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SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS, 1945-1968

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
August 1986
This thesis is my own original work

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968. The study is placed in the broader context of Soviet-Third World relations. It analyses the major issues and charts the trends that dominated Soviet-Indonesian relations during the period under survey. It begins with a background study of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1917 to 1945. This is followed by an examination of Soviet policies towards Indonesia under Stalin from August 1945 to March 1953. The next two chapters examine relations between the two countries under the leadership of Khrushchev, the first tracing the developments leading to the growing warmth and the second towards the growing chill in relations. The fifth chapter examines relations under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. The thesis ends with a brief summary of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968, the examination of Soviet gains and losses and the evaluation of the Soviet experience in Indonesia in the light of its Third World relations.

In the main, the study is issue-oriented, and purports to explain Soviet behaviour towards specific developments in Indonesia. It examines Soviet policies towards Indonesia in the light of its competing global and regional needs on the one hand, and the competing, often conflicting, ideological and national interests priorities, on the other. The object is to show that Soviet foreign policy cannot simply be described as being ideological or national interest-oriented or that its goals are always viewed from the regional or global perspective.
The study highlights the shifts in Soviet policies towards Indonesia in the context of the changing domestic and international alignments, interests and environment. This in turn demonstrates how Soviet leaders have visualised developments in Indonesia and how changing priorities, policies and interests have called into question strongly held views. It also analyses the interplay of great power rivalries on a regional scene, on the one hand and the conflicting needs and policies of regional powers on the other and how these have been brought to bear on Soviet foreign policy as far as Indonesia is concerned.

The study also analyses the place of Indonesia in the context of the constant reassessment and revision of Soviet attitudes toward the Third World. When it became clear to Soviet policy makers that the policy of isolation was unsuccessful, how did they relate with Indonesia? When it became evident that neutralism and non-alignment were the bases of the foreign relations of many of the new states, how did these have a bearing on Soviet-Indonesian relations? When the weakness of the proletariat and local communist parties was recognised and the Soviet Union introduced the doctrines of national and revolutionary democracies, where did Indonesia stand in Soviet ideological thinking? Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, the goal of scientific socialism and workers' states was pushed into the future and the immediate task stated as the increase of Soviet influence in the Third World. How was this realised as far as Soviet-
Indonesian relations were concerned? How exactly did these changes come to bear on Indonesia and as to whether Soviet-Indonesian relations conformed with the existing pattern or 'line' is detailed in this study.
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The phrases 'Soviet perceptions', 'Soviet perspectives', and 'Soviet attitudes', present methodological problems that must be at least briefly discussed here. As a closed society, which controls all forms of communication including publishing, the Soviet Union produces a vast amount of propaganda for external as well as internal purposes. In a way, since everything published must pass the censor, except for the illegal samizdat (independent press), the foreign observer can be sure that the output represents what the leadership wants the public (domestic or foreign) to know. As Sergei Yakobson, Chief of the Slavic and Central European Division of the Library of Congress, has argued:

In a totalitarian regime, such as prevails in the Soviet Union, neither the title of a publication nor its contents, point of emphasis, choice of audience, and focus of attention are left to chance. By itself, a specific item may sometimes look small and insignificant, but in context of a comprehensive bibliography of Soviet literature the mere fact of its release provides a clue as to the intent of the party and government and gives better understanding of the manipulation of mass media in Communist society.

An analysis of Soviet bibliographical listings provides not only information as to what has been published in the Soviet Union but also data for study as to why a particular body of material was chosen for publication by the Soviet rulership. It does not mean that the published material represents the true perceptions of the decision makers. In fact, Soviet decision makers very often conceal their views to confuse their opponents and gain advantage by surprise.

Thus, great caution must be exercised in assessing the signals that emanate from closed societies. The first step, then, is to develop a classification scheme and a rating scale for the various kinds of signals. Some signals originate at the highest level, that is, from the Politburo and, most often, from the General Secretary. The occasions differ, but one should look at the quinquennial congresses of the Communist


Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as well as at speeches, interviews, statements, joint communiqués and the like. Editorials and other authoritative statements in Pravda, Izvestia, broadcasts from Radio Moscow, and TASS (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza) releases, all signify the official imprimatur. Pravda (Truth), the official Party daily, has remained by far the most authoritative and influential organ of the CPSU. Izvestia (News), the official government newspaper, has been described as "the Party's faithful assistant in the strengthening of Party ties with the masses in the development of socialist democracy". These two organs have been extensively utilised in the present study.

An entirely different function is served by the Soviet propaganda machine, whether for domestic political purposes or for moulding world public opinion. Here, we find mass circulation daily newspapers, weekly and monthly periodicals, pamphlets openly marked v pomoshch' propagandistu "to aid the propagandist", and general interest books for the lay public, issued in tens or even hundreds of thousands of copies. In this category, four publications have been used in this study whenever relevant: the national organ of the Young Communist League, Komsomol'skaya Pravda (Young Communist League Truth), the national organ of the trade unions, Trud (Labour), the military newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) and Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette), the organ of the literary organizations.

In addition to radio broadcasts and such illustrated magazines as Soviet Life and Soviet Woman, the foreign public is provided with foreign-language editions of several Soviet journals. The most frequently published is the popular Novoe vremia - New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs - which is also published in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish and Czech editions. Next in frequency of publication is Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn - International Affairs: A Monthly Journal of Political Analysis issued by the All-Union 'Znanie' (Knowledge) Society in Russian, English and French, and the monthly Asia i Afrika segodnia in its bimonthly foreign edition, Asia and Africa

3. Speech by N.V. Podgorny, reported in Izvestia, 14 March 1967.
Today: Bi-Monthly Scientific and Socio-Political Journal of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa of the USSR Academy of Sciences, published in English and French. Also of interest to us is the more recent (since the early 1970s) quarterly, Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka - Far Eastern Affairs: A Quarterly of Social Science and Political Analysis - published by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in English, Spanish and Japanese. There are also other official Soviet English-language journals such as Soviet Military Thought. There are no copyright restrictions whatsoever on this type of Soviet material designed for a foreign audience, as every publication includes the statement "Any articles and other materials in the journal may be reproduced with due acknowledgement".

It should be noted, however, that the foreign-language editions of Soviet publications do not contain all the material appearing in the Russian-language version. Some of the omissions, often in the book review section, may be due simply to space limitations. At other times, there may be political considerations, such as the omission of a commentary on the results of Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States. This clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of research on the Soviet Union which is based only on English-language sources.

Somewhat less propagandistic are scholarly Soviet monographs and book reviews in scholarly journals. Outright, blatant anti-American propaganda seldom occurs, although it is de rigueur to start a scholarly article or monograph with an appropriate quotation from Lenin's Collected Works, followed by a quotation from a recent pronouncement on the subject by the current General Secretary of the CPSU.

While Soviet mass propaganda journals, such as New Times or Asia and Africa Today, do not, as a rule, provide an apparatus of bibliographical citations, articles in the more scholarly journals do document many of the statements.

and statistical data. Here, one has to be careful, as a very skillful game is played with quotations. To be sure, many sources are quite legitimate, such as the use of primary documentation for speeches and statements of Soviet leaders and some of their allies. The quoting of their antagonists is very selective and is done to suit the purposes of the Soviet writer, sometimes quoting a primary Chinese, Indian, Indonesian or American source, but often citing a Soviet or a Western newspaper. Given the diversity of the Western, Indian, Indonesian and Japanese press, it is not surprising that they are prominently cited to buttress a point made by the Soviet author. The Soviet articles will often cite a Western publication, without identifying it as such, thus giving credence to the Soviet position, as though it was supported by a non-Soviet newspaper. At times a statement in quotation marks authoritatively claiming, for example, that the Chinese leaders "in their assessment of the situation in the world put an equation mark between the imperialist, militaristic policy of the United States and the peaceloving, essentially anti-war policy of the countries of the socialist community" turns out to be from Izvestia or Pravda. 

Thus, Soviet sources should not be cited indiscriminately without assessing sources, their potential audience, their propaganda mission, and their likely meaning. This is often accomplished by reading between the lines, looking for what the Soviet sources do not mention. On the whole, Western studies of Soviet foreign relations have relied too much on analysing declaratory policy, and less on examining Soviet actions. There is a definite limit on what can be made of Soviet pronouncements, whether official statements or unofficial writings. I therefore approach my task of trying to describe "Soviet relations with Indonesia" with a great deal of trepidation. Even if we leave aside the propagandistic and self-serving statements, what are we to make of serious Soviet scholarly analyses? Do these writings reach the decision makers,  

and if they do, how much influence do they have? Can we ever be certain of what we read? I am afraid I do not have answers to these questions. Nonetheless, it is important to find out what the input is and how it has changed over time as far as Soviet-Indonesian relations are concerned. Nevertheless, it should constantly be borne in mind that every opportunity is taken by Soviet writings and publications to push forward the existing 'line' of the time. The 'line' here being interpreted as the position adopted and pushed forward by the Soviet leadership or its propagandists at any one time on a specific issue or development. This is achieved by the various control mechanisms. Ultimately, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU has the last word on any issue. Officially, however, the State Committee on the Press of the Council of Ministers is the governing body for all publishing matters in the Soviet Union, and this body is constantly subject to Party direction. Despite this, the principal newspaper censorship agency is the Main Administration for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press. This agency is formally attached to the State Committee on the Press and the Council of Ministers, but actually works directly under the guidance of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department Press Sector.  

In recognition of this control mechanism, it is apparent that all publications are closely controlled and directed and hence we can expect to read the existing 'line' at any one time. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that different publications in the Soviet Union would thrust forward conflicting views, even though there may be differences in emphasis, as with Pravda being more concerned with ideological and party affairs, Izvestia with state-to-state relations and Krasnaya zvezda with military matters. As and when such difference in emphases are discovered, they will be highlighted in the study. Otherwise, Soviet works on Indonesia will be referred to largely to indicate the existing 'line' on Soviet-Indonesian relations and the Kremlin's position and policy on various developments in Indonesia and others.

related to it. At the same time, attention would be focussed on not just what is said but what is done. In the final analysis, Soviet relations with Indonesia would be judged on the basis of the Kremlin's words and deeds.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1945, fluctuating relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia have been one of the most dynamic aspects of the foreign policies of these two countries. The friendship between them has manifested itself in numerous forms of cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and military fields. The relationship has, however, been plagued with problems, caused largely by the clash of national interests. Western study of Soviet international and domestic behaviour has carried the bias of these societies toward the Soviet Union, probing Soviet deportment with a view to discovering the motives for the spread of Communism and its power. It is not suggested that the Soviet Union does not pursue its foreign policy with these objectives in mind, but that such a point of view is inadequate for understanding the course of Soviet-Indonesian relationship, as the transactions are more likely to have served the national interests of both countries rather than that of the Soviet Union's alone.

Like any other state, the Soviet Union's foreign policy is shaped by its leadership's view of the world, its national interests and the international balance of power at any given time. It has to respond to unexpected problems, threats and opportunities thrown up by the course of developments in the international system. The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as one of the strongest military powers, but, unlike the United States, remained for many years a continental and not a global power. Soviet foreign policy underwent a major change in the mid-1950s, and under
the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow expanded its political, economic and cultural ties with the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. In the context of the changed Soviet foreign policy orientation, this thesis examines the evolution of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968, in the vortex of interacting decisions of both countries, as well as those of the United States, the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China (PRC) insofar as these affected Soviet-Indonesian relations.

It is also useful to highlight that since 1975, and more so since 1978, it has become rather common to speak of the 'Soviet offensive in Southeast Asia'. This refers basically to the growing Soviet involvement in Indochina and of the alliance relationship with Vietnam, including the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Added to this, there is also a visible expansion of Soviet 'diplomatic offensive' in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, with more regular visits by various Soviet delegations. While the expanding Soviet involvement in the region at present is undeniable, it is, however,

erroneous to view this as something novel. It is equally mistaken to maintain that the Soviet Union is a new actor in the region. In many ways, Soviet interests in Southeast Asia are long-standing and its involvement predates 1975. This is most vividly demonstrated by Soviet Union's relations with Indonesia from 1945 to 1968, the focal period for this study.

The Study

This thesis examines Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968. It will analyse Moscow's relations with Jakarta and plot the course of bilateral relations in the context of domestic, regional and global developments. The study will concentrate mainly on state-to-state relations. However, where party-to-party relations do intervene in the affairs between the two countries, they will be accounted for, but state-to-state relations will still constitute the main component of this thesis. The rationale for this study will be best understood after a review of the existing literature on Soviet-Indonesian relations has been undertaken.

Review of the Literature

A review of the literature on Soviet-Indonesian relations during the period under study indicates that work has so far been confined to three broad areas: the development of Indonesian Communism, the Indonesian Revolution and relations in the context of specific crises faced by the Indonesian Government. The three main crises covered here are the West Irian dispute, the Malaysian Confrontation and the October 1965 'coup'.
The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and its relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Third International (Comintern) have been the focus of many studies for obvious reasons. Not only was it the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, but also the most powerful political party in the country. It was also the first communist party in Asia. Ruth McVey's study of the PKI's development "from its birth in 1914 to its temporary eclipse in 1927 after a disastrous revolt attempt" was a major contribution to our understanding of the CPSU/Comintern links with the PKI. She examined the factors leading to the birth and growth of the PKI, its cooperation and conflict with the other political parties, especially the Sarekat Islam (SI), its cooperation and later defiance of the Comintern, leading finally to the 1926/1927 uprisings, which nearly obliterated the party.

Her next work, co-authored with Harry Benda, delves into the PKI's 1926/1927 revolts, which were seen as "a significant event which had a considerably greater impact on Indonesia's subsequent political development than the actual strength marshalled by the communists might suggest". This work elaborates on the rebellion as well as on the background factors that led to it. The writers concluded, in dissension with the Dutch Governor-General's Reports.

that these revolts were "primarily Indonesian, internal uprisings in which international Communism and its spokesmen in the colony played tangential, rather than originating or causal, roles". 

Charles McLane, though in greater brevity and without the same documentary strength as McVey, covered the same ground, explaining the birth of the PKI, its love-hate relations with the Comintern and, finally, its eclipse after the 1926/1927 uprisings. McLane, however, goes a step further in examining the fate of the PKI after the 1926/1927 disaster and traces the party's activities through to the 1930s. During this phase, the PKI was declared illegal and its members kept alive the party's flame by joining political parties that had legal existence and which became the centres of the continuing efforts to overthrow Dutch rule. McLane maintained that "had Moscow's tactics in Indonesia been more flexible, ex-communists might have been used to bring the nationalists greater into closer harmony with Soviet objectives. As it was, communists gained prominence with the nationalist movement only in Perhimpunan Indonesia, the organization of Indonesian Students in Holland, an organization whose voice in affairs at home was becoming limited".

McLane is again alone in examining Soviet perspectives on Indonesia during the Second World War. Even though the Indonesian Communists were restricted by Soviet 'anti-fascist' policies during

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6. ibid, p.xix.
8. ibid, pp. 191-192.
the war from open collaboration with the Japanese and were active only in underground anti-Japanese movements, on the whole, the PKI was a secondary force in Indonesian politics at this phase. It was thus not surprising that "Soviet wartime coverage on Indonesia was confined to surveys of the pre-war period, studies on local geography and at rare intervals, description of naval battles in the vicinity".  

The Indonesian Revolution, following on the heels of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, is covered by both McVey and McLane. The former elucidates the Soviet attitude towards the Indonesian revolt against Netherlands' rule and in the process examined the dilemma confronted by Moscow which it has generally faced in its Asian dealings: "Whether to sacrifice local communist interests in an attempt to gain the friendship of the nationalist movement, or to push communist efforts to gain power at the risk of alienating Asian nationalism". This dilemma was vividly demonstrated during the various phases of the Indonesian revolutionary war and especially during the PKI's 1948 Madiun revolt. In another work, McVey maintained that "whatever may have been the role of later Soviet machinations in the Republic, there is little reason to suspect that the Calcutta meeting fomented the insurrection of 1948". McLane also alluded to the Soviet dilemma in Indonesia during the Revolution: "The Kremlin was faced with two alternatives: should it

continue to accept the Indonesian Republic as constituted, not only under Sjariffudin but equally under Sukarno, Hatta and other decidedly non-communist nationalist leaders? Or should Moscow turn against the nationalist leadership... in favour of a more vigorous effort by communists to seize power in their own right?" 12 On Madiun, McLane maintained that "Moscow perhaps bore some general responsibility for the PKI’s strategies through its more truculent posture in world affairs since Zhdanov’s speech in Poland a year earlier". 13

The literature on Soviet-Indonesian relations after the Dutch colony gained independence focussed on two aspects: the rise and fall of the PKI and the relations between the two countries in the context of the various crises. McVey examined PKI’s relations with both the Soviet Union and the PRC until 1954 in the broader context of strained relations with the two communist giants. She shows that by 1953 the PKI was veering more closely towards the Chinese, due in part to the lack of Soviet interest in Indonesia as a whole. 14 McLane confirmed this by arguing that "Chinese communist influence within the PKI, it is believed replaced Russian, early in the 1950s". 15

After 1954, the literature on Soviet-Indonesian

12 McLane, Op cit, p.401.
15 McLane, Op cit, p.415.
relations focussed increasingly on state-to-state aspects and even though relations with the PKI were examined, these were mainly to demonstrate the growing distance from Moscow, especially in the broader context of the emerging rift in the communist camp between the Soviet Union and the PRC. The PKI's role at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress would indicate, according to Donald Hindley, an attempt to take a middle path in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This was achieved by siding with Moscow on some issues and with Peking on others, and preferring to remain 'non-involved' in other controversies.

By the early sixties, literature on Soviet-Indonesian relations focussed on the growing closeness of the two countries in the context of the various problems faced by the Sukarno Government. The overriding problem, which was a legacy of the 1949 Independence Agreement, was the West Irian dispute. Guy Pauker argued that the growing commonality of interests between the two governments and the large scale Soviet economic and military aid to Indonesia was politically motivated. He maintained that "the Soviet Union is preparing a major political 'coup' by trying to win over the last significant anti-communist factor in Indonesia, namely, the Armed Forces". In another work, Pauker warned of "the Soviet challenge in Indonesia" and exhorted that the Soviet presence is a force to be reckoned with, in every respect. He saw the West Irian crisis as representing a major boon for Moscow.

providing it with an opportunity to make inroads in what was basically a Western sphere of influence and this was to be achieved in part by encouraging the Indonesian leadership to embark on a 'military solution' of the West Irian problem.\(^{18}\)

Nadia Derkach examined the Soviet attitude towards the West Irian and Malaysian disputes. She argued that an analysis of "actual Soviet policy shows that in fact the Soviet Union has not viewed the situations as identical. These differing appraisals are reflected in 1. the official Soviet statement of support in each case; 2. news media treatment; 3. Soviet treatment of Malaysia as an 'emergent state'; and 4. the hesitant character of Soviet support for Indonesian claims in the Malaysian dispute."\(^{19}\) Soejati's work also examined the two disputes but with different emphasis: he evaluated the Soviet role in the two disputes in terms of the concept of a third party. He demonstrated that the position of the Soviet Union during Indonesia's confrontation over West Irian constituted a special and unique case of the use and role of a third party. It was a factor which induced mediation by the United States, a third party in the conventional sense of the term. The Soviet role, however, may be referred to as that of an indirect third party or a fourth party. However, in its confrontation against Malaysia, Indonesia failed to promote a corresponding Soviet role as a


means of soliciting American mediation in its favour. Instead, Indonesia turned to the PRC, which led inevitably to a deterioration in Soviet-Indonesian relations.  

After 1965, the literature focussed principally on the dramatic events of October 1965, which subsequently led to the near total obliteration of the PKI, the fall of President Sukarno and the rise of the military under General Suharto. This also ushered in the 'New Order'. Justus M. van der Kroef examined the changes in the Soviet view of Gestapu (the movement that originated the 1965 events) and concluded that this can only be appreciated in the context of the 'running Sino-Soviet conflict'. Robert Horn, on the other hand, examined Soviet-Indonesian relations since 1965 and stated that Moscow's policies steered between the extreme of breaking relations with Jakarta's new regime as a response to the crushing of the PKI and the country's swing to the right, both internally and externally, and the extreme of ignoring the hunting down of communists and banning of the PKI and seeking to establish close and unqualified relations with the new regime.  

Examining the same developments, Rodolfo Severino, Jr., concluded that for the Soviets "the overriding objective in Indonesia is to retain as much as they can of whatever influence they still have in the country.

and to keep Western influence down to the lowest possible level. And it is obvious that the way to do this is not by a clear-cut alignment with the ineffectual and unreliable Indonesian Communists but by showing goodwill toward the regime in power, supporting it against pressure from the 'ultra-Right' and the imperialists and stiffening it in its effort to remain non-aligned in foreign affairs.  

Some Observations On Past Research

A review of the above research highlights a few points: Firstly, whether the research is on Indonesian Communism or on the various crises, it has been principally issue-oriented, often focusing on one or two issues. No attempt has been made to study Soviet-Indonesian relations coherently by examining the full flow of relations over a particular time period. Secondly, no attempt has been made to understand Soviet relations with Indonesia in the broader context of Soviet-Third World relations and especially with reference to the changing Soviet perspectives on the Third World since 1945. Thirdly, the research has not benefitted from the recent literature which has emanated from the Soviet Union on Indonesia. Indeed, since 1978, the Soviet Union has shown great interest in the study of Indonesia, not just on the pre-1945 period, but also the revolutionary phase and the period of Sukarno rule, until his ousting in 1968. Finally, no attempt has been made to examine Soviet-Indonesian relations in the special context of Soviet-Southeast Asian relations. Here, it should be highlighted that the present Soviet interest

and involvement in Southeast Asia are in no way novel, as its past relations with Indonesia would testify. As this is the case, no attempt has been made to learn from the Soviet experience in Indonesia, in an effort to understand and explain Soviet behaviour in the region at present. Flowing from this, no attempt has been made to inquire whether there is anything unique in the Soviet experience in Indonesia within the broader context of Moscow's Third World relations.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is fourfold. Firstly, it aims to make a contribution to an improved understanding of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968, that is, to analyse how Moscow related with what was basically Sukarno's Indonesia. Secondly, it aims to elucidate the position of Indonesia in Soviet-Third World relations and especially how Soviet theories and practises in the Third World as a whole, were specifically applied to Indonesia. Thirdly, it aims to highlight recent Soviet writing on Indonesia for the period under study and examine how these conformed to and differed from past Soviet writing. Finally, it aims to highlight how the Soviets viewed Indonesia and their experiences and analyse whether Soviet relations with Indonesia were in any way unique in terms of overall Soviet-Third World relations.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will be confined to the bilateral exposition of Soviet-Indonesian relations from the period
1945 to 1968. Extraneous factors will be brought in only insofar as they help to explain the course of relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. The reasons for limiting the thesis from 1945 to 1968 are as follows: In August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia from the Dutch and this marked the onset of the Indonesian Revolution which lasted until December 1949. It is useful to begin the study in 1945 as this not only marked the period of 'independent' Indonesia, but more important, the beginning of the revolution, and in Soviet parlance, 'the national liberation struggle'. A study of the Soviet attitude during this phase is important as it will manifest Moscow's policies toward Third World independence struggles in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. More pertinent, Moscow's policies toward Indonesia after the formal transfer of independence were largely conditioned by its perception of developments in Indonesia during the revolutionary period.

While it is generally agreed that the turning point in the history of independent Indonesia occurred in 1965 following the abortive 'coup', 1968 has been chosen as the cut-off point in the study for the following reasons: First, the full impact of the abortive 'coup' became apparent only by 1968, when General Suharto was proclaimed President, the surviving leaders of the PKI, Njono and Sudisman, executed and Sukarno, by then an ordinary citizen, was placed under house arrest. Second, for the Soviet Union, 1968 was also a critical turning point in its relations with Indonesia, largely caused by Suharto's domestic and foreign policies, by the complications in the Soviet Union's international position brought
about by the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and finally, the developments in Czechoslovakia. The combination of these developments forced a change in Moscow's policy towards Jakarta which in the final analysis was its belated response to the full impact of the abortive 'coup' of 1965.

Despite the delimitation of the scope from 1945 to 1968, the thesis will also include brief background notes in order to introduce the state of relations before 1945, insofar as these had implications for developments in the post-1945 period. Similarly, some developments that occurred after 1968 will also be mentioned, especially those with bearings for the period under survey.

The Context of the Study: Soviet Views On the Third World from Lenin to Brezhnev

This section examines Soviet (Marxist-inspired) theories on how underdeveloped societies change and of the political theories of how the struggle against feudalism and imperialism is to be conducted, with a view to moving straight into the socialist phase, without having to suffer from a developed capitalist phase. Since 1917, the Soviet Union has professed to conduct its diplomacy according to the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. Theory is an essential component of political action from the Marxist standpoint; and of course, political action depends on the realities of the international system. When a new policy is adopted and implemented for empirical reasons, a new theoretical justifi-
cation has to be found to explain it and in this regard, it is important to study the interplay of theory and action.

Marx did not develop any specific theory of imperialism. He depended on Capitalism spreading to countries with pre-capitalist modes of production which, once developed, would evolve into the next progressive phase of Socialism. It was thus argued that, in view of the backward pre-capitalist mode of production in what was later to be called the Third World, colonialism was indeed a 'progressive development'. Marx's 'positive' interpretation of colonialism was accepted by European socialists right up to the beginning of the twentieth century, as shown by the Second International's approval of what was regarded as the development of backward areas by the 'civilised world'.

Lenin revised this view and formulated modern Marxist theory on the development of imperialism and anti-imperialism as well as laying the theoretical foundations of Marxist-Communist interest and involvement in the Third World. This was specifically stated in Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. The underdeveloped and colonial areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America were collectively referred to as the 'East' by the Soviets.


27. According to Mikhail Pavlovich, "The East is the whole colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples not only of Asia, but also of Africa and South America." Cited in McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p. 1.
and Lenin saw the region as the 'weakest link' in the 'imperialist-colonialist system' and credited it with tremendous revolutionary potential.\textsuperscript{28} He also saw the 'national liberation movements' in the 'East' as constituting 'natural allies' of the socialist state(s), even if led ipso facto by non-proletarian bourgeois nationalist elements.\textsuperscript{29} At the Second Comintern Congress in July 1920, Lenin urged all communist parties to support the nationalist 'liberation movements' in the 'East'. The theses adopted at the Congress called for a two-pronged attack which would unite the forces of communist-led national proletariat of the capitalist countries with the national liberation movements in the colonies, indicating that Moscow was prepared to utilise bourgeois democratic nationalists and other non-communist elements in the campaign against Imperialism.\textsuperscript{30} Stalin, in an article entitled "Our Tasks in the Orient", published in March 1919, spoke of the need for a "bridge between the proletariat revolution of the West and the anti-imperialist movements of the Orient, creating in this way an all embracing ring around the expiring imperialism".\textsuperscript{31} This, however, only


applied to the areas in the East: even though strong nationalist and anti-colonial movements emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus (in the former Tsarist Russia) with many declaring themselves independent and sovereign, the Red Army brutally suppressed and reannexed these territories and extirpated the national independent movements.

With Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's accession to power, the Soviet policy of alliance with nationalist movements was further refined. Stalin argued:

Of course this does not mean that the proletariat should support every national movement, always and everywhere in all separate concrete cases. Rather, this means that the proletariat should support national movements which are directed at the weakening or destruction of imperialism...

This was most clearly demonstrated in Stalin's attempt to mediate between local communists and nationalists so as to preserve the anti-colonial alliance as well as to protect the fortunes of the local communists. The problem in this approach was manifested in China where the Soviets attempted to support both the Communists and the Nationalists and urged them to forge a coalition. This, however, failed and the nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, outmanoeuvred the Communists in 1927 and almost annihilated them. This defeat forced Stalin to change tactics, and the Comintern urged local communists to fight the nationalist-bourgeois, leading in reality to a change in strategy.

33. I.V. Stalin, "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924), Sochineneia, Vol. 6, (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), pp.142-144; Saivetz and Woodby, Op cit, p.6.
On the whole, Soviet interest in the colonial world prior to the Second World War was confined to a few countries, mainly on its borders, and bore little in the way of results. By the late 1920s, Soviet concern for the 'East' deteriorated rapidly, as did the world-wide revolutionary ardour precipitated by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Moscow's interests in the colonial world were pursued by the Comintern and other instrumentalities such as the League Against Imperialism. By the mid-1930s, these activities were largely terminated as a result of the shift in the balance of power in Europe caused by the emergence of Nazi Germany. In these circumstances, Moscow sought to enhance its security by advocating 'collective security' with the major Western powers, and to enhance its credibility with the would-be allies, who also happened to be the colonial powers. Moscow instructed the Comintern and its client parties to desist from efforts to foment revolution and national liberation movement in the colonial world. This was endorsed by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, meeting in July and August 1935, which called for a strategy of 'united front' to confront 'Fascism'.

Stalin favoured the formation of national fronts at the expense of the national liberation struggle and this had the effect of slackening Soviet interest in the colonial world.


36. Georgi Dimitrov, the Secretary General of the Comintern, inaugurated the 'united front' strategy in July 1935 by declaring that "the first thing that must be done is to form a united front, to establish unity of action...in every country all over the world. The Communists pledge...not to attack anyone, neither persons nor organizations nor parties that stand for the united front of the working class against fascism". See *VII Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings*, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1939), p. 172.
in the colonial world. Except for a short interlude between the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact (23 August 1939) and the German attack on the Soviet Union (22 June 1941), the Soviet disinterest in the colonial world continued throughout the Second World War.

The Soviet Union emerged from the war as a formidable military power, but lacked the means to project itself beyond its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and to a certain extent in North Korea and northern Iran. Economically, it was weak, partly as a result of wartime destruction, and this prevented it from competing for influence on a wider scale. In the colonial world, the mood was to overthrow the colonial powers, but in the immediate post-war years Stalin had no intention of alienating his erstwhile allies by aiding the disintegration of their colonial empires, as he was seeking their acquiescence to his newly acquired sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

To be sure, from August 1945 to August 1947, the Soviet Union viewed the colonial world with a degree of optimism. This was most clearly reflected in the writings of Eugene Varga, a leading Soviet political-economic theorist at that time. In 1946, he argued that the imperialist powers' grip over their colonies was being weakened by the economic and political changes in the colonies brought about by the war. For instance, he declared:

A completely new fact, without precedent in the history of imperialism, is the almost universal lessening of the financial dependence of the colonies and dependent countries on the empire, converting some colonies from the debtors to the creditors of the imperialist metropolis. This course of development, which has been almost impossible to stop since the war, bears witness to far-reaching changes in the relationships between the colonies and the metropolis.37

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As for the political changes, especially in the Southeast Asian colonies which were occupied by Japan during the war, Varga noted that four factors had brought about an upsurge of anti-imperialist movements:

1. The economic developments of the colonies strengthened the native bourgeoisie and the native proletariat — exactly those classes which generally take a leading position in the struggle for independence;

2. Both warring camps made wide use in the war of native armed forces, which heightened the self-confidence of the colonial peoples;

3. The defeat by the Japanese of the former rulers [English, Americans, French, Dutch] shattered the belief of the colonial peoples in the durability of white rule; and

4. The war made it possible for a large number of natives to obtain weapons. 38

Varga's analysis was interesting in view of Soviet Marxist belief, that the colonies were without hope, short of revolution. 39 More important, the reference to native bourgeoisie and proletariat as leaders in the struggle for independence, coupled with the belief that the metropolis' economic hold was being loosened, made it easier for analysts such as Varga to believe that it was also possible for the political grip to be weakened. In addition to the internal political and economic changes in the colonies, Varga saw external pressure on the metropolis, in the form of United States' support for the independence movements, as an important cause for change in the colonies. In Varga's view, Washington supported the decolonization of the Western empires in order to make economic inroads into the colonies and this would

further force the metropolis to make political concessions to the 'national liberation movements'. This optimistic outlook was manifested in the Soviet declaratory policies toward the Third World in general. Though lacking in the wherewithal to pursue an active policy, the Soviet Union approved of the national liberation movements then being led by bourgeois-nationalists. One Soviet writer even spoke favourably of the Western powers which he said were "pursuing a more progressive policy towards their colonies and dependencies". More revealing, the bourgeois-led national liberation struggle was favourably reported in the Soviet press.

With the enunciation of the Zhdanov 'two camps' theory in September 1947, the Soviet view of developments in the Third World underwent a major change. This was largely brought about by the failure of the French and Italian Communist Parties to capture power in their respective countries and in reaction to the decision of the Truman Administration in August 1947 to 'contain' Soviet 'expansion' in Europe and to undertake a global crusade against Communism. In response to the United States' ideological challenge of defending the 'Free World', Moscow announced an equally rigid ideological position which perceived the international system as being divided into two hostile 'anti-imperialist'
and 'anti-democratic' camps. This had direct consequences for Soviet policies in the Third World, and Varga's optimistic outlook was replaced by a more hardline posture. In the Soviet Union, Varga's theories were criticised, and commentators now argued that "in the vast majority of the colonies, there was not created, even as a result of the Second World War, the basic pre-requisites for their economic independence: they lack every industry, do not produce the means of production [and] do not have machines." The new position resulted in three policy decisions:

1. The independence of states such as the Philippines, Burma and India, was judged to be fictitious.

2. The leaders of these states were viewed as 'agents' of imperialism.

3. There was no room for non-alignment or neutrality.

The following statement by Zhukov clearly described the new Soviet policy towards the national-bourgeoisie in the colonies and the newly independent states:

...the Indian big bourgeoisie has become a specially trusted gendarme at the service of the Anglo-American imperialist masters. The development of historical events in Indonesia after the Second World War shows that the Indonesian bourgeoisie leaders like Sukarno and Hatta, who for the time being headed the Indonesian Republic, from the very beginning oriented themselves toward the attainment of a 'decent compromise' with imperialism.


Following the enunciation of the 'two camps' doctrine, not only did Stalin fail to exploit the considerable reservoir of anti-Western sentiments, he also roused the hostility of Third World states by encouraging subversive activities through the support of local communist parties. Professor Ivan Potekhin, Moscow's leading Africanist, wrote in 1950 that:

Stalin's theory of colonial revolution proceeds from the fact that the solution of the colonial problem, the liberation of colonial slavery is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism.49

In addition to Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist systems, his perception of the newly independent states as neo-colonies, his over-estimation of leftist strength (especially in Southeast Asia) and the under-estimation of nationalism and nationalist forces in the Third World in general influenced him to attach a low priority to these states.

Stalin's hardline towards the Third World continued right up to 1952. In that year, at the Economic Conference held in Moscow in April, the Soviet leadership indicated its willingness to increase trading relations with the Third World and in October, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, the groundwork for a more flexible policy towards it was laid.51


the impression that Moscow did not show any interest towards Third World nationalism until after Stalin's death in March 1953, a more careful examination of the last few months of Stalin's foreign policy would reveal a more subtle and complex scenario. An important reason for the change in Stalin's attitude was his belated realization that not all Third World states were 'agents' of the Western powers: this had been clearly demonstrated in the differences in practical policies between independent Asian states such as India, Burma and Indonesia and their former colonial masters in the Korean War. However, it was left to Stalin's successors to implement the new policy.

Following the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union reassessed its Third World policies; modifying its past posture, it supported national liberation movements and the newly decolonised states. This change took place against the backdrop of a broader reassessment of Soviet foreign policy. In the summer of 1953, Moscow offered its first contribution to the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. In 1954, the USSR joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Extended Soviet membership in international organizations provided new opportunities for contacts with representatives of the Third World. A number of events which occurred in 1955 made it evident that interest in the Third World was becoming a significant fact of Soviet foreign policy.

The signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May, which provided for Austria's military neutrality, and the extension on 19 September of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for twenty years (reaffirming Finland's neutral status) indicated that neutral and non-aligned states could serve Soviet interests under certain circumstances. The decision to effect a reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia in June 1955, after Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948, was probably prompted in part by the desire to develop contacts of the kind that Belgrade had successfully established with such Third World countries as Egypt, Indonesia, Burma and India. The success of the PRC at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in April, to which Moscow was not invited, undoubtedly made the Soviet leaders aware of the desirability of operating in this area. On the whole, there were six reasons for the new Soviet leadership interest in the Third World:
1. It acknowledged the lack of success of the past policies and strategies;
2. It realised the growing importance and strength of the nationalist movements and governments;
3. It recognised that the Third World had an important role to play in the world balance of power;
4. It accepted that the future outcome of the struggle between the East and West, to a large extent, depended upon its actions in the Third World;
5. It was convinced that the breakup of the colonial system would weaken the West; and
6. It was in response to the United States' efforts to create alliance systems in Asia as part of its 'containment' policies after the Korean War.

The changing Soviet perception of the Third World led to the modification of its doctrines and this cleared the path for Soviet-Third World rapprochement. Firstly, the Third World was no longer viewed as an appendage to Western imperialism but rather as a 'zona mira', a zone of peace, with interests and goals highly compatible with those of the Soviet Union. Secondly, Stalin's idea of the ultimate inevitability of war between the two systems was replaced by the possibility of 'peaceful coexistence'. Thirdly, the Soviet leadership rejected proletarian revolution as the only conduit to socialism, and recognised the possibility of peaceful transition. Finally, the Soviet Union realised that the Third World contained a number of states which had the capacity to act independently of the West, and this led to the abandonment of the 'two camp' theory.

The Soviet policy shift towards the Third World was officially enunciated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956:

The leading political circles of these [Third World] states rightly hold that to participate in closed military alignments would merely increase the danger to their countries of becoming involved in the aggressive forces' military gambits and being drawn into the ruinous maelstrom of the arms race.

...As a result, a vast 'peace zone', including both socialist and non-socialist peace-loving states in Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world arena...In contrast to the prewar period, most Asian countries now act in the world arena as sovereign states or states which resolutely uphold their right to an independent foreign policy. 53

The new Soviet thrust in the Third World was aimed at achieving a number of objectives:\(^5\)

1. To prevent the participation of Third World states in the United States' sponsored alliance systems and thereby disrupt those systems.

2. To reduce and then eliminate Western influence as part of the total effort to isolate the United States and Western Europe.

3. To establish contacts with the new states and to win their support for Soviet policies and especially for Soviet proposals in the United Nations.

4. To persuade Third World states to accept the Soviet Union as a model for rapid industrialization and modernization.

5. To encourage neutralism or the 'non-bloc policy' (vneblokovaya politika).

6. To promote politico-socio-economic conditions thought to be conducive in the long run to the development of communist parties.

7. To build up a reservoir of goodwill and promote the image of the Soviet Union as a friend of the Third World.

The Soviet Union not only recognised the Third World as an important factor in the international system but hastened to enlist a number of key countries, such as India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt and Afghanistan as its allies. Theoretically, this was achieved through the formulation of the 'zona mira' concept which envisaged the Third World

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and the Socialist community acting together as a bulwark against the 'warmongering imperialists'. In practical terms, the new Soviet policy dictated important changes in attitude towards the newly decolonised countries. Not only did the Soviet leadership accept the notion that national independence could be achieved through peaceful means, it also viewed the establishment of a 'national-democratic state' as a positive development even though it might at first be based on capitalist principles. More important, political emancipation of the Third World states was now considered as a pre-requisite for the achievement of complete independence and eventual transition to socialism. V. Semyonov, a leading Soviet theoretician, pointed out in his article in *Kommunist*, the ideological organ of the CPSU, in 1956 that:

The winning of state political independence is a revolution in the life of formerly colonial peoples. Unfortunately, this is not clear to all. Take for example, the fact that foreign capital still exerts very great influence on the economy of many countries in the East which have won political independence. From this, some Soviet Orientalists have drawn the incorrect conclusion that after gaining independence these countries remain, in point of fact, colonial in status. The adherents of this incorrect view confuse two different questions: the question of political liberation and self-determination of the peoples of formerly colonial countries, and the question of achievement of economic independence by countries of the East which have only recently cast off the colonial yoke. 55

Finally, the national bourgeoisie was recognised as a progressive force deemed worthy of Soviet support. In Khrushchev's words:

To what extent the national bourgeoisie there participates in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle has a considerable hearing on the firmness of the alliance between workers and peasants.... Under modern conditions, the national-bourgeoisie not

connected with the imperialists in the colonies, former colonies and dependencies is, from the objective point of view, interested in fulfilment of the basic tasks of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution and consequently, still retains its progressive role and its ability to participate in the solution of imminent national problems.56

The Soviet support for the national bourgeoisie was also in response to the realization that in the Third World as a whole, it was the national bourgeoisie which was holding the reins of power and that the Communist Parties were either weak or completely suppressed. As A.A. Guber pointed out:

The number of Asian and African countries which attained independence under the leadership of the bourgeoisie is much larger than the number of People's Democracies in the East. This is explained by the actual correlation of class forces in these countries, and the degree of their working class organization and consciousness. In many of these countries there were no working-class parties before the Second World War, and none even today.57

Thus, in order to facilitate its acceptance in the Third World, Moscow softened the rigidity of Stalinist doctrines. This did not mean that the Soviet Union abandoned its goal of seeing the Third World's transition to socialism: on the contrary, the new flexible position was only a means to the same end. In fact, the Soviet leadership hoped that the Third World bourgeois leadership would be impressed with the superiority of the Soviet model and gravitate towards it.58

The ideological basis for Khrushchev's new policy towards the Third World was provided by Lenin's strategy concerning the role which he thought national liberation struggles for independence in developing countries would play in the cause of world socialist revolution. In Leninism,


socialist revolution in colonies would undergo two stages: the national-bourgeoisie would lead the revolution against imperialism and feudalism and at the same time win popular support to its side. The first national and bourgeois-democratic revolution would lead to the rise of powerful class organization of workers and peasants which would overthrow the rule of the national-bourgeoisie and with the help of the Soviet Union, inaugurate a non-capitalist development, leading eventually to the construction of a socialist order.  

Accepting Lenin's theory of two-stage revolution in the colonies, Khrushchev launched his programme of economic and technical aid to the developing countries on the conviction that the revolutionary energy accumulated there during their long colonial rule should be mobilised in the first stage of the national liberation movement. He believed that the Soviet Union should support developing countries so long as they endeavoured to achieve political and economic independence from the West, no matter what internal policies their governments pursued. According to Khrushchev, the second phase of the socialist revolution would be realised after the industrial proletariat, growing with the progress of industrialization, had taken hold of the country's leadership in alliance with the peasantry and the national intelligentsia. Khrushchev reasoned that the developing countries would take non-capitalist policies to expedite the realization of socialism and these policies would enable them to proceed from the state of economic backwardness directly to socialism without going through an intermediate stage of capitalism. The steps 

60. Ibid, p. 9.
contemplated by Khrushchev by which a Third World state would adopt the non-capitalist way and hence bring it closer to the final stage of socialism, included: Nationalization of all foreign monopolies, businesses and operations; nationalization and state control of external trade; nationalization of all banking, insurance and other companies, transportation systems and key industries; drastic land reforms and abolition of all feudal and semi-feudal systems; national economic planning in the public sector; and redistribution of national income for the promotion of national productivity.

Armed with a series of doctrinal justifications, the Soviet leadership began in 1955 to expand contacts of all sorts with Third World states, although the focus of that policy was on the creation of economic links as a prelude to broader political contacts. The decade from 1955 to 1965 witnessed a five-fold expansion of Soviet trade with the non-communist developing countries, from 304 million roubles (5.2 percent of the total trade turnover) to 1,743.6 million roubles (11.9 percent).

Even though there was a general change in attitude, the initial Soviet thrust was focussed on regions and countries of specific strategic significance, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. The Soviet Union also took advantage of a number of developments such as the civil war in Zaire and the rise of anti-Western leaders such as Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah in Ghana and Sekou Toure in Guinea.

61. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
By the late 1950s, however, it became evident that in many ex-colonies, the bourgeois-democratic revolution was not developing into a socialist one as Soviet theoreticians had optimistically predicted and there was no reason to expect that the proletariat in these countries would soon come to power and establish a dictatorship. At the same time, the Kremlin could not insist on the inevitability of such a development because it wanted to retain friendly relations with Afro-Asian states which it had so painstakingly developed since 1955. The Soviet dilemma was well expressed by Guber when he noted:

The experience of the Eastern non-Socialist countries which have taken the road of independent development after the Second World War reveals two aspects of the national bourgeoisie: on the one hand, its ability to continue to fight against imperialism, for an independent foreign policy and the consolidation of national economic positions; on the other, the limited nature of its methods of struggle for real economic independence, dictated by its class interests, and its fear of the Socialist forces in its own country.

Having 'rehabilitated' leaders such as Nehru, U Nu, Nasser and Sukarno at the Twentieth Party Congress, Moscow was now compelled to make the continued existence of these national-bourgeois states and regimes somehow fit Marxist theory. This led to the introduction of the 'national democracy' (natsional'naia demokratiiia) concept, which was conceived as a transitional stage from a bourgeois democratic state to a dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a People's Democracy. The concept was introduced at the Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow.

in December 1960. The new type of state was defined as one which:

- consistently defends its political and economic independence,
- that struggles against imperialism and its military blocs,
- against military bases on its territory;
- a state that struggles against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital;
- a state that rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of administration;
- a state in which the people enjoys the broadest democratic rights and liberties (freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of demonstration, of forming political parties and social organizations) in which they have the possibility to strive for land reforms and for the implementation of other demands for democratic and social transformation and participation in shaping public policy.64

As for the priority tasks, the new type of state was supposed to strengthen national independence; carry out land reforms in the interest of the peasantry; abolish the remnants of feudalism; extirpate the economic roots of imperialist rule; limit and oust foreign monopolies from the economy; develop national industry; raise the standard of living of the people; democratise public life; undertake an independent and peace-loving foreign policy; and develop economic and cultural cooperation with the socialist states.65 To be sure, the national democracy formula was not novel in the sense that it represented a two-stage theory of revolution in the Third World, as formulated by Lenin. Put in another way, the national democracy model was meant only to be an intermediate stage leading eventually to socialism. This was made clear by Khrushchev when he said:

> With an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution achieved, there will emerge most favourable conditions for a shift to socialism. What is important to many countries now is to have an extensive mass of people participate in such revolutionary

64. Pravda, 6 December 1960.
65. Ibid.
creative activities. In this process, the masses approach their new goal, a socialist reform. Thus, through the process of dissolving a common democracy, which has no socialist character itself, there emerge preconditions for a drift to socialism.66

Cuba, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Burma, Algeria, Egypt, Mali and Indonesia were the first eight states honoured by Soviet theoreticians as national democracies.

Initially, it was clear that Soviet theoreticians were optimistic about the prospects for national democracy, and felt that they had found a formula for a Marxist programme for the Third World which would take into account local nationalistic aspirations, as well as local communist and Soviet national interests. This was clearly reflected in Boris Ponomarev's (the head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department) statement in 1961:

The strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they find new methods and forms of struggle which lead in the most positive manner to the realization of their vital interests. The idea of the national democratic state is not the fruit of armchair cogitations, but has been engendered by life itself.67

Political developments in the national-democratic states, however, belied this assertion. In states such as Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Egypt, Burma and Algeria, one party states under authoritarian leaders made their appearance, and the communists, far from being included in the government, were persecuted or simply pushed into the background. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the leaders of these states from carrying out far-reaching social and economic reforms.

