than poor domestic integration of the kind dealt with here.

The first case is exemplified by the situation which prevailed in Thailand before the mid 1950s when the Thai government of the day started the first programs directed at bringing the hill peoples under the effective jurisdiction of the state. There is no evidence to suggest that the non-integrated state of the various ethnic minorities like the hill peoples influenced in any appreciable way the power of successive Thai governments either in the period of the absolute monarchy immediately before 1932 or in the constitutional period after 1932 up to the mid
Such awareness of the minorities as there was existed essentially on the geographical fringes of the majority group and was mainly due to contact through trading and so on. A similar situation existed in Cambodia where the issue of the minorities was one which on the whole was denied existence. Sihanouk would at times appear to have encouraged some of the minorities straddling the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam to unite in a common cause but his actions in this regard were at least partially meant as an embarrassment to the government of South Vietnam. The minorities would not appear to have played a role in the internal politics of Cambodia or to have affected Sihanouk's own position. The only possible exception was the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia but this was again an issue which primarily affected Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations.

The second example of non-integration of minorities corresponds essentially to the first in all but two respects. Firstly, the government is pursuing a policy of integration in regard to the minorities. This implies inter alia bringing them under the jurisdiction of the state. Secondly, this policy is met with resistance and opposition by the minorities. An important difference between the two cases is, therefore, that, unlike the first example, the question of the place and the status of the minorities is now an issue within the political system even though the minorities themselves still are outside the system. As any other political or economic issue it is a potential source of controversy and conflict and may as such influence the power of the leaders. The extent to which this is the case will depend on the magnitude of the problem itself and on its

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204. This is the conclusion to be drawn from Wilson, *Politics in Thailand*, in which the ethnic minorities, with the exception of the Chinese, are not mentioned.
magnitude relative to other political problems in the system. In Burma
the sheer size of the problem has been such that it has loomed large
among the political issues which have preoccupied the majority group, the
Burmans. One of the main reasons for the Ne Win takeover in 1962 was
ostensibly the U Nu government's policies towards the minorities. In
this case it obviously has been an issue capable of making the power pos­
ton of the leaders vulnerable.

The situation in Thailand after the mid 1950s may also serve
as an example of the second case. The policies towards the hill tribes
in the north and the northeast have served as a means by which one segment
of the Thai power equation, the army, has been able to further strengthen
its power and hold over the government vis-a-vis another contender, the
police. 205

The minority issue need not, of course, have the effect of
reducing the power of the incumbent nor need it make the power base more
unstable. The introduction and the existence of the minority issue in the
political system may, indeed, have the effect of unifying the majority to
a degree previously not possible. This may happen when the government
formulates policies towards the minorities which play on the latent and
overt hostile feelings often entertained by the majorities towards the
minorities. It is not unlikely that the relative harder line towards the
minorities adopted by Ne Win in Burma may have won him considerable favour
with the Burmans. The issue of the overseas Chinese would appear to have
been a factor in some countries which at times has strengthened the
position of those who favoured a hard line towards this minority.

The third case is different from the previous two in one
crucial respect. Not only has the minority issue been introduced into
the political system but the minorities themselves are participating in the system through their own representatives. This means that they are not only in a position to influence the question of their own status and position but they also have the opportunity to affect in one way or other all other issues within the system. Within this third case two different patterns of relations can be distinguished, namely what may be termed a stable and an unstable pattern.

The relatively stable pattern is exemplified by Indonesia where the minorities have taken their place in the scheme of things much in accordance with government policies. The minorities are not on the whole mobilized in opposition to integration as witnessed by the extent to which the population of Indonesia has acquired a measure of identity with the country as a whole that tends to overshadow ethnic loyalties. This would seem to be the state of affairs in Indonesia especially in the time after the rebellions of the late 1950s which were predominantly staged on a regional basis but also contained an ethnic element. Nonetheless, the relative non-integrated state of some minorities in Indonesia would seem to be an issue which does not have the capacity of influencing the power position of the present leadership.

The unstable pattern is exemplified by the Philippines where large elements of the Muslim minority in the south are in open rebellion against the government. Some elements of the Muslim minority have become integrated whilst other elements, probably the great majority, though a part of the political system are not integrated. It is an unstable situation because the integrated members of the minority group as well as members of the majority group itself may turn against the government because of its policies towards the minority. Hence, apart from the issue itself and its potential for creating dissension and conflict within
The majority group there are now minority members within the political system who may serve as further catalysts of dissension.

The case of Singapore's stormy relations with Malaysia during the two years between September 1963 and August 1965 cannot be said to fit either of the categories above. Although the problem again was the status and position of a minority group within the political system (assuming the Chinese can be considered a minority within the meaning of this chapter), the sheer size of the Chinese community and the nature of the policies of the Chinese leaders in Singapore did not only threaten to upset whatever harmony and balance had been achieved on the mainland, but also posed the question of which ethnic group would be the dominant in the new federation in the future. The case of Singapore and the federation can be said to involve most of the various types or aspects of integration identified by Weiner. But perhaps more than the others it was a matter of value integration, that is '...the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order'. In this respect it is noticeable that the Chinese community in Malaysia was divided mainly between the Singapore Chinese and the Chinese on the mainland with the policies of the former not only being a threat to the Malays but also to the leadership of the Chinese community on the mainland.

The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia was in a sense a departure of one part of an ethnic minority from the political system. In another sense it was also the departure of a modern political system which had already considerable experience in functioning as such. Thus, when the Tunku decided that Singapore had to go he did not only expell a

troublesome ethnic minority but also a political system and a set of political ideas which may have had considerable appeal to the rest of the federation.

It has been assumed throughout the discussion that the majority groups themselves are well integrated. This is of course a severe limitation but it need not necessarily change the conclusions. The discussion has been concerned with showing that there are situations in which leadership control or power may be largely independent of the fact that the state may not be well integrated and the example of non-integrated or partially integrated ethnic minorities have been used to show that this may be the case.

This does not mean that Haas' hypothesis which was cited above has been invalidated. By specifying under what conditions it may hold true it will increase its explanatory value. Hence, it would seem that on the basis of the discussion above and in regard to ethnic minority integration, three conditions in particular are important, namely the extent to which the issue of the minorities is important in the political system, the extent to which the minorities are formally represented or participate in the political system, and the extent to which the minorities are mobilized, inside or outside and for or against the political system and the state of which they are formally a part. The political power of the leaders are least likely to be influenced by the state of integration at the beginning of the process, that is, when the minorities are least integrated. This is when there is little or no representation, participation and mobilization of the minorities. Between this state of affairs and the end of the integration process, that is, when the minorities have ceased to exist as an issue of integration, there are several possibilities in which leadership power may be influenced by degree of
There remains one possibility which ought to be mentioned. Through their countries' participation in integration processes at the regional level minorities may eventually direct their loyalties towards a regional entity of some kind. The pull of Pan-Africanism is an example. However, nothing comparable has as yet emerged from regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and for the moment integration into their respective societies seems the only available option. In this respect much will depend on the terms they are offered.
The attainment of a reasonable level of security is the first consideration of the foreign policy of every country. Foreign policies include, of course, additional goals such as economic and social welfare but these are subordinate to the overriding concern for security. This does not necessarily imply that statesmen spend all or even most of their time thinking about and acting directly in relation to the security of their country. There are many countries in which security considerations at certain times and on a day-to-day basis are relegated to a relatively unobtrusive position in the hierarchy of foreign policy concerns. This may be the case, for example, when a country considers its security requirements adequately fulfilled or when it considers there to be no immediate threat to its independence and sovereignty.

Security is also the primary goal of the foreign policies of the Southeast Asian countries. But contrast with the situation in some other parts of the world the issue of security has rarely receded to the background in the minds of the political leaders. It has instead been for long periods a daily preoccupation of the same leaders, sometimes to the exclusion of nearly all other business. The balance between the feeling of security and the feeling of being threatened has on the whole tended to tip strongly in favour of the threat end of the scale.

These feelings of threat have contributed perhaps more than any other single factor to the flavour of international relations in Southeast Asia. More specifically, they have strongly influenced the processes of cooperation and integration by determining the membership and the
participation in these processes thus placing in relief the problem of the extent to which Southeast Asia can be considered one region.

In the first part of this chapter some observations will be made about the notion of threat. The second part will deal with the specific security and threat problems of the various countries in Southeast Asia, and the third and last part will consist of a discussion of the ways in which perceptions of threat have tended to preserve and even exacerbate the fragmented nature of Southeast Asia.

THE NOTION OF THREAT

In order to more fully understand the situation in Southeast Asia it is necessary to make a few observations about the concept of threat.

Most definitions of threat have built into them an explicit act on the part of one party, the threatener, designed to convey to another party, the threatened, that unless the latter does or does not do certain things he, the threatener, will take some actions which involve a certain risk or cost to the threatened greater than the risk or cost to himself. This conception of a threat as an overt act or an issuance of an explicit conditional warning is, for example, contained in Schelling's definition when he says, 'The distinctive character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party's behaviour'. 1 Boulding's definition also sees a threat '...as an act that creates a conditional expectation of damage, conditional on the performance (or, perhaps, the non-performance) of some other act.' 2

The purpose of a threat thus conceived is to instill in the threatened a feeling of insecurity such that in the end he will comply with the threatener's demand(s) or will.

The purpose of a tacit threat, as contrasted with an overt threat, is basically the same and it is similar in that it too requires an act of some kind on the part of the threatener except that this act is more in the way of a hint than a deliberate assertion of intent. Richardson, for instance, when giving an example of a tacit threat, talks of a '...veiled menacing reference to overwhelming power'. 3

A prerequisite for a successful threat in the conception of Schelling and the others is that it is credible, that is, the threatener must somehow convince the threatened that he has both the means and the will to execute the threat if necessary. This can be done in various ways which need not concern us here. 4

However, these definitions of an overt as well as a tacit threat are too dependent on a specific 'threat structure' to adequately cover a number of situations which also imply the existence of threat, threatener and threatened and in a general sense may be described as a 'threat situation' or 'threat environment'. The definitions are similar in that they all depend on that initial act, overt or tacit, on the part of the threatener to imbue in the threatened the feeling of insecurity which would seem necessary if the threatener is to succeed (without having to carry out the threat, we might add - in line with Schelling). While the Schelling-Boulding-Richardson conceptions certainly have relevance to a great number

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of situations and relationships in Southeast Asia there are, however, other situations which require that one go beyond their notions. It is argued that situations or 'threat environments' may exist in which one party may feel threatened by another party and consequently change his behaviour in such a way as to take account of this fact without the latter actually having issued a threat, overt, explicit, tacit or otherwise.

To give an illustration, one may perhaps refer to the vague feeling of threat and impending danger a person, forced by circumstances to take that route, has when he is walking through a dark and deserted street in a city area he knows to have a high rate of crime. He adjusts his behaviour and becomes unusually careful and alert so as not to provoke the 'enemy'.

A similar phenomenon - tangible or intangible - with the ability to imbue fear or a feeling of threat or insecurity by its very existence or presence in certain situations may also be found in the international system. We are referring to superior power or strength, the largest concentrations of which are found in individual states, and are controlled by governments. There is something intrinsically menacing or threatening in great strength which may make a less strong or weak power change its behaviour in ways it thinks will please the powerful. But although an element of fear or insecurity may exist on the part of the weaker in all superior-inferior relationships based on power we would not argue that the weaker therefore always or even most of the time changes his behaviour in a direction dictated by the stronger. To do so would be to overlook the fact that there exist a number of factors which can be used by the weaker to circumvent the compelling strength of the stronger and thereby avoid the change in policy or behaviour. For example, the weak may be
able to call upon the protection of a third party whose power is equal to or greater than its superior opponent. However, the weaker is in a much more difficult situation when he encounters a superior power with, at best, only equals and, at worst, no equals among third parties. The range of choice in terms of partners, allies, protectors and so on is now effectively much narrower. Such superior powers are usually referred to as big powers or super powers, and it is in the relationship between them and the weaker powers that one is most likely to find that the mere presence of superior strength may cause the small and weak to adjust its behaviour and policies in ways thought amenable to the big power, and this without the latter having issued any threat as envisaged by the Schelling-Boulding-Richardson definitions.

A further point of qualification needs to be made. The frequently repeated observation that the globe is becoming ever smaller due to the revolution in communications and that therefore every nation is every other nation's neighbour, although in some senses correct, nevertheless does not dispense with the fact that there is a certain degree of insulation in the international system related to what is often vaguely referred to as spheres of influence centered around specific big powers. This relative insulation of one sphere from another leads to partly - in some cases even strongly - curtailed opportunities for the weaker powers to seek allies and so on in other spheres. In an age in which survival is at stake the big powers are inclined to reduce to as few as possible the number of conflict points between them which in this case means leaving each other's spheres of influence alone.

5. The concept of spheres of influence is now the subject of a dissertation by a fellow research student, Paul Keal, in the Department of International Relations, the Australian National University.
In the light of such conditions it seems natural to suggest that the phenomenon under discussion is most likely to occur in relationships between big and small powers within somewhat defined spheres of influence.

At this juncture another problem must be discussed. Is it really enough to say that the existence of superior power in itself is enough to alter a nation's behaviour even with the qualifications already introduced in mind? Must not the small power which feels threatened also have to be convinced that the superior power in a contingency possesses the will to take some kind of hostile action? From where does this conviction on the part of the smaller power derive?

Firstly, a big power has, of course, no incentive to convince anybody of the will behind a threat it has not issued. Consequently when another weaker power is convinced that negative repercussions may result if it does not adjust its behaviour this cannot result from some specific or general effort by the big power to plant such convictions in the mind of the weak.

Secondly, however, the will to carry out a threat is not so much a feature of the threat as such as a characteristic of the agent issuing the threat, that is, the threatener. Thus the will may in a sense exist independent of specific threats and threat environments. This in turn means that one has to look to characteristics, or at least what the small power consider to be characteristics, of the big powers to discover from where the small derive their convictions concerning the will of the big.

At this point the phenomenon under discussion may perhaps be referred to as a lingering threat, and it can be defined as a belief on the part of the weak power that the strong has both the means and, at
least, a latent will to take measures which may be detrimental to the weak. From the standpoint of the weak the means are obviously there. They derive from the superior-inferior power relationship, and they are easily observed by the weak without efforts on the part of the big to persuade the small of their existence.

When it comes to the will there are two observations to be made, one of a general and the other of a specific nature.

In the general sense there is probably a belief, or perhaps a suspicion, on the part of all weak states that the strong and powerful sooner or later is ready to do harm to the weak in one way or another, under one or another pretext, for example, under the guise of pursuing its 'national interest'. Although we have no evidence readily at hand, it may be that this is a phenomenon which is socio-biologically inherent.

In the specific sense many small powers situated on the rim of some big power may derive their belief in the will of the big power to injure them from particular historical experiences, even of a fairly ancient vintage, in which they were both involved.

Where these two beliefs exist simultaneously in a small power one may expect them to reinforce each other so that the net effect is particularly strong.

By way of a final comment the geographical aspect of this type of threat or feeling of threat should be emphasized. It is most likely to occur in the relationship between big powers and specific smaller neighbouring powers. It should also be emphasized that this type of threat is not of a transient nature but rather something which lingers on and which stays with the powers in which it exist for long periods – frequently decades, some times even centuries. Its existence over time does, of course, also depend on the fate of the big power.
In what follows it will be argued that this type of threat is very prominent in many Southeast Asian countries, and that it has been instrumental in shaping the cooperative and integrative processes in the region to a significant degree.

THREATS AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The threat to the security of the various countries in Southeast Asia has been perceived by the governments as being predominantly of three kinds. Firstly, there is the internal or domestic threat often in the form of insurgencies of various kinds. Secondly, there is the regional external threat, that is, the threat thought to emanate from another, often neighbouring, regional power. And thirdly, there is the extra-regional external threat, that is, the threat supposed to originate from without the region, often from one or another of the big powers. In terms of the individual countries this means there are basically one internal and two external sources or types of threat. The reason for the latter division - into two external sources - is simply that they often are seen by the various countries as being different both in kind and magnitude. The division is also relevant as and when we wish to look at the question of threat and security from a regional point of view as is increasingly happening in Southeast Asia itself.

All the countries in the region entered the 1960's feeling that they had a more or less serious security problem arising from one or a combination of the three sources of threat just mentioned. However, the intensity of the insecurity experienced and the conclusions drawn and the policies adopted to counter the threat varied considerably from country to country depending on circumstances, historical factors, the direction from which the most serious threat was thought to come, and so on.
The neutralist foreign policy of Burma revolves around the fact that she has a common border with China longer than any other country in Southeast Asia. The awareness of China displayed by the Burmese leaders is well reflected in the following remark -

Back of all our public statements about 'non-alignment', 'friendship with all countries', 'positive neutralism', and the like, is a constant awareness of our big and powerful neighbour in the north. We do not fear communism as an ideology so much as we fear the day when China's masses must find living space in our under-populated country.

Similar sentiments are reflected in another remark, 'Burmese foreign policy is founded on the immutable axiom of 700 million Chinese to the north'. The general tenor of these remarks is, of course, one often expressed by the small and the weak with regard to the big and powerful. It could have originated in any small country in similar circumstances. However, the specific content of these remarks conveys the idea of China, if not as an overt or manifest, at least a potential or latent threat to the sovereignty and security of Burma. In fact the distinction between latent and manifest is especially convenient in the case of Burma because one can appropriately regard her foreign policy as primarily a design meant to prevent the transformation of China from a predominantly manifest threat to Burma. The fact that Burma up to 1967 on the whole enjoyed relatively harmonious relations with China is not, of course, solely attributable to this 'design' but neither can it be

stripped of merit altogether. 8

As had been the case in regard to the Chinese nationalist government Burma set out at the first opportunity to create good relations with the new rulers of China by being the first non-communist country to recognize the Chinese People's Republic in December 1949. 9 In the ensuing years to 1960-61 especially three issues were of vital importance to Burma in her relations with China. Two of these — the ethnic and communist rebellions, especially the latter, and the presence of Kuomintang troops on Burmese soil — provided China with possible grounds for direct or indirect intervention in Burmese affairs. The third issue — the border dispute — concerned the territorial integrity of Burma in so far as she may have had to face the loss of substantial parts of her territory to China.

However, after some tense periods which reached a peak in late 1956 and early 1957 with reported incursions of Chinese communist troops into Burma's northeastern territory the border dispute was resolved in January 1960 when a treaty was signed according to which China abandoned large territorial claims for some minor modifications of the old British boundary. 10 The reasonable attitude of the Chinese in regard to the border issue did much to allay fears in Burma and the agreement ushered in a period of better relations than ever between the two countries.

The issue of the border was to some extent related both to

8. With regard to the evolution of Burma's policy towards China, see Johnstone, op. cit., esp. pp. 158-200. See also Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia, esp. ch. 4.

9. See Johnstone, ibid., pp. 52-57 on Burma's recognition of the CPR.

10. For the development and resolution of the border dispute, see ibid., pp. 187-197. See also Lamb, Asian Frontiers, pp. 150-157.
that of the Kuomintang troops and the internal rebellion. On the one hand the refugee Kuomintang troops could have been used as an excuse by the regime in Peking for incursions on a large scale into Burmese territory and once there the communist troops could not easily, if at all, have been evicted by the Burmese. On the other hand, an occupation of the claimed territory by the Chinese could have been used as a pretext for extending more effective help to the internal rebellions in Burma, especially the communist rebellion. As it happened these fears on the part of the Burmese leaders were never really fulfilled. The Kuomintang troops issue was largely resolved by actions initiated by the Burmese government within the context of the United Nations. 11 The Chinese leaders on their part early indicated that they considered the issue a matter to be dealt with by the Burmese themselves. 12 Hence by 1960 the issue was no longer of much significance in Sino-Burmese relations even though some Kuomintang troops still remained in eastern Burma principally preoccupied with opium smuggling.

The internal rebellions in Burma have proved to be a more complicated question since they are still not eliminated as a potential issue of conflict in Sino-Burmese relations. However, throughout the 1950's the Chinese communists showed little interest in their ideological brethren in Burma. As one scholar has observed, between 1950 and 1963 China's support for and contacts with the Burmese communists '...were more symbolic than subversive. At the most, they indicated that Peking had only a residual interest in the Burmese Communists' cause, an interest that could be activated, however, if Burma's foreign policy turned hostile toward Peking.' 13

12. Ibid., p. 178.
Thus by 1960 the most dangerous issues in Sino-Burmese relations had on the whole found a satisfactory solution as far as the Burmese government was concerned. Only the ethnic and communist rebellions simmered on as a potential issue of conflict but even here the Burmese government's fears had been largely dissipated by the restraint and relative lack of interest of the Peking regime.

This attitude of the Chinese - so beneficial from a Burmese point of view - was probably also a result of steps taken by the Burmese government simultaneous to the search for solutions to the issues just referred to, steps which reflected Burma's general desire to assure China of her peaceful intentions. Initiated by the abovementioned early recognition of the CPR, Burma in 1954 followed up by declaring her adherence to the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence' during a visit of the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to Rangoon. On several subsequent occasions she reaffirmed her adherence to the principles. 14 Burma's attempts to placate the Chinese in this period up to the 1960's was crowned by the signing of a 'Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression' in January 1960 in Peking on the same occasion the border treaty was signed. 15 The most significant clause in this treaty was the third which stated that 'Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance against the other Contracting Party'. 16

Thus Burma began the 1960's quite satisfied her relations with China were never better. Her relations with her other close

neighbours, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Laos, were also - from the point of view of Rangoon - satisfactory. Although minor problems existed in her relations with India over the Indian minority in Burma, and with Pakistan and Thailand over their common border these were either solved or never allowed to assume the proportions of major disputes. 17

Sino-Burmese relations were now extended into other fields. The Chinese promised large credits for trade promotion and in 1963 a number of technical assistance and other aid projects were launched. The Burmese, on their side, supported in general, though sometimes rather vague, terms many Chinese policies on international issues not directly related to Sino-Burmese relations. 18

The apparent Chinese desire to maintain good government-to-government relations was put to a test in 1963 when the Burmese government in April of that year declared a general amnesty and called for unconditional negotiations between itself and all insurgent groups, including the communists. The negotiations lasted for about two months and a half before they broke down in mid-November. If anything the Chinese appear to have urged the Burmese communists to come to an agreement with the government. 19

This generally moderate stand of the Chinese in regard to the communist rebellion lasted to 1967 when the relations between the two governments abruptly changed.

Due to the greatly intensified American involvement in Vietnam from 1964-65 Burma found it more difficult to practise her brand

17. Ibid., pp. 255-256.
20. See, for example, the conclusion reached in Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy. Peking's support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 97-98 as far as the year 1965 is concerned. See also Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 102-105.
of neutralism without offending China. Burma's general, rather non-committal, stand on the conflict in Vietnam may not have been entirely to the liking of China who probably would have liked to see an outright Burmese condemnation especially of the American involvement. Some pressure would seem to have been brought to bear on the Burmese government in this regard but without much success. The independent line of Burma in this and other questions would not, however, seem to have been interpreted in China as hostility toward Peking nor as a departure from the Burmese policy of neutralism. 21

However, all this changed in June 1967 when the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution in China spilled over into Burma. The relations between the two countries - so cordial prior to June 1967 - quite suddenly turned hostile, sometimes even vitriolic, primarily due to actions and conditions over which the Burmese had very little influence and no control. 22 In short the rift that occurred grew out of the Burmese refusal to let the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung be disseminated, particularly among the Chinese minority in Burma. Inspired by and directed from the Chinese embassy in Rangoon attempts were made to spread the thoughts of Mao and encouragement was also given to activities similar to those of the Red Guards in China, all in open defiance of the clearly expressed disapproval of the Burmese government. Riots followed in which a Chinese aid technician was killed and the relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. On June 30 an editorial in the

22. We shall not here rehearse all the detailed events which led to the rift. For such details, see Frank N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Thaw Era", pp. 1034-1054 and Peter Boog, "The China-Burma Rift", pp. 5-11.
Jen-Min-Jih-Pao (People's Daily) in Peking attacked the government of Burma in the strongest terms calling it 'reactionary', 'fascist' and 'counter-revolutionary'. The day after, on July 1, a statement by the Communist Party of Burma was broadcast by the New China News Agency and given official Chinese support. In it the Burmese government was once more attacked in strong terms and the NCNA exhorted the Burmese people to support the communist insurrection in Burma. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended. The Chinese indicated that their ambassador would not return to Rangoon after having been recalled earlier in the year before the dispute started. The Burmese ambassador was withdrawn in September. During November the Chinese aid technicians returned to China. These and other developments during 1967 and 1968 brought relations to a breaking point. The Chinese press campaign against Burma in general and Ne Win in particular continued unabated throughout 1967 and well into 1968 when in addition large scale fighting between Burmese and Chinese troops was reported to have broken out along the common border in the north.

However, 1968 also produced the first sign of a change in China's extremely belligerent stand. Although the press campaign continued Peking, nevertheless, initiated moves which indicated a desire to move towards improvement in the relations. China donated typhoon relief aid to the Burma Red Cross and Burmese officials were invited to Peking to attend national celebrations. In 1970 high ranking Burmese officials began to attend functions they had previously boycotted. Later that year the Burmese ambassador returned to Peking while the Chinese

24. Holmes, ibid., p. 689.
25. Ibid., p. 694.
246.

ambassador returned to Rangoon in March 1971 thus re-establishing normal
diplomatic relations. In August 1971 Ne Win went to China at the
invitation of Premier Chou En-lai, the first such visit since July 1966.
Relations continued on the whole to improve in 1971 and 1972. 26

The rupture in Sino-Burmese relations did not bring about
any significant change in Burma's relations with other countries. The
threatening posture of China after June 1967 did not induce
Burma to look around for other powers with which to align herself and
thereby perhaps ward off the threat from China. Such change that has
taken place in Burma's foreign policy refers more to range than content
and started before the conflict with China. She had become increasingly
assertive in her conduct of foreign relations expressing interest in
extended diplomatic and economic contacts with her neighbours and with
the major powers. 27 This new assertiveness, which continued after 1967,
did not, however, compromise her basic policy of neutralism. She studiously
avoided establishing such contacts with other powers which could be inter-
preted as hostile to China while at the same time adopting a moderate,
even conciliatory, but nevertheless firm stand against hostile Chinese
actions. What up to 1967 had been the cornerstone of Burma's foreign
relations - to avoid irritating or provoking China - was never lost from
sight in the period after.

Whether or not Sino-Burmese relations will again return to
the same level of intimacy at which they were conducted prior to 1967 will
depend not only on the actions of both parties but also how they
interpret these actions. The sudden crisis of 1967 and subsequent events
obviously caused great alarm in Burma and must have reawakened the Burmese
to the potential of China as a threat.

26. Ibid., pp. 695-698. 27. Ibid.
The events of 1967 have been interpreted in basically two ways. One interpretation maintains in the words of one of its proponents '...that China's frustration over the lack of success of its policy vis-a-vis Burma led to the actions precipitating the Sino-Burmese rift'. In this view the events of 1967 were but a part of a continuous Chinese policy aimed at bringing Burma within a distinctly Chinese orbit - to entice, as it were, Burma to give up her policy of neutralism in favour of a much more pronounced pro-China policy.

The other interpretation sees the same events as a break or discontinuity in Chinese policy brought about by ultra-leftist elements in the Cultural Revolution. In the words of one of its advocates '[the] Cultural Revolution has been an internal phenomenon, and its seepage abroad to become a factor in China's relations with other countries seems to have been an uncalculated though perhaps inevitable by-product'. According to this view the Chinese leaders, inter alia Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, lost control over the conduct of foreign affairs and, for a period, even the foreign ministry itself. Accordingly, the rift in China's relations with Burma and other countries during the Cultural Revolution represented an unintended discontinuity in policy which would be rectified by relations being brought back to a substantially similar, if not entirely identical, course with the passage of time.


Neither of these two interpretations - and the evidence at the time of writing seems to favour the latter of the two as most likely - would seem to be capable of laying to rest Burmese anxieties vis-a-vis China. Those Burmese who lean towards the first alternative must ask themselves what there is to prevent China from again resorting to similar or perhaps more forceful tactics in her pursuit of her foreign policy goals.

