USE OF THESES

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G.N. Scarrabellotti
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<td>Peyton, Sir John Journal of a Parliamt holden at Westminster begun the third day of November, 1640.</td>
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R.P.C.S. Register of the Privy Council of Scotland.

Rushworth Rushworth, John Historical Collections


Whiteacre, B.M. Add. MSS. Whiteacre, Lawrence House of Commons Proceedings, 1642-1647, British Museum Additional MSS.

Yonge, B.M. Add. MSS. Yonge, Walter Journal of Proceedings in the House of Commons, British Museum Additional MSS.
Introduction
According to Professor Trevor-Roper, John Pym was in the habit of calling on the Scots to aid the Long Parliament's cause and of dismissing them when he had done with their services. Whatever the truth of this claim, most of the historians of the Great Rebellion have followed the example of Trevor-Roper's John Pym, and have peremptorily summoned and dismissed the Scots as it suited the requirements of their narrative. For this, however, historians of the great contest between King and Parliament ought not to be blamed. After all, the object of their scholarship is the working out of that conflict, and the drama of the events depends very much upon the close combat between King and 'Country'. The Scots are but one ingredient in a complex of rival forces; and at times the significance of the Scots to the narrative is greater than at others. To the history of the Great Rebellion, particularly during its early years, the Scots are but a shade of colour employed to develop the grand canvas upon which the general historian works.

The treatment of the Scots in these early stages of the rebellion is episodic. It is a treatment which, though suiting the purposes of general history, is not necessarily appropriate to understanding the import of this single factor in the melee of the early 1640's. Such is the task of an history thesis: to highlight the issues half-

forgotten in the writing of great historical narratives. There has yet to be described the Scottish factor in these tumultuous events.

Most historians recognise that the parliamentary side sought to gain some advantage from having a Scottish army on English soil. Some historians recognise that parliamentary affection for the Scots fluctuated, and that it differed from one group to another. Historians generally recognise that Parliament did much to detain the King from his Scotward journey, in August 1641, lest Parliament be deprived of those advantages the Scots had provided hitherto. Most historians perceive that parliamentary affection for the Scots was not simple and grateful but


3. Gardiner, op. cit., 294-7, 300-1, 376-7; Brett, op. cit., 182-3; J. H. Hexter, The Reign of King Pym, London, 1941, 28-9; Montague, op. cit., 246-7; Wedgwood, op. cit., 406ff. All historians consulted agree that a dislike of Presbyterianism occasioned some change in the attitude of Parliament to the Scots. Often, however, this conclusion is implicit in their comments on the subject of religion, rather than explicitly stated.

4. See any general history of the civil war.
inlaid with misgivings. This betrayed itself especially on the subject of religion, which was so natural a part of the parliamentary sense of the Scots that it was only the dire strait of near defeat that compelled Parliament to seek, in 1643, Scotland's military aid.

It seems to me that the general historians are right in much of what they say about parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots. However, their statements are a gloss. They have not sought to detail the history of that relationship and they have not attempted seriously to understand and explain the fluctuations in the Long Parliament's attitudes toward the Scots from its opening to the making of the Solemn League and Covenant. For instance, by being content to observe simply that military pressures forced Parliament into alliance with the Covenanters, historians fail to provide an adequate account of the considerations Parliament made when contemplating the proposed measure. Because of this oversight historians tend to underestimate the controversial nature of Scottish issues. On examination, much of the writing about parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots appears to be derived from a cursory examination

7. See above, Note 6.
of the Scottish question in the early years of the Long
Parliament.

Why should one attempt to probe the matter more
deeply? Historians of the period open their work with England
nearly prostrate before their Scottish saviours out of
gratitude for their stand against the Court. London, we are
told, celebrated the Scottish invasion as its own victory. 8
But not one historian has any difficulty in passing from
England's salutation of the Scots to hinting darkly at
England's suspicions. Almost every one of them seems
determined to drain from his narrative any suggestion of
English affection for their 'Brethren the Scots', until
each becomes as hard-headed about the Solemn League and
Covenant as were Pym or Vane. There is no love at the
bottom of it, but all Adwalton Moor and Roundway Down.
Again, I think the historians are justified in recording
this dichotomy; and I appreciate that there is little room
in their work for describing how Englishmen moved from the
warm embrace of 1640 to the cool calculation of 1643. They
do not have the space to analyse adequately those prejudices
which had to be overcome before Parliament was ready openly
to align itself militarily with the Scots. But, however
true and faithful be the record of historians, they have
left some explaining to be done.

8. Gardiner, History of England, ix, 205; Davies, op. cit.,
95.
9. The exception to this is Gardiner; and I deal specifically
with him below.
The real historical problem left by the general historian is one of proportion. The question crucial to this thesis is: what significance does one place upon the Scots in the preoccupations of the Long Parliament? This problem is best illustrated in the work of Samuel Rawson Gardiner. He, of all the students of that time, treats the Scottish problem most extensively. It is he who describes in greatest detail the growing coolness and even distrust of Parliament for the Scots. He reveals that some were more willing than others to cultivate and even promote the Scots; and that these differences eventually issued in a heated outburst in the Commons. Yet, in his revealing summary of those revolutionary events, written as an Introduction to his Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, he treats the Scots as scantily as any. Of course this Introduction is only a summary account of the important issues in the conflict, but precisely for this reason it reveals that Gardiner inclines not to hold the Scots of much account in the concerns of Parliament men. But having skirted the problem, he has not escaped it. Later in the same Introduction he is compelled to observe that the Solemn League and Covenant was yet another obstacle to reconciling the parties into which England had divided. So the Scots, then, were of some significance in Gardiner's account of that great breach in the English polity; but he has either underestimated the degree or not weighed it at all—a curious

11. ibid., 294-5.
oversight when one considers that the Scottish question occupied the Parliament almost daily from 3 November 1640 to the first recess beginning on 9 September 1641.

Gardiner seems, therefore, to have raised the tantalising problem of the Scots only to let it slip for the sake of developing his thesis that 17th Century England witnessed a puritan revolution. He is insistent that Parliament, once so united, divided chiefly over the matter of religion; and that, had it not been for this issue, the Parliament might have disposed of Charles, as they were later to dispose of his son in 1688, without the attendant horrors of civil war. Indeed, the dividing of the Parliament into warring factions has been a problem that has tested the wits of every historian of the Rebellion; and, like Gardiner, by overlooking the significance of the Scots, they all appear to have missed the first signs of a division that was the making of a generation of strife, and the origins of a problem that did so much to render the parliamentary cause so sluggish in war.

Gardiner dated the formation of the parties from September 1641, when in the closing days of the first session of the Long Parliament, the debate on religious policy was renewed, and the attack on the Prayer Book commenced. This attack, wrote Gardiner, 'was the commencement of the Civil War. There was now the possibility that Charles might find

a party not only in Parliament but in the nation. But if, as Gardiner elsewhere suggests, Scottish involvement in English affairs was to provide an occasion of enmity between Englishmen, then, even in the early months of 1641, the Scots were dividing members of parliament and were giving to future royalists an opportunity to identify like-minded gentlemen with whom they would soon be in arms. Serious divisions had appeared in the Parliament long before the debates on the Prayer Book. Already, by March of 1641, men were looking upon one another with suspicion and were rallying on the floor of the House in the same company as they were to rally on fields of battle. The cause of this hostility was a Scottish army on English soil.

This is not to say that Charles had a party ready to war at his side; but it is to say that the division out of which a royalist party would emerge was already apparent. The issue was not religion so much as a Scottish army. The very circumstances in which the Long Parliament was called were so unusual, so shocking, and so humiliating that even from its earliest days they gave rise to a problem which was to bedevil the entire course of the rebellion.

The aim of this thesis, then, is to affirm the consequence of the Scots in the affairs of Parliament by tracing the evolution of parliamentary attitudes towards

14. ibid., 15.
15. See above, Note 11.
them from their welcome invasion of 1640, through those events which rendered relations with them so business-like, to the Solemn League and Covenant itself. In the course of seeking to test and explain the commonly accepted assumptions about parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots, I will argue that the general historians have underestimated the significance of the Scottish element in the making of events from November 1640 to the Solemn League and Covenant; and that the Scots were fundamental to the political, and later military, strategy of the reforming party. The Scots not only provided the occasion for the reform so warmly desired in England, but they also opened the first cracks in Parliament's unity, and, thereafter, continued to highlight the emerging division even after they had withdrawn from England and when their support was needed in Ireland. As the struggle with Charles intensified in early 1642 and each party cast about for allies, the importance of the Scots in the English troubles, and particularly to the parliamentary party, was re-emphasised. In war, however, a conflict over Scottish policy, which mirrored the earlier disputes between the embryonic rebel and royalist parties, arose between factions of the parliamentary party. This protracted struggle, between those who desired a military alliance with Scotland, and those who preferred to compound with the King rather than seek Scottish aid, was not resolved for nearly a year, and contributed much to delaying the formation of the League with the Covenanters.

It is appropriate to point out that there are some
things with which this thesis is not concerned. Firstly, this work does not treat specifically the Long Parliament's attitudes towards Scottish Presbyterianism. To raise this as an issue to be discussed in its own right would be to raise a question about the nature of English Civil War Protestantism which cannot be dealt with within the scope of this thesis. My work here is not concerned with what Parliament thought about Presbyterianism as a religious option, so much as with the political issue of how Parliament perceived the relationship of the Scots to its own struggle with the Crown. Where this relationship is complicated by the aggressive Presbyterianism of the Scots, I touch upon religious influences; just as, where the relationship is complicated by constitutional problems, I touch upon constitutional influences. Moreover, quite apart from these considerations, there is the additional one of there being insufficient evidence upon which to base a full analysis of parliamentary attitudes toward Presbyterianism during the period under discussion. Further than observing that Parliament, at this time, was reluctant to adopt Scottish Presbyterianism, we cannot go.

Secondly, it is not the task of this thesis to deal with the Solemn League and Covenant itself, nor with the negotiations leading to it. My analysis ends with the defeat of the Peace Party and of opposition to the proposed alliance with the Scots on 5-7 August 1643. The League itself, and the negotiations for it, are the points at which historians usually begin seriously to discuss Anglo-Scottish
relations, because they see the Covenant as the beginning of an important new phase in the politics of the Civil War. Thus they have examined the content and implications of the negotiations and of the League in such detail that I do not think I can add profitably to their work on this score. However, I believe that I can contribute to our understanding of how the alliance became at all possible. This is a question which is not adequately understood simply because, as I have indicated, historians have neglected to study parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots prior to the formation of the Solemn League and Covenant. As we regard the Civil War with hindsight, we see how obvious and natural an ally were the Scots to the parliamentary cause, especially in the dark days of 1643. But what seems obvious to us now was not so at the time. The issue of Scottish policy was not settled as simply as we might think; and by neglecting to question our assumptions on this matter, we fail to appreciate that the Solemn League and Covenant signalled the end of a struggle that had been hard fought since November 1640.

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Although this thesis deals with parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots, the discussion cannot properly begin until we have discussed briefly the immediate results of the Scottish invasion of England which began on 20 August 1640. This invasion and the ensuing negotiations at Ripon gave to the Long Parliament not simply the direct cause of
its calling; it also precipitated those conflicts with which my study begins.

It is well known that Charles' particular attempt to impose a Laudian settlement upon the Presbyterian Scots failed. Instead, he managed to provoke a fierce rebellion against his royal authority. Ultimately, the Covenanters felt obliged to invade England to pre-empt an attempt by Charles to impose his will by force. The royal army, though large and well equipped, lacked the discipline and training of the Scots, and so gave way easily before their advance. A stand was made at Newburn on the Tyne (29 August), but the English force was driven back, and fled leaving Newcastle undefended. The next day General Leslie occupied the town; and the main royal army, advancing to its defence, fell back upon York. In a few days the Scots occupied Northumberland, Newcastle, and the Bishopric of Durham as far as the river Tees; and they imposed a levy of £850 per day on the occupied parts for the support of their army.

Though the main royal army at York was intact and, on paper, formidable, there was little spirit in it for fighting. Most importantly, the men who should have been its leaders against the Scots, the gentry and nobility, were not anxious to fight. On the same day that the royal vanguard was being beaten out of its positions at Newburn, a group of Peers opposed to Charles' government was signing in London a

16. C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 173-4; Rushworth, iii, 1298.
petition for a Parliament and negotiations with the Scots. This was but one sign of that widespread discontent with the war and the royal government which general histories have adequately sketched. Further to this opposition, there was said to be in England even a party which was favourable to the Scots, or which was at least prepared to seek in England some political advantage against the King by exploiting the predicament his Scottish policies had created. Concerned by this additional factor in the English disenchantment with the war, Secretary Vane wrote to Windebank expressing his fear that if the Scots crossed the Tyne, the Court would find itself in a difficult position:

I wish these things had been foreseen in time, you know what my opinion has long been both of their strength and of a party in England...If they still advance southward it is then to be apprehended they have certainly a party amongst us.18

The Venetian ambassador, Giustiniani, described this party as one bent upon exploiting the war to obtain from Charles the satisfaction they had been unable hitherto to win by respect and loyalty.19

The Scots were regarded more as friends than

18. ibid., 642. See also Giustiniani’s report that Scots had invaded England because they were encouraged by the open friendliness of the English: C.S.P.V., xxv, 70.
19. ibid., 73.
enemies at this time because the Bishops' Wars, as they were called, had brought to a head all the discontent with the King's government. In addition to the discontent, Charles was beset by a grave financial crisis. War had drained the royal coffers, the cost of maintaining the army running at £40,000 per month. How could he sustain his policy and the country's defence with only a trickle of money?

There was a solution upon which both the Covenanters and the English opposition insisted: a Parliament. On 4 September Charles received from the Scots a supplication which called for a redressing of their grievances with the advice of an English Parliament; on 5 September the Lords Mandeville and Howard presented the petition of the Peers. As both the Earl of Arundel and Giustiniani thought, the documents seemed to have been prepared in collusion. In this situation Charles resolved, with the advice of his counsellors in London, to call a great council of Peers to assemble at York on 24 September, to advise him in his difficulties. However, as the Earls Hertford and Bedford pointed out to the London counsellors, the proposed great council could not properly supply the King; and only a Parliament, for which a large part of the gentry and nobility cried, would suffice. Even the Yorkshire

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22. C.S.P.V., xxv, 79. See also Secretary Windebank's notes of a meeting between the Privy Counsellors in London and the Earls of Hertford and Bedford: Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 79.
gentlemen, for whom Charles had such high regard, petitioned for a Parliament. London too was eager. Charles was compelled to yield. When the great council met he announced the summoning of Parliament for 3 November 1640.

During the King's speech at this opening of the council he sought the advice of the Peers as to what answer he should give the petition of the Scots. On the Earl of Bristol's motion the Peers recommended that the King appoint from among the Lords assembled a commission to treat with the Scots. On 2 October the Lords Commissioners met with the Scots at Ripon. What they negotiated there compounded the political difficulties of the King, and gave rise to issues which provoked serious disputes among the members of Parliament not long after it met.

The main points of the agreement concluded at Ripon by 26 October were that a cessation of arms should continue until the peace was negotiated; that the Scots should remain in occupation of the North during these negotiations; and that these occupied territories should

24. ibid., 204-6.
26. H.S.P., ii, 186; Rushworth, iii, 1275.
27. H.S.P., ii, 186.
28. The Lords Commissioners were: the Earls Bedford, Hertford, Essex, Salisbury, Warwick, Holland, Bristol and Berkshire; the Lords Wharton, Paget, Kimbolton, Brooke, Pawlet, Howard, Savile and Dunsmore. They were assisted by the Earls Traquair, Morton and Lanerick, Secretary Vane, Sir Lewis Stewart and Sir John Borough. The Scots Commissioners were the Earl of Dunfermline, Lord Loudoun, Sir Patrick Hepburn, Sir William Douglas, John Smith, Alexander Wedderbourne, Alexander Henderson, and Archibald Johnston: Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 2-4.
continue to pay for the support of the Scots. So far as this thesis is concerned the important point to remember is that the treaty of Ripon underlines the astonishing circumstances in which the Long Parliament opened. Ripon ratified the Scottish occupation and their exactions upon the North, which exactions being insupportable were soon underwritten by Parliament. At Ripon Charles lost the very point upon which he had most insisted: that the Scots should evacuate England before the meeting of Parliament. Now the presence of the Scottish army would only encourage what Charles had hoped to avoid: 'the licence of members, whose demands are expected to be insolent.' Charles, however, had more to fear than the insolence of his opponents' demands. Because of Ripon, England had to support two armies while the peace negotiations were being conducted. This meant that Charles was obliged to keep Parliament in being until the peace was ended and the armies paid off. The opponents of the Crown, whether or not they had conspired with the Scots, had won a great tactical advantage over the King. As Buchanan wrote,

This incoming of the Scots, gave occasion and liberty to divers of the Nobles of England...to desire of the King, a Parliament for the good of the Kingdom. The King durst not refuse their demand, by reason of the Scots, more then the continuance of it, which he granted likewise thereafter for the same Causes.

Thus the 'Country' had won a Parliament which must sit at least as long as the negotiations continued and the armies

29. For the Articles of Cessation signed at Ripon on 26 October see Appendix I.
30. C.S.P.V., xxv, 87.
31. ibid.
needed paying. Here was a great opportunity to pass that reforming legislation which men had long awaited.

However fortunate were these circumstances for the reformers, the invasion and the treaty had left a legacy of recrimination and suspicion. The coincidence of the interests and demands between the Covenanter and the King’s English opponents gave rise to the belief that there had been a conspiracy to extract from the King what otherwise he would not have granted freely. Whether or not there was a conspiracy we cannot certainly say, nor is it the task of this thesis to discuss the evidence for and against the suspected plot. It is necessary only to be aware that a conspiracy was suspected, and that later Charles thought he had enough evidence to bring a charge of treason against his six leading opponents: Pym, Hampden, Holles, Strode, Haslerig and Lord Mandeville. This suspicion of foul, or at least irregular, dealings with the Scots was the seed from which sprang an important and neglected conflict within the Long Parliament.

Already we have noticed the suspicions harboured by men like the Venetian ambassador, the Earl of Arundel and Secretary Vane. The Earl of Bristol was said by Strafford to be the Scots’ ‘Mercury’ during the discussions which preceded Ripon. At Ripon itself the Earl of Holland, regarded by Baillie as a friend to the Scots, kept a table

34. Baillie, 1, 305-6.
for the English and Scottish commissioners over which it was said a 'correspondence' was maintained. The English Commissioners had even sent a trooper to prison for insulting the Scots when first they alighted at their inn at Ripon. Indeed, according to Giustiniani, the Lords Commissioners were all men who had declared themselves favourable to the Scots; and, moreover, their inclinations were known to the King. However, not all Englishmen felt so disposed toward the Scots. Not surprisingly, opinions were sharply divided. As Whitelocke observed,

The Discourses of the Scotish War, were various, those who favour'd the Popish and Prelatical ways, did sufficiently inveigh against the Covenanters; but generally the rest of the People favoured and approved their Proceedings; and there was a strange Spirit of division in the Opinions and Wishes of most Men in these Affairs, too many not only favouring, but joining with, and assisting the Proceedings of the Scots Covenanters. 38

Then came the treaty itself which added material to the controversy.

The key issue in the negotiation was whether the Scots should be paid a maintenance during the cessation. This was a demand at which even the Lords Commissioners baulked. The Scots found the Lords Commissioners, under the unquestioned leadership of the Earl of Bristol, the Scots'

36. Ibid.
37. C.S.P.V., xxv, 87.
'Mercury', difficult negotiators from the beginning. By the end of proceedings on 5 October it was clear that the Lords Commissioners were reluctant to yield to the Scottish demands for financial support; and the day ended with Bristol insisting that the Scots, contrary to their protestations, were invaders. It seemed that Ripon was not, as some feared and others claimed, a meeting of collaborators. On 6 October Vane wrote to Windebank that the Scots' demands were 'very high and vaste'; and that the Lords Commissioners appeared 'sensible of the exorbitance' of the demand that the Scots should be provided with £40,000 per month. However, they were resolute that the treaty would not proceed until the English agreed on this point. By 14 October the King had yielded the principle; and his Commissioners informed the Scots that they were authorised to negotiate the sum. After two more days of tough bargaining the English managed to beat the Scots down from their original figure of £40,000 to £25,500 per month. Thus in fact Ripon simply ratified the exaction the Scots had imposed already—£850 per day. The Scots finally and

39. The Scots objected to the Lords Commissioners' wish to negotiate upon the basis of the Pacification of Berwick, and to the English defence of their Scottish assistants in the negotiations, regarded by the Scots as incendiaries. The Scots also objected to the refusal of the Lords to discuss the cessation without further discussions with the King: Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 1-16; Baillie, i, 263.


41. C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 144.

42. Ibid., 151, 155, 166.


44. Whereas previously the £850 was raised from Northumberland, Durham and Newcastle, the articles of the cessation eased the burden a little by enlisting the support of Cumberland and Westmoreland to provide a proportion of the sum: see C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 173-4; Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 29-44. See also Appendix I for the Articles of Cessation.
ungraciously accepted the figure on 17 October, with the provision that should payment fail, it would be recouped by forcible exaction: in effect, by plundering. Enshrined in the seventh article of the cessation, this condition epitomised at once the uncompromising character of the Covenanters, and the complete humiliation of England; and it proclaimed that England had no alternative but to comply with the Scots. It gave formal expression to the fact that England was being blackmailed. The seventh article belied the Scottish protestation of brotherliness. By 26 October the articles of the cessation had been agreed to, and Charles had consented to adjourn negotiations to London, where Parliament would play its part in the settlement, and where, according to Nalson, the Scots were assured of many friends in both Houses. 46

Despite, however, the suspected league between the King's English and Scottish opponents, despite even the sympathy between them, the treaty at Ripon fired among the former a debate over the Scots. Though the Lords Commissioners were said to be favourable to the Scots, and though most later took the parliamentary side in the civil war, they nevertheless returned from Ripon somewhat shamefaced at the part they had played. At York the King asked them whether he should sign the articles of cessation. The Lords, however, would not give him a simple affirmative recommendation. They

45. Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 46-47; see also Appendix I. The intention of the treaty was to avoid the plundering of the northern counties, but the provision allowing the Scots to raise the unpaid contributions themselves effectively subverted that intention.

believed that there were many 'Articles unfit to have been condescended unto by any Army, that had been but in a probable condition of defence.' Therefore they would not give the King any advice unless His Majesty would give them leave to present a declaration of what had induced them to give the advice they proposed. The Lords thus presented their apologia protesting how much military and financial circumstances had compelled them to advise the signing of the articles and

conceiving it to be a great Wisdom in a Prince (in cases of Necessity) to dispense with the strict rules of Honour, for the safety and preservation of his Estate and People.47

The fact is that, before Parliament sat, the conditions under which it had been called had provided an issue which was already dividing men in ways which foreshadowed the divisions of the civil war. Before turning to examine the attitudes of the Long Parliament itself toward the Scots, we can profitably consider Whitelocke's description of the effect Ripon was having upon England prior to 3 November 1640:

Many wondered, and some inveighed against this Treaty, wishing the King would have put it rather to the Issue of a Battle; then to have given such Terms to his subjects in Rebellion, and of this judgement was Strafford, and the Episcopal Party. But the other Party cried up this Treaty, as Just, Honourable and Pious; to prevent effusion of Blood...48

47. ibid., 465-7; Rushworth, iii, 1308-10.
The Scots' occupation of northern England in 1640 provided an issue around which embryonic royalist and rebel factions began to form even within a few months of the Long Parliament's meeting. When Parliament opened its most impressive feature was an apparent unity. So generally inclined were members to reform that the chief problem taxing historians of the Long Parliament has been to explain how this body came to divide into parties to a civil war. A score of theories has been advanced. However, none of them considers the very circumstances in which Parliament met: England defeated, and the Scots in occupation. It was this situation which provoked the first clashes in Parliament between men who would later constitute the royalist and rebel parties. I will argue in this chapter that it was the different attitudes of parliamentarians toward the Scots which first opened that division in the parliamentary ranks which made possible the civil war.

At first, Parliament appeared firmly wedded to the Scots, and refused to tolerate an attack on them. When Charles, for instance, opened Parliament, he declared the Scots rebels and called on Parliament to aid him in driving them out of England. But the Lords and Commons were sufficiently indignant at this aspersion upon their 'Brethren' of Scotland to compel Charles to excuse his words to both Houses. If this incident was galling for the King

1. See His Majesty's speech: Rushworth, iii, 1335.
2. The excuse was made on 5 November 1640 when Charles received William Lenthall, member for Woodstock, as Speaker for the Commons. For His Majesty's speech on this occasion see Rushworth, iii, 1336; C.S.P.V., xxv, 95; Baillie, i, 262.
it was probably no less galling for certain members who soon were to raise their voices against fawning on the Scots. For despite the favour with which Parliament seemed at first to regard the Scots, awareness of the disaster England had suffered at their hands was sharp enough to provoke expressions of hostility. In fact, hostility to the Scots provided the single discordant note in the tedious harmony of opinion which marked the grievance debates of November 1640.

Two days after the King's embarrassment before the Houses (7 November 1641), Sir John Holland, along with John Pym, Sir Benjamin Rudyard and others, rose to enumerate the catalogue of a nation's grievances. Holland proved himself one member of Parliament who did not regard the Scots as saviours. Although he agreed with his fellow speakers as to what were England's woes, he added one that the others notably omitted. Holland included among the country's four chief grievances the presence of Scottish forces upon English soil. Moreover, far from wishing to draw some advantage from the Scottish occupation, he recommended that if the Scots could not be persuaded to leave with the 'soft and gentle hand' of a reconciliation, consonant with the King's honour, then they should be repulsed with such resolution as became the 'ancient renown of the English Nation.'

