‘Dancing among Elephants’:
Framing the Rise of Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey (2000-2015)
by Applying Analytic Eclecticism to the Concept of Pivot State

By
Awidya Santikajaya

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University
Declaration

I certify that this thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the Australian National University is solely my own work. It contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Awidya Santikajaya
Acknowledgment

My thesis is a result of the kind support of many people who shared love and courage with me. With its completion, I have learnt much about wisdom and love, especially from a great number of people who deserve recognition for their help and support over the past four years. I cannot imagine what would have happened to my research without their support.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my PhD supervisors Professor William Maley and Dr Jeremy Farrall for their continuous and intensive guidance in the last four years. Bill and Jeremy are truly academic professionals who always provided the necessary criticism, thoughtful advice and accurate suggestions for my study. More than that, they often act as friends who enthusiastically support my up and down spirit.

I would also like to thank my advisors Professor Ramesh Thakur and Dr Christopher Roberts for constructive advice on this project. I am also thankful to the Director of the ANU’s Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) Dr Jochen Prantl, Dr Pauline Kerr and Dr Susan Harris-Rimmer and other academic staffs in the department have contributed to creating a rigorous and conducive academic environment. I owed a lot to Susan’s experience and knowledge of the G20.

My colleagues at APCD Srinjoy Bose (who has been my office mate for almost four years), Erlina Widyaningish, Akiko Okudaira, Niamatullah Ibrahimii, Giridharan Ramasubramanian, Jayson Lamchek, Astari Daenuwy and Timothea Horn who have always shared their constructive insights and comments, and more importantly, joyfully strengthened each other in a spirit of friendship. Professional staff Craig Hanks, Andrea Haese, and Gordon Hill were always ready in case I needed a hand up.

Regarding the funding of my PhD research, I would like to thank the Scholarship Program for Strengthening the Reforming Institution (SPIRIT), which is jointly initiated and managed by the Government of Indonesia and the World Bank, for enabling me to pursue PhD study. I am very honoured to be given the opportunity by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (KEMLU) to broaden my scholarly experience through this PhD study. My thanks especially go to the Directorate General of America and Europe, where I served before my study, and the Centre of Education and Training (Pusdiklat), which provided continuous support during my study. The Indonesian Ambassador to Australia H.E. Najib Rhiphat Koesoema and embassy officials are warm, supportive and reliable in times when I need help and support.

A number of individuals were very helpful during my fieldwork. When doing fieldwork in South Africa, I was very much helped by Mr Sigit Sadiano and Mr Adib Abdurrahman of the Embassy of Indonesia to settle down and deal with logistical issues. Dr Francis Korngay and officials of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation helped me with interviews and data collection.

Dr Murat Yurtbiiir of the ANU’s Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies helped me connect with a number of resource persons in Turkey. Scholars from think tanks such as TEPAV and USAK as well as officials in the Turkish government were very helpful to facilitate interviews and provide insightful information. A number of Indonesian students in Turkey such as Mughzi Abdullah, Aini Putri, Mayuni Harianja, and Sya’roni Rofii were very helpful, especially when I had difficulty in communicating with non-English speaking local people and dealing with strict security access to universities and office buildings. Mr Fahmi Aris Inayah of the
Indonesian Embassy in Ankara and Ms Humaidah Soejoethi of the Indonesian Consulate in Istanbul warmly hosted me during the fieldwork.

Indonesian scholars in Canberra provided a friendly and conducive environment for my study and social networking. I was very honoured to chair a discussion group named Indonesia Synergy for two years and serve as a national committee member in the Indonesian Students Association (PPIA Pusat), during which time I have found genuine friendship and mutual affection.

My special thanks go to my family. Without their support and love, I would not be the person I am. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my wife Nimah, my son Avicenna and my daughter Alveena for all the sacrifices that you have made on my behalf. This thesis is not only my achievement, but also theirs as they are an integral part of my study. They are always my support at all moments.

I would like to thank to my parents for raising me with a love of science and for supporting me in all my pursuits. My thanks go as well to my sister, parents-in-law and sisters-in-law. Their prayers have sustained me thus far. Thank you.

I specially dedicated this thesis to my mother-in-law who passed away just few days before I submit this thesis. Rest in peace. You are loved and missed.
Abstract

The rise of emerging powers in our contemporary world has sparked significant research interest. While the rise of the main ‘emerging powers’ – which are collectively referred to as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) – has attracted the attention of many scholars, the rest of the emerging powers are still very much understudied. There is a trend of generalisation in the study of emerging powers whereby countries such as Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey are overlooked because their material capabilities are less than those of the BRIC countries. The lack of sufficient academic investigation of countries outside BRIC has made our understanding of current power shifts incomplete, because despite their smaller size, these non-BRIC emerging powers are a substantial element of the international system.

This thesis proposes the use of a ‘pivot state’ conceptual framework to characterise non-BRIC emerging powers. As explained in chapter 3, three criteria to identify pivot states are introduced: (1) attitude towards the international order, (2) performed role, and (3) nexus between regional and global contexts. Pivot states are able to maintain a level of influence at the global level by carving out niches for themselves in areas in which they possess expertise, resources and reputation and through which they typically operate within a multilateral and institutionalised setting. Pivot states’ behaviours are framed in the theoretical construction of pivoting behaviours: (1) soft-revisionist, (2) normative bridge-builder, and (3) accommodative regional leadership.

An investigation of three countries (Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey) presented via three thematic case studies – (1) states of concern, (2) climate change and (3) global economic governance and the G20 in chapters 5, 6, and 7 tests for the presence in these states of pivoting behaviours. From the exploration in these chapters, it is concluded that the three countries have displayed some elements of pivot states’ behaviours although there are variations among them. Indonesia has been a relatively consistent pivot state. South Africa’s membership in BRICS and BASIC has shaped its foreign policy towards a closer relation to BRIC countries. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this thesis, South Africa is trying to maintain its relations with other groupings / entities. Since the stagnation of the EU membership negotiation in 2009, Turkey has begun to diversify its foreign policy beyond its
traditional alliance with Western countries. Nevertheless, since it found that alternatives to the West were not promising, such as the failure of Turkey’s Iranian nuclear policy, Turkey has been significantly retreating to the West.

In order to understand the motivations behind the pivoting behaviours, the concept of analytic eclecticism, which combines rationalist and constructivist approaches, is applied. Rationalism provides an explanation that these countries decided to display pivoting behaviours as a rational choice between their constrained ability to compete for relative gains and their careful attitude towards the primacy of absolute gains which often disadvantaged them. On the other hand, constructivism saw the pivoting behaviours as a result of compromise between multiple identities, which grew in number due to domestic transformation and international interaction.
# Table of Contents

List of tables and figures ........................................................................................................... 1

List of abbreviations and acronyms .......................................................................................... 2

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 6
  1.1 Background of study: The emergence of emerging powers narratives ............................ 6
  1.2 Contextualizing problems: The lack of the study on ‘beyond BRIC’ emerging power .......... 13
  1.3 Research questions ........................................................................................................... 14
  1.4 Chapter outlines ............................................................................................................... 16

Chapter 2 Emerging powers: Between BRIC and non-BRIC .................................................. 19
  2.1 Between BRIC and Non-BRIC: The need for a separate analysis ...................................... 19
      2.1.1 BRIC in the centre of analysis on emerging powers studies ....................................... 20
      2.1.2 Non-BRIC: The ‘left behind’ in studies of emerging powers ....................................... 31
  2.2 Possible approaches to non-BRIC emerging powers .......................................................... 34
      2.2.1 Middle power ............................................................................................................ 35
      2.2.2 Regional power ........................................................................................................ 39
  2.3 ‘Pivoting behaviour’: A potentially useful approach ............................................................ 41
  2.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 43

Chapter 3 Pivot state and analytic eclecticism ......................................................................... 46
  3.1 Pivot state: Historical development and reconceptualization .............................................. 47
  3.2 Theorising pivot state through behavioural characteristics ............................................... 52
      3.2.1 Attitude towards the international order ..................................................................... 53
      3.2.2 Performed role ......................................................................................................... 57
      3.2.3 Nexus between regional and global roles ................................................................. 59
  3.3 An analytically eclectic approach to pivot state ................................................................. 64
      3.3.1 Rationalism .............................................................................................................. 66
      3.2.1 Constructivism ........................................................................................................ 70
  3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 73

Chapter 4 Background for the case studies ............................................................................. 75
  4.1 Reasons for case studies selection ....................................................................................... 76
  4.2 Overview of thematic cross-country case studies ............................................................... 80
4.2.1 States of concern .................................................................................................................. 82
4.2.2 Climate change negotiations ................................................................................................. 89
4.2.3 Global economic governance and the G20 ......................................................................... 96
4.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 101

Chapter 5 Indonesia as a pivot state? An analysis of three case studies .......................... 104

5.1 Overview of the rise of Indonesia .......................................................................................... 104
5.2 Indonesia’s response to the Myanmar conflicts ..................................................................... 108
  5.2.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................... 108
  5.2.2 Assessing Indonesia’s behaviours .................................................................................... 111
  5.2.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 124
5.3 Indonesia’s role in climate change negotiations ................................................................. 125
  5.3.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................. 125
  5.3.2 Assessing Indonesia’s behaviours .................................................................................... 127
  5.3.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 138
5.4 Indonesia’s position regarding global economic governance and the G20 .................. 139
  5.4.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................. 139
  5.4.2 Assessing Indonesia’s behaviours .................................................................................... 140
  5.4.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 149
5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 150

Chapter 6 South Africa as a pivot state? An analysis of three case studies ...................... 153

6.1 Overview of the rise of South Africa ..................................................................................... 153
6.2 South Africa’s policies towards Zimbabwe ........................................................................... 157
  6.2.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................. 157
  6.2.2 Assessing South Africa’s behaviours .............................................................................. 159
  6.2.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 164
6.3 South Africa’s role in climate change negotiations ............................................................. 165
  6.3.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................. 165
  6.3.2 Assessing South Africa’s behaviours .............................................................................. 168
  6.3.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 173
6.4 South Africa’s position regarding global economic governance and the G20 ............. 174
  6.4.1 Introduction and context .................................................................................................. 174
  6.4.2 Assessing South Africa’s behaviours .............................................................................. 177
  6.4.3 Summary and interpretation ............................................................................................ 183
6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 184
Chapter 7 Turkey as a pivot state? An analysis of three case studies .......... 187
  7.1 Overview of the rise of Turkey .............................................................. 187
  7.2 Turkey’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program .................................... 189
    7.2.1 Introduction and context .............................................................. 189
    7.2.2 Assessing Turkey’s behaviours ...................................................... 192
    7.2.3 Summary and interpretation ......................................................... 198
  7.3 Turkey’s role in climate change negotiations ....................................... 199
    7.3.1 Introduction and context .............................................................. 199
    7.3.2 Assessing Turkey’s behaviours ...................................................... 201
    7.3.3 Summary and interpretation ......................................................... 205
  7.4 Turkey’s position regarding global economic governance and the G20 .......... 206
    7.4.1 Introduction and context .............................................................. 206
    7.4.2 Assessing Turkey’s behaviours ...................................................... 208
    7.4.3 Summary and interpretation ......................................................... 215
  7.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 216

Chapter 8 Explaining patterns and variations using analytic eclecticism ........... 219
  8.1 Rationalism ......................................................................................... 221
    8.1.1 Indonesia ....................................................................................... 221
    8.1.2 South Africa .................................................................................. 230
    8.1.3 Turkey ........................................................................................... 236
  8.2 Constructivism .................................................................................... 243
    8.2.1 Indonesia ....................................................................................... 244
    8.2.2 South Africa .................................................................................. 250
    8.2.3 Turkey ........................................................................................... 255
  8.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 260

Chapter 9 Conclusion ................................................................................... 263
  9.1 Main findings ....................................................................................... 264
  9.2 Contribution to academic literature .................................................... 269
  9.3 Potential avenues for future research .................................................. 271

Appendix I List of interviewees ..................................................................... 273
Appendix II Sample questions to interviewees ............................................. 277
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 279
List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 2.1 Military spending in 2015 ................................................................. 26
Table 3.1 Behaviours of pivot states, BRIC and middle powers ......................... 62
Table 4.1 Current GDP in 2014........................................................................ 76
Table 4.2 CO2 emissions (excluding agricultural and forest fires) in ktons CO2........ 94
Table 4.3 Shift of IMF quotas of G20 members which benefit from the reform ......... 99
Table 4.4 Shift of IMF quotas of G20 members which suffer from the reform .......... 100
Table 5.1 Myanmar’s top trading partners, 2014 ............................................... 117
Table 8.1 Summary of case studies .................................................................... 219
Table 8.2 ASEAN-5 economic growth, 2008–2014 ............................................. 222
Table 8.3 Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations ............... 231

Figures

Figure 2.1 Share of OECD and non-OECD countries to global economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms .......................................................... 21
Figure 2.2 GDP annual growth in %.................................................................... 22
Figure 3.1 Illustration of conceptual division and intersection between pivot states, middle powers and BRIC .......................................................... 64
Figure 7.1 Greenhouse gas emissions per capita (thousands kilogram) ................. 201
Figure 8.1 South Africa’s military expenditure (% of GDP), 1994–2014 ................... 231
Figure 8.2 South Africa’s GDP growth (annual %), 1980–2014 ............................. 232
Figure 8.3 Real GDP growth, 1999-2015 ............................................................ 237
### List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3G</td>
<td>Global Governance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCI</td>
<td>ASEAN Climate Change Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGN</td>
<td>African Group of Negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICHR</td>
<td>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTO</td>
<td>Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity to Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AllIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCEN</td>
<td>African Ministerial Conference on the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOSIS</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCEAO</td>
<td>Central Bank of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Bali Democracy Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAC</td>
<td>Central Bank of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEMS</td>
<td>Big Emerging Markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICSAM</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN states and Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-10</td>
<td>Committee of Ten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHOSCC</td>
<td>Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVETS</td>
<td>Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Contingent Reserve Arrangement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CBDR : Common But Different Responsibility
CDM : Clean Development Mechanism
CIS : Commonwealth of Independent States
COP : Conference of Parties
COSATU : Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSTO : Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTI : Coral Triangle Initiative
DIRCO : Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DNPI : *Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim* / Climate Change National Commission
EAS : East Asia Summit
EEU : Eurasian Economic Union
FDI : foreign direct investment
FOCEM : *Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural do MERCOSUL* / MERCOSUR Fund for Structural Convergence
FTT : financial transaction tax
G4 : Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
G6 : The US, Japan, Germany, UK, France and Italy
G8 : Group of Eight
G20 : Group of Twenty
G77 : Group of Seventy-Seven
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
GESF : Global Expenditure Support Fund
GII : Global Infrastructure Initiative
HoB : Heart of Borneo
HSBC : The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Cooperation
HSCC : The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA : India, Brazil, and South Africa
IBRD : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFC : International Finance Corporation
IFIs : International Financial Institutions
IMF : International Monetary Fund
INDC(s) : Intended Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
IPCC : Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPRs : Intellectual Property Right(s)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSSCANNZ</td>
<td>Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnas HAM</td>
<td>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia / Human Rights National Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEU</td>
<td>low-enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMDC</td>
<td>Like-Minded Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MDBs)</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur / Southern Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINT</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIST</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEFOS</td>
<td>New Emerging Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialized Country(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O5</td>
<td>Outreach 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJK</td>
<td>Otoritas Jasa Keuangan / Financial Service Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLDEFOS</td>
<td>Old Established Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan / Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RwP</td>
<td>Responsibility while Protecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLORC</td>
<td>State Law and Order Restoration Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>\textit{Unión de Naciones Suramericanas} / the Union of South American Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHE</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on the Human Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTIO</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIIKA</td>
<td>Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı / Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background of study: The emergence of emerging powers narratives

Literatures on a ‘changing world’, ‘transformation of global order’ or ‘global governance transition’ have flourished in recent years. There is a growing belief that the world is undergoing changes that challenge the post-cold war system and take the world in uncertain and unpredictable directions. The narratives of global political transformation challenge the major intellectual discourse where a Western-arranged global system would prevail and sustain its dominance.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991, it was widely believed that the West had prevailed, at least according to neoliberal ideas which flourished in that period. In the early 1990s, a significant number of scholars argued that the West had not only affirmed its political and economic domination, but also brought history to an end through the spread of advanced capitalist democracies. Robert Cooper argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union represented not only the end of Cold War, but also the end of a strong-state system. Fukuyama believed that liberal democracy represented the last form of human kind’s ideological evolution and for this reason, market democracy was the best form

---

2 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formally dissolved in 26 December 1991 when the Soviet Council of Republics issued a declaration that the USSR ceased to exist, but a series of events preceded, such as Poland’s free election in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall which started on 9 November 1989, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 25 February 1991.
3 The term ‘West’ was widely used in both scholarly and popular publications to refer to Western Europe and Northern America. In addition, some countries outside North America and Europe which have a strong connection with the US – such as through a security alliance - can be added. Jacinta O’Hagan for example saw the West as a ‘civilizational identity’ and an ‘imagined community.’ These definitions allow us to include countries such as Japan, Israel, and to some extent South Korea as part of the West although geographically they are not located in North America or Europe. See Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 14–15. The term ‘West’ is repeatedly used in this thesis to refer to dominant powers in the international system following the end of the Cold War which consist of the United States (US) and its allies. In Chapter 3, this thesis will show that the ‘West’ is less unified and less solid in several cases than common assumption. Although the West – East or even the North-South dichotomy is often criticised for oversimplifying the complex geopolitical map, this thesis sees the usefulness of the ‘West’ term to understand the current international order, as countries in the West are the ones who have significantly shaped the current order.
of government that trumps alternative visions of political economy. The spread of liberal democracy across states was perceived as a fundamental way to stabilise the international system. At the same time, the global capitalism project, which began in 1944, had inspired many countries in the world, from developed to developing and even poor countries, to adopt general principles of economic liberalism by the 21st century. Through the primacy of democracy and capitalist systems, the United States of America (US) became the only world superpower, with the European Union (EU) as its political and economic ally.

Since the turn of the 21st century, however, scholars have increasingly questioned the durability of a unipolar system. The 9/11 attacks and long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq raised doubts about the US’ capability to lead other nations in dealing with complex global challenges. Furthermore, the global financial crisis in late 2007 inaugurated a new political power transition from the West to developing nations. Since the 2007 crisis, the large and increasing economic and demographic strength of a number of developing nations have drawn the political advantage away from developed nations. The crisis encouraged the rearrangement of global management so that a more inclusive group of nations, beyond the traditional group consisting of the United States and its allies, could participate in decision-making more substantially.

---

11 The financial crisis ‘officially’ started in December 2007, according to a panel of economists from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), but scholars, such as Ron Martin argued that the housing bubble in the US market since 2006 was an integral part of the crisis. See Ron Martin, “The Local Geographies of the Financial Crisis: from the Housing Bubble to Economic Recession and Beyond,” Journal of Economic Geography 11, issue 4 (2011): 592.
In observing current changes in world politics, analysts present two contrasting views. Declinists\textsuperscript{14} believe that the world characterised by the existence of single superpower – the United States – might not last much longer.\textsuperscript{15} On the other hand, primacists\textsuperscript{16} are convinced that despite some developments such as a change in the world’s economic distribution, there is no significant change in the current international hierarchy. Others are more careful in contending that the US still plays a major global role, but the continuous rise of some non-Western states, especially in terms of economic importance, has modified the distribution of world power. Fareed Zakaria explained that the present world situation should not be described merely with the decline of the United States, but rather with the ‘rise of everyone else.’\textsuperscript{17} The growing importance of some non-Western countries in contemporary world politics and economics has encouraged scholars and policymakers to identify those nations as ‘emerging powers’ or ‘rising powers.’

In order to understand the current global state of affairs, it is important to note that our current era is not the first to witness a discussion of ‘emerging powers.’ The first ‘great debate’ in International Relations (IR) indeed revolved around realist-idealist views on the rise of the Nazi-Germany during the inter-war periods. Realism saw that the only way to oppose Germany was to counter-balance by increasing military capacity, while idealism believed in accommodating Germany’s rise through international cooperation. Realists criticised idealists’ over-optimistic assumption that Germany could be incorporated into the international community through international institutions and laws.\textsuperscript{18}

In the post-World War II period, despite significant war damage, Germany – called West Germany at that time until it was reunified in 1990 – and Japan were able to re-emerge to be among the world’s economic powerhouses from the 1950s. West Germany’s economy grew


\textsuperscript{17} Fareed Zakaria, \textit{The Post-American World} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009).

at around 8% per year during the 1950s, while Japan grew at an average annual rate of 11% from the mid-1950s to 1970. Analysis of Germany and Japan at that time mostly focused on economic matters. There was not much attention from IR scholars on the question of whether their economic achievements could influence world politics. Ezra F. Vogel, for instance, described Japan’s success story as an effective industrial power and efficient governance and society, but it did not explore Japan’s political influence on the international stage.

In the 1980s, the term Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) was introduced to define nations that economically outpaced other developing countries. Some of the NICs even surpassed developed nations in terms of GDP per capita. Singapore for instance has become a nation with high per capita income, surpassing many industrialised nations, including surpassing the US since 1993. As cited by Bradford, an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publication in 1979 characterised three elements of NICs, which are ...(1) rapid penetration of world markets and manufactures, (2) rising share of industrial employment and (3) an increase in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita relative to the more advanced economies.... NICs presented an alternative model to Western neoliberal economic systems through their emphasise on state intervention in governance and policy.

Stephan Haggard explained that NICs are generally divided into two groups according to their paths to advance their economy. The first category was countries such as Brazil, India and Mexico which industrialised through self-reliance and import substitution strategies. The second group was those that followed an export-led growth. Most notable countries in the second group were those popularly called ‘Asian Tigers,’ consisting of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Other countries with high economic growth in the 1990s, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, were often referred to as ‘Tigers’

---

23 Brian Smith, Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 2nd edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2003), 101.
as well. The sources of NICs’ high economic growth were capital accumulation\textsuperscript{25} and low labour costs.\textsuperscript{26} The second group was more widely observed mainly because they possessed higher economic growth rates than the first group. Economic growth rates of Brazil and India during the 1980s were much lower than those of Asian Tigers. After enjoying an 8.9% economic growth rate between 1967 and 1974, as a result of trade expansion, especially with regard to import goods, Brazil experienced economic stagnation caused by both the 1973 oil crisis and its failure to pay mounting foreign debt. At the same time, during the 1970s and 1980s, India also experienced slow economic growth, commonly called the ‘Hindu growth’. According to Rodrick and Subramanian, during the period 1960-1980, India’s economy grew 0.7% more slowly per year than the average country in the world.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite the economic advantages of the NICs since the 1970s, there was not much discussion about how their economic achievement affected world politics. Most literature concerning nations in the NICs category focused mainly on economic and business perspectives, with little or even no emphasis on how NICs translate their economic success into improving their roles in world politics. The fact that little attention was paid to the global political implications of NICs can be explained from two perspectives. First, despite achieving high economic growth, ‘Asian Tigers’ NICs were small in terms of total GDP and population size. Singapore, for instance, only had a population of 2.41 million in 1980,\textsuperscript{28} while Taiwan only had a population of around 18 million. Even one of the largest NICs at that time, South Korea, only had a population of less than 40 million and its economy was not yet in the 20 largest in the world.

Secondly, since the early 1980s some NICs, especially Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, experienced debt crises when their foreign debt surpassed their ability to repay it. The debt crisis was caused primarily by the inability of Latin American countries to repay non-concessional commercial bank loans during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{29} In previous decades since the end of World War II, Latin American countries had had soaring economies. The Mexican economy for instance, grew over 6% from 1960 to 1979. Given positive economic indicators, several multinational commercial banks without significant

doubt provided loans to those countries. Unfortunately, massive amounts of debt exceeded those countries’ capacity to pay both interest payments and the repayment of the principal. The crises forced NICs to dismantle their import substitution policies and embrace an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-advised trade liberalisation, providing an opportunity for the developed nations to increase their influence, so that Latin American NICs remained reliant on Western dominance of the global economy.30

In contrast to the NICs era, when the economic rise only occurred in a few small-middle sized countries, in the current era, the rise of developing countries’ economies has become a more general phenomenon across the globe. Following the more substantial economic rise of developing nations in recent years than during the NICs era, scholars have begun to discuss the impact of their economic progress on the global political landscape. ‘Emerging powers’ is the term commonly used to represent countries whose increasing economic weight increased their international activism.

It is unclear who first popularised the idea of ‘emerging powers,’ but that term might be derived from the term ‘emerging markets,’ first introduced by Antonie van Agtmael from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1981. Agtmael was not satisfied with the term ‘Third World,’ replacing it with emerging markets which he believed would have been the centre of economic gravity.31 In 1997, Jeffrey E. Garten selected ten countries as the Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) to which Washington had to provide more attention due to their important economic and political roles.32 Garten set some criteria when selecting BEMs which included large populations, large resource bases, large markets, critical participation in major international events, fast penetration to the global market, and moving toward an open economy.33

Studies of ‘emerging markets’ have grown since the early 2000s with the outgrowth of business-motivated reports suggesting the economic potentials of developing nations. These reports often introduced clever names, which Donald Emmerson has dubbed ‘acronymic enthusiasm,’ such as CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa), MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey), and The Next-11 (Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Turkey).

33 Ibid, 9-11.
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam). Economic potential, population and geographical size, and political conditions become the main considerations in categorising countries into those groups. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Cooperation (HSBC) Chief executive officer (CEO) Michael Geoghegan, who introduced CIVETS, argued that CIVETS nations have diverse and dynamic economies and political stability. The Next-11 were defined as set of developing countries with the potential to become significant global economic players. The acronymisation trend became especially popular after Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim O'Neill coined BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in 2001. In the next version of its report, Goldman Sachs predicted that BRIC would surpass the G6 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy) economies by 2040.

Although the acronyms approach was first intended for business purposes and used by private organisations, scholars increasingly utilised the acronyms for political and international relations analysis. One example is when the ‘BRIC’ acronym was extended from concept to practice with the formation of an informal political group called ‘BRIC’ in 2009. South Africa then became a member in the third Summit in Sanya, China in 2011, thus changing the group’s name to BRICS. Another example is BRICSAM - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mexico - which was initially coined in a scholarly paper written by Cooper, Antkiewitcz and Shaw. That paper originally focused on economic matters, but then the concept was adopted for the Heiligendamm Process, an initiative for formalising dialogue between the Group of Eight (G8) and the most important developing countries, Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico, which were referred to as the O5 (Outreach 5).

There is a clear shift in the narrative of ‘emerging’ from just merely focusing on economic aspects (emerging markets) in the 1980s-1990s discourse to a more complex definition of ‘power’ since the early 2000s, when the concept of emerging power begun to be more widely

---

36 Goldman Sachs used the Growth Environment Score (GES), which consists of macroeconomic stability, macroeconomic conditions, technological capabilities, human capital and political conditions. Goldman Sachs concluded that among 11 developing countries which were observed, only Mexico and South Korea which had the capacity to become as important as BRIC.
used. Similar to the NICs, emerging powers have made their mark first and foremost in the economic realm. But while the concept of NICs paid attention merely to economic growth, the emerging powers discourse observes the importance of states from a combination of large demographic and geographic sizes, increasing economic and military capabilities, and political influence. As a consequence of this complex observation of material aspects, the issue discussed in many IR studies is no longer the achievement or success story of NICs, but how countries with large and increasing material possessions will influence contemporary global politics.

1.2 Contextualising problems: The lack of study of ‘beyond BRIC’ emerging powers

As a manifestation of their increasing economic weight and their common interest in playing a more significant global role in world politics, emerging powers have manifested foreign policy activism in various multilateral negotiations. Those emerging powers are now seen not merely as destinations for foreign investors, but also as countries which have an ambition to promote major changes in international relations. They often actively question the relevance and legitimacy of world politics’ established norms, although at the same time, they also embrace Western norms such as those of modern capitalism, which have benefited their perceived national interests.

These new forms of foreign policy activism have been scantly addressed. Despite growing attention to nations in this ‘emerging’ category, there is a dearth of relevant theoretical frameworks to help us understand this phenomenon. ‘Emerging power,’ ‘emerging market,’ ‘anchor countries,’ and other popular terms are used by policymakers and scholars around the world, and the existence of emerging powers is an undoubted fact, but conceptualisation needs more focused intellectual analysis. The elaboration of the emerging powers remains contested and ambiguous. ‘Emerging power’ is often a taken-for-granted group for

---

41 Nick Bisley, Great Powers in the Changing International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2012), 148-149.
analytical purposes, without deep understanding of the complexity and variation of countries within that category.

When discussing ‘emerging powers,’ a list of some countries comes to mind, including China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina, South Korea, sometimes Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and some others. But difficulties soon follow when there is a need to identify their significance in the international system or to explain patterns of their behaviour. This thesis is particularly concerned with countries that are widely recognised as ‘non-BRIC emerging powers.’ While research concerning China, India, Brazil and Russia as emerging powers is abundant, few academic works look at emerging powers beyond those countries. Non-BRIC states, sometimes called second-tier emerging powers and near-BRIC, are so far understudied. While studies about individual non-BRIC emerging powers exist, as further explained in the introduction part of Chapters 5, 6 and 7, there is not much attempt has been made to identify their common characters and how their particular roles contribute to shaping current global. Academic discussion which categorises these countries into the group of emerging powers in general is not helpful because there are different characteristics between BRIC and non-BRIC emerging powers.

There is a need for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of emerging nations beyond the BRIC. Current explanations of emerging powers are too broad, and so generalised that specific aspects of particular sub-groups in the emerging powers category are overlooked. Investigation of emerging powers beyond BRIC is required to help expand understanding of a more exact picture of what is happening in contemporary global politics.

1.3 Research questions

Similar to BRIC, non-BRIC emerging powers in recent years have assumed a more active international role. Emerging powers are generally not comfortable with the configuration of global order hierarchy which favoured Western countries. Studies of emerging power so far did not make a clear separation between these countries and BRIC. Having said that, this thesis sees the necessity to distinguish non-BRIC from BRIC emerging powers group, as the two groups display different characteristics, which might have different implications to the current international order.

In an attempt to fill the gap of the limited studies of non-BRIC emerging powers, the main research question to be addressed by this thesis is:
How can states, which are commonly regarded as second-tier/near-BRIC/non-BRIC emerging powers, best be characterised in contemporary world politics?

In order to substantiate and systematically explain these initial observations, three questions are presented as a derivative of the main research question above:

1) The first question concerns the necessity to establish a separate object of analysis for non-BRIC emerging powers. Many studies of emerging powers emphasise the importance of BRIC, both as individuals and entity. The focus on China, India, Brazil, and Russia might be in great part the result of these four countries’ large populations and areas, increasing military spending and significantly-growing total GDP.

A common logical interpretation of the phenomenon of emerging powers is that their given conditions, such as strategic geographical position and abundant natural resources, and their stellar economic growth, laid the foundations for more assertive foreign policy. Economic strengths not only enable them to improve their military capability, but also provides them with more bargaining power at the negotiation table. Nevertheless, it is still unclear what the notion of ‘assertiveness’ means in reality? What kind of assertiveness is displayed by emerging powers and what variation of assertive foreign policy can be found within the emerging powers category?

Recognizing these unanswered curiosities, the first question this thesis wants to answer is:

**Why is it necessary to establish a new analytical categorisation of non-BRIC emerging powers, separated from BRIC?**

2) Related to the first question, the second puzzle concerns the criteria which could help distinguishing BRIC from non-BRIC.

What general patterns apply to countries in the non-BRIC emerging powers category and, using those patterns, how could the category of non-BRIC emerging powers be distinguished from other groups of countries?
3) The third puzzle this thesis examines is **what are the determinants of general patterns observed in non-BRIC emerging powers?** This question is presented as it is necessary to explore key factors which influence unique characteristic of non-BRIC emerging powers. Understanding the key factors will enable a more accurate way of locating these countries in the changing international order.

### 1.4 Chapter outlines

This thesis explores the similar patterns of foreign policy behaviours among non-BRIC emerging powers as a basis to establish them as an object of analysis. The main argument of this thesis is that the more accurate way to make sense of countries that are widely recognised as non-BRIC emerging powers is by identifying them as pivot states. These pivot states have displayed characteristics which are different from the four most important emerging powers – China, Russia, India, and Brazil - by assuming a soft-revisionist stance towards the international order, playing a normative bridge builder role and pursuing an accommodative regional leadership.

The argument of this thesis is developed through seven Chapters, excluding introduction and conclusion. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of emerging powers and takes a task of answering question on why there should be reclassification within the emerging powers category. This Chapter develops a conceptual separation between BRIC and non-BRIC. As explained in Chapter 2, BRIC become increasingly rebellious against the existing international system. They try to intensively shape the international order which could favour them better. Non-BRIC emerging powers, on the other hand, have an aspiration to reform structures in the international system, but their desire is softer and compromised. Their ambitions to become the world’s future great powers are not as big as those of BRIC countries. The chapter then explores the applicability of existing conceptual terms - middle power and regional power - to explain non-BRIC emerging powers. It concludes that a new conceptual term needs to be established for non-BRIC emerging powers in order to capture their characteristics more accurately.

Chapter 3 builds a theoretical framework to explain answers to sub questions 2 and 3. The first step of Chapter 3 introduces the term ‘pivot state’ to identify non-BRIC countries and provides reasons for and justifications of using the concept of pivot state. The second part
identifies certain parameters of foreign policy behaviour and establishes characteristics which differentiate pivot states from BRIC and middle powers. The last part argues that in explaining why non-BRIC emerging powers display pivot states characteristics, one cannot rely on a particular IR theory. Instead, analytical eclecticism, which uses different IR theories concurrently, will be utilised as a theoretical framework for analysing the strategies of the emergence of non-BRIC emerging powers.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 cover the application of the analytical framework to case studies. Chapter 4 provides an argument to select three countries in this thesis (Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey) and overviews of three thematic case studies (states of concern, climate change and global economic governance and the G20). Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the pivot states concept through the investigation of the roles which those three nations played in those three parallel comparative cases. Chapter 8 answers the question of what the determinants of those three countries’ foreign policy behaviours are by presenting analytical eclecticism frameworks through the use of rationalism and constructivism. Chapter 9 will conclude arguments across the whole of the previous Chapters.

This thesis’ observation started from roughly the turn of the 21st century to 2015. This period is of course not strict, as for analytical purpose, investigations in this thesis also refer to events which occurred before 21st century. Therefore, the range between 2000 and 2015 is an approximate period of analysis. This period is selected for two reasons. Firstly, the early 21st century was when the discussion of emerging powers emerged, as shown through the introduction of BRIC term in 2003. Secondly, that period also marked with domestic transformation in three countries in the case studies – Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. Indonesia experienced a political transition from authoritarian to democracy in 1998. South Africa has undergone a reconciliation process in which a democratic multiracial government replaced an apartheid regime in 1994. Turkey moved from long decades of a weak multiparty system to a stable government, after the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party (AKP) came in power in 2002. These domestic transformations are seen as the beginning of the emergence of these countries into more prominent positions in the world.
Chapter 2

Emerging powers: Between BRIC and non-BRIC

In order to simplify understanding of diverse countries around the globe, countries are often categorised into different groups based on their capabilities, the breadth of their influence, and other countries' perceptions of them. Categorisation of states based on their powers - superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers or developed and developing countries – has been widely used in both scholarly and policy analyses. ‘Emerging power’ is a term which was introduced to explain countries which cannot be clearly captured by those categories. The term emerging power in general is used to explain countries that are growing and their presence becomes more recognisable. Nevertheless, the concept is still vague and contested. It neglects the variation among countries in the emerging powers category.

This Chapter’s main objective is to contribute to solving contestation and ambiguity surrounding the concept of emerging powers by deeply exploring countries within emerging powers category. It will be pursued through the establishment of two subcategories within emerging powers. The first subcategory consists of four large emerging powers which have gained much more attention in the study of emerging powers – Brazil, Russia, India, and China which altogether are called BRIC -. The second group is emerging powers outside BRIC which so far is just loosely defined as non-BRIC, until a more accurate term is introduced later in Chapter 3. This Chapter would argue that BRIC and non-BRIC emerging powers are located in different cleavages; therefore, a separate analytical observation should be established.

As a point of a departure, the Chapter first of all begins by presenting BRIC as the most observed emerging powers. It is then followed by raising a concern that emerging powers outside BRIC countries are significant less analysed than BRIC. This part provides arguments for the need to observe emerging powers outside BRIC more systematically and establish an analytical category of these countries. The second sub-chapter presents some possible approaches to explain emerging powers outside BRIC which focuses on two main theories commonly suggested by various scholars which are middle power and regional

power. This part explains why the existing theories are unsuitable once applied to non-BRIC emerging powers. Finally, the Chapter shows commonalities and patterns of non-BRIC emerging powers which have not been sufficiently explained yet by the large body of literature. These commonalities become a basis for constructing a non-BRIC emerging powers identification.

2.1 Between BRIC and non-BRIC: The need for a separate analysis

2.1.1 BRIC in the centre of analysis on emerging powers studies

A major narrative which is commonly applied to explain the global reordering of power structures is that the aggregate dimensions of material aspects – a combination of economic, population and military sizes - have shifted in favour of emerging powers. Although several countries are often included into emerging powers, academic and policy assessment has focused largely on analysing the likelihood of four large countries - China, India, Russia, and Brazil – to obtain great power status. These four countries are seen as the leading beneficiaries in the current redistribution of global powers. Andrew Hurrell, for instance, observed that these four countries needed to be given attention due to their: (1) increasing material capabilities (economic, military and political power sources), (2) aspiration for a more prominent global role, (3) growing commitment to coordinate their action and (4) difference from middle-sized powers such as Japan and Australia. Regarding Hurrell’s first characterisation, which is material powers, these four countries have clearly expanded their material powers much more significantly than other emerging powers.

From an economic perspective, developing countries’ economies have expanded substantially. According to a report by OECD, the share of non-OECD countries in the global economy would rise from 49% in 2010 to 57% in 2030.

In contrast, the developed nations’ share of world GDP has generally declined. The US’ share as the world’s largest economy declined from 30.87% in 2000 to 24.44% in 2015, Germany from 5.85% to 4.57%, and United Kingdom (UK) from 4.66% to 3.89%. The European economy still has to deal with stagnation. Eurozone’s contribution to the world’s GDP decreased from 19.46% in 2000 to 15.71% in 2015.

Economic relations among developing countries have also increased substantially. Trade among developing countries, commonly called South-South trade, increased by more than twice in the last 20 years. It now contributes to around 25% of the world’s trade. These developing countries also emerged as significant providers of official development assistance (ODA). Development aid which was allocated for infrastructure development in Africa by non-OECD countries, for example, increased substantially from $1 billion per year in the early 2000s to more than $10 billion in 2010.

In this shift of economic weight, BRIC countries substantially increased their share of global GDP. China’s share of world GDP increased from 3.62% in 2000 to 14.8% in 2015, India

---


from 1.43% to 2.82%, Russia from 0.78% to 1.8%, and Brazil from 1.97% to 2.42%. China has been the most significant among the four countries, and also among other emerging powers. China has come from being the twelfth largest economy in 1990 to sixth in 2000 and then to second in 2010. China’s advanced economic progress was not a sudden progress, as it resulted from a series of economic reforms that were implemented since 1978. Although China’s economic growth during the 1990s had already been high, it has become relatively much higher since the global financial crisis since which Western countries’ economies have been relatively stagnant. From 2000 to 2014, China’s average GDP growth was 9.62% annually. China’s economic growth has been significantly supported by the export of manufacturing products. China surpassed Japan in 2006 and the US in 2010 to become the world’s largest manufacturer.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Figure 2.2}
\textit{GDP annual growth in \%}\textsuperscript{51}

India has been another focus of attention due to its high economic growth. India has actually been in the world’s top ten largest economies since 1960, mainly because of its large population. Nevertheless, when the NICs and Asian Tigers concepts emerged in the 1980s


and 1990s, India was largely overlooked due to its relatively low economic growth rate by the standards of Asian developing countries. From 1978-1979 to 1988-1989 India’s average annual growth rate was 4.1%.\textsuperscript{52} For comparison, during that same period South Korea’s economy grew 8.9%.\textsuperscript{53}

India’s series of economic liberalisations since 1991 boosted its economic performance.\textsuperscript{54} From that time to 2015 India’s economy had an average annual economic growth of 6.55%, peaking at 10.25% in 2010 when most major economies were severely impacted by the global financial crisis. India’s economy was significantly supported by robust expansion of the information technology (IT) industry which contributed around 10% of India’s total exports.\textsuperscript{55} India is predicted to take over China as the world’s second largest economy before long because of the decline in the world’s oil price which positively reduced the inflation rate, the higher growth rate of India’s young population than China’s, and the expansion of consumption spending.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite not being as robust as China and India, Brazil is also regarded as another world’s economic successes. Brazil’s economy was already among the top ten largest economies since the 1970s, but it often went up and down, sometimes dramatically. Even after the introduction of new currency to control inflation in 1994, Brazil’s economy worsened in the early 2000s when fiscal and balance of payments deficits forced Brazil to ask for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Brazil fortunately revived in a short period. Increasing economic growth of developing countries, especially between 2003 and 2008, resulted in the


\textsuperscript{53} Author’s calculation using data from World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %),” op cit.

\textsuperscript{54} Since 1991 Prime Minister Narashima Rao implemented liberalization policies by reducing tariff, privatizing state-owned companies, easing requirement for foreign direct investment (FDI) influx, dismantling license requirement for private companies to produce etc. These policies significantly policies dismantled India’s long standing socialist-leaning planned economy which had been implemented since 1967.


growing demand for commodities. Brazil took advantage of this the trend by increasing exports of its main commodities such as soya beans, iron, oil, meat, and sugar. As a result, its export as a percentage of GDP significantly increased from 6.7% in 1996 to 11.7% in 2014. Brazil’s economic growth increased significantly from 1.7% in 2001 to 6.1% in 2007.

Brazil’s economic growth was volatile because of the fluctuation of commodities price. The country’s growth rate was 1.9% in 2012 and 0.1% in 2014. Yet, compared to the 1990s and early 2000s, Brazil now has a stronger macroeconomic situation as a result of series of economic reforms which included inflation targeting, trade liberalisation, and central bank reform. Given this, and also the continuing slow growth rate in many Western countries, Brazil has consistently kept itself among the world’s top ten largest economies.

Russia also gains a more prominent position in the global economy. Previously, the Soviet Union was the second largest economy in the world until the late 1980s when it experienced rapid dissolutions and finally collapsed. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia implemented economic policies which radically transformed a planned socialist economy to a market-oriented system. The transformation did not proceed smoothly. Privatisation of state-owned companies for example, was heavily corrupted by a small number of people with close connections to government offices. Massive capital outflow and macroeconomic instability led Russia to request the IMF’s help in 1998 in the form of a $4.5-billion loan.

The devaluation of the ruble improved Russia’s competitiveness in the global market and the increasing demand for Russian oil and gas helped revive its economy in a relatively short period of time. Russia now becomes among the world’s largest producers of gas and oil. During the 2008 financial crisis, Russia experienced a brief recession during which its real GDP declined by 7.8% in 2009 but then quickly revived and grew at 4.5% in 2010. The latest stint of its economic challenges occurred from mid-2014 with the fall in the oil price, ruble crises and economic sanctions implemented by the US and EU following Russia’s annexation of Crimea which resulted in the continuous decline of Russia’s economic growth

---

rate. Having said that, the Russian economy remains between the 10th and 12th largest in the world.

It is true that the economic growth of those BRIC countries, as well as other emerging powers in general, is no longer grown as rapid as during the 2000s. These four countries still have ways to go before taking over the US and other Western countries’ dominance in the global economy. Jim O’Neill, who originally coined the term BRIC, himself has several times revised his earlier prediction of BRIC’s economic miracle, given Russia’s economic recession since 2014, Brazil’s social and political crises since 2015, and China’s slowing down. Having said that, the four BRIC countries have so far remained stable and their influence over the global economy is substantial. China’s economic growth is still significantly high and remains the highest among members of the Group of Twenty (G20). Russia has become an increasingly influential for Europe. Despite a political rift over some issues, the EU has been dependent very much on Russia’s supply of gas, as around 25% of the EU’s gas consumption comes from Russia.63

India’s and Brazil’s economies were considered vulnerable in the current global financial crisis. Both countries, together with Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey, were named as ‘fragile five’ by Morgan Stanley in 2013 due to their high inflation, slowing growth, and increasing external deficits, as well as their uncertain leadership transition.65 Despite this ‘fragile’ label, both countries’ economies remain strong and less dependent to foreign investment flow compared to Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey.66 Given their strong economic situations, these two countries have ‘graduated’ from the ‘fragile’ status, replaced by Mexico and Colombia.67

The four BRIC countries have occupied a more prominent role in the world’s economy. China’s GDP is far larger than any other emerging powers, while India, Brazil, and India

---

67 Ibid.
have achieved substantial increases. Their importance was not only reflected in increasing economic size, but also their central position in the world economic system. China for example now possesses the largest foreign-exchange reserves, surpassing Japan since February 2006,\textsuperscript{68} which makes China not only the world’s most important production centre, but also one of the most important outward foreign direct investors. Given their increasing significance, the countries of BRIC will continuously occupy a prominent position in the global economy.\textsuperscript{69}

Regarding military capability, emerging powers have also been expanding the military capabilities. From a military spending perspective,\textsuperscript{70} BRIC nations are also among the top military spenders. Emerging powers’ military spending briefly declined during the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but their overall military spending between 2005 and 2014 increased substantially.\textsuperscript{71}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Spending ($ Bn.)</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
<th>Change 2005-2014 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>World total</td>
<td>1,776.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>[216]\textsuperscript{73}</td>
<td>[2.1]</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>[84.5]</td>
<td>[4.5]</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{70} In addition to military spending, other additional measurements of military capability are manpower, military infrastructure, combat research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), defense industrial base, and inventory and support. See “Chapter Seven: Measuring Military Capability,” RAND Corporation, 13, accessed 29 May 2013 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/11100/ch/7.pdf.


\textsuperscript{73} “[]” means values estimated by SIPRI.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>[46.5]</td>
<td>[1.2]</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>[22.8]</td>
<td>[5.1]</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

: BRIC countries

With regard to political influence in international institutions, BRIC countries have occupied unique positions that are inaccessible to other emerging powers. China and Russia are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).\textsuperscript{74} Brazil and India are not permanent members of the UNSC, but they frequently feature on the UNSC as elected members. They are strong contenders to be new permanent members in the various models proposed for UNSC reform and expansion. Together with Germany and Japan, Brazil and India formed the Group of Four (G4), which advocates UNSC reform and their inclusion as additional UNSC permanent members. In addition, in other multilateral fora Brazil and India have played leading roles among other emerging powers. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, both countries actively engaged other developing countries to take solid positions on issues such as agriculture and the pharmaceutical industry.

Other countries that are often regarded as emerging powers, such as South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, have also expanded their economic and military capabilities and international influence. But their increasing capabilities are considerably less than those of BRIC countries. In terms of economic weight, the difference between BRIC

\textsuperscript{74} China's seat was occupied by Taiwan between 1949 and 1971.
and other categories was well-illustrated by George Magnus\textsuperscript{75} who differentiates ‘emerging markets’ through a pyramid of four layers using economic weight considerations. Magnus puts China at the top of the pyramid, given its large economic size compared to other developing countries. India, Brazil and Russia are located well below China as those countries are the closest to China in terms of size and potential. The second layer is comprised of NICs such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. These countries have become developed countries because their GDP per capita and standard of living have exceeded those of many developed countries. In the third layer are countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Thailand, whose economies have expanded but less significantly than BRIC.

In some aspects countries outside BRIC outrank BRIC, but in aggregate, BRIC’s material capabilities are relatively larger than other emerging powers. In term of population size for example, it is true that Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country, larger than Brazil and Russia. But in that population size, Indonesia’s smaller economic size compared to BRIC is its downside. Brazil and Russia on the other hand enjoyed more prominent position in term of economic and military sizes compared to Indonesia.

BRIC countries have been central actors in recent global political transformation discourse as they ranked highly in many indicators of material powers. Their substantial increase in material capabilities implies that it is difficult to achieve complex multilateral agreements without accommodating their interests. This is particularly evident in the case of climate change where those four countries have a significant level of gas emissions which allow them to exercise significant diplomatic leverage in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. It is true that those four countries have substantial differences in many respects, including political systems, economic structures, regional environments and different priorities. BRIC is also far from a monolithic entity, with sensitive issues such as China-India border disputes that remain unresolved. As a formal group, BRICS,\textsuperscript{76} with South Africa as becoming the fifth member, also did not always have a solid blueprint on all global issues. On climate change for example, as will be explained in following Chapters, there are clear differences between Russia, as a non-Western developed country, and China as a developing country.

\textsuperscript{75}George Magnus, \textit{Uprising: Will Emerging Markets Shape or Shake the World Economy} (New York: Wiley, 2010), 5-6.

\textsuperscript{76}‘BRIC’ and ‘BRICS’ are used frequently in this thesis. For clarification, ‘BRIC’ refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China as an analytical group vis-à-vis non-BRIC. BRIC and non-BRIC are used by this thesis to explain the variation within the category of emerging powers. ‘BRICS,’ on the other hand, refers to the real group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa which was established in 2008.
Given these differences, a more productive analytical study should not regard the BRIC states as a solid force which always pursues a coherent position and strategy. Rather, attention should be directed to understand the implications and aspirations of their existence – both collectively and individually – on the changing international order. Considering these four countries together could open up a way of understanding their pathways to become more prominent international actors. In this sense, even if they exhibit different strategies and orientations, it is clear that these four countries are both willing and able to pursue a bigger say in the world, especially in international institutions in which their interests are underrepresented. Although the effectiveness of their coordination and institutionalisation remains in doubt, these four countries are at the forefront in advocating change. They are increasingly seeking to shape, instead of passively being subject to the rules of international governance. China and India are now in a position to challenge the superpower status of the United States and its allies around the globe. Brazil is also perceived a rising power that is willing to challenge the status quo and push for the reform of global governance institutions. Even given the various differences among them, the BRIC countries will still play a central role in the shift to a multipolar system given the large scale of their hard power. Although their intention to become a collective force is doubted, BRIC countries have a stronger and clearer ambition to reconfigure the international order in ways that could favour them.

Their aspiration for more stakes in the international order is logical, especially when observed using the power transition theory. First introduced through his book World Politics, A.F.K. Organski pointed out that, ‘if the rise of the challenger is extremely rapid, it will be more difficult for the dominant nation to make whatever peaceful adjustment may be in order’. Power transition theory recognised a hierarchy that consists of a dominant nation and its allies on one side and challengers on the other. The hierarchy is determined by material sources of power that consist of three elements: population size, economic

productivity, and political capacity to project influence beyond its border.\textsuperscript{81} Power transition theorists emphasise relative satisfaction with the rules of the global hierarchy. According to this theory, dissatisfied nations will challenge the status quo because they consider the international system to be unfair and corrupt. Tensions arise when challengers are not satisfied with the status quo and rules of the games. Drawing from Organski’s theoretical framework, many scholars see that emerging powers are challengers to the world’s status quo. Jacques for instance, argued that emerging powers would use their economic achievement for wider political, cultural, and military ends.\textsuperscript{82}

Power transition theory might have some strength and validity in explaining emerging powers in the past. It was true that Germany prior to World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, became challengers to Anglo-saxon dominance. But the current emerging powers are more complex as they pursue various foreign policy strategies that cannot be simply categorised under the satisfied-versus-dissatisfied framework of power transition theory. Power transition theory is still seen applicable for explaining current emerging powers, especially when tracing back the history of collective groupings in the Global South such as the Group of Seventy-Seven (G77) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which were always critical of the Western world. But, the problem is that the developing world has now become very diverse as global power has diffused from a few to a broader number of countries. The clear lines separating First, Second, and Third Worlds have become blurry and contested,\textsuperscript{83} so that the effort to create a collective movement of developing countries faces many difficulties, as each country has its own interests and capacities. In this sense, aspirations to become rule-makers in the international system might vary between BRIC countries, which have significantly expanding material capabilities and thus stronger bargaining power in world politics, and, on the other hand, other smaller and less powerful emerging powers.

2.1.2 Non-BRIC: The ‘left behind’ in studies of emerging powers

Most studies of emerging powers very much concentrate on whether emerging powers would be either challengers to or supporters of the current international order. This dichotomist paradigm has occurred because the literature has focused very much on the large emerging powers which have more capability and options to shape the international order in their favour or to create an alternative if the order fails to deliver benefit for them. Yet, this paradigm neglects important complexities. There is a high degree of diversity and variation within the emerging powers category beyond the ‘traditional’ dichotomy of supporter and challenger of the international order.

As explained in the previous section, BRIC has been central in the study of emerging powers due to their increased material capabilities. The obvious advantages of BRIC in the shift of global material powers have attracted much attention that significant portion of literatures on emerging powers are devoted to explain these four countries. The term ‘BRIC’ is even often used interchangeably with that of emerging powers as a whole. Lin Yueqin called four BRIC countries as a representative of emerging powers.84 Joshua Toh regarded these four countries as the leading actors which shape the world order in the early 21st century.85

The focus on four countries is logical if ones look at the size dimension of material powers. However, we have to consider the fact that, as briefly explained in Chapter 1 and earlier part of this Chapter, the current rise of emerging powers is different from the emergence of Germany and Japan before World War 2 in the sense that the current emerging powers constitute larger number of countries. Instead of merely the rise of particular few countries, emerging powers is a universal phenomenon which should be analysed more widely. Large emerging powers such as China and India are reshaping global political and economic landscapes, but the smaller and materially less powerful countries need to be given attention at least for two reasons.

First, these smaller emerging powers are so numerous that their rise cannot be ignored. Despite variation on methods, theoretical approaches, and used parameters, several countries have been discussed as emerging powers. From business-oriented reports, foreign policy writings, and/or their leaders’ own claims, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico,

Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Peru, Vietnam, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, Nigeria, Kenya, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Colombia, Chile, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Mongolia. The list of emerging powers - which at this time we can call 'non-BRIC emerging powers' until a more appropriate term introduced in the next Chapter- can even go on if we add parameters when defining emerging powers.

These countries deserve greater attention. The relative absence of the study of non-BRIC emerging powers dismisses a substantial element of international system itself. In the last decade, it is not only BRIC countries which are rising. Non-BRIC emerging powers also have improved economies in recent years which raise their place in the world's economic hierarchy.

Secondly, the expansion of material capabilities is often accompanied by an emergence of new characters and trajectories. In this sense, countries whose material capabilities are less than other emerging powers might display tendencies and trajectories which are different from BRIC countries. It is true that the power and global influence of BRIC itself is somewhat still constrained and subject to debate. Their interest and strategies are not homogenous and solid. But it is clear that BRIC have larger power resources and more prominent position in the world hierarchy, which could become strong modalities for them to achieve their desired outcomes. Regarding their foreign policy objective, BRIC have ambition and clear potential to challenge Western powers and to become great powers, while non-BRIC emerging powers are less interested to obtain great power status.

Exploring non-BRIC emerging powers could offer intellectual benefit to understand the transition of global power more comprehensively. Unfortunately, there have been relatively few attempts to conceptualise non-BRIC emerging powers as a consistent analytical

category. Smaller states such as Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Vietnam, and Mexico do not occupy any major position in the analysis of emerging powers. They are merely considered to be part of 'the rest.' By not controlling material capabilities as much as BRIC, non-BRIC emerging powers are often overlooked, as shown by the relative lack of academic investigation exploring their roles. This does not imply that the study of non-BRIC is completely absent. There are indeed a number of analyses on these countries. Nevertheless, few, if any, studies have discussed this group of countries as an analytical category. Acknowledging so many differences among them, it seems impossible to draw a pattern, trend, or similarity across non-BRIC emerging powers. Therefore, studies mainly focus on a country-by-country review. Each study elaborates unique characteristics of each country in the increasing use of emerging powers narrative, but there is little attempt to compare and look at commonalities of those nations nor to create a link between their rising economic and diplomatic activities, and their impact on world politics. They did not provide much insight on how these countries’ rise can be put into a general phenomenon which could significantly contribute to our better understanding on emerging powers concept.

Discussions about countries from the non-BRIC emerging powers category mostly use the same framework as BRIC. They focus on analysing whether it is feasible for these countries to follow ‘BRIC’s ideals,’ such as assertive diplomacy and a critical stance towards the current international order. From economic perspectives, these non-BRIC emerging powers are analysed primarily in terms of whether they have sufficient economic potential to be included into BRIC. Economic and investment reports elaborate business opportunity in these non-BRIC emerging powers, arguing that those countries can serve as alternative to BRIC. These analyses thus focus on whether a certain state could be included to the BRIC group or not. The failure of these non-BRIC to meet BRICS’ ideals is then attributed to the lack of material controls. While the lack of capabilities, and structural conditions, have restricted their international roles, there are other aspects which are often left in studies of emerging powers, such as domestic politics and socio historical aspects. Given their lower material capabilities, the influence of these countries seems limited to their immediate regions.

More limited material capabilities might account for part of non-BRIC emerging powers’ foreign policies, but there are other elements which are often neglected in examining these countries such as changing in society and domestic politics. In order to more accurately understand the complex roles emerging powers can play in the international system, more studies need to take a task of examining diversity and variation within the emerging powers category. An exclusive focus on the BRIC ignores the significant impact of other emerging
powers on current transition in global politics and economy. The conceptual distinction should be clearly made between the concept of BRIC and non-BRIC emerging powers. Using BRIC as an analytical framework to denote the remaining emerging powers, as many have done, is less helpful because, in many cases, non-BRIC emerging powers exhibit different characteristics to BRIC. BRIC does not represent an adequate analytical explanation for the rest of the emerging powers, thus separate investigations into non-BRIC emerging powers need to be established. It is true that non-BRIC emerging powers are much more diverse than BRIC because the number of states which can be categorised as non-BRIC is large. They occupy vastly different power positions and various regions in global politics. Each of them has specific socio-economic and political characteristics. Having said this, the identification of general patterns of non-BRIC emerging powers is necessary to obtain a greater understanding of the current phenomenon of emerging powers.

2.2 Possible approaches to non-BRIC emerging powers

The previous section has noted the necessity to establish non-BRIC emerging powers as an analytical category. There is currently lack of analytical instruments to explain non-BRIC emerging powers and to differentiate these countries from other categories of states. In order to identify emerging powers beyond BRIC, scholars have introduced some terms which put these countries on a lower level from BRIC regarding material capabilities. Onis and Kutlay for example use the term 'near-BRIC' in explaining Turkey in comparison to BRIC countries. A number of writings such as Iain Watson, Wilkinson, and US National Intelligence Council have applied 'second-tier emerging powers.'

