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PERSIAN GULF IN THE SOVIET PERCEPTIONS:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE BA'THIST IRAQ  
(1968-1975)

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## INTRODUCTION

This sub-thesis studies Soviet policy towards the Ba'thist Iraq. Basically, it is a recapitulation of the Iraqi scene which offered, or denied, opportunities to the USSR during the period 1968-75. It sets out the context, as projected by Soviet media, within which the Soviet policy operated. Without undertaking an exhaustive treatment of the nature, or evolution of, Soviet relations with Iraq, this sub-thesis attempts to outline the Soviet perception of the following three inter-related problems of the area directly involving Iraq and, subsequently, affecting development of the Soviet policy:

- a. formation of a 'united front' of all 'progressive' forces of the Ba'thist Iraq.
- b. resolution of the 'nationalities question' of autonomy/separation seeking Kurds.
- c. promotion of friendlier relations of Iraq with the neighbouring Iran.

In other words, this sub-thesis will project and explain the nature of Moscow's pattern of interaction with Iraq and its governing logic in the regional context.

Instead of undertaking a country to country approach, Iraq was selected, arbitrarily, for the purpose of this research. It was done, because Iraq was, Kremlin believed, the only country of the area which "on the whole" was striving for socialist construction and following the non-capitalist path of development and had all the aforesaid problems on its agenda. Thus, the study of the Ba'thist Iraq provided us with a unique example where the Soviet response towards these three dimensions of political process could be seen progressing simultaneously. Hence, it was held imperative to delimit ourselves to the post-68 Ba'thist Iraq.

Soviet policy towards Persian Gulf has long intrigued policy-makers and scholars alike. Scholarly literature on the Soviet policy in the region, highlighting geopolitics and the legacy of Tsarist expansion into Central Asia, stresses that Moscow's interaction is marked by historical continuity with Tsarist Russia. The present leaders in Moscow are seen to nurse the same ambitions as their predecessors in the nineteenth century when in the 'Great Game' the two advancing empires, Tsarist Russia and British India, met each other in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

Such geopolitical and historical continuity explanations of Soviet behaviour remain theoretically inadequate and historically inaccurate as they fail to explain variations in Soviet policies over time. Geography and history alone can

not explain why Soviet policies towards its southern neighbours were qualitatively different from Tsarist policies under the two Bolshevik regimes of Lenin and Stalin. Besides, the USSR is much less inhibited by constraints of geography and history than its predecessor, the Tsarist state. Insofar as geography and history are an integral part of the operational and psychological environment of any nation, they shape and condition its external orientation. This orientation, however, itself cannot be the expression of these forces as Barrington Moore pointed out: "the driving forces behind any contemporary expansionism must be found in a contemporary social situation. Historical and geographical factors may limit the expression of an expansion drive. They cannot be expansionist forces in their own right".<sup>1</sup> Therefore, instead of basing our study on explanations which are heavily skewed in favour of geography and history as explanatory factors, we emphasize the importance of the Soviet ideology and therein professed role of the Soviet state in the world system as the motivating force behind Moscow's policies.

With this background in mind, Chapter-1 traces history of Russian policy towards the countries of the Gulf area from the early nineteenth century to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 on the one hand and from 1917 to 1953 on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight theoretical inadequacy and historical inaccuracy of Western interpretations of Soviet motives in the Gulf area which

have, by and large, relied upon a carry-over from a situation which no longer exists. This chapter further argues that except for Iran, there has been little historical contact between Russia and the countries of the Gulf region. In historical terms, the Russian policy vis-a-vis Iraq can be best viewed as forming part of the 'Middle Eastern Question' which stretched from India, Afghanistan and Iran on the one hand to the Turkish Straits and Constantinople on the other. Iraq, lying in the midst of these two poles had very little importance of its own. Thus, throughout the 'Great Game' of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Iraq's importance for the Tsarist Russia remained that of peripheral interest. Tsarist policy was to apply pressure in one area to gain concessions in another. The situation has totally changed as the Gulf is no longer a specifically British sphere of influence and the Indian sub-continent is no longer a British possession, while the main antagonist is no longer Britain but the United States which cannot be pressurised in one area for concessions in another in quite the same way as was the case in the Tsarist times.

The changed character of the Soviet state is stressed in Chapter-2 which outlines the ideological framework of the Soviet Third world policy, without necessarily implying that ideology is an independent variable shaping Moscow's decisions. The broader Soviet approach towards the Third World-of which Iraq was an integral part for the Soviets-is emphasised



by discussing in this chapter the ideological tenets of the Soviet State ideology. This gives an appraisal of the doctrinal contours within which the Soviet leadership explained, if not operated, their policy. The ideological re-appraisals of the early 1960s and onwards, this chapter argues, projected the ideological flexibility and an evolving adaptability which provided the Soviet decision-makers with a framework to approach the complex problems of Ba'thist Iraq. In context of the 'national liberation movements' of particular interest to us in this chapter were the problems of a 'national democratic state' and how it handles (or should handle) the issues like 'united front', 'non-capitalist path of development', and the 'nationalities question'. On the part of the Soviets, they, insofar as possible, this chapter concludes, wanted to develop relations with all kinds of states, be they progressive or not. It was essentially this doctrinal flexibility which enabled Moscow to try to court the Ba'thist regime of Iraq in the late 1960s and onwards.

As against these ideological tenets, chapters 3, 4 and 5 aim at projecting how these ideological principles were translated into policy. Three specific questions are addressed in these chapters respectively. First, regarding the establishment of a United Front; second, regarding the Nationalities Question which concerned an autonomy/separation seeking minority; and third, the question of friendly cooperati

with a neighbourly, pro-western monarchical state i.e. Iran with whom Iraq had shared the Kurdish minority and a disputed frontier. These chapters thus focus on the problems of Ba'thist Iraq affecting Soviet policy towards, and relations with the post-68 Ba'thist Iraq.

Officially founded in 1952,<sup>2</sup> the Ba'th Party of Iraq was in direct competition with the Iraqi Communist Party. Bitter rivalry had dominated relations between the two parties since General Abdul-Karim Kassem's advent to power in July 1958. Their relations further deteriorated after the communist role in the suppression of the Mosul revolt.<sup>3</sup> Thus when the Ba'thists seized power in 1963, they were determined to eliminate the Communists. A statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party charged that the Ba'thists have put to death more communists than those executed by Nuri al-Said during a quarter of a century.<sup>4</sup> The persecution of communists continued, even though a new Ba'thist government, established in July 1968, began pursuing policies friendlier to the USSR. As Baghdad began to move closer to the USSR, relations between the Ba'thists and the communists improved somewhat. In April 1972, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two countries. A cabinet reshuffle in May 1972 brought two communists into the government. Yet, both remained suspicious of each other's ideology as well as of policies.

In February 1968, Dimitry Volsky, a Soviet commentator stated in the New Times that "the success of the liberation

movement in the eastern part of the Arab world depends very largely on how things go in Iraq".<sup>5</sup> The Ba'th Party of post-1968 was described by Soviet analysts as having formulated a platform which was compatible with the interests of most Iraqis. One of the most pressing tasks confronting the Iraqi government was the creation of a 'national front' unifying "all progressive, anti-imperialist organisations" including the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party. Chapter 3 traces how the Soviets impressed Iraq to forge a united front and travel along the non-capitalist road of development, held so important for anti-imperialist struggle. As against these intricacies involved in forging a front of the above-said major actors, chapter 4 highlights the efforts pursued for resolution of the Kurdish Question. It has recapitulated fluctuations in the Soviet political moves, in cultivating relations with the ruling Ba'ths, at times even at the cost of the Iraqi communists. It was not only the Kurdish problem which divided Iraq and Iran, Moscow held, but also the imperialist powers' "divide and rule" policy. Against such western "conspiracies", Soviet commentators on their part emphasised the need for peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries. Chapter-5 brings into perspective progressive Iraq's relations with the 'reactionary' and 'pro-Western' monarchical Iran, and the Soviet Union's apparent neutrality. We find that despite sharp criticism of Iran's military role in the region, strong ties with the West and arms acquisitions, Soviet

media did not take sides in Iraq-Iran relations but instead encouraged their friendlier relations—much to Iraq's discomfort.

The purpose of putting these three aspects together is to integrate the dimensions upon which hinges the Soviet policy towards a Third World Country. With this we have, it is hoped, brought into perspective the imperative need of understanding an over-all Soviet approach towards a national democratic regime where she, despite apparent strong influence, largely remains less competent to influence the local dynamics of politics. We find that the interacting local forces in Iraq's case had their own momentum which was largely beyond Moscow's control.

A word about the sources: A constant problem in any study of Soviet policy is the relative weight to be attached, in absence of any open public debate inside USSR, to declaratory policy, official statements and media broadcasts. No attempt is made to establish the relative weight of these sources. As opposed to Chapter 1 and 2 which rely on contemporary sources, both primary and secondary, chapter 3, 4 and 5 rely exclusively upon the radio broadcasts as monitored by Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). This was done, partly to avoid excessive reliance on purely formal declaratory policy and mainly to highlight the Soviet perception as projected through the media. By inference, it can

perhaps also be argued that the state controlled Soviet media is a fairly accurate representative of Soviet policies and thus a close monitoring of it can provide with valuable insights into the evolving Soviet response to the unfolding regional crises. Occasionally, somewhat hasty and generalized statements/commentaries did surface during the period but these were probably targetted at generating optimism in its listners and hiding Soviet difficulties.

## CHAPTER-1

### RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF REGION: 1800-1953

The Russian policy towards the Persian Gulf during 1800-1917 was, by and large, a contest for political ascendancy with the British. There was a prolonged 'cold war' from the beginning of the eighteenth century between the two Empires over what is called 'the Central Asian Question'.<sup>1</sup> Their rivalry in this area began with two developments of fundamental nature. Firstly, the emergence of Russia as a Great Power to play an important role in the European Concert and beyond, after Russia's contribution to the defeat of Napoleon. Secondly, the rise of the 'Forward School' in British India and London, which aspired to seeing British India's 'natural' frontiers running from the Indus to the Nile. Russian moves in the region under our study during the period were motivated by considerations of bringing pressure on the British in one area in order to acquire objectives in another.

The purpose of this chapter is argue that the Soviet concerns and motivations in the area are entirely different from those of the nineteenth century, and therefore, the situation has so totally changed as to render interpretations based on past history totally invalid. This chapter does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of Russian policy. An attempt is made to outline the context within which Russian policy

operated. Their interests and objectives are discussed in order to analyse Russian strategy and identify a pattern of continuity and change. In other words, it is a brief survey of recurrent Russian fears, motives and actions during the specified period. But first a framework through which the past can be viewed is in order.

The geographical position and the resultant historical experiences of a country largely determine its perceptions and foreign-military policies. The Russian Empire, spreading over two continents, has long been subject to the threats of invasion by advanced and dynamic European powers on the one hand, and border violations by marauding nomads on the other. With approximately fixed boundaries in Europe by the early nineteenth century, technologically backward and militarily weak states to the South and East offered opportunities for expansion. The experiences of the past, when between 1812 and 1941 it was invaded thrice, twice threatening the Russian heartland, left the Russians apprehensive concerning their security.<sup>2</sup> This resulted in overwhelmingly continental concerns, and in a deep desire to secure clear and geographically defensible frontiers in the South and East, if not in Europe where it was virtually impossible. The policies adopted appear to be obsessive in their concern to eliminate or reduce any threatening military capability. This was achieved by pre-emptive strikes, by expanding political control, and by annexing the bordering 'barbaric' states and vast stretches of un-

inhabited lands.<sup>3</sup> These areas, in time, would also serve as a buffer between the Russian heartland and potential enemies.

Access to commercial outlets was another consideration dictated by geography. In the absence of any elaborate railway system,<sup>4</sup> a substantial part of Russian trade was carried along rivers.<sup>5</sup> This led the Russian expansion to follow, more often than not (throughout the nineteenth century), the course of the major rivers.<sup>6</sup> The other Russian ports being seasonal and far away from major trading centres, Russian westward expansion, the control of the Turkish Straits and the Constantinople, ranked high in St. Petersburg's strategic thinking.<sup>7</sup> Economic well being, as well as security considerations, demanded that no hostile power should dominate these waterways. Russian interests and objectives in the area of our study, therefore, had to be defined within the framework of the larger interests of the Empire. Different combinations of power relationships between the Russian, British and Ottoman Empires with the French and later with the Germans and Japanese, were to influence the formulation and execution of Russian strategy. The British Government in India had a set of attitudes towards Russia which had been derived from the Russian role in European affairs. When these perceptions were extended into India, Afghanistan and Central Asia, they were to determine the course of events of the 'Great Game'. This was a race to gain greater strategic



advantages by occupying or controlling strategic positions. The scheme on both sides was to press forward and forestall the adversary in the acquisition of political influence. Each, in pursuit of its imperial ambitions, considered the adversary to be the aggressor. "It is possible" wrote Lorimer in one Government of India's Gazeteer, "that neither Russian nor British politicians had at (that) time any adequate conception of the difficulties, physical or political, that the players of the Great Game would face".<sup>8</sup>

A recurring reference in discussions of Central Asian Question has often been the famous "will" of Peter the Great (1682-1725). In this "will" Peter the Great is said to have advised his successors to obtain an outlet to the sea through the Persian Gulf and advance "as far as India".<sup>9</sup> The "will" was clearly recognised as a fake, and nobody took it seriously for many decades after its appearance in a book by a Frenchman called Le Sur in 1811.<sup>10</sup> This fraudulent document, however, was often used to justify the forward policies of British India.<sup>11</sup> The validity and the binding force of this document to his successors aside, the dawn of the nineteenth century is marked with a joint Franco-Russian plan to "liberate" India. After Napoleon's withdrawal from the agreement Tsar Paul I (1796-1801), considered by his contemporaries to be mad, undertook this venture alone and sent a small army towards India.<sup>12</sup> After his assassination, Alexander I (1801-25), his successor, abandoned the plan. Napoleon, with

his dreams of Asiatic conquest, in 1807 again suggested a joint Franco-Russian assault. This plan, which is properly said to have "belonged to the world of fantasy",<sup>13</sup> was abandoned, like the first, as Franco-Russian relations became increasingly strained.

Russian policy was aimed less at conquering India, and more at manipulating the Indian issue as a leverage for broader balance of power considerations. This was a theme which recurred periodically, and which was to create grounds for Britain's "forward policy" and at times what was called "masterly inactivity".

The upholders of the Forward School advocated the extension of British rule to the south and east of the River Sutlej. The annexation could lead, they claimed, to more trade and profits; cheaper and more effective government; the consolidation of British power, and the acquisition of a power base to protect British defence capability against invasions.<sup>14</sup> Under the influence of this line of thinking, the British activities started focusing "well beyond the frontiers of India"<sup>15</sup> into Persia, Central Asia and Afghanistan. British missions and spies in the guise of merchants and travellers were sent into the area to cause alarm in St. Petersburg. These agents were, as Michael Edwards has summarized, "theorists who carefully tailored such facts as came their way to suit their theories".<sup>16</sup> They rarely came across directly but invariably heard of the activities

of Russian agents. Many in India believed that Russian agents and merchants would be followed by the Russian army. The four rival information-gathering centres in India often exaggerated the magnitude of these feelings.<sup>17</sup> This culminated in a frenzy of Russophobia: already the fashion among some of the Conservatives<sup>18</sup> and many traveller-scholars in London.

Russian active involvement in the area, however, began with the wars against Persia, beginning in 1804. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century Georgia declared her independence from Persia and aligned herself with Russia.<sup>19</sup> Driven by territorial ambitions and instigated by Napoleon,<sup>20</sup> Persia attacked Georgia aiming to re-occupy it. Western Georgia was particularly significant to the Russians, as from there, they could control the provinces of Northern Persia and exert pressure on the Ottoman Empire. The war ended in the Treaty of Gulistan (1813)<sup>21</sup> whereby Persia accepted Russian control from the north of the Caucasus to the banks of the Araxes. In addition, Russia got the exclusive right to sail ships of war in the Caspian Sea. Disappointed by the British, Persia now sought French help and signed the Treaty of Finkenstein in 1807, declaring Russia to be the common enemy of both the Persian and French Empires.<sup>22</sup>

The British activities in the area during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, on the other hand, were mainly of a political and commercial nature. But starting with Napoleonic

diplomatic activities in 1798, and the arrival of one of the pioneers of the Forward School, Richard Wellesley, as Governor-General in India, a new era of vigorous British involvement beyond Indian borders began. The frantic nature of the British reaction to French activities during this time captures the central theme of British policy for the rest of the century.

By 1808-9, the Forward Schools' views were shared by many in London and India. Exploiting the weakness of Persia,<sup>23</sup> the Persian Shah was persuaded by the British to sign a commercial and political treaty in 1808. This was followed by the 'Definitive Treaty' (1814) of mutual defence against any European aggressor, and in the Persian Shah's commitment to invade Afghanistan if the latter attacked British possessions in India.<sup>24</sup> This treaty was designed to 'frighten' the Afghans and the Russians, as the French threat had diminished; and to stiffen the Shah's determination to resist Russia.<sup>25</sup> This treaty encouraged the Shah to nourish illusions of British help<sup>26</sup> so he declared another war against Russia. This war, like the first, ended in another humiliating treaty, the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1826).<sup>27</sup> In order to compensate for some of his territorial losses, the Shah seized Herat. Britain, contrary to the treaty's provisions, sided with Herat against Persia, and occupied the Persian island of Kharj in the Persian Gulf.<sup>28</sup>

Russian successes against both Persia and Turkey, raised alarms in London and India.<sup>29</sup> The Forward School viewed the Russian expansion in the Caucasus as a preliminary to further expansion in the direction of the Euphrates Valley, and the eventual control of Baghdad and Basra.<sup>30</sup> Control over the head-waters of the Gulf would provide St. Petersburg, the Russophobes feared, with two objectives simultaneously.<sup>31</sup> First, Russia would possess a warm-water outlet to the sea and would be in a better position than any other Great Power to assert eventual control over all Gulf waters. Moreover, it was feared, it might provide Russia with an important base for future operations against the British in India.

The first British-Afghan Expedition (1838) had its Russian counterpart. Seeing the British advancing towards Afghanistan and finding them settled there in 1839, Russia made an abortive attempt to reach Khiva. Alexander Burnes, British envoy at Kabul, for example, considered it as a reply to the British advance into Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, the British saw a Russian hand behind the siege of Herat by Persia. Russia, on the other hand, held Britain responsible for the Persian unrest of 1838-39 and 1840-41.<sup>33</sup> It should also be noted that while Britain was grappling with the Sind (1843), Punjab (1849), and other smaller dominions, Russia was busy erecting fortresses in 1847-48. Each viewed the other's activities with suspicion.

There were four major routes thought to be available to St. Petersburg in any move towards the Persian Gulf and into India. Marching towards any one of these sub-regions was considered to be an essential prelude to another. Britain's aim was to extend its superiority, or at least effective influence, over these areas in pre-emption. A brief survey of these probable routes will help us to examine the Russian strategy and priorities.

The first route passed through Khiva, down to the Oxus, through Bokhara and thence to Kabul and Peshawar. A variation of this route passed from Smarkand to Kilif and thence to Kabul.<sup>34</sup> Both, Russia and Britain recognised the importance of Kabul.<sup>35</sup> In fact, Britain at times thought it so important that she occupied it in 1839 and again in 1878-79.

The second route was through northern Persia to Herat and thence to Kandahar.<sup>36</sup> A possible variation might originate in Merv and thence to Herat.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps the most persistent idea that dominated the British Central Asian proceedings was an unmovable belief that Herat was key to India.<sup>38</sup> Herat and Kabul should not fall, directly or indirectly, to Russia. The protection of Herat demanded greater British influence in Persia.

Attached to the Herat route was the strategic importance of Khorasan and Seistan. Through Khorasan ran,

as General Politoyev, Chief of the Russian General Staff, had said, "the existing strategically very important roads to Afghanistan".<sup>39</sup> The British Government in India was equally, if not more, aware of this.<sup>40</sup> Control of Seistan was also considered very important as Russia could employ it as a staging area for operations against Persia, Afghanistan and India, while British control of it would expose Russia's southern flanks to British counter-operations from Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup> There was a general consensus among the British planners that, in the words of Lord Curzon, "in no circumstances, direct or indirect, ought Seistan to pass under Russian control".<sup>42</sup> Moreover, it was thought by the British to be important to the Russians as a gate to the Indian Ocean.<sup>43</sup>

The third possible route originated in the upper Oxus (Amu Darya), or Pamir, and thence descended upon Chitral and/or Gilgit via the mountain passes ultimately to Kashmir. Although a far-fetched possibility, it was never ruled out; and Chitral, Gilgit, Kashmir and the surrounding dominions, like Kalat, were gradually occupied by the British, though they held that the route would be employed merely as a diversion, and not as the main invasion line.<sup>44</sup>

The fourth possible route passed down the Euphrates valley to Basra. From a base on the Shatt-al-Arab, it was thought that the Russians might proceed down the Persian

side of the Gulf, to the mouth of the Indus.

The viability of these propositions was hardly challenged. Instead, in the 1830s, when the merits of possible routes were being discussed, many urged that Britain occupy Euphrates valley before Russia did so.

#### RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES

Against these fears on the British side, the Russian attitudes towards the Persian Gulf area and/or India can broadly be divided into two categories. First, that which subscribed to the view that the conquest of India was a desirable end in itself. Second, that which believed that varying degrees of pressures, not amounting to conquest, could serve as a useful leverage for obtaining the objectives of the Empire in the Near East. Statements by various individuals of varying stature can be cited in favour of both schools, though the former is thought to be more influential.<sup>45</sup>

The Russians periodically applied pressure on the British, without going so far as to risk the outbreak of hostilities, when they needed leverage to attain objectives in another region. And, when a opportunity arose to attain a more important objective in another region, St. Petersburg was more than willing to bargain away the position in Central Asia to get British support in the other region. In other words, if the British presence diminished, the Persian Gulf



region would be of little value to the Russians. To illustrate these propositions, we shall now examine this dynamic interaction.

In addition to Constantinople and the Turkish Straits, it was also desirable for some Russian statesmen to secure an outlet to the sea through the Persian Gulf, while for some it was more realistic to hope for the Persian Gulf than the Straits.<sup>46</sup> The Russian Government, too, is said to have entertained, from time to time, proposals for the establishment of ~~an~~ such an outlet from either Kuwait, Basra, Mohmmara, Busher, Bandar Abbas or Chahbhar.<sup>47</sup>

There was, however, considerable disagreement concerning the character and purpose of such an outlet. Some are believed to have favoured merely a commercial outlet, possibly a terminus for a Russian railway or pipeline, with a Consulate.<sup>48</sup> Others favoured the establishment of a commercial outlet as a means of gaining a foothold in the Gulf which, in the future, could provide the basis for the establishment of a Russian naval base.<sup>49</sup> Finally, there were some who called for the immediate establishment of a naval base.<sup>50</sup>

These were personal opinions and not all Russians felt that it was practical to establish an outlet in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean. Their rationale was simply that Russia did not have the resources necessary to maintain effectively any sort of outlet in the Gulf, to say nothing

of a base.<sup>51</sup> Russia simply did not have enough naval power or the communication network to challenge the British position there. And, then, why should they? In economic terms the Gulf area had very little to offer.<sup>52</sup>

The domestic, regional and international situation during the early nineteenth century seemed to favour Russian expansion in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Instead, in 1834, when Mohammad Shah (1834-1896) became sovereign in Persia, St. Petersburg pledged to Britain to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Persia.<sup>53</sup> This commitment was renewed in 1838.<sup>54</sup>

The English claimed that Russian expansion into the Euphrates Valley would mean a frontal attack on the Ottoman Empire. Nicholas I (1825-55), on the other hand, knew that the sudden collapse of the Empire would result in its partition between Austria, France and Britain. This would mean opposition against Russian claims to the Turkish Straits. Constantinople would, with all probability, become a free port and the Black Sea would be opened to foreign shipping.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the Tsar feared that the claims of those Englishmen who felt that Britain should extend control into the Euphrates Valley would be strengthened if he acted quickly.

In the light of these considerations, a Russian frontal attack via the Euphrates Valley was not a viable policy. The situation, on the other hand, demanded that Russian relations

with Turkey be cultivated. Hence, two treaties between Russia and Turkey were signed: the Treaty of Adrianople (1828) and the Treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi (1830). Under the provisions of these treaties the Turks agreed to close the Straits, in the event of a war between Russia and any other power, to all powers but Russia. Thus Russia established a virtual protectorate over the Straits.<sup>56</sup> The Russians did not, therefore, want to initiate, especially when they might lay claims to the Straits in a general agreement with the European powers. Yet, Russia had serious reservations over their occupation by any other power - especially by her arch enemy, ~~the~~ Great Britain.<sup>57</sup> The settlements resulting from the London Conference of 1840 were interpreted by the Tsar as preliminary to the orderly division of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1831, Count Simonovich, the Russian Minister at Tehran, encouraged the Persian Shah to form an alliance with Kabul and Kandahar, guaranteed by St. Petersburg. A draft convention between the Shah of Persia and the Sardar of Kandahar about the future of Herat was concluded, according to which the Russian Government was to act as guarantor.<sup>58</sup> The British protest through its ambassador in St. Petersburg warned that the Minister's activities would not be tolerated by Britain. Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, replied that "The intention of the emperor ha(d) been and (would) continue to be, not to maintain with Afghanistan any other than commercial relations; and that his wishes (had) been ill-expressed or ill-understood".<sup>59</sup> Count

Nesselrode's reply to the British note answered the unstated fear rather than the overt complaint. He assured, "the idea of assailing the security and tranquility of the state of possession of Great Britain in India has never presented itself to the mind of our august master". He also emphasised the "immense distances" which separate Russia from India, claiming that they made "any such idea unreasonable."<sup>60</sup> The case of the Persian Gulf was even less promising as it had little to offer in economic and political terms and was far more adventurous as Russia lacked any worthwhile naval force.

In the 1830s and 1840s almost all activity in Central Asia was initiated by relatively small groups of people at the official level. But in the 1850s, both England and Russia had bigger pre-occupation. On the Russian side it was the Crimean War (1853-56). The origins of the war had no connection with the Gulf or India, but British and French readiness to participate alongside Turkey created additional problems for Russia in regard to the Mediterranean and Middle East, as did British intention to minimise Russian gains from its war against Turkey in the Balkans in 1877-78. On the British side, the second military expedition to the Persian Gulf was followed by the 1857 uprising in India - the official circles and the Press saw Russia and Persia as instigating these happenings.<sup>61</sup> After the suppression of the 1857 uprising, India came directly under the control of

the British Crown and the years that followed were years of concentration on the borders.