3. According to Rushworth's records of Pym's and Rudyard's speeches (respectively: Rushworth, iv, 21-4; 26-7) neither considered the Scots a grievance. For Sir John Holland's speech see ibid., 27-8; Nalson, i, 496-7.
This opinion was in contrast to that of John Pym. According to the extract of his speech provided by D'Ewes, Pym saw clearly how closely related were the interests of the Covenanters and the English reformers. He saw that the reform cause would be served best by avoiding a rupture with the Scots: only those who wished to change religion and government desired a difference between England and Scotland. Thus Pym conceived the tactical and strategic importance of the Scots to the reformers; he believed that by friendship with the Scots the process of innovation and

4. In this thesis I will employ the generally accepted analysis of the reforming movement and its leadership provided by J. H. Hexter (see his The Reign of King Pym, London, 1941, passim.). I concur with Hexter's thesis that the leadership of the reform cause seemed to have been embodied in the so-called Middle Party. Whether such a group had a conscious existence, especially at the opening of Parliament, is arguable. However, it is certain that there was a widespread network of connections which bound together a group of like-minded men who were most prominent among the reformers: Pym, Hampden, St. John, Lord Brooke, Lord Viscount Saye and Seal, etc. This group certainly did seem to embody, at the opening of Parliament, the reform movement, as it provided the most effective leadership. This body, together with its more radical supporters like Isaac Pennington and Henry Marten, I will call the 'active party.' I will continue to use this terminology until the outbreak of war requires more appropriate categories. As a result of the influence of Hexter's thesis we tend to fall into the habit of embodying the entire reform party in Pym himself. One is almost tempted to speak of the Middle Man rather than the Middle Party. To avoid this confusion I believe that it is judicious, when we speak of John Pym's leadership of the reform party, to think of it more as representative of the leadership of the reform party in the Commons, than of the leadership of a single man over the entire Parliament.

5. The word 'change' seems to involve a paradox. Could Pym be opposed to change when he, and his fellow reformers, were so eager for it? By opposing change Pym and the active party meant opposing 'Innovations': i.e., the diversion of government from those principles of religion and statecraft which they believed used to guide monarchs and parliaments in the halcyon past.

subversion, advanced by Laudians and other enemies, would be resisted, and the reformation of church and state undertaken.

Here was a fundamental difference of opinion that could not be stated more plainly. One man was for driving out the Scots, and the other for linking their presence with the cause of reform. Pym had pronounced at the outset that those who were hostile to the Scots were enemies to reform. He had uttered a strategic dictum which many men opposed to the government could not endure, and which was to provoke the first signs of hostility to the reforming party.

Not every parliamentarian saw the issues as clearly as Pym or Holland. There were men who shared the opinions of both. This fact highlights how difficult it was for some men to submit to defeat by a traditional enemy for the sake of reforming Stuart government. Sir Edward Hales, who also this day spoke on the subject of grievances, concurred with the King. He said it behoved Parliament to assist the Crown against an enemy which had entered the Kingdom forcibly, 'so that they may be ordered into their own country, or chased out of this, without any dishonour to the King's Majesty and this Kingdom...' But driving out the Scots was not Hales' only consideration. He conceived also that if this Parliament was to be, as he said, 'happy', it had to begin by redressing grievances at home; it was far

better that the Scots had 'come into us than the Devill should raise his army to overthrow us both in Church and Commonwealth.' Hales argued that the first job for Parliament was to execute fully the penalties against papists for which the Scots chiefly had entered England. Still, if Hales was prepared to reap the benefit of the Scots' presence, he did not trust them; and he reflected that though he hoped the Scots intended nothing more than religious reform in England, such reform would test not only the good intentions of members, but also those of Scotsmen.

The meaning of these speeches is plain: not four days after Parliament's sitting a significant disagreement had emerged. Traditionally historians have held that the gentry was willing to seize upon defeat and the humbling of their King as the opportunity for reform. However, these few speeches suggest that, having obtained a Parliament with Scottish aid, members seemed liable to falter in pressing the advantage further. For some the issue was clear. Men of Pym's persuasion saw that the Bishops' Wars had given Parliament its being, and that an understanding with the Scots was a guarantee of the success of reform. As Thomas

8. ibid. Harbottle Grimston, who was unfailingly to serve the rebel cause, while in 1643 Sir Edward Hales went over to the King, seems to have shared also this predicament. In a grievance speech delivered on 9 November Grimston admitted that during the Short Parliament England was threatened by the Scots with a danger that now, in November, was upon them. However, the constitutional problems and the state of propietary rights were so grave that they had to be solved before Parliament would vote money to meet the Scottish threat. Grimston was more ready than Hales to take advantage of the legacy of Ripon, but he did not deny that the Scots were a problem that England could not long tolerate: Rushworth, iv, 34.
May, official apologist for Parliament, was later to write:
Parliament was glad to suffer the Scottish occupation until
all things were better settled. The more determined reformers
in Parliament clearly hoped that the disadvantages of the
Scots' occupation would be outweighed by the assistance their
friendship would contribute to the advance of reform.
Opposed to this view was another which maintained that,
though reform was necessary, the circumstances of reform
were intolerable. Holland, the man who first made this
point, was later to share the same cause with Pym; but
others who were later heart and soul for the Crown were soon
to take up the same point with a fierceness which threatened
the continuing unity of Parliament. The issue was crucial.
As if to emphasise this, the speech of Sir Edward Hales
reveals to us the heart-searchings of a man very conscious
of the difficulty of tolerating the Scots. He sought to
comprehend in the one analysis of England's troubles the
intolerable and the fortunate: the intolerable fact of
invasion; and England's fortune in being rescued by the
Scots from those who wished to change religion and
government. Sir Edward Hales was worried; and he was not
alone. Before one bill had been passed, Parliament was
hesitating between two principles of action: between real-
politik and honour.

which began November 3, 1640: with a short and necessary
view of some precedent years, Oxford, 1854, 104.
10. Significantly, Holland ended up as a firm Peace Party
man, whose caution in prosecuting reform is revealed in
his grievance speech of 7 November, as in his telling
for the Peace Party in those crucial divisions on the
Oxford negotiations in 1643.
11. See above, Note 7.
Sir William Widdrington and Charles Price were both zealous for the King. They sat, respectively, for Northumberland and Radnor; Widdrington was a substantial landholder in his county, and Price, a professional soldier, served in the royal army throughout 1640 and was a Lieutenant-Colonel by the end of the year. Both were Straffordians. Both hated the Scots. On 10 November 1640 Widdrington presented a petition on behalf of his county complaining bitterly against the misery of Scottish occupation. In the course of his speech Widdrington called the Scots 'Invading Rebels'. Denzil Holles and John Glyn spoke after him demanding that he make either a satisfactory explanation or be punished for his words. As Widdrington stood up to explain himself, Price moved in angry terms:

That they would give Losers leave to speak, with all favourable Construction that one Member ought to give another; for his Widdrington's whole Estate was under Scots Power.

In the event the House was not content to admit of a

15. According to D'Ewes, the petition desired relief for the losses suffered by the county since the beginning of the Scots' occupation. Coal could not be mined; trade was decayed; people were evicted from their homes; men had deserted the fields and the meadows were despoiled; cattle were starved and were forcibly sold at a loss; homes were plundered: D'Ewes, Notestein, 22-3.
17. Ibid.
18. Rushworth, iv, 38.
favourable construction to Widdrington's words, and so he was obliged to apologise, saying that he knew the Scots to be the 'Kings Subjects, and would no more call them Rebels...'

It is evident from this incident that the mood of the House was generally favourable to the Scots. As Balfour wrote:

then our good brethren would not have ws called rebels, but houpit that ere long the Scotts armey should be called the Kings armey. So hotte was ther affectione to ws then.

But whereas most, at that time, preferred to bear with the Scottish audacity, or frankly to delight in it, there was an undercurrent of anger, latent in some, obvious in others, against the Scots' presence.

Although Widdrington had been silenced, the issue, so far as Pym was concerned, had not been settled. He understood that Widdrington and Price had touched upon a nerve sensitive in ordinary Englishmen. He saw that Widdrington's petition was eagerly taken up by the House and 'much debated'. This suggests that many members were concerned with what the Scots were doing in the North, even if they were reluctant to call them rebels. In these circumstances Pym had to ensure that the effects of the occupation of the North did not swing opinion against the Scots.

During the debate on Widdrington's petition Sir Benjamin Rudyard desired that the North be supported by the common purse; and Sir Henry Anderson called for the relief of Newcastle and Durham. But too much concentration on the plight of the North did not suit Pym's purposes. It could only awaken members to the ravages of the Scots and infect relations between them and Parliament even before the Scottish Commissioners had reached London. Pym, therefore, but only momentarily, scotched the business by turning the attention of members from the condition of the North to the 'authors of this mischiefe' who 'might be found out in time and out of their own estates to repair this losse.' As the Journal recorded succinctly, the matter was 'much debated; but nothing resolved.' When northern fields were ravaged, homes despoiled and trade in disarray, many must have gone that day confused, if not discontented, from the House.

If Pym was not happy to let the troubles of the North fester into a general hatred for the Scots, he was careful, on the other hand, not to neglect the North. He was a leading figure in a debate on 13 November which ended with the House resolving that £100,000 be raised for the

22. D'Ewes, Notestein, 23. Anderson sat for Newcastle. He was later excluded from the House on account of his connection with the Hothams: Brunton and Pennington, op. cit., 266; Keeler, op. cit., 87. He was to prove a tireless advocate for the North in the ensuing months. 23. The Scottish Commissioners to negotiate the peace reached London on 14 November 1640. 24. D'Ewes, Notestein, 23. 25. C.J., ii, 28. 26. D'Ewes, Notestein, 23.
relief of occupied territory by an Act of Parliament. Pym did not wish to give encouragement to anti-Scottish feelings which might undermine the authority of his own party and also destroy a valuable strategic and tactical asset; at the same time he could not risk driving men of ardent patriotic spirit into opposition by neglecting the counties now occupied. When, on 10 November, patriotic feelings were warming to the troubles of the North, Pym saw fit to exert his influence to divert the debate from those problems; but on the following Friday he was content to let Parliament resolve in more congenial circumstances upon some assistance for the occupied parts. Pym realised that native English antipathy to the Scots, if handled indelicately, might be roused and overwhelm the reform party. However, Parliament's undertaking to pay the bills of the northern counties did not mean that the problem of the North and its repercussions in Parliament were about to disappear. After all, if Parliament defaulted on the payments, the Scots were still free (according to the seventh article of the cessation) to extract the due sums from the counties by plunder. Now that Parliament had made itself directly responsible for the northern counties, its leaders would be affected more immediately and more markedly by any apparent dereliction of duty.

For Charles, as for his opponents, the Scots were the crucial political factor. To the opponents of the government the Scots made possible the calling of Parliament

27. C.J., ii, 28.
and were regarded as guarantors of reform. Charles also saw that the Scots provided Parliament with an opportunity to attack his government. He believed, therefore, that if Parliament were deprived of their friendship he might the more easily provide for his own defence. Charles' first preoccupation, then, was to divide the Scots from his English opponents. He could do this in two ways. Firstly, he could hasten the despatch of the treaty with the Scots. The sooner this was done, the more quickly the Scots would return home, disband their army and leave Parliament without support. At the same time Charles might weaken Parliament by heightening those tensions between it and the Scots of which there were already signs. The royal policy was well appreciated by Giustiniani, the Venetian ambassador, who, through his connections with the Court, was able to report to his masters that an attempt to separate the English and the Scots was 'the only stroke with which His Majesty aspires to conquer the hydra of so many troublesome seditions.'

In concentrating on the reformers' dependence on the Scots Charles had seized upon the weakest point in his opponents' defences. There were good hopes of his exploiting it. Despite Pym's efforts to succour the North without being over-mastered by anti-Scottish fervour, his willingness to

28. See above, 5-6.
29. C.S.P.V., xxv, 111. The nature and progress of royal policy vis-a-vis the Scots is a dominating theme in Giustiniani's letters throughout the months preceding Charles' journey to Scotland in August 1641: see especially ibid., 102, 103, 107, 145.
underwrite the expenses of the northern counties had neither resolved the kind of problem that worried Hales nor soothed the enmity of a Widdrington or a Price. In fact doubts and resentments were being kindled in some who were leading advocates of reform.

On 14 November Edward Bagshaw delivered an extraordinary speech. Bagshaw sat for Southwark, and although he was to join the King at Oxford in 1644, he was at this time working with Pym and his company. Bagshaw complained typically against the country's grievances, but, referring to the outburst four days earlier, he carefully opened his own mind on the subject of the invasion:

The Scots we have heard branded as traitors, because, contrary to the law of nations and their loyalty, they have invaded our lands; what other title have they merited that have invaded our laws and liberties, the precious evidences by which we should freely enjoy ourselves and our estates?

Yet Bagshaw was not censured for this implication. Perhaps the leaders of the opposition could not afford to risk fuelling the dissatisfaction that smouldered around the subject of the Scots. But what is more strange is that Bagshaw escaped censure even after hinting further that some English were not free from the suspicion of treason:

Are not our lives in danger whilst an enemy disguised as a friend is provoked, and suffered to come into our very bosoms, and rifle some of their goods, others of their loyalty, which they neither would nor could have touched, might we with united power have withstood them?

31. Brunton and Pennington, op. cit., 236.
32. Keeler, op. cit., 94.
33. My underlining.
The silence of the House in the face of this accusation can be explained by assuming that even if those suspected of treachery were innocent, then they thought it wiser to suffer the accusation: it would have been difficult to deflect such a charge without provoking the Scottish issue Pym had been attempting to play down. But Bagshaw had scented something that Charles thought it profitable to pursue. When on 3 January 1642 he charged the five members and a Lord with high treason, in two of the articles Charles accused them of conspiracy with the Scots against himself. The King and his advisers must have thought the charges would stick.

On the day that Bagshaw made his accusations, the Scottish Commissioners reached London, and a desperate struggle commenced. The English Lords Commissioners at Ripon, as we have observed already, were not pleased with what had passed there. Yet they shared in varying degrees in the general desire for reform which accompanied the first meeting of Parliament. They also knew that there could not have been a Parliament without the Scots. On the whole the Lords, like Hales in the Commons, were reluctantly grateful to people they suspected.

In a similar frame of mind the House of Lords

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34. The fourth article of the charge read: 'That they have traiterously invited and encouraged a Foreign Power to invade His Majesty's Kingdom of England'. The seventh article read: 'And they have traiterously conspired to levy, and actually have levied, War against the King.' L.J., iv, 501.
35. See my Introduction, xvii-xx.
Ripon. The Earl of Bristol opened the conference on behalf of the Lords by closing off the murky and dangerous subject of how the pacification of Berwick was broken, and why the Scots had invaded England. He affirmed that it was the Lords' intention to report solely on the circumstances which obliged the Lords Commissioners to treat and to conclude in the terms they had.

The predicament of the Lords Commissioners at Ripon has been explained. The essence of it was a maintenance payment of £850 per day for the Scottish army, which 'seemed very strange to their Lordships'. However, necessity had forced them to accept a demand that was 'hard of digestion.' But if the House of Lords was reluctant to discuss the origins of the war, it was not afraid to suggest how much it distrusted the Scots now. Having concluded his narrative, Bristol took the opportunity to impress the Commons with the terrible state of the King's affairs in the North. In this matter the Lords had taken a different view from that of the Commons, whose leaders were not especially sorry for His Majesty's affairs when they promised to secure their own. The Lords were unready to exploit what they said necessity had imposed upon them. They therefore raised implicitly the question of the dignity and honour of the Crown and Kingdom. To illustrate how both had

37. See my Introduction, xvii-xx.
38. Rushworth, iv, 46-51.
39. Ibid.
suffered, Bristol reminded the Commons of the distresses of the northern counties, which could not bear the burden of finding the £850 every day. If the supply of money failed, he said, the Scots declared that they could no longer obey His Majesty and would plunder for their upkeep.

Seemingly, Bristol, on behalf of the Lords, was impressing upon the Commons that it was useless to imagine that the embarrassment of the Scottish army occupying the North was something from which the attention of members could easily be averted. For the Scots were not merely upon English soil: they were threatening unrestrained plunder should their maintenance fail.

Since Parliament had undertaken to maintain the invaders to save the North from ravages, the Scots could be regarded as blackmailers; and blackmail was the very thing to spark the old hostility toward them. Bristol did nothing to discourage these feelings; for having raised the spectre of plunder within the northern counties, he went even further, to suggest that the Scots might advance into Yorkshire. This was no wild piece of scare-mongery. Once the Scots had exhausted the resources of the occupied territory, they would be obliged to move. Moreover, General Leslie already had contemplated a further advance as a means of exerting pressure on the English negotiators at Ripon; there
was no reason to think he would not still do it. Bristol thus argued wisely when he said that the prevention of such an advance should be the first concern of the Kingdom.

Then Bristol turned to the state of the royal army, making the Commons taste of his irony. He thought it odd, he said, that the Scots be maintained, and not the King's army; and he left it to the discretion of the Commons whether they could trust the elements to contain the Scots!

His Lordship confessed that the Scots had made great Protestations...that they had no Intent to advance...but return when they had received satisfaction. Yet their Lordships did not conceive that the Kingdom should rely on Promises or Protestations. Many Accidents might happen, when a Nation, come from a far Country to a better, should be told the Business they came about, was just, and their Quarrel good; who finding themselves in a fat Pasture might pick Quarrels with their Leaders, if they should go about to prevent them of the Reward of their Vertue and Valour.

Therefore, because of the possibility of further advances by the Scottish army, Bristol proposed that the royal army should not be disbanded but that it should be re-supplied, 'or other Parts of England were left to the Scots discretion.'

His Lordship said, he durst not say the Scots would not forward, but that it was in their Power, if they would; and therefore he recommended

40. For Leslie's plan to march further south see Baillie, i, 263. To advance into Yorkshire would have been a breach of the treaty of Ripon, since according to that agreement the Scots were to stay north of the Tees. See Article VIII of the Articles of Cessation, signed on 26 October 1641: Nalson, i, 463-4; Rushworth, iii, 1306; C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 196. See also Appendix I.
this Representation to the whole Body of the Kingdom to prevent future dangers.41

The sensitivities of all Parliament-men and the worries of the leadership had not been spared. Bristol, on behalf of the Lords, had portrayed the present problems in such gloomy and threatening terms that no member could be ignorant of the circumstances that had angered some from the first. Who knew what an army of rapacious Scots might not do? Whatever threatened, it was now, after Bristol's plain speaking, more than ever vital to Pym and company that the situation in the North should not be permitted to provoke the patriotic instincts of members into an outcry which might unseat the leadership of the leading reformers, and with it the reform cause itself. But the job of restraining the temper of the Commons was made more difficult by another problem.

For those most concerned with reform, the problem was not simply one of muzzling the natural enmity of their countrymen for the Scots, but of curbing the Scots themselves. Charles was not the only one in a difficult position on account of the Scots army. This is why Bristol's report of 18 November is so important. It showed that the Scots were in a position to extract everything they desired from England; and that Parliament should not expect any favours.

41. For the entirety of this report by the Lords on the Treaty of Ripon see Rushworth, iv, 46-51. See also: Nalson, i, 52h-9 (who misdates the report 13 November); D'Ewes, Notestein, 40-1.
The Scots believed, of course, that those who had benefitted most from their coming would be most ready to meet their terms. Even though their hopes of perfect amity with the English reformers had been disappointed at Ripon by some unexpectedly stubborn bargaining, they knew how much those most intent on reform were in need of them. As Baillie observed:

Under God, they all everywhere profess that they are aughtin to that armie their religion, liberties, parliaments, and all they have; that if we take conditions for ourselves, they say they are undone.42

It looked, therefore, as if Pym and his associates in both Houses, were threatened on two flanks. If they acquiesced too readily in Scottish demands at the coming treaty, or if they were tough and provoked the Scots to cross the Tees, every English heart would be lost to them who had countenanced the intruders. From the standpoint of a reformer, the ensuing struggle between King and Parliament looked a very close thing. Charles could take the initiative; he was not outmanoeuvred and prostrate, for strangely, in the necessity of seizing the opportunity provided by the Scottish invasion, the opposition had created a situation fraught with dangers for itself. Charles had on his side the native antipathy for the Scots, and the difficulty of the task the parliamentary leaders were about to attempt in seeking to conduct a negotiation with the invaders: if they were either too hard or too conciliatory with the Scots, Charles might easily regain the advantage.

42. Baillie, 1, 275-6; also 280-1, 285-6.
At the opening of negotiations on 19 November, the immediate prospect turned gloomy for Charles. He seemed naively to think that his presence at the negotiations would ensure a peace consonant with his honour. Doubtlessly he thought he could guide the talks to prevent the Scots and Parliament colluding against him; but neither the Lords Commissioners nor the Scots would tolerate his superintendancy. For their part, the Scots believed they would secure satisfaction only from those who disliked the royal policy as much as themselves. As for the parliamentary leaders, they did not intend that Charles, by reaching a quick agreement with the Scots, should deprive their Parliament of its reason for existence. Time was what the leaders needed if reform was not to be frustrated by another dissolution. As Secretary Agostino wrote:

Meanwhile it is announced that they /the Scots/ will receive every possible satisfaction from the Parliament, though it will not hasten the conclusion of the affair, careless of the expense of 25,000l a month if they see all the affairs of England satisfactorily adjusted with the support of their arms...44

On this first day of negotiation the Scots were concerned with the indigestible question of supply. They warned that their supplies were precarious; that their men lived only on water; and that there was no relief coming from the northern counties. They advised that they were preparing a paper on their conditions, and recommended the plight of the counties, or rather of themselves, to the consideration

43. C.S.P.V., xxv, 100.
44. Ibid.; see also 97.
of Parliament. The Commons was not slow to act.

A grand committee of the whole House of Commons considered (21 November) the question of supply for the Scots, for the royal army and for the occupied counties. It was resolved that a standing committee (usually called the Committee for the King's Army) be formed to investigate and report to the Commons on these matters. Clearly the Commons had set out to tackle a crucial business for which the members seemed well equipped to deal. Wilmot, Ashburnham and Hopton were actually officers of the royal army; Uvedall was its paymaster; and Hotham had had military experience in Holland. Rainsborough was a naval captain. However, the committee membership was unlikely to be united in their attitudes toward the problems they had to consider. On the one side were Hampden and Holles. They were among the leaders of the active party and men most like to countenance the Scottish invasion for the advantage it brought their cause. Denzil Holles had placed himself already in the pro-Scottish camp by his attack on Widdrington. On the other side was a batch of future and prominent royalists: Commissary Wilmot,

45. The matter of the negotiations conducted on 10 November was reported the following day at a conference of both Houses. See Palmer's notes on the conference used by Notestein in his edition of D'Ewes' Diary: D'Ewes, Notestein, 48-9; cf. Nalson, 1, 524-9.


47. Keeler, op. cit., passim.

48. See above, 7.
Ashburnham, Hopton, Capel, Kirton and Noel. Wilmot, Ashburnham and Hopton having connections with the Court, being army officers, and having suffered defeat and a humiliating cessation, were unlikely to favour the Scots, or those who tried to delay completion of the treaty. Noel and Kirton were future Straffordians and royalists—a mark of unfailing hostility to the Scots and to the tactics of the active party. With this membership, which mirrored the divisions emerging in the Commons, the committee, rather than dissolving the Scottish issue, crystalised it.

Moreover, the appointment of the committee was not going to prevent the Scottish issue being disputed in the House. Tempers were prone to flare when questions of England's honour and defence were raised—a sure sign that opinion was dividing. A week later, for instance, a dispute erupted over money to be shipped north for the armies. The point at issue was what proportion of the sum (£50,000) each army should receive. Some members were testy at the idea of the Scots getting more of the sum than the royal army; though some, like Sir Thomas Roe, being more concerned to prevent plunder, were prepared to give the Scots all. Details of the debate are sketchy; but it is clear that the resentments exposed by Holland, Hales, Widdrington, Price and Bagshaw

49. Keeler, op. cit., passim.
50. It is not surprising that a committee should reflect divergent opinions within the House. Members of committees were nominated by members standing in their place and calling the name of some other member whom they desired to be of the committee. Members would naturally tend to nominate for committees, especially those appointed to examine some controversial issue or problem, men who represented views akin to their own.
were simmering away. The point was not settled until 4 December when the interests of the royal army carried the day. The conscience of the members doubtless had been afflicted by Bristol's irony; and with the presence of many officers to improve the effect of his words, the Commons resolved that of the £50,000, £30,000 was to be sent to the royal army, and the rest to the northern counties and thence into the pockets of the Scots. On 10 December the House followed up the measure by voting two subsidies for the supply of the northern counties and the royal army in place of the £100,000 ordered on 13 November. The votes were passed apparently without any serious opposition. Even men prepared to countenance the Scots would have had no desire to see the North plundered or Yorkshire invaded. There did not seem to be any members who trusted the Scots so much as to believe that measures were not required for the preservation of the North and the defence of the South.

Thus the debate of 28 November was a reminder to all that the undercurrent of suspicion of the Scots, of regret at England's predicament, and perhaps of distrust for the politic men careful not to offend the Scots, threatened to rupture Parliament's untried unity. Given the importance Charles was placing on these negotiations, Pym had to treat

51. D'Ewes, Notestein, 81. This debate occurred on 28 November 1640.
52. ibid., 108.
53. C.J., ii, 49; D'Ewes, Notestein, 136. D'Ewes' report of this vote is as terse as that of the Journal. He records no debate. As he usually gives some indication if a serious debate took place I conclude that there was, very likely, general agreement on the question.
carefully the misgivings of the Commons.

Unfortunately for Pym, he could not control the Scots. It was their arrogance and bluster which threatened to provoke the reaction Pym was anxious to avoid. On 17 December the Earl of Bristol reported the Scots' paper promised at the first meeting of the Lords and the Scots Commissioners. The paper was in two parts. The first contained the eight articles of the peace treaty; the second concerned the 'calamitous state' of the Scots' army. Though the articles were stiff, it was the ultimatum contained in the second part which was hardest for the Commissioners to accept: that unless £30,000 were sent immediately, the Scots would be obliged to plunder the northern counties. There was now no mistaking the mood of the Scots. Certainly the Kingdom owed the money to support the northern counties; but such tough-mindedness, expressed even before the supposed 'Brethren' had settled down to bargaining, must have confounded many not yet so fierce as a Widdrington or a Price. Indeed, the Commons were very worried by the attitude of the Scots. Rather than springing to meet their demands, the next day the House voted £25,000 for the payment of the King's army. The first reaction of

54. D'Ewes, Notestein, 81. This debate occurred on 28 November 1640.
55. See above, 19.
56. L.J., iv, 111-12; Nalson, i, 689; Appendix II.
58. The Commons voted that £25,000 lent by Mr. Harrison on the customs be paid to Sir William Uverdall for payment of the army: C.J., ii, 54.
the Commons was to secure their defence.