At the same time, these states opposed 'imperialism' and supported the general aspects of Soviet foreign policy, especially those concerning the Third World. In this situation, the Soviet leadership was faced with a choice between condoning the behaviour of these 'national democrats' as ideologically erroneous in the light of the national democratic state doctrine on the one hand and accepting their stand as a revised form of the same doctrine on the other. Over this issue, two conflicting opinions emerged among Soviet ideologists. In 1964, G. Mirski came out with the argument that non-communist leaders could perform functions which in the traditional Marxist-Leninist model would be exercised only by the communist proletariat. He held that it was possible for 'revolutionary democrats' to 'start a transition towards a socialist revolution' and that the world socialist system could serve as the vanguard of the proletariat in the revolutionary process while the proletariat was not yet mature in influence or leadership. This view was opposed by other functionaries responsible for the Party's foreign policy and having to do with the local communist parties abroad. M. A. Suslov, B. N. Ponomarev and A. M. Lumiyansev, for example, spoke for the communists in the Third World states who had often been oppressed by the 'revolutionary democrats' supported by Mirski and others. Until late 1963, Khrushchev remained neutral between the two groups but by early 1964

68 For a full description of the debate, see Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenye, No. 4, 1964, pp. 116-113 and No. 6, pp. 262-81.
69 Ibid.
and until his removal from power, he generally veered towards Mirski's view. Moreover, at a time when the Soviet Union was vying with the West and the Chinese for influence in the Afro-Asian world and was eager to win the friendship of the reformist leaders of the Third World, Soviet theoreticians were compelled to abandon the concept of national democracy. In 1964, the concept of 'revolutionary democracy' (revolutsionaia demokratija) was introduced, preceded by favourable Soviet commentaries on Third World regimes which were carrying out social and political reforms, even though they were at the same time suppressing the local communists, as in Algeria, Burma and Egypt. For instance, I. Belyayev argued that "the experience of the UAR (Egypt) has shown the successes which a young state can achieve when its leaders base their policies on the objective necessity for developing their countries along socialist lines".

K. Brutents formally introduced the concept, defining 'revolutionary democrats' as those politicians "who were under the influence of the tremendous achievements of the world socialist system: those who were carrying out programmes going beyond the bounds of capitalism and those whose policies included many important programmatic demands of the Communist Parties of the liberated countries". The concept represented another ideological switch, aimed at reconciling Marxist

ideology with the developments in many Third World states which the Kremlin considered as progressive, but which had hitherto not been sufficiently taken into account by the national democracy formula. In some ways, the new concept was 'petty bourgeois' rather than Marxist, as it was tantamount to saying that the 'revolutionary democrats' could do without the communists as long as they were carrying out reforms insisted on by the communists. This was clearly brought out in a Pravda editorial on 31 January 1965:

> With the present distribution of forces in the world arena, transition to the non-capitalist road can be achieved under the leadership of the revolutionary democrats, and not only under that of the working class. The former have come to power in a number of young states in which, although the bourgeoisie has become bankrupt, capitalism has become discredited and the people are leaning towards socialism, a powerful working class has not yet emerged - a low level of productive forces - so that conditions for the realization of proletarian leadership are absent.74

Egypt, Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Zanzibar, Guinea and Mali were the first eight states described as 'revolutionary democracies'. The theory of revolutionary democracy suggested that the Soviets had a very optimistic view of developments in the Third World. The distinction between the non-capitalist and socialist approaches to economic and political development became much less clear than it had been in the national democratic state doctrine. The theory also provided the Soviets with an ideological ground for continuing economic aid to progressive but non-communist leaders of the Third World, who at the same time, suppressed the local communists in their countries.

With the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin administration

in October 1964, the Kremlin admitted that it had been unsuccessful in its approach towards the Third World and in applying Soviet prescription to it. The rejection of the Soviet model by Ghana, Mali and Algeria prompted Moscow to reflect on the excessive optimism indulged in by the Khrushchev administration in assuming that a non-capitalist road would lead directly to the road of Socialism. The new administration realised that the prospect for the introduction of socialism in the majority of the new states was bleak and that the instability of many of the regimes meant that leaders favourably disposed towards the Kremlin could be easily deposed by 'rightists'. In the light of this awareness, the new administration developed a more prudent policy line. This appeared in the form of an editorial entitled, "The Highest Internationalist Responsibility of a Socialist State", published on 27 October 1965 in Pravda. Its salient features included:

1. The Soviet Union could best discharge its internationalist responsibilities by ensuring successful development of its economy.

2. That each country and its people have the supreme responsibility for its own affairs.

It was a clear signal that there were limits to what the Soviet Union can and should do, as well as the realization that too close ties between themselves and the Third World would hinder rather than help the national liberation movements.

The tone of Brezhnev's policies toward the Third World, beginning in 1965, was clearly one of caution. The optimism that prevailed during the Khrushchev years concerning revolutionary prospects in the Third World had declined, and it was pointed out that the non-capitalist process of development would take a very long time. No new ideological concept concerning the Third World was introduced until June 1969. At the International Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, the general ideological framework for transformation of Third World states into 'socialist-oriented states' was restructured to allow the view that a country on a non-capitalist road might take the form of a national democracy but was also capable of taking other forms of government. By 'socialist-orientation', Soviet ideologists refer to those Third World states which were attempting to bypass the capitalist stage of development and build the foundation for socialism with the support and assistance of the socialist countries.

Ample space has been devoted to the description of Soviet views on the Third World: this is necessary because Soviet-Indonesian relations were conducted within the broader context of Soviet-Third World relations. Against this backdrop, this thesis will examine Soviet-Indonesian relations and analyse Jakarta's place within the broader framework of Moscow's world view of the Third World.

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Thesis Outline

The thesis's point of departure is a historical presentation of developments from 1917 to 1945, with a view to examining Soviet relations with the Dutch colony. Following this, relations during the Stalin period from 1945 to 1953 are examined. The next two chapters will examine relations from March 1953 to late 1964, basically charting relations during the Khrushchev's period. The fifth chapter analyses developments during the Brezhnev-Kosygin period. The conclusion brings the discussion to a close with highlights of the main points of the study, analyses, Soviet gains and losses, and the uniqueness of the Soviet experience in Indonesia from 1945 to 1968.
CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, 1917-1945
This chapter outlines the course of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to 1945. It highlights the development of Soviet relations with neighbouring states as well as Moscow's policies toward the colonial world. It is within this context that Soviet relations with the Dutch East Indies will be evaluated. The object of the chapter is to illuminate relations between Moscow, especially through its Comintern arm, and the PKI, in an effort to comprehend the Soviet view of Indonesia before 1945.

Since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet foreign policy has been determined by a combination of national, geographical, historical and ideological elements. Some Western scholars have stressed the elements of continuity, arguing that geography and historical experiences have influenced the country's basic interests regardless of regime. Stressing such consistent goals as the desire for security, urge to the sea, manifest destiny in Asia and leadership of the Slav people, they contend that Soviet foreign policy has been pragmatically power-oriented.

1. The word 'Indonesia' and the 'Dutch East Indies' will be used interchangeably in this study, even though technically the latter referred to the period of Dutch colonial control over the territory. However, even this is not entirely correct as the word 'Indonesia' began to replace the colonial 'Indies' in political discussions in 1921. This was in the context of the growing nationalist movements in the country, where in intellectual circles, people began to speak about an 'Indonesian state' and 'Indonesia Malay' - the future 'Bahasa Indonesia' - began to be spoken instead of Dutch by Indonesian delegates to the Volksraad. See Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 112.


Others, especially ex-communists, emphasised the paramountcy of Marxism-Leninism. They stressed that Russian leaders have sought to create a world communist system dominated and directed by the Soviet Union and view relations with the non-communist world as a protracted struggle lasting until one side triumphs. Straddling in between the two dichotomous positions, middle-path scholars view Soviet foreign policy as combining traditional and ideological features: first revolutionary beliefs and ideology were uppermost; then pragmatic nationalism took leading place as Soviet leaders reverted to more conservative policies based on history, geography and power. This dualism - the promotion of revolution abroad and the quest for national security - has, according to this group, remained a salient characteristic of Soviet foreign policy.

Regardless of the various determinants, Soviet relations with the various communist parties and policies toward the colonial world were a function of its foreign policy. Between 1917 and 1945, Soviet foreign relations went through six distinct phases.

**Revolutionary Era, 1917-1920**

During this phase, the new fledgling communist state was in constant crises. The Bolsheviks came to power while the First World War was still in progress. Burdened with Tsarist legacy of a despirited, disorganised army, a population weary of war and internal order on the brink of collapse, Lenin's first task was to get out of the

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'imperialist world war'. On 15 December 1917, the Bolsheviks sued for peace with Germany at Brest-Litvosk. By this, they lost one-third of their population, industry and mineral resources but gained badly needed peredishka (breathing space). The treaty was later annulled at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Lenin also declared his 'Decree of Peace' which called for the end of secret diplomacy. The Bolsheviks also published secret treaties which the former Tsarist Government had entered into with Western governments. The aim of this was to ignite a revolution in Europe and to induce the allies to join the peace negotiations so that the Bolsheviks need not face the Central Powers alone. The Bolsheviks faced a grave crisis in the summer of 1918 when the Allies militarily intervened in the Russian civil war. Lenin and his cohorts saw the Allied aim as being to overthrow Bolshevism, to set up spheres of influence and to exploit resources of the country. But for the Allies, the stated aims were to restore an eastern front, to win the war and to keep their supplies out of German hands. The Allied hostilities, however, fed the extreme policies of

the Bolsheviks. One major aim of Moscow during this phase was to foment revolutions abroad because the new leadership believed that otherwise 'world capitalism' would crush it. The massive destruction and war-weariness, and the growth of revolutionary activities in Europe, especially in Germany and Hungary, made it appear that the continent was ripe for revolution. At the same time, the Allies ignored and refused to recognise the Soviet Government and preoccupied themselves with the settlement of the German question. This further fed Bolshevik hostility towards the peace settlement and the League of Nations, which they saw as a capitalist coalition directed against the Bolshevik state.

It was in these circumstances that the Third International or Comintern was established in March 1919 with the purpose of acting as a nucleus for world communist movement, especially in Europe, even though it was too weak to organise revolutions.  

Lenin's strategy for the colonial world was based on his evaluation of the role of imperialism in the maintenance of the capitalist system. Because of the revolutionary sentiments in Europe and the nationalist activities in the Middle East and Asia, the new Soviet leadership made appeals to the colonial world to overthrow the imperialist rulers. Nevertheless, the colonial question played an insignificant role at the founding of the Comintern even though Lenin had previously emphasised the importance of the national

\[13\text{.For example, the first Bolshevik declaration on the colonial question was an Islamic appeal: "To all Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East", made on 24 November 1917. See I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya, Vol. 4, pp.90-92.}
liberation movements in the colonies for the proletarian movements in Europe. For example, at the First Comintern Congress' resolutions, only the following reference had relevance to Asia: "Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia! The hour of proletariat dictatorship striking in Europe will signal your liberation as well." This was principally due to Moscow's preoccupation with its own survival and the paramountcy of European affairs for its national interest.

By the time the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in Russia, the Dutch East Indies had an active Marxist movement, and the nationalist struggle was well beyond its embryonic stage. Before the First World War broke out, a number of political parties emerged in the Dutch colony. Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour) was founded in 1908. According to a Soviet scholar, it was founded by "impoverished feudalistic and bureaucratic families" under "the influence of the 1905 Russian Revolution." In 1912, the Indies Party was established by Europeans living in the colony. More significant was the establishment of Sarekat Islam in 1912. It began as the Islamic Merchants' League in 1911 in Surakarta, to protect Javanese batik merchants from competition by Chinese traders. Following an outbreak of anti-Chinese riots in Surakarta in 1911, the party was banned, but reemerged in Surabaya under the leadership of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto. The Sarekat Islam expanded rapidly, becoming in E. Gurevich's

words, the "first mass political body in Indonesia even though it was led by the national petty bourgeoisie".\textsuperscript{17}

At the time when the Party was expanding its activities and gaining widespread support, Lenin described the "spread of revolutionary democratic movement" in the Dutch colony in the following terms:

First, the democratic movement is developing among the masses of Java, where a nationalist movement has arisen under the banner of Islam. Secondly, capitalism has created a local intelligentsia consisting of acclimatised Europeans who demand independence for the Dutch East Indies. Thirdly, the fairly large Chinese population of Java and the other islands have brought the revolutionary movement from their native land...

A national union of the native population has been formed in Java. It already has a membership of 80,000 and is holding mass meetings. There is no stopping the growth of the democratic movement.\textsuperscript{18}

More significant in terms of future Soviet-Indonesian relations was the formation of the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV) or the Indies Social Democratic Association, in 1914. On 9 May 1914, a group of Dutch Social Democrats living in the Indies set up the ISDV in Surabaya.\textsuperscript{19}

This was the first Marxist organization in Southeast Asia, and socialism took roots in the Indies only after this.\textsuperscript{20}

The ISDV was not a unified group. The right-wing faction wanted to turn the organization into a political debating society while the left-wing was more interested in spreading revolutionary propaganda among the Indies natives. Being a weak party, the ISDV sought strength through alliance with other parties. The ISDV utilised the strategy of 'bloc

\textsuperscript{20}Mintz,Op cit,p.24.
within whereby members of a Marxist organization joined a mass movement and worked to seize control of it from within. The ISDV's strategy was greatly influenced by the practice of multiple party membership in the Indies. The ISDV's first alliance was with Insulinde, a party founded in 1907. This party absorbed the membership and characteristics of the Indies Party when the latter was dissolved in 1913. However, the alliance proved a mistake for the ISDV, as Insulinde was a European-centred party and its flirtations with Socialism were opportunistic, aimed at replacing the Dutch colonial rule with its own. The alliance ended on 30 August 1917. The ISDV looked for its next target at Sarekat Islam, which by then was the largest mass party with over a million and a half members. Sarekat Islam's religious character and its wide-based structure, however, imposed caution. Through its 'bloc within' strategy, the ISDV succeeded in bringing into its organization gifted and radical Sarekat Islam members. These were trained along revolutionary lines and were to become the future leaders of the PKI. Semaun and Darsono were two leaders of Sarekat Islam who were inducted into the Marxist movement in 1916. In that year Semaun was transferred from the Surabaya branch of Sarekat Islam to Semarang, the home ground of Sneevliet. One consequence of this was the rapid expansion of the Semarang branch: from 1916 to 1917 it grew from 1700 members to about 20,000.

21 McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp. 76-104.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 23.
The ISDV and especially its allies from the Semarang branch succeeded in influencing the direction of Sarekat Islam. At its foundation, Sarekat Islam pledged its loyalty to the Dutch, but the hardships caused by the First World War and more important, the influence of the ISDV led it to raise questions of self-determination and condemn foreign capitalism. The growing radicalism of the Sarekat Islam was apparent in October 1917 and at its Second National Congress at which, for the first time, it demanded freedom of political organization, radically improved labour and agrarian legislation and free public education.

The March 1917 revolution in Russia, which ended Romanov rule, gave further impetus to the leftward shift in Indonesian political development. This was more the result of ISDV's activities, which became the primary vehicle for dissemination of Russian revolutionary ideas rather than any direct Russian involvement. The November Bolshevik Revolution was met with even greater enthusiasm and acted as a further boost to ISDV attempts to spread Marxism in the Indies. Indeed, attempts were made to follow the 'Bolshevik path': for example, in Surabaya, where the principal Dutch naval base was located, moves were made to organise 'soviets' among soldiers and sailors. At the May 1918

27. Ibid, p.388; Guber, "Indonezila", B.S.E., p.240.
28. For example, on 25 November 1917, the ISDV daily, Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word), wrote: "For us revolutionary socialists, these comrades [the Bolsheviks] with their great spirit of self sacrifice and matchless valour are a brilliant flame, a powerful radiant light, which gives us strength to weather the hard times". Cited in Zakaznikova, Op cit, p.390.
29. According to Zakaznikova, "the establishment of Soldiers and Sailors' Councils in Surabaya in November 1918 was one vivid expression of the direct influence exerted by the October Revolution on the Indonesian people's liberation struggle". See Zakaznikova, Op cit, p.393.
National Congress of the ISDV, discussions were held on how to encourage 'revolutionary defeatism' in order to persuade the colonial troops not to fight, as had been done in Russia by the Bolsheviks. The colonial authorities, alarmed by the movement, moved with speed: they ruthlessly suppressed the 'soldiers and sailors' councils and expelled their organisers.30 Also significant was the impact of the Russian Revolution on Sarekat Islam, manifested at its Fourth National Congress in 1919. During the debate on a trade union central headquarters, the Congress declared:

> If mankind is to attain general happiness and well being, it must destroy capitalist society by establishing a socialist social order in its stead. Recognising this outlook, the revolutionary socialist trade union centre is to work for a revolutionary overthrow of the old society. The working class should be prepared to tackle the task it will face in a socialist society.31

While it is undeniable that the Bolshevik Revolution played a great role in shaping the direction of the national liberation movement in the Indies, the developments were, however, not caused by any deliberate Soviet machinations. While it is correct that Soviet Russia declared its goal of spreading world revolution, her weakness prevented her from translating this into policy goals in its foreign relations. Rather, the developments in the Indies were induced by domestic factors. In this regard, Soviet writers are emphatic in denying the "fables of the colonizers and their agents who maintain that the rise in revolutionary anti-imperialist movements in Indonesia was the result of the exporting of revolution from Moscow."32 On the contrary,

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Zabozlaeva maintained that the rise in revolutionary activity was "due to the contradictions of the capitalist system in Indonesia that had reached a sharpness previously unknown as a result of which the country's backwardness and its economic and political dependence began to be more noticeable to the population." 33

The increase of revolutionary activity in the Indies, which was spearheaded by the ISDV, was accompanied by a growing clash of factional interests in the ISDV, culminating in the en masse withdrawal, in 1918, of the right-wing group, which generally adhered to the platform of the Second International; the group later founded the Indies Social Democratic Workers' Party. Soviet writers such as Zabozlaeva have maintained that the "main objective of the new party was to paralyse the influence of the ISDV in the national movement, especially in the ranks of the Sarekat Islam". 34 The withdrawal of the moderates reduced the ISDV essentially to a group of communists. The influence of the ISDV on Sarekat Islam also began to increase, as was manifested in its growing radicalism. 35 Zabozlaeva argued that it was the activity of the left-wing social democrats, that is, the ISDV, that helped to "transform in a relatively short space of time the position of the Sarekat Islam from one of cooperation with the Dutch authorities to that of a desire to overthrow the colonial regime and form a national democratic government". 36

33. Ibid., p. 38.
34. Ibid., p. 41.
36. Zabozlaeva, "Great October...", p. 41.
Following the formation of the Comintern, the Social Democrat label came to be identified with the now despised Second International, and consequently the ISDV proposed a change in title. At the Seventh ISDV Congress, the organization's name was changed to Perserikatan Komunis di India (Communist Party in the Indies, PKI). On 23 May 1920, the PKI became the first communist party in Asia. Even though Soviet writers have seen the birth of the PKI as an important force in the development of the colonial struggle and great importance has been attached to the party since it indicated that the working class began to operate as an active independent political force, on the whole the party was ignored by Moscow and the Comintern. This can be explained by the following reasons: after the Bolshevik Revolution, the new leaders in Moscow generally ignored non-Tsarist Asia. Their lack of information about the region, the Bolsheviks' expectation of an imminent revolution in Europe, the on-going civil war and their attempt to gain control of Central Asia prevented the new leaders from stating an interest in non-Bolshevik Asia. All this changed with the adoption of a more conciliatory foreign policy after 1920.

**Accommodation Phase, 1920-1927**

From 1920 to 1927, Soviet foreign policy entered the phase of accommodation. Following the Allied withdrawal from Russia and the defeat of the White Armies in the civil war, the basis for accommodation between the Soviet government and the West was laid. Lenin called for 'coexistence' between

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the communist and capitalist systems. This was, in part, due to the realization that the capitalist system was far from doom, as had been expected: indeed, the Western economies were reviving rapidly from the wartime devastation. Added to this, the Western capitalist states' desire for Russian markets struck a responsive chord to the Soviet appeal. Internal Soviet determinants such as its weakened position caused by the Red Army's defeat in Poland, the years of strife since 1917 and peasant uprisings, as well as the collapse of revolutionary movements in Europe, marked the beginning of moderate Soviet/Comintern policy. In order to revive its near collapsed economy, Lenin implemented the New Economic Policy. In its foreign policy, the conciliatory policy was aimed at seeking diplomatic recognition, trade and credits from the West. The object behind all this was to strengthen the regime. The Bolsheviks felt that recognition would provide security against Western attacks. It would also aid the Soviet efforts to divide capitalist countries and win trade concessions. Despite obstacles resulting from Comintern propaganda in the West and the colonies and problems over Russian debts, the West responded favourably because European industries lacked sufficient markets and their governments were never really committed to the overthrow of the Bolshevik system.

This led to a recession in interest for world revolutionary movement in Moscow. Instead, the Soviet Union stressed the importance of attaining friendly diplomatic

relations. The focus of policy was Europe. This, however, did not prevent the Soviet government from signing diplomatic agreements with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in the hope of weakening Franco-British influence in the Middle East. At the same time, Soviet leaders moderated support for revolutionary activities throughout the colonial world as a corollary of their efforts to improve relations with independent Asian governments and governments of colonial powers.

The moderate Comintern policy after 1920 sought collaboration with all types of nationalist governments throughout Asia. It also marked a general decline in Comintern's interest in colonial questions. Communist parties were told to pursue the 'united front from above' policy. On the whole, Asia remained secondary in Soviet policy. Even though Lenin recognised the revolutionary potential of colonial peoples in undermining Western imperialism, the Soviet Union was too weak to exploit it. Its weakness on the one hand and its desire to win support from Western governments, on the other, caused it to ignore the colonial areas. The essentials of Soviet foreign policy during this phase can be summarised as follows: the primacy of the preservation of the Soviet state over revolutionary aspirations; the courtship of Germany; the normalization of relations with all capitalist countries and promotion of 'peaceful coexistence' as a norm for Soviet behaviour; the establishment of correct

relations and non-aggression pacts with the bordering Baltic and Eastern European states that had previously been wholly or partially subdivisions of the Tsarist empire; the quest for close ties with China to counter Japanese expansionism against the USSR and its client state, Mongolia; and finally, the use of Comintern and other non-governmental organizations to manipulate public opinion in support of Soviet policies and foment trouble in capitalist and colonial countries.  

After Lenin's death on 21 January 1924, a succession struggle followed between Stalin and Trotsky, with the former gaining the upper hand by 1925. The Stalin-Trotsky rivalry affected Soviet/Comintern policy towards the colonial world. This was clearly demonstrated in China. Trotsky, however, advocated an armed communist uprising and a direct transition to socialism. Stalin's policy prevailed but during Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition, the communists were slaughtered in Shanghai. Soviet advisers were expelled, bringing to an end the communist-nationalist coalition. It was only following disasters of this nature that Stalin began to deny the 'progressive' character of various nationalist movements. The main reason for the failure of the 'united front from above' policy in the

colonial world was caused by the weakness of the local communist parties, the dominance of nationalist forces and the antipathy of the latter to the goals of the local communists. The development of the Soviet/Comintern 'line' and the problems they faced in the colonial world were clearly demonstrated in their relations with the PKI.

In early December 1920, an Extraordinary Congress of the PKI met to discuss the twenty-one points of the Comintern and the question of joining it. On 24 December, a resolution was passed favouring Comintern membership, and this directly introduced the Soviet connection into Indies colonial politics. The timing of the PKI's decision was also important in another sense: it was a time when the Soviet leadership was beginning to 'look out'. This was partly caused by the general decline in revolutionary ardour in Europe, which in turn forced Moscow to pay more attention to non-Bolshevised Asia and to divert the West European's, especially the colonial powers' resources, away from the socialist state following their, first, military and later, diplomatic, efforts, to contain Bolshevism.

It was in these circumstances that the Second Comintern Congress examined the 'National and Colonial Question' in detail. A Commission on the subject was founded with Lenin as its Chairman and Sneevliet as Secretary. It was at this Congress that the famous Lenin-Roy debate took place over the strategy of national liberation struggle.

45 Eudin and North, op.cit., p.143; Kahin, op.cit., p.74.
in the colonies. Lenin asserted that the communist parties in all colonial countries must assist bourgeois democratic liberation movements, while Roy opposed alliances with certain bourgeois-democratic groups, having the Indian National Congress in mind. As a consequence, the Comintern counselled to support 'revolutionary liberation movements' and not 'bourgeois democratic liberation movements'.

At the Congress, Sneevliet endeavoured to secure approval of Sarekat Islam as a 'proletarian party', contending that the 'Mohammedan religious tendency was only a side issue'. Tan Malaka, a PKI leader, also appealed to the Congress to support and endorse Islam and Pan-Islamic movements. Sneevliet supported Lenin in his controversy with Roy and also supported the Comintern's call for the communist parties to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. However, both Tan Malaka's and Sneevliet's appeal for support for Islam and Pan-Islamic movements was rejected by the

49. Eudin and North, Op cit, pp.68-78; Carr, Op cit, p.252; While many scholars have argued that the change was tantamount to a 'modification' of Lenin's thesis on the national and colonial question, Soviet scholars have, however, denied this, arguing that it was Lenin's 'correction' that altered the wording and spirit of Roy's thesis to a considerable degree and Roy's stance was judged as 'left-opportunist'. See Reznikov, Op cit, pp.25-106.
Congress, even though it had in the past viewed them with favour. A major consideration for its support in the past had been Bolshevik weakness in Central Asia, but with the strengthening of Soviet power there, Islam and Pan-Islamism had come to be perceived as centrifugal forces. In this regard, it is useful to note that recent Soviet writings on this matter have denied that the Comintern was in principle against Islam and Pan-Islamism. For instance, it has been argued that "the Comintern was by no means opposed to Muslim movements or the Mohammedans but to the policy of exploiting the dogmas of Islam and Islam bigotry, in order to replace foreign 'infidels' oppression by 'co-religionist' and to conserve social backwardness and social oppression under the mantle of one religion". This denial and defence of Comintern's past policies have been adopted largely to criticise 'bourgeois writers' who have maintained that the Comintern misunderstood the situation in Indonesia, knew little about it, showed no interest in it and that the decisions the Comintern took stemmed either from certain 'dogmas', or from interests unrelated to the needs of the PKI. In part, it is also a defence against charges by Western writers that Marxist concepts are inapplicable to the analysis of the situation in a colonial or dependent country and that Marxist tactics and strategies are ill-suited for the development of political parties in environment such as was the Indonesian case.

52. Eudin and North, Op cit, pp. 43-44; On Islam, the Second Congress stated that "it is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and similar currents of opinions which attempts to combine the struggle for liberation from European and American nationalism with strengthening of Turkish...imperialism and of the nobility, the large landowners and the clergy", The Second Congress of the Communist International: Report of Proceedings of the Petrograd Session of 17 July and of Moscow Session of 19 July to 7 August 1920, p. 496.


54. Ibid., pp. 383-385.
Tan Malaka's call for support of Islamic movements indicated that the PKI did not agree with the Comintern's resolution on Islam. The PKI also disagreed with the Comintern's call for cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists and the thesis on the 'National and Colonial Question'. In general, the Comintern's 'line' in the colonies was in accordance with the general framework of Soviet foreign policy. The adoption of a more relaxed and pragmatic Comintern strategy of 'united front from above' was in consonance with Moscow's accommodative foreign relations with the West from 1920 to 1927. Because of the various crises, the preservation of the Soviet regime and power base became paramount, even if it was to be at the expense of foreign communists. It was in view of this realization, namely, that the Comintern 'line' was beneficial for Soviet interests but not necessarily the interests of the Indies people, that the PKI criticised and even opposed the Comintern's directives and resolutions. Baars, a leading member of the ISDV and later the PKI, expressed this sentiment clearly on the Comintern's resolution of the 'National and Colonial Question':

It is understandable and forgiveable that it is the Russians most of all who do this, since for them, the nationalism of the oppressed middle class in India, Egypt and elsewhere, really is an enormous help in the struggle against England, the leader of the entente.

The Comintern's position on Islam and cooperation with 'bourgeois nationalism' created problems for the PKI in the Indies. The Comintern's declaration on Islam intensified PKI's differences with Sarekat Islam, as this gave fresh ammunition to the opponents of the PKI in Sarekat Islam.

to claim that the PKI was hostile to Islam and Pan-Islamism, at a time when such movements were gaining support in the archipelago. Recent Soviet writings have, however, denied that the Comintern's criticisms of Pan-Islamism created any "appreciable difficulties for the communist movement, contrary to the assertions of certain Western historians. Secondly, the apprehensions of some Indonesian Communists that the Comintern's stand on Pan-Islamism could push Muslim masses away from the Communist Party turned out to be groundless". 57 Drugov based his case on the fact that the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) had urged the leadership of the PKI to cooperate with the 'national revolutionary mass organizations', including the Sarekat Islam. Moreover, the fact that a number of Muslim preachers and clergymen had taken part in the communist-led uprisings in 1926/1927 is seen as a vindication of this case. 58 This, however, obscures the fact that the 1926/1927 uprisings were more a nationalist revolt rather than a merely communist one, even though the PKI organised it.

In view of the continuing differences between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI, the Comintern's strategy of 'united front from above' could not be realised. PKI's relations with the Comintern were further complicated by internal developments in the Indies. In June 1920, Budi Utomo revoked its previous practice of permitting members to join one or more other political parties, and other parties soon followed suit. The principal consequence was the tension created between Sarekat Islam and PKI, especially in view

57 Drugov, Op cit, p. 387.
58 Ibid, pp. 386-388.
of the latter's successes in winning over a sizeable Sarekat Islam following.

In general, Soviet scholars have interpreted the increasing tensions between Sarekat Islam and PKI as caused by the growing 'rightist tendencies' of Sarekat Islam's leadership. Zakaznikova also maintained that the fear of losing their importance in the movement provoked the 'right-wing elements of the bourgeois leadership of Sarekat Islam to refuse to unite with the PKI'.

The rivalry between Sarekat Islam and PKI split the former and at the October 1921 Congress of the Sarekat Islam, a showdown erupted between the moderates led by Tjokroaminoto on the one hand and the PKI faction led by Semaun and Tan Malaka on the other. The moderates moved a motion for party discipline and the PKI-oriented group was defeated. The faction that supported the PKI stance resigned en masse and set up the Sarekat Islam Association or the Red Sarekat Islam. This was later reorganised as the People's League following the official expulsion of the communists during the February 1923 Congress of the Sarekat Islam.

60. Ye P. Zakaznikova, "The Labour Movement in Indonesia", in lugo-vostochnaia Azii, ocherki ekonomiki i istorii, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vostochnoy literatury, 1958), p.45; Rewriting the event, the writer admitted that the Sarekat Islam's slide to the right was also, to a considerable extent, due to the PKI's own mistakes: "which it had inherited from the Dutch left-wing Social Democrats. These boiled down to an eclectic attitude to the tasks of the different stages of the national liberation revolution, a theoretical confusion in the matter of a correlation between general democratic and socialist slogans in the revolutionary movement". Zakaznikova, "The Early Spread...", p.193.
61. Tan Malaka, one the PKI leaders, later blamed the split on its members for their 'tactless criticism of the leaders of Sarekat Islam'. Nevertheless, the PKI's decision to form the Red Sarekat Islam was a tactical one, aimed at weakening the Sarekat Islam, in the hope of winning over its membership and emerging as the dominant political party in the Dutch colony. See Mintz, Op cit, p.30; McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp.115-116.
The Comintern watched anxiously as the PKI and the Sarekat Islam parted ways. However, the Soviet Union's weaknesses prevented the Comintern from doing anything more than being a mere bystander. On the one hand, to intervene directly would have complicated state-to-state relations with the Netherlands and won the wrath of other colonial powers that were already wary of Comintern activities. On the other hand, to remain silent on the PKI-Sarekat Islam crisis would have made mockery of the Comintern as a nucleus of world revolution and encouraged the break-up of 'united fronts' in other parts of the world. In these circumstances, the Comintern chose a middle path of counselling both parties to continue their cooperation in their efforts to dislodge 'imperialism'. In early March 1923, the ECCI sent a letter to Tjokroaminoto, emphasising the need for continued cooperation with the PKI. At the same time, the ECCI warned the PKI not to turn its back on Sarekat Islam:

You are aware what great importance we [the Comintern] attach to the Sarekat Islam movement. There is no need to dwell upon it, for our Party wanted to cooperate with Sarekat Islam from the very beginning. The Third International is very much interested in this movement. The differences which two or three leaders of Sarekat Islam create will be insignificant compared with that we stand to gain by winning over the masses of Sarekat Islam.

In spite of this counsel, the PKI began increasingly to stress its 'proletarian purity'. At a party meeting held from 11 to 15 December 1924 at Kutagede, near Jogjakarta, the PKI agreed to abandon the Sarekat Rakyat (the new name for Red Sarekat Islam), which constituted its primary

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64. The PKI claimed that its considerations were influenced by the Fifth Comintern Congress (in 1923) and the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference, where a move towards greater proletarian purity was supposedly urged. See Mintz, *Op cit*, pp. 30-31; Kahin, *Op cit*, p. 77.
peasantry base. This decision was taken in spite of the knowledge that the Comintern supported the existence of Sarekat Rakyat. The decision to jettison its peasantry base was largely influenced by the PKI leadership's belief that it contained too many bourgeois nationalists who could not be counted upon to undertake revolutionary activities. There was also the general belief that the peasantry was not a revolutionary force compared to the industrial and urban proletariat.

The PKI's decision to abandon Sarekat Rakyat also went against the Comintern's strategy of 'revolution from above'. This has been further confirmed by recent Soviet works. Drugov, for instance, stated that "the advocacy of a united anti-imperialist front and of action to end sectarianism and seclusion is known to have been typical of the Comintern's entire work with the CPI. [However], the CPI leadership saw no point in working with the Sarekat Islam mass organization". On 6 April 1925, the Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI in 'Work of the Communist Party of Java' resolved that "the Sarekat Rakyat be developed into a mass national revolutionary party, operating under the communist leadership but not amalgamating with it". On 4 May, in its letter to the PKI leadership, the ECCI warned that "the experience of the International Communist movement has shown that there is not a single country in the world where the proletariat can count on success... unless it

obtain the active support of the majority of the peasantry". The letter also cautioned that "if you refuse to lead the struggle of the peasantry in Indonesia against the Dutch imperialists, you will hold up the revolution for many years". Largely as a result of this pressure from the Comintern, the PKI leadership agreed upon a compromise: it would not abandon the Sarekat Rakyat immediately but instead allow it to wither away. The Comintern charged that the PKI decision was a wrong one, which in turn forced the PKI to protest to the ECCI for breach of international party discipline. The PKI's decision was rebuked in the latter's reply:

The resolution of the last ECCI Plenum regarding the gradual separation of the Sarekat Rakyat from the Party and its transformation into an independent national revolutionary organization with close ties to the broad masses has not been carried out... if the Party does not take a correct line regarding the peasantry in time, the political movement of the peasants will pass over the party as has already been the case to some extent with the radical nationalist elements. Only the complete and unconditional execution of the resolution of the last ECCI Plenum can bring the Party out of its isolated position and unite it with all the active anti-imperialist forces of the Indonesian people.

It was in view of the PKI's refusal to heed the Comintern's advice on Sarekat Islam that on 8 May 1925, Stalin accused the PKI of suffering from 'the infantile disorder of left-wing communism'. This consisted of:

...overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and underrating the importance of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. The Communists in Java recently erroneously put forward the slogan of a 'Soviet Government' for their country, suffer it seems from this deviation. It is a deviation to the left, which threatens to deviate the Communist Party from the masses and to transform it into a sect.

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69. Kahin, Op cit, pp. 77-78.
72. I. V. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (Moscow, 1940), p. 192.
By the end of 1925 and at the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU, Stalin had won in his feud with Trotsky.  

Stalin’s position on the colonial question was also reflected at the February 1926 ECCI Plenary Session which called for a 'bloc within' strategy and the cooperation of communist parties with non-communist and peasantry elements. The PKI's decision to jettison the Sarekat Rakyat and to persist in its proletarian drive opened it to charges of 'Trotskyism'. Semaun objected to this, claiming that the PKI's position was not due to its defiance of the Comintern but rather was compelled by local circumstances. This explanation was, however, rejected by the ECCI which observed that the party had committed errors, evaluating 'incorrectly the correlation of class forces', which 'allowed certain sectarian mistakes'. Writing on the ECCI's rejection of the PKI's decision to jettison the Sarekat Rakyat, a recent Soviet work stated that:

It was typical of all the Comintern documents dealing with the CPI to combine a highly exacting attitude and an approach of principle with a friendly understanding of the entire complexity of the situation the budding CPI operated in. The Comintern's leaders realised that many of the predominantly leftist difficulties and deviations in CPI activities had been engendered by the specific social climate of colonial Indonesia which obstructed the propagation of genuinely proletarian views and kept the Communists surrounded by all penetrating petty-bourgeois elements.

This claim is, however, difficult to sustain in view of Stalin's condemnation of the PKI for its 'deviations' and the ECCI's accusation of its 'Trotskyist' tendencies.

To Soviet analysts the principal event which highlighted

75.Ibid, p. 230.
the PKI's 'sectarian mistake' was its decision to launch revolts in 1926/1927.

The PKI leadership, especially Alimin and Musso, were convinced that the Indies was ripe for revolution and that the Dutch could be overthrown. There was also the feeling that the Party had no choice but to revolt, which was largely contributed to by the successful Dutch reprisals against its leadership. But, both Moscow and the Comintern cautioned against the revolt. As early as 6 April 1925, the ECCI advised the PKI that the situation in the Indies was not propitious for the "development of a straightforward armed struggle to establish a worker-peasant government". M.N. Roy, who was in charge of colonial affairs in the ECCI Presidium, similarly warned against 'adventures' on 12 June 1926. In this context, it was not surprising that the Alimin-Musso mission to Moscow, to gain approval for their revolt plans, proved futile. Their plea for support was denied on grounds that not only was the revolutionary situation in the Indies not yet ripe but also that the PKI did not have a clear-cut political programme for an uprising. Instead, the ECCI advised the PKI to adopt the strategy of 'revolution from above'. In addition, "the representatives of the Comintern drew the former's [PKI delegation] attention to the fact that in Indonesia a democratic and not a socialist revolution was maturing". But "the CPI leadership did not agree with the Comintern".

Within a week of its outbreak in Java, the revolt was crushed by the Dutch. Even though the ECCI had advised against the revolt, once the insurrection broke out, it gave its full support. A Manifesto of the ECCI on 20 November 1926 read: "The Comintern welcomes the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Indonesia and pledges its complete support". Bukharin, a politburo member and head of the Comintern from 1926 to 1929, similarly declared, "We greet the proletarians and peasants of Indonesia, the broad working masses of this Dutch colony who are likewise engaged in a bloody struggle against capital. Our full support to the Indonesian people".

Why did the Comintern support the 1926/1927 revolts? Once it became a fait accompli, the Comintern may have decided that it would have done greater damage to itself if it did not support it. Drugov, for instance, was later to argue that the Comintern supported the revolt because its policy:

... was governed by the principles of proletarian internationalism and the mistakes of the CPI leadership did not exempt other communist parties from their moral obligation to come to the aid of any contingent of the International Communist movement that may find itself in trouble.

Of greater significance was the failure of the revolt and the manner the Soviet Union and the Comintern analysed it. In its initial assessment, the Comintern observed that the revolt failed because the PKI ignored the other political parties, that it failed to make the necessary concessions to nationalism and that it did not follow the 'bloc within' tactic with regard to Sarekat Rakyat.

inadequacy of the PKI's organizational strength and power to carry the revolt off successfully, the launching of the revolt without taking account of the political and military realities of the time, the successful Dutch measures before the revolt and the Party's failure to take full cognisance of the vigour of prevailing mores, especially of the role of religion in Indonesia, ensured the revolt's failure.  

However, by November 1927, the ECCI argued that:

The whole course of the revolt betrayed the lack of earnest political and organizational preparation of this movement as a whole. It is extremely characteristic that the revolt was under the general slogan of the fight against Dutch imperialism, and without a concrete political and economic slogan which would have mobilised broad masses and would have made the revolt the last and deciding point of a general strike and a peasant insurrectionary movement.87

While the initial assessment blamed the failure on the PKI's violation of the 'united front from above' strategy, the November 1927 ECCI's assessment would tend to imply that failure was assured due to the lack of adequate preparations. While the initial assessment would tend to caution against a revolt, the latter evaluation implied no such restraint. This change in perspective was largely the result of the various setbacks the Kremlin and the Comintern experienced in the colonial world and China, which subsequently prepared the ground for the reassertion of a more hardline, ideological and inward looking foreign policy.

Ultra-revolutionary, neo-isolationism phase, 1928-1933

This phase was the result of Stalin's predominance
domestically and a return to autocracy at home as well as Moscow's setbacks in foreign policy. Domestically, Stalin eliminated his political rivals and stressed the danger of imminent capitalist attack. At the same time, the onset of the Great Depression was hailed as the imminent doom of world capitalism. Despite the alarmist tone of Stalin's declarations, he was cautious and pacific, avoiding confrontation with the capitalist powers.

There was, however, a clear shift in policy as far as the colonial world was concerned. In 1928, Moscow enunciated the policy of 'united front from below', which was later sanctioned by the Sixth Comintern Congress. The national bourgeois was accused of betraying their own countries and having sought rapprochement with the imperialist powers, which in turn led to a decline in the influence of the national bourgeoisie over the masses, to the sharpening of the revolutionary crisis, to the unleashing of the agrarian revolution of the widest masses of the peasants and to the creation of favourable conditions for the 'hegemony' of the proletariat in the struggle for full national liberation. On 1 September 1928, the Comintern Congress' theses on the colonial question called for 'unity between socialist world revolution and the proletariat of the colonies', but ignored the national bourgeoisie. The ultra-revolutionary 'line' called for the development of the communist party as the leading force of the revolution and the rejection of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. This, however, ignored

89. See McLane, Op. Cit., pp. 64-73.
the fact that attempted communist revolutions in China and Indonesia had disastrously failed a year earlier. The Sixth Comintern Congress, showing its total subordination and subservience to Soviet domestic and foreign policy objectives, enunciated the following guiding principles for foreign communist parties:

1. The Soviet Union was the citadel of world revolution;
2. The preservation of the Soviet Union must be the primary concern of the international proletariat; and
3. All communist parties owed exclusive allegiance to Moscow.90

Recent Soviet works have, however, been especially vocal in rejecting Western scholars' charges that in all stages of its work and the recommendations it offered to the communist parties, including the PKI, were built, above all, on the national interests of the Soviet Union, regardless of the local conditions and requirements of the class struggle of the communists in Indonesia and other countries. Some Western scholars have also argued that after it became evident, following Lenin's death, that there would be no proletarian revolution in Europe in the foreseeable future and that the Kremlin could not build socialism without the aid of a 'world revolution', the Soviet leadership began provoking tension in the colonies for the West to face so as to divert 'capitalist danger' from her own borders.91 In defence, Drugov argued that:

the Comintern and the CPSU did not regard their interests as something isolated but saw them closely intertwined and combined. When the Comintern acknowledged the special position of Soviet Russia on the world scene as well as her role in the worldwide historical process, that was no concession to the national interests of the Russian Federation or the USSR, but an inference from an objective analysis of the prevailing situation without which the formulation of a precise and realistic policy would have been impossible.92

Most scholars have seen the inward-looking, neo-isolationist phase of foreign policy as the result of internal Soviet politics and the problems confronting international communism. This, however, had important consequences for Soviet relations with other countries, especially those in the colonial world.

In a way, the adoption of a hardline posture towards Indonesia was already in the pipeline by late December 1926. Following the suppression of the revolts, one of the PKI leaders, Semaun, entered into an agreement with Mohammad Hatta, the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), a student organization in Holland which played an important role in the Indonesian nationalist struggle, on 5 December 1926. In essence, the Semaun-Hatta Convention recognised the PI's leadership over the PKI. Semaun was largely motivated by the destruction of the PKI, while Hatta sensed that the PKI had great influence over the masses. The convention was seen as a convenient instrument to reduce this influence and "bring them under the influence of our [PI] organization". The ECCI, however, repudiated the agreement, accusing the PKI of 'liquidationism', which encouraged it to 'surrender some of the party's independence'. According to Drugov, the Semaun-Hatta Convention:

in defiance of the guidelines of the second and subsequent congresses regarding united front tactics, left the leading role to a typically bourgeois-nationalist association, while the communist party, its allies and mass organizations pledged themselves to refrain from criticism of, and all opposition to, the leadership of the association.

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95. Ibid, p. 43.
96. Ibid, p. 54.
97. Ibid.
Despite the suppression of the PKI during the 1926/1927 revolts, in order to downplay its foreign policy setback, Moscow (and the Comintern) sought to keep alive the fiction that the communist movement in Indonesia (and elsewhere) existed and was of significance. For instance, the Comintern press boasted in January 1930 that "the approaching revolt of the Indonesian masses under the leadership of the PKI will prove that Indonesia is not only ripe to take her fate into her own hands but is prepared to win". Other than optimistically representing the PKI, Moscow and the Comintern excoriated the other nationalist parties that came into existence after the 1926/1927 revolts, in line with the adoption of a hardline 'united front from below' strategy, which in general was critical of the bourgeois-nationalists. Except for one incident, developments in the Dutch colony were ignored. In February 1933, Dutch and Indonesian seamen mutinied on the Dutch warship, De Zeven Provincien. In the context of portraying the PKI in positive terms, a Soviet writer described the mutiny "as evidence that we are at the threshold of that revolutionary upsurge...A rising of the PKI, with the genuinely Bolshevik help of the Communist Party of Holland, is more than ever the order of the day". Guber, similarly, saw widespread implications for the affair and called for a 'revolutionary solution of the crisis, the overthrow of Dutch imperialist domination and national freedom'. The optimism of these writers was, however, unfounded, as the mutiny was an isolated episode. In the first place, the PKI was not even involved.

98. Gerald Vantes, "Terror, Famine and Pestilence in Indonesia", International Press Correspondence, 9 January 1930, p. 27.
100. Ibid.
in planning and did not attempt in any way to make capital of it. If Soviet and Comintern spokesmen seized on the incident as an indication of 'revolutionary upsurge' in Indonesia, it was because they had no other events to focus their attention on in the Dutch colony which was gripped with nationalist struggle. Developments in Europe and East Asia, however, effected a change in Soviet national security considerations, and this called forth a new 'line' in its foreign policy, which had implications for its policies in the colonial areas.

Collective Security Era, 1934-1937

The main beneficiaries of the Great Depression were not the Western colonial powers but the militarists in Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union was forced to abandon neo-isolationism and ultra-revolutionary policies because of the rising threat of Nazi Germany. A corollary of this was the abandonment of opposition to the Versailles system, in the hope of seeking reconciliation with the West. From 1932 onwards, Moscow began to develop state-to-state relations with Finland, Estonia, Poland and France. The Soviet Union also attempted to set up an 'eastern Locarno' to protect its western borders but failed. By 1934, when the Nazi danger was seen as real, Moscow accelerated its shift towards the Western democracies. In September 1934, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations and totally abandoned hostility towards the Paris Peace agreements. At the same time, Stalin sought security through mutual defence pacts; for example, in May 1935, a defence pact was concluded with

France. The rising Nazi threat on the West and the concerted
growth of danger from Japan in East Asia, forced Moscow
to seek security through better relations with Western
capitalist and colonial powers. Consequently, this led to
changes in Soviet policy towards Europe and the colonies.
Revolution was deemphasised in both Europe and the colonial
world. This led directly to the Seventh Comintern Congress,
adopting a new 'popular front' policy, urging "all progressive
forces to cooperate against Fascism, the most dangerous
form of capitalist imperialism". In its quest for Western
governments' support against Germany, Moscow's interest
in the colonial affairs waned, demonstrating once again
that support for revolution gave way to the demands of
Soviet domestic and foreign policies. In this respect, recent
Soviet works have rejected Western writers' interpretations
of the Seventh Congress' decisions which boils down to
setting anti-fascism off against the struggle with the
'original' colonialists, for national liberation. Rather, it
is argued that the idea of popular front was to invite
the attention of the communist parties to the fresh danger
of Fascism and to work out a new tactic appropriate to
the changed circumstances. The writer noted that "the struggle
for national liberation and for democracy was never stricken
off the agenda, but took on new forms". It, however, still
does not explain why the opposition to the Western colonialists
was downgraded and how the nationalist-colonialist cooperation
against Fascism was supposed to assist the national
liberation struggle. Regardless of Soviet claims, interest

103. See VII Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Stenographic
in the colonial world was only indicated when it would benefit Moscow's effort to gain support of the colonial powers or to check the danger of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan.