The Crimean War, in which Britain and Russia were in direct conflict for the first time, slowed down the Russian advance into Central Asia. The need for it, nevertheless, intensified. During the war, Russian fears of British expansion into Central Asia increased. In 1854-55 Persia was persuaded to join the Anglo-Turkish alliance against Russia.<sup>62</sup> While Turkish envoys, with the encouragement of their British allies, were already active in Central Asia, British agents also appeared in 1856 in Khokand, Khiva and Turkoman.<sup>63</sup> Dost Mohammad (1793-1863), the Afghan Amir, became an official ally of the British in 1855. Soon after, he occupied some territory of Bokhara.<sup>64</sup>

The Russian defeat in the Crimean war culminated in an intensified need for a favourable solution in the Balkans where it had held more than a thousand miles of coastline on the Black Sea and possession of the mouth of the Danube. Therefore, it was very unlikely that Russia would accept indefinitely the unrealistic provision in the Treaty of Paris (1856) that excluded her from that sea and forbade the construction of fortifications along its shores. Alexander II (1855-81) merely awaited a favourable opportunity. Central Asia and the Gulf area were important insofar as Russian control of these areas contributed to the attainment of her

objectives in the Balkans. If the primary objective was to apply pressure on the British in India, any of the four routes to the Gulf and India would do. Naturally, the route which offered the least opposition would be preferred. From this perspective, the Gulf route was the least promising, particularly since the British had by then consolidated their position there.<sup>65</sup>

The situation in Central Asia, however, was promising. None of the Great Powers was committed to the territorial integrity of the Khanates of Central Asia.<sup>66</sup> Initial British interests and aspirations had been seriously reduced as a result of her experience in Afghanistan. The expansion of Empire aside, the primary Russian objective in Central Asia was application of pressure on the British in India in pursuit of objectives in the Balkans. This clearly down-graded the importance of the Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf to the level of the other three routes to India. Prior to the 1860s, the Persian Gulf area was, at least in part, an end in itself. After the 1860s however, the entire area was a means to another end: the Balkan problem. This was clearly to continue until the mid-1880s.

The Russian advance into Central Asia has been attributed to a wide range of considerations. Some held that 'civilized' Russia had to advance against the 'half-savage'.<sup>67</sup> Outside Russia, some Englishmen also subscribed to this idea.<sup>68</sup>

More believed that Central Asia was so tempting that Russia could not resist the conquest. This attraction was because of a vast power-vacuum,<sup>69</sup> stretching from the Caspian to the borders of China, and Afghanistan to the edge of the great Siberian plain. Others believed that the object of Russian policy in Central Asia was the attainment of an outlet in the Near and Middle East.<sup>70</sup> A further impetus to this Russian penetration was given by the interruption of cotton supplies from America, due to the Civil War, and these areas could substitute sources of supply.<sup>71</sup>

The decision-makers in St. Petersburg undoubtedly would have pondered all these considerations. The power available, however, was largely to determine the formation of the strategy. In the wake of defeat in the Crimean War the immediate contest was Anglo-Russian rivalry, and the Franco-English determination to oppose Russian claims against Turkey.

In 1857, the British forced Persia to evacuate Herat which had finally fallen to Persian forces. This was followed by the granting of extensive commercial privileges to British merchants from Persia.<sup>72</sup> Russian apprehensions were further aggravated in 1860, when Lord Lytton, the new Conservative Viceroy in India, invigorated the British policy and sent agents into Bokhara.

The Russians reacted to this by sending two missions to undo the influence Britain had gained; one to Khiva and

Bokhara, and the other to Afghanistan.<sup>73</sup> Both failed, adding to Russian anxiety. Nikolai Milyutin, the Minister of War, summarizing the Russian fears, held that the occupation of Central Asia was the only bargaining instrument Russia had against Britain. In case of a European war, he wrote, "we ought to particularly value the control of that region. It would bring us to the northern borders of India. By ruling in Khokand, we can constantly threaten England's East Indian possessions....this was essential...since only in that quarter can we be dangerous to this enemy of ours."<sup>74</sup> But this was not an easy thing to do. Memories remained of the 1838 Russian expedition towards Khiva, where more than half of the Russian force had been destroyed before reaching its destination. The Russian Government was therefore prepared to accept cheap and successful advances by the local commander even without express authority; but not expensive and unsuccessful ones. There was, as was the case in Britain, "an unstated and obvious compromise between the caution of government and the recklessness of commanders in the field beyond the restraints of the telegraph and the railway!"<sup>75</sup>

Initially the direction of Russian expansion seemed to focus on the Oxus River. In 1865 Tashkent fell, in 1866 Bokhara, and two years later, Smarkand. In the same year Krasnovodsk, on the Eastern shores of the Caspian was annexed as a stepping stone for future operations in Turkestan. Khiva fell in 1868, and in 1875, Khokand.<sup>76</sup> This wave of expansions



brought Persia and Russia face to face east of the Caspian.<sup>77</sup>

From this point, the British feared, as did the Persians, that Russia could proceed in the direction of the Gulf or India, through Kabul or Herat.<sup>78</sup> But on the Russian side, it was considered that moves in that direction were inappropriate and adventurous.<sup>79</sup> Instead, with this impressive record, St. Petersburg opened hostilities against the Ottoman Empire in April 1877.

In 1878, Russian forces swept down onto Constantinople. Britain was committed to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because, other reasons aside, it had extended loans to the latter amounting in 1875 to £200,000,000.<sup>80</sup> Thus it moved Indian troops to Cyprus and a battle fleet to the Bosphorus.<sup>81</sup> The arrival of the British fleet at Constantinople immediately revived the time tested strategy: Russia should apply pressure on the British through Central Asia in support of her war efforts in Turkey. Nicholai Milyutin, among others, is reported to have suggested this to the Tsar.<sup>82</sup> Consequently, apart from extensive military manoeuvres in the area, a treaty was proposed with Afghanistan which provided for Russian military aid if Afghanistan was invaded by a "foreign power",<sup>83</sup> and the Shah 'requested' the Russian government to undertake the training of the Persian armed forces. It is worth mentioning, however, that though Russia apparently had threatened India through Afghanistan, yet Gock-tepe, Ashakabad and

Merv had not then fallen into Russian hands, and the Trans-Caspian railway did not then exist. Against the concerted Austrian-English threats, a general European conflict was avoided and the Turks made peace with Russia by the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) which bore witness to the overwhelming defeat of Turkey. Thus, by the summer of 1878, the international situation had again changed, and military demonstrations were no longer desired.

Anglo-Russian relations improved as a result of the Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878), which was called by Germany to revise the Treaty of San Stefano. Because of its isolation, further emphasised by the establishment of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy (1879-81), Russia felt that war with Britain should not be risked. The proposed Russo-Afghan Treaty to which the English were opposed, therefore, was never ratified, and military preparations were halted. These sentiments were expressed by the War Minister himself in 1878, saying, "collision with that power (Britain) would be a signal for general and stubborn war...the support of the Afghan Amir would be fitting only if a break with England becomes inevitable. This is what we had in mind at the beginning...when we were preparing for war. Now there can be no question of any active measure on our part".<sup>84</sup> Hence, the Afghan Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-66 & 1869-73) was not helped when he requested aid due to the British invasion of his country in 1878. This policy of

appeasement culminated in the Russian proposal of 1882 for a joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission to demarcate the Russo-Afghan border.<sup>85</sup> Britain declined the proposal, but accepted it two years later when St. Petersburg revived it.<sup>86</sup>

Feelings of mistrust and fears between Britain and Russia, however, survived the Congress of Berlin. Both were apprehensive of each other's activities. A Russian memorandum of early 1880 commented on the British policy: "England is very far from making peaceful pronouncements. On the contrary, she still pursues against us a policy of advance; a policy which becomes more widespread every year. Having subjugated Asiatic Turkey, having destroyed Afghanistan, having close ties with the Turkomans, and trying to win Persia on her side as well, she is beginning deliberately to threaten the Caspian region".<sup>87</sup> The Chief of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I.Z. Zinoviev, is also said to have felt that the reason Russia was drawn eastward from the shores of the Caspian, was the necessity of impressing on the British that Russia was resolved to prevent England from conducting an anti-Russia policy in the Central Asian region. He asserted that if the British were unopposed, they would embark upon a "political programme which would tend towards the spreading of England's influence in Central Asia to extreme limits, to the detriment of the importance of Russia".<sup>88</sup>

Under Alexander III (1881-94), Russia, by and large, stood aloof from the European affairs and ceased to interfere in the concerns of other nations. This policy of 'hands off' had come increasingly in favour following the Congress of Berlin. The Tsar trusted no foreign power; had pronounced mistrust of England, and tolerated no outside meddling in return for his own non-interference.<sup>89</sup> During his reign, Russia resorted to arms only once and that was with Afghanistan in 1885 - culminating in Russian possession of the Merv and Panjdeh Oasis. After 1885, the 'power-vacuum' of Central Asia had been filled by Russia, and boundaries with Persia and Afghanistan had been drawn. After the Russo-Turkish war and the abandonment <sup>of</sup> ~~and~~ Sher Ali to Britain, the regional situation had again changed, and called for demonstration in Central Asia.

Russian objectives had been set out in such a way that Central Asia was merely a means to a higher end; the solution of the Balkan Question. Consequently, when the external pressures called for a demonstration of force in Central Asia, the areas were selected which promised the greatest prospects of success.

In 1878, the area which promised greatest prospects centred around Kabul. A new situation was presented by the British involvement in Sudan. Russia, seeing England busy there, again sought diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Though exhausted by the Boer War (1899-1902), the British were

not prepared to let the Afghan Ameer accommodate the Russian request of establishing diplomatic relations.<sup>90</sup> This was followed by rumours in 1895 of Russian troop concentration at Kusk, about ninety miles from Herat. It would be hardly surprising that the Russians were anxious to take advantage of Britain's loss of face in Asia, but the purpose of these moves, if they existed at all, is difficult to establish.

Against these fears and suspicions present on both sides, the actual barriers imposed by geography deterred both these great powers from undertaking adventurous military campaigns. According to the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission (to define the Afghan borders), the border was "...a rugged and inaccessible spur of the Sarikal range" which carried the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia, and entered into "regions of perpetual snow to its junction with the main range."<sup>91</sup> From this point, for a distance of about 1,200 miles, the Indo-Afghan boundary (the Durand Line) ran south-west till it reached the Persian frontier at the rocky mountains of Koh-i-Malik Shah, in the inhospitable desert regions beyond the Helmund River. To cross these frontiers with the intention of invading India would be too reckless to undertake, especially in the absence of any communication network. The Trans-Caspian railway line was not connected with the main system, either in Europe or in Asia, and was completed only to Kizil-Arvat. In the absence of a railway between this point and Herat, the

concentration of a significantly strong Russian force for the conquest of Afghanistan, let alone the invasion of India, was impossible.

In short, Russia was separated from India by immense distances of sparsely populated bleak mountain-ranges. From such areas the Russians simply could not obtain the supplies and transport necessary for the support and movement of a force large enough to invade India with reasonable chances of success. At the lowest estimate Russia would have required, it was estimated then, an army of 200,000 men to invade India,<sup>92</sup> and for this force all the supplies and transport that could not be raised locally would have had to be brought from Russia.

Even if the Russians had overcome all these problems, which seems highly improbable, would not the Afghans have destroyed or removed all the supplies as they had done to the British army on the Helmund? Moreover, the further the Russian army advanced, the more the dangers of their defeat would have multiplied. Any Russian reverse, even the initial one, would have encouraged the Afghans, Persians and Turkomans to revolt against them. There might even have been a general rebellion throughout Turkistan and trans-Caspian.

Lord Mayo, the British Viceroy in India had summarized such a scenario that if Russia was demented enough to attack India, a handful of British agents and a

few hundred thousand pounds of gold could raise the whole of Central Asia in a holy war, and, "I could make a hotplate for our friend the Bear to dance on".<sup>93</sup> Against such probable heavy odds, it seems improbable that the Russians would ever have seriously entertained the idea of invading India.

Britain's difficulties with the Boers, on the other hand, called for radical re-appraisal of Russian strategy. The Russian Foreign Minister was said to be convinced that military preparedness in Central Asia should be maintained, as the British were always impressed by that. The Cabinet, however, is believed to have agreed that it was more important to win control of the Bosphorus. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister held that when unrest did come, as it would, that would be the time for Russia to avail itself of the opportunity of furthering its influence in Afghanistan.<sup>94</sup>

On the British side, Lord Curzon was convinced that Russia, with the help of France, was preparing in 1903 for a military campaign into Persia.<sup>95</sup> Convinced of Russian advances, Lord Curzon put the Indian army on a war footing. As against Lord Curzon's forward strategy, there was a growing desire in London to come to terms with Russia and France in order to balance the growing power of Imperial Germany.<sup>96</sup> Lord Curzon, less concerned with the balance of power calculations of the London Office, sent the Indian army into Tibet on the pretext of Russian infiltrations there.

All this was happening when the Russians were playing cautious. One example of this is that they made no move to put forward a candidate of their own on the death of the Afghan Amir, Abdul Rehman (r. 1880-1901), and did not contest pro-British Habibullah's accession to the throne (r. 1901-19).<sup>97</sup> In fact, St. Petersburg had now a very low priority for affairs in Central Asia. The Russian Government was pre-occupied instead with the internal turmoil and the Japanese challenge in the Far East. The Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5) and the nature of the Russian Revolution (1905-7) had significant repercussions in the concluding years of the Great Game. Lenin, then relatively unknown, on writing in vperyod (1 January 1905) on "The Fall of the Port Arthur" immediately welcomed the triumph of Japan as the triumph of "progressive" Asia over "backward and reactionary" Europe.<sup>98</sup> The impact of the Russian revolution in the orient was of still greater importance. M. Pavlovitch, a leading Soviet Orientalist, later regarded it as the French Revolution of Asia.<sup>99</sup> A western observer, likewise, later asserted that the Russian Revolution "in many respects had a stronger appeal... than the October Revolution".<sup>100</sup> Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan particularly experienced the full impact of the Russian Revolution.<sup>101</sup> These developments, together with the Franco-Russian Alliance, negotiated under Alexander III (1891-94), paved the way for better relations with England in the



reign of Nicolas II (1894-1917) and Russia hoped to gain British support concerning the Balkans.

All these factors combined to induce Russian statesmen to revive the proposition which had underlined Russian strategy throughout the nineteenth century. This held that Central Asia was a means to a higher end, and of lower priority in itself. The new Russian strategy bargained away the Russian position in Persia in order to gain her objectives in the Near East, resulting in August 1907, in the Anglo-Russian Entente by which Russia recognized Afghanistan as a British sphere; both powers agreed to maintain a 'hands-off' policy in Tibet; and each retained a sphere of influence in Persia - the Russians in the north and the British in the south. Thus, Russia abandoned her previously held position of resistance to British efforts to partition Persia.

In retrospect, it is interesting to recall that the Anglo-Russian partition of Persia created a new problem that instead of constitutional government and social reforms in Persia, the quest for liberation from Tsarist and English 'domination' became the prime consideration. Many organizations were founded to combat foreign domination like Ittehad-e-Islam (1912) of Mirza Kuchuk Khan, becoming prominent in the uprising in northern Iran following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. It was this pre-occupation with national liberation that the Bolsheviks were able to take advantage of in 1917.<sup>102</sup>

Tsarist government's interpretation of four main factors leading to Anglo-Russian rapproachement, as summed up during a conference on the Afghan question, held under the chairmanship of A.P. Izvolsky, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 14 April 1907 is of particular interest: (1) the rapid rise of Germany forced England to change her traditional policy towards Russia; (2) the understanding with England made it easier for Russia to find a common understanding with Japan, already an ally of England; (3) the common fear of the development of national liberation movements in the orient had aroused sympathetic response in a number of oriental countries, like Persia; (4) England's fear that she might lose her colonies as a result of revolution, with the consequent loss of prestige involved, impelled her to make concessions to Russia and to enlist Russian support as a gendarme to help pressure order among the Asiatic peoples.<sup>103</sup>

The Russian position was further elaborated by the Russian Foreign Minister in 1907: "If Russia should be...unable to raise her voice at such a moment of solution of European problems, she should immediately descend to the level of a second rate power. We must put our interests in Asia in their proper place, otherwise we should ourselves become an Asiatic state, which would be the greatest calamity for Russia".<sup>104</sup>

Under this line of thinking, the agreement with Britain proved to be a prelude to the creation of the Triple Entente of Britain, Russia and France. By the out-break of the First

World War, thus, the Russian role in the 'Central Asian Question' had considerably diminished.

The Russian position in Persia was further abandoned during the First World War when in 1915, St. Petersburg agreed to turn over the Neutral Zone, demarcated in 1907, to Britain. In return, Britain promised to support the Russian claims to Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. In a complete reversal of traditional Anglo-French policy on the Straits Question, the so-called Secret Agreement in regard to Constantinople (4 March - 10 April 1915) officially recognized the right of Russia to Constantinople, and also provided for the transfer to her of the western part of the Bosphorous coast. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), disclosed in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, substantially extended the understanding reached by England, France and Russia in 1915. Thus, the Russian strategy of applying presence <sup>sure</sup>~~ence~~ in one area to get concessions in another, applied throughout the nineteenth century, secured her strategic objective: Turkish Straits and Constantinople.

While the Russian Revolution of 1905 was only the "dress rehearsal" according to Lenin,<sup>105</sup> the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had, said Stalin, "ushered a new era, an era of colonial revolutions, which are carried out in the oppressed countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat".<sup>106</sup> No longer according to Stalin, would the countries of the Entente, especially

England, rest secure in their possession of vast colonial areas, for the October Revolution "dealt blows at the imperial rear, at its periphery" by undermining imperialist domination over colonial and dependent countries.<sup>107</sup>

In view of their identification of the Bolshevik Revolution with the national liberation movements in the East, Soviet leaders revised the traditional concept of the Eastern Question which, as we have seen, under the Tsarist regime had meant applying varying degrees of pressure in an area to secure objectives in another. The Bolshevik overtures appeared to remove the threat of Russian expansion at the expense of its southern neighbours like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The Bolsheviks redefined the Eastern Question as one which involved Soviet aid for the liberation of enslaved peoples from domination by "England, France, the United States and other capitalist countries".<sup>108</sup> Thus, the Soviets further broadened the scope of the Eastern Question by including therein the problems of oppressed colonial peoples everywhere:

"The Orient is not only the oppressed Asiatic world. The orient is the entire colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples...Capitalism draws its chief strength, not from industrial European countries, but from the colonial possessions".<sup>109</sup>

## SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICIES

Within days of the Bolsheviks' rise to power, a declaration on the rights of the people of Russia was issued for a just peace without annexations and indemnities based on the right of self-determination. Soon after, on 3 December 1917, "All the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the Orient" - among whom the Persians, Turks, Arabs and Hindus were mentioned specifically - were called upon to overthrow their imperialist rulers and to build their "national life freely and without hindrance."<sup>110</sup> All the secret treaties entered into by the Tsarist regime were declared null and void, and all territorial claims were renounced.<sup>111</sup> Animated with the ideological tenets as these were, the initiatives were also aimed at internal consolidation, external legitimacy and were, as one commentator later concluded, "a response to an outgrowth of Soviet weakness elsewhere" and largely "represented a desperate effort to break through capitalist encirclement".<sup>112</sup>

The first comintern meeting (1919) produced a manifesto in which a section referred to a "series of open risings and revolutionary unrest in all colonies".<sup>113</sup> The oppressed peoples of the world, primarily under British rule, were called upon to rise and join the hands with their Bolshevik counterparts to realize the 'world revolution'. The second Comintern Congress (July 1920) accepting Lenin's optimistic vision of the two stages of revolution in the East, called for creation of an international anti-imperialist front by supporting, in

'backward' countries, the bourgeois democratic movements. The purpose was, in immediate terms, to weaken anti-Soviet imperialist powers. It was hoped that nationalist, bourgeois revolutions in the East, if successful, would eventually result in socialist revolution in the industrialized Europe. The substance of Soviet foreign policy, therefore, was to support nationalist leaders, movements and governments in Asia in order to break Soviet diplomatic isolation on the one hand and create problems for anti-Soviet interventionist forces on the other.

By the end of 1920, however, the conflict between the grand schemes and the adverse conditions at home became increasingly apparent, leading the Bolsheviks to ask for Western aid and capital. An agreement was finally reached with Britain on the much desired trade deal. One of the conditions of the agreement, signed on 16 March 1921, was that

"Each party (will) refrain from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders an official propaganda, direct or indirect,...More specifically, the Russian Soviet government (will) refrain from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form..."<sup>114</sup>

The internal conditions of Soviet Russia which led to, what Lenin called, "concessions" to the capitalist world and the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, also became the basis for the new Soviet foreign policy culminating almost simultaneously in friendship treaties with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, along Soviet southern borders. The Bolsheviks pursued this policy

tactfully, thus avoiding the disruption of its economic relations with the Western capitalist world.

Lenin's "Thesis on National and Colonial Question", adopted by the Second Comintern Congress, was echoed again in the Baku Congress (September 1920). This came very close to calling for a Holy War against Britain - as the old adversary, then encircling the southern borders, was supporting the counter-revolutionaries.<sup>115</sup> Prior to 1921, therefore, Soviet neighbours like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan were primarily treated as one unit in Soviet diplomacy. It was so because all of them were Muslim and shared borders with Soviet Russia, and, all of them were suspicious of British activities and had recognized England as their common enemy. The Soviet leadership, then, tried to cultivate relations with these neighbours in two ways: a) by disassociating itself from all Tsarist claims and territorial designs, b) by offering political, economic and military support to the nationalist leaders of these countries.

Contrary to his initial involvement,<sup>116</sup> Stalin showed no interest in bourgeois democratic or nationalist leaders of Asia. He held that the success of national liberation wars in the colonies and semi-colonies was possible only after revolution had occurred in Europe. He asserted, in 1928, that "there are occasions when the right of self-determination conflicts with the other, the higher right - the right of a working class that has assumed power to consolidate its power. In such cases,

this must be said bluntly, the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship".<sup>117</sup> The Sixth Comintern Congress (1928), under Stalin's directions, adopted the "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi Colonies",<sup>118</sup> which cautioned against "the excessively marked proportion between the objective revolutionary situation and the weakness of the subjective factor". Therefore, the document upheld, "it is necessary to reject the formation of any kind of block" between the Communist Party and reformist (bourgeois or national revolutionary) forces. In other words, revolutions in Asia could occur only as byproduct of revolutions in Europe. Thus, Lenin's "two-stages" formula, for revolutions - which had given the Soviets greater flexibility to deal with the situations prevalent in the Orient - was formally abandoned in favour of a formulation which envisaged revolution only in 'one-stage'. Though the Seventh Cominform Congress (1935) provided for some sort of national front, this stricture remained in force till Stalin's death in 1953. His refusal to deal with the nationalist leaders was further strengthened at the inaugural session of the cominform, in September 1947, when Zhadanov, Stalin's Chief henchman, presented the absolute dichotomy of "two-camps".

Thus, following the treaties of 1921 with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in a bid to sharpen their contradictions with England, the Soviet government turned its attention from the



Orient to Europe. In general, from 1927 to 1941, there was no direct Soviet action on a large scale in these countries and her dealings with the East were primarily undertaken in such a way so as to influence developments in Europe and create difficulties for the colonial powers, particularly the British. The main reason for the comparative lull in Soviet activities in the area was the rise of facism. The USSR placed more and more emphasis on non-aggression pacts with neighbouring countries, normalizing relations with the US, joined the League of Nations in 1934 and entered into an alliance in 1935. Besides, the desperate economic situation in the Soviet domestic front aggravated by famine and the failure of First Five Year Plan coupled with efforts at large-scale industrialization, pre-occupied the Soviet government and deterred it from activities that would unduly antagonize the major colonial powers.

Turkey: Welcoming the Turkish Revolution of 1918-22 as a counterpart of the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet regime described it as "the first Soviet Revolution in Asia".<sup>119</sup> The Soviet leaders appear to have sensed an opportunity to make use of the revolutionary Turkey as the vanguard of revolution in the East, and as an ally against the Entente powers. At the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1921, Stalin asserted: "Turkey, the most politically developed country among the Muslim peoples, has raised the banner of revolt and rallied around itself the people <sup>of</sup> ~~and~~ the East against imperialism"<sup>12</sup> Soviet Russia not only abandoned its claims over Constantinople in May 1917, but also dismissed Milikov, minister of foreign

affairs in the provisional government, who had refused to yield on Tsarist claims.

In September 1919, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Chicherin in a direct appeal reminded to the workers and peasants of Turkey that "so long as your country is led by benal Pashas... there is no salvation for you".<sup>121</sup> Chicherin went on to invite the Turkish toilers "to stretch forth a brotherly hand in order to drive off the European robbers...(and) to destroy and make powerless those within the country who are accustomed to building their happiness on your misfortunes."<sup>122</sup> Moscow knew perfectly well that attempts to create a Turkish Communist Party were not likely to be regarded with favour by the Turks. Ataturk, however, desperately needed help and support which he found nowhere but in Soviet Russia: whereas Moscow was helping a bourgeois nationalist leader to consolidate, Ataturk, at least for a while, showed a degree of tolerance at Moscow's direct overtures to the peasants and workers. Against this backdrop the Turkish appeal "to coordinate labours and military operations against the imperialist governments" did not create enthusiasm on the Bolsheviks' side partly because they did not trust the Turkish nationalists of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois origin as was also reflected later in the September 1920 Baku Conference,<sup>123</sup> and partly because they could not afford to fight on one more front. Thus, Chicherin's reply to Kemal Ataturk on 2 June 1920 made no mention of a common military action.<sup>124</sup>

Growing Bolshevik maturity was reflected in their concern with the consolidation of a strong national government in Turkey as the promise of that country's independence against Western tutelage. In the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November 1922), the Turkish delegates' complaining of government repression in Turkey were commended to support the nationalist movement in any case. In the 12th Russian Communist Party Congress (April 1923) Bukharin restating the Soviet position towards Turkey said: "Turkey, in spite of all persecutions of communists, plays a revolutionary role, since she is a destructive instrument in relation to the imperialist system as a whole".<sup>125</sup>

In line with this friendly diplomatic appeal and the Soviet military aid programme to Turkey, M.W. Frunze (the Commander of the Ukranian Red Army) visited Turkey in the winter of 1921 and reassured the Turks that the Russians would not try to Bolshevize Turkey and recognized that a strong Turkish state would be a most satisfactory guarantee to the security of Soviet borders. His mission led to Russian aid the same year, the precise quantity of which is still largely unknown.<sup>126</sup> Relations further improved as this marked the beginning of, and set the tone of, Turko-Soviet relations that lasted until the eve of the Second World War as keystone of Kemalist foreign policy.

It can be argued that the Turkish Revolution and for some time thereafter, the character of Turkish relations with

the Soviets was contingent upon the policy of Entente powers towards Turkey. In other words, whenever the Turks were hard pressed by the Entente and threatened with dismemberment of their country, they returned inevitably to the USSR for support. On the other hand, in proportion as the Entente powers ceased their pressure and displayed a willingness to compromise, the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement cooled off appreciably.