To other Burmese the second alternative may appear only slightly less disturbing especially if they take seriously Mao's own statements about the continuing revolution and the necessity for more Cultural Revolution type upheavals in the future. \(^{31}\) How can one be sure that such future upheavals, were they to occur, would not produce consequences similar or even more serious to Burma than those flowing from the first Cultural Revolution?

For still other Burmese the events of 1967 may have caused them for the first time to view China as a potential, even an actual, threat to Burma. To these people experiences of a traditional and historical nature, reinforced by the largely harmonious relations between the two countries in the post-independence period up to 1967, had led them to consider China a friendly neighbour not to be particularly feared. \(^{32}\)

However, Burma has had to face also a more manifest or overt threat stemming from domestic ideological and ethnic conflicts. Ever since 1948 the Union government has had to combat secessionist rebellions by segments of the numerous ethnic minorities. In addition the government

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31. Mao himself has advocated the need for future Cultural Revolution type changes in China.

has had to handle the rebellions by the communist Red and White Flag factions. Although the communist and ethnic rebellions cannot be easily separated in that they to some extent overlap it is possible to say that the former has been viewed the most seriously by the Burmese government. This is not due so much to the strength and size of communist insurrectionist activities which would appear to at much the same scale and level as the ethnic rebellions as to the possible and actual links between the communists and the regime in Peking.

As already indicated at the actual level the Peking regime was rather lukewarm in its support of the communists in Burma at least until 1967. Its support, more symbolic than subversive, had not influenced the internal situation to any significant degree apart from such influence as Mao's writing on guerilla warfare had on the tactics adopted by the White Flags in particular. After the breakdown of the talks between the Burmese government and the various rebel groups in the autumn of 1964 the White Flags adopted a more outright 'war-line' in their struggle against the government. Still, little more than low-key moral support would appear to have been forthcoming from Peking. 33

The rift of 1967 could have provided a turning point in China's support of the communists in Burma and to some extent it did. The change could, however, have been much more drastic than was the case. To be sure, the verbal support for the communists in the Chinese media was greatly increased. However, for a variety of reasons no significant material assistance would seem to have been given the White Flags by China. 34

33. Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 102-103.
34. Ibid., pp. 150-152.
As government-to-government relations have gradually improved since 1968 Peking's verbal support of the Burmese communists has decreased though not ceased.

It is rather the level of the possible or potential that will cause the Burmese to continue to keep a wary eye on China. They cannot be certain that should the leaders in China deem the conditions favourable they will not extend far more than verbal and low-level material support to the Burmese communists. As we shall see this is a fear they share with the leaders in many other Southeast Asian countries.

THAILAND

No less than in the case of Burma the close presence of China has figured prominently in Thai foreign and security policy after World War II. But whilst the Burmese have been careful and reticent the Thai have on occasion been outspoken in naming China a threat. Likewise, the actions taken and the policies adopted vis-a-vis China have been widely different. The Burmese moved early to remove any cause for Chinese military or other intervention by adopting a policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict while they at the same time and within this framework attempted to cultivate as warm and friendly relations with China as possible. Only after some initial hesitation Thailand, on the other hand, opted for a strongly partisan policy in favour of the west the cornerstone of which was her relations with the United States.

Traditionally Thailand was part of the tributary system the center of which was China and the last tributary mission, which had averaged between one and two a decade, went to Peking in 1853. A variety of commercial and cultural links had existed and from about the 14th century onward a

steady trickle of Chinese migrants entered Thailand until in the mid 1950s an estimated 10-11 percent of the population was Chinese, a percentage which has been fairly steady since. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia this Chinese minority dominates commercial and other economic activities. 36

The Thai policy towards China was one of avoidance rather than involvement, a policy facilitated rather than hindered by the tributary system. 37 From the mid 19th century, however, the relations at the official level were broken off when Thailand, by the force of circumstances more than by choice, became part of an international system dominated by the colonial powers. In fact, with the exception of the four years between 1946 and 1949, and then only as a result of the postwar settlements, Thailand, for the last 120 years, has not had diplomatic or consular relations with any of the regimes ruling mainland China. 38

In the post World War II years this insulation, especially at the official level, has not prevented China from looming large in Thai foreign policy. It may indeed be that China occupied so large a place in Thai thinking precisely because of the near total absence of relations between the two countries. The largely unknown and the distant (and we are talking about social rather than geographical distance) sometimes have a tendency of assuming qualities in the minds of people which in fact do not exist while those qualities that do exist, be they good or bad, tend to become enlarged out of all proportions.

37. Ibid., p. 350.
38. Ibid., p. 351.
The shift in Thai foreign policy towards a reliance on the West and the United States was precipitated by the army coup d'état in November 1947 when the then leading political figure and former Prime Minister Pridi Panomyong was ousted. In April 1948 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram became Prime Minister again, a position he had previously held from 1938 to 1944 and which he this time was to hold until 1957 when another coup removed him from office.

By 1950 the constellation of forces in Asia, previously somewhat fluid due mainly to the civil war in China, had crystallized so much that the Thai leaders felt the time had come to make the choice. They were convinced that communist China was a threat and that she would be hostile to Thailand, that she would inspire subversion and also would extend military aid to the Vietnamese and Laotian communists who in turn were ready to aid separatist elements in the largely Thai-Lao populated northeast of the country. With such convictions the choice was fairly clear.

The first steps on the pro-Western road were taken when Thailand recognized the newly proclaimed independent Vietnam under the Emperor Bao Dai and the governments of Laos and Cambodia to be followed a month later in March 1950 by the recognition of South Korea. Support for these regimes was also United States and British policy and Phibun thought that by doing so he would invoke the gratitude of the United States and concomitant large amounts of economic and military aid. In this he was

39. A number of books describe this phase of Thai history. The exposition which follows is based on the following works if nothing else is indicated; Wilson, Politics in Thailand, and the same author, The United States and the Future of Thailand (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965); Modelski (Ed.), SEATO, Six Studies, and same author in Halpem, Policies Toward China; and Donald C. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965).
greatly helped by the outbreak of the Korean War which was to change completely the size and the complexion of the United States involvement in Asia, which until then had been largely economic and cultural and relatively small compared to what was to come.

In September 1950 an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was concluded with the United States and the following month a Military Assistance Agreement was also signed. The latter, however, did not go beyond equipment and training. The Americans made it quite clear that the United States was not prepared to give Thailand a security guarantee although the Thai leaders had very much wanted such assurances.

As is natural in a situation of near 'non-relations' such as existed between Thailand and China there were not many issues that directly concerned only the two of them. One such issue, however, was the establishment by China in 1953 of the Thai Autonomous People's Government in the province of Yunnan, one of a number of similar administrative units for minority groups in China. This event caused much excitement and even more consternation in Thailand particularly since the Thai government suspected former Thai Prime Minister Pridi, now an exile in China, of being involved. To those who believed in the hostile motives of the Chinese this was only further confirmation. To many who had been less convinced of the evil intentions of China it was the event which tipped the scale.

Thai government support for SEATO has fluctuated mainly according to Thai perceptions of the security situation in Indo-China and the gap between the policies advocated by the Thai in this regard and those of her SEATO partners, especially the United States. To the Thai the events in Laos during 1960-62 appeared particularly ominous for Thailand especially when it became clear that the policies favoured by her, intervention on behalf of the right wing forces in Laos, did not meet with the desired response from the rest of the SEATO members. Britain and France in particular
were opposed. This caused Thailand to renew her attempts to bring about at least such changes in SEATO that would permit individual states to act without the prior agreement of all the other members. Short of a bilateral alliance, which throughout had had first priority, Thailand wanted in particular an arrangement which permitted and ensured that the United States would act independently of her other SEATO partners in case of a communist attack on Thailand. In March 1962 the Thai received the assurances they had been seeking off and on since at least 1954. In a joint statement by the United States and Thai foreign ministers in Washington the United States pledged full support for Thailand's independence and security and promised to meet any attack on Thailand if necessary independently of SEATO.

The doubts which had existed in the minds of the Thai leaders as to the willingness of the United States to stand up to what the Thai considered the expansionist communism of China and North Vietnam were further dissipated in the years which followed. The United States became increasingly involved in Vietnam and with the bombing of North Vietnam in 1964 and the arrival of large numbers of American troops beginning in 1965 this commitment was drastically extended. The Thai responded to United States requests for active Thai support in the fight against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong by permitting the Americans to build several large air bases in Thailand from which bombing raids against Vietnam and Laos were conducted. In 1967 the Thai even committed ground forces which at their peak numbered about 12,000 infantry and support troops.

With the partial rapprochement between the United States and China and the American military disengagement from Indo-China and consequent reduction of forces in Thailand, much of Thai foreign and security policy has been left substantially without a firm base. The heavy reliance
on the United States and the latter's responsiveness had made Thailand's strongly anti-China and outspokenly anti-communist policies possible. The reorientation of United States policy removed much of the rationale of Thai policy leaving her with basically two options in regard to China. Either she could continue her strongly anti-China policy in spite of the likelihood of diminishing United States support. Or she could attempt to come to terms with China in one way or another. On present evidence it would appear that Thailand is moving in the direction of this latter alternative.

In addition to the extra-regional external threat from China the Thai have also been preoccupied with the regional external threat posed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam). To the extent the Thai have considered direct military invasion a possibility it has been thought most likely to come through Laos from either China or North Vietnam. Seen from Bangkok, Thai anxieties may not have been totally without foundation. As the 1962 international agreement on Laos deteriorated and as the conflict in Vietnam, escalated North Vietnamese troops reached on more than one occasion the east bank of the Mekong and thus directly faced the northeast region of Thailand. It is also evident that Thai authorities never have cherished the thought of a united Vietnam especially under communist rule. In this they have not, of course, been alone in Southeast Asia.

Nearly as important for Thailand as an understanding with China is some kind of modus vivendi with North Vietnam. It may indeed be that the latter can best be arrived at through the prior establishment of the former, that is, the way to Hanoi goes through Peking as far as Thailand is concerned. However this may be, Thailand has been given some breathing space in which she can reformulate and change her policies towards both China and North Vietnam.
The importance of better relations with these two countries is further underscored by the links between them and the third threat to Thailand, namely the internal or domestic insurrection or subversion. This threat, not particularly prevalent in the 1950's, has become perhaps the major security problem facing the Thai government, especially after 1964.

Until that year Chinese support of the Thai communists had on the whole been on a very small scale and Thailand would not seem to have rated high on the Chinese priority list. The Chinese assistance was in the form of low level training and propaganda support of the Thai communist exiles. 40 A kind of division of labour may indeed have existed between China and North Vietnam in regard to the Thai communist movement. China appears to have taken care of the training of a small number of relatively senior Thai cadres while the North Vietnamese - primarily at the Hoa Binh School outside Hanoi - trained a larger number of ordinary soldiers and low level cadres of which possibly some were not even sent back to Thailand but rather included in Pathet Lao units in Laos. 41 However, as far as China was concerned it would appear that her '...early involvement with the Thai Communists ... provides little evidence of a meaningful Chinese effort to foment trouble in Thailand. 42

Starting in late 1964 a change took place in the attention paid the Thai communists and the situation in Thailand by both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. After many years, during which not much at all was heard of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) Peking published a National Day message from the CPT on November 1. This message also contained an appeal for the formation of a united front aimed at the overthrow of the

41. Ibid., p. 17.
42. Ibid., p. 16.
Thai government and was followed in the next few months by the establishment of front organizations such as the Thai Independence Movement (TIM) with a programme compatible with the CPT programme, and the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) which at the end of 1965 merged with the TIM. 43

This re-emergence of the organized Thai communist movement coincided with increased Chinese and North Vietnamese support. But in the case of China this increase would not appear to be impressive. It is indicative that Chinese propaganda material surfaced much more frequently than Chinese arms and equipment in the north and the northeast of Thailand. 44

The North Vietnamese involvement, on the other hand, was more significant although not on a scale which would suggest that the DRV considered the rebellion in Thailand a matter of priority. 45 From 1962 to 1965 the number of guerillas trained at the Hoa Binh school each year would seem to have doubled from about 70 to 130. 46 The increase in guerilla activity in the late 1960's in the north and the northeast of Thailand cannot, however, with any certainty be attributed to the communists alone. Considerable non-communist anti-government sentiments exist among the hill tribes and the attempts by the Thai to bring them, especially the Meo and Yao, under effective government control met with considerable resistance.

Some of the increase in guerilla activity in Thailand in the second half of the 1960's was nevertheless in some degree undoubtedly due to increased Chinese and, especially, North Vietnamese support. The reason for this increase at that particular time may not, however,

43. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
44. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
45. Ibid., p. 18.
be found so much in a desire to create in Thailand 'another Vietnam' as
in the strong links between Thailand, the United States and the conflict
in Indo-China. Thailand's role in this conflict had, as we have already
indicated, increased in step with the escalating United States involvement.
By providing bases for the United States Air force Thailand played a
crucial role in the conduct of the war on the part of the United States.
It is more likely than not that China's and North Vietnam's stepped up
support in 1965 and 1966 was a reminder to Thailand of what might happen
if she did not reconsider her foreign policy in general and her involve­
ment in Indo-China in particular. '... [the support] was staged in
careful phases during 1965 and 1966, apparently to give Thailand time to
reconsider her foreign commitments'. 47

CAMBODIA

Considered as both a potential threat to and a potential pro-
tector of Cambodia, China was assigned a part in Cambodia's (or Sihanouk's)
foreign policy quite unlike in many respects the one that she occupied in
the foreign policies of Burma and Thailand. 48 The seemingly contradictory
expectations Sihanouk had in regard to China - as at once both a potential
threat and the immediate benefactor - led him actively and deliberately to
exploit her existence for foreign policy purposes in a manner not paral-
elled elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While the Thai have sometimes been

47. Gurtov, op.cit., p. 45.
48. The section on Cambodia has been based mainly on the following
works; Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia; Roger M. Smith,
Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1965); Leifer, Cambodia. The Search for Security,
Donald Kirk, Wider War (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); Michael
Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality', and
National Security", in Halpern, op. cit.
accused, rightly or wrongly, of having quite cynically used the presence of China and communism to extract additional military and economic assistance from the United States, Sihanouk has, in quite a different fashion, used China herself and her presence in his attempts to extract from the world community - and especially the big powers and her own immediate neighbours - what he considered his most important foreign policy objective, namely an international agreement guaranteeing Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity.

Partly as a result of the influence of Prime Minister Nehru of India, Sihanouk began in the mid 1950's - in the aftermath of the 1954 Geneva Agreement - to redirect Cambodia's foreign policy towards 'neutralism'. As in the case of Burma, Sihanouk sought security in friendly relations with China rather than risk her hostility arising from too close a relationship with the western powers and the United States in particular. But perhaps more than fear of the immediate presence of a big power, Sihanouk's rejection of a Western oriented foreign policy as a viable alternative for Cambodia, was based on his gradually emerging belief that communism was the strongest and most dynamic force in Asia. Not a communist himself he nevertheless saw communism as the social force which would dominate Asia in the not too distant future. 49 It therefore became essential to the survival of Cambodia to be on good terms with this force and especially its most important Asian repository - China. The considerable apprehensions he harboured with regard to China's ultimate motives and intentions were pushed into the background in favour of an attempt to enlist her assistance in containing what he considered more urgent threats to Cambodia.

Although he never moved to an overall foreign policy position completely identical with that of China, Sihanouk in the late 1950's and early 1960's gradually identified Cambodia very closely with Chinese policies on many international issues. This he did, not only on the basis of whatever convictions he had about the wisdom and efficacy of these policies, but also because he calculated that Chinese friendship could be valuable whenever he had to cope with what he saw as the more urgent and overt threat to Cambodia from her nearest neighbours, Thailand, Vietnam (North and South) and, to a lesser degree, Laos.

Cambodia's suspicions - even bitterness - towards her neighbours have long historical roots and have in recent times been nurtured by incidents and issues which have served only to further increase Cambodian suspicions of successive Thai and Vietnamese governments and political movements.

The prolonged dispute with Thailand over the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear, finally settled in favour of Cambodia by the International Court of Justice in 1962, added to the already strained relations between the two countries. Dissatisfaction among certain Thai circles with the verdict of the Court and the somewhat reluctant Thai acceptance of it, led the Cambodians to believe that Thailand had not really given up the claim so that the issue of the temple continued to linger on after 1962. Sihanouk also suspected the Thai of wanting to recover the Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap annexed by the Thai in the 19th century and again granted the Thai by the French under the auspices of the Japanese in 1941, but returned to Cambodia in 1946. Then there was the question of Cambodian exiles in Thailand, especially Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Serai (Free Khmer), whom Sihanouk accused the Thai of supporting in alleged attempts to overthrow him.
Cambodia's relations with South Vietnam were, if anything, worse. The Vietnamese were alleged to have territorial interests in Cambodia especially in regard to certain off-shore islands in the Gulf of Siam. The Saigon regime, in fact, called on Cambodia to renounce possession of seven of these islands in 1960. It did not, however, back up its claim by military means. Another factor in their relations is that Cambodia, on her part, never gave up her claim to Cochinchina, the most important part of South Vietnam which had been part of the Khmer kingdom until late in the seventeenth century. As late as 1958 the Cambodian government brought this claim to the attention of the United Nations; although it is unlikely that she entertained any hopes of ever realizing the claim. Another issue which served to poison the relationship between the two countries was the question of the Khmer minority in Vietnam and the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. This gave rise to numerous charges and counter-charges of ill treatment and intimidation. Repeated South Vietnamese violations of the Cambodian border while in pursuit of the Viet Cong, coupled with Saigon charges that the Viet Cong used Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and base camp, did not improve relations either. Nor did the much earlier 'Dap Chhuon' plot of 1959 in which, according to Sihanouk, the South Vietnamese, the Thai and the Americans have been in collusion with the governor of Siem Reap province to overthrow him. The significant aspect of all these charges and counter-charges, disputes and conflicts and so on, is, of course, that they are not without substance.

The different ideological complexion of the regime in North Vietnam did not do much to allay Cambodian suspicions of Hanoi. The most significant feature of the Hanoi regime is not, as far as the Cambodians are concerned, that they are communists but that they are Vietnamese. The relations were, however, considerably tempered by
Sihanouk's apparent belief in the ultimate dominance of communism and his consequent desire to be on as good terms as possible with China and North Vietnam. Wary of possible North Vietnamese support for the Khmer Viet Minh or Khmer Rouge (the Red Khmer) and apprehensive of what a united Vietnam under the communists might have in store for Cambodia, he continuously tried to extract from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong written agreements guaranteeing the borders of Cambodia. His success in this respect was, however, qualified. In 1964 the government of North Vietnam finally acknowledged Cambodia's right to the off-shore islands but not in a formal agreement. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Pathet Lao likewise offered only verbal, not written, recognition of the existing borders.

As far as the Saigon regime was concerned the situation in Vietnam rapidly deteriorated and by 1964 Sihanouk was further convinced that it was only a matter of time before South Vietnam would fall to the communists. South Vietnamese unwillingness to talk about the border and other outstanding issues between the two countries, previous Chinese economic and military aid and pledges of support to Cambodia in case of foreign armed aggression - all this strengthened his belief in the wisdom of Cambodia moving still closer to China if there were to be any hopes of coming to terms with North Vietnam.

Sihanouk's disenchantment with the western powers and the United States in particular was complete by 1964. The Americans had shown themselves to be uninterested in providing Sihanouk the guarantee he wanted, and in May 1965 he broke off diplomatic relations with them, perhaps as much out of a desire to please the Chinese as in disappointment with Washington's policies.

During 1965 Sihanouk began to realize, however, that China's interest in his neutralization scheme for Cambodia was secondary to both
Peking and the Vietnamese communists as long as the war in Vietnam was not settled. At the Indochinese People's Conference, convened by Sihanouk in Phnom Penh in early 1965 primarily to discuss his scheme, the situation in Laos and Vietnam had priority.

In late 1966 and 1967 Sihanouk had another problem to handle. Radical-leftist politicians brought about a government crisis over the selection of a right-of-center cabinet under General Lon Nol. While Sihanouk was in France radical dissension in Phnom Penh merged with agrarian revolts in Battambang province causing Lon Nol to dispatch troops to the province to stop anti-government violence allegedly inspired by the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk put the blame on external influences. 'The masters of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong', he alleged.

In the midst of this internal upheaval the cultural revolution or its spill-over reached Cambodia. Inspired by the events in China the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh became, as it had been in Rangoon, the center for the distribution of Maoist propaganda directed especially at the local Chinese population. Sihanouk took countermeasures by cracking down on the Chinese school system in particular, although he carefully attempted to maintain a distinction between Peking and local subversion in order not to provoke Chinese hostility. In this he was only partially successful, since in June 1967 the Chinese ambassador was recalled. Contributing to the ever worsening relations was Sihanouk's now more outspoken criticism of China for not making clear her attitude in regard to the frontiers. Only after the Soviet Union had issued a formal statement recognizing the present borders in early June, did the Chinese do the

50. Quoted in Gurtov, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
same, first in a statement of 13 June which merely indicated respect for the borders, and finally in a declaration of 31 July which fully recognized the existing borders. The NLF and the DRV did the same just after the Soviet Union. Sihanouk's response was to grant de jure recognition of the DRV and to permit the NLF to establish a permanent representation in Phnom Penh.

Sihanouk's reliance on the Soviet recognition to extract the same guarantees from China may not have pleased the leaders in Peking. In August-September relations deteriorated to the breaking point mainly because of opposite views as to the propriety of local Chinese activities in Cambodia. Sihanouk announced on 22 August the withdrawal of Cambodian embassy personnel in Peking and only after a personal apology by Chou En-lai himself did he retract his decision.

The events of the summer of 1967 had considerable impact on the foreign policy thinking in Cambodia. Although the policies did not themselves change substantially, Sihanouk himself began to have doubts about the real influence of China on the communist forces both inside and outside Cambodia's borders. While assuring Peking of Cambodia's continued friendship, Sihanouk began to show willingness to improve relations with the United States.

Speculation in this regard was touched off by the ostensibly unofficial visit by Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy late in 1967, followed in January 1968 by the visit of then United States ambassador to India, Chester Bowles. By these visits Sihanouk, among other things, may have wished to demonstrate to the Chinese and the North Vietnamese that there was after all a channel open to the United States.

Under the pressure of the threat of an American military move into Cambodia the first explicit Cambodian admission about the Viet Cong presence in Cambodia was made. When new internal disturbances occurred
during the first half of 1968, Sihanouk in strong terms related these to external communist sources like the Pathet Lao, the Viet Cong and even Thai communists, all of whom he accused of aiding the Cambodian rebels. These accusations went beyond any previous proportioning of blame and may have been a result of what Sihanouk felt was a shift in the balance of forces especially in Vietnam. The Americans had shown themselves determined to honour their commitments, and the Viet Cong seemed to be further from victory than they had been three or four years earlier. It is indeed possible that Sihanouk used the Americans by appearing to move closer to them to extract further guarantees from Peking and Hanoi to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Cambodia.

If this was the case Sihanouk would seem to have had more success with the Chinese than the North Vietnamese. In March 1968 the Chinese reiterated their support for Sihanouk and his policy of non-alignment. Hanoi and the NLF were less responsive insofar as they would seem to have continued their build up in Cambodian border areas in spite of continued professions of respect for Cambodia's territorial integrity.

Throughout 1968 and 1969 Sihanouk continued his dialogue with the Americans. In April 1969 the United States recognized Cambodia's existing borders, and in June he agreed to a reopening of the American embassy with a charge d'affaire as its head. Simultaneously he continued to cooperate with the communists, and in May he announced that the NLF mission had been upgraded to embassy level, and in June he recognized the NLF dominated Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG).

In March, when on a tour of Europe and Asia and on the way from Moscow to Peking, Sihanouk was overthrown. Lon Nol became Premier and Prince Sirik Matak his First Deputy Premier. Those who until then had been enemies became friends, and friends, prior to March 1970, became
enemies. The result was that Cambodia became part of the Vietnam battlefield and within a short period of time Cambodia was engulfed by the whole fury of war.

LAOS

In no country in Southeast Asia have the circumstances of geography played such a crucial not to say cruel role as in the case of Laos. Landlocked and surrounded for the most part by much stronger neighbours her independence and sovereignty has been a matter over which she herself has had little influence. Instead her state of survival as an entity, very much a part of the broader East-West conflict, has been a contentious issue the outcome of which all along has been mainly in the hands of her neighbours and their allies and still essentially remains so. 51

Laos has a common border with Thailand, Burma, China, Cambodia and North and South Vietnam. Her misfortune lies in the fact that of her immediate neighbours, especially Thailand, China and the two Vietnams, each in its own way has considered her a vital part of their own security.

To China, always sensitive about her security 52 and especially the security of her borders 53, it has been important to prevent the emergence of a regime in Laos hostile to China. Of equal importance has been the aim to prevent other powers with a commensurate capacity, most


53. Ibid., p. 395.
notably the United States but also the Soviet Union, from establishing a lasting influence in areas adjacent to herself including Laos. To achieve this the most obvious alternative for China was to support those factions within Laos most friendly to her. More or less simultaneously with the clarification of the situation in China herself resulting in the complete dominance of the communists over mainland China, the situation among the Laotian forces struggling for independence from France had begun to crystallize leading to the formation of the communist dominated Pathet Lao in 1950. In the ensuing domestic struggle of the post-independence era the Pathet Lao has been China’s main ally in Laos.

They have also been the principal ally of the North Vietnamese. In fact the Viet Minh was one of the main forces behind the formation of the Pathet Lao back in 1950. And as the conflict in Vietnam escalated in the 1960’s Laos became more and more important to North Vietnamese strategy.

As the Thai saw it it was imperative to stop Laos from falling completely into the hands of the communists, because of her own exposed northeastern provinces. Thailand’s principal allies within Laos were the various right-wing factions especially centered around General Phoumi Nosavan.

To the Americans the objective in Laos was not only to protect Thailand but also South Vietnam and ultimately to stop the spread of communism in Asia. To them Laos was part of the front line in the global struggle. The Americans, disinclined in the 1950’s to trust the neutralist and centrist Prince Souvanna Phouma, came in the 1960’s and especially after the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos which proclaimed the neutralization of the country, mainly to rely on him as their principal ally.

The Laotians, weak and divided among themselves, have been little more than pawns in a game in which the principal actors were these external forces. Except for brief periods when the Pathet Lao according to the
stipulations of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements were to be integrated into the larger body politic of the Kingdom of Laos, the country has been divided into mainly two opposing camps waging war at each other.

Whatever apprehensive and ambiguous feelings the Lao may have had in regard to their various neighbours, especially the Vietnamese and the Thai but also the Chinese, these have been to a degree circumvented by ideological divisions. The Pathet Lao through the common bond of communism may have come to trust and certainly to rely on the North Vietnamese and the Chinese more than they otherwise would. The centrist forces around Prince Souvanna Phouma and the rightists based on certain traditionally powerful families in their turn may also have come to trust and equally rely on the Thai and the Americans through their shared anti-communist sentiments. All factions, in order to survive, were compelled by the circumstances to depend on one or the other of the external forces, especially after 1964-1965 which brought about the dramatic escalation of the war in South Vietnam.

In the post-Vietnam war era, if we indeed can call it so, attempts at some kind of reconciliation of the various factions, communist and non-communist alike, have taken place through the formation of a coalition government in Vientiane.

MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

There are two factors in particular which stand out in the consideration of Malaysia's and Singapore's security policies. Each in

its own way has had a fundamental impact on the orientation of their external relations. The first factor is the unique experiences both countries have had with communism and the second is the racial composition of their populations.

For about 12 years Malaya (as she then was) and, to a lesser extent Singapore, were subjected to a communist insurgency during the period commonly referred to as the 'Emergency' stretching from 1948 until it was officially declared terminated in 1960. As far as Malaya is concerned this period straddled the last years of her colonial existence and the first years as an independent country. In Singapore the communist insurrection had repercussions which in a fashion similar to that in Malaya came greatly to colour her post-independence external policies.