Both the near-BRIC and second-tier emerging powers terms nevertheless are only scantily used without much further exploration, qualification and verification. Indeed, these phrases are only used to differentiate them from BRIC in terms of material capabilities. The use of these terms could lead to the danger of simply assuming that the lower material controls non-BRIC emerging powers have, the weaker their global influence. This approach

overlooks other complex interrelated factors which shape foreign policy. Possession of material capabilities is important source of actions which differentiate BRIC and non-BRIC. Nevertheless, as explained in following Chapters, other aspects beyond possession of material factors also matter. Therefore, terms which specifically refer to material capabilities are not sufficient to offer more comprehensive explanation on non-BRIC emerging powers.

In order to find a more satisfying explanation non-BRIC emerging powers, two existing theories - middle powers and regional powers -, are investigated here.

### 2.2.1 Middle power

Various studies applied the term ‘middle powers’ theory to explain emerging powers, including non-BRIC states. The middle power concept has traditionally been used to describe some Western powers which are not very powerful but are still influential in international relations. Applied first to Canada’s strategic stance in the UN Security Council, middle power theories have been expanded to explain other middle-size developed countries. In explaining Australia for instance, Ungerer argues that although Australia has experienced numerous leadership changes, each with different styles and policy, there has been a continuous pattern of Australia’s middle power diplomacy which is characterised by ‘(1) independence of action within alliance, (2) pragmatic regional engagement with Asia and (3) a focus on pursuing outcomes that benefited the international community.’ Scandinavian states are also often referred to as middle powers.

The idea of ‘middle powers’ itself is not a single coherent theory. Rather, it consists of various approaches. Chapnick divided middle power theories into three models: (1) hierarchical, (2) behavioural and (3) functional. Using a hierarchical perspective, Holbraad argues that middle powers can only be identified from the ‘strength they possess and power

98 “Middle Power” terms gained a prominence when during and after the World War II, Canadian politicians and diplomats were fear of Canada’s minimum role in the post-World War global governance. Therefore, they pushed hard to promote Canada’s status as “middle-power” in the UN. For a deeper exploration on the history of middle power concept see, e.g., Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 188.
they wield", although he understands that measuring strength and estimating power is extremely subjective, depending on the scholar's personal preference. Another indicator which is often used to put middle powers in the hierarchy system is through their membership in international organisations. Jung for instance, defines Canada as a middle power because of its role as a junior partner of the much more powerful United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the other hand, those who are more concerned with behavioural dimensions look at middle powers' role in exercising their power and responsibility in the world. An important identification by Cooper et al. explained middle powers through their active contribution to find multilateral solutions, their eagerness to adjust their stances in international conflicts and their aspiration to become 'good international citizens.'

A functionalist approach is more specific in looking at how middle powers perform particular functions on the international stage. Widely-used terms such as 'middlepowerhood,' 'middlepowermanship' and 'middle power diplomacy' are used to explain the 'functionality' of middle powers in the world system. In explaining Canada's middlepowermanship, Murphy explains that during the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) in San Francisco in 1945, Canada pursued independent and constructive stances, avoiding close alliance with the US and UK, as shown by its intense lobby to limit excessive authority of great powers. From behavioural perspectives, Robert Cox argued that Japan had performed middlepowermanship by being active in international organisations, restricting its military capability and being quietly active in moderating regional conflicts.

Given the extensive use of middle powers theories, many scholars then are inspired to apply the concept to emerging powers, particularly non-BRIC. Regarding BRIC, it is hard to find studies that define China and Russia as middle powers; most literature instead regards them as great powers or future great powers. Several studies however recognise Brazil and India as middle powers. But both countries are increasingly recognised more as future great

103 Karsten Jung, Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests through Peacekeeping (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 112.
powers than as middle powers. Sean Burges argues that ‘Brazilians do not identify their country as a middle power, but as a rising power or great power.’

The middle powers concept is commonly used to explain non-BRIC emerging powers. Saxer and Robertson observe middlepowermanship in Korea’s foreign policy and Palou in Mexico’s. Jonathan Ping applied the middle powers concept to explain statecrafts of Indonesia and Malaysia. In September 2013, five countries formed MIKTA - Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia -, which is perceived as a group of middle powers.

Studies which have tried to add non-BRIC emerging powers to the category of middle powers rely on hierarchical approaches, mainly from these countries' material capabilities. Non-BRIC emerging powers are perceived as newcomers in the middle rank of material capabilities. As explained by Ping, Indonesia and Malaysia are middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region because they are in the middle rank of several indicators: (i) population, (ii) geographic area, (iii) military expenditure, (iv) gross domestic product (GDP), (v) GDP real growth, (vi) value of exports, (vii) gross national income per capita, (viii) trade as a percentage of GDP and (ix) life expectancy at birth. Ikenberry and Mo defined the new middle powers as those who are upper-income or upper-middle-income developing countries in term of GDP per capita which are increasingly different from other developing countries because of their high economic growth, such as South Korea, Turkey and Mexico. Others use behavioural approaches by arguing that those new middle powers exhibit middlepowermanship as well. Van der Westhuizen, for instance, described South Africa’s

---

113 Jonathan Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific (London: Ashgate, 2005).
114 In their statements and documents, MIKTA leaders do not claim themselves as a group of middle powers. Having said that, some scholarly and policy writings call them a middle powers group. See, e.g., Sook Jong Lee, “South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power,” in Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century, ed. Sook Jong Lee (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 6.
115 Ping, op. cit., 215.
active role in many peacekeeping activities as exhibiting its middlepowermanship. From both material and behavioural perspectives, the number of countries which fall into the category of middle powers has increased. Vietnam, which even until some years ago was still not considered, now is regarded as a middle power for both its economic potential and geopolitical position as China's neighbour.

Despite the attempts to classify these middle powers category, ultimately the concept of middle powers does not very much help in grappling with non-BRIC emerging powers' increasing role on the world stage. This is because the frames used to identify middle powers, such as Australia, Canada and Japan are not compatible when applied to emerging powers. Factors such as GDP per capita and the level of integration into the world economy and domestic, level of democracy, and location within the US alliance, distinguish non-BRIC emerging powers from middle powers. Furthermore, despite their somehow more limited hard power capabilities, non-BRIC emerging powers aspire to set new norms and act as rule-makers, while Australia, Canada and other middle powers have been comfortable with the Western liberal order. Since they have been integrated into the international system, and they have even contributed to shaping the system, middle powers’ foreign policy ambitions are relatively modest. Projecting themselves as good international citizens is sufficient for them. Their moral vision, as we can see from their mediation efforts, mostly aims to strengthen the current system instead of changing it. This is significantly different from non-BRIC emerging powers which have aspiration to gain more voice in the system.

Jordaan made an important contribution by distinguishing ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ middle powers through a set of different structural positions and behaviours. From a constitutive perspective, he characterised ‘emerging middle powers’ as relatively unstable and unconsolidated democracies, semi-peripheral in the global economic system and regionally powerful compared with their geographical neighbours. On behavioural aspects, Jordaan described emerging middle powers as nations that are eager to assume leadership in regionalism and are reformist in global change. By contrast, traditional middle powers are ambivalent on regionalism issues and tend to appease the global order.

120 Ibid.
Despite Jordaan’s important reclassification, the problem of the inconsistency and subjectivity of middle power classification still exists. From a behavioural aspect, for instance, describing emerging middle powers’ purpose of identity construction as distancing them from the weak in the region is not accurate because in fact many non-BRIC emerging powers often express a desire and commitment to represent the region’s aspirations and interests on the global stage. Indonesia, for example, has been involved in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regionalism process and, for that purpose, has intensively engaged with smaller ASEAN countries. Furthermore, the identification of emerging middle powers as ‘revisionists’ needs further clarification. It is true that non-BRIC emerging powers have a revisionist aspiration, but compared to BRIC, they displayed a more supportive tendency to the current international order, as explained in following Chapters.

Middle power approaches provide some useful ideas for separating non-BRIC emerging powers from smaller and less powerful states as well as from BRIC, but the approach does not provide a full picture of non-BRIC emerging powers. One aspect of the middle power concept which could be significantly helpful in explaining non-BRIC is the behavioural perspective where non-BRIC emerging powers aspire to pursue a balancing act among more powerful states in the global system and to promote themselves as a middle-way agenda setter on selected issues.

### 2.2.2 Regional power

‘Regional power’ is another approach which has been widely used to explain emerging powers. Non-BRIC emerging powers are regarded as regional powers due to their relatively more powerful material capabilities and/or central role in regional organizations. They are primus inter pares among countries in their regions. Kappel for instance used parameters such as large population, large area, high economic growth, central role in regional trade, stable currency, and reliable capacity to provide public goods.\(^\text{121}\) Having those capacities, regional powers are those who are able to provide leadership to other countries within a certain region.\(^\text{122}\) In addition to their relatively large material preponderance, a regional power has

---

non-material resources, such as exemplary political and social values, cultural attraction, quality political leadership at home and a sound diplomatic reputation abroad which equip a regional power for a pre- eminent role in its regional environment and, on the behalf of the region, on the global stage.\textsuperscript{123}

Identifying states which have regional influence based on both material and ideational aspects, scholars have listed several regional powers, ranging from China to India, from South Africa to South Korea, and from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia. Given these significant variations, regional powers conception is indeed not entirely applicable an explanation of non-BRIC emerging powers, especially when one discusses what kind of regional leadership can be delivered by a regional power and how effective the leadership is. In this sense, non-BRIC emerging powers did not always display an effective leadership role in their regions. They are often careful for not being perceived as selfish hegemon. Non-BRIC emerging powers are often reluctant to adopt assertive role in their region. Despite their relatively larger material capabilities, their significance to influence events in their neighbourhood is unclear. Indonesia for instance could not do much to help resolve Thailand’s political crises which occurred since 2006.

Their roles in regional organizations also need to be explored more deeply. Some non-BRIC emerging powers are the most influential states in regional organizations. But when they are expected to provide public goods to regions, bear responsibility for regional peace and security and bring regional aspirations to global stage, they often fail to effectively carry out these tasks. Non-BRIC emerging powers often seem less powerful and/or less eager to assume leadership in their region than is common assumed. While in terms of material size non-BRIC emerging powers are larger than their immediate neighbours, these states cautiously refrain from acting assertively.

The concept of regional power might provide some explanations for non-BRIC emerging powers. Regional context is indeed an integral aspect of non-BRIC emerging powers’ emergence. One parameter to identify their rise is their activism in regional affairs. They often use regional leadership as a base to project their influence onto the global level. Nonetheless, the regional powers concept cannot cover other dimensions of the non-BRIC emerging powers’ behaviour, such as relations with major powers outside their regions, their attitude towards global issues, and effective leadership towards smaller size states. Regional context of non-BRIC emerging powers needs to be clarified beyond generalized label and

\textsuperscript{123} Deon Geldenhuys, “South Africa: The Idea-driven Foreign Policy of a Regional Power,” in Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (online through ProQuest ebrary), ed. Daniel Flemes (London: Ashgate, 2010).
status as regional powers because there are clearly some degree of variations between the commonly recognised regional powers concept and non-BRIC emerging powers’ regional power hood.

2.3 ‘Pivoting behaviour’: A potentially useful approach

The previous section has explored the possibility of using middle power and regional power concepts to explain non-BRIC emerging powers. At the same time, it has demonstrated the limitations of both approaches. These concepts are not very appropriate to identify these countries because non-BRIC emerging powers display too much variation from the basic characteristics of middle powers and regional powers. Therefore, there is a need to find another way of categorizing and locating these countries.

One promising way to identify non-BRIC emerging powers is by looking at the similarity of foreign policy behaviours among them. Before identifying the foreign policy behaviours of non-BRIC emerging powers, it is important to identify a general pattern of emerging powers’ foreign policy behaviours. Emerging powers in the general have exhibited at least three foreign policy behaviours: (1) activism, (2) pragmatism, and (3) multidirectional foreign policy.

‘Activism’ – sometimes also called ‘internationalism’ - can be loosely defined as ‘assertive and ambitious foreign policies,’ in contrast to low-level foreign policy pursued by small powers. Grigoriadis124 and Öniş and Yilmaz125 for instance used the term ‘activism’ to illustrate Turkey’s increasing diplomatic activities in recent years. Suisheng126 explained that China’s current diplomatic activism reflects the abandonment of the taoguang yanghui (low profile) policy. Pragmatic foreign policy might be generally defined as foreign policy which is conducted based on the calculation of national interest and places less emphasis on certain ideological principles. Emerging powers have become more confident in pursuing pragmatism, instead of limiting themselves to ideologically-based foreign policies which were common during the Cold War. This pragmatism can be observed from the emergence of

---

BRICS as a group despite the fact that BRICS members have different ideologies and political systems.

The pragmatism is accompanied with multi-directional foreign policies. Emerging powers have expanded their diplomatic activities beyond their traditional areas or alliances. Vietnam for example has a close economic relation with China which becomes Vietnam’s largest investor and trading partner in recent years. On the other hand, Vietnam has an increasing security and military engagement with the US which could be seen as an effort to deal with the growingly tense South China Sea dispute. Indonesia has started to pursue more active roles in global affairs beyond their longstanding regional focus in ASEAN. Non-BRIC emerging powers also become more flexible and autonomous in pursuing their foreign policy. Turkey which has strong and long standing security alliance with NATO, had built some foreign policy options which sometimes contradicted with the positions of NATO, EU, or US.

Although activism, pragmatism and multi-directional foreign policy can be commonly identified in all emerging powers, we can see that the different behaviour between BRIC and non-BRIC emerging powers can be detected when observing them more closely. Non-BRIC emerging powers occupy somewhat an ambiguous position and express their specific role, behaviour and strategy. They are trying to stay midway between the West and BRIC – particularly China and Russia – on global issues. This observation is in contrast to most literature which regards non-BRIC as being at the same category as BRIC countries, which tend to become revisionists and challengers to the global order. In fact, there are tendencies of these countries to pursue a balance between different powers in the global system, which causes them to pursue some foreign policy positions on certain issues at the same time. In order to show their significance for international relations, non-BRIC emerging powers increasingly perform ‘pivoting behaviour’ by flexibly moving from one particular group or major power to another, preferring to stay in the middle between conflicting positions and employing diplomatic entrepreneurship if there is a chance. BRIC countries on the other hand have achieved more progressive steps to present themselves as alternatives to the Western-led international order. While still in early stages, initiatives such as BRICS, New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have undergone significant institutionalization process recently.
Major powers also employ pivoting behaviour as well, as shown by the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ and China’s ‘pivot to Eurasia.’ Powerful states indeed have more foreign policy choices, as shown when they decide which issue should become an international concern and whether negotiation in international institution or power-based unilateral action is the most suitable instrument to achieve their national interest on that issue. The pivoting behaviours of non-BRIC emerging powers, on the other hand, are different as they rely more on norm promotion, moral position, and soft power. They also present a tendency to bridge many interests of different powers in global politics. These pivoting behaviours could become a potential basis to construct a clearer definition of non-BRIC emerging powers.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the conceptual gap whereby the study of emerging powers paid most attention to BRIC, while the explanation of non-BRIC emerging powers has been substantially ignored. This chapter has pointed out the implications of overlooking non-BRIC emerging powers, in particular the failure to get a more accurate picture of the current global power shift. This part underlines the importance of establishing non-BRIC emerging powers as an object of analysis, separating them from BRIC. The concepts of middle power and regional power are explored as potential approaches to explain non-BRIC emerging powers. These concepts also fail to fully account for these countries, as they have exhibited some characteristics which are different from those that middle powers and regional powers have generally shown.

Observing foreign policy behaviours could give more benefit. This thesis briefly identified some patterns which can be found across non-BRIC emerging powers. These countries aspire to be in the middle way of various global interests and try to maintain balanced relations with different countries/groups. This thesis calls this phenomenon ‘pivoting behaviour,’ which at this stage is defined as a tendency to stay in the middle of different interests of countries or groups and to relate in flexible ways to them in order to achieve the most beneficial relations and raise their international profile. Pivoting behaviour could be used to distinguish non-BRIC emerging powers from other kinds of states. Despite the variation in the types of states, the power they possess and the circumstances within which

---

they operate, pivoting behaviour could serve as a basis to identify common patterns of the non-BRIC emerging powers group.

This chapter has left some methodological issues unresolved which will be addressed in the next chapter:

(a) If the concepts of middle power and regional power are not sufficient to explain non-BRIC emerging powers, then what other theoretical approach should be applied?  
(b) How might foreign policy behaviours be operationalised as parameters which differentiate non-BRIC emerging powers from other groups of countries?  
(c) What framework should be used to describe the determinants of certain foreign policy behaviours of non-BRIC emerging powers?
Chapter 3
Pivot state and analytic eclecticism

The previous section has briefly foreshadowed a promising way of establishing non-BRIC emerging powers as an analytical group of countries by identifying patterns and similarities of states’ behaviour. To follow up, this chapter aims to create a general framework to identify non-BRIC emerging powers’ broad pattern of behaviour. It develops a working definition of the pivoting behaviours which are increasingly displayed by non-BRIC emerging powers as a manifestation of their growing international activism.

Structure of this Chapter follows the unanswered questions pointed in the conclusion of Chapter 2 – (1) the introduction of a new conceptual term, (2) parameters to help set a working definition of the new term, (3) theoretical framework which determine particular characteristics of the new term. The first step in analysing non-BRIC emerging powers is to introduce a new conceptual term to identify countries in that category. Why is introducing a new term necessary? As explained in Chapter 2, the terms ‘near-BRIC,’ ‘non-BRIC,’ and ‘second-tier’ imply a strong focus on material factors and do not explain other important aspects of foreign policy behaviour. Middle powers and regional powers theories offered some important points, but do not cover the exact picture of these countries. As briefly addressed in Chapter 2, investigation into the pattern of behaviours could offer a more useful identification. Therefore, a new term which can cover behavioural aspects of non-BRIC emerging powers needs to be explored.

This thesis takes the view that a possible framework to interpret non-BRIC emerging powers is that of non-BRIC emerging powers as ‘pivot states.’ Ian Bremmer defined a pivot state as ‘a country able to build profitable relationships with multiple other countries without becoming overly reliant on any of them.’ A pivot state is ‘the ‘winner’ who is able to take benefit from a ‘leaderless world’ by skilfully adapting to changes.’ The first part of this Chapter therefore begins by demonstrating the applicability of pivot state concept to explaining non-BRIC emerging powers. It clarifies the notion of pivot state and highlights advantages of using pivot state as a conceptual framework. By using the term pivot states, this thesis hopes to propose a framework which could capture the tendency of non-BRIC emerging

powers to employ strategies to play off different states/groups with the aspiration to opportunistically take benefits and to play a certain role. The next section then discusses the parameters which will be used to establish the working definition of pivot states. The third part presents possible theoretical frameworks and selects analytical eclecticism as the most helpful approach to explain why pivot states are pursuing certain behaviours.

3.1 Pivot state: Historical development and reconceptualization

This part clarifies how this thesis defines the concept of pivot state. The term ‘pivot state’ is frequently-used, but not yet well-established. The use of pivot states to explain the importance of particular countries in international politics can be traced back more than a century. The first scholar to coin the term ‘pivot state’ is Halford J Mackinder, who was credited with being one of the founding fathers of geopolitics. In suggesting a reorientation of British strategic policy, he argued that the land power in Eurasia would rise to become the most important world players given that region’s vast and centrally located landmasses. In this context, Russia was perceived as a pivot state because its vast unused land at that time had the potential to be converted into agricultural and industrial powerhouses. The development of the trans-Siberian railway also would become a fundamental factor which allowed Russia to mobilise its power and population in the same way as the UK did on the ocean. Russia as a pivot state and Eurasia as a pivot region were surrounded by outside powers consisting of those located in an inner crescent, such as Germany, Australia, Turkey, India and China and an outer crescent such as Britain, South Africa, the United States, Canada and Japan. Russia’s central position enabled it to take advantage of cooperating with countries around its geographical proximities.

Mackinder’s argument was supported by the high economic growth in Russia at that time. An industrial boom, which was supported by the construction of the railways, enabled Russia to grow around 4.7 % between 1889–92 and 1901–04. Mackinder's prediction about Russia’s strategic importance was not entirely realised, as although Russia occupied the vast Eurasian region, which was recognised as the central region with geopolitical importance, it faced ups and downs of international significance throughout history. Russia

---

131 Ibid., 434.
132 Ibid.
became one of world's two superpowers during the Cold War, but in other periods, such as the early period of the Soviet regime and the period 1990–2000, it experienced significant political and economic decline. Although some of Mackinder's predictions did not ultimately materialise, Mackinder's pivot states concept inspired other scholars to study countries using a mixture of the disciplines of geography and politics.\textsuperscript{134}

Tracing back to Mackinder's idea, Chase, Hill, and Kennedy used 'pivot states' in their 1996 \textit{Foreign Affairs} publication.\textsuperscript{135} Their 'pivot states' concept came from a view that while in the post-Cold War period the United States had prioritised its relations with major countries and it was less possible for it to engage with all countries in the developing world, it still needed to advance relations with a few developing countries whose future was vulnerable, but whose success and failure would greatly impact their respective regions. They define a pivotal state in terms of its capacity to affect regional and international stability. A pivotal state is '… so important regionally that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease...'\textsuperscript{136} A pivotal state's economic advantage and political stability would enhance economic and political situation of countries of its surrounding countries which would benefit the US interest.\textsuperscript{137}

From these understandings there were nine countries which they considered to be pivotal states: Mexico and Brazil; Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa; Turkey; India and Pakistan; and Indonesia.

The explanation of pivotal states given by Chase et al. was heavily based on US strategic considerations. They pointed out that these pivotal states were important from the perspective of US goals and objectives, but not given much attention compared to countries in what they refer to as ‘Category A’, which covers (1) large powers (Europe, Russia-Ukraine, China, Japan), (2) US special allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia-Kuwait, South Korea) and (3) ‘rogue states’ (Libya, Iran, North Korea, etc.).\textsuperscript{138} Chase, Hill and Kennedy indeed argue


\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

that the list of pivotal states was not strictly limited to those nine states. Rather, the pivotal states conceptual framework was developed to encourage policy debates on how the US should better approach the developing world. Thus, they were open to the possibility of change in the pivotal states list in future. States can be removed from the pivot states list if either they became less important for the United States or became major powers – so that they match with countries in ‘Category A’ more than with pivotal states.

As about the same time as Chase, Hill and Kennedy’s publications on pivotal states, Brzezinski coined the term ‘geopolitical pivots’. Similar to the ‘pivotal states’ conception, Brzezinski uses the ‘US strategic interest’ lens in determining whether a state should be considered a geopolitical pivot. According to Brzezinski, geopolitical pivots are ‘ … the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequence of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behaviour of geostrategic players’. Brzezinski distinguished geopolitical pivots from ‘geostrategic players,’ describing the latter as states which have capability and motivation to project power and significance not only to their regional proximity but also globally, with ambitions to reshape current international politics. He identified five geostrategic players: France, Germany, Russia, China and India, and five geopolitical pivots: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran. Similar to Mackinder, Brzezinski described the Eurasia region as ‘the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played’. The geopolitical pivots are perceived as states which will be likely contested and pulled by major geostrategic players in their quest for greater global influence. Ukraine, for example, is a pivot state because of its location between Russia and Europe, which have divergent strategic interests, thus, putting Ukraine into a vulnerable geopolitical rivalry.

A 2004 study by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) took a different approach by investigating behavioural aspects of countries with ‘strategic goods.’ Written from a security perspective, the report defines ‘pivot states’ as states which possess military, economic or ideational strategic assets that are coveted by great powers. They are caught in the middle of overlapping spheres of influence of these great powers as measured by associations that consist of ties that bind (military and economic agreements.

---

139 Ibid., 420–422.
141 Ibid., 41.
142 Ibid., 40.
143 Ibid., 31.
and cultural affinities) and relationships that flow (arms and commodities trade and discourse). A change in a pivot state’s association has important repercussions for regional and global security.\footnote{Ibid., 8.}

That HCSS report describes pivot states as states whose capabilities are less than great powers (the United States, the European Union, China and Russia), but possess ‘strategic goods’ which comprise military, economic and ideational goods. In order to measure the shift in the relations between pivot states and great powers, the report uses two parameters on those three strategic goods aspects. These parameters are: (1) ‘ties that bind’ or structural bonds (agreement, formal alliance, etc.) and (2) ‘relationships that flow,’ measured from dynamic factors that continuously change (trade flow, arms transfer, events between states). Among 33 states, the study concluded that 20 states displayed pivoting behaviour by not clearly aligning with any of the great powers.

Despite its valuable data collection and analysis, the HCSS report nevertheless had some shortcomings. If it intended to analyse security implication of pivot states, why were some countries, which should have been included in the analysis given their size and influence, such as Nigeria and South Africa, not discussed in the report? Furthermore, dividing great powers into four corners – US, EU, China, and Russia – is a debatable strategy. The EU at the same time have closer security and economic relations with the US. China and Russia have close cooperation in the SCO and often share positions on global issues in the BRICS group. This creates complexity in establishing four different corners. Moreover, the weighting of the three strategic components – military, economic and ideational – is also unclear, for it is difficult to quantify the exact proportion of these three different sets of dimensions.

Although the concept of pivot state has been around for some time, it has not yet been well conceptualised. A theorisation and practical use of pivot states theories has been scattered, without a clear link between one and another, preventing the concept from occupying a significant place in the emerging/rising power discourse. Examining pivot states-related studies above, this thesis has identified two limitations of the current use of pivot states.

Firstly, pivot/pivotal states concepts have been used merely to measure the importance of certain countries in the eyes of major powers or from an ‘outsiders point of view.’ The current literature on pivot state saw that whether a state could be defined as a pivot state or not depends on the perspective and interest of major powers. Chase, Hill and Kennedy and Brzezinski, for example, define pivot states as those which are important for the US interest.
Countries defined as pivot states are seen as the ‘object’ of contestation and rivalry among major powers, instead of being themselves key actors and subjects in the international system.

Ian Bremmer offered an interesting perspective, viewing a state’s capacity to pivot as a key determinant of being a pivot state.\textsuperscript{146} The ability to pivot comes from the state’s achievement in creating beneficial relationships with other countries. In explaining Vietnam, for example, Bremmer argued that it has the ability to pivot as it has cordial relations with various countries: (1) Japan, which provided development assistance, (2) Russia, from which it imported weapons, (3) China, which supplied capital goods, and (4) the US, as its main export destination.\textsuperscript{147} Therefore, unlike other pivot state scholars who look at states’ importance from the view of major powers, Bremmer placed the importance on the state’s own capacity and motivation to maintain cordial relations with different countries. Treating a pivot state as an object of bigger powers’ rivalry and interest, scholarly investigations failed to provide clear picture on how that pivot state could function as an independent actor. Questions of how, why, and to what extents they display pivoting behaviours could not be observed clearly if these states are treated as objects.

Secondly, most depictions of pivot states focus on material aspects, such as strategic location, population, and economic and geographic size. What is lacking in these descriptions is that analyses do not consider other potentially important dimensions. Domestic structural analysis, for instance, is overlooked. Similar to most pivot states scholars, Bremmer’s analysis on a state’s ability to pivot is also based on hard power aspects such as population, economic performance and military power. Bremmer too overlooks other important aspects which determine a state’s behaviour, such as norms and identities.

In order to operationalise the pivot states concept as a tool to identify non-BRIC emerging powers, there is a need to revise our view of the term ‘pivot’ and ‘state.’ There is no need to debate ‘state’ because the term is clear and widely used. ‘Pivot’ on the other hand has two distinct meanings. The emphasis of most studies is that the word ‘pivot’ is used from a passive perspective. As an adjective, pivot (and pivotal) implies ‘of crucial importance in relation to the development or success of something else.’\textsuperscript{148} Used in the context of pivot

\textsuperscript{146} Bremmer, \textit{op. cit.}, 176-177.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 177.
state, this passive perspective implies that a pivot state’s importance depends on interest, action, and the perception of other actors, rather than on ability to act on its own.

The other side of the ‘pivot’ definition, which implies a more active aspect, is seldom observed. The verb meaning of ‘pivot,’ which is ‘to swing round a central point during a manoeuvre,’ ‘to turn or swing’\textsuperscript{149} or ‘to turn or twist’\textsuperscript{150} could usefully illustrate states from a more active perspective. ‘Pivot state’ as a compound, which consists of pivot as a verb and state as a noun, reflects a dynamic condition of states to behave independently, actively, and flexibly in searching for the most fitting place for their existence. This interpretation is compatible with non-BRIC emerging powers whose behaviours have shown patterns noted in Chapter 2 such as ‘foreign policy activism,’ ‘all-direction foreign policy,’ and ‘diversification of foreign policy’.

The concept of pivot state has the potential to serve as a new term to represent non-BRIC emerging powers if more emphasis is given to this compound form, rather than the adjective pivot/pivotal. The pivot state will allow the investigation of states beyond classic classifications of super, major, middle, small powers, etc. which are based on relative rankings within the international hierarchy of powers. By observing behaviours, the pivot states concept investigates more comprehensive factors which shape states’ behaviours, not only from their hierarchical status, but also from far-reaching, complex and profound domestic and international changes.

3.2 Theorising pivot state through behavioural characteristics

Investigation of states’ behaviours becomes a fundamental part in the theoretical construction of pivot states. It becomes a starting point in setting the dividing line between pivot states and other categories of states; thus, identifying foreign policy behaviour will enable the construction of the definition of pivot states and how these states are distinguished from other categories. In general, this thesis uses the definition of foreign policy behaviours developed by Anda, namely ‘the actions of states and their representatives toward explicit targets external to those states undertaking action in the international system.’\textsuperscript{151} Using that definition, this thesis categorises a state’s behaviour as an output of

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} According to Cambridge Dictionary http://dictionary.cambridge.org, accessed 7 October 2014
\textsuperscript{151} Michael Anda, \textit{International Relations in Contemporary Africa} (Lanham: MD, University Press of America, 2000), 53.
the foreign policy making process. In that sense, foreign policy behaviour becomes a dependent variable of the concept of pivot state. By analysing behaviour as an output, the definition of a ‘pivot state’ will be obtained by comparing its behaviour with behaviours of countries in BRIC and middle power categories. The comparison would help to create a solid definition of pivot states.

Since a state’s behaviour is used to establish a working definition of pivot states, the first step is to select a set of parameters as a basis for identifying behaviour. Through the parameters, pivot states’ behaviours will be distinguished from those of BRIC and of the middle powers’. This effort does not oversimplify the differences within BRIC countries and middle powers as well as pivot states. But for the purpose of theory building, it is necessary to draw out common behaviours displayed by states which could be seen as falling into the same category.

Because the concept of middle power has some limitations in explaining non-BRIC emerging powers, as already discussed in Chapter 2, it is important to clarify that from this outset, the term ‘middle powers’ used in this thesis refers to ‘traditional middle powers.’ As a consequence, countries which were included by Jordaan as ‘emerging middle powers’ such as Brazil, India South Africa and Turkey are then categorised into either BRIC or pivot states in this thesis.

A set of parameters has been selected for identifying pivot states. This set consists of: (1) attitude towards international order, (2) promoted role, and (3) nexus between regional and global roles. The following discussions explain these three characteristics and determine how pivot states are located between BRIC and middle powers.

3.2.1 Attitude towards the international order

The discourse of ‘international order’ has been much discussed in parallel with debates on emerging powers. Emerging powers are generally seen as challengers to the current US-led international order. They demanded the revision of the current order which could reflect a fairer redistribution of power and presented themselves as challengers to established

---

Most studies have focused on assuming various countries from China, India, and Brazil to Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey as revisionists to the global order as part of their aspiration to increase their visibility and influence. Nevertheless, there has been little discussion of how we understand these critical-to-global-order stances. There is not much elaboration on the validity and variation of the revisionist behaviours among those countries.

Before moving to identify different attitudes to the international order, first of all this thesis clarifies how it perceives the international order. Hanagan argues that ‘...international order refers to the structure, functioning, and nature of the international political system’. International orders, including the current ones, are never static. Overtime, there are some changes or adjustments. According to realism, which assumes that the international system is anarchical in nature, international order is reflected by the distribution of power. Liberals regard international order as agreed values and principles which become foundations for cooperation. Although order is perceived as a result of shared ideas, liberalism recognises the importance of learning and adaptation as factors which could change international order.

Although there have been several elements of change in the international order as a result of the changing distribution of power, as well as continuous learning and adaptation process, the US-dominated international order, which was created at the dawn of World War II through institutions such as the UN, IMF and World Bank, remains relatively stable and consistent. It is true that non-Western countries have become more confident and able to build institutions which have different goals, standards, and practices from Western-dominated institutions, such as the SCO. Having said that, the US-led order is preferred because it is beneficial, while other alternatives remain unclear and uncertain. The US capability to maintain its dominance has been declining, but its military and economic strength is still unchallenged. Therefore, it is safe to say that the current international order remains largely the one which was built from the US domination from the end of World War 2.

This assumption of Western-dominated international order allows this thesis to understand the revisionist – status-quo seeking divide. Since the current order is largely dominated by the US and its Western allies, their foreign policy objective is to maintain their dominant position in the international order. The separation between status quo seeking and revisionist is sometime challenging issues. Western countries did not always walk side by side. Solidity of Western countries’ relations is more complex than the democratic peace theory’s assumptions. War between Western democracies did not happen, but they found it increasingly difficult to mobilise a cohesive position, as we can see from the disagreement between the US and EU on climate change issues, refugee and the Iraq war, and other global issues also prove the complexity of clarifying revisionism and status quo seeking. On the other hand, countries, which are often cited as revisionist, do not like the revisionist label. China, for instance, which was seen by many as the most likely candidate to become a superpower, portrayed itself with the ‘peaceful rise’ concept. No country in the world – except probably North Korea – explicitly declared itself as a radical revolutionist.

In order to deal with this revisionist – status-quo seeking complexity, this thesis uses an approach built by Arnold Wolfers and used as well by Jason W. Davidson. Wolfers recommended the definition of revisionists as those who seek ‘values not presently enjoyed’ and status-quo seekers as those who look for the prolongation of those values. The emphasis on values is useful in the context of fluid assumptions of the global order. If applied to the IMF reform, for example, the EU can be perceived as a revisionist because it sided with developing nations to push the US to adopt the 2010 IMF reform package. Having said that, the EU still shared significantly similar values with the US in the sense that both sides embrace a capitalist economic system, despite the existence of strong socialist politics since the last decade. Similar to the US, the EU also resists giving up greater clout to emerging powers which would decrease their representation in the IMF executive board.

In this revisionist versus status quo debate, pivot states act as ‘soft-revisionists,’ implying that they demand reordering of the current global order, but they are still supportive of the order. They prefer carefully strategic positioning by minimising direct confrontational attitudes. This does not necessarily mean that they are detached from the aspiration to amend the global order. Given their historical background as ‘periphery countries,’ according to world-system theory, and their legacy in the Global South groupings, they still share aspirations and goals with BRIC in changing arrangements of global governance in ways

---

159 Ibid., 13.
which could favour them and other developing nations. The difference between BRIC and pivot states in terms of their attitude towards the international order is that while BRIC is able to present an alternative to the existing global order, pivot states are more moderate in pushing for reform. While rhetorically advocating global order’s reform, pivot states prefer to take a wait-and-see approach in the reform process.

Some scholars argue that BRIC countries are also modest reformers to global order by referring to BRICs’ roles as ‘good-international-citizens’ and active multilateralists. Fi Yung, for example, labelled China as a rising power that is eager to ‘improve the international order and the global governance’.\(^{160}\) Wei Liang argued that in the WTO argued that China was generally a supportive actor in the WTO which advocated more market access for its exports and at the same time unilaterally opened up its market for imports from abroad.\(^{161}\) In the same vein, Russian authors also tend to portray Russia’s international roles as ‘non-aggressive,’ ‘peaceful,’ ‘purely defensive,’ oriented to ‘protection of its legitimate interests,’ etc.\(^{162}\)

Contrary to these views, it is clear that BRIC countries have been more vocal in exposing the inconsistencies and unfairness of the international order. It is true that BRIC countries themselves are diverse and lacking a coherent revisionist agenda within themselves. Each of them has different priority in different issues. Despite different prioritization between them, they have increasingly been able to put aside difference among them and come up with a solid voice when dealing with the issue of global governance reform. Regarding the UNSC reform for example, China and Russia confirmed their support to India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC,\(^{163}\) despite China’s initial reluctance to endorse India.\(^{164}\) BRIC have exhibited strategic objectives and behaviour which reflected with the international order.


Pivot states' soft-revisionist attitudes to the global order are also different from (traditional) middle powers. Despite their prominent roles in urging and facilitating some reforms on global issues, middle powers are very close to and supportive of the international order, as most of them were early supporters of the UN and Bretton-Woods institutions. Although they seek to pursue a higher degree of independent foreign policy, they are bound by the framework of alliance with the US. As noted by Adam Chapnick, Canada contributed importantly to some UN reforms by supporting and encouraging the reform of the UN’s management structures and the establishment of a peacebuilding commission and.\textsuperscript{165} But Chapnick also noted that Canada’s enthusiastic attitude for reform became suddenly silent when discussing sensitive issues such as reform of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{166} Pivot states on the other hand are not as pro-status quo as middle powers. They have certain degrees of aspiration for global order rearranging which are rooted partly in the historical background when the Global Southern movement was very active during the Cold War era.

Pivot states are located in the middle-way between BRIC’s revisionist stances and middle powers’ pro-status quo attitude. Pivot states’ locations are not somewhat fixed and static; rather they move around between revisionists and pro-status quo. This swinging positioning is somehow influenced by the dynamic nature of the international order itself which is as a result of changes in the distribution of power, according to the neorealist view, and of socialisation and identity construction among states, according to constructivism.

### 3.2.2 Performed role

The idea of a performed role in this thesis is drawn from K.J. Holsti’s works. Holsti builds a theoretical framework which argues that role performance of a state is a result of the interaction between ‘role conception’, which is the idea of the state about itself and the environment, and ‘role prescriptions’, which are expectations of appropriate conduct, as main sources of the position or status of the state in the international system.\textsuperscript{167} According to

\textsuperscript{164} Among several reasons for China’s reluctance in supporting India’s UNSC permanent seat was that India proposed the bid together with Japan, who is China’s strategic rival. See Anant Khrisnan, “China Ready to Support Indian bid for UNSC,” The Hindu, 17 July 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-ready-to-support-indian-bid-for-unsc/article2233806.ece, Accessed 4 January 2016.


\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, 85.

Holsti, role conception is a product of a nation’s socialisation process and is influenced by history, culture and societal conception.\textsuperscript{168}

In that context, a pivot state has been displaying a performed role as ‘bridge-builder.’ They act as a middle-way player and mediator, locating themselves in the middle of different states, many of which are more powerful, pivot states intend to promote their capability to set the agenda and actively propose creative solutions to global issues. They have often acted as mediators in conflicts, encouraged different parties to find a common position, and rejected confrontational approaches that could escalate rivalry.

BRIC countries on the other hand are less enthusiastic towards playing a bridge-builder role. Their diplomatic activities have focused more on building a larger negotiation bloc which could leverage their positions through efforts such as South–South cooperation. They had played a bridge-builder role in the past, but as their power increased, their global ambition overshadowed their bridge-builder attempts. India, for instance, became an important player that reconciled differences between developing countries and Europe during the Conference of Parties (COP) 1 of the UNFCCC in Berlin in 1995 by proposing the ‘green paper’ which encouraged developed countries to adopt specific and legally binding emissions reduction. Nevertheless, India becomes less interested in acting as a bridge-builder as its individual power and ambition is growing, as explained in Chapter 4.2.2 and Chapter 6.3.2.

The pivot states’ bridge-builder role has some similarities with middle powers’ middlepowermanship in the sense that both behaviours reflect a motive of becoming good internationalists that contribute to consensual solutions. Having said that, the differences between bridge-builders and middle powers are clear from ideological and capabilities aspects. From an ideological point of view, middle powers are traditionally Western countries, so that their middlepowermanship role aims to perpetuate the US-led global system. In contrast, pivot states are basically developing countries. Therefore, their bridge-builder ambition is directed at bringing developing countries’ perspectives to bear on global issues.

Regarding capabilities, middle powers have the ability to suggest or assist credible solutions to conflicting parties. Norway, for example, is able to provide an example of partnership between developed and developing countries in emission reduction projects because Norway has the financial capability to do so. The capabilities of pivot states, on the other

hand, are often constrained. They may have large aggregate economic size, but their GDP per capita is usually small, not to mention other domestic challenges they face such as high unemployment rates and inflation. They might be able to fulfil some of the middle power functions in the international system, but because they have more limited capabilities than middle powers, pivot states have chosen to play a role only in specific areas of their strengths.

The lack of resources has on occasion restrained pivot states from laying an effective and decisive role as a mediator, a role often played by middle powers. Pivot states are thus more interested in focusing on more ‘normative aspects’ of the bridge-building role which emphasises encouragement and consultation-based action, rather than actively offering mediation role. This ‘normative bridge builder’ role is not only less costly, but also realistic given their constrained resources.

**3.2.3 Nexus between regional and global roles**

This thesis frames pivot states for their aspiration to play balanced roles at global and regional levels. Pivot states do acquire significant material strengths. In term of economy, military, and population sizes and other aspects of material capabilities, many of them are the largest countries in their respective regions. Given their relatively superior capabilities compared to other countries in their regions, they have more influence and ability to project their ideas and interests. They often act as agenda and norm setters in regional organisations. Given their special position in their regions, pivot states strive to bring the aspiration of their regions to the global stage. They promote themselves as interlocutors between regional and global interests.

Understanding these characteristics, pivot states seem similar to BRIC and middle powers, in the sense that their material capabilities enable them to utilize their relationships with smaller states as their power bases in playing roles in international politics. Although both pivot states and BRIC seem similar in displaying role as regional powers, their conceptual and practical understanding on the region are different substantially, especially related to how they pursue relations with less powerful states in their respective regions. Claiming a leadership role from other countries in the region is a complex matter and requires a careful strategic positioning. The less powerful states act either as followers or contesters of other
countries leadership,\textsuperscript{169} but many of them, despite their small size, are uneasy to accept a leading role of more powerful countries in their regions. These smaller states aspire to protect their sovereignty and national integrity.

These different perceptions regarding regional power concepts is accurately explained by Miriam Prys who divided regional powers into three types: (1) regional dominator, (2) hegemon and (3) detached power.\textsuperscript{170} According to Prys, a regional dominator usually uses a threat of force to influence less powerful states to do what it demands. A hegemon on the other hand bears a significant task of providing public goods and encouraging less powerful states to help support it. A detached power concentrates on domestic and/or global arenas over regional politics and consistently intends to play down the risk or cost of interaction with less powerful states. Miriam Prys argues that ‘the global ambitions of states… can have a disruptive effect on their perceived, desired, or actual leadership within the region.’\textsuperscript{171} Using Prys’ typology, pivot states act as hegemon, while BRIC displayed similar characters to dominator or detached power.

In this complex relational dilemma, pivot states seek to claim a role as regions’ representative in relations with external actors. They try to consistently balance between roles in regional and global contexts. These pivot states are somehow ‘trapped’ in their regions. They are not able to put their regions aside. Therefore, they display a tendency to shape their global ambition by taking regional agendas into consideration. In spite of their ambition to lead the regions, they carefully avoid displaying themselves as egoistically dominant leaders, as this would generate negative reaction by smaller neighbours.

BRIC countries on the other hand are less sensitive than pivot states in their relations with smaller states in their regions. Understanding that less powerful states might contend their leadership, BRIC countries were less interested in a regionalism project. They have been involved in regional organizations, but their roles in these organizations are overshadowed by the priority they have given to the global stage. BRIC countries show elements of dominating behaviours towards their smaller neighbours. On the other hand, if they have to deal with their neighbours, they often choose to detach themselves from the regional process. BRIC aim to pursue a global power role and at the same time, do not take proactive stance in regionalism issues.


\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, 39.
India, for instance, was a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), but it did not see the SAARC as its main diplomatic venue. For example, as explained by Prys, India was not willing to take a leadership role in utilizing SAFTA as an economic connection between developing countries in South Asia and the developed world.\(^\text{172}\) Compared to other regional organizations, SAARC is an ineffective, mainly due to India-Pakistan rivalry. In 2014 for example, the SAARC Summit in Kathmandu, Nepal did not achieve significant progress due to India-Pakistan rivalry. SAARC leaders failed to adopt significant agreements in the summit as Pakistan demanded more time to deal with its internal process.\(^\text{173}\) China is also a member of some regional institutions, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and East Asia Summit (EAS). However, China often prioritizes the use of threat in dealing with issues related to territorial integrity and dispute with its neighbours. China uses coercive and threat tactics to smaller neighbours, such as Vietnam and Philippines on South China sea dispute and refused dialogue and mediation offered by ASEAN. In the post-Soviet era, Russia has established some organizations around its regional proximities in Central Asia, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these organizations is questioned. These organizations were established mainly to facilitate Russia's ambition to maintain and if possible, expand Russia's presence in Central Asia and keep external powers at bay\(^\text{174}\), rather than to improve the quality of life and to solve the problems in the region in equal and institutionalized mechanisms.

Among these four countries, Brazil is the most enthusiast regional actor. Brazil significantly contributed in strengthening regional cooperation in Latin America. President Lula da Silva's main achievements in the region during his presidency were the strengthening of the Mercado Común del Sur / Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) – such as the creation of the MERCOSUR Parliament and Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural do MERCOSUL / MERCOSUR Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM) -, the establishment of Unión de Naciones Suramericanas / the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and an

\(^{172}\) Ibid, 142.
improved relation with Argentina. Despite its regional attempts in recent years, Brazil’s relations with its regional neighbours found persistent challenges. Brazil’s ambition to become a permanent member of the UNSC was fiercely rejected by Colombia and Argentina which voiced their opposition through the Uniting for Consensus, a group developed from the 1990s consisting of Italy, Canada, South Korea and some other countries that opposed the possible enlargement of the UNSC permanent membership. MERCOSUR itself also hardly becomes an effective institution. Principal contention between pro-free trade countries – Chile, Peru, and Colombia – and the rest of Latin America, many of which adopt socialist and protectionist policies, hampered MERCOSUR’s progress to become a strong economic bloc.

Middle powers on the other hand have a fairly low regional orientation. Their economies have been significantly integrated into the global system. Many middle powers have security arrangements with the US. Since they have benefited from the global order, their regionalism intention is not very high. They have participated in regional projects such as Australia and Japan in the EAS and Canada in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Nevertheless, they have not shown much leadership in these regional mechanisms.

These three identifications of foreign policy behaviours have set the line which separates pivot states, BRIC, and middle powers. These differences can be summarised into the table below:

Table 3.1
Behaviours of Pivot States, BRIC, and Middle Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>BRIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards global order</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performed role</td>
<td>Great power-status seeker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nexus between regional-global roles</td>
<td>• Weak regional orientation due to their priority to pursue either domination ambition or detached role.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pivot states</th>
<th>Soft-revisionist</th>
<th>Normative bridge-builder</th>
<th>Balanced role through accommodative regional leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle powers</td>
<td>Status-quo seeking</td>
<td>Mediator with legitimator tendency</td>
<td>Weak regional orientation due to their integration to the current international order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining the general characteristics of emerging powers, as explained in Chapter 2, and the specific behaviours described in this section, this thesis defines pivot states as:

**States which since the turn of the twenty-first century increasingly have been adopting activist, pragmatic, and multidirectional foreign policy and pursue 'pivoting behaviours' which could be characterized as:**

1. **Soft revisionist toward the current global order**
2. **Normative bridge-builder role**
3. **Accommodative regional leadership**

This definition provides clear guidance in identifying pivot states and how to distinguish them from BRIC and middle powers. These three pivoting behaviours are framed as a hypothesis when testing case studies in next Chapters. The hypothesis would thus say:

1. A state which displays soft-revisionist, normative bridge-builder, and accommodative regional leadership would fall into category of a pivot state.

2. On the other hand, if they display different characters from pivot states, they would probably fit into either BRIC or middle power categories.

Despite these dividing lines between pivot states and two poles – BRIC and middle powers -, there are elements of characteristics which pivot states share with these two categories. For instance, a pivot state could change a role from a normative bridge-builder to an effective mediator if it has expanded resources which are sufficient to support mediation effort. Therefore, pivot states are not static. Countries in the pivot state category could move to BRIC or middle powers in certain cases and periods.
After selecting a conceptual term to better explain non-BRIC emerging powers and setting parameters which differentiate them from BRIC and middle powers, the next issue that needs to be addressed is to develop a framework which can be used to explain why certain pivot states pursue pivoting behaviours.

### 3.3 An analytically eclectic approach to pivot state

Scholars normally chose a particular IR theory to explain a certain event. In order to defend the applicability of that theory, they usually contend other theories’ reliability and validity. While this attempt has been able to produce strong explanatory power, it on the other hand ignores the useful element of other theories. A particular IR theory might be able to provide a certain explanation of some events and puzzles, but it has left out other aspects which might be best explained by another theory. As a result, an excellent explanation from one theory does not have much applicability in the real world.

Contrary to common approaches which apply certain IR research tradition, this thesis prefers to develop a theoretically plural approach. Understanding the fact that different theoretical frameworks are capable to provide important insights to explain events according to their disciplines, there is a need to use these diverse theories concurrently to take benefit from their competing paradigms. Each of the IR theories has strengths. Relying on one particular theory nevertheless could dangerously lead to a misleading conclusion. Therefore, this
thesis selects an approach which can allow for a more nuanced analysis involving different research paradigms. This approach has been embraced by increasing number of scholars as ‘analytic eclecticism.’

First conceptualized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, analytic eclecticism pragmatically goes beyond paradigmatic boundaries and applies them to enable a multidimensional investigation of problems. This pragmatic methodology is necessary because each IR theory tend to prioritise its certain assumptions and neglect others, often resulting in a failure to understand overlapping and competing factors and variables which shape and construct a situation. Realism, for instance, has paid attention very much to states’ rationale at the expense of idea and identity. Analytic eclecticism emerged after researchers realised that for decades the study of IR has been dominated by rivalry among research traditions. As explained by Katzenstein, a certain research tradition ‘often lead[s] to a degree of specialization that makes academic scholarship irrelevant to the concerns of a broader policy community.’

States indeed interact with each other within the system not with a set of fixed and unchanging interests and ideas. The importance of different factors that shaped state’s behaviour varied in different period and situation. Understanding that there is much disadvantage from choosing a particular theory while neglecting others in understanding world politics, analytic eclecticism was introduced as a pluralist and multi-theories methodology. It does not intend to become an alternative to existing theories. Katzenstein and Sil argue that analytic eclecticism does not aim to abandon existing research traditions as those have positively contributed to understanding the ‘operation of certain variables, mechanisms, and processes.’ Instead, analytic eclecticism realises that IR theories should not be mutually exclusive and could have more explanatory power for complex sets of problems. In that sense, analytic eclecticism does not integrate various research paradigms into another new theory. In contrast, it uses a variety of theoretical tools to explain the complexity of particular cases. Analytic eclecticism elaborates possibility of employing various ‘assumptions, concepts, interpretations, and methods’ of different research


179 Sil and Katzenstein, op cit. 2011, 483.

180 Hyug Baeg Im and Ju Hee Lee, “Approaches to Inter-Korean Peace and Democratization of North Korea: From Impossibilism to Possibilism” (paper prepared for presentation at World Congress of the
paradigm. It therefore functions as 'a problem, rather than approach-driven style of analysis.'

The use of analytic eclecticism could provide benefits for the purpose of answering this thesis’ research puzzle on why countries are increasingly pursuing pivoting behaviours. A tight realist, liberal or constructivism approach is not able to seize the complexity of pivot state’s characters. As a problem-driven methodology, analytic eclecticism is flexible to engage with different theories in formulating and answering that puzzle. Analytic eclecticism does not create a single new theory. Rather it applies theoretical plurality which recognises pluralistic methodology. Therefore, two major IR theories – rationalism and constructivism- will be used to investigate foreign policy behaviours.

Rationalism and constructivism are selected in the analytic eclecticism framework over other theories because the two theories are able to capture material and ideational dimensions of state behaviour. While rationalism could explain a state’s motivation for material benefit, constructivism looks at ideational construction which shapes behaviours. The mix of rationalism and constructivism could provide a powerful explanation of the interplay between these two aspects.

**3.3.1 Rationalism**

A plausible hypothesis to explain the behaviour of pivot states can be derived from rationalism. Rationalism is an intersection between two major IR theories: realism and liberalism (idealism). From realist perspectives, a state’s foreign policy could be perceived as a strategy to deal with insecurity and rivalry, and as a way to minimise threat. According to Schneider, realism – and particularly neorealism - investigates states’ foreign policy behaviours based on five assumptions: (1) there is no effective centralized supranational government, meaning that all states live in anarchic situation; (2) each state pursues self-help policies; and (3) each state is concerned about how to survive in the anarchic system; (4) states are the main actor; and (5) states are rational.

---

Realism, particularly neorealism, regards state’s behaviour as a reflection of its ambition to maximise its interests in the anarchic world system. The behaviour is shaped by the material structure of the international system. The material conditions are perceived as the only source of power. According to Waltz, powers consisted of ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’

Mearsheimer, who first postulated offensive realism, believed that states always try to maximise their share of the global power and eventually to become a hegemon. According to Mearsheimer, a hegemon is ‘a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system.’ Using offensive realism, he believes that states are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. Realists assume that there is a limitless struggle for power among states caused by a quest for security as a result of the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy makes states always worried about aggression and expansion by other states. Some recent pivot states studies were observed according to the realist assumptions. Ian Bremmer himself for instance, believe that it is the current anarchical situation which provides the opportunity for pivot states to arise and diversify their alliances whatever fit their interests the best. Bremmer defined the current geopolitical situation as G-Zero and the leaderless world.

Neoliberalism rejects the emphasis that neorealism places on conflict and rivalry. Neoliberal scholars’ school of thought tends to pursue a more optimistic stance by assuming that emerging powers either will eventually subscribe to the liberal norms of the current global order or will have benefits from the prevailing order. They cite growing levels of interdependence and new inclinations towards cooperation as evidence in support of their perspective. A state’s motivation to pivot is economic profit. Liberals argue that the transition of the world order will work smoothly because nations at different levels of power will be in

---

184 Ibid, 46.
187 Bremmer, *op cit.*, 35.
188 For example, Liu and Chen predicted that China will gradually democratise itself in the next two decades. They argue that the democratisation of China is necessary to improve China’s level of economic and social conditions. They believe that ‘...a democratizing China will be gentler, kinder, and more confident and peaceful in domestic and international affairs.’ See, Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, “Why China Will Democratize,” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2012): 41–63.
189 Snyder, *op. cit.*, 215.
concert to find ways to build a mutually beneficial global architecture. Ikenberry argues that emerging powers are increasingly engaging with other established powers in order to pursue their national interests. Neoliberal institutionalists, particularly, believe that emerging powers will not become aggressive because they benefit from the international order, so that they will be supportive toward the American-led post World War II institutions because those institutions have provided means and ways for them to pursue their national interests.

Realism and liberalism have been involved in continuous intellectual debates since the First Great Debate in 1930s. The debates have played important roles in advancing IR theories by introducing variants of these two paradigms such as neorealism, neoliberalism, neoclassical realism, etc. Despite long standing debates, the two disciplines have started to engage in more constructive directions and accept previously excluded variables in recent years. Realism and liberalism are no longer irreconcilables as in some aspects they have found convergence. Both theories share a rationalist methodology by exploring the possibility of applying different conceptions within traditional theories such as the application of shared ideas in anarchic situations, which was previously considered unimportant in the realist tradition. Williams argues that "...the increasing unity of neorealist and neoliberal theories within the shared structures of rationalist social science has been one of the most notable developments in IR theories over decades...." Sørensen on the other hand argued that although liberalism remain an important theory, neorealism and constructivism which are playing more prominent roles within IR discipline because there are still numerous conflicts around the world which degraded the significance of liberal optimism.

194 The First Great Debate was concerned on how to deal with the Nazi Germany which displayed aggressive and expansive tendencies. Realism held a belief that Germany's ambition should be checked with deterrence using balance of power thinking. On the other hand, liberalism believed in the prospect of international cooperation (the League of Nations) in easing tension between Germany and other states.
One way to utilize the increasing closeness between realism and liberalism is by framing these two approaches through rationalism. Both realism and liberalism are commonly grouped in the rationalist discipline as both perceive a state as a rational actor and utility-maximiser which operate in unitary framework. Despite different assumptions – realist focuses on ‘power’ and anarchical situation, while liberalism prioritizes economic prosperity and international institution -, both theories saw a state's action as interest-driven. It brings us to the concept of ‘gains.’

Realism and liberalism are distinguished by their emphasis on two concepts of gains: 'relative gains' and 'absolute gains.' According to realist assumptions, states are concerned with relative gains as they compete with each other for relatively better positions in the international system. State’s motivation for relative gains imply how much a state will benefit relatively from its interaction with other states. If countries gain relatively, it would try to retain expected additional gain. In contrast, liberals on the other hand believe that because all states are growingly interdependent, there is no individual motivation of a state to take benefit from other states. States on liberal view only consider absolute gains which can be obtained through cooperation and collective efforts with other states.

Those two concept of gains are used separately in the current studies of state’s behaviour. On the contrary, a combination of relative and absolute gains could offer more meaningful explanation for pivot state’s behaviours. We so far know that non-BRIC emerging powers are less assertive than BRIC because in term of material sizes they are much smaller. We however have not understood yet how more limited material factors operatively influence a state’s decision to pursue somewhat low-profile diplomacy. Integrating realism and liberalism views would help solve this puzzle by framing state’s motivation to act as a rational choice of the consideration on relative-absolute gains.

Different from BRIC whose military and economic capacities are much larger, pivot states have limitation to support their ambition for relative gains. Although obtaining relative gains is too risky for them, pivot states do not simply rely on absolute gains. If absolute gains from international institutions and/or cooperation, which are dominated by the US and its allies in term of rules and values, could provide more benefit to them, they would prefer to pursue absolute gains over relative gains. Middle powers such as Australia and Canada have taken this strategy by staunchly supporting international institutions and are less interested in developing rival or option. Pivot states on the other hand are reluctant to totally trust absolute gains strategy. Their reluctance is motivated by their careful assessment on the effectiveness, usefulness, and fairness of international institutions.
In compromising its limited capability to pursue relative gain and its reluctance to adopt full reliance to absolute gains, a pivot state is therefore much concern with indirect, abstract or intangible relative gains, such as image building and normative recognition. That pivot state decided to stay in the middle of different powers’ competition and rivalry. Using this logic, the hypothesis developed from rationalism is that:

A non-BRIC emerging powers pursues a pivot state’s behaviours – soft revisionist, normative bridge-builder, and accommodative regional leadership – because it is seen as a rationally middle way between its constrained ability to compete for relative gains and its curiosity over the prospect of absolute gains from institutional relationship with international order.