The alacrity with which the Soviets responded to the Turkish note of 11 April 1936, calling for the revision of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) and particularly to the abrogation of those clauses providing for the demilitarization of the Straits, was typical of the Soviet policy of normalization of relations with neighbouring countries during the period. The subsequent Montreux Convention of 1936 (signed on 20 July 1936) granted Turkey complete sovereignty over the Straits, permitting her to close them to the warships of all nations in the interests of her own security. The USSR was well satisfied with the convention as it safeguarded Soviet exit to the Mediterranean and restricted the naval power of potential enemies in the Black Sea. By the mid-1940s, however, a change in Soviet view was visible as it was stated in 1945: "In spite of some shortcomings in the convention, its acceptance was tremendous victory for Soviet diplomacy".<sup>127</sup> At the end of World War II, however, the USSR demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention because, Moscow charged, it conferred on Turkey the exclusive right to control the Straits to interpret the convention and implement it unilaterally.<sup>128</sup> Stalin not only sought revision of the

Convention and possibly a Soviet base on the Straits, but also hinted at the possible revival of Soviet territorial claims in respect of the Kars and Ardahan areas of Eastern Turkey.<sup>129</sup> These relatively crude attempts at territorial aggrandizement were counterproductive as in response Turkey found itself in alliance with the very powers the Bolsheviks had been helping her to fight with.

Iran: Konstantin Troyanovsky, a Soviet writer, called Iran in 1918 as the "citadel of revolution in the East". He held that the Persian revolution "may become the key to the revolution of the whole Orient...just as Egypt and Suez Canal are the key to English domination in the Orient, Persia is the Suez canal of the Revolution. By shifting the political centre of gravity of the Revolution to Persia, the entire strategic value of the Suez canal is lost..."<sup>130</sup> In other words, a revolution in Persia was desired, first and foremost, to eliminate the British presence from the area. Though the degrees of involvement fluctuated over time, this objective nevertheless captures the central theme of Soviet interests and policies during the period.

Shortly after the appeal to All Muslims of Russia and the East, and in line with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (15 December 1917) between the Bolsheviks and the central powers, the Soviets started withdrawing their forces. The English were quick to fill the 'vacuum' created by the departure of Soviet and Turkish forces, and occupied all of Persia using it as a base of operations against

the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia and Turkestan. Later on, in August 1919, an Anglo-Iranian treaty was signed which transformed the latter into a British protectorate. The Iranian Majlis, however, did not ratify the treaty and Iran (like the Turks after the Treaty of Sevres, and, Afghans during the Third Anglo-Afghan war) turned to Soviet Russia for support.

According to Soviet sources, under the impetus of the October Revolution, there was an upsurge in the national liberation movement in northern Iran, especially in Resht and Enzeli (Pahlevi) and the Shah's governors were removed and local Soviets were established in Gilan by forces headed by Mirza Kauchik Khan and Ehsanullah Khan.<sup>131</sup> The class composition and the need to secure a united front demanded that, in line with the Third International guidelines, the Communist programme be subordinated to local issues in order to concentrate on the one objective common to all - the expulsion of the English from Iran. In absence of strong and influential communists, the Soviets understandably supported the nationalist Islamic reformist movement. Fighting since 1917, but finding themselves in difficult situation, they appealed for help to the Soviets in 1919. The Persian Socialist Republic in Gilan was finally established on 4 June 1920, all this coinciding with Persian-Soviet negotiations to establish diplomatic and trade relations.

To Persian protests on Soviet help, the Bolsheviks denied that there were any Soviet troops involved, only those of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Yet, the Bolsheviks showed

willingness to try to influence the Republic to withdraw its forces from Persia provided the British would do likewise. Moreover, Moscow also declined English overtures to once again partition Persia along the 1907 treaty lines.<sup>132</sup> Finally, England finding it difficult to control whole of Persia, withdrew its forces in May 1921, to be followed by Soviet evacuations completing in September. This made way for Reza Khan's forces to enter Gilan, where upon the Gilan Republic came to an end within days. It can be argued that the Soviet support for "bourgeois democratic" movement of Kauchik Khan was to sharpen still further the strong anti-British feelings then prevailing in Tehran. With the establishment of relations with Persia, the signing of friendship treaty, and the evacuation of British troops, the Soviets found it more advantageous to end their military presence in Gilan. The proposition, it appears, was simple: If the Bolsheviks remained in Gilan, the British would continue to occupy the South.

Reza Khan took control of Tehran on 21 February 1921, and signed a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia on 26 February 1921, on the same day that the 1919 treaty with Britain was formally renounced. The Friendship treaty, as it had been set out earlier in a Soviet note of 26 July 1919,<sup>133</sup> renounced all Tsarist privileges and concessions. Article VI of the treaty gave Soviet Russia right "to advance its troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence". In October 1927, a non-aggression

and neutrality treaty was signed prohibiting political alliances or agreements directed against the "safety of the territory of territorial waters of the other contracting party or its integrity, independence or sovereignty".<sup>134</sup> Originally directed against the activities of 'white' Russians in Persia, the Soviets invoked the treaty in 1950s charging that the ties established with the US (CENTO) were in violation of this and the 1921 treaty. The main objective evidently was the elimination of British, and later in 1950s, the American influence.

In the Rise of Reza Khan,<sup>135</sup> the Soviets saw the rise of a national liberation movement of "an anti-imperialist character" characterizing a turn from feudalism to capitalism, representing a nationalism primarily directed against Britain.<sup>136</sup> Thus, Soviet trade (particularly with Iran's northern provinces) expanded rapidly, and with the completion of trans-Iranian railways, the USSR in 1930s came to occupy first place in Iran's foreign trade. From late 1930s onwards, however, Nazi Germany started replacing USSR as Iran's Trading partner.<sup>137</sup> The Soviets responded by further increasing their attention on developments in Europe.

During the World War II, though Reza Khan declared his country's neutrality, but tended to favour Germany especially by refusing to expel Germans from the territory and permitting Iran to be used as a route for transport<sup>ation</sup> of Western aid to the Soviet Union. The Gulf route had acquired strategic importance for the western supplies to the USSR by its western allies. This led to Soviet and British forces, now allies in a common



war against Nazi Germany, to enter Iran on 25 August 1941 and force Reza Khan to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The British-Soviet occupation was formalized by a treaty of allies between UK, USSR and Iran (January 1942), ensuring respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran, and declared that all occupant forces would withdraw their forces within six months of the end of the war. Despite the declarations of the Tehran Conference (28 November-1 December 1943) between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, the Soviets, however, were reluctant to withdraw their forces. Instead, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic were established in the Soviet occupied areas on 12 and 15 December 1945 respectively. The Iranian Prime Minister in order to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops, signed an agreement establishing a joint Soviet-Iranian company (51% Soviet shares) to exploit northern Iran's oil reserves, gave the Tudeh Party three ministerial level portfolios in the central cabinet and promised to enter into negotiations with the Azerbaijan Democratic Party,<sup>138</sup> recognizing it as the legal principal government. The Tudeh Party which was established in January 1942, though was particularly strong in Azerbaijan and other industrialized and Soviet occupied areas, was weakened by the establishment (September 1945) of Azerbaijan Democratic Party. Paradoxically, the Soviets gave the ADP more influential role.<sup>139</sup> All this resulted in Soviet troop evacuation in May 1946, and within a few months, the collapse of the two republics. Iranian Majlis, as it had done earlier in 1919 on the issue Anglo-Persian treaty,

refused to ratify the agreement on 22 October 1947. It is worth-mentioning that Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq was then leading the Majlis and was soon to get Soviet support over the oil nationalization issue (1951-1953) against Britain and the United States. Mossadeq was a millionaire landlord, "a bourgeois nationalist", and Stalin trusted, if any one, only the Communists, yet he extended Soviet support because he did not want Mossadeq to replace, in Soviet view, the declining British power with the rising American influence in the area.<sup>140</sup>

After Mossadeq's refusal to renew Soviet fishing concessions in the southern Caspian, Stalin's suspicion of Mossadeq increased considerably and contributed to his decision not to support him directly and act through the Tudeh Party against his arch rival - the Great Britain. Stalin died in March, whereas the Shah was forced to leave Iran in August 1953. The new <sup>Soviet</sup> leadership, responding cautiously, could not grapple with opportunities available to the Tudeh Party from April to August 1953. This caution, however, made it possible to sign a trade agreement with Iran in September 1953 and in December 1954 on exchange of certain border areas.

Afghanistan: When the Soviet Russia withdrew its forces from Persia in March 1918, the British quickly occupied not only the whole of Persia but also entered in the Russian Central Asia. The Afghans saw in these British moves first a complete encirclement to be followed by ~~the inevitably leading~~ ~~to~~ complete liquidation. The Afghans were, therefore, favourably

disposed towards the Soviet moves of renunciation of all Tsarist territorial claims and unequal treaties, and had welcomed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty of 3 March 1918.

After pro-British Habibullah's (r. 1901-1919) assassination on 21 February 1919, and in the wake of sharp criticism of him by the young Afghans, the new Afghan Amir, King Amanullah (r. 1919-1929) within a week announced that "Afghanistan would henceforth be a free and independent country which recognizes no foreign domination over it".<sup>141</sup> Sensing the anti-British character of this declaration the Bolsheviks were the first to extend recognition of the full sovereignty of the Afghan state on 27 March 1919. A few days later, the Soviet Russia sent to the participants of the Paris Peace Conference a document containing the conditions for concluding peace with Soviet Russia, of which the first was the mutual obligation of all states not to use force to subvert the legal government of Afghanistan.<sup>142</sup> These initial moves provided sufficient ground to initiate, on the highest level, diplomatic correspondence. Calling Bolsheviks as the "friends of humanity" who had "voiced the principle of the freedom of equality of nations and peoples of the whole world",<sup>143</sup> King Amanullah on 7 April 1919, sent a personal message to Lenin. A similar letter was sent by the Afghan Foreign Minister, Mahmood Tarzi, to his Soviet counterpart, G.V. Chicherin. Three weeks later, on 21 April, Amanullah sent another delegation to prepare the ground for establishing the necessary friendship between the two governments. Central Asia then had yet to be

Bolshevized and Afghanistan was faced with the Third Anglo-Afghan war. Lenin, in order to win Amanullah, replied on 27 May 1919 that "an attempt by Afghanistan to follow the Russian example would be the best guarantee of strength and independence of the Afghan state".<sup>144</sup> He further stressed that "the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two people will open broad opportunities for mutual help against any encroachment on the part of foreign predators on others' freedom of possession".<sup>145</sup>

Not used to such a favourable reply by a great power, Amanullah felt indebted to the Soviets not only for such a reply but also for turning back, in the spring of 1919, the attack in Turkestan and forcing the British command to abandon the plans of opening another front against Afghanistan from the north.<sup>146</sup> By the Treaty of Rawalpindi (8 August 1919), within two months of the termination of war and coinciding with the Soviet consolidation in Central Asia, the British accepted Afghanistan's independence in internal as well as in external affairs. Later, on 14 October, Lenin in an apparent bid to win Amanullah and question British position in the East, was reported to have stressed that insofar as Afghanistan was the only independent *Muslim* state in the world, the "great historical task befell on it of unifying around itself all the enslaved Muslim nations and leading them on the path of freedom and independence".<sup>147</sup> Encouraged by the friendlier gestures, Amanullah in May 1920 requested general assistance from Moscow as well as <sup>it</sup> commercial

treaty. By September 1920 the two sides initiated the first text of the treaty which was finally signed on 28 February 1921 - two days before a similar treaty was signed with Persia. The first Soviet military and financial assistance began in 1919 with several subsidies, followed by a gift of 13 airplanes, plus ~~pelits~~<sup>pilots</sup>, mechanics, transportation specialists and telegraph operators. Before 1928, the USSR established an air route for Moscow to Kabul via Tashkent.<sup>148</sup> Modest in quantity but significant in political terms, the Soviet aid reduced Afghanistan's critical dependence for personal subsidies and transit rights on the British India.

Nevertheless, Soviet annexations of Khiva and Bukhara, involvement in Iran in May 1920, and perceived involvement in the creation and activities of democratic organizations in Afghanistan cautioned King Amanullah.<sup>149</sup> The Afghan King welcomed the Bukharan Amir as a state guest in March 1921. Feeling threatened by Soviet consolidation in Central Asia, an area where Amanullah himself was nursing the idea of confederation under his leadership, he signed an agreement with British in November 1921 in an effort to counter-balance.

The relationship between the two countries in the inter-war period (1919-1939) was governed primarily by the security concerns of the both and then of the Soviet government which feared the use of Afghan territory by Nazi Germany for an attack on the vulnerable Soviet Asian flank.<sup>150</sup> It was, however, not until the death of Stalin that the Soviet leadership began

its policy of economic and political involvement in response, at least in part, to Pakistani, Iranian and Turkish decision to join the American led Baghdad Pact.

The sharp decline of Soviet influence in this period can be measured from the fact that the very states Soviet Russia had counted upon - Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan - joined with Iraq in July 1937, in Tehran to conclude the Saadabad Pact,<sup>151</sup> after the settlement of Iran-Iraq boundary dispute. Moscow viewed <sup>this</sup> its 'Near Eastern Entente' as a British scheme to create a chain of alliances along the southern Soviet border and to ensure joint action on the part of the member countries to stemp out the national liberation movement.<sup>152</sup> It later served as a pattern for the Baghdad Pact (1955).

In the 1930s there appeared in the area German secret agents in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, with the alleged object of creating bases for an ultimate attack on the USSR. While Iran remained an area of intense activity <sup>of</sup> and Nazi agents, they were also strong in Egypt and Iraq. Nazi propaganda appealed to the Muslims to join forces with the Nazis under the leadership of Fuhrer against Comintern.<sup>153</sup> The success of the Nazi propaganda campaign was reflected in the spectacular increase in German-Iranian trade, at the cost of Soviet Iranian trade.<sup>154</sup> On the other hand, British colonial authorities appear to have evinced a considerable degree of tolerance towards the Nazis in their colonies as the British regarded the USSR as a greater potential

threat than the Germans.<sup>155</sup> On the other side, as we have seen, the ~~USSR~~ that the initial Soviet concern about the British presence along its southern borders was replaced first by Nazi Germans and after the World War II, the United States.

## CHAPTER-2

### SOVIET VIEW OF THE THIRD WORLD

The 1960s were marked by a new phase in Soviet policy towards the Persian Gulf. Developments particular to the region apart, this was in line with a general doctrinal re-appraisal of the newly independent countries. The purpose of this section is to bring into perspective the doctrinal contours within which the Soviet leaders explain their policies towards the "Third World". Without going deeply into the details of doctrinal intricacies, an attempt is made to highlight the revolutionary-in-appearance patterns within which Soviet actions, or lack of them, are justified. Given the flexibility inherent in the Soviet official ideology, 'power-politics' may be explained as an indivisible part of ideology. The nature of questions from Lenin's time has been the same: How much weight ought to be given to the 'subjective' factors against the 'objective' conditions? What should be the criteria and extent of support for wars of national liberation? And at what cost?

The concept of national liberation is the single most powerful ideological tenet providing the Soviets with a perspective for their relations with the developing countries. Its guiding principles are traced from Lenin's writings.<sup>1</sup> The 'victorious' proletariat is held duty-bound to consolidate its gains and continue strengthening itself internationally.



Capitalizing on the inherent contradictions of capitalism is thought to be one way of achieving these objectives, as is helping the wars of national liberation. The entire perspective is double-edged: it aims at not only abandoning wars with the capitalist bloc and gathering dividends peacefully, but also at transforming it eventually into the socialist system. The revolutions in the Third World, it is hoped, will hasten the inevitable process of history. In the absence of a fixed time-table, the time scale is flexible.

Stalin's time was the most restrictive in ideological terms. His pre-occupations are described in "Socialism in one country."<sup>2</sup> He refused to acknowledge national liberation struggles and national revolutionary leaders. His formula was a simple one: once the national bourgeoisie had assumed political power and had become the ruling class, it was no longer capable of playing a revolutionary role. He theoretically justified support to bourgeois nationalist movements, but refused to deal with their governments. As for nationalist governments, these were not independent at all; their independence was considered to be phoney, and their leaders were seen as agents of imperialism. Soviet interests in Afro-Asia declined and relations became increasingly strained. In the words of Deutscher, "Stalinism neglected and then suppressed...internationalism, and it sought to elevate the isolation of the Russian revolution to a virtue and a theoretical principle".<sup>3</sup>

The impulse for change can be traced back to 1949.<sup>4</sup> It was in 1952, however, that the 19th Party Congress put together, sometimes mutually exclusive, stirrings of the previous years.<sup>5</sup> But any substantial change in policy had to await Khrushchev's advent to power in the hey-day of the Cold War.

In his turn, Khrushchev undertook new policy initiatives soon after assuming the role of the First Secretary of the Party. Prepared to respond to developments on the world scene, and particularly in the 'Third World', Khrushchev gave his blessing to nationalist governments. As for ideological re-appraisal, this started with the 20th Party Congress of 1956, but it was not until 1960-61 that it got its final shape. The new doctrinal innovations had to take into account not only the attacks from within and from China, but also the new stage of development which the progressive regimes had attained in the U.A.R., Burma, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and later in Cuba and Algeria.<sup>6</sup> Underlying the immense optimism that the newly born countries could be lined-up in a joint anti-imperialist struggle, was the Khrushchevian endeavour to exploit the 'subjective' conditions.

At the 20th Party Congress, the Stalinist "two-camps" formula was abandoned in favour of a demarcation of the world into 'two-zones'. The idea of peaceful co-existence was elevated from the tactical plane, where it had been since Lenin's time, to the doctrinal level. The competition between capitalism

and socialism was now to be carried out on the economic front. This broader framework was in line with a slogan issued for the first May Day after Stalin's death: "There is no controversial or unresolved question which cannot be solved by peaceful means, through mutual negotiations of interested parties".<sup>7</sup> This orientation was also designed to win the developing countries to the Soviet side. In delivering the Central Committee Report to the 20th Congress, Khrushchev asserted that the zone of peace now "embraces tremendous expanses of the globe inhabited by nearly 1,500,000,000 people - that is, the majority of the population of our planet".<sup>8</sup> This ambitious policy re-orientation demanded many 'concessions' vis-a-vis the bourgeois nationalist leaders.

Nationalism, for the first time, was regarded as a positive force in the developing countries. The progressive aspects of 'state nationalism' were seen as distinguishable from the reactionary aspects of 'tribal nationalism'. New evaluations, acknowledging the positive aspects of the phenomenon, urged their utilization as long as they played a progressive, anti-imperialist role.<sup>9</sup>

The re-appraisal can be seen from the writings of one Middle-East expert, L. Votolina. In 1955 she asserted that only the proletariat could lead the national liberation movement; "the bourgeoisie had tried out at times to put itself at the head of the movement, but (in) wavering and (being) inclined to compromise with imperialism, it had

shown itself incapable of leadership".<sup>10</sup> A year later she changed her position to maintain that the "active and widespread participation of the bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle was a characteristic feature of the anti-imperialist battle in the Middle East; the national bourgeoisie had grown much stronger, whereas the proletariat was only beginning to play the role of a vanguard".<sup>11</sup> Brutents, a prolific writer, went a step further and declared that the revolutionary democrats express the interests of the masses.<sup>12</sup>

Though the developing countries lacked a proletariat, it was held, they could still adopt a socialist orientation, and the international socialist system could be substituted for the role of the working class. Great hopes were built up by the national liberation wars which were intermingled with "Scientific Socialism". These hopes led the Meeting of Communist and Worker's Parties in 1960 to declare: "The impact of the national liberation movement is a development ranking second in historical importance only to the formation of the world socialist system".<sup>13</sup> Brutents further explained that the leading role of the internationalist proletariat "naturally does not put it 'above' the forces of national liberation. It merely gives it one privilege - to be the organizer of the (national liberation) struggle...the national liberation movement is an important and independent force of historical progress".<sup>14</sup> The same commentator added a few years later that national liberation revolutions "being

an organic part of this (transition to socialism) world-wide process, are intricately anti-imperialist in nature. Their historic mission is...to pave the way for the socialist remarking of history". He claimed that, "the epoch of transition from Capitalism to Socialism on a world-wide scale, and the social processes in the newly independent countries, cannot be isolated from this transition".<sup>15</sup>

The concept of the 'national front' was broadened to its extreme limits. The Congress of 81 Parties declared the 'alliance of the working class and peasantry' as the most important force within a broad national front of "all elements of the nation prepared to fight for national independence against imperialism".<sup>16</sup> Later, the concept was further broadened to include "support from all persons at all levels of society, as long as they opposed imperialism".<sup>17</sup> The transition from a state of national democracy to socialism was hoped to be non-violent, and sometimes even parliamentary.<sup>18</sup> The Manifesto of 81 Communist Parties declared, "the people of all colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and non-revolutionary methods, depending on the specific conditions of the country concerned".<sup>19</sup> The road to their national independence was through 'national democracy'.

The Congress of 81 Communist Parties brought into focus the doctrine of 'national democracy'. This was further elaborated a year later, at the 22nd Party Congress. National democracy was held to be a higher phase of the national

liberation movement, in which the national bourgeoisie is compelled to share power with other forces. A national democratic state, it was recommended, must fight against imperialism and feudalism, for its political and economic independence. It must "reject dictatorial and despotic methods of government", and it must give its people "broad political rights and liberties" (including the formation of Communist parties), to "participate in shaping government policy", and "to work for agrarian reforms".<sup>20</sup> It was not a programme for a socialist revolution; rather a transitory phase "consistent completion of anti-imperialist, ~~anti-imperialist~~, anti-feudal, democratic revolution".<sup>21</sup> It was the duty of the local Communist parties to create such national democracies, by accepting a subordinate role, and by helping the bourgeois nationalist leaders to travel along the 'non-capitalist path' of development.<sup>22</sup>

The non-capitalist way of development was explained more in economic terms than socially or politically. This was a status attributed to the states occupying a special place in each system, forming a special sector of the world economy, which was no longer capitalist, but at the same time, not yet socialist. It aspired to the attainment of economic independence to supplement the political independence of the newly independent countries. To go along this path was possible only in the conditions of industrialization in the state sector. Unlike monopoly capitalism, this state capitalism was viewed as a progressive force. In the words of a writer in

Osnovy Marksizma, "in the countries of the East, State Capitalism in its present form is not a tool of imperialist monopolies, on the contrary it stimulates an anti-imperialist movement".<sup>23</sup> To a more ambitious commentator like Brutents, it was "a specific form of transition to socialism".<sup>24</sup> The non-capitalist path of development could only be adopted with the aid and assistance of the Soviet Union, and progressively diminishing reliance on the Capitalist bloc.

Such a programme of industrialization in Khrushchev's days, essentially meant the establishment of heavy and basic industries in the state sector. It was envisaged that these prestigious projects would create a working class and thus lay the foundations of future socialism. The supply of arms, especially after 1965, was not ruled out. Some scope was also conceded to the private sector and imperialist aid from the West.

Of the regimes which were declared 'progressive' in the early 1960s - Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the UAR and Algeria - none had accepted, ipso facto, the notion of 'national democracy'. Instead, they practically rejected the idea of allowing the communist parties to function openly, let alone participate in governmental decision-making. By early 1963, the Communist parties in these countries had even been banned, in favour of One Party Systems.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, however, some of these regimes also inaugurated measures for the nationalization of capital, domestic and foreign, and undertook some internal socio-economic reforms aimed at social

revolution. They were also willing to meet another pre-condition: rely on the support of the Soviet bloc (sometimes inevitably, as the Western bloc was denying it). In other words, even without the existence of legal Communist parties, these regimes were prepared to walk along the non-capitalist way of development. Soon they also started claiming that they were building their own brands (African, Arab, etc.) of socialism.

Khrushchev's reactions, dissident opinions<sup>26</sup> and some of his own flamboyant statements apart, were still favourable.<sup>27</sup> Considering that the economic reforms undertaken by these countries were more radical than the theories elucidating them, the bourgeois nationalist leaders were still playing a progressive role. Mirsky held that their revolution "can immediately break the framework of bourgeois democratic revolution", and that "if the conditions for proletarian leadership have not yet matured, the historic mission can be carried out by elements close to the political, military and economic requisites for the continuous advance of the national liberation revolution".<sup>28</sup> Brutents, after criticizing, the local brands of socialism, maintained: "Though at times infected with nationalistic and other prejudices, they reflect the militant democratic sentiments of the masses, profound hatred of capitalism, warm sympathy with the people's sufferings, and a desire to give them a better life. Such theories are capable of serving, not as antipodes to scientific socialism, but as a step towards it".<sup>29</sup> Khrushchev, in his



endeavour to exploit the subjective conditions, had already declared in 1961 that to lead all other Communist parties from a single country "is both impossible and unnecessary".<sup>30</sup> Later, he claimed, "today practically any country, irrespective of its level of development, can enter on the road leading to socialism".<sup>31</sup> The only political requirement from these nationalist bourgeois leaders was internal democracy for the progressive elements, but not necessarily for the Communist parties. Theorizing on the type of non-capitalist path which these countries had followed, this was explained that they were 'revolutionary democratic' states. Instead of alienating themselves from the masses by opposing these nationalist leaders, the local communists were urged to play the role of their friend and assistant. They were even encouraged to join these progressive parties. On the external front, the strengthening of socio-political and economic ties, and "close alliance and co-operation" with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which were "helping them to resist imperialist pressure" was "an important condition for their struggle".<sup>32</sup> This is how these regimes were extended with extensive support, political as well as economic.

The assumptions underlying Khrushchev's optimism were never immune to criticism. An under-current of dissident opinion seems to have gained ground from about 1962-1963.<sup>33</sup> Particularly disillusioned were those who hoped to reap dividends immediately.<sup>34</sup> Only a very small, and even that

insignificant, number of developing countries, decided to travel the non-capitalist path. N.A. Simoniya, for example, noted that most of the Afro-Asian countries have actually chosen the capitalist road. Thus, "one cannot speak of growing into socialism" as the "prevalent tendency" in the development of national liberation revolutions.<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that Simoniya was not the only Soviet expert to express this pessimism.<sup>36</sup>

Of those who had professed the non-capitalist path, most were overthrown by military coups in less than a decade - Ben Bella (Algeria), Keita (Mali), Nkrumah (Ghana) and Sukarno (Indonesia). This led the ideologues to underline the importance of 'vanguard' parties, within the existing popular parties or independently. These could institutionalize the revolutionary policies of the individual leaders after their disappearance or betrayal. V. Kudryavtsev, for example, expressed this disillusionment in Izvestiya (December 11, 1966) that in the developing countries "...the subjective factor had great and sometimes decisive significance; that is, the devotion to the idea of socialism of the state leaders...whose power is enormous and whose authority is unquestioned...if for certain reasons the leader decides to turn the helm of the leadership to the right, or if he is over-thrown, a serious threat to revolution arises..."<sup>37</sup> These events had also brought into focus the threat to the continued success of the non-capitalist way caused by domestic political instability. The weakness of the policy which relied

heavily on a single (charismatic) nationalist leader, demanded a more cautious and enduring policy.<sup>38</sup> The question was: are these nationalist leaders worth the drain on the Soviet economy to the extent Khrushchev had promised?