Delay, however, would make the Scots only more determined; and that determination would serve to increase the English suspicions already aroused. As it was, Scottish necessities fathered this latest threat. The Scots had not been convinced by the fair words of persons despatched apparently to assure them how much England was beholden to their arms. Without money, assurances were worthless. On 12 December Baillie wrote:

for our affaires they have granted two subsidies, about 200,000 pound Sterling for the present, mainelie for the maintenance of our army. We are offended, that the monie decreed and daily pressed by us, and as oft promised by them, is yet gone away in so small a proportion. They confesse that army is their own, and a most happie meane for all their desyres; that the dissolving of it were their ruin; that for the keeping of it on foot and all our bygone losses, what they would doe! Yet we tell them all is but fair words: they by their ways, hes oft put us neare extreme necessitie, either to disband or plunder...60

So the Scots sent in their ultimatum and confirmed every latent doubt. Not content with pressing the English for an instant £30,000 toward the agreed maintenance of their army, they chose to advance a new demand: their sixth article of

59. Parliament proceeded with this defence policy throughout the early days of January 1641. The chief problem was raising money for the royal army. Sir Paul Pindar agreed to advance £60,000 for the army on security of the customs: C.J., ii, 67; D'Ewes, Notestein, 248-9. On 15 January a letter was sent under the Speaker's hand to the Lord Mayor of London suggesting that the citizens might assist in raising a further £60,000 for the royal army; and that there should be provision for security of their loans in the bill of subsidies: C.J., ii, 68; D'Ewes, Notestein, 257; Rushworth, iv, 142. On 10 February 1641 the Commons Journal reiterated that the second £60,000 was for the royal army and garrisons: C.J., ii, 82.

60. Baillie, i, 280-1.
the treaty claimed compensation for damages suffered by the Scots in the war. This demand coming so soon after the pay-or-plunder threat was the very thing to damage Parliament's unity.

The Earl of Bristol was evidently shaken when he announced (12 January) the Scottish demands under the sixth article. He reluctantly presented a paper containing the Scots' claim for compensation, saying that he was shocked when he considered the dishonour into which England had fallen. The Scots alleged damages above £700,000, of which part ought to be covered by England because she 'had seen that what they had done was for the good of both kingdoms...' This appeal divided those parliamentarians who approved the Scots' coming from those who would have them out of England.

By 21 January when the Commons moved to discuss this demand, the division had become serious. Sir Benjamin Rudyard said that the honour of His Majesty and the nation behoved them to pay compensation. But Sir John Maynard, more sanguine than Rudyard, called for the matter to be referred to the Lords for further negotiation with the Scots. Clearly he thought the demand too bold. Rigby was

61. L.J., iv., 112.
62. D'Ewes, Notestein, 246.
63. According to Baillie, the Scots calculated their expenses at £785,628, of which they proposed to put aside £271,500, leaving £514,128. Of this sum they offered to bear as much 'as the Parliament should find reasonable or us able.' Baillie, i, 289.
64. D'Ewes, Notestein, 246.
for postponing the debate until England was capable of paying. D'Ewes immediately objected to this dangerous proposal. Any delay risked subjecting England to the desolations of Germany. Under such circumstances they could not afford to provoke the Scots; he so feared them that he advised that the royal army be not reinforced, lest reinforcement interrupt the treaty when England had every hope of peace. Therefore, he urged that the House resolve into a committee to debate the issue so that all objections to the proposition might be fully answered. For D'Ewes no price was too high for peace.

While most debaters, then, were worrying about the size of the Scots' demand and the difficulties of England's position, Sir Christopher Wray delivered a speech which opened the minds of those parliamentarians who held an understanding with the Scots to be the lynch-pin of parliamentary strategy. Recognising that some of his fellow members were afraid of the Scots' intentions and were worried by Scottish demands, he called upon the House to apply 'without any scruple or distaste' what he regarded as a necessary remedy for England's sickness. He was for a full agreement with Scotland. He was, he said,

confident the recovery will be perfect and the whole body of Great Britain safe and sound. The happy union of Scotland and England hath long flourished in interchangeable blessings, but of late by dark underminings we are severed into Scotch and English armies. Let their [the Scots'] well composed preamble speak for me, which I wish were printed as an excellent emblem of brotherly love that discovers who has wounded us and how

65. ibid., 268-9.
each should help the other, seeing our and their religion and laws are both at stake. Think of it, noble senate, their substance is ours, we live or die, rise or fall, together. Let us find out the boute-feux of this prelatical war and make them pay the shot for their labour...Nor need we fear that they intend to disposses the English of their inheritance, being ready to withdraw their forces on reasonable terms, referring their demands for reparation...to the justice and courtesy of this House, which I assure myself will give a bountiful and speedy supply for bis dat qui cito dat is the best motto of this time.66

The debate of 21 January 1641 proved to be an open admission that there was in the Commons division over the Scots. The House resolved to consider the sixth article further on the next day in a grand committee.67

When the debate resumed on 27 January it was plain that many had not been impressed by Sir Christopher Wray’s wisdom. Sir Thomas Jermyn, Sir Henry Vane the elder and John Selden urged that nothing should be promised. Others, like Grimston and Perd argued that payment should be made out of the estates of ‘Incendiaries’ and by a gift of Parliament only if these were insufficient. St. John urged the House to nominate a sum, and then to request that the Lords Commissioners negotiate from that figure for a lower payment. There was hardly a man, even among the leading reformers, happy with the proposal to pay compensation

67. C.J., ii, 71.
68. Comptroller of the Household and a Privy Councillor. He was from the very first a royalist. See Keeler, op. cit., 235.
69. Treasurer of the Household and Secretary of State. Though he was to take the parliamentary side, he could be considered at this time as belonging to the Court party.
70. D’Ewes, Notestein, 273.
to the Scots as well as maintaining their army. All this dilatoriness annoyed D'Ewes. It would not satisfy the Scots. England needed peace and Parliament should be prepared to do what was necessary to have it. He argued, therefore, that a question should be put committing England to reparation, so that a peace might be concluded and the armies dissolved. D'Ewes was right. The Parliament had no alternative but to pay. But only after a 'serious and long debate' was it resolved:

That a friendly Assistance and Relief shall be given, towards Supply of the Losses and Necessities of the Scots; and that in due Time this House will take Consideration of the Measure and Manner of it.72

There was no division. However, the feelings of many members whose dislike for the Scots we have already noted were more likely to be provoked than soothed by the general willingness to assist the invader. It smacked of treason, Nalson commented, to treat 'invading Rebels at the Rate and with the Terms of Friendship...'

Those members who voted grudgingly for the relief were soon disabused of their hope that agreement would hasten the treaty. Only five days later at a conference of both Houses the Lords reported that the Scots were thankful for the vote of 'Assistance and Relief'; but they still would not proceed to the remaining articles until the sum was fixed. All things tended to greater misgivings.

71. ibid., 273-4.
72. C.J., ii, 71; D'Ewes, Notestein, 274-5.
73. Nalson, i, 734.
74. C.J., ii, 74 (27 January 1641).
75. D'Ewes, Notestein, 293-4.
Suspensions grew that the sixth article was designed to prevent a conclusion of the treaty, and thereby to provide the Scots with a pretext for keeping the northern counties. The Scots, on their part, disturbed by increasing signs of hostility, were anxious to calm these fears, and thus they produced a paper detailing losses by which to justify their claim. Many members were not impressed. Meanwhile, news of Scottish reinforcements served to increase suspicion.

The seriousness of the breach that was opening in the Commons was revealed on the day (3 February) that the House resolved to settle a sum as a 'Brotherlie Assistance' upon the invaders.

To decide upon a sum was the object of the debate; but after all the upset of 21 and 22 January it was not going to prove a simple matter. Men as far apart as Marten and D'Ewes shared the common problem. Marten proposed £300,000. D'Ewes was relieved; he feared a greater sum. This was a figure, he said, they could readily vote; and vote they must, for the treaty was costing them £60,000 per month. Here was an opportunity to bring the treaty quickly to a close. John Selden, who had already distinguished himself as an opponent of the Scottish demands, spoke again 'to the great offence of the House'. He attempted to re-open the issue that many had believed concluded on 22 January. Parliament, he argued, was not authorised to treat of reparations; and in so doing it had breached 'divers statutes

76 C.S.P.V., xxv, 118.
77 Ibid.
to aid and assist them coming with swords in their hands.' Selden was so incensed by the demand for reparations that he was prepared to risk a breach with the Scots. He declared that England ought to treat of reparations only when all other articles were finished and the Scots had returned home. Kirton feared that by paying, which he was willing to do, they ran the risk of treason. But D'Ewes, representing those preoccupied by necessity and peace, replied to those arguments that there was nothing illegal in making peace with a people who were no foreign enemy.

Once more, and more fiercely than ever, the festering hostility to the Scots burst forth. Some, like Sir John Strangways and Selden, wanted to rescind the past resolution of the House, and seemed prepared to risk war for honour's sake—a prospect as terrible for those who thought first of peace as for those who cared more for strategy. Sometime during this debate Sir Benjamin Rudyard delivered a speech. It was a speech significant on several counts. While it was by now clear that opinions about the Scots and the treaty were becoming sharply divided, attitudes were also shifting. As we saw at the opening of Parliament,

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78. D'Ewes, Notestein, 317-20. According to Peyton it was Sir John Strangways who first raised the question of Parliament's power to treat of reparations. Selden supported him: Peyton, f.79v.
79. Nalson dates this speech to 22 January: Nalson, i, 737. Rushworth puts it at 3 February: Rushworth, iv, 167. I believe Rushworth is right because Rudyard mentions a particular sum which was not in question on 22 January. Furthermore, Giustiniani claims that the Scots did not present their paper of expenses until after 22 January: C.S.P.V., xxv, 118; cf. above, 29.
Rudyard did not appear to regard the Scots as a problem. But by February he had found himself in a predicament similar to that of Sir Edward Hales—hostile and suspicious but, paradoxically, grateful. Now Rudyard was wounded by the ingratitude of the Scots. Had not His Majesty assented to their articles? Was this satisfaction not enough? Rudyard was increasingly dubious about their good intentions. Referring to the Scottish protestations of innocence, which preceded their invasion, Rudyard recalled their claim:

That they would take nothing of the English, but what they would pay for, or give security...

But what had in fact happened was quite to the contrary. Rather than the Scots paying and giving security,

we have defrayed them hitherto and are provided to do it longer. They did well remember, That we assisted them in Time of their Reformation; and it is not to be forgotten, that we did bear our own Charges.

Yet Rudyard was prepared to give them a fair sum 'that we may go off with a friendly and handsome Loss: If they reject it, we shall improve our cause.' With the words 'our cause' we come to the matter that was troubling Rudyard. It seems he had begun to think there was a 'cause' or case against the Scots which would be strengthened if they were not prepared to accept a reasonable and 'friendly' settlement. Such a refusal would indicate some other, perhaps sinister, intention in the Scots' invasion, and lend strength to the argument that there was an English cause to

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80. See above, 2.
81. See Rushworth, iv, 364-6. Rushworth gives the Scots' demands and the replies thereto.
vindicate. Perhaps Rudyard was beginning to worry about the integrity of English lands. Whatever it was, he hinted gravely at something tempting the Scots:

It was never yet thought, Mr Speaker, any great Wisdom, over-much to trust a successful Sword. A Man that walks upon a rising Ground, the further he goes the larger his Prospect; Success enlarges Mens Desires, extends their Ambition, it breeds Thoughts in them they never thought before; this is natural and usual. But the Scots being truly touched with Religion, according to their Profession, that is only able to make them keep their Word; for Religion is stronger and wiser than Reason or Reason of State.

However, despite these doubts, Rudyard hoped to return to what seemed to be his former opinion of the Scots and their deeds in England. But in hoping that Providence would guide them to a 'closer, firmer, Union', for the benefit of religion and the greatness of the King, he was admitting that things were not ending as he had hoped in the beginning. Such a shift of opinion bespoke increasing anxiety over the Scots and whether they could be trusted.

Most men make no mark in history. Some appear briefly and disappear unremembered. Thus Gervase Holles seized the stage for one defiant, chivalrous moment and then, to his honour, was cast into the Tower. He achieved nothing except to prove that men were now raging at one another because of the Scottish army. Incensed probably as much by the uncertainties of a Hales or a Rudyard as by those like Wray who frankly applauded the Scots, Gervase Holles rose to deliver a denunciation that rocked the

82. For the text of the speech see Rushworth, iv, 167-8; Nalson, i, 737-8.
Sir, We are now upon the 5th Article... which as it was expressed by a Noble Lord at the Conference, is a very teeming Article; it hath produced many other, and they such whatsoever Focus or Artifice they may be slighted over with, I do not like their Countenance; they may well be our Younger Brother of Scotland, but, like Jacob, they seem to me as if they had an Aim to supplant us, and take away our Birthright.

Sir, There is no Man that hath a more charitable Construction of their intentions than I had, whilst they made their Addresses in humble Distance as befitted Subjects to their Sovereign... my heart went along with them...but now, Sir, when I see them swell in their Demands beyond all Proportion; when I heard them enlarge upon their first Proposition and require Things unfit for a King to grant, and dishonourable for this Nation to Suffer, I cannot but fix a Mark of Danger upon them; I fear we have nourished in our Bosom those that will sting us to Death.

Here he was interrupted, but the House bade him continue. He observed that he had known oppressions, but that the Scots' demand for reparation was in reality a command more threatening than any oppression. Such arrogance would not have been suffered from the Scots in bygone days, so 'it cannot but trouble me, that we should not only meet them at the Half Way, but embrace the Bearers.' He hoped, therefore, that the blood of their ancestors had not run cold. He proposed that a select committee should consider those demands which were reasonable, that they might be granted, and the rest should be rejected:

And if our firm Peace may be had upon honest and favourable Terms, I will cherish the Thoughts of it; if not, there are but two Ways left worthy the Entertainment of this Nation; that is to stand or fall with Honour.

God, I hope, and our English Virtues, will secure the first; if otherwise, he is neither worthy of Life nor Memory, that shall not bury himself in the Ruins of his Country.

Immediately there were cries of 'To the bar! To the bar!' Others opposed the call. He moved to explain himself but his
Gervase Holles went on later to vote for Strafford and to join Charles in the field. Ultimately the Commons voted £300,000 to the Scots; but the calls for and against Gervase Holles confirmed that the House was not unanimous. Gardiner claims that with this vote all chances of a break with the Scots came to an end. Be that as it may, the tension unleashed in the House by the debate made a rupture within the Commons more likely than before.

The problem now was one of money. But it was one which impinged much upon the honour—in some minds, even upon the survival—of a nation. For the moment financial difficulties were great enough without having any worry of the 'Brotherlie Assistance'. On February 16 Charles assented to a Bill for the 'Relief of his Majesty's Army and the Northern Parts, being a grant of Four entire Subsidies.' Meanwhile a flurry of orders was made for receiving and distributing £60,000 to be borrowed from the city of London.

84. Keeler, op. cit., 220; Gervase Holles is included on D'Ewes' list of Straffordians; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. f.85 /When referring to the D'Ewes Harleian MSS, I employ the old foliation system. On the microfilm I employed the new foliation was not always clear/.
86. L.J., iv, 163; C.J., ii, 87.
87. For origin of this sum see Note 59. See also C.J., ii, 82 for 10 February 1641, where Hyde reported from a committee of the whole House, and it was ordered that out of £60,000 to be lent by the city of London for the use of the royal army and garrisons, the first £50,000 was for the use of the army; that before the commanders of the army paid their soldiers, the County must be paid a month's billet money towards the County's arrears; and that the next £25,000 to be raised after the £50,000 be raised for the northern counties.
However, by 17 February the House was agitated about the slowness with which London was providing the sum. The Commons, therefore, despatched Sir William Uvedall to the Lord Mayor to 'demand of him' an order for Sir William to receive all monies already collected, or to be collected, until the sum of £50,000 was received. Defence had once again assumed the first priority, for this first £50,000 of the London loan was for the supply of the royal army. On the same day the Commons went into a grand committee on the matter of supply. It soon resolved that the Committee for the King's Army should consider ways of raising money on the subsidies granted the day before. New members also were added to the committee: Sir William Widdrington, Green, Hyde, Cage, John Harrison, Sir William Carnaby, Scawen, Partridge, the citizens and burgesses of London.

The addition of the new members to the Committee for the King's Army emphasises the concern of the House for the Scottish problem. Adding the 'citizens' of London (Alderman Pennington, Alderman Soames, Craddock and Vassall) showed the serious requirement for London money; whilst the infusion of northern members (Widdrington, Scawen and Carnaby) pointed to the growing dissatisfaction of the northerners with their occupied condition. They were probably well known by now among their fellow members for their strong views on the subject. Indeed, the whole issue was one which attracted men of strong views; for among the new members were the

88. C.J., ii, 88.
89. See above, Note 87.
90. C.J., ii, 88.
London radicals as well as the future royalists, Hyde and Harrison, and the future royalist-Straffordians, Widdrington and Carnaby. The signs of division were becoming ominous.

The next day (Thursday 18 February) there was grim news for the Parliament and the refurbished committee. Uvedall reported that despite Alderman Pennington's assurances that £60,000 would be paid into the city chamber by Monday 16, there was only £21,000 paid in. The House was disturbed at this report. Rudyard, who was already worried by the Scottish problem, told the House that if it failed to raise this money 'it would endanger both our honours and safeties.' A tone of urgency, therefore, characterised the Commons' business the next day (Friday 19). Once more the House went into committee on the relief of the northern counties and the supply of the royal army—for what was described as 'the present necessity and safety of this Kingdom.' The committee decided to order Mr. Speaker to write to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Commons of London, to remind them of their promise of £60,000; and the Speaker, in his letter, was authorised to use such 'motives and Arguments as he shall think fit, to stir and quicken them to the performance of their promise.' Even the reticent Commons' Journal could not contain the excitement of the House. To the discontents which harbouring an enemy had kindled was added a wider fear of financial collapse and invasion. It was impossible when thus oppressed by the

91. D'Iewes, Notestein, 371.
92. C.J., ii, 89.
93. Ibid.
spectre of disaster that men, already divided as to the part of the Scots in English affairs, could long maintain the outward signs of unity.

On Saturday 20 February the House resumed its deliberations in committee. This time it was proposed that two extra subsidies be granted to provide better security upon which the Londoners might be induced to lend more willingly. Edward Kirton, once more prominent in debate, told the House that if money could not be found 'we should provide for our safeties.' Clearly he envisaged the alternative of war. D'Ewes at least thought he did and rebuked him: war would cost them blood, he said, as well as money. D'Ewes, however, did not deny the gravity of the situation; he argued that unless the subsidies were voted every man's safety and estate would be threatened. Furthermore, he did not doubt that men would lend, especially if Parliament played its part in preparing bills to settle the religious question. As it stood, London was already upset by Father Goodman's reprieve, and by a still undisbanded Irish army.

By raising these London grievances D'Ewes brought into the open what members opposed to the Scots must have suspected. The fact was that the Crown's main opponents were prepared to exploit England's military predicament to extract from Charles what they claimed for reform. Moreover, the reformers were becoming dissatisfied with what they had accomplished so far. Strafford and Laud had been impeached,
of course, but the processes were bogged down. On 9 November 94
Monopolists were excluded from sitting in the Commons; on 95
7 December Ship Money was declared illegal; Convocation's
controversial new canons were voted illegal on 16 December;
but these things were little more than a declaration of
policy, the only substantial achievement so far being the
Triennial Bill which was given the Royal Assent on 16
February. With relatively little done and with the great
issue of Strafford still unresolved, there was a sign of
frustration in the House: some members began calling for a
deferation of the debate on the extra subsidies until they
saw how the Lords would treat the accusations against the
Earl. Others wanted the debate deferred until 'some finall
course weree taken with the saied Earle of Strafford.' This
was a dangerous proposal, particularly as the delay of money
might trigger a Scots advance. Pym, perhaps fearful that
his more vigorous supporters would over-reach themselves,
moved that London be forced to lend. Culpepper, Holles and
D'Ewes all objected: this was a violation of the very
liberties they were gathered to uphold. Capel, however,
thought that the crisis was so grave that 'if hee knew his

94. C.J., ii, 24; Rushworth, iv, 33.
95. C.J., ii, 46; Rushworth, iv, 88.
96. C.J., ii, 51-2; Rushworth, iv, 112-13
97. C.J., ii, 87; L.J., iv, 163; Rushworth, iv, 189.
Parliament had to wait a good deal longer before it
saw much of the fruit of its labours. It was not until
5 July 1641 that the Star Chamber was abolished, and
with it the Court of High Commission. Ship Money was
not abolished either until 7 August; nor was an Act
passed limiting the royal forests until that same day.
Parliament had to wait until August before the fines
against refusers of knighthoods were abolished - see
Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan
owne sonne had monie and would not lend it upon this occasion hee would torture him.'

Pym's startling motion had turned the debate away from Strafford's trial and back to the original subject; but discussion exhausted itself on the question of how to raise the money 'because', as D'Ewes wrote, 'we knew not wheere for the present to have it.' Subsidies and further borrowing seemed the only alternative. Nevertheless, the extra subsidies needed to attract the loans were still fiercely opposed. This time the issues had come to a head, and the clash, which barely had been avoided in the past, could no longer be escaped.

In these early days of the Long Parliament there were few divisions of the House. Therefore any division represented a serious divergence of opinion. When the question was put in committee whether a question for two or more subsidies should be put, those for the subsidies won a complete victory. What had made this division and victory possible? If we compare this vote for the extra subsidies with the previous votes for the 'friendly Assistance' (22 January 1641) and for the £300,000 (3 February 1641) we can deduce an answer to our question. On both 22 January and 3 February the anti-Scottish group opposed paying reparations

98. For the record of this debate on the two additional subsidies see D'Ewes, Notestein, 380-4.
99. The Ayes, told by Sir Robert Pye and Giles Strangways, were 195. The Noes, told by Sir John Wray and John Moore, were 129; Ibid., 384-5. When the report was made from the committee the Noes yielded, and the two extra subsidies were voted: Ibid., 385; C.J., ii, 89.
to the Scots. However, while most men feared the consequences of rejecting this Scottish demand, the resistance of the anti-Scottish group was rendered ineffective, and both votes passed in favour of 'Assistance' without a division. But on the question of the two extra subsidies the arguments of the anti-Scottish group prevailed. Clearly, some people who formerly had lent their support to the pro-Scottish group, out of fear of provoking the Scots, must now, for the same reason, have switched sides to support those who were outraged by the Scots and by their parliamentary sympathisers.

On this occasion the anti-Scots group was arguing for financial measures that would, by providing an adequate supply toward the maintenance of the Scots, prevent their threatened advance. This argument would have appealed to those worried men like Rudyard and D'Ewes who might have been prepared to accept a Parliament and the prospect of reform at Scottish hands, but who were too worried about peace and property to keep in England a Scottish army, with all its attendant dangers, to awe the King. They wanted to make peace and be rid of the armies as quickly as any, and without provoking the Scots. They were men who did not scruple to swallow unpalatable Scottish demands; but, having swallowed them, they were happy to support measures which would keep the Scots in place; and which, by meeting England's financial obligations to them, would speed a happy end to the treaty.

The line-up of the tellers is revealing. For the
Ayes was a future royalist (Strangways) and a future Peace Party man (Pye); for the Noes there was a staunch ally of the Scots in Wray, and in Moore, the uncompromising radicalism that was the making of a regicide. Here is further evidence that the dispute was dividing men along the lines of later conflict. Moreover, it appeared that the advantage of an invasion, which promised much benefit to the reforming cause, was unsettling the unity of Parliament and shaping a disenchanted body of members whom Charles could make his own. If there was any doubt among the most active reformers that the Scots were in danger of becoming a political liability, affecting their control of the Commons, events were soon to establish it beyond doubt.

Alderman Isaac Pennington, who was distinguished early for his radicalism, was a key figure in the attempt to extract concessions from Charles by exploiting the Scots occupation. From the first he was closely linked with Parliament's loan-raising efforts in London. His tactic was to raise sufficient sums to placate the Scots, but not so much, or so readily, as would bring the treaty quickly to a conclusion. The tactical problem, for Pym and associates like Pennington, was to keep the Scots in England as long as possible to assist reform without provoking an invasion. We have noted Pennington already in connection with the London loan of £60,000. Despite his assurances, the House

100. Pennington became in later years a leading parliamentary Independent, and survived to sit in the Rump.
was annoyed and distressed by the failure of London supply. In the meantime, some of the more aggressive members had proposed putting political conditions on the progress of the treaty. Thus the most anti-Scottish of the victors of that division over extra subsidies were suspicious that political interference with the loan-raising in London had occurred. They decided themselves to call upon the Londoners. On 23 February a committee was formed to treat with the merchants 'and such persons as they might think fit', and was commissioned to employ whatever 'Motives as they shall please for procuring of such Money as they can get....' This committee was the epitome of the anti-Scottish party, most of its members being future royalists: Digby, Capel, Hyde, Culpepper, Sir John Strangways, Sir Ralph Hopton, Sir Henry Herbert, Sir Edward Hales and Sir Henry Vane the elder, Sir Robert Pie, Sir Arthur Ingram, and Sir Edward Hungerford.

To those who planned to take advantage of the Scots' army, this formidable committee must have posed a

102. See above, 36-7.
103. See above, 37.
104. C.J., ii, 91. Digby, Capel, Hyde, Culpepper, Strangways, Hopton, Herbert and Hales were all future royalists. The elder Vane, at this stage, could be counted of the Court. Sir Robert Pie was opposed to the Scots, as witnessed by his telling for the Ayes in the division of 20 February over extra subsidies. He was also a Peace Party man who had contemplated making his peace with the King: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1076-1076v. Given the unanimity of opinion among the above committee members, and the absence of men of a clearly contrary view and different political histories (Hampden, Erle, Holles), then, if Sir Arthur Ingram and Sir Edward Hungerford were of another mind from the rest of the committee, they were certainly a minority.
threat to their plans, if not to their political survival. The fact that such a committee could be formed witnessed how much the fortunes of the active party had declined, and those of the more conservative elements had improved. Certainly it was threatening to assume the management of Parliament's business with London. A few days later (27 February) the Commons was again considering the business of raising money; this time Pennington was on the defensive. Pennington's aim was, as we have seen, to supply only such money as would keep the Scots threateningly on English soil without provoking further invasion. However, as London lending became more dilatory, and as men grew more fearful of a Scottish advance, some members, the anti-Scottish ones particularly, became less happy with Pennington's role as a money-raiser. If he were to retain his influence over this important aspect of parliamentary business, something needed to be done quickly. Thus he rose in the House to reassure members that money was coming in, and that soon the £60,000 would be paid.