### 3.3.2 Constructivism

Although neorealism and neoliberalism have some strengths, not all aspects of pivot states’ behaviours can be explained through the rationalist orientation – through competition and cooperation in neorealist and neoliberal frameworks respectively. Not all realist assumptions – a state’s motivation to pivot is to minimise threat and to maximise global influence – appear in reality. Changing coalitions in multilateral negotiations is not merely based on the motivation to secure national interest, but also on the basis of finding a group which has a similar view on global issues. On the other hand, liberal ideals do not always become determinants of a pivoting strategy, as can be seen by pivot states’ ‘middle-way approach’ in dealing with security issues.

While rationalist overlook the possibility of change in state identities and interests, constructivism emphasises the importance of social interaction in the formation of state’s identity. What this thesis means by ‘identity’ follows a conceptual definition by Rafaella A. Del Sarto. According to Sarto, states’ identities are collective identities which are “…regulative accounts of actors themselves and of their relationships to others.”

From the constructivist assumption, pivoting behaviours could be motivated by identity-related factors. In the view of constructivists, states’ identities are shaped by cultural and

---

institutional contexts of the states' international and domestic environments.\textsuperscript{199} According to constructivism, a state’s behaviour is not only shaped by its specific position in the international structure. Neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists usually take the state interest for granted or from a top-down generated story of state interests.\textsuperscript{200} Constructivism, on the other hand, regards a state’s identity as a result of interactions between unitary state actors and what happens between them. From their socialization with other actors in the international system, states have been experiencing dynamic transformation of identities and norms. According to constructivism, states could decide to carry on certain foreign policy, including a pivoting movement, as the result of leaders’ perception that the policy is matched to state’s identity.

In spite of taking different assumptions from rationalism, constructivism shared the similar level of analysis with rationalism. The original idea of Alexander Wendt’s constructivism focused on a systemic-level process of identity formation and undermined a unit-level process.\textsuperscript{201} Wendt continues to treat a state as a unitary actor which is similar to what realism assumes. Because in reality domestic factors matter a lot in constructing state’s identity, constructivism is required to look at socially constructed variables in both systemic and unit level in understanding interest formation.\textsuperscript{202} Democratization in developing countries, for example, have changed state’s identity from authoritarian to democracy. Constructivism would have more explanatory power if paying more attention to domestic process and cultural factors in the adoption of norms and identity.\textsuperscript{203} From the domestic point of view, the formation of state identity is determined by interaction among foreign policy interest groups. As argued by Yucel Bozdaglioglu, ‘‘in pluralistic societies, then, a state’s identity and consequently its interests arise out of a struggle among different domestic groups trying to influence the course of the state’s foreign policy in accordance with their identity conceptions.’’\textsuperscript{204}


\textsuperscript{202} Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012): 1.


Both systemic interaction and domestic elements are considered equally important in state’s identity formation by this thesis. Both contributed to what this thesis calls ‘the proliferation of multiple state identities.’ States normally have more than one identity. These multiple identities often overlap and contradict each other which often force a state to make a choice. Nonetheless, in a certain circumstance, the state cannot simply choose one identity and undermine others. Instead, different identities are in a concurrent operation of influencing state’s foreign policy. In that situation, the foreign policy is shaped by the need to balance multiple identities. This effort is particularly difficult for a state which has undergone a domestic transformation. A drastic domestic transformation such as democratization and the change of political system resulted in the emergence of new identities. The new identities however did not subsequently eliminate old identities which still significantly exist. In this sense, a pivot state’s behaviours – soft-revisionist, bridge-builder role, accommodative regional leadership – are displayed because different identities influence the state’s foreign policy. As a result, the foreign policy is shaped in a way to accommodate different, and sometimes conflicting, multiple identities. Given this logic, a plausible hypothesis to explain the behaviour of pivot states from constructivist theory is that:

A state adopted the behaviours of pivot states as a compromise of multiple state’s identities which are increasingly proliferated as the state undergoes a domestic transformation and/or a complex socialization with regional and global actors.

The concept of the proliferation of multiple identities is useful to explain the difference between pivot states and BRIC countries. Different from BRIC whose foreign policy is more confident, decisive, and assertive, including when challenging current international order, pivot states often found difficulty to articulate a clear stance on a certain issue and then adopt a foreign policy ambiguity. By using constructivist frameworks, this ambiguity is an outcome of sophisticated process of the identity formation which are caused by domestic transformation – such as democracy and radical change in political system - and complex international interaction. BRIC on the other hand did not experience much domestic transformation which changed their identities drastically. China has been a politically communist and economically liberal since 1990s. Russia has attempted to democratize in

early 1990s, but it went back to authoritarian style since Vladimir Putin took power in the late 1990s. Brazil and India have been democratic countries for decades. Therefore, there is no clear proliferation of identities in BRIC countries. The most significant new identity they have is a sense of becoming future global power.

3.4 Conclusion

The first section of this chapter justified the potential application of the pivot states concept to explaining non-BRIC emerging powers by drawing a general pattern of foreign policy behaviours. Although it has been used for a long time, the pivot states concept is weak and not well structured. Many writings on pivot states have focused on the importance of these states from great powers’ perspectives. This chapter argues that if looked at from different angles, pivot states provides a much more useful and applicable concept. The pivot states concept can be used to explain behaviours of non-BRIC states which are increasingly able to maintain cordial relations with different states and are locating themselves in the middle-way of different regional and global interests.

The remaining chapters provide supporting explanations of pivot states. The second section has drawn out three behavioural characteristics of pivot states: soft-revisionist towards the current global order, bridge-building diplomatic role, and balanced global-regional roles. These three behavioural characteristics differentiate pivot states from BRIC and middle powers, setting up clear and strong definitional lines. Recognising that no single IR theory could provide a satisfactory description of what factors influence pivot states’ foreign policy behaviours, this thesis adopts analytical eclecticism which investigates behaviours through two IR theories: rationalism and constructivism. Each theory provides different hypotheses. Hypothesis from rationalism is concerned about the use of the relative-absolute gains concern. On the other hand, the hypothesis from constructivism is that the pivot state’s behaviours is a resultant of the proliferation of multiple identities from both domestic process and international socialization.

It is the task of the next Chapters to test the validity of these hypotheses through case studies. In contrast to the test in each IR paradigm, analytic eclecticism does not aim to select which hypothesis is better over others. Rather, the two hypotheses could be used together and be applied concurrently in different contexts and different points of view: – (1) relative power in the rationalist hypothesis or (2) identity in constructivism -.
Chapter 4
Background for the case studies

This thesis follows the top-down approach which starts by building a strong and applicable theoretical framework which guides enquiry into the main research question. The thesis tests this theoretical framework to prove or dispute it through the comparative case study method. Comparison is an important analytical instrument because it can help hone the argument’s descriptiveness by drawing commonalities and differences among cases.

Cross-national investigation is needed to answer this study’s primary research question, which is to better define countries which are regarded as non-BRIC emerging powers. Because the aim of the research is to explain general commonality and diversity among different countries, it is impossible to use only a one-country study. Cross-national comparison enables one to differentiate between universal and variation cases of foreign policy behaviour. A comparative method is preferred because it can ‘provide a powerful tool for theory building,’\textsuperscript{207} rather than a single case analysis.

In order to set a clear foundation for the comparative method, this chapter provides justification of the choice of case studies and places thematic case studies in the context of pivot states concept. The first section of this chapter defends the selection of Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey as case studies. There are some similarities among these three countries which make them a perfect fit for case studies. In addition to their similarities, they present some differences, which could help this thesis analyse the possible variation of behaviours. These differences become an important basis for a comparison under the methodological framework which was explained in the previous chapters. The second part provides background of the three thematic case studies where three countries are compared in terms of their behaviours. The contextual aspects of the three thematic case studies lay the foundation for the analysis in the subsequent chapters.

4.1 Reasons for case studies selection

Sub-question 1 of this thesis looks at whether non-BRIC emerging powers perform pivot state behaviours, which have been set out in Chapter 3. In line with this objective, countries which are selected as case studies should have certain similarities. Through the investigation of their characters, these similar countries are then tested to determine their eligibility for the pivot states category.

Choosing some countries and dismissing others in case studies is nevertheless not always easy. In the real world no two countries constitute very similar situations. In answering the question of ‘why Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey?’, this thesis recognises that the initial pool of potential case studies could consist of various countries across the globe from Mexico to Vietnam, Nigeria to the Philippines, and Colombia to Malaysia, which may all fall into the non-BRIC emerging powers category. However, three countries is an ideal number for this thesis’ case studies. Although more countries could have enhanced the descriptive nature of this thesis, it could dilute the analytical process and the clarity of the arguments. Therefore, not more than three countries are used as case studies in this thesis. The three countries, which have been picked up, satisfy the requirements of pivot states, according to the framework developed in Chapter 3.

There are two main similarities which are weighed to select countries as case studies. The first condition is that countries have large material capabilities – a combination of economy, population, and military – more than many other developing countries, especially in their respective regions, but less than the BRIC countries. Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey fulfil this condition. In terms of total GDP, as shown in table 4.1, these three countries are ranked lower than BRIC countries. Despite their increasingly large economies, these three countries are among the smallest economies in the G20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current GDP (in billion US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17,419.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>10,354.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4,601.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1
Current GDP in 2014

Brazil, Russia, India, China

three countries in the case studies (Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey)

Compared to their neighbours, all three countries are powerhouses in their respective regions and relatively larger than their neighbouring countries – Indonesia in Southeast Asia, South Africa in Africa, and Turkey at the intersection between the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia and Europe. Yet, despite their status as the largest countries in their neighbourhoods, these three countries are not expected to become major/super powers in the international system.

The second reason is that those three countries are increasingly active on the international stage, especially through international institutions. Each country has served as a non-

---

Data for 2014 is unavailable for Venezuela. Therefore, the number is Venezuela’s current GDP in 2012.
permanent member of the UNSC. Indonesia was a non-permanent member in 2007–2008 and is a candidate to return to the UNSC in 2019–2020 position. South Africa served as a non-permanent member in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012. Turkey held the seat between 2009 and 2010. They are all G20 members and Turkey held the presidency in 2015. They became mediators in some conflicts and contributed to international peacekeeping missions. As the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia played a leading role in promoting political change in Myanmar. South Africa mediated numerous conflicts in Africa, including in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lesotho. Turkey offered mediation initiatives in Middle East and, in cooperation with Finland, established the Friends of Mediation, which offered mediation roles to conflict around the world.

Their role and influence in multilateral fora might be more limited than BRIC and middle powers. But they have carried out focused and specific roles on certain global issues on which BRIC countries and middle powers did not prioritize. Indonesia has played a role in interfaith dialogue by hosting several initiatives on Muslim and Western dialogues. South Africa is the main player in campaigning for better African development. Given the increasing influx of Syrian refugees into its territory since the Arab Spring, Turkey has been the lead actor in Middle East humanitarian issues.

There are some other candidates which were considered, but they were eliminated because, compared to these three countries, their capabilities and international roles are more limited. In Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are economic success stories. Nevertheless, their international role is more limited than Indonesia’s. They are not G20 members and rarely play leading roles on global issues. Nigeria was also a candidate for its large population and economy, but the country’s domestic problems, including communal violence and terrorism, hindered it from taking a more prominent international role. The size of Saudi Arabia’s economy is close to Turkey’s, but Turkey’s global and regional roles are recognised, while Saudi’s diplomacy is very much concentrated on the Middle East, Islamic issues and oil.

In addition to these two key commonalities, these three countries experienced important domestic transformations which revitalised their international roles since around the turn of 21st century. Indonesia experienced a transition from more than 30 years of authoritarian governance to a democratic multi-party system in 1998. South Africa ended the apartheid government in 1994, moving to a more democratic system. In Turkey, after a long era of unstable coalition governments and deep military involvement in politics, the ruling AKP party gained a majority in parliament in 2002 which enabled it to form a government on its
These domestic transformations go hand in hand increasing international activities of these three nations, raising interesting questions about the links between domestic factors and foreign policy behaviour.

These states, however, are different in some ways, and these differences might influence their behaviours. Regarding the level of regionalism, Indonesia lives in a region which has relatively strong and developed regional institutions, especially in terms of economic relations. ASEAN, which implemented an economic community in 2015, is regarded as one of the most coherent regional groupings among developing countries. Post-apartheid South Africa is active in regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) and Southern African Customs Union (SACU). In contrast to Indonesia and South Africa, Turkey lives in volatile neighbourhoods with less developed regional institutions. Turkey has a strong interest in the EU, but the membership accession process has presented several difficulties. Another key difference is economic status. According to the World Bank’s measurement, Turkey and South Africa are upper-middle income countries, while Indonesia is a lower-middle income country.

Different levels of regionalism and economic development affect the variation of foreign policy behaviours among different countries. Although this thesis recognises these differences, it holds them as constant. Although Turkey’s surrounding area lacks strong regional organisations, Turkey has exercised its regional leadership role by initiating some regional organisations such as the Turkic Council and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Different GDP per capita, which separates Indonesia from Turkey and South Africa, as they fall into different categories, does not provide a full picture of economic conditions if other indicators such as the Gini coefficient, unemployment rates and budget deficits are not considered. In fact, despite its lower GDP per capita, Indonesia has performed better than these two countries in other economic indicators. Turkey’s unemployment rate for example was 9.2 % in 2014 and South Africa’s was 25.1 %, while Indonesia’s rate was ‘only’ 6.2 %. The three countries are also democracies. There are, however, some differences in the recent political configuration. South Africa and Turkey are ruled by dominant majorities – the African National Congress (ANC) since 1994 and the AKP since 2002 respectively.

---


Indonesia, on the other hand, has been governed by multi-party coalitions since 1998. The current Indonesian government under President Joko Widodo is supported by seven political parties. The largest party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle / PDI-P), constituted only 18.96% of parliamentary seats. This different political situation might affect the foreign policy making processes. Despite their dominance in domestic politics, both ANC and AKP have also experienced internal friction which resulted in a complex and difficult foreign policy making process. In South Africa, President Jacob Zuma came to power in 2009 through a power struggle with Thabo Mbeki, both of whom have different foreign policy orientations, as will be explained in Chapters 6 and 8. In Turkey, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu resigned in May 2016. One reason for Davutoglu’s resignation, as observed by Bayram Balci, was that Erdogan is not satisfied with Davutoglu’s too soft and diplomatic style in the management of the country and in the management of certain issues between Turkey and Europe. Given the existing political frictions within the ANC and AKP, differences between Indonesia on one hand and South Africa and Turkey on the other hand can be omitted when comparing these three countries in the case studies. The similarities and differences above justify methodological decisions to pick Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey as case studies.

4.2 Overview of thematic cross-country case studies

To test the validity of the pivot states framework developed in Chapter 3, three thematic case studies have been selected for the three country studies of Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. These three case studies offer a wide cross-section of observable behaviour, providing comparative contexts across issue type. The case studies cover multilateral issues, but contain also regional and neighbourhood dimensions. Membership and activity in multilateral institutions demonstrates not just the states’ tendency for cooperation, but also how they engage in self-promotion and status-seeking. Investigation into multilateral issues will allow this thesis to look at the places of the three countries in the revisionist – status quo divide as well as their status-seeking efforts vis-à-vis legitimation roles.

212 Conflicts between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma happened in 2005 when Mbeki removed Zuma from his position as the Deputy President of South Africa due to corruption allegations. Zuma contested Mbeki’s removal and in 2007 defeated Mbeki in the ANC’s chairmanship election. In 2008, the court ruled that Zuma’s charge on corruption was unlawful. After unsuccessfully contesting the court’s decision, Mbeki resigned from the presidency, replaced by Zuma’s deputy in the ANC leadership Kgalema Motlanthe.

The first case discusses these countries’ responses to issues related to ‘states of concern.’ This thesis prefers to use the term ‘states of concern,’ rather than rogue states, pariah states, or axis of evil, as the latter terms imply strictly negative perceptions. Three cases are selected because they have become international concerns and are in close proximity to Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. The cases are (1) Myanmar’s human rights and democracy issues especially from 1988 to 2012, (2) Zimbabwe’s human rights issues and intra-state power struggle between 2007 and 2013, and (3) Turkey’s policy on Iran between 2007 and 2015. Although the three issues were diverse, they were at a similar level at the sense that they were intensively discussed in the UNSC and have attracted the attention of international actors, many of which were divided into pro-intervention and anti-intervention.

The second comparative case is climate change negotiations in the UNFCCC. Climate change negotiations are selected as this is an arena where different interests interact, compete and cooperate. Since the first COP in Berlin, developed and developing countries have adopted different positions on climate change issues especially related to the questions of who is the most responsible for climate change and what those responsible should do to tackle climate change. Furthermore, contrary to the UNSC or the G20 which involve a limited number of countries, the UNFCCC involved all sovereign states under the UN, except the Holy See, in the negotiation process. Elaboration on the climate change negotiation process will allow understanding of the three countries’ stances in the midst of complexly different interests and groupings.

The third case compares these three countries’ views on global economic governance, particularly on issues related to the G20 and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) reforms. Global economic governance issues are important to discuss because the rise of emerging powers itself has been linked with the change of economic weight between countries. The idea of fair and equal economic governance attracted the attention of developing countries because the economic institutions which were established at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference were considered not compatible any more with the increasing weight of emerging powers. In this sense, the G20 has become an important forum which provides greater opportunity to discuss global economic challenges.

4.2.1 States of concern

As states with significant material capabilities in their regions, emerging powers in general – both BRIC and pivot states - are expected to contribute to creating peace, stability and conflict resolution. Given their relatively more powerful capabilities, they are expected to take a decisive role in conflict management. The UNSC remains indispensable as the main global instrument for maintaining global peace, but its ineffectiveness is questioned because of its clear power politics and the conflict of interests and values among member states.\textsuperscript{215} The UNSC often becomes deadlocked over how to deal with conflicts around the world. Furthermore, as often confirmed by US policymakers themselves, the US has experienced a lack of resources to address conflicts.\textsuperscript{216}

Despite awareness of the need to include more actors in dealing with conflict-ridden areas, there is a high degree of variation in perceiving what the best instrument to solve the conflicts is. Tools of intervention in conflicts are hotly contested. Western countries generally prefer to impose the use of force – through interventions and sanctions- to discourage abuse and protect civilians from their occurrence. On the other hand, non-Western countries have generally rejected intervention and sanctions. The difference exists because of different perception regarding values and norms they believe in as well as the role of supra national regimes/institutions in guarding those values. The US and its Western allies hold a belief that democracy, human rights, freedom of religion, and freedom of politics are universal norms.\textsuperscript{217} Given this understanding, international institutions are hoped by Western countries to exercise a role of enforcing these universal norms.

Sanctions could be generally defined as mechanisms to punish an offending party and encourage attitude/policy changes and include a wide range of non-military actions, such as economic sanctions, termination of aid and other forms. Jeremy Farrall\textsuperscript{218} defines sanctions as ‘action which seeks either to coerce target into behaving in a particular manner, or to

punish it for behaviour considered unacceptable by the sender’. Sanctions were ‘institutionalised’ as multilateral collective actions when the League of Nations was established in 1920, although the League’s sanctions record was not particularly effective.\footnote{One example of the League’s failure was when its oil sanction against Italy, which was imposed after Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, was ineffective because Italy was still able to obtain oil from the US which did not support the sanction. See, G. Bruce Strang, ‘“The Worst of All Worlds:’ Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 19, no. 2 (2008): 210–235.} The further institutionalisation of sanctions occurred through the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. Chapter VII of the UN Charter assigned the UNSC with a power to ‘resort to non-military and military action to maintain or restore international peace and security’.\footnote{UN, “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” accessed 1 April 2015, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/Chapter-vii/.}

Although the use of sanctions by the UNSC in response to a threat to international peace and security is authorised under the UN framework, sanctions were rarely used during the period between 1945 and 1989 because of intense veto rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. During that period, both superpowers with UNSC permanent memberships tried to gain a competitive edge over each other by cooperating with corrupt leaders. This policy made sanctions an ineffective tool. During that period, sanctions were imposed only twice: against the white-minority government in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the apartheid government in South Africa. Sanctions became increasingly used during the post-Cold War era. Under the UN framework, there were 23 new mandatory sanctions regime between 1990 and 2009.\footnote{Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “Evaluating UN Sanctions: New Ground, New Dilemmas, and Unintended Consequences,” International Journal 65, no. 1 (Winter 2009–10): 1.}

The rise of emerging powers provides a new dimension regarding the use of sanctions. The use of sanctions to intervene in a country’s domestic affairs becomes their particular concern. In several cases, Western countries believe that changing a country’s attitude to be more compatible with what they perceive as universal values is a moral obligation.\footnote{Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders,” Human Rights Law Review 12, no. 1 (2012): 12.} Non-Western countries on the other hand see the imposition of sanctions and intervention as Western countries’ instrument to pursue their strategic interests. Although their opposition towards sanctions and intervention is not something new, non-Western countries became more engaged in directly debating about whether multilateral institutions should or need to take action to shape the behaviour of a particular state. They are also contesting the idea that an action taken by any supranational mechanism is effective to bring positively desired
change to that state. They are concerned with the fact that many intervention and sanctions have resulted in adverse consequence to the large innocent population in the state.

As UNSC permanent members, China and Russia are more assertive in responding to sanctions by increasingly blocking intervention proposals by Western countries. But it is first of all important to clarify that the veto use and votes in sanction proposals cannot be entirely framed through the Western versus non-Western divide. In fact, since the end of Cold War, it was neither China nor Russia, but the US which implemented vetoes the most, which were mostly intended to defend Israel’s security and existence in Middle East. Furthermore, Western countries often shared a similar position with China and Russia in relations to issues such as sanctions against Iran in 2010. All sanctions regime which are currently implemented under the UN frameworks are supported by China and Russia. On the other hand, Western countries are also not always coherent on the use of sanctions and intervention, as shown for example by France’s rejection over US-led Iraq war in 2003. While sanctions were first intended to maintain peace and security, some of them have more specific and targeted goals, which are democratisation and regime changes. The division between the West on the one hand and China-Russia on the other hand becomes clearer in issues related to human rights violations or those which are directly related to their national interests and security. In dealing with difficulties to solve conflicts through the UN mechanism, Western countries often apply unilateral sanctions, as explained in Chapter 5 regarding Western countries’ sanctions against Myanmar.

China and Russia have a strong sense of sensitivity on issues related to sovereignty and regime changes. Some scholars have argued that due to China’s interaction with Western norms, including harsh criticisms from civil society organisations on issues such as Sudan, China has adopted a more flexible and constructive interpretation of the non-interference principle. Regarding the issue of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), for example, Teitt argued that China has revised its attitude from a strict rejection to a modified implementation, in which China will supports the R2P only if it was intended to protect civilians from systematically state-sponsored mass killing.223 Pang explained further that China has become steadily involved in international interventions by supporting some sanctions – including those on issues related to non-proliferation and the war on terrorism – sending large numbers of UN peacekeeping forces, and participating in post-conflict

reconstructions. Contrary to these claims, China is so far still among the strongest opponent of sanctions and intervention. Looking at patterns of China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC, China mostly voted against or at least abstained from draft resolutions which have sought to implement international sanctions. It is obvious that in cases such as the Darfur conflict, China acted as Sudan’s main international backer in rejecting international intervention, as the Sudanese government itself was unable to oppose sanctions without China’s support. China’s rising power and strong sentiment on its national sovereignty and the non-interference principle, as well as its national interests motivated it to strictly reject sanctions and intervention.

Russia pursued intervention policies in dealing with its neighbouring countries’ intra-state conflicts. Russia implemented sanctions, sent large numbers of troops, and annexed territories such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and lately Crimea for the sake of protecting Russian ethnic groups from persecution and ethnic cleansing. Although the argument for intervention seemed similar to that of Western countries, Russia’s perceptions of and justification for the intervention were different from those of Western countries and institutions, such as NATO and the EU. The West saw intervention as an international norm that is necessary to be implemented to maintain international peace and security, while Russia’s intervention was driven more by protecting its sovereignty and strategic interest. Russia’s intervention policy was strictly limited to its geographical proximity, while in other parts of the world Russia also remains mostly uncompromising regarding the use of sanctions and intervention.

India and Brazil have also expressed critical stances against intervention. India, for example, abstained from draft of resolutions on Libya in March 2011 and Syria in October 2011 when it served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. In fact, during its UNSC tenure between 2011 and 2012, one of India’s five goals was to ‘… protect the primacy of [the] state from

---

UN-sanctioned military intervention. Brazil also displayed careful policies regarding sanctions. It voted against resolution 1929 against Iran and was abstain in two occasions: (1) Resolution 1973 which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and (2) draft resolution on Syria which was eventually vetoed by China and Russia.

Brazil's and India's stances toward sanctions and intervention are not as strict as those of China and Russia. The two countries' more flexible approaches in the use of sanctions and intervention have roots in their intention to get more a positive reputation in the international community as good multilateralists since the two are hoping to obtain additional permanent seats in a reformed UNSC. But overall, the two countries have been very much bound to the non-interference principle. India was, for instance, significantly absent when the international community condemned Myanmar's human rights problem, despite the fact that Myanmar is India's close neighbour. Complex relations with its regional rival Pakistan, war in Afghanistan and suspicions from other smaller states such as Nepal and Sri Lanka keep India at bay when dealing with conflicts in South Asia. India's latest involvement in its neighbouring countries' conflicts was when it intervened in the Sri Lankan civil war. India, which initially intended to protect Tamil population by sending peacekeeping forces, had to withdraw the troops in 1991 due to its fear over increasing China's influence in Sri Lanka, growing anti-Indian movement among Sri Lankan and the high cost of sending troops. Since then India generally chose to be outside of its neighbours' intrastate conflicts such as when it did not pursue any action in Nepal's civil war.

As explained in Chapter 3, compared to China, India, and Russia, Brazil is more willing to use regional organizations as diplomatic avenues. Brazil was considered as the most important actor in maintaining peace and security in South America, by mediating conflicts in Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras since 1990s. Having said that, in recent years, Brazil's ability and willingness to play mediation role has diminished as President Dilma Rouseff focused more on domestic issues, as shown by its less activity in dealing with

Venezuela political crisis in 2014. Furthermore, as its economic relations – in the forms of trade and investment – with Latin American countries grow, Brazil’s consideration before taking mediation role become more complicated as it hoped that its foreign policy did not cause further destabilization which could hamper economic interest. Although Brazil had global aspiration, it cannot display role as a leading conflict manager in the region. In the 2009 Honduran conflict for example, it was not Brazil, but countries such as Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela which played more important role.

Despite its attempt to strengthen UNASUR and MERCOSUR especially during Lula’s presidency, Brazil became more hesitant to take a lead in using these regional organizations to resolve conflicts in South America. One explanation for this was that South American countries were highly sceptic to see Brazil’s actively regional leadership. Chile, for example, acknowledged Brazil as the most powerful and influential actor in South America, but it is hesitant to follow Brazil’s leadership because of Chile’s preference to maintain security cooperation with Argentina. Brazil also gained international attention when proposing the ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) idea, which was a constructive idea to reconcile the different perceptions between the West and non-Western states on the use of external

---


234 Ibid.


236 The conflict arisen after Honduran President Manuel Zelaya issued a decree to hold an unbinding referendum in November 2009 to establish a Constitutional Assembly which would have been tasked to write a new constitution. This policy was criticized by Hondurans as his first step to extend his presidency terms. The Supreme Court ruled that the decree was illegal and as a response, Honduran armed forces toppled Zelaya. Zelaya since then exiled at the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras. This military coup was condemned by the OAS and the UN. After series of mediations by Dominican Republic and Colombia, Zelaya was allowed to return to Honduras in 2011.

237 Mares, op cit., 132.


239 As summarised by Derec McDougal, the main ideas of RwP consist of nine points:

... the importance of preventive diplomacy (a) and the need ‘to exhaust all peaceful means’ (b); the use of force must be authorised by the Security Council or the General Assembly in exceptional circumstances (c). Any authorised military action ‘must abide by the letter and spirit of [its] mandate’ (d), producing ‘as little violence and instability as possible’ (e); such action ‘must be judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established by the Security Council’ (f). The proposed guidelines ‘must be observed throughout the entire length of the authorization’ (g). There was a need for ‘[e]nhanced Security Council procedures ... to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are monitored and interpreted’ (g). A final point (i) emphasised that the Security Council ‘must ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force.’

intervention. Nevertheless, despite initial optimism with the RwP, the follow up of the concept is still questioned. RwP itself currently no longer became a priority of the Brazilian foreign policy.

Through their rejection of draft resolutions seeking sanctions and intervention during their times in the UNSC, China, Russia, India and Brazil have expressed foreign policy which has attempted to revise Western interventionist policy in dealing with states of concern issues. Given their high sensitivity on issues related to sovereignty and national integrity, they perceived sanctions and intervention as a Western international norm and thus they have been hesitant to provide full support.

On the states of concern issue, middle powers often act as a mediator such as when Australia sent peacekeeping forces and election commissioners to Cambodia to help monitor peace process and prepare for a general election in 1992. When serving as non-permanent members of the UNSC, these middle powers usually voted for supporting sanctions. Western countries have a strong tendency of using sanctions and intervention in dealing with conflict. Germany, for example, initially refused sanctions against Libya. Germany was one of five UNSC members which abstained from the UNSC Resolution 1973 on ‘no-fly zone’ policy against Libya. Nevertheless, it then participated in a NATO mission in Libya and joined Western countries in demanding Muammar Qaddafi to step down.

The three countries in the case studies – Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey – have served as non-permanent members of UNSC in recent years, providing them with a venue to express their stance regarding the use of sanctions and international intervention. From their experience in the UNSC, it seems that those three states shared the same ideas as China, Russia, India and Brazil which generally reject the use of sanctions and intervention. Indonesia served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 1995–1996 and 2007–2008.

In the latter period, Indonesia abstained on resolutions seeking sanctions against Myanmar\textsuperscript{245} and Zimbabwe,\textsuperscript{246} both of which were eventually not implemented because of China’s and Russia’s veto. South Africa, which served in 2007–2008 voted against resolutions to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe and Myanmar. South Africa’s other tenure was between 2012 and 2012, when it abstained from the resolution draft on sanctions against Syria. In its 2010–2011 period, Turkey voted against a sanctions resolution on Iran’s nuclear program. Although the three countries in the study seemed to share similar positions with China, Russia, Brazil, and India on states of concern issues, what is analysed and concluded in Chapter 5, 6, and 7 is that a stronger and more helpful outlook to explain these three countries can be discovered by applying pivot states’ behaviours – soft-revisionist, normative bridge-builder role, and accommodative regional leadership – in response to sanction and intervention ideas.

\subsection*{4.2.2 Climate change negotiations}

Global environment problems were first addressed internationally through the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. During the 1980s, climate change issues became more popularly discussed in several meetings, which resulted in agreements such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol in 1987. In the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, countries agreed to start negotiations under the COP.

The Rio conference recognised the principle of Common But Different Responsibility (CBDR). Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration stated that:

\begin{quote}
In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.\textsuperscript{247}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{245} See Chapter 5.2.1 of this thesis for detail.


Through the principle, developing nations generally pushed the developed world to bear more responsibility in emission reduction. Developing countries aligned themselves through the G77. As the largest coalition bloc in the UNFCCC, the G77 was not specifically established for the purpose of climate change negotiations. The G77 was formed in 1964 to address unequal economic balance between developing and developed nations in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Given its already established secretariat and mechanisms, the G77 was operationalised as a platform to advocate the interests of developing nations in climate change negotiations. Since 1981, China has become a special invitee to the G77, transforming the association’s name to ‘the G77 and China’. As the largest coalition in the UN System, G77 was seen as the ‘umbrella’ which could leverage the position of many small and medium-sized developing countries in multilateral negotiations.

Divisions between developed and developing countries in climate change negotiations have been evident since the first COP in Berlin in 1995. During the COP3 in Kyoto in 1997, the G77 and China successfully pushed a protocol which excluded them from any binding commitment, given their relatively low level of development and weak capability for adaptation and mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol outlined the greenhouse gas emission reduction obligation for Annex I countries to an average of 6–8 % below 1990 levels between the years 2008 and 2012. The subsequent COPs discussed the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol and set the stage for nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

In the years ahead of the expiration of Kyoto Protocol, parties began to discuss the post-Kyoto agreement. The main debates in the post-Kyoto negotiations remain unchanged, which was to centre on who should bear the burden of emissions reduction commitment. Developing countries consistently pushed developed countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, the United States and some other developed nations argued that large economies such as China, India and Brazil had also contributed to the emissions reduction effort given their increasingly large emissions. For some years since the post-Kyoto agreement was first negotiated in 2007, UNFCCC parties failed to agree on a new commitment and in COP18 in Doha, the Kyoto Protocol’s expiration was extended from 2012 to 2020. Approaching the COP21 in Paris, fortunately there were moves from various countries/groups to find convergence, which eventually resulted in an agreement in which each country is voluntary committed to a target for emission reduction, called an intended nationally determined contribution (INDC).
In addition to the developed–developing nations divide, a great diversity of positions within the G77 presents extraordinary challenges. All decisions in the G77 are based on consensus and common position, but individual countries are free to intervene with their own positions if they disagree with the positions made by the G77. Although the G77 countries are united by the challenges they face in tackling economic and development challenges, there are active subgroups within the G77 on climate change negotiation, including the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Least Developing Countries (LDCs), and the African Group. These groups do not always have the same positions on many issues. From COP1 until COP21, the G77 has been relatively solid and unified with the exception of COP1 in Berlin in 1995 where 72 developing countries collaborated with EU members to produce the Berlin Mandate, which excluded developing countries from new commitments. Countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most of which are part of the G77, on the other hand, refused the recognition that the commitments made by the UNFCCC were inadequate, worrying that their revenue from oil and gas might decline because of the emissions reduction.

The most significant subgroup which emerged was BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) which aimed to improve these four countries’ bargaining position in the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen. Successfully pushing for the Copenhagen Accord, a loose political agreement without binding commitment, BASIC met regularly and consolidated their positions in subsequent COPs.

On the Western side, across the numerous climate change negotiations, Europe and the US often pursued contrasting stances. While the EU accepted binding commitments and has taken progressive actions, the US signed the Kyoto Protocol but did not ratify it. The US held the belief that as long as large developing countries are treated as non-annexes, then it should not ratify the protocol. The EU has been a leader in combating climate change. Within its member countries, the EU has set binding emission reduction targets by intending to cut emissions to 20% below 1990 levels in 2020 and 40% in 2030.248

A number of factors explains why the EU has a far more progressive climate change policy than the US. According to Hayes and Hayes,249 the EU’s progressive stance was motivated

by its desire to grab global leadership as well as economic opportunities. On the other hand, the US perceived climate change mainly from a security perspective, so that the fear of a negative impact of emission reduction, such as the decline of economic growth and the rise of the oil price, became the more dominant narrative among US decision-makers. Another factor was the earlier and bigger pro-environment movements in Europe than in the US. According to Carlarne, the pro-environment non-governmental organisations (NGOs) grew rapidly in West Germany when the public opposed the development of nuclear plants. This anti-nuclear movement then turned to pro-climate change policy. Strong domestic pressure pushed the unified German government to take an aggressive policy stance on emission reduction. As the largest state in the EU, Germany’s pro-environment policy influenced other EU countries to adopt the same policies.

The US and non-EU countries established the JUSSCANNZ group (Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand), which later transformed into the Umbrella Group. The Umbrella Group’s membership included diverse countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Norway and Switzerland, while countries such as South Korea, Iceland and Mexico often attended the meetings. The Umbrella Group is less enthusiastic than the EU. They insist that the binding agreement should also include some developing countries that have enough economic and technological capabilities to undertake an emissions reduction commitment. In contrast to the G77, the Umbrella Group does not agree with CBDR and has urged that the categorisation of countries into annexes is incompatible with the reality of large developing countries’ contribution to global emissions.

Despite pursuing significantly different positions from the EU and G77, the Umbrella Group is not a negotiation bloc and is working as a loose information-sharing forum. Therefore, their perceptions toward climate change vary significantly and the group did not always come with specific positions into the negotiations. Canada, New Zealand and Japan, for example, were initially among active supporters of the Kyoto Protocol, but later Canada withdrew from the protocol, while Japan and New Zealand did not make commitments in the second round of the protocol.

---

250 Ibid., 88–90.
252 Ibid.
Given the high degree of variation in both Western and non-Western countries and the existence of complex diplomacy among them, the clear separation between status quo and revisionist cannot be established following the Western-versus-non-Western divide. This problem is understandable because UNFCCC and climate change governance is a relatively new institution, different from UNSC, IMF and the World Bank, which were made on the edge of World War II. Developing countries often also acted for the status quo by keeping the Kyoto Protocol, as the protocol excluded them from any obligation.

In order to solve the confusion regarding the revisionist – status quo divide, Katherine Combes\textsuperscript{254} offered a helpful view that the revisionist stance can be seen from states’ refusal to make stronger commitments and resistance to international norms which require obligation. Combes defined status quo not as the Western dominance over developing countries, but as a neoliberal institutionalist idea which treated climate change as a world problem which needs to be tackled through collective efforts of all nations. Therefore, international order on climate change was not the one which was dominantly shaped by the US, as happened to Bretton Woods institutions, but was dynamically constructed by actors since the 1980s, that saw international collaboration as necessary to combat climate change. In this regard, Combes perceived China as a revisionist because of its active effort to consolidate developing countries to oppose any climate change regime which binds them to mandatory commitment. China focused very much on the need for developed countries to contribute a much bigger role in tackling climate change,\textsuperscript{255} rather than recognising its role in creating climate change. In this sense, China’s revisionist stance can be seen from its refusal to accept measures, which would help to address the problems more successfully and thus demonstrating its lack of true resolve to address international environmental problems.\textsuperscript{256}

China and India, which are the world’s largest and third largest greenhouse gas emitters, as shown in table 4.2, have acted as leaders in rejecting binding emission reduction commitments for developing countries. Instead, they have pushed developed nations to seriously implement commitments made in COPs.

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 20–21.
## Table 4.2

**CO2 emissions (excluding agricultural and forest fires) in ktons CO$_2$**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Annual increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>431,451.40</td>
<td>10,540,749.59</td>
<td>167.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5,275,485.24</td>
<td>5,334,529.74</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>4,095,705.91</td>
<td>3,415,235.46</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>867,356.33</td>
<td>2,341,896.77</td>
<td>12.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,735,009.56</td>
<td>1,766,427.27</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,245,660.17</td>
<td>1,278,921.81</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>907,280.24</td>
<td>767,145.57</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>277,653.01</td>
<td>618,197.22</td>
<td>8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>400,532.75</td>
<td>610,065.60</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>481,079.89</td>
<td>565,991.53</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>263,421.41</td>
<td>501,102.85</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>215,412.34</td>
<td>494,822.17</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>316,980.98</td>
<td>456,269.59</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>234,219.33</td>
<td>452,976.61</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>546,759.69</td>
<td>415,420.92</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>300,875.74</td>
<td>409,398.52</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>285,326.54</td>
<td>392,718.90</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>176,431.41</td>
<td>353,194.46</td>
<td>7.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among BRICS, Russia is not a BASIC member. As a former Soviet state, Russia is an Annex II state under the Kyoto Protocol. Between 1990 and 2012, Russia successfully reduced emissions by more than 40%. But, Russia’s success did not really reflect the real situation. Samuel Charap has argued that Russia is a passive actor in the international climate regime because Russia’s achievement on emissions reduction did not come from systematic and clear policy, but from its changing geographical and economic situations.\(^{258}\)

The Kyoto Protocol itself used 1990, instead of 1997, as its historical base year which means that Russia was still under the Soviet Union’s era. The Soviet dissolution in 1991, which resulted in a significant decline of Russia’s geographical area, as well as the drastic collapse of many large manufacturing industries and the rise of its forest area due to abandoned land, made the emissions level in current Russia far less than in 1990.

---


Russia joined the Umbrella Group which demanded more responsibility from large developing countries on emissions reduction. Nevertheless, as the nature of the Umbrella Group is a loose association, Russia took a different strategy and position from other Umbrella Group countries. In contrast to the US, Russia did not express explicit opposition to China, India and other large developing countries, which may have been motivated by its intention to maintain cordial relations with these countries in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other cooperation projects. Russia did not openly demand that developing countries commit to emission reduction. This could be motivated by economic interest considerations because if growing developing countries such as China and India are committed to emission reduction, Russia would lose their potential markets. When chairing BRICS in 2015, Russia hosted the first ever environment ministers meeting which agreed to seek the possibility of environmental projects under the BRICS New Development Bank and the sharing of expertise, among others. Thus, despite its long standing association with the Umbrella Group, Russia has increasingly considered itself as an aspirant actor as China, India, and other non-Western countries which strategically avoided binding commitment on emission reduction and manoeuvred for any flexible mechanism.

Contrary to China and India, middle powers have supportive tendencies towards climate change agreements. Although some of them are in the same association with Russia in the Umbrella Group, they are more willing to show leadership than Russia’s passive role. Notwithstanding its withdrawal from Kyoto in 2011, the new Canadian government in 2015 has shown an active and leadership role in the Paris climate change talk including by promising $2.65 billion for adaptation and mitigation projects and to implement carbon

---


New Zealand also promised $200 million to support developing countries in dealing with climate change challenges.²⁶²

Within the status quo–revisionist complexity of climate change negotiations, the roles of the three countries in the case studies were somehow overshadowed by other bigger states which attracted bigger press and scholarly coverage. A different stance is taken by this thesis by looking at Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey from a more active perspective. The set of pivot states characteristics – attitude towards international order, accepted and claimed role, and regional–global balancing role – will be analysed step by step for each country through one sub-chapter in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The assessment of every sub-chapter on climate change issues will become an integrated part of the conclusion at the end of every Chapter which will make a generalisation as to whether the country could be categorised as a pivot state.

4.3.3 Global economic governance and the G20

In recent years, the G20 has emerged as an influential platform to discuss global economic management. Despite its informality and questions over its legitimacy, the G20 has been able to set agendas and priorities, coordinate actions, and mobilize resources in response to the global financial crisis. The rise of the G20 itself was not a sudden process. Nine years prior to the first G20 Summit in 2008, in the wake of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the G20 was established as a meeting between finance ministers and central bank governors to mitigate the crisis, promote cooperation under the Bretton Woods system and advance progress in WTO negotiations,²⁶³ among other things.

The 2008 global financial crisis put the G20 in a more prominent position. The G20 summit mechanism was needed by the G8 to overcome the problem of legitimacy and efficiency in the global economic governance. . As explained by Payne, the legitimacy problem in the G8 could be traced from the lack of regional variation and power divisions in its self-selection

membership, while the efficiency problem could be seen from the fact that the G8 had lost its previous capability to set the agenda and mitigate the financial crisis. The emergence of the G20 process at the same time provided an opportunity for non-Western developing countries to promote issues of their concern such as reforms of the global economic governance, especially to push for greater role and voting power in the IMF and the World Bank, the two foremost multilateral financial and development institutions.

Current global economic governance has its roots in the shadow of the end of World War II, when Allied nations held the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the US. Among other important points, the conference agreed on the formation of the IMF and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is one of components of the current World Bank. The Bretton Woods system actually collapsed in 1971 when the US abolished the convertibility of the US dollar to gold; therefore, the Bretton Woods' fixed exchange rate system was abandoned. Despite the collapse of the currency system, IMF and the World Bank still play a significant role in addressing global economic problems. IMF functions as a lender to countries which have balance of payments problems, while the World Bank has focused on providing loans which aim to enhance countries’ capacity and to support development projects.

The relative shift of economic weight to developing countries raised an aspiration to reform the IMF and World Bank. Developing countries are mostly disappointed with their lack of powers and influence in the decision making process. They demand better representation and accountability of the IMF and World Bank. This demand referred to minimum representation of developing countries in both institutions. In the IMF, the governance’s top decision makers consist of 24 executive boards in which five of them were each owned automatically by the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK, while the rest 19 seats were elected by member countries. As a country with largest voting share and quota, the US has unilateral veto over IMF’s decision. In the pre-2010 reform, Europe had been overrepresented. All IMF managing directors are Europeans. European countries’ quota share was much higher than their GDP. Combined GDP of four largest European countries – Germany, France, Britain, and Italy - was 13.4% in 2014, but their quota was 17.3%.

265 Ibid.
The issue of IMF quotas has been discussed regularly through the IMF General Review of Quotas – usually every five years. Any changes have to be approved by at least 85% of the total voting power. A member’s consent is required if its quota is changed. The current quota formula is a weighted average of GDP, openness, economic variability, and international reserves. GDP itself is measured through a blend of GDP which is based on market exchange rates and PPP exchange rates. Although quotas are central to the IMF governance, the urgency to revise the IMF quotas was never widely discussed until recently, especially since the first G20 Summit in 2008. Prior to the G20 Summit, the IMF quotas had been actually revised in the 2006 IMF Annual Meeting in Singapore. Nevertheless, the 2006 reforms were still seen insufficient by developing countries to accommodate the shift of global economic weight.

The 2008 G20 Summit discussed IMF quota reform and recognised the necessity to initiate reforms on global economic governance in general. In the Leaders’ Declaration, the G20 agreed to:

> advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness. In this respect, emerging and developing economies, including the poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation.  

In that summit, the G20 established working groups on IMF reform and on the reform of the World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). During the 2nd G20 Summit in 2009, G20 members from both developed and developing countries found convergence on the need to pursue IMF reform as an integral part of improving IMF’s lending capacity. Ahead of the IMF General Review of Quotas in December 2010, the G20 met in its fourth Summit in Seoul. The summit sent a strong message to support a previous meeting of central bank governors and foreign ministers which agreed to formalize the reforms which included the rise of the quotas to around US$ 733.9 billion as well as shifting quota shares from developed countries to developing countries by more than 6%. The points on IMF reforms agreed at this Seoul Summit are widely called the 2010 Seoul package.

---


IFIs’ reforms are important for the G20’s existence, not only in the time of crisis, but also in the post-crisis period. As argued by Cooper and Bradford, one key factor which would determine the G20’s integrity in the post-crisis era is its commitment to continue reforms of global economic governance. Serious implementation of reforms would strengthen the G20’s role as a global steering committee well beyond the crisis period.

Understanding the change in global economic distribution, the IMF, under the pressure from the G20, decided to revise the composition of quota and voting rights. In the 14th General Review of Quotas in December 2010, IMF Board of Governors approved quota and governance reforms proposed by the Executive Director. The reforms have raised the quotas to around US$ 733.9 billion as well as shifted quota shares from developed countries to developing countries more than 6%. Among G20 members, some benefited from the reforms, while the others are adversely affected.

Table 4.3
Shift of IMF quotas of G20 members which benefit from the reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>PreSingapore274</th>
<th>Post 2008 reform</th>
<th>Post 2010 reform</th>
<th>Change 2008 vs 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.980</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>6.390</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.945</td>
<td>1.911</td>
<td>2.749</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>2.218</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td>1.799</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>1.520</td>
<td>1.868</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.782</td>
<td>2.493</td>
<td>2.705</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.514</td>
<td>1.357</td>
<td>1.378</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

274 Quotas before the 61st IMF-World Bank Annual Meeting, on 19-20 September 2006 in Singapore.
Table 4.4
Shift of IMF quotas of G20 members which suffer from the reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>PreSingapore</th>
<th>Post 2008 reform</th>
<th>Post 2010 reform</th>
<th>Change 2008 vs 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.268</td>
<td>2.929</td>
<td>2.095</td>
<td>-28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>-18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.980</td>
<td>2.670</td>
<td>2.311</td>
<td>-13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.086</td>
<td>6.107</td>
<td>5.583</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.024</td>
<td>4.502</td>
<td>4.225</td>
<td>-6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.024</td>
<td>4.502</td>
<td>4.225</td>
<td>-6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.301</td>
<td>3.305</td>
<td>3.159</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.228</td>
<td>6.553</td>
<td>6.461</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17.380</td>
<td>17661</td>
<td>17.398</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2010 reform package was delayed for more than five years because it was blocked by the US Congress. The Republican-led Congress feared that the reform would reduce the US’ influence in the IMF. In responding to the delay, G20 members and IMF officials, including IMF Executive Director Christine Lagarde, put a lot of pressure on the US. Developed countries other than the US supported the 2010 reforms. So, within the G20, the US was the only member which refused to approve the reforms. Understanding these developments, the revisionist-status quo setting in the G20 and on IMF quota reform should not simply follow the division between who supported the reforms and who did not because in fact only the US which was reluctant to adopt the reforms package. Instead, the division should be made based on the motivation of supporting reforms and intensity to push it.

BRICS’ motivation for reform was to gain more powers in the executive board’s decision making process. BRICS as a group became the most critical opponent to the US’ reluctance. In any chance of their meetings, BRICS leaders often issued statement requesting the US to approve the reform as soon as possible. BRICS put the IMF reform issue, especially the quota reform in the heart of their common position in the G20. BRICS repeatedly delivered formal statements pressing US to ratify the reform. In a BRICS meeting in the sidelines of the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, BRICS released a statement:

The (BRICS) Leaders also reaffirmed their disappointment and serious concern at the non-implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms, and its impact on the Fund’s legitimacy and credibility…………….. In the event that the United States fails to ratify the 2010 reforms by the
year-end, they called on the G20 to schedule a discussion of the options for next steps that the IMF has committed to present in January 2015.275

In another meeting in the G20 Summit in Antalya in 2015, BRICS leaders again issued a statement which ’…urge the United States to ratify these reforms as soon as possible.’276

European countries’ supportive attitude on the other hand had less emphasises on the need to change the Fund’s decision making process. Rather, by supporting the reforms and providing more quotas to developing countries, IMF could raise its resources which could help ease the Eurozone crisis. Furthermore, although the reform brought India and Brazil to top ten of largest quota shares and raised China’s position from 6th to 3rd position, Europe still maintain significant number of voting and quota shares. The combination of four largest European countries’ voting shares is 17.11%, well beyond 15% of votes needed to veto IMF Executive Board’s decision.

The difference between BRICS and middle powers became much clearer after the US Congress eventually passed the IMF quota reforms in December 2015. While middle powers were generally satisfied with the US’ ratification, BRICS wanted further reforms beyond the 2010 package. China, Russia and India saw the 2010 Seoul’s reform package was still not sufficient. During a China-Russia-India trilateral meeting, they demanded further reforms which could give developing countries more representation and power.277

Amidst the difference between BRICS and middle powers on the issues of global economic governance in the G20, the three countries – Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey – will be investigated on whether they tend to comply with either BRICS or middle powers’ stances, or choose different set of behaviours framed in the pivot states concept – soft revisionist, bridge-builder, and regional accommodative leadership-. It is true that they all joined BRICS in pushing for the reform. But position and strategy of each in the G20 was different from BRICS, as will be elaborated and concluded in next Chapters.


277 India’s Ministry of External Affairs “Joint Communiqué of the 13th Meeting,” op cit.
4.3 Conclusion

This Chapter clarified and justified the reasons for choosing case studies. Given their commonalities in the expansion of relative powers and active international roles, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey could be seen as candidates for pivot states. These three states offer unique points to apply a comparative method that draws out patterns of behaviour. Further, part of this Chapter provided background to and context for three thematic case studies: (1) the issues of states of concern, (2) climate change negotiations, and (3) global economic governance and the G20. These thematic case studies will be used to test pivot states behaviours of the three countries.
5.1 Overview of the rise of Indonesia

While recognition and prediction of Indonesia’s status as one of emerging powers have risen since mid-2000s, Indonesia’s own perception as an ‘emerging power’ is not something new. Since gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has aspired to become an important world player. The Indonesian Constitution explicitly mentioned that one of its four national goals was ‘to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice,’ which reveals an ambition to play a global role. One important manifestation of Indonesia’s ambition to promote its global role was when it hosted the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955. Through the conference, which was the first large meeting of newly independent developing countries, Indonesia presented itself as a leader among developing countries that did not want to be trapped in the Cold War ideological dichotomy. The conference itself laid a strong foundation for the NAM, of which Indonesian President Sukarno was one of its five founding fathers.

Despite non-aligned rhetoric, Indonesia manifested its foreign policy through its opposition to the Western capitalist system, and a closer move to the Soviet Union and later China. In the early 1960s Indonesian President Sukarno introduced the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) concept, through which Indonesia positioned itself as a de facto leader in a campaign against Western countries, which Sukarno defined as the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS). Indonesia also initiated the Jakarta–Hanoi–Phnom Penh–Beijing–Pyongyang axis, although the realisation of the axis did not happen. Indonesia's anti-Western stance at that time was triggered, among other factors, by its former colonial power the Netherlands' reluctance to discuss the future of West Papua, which Indonesia claimed as its territory.

---


279 Other founding fathers are Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. The NAM first met in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1961. The establishment of NAM was based on the pledge for being consistently neutral during the course of the Cold War which was agreed at the Bandung Conference. See Kementerian Luar Negeri, “Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned Countries,” accessed 1 October 2014, http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir_dok/01st%20Summit%20of%20the%20Non-Aligned%20Movement%20-%20Final%20Document%20(Belgrade_Declaration).pdf.

280 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), 27.
Sukarno’s successor, Suharto, restricted the area of Indonesia’s diplomacy to the Southeast Asian region through ASEAN and leaned to the West for economic purposes. In its region, Indonesia is recognised as the main determinant of ASEAN. Despite somewhat low-profile foreign policy, in economic and development aspects Indonesia enjoyed high economic growth during the Suharto era. According to World Bank data, Indonesia’s average economic growth between 1990 and 1996 was 7.89% per year for which Indonesia was widely praised as one of the ‘New Asian Tigers’. Nevertheless, it soon fell into a deep downfall during the Asian economic crisis in 19971998. The crisis significantly downgraded Indonesia’s foreign policy standing as much attention was directed to deal with complex domestic and political problems.

The Indonesian economy revived in just a few years, with annual economic growth of 5.1% between 1999 and 2008. The high economic growth and strong macroeconomic indicators, together with increasingly resilient democracy, brought a positive impact toward Indonesia’s regional and global standing. During Yudhoyono’s two terms of presidency, Indonesia displayed more active international roles. Indonesia hosted the COP13 of UNFCCC in 2007, attempted to mediate in the Cambodia–Thailand border issue dispute in 2011, and co-chaired a high-level panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, among others.

When narratives about emerging or rising powers were popularised in the turn of the twenty-first century, Indonesia was also included in the emerging powers/markets categories such as Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey (MINT), MIST, N-11, CIVET, and the Big Ten, Nouriel Roubini optimistically saw Indonesia’s potential economic strength and predicted that Indonesia would be the sixth largest economy by 2030. Roubini argued that Indonesia has presented an interesting economic model whose low inflation, low debt, and large domestic contribution to GDP, supported by a large young population, would bring more sustainable

---

282 Indonesia’s role in setting norms in ASEAN could be observed through its initiative in initiating the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) which was signed in 1995 after continuous negotiation since the late 1970s.
Some suggested Indonesia should be included in BRICS, for both analytical purposes and real membership. Thee Kian Wie suggested that Indonesia should replace Russia in BRIC, changing the group’s name to BIIC, because Indonesia’s economy is much more diverse than Russia’s, which is significantly dependent on oil and gas exports.287 Georgy Toloraya of the BRICS National Research Committee saw Indonesia as the likeliest candidate for BRICS’ membership expansion.288

Although economic and business reports have acknowledged Indonesia’s economic potential, little literature has looked at the significance of a rising Indonesia on the global political landscape. This lack of analysis is related to the size – economic, military, and political influence – of Indonesia which is not as large as China, India and Russia. Among the few attempts to offer analysis on Indonesia’s rise was Amitav Acharya.289 Using a constructivist framework, Acharya argues that while other emerging powers are rising through economic and military developments, Indonesia’s rise is a result of the country’s ability to build conclusive interaction between three factors: democracy, development and stability. Through its strengths on these three factors, Indonesia was able to promote itself as a ‘normative actor’ rather than projecting its military and economic powers as foreign policy tools.290 Acharya provided an example of Indonesia’s important achievement as the normative actor when Indonesia became a facilitator in Asia more effectively than other major powers in Asia, such as China, Japan and Korea.291

Acharya has contributed significantly not only in explaining Indonesia’s rise, but also to the literature on emerging powers, by proposing norms as another key factor for a country’s rising. Nevertheless, Acharya simplifies the positive sides of democracy, development, and stability, and overlooks the complexity of them. For instance, Acharya rightly argues that democracy on the one hand has become one of the key narratives in Indonesia’s foreign policy in recent years. Through the institutionalisation process in ASEAN and initiatives such as the Bali Democracy Forum, Indonesia has promoted its role as a democracy promoter in the region. Having said that, the significance of democracy promotion in Indonesia’s foreign

286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
policy remained unclear. When facing issue such as military coup in Thailand or alleged unfair election in Malaysia for example, Indonesia was not able to show a role as a democracy promoter. Acharya’s notion of Indonesia’s successful image as a democracy does not really work in influencing the Thailand and Malaysia cases. Indonesia’s inaction in these cases is better explained through a realism lens: that it was relative material constraints which made Indonesia refrain from taking a role. Furthermore, Acharya overpraised Indonesia’s democracy and overlooked complex problems such as the existence of vote buying, intra-communal conflicts which often followed local elections, and the dominant role of oligarchy. Given these facts, Indonesia’s current foreign policy should not be explained solely from the constructivist framework because Indonesia’s democracy, development, and stability are complex identities. Indonesia’s relative modest expansion of material capabilities might influence its less aggressive foreign policy compared to BRIC, the issue which will be elaborated in following parts.

In contrast to Acharya, Vibhanshu Shekhar uses a neoclassical realism approach whose main argument was that the main factor which shapes a country’s foreign policy is its relative position in the international system, especially in terms of its material capabilities. Shekhar suggests that Indonesia’s soft power tendency is not because of achievement on some normative aspects as argued by Acharya, but from its ‘lack of institutional capacity and resources to innovate’ as well as its increasingly fragile democracy and economic uncertainty. On this point, Shekhar’s arguments converged with Dave McRae’s, who argued that Indonesia’s middling economic and military capabilities have prevented it from pursuing a forceful foreign policy. Despite Shekhar’s effort to incorporate domestic factors as determinants of Indonesia’s rise, these domestic factors are seen more from a negative view. Issues such as the rise of Islamic radicalisation, economic inequality, and weak state capacity are seen as factors which constrained Indonesia’s rise, which is a result of the increasing of Indonesia’s relative power position in the international system. Domestic factors are treated merely as secondary determinants whose roles are undermined by the changing configuration of power distribution in the international system.