This was clearly shown in Soviet/Comintern policies toward Indonesia during this phase. In 1935, Musso, one of the leaders of the PKI's 1926/1927 revolts, returned to Indonesia to set up the 'illegal PKI'. In the words of a Soviet writer, the ECCI sent Musso "to organise work of rebuilding the PKI as a national force capable of acting as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle." This has been confirmed by many writers, and the 'illegal-PKI's' underground activities were relatively successful as seen in its penetration of a number of important political organizations such as Partindo (the Indonesian Party), Gerindo (the Indonesian Peoples' Movement) and Gapi (the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties). In May 1937, the leaders of Partindo and underground PKI members founded Gerindo, which Guber described as being established by "revolutionary representatives of the national bourgeoisie and the consistent fighters of the freedom of the Indonesian people - the Communists - [which in turn] gave expression to the movement of the most decisive and patriotic forces". Zakaznikova also applauded the Gerindo for applying "in the most correct way the general line elaborated by the International Communist Movement to

105 McLane, Op cit, p. 192.
Indonesian conditions”. Soviet/Comintern’s praise for Indonesian nationalists and communist activities was, however, shortlived. Following the intensification of tension in Europe and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in China, a new foreign policy line was adopted, which in turn called on the colonies to change their policies toward the colonial powers.

The Soviet-Nazi Pact, 1938-1941

By mid-1930s, there was already growing Soviet disillusionment with the failure of the collective security system to check the expansion of the Nazis. In March 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties. German refortification of the Rhineland shattered the collective security system as well as undermined the Franco-Soviet pact. The Western powers’ apathy towards the Spanish Civil War which began in July 1936, reinforced Stalin’s belief that he could not count on the West to check Hitler. Other ominous developments from 1936 to 1938 led to a reconsideration of Soviet priorities, leading finally to the Soviet-Nazi pact in 1939. The formation of the Axis Pact (between Germany and Italy) in October 1936, and the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern pact with Japan in November, further aggravated antagonisms between Fascism and Communism. The Nazi gains in 1938 finally destroyed the remnants of the collective security system and totally alienated the Soviet Union from appeasement-minded West.

Hitler’s annexation of Austria drew only ineffectual Western

protest, confirming Stalin's belief that he could not rely on the West to save central and eastern Europe. His last straw was the Western capitulation to Hitler in Munich, in October 1938, on the question of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the growing Soviet tension with Japan encouraged Moscow to seek peace with Hitler which culminated on 27 August 1939 in the Nazi-Soviet pact.  

The pact called for a revision of Soviet strategies in the colonial areas: the 'united front against Fascism' was modified since the 'German fascists' were now allied with Moscow. In Indonesia, this led to Moscow's call for the intensification of the 'national liberation struggle' against the 'Dutch colonisers and imperialists'. In real terms, however, there was no immediate change in Soviet policy towards Indonesia because of the outbreak of war in Europe and the German occupation of Holland. In this regard, the change in declaratory policy was significant only to the extent that the Soviet Union announced a modification of its 'united front from above' policy. This was later changed as a result of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the latter's joining the Allies to combat the Axis powers.

**The Second World War, 1941-1945**

While Hitler was busy absorbing, through the Nazi blitzkrieg, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and France, Stalin wasted little time in claiming his booty: the Red Army occupied Eastern Poland, pressured

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the Baltic states into permitting Soviet troops to be stationed on their territory, a prelude to their formal incorporation into the Soviet Union in August 1940, and tried to intimidate Finland into surrendering territory that would have strengthened the defensive position of Leningrad. Upon the Finns’ refusal, Moscow abrogated its treaty of non-aggression on 28 November 1939 and attacked the next day. The Finns only capitulated on 12 March 1940. Thus, between September 1939 and June 1941, Stalin took advantage of Hitler’s expansion, to expand at the expense of immediate neighbours. The Soviet-German 'honeymoon' ended abruptly following the German attack on the Soviet Union. This led to the formation of a Grand Alliance against Hitler. Upon this, the primary concern of Soviet domestic and foreign policies was the preservation of the Soviet state. All other goals were subordinate to this objective. In this context, the Soviet support for liberation movements in the colonial areas was almost non-existent unless such movements were connected with the successful conclusion of the war. The Soviet concern for world revolution and liberation struggle in the East was postponed. Even the Comintern was dissolved in 1943.

In Indonesia, the weakness of the PKI and the dominance of the bourgeois-nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta made the Soviets ignore developments there. The Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago was ignored throughout the period of the Second World War. Commentaries on Indonesia began to emerge only after the Japanese surrender. Guber, for instance, analysed the Japanese
occupation of Indonesia from March 1942 to August 1945 as follows:

The Japanese imperialists found conditions favourable for hood-winking the enslaved peoples of the countries they occupied [in Southeast Asia]. This was to no little extent due to the colonial regime that existed in Southeast Asia up to the war. The Japanese aggressors were able, particularly in the early period of their invasion, to create certain illusions among the colonial peoples by granting them the semblance of 'broad autonomy' by setting up local governments and so forth. This applies particularly to Indonesia... where under Dutch rule, the population was denied elementary rights. But the plunder and violence practised by the Japanese aggressors revealed the utter falsity of these demagogic promises. It roused the hatred of the peoples of Southeast Asia against the Japanese and prompted them to resistance. Notwithstanding the reign of terror and oppression, the partisan struggle and the resistance movement grew and expanded in all the countries seized by the Japanese.\footnote{Guber, "What's Happening in Indochina and Indochina?", \textit{New Times}, No.11, 1 Nov.1945, p.10.}

Guber has stressed the negative aspects of the Japanese occupation while the benefits that accrued to the nationalist movement through Japanese creation of various mass movements, the employment of locals in the administrative services, and the training and establishment of a native army are overlooked.\footnote{See Joyce C. Lebra, \textit{Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia}, (Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977); B.R.O'G. Anderson, \textit{Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946}, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972); H.J. Benda, \textit{The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation}, (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958).} At the same time, Guber emphasised the antagonistic aspects of Japanese-nationalists relations while ignoring the continuous cooperation on various matters.

\textbf{An Overview}

The Soviet Union adopted two different types of policy towards Asia after the Bolshevik Revolution. The first can be described as diplomatic and this was applicable to countries which had attained political independence,
such as Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, China and Japan. The second type of policy can be designated as revolutionary diplomacy and this was applicable to the European colonies, such as the Dutch East Indies. The Soviet Union conducted its revolutionary diplomacy through the Comintern.

Between 1917 and 1945, the Soviet Union made a number of tactical changes in its revolutionary diplomacy. It generally stressed 'revolution from below' from 1917-1920, 1928-1933, 1938-1941 and 1941-1945. 'Revolution from above' was emphasised during the periods from 1920-1927 and 1934-1937. Despite these tactical zigzags, Moscow's basic objective was to extend support to the various nationalist/revolutionary forces, help them morally, not materially, to become independent of European control. In this regard, Moscow was freed from all the confines and limitations of classical diplomacy, since there were no independent states in these areas (the European colonies) with which diplomatic relations could be developed, no national government to whom the Soviet leadership could turn in order to establish close political and economic relations. It was also apparent that the primary concern of the Soviet leadership, from 1917-1945, was to consolidate its hold on power and establish a viable, functioning Soviet state. At the same time, lacking in economic and military capabilities, Moscow was constrained from playing a direct role in Third World affairs.

As far as Soviet-Indonesian relations were concerned, which during the period from 1917-1945 were mainly Soviet/Comintern relations with the PKI, from the very start, were plagued with problems. This can be largely
explained by the clash between the needs of Soviet national interest and Marxist ideology as represented by the Comintern on one side and the realities of Indonesian life in which the PKI operated. The position of the Comintern on Islam, Pan-Islamism, cooperation with the national bourgeoisie and the peasantry and the strategy of 'united front from above', after the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, placed the PKI in an untenable situation. Operating in a predominantly Islamic environment, the PKI was counselled to commit political suicide by condemning Islam and Pan-Islamism. Though this suited Soviet national interests, for the encouragement of Islamic sentiments was not only anti-Marxist but could also weaken Bolshevik control over the Central Asian territories, it was an unsuitable prescription for the PKI which was then attempting to win over the Sarekat Islam's leadership and followers. This naturally caused tension between the Sarekat Islam and the PKI on the one hand and between the Comintern and the PKI on the other. The consequence was that the PKI was conveniently accused of 'leftist deviations'. The lack of communication between the PKI and the Comintern caused by geographical isolation of the Dutch East Indies from Moscow also created misunderstandings, as the main sources of information for the Comintern about the colony were the Dutch Communist Party and PKI exiles. More often than not, the Comintern was not aware of the predicament of the Indonesian communists, especially the pressures and constraints they operated under. The PKI's differences with Sarekat Islam and the ever-present threat
of prosecution by the colonial authorities also limited the scope of activities of the Indonesian communists. It was one thing for the ECCI to make declarations and issue instructions to the PKI but completely another matter for the PKI to implement them. This dichotomy explained the tense relations between the PKI and the Comintern from 1920 to early 1927, when the PKI was decimated by Dutch repression.

Following the Second World War, changes in both Indonesia and the Soviet Union created a new set of circumstances, both domestic and international, and this had tremendous implications for relations between the two countries, which the next four chapters will illuminate.
CHAPTER TWO

SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER STALIN, 1945-1953
This chapter examines the development of Soviet-Indonesian relations from August 1945 to March 1953. Unlike the pre-war period, it is now possible to speak of Soviet-Indonesian relations at a governmental level as the Indonesian nationalists declared themselves independent and sovereign in August 1945. Equally important was the emergence of the Soviet Union as one of the two leading powers in the world. The victory in the Second World War and the occupation of vast areas in Europe and East Asia extended the physical frontiers of the Soviet heartland. Being the strongest land power in Europe, Soviet leaders demanded a safe and secure protective belt of countries with unquestioned loyalty to themselves in order to protect their vulnerable western borders. In this context, one of the earliest tasks of post-war Stalin’s foreign policy was to secure political control of areas under Soviet military occupation, especially those contiguous to the Soviet state such as Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.¹

At the same time, the Asian continent was seething with nationalist activities, and the Soviet Union as a revolutionary, anti-colonial power, was expected to respond to developments there. Its great power status which was convincingly established in the Second World War and its role, along with the other Allied powers, in the establishment of post-war peace gave Moscow a voice in international affairs, including those affecting the colonies, something which she did not have before 1945. In the pre-war period,

isolationism and remoteness characterised Soviet relations with colonial peoples, especially those under direct colonial administration, presenting it with little opportunity to further its interests directly. Instead, it had to rely on the communist parties in the metropolitan countries, on the local communists and sporadic contacts with its leaders, to maintain relations and exert its influence. However, in the post-war years, a new situation emerged as the prospect of decolonization, coupled with the growing international role and status of the USSR, raised the possibilities of direct diplomatic relations with new governments in the former colonial areas.

Against this backdrop, Soviet foreign relations with Indonesia will be examined in three parts: from August 1945 to March 1947, from March 1947 to April 1952 and from April 1952 to March 1953, which also reflected the general oscillations in Stalin's foreign policy after the war until his death.

Phase 1: August 1945 - March 1947

Soviet policies toward the colonial world followed the general contours of its world-wide political conflicts with the United States and its allies. In the immediate post-war years, there continued lingering hopes for Big Power cooperation. However, the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the fear of American power potential influenced the Soviet leaders to exploit their wartime gains to expand their territory, to increase the number of dependent territories and to raise the influence and power of communist parties. The first order of things was to secure a belt of buffer states
on the periphery of the Soviet Union and adopt a policy of collaboration with nationalist forces for countries outside the reach of the Red Army. From August 1945 onwards, the Soviet Union installed communist governments subservient to Moscow in Eastern Europe. In other areas contiguous to the Soviet Union, attempts were made to establish buffers under the control of local communists. The attempts to detach Azerbaijan from Iran between 1945-1946, to exploit the Greek civil war between 1946-1949, the installation of a communist regime in North Korea and the establishment of a Chinese communist base in Manchuria between 1945-1946, were examples of this policy. These manoeuvres were, however, restricted to regions on the borders of the Soviet Union, where Moscow felt that it had a right to intervene in what was perceived as its sphere of influence. At the same time, there was still in existence the semblance of great powers cooperation, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, as Moscow perceived, between 1945 and 1946, that the United States would not use its great power potential to lead the non-communist world and that Great Britain, which had been greatly weakened by the World War, would be its principal adversary.

Europe was still the main focus of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet relations and policies elsewhere were a reflection of its interests in Europe. This was clearly evident in Moscow's relations and policies towards the national liberation movements in the colonial world, especially

those led by the communist parties. Because of the massive strength of the French and Italian Communist Parties, Moscow harboured hopes that these parties would assume power via the parliamentary route. It was this consideration that led Moscow to continue counselling communist parties to pursue the strategy of 'united front from above'. That there was still the semblance of cooperation with the other Allied powers, might have also played a role in the adoption of the above 'cooperative' strategy. Soviet relations with Indonesia's revolutionary government reflected the broad parameters of its policies elsewhere in the colonial world.

On 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia independent, but the Dutch refused to recognise the newly proclaimed republic. The August Revolution, as the proclamation of independence has been referred to, was largely effected by non-communist nationalist leaders. The PKI played a minimal role. It viewed the Revolution as one of a 'united national front', but its weakness in the 'political, ideological and organization fields, at that time, made the Party incapable of giving leadership in that very advantageous situation'.

The initial Soviet response was one of indifference. This was despite Soviet expectations of change in Southeast Asia after the defeat of the Japanese. On 21 August 1945, for example, Radio Moscow declared:

> Just as Europe, liberated from the Hitlerite yoke, cannot be the Europe of pre-war days, so Asia freed from Japanese tyranny cannot be the old Asia. The lessons of the Pacific War cannot be discounted, especially as far as the colonial countries are concerned. Certain general principles to settle colonial problems are outlined in the United Nations

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The time has now come for the practical settlement of these urgent colonial questions in the spirit of respect for the vital interests and rights of dependent peoples, including the right of self-determination and full national independence.

Reinforcing this broadcast, G. Evgenyev warned in October 1945 that "it would be very deplorable from the point of view of international security if the status of colonial and dependent countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia remained unchanged".8

However, the primary Soviet concern, following the defeat of the 'fascist powers', was in Europe, and Asia was viewed as a secondary theatre with no vital interests. Moscow's main concern was to consolidate its wartime gains in Eastern Europe and to rehabilitate its war-ravaged society. The Soviet Union's indifference to nationalist revolutions in Asia was not limited to Indonesia; even the communist-led revolution of the Vietminh in Vietnam was ignored.9

There was an ideological aspect to this. The 'popular front strategy' was still in force, even though the Comintern had been abolished in 1943. The CPSU thus viewed with suspicion, the declaration of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, especially since no role was being played by the communists. In this regard, Moscow had some reasons to believe with the Dutch that the Republic of Indonesia was indeed a 'Japanese-inspired plot'.

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7. Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraphic Services, Radio Moscow in English, Part 1, No. 2227, 21 August 1945, p. 3(b)ii.
The Soviet Union only changed its view about the new Republic gradually, and this was due as much to developments in Europe as in Indonesia. The growing tensions in the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union and the West, and the growing decline in opportunities for communist success in Western Europe, encouraged the Soviet Union to devote greater attention to Asia. The most obvious issue for attention, French Indochina, presented difficulties to Soviet foreign policy because in post-war France there was a large and powerful Communist Party, which might reach power and inherit control of Indochina; it was therefore desirable not to alienate French opinion in the interim by supporting the Vietnamese struggle. Moreover, until the spring of 1947, the French Communist Party supported the retention of Indochina as a colony. This operated to restrain overt Soviet support for the 'liberation of Vietnam'.

In the case of the Netherlands, no such complication existed, as the Dutch Communist Party was weak.

The birth of the Indonesian Republic finally came to be seen as providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity to make its influence felt in Southeast Asia, as well as to support, at least through proclamations, national liberation movements in the region. As more detailed and accurate information emanated from the new Republic, Moscow must have realised that a genuine colonial revolution was taking place there. More importantly, Indonesian leaders directly appealed for Soviet assistance, and in October

1945 Sukarno sent a telegram to Stalin on the anniversary of the October Revolution. On 14 November, Radio Moscow reciprocated with a wish that "Allah grant that all the noble aims of the Indonesian people be successfully achieved". The unfavourable initial Soviet views of the August Revolution were replaced by more favourable ones. The Indonesian independence movement was said to be genuinely revolutionary and to possess a national unity that cut across class lines. A review of the situation in early 1946 found that what was ‘undoubtedly a mass movement' had been developing in the second half of 1945. It was not uniform in composition: but "all participants in the present movement, whatever their shade of political opinion, are united by a single aspiration to see their country free". At the end of the year, the point was made even more emphatically by a Soviet writer who quoted an Indonesian source to the effect that there was no difference between the extreme left and right on the question of independence and the republic. He maintained that radical sentiments were strong among non-communists and found the position of the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir 'very remarkable'. Sjahrir was credited with pointing to the connection between the internal liberation struggle and the world-wide struggle against imperialism: "More than for any other people of the world, for us it is indispensable to change the basis of human society in order to drive capitalism-imperialism from this earth". In later Soviet writings, the Indonesian

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declaration of independence was seen as "a great event which opened a new page in the history of the country", while Model, writing in 1960, saw it as being "provoked by the aggravation of one of the main antagonisms in Indonesian society - that between imperialism and the Indonesian nation". What is significant for our purpose is that the Soviet Union viewed the revolution in positive terms. Developments in Indonesia following the proclamation of independence provided Moscow with greater opportunities to involve itself, both directly and indirectly, in the revolutionary war and developments thereafter.

Following the Japanese surrender, Vice-Admiral Mountbatten, as the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, was given the responsibility of disarming the Japanese and retrieving the Allied prisoners of war in Indonesia. There was, however, a gap of forty-three days between the proclamation of Indonesian independence and the first landing of British forces on 29 September, and this provided time for the new Republic to consolidate itself. The initial

16. A. M. Model, "Fifteen Years of Indonesian Independence", Problemy vostokovedeniia, No. 4, 1960, p. 56. In 1972, Drugov described the August Revolution in the following terms: "The August Revolution was carried out by a united national front, under the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie which, by virtue of its weak economic and political positions, was initially compelled to let representatives of the proletariat and its political parties take a share in state administration. But the PKI, which had sustained heavy losses in the years of the underground anti-imperialist struggle against the Dutch colonialists and Japanese invaders, failed to take advantage of the situation and to make the working class the hegemon of the revolution". See A. Yu Drugov, "Indonesia", in Southeast Asia: History, Economy, Policy, (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1972), p. 214.
Allied landing in Batavia, mainly British and Indian troops, encountered no major problems as the Republican leaders accepted its presence as necessary to disarm the Japanese and liberate Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. But, by mid-October 1945, tension mounted with the return of Dutch troops to Java. The Republican leaders became suspicious of British intentions and began to fear that the Allied presence was intended to assist the Dutch to reimpose colonial hegemony. The powder-keg ignited, following the shooting of Brigadier Mallaby, in Surabaya on 29 October, and the situation was worsened by the British decision to use Japanese troops against the Republican forces.

The Soviet Union condemned the intervention of British forces in Java as assisting the Dutch to reassert control. On 24 October, Pravda reported that fighting was in progress in the Dutch East Indies, between the British forces and those under the leadership of Sukarno. In November 1945, Guber wrote:

... notwithstanding their announced intention not to interfere in the internal affairs, the British representatives of the Allied Command began at the start to support the forcible restoration of Dutch rule in Indonesia. Lord Mountbatten... issued an order that the Japanese forces were nowhere to surrender their arms to the newly formed National Government. A large part of the Japanese troops have not been disarmed to this day and the reason for this is not that the Allied forces in Indonesia are inadequate for the purpose but that the Japanese are being used to suppress the national movement.

20. The use of the surrendered Japanese troops by the Allied forces to maintain law and order was a sensitive issue. The Dutch Government justified its use on grounds that the necessity was obvious since "there were 200,000 Japanese soldiers in Java". See Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services, Radio Moscow in English, Part 1, No.2624, 27 Sept. 1946, p.3(b)ii.
The Soviet view of the British troops as protectors of Dutch colonial interests remained unchanged as long as they remained in Indonesia.  

At a time of severe Allied pressure on the Republic, the Soviet view of the Republic took a turn for the better, and Guber argued that "Sukarno's government appears to enjoy wide support in Java". The Dutch claim that Sukarno's government was a 'puppet' of the Japanese was dismissed. Writing on the Indonesian nationalists' cooperation with the Japanese during the occupation, Guber noted:

... a number of political leaders who head the independent movement, including Sukarno himself, were members of the 'autonomous government' set up by the Japanese during the occupation. The Dutch are exploiting this circumstance to the utmost to make it appear that the movement headed by Sukarno has been inspired by the Japanese.

This in Guber's judgement was 'absurd and injudicious'. Vasileva similarly dismissed charges of Sukarno's wartime collaboration with the Japanese. There is no doubt that Sukarno and other leaders such as Hatta did collaborate with the Japanese from 1942 to mid-1945. It is, however, incorrect to claim that because of this the nationalist movement in Indonesia was inspired by the Japanese, for the movement preceded the Japanese arrival by some four decades. Moreover, Sukarno collaborated with the Japanese in order to hasten the independence of his country and not to become part of the Japanese empire. This was reiterated

23. In September, Radio Moscow stated that the British troops "had come to oppress the national liberation movement in Indonesia and to restore the colonial rule of the Netherlands. The key to understanding the events now occurring in Indonesia is to be found in the offensive policy of British imperialism in Southeast Asia". See Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services, Radio Moscow in English, Part 1, No. 2624, 27 Sept. 1946, p. 3(b)(i).


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

by R.A.Ulyanovsky, who argued in 1984 that during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Sukarno maintained outwardly 'loyal relations' with the military authorities, reckoning at first to use the links with Japan in order to prevent the country from returning to Dutch rule. At the same time, "he kept up contact with and assisted underground national and patriotic organizations". The views of Guber, Vasileva and Ulyanovsky would therefore be justified.

Following the clashes at Surabaya in late October 1945, both the British and Dutch began labelling the nationalist forces as 'bandits and extremists'. This, according to the Soviet press was to convince "the world that there can be no negotiations with people of this type". In Soviet commentaries, the British were the number one antagonists in the region, and it was 'British imperialism' that had to be checked. It was argued that the British needed the huge resources of the region for military purposes and that Indonesia's geographical position on the southern flank of Malaya and Singapore drew London's attention to the archipelago. During this phase of Soviet foreign policy, Britain rather than the United States was viewed as the greater danger, and Soviet criticisms of British activities in the Dutch East Indies should partially be viewed from this light.

In view of the continuing clashes between the Allied and Republican forces, the Soviet Union raised the Indonesian Question in the United Nations in January 1946, and this 'internationalised' the issue: Moscow's incentive for doing so being all the greater because the United States did not support the Indonesian Republic. The Soviet decision to raise the matter was, however, related more to events in Europe and Iran rather than to Indonesia. Britain had raised the question of the reluctance of the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran at the first meeting of the Security Council in London on 17 January 1946. In riposte, the Soviet delegate complained of the activities of British troops in Greece and Indonesia. The Soviet initiative on Indonesia also partially undermined the United States' image as an anti-colonial power. As most of the independent Asian states supported the Indonesian case, it was an issue which provided the Soviet Union with support in the United Nations, at least in the General Assembly. At a time of increasing tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the raising of the Indonesian Question portrayed the former as a 'moralistic' and 'principled' power and confirmed Moscow's anti-colonial credentials. It also represented one of the first few cracks in the wartime alliance.

The Soviet decision to support the Indonesian case at the United Nations had immediate repercussions

33. It is equally arguable that the British raised the Iran issue to draw attention away from their activities in Greece and Indonesia or at least to silence Soviet critics.
in Indonesia. It forced the hand of the PKI, which, banned by the Dutch authorities in 1926, was legally reestablished on 7 November 1945 under the leadership of Mohammad Jusuf. Under his stewardship, the PKI adopted a hostile attitude towards Sukarno's government.²⁵ In many ways, this conflicted with Moscow's position. Jusuf was arrested in February 1946 by the Republican Government, following a communist-inspired attack on a government police barracks. In March, under the new leadership of Sardjono, the party repudiated Jusuf's hostile position towards the Sukarno government and pledged to join "in the defence of the Republic of Indonesia".²⁶

The Soviet initiative at the United Nations was appreciated by the Republican Government. Sjahirir showed his government's gratitude towards Moscow when he remarked that "the Soviet Union was the most suitable in as much as it was the main power least of all directly interested in Indonesia and best able, accordingly, to put the question as a problem of moral order".²⁷

On 7 February 1946, D. Z. Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate, introducing the Indonesian Question, argued:

We have a situation in Indonesia which... endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. The intervention of British and Indian troops in the internal affairs of Indonesia is without doubt, in direct contradiction... of the United Nations Charter.²⁸

In his view, "the use of British troops for the suppression of the national movement of the Indonesian people is inadmissible". Manuilsky further argued that "the most

²⁶. Ibid.
appropriate settlement of the Indonesian Question in its present stage would be the creation by the Security Council of a special commission to investigate the situation on the spot and to establish peace". 39 His proposal was, however, endorsed only by the Ukraine, Poland and the Soviet Union. 40 Sjahrir, however, felt that Manuilsky's proposal was "a good one because it would have the effect of putting Indonesia and her problem more squarely on the map". 41 The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, saw the Soviet move as an attempt to secure a foothold in Southeast Asia. 42 Manuilsky's proposal was not without significance. According to a United States State Department Intelligence Report in January 1946, "the practical effect of the USSR-Ukrainian move [was] to exert some additional pressure on the Netherlands and Great Britain to achieve a speedy solution to the conflict in Java". 43

By mid-1946, the Dutch had gained full control of the outer islands and had even landed troops in parts of Java and Sumatra. On 19 July, Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor of the Netherlands East Indies, organised for the 'representatives of the Great East Indonesia and Borneo Republics' a conference at Malino (Celebes) which adopted a resolution demanding a federal Republic of Indonesia consisting of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East Indonesian Republic. 44 The resolution aimed to isolate the Republican

39.Ibid.
40.Oey Hong Lee, Op cit, p.64.
41.Ibid.
43.Cited in Ibid, p.117.
Government in Java and to balkanise the archipelago, in pursuance of the Dutch colonial policy of 'divide and rule'. A Soviet writer maintained that "the purpose of the conference was to split the Indonesian nationalist movement". To be sure, negotiations between Van Mook and the Republican Government had been in progress since 31 October 1945, but no headway had been made. A Soviet editorial in August 1946 argued that "the Dutch deliberately brought about the failure of the negotiations...in order to gain time in which to transfer additional troops and armaments to Indonesia".

On 14 October 1946, the Allied forces and the Republican Government agreed on an armistice. Radio Moscow, however, warned that the truce "only indicates a policy of gaining time in order to make further preparations for war of oppression". On conclusion of the truce agreement, the British served notice that they would withdraw their forces by 1 December 1946. On 25 October, Radio Moscow commented on the British decision:

The generous gesture concerning the impending withdrawal of their troops is by now of no avail. The British troops there have done their job well. They have seriously hampered the Indonesian people's struggle for independence and have further enabled the Dutch to land substantial Dutch forces.

Soviet criticism of the British role in Indonesia was not without reason. The British assisted in Dutch reoccupation of Indonesia after the Japanese surrender. The British refused to hand over Japanese weapons to the nationalists and used

45."The Situation in Indonesia", p.18.
46.Ibid.
47.Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services, Part 1, No.2652, 25 October 1946, p.3(b)i.
48.Ibid, Part 1, No.2654, 27 October 1946, p.3(b)ii.
Japanese troops to maintain law and order, which meant their fighting the nationalists, but never the Dutch.

The British decision to withdraw their forces from Indonesia stimulated the Dutch to end the fighting and reach a negotiated settlement. The result was the 15 November 1946 Linggajati compromise, which recognised de facto the Republic's authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura. The Republic and the Dutch authorities agreed to work towards a United States of Indonesia (USI), which would be sovereign, democratic and federal. On the whole, the compromise was supported by all leading groups in the Republic, including the PKI, which saw it as providing the Republic with "a breathing space to consolidate itself". However, the agreement was ratified only in March 1947 by The Hague due to differences over interpretation of its clauses.

The immediate Soviet response to the Linggajati Agreement was one of caution and on 9 April, Alexei Belov, a Radio Moscow commentator stated:

The circumstances of the signing of and the conditions which the Dutch Government instructed the Commission-General to put upon the signing of the Agreements are very important. Two days before the signing, the Dutch Command in Indonesia launched a powerful offensive on the neighbourhood of Surabaya. Another peculiar aspect of the signing of the Linggajati Agreements is that the Dutch laid down that they would be bound to their own interpretation of the Agreements. That one of the parties of the agreements should openly declare that he interprets and intends to apply an agreement according to his own light is something quite new in diplomatic history. Indeed, it is quite clear how the Dutch intend to apply the Agreement. Simultaneously, with the instructions to the Commission-General to sign the Agreements, new troop reinforcements left the Netherlands for Indonesia. This hardly tallies with a sincere intention on the part of the Dutch to consider the Linggajati Agreements as the basis for a peaceful settlement between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

51. Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services, Part 1, No. 2789, 11 April 1947, p. 3(b)ii.
While the Soviet Union did not indicate any hostility to the agreement itself, its scepticism of its success was apparent. This was largely the consequence of the growing tension between Moscow and the West, which was to usher in full-blown 'Cold War' in the next few months, in what can be described as the second phase of Stalin's post-war foreign policy.

**Phase 2: March 1947 - April 1952**

The escalation of rivalry with the United States was the principal factor underlying Moscow's adoption of a hardline foreign policy. Contrary to its earlier expectations, by March 1947 Soviet leaders saw great danger in the United States utilization of its economic and military strength to defend the capitalist system in Europe and to assume leadership of the 'Free World'. The post-war conflict of interests and purpose between Moscow and Washington, heretofore partially concealed by the lingering aura of wartime cooperation, stood starkly revealed in all its dimensions and depth, as the United States moved determinedly and decisively at this time to join issues with the Soviet Union. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the enunciation in June of the idea which became the Marshall Plan, the Soviet withdrawal from the all-European conference called to consider American proposals to aid Europe's reconstruction in June and the public adoption by the United States of the 'containment' strategy brought the issues out in the open.

This directly led to the adoption of 'ideological purification' campaigns in the Soviet Union. As a remedy to war-time developments which were now considered undesirable, such as the exposure of a sizeable segment of the population to alien influence and the general relaxation of doctrinal exclusiveness which accompanied the alliance with the United States and Great Britain, the CPSU now adopted a programme of ideological tightening and reararmament. Beginning from mid-1947 onwards, a full elaboration of the ideological position of the Soviet Union towards the non-communist world emerged and all deviations from the new 'line' laid down by the Kremlin were suppressed. This began with the criticism of Varga's liberal, optimistic views about the outcome in the colonial world and culminated in the spelling out of the 'two camps' 'line' by Andrei Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947. This led to three immediate results: the abandonment of communist parties' support for the bourgeois coalition governments in Western Europe; the tightening of Soviet control over the areas it already occupied; and the engagement of the Soviet Union in a major struggle against the non-communist world, especially in Europe and Asia.

Just as in the earlier phase, developments in Europe were of paramount importance for Moscow. The measures undertaken by the United States in Europe and the failure of communist parties to make progress, especially in Italy and France, partially encouraged Moscow to adopt a new

'line' in the colonial world. The communist parties were now called upon to form broad revolutionary fronts under their leadership in order to overthrow the imperialists and bourgeois-nationalists. The corollary of this was the adoption of a policy of non-recognition of independent Asian states and the encouragement of subversive activities against the regimes. How exactly this 'line' was applied to Indonesia is analysed next.

Moscow's growing apprehension of developments in non-communist Asia was already evident at the Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi, sitting from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Here, the Soviet representatives from the Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Republics in Transcaucasia and Central Asia expressed support for the 'armed struggle' launched by various nationalist movements against the 'imperialists', while independence achieved through 'peaceful negotiations' was denigrated. In this regard, the Indonesian delegate present at the conference was applauded: Zhukov, who was to become the chief articulator of the new Soviet 'line' on the colonial question which was set down authoritatively at the founding of the Cominform, wrote in early 1948: "In his person [the Indonesian delegate] the conference greeted the people of Indonesia, who with arms in hand fight for their genuine independence". The difficulties experienced by the Republican Government in its negotiations with the Dutch might only have encouraged the Soviet view of Indonesia.

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The four and a half months delay between the Linggajati Agreement and its ratification by the Dutch dissipated much of the goodwill engendered in November 1946. The agreement failed to hold because of the Dutch decision to interpret it to their own convenience, their attempt to unilaterally create 'independent republics', their blockade of the Republic and crossings of the demarcation line, as well as the Republic's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Middle East countries. In the light of these irreconcilable differences, I. Platov, a Soviet political analyst, argued in Izvestia on 31 May 1947 along the following lines:

The Indonesian Republic was attempting faithfully to fulfill the agreement that had been signed, but the actions of the Dutch authorities suggested that this agreement served them only as a smoke screen, under cover of which they are marshalling armed forces in Indonesia for a change over to a resolute offensive against the Republic.

Platov's statement would prove to be prophetic. The vitiation of the Agreement paved the way for the first Dutch military action against the Republic. On 27 May 1947, the Dutch issued an ultimatum to the Sjahrir Government, which according to Kahin "was interpreted by the Republican Government as posing the alternative of capitulation to the Netherlands or all-out war". Writing in Trud on 13 June 1947, an 'Observer' argued that:

The Hague tendered the government of the Indonesian Republic a note that had all the distinguishing features of an ultimatum, even to the inclusion of a deadline within which a reply should follow. This deadline expired on June 10. Holland demanded the formation of a single government for all Indonesia, in which the

The republic of the puppet states would be included, the severing of direct relations between Indonesia and foreign countries, the creation of a joint police force, etc. The ultimatum further envisaged the virtual establishment of Dutch control over the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic. The economic section of the ultimatum provided for Dutch control of the importation and exportation of goods, the organization of a central monetary fund to be directed by a special council, in which the representatives of the Republic would be in the minority. The note also demanded that all factories and plants in the territories of the Republic be returned to their Dutch industrialist owners. Thus, the ultimatum demanded, in essence, the reestablishment of unlimited Dutch control in Indonesia.63

On 20 July 1947, a Dutch force of 120,000 invaded the Republic, the immediate cause of the so-called 'police measures of limited proportions' being the failure of the Sjahrir Government to respond to the 27 May ultimatum.64 The Soviet Union condemned the Dutch action but saw the United States' pressure on Jogjakarta to be the principal cause of the conflict. This viewpoint should be understood in the context of the growing 'cold war' between Moscow and Washington. On 21 July 1947 Radio Moscow broadcast on the Dutch attack:

The answer [to the Dutch 'police action'] can be found in the Note which the United States' Consul-General in Batavia handed to the Indonesian Government in the name of the State Department. This Note speaks of United States' interests in the position on the Indonesian islands and states that the United States Government insists that the Indonesian Government cooperate with the Netherlands Government without delay and that a provisional federated government be formed immediately. The US Note says that after this is done, the USA will agree to open negotiations with the Netherlands Government and the Provisional Government on financial assistance and in restoring Indonesia. This US Note is open interference in Indonesian affairs and presages the United States intention to expand the so-called Truman doctrine in Indonesia. It is direct support of the Netherlands colonial regime.65

There is evidence to suggest that the Soviet charge is

63. Trud, 13 June 1947.
64. Kahin, Op cit, pp. 211-212.
not without substance. In a 5 June telegram, the Acting Secretary of State, D.C. Acheson, instructed W.A. Foote, the United States Consul-General in Jakarta, to deliver the following message verbally to the Republican Government:

The US Government considered that the Dutch proposals of 27 May had been offered in good faith in an effort to implement the Linggajati Agreements, that the proposals appeared to offer a reasonable basis for an effective interim government pending the formation of a sovereign RUSI [Republic of the United States of Indonesia] and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and that the Indonesian Republic would be well advised to respond promptly in a spirit of good faith and compromise, thus demonstrating the sincerity of its pledge undertaken at Linggajati.

On 25 June, the State Department made public its support for the Dutch 27 May ultimatum. In the light of the American implicit and explicit support for the Dutch and the general tense East-West relations, Moscow resolutely condemned the Dutch 'colonial blitzkrieg' in Indonesia and began criticising the Linggajati Agreements. This was because Moscow saw the negotiations with the Indonesian representatives, which culminated in the Linggajati Agreements, as manoeuvres by the Dutch "for gaining time and bringing up their forces".

More important to Soviet analysts was the support of the 'imperialist powers', especially British and American, that made the Dutch 'police action' possible.

The critical Soviet stance on developments in Indonesia was partly the consequence of Washington's growing partiality in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Before March

1947, the United States had adopted a neutral stance in the conflict. For instance, in November 1945, Washington had prohibited the shipment to Java of ammunition stocks purchased by the Dutch and had refused to equip several thousand released Dutch prisoners of war in the Philippines, who were waiting to be transported back to Java. In October 1946, the Secretary of State, J. F. Byrnes, declared that "no arms or equipment have been sold to the Netherlands for military use in the Netherlands East Indies... Furthermore, it is contrary to the policy of this Government to permit American flag vessels or aircraft to transport troops of any nationality to or from the Netherlands East Indies, except for the evacuation of Japanese".

But after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the United States adopted a more pro-Dutch stance, necessitated largely by the perceived need to 'contain' the Soviet Union in Europe. Washington's support for the Dutch ultimatum of 27 May was a clear example of this. In the same vein, it was not surprising that Washington did not condemn the Dutch 'police action'. In contrast, London was critical of the Dutch actions, warning that "it may be that militarily the Dutch will gain an initial success; but the resulting situation in Southeast Asia will make the position of Western powers very difficult indeed". Other than being concerned for its own colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, Britain was also disappointed with the Dutch action since it put paid to the Linggajati compromise.

71. Oey Hong Lee, Op cit., p. 119.

72. FRUS, Vol. 8, p. 823.

73. Cited in ibid., Vol. 6, p. 988.
an agreement in which the British had played an important mediating role.

Viewed in this context, the Soviet Union's depiction of the United States and Britain as being the two 'imperialist powers' backing the Dutch 'aggression' in Indonesia is only partially correct. It is arguable that by its silence, Washington indirectly condoned the Dutch 'police action'. Moreover, by publicly supporting the 27 May ultimatum and, through its Consul-General in Jakarta, 'advising' the Sjahrir Government to 'promptly respond in a spirit of good faith and compromise' to the Dutch demands, the United States openly took the Dutch side, and open American support may have even encouraged the Dutch to use force to settle the issue.

The same, however, cannot be said of the British, for the Labour Government of Attlee was in the process of decolonising its empire in the region, as the granting of independence to India, Pakistan and Burma proved.

India and Australia brought the case of Dutch aggression in Indonesia before the Security Council on 30 July 1947. During the debate at the Security Council, the Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that it was "necessary for the troops of both countries - Holland and the Indonesian Republic - to be immediately withdrawn to the positions they held before the beginning of military operations in Indonesia". This did not receive the necessary support in the Security Council. Instead, it passed two other resolutions. The first, jointly proposed by China and Australia, suggested that Security Council members which had diplomatic representatives in Jakarta [the Soviet Union did not have one]

should instruct them to prepare a joint report for the Council's information. The second, proposed by the United States, provided the Council to offer its services to both the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, by forming a special commission of three of its members, to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute, at the request of the belligerent parties.\textsuperscript{75} Gromyko, however, proposed the formation of a commission composed of member-states of the Security Council to observe the fulfilment of a ceasefire agreement. This proposal was vetoed by France.\textsuperscript{76}

The Committee of Good Offices (CGO) was established on 25 August 1947 and comprised delegates from the United States, Australia and Belgium. The USSR opposed its formation, presenting it as an attempt to circumvent the Security Council and thus "inflict a grave blow against the United Nations Organization".\textsuperscript{77} In Gromyko's view, the CGO was "not really an organization of the Security Council, even from the point of view of the principle on the basis of which it was set up".\textsuperscript{78}

The formation of the CGO was pleasing to the United States and the Western powers as it excluded the Soviet Union and the other communist states from Indonesia, an area that had been traditionally regarded as a Western sphere of influence. For the Soviet Union, with the formation of the CGO and its exclusion from it, the Indonesian Question was removed from the Security Council, and thus lost an opportunity not only to make capital out of Western

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., No. 1780, 28 August 1947, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid.
powers' activities in Indonesia but, more important, to influence the future development of Indonesia itself. This was all the more so since no bilateral relations existed between Moscow and Jogjakarta. When the resolution was put before the Security Council for the formation of the CGO, the Soviet Union abstained and did not exercise its veto, as it would have been accused of impeding the solution of the Indonesian problem, a problem which was first raised by Moscow.

The heightening tension between the emerging Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Western coalition led by the United States was apparent in the inflexible ideological positions propounded by both Washington and Moscow. President Truman's decision to pledge economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey in March 1947, the June Marshall Plan and the 'containment doctrine' in September, were measures to defend 'democracy' and the 'free world' against 'communism'. The creation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in Belgrade in September 1947, ostensibly to coordinate the communist parties of France, Italy and Eastern Europe, deepened the ideological rifts with the West. At its founding congress in Warsaw, Andrei Zhdanov advocated a new radical 'line' in Soviet foreign policy, officially signifying the end of the wartime alliance. This was the enunciation of the 'two camps' theory, which divided international political forces into two major camps: the anti-democratic camp led by the United States and the anti-imperialist camp led by the Soviet Union. In Zhdanov's analysis:
This [anti-fascist and anti-imperialist camp] is based on the USSR and the new democracies. It also include countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Syria and Egypt. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labour and democratic movements and by the fraternal communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country.79

The significance of Zhdanov's elucidation was that Indonesia was viewed as an associated member of the Soviet-led camp. Guber reaffirmed this: "Today, Indonesia belongs to the anti-imperialist front: the ideas of Lenin and Stalin have directed the Indonesian people in the struggle for independence and true democracy".80

The Zhdanov 'doctrine' was significant because it indicated that the 'popular front' tactics and attempts to win power through parliamentary elections were now outmoded. Communist parties were now to lead and not accept secondary positions in national fronts. In December 1947, Zhukov examined the implications of the Zhdanov 'doctrine' for the colonies:

In a number of colonial and dependent countries a people's anti-imperialist front has been formed, consisting of a coalition of parties having the struggle for liberation as their platform, under the leading participation of the communist parties (Indonesia, Vietnam). The political programme of such a coalition envisages complete independence from foreign imperialism and broad democratic reforms, laying the foundations for the economic and political independence of the country. Such a programme must be aimed not only against imperialism, but also against its internal social backers - the landlords and that national bourgeoisie which is connected with foreign capital. It is well known that democratic forms have already been successfully put into practice in large areas of the liberated parts of China, in the unoccupied territory of the Indonesian Republic and in the inner regions of the Republic of Vietnam.81

Indonesia was accepted as a member of the Soviet camp due to the Republic’s ongoing colonial war with the Dutch. It is also important to add that the differences between the Indonesian and Indochinese situations which seem clear now were by no mean obvious at that time. The PKI emerged from the war as a small and weak organization, but the strength of Communism in Indonesia could not be judged by that alone. The PKI participated in the left-wing coalition of parties which governed the Republic until early 1948. Although a minor member outwardly, its real strength was greater than appearances suggested, as individuals who secretly were Communists had gained important positions in other parties in the coalition. In addition, socialists such as Sjahrir and Amir Sjariffudin held high offices in the Republican government. From Moscow, the situation may have looked analogous to the one in Indochina, where Communists in reality dominated the national front, the Vietminh, in spite of the fact that the Indochinese Communist Party had been formally dissolved in November 1945. It was in these confused circumstances that Soviet commentators overestimated the strength of the PKI. Zhukov, for instance, claimed that in Indonesia “the anti-imperialist front has been formed... under the leading participation of the Communist Party”. In January 1948, Vasileva claimed that “the people of Indonesia... entering into the advance guard of the liberation struggle of the colonial peoples, have formed a people’s democratic republic”.

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82. McLane, Op cit, pp. 261-278.
84. Vasileva, “Bor’ba za demokraticheskoe razvitie Indonesiikoi respubliki”, Voprosi ekonomiki, No. 1, 1948, p. 81.
This conclusion could only have been due to a misperception of the 'correlation of forces' in the Indonesian nationalist movement as well as a general ignorance about the Republic.

The rejection of reformism as a path to independence and the application of the 'two-camps' view might easily lead one to the conclusion that by December 1947, the Soviet Union had drawn a sharp distinction between non-communist and communist-controlled independence movements, reserving its endorsement exclusively for the latter. Such generalisation needs to be at least partially qualified in the case of Indonesia. In many ways, Indonesia's political course in the spring and summer of 1947 appeared to be opposite of India's. For instance, the period brought a compromise settlement with Great Britain externally and, a polarization between the dominant National Congress and the weak Communist Party internally in Indonesia, armed conflict with the Dutch erupted in July after the moderate leftist Sjahrir had been replaced as Premier by Sjariffudin, a radical leftist who claimed the following year that he had long secretly been a Communist. Though its influence in the Indonesian government was strong and apparently growing, Communism did not win a dominant position, as events were soon to show. Nevertheless, the initiation of the 'two-camps' line saw the inclusion of Indonesia in the 'democratic camp'. Indeed, an effort was made to give a theoretical explanation of why the Indonesian situation differed from the Indian: Dutch imperial policy had produced a numerically and economically

weak national bourgeoisie and a relatively strong proletariat, creating even before "the Second World War...the objective preconditions not only for the formation of a broad national anti-imperialist front but also for the uniting of the struggle for independence with the struggle for the democratic reconstruction of the country". It is impossible to determine with certainty the cause of this obvious aberration. Soviet spokesmen conceivably were intentionally distorting reality when speaking of communist leadership in order to place a stamp of legitimacy, without appearing to contravene the new 'line' on a radical nationalist movement engaged in an 'objectively' revolutionary struggle against the 'other camp'. Or the placing of Indonesia in the 'democratic camp' may have reflected a serious misreading of the situation by Moscow. Such misreading seems the more probable in view of the extraordinary persistence of Soviet optimism, even after the momentum of Communism had received its decisive setback in January 1948 with the replacement of Sjariffudin's cabinet by one much farther to the right.