The experience had shown that the class character of different interacting forces needed a thorough re-assessment. It was felt that it was "difficult to generalize socio-economic developments" in the Third World. It was also acknowledged that "it was only in relatively recent times" that the study of the "diverse forms and methods of class struggle in the Third World had begun."<sup>39</sup> The new leadership, aware of these limitations, entertained a rigorous and detailed analysis of the 'subjective' conditions prevailing in the developing countries. Displaying less enthusiasm to create subjective conditions hurriedly, the new leadership placed an emphasis on availing itself of more opportunities - and that, without undertaking many risks.

It can also be suggested that by the mid-1960s - there was relatively less urgency to pretend and project the USSR as a desperate superpower running after clients. As Brezhnev had said, the International Socialist System had reached 'the stage of maturity'. The Brezhnev-Kosygin style of leadership also coincided with the severe economic problems in the 7-Year Plan (1959-1965) in the internal front,<sup>40</sup> and detente on the international level.

Broadly working within the Khrushchevian framework, the new leadership showed a more restrained and less wishful attitude towards the national liberation struggle.<sup>41</sup> The progressive nature of the revolutionary democracies and the gains the non-capitalist path had made were still hailed, but not without ambivalence and reservations. The concept of the 'national front' was upheld, "the utility of all patriotic and democratic forces is still the most important requisite for the success of this (national liberation) struggle. It becomes an objective necessity because (of) imperialism and neo-colonialism..."<sup>42</sup> The primacy of the ideological work, however, was thought to be fundamentally important for socialist development. But in the absence of a strong proletariat, bourgeois nationalist leaders were to continue playing their leading role with ever-increasing ties with the victorious proletariat.<sup>43</sup> This was affirmed by the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, "experience shows that the struggle for social progress and national independence, where there is greater unity of all patriotic and democratic forces". Under revolutionary leadership, the U.A.R., Algeria, Guinea, Burma, Congo (Brazzaville) had carried out, it was declared, "important social transformations", and had "taken the socialist path".<sup>44</sup>

There was a strengthening of demarcation between the roles of the working class and the national bourgeoisie. The immediate task of national fronts was the eradication

of imperialistic influence by undertaking reforms internally and by strengthening relations with the Socialist countries externally.

"Only strong unity...on an anti-imperialist basis...and their close alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries can bring their tasks to fulfilment".<sup>45</sup> It was underlined, however, that the bourgeois nationalist parties, despite their progressive role, would not substitute the politically 'conscious' role of the working class.<sup>46</sup> Pravda passed this judgement in 1969 that, "Life has proved that the task of national democratic revolution...cannot be carried out under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie."<sup>47</sup> Pravda also proclaimed that it was "first of all the peoples of the young national states who can put an end to all forms of colonialism and raise the economy and culture of these countries... The socialist countries...cannot take the place of the peoples of the young national states in solving the tasks of the national liberation movement".<sup>48</sup> The Kommunist declared the same year that the "transition to the socialist stage is possible only as a result of revolutionary transformations affected in the course of the working class, headed by a genuinely revolutionary party, armed with a proletarian ideology".<sup>49</sup>

As for local brands of socialism, there are no socialisms but "universal scientific socialism".<sup>50</sup> The revolutionary role can be played, it was held, by the classes

other than the working class. While the national bourgeoisie "could be admitted" into the national democratic front, the leadership of the front "must be in the hands of the worker-peasant alliance...or democratic intellectuals who accept Marxism-Leninism".<sup>51</sup>

That the revolutionary role of the national fronts was upheld can be seen in the Basic Document adopted by the 1969 Moscow Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties. It observed, "our era is an era of transition from capitalism to socialism...the role of the revolutionary democratic forces has grown...(it) offers the possibility of eliminating the backwardness...and creating the conditions for the transition to socialist development".<sup>52</sup> This thesis was again upheld by the 24th Party Congress in 1974, which stated that the struggle against imperialism "largely depends on the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces, (and) above all of the World Communist Movement".<sup>53</sup>

One finds that the principal requisites did not include the functionary role for the Communist parties.<sup>54</sup> In the absence of the 'vanguard' parties, the revolutions would naturally vary in their forms. Uri Andropov, quoting Lenin, raised this aspect of the problem:

"All nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable - but they will not all arrive at it in the same way; each will make its own unique contribution in the shape of a certain form of democracy, a particular variety of the

dictatorship of the proletariat, or a different pace in the socialist transformation of different aspects of social life".<sup>55</sup>

Instead of insisting on a role for the Communist parties, frequent reference was made to the examples of the Soviet Central Asian Republics and to Mongolia, where the Socialist revolution took place "even without the direct guidance of the working class".<sup>56</sup> Here, too, one finds reservations. Zhukov, for example, pointed out that "they relate to the parts of the SU which were under the influence of the Russian proletariat...this example is therefore less typical and can hardly be referred to...".<sup>57</sup>

It was no longer the fashion to intermingle the non-capitalist path with 'scientific socialism'. Nor was the notion patronized that revolutionary movements would automatically grow into socialism. Support for the liberation movements was consistently reiterated, but within the framework of an international class struggle. It was held that the non-capitalist way would 'entail a change in the class struggle of society'. Therefore, it was only 'a means' for creating socio-political conditions which would "pave the way for the transformation to socialism".<sup>58</sup>

As for the growth of the state sector, it was not equal to 'scientific construction'. Rather, it meant "on the one hand, the limitation of the positions of the national bourgeoisie, and on the other, the strengthening of the

positions of the working class".<sup>59</sup> Simoniya defined the non-capitalist path of development sombrely: "That specific type of transition to socialism in which the stages of democratic transformation in previously backward countries, is accomplished under the leadership of revolutionary democracy, whose radical section, concurrently with these transformations, gradually goes over to the position of scientific socialism".<sup>60</sup> This re-orientation can be summarized in the words of Nikolayev:<sup>61</sup>

"the non-capitalist path of development is the shortest way of building a modern independent economy. But it is not identical with outright construction of socialism...(I)t is premature to regard the countries developing non-capitalist way, as already being at the stage of socialist construction".

The re-assessment was coupled with a re-appraisal of the general status of the national liberation movements. By 1964, it was not regarded as a socialist path, ipso facto, but as a lower stage of development. National liberation wars were held to be an 'organic' and 'integral' part of the development of world revolution, but in the three streams of the world revolutionary process - the national liberation movement, the international Communist and worker's movement, and the socialist commonwealth - the first one was 'an ally' of the later two.<sup>62</sup> Simoniya held that "to say their tasks (national liberation wars) merge with the tasks of socialist revolutions, and to suppose the decisive internal factor of leadership of workers, is to



exaggerate the significance of the external factor".<sup>63</sup>

The leading, rather decisive, role was reserved essentially for the Soviet Union, as the assistance given by the USSR had "become a most important international factor".<sup>64</sup>

Brezhnev, in his Central Committee Report to the 23rd Party Congress, concluded his section devoted to the developing areas, by saying that "the successes of the national liberation movement are inseparably bound with the success of world socialism and the international working class".<sup>65</sup>

It was held that because of the experience the Soviet Union had had, and its deterrent power against imperialist ploys to undermine the revolutionary movements, the USSR had a 'paralysing effect'. And that the national liberation movements were gaining their strength because of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev went a step further and declared that the developing countries "are fully aware that the policy of the USSR, and even the very existence of the Socialist power, is an important factor contributing to protect their independence".<sup>66</sup>

This line of thinking was further elaborated by invoking another doctrinal tenet, that is, building the socialist countries up so that they could guard the international interests of the working class. Throughout 1965-66, the press and the ideologues continually referred to this 'primary' international duty of building socialism in the Soviet Union.<sup>67</sup> In the presence of a stronger Soviet Union,

it would be "much easier to march along the (non-capitalist) road".<sup>68</sup> It was stressed that the additional opportunities to extend all-round external economic ties were created by the USSR's steady growth. Brezhnev observed that "the most valuable contribution of the peoples of the Socialist countries to the common revolutionary cause was the development and strengthening of the world socialist system."<sup>69</sup> In other words, the best way to support the national liberation struggles was to build the Soviet State.

The fate of most of the countries which had adopted the non-capitalist path in the 1960s, had clearly resulted in disillusionment. Though still insisting on the virtues of the non-capitalist way, the Soviets from the mid-1960s, displayed great flexibility in dealing with regimes of all complexions. While Soviet policy in Afro-Asia remained important the Brezhnev era de-emphasised the importance of spectacular short-run gains in the Developing Countries. It was hoped that in the 'multi-cultural states', even the capitalist way of development, and the imperialist finances in form of aid or investment, could play an 'objectively progressive' role. The non-capitalist path of development was, thus, redefined.

Though still as vocal and revolutionary in appearance as it was earlier, the Brezhnev leadership avoided, like its predecessors, defining the extent of its support to national liberation wars. The dysfunction of earlier optimisms eventually

resulted in readiness to come to terms with all sorts of regimes, and in abandoning Lenin's thesis that the revolutions could occur in the 'weakest link' of the world-wide chain of imperialism. In the words of Kolakowski:

"...even the rhetoric of Soviet ideology has considerably changed since Stalin's time. It is now a vague, incoherent, pot-pourri of phrases, mixing old communist tenets with ill-concealed nationalist slogans...ideology is not an independent variable shaping their decisions, even if these decisions are justified and presented in ideological terms".<sup>70</sup>

It was with this framework of ideological re-appraisal for the Third World that the post-1964 Soviet leadership formulated its strategy for the countries of the Persian Gulf region in general and Iraq in particular. Though the ruling Ba'th Party was considered by Moscow as a "bourgeois democratic movement" reflecting the interests of the non-proletarian working masses, nevertheless, Soviet analysts have asserted that one of the principal achievements of the 1958 revolution in Iraq was the establishment of "relations of friendship and cooperation" between the USSR and Iraq. Moreover, in retrospect, they have also asserted that relations between the two states reached "a higher plane" following the Ba'thist coup in 1968.<sup>71</sup>

Moscow's keenness for friendlier relations with a progressive regime can be seen from that when Colonel Abdel-Salam Aref, who had persecuted the communists rather liberally, nationalized all private and foreign banks,

insurance companies and thirty industrial and commercial concerns in July 1964, it was commented that the "progressive character of the measures undertaken by the Iraqi government is obvious. They can serve as a basis for further reforms in other areas of the Iraqi economy".<sup>72</sup> These measures not only prompted Soviet support for Iraqi government's handling of the Kurdish problem, but also Soviet military and economic aid. It was further declared that Iraq was pulling closer to those countries which "have decisively chosen the path of social renovation and progress".<sup>73</sup>

When in July 1968 the Ba'thists returned to power, Mirsky, a Soviet commentator, held that despite "whatever distortions and zigzags" the Iraqi revolution has undergone since 1958, the Ba'thist seizure of power" does not alter the historical significance of Iraq's anti-feudal anti-imperialist revolution". He also cautioned that "an anti-imperialist foreign policy can win the new government mass support".<sup>74</sup> Once in power, the Ba'th regime attempted to widen the 'social base' through cooperating with the communists. Without legalizing the Communist Party, hundreds of communists were released from jails and a communist was given a ministerial portfolio. This, coupled with anti-imperialist Iraqi campaign was ~~responded~~ <sup>answered</sup> by Moscow by increasing economic and military assistance. Thus, Primakov observed in Pravda (18 September 1969) that the Ba'th Party is "undergoing a definite ideological evolution".<sup>75</sup> Coinciding with the March 1970 agreement with the Kurds was the Soviet

comment that "now the most important national problem was the creation of a unified national democratic front of all progressive forces".<sup>76</sup> Besides, Moscow also showed its satisfaction and support on progressive legislation in the field of agrarian reforms, social security, worker's pensions and the new labour laws. Thus, the Ba'thist Iraq was, in Moscow's view, a progressive state marching along the non-capitalist path of development. Moscow, therefore, had no hesitation in accepting bourgeois nationalist leaders leading ~~to~~ national liberation movement in Iraq as Aleksey Kosygin (Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Politburo member) stated in February 1972, two months before signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation:

The development of all-round cooperation with (Iraq) is not determined by any circumstantial considerations but stems from the general trend of the Soviet foreign policy, from the peace program that was set out in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress...we are convinced that our foreign policy programme...(is) aimed at consolidation of peace in support of the just struggle of the peoples for national liberation, is in keeping also with the interests of the Iraqi people".<sup>77</sup>

## CHAPTER-3

### FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT

The most important task confronting the Ba'th government during the period under our study was the establishment of a 'united front'. On this, Moscow held, depended implementation of the Charter for National Action. This charter was a 'progressive' programme for the socio-economic transformation of the Iraqi society by undertaking agrarian reforms and strengthening of the state sector. All this depended on the degree of cooperation between the Ba'th Party, Iraqi Community Party (ICP) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) on the one hand, and on their relationships with Moscow on the other. These are, thus, discussed in this chapter in order to highlight the evolving Soviet view of Iraq's travel along the non-capitalist path of development and to trace the delicate balance Moscow tried to maintain with these parties.

The "progressive wing" of Iraq's Arab Ba'th Party came to power on July 17, 1968, with which "a qualitatively new period in Iraqi history" began.<sup>1</sup> The Ba'th take-over ended, Soviet observers maintained, "the military dictatorial methods of government which had in large measure distorted the anti-imperialist and democratic aims of July 1958 Revolution". Soviet media described the Ba'th Party as a "bourgeois-democratic movement", its progressive nucleus reflecting what they characterised as "the interests of the non-proletarian

working masses made up of the peasantry and the petit bourgeoisie". The Ba'th Party, it was asserted, reflected the attitudes of the peasantry more than that of the urban proletariat. Therefore, it was held, the Ba'th Party reflected such "popular feelings" as "nationalism, anti-imperialism and to a certain extent, the religious beliefs of the mass of the population".

Soviet analysts pointed out that between 1963 and 1968, there was a radical transformation particularly in the leadership of the Ba'th Party. The party, it was reported, eliminated extremism from its ranks and "disassociated itself from the mistakes and excesses of the previous leadership" - committed at the time of "the tragic events" of February and March 1963, "which cost the lives of the thousands of communists and democrats in Iraq".<sup>2</sup> It was further observed that "(at that time) manifestations of anti-communism, the terror against progressive forces, and the attempts to monopolize power served as the main reason for its defeat".<sup>3</sup> As against this, the Ba'th of the post 1968 period was described as having tried to formulate a platform which would be compatible with the interests of most Iraqis. In doing so, Moscow felt that new "revolutionary movement" served "to restore and reinvigorate" Iraq's "anti-imperialist and progressive policies".<sup>4</sup>

The most important task confronting the new Iraqi government was the creation of a "National Front", unifying "all progressive anti-imperialist organisations" including the KDP and the ICP.<sup>5</sup> In December 1971, however, Soviet comment

charged that a struggle was occurring within the Ba'th Party between what was described as "anti-imperialist progressive forces wholeheartedly devoted to the ideals of freedom and social progress and the elements bound by material and other ties to the moribund social relationships and to the foreign oil monopolies operating in the country!"<sup>6</sup>

Soviet writers had earlier observed that "leftovers of anti-communism, and mistrust for the Iraqi communists, are still manifested in the ruling party".<sup>7</sup> This was said to have been the case particularly within the military. In early April 1970, reference was made to talk by "some people", concerning the exclusion of the ICP from the proposed National Front.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in early 1971, the Soviet media carried reports of Communist activists' persecution in a Baghdad jail and the frequency of arrests of communists. Moscow noted that these actions testified "to fact that the reactionary forces in Iraq have not laid down their arms" but were still attempting to sabotage the unification of anti-imperialist elements in Iraq.<sup>9</sup>

It was maintained by the commentators that it would be unrealistic to attempt to isolate the influential ICP. They claimed that the accession of the Ba'th Party to power would have been impossible without the ICP's "selfless struggle against imperialism and internal reaction".<sup>10</sup> Thus, it was held that any attempt aimed at isolating the Iraqi Communists would ignore "alignment of forces" in Iraq and this would not contribute to Iraq's progressive development.<sup>11</sup> By July 1971, however, Moscow noted that the Ba'thists had taken the position of the



ICP into account as the former attempted to unify the "patriotic forces" in Iraq. Thus the Iraqi government, it was reported, issued a decree calling for the release of Iraqi Communists and other "so-called democrats" from Iraqi prisons. For their part, the Iraqi Communists were described as attempting "to eliminate old antagonisms and cultivate understanding and cooperation" between revolutionary groups.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to March 1970 the Soviets had contended that the persistence of the Kurdish problem presented a very serious impediment to the establishment of a national front composed of all progressive elements within Iraqi society.<sup>13</sup> They claimed that the establishment of such a front would be unrealistic without the participation of KDP. Thus, the agreement of 11 March 1970 (to be discussed in detail in chapter four), between the Iraqi government and the KDP was characterised as providing "an opportunity to regain the unity of the democratic and progressive forces" of which the KDP was an integral part.<sup>14</sup> Following the agreement, Soviet writers repeatedly claimed that a certain amount of cooperation and trust was established between the KDP and Ba'th Party leadership. Four months later, in July 1970, the KDP in its Congress was said to have appealed for the establishment of a 'national democratic front' which would coalesce all of Iraq's anti-imperialist parties.<sup>15</sup>

The Draft Charter of National Action (DCNA) of the Ba'th Party was published in November 1970. Soviet observers interpreted this event as opening "a new stage on the road to amalgamation of the country's patriotic forces".<sup>16</sup> This initiative

by the Ba'th Party was supposedly viewed as a "positive move" by many elements of the Iraqi political spectrum. It was said to have provided a plan for Iraq's progressive national development and therefore would constitute the basis for the unification of progressive, anti-imperialist elements of Iraq.<sup>17</sup> In the arena of domestic politics, the Draft Charter reportedly called for cooperation among the various forces in the country and the establishment of "a national coalition", thereby serving to broaden the base of the Iraqi government. The programme also provided for the election of a National Assembly and the promulgation of a new constitution which would embody such provisions as guarantees for democratic freedom, particularly freedom of political expression for these parties "sharing the aims enunciated by the Charter".<sup>18</sup>

The significance of the Draft Charter was thoroughly analysed. One commentator pointed out that its publication showed that the progressive wing of the Ba'th Party "now had an input into policy formulation". It was also maintained that the creation of a National Front in Iraq would facilitate Iraq's development in several ways. Among other things, the Draft Charter would contribute to Iraq's socio-economic and cultural development along progressive lines as well as strengthen Iraq's independence.<sup>19</sup> One writer asserted that "if the efforts of the leading Iraqi political organizations to establish a National Democratic Front are constructive, if the progressive social circles display a proper sense of responsibility, and if no attempts are made to upset the natural balance of forces in this front, then unity

and cooperation may indeed become a reality". However, the same commentator warned, "any attempt to dictate or to discriminate against one or another organization" or "advance demands ignoring the true state of affairs" in the country would "serve only to retard the formation of the National Democratic Front".<sup>20</sup>

Throughout 1972 and partially into 1973, a number of steps were reportedly taken to establish the National Front. In December 1971, the First Secretary of the ICP, Aziz Mohammad, was cited as having expressed his Party's support for the project. In response to a question concerning leadership of the proposed front "at the present stage", he stated:

"As far as Communists are concerned we are convinced that the Ba'th Party, being the ruling party, is capable of exercising real state power. In the present conditions it is this party which governs the country. We only ask for cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and agreement or a common programme, with preservation of our organizational and ideological independence and our lawful right to function as a political party".<sup>21</sup>

In order to promote cooperation between the progressive forces, the ICP even expressed its willingness to postpone the solution of existing problems until after the national front was established.<sup>22</sup> Reflecting the spirit of cooperation, which Moscow claimed was developing in May 1972, the government was reorganized and two portfolios were allocated to members of the ICP.<sup>23</sup> This governmental reorganisation was judged to be in the spirit of the National Charter.<sup>24</sup>

Assessing progress in June 1972, however, Soviet commentators adopted a somewhat less optimistic view of developments. Seemingly criticising the KDP, one observer maintained that two years had passed since the agreement of March 1970 between the Kurds and the Iraqi government and the proposed National Front had remained stalled on the talking stage. Noting this, Soviet writers, like the ICP, appealed the parties to "raise above the narrow party interests" as the specific interests "could be raised after the proposed National Front had been formed".<sup>25</sup>

One gets the impression from the Soviet media that Moscow held the KDP responsible for retarding the creation of the National Front. In contrast to the commentary concerning the position of the ICP, the attitude of the KDP was discussed in rather general terms and even there in conjunction with the position of the Ba'th Party and the ICP.<sup>26</sup>

It was, however, noted that discussions were held between representatives of the ICP and the KDP in June 1973 concerning the establishment of a National Front and on July 13, 1973 it was stated that all indications pointed to the conclusion that Iraq would shortly adopt a charter for the National Front.<sup>27</sup> On July 17, 1973 the Soviet media carried reports that the Ba'th Party and the ICP had reached an agreement concerning the Charter and principally on the establishment of 'the Progressive National Patriotic Front' (PNPF). The agreement was heralded as a "historic act" and a "turning point" in the relations between the two parties.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, progressive elements throughout

the world were said to have viewed the Front's establishment as an important event for Iraq and for whole of the Arab national liberation movement. K. Geyvandov, one commentator, for example wrote in Pravda, "a great gain of the Iraqi revolution was the creation of the Progressive National Patriotic Front within whose framework the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and other of country's national and democratic forces are operating".<sup>29</sup> Evaluating the significance of the agreement, another analyst asserted that it provided a foundation for coalition of all of Iraq's progressive elements. The decisive factor in completing the National Front was indeed participation of the KDP, it was added. Thus, both the Ba'th and the ICP urged the KDP to participate in the Front and emphasised that they would continue discussions with the KDP towards that end.<sup>30</sup>

In late April 1974, Soviet commentators described the structure and composition of the PNP as follow:

"The Iraq's progressive front currently comprise the ruling Ba'th Party, the ICP, the Independent Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. The Front is guided in its activities by the National Action Charter...The parties which comprise the front retain their own political, ideological and organizational independence".<sup>31</sup>

Following the agreement, however, relations between the Iraqi Communists and the KDP were said to have deteriorated. In January 1974 Soviet observers spoke of accusations having been exchanged between the ICP and the KDP and the publication of "controversial" articles in the ICP and the KDP organs.

Eventually, representatives of the two parties initiated talks in November 1973 to resolve the abnormal situation among them. As a result of these negotiations, an agreement was reached to terminate the campaign of charges and counter-charges. Indeed, the organ of the ICP reportedly held that the agreement could serve as the foundation for future cooperation between the two parties. The KDP, reportedly, also called for self-control on the part of the Kurdish resistance in order to prevent confrontation with the ICP and the Iraqi Army.<sup>32</sup> Here one finds emerging neutrality on part of the Soviet commentators in regard to the ICP and the KDP rift as one such commentary of January 1974 had stated:

"One need not go into who is to blame. It appears that the interests of the two parties and the country's demand that accusations and counter-accusations should be abandoned and that the fraternal relations which existed previously...should be restored, for these two parties (KDP, ICP) fought resolutely side by side throughout the years of the national liberation struggle..."<sup>33</sup>

Despite the agreement, however, Soviet observers noted that the situation in Kurdistan continued to deteriorate. Simultaneously, relations between the ICP & the KDP also worsened. Still, a somewhat positive attitude was reflected in commentaries. In April 1974, for example, Radio Moscow announced that the organ of the KDP had stated that it was about to join the national front.<sup>34</sup> Such positive reporting notwithstanding, it was, however, finally admitted in the Spring of 1974 that the KDP had rejected the offer of participation in the PNPf in conjunction with the latter's rejection of the 11 March 1974 law.

Throughout the remainder of 1974 and well into 1975, Moscow increasingly charged that the reactionary elements of the KDP had come to dominate the Party and, consequently, attempts were made to induce 'patriotically-inclined' Kurdish political organizations to join the PNPP.

Reflecting the "spirit of cooperation" on the part of progressive wing of the KDP, it was held in March 1975 that leaders of the National Front and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan participated in celebrations commemorating the fifth signing of the March Manifesto.<sup>35</sup> Though generally frustrated by the KDP, a renewed emphasis was placed on "further strengthening" of the National Front, as was manifested by Saddam Hussain's address to the Plenary Meeting of the Progressive National Patriotic Front of Iraq,<sup>36</sup> and on the occasion of the Third Anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty.<sup>37</sup>

Soviet analysts had maintained, as has already been noted, that the establishment of a National Front would provide greater internal stability and allow the government in Iraq to concentrate on dealing with the socio-economic problems. The Charter of National Action had hoped to provide Iraq with an opportunity to establish 'a socialist society'. The Charter had specifically rejected capitalism, describing it as unsuitable for Iraq's needs. Thus with socialism as goal,<sup>38</sup> Iraq was said to have achieved great success in socio-economic development, even if the KDP had not joined the National Front :

"Soviet people react with kindest feelings to what the Iraqi people have achieved. The nationalization of the oil companies, the implementation of the agrarian reform law, the measures to raise the popular masses' living conditions, the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem, and the strengthening of the front of progressive forces... all these are important steps in the country's development".<sup>39</sup>

In July 1975, the Iraqi ambassador to Moscow was reported to have said that "Iraq is marching along the path of socialist construction".<sup>40</sup> Moscow continued to herald Iraq's "important role" in the "Arab National Liberation Movement" and in the "struggle against imperialism".<sup>41</sup> Throughout 1975, Moscow increasingly accused the West of constantly conspiring against the Ba'thist Iraq.<sup>41</sup> It, however, never acknowledged KDP's refusal to join the National Front and continued to herald Iraq's "important role" in the "Arab national liberation movement" and its "struggle against imperialism".<sup>42</sup>

Moscow's insistence on the establishment of an anti-imperialist united front - even if not headed by the Communists - was indeed in line with its ideological formulations. As we have noted, the USSR favoured a maximum amount of cooperation based on minimum items. This is probably why the USSR went to great lengths to back the March 1970 agreement. It also helped by sponsoring agreements between the ICP and the Ba'th, the ICP and the KDP, and, the KDP and the Ba'th Party. Moscow made it obvious that it wanted KDP to participate in the National Front.