Unhappily for Alderman Pennington, the Scots themselves were becoming anxious about their standing with the English, and chose this moment for an inept attempt to rescue their declining influence in English politics. The Scots were distressed to discover in England that their supposed friends were more intent on exploiting the Scottish presence for their own political purposes than they were.

helpful in assisting the Scots to settle the peace according to the Covenanters' wishes. The Earl of Bristol, by attacking their sixth article (on the payment of reparations) during the negotiations, had proved again that he was unready to accept meekly the Scots' proposals. Although ultimately he favourably reported this article to the Houses—removing the suspicion that the Scots 'began to conceive of his too hot reasoning against us...'

--yet they knew there were many in both Houses 'averse from this demand, and brust out into words, in several places, of dislyke...'

In late February Baillie frankly commented that the city of London had promised long since £60,000, but had delayed paying it, then, because of Father Goodman's reprieve; now, because of the Earl of Strafford. 'They will give no money: this is their great weapon; so both armies are in their third month.' These friends, who calculated how much advantage they could wring from delaying the treaty, must have been as disenchanting as enemies to a man who was hoping to finish the treaty by 15 February.

As weeks rolled by the Scots saw their friends falling away. It was Bristol's policy to save England from an insoluble constitutional and religious conflict between the Commons and the Crown by persuading Charles to add to

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107. ibid.
108. ibid., 290.
109. ibid., 302. Baillie wrote that Parliament had decided to put 'private' matters—Strafford, Windebank, Goring, the Papists and Monopolies—before all others. 'When these were closed, they intended to close a Session, and dismiss the armies.' ibid., 290-1.
110. ibid., 290.
his Privy Council moderate Peers who would serve him with wiser counsel. But their promotion to the Privy Council and the attempt to steer a course between the King and the Commons, proved ultimately damaging to the Scots. On the one hand, they grew to doubt even more their friends among the Lords, who now were heard to plead publickly for a delay to Strafford’s processe and to look upon Scottish affaires not altogether so pleasantlie as they wont... On the other, various of their allies in Parliament and in London blamed the Scots for the promotion of those Peers who seemed determined to curb the active party. Thus the Scottish Commissioners ordered Alexander Henderson to prepare a paper assuring their friends that they were constant against episcopacy and the incendiaries. Unfortunately, the paper fell into the hands of a stationer and was printed.

The paper, which called for an end to episcopacy, offended even staunchly anti-episcopal Puritans who regarded it as an unwarranted interference in English concerns. Meanwhile, Hyde, Capel and others seized the opportunity to attack Pennington and whoever else liked the Scots to tarry, striking at the point where they were most vulnerable: this dalliance with enemies. Hyde showed that his committee to treat with the London merchants had

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112. It was thought Hamilton persuaded the King to this: Baillie, i, 305. The Lords were: Bristol, Essex, Bedford, Hertford, Mandeville, Savile, Say and Seal.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., 305-6.
approached men who were not reluctant to lend and who had promised a further £50,000. Their complaint, said Hyde, was against the Scots themselves, for circulating this anti-episcopal paper. Capel supported him by adding that their objection was to the stay of the Scots, and if they were gone money would flow. They had been talking, evidently, to men of a different political persuasion from Pennington's contacts. He, conscious of the danger of being regarded as a friend to invaders, declared that the number which took objection to the paper was inconsiderable. Sir John Strangways and Sir Ralph Hopton joined in with fierce attacks on the paper and with calls that it be read. Others like Erle and Strode opposed them.

It must have been obvious to the active party that the developing attack on the Scots had to be stopped. If it were not, the policy of making peace conditional on certain political concessions would be in tatters, if not the entire reform programme. Soon the House was all shouting and abuse as men rose to speak and were interrupted. To close the debate, Sir John Evelyn and others said that the Scots disavowed printing the paper, and eventually the affair was passed over; but it had been one of the 'greatest distempers' D'Ewes had ever seen in the House. There was no doubt now that many people inside and outside Parliament would no longer readily tolerate the Scots, and wished them speedily

115. D'Ewes, Notestein, 417.
116. Quoted from the diary of Framlingham Gawdy by Notestein: ibid.
117. ibid., 418.
gone. The shadow of dishonour grew darker upon those who frustrated the despatch of peace. Among the moderate men, who gave a tentative support to the anti-Scottish group, there was grave concern over the burgeoning cost of the treaty, and over the constant threat of invasion; but among the more fervent opponents of the Scots, men who would one day draw the sword upon Pym and Parliament were already hostile to the tactics of the more zealous reformers.

The Scots, feeling themselves deserted by their old friends, now new counsellors, and assaulted by the wrath of the episcopal party, were admonished even by true friends for their rashness: 'though they loved not the bishops, yet, for the honour of their nation, they would keep them up rather than we strangers should pull them down.' This crude interference in English business was a set-back for the Scots as well as for their friends, who told the Scots that now the enemies of Scotland were in the ascendant. This was a moment of crisis. English tempers had flared on all sides, giving the anti-Scottish group of court supporters and future royalists a temporary authority. In the country, Lady Brilliana Harley saw the whole affair as an attempt to overthrow the godly party.

Pennington was shaken by this reversal of fortune. In reply, he made a clumsy and embarrassing attempt to re-

118. Baillie, i, 305.
119. Ibid.
120. 'Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley', ed. Thomas Taylor Lewis, Camden Society, lviii, 1854, 58.
establish his own credibility and influence over money-raising, which only compounded his defeat. Walking into the Commons on 1 March he confidently assured the House that he had propositions from London which, if the House accepted, would bring in £100,000 upon the new subsidies. He disparaged the offer of £50,000 made to the anti-Scots committee, because of the remonstrance which accompanied the proffered loan. He declared that there would be no provisions attached to his offer of £100,000. The House, to have the sum, was to declare the proposed loan an acceptable service to the Commonwealth, and should send members, whom the citizens wished to nominate, to request the Lord Mayor and Aldermen to raise the loan. These propositions were a bold breach of privilege; but what is a breach of privilege between friends? Desperate for money, the House apparently permitted Pennington to nominate the members, since a committee manned by Erle, Pym, Hampden, Holles, Fiennes and Vane the younger was ordered to the city. Hyde, Capel, Strangways and the rest could not object. They, after all, had pressed hard for completing the treaty and raising money. There was an attempt by members of the anti-Scots committee, supported by Lord Falkland, to tax Pennington for his aspersions upon that committee; but the matter did not develop.

121. D'Ewes, Notestein, 420-1.
122. C.J., ii, 94. It is not certain from the sources that the members of the committee were those proposed by the citizens; but it is unlikely that those named by the House could have been unacceptable to Pennington and his friends.
Two days later (3 March 1641) an embarrassed Pennington confessed to the Commons that he had been mistaken in advising that £100,000 could be raised. He tried to mollify the House by offering £2,000 apiece from himself and half-a-dozen friends. Lord Digby gloated in triumph. With Pennington's most recent rebuff the anti-Scottish faction asserted its influence, if only briefly. For the moment their authority in treaty matters was recognised. On the very day of humiliation for the extreme party, the Lords desired a conference on the eighth article for the demolition of the fortifications of Carlisle and Berwick. Hyde, Sir John Strangways and the elder Vane joined Holles and Glyn as reporters. There were no radicals.

The discomfiture of Pennington and the prominent position which anti-Scottish (and future royalist) members began to assume in the debates and committees of the Commons was due to the steady growth of a party opposed to delaying the pacification, and to seeking political advantage from the presence of Scottish forces in England. The movement was carried along by a strong patriotic anti-Scottish sentiment which had been developing in Parliament from November 1640 to March 1641. Originally, it had been provoked by military defeat, then subsequently inflamed by a group which seemed more concerned to take advantage of the defeat than to

124. ibid., 433. This incident was not without heat. D'Ewes recorded that Sir Henry Jermyn and Henry Martin replied upon each other with 'foul language.' ibid.
125. C.J., ii, 96; D'Ewes, Notestein, 434.
126. C.J., ii, 96.
restore England's honour. The conflict between practical politics and questions of honour caused the first major crisis in Parliament. Those members most active for reform, and more inclined to take the opportunity which occupation provided, began to clash with others who wanted the treaty rapidly and honourably concluded. There were even some who preferred war to a dishonourable peace. In the Commons, almost without exception, those hostile to the Scots, or to the articles of the treaty, who would not permit obligations to the Scots to be used for political advantage, were future royalists: Hyde, Culpepper, Kirton, Capel, the Strangways, Jermyn, Hopton, Digby, Widdrington, Price and Herbert. They were supported by belated royalists like Sir John Hotham and Edward Bagshaw, and reluctant parliamentarians like Sir Robert Pye and Sir John Holland. The conservative side of Parliament was hostile to the Scots; it was a matter of honour. Their opponents, of course, were the leading reformers: Pym, Holles and Hampden. These were supported by men like John Glyn, Sir Christopher Wray and Sir Walter Erle, and by radicals like Marten, Pennington and Moore. What is important about this division is that it occurred along lines corresponding to the party divisions of the civil war.

This dispute, although neglected by subsequent historians, was of paramount concern to both King and Parliament. Charles pinned his first hope of restoring his authority upon driving a wedge between Parliament and the Scots. If the negotiations discredited his main opponents
and Parliament jibbed at the Scots' demands, he might easily strike up an alliance with moderate forces in both Houses. If negotiations went badly, and if the anti-Scottish group gained the upper hand in negotiating the treaty, the reform envisaged by Pym and Hampden and supported by the radicals would be in jeopardy. Since the chief proponents of reform were seen to be pro-Scottish, and since their reform policy was so closely bound to their Scottish policy, then, with the defeat of the Scottish policy, the reforms also would be threatened. 127

127. See Appendix III for an analysis of Gardiner's treatment of the Scottish issue during this early period.
Chapter II

Shifting Loyalties
As I argued in Chapter I, a group had been forming in the Commons, ever since the opening of Parliament in November 1640, that was eager to give impetus and a new direction to the handling of peace negotiations. This group was anti-Scottish in sentiment, and generally consisted of future royalists and royalist-Straffordians: it was a proto-royalist group. If this body prevailed, and negotiation of the treaty speeded up, the pre-eminence of the more ardent reformers would be broken, and political reform in England would cease to be a condition of peace with the Scots.

Events were to prove, however, that the anti-Scottish party was not sufficiently strong to topple the Commons' leadership. However, the active party could not ignore the strength of the anti-Scottish faction. To do so would be perilous. Instead, the active party sought to control their opponents by taking into account their attitudes; and to conciliate them by proceeding with the treaty, while keeping it under their own control. Nevertheless, the attacks launched by the reformers upon the new Irish army and on the royal army in the North kept the Scottish debate open, and, by continuing to aggravate patriotic

1. There were two Irish armies: the 'new' and the 'old'. The 'old' was the army of occupation. It consisted mostly of Protestants and was scattered in detachments throughout Ireland, and was only about 3,000 strong, both horse and foot: see C. V. Wedgwood, Thomas Wentworth, First Earl of Strafford 1593-1641, London, 1961, 140; Gardiner, History of England, x, 52. The 'new' Irish army was that raised by Strafford, upon subsidies voted by the Irish Parliament, during its session of 16-24 March 1640, to support the King's planned summer campaign against Scotland. It was nearly 8,000 strong, mainly Catholic, and reputedly well armed: Gardiner, op. cit., ix, 213; Wedgwood, op. cit., 314.
sentiment, consolidated the anti-Scots party as a distinct group in the Commons, hostile to the leadership but unable to replace it. In this respect a major obstacle to the success of the anti-Scottish party proved to be Strafford's attainder. He was hated so generally that the strength of the anti-Scottish faction was swamped by the widespread preoccupation with his ruin. All other parliamentary business, including the treaty, was halted until Strafford's end had been encompassed. Moreover, some of the anti-Scots party must have shared the prevailing distaste for Strafford, since their faction made no evident attempt to resist, in April 1641, this further delay of the treaty. But those who supported Strafford survived the threshing and winnowing of the anti-Scottish group to emerge as the Straffordian core of an embryonic royalist party. The execution of Strafford, though it was a victory for the active party, did not, however, mean a defeat for the anti-Scottish sentiments of their opponents. In fact, the unrelenting demands of the Scots throughout these crucial months began perceptibly to turn the active party against their 'Brethren', so that the reformers grew to be as mindful of English interests and integrity as the Straffordians and the anti-Scottish group had been all along. The anti-Scottish faction was not an internally cohesive party. One part consisted of men who opposed paying a penny to the Scots (there were even some for fighting them); but their numbers were small. The other part consisted of those who, not so hostile to the Scots, but moved by varying degrees of dislike, wanted to see the business ended rapidly and the Scots returned home. The
tenuous character of this alliance was soon evident.

When the conference of 3 March was reported in the Commons, Digby moved to press home the advantage which the anti-Scottish group apparently had won in recent weeks. He failed. At the conference the Lords proposed that Parliament should accept the first part of the complex and contentious eighth article of the Scottish demands—pertaining to the demolition of the fortifications of Berwick and Carlisle, and the withdrawal of their garrisons—because of the expense of long continuing the treaty. Furthermore, they suggested to the Commons that the Lords Commissioners should move the Scots to present all together the remaining demands they proposed to make under the eighth article. When Treasurer Vane reported the conference, Digby moved that the Commons approve the Lords' recommendations for speeding the treaty. Hollis opposed this; and Digby was unable to rally enough support to maintain his proposal, and to prevent the House from slipping into another interminable dispute over money. The momentum which the anti-Scottish faction seemed to have developed in the past few days already was running down. The days that followed confirmed this impression of failure. On 4 March the Commons entered into a long and ragged debate as to whether they should discuss raising money or the eighth article. Some members renewed complaints about the failure to disband the new Irish army, and the delay of

2. See above, 49.
3. D'Ewes, Notestein, 434; L.J., iv, 175.
Strafford's trial; tempers flared; order was restored again; and the House eventually resolved that it would consider money first, then the eighth article, and, finally, the Irish army.

Friday 5 March witnessed beyond a doubt to the weakness of the anti-Scottish group at which the preceding days had hinted. The House resumed debate on the Lords' report of the eighth article. There was a hot dispute over whether the first part of that report (concerning the forts) should be voted separately, or whether both parts (the second concerning the Lords' proposal to have the Scots present all their remaining demands together) should be voted as one. Eventually it came to a question of whether the Lords' paper should be committed before anything was voted. The anti-Scottish faction would brook no delay and refused to yield. The House was divided, and the refusers were beaten decisively: 213/107.

It is clear that many who had voted with the anti-Scots party in favour of the extra subsidies on 20 February had switched sides. The Yeas had a reasonable case. The Scots were firm that they would treat only article by

5. ibid., 438. D'Ewes records that during this debate someone hissed—considered a serious abuse—and he narrowly escaped a call to the bar.
6. C.J., ii, 97; D'Ewes, Notestein, 444-5. Tellers for the Noes were Ashburnham and Sir Frederick Cornwallis (both future royalists; and Cornwallis, a future Straffordian). Tellers for the Yeas were Hollis and Sir Anthony Irby. This division does not imply that the strength of the anti-Scottish group was 107, but it is a sign of the support they could rally.
article, so it was prudent to consider whether the Lords' second proposal would anger the Scots rather than advance the treaty. The vote revealed that the anti-Scots party could not hold its support. But it also showed that there was a resolute core in favour of concluding the treaty, which could rally the support of a third of the House, and which would not tolerate a delay of the treaty for any political advantage. The active party had won this round, but, trying to promote reform at home, it could not afford to alienate further such a strong band of opponents. The obvious plan would be to conciliate them. Indeed, this is what happened. When the House moved to appoint a committee to consider the Lords' paper and to prepare for a conference with them, the committee did not so much reflect the victory of the active party as continue to recognise the substantial minority opinion represented by the anti-Scottish group. The members appointed were Sir Henry Vane the elder, Sir John Strangways, Culpepper, Hyde, Holies and Glyn.

The active party, then, had not rejected out of hand the views of the anti-Scottish group. However, external pressures also were exercising some influence upon the policy of the reformers. The Scots themselves continued to exert such pressure on Parliament that they pushed the reformers toward the more hostile position of the anti-Scottish faction.

It was the question of supply which aggravated

7. C.J., 11, 97.
the situation. The Scots had grown impatient with the failure of money supplies, and despatched a sharp note to Parliament. They threatened to plunder counties that were better provisioned unless £25,000 was supplied instantly. On the morning of 6 March Sir Henry Vane the elder, obviously shaken by the demands, rose to urge that the House consider the Scottish paper which, he declared, if ignored, threatened the imminent ruin of the Kingdom. Many members did not relish paying the Scots sums which had been reserved for the royal army, especially under threat. Others, however, supported Purefoy's proposal to employ that money to meet the Scots' demands rather than, as D'Ewes put it, to run the hazard of war. Even Vane the elder, who had opposed such proposals previously, gave way rather than risk invasion. In the end the House voted what the Scots demanded. The money was to be paid that very afternoon through the Earl of Warwick.

The same afternoon, doubtless impressed by the morning's shock, the Commons voted the demolition of the northern English strongholds. However, they also voted to approve the Lords' proposal that the Scots' Commissioners should present, in one body, all their remaining demands.

8. For the paper see L.J., iv, 176-7. The paper was actually delivered by the Scots Commissioners to the Earl of Warwick. The Lords delivered the paper directly to Sir John Hotham late in the evening of 5 March: D'Ewes, Notestein, 448-50.
9. ibid., 450; C.J., ii, 97; L.J., iv, 177. The sum of £25,000 to be taken from £40,000 reserved for the royal army in the care of Sir William Uvedall, treasurer of the army.
Thus the active party, having asserted its authority on the floor of the House on 5 March, the next day accepted the very proposition it had rejected on the previous. The active party now seemed ready to prosecute the treaty more speedily. When confronted by such aggressive Scottish behaviour the active party could not but yield to a more celeritous policy. If it refused, it risked further invasion, and a revolt against its leadership in the Commons. As it stood, a third of the House had shown itself unyielding on the point of further delaying the treaty; and there was a substantial number of other members who had supported this core in the past—for example on 20 February—to prevent a Scottish invasion. The active party could not ignore this strength of opinion. It was better to let the treaty proceed, but under the auspices of the active party itself.

If most members were happy with this decision to speed up negotiations on the eighth article, the Scots were not. One might have expected that the Scots would have been ready to oblige the English in anything that hastened the end of the treaty. But no; the Scots, though anxious to be home, were wary of any attempt to hustle them out of England before the English had fulfilled their financial obligations. Hence the Scots interpreted Parliament's proposal that the Scots Commissioners should present all their remaining articles in one body (rather than one at a time), as an alignment of the Commons with the Peers and the Crown. This

11. See above, 39-41.
they saw as an attempt by the English to wriggle out of their commitments by hastily concluding the treaty. As far as the Scots were concerned, Baillie wrote,

We would be most gladlie at an end; yet if we were readie to goe, as we cannot be in haste, they know and proclaime that they were undone; yet the unstabilitie and fearfullness, and cleaving to their moneys of too many of them, will make us trust them lesse and see the more to our own affaires.12

Within two days of this letter the Scots, as Baillie had predicted, did look to their own affairs. They issued another ultimatum detailing the misery of their soldiers. What was hardest for them, the Commissioners wrote, was that they were obliged by the cessation to remain within the bounds of counties whose resources were exhausted. Unless arrears were paid their army must starve or break out of its limited territory. The predicament of both the English and the Scots could not have been put more plainly. Moreover, the Scots hinted ominously that the troubles of both kingdoms would not be removed unless Parliament decided the time and manner of paying the 'Brotherly Assistance' before the treaty drew to a close. With this provision in mind, the Scots hoped that the treaty would be speeded that they might return to their homes. 13

13. L.J., iv, 187. According to article eight of the Cessation the Scots army had to reside within Northumberland and Durham, and was permitted only to send convoys into Cumberland and Westmoreland to collect unpaid contributions. This meant that by this time (March 1641) Northumberland and Durham, directly subject to the burdens of occupation, were seriously weakened in their resources. As neither Westmoreland nor Cumberland was an hospitable county for an army of occupation, both being largely barren hilly places, the Scottish threat to break from their limited bounds seemed to suggest a move into Yorkshire—a breach of the Cessation. See Appendix I.
The entire Parliament treated this Scottish paper very seriously. During the next few days the Commons searchingly entered into the business of raising money, perplexed, on one side, as to how to raise the sums; and staggered, on the other, by their size. Yet despite the fact that strong pressure from the Scots was beginning to push the active party towards a policy more like that of the anti-Scots group, there were still some members who were unmoved in their zeal to exploit the occupation for political reasons. There were still members who were not impressed by England's predicament. These men hoped to advance their cause not in spite of, but precisely by means of, this predicament. Such a man was Henry Marten.

On Saturday 20 March, while the Commons sat in committee on these problems, Marten moved that no money be advanced until justice was done on Strafford. He was seconded by Sir Walter Erle. Such a proposal was contrary to the prevailing mood of the House. Moreover, if Pym and his allies wished to maintain control of treaty affairs, this radical proposal had to be quashed. Immediately this motion was put, Strode moved that the Speaker resume his chair, thus breaking off the debate before it got out of hand. To ensure that the business of money-raising could

14. On 19 March 1641 Sir Henry Mildmay and Sir Thomas Barrington were ordered to treat with a Mr. Collwell or with whomsoever they thought fit for the speedy raising of loan funds: C.J., ii, 108. The following day Sir John Hotham delivered a paper on the sums due to both armies by 16 April. There was a debate on how Parliament could meet these obligations: D'Ewes, Notestein, 513.
15. ibid., 513-4.
proceed undisturbed by radical proposals, the debate was transferred to a select committee from whose membership Marten and Erle were conspicuously absent. The committee represented a wide spectrum of parliamentary opinion. On the one hand, it was served by men who had taken a lead in prosecuting the treaty and attacking the Scotish predilections of the active party (Sir Henry Vane the elder, Sir John Culpepper, Hyde, Sir John Hothen and Henry Bellasyse); but on the other, it was dominated by Pym's friends and by others on whom they could doubtless rely: Nathaniel Fiennes, Holles, John Crewe, Sir Henry Vane the younger, Arthur Goodwin, Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir Edward Hungerford, John Hampden, William Cage and William Strode. The treaty was thus proceeding more in accord with the wishes of the anti-Scottish group, but definitely under the aegis of the active party.

Whatever opinions divided this committee, the members were soon united in bewilderment at their difficulties. They reported that the House should inform the Peers that the Commons had left no ways unattempted in their efforts to raise money, 'but cannot find any which is likely to answer the Urgency and Necessity of the Occasion.'

16. ibid., 516; C.J., ii, 108.
17. C.J., ii, 108. I conclude that Sir Henry Bellasyse was a man to take his stand with Culpepper, Hyde and the rest because: a) he, like them, was a future royalist, which suggests that he was likely to be anti-Scottish; b) he sat for Yorkshire, which would have given him a special interest in the treaty; and c)---granted a) and b)---because he was considered by members worthy to be nominated for this committee.
18. ibid.
There was only £120,000 left to provide for all the Kingdom's needs, so, therefore, they should ask the Lords for their advice as to what might be done in this crisis — an extraordinary suggestion when one considers how jealous was the Commons of its privilege in financial matters.

The Lords replied frankly to the Commons, and their answer was an indication of a growing impatience—inside and outside Parliament—to finish the treaty. The Lords said that there was no shortage of money but only a reluctance to lend, since men feared the dangers which the unsettled peace threatened. There was only one way of opening London purses, and that was to give some real hope of peace with the Scots. For their part, the Lords ordered their commissioners to proceed resolutely in their negotiations, and to satisfy the Scots on all points. The Lords also proposed that a committee of both Houses should approach London for a loan. The Earl of Essex also pointed out that another obstacle to raising money was the Kingdom's grievances, which were still unredressed, and the authors thereof still unpunished. He assured the Commons that the Lords were ready to join with them to remove all such hindrances. It was clear that the Lords wanted nothing to stand in the way of the treaty's despatch.

19. ibid., 109-10; L.J., iv, 193.
20. ibid., 194-5; C.J., ii, 111. The trial against Strafford opened this same day (22 March 1641). It is likely that Essex's speech was made in reference to this fact, and that he, and his Peers, hoped the opening of the trial would be sufficient to remove the particular grievance of a delay in the execution of justice.
A variety of pressures, then, was playing upon the Commons, and upon the active party especially, to clinch the peace. There was the behaviour of the Scots themselves, the wishes of the Lords, the fears of the London financiers as well as those of the anti-Scottish group in the Commons; and although this parliamentary party was being held in check, the general parliamentary momentum for meeting these obligations to the Scots and for making a peace was high. Even the first sign of a threat from the English army, though startling, did not suffice immediately to deflect the Commons from its course.

On the day after the above conference with the Lords (23 March), the Peers delivered to the Commons a letter from officers of the royal army. The letter declared that the army's ability had been slighted by the Commons, and that the army, to restore its lost honour, was ready to take the field against the Scots. The officers also complained about parliamentary interference in the internal affairs of the army. The sharp words against Parliament and the veiled threat to move against the Scots so upset members that there were calls for disbanding the royal army immediately. However, most believed the House should proceed with the raising of money, so the officers' letter was dropped; and the House ordered the despatch of the bill

21. ibid. The letter was not reported in the Commons until 24 March: ibid., 112; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 356-7.
22. For the report of the letter's contents see D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 945v.
24. ibid.
for two extra subsidies and resolved to join with the Lords to treat with the city for loans. On 25 March the Commons agreed with the Lords to seek a loan of £120,000 from London. Once again the committee chosen by the Commons was dominated by the active party which now had taken treaty affairs firmly into its own hands.