Notwithstanding this misreading, the Soviet 'two camps' doctrine had two significant consequences. First, it ensured continued Soviet support of the Indonesian case in international forums such as the United Nations. Second, it resulted in the adoption of an uncompromising attitude towards Asian nationalism. In 1947 and 1948, Indonesia [only until mid-1948], Vietnam and China were viewed by the Soviet

86. Guber, "Imperialisty-dushiteli svobody i nezavisimosti narodov (k sobytiiam v Indoneziia)", Bolshevik, No. 19, 15 October 1947, p. 52.
Union as good examples for the colonies to follow in their fight for independence. This resulted in the adoption of a hostile attitude toward countries that gained their independence peacefully, such as India and Burma. This was because, as a result of Zhdanov's 'two camps' theory, Moscow adopted the view that formal independence from a colonial power did not necessarily mean that a country had 'real independence' when the economic power was still in the hands of the former colonial power and its 'agents'. This was the essence of the theory of 'neo-colonialism'.

The Western-dominated CGO succeeded in bringing both the Dutch and Republican representatives to the conference table, and the Renville Agreement was signed on 17 January 1948. From the very start, Moscow had reservations about it. While negotiations were in progress aboard the American warship 'Renville', Radio Moscow warned that "the Dutch old disgraceful game [of making agreements and violating them subsequently] was being reenacted". On 26 February, Gromyko declared at the Security Council that the Renville Agreement was:

... among the most shameful documents which have ever been published under the aegis of the United Nations and should be placed in a museum as proof of how shameful a document can be produced when some of the members of the United Nations betray the interests of the Indonesian people for benefit of the colonial powers.

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The Soviet Union also stressed that the agreement was "the result of compulsion and that the CGO had sided 100 percent with the Dutch imperialists and that its actions are glaringly contrary to the United Nations Charter". The Soviet Union was consistent in its condemnation of the Renville Agreement. Moscow's negative response can be explained by a number of factors. Its disappointment was understandable in view of the fact that an agreement had been reached without Soviet participation, by a United Nations-sanctioned committee, on a problem that was first raised in the United Nations by a Soviet delegate. More significant, perhaps, the Soviet Union's principal adversary, the United States, had played a crucial role in successfully effecting an agreement. Moreover, in the context of escalating tension in Europe and the 'Cold War', an agreement on the Indonesian Question brought about by the three members of the 'anti-democratic camp'[the United States, Australia and Belgium] could only have invited the Soviet Union's wrath. Finally, Indonesia, an 'associate member' of the 'anti-imperialist camp' was apparently being dragged into the 'anti-democratic camp' and this was seen as a blow to Soviet prestige and power in Asia. Developments in Indonesia following the Renville Agreement only reinforced Soviet apprehensions.

93 For example, three months after its signing, Krasnaya zvezda, the Soviet Army newspaper, criticised the agreement along the following lines: "The Republic had withdrawn its troops from various areas of Java and Sumatra, thus leaving the Dutch in control of all the most strategic areas. US monopolists, too, had greatly benefited as a result of the agreement. Not content with persuading the Indonesians to yield at this point, the most strenuous efforts had been made to induce the Republican representatives to become part of the USI which had as its aim the final liquidation of the struggle being waged by the Indonesian people for its national independence". See Krasnaya zvezda, 17 April 1948.
The Renville Agreement caused great internal dissensions within the Indonesian Government, with the Muslim Masjumi Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party, which initially supported the negotiations, withdrawing from Amir Syariffudin’s cabinet, and subsequently opposing it as long as he remained Prime Minister. This was directly responsible for the fall of Amir’s cabinet and on 25 January 1948, he returned the mandate to Sukarno. The President appointed the Vice-President, Hatta, and he formed a presidential cabinet. Soviet spokesmen attributed the fall of Amir’s cabinet, in 'cold war' terms, to pressure from 'US imperialists'.

Vasileva argued:

The latest events taking place in Indonesia - the resignation of the Indonesian Government and the formation of the rightist Government under Mohammad Hatta, the majority of the members of which are pro-American in sympathy - bear witness to direct intervention of Wall Street into the internal affairs of the Indonesian Republic. The Americans are attempting to unite reactionary groups from the Masjumi and National Parties and are relying on them in their expansionist policy; but the mass of the people, the working class in Indonesia, is carrying on a struggle against the provocations of American imperialism. They are demanding the replacement of the pro-American Government and the return of the socialist Amir Sjariffudin.94

The critical Soviet response to the establishment of the Hatta cabinet initiated a period of cool government-to-government relations between Moscow and Jogjakarta. The Soviet Union, however, continued to support the 'Republic' and 'People' of Indonesia, though not its 'Government', which was viewed as being made up of 'extreme right-wing, pro-US elements'.95 This three-pronged approach placed the USSR in a difficulty in its relations with the Republic.

94 Vasileva, "Bor'ba demokratischekoe...", pp. 84-85.
95 SUIB: USSR and Eastern Europe, Part 1, 3-6 Feb. 1948, p. 32. On 2 February 1948 Pravda wrote that Hatta's cabinet 'was composed of pro-American elements, formed under the influence of the Three Power Commission[CGO]. On 6 February the same paper wrote: "the situation in Indonesia has become strained since the American imperialists succeeded in removing the government of Amir Sjariffudin and creating a cabinet of extreme rightist pro-American elements". Pravda, 6 Feb. 1948.
While Moscow supported the Indonesian Republic in international forums on grounds of principle [the national liberation struggle], at the same time, the Republic's Government was criticised for its anti-communism and its orientations towards the United States.

The split between the left and right-wing nationalist forces, which had become more pronounced following the signing of the Renville Agreement, was worsened by the downfall of Amir Sjariffudin's 'leftist' cabinet. From July 1947 onwards, the Sayap Kiri (Left Faction), a coalition of the Socialist Party, the Indonesian Socialist Youth, the Labour Party and the PKI, was the principal prop of Amir Syariffudin's power base. From July 1947 until his resignation in January 1948, Amir was also the Defence Minister, and he succeeded in building up a personal following in both the regular army and the laskjars (militias). The Sayap Kiri supported the Renville Agreement. After the fall of Amir's cabinet, the Sayap Kiri was denied posts in the new Hatta cabinet. Partly to pressure the Government, the Sayap Kiri was reorganised as the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR) or the People's Democratic Front, on 26 February 1948.96

The Soviet Union welcomed the amalgamation of the left parties into the FDR. Radio Moscow described the socialist-communist coalition as 'a milestone in the development of the national liberation movement against colonial rule' and as 'evidence of the consolidation of the democratic national front in Indonesia'. The coalition was also lauded as 'fresh proof of the national liberation

movement's vitality and of the democratic forces' determination to fight for their country's liberation. The principal reason for Soviet support of the FDR was the fall of Amir's cabinet, which was ideologically and politically viewed as being compatible with the Soviet definition of the 'anti-imperialist camp', whereas the Hatta cabinet was seen as being more in line with the 'anti-democratic camp'.

In addition to the downfall of Amir's cabinet, Soviet-Indonesian relations were affected by the PKI's participation in the Calcutta Conference, the failure to establish consular relations and the outbreak of the Madiun revolt.

Between 17 and 21 February 1948, a conference of 'Youth and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting For Freedom and Independence', sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, met in Calcutta, India. A number of Western observers have credited the conference with being the venue where 'orders from Moscow' were transmitted for revolts in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was represented at the conference by Maruto Darusman, a Minister of State in Amir's cabinet and a leading PKI member, and Suripno, a second-echelon PKI leader. The conference denounced the Renville Agreement, which had been signed by the Amir cabinet only a few weeks earlier. It

97 SWB: USSR and Eastern Europe, Part 1, 2-6 March 1948, p. 40.
98 For details, see McVey, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings, (Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1958).
also named the United States as the principal enemy of the 'democratic forces'. This created an anomalous situation for the PKI as regards the Indonesian people, for it was the Dutch who were regarded as their main enemy. It thus opened the PKI and the FDR to charges of being 'tools' of the Soviet Union.

To the growing Soviet criticism of Hatta Government's policies vis-a-vis the FDR, negotiations with the Dutch, relations with the United States and internal policies was added the controversy surrounding the establishment of consular relations between Moscow and Jogjakarta. In December 1947, President Sukarno and the Amir Government appointed Suripno, a leading PKI member, as Ambassador-Plenipotentiary, with full powers to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In January 1948, Suripno made contact with M.A. Silin, the Soviet Ambassador to Prague, Czechoslovakia, and both sides agreed in principle to exchange consuls. However, Amir's Government was then negotiating the Renville Agreement and as Amir had no intention of aborting or ruining the negotiations with the Dutch, he ignored the Suripno-Silin understanding. When Hatta replaced Amir, he too failed to pursue the matter as he was more interested in maintaining good relations with the United States and the Dutch. The Soviet Union's

100. Hands Off Southeast Asia,(Conference of the Youth and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence, Calcutta, 19-28 February 1948), No. 1, April 1948, pp. 4 and 32.
criticism of his government as 'right-wing' may also have influenced Hatta to give Moscow the cold shoulder.

In early May 1948, Alimin, a member of the PKI Politburo, announced that the party was willing to participate in a 'national coalition' to confront the Dutch in greater unity, and this created some hope that a 'National Government' might be realised. Then, on 22 May 1948, the Soviet Embassy in Prague informed Suripno that the Consular Treaty had been ratified. On 26 May, Radio Moscow unilaterally announced:

As a result of the negotiations that were held in Prague, an agreement has been signed for the establishment of consular relations and for the exchange of consuls between Moscow and Jogjakarta. Why did Moscow take the unilateral decision? No definite answer can be given to this question, but there are several possible reasons. It was partly to compel the Hatta Government to establish relations with the Soviet Union. It was aimed at damaging the Renville Agreement which was being implemented by the Hatta Government and pushing the United States and the Netherlands away from supporting the Republican Government. It could also have been aimed at providing the FDR with a fresh issue to combat the Hatta Government. Finally, it may have been aimed at aborting the FDR's plan of cooperating with the Government and thus at keeping the Republic in constant crisis. There is also an ideological explanation. The implementation of Alimin's suggestion would
have been tantamount to the adoption of a strategy of 'united front from above'. This would have contradicted the 'united front from below' 'line' adopted since the announcement of the 'two camps' theory. Hence, the attempt to compromise the growing reconciliation between the left and right-wing nationalist forces and the intended coalition, may have been part of the motivation behind the radio broadcast.

The 'consular affair' was embarrassing to the Hatta Government. At the same time, it was clear that the Hatta Government was not keen on establishing consular relations with the Soviet Union. The Hatta Government's decision not to reciprocate the Soviet initiative was both embarrassing and annoying to Moscow, the more so since the Soviet Union was the only great power that had consistently supported the Republic in the United Nations since February 1946.

On 8 June 1948, Y. Viktorov, a political analyst with Pravda, analysed the causes and implications of the 'consular affair'. He maintained that the consular agreement was 'greeted with great satisfaction by Indonesian public opinion, which interpreted it as an important step, contributing to the establishment and consolidation of friendly relations between the people of the USSR and Indonesia'.

This claim is highly exaggerated, as the only support for the establishment of consular relations came from the FDR. Agus Salim, the Foreign Minister in the Hatta cabinet, maintained

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106. Dey Hong Lee, Op cit, p.177.
107. This was evident in the intimation by Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo, the Chief Secretary of President Sukarno, to Coert DuBois, the Chief American delegate to the CGO, that "as long as Hatta remained Prime Minister, there would be no exchange of consuls with the Soviet Union". Cited in ibid, p.197; Also see Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p.20.
108. Pravda, 8 June 1948.
that Suripno did not have the authority to sign the agreement.\textsuperscript{109}

Viktorov argued that Salim's claim was a 'myth'. He is certainly correct as Suripno had been given the mandate by Sukarno and Amir, as was later acknowledged by the Hatta Government. The Dutch later claimed that the Republic had violated the Renville Agreement through its decision to exchange consuls with the Soviet Union. In Viktorov's analysis:

... it appears that the representatives from Holland in Indonesia, with the support of the ever present USA, are attempting to interpret the Renville Agreement in such a way as to mean that by virtues of this agreement, the Indonesian Republic allegedly does not have the right to establish independent relations with the outside world. It is extremely significant that this far-fetched argument was not advanced until it became a question of establishing consular relations between Indonesia and the USSR, although the Indonesian Republic had established diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan, which had recognised it; and although it had been recognised de facto by Holland, the USA, England, Australia, India and the Philippines, who have their own consuls in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{111}

In the final analysis, Viktorov blamed the "Dutch and US 'masters' in Indonesia" for putting 'serious' diplomatic pressure on the Hatta Government to desist from establishing consular relations with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{112} It was certainly true that the United States and the Dutch objected to the Suripno-Silin exchange of notes.\textsuperscript{113} However, the decision not to reciprocate the Soviet initiative was taken by Hatta and his cabinet, which had no intention of antagonising the United States, then in its 'cold war' rivalry with the Soviet Union. The Republican Government was cashing

\textsuperscript{109} Cited in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} See FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{111} Pravda, 8 June 1948.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Sastroamidjojo, Op cit, p. 161.
in on United States' goodwill to pressure the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia. This, more than any other factor, explained the decision of the Hatta Government, and if there was any United States or Dutch pressure, it would only have reinforced the Republican Government's own inclination.

The growing chill in Soviet-Indonesian relations was, however, kept under restraint by Moscow. Thus, six months after the fall of Sjariffudin's government, one writer was maintaining that "Indonesia and Vietnam adhere to the anti-imperialist camp". After speaking of the strength of the anti-imperialist front and the communist-oriented parties and organizations, he finally got around to mentioning the Hatta Government but seemed to dismiss it as only a brief interruption of an irresistible trend. "In the Indonesian Republic, the popular masses unanimously demand the return to power of the democratic government of the left parties". Besides popular backing, he seemed to feel certain of strong support in the army: "It is indicative that the attempt to replace the command of the Indonesian army which is devoted to the people, called forth such indignation among the masses that the government had to refrain from it". 114

It was only after the disaster of the abortive Communist uprising in September 1948 that Soviet commentators unequivocally assigned Indonesia to the 'other camp'.

In August 1948, the PKI outlined a revolutionary strategy for taking power. It was introduced by Musso, long

a prominent member of the PKI, whose arrival in Jogjakarta on 11 August marked an end of a residence of more than twenty years in the Soviet Union, interrupted only in 1935 for a brief visit to his native country. Immediately on returning home, Musso assumed the leadership of the PKI, had the Politburo incorporate his views into a resolution called 'The New Road for the Indonesian Republic' and set about explaining his plans to Indonesia's communists.\textsuperscript{115}

Musso's programme, or 'Gottwald Plan' as he called it, envisaged a communist takeover somewhat along the lines of the then recent coup in Czechoslovakia. The Government of Hatta was to be subjected to political pressure from a future communist-led national front and ultimately forced to abdicate to a national front regime. Musso attempted to apply the 'two camps' doctrine to Indonesian conditions and argued that "for the Indonesian Revolution, there is no other place than in the anti-imperialist camp."\textsuperscript{116} This was clearly elucidated by Buruh (Labour), the newspaper of SOBSI, the largest trade union federation in the country and under the control of the PKI, on 3 September:

\begin{quote}
The world is divided into two fronts, the anti-imperialist front and the imperialist front. Who rally behind the imperialist front? All countries with colonies... Imperialist America is the leader of the imperialist front. We cannot remain neutral; we must choose one of the two fronts. The talk about a 'third force' is nonsense... The Republic of Indonesia faces not only Dutch imperialism; it faces an international imperialism... We must find our friends among the New Democratic States of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and we must immediately exchange consuls with Soviet Russia. We must not only make friends with Russia, but we must have a strong relationship with Russia.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{116} Cited in McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution, p. 68.

Musso's programme had as its immediate aim a communist dominated national front to reign over the bourgeois-democratic revolution, not a dictatorship of the proletariat. Can it be taken as indicative of Moscow's thinking on Indonesia? The link, in the person of Musso, between Moscow and the new course for the PKI appears much closer than any known tie between, say, the Soviets and the Indian Communist Party's programme. After his prolonged stay in the Soviet Union, Musso presumably was conversant with Soviet attitudes on the Asian situation: but it cannot be ruled out that the Soviet contribution did not extend beyond a general sanction or that Musso, if he carried specific instructions, modified them. There are nevertheless several reasons to suspect that Musso was trying his utmost to keep in close step with Moscow. For one thing, Indonesia was a country in which the Soviet Union clearly manifested its interest in various ways, including its stands in the United Nations and its attempt to establish consular relations the previous May. Also, in view of the open Soviet split with Yugoslavia the previous June, it is an extremely unpropitious time for a foreign communist party or its leader to show initiative. Musso did seem to go out of his way to demonstrate his orthodoxy. The part of the Politburo's resolution devoted to organizational reforms, for example, asserted that "good notice of the lesson provided by the events in Yugoslavia" had been taken. Its call for the merger of several communist or communist-infiltrated organizations into one consolidated

communist party [hereafter as PKI-Musso] and for the party to appear under its own name sounded like the criticism that Moscow was then directing at the Yugoslav communists for allegedly submerging themselves in a national front and losing their identity. The 'New Road' resolution also included a ringing denunciation of neutralism in international affairs and an unconditional commitment of Indonesia to the Soviet camp. Given the heated state of the Cold War, the geographic isolation of Indonesia from the Soviet Union and the Western naval predominance along the approaches to Indonesia, such parading of the communist aspect of the proposed revolution is difficult to comprehend. It also contrasted with the behaviour of the Vietnamese communists, who in similar conditions of isolation were playing down the communist nature of their revolution. The Indonesian stance may well represent an obeisance to Moscow. However, growing tension between nationalists and communists prevented the implementation of Musso's plans. This episode in the history of Indonesian Communism ended with the crushing of the communist armed uprising at Madiun, in September 1948 - an uprising apparently not inspired by long term strategy but hostility improvised to meet the exigencies of the moment.

What was the Soviet response to the Madiun revolt?

According to a report by a member of the Secretariat of

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120. See Ibid.
the CGO, Moscow Home Service in Russian, on 19 September, stated:

There has been a People's Government set up in Madiun and People's Committees are being established in other leading towns. This was a popular uprising against the Government of the Fascist Japanese Quislings, Soekarno and Hatta. 122

Between 25 and 27 September, the Soviet information agency, TASS reported that "a communist Government set up in Madiun was enjoying a strong support, and a mass demonstration had proclaimed loyalty to the Madiun Government". 123 Charles McLane has, however, questioned the authenticity of these reports, claiming that "it is wholly uncharacteristic of Soviet news media to respond so promptly to revolutionary developments of this nature, and that the charges raised in the broadcast against Sukarno and Hatta had not been made prior to Madiun". 124

McLane's claim can be objected to on a number of grounds. General A.H. Nasution, the former Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces and Minister for Defence and Internal Security, recalled that he was told by a government member on 20 September that Moscow had expressed support for the 'Madiun coup'. 125 This could only have been transmitted through a radio broadcast. Kahin believes that although a similar broadcast was not beamed in Indonesian or in any other language, the "report of this broadcast was almost immediately made known to the top Republican leaders". 126

Secondly, it is correct that the charges made against Sukarno and Hatta had not been made prior to the events in Madiun, even though Moscow had been increasingly hostile towards the Hatta Government since its installation in January 1948. It is highly plausible that the Soviet Union desisted from continuing with these charges following the successful putting down of the revolt. However, within a few months of the Madiun uprisings, these charges were repeated and this lends credence to the view that the 19 September radio broadcast from Moscow was authentic. It is also worthwhile noting that the Madiun revolt occurred at a time of tense international relations: the Chinese communists and nationalists were locked in a conflict in China, and in Europe, the Berlin crisis dominated East-West relations. This was the height of the 'Cold War' phase of relations between the two superpowers. A communist coup, as it may have appeared in Moscow and led by Musso, was thus to be supported. The 19 September radio broadcast should, therefore, be viewed against the backdrop of these developments.

In general, Soviet commentators have interpreted the Madiun uprising as an event 'provoked' by the Hatta Government. This, later, became the 'line' of the revamped PKI under Aidit's leadership. For instance, Model described the event as follows:

... the Indonesian people's struggle for freedom was complicated by the activities of internal reactionary forces such as the Hatta Government, the leaders of the Masjumi, the Right

128 See 40 Years PKI, p.45.
Socialist Parties and the Trotskyists. These groups frightened by the rapid rise in the liberation movement and particularly the role played by the PKI, set out to destroy the democratic camp. In September 1948, they provoked the Madiun revolt and in the reign of terror that followed, the liberation movement was severely weakened.

Model claimed that the revolt was 'provoked by reaction' in order to 'serve as a pretext for the subsequent reprisals against Musso and other communists and the trade union leaders'. In his analysis, Model portrayed Musso as being a 'victim of reaction'.

Assessment of the revolt has varied: some have maintained that the United States was responsible, for it 'ordered' the Hatta Government to carry out the 'provocation'. Others have suggested that the uprising was 'ordered' by Moscow. Both these extreme 'cold war' positions ignore the local developments, which in the final analysis, were responsible for the Madiun uprising. The downfall of the Amir Government in January 1948, the decision of Hatta not to include any communists in his cabinet, the refusal of the Government to establish consular relations with the Soviet Union, the threats envisaged to the PKI-oriented military and laksjar units by the 'rationalization programme' launched by the Hatta Government, the general tension caused by Musso's return and his reorganization of the opposition forces into a single integrated party and the military clashes between the left-wing groups and the Government forces in Solo and Madiun, together contributed

130. Ibid.
131. Ibid, p. 27.
133. See 40 years of PKI; Model, Op cit; Guber, "Indoneziia", B.S.E.
to the Madiun affair. It is also worthwhile noting that it was not the PKI leadership that initiated the revolt: rather, it was started by the regular units of Brigade 25, and once the revolt broke out, the PKI leadership decided to support thefait accompli. Of greater significance were the consequences of the revolt. It raised the status of Sukarno and Hatta with the United States and the non-communist world. At a time when the communist march in China appeared irresistible and with the outbreak of communist-led revolts in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's successful extinguishing of its communist threat would have suggested to the State Department that the Republic could be an anti-communist bulwark in Southeast Asia. In fact, one reason for Hatta's full-blooded response was to prevent the Dutch from exploiting the event as evidence of the Republic's powerlessness and softness towards Communism and using it as an excuse to invade. The fact that the Dutch representative at the United Nations, van Roijen, raised the issue of the communist threat after the Madiun uprising had been suppressed lends credence to the argument that the Republican Government was out to prove the point that it could control the communist threat. In spite of Roijen's attempt to raise the 'communist bogey', it was clear that in the United States and Britain there was a belief that the communist threat in Indonesia had subsided tremendously. In this regard, it can be argued

135. This view was confirmed by Nasution during his interview with the writer on 14 April 1984, Jakarta.
137. McMahon, Op cit, p. 244.
that Washington was cured of an illusion, carefully cultivated by the Dutch, that the Republic's leaders were communist extremists deserving Anglo-American non-involvement, and thus "there is reason to believe that the ease with which the Republic put down the revolt has disappointed none more than the Dutch authorities". Another important consequence of the revolt was that the PKI completely lost its role in the Indonesian Revolution, other than a negative one. From beginning to end, the Revolution was led by the 'bourgeois nationalists'. It is also significant that the Madiun uprising occurred in the context of the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch and was regarded as a 'stab in the back', which partly explained its failure. It was largely due to these negative repercussions that Soviet commentators were later to criticise the PKI for committing errors. For instance, in February 1949, Radio Moscow pointed out:

The PKI was given the possibility of carrying on a legal existence. The weak spot of communist activity in Indonesia at that time was, however, the fact that they clung to their tactics developed at the time of the underground organization, and this dissipated their strength. They even went so far as to form a Socialist Party, thus enabling the Right-wing socialists, including Soetan Sjahrir, to play a leading role.

Similarly, at the June 1949 Academy of Sciences Conference, A.A. Guber delivered a report on the Indonesian situation highlighting the PKI's errors as follows: that it failed to lead the revolution, that it split the communist strength by the formation of the Socialist and Labour Parties instead of concentrating strength in the PKI, that it took a conciliatory attitude regarding relations with the Dutch and approved the Linggajati Agreement, and that it refused to participate

openly as a party in the first three Republican governments and their assumptions of only minor posts in the Sjariffudin cabinet. These mistakes, argued Guber, were only corrected in late summer of 1948, under the leadership of Musso, strengthening the earlier suggestion that Musso's actions were probably in line with Soviet thinking on Indonesia. However, by then it was already too late: the Hatta Government responded with 'police measures' which could only be answered by revolt. Since the previous weak policy of the communists had left the populace unprepared to take arms against the government, and since the uprising was badly organised, the revolt was easily crushed by the forces of 'reaction'.

By October 1948, the Soviet Union was looking at Indonesia with an extreme 'two camps' orientation, with Indonesia being placed in the 'imperialist camp'.

Developments in Indonesia, however, complicated Moscow's clear categorization of the Republic. On 19 December 1948, the Dutch launched their 'second military action' against the Republic, its timing of attack being partly influenced by the weakness and division within the Republic, caused by the Madiun revolt and the fact that the United Nations Security Council was going into its Christmas recess.

The United States responded by calling on the United Nations to investigate the 'responsibility for the renewal of hostilities', but which Soviet commentators saw as an American manoeuvre to "give time for the Dutch

imperialists" to "crush the Indonesian Republic".\textsuperscript{144}

Writing in \textit{Pravda} on 26 December, V. Viktorov argued:

This attack, which can only be defined as an act of unprovoked aggression, was the beginning of large scale military operations undertaken by the Dutch colonisers in accordance with a plan carefully conceived and prepared long ago. The purpose of these military operations is obvious: to crush the Indonesian Republic and to restore the colonial regime that formerly existed in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{145}

The Soviet Union vehemently condemned the attack claiming that the "notorious American dominated 'good offices' committee was but a screen, covering intensive preparations for renewed aggression".\textsuperscript{146} Moscow saw the Dutch attack as being condoned by the 'imperialists' (read: the United States, Great Britain and the other colonial powers).

"Behind it stands the big imperialist-robbers, alarmed by the developments of the national liberation movement not only in Indonesia, but likewise in China, Malaya, Burma and Indochina."\textsuperscript{147}

The Soviet claim that Washington supported the Dutch military operations against the Republic is, however, questionable. There is evidence to suggest that the United States strongly disapproved of the Dutch action. On 23 December 1948, the Acting Secretary of State, R.A. Lovett, sent a telegram to Philip Jessup, the American Deputy representative at the Security Council, expressing the State Department's concern at the Dutch action:

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Pravda}, 27 December 1948.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid}, 26 December 1948.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid}.
The Dutch handling of the Indonesian situation has been lamentable whether we consider its effects on the Dutch themselves, its effects on their future relationship with Indonesia, the jeopardy thereby presented to the US cooperation with Western Europe on such matters as the European Recovery Programme and the North Atlantic Pact or in the United Nations' support for the maintenance of peace. We have no desire to condone or wink at the Dutch actions in Indonesia.  

Lovett also sent the following message to United States consuls abroad:

By the attack on the moderate Republican Government of Sukarno and Hatta, which is the only Government in the Far East to have met and crushed an all out communist offensive, the Dutch may have destroyed the last bridge between the West and the Indonesian nationalists, and have given the Communists everywhere a weapon of an unanswerable mass appeal.

These were very strong statements of disapproval of the Dutch action. The United States disapproval was influenced by two main considerations. First, embarrassment that one of its allies had flouted the United Nations and resorted to force to settle an issue in an important Asian state. Second, it feared that the 'national communists' would fill the political vacuum created by the Dutch arrest of Sukarno and Hatta. This was something Washington would not have tolerated as any form of Communism was anathema to the United States. The critical American reaction started a process that was to wind up the Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia.

Of greater significance was the Soviet decision to defend the Republic at the United Nations in spite of the crushing of the communists at Madiun three months earlier and the placement of Indonesia in the 'imperialist camp' by Soviet ideologues. Moscow continued to support the Republic.
for this provided it with an opportunity to rebut possible charges that its 'principled' stance on decolonization was hypocritical. The Soviet Union wanted to present itself as a defender of all national liberation movements - not just those which were communist-led. There was also a convenient propaganda point against the United States, in that the Dutch, an ally of Washington, were the culprits.

Even though the 'Republic' was defended at the United Nations, the Hatta Government was unequivocally condemned. Hatta was described as a 'puppet of Washington', and in December 1948, the Soviets accused some members of his Government of treachery: "The relative ease with which the Dutch occupied Jogjakarta and took the Government prisoner, also give rise to suspicion that treachery and betrayal in the Government have played a part". In December 1949, this 'line' of accusation was radically altered. Writing in Izvestia, E. Physhevsky, a feature article writer, claimed:

The Government of Sukarno and Hatta found itself prisoner, although it had ample opportunity, together with the Republican troops, to evacuate the capital. But the agents of the American imperialists did not even give this thought. The farce of the 'imprisonment' staged by them was necessary to camouflage their treachery so as to deceive the people, before whom the Government hoped to play the role of 'champion of the Republic'. The imperialists needed the further services of these traitors to the Indonesian people, in as much as neither the Dutch imperialists nor their masters from Wall Street harboured the illusion that the Indonesian people would cease to fight for their independence and for a free Indonesia.

151. Ibid.
152. Izvestia, 8 December 1949.
The object of this new 'line' of denunciation was to highlight the cooperation between the moderate Republican leadership and the 'imperialists'. This was largely fueled by the Republic's decision to participate in the Round Table Conference (RTC) in The Hague, a conference which finally culminated in the independence of Indonesia in December 1949.

The second Dutch 'police action' was a turning point for the Indonesian nationalist struggle in that it set in motion a chain of events that forced the Dutch to relinquish their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Not only did the Dutch attack antagonise the United States, but the support the Republic received from the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa was also significant. One consequence of the Dutch action was the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia held in January 1949, which condemned Dutch actions in Indonesia as being repugnant to the principles of the United Nations Charter, as superseding the claims of Indonesian nationalism and endangering world peace. 153

By all accounts, the Dutch emerged the losers from their second military action against the Republic. They forfeited the support of the United States, the leader of the 'Free World' and antagonised the Asian countries. Even the 'independent Republics' they had set up in Greater Indonesia, Borneo and West Java, did not support the Dutch action and resigned en masse from their 'federal posts'. 154

guerilla war that broke out proved costly for the Dutch. Finally, the Dutch Government was divided over the entire affair. The combination of these factors, and principally the pressure from the United States, forced the Dutch to be more conciliatory, and this paved the way for the negotiations leading to the independence of Indonesia.

The first series of meetings was held in Jakarta in March 1949. When negotiations were in progress and the Dutch announced their readiness to form a United States of Indonesia [USI], the Soviet representative at the Security Council, Tarasenkov, warned on 16 March:

The Netherlands Government's statement concerning the establishment of the so-called USI cannot be treated seriously. Such statements are a deception. Attempts are being made to find a new form to justify the Netherlands' colonial domination over the Indonesian people. It is trying to set up a puppet state with a puppet government having illusory sovereignty and illusory power. 155

Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations, Moscow's vilifications of the Round Table Agreement (RTA) took a new high pitch. On 13 December, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, Semyon Tsarapkin, declared:

The Hague agreements form a shameful page in the record of the United Nations... the shackles of colonial slavery have again been imposed on the Indonesian people with the assistance of the Sukarno-Hatta clique. It is clear from the text of the agreements of The Hague that Indonesia's freedom and independence are being sacrificed to the political and economic interests of a bloc of colonial powers, namely, the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and allies. For the Indonesian people, these agreements signify their return to their former colonial slavery under new and more subtle form... any serious talk of the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands to the Government of the USI is a gross deception. A glance at the contents and nature of the agreements signed... is enough to show that they do not even bestow a vestige of sovereignty upon Indonesia. On the contrary, their whole

object and purpose is to reaffirm the authority of the Dutch Crown over Indonesia and its people in a new form and to obtain possession of that country’s inexhaustible wealth.156

A number of factors accounted for the jaundiced Soviet view of the RTA and of the final achievement of Indonesian independence. The fact that the Soviet Union was not consulted or involved in the negotiations must be counted as one reason; the prominent role of the United States as another. The 'two camps' doctrine also partly explained the Soviet attitude towards the agreements. The Soviet Union did not recognise the 'independence' of the new states as genuine because of the continuing 'imperialist' economic stranglehold, which in the case of Indonesia was in the hands of the Dutch, Americans and British. In this context, Indonesia was perceived as having only a 'fictitious independence and sovereignty'.157 It is also plausible that the Soviet Union did not really understand the actual significance of the agreements which, for the Indonesians, in spite of their deficiencies, removed the colonial power that more than three centuries ruled and exploited parts of Indonesia. There was also a political motive as far as the domestic balance of power in Indonesia was concerned. Following the rise of the Hatta Government, and especially after the suppression of the Madiun revolt, Indonesia was perceived as being led by anti-communist, United States-oriented 'agents'. It was thus not surprising that Moscow adopted

a highly hostile posture towards the Republic, and especially its Government. For instance, on 8 December 1949, Izvestia described Sukarno and Hatta as 'traitors to the Indonesian people' who were 'carrying out the will of the American imperialists'. The Soviet Government newspaper also pointed out that "the democratic forces of the Indonesian people, headed by the People's Democratic Front, [that is, the FDR], which was continuing to wage stubborn battles against the imperialist enslavers in Java, Sumatra and Borneo, are resolutely demanding that they withdraw. Mass demonstrations by the Indonesian people against the disgraceful deal concluded at The Hague attest to the fact that no matter what manoeuvres the Dutch colonizers make, the Indonesian people will not cease their struggle for national independence".  

The rationale for the adoption of this hostile posture against the Republic lies in the fact that it was now clearly viewed to be located in the 'imperialist camp', and where revolution was to be encouraged and promoted. This 'line' was pursued in spite of the fact that the FDR and the Musso-PKI had been decisively crushed and that independence was received euphorically by the Indonesians. Indonesia became independent on 27 December 1949, and on the following day the United States recognised it. The Soviet Union did not do so until 25 January 1950, but when it did so, it also suggested that the USSR or RUSI should send a mission to either capital to discuss the

158. Izvestia, 8 December 1949.
establishment of diplomatic relations. The Hatta cabinet accepted the suggestion, and an Indonesian delegation was despatched to Moscow on 15 April 1950. The Soviet delay in recognition can be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate its unhappiness with the new Republic over its pro-Western slant, its suppression of the PKI in 1948, its decision to accept and implement the RTC Agreements and finally, its adoption of a Western system of government. On 15 January 1950, Izvestia clearly manifested Moscow's displeasure with the Jakarta Government:

The first steps by the so-called 'government' of Hatta-Sukarno after the Hague deal prove that this clique is ready to serve its real master - American imperialists - faithfully and well. Feverish military preparations on the part of the imperialists and their parasites have been brought about by the fact that they have not succeeded in deceiving the Indonesian people by false 'self-determination' which Indonesia received in The Hague and the people are continuing the struggle for their genuine independence.

Here, it is useful to note that even though Jakarta recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Peking did not reciprocate until 3 June 1950. This delay can be explained by the domestic problems that absorbed the new leadership's attention in China as well as the critical Soviet attitude towards Jakarta since January 1948.

L.N. Palar, the Indonesian Ambassador-designate to the United Nations, led a six-man delegation to the Soviet Union in mid-April 1950. The mission had two objectives:

160. Ibid.
discuss the exchange of ambassadors and to elicit Soviet views on the Indonesian decision to join the United Nations in September 1950. On 3 May, the delegation met Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky. It was agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors, and that the Soviet Union would not veto Jakarta's application for United Nations membership. On 19 May 1950, the Indonesian Embassy in Washington announced that Palar's mission to the Soviet Union had been 'very successful'. This assessment appears to have been diplomatic rather than descriptive, in view of the delay that actually occurred in the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries. More significant was the cool, even undiplomatic, treatment given to the Indonesian delegates during their short visit. Palar and the entire mission were humiliated at the border by customs officers who disregarded their diplomatic status. Wibisono, a member of the delegation, wrote that the customs officers called "the members one by one for close examination". This greatly offended the Indonesians, interpreting the treatment as Soviet disrespect and disregard for the Republic's sovereignty. In Wibisono's assessment, "the arrival of our mission, it seemed, was of no significance to the government of the Soviet Union. Concerning our arrival and our meeting with Vyshinsky, there was only brief mention in the official daily". It can be argued that the treatment of the Indonesian delegation was an indication of Soviet displeasure with and indifference

165. Ibid.
to the new Republic. This helps to explain Indonesia's policy towards the Soviet Union in the next few years.

Following the RTC Agreements, the RUSI, a federation of 16 autonomous states, was formed, but on 17 August 1950, a unitary state was proclaimed. The Soviet Union had been critical of the entire RTC arrangements and hence of the RUSI, describing it as a 'totally artificial creation'.

Nor did it approve of the unitary state, arguing that it was created to benefit 'American imperialism'. On 22 August 1950, Pravda declared:

> Now having consolidated its position in Indonesia, with the aid of local reaction, the USA hopes to drive both the Dutch and the British out of the country. American imperialism now emerges as the champion of a unified Indonesian state, hoping in this event to subordinate the entire Indonesian archipelago to its dictate.

At the same time, the Republic's Government was viewed with reservations. Pravda, for instance, wrote of the 'so-called Hatta-Sukarno Government', indicating the Kremlin's non-acceptance of the Indonesian Government and its leaders. In addition, Merle Cochran, the United States Ambassador to Jakarta, was described as the "clandestine manager of affairs for the puppet government of Hatta-Sukarno". After 1951, however, Moscow became more supportive of the unitary state. This was largely the result of growing contradictions between the newly independent states and their former colonial masters, undermining the basis of the 'two camps' theory. Soviet commentaries, however, adhered to the basic 'two camps' frame of reference, not admitting that the aims of non-alignment or neutrality professed by several of the new

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168. Izvestia, 4 November 1949.
governments had anything to do with their actions. Instead, resort was now made to the heretofore neglected themes of 'inter-imperialist contradictions' and 'pressures from below'.

For instance, in December 1951, *New Times* described the establishment of a unitary state as being the result of 'Indonesia's democratic organizations': "They showed up the conference and the designs of the imperialists who had sponsored it and roused the masses to fight for genuine independence, for abolishing the RTC decisions, which perpetuated Indonesia's servitude and for driving all imperialists from the archipelago". For Moscow, the PKI's leadership's decision to support the unitary state was evidence of the 'pressures from below'.

The foreign policy of the Hatta Government during the post-revolutionary period has been described as one of 'pro-Western neutralism'. The government established diplomatic relations with and opened embassies in the major Western capitals as well as most 'non-committed' countries. No diplomatic representatives were exchanged with the communist states, and even though the PRC sent an Ambassador to Jakarta on 14 August 1950, Jakarta despatched a chargé d'affaires to Peking only on 14 January 1951.

Apart from Hatta's personal anti-communism, the need to obtain economic assistance from the West was an important consideration. It would be overstating the case to argue that the Hatta Government was totally, or even to a large degree, pro-

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Western, for it continued to adhere to the basic policy of not taking sides in the 'cold war'. Rather, it maintained that Indonesia pursued an active and independent foreign policy. This position was declared principally to sound out the great powers, especially the United States, as the seizure of power in China by the communists in 1949 created a political climate that advocated the damming of the 'Chinese threat' in Asia. More important, the birth of the PRC was viewed as a 'victory' for 'Stalin's expansionism' and Indonesia feared that this might lead to the spread of the 'cold war' into Asia. The Baguio Conference, convened in the Philippines in late May 1950 by President Quirino, was seen in Jakarta to have this objective in mind. The Hatta Government despatched Achmed Subardjo, a former Foreign Minister, with instructions to "thwart the Philippines in their hope of arranging such a permanent anti-communist body of cooperation". The Soviet Union, still reeling under Stalin's 'two camps' approach to international politics, saw the opposition of Indonesia and other countries such as India, Ceylon and Burma at the conference to "the proclamation of any anti-communist slogans" and their refusal to "discuss the question of any permanent Union or alliance of the countries of Southeast Asia" as indicating that these governments were under pressure from their "national liberation movements" and "did not dare, at least openly, to put on the harness of the American imperialists...".".

178 Ibid., p. 195.
179 Izvestia, 6 June 1950.
The Korean War broke out in June 1950. Indonesia saw it as a 'cold war' issue and, together with India, worked actively for a truce. The Indonesian delegation at the United Nations rejected the United States thesis that the PRC was the aggressor, but supported the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' sponsored by the United States, a resolution which the Soviet Union opposed on legal and political grounds. Nevertheless, the war was significant in terms of future American policies in Asia as well as compelling the Soviet Union to reconsider the political and ideological status of the newly independent states such as India, Burma and Indonesia.

Mohammad Natsir formed the first cabinet in the unitary state of Indonesia. It adopted a pro-Western foreign policy which was motivated by the need to acquire foreign aid and improve trading relations and was also a consequence of the continued Soviet condemnation of new states which had pursued an 'uncommitted' foreign policy and its vilification of Indonesian leaders since 1948. In spite of its Western orientation, the Natsir Government attempted to present a balanced outlook towards the two 'cold war' camps. Natsir's Government's non-aligned credentials were enhanced when it rejected in October 1950 an offer of American military aid. In the same month, however, it signed an economic and technical assistance agreement with the United States.

183 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p.175.
Describing the Natsir Government in December 1951, a Soviet political commentator wrote:

... the people expected that now following the resignation of the Hatta Government on 17 August 1950 a government would be formed of men who had led the national liberation movement. But as the outcome of fresh machinations by the imperialists and Right-wing parties which they backed, the new government was made largely by leaders of the Muslim Masjumi Party. 184

Despite its hostility towards the Natsir Government, the Soviet Union endorsed the Republic's entry into the United Nations as had been agreed upon during Palar's visit in May 1950, and on 27 September Indonesia became the sixtieth member of the organization. 185

A conservative and anti-communist government headed by Sukiman succeeded Natsir in mid-1951. Its anti-communism was clearly manifested in August 1951 when it began a crack down on the reconstituted PKI under the leadership of D.N. Aidit. The government maintained that the Party was planning a 'second Madiun' with outside assistance, a claim that was difficult to justify in view of the party's weakness. It was still recovering from the blow it received in September 1948. 186

Unlike Natsir, Sukiman's Government conducted an active foreign policy, and during this period relations with the PRC reached a low point. The Chinese Ambassador, Wan Yen-shin, a former Indonesian Chinese, was an outspoken communist. Contrary to diplomatic practice, his Embassy commented publicly and often critically on Indonesian affairs, publicly condemned the mass arrest of the PKI members in August 1951 and gave sanctuary to Alimin, a prominent PKI leader. At

the same time, China was annoyed with Sukiman Government's anti-communist policies, its refusal to permit the celebrations of China's National Day on 1 October in Indonesia and denial of entry rights later that year to 50 Chinese diplomats and consular officials, who arrived without prior clearance from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{187}

As the Korean War progressed, the United States attempted to isolate the PRC politically as well as to apply economic pressure through the United Nations-sponsored sanctions. On 1 February 1951, it initiated a resolution, declaring the PRC the aggressor in the Korean War and embargoing export of strategic materials to it.\textsuperscript{188} Indonesia did not support the aggressor resolution, but it agreed to abide by the embargo.\textsuperscript{189} The Government's active pro-Western foreign policy was clearly demonstrated by its decision to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan on 8 September 1951, and to accept economic aid under the Mutual Security Act (MSA) arrangements on 5 January 1952. The signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty was controversial in Indonesia, where it was viewed as an American-sponsored document, endorsement of which would be tantamount, so its opponents maintained, to joining the United States camp in the 'cold war'.\textsuperscript{190} The Government's decision to despatch Subardjo to San Francisco was all the more disputatious in view of the fact that India and Burma, the two principal 'uncommitted' states

\textsuperscript{188}Sastroamidjojo, Op cit, p. 231.
\textsuperscript{190}Sastroamidjojo, Op cit, pp. 233-244.
In assessing the Government's decision to endorse the Peace Treaty, a Soviet commentator argued that "it was contrary to the will and desire of the Indonesian people to sign the infamous event in the history of the country". The 'Americanised ruling clique' and Ali Sastromidjojo, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States, were described as "well known agents of the United States' State Department". The Treaty, claimed the Soviet writer, was 'dictated' by the State Department, and it was supposed "to have exasperated the various segments of the Indonesian people". Moscow's condemnation of Sukiman Government's endorsement of the treaty was understandable in the light of its own refusal to participate in the San Francisco Conference.

The opposition in Indonesia, as well as Soviet condemnation of the Sukiman Government, reached its climax after Subardjo signed an agreement with the State Department to accept aid under the 1951 MSA arrangements which stipulated that aid could only be dispensed provided it benefited the 'Free World'. Subardjo signed the agreement with the concurrence of Sukiman alone, and it was only a month later, in February, that the agreement was leaked to the press, which accused the government of forfeiting the nation's treasured independent foreign policy. The opposition to the agreement was so intense that Subardjo resigned in the second week of February 1951, followed by the entire

cabinet on 23 February. This event demonstrated how much some Indonesian political circles valued the principle of an independent foreign policy and the cost a party or government would incur if it appeared to be taking sides in the 'cold war'.

In March 1952, a Soviet political analyst argued that "officially, the agreement was to provide Indonesia, American aid under the so-called Mutual Security Agreement. That the purposes of that Act are aggressive and extortionate is no secret". On the resignation of the Sukiman Government, the analyst noted: "the resignation was the sequel to an American attempt, made with the help of Sukiman's Foreign Minister, Achmed Subardjo, to force a military and economic agreement on Indonesia and with the Cabinet resignation, that agreement becomes a big question mark". 194

The fall of the Sukiman Government came at a time when the Soviet Union under Stalin was beginning to reconsider the place of the newly independent states in its world view. This reconsideration, which led to the initial interest for constructive relations with the newly independent states, marked the final phase of Stalin's foreign policy.

Phase 3: April 1952 - March 1953

By April 1952, Soviet foreign policy under Stalin underwent a subtle change. The outright hostility towards the capitalist camp and the Third World in general gave way to attempts to improve relations with selected states. The

stalemate in the Korean War, the lack of success of revolutions in the Third World, the beginning of competition with the PRC in the Third World, and the attempts by the United States to move into Asia in order to forestall further communist expansion might have influenced Moscow to partially soften its stance on cooperation with Third World states. At the same time, the Korean War clearly showed the lack of credibility of the 'two camps' doctrine, while vindicating the position of the neutralists when countries such as Burma and India refused to join the 'imperialist bloc'. In this context, the convening of an economic conference in Moscow in April 1952 can be regarded as the beginning of a Soviet reconsideration of relations with Third World states. At the conference, Soviet leaders indicated their willingness to increase trading relations with Third World states.  

Stalin's changed world view was clearly enunciated in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", an article which appeared in Boishevik on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress in September 1952. Stalin advised caution and realism, emphasising the contradictions within the capitalist world, leading possibly to the outbreak of wars between individual capitalist countries but downgrading the likelihood of military conflict between the capitalist and communist countries, that is, undermining the very basis of the 'two camps' doctrine. It can be argued that Stalin was warning against any assumption that the rigidly bipolar international situation would continue.

indefinitely implying as a corollary that Soviet foreign policy should reject direct confrontation in order to exploit future splits within the capitalist camp. Such a conclusion would provide the basis for a more active diplomacy towards the individual capitalist states including those in the Third World. Although no changes in Soviet policy were publicly announced before Stalin’s death, the new attitude laid the groundwork for a more flexible Soviet approach towards the Third World soon after Stalin’s death. The emergence of a more flexible Soviet international posture was evident in its relations with Indonesia.

In April 1952, Wilopo formed the next Government. This period also saw the rise of the ‘new PKI’, which reconstituted itself, adopting a new strategy to gain influence and to break out of its isolation from Indonesian politics. The revival began under the triumvirate of Aidit, Njoto and Lukman, and the PKI’s political strategy was to fit its programme into the mainstream of the country’s politics. This ‘new road’ was to bring the party tremendous success.