If a compromise could have been reached on KDP's participation in the National Front (and, of course, on the issue of autonomy for Kurdistan, which we have discussed in chapter four), then the USSR could have used two of the three partners in the Iraqi government (the ICP and the KDP) to counter-balance the third (the Ba'th). Moreover, Moscow could have played, if necessary and at least to some extent, the KDP off against the ICP. Clearly, the USSR would have preferred to have had two levers (the ICP and the KDP) to counter-balance the ruling Ba'th Party. This, of course, implied that hostilities between the KDP and the Ba'thists, to say nothing of the KDP and the ICP, be avoided and these parties be incorporated into the United Front. As against these propositions, Moscow, in reality could not always take any of these parties for granted.

In this chapter we have also noted that Moscow never really had any effective control over the situation in Iraq. Consequently, the possibility of using the KDP in future became increasingly unrealistic. Furthermore, as it became obvious that Moscow would have to take sides, it chose Baghdad.

The USSR had several incentives in supporting Baghdad. First, the Ba'th Party was in power and thus it was far more important than the opposition parties which had little chance of coming to power on their own. Second, the Ba'thists themselves were eagerly seeking friendly ties with the USSR, especially in the wake of 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Moscow, on its part,

having lost Egypt to the West, probably stood equally in need of a friendly state in the Arab World. Third, the Ba'thists were no longer persecuting the Iraqi Communists. Instead, with Moscow's encouragement, the ICP was admitted as junior partner of the government. This indeed was an ideal position from Moscow's standpoint of a national democratic state. Moreover, the Ba'th government had chosen to travel along the non-Capitalist path of development, as Moscow called it, by initiating agrarian reforms and strengthening the state sector internally and joining the 'anti-imperialist' forces - headed by the USSR - internationally. It had given Moscow a degree of leverage over the Ba'thists and, indeed, a degree of ideological legitimacy to cultivate a national democratic Arab State.

The KDP, because of its attitude towards Baghdad, had become a political liability in Soviet dealings with Iraq. Moscow, consequently decided to abandon the KDP in favour of the Ba'thists and their partners, the ICP. Had the USSR overtly supported the KDP over Baghdad, Moscow would have run the risk of driving Baghdad to the West. Moreover, had Moscow supported the KDP irrespective of the ICP's own reaction, the general position of the ICP could well have also worsened, or Moscow's influence over it considerably diminished, and the ICP would have become more independent or faced a split.

It is, however, important to note that in abandoning the KDP, the USSR did not cut off all ties altogether. As we have seen, a desire to maintain links was reflected in the

positive treatment accorded to the so-called progressive wing of the KDP. In the next chapter, we shall see that ~~how~~ Moscow went to great lengths to avoid the impression of discarding the Kurdish movement as it discarded the Kurdish leadership. Though the solution of the Kurdish question was intrinsically related to the establishment of the United Front, but treating it separately would enable us to see the Soviet attitude towards an autonomy/separation seeking nationality.

## CHAPTER-4

### THE KURDISH QUESTION

The Kurds, residing in the mountainous area of northern Iraq, constitute over 20 percent of the Iraqi population. During 1961-66, the Kurdish areas were described as zones of continuous fighting. On June 29, 1966, a ceasefire was arranged, under the terms of a twelve-point programme designed to secure the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. The programme was said to have recognized Kurdish national rights within a 'united Iraqi homeland'. Despite this, tensions persisted in northern Iraq and, while regular clashes had for the most part ceased, occasional incidents continued. Each side reportedly blamed the other for the continued problems. Soviet observers noted that, on the one hand, "Kurdish leaders accused Baghdad of failing to carry out the 1966 agreements and seeking to impose a 'military solution'." Baghdad, on the other hand, "reproached the Kurds with intransigence" and "bellicosity". In other words, according to Moscow, "mutual mistrust was still very strong".<sup>1</sup>

The new Ba'th government having come to power in July 1968, was greeted with praise for its policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. The new government "realized that the popular masses" attitude towards the regime, the future of the Iraqi revolution and the country's unity in the face of Imperialist and Zionist aggression in the Near East, all

depends to a great extent on the resolution of the Kurdish question".<sup>2</sup>

The KDP was characterised as one of Iraq's largest political parties - a party which cemented the cooperation of the Arabs and Kurds. Moreover, just as the Ba'th Party would not have come to power without the efforts of the ICP, similarly, the Soviets argued that the Ba'thist accession could not have been possible without what was described as "the Kurdish democrats" struggle for self-assertion of the Kurdish people as a constituent part of a united Iraq with the same rights as the Arabs."<sup>3</sup>

On September 21, 1968, the new government introduced a new provisional constitution which provided for "equal rights for Kurds and Arabs within the framework of the Iraqi State". On January 25, 1970, the Ba'th re-affirmed the June 1966 programme and announced a general amnesty for all those involved in "the northern events". Those involved were no longer obligated to surrender their arms and ammunition. Furthermore, anyone who had been dismissed from his job as a result of the hostilities was to be re-instated. In the late 1970 and continuing into early 1971, what was described as a "dialogue", took place between representatives of the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders. Thus, in the words of one Soviet commentator, "healthy elements have reached this stage from both sides with a full awareness of the need for constructive steps to solve the Kurdish problem".<sup>4</sup>

On March 11, 1970, the "prolonged fratricidal war between the Arabs and the Kurds which took thousands of lives and cost over 1.5 billion dollars" was reported to have formally ended.<sup>5</sup> Further describing the provisions of the March 1970 agreement ending hostilities, Moscow observed:

"The agreement envisages the introduction of amendments to Iraq's provisional constitution to the effect that the Iraqi people comprise two main nationalities - Arabs and Kurds. The constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurds and the other minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity (the Kurds make up 19 percent of the Iraqi population). The Kurdish language is declared official along with the Arab language. One of the country's Vice-Presidents must be a Kurd. The Kurds will participate directly in the legislative and executive organs of the central and local powers. Great attention is devoted in the agreement to the problems of culture and education as a whole. In Sulaymaniyah, for example, a Kurd University has been created and a Kurd faculty opened in the philosophical structure: education in Kurdish regions will be carried out in the native language. Some of the proposals in the agreement are calculated to ease the people's life. These include points relating to the payment of money grants to the families of Kurds who have fallen on the battle-field, the return of Kurds and Arabs to their native lands, special measures to eliminate unemployment and many others. After a consensus is held, it is intended to make alterations in the administrative divisions in the north, taking into account the prevalence of the Kurd population in different regions. There is already an arrangement on the creation of a special Kurd province. Without infringing on Kurd's national dignity, a solution is also being sought for such a complex question as the future position of the Kurdish armed forces. Thus, irregular detachments of ("Peshmerga") Kurdish patriots will remain as a national guard".<sup>6</sup>

The agreement was judged to be "a measure of significance not only for the democratic situation in Iraq, but for Iraq's international position and world's progressive forces generally".<sup>7</sup> The agreement was said to have accomplished several things. It reportedly established the pre-requisites for consolidating Iraq's progressive forces and for normalizing the internal situation in Iraq. In this way, major studies were said to have been undertaken to foil the West's alleged policy of capitalizing on the Kurdish-Arab hostilities to divide and rule Iraq.<sup>8</sup> The agreement was also interpreted as recognizing Kurdish "national dignity" within the framework of the Iraqi State.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, it was said to have opened the way for institutionalisation of a spirit of cooperation between Iraq's two principal nationalities: the Arabs and the Kurds.<sup>10</sup> Finally, the agreement opened the way for not only promotion of a United National Front but also for reallocating resources to socio-economic and cultural projects.<sup>11</sup>

As Iraq's ability to resist "western encroachments" increased and as it accelerated its "progressive policies", the position of the entire national liberation movement of Asia and Africa, of which Iraq was said to be an important part, would be strengthened.<sup>12</sup> Prior to the agreement, Soviet analysts held, the Kurdish problem prevented Iraq from "playing the role it should have in the general Arab cause".<sup>13</sup> In the words of one writer, the agreement of 11th March was "a symbol of the fact that a serious start has been made toward ending the mutual

prejudice that has burst up over many years".<sup>14</sup> Two other writers, however, observed that "the important positive result achieved by the settlement with the Kurds in Iraq is not a resolution to the entire problem".<sup>15</sup> Thus, it was asserted that "as the experience of many countries show, a successful national policy is a difficult matter demanding painstaking daily work, which is virtually only just starting in Iraq".<sup>16</sup>

Shortly after the conclusion of the agreement, one could see, it was reported, the "positive impact" which the termination of hostilities had upon life in Northern Iraq. The state of emergency was over and the plans had reportedly been formulated for socio-economic developmental projects in the north.<sup>17</sup> Citing some of the gains, one commentator observed:

"Trade ties had been restored between the north and the other regions of the country. Produce from Kurd small holdings and stubble fields was being marketed in the Arab regions, consumer goods were being received from Baghdad without hindrance. Brigades of Kurd and Arab road-building workers were renewing the highways and houses which had been destroyed were being restored".<sup>18</sup>

Politically the KDP was legalised and branches of the party were opened in the principal cities including the capital. The party also began circulating its newspaper. Five Kurds, including three KDP Executive Committee members, reportedly joined the government. In addition, Kurds were also said to have been appointed governors of four of Iraq's northern provinces. Moscow stated that the Iraqi government had decided to provide a monthly compensation to members of the 'Peshmerga' until



they could find employment.<sup>19</sup> Thus, by March 1971, Soviet commentators held that a measure of cooperation and trust had been established between KDP and the Ba'thists. However, it was also pointed out that the Arab-Kurd conflict "has left many unremoved traces, much bitterness, and many reciprocal claims".<sup>20</sup> It was, therefore, highlighted that "under these conditions extremist sentiments...which are supported by some figures lacking sufficient self-control and maturity, could do Iraq a disservice"<sup>21</sup> upon life in northern Iraq.

Soviet observers, however, reported from the very outset that the agreement produced alarm in Israel and the West. Less than one month after the conclusion of the agreement, it thus warned that "foreign agents as well as local reactionaries were accelerating their efforts" to sow discord to sabotage the reconciliatory efforts.<sup>22</sup> These initial warnings continued to get more and more coverage in the Soviet media. In late 1971, it was reported that "pro-imperialist reactionary elements" made an attempt on the life of Mustapha Al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader. Accompanying the attempt allegedly were predictions in the western media that Arab-Kurdish relations were about to collapse, and that their agreement was only a "scarp of paper". This theme was said to have been complemented by efforts of "certain foreign radio systems" to "inflame passions" by asserting that the trust which had emerged "has now collapsed and that matters are moving, if not towards a resumption of the internecine war, at least toward a break in relations".<sup>23</sup>

Throughout 1972, Soviet writers continued to focus attention on what they characterized as the "distorting role played by the forces of imperialism in the past events in Iraq".<sup>24</sup> For example, in August 1972, Western media were cited as having published increasingly prejudiced reports on "the occurrences of complications in the relations between the Ba'thist command and the Kurds".<sup>25</sup> The objective of these, reportedly, was to exacerbate tensions between the Kurds and the Arabs and thereby stimulate a new round of hostilities. The choice of words here is significant since Moscow was apparently admitting that there were "occurrences of complications" and that the West merely reported these "complications" with increased prejudice. Additional implicit acknowledgement that all was not progressing smoothly in northern Iraq came in March, 1973. At that time, commenting on discussions held with certain Arab and Kurds, a Soviet writer observed in Pravda that "some talked about going slow in implementing some of the articles of agreement". It was further stated by the same commentator, "I felt that there was a trend to blame the other side yet none of those who talked to me objected to the agreement".<sup>26</sup> At any rate, Soviet analysts stressed that the West was continuing its policy of exacerbating Kurdish-Arab tensions. They indeed claimed that these provocations intensified whenever conditions for the establishment of a national front improved. The attempt on Barzani's life was cited as an example of this. However, it was noted that both Ba'th and KDP leaders "displayed enough wisdom to prevent developments from taking a dangerous turn".<sup>27</sup>

In April 1970, Soviet writers had linked "the persistent struggle which the Iraqi Communists have waged for a most rapid democratic settlement in the north" with the "success in solving the Kurdish problem". It was stated:

"The principle of the Kurds' national autonomy, the complete recognition of their rights within the framework of the Iraqi state, and the defence of their national interests....all these slogans and demands have been submitted at one time or another by the ICP as platforms for the solution of the Kurdish problem and have been set down in a number of Iraqi Communist Party documents".<sup>28</sup>

The July 1973 agreement between the ICP and the Ba'th Party was heralded in the Soviet media as a step which would contribute to the solution of what was still referred to as the "Kurdish problem". While noting that the KDP had been invited to participate in the newly formed coalition, Moscow acknowledged by the end of 1973 that there remained obstacles to KDP participation. The existence of these obstacles was, of course, attributed to the activities of "Western agents and local reactionaries".<sup>29</sup>

It was, however, admitted by January 1974, that relations between the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party had deteriorated. It was reported that the ICP Politburo had sent a memorandum to the KDP accusing armed KDP groups of pursuing ICP members. The KDP, in turn was said to have accused the ICP of paying insufficient attention to the Kurdish question. Moreover, the ICP was accused of not sympathising with the Kurdish aspirations. Moscow noted that, despite denials by both sides, "the charges should not be dismissed lightly",

since deterioration of relations between the two parties would only benefit the West and its conservative allies in the area.<sup>30</sup> Accompanying these reports, however, were encouraging reports that the ICP and KDP had taken steps toward normalizing relations between their two parties.<sup>31</sup> Moscow urged such a normalization and one gets the impression that to the Soviets such relations were still possible as was also the prospect of the establishment of a national front.

On 11th March, 1974, four years after the 1970 agreement, the Iraqi government proclaimed measures such as the "Autonomy of the Kurdish area within the framework of the Iraqi Republic". Discussing the new law, Soviet observers maintained that it broadened the terms of the March agreement. Under this new law, the Kurds could exercise self-government in a number of fields and the Iraqi Kurdistan was supposedly to become "a separate administrative unit". Kurdistan's administrative bodies would be composed of an elected legislative council and an executive committee. The President would appoint the Chairman of the latter from among the legislative council members. In addition, the Kurds would be responsible for distribution of that part of the Republic's budget allocated to Kurdistan. Finally, Kurdish and Arabic would constitute the official languages of Kurdistan. Assessing the significance of the new law, Moscow felt it could potentially provide foundation for the establishment and close relations between the Kurds and the Arabs.<sup>32</sup> The Iraqi government was said to have also passed a law which offered a "general amnesty" for all Kurdish military personnel as well

civilians who were being held for previous violations of martial law.<sup>33</sup>

Immediately following the announcement of the new law, the Soviet media began to develop the theme that right wing elements which had "penetrated the KDP as a result of its class heterogeneity" were attempting to "arouse separatist sentiments".<sup>34</sup> Simultaneously, it was noted that differences persisted concerning some of the provisions of the March agreement. Differing, sometimes conflicting, interpretations were reportedly being put forth concerning the exact boundaries of Kurdistan. Initially, Soviet writers adopted an optimistic line in their assessment of the seriousness of these differences. Eventually, however, they admitted that the negotiations had reached an impasse concerning the fate of the oil-rich Kirkuk area. Certain Kurdish leaders were said to have demanded that Kirkuk be included in the Kurdish area. Their demands were said to have been motivated by historical factors as well as their assertion that the majority of the area's inhabitants were Kurdish. However, Moscow hastened to add that due to the absence of recent census data, there was no definitive information available concerning the size of the population and its national composition. As a result, the Iraqi government reportedly called for the establishment of a joint Kurdish-Arab administration in Kirkuk which would be subordinate to Baghdad. The Kurds, however, refused to accept the plan.<sup>35</sup> One commentator observed that negotiations could have resolved the question had not "unexpected incidents" intervened. The KDP leadership was said to have "suddenly" announced that it would

not support the government's plan for Kurdish self-rule. The KDP members then ceased to participate in negotiations with the government; their newspaper halted publication. Some elements of Kurdish population set off for the mountains, where even after 1970, the main residence of the KDP continued to be situated and where Kurdish armed detachments - the Peshmerga - had been retained.<sup>36</sup>

Throughout the remainder of 1974 and well into 1975 (and rest of the 1970s, for that matter), Moscow increasingly charged the "reactionary elements of the KDP who had come to dominate the party" and consequently, attempts were made to induce as were called, "patriotically-inclined Kurdish political organizations". It was stated by a writer that the action of "the reactionary dominated KDP" combined with the renewed fighting in Kurdistan "had forced a considerable number of Kurds, including certain members of the KDP leadership to break away from its leaders and renew the party advocating the strengthening of ties with the progressive forces" of the country and "support for the socio-economic reforms" which were "being implemented and the law on autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan".<sup>37</sup>

These developments were projected by the Soviet media with a claim that contradictions within the Kurdish Democratic party had surfaced and hence, a left and a right wing of the movement had appeared. The leftist elements of the KDP, of course, advocated close ties between Iraq's progressive elements and the initiation of progressive socio-economic reforms in Kurdistan similar to those already undertaken in other parts

of Iraq. Consequently, a group of prominent figures, including a KDP Politburo member, Aziz Agrawi', supported the law on autonomy.<sup>38</sup> However, right wing elements representing "the feudal, tribal nobility" also became increasingly active and opposed closer relations with Iraq's progressive parties. In addition, these rightist elements were also reported to have opposed the extension to Kurdistan of even progressive socio-economic programmes such as agrarian reforms. It was denied that "these feudal and bourgeois" elements of the right wing of the KDP constituted "most of the Kurdish leaders".<sup>39</sup> The responsibility for rejection of the new autonomy law, of course, rested "on the shoulders of these forces that represent the right wing of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan". These elements were also said to have "been prejudiced against, and distrustful of, the progressive steps taken by Baghdad from the beginning" and were "guided by unethical interests and ambitions".<sup>40</sup>

It was charged by the Soviet media that the right wing Kurd leaders had been affected by pressure from Western agents and local reactionaries who had capitalized on "the splittist mood" of the right wing of the KDP. Along these lines, it was claimed, that these external forces were providing the Kurdish extremists with military equipment as well as financial aid.<sup>41</sup> On its part, the right wing of the KDP was described as having undertaken a series of measures: opening of the Iranian -Iraqi frontier, and declaring its willingness to accept support from any quarter, including Israel and the United States. It also offered to grant the Americans an oil concession

at Kirkuk in return for the US aid. Along these lines, the right wing elements, it was alleged, assured the West that had they been able to, they would have prevented the nationalization of Western oil interests in Iraq.<sup>42</sup>

Soviet observers claimed that the right wing of the KDP constituted an ally of the West and Israel. By supporting the Kurds, the West allegedly hoped to overthrow the Iraqi government and thereby regain lost ground in the Gulf area. The Western powers allegedly looked upon the Kurdish movement as merely "an interim tool to achieve their own aims"; once these aims were achieved, the West would "then doom this movement to oblivion and liquidate it".<sup>43</sup> Therefore, in the words of one analyst, "while posing as friends of the Kurdish people, the West has sought only the elimination of Iraq's progressive government. Indeed, only immature people or politicians who do not hold the destinies of their people very dear can fail to understand this".<sup>44</sup>

As tension mounted, clashes occurred, resulting in the Kurdish retreat deep into their mountain strongholds. While admitting that reports of the renewed hostilities gave "rise to anxiety", the Soviet media criticized the foreign press, including the press in Turkey and Iran, for printing what was called "false data", "lies", and "discounted press exaggerations" designed to "incite the reader" and thereby "increase the tense domestic situation" in Iraq.<sup>45</sup> Moscow, however held that the Iraqi government was more accommodating in granting a 30 days' extension for Kurds to return to their place of



employment from the mountains as the original law had been set to expire on 25 April.

Beginning during the Summer of 1974, the USSR's image of events in Kurdistan however somewhat changed as the media started giving emphasis to the political struggle over the military developments in Kurdistan. Writing in the <sup>Zi</sup>Rubezhom on 2 August 1974, one analyst wrote:

"The ICP, just like the Ba'th Party, condemned these dissenting activities of the right wing of the KDP. The government was forced to begin military reprisals. Nevertheless, basic efforts are being directed at solving the Kurdish problem politically. Attempts are being made at attracting patriotically-inclined Kurdish political organizations to participate in the Progressive National Patriotic Front!"<sup>46</sup>

While the media always discussed the efforts of the Iraqi government to continue the programme of autonomy for Kurdistan despite the fighting, from the Summer of 1974 onwards, almost exclusive attention was devoted to the political struggle.<sup>47</sup> It was finally claimed on 13 March 1974 that an agreement was concluded which provided for the termination of hostilities between units of the Iraqi army and Kurdish forces. This was followed by the reports that the shooting had died down and "thousands of Kurdish families who were on Iranian territory have expressed their wish to return to Iraq".<sup>48</sup>

By the end of 1974, for example, it was stressed that peace had been restored throughout most of Kurdistan. The machinery of self-rule was said to be operating, the economy

was stabilizing, and trade links had been restored between northern and southern Iraq.<sup>49</sup> While occasional reports did appear describing efforts to exacerbate Kurdish-Arab tensions, for the most part this aspect of events in Kurdistan (as well as the conflict between the Kurds and government troops) was down-played. Thus, the focus of discussion centered on the theme that increasing numbers of Arabs and Kurds recognized that "the forces kindling the armed conflict in the north of Iraq" were "trying to eliminate all the gains of the Iraqi revolution, (and) undermine the integrity and sovereignty of that country".<sup>50</sup>

One finds that the Soviet response to the Kurdish problem was intertwined with the USSR's attitude towards the three major parties in Iraq - the Ba'th Party, the ICP, and the KDP - as well as the state of Soviet-Iraq relations. The Soviets had traditionally utilized the Kurdish desire for autonomy as a lever to apply pressure on the Iraqi government. Following the Ba'thist take over in July 1968, however, the USSR began to improve ties with Iraq. The March 1970 agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds consequently was interpreted by Soviet media as a positive step in the right direction. It was asserted time and again that the USSR has always stood for "the peaceful democratic resolution" of "this highly important question for the destiny of Iraq".<sup>51</sup> An article in Pravda, in early April 1970, had cited a member of the Politburo of the Kurdish Democratic Party as stating:

"The friendly Soviet Union gave support to a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question; ...the USSR helped to clear the atmosphere with the aim of encouraging dialogue and furthered the attainment of results necessary to ensure Arab and Kurd interests".<sup>52</sup>

Consequently, terms such as "sincerely welcomes", "greatly pleased", and "greatly appreciated" were used liberally to describe the Soviet response to the conclusion of the agreement.<sup>53</sup> Between mid-1970 and the end of the 1973, Moscow was cautiously optimistic concerning the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan. The Soviet media, needless to add, was full of warnings to both the Kurds and the Arabs to remain true to their objective of a united Iraq embracing both nationalities in the face of efforts to sabotage the negotiations. Moreover, especially in late 1972 and into 1973, the Soviet media implied on various occasions that all was not moving smoothly towards an agreement. By September 1972, the USSR media was pointedly citing its own interpretation of its nationality policy as an example for the Iraqis:

"The measures adopted in Iraq to implement the March 11, 1970 declaration concerning the democratic and peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue finds complete understanding and satisfaction in Soviet Union. It is known that (in) the Soviet Union...the questions of nationalities were successfully solved...This was recognized on the basis of the recognition and the practical application of equality among all nationalities ...Hence, (the Soviet people) sincerely welcome the steps being taken in Iraq in this direction".<sup>54</sup>

At the same time, officially the USSR adopted a friendly attitude towards the KDP. In August of 1971, for example, the CPSU Central Committee sent the KDP a telegram

of congratulations on the latter's 25th anniversary. This message referred to the KDP's "activities in defence of legitimate national interests of the Iraqi people" and that it "deserved recognition of the progressive patriotic forces".<sup>55</sup> A year later representatives of both the KDP and the CPSU reportedly agreed concerning "the need to form a national front for the patriotic forces in Iraq".<sup>56</sup> Both sides also expressed "satisfaction that relations of friendship and cooperation had been established between the CPSU and the KDP and other progressive parties" in Iraq.<sup>57</sup>

Following the KDP's refusal to join the National Front in July 1973, the situation however deteriorated to such a point that in November 1973, fighting erupted between the Communists and the Kurdish partisans. At the end of November, Boris Ponomarev led a delegation to Iraq apparently in an effort to mediate between the antagonists. Despite a series of alleged meetings with the Iraqi Communists, the KDP and the Ba'thists, however, this effort at mediation failed.<sup>58</sup> In January 1974, the Soviet media acknowledged the gravity of the situation in northern Iraq. Discussing the situation in Kurdistan, a Radio Moscow broadcast first recalled that in November 1973 a KDP delegation had met with Ponomarev in Moscow and at that time both the CPSU and the KDP expressed an awareness of the necessity to implement the March 1970 agreement.<sup>59</sup> The broadcast went on to state:

Disputes and quarrels between the various revolutionary...must not be allowed to hinder the strengthening of the unity of the country's patriotic forces, especially at the time when the Iraqi people are engaged alongwith the other people, in a stubborn struggle to remove the consequences of Israeli aggression. The Kurds are considered part of the Iraqi people. As such they are very concerned about putting an end to the Israeli aggression and recovering the usurped rights of all the fraternal peoples. Leaders of the democratic Kurdish movement have frequently pointed out this fact...(Soviet people) can only express regret at quarrels between these two groups (Arabs & Kurds), major revolutionary forces in the nascent Iraqi republic. Soviet citizens are fully aware of the close cooperation which has been going on for several years between the ICP and the KDP and of the joint struggle of these two parties against imperialism and reactionaries. For this reason they are confident that these two parties can put an end to the quarrel and reach understanding for the sake of progressive development..."60

Throughout the Winter and Spring of 1974 and onwards, the Soviet media seemed to continue to leave the impression that the Kurdish problem could be solved peacefully. At about the same time, the Soviet media also began to develop the theme that right wing elements were becoming increasingly powerful within the Kurdish movement. By the end of April 1974, Moscow publicly abandoned hope of a peaceful solution. It was now asserted that the right wing elements of the KDP had become dominant in the KDP and these elements were betraying the "Kurdish cause" to the West and the Zionists. It should be pointed out however, that the media refrained from speaking of Iranian support to the Kurds. It was very rare that the Iranian media, along with the Turkish media, was criticized for publicizing inflammatory reports.