The insurgency, fought with the decisive assistance of Britain, left the Malayan leaders with the conviction that for the sake of security Malaya would have to depend on the west, especially Britain. The concrete result of this conviction was the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty of 1957 which provided for the presence of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve force in Malaya made up of troops from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. At the same time Malaya refused to have diplomatic relations with any communist country, especially China, who would appear to have been the main supporter of the insurgents. Her anti-communist stand in the 1960's also gave itself expression in support of the United States involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Only at the end of the 1960's did her attitude towards official relations with the communist countries change when she established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1968 followed by similar relations with a number of other European communist regimes. After Prime Minister Tun Razak's visit to Peking in May 1974 Malaysia established diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic.

Since her withdrawal from Malaysia in 1965 Singapore has followed
a similar policy toward the communist camp, that is, strongly anti-communist but with diplomatic relations between herself and some communist countries, notably the Soviet Union, but not China. As in the case of Malaya (from September 1963 Malaysia) Singapore depended on the British for military security. This was the case during the emergency in the 1950's and it again was the case during the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia between 1963 and 1966. 55

It is clear that China occupies a prominent place in the planning and policy making of security both in Malaysia and Singapore. The fear of China is, as in so many other Southeast Asian countries, closely related to the CPR's actual and potential support for communist insurgency movements. In this connection it is worth remembering that the insurgents in Malaya during the emergency were mainly Chinese. Malaysia still has an insurgency problem on her borders with Thailand where the remnants of the emergency insurgents are active, and in Sarawak on the border with Indonesia. Now, as then, the insurgents are mainly Chinese and now, as then, they receive some material and more propaganda support from China.

However, what makes the relations between Malaysia and Singapore, on the one hand, and China, on the other, more delicate than similar relations between China and other Southeast Asian countries, is the fact that in no other countries in the region is the Chinese component of the population so big as in Malaysia and Singapore. In 1970 about 34 percent of the population in Malaysia were Chinese while the corresponding percentage in Singapore in 1972 was about 74, which for all practical purposes makes the latter a 'Chinese' state.

Perhaps more threatening to the leaders in Malaysia and Singapore than China-supported insurgency as such, is the possible attraction a

55. See Brackman, op. cit., on confrontation.
vigorous, united and self-respecting China may have for the Chinese population in the two countries. Although the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai repeatedly has urged the overseas Chinese to settle down and assimilate in their respective countries, suspicions linger on in Malaysia and Singapore as elsewhere in Southeast Asia as to the intentions of the CPR. In the case of Singapore there is an additional difficulty in the concern sometimes voiced about the possibility of Singapore herself becoming a center of attraction for the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.

Both in Malaysia and Singapore the memory of the confrontation with Indonesia between 1963 and 1966 continues to exist. This suspicion and anxiety is more prevalent in Singapore than in Malaysia. Common racial bonds exist between the Malay population and the Indonesians, which in addition to the conservative orientation of both governments, have tended to have a softening effect on the bitter memories of confrontation. While Malaysian-Indonesian relations improved fairly rapidly after the fall of Sukarno relations between Singapore and Indonesia were much slower in improving. Only in May 1973 did Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pay his first visit to Indonesia, a visit which may have helped remove some of the mutual suspicion between the two countries.

INDONESIA

Indonesia, the largest of the Southeast Asian countries both in terms of population and area, has perhaps less than any other country in Southeast Asia harboured any strong fears of China. This is partly due to her size and geographical location fairly far removed from China. Her Chinese minority is also relatively small, only about 2.6 percent of the

total population. In fact, from about 1960 until the autumn of 1965 China was Indonesia's principal ally in Asia. 57

Foreign policy received scant attention in Indonesia in the first couple of years after independence in late 1949. The first Indonesian governments practised a mild pro-western policy reflected in the establishment of diplomatic relations with all the major western powers and the neutralist powers before similar relations were inaugurated with the communist bloc countries. It was on the whole a policy of restrained involvement in international affairs based on a desire for independence from undue encroachments from without.

From about 1953, however, a more active foreign policy was pursued beginning with the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, which staged the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955. Sukarno himself now became increasingly influential in foreign policy making and throughout the late 1950's the policy shifted towards a more militant anti-colonial stand. 58


58. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 45.
Relations between Indonesia and China, initially rather cool, began slowly to improve especially after the signing of the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality agreement in 1955 pertaining to the legal status of the Chinese minority in Indonesia. This agreement signified the start of a decade of good relations between China and Indonesia which became especially cordial between 1960-61 and 1965. It came about through a combination of international and domestic Indonesian developments in the late 1950's eventually resulting in the so-called 'Djakarta-Peking axis'.

The international development stemmed from the Sino-Soviet dispute. The controversy over the Asian policies was related in particular to the issue '...of whether the CCP offered a unique model for revolution in the developing world and whether this model should be oriented primarily towards Asian governments or Asian communist parties. Although no clear-cut abandonment of the former for the latter occurred it became apparent in the late 1950's that China was devoting more attention to 'wars of national liberation' against incumbent governments than to its earlier strategy of cooperation with anti-imperialist bourgeois leaders'. 59 This and other differences led to the increasing isolation of China within the world communist movement.

In Indonesia Sukarno had substantially increased his influence to the extent that by 1960 he had made himself the outstanding political figure. Through pursuing the claim to West Irian, and also through the strengthening of the central government resulting from the suppression of the so-called 'outer islands revolt' of 1957-58, which also served to discredit the Muslim political party, Masjumi, and the parliamentary system,

Sukarno, with the support of the army, introduced the 1945 constitution by decree in mid 1959. Under the powers of this constitution he was able to introduce a number of changes which inter alia greatly reduced the role of the political parties, while at the same time amassing decision-making power in his own hands. Considerable power rested, however, also with the army which had assumed a new prominence both in the administration and the policy making institutions of government after the imposition of martial law.

In order to maintain his own position at the apex of the political structure Sukarno increasingly used the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) as the force with which to counter the pretensions of the army. The party claimed the largest membership of any Indonesian political party and was at the same time the largest communist party outside the communist bloc. It had a well developed grass-roots organizational structure. The situation was thus one in which a triangular balance of power existed between the army, the PKI and Sukarno within which Sukarno would sometimes ally himself with one and then the other, while mutual hostility between the army and the PKI did never permit their alliance against himself. 60

As Sukarno's influence increased so did the international influence of Indonesia. The revival of revolutionary nationalism - very much due to Sukarno himself - had expressed itself in the campaign against the Dutch to wrest West Irian from their control. This had been a major concern of foreign policy in Indonesia ever since independence and her view of many other countries came to rest on these countries' attitude to

60. Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 52-54.
the West Irian question. Indeed, her foreign policy as such, at least in the period when Sukarno reigned supreme, was much influenced by her anti-colonial confrontation with the Dutch. Moreover, it is probably fair to say that Indonesia's foreign policy from about 1960-61 was Sukarno's foreign policy.

Increasingly anti-colonialism and related sentiments came to occupy a prominent place in Sukarno's thinking. At the Belgrade non-aligned conference in 1961, instead of attempting the traditional neutralist view of the world as divided into three main blocs with the non-aligned serving as a mediator between the two cold war blocs, he adopted a view similar to the Marxist 'two warring camps' thesis, a view which largely coincided with that of Peking, and which in fact came to form the basis of Sino-Indonesian friendship, at this time already well under way. The new formula was based on a different distribution of world power; now was the era of the clash between the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO).

To China, more and more isolated, Indonesia emerged as an attractive alternative ally. The anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist policies of Sukarno were very much in line with China's own ideas and policies. China had strongly supported Indonesia's struggle for West Irian. But what must have made Indonesia even more attractive and important as an ally was the fact that China in Indonesia could openly work through and support the only legally existing communist party in

61. For a review of this problem, see Reinhardt, *ibid.*, pp. 67-74 and Brackman, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-100.
Southeast Asia outside the communist world without thereby inviting the disapproval or wrath of the government.

In Southeast Asia, China and Indonesia came to share certain objectives including the removal of British and United States influence in the region, the fragmentation of Malaysia, the elimination of forces in Indonesia dangerous to the communists and the Sukarnoists, and the division of Southeast Asia into spheres of influence centered around Peking, Hanoi and Djakarta. 64 The Sino-Indonesian axis became something of a dogma and Chinese verbal support for Indonesia was followed up so much so that in the three years leading up to the October 1965 coup Indonesia had become China's largest aid recipient. 65

After the successful completion of the campaign to gain control over West Irian in 1962 Indonesia began to turn her attention to the Malaysia proposal. In May 1961 the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had dropped the first hint about the desirability of a merger between the North Borneo territories - Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei - and Malaya and Singapore. At first received with cautious approval in Indonesia the mood in Djakarta was soon to change. In August 1961 came the first attack on the Malaysia proposal in the Indonesian press. 66 When the Brunei revolt occurred in December 1962 Sukarno and the PKI declared their support for the Brunei people's 'struggle for independence'. The revolt crushed after only four days by British troops brought in from Singapore proved to Sukarno that the

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64. Sutter, op. cit., pp. 531-532.
65. Simon, op. cit., p. 27.
66. Sutter, op. cit., p. 525.
Malaysia proposal was unstable because of lack of support from the people of Borneo. Furthermore, to Sukarno the Malaysia proposal was another attempt of the 'neo-colonialists' and the 'old established forces' to maintain and expand their influence. In this view he was strongly supported by the PKI as well as the army, although for different reasons. For the military also shared Sukarno's vision of Indonesia exercising hegemony over Malay archipelago - something less likely to happen should Malaysia be established. 67

In February 1963 Sukarno formally declared Indonesia's opposition to the Malaysia scheme and in April the same year the military phase of 'Confrontation' began with a guerilla raid on a border village in Sarawak. For the next three years or so raids and attacks followed both in Borneo and Malaya carried out by Indonesian units. Eventually Confrontation was officially ended in August 1966 when an agreement was signed between Indonesia and Malaysia. However, by that time Sukarno was a spent political force, the PKI had been virtually eliminated, and the army was in full control of the situation in Indonesia.

The Gestapu affair, so called, signalled the eclipse of Sukarno and the demise of the PKI from the political scene in Indonesia. It also signalled the end of the Djakarta-Peking axis proclaimed by Sukarno to be in existence only a couple of months before. 68 In contrast to the axis was substituted a strong anti-China policy on the part of the new leaders in Indonesia. 69

68. Sutter, op.cit., pp. 533-534.
Although the Philippines has considered and still does consider communism the greatest threat she has on the whole been relatively less sensitive to the actions and policies of China than her SEATO partner Thailand. In the 1950's China was considered just one among many communist powers. Aggressive though she was, China, in the Filipino view, was nevertheless weak and without the means to carry out direct aggression against the Philippines. Moreover, the Philippines was largely insulated from China by the South China Sea.

With the passage of time this Filipino view of China underwent a change. Partly due to the split in the communist camp between the Soviets and the Chinese the latter has gradually come to be considered independent and sufficiently strong to stand her own among the big powers. This change in the image of China has been brought about by the expansion in China's power and influence. The vague references of the 1950's to international communism have in the 1960's tended to become more directly identified with Chinese communism. Chinese nationalism and communism combined became the primary external threat.

Still, protected by the presence of the United States Seventh Fleet and large American bases in the Philippines the Filipinos did not feel too alarmed. Growing out of the colonial relationship with the United States and the experiences of World War II the security guarantees extended to the Philippines by the Americans have no parallel elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Through a number of agreements the United States committed herself firmly to the defence of the Philippines. In 1947 the Military Assistance Agreement and the Military Bases Agreement were concluded to be followed in 1951 by the Mutual Defence Treaty. Finally, in 1954 the set of guarantees was rounded off with Filipino membership in SEATO. All these agreements have amounted to a pledge on the part of the United States to come to the defence of the Philippines if she is attacked by external forces and also to contribute to her defence against internal subversion. This commitment has been reaffirmed by consecutive American administrations.

Developments within the Philippines throughout the 1960's in particular have tended to loosen some of the strong bonds between the Philippines and the United States. The pervasive American presence has led many people to question the reality of Filipino independence. Situated in Asia but with a western outlook not found elsewhere in the region she has been torn between her natural inclination to side with the western world and her desire to participate more actively in the part of the world she belonged to geographically and racially. 71 The growing nationalistic feelings

which have given themselves expression in a desire to be less dependent on
the United States in particular have led to demands for a review of the
entire relationship \(^{72}\), and for a new role for the Philippines in world
affairs in general and in Asian and Southeast Asian affairs in particular.\(^{73}\)
As elsewhere in Southeast Asia the partial detente between China and the
United States has precipitated this search.\(^{74}\)

**SOURCES OF THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

The threats thought to emanate from various extra-regional powers
have been the most constant and pervasive feature of the international rela-
tions of Southeast Asia over the last decade or so. To the governments of
most countries in the region China has been and would still seem to be the
main extra-regional threat. To North Vietnam this dubious role has both in
the actual and potential sense been occupied by the United States through-
out the entire period. However, Sukarno also professed to feeling threatened
by the United States as well as by Britain in their roles as the main imper-
ialist and neo-colonialist powers. In the post-Sukarno era these two
countries have been replaced by China who to the present Indonesian leader-
ship appears a much more potent threat than any other power in an otherwise
basically hostile international environment.\(^{75}\)

For the most part conspicuously absent as an extra-regional threat
is the Soviet Union. She has on the whole not been considered a direct
threat except as a member - admittedly the leading one - of the inter-
national communist movement. Since the split in this movement came into the

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73. See, for example, the article by the former Philippine Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Salvado Lopez, "The Philippines in Search of a

Filipino overtures towards China.

75. See Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia".
open in the late 1950's the attention in Southeast Asia has come to focus on China and to a lesser extent North Vietnam as the repository of a specific communist threat. The relative absence of the Soviet Union from this picture reflects the rather scant attention she has shown the countries in the region except North Vietnam to whom the Soviets hardly seemed a threat. 76

Japan is also largely absent from this picture. There are, however, strong signs of growing apprehension, most notably in Indonesia and Thailand, related to the increasing Japanese economic penetration of the region which in the view of many may lead to or has already led to undue dependence on Japan economically. This is a question which is dealt with in more general terms in chapter 7. However, as a security threat Japan does not as yet figure prominently. 77

The external regional threats have been numerous. Possibly with the sole exceptions of the Philippines and Burma all countries in the region have at one time or other perceived of some degree of threat from one or more of their neighbours. The outstanding case in this context is Cambodia whose fears of the Vietnamese and the Thai have tended to overshadow her apprehensions of China both qua big power and communist power. Indeed a main reason for seeking China's friendship was precisely the value Sihanouk put on China as a deterrent against possible and actual encroachments of Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese and the Thai.

Another significant regional source of threat has been Indonesia under Sukarno. Confrontation in particular established the perception in


the minds of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans that Indonesia was an expansionary power, a belief it has taken many years to dissipate especially as far as Singapore is concerned. Some doubts about Indonesia's ultimate motives still linger on, a question on which some further considerations will be made in chapter 7.

Threats of the domestic or internal variety have been and are of many kinds. In Burma ethnic rebellions with secessionist overtones have been in progress at various levels of intensity ever since independence. Indonesia has experienced regional rebellions also with secessionist overtones and in the southern Philippines an ethnic-religious rebellion is at present going on of which segments are advocating separate statehood for the Moslem south. 78

Serious though these kinds of rebellions are they are nevertheless considered on the whole less threatening or menacing than the rebellions directed, led and manned by communists. The reasons are many and some of them were discussed in the last chapter. Suffice it here to mention two. Ethnic rebellions do not as a rule aim specifically at the overthrow of government and society as such. As a rule communist rebellions do, and this fact alone makes them intrinsically more dangerous to the established elites and governments. Another reason is that communist rebellions, by virtue of belonging to a movement with ideological connotations of a revolutionary and international kind, are much more prone to receive external assistance. In terms of Southeast Asia this assistance has mainly come from China and North Vietnam although in the case of Laos and South Vietnam also from the Soviet Union. Elsewhere 79 we argued the considerable, if not

78. See chapter 4 above.

79. Ibid.
decisive, importance of external support for the success of internal rebellions, apart from exceptional circumstances. It is chiefly communist insurgencies that are in a position to count on such assistance in their struggle. This does not mean that in each and every case of a communist insurgency these conditions have been present. As the review of the situation in the various countries have made clear, China has for various reasons been restrained in her support of insurgencies materially and even verbally. The only exception is the case of South Vietnam and possibly Laos. In some cases like the Philippines Chinese material support would seem to have been virtually non-existent. While external support has been on a scale sufficient enough in some cases to keep a low level communist insurgency going, it is rather the thought of the consequences was China in the future to increase her support that tends to instill a measure of trepidation in the minds of the leaders of many Southeast Asian countries.

Perhaps more than that of any other state in Southeast Asia, Burma's foreign policy would seem to reflect an attitude towards China based largely on a feeling of threat and impending danger resulting in a carefully formulated policy designed to avoid acts and relations which could be interpreted as provocative. The following remarks amply illustrate the feelings of the Burmese.

Small nations always mistrust bigger ones, especially those close by. For years past, every Burman mistrusted China, whether under Mao or Chiang. They also mistrust India; for that matter they also mistrust Soviet Russia and even America. We do not consider China menace, but we accept a possibility of China one day invading us. We are entering into close relations with India, Pakistan, Indonesia and we are trying to find a formula for peaceful co-existence in this part of the world. We don't want to do anything that will provoke China, but if she does invade, I am confident that the national spirit of our people will stand firm against her...
Being a small nation, we must find ways and means of avoiding embroilment in power blocs.  

The Burmese desire to placate the Chinese has given itself many expressions. As had been the case in regard to the Kuomintang when it dominated the mainland, Burma set out at the earliest opportunity to establish good relations with the new rulers in Peking by being the first non-communist country to recognize the recently established Chinese People's Republic. To the Burmese the essential thing was the quality of relations with whoever were the rulers of China. Their identity or ideology was, if not irrelevant, at least a secondary consideration.

In 1960 she signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression' with China which according to the letter of the treaty pledges both parties to refrain from participating in aggressive alliances against each other but which by the Burmese has been interpreted as effectively stopping Burma from participation in any kind of military alliance.

The rift of 1967, caused predominantly by factors over which the Burmese had little if any influence, is a further case in point. It provided her with an excuse to reorientate her foreign policy away from China, something which under the circumstances would not have been unreasonable. The Burmese leaders, however, counselled caution and avoidance of provocative acts in the face of a virulent anti-Burmese press campaign from China. Although a considerable element of intimidation was present, the 'shadow of China' proved the more pervasive. Thus with an obvious eye to the future Ne Win in a speech in November 1969 said,

I wish to stress that we want friendly relations with our neighbours... With regard to China, we would like to restore the cordial and friendly relations that

80. Quoted in Trager, Burma, pp. 231-232.
previously existed. This will require efforts by both sides. For our part, we only wish to heal the wound of the 1967 incidents. Despite the clashes at the borders and the present situation, we shall do whatever we can on our part to restore the old friendship and keep the situation from getting worse. We regard the 1967 incident as an unfortunate one. We would like to heal its wounds and forget the whole ugly incident.  

The shadow of China has, however, had a more telling and in this context more significant effect on Burma's foreign policy. The perceived threat from China has on the one hand served as the yardstick by which relations between the two countries have been conducted. But this threat has on the other hand also served as a basis for Burma's particular brand of neutralism and as such set the limits to what the Burmese leaders have felt was permissible in regard to contacts and relations with other, third parties. This is, for example, evident in the case of her relations with the United States. Relations with the Americans have been correct but cool. In mid 1971 the aid program to Burma virtually ceased on Burmese initiative, and she turned down further offers of aid on very favourable terms.  

In our context it is, however, more important to note that China's presence also has set limits to Burma's participation in Southeast Asian affairs. Although she maintains diplomatic relations with all the countries in the region except the two Vietnams, and is in general on good terms with the various countries, she has refused to participate in any efforts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia despite repeated invitations.  

In late 1959 the Tunku issued an invitation to seven countries in Southeast Asia to meet to discuss the formation of a region-wide organ-

ization for economic cooperation. \footnote{83} Burma, however, declined as she would on all later occasions. \footnote{84} Thus in May 1967 when Adam Malik visited Rangoon he again suggested Burmese participation in what was to become ASEAN but was met with a refusal on the part of the Burmese. \footnote{85} When Ne Win visited Malaysia in April 1968 the subject was apparently again discussed and again rejected by the Burmese leader. \footnote{86} The same happened in March-April 1972 during a visit of the Burmese foreign minister to Malaysia and Indonesia. \footnote{87}

On all these occasions the Burmese position has been based on essentially two considerations; firstly, what she thinks is acceptable to China and, secondly, the character of the proposed or existing regional organization. Although Ne Win is reported to have wished aloud that he had '...an atomic scissors so that I could cut this country off from Asia and have it towed out to the sea away from those...up north', \footnote{88} he has never been willing to take the risk of invoking the wrath of China by joining any of these organizations. At the official level the Burmese would maintain that 'true cooperation' cannot be achieved as long as any of the participants are allied to or influenced by great powers \footnote{89}, as is the case in regard to most members of ASEAN. At the unofficial level, however, some Burmese would

explain that 'Burma has no friends and wants none. Friends have enemies... and their friend's enemies might take offence at Burma because of her friendship'.

Similar attitudes on the part of Sihanouk provided a basis for Cambodia's foreign policy. He, as well, had considerable respect for China's power and presence which caused him to orientate his foreign policy in a direction he thought would win favour with her. Contributing, too, was of course Sihanouk's apparent belief in China's ability to influence and restrain the communists in Indo-China in general and the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in particular, and China's value as a deterrent against the South Vietnamese and the Thai. The United States could have served the same purpose as China in Sihanouk's scheme of things but she had disqualified herself by her close alliance and support for Cambodia's two arch enemies, South Vietnam and Thailand. Besides, Sihanouk took a rather gloomy view of the sincerity of the United States' commitments in Southeast Asia which he thought would not last long in the face of the near-invincible communist strength. Shortly before he was removed from power in 1970, however, he came as far as publicly to express the hope of a continued American presence in Southeast Asia to serve as a shield behind which the peoples and the governments of Southeast Asia would prepare themselves to face the onslaught of the communist forces.

Sihanouk was nevertheless adamant in his opposition to Cambodian participation in regional cooperation lest it compromised his policies in the eyes of China. The Tunku's invitation of 1959 to participate in the planned economic organization was turned down ostensibly because of the 'political'

90. Ibid., 30 August 1967.
character of such a grouping. During the prelude to the formation of ASEAN in 1967 the question of Cambodian membership in the organization was raised. Attempts by Malik and others to have Cambodia included were however met with refusal by Sihanouk. On a number of subsequent occasions Cambodian membership was sought but the answer was always the same.

Other countries in Southeast Asia with an equal awareness of China's power and presence and with deep-rooted apprehensions about her intentions reacted, however, differently. Not imbued with the determinism, even fatalism, implied in Sihanouk's belief in the inevitable victory of communism and with their thinking fashioned and informed by Thailand's own pragmatic ability to survive in the face of adverse conditions, her leaders decided that a viable foreign policy alternative existed in a close relationship with the western powers, especially the United States. To countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines the choice was more or less self-evident. The earliest Philippine-American treaties, which had in mind a possible future threat from Japan as much as anything else, soon came to be considered a shield against the communist threat, especially after the experiences with the so-called 'Huk' rebellion in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Malaysia and Singapore, to whom communist insurgency was a part of the national experience, started their existence as independent countries allied to the west, notably Britain. Indonesia's foreign policy, as it evolved after the October 1965 coup, represented a sharp break with the policies of the Sukarno era. China replaced the United States and Britain as the main threat while relations with Malaysia and Singapore, the former

94. See, for instance, Straits Times, 22 March 1968 and Bangkok World, 6 July 1969.
enemies, were re-established. 95

It is among this latter group of states - Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines - that the various attempts at functionally inclusive regional cooperation have originated.

It was argued in chapter 2 that the formation of ASA was undoubtedly motivated by a genuine desire to promote economic and cultural cooperation. But some more or less well defined and articulated perceptions of threat were nevertheless important as a precipitating agent in the establishment of the association. To the Tunku, with whom the idea of ASA originated, one way of stopping the dissemination of communism in Southeast Asia was to attack the conditions on which it fed, namely social deprivation and poverty. To be able to do so the countries of Southeast Asia had to pool their resources through cooperative arrangements. 96 Similar anti-communist sentiments were part of the motivations of the Filipinos and the Thai. 97

When ASEAN was formed in August 1967 the avowed purpose was economic, social and cultural cooperation. 98 The only reference to security questions was a paragraph in the ASEAN Declaration which stated that '...all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned...'. 99 This brief reference, however,

95. See Weinstein, op. cit.
96. Ideas such as these were frequently expressed by the Tunku. See chapter 2 as well as Manila Bulletin, 5 January 1959, Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 January 1959, Straits Times, 10 February 1961. See also Gordon, op. cit., p. 166.
99. Ibid., p. 15.
only obscured the importance of security considerations in the formation of the organization, a point partially borne out by the fact that at the meeting in Bangkok it was the topic which led to the most time-consuming and protracted discussions.

The close association between the objectives of ASEAN and the imperatives of security was also reflected in the closing speeches at the Bangkok meeting. Narcisco Ramos of the Philippines expressed it in this fashion.

The Declaration establishing ASEAN poses more than just another challenge to make this organization a living, dynamic vehicle for bringing about material progress within our region. It also implies an urgent responsibility to harness all our natural resources, our acquired technical skills, our political experience, our diplomatic acumen to the goals we are determined to achieve. For now the time has come for a truly concerted struggle against the forces which are arrayed against our very survival in these uncertain and critical times. 100

Adam Malik of Indonesia was no less explicit.

Indonesia's thinking regarding the regional cooperation is well known. It is not necessary to elaborate, but I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to recall that Indonesia always wants to see Southeast Asia develop into a region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against negative influence from outside the region. 101

Similar sentiments were also part of Tun Razak's attitude.

Unless...we are all conscious of our responsibility to

101. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
shape our common destiny and to prevent external intervention and interference, our region will continue to be fraught with danger and tension...The vacuum left by the retreat of colonial rule must be filled by the growth and consideration of indigenous powers - otherwise our future, individually and jointly, will remain dangerously threatened...The key to peace and stability of our respective countries and of our region and the success of our resistance to external forces of intervention and interference lie in our ability to surmount the backwardness of our people and to promote their welfare and their well-being. 102

After having declared that ASEAN was not directed against anything or anybody, Rajaratnam of Singapore went on to say,

If there are people who misunderstand the proposed regional grouping, or manifest hostility towards it, let us explain that it can only be because as in Europe and in many parts of the world, outside powers have vested interests in the balkanization of this region. We ourselves have learnt the lessons and have decided that small nations are not going to be balkanized so that they can be manipulated, set against one another, kept perpetually weak, divided and ineffective by outside forces. 103

Finally, Thanat Khoman of Thailand said,

[...millions of men and women in our part of the world]... are, and want to remain forever, free men and women, unchained by the shackles of bondage. In seeking to attain these objectives they must free themselves from the material impediments of ignorance, disease and hunger which reduce their possibility to enjoy this earthly life. At the same time they must prevent

102. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
103. Ibid., p. 37.
attempts to deprive them of the right to lead a free and sovereign national existence. Alone such a two-pronged task may prove to be too weighty. By joining together and cooperating with those who share the same aspirations, it may become lighter and easier to implement. 104

A striking characteristic of these speeches is the tendency of threats to their national existence to occupy the entire content of remarks about and references to the extra-regional environment. It is not possible to bring out this feature without reproducing the full text of the speeches. The quotations above are nonetheless indicative of the extent to which this is the case as well as demonstrations of the degree to which perceptions of threat from the extra-regional environment served as strong underlying motives in the formation of ASEAN.