In April 1952, the Soviet Union convened an economic conference in Moscow, where the ‘Stalin Plan’, a programme for Soviet trade with the newly independent states in return for raw materials, was announced. This represented an important turning point and change in Soviet attitude towards

the Third World states and this was largely a belated recognition that the Third World did contain a number of states that had the capacity to act independently of their former colonial masters, as had been demonstrated during the Korean War.

The Wilopo cabinet despatched a mission headed by Suchjar Tekjasukmana, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Economic Council. The Wilopo Government maintained that the mission was 'a purely private group' attending as 'observer' and would maintain a 'strictly neutral' position, but the fact that it was sent at all was an indication that the Government was attempting to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union in order to make credible its independent foreign policy. The need for this was all the more urgent because of the previous policies of the Sukiman Government. On 6 May, Tekjasukmana broadcast over Radio Moscow as 'a private citizen', declaring that "the Soviet regime had done a lot for the material welfare of the Soviet citizens, and Indonesia could take it as an example". This can be regarded as an important step in the growing 'detente' between Moscow and Jakarta.

The Army-Government crisis, also referred to as the 'October 17 Affair', which began during the Sukiman period, exploded in October 1952 when a group of officers, with the support of Colonel Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to overthrow the parliamentary government and

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reconstitute a presidential system, in what Sukarno later called a 'half coup'.202 Sukarno succeeded in talking the officers out of their plan, so that the attempt ended in total failure and Nasution was dismissed from the Army. In his place as Chief of Staff, the Defence Minister appointed Colonel Bambang Sugeng, and this appointment split the Army into two groups - those for and those against the overthrow of parliamentary government.

A Soviet political commentator was later to argue that:

... acting on the instigation of the imperialists, the reactionary forces are trying to abolish the Parliamentary system in favour of a military dictatorship. To do that, they are endeavouring to throttle the democratic and anti-imperialist movement. That was the purpose of the putsch staged in Jakarta on October 1952. The Right-wing Socialists had a big hand in this venture, which was foiled by the masses.204

The crisis weakened the Government, which fell in June 1953. Soviet political analysts have, however, blamed the Masjumi for this, Cuber, for instance, arguing that "the reactionary Masjumi Party leaders sabotaged the progressive policies of the Wilopo government and maintained secret contacts with bandit detachments of Darul Islam, groups of armed Muslim extremists who resorted to terror and violence in an attempt to make Indonesia a theocratic Muslim state".205 Kruglov similarly blamed the Masjumi for the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet. In August 1953, he argued:

... its Masjumi members had tried to return the Sumatran plantations, taken over by the peasants, to the Dutch planters, and to restore the rights of Bataafsche

Petroleum to the Sumatran oil fields. Masjumi also resisted the popular demand for the punishment of the organisers of the October 17 Putsch and for measures against the Darul Islam bands. Lastly, Masjumi sabotaged the parliamentary decision adopted in April to open an Indonesian diplomatic mission in Moscow.206

Formed in November 1945, the Masjumi Party has been viewed by Soviet scholars as a 'reactionary, pro-imperialist' organization, a view which remained consistent throughout the existence of the party. The party has also been accused of attracting supporters by means of 'religious propaganda', while A.I. Ionova accused the 'religious socialists' of 'bloody violence against the communists and democratic organizations' in 1948.207

The importance of these criticisms was not so much its nature and content, but rather its focus: the Wilopo Government was not vilified but its opponents were. In this regard, of significance was the fact that Soviet-Indonesian relations were now entering the phase of proper state-to-state relations. Relations between Wilopo's Indonesia and Stalin's Soviet Union can be described as correct, insofar as past Soviet denunciations of the Indonesian Government's links with 'Imperialism' were now downplayed as well as genuine attempts being made on the part of Jakarta to put relations with Moscow on a proper footing. This was most vividly demonstrated by the Wilopo Government's attempts to exchange diplomatic representatives with Moscow.

The understanding on the exchange of diplomatic missions reached in May 1950 was not implemented until

206 Kruglov, "The Situation in Indonesia", p.31.
208 A. I. Ionova, "The Historical Destinities of 'Muslim' and 'Democratic' Socialism in Indonesia", Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 5, 1964, pp. 36-46.
April 1954. The Masjumi Party, which was dominant in Indonesian politics in the first three years after independence, opposed the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Moscow.²⁰⁹

The first three cabinets, those of Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman, showed no interest in implementing the Palar-Vyshinsky accord because they were pro-Western, especially pro-United States and were angling for American aid. At the same time, Moscow was overtly critical of the three governments, and had nothing attractive to offer in the way of economic assistance. It was only during the term in office of the PNI-led Wilopo cabinet that the first steps were taken in the direction of establishing a diplomatic mission. Otto Rondonuwu, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, tabled a motion on 23 February calling for the establishment of an Embassy in Moscow.²¹⁰ The Masjumi Party opposed it but was defeated.²¹¹ On 10 April, Parliament passed Rondonuwu’s motion by 82 votes to 43 and specified that the Embassy be established in Moscow before the end of the year.²¹² In support of his motion, Rondonuwu maintained that "Indonesia's policy will lack strength and our national prestige will suffer as long as our country has not established an Embassy in Moscow."²¹³ Others argued that to establish an Embassy in Moscow would strengthen the country's independent foreign policy.²¹⁴ It was also noted that even adversaries of the Soviet Union such as the United States

²¹⁴. See Editorial, Sumber, 29 May 1953.
and Britain, had embassies in Moscow, while the PKI argued that the step would benefit the Republic economically and politically. However, the Wilopo cabinet was not able to implement the decision in its term of office because of the shortage of funds and trained personnel. Nevertheless, these efforts by the Indonesian Government were not lost on Moscow, especially at a time when the Kremlin itself was reconsidering the role and importance of 'uncommitted' states in the Afro-Asian world.

Summary

Broadly speaking, Stalin's approach to the nationalist movements in Southeast Asia as a whole, and Indonesia in particular, from the years 1945 to 1953 oscillated from tentative acceptance, to total rejection and opposition, to reconsideration. While the Soviet Union did not have any vital interest in Southeast Asia as a whole, the region, which was experiencing drastic political change, could not be ignored, especially by an emerging world power which at the same time presented itself as the centre of a universalistic ideology. However, it was the end of the Stalin era that led to his successors totally revamping their perceptions and conceptions of the Third World. It was in the wake of this reconsideration that Indonesia became a major target for Soviet policy in the Third World, which the following chapters will examine in detail.

CHAPTER THREE

SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER KHRUSHCHEV, 1953-1962
This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations from March 1953 to August 1962. It traces developments from the death of Stalin through the Malenkov-Khrushchev period until the resolution of the West Irian dispute. Soviet-Indonesian relations should be understood against the backdrop of the broader Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Third World; it was during this phase that relations between Moscow and Jakarta reached its pinnacle.

The course of Soviet foreign policy underwent a dramatic change after the death of Stalin. Under Malenkov and later Khrushchev, Moscow introduced doctrinal changes which made possible practical policy reversals and this in turn had great consequences for its Third World policy. Changes were necessitated by a number of factors. The first of these was the new leadership's desire to distance itself from Stalinist domestic and foreign policies. The second factor was the general failure of Stalin's past strategies and tactics. The changing international climate, especially in Asia, caused by the introduction of American 'containment' policies and the growing importance of the PRC as a world power, was another factor. The final factor was the growing importance of the Afro-Asian countries, especially the opportunities provided by their desire to remain non-aligned and neutral. The adoption of 'peaceful coexistence' as a principal tenet of its foreign policy at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 meant the repudiation of the 'two camps' theory. It also affirmed the possibility of a 'peaceful transition to socialism' as well as a recognition of the Third World as an 'autonomous' actor in its own right. The corollary of

1See Pravda, 15 February 1956; Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflict, (Lexington, Mass, Lexington
this was that Third World 'national bourgeois' leadership was recognised as a 'progressive' force.¹ These changes provided the rationale and gave incentives to Soviet leaders to expand ties with Third World states.

While it is not unusual to refer to the Twentieth Party Congress as the beginning of the 'new course' in Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World, many signals of change were apparent even before this. In August 1953, Malenkov noted that "after a long period of mounting tension, one feels for the first time since the war a certain easing of the international situation".³ In February 1955, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, gave expression to the changing situation in the newly independent states: speaking of India, he observed that "there is a great historical significance in the fact that colonial India no longer exists, but the Indian Republic. This is an important turning point in events characterising Asia's post-war development."⁴ In August 1955, the theoretical publication of the Soviet Communist Party, Kommunist, analysed the changes in Asia since 1945. It divided post-war Asia into four categories.⁵

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³ Pravda, 9 February 1955.

⁴ V. Mikheev, "Novaya Azia", Kommunist, No. 12, August 1955, pp. 80-94; In December 1956, V. Semyonov put forward a similar categorization less the colonies. See "Raspad kolonial'noy sistemy imperializma mezhdunarodnii otnosenii", ibid., No. 18, December 1956, pp. 97-114.
The first comprised the 'socialist camp', and this included four countries: Outer Mongolia, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The second comprised the 'regenerated states' which were the chief object of Soviet foreign policy in the area at that time. This group included countries such as Burma, India and Indonesia, defined by their strictly 'neutralist foreign policy' which served preeminently to block the extension of American military alliances into Asia. The third category was made up of 'formally independent states', that is, states which were fully sovereign but belonged to US military 'blocs'. Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Iraq and Japan were included in this group. The final category consisted of the 'colonial areas' and this included Malaya and New Guinea.

For the purpose of this thesis, it will be useful to look in greater detail at the 'regenerated states', and in particular Indonesia, in order to elucidate the Soviet thinking on these countries. The countries in this group were characterised as politically independent but economically dependent entities - "former colonies which have achieved state independence and are now acting independently in the international arena: but which in view of historical conditions have not yet been able to extricate themselves fully from economic dependence on foreign capital". Mikheev set forth two major shortcomings of the 'regenerated states': first, their dependence upon 'foreign capital' was viewed as a prime hindrance to their efforts to solve the tremendous tasks confronting them; second, the internal machinations

7. Ibid, p. 86.
of such 'reactionary classes and groups as the feudal land­owners, powerful capitalist-campradores and the direct agents of foreign imperialists' impeded economic and political progress". The article, however, advised that this group of governments was no longer to be opposed indiscriminately on the ideological grounds that they were 'semi-colonial' countries under 'foreign control'. Instead, Mikheev argued that the Communist Parties in these countries were to "support all progressive measures of the national governments and strive for a more resolute onslaught on the positions of foreign colonisers and land-owners; they were to favour national unity against the imperialists and their agents, remaining mindful that the role of the working class demands continued pressure for profound social reforms, land reforms, and the liquidation of the economic positions of imperialism". Thus, by mid-1955, it was clear that theoretically the Soviet Union had adopted a new posture toward Third World states, and the domestic and foreign policies of these states were the primary yardstick by which Moscow categorised them.

The changing Soviet view of the Third World climaxed in November 1955, with Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Afghanistan, India and Burma, launching in earnest the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Third World. At the same time, Soviet arms began appearing in the Middle East. It also

8 Ibid, pp.86-87.
9 Ibid, p.87.
signalled the emphasis of state-to-state relations while downplaying the party-to-party links, though not necessarily downgrading them totally. The countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and a few others which were deemed important, were the object of Soviet foreign policy, and Indonesia was one of these earmarked for special attention by the Kremlin.

Soviet relations with Indonesia during this period should be understood within the broader context of its objectives in the Indonesian archipelago, which can be generalised as follows: to prevent the Republic's participation in American-sponsored military alliance systems in Southeast Asia and thereby disrupt these systems; to reduce and eliminate the influence of Western powers as part of the total effort to isolate the United States and Western Europe; to establish contacts with the Republic's leadership and win its support for Soviet policies, especially in the United Nations; to persuade the Republic to accept the Soviet Union as a model for its industrialization and modernization; to encourage the Republic's policy of non-alignment and neutrality; to promote political and social conditions thought to be conducive in the long run to the development of the PKI; and to build up a reservoir of goodwill and promote the image of the Soviet Union as a friend of Indonesia.  

The doctrinal and policy changes in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death coincided with policy changes in Indonesia. Wilopo's Government was replaced by Ali Sastroamidjojo's on 1 August 1953. Following his inauguration, concerted efforts were made to implement the Wilopo cabinet's decision to establish an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow. On 21 December 1953, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, agreed to the appointment of an Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow. On 13 April 1954, Jakarta's first Ambassador, Subandrio, presented his credentials to President Voroshilov of the Soviet Union, and Moscow in return despatched a senior diplomat, E. Zhukov, to Jakarta on 14 September 1954. Zhukov's arrival, five months after the despatch of Subandrio, was not the result of any political misunderstandings but more the consequence of 'technical difficulties' in establishing an embassy in Jakarta and finding the right candidate for the job. Of significance was the exchange of diplomatic missions, four years after agreement to do so, which in return placed both governments in a better position to relate to each other on a government-to-government basis.

The increasing warmth of relations between the two countries during this period was principally the result of the various policies announced and implemented by the Ali Government. One of the most important decisions taken by the Ali cabinet was to dissolve the Dutch-Indonesian Union formed in December 1949. In July 1954, the Jakarta

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15. At the Round Table Conference, the agreement for the transfer of sovereignty stated that the Netherlands-Indonesian Union would be established for "mutual consultations on matters of common interest." However, it was largely a paper institution without real substance and powers. See George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 433-434.
Government decided to abrogate the Union, due to differences over West Irian and the economic and political clauses of the RTC Agreements. Sukarno, in defending the government's decision, stated that the "Union kept too much alive the memory of the unhappy past." Soviet commentators viewed the abrogation of the Union as a positive development, with Y. Yegorov praising it as "a new and significant victory in Indonesia's struggle for independence". Radio Moscow hailed it "as another blow to colonialism in Asia," while Pravda welcomed it as "a new stage towards the strengthening of Indonesia's independence". It was, however, only in March 1956, during Ali's second cabinet [from March 1956 to March 1957], that the entire RTC arrangements were abrogated. This also involved the repudiation of a debt of 3.6 billion guilders. These actions were described by Radio Moscow as 'rightful', 'just' and ones which "would strengthen the country's independence and eradicate colonialist aspirations". Ali's actions, however, brought differences with the Dutch to a new height.

Another decision which was supported by the Soviet Union was the 'Indonesianization' of the economy, which began in November 1953. This involved the nationalization of foreign enterprises, mainly Dutch, and by November 1954, some 2000 enterprises were placed in native hands. A

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Soviet economist A. Baturin saw the nationalization as an Indonesian "attempt to eliminate all relics of colonialism and build a national economy". In Soviet writings, all the obstacles which impeded Indonesia's economic development were attributed to the 'foreign monopolies' and the 'heavy legacies of colonialism'. In this regard, another Soviet economist, D.V. Bekleshov, opined that the most important achievement of the Ali Government was to limit the influence of foreign capital and to lay the foundation of the 'state sector', which was seen as a 'progressive phenomenon'.

In this context, the Five Year Plan, 1956 to 1960, introduced by the Ali Cabinet, was fully endorsed; in Baturin's analysis, it "would not fully solve the problems of converting the colonial economy into a national economy. But it will undoubtedly create important requisites for further progress: it will strengthen the state-owned sector and national capital, provide essential financial resources and raise the national living standards".

It was in the field of foreign policy that Ali's cabinet made its presence felt most markedly. Its actions included the establishment of an embassy in Moscow, rejection of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), revocation of the embargo against the PRC, signing of trade agreements with Eastern European countries, endorsement of the five principles of 'peaceful coexistence' and the hosting of the Bandung Conference.

The signing of trade agreements with East Germany, Hungary and Czeschoslovakia, and later the PRC in 1954, was interpreted by a Soviet political analyst as "the Indonesian Government's anxiety to break free of Washington's economic dictation which is causing so much damage". The five principles of 'peaceful coexistence', viz. mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and reciprocal advantage and peaceful coexistence, embodied in the Sino-Indian agreement of June 1954, were endorsed by the Ali government on 1 July 1954. The endorsement was praised by Soviet political analysts, but it was only on 9 February 1955 that the Supreme Soviet declared its open support for the five principles. In June 1956, the Ali Government lifted its embargo against the sale of rubber to the PRC, on the grounds that "it wanted to put an end to the great damage it was causing to the Indonesian economy and to contribute to the cause of peace and human well being". Pravda welcomed the decision, declaring that "the Indonesian move was quite different from what Washington had apparently expected. It shows that the Asian people are firmly and confidently taking to the path of full national independence".

27. Yegoro v, Op cit, p.11.
28. Ibid.
30. For instance, N.A.Bulganin declared that "we deeply respect these principles, as being in accord with the principles of Soviet foreign policy, and consider that the greater the number of countries that adopt and guide themselves by themselves by them, the more effective will international confidence develop, and the more rapidly will tension be lessened and peace be strenthened". Cited in V.Avarin,"Asia in the Modern World",Ibid, No.4,19 Jan.1956, p.4.
32. Ibid, 10-12 July 1956, p.36.
The Ali Government's policies vis-a-vis the West Irian issue, the formation of SEATO, the Bandung Conference, Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union, the Suez Crisis and the separatist movements further cemented Soviet-Indonesian relations.

The West Irian Issue

At the RTC, agreement was reached on all matters except one: the issue of West Irian. In order to save the agreement that had already been reached on the transfer of sovereignty, a compromise resolution was agreed upon which stipulated that within a year of the date of transfer of sovereignty, the question of the political status of West Irian would be determined through negotiations. However, negotiations ended in a deadlock. To the Indonesian leaders, the continued presence of the Dutch in West Irian was a smudge on their country's sovereignty and which rendered the national revolution incomplete. The Dutch had also used Boven Digul, in West Irian, as a camp for holding Indonesian nationalists who were exiled from Java and Sumatra, and in this regard, the territory acquired an emotional significance as a reminder of the oppression Indonesians had to endure. The Ali Government also maintained that its security was threatened by the presence of Dutch troops in West Irian, as well as by the use of the territory as a base by various rebel groups.

In its strategy to regain West Irian, the

Government initially resorted to bilateral negotiations. As no progress was made, the Ali Government introduced two additional strategies: The first was to mobilise support within the country; and second, to internationalise the issue by placing it on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1954, hoping that with the support of the Soviet bloc and the newly independent countries, the Dutch would be pressured to relinquish West Irian. Though the Republic received majority votes in the UNGA, it failed to muster the two-thirds majority needed to pass its resolution. This greatly embittered the leadership and was principally responsible for the adoption of a more hardline attitude towards the Dutch.

An important factor in accounting for Dutch intrasigence was the support the Netherlands received, directly and indirectly, from Australia and the United States. With the accession to office of the Liberal-Country coalition in December 1949, Canberra adopted a strongly anti-communist foreign policy, supporting the Dutch retention of West Irian, for two reasons. First, it hoped that the Dutch presence there would act as a bulwark against the spread of Communism from Indonesia, and second, it feared that in view of the ethnic affinities between the populations of West Irian and Australian New Guinea, Indonesia's possession of the territory would lead to a claim to the adjacent Australian trust territory. Officially, the United States adopted a position.

of neutrality in the dispute, but this meant supporting the maintenance of the status quo. After the conclusion of the RTC Agreements, the Americans had no intentions of antagonising their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally and arousing Dutch nationalism against themselves. After conclusion of the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty, Washington had two allies which were against Indonesia's control of West Irian. American support for the status quo, however, worked to Dutch advantage, as Jakarta was only too well aware. Howard Jones, the American Ambassador to Indonesia from February 1958 to May 1965, admitted later that "although the official position was one of neutrality, American government sympathies were with the Dutch. We would support what the Dutch wanted to the extent consistent with our public position of neutrality on the issue." While this encouraged the Dutch, the Indonesian bitterness towards the Netherlands and the United States increased, and this played an important role in the Ali Government's decision to practise its 'independent foreign policy' more vigorously and thus pursue closer ties with the Soviet bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union. In this regard, Howard Jones was correct when he admitted that "the West Irian problem contributed greatly to the genesis of the long, steady movement of Indonesia away from the West and toward the Communist bloc".

From the very beginning of the issue, the Soviet Union supported the Indonesian claim. Soviet commentators emphasised the legality of the claim and the ties supposed to exist between the peoples of West Irian and Indonesia.

41. Ibid.
L. Dadiani maintained that the Dutch authorities themselves admitted that the two territories comprised one state, for they were 'legally confirmed' in the Linggajati and Renville Agreements. N. F. Bulygin asserted that ties existed as far back as the Middle Ages when West Irian was part of the Majapahit empire, while G. Kesselbrenner dated the ties back to the Srivijaya period of the eighth century. Soviet writers have also stressed that, even though the Dutch maintained that the colony had little economic importance, it was nevertheless rich in raw materials and minerals, and this explained the eagerness of the Dutch to hold on to it. The Soviets also criticised the United States for exploiting the resources of the territory and suggested that it was attempting to set up military bases. In April 1951, Krasnaya zvezda stated that "the United States' monopolies were paying special attention to the Western part of New Guinea which occupied an important strategic position in the Pacific and was rich in large deposits of useful minerals". Writing in Izvestia, Yuri Zvyagin argued on 2 February 1952 that "despite the fact that New Guinea was an inalienable part of the national territory of Indonesia, the United States' monopolies were more interested in exploiting the territory. This was because

42. L. Dadiani, Review of G. Kesselbrenner's "West Irian - An Inalienable Part of Indonesia", International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 4, April 1959, p. 120.
45. Y. Yegorov argued that "the United States is eager to retain Dutch control of West Irian, where the Dutch administration, under Pentagon pressure, is erecting military installations". Y. Yegorov, "The Enemies of Indonesian Independence", New Times, No. 35, 28 Aug. 1954, p. 10.
46. Krasnaya zvezda, 13 April 1951.
as a source of raw materials, New Guinea is certainly a tasty morsel for Wall Street". During the debates in the UNGA in 1954, the Ukrainian delegate, Palamarchuk, defended the Indonesian case:

The dispute about the political status of West Irian constituted a latent threat to peace and security in that particular area. Indonesia has recently, after a long struggle for independence, become a sovereign state. However, a part of Indonesia - West Irian - remained under the colonial domination of the Netherlands, although it was an integral part of Indonesia. The Netherlands, which had formerly administered the colony, had never treated West Irian as an administrative area separate from the rest of the colony. Indeed, the administrative unity had been reinforced by long established economic and cultural ties between West Irian and the other islands of Indonesia.

In spite of support from the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian countries, the phase of 'beggar-diplomacy'(that is, where the Republic resorted to bilateral negotiations to recover the territory) from 1950 to 1957 brought no postive results, and this was the main reason why the Government adopted the strategy of brinkmanship.

The formation of SEATO

On 8 September 1954, SEATO was founded in Manila, with the principal aim of containing the southward spread of Communism. Like India, Burma and Ceylon, Indonesia declined to join the pact. The Soviet Union condemned the formation of SEATO. On 15 September 1954, Pravda declared that the pact was "directed against security in Asia and the Far East and, at the same time, against the freedom and national independence of the Asian peoples". Another

47. Izvestia, 2 February 1951.
51. Pravda, 15 September 1954.
Soviet writer stated that "as a sector in the military encirclement of the socialist countries, SEATO is meant also to reinforce colonialism and to suppress liberation movements. It imperils the independence of the neutralist countries and furthers the enslavement of the Asian states involved in it." It was therefore not surprising that Moscow praised Indonesia's decision not to be a party to it. In August 1954, Yegorov argued that "a dominant feature of Indonesian policy is the desire to keep out of aggressive blocs in Asia". In addition to its own condemnation of American attempts to establish military alliance systems in Asia, Indonesia's rejection of SEATO was supported as this would not only encourage other neutralists to do so but also create gaps in American containment policies and hopefully weaken SEATO and American defence strategies in the region.

The Bandung Conference

The conference opened on 18 April 1955 and was attended by 340 delegates from 29 countries. The conference was the first attempt to unite the newly independent Afro-Asian states, especially those which had adopted non-alignment as their foreign policy. Among the great powers, only the PRC was invited, and this was partly to draw it away from the Soviet Union and closer to the Asian countries.

the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, the Soviet Union had been represented by delegates from its Asian Republics. At Bandung, however, Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, made it clear that the USSR would not be invited "for the simple reason that it was not an Asian power".  

Even though publicly the USSR welcomed the conference, in private, its Foreign Minister Molotov expressed his displeasure at not being invited. He is said to have protested that "geographically speaking, the Soviet Union is an Asian power, the greatest part of its territory indeed situated in the Asian mainland". On 16 April 1955, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov welcomed the holding of the conference and declared Soviet support for the five principles of 'peaceful coexistence'. Although Moscow supported the convocation of the conference, its initial reactions contained some reservations. Thus Ye Zhukov observed:

The contemporary anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movement in Asia and Africa is not a uniform movement of revolutionary-minded masses. People who are opposed to revolutionary measures are also taking part in it (the conference). What is more, even direct agents of imperialism and adventurers of all kinds are tagging along.  

Similarly N. Sergeyeva argued:

The feverish activity of the diplomats from the Philippines, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey and Pakistan, who have come to Bandung on Washington's orders, is supplemented by the backstage manipulations of American agents, trying to influence the representatives of countries which have not yet determined their position. It is known in journalistic circles that there is a special lobby campaigning against the principles of peaceful co-existence. It distributes literature which furnishes the cue for statements in defence of the US 'policy of strength'.

58. Izvestia, 17 April 1955.  
Despite these initial reservations, the results of the conference were generally pleasing to Moscow, and Soviet writers have viewed them as marking "a new era for the Asian and African peoples". For instance, Sergeyeva observed:

It branded colonialism as an evil which should speedily be brought to an end and deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination. It explicitly decided in favour of general disarmament and prohibition of experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war. The decisions of the Bandung Conference are another blow at the decaying and insolvent imperialist system. For the delegates' condemnation of colonialism was in fact a condemnation of the whole policy of imperialism with its drive for colonial conquest and enslavement and exploitation of the Asian and African peoples.61

The final communique listed ten articles [the Ten Bandung Principles], which Babojan Gafurov, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, maintained "embodied Lenin's ideas of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems". The Soviet Union has continued to view the conference as "a historical milestone in the anti-imperialist struggle of the Afro-Asian people".62 It was in this regard that one of the most important consequences of the conference was the rapid improvement in Soviet-Indonesian relations. Following the exchange of diplomatic representatives, the rejection of SEATO and the convocation of the Bandung Conference, Moscow began to perceive the Republic as an 'anti-imperialist state'.

Sukarno's Visit to the Soviet Union

Sukarno's first visit to the Soviet Union from 23 August to 12 September 1956 represented another step in the expanding Soviet-Indonesian relations.63 It was

61. Ibid, No.18, 1 May 1955, p.25.
64. For details, see Ganis Harsono, Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era, (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1977), pp.141-161.
preceded by a visit to the United States, during which Sukarno made an unsuccessful attempt to change Washington's policy towards the West Irian dispute. The Soviet Union made a great attempt to impress its guest: the mass media heralded the visit as an event of utmost importance to the growing relations between the two countries, and the entire Soviet Politburo went to Moscow Airport to receive him. While the Soviet Union saw in Sukarno an important leader of the Afro-Asian movement, who pursued a foreign policy of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, Sukarno hoped by his visit to demonstrate the country's independent foreign policy, as well as to examine at first hand what Socialism had to offer to Indonesia.

Throughout his visit, Soviet leaders repeatedly declared their support for Indonesia's fight for the 'liberation of West Irian'. In addition, two important events took place: the Soviet commitment to supply US$100 million in long-term credits, and the signing of a joint communique. The acceptance of long-term credits posed no problems, as to accept Soviet as well as Western aid was evidence of non-alignment. But the signing of the joint communique unleashed a political storm in Indonesia because Sukarno, as Constitutional-Head of State, sought no clearance for it from the Government. On 10 September, in discussions in the Kremlin, Sukarno proposed a joint communique, in order to manifest 'a deeper and more concrete...bond of friendship', which the Soviet leaders found agreeable.

67. Ibid.
68. Ibid, pp.148-149.
A joint communique was issued on the following day, but Indonesian parliamentary leaders in Jakarta were enraged by point two of the communique which read:

With regard to such international questions as disarmament, the struggle against colonialism, prohibition of the use and the testing of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, etc., the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia are guided by the spirit and principles of the Bandung Conference. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Indonesia have declared that the existence of military pacts will not facilitate the efforts to lessen international tensions, which are in turn essential for the establishment of world peace. In this connection, the admittance of the PRC to her rightful place in the United Nations Organization was recognised not only as a natural act but also a constructive contribution to the cause of world peace.69

Four main objections were raised in Jakarta to the communique. First, no clearance was sought from the Government; this was interpreted as defiance of the authority and power of the Parliament and Government. Second, despite its generality, point two would tend to imply that the Republic was siding with the Soviet Union against the United States. Third, all the issues raised were of consequence for the Soviet Union, not Indonesia, and hence a Soviet diplomatic victory. Finally, the issue of West Irian, which was the foremost concern of the Government, was not mentioned, and this incensed the Indonesian parliamentarians. For Sukarno, however, even though the communique made no mention of West Irian, he may have been satisfied with the numerous Soviet declarations made in support of the Indonesian claim. More important, Sukarno saw the communique as an instrument to force the hands of the United States and the Netherlands, for, by identifying more closely with the Soviet Union,

69. Pravda, 12 September 1956.
he hoped to achieve concessions on West Irian.  

The Suez Crisis and the Soviet Invasion of Hungary  

The second Ali cabinet faced two international crises almost simultaneously. The first was the Suez crisis which began with Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. The Indonesian Government supported Egypt's decision, and on 7 August 1956 the cabinet stated that "the government recognises the complete right of Egypt as an independent and sovereign nation to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, which is an Egyptian Company". In his Independence Day address in 1956, Sukarno also declared his solidarity with the Egyptian people and government. On 29 October, Israel invaded Egyptian Sinai, and on the following day, French and British forces invaded the canal zone. The Indonesian Government condemned the invasion as 'an aggression' and called on the governments of Israel, the United Kingdom and France "to cease their attacks immediately and to withdraw their forces from the territory under the sovereignty of Egypt". The second crisis was the Soviet invasion of Hungary on 5 November 1956. On the following day, the Ali Government passed a resolution 'regretting' that 'the process of democratization' in Hungary had been 'arrested'. It also 'regretted' the 'intervention of the Soviet Army' and 'urged that peace be quickly restored' so that 'the Hungarian people be given complete freedom to determine the form and composition of their government'.

70. This was most clearly indicated when he defended his actions in Moscow by arguing that the object was "to lead us to the satisfactory completion of this thus far unfinished task of ours to build our nation from Subang to Merauke,...,remember this part[West Irian] of Indonesia is still smarting under Dutch colonial rule". See Harsono, Op cit, p.154.
73. Sastroamidjojo, Op cit, p.332.
74. Ibid, pp.332-333.
The difference in substance and tone between the statements is evident: the Indonesian Government saw the Suez crisis as a colonial issue,\(^7^5\) while the invasion of Hungary was interpreted as a 'cold war' development. A similar dichotomy could be discerned in debates in the United Nations, where the Indonesian representative described the attack on Egypt as a 'flagrant aggression' not only against Egypt but against the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, but only 'regretted' the Soviet invasion of Hungary.\(^7^6\) The two crises demonstrated the dilemmas of the 'uncommitted' nations - while both Egypt and Hungary were invaded by external powers, the Egyptian case was seen as 'aggression' by Israel, Britain and France. However, the Soviet invasion was not. This position was largely influenced by the non-aligned countries' wish to stay out of the Cold War. For Moscow, however, this was another proof of Jakarta's 'independence', which further assisted the development of their bilateral relationship.

The Separatist Challenge

Sukarno's belief in the need for a strong central executive authority (which was later to crystallise into the system of Guided Democracy) coincided with the period of severe problems between the Ali Government and the military commanders in the outer islands. The issue of smuggling, which had existed since 1949, became a major problem for the government in 1956. The opposition parties, especially the Masjumi, accused the Government of treating the outer islands as

\(^{75}\) That the United States opposed the invasion of Egypt by its allies, that is, France and Britain, made it above all, a 'colonial', not a 'cold war' issue.

\(^{76}\) Wilborn, Op cit, p.223.
'step children', seen only as providers of foreign exchange for Javanese consumption. In 1956, two 'smuggling affairs' broke out involving Army Commands in the outer islands. The first was the 'Teluk Nibung Affair' in East Sumatra, which involved the smuggling of rubber and second, the 'Bitung Affair' which involved the smuggling of copra.

While the controversy between the Ali Government and the regional commanders was raging, Sukarno dropped a bombshell, when he declared on 28 October that all political parties should be 'buried'. Later, in a speech in Surabaya in November, he declared that 'Western Democracy' was unsuitable for Indonesia and advised that Indonesia should revert to its 'indigenous democracy', which was later formalised into the system of 'Guided Democracy'. Sukarno's attempt to introduce a strong central authority provoked the regional commanders to seize power in their respective territories: military commanders in North, Central and South Sumatra as well as in Sulawesi declared their independence and non-recognition of the Ali Government. These developments indicated that the Ali Government had lost control over the regional Army commanders. While on the one hand, Sukarno's Guided Democracy proposal sounded a death knell of Parliamentary Democracy and with it, of Ali's Government, on the other, the actions of the regional military commanders demonstrated that the Government had no power to control them. In view of these developments, Ali returned the government mandate.

to Sukarno, who in turn announced the formation of a 'gotong-royong cabinet' under the prime-ministership of Juanda, in April 1957.82

On the whole, the policies of the Ali Government caused a coolness in relations with the United States, which saw them as indications of Jakarta's drift into the Soviet camp. The situation was exacerbated by the Ali Government's perception of United States foreign policy under Dulles and Eisenhower as 'militaristic' and 'hostile' towards 'uncommitted states' such as Burma and Indonesia.83 On the other hand, the Soviet Union viewed Jakarta's policies with favour. The decision to establish a diplomatic mission and despatch one of its most capable ambassadors to Moscow, the rejection of SEATO, Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union, domestic policies such as 'Indonesianisation', abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the RTC Agreements were all perceived as evidence of Indonesia's 'progressiveness' in line with Mikheev's prescription of a movement towards an 'anti-imperialist and anti-colonial Asian state'.84 This was greatly assisted also by the change in the political climate in Moscow following the death of Stalin, where, thereafter, the newly independent states were no longer regarded as vestigial semi-colonial countries and instruments of 'neo-colonialists'.

The Soviet Union's approval of the Ali Government and its policies was clearly evident in its changing

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84. Mikheev, Op cit, pp.87-88.
assessment: in 1952, a Soviet writer had described Ali as an 'agent of the State Department', and yet after 1954 a complete reversal could be discerned. In July 1954, A. Kholopova argued that "the active struggle of the Indonesian people for full national independence and the efforts of the present government to pursue an independent foreign policy have aroused the ire at home and abroad". On 17 August 1955, Izvestia argued that "the government of Sastroamidjojo...had done a lot to stabilise the country's economic situation, to improve the life of the people and to ensure industrial progress". Arguing in the same vein, Radio Moscow announced in February 1957 that "the Western powers, grossly interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs, are using every means to overthrow the present government headed by Sastroamidjojo. The fact is that this Government is pursuing in the sphere of foreign and internal policy a course aimed at strengthening the country's sovereignty and national independence". These positive assessments of the Indonesian Government can be explained by the favourable reading of its policies by the Kremlin as well as the changing Soviet views of the newly independent Afro-Asian states.

Notwithstanding its support and approval of the policies of the Ali Government, the Soviet Union endorsed Sukarno's programme for a strong central executive. This was clearly evident from the various Soviet commentaries.

85. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 22 January 1952.
86. A. Kholopova, "In Indonesia", New Times, No. 28, 10 July 1954, p. 27.
87. Izvestia, 17 August 1955.
In March 1957, V. Zharov argued that "trouble in Indonesia has been brewing since the end of last year when the Lubis conspiracy was exposed. Though the attempted coup failed, Col. Lubis' accomplices, with foreign imperialist support, succeeded in organizing separatist rebellions in various parts of the country". At the same time, Soviet political analysts took great pains to deny allegations that the revolts were caused by antipathy in the outer islands to Javanese 'imperialism'. Rather, they have insisted that there was collusion between the regional commanders and the Western powers. For instance, Model maintained that "the revolts were led by reactionary army officers who had close liaison with the Right-wing political parties and the imperialists, particularly those who belonged to the SEATO bloc". As for the introduction of Guided Democracy, a Soviet writer argued that it was necessary to 'strengthen the state system and unite the people' as well as to 'end the opposition's obstructionist tactics in Parliament'. This would:

- overcome the elements of political anarchy existing in the country and put an end to bickering and strife so that all the efforts of the people might be concentrated on economic reconstruction and raising the living standard. But this would have spelled an end to the big profits of the American and Dutch companies which are pumping fabulous wealth out of Indonesia. It would have meant too an end to all hopes of restoring colonial oppression in Indonesia and turning her into an instrument of imperialist policy in Asia.

90. Model, Op cit, p. 57; In 1972, A. V. Drugov argued that "the imbalance between production and consumption on Java and the other islands, inherited from the colonial period, proved to be a serious economic problem. Java, with its large population, largely depends on the exports of oil, tin, rubber, nickel, copra and other items produced in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. It was this imbalance that caused disagreements between the outer islands and Java, the administrative centre, and stimulated the growth of separatist sentiments on these islands". See Drugov, "Indonesia", pp. 219-220.
91. Zharov, Op cit, p. 11.
On the whole, Moscow's endorsement of Sukarno's foreign and domestic policies, including the introduction of Guided Democracy, was related to its perception of the Indonesian Republic as an ardent critic of 'neo-colonialism', as an opponent of American military security pacts in the region, and as a major sponsor of Afro-Asian solidarity. Added to this, Sukarno's proclamation of a 'socialist future for Indonesia' and the introduction of 'democracy Indonesian style' which included the participation of the PKI, placed Sukarno's Indonesia high in Moscow's categorization of Third World 'progressive' states.

Therefore, it was not surprising that Soviet-Indonesian relations improved with Sukarno's acquisition of executive powers under Guided Democracy. On 5 July 1959, Sukarno decreed the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and restored the 1945 Constitution, marking the return to a presidential form of government. Following this, Sukarno introduced the doctrines of Manipol-USDEK and NASAKOM, which in the process succeeded in bringing the PKI into the mainstream of Indonesian politics, but which in American eyes was merely another name for "a type of Communism guided by a would-be dictator whose leftist leanings and personal peccadilloes were becoming more widely known". On 5 March 1960, Sukarno dissolved Parliament, and on 17 August banned

93. On 17 August 1959, Sukarno declared that the struggle must be waged on the basis of unity, as expressed in the 1945 Constitution, Socialism a la Indonesia, guided democracy, guided economy and the personality of the Indonesian nation. The speech was subsequently proclaimed a political manifesto (manipol) and together with the initials of the five principles of Pancasila, gave rise to a vehicle labelled Manipol-USDEK.
94. NASAKOM is the acronym for Nasionalis (Nationalist), Agama (Religious) and Komunis (Communist) groups in Indonesian society.
the Socialist and Masjumi parties for their role in the separatist movements.96

The implementation of the Guided Democracy system and with it, the strengthening of Sukarno's executive powers were welcomed by Moscow. Trud, for instance, argued that "Sukarno's plan to improve and strengthen the state administration by the foundation of a 'collegiate' cabinet of representatives of all the national parties would strike one more blow at the USA".97 Soviet growing support for the Indonesian Republic, especially Sukarno can be explained by the following reasons: The elevation of Sukarno as the most powerful leader in Indonesia, and one who pursued anti-Western policies was one important factor. In addition, the size, population and prestige of the Republic in the Afro-Asian world made Indonesia an inviting target. There was also the increasing role of the PKI, the most powerful and the largest Communist Party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, with which Sukarno was willing to cooperate. Following the 1955 Bandung Conference, Indonesia and Sukarno were emerging as leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc and Khrushchev, after the 1956 CPSU Congress, was only too keen to establish a working relationship with the 'progressive' forces in

97. Trud, 6 March 1957; Later Soviet writings were to reverse this assessment. For example, A. Drugov and A. Reznikov, examining the country's political life in 1960-1962 argued that in that period negative trends grew stronger in all aspects of 'guided democracy'. "In home policy, the regime was rapidly transformed in the interests of the bureaucratic stratum. In these conditions, the trend to restrict the democratic rights and political activity of the working masses becomes increasingly clear. Indonesia's foreign policy also underwent negative changes: nationalism had acquired hegemonic tendencies, and the struggle for consolidating the nation's political and economic independence was increasingly substituted for foreign policy adventures". See A. Drugov and A. Reznikov, Indonesia in the Period of "Guided Democracy", (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1969), pp. 32-58.
the Third World. Indonesia's relations with the Western powers, especially the United States, were strained by Western support for the Dutch over the West Irian issue and implication in the separatist movements. Finally, there was also a growing personal rapport between Sukarno and Khrushchev. The Soviet Union's high regard for the Republic was demonstrated by the visits of President Voroshilov from 6 to 19 May 1957 and Khrushchev from 20 February to 1 March 1960, to Indonesia. In addition to committing aid, Moscow's support for Indonesia's position on West Irian was reiterated.

In June 1961, Sukarno was again invited to the Soviet Union, and the close relations between the two countries were clearly exhibited by Sukarno's remarks in the Kremlin:

> And why shouldn't we be friends with the USSR? Isn't the Soviet Union assisting us? Isn't the Soviet Union waging and leading the struggle against imperialism? And in the United Nations, isn't it helping us? And isn't the Soviet Union helping us build our industry and our armed forces? That is why, Soviet Union is our friend... You gentlemen [Western journalists] do not however, like our struggle for world peace, but the Soviet Union does. Then, why shouldn't we be friends with the Soviet Union?

The Soviet Union lavishly committed economic and military aid to Indonesia, which between 1956 and 1964 received more than US$1.5 billion in Soviet credits - more than any other Third World country except Egypt, while Indonesian leaders saw American aid as rendered in too business-like

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100. See Dua 'K' Di Indonesia, (Surabaya: Penerbitan 'Grip', 1960); I. Dajawan, Chrushitov Dan Indonesia, (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembaruan, 1960).
a fashion.\textsuperscript{103} In contrast they, and especially Sukarno, spoke of their Soviet experience with approbation. For example, Sukarno narrated his experience with Khrushchev:

I asked Khrushchev for $100 million in September 1956. It was bitter cold, yet he came out of the Kremlin into the street to embrace me, welcome me with warm words, and walk me inside personally. There were no long, cold negotiations. His finance men deliberated just long enough to determine our rate of repayments and grace period. Two minutes later, everybody said 'da', and that was it. Nor did they dictate my future behaviour before giving me my crust of bread.\textsuperscript{104}

In addition to aid, Soviet ideologues saw Indonesia as a 'National Democracy', a concept that was first introduced at the December 1960 Moscow Conference of Eighty-One Communist Parties.\textsuperscript{105} This meant that by 1960 Soviet ideologists saw Indonesia as a new type of post-colonial state which was in transition from a bourgeois democratic state to a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was also a codeword for a Third World state that was defending its political and economic independence, struggling against 'Imperialism' and its military blocs, rejecting military bases on its territory and undertaking social, political and economic policies for the benefit of the masses.

It was in this regard - its receipt of Soviet aid, its acceptance as a state ideologically compatible with the Soviet Union and its approbation of the Soviet Union - that a number of observers believed in the early 1960s that Indonesia, for all intents and purposes, was an 'ally' and in the 'Soviet camp'. Guy Pauker, for instance, argued:

\textsuperscript{103} See M. Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1958, p. 486.
\textsuperscript{104} Cited in Gindy Adams, Op cit, p. 296.
\textsuperscript{105} Pravda, 6 December 1960; B. Ponomarev, "O gosudarstve natsional'noi demokratii", Kommunist, No. 8, 1961, pp. 43-45.
Since Premier Khrushchev's visit in February 1960, Indonesia has become a major target of Soviet aid and influence and only massive Western efforts can now prevent its gradual incorporation into the communist bloc. All the instrumentalties available to the Kremlin - overt and covert, domestic and international - are concentrated on the elimination of Western influence from Indonesia, its isolation from the new nations of Asia and Africa, erosion of the will of domestic anti-communist political forces to resist capture of the government by the Communist Party and eventual alignment with the Soviet Union. What the West faces in Indonesia is not simply harassment from a group of conspirators from a great power. Indonesia has become a testing ground for the new technique of power politics, with the local Communist Party only one of the various instruments used by the Soviet state to supplant Western influence.  

The Soviet Union's 'honeymoon' with Indonesia during the Khrushchev period was clearly evident in its support for the Republic in the latter's conflict with the PRC over the issue of Overseas Chinese, with the United States over the separatist movements and with the Dutch over West Irian.

Sino-Indonesian Crisis

Following the Bandung Conference, Sino-Indonesian relations took a turn for the better. This was epitomised by the Sino-Indonesian Agreement on Dual Nationality on 22 April 1955, which stipulated that "anybody who at the same time has the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia and of the PRC shall choose between the two citizenships on the basis of his or her will". This represented Chinese renunciation of the principle of *jus sanguinis*, by which every Chinese, no matter where he is born or chooses to live, retains his original nationality and hence represented an important Chinese concession. It was aimed not merely

at improving Sino-Indonesian relations, but also at reducing the suspicions of Chinese political intentions in the region as a whole. However, due to economic, political and cultural factors, the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia continued to be viewed as foreign interlopers, squandering the Republic’s wealth at the expense of the prihunis(natives).\textsuperscript{108} In May 1959, two government decrees, aimed at eliminating Chinese economic and political influence in the rural areas, precipitated a major Sino-Indonesian crisis.\textsuperscript{109} These measures received Sukarno’s blessing when he warned in his Independence Day address that "vultures capitalists of our nation" and "foreign non-Dutch capital", which illegally supports the 'counter-revolutionaries' or "carries out its acts of economic sabotage" would be crushed.\textsuperscript{110}

The Chinese Government was placed in a dilemma, as the decrees, if not contested, would entail a surrender of the right to defend the interests of the Overseas Chinese which was unacceptable on nationalistic grounds but, if opposed, would mean defending capitalism abroad while condemning it at home, as well as straining relations with Jakarta. The Chinese dilemma was aggravated by the non-ratification of the Dual Nationality Treaty by Jakarta, and the Soviet wooing of Indonesia at a time when the Sino-Soviet rivalry was emerging into the open.