Nevertheless, the Soviet media with implicit approval continued to report Baghdad's response to the situation.<sup>61</sup> It was also highlighted that the left wing of the Kurdish movement was working with the Iraqi government to solve the Kurdish problem and form the National Front.<sup>62</sup>

Meanwhile, as the USSR abandoned the KDP, fighting continued to rage in northern Iraq. Despite efforts by Baghdad to cut Kurdish supply lines to Iran in the Autumn of 1974, these lines remained open and Iran continued to provide large amounts of supplies to the Kurdish movement. Failing to defeat the Kurds on the battlefield, Baghdad altered its approach and in March 1975, Iran and Iraq reached an agreement whereby Iran would terminate its support to the Kurdish uprising and Iraq would agree to Iran's demands concerning the Iran-Iraq border issues. Now, with Tehran and Moscow both having abandoned the Kurds, their uprising collapsed. Many Kurds escaped to Iran before Tehran closed the frontier, while some Kurds availed themselves of Baghdad's amnesty terms. The Soviet media was virtually without comment concerning the implications of the Iran-Iraq settlement on events in Kurdistan. On only one occasion did Moscow make the association. In doing so, one finds an extra caution in citing the Lebanese newspaper Al-Mohr as the source of its information.<sup>63</sup>

It would be fair to conclude that the Kurdish problem was neither created nor solved by the Soviet influence. The USSR, during the period under study, was primarily respond-

ing to the other's initiatives. It, however, did show active interest in resolving it by promoting its own image of the nationalities problem. One gets the impression studying the Soviet response that it preferred to avoid active involvement in the crisis itself. Nevertheless, recognizing that non-involvement was virtually impossible due to cross pressures, Moscow, quite understandably attempted to make the best use of the situation by making the difficult choices necessary in such a way as to maximize its future options. The desire to court all the three major parties involved (the Ba'th Party, the ICP, and the KDP) was again persistently reflected by the Soviet media, apparently with an eye on same objectives as were present in the establishment of a united front. Since the Soviet response was intertwined with the USSR's attitude towards the three major parties and as well as the state of Iraq-Soviet relations, the Soviets perhaps never came to grips with the complexities of the situation on the ground and the media repeatedly gave hasty judgements on the situation. The Western 'conspiracies', of course, remained convenient targets and were time and again accused for all policy set-backs.

The USSR virtually ignored the connection between Iran-Iraq relations and the Kurdish question. The Soviets apparently thought it better to simply ignore the Iranian role in Kurdistan since there was little they could do to affect the Iranian policy towards the Kurdish situation. The border conflict between Iran and Iraq was sufficiently embarrassing

to the USSR without adding further to the embarrassment by commenting on the Iranian role in the Kurdish uprising. In the next chapter on Iran-Iraq relations, we shall see that despite Soviet urging that Baghdad and Tehran compose their differences, Moscow never really had any influence over their relationship either.



## CHAPTER-5

### IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS

Soviet analysts consistently interpreted Western activities as designed to exacerbate tensions between Iraq and Iran. They portrayed these efforts as being an integral part of the West's 'divide and rule' strategy. The origins of the Iran-Iraq dispute were traced back to 'the ominous era of colonial domination in the Middle East'. During that period the British allegedly attempted to stimulate an atmosphere characterized by tension. It was for this reason that the border between these two countries was determined in "such a way as to ignore interests" of both countries. Moscow also claimed that in certain areas the border was not even delineated clearly. The tension along the Iran-Iraq border was used by Britain to "maintain its positions, delay the development of the national liberation trend, and, the struggle against the British monopolies which loot the resources of these two countries". It was, moreover, pointed out that the British have traditionally attempted to create an adversary relationship between Iraq and Iran.<sup>1</sup>

Following the decline of British power in the Middle East, the United States continued with the policies of exacerbating tensions between the two neighbours, Soviet commentators maintained.<sup>2</sup> As a result, "misunderstandings and conflicts" continued to occur. Soviet commentators held that the Iraq-Iran

border dispute, which periodically manifested itself in armed clashes, only served the interests of the West - "the common enemy of the two states".<sup>3</sup>

It was claimed that tension between Iraq and Iran served Western interests in a series of ways. This theme was developed in greater depth in various ways and was echoed time and again. First, tension was allegedly used by the West "as a diversion to mask"<sup>4</sup> the British and American subversive plots in the Persian Gulf area. Second, tensions, and ultimately military hostilities between Iraq and Iran, were supposedly used to argue that Western troops must be retained in the area to prevent regional instability. Moreover, Western interventions into the internal affairs of the Persian Gulf States were justified in a similar manner.<sup>5</sup> Third, the West had used, it was emphasised, Iraq-Iran tensions to rationalise and accelerate the regional arms race.<sup>6</sup> Fourth, the existence of tensions helped to justify CENTO's (then) intensified activities.<sup>7</sup> Fifth, the West was accused of exacerbating Iraq-Iran tensions in order to divert Iraq's attention from the progressive socio-economic reform programmes undertaken domestically and weaken her position within the Arab world and internationally.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, the West was accused of increasing tension between Iraq and Iran in order to disrupt cooperation among the oil producers and ultimately destroy the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).<sup>9</sup>

In an effort to promote this strategy the West was said to have perpetuated the idea that Iraq had aggressive designs on Iran. Moreover, it was alleged that the Western media put forth the interpretation that the differences between Iraq and Iran were too serious to be reconcilable and therefore, military hostilities were inevitable.<sup>10</sup> This interpretation was repeatedly questioned by Soviet observers by stating that there were "no irreconcilable differences" between the two states.<sup>11</sup> It was frequently stated that "Iraq has no territorial or other claims on Iran" just as "Iran has no claims on Iraq".<sup>12</sup> It was argued that there were no barriers to the establishment of, and maintenance of, normal and mutually advantageous relations between the two neighbours,<sup>13</sup> rather the interests of these two states coincided in many areas.<sup>14</sup>

The two neighbours were said to have in common their territorial and cultural heritage.<sup>15</sup> In addition, both were attempting to promote socio-economic modernization programmes.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, both were attempting to gain full control over their natural resources, the foremost being oil.<sup>17</sup> On many occasions, Iraq and Iran were referred to <sup>as</sup> having adopted coordinated policies within the framework of OPEC.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, through various international organizations, the two states had cooperated to "eliminate unequal trade and economic relations" and replace them with cooperation based on equality and sovereignty.<sup>19</sup> Both states used the Persian Gulf as a communications and trade link abroad. They both had an

interest in the maintenance of tranquility in the area.<sup>20</sup> Finally, both states were said to be united in their common desire to halt "imperialist aggression" abroad and secure "international peace and security".<sup>21</sup> Moscow often pointed to "the desire on part of both" states to "insure a lasting and just peace in the Near East by liquidating the vestiges of Israeli aggression" as "a common bond" between Iraq and Iran.<sup>22</sup>

In short, Soviet writers maintained that "the factors conducive to the two countries' close relations are neither lacking nor inadequate, and this convincingly shows that successful improvement of relations between Iran and Iraq in the interest of their peoples is possible".<sup>23</sup> The improvement of relations between them "would create conditions conducive to the expansion of economic cooperation, cooperation in defence of their interests against the Western oil companies, and conversion of the Gulf area into a region characterized by peace, stability and security".<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, favourable conditions "would be established for acceleration of the socio-economic reforms already underway in the two countries".<sup>25</sup> Finally, in a larger sense, a dangerous situation in the area already characterised by its explosive nature, one which could potentially "result in a large-scale war between the two countries perhaps endangering the general peace" would be defused.<sup>26</sup> Based on all these considerations, Soviet analysis asserted that it was in both the Iraqi and Irani interests,

as well as in the interests of the "anti-imperialist struggle" generally, that the two powers should "settle the border dispute as well as other differences, through peaceful means". It was further stressed that negotiations constitute "the only fruitful path leading to the settlement of the most complicated problems and disputes, on the basis of mutual respect and interests". "Detente", was said to have helped to create conditions necessary for the normalization of relations between Iran and Iraq.<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet media devoted a fair amount of attention to the cyclical pattern of Iran-Iraq relations. Prior to 1973, the media reported various manifestations of tension between the Iranians and Iraqis. In April 1969, for example, Soviet analysts discussed the border clashes along the River Shatt-al-Arab.<sup>28</sup> Later in January 1970, relations reportedly deteriorated to the extent that on December 1, 1971, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and Great Britain after Iranian troops landed on Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb Islands.<sup>29</sup> In May 1973, Moscow noted a movement, accelerated by the 1973 Arab-Israel war, towards an improvement in relations between the two neighbours. On October 7, 1973, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council decided to resume diplomatic relations with Iran. The Iranians, for their part, were said to have responded favourably to the Iraqi overture to undertake negotiations aimed at the solution of outstanding issues.<sup>30</sup> It was stated, in rather definite terms, that "there is not the slightest doubt

that possibilities exist for the settlement of the dispute. It is possible if both countries show good-will and tolerance".<sup>31</sup>

Accompanying the restoration of diplomatic relations was a reduction of tension along the Irano-Iraqi border. In February 1974, however, tension dramatically escalated as new fighting was reported along the border. The Iraqi government complained to the United Nations Security Council and the latter initiated an investigation. It was subsequently reported on 15 February 1974 that the Security Council completed its consideration of the crisis by appealing to both Iran and Iraq to refrain from any steps that could aggravate the situation. In addition, the Security Council suggested that the UN Secretary General appoint a representative to inquire further into the clash.<sup>32</sup> On March 1974, Moscow reported that two days earlier Iranian troops had attacked Iraqi frontier units thereby causing a further deterioration in relations.<sup>33</sup> There were, however, no accompanying reports giving the Iranian side of the incident in the broadcast. However, this is not to suggest that the Soviets had decided to take the Iraqi side - as many of the subsequent reports reflected a neutralist stand.<sup>34</sup>

In May 1974, the UN Secretary General was quoted as reporting that both Iran and Iraq had expressed willingness to observe the ceasefire, to withdraw their forces

from the frontier, and to resume negotiations in order to promote a peaceful solution to the dispute. Negotiations were held in the Summer of 1974. In September, the Soviet media noted that in their first stage of discussions, held in Istanbul, the two antagonists had reached agreement concerning the agenda for subsequent talks.<sup>35</sup> Despite scattered incidents,<sup>36</sup> meetings continued between representatives of Iran and Iraq and finally on 6 March 1975 Soviet observers announced that the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussain (Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council) had reached a "final and long term settlement" of the dispute.<sup>37</sup> Describing the terms of the agreement, the same report further stated that both sides had agreed to negotiate a final delineation of the borders and establish an effective system of frontier control. The decision was to be implemented by the joint Irani-Iraqi Commission following procedures to be defined at a Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled to be held in Tehran.

Soviet observers hailed the defusing of a dangerous situation. They observed that the agreement constituted a major setback for the Western policy of 'divide and rule'.<sup>38</sup> It was also highlighted that "it was no coincidence" that a fellow oil-producer, Algeria, should have proposed the talks and that President Boumedienne should have played a personal role in the conduct of the negotiations.<sup>39</sup>

Between March 15-17, a meeting was held between the Iranian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers which the Algerian Foreign Minister also attended with observer status. At the meeting the Foreign Ministers established three joint commissions, each to deal with a specific aspect and the border demarcation project. In addition, protocols providing for regular contacts between the two neighbouring states were also signed. Finally, it was agreed that additional meetings would be held in order to conclude a final agreement concerning the outstanding disputes. It was reported later that "relations between Iraq and Iran have been "completely normal since March 1975",<sup>40</sup> and that the agreement between these two countries

"...lays down foundations for easing the dangerous tension which had plagued the relations between two neighbouring Middle Eastern states for a long time. The point was reached even when armed clashes took place and claimed unnecessary victims on both sides. Hard feelings between Iraq and Iran were kindered... by foreign imperialist powers which wanted to achieve their own selfish objectives, which are primarily linked with their plans of consolidating their foothold in the Gulf area. The policy of divide and rule seeks to achieve these objectives in particular..."<sup>41</sup>

These developments were welcomed by "public opinion" throughout the Arab world. In an extremely rare announcement linking the Iran-Iraq dispute with the Kurdish problem, Soviet writers stated that the Lebanese Al-Moharrar commented that the normalization of relations between the two countries had made "for the ending of the bloody clashes in Iraqi Kurdistan". It was also reported that on 13 March an agreement



was concluded with the Kurdish forces through the Iranian mediation.<sup>42</sup>

Throughout the entirety of the Irano-Iraq border dispute in the period of our study, the USSR assumed the position of a concerned, but objective, observer. It was often stated that

"the USSR enjoys sincere, friendly and comprehensive relations with both Iran and Iraq. Consequently, the Soviet people have a great interest in seeing the normalization of relations between their friends in the Middle East and the establishment of cooperation and good neighbourly relations between them".<sup>43</sup>

Soviet analysts claimed that the USSR had always held that the border disputes and other differences between countries should be solved by peaceful means and that "the Soviet public firmly believes that there are no differences between Iraq and Iran that cannot be peacefully resolved".<sup>44</sup> It was argued that prolongation of the dispute ran counter to the interests of both sides and only served the interests of the West. Along these lines, referring to an article which appeared in Kayhan International, Radio Moscow in a broadcast stated that while Iraq and India "may feel apprehensive" concerning the Iranian build-up of "'defensive' weapons (of Iran)...there is no reason to believe that Moscow also shares this view". The commentator then went on to encourage the solution of their disputes by peaceful means. Consequently, "the USSR considers these border clashes between the two countries improper and unjustified".<sup>45</sup>

Soviet media frequently used such phrases as 'regrettable' and 'sadness of the Soviet people' in describing the reaction to any renewal of fighting. Conversely, words such as 'praise-worthy' and 'admirable' were used to characterise any moves by the two states to resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The 'Soviet people' were reported to have received such developments with 'pleasure and happiness'. It was stated by Radio Moscow that

"establishing cooperation...on an anti-imperialist basis will promote the strengthening of the foundations of peace and security in this region and will help to banish certain phenomenon for the life of the area which are extremely regrettable,... (reapproachment)... is undoubtedly a cause of pleasure".<sup>46</sup>

On November 18, 1974, well after negotiations were underway between Iraq and Iran, Nikolay Podgorny equated the Asian Collective Security proposal with the Iran-Iraq border dispute at a dinner given in honour of the Shah of Iran. Podgorny first noted that conflicts anywhere in Asia including "the Persian Gulf area" jeopardised the general peace. He then stated that the USSR favoured a solution to the differences by "these (Iraq and Iran) countries themselves at a conference table on the basis of peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness".<sup>47</sup> Immediately following this, Podgorny launched into a discussion of the Asian Collective Security Scheme. This speech set the tone for subsequent analysis of the Iran-Iraq dispute which appeared in the Soviet media over the next few months.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, eliminating any possible doubt that the Soviet Union intended to link the Iran-Iraq settlement with the Asian Collective Security proposal, on March 19, 1975 Radio Moscow reminded its listeners of the proposed security system. The reminder was preceded by a full discussion on the implications of the (then) recent agreement concluded by the two states. The Radio Moscow commentator then stated that the factors necessitating the establishment of the Collective Security System in Asia "applies to countries like Iran and Iraq".<sup>49</sup> The agreement between Iraq and Iran in other words, was being interpreted within the framework of the proposed Collective Security System which otherwise was hardly taken seriously by them.

The use of the Collective Security proposal as a frame of reference for analysis of the Iran-Iraq agreement was perhaps reflective of the Soviet policy of seeking dividends at low risks, low costs and minimal involvement. The USSR was apparently attempting to do at least two more things. First, to show how two states, which were already linked to the proposed Collective Security System, were now working within the spirit of the proposed system to ameliorate tensions. In other words, the USSR seemed to be attempting to show that the principles underlying the proposed system could reduce regional tensions thus illustrating the desirability of establishing the proposed system. In this regard, Moscow may have also felt that that sort of application of the principles governing the proposed system

would accelerate the establishment of the system itself. Secondly, the introduction of the Collective Security proposal into a discussion of Iran-Iraq tensions may have been a way whereby Moscow was attempting to remain aloof from what was clearly a disconcerting dispute between two of its neighbours. Significantly, by linking the proposed system with the dispute during a period of reduced tensions, presumably, it would then have been easier for Moscow to hide behind the proposal should tension again escalate in future; the USSR could then use the opportunity to illustrate the need to establish the proposed system. In any case, one finds that Moscow's emphasis on the proposed system was casual and low-keyed. At best, it aimed at some political dividends, and that too without much of policy initiative and involvement.

The factors motivating the Soviet response to the tensions between Iraq and Iran were many. The USSR had a great deal to lose by taking sides. Moscow apparently recognised that to support either side would risk damaging its own relations with the other. Moreover, there was a danger that an obvious support for Iraq would alienate Gulf States such as Kuwait, which had border dispute with Iraq in the period, or Syria. Conversely, such an obvious support for Iran would alienate majority of the Arabs. There was also a strong likelihood that the side deprived of Soviet support would turn increasingly to the West or, at least to some extent, to the Chinese. The Soviets, of course, would have

been the least appreciative of the idea that either Iran or Iraq - first an important southern neighbour and the second an important gain in the Arab world - should move any closer to the West.

If the Soviet Union was seen as attempting to play an important role, political or military, many Western and Third world governments would have professed to see it as an attempt to dominate the Gulf. Thus, the risk of prompting the West or the regional states into over-reaction was something that Soviets had to be careful about.

Then, of course, there was the general problem of taking sides in a dispute over frontiers, this being a very sensitive issue in the Third World. The Soviets had to be very circumspect in their comment on the 1975 agreement as on the one hand Iraq subsequently used force to try to change frontiers, on the other the frontiers it tried to change was one essentially imposed of it in 1975 as the price for Iran abandoning its support for the Kurdish insurrection i.e., for giving up an effort to subvert the territorial integrity of Iraq. It appears that the Soviets have been showing sensitivity to this general attitude of the Third World countries. It should be recalled that in 1976-77, Somalia's effort to change frontiers was a factor in the Soviet switch of support to Ethiopia. Therefore, the USSR would really be gaining little by supporting one side or the other. The costs of taking sides, thus, clearly out-

weighed any gains which might have been secured.

In short, the USSR obviously felt the best share to assure towards the dispute was that of a concerned but objective observer who constantly counselled the antagonists to resolve disputes through peaceful means. This policy was similar to the Soviet reaction to other regional disputes such as between the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates<sup>50</sup> or between Iraq and Kuwait,<sup>51</sup> or in the sub-continent between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.<sup>52</sup>

## CHAPTER-6

### CONCLUSIONS

The Persian Gulf area has for long been an area of keen interest for Moscow. As for Moscow's interests and policies, various interpretations have been offered by scholars. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most controversial and intriguing areas of understanding; as William Zimmerman has stated in a recent survey of theoretical literature on Soviet policy "the 'truth' as we know-about Soviet behaviour... is more definitely truth with a small 't'."\*

In this paper we have recapitulated Soviet policy towards the problems faced by Ba'thist Iraq during 1968-1975, as projected by Soviet media. The purpose of undertaking such a study was to bring into perspective the Soviet perception of the three interrelated problems faced by Iraq, namely, formation of a united front, the Kurdish question, and Iran-Iraq relations, and the manner in which these affected the development of Soviet policy. The justification for undertaking this was that during the period under study Iraq was the only country in the area where these basic tenets of the Soviet ideological framework were put to the test simultaneously. Since geography and history are an integral part of the operational and psychological environment of any nation, shaping and conditioning its external orientation, we have given a survey of major recurrents of history of

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\* William Zimmerman, "What Do Scholars Know About Soviet Foreign Policy", International Journal (Vol. XXXVII, No.2, Spring 1982), p.198.

Tsarist Russia's interests and policies in the area. However, both geopolitical and historical continuity explanations remain theoretically inadequate and historically inaccurate. Therefore, we have discussed also the Soviet ideological framework, within which the Soviets explain and justify their policies.

There was a prolonged 'Cold War' from the beginning of the nineteenth century between the Tsarist and British empires over what was called 'the Central Asian Question' stretching from India, Afghanistan, and Iran on the one hand, to the Turkish Straits and Constantinople on the other. Iraq, lying between these two poles, had very little importance of its own. The definition and scope of Tsarist interests varied from statesman to statesman and from time to time not only because individual perceptions vary, but also because of the general political situation in Europe and the nature of relationships with the British and Ottoman empires, and at times with France and later with Imperial Germany and Japan. All these influenced, in varying degrees, the formulation and execution of Russian policy.

Russian expansion in the Caucasus was viewed as preliminary to further expansion in the direction of the Euphrates Valley, for eventual control of Baghdad and Basra. The British feared that the Russian expansion into the Euphrates Valley would mean a frontal attack on the Ottoman Empire. Against such fears, the Russian primary interest.



had remained avoidance of any direct confrontation with Britain and secondly, to get the largest possible share of the Ottoman Empire, and when it disintegrated. Pressure was periodically applied on British India through Afghanistan and Iran, primarily to maximise the Tsarist gains.

The areas constituting today's Iraq had little importance of their own for Russian interests and objectives in the Persian Gulf area. These objectives, at best, viewed the area as a base for other operations and were largely determined by the nature of international policies at the time. For example the Persian Gulf area was merely a means through which diversionary pressure could be applied against Great Britain, important only insofar as the international situation at the time allowed it to be a means through which higher ends might be attained.

The situation has changed fundamentally as neither the Persian Gulf is a British lake nor India is in the British Empire. Likewise, main antagonist is no longer Great Britain, but the United States against whom the pressure cannot be exerted in quite the same way as was the case during the Tsarist times. Therefore, chapter one has argued, interpretations based on history are totally invalid and irrelevant and are, by and large, a carry-over of a situation which no longer exists. Coupled with this is the change in the nature of the Soviet state as was manifested under the Bolshevik regime of Lenin and Stalin.

The Bolsheviks have argued that Tsarist policy was guided by imperial and class interests and that there is no continuity whatsoever since the October Revolution. The USSR claims that its policy is guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, under which Capitalism is perceived as a passing epoch in the inevitable historical process which would culminate in the ultimate victory of the proletariat. The concept of national liberation is the single most powerful ideological tenet in Soviet relations with the developing countries. In line with the general doctrinal reappraisals regarding the newly independent countries, the 1960s were marked by a new phase in Soviet policy towards the Gulf area.

The victorious proletariat is held duty bound to consolidate its gains and continue strengthening itself internationally. Hence, it is claimed that the victorious proletariat is the natural ally supporting and guiding all progressive forces the world over. Presently, however, the USSR is isolated and surrounded by hostile (nuclear) imperialist powers which are eager to destroy the rising revolutionary wave emanating from the Soviet State. The inevitability of war, therefore, was revised in favour of peaceful coexistence and participation in the international (capitalist) system as competition between capitalism and socialism was now to be carried out peacefully. In view of this, the responsibility of the Soviet State was to defend the revolutionary gains already made in order to promote the historical process internally as well as internationally.

Since history is perceived to be on the Soviet side and the ultimate victory as inevitable, it was not held necessary for the Soviet State to jeopardise its own existence in order to advance the historical process on an international level. No fixed time table is given for the ultimate triumph.

Theoretically, however, the Soviet policy challenges the framework of the international system. It is important to note two qualifying factors which tend to blunt the impact of a policy which is theoretically destabilizing. First, the USSR views change in the framework of the international system as inevitable. Hence, the Soviet State need not desperately work for change, especially since to do so may jeopardise its own security. Consequently, the destabilizing influence of the USSR in the Persian Gulf area has not been so great as it might have been. Second, throughout the entire period under study, the USSR by and large lacked the power to do anything more than seek change within the framework of the system. While the Soviet leaders maintained that their policy was ultimately designed to challenge the international system, in fact their policy framework merely sought change within the system by cultivating relations with all regional actors.

The analysis of contemporary Soviet objectives in the Persian Gulf area must then be framed within the definition of Soviet objectives in the developing countries. Indeed, Soviet objectives in the area south of the Soviet State

have remained much the same since 1917. Soviet leaders have continuously sought to neutralize all threats to Soviet security emanating from the rival powers' presence.

While pursuing these objectives the USSR has simultaneously encouraged the establishment of progressive, friendly regimes (like Iraq) on the one hand, and cultivated friendlier relations with all types of 'conservative' and 'pro-western' regimes (like Iran) on the other. This means that the USSR has attempted to undermine, or at least contain, the development of economic and political relations between such countries and the western powers. Simultaneously, the USSR has itself attempted to develop close economic, political and, if possible, military ties with these newly independent countries. In pursuing this latter objective, however, it should be noted that the principal motive in the short term was not the establishment of revolutionary regimes but rather the elimination of what Moscow perceived as threatening western presences.

It must be stressed however, that despite progress in all-round ties with Iraq, and close economic bonds with Iran, the Soviet ability to affect the policies of those states remained extremely limited. In some cases the USSR was able to affect the attitudes of Iraqi leaders or of the ICP and/or the KDP. More often, however, its media coverage reflected its inability to do so.

This lack of control over the policies of the regional states has often resulted in the USSR being dragged into internal conflicts and regional crisis over which the Kremlin had little or no control. Indeed, it often presented problems for the Soviet leadership, particularly in those cases where the conflict involved rival states and or movements both of which the USSR was attempting to court. Indeed, upon examination of the USSR's response to the various conflicts and crisis which surfaced in the Gulf area between 1968-1977, one gets the clear impression that the Kremlin would have preferred to have remained aloof from virtually all of them. In the final analysis, Soviet inability to control either the actions of the regional actors or the course of the crisis which emerged in the area, combined with the Kremlin's apparent reluctance to become involved, accounted for its cautious stance in responding to these situations.

While the Soviets succeeded in establishing close relations with Iraq, they lacked the power to consistently shape the policies of either the Ba'th Party or of the ICP. The lack of power in this case proved disadvantageous considering the fact that Iraqi policies often conflicted with the policies of other states (eg Iran), or actors (eg KDP) with which USSR hoped to maintain correct relations. This meant embarrassing choices for the USSR—choices which often resulted in alienating the side deprived of Soviet support.

Indeed, Moscow's efforts to develop close relations with antagonistic actors within a State or between two States without simultaneously having any effective way of influencing the antagonists was perhaps the greatest contradiction in Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf area during the period under our study.

FOOTNOTES  
(INTRODUCTION)

1. Barrington Moore Jr., Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change (Cambridge, Mass: , Harward University Press, 1956) p. 399.
2. An Iraqi Communist Party was established in 1927. However, the official date for the founding of the Iraqi party is 1934. Nevertheless, between the wars, the party was small, faction-ridden and illegal. see, Jaan Pennar, The USSR and the Arabs-The Ideological Dimensions 1917-1972 (London, C. Hurst & Co., 1973) pp.38-41, 118-130.
3. In the suppression of this anti-communist and anti-Kassem military revolt in Mosul in March 1959 though the Communists played an important role but eventually turned out to be the losers as this turned Kassem as well as the Ba'thists against them.
4. Jaan Panner, op.cit., p.40.
5. D. Volsky, "On the Persian Gulf", New Times, No.5, February 7, 1968, pp.14-16. Similarly, Venramin Likhach the USSR's ambassador to Baghdad observed in August 1972 that "Iraq occupies first place in the Arab struggle for liberation, progress and development". See Radio Moscow, 3 August 1972, Foreign Broad Casting Information Service (hereafter FBIS) 151, 3 August, 1972, B4-5.