The link between participation in regional cooperation and perceptions of threats to the security of the member states did not cease once the meeting in Bangkok was over. To Malik, for example, the way to stop the advance of communism continued to lie in strengthening the peoples of Southeast Asia politically and economically. By cooperating in the economic field, in particular, the ASEAN countries would be less vulnerable to subversion through the improvement in living conditions. 105 At the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in the Cameron Highlands in Malaysia in December 1969, Tun Razak reiterated what has been a consistent theme of ASEAN leaders.

We in Malaysia have always believed strongly in regional cooperation and we see no other choice for newly developed

104. Ibid., p. 39.
countries of Southeast Asia but to shape our own destiny together and to prevent external intervention and interference. Most of us have been dominated by colonial powers either directly or indirectly and even today we are not entirely free from the struggle for domination by outside forces. Therefore, unless we are conscious of our responsibilities and ready to take decisive and collective actions to prevent the growth of inter-regional conflicts, our nations will continue to be manipulated against one another.

On the same occasion Thanat Khoman expressed it even more directly when he said, "The ultimate goal of ASEAN - namely a Southeast Asian Community, blessed with peace, freedom, happiness and balanced prosperity - is therefore unavoidably linked with our success in ensuring our stability and security".

Such thoughts as these have been part and parcel of the thinking of the leaders of the ASEAN countries, and they are similar, even to the extent of being nearly identical, to the ideas of the Tunku which prompted him to propose the formation of what became ASA in 1961.

Sometimes ASEAN is also seen as possibly playing a more direct role in the security of the member states. Thus president Marcos of the Philippines in January 1968 proposed a collective security arrangement under ASEAN. Ideas of converting ASEAN into a security organization of sorts have been aired on other occasions as well. In 1970 the Deputy Commander of the Indonesian army, General Panggabean, declared that Indonesia would extend help to her neighbours if they were attacked, a suggestion which was quickly denied as a misrepresentation by Adam Malik who made light of it.

by himself suggesting Indonesian assistance in the form of a prayer and a thought. 110 Other leaders had also rejected the notion of an ASEAN security arrangement as impractical. 111 But the idea is not ruled out altogether as far as the future is concerned. Only a few days after the formation of ASEAN Tun Razak said, 'A mutual defence alliance is always possible once we have become very close with a common interest and destiny'. 112 Malik expressed similar thoughts in early 1968. 'Our posture is low. When we succeed in some economic ventures...we will think of other things like political cooperation and defence'. 113 Some of the member states have, however, concluded bilateral security arrangements. These are directed at communist insurrection in the border areas between Thailand and Malaysia, and between the latter and Indonesia in Borneo. 114 Although the conversion of ASEAN into a multilateral security arrangement would seem to be ruled out for the present, to many leaders - the Indonesians in particular - the organization is often seen as a catalyst which through positive cooperative experiences may lead to closer defence and security cooperation and coordination short of military alliances. 115

THREATS, SECURITY AND PROCESSES OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

In the first part of this chapter a notion of threat different from the conventional one was suggested as more suitable when it comes to

110. Ibid., 8 December 1970.
111. See, for example, the remarks by Thanat Khoman reported in Bangkok World, 21 March 1968.
112. Straits Times, 12 August 1967.
114. See Pace et.al., Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Two First Years of ASEAN. 1967-1969, p. 59.
describing many situations and 'threat environments' in Southeast Asia. It was proposed that situations exist in which the mere presence of superior power may lead to policies or changes in policies on the part of the inferior power beneficial to the superior power without the latter having issued any explicit threat in the conventional sense. But on the basis of the examination above of aspects of the foreign policies of some countries in Southeast Asia, it would appear that the existence of such superior power may indeed have the opposite effect, that is, the weaker power may through its policies remove itself further away from the superior power than otherwise would have been the case.

The most significant result of the perception of an extra-regional threat has been to split the non-communist part of Southeast Asia into essentially two camps. As we have seen in the case of Burma, China's close presence led her to eschew any participation in cooperative processes which she either knew to be or thought to be unacceptable to China. Burma's policies in this regard may be seen as a withdrawal from regional processes in the hope of avoiding entanglements risky to her security. In fact withdrawal has served as a method of buying more security. Similar considerations can be made in relation to the case of Cambodia under Sihanouk. Here, however, the threat from outside the region was overshadowed by threats from within, particularly from the two Vietnams and Thailand. Sihanouk used withdrawal to buy deterrence from China to be used against Cambodia's regional enemies.

Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines initially, and Singapore and Indonesia later, used increased participation in the region - the opposite of withdrawal - as a means of enhancing their security. Thus as far as this group of countries is concerned, the threat from outside the region has been a significant catalyst in getting cooperative processes started.
When one asks why these two groups of states reacted so differently to what all of them considered the main extra-regional threat, one has to look to historical circumstances for part of the answer.

C.P. FitzGerald has informed us that 'Chinese influence, Chinese culture and Chinese power have always moved southward since the first age of which we have reliable historical evidence'. \(^{116}\) The countries most affected by this southward movement were in order of magnitude firstly, Vietnam, north and south, who, as far as the north was concerned, at times was under direct Chinese control; secondly, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, who in varying degrees came under the influence of and acknowledged Chinese power; and thirdly, the southern parts of Southeast Asia, that is, present day Malaysia and Indonesia who experienced the influence of Chinese culture and occasionally her political power too. \(^{117}\) Thus, the closer to China, the more awe and respect for Chinese power and influence.

It is in relation to these historical circumstances that the notion of threat introduced before may be of relevance. The closer to China, the more likely the simultaneous occurrence of the two types of belief in the latent will of China to harm, that is, the simultaneous occurrence of the 'socio-biologically' inherent belief in the will of the strong power, in this case China, and the belief based on memories of occasionally unfortunate historical experiences. In the present these perceptions or beliefs have been reinforced by the ideological nature of the regime in Peking, as well as the strength and apparent unity this regime has displayed in the period after the ascent to power by the communists, despite the

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turbmoil of the cultural revolution. It has also been reinforced by what the non-communist Southeast Asian countries have seen as the propensity of China to support 'people's war' within the region. In this view, therefore, it is no mere accident that the attempts at regional cooperation with its implied anti-China bias have on the whole originated with the states furthest removed from China. In other words, the strongest resistance to Chinese power and influence has occurred at the periphery of her potential 'sphere of influence', where historical experiences and geographical proximity have had less opportunity to produce the same despondancy and deference to her power and strength as in those countries situated more or less on her borders.

In this context Thailand's position and attitude deserve separate comment. Although not being far removed geographically from China as well as historically having been a nominal tributary, her relations with imperial China, though of long standing, were nevertheless slight. 118 This, taken together with the fact that Thailand alone among the countries in Southeast Asia was never colonized, have instilled in the Thai a confidence in their own ability to weather the international climate which has been conducive to the inclusion of foreign policy options other than deference and accommodation to China.

There is also another aspect to the 'shadow of China'. The conspicuous presence of Chinese minorities, whose commercial and entrepreneurial abilities have been the subject of envy and suspicion on the part of the indigenous populations, has also had a considerable impact in that these minorities have often been seen as the extended arm of China herself through which she has worked to achieve her aims. 119


119. Ibid., pp. 81-94. See also Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp. 397-416.
A state situated within, but on or near the periphery of a big power's potential or actual sphere of influence, is, of course, that much nearer the potential or actual sphere of influence of another big power. This fact brings the discussion to one more factor which has significantly influenced the reactions to China and the propensity to participate in regional cooperation. A prominent feature of the international relations of Southeast Asia in the period under discussion has been the competition resulting from the opposing views of China and the United States as to the proper limits of their respective sphere of influence. For most of the period after World War II the United States has had the strength and will to define her national interest in such a way as to permit the countries of Southeast Asia to 'shelter under her umbrella'. Again it is noticeable that the countries which have tacitly or openly availed themselves of this opportunity by embarking on regional cooperation with anti-China basis, are all more or less to be found on the rim of the potential Chinese sphere of influence.

When seen in these terms, regional cooperative processes are essentially attempts on the part of the countries involved to avoid being included in the sphere of interest of China. This should not be construed to mean that these states have been willing to suffer the inclusion into the sphere of influence of the United States or any other big power, for that matter. But it does mean that they on the whole have seen the most imminent danger in this respect to emanate from China. As will be seen in chapter 7, apart from the perceptions of a common enemy dealt with here, there is a set of more or less commonly held perceptions of the international environment in general, which also has profoundly influenced, not only the initiation, but also the course of regional cooperative and integrative processes. Economically strong states, such as the United States and Japan, form very much a part of this general international environment.
Besides the perceptions of a 'lingering threat' from China dealt with above, there also exist perceptions of a more concrete type of threat. Few of Southeast Asia's political leaders would appear to believe that China is ready, even given the opportunity, to launch a direct campaign of conquest and invasion, at least not in the short term. There is, however, a more immediate aspect of the fear of China which has been mentioned on several occasions already, and which is all the more significant as far as these leaders are concerned. This is the actual and potential internal threat from communist insurgency movements which are seen by these leaders as part of the threat from China herself. In other words, the internal and extra-regional threats blend in such a way that the former is seen as the extension of or the long arm of the latter. Not only do the various countries face the same enemy from without the region, but they also have the same internal enemy. Moreover, the common internal enemy is seen as feeding and depending for its success on a cluster of social conditions that are essentially the same, or at least, very similar in the various countries, namely poverty and social deprivation. From this point of view regional cooperation is seen as an instrument which will enable the countries involved to more effectively strike at the roots of these conditions and therefore at the very base of the most crucial support of their shared internal enemy.

These remarks on the role of the 'common enemy' in the initiation of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia call for some observations of a more general nature. Karl Deutsch has argued in relation to foreign military threats that their effects were never very strong and not always positive. Even in those cases when they were positive, the effects were not lasting once the threat had disappeared. 120 As well as arguing the ability of foreign

120. Deutsch et.al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 44-46.
threats to influence cooperative practices and political unions, other writers have, however, also argued the durable and lasting effect of such threats. 121

The failure to arrive at more firm conclusions about the role of external threats lies in some degree in a failure to specify the conditions under which they have or have not a positive influence. It also lies in a tendency to see foreign threats in isolation, without reference to the international environment in general, as well as in a failure to distinguish between various types of threat. Deutsch, for example, argues that no 'unusual foreign military threat played any important role in the adoption of the Swiss federal constitution in 1848'. 122 If, by this remark, Deutsch meant an external enemy poised for attack or threatening attack, he may indeed be correct. But such an interpretation overlooks the accumulated effect on the eventual formation of the Swiss federation of the existence over several centuries of strong perceptions among the Swiss of a general threat emanating from the European states system. These perceptions among the Swiss of a general external threat are similar to the perceptions


122. Deutsch et.al., op. cit., pp. 44-45.
existing in Southeast Asia in relation to China. In Southeast Asia, however, the nature of these perceptions has, as well, been strongly influenced by the ancient superior-inferior relationship formalized in the tributary system of China to which most of Southeast Asia for long periods belonged. Moreover, in Southeast Asia the effects of a general or 'lingering threat' from China were circumscribed by the imposition of colonial control over most of the region, and the more or less simultaneous decline of the power of imperial China from the early nineteenth century. The return of China in recent decades to the status of a strong extra-regional and big power, coupled with the emergence within China of a regime which is seen as ideologically aggressive, have reawakened in a strengthened form the ancient respect and fear of her strength and power.

A political and military situation so full of complexities as that which has prevailed in Southeast Asia during the 1960's and early 1970's, does not easily lend itself to analysis. If, however, the two Vietnams and Laos are excluded, and 1970 is taken as the cut-off point, that is, when Sihanouk was ousted and Cambodia became directly embroiled in the conflict in Indo-china, one might be able to isolate certain conditions or factors which would appear to have been important in determining the extent and the nature of the membership in the regional cooperation dealt with here.

As mentioned above, the condition to be explained is the different reactions, as judged by the propensity to participate in regional cooperative processes, to the perception of a common extra-regional threat with the potential capacity to overthrow the incumbent regimes by chiefly military means.

In Southeast Asia one can, firstly, isolate the existence of an extra-regional power who, in relation to the regional powers, possesses overwhelming strength not readily, if at all, countered by collective military efforts on the part of the regional powers. As suggested above, this
may be referred to as the 'lingering threat' thought to emanate from the closely situated extra-regional state qua big power.

Although to an unequal degree, the regional powers have historically stood in a relationship of inferiority to the extra-regional power, the unequal strength of dominance exerted by the latter had been largely a function of geographical distance. In other words, the further removed from the dominant power, the more room for self-assertion and the less objects of attempts at direct control. The significance of this factor lies in the historical memories it has produced.

Geographical distance, historically so important in creating a feeling of deference, has not been completely dissipated in the present, despite developments in technology and communications. This fact has allowed for the influence of other big powers to make itself felt. In other words, the geographically peripheral states have been able to take advantage, tacitly or openly, of the 'protection' provided by other big powers.

The ideological factor should not be forgotten. By professing adherence to an ideology which is seen by most regional powers to imply a relationship of undue dependence, if not formalized subservience, to the extra-regional power, communist China is seen to stand in potentially much the same relationship to the regional powers as did imperial China. In this view, the status of a 'satellite' is not much different from being a tributary state. To be a satellite or a tributary is something which goes against the main spirit of the present age with its emphasis on independence and national self-assertion.

Lastly, the existence of 'direct aggression' in the form of support and encouragement of internal subversion and military insurrection on the part of the main extra-regional power, has prompted the states less vulnerable - the peripheral states - to combine in an effort to counter this
threat to their national existence.
Cooperation and integration may be conceived as developing along a continuum in stages of increasing complexity. In the early stages these processes are but a part or extension of such relations which exist between sovereign states at peace with each other and which derive from a realization of mutual dependence and a need for at least a modicum of intercourse. As a part of normal interstate relations they take place within and are subject to the modes and conduct of conventional diplomacy as practised by the states concerned.

In the advanced stages, which begin with the first effective transfer of functions from the state governments to the regional decision-making bodies, these processes, by virtue of this first and consecutive transfers, cease to be a part of normal inter-state relations, and they are consequently no longer a subject of conventional diplomacy. Depending on the degree of transfer of functions and powers, the success or failure of these processes depend now on the bureaucratic structures and decisions at the regional level in much the same way similar processes at the domestic level depend on domestic institutions.

Cooperation and integration processes in Southeast Asia have as yet plainly not effected any transfer to regional bodies of functions and powers which previously rested exclusively with the individual states. In Southeast Asia these processes must therefore still be considered to be in their initial stages and subject to the modes and conduct of diplomacy as practised by the countries of the region.

When in this chapter consideration will be given to the
relationship between the conduct of diplomacy and processes of cooperation and integration in Southeast Asia, there are essentially two reasons. Firstly, at least in the initial stages the progression of cooperative and integrative efforts depend ultimately on conscious policies and decisions on the part of governments. This is so even if all possible, favourable preconditions are present and combine in such a way that the relevant elites and populations conceive of few or no other alternatives. In the final analysis the signal to go ahead is but a transformation of preconditions into a conscious decision of policy. The chief instrument of implementation of the policy is, as already alluded to, diplomacy. The second reason flows from the first. Since these processes are in their infancy as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, and very much a preserve of diplomatic intercourse, this is the stage at which one would expect diplomacy to exert maximum influence on the direction in which they are going.

Although it is implicit in what has been said already, there may nonetheless be a need to make the meaning of the word 'diplomacy' more explicit. Harold Nicolson identified five different usages of the word of which diplomacy as being synonymous with foreign policy is perhaps the most frequently encountered. As in the case of Nicolson, the definition of the Oxford English Dictionary will be used here. According to this diplomacy is '[the] management of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted

and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business and the art of the diplomatist'.

The concern will mainly be with what may be termed the 'style' and the 'technique' of diplomacy, and only to the extent it is necessary for the discussion of these aspects will the foreign policies of the various countries be introduced. The analysis will start with some salient features of the foreign policy establishments of Southeast Asia.

FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Statehood is a status or quality conferred on a country by the international community. All states need contact with the rest of this community if for no other reason than to initially receive the stamp of statehood and subsequently to protect it from possible encroachments from without. Hence the need for a machinery for the conduct of relations with other states and for the formulation of policies relevant to the task of protecting independence and sovereignty. As a justification for establishing a foreign ministry and a concomitant foreign service, this is the bare minimum beyond which there are numerous other legitimate reasons. As a description of the way many states in Southeast Asia entered the international system as sovereign states it is not far removed from the actual state of affairs.

The achievement of independence and the conferment of statehood on the countries of Southeast Asia left most of them with little in the way of experience, personnel and institutions as far as relations with the outside world were concerned. Never a colony, Thailand alone among the countries of the region could point to and rely on a diplomatic and foreign policy tradition of its own. In the other countries the institutions hastily set up either just before or upon the achievement of
independence were often staffed with such surplus personnel as could be
dispensed with by other parts of the civil service. The qualifications
and experience they had were often grossly lacking. The size of the
foreign policy establishments varied according to many factors such as
the position of foreign policy on the respective governments scale of
priorities, the ideological convictions of the leaders, the general
orientation of the foreign policy, and so on. 2

In most countries foreign policy has been the preoccupation of
a few members of the political elite, some of whom had no or only a narrow
institutional and popular base. 3 The reasons for this are many of which
some, like the lack of qualified and indeed interested people and the
scant importance attached to questions of foreign policy, have been
mentioned. These two latter reasons are no doubt important in certain
settings and in certain situations. The number of qualified people
however has increased and foreign policy has taken on more importance
over the years without in any fundamental way changing the elitist
nature of the foreign policy making processes. Hence, an explanation
must be sought elsewhere.

An important factor in this connection would seem to be the
nature of the regime in question. Let us consider the case of Cambodia
under Sihanouk and Indonesia under Sukarno. In Cambodia political
power, at least in the field of foreign affairs, was concentrated in the
hands of Prince Sihanouk in a manner described by Leifer as characteristic

2. For a description of the early foreign policy establishments
in Southeast Asia, see Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast
Asia: 1945-1958., Ch. 3 and Ch. 9 as far as Malaya is concerned.
3. See Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, ch.IV and
Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and
of an omnipotent ruler. His power rested partly on the support of
different groups but even more so on his own personal popularity with the
people in general, especially the peasants, and certain other factors of
a traditional nature such as the force of the monarchy as a unifying
symbol. His continued stay in power resulted from his astute
manipulation of those who would disagree with him at the same time as
he capitalized on his status as a former king. Manipulation neutralized opponents within the elite while charisma rallied the
peasantry. In foreign affairs his position was dominant for more
than a decade. Sihanouk's foreign policy was Cambodia's foreign
policy. Centered around traditional Cambodian fears of the neighbours,
it identified with dominant feelings within Cambodia itself. By
relying now on one faction and then on another for support, he was
able to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs to a degree which
justifies the characterization of it as a 'one man band'.

Sukarno's position in Indonesia was not unlike that of
Sihanouk in Cambodia. He too owed his position at the apex of the
political system partly to widespread popularity among the masses
especially in Java. His balancing act between the army and the PKI
(the communist party) gave him too the necessary freedom in the formu-
lation of the foreign policies. However, as in the case of Cambodia
it is important to note that Sukarno's policies likewise were based on

4. Leifer, *Cambodia*, p. 109. See also Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*,
pp. 224-225 and Milton E. Osborne, "Beyond Charisma; Princely
Politics and the Problem of Political Succession in Cambodia",

5. Osborne, *ibid.*., p. 121.

and conformed to deep-seated feelings within Indonesian society and elites. There was enough in his policies to satisfy both the army and the PKI and to enable him to appeal successfully to the masses when he found this necessary and opportune. In short, by neutralizing the main opposing forces and by playing one against the other he created considerable latitude for himself in terms of foreign policy. 7

In terms of Burma and Thailand it is more difficult to assess the influence on foreign policy of others but the top leadership. The persistent occupancy by General (now President) Ne Win of the country's top position suggests a strong and unchallenged leadership, based primarily on his position within the armed forces. 8

The Thai Government, also dominated by military men until the events of October 1973 removed them from the top positions of power, undoubtedly formulated the country's foreign policy in its essential outlines. It is however likely that the professionals of the Foreign Ministry have exerted influence to an extent not matched in other predominantly autocratic or authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia due mainly to a long tradition and considerable expertise.

Even in relatively democratic or quasi-democratic countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, foreign policy has been confined to a small number of people. In Malaysia the formulation of foreign policy has been nearly exclusively the preserve of a group consisting of no more than four or five persons. 9 A similar situation persists in Singa—

7. See J.D. Legge, Sukarno, A Political Biography, esp. ch. 14 and Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia".
8. See Leo E. Rose, "Nepal, Burma and Ceylon", in Wilcox et.al. (Eds.), Asia and the International System, pp. 234-235.
pore where two or three people of the top leadership of the People's Action Party make all important decisions.

Only in the Philippines, before the imposition of martial law in 1972, could one reasonably argue that foreign policy has been the synthesis of varied influences and interests insofar as the executive branch, the President and the Government, has had to take into consideration congressional views and the views of interest groups outside the institutionalized political establishment.

Apart from the factors already mentioned, the narrow base and the elitist nature of the foreign policy formulation in the countries of Southeast Asia can best be explained in terms of the relative absence of pluralism, except perhaps in the Philippines. By absence of pluralism is not meant a lack of racial and cultural diversity which plainly is not the case, but a lack of political, economic, cultural and professional pressure groups with an articulated interest and stake in foreign policy and with a somewhat well-defined power base in their respective societies. This does not mean that, for example, economic factors have not been considered worthy of attention when foreign policy has been made. Malaysia's move towards recognition of China has partly been justified in terms of export markets for her most important commodity, natural rubber. It has meant, however, that foreign policy has been left to the top level of the political hierarchy. Not being subject to any substantial domestic constraints of the kind mentioned, the political leadership, in itself fairly narrowly based, has been given a latitude in foreign affairs it would otherwise not have enjoyed both in terms of content and form.

The political base of the elites does also play a role in this context. In countries like Indonesia and Cambodia where Sukarno and, to a lesser extent, Sihanouk kept their positions by balancing forces of
equal or near equal strength, the leaders may have created additional latitude for themselves. In countries such as Burma and Thailand, until relatively recently, where the leaders formed the apex of one dominant force - the military establishment - the latitude may be less since the leaders cannot stray too far from the prevailing majority attitudes within this dominant force without running the risk of losing their positions.

STYLE OF DIPLOMACY. PERSONALITIES AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

The elitist nature of the foreign policy processes in most countries in the region has already been mentioned. A corollary of this is the wide scope for personalities and personal characteristics to exert themselves. Not infrequently relations between the nations of Southeast Asia have to an extreme degree hinged on personal qualities, and the likes and dislikes of particular leaders for each other. This is particularly evident in the relations of Sihanouk and Sukarno with other leaders.

Sihanouk's sensitiveness and highly developed self-esteem and concern with position and status were the direct, though not the basic underlying, causes of the break in diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia. It followed immediately upon a remark by Thailand's Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat at an official reception, where in an ill-disguised reference to Cambodia he suggested that Thailand show restraint and patience in the face of Cambodian accusations 'by taking consolation in the old proverbial tale of the pig challenging a lion to a fight'.

To Sihanouk this was tantamount to an insult to himself as

well as Cambodia and on 23 October 1961 Cambodia broke off diplomatic
relations which were not to be restored before Sihanouk's fall from
power in 1970. In the view of Thai officials Sihanouk himself and his
personality was in the ensuing period the single most important obstacle
in the way of a resumption of Thai-Cambodian relations. 12

Sihanouk's personal style expressed itself in ways considered by diplomats reared in the more unobtrusive tradition of western diplomacy to be less than conducive to good relations. According to Leifer 'he is capable of treating ambassadors like lowly messenger boys and has been known to subject them out of their hearing to periodic torrents of verbal abuse'. 13 Confidentiality, considered in normal diplomatic intercourse essential and a matter of course, is a principle for which he showed scant respect. '[A]n ambassador who tries to communicate with him takes the risk that his demarche will become public property within a few hours, possibly even broadcast to the world over Phnom Penh Radio. Sihanouk has small regard for secret diplomacy, preferring a more open, and even spectacular, style of communication'. 14

Sukarno's style was similar to Sihanouk's and equally flamboyant. His behaviour in connection with Confrontation with Malaysia was as frenetic as it was unpredictable. In Legge's words, 'From April to September [1963] the story is one of erratic fluctuations of mood as Sukarno, with apparent deliberation, adopted a strategy of alternating aggression and conciliation which seemed calculated to reduce the Tengku to a state of nervous confusion with regard to Indonesia's ultimate intentions.' 15 In attempting to explain Indonesia's confrontation policy Legge

puts inter alia major emphasis on the influence of Sukarno. '[Though] confrontation was not the invention of Sukarno alone, the distinctive character of the President's personal diplomacy became a major factor in the gradual crystallization of Indonesia's attitudes'. An important feature of Sukarno's diplomacy was his personal style. According to Legge Confrontation as

'... an assertive foreign policy was related not just to the content of Sukarno's domestic policy - to his goal of preserving a balance between opposing forces - but to the 'mechanics' of policy - to the modes and procedures by which he pursued that goal. Essential to his domestic political style was the element of constant movement - the sudden, unpredictable manoeuvres, catching opponents or doubters off their guard and the resourceful responses to potential challenges. The maintenance of a mood of crisis and agitation helped him to keep the initiative always in his own hands. This style had its foreign policy counterpart - boldness of posture, readiness to take risks, swiftness of adaptation to setbacks or challenges and, once again, unpredictability. Such a style of revolutionary diplomacy could indeed achieve occasional successes, but it was also related to Sukarno's constant need to hold the initiative at home. Sudden switches of policy thus had a systematic function to fulfil, and the whole apparatus of negotiation, detente, demarche, confrontation, the sudden advances and retreats, was an integral part of his political method'.

The circumstances under which individuals such as Sihanouk and Sukarno can exert a dominant influence on the formulation and conduct of

16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., p. 373.
foreign policy to the degree they did, and the circumstances under which personal characteristics of the leaders are permitted to dominate and direct both the substance and the method of foreign policy, are largely the same, and they will therefore be considered together.

In the first section of this chapter it was argued that the nature of the foreign policy processes is closely related to the relative absence or presence of pluralism in the society concerned, that is, the more pluralism, the less elitist are the foreign policy processes likely to be and the less scope there is for the influence of single individuals and personal characteristics. We shall in the following expound this argument and in the process take it a step further.

In pluralist societies such as the West European and the North American, foreign policy formulation is a process involving numerous forces. By its very nature this process leads to policies which are the synthesis of many pressures and interests originating from within as well as from without the political institutions. The relative lack of such pressures and influences in non-pluralist societies, especially from without but also often from within the political institutions, it was argued, led to a foreign policy based predominantly, though not entirely, on the rather narrow interests and attitudes of the political leadership of the day. Another salient feature of many non-pluralist societies is the limited membership of the leadership group especially the part with influence on and interest in foreign policy. As we have seen such groups contain frequently no more than four or five persons, sometimes even less, as in the case of Cambodia and Indonesia. In such circumstances the beliefs and attitudes of the persons at the top of the hierarchy are given a scope for realization not usually found in pluralist societies where foreign policy-making normally is a more complex process.
A consequence of this situation is that alternative policies may not be considered at all or rejected out of hand simply because they do not conform to the beliefs of the dominant political leader. Sihanouk's foreign policy, for example, was centered around his strong feeling of threat from Cambodia's nearest neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. His control over foreign policy excluded other, perhaps less security and threat oriented views or security-oriented views with an emphasis different from his, from playing a modifying influence on his own beliefs. That such different views existed in Cambodia was demonstrated, if not before, when the switch in the country's foreign policy took place after the fall of Sihanouk. Whether or not subsequent events have shown Sihanouk's policy to have been the right one for Cambodia in her particular situation, is a moot and irrelevant point in this context.

As far as regional cooperative efforts are concerned, Sihanouk's perception of where Cambodia's security interests lay precluded Cambodian participation in any of the regionally based and initiated cooperative ventures. It is not unreasonable to speculate that should there among politically concerned elites have been strong sentiments in favour of Cambodian participation in such ventures these would not have been reflected in official Cambodian policy. Hence, favourable elite attitudes, given primary importance as a precondition for the successful initiation of integrative processes, may under the circumstances have been without effect.