To obtain a better understanding of Indonesia’s rise, there is a necessity to apply different perspectives. A social constructivism argument which focuses on normative elements, as applied by Acharya, would be much more valuable in explaining Indonesia’s rise if it was

married with rationalism perspectives offered by Shekhar. The contrasting view of each could give strength in identifying Indonesia’s rise.

The discussion of analytic eclecticism, which combines rationalism and constructivism, is elaborated in Chapter 8. Chapter 5 on the other hand intends to identify whether Indonesia’s current foreign policy behaviour reflects pivot states characteristics – attitude towards global order, performed role, and role in the regional–global nexus. This will be done through investigation of three case studies: (1) Indonesia’s Myanmar policy with regard to Myanmar’s human rights and political problems between 1998 and 2012; (2) the role of Indonesia in climate change negotiations from 2007 to 2015; and (3) Indonesia’s role in global economic governance and particularly its role in the G20.

5.2 Indonesia’s response to the Myanmar conflicts

5.2.1 Introduction and context

Myanmar’s political problems became international concern as early as the 1962 military coup. General Ne Win, who led the coup in Myanmar and subsequently became a dictator, implemented a tough isolationist foreign policy, which initially was aimed to reduce Beijing’s and the West’s influences to the country, but later jeopardized Myanmar’s economy and international relations. After more than two decades of dictatorship, the general election was introduced in 1990 following the 1988 uprisings, when thousands were killed during student and public protests against the military junta. Nevertheless, the result of the 1990 election in which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) gained the majority of parliamentary seats, was annulled by the military government SLORC.

Following the annulment, a number of Western countries implemented unilateral sanctions against Myanmar. In 1990 the US terminated trade preferences, implemented an arms embargo and obstructed loans and grants from the World Bank and IMF. US President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13047 in 1997 which prohibited new US investment in

---

295 Ian Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 115.
Myanmar. The EU imposed sanctions, in the form of an arms embargo, from July 1991.\textsuperscript{296} Other countries such as Australia and Canada, and also individual members of the EU, implemented sanctions against Myanmar.

The UN on the other hand never implemented any sanctions against Myanmar because any discussion regarding Myanmar was vetoed by China and Russia. One meeting in the UN regarding Myanmar issues was conducted in January 2007 during which Indonesia served as a non-permanent member. The meeting was carried out to discuss a draft resolution proposed by the US and UK. The draft S/2007/14 demanded the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and to provide access to international humanitarian organisations.\textsuperscript{297} Following the debate, the draft was agreed by nine members, but opposed by China, Russia and South Africa. Indonesia, together with Congo and Qatar, abstained.\textsuperscript{298} In the following months of 2007, the Myanmar political crisis intensified with large number of protesters, including Buddhist monks, marching to demand affordable prices, better quality of public service, and eventually democracy. The crackdown, popularly called the Saffron Revolution, was responded to by the international community with harsher sanctions against Myanmar. The EU, for example, imposed sanctions which prohibited the imports of gems, timbers and metals.\textsuperscript{299} Indonesia joined other countries in expressing concern over the crackdown and encouraging Myanmar’s government to refrain from oppression. Marty Natalegawa, then Indonesian Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, stated that: ‘We are seriously following these developments very closely. We are concerned by it. We are calling on the authorities to exercise maximum restraint and desist from any acts that could cause further violence.’\textsuperscript{300} Despite this statement, which was harsh by the standards of ASEAN’s non-confrontational culture, Indonesia refused to adopt a sanctions-oriented policy.

The Myanmar human rights issue was again discussed in the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA adopted an unbinding resolution which called on Myanmar to release political prisoners, implement political reform, allow access for a UN Special Rapporteur, end political oppression, and others. In this resolution, Indonesia abstained. No ASEAN member voted for the resolution. In addition to Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Brunei abstained, while Myanmar, Malaysia, Laos, and Vietnam were against the resolution.

Indonesia’s reluctance to pursue a more aggressive and interventionist stance on Myanmar drew criticisms. Domestic pressure came from several Indonesian MPs who joined the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus. Established in 2004, the caucus was a network among ASEAN parliamentarians to push for political reform in Myanmar. In responding to Indonesia’s abstention in the UN Security Council’s vote in January, Mr Djoko Susilo, an Indonesian MP who served as the caucus coordinator in 2007–2008, said that the Indonesia’s abstention was a bad choice as it neglected Myanmar’s massive human right problems, and that decision put Indonesia’s reform legacy at stake. Another MP Nursyahbani Katjasungkana demanded that the Indonesian government be more firm and decisive in pressuring Myanmar’s military leaders.

When abstaining from the 2007 draft resolution, Indonesia seemed to share a view with China and Russia in seeing Myanmar’s problem as a domestic problem which would not threaten international stability, so that international intervention was not required. Indonesia’s abstention was based on the grounds that:

they (Myanmar issues) inflict suffering on the people of Myanmar and create problems for its immediate neighbours, but they do not make the situation in Myanmar a clear and present danger to the rest of the world.

But what is investigated and concluded below is that a much more contrasting and analytically valuable way to assess Indonesia’s position on Myanmar issues can be discovered by applying the compatibility of pivot state characteristics.

5.2.2 Investigation of Indonesia's behaviours

*Attitude towards the international order*

In order to assess Indonesia's attitude regarding the Myanmar case, it is important to more deeply understand Indonesia's stance and compare it to stances of other countries. Although Indonesia's abstention in the UNSC raised concerns about its genuine reputation as an emerging democratic broker in the region, and therefore potentially placed it in the same category as China and Russia, the whole picture of Indonesia's attitude to the Myanmar case cannot be seen merely through the 2007 voting, as the voting itself was just a response to a particular event, which was the mounting military oppression to public protests in Myanmar in late 2006.

In principle, Indonesia is still reluctant to see interference in the domestic affairs of other states. If there should be a sanction and intervention, Indonesia generally favours UN multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions of the sort imposed by the United States or the European Union. Having said that, over recent years, Indonesia has displayed a more flexible approach to the non-interference principle.

Looking at the basis for abstaining on the proposed draft resolution, Indonesia did not stress the issue of sovereignty and non-interference as the reason behind its abstention. This is different from China, whose reason for being against the draft was that ‘the Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State’. Instead of using a pro-sovereignty argument, Indonesia’s main reason for refusing the draft resolution was that the more appropriate institution to address Myanmar issues was the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) because despite the issues' complexity and intensity, there was no significant degree of threat to regional and global security. Myanmar issues were eventually discussed in the UNHRC in 2008, during which time Indonesia also served as a member. The council recommended Myanmar to take some measures including the release of political prisoners and more open access for UN officials for humanitarian aid.

---

305 Darmansjah Djumala, Interview by the author, Jakarta, 20 November 2014.
307 Ibid.
Instead of perceiving intervention as a threat to a state’s sovereignty and national integrity, Indonesian foreign policy actors saw sanctions and intervention from a more practical point of view. Indonesia would support intervention, if it is necessary and feasible, but would reject it if it is unfeasible and potentially ineffective in managing conflict. Indonesia saw international sanctions as just one of various instruments to maintain regional and global peace and security, which has both positive and negative effects. Indonesia saw the imposition of sanctions and isolation would not work in the case of Myanmar. Sanctions had been implemented against Myanmar by Western nations since 1990, but they were unable to force domestic political changes. One senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had a knowledge and experience on this issue revealed that:

In Myanmar’s case, promoting democracy is one thing, but abstaining in the UNSC is another thing. When we were abstained in the UNSC’s vote, it did not necessarily mean that we did not care about Myanmar issues. This is just a matter of policy choices, whether we want to articulate our power and influence through gradual processes or we do hit-and-run? Look, what resulted from ‘hit-and-run strategy’? The cycle of violence as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. We did not want that kind of situation happening in Myanmar as well.309

Indonesia’s more pragmatic view on international intervention changed its perception on how to solve Myanmar’s crisis, from a passive outsider in the pre-2003 period to what this thesis calls a ‘hard engagement’ from 2003 onwards. Different from the interventionist policy of Western countries, hard engagement was manifested through frank and open criticisms, not through sanctions or expulsion from regional organisations. Rhetorical interventionism could be seen from Indonesia’s criticisms over the slow political reform in Myanmar. Expressing fear over the possibility of an unfree and unfair 2010 general election, Indonesia’s then-foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda criticised Myanmar for implementing the reform ‘too slowly and often a little change at a time’.310

These bold criticisms did not happen in the past. Even in the earlier stages of its reformasi period, Indonesia was still significantly reluctant to change its hardline stance on non-interference. When then Thai Foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed the idea of ‘flexible engagement’ in the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in June 1998 in Kuala Lumpur due to the Thai government’s frustration at its failed engagement to Myanmar,311 Indonesian foreign

---

309 Darmansjah Djumala, interview by the author, Jakarta, 20 November 2014
minister Ali Alatas rejected the idea and came up with more conservative concept of ‘enhanced interaction’.312

The emergence of democracy affected Indonesia’s more proactive stance on Myanmar. Prior to a visit to Myanmar in November 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid expressed his desire to meet Aung San Su Kyi, although it was rejected by Myanmar’s government.313 Wahid’s successor Megawati Sukarnoputri also pursued rigorous policy on Myanmar. This change should be credited to foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda who took some bold initiatives to promote democracy as a new tool for foreign policy. When hosting the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, Indonesia proposed the establishment of ASEAN Community, where the promotion of democracy and human rights become parts of the ASEAN Political Security Community pillar. President Megawati appointed former foreign minister Ali Alatas as special envoy and sent him to Yangon few weeks before the ASEAN Summit to encourage changes in Myanmar. During his visit, Alatas met Myanmar’s head of state General Than Shwe and Prime Minister Khin Nyut and stressed the urgency for releasing Aung San Su Kyi.314 There was unfortunately not much progress after the visit. The ASEAN Summit also failed to push Myanmar for further reform. After disappointedly learning that Myanmar did not progress at all for months after Alatas’ visit, Megawati surprisingly delivered a harsh statement when opening the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting in Jakarta in July 2004, encouraging Myanmar to pursue actions which reflect democratic values.315

The further transformation of Indonesia’s non-interference view happened during President Yudhoyono’s era. As the first president directly elected by popular votes, President Yudhoyono’s government had strong credentials to use democracy as its foreign policy tool. Reflecting on its own relatively successful transition to democracy, Indonesia approached Myanmar’s leaders through offers for sharing experience. Recognising the fact that Myanmar’s military junta was still largely reluctant to consider the idea of reform, during his visit to Myanmar in March 2006, Yudhoyono carefully did not either mention the democracy issue or press for the release of Aung San Su Kyi. The visit, however, resulted in an agreement to set up an annual bilateral consultative forum which paved the way for Indonesia’s wider direct approach to Myanmar.

Although Yudhoyono did not use strong language, at the ministerial and technical levels especially within ASEAN frameworks, Indonesia became more frank and open in urging Myanmar to pursue more serious political reforms. In responding to the 2007 Saffron Revolution and continuous Western countries’ threats to implement sanctions, Hassan Wirajuda recommended that Myanmar adopt a five-year transitional period during which the military leaders gradually adopt a democratic system through dialogue with and participation of civilians. During a visit to Yangon in March 2010, Wirajuda’s successor Marty Natalegawa also frankly pushed Myanmar to hold a free election and to seriously commit itself to democracy. Natalegawa’s visit was crucial because it was or the first time a minister from another country was allowed to speak to Aung San Suu Kyi albeit via phone.

By implementing intense diplomatic pressure, through both bilateral and regional schemes, Indonesia has departed from its longstanding non-interference principle. This is different from China – and Russia – whose votes in the UN as well as general policies in dealing with Myanmar were driven by strict adherence to the non-interference principle. When vetoing the draft resolution on sanctioning Myanmar, China provided an argument that the Myanmar issue is ‘…mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State’. China was the main supporter of Myanmar’s military government. Amidst Western sanctions, China maintained close economic relations with Myanmar by becoming its largely dominant investor and trading partner. In responding to much international criticisms, China argued that:

China always adopts a policy of non-interference … As neighbour, China hopes to see stability and economic development in Myanmar … The stability of Myanmar serves the interest of Myanmar itself and the interests of the international community.

The Russian ambassador provided a similar reason that:

We believe that the situation in this country does not pose any threat to international or regional peace; this opinion is shared by a large number of states, including most importantly those neighboring Myanmar … We find that attempts aimed at using the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview are unacceptable.

In defending China’s stance, Chinese scholars argued that despite its veto in 2007, China "has significantly and constructively mediated on the issue among Myanmar, ASEAN, the United Nations and the West." During the UNSC meeting, China also expressed its support on the solution and reconciliation of Myanmar political problems pursued by Myanmar domestic actors, ASEAN, and the UN Secretary General’s good offices. Despite this cliché statement, China in fact did not actively contribute much to bring political crisis in Myanmar to end. There was not much encouragement and diplomatic effort to persuade Myanmar elites to pursue changes.

Through the use of hard engagement, Indonesia has shown a soft-revisionist attitude toward the international intervention which was favoured by Western countries in dealing with Myanmar. Indonesia voiced the need to revise the use of sanctions, which had proved to be an ineffective tool to bring about change in Myanmar. But at the same, Indonesia’s revisionist stance towards the sanctions regime was moderate compared to those of China and Russia. While China and Russia criticized and even vetoed a draft of sanction against Myanmar – as well as in Libya, Iran and other cases – because of their strong sense of sovereignty and national integrity as well as strategic interests, Indonesia did not display a totally anti-interventionist tendency. Instead, from Indonesia’s point of view, international intervention should be put in the right context and the right method which would not destabilize the country and the region, and would not endanger the prospect for peace.

**Performed role**

As framed in Chapter 3, performed role has two elements: (1) the state’s role conception and (2) other actors’ expectations. In the case of Myanmar, Indonesia’s role conception, which was matched with other actors’ expectation, was a bridge-builder role. In the case of Myanmar, Indonesia displayed a role as a bridge builder that attempted to bring together the various interests of international actors, especially between the idea of liberal interventionism of Western countries and the non-interference principle of China, India, and most ASEAN countries. Indonesia did not perform either an interventionist role, as displayed by middle

---

powers which supported the imposition of sanctions, or a great-power status seeking of China and India.

As outlined in Chapter 3, middle powers are expected to display mediation role with legitimator tendency. Although middle powers often offered mediation role in many conflicts across the globe, they did not play much mediation role in the case of Myanmar. Australia was providing training to Myanmar’s government officials in 2000-2003 which was aimed to persuasively promote human rights and democracy values, but the effectiveness and continuity of that program were unclear. During the 1990s and early 2000s, it was Japan which was able to lay mediation role. Japan maintained close engagement with Myanmar’s junta leaders through the significant number of ODA’s. Japan has been the Myanmar’s largest donor since 1960s and contributed to more than half of ODAs to Myanmar until early 2000s. Its status as an aid donor gave Japan’s ability and access to advising the Myanmar’s government to implement substantial political reform and carry out a better policy on human rights. Japan’s strategic position on Myanmar was declining after it sided with other Western countries to impose sanction following Aung San Su Kyi’s rearrest in 2003. Japan froze new ODA to Myanmar and urged the immediate release of Suu Kyi. While Japan was still the largest ODA provider to Myanmar, its trade relations were significantly declining, gradually surpassed by China and some ASEAN countries. Since then, Japan’s mediation role was very much reduced.

On the other hand, China and India’s performed roles in the Myanmar case were mostly defensive and passive. These two countries’ significant economic, political, and strategic interests in Myanmar refrained them from taking much role. For these countries, it was not an active involvement in solving Myanmar’s problems, but Myanmar’s stability and security – no matter whether it is democratic or undemocratic- which could provide them benefit for their great-power ambition.

Indonesia’s bridge-builder role differs from these two roles. As a bridge-builder, Indonesia did not attempt to become a direct mediator between conflicting parties in Myanmar. Instead,
it offered a framework which helped facilitate two-way normative exchanges. On the one hand, Indonesia helped Myanmar to understand the benefit of adopting democracy and complying with international norms. On the other hand, Indonesia tried to convince the international community, especially Western states, that engagement and dialogue would provide a better result for democratizing Myanmar.

Indonesia’s ability to display a bridge-builder role has root from its close ‘normative relations’ with Myanmar. During the 1980s, Indonesia was regarded as a ‘big brother’ by Myanmarese generals because it provided an example of the military’s dual roles as political and security guardians.328 Previously, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Indonesia saw Myanmar as a potential partner in the struggle against colonialism.329 Relations between the two countries nevertheless had never been at the highest in terms of material exchanges – economic and military cooperation. Indonesia’s trade volume with Myanmar was always less than its neighbouring countries. Even after Myanmar had undergone political reform from 2010, Indonesia’s relations with Myanmar remained relatively weak, as shown through table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1
Myanmar’s top trading partners, 2014330

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Value (Million Euro)</th>
<th>% World</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Value (Million Euro)</th>
<th>% World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>7,525</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>10,334</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3,368</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


329 In the early independence era – between 1945 and 1949 – Indonesia saw Myanmar as a close friend who supported Indonesia’s struggle against the Netherlands. Former prime minister Sutan Sjahrir visited Yangon in September 1947 in an attempt to gain political and military assistance, although given its central government’s weaknesses, Myanmar could not provide significant assistance to Indonesia. For more detail, see Nicholas Tarling, *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 2, part 2, From World War II to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 266. Myanmar was also among the first states which recognised Indonesia’s independence and to which Indonesia sent an ambassador. Both nations, together with India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, were initiators of the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung which inspired anti-colonial movements in Third World countries.

Given its low material relations with Myanmar, Indonesia did not have leverage to enforce certain policies on Myanmar. Having said that, Indonesia’s not-so-much economic and strategic interest to Myanmar gave window of opportunity for Indonesia to play a role in conflict resolution. This was different from, for example, India whose increasing economic relations with Myanmar and fear of insurgents in its Northeast regions has refrained it from taking a major role in managing Myanmar conflicts. Indonesia was perceived as a neutral and sincere peace promoter with not-too-ambitious self-strategic interests. This condition provided Indonesia with credibility to pursue bridge-building activity.

Similar to Suharto’s era, post-reformasi Indonesia continued to become a ‘norm inspirer’ to Myanmar. The difference was that while during the Suharto era the norm was about how the military could control politics and govern citizens, the post-reformasi norm was democratic values. The raising of democratic values on the domestic front had influence the foreign policy strategy and trajectory.  

Different from the coercive character of sanctions, the norm inspirer role was pursued through dialogue, sharing experience, and brainstorming. This norm-inspiring project was pursued through bilateral and regional fora. Bilaterally, this effort could be seen from high-level official engagements. Shortly after the 2007 uprisings, for example, President Yudhoyono sent retired army general Agus Widjoyo and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director Yuri Thamrin to Myanmar. In addition to attending the funeral of Myanmarese Priome Minister Soe Win, both envoys met some generals including the junta’s liaison officer to Aung San Suu Kyi, Major General Aung Ky and acting Prime Minister Thein Shein. There was no concrete result of their visit, but being received by Thein Sein was particularly important, as at that time Myanmarese high-level officials were reluctant to meet foreign dignitaries. UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambar was even refused several times to meet Myanmar’s high level officials.

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>647</th>
<th>3.6</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>320</th>
<th>1.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another bilateral effort was the one which was carried out by foreign minister Natalegawa’s visit. On his second visit to Myanmar in October 2011, Natalegawa not only met Myanmarese leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi but also the chairman of Myanmar’s Human Rights National Commission, which was established a few weeks before. The commission was then invited to meet the Indonesian Human Rights National Commission (Komnas HAM) and NGOs for sharing experience in 2012 and 2013. As observed by Kinley and Wilson,333 Myanmar’s idea for setting up a national human rights body had been already in the mind of Myanmarese officials since 2000, and they had closely looked at examples of human rights bodies in other countries as models, including Komnas HAM.

At a regional level, in addition to ASEAN fora, Indonesia used the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) to encourage change in Myanmar. The forum was not specifically aimed at solving the Myanmar case, but for promoting democratic values in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is also not a forum for democratic countries to teach about or enforce democracy, but rather to exchange views and experiences about democracy. This dialogue-based approach attracted participation from states such as China, Myanmar, Laos and Iran. As a follow-up to the BDF, Indonesia provided some special workshops and training to Myanmar officials on politics and democracy.334 335

Indonesia’s bridge-builder role was praised by Western countries. In several bilateral meetings, Western countries praised Indonesia’s important role in finding peaceful solution in Myanmar. In a February 2009 meeting with Wirajuda, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton underlined the need to 'consult with Indonesia for ideas about how best to try to bring about the positive change in Burma.'336 Western countries did not lift their sanctions, but they began to recognise the positive side of engaging Myanmar. In September 2009, Hillary Clinton announced bilateral engagement with the junta, saying that 'Engagement versus sanctions is a false choice, in our opinion. So going forward, we will be employing both of those tools.'337

335 Jakarta Post, “Former Rebel Tells Myanmar to Look into Democracy in Indonesia,” 19 February 2014.
Change in Western countries’ approaches to Myanmar problem from sanctions to more balanced combination of sanctions and engagement was indeed not the only factor which brought about political reform in Myanmar. Myanmar’s current political reform was a result of various triggers including Western sanctions, pressure from the UN and other international organisations, and domestic initiatives which wanted to improve socio-economic conditions as well as reduce dependency on China. But Indonesia has touched something that previous approaches failed to do, which is to provide confidence and assurance that Myanmar’s transition to democracy would eventually benefit Myanmar and that peaceful transition to democracy is possible. As observed by one Indonesian scholar:

In the context of Myanmar issue, Indonesia has promoted ideas that were not much touched by Western countries, which is persuasive encouragement. In urging Myanmar to pursue reform, we cannot simply enforce our believed principle on another country. Level of democracy, development, and thinking is always different from one state to another. In this context, sharing experience is sometimes more effective than enforcement. It gained grounds in the Myanmar case.\textsuperscript{336}

\textit{Nexus between regional and global contexts}

The Myanmar issues coincidentally happened during ASEAN’s transition from a loose association to a more institutionalised and legally-based regional organisation, which significantly started from the 2003 Indonesian ASEAN chairmanship. Furthermore, Myanmar problems mounted in mid-2000s when Indonesia’s material capabilities have risen. These situations provided opportunities and challenges for Indonesia. On the one hand, Myanmar was a test case for the effectiveness of ASEAN, especially in dealing with external pressure. As a front-runner of ASEAN’s institutionalization, solving Myanmar case was important for Indonesia. On the other hand, Indonesia’s growing material powers and international profile offered an opportunity to pursue unilateral policy.

Against these two options, Indonesia was trying to balance its unilateral intention and regional circumstance. Although Indonesia promoted democratic values to Myanmar through engagement and sharing experience, it also emphasised the importance of maintaining regional stability and bringing aspiration of countries in the region. Aspirations of countries in Southeast Asia on Myanmar were diverse and not easy to be reconciled. Their concern over

http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2009/09/20090924123349esnamfuak0.6288111.html#axzz4E6keV3Cr

\textsuperscript{336} Tirta Mursitama, interview by the author, Jakarta, 15 November 2014.
Myanmar problems was indeed low during late 1980s until early 2000s. It is important to note that during the early discussions on ASEAN’s membership expansion, the Myanmar case did not become ASEAN’s top concern. Despite a series of abuses and violence following the abolishment of Aung San Suu Kyi’s victory in the 1990 general election, Myanmar was still not regarded as ASEAN’s main concern. Instead, it was Cambodia which gained much attention from ASEAN leaders, who delayed Cambodia’s membership from 1997 to 1999 due to the extended civil war.

It was only after the rearrest of Aung San Suu Kyi following the riot between pro-government groups and Suu Kyi’s supporters on 30 May 2003 ASEAN’s concern to take the Myanmar problem more seriously was increased. In the 2003 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders for the first time released a statement regarding the Myanmar issue, although the tone used in the statement was very much positive: ‘The Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Government’s pledge to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation.’

Since 2003, Myanmar problems were discussed in ASEAN summits. ASEAN leaders particularly urged Myanmar to consistently implement its Roadmap to Democracy, which was introduced by the Myanmar government in 2003 as a response to international criticisms. In a statement in the 2005 ASEAN Summit, the leaders said: ‘We noted the increased interest of the international community on developments in Myanmar … We encouraged Myanmar to expedite the process (of its Roadmap to Democracy) … We also called for the release of those placed under detention.’

While it seemed that ASEAN members were unified in delivering strong messages to Myanmar, there were intense differences during closed-door meetings. Indonesia was generally very careful when discussing human rights and democracy issues in the region as it does not want to be perceived as an aggressive democracy promoter. As explained by former Indonesian Commissioner to ASEAN ICHR Mr Rafendi Djamin:

> It was obvious that after reformasi, Indonesia played significant roles in ASEAN political cooperation, especially since 2003 when we initiated the Bali Concord II. The political cooperation included good governance, rule of law, human rights, election, transparency, and

---


accountability. But we have to be careful when bringing those issues forward because some countries still see human rights as an issue which could undermine their power. If they are not ready for human rights and democracy, don’t force them. Let them learn by themselves gradually.\textsuperscript{341}

Djamin added that based on his experience, it was not only commissioner from undemocratic countries which opposed the discussion of human right problems. The Philippines, which was often described as the most advanced democracy in Southeast Asia, surprisingly often resisted his proposal in promoting democracy and human right ideas in the region including putting more pressure on Myanmar. This situation left only Indonesia and Thailand commissioners in the pro-human rights bench. Myanmar itself was very suspicious about regional enforcement. During the 2007 ASEAN Summit in Singapore, UN Special envoy Gambari was invited to brief the ASEAN group on his latest trip to Myanmar. Myanmar felt provoked by the briefing, almost boycotted the summit, and argued that Gambari should brief the UN, not ASEAN. Considering these less than ideal conditions for ‘radical’ human rights promotion, Indonesia focused more on the collective ASEAN effort for not isolating Myanmar. There were some criticisms of this stance. The EU terminated EU-ASEAN FTA talks, while the US boycotted the 2009 US–ASEAN dialogue. Indonesia could not entirely ignore the US and EU positions. Their negative reactions have degraded ASEAN’s interest as ASEAN has become economically more interdependent with the West.\textsuperscript{342} Indonesia and ASEAN indeed conveyed strong messages to Myanmar and urged for necessary reforms.

The converging positions on Myanmar among ASEAN members were not caused by the increasing embrace of democratic and human rights values. Rather, it was motivated by the fear of ASEAN’s declining strategic importance, especially in its relations with global actors in Asia-Pacific. In responding to pressure from external powers who questioned ASEAN’s effectiveness and to respond to potentially growing rivalry between the US and China, ASEAN launched the first EAS in 2005. Inviting most major countries in Asia and Pacific, the EAS is aimed to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific regionalism.\textsuperscript{343} EAS indeed discussed Myanmar cases. Despite the presence of the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan who imposed sanctions against Myanmar, EAS’ statements on Myanmar were quite similar to ASEAN’s which emphasised encouragement and engagement, rather than warning and pressure. In responding to the Saffron revolution for example, EAS leaders

\textsuperscript{341} Rafendi Djamin, interview by the author, Jakarta, 3 November 2014.
\textsuperscript{342} Christopher Roberts, \textit{ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community}, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 114.
\textsuperscript{343} Jae Cheol Kim, "Politics of Regionalism in East Asia: The Case of the East Asia Summit," \textit{Asian Perspective} 34, no. 3 (2010): 125.
‘reaffirmed our commitment in continuing to give strong support to the UN’s role and Gambhari’s mission, and encourage Myanmar to continue to work closely with the UN towards national reconciliation.’ ASEAN worked hard to solidify their position on Myanmar in order to minimize pressure from external actors in EAS.

ASEAN’s engagement helped to improve Myanmar’s confidence and trust. This was during Cyclone Nargis in 2008 which caused the death of around 90,000 people. During the disaster, the Myanmarese junta was under a lot of international pressure to open access for international aid. Being suspicious of the possibility of using humanitarian effort to intervene in the country’s domestic affairs, Myanmar restricted international aid. In that situation, only ASEAN was able to obtain Myanmarese approval to send in an assessment team and help organise relief operations.

ASEAN implemented a stick and carrot approach. ASEAN not only fiercely criticises Myanmar during ASEAN’s closed-door meetings, but also offered ‘rewards’ if Myanmar made some progress. After the 2010 election and Suu Kyi’s release for example, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries concerted to praise Myanmar and tell the world that Myanmar had changed, and eventually accepted Myanmar’s proposal to chair ASEAN in 2014 – and also hosted the Southeast Asian Games in 2013 -. Of course, the 2010 election was not free and fair if portrayed through Western standards. Military’s representatives retained 25% of parliamentary seats without participating in the election. But rewarding Myanmar for this election was something which fitted in the ASEAN context, as other ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Vietnam, and Laos never even have meaningful elections.

ASEAN itself sometimes experienced difficulty to consolidate its positions on Myanmar. In 2009 the political situation stepped backward when Suu Kyi was convicted of breaching conditions of her house arrest. Her house arrest was extended as a result. ASEAN did not act decisively in responding to that event, except waiting for ASEAN summit and other related meetings to discuss it. Between late 2008 until mid-2009, ASEAN was largely ineffective. Thailand which chaired ASEAN faced domestic political crisis which resulted in delays of ASEAN Summit and EAS. Thailand and Cambodia were in military conflict following dispute over area around Preah Vihear temple. Following the war, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to not attend ASEAN Summit in February 2009 in

345 David I Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2012), 337.
Thailand. These events degraded ASEAN’s international credibility and effectiveness in dealing with Myanmar case.

In a situation when ASEAN’s solidity and effectiveness declined, Indonesia chose to pursue a unilateral action. Natalegawa’s visit in 2010 which urged Suu Kyi’s release and a freely general election was purely an Indonesia’s initiative without much consultation with other ASEAN countries. Indonesia’s initiatives to provide capacity building on democracy and elections were also not discussed with ASEAN members. But when there was need to take policy or statement which were sensitive in the view of other ASEAN countries, such as the need to increase pressure on Myanmar, Indonesia preferred to discussed on the ASEAN’s table. This combination between global and unilateral ambition on the one hand, and regional reality on the other hand, showed Indonesia’s accommodative regional leadership.

5.2.3 Summary and interpretation

With the help of pivot states concept, this thesis can draw a clear line separating non-BRIC emerging powers from BRIC countries and middle powers; thus, Indonesia can be categorized as a pivot state. From the explanation above, the case study confirmed that over the course of Myanmar’s political problems, Indonesia’s stance cannot be simply understood through the non-interference framework. While its voting behaviour in the UNSC reflected some parts of similarities with China and Russia in rejecting attempted UNSC sanctions, when this thesis examines the issue more closely, it found that there are significant differences between Indonesia and those countries. Indonesia’s strong belief in the non-interference principle, which has roots in the Suharto era, has been gradually compromised following the 1998 reformasi. Indonesia was able to position itself in the middle of contrasting positions between Western countries’ sanctions policy and China’s and India’s non-intervention stances. Despite Indonesia’s abstention on a draft resolution which discussed Myanmar’s case when serving as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, in bilateral and regional frameworks Indonesia pursued hard engagement which pushed Myanmar to comply with international norms especially with regards to democracy and human rights.

The relaxation of non-interference principle allowed Indonesia to engage with Western countries in discussing Myanmar case, as shown during Indonesia’s bilateral meetings with some Western leaders. On the other hand, Indonesia needed to maintain its close relations ASEAN countries especially considering the fact that at that time ASEAN was attempting to consolidate themselves to become more institutionalized through the ASEAN Charter,
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ASEAN Community, and others. Indonesia’s Myanmar policy thus could not be pursued by ignoring the reality of its neighbours. Instead, Indonesia was trying to comfort its ASEAN fellows, although in some periods, especially when ASEAN failed to act, Indonesia displayed unilateral approaches. From investigation of this case study, overall Indonesia has consistently displayed behaviours which can be distinguished as a pivot state.

5.3 Indonesia’s role in climate change negotiations

5.3.1 Introduction and context

Indonesia has been quite active in climate change negotiations since the beginning. By 1992, Indonesia had ratified almost all treaties on environment and climate change such as the Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, London Amendment and UNFCCC. Indonesia’s active involvement in climate change talks was triggered by its awareness of its geographical structure as an archipelagic state which would be significantly affected by the rise of sea levels.

On the other hand, Indonesia’s active involvement in UNFCCC could be interpreted as part of Suharto’s ambition to show his international leadership beyond the Southeast Asian region. Being relatively successful at providing leadership in ASEAN and contributing to Cambodian peace in the late 1980s, Suharto expressed a greater interest in Indonesia’s global role, especially among developing countries. Suharto chaired the NAM between 1992 and 1995, at the time when the Movement needed to define its future after the collapse of the USSR. Suharto attended the Rio Conference in June 1992 which was a few weeks before Indonesia’s hosting of the NAM Summit on 1–2 September 1992. Upon returning from Rio, Suharto instructed his cabinet to coordinate with officials from NAM members so that the NAM Summit could agree on a specific item on environmental issues. The NAM Summit subsequently agreed on several points on climate change and environment issues, such as demanding transfer technology from developed nations and the establishment of the

346 On the Cambodian civil wars, Indonesia hosted the Jakarta Informal Meetings in 1988 and 1989 which aimed to facilitate dialogues among conflicting factions in Cambodia. These meetings paved the way for the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 which ended the Cambodia–Vietnam civil war and mapped a comprehensive political solution for the Cambodian civil wars.

High Level Commission on Sustainable Development.\textsuperscript{348} The follow-up and effectiveness of this commission were unclear because in the following NAM Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, in 1995, the commission was not mentioned and even the issue of environment protection was not in any document. The lack of environmental concerns in the subsequent NAM summits was related to C.H. Petrich’s observation that at that time not all developing countries were willing to unify political positions vis-à-vis developed countries because they were economically relied on developed countries.

Indonesia’s attempt to show leadership among developing countries was not merely shaped by its awareness of the necessity to combat climate change. As observed by Gupta,\textsuperscript{349} Indonesia’s activism in climate change negotiations was also motivated by the need to revive its international image which worsened due to human rights issues in East Timor. Post-
\textit{reformasi} governments continued Indonesia’s commitment on climate change issues. Indonesia signed the Kyoto Protocol on 13 July 1998 and ratified it on 3 December 2004. As an Annex II country, Indonesia was not required to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. During Yudhoyono’s presidency, Indonesia hosted the COP 13 in 2007, which was instrumental in paving the way for the post-Kyoto negotiations. The COP resulted in an agreement where parties would hold a two-year series of negotiations for a new treaty replacing the Kyoto Protocol.

Despite Indonesia’s active role in climate change negotiations, there is not much literature that explores this. The lack of academic analysis is related to the oversimplified view that Indonesia’s role is merely limited to the G77 framework. Literature on Indonesia ‘s climate change negotiation role has looked mostly at its place within the G77 and the developing countries’ perspective. In contrast to the view which associates Indonesia with the G77, as argued in the analytical explanations below, the more advantageous way to look at Indonesia’s role is by using a pivot states framework.


\textsuperscript{349} Joyeeta Gupta, \textit{The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus?} (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1997), 76.
5.3.2 Assessing Indonesia's behaviour

**Attitude towards the international order**

As one of its founding members, Indonesia identified itself as part of the G77’s negotiation bloc and resided with the G77 in all UNFCCC negotiations. Shortly after the COP3 in Kyoto, which agreed on the Kyoto Protocol, Indonesia was elected as the G77 chair in 1998, and led the group during the COP4 in Buenos Aires. During the COP4 in Buenos Aires in 1998, which aimed to set key elements of the Kyoto Protocol, the G77 had disagreements within the group over whether voluntary commitments of non-Annex I Parties should have been discussed.

Argentina, as the host, and Kazakhstan broke from the G77 by offering voluntary emission reduction. On the other hand, most G77 members, especially oil-exporting countries disagreed with the move and refused to discuss developing countries’ voluntary emissions commitment. During the COP4, OPEC Secretary General Dr Ridwanul Lukman issued a statement:

> If there is a large-scale introduction of climate change-induced measures, we are likely to see our economic well-being jeopardised by the resultant heavy reduction in demand for petroleum, which may in turn result in an annual loss of tens of billions of dollars of exports revenue, according to our research. Indeed, other estimates of economic damage from mitigation measures consistently identify fossil fuel exporters as the key sufferers.  

Indonesia had opportunity to play role to reconcile the difference between pro and anti–voluntary emission within the G77. Indonesia was an OPEC member, but at that time its oil production had declined significantly, distancing it from other major OPEC members. At the same time, Indonesia’s geographical situation as an archipelagic state made it share concerns with AOSIS about the fear of increasing sea levels. Nevertheless, Indonesia was not successful enough to provide leadership during the COP4. It was complex domestic political and economic crises, for which President Suharto stepped down in May 1998, which severely weakened Indonesia’s chairmanship capability and legitimacy as shown by

---


Indonesia’s failure to send a minister to attend the COP and chair the G77.\(^{352}\) Given the crisis, Indonesia was even offered to defer its chairmanship period but rejected the offer.\(^{353}\)

Over time, despite Indonesia’s firm commitment to stay in the G77, Indonesia has moved away from a hardline stance which sees climate change issues as merely developed countries’ responsibility. Indonesia began to learn that environmental protection could be compatible with economic development. This came after learning that a climate change regime could provide economic benefit for Indonesia. The rise of Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) initiative in 2005, which was first proposed by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, was seen as an opportunity to take benefit from the climate talks, given Indonesia’s status as having one of the world’s largest rainforests.

On the other hand, since the 1997 Asian crisis and the decline of Indonesia’s crude oil production, it was palm oil which significantly became one of the most important export commodities for Indonesia. Indonesia contributes to around 44% of the world’s palm oil demand and since 2006 it has surpassed Malaysia as the largest palm oil producer.\(^{354}\) Simultaneously, or more precisely as a consequence of rapid expansion of palm oil production, Indonesia’s deforestation rate grew higher.\(^{355}\) The deforestation rate was approximately 1.17 million ha/year between 2003 and 2006.\(^{356}\) Looking ahead to the COP13, there was much criticism of Indonesia from both domestic and international actors, especially related to its status as having the fastest growth of deforestation.\(^{357}\)

The idea of the REDD proposal offered a potential opportunity to reconcile economic interests and environmental problems through the inflow of international funding to compensate for the cessation of forest exploitation. Indonesia grabbed the REDD’s potential when hosting the COP13 in 2007 in Bali. The COP13 discussed REDD issues extensively.


\(^{353}\) Ibid.


\(^{355}\) Other factors which significantly contribute to Indonesia’s high rate of deforestation are illegal logging and agricultural expansion.


and came up with the proposal for REDD+, in which the ‘+’ referred to sustainable management of forests, conservation of forest carbon stocks and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The COP13 agreed on specific points which ‘… support capacity-building, provide technical assistance, facilitate the transfer of technology to improve, inter alia, data collection, estimation of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation …’ Indonesia used REDD+ issues for a bargaining position in dealing with other actors in UNFCCC. Indonesia initiated the Forest-11, a coalition of 11 countries which have large proportions of tropical forest to act together in the COP13, especially in promoting REDD+. Indonesia later became the first nation to introduce a legislated REDD scheme in 2008 and also hosted some REDD+ related projects.

Given the importance of promoting the REDD+ concept and encouraging wide global support for it, Indonesia took a more progressive position than the rest of the G77 by not focusing entirely on pushing developed countries to cut emissions and provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries. As revealed by a senior official of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Our position (on climate change) is more progressive than G77’s. G77’s hardline position was probably the same with ours fifteen years ago in WTO. But now we are not in that way anymore. G77 is still conservative and defensive in some issues. We are more advanced. Although we are still part of the group, we are free to choose.

When BASIC emerged during the 2009 Copenhagen COP, Indonesia decided to not join in it, believing that this new informal group would divert the G77’s unity. BASIC manoeuvred through a direct talk with the US outside the COP’s main venue to push for a non-binding political statement. Despite the claims that their positions represent developing countries, BASIC draws criticisms and opposition from other developing countries. BASIC’s manoeuvre to push for a non-binding political statement disappointed countries in AOSIS and LDCs, almost all of which are also G77 members. In an interview evaluating the process in the Copenhagen Summit, a British national who served as a member of the Maldivian delegation Mark Lynas expressed disappointment in BASIC’s action in Copenhagen by saying that: ‘China’s strategy was simple: block the open negotiations for two weeks, and then ensure that the closed-door deal made it look as if the West had failed the world’s poor once again.

And sure enough, the aid agencies, civil society movements and environmental groups all

---

359 Toffery Soetikno, interview by the author, Jakarta, 30 October 2014.
took the bait'. AOSIS demanded that China and India take a more cooperative stance and curtail their emissions.

Disappointed with the conservative stance of the G77, AOSIS became closer to the EU. Moving ahead to the 2012 Durban COP, AOSIS, EU, and LDCs formed an alliance which worked on an agreement in favour of an extension of the Kyoto Protocol as long as parties agreed to a roadmap for future negotiations. The alliance successfully pushed big emitters, including China, India and Brazil, as well as the US, to agree on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Cooperation which set a deadline for a new agreement in 2015.

In contrast to BASIC countries, in Indonesia’s view, developed countries’ obligation to provide sufficient resources to developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation efforts should be discussed in a constructive way and with mutual trust. This could be only achieved if the G77 also offered options and alternatives for constructive cooperation with developed countries. When invited to join BASIC, former Indonesian environment minister Rachmat Witoelar revealed that:

We are not interested with the idea of BASIC. During the Copenhagen meeting, I was approached by the Indian Environment Minister to join BASIC. Once we joined, the group name will be changed to BASIC, which will include Indonesia. But I refused. I told them ‘why did we need this kind of grouping?’ We already have G77. If we have BASIC, we would leave the rest of G77. And it is not part of our foreign policy. Indonesia always puts itself as an intermediate and interlocutor during the deadlocks. Everyone recognises us as a ‘peacemaker’ in climate change negotiations.

Indonesia has displayed a more soft-revisionist stance towards the international climate change regime, compared to many developing countries. Indonesia still shared much with the G77 especially on general issues, such as CBDR. But when it came to strategic and practical issues, Indonesia separated from the G77. Indonesia’s case is of course not unique, as other countries do the same thing. The difference with other emerging powers in the G77, such as China and India, was that Indonesia became less interested in taking ‘traditional’ and hard line stances which view developed countries with suspicion as the ones which were attempting to weaken commitments.

Performed role

Indonesia’s promoted role can be observed from its alliance preference in climate change negotiations. Instead of joining BASIC, Indonesia preferred to work on a new group, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, as a way to find solutions to and common understanding on climate change issues beyond the traditional North-South division. As mapped by Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, the Cartagena Dialogue has a unique position by bringing developed and developing nations to exchange views and explore a possible common understanding and position which could help solve the lack of trust between various actors in climate change negotiations.363

The Cartagena Dialogue was formed following the Copenhagen COP’s failure to produce a substantial agreement. It is substantially different from Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), another subgroup within G77. Initiated by China in 2012, LMDC promoted a similar narrative with BASIC on CBDR and developed nations’ responsibility for emissions reduction.364 The Cartagena Dialogue, on the other hand, is not an exclusive group. It welcomes developing and developed countries to engage in frank and constructive exchanges of views. Consisting of a wide range of countries, from the EU, non-EU developed countries, AOSIS, and the G77, the Cartagena Dialogue contributed to building trust among different actors by emphasising that it is the responsibility of all countries to reduce emissions based on their relative economic capacities. The Cartagena Dialogue’s flexible and inclusive stances paved the way for the success of the Durban COP in 2012.365

As an informal group, the Cartagena Dialogue did not deliver a decisive statement or breakthrough. Even its membership is flexible and no binding commitment is made. But the rise of this group has sparked a spirit of solving deadlocks. In the first Cartagena Dialogue meeting, for example, even Ethiopia, a country which had history of massive poverty and disaster, had declared an intention to become a carbon-neutral country by 2025.366 Ethiopia’s pledge was supported and followed by other countries such as Costa Rica, the Maldives and Samoa. This kind of initiative smoothed the path to motivate other countries to

364 Ibid., 759.
find creative solutions on some sensitive issues such as access to carbon markets, technology transfer and reduction targets.

Through its participation in the Cartagena Dialogue, Indonesia displayed a role as a bridge-builder in climate change negotiations. Indonesia valued the Cartagena Dialogue as an important diplomatic venue given the Dialogue’s flexibility to bring developed and developing countries together in addressing climate change issues. Indonesia always sent high-level delegations to Cartagena Dialogue meetings. As stated by Witoelar, ‘We are trying to make Cartagena not only a group in the middle, but also a middle-ruler, meaning that it is a rule-maker which actively reconciles different interests and positions. This kind of role fits Indonesia the best.’

Indonesia’s bridge-builder roles can also be observed from its COP 13 presidency in 2007 and from its commitment to a voluntary emission reduction during the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh. The COP13 was full of suspicion from both developed and developing countries regarding the status of the US as a non-party to the Kyoto Protocol. The US status gave other developed countries doubts about their commitment, while developing countries saw it as a potential motivation for developed countries to move away from the Kyoto Protocol. The COP13 almost failed to achieve any agreement and the negotiation was extended to one day after the planned period due to the deadlocks, as the US could not agree with the draft agreement which did not mention the obligation of developing countries. The US also attempted to delete some points related to developed countries’ obligations, including a binding aggregate commitment to achieve between 25% and 40% below the 1990 level of emissions. The US’ stances were condemned by developing countries, which accused the US of weakening the international climate change regime. The differences between the US and other parties were reconciled in the final day after harsh pushes by developing countries. Papuan New Guinean negotiator Kevin Conrad, among others, delivered a sharp statement to the US that ‘If you're not willing to lead, get out of the way’ The US eventually joined the conference’s consensus, called the Bali Road Map, which mandated steps to be taken to discuss the post-Kyoto agreement.

367 Rachmat Witoelar, op. cit.
368 Peter Christoff, “The Bali Roadmap: Climate change, COP 13 and Beyond,” Environmental Politics 17, no. 3 (2008): 468.
369 Ibid.
Although the US’ decision to eventually agree on the Roadmap was because of intense pressures from developing countries and the lack of actions of US’ climate allies, such as Japan, the things which were not much covered in public was that in the late night and early morning ahead to that extended day of the conference Indonesia was pursuing ‘shuttle-cock diplomacy’ by approaching different parties and groups to ensure that conflicting parties found convergent in the final meeting.371

It was true that the Bali Road Map itself was not a binding commitment, but compared to its predecessors the Road Map was essential and a breakthrough as this was the first time developed and developing countries put aside their long-standing differences on international climate change regime. According to UK Environment Hillary Benn, the COP 13 was ‘for the first time ever all the world’s nations have agreed to negotiate on a deal to tackle dangerous climate change’.372 Indonesia’s efforts led to a compromise where the Action Plan’s reference to numbers was 25-40% of emissions reduction, which basically had been widely known in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports.

Another bridge-builder attempt which differentiates Indonesia from others was when President Yudhoyono declared Indonesia’s commitment in the 2009 G20 Summit to reduce emissions by 26 % by 2020 from business as usual and 41 % with international support.373 Yudhoyono argued that ‗… it is possible to cure the global economy and save the planet at the same time …‘ implying that the G20 should expand its agenda, including on climate change. The announcement of voluntary emission reduction was surprising because the inclusion of climate change issues into G20 agenda by the US as the G20 host at that time was not welcomed by all G20 members. China and India were the ones which rejected discussion on the climate change issue in the G20. Through this commitment, Indonesia became the third developing countries to announce voluntary emission reduction. Although Argentina and Kazakhstan had declared voluntary reduction in 1998, the implementation of emission reduction in both countries did not progress quite well, not to say a failure. Argentina had no domestic policy to implement that voluntary target ambition until several years after 1998.374 In the same vein, despite positive commitment of Kazakhstan to implement voluntary emission reduction and voluntarily apply to Annex-I, it was not until 2009 for Kazakhstan to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Different from those two countries, as

371 Rachmat Witoelar, op cit.
argued by Michaelowa and Michealowa, Indonesia, together with South Africa, was the most progressive developing country in climate change mitigation.\(^{375}\)

Some positive results were obtained after Yudhoyono announced voluntary commitment. In 2011, Indonesia was offered $1 billion by the Norway government in conservation assistance for its commitment to implement a two-year moratorium on new forestry permits for peat and primary forests. Australia also committed to support Indonesia’s REDD+ projects by providing $45 million.\(^{376}\)

By committing itself to voluntary emission reduction, pursuing bilateral schemes with developed states, participation in the Cartagena Dialogue, and acting as a deadlock-broker at COP13, Indonesia has displayed a role as bridge-builder that consistently seeks creative and middle-way solutions among different interests. China and India have indicated some characteristics of bridge-builders by offering solutions to lingering debates on climate change, such as China’s pledge to cut emissions to 60–65% by 2030. Nevertheless, these steps were initiated much later than Indonesia’s. Given the converging positions of different parties, especially after the COP20 in Peru, countries such as China and India did not have much choice, except to engage with the EU. Before that, both countries saw binding and deeper commitments as the sole obligation of developed nations. They displayed a strong opposition toward initiatives made by developed countries in regard to adding new requirements in the Kyoto Protocol which included developing nations.

Indonesia’s image as a bridge-builder in climate change negotiations is internationally well-known. However, it sometimes faced inconsistency, especially related to domestic capacity. As explained by Jotzo, Indonesia played a very crucial role when hosting the COP 13, but its role became modest in subsequent meetings.\(^{377}\) When China, India, and other countries began to relax their previously hard line positions ahead to the COP 21 in Paris and


\(^{377}\) Jotzo, op. cit.
engaged with developed countries to strengthen efforts to curb emissions, Indonesia did not show much leadership effort.

Despite being successful in displaying itself as a constructive actor in the midst of climate change complexities, Indonesia’s bridge-builder role was much reduced since the strategic position of climate change issue as Indonesia’s top priority began to fade in 2012. The departure of skilful and well-respected Rachmat Witoelar from environment minister position was one of the most important factors contributing to the decline of Indonesia’s role. Witoelar was indeed given a position as chairman of Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim / Climate Change National Commission (DNPI). Through this new post, Witoelar maintained his position as chief of Indonesia’s delegations in COPs. Nevertheless, because it was a small organization with limited staff, DNPI’s power and influence was limited. DNPI, and another agency which was assigned to deal with REDD+ issue – called BP REDD+ -, were disbanded by President Joko Widodo in 2015. President Widodo previously merged environment ministry and forestry ministry.

The clear impact of these restructuration is not clear yet. But it is clear that on climate change issues, consistency of Indonesia’s bridge-builder role and legacy depended much on the presence of strong, dedicated, and skilful personalities as the departure of some key persons significantly reduced Indonesia’s profile. Reliance on personality created a problem of consistency especially if there is no clear ambition to improve the country’s structural capacity in dealing with the complexity of climate change negotiations.

**Nexus between regional and global roles**

Given its complexity and nature, ASEAN never becomes a negotiation bloc in multilateral negotiations, including in relation to climate change. All ASEAN countries, including Singapore are members of the G77. Therefore, their positions in climate change negotiations are mostly aligned to the G77. Compared to other regions of developing countries, Southeast Asian countries’ concern on climate change issues is relatively high. They

---

378 One of the most significant progress was a deal between the US and China to pursue their unilateral commitment to their gas emission. China is committed to slowing down and then stop the growth of its emissions by 2030. The US at the same time pledged to reduce emissions by up to 28% by 2025. See Lenore Taylor and Tania Branigan, “US and China Strike Deal on Carbon Cuts in Push for Global Climate Change Pact,” *The Guardian*, 13 November 2015, accessed 2 January 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge
participated actively in negotiations process and are committed to constructively engage in combating global warming.

Thailand for example hosted the Climate Change Conference in March 2008 to follow up the Bali Road Map. Given its geographic situation which is vulnerable to natural disaster, the Philippines has also been active in climate change negotiations. In the COP 18, Filipino lead negotiator Naderev Sano delivered touching speech which urged parties in the COP to take more serious commitment to combat climate change as the climate-related natural disaster has increased, including typhoon Bopha which devastated Philippines’ islands and killed thousands. In 2015, Malaysia made a voluntary pledge to reduce emission by 45% by 2030, while Singapore declared its intention to reduce emission by 36% from 2005 levels by 2030.

Despite being active as individuals, Southeast Asian countries found it difficult when trying to arrange any joint project or agree on any binding commitment on climate change. ASEAN indeed has several cooperation devices on climate change adaptation and mitigation. One institution created to coordinate action to address climate change is the ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI), which consists of officials from environment ministries of ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, ACCI is a weak and loose platform. It has not much elaboration on key sensitive issues usually discussed in the UNFCCC such as emission reduction, transfer of technology, and climate finance. It is difficult for ASEAN to have collective binding commitment on climate change as the EU has.

Various levels of development, emissions, technical and negotiation capacity and climate change impacts influence different positions of ASEAN countries. It is also complicated by the fact that sovereignty and national integrity are among ASEAN’s most ‘sacred’ principles. Therefore, it is not easy for ASEAN to have common position on global issues, including climate change, especially the one which requires a binding national commitment. ASEAN never has a common position paper in the UNFCCC frameworks, which is different from The EU or AGN. Indonesia itself sees the prospect of having a solid ASEAN position. Indonesian

officials tried to consolidate ASEAN’s positions in the UNFCCC negotiation process, but without success.\footnote{137}

Understanding complexity in ASEAN, Indonesia’s engagement with its neighbours on climate change is more effective pursued through cross-border subregional initiatives such as the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) and the Heart of Borneo (HoB). CTI is a partnership of Indonesia, East Timor, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands to work together to sustain marine and coastal resources against the impact of climate change. The HoB is a commitment of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei to a two-year moratorium – later extended - on new forest concession with the support from international funding. Both initiatives cover significant areas with rich biodiversity which are vulnerable from climate change impact, attracting much international support. CTI and HoB received substantial funding from the US, Australia, Japan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and other international organizations.

There have been challenges in effectively implementing CTI and HoB such as pressures from palm oil industry and excessive fishing activity, but there are some positive results such as the freezing of the development of oil palm in border between Indonesia and Malaysia.\footnote{382} CTI and HoB themselves were significantly supported by international NGOs and ADB during the establishment and implementation through intensive and long process.\footnote{383} HoB for instance was initiated by WWF in 2001 and it took more than six years for completing conceptualization and plans of actions among three countries involved.

To some extent, both CTI and HoB initiatives have shown Indonesia’s lack of capacity to deal with climate change challenge as both initiatives substantially depend on funding from international sources. Indonesia’s government has generally failed to provide sufficient budget allocation to deal with climate change. Indonesia has so far provided secretariats for both, hosted some meetings and workshops, most notably was the CTI Summit in 2009, and provided limited capacity building trainings. Indonesia has no capacity to offer financial support to significantly enhance these two programs.

\footnote{383}{Ibid.}
Instead of displaying a behaviour that reflect a regional dominator which can provide public goods to its smaller neighbours, Indonesia brought together its neighbours to discuss the need for cross-border cooperation. The operational construction of both CTI and HoB was that how countries in these two arrangements could engage in collective discussion among them on what necessary actions should be taken and how these collective actions can raise their bargaining position in partnership with external actors. This kind of regional interaction is not the case for India, China, or Russia, whose attention to their neighbours on climate change issues was not much. Among BRIC, only Brazil has shown extraordinary leadership on climate change cooperation with its neighbours such as through the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). The difference between Brazil and Indonesia was that while Brazil has more capacity to provide funding to the ACTO - for instance by pledging $23 million for the Organization’s operation\footnote{Brazilian Development Bank, “BNDES Approves R$ 23 Million To Monitor The Amazon Forest in ACTO Countries,” 5 March 2013, accessed 1 April 2014, http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/ndes/bndes_en/Institucional/Press/Noticias/2013/20130503_ctica.html.} - Indonesia did not.

5.3.3 Summary and interpretation

Three insights can be drawn from Indonesia’s climate change policy which confirms its character as a pivot state. First, there was a shift in Indonesia’s approach to climate change from the ‘traditional’ stance of refusing compromise to more progressive one of attempting to play a role as a constructive player. This transformation to a more soft-revisionist stance gained momentum especially after learning that due to its vast areas of rainforest Indonesia could benefit from REDD scheme. Secondly, Indonesia became increasingly interested in displaying the bridge-builder role. When hosting the COP 13 in 2007, Indonesia led the complex negotiation and successfully brought all parties to agree on the Bali Roadmap which paved the way to post-Kyoto negotiations. Despite its success in promoting bridge builder role, in following COPs Indonesia did not much play decisive role. The inconsistency is triggered by the lack of effective and strong institution and leadership to continue the outstanding role it played in 2007. The third insight is that although Indonesia has limited capability to provide public goods to neighbouring countries in term of material powers such as climate finance, Indonesia demonstrated accommodative leadership role by engaging its neighbours in developing CTI and HoB projects.
5.4 Indonesia's position regarding global economic governance and the G20

5.4.1 Introduction and context

Indonesia is keen to participate in the G20 summitry process as this participation provides Indonesia with the opportunity to be involved in global policy making on a more regular and intense basis. The G20 membership has become a central point of many Indonesian officials’ speeches and statements. They often claim that Indonesia’s inclusion in the G20 is a portrayal of its economic success. President Yudhoyono underlined the importance of the G20 to facilitate coordinated action to deal with the global financial crisis\(^{385}\) and that Indonesia aspired to play the role of problem-solver of the global financial crisis.\(^ {386}\) participation in the G20 has provided an opportunity for Indonesia for image building. Becoming a G20 member was seen by Indonesian elites as a transformation to become ‘world class’ and envisioned that this would help Indonesia obtain more prominent world status.\(^ {387}\)

On the issue of IFIs reforms, which became one of most discussed agendas in the G20, Indonesia shared the same position with other emerging powers in the G20. They demanded reforms which could better reflect a new configuration of the world’s economic weight. Indonesia’s big interest in IFIs reforms was particularly related to its past status as a recipient of IMF’s loans in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis. Although the impact of IMF’s economic assistance in reviving Indonesia’s economy from crisis is still debated, Indonesia felt that the way IMF operationalises need to be reformed especially by providing loan recipients with more influence over the policymaking process.