Even though the active party had consolidated its control over treaty affairs in the Commons, it was not relieved from pressure to proceed to a conclusion. In fact, the active party had to commit itself more firmly to ending the treaty and relieving England of the threat of invasion. The first reply of the city fathers to the joint committee was negative. They complained that wars in the realm and the delay of justice against delinquents made men reluctant to lend. To meet this backwardness, Parliament instantly offered personal security to whomsoever should lend. But on 31 March the Recorder of London reported that so far

25. ibid., f. 357; C.J., ii, 112.
26. ibid., 112-13; L.J., iv, 198; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 360. The committee of both Houses was to go into London on 27 March.
27. The committee of the Commons consisted of William Pierrepont, Erle, Fiennes, Hampden, Sir Thomas Barrington, Holles, Mildmay, Crewe, Sir Gilbert Gerard and, to represent the anti-Scottish group, Digby, Hyde, Sir Edward Hales, Lord Falkland and Sir Gervase Clifton: C.J., ii, 113. I take it that Clifton was anti-Scottish, being a future royalist and a Straffordian: Brunton and Pennington, op. cit., 229.
29. It is not clear what is meant by 'personal' security, though I take it that it meant that M.P.s themselves were to provide security for repayment of loans.
the Lord Mayor could find only fifty men willing to lend £1,000 apiece, and begged more time in which to raise the money. So, when on 3 April the city reported for the third time, Parliament was so concerned to secure the money that the joint committee promised the London representatives that the funds would be used exclusively for disbanding the armies, and that there should be no delay in redressing grievances. There no longer seemed any doubt that the whole Parliament was determined to raise money for the Scots and finish the treaty, rather than exploit the negotiations for political advantage.

Of course an eagerness to pay arrears and to keep the Scots confined to Northumberland and Durham was one thing; actually bringing the treaty to a close was another. The test of the active party's earnestness in this matter would come when the present cessation expired on 16 April. Would the active party want to renew it again?

Certainly there were some men very eager that the cessation should not be renewed, and that negotiations be forced to a conclusion. The move came from the Committee for the King's Army. On 1 April Sir John Hotham reported from the committee a proposal that the English and Scottish armies be disbanded at the end of the present cessation—

31. ibid., 206.
16 April. So many members approved the measure that the Speaker stood up to test the matter with a question. At this moment of decision the House was turned from its course. Mr. Godfrey Bosvile, whose radicalism was to propel him into the Rump, moved that the Commons should first vote the disbanding, not of the English or Scottish army, but of the Irish army. The House, distracted by this highly contentious issue, dropped Hotham's report and fell to debating Bosvile's motion.

The problem of the Irish army was one exactly suited to wreck any debate on disbanding the armies in England, though we cannot be certain that Bosvile had acted according to a plan to divert the Commons from decisions that were likely to end the treaty. For some time now, many members had desired the disbanding of the new Irish army which Strafford had raised, and which he had hoped to employ in the King's service against the Scots. This was the army of which Strafford was said to have advised His Majesty, 'You have an army in Ireland you may employ here to reduce this Kingdom.' Whatever Strafford was said to have advised at the council table on 5 May 1640 was now the chief article

32. D'Ewes, B. M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 391. Other proposals were made also: that the Scots be treated with for as long a time as possible in which to pay the 'Brotherlie Assistance'; that £275,000 was due to both armies on 16 April, but that since three parts of the sum was due to the northern counties, they should be dealt with to forego their money till October 1641, and in the meantime a bill be passed to ensure payment of that sum: ibid.
33. ibid.
in Parliament's charge against the Earl, and a source of the dark fears of conspiracy which beset Parliament during its early months. But the fear was not universal. There were some members who were preoccupied rather with the Scottish threat than with the supposed threat of an Irish army which, in the last resort, might be necessary for England's defence against the Scots. Thus a dispute occurred over the disbanding of the Irish army, which brought again those who most disliked and feared the Scots and were most careful for England's honour into conflict with the active party. The clash over the Irish army, provoked by Bosville's motion, shows that despite the changing policy of the active party, there were still great differences between the anti-Scottish faction and the leaders of the House. Hence, even while the anti-Scottish faction and the active party seemed to draw closer to one another on the subject of the treaty with the Scots, their fundamentally different attitudes to the Scots manifested themselves over the question of the Irish army, confirming and consolidating the anti-Scot group in its variance with the reformist leadership of the Commons.

The issue of the new Irish army had been causing contention between future royalists and future rebels for some months now. On 4 January 1641 the Commons had resolved to represent to the Lords the disorder and danger of the newly levied Irish army, and to request that the Lords join the Commons to petition His Majesty for its disbanding. Significantly, Sir Walter Erle and Sir John Clotworthy, men
close to the parliamentary leadership, were chosen managers of this conference. The business rested three days until there was a great debate about the ravages committed by the Irish army. D'Ewes proposed a conference with the Lords on the subject, but Sir Thomas Jermyn opposed him, arguing that there should be no conference, and that the Irish should not be demobilized until the Scots had returned home. The debate was interrupted by a message from the Peers and not renewed that day. But if the business was neglected in the House, it was not neglected in the committees where the reformers were doing their work. Erle and Clotworthy reported to the House on 11 February about the Irish army, and the Commons ordered a second time that there be a conference with the Lords about disbanding it.

The Lords shared more fully the concern of the anti-Scottish party in the Commons, and therefore they were reluctant to commit themselves hastily to the course proposed in the lower House. They delayed their reply to the message from the Commons until 23 February 1641; and when they replied, they did so in terms which could not have been satisfactory to the active party. The Lords said they

35. C.J., ii, 62. It is worth noting, as further evidence that the disbanding of the new Irish army was an especial concern of the active party, that Nathaniel Fiennes, son of the Lord Saye and Seal, was chosen as messenger to arrange this conference with the Lords; and that the committee in charge of Strafford's prosecution was set the task of preparing heads for the conference: ibid.

36. D'Ewes, Notestein, 230; C.J., ii, 65. As I have observed above, Sir Thomas Jermyn was regarded as a faithful King's man from the opening of Parliament: see above, 27, Note 68.

37. ibid., 83.

38. ibid., 91; L.J., iv, 70.
would agree with the proposition to disband the new Irish army only if the old were reinforced. Clearly the Lords were not prepared to throw away even a popish army in this dangerous time, so worried were they by the Scots' presence in England.

The next time the Commons discussed this problem (Saturday 13 March) it was in the context of reducing the expense of the armies. It was a perfect occasion on which to renew the issue of disbanding the new Irish army. But many heatedly opposed the disbanding. Sir Frederick Cornwallis, for instance, a future royalist and Straffordian, declared that it was unfit to disband 'because their is an enemy in our bosome', and then walked out of the House (clearly in demonstration of his disgust), with Erle moving as he did so that he should explain what he meant by such

39. The report of the Lords' answer was made on 26 February: C.J., ii, 91; D'Ewes, Notestein, 407. However, both the Commons' Journal and D'Ewes note only that the report was made. At the same time as the conference was reported, the Commons ordered that the business be debated on 2 March, but there is no record of the debate in either D'Ewes or the Journal. For some evidence as to the content of the Lords' reply we have to go forward to 13 March 1641 where, in a debate on the disbanding of the new Irish army, Sir Simonds D'Ewes reveals that the Lords were prepared to agree to disbanding that army if the Commons would agree to reinforcing the old Irish army: D'Ewes, Notestein, 484-5.

40. The Earls of Hertford, Bristol, and Holland led the Lords in this view, and managed the conference on their Peers' behalf: L.J., iv, 170. Some Lords were evidently adept at concealing their real feelings from the Scots: on 15 March Baillie was writing of 'our good friend' Holland: Baillie, i, 305-6. As I have indicated already, Bristol was suspect to them.

41. The Commons had just ordered the Committee for the King's Army to consider means to lessen the charge of both armies in England, and to find out what sums would be required to disband them: D'Ewes, Notestein, 483.
words. Sir John Strangways, another future royalist, opposed the disbanding until Parliament saw how the treaty with the Scots would end. Others met the argument for disbandment with motions to strengthen the Irish army, which were so well supported that the Speaker attempted to put a question for reinforcement. However, in the event, nothing was decided; and the dispute was postponed until 15 March, when the radicals won the point, persuading the House to renew its demand that the Lords join the Commons in petitioning the King for disbandment, and even to refuse the Lords' wish to reinforce the old Irish army. It was fear of a Catholic conspiracy which gave strength to the argument to disband, a fear the radicals exploited by linking the question of the Irish army to fear of the papists at home.

If the fear of popery dominated the Commons, it was suspicion of the Scots that distracted the Lords. The conference was held; but a week was to pass before the Lords would give an answer. Meanwhile, the Commons reopened the debate on 23 March. Someone moved that the House should send again to the Lords, with Henry Marten calling for the Commons to proceed without them. D'Ewes opposed this audacious motion, and urged that they ask the Lords a third

42. Recorded in Moore's diary, f. 324: see D'Ewes, Notestein, 484.
43. Sir John Coke the younger to his father, in a letter dated 13-14 March from London: see H.M.C., Cowper, ii, 274.
44. D'Ewes, Notestein, 484-5.
45. C.J., ii, 104; D'Ewes, Notestein, 486-7.
46. Ibid.; C.J., ii, 104.
47. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 351.
time to appoint a day for petitioning the King. Besides, he said, there was the problem of raising money to pay the Scots, to which the new Irish army was a 'great obstacle'. D'Ewes was turning the argument of the anti-Scottish party against them. They argued that safety demanded that England retain the new Irish army; D'Ewes responded that maintaining it would provoke the disaster they hoped with Irish aid to avert. This must have irked those who a few weeks earlier had defeated Pennington's attempt to attach political conditions to London money and to the conclusion of the treaty. But there was no chance that the anti-Scottish group would win the point again. The Scots were insistent, and began to threaten for their money which only London could supply. Moreover, continued argument on behalf of the Irish army and outspoken contempt for the Scots would discredit the anti-Scots group in the eyes of men who were sensitive to any suggestion of popery. A message again went up to the Lords for a conference on disbanding the Irish, disarming recusants at home and purging the Court of Catholics.

Given the strength of these fears of a Catholic conspiracy and of a threatened Scottish advance, it was not surprising that, when the Commons still had received no reply from the Lords on the Irish army, Bosvile was able to interrupt Hotham's important proposals for ending the treaty. But since disbanding the Irish army had been long prosecuted by the active party and resolutely opposed by the Lords and

48. ibid., f. 351-2.
49. ibid.
by the anti-Scottish faction in the Commons, Bosville's motion looked like an attempt to protract the treaty at least until the increased dangers and heightened fears, occasioned by further delay, forced the Lords into yielding on the Irish army. The insistence on disbanding this army against all the objections of the anti-Scots party could only have widened the breach that was opening in Parliament. Young Sir John Coke, who thought himself above the factions he saw forming in Parliament, wrote to his father at Melbourne Hall that the question of the Irish army certainly was dividing the Commons. On one side he saw Sir John Strangways and those who wanted to maintain the Irish army till the treaty was done. These, he implied, were defenders of a 'popish party'. On the other side, their opponents formed that party which was labouring 'to get all the strength of the Kingdom' into its own hands. The opponents of the Scots and supporters of the new Irish army had now become an identifiable group in the mind of at least one member. But now that the anti-Scottish group was aggravated and distinguishable, the active party began what appeared to be an attack upon England's last defence against the Scots, the royal army itself. The ensuing struggle over the royal army was going to confirm the divisions that were present already in the ranks of the Long Parliament.

On the same day that Marten urged the Commons to go on without the Lords in the business of the Irish army (23 March), the Peers delivered in the letter from officers

50. H.M.C., Cowper, ii, 274.
of the English army. We have noted already that in this letter the officers complained that they were mistrusted by Parliament, and declared that, as the Scots were preparing to advance, they for their own part were ready to prove their valour. This shocked some members so much that they wanted to disband the army, but as I have pointed out, at that moment Parliament was too preoccupied with raising money to satisfy the Scots, and to provide for the ultimate disbanding, to take heed of this suggestion. There was no doubt, though, that some members believed war was imminent. Whatever the Scots were about to do, the royal army seemed about to take the offensive.

Everything the reformers hoped for appeared threatened. War and defeat had given them a Parliament and a lever to move their projects; but renewed war was likely to reverse their fortunes. After a long humiliation, a new chance in battle to recover England's honour might divert all attention from the reforming programme and undermine the support of those who for the sake of the programme had dealt too obligingly with the ancient foe. A victory would restore the prestige and fortunes of the Crown, while those who had once countenanced the Scots would be discredited and liable to accusations of treason. If there was a defeat, the effect on the active party would be the same. It was imperative,

51. See above, 64.
52. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 945v.
53. See above, 64-5. An additional problem with this proposal would have been that to disband the royal army immediately would have demanded that it be paid off immediately. This would have had the effect of compounding the money problem.
therefore, that the aggressive mood of the royal army be curbed. This, however, was not to be done without stiff opposition from the anti-Scottish group. On 3 April the Commons voted a head of a conference with the Lords:

That during the Session of this Parliament neither the King's Army, nor any of the Train'd-Bands of Yorkshire, shall March or Advance without the special Order of his Majesty, with the Advice and Consent of both Houses of Parliament, except in Case the Scottish Army should Pass the Limits appointed by the Treaty...That all Persons so offending, shall be accounted and taken for Enemies of the King and State; saving in Case the Scots do draw their Forces together, then, the drawing the King's Army into one or more Bodies shall be accounted no Breach...54

However, the conference did not eventuate. Apparently it was considered that the Lords, who had shown themselves mistrustful of the Scots, would be disinclined to curb the ardour of the King's army. The vote of 3 April was renewed on the sixth. This time it was proposed that what was intended as an order of both Houses, should be voted as a declaration of the Commons' opinion. Some members wanted to reject the proposal. Others were prepared to vote it, but with a declaration attached proclaiming the Scots enemies if they moved aggressively—Capel was first among them. But pacific opinions akin to those of D'Ewes prevailed.

54. This head of conference is recorded by D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 399. I, however, have given the text from the final form of the resolution taken on 6 April 1641: C.J., ii, 116; Rushworth, iv, 223.

55. I think the Lords had shown already that they had taken the part of the army, for when the Earl of Holland delivered in the officers' letter on 23 March, he enlarged upon the grievances of the army and urged the Commons to supply them money. He urged that the Commons 'might pardon them though they wrote in too high a straine...' D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 945v.
He argued that any declaring the Scots enemies would only provoke them, as they had already suffered much because of Parliament's misfortune in being unable to raise money for them. The resolution to order the English army to remain in camp was voted as a declaration only of the Commons. The Venetian ambassador interpreted this vote as a victory for those who wished to keep the Scots in England 'to serve their own licence and serve as a bridle to any generous decisions the king might take...'. Men like D'Ewes simply wanted to avoid renewed war; but radicals like Marten and Pennington, and closer to the centre, the great leaders like Pym, Hampden and Holles, would have hoped that their declaration could stop the army from doing anything which menaced their own survival. If the English army drove out the Scots, and Charles thereby was relieved of the pressure obliging him to continue the Parliament, the active party's policy of reform would be at serious risk. Therefore, if the Scots had to leave England, it was better they should do so with the blessing of the active party. It was essential that the leaders of the Commons should not lose control over England's dealings with the Scots.

For months now the active party had been frustrating the anti-Scottish party, to whom it seemed there was no intention to relieve England of the Scots. On 9 April the anti-Scots faction attempted again to end the treaty. That day the question arose whether or not to extend the cessation

56. ibid., f. 405-6.
57. C.S.P.V., xxv, 140.
a fortnight longer; and the anti-Scottish party opposed. But again it was beaten. Gardiner nearly overlooks this very important division. He cursorily observes that the vote worried Pym and his associates, who feared for their control of the Commons at a time when the Lords seemed to be cooling in their ardour for Strafford's prosecution. Gardiner completely misinterprets this division. Once more he seems to ignore the months of hard-fought divisions, rousing speeches and ill-tempered remarks which bespoke outrage at England's dishonour. He complacently observes that

the unhappy religious question stood in the way of all harmonious action...There were many who wished, in the interest of the bishops, that another war might break out, in which the Scots might be less successful than before.59

The division of 9 April was the last serious attempt of the anti-Scots group to direct the treaty deliberations. But they had not been routed. In fact, they commanded nearly half the votes in the House; and if it had not been for a matter of such transcendant concern as Strafford's trial, they might have captured in time the last handful of votes. However, the progress of Strafford's

58. According to the Commons' Journal the division was: Yea's, 167, Tompkins and Lord Compton being the tellers; Noes, 128, Holles and Sir Edward Hungerford the tellers: C.J., ii, 118. According to D'Ewes the tellers were reversed: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 963v. I accept D'Ewes' account. Going on the past behaviour of the House it is unlikely that Holles would have voted against extending the Cessation. On the other hand, one would expect a future royalist like Tomkings and a future royalist-Straffordian like Lord Compton to have voted for the Noes. D'Ewes records that the tellers did behave according to expectation, and so I conclude that his record is faithful.

prosecution was by this time beginning to preoccupy members completely. As Gardiner points out, the leadership in the Commons was becoming disturbed over the aloofness of the Lords, and feared that disagreement (over things like the Irish army) might affect their judgement of the case against Strafford. Many members thought their survival depended upon Strafford's extinction; so that when their case seemed about to fail they seized upon the merciless expedient of Attainder. After the Commons had walked out in dismay from the trial (10 April), agonizing weeks followed as they awaited the Lords' reaction to the Attainder, and, finally, that of Charles himself. During the month between 10 April, when the Scots Commissioners presented the eighth article in full, and 12 May, when Strafford was dead on Tower Hill, the anxiety with which members awaited the process of Attainder was transformed into terror by fears of an army plot at home, and a Catholic menace from Ireland.

There was no doubt that the Scots army worried the Parliament; but with the failure of the impeachment of Strafford a new and more immediate threat began to menace the survival of the reforming party. If Strafford were acquitted, Charles might easily launch a counter-attack against a discredited leadership of the House of Commons. Rumours were abroad. It was known that he was shaping a moderate party around Bristol and Bedford in the Lords; and Goring had revealed already to the Lord Newport a plot concocted by the dilettante officers, Suckling and Jermyn.

60. ibid.
The Scots Commissioners handed all their demands under the eighth article to the Lords on the very day that the Commons deserted Westminster Hall for the way of Attainder; but consideration of the treaty was not renewed until 17 May, when Strafford was five days dead. On 10 April Parliament readily elected to extend the cessation for another month. It was clear the reformers were giving themselves time to deal with the Attainder rather than with the Scots. On 14 April, when the Earl of Bristol was describing for the Lords the complexities of the eighth article, the Commons were reading the Attainder for the second time. On 15 April the Lords delivered the eighth article to the Commons, but it was not reported in the House until 22 April, the day after the Commons voted the Attainder; and when the Commons did return on 27 April to the treaty, it was not to discuss the articles but to raise the sums needed to maintain the Scots until the treaty could be resumed.

Doubtless the Scots were not pleased with further delay. However, they too had promised themselves the delight of seeing Laud and Strafford destroyed. The Scots did not doubt that unless these incendiaries were extinguished they

61. L.J., iv, 213; C.J., ii, 118; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 965v. The cessation was extended from 16 April by one month.
62. L.J., iv, 216.
63. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 437.
64. C.J., ii, 120-1; L.J., ii, 217-18; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 975.
65. C.J., ii, 125.
66. ibid.
67. C.J., ii, 128-9; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 495-6. D'Ewes here notes that the debate was over a proposed poll tax and the borrowing of further sums from London until the tax was bringing in money.
would continue to plot the downfall of the Covenant. For the Scots, one of the chief objects of the treaty was to ensure that Laud and Strafford were removed as advisors to the Crown. The Scottish Commissioners had been instructed to treat for the punishment of all incendiaries between the two kingdoms; and in accordance with this instruction, the demand was enshrined in the treaty, and now was before Parliament as part of the eighth article. Moreover, they already had contributed accusations to the impeachment of both the Archbishop and the Earl. The Scots, therefore, were in no position to complain when Parliament was about the business for which the Scots had invaded England. It seemed that even the hostilities of the anti-Scottish group, not exclusively Straffordian, disappeared for the moment in the blast of nearly universal hatred for Strafford.

If we examine a list of Straffordians we quickly realise that there were men who spoke against the Scots but who were opposed to Strafford. On the other hand, I can find no evidence of a Straffordian who could tolerate the Scots. Many Straffordians, men like Widdrington, Kirton, Gervase Holles, Lord Compton and Cornwallis, voted not merely against the injustice of legislatively condemning a man against whom

68. Instructions from the Committee of Estates to the Scotch Commissioners appointed for the Treaty at London... C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 2d4-5.
69. Punishment of the incendiaries was covered by the eleventh part of the eighth head, under the eighth article: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 604; Rushworth, iv, 372.
70. The Scots presented their charges against Strafford and Laud on 17 December 1640: Malsdon, i, 680-8.
71. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 85; Verney Papers, 57-8.
no charge could be proven; they voted also against those men who, to the mind of a Straffordian, had revealed in their dealings with the Scots an inclination to exploit every opportunity for the sake of some political advantage, even at the cost of England's honour. To the Straffordians the Attainder was a deed of the same order. Whereas once the active party had tried to use the Scottish occupation and delay of the treaty to force political concessions from Charles, so now they chose to destroy the King's chief minister by Act of Parliament when the legal prosecution was failing. When a Straffordian considered the events of the past months and compared the bill of Attainder with the active party's handling of the treaty, he could have concluded that the active party seemed to be bent on implementing its policies by fair means or foul. If the active party, Straffordians asked themselves, used both treason and murder to attain their goals, then what more did they intend? There can be little doubt that the Attainder divided the embryo of the royalist party from the progressive wing of the Commons. The Straffordians had not found themselves suddenly thrown together by the introduction of the Attainder; they were not the product of a few April weeks. They had been schooled for long months in the tactics of men who, it seemed, would stop at nothing to have their reforms. The Straffordians had tasted daily since November the humiliation of supporting an occupation by an old enemy. They were exasperated by the checks the active party put in the way of an attempt to rid England of her invaders. Now the reformers were sending a man to death by the same
disingenuous means.

In the meantime the Commons awaited the reaction of the Lords to the Attainder. On 27 April, when the Commons were debating taxes and loans, the Lords were reading the Attainder for the second time. It looked as if it might pass, but the Lords were in no haste to proceed with the matter. They faltered. The leaders of the opposition were alarmed. Charles contributed to the growing tension by announcing that he would not disband the new Irish army until the treaty was concluded, and that he would go into the North and personally take charge of the royal army. Certainly something dreadful was expected. The active party feared that Charles would attempt to dissolve Parliament with a disaffected army at his back. When the Usher of the Black Rod called up the Commons (1 May) to hear His Majesty in the Lords, the Commons believed they were about to be dissolved. Instead, Charles declared that his conscience would not permit him to condemn Strafford. The King's attitude, however, did not relieve the Commons of their doubt that Parliament was threatened; indeed, if Charles did not yield on the Attainder, it seemed that a dissolution was inevitable. In these circumstances the Commons ordered that a bill for two extra subsidies, now in the committee stage, be amended so that the passing of this bill (or any

72. L.J., iv, 227. The Lords read the Attainder for the first time on 26 April 1641: ibid.
73. C.J., ii, 131.
74. C.I.P.V., xxv, 145.
75. D'Ewes, B.H. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 572: The Black Rod assured the Commons, when he saw their fearful countenances, that they were not going to be dissolved.
The fear of a dissolution had been worrying the parliamentary leaders since November. They knew that the Scots' invasion had compelled Charles to call Parliament; they knew that he needed Parliament to raise money both for his own army and for the Scots army also. Now the Houses were about to pass a bill to raise that money for the Scots and to pave the way for their return home. The active party realized that once they had met these financial obligations Charles would no longer have so pressing a need for Parliament. Thus by amending the subsidy bill to prevent a dissolution once provision was made for the Scots, the active party was admitting publicly that hitherto it had regarded the necessity to pay the Scots as the guarantee of Parliament's survival. The reason for all these months of delaying in treaty-making was thus made apparent to any who hitherto had not understood. Now, however, the active party had to seek some other device to ensure Parliament's future sitting. Unless appropriate steps were taken, Charles might save Strafford and close Parliament at a single stroke.

Nor were the Scots an aid to Parliament in this predicament. In fact, they were as impatient as the King to finish the treaty. At this dangerous moment, when the reformers would have looked most for Scottish support, the Scots, who had restrained themselves from pressing their

76. C.J., ii, 131. Significantly, the reformist lawyers Whitelocke, Selden and Wilde were set the task of amending the bill.
demands on Parliament, now renewed their cries for money, and urged that the treaty be ended quickly. This, they said, was the only way to prevent a starving army from plundering counties as yet untouched. They complained also that they had waited too long for an answer to their eighth article. This paper could not have endeared the Scots to men who at that moment most needed the Scots to forbear. There was now considerable reason to doubt that the active reform party could continue to rely on the Scots for support. Indeed, it seemed that some of the things for which the Scots had called in England, like the punishment of the great incendiaries, Strafford and Laud, had diminished in importance for the Scots. As Baillie himself said, these things were now 'private' matters for the English: the Scots only wanted to return home as soon as they could. In the meantime, they were determined to prosecute their own interests with a singlemindedness which informed their English friends they would be treated as uncompromisingly as the King. To exploit the crisis over the Attainder as a means of strengthening the Scottish negotiating position must have seemed to members an action unworthy of 'Brethren'. Under these circumstances, therefore, the attitude of the active party toward the Scots began to change. As I will show in the next chapter, the Scottish way of making their case with a bludgeon made the active party more suspicious of the Scots and more attentive to English interests. This

77. This paper was delivered to the Lords on 1 May. It was penned on 28 April before Charles' speech to the Houses concerning the Attainder. For the paper see L.J., iv, 231-2.
78. Baillie, i, 302.
change of attitude was evident from the moment Parliament returned to the treaty after Strafford's execution. The refusal of the Scots to relent for the sake of the active party even in a moment of great crisis had begun to embitter the reformers' affection for the Scots.