18. See chs. 2 and 5 on Sihanouk's policies in this regard.
19. See for example Haas in International Organization, Vol.XXIV, No. 4 (Autumn 1970) and Deutsch, Political Community.
Similar observations may be made in relation to the case of Sukarno's position in Indonesia. Indonesia's foreign policy came increasingly to reflect the personal beliefs and attitudes of Sukarno. He, too, defined his country's foreign policy interests so as to preclude participation in regional organizations although for different reasons. A nearly complete switch in these policies took place with the decline and fall of Sukarno from positions of power. Indonesia in the post-Sukarno era has become perhaps the force behind a regional organization such as ASEAN.

There is a second important consideration. Since in non-pluralist societies there is no or only a very limited foreign policy constituency there is considerably less or no need for the ruler to answer for his policies. Mistaken and harmful policies may pass unchallenged.

A corollary of the dominant position of individual leaders is the latitude for the individual characteristics of these leaders to exert themselves. In countries such as the West European and North American the foreign policy practitioner is often reared within a highly institutionalized process. The crucial institutions, in this context the foreign affairs department and the foreign service, have often a long tradition within which some well established 'rules of the game' and modes of behaviour, written or unwritten, have been formed. Rules of diplomatic conduct, in most important respects similar in the various countries, have become internalized and form part of the principles according to which these institutions are run and relations with other countries are pursued. In order to reach the top of the foreign policy establishment a person must to a substantial degree conform with accepted rules and principles of

20. See chapters 2 and 5 on Sukarno's attitude to regional cooperation.
conduct. Or put differently, a person with a highly eccentric or idiosyncratic mode of behaviour, that is, idiosyncratic defined in relation to the accepted rules of the particular institutional setting, has a much reduced chance of finding himself at the apex of the structure. The number of checks and constraints on the way to the top usually prevent such a person from reaching it. Should he, however, in spite of these constraints still manage to reach the top the likelihood is high that he will not remain there long. If the processes that promote a person up through the ranks are well defined, the processes that will demote him are equally well defined and often much shorter.

These rules of conduct, although particularly noticeable in the foreign office and the foreign service, also extend, perhaps in a modified form, to other governmental and non-governmental institutions so that a person not reared and experienced within the specific foreign policy institutions is nevertheless subject to the pressure to conform.

Modes and procedures of diplomatic conduct, to the extent they have been accepted by the countries of Southeast Asia, are however less internalized in the institutional structures dealing specifically with foreign policy. This is mainly but not exclusively a function of the short existence of these institutions all of which have been established after World War II except in Thailand. Apart from lacking internalization the function of these procedures and modes of conduct as a constraint on individual behaviour is also limited by the fact that the institutions within which they are most strongly promulgated - the foreign ministries and the foreign service - have a less established and prestigious position compared to their counterparts in the West. This is probably true of the position of the bureaucracy in general and again this is largely due to its short existence and consequent lack of tradition and proven experience.
In such circumstances the bureaucracy, including the foreign policy institutions, to a greater extent functions as a tool of the political leadership and less as a center of independent authority exerting influence in its own right. In Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines are possible exceptions.

To the extent that the domestic foreign policy generating processes, and indeed the policy processes in general, will continue to depend on fairly narrowly based political forces, the conduct of foreign policy will continue to be vulnerable to political leaders with highly idiosyncratic behaviour. Although it may be true that 'charismatic' leadership of the Sihanouk and Sukarno varieties is eschewed at present, some of the conditions which produced them, such as those just discussed, are still existing.

NEGOTIATIONS SOUTHEAST ASIAN STYLE.

Apart from the influence and latitude of certain individuals and individual characteristics, it is perhaps the style of negotiation, and the part played in it by the notions of musjawarah and mufakat, which most clearly distinguishes Southeast Asian diplomacy from its counterpart elsewhere, or so it is alleged.

Musjawarah as a style of negotiation was introduced into Southeast Asian diplomacy especially by Sukarno and the Indonesians. The notion itself has its roots in traditional village society in Indonesia as well as in other parts of the Malay world - in Malaysia and the Philippines. At the village level musjawarah meant 'that a leader should not

22. Peter J. Boyce, "The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional Diplomacy", in Lau Teik Soon (Ed.), New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia, p. 176.

act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his syntheses-conclusions’. 24

Mufakat means consensus or unanimity and as such is no more than the aim toward which the process of musjawarah is working. 25

At the core of musjawarah is a 'psychological disposition on the part of the members to give due regard to the larger interests. Musjawarah goes on as long as mufakat, or consensus, is not achieved. 26 Furthermore, negotiations in the musjawarah spirit take place 'not as between opponents but as between friends and brothers', to use the words of the former Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. 27

The apparent emphasis of the ASEAN states and in particular the Malay members - Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines - on musjawarah and mufakat in their deliberations raises questions about the suitability and the significance of these processes to inter-state relations in Southeast Asia.

The transposition of musjawarah as a practice from its original village setting to the international arena involves necessarily some drastic adaptations. Firstly, to participate in deliberations at the international level means facing problems and opposing interests of a vastly increased intricacy and magnitude from what is the case at the village level. Even if interstate negotiations take place within a group of people who are psychologically disposed to give due regard to each other's views and interests, such sentiments will inevitably be much

27. Ibid., p. 135.
tempered by the magnitude of the problems and interests involved. The obstacles in the way of mufakat are simply so much higher and difficult to remove at the international level. Although a psychological disposition favourable to consensus building is an advantage it simply is no substitute for overlapping or identical interests.

Secondly, and perhaps even more important, when transposed to the international level musjawarah loses the element of authority usually invested in the person of the village leader or elder which is an integral part of it at the village level. Although the onus is on extensive consultation and compromise of opposing interests, the authority and prestige of the leader will necessarily have a great deal of influence. In international deliberations no one participant can legitimately claim the position of leadership. It is, on the contrary, most likely that each participant will jealously protect his own status as an equal vis-a-vis the others. Indeed, the recognition and acceptance of the principle of equality - at least in its formal sense - are reprequisites of all international negotiations but the most exceptional such as take place between the victor and the defeated.

With these points in mind it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the claims to uniqueness occasionally made on behalf of musjawarah are largely exaggerated. Similar modes of negotiations are part and parcel of many western international organizations in which they to a great extent have been institutionalized. After all, mufakat, or unanimity, was an established part of the procedures of the League of Nations and in fact haunted the organization throughout its existence. The Council of Europe,

to take a contemporary example, requires unanimity in respect to some cases, and the Council of NATO works on the bases of the same principle.\textsuperscript{29} The much celebrated 'community spirit' or 'method' of the EEC with its long all night sessions is essentially a musjawarah in which mufakat is sought at the expense of the lost sleep and frayed nerves of the participants.

Yet, a residue of goodwill based on feelings of brotherhood and kinship may serve the same purpose as oil on rough sea. They take the edges off the waves and make for smoother sailing. Even this factor however is not something unique to musjawarah diplomacy. Similar or identical sentiments have been manifest in the relations between the countries of the Anglo-Saxon world, between the white Commonwealth countries, perhaps even within the Commonwealth as a whole, and they have been prominently present within such groups of countries as the BE-Ne-Lux and the Scandinavian.

The significance of musjawarah as a mode of conduct in international negotiations, therefore, lies not in its unique or peculiar features, because there are none which are not known or practised elsewhere, but rather in the emphasis and the position it has been given as the mode of conduct in the relations between the ASEAN group of states.\textsuperscript{31}

To the extent the style of negotiation exemplified by musjawarah is preferred, this implies a corresponding rejection of other modes of negotiation. The significance of this will become apparent as we consider another aspect of musjawarah which did not receive attention above.

\textsuperscript{29} For various styles of negotiation, see Philip C. Jessup, "Parliamentary Diplomacy", Recueil des Cours, 1956 I, pp. 185-318.


\textsuperscript{31} Boyce, in Lau, op. cit., p. 176, Solidum, op. cit., pp. 99-100 and 133-139.
Cooperation within ASEAN proceeds along the assumption that no projects or ventures will be launched without the support of all the members. Usually unanimity is sought and voting on specific proposals is avoided. When a particular view or policy is not acceptable to a country, no decision is made. Michael Haas attributes this practice to a '...belief that no majority has the right to shame anyone. Everyone is entitled to the dignity of his own position'. While such considerations may indeed be involved it is suggested that the practice derives much more from an assessment of what may realistically be achieved and of what is acceptable or not acceptable to the individual countries. As such it may be more significant as an indicator of the existing level of community than many other.

The frequent references to kinship and to common traditions of a cultural kind are indicative of the existence of communal sentiments but their strength and significance can only be assessed in the light of evidence other than verbal pronouncements. In this context the absence of institutionalized procedures providing for majority decisions as well as the actual absence and the positive avoidance of such decisions within the cooperative institutions of ASEAN, point to a realization that such procedures would be unacceptable to the member states, and that majority decisions would more likely than not be felt not to be binding on those states which did not concur in them. Thus the higher level of community and indeed integration which the existence of such procedures and practices would be an important indicator of, do not exist among the ASEAN states.

Most of the decisions taken so far within ASEAN and the cooper-

ation they have given rise to have by and large been less than momentous. The decisions and the compromises they reflect have been of the type Ernst Haas has described as "accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator", that is, on the basis of what the least cooperative partner is willing to accept. 33 Musjawarah diplomacy with its emphasis inter alia on the equality of the participants and its absence of institutionalized mediatory services is geared to accommodation along these lines, and much less to accommodation based on what Haas has called 'splitting the difference' or 'upgrading the common interest'. 34

There is a last aspect of this style of negotiation which deserves attention. Musjawarah and mufakat were adopted at an early stage as the principal mode of negotiation and as such they fairly accurately reflected the limits and the possibilities of ASEAN cooperation and level of community. However, as time has gone by musjawarah and mufakat may have come to serve as both cause and effect in relation to the level of cooperation and integration within ASEAN. As the only or principal mode of negotiation it may have become internalized to the extent that the calculations the members make with regard to what is possible are limited or circumscribed by what they can adapt to the prevailing style of negotiation. In other words, the members come to meetings with plans and proposals which are deliberately or otherwise geared to the limits set by the mode of negotiation. To the extent this is the case mode of negotiation is a causal factor in relation to level of integration.

34. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
Mode or style of negotiation may also result from or be the effect of the level of integration. The expectations of member states in regard to cooperation and actual level of cooperation may be such that the need for other more demanding modes of negotiation and decision-making does not arise. Hence, the continued position of musjawarah as the dominant style of negotiation is ensured by the level of expectations and integration. In this way mode of negotiation and level of expectation and integration may serve to preserve each other unchanged.

SUMMITRY

Another aspect of Southeast Asian diplomacy noted by some observers is the extensive use of ad hoc summit meetings. However, this is a part of diplomacy everywhere and it is difficult to see that Southeast Asian practice in this regard is in any significant sense exceptional. It has been suggested that summit diplomacy in Southeast Asia 'are reinforced and, at the same time, are a product of the authoritarian principle in the value system of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian societies, from the national to the village level, recognize the leadership of an authority in the hands of an elder'. Although this observation seems to be somewhat at variance with what the same writer has said in relation to musjawarah (above, note 23), it is suggested that summit diplomacy can be better understood if viewed as a response to domestic and international conditions. It is arguable that summit con-

ferences may be a result of individual characteristics. Some leaders, such as the two Roosevelts and Kennedy, would seem to have enjoyed the personal involvement entailed in summit meetings, and in Southeast Asia the same would seem to have been the case with such persons as Sukarno and Sihanouk. However, to carry this argument any further and attempt to explain the propensity of some states to utilize summitry in their diplomacy exclusively or mainly in terms of individual characteristics would amount to reducing much of international politics to a theatrical play in which some star actors perform only for the sake of performing.

This is not to say that vanity, a yearning for personal glory, or whatever other individual 'attributes' are involved may not play a part, but when political leaders embark upon summitry they respond primarily to more fundamental conditions. One way to approach the question is provided by a study of Howard Wriggins. As the starting point of an illuminating analysis of political leadership in Asia and Africa he asked inter alia the following question. 'How can [a ruler] best use his person, his trusted associates, and whatever political or governmental assets he has to strengthen his own influence and achieve his ends, beyond mere survival in the president's or prime minister's office?'

One of the things he can do is to make use of foreign policy. In this context summit meetings are significant events. They are highly 'visible' and highly publicized events which may serve to enhance a

leader's position at home as well as abroad. To the leaders in many less developed countries they are especially valuable since the options open to such countries tend to be limited. Under such conditions summit meetings have a high symbolic value. Viewed from this angle summitry is form substituting for content.

Beyond the symbolic value, however, the propensity to resort to summit meetings derives more importantly from the absence or relative weakness of a foreign policy and diplomatic tradition. As far as foreign policy is concerned many less developed countries have not formed 'a consistent and long-term perspective on their interests' save perhaps in the negative sense of wanting not to be embroiled in 'big power', 'power', 'East-West', 'bloc', etc. politics. The search for a leitmotif other than mere denial has led to shifts, not seldom of a drastic kind, in the policies of some countries. The world community at large needs some kind of affirmation of new policies which the ruler alone, be he president or prime minister, in view of his dominant position and his often exclusive control over foreign policy, may be able to provide. In this context summit meetings become a useful instrument through which such affirmative assurances are given.

Even in the absence of great shifts in policy the lack of a foreign policy tradition in itself introduces an element of uncertainty into the diplomacy of many countries which can best, although not entirely, be overcome through summit diplomacy.

An additional condition is the relative weakness of the diplomatic tradition as such. This weakness may consist in a lack of experience as well as in the limited size of the foreign service, both of which may force the ruler to shoulder more of the diplomatic burden.

40. Ibid., p. 222.
than otherwise would have been the case.

Where some or all of these conditions exist simultaneously one might expect a higher recourse to summitry as a diplomatic tool.

There is another side to the propensity for summitry worth noting especially when one talks about summitry in terms of aggregates or on a regional basis. A seemingly 'summit-happy' group of countries may not be that at all. Instead it may only be one or two countries in the group which frequently or more or less regularly resort to summitry in their diplomacy. To the others, their involvement in summitry may be no more than a polite, perhaps even reluctant, acceptance of the diplomatic practice of the one or two. In other words, when a country invites to a summit meeting it may be difficult for those who have received an invitation to send other than the head of the state or the prime-minister, whichever is the most important, although the agenda of the conference did not warrant a gathering at such a level.

To the extent that the conditions discussed above change one would expect the propensity to resort to summit diplomacy of the countries most affected by them to decline. This does not mean that the individual countries necessarily become less involved in summitry primarily because of inter alia the situation mentioned in the last paragraph. It does, however, mean that individual countries will become less inclined to resort to and themselves initiate summit diplomacy. The relative paucity, as opposed to the prior frequent occurrence, of such initiatives may therefore serve as a sign of the advent of a society and a political system more diverse, self-assured and 'mature' than previously was the case.

The direct involvement of heads of states and governments through summitry and otherwise in the actual conduct of foreign relations has also certain drawbacks which have been amply illustrated in Southeast
Asia. The personal animosity existing between the Tunku and Sukarno was a well known fact and could but have a detrimental effect on Malaysian-Indonesian relations especially since both took a very active hand in the conduct of their country's policies. During confrontation mutual relations reached a low point and in 1963 '...angry verbal exchanges continued between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur, with Sukarno and the Tunku apparently vying with each other in their search for the most offensive epithets to hurl across the Java sea'.

Such public displays of personal animosity were not confined to these two. Sihanouk construed an allusion to the proverb about the pig challenging a lion to a fight as an insult to himself, claiming that he had been called a pig by Thailand's Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat. On receiving the news of Sarit's death in December 1963, Sihanouk in retaliation proclaimed a public holiday to celebrate the passing of the Thai Prime Minister.

Apart from the destructive influence at the highest level of such personal relationships, the participation of top leaders such as the Tunku and Sukarno in the enunciation and conduct of foreign policy through summit meetings tend to lend an aura of finality to the policy position of their countries at any one time. Whatever views or policies the top leaders are putting forward are accorded a superior status, so to speak, which makes it difficult to reverse or change specific policies should circumstances so demand. Such changes are all the more difficult because the integrity and sincerity of the leaders tend to be called into question too. In conflict situations, when flexibility is more needed

43. Leifer, *Cambodia*, p. 89.
than ever, top leader participation may therefore introduce a measure of rigidity into the policies which makes the resolution of the conflict all the more difficult. Much distrust emanated from the meeting between Macapagal and the Tunku in Cambodia in February 1964 at which, according to the Filipinos, the Tunku gave a private undertaking to let the Sabah crisis be submitted to the International Court in the Hague. The Malaysians denied that such an undertaking had ever been made but the alleged promise proved a considerable irritant in subsequent relations because it ostensibly had been given by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, and therefore acquired a status as policy it might not otherwise have, had it been given by some lesser official. Indeed, the participation of the Tunku and Macapagal may have served to postpone the resumption of relations between the Philippines and Malaysia precisely because both were so closely identified with the policies which led to the break in the first instance. This was especially so with regard to Macapagal who was the main force behind Philippine policies in relation to Sabah and Malaysia. Similarly, the link that came to exist between the Sabah dispute and Konfrontasi may also have contributed to postpone the improvement in Philippine-Malaysian relations. Through various summits between the Tunku, Sukarno and Macapagal, the last of which took place in Tokyo in June 1964, the less serious dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia became entangled with the more intractable conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia.

Some policies would in all likelihood have been more difficult to carry out had the top leaders been more actively involved in their

44. Ibid., and same author, *The Philippine Claim to Sabah*, p. 58.
execution. The Tunku had considerable reservations about ASEAN prior to its formation primarily because of his distrust of Indonesia. The fact that the Malaysian participants in the negotiations and discussions which led to the formation of ASEAN for the most part were persons such as Tun Razak, Tun Ismail and Ghazali bin Shafie, who were not saddled with the same suspicions vis-a-vis Indonesia, facilitated the successful outcome of these negotiations. Neither is it unlikely that the Sabah issue may have figured more prominently had Marcos himself rather than his Foreign Secretary, Ramos, conducted the Philippine part of these negotiations. The latter was apparently not enthusiastic about the revival of the Sabah claim, and he may indeed have been instrumental in causing the relative absence of this issue from the ASEAN negotiations.

Extensive resort to summitry and top leader involvement in the conduct of foreign policy imply a corresponding exclusion of the traditional channels from the execution of these policies. At one level it may lead to the relative 'underdevelopment' of the foreign affairs departments and the foreign services in terms of experience and know-how relevant to solving disputes and conducting relations in general. At another level it makes the relations between countries peculiarly vulnerable to the vagaries of personal relationships between top leaders, something which has been a feature of relations between the states of Southeast Asia. These two consequences are related in the sense that if sub-leader or sub-ministerial contacts and relations are poorly developed, they are unable to maintain the overall relationship in the face of personal dislikes and animosity between the top leaders of their countries. In other

45. See chapter 2 on this point.
47. Abell, op. cit., p. 365.
words, if one channel of contact is closed or functions poorly, there are few or no alternative channels through which relations can be maintained and conducted. To the extent such alternatives exist their weakness renders them unable to carry the entire burden of the strained relationship between the top leaders. Hence, a cut in the latter relationship may cause a complete or nearly complete break in all inter-governmental relations.

METHODS OF DIPLOMACY

Nations have various means at their disposal with which to pursue their objectives. Hans Morgenthau has suggested these means can be grouped into three categories, persuasion, compromise and the threat of force. The art of diplomacy, according to Morgenthau, 'consists in putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of these three means at its disposal', and a diplomacy which relies on only one or two of them deserves not to be called intelligent. These means, however, are clearly not available in equal proportions to all states and the question of 'right emphasis ... on each of them' becomes largely academic in most situations many countries find themselves in. Depending on their own power and position, absolutely and relative to that of others, many states may have only one or perhaps two available to them in nearly all situations.

Threat of force, or alleged threat of force, has not at all been unusual in Southeast Asia. Apart from the conflict in Indo-China such threats have been present in the relations between Cambodia and her

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
neighbours, and in the relations between Malaysia and Indonesia where they failed to deter Malaysia from pursuing her chosen course and led to the actual employment of force by Indonesia. During the second Sabah crisis in 1968 the Philippine Government deployed troops to the southern islands bordering on Malaysia. Nonetheless, with the exception of Indo-China, threats of force, and indeed force itself, have been used relatively sparingly in recent years. Among the ASEAN states it has been absent altogether with the possible exception of the Philippines during the last Sabah crisis. The relative paucity in their employment does not mean that threats of force may not be used in the future. As long as conflicts and suspicions exist, the conditions and environment within which threats of force arise also exist. When they nevertheless have been relatively absent from the tool kit of ASEAN diplomacy this is due to some particular and general conditions which it is worthwhile to take note of.

Firstly, although disputes have arisen which at times have strained relations between individual countries none of them have been on a scale in relation to which threats of force would have been warranted. Again, the only possible exception was the Sabah dispute of 1968-1969.

The second point to note is the obvious one of lack of military capabilities largely making the threat of force an empty gesture. The military forces of the ASEAN countries do not on the whole possess the strength, structure and mobility necessary to lend credibility to the use of threats of force. The only exception would be Indonesia whose

51. Gordon, op.cit., p. 64 and pp. 68-119 and Leifer, Cambodia, pp.84-100.
armed forces could conceivably enable her to use threats of force towards her immediate neighbours with some success. But even in her case it is doubtful that the credibility of such threats would extend to Thailand in part because of the strength of the latter's own military forces and partly for reasons of geography and distance. 53

The third point is that in their relations with each other the ASEAN countries have stressed peaceful resolution of conflicts and eschewed force and threats of force as a tool of diplomacy. This emphasis on non-violent means do no doubt have as a basis a genuine desire to avoid force and threats of force in their mutual relations. 54 This attitude is, of course, not only based on ulterior motives. The dictates of the international and domestic environment also play an important role in this context. Most of the ASEAN countries perceive the greatest threat to their existence to emanate from internal subversion and extra-regional sources such as China. Only Singapore's suspicions and apprehensions vis-a-vis Indonesia would seem to match her fear of communist subversion and other sources of threat. 55 This more or less shared perception of internal and extra-regional threats have served to suppress whatever fears the countries have of each other and led to the stress on pacific settlement of disputes. There is, of course, also a realization that in terms of the stated goals of ASEAN threats of force and force itself are highly dysfunctional methods of diplomacy.

53. See The Military Balance, 1972-73 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies) for data on the quantitative strength of the military forces of the countries of Southeast Asia.

54. For expressions of such sentiments, see, for example, the speeches made by the foreign ministers at the ASEAN inaugural meeting in Bangkok in August 1967, in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Vol. 7, No. 1 (August-September 1967), pp. 30-39.

55. See chapter 5 above.
With threat of force by and large eschewed as a diplomatic tool for reasons of expediency and perhaps conviction, the ASEAN countries are left with compromise and persuasion as the chief diplomatic tools with which to influence each other. However, compromise or bargaining have certain limitations which once again are a function of the capabilities of the countries concerned. This method or technique of diplomacy is much dependent on the capacity of the countries involved to exchange tangible benefits, to offer rewards and to threaten to withhold or withdraw such rewards or benefits. Most often such rewards are of an economic nature such as aid, trade, tariffs and so on. However, most of the Southeast Asian countries are not in a position to offer each other much in this regard due to the weakness and structure of their economies as well as the structure of world trade. 56 The extent to which ASEAN countries have limited bargaining capabilities in relation to each other is vividly illustrated by intra-ASEAN trade data. Between 1963 and 1968 the portion of Indonesian exports going to other ASEAN countries fell from 22.2 to 17.8 percent, Malaysia's from 24.6 to 23.9 percent, Singapore's from 16.6 to 14.8 percent and Thailand's from as much as 34.2 to 18.7 percent. If the figures for 1968 are adjusted to exclude entrepot trade in rubber and tin, Indonesia's exports to the rest of ASEAN amounted to 8.5 percent, Malaysia's to 14.3, Thailand's to 16.2 while Singapore's remained the same. As far as the Philippines was concerned her exports in 1968 to the rest of ASEAN amounted to a mere 1.8 percent of her total export trade. 57

56. For some problems within the ECAFE region in this respect, see Horisho Kitamura, "Economic Components of Regionalism", Solidarity, January 1969, pp. 35-41.

57. UN Research Project on ASEAN Economic Cooperation, The Trade of ASEAN Countries, A Review of the Structure and Trends with Special Reference to Intra-ASEAN Trade (Preliminary Draft), table 2.
The point is further underlined when the commodity structure of ASEAN exports is taken into consideration. The structure of exports is similar not only in its high degree of concentration on a few primary commodities but also in the commodities which it includes. Rubber and tin are among the major export products of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, copra, oilseeds and kernels and vegetable fats and oil among those of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and wood and wood products are important export items in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Major export commodities in relation to which the countries are not in 'competition' with each other, include crude petroleum and coffee from Indonesia, sugar and copper from the Philippines, and various foodstuffs from Thailand. 58 As far as imports are concerned, in 1968 Indonesia received 4.9 percent of her total imports from the other ASEAN countries, Malaysia 19.6 percent (14.6 if adjusted to exclude entrepot trade in rubber and tin), the Philippines 2.5 percent, Singapore 26.2 percent (17.8 if adjusted to exclude entrepot trade in rubber and tin) and Thailand 3.0 percent. The only countries whose trade with each other was of such proportions relatively and absolutely that it could conceivably have been used with a measure of success in a bargaining process are Singapore and Malaysia. Nearly half of all intra-ASEAN trade (48.5 percent) consisted in trade between these two countries, and another 45.2 percent of intra-ASEAN trade between them and the rest of ASEAN. 59 These facts can but lead to the conclusion that even bargaining or compromise is a method of diplomacy which is of severely limited usefulness to the countries of ASEAN in their relations with each other as well as with the rest of Southeast Asia. It may indeed also be that the existence of ASEAN itself

58. Ibid., p. 9.
59. Ibid., table 2.
has restricted the bargaining power of its members in much the same way ASA did in relation to the Philippines and Malaysia in an earlier period. 60 By, as it were, 'monopolizing' those inter-state relations of its members which are most relevant to bargaining, namely trade and other economic relations, ASEAN has further restricted its members' scope for bargaining in the sense that economic factors cannot be used as a sanction with the same freedom as before without running the risk of undermining or destroying the entire rationale for ASEAN's existence. This places a high premium on economic factors qua rewards, but as noted above there are many limitations to what the ASEAN countries can offer each other in this respect.

With bargaining being of somewhat limited usefulness persuasion remains the chief method with which to pursue most foreign policy objectives, even those which would have benefited from a bargaining process or the use of threat of force. Persuasion is 'an effort to show the other person that a certain course of action would be in agreement with that other person's values so as to give him what could be referred to as "good conscience". Usually this would be accompanied by an effort to show that any other course of action would give him "bad conscience". 61 As a technique of diplomacy persuasion operates mainly in the spheres of values and symbols and is dependent on experienced and skilful practitioners, be they diplomats or political leaders. In this context the observations made above about summit meetings and the involvement of heads of states and governments in the conduct of foreign policy have relevance. The successful application of persuasion as a technique of

60. See chapter 3 above.
diplomacy is dependent on practitioners with fairly extensive knowledge of other countries and their leaders, of their mores and values, and of their weak and strong points. 62 In only rare cases are heads of states and governments in possession of such knowledge or indeed in a position to acquire it. Their sojourns into the actual conduct of foreign policy through summit meetings and state visits, though frequent, tend nonetheless to be brief and superficial and are mostly taking place under circumstances which are not conducive to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of the kind dealt with here. There are, of course, also numerous commitments other than foreign policy which demand their time and attention. Their participation in the conduct of foreign policy may therefore achieve considerably less than had the professionals of the foreign affairs departments and the foreign services with their presumably greater knowledge and skill in manipulating values and symbols, conducted relations and negotiations. There are, for example, strong indications that Macapagal misjudged the ideology, policies and intentions of Sukarno and was to some extent misled by his personal encounters with Sukarno to put particular stress on what he and his advisers perceived to be the 'nationalist', 'anti-communist' and 'anti-Chinese' elements of Indonesian foreign policy. 63 Indeed a prominent feature of Philippine-Indonesian relations at the time was the extent to which the two countries' knowledge of each other was very limited 64, a factor which makes persuasion a

62. Without having extensive data to support such a conclusion, it would seem that the diplomacy of Southeast Asia is still what Galtung and Ruge have called 'elite-oriented' as opposed to 'structure-oriented'. See ibid., passim.