On 16 November 1959, Sukarno signed the decrees into law and the West Java Military Commander immediately

began to remove Chinese traders from the villages in his region. It was apparent that the Army was using the issue to check the PKI's activities and to disrupt the party's scheduled Sixth National Congress. The PKI was placed in a dilemma: to support the anti-Chinese measures would bring about a break with Peking, and to oppose them would mean isolation on an issue where the Government enjoyed widespread popular support. As a way out, the PKI condemned the Army's forcible removal of Chinese as a "plot of the counter-revolutionaries to disrupt Sino-Indonesian relations", but at the same time stated that the Government had the sovereign right to issue the decrees.\footnote{Mozingo, \textit{Op cit}, p.167.}

Once the Army began forcible removal of the Chinese, Peking publicly condemned the action, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta encouraged rural Chinese to ignore the removal order. Soviet writers were later to describe this as Peking's attempt to incite 'civil disobedience'.\footnote{Ibid, p.162.} On 10 December, Peking launched a campaign to recall the Chinese home, in an apparent attempt to 'punish' Indonesia economically.\footnote{Agung, \textit{Op cit}, p.430.} By mid-1960, some 136,000 had left for the PRC and Taiwan: this caused severe economic problems in rural Indonesia, as the Chinese had a near monopoly of retail activities.\footnote{G.V. Astafyev and A.M. Dubinsky, (eds.), \textit{From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy}, (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1974), p.76.} However, by April 1960, the PRC started a diplomatic retreat, as it realised that it could not win. Apart from the economic burden caused by resettling the returned Overseas Chinese, Peking realised

\footnote{Mozingo, \textit{Op cit}, pp.171-173.}
\footnote{Ibid, p.175.}
that continued friction over the issue would only harm its position in Indonesia, the PKI, and the Overseas Chinese, and benefit the anti-communist elements in the country. It also realised that it had very little leverage on Indonesia, as it could not influence Jakarta to rescind the anti-Chinese measures. At the same time, following the 'Tjimahi affair', Sukarno intervened and forced the Army leadership to cease its anti-Chinese pogroms. In April 1960, the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta dropped the repatriation campaign, and on 10 April Chou En-lai announced that "a reasonable all-round settlement of the Overseas Chinese question could be arrived at". Even though formal agreement was reached only in April 1961, the crisis ended by August 1960 when Sukarno exhorted, that for the sake of national economic programmes and progress, no groups in the country should do anything to harm the atmosphere of cooperation.

Even though Sukarno later dismissed the Sino-Indonesian crisis as merely a 'psychological war', it marked an all time low in relations between the two countries since 1949. At the height of the crisis Khrushchev visited Indonesia, displaying the growing warmth between the two countries. In addition to declaring Soviet support for the 'liberation of West Irian', Khrushchev extended US$250 million in credits to shore up the Indonesian economy, at a time when Peking was attempting to sabotage it by

117. On 3 July 1960, two Chinese women in Tjimahi were killed by soldiers when they resisted being forcefully evicted from their homes. Sensing that the Army Command had gone too far, Sukarno had the West Java Military Commander transferred to Central Sumatra.
120. Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984 in Jakarta. During the Sino-Indonesian crisis, Roeslan was the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council.
recalling the Overseas Chinese. It is reasonable to hypothesise that one important consideration influencing Peking to terminate the crisis was the prevention of further Soviet inroads into Indonesia at its expense. Even though no mention was made of the Sino-Indonesian crisis, Soviet declaration of support for the people and government of Indonesia was implicitly support against Peking. For instance, Khrushchev declared in Bandung, "Our sympathies are with the Indonesian people who are striving to strengthen their independence, to be full masters in their own house, to dispose of all that they have created with their own hands". It is also revealing that on 16 April 1960, Peking released "Long Live Leninism", the Chinese interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, which officially precipitated the open challenge to Moscow for leadership of Third World Communist Parties. In this context, since it was more important to maintain good relations with Indonesia, to have united goals in expelling Western influence in Southeast Asia and to check the growth of Soviet influence and presence in Indonesia, Peking decided to forgo its efforts to protect the Overseas Chinese. At a time when Jakarta was confronted with Western support for the Dutch over West Irian and the separatist movements, and Peking's hostility due to the Overseas Chinese question, the net result was to push Indonesia closer towards the Soviet Union.

121. This appraisal was brought up in the writer's discussion with Roeglan Abdulgani.
123. Mozingo, Op cit, p. 185.
The Separatist Challenge

The separatist revolts which began in 1956 climaxed after the introduction of Guided Democracy. In addition to financial and autonomy considerations, the inauguration of Guided Democracy was regarded as further evidence of the growing centralization of power in Jakarta and Java, at the expense of the outer islands. On 10 February 1958, the rebellious commanders in Sumatra delivered an ultimatum to the Juanda Government, demanding that 'communists' be expunged from the Government. The Government rejected this and began military preparations to quell the rebellion.\(^\text{124}\)

A new dimension was added to the crisis when the United States Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles, indirectly expressed his sympathy for the rebels' cause.\(^\text{125}\) In a testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 26 February 1958, he declared:

...we would be very happy to see the non-communist elements who are really in the majority there exert a greater influence in the affairs of Indonesia than has been the case in the past, where Sukarno has moved towards his so-called 'guided democracy', which is a nice sounding name for what I fear would end up to be Communist despotism...I think that there is a fair chance that out of this revolt will come a curtailment of the trend toward Communism.\(^\text{126}\)

This amounted to encouraging the rebels against the Central Government and was seen in Indonesia as a blatant interference in its internal affairs. This was also the start of a series of developments that were to link the United States with...
the rebels. Dulles’ testimony was also revealing as it indicated the frame of mind in the State Department on the developments in Indonesia. First, it was believed that the communist influence was predominant and that Indonesia was moving towards Communism. Second, the revolt was interpreted as a clash between communists and anti-communists. In the words of Howard Jones, "the fact that Sukarno was sheltering, even nurturing the expansion of the Communist Party, that the base of Communist strength was in Java, and finally that the rebel leadership was solidly anti-communist, lent colour to the conviction widespread in Washington that the major issue was the communist issue". This American perception was largely responsible for the dual approach of maintaining formal relations with Jakarta and, at the same time, emphasising its support for the anti-communist forces in the outer islands. This, according to Jones, "would have the advantage of enabling communications to be established with those elements in the outer islands opposing the central government, so that in the event of Java being suddenly lost to Communism, the outer islands might be salvaged".

At the same time, Dulles toyed with the idea of offering belligerent status to the rebel government.

On 5 March 1958, the government forces under the command of General Nasution launched their operations against the rebels, and on the tenth, the rebels’ capital fell to the Government forces, effectively putting an end to the movement in Sumatra, even though the insurgency

127 Jones, Op cit, pp. 76-77.
128 Ibid, p. 78.
continued until March 1960. The focus of the separatist movement shifted to Sulawesi when the rebels declared a government in Menado in May 1958; and this rebellion continued until June 1960. The Government forces scored a double victory in operations in Central Sumatra, for not only was the back of the rebellion broken, but more important, fresh evidence of United States' assistance to the rebel forces was acquired. According to General Nasution, American arms and ammunition had been airdropped, but this was denied by the American Ambassador in Jakarta and by Washington.

In view of the insurgencies, the Indonesian Government urgently requested arms from the United States in mid-1958 but this was rejected on grounds that it would "not contribute to a peaceful solution of the internal problems [in Indonesia]." This rejection exacerbated the deteriorating United States-Indonesian relations and forced Jakarta to look for alternative sources of arms. Hence, on 7 April, the Government announced that it had signed agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for the purchase of small arms, jet fighters and Soviet-built bombers.

The State Department condemned the transaction, accusing Jakarta of turning to "the Communist bloc to buy arms for possible use in killing Indonesians who openly oppose the growing influence of Communism in Indonesia."
On 16 May, Sukarno stated that "we have ample proof that foreign states are illegally supplying the North Sulawesi rebels with arms, instructors and pilots." 136

The Foreign Minister, Subandrio, was more specific:

The United States' intervention in the domestic affairs of Indonesia is against the interests of the US itself because this kind of intervention will lead to similar actions by other countries.137

Even though this was denied by the State Department, enough circumstantial evidence was acquired to implicate the United States: modern American weaponry that was airdropped to the rebels; the American-made anti-aircraft systems that were recovered in the Pekanbaru area [Central Sumatra] and later, the shooting down and capture of Allen Pope, an American pilot who had flown from Clark Air Field in the Philippines, on 17 May 1958.138 Of greater significance was the direct implication of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the rebellion. This was later confirmed by Roger Hilsman, the Director of the State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Kennedy Administration, who admitted that "when you considered things like CIA's support to the 1958 rebellion, Sukarno's frequently anti-American attitude was understandable".140

The regional revolts, and the United States implication in them, marked a low point in United States-Indonesian relations and greatly contributed to the Republic's tilt towards the Soviet Union. This was because in contrast to Washington, Moscow fully supported Jakarta diplomatically and with materiel. The Soviet Government was alarmed by the regional revolts, fearing a direct American involvement in them. On 14 March 1958, Khrushchev declared:

The Soviet people cannot but pay attention to the imperialist intrigues in Indonesia. Why are the imperialists interfering in the domestic affairs of this country and organising plots? That cannot be tolerated. The Indonesian people should be left alone to do as they see fit and no one has the right to impose his will or way of life on them. 141

On the same day, the Soviet Government released a statement expressing concern and support for Indonesia:

Expressing the unanimous view of the Peoples of the USSR, the Soviet Government resolutely condemns the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of the Indonesian people and their aggressive actions against the sovereign Republic of Indonesia, and declares that all responsibility for the dangerous consequences of this will wholly and completely fall upon the governments of these powers. The Government of the USSR expresses the hope that the powers which are responsible for the situation that has developed in the area of Indonesia, the United States first and foremost, will heed the voice of reason, and will cease to interfere in the internal affairs of the Indonesian Republic. 142

At a time of great anxiety in the Republic, especially when it was widely believed that the United States was out to bring about the downfall of the Government, Soviet statements of support were reassuring and largely explained the growing sympathy the Indonesian leaders had.

141. Cited in V. Perov, "The Situation in Indonesia", International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 5, May 1958, p. 47.
for the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was the American refusal to supply arms in the first place which provided Moscow with its first opportunity to transfer arms to the Republic through its Eastern European allies. Finally, United States' implication in the regional revolts provided the primary impetus for the ratification of the September 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union to provide Indonesia with credits worth US$100 million, indicating explicitly that the growing Soviet-Indonesian cooperation was to a considerable extent a reaction against Washington's policies toward Indonesia.

The West Irian Crisis

On 29 November 1957, the UNGA rejected for the fourth time an Indonesian draft resolution on West Irian and this was an important factor influencing Jakarta to consider 'other means' to regain the territory. On 2 December 1957, Juanda's Government ordered a twenty-four general strike to demonstrate its displeasure at Dutch policies and continued occupation of West Irian. On the following day, workers in the Central Office of the Dutch shipping line, KPM, took over the company, and similar action was repeated at a Dutch trading company, Geo Wehry. On 5 December, the Government closed all Dutch consulates in Indonesia and expelled their staff, froze all profits of Dutch companies and requested all Dutch citizens, numbering 40,000, to leave the country, except for those involved in essential services. On
13 December, all the seized Dutch enterprises were placed under the Army's control. Taken as a whole, the measures marked a turning point in Indonesia's policy towards the Netherlands in its struggle over West Irian. These measures were lauded by Soviet commentators who argued that "control was established over the Dutch enterprises in order to prevent attempts by the Dutch companies to disorganise economic life. The Dutch companies shared in the subversive machinations against Indonesia and control over them will undoubtedly strengthen her security".  

At the same time, a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, was established in February 1958 under the command of General Nasution. The Dutch had been building up their military strength on the island and had 2500 ground troops and 1500 marines. In April 1960, the Dutch Government despatched the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to West Irian: this was interpreted by Indonesian military leaders as 'gunboat diplomacy', but to Sukarno represented a 'very hot-headed and provocative action'. In July 1960, in an address to the Supreme Advisory Council, Sukarno announced that the struggle against the Dutch would have to be waged 'with all means'. On 17 August, Jakarta severed diplomatic relations with The Hague, and at the same time the President belittled the previous governments for adopting a policy of negotiations with the Dutch.

147 Zharov, Op cit, p.8.
149 Ibid; Wilborn, Op cit, p.311.
150 Tas, Op cit, p.224.
151 Wilborn, Op cit, p.315.
In October 1960, Nasution left for the United States to purchase arms, in order to make credible the policy of 'other means'. The United States was Nasution's first choice because of his anti-communism, his desire to procure modern armaments, his wish to balance the growing Soviet-Indonesian relations and to use the United States to pressure the Dutch. However, the mission was a failure, as the United States refused the Indonesian request, largely to avoid antagonising the Dutch and to indicate neutrality in the dispute. This only reinforced Jakarta's belief that Washington was siding with the Dutch, as all the latter's weaponry emanated from the United States. The net consequence of the United States' decision to reject the Indonesian request was to force the latter further into a dependency relationship with the Soviet Union. As Howard Jones admitted later, "Indonesia never approached the Communist bloc for either economic or military aid until it had exhausted the possibility of help from America".

During Khrushchev's visit in February 1960, the Soviet leader publicly pledged only economic and technical aid to Indonesia. Privately, however, discussions were held on military aid, and it was agreed that arms would be supplied when the need arose. Following Nasution's failure in the United States, he led an arms buying mission to Moscow on 28 December 1960, and successfully negotiated an armament deal.

152 Interview with General Nasution on 14 April 1984, Jakarta.
153 Ibid.
154 Jones, Op cit, p. 122.
agreement, in which the Soviet leaders reiterated their support for Indonesia's 'liberation of West Irian'. For example, Mikoyan declared:

> We are principled enemies of colonialism... We quite understand the concern of the Indonesian people over the fact that colonialists still hold West Irian under their sway and we understand the Indonesian peoples' determination to eliminate this sore from the body of freedom loving and independent Indonesia. All progressive mankind is indignant over the breach of trust which the colonialists showed and continue to demonstrate, particularly as concerns West Irian.156

Following the arms agreement, Nasution declared that, "we Indonesians met real friends in Russia and an agreement highly satisfactory to both sides was reached precisely as scheduled". He also warned that the agreement would be "an instrument for defending peace and friendship in Southeast Asia: it will be a means of frustrating the activity of the colonialists threatening peace". On 6 January 1961, the joint communique read in part:

> The mission had been sent to the Soviet Union by the Government of Indonesia in accordance with measures taken to build up the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia, mainly in connection with the special situation which has arisen as a result of the tension increasing of late on the question of West Irian. The Government of the Soviet Union met the requests of the Nasution's mission concerning the purchase of new items urgently needed by the armed forces of Indonesia.158

An important aspect of the Nasution mission was the widespread publicity given to it by the Indonesian and Soviet media. Asked why this was so, Subandrio said on 29 December 1960, "we regard as very serious the military buildup of the Netherlands in West Irian". The Foreign

156. Pravda, 7 January 1961.
Minister also stressed that "Indonesia has to make this arms purchase because other countries cannot sell us the type of arms which Indonesia needs". It was also an Indonesian way of announcing to the United States that an alternative source was available, from its adversary, and demonstrated Indonesia's determination to pursue its policy of 'other means' even if it meant moving closer towards the Soviet Union. At a time when the Soviet Union was increasing its activities in the Third World and competing with the Chinese, the agreement with Indonesia represented a great diplomatic victory, which at the same time, enhanced its credentials as a supporter of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist causes.

In June 1961, Nasution led another successful arms buying mission to the Soviet Union. In addition to arms deliveries, Moscow and its Eastern European allies trained Indonesian military personnel, while Moscow maintained a military mission in Surabaya, under the command of Admiral Chernobay. As a result of the agreement on Soviet arms, Sukarno was able to declare on 17 August 1961:

At this moment, the Indonesian people feel itself strong enough to defy the Dutch imperialism in West Irian in all fields - in whatever field. The Dutch challenge in the political, economic and financial fields, we will answer promptly with an equal counter-challenge. The Dutch military challenge we will answer with a military challenge too.

The President went on to declare that "West Irian should

be liberated from the Dutch colonial rule in 1962".163
For the first time, a deadline was set, clearly indicating
that the Indonesian Government was preparing to wrest the
territory by force and the Dutch, realising that their
forces were outnumbered, began to look for a political
solution, but their efforts were rebuffed by the Indonesians.164
Pursuing the momentum of brinkmanship, Sukarno announced
on 17 December 1961 the formation of the People's Triple
Command for the Liberation of West Irian under the command
of Major-General Suharto, charged with conducting a military
campaign against Dutch-held West Irian.165 By the end of
1961, military tension had increased rapidly, climaxing
on 15 January 1962 with the sinking of two Indonesian Navy
gunboats in the Arafura Sea.166 Tension was further escalated
by Indonesian combat units' infiltration into West Irian
and a potentially explosive military conflict was in the
making in the region.167

On 8 February 1962, the Soviet Government
released a statement on the crisis:

The Soviet Government is proceeding on the basis of the
irrefutable premise that West Irian is an inalienable part
of the Republic of Indonesia. The Soviet Union has supported
and continues to support the lawful demand of the Indonesian
people and their government for the immediate reunification
of West Irian with Indonesia, for the abolition of Dutch
colonial domination on that part of Indonesian territory.

166.Ibid,p.238.
167.On 17 August 1962, Sukarno stated that "the 2000 volunteers we landed
in West Irian were soon joined by thousands of local inhabitants and
the colonialists were driven out of a considerable part of the territory".
The Soviet people regard it as their duty to help all the people who are fighting for the overthrow of colonial oppression and for the consolidation of national independence. The Soviet people are following the just struggle of the Indonesian people for the liberation of West Irian. The Government of the Soviet Union finds it necessary to point out to those circles in Holland which are responsible for the country's policy that by taking to the road of provocation against Indonesia, they are assuming a grave responsibility for the consequences which may result from this policy. In our days where a single spark may be sufficient for a big conflagration to break out, their playing with fire, no matter in what part of the world it takes place, is highly dangerous. 168

This was a strong Soviet commitment to the Indonesian Government and a warning to the Dutch.

Sukarno's decision to increase the political and military pressure placed the United States' Government in a dilemma. Since 1950, successive administrations had found it prudent not to give prominence to the issue, as there was a strongly held belief that they had nothing to profit from it. There was also strong attachment to the Dutch but no such close ties existed with the Indonesians. 169 But once the Kennedy Administration realised that the Indonesian Government was committed to taking over West Irian, it feared that increasing tension would completely force Indonesia into the Soviet bloc. According to Howard Jones, the Administration was convinced by June 1962 "that war was just around the corner, for we in the embassy knew what was happening as a result of an operation that was

169. This sentiment was clearly expressed, in an interview with the writer, by Alphonse Laporta, Deputy Director for Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C., on 31 January 1964.
then top secret - direct observation by U-2 planes. The Kennedy Administration feared that a new war in the Pacific would not only provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to extend its influence but, more dangerous, could lead to a confrontation between it and the United States, as an ally in NATO of the Netherlands. Continued tension and possibly a military clash over West Irian would only strengthen the PKI's domestic support and make the country veer towards Communism. In view of these considerations, Washington was forced to change its policy. It was stimulated to do so by two other incidents: first, following the sinking of the Indonesian gunboats by the Dutch, Sukarno sent Subandrio to Washington to warn that Dutch aggression would make the communists the most powerful political force in the country; second, Subandrio relayed to Kennedy Khrushchev's pledge to send Soviet military personnel to man Soviet supplied ships, planes and weapons against the Dutch Navy if war occurred.

In Howard Jones' analysis, "only a clear threat to peace of the area, of such a nature as to force American involvement in a conflict in which we had no interest, would move Washington," and that situation emerged after the sinking of the gunboats, the Indonesian infiltration into West Irian and the massive inflow of Soviet arms into Indonesia. In these circumstances, the American President

172. Cited in Harsono, Op cit., p. 238; This was later confirmed by Mikoyan who said that "Soviet training personnel were prepared to play a combat role had the issue not been settled". See Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Countries, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 25; Also see Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 328-338.
sent his younger brother and Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, on 12 February to Jakarta and The Hague; this was followed by the mediation by Ellsworth Bunker at Middleburg (Virginia), which led to the agreement transferring West Irian to Indonesia.

In the final analysis, it was American intervention and pressure on the Dutch that solved the West Irian dispute. Despite its statement of 8 February, the Soviet Government privately encouraged the Republic to seek a military solution.\textsuperscript{174} In fact, on 1 January 1962, a Soviet political commentator, Lev Skomorokhov exhorted that:

\begin{quote}
the Indonesian people were preparing for the decisive storming of the colonialist positions in West Irian. These steps are justified both morally and legally. The liberation of West Irian would be an act implementing United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples. Before this declaration was voted, the colonialists were warned that if they refused to abide by it, the people would implement it by force.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{quote}

This can be seen as some form of public encouragement for the Republic to use force. In Washington, however, it was reasoned that once hostilities broke out, it would be a no-win situation for the United States and its Dutch ally. According to Robert Kennedy:

\begin{quote}
... if hostilities were begun by Indonesia... the line would end up appearing as a struggle between the colonial nations, supported by the United States, against the new nations of the world, supported by the Communists. This was a conflict which would... over an extended period of time, be virtually impossible for us to win. The Communists would become far more entrenched in Indonesia, the anti-communists would have their position undermined, and Southeast Asia would have been encircled by
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{174} Interviews with Gen. Nasution on 14 April and Adam Malik on 16 April 1964, Jakarta.
\textsuperscript{175} L. Skomorokhov, "West Irian Will be Freed", \textit{New Times}, No. 1, Jan. 1962, pp. 22-23.
the Soviet Union and China. For these reasons, the US was vitally interested in the result of the West Irian dispute. 176

In the settlement of the dispute, it should be noted that the arms supplied by the Soviet Union were not utilised and that it was principally due to Washington that the territory was transferred to Indonesia. It would be an overstatement to conclude that the Soviet Union was pleased with the peaceful incorporation of West Irian with Indonesia. In fact, the Soviet Ambassador to Jakarta, Mikhailov, expressed privately, his disappointment to the Indonesian Government that in spite of the massive supply of Soviet weapons, the Indonesian Government 'chose an easy way out of the conflict'. 177 At the same time, the Soviet Union played down the efforts of the United States in bringing about the final solution to the problem. On 18 August 1962, Radio Moscow claimed that "the victory for Indonesian policy was brought about by the extremely widespread international support for its just struggle - the sympathy of the Afro-Asian countries and the states of the Socialist camp". 178

Similarly, in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1980, edited by Gromyko and Ponomarev, the settlement of the problem was described as follows:

The staunch stand adopted by Indonesia, which relied on Soviet assistance and the solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces, compelled the Netherlands to renounce its claim to West Irian. 179

In the final analysis, the West Irian dispute, which dominated Indonesian politics for more than twelve years after independence, had widespread implications for the Republic. It was the single issue that Sukarno utilised to mobilise mass support for himself, bring down the system of parliamentary democracy and strengthen his personal power to a near dictatorship. The issue was principally responsible for the deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian relations and with the nationalization of Dutch enterprises, not only did the Republic lose Dutch goodwill but with it, much needed capital and technical know-how. With American failure to assist the Republic and its continued professed neutrality until the last eight months, the issue provided Moscow with an opportunity not only to identify closely with the Indonesian Government and hence harvest its goodwill, but at the same time to fuel its desire to liberate the territory with the massive supply of arms. The peaceful solution of the dispute, which represented a victory for American diplomacy, meant that the Soviet Union lost not only an issue on which to support Indonesia against the West, but also troubled waters in which to fish. It also marked the beginning of troubled Soviet-Indonesian relations, which the next chapter will examine in detail.
CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER

KHRUSHCHEV, AUGUST 1962-OCTOBER 1964
This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations from August 1962 to October 1964. During this period, the Soviet Union continued to show great interest in the Third World but at the same time continued to reassess developments there. Following the espousal of the 'national democratic state' in 1960, Soviet ideologues noted that except for Indonesia, none of the countries which they claimed were approaching the goal of 'national democracy' was willing to permit the unrestricted development of local communist parties, in accordance with one of the requirements of the state of national democracy. At the same time, the 'national democracy' doctrine stated that only the working class and its vanguard were considered capable of initiating the social revolution which was required for the development of truly independent states. However, some of the very regimes which banned the activities of local communist parties also initiated radical measures of nationalization of both domestic and foreign capital and were willing to rely on the support of the Soviet bloc in any ensuing conflict with the Western powers. In these circumstances, the question which the Soviet leadership must have asked itself was: why wait for the development of strong local communist parties, if non-communist nationalist governments were willing to carry out much of the programme advocated by the Soviet Union? This directly led to a shift in policy towards the Third World, where the local communist parties were urged to play the role of 'friends and assistants' of the nationalist leaders. This was later to crystallise
into the 'revolutionary democracy' doctrine.

At the same time, it was not clear whether Khrushchev's Third World policy at this time developed essentially out of antecedent theoretical formulations such as those concerning the revolutionary potential of the national liberation movements and the transitional functions of 'national democracy' or whether the theories were largely developed to fit a policy line that Khrushchev improvised as he advanced, with the goal of exploiting opportunities to outflank and replace the Western network of alliances and to implant a lasting Soviet presence in the Third World. Nevertheless, in spite of Khrushchev's high expectations concerning the prospects of revolutionary advance in the Third World, Soviet policy in conflict situations clearly was restrained, even constrained, by the danger of escalation, especially after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis debacle. Even though Khrushchev took a strong line of support for national liberation struggles, when situations arose that might involve the Soviet Union in direct confrontation with the United States or its allies, he was rather cautious about tendering Soviet assistance in any form that might entail the danger of widening conflict or war.

Between 1960 and 1962, Indonesia was seen as a proto-type of the 'national democratic state'. By 1963/1964, however, Soviet ideologues ignored the 'revolutionary potential' of Indonesia. This change in the 'revolutionary status' was the result of developments in Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies which Soviet leaders and ideologues found unacceptable from their angle of doctrine.
or interests in the Third World. What these were and how the Soviet Union related with Indonesia during this period are examined in this chapter.

**Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Decline of Soviet-Indonesian Relations**

Following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, Sukarno announced on 17 August 1962 that his Government would henceforth concentrate on economic development to uplift the living standards of the populace and assured his people that he felt "able...to overcome the bottlenecks and the difficulties of economic problems in a short time". However, before any concrete economic policies could be implemented, the Republic was plunged into another international crisis, involving the formation of Malaysia. A former minister in the 'Gotong-Royong' cabinet informed the writer that following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, the Indonesian Army leadership became worried at the size of the armed forces and expected severe problems to result from demobilization, especially in view of the depressed economy and hyper-inflation. In order to avoid this and possibly a 'second Madiun', General Yani, the Chief of Armed Forces, worked out a plan to invade East Timor. This, maintained Yani, would absorb the oversized Army and avoid demobilisation problems. On 16 August 1962, a day after the agreement on West Irian, the Yani plan was presented to cabinet but Sukarno rejected it arguing that "he had no intentions of having a headache similar to the one caused

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by West Irian". In fact, the Republic was soon to be involved in 'konfrontasi' against Malaysia, and this may have been Sukarno's real reason for not wanting an East Timor 'headache' at that time.

The Malaysian Dispute

On 27 May 1961, in Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Prime Minister, first advanced the idea of a federation consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. One principal consideration behind the proposal was to prevent what he saw as the growing influence of Communism in Singapore - his aim was to preempt a 'Cuba' in the region. When the idea was first mooted, Indonesia did not indicate any misgivings, and Subandrio even stated in the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 that "when Malaya told us of its intention to merge with the three British crown colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo, as one federation, we told them that we had no objections and we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom".

Subandrio's declaration was, however, a tactical one because the West Irian issue was still being fought over, and the Government had no intention of alarming the United States, which was helping to settle it.

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2. Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984, Jakarta. This was confirmed by the writer in his interview with Gen. Nasution on 14 April 1984, Jakarta.
4. Tunku's fear was clearly manifested when he stated: "There is a section of the Chinese in Singapore who do not want a good government which works for the good of the people... what they want is a Communist government or a Communist-oriented government". Cited in A. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front* (New York: Praeger Pub., 1966), p. 34.
also indicated that his country had no territorial claims or designs in the region other than those which were rightly hers, namely, those territories which had belonged to the former Dutch East Indies. A change in the Indonesian Government position on the proposed federation could, however, be discerned after the West Irian settlement. During a press conference in Singapore on 27 September, Subandrio stated that "it was impossible for Indonesia to remain indifferent to Malaysia's formation because both Malaysia and Indonesia shared a common frontier". He also warned that "if Malaysia were to establish a military base in North Borneo, Indonesia would take a counteraction... If it is American, we shall then arrange for a Soviet base in our part of Borneo. I don't say that this thing will happen or even that it is being contemplated but I merely want to make it clear why Indonesia cannot remain indifferent toward the formation of Malaysia".6

The PKI was the first to exploit the Malaysian issue.7 On 6 March 1962, Aidit declared that "if we practice a policy that is counter to the concept of Malaysia, this is no different from promoting our ideas of opposing imperialism in general, since we believe the concept of Malaysia to be a concept of imperialism, which not only endangers the struggle of the Malayan, Singaporean, Brunei and North Borneo peoples, but also endangers the struggle of other

7.On 31 August 1961, in an article entitled "What is "Greater Malaysia", Harian Rakyat argued that "the disturbances in North Kalimantan posed a threat to English colonial interests. To protect military bases and economic investments, the British put forward the concept of 'Malaysia' as a trap to inveigle the peoples of Malaya, Singapore and North Kalimantan".
peoples in Asia, especially the Indonesian people." It was only after the suppression of the Brunei revolt in December 1962 that Indonesia opposed Malaysia as a matter of state policy. As in the West Irian issue, Sukarno, the Army and the PKI opposed Malaysia, but for different reasons. 

On 16 September 1963, Malaysia was officially inaugurated. Jakarta as did Manila, because of the Sabah claim, refused to recognise it, which caused Kuala Lumpur to sever diplomatic relations with both countries on the following day. On 16 September Sukarno declared his policy of Ganjang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) and on 25 September he decreed a ban on all trade relations with Malaysia and confiscation of all Malaysian property. Despite the declaration of 'Ganjang Malaysia', Indonesia's initial policy represented nothing more than a 'verbal barrage'. This changed with the establishment of the Dwikora, or Dual People's Command, on 3 May 1964, and on 17 August and 2 September 'volunteers' parachuted into Johore, in south-west Malaysia. On 3 September Malaysia protested to the Security Council about Indonesian 'aggression', which the Indonesian representative did not deny. On 17 September the Security Council voted 9-2 to condemn the Indonesian actions, but the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution.

10.For details, see Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Southeast Asia and Theories of Regional Integration,(PhD Thesis,Dept. of International Relations,Australian National University,Canberra,1975),pp.85-120.
The Soviet action should not be interpreted as a declaration of immediate or unqualified support for Indonesia's policy of confrontation. On the contrary, Indonesia's decision to launch 'konfrontasi' marked a turning point in Soviet-Indonesian relations because, unlike its earlier support over West Irian, the Soviet Union initially showed itself indifferent towards Jakarta's claim and only later altered its stance to one of qualified support. While West Irian was seen as a colonial struggle, a national liberation movement against a colonial power, Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia was viewed as a clash between two newly independent states. This principally explained the Soviet Union's different attitude to the two conflicts.

To be sure, Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia placed the Soviet Union in a difficult position. To support Jakarta's policy with the same vigour as its brinkmanship over West Irian would have incurred the following costs: it would have disturbed the detente with the United States; foreclosed the possibility of useful relations with Malaysia (and later Singapore); forced the Soviet Union to choose sides not between a colonial power and a new state but between two new states and thus incur the wrath of states such as Egypt and India that had recognised Malaysia; and finally, an open approval of Indonesia's dispatch of guerrillas into Malaysia would have the result of sanctioning the 'export of revolution', a policy the Soviets had publicly disclaimed. On the other hand, the open opposition to Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia

would have proved the Chinese contention that the Soviet Union had lost interest in national liberation movements, and hence guaranteed to the Chinese a dominant influence in Indonesia.¹⁸ That the Soviet Government did not issue an official public statement comparable to the one on West Irian, that less attention was devoted by the Soviet media on the dispute and that there were no arms transfers, not even small scale ones, were clear indications of Moscow's lack of support, even disapproval of Indonesia's 'konfrontasi' against Malaysia.

Soviet-Indonesian differences also arose over the latter's inability to repay its debt, and its decision to adopt a radical foreign policy posture instead of remedying its economic woes.

**Debt, Economic Problems and the Soviet Union**

Even before the West Irian dispute was settled, Soviet leaders and publicists had, on a number of occasions, hinted that not enough was being done towards putting Indonesia's economic house in order.¹⁹ Even though Soviet writings openly critical of the economic shortcomings started in earnest only in 1963, Indonesia's economic difficulties had been analysed much earlier. V.I. Antipov noted that the execution of Indonesia's first Five Year Plan, covering 1956-1960, was achieved under serious

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¹⁸ Ibid, p. 11.
difficulties, caused principally by the 'armed struggle with forces of internal reaction' and 'foreign capital'.

Even though the Eight Year Plan, covering 1961 to 1968, was welcomed, Soviet writers pointed out that one pressing problem pertained to agriculture and one observed that Indonesia's inability to alleviate the food problem was caused by its weak industrial sector and its one-sided development in agriculture, which resulted in it being totally dependent on the world capitalist market. The Government had also been criticised for its failure to change the system of land tenure, which was seen as the principal cause of the peasantry's woes.

Following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, Soviet writings repeatedly stressed that, of the three aims of the 1959 Guided Democracy programme, namely, the liberation of West Irian, the establishment of internal security and the provision of adequate food and clothing for the people, only the first two had been attained. Zharov blamed this on the Dutch, emphasising that in the course of "many decades, the colonialists mercilessly stripped the Indonesian economy and turned it by force to their own needs and interests. The dependence on the colonialists was so great that Indonesia could not develop without the help of Western countries". An economic survey in 1963, however, blamed Indonesia's economic hardship on the West Irian campaign, which accounted for 75 to 80

percent of the state expenditure and strongly advised that "at the present time the vital problem of the utmost importance is the stabilization of the economy and restoring the finances to health". This was endorsed by another survey later that year.

While Soviet writers in general approved of the growth of the state sector of the economy, its results had, however, been criticised. Andreyev noted that "in the most important branches of the national industry, excepting peasant cultivation, the state sector now controls more than half of productive capacity and is now the leading sector in the economy". He, however, blamed 'reaction' for the poor results, arguing that "in recent years it had fiercely attacked the state sector of the economy, trying to take revenge here for its political defeat. Reaction in the form of the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie is trying to protect its capital by means of manipulations in government enterprises, to drain them dry, and then, using the excuse of their non-profitability, to start a campaign for their liquidation".

Against this backdrop of Soviet reservations about the Indonesian economy, following the settlement of the West Irian dispute, Moscow's message to Indonesia was clear: put your economic house in order. If successful,

27.Ibid, p. 39.
28.On the anniversary of the Indonesian independence in 1963, Khrushchev and Brezhnev sent their good wishes for "further successes in the development of the national economy, social progress and an improvement in the living conditions of the people". Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 August 1963.
this would not only reduce Indonesian demands on the Soviets, but more important, it would make available foreign exchange to repay the Soviet debt. It was in this context that the Malaysian confrontation became another source of Soviet-Indonesian friction, for, because it was economically disastrous, it also meant further delay in repayment of Soviet debt. The situation was aggravated by the Soviet refusal of diplomatic and material support for the confrontation. The PRC, on the other hand, fully supported the Indonesian cause, and this brought Soviet-Indonesian relations almost to a breaking point as the PKI and the Government supported Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Jakarta, the PKI and the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Chen Yi’s (the Chinese Foreign Minister) visit to Jakarta in April 1961 marked the beginning of a rapprochement between Jakarta and Peking, following the deterioration of relations caused by the Overseas Chinese issue. The PRC’s conflict with Moscow over a whole range of issues, including the leadership of the Third World, caused her to organise an international anti-Soviet as well as anti-American front. It was in this context that there developed a growing convergence of Sino-Indonesian foreign policy objectives, that were clearly epitomised by the Malaysian confrontation. To the PRC, Malaysia represented another effort by the ‘imperialists,’ in addition to SEATO, to establish a chain

29. See Mozingo, Op cit, Chapter 7.
of anti-communist states in the region as part of the containment policy. In order to win over Indonesia to its side, the PRC not only supported confrontation but more important, played down the underlying conflicts such as the issue of Overseas Chinese. Peking's conviction in its support for Jakarta was further enhanced by the PKI's tilt towards the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

The PKI's difference with the CPSU began in the early 1960s, the major turning point being the Twenty-second Party Congress of the CPSU in December 1961. At that Congress, the CPSU publicly condemned Albania, but like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PKI refused to follow suit. However, the PKI did not follow the CCP's example of defending the Albanian Workers' Party (AWP). On 15 December, Aidit declared that the PKI did not criticise the AWP because "it did not know in advance that the party would be criticised, that the PKI believed that party differences cannot be settled by open criticisms and that the 1957/1960 Documents [referring to the resolutions passed at the Meetings of the Communist Parties] clearly indicated that problems between parties should be settled by negotiations". The PKI also disagreed with the CPSU's handling of Stalin. For instance, Aidit declared:

...it is the right of the Soviet communists to do whatever they like about their former leader, Stalin. Viewed from this angle, all the CPSU's actions towards Stalin can be considered an internal affair in which other Communist Parties do not have the right to and cannot interfere. It is impossible for other Communist Parties to be familiar with the details of the internal life of

the CPSU, just as it is impossible for the CPSU to be familiar with the details of the internal life of other Communist Parties. On the other hand, Stalin was an international figure who led the continuation of Lenin's efforts to build Socialism in the Soviet Union and he played an important role in the defeat of fascism. Being Communists and democrats, we can speak of Stalin as an international figure.

In its criticism of Stalin for the cult of the individual, the CPSU has the support of the Communists of Indonesia. At the same time, the Communists in Indonesia continue to respect Stalin, many of whose speeches and writings are still useful, for example those dealing with revolution in Eastern countries, including the Indonesian revolution.32

The PKI's stance on Albania and Stalin was indicative of the emerging differences between the PKI and the CPSU. The Chinese opposed Soviet criticisms of Albania and Stalin, and, though the PKI did not support the Chinese stance, its assessment of the situation did not entail any convergence with the Soviets either.

The PKI's differences with the CPSU escalated as a result of six other developments: Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet decision to back India in the war against China in 1962, to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, to deal with Tito despite the condemnation of him at the 1960 International Meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow, the Soviet conclusion of an arms deal with the Indonesian Army without consulting with the PKI and, finally, the lukewarm attitude towards Indonesian policy over Malaysia.33

However, it was only in October 1963 that the PKI openly backed the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following an international tour of the PRC, the USSR and Eastern Europe between July and September, Aidit declared

32. Ibid.
on his return the party's new line. This may be summed up in these terms:

The Party would adopt those aspects of Chinese international strategies which advanced the radical nationalist course that was being followed by the Sukarno-PKI alliance and that found its most militant expression in the confrontation against Malaysia. In this area, the Indonesian Communists would cooperate closely with their Chinese comrades in the interest of mutual advantage, but would present the common strategy of the two parties in their own idiom and without overt recognition of Chinese authorship. In the domestic sphere, the PKI would pursue its own strategy of peaceful penetration and pressure without regard for Chinese denunciations of the peaceful road to power. In the conflict between the CPSU and the CPC, the PKI would henceforth align itself fully with the latter against the Soviet's 'collaborationist' relationship with the United States and its attempts to intimidate parties that declined to follow its ideological lead. At the same time, the PKI would make no formal break with the CPSU. Unlike the CPC, the Indonesian Party was not aspiring to hegemony over the world communist movement, and hence it had no interest in enlarging the fissures in it; although the split had not affected the PKI adversely to any appreciable extent, the party still had reason to fear that further exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict might rebound to the advantage of those in the Indonesian governmental elite who were opposed to the current trend in the country's foreign policy and sought a return to a more independent stance or a pro-western alignment.

The PKI's denunciation of the CPSU was made more explicit when Aidit catalogued his party's grievances:

1. The Soviet Communist Party has shown egoism and commanderyship in its relationship with the other Communist Parties and has sought to prevent them from being sovereign. The most obvious case in recent years is that of Soviet Communist Party's relations with the Albanian Workers Party;

2. Following from this, the Soviet Communist Party has attempted to foist policy on other parties which are in fact harmful to those parties. It has attempted to force other parties to accept the peaceful or parliamentary roads to Socialism or the error of modern economism and has sought to stifle wars of national liberation. In other words, the Soviet Communist Party has led other parties to accept policies which lead into a cul-de-sac or destruction, not to Socialism. Previous comments of the Indonesian Communist Party have suggested that its leaders consider at least their Iraqi, Egyptian and Indian comrades to have been brought to such a situation;

3. The Soviet Communist Party has blunted the struggle to resolve the basic contradictions by treating the imperialists as seekers of peace by promoting the concept of peaceful economic competition and by putting

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a brake on the struggle of the oppressed nations to shatter the bonds of imperialism;

4. The Soviet Communist Party, in its subjectivist quest to build Communism before the demise of imperialism, has placed its own affluence and security before the needs of the international Communist movement. It has given only limited aid to the other Socialist countries and has held in check the national liberation movements;

5. The Soviet Communist Party has taken decisions affecting other Communist Parties without prior consultations as equals. The Indonesian Communist Party has cited as examples: the de-Stalinization process, the rapprochement with the Yugoslav League of Communists, the attacks on the AwP, the polemics against the CCP, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, and the ambivalence in the Sino-Indian border war. 35

The PKI, in support of the CCP, refused to attend the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow scheduled for December 1964. Instead, Aidit declared that "the PKI and the CCP are as close as flesh and blood in the struggle against the twin brothers - imperialism and revisionism. We hold that the CCP is a real beacon light in upholding Marxism-Leninism and combating modern revisionism". It was thus clear that after the settlement of the West Irian dispute, the PKI, which was the most powerful political party in Indonesia and one which cooperated closely with Sukarno, strongly opposed the CPSU and with it, Soviet policies. This was to play an important role in Soviet assessment of Indonesia as a whole, especially following Sukarno's growing criticism of Moscow's policies.

The Soviet Union, Indonesia and the Afro-Asian Conference

Another source of Soviet-Indonesian friction was Jakarta's refusal, in league with Peking, to support

Soviet participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June 1965.\textsuperscript{37} When the first Afro-Asian conference was held in Bandung in 1955, the Soviet Union was not invited. Even though it showed its displeasure privately, Moscow gave full public support to the conference. In the subsequent meetings involving the Afro-Asian conferences, the Soviet Union began pressing hard its right to participate as an Asian or Eurasian country.\textsuperscript{38} This was motivated by its desire to identify more closely with the Afro-Asian bloc that was emerging as an important force in international politics, as well as to dwarf the Chinese role in the Afro-Asian movement, an objective which became more pressing following the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

The Soviet Union made a concerted effort to participate in the Second Afro-Asian Conference, and at the April 1964 Ministerial Meeting for the Preparation of the Conference, held in Jakarta, India, which had opposed Soviet participation at the Bandung Conference, this time proposed it.\textsuperscript{39} This was, however, objected to by Chen Yi, the leader of the Chinese delegation, arguing that the proposal was improper "because as everyone knows, the Soviet Union is not an African or an Asian country". Principally due to the Chinese objection, which was endorsed by Indonesia.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} See the statement of the Chinese Government in Peking Review, No. 23, 5 June 1964.
no invitation was extended to the Soviet Union. On the issue of Soviet participation, the final communique of the Ministerial Meeting stated:

"It was proposed that an invitation be extended to the USSR. Some delegates supported and others opposed the proposal to extend an invitation to the USSR. A number of delegations stated that they needed consultations with their governments. After discussions, no consensus could be reached. Some delegations were of the view that the matter may be placed before the Heads of State and Governments of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, for their consideration. Some other delegations were against submitting the matter to the Heads of State/Governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Therefore, no agreement was reached."

However, the coup by Colonel Boumedienne against President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria on 19 June 1965 put an end to the scheduled conference, and in that regard the enterprise remained abortive. What was important was Indonesia's decision to lend its weight to the PRC in blocking Soviet participation in the conference. Indonesia had no direct interest in excluding the USSR, so its only reason to back the PRC was a quid pro quo for Peking's backing of 'konfrontasi' against Malaysia.

The refusal of Jakarta to back Soviet participation further soured Soviet-Indonesian relations: Guber argued that "the consistently increasing pro-Peking course of Indonesia was manifested in the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Afro-Asian Conference of journalists in 1963 in Jakarta on the grounds that it was a non-Asian country and in the attempt of Indonesia and several other countries to exclude the Soviet Union from the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers".

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OLDFO, NEFO, GANEFO, CONEFO and the Soviet Union

Over and above 'Konfrontasi' and Jakarta's refusal to support Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian Conference, relations between the two countries were further strained by Sukarno's attempt to realise his concept of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) as distinguished from the Old Established Forces (OLDFO), which was a manifestation of the growing radicalization of Indonesian foreign policy.  

In September 1961, at the Belgrade Conference of the Non-aligned Nations, Sukarno introduced his NEFO concept, a term referring to the Afro-Asian countries as well as the various national liberation movements that were still fighting for independence. However, the concept only became a key guide to Indonesia's foreign policy after the West Irian issue had been settled, and was clearly manifested during 'konfrontasi'.

The Fourth Asian Games were held in Jakarta in 1962, but were declared illegal by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) because Taiwan and Israel were barred from participation for political reasons. The IOC admonished that politics and sports should not be mixed, but Sukarno emphasised the political nature of all international sports, and the IOC thereupon banned Indonesia from membership. In retaliation, Sukarno launched a new project, GANEFO, the Games of the New Emerging Forces, both as a rival to the

46 G.A. Modelski, (edn.), The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy, (Canberra: Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1963), pp. 73-74.
Asian and Olympic Games and as a means of realising in part, his doctrine of NEFO. He asserted:

...that sports cannot be separated from politics. Therefore, let us now work for a sports association on the basis of the new emerging forces. The IOC have proved to be openly an imperialistic tool. Indonesia proposes to mix sports with politics and let us now establish the Games of the New Emerging Forces... against the Old Established Order [as represented by the IOC].

This culminated in the staging of the first GANEFO Games in November 1963, with 3000 athletes from 51 countries. The PRC, itself not an IOC member, fully supported the scheme, and financially bore the main brunt of the games. The Soviet Union was embarrassed by the entire enterprise, even though it was made the European Vice-Chairman of the Games, as it feared its participation would jeopardise its Olympic status. However, to avoid offering the PRC a new forum to launch polemics against the Soviet Union and at the same time to win Afro-Asian support, a delegation from the Soviet Communist Youth Organization, Komsomol, was sent to the Games.

At the Preparatory Conference of GANEFO, the Chief Soviet delegate, Evgeniy Valuev, expressed his disapproval of the IOC’s banning of Indonesia:

The Soviet Sports Organization consider such recommendations as an attempt to exclude one of the largest countries of Asia from the Olympic Movement as an international[sic] pre-arranged tactic of imperialist circles to weaken the joint front of progressive forces of the whole world in the struggle against Imperialism, Colonialism, for peace and social progress.

...the Sports Organizations of the Soviet Union express their positive attitude to the organization of these Games and consider them an important contribution to the further development of sports in Asia, Africa and Latin America and in Socialist countries as a means of consolidation of progressive forces in the struggle against imperialism and and colonialism, for peace and friendship among the nations.51

This statement is revealing as it showed the Soviet dilemma: on the one hand, nothing was said about Soviet support for GANEFO, so as to preempt any adverse reaction which might jeopardise Soviet Olympic status; on the other hand, the Soviet Sports Organizations endorsed GANEFO and criticised the IOC’s decision on Indonesia, thus demonstrating support for the Indonesian cause and at the same time neutralising any attempts by the PRC to make undue capital out of the Games. The Soviet participation was presented as 'people to people diplomacy', to prevent any embarrassing encounters between the IOC and the Soviet Government. The Soviet dilemma was well reflected by a TASS statement on the Games:

The nature of the activities of Soviet representatives in the International Olympic Movement is determined by the spirit of internationalism, the sense of great responsibility to the progressive forces of the world, to the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Realising the necessity of strengthening the unity of the world sports movement, the Soviet Youth support the idea of the GANEFO, which as conceived, does not stand in opposition to the Olympic Games.52

While Sukarno’s objective was to rival the OLDFO, in this case the Olympic Movement, the Soviets, in order to prevent any clashes with the IOC, depicted the Games

as being in accord with the Olympic spirit. This was also stressed by Yuri Torsuyev, a member of the Soviet Youth delegation to the Games, who stated that the "Games do not compete with the Olympic Games but somehow widen the arena of sports meetings and serve as a means of strengthening the solidarity of progressive forces".