The Attainder passed its second reading in the Lords on 5 May. It appeared the Bill would pass; but the King could still refuse it. The harrowing ordeal had not yet run its course. The Suckling Plot had been revealed and the Protestation taken. Parliament was tense. The same day, members learnt by letter of threats made against the gentlemen of Cumberland and Westmoreland to plunder them unless they provided supplies for the Scottish army. The audacity of the Scots knew no bounds. Many members, especially Northerners, spoke for the relief of the counties; and Mr. Treasurer Vane urged the House to conclude the treaty and disband the armies. However, even though the boldness of the Scots was becoming insupportable, the active party could not yet be without them. The debate was allowed to lapse; and searching about for some way to replace the tactical advantage they once sought in the Scots, the active party despatched Whitelocke to prepare a bill for the continuance

79. L.J., iv, 235.
80. The Protestation was taken on 4 May 1641: L.J., iv, 233-4; C.J., ii, 132. The Suckling Plot was revealed on 5 May, before the Lords finally voted the Attainder: L.J., iv, 233. It was a nicely timed revelation.
82. D'Ewes mentions Mr. Blackiston and Sir Henry Anderson, members for Newcastle, speaking for the relief of the North: ibid.
83. ibid.
of the present Parliament. On 7 May the Attainder finally passed the Lords, and Parliament awaited its greatest test thus far.

The Commons thought that the King would do anything rather than agree to the Attainder. They feared most that the royal army would be turned against Parliament; and that fear increased now that the bill was before the King. Members were so absorbed by the outcome that when Sir Henry Anderson delivered (8 May) a 'good and honest speech' about the plight of the northern counties he was ignored. The drama, however, was soon ended. On 10 May the King gave his assent to the Attainder.

The passage of this amazing bill does give us an important insight into parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots. The most vehemently anti-Scottish group of M.P.s who had been formed and isolated over the months by the 'Brotherly Assistance', by delays in the treaty, by attacks on the new Irish army and on the royal army, saw the Attainder as the most extreme measure so far in a series of measures which not only affronted the dignity of the nation, but also might be construed as an attack upon the Crown itself. The Act of Attainder brought forth a tiny Court party which had its roots in the disagreements over policy

84. C.J., ii, 136.
85. L.J., iv, 238.
86. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 537-8. The House preferred to hear a report of a conference held with the Lords on 7 May about a suspected attempt to disaffect the army to Parliament. For details of the conference, see C.J., ii, 137-8; L.J., iv, 237-8.
toward the Scots. Nevertheless, the pro-Court party was as yet a small faction. This is not to say that the Scots issue was insignificant. Despite the weakness of the anti-Scots group and the reassertion of the active party's control over the treaty, the 9 April division over extending the cessation suggested that a major split might yet develop in the Commons over policy towards the Scots. However, the attack on Strafford and the fear of royal retaliation seemed to unite most members just when it looked that a serious rupture over the Scots was emerging. For the majority of members, Strafford was a bigger issue than the Scots. A split, then, was averted. This is not to suggest that the active party's apparent attitude of solicitude toward the Scots triumphed also. Their behaviour, particularly during the crisis of the Attainder, shook the active party's confidence in them as an ally of reform, and sowed doubts among the reformers as to the nature of the Scottish intentions. The active party began to suspect the Scots. This new mood began to manifest itself when Parliament resumed discussion of the treaty.

87. See above, 76–77.
Chapter III

Scots all Suspected
Now that Strafford was dead, Parliament was ready to return to the treaty. The active party re-embarked upon it conscious of the real possibility of Scottish intervention. It was now plain that the Scots had entered England partly in order to ensure that the English would settle their political and religious difficulties in a way compatible with Scottish interests. Even Englishmen who thought that Scottish and English interests were closely allied could not tolerate the Scots canvassing a Presbyterian settlement of the English church. Meanwhile, Scottish threats to advance their army diminished the active party's attraction to a connection in which they were treated less as a partner and more as a milch cow. Nor had the Scots' behaviour assisted the active party in holding its position in Parliament. The domineering ways of the Scots, in fact, threatened the leadership that Pym and his associates exercised in the Houses. Now that Strafford was gone, Laud imprisoned and the Act for the continuation of the Long Parliament given the royal assent, the Scots were no longer so important to the active party. I will argue in this chapter that the diminished importance of the Scots in the calculations of the active party was overtaken by an increasing suspicion of them. This change, facilitated by uncertainty as to the role of the Scots in the suspected royal machinations against Parliament, led even the active party by August 1641 to regard almost as enemies those they had once greeted as friends.

Parliament at no time during this period could
afford to risk a breach with the Scots. However, by May 1641 the more ardent reformers felt less need and liking for them, and a new and widespread tone of firmness began to characterise parliamentary dealings with them. The first sign came with the religious problem. The Scots in their first head under the eighth article of the peace treaty desired that there might be unity in religion and uniformity of church government as a special means of conserving the peace between the two kingdoms. Besides the fact that religion was a question upon which the English were not agreed amongst themselves, to yield on the issue would be to admit of Scottish interference in matters that were exclusively English. Thus the Scots received their first check when (17 May) the Commons voted

...That this House doth approve the Affection of their Brethren of Scotland, in their desire of Conformity, in Church Government between the Two Nations; and doth give them thanks for it: And as they have already taken into Consideration, the Reformation of Church Government, so they will proceed therein in due time, as shall best conduce to the Glory of God, and the Peace of the Church.2

As Clarendon observes, this signified and concluded nothing so far as the course of church reform was concerned; however, it was a blank refusal to let the Scots dictate the terms of religious settlement. It was a foil to the Scottish hopes of interfering in a crucial question of reform. On this point, at least, the active party and their opponents of the anti-Scottish faction were united. After many months of angry exchanges it appeared that two

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1. Rushworth, iv, 368.
formerly hostile factions in the Commons were uniting to resist Scottish demands—a sign that the attitudes of the active party to the Scots had undergone some change. It looked as though both sides of the House might unite to free England of an army that had outworn its welcome. Certainly the orders of the House suggest that the Commons was busy about the treaty and the disbanding, wherein, hitherto, it had delayed.

On 18 May the Commons was discussing security for those who would lend £200,000 'for disbanding the two armies & the conclusion of the peace within one month, or sooner...'

Meanwhile, negotiations were proceeding with the Merchant Adventurers for the loan of the said money; and the Committee for the King's Army was ordered to consider means of disbanding the two armies. The task of disbanding was considered so urgent that new members were added to the committee, and these (Sir William Armyn, Lucas, Cage, and Crew) were men whose connections were with the active party. On the following Wednesday (19 May) the debate on the armies was resumed, with the new members of the committee taking a leading part in describing forcefully the urgency and difficulty of raising the sums required for disbanding.

Indeed, it did seem that for the first time since November 1640 the Commons was uniting to speed the treaty and the disbandment, with prominent reformers active in the task. In
This time they were considering a Scottish proposal that neither Kingdom should make war on the other without the consent of their respective parliaments. Many men objected that this was a dangerous proposal which touched the King's prerogative. Culpepper and Edmund Waller were chief among the opponents of the article. But no grave dispute seems to have erupted; instead, the proposal was referred to a conference for discussion with Lords. For a matter which was said to involve the prerogative, the whole House was taking the business fairly coolly. Greater difficulties, however, were in store in the next head of the eighth article. This one—the third—proposed that neither party should make war upon a foreign country without the consent of the other. Many objected strongly to this and moved that it be rejected. Once more Culpepper—this time supported by Kirton and Hopton—led the attack on this demand. However, despite the fact that the anti-Scottish party and future royalists were leading the assault against the Scots, there was not the clash on the issue that there would have been in previous weeks. Instead, the Commons resolved that the article be returned to the Lords Commissioners for further negotiation. It is surely significant that despite the forwardness of the anti-Scots party against these articles, they did not appear to

9. ibid., f. 590.
10. ibid., f. 591.
11. ibid., f. 592.
12. ibid., f. 592-3.
clash with the active party which once seemed set on delaying the treaty and on pleasing the Scots at every turn. It looks as if the active party shared in the dislike of the articles, and was prepared to let the anti-Scots group have the running. The Commons was surely united in a common determination to conclude the treaty, but on respectable terms.

The eagerness of Parliament, and especially of the active party, to be rid of the armies, became increasingly apparent from day to day. On 20 May a standing select committee of 52 Commoners and 26 Peers was formed to plan and oversee the disbanding of the two armies—taking this responsibility away from the Committee for the King's Army, where formerly it had resided. Significantly, the new committee was directed 'to meet at all such times as they shall find the business to require.' A more decisive commitment of the Commons to easing the burden of the armies came on the same day, when the House turned to consider the fourth head of the eighth article. The Scots wanted Acts to be passed in both Kingdoms ratifying the treaty of peace—to which the Commons agreed—and proposed that the armies be disbanded only when this act had been passed in England. The latter part of the proposition generally disturbed the House, for, as D'Ewes pointed out, they would be unable to provide for armies which were to be kept so long in being as

13. C.J., ii, 152; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 596; L.J., iv, 254. This committee was directed also 'to settle a perfect Accompmt' between the Scots and the northern counties.

14. ibid., f. 597.
by this proposal. The Commons thereupon made a resolution which showed how committed they were to ending the treaty and, especially, to disbanding the armies:

...this House desires the Armies shall be disbanded as soon as may be and the Articles of the Treaty should be presently concluded; and such of them, as cannot be concluded, should be referred by mutual Consent: That those Articles, which shall be concluded, shall be confirmed by Act of Parliament. 16

By this the Commons declared their wish that the disbanding of the armies should not depend upon the final conclusion of the peace treaty.

A strong desire to conclude matters was gripping men who had been once active in delaying them. Resolutions which once would not have been accepted without a struggle now passed the House without a division—a sure sign that the active party and their opponents were united. Even the most extreme members shared in this new mood. For instance, on 21 May Mr. Treasurer Vane reported from the committee of 52 (which met with the Lords on 20 May) three propositions concerning arrangements for the payment of the Scots and the northern counties, and for disbanding the armies. The third of these proposed that when the peace had been concluded, and public faith had been given for the payment of the 'Brotherly Assistance', the armies would be disbanded by

15. ibid.
16. C.J., ii, 152; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 597v.
degrees as money was collected. This caused dispute in the Commons because some claimed that it 'limited the time of the disbanding the armies to the giving of publicke faith and the paiement of arrears.' Henry Marten, who previously had moved that the treaty should be laid aside until Strafford's process had been concluded, now moved that since the House had voted (on 20 May) the speedy disbanding of the armies, this latest proposition 'crossed' that vote. Marten was right. However, the Commons realised that they could not separate the disbandment of the armies from completion of the treaty, wish all they might. The Scots would not leave without money and the guarantees provided by a formal parliamentary Act. In the meantime, England had to maintain its defences. Nevertheless, despite these contrary votes, the Commons had revealed their wish that the Scots should be gone; whilst Marten's motion shows how much the attitude of the lower House had changed. Even those who once had dallied were now for despatch.

On the day after Marten's exclamation (22 May) the House provided further evidence that attitudes toward

17. The first and second propositions were: i) That an arrear of £200,000 to be paid to the Scots for the counties and the 'Brotherly Assistance' of £300,000 shall be settled and secured by the Kingdom of England to the Scots; ii) That if the deductions for the counties are more than the Scots can spare, they will be allowed the full sum for disbanding, and the debt to the counties be taken upon the Kingdom of England and deducted from the 'Brotherly Assistance': C.J., ii, 153; L.J., iv, 255; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 600v.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. The Commons agreed to the three proposals and voted that the Lords Commissioners treat over them with the Scots.
the Scots were changing. A division occurred which seemed to suggest that disagreements over the Scots, and what was fit for England's honour, had passed from being disagreements between the active party and the anti-Scottish group, to one which divided the active party itself. That day Mr. Crew reported the grand committee's deliberations on the remainder of the eighth article. A sharp dispute erupted over the final demand concerning the extradition of incendiaries. The point in dispute was neatly expressed by Selden, who spoke 'verie vehementlie against it: showing it was against the law of Nations to deliver such as fledd to them for refuge and protection...and That we should come to be iudged by a law we know not.' Holies answered him that though treason committed in another state under one king was not treason in another, this did not apply to the case of England and Scotland because they were under one king. Ostensibly the issue was a legal one. However, it could not have arisen unless a substantial part of the Commons considered the Scots as foreigners who could not be treated favourably, as countrymen, without dishonour to Parliament and to England. Thus the House was deadlocked, in reality, over an issue of honour. In the end a division settled the question in favour of the Scots. This division was not, however, like those of days past when the active party marshalled against the anti-Scottish faction. This time the active party was divided against itself. Strode and Holies told against Glyn and Fiennes.

20. For the full article see Rushworth, iv, 372.
This division further indicates that attitudes to the Scots were changing in the Commons, and that even the active party had become infected with dislike for the Scots' demands. Prominent figures among the reformers were now leading the anti-Scottish vote! Even the Venetian ambassador, who had been reporting for months that the reformers were in collusion with the Scots, noted a marked change in Parliament. He saw that it was prosecuting the treaty vigorously, and that its suspicion of the Scots was growing apace:

Parliament has recently voted two subsidies, on condition that they are controlled by its commissioners, and employed solely for the pay of the armies, which they want to disband as soon as possible. They are actively negotiating with the Scottish commissioners to terminate if possible, all their differences and to conclude a close alliance, between the two crowns. The commissioners are apparently perfectly favourable to an adjustment and equally ready to withdraw their forces, but many feel doubtful if they will fulfil their promises.23

The Scots doubtless were 'favourable to an adjustment'; but they continued behaving in their high-handed way. It seemed that their arrogance knew no bounds. They were confident of the strength of their position, and used it to make further demands which added to the store of insults and increase of doubts which England had garnered at their hands. The Scots accepted the proposals for disbanding the armies and for payment of the northern counties; but they did so ungraciously. They began to insist that their privation in the North could not be

24. See above, 95, Note 17.
relieved by paying arrears of £120,000. They demanded that the arrears should be calculated not from 16 October 1640 but from the time of their first coming—20 August. They also required that a proportion of the 'Brotherly Assistance' be paid to meet their urgent requirements: the need to refurbish their trade, and to compensate those who had indebted themselves to equip the expedition.

Although there were signs of an increasing parliamentary discontent with the Scots, the mood was not of that unbridled kind which might provoke a breach. There were other reasons, however, for bringing the treaty to a close besides hostility to the Scots. For one, the cost of the armies was almost more than England could bear. Moreover, another more serious factor was emerging: the English army's loyalty to Parliament was suspect. Here was a very persuasive reason for making an early settlement, and an even quicker disbanding. Therefore, the Commons empowered its committee of 52 (26 May) to propose to the Lords that a sum of £80,000 should be paid upon the disbandment as part of the 'Brotherly Assistance.' The Peers agreed to the sum and proposed in reply that the standing select committee on disbanding should meet daily to discuss any difficulties as they arose. The Commons,

25. C.S.P.D., 1640-41, 583. The demand was not presented to the Commons until 22 May: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 622.
26. C.J., ii, 157; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 621. The committee was also empowered to propose a further cessation of 14 days from 30 May, which was granted by the Lords: L.J., iv, 257; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 622.
27. ibid., f. 622v.
now as eager as the Lords, immediately agreed. Both Houses, despite all insults and all unreasonable demands, were committed to finishing matters as soon as possible. On 27 May (the day Sir Edward Dering introduced the bill against episcopacy) the Commons read for the first time a bill to raise £400,000 on the English and Welsh counties for disbanding the armies. Indeed, the Commons had become so bent on freeing England of armies and obligations that, after a bitter debate, it voted the coining of plate.

As I have hinted above, the active party's forging ahead with the treaty and disbanding was motivated not simply by a belated sense of patriotism. They were creatures too politic for that. Ever since the Suckling plot and the days when the King's officers were telling Parliament they were eager to do battle with the Scots, the army had been under a cloud. It was necessary, therefore, that the royal army be dissolved. This meant that peace must be made with the Scots rapidly, and their army withdrawn. For the present the royal army was looking riotous and insubordinate, which in itself was problem enough to worry Parliament and to make members wish it was disbanded. But wish all they would, the members could not solve the problem of the royal army until they had concluded the treaty with the Scots.

28. ibid., f. 623v.
29. ibid., f. 628. The Bill was called the 'Subsidy Bill'.
30. ibid., f. 654. The debate was 'bitter' not because the House disagreed on the necessity to raise money and quickly be rid of the Scots, but because members disagreed about the appropriateness of the measure. It appeared to be very drastic.
On 7 June Sir Henry Mildmay reported to the Commons a letter from Hull informing members that a Captain Withers had been murdered by mutineers. In response to the letter the House began arguing whether they should debate disbanding the armies or the 'eradication' of bishops. It chose to debate raising money to disband the armies. The Lords reacted a little more sharply. They decided to tell the Commons that as times were dangerous 'no Way is so fit to prevent further inconveniences as to disband both Armies.' They advised the Commons committee of 52 to meet on the unfinished articles until they were complete and speedily return them to the Lords Commissioners. The Lords further advised the Commons to think of ways to raise money for disbanding the armies.

The Commons did not seem to mind these sharp words. In fact some Commoners so much agreed with them that when the House came to consider (8 June) extending the cessation from 14 June, they flatly rejected the proposal. Others, equally desiring peace, objected to the refusers, arguing that it was impossible to conclude in time and that without a cessation the armies might come to blows. Still others maintained that they would agree to a cessation only if the Commons would declare that the treaty would not continue

31. ibid., f. 665.
32. C.J., ii, 169.
33. L.J., iv, 268.
34. D'Ewes, B.H. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 671.
beyond 28 June. In these circumstances of fear that the royal soldiers would turn against Parliament once the Scots were gone, some called for the House not to consent to a disbanding of the Scottish unless the English army was disbanded at the same time. But the Commons ended the debate by voting the cessation without any conditions. They probably understood that the Scots, though anxious to be home, were not going to be hustled away without their money; and this the English could not provide in a fortnight. There was, obviously, a more drastic way to disband the troublesome and dangerous English army than by ending the treaty; Parliament could disband it, peace or no peace.

That same afternoon (8 June) Nathaniel Fiennes revealed an army plot against Parliament. There was supposed to be a plan to introduce a new garrison into the Tower and to march the royal army against Parliament supported by French troops disembarking at Portsmouth. Here alone were grounds for disbanding the royal army. The question was, however, would those grounds be sufficient to overcome the Parliament's natural concern for England's security?

In the Commons there was no effective resistance. The anti-Scottish party knew well enough that it was weak. After 14 June the army had no competent support in the Commons. This same day the Lords reported to the Commons a

35. ibid., f. 675.
36. ibid.
letter from twenty-five officers complaining that the lower House abused them by its accusations of disloyalty. Furthermore, as if to verify the Commons' suspicions of the army, the officers outlined their own political programme. They called for the maintenance of the bishops' votes, the disbanding of the Scots, and the restoration of the King's revenues. The Commons did not delay action against the army. It sent a message to the Lords desiring a conference about demobilizing five regiments on the plea of their expense.

The Peers were not impressed by this proposal. They were deeply suspicious of the Scots and feared that they would take advantage of this weakening in England's defences. They believed that the Scots' invasion and the subsequent course of the treaty had been sufficiently dishonourable to England and to their own reputations. Thus, no matter how anxious were the Commons, nor how difficult the army, the Lords were determined to maintain the country's defences against the Scots. They informed the Commons (15 June) that they were ready to give all possible assistance to effect a total disbanding. They urged the

37. ibid., f. 699-699v. See also: 'Those protests have only increased suspicions...in the Lower House...' C.S.P.V., xxv, 166.

38. According to the record in the Lords' Journal, the Commons claimed that they had used their utmost efforts to raise money to disband the armies. Necessity therefore obliged them to disband the royal army as the Commons was able to supply sufficient money for this task. The Commons proposed to disband the Scots army later: L.J., iv, 274-5. According to Giustiniani, this plea of expense was but a cover behind which the Commons launched its attacks on the royal army: C.S.P.V., xxv, 166.
Commons to provide an estimate of the cost of a full disbanding, maintaining that when they had provided this they would assist them eagerly to raise the sum. The Peers warned that the Parliament's creditors would be loath to lend for anything less than a full disbanding. Nevertheless, the Lords did make one concession—that if only a partial disbanding was possible, then the Scots must be persuaded to make a reciprocal withdrawal. 39 Even this concession, however, revealed that a mistrust of the Scots and a concern for England's proper defence underlay the Lords' response to the 'jobbery' of the Commons. The Lords would not yield, wrote Giustiniani, because they did not 'consider it safe or honourable to weaken the army while Scottish troops remain in England...'. So firm were they in this that the King's supporters looked to the disagreement as that breach between the Houses for which they had long been waiting. For a second time divisions were appearing in Parliament because of different attitudes towards the Scots. After a few weeks of apparent and unexampled unity in handling treaty affairs and the demobilizing of the armies, conflict was renewed.

There is no doubt that the active party by this time wished to free itself from an association that was now more an encumbrance than a support. Hostility to the Scots was on the increase and was shared by the leading reformers. However, between the active party and those I have termed

40. C.S.P.V., xxv, 166.
the anti-Scottish faction there was a difference of priority; a difference that was highlighted by the army plot. The clash was between those who thought the Scots enemies against whom a bulwark must be maintained; and those who saw internal political issues to be of greater importance than the issues of safety and honour provoked by the Scots. Such a difference was bound to aggravate incipient party divisions in Parliament. Some members who looked forward to reform must, nevertheless, have wondered what sort of reformers were these men who wanted to dismantle the royal army rather than make a defence against the Scots. Perhaps some future royalists asked themselves what reform was intended that was so important that even the country's defence stood second to it. It must have seemed strange to the Lords and to the anti-Scottish faction in the Commons that the royal army was being attacked for behaviour that was provoked, in part, by the long continuance of the Scots in England—a circumstance for which Parliament itself shared responsibility. Could anyone blame the officers for protesting at their treatment? Even in the Commons there was a similar manifestation of disgust. During Fiennes' report on the plot, Wilmot accused Goring of perjury (for revealing the sworn secret of the plot); and Digby appeared to impugn the legality of the investigation itself.

41. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 68. Digby's meaning is not clear from D'Ewes. If we take only this source into account, Gardiner's interpretation, that Digby seemed to question the legality of the investigation, is the most plausible. However, it is worth noting that Verney in his notes recorded (Verney, 90) that Digby also accused Goring of perjury:

Lord Digby sayd of Colonel Goring, 'In my opinion hee is purjured.'

He explained it thus, 'According to Wilmots sense.'
Some angrily called for Wilmot's and Digby's censure; others as angrily opposed. Scuffles broke out. Strode thought it was going to end in blood. Clearly the attack on the army was nettling certain members. Next day two of them, Herbert Price and Sir William Widdrington, both Straffordians and future royalists, were sent to the Tower for disorderly behaviour. However, friends did not fail to make a stand on their behalf. Hyde spoke for them; and their supporters forced a division over their punishment. Once again the anti-Scots group clashed with the active party: Strangways and Culpepper told against Holles and Clotworthy. The active party won again, but not without underlining the divisions which had emerged in Parliament.

42. For an account of this incident see D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 684-5. For Strode's comment see ibid., f. 686v.

43. As darkness fell and the dispute was at its peak, Herbert Price and Widdrington seized candles from the Serjeant and brought them into the House without order: ibid., f. 686-686v; C.J., ii, 171. Both men seemed to wish that Digby and Wilmot be cleared before the House adjourned. The division against them went: Yeas (Holles and Clotworthy) 189; Noes (Strangways and Culpepper) 172. The Commons' Journal gives the tellers in reverse order (C.J., ii, 171); but it is unlikely that Holles and Clotworthy would have told in favour of Straffordians. D'Ewes' MS. gives Strangways and Culpepper as tellers for the Noes. He, however, has crossed out Culpepper and replaced him with Sir Robert Pie: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 687v. This does not substantially affect my argument that this division reflected a clash between a future royalist party and the active party over the Scots. We have noted already that Pie was inclined to vote against the active party where the Scots and England's defences were concerned.

There is further evidence that the events of 8-9 June involved a clash of different attitudes to the Scots. On 14 June Widdrington and Price petitioned the Commons for their release. Many argued that their petition was not sufficiently repentant, and it was rejected for the moment. During this debate Sir Robert Harlow supported this argument against them by reporting that one of the two (D'Ewes said it was Widdrington) had spoken 'dangerous words' to the effect that 'whosoever in this House should call the Scottish men brother should be called to the barre.' D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 696v. Widdrington and Price, however, were released the next day: C.J., ii, 175.
However, the reformers were not content merely to accuse the army of disloyalty. They proposed to disband five regiments before the Scots were withdrawn. As Thomas Wiseman observed to Sir John Pennington, these were dangerous times and they would remain so 'till the Scots be sent away.'

For our present purposes the dispute which originated in the army plot was only a diversion (albeit a very important one) from the path of steadily developing parliamentary hostility to the Scots. It occurred on the verge of a new problem which was to sharpen tensions between the English and the Scots and raise English suspicions and hostility to a new height. We can find evidence of this tension in that despatch of the Venetian ambassador, already quoted, in which he noted that there was doubt that the Scots would withdraw their forces as readily as they promised. This disquietude had its roots in months of unyielding Scottish insistence upon a financial settlement with England to be exacted by military threat. It was not surprising that English suspicions should increase. If one urgently desires to be rid of guests so unwelcome as the Scots, it is most natural to fear that they will not want to leave.

While England was embarking upon a legislative revolution, there were men like Montrose who thought that in

44. C.S.P.D., 1641-43, 18.
45. See above, 97.
Scotland some Covenanters intended another: they believed that Argyll planned to replace the rule of the Monarch with that of the barons. This they did not like. A coterie of discontented friends and relations was gathering about Montrose, which expressed its fears and hopes in a pact formed at Cumbernauld. Montrose had been trying patiently (and would long continue trying) to win Charles to a plan for ruling Scotland by keeping the fractious lairds in their place. Letters passed between the two. Unfortunately, Walter Stewart, bearing letters to Montrose from the King, was intercepted and his mail ransacked. Among his papers were discovered some letters—in particular, a mysterious one entitled 'Instructions given by the Earl of Montrose to the Lord Napier and the Lords of Ker, &c.'—which seemed to suggest that Montrose and his friends were plotting with the King some coup in Scotland. Then on 11 June Montrose was arrested by the Covenanters upon suspicion of conspiracy.