64. Gordon, ibid., pp. 28 and 31-32.
difficult techniques with which to pursue relations in the absence of other methods.

If on the one hand membership in ASEAN has led to a curtailment of bargaining as a method of diplomacy, this same membership may, on the other hand, have enhanced the value of persuasion as a method of diplomacy. In greater measure than ASA before it, ASEAN have added persuasive weight to those arguments which oppose policies that are seen as having a negative effect on the existence of the organization. A clear example was the pressure brought to bear on Malaysia and the Philippines during the Sabah crisis of 1968-69. The efforts of the other members were accompanied by frequent references to the link between the existence of ASEAN and the overall security and welfare of its members. In this regard the words of Singapore's Rajaratnam at the ministerial meeting in Djakarta in August 1968 are a representative example. He said,

...I am convinced of the inevitability of regional cooperation because the alternative to it is increasing economic difficulties leading ultimately to political chaos and economic disintegration of national units in the region ... In fact it was because we were convinced that the only alternative to regional cooperation was economic stagnation and political disaster that we decided to the support the concept of ASEAN. 65

Coupled with international realities which promoted ASEAN to a position where it emerged a much more attractive foreign policy option, such appeals referring to the intrinsic value of ASEAN added weight of an essentially persuasive nature to the pressure on the Philippines and

65. Straits Times, 8 August, 1968.
Malaysia. Indeed, in their attempts to modify or change each other's position, the two disputants themselves used the goals and purposes of ASEAN as a lever. 66

THE INSTITUTIONS OF ASEAN

The institutional structure of regional organizations consists of mainly two types, the supranational and the intergovernmental varieties within each of which there are a number of sub-varieties. A supranational structure has as its core a regional centre of power invested with a measure of authority, however modest, which previously rested with the member states. A regional intergovernmental structure, on the other hand, usually possesses no such independent authority and it functions as a coordinating body for its members. Due to the lack of transfer from the members to ASEAN bodies of any independent powers, the organization clearly falls within the second category. Moreover, the extremely 'decentralized' character of ASEAN's institutional structure even more firmly places it within the intergovernmental mode as well as within the purview of the traditional diplomatic machinery of the members. In this regard a few observations are in order. 67

The highest decision-making body of ASEAN is its ministerial meeting which takes place once a year and rotates between the member countries. Special or extra-ordinary meetings may also be held upon

66. See chapter 3 above.

67. We have no extensive information and data available which would permit us to say with confidence that the observations which follow are substantially correct. They are based on impressions interspersed with occasional items of fact. While the reader should keep the speculative nature of the remarks in mind they may nonetheless be worthwhile making with a view to future research based on more extensive data.
request of any member. The second most important body is the standing committee which coordinates and reviews the activities of the association between ministerial meetings. It too may meet upon the request of any of the members. Between the ministerial meetings in August 1967 and 1968, for instance, the standing committee met five times. 68 It rotates on a yearly basis between the member states and is chaired by the foreign minister of the host country with the accredited, resident ambassadors of the ASEAN states as members. The association has no central secretariat. Instead there is in each member state an ASEAN national secretariat which services all other bodies. They are part of and function within the foreign ministries of the members. The secretariats operate mainly as coordinating bodies for the ASEAN-related activities of their countries and they are headed by a secretary-general who occasionally meets his counterpart in the other countries. The great bulk of the practical work is carried out by ad hoc and permanent committees each of which deals with cooperation within specific functional areas such as transport and communication, tourism, shipping, finance and so on.

The significance of the observations to be made about this institutional structure lies in what they may reveal about the possible development of a regional, as opposed to a national, outlook on the part of the relevant elites. The first concerns the degree of involvement of the various institutions in the affairs of the association. As already noted the ministerial meeting normally meets once a year and it acts mainly on the recommendations worked out at a lower level. At the ministerial meeting in the Cameron Highlands of Malaysia in December 1969 some

68. Pace, et.al., Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, table B2, p. 56.
98 recommendations were approved by the ministers. This high number would seem to indicate that the standing committee in its capacity as a body of coordination and review would have had its hands full during the year preceding the Cameron Highlands meeting. Yet it met only twice. Even allowing for the fact that a great number of the recommendations were fairly simple and straight-forward this suggests that the standing committee's involvement and exposure to ASEAN affairs are at a low level. It furthermore suggests that the bulk of the work related to ASEAN is done by the national secretariats and the ad hoc and permanent committees. Of these two the national secretariats are the institutions which are most involved and exposed to ASEAN activities on a permanent and continuous basis. The permanent committees, on the other hand, are not permanent in the sense of being continuously and on a full-time basis occupied with ASEAN affairs. Any committee may meet as seldom as once a year. During 1968-69, for example, the committee on food production and supply met twice as did the committees on shipping and tourism, whilst the committee on finance met once. This very modest frequency no doubt reflected the influence of the Sabah crisis as well as the fact that the association was only formed in August 1967. These facts nonetheless bring out the extent to which the permanent committees are not 'permanent' in the sense referred to above.

The second point of relevance to the development of a regional outlook concerns the turnover rate of personnel in the various institutions.

69. Ibid., pp. 62-83.
70. Ibid., table B2, p. 56. The relevant meetings took place in Kuala Lumpur in November and December 1969.
71. Ibid.
As noted before the standing committee rotates on a yearly basis thus every year having a different group of individuals as members, that is, the persons who happen to be ambassadors to the country acting as host. This membership is also subject to changes of ambassadors as well. With the possible exception of the foreign ministers the rest of the members of this body are therefore infrequently exposed to ASEAN affairs and then only for a year. The ambassadors of the ASEAN countries to Malaysia, for example, participated only in two formal meetings during the year the standing committee was located in Kuala Lumpur. A similar situation would seem to prevail in regard to the membership of the ad hoc and permanent committees, although perhaps not quite to such an extent. Depending on the functional area of a particular committee, the members are usually drawn, not from the national secretariats, but from the relevant government ministry in the various countries. Thus the committee on finance will usually have as members officials from the finance ministries or treasuries of the members. The length of the period of service on the committee is not known. Nor is it known to what extent, for example, the Indonesian representative on the committee is dealing with ASEAN affairs and projects within the ministry when he is not attending committee meetings. However, it is not at all unlikely that much of the time of these officials is taken up with matters other than ASEAN business. The only institutions within which the personnel are in a sense 'ASEAN officials', are the national secretariats. Their daily job is concerned with ASEAN activities and projects as long as they serve in the secretariats. Lacking information again prevents a firm assessment of the turnover rate of personnel in the secretariats but there are indications that in some countries the rate is rather high, for example, in Singapore. Factors which tend to influence the turnover
rate include career patterns, especially in the foreign ministries, and the extent to which ASEAN positions are given as rewards for services rendered. This would to some extent seem to be the case in Indonesia where the position as secretary-general of the national secretariat has been given to high ranking officers of the armed forces. 72

The third point of relevance concerns the fact that the overwhelming bulk of the work related to ASEAN is carried out within firmly national environments. The most 'permanent' and continuous of all the institutions are national secretariats located within the institution most responsible for the conduct of 'national' foreign policies. Similarly, the most important policies related to ASEAN are conceived, discussed, planned and formulated within national settings without opportunity for distinctively 'regional' viewpoints to have a modifying influence.

Taken together the three points made in regard to institutional structure and practices of ASEAN mean that there are few opportunities for a transnational elite with a regional rather than a national outlook to develop. The officials working within ASEAN remain the agents of governments which continue to pursue their own national goals within the framework of ASEAN in much the same way they did before the advent of the association.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY

The point has been reached at which it is possible to relate in a more explicit fashion the style and techniques of regional diplomacy as practised by the ASEAN states in particular to processes of cooperation and integration.

72. It is not implied that these persons are any less competent or dedicated than others.
Perhaps the most important feature to emerge from the preceding discussion is the central role of elite groups in the conduct of diplomacy and, therefore, in the processes of cooperation and integration. This in itself is not a very startling revelation since, if anything, it is but further confirmation of a phenomenon that already is a well documented feature of numerous political systems. The Southeast Asian variety of elitism, however, has its own peculiarities and effects, especially on regional processes, which it is worthwhile to discuss in a wider context.

The literature on integration is divided in its views on the role of elite attitudes and behaviour. At one end of the scale is Karl Deutsch's implicit rejection of a crucial elite group role and his strong emphasis on the importance of what one writer has called his 'sociocausal paradigm of political integration, which holds that political integration cannot occur until after a process of social assimilation creates a homogeneous transnational population'. 73 Ernst Haas' ideas, on the other hand, are almost exclusively concerned with elites and in The Uniting of Europe he says that 'it suffices to single out and define the political elites' and that 'it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys'. 74

Apart from the attitude, outlook and expectations of the elite groups their influence is a function of their plurality, variety and size. In an article nearly a decade later Haas modified his earlier theory in one important respect. In a reference to the earlier explanation of the integrative process according to which 'the superiority of step-by-step

economic decisions over crucial political choices is assumed as permanent' and 'the determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and economic structure is almost complete', Haas states that the 'phenomenon of a de Gaulle is omitted'. His primary task in the article was to amend the picture of the integrative process as an automatic 'progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states'. Acknowledging the example of de Gaulle's influence on the European Economic Community, Haas amended his theory by allowing for the influence of the strong, dominant, political leader who as well as urging the integration process along also may be capable of reversing it.

In the ASEAN states most of the initiatives and commitment to regional cooperation have originated with a small group of political leaders in the various countries. Without implying a leadership role and position of the de Gaulle variety, persons such as Adam Malik in Indonesia, Thanat Khoman in Thailand, Tun Ismail and Ghazali bin Shafie in Malaysia and Carlos Romulo have been the driving force behind the participation of their countries in ASEAN. In this respect these persons plus perhaps two or three more in each country have played a role comparable to that of de Gaulle, only in reverse. The great difference between the situation in Europe and Southeast Asia is that in the latter the leaders have no extensive or influential elite groups which either support or oppose them in terms of regional cooperation. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that in relation to such an organization as ASEAN these few persons are the elite group and that regional cooper-

76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., esp. pp. 327-331.
ation is largely sustained by their commitment. On the one hand this dependence on two or three persons in each country lends a measure of volatility and uncertainty to ASEAN because one can never be sure what will happen if and when such key individuals either disappear from the scene or change attitude. Without more extensive elite groups to sustain it if the leaders lack commitment the cooperation is apt to totally collapse. The interest and commitment of the Philippines in ASA fell disastrously with the advent of Macapagal as president because of his disinterest in the association. Hence, whilst lack of interest among top leaders in Europe may still enable the cooperation and integration process to be sustained or go forward due to the influence of the elite groups, a similar disinterest on the part of top leaders in Southeast Asia is likely to bring the same processes in that region to a complete halt or to bring about their complete reversal. This situation is not easily remedied. The creation of more extensive and influential elite groups is not likely to take place within the institutional structure of ASEAN. As noted above, these institutions contribute little or nothing to the development of a supranational bureaucracy and larger elite groups and, furthermore, are not likely to do so in the future if they remain as presently constituted.

The other side of the coin is, of course, that leaders strongly favouring regional cooperation can commit their countries more strongly than had they been opposed by extensive and significant elite groups within their countries. Possibly the only country in Southeast Asia where there are groups which could successfully bring pressure to bear on political leaders, is the Philippines. However, these groups would seem to have exercised no such pressure primarily because they are neither strongly negatively nor positively oriented towards ASEAN.

The relatively frequent participation of heads of states and
governments and foreign ministers in ASEAN diplomacy is partly a result of the factors just discussed. Precisely because ASEAN's existence is so dependent on their commitment, their participation in ASEAN activities is required in corresponding proportions. Affirmative assurances of continued support are often needed from the only persons able to issue them, namely the top leaders.

The style and technique of the diplomacy of the ASEAN countries are substantially similar and seem on the whole to be geared to the forms and content of regional cooperation in its present stage. Apart from the threats of force, as a method of diplomacy bargaining is limited by the lack of complementarity of the economies of the ASEAN countries. In this respect it is highly significant that most of the projects planned and executed within ASEAN concern technical and research cooperation and other projects which do not involve questions of economic policy. For reasons outlined above persuasion has its limits too. This brings to the fore again the question of the use of threats. It is not unthinkable that the limits to bargaining and persuasion in certain situations might cause such frustration that the countries in a position to do so might turn to threats of force once more.
The pervasive influence of extra-regional forces has done much to shape the present day relations between the countries of Southeast Asia. Situated between the two giants of Asia - India and China - the region has been the meeting point of the four great religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, all of which have put their indelible marks on it. As in so many other parts of the world, colonialism and imperialism set in train a transformation process on which the indigenous peoples had only a peripheral influence. When these peoples finally gained control over their own affairs they did so at a point in history when interdependence rather than independence was the concept most appropriately describing the relations among themselves and others. In many cases they only imperfectly understood the forces they came up against, and those who did understand more often than not lacked the means with which to deal with them. Statehood did not signal the emergence of a unified people working together for the betterment of their society. Every imaginable ideology competed for the allegiance of the population, and one section became pitted against another. Some less, others more willingly accepted the support of outside forces so readily available and eager to enter the scene. This support came from those that had the capability to provide it, primarily the big powers. Thus, Southeast Asia became the scene, not only of competing indigenous forces, but also of a struggle between extra-regional powers which tended to view it as merely a part of a world wide contest and test of strength.

The tendency of these extra-regional forces to influence and even exacerbate indigenous conflicts is a story which has been told many
times and it will not be repeated here. But this negative effect of the extra-regional forces should not make us blind to the positive influence they have had on cooperation within the region be it by their example or by more direct methods. In this context the word 'positive' should be used advisedly, because not all acts and policies of extra-regional actors in relation to Southeast Asian regional cooperation were necessarily meant to have a positive influence, any more than all acts and policies with a positive intent have had the desired impact on regional cooperation. The focus of this chapter will be on the effect of extra-regional forces on ASA and, in particular, ASEAN, and the countries or the group of countries whose policies will be considered are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC).

THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Joseph Nye has suggested that the United States' policies towards regional organization in general have served four major interests, namely hemispheric influence, containment, economic development, and conflict prevention and management. In relation to hemispheric influence her policies have been focused on Latin America and the Caribbean, whilst in regard to containment they have had global application, as have the policies related to economic development and conflict prevention and management.

In Southeast Asia much of the United States' policies have been formulated with a view to containment, that is, the central objective was to establish 'a hard political and military line between a U.S. and a Chinese

2. Ibid.
sphere of influence'. For this reason her attitude towards regional cooperation cannot be properly understood without reference to her policy of containment of communism in general and China in particular.

Throughout nearly the entire post World War II period the United States placed overwhelming stress on the military aspect of her containment policies. Through various defence organizations such as SEATO and CENTO, and various bilateral arrangements with countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, she sought to bolster the capacity of the countries themselves to resist what she saw as imminent and actual communist aggression. Beginning in the early 1960's her direct military involvement in the conflict in Indo-China served only to further emphasize this stress on military solutions. But she did not entirely rely on military means. Considerable injections of economic assistance on a bilateral basis to selected countries also served in the interest of containment, as well as economic development.

Until the mid 1960's regional economic cooperation would not appear to have figured very prominently in U.S. policy calculations. Whatever support she extended was directed towards ventures such as the Colombo plan and the Mekong River project both of which were western inspired and sustained projects. An organization such as ASA would not appear to have been assigned any role whatsoever in her Southeast Asia 'strategy'. The Kennedy Administration would appear to have given some encouragement to and placed some hope in Maphilindo, but mainly because it was hoped it would help

4. It is illuminating that ASA is not mentioned at all in the account of US policy under Kennedy given by Roger Hilsman who himself was deeply involved in the formulation of these policies. See his To Move a Nation, passim.
'Indonesia to steer the forces of its nationalism into constructive channels, to turn towards economic development and towards picking up some of the responsibility for peace and security in the region' and, by implication, to prevent her from turning to communism.

However, as the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict escalated dramatically in the mid 1960's, a search began for additional means by which to pursue her policy objectives. In a speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965 President Johnson inaugurated a new trend of U.S. support for regional cooperation as a means of fostering unity and cohesion among the countries bordering on or near China. Encouraging the Southeast Asian countries to get together Johnson declared that he would ask congress for a billion dollars towards a development plan for Southeast Asia in which he hoped other industrialized nations would also participate.

In the time which followed other administration officials reiterated the theme of support for regional cooperation throughout non-communist East and Southeast Asia. Washington's policy was one of encouragement rather than initiative or, as Walt Rostow phrased it, 'it means that the United States increasingly will lead from the middle, not from the front'. The same idea was reiterated by U Alexis Johnson, deputy under-secretary for political affairs, when he said, 'I now turn to the question of "communities" of Asian nations. Our policy has consistently been to favour such communities and we have recognized that, to have any viability, the thrust must come from within the countries themselves'.

5. Ibid., chapter 27, esp. p.400.
7. Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LV, No. 1412, p. 82.
8. Ibid., Vol. LV, No. 1426, p. 641.
The institutions or organizations singled out for more than verbal support included especially the Asian Development Bank (ADB) based in Manila, which was established in December 1965 largely on the initiative of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and to whose capital the United States contributed $US 200 millions. An object of much verbal support was the Asian and Pacific Council (ASAPAC), established in June 1966, which, like the ADB, drew its membership from countries outside Asia as well. 9 ASA also received its share of diplomatic and verbal encouragement, 10 and the same was the case with ASEAN when it was formed in August 1967. Commenting on the formation of ASEAN, a state department spokesman welcomed the new association while stating that the United States had taken no part in its establishment. 11 In the ensuing period ASEAN continued to be an object of verbal support from the Johnson as well as the Nixon administrations. 12

While little or no concrete assistance has been given ASEAN as such, it is not therefore suggested that the United States' influence was negligible. The importance of the United States in relation to an organization such as ASEAN lay as much as anything else in the creation of a certain


international climate, a point which will be dealt with at greater length below.

THE SOVIET UNION AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

If for no other reason the Soviet Union is an Asian power on the strength of the fact that the bulk of her territory and much of her population are situated within Asia. Since Stalin's death Soviet interest in that part of her own territory which falls within Asia as well as her interest in Asia in general have grown steadily with her increased capacity to influence. 13

At the general level this increased interest and activity on the part of the Soviet Union can be viewed as the 'natural' tendency of a big power to extend its influence on a global scale. At a more specific level Soviet policies have been motivated by considerations related to the influence of the United States and China as well as Japan. In this context it has been suggested that the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system are serving four main Soviet interests. 14 Firstly, the Soviet Union has viewed intra-regional conflicts as conducive to American and Chinese intervention. Especially after the rapprochment between the United States and China there has been considerable anxiety in Moscow that these two countries and Japan might act in collusion. In this regard a collective security system would obstruct American-Chinese subversion. External intervention, in the Soviet view, can only be prevented if the Asian states themselves are strong and stable enough. This has, secondly, lead to a Soviet interest in the internal development of these states and to the advocacy of regional economic cooperation as a means of strengthening the Asian states.

A collective security system would result in a situation whereby the states could concentrate their resources on their economic and social development without having to channel them into defence. A third motive follows from the expansion of its interest in Asia, which would be greatly facilitated by the reduction of tensions and conflicts between the Asian states. Finally, the Soviet Union has been interested in promoting the concept of non-alignment, especially of the 'positive' neutrality variety which is seen as implying a certain bias towards the socialist camp. 15

However, the Soviet Union's endorsement of regional cooperation has not meant that she has necessarily been favourably disposed towards all regional cooperative ventures. In general her support would seem to have been directed towards those schemes which she herself has initiated, or in which she has a part, or which are consonant with her own ideological predilections. Thus while the attitude of the United States towards ASA and ASEAN has ranged from the indifferent to the highly positive, at least at the verbal level, the utterances and attitude of the Soviet Union have on the whole been negative. When ASEAN was formed Izvestia commented that the new association was 'cause for serious concern in Asia'. 16 At the 25th session of ECAFE in Bangkok in April 1969 the Soviet delegate argued against ECAFE undertaking a study of the development potential of ASEAN on the grounds that the latter was a military organization, and therefore excluded from recourse to the services of ECAFE. 17 Nonetheless, the Soviet attitude was not one of complete hostility. After the ASEAN countries had strongly denied the existence of any military role for the association, the Soviet delegate declared towards the

15. Ibid.
end of the session that the USSR would change her attitude towards ASEAN if she was convinced that the association's projects were economic and cultural in character. He also added, however, that 'we have information in our possession to show that ASEAN is not merely an economic, social and cultural body'.

When the Soviet Union has not completely condemned ASEAN this is in large measure due to the broader motives underlying her policies. She is in general interested in closer relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and the membership of Singapore and Malaysia in ASEAN for instance, has not prevented her from attempting to broaden her relations with these countries whenever an opportunity offered itself. Moreover, an outright hostile attitude towards ASEAN would not serve to further the acceptance of her own scheme for an Asian collective security system because of the danger of alienating the memberstates of ASEAN. This point was further emphasized when Malaysia sought and obtained from the other ASEAN states the endorsement in principle of her proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union has tended to view the Malaysian proposal as being consonant with her own collective security proposal, and it would consequently be unwise to criticise too strongly an organization which is seen

by Malaysia in particular as playing an important role in bringing to fruition her neutralization proposal.

The Soviet Union's increased activity in Southeast Asia since the mid 1960's must be seen primarily in the context of her rivalry with China in particular and the United States. The change of regime in Indonesia in 1965-66, although losing her one 'friend', enabled her to adopt a more flexible policy vis-a-vis countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, \(^{21}\) whilst the diminished American commitment to and presence in Southeast Asia in general opened up new opportunities for Soviet diplomacy in countries with which she previously had only the scantest of relations. Her attitude towards ASEAN has on the whole been negative though restrained and has been tempered by the wider motives underlying her Asian policies. \(^{22}\)

CHINA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Perhaps more than in the case of other big powers, divided opinions and doubts have existed among observers about the policies and intentions of China vis-a-vis Southeast Asia. On one point, however, there is widespread agreement, namely that China in her relations with Southeast Asia is strongly motivated by considerations of security. This, of course, is not in itself strange since all states to a lesser or greater degree, depending on individual circumstances, are similarly motivated. As far as China is concerned the disagreement among observers has centred on the question of what exactly she is intent on and prepared to do about her security, which in one way or another would or could affect Southeast Asia.

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Due to her geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, China has cause for anxiety about her security in a sense more distant powers, including Japan, have not. This factor, coupled most importantly with the ideological persuasion of the regime in China, led to the widespread belief, underlying much of the policies of, for instance, the United States, that China was intent on nothing short of extending her territorial expanse and control into Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, the small group of observers which disputed this thesis has grown considerably thus tending to make yesterday's orthodoxy into today's heresy. Despite the convulsions of the cultural revolution and its external repercussions, a significant element of the reappraisal of China's policies, which has taken place over the last decade or so, is the diminution of ideology as a motivating force in favour of considerations of expediency and pragmatism. No longer is it believed that China is exclusively preoccupied with the exportation of her own brand of socialism come what may. Increasingly China's major aim in Southeast Asia is considered to be the elimination of the presence of hostile military powers from neighbouring countries, even at the expense of her own revolutionary aspirations as well as those of the Southeast Asian communists, and the eventual establishment of a uniquely Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia in much the same way as the Americas have been

23. See Ross Terrill, "China's Aims in Southeast Asia", in Ian Wilson (Ed.), China and the World Community (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973), pp. 200-219; Roderick MacFarquhar, "China's Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and India", paper delivered at the conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, April 1973, Asia and the Western Pacific: Internal Changes and External Influences, Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp. 394-396. See also Gurtov, ibid., and Horn, op. cit. For a different view which essentially argues the primacy of ideology in China's foreign relations, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "People's China and Asian Insurgency: The Continuing Partnership", Pacific Community (Melbourne), No. 9, Winter 1971, pp. 15-42.

This does not mean that China would not like socialism adopted in Southeast Asia but rather that, when all circumstances have been evaluated and weighed, ideological considerations, such as whether or not to support 'people's wars', have mainly been used to influence the foreign policies of the countries concerned in directions beneficial to China's interests, especially her own security.  

China's attitude to regional cooperation would largely appear to have been determined by the identity of the countries involved. As far as ASA and ASEAN are concerned the tendency of China has been to view these organizations as parts of a broadly based 'plot' or alliance directed at herself, a perception the formation of which is understandable in view of the outspoken anti-China sentiments of the member states throughout the 1960's. Thus when ASEAN was formed China's reaction was unequivocally hostile.

An important link in the chain of the US-Soviet campaign against China is to actively rig up an encirclement of China. With this in mind the Soviet revisionist clique has been fraternizing with the followers and lackeys of US imperialism in Asia - the reactionaries of India, Japan, Indonesia and other countries - and working at criminal designs against China with them. Jointly instigated by the Soviet revisionists and US imperialists Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and "Malaysia" formed an "Association of Southeast Asian countries" as part of the US-Soviet anti-China ring.

Although China would still appear to consider ASEAN an aggressive and hostile organization her denunciations of it have been considerably less

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shrill in recent years. This more 'reasonable' attitude on the part of China is no doubt related to the overall changes in her approach to foreign relations since the heady days of the cultural revolution. It is perhaps best exemplified by her apparent acceptance of the neutralization idea of Malaysia. Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel, for example, was told by Chinese officials in April 1972 that China would respect the neutrality of Southeast Asia once the military links with the United States were no more. A similar assurance was given to Thailand's Deputy Undersecretary of State, Pan Wannamethi, in June 1973. The acceptance, if such it is, of the neutralization idea does not, of course, necessarily imply a positive attitude towards ASEAN. However, to the extent the neutralization proposal is being identified with and promulgated by ASEAN it would be difficult for China to accept the one and not the other.

JAPAN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Japan's relations with Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular over the last three decades have been cultivated and developed within the limits created largely by her own military adventurism and subsequent defeat in World War II. Partly as a result of impositions from without (mainly the United States), and in part due to a remarkable degree of self-abnegation resulting from a soul-searching examination of her war-time experiences and defeat, she adopted foreign and defence policies which were in no way commensurate with her ascent to the status as one of the strongest economic and commercial powers in the world.

29. For a general exposition of Japan's relations with Asia, see Lawrence Olson, Japan in Post War Asia, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970). See also Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan", in Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 32-60.
Protected militarily by her alliance with the United States and eschewing a military posture of her own that could be seen as a possible threat to the rest of Asia, Japan's primary objective has been to support policies in regard to Southeast Asia which were likely to create the conditions necessary for the development and continued well-being of her own commercial and economic interests. The importance to Japan of this objective is best illustrated by a few statistics. In 1967, for example, Southeast Asia ranked with Western Europe as Japan's second most important trading area only surpassed by the United States. Furthermore, the importance of Southeast Asia is also underlined by the fact that it is one of the most important suppliers of raw materials as well as an important location for Japanese foreign investment.

Japan's policies on regional organization and cooperation have consisted of a blend of initiative and encouragement. On the one hand are organizations such as the Asian Productivity Organization and the Asian Parliamentarian's Union, as well as others, which to a great extent owe their existence to Japanese initiatives and participation. On the other hand are organizations which are seen by Japan as being instrumental in bringing about a measure of stability and order in regional affairs and therefore worthy of her support. Among these were in the past ASA and at present ASEAN. The Japanese foreign office welcomed the formation of ASEAN and saw it as evidence


of a move away from narrow nationalism and the existence of common interests which would bring about a greater measure of stability in the region.  