FOOTNOTES  
(CHAPTER-1)

1. From about the 1860s, the Asiatic phase of Anglo-Russian relations was referred to by this term. This was largely recognised as forming part of "Middle Eastern Question", and sometimes, the "Near Eastern Question". It is in this sense that the term is used throughout this chapter.
2. Vulnerability to military invasion and frontier pressures and a constant search for secure frontiers has been described as a characteristic feature of Russian history during the last 800 years. The Mongol invasions from 124-1380; the Poles from 1607-1712; the Swedes from 1611-1614, and again in 1709; Napoleon in 1812; Germany and Austria from 1914-1918; Britain, USA, Japan, France and Italy in 1918-1919; Poland in 1920; Germany from 1941-1944 have left the Russians apprehensive concerning their security. The Russians are reported to have suffered 45,000 military dead in Russo-Japanese War; two million military and countless civilians dead in the First World War; 30,000 in clashes with Japan in the late-1930; about 50,000 in the Soviet-Finnish War; and between 18-22 million dead in the Second World War.
3. The annexation of Siberia can be viewed as an expansion with economic considerations. Cyril. E. Black, "The Patterns of Russian Objectives" in Ivo J. Lederer (ed), Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1962) pp.17-18.
4. Before the Crimean War the only railway line of importance that had been completed, ran from Moscow to St. Petersburg. By 1910 its total length was 24 times that of 1860. But still Russia ranked 10th among the European countries. Alec Nove, The Economic History of the USSR (New York, Penguin Books, 1975), pp.11-15.
5. In 1913, for example, river transportation in Russia amounted to 46,300,000 tonnes. Robert Kerner, the Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1946), p.89.
6. Ibid. Chapter-IV.



7. For a brief survey, Joseph Citurba, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East, (Alabama, Maxwell Air Force base, 1968) pp.7-15; Russian expansion in these areas is sometimes attributed to the Panslavic Movement. But it must be noted that though many influential Russian statemen subscribed to this idea, totally or in part, it never became the "official" policy. see, Adam B. Ulam, "Nationalism, Panslavism, Communism" in Lederer, op.cit., pp.43-44. For the views of Nickolai La Banilevskii, a recognized spokesman of Panslavism, see, Basil Dmytryshyn (ed), Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917 (New York, (New York, Halt Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1976) pp.256-265.
8. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Asia (Calcutta, Superintendent Govt. of India Press, 1915); p.222.
9. For the text of the "will", Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, (London, Macmillan, 1940), Vol. II, p.245.
10. The validity of this document has always been questioned. Sir Arnold Wilson suggests that this document "might have been written by a Russian Commisar two centuries later", The Persian Gulf, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1928), p.171. For a brief summary of earlier views, V.K. Chauda, India, Britain, Russia: A Study in British Opinion 1838-1878, (Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1967), pp.219-223.
11. Chauda, op.cit., p.221.
12. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1795-1880, (London, Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.96-97; Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence, (London, John Murray, 1903), pp.10-11.
13. Chauda, op.cit., p.220.
14. Michael Edwards, Playing the Great Game: A Victorian Cold War (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1975), p.5; for a detailed account see, Chauda, op.cit., Chapter I and II.
15. Chauda, op.cit., p.1.
16. Edwards, op.cit., p.11.
17. Ibid. pp.8-15.

18. Chauda, op.cit. p.165, see also Chapter II.
19. R.K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs 1500-1941, (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1966) pp.43-45.
20. Ibid., p.40; Chirol, op.cit., pp.9-10.
21. For the full text, J.R. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), pp.84-86.
22. Wilson, op.cit., p.225.
23. Archibald Forbes, The Afghan Wars 1838-1842 and 1878-1880, (London, Seeley and Co., Second Ed., 1892), pp.1-6.
24. For the text of the treaty, Hurewitz, op.cit., pp.86-88.
25. Lorimer, op.cit., p.189; Michael Edwards, op.cit., p.5.
26. Ramazani, op.cit., pp.42-43; Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1875), pp.33-35; Wilson, op.cit., pp.2-5; Forbes, op.cit. p.1.
27. For the full text of the treaty, Chirol, op.cit., pp.418-424.
28. Forbes, op.cit. p.3. The island was again occupied in 1856-57 with the intention of making it the headquarters of the British in the Gulf Area, Wilson, op.cit., pp.182-257.
29. The accession to the throne of Persia of Mohammad Shah in 1834 gave an impetus to such feelings. His conduct gave the impression of his being subservient to Russian policy, see Wilson, op.cit., p.257, Lorimer, op.cit., p.223.
30. Among others, Rawlinson, op.cit., pp.263-292; Edwards, op.cit., pp.109-111.
31. Kelly, op.cit., pp.278-279.
32. Edwards, op.cit., pp.65-66.
33. Lorimer, op.cit., p.225; Wilson, op.cit., p.258.

34. Kelly, op.cit., p.261.
35. Ibid., pp.261, 262, 292-293, 297, 340-352, 486, 489.
36. Firoz Kazemzadeh, Russia and British in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp.90-92; Forbes, op.cit., p.325.
37. Kelly, op.cit., p.261, Edwards, op.cit., pp.9,90,91-93; Rawlinson, op.cit., pp.263-292.
38. See among others, A.C. Yate, The Afghan Boundary Commission (London, William Blackwood, 1886), pp.440-443; see also, Rawlinson, op.cit.; Forbes, op.cit.; Kazemzadeh, op.cit., Kelly, op.cit.
39. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p.490; Rawlinson, op.cit., pp.263-282.
40. Kazemzadeh, ibid., pp.77, 219.
41. Ibid., pp.407-427, 466, 470.
42. Ibid.
43. Rawlinson, op.cit., pp.273-88.
44. Ramazani, op.cit., pp.52-53.
45. Firoz Kzemzadeh, "Russia and the Middle East", in Lederer, op.cit., p.497.
46. Briton Busch, Britain in Russia in the Persian Gulf: 1894-1914, pp.104-113, 117-131, 262-266; Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.201, 219, 336, 360-367, 430-470. Martin L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828-1914, (Florida, University of Florida Press, 1965), pp.33-37.
47. Busch, op.cit., pp.117-131.
48. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.201, 333, 360, 379, 382-385, 466-470; Busch, op.cit., pp.104-110, 117-131.
49. Busch, op.cit., pp.117-131; Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.360-366.
50. Busch, Ibid, pp.117-131; Kazemzadeh, Ibid., p.488.
51. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.486-488.

52. Russian trade with Persia, for example, though doubled between 1890 and 1900, but on balance Russian exports to Persia in 1900 were 20,600,000 roubles, compared to 20,400,000 imports in the same year (at that time about 9.47 roubles were equal to one pound sterling), Chirol, op.cit., pp.445-46. For a detailed treatment see Entner, op.cit.
53. Lorimer, op.cit., p.225; see also note no. 29 above.
54. These pledges later culminated in Russian and British participation in Persian-Turkish Boundary Commission of 1843-1847. Lorimer, op.cit., p.230.
55. J.B. Kelly, Arabia, The Gulf and the West (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p.270.
56. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (London, Cornell University Press, 1980), pp.16-19.
57. Kelly, op.cit., pp.281-282, 300, 348-349, 352.
58. Edwards, op.cit., p.37.
59. Ibid., p.35.
60. Ibid., pp.38-39.
61. Chauda, op.cit., p.21.
62. Yate, op.cit., p.319.
63. Edwards, op.cit., pp.84-85.
64. Ibid., p.85.
65. Kelly, (1980), op.cit., p.460; Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp.25-31.
66. For initial interests of England, see among others, Edwards, op.cit., pp.38-39; for period after the First Afghan War, Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.3-19.
67. Ramazani, op.cit., pp.51-53; Kazemzadeh in Lederer, op.cit., pp.492-496; Chauda, op.cit., p.24; Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan, Vol.II, (London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1940), pp.86-87.
68. Viceroy Lawrence in 1867, for example, stated "I am not at all certain that Russia might not prove a safer ally [and], a better neighbour, than the

- Mohammedan races of Central Asia and Kabul...She would introduce civilization". For similar views by others see, Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.13-14; Chauda, op.cit., p.24,25, Yate, op.cit., p.444; Edwards, op.cit. pp.65-66.
69. For Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky's views, see Chauda, op.cit., pp.21-22.
  70. Among others, Rawlinson, op.cit., pp.263-292.
  71. Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973), p.34; Kazemzadeh in Lederer, op.cit., p.493.
  72. Sayed Athar Abbas Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolt, Canberra, Mar'fat Publishing House, 1980), Chapter 3; Edwards, op.cit., p.85.
  73. Edwards, Ibid., see also Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization: 1880-1964 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969), Chapter 4.
  74. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.45-47.
  75. Edwards, op.cit., pp.73-76.
  76. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.3-36; see also, Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah: 1941-1979, (London, Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1980), pp.11-19.
  77. See Ramazani, op.cit., pp.51-62.
  78. Lord Salisbury, at this stage was planning not only to occupy Afghanistan, but also to attack Central Asia with a force of twenty thousand men. Edwards, op.cit., p.76.
  79. Edwards, op.cit., pp.90-91; Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.38-39. About this time official gazetteer recorded, "during 1872-1876...there were still no symptoms of Russian activities in the Persian Gulf Region". Lorimer, op.cit., p.269.
  80. Ivor Spector, "The Soviet Union and the Muslim World: 1917-1958 (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1959) p.14.
  81. Edwards, op.cit., pp.90-91.
  82. Ibid., Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.45-53.

83. Chirol, op.cit., pp.445-46.
84. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p.51.
85. Yate, op.cit., p.430; Chirol, op.cit., p.339.
86. Yate, Ibid., p.442.
87. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p.74.
88. Ibid., pp.48-49.
89. Ivor Spector, op.cit., p.18.
90. Kazemzadeh, pp.74-99. It was not until the termination of the Boer War that Britain made the most important declaration of her policy in relation to the Gulf since Sir Edward Grey's pronouncement in 1895. See, Ramazani, op.cit., pp.89-93.
91. Chauda, op.cit., pp.1-2.
92. Yate, Ibid., p.441.
93. Edwards, op.cit., p.90.
94. Ibid., p.90.
95. For Lord Curzon's view of Russian threat to the Gulf, see his budget speech of 1903, reproduced in Chirol, op.cit., pp.1-6; Hurewitz, op.cit., pp.219-249.
96. Edwards, op.cit., p.94.
97. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1980 Edition), pp.430-441.
98. Quoted in Ivor Spector, op.cit., p.19.
99. Ibid., p.106.
100. Ibid., p.24.
101. For details see, Ibid., pp.19-27; Gregorian, op.cit., pp. 206-210, 223-24.
102. I. Spector, op.cit.,

103. Zhurnal Osobogo Soveshaniya 14 Aprelya, 1907 g. P<sup>ch</sup> Afghanskonn Voprosu, "Krasnyi Arzhiv" II-III (1935). pp.3-39 quoted in Spector, op.cit., p.22.
104. Kazemzadeh, op.cit., pp.498-99.
105. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, Mass., Harward University Press, 1954), pp.75-79.
106. Joseph Stalin, "The International character of the October Revolution", Pravda, November 6-7, 1927, quoted in Ivor Spector, op. cit., p.32.
107. Ibid.
108. Pavlovitch, "Zadachi. Vserossiiskoi Nauchnoi Assotsiatsii Vostokovedeniya", p.11, Ibid., pp.41-42.
109. Ibid., p.42.
110. Ghulam Muradov, "The USSR in Solving the National Question and the Liberated countries of the East", in Yuri V. Gankovski, Soviet Scholars View South Asia (Lahore, Peoples' Publishing House, 1975) pp. 89-106.
111. For a discussion of these changes see Roger E. Kanet, 'The Soviet Union and the Colonial Question: 1917-1953', in his, The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1974) pp.1-26. When the Bolsheviks abandoned their claims over constantinople in May 1917, Milikov, Minister of foreign affairs in the provisional government refused to yield. The Bolsheviks dismissed him, Ivor Spector, op.cit. p.65.
112. Spector, op.cit. p.37-38
113. Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 Vol.III. (New York, the MacMillan Press, 1961), p.235.
114. J. Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Vol.I, (London, Oxford University Press, 1951) pp.220-22.
115. In his speech, the head of the Communist International summoned "the peoples of the East...to a Holy War first of all against British Imperialism". In response, this gathering of 1,891 delegates from 37 different nationalities were said to have cried, "Jihad! Jihad!" Merton Schwartz "The USSR & Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries", Survey (Spring 1973) pp.209-244.

116. Stalin was the first Commissar for the Nationalities, and in this capacity the 3 December 1917 appeal to all the Muslims was jointly signed by Stalin and Lenin. As early as 1913, on Lenin's instructions, he wrote Marxism and the National Question. However, it has also been argued (Lowy, op.cit.) that Lenin had serious disagreements on many issues discussed by Stalin, and never referred to it throughout his life.
117. As cited in Bernard Taurer, "Stalin's last Thesis", Foreign Affairs, (April 1953), pp 367-381
118. For the full text of the thesis, George Lenezowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry (New York, Cornell University Press, 1949) Appendix VII, pp.328-373.
119. Yu Steklov, "Turetskaya Revolyutsia", Izvestiya, 23 April 1919, quoted in Ivor Spector, op.cit., p.64.
120. Joseph Stalin, Sotchineniya V, p.37, quoted in Ibid.
121. J. Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy: 1917-1923 Vol. III (New York, the MacMillan, 1961) p.235.
122. Ibid., p.167.
123. A delegate from the Caucasus expressed the Congress's view of the Turkish case in these words, "Mustafa Kemal's movement is a national liberation movement. We support it, but, as soon as the struggle with imperialism is finished, we believe that this movement will transform into a social revolution", quoted in Carr, op.cit., p.246.
124. Carr, op.cit. p.484.
125. J. Degras, op.cit., p.187-188.
126. The aid was in three forms: money, arms and munitions. Considering that Russian economy was bankrupt at the time, and the country was ridden with warfare against the Allied powers and White Generals, the magnitude of this aid could not be as spectacular as it is sometimes claimed. Nevertheless, this had come at the right time when it was most needed to furnish an otherwise poorly equipped Turkish army, and has been instrumental in the final victory. In round figures the total Russian aid, according to the Turkish envoy Ali Fuad Pasa in Moscow, was 10 million gold rubles (paid in installments), rifles, bayonets, machine-guns, cannons horses and relevant material to equip two divisions, quoted in Dogu Ergil, Social History of the Turkish National Struggle: 1919-22 (Lahore, Sind Sagar Academy, N.D.), p.150.



127. Potyomkin (ed.), Istoriya Diplomatii, III, p.571, quoted in Spector, op.cit., p.185.
128. A.F. Miller, Turtsiya i. Prosloma Prolivov (Moscow, 1947, p.19) quoted in Ibid.
129. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1946, pp.7737-8 and 8076 quoted in G. Jukes, op.cit., p.97.
130. Spector, op.cit., p.84-85.
131. Ibid. p.86; see for details Woodby Fain (in note 5 of chapter-2).
132. Argeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, (Croom Helm, 1980), p.18.
133. Ibid., p.12.
134. Ibid.
135. Reza Khan became the War Minister in April 1921, Prime Minister as well as de facto ruler in October 1923, and was crowned on 26 April 1926.
136. Spector, op.cit. p.87.
137. Manoucher Parvin, "Political Economy of Soviet Iranian Trade: An Overview of Theory and Practice", The Middle East Journal, (Winter, 1977) pp.31-43.
138. Yodfat, op.cit. p.18.
139. R.K. Ramazani, "The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic: The Rise and Fall", Studies on the Soviet Union, (Vol. II, No.4, 1971) pp.401-427.
140. Yodfat, op.cit., pp.10-23.
141. Michael Volodarsky, "First Steps in Soviet Diplomacy towards Afghanistan, 1917-1921", in Yaacov Ro'i (ed) The USSR and the Muslim World, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984) pp.215-225.
142. Ibid., p.216.
143. Ibid., p.217.
144. I.N. Zemskov etc.al, Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1945, Vol.I, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981) p.140.

145. Ibid., p.141.
146. M. Volodarsky, op.cit. p.220.
147. Ibid.
148. Dupree, op.cit., p.451.
149. Gregorian, op.cit. Chapter 4.
150. Giles Bullard, "The Power of Menace: Soviet Relations With South Asia: 1917-1974", British Journal of International Studies (No.2, 1976), pp.51-66.
151. For text see, H.M. Davis (ed), Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East Rev. Ed.,(Durham, Duke University Press, 1957) p.523-526.
152. A.F. Miller Otcherki Moveisnei Istorii Turtsii, op.cit. pp.523-26, quoted in Spectore Ibid. p.186
153. Paul Schmitz, Moskan urd die Islamische Weet (Munich, 1938), p.58, in Spectore, ibid, p.187.
154. The Soviet share in the Iranian trade decline from 35.5% in 1936-37 to only 0.5% in 1939-40. By 1938-39 Germany, previously little business in Iran, occupied first place with more than 40% of the entire Iranian foreign trade, Spector, Ibid. p.187.
155. Ibid., p.187.

FOOTNOTES  
(CHAPTER- 2)

1. Lenin's writings of immediate relevance, though written against a different background and with different purpose in mind include: "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism", and "The Socialist Revolution and Nations Right to Self-Determination". For brief survey of his writings most often quoted by the Soviet Third World experts, Gafurov, "Lenin and the Liberation of the People of the East", International Affairs (Moscow), May 1970.
2. For Stalin's Afro-Asian policy, among others, Thomas P. Thornton, "Peking, Moscow, and the Under-developed Area", World Politics, July 1961, pp.494-504; and his, The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964); Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, (Cambridge, Howard University Press, 1963); William T. Shinn, "The National Democratic State: A Communist Program for Less Developed Areas", World Politics, April 1963, p.377-389; Alexander Dallin, "The Use of International Movement", in Lederer, op.cit., pp.311-48, also see note 4 below.
3. Issac Deutscher, Heretics and Renegades and other Essays, (London, Hamnish Hamilton, 1955).
4. A change in Stalin's attitude can be seen in his "Economic Problems and Socialism in USSR" (1952), reproduced in Bruce Franklin, (ed), The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-1952, (London, Croom Helm, 1973), pp.445-481; see also Rodger Swearingen, "A Decade of Soviet Foreign Policy in Asia", Current History, February 1957, pp.56-89; Richard Lowenthal, "Russia, the One Party System, and the Third World", Survey, January 1966, pp.43-58; Bernard Taurer, "Stalin's Last Thesis", Foreign Affairs, April 1953. Shulman, op.cit.; Uri Ra'anani, "Moscow and the Third World", Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb., 1965, pp.22-31.
5. The Changes in opposing directions are surveyed by Sylvia Woodby Fain, "The Evolution of Soviet Approaches to Colonial Nationalism: South and South East Asia 1946-1953", (Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1971) pp.260-287, 30-381; see also note 4 above.

6. R.A., Yellon, "The Winds of Change", Mizan, Vol. 9, 1967, pp.51-57, 155-173.
7. Quoted in J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India from Stalin to Brezhnev, (Delhi, Vikas Publishers 1970), p.69.
8. Quoted in Yellon, pp.51-57, 155-173.
9. V. Seityonov, in one of the earliest re-assessments, divided the former colonies into three groups. In the first group, that closest to the Soviet Union, were the States that have won "complete liberation" (e.g. China, North Korea, Vietnam). The second group was composed of nations, now possessing national independence and not participating in military blocs with the colonial powers (e.g. India, Indonesia, Egypt, Burma, Syria). Finally, States with "formal state independence" (e.g. Pakistan, Iran, Philippines), Kommunist, December 1956 in Michael P. Gehlen, The Politics of Co-existence: Soviet Methods and Motives, (Bloomington, Indian University Press, 1967), pp.50-52.
10. Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, No.II, 1955 in Walter Z. Laqueur, "Towards National Democracy: Soviet Doctrine and New Countries", Survey, July-September 1961, pp.3-11.
11. Araby V, Borbe Za Nezavisimost', Moscow 1957, in Laqueur, Ibid.
12. K. Brutents, "Developing Countries and the Break-up of the Colonial System". International Affairs, January 1966, pp.62-71.
13. Mizan, January 1961, pp.1-3.
14. K. Brutents, "Integral Part of World Revolutionary Process", International Affairs, February 1964, pp.30-37.
15. Brutents, "Developing Countries and..." op. cit., pp.62-71.
16. Mizan, January 1961, op.cit., pp.1-3.
17. Roger E. Kent, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin" in his ed. The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp.27-50.

18. For a detailed account, Gehlen, op.cit., Chapter 2; see also George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington, Institute for Public Policy, 1971), pp.13-18.
19. Quoted from Kanet, op.cit., pp.27-50.
20. Ye. Zhukov, Pravda, January 5, 1961, as translated in Mizan, No.1 January 1961.
21. B. Ponomarev, "The State of National Democracy", Kommunist, No.7, 1971 translated in Mizan, January 1961.
22. Among others, an article by Zhukov in Pravda (January 5, 1961) reproduced in Mizan, No. 3, January 1961.
23. Quoted by Laqueur, op.cit., pp.3-11.
24. Brutents, "Developing Countries and...." op.cit., pp.62-71.
25. Lowenthal, op.cit., pp.43-58.
26. See Brutents, "Developing Countries and..." op.cit., pp.62-71.
27. See this statement during his visit to UAR in 1964, or on the occasion of Ben Bella's visit to Moscow the same year in Yellon, op.cit. pp.51-57, 155-173.
28. Quoted in Ra'anana, op.cit., pp.22-31.
29. Brutents, "Integral Part of the....." op.cit., pp.30-37.
30. Dallin, op.cit., p.339.
31. Quoted Kanet, op.cit., pp.27-50.
32. For a detailed account of 'revolutionary democracy' Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries", Foreign Affairs, October 1964, pp.87-98.
33. Ra'anana, op.cit., pp.22-31; Ian Clark, Soviet Policy Towards India and Pakistan: 1965-1971, (Ph.D. Thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1974), Chapter 2.
34. See, for example, proceedings of a debate of the Academy of Social Sciences, "The Theory and Practice

- of the Non-Capitalist Way of Development", International Affairs, November 1970, pp.11-25.
35. Jaan Pennar, The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension, (London, C. Hurst and Co., 1973), pp.10-13.
36. Eg. O. Bogomolov, "CMEA and the Developing Countries", International Affairs, July 1979, pp.23-34; see also Tyagunenko's comments in "The Theory and Practice of the..." op.cit., pp.11-25.
37. Quoted in David Morison, "Soviet influence: Prospects for 1967" Mizan, January-February 1967, No.1, pp.31-37.
38. Tinji Otegebey, "For a United Front and All Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Feudal Forces". International Affairs, January 1970, pp.27-23.
39. D. Zarine, "Developing States and International Relations", International Affairs, May 1968, pp.47-52.
40. See for details, Yellon, op.cit., pp.51-57 and 155-173. However, there was another factor contributing to the reductions in Soviet aid commitments that is, increasing magnitude of non-utilized aid in the recipient countries, Clark, op.cit., pp.72-77.
41. Morton Schwartz, "The USSR and Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries", Survey Spring 1973, pp.209-244; Walter C. Clemens "Soviet Policy in the Third World in the 1970's: Five Alternative Futures", Orbis, Summer 1969, pp.476-501; Clark, op.cit., chapter.2; "The National Liberation Movement: A Lower Soviet Rating" Mizan, No.2, 1967, pp.41-51.
42. V. Fyodorov, "The Driving Forces of the National Liberal Revolution", International Affairs, January 1968, pp.66-72.
43. See Mikhail Suslov's Opening Speech to the Plenary Session of the International Theoretical Conference on "The Great October Revolution and the Present Epoch", held in Moscow in November 1977, The Radiant Ideas of the October Revolution, (Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1978), pp.5-19.
44. Quoted from Zarine, op.cit., pp.47-52.

45. Y. Seleznyova, "Developing States and International Relations" International Affairs, May 1968, pp.67-73.
46. "From the General Democratic Transformation to the Socialism", Kommunist (September 1962), cited in Clark, op.cit., pp.72-77, see also the summary of Simoniya's article, "On the character of National Liberation Revolution", Narody Azii I Afriki, No.6, 1966, published in Mizan, No.2, 1967, op.cit. pp.41-51.
47. October 2, 1969, in W.W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: 1964-1972, (Syracuse University Press, 1973), p.170.
48. G. Kim and P. Shastiko, Pravda, September 14, 1966, cited in Clark, op.cit., p.71.
49. No.13, September 1962, in Clark, op.cit., p.63.
50. Ye. M. Zhukov, "Modern Theories of 'National Type' Socialism", (Moscow, 1967) (Russian), abstract published as "UAR and USSR: The Dialogue on Socialism", Mizan, January-February, 1968.
51. Tingi Otegeby, op.cit., pp.27-33.
52. Pennar, op.cit., p.14.
53. Daniel S. Papp, "National Liberation During Detente: the Soviet Outlook", International Journal, Vol. 32, 1976-77, pp.82-89.
54. A. Lavrishchev, "The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries", International Affairs, January 1968, pp.59-65.
55. Quoted in Papp, op.cit., pp.82-89.
56. Tingi Otegeby, op.cit., pp.27-33.
57. "The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist...", op.cit., pp.11-25.
58. Zarine, op.cit., pp.47-52.
59. Meimo, No.5, 1968 in David Morrison, "Africa Asia: Some Trends in Soviet Thinking", Mizan, No.1, January-February 1968, pp.107-184.
60. Ibid.

61. V. Nikolayev, "'Third World': Choice of Path", International Affairs, July 1970, pp.31-36.
62. V. Kremenyuk, "Conflicts in the Developing Countries and Imperialist Policy", International Affairs, January, 1974.
63. N. Simoniya, Nar<sup>ally</sup> Azii I Afriki, No.6, 1966, as translated in Mizan, April/May 1967, op.cit., pp.41-51.
64. A. Lavrishchev, op.cit., pp.59-65.
65. Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy, (New York, Macmillan Co., 1968), p.256.
66. Lavrishchev, op.cit., pp.59-65.
67. See Yellon, op.cit., pp.51-57, 155-173.
68. Andreasyan, "Soviet Experience and the Developing Countries", International Affairs, August 1967, pp.17-22.
69. Quoted in Papp; see also L. Brezhnev, "A Historic Road to Communism", International Affairs, May 1970.
70. A Conversation with Leszek Kolakowski Encounter, January 1981, pp.9-26.
71. Radio Moscow, FBIS 138, 15 July 1970, A27-28; Radio Moscow, 23 August 1974, FBIS 175, 9 September 1974, F5-6.
72. Pravda, 18 July 1964, quoted in Pannar, op.cit., p.119.
73. Radio Moscow, 30 August 1966, quoted in Ibid., p.120.
74. New Times, 21 August 1968, p.3., quoted in Ibid., p.121.
75. Quoted in Ibid.
76. Pravda, 5 May 1970, quoted in Ibid., p.122.
77. Speech by Aleksey Kosygin, 11 February 1972, Radio Moscow, 11 February 1972, FBIS 37, 14 February 1972, B1-4; see also, A. Nikanorov, "Friendship, Cooperation", Izvestiya 20 February 1972, 2-FBIS 37, 23 February 1972, B4-8.