The news of the arrest and a copy of the strange paper were sufficient to convince Parliament that some grand international plot was hatching against them: the Scottish army might stand with the royal army for the King. It was not surprising that Parliament suspected the Scots, whose arms for nearly a year had been hovering over English heads. For a month now, Parliament had known that Charles intended a journey into Scotland; and since the discovery of that plan, members had had much time in which to speculate

46. The Cumbernauld bond was made in August 1640.
47. Rushworth, iv, 290-1.
as to not only the royal but also Scottish intentions.

News of the planned journey had reached Parliament at least by 18 May. The fact that it came so close upon the King's humiliating defeat over the Attainder and the Parliament Non-dissolution Bill was ground enough for suspecting the King's intentions. These bills were heavy blows to royal authority and the effect of their passage was plain to all men, especially the King's supporters: 'I may live to doe you a kindnes', said the Earl of Dorset to the King, 'but you can doe me none.' Charles intended to restore that authority; and the prospect of a settlement with the Scots provided him with hope of resuming the power he had lost to Parliament. Charles had resolved on his journey, wrote Giustiniani, 'possibly in order to set in motion some other design by his presence and to prove his authority.' As Charles already had lost the confidence of Parliament (why propose the Triennial Bill or Non-dissolution Bill if he was trusted?) there is no doubt that his plan to leave London, discovered but six days after Strafford's

48. In a letter dated 18 May Sir John Coke, junior, wrote to his father: 'It is spoken that the King is resolved upon a journey into Scotland about the midst of July.' H.M.C. Cowper, ii, 282-3. Gardiner quotes from a letter to the Queen of Bohemia from the Elector Palatine, of the same date, reporting that Charles planned to visit Scotland as soon as the treaty was completed. Gardiner suggests that this news reached Pym through Lady Carlisle: Gardiner, History of England, ix, 375-6. Also about this time—21 May in fact—the Venetian ambassador wrote: 'In the middle of next July the session of Scottish Parliament will reopen and His Majesty openly declares that he will go there...': C.S.P.V., xxv, 153.


50. C.S.P.V., xxv, 153.
death, provoked in the active party suspicion that he planned to strike a bargain with the Scots. Furthermore, since it was into the arms of the Scots that Charles was about to fling himself, it is obvious that Pym and his friends would have asked themselves what part the Scots might play in the King's plans. The Scots were not above suspicion. They had been harsh and exacting, and they had shown an inclination to interfere in strictly English matters. As I have argued, the active party had cooled toward them. Was it not possible that in return for a favourable settlement with the King, the Scots might give him their support against Parliament? The active party believed Charles had connived in the army plot. Why might he not try for the support of the Scots' army? Moreover, the recent news of Montrose's suspected conspiracy gave Parliament grounds for suspecting that Charles might find a party in Scotland. It was, therefore, not merely necessary to disband the English army, but also to stop Charles from joining with the Scots. To do this the active party tried to prevent him from departing for Scotland before both armies were disbanded. Accordingly, on 23 June, the day following final agreement on the articles of the treaty, the Commons resolved:

That both Houses be humble Suitors to his Majesty, That the Armies may be disbanded before the King's going into the North. That all Parts of the Kingdom be put into a Posture of Defence against all Opposition whatsoever: That all counties, especially the Northern, should be well stored with Ammunition and Arms; and that the Trained-Bands be exercised; That an especial Eye may be had over all the Counties, where the Papists are most resident: And that all publick Bills for
The Scots' army had been pronounced, by implication, a possible enemy of the Parliament. It was not just that the King could not be trusted to pass through the armies without making some bid for their support, but that the Scots' army, like the English, could not be trusted not to take his part. This seems to me a point under-emphasised by historians writing about Parliament's fear that Charles was going north to rally support against his opponents in England. Their interpretations emphasise an attempt to stop Charles recruiting against Parliament. But parliamentarians were equally concerned with the obverse: to frustrate those they feared might willingly be recruited. There is much evidence to suggest more attention ought to be paid to the Parliament's jealousy of the Scots during the weeks that followed, as distinct from its jealousy of the King.

The most important thing, however, about the worries which filled the mind of Parliament is that they contributed to the delay of the King's journey to Scotland. This, in turn, highly irritated the Scots, and was the immediate cause of the strains which gradually worsened Anglo-Scots relations and amplified Parliament's discontent with their 'Brethren'. On 24 June the Commons presented to the Lords for their concurrence the famous Ten Propositions

51. Rushworth, iv, 290-1. Rushworth gives the date of the resolution as 16 June. The Commons' Journal and D'Ewes give 23 June: C.J., ii, 183; D'Ewes, E.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 730.
to be made to the King. The aim of the Propositions was to keep Charles in England until the armies were disbanded and further reform measures made law. On 28 June Charles approved the request of the Houses to approach the Scots Commissioners about delaying the journey. Though the Scots were prepared to stay the journey, they were not happy. England was holding up the final settlement of Scottish affairs which awaited the King's arrival. The Scots warned the Parliament that their affairs were in no condition to suffer this delay; and that unless the English showed more respect for Scottish concerns and assented to His Majesty's departure on 5 August they would not consent to any delay. But the Commons wanted to delay the journey until 10 August. The Scots Commissioners agreed to this; but they suspected that Parliament would make more delays. They demanded, therefore, that the English should commit themselves positively that the King would set out on 10 August and not negatively as they had done hitherto, saying only that he should not go before that day. The Houses doggedly refused to commit themselves so far, but rather agreed

...to petition his Majesty, that he will be pleased to stay his Journey into Scotland until the Tenth of August; and that, if then he shall please to take his Journey, this House shall submit unto it.56

52. L.I., iv, 291-2.
53. Ibid., 294.
54. On the morning of 29 June the Commons decided that the King should not delay his journey until 14 August: C.J., ii, 192. However, later that morning they requested the Lords that they should join with them to petition the King to delay his journey until 10 August: L.J., iv, 294. Either the record of the Commons (at C.J., ii, 192) is wrong, or the Commons changed its mind.
55. C.J., ii, 193; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 749.
The departure date, then, was not finally settled, and the uncertainty of Charles' departure gave further grounds for suspicion in a relationship that was already strained and over-tired. The Scots hesitated to assure themselves that Parliament would not interrupt or prevent the re-organisation of Scottish affairs; while Parliament, on the other hand, was perplexed by the problem of its survival, and gave little thought to Scotland's interests: even if Charles did not use the armies against Parliament the reform party would be seriously endangered if he returned from Scotland with his hand politically strengthened. In fact, some believed that Parliament did not want Charles ever to go into Scotland because it feared a restoration of friendship between him and his Scottish subjects—or at least with a party there. The King's eagerness for the journey did not so much sharpen Parliament's suspicions of Charles—who could have been suspected more?—as increase fears 'of some secret intentions' nourished by the Scots.

By this time the Lords, under pressure from the Commons, had yielded to the disbanding of the five suspect regiments of the royal army, though they would not do it without some reciprocal withdrawal of the Scots. Now the Earl of Holland was in Yorkshire disbanding those regiments quietly; but Parliament was awaiting anxiously the reciprocal response of the Scottish army. The Scots, however, refused to

57. C.S.P.V., xxv, 177.
58. Ibid.
59. L.J., iv, 280. The Commons objected strongly to the Lords' proviso (C.J., ii, 183), but eventually submitted, as can be seen from the first of the Ten Propositions. The Scots were to be asked to withdraw from the line of the Tees.
60. C.S.P.V., xxv, 179.
withdraw from the Tees, nor disband a proportionable number of their men. In the circumstances, Holland advised a further cessation. The Houses did not hesitate; though this time the cessation was extended not for political advantage but for safety.

At the conference on the cessation the Commons were visibly worried. They wanted the Scots to name a day for their disbanding; and so that this day might be as soon as possible, they requested that the Scots forbear £80,000 of the 'Brotherly Assistance.' However, the Scots were not going to be trifled with over money. They curtly replied that they would disband as soon as the articles were ratified and the money paid at Newcastle. A week later Parliament tried again; it proposed that payment of the £80,000 be postponed until 1 September, and that the Scots march away on 9 August. Clearly, Parliament feared what might happen when Charles met the Scottish army straddled across his northward way. The Scots were in no mind to co-operate; their answer was cool and business-like. They referred the Houses to their former reply, and they desired that arrears be paid at Newcastle as arranged, reminding Parliament that a delay in payment would only prolong their stay. They ignored the request to postpone payment of the £80,000.

On 30 July Giustiniani was writing that a messenger had

61. Ibid., 183-4.
62. C.J., ii, 220; L.J., iv, 324. The date was 22 July.
63. Ibid., 325; C.J., ii, 220.
64. L.J., iv, 325.
65. Ibid., 334; C.J., ii, 229-31.
66. The Scots' reply was reported to the Houses on 31 July, 1641: L.J., iv, 336.
arrived from Scotland to urge the King on his way. This worried men, especially the Commons, even more. They pondered how to stop or delay the King's journey 'until they have an opportunity to discover with greater certainty the suspected intentions of the Scots.'

The parliamentary planners did not consider only measures to frustrate the royal visit to Scotland. It seems possible that Parliament even contemplated military counter-measures against the Scots. On 23 June, as we have noted already, the Commons voted that both the English and Scottish armies be disbanded. However, at the same time, it voted that the entire Kingdom 'be put into a Posture of Defence' and that 'all Counties, especially the Northern, should be well stored with Ammunition and Arms; and that the Trained-Bands be exercised...' Three weeks later the Commons formed a committee to prepare a bill for 'regulating' the arms and musters and for 'ordering' the trained bands and ammunition; again on 29 July, when the Commons resolved to sit as a committee on the bishops' bill, it resolved that no other committee would sit during the grand committee except that concerning the securing of money to be lent on the bill for Poll money, and the committee for the bill on the trained bands. Why should Parliament plan the disbanding of one set of forces only to plan the raising of another? The resolution of 23 June declared that the nation's defences were to be readied against 'all opposition

68. See above, 109-10.
69. C.J., ii, 236.
70. Ibid., 229.
whatsoever'. This very likely meant not only 'papists' and a mutinous royal army, but also the Scots. Parliament needed some force upon which it could rely to resist the Covenanters if the worst happened. Thus Parliament was concerned to ready the militia. Indeed, though the Commons curtailed committee activities to concentrate upon the important question of church reform, there still remained business which could not be sacrificed to religious considerations: the poll money and the trained bands—money to discharge the Scots; and arms to drive them out.

Parliament received news on Wednesday 4 August that Scotland had agreed to the terms of the treaty. But Charles was leaving London on the following Monday. There was simply not enough time to finish arrangements with the Scots and to disband their army before Charles reached Northumberland. On Thursday the Houses were meeting to resolve the last minute details for the payment of the Scots. Parliament decided to abandon their attempt to defer the payment of the 'Brotherly Assistance'. However, the attempt to make the Scots commit themselves to a timetable for disbanding was renewed. It was proposed that they should be requested to begin marching out within forty-eight hours of being paid the due sums. One can hardly wonder that the Commons had become so preoccupied with the

71. See above, 109.
72. C.J., ii, 236.
73. L.J., iv, 343.
74. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 806v.
intentions of the Scots. Loudoun had reached London bearing the ratified treaty and made what Giustiniani described as 'a long disquisition upon the perfect disposition of that people for a good understanding with this crown.' Concerning the withdrawal of the Scots, Loudoun said that four days after payment of the promised sums they would notify England of their day of departure; but before payment they would give no assurances of the time. Perhaps they did not intend ever to name a day. Such must have been Parliament's thoughts, because it was, wrote the Venetian,

much perturbed at such uncandid behaviour, and is making serious efforts to plumb the depth of the more secret objects of these arms, and do everything in their power to prevent the king from taking that journey...76

On Friday 6 August the worried Commons passed a resolution that the Scots be desired 'to give it in Writing... that they will, within Forty-eight Hours, after they shall have received the Monies at Newcastle, march away.' This was not the resolution of men on easy terms with their allies. Nor were things much happier in the Lords. The same day the Lords reported at a conference the final business of the treaty. The Lord Wharton, a man whose politics were more extreme than usual among his Peers, lamented the shamefulness of the treaty and the negotiations which had been opened at Ripon and which only now were being concluded.

75. C.S.P.V., xxv, 198-9.
76. Ibid.
77. C.J., ii, 240; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 806v. No message seems to have borne this resolution to the Lords. Apparently the Commons changed its mind. Perhaps it thought the demand for a promise in writing was more likely to provoke the Scots than hasten their departure.
There was no longer any note of thankfulness to the Scots for their coming. The brief blooming of fellowship which Baillie recorded had passed long since and had left only bitterness and fear in its stead. The important thing now for Parliament was to keep the Scots—particularly those who were armed or discontented—and the King separate from one another.

On Saturday 7 both Houses conferred about the Commons' proposal to delay the King's departure by another fortnight. They knew how this would anger the Scots, so they resolved to send commissioners into Scotland to explain things, if His Majesty agreed. By late afternoon the Lords had agreed to this proposal. In their urgency the Houses sat on Sunday 8 August and despatched an urgent request to the Scots Commissioners to agree to the postponement; and they also required to know of the Scots whether they had received instructions from Edinburgh to press the journey. Charles sent a message to the Scots Commissioners to stand firm. They did. They assured the King of their loyalty and declared their resolve to spend their lives to re-establish him in his authority. These words were a mark of extreme anger with Parliament. And it was echoed in the answer to Parliament itself. They gave a firm no to the proposal for a further postponement; and as to whether they were required to press for His Majesty's departure, they replied that the

78. L.J., iv, 349.
79. Ibid., 349-50; C.J., ii, 244-5.
80. L.J., iv, 250-1; C.J., ii, 245.
81. C.S.P.V., xxv, 201.
82. Ibid.
King's promises, the assent of both Houses and the resolution of the Parliament of Scotland were sufficient command. Parliament had no choice but to conclude the treaty bill before the King's departure, and await in trepidation his passage of the armies.

Even if Charles should pass through the armies without incident there were still the problems of disbanding the Scots, and of what might pass between Charles and his subjects in Scotland. Whether Parliament heard of the Scots' declaration of readiness to spend their blood in His Majesty's service, we cannot tell. But it is clear that Parliament felt itself suspected of some crime against the Monarchy which England shared with the Scots. During the first clashes over Scottish policy some men had not tired of telling their anti-Scottish critics that the Scots were no foreigners but, being under the same Crown, one people with the English. Thus the active party, in particular, could have readily understood that the Scots, as well as Court supporters at home, might have seen in Parliament's recent legislation an attack upon Monarchy which concerned Scotsmen as well as Englishmen. It was clear also that the Commons believed these suspicions of treason had something to do with the plots said to be forming against Parliament. For instance, on 23 June, when the Commons resolved to

83. L.J., iv, 351; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 817v.
84. The treaty bill had originated in the Lords and passed the first, second and committee stages on 9 August: C.J., ii, 247-8. It was passed the next day together with a bill giving public faith for payment of the remainder of the 'Brotherly Assistance.' L.J., iv, 357; C.J., ii, 250.
disband both armies and to take precautions against
conspiracies feared to be hatching in the North, the House
also voted very self-consciously, and in answer to its
critics:

That we might /assure/ ourselves that we have
desired nothing but what is just from the King
during this Parliament & not taken anie advantage
upon any pretended necessities as hath been
falslie bruited at home & in other parts of
Christendom.85

By 16 August it was clear that Parliament
suspected the Scots of being influenced against them by
such charges. On the same day the Houses conferred about
instructions for a committee to go into Scotland to observe
what passed there between the King and his countrymen.
Significantly, the fourth instruction empowered the
committee to clear Parliament of any imputation made against
its proceedings. Parliament did not trust the Scots not
to be persuaded by adverse interpretations of Parliament's
activities. Indeed, as the Parliament already thought that
the Scots were as likely to remain in England as to leave,
it is probable Parliament also suspected the Scots of
believing that the Houses had diminished the dignity of the
Crown, and that they were preparing to reach an understanding
with Charles to restore his authority. Parliament was now
very much afraid of the Scots. Accordingly, the English were
eager for them to withdraw and disband their army. As soon,
therefore, as the Treaty Bill and the Public Faith Bill

85. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 730.
86. L.J., iv, 366; C.J., ii, 259.
87. Bill to secure payment of the remaining £120,000 of
the 'Brotherly Assistance.'
had passed, the Commons sent a message to the Lords informing them that the £80,000 of the 'Brotherly Assistance' had been paid and that the remainder of the sum had been provided for, and the peace, thus, was concluded. In view of this the Commons requested the Lords (10 August) that their Commissioners ask the Scots to march away within forty-eight hours of payment. Two days later the Commons resolved that the Scots had until 25 August to complete the evacuation.

The Scots did cross the Tees as ordered by 25 August, but the days of waiting were ones of high tension. The Earl of Holland went to disband the truncated royal army but, unfortunately for the nerves of members, he wrote back a despatch saying the Scots had reinforced their soldiers, and hinted that their motives were the worst. Sir Edward Nicholas observed that the despatch filled Parliament with 'very great jealousies' for the Scots. Nor were the Scots in any doubt that the Parliament feared them. Years later, David Buchanan, defending his countrymen against the renewed enmity of the English, observed that once before Parliament had been duped by the enemies of reformation who raised and spread

88. The Commons informed the Lords that they had paid the Scots part of the £80,000 of the 'Brotherly Assistance' at Newcastle, and part to the Scots Commissioners in London. The remainder was, of course, to be secured by the Public Faith Bill: L.J., iv, 357; C.J., ii, 250.
89. ibid.; L.J., iv, 357.
90. C.J., ii, 253.
92. ibid.
jealousies of the Scots, among the people of the Countrey and City, namely in and about the Houses of Parliament; who having not before their eyes, the reall Honesty and Integrity of the Scots, known by so many faithful and loyal expressions; and not keeping in their mind the many good offices done to them by the Scots; giveth, in sillinesse of mind, ear and place to the crafty tales and apprehensions invented by the Agents of the Common Enemy, to bring them to confusion and trouble.

So the Plot taketh by the silly ones, and is set forward by the hid Malignants. Yea, in a word, it is managed with such addresse and successe, that the Scots must go home; and till they had done it, there could be no quiet, but increase of jealousies.93

What is surprising is that the Scots seem to have done nothing to allay these fears but rather, by keeping their counsel, to have done everything to increase them. When Parliament heard that the Scots had re-crossed the Tweed there must have been sighs of relief as members began unburdening themselves of the fear that the Scots were to turn instruments of the King's counter-stroke. 94

Having come so far in our description of parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots it is well to pause and reflect upon what conclusions we can make about those attitudes, and what bearing they might have on the future course of the conflict between the King and the Parliament.

When the Scots invaded England on 20 August 1640

94. C.S.P.V., xxv, 272.
they brought with them the necessity to call Parliament, and, with this, the opportunity to reform the government of church and state in England. The interests of the Parliament and the Scots were so bound up that it appeared as if Parliament would work with them as a close ally for the sake of reform. But this did not happen. For Parliament to have taken advantage of such an opportunity as that provided by the Scots' occupation, besides appearing to countenance invasion, would have looked like an attempt to awe the King and effectively to take away his prerogative by preventing his exercise of it over measures proposed by Parliament. The fact of invasion and defeat made an immediate impression upon a large number of members. Their honour would not permit them readily to accept what had happened. Some felt that, if a fair peace could not be negotiated, the only recourse was to battle. Initially their number was probably very small. However, the treaty dragged on and the more active reformers proved ready to pay the Scots reparations. This offended a large part of the Commons and sparked a revolt against the leadership of the House. For two and a half months a protracted campaign was waged by a group--consisting largely of future royalists--in the first place attempting to reject the unacceptable demands, and then, when they had lost that point, to conclude the treaty and send the Scots from England as quickly as possible. So strong was the assault that the active party's leadership of the Commons was threatened and the survival of the reform programme jeopardized. To survive it was necessary for the active party, having beaten narrowly the anti-
Scottish party on the floor of the House, to let treaty affairs go forward, but under their own control. Yet, even as the active party tightened its grip on the treaty, the Scots' army continued to prove itself a great divisive force in Parliament; for even the bogey of the Catholic menace, exemplified in the new Irish army, could not prevent the Lords, and many Commoners, desiring to keep that army as a bulwark against the Scots. For the moment the Scottish menace was more clearly recognizable than the Catholic.

When one considers these events one must conclude that the Scots were of great importance in the early months of the Long Parliament, not only because they gave England the chance to reform, but also because hostility to the Scots called into question the leadership of the most determined reformers at a time when reform had barely begun.

Even though the active party restored its position by permitting the treaty to proceed under the auspices of reform, the treaty could not be concluded too quickly. The battle over Strafford had not been finished. For a month the treaty was at a standstill because of the supreme importance of Strafford's prosecution to the entire parliamentary body. The treaty took second place in the minds of most men while the Attainder was battled out. However, to that dedicated band of gentlemen most opposed to the Scots and to those parliamentarians ready to countenance them, the Attainder proved a device of the same kind as the Scots' army. The Straffordians' vote against
the Attainder signified a moral alienation from a certain kind of political mentality. This was the mentality which was prepared to breach sacred canons of conduct, or so it seemed, for achieving some political advantage. It horrified the Straffordians as much to think that men would tolerate national humiliation for the sake of political reform as that they would destroy a man by legislative act to effect an overthrow that was failing the test of law. For the embryonic royalist party the significance of the Scots is essentially the same as that of the Attainder. It marks their identification of, and break with, a mentality that would not be restrained by traditional canons of patriotism, propriety and honour. The men who were most fiercely opposed to the Scots and most attached to Strafford were the first parliamentarians to become opponents of the reform party. The Scots issue is important because it outraged conservative consciences, and thereby set in train the formation of a royalist party.

The conservative conscience was not limited to royalists. Some later supporters of the parliamentary side also shared it. We have observed that some of the less ardent of the later rebel party, like Sir John Holland and Sir Robert Pie, shared the hostility to the Scots. Therefore, they also were likely to have been dismayed that others were prepared to take such drastic steps to prosecute reform. We should not be surprised, then, that men like Pie and Holland, who shared with Straffordians their distaste for the Scots, were later among the least militant
of the parliamentary party. Just as they were shocked that some could tolerate the Scots during the early months of the Long Parliament, they were also shocked later when they saw how eager were their associates for war. Peace Party men like Pie and Holland, as well as royalists, were appalled by those who were prepared to go to extremes, and were fearful of what their unbridled spirits might do.

But the significance of the Scottish intervention does not end with its effects on the more conservative members. It also had important effects on the active party. The uncompromising stands taken by the Scots, and their threats of force, wearied those who had hoped to benefit from their alliance. Moreover, Scottish behaviour sparked such a reaction in the Commons that instead of aiding the reform cause the Scots did much to disadvantage it. The active party in time came to regard the Scots as a liability rather than a help. This aversion intensified as it came to appear that the Scots would become increasingly a danger the longer they stayed, for they had shown a propensity for interfering in English matters. Thus, after Strafford's death, the active party led Parliament in concluding the treaty and sending the Scots home. Accompanying the wish to be rid of the Scots went an increasing toughness in negotiation with them. Above all the English rebuffed them on the question of religion. The relationship between the Scots and the English, and particularly between the Scots and the active party, became strained.
Meanwhile, fears of plots against Parliament had their effect upon a relationship now rendered more susceptible to graver suspicions. The remoteness of the Scots and their refusal to disclose their intentions added to the doubts. Now the former saviours of England were feared to have some design against Parliament. Nothing came of those fears; but the effect of the decay in relations between the English and the Scots in the period from May to August 1641 is nonetheless important. The active party came to understand that the Covenanters were ready to play a part in England's reformation in so far as it served their own interests; and, therefore, it became conceivable, to Pym and his company, that Scottish policy could easily run counter to the interests of the English reformers. This was of no little importance to the future of parliamentary relations with the Scots. For though they had been regarded as friends in 1640, from late 1641 they were seen as potential allies of the Crown. The parliamentarians, as a party, could no longer assure themselves that the Scots understood English reforming activities, or that they would not turn hostile to them. Even if the Scots did not take the King's part, there was no guarantee that they would not attempt to impose their own idea of reform. They had already attempted to make the English commit themselves to Presbyterianism. The experiences of 1641 could not but affect the shape of future parliamentary policy toward the Scots. They had to be treated with the greatest caution for, either as allies or enemies, they might be a danger to the parliamentary cause.
Chapter IV

Still a Natural Ally
For the moment Parliament breathed relief. The Scots were gone. On the appointed day of thanksgiving for peace (7 September 1641) Stephen Marshall and Jeremiah Burroughs preached sermons of delight. They proclaimed the year an *annus mirabilis*. No doubt it was more wonderful because the Scots had departed without incident. Everyone, the active party included, was relieved.

Two years were to pass before a faction of parliamentary rebels recalled the Scots, and this time publicly concluded with them a treaty for the defeat of the King. In the meantime Parliament remained anxious to discover what attitude Scotland might take to the continuing struggle in England. The problem created by the obscurity of Scottish intentions did not cease to worry the parliamentary opposition even though England was no longer occupied. Despite the celebrations there was still a cloud over Parliament's relations with the Scots. The problem had not disappeared with the withdrawal of Scottish soldiers; it had entered into a new phase. Even before the politicians at Westminster had begun to worry about the prospect of civil war and the Scottish role in it they contemplated the immediate problem of whether or not the Scots would reach an understanding with Charles, now in their midst. As yet the conflict in England was being waged only on the political level; but a political victory in Scotland for Charles would give him an advantage over Parliament which might prove decisive should the conflict grow to a crisis. This concern for the Scots, and for whom they favoured, exemplified the
active party's continuing conviction that Scottish goodwill toward Parliament, or at least their neutrality, was fundamental to the success of the parliamentary cause. The active party, in particular, understood, as had Bacon before them, that whoever designed to change the face of things in England must win the confidence of the Scots. They may have been an ancient enemy, a grasping and difficult people; but they were fundamental to the political strategy of both King and Parliament.

Accordingly, as we have observed in the previous chapter, Parliament sent a committee to Edinburgh to report on affairs there, and to deflect any innuendoes that Charles and his supporters might make against Parliament. In addition to this, on 9 September, Parliament formed a committee to meet during the recess of the parliamentary sitting. This committee was designed to oversee Parliament's affairs during the recess, and in particular was empowered to maintain contact with the other committee in Edinburgh, to send it instructions, and recall it if necessary. It is evident from the brief given this important committee for the recess that events in Scotland were being treated with concern at Westminster.