In the first G20 Summit, Indonesia was assigned to co-chair the Working Group 4 (WG4) on the MDBs reforms with France. Indonesia hosted the WG4 Deputy Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in February 2009 in preparation for the 2nd G20 Summit in London. The working group contributed to some points agreed in the Leaders’ Statement. Among them was to significantly increase the lending from the Multilateral Development Banks to the poorest


countries, which were vulnerable to the effects of the global financial crisis, to at least $100 billion. Along with the increase in resources, G20 leaders agreed to pursue ‘reform and modernization’ of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The reforms would include issues related to IFIs’ mandates, scope and governance to better reflect changes in the world economy.\footnote{IMF, “London Summit – Leaders’ Statement,” 2 April 2009, accessed 7 August 2014, \url{https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf}.}

In the subsequent summits, Indonesia continuously engaged in IFIs reforms issues. As briefly noted in Chapter 4, compared to IMF reform, reforms of the World Bank did not find difficulty as G20 members already agreed the World Bank’s voice reform in 2010. Indonesia’s co-chairmanship in the MDBs working group focused more on issues which become a concern of all nations such as investment and infrastructure.

On IMF reform, Indonesia joined most countries in demanding IMF reform. Under the 2008 reform, Indonesia’s quota was 0.854. In the 2010 IMF annual meetings, Indonesia’s quota was increased to 0.951, a 10 % increase from the 2008 package, as explained in table 4.2. Although Indonesia shares the same spirit and goals with BRIC countries on IFIs reform and on several other issues in the G20 related to global economic governance reform, the explanation below argues that Indonesia is more attached to a soft-revisionist stance, a bridge-builder role, and an accommodative regional leadership role, which are different from China, Russia, India, and Brazil.

5.4.2 Assessing Indonesia’s behaviour

Attitude towards the international economic order

Indonesia gives strong emphasis to the reform of global economic governance. According to the Ministry of Finance’s Director of Multilateral Cooperation Dr Syurkani I Kasim, ‘we push IMF and World Bank reforms because we are part of the changing global constellation…’\footnote{Syurkani I Kasim, Interview by the author, Jakarta, 27 October 2014.} Regarding IMF reforms, Indonesia maintained intense communication with BRICS in the G20. Aside from bilateral schemes, Indonesia also consulted with BRICS through the Emerging Economies Meeting, an informal grouping at sherpa level which aims to exchange information and explore possibly similar positions. Since the 4\textsuperscript{th} G20 Summit in Toronto, Indonesia, together with Mexico and Argentina, has been invited by BRICS to the Emerging
Economies Meeting, which usually occurred on the sideline of the summits. The Meeting was not intended to produce any binding commitment. Having said that, as argued by then-Indonesian G20 *sherpa* Mr Mahendra Siregar, the Meeting is a signal that BRICS understands that without Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and other emerging powers, BRICS will not be effective in the G20.\(^{390}\)

Despite close consultation with BRICS, Indonesia’s aggressiveness in IMF reforms was not as strong as during 2008 and 2009. One indicator was that since 2012, Indonesia has dropped IMF reforms from its main G20 agenda. Instead of putting IMF reforms as its main agenda, in the 2012 G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Indonesia’s main priorities were: (1) strengthening the G20’s effort to minimise negative impacts of crisis to the most vulnerable groups, (2) prioritising infrastructure development and (3) endorsing financial inclusion.\(^{391}\)

Indonesia’s soft-revisionist stances on the IMF reforms were affected by the change of perception on the importance of IMF reforms. Indonesia felt that it needed some domestic structural adjustments before taking more roles in the IMF, which would be automatically attached once Indonesia’s quota and voting shares increased. One example of structural adjustment was the establishment of an independent agency which supervises and regulates capital markets and financial institutions. At that time when the 2010 IMF reform was agreed, Indonesia did not have such an agency yet. The task of monitoring capital markets and financial institutions was previously assigned to the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. Learning from common practices in other countries and understanding the need for having an independent institution tasked with supervising the Indonesian financial system, Indonesia established the *Otoritas Jasa Keuangan / Financial Service Authority* (OJK) in late 2010.

OJK needed a few years of institutionalisation, including a law-making process, selection of directional boards, and attention to logistical matters. Given the time needed for these processes, Indonesia was not entirely disappointed with the delay of the IMF reforms. Mr Kasim even revealed that:

> The delay of the IMF quota reform implementation is such a ‘blessing in disguise’ for us because we then have more time to reform and advance our domestic financial system. Indonesia has to ensure that its financial system operates according to international standards. When the quota reform is implemented and our responsibility to global financial management increase, then we will be more ready to bear the responsibility.\(^{392}\)

\(^{390}\) Mahendra Siregar, interview by the author, Jakarta, 6 November 2014.


\(^{392}\) Syurkani I Kasim, interview by the author, Jakarta, 29 October 2014.
Another factor which degraded Indonesia’s mood on IMF quota reform was that a doubt over whether Indonesia’s and other emerging powers’ loan pledges to IMF was really intended to increase the role and participation of developing countries in the IMF’s decision-making processes. This doubt arose after learning that the reality of the world economy in 2010, when the reforms package was agreed, was quite different from its condition in 2011 onwards. In 2010, despite the crisis in 2008, the G20 successfully mitigated the worsening impact of the crisis. In contrast, since mid-2011, there were increasing financial difficulties in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and a number of other European countries. This condition forced the IMF to raise additional sources for stand-by agreements. For Indonesia, this development to some extent changed the original idea of the 2010 reforms package from providing developing countries with a more equal standing in the IMF to providing additional funding to European countries.\textsuperscript{393} This was complicated by the fact that emerging powers generally have better fiscal discipline than many European countries which raised doubt about the possibility of non-performing loans from the funds pledged by emerging powers.\textsuperscript{394}

While also seeing the IMF quota reform as an important matter, Indonesia did not want to treat the quota reform debate as its main issue. Indonesia put more emphasis on the governance reforms, rather than just focusing on quota and veto issues. In contrast to BRICS, which regarded the delay of the reforms package with much disappointment, Indonesia positively saw that the G20 had successfully pushed the IMF to take some steps towards governance reforms.\textsuperscript{395} Indonesia’s priority was IMF governance reform, while quota reform was just a consequence of governance reform. The governance reforms focus more on the issue of strengthening international financial architecture, such as improving the IMF’s lending capacity and its surveillance strategy. Siregar also noted that one important success of the G20, to which Indonesia, as one of its initiators, contributed greatly to, was the elimination of the large number of preconditions for IMF financing. After the reforms, many of the conditionalities applying to IMF loans were abolished.

Another key difference between Indonesia and other emerging powers relates to infrastructure and development issues. Understanding the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other existing development institutions as Western-dominated, BRICS established the New Development Bank in 2013. China also formed the

\textsuperscript{393} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{394} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{395} Mahendra Siregar, op. cit.
AIIB. While seeing the importance of these new banks to increase sources for developments, Indonesia still regards current institutions such as the World Bank as the main development creditors given their experience and capacity.\textsuperscript{396} Indonesia indeed joined the AIIB as many countries, including Western countries, did because of seeing its potential to help finance Indonesia’s infrastructure needs. However, Indonesia did not see the new institutions as replacements for the World Bank and ADB. Instead, Indonesia hoped to see them having a complementary role and for collaboration to occur between them. Indonesia is more interested in empowering the World Bank and expanding its instruments and lending facilities, rather than seeing the new institutions as rivals to the ‘old’ ones.

Somehow against to this soft-revisionist stance, when hosting the 60\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Asia-Asian Conference, Indonesian President Jokowi delivered a speech which urged the immediate and comprehensive reform of the World Bank and IMF, and the building of a new international economic order.\textsuperscript{397} But it is important to note that aside from that rhetoric, there was no clear plan or design from the Indonesian government on what kind of reform should occur and what the new economic order should be. Interviews with senior officials within the government, as explained above, provided clear arguments to believe in Indonesia’s more soft-revisionist stance, instead of political elites’ revolutionary rhetoric.

Indonesia did not detach IMF quota issue from G20 agendas, but the IMF quota issue was not seen as important as during the first year of G20 summities. In later summits, Indonesia’s focus was more on encouraging other countries to increase investment in infrastructure, especially in developing and least developed countries. In contrast to BRIC, whose sense of remoteness from and dissatisfaction with economic governance is high, Indonesia’s attitude towards IFIs reforms has subsided as other issues such as infrastructure and growth gained more importance.

\textit{Performed role}

Indonesia defined itself as a bridge-builder in the G20, as repeatedly mentioned in many official documents and speeches. The Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly revealed Indonesia’s intention to bridge different interests and stances in the G20, especially

\textsuperscript{396} Deny Abdi, interview by the author, 29 October 2014.
regarding the developed-developing countries divide. To understand whether Indonesia’s conceived role as a bridge-builder was matched with other countries’ expectations, one needs to understand the context and constellation within the G20.

The G20 is an informal and consensus-based platform. There is no certain rule and regulation as well as enforcement and monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of agreed decisions. Although the informality of the G20 was set up to ensure flexibility, the lack of institutionalized and legal mechanisms could result in the lacking of the sense of ‘we-ness’ or togetherness which could dangerously lead each member to promote their national interests only and do little to improve coordination and collaboration. This fear became reality during the fourth Summit in Seoul in 2010 where the US and China were involved in currency wars accusations. The bridge-builder role gained significance amidst the diverse positions G20 members and unclear operational mechanism of the G20. The bridging role is especially suitable for members which are not either G7 or BRICS members. G7 members have been socialized intensively among themselves for long time so that they are mostly coherent in major issues. BRICS on the other hand presented themselves as a group of alternative to G7’s economic dominance. As these two groupings have differences in some issues, G20 members outside both groups are expected to offer middle-way approach and search common interest.

One issue where Indonesia has played some role as a bridge-builder is that of infrastructure financing. From the first summit, Indonesia proposed the establishment of a Global Expenditure Support Fund (GESF), which aimed to ‘... support budget financing, on top of regular development assistance ... for countries that are most vulnerable and most in need ...’ Indonesia continued its effort at the London Summit by bringing this GESF idea into the discussions of IFIs reform. Indonesia proposed the allocation of some part of global funds from the IMF and the World Bank to regional development banks so that countries in need of loans, especially to meet debt repayments, could borrow from the fund much quicker.

The GESF proposal nevertheless did not attract much attention from other nations in those two summits.

---

399 USINDO, “Indonesia and America, Speech by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” op cit.
400 Abimanyu, Anggito, Refleksi dan Gagasan Kebijakan Fiskal (in Indonesian language) (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Tama, 2011), 255.
GESF to a Global Infrastructure Initiative (GII). Proposed by President Yudhoyono in the 4th G20 Summit in Toronto, the infrastructure initiative expected more investment on infrastructure as an integral part of sustaining economic growth, especially in developing countries. Similar to previous summits, Indonesia’s proposal did not obtain much support from many G20 members. Developed nations argued that because of the global financial crisis, they did not have sufficient funds to contribute to the infrastructure initiative. Developed nations generally prefer to restrict the G20 agenda, rather than broaden it, so that the G20 could spend diplomatic effort to discuss economic matters.

Dealing with developed nations’ reluctance, Indonesian delegations provided three arguments supporting the need for a global infrastructure fund. The first argument was that the global economic weight is now shifting away from developed to developing countries, thus the G20 should be more concerned with supporting the sustainability of developing countries’ high economic growth by providing more infrastructure funds, as a part of efforts to revive the global economy. Secondly, despite high economic growth, economies in developing countries are still far from full employment conditions, meaning that there is still much unexplored economic potential. By supporting infrastructure development in developing countries, developed countries will in the end get a high rate of return. The third argument is that providing infrastructure finance will help not only one particular country, but groups of nations, with significant numbers of population, to improve their economic condition. Indonesia provided an example of ASEAN Connectivity where countries in Southeast Asia planned to develop connected infrastructure development across the region. Once the global economy has revived, those nations will provide what the world needs, such as cheap and good quality manufactured products, because better infrastructure has helped them improve their productivity and efficiency.

During the 2012 G20 summit in Mexico, Indonesia approached the host to bring infrastructure financing on the table. In the summit, Indonesia presented its experience with the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund. Because the idea of investment in infrastructure started to gain significant support from other G20 members, the 2012 G20 Summit eventually incorporated infrastructure financing into the Leaders’ Communiqué. Indonesia also successfully ensured the G20 leaders to agree on assigning their finance ministers and

---

401 Syurkani I Kasim, op. cit.
402 Interview Siregar, Kasim and Abdi.
403 Kasim et al, op. cit., 5.
404 Point 65 of the 2012 G20 Leaders Declaration gave an emphasis to “.. Investment in infrastructure is critical for sustained economic growth, poverty reduction, and job creation...” See “G20 Leaders Declaration, Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012,” University of Toronto G20 Information Centre, accessed 5 January 2016, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html
central bank governors to ‘…. consider ways in which the G20 can foster investment in infrastructure and ensure the availability of sufficient funding for infrastructure projects, including Multilateral Development Banks’ (MDBs) financing and technical support…’

Indonesia has shown a middle-way approach by proposing infrastructure financing, an issue which was initially resisted by developed countries and did not become a priority for the BRICS who concentrated more on IMF quota reform and other economic governance reform issues. From that point, we can conclude that Indonesia’s intention to play bridge-builder role was accepted by other actors. Having said that, Indonesia’s pivoting state character has a fundamental problem, which is its lack of consistency in managing its role most effectively. It can be seen from the fact that although Indonesia was the first to bring the infrastructure issue to the agenda, it has little power to play a role once the infrastructure financing issue became the G20’s top agenda item. During the 2015 G20 Summit in Brisbane, infrastructure financing became a central agenda, in which the host Australia initiated the establishment of the Global Infrastructure Hub. Indonesia however did not much contribute ideas on how the Hub should work.

Indonesia’s difficulty to maintain the level of consistency of its bridge-builder role is caused by the country’s capacity constraints. Indonesian officials working on the G20 only numbered fewer than 30 key people. Small number of officials on the one hand made policy formulation more efficient, but it is certainly not enough to deal with the complexity of G20 issues. Understanding its lack of strength compared with other more powerful G20 members, Indonesia, together with Mexico, Australia, Turkey, and South Korea, formed an informal grouping called MIKTA in 2013. The five countries have ambition to become a ‘bridge builder in the international community.’ On the G20, MIKTA believed that they ‘have great potential to contribute to the G20’s efforts in promoting the strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the global economy.’ By this time, MIKTA had successfully held six foreign ministerial meeting.

405 Ibid, point 17.
Despite the optimistic promise of playing bridge-building role, MIKTA’s progress has been relatively slow, especially compared to BRICS. MIKTA made two attempts to hold meeting of heads of states in the sidelines of the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane and in the 2015 G20 Summit in Turkey. Both initiatives failed to be implemented. One fundamental problem with MIKTA was that despite MIKTA countries’ claim that they have become a collective bridge-builder and ‘force for good, it is unclear what their real proposal for pursuing bridge-builder role?\textsuperscript{409} Asked about Indonesia’s stance on MIKTA, Indonesian officials prefer to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Despite recognizing MIKTA’s potential, Indonesia seems less interest to spend much diplomatic energy in MIKTA because MIKTA is still in the early stage of institutionalization.

\textit{Nexus between regional and global roles}

One narrative which was often presented by Indonesian leaders was that Indonesia wanted to promote the interests of ASEAN in the G20\textsuperscript{410} and promised not to choose the G20 over ASEAN.\textsuperscript{411} Despite the rhetoric Indonesia brought forward in relations to ASEAN, Indonesia is careful not to assume that it speaks for ASEAN. For Indonesia it is nevertheless not easy to derive what ASEAN’s interests are in the G20. The G20 itself is not designed as a group of regions’ representatives. The operational link between the G20 and regional organizations remain unclear. The presence of regional organizations’ representatives in the G20 is not institutionalized as their presence depends on the host’s invitation.

ASEAN itself often found a difficulty when trying to establish a common position in multilateral institutions and fora. In the 20th ASEAN Summit in Cambodia in 2012, ASEAN leaders assigned officials to work on ASEAN’s Position Paper to the G20. The paper is nevertheless not in existence and even the process of developing this paper has not started,\textsuperscript{412} although it has been more than two years since the commitment was made. This shows ASEAN’s lack of seriousness in developing a common position in the G20. Understanding the complexity to establish a formal link between ASEAN and the G20, Indonesia became less concerned with the initial idea of solidifying ASEAN’s voice to the

\textsuperscript{412} Based on email conversations with an official of the ASEAN Secretariat.
G20. As revealed by a senior official that it is hard for Indonesia to claim that it represents ASEAN. Therefore, in the early G20 summits, Indonesia’s realistic effort was to ensure that the ASEAN chair, which is rotated among ASEAN members in annual basis, is invited by the G20 host.\textsuperscript{413} Indonesia was indeed successful to ensure the ASEAN chair be invited in all G20 summits so far. Together with the AU, ASEAN is the only regional organization which gained status as permanent invitee in the G20. In addition to Indonesia and the ASEAN chair, ASEAN Secretary General was also invited in four G20 summits.

Given the different capacity and political and economic structure of ASEAN members, there are high degrees of variation in interest and priorities of different ASEAN chairs. During the 2012 G20 Summit in Mexico, for instance, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen encouraged oil producing countries to help ease high oil prices that hampered the economies of net oil importing countries, such as Cambodia. A year later, high oil prices were not raised as an issue at the St Petersburg summit by Brunei, which took over the ASEAN chair from Cambodia. Brunei, of course, is a wealthy oil exporter and has no interest in lower oil prices.\textsuperscript{414}

Indonesia sees no problem with the rotating ASEAN chair articulating their own national interests, despite the variety in these interests. Indonesian presidents did not even hold any bilateral meetings with either the ASEAN Secretary-General or the rotating ASEAN chair in the sidelines of G20 summits, except with Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva at the 2nd G20 Summit in London. Looking ahead to the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, Indonesian President Joko Widodo also did not use the opportunity to discuss G20 issues with Myanmarese President Thein Sein, who served as the ASEAN chair. During the meeting, which was only a few days before the Brisbane Summit,President Widodo preferred to discuss bilateral cooperation and did not touch on anything about possible collaboration between the two countries in the G20.\textsuperscript{415}

Despite Indonesia’s non-assertive regional leadership in finding a coherent ASEAN position and bringing ASEAN’s aspiration to the G20, it has displayed a role that is acceptable to the region. Dominating behaviour is unrealistic in the Southeast Asian circumstances. ASEAN’s unity and resilience for long decades is because Indonesia never displayed provocatively

\textsuperscript{413} Deny Abdi, op cit.
hegemonic behaviour. As revealed by a senior official: ‘We cannot claim that we represent ASEAN. But ASEAN is always represented by the ASEAN chair in the G20. This fact is Indonesia’s achievement. We always fight to ensure that the rotating ASEAN chair becomes the permanent invitee to G20 summits.’ Although relations between Indonesia and ASEAN in the G20 have not been institutionalised, Indonesia's behaviours are clearly different from those of Brazil, China, India or Russia. Those nations take a grander role in the G20 and do not consider their neighbours’ aspirations and interests when acting in the G20. There is not such communication between India and Nepal or Bangladesh or between Brazil and Ecuador or Paraguay regarding G20. Those countries are more interested in consolidating their view in BRICS, rather than with countries in their regional proximities.

Despite limited formal coordination with ASEAN in the G20, Indonesia’s formal positions in the G20 contain several intersections with ASEAN's documents. One example is that since the first G20 summit Indonesia has advocated the infrastructure financing issue for developing countries, which is in line with the ASEAN Connectivity agenda. Another example is that Indonesia demands G20 and IFIs to improve coordination with regional arrangements when dealing with economic crisis. ‘Indonesia is trying to restrain the dangerous spirit that ‘G20 governs the world.’ Engagement with regional schemes, such as ASEAN’s Chiang Mai Initiatives, is important to improve global economic surveillance.’ In the words of Dr Yulius Herawan, ‘What Indonesia is doing in the G20 so far does not represent ASEAN materially, but more ideally. While Indonesia refused a self-claimed role of representing ASEAN, it indeed brings forward ASEAN’s ideas to the G20.’

5.4.3 Summary and interpretation

Indonesia’s role in the G20 and global economic governance is much overlooked given the fact that it is the fourth smallest economy in the group after South Africa, Argentina, and Turkey; therefore, the literature on Indonesia’s position and existence in the G20 is not extensive. Categorizing it as an emerging power in the same camp as China, India, and Brazil because of its similar aspirations including on the issue of IFIs reforms is too simplistic.

---

416 Mahendra Siregar, op. cit.
417 Deny Abdi, op. cit.
418 ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the 17th ASEAN Summit and Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity,” 2010.
419 Syurkani I Kasim, op. cit.
420 Syurkani I Kasim, op. cit.
421 Yulius Herawan, interview by the author, Bandung (Indonesia), 23 November 2014.
The investigation of this thematic case once more concluded that by observing Indonesia’s behaviours in the G20, this thesis could draw a clear line between Indonesia on the one hand and Brazil, China, India, and Russia on the other hand. Three useful points to better locate Indonesia in the context of emerging power narrative can be concluded. First of all, although Indonesia shared aspirations with G20 members in the IMF reforms issue, the issue became less important compared to investment in infrastructure, as revealed from unpublished documents as well as interviews with government officials. Secondly, despite limited capacity, Indonesia was able to play some bridging roles. Indonesia proposed GESF, which later was modified to GII, in an attempt to bridge the interest of developing and developed countries to prevent the worsening global financial crisis. In term of ideas and values, Indonesia has a potential to enhance its bridge builder role even further, although up to this time Indonesia’s role is constrained by its capacity.

Last but not least, while many G20 members do not have engagement with their ‘constituencies’ in their regions, Indonesia tried to establish an institutionalized connection of Indonesia-ASEAN-G20. It nevertheless sparked less enthusiast response from other ASEAN members who saw that Indonesia’s ‘representation’ in the G20 was not compatible with ASEAN’s principles of equality. As a compromise, Indonesia advocated the regular present of ASEAN chair in the G20 Summit which has been so far agreed by each G20 host.

5.5 Conclusion

In earlier parts of this Chapter, three case studies of Indonesia’s foreign policy have been investigated with the purpose of testing the hypothesis on whether Indonesia displayed pivoting behaviours which are conceptualized in Chapter 3. Across these three case studies, Indonesia’s pivot state characteristics can be seen in consistent patterns.

Concerning the attitude towards international order, Indonesia shared similar stances with BRIC countries in the need to reform existing international regimes / institutions with the intention of giving non-Western countries more voice which reflects their increasing economic weight. Having said that, Indonesia’s critical stances towards international order have been pursued differently from BRIC. While BRIC is developing contrasting options to existing international order, Indonesia is more concerned about the procedural and institutional correction which is deemed necessary to solve particular problems/conflicts more effectively. By pursuing hard engagement in the case of Myanmar for example,
Indonesia did not present itself as an antithesis of Western countries’ sanction approach. Rather, Indonesia aimed to correct the implementation of international intervention so that it could take regional circumstances into account and engage regional organization in a more constructive way. With regard to the performed role, Indonesia’s own conception to be a bridge-builder was matched with the expectation of other actors. In the climate change context for example, Indonesia’s active promotion of REDD+ issue and its voluntary emission reduction were seen by some developed countries as a positive contribution to solving the difficulty in climate change negotiations. This thesis has shown that in some cases, especially on climate change and the G20, Indonesia has the capacity constraint to ensure the consistency of its bridge-building role.

The investigation of Indonesia has reflected the importance of regional dimension. Although it is recognised as a regional power in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s style of regional leadership is significantly different from BRIC countries. Indonesia prioritizes accommodative leadership by not showing power-based dominating behaviour, which is often demonstrated by BRIC. Instead, Indonesia gave importance to the engagement and dialogue process in the region. From exploration in this chapter, Indonesia could be clearly identified as a pivot state whose behaviours are located in the conundrum between two antithetical positions of hard balancing pursued by BRIC and integrating to and supporting international order implemented by middle powers. An explanation of why Indonesia is displaying characters of a pivot state is set out in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6
South Africa: A pivot state? Analysis of three thematic case studies

6.1 Overview of the rise of South Africa

South Africa’s status as the Africa’s most important international actor is indisputable. The emergence of South Africa’s global role occurred much earlier before the narrative of emerging powers started to be discussed in 2000s. The end of apartheid, which culminated in the establishment of a democratic and multiracial government in 1994, was generally referred to as the beginning of South Africa’s rise as a prominent international actor. During the apartheid era, South Africa was indeed already a regional powerhouse, while many African countries were still under colonialism and civil wars. In term of military capabilities, the apartheid government had developed six and a half crude nuclear bombs during its peak.\(^{422}\) Despite significant material capabilities, apartheid-era South Africa was isolated from the international community and given sanctions which prevented it from taking an international role and achieving prominence.

The end of apartheid government in 1994 transformed South Africa from a diplomatically isolated country to an inspiration for many countries which had experienced similar situations. The first post-apartheid President, Nelson Mandela, contributed significantly in putting in place highly normative or ethical foreign policy, especially with respect to human rights, global equity issues, peace and security and the broad development of Africa,\(^{423}\) which were in contrast to the apartheid era’s foreign policy. Nelson Mandela was also actively involved in mediating various conflicts, especially in Africa. In an effort to reconnect itself with neighbouring countries, which were ideologically and politically in confrontation with the apartheid government, South Africa joined the Organisation of African Unity in May 1994 and SADC in August 1994.

Taking advantage of South Africa’s good international image in successfully transforming itself into a multiracial democracy and its relatively more advanced economy, Mandela’s

successor Thabo Mbeki pursued more assertive foreign policy, especially through his effort in consolidating African countries. South Africa not only became a passive participant, but also played important roles in African regionalism. When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU, Mbeki was elected as the first AU chairperson in 2002. He proposed grand ideas for Africa such as the African Renaissance and together with Nigerian, Algerian, and Senegalese leaders, launched the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) whose goals included improving the living standard of African nations and assisting Africa in relations with external actors.

In addition to his concern with African affairs, Mbeki also had a great aspiration to play roles on the global stage. South Africa's international ambitions went beyond its regional role in the African continent. South Africa's importance was recognised by the international community, due to the fact that it is the continent's most advanced and prosperous economy, and therefore its default leader. Differentiating itself from the past, South Africa also became a member of the Global South groups. South Africa joined the G77 in 1994 and chaired it in 2006 and 2015. In 1996, South Africa hosted the 9th meeting of the UNCTAD, an organ of the UN General Assembly which is concerned with social and economic problems, especially in developing countries. The UNCTAD meeting was the first large international conference hosted by South Africa. Between 2000 and 2011, South Africa was always invited to the G8 Summit and was seen as an implicit African countries' leader. The 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany was particularly special because five large developing countries – Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico – were invited to discuss global issues.

South Africa's awareness of its potential to take a more prominent leadership role in multilateral fora came to prominence when it, together with Brazil and India, formed a new informal group with India called the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003. Another grouping that South Africa joined is BASIC, which is specifically concerned with climate change issues. The more prominent and much more well-known grouping was BRICS. Following the establishment of BRIC in 2008, President Jacob Zuma intensively

---


lobbied for BRIC membership by visiting all BRIC members. President Zuma even headed around 400 business delegations to China in an attempt to persuade its government of South Africa’s seriousness in wanting to join BRICS.

Since joining BRICS, the portrayal of South Africa’s profile as an emerging power was mostly associated with BRICS. South Africa’s foreign policy became more in line with BRICS’. It sided with BRICS in several global issues such as climate change and economic governance. For President Jacob Zuma’s government, a closer relation with BRICS serves dual purposes: to boost its international role and to deal with the country’s domestic economic challenges. South Africa used BRICS to pursue a high-profile foreign policy which would not be easy to achieve if South Africa was only pursuing this individually such as the establishment of a development bank which offered alternative development funding for developing countries.

Because of South Africa’s increasingly closer relations with BRICS, analysis on South Africa’s rise much concentrates on placing South Africa within the BRICS context. From an optimistic view, South Africa’s membership in BRICS has allowed it to promote closer relations between African nations and other BRICS members. South Africa promoted itself as an economic gateway for BRICS to sub-Saharan Africa. When hosting the BRICS Summit in 2013, South Africa held high-level dialogues between BRICS, some key African leaders, and heads of regional organizations and regional trade arrangements which resulted in specific and practical areas of cooperation on development in Africa.

On the contrary, as a late comer to BRICS, South Africa’s existence within the group was questioned especially given the fact that South Africa’s hard powers are much smaller than other four BRICS members. When BRIC, as a business and investment term, was introduced by Jim O’Neill in 2001, South Africa was left out. O’Neill did not change his mind several years later: ‘South Africa has too small an economy. There are not many similarities

---

with the other four countries in terms of the numbers.’ South Africa by comparison is far less powerful than other BRICS members in almost all aggregate material factors. In terms of population, South Africa’s population is almost 55 million according to the UN’s latest estimate, putting it in the 24th ranking of worldwide. Other BRICS members on the other hand are in the top nine in terms of population. Regarding total GDP, as shown in table 4.1 of chapter 4, South Africa is the 24th largest, while the rest of BRICS are in the top ten. South Africa’s military capabilities are different from those of other BRICS countries. China, India, Russia and Brazil are among the largest military spenders in the world. China, India and Russia have nuclear capabilities, while Brazil has grown as an emerging defence industry powerhouse. On the other hand, according to the 2014 South African Defence Forces’ review, South Africa’s military powers have declined in the last two decades due to insufficient financing.

Although the difference in material capabilities clearly indicates that South Africa is somehow an outsider of the BRICS, this should not be the single reason for analysing South Africa separately from its BRICS alliance. South Africa’s membership in BRICS indeed should not be debated, as it is the reality. Different from Jim O’Neill’s BRIC, BRICS itself was not intended to become an exclusive group of countries with similar size of material powers although the presence of significant hard power capabilities is a crucial element of BRICS. Andrew F. Cooper explained that South Africa’s BRICS membership is logical from a diplomatic perspective. Through its invitation to the G8 Summit and its election in the UNSC non-permanent membership, South Africa has been well-recognised as one of the emerging powers. South Africa demanded BRICS membership to maximise its global interests, which cannot be achieved through Africa’s regional schemes. On the other hand, BRIC saw that South Africa’s inclusion could boost the group’s legitimacy to its claim to be a representative of emerging powers.

Despite South Africa’s undisputable BRICS membership and much analysis which framed South Africa’s current international profile in the BRICS framework, this thesis argues that

---

the more accurate and helpful framing of South Africa is by identifying it separately from the rest of BRICS. It does not suggest the expulsion of South Africa from BRICS. But the separation of South Africa from BRICS is necessary for analytical purposes. It will allow the investigation of South Africa’s complex and unique characteristics which might differ from those of BRICS. This thesis’ argument for separating South Africa from BRICS is not based on merely the different possession on material capabilities, but more on the extent to which South Africa’s behaviour match or vary from the rest of BRICS. Much attention is so far given to South Africa’s similar position with BRICS on the reform of global governance such as UN reform and WTO. The more useful understanding, however, can be achieved by looking at more detail and specific South Africa’s position on global issues which enabled us to draw a conclusion on how strong the South Africa’s tie and commitment with BRICS is. As argued and explained in the three case studies in following subchapters, South Africa has exhibited behaviours which are more compatible with pivot states characteristics: (1) soft-revisionist, (2) bridge-building, and (3) a regional-global balance role, rather than with the rest of BRICS.

6.2 South Africa's policies towards Zimbabwe

6.2.1 Introduction and context

Africa, including Southern Africa, is a conflict-prone area. During the last two decades, post-apartheid South Africa has witnessed conflicts in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho and other countries. As the largest and most powerful state in the Southern Africa region, South Africa has contributed to conflict resolution and often was tasked by the international community to provide leadership in resolving conflict.

Zimbabwe’s political crises are particularly important for South Africa, given its close proximity to South Africa. The crises in Zimbabwe have become an international concern especially after 2007, when the leader of opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, was beaten and arrested.436437 The conflicts, indeed, have long roots since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 from the racially white-dominated Rhodesia. President Robert Mugabe, who took

437 This subchapter does not provide chronological detail of Zimbabwe's case as many writings have done that task, e.g. Darlington Mutanda, “The Art of Mediation in Resolving African Conflicts: Lessons for Zimbabwe and Africa,” *Journal of Aggression, Conflict, and Peace Research* 5, no. 3 (2013):130–146.
power through a democratic election, implemented land reform policy which was based on the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. The land reform aimed to fairly redistribute land-owning between the white and black population. Desperate with the slow process of land acquisition, Mugabe supporters forcefully took over white-owned farmlands. The widespread violence following the takeovers and the government’s mismanagement in handling them worsened Zimbabwe’s social and economic situation. Zimbabwe’s inflation rate drastically increased to 2,200 % and 80 % of the population lived under the poverty line in 2007.438 These conditions paved the way for the rise of opposition.

After around 28 years in power, Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party came up against a strong contender in the 2008 election, which was Mr Morgan Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai received 47.9 % of the popular vote on 29 March 2008. The election committee ruled that there should be a run-off because Tsvangirai’s vote was not more than 50 %. Despite believing that the election result had been manipulated so that a run-off was required, Tsvangirai and his party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), initially agreed to participate in the run-off. However, after learning that violence and oppression were widespread during the run-off campaign, Tsvangirai withdrew from the election. He eventually obtained only 9.78 % of the vote,439 condemned the unfairness and widespread vote-buying and intimidation during the election.

The international community condemned Mugabe’s dictatorship and inability to hold a free election and handle communal violence. Some Western countries extended and expanded sanctions to Zimbabwe in the form of travel bans, asset freezes and arms export restrictions. Those Western nations have implemented sanctions since the early 2000s for Mugabe’s alleged human rights abuses, but the 2008 political crisis increased the number of sanctions. Zimbabwe responded to increasing international pressures by expelling Western NGOs operating in Zimbabwe which then raised further concern over worsening humanitarian conditions of the Zimbabwe population.

In responding to Zimbabwe’s political problems, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned Zimbabwe’s difficult attitude to engaging with the international community. This particularly happened when the UN’s special rapporteur Manfred Nowak, who was sent to investigate torture allegations at the invitation of Zimbabwe’s government, was denied entry

Despite intense international concerns over Zimbabwe, the UN did not impose sanctions against Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s issues were indeed discussed several times in the UN Security Council, but the Council failed to adopt any resolution due to vetoes by China and Russia. On 11 July 2008, the Security Council discussed a draft resolution proposed by the US, UK and several other countries. The draft, which urged targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe failed to be adopted. Among 15 members of the UNSC, nine voted for the draft, five against, and one abstained. In providing reasons to veto the draft, China and Russia underlined that Zimbabwe’s case did not endanger regional and global security. Both countries also emphasised the need to respect the dialogue process among conflicted factions in Zimbabwe and reminded other members that the imposition of sanction would disrupt the dialogue.

The Zimbabwe crises happened during South Africa’s non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In the 2007–2008 period, South Africa joined China and Russia to vote against the draft resolution. South Africa’s rejection of the draft resolution which aimed to sanction Zimbabwe was heavily criticised for ignoring the vast population of Zimbabwe who suffered from political oppression and human rights abuses. A report by Human Rights Watch criticised South Africa’s consistent stance in safeguarding countries with bad human rights records, including Zimbabwe, during its tenure in the UNSC. The discussion of this case is trying to solve the puzzle of whether South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy reflected similar approaches with those of China and Russia in dealing with human right crises.

6.2.2 Assessing South Africa’s behaviours

**Attitude towards the international order**

As the most economically advanced country in Africa and the default leader of the continent, South Africa is expected to provide public goods to the region, including security and peace.

---


442 Voting results: (a) In favour: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; (b) Against: China, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Russian Federation, South Africa, Viet Nam and (c) Abstaining: Indonesia. See, United Nations, “S/PV.5933 2007,” op. cit.

443 Ibid.

Although this expectation is somewhat exaggerated given Africa’s vast, complex, and vulnerable conditions as well as South Africa’s capability limitations, South Africa aspired to do this. South Africa was involved in mediation processes in many parts of Africa, such as Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Sudan, Comoros and Liberia. South Africa’s mediation roles were mostly undertaken within the regional organisations’ framework.

Problems arose when the principle and strategy pursued by South Africa was different from the ones promoted by Western nations, which regard sanctions and interventions as tools to shape other countries’ behaviours. China, Russia and many non-Western countries, on the other hand, often perceive sanctions and interventions as threats to sovereignty, national unity and integrity. Nevertheless, a deep investigation of the case, as established in this thesis, concludes that South Africa cannot be simply classified into one of these two camps. Instead, South Africa’s attitude towards sanctions and intervention is contextualised based on specific circumstances of the conflicts.

South Africa was not always reluctant to implement sanctions. When serving as a non-permanent member in the 2011–2012 period, South Africa supported Resolution 1973 on the ‘no-fly’ zone sanction toward Libya. South Africa was also a leading actor in urging the AU and SADC to impose sanctions against Madagascar in the wake of the 2009 coup. South Africa is different from China and Russia whose sense of sovereignty and national integrity prevented them from pursuing interventionist policy. According to a senior official of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO),

\[\text{We do not like the impact of the sanction, but we still respect it after it was agreed in an appropriate international procedure. As a member of the international community we are abided by sanctions imposed by the UN or AU after a process that we should follow. South Africa was abided by that even if it is not in agreement with the sanctions.}^{445}\]

Furthermore, although it did not support sanctions towards Zimbabwe, South Africa actively mediated between the conflicted parties. Following the 2007 conflict, President Thabo Mbeki held several mediation meetings between Mugabe and Tsvangirai which resulted in the formation of the unity government. Despite the continuing problems in Zimbabwe, it is important to underline that by pursuing a mediation role, South Africa exercised roles which BRIC countries are less willing to do, especially towards intra-state conflicts in their respective regions. South Africa, on the other hand, enjoyed status as the most acceptable country in the continent to pursue a mediation role.

\[\text{Senior official of SA DIRCO, interview by the author, Pretoria, 13 October 2014.}\]
South Africa could be seen as a country which is critical of sanctions and intervention. As instruments, sanctions and intervention could create unintended hardship both for the country on which they are imposed and other countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, sanctions discussed in the UNSC aimed to indirectly determine who should be leading the country. This kind of sanction was not always helpful for the negotiation process. In the case of African countries, conflict management needed a careful thought and assessment. Political problems cannot be solved by merely changing the country’s leader. When harshening sanctions against Zimbabwe, the EU declared to not recognise any Zimbabwean leader, except Tsvangirai.\textsuperscript{446} What Western countries have missed was the fact that opposition leaders have continuous internal conflicts. The MDC had the first major internal conflict in 2005. The more significant split happened in 2013 when the MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube challenged Tsvangirai’s leadership. The split created two major factions: MDC-T, led by Tsvangirai, and MDC-N, chaired by Ncube. Furthermore, after the 2013 general election, in which MDC decisively defeated by ZANU-PF, two Tsvangirai loyalists formed two other parties: People Democratic Party and Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe. These splits reflected a disunity among oppositions, meaning that replacing Mugabe with Tsvangirai would have created another problem. Tsvangirai’s capability to bring all people together was critically questioned due to the split. Although removing a ‘bad leader’ can be seen as an ideal solution, but in the case of Zimbabwe, there was no guarantee that the new leader who replaces Mugabe would have capacity to handle complex and difficult political and socio economic problems in Zimbabwe.

For South Africa whether to implement sanctions or not is a matter of strategy and political consideration rather than a principle. South Africa indeed imposed sanctions and intervention in other cases such as when dealing with conflicts in Madagascar between 2010 and 2014. In Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana was ousted by a military coup in January 2009, which brought Antananarivo Mayor Andry Rajoelina to power. The coup was internationally condemned. The AU and SADC terminated Madagascar’s membership. The United States suspended all non-humanitarian aid and expelled Madagascar from the African Growth and Opportunity to Act (AGOA). The EU did not terminate humanitarian aid, but froze any new aid initiatives.\textsuperscript{447}

South Africa took an active mediation role both through SADC and individually. Within the SADC framework, South Africa endorsed Mozambique to facilitate a meeting of four political factions which agreed on power-sharing. Rajoelina initially pledged to form a joint government with different factions, but then annulled the decision to share power and prepared an election which he intended to run in the presidential race. President Zuma, together with other SADC leaders, urged Rajoelina to withdraw from the polls to ease conflict escalation. A relatively free and fair election was conducted in October and December 2013. Hery Rajaonarimampianina, with the endorsement from Rajoelina, won the election.

South Africa’s dual positions – on the one hand implementing sanctions on Madagascar and on the other hand rejecting sanctions on Zimbabwe – should not simply be perceived as inconsistent and ambiguous. This rather could be seen as the use of different strategies in different circumstances. As a matter of principle, by pursuing these positions concurrently, South Africa remains consistently playing a role as a leading actor in solving various regional conflicts.

**Performed role and regional-global contexts**

There are significant gaps between South Africa and Western countries in perceptions of both the Zimbabwe and Madagascar cases. Western countries focus more on human rights abuses, dictatorial government structure, the lack of effective rule of law, and the manipulated democratic system. South Africa on the other hand looked at the conflicts as having roots in colonial legacies – the UK’s failure to meet colonial responsibilities to Zimbabwe and France’s alleged pro-Rajoelina stance. Given this, especially in the Zimbabwe case, South Africa saw that the best role it could play was bridging Western actors and both countries.

South Africa brought the Zimbabwe case to the G8 Outreach in Heiligendamm in 2008 and persuaded Western nations to lift sanctions. At the same time, South Africa also approached Zimbabwe to reopen itself to the IMF and World Bank in order to secure financial aid. This effort nevertheless failed because both Zimbabwe and the West did not have sufficient levels of mutual trust. Zuma initially pursued a harsher stance than Mbeki by applying direct

---

mediation and telling Mugabe what to do. This did not work either and Mugabe became more reluctantly engaged with international actors. These developments show that it was hard for international actors to influence Zimbabwe.

Given the complexity of the Zimbabwe case and the difficulty in handling Mugabe, South Africa turned its attention from West-Zimbabwe bridging issue to consolidating the position of African nations. South Africa should be credited for helping to prevent negative political fallout from the Zimbabwe case spreading into the rest of the Southern African countries. Southern Africa is vulnerable to intra-state conflicts. Countries such as Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Angola have latent uneasy inter-racial and horizontal conflicts. The toppling of President Mugabe, as aspired to by Western countries’ strategic aims, would have potentially destabilised the region.

Not decisively intervening in Zimbabwe might be normatively undesirable, especially when looked at from the Western countries’ perspective. Intervening and supporting sanctions to Zimbabwe might yield some positive result, but the cost of doing that would be huge. For South Africa, intervention could see it lose its status as the first and foremost nation in the region. Forcing sanctions would have distanced South Africa from the rest of SADC and its ambition to advance cooperation and establish a free trade economic zone in Southern Africa would have been severely delayed. One scholar illustrated South Africa’s careful strategy when managing relations with African states:

More or less they [SADC members] do recognise South Africa’s leadership, but there is tension about South Africa’s becoming a dominant country in the region. They supported South Africa, but in some ways, they also resisted it. South Africa is expected to lead because it has more capacity and engagement with other countries.449

South Africa has not been successful in performing a bridge-builder role between external powers, on the one hand, and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, it has successfully brought Southern African countries to pursue a common approach and values in both cases. Complex political and socio-economic problems in Zimbabwe remains exist. Zimbabwe’s situation is significantly negative if framed according to Western standards of democracy and human rights. Having said that, South Africa has played a significant role as a regional manager in this case by providing some degree of stability in Zimbabwe which kept the country away from chaos.

449 Francis A Kornegay. Interview by the author, Johannesburg, 14 October 2014.
Forcing a leadership change through international intervention is not really acceptable in the context of Africa whose level of democracy practices vary from one to another. South Africa’s stance on Zimbabwe also helped SADC to foster unity. In this sense, South Africa has demonstrated an ability to provide an example that different from other conflicts in Africa where intervention of other countries was carried out, such as Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia which turned to continuous violence, Zimbabwe political crisis can be navigated through dialogues and confidence-building efforts so that it did not become a major civil war.

6.2.3 Summary and interpretation

South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy was criticized for not reflecting South Africa’s human rights and democracy values. Despite this criticism, the explanation above proved that South Africa was not exclusively reluctant with the use of sanction and intervention in dealing with conflicts in its regions. South Africa is different from BRIC whose high sense of non-interference principle and sovereignty prevent them from taking significant mediation role.

South Africa regards sanctions and intervention as matters of situational choice, depending on feasibility and applicability. This can be observed from South Africa’s policies on Zimbabwe, which are different from its Madagascar policies, as the two cases had different characters and situations. The Zimbabwe case was more complex as the opposition consisted of several factions which fought each other, so that a regime change would not always result in a positive result. On the other hand, the Madagascar problem was less complicated, as the conflicts were mainly centred on two personalities: Rajoelina and Ravalomanana. Pursuing active mediation in Madagascar was considered more realistic and feasible than doing the same thing in the case of Zimbabwe.

South Africa’s close relations with SADC and the AU over the Zimbabwe case informed South Africa’s bridge-builder and accommodative regional leadership role. Realising its ability to provide leadership in the Southern Africa region, South Africa took initiatives to solve the Zimbabwe crises. Having said that, South Africa realised that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of mediation efforts, it had to engage SADC members and recognise their interests. The unresolved problem in Zimbabwe might disappoint some international actors, but the current solution, in which Mugabe retained the presidency through an election in 2014, was the most realistic outcome which South Africa and SADC could achieve.
6.3 South Africa’s role in climate change negotiations

6.3.1 Introduction and context

Climate change has become an issue of importance for South Africa since the end of the apartheid era. South Africa has regarded itself as a constructive participant in the UNFCCC. South Africa’s active role substantially changed the passive and isolated portrayal of the apartheid government. In the early years of multilateral environment talks, South Africa was largely absent due to international isolation from many countries and international organisations, preventing it from taking an active role in the early years of international talks on environment issues. In the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, for example, South Africa did not contribute to the conference and preparatory meetings very much, except to prevent international condemnation of its apartheid system from the conference’s declaration.\textsuperscript{450} \textsuperscript{451} After its failure to commit to sustainable development agendas, South Africa was then not invited to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio.\textsuperscript{452}

As the Government of National Unity under Nelson Mandela took power in May 1994, South Africa enthusiastically participated in numerous multilateral fora,\textsuperscript{453} including in the UNFCCC process. Differentiating itself from the past, when it was associated with the developed world, South Africa joined the G77 in 1994 and since the first COP in Berlin has formally been part of the group. South Africa generally followed the normative position of the G77, which in the early years of COPs was reactive and focused merely on ensuring that developing nations should not have been required to undertake any binding commitment.

South Africa ratified the UNFCCC in 1997, a few months before the UNFCCC COP 3 in Kyoto. In the agreed Kyoto Protocol, South Africa joined other developing countries to push for more access to technology and transfer of technical know-how from developed


\textsuperscript{452} Phia Steyn, \textit{op. cit.}

countries. As a non-Annex I country which has no obligatory emission reduction, South Africa ratified the Kyoto Protocol in July 2002, only three weeks before the Earth Summit in Johannesburg from 26 August to 4 September 2002, which could be perceived as a symbolic step to show South Africa’s diplomatic leadership in the summit.

Compared to many developing countries, especially in Africa, given its higher level of economic development South Africa has stronger technical, institutional and negotiation capacities. This allowed South Africa to play a prominent role, including by chairing the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) during COP7 in Marrakech in 2001. As its diplomatic reputation grew – in part because it hosted the Earth Summit – South Africa set more rigorous ambitions in climate change negotiations. Its National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa in 2004 clearly mentioned that South Africa positioned itself as having ‘a leading role amongst the ranks of the developing nations’ on climate change issues.

IBSA was not specifically established for climate change issues. It discussed and took positions on a wide range of global issues. But when hosting the 2nd IBSA Summit in 2007, it was South Africa which proposed the formation of the Climate Change and Environment Working Group which aimed to ‘promote dialogue and interaction among the three countries on global environmental issues such as UNFCCC’. Despite the initial commitment for advancing interaction among the three countries in UNFCCC, IBSA did not act as a coalition and never released a joint position.

Since the discussion on the post-Kyoto commitment, especially since the COP 13 in 2007, there was a growing number of new alliances within the G77 as a result of increasing divergence of concrete interests and aspirations among developing countries. Together with Brazil, China, and India, South Africa joined BASIC prior to the COP 15 in Copenhagen.

Although in terms of size South Africa is the smallest among these four countries, South Africa played a pivotal role during the negotiation which resulted in the Copenhagen Accord.\textsuperscript{458}

The status quo in climate change negotiation was that there was the Kyoto Protocol which assigned Annex-I countries to cut their emissions, but its implementation was weak due to US’ reluctance to become a party. Together with BASIC, South Africa challenged this status quo by pushing developed nations to take more progressive commitments. BASIC is not a formal group and all BASIC members still associate themselves with the G77 and China, but it has regular consultations and has ambitions to develop joint projects. By the time of the submission of this thesis, BASIC already held 22 times ministerial meetings.

South Africa itself gives strong emphasis to its involvement in BASIC, seeing that it is a tool to obtain international prestige and reputation.\textsuperscript{459} South Africa’s alignment to BASIC can be seen in line with South Africa’s global ambition. As the most economically advanced country in Africa, South Africa has a desire to expand its global influence beyond its immediate region. In this sense, BASIC provided South Africa an avenue to raise its global profile as well as to pursue a more effective diplomacy, in contrast to complex consensus-building processes in the G77.

Given South Africa’s close association with BASIC, South Africa’s role in the climate change negotiation is mostly framed through its BASIC membership. Via its BASIC membership, South Africa has been trying to take a leading role among countries in the Global South by voicing criticism to developed countries’ reluctance to take more progressive commitments. Despite South Africa’s tendency to coordinate position with BASIC which often act as a revisionist power, what would be argued in the subsequent part is that South Africa’s association with BASIC only tells part of its entire climate change policy. Through the investigation of pivotal state’s behaviours, South Africa has been trying to balance its relations with different actors and attempt to play bridge-builder role and regional accommodative leadership.


\textsuperscript{459} Karl Hallding et al., \textit{Together Alone: BASIC countries and the Climate Change Conundrum} (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011), 55.
6.3.2 Assessing South Africa’s behaviours

**Attitude towards the international order**

In assessing South Africa’s stance towards international order, South Africa has explicitly shared similar positions with BASIC countries which refused to accept any responsibility for mitigation especially with regard to emission reduction. In many of their statements, BASIC countries continuously reaffirmed their collective positions to push fairness and equality of the climate change regime. In the 7th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in May 2011 for example, BASIC urged Annex 1 Parties to seriously implement commitments mandated under the Kyoto Protocol.460

There is no doubt that South Africa has consistently participated in BASIC frameworks. Nevertheless, a closer look at the nature of BASIC would give more valuable understanding on South Africa’s role. While South Africa is active in BASIC, it is important to underline substantial difference between South Africa and the rest of BASIC. During the post-Kyoto negotiations, especially in the COP 16 in Cancun, South Africa and Brazil hinted willingness to agree on two-track commitments which included commitments imposed on large developing countries. This stance is clearly different from China’s and India’s positions which believed that non-Annex countries should not be burdened with any commitment as long as all Annex-I countries have not implemented their mandated obligations

While BASIC has met regularly at ministerial and technical levels, from the statements that they made it is clear that the principle is so broad that everybody can agree on that. BASIC has been used as a political grouping, but they so far cannot move beyond broad principle. BASIC’s position has been more about statement but not about clear program and implementation. South Africa and Brazil are BASIC’s most progressive members which were committed themselves to voluntary reduction. In the COP 15 in Copenhagen, South Africa also announced a voluntary emission reduction to 34% below the level of business as usual by 2020 and 42% by 2025.461 Brazil also pledged to lower emission at 36% from business as usual by 2010. China and India eventually also declared voluntary emission reduction in the

---


following years, but it came after they were increasingly isolated in the negotiations.\textsuperscript{462} South Africa’s pledge was one of the most ambitious voluntary commitments made by developing countries.

BASIC offers some important platform for South Africa for instance in advancing South-south cooperation on climate change issue. BASIC statements cover a wide range of issues such as adaptation, finance, and technology transfer which have become common concern for all developing countries since the earliest years of climate change. But if we look at more detailed elements of climate change negotiations, BASIC is not so cohesive. There are clear variations among BASIC members. India for instance is pushing for technology and property rights. During the COP 17, India released a proposal which demanded the inclusion of intellectual property-related points such as the need to acknowledge the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) of climate technologies as a public good. India reiterated this stance again during the COP 18 in Doha and proposed the idea of a royalty fund to help developing countries pay patent license fees. The proposal was nevertheless rejected by developed countries. India’s unilateral proposal on climate technologies was not formally supported by other BASIC members. For China, its long standing principle was to oppose a universally binding commitment. For South Africa, on the other hand, one of its main priorities was to push for legally binding commitment to all, including developing countries.\textsuperscript{463}

South Africa’s insistence for a binding commitment was particularly emphasised when it hosted the COP 17. As the host, South Africa had aspiration to ensure that the COP could produce an important document which strengthen South Africa’s legacy as a leader among developing nations. The COP 17 eventually resulted in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Cooperation which task parties to work for a universal legal agreement on climate change which should be agreed by 2015 and come into force by 2020. South Africa’s stance was clearly different from China’s and India’s which refused to be included in a binding emission reduction. South Africa and the rest of BASIC shared ideological similarities which encompass South-South solidarity and aspirations to establish a climate change regime which favours developing countries. But its approaches to emissions cut commitments revealed that, in contrast to China and India, South Africa’s advocacy for fairer climate


change schemes is based on greater adherence to and respect for the current climate change regime, rather than weakening it.

**Performed role**

Similar to its position in the BRICS, South Africa’s alignment with the BASIC was somehow questioned due to the fact that its economy and population size is much smaller than other BASIC members. South Africa’s total emission is much less than other BASIC members, although its CO2 emissions per capita is higher than other BASIC countries and even the EU.

Becoming a BASIC member has leveraged South Africa’s position in climate change negotiations. BASIC has provided South Africa with an opportunity to raise its diplomatic profile. A few days prior to COP21 in Paris for example, South Africa was among a few countries, which included BASIC countries, which were invited by the French President to discuss possible consensuses in the negotiations.

South Africa, however, did not go with BASIC all the time. In the 2012 Cancun COP, South Africa took a different position from BASIC on voluntary emission reduction issues. South Africa has still maintained the aspiration of bridge-building between different interests on climate change issues. In line with intention to become a bridge-builder, South Africa used different tracks of engagement and built like-minded coalition rather than going with BASIC partners. South Africa tried to balance its activity in BASIC, the G77, the AGN, and its own bilateral relations with developed countries. South Africa valued G77 - and regional scheme (AGN)- as important as BASIC. South Africa is active at G77, chairing the group twice, in 2008 and 2015.

The degree of South Africa’s involvement in the G77 is different from Brazil, China, and India. These three countries never chaired the G77. India played a leading role in the G77 in COP 1 in 1995 by proposing a green paper which demanded that industrialised countries cut their emission by 20% in 2000 compared with 1990 levels. But over the years India became more distant from the rest of G77 when it, together with China, insisted that only Annex 1 countries should take obligatory emission cuts in the post-Kyoto agreement, a

stance which partly contributed to the delay in finding a solution to the stalled negotiations. India did not change its position although countries around India’s neighbourhood such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal were eager to implement domestic emission reduction.\textsuperscript{465} South Africa on the other hand put G77’s unity as its top priority during its chairmanship. South Africa was praised by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon for its effort to forge consensus. During its G77 chairmanship, South Africa brought the concern of Alliance of Small Island States (AIOIS) countries by pushing the immediate realization of climate financing which was delayed due to lack of commitment from the parties.

In bridging the North-South debates, South Africa changed its climate change approach significantly when it hosted the 2011 Durban COP from a pragmatic challenger against international climate change regime to a more constructive and reconcilable actor. As a host, South Africa was very conscious that they did not want Durban to die.\textsuperscript{466} Therefore, South Africa built like-minded coalitions beyond BASIC. As a host, South Africa persuaded China, India, and other large emerging powers as well as reluctant developed countries to adopt the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The Durban Platform was significant in the sense that it was for the first time all parties including China, India, and the US, which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to agree to negotiation for a universal emission reduction commitment by 2015. In the Durban COP developing countries were committed to increase their level of mitigation ambition according to their different levels of capability and responsibility. This commitment shed a light for the success of the COP 2015 in Paris.

The success of Durban was much credited to the EU’s ability to create the progressive alliance with AOSIS and African countries.\textsuperscript{467} At the same time, South Africa has to be given a credit as well for its ability to persuade China and India to flex their muscles. Furthermore, the EU’s activism during the COP 17 was not possible if there was no close interaction between South Africa and the EU. The EU itself has significant cooperation with South Africa on climate action. It even provided financial assistance for the South Africa’s COP Presidency in 2012 as well as facilitated discussion between the two entities to converge their objectives. China and India also have cooperation with the EU but the agreements for cooperation only come in 2015 and 2016 for China and India respectively after the two countries adopt more constructive approach. South Africa’s cooperation with the EU on the


\textsuperscript{466} Lesley Masters, interview by the author, Johannesburg, 2 October 2014.

other hand has much more developed than China’s and India’s. At the bilateral level, Germany provided financial and technical assistance in several projects including promoting renewable energy development in large cities and climate-friendly refrigerators in supermarkets.\textsuperscript{468} A close and concrete cooperation between South Africa and the EU is a proof that despite its alignment with BASIC and the fact that BASIC have influenced South Africa’s climate diplomacy, South Africa is trying to balance its relations with different foreign policy partners.

\section*{Regional-global roles}

Another dimension which differentiates South Africa from BASIC is its commitment to the African continent through AGN and also SADC. India never brings the interests of countries in the Indian subcontinent on climate change issues. During the 2012 COP in Cancun, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal even criticised India for its failure to provide voluntary reduction commitment. Brazil also has no climate change cooperation scheme with Latin American countries through UNASUR and MERCOSUR. Brazil was less interested to reconcile positions of Latin American countries which were significantly diverse from Chile and Colombia, which chose more constructive and middle-way approaches including through their membership in the Cartagena Dialogue, to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela which framed climate change issue from socialist-capitalist division.

As the default leader in Africa, South Africa is not only active in the AGN, but also contributes to consolidation and capacity building of African negotiators. This was not only triggered by a motivation to be seen as the continent’s leader, but also as a response to African countries’ criticisms toward South Africa’s close association with BASIC. South Africa’s alignment with the BASIC group and their role in jointly drafting the Copenhagen Accord at COP15, led to other African countries’ allegations of treason of African interests\textsuperscript{469} because the AGN demanded a stronger commitment than the weak and non-binding Copenhagen Accord. South Africa responded to criticism from other African countries. South Africa’s engagement with the AGN was then restrengthened during the preparations to the


2011 Durban COP during which South Africa took more progressive position which was aimed to make the COP Durban successful. As the largest emitter in the continent, South Africa is careful for not being perceived arrogant and egoistic by other African countries.