Following the success of GANEFO, Sukarno next concentrated his efforts on CONEFO, the Conference of the New Emerging Forces, which the Chinese supported and agreed to finance, as well as assisting in the construction of the CONEFO Building in Jakarta. However, throughout the Khrushchev period in office, the Soviet Union did not declare its support for the project, indicating its disapproval of what was perceived as Sukarno's growing 'leftism' in league with the 'Maoist regime'.

**Soviet-Indonesian Relations into the Abyss**

An Izvestia editorial on 14 April 1964 admitted that relations between the two countries were not 'normal':

It is well known that both inside the Republic and beyond its border there are certain quarters which oppose Indonesia's friendship with the USSR. But their efforts aimed at hindering the great process of the international rapprochement of the two people are doomed to failure. Soviet-Indonesian relations have withstood the tests of joint anti-imperialist struggle. The Soviet Union has repeatedly rendered moral, political, diplomatic and military aid to Indonesia. This happened during Indonesia's armed clashes with the colonialists in the period 1945-1949, in the period of rebuffing foreign intervention in 1958, during the suppression of the anti-Government rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi and during the liberation of West Irian. The Soviet peoples for their part highly appreciate the

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54. See Harsono, Op cit, p.287.
support the Indonesian people gave to the Soviet Union's anti-imperialist and peaceable policy.55

It is important to note the timing of the editorial, which was on the second last day of the Ministerial Meeting preparing for the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Jakarta, and it can be argued that it was part of the Soviet Government's 'signal' to Jakarta to view its case favourably. Secondly, the editorial's omission of any reference to Malaysia was a revealing indication of Soviet reservations, at a time when Indonesia was conducting its 'crush Malaysia' campaign.

In June 1964, Mikoyan visited Jakarta, and, in contrast to previous Soviet reticence, he repeatedly declared that Malaysia was a 'neo-colonialist plot' and that the Soviet Union fully supported Indonesia's policy of confrontation.56 For instance, in a speech at a mass rally in Jakarta on 25 June 1964, Mikoyan declared:

Malaysia offers an example of neo-colonialism camouflaged by independence. This artificial state was created by British capital in an attempt to maintain its control over the area. The Soviet people are heart and soul with the fighters against neo-colonialism. They are with the working people of Indonesia in their struggle to eliminate such survivals of colonialism and neo-colonialism as Malaysia.57

Mikoyan also pledged military assistance to Indonesia, but this failed to materialise, thus further aggravating relations between the two countries.58 Nevertheless, Mikoyan's visit can be seen as an attempt to dissipate Soviet-Indonesian

55.Izvestia, 14 April 1964.
misunderstanding and to counteract Chinese political and diplomatic successes in Indonesia. Regardless of these motivations, the net result appears to have been worsened relations, especially in view of the Soviet rescinding of their pledge to deliver arms to Indonesia.

That relations between the two countries had deteriorated rapidly since August 1962, was not in question. This was most vividly apparent in Indonesia's exclusion from the list of states which Soviet ideologues described as, 'revolutionary democracies'. At a time when the Soviet leadership was pinning its hopes on 'revolutionary democrats' rather than the communist parties, Indonesia's ideological downgrading was clearly evident in spite of the fact that Sukarno was avowedly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist and the presence of a powerful communist party. This state of affairs can be explained by the increasing radicalization of Indonesia's foreign policy, its support for the PRC in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the cool PKI-CPSU relations, Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia, Jakarta's refusal to support Soviet participation in the proposed second Afro-Asian Conference and the inability of Indonesia to repay its massive debts to the Soviet Union. Thus, it was obvious that Soviet policies in the Third World, as far as Indonesia was concerned, were already in trouble even before Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964. His removal and the inauguration of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership provided the opportunities for the revamping of Khrushchev's Third World policies and this had far-reaching consequences for Soviet-Indonesian relations.
CHAPTER FIVE

SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS UNDER BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN, OCTOBER 1964 - OCTOBER 1968
This chapter examines Soviet-Indonesian relations under the leadership of Brezhnev-Kosygin from October 1964 to October 1968. This period would be discussed in the light of two broad phases. The first, covering the period from October 1964 to October 1965, details Moscow's relations with Sukarno's Indonesia. The second phase, from October 1965 to October 1968, covers relations between the two countries after the attempted 'coup' of October 1965. How the 'coup' transformed Indonesia and how this in turn had consequences for Soviet-Indonesian relations will be analysed under this section.

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its relations with the Third World and this was facilitated by its willingness to provide considerable economic and military aid on concessionary terms. On 14 October 1964, Khrushchev was ousted, and his dual role as leader of the Party and Government divided between Brezhnev as the First Secretary of the CPSU and Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The new Soviet leadership called for greater realism and sophistication in its relations with the Third World. This was largely the result of its growing awareness of the domestic problems of the new states, the buildup of extended and unfulfilled aid commitments and the extensive Soviet courtship with Third World states which had yielded only minimal political dividends.

Following Khrushchev's overthrow, Soviet policy in the Third World was gradually rationalised, with the optimism of the late 1950s and early 1960s being questioned and indeed, replaced by a growing realism concerning prospects for political and economic development. The new leadership recognised that prospects for the introduction of socialism in the majority of Third World states were bleak and that the instability of many of these societies meant that leaders favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union might well be overthrown by 'reactionary elements'. In these circumstances, the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective leadership did not expect much from the Third World nationalist leaders, was more reluctant to back up Third World states in their territorial disputes or their confrontation with the West and at the same time began to look pragmatically upon right-wing states. This also led to a new approach to the Third World. The Kremlin maintained that while the Third World was an important element in its foreign relations, nevertheless, its short run priorities there were reduced until the economic situation in the Soviet Union allowed it to focus greater attention or improved prospects of substantial revolutionary gains merited renewed Soviet initiatives. It also called for the broadening of the base of Soviet relations with Third World states along the lines  

2. In fact, G. Kim and A. Kaufman suggested that in the light of the relatively backward political and economic conditions prevailing in most Third World states, the skipping of stages and premature radical steps in the transition to scientific socialism were inadvisable, and that the revolutionary process in the Third World would therefore turn out to be much slower than once thought, perhaps spanning 'an entire historical epoch'. See G. Kim and A. Kaufman, "On Sources of Socialist Conceptions in Developing Countries", World Marxist Review, December 1971, p. 128.  
oriented towards achieving possible revolutionary gains in the long run. A major Third World plank at this juncture was to reduce the backlog of unfulfilled aid commitments by holding new pledges to the minimum while fulfilling previously granted credits. The new leadership also adopted a more detached attitude towards the Third World with a view to impressing upon these states that Soviet economic and political support should not be taken for granted but rather demanded as a *quid pro quo* than had hitherto been the case. Finally, the policy was to recover ideological initiatives concerning the evolution of the national liberation movements, especially in the face of the Chinese challenge, by developing a clear ideological stance founded on a more realistic analysis of Third World developments and conditions.

The new Soviet leadership continued its past policy of aid and trade but concentrated in a few areas, which were chosen according to the consideration of political-strategic importance rather than the criteria of 'progressiveness' alone. In fact, even in cases where previously pro-Soviet regimes had been replaced by moderate and less friendly governments, the Kremlin attempted to maintain business-like relationships in order to protect its past investments. Over and above economic factors such as debt repayment, the acquisition of new markets and raw materials, in choosing its targets in the Third World, the Soviet Union considered strategic factors such as the degree of Chinese and Western interest in a country, its importance to Soviet

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security and its ability to provide support facilities, including airports, harbours or sites for communication stations for Soviet military activities. The strategic factor was a new element in Soviet-Third World relations during the Brezhnev period.5

By the time Khrushchev was ousted, Soviet-Indonesian relations had deteriorated and this trend continued under the new leadership. The continued deterioration of this relationship should be understood in the broader context of Soviet foreign policy objectives and the factors which impinged upon Moscow's interests world-wide. Soviet-Indonesian relations during the Brezhnev-Kosygin period were shaped by developments in the Soviet Union and Indonesia, by the increasing momentum towards detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, especially after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, by the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the increased militarization of American policies in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

Phase 1: October 1964 to October 1965

During this period, Soviet-Indonesian relations were plagued by five inter-related issues: Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia, Sukarno's attempts to hold a conference of new emerging forces, Jakarta's withdrawal from the United Nations, Sukarno's endorsement of Peking's foreign policy and the PKI's support for the Chinese in

the Sino-Soviet conflict. In all these issues, the Chinese supported the Indonesians while the Soviets were either openly against or disapprovingly reticent.

A major indication of the growing closeness between Jakarta and Peking on the one hand and growing distance between Moscow and Jakarta on the other, was Indonesia's decision to leave the United Nations. Sukarno's grievances against the United Nations were not of recent vintage and as far back as September 1961, he had stated, in an address to the General Assembly, that the organization was riddled with shortcomings and should be radically transformed. His grievances escalated following the setbacks suffered by Indonesia at the United Nations, when Malaysia successfully mustered support for its case against Indonesia's 'aggression'. Though saved from total embarrassment by the Soviet veto, Indonesia's complaints were only reinforced when a number of Afro-Asian states sided with Malaysia, and the grievances came to head when Malaysia was elected a temporary member of the Security Council. On 7 January 1965, Sukarno therefore decreed, against the advice of his Foreign Minister, that Indonesia should become the only country to abandon United Nations' membership. On the following day, he denied that the decision was taken in league with the PRC, stating that "our secession from the United Nations has no connection at all with Communist China... Many quarters view that we quit the UN in an attempt to stir up the Indonesian peoples' sentiments, just as we did in the liberation of West Irian

and the holding of GANEFO, but such a view is entirely wrong". The Chinese Government was pleased with the Indonesian decision and Chou En-lai declared that "a revolutionary UN may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with the body which calls itself the UN but which being under the manipulation of US imperialism is capable only of making mischief and can do nothing good".

The Soviet Union did not approve of the Indonesian action and along with a number of Eastern bloc countries, attempted to dissuade Jakarta. On 21 January 1965, Pravda argued that "regardless of how one assesses Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, this fact in itself is evident of an abnormal situation in the United Nations". Not surprisingly, Sukarno was later to claim that the Soviet Union did not support his government's decision to quit the United Nations, maintaining that the only support he received was "in the Russian press". A later Soviet assessment strongly reaffirmed Moscow's disapproval of Sukarno's decision to quit the United Nations:

Despite the 'left-wing' phraseology the decision was couched in, it was clearly a rash, hasty move that came as a shock to world public opinion and was unprecedented in the history of the UN, evidence of the impasse that was becoming increasingly patent in the foreign policy of the Sukarno Government, and considerably lessening the chances of its getting out of this impasse. At the same time, unexpected though it was, this move was clearly prepared for by the whole nature of Sino-Indonesian...

10. See Komsomolskaya Pravda, 19 March 1967.
cooperation as it had developed over the preceding years, and their joint actions in the international sphere. Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN caused incalculable damage to the diplomatic prestige of Sukarno's Government and increased Indonesia's international isolation.13

Similarly, Moscow's position on CONEFO highlighted its skepticism of Sukarno's foreign policy. Ever since Sukarno announced his intentions to hold a CONEFO in Jakarta after the GANEFO Games in November 1963, the Soviet Union remained silent on the question. Only in mid-1965, when details were being worked out for the convocation of the conference, did the Soviet Union indicate its intention to participate. Prior to 1965, it was assumed that CONEFO was merely an idea, but after the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations, the Soviet Union realized that Indonesia was serious. When in May 1965 the conference was tentatively scheduled for August 1966, Deputy Foreign Minister K.T. Mazurov expressed Soviet endorsement on 18 May 1965 and further stated that "if Indonesia wanted the Soviet Union to participate in the preparation of the conference, it could make a constructive contribution," while stressing that the CONEFO suggestion was in line with Soviet policy which aimed "to strengthen the progressive forces in the world to destroy imperialism".14 That this was wholly a diplomatic declaration was clear to Jakarta, since both countries had very divergent views on what constituted 'Imperialism' and 'progressive forces'. Nevertheless, the motivation behind the Soviet expression of support for CONEFO included the desire to check Chinese exploitation of the proposed conference for anti-Soviet purposes and to prevent Indonesia from

13. See Astafyev and Dubinsky, Op cit, p. 78.
falling completely into the Chinese orbit. It also represented an important 'signal' from the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership that it intended to mend its fences with Indonesia.

Notwithstanding, the Soviet Union's continued ambivalence to Sukarno's confrontation against Malaysia, its failure to convince the PKI to support its position or at least to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and to convince Sukarno not to openly support Chinese foreign policy posture, gravely disturbed Soviet-Indonesian relations at a time when Moscow was reassessing its posture in the Third World as a whole. And as to where Sukarno's Indonesia stood in the Sino-Soviet conflict, was made clearly explicit on 17 August 1965 when Sukarno announced the "existence of a mighty, powerful and unbreakable Jakarta-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Peking-Pyongyang axis - uniting five countries in one purpose: to struggle against the old established order, colonialism, imperialism and to destroy Western stern imperialist influence in Asia". The 'axis' was condemned by a Soviet writer as a 'dangerous slogan' that would not only 'deprive Indonesia of her independence' but also isolate her internationally and result in 'a certain retreat from non-alignment'. Through the 'axis', maintained another Soviet political analyst, Indonesia became a 'client of China'.

The above developments would indicate that the post-Khrushchev leadership failed to improve its relationship with Indonesia, if anything, it became worse. It was in the light of this context of strained relationship that

17. Astafyev and Dubinsky, Op cit, p.79.
on 1 October 1965 a 'coup' was launched and this had widespread ramifications for relations between the two countries.

Phase 2: October 1965 - October 1968

The attempted 'coup' against the Army High Command on 1 October 1965 marked a turning point in the history of independent Indonesia. This 'coup' occurred against the backdrop of intense polarization between the left and right-wing forces, severe economic difficulties and the increasing isolation of Indonesia internationally. On the morning of 1 October 1965, the Gerakan September Tigapuluh (GESTAPU), the Thirtieth September Movement, headed by Lt. Col. Untung, a commander of the Tjakrabirawa Battalion, which provided the palace guards, kidnapped six senior Army generals: three were shot dead in their homes while the three other captives, including General Nasution's adjutant, were murdered at Lubang Buaya at the Halim Air Force Base, which was also the operational headquarters of the GESTAPU. Later, the GESTAPU headquarters announced that the 'Council of Generals' had been purged as it had planned a coup for 5 October; that a Revolutionary Council would be established in place of the Dwikora Cabinet; and that the putsch was an internal affair of the Army. A

18. It is important to briefly detail the 'coup' as it marked a watershed in Indonesia's relations with Communist countries and the West, and this was due not only to the consequences of the coup, but more important, to the perceptions at different times from October 1965 to October 1968 of the ones responsible for it.


45 member Revolutionary Council was subsequently announced. On the same day, Sukarno appointed Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudara as the Acting Chief of the Army and confirmed this in a letter to Suharto, delivered to the KOSTRAD (the Strategic Reserve Command of the Armed Forces) headquarters. In his reply, Suharto stated that retaliatory measures were being taken against the 'plotters', that the fate of the kidnapped generals was still unknown and that, as the general next senior to Yani, he was temporarily assuming command.

Forces loyal to Suharto and Nasution easily captured the installations under the occupation of the GESTAPU forces, and in the early hours of 2 October Halim Air Base was retaken and the putsch, to all intents and purposes, smashed.

On 2 October, Sukarno announced that the putsch and counter-putsch were political affairs which had to be settled immediately in the political field, a direct contradiction of Untung's claim that it was a military affair. On the same day, the PKI daily, *Harian Rakyat*, published an editorial which had gone to press on 1 October, supporting GESTAPU.

On 4 October, Sukarno attempted to downplay the role of the Indonesian Air Force in the affair and on the same day the bodies of the six generals were discovered in an unused well at Halim Air Base. Following this, rumours

began proliferating throughout Jakarta that the generals had been brutally tortured by the PKI Youth (Pemuda Rakyat) and Women (Gerwani) wings. To feed the rumours further, the Army started a mass propaganda campaign showing photographs of the dead generals repeatedly over the television and in the newspapers. Whether the rumours were true or false, they were believed by the Army rank and file and the masses, and this was an important factor in explaining the subsequent revulsion against the PKI.

On 6 October, the PKI Central Committee issued a statement to the effect that the 'coup' was an internal affair of the Army, that the PKI was not involved, and that the communists listed in the Revolutionary Council had been named without approval. To the Army and Muslim groups, however, the affair was an opportunity to settle old scores, and a nation-wide pogrom was launched against the PKI, beginning with the burning down of its headquarters and other associations linked with it in Jakarta. Sukarno's attempts to protect the PKI leaders and a number of senior Air Force officers angered the Army, and the general public was made to believe by the Army that the PKI was the 'dalang', the manipulator of the 'coup'. This also marked the beginning of the end of Sukarno's political power.

Sukarno's main reason for protecting the PKI leaders and

28. Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), p. 14; General Suharto stated after the recovery of the bodies on 4 October: "You can imagine the fury of a soldier once he learned what had happened. Perhaps, an officer can be controlled but an ordinary soldier can be very hard to restrain". Cited in Hughes, Op cit, p. 23.
29. None of the Jakarta papers published the statement. The Soviet media, however, reported it.
PKI was his desire to preserve NASAKOM, and therefore he opposed the persecution of the party.\textsuperscript{31}

On 14 October, Suharto was officially appointed as Chief of the Armed Forces, replacing the \textit{de jure} chief, General Pranoto, indicating that the counter-putsch group had won its first battle against Sukarno.\textsuperscript{32} The appointment also marked the official ascendency of Suharto in Indonesian politics. On 18 October, the Army banned all PKI activities in Jakarta, but not the party itself.\textsuperscript{33} Meanwhile relations between the Army and Sukarno continued to deteriorate, the Army being angered by his refusal to attend the generals' funeral, protective statements on behalf of the PKI and sheltering of senior Air Force officers. Following the crushing of the putsch and the PKI, Sukarno's political power was methodically reduced. This in many ways can be regarded as the real \textit{coup d'etat} in Indonesia. Untung's putsch having been more aimed at purging the Army's High Command. Suharto's counter-putsch not only crushed the Untung putsch group but obliterated the PKI, finally deposed the President and elevated the leader of the counter-putsch group to his place, though this was undertaken gradually in 'Javanese style'. On 11 March 1966, Suharto executed a \textit{coup d'etat} 'Javanese style', where Sukarno was forced to transfer his executive powers to the Indonesian Army. \textsuperscript{34} Having assumed

\textsuperscript{31} Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani on 18 April 1984, Jakarta.
executive powers, Suharto on the following day formally dissolved the PKI throughout Indonesia.\textsuperscript{35} At the 5 July 1966 MPRS (Provisional People’s Consultative Congress) Session, Sukarno’s constitutional powers were further curtailed. In foreign policy, the Congress endorsed the decision to rejoin the United Nations, to resolve the Malaysian dispute peacefully, to pursue a free and independent foreign policy, seek assurances of economic aid from the West and obtain a rescheduling of the extensive debt.\textsuperscript{36} The transfer of executive power to Suharto, which was sanctioned by the June MPRS Session, signalled the political death of Sukarno and marked the launching of the New Order. With the Army’s backing, Suharto consolidated his power, and on 27 March 1968 was sworn in as President, while Sukarno languished under house arrest until his death on 23 June 1970.

The putsch and the subsequent actions by the Army were a watershed in Indonesian history and politics, bringing about the downfall of President Sukarno, the destruction of the PKI, the rise of the military and Suharto to the pinnacle of power in Indonesia, an end to the Jakarta-Peking axis and a turnabout in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the West. In Southeast Asia, ‘konfrontasi’ was terminated, Malaysia and Singapore recognised, and Indonesia began to play an active role in promoting regional cooperation and stability.

\textsuperscript{35} Roeder, \textit{Op cit}, p. 43.
Soviet-Indonesian Relations In the Light of the 'Coup' and its Consequences

Before the putsch, Soviet-Indonesian relations had been at their lowest ebb since diplomatic representatives were exchanged in 1954, mainly because of Sukarno's pro-Peking foreign policy. In view of the cool Soviet-Indonesian relations on the one hand and the increasing military escalation of the United States in Vietnam and the growing radical posture of the PRC, manifested by the Cultural Revolution, on the other, it would be useful to sketch the Soviet response to the 'coup' and developments thereafter, as a barometer of Moscow's relations with Indonesia during this period. The Soviet-Indonesian relationship during this period can be examined in two broad phases: Phase A: October 1965 to December 1966; and Phase B: January 1967 to October 1968.

Phase A: October 1965 - December 1966

The initial Soviet response to the 'coup' was one of surprise and confusion. The Soviet media had to rely largely on Western sources for their reporting of the developments in Indonesia. On 1 October, Radio Moscow announced that "Indonesian Army units have put down an attempted coup against the present Indonesian Government. They arrested members of the so-called Generals' Council created in Indonesia with the help of the United States 37.

37. This was clearly evident in the early reportage in the Soviet media. According to Manai Sophian, the then Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow, "the Russians simply did not know what was going on in Jakarta". Interview with Manai Sophian on 13 April 1984, Jakarta.
Central Intelligence Agency, which prepared the coup. The coup was scheduled for 5 October, Indonesian Armed Forces Day. This was no more than a factual report of Untung's first broadcast at 7.20 am on 1 October. In the next few days, the Soviet media continued to present a factual account of the developments in Indonesia without commitment to any side. On 8 October, the Soviet media widely reported the PKI's denial of involvement in the putsch. For instance, Radio Moscow stated:

concerning the 30 September Movement, the Central Committee of the PKI was of the opinion that the movement constitutes an internal issue of the army and the PKI was not at all involved in it. As a result of the answers to the questions about PKI members whose names were listed in the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, obviously they were not consulted and they have not given their consent to the inclusion of their names in the namelist.

The Soviet media did not report the murder or funerals of the six generals. Instead, they emphasised the growing anti-PKI atmosphere and movement in the country.

On 11 October, Brezhnev and Kosygin sent a message to Sukarno, wishing him good health and expressing the hope that "all anti-imperialist forces would work together", as well as warning that "the reactionary forces are trying to strike a blow at the most active anti-imperialist forces". This was the first Soviet 'signal' to Sukarno that it was willing to forget the past differences; it was motivated

42. Pravda, 12 October 1965.
by the growing ascendancy of the Army in Indonesian politics, the growing anti-PKI movement and the increasing isolation of the President.

On 17 October, Izvestia made the first detailed analysis of the 'coup'. The Soviet Government newspaper noted that "reactionary elements have launched a massive campaign under the slogans of anti-communism"; that "demands have been made to ban the Communist Party and other progressive organizations"; that "the President had appealed to the country to preserve order and not to give vent to vengeance"; and that "Sukarno had urged that the NASAKOM system be preserved". Izvestia also noted that "making use of the fact that several communists were included in the Revolutionary Council and that the Communist Party organ Harian Rakyat, not having looked into the confused situation of the events of the first few days, wrote that the revolt was supported by the people, the reactionary elements unleashed a mass campaign under anti-communist slogans". The article concluded that the situation in Indonesia "continues to remain tense. Imperialists and other forces who would like to use the internal affairs of the country for their own external political machinations against the national interests of the Indonesian people are interested in its aggravation".

The Soviet Union supported Sukarno's call for the preservation of the NASAKOM system as this would mean the return of Sukarno to his preeminent position, the cessation of persecution against the PKI, the moderation of the Army's anti-Communism and the Republic's ability

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43. Izvestia, 17 October 1965.
44. Ibid.
to act as a barrier against the economic and political penetration of the West. The article also revealed the first Soviet admission that the PKI might have been involved in some ways in the putsch. However, with growing momentum in the mass killing of the PKI members, the Soviet media shifted their emphasis: their line stressed that reactionary forces, both within and without, were using the incident to further their own cause.45

Following the funerals of the six generals, a mass movement, orchestrated by the Army leadership and the Muslim parties, pressed for the banning of the PKI. On 20 October, Pravda argued that "the Right-wing forces in Indonesia are using the extreme situation which has arisen to settle accounts with their political enemies, disregarding the interests of national unity and the anti-imperialist struggle of the Indonesian people".46 On 26 October, Pravda, in its first editorial, entitled "In Defense of the Unity of the National-Democratic Forces in Indonesia", stated that:

...the only established fact is that the active force attempting to carry out the putsch was a group of conspirators made up of Indonesian officers headed by Lt. Col. Untung. The anti-communist campaign is being fanned under the proposition that the PKI allegedly participated in the 30 September Movement. At the same time, the fact that the PKI as far back as on 5 October published an official statement in which it disassociated itself from the organisers of the unsuccessful overthrow and characterised it as an 'internal affair of the army' has been completely ignored. Even if one were to assume that individual members of the leftist organizations, lending themselves to provocation, has some some sort of connection with the event of 30

September, it still does not in any way justify the repression against the three million strong PKI that achieved the deserved glory of a truly patriotic and revolutionary party. The wave of anti-communist outbreak in Indonesia causes serious damage to the unity of the national-democratic forces in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. One cannot help but see that those who attack the Communist Party and other democratic organs cause direct harm to the national interests of their country. Attempts by international reaction to accuse the Communists with a desire to split the national-liberation movement will be resolutely rejected by the world progressive public. Progressive people throughout the world know well the ideology and the strategic and tactical principles of the Marxist-Leninist parties. Political adventurism, putschism and sectarianism are foreign to Marxism-Leninism. Marxists-Leninists see in the national-democratic forces of the developing world their natural allies and consider their duty comprehensively to support them in their common struggle against imperialism and for national rebirth and social progress. Communists have always supported and continue to support a broad alliance of all patriotic and anti-imperialist forces in the national-liberation movement and are ready to conscientiously cooperate with all progressive revolutionary organizations and figures.

The editorial concluded with the note that:

...the Soviet people sincerely strive for further cooperation between the USSR and Indonesia in political, economic, cultural and other areas. The Soviet people express their confidence that domestic and international reaction will suffer a defeat in its attempts to fan anti-communist hysteria in the country, to upset the unity of the national-patriotic forces and to turn Indonesia away from the path of independent democratic development. 47

The editorial represented the first extension of ideological solidarity from the CPSU to the PKI. It was also a defense of the PKI in the face of repression by the Army. As in the 17 October Izvestia article, the Pravda editorial indirectly admitted the PKI's involvement in the putsch but attempted to distinguish between involvement of the PKI as an organization and the involvement of some of its members. The editorial also expressed the opinion

47. Ibid, 26 October 1965.
that PKI members might have been provoked by 'reactionary forces'. It is also worth noting the Soviet Union's ideological preoccupation on the matter, where "political adventurism, putschism and sectarianism" were regarded as being "foreign to Marxism-Leninism". Initially, when the PRC was blamed for the putsch, the Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin 'scolded' Manai Sophian as this was "not in line with communist tenets". Even though the Sino-Soviet rivalry was at its peak, the Soviets still 'defended' the Chinese on grounds that as communists they could not be involved in the putsch, and to accuse the Chinese communists would be tantamount to a negative reflection on the Soviet communists.48

The 'predominant line' during this period was that the 'coup' was an internal affair of the Army and that the PKI was not involved; this was clearly manifested by Radio Moscow on 27 October:

> Reactionary elements have taken advantage of the conspiracy to pursue an anti-communist campaign. They allege that the PKI was involved in the 30 September Movement. Yet it is absolutely clear that this movement was nothing but a conspiracy by a completely isolated group of officers. The fact that the three million strong PKI had nothing to do with the coup is evident to anyone who respects facts and not inventions.49

In addition to the fate of the PKI and its members, the major Soviet concern related to the course of Indonesian foreign policy. This was clearly highlighted in V. Shurygin's article in Pravda on 6 November, in which he stated, "many Indonesian leaders say that present events in the country will not influence the anti-imperialist course of the

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48. Interview with Manai Sophian on 13 April 1984, Jakarta.
state's foreign policy". He concluded, however, that "one cannot help noticing that the spreading campaign against the communists and democratic organizations in Indonesia is meeting with the warm support of the very forces who are trying to achieve changes in this anti-imperialist course". 50

Another prominent feature of the Soviet response during the early phase of the putsch and counter-putsch was the repeated attempts made to extend the hand of friendship to the Indonesian leaders. This was despite the continued persecution of the PKI, indicating that friendly state-to-state relations were not seen as necessarily incompatible with the continued persecution of the left-wing forces in the country. Thus, on 6 November 1965, in a speech on Soviet-Indonesian relations in the Kremlin, Dmitri Polyansky, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a Politburo member, declared:

> our people has always praised highly the anti-imperialist direction of its [Indonesia] policy. We believe that every people must choose the path and form of its social and national development. At the same time, the Soviet people cannot help being troubled by the fact that in certain countries which have good relations with us, an anti-communist campaign is being waged and progressive people are being arrested and thrown into prison. 51

It was clear that the last remark was directed at Indonesia though it was not specifically named, and this can be regarded as an attempt to extend a conciliatory hand to Jakarta and especially to the new leaders.  

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50. Pravda, 6 November 1965.  
51. Ibid, 7 November 1965.
On 26 December 1965, Pravda brought out its second editorial on Indonesia entitled, "Against Rampant Reaction in Indonesia". It noted that:

...this entire campaign is of clearly anti-communist nature. The brunt of the oppression is borne by the PKI and the public organizations affiliated with it. In effect, the Communist Party has already been declared illegal. All of its representatives have been expelled from the central and local organs of power and the majority of them have been arrested. Savage reprisals against many Indonesian Communists were carried out without a trial or an investigation. In recent days, the foreign agencies have reported the murder of the leaders of the PKI.

...the imperialist reactionary circles do not hide their rejoicing over this anti-communist offensive. They see in it the disassociation of the anti-imperialist forces and the undermining of the anti-imperialist front in Indonesia. They attempt to utilize the situation that has come about in Indonesia to change its foreign policy towards a rapprochement with the imperialist camp and to turn it toward reaction in internal politics.52

While it was incorrect to state that the PKI had been declared illegal - it was only suspended - the tone of the editorial demonstrated a growing harshness and concern for the fate of the PKI, especially after the reported shooting of Aidit. By the end of December 1965, it was clear to the Soviet Union that the Army was bent on wiping out the PKI, and even though the party had been pro-China since 1963, as a self-proclaimed leader of the communist bloc, Moscow could not remain silent as it witnessed its wholesale annihilation.

On 19 January 1966, Izvestia reported Brezhnev's "anxiety over the attempts of the reactionary forces and imperialism to divert Indonesia from a position of struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism".53

52. Ibid, 26 December 1965.
On 21 February 1966, Njono, one of the main PKI leaders, was sentenced to death by a Military Tribunal. On 24 February, Pravda published a statement issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU, "angrily condemning the sentence of death on Njono". It also stated that "the whole trial, which took place in an atmosphere of mass terror against the Communist Party and left-wing forces, revealed the intention of the reactionaries to deal with their political enemies." On 6 March, Brezhnev and Podgorny appealed to Sukarno to repeal the death sentence. Writing in Trud on 2 March 1966, A. Lavin condemned the 'death sentence passed by the Military Tribunal on Njono'. At the same time, however, he argued that:

The Soviet people do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but they have a right to state their attitude on certain events, particularly when they concern such a friendly people as the Indonesians, whose historic struggle against imperialism and for national independence was so highly appreciated in our country, and received moral, political and economic support in this struggle.

Significantly, on 9 March 1966, I. Antonov claimed that since 1959, the PKI had adopted the 'correct approach':

The PKI and its members have followed the party programme adopted at the Sixth Congress (September 1959) and reaffirmed at the Seventh Congress in 1962. The Party's ultimate aim, as formulated in the programme is popular government. Can this be achieved by peaceful parliamentary means? The programme says, 'This is fully possible, and we must exert every effort to translate this possibility into reality'. As far as the Communists are concerned, the peaceful, parliamentary way is the best, ideal form of transformation to 'People's Democracy' as a preparatory stage to Socialism. And if it depends upon the Communists, this is the way that will be chosen. The Party programme has nothing in common with the tactics of adventurism and conspiracy, which its enemies ascribe to the communist movement.

55. Ibid, 6 March 1966.
This declaration is important in the light of later revelations by the PKI remnants and the subsequent change in the Soviet assessment both of the PKI and of its role in the 'coup'. On 15 March 1966, Izvestia alluded to the fact that the 1965 'coup' might have been provoked along the lines of Madiun in 1948. It stated that "it could be compared to the events of 1948 when bourgeoisie and landowning circles provoked a clash between various military units in Madiun". However, in the light of developments in Indonesia and the emergence of a pro-Soviet PKI wing, this line was discontinued.

At the Twenty-third Party Congress of the CPSU held in Moscow from 29 March to 8 April 1966, Brezhnev condemned the continued repression of the PKI. Other than the need to oppose the persecution of a communist party in front of the world communist audience, Brezhnev was influenced by a number of considerations: the rise to prominence of the anti-communist Army which since March had held the reins of political power; the complete ban on the PKI; and the arrest of pro-Sukarno, leftist ministers, which signalled that the new leaders were attempting to swing the political pendulum of the country towards the right. Brezhnev declared on 29 March:

The whole of our Party and all our nation condemn the anti-communist terror in Indonesia. The reactionary forces in that country have, without trial, brutally exterminated tens of thousands of people whose only 'guilt' was their being members of the Communist Party. The persecution and banning of the

By March 1966, the Indonesian Army exercised *de facto* as well as *semi-de jure* control [nb: General Suharto was only sworn in as Acting President in March 1967]. In view of this, it was not surprising that on 16 April 1966, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* blamed the Indonesian Army for the 'reign of terror' in the country. However, the writer also argued that "armies can play a progressive role in the developing countries. This was because the part played by the army in most young countries of Asia and Africa is considerable. It is often the most real and organised force capable of playing a serious role in deciding the paths of further development".

To be sure, the Soviet Union was in a dilemma and did not really know how to handle military regimes, and this problem was compounded by the series of coups that occurred between late 1965 and later 1968. Viz. Indonesia (October 1965), Congo (November 1965), Dahomey (December 1965), Nigeria, Upper Volta and Central African Republic (January 1966), Ghana (February 1966), Togo (January 1967), Sierra Leone (March 1967) and Mali (November 1968).

In May 1965, that is, four months before the events in Indonesia, K. Ivanov, a Soviet specialist on the Third World, examined the 'new role' of the military in revolutions.

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60. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 16 April 1966.
in the developing countries and concluded that:

Armies are not walled off from revolutionary process under way among the people. The noble heart of a patriot may beat beneath an army uniform... In Egypt, Burma, Algeria and some other countries army officers formed the backbone of the revolutionary democratic forces; the army was not only the centre of patriotic resistance, but also began to play... an outstanding part in laying the basis of a new life... Nowadays, the various detachments of anti-imperialist fighters are marching towards each other; to ignore some of them merely because they wear uniform would be the height of folly. 61

However, not all Soviet writers accepted Ivanov's analysis, indicating that the Soviet leadership had not decided on the matter. This was clearly indicated in A.S. Kaufman's evaluation of the problem:

The view is sometimes expressed that, owing to the ideological and organizational weakness of the working class, the liberated countries' transition to socialism can be accomplished under the leadership of other revolutionary forces. In this context, one is increasingly often given the names of outstanding national democrats, and of generals and officers of a patriotic disposition, as representing those political and revolutionary forces which are capable of consummating the cause of the national liberation revolutions in the developing countries. Such a view of the question overlooks class relations within society; it is contrary to Marxism, and in our opinion inevitably leads to overestimation of 'strong personalities'. It also results in an exaggeration of the importance of the army. The army has its own specific forms and methods of leadership, which do not always accord with the development of democratic forms of government. 62

In spite of the differences in view, the 16 April Literaturnaya Gazeta article indicated that the Soviet Union was not averse to the rise of a military regime in Indonesia as long as it was 'progressive'. But what caused serious doubts in Moscow was the steady slide towards the Western

63. By 1968, it appears that the Soviet leadership had worked out a policy toward Third World 'military regimes'. See G. Mirskii, "Political Role of the Army in Asia and Africa", ibid, No. 6, 1968, pp. 3-14.
Hence, on 19 June 1966, Pravda reported that Japan planned to form a consortium of Indonesian creditors. It warned that this would "lead to economic and political control over the country". It also noted that the Soviet Union, the largest creditor of Indonesia, was not invited to take part in the consortium. Added to this, when the idea of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was first raised in August 1966 and Indonesia was considering joining, Izvestia warned that "such a step would be against the interests of Indonesia itself and against the people of Asian countries". This was because the proposed Association was seen to have been prompted by the Americans, partly as a replacement for the ineffectual SEATO. It was also seen to be against Jakarta's proclaimed policy of 'neutralism'.

On the twenty-first anniversary of Indonesian independence, Pravda failed to report on the ongoing persecution of the PKI. Instead, the CPSU paper stated that "the Soviet Union and other Socialist states have always supported Indonesia in its efforts to build a new life. The desire of the Indonesian people to strengthen sovereignty and the independence of its young state, liquidate economic difficulties, achieve a rise in the interests of peace, national independence and security of peoples has met and meets unfailingly the understanding and support of the Soviet people".

64. Pravda, 19 June 1966.
65. Izvestia, 16 August 1966.
Following the MPRS sessions from 20 June to 6 July 1966, Sukarno's political powers were severely eclipsed, indicating clearly that his fortunes were on the decline. This was one reason why, unlike Pravda, Izvestia chose the twenty-first anniversary of Indonesian independence to criticise Sukarno's policies. While in the past the Soviet Union had supported NASAKOM, now Izvestia maintained that:

... it did not justify itself because it remained on paper. Moreover, in recent years, not all actions undertaken by Indonesia have made a contribution to the development of world progress. Attention is drawn, for example, to Indonesia's hurried exit from the United Nations and other international organizations. Not everyone understood the change in Indonesia's relations to the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with the different social structures and the change in attitude towards atomic warfare.

On 5 September 1966, Harian Rakyat's Moscow correspondent, Anwar Dharma, was expelled on grounds of "engaging in anti-Soviet activities and maintaining an active contact with a certain foreign mission which is hostile to the Soviet Union". This was followed by the expulsion of Suar Surosa, the PKI representative in Moscow. Both were later granted political asylum in Peking, and the expulsions can be seen as another indication of Soviet attempt to establish a 'correct' relationship with the Suharto regime.

68. Izvestia, 17 August 1966.
70. See Sumartono and et al., Indonesia Under Fascism, (n.p., n.d.), p. 73.
At the same time, the evolving policies of the new leaders in Jakarta caused concern in Moscow. In September 1966, the 'Tokyo Club', a grouping of Indonesia's Western creditors, was formed, and on 29 September the Club agreed to reschedule Jakarta's repayments. In November, Jakarta lifted the controls over American and British enterprises and plantations instituted in 1964/1965, and in December the Indonesian Parliament passed a law opening the country to direct foreign investments.71 These developments were viewed as evidence of the new leadership's drift into the 'Western imperialist' camp.

The developments in Indonesia placed the Soviet Union in a dilemma: on the one hand, it was pleased to see the end of the pro-Peking PKI and of Sukarno's pro-PRC foreign policy, but on the other, the mass annihilation of the PKI and the increasing contacts between the new regime and the West, caused fear that the new leaders might join the 'imperialist camp'. In this context, the USSR found it difficult not to condemn the violent excesses against the PKI, but at the same time, Moscow was interested in courting the new leaders. If not for anything else, at least to safeguard its past investments in the country. The Soviet dilemma was well expressed by Pravda on 24 November:

...the terror waged against the Communists and other forces had seriously weakened the national forces in Indonesia. The recent Soviet-Indonesia talks (Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was in Moscow to discuss the rescheduling of Indonesian debts and an agreement was reached on 24 November 1966) in Moscow has dealt only with inter-state relations.

During phase A, the Soviet Union maintained that the putsch was an internal affair of the Army; that the PKI was not involved; that reactionaries from within and without were involved; condemned the persecution of the PKI and other progressive organizations; and at the same time, attempted to establish friendly relations with the new leaders in Jakarta. Even though a number of reports hinted that some PKI members may have been involved in the putsch, these were brushed aside as in no way implicating the party as a whole.

The initial Soviet response indicated that the putsch came as a surprise to Moscow, and the need to rely on Western sources prevented an early Soviet appraisal of the putsch and counter-putsch. Right up to the end of 1965, the Soviet Union hoped that the putsch was only an attempt by junior officers to get rid of the senior generals, and that Sukarno's power and position would not be trampled upon. However, with the steady increase of Suharto's power at the expense of Sukarno, and the implication of the President in the affair, it dawned on the Soviet leaders that the President was losing his fight to remain in power; this largely explained the various Soviet attempts to win the friendship of the new leaders and of the Army as a whole.

whole. By the end of 1966, Suharto’s political power was consolidated and the PKI obliterated as an effective political force; this principally motivated the Soviet reassessment of the Party’s role in the putsch, which marked the beginning of the second phase of Soviet response to the ‘coup’.

**Phase B: January 1967 - October 1968**

On 17 August 1966, the pro-Peking Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI issued a document entitled "Take the Road of Revolution to Realise the Tasks which Should Have Been Accomplished by the 1945 August Revolution" (hereafter this document will be referred to as 'The Road to Revolution'). In September, the pro-Peking faction of the PKI adopted a self-criticism which was subsequently published in the **Indonesian Tribune** in January 1967. The self-criticism was entitled "Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line To Lead the People’s Democratic Revolution in Indonesia" (hereafter this document will be referred to as the 'Self-Criticism').

The 'Road to Revolution' maintained that:

> The crucial struggle of the people against the armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by taking the road of armed struggle, the Indonesian people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries, as a precondition to realise their aspirations for which they have fought for scores of years - independence and freedom.73

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This clearly followed the Chinese line of armed struggle as distinct from the Soviet line of a peaceful, parliamentary path to power. In contrast, the 'Self-Criticism' focussed mainly on the 'coup' and maintained that:

The PKI's leadership had been engaged in adventurism. Violating organizational rules they easily involved themselves in the September 30 Movement that was not based on the high consciousness and conviction of the masses. And therefore they had caused the isolation of the Party from the masses of the people. On the contrary, after the defeat of the September 30 Movement, the Party leadership carried out a Right opportunist line, by entrusting President Sukarno with the fate of the Party and the revolutionary movement. These were the climax of serious shortcomings and weaknesses of the PKI in the ideological, political and organizational fields.

Moreover, 'modern revisionism' began to penetrate into our Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and adopted the lines of 'achieving Socialism peacefully through parliamentary means' as the line of the PKI. This peaceable road, one of the characteristics of modern revisionism was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of the PKI... This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh (Extraordinary) National Congress of the PKI and was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the leadership of the CPSU had been following the road of modern revisionism.

This document clearly admitted the PKI leadership's involvement in the putsch. Thus, it not only strengthened the New Order's case against the PKI, but more important, forced a change in the Soviet assessment of the putsch. In the main, the pro-Peking remnants of the PKI admitted that the Party made three mistakes: 1. it was engaged in adventurism; 2. it relied too much on Sukarno and his popularity; and 3. it succumbed to 'revisionist' influences.

74. For a comparison of the two 'lines', see Justus M van der Kroef, "Soviet-Indonesian Relations and the PKI", Pacific Community, No. 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 311-325.
76. Ibid, pp. 898-907.
The first indication that the Soviet Union had changed its line on the putsch was revealed by Pravda on 20 January 1967, when it blamed "Chinese leaders for causing many difficulties for the Communist movements in Asia. This had particularly influenced the tragic events in Indonesia." On 25 January 1967, Sergei Sevchenkov and Boris Smirnov, correspondents for New Times declared:

Repeatedly, we heard it said [in Indonesia] that Col. Untung's revolt, supported (if not inspired) by some leading figures in the Communist Party, was provoked from two sides: by Western intelligence services and by Peking. Everyone knows, people told us, that Peking had a great influence on the Communist Party's leadership and tried to impose its adventurist line on the Indonesian Communists and the left forces supporting them. This was one of the reasons why the Communist Party's leadership succumbed to the imperialist provocation. Others did not speak of provocation but they too linked the tragic events in Indonesia with the Chinese leaders' interference in her affairs. It seems clear in any case that the subversive Western intelligence activities designed to get the left forces smashed and the pressure exerted by the disrupters of the international communist movements, helped to produce an atmosphere of general distrust and suspicion, to increase political tension, divide the nation's patriotic forces and divert them from the principles of joint struggle for a free and flourishing Indonesia.

This indicated an important reassessment of the Soviet position as the claim that the 'coup' was an internal affair of the Army was no longer credible in view of the 'Self-Criticism'.

Even though Izvestia and Pravda reported on the developments in Indonesia, the former, being the Government's paper, emphasised the changes in the course of the country's foreign policy, while the latter, being the Party's paper, paid more attention to the persecution of the PKI members and examined the causes of the 'coup'. On 1 February 1967,

Izvestia argued that the United States was attempting to "shift Indonesia from its neutralist position and bring her into United States' inspired bloc in Southeast Asia". In addition, "there were certain influential people in the country who would be prepared to fall in line with the American plans". The article, however, concluded on an optimistic note, stating that "leaving aside an appraisal of the events which have happened in Indonesia, one must say that the positions of neutralism and non-alignment are a victory for the Indonesian state and people which allowed it to maintain its national independence and which cannot be wiped out by the events of September 1965".

In March 1967, Suharto was sworn in as Acting President, signifying the complete political demise of Sukarno, and it was partly because of this that on 19 March V. Verbenko, a political analyst, catalogued the 'errors' of the former President:

Sukarno began to oppose the ideas of peaceful coexistence... departed from the spirit of the Bandung Conference and slid towards dangerous adventures. He withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations, despite the fact that many countries including the USSR, believed that with all its failings, the United Nations is a real international institution for the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all its manifestations. These actions also proved detrimental to Indonesia's interests. Sukarno declared the so-called 'confrontation' of Malaysia, which ate up 80 percent of the annual budget, to be the central task of the country. The Peking leaders set these two states against each other, and confrontation fully suited them. The Indonesian economy declined. Specialists began to speak of catastrophe. Propagandists were reassuring. The country was on the verge of disaster, but the President spoke of prosperity... Sukarno spoke of prosperity and proposed grandeur projects, having no idea of the enormity

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79. Izvestia, 1 February 1967.
of the catastrophe. Historians have still to tell us how
great is the personal responsibility of Dr Sukarno for
what Indonesian had to endure.80

Soviet writers also began criticising 'Guided Democracy',
a concept which had formerly been vehemently endorsed.
For instance, Guber pointed out that "Sukarno viewed guided
democracy as a way to curb the right-wing parties, to enhance
his personal authority and to implement the ideas of petit
bourgeois Socialism". Yuri Drugov, on the other hand, noted
that Guided Democracy had many weaknesses:

The new system embodied all the elements of a regime of
personal power, although by virtue of the particular
conditions obtaining in Indonesia, this power was not
absolute. It was restricted, on the one hand, by the
presence of the influential and steadily strengthening
Communist Party, with its mass organizations, and on
the other, by the mounting role of the army, which
undoubtedly played an important part in winning and
defending independence, and had acquired by that time the
status of an influential caste with its own attitude on
the country's future development.82

During the June/July 1966 Session, the MPRS decreed
that the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology be
prohibited. In line with this, on 18 March 1967 the Indonesian
Government banned a number of Soviet publications, and this
evoked strong criticisms from the Soviet Union. On 20 March,
Radio Peace and Progress stated:

80 Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 19 March 1967; Similarly, in 1980, M. Kapitsa and N.
Maletin, writing a political biography of Sukarno, in what has been described
as the first attempt in Soviet literature to make an all-round analysis
of Sukarno, argued that "having become a closed political group linked
by personal relationships, the ruling elite headed by Sukarno objectively
impeded the development of the country and doomed it to stagnation".
See M. S. Kapitsa and N. P. Maletin, Sukarno: A Political Biography, (Moscow: Mysl
81 Guber, "Indoneziia", B.S.E., p. 242.
82 Y. Drugov, "Indonesia", p. 224.
This unfriendly act caused a feeling of misapprehension and sorrow and was a sign of the reactionaries' aspirations to impose an illiteracy which would help to purge peoples' mind of freedom-loving spirit and suppress democratic institutions. By burning Soviet books and magazines, an act reminiscent of Hitler, Indonesian reactionaries wanted to force the Indonesian people to forget their ancient links of friendship with the USSR and their joint struggle against the imperialists and neo-colonialists. In burning such literature, the Indonesian reactionaries wanted to earn the approval of the imperialists. These plans had not been worked out in Jakarta; they had been sent to the Indonesian capital for execution.  