FOOTNOTES  
(CHAPTER - 3)

1. It is interesting to note that the term "new period" was used apparently to avoid some basic controversies about the "...nature of the events of 17 July 1968 which brought the Ba'th Party to power: whether this was a revolution or a turning point and an important revolutionary act within the framework of the 1958 revolution which overthrew the dictatorship of Nuri as-Sayed? It is worth turning these questions into an obstacle, even if only temporarily..." V. Kudryavtsev, "Iraq on the March", Izvestia, 8 June 1972, 4-FBIS 115, 13 June 1972, B9-13.
2. R. Petrov, "Iraq on the Path of Change", Pravda, 14 July 1971, 4- FBIS 128, 19 July 1971, B9-11.
3. R. Petrov, "Iraq on the Path of Changes", Pravda, 14 July 1971, 4- FBIS 138, 19 July 1971, B9-11.
4. R. Petrov, op.cit., B9-11; V. Kudryavtsev, op.cit. B9-13; Radio Moscow, 17 July 1972, FBIS 141, 20 July 1972, B6-7; see also, V. Kudryavtsev, "The Republic of Arabs and Kurds" Izvestiya, 21 March 1970, 4-FBIS 58, 25 March 1970, A46-48; Radio Moscow, FBIS 138, 17 July 1970, A28-29; Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B4-5; Radio Moscow, FBIS 45, 6 March 1975, B5-6; A. Lukovets, "Figs, Oil and Politics", Pravda, 27 May 1975, FBIS 106, 2 June 1975.
5. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult Boundry Crossed", Pravda, 5 April 1970; 4-FBIS 68, 8 April 1970, A22-25; R. Petrov, "Iraq on the Path of Changes", 14 July 1971, 4-FBIS 138, 19 July 1971, B9-11; K. Geyvandov, "Along the Chosen Road", Pravda, 16 July 1975, FBIS 139, 18 July 1975.
6. R. Petrov, op.cit., B9-11.
7. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, op.cit., A-22-25.
8. Ibid.
9. Radio Moscow, FBIS 29, 11 February 1971, A13-14, see also, Radio Moscow, FBIS 13 5, 14 July 1971, B7-8.
10. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, op.cit. A22-25; V. Kudryavtsev, op.cit.
11. Ibid.

12. Radio Moscow, FBIS 135, 14 July 1971, B7-8; R. Petrov, op.cit. B9-11.
13. Radio Moscow, FBIS 20, 29 January 1970, A7-8.
14. V. Kudryavtsev, op.cit. B9-13; Radio Moscow, 17 July 1972, FBIS 141, 20 July 1972, B6-7; Radio Moscow, FBIS 159, 17 August 1971, B3.
15. A. Vasilyev, "The Celebration of the Arabs and the Kurds", Pravda 11 March 1971, 4-FBIS 51, 16 March 1971, B9-10.
16. Radio Moscow, 1 January 1972, FBIS 1, 3 January 1972, B10; K. Karim, "A Short Prop", Pravda, 29 April 1973, 4-FBIS 87, 4 May 1973, B2-4.
17. Ibid.
18. Other relevant sections of the Draft Chapter will be discussed subsequently.
19. Radio Moscow, 11 February 1972, FBIS 21, 14 February 1972, B1-4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 36, 22 February 1972.
20. K. Karim, B2-4; L. Koryavin, "On the Banks of the Tigris", Izvestiya, 10 February 1972, 3-FBIS 37, 23 February 1972, B4-5.
21. R. Petrov, "Iraq: New Horizons", New Times, No.49, December 1971, pp.20-21.
22. Radio Moscow, FBIS 97, 17 May 1972, B3-4.
23. Mukarram At-Talabani was named as Minister of Irrigation, and 'Amir Abdullah' was named Minister of State.
24. F. Karim, "A Strong Prop", Pravda, 29 April 1973, 4-FBIS 87, 4 May 1973, B2-4; see also, L. Koryavin, "On the Banks of the Tigris; Izvestiya, 10 February 1972, 3-FBIS 37, 23 February 1972, B4-5.
25. V. Kudryavtsev "Iraq on the March", Izvestiya, 8 June 1972, 4-FBIS 115, 13 June 1972, B9-13. Commenting further, Kudryavtsev asserted that "Is it worth turning them (the specific interests) into a fundamental barrier on the path to agreeing on the test of the future fronts' programme? Such exaggeration of the significance of such questions for the actual present and their elevation to a principle also come about because the opinion has formed among politicians that the National Front

is the consummation and virtually the merging of the progressive forces...In fact, however, the front has only started a new period in the parties' cooperation in implementing the socio-economic reforms clearing the way to the country's development in a socialist direction. The parties remain parties even after the front's creation...Within the front they will still argue, discuss problems arising & solutions, and develop within themselves the ability to cooperate within the framework of such an organization as the National Front, for the sake of general national - nationwide interests....The details and minor questions will be resolved in the process of joint activities..."

26. Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B4-5.
27. Radio Moscow, 13 July 1973, FBIS 136, 16 July 1973, B6-8.
28. Radio Moscow, 18 July 1973, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B3-4. B. Orekhov, "In the Interests of National Unity", Pravda, 28 July 1973, 5-FBIS 147, 31 July 1973, B1-2; see also Radio Moscow, 19 July 1973 - FBIS 140, 20 July 1973, B5; Radio Moscow, 20 July 1973 - FBIS 141, 23 July 1973, B10-11.
29. K. Geyvardov, "Along the Chosen Road", Pravda, 16 July 1975, FBIS 139, 18 July 1975.
30. Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B3-4; O. Orekhov, "In the Interest of National Unity", Pravda, 28 July 1973, 5-FBIS 147, 31 July 1973, B1-2; Radio Moscow, FBIS 140, 20 July 1973, B5; Radio Moscow, 20 July 1973, FBIS 141, 23 July 1973, B10-11.
31. It was also noted that the Front's activity is controlled by a Higher Committee composed of 16 members. The Ba'th Party had eight representatives, the ICP had three, and three seats "are reserved for the Kurds. The Independent Democrats and the Progressive Nationalities have one representative each". It was also pointed out that in addition to the Higher Committee, a Secretariat has been formed to deal with the political implementation of the Committee's decisions. A. Iskenderov, "Cooperation Among National Forces", Pravda, 30 April 1974, 5-FBIS 87, 3 May 1974, F3-4.
32. Radio Moscow, 20 July 1973 FBIS 141, 23 July 1973, B10-11; B. Orekhov op.cit. B109; Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B3-4; see also Radio Moscow, 4 January 1974, FBIS 4, 7 January 1974, F9-10; Radio Moscow; 14 September 1973, FBIS 180, 17 September 1973, F6-7; Radio Moscow, FBIS 232, 3 December 1973, F4-5.

33. Radio Moscow, 4 January 1974, FBIS 4, 7 January 1974, F9-10.
34. Radio Moscow, 4 April 1974, FBIS 67, 5 April 1974, F8-9.
35. B. Orekhov; "Fall in Iraq", Pravda, 26 November 1974, 5-FBIS 232, 2 December 1974, F5-6; Pravda, 13 March 1975, 4-FBIS 52, 17 March 1975, F1.
36. Radio Moscow, 9 June 1975, FBIS 126, 30 June 1975, F2-3.
37. Radio Moscow, FBIS 69, 9 April 1975, F2-4.
38. Radio Moscow, FBIS 102, 24 May 1972, B2-3.
39. F. Demchenko & A. Lukavets, "Figs, Oil and Politics", Pravda, 27 May 1975, FBIS 106, 2 June 1975.
40. Radio Moscow, FBIS 161, 10 July 1975, F2-3.
41. See, eg, Ye Komar, "Offensive Over the Air", Za Rubezhom, No.23, 29 May 1975, FBIS 109, 5 June 1975, A-3; Radio Moscow, 2 April 1975, FBIS 66, 4 April 1975, F1-2; Radio Moscow, 6 December 1975, FBIS 236, 8 December 1975, F8-10;
42. See, eg., Radio Moscow, FBIS 45, 6 March 1975, F5-6.

FOOTNOTES  
(CHAPTER- 4)

1. Radio Moscow, 29 January 1970, FBIS 20, 29 January 1970, A7-8; D. Volsky, "Arabs and Kurds" New Times, No.3, January 24, 1968, pp.13-14; N. Nikolayeva, "Iraq: Arabs and Kurds", New Times, No.12, March 24, 1970, pp.26-27.
2. Radio Moscow, 29 January 1970, FBIS 20, 29 January 1970, A7-8.
3. V. Kudryavtsev, "Iraq on the March", Izvestiya, 8 June 1972, 4-FBIS 115, 13 June 1972, B9-13; Radio Moscow, 17 July 1972, FBIS 159, 17 July 1972, B3.
4. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult Boundary Crossed", Pravda, 5 April 1970, 4-FBIS 68, 8 April 1970, A22; Radio Moscow, FBIS 20, 29 January 1970, A7-8; A. Vasilyev, "The Celebration of the Arabs and the Kurds", Pravda, 11 March 1971, 4-FBIS 151, 16 March 1971, B9-10.
5. Radio Moscow, FBIS 50, 13 March 1970, A5-6.
6. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Republic of Arabs and Kurds", Izvestiya, 21 March 1970, 4-FBIS 58, 25 March 1970, A40-48.
7. Radio Moscow, FBIS 64, A April 1970, A40-41; Radio Moscow, FBIS 50, 13 March 1970, A5-6.
8. Radio Moscow, FBIS 135, 14 July 1970, A23-24.
9. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Republic of Arabs and Kurds", Izvestiya, 12 March 1970, 4 FBIS 58, 25 March 1970, A46-48.
10. Radio Moscow, 17 July 1972, FBIS 141, 20 July 1972, B6-7.
11. Radio Moscow, 30 April 1971, FBIS 86, 4 May 1971, B8; Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 19 July 1973, B4-5.
12. L. Koryavin, "An Important Event", Izvestiya, 12 March 1972, 2-FBIS 56, 21 March 1972, B6-7.
13. Radio Moscow, FBIS 64, 2 April 1970, A40-41.
14. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Republic of..." op.cit., A46-47.

15. I. Belyayev and Ye. Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult Boundary Crossed", Pravda, 5 April 1970, 4-FBIS 68, 8 April 1970, A22-25.
16. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Republic of Arabs and Kurds", op.cit., A46-48 I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, op.cit., A22.
17. A Vasilyev, "The Celebration...." op.cit., B9-10.
18. Ibid.
19. A. Vasilyev, Ibid; L. Koryavin, "An Important....", op.cit., B6-7.
20. A Vasilyev, "The Celebration..." op.cit., B8-11; see also Radio Moscow, 18 August 1972, FBIS 162, 22 August 1972, B8-9.
21. A. Vasilyev, "The Celebration....", op.cit., B9-10 see also Radio Moscow, 18 August 1972, FBIS 162, 22 August 1972, B8-9.
22. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult....", op.cit., A-22.
23. Radio Moscow, 18 August 1972, FBIS 164, 22 August 1972, B8-9. R. Petrov, "Iraq on the Path of Changes", Pravda, 14 July 1971, 4-FBIS 138, 19 July 1971, B9-11; L. Koryavin, "On the Banks of the Tigris", Izvestiya, 10 February 1972, 3-FBIS 37, 23 February 1972, B4-6.
24. Radio Moscow, 18 August 1972, FBIS 164, 22 August 1972, B8-9.
25. Ibid.
26. Ye Primakov, Pravda, 10 March 1973, FBIS 50, 14 March 1973, B12.
27. R. Primakov, "Iraq: New Horizons", New Times, No.49, pp.20-21.
28. I. Belyayev and Ye Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult...", op.cit., A22; see also A Vasilyev, "The Celebration....", op.cit., B9-10.
29. Radio Moscow, 2 December 1973, FBIS 232, 3 December 1973, F4-5.
30. Radio Moscow, 20 July 1973, FBIS 141, 23 July 1973, B10-11.
31. Radio Moscow, FBIS 232, 3 December 1973, F4-5.

32. Radio Moscow, FBIS 48, 11 March 1974, F8; Radio Moscow, 19 April 1974, FBIS 78, 22 April 1974, F9-10; P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict in Northern Iraq", Pravda, 14 May 1974, 4 FBIS 101, 23 May 1974, F9-11; Radio Moscow, 9 April 1974, FBIS 71, 11 April 1974, F8-10.
33. B. Orekhov, "New Laws Adopted", Pravda, 28 March 1974, 5-FBIS 65, 3 April 1974, F10.
34. P. Demchenko, "Autonomy for Iraq's Kurds", Pravda, 14 March 1974, FBIS, 16 March 1974, B3-5.
35. P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict...", op.cit., F9-11.
36. Radio Moscow, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F5; Radio Moscow, 28 April 1974, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F8; Radio Moscow, 26 April 1974, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F6-8; P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict in Northern Iraq", Pravda, 14 May 1974, 4-FBIS 101, 23 May 1974, F9-11.
37. "The Peshmerga Return Home", Izvestiya, 10 May 1975, FBIS 101, 23 May 1975, F5-6.
38. P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict...", op.cit., F9-11. It also stated that the KDP branch in Irbil, Kurdistan's second largest city declared its support for the new law or autonomy. The same position was also reportedly taken by the new editorial collegium of the KDP newspaper Al-Ta'akhi, which had resumed publication.
39. Ibid.
40. Radio Moscow, FBIS 124, 26 June 1974, F5.
41. Radio Moscow, FBIS 124, 26 June 1974, F5.
42. A Ignatov, "Iraq Today" New Times, No.21, May 1974, pp.23-25; see also, Radio Moscow, FBIS 69, 4 April 1975, F4-5; Radio Moscow, FBIS 75, 8 April 1975, F5-6; Radio Moscow, 6 December 1975, FBIS 236, 8 December 1975, F8-10.
43. A. Ignatov, op.cit., pp.23-25.
44. A. Ignatov, op.cit., pp.23-25; P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict...", op.cit., F9-11; Radio Moscow, 25 June 1974, FBIS 124, 26 June 1974, F5.
45. Radio Moscow, FBIS 55, 20 March 1974, F2; Radio Moscow, 26 April 1974, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F6-8; see also, Radio Moscow, 28 April 1974, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F8; P. Nadezhdin, "The Armed Conflict in Northern Iraq",

- Pravda, 14 May 1974, 4-FBIS 101, 23 May 1974, F9-11; Radio Moscow, 28 June 1974, FBIS 127, 1 July 1974, F4; Ye Komar, "Offensive Over the Air", Za Rubezhomv No.23, 29 May 1975, FBIS 109, 5 June 1975, A-3; Radio Moscow, FBIS 66, 4 April 1975, F1-2; Radio Moscow, FBIS 75, 8 April 1975, F5-6.
46. G. Kuznetsov, "Iraq Looks Ahead", Za Rubezhom, 2-8 August, 1974, FBIS 15 August 1974, C13-27.
47. Radio Moscow, 9 April 1974, FBIS 71, 11 April 1974, F8-10; Radio Moscow, 19 April 1974, FBIS 78, 22 April 1974, F9-10; Radio Moscow, 26 April 1974, FBIS 84, 30 April 1974, F7-8; see also A. Igratov, op.cit., pp.23-25. Moscow Radio, FBIS 45, 10 March 1975, F2-3.
48. "The Peshmerga Return Home", op.cit., F5-6.
49. B. Orekhov, "Fall in Iraq", Pravda, 26 November 1974, 5-FBIS 232, 2 December 1974, F5-6; Radio Moscow, 11 October 1974, FBIS 203, 18 October 1974, F7; Radio Moscow, 11 November 1974, FBIS 222, 15 November 1974, F10; Radio Moscow, FBIS 249, 26 December 1974, F8; Pravda, 13 March 1975, 4-FBIS 52, 17 March 1975, F1; K. Geyvandov, "Along the Chosen Road", Pravda, 16 July 1975, FBIS 139, 18 July 1975;
50. Radio Moscow, FBIS 139, 18 July 1974, F4-5; Radio Moscow, FBIS 244, 18 December 1974, B3; Radio Moscow, FBIS 106, 2 June 1975;
51. Ye Primakov, "Iraq Faces Important Decisions", Pravda, 29 January 1970, FBIS, 31 January 1970, F7-11.
52. I. Belyayev & Ye Primakov, "Iraq: A Difficult....", op.cit., F8. see eg, Radio Moscow, FBIS 50, 13 March 1970, A5-6; Radio Moscow, FBIS 53, 18 March 1970, A2-3; Radio Moscow, FBIS 135, 14 July 1970, A23.
53. Radio Moscow, FBIS 50, 13 March 1970, A5-6; Radio Moscow, FBIS 53, 18 March 1970, A2-3; Radio Moscow, 14 July 1970, FBIS 135, 14 July 1970, A23.
54. Radio Moscow, FBIS 185, 21 September 1972, B4-7.
55. Radio Moscow, FBIS 158, 16 August 1971, B4.
56. Radio Moscow, 28 August 1972, FBIS 170, 30 August 1972, B12-13.
57. Ibid.



58. Radio Moscow, 30 November 1973, FBIS 232, 3 December 1973, F1; Radio Moscow, FBIS 232 3 December 1973, F2-3; see also, John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism", Problems of Communism, March-April 1975, pp.35-36.
59. Radio Moscow, FBIS 222, 16 November 1973, F6.
60. Radio Moscow, 4 January 1974, FBIS 4, January 1974, F9-10.
61. Radio Moscow, 20 September 1974, FBIS 185, 23 September 1974, F2.
62. See, eg, Radio Moscow, 20 September 1974, FBIS 185, 23 September 1974, F2; "The Peshmerga Return Home", Izvestiya, FBIS 101, 23 May 1975, 5-6; Pravda, 5 May 1975, FBIS 90, 8 May 1975, F5; Radio Moscow, 8 April 1975, FBIS 70, 10 April 1975, F1-2.
63. See note 58 above.

FOOTNOTES  
(CHAPTER - 5)

1. Radio Moscow, 15 February 1974, FBIS 34, 19 February 1974, F3; Radio Moscow, FBIS 106, 31 May 1974, C3-4; Radio Moscow, 7 March 1975, FBIS 45, 10 March 1975, F1-2; A. Vasilyev & V. Percsaka, "Dangerous Designs", Pravda, 04 November 1975, FBIS 217, 10 November 1975, F4-5.
2. See, for example, N. Aborin, "Bases Again", Sovetskaya Rossiya, 11 August 1977, FBIS 160, 18 August 1977, F3-4.
3. Radio Moscow, 15 February 1974, FBIS 34, 19 February, 1974, F3; Radio Moscow, 13 August 1974, FBIS 160, 16 August 1974, F3-4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 236, 8 December 1975, F8-10 Radio Moscow, FBIS 238, 10 December 1975, F3-4; Radio Moscow, 8 December 1975, FBIS 241, 15 December 1975, F2-3.
4. In April 1969, for example, Moscow reported that "Western propaganda" had attempted to "make use" of the Irano-Iraqi tension in order to justify "the need for prolonging the stay of British forces in the Persian Gulf area". Citing Radio London broadcasts, Soviet analysis further claimed at that time that these Western propagandists attempted "to instill in the listener the idea that the withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 will, so to speak, create a vague and unknown situation in this area and will result in disorder the strife". Thus, these broadcasts were interpreted as "an attempt to prove the colonialist theses that the people of the Persian Gulf, as it were, will not be able to solve their affairs without the imperialists." Radio Moscow, 23 April 1969, FBIS 78, 23 April 1969, A 7. Even after 1971, Soviet writers continued to claim that "U.S. and British imperialist circles...were greatly expanding their military presence in the area, strengthening their existing military bases and creating new ones and were vigorously trying to establish their military, political and economic control over countries of the Middle East", Radio Moscow, 10 October 1973, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11. Thus, as late as March 1975, they repeated their contention that the "imperialists" were exacerbating relations between Iran and Iraq in order to "perpetuate the presence" of "imperialism" in the Persian Gulf area, one "of the last posts of its oil empire", Radio Moscow, 19 March 1975 - FBIS 57, 24 March 1975, F1-2!

5. Radio Moscow, 7 March 1974 - FBIS 47, 8 March 1974, F 9; Radio Moscow, 8 March 1975 - FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F 2-3.
6. See, e.g., Radio Moscow, FBIS 176, 10 September 1975, F 1-7.
7. Radio Moscow, 8 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F 2-3; see also, Radio Moscow, 19 March 1975, FBIS 57, 24 March 1975, F 1-2; Radio Moscow, FBIS 105, 2 October 1975, F 2-3.
8. Radio Moscow, 7 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F 1-2, Radio Moscow, FBIS 66, 4 April 1975, F 1-2.
9. Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F 9-10; Radio Moscow, FBIS 26 November 1974, F 2; Radio Moscow, 7 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F 2-3. see also Radio Moscow, FBIS 66, 4 April 1975, F 1-2; Radio Moscow, 12 May 1973, FBIS 102, 22 May 1973, B 2-4.
10. Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974; Radio Moscow, FBIS 229, 26 November 1974; Radio Moscow, 8 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F 2-3.
11. Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F 11.
12. Radio Moscow, 23 February 1974, FBIS , 26 February 1974, F 8-9; Radio Moscow, FBIS 106, 31 May 1974, C 3-4.
13. Radio Moscow, FBIS 106, 31 May 1974, C 3-4.

14. Radio Moscow, FBIS 229, 26 November 1974, F2-4.
15. Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, 23 August 1974, FBIS 168, 28 August 1974, F7-8; Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11.
16. Radio Moscow, 23 August 1974, FBIS 168, 28 August 1974, F7-8, Radio Moscow, FBIS 173, 5 September 1974, F6; Radio Moscow, FBIS 229, 26 November 1974, F2.
17. Radio Moscow, 23 February 1974, FBIS, 23 February 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, 23 August 1974, FBIS 168, 28 August 1974, F7-8; Radio Moscow, FBIS 173, 5 September, 1974, F8; Radio Moscow, FBIS 229, 26 November 1974, F2.
18. Radio Moscow, 12 May 1973, FBIS 102, 25 May 1973, B2-4.
19. Ibid.
20. Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11; Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, 23 January 1975, FBIS 19, 28 January 1975, F3-4.
21. Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11.
22. Radio Moscow, 12 May 1973, FBIS 102, 25 May 1973, B2-4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, B8-9; Radio Moscow, 23 January 1975, FBIS 19, 28 January 1975, F3-4;
23. Radio Moscow, 12 May 1973, FBIS 102, 25 May 1973, B2-4.
24. Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F8-9.
25. Shamsuddin Rahimov, "Settlement of the Iran and Iraq Dispute in the Interest of Both Countires", Radio Moscow, 23 January 1975, FBIS 19, 28 January 1975, F3-4.
26. Radio Moscow, FBIS 173, 5 September 1974, F6; Radio Moscow, FBIS 78, 23 April 1969; Radio Moscow, FBIS 9, 14 January 1975, F9-10.
27. Radio Moscow, FBIS 47, 8 March 1974, F9; Radio Moscow, FBIS 104, 31 May 1974, C3-4; Radio Moscow, 23 January 1975, FBIS 19, 28 January 1975, F3-4.
28. Radio Moscow, FBIS 78, 23 April 1969, A7.

29. Radio Moscow, FBIS 231, 1 December 1971, B4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 232, 2 December 1971, B4-5.
30. Radio Moscow, 12 May 1973, FBIS 102, 25 May 1973, B2-4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 195, 9 October 1973, F26; Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, B8-9; see also, Radio Moscow, 12 October 1973, FBIS 199, 15 October 1973, F19-20; Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11; Radio Moscow, 15 February 1974, FBIS 34, 19 February 1974, F3.
31. Radio Moscow, FBIS 176, 10 September 1975, F1-7.
32. Radio Moscow, 15 February 1974, FBIS 34, 19 February 1974, F3; Radio Moscow, 23 February 1974, FBIS, 26 February 1974, F4.
33. Radio Moscow, 1 March 1974, FBIS 45, 6 March 1974; Radio Moscow, FBIS 46, 7 March 1974, F8-9.
34. See, for example, Radio Moscow, 7 February 1975, FBIS 30, 12 February 1975, F5-6.
35. Radio Moscow, FBIS 173, 5 September 1974, F6.
36. Radio Moscow, 18 December 1974, FBIS 246, 20 December 1974, F6; Radio Moscow, FBIS 173, 5 September 1974, F6.
37. Radio Moscow, FBIS 15, 15 January 1975, F2.
38. Radio Moscow, 19 March 1975, FBIS 57, 24 March 1975, F1-2.
39. Radio Moscow, 7 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F1-2.
40. S. Losev, "Who is Kindling the Arms Race in the Near East", FBIS 177, 10 September 1976, F10-11.
41. Radio Moscow, 7 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F1-2.
42. "Iran-Iraq Talks", New Times, No.12, March 1975, pp.7-8.
43. Radio Moscow, FBIS 102, 24 May 1974, F4-5; Radio Moscow, 15 February 1974, FBIS 34, 19 February 1974, F3; Radio Moscow, 23 February 1974, FBIS 26 May 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, FBIS 197, 11 October 1973, F11; Radio Moscow, FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, FBIS 47, 8 March 1974, F9.

44. Radio Moscow, FBIS 47, 8 March 1974, F9.
45. Radio Moscow, FBIS 78, 23 April 1969, A7; Radio Moscow; FBIS 32, 14 February 1974, F8-9; Radio Moscow, FBIS 102, 24 May 1974, F4-5; Radio Moscow; 23 August 1973, FBIS 157, 14 August 1974, B11-12.
46. Radio Moscow, 15 January 1975, FBIS 15, 20 January 1975, F1-2.
47. Radio Moscow, FBIS 224, 19 November 1974, F1-4.
48. Radio Moscow, FBIS 226, 21 November 1974, F5-8; Radio Moscow, 23 January 1975, FBIS 19, 28 January 1975, F3-4; Radio Moscow, 8 March 1975, FBIS 47, 10 March 1975, F2-3; Radio Moscow, FBIS 229, 26 November 1974, F2-4.
49. Radio Moscow, 19 March 1975, FBIS 57, 24 March 1975.
50. USSR-Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) communique, 9 October 1971, Pravda, FBIS 197, 12 October 1971, B17-19; Speech by A. Kosygin, 21 November 1972, FBIS 228, 24 November 1972, B1-2; Radio Moscow, FBIS 70, 10 April 1974, F5-6; Radio Moscow, 17 March 1972, FBIS 56, 21 March 1972, B3-4; Radio Moscow, FBIS 67, 5 April 1972, B4-5; Radio Moscow, 11 April 1972, FBIS 73, 13 April 1972, B4-5; Radio Moscow, 17 October 1972, FBIS 204, 19 October 1972, B7-4.
51. See, for example, Anne M. Kelly, "The Soviet Naval Presence During the Iraq Kuwait Border Dispute" in Michael McGwire, Ken Book and John McDonnell, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, pp.387-406.
52. See, for example, Derendra Kaushik Soviet Relations With India and Pakistan (New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971) pp.25-43.

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