The AGN is now increasingly able to come up with a unified voice. South Africa itself is a central element of the AGN as other African countries often depend on South Africa’s assistance in the negotiation process. Since the AGN is structurally more developed and institutionalised than BASIC, South Africa does not want to leave the AGN in favour of BASIC. South Africa clearly keeps multiple tracks of its climate change diplomacy by engaging BASIC, G77, AGN, and bilateral schemes with developed countries in a mostly balanced way.

**6.3.3 Summary and interpretation**

South Africa’s behaviours in climate change negotiation most likely resemble that of a pivot state. Although much coverage looks at South Africa’s coalition with BASIC as its main vehicle to pursue more active climate change policy, as concluded from this subchapter, South Africa has been trying to consistently maintain complex multiple relations with different actors. Regarding its attitude towards the international climate change regime, South Africa has modified its stance from a hard liner pursued especially during the 2009 Copenhagen COP to a more reconciliatory one especially during its COP presidency in 2012. South Africa was the one who put mitigation commitment during the COP. This position allowed South Africa to act as a bridge-builder of different actors, all of which eventually agreed on the Durban Platform which set a commitment to agree on a binding commitment in the COP 21 in 2015. South Africa’s bridge-builder role was not as aggressive and effective as the EU which was able to create a coalition with AOSIS, LDCs, and the AGN. South Africa’s role, on the other hand, is more limited to influencing BASIC especially China and India to adopt more flexible approach during the Durban conference.

Accommodative regional leadership role can be seen from South Africa’s role in balancing its identities as part of the AGN, G77, and BASIC. During a short period of 2009-2010, South Africa seemed to move closer to BASIC at the expense of the AGN. After learning that

---

African countries were not happy with its alliance with BASIC which resulted in a weak Copenhagen Accord in 2009, South Africa skilfully adjusted its climate policy. As shown from the Durban COP onwards, South Africa’s involvement in the AGN has increased, among others by providing technical and capacity assistance to smaller African countries during negotiations. Instead of acting as a regional hegemon, South Africa positively played a role as a supportive actor which prioritised the AGN’s unity and solidity over South Africa’s global ambition.

6.4 South Africa in the G20 and Global Economic Governance

6.4.1 Introduction and context

South Africa was among 44 countries which participated in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. South Africa was also one of 29 founding members of the IMF which signed the IMF Articles of Agreement in 1945 and at that time it was a leading free-market economy which was supported significantly by robust international trade. In spite of stable progress in 1950s, South Africa’s economy nevertheless experienced increasing budget deficit since 1960s, among other as a result of rising military spending which mainly determined by political and security factors. South Africa received the first IMF loan in 1975 and received some loans until 1982, when the US, as a response to international call to isolate the apartheid regime, issued the Graham Amendment which asked the US Executive Director at the IMF to oppose any loan to South Africa. Taking advantage from South Africa’s reconciliation process in early 1990s for which international community began to ease sanction and isolation, the IMF approached the interim government and agreed to provide a $850-million loan. Although the loan was agreed before the ANC took power, Nelson Mandela was part of the interim government which approved the loan.

Although the loan was seen contrary to the ANC’s anti-capitalist ideas, it indeed helped stabilize South Africa’s economy. South Africa’s strong economic performance paved the way for its inclusion in the G20 which was established in 1999. At the time when the group

was elevated to the summit level in November 2008, South Africa experienced both political and domestic crises. President Thabo Mbeki resigned on September 21, as a result of political struggles within the ANC and was replaced by Acting President Kgalema Motlanthe, who formed a cabinet less than two months before the summit. From an economic perspective, South Africa was very much affected by the 2008 global financial crisis. Because its economy is more integrated to the world economy than other African countries, South Africa received a more severe impact from the financial crisis. South Africa’s GDP growth declined by 1.5 % in 2009\(^{473}\) and the unemployment rate increased from 26.7 % in December 2008 to 29.7 % in June 2009.\(^{474}\)

Given this background, South Africa’s focus in the first few summits fell into the necessity of taking short-term measures to ensure global growth. Other issues such as financial, regulatory and IFIs reforms were important, but not yet South Africa’s top priority.\(^{475}\) After the 2nd G20 Summit in London, the president’s office issued a document following up the result of the summit which put issues of stabilising global finance and boosting domestic demand as South Africa’s priorities. Since the 4th summit in Toronto, South Africa co-chaired the G20 Development Working which gave it more opportunity to put Africa’s development needs to the G20. In the 5th summit in Seoul, South Africa narrowed its focus to two issues: (1) encouraging the implementation of development commitments made in previous summits and (2) endorsing IFIs reforms, especially the 2010 IMF quota reform.\(^{476}\)

South Africa joined BRICS in 2010 and since then has been involved in BRICS activities including the formulation of a common position. BRICS is not a negotiation bloc in the G20 because as an informal forum, the G20 does not recognise and require any negotiation bloc. But BRICS has institutionalized itself through regular meetings in the sidelines of G20 meetings to consolidate their positions. Topics discussed in those meetings ranged from BRICS’ demand for the implementation of the IMF reforms to less-disputed issues such as

---


growth and investment.\textsuperscript{477} South Africa has been in the same position as other BRICS countries in opposing the delay over the implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms package.

Within BRICS, South Africa joined the efforts of other members to strengthen the group’s coordination and capacity. In order to present BRICS as alternative forces to the existing global economic governance architecture, BRICS set up the BRICS Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), and both were formally adopted during the 4\textsuperscript{th} BRICS Summit in Durban. By pushing forward the BRICS bank and CRA, South Africa used the Durban Summit to raise its importance as an important player as well as to improve its economic expansion.\textsuperscript{478}

South Africa has a strong aspiration for global economic governance reform as shown in various official speeches and statements. During a state visit to Nigeria, President Jacob Zuma demanded ‘the reform of the international financial institutions, the IMF, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank to be more reflective of the realities of the changed and changing international environment.’\textsuperscript{479} South Africa’s increasing alliance with BRICS in multilateral fora, including the G20, can be seen as its ambition to exert power beyond its own backyard. Considering its limitation, especially in relations with its status as the smallest economy in the G20, South Africa’s alignment with BRICS can be seen as part of strategies to enhance South Africa’s influence in the group, both for pursuing its national interest and representing Africa.

Despite South Africa’s close coordination with BRICS in the G20, careful analysis of South Africa’s role suggests that its BRICS relations only explained part of the country’s perception of global economic governance. As explained in the following part, South Africa’s inclination to BRICS comes not at the expense of its attempt to pursue its strategic autonomy, including to keep relations with other international actors.

\textsuperscript{477} See, e.g., “Media Note,” 2014, \textit{op cit.}
6.4.2 Assessing South Africa's behaviour

**Attitude towards the international order**

South Africa often expresses a strong case in pushing the G20 to initiate IMF reforms. With particular emphasis on shifting quotas to developing countries and an additional chair for sub-Saharan Africa on the IMF Board, South African leaders consistently brought the idea for reform to the G20 table. South Africa's insistence on IMF quota reform was interesting because the reform in fact did not result in the increase of South Africa's quota. Under the 2010 reforms package, South Africa's quota was in fact significantly reduced by 21 % from 2.799 in the post-2008 reform to 2.01 % in the post-2010 reform.

The 2010 reforms also did not give much benefit for Africa's position in the IMF. Africa's quota shares also declined from 5.0 in the post-2008 to 4.4 in the post-2010 and its voting shares are reduced from 6.2 to 5.7. Nigeria, as the largest economy in Africa, also has to see its quota reduced from 0.735 to 0.515. South Africa's stance for reform raised a question, why did South Africa support something that actually degraded its position, as well as Africa's position, in the IMF?

South Africa's support for the 2010 reforms is indeed consistent with its national aspiration for a fairer global governance. South Africa is cautious with the IMF given the fact that in the past the Fund provided significant loans to the apartheid regime, among others to finance its huge defence budget which were used to oppress ANC activists. For the wider African continent, although the IMF has provided much financial assistance to African countries since the end of World War II, IMF's success is debatable. The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by IMF and the World Bank were criticized for being unable to solve Africa's economic and social problems and even worsened poverty.

---

480 There have been pros and contras to the impacts of the SAPs in increasing Africa’s life. Vadlamannati, et al, for example argue that IMF programs have successfully helped reduce conditions of ethnic tension and empowered communities who were under pressured in time of economic crisis. See Vadlamannati et al, “Do IMF Programs Disrupt Ethnic Peace? An Empirical Analysis, 1985–2006,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 no. 6 (2014): 711-725. On the other hand, Lotsmart Fonjong was concerned about the implementation of a common liberalization policy under the IMF’s/World Bank’s SAPs during which more human rights violations were recorded. The violations increased because SAPs’ liberalization programs did not much recognize country’s specific condition. As a result, SAPs failed to improve welfare, livelihood, poverty or opportunities, which eventually led to more violence. See Lotsmart Fonjong, “Rethinking the Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Human Rights Violations in West Africa,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 13, no. 1-2, (2014): 87 – 110.
Although South Africa joined BRICS in pushing for IMF reforms, when interacting with other African countries South Africa’s emphasis on IMF reforms is ‘softened’ given the fact that that issue does not become African countries’ central priority. African countries’ less emphasise on quota-based reforms can be seen from statements made by the Committee of Ten (C-10) which paid less attention to IMF reforms. The C-10 was established in 2008 to coordinate actions necessary to minimise the impact of global financial crises. It consisted of finance ministers and central bank governors of eight key African countries, including South Africa, the African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and Central Bank of Central African States (BEAC).

One of the C10 goals was to provide recommendations and views to South Africa so that it could better speak for African interests in the G20.481 In its meeting in 2010, the C-10 delivered a strong message on the need for IFIs reforms and more quotas and seats to Africa.482 But the subsequent communiqués did not address the IFIs reforms. They rather focused on the issues faced by most African countries, such as poverty and development. African countries seem less interested with the 2010 IMF reforms as the quota reforms in themselves do little to shake up the existing imbalance of power. The primary beneficiaries of that reform were large emerging powers rather than African countries. Furthermore, fifteen African countries are currently receiving IMF loans. These countries as well as many other African countries would not be able to provide additional financial resources to IMF. As their quotas increase, they are required to add financial contribution to the IMF.

Despite similar aspiration on global economic governance, there is different focus between Africa and emerging powers. For most African countries, quota and voting share reforms did not become much priority because under any scenario – either the 2008 or the 2010 packages –, their quotas and voting shares would decline because their economic growths are still lower than developing countries in other parts of the world. Ahead to the 2006 IMF Annual Meeting in Singapore which discussed some ideas of reforms, African countries furiously opposed the quota reallocations because the reforms prioritized to give additional financial.

quotas to only four countries – China, Turkey, South Korea, and Mexico –, while African countries’ quotas declined significantly.\(^{483}\)

Instead of quota reforms, it is the possibility of adding a seat for sub-Saharan Africa on the IMF’s executive board which would benefit African countries more at this time. Sub-Saharan is clearly underrepresented compared to other regions. Forty-five countries in sub-Saharan are currently represented by only two seats. That means 22 or 23 countries per executive director, which is a huge number for any executive director. Furthermore, sub-Saharan countries have more complex and difficult challenges than other parts of the world. For each of them to be adequately represented by the executive director is a difficult challenge. Because African countries have been major users of IMF resources, it is logical that they need to be more properly and effectively represented.

The 2010 reforms unfortunately did not address this issue. The reforms only mandated the shift of two seats from European countries to developing countries and emerging economies. Again, those who got advantages from this changing of seats was not Africa, but Asia as well as Central and Eastern Europe. There is a positive side of the 2010 reforms for Africa. While in the past only 19 seats were elected by member countries and five others were automatically owned by five largest countries, now all 24 members of the board are chosen by election. This change opened up opportunity for Africa to gain the third seat. Nonetheless, in order to get the seat, Africa will need to coordinate with developing countries from other regions to arrange allocation of seats and constituencies.

Up to now, it is still uncertain on whether Africa’s seat will be added in the next IMF general review in 2017 and from what other continents the seat will be rearranged. Realizing demand for a greater voice for African countries at the Fund would take some times as it requires complex process of amending the Fund’s Article of Agreements. Given this fact, South Africa’s stance in siding with BRICS on IMF quota and voting share reforms is probably part of the strategy to influence other BRICS members so that once their aspiration for quotas increase were agreed, they then would be willing to help push for a proposal to give Africa more influence. The question is will the rest of BRICS support South Africa’s and Africa’s aspiration for a greater voice, which in this case is framed through the additional seat for Africa? Rhetorically, the answer may be yes, but substantively maybe not yet. In any

BRICS statements on the IMF reforms issue since 2013, there was never a particular point concerning the necessity to give additional seat to Africa. Other BRICS leaders also never individually said anything about the idea of giving more seat to Africa. From this point, we could guess that South Africa’s influence on the rest of BRICS is not as big as the influence of other BRICS to South Africa because BRICS’s commitment to the aspiration of Africa’s countries is not clear yet, although South Africa has lent significant support to BRICS on IMF quota issues, which did not entirely reflect the interests of many African countries.

On the IMF quota reforms, South Africa’s support for the agenda of the rest of BRICS is not only a reflection of South Africa’s own rational choice, but also because of a significant influence of other BRICS members. South Africa shared vision and principles of its BRICS partners in ensuring reform of the IFIs. But the problem is that each BRICS member has different top priority. China, India, and Brazil have strong reasons for spending a great deal of diplomatic energy to push the implementation of the reform because their economic weight have increased substantially. South Africa on the other hand did not have economic weight to push the issue of additional seat for Africa in the IMF’s executive board, which become Africa’s important concern.

South Africa’s smaller influence in BRICS does not necessarily mean that South Africa has no room for manoeuvre. The manoeuvre beyond BRICS is possible because BRICS itself is a loose alliance in which part or all of BRICS members can share similarities, but on other issues they could have different interests. South Africa’s individual manoeuvre beyond BRICS group in the G20 was pursued in at least two issues: financial transaction tax and climate finance, in which South Africa was more aligned to the EU. South Africa supported the financial transaction tax (FTT) which aimed to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair and substantial contribution to public finances and to compensate the most affected countries in times of financial crises. The FTT idea was promoted by France and Germany which learnt from financial speculations that devastated the Eurozone. Later, at the 2012 G20 Summit in Cannes, South Africa made a joint statement in supporting the financial transaction tax with France. South Africa’s stance was in contrast to the rest of BRICS, which saw the taxation as a threat to their financial development.

On climate finance, South Africa also took different positions from BRICS. South Africa preferred to discuss climate finance in the G20 as one effort to raise additional funds to address climate change issues. South Africa’s position was motivated by its observation that Africa needs significant climate finance whose sources could be enhanced by rigorous discussion in the G20. China and India, on the other hand, rejected the idea for discussing
climate finance and regarded the UNFCCC as the only legitimate institution to discuss about climate finance. South Africa’s engagement with developed nations in the G20 in certain issues has shown its intention to keep relations with Western nations despite the BRICS alliance.

**Performed role and nexus between global-regional roles**

Performed role and global-regional context are discussed in a single section here as the two aspects have close correlations. In both G20 and BRICS membership, South Africa seek to represent the interest and aspiration of Africa. Although South Africa does not claim as representative of Africa, the selection of South Africa in the G20 is because of it is part of Africa. This provides South Africa with pressure that it has to represent African interest and act as a bridge-builder between Africa and external actors. South Africa’s role as an informally ‘Africa’s representative’ is unique compared to the rest of BRICS which do not have such an obligation to ‘represent’ their respective regions.

South African government officials have confirmed that representing Africa is South Africa’s top interest as no other African nations in the G20. President Jacob Zuma himself reiterated that ‘..We will work together in various international forums such as the G20, with South Africa’s goal being to promote the interests of the African continent in particular and the developing world in general.’ South Africa indeed spent significant effort to ensure greater G20’s attention devoted to address African interests. South Africa co-chaired working groups on development, agriculture, and food security. These issue is not only relevant to Africa, but also South Africa itself which has serious social economic problem such as high unemployment rate and inequality.

South Africa’s ambition to ‘represent Africa’ in the G20 has to face some challenges. First, there is clear structural difference between South Africa and the rest of Africa. South Africa’s financial system is far more developed than the rest of the continent. South Africa is also the

---

484 Senior official, the South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, interview by the author, Pretoria, 13 October 2014.
most open country in Africa for FDI inflow.\textsuperscript{487} South Africa has technical and economic capacity to cope with complex economic issues discussed in the G20. Other African countries on the other hand lack of the capacity and exposure on sophisticated financial areas.

Secondly, although South Africa has the most advanced economy in the region, its economy was volatile in recent years. South Africa’s budget deficit is now among the largest in Africa. Some large developing countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, Congo, Mozambique, and Tanzania, economically grew fast. South Africa is still the richest and the most economically advanced in the continent, but its significance might decline given the rise of other countries. Other rising countries in Africa have interest and aspiration in the global economies which might be different from South Africa as clearly shown on IMF reforms.

The third challenge is that as the smallest economy in the G20, South Africa’s bargaining power to ensure continuous discussion on Africa’s issue in the G20 is limited. Indeed, not many of G20 documents specifically address Africa. Only the 2015 G20 Summit in Turkey which explicitly delivered a commitment to address Africa’s problem by promising to enhance electricity access in Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{488} Africa issue has been much sided from the G20’s agendas especially in the post-crisis period.\textsuperscript{489}

To deal with these challenges, in early G20 summits South Africa was trying to engage other African countries through the C-10. The Committee nevertheless did not go as expected. Its last meeting was before the 2014 Australia G20 Summit and since then, there has been no clear vision for the future of the Committee. The work of the Committee seemed to be overtaken by the AU which was more regularly invited to the G20. The AU chair is now the one who is mandated with the role of representing Africa in the G20.

South Africa’s relations with chairs of the AU and NEPAD in the G20 remain unclear. South Africa did not hold any meeting with both parties in the G20 Summits’ sidelines nor did it engage in structural and formal consultation with them. A then-senior economist of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) revealed that:

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{489}Peter Draper et al, \textit{op cit}, 130.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushright}
There is an effort to communicate, to try to understand Africa’s position. But there is no formal mandate. We go to the G20, but there is no meeting between us and African heads of states to discuss what issues should be raised and what happened in the summit. It is hard to imagine that it would happen.\textsuperscript{490}

South Africa’s choice for not directly engaging the AU and NEPAD chairs could be interpreted as its careful strategy for not being perceived as the continent’s hegemon, which otherwise would spark counter-reaction from other African countries. Instead of unilaterally defining what best for the African continent, South Africa preferred to facilitate African nations themselves to discuss the relations between the G20 and Africa, including by hosting the Annual African G20 Conference. This conference invited government officials, think tanks, business entities, and NGO activists of African countries. The Conference is organized by a Johannesburg-based think tank, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), instead of the government. Through the conference South Africa can informally update what it has done in the G20 and indirectly absorb the idea of what Africa wants in the G20.

\subsection*{6.4.3 Summary and interpretation}

The elaboration in this subchapter revealed that South Africa’s role in global economic governance issue cannot be simply looked at from its BRICS membership. BRICS indeed has become an important diplomatic avenue for South Africa. South Africa has shared similar positions with BRICS on several issues. Nevertheless, South Africa’s shared ideas with BRICS sometimes did not exactly reflect the interest and aspiration of Africa. The example of IMF reforms is a clear example of the difference between South Africa and other African countries. While both shared a similar vision of reforming IMF, they are different regarding the prioritization. For other African countries, the quota reforms as agreed in the 2010 package did not represent their interest at best as their quotas have declined. In this sense, South Africa did not display a soft revisionist stance, as expected in the pivot state framework. South Africa has been ‘dragged’ into the BRICS camp by supporting the 2010 reform package although the reform did not become much priority of African nations. The soft revisionist stance, on the other hand, could be observed from South Africa’s more flexible strategy to engage with developed countries on FTT and climate finance issues.

\textsuperscript{490} Daniel D. Bradlow, interview by the author, Pretoria, 16 October 2014.
South Africa has attempted to pursue bridge-builder role and accommodative leadership role. South Africa’s exceptionalism, which is its advanced economic and diplomatic capabilities, becomes a strong modality to become an interlocutor between Africa and external actors. There are clear difficulties for South Africa in maintaining formal and effective relations with the continent on G20 issues as proved by South Africa’s weak coordination with the AU, NEPAD, and the C-10. South Africa’s strategy to pursue accommodative, rather than dominant, regional leadership has been shown through the initiative such as the Annual African G20 Conference. This scenario has served South Africa’s G20 policy well, at least in minimizing the continent’s fear that South Africa would take a path for regional domination through the G20 membership. South Africa’s bridge-builder role and accommodative regional leadership could be nevertheless undermined if South Africa continues its leaning towards BRICS, while on the other hand abandoning relations with other actors.

6.5 Conclusion

As a member of BRICS and BASIC, South Africa’s behaviour was mostly framed through its anti-Western position. This framing might be true if we are merely based on South Africa’s official statements. Having said that, deeper observation on the policy process and South Africa’s relational aspects with other actors informed that South Africa’s close relationship with BRIC only told part of the whole story about South Africa’s foreign policy. The more accurate argument is that South Africa adopt multiple policies at the same time to accommodate its multiple identities, which confirm a pivot state’s characters. On climate change, despite numerous meetings, BASIC is never able to go beyond broad principles and fail to go into detail and concrete cooperation. Therefore, South Africa keeps close relations with the EU – which could provide substantial material benefit -, the AGN – which is more structured and institutionalized than BASIC -, and the G77 – which could give it a prestige of being perceived as a leader of developing countries. As the most advanced and capable country in the continent, South Africa has a motivation to keep its exceptionalism by maintaining cordial relations with different actors. While BRIC countries mostly disengaged with the regional process and pursued more global-oriented ambition, South Africa has a clear ambition to bridge between Africa and the world as well as to provide leadership to African countries.

Nevertheless, South Africa’s intention to balance between different identities and objectives sometimes found difficulty. On the issue of IMF reforms, for example, South Africa’s interest
was swept aside by geopolitical and economic interests of the rest of BRICS which demanded more quotas and voting powers. African countries, on the other hand, were not entirely satisfied with the rearranging of the quotas which made them worse off. South Africa has indeed tried to understand and bring Africa’s interest and aspiration through the C-10, but the committee does not really work effectively. South Africa therefore chose to take a more informal strategy of engaging African countries through the Annual African G20 Conference.

South Africa's skilful ability to reconcile its national interest, regional leadership and global ambition depend on its leaders' commitment. If South Africa leaders choose to take a side with BRICS or BASIC, there would be some counter reactions from African countries which would check South Africa’s global ambition. South Africa’s association with BASIC which resulted in a weak Copenhagen Accord, for instance, was criticized for not representing African interest. This criticism has influenced modification of South Africa’s behaviour to be more accommodative to its region.
Chapter 7
Turkey: A pivot state? An analysis of three case studies

7.1 Overview of the rise of Turkey

From an historical point of view, Turkey was one of world's major powers for centuries until its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, collapsed in the aftermath of World War 1. Turkish first president Kemal Pasha Ataturk pursued a non-confrontational foreign policy through his ‘Yurtta sulh, Cihanda sulh’ (Peace at home, Peace in the world) stance which aimed to preserve Turkey's national independence and territorial integrity amidst the rivalry of great powers and focus more Turkish modernisation which based on Western ideas. Turkey entered the World War II on the side of the Allies at the final stage of the war. Since the early period of the Cold War Turkey has joined the NATO. Another important move which marked Turkey’s close alliance with the West was its accession to the OECD in 1961.

The end of Cold War and the turn of 21st century brought some new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey is widely recognised as one of the emerging powers due to its strong economic performance. When the BRIC term was coined in 2001, Turkey was indeed not considered an emerging economy, as at that time it was still in deep economic crisis which was rooted in the previous decades. In the 1990s Turkey had a high inflation rate and large budget deficits. The stabilization program implemented in 1999 by the government with IMF advice failed to handle the worsening situation, resulting in massive capital outflow and the shrinking of the GDP growth to -8.9% in Quarter 2 of 2001. During November 2000 $5.3 billion left Turkey, which was then followed by $ 5 billion outflow on 19 February 2001 alone. Turkey’s economy fortunately revived in a relatively short period. Its average annual GDP growth between 2002 and 2014 was 4.7%. Referring to its good economic performance, Turkey was included in groups of emerging economies such as CIVET, MINT, MIST, and the Next-11.

The early 21st century also witnessed the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey. In contrast to the Islamist-oriented Refah Party which failed to form the majority government despite winning the 1994 election, the AKP won the 2002 election with the absolute majority which enabled it to form a government by its own. It was the first time since 1965 that a Turkish political party successfully gained a political majority in the parliament. It ended years of unstable politics and fragile coalitions. Despite its moderate Islamist background, in the early years of its administration, the AKP focused on following a path of pursuing the EU accession process which had been Turkey’s longstanding foreign policy vision, going back to 1959 when Turkey first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community.

Turkey’s economic success and relatively stable politics in the early 21st century enabled an increase in its diplomatic activities. In addition to its long standing relations with Western countries especially through NATO, Turkey expanded engagement with developing countries beyond its immediate neighbours. Turkey became an observer of the NAM and Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended the 2009 NAM Summit in Egypt. Then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also delivered a speech in the NAM foreign ministerial meeting in 2014, emphasizing Turkey’s close relations with NAM members. Ankara also become more active in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), especially once Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turk, assumed the Secretary General’s position in 2004. In an effort to engage with diverse regional organisations, Turkey became an observer to the AU, ASEAN, and Association of Caribbean States (ACS). Turkey’s increasing engagement with developing countries, at the expense of its relations with the West to some extent, raised intellectual curiosity as to how should we view Turkey’s rise? Has Turkey experience a drastic transformation which downgrades its long standing relations with the West?

Two main insights are presented by scholars to answer the puzzles. The first insight identified Turkey as an emerging power, in the same league as China, Russia, Brazil and India. In analysing close cooperation between Turkey and Brazil in brokering the Iran’s nuclear crisis in 2010, Lazarou identified both countries as emerging powers as they shared identities, principles and aspiration to take part in global policy making including in advocating global governance reforms.495 The second perception is that Turkey is portrayed through the middle power lens. This view was largely based on the historical and structural contexts. Using ‘soft power diplomacy’ and ‘zero problem with neighbours,’ Turkey displayed

a middle power role. Different from those who call Turkey an emerging power, scholars who see Turkey as a middle power recognised the strength of Turkey’s relations with Western countries. As a middle power, Turkey does not challenge the Western-led international order. Rather, given its lack of capacity to obtain any significant diplomatic achievement without support from its Western ally, Turkey’s foreign policy activity does not aim to present an opposite alternative which disrupts the international system.

While these two views have some grounds, they are insufficient to describe Turkey’s foreign policy. The label of pivot state could provide a useful explanation on aspects which are not covered by the concepts of emerging power and middle power. Within a relatively short period of approximately one decade, Turkey in fact, has adopted these three characteristics – middle power, emerging power and pivot state - as demonstrated through the investigation of case studies below.

7.2 Turkey’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program

7.2.1 Introduction and context

Relations between Turkey and Iran have historical roots of continuous struggle and numerous wars which can be traced from the Ottoman – Saffavid era. The tension has been minimized since the Ataturk era as Turkish leaders kept distance from Middle East affairs including Iran and looked for closer relations with the West. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran undertook policies which project itself as a rising power, among other through the development of nuclear capacity, which was initially supported by the US and European countries for civilian purpose since 1950s.

Ideological suspicions between Iran and Turkey rose as two countries took contrasting political paths. The Islamic Republic of Iran saw itself in a contrast form from Turkey’s secular life and Western alliance and at the same time, Iran’s Islamic revolutionary project was seen as contradictory by Turkey. Having said that the mutual suspicion did not escalate into conflicts and both countries were maintained relatively good relations as Turkey stayed

---

497 Anastasia Koutri, “Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s Role As A Middle Power” (Master dissertation, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2011), 46-47.
neutral during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. During that time, Iran had a difficult period of realising an ambition to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant as Western countries’ cut off of nuclear assistance because of the revolution.

Iran established a new cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1990 to build the new plant, but several months after the deal, the Soviet Union collapsed and the new Russian government terminated its support to state-owned companies which built power plants in other countries, including in Iran. Russia agreed to continue the building of the plant in 1995. Russia’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear program provided a basis for cordial relations between two countries for several years afterwards.

Turkey did not see closer relations between Russia and Iran as a threat, but rather as an opportunity. Turkey’s main interest in relations with the two countries was economic. The rise of Islamist Necmettin Erbakan as Turkish Prime Minister in 1997 even improved ties, especially through bilateral deals on Turkey’s importing of Iran’s oil and gas. This deal was nevertheless seen as a challenge to the US. Being suspicious with Iranian nuclear program, US President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions in 1995 and 1996 which prevented US firms from investing in and trading with Iran. Prime Minister Erbakan on the other hand said that ‘Our visit has no aims against the United States, which is also our friend and ally.’

The rise of the AKP brought new developments in Turkey’s Iran policy towards a closer engagement. The AKP government began to adopt more active engagement with neighbouring countries by proposing initiatives such as a common market and visa-free agreements. At the same time, since mid-2000 sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program become more intense both within the UN Security Council frameworks - Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 - and outside the UN, such as the EU. Amidst increasing pressure on Iran, Turkey took more divergent policies from the West. One of the most momentous parts of Turkey-Iran relations was the Brazil-Turkey initiative to establish a tentative compromise with Iran the international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. The trilateral declaration came after the failure of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) since 2006. Following the failure of the negotiations in November 2009, in February 2010 Iranian President Ahmadinejad declared Iran as a nuclear state with

capability of producing bomb fuel\(^{500}\) which further hampered the negotiation prospects. By May 2010, the P5+1 countries were frustrated with Iran’s failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and called for stronger sanctions.

On the other hand, Turkey and Brazil, both of which were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council at that time, took advantage of the opportunity surrounding the stalemate by proposing a middle-way deal. After intensive talks, the three countries issued a joint declaration on 10 May 2010 that Iran agreed to ship 1.2 tonnes of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey for a later exchange of 120 kilograms of nuclear fuel for its medical nuclear reactor in Tehran.\(^{501}\) The deal was temporarily seen as a breakthrough in long-stalled negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. But, soon afterward, the prospect of the deal’s implementation was doubted.

Throughout Iran’s nuclear case, China and Russia supported all UNSC resolutions sanctioning Iran. Through their supports to the UNSC sanctions, China and Russia did not want to be perceived as ‘spoilers’ in the UN system,\(^ {502}\) from which they have benefited from their status as UNSC permanent members. China’s support to sanctions aimed to show that China was not the US’ rival.\(^ {503}\) Despite the supports, it is important to note that during the implementation of sanctions, China and Russia maintained significant economic relations with Iran. China has replaced the EU as Iran’s biggest trading partner since 2011 and, despite the sanctions, Chinese investment in Iran have expanded substantially, not only in energy industries, but also in infrastructure projects.\(^ {504}\) In this sense, China and Russia’s supports should not be perceived as a result of sharing ideas on global norms with Western countries. The supports are more about rational calculation which was intended to strengthen their positions in the international security management under the UNSC framework.

Turkey’s initiative to make a deal with Iran was part of these larger developments of Turkey’s international relations in searching for alternative diplomatic arenas outside the typical Western-dominated ones. The question is whether by making a deal with Iran Turkey shifted


\(^{504}\) Wu, op. cit, 52-53.
its axis and moved away from the West? A more comprehensive understanding of whether Turkey displayed the three parameters of a pivot state – attitude towards international order, performed role, and regional-global role – can be achieved by dividing the period into three intervals.

7.1.2 Assessing Turkey’s behaviours

I. A supporter of the NPT regime (2002-2009)

The first period, which is between 2002 and 2009, was the time when Turkey had a strong aspiration to strengthen relations with the West through the EU’s membership. Despite the arrival of AKP into power in 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy main objective remain to be accepted as an EU member. During that time, on the other hand, Turkey also began to reconceptualise its relations with neighbouring countries by adopting the ‘komşularla sıfır sorun’ (zero problem with neighbours), which was significantly shaped by Ahmet Davotaglu, who was then Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign policy advisor. Under this policy, Turkey pursued rapprochement with Iran by increasing number of official visits and cooperation initiatives between the two countries.

Given the increasing economic relations between both countries, Turkey did not react much in response to international sanctions imposed on Iran. The first UNSC resolution concerned with Iran was adopted in 2006 and demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.\(^{505}\) The UNSC Resolution 1737, which was adopted six months later, imposed sanctions banning the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology, and froze the assets of key individuals and companies related to the program. Western countries followed these sanctions and even imposed harsher sanctions. The EU, for instance, added some firms and individuals in its blacklist beyond those in the UNSC Resolutions' lists.\(^{506}\) Turkey, on the other hand, did not support sanctions on Iran, as doing so would have escalated conflict in the region and hampered its growing cooperation with Iran.

In spite of rejecting sanctions, Turkey was still significantly in line with the views of Western countries. Speaking before the Turkish parliament, then foreign minister Abdullah Gul

---


expressed his weariness over the negative impact of Iran’s nuclear program to the international security.\textsuperscript{507} Furthermore, in a meeting of the IAEA in September 2005, Turkey let the UK speak on behalf of itself, together with the EU and few other countries, in expressing disappointment over Iran’s uncooperative attitude to comply with the IAEA’s standards.\textsuperscript{508} Turkey itself is a firm supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has long advocated creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the \textit{Middle East}. Turkey saw the Middle East as a very vulnerable region and establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone was an urgent matter to collectively create long lasting peace. Iran’s nuclear program was clearly in contrast to that Turkey’s ambition.

Turkey’s role on Iran’s nuclear program in that period can be characterized as a middle power. Turkey was still significantly attached to the Western security ideas; therefore, was supportive to the NPT regime. It is true that there were increasing economic and diplomatic relations with Iran, but those improvements were not dramatic and indeed had been started several years before, especially during Necmettin Erbakan’s premiership.

\textbf{II. Revisionist (2009-2011)}

Because its two previous sanctions failed to change Iran’s attitude, the UNSC passed Resolution 1747 in March 2007 which imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freezes on Iranian assets. Another resolution passed in 2008 extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the activities of Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and to monitor the movement of individuals involved with the program through their territory. Shortly after the 2008 UN sanctions, the US imposed another unilateral sanctions on Iran's financial and energy sectors, encouraging other countries to abandon investment in Iranian markets.

In responding to these sanctions, Turkey displayed a more revisionist stance towards the UNSC’s decision by explicitly rejecting the implementation of the sanctions and argued that a peaceful diplomatic solution was still possible.\textsuperscript{509} Turkey’s divergent position from Western countries mounted in 2010 when Turkey, which at that time served as a non-permanent

\textsuperscript{508} IAEA, “Statement to the 49\textsuperscript{th} IAEA General Conference on Behalf of the European Union to the IAEA by the UK Governor to the IAEA, Mr Robert Wright,” 26 September 2005, accessed 14 May 2016, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Statements/UKforEU.pdf.
member of the UNSC, made a nuclear deal with Iran and Brazil. Turkey was proud of presenting itself as a broker of the deal. In his op-ed published shortly after the deal, then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu argued that Turkey’s role in solving Iran nuclear issues is an integral part of Turkey’s foreign policy grand vision in creating a stable and peaceful Middle East, which also included Turkey’s mediation in Syria-Israel, Palestinian conflict and Iraq civil war.\footnote{Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, 20 May 2010, accessed 2 October 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/.}

Turkey’s attempt to present itself as a problem solver as well as an alternative of Western’ sanction approach unfortunately failed. The West did not support the deal and a new sanction was imposed in June 2010. Iran grew impatient with the long and complex negotiation process with the West; thereby, abandoned the agreement with Turkey and Brazil and returned back to unilateral policy. The deal failed to dismiss anxiety among Western countries that Iran would once more violate international agreements. The US continued to promote sanctions and on 9 June 2016 successfully won other P-5 support to adopt UNSC Resolution 1929 which implemented a complete arms embargo to Iran and froze assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.\footnote{IAEA, “Resolution 1929 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th Meeting, on 9 June 2010,” 2010, accessed 18 April 2016, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.} Turkey and Brazil were the only states which voted against the resolution.

While Turkey’s brokering Iran nuclear deal was regarded as a mediation effort,\footnote{See, e.g., Aylim G. Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012):40-41} there are some indications that it should be seen as a revisionist effort to the international nuclear regime, rather than a mediation. First, the deal was the result of rushed negotiations between three countries. It was not the outcome of long-term confidence building measures between Iran and Turkey. The deal was also unclear in the sense that it had no a timeframe and a transparent tool to force the implementation of the nuclear swap.

Secondly, despite an initial ambition to make the deal as a breakthrough, Turkey – and Brazil – had no capability to ensure both international community and Iran to support the deal. Both countries did not get assurance from Western countries to support the deal because in previous negotiations, Iran did not show a positive attitude. Iran agreed on an LEU swap proposed by the US and backed by the IAEA in October 2009, but it later cancelled the deal after domestic opposition. Iran at the same time also did not fully trust
Turkey and Brazil as none of them had the ability to produce fuel for the Iran’s nuclear reactor. They also did not have capacity to influence Western countries to lift sanctions.

Given the lack of a credible process and a clear modality, Turkey’s initiative is more about separating itself from its traditional alignment with the West, rather than to offer a feasible solution for Iran. By pursuing the deal, Turkey tried to show that it had a diplomatic weight to adopt a more independent and firm foreign policy. The deal also reflected Turkey’s rebellious view on the use of sanction and intervention as tool for conflict resolution.

**III. A pivot state (2011-2016)**

Turkey’s attempt to present itself as a problem solver as well as to pursue an alternative to the Western sanctions approach ultimately failed. The West did not support the deal and new sanctions were imposed in June 2010. Iran grew impatient with the long and complex negotiation process with the West. It therefore abandoned the agreement with Turkey and Brazil and returned to its previous unilateral policy. The failure of the deal had an impact on its relations with its Western allies. It is true that, despite taking a different position from Western countries by refusing to support sanctions against Iran, Turkey remains an important NATO member. Turkey has become the second largest contributor to NATO PKOs and takes parts in all major NATO initiatives.\(^5\) Having said that, Turkey’s ambition to promote its role as a problem solver on Iran’s nuclear case had drastically diminished.

On the other hand, in the subsequent years, when Iran held intensive negotiations with P5+1, Turkey was not involved. The first meeting in 2011 and the third round in 2013 were held in Istanbul. In these meetings, however, Turkey was not at the negotiation table. The negotiations were concluded in July 2015 in which P5+1 countries, the EU and Iran agreed on a framework for a deal. According to this framework, Iran would redesign, convert, and reduce its nuclear facilities in order to lift all nuclear-related sanctions.\(^6\)

Turkey was bypassed in the P+1 - Iran nuclear negotiation process and failed to play a role in advocating dialogue among conflicting parties. During the negotiation period between

---

\(^5\) Senior official of the Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by the author, Ankara, 26 November 2015.

2011 and 2015, Turkey rarely issued statements which criticized Western countries’ sanctions policy. Turkey seemed careful not to create another policy which would degrade its relations with the West. On the other hand, relations between Turkey and Iran have fluctuated due to Arab springs, as the two countries have different approaches on Syria. Following the outbreak of Syrian civil war, Turkey condemned Syrian President Bashar Assad and asked him to resign. Ankara’s anti-Assad position was not only based on a pro Sunni tendency, but also on its wariness over Syria’s increasingly pro Kurdish policies which included plans to provide citizenship status to Kurds in Syria and recognition of their cultural rights.\(^5^{15}\)

In responding to Arab uprisings, Turkey initially positioned itself as a regional leader by offering a role as a mediator and portrayed itself as a model for ‘new’ Middle East region. There were nevertheless counter-reactions from Middle East countries, especially because of Turkey’s policy to take a side in some conflicts. It supported Sunni rebels to topple Bashar Al Assad in Syria, which was Iran’s strategic ally. A clear sign of Turkey's failure was the rejection of Turkey's mediation initiative in Yemen and Bahrain. Turkey withdrew its support for Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Yemen conflict and proposed itself as a mediator between the Yemenese government and Houthi Shia rebellion. In the Bahrain conflict, Prime Minister Davotaglu visited Manama in early 2015 and also offered mediation between the Sunni Bahrain government and majority Shia demonstrators. Neither Yemen nor Bahrain accepted Turkey’s mediation offer. As unintended result of its zero-problem-with-neighbours, Turkey became increasingly isolated in Middle East, destroying its initial ambition as an effective regional mediator.\(^5^{16}\)

Due to the difference, Turkey-Iran relations were not as warm as before. For more than two years until January 2014, heads of states/governments from both countries did not meet up, which was in stark contrast to the periods between 2008 and 2011 when the leaders met at least once every year. By not engaging in the 2011-2015 negotiation process, Turkey seemed to become a less significant actor in Iran and Middle East in general. Having said that, it is not true to say that Turkey had no role at all. Turkey was in fact able to contribute to building a conducive environment for peace. Both countries still maintained significant economic relations. Given international sanctions, Iran had no many options to diversify economic ties.


Different from Saudi Arabia which urged Western countries to attack Iran, Turkey-Iran relations is much more positive. Saudi Arabia was also not enthusiastic in responding to the 2015 nuclear deal, while Turkey had expressed a hope that the deal could bring a constructive development in Middle East. Following the deal, then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Iran in March 2016, accompanied by a large number of government officials and businesspersons. The two countries agreed to increase bilateral trade volume to $50 billion a year. Few weeks after that, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Istanbul for the OIC Summit and met President Erdogan in Ankara.

Turkey's Iran policy between 2012 and 2016 is best explained through a pivot state's characteristics. Turkey was a soft-revisionist as it was not able to challenge and criticize Western's policy on Iran as it did between 2009 and 2011. Different from 2002-2009 and 2009-2011 periods, between 2012 and 2016 Turkey's Iran policy proceeded no further than the point that displeased Western countries. Furthermore, during the Davutoglu's premiership, especially after the election in November 2015 which gave the AKP a massive win, Turkey adopted rapprochement policy towards EU in issues such as refugee and with NATO on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

Despite not being involved in the 2011-2015 talks, as well as the contrasting policies between the two countries on Syria, Turkey has been able to keep open all channels of relations with Iran. This confirmed Turkey's role as a normative bridge builder and accommodative regional leadership role. Turkey has displayed itself as an asset and an equilibrium between the two opposing blocs - Iran vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies and took important bilateral steps to support the success of the implementation of the 2015 deal.

---


521 Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring: Finding a Middle Ground,” Middle East 21, no. 4 (2014): 116.
7.2.3 Summary and interpretation

Through the overall process of Iran’s nuclear problem, despite its intention to present an alternative to Western sanction’s policy on Iran, Turkey’s initiative had significantly failed. Turkey might be able to act as an independent regional player, but not in terms of challenging the West’s security regime such as sanctions on Iran, because in the context of the traditional security structure Turkey cannot depart too far from its Western allies. As a member of NATO, Turkey has contributed significantly to NATO’s operation. Turkey has identified its relations with Western countries as a fundamental element when framing its grand security policy. The realist-based foreign policy which distanced Turkey from the West did not bring any good for Turkey and the Middle East, and in fact, Middle Eastern countries did not value Turkey’s mediation effort highly if it detached itself from the West. It was Turkey’s alliance with the West which would make Turkey’s mediation effective.

Turkey has moved from revisionist policy, which was commonly adopted by BRIC countries, to a more status-quo defender, especially since late 2015 when Turkey pursued rapprochement policy to the EU. If Turkey could manoeuvre, the most possible stretch is to act as a pivot state, instead of BRIC-style confrontational policy. Turkey indeed displayed some characters of a pivot state. Despite political differences over Syria, Turkey has contributed to positively in reducing tensions, especially between Iran and its Sunni neighbours, by continuously engaging Iran. Turkey indirectly helped lay a foundation for Iran’s confidence to pursue a more cooperative international behaviour. In this respect, Turkey has repositioned itself as a peace and stability promoter and a soft power in its neighbouring regions.

Turkey has influenced the negotiation process indirectly. Turkey’s mediation in 2010 proved that Iran was not resistant to any international approach. Comparing to previously failed negotiation, in the latest rounds of negotiation, the US and EU did not play the card of threatening new sanction to Iran if Iran failed to pursue more transparent and cooperative attitude in their nuclear program. Rather, the West used an argument that a more cooperative Iran was needed to create more stable Middle East and to deal with more complex security challenges such as ISIS and solution to Syrian civil wars.

522 Baris Doster, email interview by the author, 10 June 2010.
523 From an interview with a senior official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, 26 November 2015.
In spite of some tensions with Iran, Turkey was more trusted by Iran than another regional power Saudi Arabia. Turkey was more flexible and eager to pursue cooperation than Saudi. It explains why there were still some high-level official visits by governments from both countries in the last couple months, including by Iranian President Rouhani to Ankara, despite some critical statements from both sides. Turkey becomes the only Sunni-majority country in the Middle East region with which Iran has maintained warm relations, in the time when Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates cut diplomatic ties with Iran following the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2015.

7.3 Turkey in climate change negotiations

7.3.1 Introduction and context

Turkey is considered a late comer in climate change negotiations. Although Turkey became a party to almost all of international agreements in climate change and became a party to UNFCCC from May 2004, Turkey ratified the Kyoto Protocol only on 5 February 2009 and did not participate in the 2008-2012 commitment. Alkan-Olsson and Alkan-Olsson explain the reasons behind Turkey’s late ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. From an economic perspective, Turkey saw the Kyoto Protocol as a potential threat which could contribute to slackening economic growth, especially given Turkey’s significant dependency on the importation of energy supply. Turkey’s use of energy has risen around 4% annually from 1973 to 2011, 74% of which is imported from abroad in 2014.

The increase in fuel price as a consequence of emission reduction and the investment needed to carry out mitigation and adaptation commitment were interpreted very costly to Turkey, especially given the fact that Turkey is dependent on energy supply from other countries. Because of fear over cost and consequences borne from emission reduction

527 Ibid, 15.
530 Alkan-Olsson and Alkan-Olsson, op cit, 14-15.
commitment, Turkey’s diplomatic focus during early UNFCCC processes was to remove itself from Annex lists of the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol initially included Turkey in both Annex 1 and Annex 2 to the Convention because of its status as an OECD member. All OECD members at that time were included in both annexes.

Turkey rejected that inclusion, arguing that its per capita greenhouse gasses emission was much smaller than other OECD countries, so that it should be exempted from emission reduction obligations as well as from a commitment to help developing countries undertake emission reduction projects. According to the latest OECD data, Turkey’s per capita GHG in 2012 was 5,850 kgs, below the average of total OECD members at 12,470 kgs. Turkey’s unstable economic situation in 1990s, during which the Kyoto Protocol was discussed, further strengthened Turkey’s reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Since 1990s, Turkey experienced series of economic crisis and in 1999 its GDP declined by 5%.

With the help of a proposal for amendment from Azerbaijan and Pakistan, Turkey was eventually removed from Annex II and given a special status in Annex I in the UNFCCC COP 7th in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2001. By this new agreement, Turkey was then treated as a ‘party in a situation different from that of other parties included in Annex I to Convention’ without emission reduction target. Turkey eventually became party to the UNFCCC on May 2004, among the latest countries to do so, although it did not immediately sign the Kyoto Protocol.

After ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 2009, Turkey has become more active in climate change negotiations and expressed desire to shape the post-Kyoto agreement, shown by attendance of Turkish high-level leaders in the UNFCCC. Turkish President Abdullah Gul participated to the COP 15 in Copenhagen and his successor Recep Erdogan attended the COP 21 in Paris. The attendance of Turkish heads of state in COPs indicated increasing elites’ concern on climate change as previous presidents did not attend COPs. The discussion below elaborates Turkey’s increasing activity in climate change process. The objective of this part is to understand whether Turkey’s activism was accompanied by

532 OECD Economic Outlook No. 67 (Paris: OECD, 2000), 139.
534 President Ahmet Sezer attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, but the meeting was not part of UNFCCC process.
shifting identities from a passive bystander to a more active player and how Turkey is located between different actors.

### 7.3.2 Assessing Turkey’s behaviours

**Attitude towards international order**

In both Kyoto and post-Kyoto negotiations, Turkey consistently tried to protect its interest for not being included into a category which requires binding commitment. Turkey holds the principle of CBDR, viewing developed countries as the most responsible actors for climate change and that Turkey has a development right to pursue growth-oriented economic principle. In his speech in the COP 2009 in Copenhagen, President Abdullah Gul underlined Turkey’s status as a developing country which needs assistance in technology and finance to deal with climate change problems.\(^\text{535}\)

---


Despite its increasing activism, Turkey still holds a belief that as a rapidly growing developing country, Turkey should not bear the responsibility over climate change commitment at the expense of economic progress. The AKP government claimed that it has development right and the emission reduction would result in a decline in economic growth.\(^{537}\) Energy demand particularly becomes Turkey’s main concern when deciding its climate change commitment. Turkey has limited domestic energy sources and has been significantly dependent on energy supply from other countries. Turkey wants to make sure that they can get these resources. Turkey was worried that binding emission reduction would restrict its energy supply.\(^{538}\)

In spite of showing increasing activism in recent years, Turkey was generally viewed as a passive actor in the climate change negotiations. In addition to its late ratification to the Kyoto Protocol, Turkey is not a member of any negotiation group in the UNFCCC. In the post-Kyoto negotiations, Turkey’s principle did not change significantly, which was to ensure its exclusion from the category mandated for emission reduction. Turkey’s ‘special status’ was discussed again in the 2010 COP in Cancun, Mexico where Turkey was kept out from an obligation to contribute to Green Climate Fund to help least developed countries to adapt climate change. Due to its not-so-progressive stance in the UNFCCC and its lone wolf policy Turkey was awarded ‘fossil of the day’ by Climate Action in the COP 2012 Doha.\(^{539}\)

Turkey’s main goals in both Kyoto and post-Kyoto negotiations were to evade mitigation commitments and to promote itself as an eligible recipient of climate change finance.\(^{540}\) Although in recent years Turkey has been more active in climate change negotiations in recent years, Turkey did not radically change its core position. According to Semra Cerit, Turkey’s climate change policy is ‘continuity in change’ in which ratification of international agreements including the Kyoto Protocol is more symbolic rather than substantial step because it did not change the grand idea of Turkey’s climate policy preference.\(^{541}\)

\(^{537}\) Ibid, p. 17.  
\(^{538}\) Mustafa Özgür Berke, interview by the author, 23 November 2015.  
\(^{541}\) Semra Cerit Mazlum, “Turkey’s foreign policy on global atmospheric commons: climate change and ozone depletion,” in Climate Change and Foreign Policy: Case Studies from East to West, ed. Paul G. Haris (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 76.
Turkey’s less ambitious climate policy could be observed from its INDC. According to its INDCs, which was submitted in September 2015, Turkey is committed to reduce emission by 21% from the business as usual (BAU) scenario between 2020 and 2030. Although the 21% reduction seemed progressive, Turkey’s emission growth itself is very high. According to the BAU target, Turkey’s emission would increase from 459 million tons of CO2e on 2013 to 1175 million tons on 2030. Therefore, a 21% reduction means that Turkey’s emission would be around 929 million tons of CO2e in 2030, which would be still significantly high. This less ambitious INDC was decided for the sake of Turkey’s ambition to continue its high economic growth.542

Some suggest to not see Turkey’s role as a free-rider in climate change process543 because Turkey had joined the Kyoto Protocol and adopted most of UNFCCC key agreements, while other countries such as Canada and New Zealand even withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. Having said that, Turkey’s refusal to take more rigorous climate change commitment was indeed in contrast to the trend in emerging powers in recent years. Countries such as Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico pledged for voluntary binding commitment several years before the COP 21 in Paris. Even China and India, which took conservative stance of refusing emission reduction commitment for years, have revised their stance to be more constructive ahead to the COP 21. Similar to Turkey, these countries also needed to deal with ‘development versus environmental protection dilemma.’544

Given its inward-looking stance, Turkey’s attitude towards climate change regime cannot be classified in either BRIC, middle power, or pivot state categories. Different from China and India, Turkey did not try to frontally revise the climate change regime and did not much push developed countries to seriously cut emission and commit to mitigations commitment. Turkey on the other hand did not join the European countries which seek to strengthen the climate change regime. Turkey itself is geographically – and geopolitically - located between the most-progressive group EU and the least cooperative region Middle East, both of which offered extreme positions on climate change issues. EU has become important pressure group to Turkey. But alliance with EU was unrealistic because Turkey did not have capacity to comply to EU’s progressive policies.

Turkey might be best defined as a status-quo seeking in a way that the US has pursued for years in resisting a climate change commitment in multilateral frameworks. Compared to the US Turkey was slightly more cooperative as it ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Another possibility is to identify Turkey at the same group with OPEC and Middle East countries which are traditionally reluctant with the idea of emission reduction.

**Performed role and regional-global aspiration**

Despite isolation from other groupings, Turkey has displayed some parts of a bridge-builder role. Some parts of the government especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment have urged Turkey to adopt more positive climate change policy would could raise Turkey’s diplomatic profile as well as allow it to take benefit from climate change agreements. Nevertheless, there was a strong opposition from the Ministry of Energy. Even the less ambitious INDC was criticized by the Ministry of Energy for potentially curbing Turkey’s economic growth.

Despite Turkey’s capability limitation, Turkey has played a unique intermediary position which connects developed and developing nations in the implementation of global climate change regime. Climate change issue is definitely not a top priority for countries in Turkey’s surrounding regions such as Middle East and Central Asia which see climate change commitment as a threat to their economy which depend on revenue from oil and gas. On the other hand, countries in Balkan and Africa which geographically are not too far from Turkey have limited capacity to deal with climate change.

One of Turkey’s bridge builder contributions was its engagement with the Least Developing Countries (LDCs). Turkey hosted the 4th UN Conference on LDCs which resulted in some commitments made by developed nations and international organizations to help LDCs including in the area of climate change mitigation. Turkish efforts to encourage collective funding for climate change through the LDCs Conference was important because LDCs countries so far did not receive sufficient substantial funding to address climate change problem. Most Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects go to China, India, Brazil, and large developing countries, while LDCs got only small proportion. Turkey itself delivered commitments to help LDCs on climate change through Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı / Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). TIKA’s

---

545 Mustafa Berke, op cit.
546 Ibid.
contribution is still far below those of major climate change donors, such as the EU and Scandinavian countries, but Turkey’s increasing presence in Africa made it an option for countries such as Sudan and Somalia, which often become targets of Western countries’ criticism, to obtain development aid.

Another of Turkey’s initiatives was the 2012 International Islamic Climate Change Symposium in Istanbul. The symposium produced the Islamic Climate Declaration which urged Muslim-majority countries to take more progressive and coordinated steps to tackle climate change problems. Although the declaration was not binding, it was an indication that Turkey wanted to be in the forefront of climate change issue compared to other Middle Eastern countries, which are traditionally reluctant participants to climate change regime, to take action in global action to combat climate change.

Turkey also established a region-wide approach to climate change adaptation and disaster resilience in Balkan area, in cooperation with seven Southeastern European countries. This scheme was a response to increasing floods in Balkan and Turkey which were triggered by climate change. Turkey did not only host its inaugural meeting in 2014, but provided technical and technological assistance to Balkan countries. Turkey’s capacity building assistance to these countries are supported with financial arrangement from EU, while the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) help in assessment and monitoring. Furthermore, since the COP 15 in Copenhagen, Turkey also has contributed to strengthening the regime’s weak carbon market scheme. Turkey has the leading promoter of carbon trading. In 2009, Turkey established a domestic voluntary carbon trading which resulted in 5 million-ton reduction in GHG emissions. Turkey’s successful domestic carbon trading has attracted wider international interest, making Turkey one of leading players in the world market of carbon.

7.3.3 Summary and interpretation

Insights obtained from the investigation of Turkey's climate change policy resulted in two interesting finding. First, regarding its attitude toward international climate change regime,

---


Turkey is more a US-like status quo seeker. Turkey did not fit into BRIC, middle power, or pivot state categories. This status quo stance is motivated by its policy of valuing economic growth highly, which was a result of a sense of pressure to catch up with the Western countries' level of development. The second finding is that despite Turkey’s lack of coalition partner in climate change negotiation, Turkey has displayed some attempts to bridge between its national, regional, and global interests. Turkey provided assistances and set up initiatives in cooperation with LDCs and its neighbours in addressing climate change problem. This contrasting behaviours between status quo-seeker on the one hand and bridge-builder and accommodative regional leadership on the other hand – which represented a pivot state's characters – is an indication that Turkey is playing different identities and strategies on different issues.

7.4 Turkey's position regarding global economic governance and the G20

7.4.1 Introduction and context

This part gives background of Turkey's role in global economic governance. Turkey has long standing relations with global economic regimes. Although Turkey joined the Alliance only in the final stage of World War 2 and was not involved in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, Turkey's government took aggressive step to get financial aid which was intended to revive Europe’s economies, including from the Bretton Woods’ institutions.\(^{549}\) Turkey was among the first nation which received loan from the IBRD – which later in 1950, when it got $9 million for the newly-established Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.\(^{550}\) Since then Turkey received the World Bank's loans in many economic sectors. The significant number of loans was provided during the era of President Turgut Ozal, who was the first Turkish President to significantly implement the economic liberalization policy in 1980s.\(^{551}\)

During Ozal's period, Turkey also got loans from the IMF. Together with the loans from the World Bank, loans from the IMF were aimed to stabilising Turkey's economy to deal with high deficit of balance of payments as well as to providing a strong foundation for a capitalist economic system.\(^{552}\) Turkey received an IMF loan first in 1961 when President Cemal

\(^{552}\) Ibid, 44.
Gursel instigated long-term economic planning which required large funding, in a time when US economic assistance to Turkey under Mutual Security Plan was ended. From that time, there were 19 loan agreements between Turkey and IMF between 1991 and 2005.

Given Turkey’s volatile economy, when the G20 was established in 1999 at the ministerial level, Turkey was not considered as an absolute candidate by major Western powers due to its weak and vulnerable financial situation. Turkey was eventually included to the G20 because of intention from the US and Canada to bring Turkey closer to the Western alliance. Turkey’s economy had to deal with another crisis in 2000-2001 which was also triggered by large fiscal deficit and the economy’s overreliance on short term foreign investment. To deal with the crisis, Turkey received loans from IMF. At that time, Turkey’s debts to the IMF reached a record level of $19 billion loan, which made it the IMF’s largest debtor.