The general support for ASEAN was reiterated by the Japanese Prime Minister, Sato, when he visited several ASEAN countries in September 1967, and as a policy it was continued by his successor, Tanaka, who expressed similar support for ASEAN on his tour of Southeast Asia during December 1973 and January 1974. It should, however, be stressed that, as with the United States, Japan's policy has been one of moral encouragement and support at the verbal level, and she has continued to deal with the ASEAN countries on an individual basis.

THE EEC AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Of the countries which constitute the European Economic Community at present, especially Britain, France and the Netherlands have had long-standing relations with most of Southeast Asia, first in their capacity as colonial masters and later as significant trading partners and aid donors. Although they have rapidly weakened in later years, Britain has in addition retained relatively strong military and defence links with Malaysia and Singapore through various defence arrangements which provided for a British military presence in the area. Due to the nearly total British military withdrawal from the area, however, the significance of Britain's relations, as of the rest of the EEC countries, now rests nearly entirely in the economic, commercial and political contacts that exist.

The years prior to 1967 were characterized by bilateral relations between the countries of the EEC and those of Southeast Asia. The EEC as such

had no particular relations or agreements with any one country or group of countries in the region. Since about 1967-68, however, there has been a slow but perceptible change in the character of the relations between the countries of the EEC and those of ASEAN in particular. There are signs that in relation to certain matters the EEC and ASEAN have begun to deal with each other on an organizational basis. The reason for this can be largely related to the fact that the formation of ASEAN more or less coincided with the entrance of the EEC into a new significant phase. This was the establishment, with effect from 1 July 1968, of the customs union which meant that the customs duties within the common market were no more, and that a single, external tariff of the community was introduced. 35 With some exceptions, this in turn meant that trade agreements had to be concluded with the community as such rather than with individual EEC members. The consequence of this has been that more than before the outside world has tended to look upon the EEC as an entity the trading and commercial power of which calls for greater coordination among countries outside the community. As far as ASEAN is concerned this process towards inter-organizational relations began with the visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, to Southeast Asia in mid 1968. On that occasion he advocated the formation of a common market among the ASEAN countries which would serve to enhance the bargaining power of these countries in their dealings with the EEC. 36 A similar impetus towards a greater measure of coordination of policies was received when Foreign Minister Walter Scheel pledged West German economic and technical aid to projects initiated by ASEAN during a visit to the region in 1970. In late


1971 the Indonesian Minister of Trade, Dr. Sumitro, met EEC officials who expressed the EEC's preference for dealing with the ASEAN countries collectively rather than individually. This first contact with EEC officials caused the formation of an ASEAN committee to coordinate the policies of the member states towards the EEC. At the official level the first talks between ASEAN and the EEC took place in June 1972. On that occasion the ASEAN delegation submitted for consideration by the EEC a memorandum dealing with the conditions of access of ASEAN exports to the community. At the institutional level an ASEAN Brussels Committee was formed to handle the day-to-day relations with the EEC institutions. These initial and subsequent meetings were of an exploratory nature, and no agreement has as yet been concluded between the EEC and ASEAN. Until such time the trade of the ASEAN countries (as well as that of other Asian countries) will continue to suffer a handicap compared to that of countries from other regions of the world, especially Africa. This has become even more pronounced after the entry of Britain into the EEC which led to the abolition of Commonwealth preferences for countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. Nonetheless, the continuing contact between the EEC and ASEAN holds the promise that this situation will be remedied.

EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

The extra-regional environment and, more specifically, certain extra-regional powers such as those dealt with above, may be seen to exert influence on two levels. At the more specific level there is the impact of particular extra-regional policies either towards ASEAN as such or towards individual member states. In more ways than one these may influence the course of the cooperation within the organization. At a more general level, there are the thoughts and attitudes the political leaders of the ASEAN countries entertain about the international environment. Since this environment is never static, these thoughts and attitudes are liable to change in response to outside developments. Such changes may also have considerable effect on the thinking of the political leaders as far as regional cooperation in general and ASEAN in particular are concerned.

As regards the influence of the policies of the extra-regional powers on ASEAN, one can do little more than speculate, primarily because of the short existence of ASEAN itself. Nonetheless, there are certain features which would seem to stand out and in relation to which two initial observations should be made. The first concerns the extent to which the policies are essentially political or economic in nature. The second concerns the extent to which extra-regional policies are directed at ASEAN per se, or at individual member states. The importance of these distinctions rests on their capacity to produce a common or an individual response from the ASEAN countries, that is, whether or not they have caused the ASEAN countries to adopt common policies towards the outside world, and thus presumably been instrumental in 'nudging' the organization along the road towards a higher degree of integration.

As already indicated only the EEC has stated a clear preference for dealing with the ASEAN countries as an entity. Indeed, the reaction of the ASEAN countries has been such as to suggest that the community has made this
stipulation a condition for future economic relations. Whatever the case may be in this regard, this preference on the part of the EEC has provided an added incentive for the ASEAN countries to search for a common approach to economic relations with the community. It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent the ASEAN countries will be able to define their economic interests in such a way that a common policy emerges. However, the pressure to downgrade differences and to emphasize the search for common solutions is certainly there. Depending inter alia on the duration of the relations between the EEC and ASEAN, whatever agreements are concluded are likely to entail a measure of integrative behaviour which may become internalized within the various countries. In this way external pressure and influence on ASEAN may in some measure impress upon the relevant elites a regional outlook the development of which is, as argued in the previous chapter, otherwise unlikely within the present institutional structure of ASEAN.

As far as the United States and Japan are concerned their relations with ASEAN as such have mainly consisted of moral and verbal support for the idea of regional cooperation as expressed in ASEAN. There have been no or only inconclusive moves on their part indicating a readiness to treat the five countries as a group in any other than a symbolic way. Policies continue to be formulated with a view to individual countries. It is arguable and, indeed, quite likely that the strong political and military presence of the United States in particular, has served to maintain the fragmented nature of much of Southeast Asian inter-state relations. Through her policy of containment and her military presence she has provided some Southeast Asian countries with an 'easy' option as far as their security needs are concerned, thereby in a sense abolishing the need for distinctly regional solutions. A corollary of this is that it may have removed much of the urgency from the need to settle intra-regional conflicts. The American presence and military
assistance to Thailand to counter the perceived threat from China and North Vietnam may, for example, have made it less important for Thailand to attempt to bring about a detente with Sihanouk's Cambodia.

On the other hand, certain policies of the United States and Japan may quite unintentionally have served to strengthen the unity within ASEAN or, at any rate, brought into existence a perception of common interests in special areas where no or only a weak perception existed before. This was the case when the United States released on the world market a quantity of rubber from her stock piles. This action provoked a protest from the ASEAN countries. A similar ASEAN concern was expressed in relation to Japan's production of synthetic rubber which has tended to adversely affect the production of natural rubber within ASEAN. Such actions on the part of the United States and Japan have served to heighten the awareness within the ASEAN countries of the value of a common policy for the protection of important economic interests.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China has recognized ASEAN as a group. On the contrary, both have tended to consider the organization as being inimical to their interests. Nevertheless, the question of China forced the ASEAN countries to coordinate their policies as far as relations with her were concerned. The policies of China after the cultural revolution, and her apparent willingness to broaden her formal relations with Southeast Asia, led the ASEAN countries, firstly, to adopt a common policy on the admission of China to the United Nations and, secondly, to extensively consult each other on the question of diplomatic relations. This consultative

and cautious approach derived not only from the uncertainty about China's external policies in general, but more specifically from a concern for the effect of relations with China on the large Chinese minorities in the various ASEAN countries. This last consideration has been uppermost in the minds of the political leaders in Malaysia and Singapore, the latter of whom herself is essentially a Chinese state. Nonetheless, when in May 1974 Malaysia concluded an agreement with China on diplomatic relations this was done on the basis of an understanding among the ASEAN countries, all of which have agreed in principle to relations subject to the fulfilment of individual conditions.

The extent to which policies emanating from the international environment will forge a greater measure of unity and cohesion within ASEAN is still a matter for conjecture. However, there are signs showing that certain policies have had such an effect. In this regard, the insistence of the EEC on relations with ASEAN as such rather than with the individual members, would seem to possess in itself a greater potential capacity for encouraging such tendencies within ASEAN. To the extent economic relations with the EEC yield results beneficial to ASEAN, this in turn may lead to a stipulation on the part of ASEAN that other countries or group of countries also treat the ASEAN countries as an entity at least in relation to some economic activities.

It is also likely that economic rather than purely 'political' policies and stimulants will serve as the greater incentive to the development of ASEAN unity and cohesion. This can be attributed to two factors in

42. For a general and informative analysis of China's relations with Southeast Asia, see FitzGerald, China and Southeast Asia since 1945, passim.
particular. Although there are signs of more extensive political consultations, the organization is nonetheless predominantly geared to the development of economic cooperation. This being the case one would expect the countries involved to more readily react to economic pressures and stimulants. But more importantly, because of the transitory nature of many specifically political stimulants, their effect may not be as lasting as the more enduring stimulants provided by economic factors. Political decisions and agreements may also more easily be reversed than decisions and agreements based on economic and commercial considerations.

When all this is said it should also be added that one ought to be on guard against the economic determinism that this type of argument often entails. Cooperation within ASEAN takes place within an environment, regional and global, in which factors essentially political in nature tend to have an overriding influence. As argued in the previous chapter the development of ASEAN is ultimately dependent on the commitment and support of a fairly limited group of people in the various member states. Their commitment in turn is anchored in the ideas, thoughts and perceptions they have about the international environment in general and the regional in particular, and the place and status of their own countries in relation to these surroundings. It is therefore important to pause for a moment to examine these ideas and perceptions and their relationship to the course ASEAN has taken so far.

Perhaps more than any other the perception of the international environment as predatory in nature permeates the thinking of most leaders in

44. See the call by Singapore's Foreign Minister, supported by Thailand and the Philippines, for more extensive political consultation, reported in Japan Times, 14 April 1972 and Manila Bulletin, 16 April 1972.
the ASEAN countries. Most often this idea is expressed in a belief in the readiness of outside powers to exploit all internal weaknesses and to seek the domination of Southeast Asia if given the opportunity. The strength with which this belief is held may vary from person to person and from country to country, but it is in some measure present in the thinking of all. Yet, it is not held with equal conviction in relation to all outside forces and powers.

More so than others Indonesian leaders would seem to harbour suspicions about the international environment in general. In the words of Franklin Weinstein, they see the outside world as 'basically a hostile place in which there are always forces at work seeking to exploit and subjugate Indonesia. Every nation, of course, has its enemies. But those who perceive the outside world as predominantly a hostile place are worried about their friends as well'. 45 However, feelings and perceptions of being victimised by the international environment are not confined to the Indonesians. In an address in March 1967 the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, said inter alia that '...it is by no means an exaggeration to observe that the world we live in today is at best difficult and challenging and at worst hazardous and even dangerous'. 46 On another occasion he expressed the 'need for a more effective effort to neutralize any eventual interference or intervention on the part of others into our affairs and our interests'. 47 Malaysia's Ghazali bin Shafie wrote in October 1971 about Southeast Asia's strategic value and economic potential which made the region a natural target for exploitation and an arena for big power struggle. In his view foreign

45. "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia", p. 367.
46. Address reproduced in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 6, No. 4 (February-March 1967), p. 311.
47. Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 2 (October-November 1968), p. 104.
interference is primarily a matter of global strategy and power balance as well as economic exploitation which will make the major powers continuously examine the international situation to gain an advantage in relation to other powers. 48 The most outspoken of all Southeast Asian leaders, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, expressed it in this way, 'In the next hundred years, we shall have to live with the fact that at present two, and later three superpowers, will contend in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to so order the political and economic life in the region to the maximum advantage of each superpower'. 49

These general though sometimes vaguely held attitudes of uneasiness and suspicion of the international environment, represent the constant and more enduring element in the thinking of ASEAN leaders. In particular periods of time and under certain conditions they become reinforced and explicitly focused on particular parts of the international environment, and during the 1960's and early 1970's on none more than communism and communist ruled states such as China and North Vietnam. The following quotation sums up the attitude and perceptions of most leaders in the ASEAN countries.

...in the wake of the...retreat [of Western colonialism] a new form of imperialism - the communist imperialism - is stepping into the shoes thus vacated hoping to reap the benefits enjoyed by the former exploiters of foreign lands and peoples. The communist imperialists seek to attain the same objectives as the western colonialists, namely domination and subjection of other nations and exploitation of the riches and resources belonging to others. However, they are clever enough to introduce novel methods of implementing their aims. 50

From the standpoint of any one of the member states, the rest of the ASEAN members are nominally a part of the international environment in

49. Straits Times, 17 February 1968.
50. Thanat Khoman in Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol.6, No.4, pp.311-312.
general, and thus presumably the object of much the same distrust as the extra-ASEAN environment. But the question arises about the extent to which this is the case. Given an attitude of distrust towards the general environment, a propensity on the part of each member to distinguish between the rest of ASEAN and the international environment as such, may be taken as a sign, weak though it may be, of a growing feeling of community among the ASEAN states.

The very formation of ASEAN itself is, of course, an explicit indication that a distinction of sorts is part and parcel of the thinking of the ASEAN leaders. But it need not necessarily be a sign of growing community sentiments. The motives underlying the participation in any regional cooperation are usually mixed. In the case of the ASEAN states the perception of an outside threat to all of them stronger than that of each to the other proved a considerable motivating force. Singapore is the only possible exception in that she would appear to harbour anxieties vis-a-vis her neighbours, especially Indonesia, which possibly matched her distrust of the extra-ASEAN environment. Whatever the case may be, however, the existence of distrust of the international environment in general, cannot be taken as evidence of the development of community feelings. One further point should be made about Singapore's decision to join ASEAN which also would tend to question the content of the distinction between ASEAN and the rest of the international environment. There is considerable reason to believe that Singapore joined ASEAN as much out of necessity as from an exercise of free choice. In other words, there was an element of compulsion involved in Singapore's decision to join which was not present in the decision of the other members. Singapore's leaders would appear to have favoured other, more broad conceptions of regionalism than that encompassed in ASEAN. She was more interested in countries such as Britain, Australia, the United States and Japan than in her Southeast Asian neighbours as cooperative
partners primarily because she thought there were greater benefits to be harvested from such relations. However, the facts of her own geographic and economic position made it difficult, if not virtually impossible, for her not to join ASEAN. The attitude of her leaders may perhaps best be summarized in the words, 'if you can't lick 'em, join 'em'. Given the perception of having to join ASEAN, Prime Minister Lee saw the membership in the organization as an opportunity for her neighbours to prove that their intentions towards Singapore were peaceful and harmless. Asked just after the formation of ASEAN in August 1967 about Singapore's readiness to play her part in constructing a framework for regional prosperity and security, he answered,

I don't think we can come to mutual security until we come to the economic and commercial part first. If you are trying to fix me economically, do you believe that I will believe that you are going to defend me? I mean, this is nonsense, isn't it? First of all, let us demonstrate to each other that we mean well to each other. 52

Thus, in 1967 the formation of ASEAN and the implied distinction between it and the rest of the international environment were not necessarily an indication of a qualitatively different relationship among the ASEAN countries. However, in the years since there have been signs that when ASEAN leaders distinguish between ASEAN and the international environment at large, they increasingly do so because they regard the relations within ASEAN to be different, less predatory and exploitative, less directed by devious motives, and more moved by enlightened self-interest to an extent the rest or most of the environment is not. In short, ASEAN leaders are increasingly beginning

52. Straits Times, 7 November 1967.
to think in terms of 'us and them', of 'we and they'.

The increasing propensity to seek common solutions to economic, commercial and even political, relations with the outside world is, of course, the practical manifestation of this tendency. But it is also reflected in the thinking of the various leaders. In this respect the changes in the outlook of the Singapore leaders are especially significant because none was more skeptical about the potentials of ASEAN. Commenting in 1967, Lee said,

First, we must convince each other that we don't want to change boundaries by force...Once that is demonstrated and I am convinced nobody wants to do me in, more important, Singapore is convinced - because I may be convinced, but if the people of Singapore are not convinced, the Prime Minister cannot do it - if Singapore is convinced that her neighbours, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, eventually even Burma, Cambodia, Laos mean us well, once we are convinced of that, then we will really cooperate to mutual advantage.  

In 1971, the Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, talked less about mutual suspicions and anxieties, "The nations of Southeast Asia, more than ever before in their history, are talking more directly to one another. There is a growing awareness of not only one another's presence but also of the fact that they have many problems in common'.  

In April the following year, Lee himself talked about the greater understanding of each other's problems as perhaps the greatest achievement of ASEAN. The understanding and goodwill it had generated had helped to lubricate relationships which

53. Ibid.

54. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-4, 12 March 1971, Opening statement by Mr. S. Rajaratnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour of Singapore, at the Fourth Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Manila 12 March 1972, p. 6.
could otherwise had created frictions. 55 At the ASEAN ministerial conference in May 1974, Rajaratnam talked about the things which ASEAN had not done.

However, the past seven years have been spent largely in establishing the habit of regional co-operative thinking, both of which barely existed before the setting up of ASEAN...So while conceding that we could have done more during the past seven years, nevertheless I am not inclined to be unnecessarily modest about the progress ASEAN has made so far. I am convinced that ASEAN is now an established organization, and that it has now passed the point of no return. We cannot, even if we wanted to, dismantle it without each of us getting into very serious economic and political difficulties. Perhaps without our realising it, ASEAN ideas and techniques have sufficiently permeated national frontiers and national thinking to make their eradication an extremely difficult and possibly risky operation. 56

Statements and words such as these by the Singaporeans have also been spoken by other ASEAN leaders. Malaysia's Tun Ismail said in April 1972 that '...the existence of the regional bodies I have mentioned leads me to believe that we are in a position to embark upon what has been so far no more than a dream, the creation of a Southeast Asian Community'. 57 Carlos Romulo of the Philippines gave expression to similar thoughts when he stated in March 1971, 'We wish to erect a community among ourselves with strong economic and cultural ties binding us together. Underlying all is the search for a moral consensus, the vital ingredient of any community. That is our first task'. 58 Talking about the progress of ASEAN so far, Thanat

55. *Straits Times*, 14 April 1972.
Khoman of Thailand said at the ministerial meeting of the organization in 1971, '...we cannot help feel that the Organization has now passed its organizational stage and should from now on ... bring direct and tangible benefits to our peoples'. 59

Statements such as these contain no doubt a measure of rhetoric and optimism designed to suit the occasion. They have, however, nearly invariably been accompanied by warnings against expectations of instantaneous benefits. In this respect Adam Malik's words from 1971 could have been spoken by all of them. 'Meanwhile, it has been recognized that we shall not attempt to reach our ultimate goal overnight, nor shall we achieve them without pains, inconvenience, disagreement and painful adjustment.' 60 Nor do these statements reflect a belief that all conflicts, problems and differences have been removed from intra-ASEAN relations. They do, however, reflect a cautious belief that some suspicions, differences and anxieties have been reduced in strength, that the cooperation within ASEAN has been worthwhile and instrumental in bringing about this state of affairs, and that ASEAN will and can play a useful role in the future.

To say that all regional organizations in some measure are children of the perceptions political leaders have about the international environment, and the status and place of their own countries within this environment is, of course, to state the obvious. The important question concerns the degree to which this is so in individual cases, because it is

59. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-3, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at the Fourth Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 12 March 1971, p. 8.

60. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-6, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by H.E. Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of ASEAN, Manila, 12 March 1971, p. 10.
after all not unthinkable that a regional organization might be formed largely in response to 'objective' conditions in the environment which may have only a tenuous relationship to the prevailing perceptions of this same environment. In the case of ASEAN, there is a sense in which this organization, perhaps more than others of a similar kind, is the child of and has been molded by the perceptions of the political leaders involved.

Reference has already been made to the perception of the international environment in general as predatory, hazardous, even brutish in nature. This is of course an impression one might acquire without reference to particular concrete experiences. In the case of the present generation of political leaders in Southeast Asia, however, the colonial experience and especially the exploitative aspects of it, left a deep imprint on their minds. 'Among the deleterious effects of foreign domination the most painful to bear was perhaps the injury done to Asian pride and dignity'. In some cases, such as Indonesia, independence was won only after a long and hard armed struggle. Moreover, unlike most other decolonized areas of the world the Southeast Asian countries were not left to deal with their problems in relative peace. No sooner had they rid themselves of one set of imperial powers before another set attempted to encroach on their independence. The whole tragic story of the Indo-China conflicts and the problems connected with insurgency and subversion could not but reinforce the view of the world as a dangerous place to live in. The words of Thanat Khoman describe well the situation most of them found themselves in. 'Ever since I took office almost ten years ago, I cannot recall a month or a year about which I can say that we are living in peace, that we have no problems

62. Ibid., p. 144.
to try to think about and to find the solutions' 63 The perception of an external threat to the security of their countries and its role as a motivating force in the formation of ASEAN were discussed in chapter 5. As far as the leaders of the ASEAN countries are concerned, this is the most important danger emanating from the international environment. But there are others as well. The economic weakness of their countries is seen as making them an easy prey for determined predators. The then Philippine Foreign Minister, Ramos, talked about this danger at the meeting in Bangkok in 1967 when ASEAN was formed. 'The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia, each pursuing its own limited objectives and dissipating its meager resources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavours of sister states, carry the seeds of weakness in their incapacity for growth and their self-perpetuating dependence on the advanced industrial nations.' 64

These strong perceptions of living in an international environment fraught with danger and inhabited by forces only too ready to exploit and even conquer, it is argued, played an unusually prominent role in determining the formation of ASEAN. They created a desire to find means to counter these dangers, and coupled with the perception of their countries' individual weakness, prompted the leaders to seek solutions beyond national boundaries. The influence of these perceptions, however, did not cease with the formation of ASEAN in 1967. In a general sense they have continued to fuel the organization in subsequent years. At the same time they have also strongly influenced the pace with which the cooperation within the organization has proceeded. Well aware of the existence of mutual suspicions and

63. Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 1 (August-September 1968), p. 5.
64. ASEAN/Dec/3 Proceedings, p. 2.
latent conflicts among themselves, the ASEAN leaders moved cautiously and slowly. Feeling their way with each other, they have avoided forcing the pace lest the strain would lead to the collapse of the organization, and thus leave them more exposed than ever to the vagaries of the international environment.

Ernst Haas (and others) has suggested that the external environment can be of great importance in explaining integration. There is, however, a need to distinguish between several sources of influence all of which are but parts of this environment and not all of which necessarily exert equal influence. Haas himself has suggested three sources in particular, namely the global system as such, a single state (or its elite) and a regional counter system. 65

As argued above the perception of the ASEAN leaders of being victimized by the international environment has, indeed, had a strong impact not only on the formation but also on the subsequent course of ASEAN. In words identical to those used by Haas 66, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, in a speech in April 1972 talked about regional cooperation and the formation of a Southeast Asian 'community' as a means by which the countries in the region may be 'able to get out from under', to rid themselves of undue influences, and to 'breathe the free air and grasp the opportunity to decide [their] destiny'. 67

As already suggested the reason for this unusually strong influence of the international environment as such rests in the historical, especially the colonial, experiences which could not but greatly influence the perceptions of the leaders. Such experiences are, of course, not unique to the

66. Ibid.
leaders in Southeast Asia. But in their region independence did not mark the start of a period of relative tranquility and peace but rather the opposite. Nearly without exception the era of independence has been a time of great turmoil and conflict for these countries to an extent unmatched in other regions. If anything, it reinforced their view of the international environment as basically predatory and hostile.

In terms of single extra-regional states, no one state can be said to have had anything but a marginal direct influence on ASEAN. Especially after the mid 1960's, the United States offered moral and symbolic encouragement to regional cooperation. Together with Japan, she has continued this form of support without, however, in any apparent way having directly had a strong influence on the course of the cooperation within ASEAN. By their largely negative attitude, the Soviet Union and China may possibly have strengthened the resolve of the ASEAN leaders. All four of them have, on the other hand, indirectly greatly influenced ASEAN through their roles as the most significant elements of the international environment.

In its capacity as a regional counter system, the EEC has had a greater influence which has expressed itself in essentially three ways. Firstly, together with other regional organizations it has become an example

68. See the reaction of Thanat Khoman to opposition to ASEAN, reported in Bangkok World, 21 March 1968.
to be copied and possibly emulated. As alluded to in chapter 2, the Tunku often referred to the EEC and the Nordic Council as possible models for similar efforts in Southeast Asia. In this sense the EEC has been used perhaps mainly as an example of a contemporary vogue. Secondly, the EEC is seen as the foremost exponent of a trend in the international system towards bigger economic and commercial concentrations, the emergence of which makes it imperative for smaller countries to respond by coming together. Tun Ismail expressed this idea in explicit terms when he said,

I think it would be true to say that the concept of regional cooperation is now widely recognized and universally acknowledged as an important instrument, if not an imperative in the development of nations, particularly those that are small and still in various stages of economic growth...In a sense, regional cooperation is a logical and inevitable fact of economics; for just as small companies have to combine and join together to meet the challenge of new and bigger companies so have small countries to come together to pool their resources and coordinate their efforts. That way only can we rise effectively to the challenge and provide an alternative to the threat of domination by the big countries with their powerful economies. 69

Thirdly, the EEC has at least the potential of greatly influencing ASEAN, especially by its preference for dealing with the ASEAN countries as a group rather than individually. As seen already this process has started. Hence, the EEC has had an impact on ASEAN inasmuch that its presence has impressed on the leaders of the ASEAN countries a view of regional cooperation

69. ASEAN 71FM/STA-5, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by H.E. Tun (Dr) Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the Fourth Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Manila, 12 March 1971, p. 3.
as something urgent, necessary and, indeed, inevitable.

Although no extensive treatment will be accorded it here, since this would inevitably involve a thorough and detailed analysis of the domestic politics of the countries concerned, there is another aspect of the influence of the external environment about which a few words should be said.

The arguments which pertain to this aspect revolve around the notions of 'neocolonialism' and 'neoimperialism'. More specifically, they hold that much of the less developed world is in effect controlled by the developed capitalist governments and economies through the penetration of the economies of the former by the economies of the latter. Though the colonial empires by and large have crumbled, the control and dominance exerted by the capitalist states have nonetheless continued in much the same way as in colonial times, only, in the contemporary world, the means have changed. Moreover, 'imperialism is not a matter of choice for capitalist society; it is the way of life of such a society'.

In other words, imperialism and neocolonialism are seen as essential parts of the nature of capitalism.

Leaving aside the question of the nature of capitalism, there is one aspect in particular of this argument, which has special relevance to processes of regional cooperation and integration. Sometimes it is said that the penetration of the economies of the less developed countries by the economies of the developed capitalist states, has imposed on the economic and political systems of the former a semblance of stability and order which is 'artificial', and without which social forces within these societies would bring about much needed social change. More often than not, this stability and

70. Perhaps the most prominent contemporary exponent of this thesis is Harry Magdoff. See his, The Age of Imperialism. The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), passim. For a recent, critical analysis of Marxist and radical theories of imperialism, as well as for some suggestions of his own, see Benjamin C. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism. The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (London: Macmillan, 1973), passim.
and order with their implied bias in favour of the status quo, are seen as results of a deliberate policy on the part of the developed capitalist states designed to suit their interests. A corollary of this argument is that the relative peace and tranquility which have on the whole characterized the relations between the ASEAN states in recent years, are in no small measure due to this kind of influences, which allow the capitalist states to extract maximum profits from the former.

The merits of this kind of arguments cannot easily be determined since they are essentially complex empirical questions, the answers to which, we believe, are not to be found in immutable laws pertaining to the 'nature of capitalism'. One can, however, put forward one or two tentative points about possible effects of economic penetration in the ASEAN countries. There are, for example, indications that foreign investments in Indonesia have contributed to a more stable economic situation. Whether or not this 'stability' is of any benefit to Indonesia as a whole is a question to which many and conflicting answers have been given. Views have also been advanced which argue that the Indonesian military elite in particular is dependent on foreign investment for their continued stay in power. In Thailand, another heavily 'penetrated' country, western capital and investment did not save the military from being removed from Power. Furthermore, both in Indonesia and Thailand, the visible presence of foreign capital and enterprises have caused considerable internal conflict between the governments and indigenous business, which argue in terms of lost opportunities and unfair advantages given to foreign capital, and between the governments and nationalists, who argue in terms of the erosion of sovereignty and independence. Thus, the penetration by foreign capital has had many effects, by no means all of which support those who argue that the relative stability and tranquility within and between the ASEAN states are due to the influence of western capital.
Such arguments tend to overlook the actions of the governments themselves. Moreover, although a measure of economic stability may be necessary for any ordered relationship between states, the cooperation between the ASEAN countries has in one sense been essentially political in that much of the activities have resulted from actions of political leaders concerned with creating a political climate conducive to more fruitful economic cooperation.