In the same vein, Pravda warned that "the whole policy of our State is founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which has the greatest regard for the defence of the vital interests of the working masses. All states which are interested in developing friendly or simply normal relations with the Soviet Union must take this fact into account."  

Throughout 1967, the Soviet media repeatedly declared that Indonesia was being dragged into the anti-communist camp by the 'imperialists'. For instance, Yuri Sholnov, a feature article writer, argued that Indonesia's independence was threatened by 'imperialist pressures', that 'the increased power of the right-wing in Indonesia had made it difficult to pursue a non-aligned policy' and referred to 'Indonesia's plan to participate in a military and political bloc of Southeast Asian countries'. The writer, however, concluded that "these bellicose appeals by the right-wing did not meet with the approval of representatives of the present rulers of the country."  

it appears evaluate Indonesia’s role in the modern world more soberly and with greater responsibility. Recently, Indonesian leaders have often talked of regional economic and cultural cooperation among the states of Southeast Asia. Such cooperation could, under certain circumstances play a positive role.  

On the forty-seventh anniversary of the PKI in May 1967, Pravda criticised the party for its 'errors':

> It is still up to the Indonesian Communists and the entire international Communist movement to provide answers to many questions relating to the recent tragic events in Indonesia. Why and how did the 3,000,000 strong party suffer a severe defeat? Why and how were hundreds of thousands of its best sons exterminated and the overwhelming majority of the Party’s leaders - members of the Politburo and members of the PKI Central Committee - put to death without trial and investigations or thrown into prison? The answers to all these questions must be given first of all by the Indonesian Communist themselves so that lessons necessary for the future can be drawn. It follows from documents [Self-Criticism] circulated recently by various groups in Indonesia that the Party leadership violated provisions of the Party programme and in the years preceding the events of September 30 had committed serious mistakes, which weakened the unity of the Party and led to its defeat.

This criticism was inevitable in the light of the 'self-criticism' of the PKI remnants. It was also useful, from the Kremlin's viewpoint, to explain its shift in assessment on the 'coup' and developments thereafter.

Following the passing of the death sentence on Sudisman, one of the five principal leaders of the PKI from 1951 to 1965, who was arrested in December 1966, Pravda declared that "it represented a normal action of the anti-communist forces in Indonesia who have embarked on the..."

85. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 12 April 1967.
86. Pravda, 28 May 1967.
physical destruction of their political opponents". The paper also claimed that "the evidence of the accused and witnesses showed only a very small group of people in the PKI leadership knew of the 30 September Movement. The very course of events after 30 September clearly bears witness to the fact that the broad mass of Communists, including even members of the Central Committee, were caught unaware and knew nothing of what happened in Jakarta during the night of first October 1965".87

In November 1967, the Chinese paper Hongqi (Red Flag), published an editorial, entitled "People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime", declaring:

The Political Bureau of the pro-Peking PKI criticises the revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and points out that this counter-revolutionary line has caused serious damage to the Indonesian Communist Party and brought tremendous losses to the Indonesian peoples' revolutionary movement. Modern revisionism, with the leadership of the CPSU as its centre, is the greatest danger to the international communist movement and to the Indonesian Communist Party as well. The bloody lesson of the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in Indonesia shows once again that the revisionist road to peaceful transition advocated by the leadership of the CPSU is the road of burying the revolution, the road to exterminating the Party and the people.88

This criticism was largely in response to the increasing activities of the pro-Soviet remnants of the PKI based in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and where there were suggestions that a new pro-Soviet PKI was about to be established.89 On 7 November 1967, these remnants published

87 Ibid, 5 August 1967.
88 Cited in People of Indonesia, United and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime, pp. 3-4.
a document in Prague entitled, "Appeal of Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia: For a Sound Revolution" (hereafter to be referred as 'The Appeal').

It noted that, prior the outburst of the September 30 Movement, two negative tendencies afflicted the Party:

1. "Increasing penetration of bourgeois ideology into the Party's organism and the shifting of the Party's policy on to an adventuristic footing";

2. "Increasing symptoms of the Party's leadership turning bourgeois, which made them lose the Party identity, caused them to sink down even deeper into the bog of self-conceit and bureaucracy and become drunk with their achievements".

The document also pointed out that even though the Party made quite a few gains from cooperation with Sukarno, the cooperation was fraught with some negative symptoms:

Not infrequently when analysing our political successes, it was hard to see which of them were the result of our struggle and which were achieved by borrowing from the President's prestige. Moreover, the Party was being increasingly misled by illusions with regard to Bung Karno which resulted in the loss of its political independence, the inexorable gravitation towards ideological prostitution and the alignment of its theory and practices with those of Bung Karno. This in turn, led to utter confusion in interpreting Marxism-Leninism and to complete departure from it.

The Party's cardinal mistake in the field of theory was the thesis of 'subordinating class interests to national interests'. Compliance with the thesis make it appear that, allegedly, class interest contradict national interests. In actual fact, this was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism which teaches us that the interests of our class encompass the best interests of the entire nation.

It is thus clear that the thesis of the priority of national interest over class interest, the attempts to subordinate the Party programme to the Political Manifesto, the United Action to the NASAKOM Alliance, the attempt to make Marxism the property of the nation - all this is but a reflection of how deeply petty-bourgeois ideology became rooted in the body of our Party.

The document further pointed out that:

...the Chinese comrades were not averse to capitalising on the positive and negative characteristics of President Sukarno; while in doing so they aligned themselves with our Party’s leadership to ensure the victory of their petty-bourgeois concepts of political hegemony in Asia and Africa and to replace the policy of international anti-colonial front and struggle for peace with the 'Jakarta-Peking Axis'.

On Soviet-Indonesian relations, the document noted:

Although, officially, our relations remained good and friendly, in actual fact, we followed the wrong path by treating as our enemies those whom we believed to be 'revisionists' matching in their viciousness and evil the pillars of world imperialism. Each critical thought or argument which failed a priori either to justify or accuse the sides was increasingly strongly condemned as an inconsistent class position reeking of revisionism, to be naturally exorcised from the Party. Not only did we fail to stand on our own and strengthen our identity, but rather we became even more ideologically, politically and economically dependent on a certain party [the CCP]. What is more, that Party was responsible for turning the Indonesian Revolution into a gaming table for its political gambles.91

The document proceeded to argue that "the weakening and disappearance of friendship between the two major parties [CPSU and PKI] while the advantages of this friendship had been tested over the decades, caused serious damage to our movement due to the fact that we were forced to subscribe to a lopsided point of view. This is what led to the 1965 tragedy." More important was the document's analysis of the 'coup':

...the September 30 Movement was spearheaded against the coup, a movement that overthrew the Council of Generals and was at the same time a revolutionary movement aimed at the establishment of State power that will be a harbinger of a People’s Democracy. In reality, this movement developed into a military adventure and was failed.

The primary cause of the defeat of the September 30 Movement was not that the enemy confronting us was too strong, or that we lacked courage or that our fighters lacked courage. The subjective causes lie in recklessness on the part of some leading Party quarters, in the ideological, political and organizational muddle-headedness, which was the objective result of the

91. Ibid, pp. 45-52.
92. Ibid, p. 52.
petty-bourgeois ideology of revolutionism, in excessive revolutionary zeal, a desire to achieve a quick victory, in forcing the development of the revolution which miscarried in gambling on the balance of forces, in indulgence in adventurist fantasies, etc.

The document listed two political mistakes that were perpetrated by the Party's leadership during the 'coup' itself:

1. The organisers of and immediate participants in Untung's actions failed to take into consideration the need to draw the masses to their side in order to secure the support of progressive forces within the country. After the successful seizure of Radio Republic Indonesia, they did not offer their people a positive socio-economic platform, nor did they call upon peasants and workers to watch for the dangers of the conspiracy of the Council of Generals. Instead of issuing a decree for the creation of people's armed forces, a decision was made to give fresh boost to the military. Following all this, it was hard to count on the support of the masses for the September 30 Movement;

2. When all the political leaders denied their participation in the Revolutionary Council, the leadership of the Party made a belated statement to the effect that it was wrong to believe that the Party had taken part in the September 30 Movement. However, the Party leadership did not refute that it had supported the purge carried out by Untung and his followers.

The 'Appeal', as in the 'Self-Criticism', admitted the involvement of the Party's leadership in GESTAPU. Both the documents blamed the Party's deviation from Marxism-Leninism as the cause of its debacle. Both the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese PKI remnants blamed their close association and subordination of their interests to Sukarno and his ideas. The 'Appeal', however, manifested two major differences: in addition to the above, it blamed bourgeois and Maoist ideologies for the Party's deviation from its programme. In practical terms, this referred to the divergent Soviet view of the Party's relations with the nationalist regime and the way of carrying out revolution, from the one put forward by the Chinese. The 'Appeal' attributed the Party's defeat to its inability to improve the organizational and ideological

93. Ibid, p.64.
level as well as its excessive reliance on peasant-based revolution. In contrast, the 'Self-Criticism' attributed the debacle to the lack of stress on the education and training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish revolutionary bases. The 'Appeal' condemned the notion that revolution can only be brought about by 'force of arms' and instead stressed the 'peaceful road'. The 'Self-Criticism' rejected the 'peaceful path' and exhorted that the Party should "firmly hold to the general law of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries". The different diagnosis and therapy can be explained and appreciated in the context of the ongoing Sino-Soviet controversy over the role of the Party and State in Marxism-Leninism.

In January 1968 A.B. Reznikov, in an article entitled, "Two Documents: Two Courses of Communist Movements in Indonesia", in Narody Azii i Afriki, analysed the 'Appeal' and the 'Self-Criticism'. He argued that the 'Marxist Self-Criticism had deviated from the line of the international Communist Movement", and that it was "widely known that the leaders of the PKI, after the return of a Party delegation from the PRC in the autumn of 1963, came out against the line of international Communist Movement, which had been fixed at international forums of Communist Parties with the participation of members of the PKI. In connection with this, the PKI leaders reviewed many Party decisions. After the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the PKI (December 1964), the leaders of the Party adopted
the position of the Mao Tse-tung group, while maintaining formal contacts with the fraternal parties which supported the positions of the world Communist movement, fought against them. In 1965, the Party leadership had gone so far that it ceased to conceal its subordinate position in respect of the Mao Tse-tung group. On 25 May, it publicly announced: 'The PKI and the CCP have joined together in the struggle against the twins of imperialism and modern revisionism like finger nail to finger...We believe that the CCP is an example for us in defending Marxism-Leninism and in struggling against modern revisionism'. Concluding his comparative analysis, Reznikov argued that:

One thing at least is clear: the 'Politburo', that is, the pro-PRC group recommends to the Party the same programme and strategy by which the PKI leaders, between 1963 and 1965 led the Party to inevitable collapse... the 'Marxist-Leninist Group of the PKI' advocates the line which for a long time gained the Party growing political influence in the country but which was later rejected by its leadership... one cannot help drawing the conclusion that the course on which the 'Politburo' is pushing the Indonesian Communist does not accord with the tasks of reviving the Party. The group which published the 'Self-Criticism' is, under the flag of 'self-criticism', striving to assert and carry out, even more persistently than before 30 September 1965, the same political line which brought the Party to a heavy defeat... As for the document "For the Correct Path of the Indonesian Revolution", then this in our view gives the Communists a basically correct orientation. This document can be useful for working out a programme of action with which to try and raise the Communist Party of Indonesia from the ruins.

Reznikov's analysis of the shift in 'line' towards the PRC by the PKI from 1963 to 1965, is correct. It should, however, be noted that his argument contradicted Antonov's claim of March 1966, which insisted that the Party made no deviation and that it followed the Party's programme adopted at the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, which recommended

95. Ibid, pp.48-50.
a peaceful, parliamentary road to power. Reznikov’s article should, however, be analysed in the context of heightened Sino-Soviet rivalry, and it was clear that one of its objectives was to demonstrate that the Soviet ‘path’ was not only rational and superior but also more relevant for the PKI in contrast to the Maoist ‘road’. Additionally, Reznikov’s article should be viewed in the context of the changed Soviet position on the ‘coup’, which no longer saw it merely as an ‘internal affair of the Army’.

Throughout Phase B, the Soviet Union blamed the PRC for the ‘coup’. This was reaffirmed on 8 March 1968 when Radio Moscow stated:

...progressive public opinion and the Indonesian Communists waging an underground struggle, agree that, except for the handful of PKI leaders, who were influenced by Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung himself and his group should bear a major share of the responsibility for the destruction of the PKI and the martyrdom of tens of thousands of its members.96

While the pro-Peking faction of the PKI (and hence the PRC) blamed the Party’s leadership, especially Aidit, for the disaster of 1965, Soviet commentators have evaluated Aidit’s role in a more balanced manner. On 30 June 1968, the forty-fifth anniversary of Aidit’s birth, an article by P. Afanasyev entitled ‘Valiant Son of the Indonesian People’ in Pravda argued:

...the Party under Aidit’s leadership made serious mistakes in the early 1960s and the Party had to pay a heavy price for the deviations. However, in criticising the Party leadership and Aidit personally for these errors, Indonesia’s Marxist-Leninists at the same time reject with indignation the attempts of the Mao Tse-tung group and its supporters in Indonesia to lay the blame for these events entirely on Aidit, the distinguished leader of the Indonesian Communist Movement... He was courageous to the

end. Indonesian reaction is still trying to smear the name of this valiant man. But its attempts are vain. The name of Comrade Aidit—distinguished revolutionary—is linked forever with the history of the national-liberation movement, with the struggle of the Communist Party. 97

Between July and August 1968, the Indonesian Army carried out 'search and destroy' operations in East Java and successfully routed the PKI remnants. The Soviet Union blamed the PRC for this, because China had encouraged the communists to adopt a strategy of 'people's war' and 'the tactics of surrounding the cities with villages'. 98 On 14 September 1968, Pravda stated that "these new and tragic results once again clearly bear witness to the great harm that disregard for the revolutionary teaching of Marx and Lenin and its substitution by the ideas of Mao Tsetung group will bring to the Communist Movement". 99

In October 1968, A. Belinkiy and B. Ilichev published an article in Kommunist, entitled "Some Lessons of the Events In Indonesia". Both writers stressed that two errors were responsible for the destruction of the PKI: its total support for Sukarno and its pro-Peking orientation:

The unconditional support for Sukarno and his exaltation by the leadership of the Communist Party, and the training in this spirit of the whole three million strong Party, chiefly peasant in composition, gradually led to the ideological disarmament of the PKI and relinquishing of class positions, and the replacement of proletarian slogans by petty bourgeois nationalist ones... they opposed the line of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, promoted the thesis of the impossibility and undesirability of building Communism in the USSR before the worldwide and complete victory over imperialism, supported the Maoist slanders about the 'restoration of capitalism' in the USSR and rejected the thesis of the decisive role of the Socialist system.

97. Pravda, 30 June 1968.
They tried to educate the Indonesian communists in an anti-Soviet spirit, filling the columns of the Party press with reprint of the malicious, slanderous articles from the Chinese and Albanian newspapers. Such activity resulted in a sharp deterioration in the links between the Indonesian Communist Party and the international Communist movement. On the eve of the events of 30 September 1965, the Party was in a state of complete isolation from the other fraternal parties.

The writers concluded:

The PKI's cooperation with Sukarno, who had achieved authority among the people by his long struggle for Indonesian independence was completely natural. However, the course of the PKI leadership of total and unconditional support for Sukarno, which resulted in the disappearance of the revolutionary struggle for the everyday and basic interests of the proletariat and all workers at a time when their conditions were deteriorating all the time, was incorrect.

During Phase B, the Soviet response totally ignored the earlier thesis that the 'coup' was an internal affair of the armed forces. Following the publication of the 'Self-Criticism' and the 'Appeal', where both the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions admitted a degree of involvement of the Party leadership in the putsch, the Soviet Union was compelled to alter its 'line'. However, Moscow added a new twist to the argument by blaming the 'Maoists' for influencing the PKI's leadership and thus for being principally responsible for the disaster. At the same time, PKI's close relationship with Sukarno was reassessed and partially blamed for the tragedy that befell the Party.

On 4 July 1968, Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, declared in Jakarta that relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia had entered a 'new stage'.

This followed the agreement signed with the Soviet Ambassador in Jakarta to reschedule the repayment of Soviet credits. By October, however, Soviet-Indonesian relations had reached a crisis point, and an anti-Indonesian campaign was launched by the Soviet media. The immediate cause of this reversal was the rejection by Jakarta of the Soviet Government's plea for clemency for Njono and Sudisman. On 11 October, Pravda published a statement from the CPSU:

The continuing reprisals against the Communists and other democrats in Indonesia show that the Indonesian authorities have no intention of heeding the wrathful protests of world opinion or the promptings of their own people's conscience and honour. For three years now, the reactionaries in Indonesia, who have chosen anti-communism as an instrument of their policy, have been following a line aimed at the physical extermination of those who think differently. The history of man has not previously witnessed such mass extermination of people in time of peace for ideological reasons. The Communists of the Soviet Union, together with the entire Soviet people pay tribute to the memory of our class brothers who have perished and brand with shame these monstrous crimes. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet public have repeatedly and resolutely demanded an end to the bloody reprisals against the Communists and other patriots of Indonesia. The CC CPSU declares that the unwillingness of the Indonesian authorities to heed these justified protests and demands and to heed to the voice of world public opinion shows that the upper hand in Indonesia is being taken by forces which seek to complicate relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to renounce the traditional friendship between the Indonesian and Soviet peoples in order to curry favour with the imperialist powers and to win the approval of the darkest reaction.

On 12 October, the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Podgorny, appealed directly to Suharto:

Soviet people were profoundly shocked by the intention to carry out the death sentence. It is difficult to avoid the impression that this decision was made under the pressure of those forces, including forces outside Indonesia, who are not sated with the blood of hundred of thousands of Indonesians who perished after 30 September 1965 and want more and more victims, caring little about the serious

damage that these executions will do to the national interests of Indonesia, its international prestige and its cooperation with Socialist countries.  

Jakarta not only ignored the Soviet pleas but viewed them as 'intimidations'. Njono and Sudisman were executed on 29 October and on 1 November Pravda declared:

They were killed because the reactionaries, the imperialist agents in Indonesia, bourgeoisie, the landlord usurers and embezzlers tried to take vengeance on the leaders of the Party which was always a great threat to them. They could not forgive the Communist Party for the fear which all the black forces experienced and still experience at the very word 'Communist'.

The anti-Indonesian campaign continued until early 1970, and this was not simply because Jakarta rejected Moscow's clemency plea. Rather, it opened the floodgates for criticisms of the Indonesian leadership over a whole range of issues: its anti-communism, its pro-Western orientation, its persecution of the PKI, its criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, its membership in ASEAN, its steady integration of its economy into the Western capitalist system and decision to open the country to private enterprise. Two related factors aggravated Soviet-Indonesian relations, namely, the Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe after the 'Prague Spring' and the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviet Union adopted a 'hard line' towards its allies in Eastern Europe and this was manifested in its growing ideological rigidity. Over and above Soviet problems in Eastern Europe, the Chinese accused the Soviets of having provided arms and a deferment of debt repayments, all of which facilitated the Suharto regime's suppression of the PKI.

106. Ibid, 12 October 1968.
108. Pravda, 1 November 1968.
In short, following the putsch, the new leaders brought the country into the Western camp in spite of their proclamations of pursuing a 'free and independent foreign policy', and in this regard represented a 'loss', especially annoying to Moscow, in view of the vast Soviet economic and military investments in Indonesia. Moreover, even though the Soviet Union was Indonesia's largest creditor, it could do little to influence its behaviour, because of the availability of Western credits. The combination of these factors explained the Soviet hostility towards Indonesia in October 1968.

In February 1969, the pro-Soviet PKI faction published a document in Moscow entitled "The pressing Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia". Nothing new was put forward: the points raised in the 'Appeal' were merely reiterated. It, however, criticised the 'Self-Criticism' for attempting to impose the 'Chinese path' on the Indonesian Communists and for condemning Aidit for the Party's past mistakes.

Sukarno died on 23 June 1970. On the following day, Pravda described him as 'an outstanding personality of the Indonesian liberation movement' and emphasised that 'he favoured a foreign policy of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism'. Radio Moscow, however, used the occasion to describe his mistakes:

Sukarno's greatest mistakes included the confrontation against Malaysia and the isolation of Indonesia from the world revolutionary process. Faced with violent social conflicts at home, Sukarno

could not escape from his illusion that contradictions could be solved artificially by unifying all political elements, both Rightists and Leftists within his NASAKÜM concept. When in the autumn of 1965 there was a Right-wing plot which wiped out his illusory concept of a 'reconciliation of classes' in Indonesia, the late Sukarno, being a leader of the petty bourgeoisie, did not have the courage to take a resolute stand... In the end, he fell victim to his vacillation at a time of violent class struggle in Indonesia.112

Despite the growing hostility towards Indonesia, the Soviet Union did not introduce any new interpretation of the 'coup' in the period covered by the study, accepting that it was staged by 'progressive junior officers' with the backing of some PKI leaders and that the PKI was inveigled by Peking.113


113. See Y. Alyoshin, "Half Century of Struggle", New Times, No. 21, 26 May 1970, p. 25; It is important to point out that in 1984, R.A. Ulyanovsky, added a new twist to the Soviet interpretation of the 1965 events, where for the first time in Soviet literature, Sukarno's involvement in the affair was alluded to: "In 1965, the President and supreme commander of the armed forces learned of the existence among the top generals of a right-wing conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the head of state or severely limiting his powers, a basic revision of the entire political course, the elimination of left-wing forces, above all, the communists and left-wing nationalist movements, and at a rapprochement with the imperialist West. Sukarno remained true to himself; he took the decision to make do with measures at the top, having limited as far as possible, the scale of the conflict. He did not relate the fact of the conspiracy to general class processes in society and hoped to avoid bloodshed by depriving the conspiracy of its leaders with the help of loyal officers of the palace guard, the army, air force and navy. The President and his supporters tried to enlist the support of the leadership of left-wing forces. But here, once again, his petty-bourgeois fear of involving the masses in political struggle played its fatal part. Sukarno and the officers on whom he relied did everything to ensure that the participation of the members of left-wing parties, above all the Communist Party, was reduced to auxiliary activities, guaranteeing the operation of the military units, and the whole conflict under no circumstances got out of control. Unfortunately, ... the small group of Party leaders who were initiated into Sukarno's plans went along with the President's cause and did not show the necessary political independence, but accepted the secondary, dependent role which it was allotted under these plans and did not appeal to the people to save the republic from the threat from the right". See R.A. Ulyanovsky, Fighters for National Liberation: Political Profiles, (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1984), p. 71.
In this final section, a summary of the main developments in Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968 is provided. This is followed by an assessment of Soviet gains and losses in Indonesia, the uniquenesses of its involvement there and finally, the major contribution this study has made to our understanding of the subject.

Soviet-Indonesian Relations, 1945-1968: A Summary

This study has examined the development, rise and steady decline of Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968. The Soviet Union's attitude towards Indonesia under Stalin can be studied through a number of clearly differentiated stages. It manifested indifference towards the August Revolution due largely to the lack of information, its preoccupation with its wartime gains in Eastern Europe and its own post-war rehabilitation. The Soviet Union showed interest in Indonesia only after the landing of British and, later, Dutch troops in Java - this was more to exploit the opportunity to condemn the British as the advance guard of the Dutch, aimed at restoring Dutch colonial rule, even though it had been agreed at the Teheran and Potsdam Conferences that the British were to administer the surrender of the Japanese troops in Southeast Asia. Moreover, with the growing tension in the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the clashes between the Indonesian nationalists and the Allied forces provided the Soviet Union with a case of a 'just war' of 'national liberation'. Soviet support and endorsement of
the Indonesian Republic at the United Nations should be understood in this light. It was also a convenient issue with which to embarrass the United States, then a 'cold war' adversary, which had hitherto presented itself as an anti-colonial power. In many ways, the period from the landing of the Allied troops in Indonesia in late October 1945 up to the first Dutch 'police action' in July 1947 can be regarded as one of Soviet support, wholly through diplomacy, for the Republic.

Following the setting up of the Commission of Good Offices [CGO], a fundamental change occurred in the Soviet attitude towards Indonesia. The Soviet Union continued to support the Government of Amir Syariffudin, which came to power in June 1947. However, Moscow showed its reservations about the CGO, largely because it was excluded from it, and thus denied the opportunity to influence the course of events in Indonesia. Moreover, it was also a juncture for the adoption of a hardline foreign policy, following the announcement of Zhdanov's 'two camps' doctrine.

Following the downfall of the Amir Government and the rise of Hatta's in January 1948, Moscow adopted a dual posture towards the Indonesian Republic. While supporting the 'Republic' in principle, Moscow condemned the Hatta Government as a 'right-wing agent of Washington'. This was largely engendered by Hatta's pro-Western stance, manifested in his decisions to omit the FDR from his cabinet, reject consular relations with the Soviet Union, brutally suppress the Madiun revolt, and finally conclude the Round Table Agreements in spite of Soviet opposition. Even though the
Soviet Union did not veto the setting up of the CGO and most of its activities for fear of being accused of impeding the solution of the Indonesian Problem, it clearly showed its opposition to the committee's achievements, whether it was the Renville Agreement or the Round Table Agreements. The only occasion when the Soviet Union exercised its veto on the Indonesian Question was when the Security Council was evaluating the achievements of the CGO in December 1949, following the conclusion of the agreements in The Hague. By then, the committee's activities were over, and the Soviet veto had only symbolic significance.

Following Indonesia's independence in late December 1949, cool state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union continued, especially under the cabinets of Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman. This largely represented a continuation of the chilled relations since January 1948 which were caused by the various Indonesian Governments' anti-communist policies and their pro-West orientations. The situation was exacerbated by Moscow's condemnation of the three governments, as well as the Stalinist belief that the new states were 'neo-colonies' of the West. Relations only improved during the Wilopo cabinet when concerted efforts were made to exchange diplomatic representatives as well as to improve trading relations.

In evaluating Soviet relations with Indonesia during the Stalinist period, it is important to bear in mind that Indonesia's significance to Moscow was only
opportunistic in nature. Moscow had no intrinsic interests in the Indonesian archipelago other than to embarrass the Western powers and impede their activities there. That was the principal reason why the Western powers created the CGO, a device to reduce Soviet interference in Indonesia. Following the 'internationalization' of the Indonesian Question by the Soviet Union in February 1946, the Indonesian leaders [other than the FDR, which did not play a crucial role in the Indonesian Revolution] looked towards the United States to assist the Republic in achieving its independence because the leadership was aware that only Washington had the clout, influence and interest to force the Dutch to relinquish their colony. In this context, the Soviet Union was viewed as a secondary actor, and right up to Stalin's death its role remained secondary.

With the inauguration of the Wilopo cabinet, the gradual improvement of state-to-state relations was discernible. It was, however, during the prime-ministership of Ali Sastroamidjojo that Soviet-Indonesian relations improved dramatically. Following the death of Stalin, Moscow reassessed its policies toward the Third World, viewing it as a 'zone of peace'. At the same time, the United States began to establish military alliances in West and Southeast Asia, as part of its containment strategy, and in order to foil this, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev made great efforts to court countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, Burma and India, which opposed the intensification of the 'Cold War'. In addition, the policies of the Ali Government of
rejecting SEATO, curtailing Western economic and political influence and vying for leadership of the Afro-Asian world, as shown by the convocation of the Bandung Conference, were indications to Moscow that Indonesia was an important Third World state which was 'anti-colonialist' and 'anti-imperialist'. More specifically, the West Irian dispute, in which the Western countries were seen as being in league with the Dutch, provided Moscow with an opportunity to present itself as a supporter of oppressed and disadvantaged Third World states such as Indonesia against the avaricious Western capitalists. The Soviet support for the Indonesian Government against the separatist movements can also be viewed in the same light.

In the context of this growing momentum, the highest point of cordiality in Soviet-Indonesian relations was reached under Khrushchev, from mid-1957 to mid-1962, a warmness that has not been witnessed before or since. This period saw the visits of the Soviet President and the CPSU Secretary-General to Indonesia, and the commitment of Soviet economic and military assistance to an extent not found elsewhere in the Third World, except Egypt. Diplomatically, the Soviet Union was the principal supporter of the Republic, and on issues such as the foreign intervention in the separatist movements and West Irian, no country backed Indonesia as did the Soviet Union. In fact, a number of Western scholars regarded Indonesia as being part of the Soviet camp, and in Washington Sukarno was viewed as a communist or at least a crypto-communist.
It was also under Khrushchev that relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia deteriorated. The turning point occurred immediately after the settlement of the West Irian dispute, a settlement in which the Soviet Union played no role, in contrast to its principal adversary, the United States. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Moscow became interested in establishing a more predictable relationship with Washington, marking the early phase of detente between the two superpowers. It, therefore, began to encourage Indonesia to emphasise economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to desist from adventurism. However, Sukarno embarked on 'konfrontasi', wreaking havoc on the country's economy. Estrangement with Moscow was worsened by the Sino-Soviet conflict, since contrary to the Soviets, the Chinese encouraged and supported Sukarno's radical foreign policy. Issues such as debt repayment, Indonesia's refusal to back Soviet participation in the Second Asian-African Conference and the PKI's tilt towards the Chinese, further damaged relations between the two countries.

This was the state of Soviet-Indonesian relations which the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership inherited in October 1964 and no headway was made in improving relations with Jakarta. If anything, relations were worsened by the dramatic events of 1965 in Indonesia. Generally, the Soviet Union adopted a reactive stance, especially after GESTAPU. The 'coup' was a watershed in the history of independent Indonesia, and it occurred at a time when the Soviet Union
was reassessing its role in the Third World. In some respects, the Soviet leadership welcomed the post-GESTAPU developments, which included the abandonment of the pro-Chinese foreign policy, the elimination of the pro-Peking PKI, and the easing of 'konfrontasi', which allowed the Soviet Union to develop its relations with Singapore and Malaysia without inhibitions. The new regime was less concerned with nationalistic ideology than Sukarno's, and this created hopes that Moscow would be able to come to some form of understanding with Jakarta, especially since the Soviet Union was Indonesia's largest creditor.

However, the Soviet attempts to normalise relations with the new leadership were hampered by a number of factors: First, even though the Cultural Revolution in China provided Moscow with an opportunity to erode Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union discovered that Jakarta's anti-PRC policies did not mean that it would welcome the Soviet Union. Instead, the new leadership saw Communism in general as to be condemned and feared, and even though Moscow played no role in GESTAPU, its position as the leader of the communist bloc ensured Jakarta's maintenance of a distance from it. Second, in direct reversal of Sukarno's policies, the new leadership concentrated on the rehabilitation of the economy. For this, foreign capital and firms were welcomed, all foreign enterprises denationalized and the non-capitalist road of development abandoned. Third, the new leadership proclaimed a non-aligned foreign policy, but this was more apparent than real, because Jakarta attempted to maximise its economic options and overcome its political
isolation by increasing its cooperation with the West. This was clearly manifested when Indonesia joined ASEAN, which Moscow initially saw as a military pact set up by the United States to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. In short, the Soviet Union saw the new leaders in Jakarta changing their pro-Chinese leaning for a pro-Western one. In the period under survey, the Soviet Union under Brezhnev-Kosygin failed to improve its relations with Indonesia after GESTAPU. If anything, relations worsened and Moscow demonstrated its hostility towards the new leadership by labelling it a 'fascist regime', by taking an uncompromising line on debt rescheduling negotiations and finally by launching a year-long campaign against the Jakarta government for persecuting the 'progressive forces' and being a 'puppet of Western imperialism'. This was, however, mainly a response to Jakarta's anti-communist, pro-Western domestic and foreign policy.

On the whole, the overthrow of Sukarno's government, the large scale blood-letting against the PKI and its sympathisers, the new Indonesian leadership's upgrading of economic and political relations with the West, the adoption of anti-communist posture both domestically and in foreign policy and the support of American policies in the region, especially in Indochina, indicated clearly that since October 1965, Indonesia was lost to the West. Some writers have argued that the developments in Indonesia since October 1965 represented a victory for the Soviet Union in that the Peking-Jakarta 'axis' was revoked.¹

¹See Rodolfo Severino,Jr., "Soviet Policy Towards the New Order in Indonesia", Pacific Community, No.8, Autumn 1971, p.75.
If that can be regarded as a victory, then the net consequence of the 'coup' must certainly be judged as a total loss, because the rise of right-wing Army officers to the pinnacle of power in Jakarta led to a complete shift of Indonesian domestic and foreign policies and with it, increasingly hostile Soviet-Indonesian relations. This certainly cannot be evaluated as a Soviet victory. Even though the estrangement and break between Jakarta and Peking must have been welcomed in Moscow, Indonesia’s increasingly warm relations with the West were obviously unwelcome for in practical terms Indonesia merely changed its external alignment from one bitter adversary of the Soviet Union to another, and in this sense the 1965 events and their consequences, certainly cannot represent a Soviet victory at all.

Soviet Gains and Losses in Indonesia

Most writers have argued that Soviet policy in Indonesia was a dismal failure, because Moscow’s economic, political, diplomatic and military investments failed to accomplish the following:

1. To promote socialism in Indonesia;
2. To divert Indonesia on to the non-capitalist path of economic development;
3. To promote the country's economic development;

4. To prevent Sukarno and the PKI from establishing close ties with Peking;
5. To encourage the Army to promote Soviet interests in the country;
6. To prevent Jakarta from launching its 'konfrontasi' against Malaysia;
7. To persuade Indonesia to support Soviet participation in the aborted Afro-Asian conference;
8. To induce Indonesia substantially to reduce or even cut off its economic and political ties with the West;
9. To prevent Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations; and
10. To prevent the new leadership in Jakarta from establishing close ties with the West or to halt the decimation of the PKI and other 'progressive' forces.

These failures are usually examined in the wider context of Soviet setbacks in the Third World, following the spate of coups that overthrew progressive leaders such as Nkrumah and Ben Bella. This viewpoint was reinforced by Soviet writings which acknowledged that in general Moscow had failed to promote socialism or the non-capitalist mode of production and suffered setbacks in the Third World.  

There have been no direct references in Soviet writings to Moscow's 'failures' in Indonesia. There have, however, been a number of studies dealing with the 'errors' of Sukarno and the PKI, and an examination of these would

indirectly reflect Moscow's view of its failures in Indonesia, especially in the light of its past close relationship with the Sukarno regime. The following mistakes of Sukarno have been pointed out:

1. **NASAKOM remained a paper concept:** As a result, it did not justify itself because, "for many years the Communists, organised in a more than three million-strong party, were not admitted into the government". In addition, the "development of the cooperation of the nationalist, religious and communist forces was hindered intentionally by the reactionary circles, above all by members of Masjumi". 4

2. **His decision to withdraw from the United Nations:** This proved detrimental to Indonesia's interest because "despite all its failings, the United Nations is a real international institution for the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all its manifestations". 5

3. **His departure from the Bandung 'spirit':** This referred to his support for the PRC in the Sino-Soviet conflict and his cooperation with Peking in limiting Soviet involvement in the Afro-Asian movement. 6

4. **His 'dangerous adventures':** This involved his "so-called 'confrontation' of Malaysia, which ate up eighty percent of the annual state budget". 7

5. **Economic mismanagement:** The failure to concentrate on economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, especially after the reunification of West Irian, "brought the country to the verge of disaster". 8

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8. Ibid.
The two fundamental mistakes of the PKI were:

1. Its pro-Chinese orientations: This led to the adoption of a 'left-opportunist strategy' which in the final analysis brought disaster to the Party.  

2. Its total support of Sukarno: This led to 'ideological disarmament', the relinquishing of class position and the replacement of proletarian slogans with bourgeois-nationalist ones.  

The illumination of these 'mistakes' was a good example of being wise after the event. In the first place, the Soviet Union supported and, indeed, recommended PKI's cooperation with Sukarno, in line with the Soviet ideological position of encouraging cooperation between communist parties and progressive national-bourgeois leaders in the Third World, which formed the basis of the national-democracy concept. More important, immediately after GESTAPU, the Soviet Union itself looked towards Sukarno as the saviour of the PKI, and this was because it saw him as the only one who had the power and interest to do so. At the same time, Moscow saw the continued preservation of NASAKOM as being in line with its desired goal of setting up an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national front. Also, through NASAKOM, the Soviet Union hoped to strengthen the unity of the 'progressive forces' and possibly lead the country to a non-capitalist path of development. Anyway, what choice did the PKI have other than mortgaging its security and survival with Sukarno? To continue opposing both Sukarno and the Army.

would have been suicidal, as the PKI had learnt from its debacle in 1948. In fact, the only course open to the party was to align itself with Sukarno in the hope that through the latter's 'balance politics', of which NASAKOM was one element, it would ensure its survival and play an important role in Indonesian politics, as it did from 1953 to 1965. But once Sukarno's 'consensus politics' failed, the PKI sank together with him into oblivion.

While it is true that the Soviet Union suffered serious setbacks in Indonesia after the relatively close relationship between the two countries from 1957 to 1962, it would, however, be unrealistic to dismiss Soviet policies as totally unprofitable during the period under study. Analysing the short and medium term goals, it can be argued that the Soviet Union accomplished the following:

1. Soviet military aid to Indonesia added to the growing tensions in Southeast Asia; this caused problems for the United States and other Western powers, because it paved the way for political quarrels with the West and its allies in the region.

2. Soviet political, economic and military support for Indonesia's claim to West Irian was principally responsible for influencing the United States to intervene in the conflict, and in this respect, Moscow can be credited with having indirectly assisted in resolving the dispute in Indonesia's favour. It also raised Soviet involvement in the region, its prestige as a supporter of Third World states and its credentials as a backer of 'just causes' and 'national liberation movements'.
3. One of the most important achievements of Khrushchev was to begin the transformation of the Soviet Union into a global power, shifting from a continental-based strategy to a global one. In this regard, the Soviet Union's close ties with Indonesia during the 'honeymoon' phase from mid-1958 to mid-1962, reinforced the Soviet Union's growing role as a global power.

4. Even though Indonesia would not have joined SEATO, Moscow's support for Jakarta's 'free and active foreign policy' helped to reinforce the latter's rejection of SEATO, and this had the effect of weakening the American alliance system in the region.

5. Through its military aid, the Soviet Union successfully, albeit temporarily, made inroads into Southeast Asia, an area which had previously been a Western preserve. By the same token, its involvement in Indonesia made it an important Southeast Asia actor, in contrast to its past position as an outsider.

The Soviet Union's Indonesian Experience: Is it Unique?

The large-scale Soviet involvement in the Third World began after the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, at which the newly independent states were viewed as important units in the global 'correlation of forces'. Moscow's reassessment coincided with the period of American attempts to set up alliance systems in Asia, and this gave greater impetus to Moscow to involve itself in the region. In a number of key states such as Egypt,
India and Indonesia, charismatic leaders such as Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno opposed the American setting up of military pacts in their regions, and this provided Moscow with ready-made 'friends', as well as opportunities to expand state-to-state relations.

To a large extent, a common pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World can be discerned. The charismatic leaders saw themselves as catalysts of change and pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment, which was often forced upon them by the domestic balance of power. In addition to opposing American 'pactomania', they also rejected American military assistance. These leaders came into conflict with the European powers, especially their former colonial masters, who were more interested in maintaining the political, economic and military status quo. In the ensuing differences, the Soviet Union as a rule, always supported the new states and their leaders against the colonial powers. More important, in regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Indo-Pakistani Wars and the Indonesian conflict with the Dutch over West Irian, Moscow supported Egypt, India and Indonesia and this influenced the three states to turn to the Soviet Union for aid and political support. It was through this pattern that the Soviet Union made its inroads into the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

In the Indonesian case, however, three factors complicated the Soviet involvement. First, there was the rivalry with the PRC. As long as Soviet and Indonesian
interests were in harmony. Jakarta maintained warm relations with Moscow, but once the Indonesian leadership realised that Moscow was no longer willing to support Indonesian policies which risked its detente with the United States, Jakarta turned towards Peking, which presented itself as a revolutionary, anti-status quo power in the region. In the case of Egypt and India, the China factor did not play the same role. In fact, in the case of India, it functioned in reverse, New Delhi perceiving Peking as a major threat to its security and closing ranks with Moscow as a counter to Chinese power.

Secondly, in both Egypt and India, the Communist Parties were weak and pro-Soviet, and this permitted the Soviet Union to develop its relationship with the national bourgeois leadership without major complications. In Indonesia, however, there was a large and powerful Communist Party; as long as the PKI pursued a pro-Soviet or a neutral policy in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Moscow could develop its relations with Sukarno without major problems, but once the PKI turned towards China, and especially after 1963, when Sukarno did the same, Indonesia became a wasting asset to Moscow.

Thirdly, the geo-strategic factor also influenced the Soviet-Indonesian relationship. Unlike India and Egypt, which were located in areas contiguous to vital Soviet economic and military interests, Indonesia's location away from immediate Soviet concerns played an important role in the
Soviet easy detachment from the Republic. In this regard, the development of close relations between the two countries was certainly seen as a bonus, but once obstacles and clashes of national interests placed a brake on their close relationship, the lack of vital Soviet interests in the region and in Indonesia itself made it easy for the Soviet Union to 'withdraw' from the Republic and detach itself directly from developments there. The great distance of Indonesia from the Soviet heartland, and the absence of a Soviet blue water navy to give 'teeth' to its policies and in the process raise confidence of its partner, in this case Indonesia, only reinforced this attitude.

The Soviet experience in Indonesia was sobering for the following reasons:

1. It demonstrated the dangers of relying on and investing in one particular leader in the Third World. As a rule, these leaders were nationalist, anti-West and anti-colonial and often influenced by Marxism to a greater or lesser extent. This, however, did not mean that they were ready-made tools of the Soviet Union. More often than not, these leaders used the Soviet Union to achieve their foreign policy and domestic objectives and whenever there was a clash between Soviet and national interests, they would sacrifice the Soviet Union's without hesitation. In this regard, the Third World leaders' nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism were not a guarantee that they would lead their countries to 'scientific socialism' if left to their own devices. At the same time, with the
advantage of hindsight, the nature of Soviet relationship with Third World states also highlighted the lack of understanding by a number of Western scholars and officials in the United States, who believed in the early 1960s, that Sukarno was a communist, that Indonesia was in the Soviet camp and that Sukarno was simply a surrogate or proxy for the Kremlin. Rather, if there sometimes appeared to be a 'puppet relationship', it was largely because Soviet and Indonesian interests essentially converged, as during the West Irian dispute.

2. Even if some leaders could be won over for the Soviet cause, including the implementation of non-capitalist programmes, they were still vulnerable and their overthrow would bring an end to years of Soviet goodwill and investments. This is because, given the societal power structures characterised by conservatism and deeply embedded Western influence, these leaders were unlikely to remain long enough in power to effect the transition to 'Soviet type of socialism'. Hence, the 'peaceful transition to socialism' proved illusory. The lengthy colonial histories of these countries, the greater concern of their governments for internal development than for foreign relations with the socialist states, the divorce of incompetent leaders from the masses, the too great dependence on the world capitalist economy, the existence of serious economic problems, the disruptive activities of local and foreign 'reactionaries', the instability of petty-bourgeois democracy, the large scale corruption, the absence of a strong vanguard party, the subjective mistakes by the leadership, the
setting of ambitious goals without regard to economic and cadre resources and the inability to achieve cooperation between all anti-imperialist elements only compounded the weaknesses of what may have appeared to be 'progressive regimes', such as was Sukarno's Indonesia.

3. It is important to note that in almost all cases, and this would certainly be true of Indonesia, it was the Soviet Union that was drawn into the region by the combination of domestic and regional developments which the Kremlin saw as propitious. While the Soviet Union reassessed its position and was willing to involve itself in the Third World, in each case it was the local leaderships which presented themselves as willing allies to Moscow in order to further their national objectives; once these were achieved, the Soviet Union was discarded, especially when it came into conflict with new goals of the Third World state, as happened in the cases of Egypt and Indonesia. This experience showed that the Soviet Union did not have a strong constituency in the Third World and very often was hostage to the goodwill of a particular Third World state.

4. In the case of Southeast Asia, the China factor played a vital role in hindering the expansion of Soviet influence. Sino-Soviet rivalry was to a large degree responsible for the Soviet Union's initial largesse to Indonesia and it also played a primary role in finally causing the estrangement between Moscow and Jakarta. In this regard, Soviet success or failure in Southeast Asia and
particularly in Indonesia, has been determined as much by internal changes within the countries of the region as by international factors, including the role of China.

5. The Soviet Union's relations with the PKI must have also awakened the Kremlin that the emergence of a powerful communist-led revolutionary movement capable of seizing power without outside assistance was not a realistic expectation in the Third World.

6. Finally, Soviet economic assistance did not secure significant political dividends, nor did developing countries show any enthusiasm for embracing the Soviet model of economic development. This was because the Soviet Union simply could not compete with the West in economic aid to the Third World.

The Study's Contributions

The following can be regarded as the contributions of this study:

1. It detailed the developments in Soviet-Indonesian relations from 1945 to 1968. This would fill a major gap in the academic literature as no such study exists over the period surveyed in a single volume and over such wide-ranging issues as covered in the study.

2. The study highlighted the Soviet theoretical concepts on the Third World and examined their application to Indonesia. It is evident that if one were to characterise the policy of the Soviet Union in the Third World during
the period under survey, one would have to conclude that this policy has been one of constant reassessment and revision. When it became clear that a policy of isolation was unsuccessful, the Soviets developed economic and political contacts with the Third World; when it became evident that neutralism was the basis of the foreign relations of many of the new states, Soviet leaders came out in favour of non-alignment; when the weakness of the proletariat and local communist parties was recognised, the Soviets introduced the doctrines of 'national and revolutionary democracy'. Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, the goal of scientific socialism and workers' state was pushed into the future, and the foremost immediate task stated as the present increase of Soviet influence in the Third World. This, it felt, could best be accomplished by supporting the existing nationalist governments, by providing military and economic assistance and by developing political, economic and cultural ties with the peoples of these countries. How specifically these changes affected Indonesia, and hence the course of Soviet-Indonesian relations, has been detailed in the study, which would represent another contribution since there is no specific case study of Soviet-Third World relations with reference to Indonesia.

3. The study has also attempted to highlight some of the recent Soviet literature on the subject and period under survey. It is clear that many changes have taken place
in perspective and position, and this can be explained by the benefit of hindsight and the changing Soviet view of the Third World.

4. Finally, the study has attempted to illuminate the uniqueness of the Soviet experience in Indonesia and the factors accounting for this.
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