The period between 2003 and 2008 witnessed Turkey’s high economic growth with average GDP growth of 6% per year. Despite hit by global economic crisis in 2008, Turkey’s economic grew relatively better than European countries, around 3-5% annually between 2008 and 2014. Turkey’s improved economic performance changed its relations with IMF. Supported by strong and stable economic growth and the elimination of the government’s deficit, among others by privatizing state-owned companies, the AKP government successfully ended Turkey’s dependence on the IMF by repaying all debts in 2013.

Turkey regarded G20 membership as a chance to play role as important economic actor and enhance its economic capability. Turkey was not only satisfied to be included to the group, but also aspired to play a significant role. It was particularly shown when Turkey applied to host the G20 summit. During the 2010 Summit in Toronto, Turkey submitted an application

---

553 Gursel was military leader, who appointed as Turkish Head of State between 1960 and 1966 by the leaders of the 1960 military coup.
554 After the 1960 coup, military junta consulted with bureaucrats and academics and concluded that one main problem of Turkish politics and society was the high degree of uncertainty. For this reason, the junta established the State Planning Organization (SPO) which then implemented a series of five-year plans, which the first period occurred between 1963-1967.
to host the G20 presidency for 2013, but eventually was selected to hold the 2015 presidency. Since the first G20 Summit in 2008, Turkey also shared similar positions with emerging powers on the issues such as IMF quota reforms, which became Turkey’s one important priority in the G20.\textsuperscript{558} This raised a puzzle on whether Turkey’s perception and aspiration to the global economic governance has shifted away from the West towards more revisionist visions in similar fashion as BRIC countries.

Turkey became increasingly critical to the IMF. In a visit to Peru in January 2016, President Erdogan further criticized the IMF, saying that ‘..the IMF does not manage the money it lends. After it gives you a loan, it tries to politically manage you.’\textsuperscript{559} In spite of frequent rhetoric criticism to the current global economic order, especially regarding the IMF, Turkey indeed did not frontally demand a significant revision to the current order. As argued and explained below, during its G20 presidency process, Turkey displayed more reconciliatory approach and a clear attempt of engaging with different countries. Its demand for IMF reforms was indeed eased ahead to the 2015 G20 Summit.

7.4. Assessing Turkey’s behaviours

\textbf{Attitude towards international order}

Turkey’s insistence on IMF reform was certainly motivated by benefit it got from the reforms. As explained in chapter 4, Turkey has benefited from the 2008 IMF reform package which increased Turkey’s quota from SDR 1.2 billion to 1.45 billion. Turkey was the one which gained the most from the 14\textsuperscript{th} General Review of Quotas in 2010. The 2010 quota reform increased Turkey’s quotas at 60.2% and moved it to the 20\textsuperscript{th} largest economy in the IMF. Therefore, it is understandable that Turkey gave important emphasis to IMF reforms. Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said that the IMF quota reforms were urgent.\textsuperscript{560}

Obtaining the larger quota and voting powers is a fair demand given the change in global political economic structure in which Western economies could not claim significant

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{558} Dries Lesage and Yusuf Kaçar, “Turkey’s Profile In The G20: Emerging Economy, Middle Power And Bridge-Buildfer,” \textit{Studia Diplomatica} 63 no. 2 (2010): 134.
\end{flushleft}
domination anymore. Turkey’s aspiration for reform was furthermore supported by the fact that Turkey has turned itself from IMF loan’s borrower to potential lender opened up space for more independently pursuing its strategic position in global economic governance. Following up the 2012 G20 Summit in Mexico which BRICS countries pledged funding commitment to IMF, Turkey was committed itself to provide $ 5 billion to IMF. Turkey moreover also emerged as a lender, offering the IMF $5 billion loan for debt-ridden European countries. In addition the quota reform, Turkey’s aspiration in the IMF also included the reform of governance for which Turkey hoped to get benefit from additional two seats from European countries to emerging countries. Turkey went further far by presenting the idea of a Turkish-Lira zone as alternative to ailing Eurozone, although the detail and serious proposal for this is not clear.

Turkey had an opportunity to push for the reform when it co-chaired the G20’s International Financial Architecture Working Groups with Australia from 2010. Turkey indeed used the opportunity to press hard for the 2010 reform to take place. Although Turkey as a co-chair needed to become a neutral actor, Turkey sided with emerging powers. European countries, which traditionally did not want to give up their quotas, began to relax their voice and agreed to support the reforms formula. This situation left the US as the only country which failed to approve the reform.

Turkey’s biggest opportunity to push for the reform arrived during its G20 presidency in 2015. The IMF reforms was indeed regarded as one of the Turkish G20 presidency’s priorities. On this issue, Turkey emphasized that ‘..completing the IMF reform will not only ensure a more even-handed realignment in the ranking of quota shares, but also help the Fund maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness.’ Furthermore, Turkey had ambition to bridge different views regarding the IMF reform and intended to ‘start discussions on alternative ways to enhance the governance of the Fund.’ This was in line with the previous summit in Australia which asked the IMF to start discussion options for interim steps to preserve the 2010 reforms package.

562 Senior official, Undersecretariat of Treasury, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Ankara, 30 November 2015.
564 ibid
In spite of Turkey’s commitment to push for the reform and lead in the development of alternative steps to continue the 2010 reforms package, the G20 Leaders’ Communique has no supportive language for the reform. The communiqué pushed the US to ratify the reforms soon, but it failed to provide a platform to start discussion on the possible options as promised by Turkey in early 2015. This failure was of course not entirely Turkey’s fault. The complex dynamic within the group also contributed to the reforms’ stalemate. Turkey itself had no power to push it alone, even when it hold the G20 presidency. The problem is related to domestic policy issues in the US which external factors had not much influence. “…The problem is related to domestic policy issues in the US. And, how much Turkey’s power to influence the US? Zero.”

It is important to note that the decline of IMF reforms' importance during the Turkey’s G20 presidency was not a sudden process during the Summit in November. The deadlock had happened in months earlier. According to interview with senior official of the Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury, Turkey circulated a proposal for interim steps to G20 members and to the IMF through Mexico which served as the chairman of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC). Turkey’s proposal was discussed in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in April 2015. The meeting at the deputy levels progressed in productive communiqué. Unfortunately, at the ministerial level, in the drafting session G20 members failed to reconcile significant differences among them. Different from what other G20 members wished, the US delegates were not mandated by their government to agree on the IMF reforms. At that point, despite of all avenues and creativities to search a solution, the G20 did not get much assurance from US officials. It sparked strongly negative response from BRICS which even refused any interim steps and went back to their original demand for the immediate implementation of the 2010 reforms package without any other alternative.

For Turkey, this development could dangerously degrade the prospect of its G20 presidency’s success. In order to avoid the failure of the G20 Summit, after that April meeting, Turkey decided to not propose a new talk about IMF reforms anymore. Initiating interim solution without strong consensus from all G20 members was too risky for Turkish G20 Presidency. For Turkey, all compromise and shuttle diplomacy was basically nothing at that point as the US did not commit to step forward.

566 Ussal Sahbaz op cit.
Turkey’s attitude towards the IMF reform could be best identified as soft-revisionist. While China, Brazil, and India which pursued their objectives in the G20 using the similar framework they used in WTO where confrontational strategy was pursued, Turkey’s search for alternative other than Western-dominated international economic governance is still pursued through careful and wait-and-see strategies. Turkey positively welcomed new institutions such as the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the AIIB. But these were also uncertain territories, because IMF has become the single most and the highest most institution in the international system.\textsuperscript{567} The emerging plural structures will require significant coordination. Otherwise the lack of coordination could jeopardize these institutions as well because some still have incentives to move other resources to the other institutions.\textsuperscript{568} In this sense, Turkey prefers to have a capable single institution, rather than plural, but weaker institutions.\textsuperscript{569}

Furthermore, in responding to the US Congress’ decision to ratify the 2010 reforms package in December 2015, China, India, and Russia released a statement which demanded even more quotas and voting powers. Turkey on the other hand, has been quite satisfied with the implementation of the 2010 reform. According to the reform, the EU has agreed to move part of European chairs to emerging European countries. Since the beginning of the discussion on IMF reforms, no country objected to this initiative. Turkey has benefited from this new arrangement. Turkey for the first since its membership in the fund has gained a direct seat, although in the rotational format through four-year term of directorship of eight countries.\textsuperscript{570} In that new group, Turkey has the biggest voting power so that it is the most influential in decision making process. Turkey also holds the current position of alternate director from that constituency. Turkey’s status as the largest country in its new constituency, as well as its significant quota increase under the 2010 package which has been approved by the US, would make its emphasize on the further reforms of the IMF decline. This is different from positions of China, Russia, and India which still demanded the further reforms as explicitly stated in the meeting of their foreign ministers in February 2016.

\textsuperscript{567} Kutlay op cit.
\textsuperscript{568} Sak, op cit.
\textsuperscript{569} Senior official, of Treasury, op cit.
\textsuperscript{570} The new constituency consists of Austria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey.
Performe role and regional-global aspects

This part discusses both performed role and nexus between regional and global roles as both aspects are closely connected. Regarding its performed role, Turkey’s significance in the G20 was significantly enhanced when it held the presidency in 2015. All G20 chairs have similar ambitions to create legacy of their chairmanships. South Korea for instance successfully urged G20 members to agree on the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth which among others encouraged G20 members and other actors to boost development assistance to less developed countries by respecting these countries’ national integrity and active participation. The 2012 G20 Presidency of Mexico also delivered special concern on environment and energy issues as Mexico attempted to link between its presidency and the Rio+20 Earth Summit which was held only one day after the G20 Summit.

Despite the host’s intentions to develop new initiatives, their ambition is moderated by the G20’s troika system in which previous, current, and future chairs work together to maintain continuity and consistency of G20 agendas. Therefore, there should be always a set of priorities which are consistently discussed in different years. During its presidency, Turkey delivered expanding and diverse G20 agendas. This expansion was in contrast to Australia’s 2014 presidency which focused strictly on financial issues.

Turkey’s broad agendas can be interpreted as its attempt to bridge interests of world largest economies and those which were not represented in the group. When conceptualizing its G20 priorities, Turkey highlighted three priorities: Investment, Implementation, and Inclusiveness. Through the issue of inclusiveness, Turkey brought the group’s attention to discuss about the role of small and medium enterprises and least developed countries (LDCs). The emphasise on inclusive growth was relevant in dealing with continuing slower growth of the global economy during which global economic growth was declining from 4.4% in quarter 3 of 2014 to 3.5% in quarter 4 and 2.9% in quarter 1 of 2015. Turkey’s initiative on inclusiveness demonstrated its intention to become bridge-builder between world’s largest economies and LDCs. This was consistent with Turkey’s effort to engage LDCs by hosting the UN Conference on LDCs which was held in Istanbul in 2011. The conference agreed on the Istanbul Programme of Actions for which Turkey served as the coordinating

---

country for LDCs development for the period of 2011 to 2020. In relations with LDCs, Turkey also delivers increasingly significant development assistance to LDCs especially in Africa.

Ahead to the summit, Turkey’s focus was expanded even more. Innovation and technology, which were not prioritized when Turkey conceptualized its agendas for presidency, emerged as important points for discussion. For Turkey, which has experienced middle-income trap, innovation and technology transfer have become issues of importance. Technology transfer is also concerned by wider developing world as the barrier of technology capacity has significantly divided developed and developing world despite developing countries’ stellar economic growth. Therefore, Turkey included technology as an important element to increase productivity growth. G20 members saw the inclusion of technological transfer as part of efforts to promote more inclusive growth and to advance infrastructure cooperation, which was discussed intensively in the previous summit in Brisbane. The G20 delivered strong message on technology diffusion and the word ‘internet’ for the first time appears in the G20, recognizing the importance of technology to increase productivity growth.

In addition to those innovative ideas, Turkey’s presidency was required to address social and political aspects, which were terrorism and refugee. Those two issues were not initially planned to be discussed in the summit. But within one month, the two issues had occupied central narrative of foreign policies in both Turkey and the world. Turkey hosted the largest number of Syrian refugee, while European countries became increasingly frustrated with increasing number of refugee who crossed EU’s borders. At the same time, ahead to the G20 Summit, terrorist actions intensively increased. The attacks in Paris happened just two days before the summit, and other terrorist attacks occurred in Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq within one month before it.

The discussion of these two issues did not only serve Turkey’s interest, but also interest of its neighbouring countries. Turkey’s surrounding areas were occupied by political crises and conflicts. G20 and complex global economic issues were simply not in their top interests. Turkey also live in regions with a lack of strong and mature regional organizations. This complexity made engagement and outreach with Turkey’s neighbours regarding G20 and economic issues were limited. During its G20 presidency, Turkey invited Azerbaijan as a guest. Compared to economies of other neighbours, such as Iran and Egypt, Azerbaijan’s economy is much smaller. It only ranked at the 94th place in the world’s largest GDP. Having said that, the election of Azerbaijan as a guest was Turkey’s realistic choice because

---

572 Senior official of the Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury, op cit.
Azerbaijan has been politically stable – despite its authoritarian system – and has become increasingly active on the international stage, making it more eligible as an invitee than conflict-prone countries in Turkey’s proximity.

Given complex political situation in its surrounding regions, Turkey could not effectively establish an appropriate channel for dialogue and exchange views on G20 issues. Having said that, the inclusion of terrorism and refugee issues provided Turkey with an image that it cared of problems faced by its neighbours. On refugee, G20 members agreed to share the burdens associated with refugee crisis through humanitarian aid, settlement, and other efforts. Leaders also asked officials of G20 members to determine steps countries are taking to cut off terrorism-related financial flows. These two issues reflected Turkey’s accommodative approach to problems faced by its regions, despite the regions’ weak regionalism.

Turkey’s initiatives on LDCs development, technology issues, and the inclusion of its surrounding regions’ interests show the dimension of both bridge-builder role and accommodative regional leadership. In comparison, Australia also pursued several outreaches during its G20 presidency to several countries. Nevertheless, Australia’s outreach was considered a failure in bringing a clear narrative about regions’ aspiration and concern such as the increasing economic importance of countries in East and Southeast Asia.573

Despite a bridge-builder tendency, it is interesting to consider that during its G20 presidency, Turkey did not associate itself with MIKTA, to which Turkey belongs. The 6th MIKTA foreign ministerial meeting in September 2015 clearly mandated member countries to seek possibility of a leaders’ summit in the sidelines of the G20. The meeting nevertheless did not happen and there was no initiative from Turkey. An official of the Turkish government revealed that:

Turkey did not want to be perceived as a part of any grouping when hosting the G20. The development of MIKTA is still in early stage and the group itself is very diverse. We fully understand the previous commitment for a MIKTA summit, but for Turkey, positioning itself as an individual provided more beneficial diplomatic leverage than as part of MIKTA.574

Turkey’s views on MIKTA reflected the fact that MIKTA has not developed as fast and become as institutionalised as BRICS. After only two foreign ministerial meetings, the earlier

574 Senior official of the Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury, interview by the author, Ankara, 30 November 2015.
iteration of ‘BRIC’ was able to hold a summit level meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia in June 2009. Despite their many differences, BRICS countries found common interests and often act as a negotiating bloc. BRICS now has at least ten ministerial level meetings every year and numerous non-governmental forums. BRICS has even created a new development bank which many perceive as a rival to the World Bank.

Turkey is happy to become a part of this because it provides different multilateral arrangements. It could increase Turkey’s role in global affairs. But from Turkish side, they don’t know what to do in MIKTA. What kind of interests do Turkey have? What kind of policies to promote collective interests of MIKTA? They don’t see something concrete in the MIKTA process. That’s why they are just waiting and seeing what will happen next.\(^5\)

Compared to BRICS, MIKTA has maintained its somewhat low-level institutionalisation. The future of MIKTA remains unclear. All of MIKTA members regard MIKTA as a work in progress. They understand that MIKTA has conceptual problems, but each of member countries, including Turkey, prefer to wait and see, and did not intend to spend much diplomatic energy for MIKTA at the expense of other already established institutions.

### 7.4.3 Summary and interpretation

This case study reveals that leaders’ positions regarding a certain issue might sometimes be different from positions and actions taken by officials at the lower level. On global economic governance, Turkish leaders often expressed disappointment over global economic governance and suggested the need for reform. At the official level, on the other hand, Turkey’s push for IFIs reforms was ‘moderated.’ During its G20 presidency, Turkey initially put the 2010 IMF reforms as one of its main agendas. Nonetheless, after difficulties in pushing and persuading the US to accept the 2010 proposal during the finance ministerial meeting, Turkey downgraded the priority of IMF reforms. Turkey felt too risky to come up with an interim solution in managing the diverse position on IMF reforms, as the G20 members’ lack of support could result in a deadlock, something which tried to be avoided by the Turkey’s G20 presidency. This evident is in line with Ünay’s argument that the issue of the IMF reform did not become Turkey’s main priority after Turkey gained a position in the IMF executive board in 2012.\(^6\) Furthermore, Turkey's soft revisionist stance could be observed from its satisfaction over the US Congress approval to the 2010 reforms package. Turkey is among the major beneficiaries of the reform and now is the largest country in its

\(^{575}\) Mustafa Kutlay, op cit.

new constituency which enables it to take a more influential role in the decision making process.

Turkey has displayed some characters of bridge builder role and accommodative regional leadership during its G20 presidency at least from three issues: (1) the development of LDCs, (2) technology and innovation, and (3) counter-terrorism and refugee. Turkey's bridge-builder and regional leadership roles nevertheless were constrained by the lack of mature and effective regional organizations in regions where Turkey live. Therefore, Turkey's bridge-builder and regional leadership roles were pursued through a unilateral action. It was successful in some cases. Turkey has played a crucial role in encouraging greater international attention for LDCs. This was supported by Turkey's increasingly significant development aid to LDCs in recent years.

However, Turkey's unilateral bridge-builder ambition was constrained by its capacity. Urging G20 members to adopt same views on technology, refugee, and counter-terrorism was not too hard considering the fact that countries had little disagreement on these issues. But when trying to bridge an issue where G20 members had a diverse view such as on IMF reform, Turkey was not able to display a character as the bridge-builder, although this ambition was clearly mentioned in the earlier period of its G20 presidency in 2015 as one of its top priority.

7.5 Conclusion

Although many scholars place it in the emerging power category, Turkey's behaviours show significant differences with BRIC countries. Regarding Iran's nuclear policy, Turkey initially displayed a revisionist policy by brokering a deal, together with Brazil, in 2010. Nevertheless, the deal collapsed after being rejected by the West. Learning from the failure, Turkey did not take any further initiative and in an attempt to revive its overall role in the Middle East, Turkey re engaged its alliance with the West. Turkey's approach had an element of revisionism toward the West's sanctions policy to Iran, but after the failure of the 2010 deal Turkey did not frontally challenge the policy of the US and EU. Instead, Turkey adopted behaviours which confirm a pivot state’s character by engaging Iran in some bilateral initiatives despite different approaches between them regarding the conflict in Syria.

On climate change, although Turkey portrays itself as a developing country by requesting access to international climate finance, it did not follow a developing countries' trait. It did not
actively urge developed countries to more seriously deliver commitments made in various climate change agreements. Being cautious of its possible inclusion in a post-Kyoto agreement, Turkey prioritised its climate change diplomacy to preserve its special status; therefore, did not much put pressure on developed countries. On the other hand, Turkey displayed pivot state’s characters by acting as a bridge-builder between the interest of LDCs and Southeastern European countries and the global climate change regime.

Turkey’s policy on the G20 and global economic governance provided clearer evidence of Turkey’s pivot state characters. Despite some rhetorical speeches and official statements which demanded the implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms, Turkey’s intensity in demanding reform was moderated by the fact that Turkey had no capacity and power to push the US to adopt the reform. Turkey thus acts as a soft revisionist, rather than a firm revisionist.

Investigation of these case studies reveals that there was not a radical strategic shift of Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey is just taking a policy of a way of keeping a balance between the West and other diplomatic alternatives. Turkey’s behaviour in recent years is best illustrated by Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oguz Gok that Turkey’s increasing international activism did not reflect anti-Western and Third Worldist attitude, but an action which could be identified as a ‘within-system challenger’.\(^{577}\)

Chapter 8
Explaining patterns and variations using analytic eclecticism

From investigation of case studies in three previous chapters, it appears that Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey have displayed significantly some patterns of the behaviour of pivot state. Unlike many other analyses which locate these countries into the category of emerging powers, this thesis has shown that a more accurate location of the three countries are in the pivot state category as the three countries have demonstrated characteristics which are matched with those of pivot state: soft revisionist, normative bridge-builder and accommodative regional leadership. These behaviours mark the clear lines which separate these countries from other groups of countries, especially BRIC and middle powers.

There are however some variations which can be summarized below:

Table 8.1
Summary of case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parameters</th>
<th>State of concern</th>
<th>Climate change</th>
<th>G20 and global economic governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>partly confirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>partly confirmed through different behaviours in different phases.</td>
<td>partly confirmed. It is a pro status quo, but on the other hand has intention to play bridge-builder role.</td>
<td>partly confirmed through different behaviours in different phases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the summary above, Indonesia has been relatively consistent in displaying behaviours as a pivot state. It shared some similar characteristics with BRIC countries regarding the need for a rearranging international order to better reflect the new reality of the distribution of power where developing countries have enjoyed a relatively considerable increase. However, Indonesia is trying to keep a distance from BRIC and maintain strategic autonomy in relations. Although these policies positively allowed it to engage with different actors, Indonesia is facing a lack of capacity in maintaining the same level of consistency and offering a coherent initiative to different parties. This lack of capacity has downgraded
Indonesia’s relevance in the international system, as shown by Indonesia’s declining role in climate change negotiations.

Despite membership in BRICS and BASIC, South Africa has strikingly displayed some behaviours which distinguished itself from the rest of BRICS and BASIC. On states of concern, South Africa apply different approaches than BRIC countries. It shared BRIC countries’ tendency to reject intervention and sanctions on cases related to human rights and democracy issues. Having said that, South Africa employs more active stance by involving in conflict mediation and, in the case of Madagascar, implemented sanctions by supporting Madagascar’s exclusion from the AU and SADC. This is different from the less significant roles BRIC have played in intra-state problems of their neighbours - such as China and India’s less active role in solving Myanmar political problem -. On climate change, despite participating in BASIC schemes and jointly releasing statements with other BASIC countries, South Africa distinguished itself from BASIC by adopting more progressive emission reduction commitment, as well as, coordinating with developed nations and the EU during the COP 17 in Durban.

On the global economic governance reform, South Africa displayed mixed characteristics. On the one hand, it demonstrated the behaviour of BRIC by pursuing a strong revisionist vision on IFIs reforms. On the other hand, South Africa also demonstrated a bridge builder and accommodative regional leadership roles, due to its efforts to bring the interest of Africa in the G20. To some extends, the revisionist attitude does not contradict with bridge-builder and accommodative regional leadership roles. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between these attitudes, especially when South Africa’s joint stance with BRICS in pushing for the 2010 IMF quota reform was not in line with the interest and aspiration of many African countries which did not benefit from the reform.

Different from Indonesia and South Africa, Turkey displayed more complex behaviours which cannot be simply identified through the pivot state-BRIC-middle power dividing lines. In this sense, a more accurate way of understanding Turkey’s behaviours is by dividing them into three phases, as has been done in explaining Turkey’s Iran policy in chapter 7.1. Between 2002 and 2009, Turkey displayed characteristics of a middle power. Turkey has an aspiration to a closer relation with the West. In contrast, roughly between 2009 and 2011, Turkey demonstrated behaviours of BRIC by pursuing revisionist stances and more globally-oriented ambition. Between 2011 and 2015, Turkey moderated its revisionist stance and displayed characters which were matched with those of pivot state.
The subsequent parts will answer the sub question 3 of this thesis on why the three countries have shown both patterns and variations of pivot state’s behaviours from rationalist and constructivist perspectives. As explained in chapter 3, different from other approaches which mostly restrict to discipline boundaries, the analytic eclecticism approach used in this thesis do not prioritize one theory over another. Rather, the analytic eclecticism takes benefit from the strength of different theories which could offer the explanation of a same event from different angles.

8. 1 Rationalism

As framed in chapter 3, a hypothesis drawn from rationalism is that a state chooses to pursue pivoting behaviours as a rational calculation of the relative-absolute gains. The moderate expansion of material capabilities constrains the state from pursuing an aggressive relative gains ambition. That state on the other hand also did not want to rely much on the absolute gains as it felt underrepresented and sometimes marginalized in the existing international institutions. State, therefore, adopts a policy which pursues a pragmatic strategy of diplomacy in order to make a relative gain in terms of intangibles such as goodwill and influence.

8.1.1 Indonesia

*Moderate expansion of material powers*

Indonesia’s rising activism can be traced from its aspiration to gain a more prominent position in the international system given its growing material capabilities. This follows the logic that no matter how effective and smart the leader of a country, that country will not be able to play the same role as one that has more power capabilities. In the case of Indonesia, during the difficult year following the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, during which Indonesia’s economy contracted by 13.13 %, and which was then followed by series of political crises, disintegration, and interracial conflicts, its international profile was severely constrained. Indonesia’s foreign policy was deployed to more inward-looking agendas such as securing financial assistance to deal with the crisis and managing the East Timor issue, which became target of criticism from many international actors.

---

Although it was the worst affected by the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's economy revived relatively well and quickly. According to the World Bank data, Indonesia has recorded a strong average annual economic growth of around 5.30% between 2000 and 2015. Compared to other ASEAN-5 countries, Indonesia's average annual economic growth is the highest and the most stable between 2008 and 2014. The Indonesian economy was also the least affected by global financial crisis in 2008/2009.

Table 8.2
ASEAN-5 economic growth, 2008–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia’s military capabilities are also expanding in recent years. The military sectors receive the third largest budget allocation. Military spending steadily increased at 21.1% annually between 2007 and 2012. Despite being the subject of a US arms embargo between 1999 and 2010, Indonesia was able to diversify sources of arms and weaponry from other countries, including the purchase of Sukhoi fighter jets from Russia. The significant purchase of jet fighters from the US, Russia, South Korea and Brazil, tanks from Germany, frigates from the UK are parts of the Indonesia’s military modernization in recent years.

581 The US arms embargo was first imposed on Indonesia in 1991 following the 1991 Santa Cruz event when hundreds of pro-independence protesters were killed in Dili, East Timor, which was then part of Indonesia. The 1999 East Timor referendum, in which East Timorese voted for independence, was soon followed by armed conflicts. In responding to the post-referendum conflicts, the US government imposed the total arms embargo on Indonesia. The embargo had been lifted gradually since 2005 and completely since 2010.
In addition to increasing economic development and military capabilities, there is another factor of a neorealist materialist aspect for which Indonesia has a clear advantage compared to its neighbours, which is political stability and democracy. A series of political reforms since 1998, which included direct presidential and local elections, political and economic decentralisation, and the exclusion of the military from politics, brought a new political stability. The first free and fair election after the 32-year Suharto rule was carried out in 1999. At the same time, separatist movements, most notably the Aceh Free Movement, which was increasingly active during the post reformasi period, agreed on a peace deal with the government in 2005. Vote-buying, fraud and small-scale communal violence are still widespread, but democracy has provided new stability where military coups and unconstitutional changes of government seem less possible and are seen as more undesirable by the population. Indonesia’s status as a stable and new democracy eclipsed Thailand’s and the Philippines’ images as long-standing democracies in the region.

High economic growth, increasing military capability and political stability have elevated Indonesia to a higher position in the international structure. There are some degrees of change in the distribution of capabilities in the international system which favour Indonesia relative to other countries. Indonesia’s increasing material capabilities affected its view on relative gains. Indonesia has a growing desire to increase their relative gains in its relations with other countries. Similar to BRIC countries, given its relatively higher position in the international structure and increasing material capabilities, Indonesia’s motivation for foreign policy is to create conditions which allow it to continue its rise or at least to maintain its relative power. Indonesia’s interests in the system expand so that it increasingly plays a more ambitious global and regional role. This resonates with the neorealist belief that every state is always trying to change the system in order to maximise its own benefit, at the expense of others.

Despite sharing similar logic for relative gains, there is a difference between Indonesia and BRIC countries regarding the expansion of material powers. While the growth of BRIC countries, in terms of hard power aspects, is far higher than their neighbours, Indonesia’s economic and military rises are not far larger than those of other countries in Southeast Asia. In defence, for example, despite Indonesia’s increasing military expenditure, Singapore is still the largest military spender in the region both in terms of total value and percentage of GDP. Indonesia’s economic rise at the same time does not reflect a significant economic gap between Indonesia and its neighbours. All countries in Southeast Asia have grown fast economically in the last couple of years, meaning that Indonesia is not a unique case of economic success. As shown in table 5.1, the Indonesian economy grew faster than other
countries in the region, but Indonesia’s economic growth in the last decade was driven by
domestic consumption and export of commodities (mainly palm oil, coal and natural gas), not
by significant structural transformation. Indonesia has the smallest manufacturing share per
total GDP and per total exports compared to the ASEAN-5 and China, and is not a
significant participant of the global value chain. The moderate expansion of capabilities
puts Indonesia in a lower rank of the international structure compared to BRIC and this
condition has restricted Indonesia’s increasing opportunity.

**Pivoting behaviour as a rational choice**

Indonesia’s lower expansion of material capabilities resulted in three consequences. First,
different from BRIC countries which have been able to reduce a gap of material differences
between them and the hegemony – the US and generally the West – in recent years,
Indonesia is still far away from achieving that level. Therefore, Indonesia could not follow the
behaviour of BRIC countries which often contend the international order because it is uneasy
for Indonesia to pursue a quest for relative gains with the US, which ranks top in the
international system’s power structure. Secondly, Indonesia has had to face increasing
relative power competition with BRIC. It is true that in many ways Indonesia has increasing
relations with BRIC countries. They have also often shared the same opinions about global
and regional issues. China has become an important source of economic growth for
countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Having said that, there is a degree of
suspicion and wariness over the increasing aggressiveness of BRIC, which has led to
competition over relative power between Indonesia and BRIC countries, especially with
China, which geographically is not far from Indonesia. Thirdly, Indonesia’s larger possession
of material powers has increased its influence over its neighbours, but given the fact that the
increase of material resources is relatively not much compared to its neighbour, Indonesia
needs to significantly consider the region’s interest and aspiration when pursuing foreign
policy.

Given these situations, Indonesia’s concern for relative gains is not much as BRIC countries.
Indonesia accept absolute gains offered by international and regional cooperation. However,
to accommodate its own aspiration to maintain its rising trend of material capabilities,

---

582 Shiro Armstrong, “Can Jokowi transform Indonesia’s economy?” *East Asia Forum*, 17 August
indonesias-economy/.
Indonesia cannot pursue a purely absolute-gains strategy. Since it would be likely worse-off in a relative-gains competition vis-à-vis more powerful state(s), either of BRIC countries or Western countries, Indonesia pursue a combination of absolute and relative gains. In this combination, relative gains are not gained from a fierce competition, but from activity in international institutions in which Indonesia aims to secure abstract, intangible or indirect relative gains such as influence and a good image.

Indonesia’s aspiration for intangible relative gains is a key determinant which influences its Myanmar policy. Indonesia realised that despite its increasing material capabilities, it was not the most influential actor in Myanmar compared to China, India, and some other ASEAN states – Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. On the other hand, international approaches to Myanmar at that time, which could be divided into two extremes - (1) the pro-sanction-and-intervention orientation of Western countries and (2) the do-not-care policy adopted by countries such as China, India and Russia - did not offer many relative gains for Indonesia.

Indonesia tried to avoid getting trapped in choosing between these two different approaches on Myanmar, because neither of them served Indonesia’s interest. When facing a choice in the UNSC whether to support sanctions or not, Indonesia was aware that sanctions would not have changed the behaviour of Myanmar as happened in previous years due to Myanmar’s strong economic connections with China, India and other countries which have significant investment and economic interest in Myanmar. At the same time, however, ignoring Myanmar’s political problems would have also endangered Indonesia’s strategic interest.

What are Indonesia interests and what relative gains did Indonesia want to pursue from its Myanmar policy? Indonesia’s economic interest in Myanmar was not particularly high. It was true that in order to maintain its economic growth, Indonesia needed to expand economic ties, including with Myanmar. Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 5.2, Indonesia’s economic relations with Myanmar were quite limited compared to those of China, India and other ASEAN members. In addition, Indonesia and Myanmar shared the same type of main products, which were in the energy and commodity sectors, so that there was not much incentive for trade because there was no clear comparative advantage between the two countries.

Instead of being related to its economy, Indonesia’s interest in Myanmar was more driven by intangible and indirect relative powers. These can be observed through two aspects. The first one was to strategically get Myanmar away from China’s orbit in order to accelerate
Indonesia’s regionalism vision in ASEAN. When Myanmar was accepted to ASEAN in 1997, one reason behind Myanmar’s inclusion into ASEAN was ASEAN countries’ fear that Myanmar could have fallen into China’s orbit if it had been excluded.\textsuperscript{583} The fear remained in Indonesia’s mind years later. ‘China’s approach to ASEAN was increasingly aggressive. Although it is economically beneficial, it also could have unintended consequences in political, security, and strategic aspects.’\textsuperscript{584}

As the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia saw solidity and solidarity within Southeast Asian countries as a crucial matter. Indonesia regards ASEAN It shown the ‘ASEAN centrality’ in dealing with external powers.\textsuperscript{585} In this sense, the Myanmar issue had endangered the prospect of a strong and respectable ASEAN centrality. Myanmar was at that time distant from other ASEAN countries in the regionalism project and its political, economic and military development was deeply under China’s sphere. Therefore, leading a regional effort to solve Myanmar problem was a strategic necessity for Indonesia because by doing so Indonesia would strengthen its leadership role in ASEAN.

The second reason for involvement in Myanmar was to get a benefit from an image-building project as a prominent democratic country in the region. Through its role in projecting itself as a democracy model and helping shape Myanmar’s democratisation, Indonesia had an opportunity to improve relations with other countries and international organisations. There were indirect positive consequences of Indonesia’s imaging project in the Myanmar case. Many bilateral meetings between Indonesia and Western countries discussed the Myanmar case and praised Indonesia’s important role in finding a peaceful solution.\textsuperscript{586} Some of Indonesia’s strategic partnerships with Western countries, many of which were launched during Yudhoyono’s 2004–14 presidency, clearly recognised Indonesia’s role in democracy promotion in the region. The strategic partnerships provided Indonesia with some material benefits in the form of aid and grants,\textsuperscript{587} investment and trade access.

\textsuperscript{584} Ganewati Wuryandari, interview by the author, Jakarta, 27 October 2014.
\textsuperscript{586} For instance, meetings between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, and later Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in which the US supported Indonesia’s engagement role with Myanmar. Another example was the consultation between President Yudhoyono and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd when finding an effective way to persuade Myanmar’s military government to be more open to foreign humanitarian assistance.
\textsuperscript{587} Such as 24 F-16 fighters in a grant from the US.
Indonesia’s pivoting behaviour – acting as a bridge-builder between Western countries and Myanmar, a soft-revisionist to the Western sanction approach which was not effective for a long time, and an accommodator between global and regional interests – has increased Indonesia’s relative gain, albeit the gain was economically small and came from an indirect channel. China was a relative loser in the process, losing its superior influence over Myanmar, which started to diversify its international relations after undergoing political reform. One indicator of China’s relatively decreasing influence was the drastic decline of its investment to Myanmar from $13 billion in 2011 to $407 million in 2012, after some of China’s large projects were cancelled due to public protests for various reasons.588

Indonesia’s moderate expansion of material capabilities also influenced its behaviour in climate change negotiations. The neorealist perspective is generally concerned with the competition among states to gain as many as resources as possible to secure them from the negative impact of climate change. In the neorealist view, the existing climate change regime, which mainly centred around the Kyoto Protocol, was seen as not being able to reconcile an anarchic situation, given the fact that the US and some other developed countries were not part of it, and at the same time the implementation of the protocol was delayed due to some debated issues such as climate finance. Therefore, although the UNFCCC itself is an international institution, climate change negotiations could not be merely seen through a neoliberal institutional prism because conflict, competition and deadlock have been common in the negotiations.

As part of the G77, Indonesia’s main objective in climate change negotiations is to maximise its relative benefit from developed countries, which were seen as the main actors causing emissions. But if we look deeper into the political constellation on climate change negotiations, there is also strategic competition among developing countries to secure resources to deal with increasing climate change challenges. The competition happens because climate change agreements provide only long-term benefits for the whole world, while the exact benefit for each country is still difficult to measure. On the other hand, the negotiations to achieve any agreements were often uncertain, unpredictable and complex. This gave an incentive for countries to look for short-term relative gains for their economic and security self-interest, such as financial assistance for climate adaptation and mitigation.

One short-term benefit many developing countries wanted to obtain was climate finance. As Purdon argues: ‘While climate finance is not the only issue in climate change politics, it is one of the most salient ones’. Sources for climate finance under the climate change framework are the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is basically a multilateral ODA to help developing countries in climate change adaptation and mitigation, and the carbon market. Both sources of finance have their own problems. The contribution to the GCF remains low as some developed countries were reluctant to deliver the commitment. As of mid-2015 only 42% of the total committed amount had been provided to the GCF. On the other hand, the carbon market needs substantial domestic processes which were often delayed due to capacity problems. In the case of Indonesia, for instance, a carbon market was not developed until 2013.

From neorealist perspectives, if Indonesia joined BASIC, it might get some benefit from BASIC’s powerful bargaining position in negotiation vis-à-vis developed countries. Having said that, given that Brazil, China and India have much bigger total emissions, relative gains obtained from developed countries would mostly go to these countries. They would gain the greatest relative benefit from a climate finance scheme, as happened in the case of CDM projects.

Indonesia’s reluctance to join BASIC can be seen as its disbelief that the group could offer much relative gains. On the other hand, pursuing non-confrontational strategy by presenting itself as: (1) a constructive player which engaged both developed and developing countries, and (2) a leader among developing countries that have large rainforests, have benefited Indonesia. It was able to secure a bilateral deal from countries such as Norway to reduce the deforestation rate. Acting as a bridge-builder and soft-revisionist allowed Indonesia to preserve its position in the current structure of the climate change regime which benefited itself the most.

On the global economic governance issue, the reason for Indonesia’s pivoting behaviour can be observed from Indonesia’s relative position in the G20. Although the G20 is an international institution per se, it has no clear rules of the game. The G20 has no secretariat and no monitoring and evaluation system and its agenda is fluid from time to time. Size of

---

GDP matters in the G20, as it determines the weight and economic capacity of each state. In this sense, Indonesia is among the ‘low rank’ states in the G20. As the fifteenth largest GDP among 20 members, Indonesia did not have much advantage in the group. Although Indonesian elites often claim its success as having the second highest economic growth rate in the G20, the fact is that the growth has not moved Indonesia to a higher total GDP ‘rank.’ Its relatively inferior status in the group in terms of total GDP constrained Indonesia from taking a decisive revisionist stance in global economic reform. On IMF quota reform, Indonesia’s quota in the IMF under the 2010 reform package will increase modestly compared to China and India. There is not much incentive for Indonesia to strongly demand more voting power and share in the IMF because the relative gain it would get from the reform would not be as much as China, Brazil and India, as explained in chapters 4 and 5.4.

Furthermore, there was anxiety that the additional funding contributed by Indonesia and other developing countries would be mainly used to help ease the European crisis instead of to improve the role of developing countries. As explained by a senior official in the Ministry of Finance:

> We understand that the increasing role and quota requires more contribution from us. But, we feel that at that current situation, the additional contribution would be mostly directed to deal with crisis in Europe. Our concern is that so far we have more fiscal discipline than many European countries. So, why do we need to contribute more to IMF, while the funding will not be used by us, but by countries which do not implement fiscal discipline measures?591

Although Indonesia emphasised the importance of IFIs reform, including IMF quota reform, the relative benefit for Indonesia was not much. Another important point was that Indonesia’s capacity to bear the consequences of a quota increase was more limited than China’s or India’s. Increasing quota in the IMF means increasing responsibility and contribution to IMF and in this sense, Indonesia’s capacity to support the increase is not as great as that of BRIC countries.592 The lack of capacity was demonstrated by a relatively small stand-by loan committed by Indonesia made in the aftermath of the 2012 G20 Los Cabos Summit. China promised to provide $43 million and India, Brazil and Russia pledged $10 billion each. Indonesia on the other hand could only pledged $1 billion. Both factors – the small benefit offered form the changing quota and the lack of strong capability to bear the consequence of increasing quota – have contributed to Indonesia’s less ambitious approach on the IMF reforms.

591 Syurkani I Kasim, op. cit
592 Yulius Purnawan, op. cit.
8.1.2 South Africa

**Moderate expansion of material powers**

Referring to the neorealist theory, South Africa’s behaviour which reflected the characteristics of pivot states is determined by material factors and its position in the international system. South Africa possesses superior material factors compared to other African nations. It also has a distinguished position in the international system and has often been seen by the international community as the de facto representative of Africa in multilateral groupings, such as the G20. South Africa had the largest GDP in Africa until 2014 and the highest GDP per capita until the present. This situation is particularly unique because other large countries such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia also have the largest total GDP in their regions, but given their large populations, their GDP per capita is much lower than those of their neighbours. Strong economic advantage, supported by a relatively stable democratic environment (compared to most African countries), puts it at the relatively highest rank among African states.

Although South Africa’s relative superiority in the continent in terms of economy is quite clear, looking more deeply at the configuration of its material capabilities would allow a more accurate understanding on the rationality of South Africa’s behaviours. In reality, over the course of two decades, South Africa’s relative power in the continent declined gradually. An obvious indicator of South Africa’s relative decline is its military capabilities. South Africa is still one of the most powerful military power in Africa. But compared to the apartheid government which had the strongest armed forces in the continent, South Africa’s ranking is now surpassed by Egypt, Algeria and Ethiopia. It was the largest military spender, but is now in the fourth place, surpassed by its SADC fellow, Angola. In terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, South Africa ranked 20 in the continent. This declined gradually from 2.5% in 1994 to 1.1% in 2014, as shown by figure below.
Furthermore, while in the early years of the post-apartheid government South Africa contributed significantly to peacekeeping operations especially in African conflict zones, South Africa is currently ‘only’ at the tenth rank of African countries’ largest peacekeeping troops contributors, overtaken by smaller countries such as Rwanda and Burkina Faso.

Table 8.3
Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking among African countries.</th>
<th>World ranking</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Total troops and polices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, "Military expenditure (% of GDP)."

Although in terms of GDP per capita South Africa is still the biggest in the continent, its status as the largest economy in Africa has been overtaken by Nigeria since 2014. Further, the IMF confirmed in its World Economic Outlook in April 2016 that South Africa has been surpassed by Egypt as the second largest economy in the continent. Since the end of apartheid South Africa’s economy experience some economic recessions such as happened in 1998, 2001, 2008 and recently in 2015, as can be seen from the figure 8.2, South Africa was affected very much by the 2008 global financial crisis which resulted in negative growth in 2009. Although South Africa is still the largest economy in SADC, its annual economic growth between 2003 and 2013 was only the tenth highest of the 15 countries in the group.

**Figure 8.2**
South Africa’s GDP growth (annual %), 1980–2014

Despite South Africa’s much-discussed profile and status as one of the emerging powers, South Africa’s military and economic trends in the last couple of years reveal the fact that its relative material capabilities have not expanded significantly. Other countries in Africa, on

---


the other hand, have increased their material capabilities at higher growth rates than South Africa. These facts of course do not derail South Africa’s role and status as the most important player in Africa in the short and medium term. But its relative and hegemonic influence might decline gradually in the future if its power continuously experiences relative decline. Compared to other members of BRICS, South Africa is not only the smallest state in term of size, but also the one whose exponential growth of material capabilities is the lowest. While BRIC countries have progressively rise to closer ranks from the US and Western countries since the last decade, the gap between them and South Africa on the other hand did not change much.

*Rationalist decision for pivoting behaviour*

Given its status – the most powerful, but relatively declining state in Africa- , an alliance with BRICS is understandable as a way to increase South Africa’s bargaining position in pursuing relative gains vis-à-vis the US-led international order. Demanding a fairer international order does not only serve South Africa’s national interest, but also aim to strengthen its leadership among African countries, assuming that the reform of international order reforms would benefit of Africa which has been underrepresented in the international system.

Having said that, the case studies in chapter 6 revealed that South Africa sometimes did not always side with BRICS and BASIC in all issues. On climate change issues for example, although South Africa partners with BASIC through numerous joint statements, South Africa took more progressive stance especially since the COP Durban in 2012. From the rationalist perspective, South Africa did not side with BASIC all times because BASIC did not offer much material benefit for South Africa aside from the broad statements. Relations with African countries on climate change issues become more important for South Africa. Different from BASIC, which is an informal and loose group without much interest in detail and concrete project, the AGN is more structured and well-coordinated. The AGN has mechanism to discuss the African’s common position. Although it was initially insignificant and overshadowed by the G77, the AGN has now grown and become increasingly institutionalized. The AGN is working under the direction from the African Ministers of Environment (AMCEN), the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), and the African Union Assembly. This structure made the AGN a formally recognised alliance to represent Africa. In preparation for a COP, the AGN usually held several intensive preparatory meetings. It also has commitment to provide
training, sharing experience, and capacity building especially to small countries with limited diplomatic capability.

South Africa’s close and constructive relations with the AGN and African countries are necessary for maintaining its status as the region’s leader. The fact that South Africa itself was the largest emitter of both total and per capita GHG in the continent put South Africa in an awkward position, as African countries demanded that South Africa to also contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation in Africa. South Africa’s shared position with BASIC during the COP Copenhagen in 2009 for example was criticised by African countries especially by big African countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and Kenya. The way South Africa acts in climate change demonstrates South Africa’s complex relative-absolute gains considerations. On the one hand, relations with BASIC is necessary to strengthen South Africa’s effort to pursue relative gains vis-a-vis Western countries. On the other hand, since relative gains obtained through its alliance with BASIC are not clear and real yet, South Africa at the same time maintain close relations with the AGN in order to remains to be seen as the Africa’s de facto leader.

While seeing BASIC and BRICS as alternatives to the Western international order, South Africa’s relations with BRIC countries present both cooperative and rivalry aspects. South African leaders have generally projected it as a ‘gateway’ for foreign interests to the rest of Africa for both economic and strategic purposes. As said by a South African government spokesperson in underlining the importance of BRICS membership: ‘… Our BRICS partners view South Africa as a gateway into the continent as we provide guidance on African economic development opportunities …’ Nevertheless, there is another side which is often overlooked, which is the fact that South Africa’s interests in Africa have been challenged by the increasing ambition of BRIC. A study by Edwards and Jenkins revealed that South Africa’s exports to other African countries declined by 20% in 2010 because of the penetration of China’s products. Wenzel also argued that although the close involvement of South Africa in BRICS brought benefits to the country, some sectors suffered from intense competition such as infrastructure development and mining equipment markets.

---

Zimbabwe was a clear case of South Africa’s relatively declining influence. China has already overtaken South Africa’s status as the biggest investor in Zimbabwe. Supporting sanctions would therefore further hamper South Africa’s economic advantage in Zimbabwe which increasingly favours China. Furthermore, despite its deep economic crisis, Zimbabwe is a big country which borders with South Africa. It has around 15 million people, the fifth largest among the 15 SADC members. Implementation of sanctions could spark an unintended burden for South Africa such as the flux of refugees, which has now has already become an enduring problem. Pursuing hegemony and maximising South Africa’s share of power in Southern Africa would not be achieved simply by intensifying security competition with Zimbabwe through sanctions and intervention.

South Africa was reluctant to take an interventionist stance in any case in which the prospect for a solution was difficult. In responding to the Zimbabwe crisis, both President Mbeki and Zuma refrained from intervention and sanctions. Furthermore, as happened in other parts of Africa, the Zimbabwean conflict is complex and difficult to completely resolve. Even a regime change cannot guarantee the end of conflict, as there were power struggles among opposition themselves. In conflict-ridden Africa, including Zimbabwe, what is seen as the solution for intra-state conflict is sometimes not changing a regime or democratisation, but stable political order which does not cause a domino effect to neighbouring countries. ‘Quiet diplomacy’ is at least able to maintain the degree of South Africa’s prominent role in SADC. It can be interpreted as a possibly less costly option to maintain or even improve one’s position in relation to others in terms of power.

The situation was different in Madagascar, against which South Africa implemented and initiated sanctions. Madagascar was strategically less important to South Africa than Zimbabwe. South Africa is only the seventh largest exporter to Madagascar, far below China in the first place. Madagascar is much smaller than Zimbabwe in terms of GDP and population, so that the advantages of closer ties with Madagascar would not provide much relative benefit to South Africa. Madagascar is also relatively distant from South Africa, separated by sea, so that the possible impact of sanctions such as refugees would not directly impact South Africa’s national interest. South Africa would not have lost any relative gains by supporting sanctions against Madagascar. South Africa’s decision to either support sanctions or not is more practical, which based on relative-absolute gains consideration, rather than ideological.

Of the three case studies, South Africa’s policy on global governance reform is the least compatible with the pivot state’s characteristics. South Africa has consistently shared
BRICS’ ideas about IFIs reforms. As explained in chapter 6, South Africa’s joint position with BRICS regarding the IMF quota reform did not fully reflect the aspiration of African countries whose quotas relatively declined. Despite the difference, South Africa actively promotes Africa’s interest in the BRICS. South Africa tried to ensure that BRICS could provide benefit for Africa especially in economic development.

Regarding the BRICS’ New Development Bank, which is seen as an alternative to the World Bank, South Africa has optimistic and enthusiast view, believing that the bank would promote infrastructure development across Africa. The progress of the establishment of the bank was nevertheless slower than expected in which the debates over the bank’s structure, operation, location, and financial contribution of each member took three years to resolve. The establishment of the bank should be appreciated as a new source to advance development in developing and least developed countries. Nonetheless, the scope and working areas of the bank itself have become a source of another debate. While South Africa hoped the bank could provide a loan to African countries, India hoped more specific focus and seemed worried of having its capital lent by other countries as domestically it still has unfilled demand for capital. Given this fact, South Africa’s wish to bring much capital to help the development in Africa seems to need long and complex process. In this sense, a rationalist hypothesis is of little help in explaining this situation as despite unclear relative gains it and the continent get, South Africa remains consistent in BRICS. South Africa’s hope for relative gains from BRICS has not been clearly realized yet.

8.1.3 Turkey

Turkey’s emerging power characteristics – activism, pragmatism and multidimensional foreign policy – are enhanced by its increasing relative material capabilities. On a range of material factor indicators, which are often used by neorealist scholars, Turkey has an increasingly higher relative ranking on material capabilities. Turkey’s GDP growth in the last 15 years is significantly more than that of OECD countries in total. Turkey’s economic rising strengthens its relative position in relations with OECD and EU members and provides it with more confidence in international affairs. For instance, in dealing with persistent

---

602 Ibid, 6.
economic crisis in Greece, which is its next door, Turkey one time entertained an idea of providing bilateral loan to Greece, although the idea was rejected.

Similar to the exploration in chapter 7.2, Turkey’s pivoting behaviour would be framed by dividing Turkey’s rising into three periods.

I. **Absolute-gains orientation period (2002-2009)**

During the Cold War, Turkey aligned itself with the West for mutual benefit between the two parties. For Europe, Turkey was strategic as the West’s most Eastern frontier and in turn Turkey received military and economic assistance from the West. At the end of the Cold War, although the Turkish elites’ perception of Russia’s threat declined, Turkey was still unsure about what would happen in the post–Cold War international system, particularly regarding the future of the newly-established Russia, which was at that time experiencing intense domestic dynamics. In dealing with this uncertainty, Turkey enhanced its cooperation

---


with the West. It followed the liberal institutionalist logic by supporting the liberal–institutional global order built by the US and its Western allies. One example of Turkey’s more Western-leaning was when President Turgut Özal enthusiastically supported the 1991 Iraq war, which was the first UN-authorised war after the Cold War. As observed by Sedat Laçiner, ‘… Özal’s and the army’s liberal policies showed them as closer to the capitalist world and more conservative than previous Kemalist military take-overs’.\(^{606}\)

Although Turkey’s economy had risen since 2002, Turkey did not immediately revise its grand foreign policy strategy. From a neorealist point of view, the lack of significantly new foreign policy initiatives by the new government and its insistence on the EU negotiation process could be explained as Turkey’s survival strategy for both economic and security reasons. Although Turkey has become a NATO member, EU membership is crucial for Turkey’s full integration to the West in the European security structures. Turkish elites perceived Europe as an inspiration for the country’s modernisation, although the Cold War, which forced Turkey to choose NATO at the expense of the USSR, had ended.\(^{607}\) NATO can only provide Turkey’s protection and benefit in security aspects, while EU membership would give Turkey more comprehensive benefit from Europe’s economic wealth and political stability and advanced culture. Furthermore, closer relations with the West – through the IMF- was necessary to deal with Turkey’s deep economic problems in the early 2000s. Different from cases in other countries where IMF loans and conditionality were protested by societies, Turkey had a relatively cordial relation with the IMF. Following the IMF loan in 2001, relations between Turkey and the IMF was strengthened much more than before, as both sides shared mutual interests – Turkey needed a significant economic aid, while the US, the most dominant IMF stakeholder, needed Turkey to support its Middle East policy -\(^{608}\).

Turkey was indeed disappointed with the Iraq war in 2003, with which Turkey disagreed, refusing to let its land become a US military base. Given the fact that Turkey bordered Iraq, Turkey was among the largest recipients of Iraqi refugees, which brought financial, social and security consequences to Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey was disappointed with what it saw as blundering American unilateralism that destabilised the entire Middle East. Having said that, Turkey maintained its active participation in the Western security order by hosting


the 2004 NATO Summit, participated in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq and provided capacity building trainings to Iraqi personnel.

During this period, absolute gains obtained by Turkey through cooperation far exceeded relative gains pursued through competition with Western countries. There were some initiatives pursued by Turkey, such as ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ policy, but those initiatives did not explicitly challenge the West. Instead, the AKP, in collaboration with secular liberals and business entities, pursued strong pro-EU policy. Turkey indeed gained from its moving closer to the West, not only regarding economic revival during the 2000s, but also regarding domestic transformation achieved from structural adjustments which were encouraged by the IMF and EU. Absolute gains obtained from the closer relations with the West influenced Turkey’s decision to adopt foreign policies which were in line with the West, such as ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

II. Relative-gains orientation (2009-2011)

Relations changed drastically during the second government of AKP, which started in 2007, although the change can be more clearly observed in 2009. As explained in chapter 7, since 2009 Turkey took diverging positions from the West, such as when it voted against the UNSC resolution on Iran. President Erdogan also became increasingly critical to international institutions, such as the UN and IMF. Turkey shared similarities with those of emerging powers, which demanded more recognition of their status in global governance.

Turkey’s decision to choose an alternative way which was in contrast to Western countries’ policy should be looked at from a wider context of Turkey’s foreign policy. During that period, there were some developments which influenced Turkey to adopt an opposite position vis-à-vis Western countries. Firstly, Turkey was deeply disappointed with its stalled EU accession process. Due to its bilateral conflicts with Turkey over the status of Northern Cyprus, Cyprus blocked some chapters of EU’s negotiation process. By December 2009, of 35 chapters, six chapters were blocked by Cyprus, four were blocked by France, and eight were blocked by the European Council. Turkey also became increasingly disappointed with the widespread opposition to its accession among EU member states especially from right-wing governments who won elections in countries, such as Germany and France. The European process became complicated and at some points it was stuck. Turkey was frustrated because the European membership process became complicated although Turkey has
implemented many domestic reforms in order to comply with EU’s requirements.609 The second development was the uneasy defence and security relations with Western countries. Although Turkey has been the second largest troop contributor to NATO operations, Turkey was left out during NATO-EU cooperation discussions. This happened when Cyprus blocked Ankara’s bid to become an associate member of the European Defence Agency in 2007.610 Turkey-Western countries relations were further complicated by the Eurozone crisis. The crisis raised doubt within Turkish society whether joining EU would be good for Turkey’s economy.611 Eurozone crises since 2008 showed the EU’s difficulty in managing complex coordination among its members, which further raised doubt about advantages of joining the EU. The crises changed the structure of international system. Turkey’s economy grew 4.78% annually between 2002 and 2015, much higher than OECD countries whose average growth was 1.59%. Turkey’s growth was also higher than its Central Europe and the Baltics neighbours -some of which have become EU members such as Bulgaria and Romania-, which grew 3.12% annually at the same period.612 Greece, Turkey’s near neighbour, experienced continuous financial difficulties where the government debt is more than 150%. From the neorealist lens, there was gradual redistribution of power between Turkey and its neighbours. Turkey was clearly moving toward greater prosperity, while many of its neighbours, including those who are in the EU, were relatively declining. Furthermore, in term of military capability, Turkey is in now the top 15th largest military spenders. Its military spending grew 13% between 2004 and 2013.613 Turkey’s increasing material capabilities relative to its neighbours leveraged Turkey’s relative position in the international system. This change shaped Turkey’s behaviour in its interaction with other states, from seeing the formal membership to EU as Turkey’s means for survival, especially to pursue self-help attempt to escape from economic crises, to treating relations with EU and the West in general as more pragmatic and practical ones. The lack of progress in the EU membership talk made the AKP less interested with a closer relation with the West. On the other hand, Turkey aspired to have more powerful and influential relations with many countries in the world, especially in its geographical proximities such as Middle East

609 Altay Atli, op. cit.
610 Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “The European Union’s Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective,” in The Future of European Foreign Policy, eds. Erik Jones and Saskia van Genugten (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 71.
611 İlhan Uzgel, interview by the author, Ankara, 27 November 2015.
612 Economic growth numbers were calculated by the author using World Bank data.
and North Africa. Relations with non-Western states were believed to give more gains to Turkey.

A clear reorientation of Turkish foreign policy happened in its relations with Middle East countries where Turkey aimed to become a main peacemaker and strategically the most important state. From a rationalist point of view, closer relations with Middle East countries would benefit Turkey's perceived national interest. As Turkey's economy and population are growing, Turkey needs to secure oil and gas supplies from the Middle East. Iran, which at that time was still under Western sanctions, was seen as a significant partner for Turkey. Turkey's change in capabilities and relative position in the system shaped Turkey's approach in three case studies discussed in Chapter 7. In the Iranian nuclear case, Turkey saw a nuclear-equipped Iran would have negative implications for itself and the region. This view was of course shared by Western countries. The difference was that while Western countries believed that sanction was the best way to discourage Iran's nuclear program, Turkey remains adamantly against the imposition of sanctions.