Nonetheless, when all this is said, it remains also to be pointed out that these are questions which need to be researched, if we are to arrive at a fuller and more complete picture of the influence of the international environment on regional cooperative and integrative processes.
PART THREE

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS: PROCESSES OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

It has been assumed throughout this study that cooperation and integration are continuous in the sense that at some point along a continuum processes of cooperation pass a threshold at which they are transformed into or become processes of integration. This point has been assumed to have been reached with the first transfer, however modest, to regional bodies of functions and powers which previously rested with the individual states. ASEAN, and for that matter any other regional organization in Southeast Asia, has plainly not reached this point. In the case of ASEAN there are nevertheless signs that in some respects there have been slow but discernible moves towards this point. In other respects, however, the signs are less unequivocal, and in this last chapter an attempt will be made to assess these trends, some of which appear to be contradictory, and to relate them to elements of existing theories of regional integration.

In assessing the contribution of the study of regional organizations such as ASA and ASEAN to our understanding of integration, it is necessary to make one or two initial points.

The existing knowledge of cooperative and integrative processes at work in Southeast Asia leaves much to be desired, and this study has only in some degree been able to remedy this situation. Our knowledge is partial and fragmented, and a number of potentially important factors have not been investigated. This being so, it is difficult, if not impossible, to relate the findings of this study to particular theories as such. The best that can be done is to relate what we have learnt to specific elements or parts of these
The second and related point was made in the introductory chapter but needs restating here. Most theories of regional integration deal with processes that have passed the point on the continuum at which, at least, some functions and powers have been transferred to regional bodies. The empirical generalizations and relationships they stipulate, therefore, deal with conditions and processes the outcomes of which are associated with levels of integration not reached in Southeast Asia. For this reason they may indeed be considered 'ideal' outcomes, and as far as Southeast Asia and ASEAN are concerned, there is no a priori reason to believe in their attainment. In other words, any eventual outcome of the specific processes at work in Southeast Asia may be quite different from those attained elsewhere.

COOPERATIVE AND INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Since our knowledge of the cooperative and integrative processes at work in Southeast Asia is so partial and fragmented, it is impossible to firmly determine the relative salience of the various factors. Bearing in mind the tentative nature of such an undertaking, it is, nevertheless, possible to indicate an order of importance among the factors about which some knowledge exist.

The most significant conclusions to emerge from the analysis in the preceding chapters are clustered around the role of the external environment in the cooperative and integrative processes in Southeast Asia. It is not, therefore, implied that the external factor is all important, everywhere, all the time. To the extent the external factor has been examined, the concern has been with the conditions under which it could exert the strong influence it has.
In the search for explanations we shall find much of the answer in the prevailing perceptions of the international environment.

From the point of view of Southeast Asia as a whole, the perceptions of an extra-regional threat have on the whole been stronger than similar perceptions pertaining to the regional environment. For reasons discussed in chapter 5, these perceptions have contributed strongly towards a division of the area into essentially two non-communist camps, of which one based its foreign policies on accommodation to China and the other on opposition to her. It is among the latter group that regional cooperative processes have flourished. This fact raises the question whether or not one can talk about Southeast Asia as a region in any other than a geographical sense. There are certainly a number of conditions that are common to more or less all the countries in the region, such as the less developed state of their economies, a high incidence of internal, often violent, conflict, and so on. The main characteristic of most of these shared conditions rests in their negative aspects, that is, a great number deal with things that these countries do not possess. Although the latter may be a motivating force in the sense that a belief may arise in the superiority of collective over individual efforts in the search for remedies, it is suggested that alone, they provide an insufficient motive in getting cooperative processes started. In Southeast Asia they have been cut across by considerations related to security, in a manner outlined in chapter 5. Due to historical relations and circumstances, and geographical proximity to the main extra-regional threat, the fact of underdevelopment has not provided the impetus in Burma in the way it has in the case of the ASEAN states.

Should the cooperation within ASEAN continue and flourish, the countries involved may learn and acquire cooperative practices which will set them apart from the rest of the area. Another possibility is, of course, that the ASEAN states and the rest of Southeast Asia, including the communist
ruled states, may see themselves as having interests in common in relation to China. It has long been part of the thinking of Adam Malik and others, that once the situation in Indo-China was settled in one way or another, these states should be brought into the cooperative framework of ASEAN.

When we turn from the region as a whole to specific states, it was suggested before that the political leaders of the ASEAN states perceive the general international environment as hostile and predatory; that they have a particularly strong sense of their countries being victimized by this environment, and that these perceptions and feelings produced much of the desire for 'getting out from under', that is, for cooperation among themselves to counter all sorts of dangers and threats from the environment. It needs to be stressed once more that these perceptions are deep rooted. They derive from a keen sense of history which in these leaders' view has treated their countries none too kindly. Nearly all of them consider themselves and their countries heirs to and the custodians of what is left of the great civilizations of Southeast Asia. To them the colonial experience was especially humiliating, and the struggle to cast off the colonial yoke was in many ways a cleansing process which restored their self-esteem. But as mentioned above, the era of independence was in more ways than one merely a continuation of the colonial times. There were still forces within, as well as without, ready to exploit and to dominate. Having recaptured a measure of control over their own destinies, it became imperative to retain and possibly expand the scope of this control. Well aware of their countries' individual weakness, the idea has grown among these leaders that the chance of survival could be enhanced through a collective rather than an individual approach. It is suggested that the external factor, conceived in this manner, has played a crucial part in the formation of ASA and ASEAN.

This leads on to a related question to which no one answer exist. How enduring are these perceptions as a motivating force? What will happen
if the international environment changed to the 'better'? Much will in this regard depend on which elements of the perceptions of the leaders are the more durable and strongly held and which are the more transitory. It was suggested that the view of the international environment as fundamentally hostile and treacherous is firmly embedded in the beliefs of the political leaders of the region. One would therefore expect that the external factor will continue to exert considerable influence on the course of regional cooperation in general, and ASEAN in particular, since changes in the particular parts of the international environment, unless of a drastic nature, are unlikely to change in any fundamental way the perception of the international environment as such.

In Southeast Asia both ASA and ASEAN came into being partly because of the strong perceptions of a threat to the security of the member states. When ASA proved less viable than ASEAN, this can in no small measure be explained by reference to the changes in the external factor. In the early 1960's Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had strong military links with western powers, notably the United States and Britain, who served as guarantors of their security. This externally provided security against mainly extra-regional threats made the resolution of intra-regional and intra-ASA conflicts less urgent and imperative. In the late 1960's and early 1970's the same countries, plus Singapore and Indonesia, now as members of ASEAN, could no longer rely on the same degree of externally supported security. There is on the whole a realization in Southeast Asia that sooner rather than later, the countries in the region will have to fend for themselves in matters of military security. Being on their own has made them realize that intra-regional and intra-ASEAN conflicts must be downgraded in the interest of a common approach to threats from without. These threats include not only the military variety, but also other kinds prominent among which is the fear of economic domination and subjugation.
As argued in chapter 7 the external environment has also exerted considerable influence on the pace with which ASEAN has developed. Although the threats from the external environment have on the whole been considered more dangerous than any threats, tensions and potential conflicts within ASEAN, the awareness of the existence of the latter has caused more caution and a slower pace than otherwise might have been the case, lest this would lead to intolerable strains and the collapse of ASEAN, thus exposing the members to the full force of the international environment. In other words, the presence of internal tensions and suspicions have in themselves been a hindrance to the development of ASEAN. Over and above such obstacles, however, the tension between the strong perception of an external threat and the awareness of intra-organizational suspicions has been an added obstacle.

These effects of the international environment may be summarized and given a more general formulation. Firstly, strong perceptions of a hostile international environment and of victimization are likely to have a strong influence on the formation and initiation of cooperative activities. In cases where these perceptions are based on and informed also by historical memories of injustice and exploitation, they are apt to prove particularly strong and enduring, and, consequently, likely to constitute a correspondingly strong motivating force.

Secondly, in a case where strong perceptions of victimization by the international environment are present, the existence of intra-organization tensions and potential conflicts will tend to slow down the progress towards a higher degree of cooperation and integration over and above what they normally might have, because of anxieties about the consequences of an organizational collapse. In other words, the strong perceptions of victimization by the international environment tend to heighten the awareness of intra-organization tensions and lead to a more cautious and slow advance, lest the more forceful pace would bring into the open latent intra-organization
conflicts with a capacity to destroy the organization, and thereby expose the members to the much more dangerous international environment. Thirdly, for much the same reason this relationship between external threats and internal tensions will also positively influence the durability of the organization. Thus, the somewhat paradoxical situation has occurred whereby perceptions of extra-regional and intra-regional threats interact so as to, on the one hand, serve as an obstacle in the way of more speedy progress of cooperative efforts, and, on the other, ensure, as it were, the continued existence of the organizational framework within which such cooperation as there is, can continue and slowly develop. In a case, however, where all or a substantial number of the members of the organization have their security needs catered for by extra-regional or extra-organizational powers, the effect of this relationship might be deflected, and lead to a more vulnerable organization. The extra safety-valve provided by the need for a united stand to meet the common threat, has to some extent been removed by the existence of military arrangements with outside powers.

The influence of the external environment has also made itself felt in a more indirect, but perhaps no less real, manner. In chapter 3, it was argued that ASEAN had contributed towards a condition of relative peace among its members through the influence it exerted on the parties to the Sabah dispute. It was able to do so because of the scarcity of foreign policy options, which tended to enhance the value of membership in the organization. The high value placed on membership served the same function as an 'economic web of interdependence' in restraining the conflict behaviour of the parties.

The question arises whether or not membership in the organization can again serve the same purpose in the absence of a higher degree of economic interdependence and integration. In the explanation above, high value on membership was seen as a function of the available range of foreign policy options. The latter, however, is in some degree a function of changing inter-
national environmental conditions. According to the reasoning above it would, therefore, seem natural to argue that should additional options become available due to changes in the international environment, the value of membership in ASEAN would decrease, and its effect on conflict behaviour dissipate. Or, would it?

The relationship between range of options and the value of each option is not necessarily such that with an addition of several more options, the value of existing ones would decrease, and vice versa. The crucial point is the nature of the new options, that is, are there among the additions one or more which, in functional terms, compete with existing ones? Only to the extent new possibilities offer themselves, which embody similar or identical needs, hopes, and expectations as those presently invested in ASEAN, would one expect that the value of membership in the organization would decrease appreciably. Since the organization is in an early stage of development, it no doubt is vulnerable to such competing options, primarily because few tangible, material benefits have accrued from it so far.

These remarks about options bring the discussion to a question raised in chapter 5, where it was argued that ASEAN in one sense may be seen as an attempt by the members to avoid being included in a distinctly Chinese sphere of influence. The condition that made this possible was mainly the power of the United States who, through her policy of containment of communism, tacitly or openly committed herself to the defence of most of non-communist Southeast Asia. Her failure in Indo-China in this respect, as well as her partial withdrawal from the area, have led to strong doubts about the credibility of American commitments. These factors have brought home to the political leaders in Southeast Asia the need for some sort of accommodation with China. The nature of the relationship with China remains to be worked out as far as most of these countries are concerned, although moves are well in train in the case of some of them. It seems a fair bet, however,
to assume that China's influence will increase considerably in the years to come, and that the unifying force provided by the opposition to Chinese influence in the past, may not last long. In other words, closer relations with China tend to mitigate against anti-China policies and sentiments as a rationale underlying regional cooperation. Given a general need for closer and more amicable relations with China and communist ruled Southeast Asia, the members of ASEAN may, nonetheless, succeed in agreeing among themselves about the desired nature of their relations with China, in which case the factor of China may yet prove to be a force with a positive effect on regional cooperation. There is, of course, another big unknown in this equation, namely China herself. What kind of relations does she want with the countries of ASEAN?

Specific actors in the external environment may also have an influence on regional cooperative and integrative processes. Some of the economic policies and actions of these actors may have quite unintended results, such as the examples given in chapter 7 related to actions by the United States and Japan in regard to synthetic rubber. Whilst these actions may be detrimental to the economies of the countries concerned, they have had a positive effect on the cooperation within ASEAN in that they made the members appreciate the value of common policies towards the outside world. The same has been the case in regard to the policies of the EEC towards ASEAN.

What has been learnt about the influence of the external environment in this study, does not constitute a refutation of earlier hypotheses and empirical generalizations. In this sense it is merely a confirmation

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of the existence of one variable which has been found to be present elsewhere. When it was argued, however, that the external variable has had a strong impact on the initiation and the maintenance of cooperative processes in Southeast Asia, the emphasis was on the conditions and the factors that conspired to make the external factor exert the influence it has. It is hoped that in this sense the analysis has provided useful and additional insights.

In the analysis of that special form of poorly integrated country represented by the existence of numerous non-integrated or partially integrated ethnic minorities, it was argued that this situation need not necessarily detract from leadership power in such a way as to impair the quality of the country's participation in cooperative and integrative processes. According to the sense in which the problem was posed in chapter 4, this may indeed be true. Ethnic minorities can, however, influence the quality of participation in ways other than by detracting from leadership power. The integration of minorities into the political system is quite clearly a difficult task which is both resource and time consuming. Depending on how urgent the problem is felt to be, the allocation of very substantial material and human resources may be necessary. In countries in which resources of nearly every kind are in short supply, their distribution is a particularly acute problem, especially so when considerations of national security are involved. In some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, the minority and the security questions are so mixed that it becomes difficult to distinguish one from the other. In a situation such as this, in which the participation in cooperative and integrative processes has to compete for scarce resources with problems that are intimately related to considerations of immediate security, the former is likely to find itself on the losing side. As far as ASEAN is concerned, this has not become a problem so far, because the participation in the organization has not as yet demanded the kind and amount of resources that would confront the members with this dilemma. Nor would the
minority problems appear to have been a significant factor in the development of ASEAN until now. But it is not an exercise in frivolous 'futurology' to suggest that the minority question will become a problem that will demand more and more of available material resources and human talent to be resolved.

These considerations of the relationship between poor domestic integration and participation in cooperative and integrative processes at the regional level serve to highlight the complexity of this relationship. The empirical generalization by Haas to which reference was made in chapter 4, is not invalidated by these remarks. But they point at least to the necessity for further refinement.

Although no answer will be provided here, it is worthwhile in passing to raise a question which is quite fundamental to the problems just discussed. It concerns the meaning of poorly integrated. When is a country 'poorly integrated'? What are the criteria according to which one considers a country 'poorly integrated'? There seems to be a presumption in much of the literature on international or regional integration that all countries which are located in Africa and Asia are automatically 'poorly integrated'. Moreover, the notion of poor integration seems to be related to ideas of 'modernization' and 'economic development' in a manner which suggest that if a country is not modern in the western sense and has not achieved a GNP comparable to those of the western countries, it is somehow 'poorly integrated'. For example, in what sense is Thailand less integrated than France or, for that matter, Britain? Excluding the ethnic minorities, there is much to suggest that if an integrated polity is considered to be one that functions in a relatively orderly and peaceful fashion according to indigenous criteria of order and peace, one in which power and authority are distributed and transferred according to the rules of that particular system, one in which individuals and groups function largely according to the scheme of things as
defined by that system, then a country such as Thailand may have to be classified as integrated in much the same way France and Britain presumably are. In other words, perhaps the notion of an integrated country employed in much of the literature on regional integration is much too dependent on experiences and criteria derived from western examples, and that this has led to a somewhat distorted picture of what constitutes integration in, for instance, the Thai context. 2

Regional cooperation has many uses, for instance, as a means of promoting more peaceful relations among a particular group of states. This has been part of the motivation of the ASEAN countries. As we have seen, it has more importantly also been considered an instrument - a protective shield as it were - enabling the countries to escape the exploitative and more hazardous aspects of the international environment.

A corollary of this latter view is the thought of ASEAN as a means whereby the member states might gain added internal strength. Regional cooperation is envisaged as a tool with which to increase national resilience and the viability of their respective countries. By contributing to the production of values such as stability, economic welfare, and security, regional cooperation in this view is seen as adding to the internal prestige of governments and helpful in securing the continued loyalty of the citizenry to the state. In short, regional cooperation is but part of a process which will

strengthen the member countries qua sovereign states. Conceived in this way regional cooperation is a station on the way to a terminal state which is the very opposite of that to which an integration process leads.

The political leaders involved are not unaware of the link between processes of cooperation and integration. They realize that the processes involved in the cooperation within ASEAN may lead to regional integration in one form or other. Thanat Khoman, for example, displayed this awareness when ASEAN was formed. 'The modern trend either in politics or economics points towards closer cooperation and even integration. South East Asia ... cannot escape the present-day exigencies'. Although aware of the link between these processes, other leaders are more apprehensive, a feeling Rajaratnam has described as the reluctance of the countries of Southeast Asia 'to compromise their sovereignty in the interests of regionalism'. This feeling of apprehension about the thought of relinquishing sovereignty is, as Rajaratnam has suggested, closely related to the novelty of nationhood. There is a high degree of sensitivity about the status of sovereignty, and its exercise is a new experience. It is symptomatic that it is Thanat Khoman, the representative of the only country with an unbroken line of sovereign existence, who appear to entertain least misgivings in this regard. Thus it is possible and, indeed, quite likely that a more ready, or

3. For statements expressing this view see, for example, the speeches at the meeting in Bangkok in August 1967, when ASEAN was formed, in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 7, No. 1 (August-September 1967), pp. 30-39. See also speech by Adam Malik before the Gotong-Royong House of Representatives, 21 August 1967, in The Association of Southeast Asia, (Department of Information, Indonesia), pp. 3-9.


6. Ibid.
less reluctant, acceptance of the idea of a surrender of national powers to a regional body, might have to await a new generation of political leaders. This observation conforms to the finding of Deutsch and others that a close association existed between the rise of a new elite and integration in a number of historical cases. 7

This tension between what is perceived to be the advantages accruing from the cooperation within ASEAN, on the one hand, and the feeling of apprehension about possible consequences for the sovereign powers of the individual states, on the other, has also contributed to the course of ASEAN so far. We would suggest that it has expressed itself most prominently in the institutional structure of ASEAN which is, as we have seen in chapter 6, decentralized to an extreme degree with nearly all the organizational bodies situated in surroundings which offer maximum opportunity for the expression of national points of view. Consequently, the decision of the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in 1973 to establish a central ASEAN secretariat to be located in Djakarta 8 may be interpreted as a weakening of the anxieties about the consequences of the cooperation within the organization. It may, of course, also indicate a realization that the cooperative processes need not necessarily lead to integration and surrender of national sovereignty.

There is also a tension between those, such as the Indonesians, who believe in a quicker pace and others, such as the Singaporeans, who are less convinced of the potential of ASEAN. No one has so repeatedly called for increased cooperation as Adam Malik. In an interview in 1971 he said inter alia, 'We must look at ASEAN as an organization to boost development. We cannot leave each country to develop by itself; it is too slow'. 9

Contrast this with the attitude of Rajaratnam who in 1970 said, '...it is my

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submission that a combination of economically weak and underdeveloped nations does not add up to strength nor does it make for effective regional cooperation...Before there can be a meaningful regional association the national economies of its members must reach a certain level of economic modernization and sophistication'. The imperative of survival makes cooperation within ASEAN proceed mainly by accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator. Given their views, it seems therefore reasonable to suggest that Singapore rather than Indonesia decides the tempo. There are, however, limits to Singapore's influence in this regard. The existence of views such as Malik's puts the onus on Singapore to justify her position, a task not always easy to perform. Moreover, the threat of organizational collapse cuts both ways. Singapore may well threaten drastic action if she thinks the tempo too ambitious and harmful to her interests, but Indonesia may do the same if she thinks the tempo too slow.

It is necessary to say a few words about the possible causes of the difference in the views between Singapore and Indonesia. Although the Singapore leaders share the view of the international environment as hostile and predatory, and therefore admit to the need for collective efforts to counter threats of domination, they nonetheless are more confident than most other leaders about their own ability to deal with the outside world. This is particularly the case in regard to economic and commercial matters. A good deal of this confidence no doubt derives from cultural characteristics but much of it also stems from the actual economic performance of the island state itself. Between 1963 and 1969 Singapore increased her GDP (gross domestic product) about 82 per cent and her GDP per capita by about 60 per


cent, from $US 519 to $US 829. During the same period Indonesia increased her GDP about 48 per cent and her GDP per capita about 21 per cent, from $US 70 to $US 88. In 1969 Singapore's GDP per capita was nearly two and a half times larger than that of her nearest rival, Malaysia. Furthermore, in 1968 50 per cent of Singapore's GDP came from industrial activities and trade. The corresponding figure for Indonesia was about 30 per cent. Indonesia is still a largely agrarian society with 52 per cent of her GDP coming from agriculture while the corresponding figure for Singapore is only 3 per cent. As these figures indicate, the Singaporeans are increasingly acquiring experience in dealing with the outside world, especially the developed parts, on their terms, that is, on a level which is technologically and economically advanced. Moreover, they are gaining this experience at a faster rate than any of their partners in ASEAN. Because of her small size and compactness Singapore has also been able to distribute her increased wealth more equitably throughout society, a task vastly more difficult in a country such as Indonesia whose population is about sixty times that of Singapore. Thus economic achievements have produced in the Singaporeans a confidence in their ability to achieve which increasingly has led them to look to the developed countries as their 'natural' peers - the group to which they can more easily relate and the group with which economic relations are potentially most profitable. But geopolitical facts, most prominent among which are her geographical location, her small size both absolutely and relatively to her own neighbours, and the ethnic origin of the majority of her population, have made membership in ASEAN an imperative. Factors such as these in large measure explain the ambivalent and vacillating attitude of Singapore to ASEAN and regional cooperation in general.

Singapore's position and role in ASEAN as described above would tend to lend credence to Nye's suggestion that level of development as measured by, for example, GNP per capita is closely related to integration, that is, inequality of development tends not to be conducive to integration. 14 We would like to add that inequality of development also have a tendency to affect perceptions about expected profits from regional integration. Singapore's achievements in economic development have led to a relative shift in her expectations away from the region, because she perceives the greatest profits to lie in relations with developed countries, even though there are great untapped possibilities within the region and ASEAN. It is, however, prudent to enter a qualification here. The ASEAN countries have until now been mainly preoccupied with creating the conditions under which meaningful and mutually profitable cooperation can take place. This has been a deliberate policy and it is reflected in numerous remarks and statements some of which were cited in the last chapter. It has meant that plans and projects involving major national economic policies have been eschewed during this initial period. Thus the observations pertaining to the effect of Singapore's higher level of development, have to await the test of more demanding decisions and policies within ASEAN.

It has been argued that the expectations of the participants in integration processes, especially among late developing countries, tend to be prematurely politicized 15, and in relation to Southeast Asia Gordon has argued that 'matters that relate to the economy are subjects of high governmental priority'. 16 Whether Gordon's observation can be taken as a


confirmation of the 'premature politicization' hypothesis is not certain, at least if the experiences of ASEAN are invoked. In this context a couple of observations should be made. In the paragraph above it was argued that much of the activities of ASEAN so far have been of a preliminary nature designed to create the conditions for more mutually profitable cooperation. These activities have mainly been related to areas such as the promotion of tourism within ASEAN, the easing of travel restrictions within the area, and similar projects. Much of the reason for embarking on these projects with less than monumental integrative potential has been to test the goodwill and sincerity of the members. They have served as means whereby mutual suspicions could be dissipated and a measure of trust be established. The leaders of the ASEAN countries were well aware of the lack of trust, and in this policy of caution there may well have been involved a realization that premature politicizing could be a consequence if more ambitious policies were attempted. But a more direct cause has been the determination not to let suspicions and distrust created by past conflicts, prejudice, inhibit, and politicize future cooperative efforts. Hence, the need for an initial period during which a measure of trust that did not exist before, could be built, and in this, they would seem not to have been entirely without success.

Whether or not premature politicization will in fact take place is a matter for the future to decide, if and when more ambitious projects involving major national economic policies are attempted. As Gordon has observed, some of the conditions that spawn early politicizing of economic issues are present in Southeast Asia, such as the high priority of economic development. But here again one should be aware of the inhibiting effect of the prevailing perceptions of the international environment which may serve to check eventual tendencies towards 'overpoliticization'.

17. Ibid.
The cooperation within ASEAN has been initiated and sustained by a rather small group of political leaders in each country. What has given an appearance of unity and solidarity to their efforts, has been the shared perception of a strong extra-regional threat, which brought about the desire to find remedies whereby this threat could be diminished. But beneath the unity forged by the perception of a common enemy, and within the limits set by the interaction between external pressures and the dangers from latent intra-organizational conflicts, there exist various conceptions related to regional cooperation about which there is less than unanimity. There is a tension between those who see regional cooperative processes as a means towards, inter alia, the establishment of a military security organization, and those who will hear none of it; there is tension between those who see these processes as a means towards strengthening their country qua sovereign state, and those who are less concerned with this aspect; there is tension between those who are impatient for quick benefits and rewards, and those who, for various reasons, prefer a more leisurely pace; there is tension between those who expect mainly material gains, and those who are content with gains of a symbolic and ideal nature, at least in the short term; and, finally, there is considerable tension between those who see regional cooperation as a means by which to establish a dominant or leading position for their country, and those who fear and resist such ambitions.

Of these tensions, the last is clearly the most dangerous among a group of states so sensitive about their independence and sovereignty as most of the ASEAN states. An example of this sensitivity is the disintegration of the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore. This is a case which deserves a study of its own, because the departure of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 was not the end of the story. In the subsequent years the commonly owned, managed, and run Malaysia-Singapore Airlines broke up, only to continue as two distinct national airlines. Not long after, the currency
split occurred between the two countries. Apart from the substantive issue involved, certain sentiments related to ideas of 'sovereignty' and 'independence' were also present as precipitating agents. In other words, the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore had to acquire a new equilibrium, which could not be found without the disappearance of all the vestiges of the old 'dependence'.

Then, are the ASEAN states any nearer a situation in which characteristics associated with their sovereign status may be surrendered to regional bodies?

There is no doubt that, as far as ASEAN as a group is concerned, there is a higher degree of realization of common interests both in terms of relations with the outside world and among themselves. In this sense, the consummate and careful diplomacy within the institutions of ASEAN has borne fruit. This more relaxed and improved intra-regional climate has produced modest progress towards a higher degree of interdependence, especially in relation to the perceptions of the leaders. When it has not produced more spectacular results, this has partly been due to deliberate policies which are merely reflections of the fact that suspicions and anxieties about motives, though not as strong as before, are still present. Nonetheless, the cooperation has produced increased responsiveness to each other's needs, which in itself is conducive to a higher degree of interdependence and integration. So far this responsiveness and increased realization of common interests are largely confined to a small group of political leaders in each country. There are, however, signs that a certain amount of seepage into the larger societies has taken place, as can be gleaned from the formation of transnational business groups associated with ASEAN bodies.

The reluctance to contemplate the use of force and the threat of use of force may be seen as trends towards an end state associated with the concept of a pluralistic security community in the Deutschian sense. There is, however, a need for a more thorough analysis of this aspect than
has been afforded it here.

The processes and factors isolated in this study lend themselves more naturally to analysis in the neo-functional mold, inter alia because of the strong emphasis in this approach on the perceptions of the actors, and its view of welfare-related and foreign and defence policy issues as the most important considerations underlying the actions of the leaders involved. If a communications approach, with its lack of discrimination between various forms of transactions, had been utilized, it is believed that nothing very useful could have resulted from a study of regional processes in Southeast Asia.
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