During this period, Turkey's view regarding the concept of gains had changed, as Europanisation did not give much absolute gain Turkey hoped. Turkey then turned its attention to a stronger relative gains concern by challenging the Western international order. Turkey became more self-confined in terms of foreign policy issues. It became more keen to take a more active role around the world, even with contrasting views vis-à-vis Western nations. It, for instance, refused to participate in the NATO operation in Libya arguing that 'military intervention by NATO in Libya or any other country would be totally counterproductive.'

Turkey's relations with the West were worsened by the fact that Turkey has different priorities from Western countries in the Syrian conflict. Turkey prioritised removing Assad, while other NATO members saw ISIS as the main threat.

Turkey's manoeuvre in the 2010 nuclear deal can be seen as its attempt to give the signal to Western countries that alliance with them was not the only option for Turkey. Turkey wanted to show itself as a respected regional power which had options, rather than relying on its alliance with the West. Good relations with Iran on the other hand could not only stabilize the region, but also help Turkey dealt with Kurdish issue. Prime Minister Erdogan even entertained the idea of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) when meeting

President Putin in 2013, although based on interviews conducted by the author to Turkish scholars and government officials, there is no clear evident of Turkey's intention to join the SCO.

III. Intangible relative gains (2012-2015)

Turkey’s attempt to display itself as a revisionist power has nevertheless failed. It can be specifically observed regarding the situation in Middle East which has been uncertain and unpredictable. Turkey also had started to lose its credibility as a mediator and peace promotor, as it sided with Sunni groups in the Syria, Egypt, and Yemen conflicts. Turkey became significantly isolated and its capacity to play a role was constrained. Turkey did not have much scope to influence conflicting parties.

On the other hand, Turkey's close relations with Russia, its geographically closest major power, became more distant as both pursued different positions on Syria.

In these uncertain situations, Turkey attempted to repair relations with Western countries. On the refugee crisis, for example, Turkey's capacity to deal with refugee problems is limited. On the Middle East conflicts, Turkey also faced limited capability to act as a single actor. Without collaboration and coordination with a Western alliance, Turkey did not have an advantage to contribute to the solution of the Middle East's conflicts. As noted by a Turkish scholar:

> Abandoning Western alliances is not an answer because all Turkey’s security and development progress come from its alliance with the Western alliance. Turkey cannot ignore transatlantic alliance. Without relations with EU, Turkey will not be regarded as a power in middle east and north Africa. Turkey is respected because it is negotiating with the EU, establishing strong linkages with EU.

Regarding economic aspects, it is unclear whether Turkey’s attempt to diversify relations has benefited Turkey as the EU is still Turkey’s largest trading partner and the trade between two entities account for more than 40% in 2015. These situations have rationalised Turkey's foreign policy choice. Given Turkey's close economic, security and cultural relations with the

---


West, which was mostly as a result of the decades of secularism project, it is uneasy for Turkey to make a relative gain vis-à-vis Western countries. The realistic option for Turkey was to pursue an absolute-gain orientation by integrating itself with the EU, while the idea for global governance reforms is pursued through rhetoric, instead of truly reformist. Although it has some differences with the West, Turkey became less critical, as shown through in Iran nuclear case and IMF reforms.

Given difficulty to pursue truly relative gains, Turkey then seek intangible relative gains. In the case of Iran, intangible relative gains concern was demonstrated through Turkey’s ability to maintain diplomatic channel with Iran despite existing tensions between two countries. Regarding global economic governance, Turkey displayed its good image as a leading actor in the development of LDCs. Rationalist approach, nevertheless, is of little help in explaining Turkey’s climate change policy which, as explained in chapter 7.3, was characterised as a passive role and status quo seeker. A better explanation is obtained by the constructivist framework.

8.2 Constructivism

Rationalism has the strength of explaining the three countries’ trait of displaying pivoting behaviours, as well as the difference and variation among them. Nevertheless, the rationalist model has limitations as it omits other factors such as the social context of material factors and the role of non-state actors in explaining a state’s foreign policy. Climate change, for example, is an issue which cannot be framed through a rationalist lens. The negative impact of climate change is beyond the state-centric paradigm because the increasing GHG emissions in one place are dispersed to other places through the atmosphere. A constructivist approach could help explain what rationalists fail to explain by looking at the changing state identities in the course of recent years. Constructivism assumes that state’s identities and interests can change overtime and become endogenous to state interaction.

As framed in chapter 3, state’s pivoting behaviour is a result of state’s growing multiple identities. The rise of multiple identities, which might come from both interaction with international actors and domestic processes which involve different foreign policy interest

groups, presents a challenge for the state. The state ideally expects to hold multiple identities concurrently. But in many cases, the state avoids privileging one identity over another and tries to keep a balance of these different identities.

8.2.1 Indonesia

In addition to the relatively moderate expansion of material capabilities, Indonesia’s behaviours can be observed through the process of state identities transformation of state identities in recent years. Regarding its perceived status as an emerging power, Indonesia enjoyed its inclusion in various groups of economically potential countries such as MINT, CIVETS, N-11, as well as in new groups such as the G20 and MIKTA. Indonesian elites regarded these inclusions as international recognition of the country’s success.

In term of hard power, Indonesia is in fact still far away to catch up with developed countries and even with China due to its lack of sufficient infrastructure and effective institutions. Indonesia also lacks of a strong economic foundation. Different from China and India, Indonesia cannot ‘utilise’ its huge population as a strong basis production for labour-intensive industries due to their low productivity. But recognition from international community constructed Indonesia’s new identity in the form of an increasing confidence and therefore willingness to take a more aggressive action.

The ‘emerging power’ identity becomes a somewhat more important factor behind Indonesia’s activism, more than its increasing hard power resources, which were proven to be not as significant as BRIC countries explained in section 8.1.1. As explained by Evi Fitriani, an Indonesian scholar:

> It is not us, but somebody else who regards us as an emerging power. In the past, Indonesia was active in international affairs, as we shown in ASEAN and the Asian-African Conference, without being acknowledged as an emerging power. Our economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s was much higher than today. So, why only recently did they call us an emerging power? I am afraid that an ‘emerging power’ was created just for the purpose of promotion and labelling, rather than reflected a real improvement of Indonesia’s international stature.

Perception of Indonesia’s emerging power status has encouraged elites to pursue an assertive foreign policy. This assertive foreign policy, however, was adjusted during the socialisation process with other countries especially with those located in its neighbourhood.

---

620 Makmur Keliat, interview by the author, Depok, Indonesia, 12 November 2014.
621 Faisal Hastiadi, interview by the author, Depok, Indonesia, 6 November 2014.
Indonesia’s neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia respond Indonesia’s perceived status as an emerging power with a dual strategy. On the one hand, they appreciated Indonesia’s willingness to show leadership and provide some public goods to ASEAN. Without Indonesia’s eagerness to lead, ASEAN would not progress a lot. It was shown when Indonesia’s role in ASEAN declined due to the 1998 economic and political crises. At that time, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir expressed an intention to provide leadership to fill a position of ASEAN’s de facto leader which was left by Suharto. Nevertheless, his diplomatic ideas, such as his objection to Australia’s interest to become an ASEAN’s permanent dialogue partner and his proposal on the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), were openly criticised by other ASEAN members for Mahathir’s failure to consult with them prior to expressing his ideas, as well as for signalling confrontational messages to ASEAN’s partners. Indonesia is more acceptable to provide leadership to ASEAN countries, due to its emphasise on dialogue process and consultation prior to making a decision.

On the other hand, Indonesia’s status as an emerging power, both according to business reports and its membership in the G20, created some level of jealousy from other ASEAN countries. Having said that, the jealousy was not expressed through an open and explicit action. Rather, they implicitly demonstrated by showing that they are also important actors despite their exclusion from the G20 and other categories of emerging powers. Singapore, for instance, as the richest country in Southeast Asia, and among the richest in the world, did not want to be left behind in the G20 process. Singapore created a coalition of small but economically strong non-G20 countries called as the Global Governance Group (3G) in 2009 inviting some countries including Switzerland, Luxembourg and Bahrain, as well as Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam to join in. The 3G was aimed to ensure that the G20 hear the aspirations of its non-members. Singapore successfully raised its diplomatic bargaining position in the G20 by being regularly invited to the summits since the 2010 Seoul Summit - except to the 2012 Los Cabos Summit- as a representative of the 3G, although it remains unclear why only Singapore, not other 3G members, always represents the group. As revealed by Indonesian officials, Indonesia does not have much communication with Singapore during the summits and Singapore never consulted on its agenda in the G20 with Indonesia.

---

625 Interview with Siregar, Soetikno, and Abdi, op cit.
Indonesia was, in fact, trying to establish a formal link between ASEAN and the G20. The link was also necessary for Indonesia to obtain credibility and legitimacy of informally representing Southeast Asian nations in the group. In the 15th ASEAN Summit in 2009, ASEAN leaders mandated the establishment of an ASEAN G20 Contact Group comprising the ASEAN Chair, Indonesia and the Secretary-General of ASEAN. The Contact Group, however, failed to be established. According to series of interviews with Indonesian G20 sherpa, officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance in November 2014, which was five years after the 15th ASEAN Summit, the Contact Group has not existed yet. On several occasions, Indonesian officials delivered brief information to other ASEAN countries in meetings of ASEAN finance ministers regarding some important points agreed by G20 members, but there was no serious and systematic dialogue on either what particular interests Indonesia and ASEAN should present in the G20 summit or what concrete actions ASEAN leaders would have to take to support the G20’s commitments. ASEAN’s failure to establish a formal link between the G20, ASEAN and Indonesia reflected ASEAN countries’ reluctance to have themselves represented by Indonesia in the G20. This reluctance has root from the fact that ‘equality’ of its members becomes one of ASEAN’s key principles.626

Indonesia’s assertiveness is therefore constrained by other countries’ reluctance to accept its too big role in ASEAN. Indonesia’s reluctance to pursue an assertive region leadership in the G20 was, therefore, a result of social interaction with other ASEAN countries during the process of redefining its role. The socialisation resulted in Indonesia’s understanding that if it shows dominating behaviour by taking a too-dominant role, Indonesia will need to pay a disproportionate diplomatic cost from other ASEAN countries’ counter reaction.

In addition to the role of external actors in creating Indonesia’s status, Indonesia’s pivoting behaviour can be traced to a substantive domestic transformation since reformasi in 1998 which formed a democratic identity. It is true that Indonesia’s tendency to stay neutral and position itself in the middle has a root from a long process since its early independence period in the late 1940s. In the time of global political division between capitalism and communism during the Cold War, Indonesia declared the bebas aktif (independent and active) principle, to maintain its strategic autonomy. While the bebas aktif was formulated by a limited number of elites, the reformasi period witnessed a wider and more complex

---

process of identity formulation. The dramatic change from an authoritarian to a democratic system in 1998 introduced a new identity and norm, which is the democracy.

Democracy has become increasingly influential in Indonesia’s foreign policy narrative. Dosch argued that rapid growth of civil society has increased the degree of openness and transparency of Indonesia’s foreign policy.\(^\text{627}\) Democracy has significantly improved Indonesia’s self-confidence\(^\text{628}\) and laid a foundation for foreign policy activism.\(^\text{629}\) Avery Poole described how the influence of democracy in Indonesia’s foreign policy could be understood through two channels: democracy as a set of ‘values’ and as a ‘process’.\(^\text{630}\) As values, democracy has been used for Indonesia to promote its new role in regional and global affairs, while as a process, democracy enables a wider scope of domestic actors in foreign policy making.\(^\text{631}\)

The increasing role of wider foreign policy actors as a result of democratisation can be observed from Indonesia’s Myanmar policy. Pressure for Indonesia’s more proactive role also came from human rights groups. Ahead of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s visit to Myanmar in 2011, for example, a number of Indonesian NGOs released a statement which urged the Indonesian government not to support Myanmar’s aspiration to take ASEAN chairmanship in 2014 as long as there was no significant political reform in Myanmar.

While the emergence of democratic values has introduced a new identity to Indonesia’s foreign policy in the form of a more democratic orientation and more embracement of global liberal norms, democracy has created another implication which is often overlooked by scholars writing about Indonesia’s foreign policy, which is the proliferation of other identities. These new identities are pushed around by different interest groups which seek to influence the state’s foreign policy.

One identity which emerged in Indonesia’s foreign policy narrative in the post-


\(^\text{628}\) Endi Bayuni, interview by the author, Jakarta, 6 November 2014.


\(^\text{631}\) Ibid., 1–2.
developing Indonesian thinking about the nation, Islam identity has been increasingly taken into consideration by elites in making foreign policy. While during Suharto era Islam did not entail significant portion of Indonesia’s foreign policy due to the centralized nature of foreign policymaking where only limited number of elites involved, Islam has gained more influence through the presence of Islamic parties and civil societies. On Myanmar, for example, the Indonesian government needed to take account the increasing pressure from Muslim groups who brought a Muslim solidarity rhetoric condemning the prosecutions of Rohingya Muslims which has become an international concern since 2012.

Both democratic values and Islamic solidarity encouraged Indonesian elites to pursue a more interventionist foreign policy, albeit from different points of view. Despite the emergence of interventionist values, Indonesia also witnessed the rise of what Edward Aspinall called ‘new nationalism.’ The new nationalism has been developed since the 1998 reformasi not from ideological reason, but for the failure of post-reformasi politics to address economic and social issues. This nationalistic idea shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy to be more defensive and inward-looking. Putting more emphasise on national interest and territorial integrity, the nationalistic idea is more concerned about protecting Indonesia’s interest from foreign intervention on issues, rather than democratic promotion abroad. Indonesia’s active, but not dictating, stance on Myanmar was a reflection of compromise between two newly formulated identities: (1) interventionist (both democracy and Islam) and (2) nationalistic.

Democratic ideas also influenced substantial change in Indonesia’s climate change identities, which were formed by foreign policy interest groups. From an historical perspective, Indonesian environmentalist NGOs have been quite close to the government’s circle, even during the Suharto era. But the authoritarian system restricted NGO activists from taking a critical stance towards the government; therefore, environmental NGOs at that time functioned more as the government’s partner in climate change research and projects rather than as actors demanding more pro-environment policy. The 1998 political reform paved the way for change, for there had been increasing public awareness and NGO pressure on the climate change issue. Environmental NGOs obtained more freedom and space to campaign for a more active climate change policy. One example was that one

635 Ibid, 80.
prominent Indonesian NGO, WALHI, filed a case against 11 companies it claimed had caused wildfires in South Sumatera province in 1999. This kind of civil lawsuit was almost impossible during the Suharto era. Pressure from national and international environmental NGOs was quite intense, especially when responding to the high rate of deforestation in Indonesia. Although Indonesia’s total emissions are lower than those of developed nations and BRIC countries, its deforestation rate increased rapidly over the years and had surpassed Brazil’s in 2014 as the highest in the world.

Indonesia’s democracy has enabled NGOs to participate in the policymaking process. They not only act as agencies at the domestic level, but also as actors who engage in transforming Indonesia’s identity to be more a pro-environment country. The Indonesian delegation team involved a significant number of NGO activists, especially since Indonesia hosted the COP13 in 2007. During President Yudhoyono’s term, many officials of DNPI and BP REDD+, both of which were tasked, among other things, to deal with Indonesia’s international stance on climate change matters, came from NGO backgrounds. For the government, the involvement of NGOs is necessary to improve the legitimacy and representativeness of the negotiation team and strengthen its understanding of the technical and scientific aspects of climate change. For political reasons, having NGOs as delegation members could also ease NGOs’ critical stance on issues such as deforestation. The involvement of NGOs, as well as academics, in the Indonesian negotiation team imported environmentalist liberal values which changed the state-centric bureaucratic life in Indonesia’s climate change diplomacy. Their international networks and shared values with other international NGOs help Indonesian foreign policy actors become socialised into the global environmental norm. This close collaboration between government and non-state actors has modified Indonesia’s approach in climate change negotiations from an Annex II hardliner to a more constructive actor which hoped to engage with different actors outside the G77 establishment.

Despite the rise of democratic principles which allow civil society organisations to campaign for a stronger commitment to climate change, at the same time, there has been an increasing influence from the opposite side, which is business sectors, such as coal and palm oil companies! Due to their business interests, members of this group developed a counter-narrative to pro-environment identity. When the Indonesian government agreed with Norway to implement a moratorium on palm oil from 2010, the association of Indonesian

---

palm oil companies initially did not express much opposition. They were engaged with the government’s policy and supported the moratorium through their advocacy on the sustainable palm oil concept. Nevertheless, after several months of the moratorium implementation, they frequently delivered disappointment over the moratorium policy and saw it as a burden of their contribution to Indonesia’s economic growth. Many of the companies, who have close economic and political relations with elites, remain able to retain the permit for continuing palm oil production despite the moratorium. Business sector’s pressures have prevented Indonesia from taking a more progressive stance such as that pursued by the EU. Pivoting behaviours are therefore a result of accommodating different identities – environmentalist and pro-business identities.

8.2.2 South Africa

As explained in section 8.1.2, South Africa’s expansion of hard powers in recent years is in fact less significant than many have observed. South Africa’s international activism is therefore more about its own identification as a member of ‘emerging power,’ rather than because of the accumulation of material capabilities. South Africa in fact promoted itself as a moral force by demonstrating profiles as a ‘good global citizen’ and ‘rainbow nation.’ Different from the apartheid regime, which was diplomatically isolated and distanced from the international affairs process, the post-apartheid era displayed South Africa’s international image through democracy and human rights values. As underlined by Chris Alden and Garth le Perre: ‘For the ANC, the struggle for an apartheid-free South Africa was a struggle for fundamental human rights. It was no coincidence, therefore, that once the ANC was in power, human rights became an important leitmotif in its foreign policy.’

Although the pro-human rights rhetoric was quite frequent during early years of post-Apartheid period, many cases, such as South Africa’s quiet diplomacy over Zimbabwe, raise the question as to why South Africa has pursued inconsistent foreign policies, which sometimes are in contradiction with democracy and human rights. The explanation of South Africa’s ambiguity between its rhetorically liberal values and its real policies, which often rebelled against the liberal order, can be pursued through a constructivist conceptual understanding. Instead of focusing on particular identities, it is more accurate to say that

637  Jörg Husar, Framing Foreign Policy in India, Brazil and South Africa: On the Like-Mindedness of IBSA States (Paris: Springer, 2016), 133.
South Africa’s transformation since 1994 involved a significant balance between liberal and revisionist views. On the one hand, it shares a liberal democratic identity with Western countries, but on the other hand it holds a belief that the West’s liberal identity does not fit with South Africa’s aspiration to advocate for the world’s equal and fair global governance. The revisionist views, which are reflected through its continuous demand for reforms of international institutions and systems, were motivated by South Africa’s perception that the liberal international order is inconsistent and often politically manipulated for the interests of more powerful Western states. On one interview, for example, Jacob Zuma criticised Western promotion of democracy and human rights.

People are constantly applying double standards. Take the United States, for example. Washington wants the whole world to admire the country for its democracy. Then the government sends out its army, in the name of this democracy, and leaves behind the kind of chaos we see in Iraq.639

South Africa’s pivoting behaviours attempt to balance these frequently mutually conflicting principles: liberal values and revisionist stances. Because of this struggle of identities, South Africa seeks to construct a particularly favourable foreign policy with each different foreign policy audiences. This clearly can be observed in the case of South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe, where a revisionist stance is preferred by South Africa, Zimbabwe and other SADC members, rejecting Western countries’ sanction policy. On the other hand, South Africa’s pro-sanction policy, which reflected liberal values, in relation to Madagascar was preferred because it was a policy on which South Africa shared values with Western countries.

The emergence of different state identities is a result of the domestic situation. Since the transition from apartheid, South Africa has to deal with two economic realities. Firstly, despite some economic problems during the final years of apartheid government such as high inflation and huge budget deficit, South Africa remains an economic weight in Africa. Its economy has been the most advanced and the most integrated economy in Africa. Secondly, however, South Africa has been the most unequal country in Africa. The unemployment rate is high. These contradictive situations required two contrasting

strategies. The first reality required South Africa strengthen its ties with Western countries with which South Africa enjoys significant trade relations. South Africa therefore adopted pro-investment and pro-trade policies such as privatisation of some state-owned companies and the relaxation of capital control. On the other hand, the second reality made South Africa to socially-oriented economic policies which focused on empowering black majority who suffered during the apartheid era. The contrasting principles resulted in some mixed policies which combined neoliberal and socialist values, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

The duality did not only occur in domestic policies, but also was reflected in foreign policies. South Africa often pursues some policies which can be perceived as multi-directional foreign policy, from committing to Africa and supporting South-south cooperation to improving North-South relations. Three post-Apartheid presidents showed significant efforts in managing these different identities. However, as explained in the section before, there is a puzzle which needs to be explained on why South Africa pursues an active policy of advocating IMF quota reform, which did not gain a clear and much support from other African countries, implying that South Africa has been closer to BRICS than Africa. This puzzle can be solved by understanding South Africa’s evolving identity under the three post-Apartheid presidents – Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma.

Mandela’s foreign policy was highly normative, especially with respect to human rights, to global equity issues, and broad development of Africa. South Africa was not concerned much about pursuing its realist interest. It, on the other hand, displayed a moralistic identity. Mandela wanted to revive South Africa’s international relations, which was severely damaged by international isolation during apartheid era, by demonstrating a role as an honest broker and bridge builder. Furthermore, Mandela’s bridge-builder attempt can be seen as another way of strengthening South Africa’s exceptionalism in the continent. As the history of post-colonial Africa was full of problems such as civil wars, coups and conflicts, Mandela wanted to put South Africa as a responsible international citizen.

During the early years of his presidency, Thabo Mbeki generally continued what Mandela had done. Given his background as a former top chief of diplomats the ANC during the talks with the Apartheid government, Mbeki has passion in foreign policy and personally he aspired to build a strong legacy in foreign policy. Different from Mandela whose ideas were mostly normative, Mbeki was also interested in putting his thoughts through institutional buildings. He was particularly concerned with African and South-South identities. In 1998 he came up with the African Renaissance and the NEPAD. He was also actively involved in
South-South grouping of like-minded countries, such as IBSA. Although some of his initiatives were trying to create a counter block to the West, Mbeki did not seek to delink or destabilise conversation with the West. He, for instance, attended the at the Progressive Governance Conference for which leaders from both developed and developing countries discussed current world affairs. South Africa even hosted its 2005 conference where Mbeki encouraged Western states to rethink about their approaches to address Africa’s socio-economic problems beyond pro-market policies. Mbeki was disappointed with the way Western states fulfilled their commitment to Africa, but he still significantly maintained close relations with Western countries.

Jacob Zuma, who came to power through political rivalry with Mbeki in 2009, attempted to undercut Mbeki legacy. There was somewhat of a crisis identity, as there was uncertainty over whether Zuma would continue Mbeki’s initiatives, such as NEPAD. Zuma’s rise to power was coincidentally at the same time with the establishment of BRIC. “…Zuma needs to find space for influence and he saw this is an opportunity. [therefore] South Africa began to lobby extensively to become a BRICS member….⁶⁴¹ Despite South Africa’s BRICS membership, South Africa has not played a prominent role in BRICS. Although South Africa advocated the Africa’s development issue, BRICS has more concern on global issues and does not much address African problems. BRICS countries commitments to Africa development remain limited to trade and investment, rather than a grand strategy to develop Africa.

BRICS is a scheme with which South Africa feels convenient, but not all BRICS agenda served South Africa’s interest. Zuma’s preference to collaborate with BRICS countries in issues, such as IMF quota reforms, is more personally motivated to differentiate himself in foreign policy with Mbeki by more intensively promoting South-South vision. The South-South narrative is on the other hand not ideological, but more pragmatic. Zuma would maintain Mandela and Mbeki’s legacy of becoming a bridge-builder, but for issues which Mbeki did not have a chance to express his precise position, Zuma would take more decisive and firm stance which contrasted himself with previous presidents. Despite the anti-Western speeches and statements, South Africa still needs the West to play a more prominent global role. As shown in the COP Durban, the collaboration with the EU allowed South Africa to mediate different factions in the negotiation. South Africa’s strong structural relations with the

⁶⁴¹ Mzukisi Qobo, op cit.
West, especially with regards to the EU as its largest export destination, contribute to South Africa’s characteristics as a pivot state which seek a role as a bridge-builder.

Zuma’s ability to manipulate South Africa’s foreign policy to become more-aligned with the identity of BRICS in certain issues was possible because of the strength and dominance of the ANC as the most influential political party in the post-Apartheid South Africa. Opposition parties play a minimum role in influencing foreign policy, given their small parliamentary seats. They are not interested to mobilise resources and energy to challenge Zuma’s foreign policy. There tend to be more agreement on issues of international relations. Questions from parliament in terms of foreign policy is more reactionary, than proactive.\textsuperscript{642} Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), one of two ANC’s allies, criticised the government’s decision to provide a $2 billion stand-by loan to the IMF, citing that the money allocated to the loan was better to be allocated to deal with South Africa’s massive socio economic problem.\textsuperscript{643} But, the ANC was quite dominant and able to undermine this kind of criticism. One scholar argues that South Africa’s political system is strangely a ‘one-party dictatorship within multiparty system.’\textsuperscript{644} This situation allows Zuma to bring South Africa’s foreign policy closer to BRICS in certain issues without much criticism.

In addition to domestic aspects, regional circumstances also significantly shaped South Africa’s pivoting behaviour. Because of his commitment to liberal values, Nelson Mandela was eager to take interventionist stances in several issues. Nevertheless, South Africa had to deal with the fact that many African countries did not welcome intervention. South Africa might have learned from the 1998 intervention to Lesotho. Following the fear over the civil unrest and possible military coup after a disputed election in Lesotho, South Africa sent 700 troops to Lesotho at the request of the Prime Minister of Lesotho Pakalitha Mosisili. Although the mission was successful in maintaining order and protecting the Lesotho government, there was a significant number of causalities, with more than 50 people being killed, including ten South African military personnel, and hundreds of residential and business areas in Lesotho were destroyed. More importantly, South Africa was accused by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia of pursuing a double-standard policy for its proactive intervention in Lesotho, but not in the DRC, which was strategically and economically less

\textsuperscript{642} Lesley Masters, \textit{op cit}. \\
\textsuperscript{644} Francis Kornegay, \textit{op cit}.

South Africa is generally wary of being seen as operating in a hegemonic style, even in its regional proximity in Southern Africa.\footnote{Chris Saunders, “Military Intervention in Conflict Situation in Africa: Thoughts on South Africa’s Role,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35, no. 2 (2013): 155.} South Africa does not always reject sanctions. Rather, through socialisation and interaction with targeted countries, South Africa was trying to search what best strategies to influence other regimes, which were generally considered impossible to be changed except through the implementation of sanctions.

8.2.3 Turkey

The previous section proved that Turkey’s rise of material capabilities is limited, so that its ability to pursue a relative gains ambition was constrained. Turkey also has also been experiencing a process of continuous social transformation which resulted in the emergence of new identities and norms. Turkish multiple identities were not something new, as since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1924, Turkey had to deal with such complex identities. Having said that, for decades until the end of the Cold War, Turkey chose to absorb a Western identity as its main ideological position. The end of the Cold War allowed the revival of Turkish multiple identities. Among several identities, four are particularly prominent: (1) European, (2) Islam, (3) regional leader and (4) developing country.

The first identity, which was translated to EU membership talk, did not only result in a prospect of Turkey’s being EU member, but also a more intense Turkey's socialisation to European norms and values. One important norm Turkey learned from the Europeanisation process was the decline of the Turkish military role in politics. The Turkish army played a role not only in protecting national integrity and unity, but also in guarding Ataturk’s secularist principles. Its EU membership application nevertheless forced Turkey to adopt a strong civilian control over the military. By 2004, there was significant progress on the elimination of the possibility of the military’s involvement in Turkish politics. As revealed in the European Commission’s 2004 Progress Report on Turkey: ‘… A number of changes have been
introduced over the last year [2003–2004] to strengthen civilian control of the military with a view to aligning it with practice in EU member States…  

EU's accession process has influenced Turkey's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

The post–Cold War period also saw the construction of Turkey's emerging Islamic identity, which from a constructivist perspective can be traced from both international contexts and domestic changes. From the international context, the construction of Islamic identity came from Turkey's learning from socialisation with its neighbouring countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a ‘power vacuum’ in the Middle East because Turkey’s regional rivals which were dependent on the Soviet Union, such as Iraq and Syria, lost a significant level of support from the Soviet Union. Turkey, which was for decades seen as a secular state and distinct from other Middle East countries, used Islam to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim population in Caucasus and Central Asia. In those regions, there was an increasing demand from the Muslim population in those countries for Islamic education. Turkey’s non-state organisations, especially from the Hikmet – or Gülen – Movement played a significant role in providing education, which was welcomed enthusiastically by the Muslim population.

From a domestic perspective, the rise of Islamic identity was the continuation of a process which was started in 1970, when Necmettin Erbakan established an Islamic party Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP), which was later banned by the authorities because its Islamic ideology violated the Turkish constitution. The Refah Party, a new form of the MNP which was also headed by Erbakan, won the election in 1995, but the number of parliamentary seats it won was not sufficient to form a government. Erbakan eventually took power in 1996 after a coalition of secularist parties led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz collapsed. Erbakan established some pro-Islamic world initiatives. He initiated the D8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (D8), inviting Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan in an attempt to reach Africa, East and Far Asia, especially these regions' Muslim populations. Erbakan was nevertheless in power for only one year. He stepped down amidst the military’s opposition to his pro-Islamic policies. Despite Erbakan’s resignation, the rise of Refah paved the way for a further rise of Islamic identity in Turkish politics. Refah won the mayoral elections in two of Turkey’s most important cities, Ankara and Istanbul, which allowed it to widen it political basis at local levels. Moreover, the pro-Islamic movement also

---

648 Mustafa Özgür Berke, op cit.
successfully gained support from Islamic-oriented entrepreneurs, who presented themselves as a new force vis-à-vis the economic domination of large family cartels and weak state-owned enterprises. The rise of political Islam was seen as a result of some part of Turkish society’s disappointment over the long decades of Westernisation from which they had not got much benefit.

The third identity which emerged was regional leaderidentity. In addition to Turkey’s much-vaunted diplomatic activity in Middle East, Turkey also tried to present itself as a leader in Central Asia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were popular ideas among Turkish elites for establishing a Pan-Turkic community which included former Soviet countries in Central Asia. President Turgut Özal initiated and hosted the first Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS) in 1992. However, in contrast to the emergence of more pluralist democratic systems and Islam identities, the Turkic identity did not successfully flourish. In that first summit, for instance, Turkey proposed ambitious ideas such as the establishment of a common market and of a development bank among Turkic countries, but these proposals were rejected by other countries. The Council meets periodically, but the concrete results so far are limited. A number of factors restricted the Turkic Council from developing further, including Russia’s strong influence and links with former Soviet republics.

The fourth identity is Turkey’s developing country identity. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey did not consider itself as a part of the Global South and did not join groupings of developing countries such as the G77 and the NAM. Turkish representatives indeed attended the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Indonesia, but Turkey later abandoned its engagement with the NAM due to other countries’ criticisms of Turkey’s pro-Western stance. NAM states also condemned Turkey for intervening in Cyprus. Turkey also shared developing countries’ concern on the reforms of global governance to make it better, more fair and just. Turkey sided with non-Western countries related to issues such as UN reform and IMF reform.

These four identities did not always go in harmony. They are often in contrast and conflicting. Turkey’s pivoting behaviour is thus motivated by its attempts to balance between

---


these multiple identities. Any attempt to move to a particular direction was subsequently checked by the pressure to move in another direction. Its constitution, for example, has restrained Turkey from a massive reorientation of Turkish foreign policy to a more Islamist-oriented stance. It is true that military intervention has been gradually reduced since the AKP won the election in 2002. But the secular principle was deeply entrenched in bureaucracy, academia, the economy and the daily life of Turkish society. Therefore, despite the rhetoric to challenge the Western-led international order, Turkey’s advocacy for reform of the international order is much more moderate than positions of BRIC countries.

Balancing these different identities is nonetheless uneasy. Turkish elites, however, are confident that Turkey has an ability to manage these multiple identities. Then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu argued that:

> Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade…. To achieve them, Turkey must progress in all directions and in every field, take an interest in every issue related to global stability…. This collective effort will make Turkey a global actor in this century. Turkey’s actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace.653

This elite-driven view nevertheless is not supported by the country’s capacity.654 Erdogan’s ideas of joining the SCO, for instance, which can be perceived as a way to diversify its security alliance with NATO, is not feasible due to strong relations between Turkish military and NATO. This condition restrained Turkey from pursuing a clear foreign policy.

While balancing between multiple identities sometimes provides benefit for Turkey through a chance to display a mediating role, Turkey also took a risk of being excluded and isolated from contributing to global issues. On climate change issues, for example, the multiple identities can be observed through Turkey’s unclear development status. Since the Kyoto Protocol, Turkey has portrayed itself as a developing country.

Turkey’s claimed status as a developing country has reasonable grounds. Turkey is more vulnerable than many other parts of the world. There is vulnerability over climate change. Therefore, asking for assistance for climate mitigation is reasonable. Looking at the history of industrialisation, the Turkish contribution to global emissions is generally low. Nevertheless, by positioning itself as a developing country, Turkey neglected the fact that it has among the highest levels of both economic growth and emissions growth in the OECD. By advocating its status as a developing country, which was not required to commit to emission reduction obligation, Turkey distanced itself from the European identity.

---

653 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *op cit.*

It is true that some OECD countries, such as South Korea and Mexico, were also not included into the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol. Both countries were not OECD members yet when negotiation under the UNFCCC was launched in 1994. The difference was that while these countries were willing to make some efforts to be active in climate change negotiations, Turkey did not much participate in communicating with like-minded countries to find a solution to global warming problems. Since joining the OECD, Mexico and South Korea had left the G77. But then, both countries are intensely active in UNFCCC, among others by establishing the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) in 2000 together with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Monaco. By not joining in any grouping, Turkey sits in a grey area by not aligning itself with particular negotiation blocs in the UNFCCC.

Turkey’s reluctance to adopt a more active climate policy is prompted by its sense of being lagged behind OECD and EU members. Although Turkey is one of the OECD founding members, it ranks low on many economic indicators. In term of GDP for instance, Turkey has the second lowest ranking after Mexico. Turkey also has the highest inflation rate and the widest gender gap for economic participation in OECD. Turkey’s aspiration to become an EU member boosted a strong viewpoint that Turkey has to catch up with EU’s level of economic development. The fact that Turkey has the lowest GDP per capita in OECD after Mexico also inspired Turkey’s elites to prioritize development over environment. This strong development ambition was mostly framed through the need for high economic growth, which unfortunately sacrificed environmental sustainability.

Turkey’s self-identification as an ambitious global actor – whose development level should be the same with European countries – made it more comfortable with an identity as a developing country, because this identity allowed Turkey to grow economically without constraint from environmental commitment. As long as the EU’s membership talk is stagnant, there is not much incentive for Turkey to adopt European identity, including pro-environmental policy. On the other hand, Turkey is also not fully able to display a characteristic as a developing country because if it joined groups of developing countries,

---

such as the G77 and BASIC, Turkey would directly face Western countries who would demand Turkey’s more progressive commitment.

The more obvious evidence of Turkey’s difficulty in balancing multiple identities can be observed from its decision to exert influence abroad through Islamic identity. Turkey initially saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to play a constructive role and promote itself as a model of democracy for Middle East. Nevertheless, when exerting influence abroad, the AKP used its Islamic roots by preferring to take a side in Syria and Egypt. The adoption of a more Islamic-oriented identity happened at the same time as the AKP government needed to consolidate domestic support after the AKP’s split with Gülen movement in 2013. While the AKP successfully retained domestic popularity by demonstrating ‘Islamist’ foreign policy, its pro-Western identity became less viable, as shown through its difficult relations with Western countries over issues such as Syria and refugees. Turkey’s partisan foreign policy also restrained it from becoming a regional leader. While in terms of capabilities Turkey is among the strongest in Middle East, its influence is significantly constrained.658

8.3 Conclusion

Analytic eclecticism, pursued by applying rationalism and constructivism, provides strong and complementary explanations to understand determinants of these three countries’ motivation to pursue certain behaviours. Rationalist hypothesis is confirmed in this section, as these three countries’ pivoting behaviours is motivated by their moderate expansion of hard power capabilities. Dividing Turkey into three periods is also helpful to understand the variation its behaviour. On the one hand, when Turkey enjoyed absolute gains offered through cooperation with European countries, it displayed a middle power’ characteristics. After its relative gains concern increased, Turkey drastically changed to behaviours which were closer to BRIC countries. After a relatively brief period, Turkey’s BRIC characteristics were then moderated which made it more appropriate to be categorised as a pivot state.

The constructivist hypothesis is also proved. The three countries have experienced the emergence of multiple identities. The rise of new identities, however, has not completely eliminated old identities. Instead, the old and new identities present at the same time, creating multiple identities which concurrently work in shaping their behaviours. They generally wished to hold these multiple identities concurrently, but in some cases, they had

to choose, because these identities were often in conflict. As a result, they decided to adopt a policy which reflected a fair and balanced relation between different identities and did not prioritise ones over others. However, the dynamic of domestic politics, as well as regional socialisation, often influence elites' decisions to favour one identity at the expense of others. This process can be observed through President Jacob Zuma's decision to side with BRICS regarding the IMF reforms which was shaped by the domestic political motivation of distinguishing himself from Mbeki’s bridge-builder legacy.
Chapter 9
Conclusion

Since the turn of the 21st century, there have been significant developments in international politics, particularly indicating the relative shift of power from the US-dominated order to a more diverse distribution of power. Numerous conflicts in many parts of the world and the 2008 global financial crisis particularly have changed relations among states as well as between states and non-state actors. In responding to these changes, numerous scholarly and policy-oriented writings have been devoted to analysing how new developments in what was long considered the Third World are shaping international politics. Non-Western countries which are growing economically, becoming more powerful militarily, and more politically influential aspire to obtain a more prominent diplomatic role. These countries, which are commonly called emerging powers, have been exercising foreign policies which often attempt to correct the current Western-dominated international order.

Related to that phenomenon, this thesis addresses a main puzzling question: how emerging powers outside the four most powerful countries (China, Russia, India and Brazil) behave in contemporary world politics. It has sought to show that our traditional paradigms of understanding and interpreting emerging powers has left a fundamental gap, which is the failure to recognise variation of countries in the category of emerging powers. The question is puzzling because non-BRIC emerging powers are very much overlooked in the large body of literature on emerging powers. Studies of emerging powers outside BRIC exist, but there is not much effort of to draw out commonalities across these countries. They are left behind by the mainstream literature on emerging powers. Hence, each candidate state for such a study is typically analysed in isolation, in terms of its own foreign policy objectives, strategies and obstacles. The lack of adequate investigation of non-BRIC emerging powers made a clear and comprehensive understanding of the impact of these nations on the changing international order difficult to achieve. This leads to an oversimplified and overgeneralised view that such states develop – and frame and reframe their foreign policies – in the same fashion as BRIC. This view has proved to be misleading because as established by this thesis, these three countries have displayed behaviours which are different from those of BRIC.
This final chapter summarizes main findings of this thesis which have been discussed in previous chapters. It then discusses most substantial contributions of this thesis to the intellectual debate on emerging powers. This chapter concludes by offering a few suggestions in terms of potential avenues for future research.

9.1 Main findings

This thesis is divided into seven chapters – excluding introduction and conclusion chapters - which reflect the elaboration of answers to three sub questions proposed in chapter 1. Across those chapters, conclusions which can be drawn are explained in points below.

1. Chapters 2 answered the first sub question on why it is necessary to locate BRIC and non-BRIC emerging powers into two separate categories. That section revealed that emerging powers outside BRIC have been significantly left out in the study of emerging powers. The focus of a large body of literature on BRIC countries which have significant economic and military strength has undermined the investigation of emerging powers outside BRIC. An exclusive focus on the BRIC ignores the significant impact of other emerging powers on current transition in global politics and economy. Non-BRIC emerging powers indeed exhibit different characteristics to BRIC, therefore a separate category of non-BRIC emerging powers needs to be established. BRIC countries, particularly, have a bigger ambition to become great powers than non-BRIC emerging powers.

2. After learning the necessity to establish non-BRIC emerging powers as a unit of analysis, chapter 2 explores the applicability of existing conceptual terms to explain non-BRIC emerging powers. Middle power and regional power concepts are selected for the discussion. Both middle power and regional powers have some strengths in describing these countries. Nevertheless, there are significant incompatibilities of the two concepts with non-BRIC emerging powers. Middle powers project themselves as good international citizens because they have been significantly integrated to the international order, while on the other hand non-BRIC emerging powers have aspiration to gain a more prominent position in the international system. Non-BRIC emerging powers display some characteristics of regional powers, but the concept of regional powers itself needs to be clarified further. Non-BRIC emerging powers indeed seem less powerful and/or less eager to assume leadership in their region than is common assumed. While in terms of material size non-BRIC emerging powers are larger than their immediate
neighbours, these states cautiously refrain from acting assertively. Insufficient explanation of both middle power and regional power concepts led this thesis to search a more accurate conceptual term. In that sense, the chapter then observed the benefit of looking at common behaviours as a basis to establish an analytical category of non-BRIC emerging powers.

3. Chapter 3 provided an answer to sub question 2 regarding ‘What general patterns can be found from countries in the non-BRIC emerging powers category and, using those patterns, how could that category be distinguished from other groups of countries?’ Chapter 3 started by arguing that a possible framework to interpret non-BRIC emerging powers is that of non-BRIC emerging powers as pivot states. The concept of pivot state is selected because the term is matched with behaviours observed from non-BRIC emerging powers which moving from one particular group or major power to another, preferring to stay in the middle between conflicting positions and employing diplomatic entrepreneurship if there is a chance. A set of three parameters have been framed to identify special behaviours pivot states display and to distinguish non-BRIC from BRIC and middle powers: (1) attitude towards the international order, (2) performed role, and (3) nexus between global and regional roles. Using these parameters, chapter 3 comes up with the definition of pivot states as: ‘states which since the turn of the 21st century pursue activism, pragmatism multidirectional foreign policy, and apply ‘pivoting behaviours’ which can be characterised as: (1) soft-revisionist towards the current global order, (2) normative bridge-builder and (3) a balanced role between the regional and global stages.’

4. Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7 test three selected countries – Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey – for their possible compatibility with the concept of pivot state. These three countries’ behaviours are investigated through their roles in three thematic case studies – states of concern, climate change and global economic governance -. The three countries in the case studies have consistently demonstrated pivot state behaviours, which differentiate them from other groups of nations (middle powers and BRIC). Indonesia’s tendency for pivoting behaviour is consistent for the given period from the political reform in 1998 to 2015 across thematic case studies.

5. South Africa has mostly displayed a pivot state’s characteristics. Contrary to other members of BRICS and BASIC, South Africa demonstrated a more flexibility in engaging with different countries / group of countries. Regarding climate change issue, for example, South Africa took a more progressive stance by offering voluntary emission
reduction much earlier than China and India. As proved in chapter 6, South Africa’s alignment with BASIC is more rhetorical than concrete. Its close engagement with African countries through the AGN and its cooperation with the EU provided South Africa with a more tangible result, as shown through its success in mediating different parties when hosting the COP 17 in Durban. On global economic governance issue, South Africa’s pivot state characteristics are partially confirmed. The pivot state concept is proved through South Africa’s intention to become a bridge builder and accommodative regional leader for its efforts to bring the interest of Africa in the G20. On the other hand, South Africa demonstrated a behaviour of BRIC by pursuing a strong revisionist vision on IFIs reforms. Although South African leaders believe that its revisionist stance does not contradict with its ambition to represent African interest there is a clear difference between these attitudes, as the 2010 IMF quota reform did not benefit many African countries.

6. Turkey demonstrated complex behaviours across the three case studies which are better to be observed by dividing them into three phases. Between 2002 and 2009, Turkey displayed characteristics of a middle power, as it demonstrated tendency for a closer relation with the West. In contrast, roughly between 2009 and 2011, Turkey demonstrated behaviours of BRIC by pursuing revisionist stances and more globally-oriented ambition. In the third phase, which is between 2011 and 2015, Turkey moderated its revisionist policies and displayed characters which were matched with those of pivot state. Turkey has been displaying frequently-changed stances by moving around camps, particularly between the US and Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other hand with respect to issues such as Iran, Syria and refugee. This could be dangerously perceived as inconsistent and unclear by international actors.

7. Chapter 8 provides answers to sub question 3, which is ‘what are the determinants of general patterns observed in non-BRIC emerging powers?’ Analytic eclecticism, which consisted of rationalist and constructivist perspectives, provided valuable insights. From a rationalist view, the reason for pivoting behaviour is the modest expansion of material capabilities which forced them to pursue more realistic and feasible strategies. Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey indeed experienced the modest expansion of material capabilities. This situation rationalised their decision to be more concerned with intangible relative gains.

8. Indonesia has demonstrated this concern by persuasively engaging Myanmar government, instead of either pushing for sanctions and intervention or strictly applying
non-interference principle. This strategy gained Indonesia a positive image as an effective regional leader and democratic promotor, although in terms of relative gains—such as material benefit from Myanmar—Indonesia did not much benefit from its efforts.

9. South Africa’s modest expansion of hard power capabilities also made it rationalise its decision for not taking a hardline position in climate change negotiation. Instead, collaboration with different actors beyond BASIC countries, including the AGN and the EU, was necessary to deal with South Africa’s two conflicting situations: (1) its demand for more resources allocated to deal with climate change and (2) its status as the largest emitter—both in total and per capita—in Africa.

10. Turkey’s change from characteristics of middle power to those of BRIC occurred because Turkey did not receive many absolute gains it desired from close cooperation with Western countries, including the EU and NATO. This condition encouraged Turkey to look for relative gains vis-à-vis the Western-led international order. Nevertheless, given Turkey’s constrained capacity and the fact that its current development and progress are a result of its close connection with the West, Turkey failed to obtain much relative gains. As a result, it became more concerned with intangible relative gains by moderating criticism towards the West and the international order and presenting itself as a more constructive actor, such as when it hosted the UN Conference on the LDCs.

11. Constructivist ideas cover issues which are overlooked by rationalism which is the change of state’s identity and interest. The constructivist hypothesis, as developed in chapter 3, suggest that pivoting behaviours are pursued as a way to balance the increasingly multiple identities. In the case of Indonesia, democracy becomes a growingly more important foreign policy identity. Nevertheless, given the existence of strong nationalist sentiments, which are reluctant to accept foreign intervention on Indonesia’s domestic affairs, Indonesia pursued a middle-way policy regarding Myanmar by trying to compromise both a strong interventionist demand from human rights groups and a non-interventionist tendency of national chauvinistic spirit.

12. Constructivist investigation helped explain South Africa’s decision to take a side with BRICS on IMF reforms despite the fact that the 2010 reforms did not benefit Africa. Although an aspiration to reform global governance has been consistently promoted by the post-Apartheid South Africa, it is President Jacob Zuma who pursues a stronger advocacy to the Global South interest and, to some extent, downgrades South Africa’s
role as a North-South bridge. As argued in chapter 8, the decision of aligning with BRICS in the global economic governance issue was more influenced by a domestic constellation where the Jacob Zuma’s administration was trying to build a different legacy from Thabo Mbeki’s bridge-builder policy.

13. Constructivist ideas are also useful to explain Turkey’s behaviours. On the one hand, Turkey’s increasingly multiple identities – European, Islam, Turkic-area regional leader and developing country – required Turkey to take a middle position by not prioritising one identity over another. The uncertainty regarding EU’s membership talk, however, changed Turkey’s identification as a European country. It can be observed from the climate change case where Turkey refused to take a progressive climate change policy, claiming that it is a developing country which still needs to grow to catch up with the Europe’s level of development. Despite identifying itself as a developing country, Turkey did not participate in any developing country groupings as it was fear of being pushed by the EU to adopt a more pro-environment policy, as the EU has done to China and India. This created a somewhat crisis of identity which eventually excluded Turkey from taking a more prominent position in the climate change debate.

14. From rationalist perspective, pivot states would move closer to BRIC countries if BRIC offer more gains, and vice versa. On the other hand, the constructivist framework looks at the state’s capability to manage increasingly complex state identities as the main factor influencing the pivoting behaviours. If, due to domestic and international factors, these pivot states identified themselves with BRIC’s identity, then they would be moving closer to BRIC.

From all the above points, this thesis comes up with a resulting statement:

Contrary to many analyses that regard non-BRIC emerging powers, such as Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey in the same category as four largest emerging powers – China, India, Russia and Brazil -, the concept of pivot states has proved to be more useful and accurate in explaining those countries, as the concept clearly captures unique characteristics of them which can be summarised as pivoting behaviours (soft-revisionist, normative bridge-builder and accommodative regional leadership) in current contemporary international politics.

Pivot states’ characteristics are located in a conundrum between those of BRIC and middle powers. These pivot states are ‘dancing’ between more powerful countries. These countries
are well placed in the middle of an increasing divide between the ‘old powers’, which are comprised of the US and its Western allies, and the large emerging powers which have great power ambition. Being located in the middle, the ‘dancers’ are sometimes pivoting closer to either BRIC or the West. But more often they are maintaining a skilful strategic autonomy by keeping distances from either BRIC or the West and trying to present their constructive roles.

**9.2 Contributions to academic literature**

This thesis makes three key contributions to a large body of literature:

1. This thesis aims to be among the first studies which observe emerging powers beyond the more popularly and scholarly observed BRIC nations. It is of course not the first to investigate the foreign policy of each country in the case studies, but it provided a useful way of looking at countries in the category of emerging powers and variation in that category. Emerging powers and the term ‘emergence’ itself was created by the World Bank, Goldman Sachs and other institutions which were essentially business-driven. Therefore, despite the widespread use of emerging powers, the investigation of these countries often does not go deeper. Non-BRIC emerging powers are particularly ignored in the lack of deeper investigation of emerging powers. These countries are much more diverse than BRIC because the number of states which can be categorised as non-BRIC is large. Initially, when choosing these three countries in this study (Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey), there are neither the same strengths nor extremely similar development challenges across the group of three countries. In the real world, no two countries constitute very similar situations. But from this thesis, looking at similar types of behaviour could give an alternative and valid way to identify these three countries and then to categorise them into a group of pivot states.

2. As explained in this thesis, pivot states display behaviours which uniquely distinguish themselves from other existing groups of countries. Acknowledging the existence of pivot states and their unique behaviours and roles encouraged a more accurate policy formulation in engaging these countries. Their concern about intangible relative gains, for example, makes the policy of engagement and dialogue more productive. IN dealing with states of concern, for example, South Africa has displayed a more open and flexible behaviours regarding the use of international intervention than BRIC countries. South Africa is also much more interested in becoming a regional manager. Therefore, South
Africa has several points of intersection with the West in dealing with the conflict. If Western countries would like to see a more positive result of Zimbabwe’s political crisis, they should engage in a constructive, open and equitable dialogue with South Africa, instead of criticising it, on how to deal with Zimbabwe’s crisis. Although South Africa’s quiet diplomacy seemed slow and not conclusive, it is a method which is respected by SADC countries to navigate the conflict and prevent it from further escalation.

3. This thesis contributes to the more useful operationalisation of the concept of ‘pivot states.’ As explained in chapter 3, pivot states have been widely used, but the conceptualisation remains vague and unclear as it relies much on the major powers’ perception of these states. This thesis’ understanding of pivot states is built from Ian Bremmer’s definition that a pivot state holds a belief that there was no need to choose between the West and the alternative order. Having said that, different from Bremmer who saw the state’s ability to pivot was based on the increasing material capabilities they have, this thesis incorporates a domestic structural analysis which allows the understanding of the impact of identity on state’s behaviours. As proved through the case studies, the formulation of identities is crucial for the pivot states to diversify their relations and engage with different part of the world at the same time with the same enthusiasm, energy and efficiency.

4. This thesis also makes a significant contribution by operationalising the analytic eclecticism framework. Analytic eclecticism is a relatively new concept and has not been used much to provide a solid explanation for political events. In this thesis, the combination of rationalism (neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) and constructivism gave a strong and comprehensive account for explaining states’ behaviours. Analytic eclecticism has provided answers about the conditions of states’ emerging behaviours, as well as their potential trajectories, by opening the ‘black box’ of the state and examining both domestic and external factors which conditioned state’s behaviours.

5. Rationalist and constructivist frameworks provide complementary arguments. Regarding South Africa’s close relations with BRICS on IMF reforms, for example, rationalist prediction cannot provide a clear picture of why South Africa strongly pushed for the 2010 IMF reforms package, as both South Africa and Africa did not benefit from the reform. The answer to this question is provided by constructivism which concluded that it was the changing political leadership that shaped South Africa’s pro-BRICS policy. On the other hand, constructivism alone will not be useful to explain pivot states’ activism. Indonesia,
for example, could not assert a significant role on Myanmar political crisis if it was in economic difficulty. Material aspects and gains consideration matter in state’s behaviours. This is in line with the realist perspective that with the absence of effective global authority, what matters the most for each state is its control over material capabilities, where economic and military capabilities are crucial elements.

9.3 Potential avenues for future research

This research is not without a significant potential for fruitful extensions. Firstly, learning from contributions explained in the previous section, the concept of pivot state could potentially be used to explain some countries which are often regarded as emerging powers, such as such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Colombia or Mexico. Mexico, for instance, is structurally similar to Turkey. Both countries in recent years have been trying to move away from Western influence and engage with different powers in the world. Nevertheless, they cannot really ‘escape’ from the West given Turkey’s close economic, social, and security ties to Europe, while Mexico is close to, and somewhat dependent on, the US. What they can do is not present alternatives to the current US-led system, as pursued by Brazil, Russia, China and India, but rather influence change in the current international order from within, as shown by pivot states in the case studies.

Secondly, the investigation of pivot states will also be strengthened by incorporating more countries in the analysis. Although discussing more countries in the cross-country analyses of behaviours could dilute the analytical process, as noted in chapter 4, it could enable ones to construct a pattern of commonalities which represent a more significant number of countries.

Finally, the future research should continue exploring the further application of analytic eclecticism. This thesis has proved the usefulness of analytic eclecticism concept to identify reasons behind the pivoting behaviours. Nevertheless, this dissertation only used two major IR frameworks, which are rationalism and constructivism. Future research should consider the applications of other IR theories, such as English School, post-modernism and post-structuralism, when applying analytic eclecticism.

APPENDIX I

List of interviewees


6. Dr. Altay Atli. Lecturer at the Asian Studies graduate program. Boğaziçi University. Istanbul. 2 December 2015.


12. Dr. Barış Doster. Associate Professor of political science and international relations. Marmara University. Email interview, 10 June 2016.


15. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science. Bilkent University. Email interview, 10 June 2016.


22. Dr. Mustafa Kutlay. Director of Centre for EU Studies. USAK. Ankara. 27 November 2015.

23. Dr. Lesley Masters. Senior Lecturer at the SARChI Research Chair for African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg. Johannesburg. 2 October 2014


33. Dr. Oktay Tannsever. Professor in the Department of International Relations. Middle Eastern Technical University. Ankara. 30 November 2015.

34. Dr. İlhan Uzgel. Professor in the Department of International Relations. Ankara University. Ankara. 26 November 2015.

35. Dr. Harold Winkler. Member of the South Africa delegation to climate change negotiation and associate professor at the Energy Research Centre. University of Cape Town. Phone interview. 2 October 2014.
36. Dr. Dinna Wisnu. Dean of the Graduate School of Diplomacy. Paramadina University. Jakarta. 6 November 2014.


APPENDIX II
Sample questions to interviewees

1. Why did Indonesia not join in BASIC in the COP 15 in Copenhagen?

2. How did Indonesia decide to be abstain in the UNSC’s vote on Myanmar?

3. How was interaction between Indonesia and other ASEAN countries when discussing about Myanmar case?

4. Indonesian elites often claim that Indonesia is a *primus inter pares* in ASEAN? Do other ASEAN nations perceive Indonesia in that way?

5. What do you think about the role of civil societies in foreign policy making in Indonesia?

6. How does Indonesia see the slow progress of IMF reform?

7. How intense is the communication between Indonesia and BRICS countries in the G20?

8. Is it still relevant to regard ASEAN as Indonesia’s foreign policy cornerstone?

9. How is interagency coordination in Indonesia’s foreign policy?

10. What do you think about current South Africa foreign policy, especially in relations with BRICS?

11. South Africa often incorporates an ambition to represent Africa’s interest into its foreign policy. How effective is this ambition?

12. How does South Africa see the African Group of Negotiators?

13. How does South Africa define its role in the Committee of Ten?

14. Why did South Africa not take a firm position to condemn the brutality of Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe?

15. How big is the influence of state-owned companies and private companies in South Africa’s climate change policy?

16. How important is foreign policy to the ANC?

17. How significant is the influence of opposition parties on the formulation of foreign policy in South Africa?

18. Is IBSA still relevant, compared to BRICS?

19. When South Africa pledged $2 billion loan to IMF, was there any influence from other BRIC members in that decision?
20. How does Turkey in general perceive China and its rise from geopolitical and economic perspectives?

21. Turkey in recent years intended to become an observer in various regional organisation across the world, such as ASEAN and the ACS. What is a concrete target from pursuing this policy?

22. How do you predict Turkey’s position in the COP 21 in Paris?

23. How much is the influence of NGOs in Turkey’s climate change policy?

24. How do you see Turkey’s intention to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

25. How does Turkey look at the prospect of MIKTA?

26. Do you think that Turkey has a capacity to offer a mediation regarding IMF reforms issue?

27. Turkey’s energy supply significantly comes from Russia. How does it influence Turkey’s foreign policy?
Bibliography

A. Books


Sukma, Rizal. *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy.* London: Routledge, 2014


B. Peer-reviewed journal articles


Aras, Bulent and Emirhan Yorulmazlar. “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring: Finding a Middle Ground.” *Middle East* 21, no. 4 (2014): 112-120.


Dogan, Y. P. “Turkey to become Key Carbon Market to Kick CO₂ Habit.” Today's Zaman, 4 March 2009.


Wehner, Leslie E. “Inter-Role Conflict, Role Strain and Role Play in Chile’s Relationship with Brazil,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 35, no. 1 (2016): 64-77.


**C. News and op-ed articles**


---

**D. Reports, policy papers, speeches, statement, documents and data**


ASEAN Secretariat. “Chairman’s Statement of the 17th ASEAN Summit and Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.” 2010.


E. Dissertation and conference papers