The active party was troubled now just as it had been throughout the past months. First they feared that a revolt of the proto-royalists within Parliament would

2. See above, 119.
deprive their leadership of credibility as well as of Scottish support. Now the active party was worrying that the Scots might be won by Charles and might assist him to re-establish his authority in England. Indeed, we can say that the committee to meet during the recess represented, among other things, the particular concern of the active, and future parliamentary, party for developments in Scotland: out of forty-eight Commoners who sat on that committee, only seven were identifiable royalists. Though the active party was clearly relieved that the Scots had evacuated the North and were disbanding their army, it was still gravely worried by the mysteries of Scottish policy. On 8 September Parliament went into recess full of doubt. The Venetian embassy reported that though the Scots had disbanded, the parliamentarians still were not reassured about the intentions of the King and of the Scots. News that they had given him a tumultuous and festive welcome alarmed leaders of the parliamentary opposition, who were now meeting earnestly and in private. Giustiniani could not say what they were discussing, but he said that it was widely agreed they were planning to counter any attempt Charles might make against them should he return triumphant from Scotland.

As events proved, Parliament did not need to worry about a mass Scottish movement in favour of Charles. But they soon discovered their enemy in the form of an anti-

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4. The future royalists were Culpepper, Bridgman, Sir Richard Cave, Sir Thomas Bowyer, Sir Edward Hales, Lord Falkland and Edmund Waller: C.J., ii, 288; Brunton and Pennington, op. cit., 225-45.

covenanter faction of discontented nobles and soldiers, perhaps with English connections. Their activities were revealed in that fiasco known to us as The Incident. On the night of 11-12 October 1641 there was an attempt to seize the Marquis of Argyll, the Duke of Hamilton, and the Earl of Lanark: men thought to be the King's chief opponents in Scotland. The conspiracy failed; but it focused the attention of Parliament on that faction from which they had most to fear in Scotland. The vague suspicion of the Scots was transformed into one directed more precisely against those who, if they ousted the Covenanters, might lead Scotland into the royal camp.

The Incident fitted well with the conspiracy theory by which the active party (and indeed everyone else) explained the politics of the day. Parliament declared that a network of malignant plotters was extended throughout both Kingdoms, and that they would soon attempt something similar in England. The active party claimed that the existence of a common conspiracy ought to unite the 'well-affected' of both Kingdoms; and they were to continue arguing this case until they secured the firm alliance of the Scots in 1643. The conspiracy theory served as a vehicle to establish the active party's claim that the Scots Covenanters were the natural allies of reform in England.

Unfortunately for the active party not everyone was convinced that there was common ground for co-operation

6. C.J., ii, 293. The date was 22 October 1641.
with the Scots. The events of early 1641 had shown that some men were unwilling to use the Scots against Charles. Some had thought them even more dangerous than the Irish army. Now, toward the end of that year, when the active party began to propose the need for renewed co-operation with the Covenanters, the 'well-affected', there were still parliamentarians who were not prepared to co-operate with them even for the sake of threatened national interests.

On 28 October 1641 messengers informed Charles that a rebellion had broken out in Ireland. Later, when he had finished his round of golf, Charles took the news to the Scottish Parliament, which offered to assist England should the King and the English Parliament desire it. It was known at Westminster by 3 November that the Scots had made an offer to aid England in suppressing the rebels, but that the Scots would do nothing until they understood the wishes of Parliament. The next day the Commons decided to request Scottish help under the articles of the Pacification.

To make an appeal to the Scots on the basis of the

7. Rushworth, iv, A407/. This offer of aid was reported officially in the Lords on 5 November by a letter from one of the committee at Edinburgh, Lord Howard of Escrick: L.J., iv, 423.
8. Sir Richard Cave reported to the Commons that he had received a letter from the Prince Elector Palatine, with Charles in Scotland, in which the Prince informed Cave of the offer: D'Ewes, Coates, 77.
9. ibid., 84; C.J., ii, 305.
10. ibid. According to D'Ewes, the committee for Irish affairs was ordered to prepare instructions to the parliamentary committee at Edinburgh: D'Ewes, Coates, 96.
Pacification was significant. Now that it was clear, to the minds of parliamentarians, that there really was a popish plot being hatched against the peace of the kingdoms, they asked Scotland for aid according to its commitment in the treaty to defend the peace recently re-established. The active party did not wish that its dealings with Scotland should appear an extension of some conspiratorial league. Co-operation was now going to be placed upon the public and respectable foundation provided by a treaty. The active party was saying, in effect, that it was natural and legal that England and Scotland should co-operate in suppressing the dangerous forces that threatened to overwhelm the Protestant Kingdoms. The argument, for the present, was not intended so much for the Scots, because they were already eager to go to Ireland. It was rather intended for parliamentarians who might be squeamish about further entanglements with the Scots. The argument was certainly needed, especially in the Lords, where opposition to the presence of Scottish forces in Ireland proved most intransigent.

In the Commons the idea of renewed engagements with the Scots, particularly in Ireland, England's treasured possession, roused something of the old anti-Scottish sentiment. Even though the Commons had ordered its committee for Irish affairs to prepare instructions for the parliamentary committee in Scotland to request its military help, the committee baulked at its charge. Early on the

11. See above, 132.
morning of 5 November a 'thinne' committee voted that they opposed the vote to ask for Scottish aid. Such a request was dishonourable to England. The committee's report sparked a debate in the Commons, with Sir John Hotham and Lord Falkland leading the attack on the request for Scottish soldiers. Both men had shown themselves previously averse to those whom others called 'Brethren'. Their arguments were of little avail, however, and were quickly swept aside as the Commons resolved to ask, for the present, for a regiment of a thousand men. Another problem which concerned members was the pay of these soldiers. Men were still aware of the continuing financial difficulties which the Scots' invasion had occasioned. They were reluctant to burden themselves with any new obligations when they had not discharged the old. There was still the remnant of the 'Brotherly Assistance' to pay. Culpepper and D'Ewes objected that England should not commit herself to paying the Scots. This argument was also rejected; and the House resolved to pay. The protest begun in a committee was crushed in the Commons. By 9 November instructions to the committee in Scotland were voted and sent up to the Lords. The whole business was conducted successfully under the management of the active party.

12. D'Ewes, Coates, 92.
14. D'Ewes had just finished speaking for Scottish aid.
15. D'Ewes, Coates, 93-4.
16. C.J., ii, 308; D'Ewes, Coates, 110-12.
17. C.J., ii, 308. I conclude that the active party was guiding the House in this business since Pym, Strode and Holles were appointed, along with Sir John Hotham, to manage the conference with the Lords at which the instructions were presented.
The parliamentary leaders, however, who sought to establish a co-operative friendship with the Scots did not neglect England's interests. They seem to have done everything possible to pre-empt the hostility of the Lords. For instance, in the fifth article of the instructions, the Commons declared its wish that the Scots 'shall upon all Occasions persue and observe the Directions of the Lord Lieutenant, his Lieutenant General, or the Governors of Ireland...'. The active party was showing itself careful of the Lords' sensitivities, and also shrewdly aware that the Scots might be tempted by their sojourn in Ireland. The active party was completely awake to the possible ambitions of the Scots. For the moment the Commons appeared to have been completely successful, because the Lords agreed to these instructions, and in particular to the request that a thousand Scots go into Ireland.

But on 11 November the Commons increased the number of soldiers to be requested of the Scots to 10,000. It was done very carefully so as to take account of the anti-Scottish sentiments present in both Houses. It was also done wisely, reflecting the active party's appreciation that English and Scottish interests could possibly clash in Ireland. On 5 November, having given themselves the option of asking for more Scots, and having succeeded in obtaining the Lords' consent to the original request for Scottish aid,

19. Ibid., 434.
21. See above, 134.
the active party now thought to accept of a Scots offer of 10,000 men, but 'under such Conditions, and upon such Cautions, as shall be honourable and safe for this Kingdom.' They also assured the Lords that 'unless the Scotts condescend to be commanded by the Government of English settled in Ireland that there is no Intention that any should go at all.' The active party was making every attempt to assure the Lords that it did not intend to neglect English interests in Ireland, that it was under no misapprehension as to possible Scots' ambitions there. Nevertheless, the Lords were still reluctant to go so far as 10,000 men. They clung to their vote for a thousand Scots and proposed only to intimate a desire for a further 9,000—'if Occasion be.'

The Lords' reluctance provoked a resurgence in the Commons of hostility to the Scots. On 12 November the Commons heard the Lords' resolution to request only a single regiment. But instead of rejecting this proposal, the Commons itself divided over whether it should insist also on its former request for a thousand Scots. Sir Ralph Hopton and Giles Strangways, who had distinguished themselves earlier

22. C.J., ii, 312.
23. ibid. The Lords reported the proposals of the Commons in the following terms: 'That the House of Commons voted, to desire the Assistance of our Brethren in Scotland against Ireland, for Ten thousand men, not presently to be sent, but at such Times, and in such Manner, as shall be agreed upon by Articles and Conditions of both Parliaments, according to future Occasions.' L.J., iv, 435.
24. ibid.
25. That is, the resolution to make a request for a single regiment made by the Commons on 5 November. See above, 134.
for their antipathy to Scotland, led a party of similarly disposed members to a thirty-five vote victory against the active party. The House resolved again to request one regiment. However, the recovery of anti-Scottish feeling was too weak to withstand the shock of worsening news from Ireland. On the following day a letter was read in the Commons describing conditions in Ireland. After considerable debate the Commons voted, without a division, to ask for 5,000 Scots. The anti-Scottish feeling of the Commons was still strong, though it was clearly weakening under the shock of rebellion.

The important point to consider when examining these votes, both in the Commons and the Lords, is that co-operation with the Scots could not necessarily be guaranteed by either a treaty or a common foe. Many men were still reluctant to accept that England had anything in common with the Scots except mutual hostility. Just as earlier in the year the Lords were as impressed by an immediate threat from the Scots as by a supposed threat from the Irish army, now in November they were reluctant to employ the suspect Scots against the very real and terrible uprising in Ireland.

Unfortunately, S. R. Gardiner fails to assist our understanding of these November disputes just as he failed

26. The vote was: Yeas, 122; Noes, 77. Sir Walter Erle and Henry Martin told for the Noes: C.J., ii, 313-14; D'Ewes, Coates, 130.
27. C.J., ii, 314; D'Ewes, Coates, 137-8.
us in the clashes we have discussed in previous chapters. Too insistent that the fundamental conflict at this time was between puritan and episcopalian, he is compelled to argue that the division of 12 November was an attempt by the episcopal party to prevent the religious scales in Ireland being tipped by the Scots in favour of puritanism. The point is not convincing. As we have seen, if a man opposed the Scots and also was an episcopalian, this does not imply that his hostility was caused by his preference for bishops. Furthermore, as Secretary Nicholas observed to His Majesty, some men believed the presence of the Scots' forces would only exasperate the Irish more and make them more resolute in rebellion. Moreover, when still other men rendered their opposition in terms of honour and disgrace we might reasonably conclude that the love of country, rather than love of episcopal government, was at the bottom of their resentment. Certainly it was upon the ground of dishonour that Hotham, Falkland and other members of the Committee for Irish Affairs made their protests. Even the active party was alive to the dangers involved in permitting a Scottish army to operate in England's Ireland. Gardiner, by being too determined to emphasise the religious factor in English politics, has concealed a powerful motive for English hostility toward the Scots.

Though it is true that there were men in both Houses averse to renewed entanglements with the Scots, the

28. Gardiner, op. cit., x, 70.
29. Secretary Nicholas to Charles I, 18 November 1641, Sir John Evelyn, Diary and Correspondence, iv, 132-8.
pressure of events was wearing down that opposition. On Saturday 13 November, when instructions to the Edinburgh committee were reported to the Lords, the figure of 10,000 had been inserted in the instructions, of which, for the moment, only 5,000 were requested. The Lords also agreed to these figures. However, their resistance was not finally broken.

The second of December saw the arrival of new Scots Commissioners to treat with Parliament about aid for Ireland. The Scots came ready to treat for 10,000 men, the least number, according to their reckoning, capable of mounting an effective operation against the Ulster rebels. Soon after, the Commons, where the active party had always intended that 10,000 should go, voted to empower its committee to treat with the Scots to negotiate for 10,000. But the Lords directed their committee to request that the Scots Commissioners send to Edinburgh for power to treat for a lesser number. Naturally the Scots were annoyed. However, it was only after a conference, on 13 December, and a long debate in the Lords, that the Peers yielded to the desires of the lower House and similarly resolved on seeking the

30. L.J., iv, 438; R.P.C.S., vii, 150-3. Although there is no record in the Commons' Journal, the Commons must have assented to this figure despite the vote earlier in the day for 5,000 Scots.
31. Ibid.
32. C.J., ii, 331-2.
33. L.J., iv, 471; C.J., ii, 339.
34. Ibid.; D'Ewes, Coates, 274-5. This committee was firmly in the hands of the active party. Its members were: Nathaniel Fiennes, Sir William Armyn, Sir Philip Stapleton and John Hampden: C.J., ii, 332; L.J., iv, 461.
35. Ibid., 471.
support of ten Scottish regiments. But the Lords attempted yet another course for preventing the Scots, as they thought, from annexing Ulster to themselves. On 18 December the Earl of Bristol and the Lord Saye, the latter a man of the active party, presented a paper to their House in which they proposed that the Scots should not go into Ireland unless an equal number of English were sent, and unless money for this expedition were assigned equally as for the Scots. With the memory of how the royal army had been impoverished to supply the Scots' army of occupation doubtless still fresh in their minds, the Lords recommended that

the Proportion as belongeth to the English be not meddled withall upon any Occasion, but be employed for raising and sending away the Ten Thousand English...38

Meanwhile, the Scots were complaining bitterly about delays in this new treaty; and on Monday 20 December the Commons reiterated these complaints to the Lords. The Lords refused to budge. They completely rejected the sending of an army of Scots to Ulster before an equivalent army of English was sent. The Commons were furious. When on the following day the Lords persisted in their demands, the Commons declared that they were free of all responsibility for whatever disasters now might befall Ireland; and

36. ibid., 472.
37. C.S.P.V., xxv, 267.
38. L.J., iv, 481.
39. C.J., ii, 350; L.J., iv, 482.
40. ibid.
41. C.J., ii, 252.
later the same day they declared that they would not be 'capitulated with' and that the Lords must vote the 10,000 Scots independently of the 10,000 English. The Lords were in a difficult position. They were accused of frustrating the succour of Ireland. Whatever their attitude to the Scots they could not hold out long in these circumstances. Thus they soon yielded to the fury of the Commons. Despite the strength of opposition that had prevailed in the Lords at first, there was in the end scarcely a half-dozen voices opposed to it.

The collapse of the Lords, though complete, did not represent a change of heart. They had been bludgeoned into submission. Their revolt was supported in the Lords even by one accounted among the leaders of the active party, the Lord Viscount Saye and Seal. The defeat of the Lords on this point does not diminish the fact that they did not believe that a supposed threat to the peace of both Kingdoms was sufficient ground for calling upon Scotland for aid. Nor were they impressed by the argument of the Commons that the treaty bound the Scots to aid Parliament. The Peers preferred that the Commons should not attempt to bind the Scots to interest themselves in English and parliamentary interests and affairs. As far as the Lords were concerned the Scots were better out of it. However, in the Commons the parliamentary party was determined to seek active co-operation

42. Ibid. 253; D'Ewes, Coates, 332; L.J., iv, 486.
43. L.J., iv, 486.
44. Sidney Bere to Sir John Pennington, 23 December 1641, C.S.F.D., 1641-43, 211.
with the Scots.

Nobody really believed that King and Parliament would come to blows. Events, however, rapidly were approaching that crisis in which the most stalwart opponents of the Crown believed the role of the Scots would be vital. But what considerations would shape parliamentary policy toward the Scots? Would native English suspicions cause Parliament to neglect the Scots? Or would wisdom demand that they cultivate the friendship of the Covenanters? Would shrewdness conquer the national passions? The test of these questions was near. On 4 January 1642 Charles made his abortive swoop upon Parliament. Within a few days he was retreating from London. On 11 January from Hampton Court he issued instructions to secure Hull for himself. Unluckily for the royal cause Parliament moved more swiftly. The younger Hotham took command of Hull in Parliament's name before Will Legge could execute the King's command. Two days later Charles had retired himself to Windsor. England was slipping into civil war.

The Scots were concerned with the worsening situation in England. The unsettled circumstances of English politics might prove a threat to the future stability of the settlement recently made in Scotland during Charles' reign.

45. Gardiner, op. cit., x, 152-3.
visit. For the moment they did not wish to take sides, but only to interpose in a conciliatory way that agreement might be reached. The Scots commissioners, therefore, sent the Commons a paper expressing their regret at the 'emergent distractions' afflicting England, and gently suggested that as Parliament had mediated in their own 'late troubles', so now the Scots might render the same service. Their paper was even-handed. They told Parliament that they had advised the King to seek a composition of the dispute, and recommended that Parliament do likewise.

It was soon evident, however, that the Commons did not prefer even-handedness. They wanted the Scots to take Parliament's side, naturally enough, and to persuade or compel Charles to return to Parliament. Certainly the Scots received no thanks for their unsolicited advice to Parliament. On the other hand, the Commons thanked them heartily for the advice they had given Charles. This was evidence of their 'Fidelity and Affection' for England, an act acceptable to the Commons. Moreover, the Scots were

46. As the Scots said in their advice, soon to be delivered to His Majesty, the mutual relationship of the two Kingdoms was such that 'as they must stande or fall together, and the Disturbance of the one must needs disquiett and distemper the Peace of the other, as has bene often acknowledged by thame both, and especially in the late Treaty...soe that they are bound to maintaine Peace and Liberties of on another, being highly concerned therein, as the assured Meanes of the Safety and Preservation of thaire own...': L.J., iv, 525; To the Kings Most Excellent Majestie; the Humble Desires of the Commissioners of His Majesties Kingdom of Scotland, London, 1642.

47. The Commons received the paper on 15 January 1642: C.J., ii, 383. It was presented to the Lords on Monday 17 January.
...that, according to their Affections already expressed, they will continue their Care and Endeavour to remove the present Distractions amongst us; as also to preserve and confirm the Union between the Two Nations, so happily begun. With that, Pym, Vane the younger, Stapleton, Goodwin and Long were despatched to the Scots Commissioners with these thanks. The leaders of the parliamentary opposition clearly meant that the Scots should take side with Parliament and continue their advice to the King.

The struggle for the adherence of the Scots had opened, and it was not to be resolved until 1643 when the Solemn League and Covenant was signed and the Scots began mobilizing an army to aid the beleaguered Parliament. In the meantime there was a continuous struggle between King and Parliament to convince the Scots of the righteousness of their respective causes. Charles, too, had opened his campaign for the minds of the Scots. He probably realized that his settlement of affairs there had not been satisfactory to himself, and that he could not command the Scots to arm in his cause. But he could attempt to keep them at home and to counter the influence of parliamentary propaganda by the intricate web of his own diplomacy.

Charles sent from Windsor (27 January) a letter to his Privy Council in Scotland expressing his wish that they would display their loyalty to him and shun the disputes.

48. Ibid., 386. The Commons received the Scots Commissioners' advice to His Majesty on 17 January: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 322v; C.J., ii, 386. The paper of advice to His Majesty is referred to above, 143, Note 46.
49. C.J., ii, 386.
Though Parliament earnestly set about ensuring that Scotland should adopt an attitude favourable to the parliamentary cause, its proponents were not prepared to slacken their watchfulness upon English interests or upon those of the Scots for the sake of reaching an agreement with them. As the crisis deepened Parliament continued to discuss arrangements for the Scottish force designed for Ireland. But the increasing need for an ally against Charles did not move Parliament to render the terms of the treaty more generous. For example, the Scots proposed that they be rewarded out of the lands of the rebels for the forecast success of the Scots in Ulster. The Commons rejected this presumptuous idea. It had made 'no such Condition with any of the English Forces employed in Ireland; and therefore they hold it not fit to be obliged in any such Condition, unto them.'

However careful Parliament might be to guard England's interest against the acquisitiveness of the Scots, it was not blind to the part the Scots must play in the struggle to persuade Charles to submit to Parliament. As relations with the Crown grew worse, and Henrietta Maria prepared to embark with the crown jewels for the Continent, the significance of the Scots for the success of the parliamentary cause increased. Some sort of appeal to the

51. C.J., ii, 430.
Scots was needed. However, there is little doubt that some men were reluctant. As if to ready these backward fellows for the struggle and to brace them for the unpalatable measures that would be required, Edmund Calamy adverted, one Friday fast day, to how Scotland had been a strange instrument of God's merciful but inscrutable providence. Calamy seemed to imply that men must again be prepared to accept this unusual agent of good as an ally in the deepening conflict with the King:

God hath delivered us not only by little meanes, by unlikely meanes, but by contrary meanes; he hath brought unity out of division: The indeavours to divide the Nations of England and Scotland, have been the meanes of their farther union...Scotland hath been the cause of a great deale of good to England. God hath brought liberty out of oppression...52

There was good reason at this time to reiterate the importance of the Scots to the parliamentary cause. Recollections of the recent embarrassing treaty negotiations and of the vast sums consumed had not been dimmed. Everywhere there were signs that people remembered. Many had been galled by Parliament's dealings with the Scots. During late 1641 placards appeared, particularly in London and Yorkshire, accusing Parliament of treason; and a set of satirical questions was circulated asking how far Parliament used the Scots or was used by them. Charles also later sought to recall memories of the treaty in his attempt to defame the

54. Ibid., 113.
Parliament. From York he issued a declaration (9 March 1642) maintaining that the Grand Remonstrance actually admitted his acts of grace, and had said that the Kingdom was better thereby. But all Parliament had done in return, said Charles, was to impose upon the land subsidies and poll taxes to the extent of £600,000, and had contracted a debt of £220,000 to the Scots. With wounding accusations like these in circulation some members may have shrunk from renewing overtures to the Scots. By reviving past dealings with Scotland they may have thought they risked the suspicion of conspiracy and treason, which could do serious harm to Parliament's cause. And there was still the simple English distrust of the Scots to consider. Well might Calamy discover a providential role for the Scots, for as weeks passed Parliament felt increasingly the need for providential help.

As the year entered into March, Parliament began to discover that the entire country was not at its back. Petitions came in from Chester and Cornwall protesting at puritan, rather than Laudian, innovations in religion. They protested, too, against the diminution of the royal prerogative. These petitions were printed and circulated throughout the country, filling the parliamentary party with fear of what further opposition they might arouse. At the same time reports were circulating that the Prince of Orange intended to aid Charles. Parliament had cause for

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56. C.S.P.V., xxvi, 17.
concern. On 29 March directions were sent to the younger Hotham to reinforce the garrison at Hull. Parliament was quickly discovering the need for friends. Thus, on 6 April, it was ordered that a committee (Stapleton, Hampden, Fiennes, the younger Vane, Sir William Lewis and Pierrepont) draw up a declaration to the Scots designed to preserve the 'brotherly Affection and near Union' between England and Scotland. The time had come to ensure that the Scots understood affairs in England.

The task was to convince the Scots of Parliament's interpretation of the struggle in England. Parliament as yet was not confident that the Scots would not harken to the King's arguments. Therefore, when the Commons conferred with the Peers (8 April) about maintaining 'a good correspondency between the Two Kingdoms...', the emphasis was on refuting the claims made on the King's behalf against the Parliament. The Scots were to be 'rightly informed of the Proceedings of Parliament' to prevent the rise of 'jealousies' in a time when malignants desired to set the Kingdoms against each other. Both Houses resolved to send the declaration to the Scots, advising them that a fuller explanation of affairs was in preparation, but assuring them that Charles had not abandoned Parliament on account of anything the Parliament had done, but solely because of evil counsellors who had 'disaffected' His Majesty with

57. ibid., 19.
58. Gardiner, op. cit., x, 184.
59. C.J., ii, 513. The declaration of the Parliament to the Scots was reported to the Commons on 8 April: ibid., 517.
60. L.J., iv, 706.
Parliament's proceedings. The tenor of the conference and the declaration indicated that Parliament was not at all certain that it could retain the goodwill of the Scots. The fact that the English were eager to send the Scots even a preliminary declaration implies that they were not simply sensitive to royalist imputations, but that they feared the Scots would be beguiled by them. This urgency of conference and declaration was not a sign of confidence in the Scots. As to the declaration itself, D'Ewes protested that the sharpness of the language against the King was unseemly. Although perhaps the language was unseemly, it was the language of men earnest not to be enemies of both the King and the Scots. It was the language of protest; a protest of innocence to a party which, they did not doubt, might be swayed by the royal arguments. D'Ewes also complained that it was superfluous to send to the Scots another declaration when they had already seen the 'Remonstrance on the State of the Kingdom and the late Declaration sent to Newmarket.' But the number of protests, however indiscreet, serves to indicate how anxious Parliament was about the disposition of the Scots. All D'Ewes' objections were ignored, and the Commons hastily adopted the main declaration.

While Parliament was beginning its attempt to keep the Scots out of the royalist camp and secure, at least, a neutral friend to Parliament, Charles declared his intention to go to Ireland and personally suppress the

61. ibid., 707; C.J., ii, 520-1.
63. ibid.
rebellion there. It is not surprising that Parliament did not wish him to go. The further Charles removed himself from London, the less able would Parliament be to watch over him and prevent his preparing some stroke against itself. On 15 April Parliament sent to the King a protest against his decision to go into Ireland and noted that, should he go, the papists would be encouraged in their efforts to destroy Protestantism, which even now was only prevented by the union of England and Scotland. The document clearly implied that Charles would be acting contrary to the efforts of the two Kingdoms to preserve the Protestant religion if he went to Ireland. Charles' proposal to go to Ireland would be seen to countenance the rebels, and would hinder further reform. On the other hand, it was England and Scotland which stood united against those forces which assailed the Kingdoms. Clearly Parliament regarded Scotland as a desirable ally against 'Papists' and 'Malignants'.

The Scots, however, were not inclined, for the moment, to enter into any agreement with either the King or the Parliament. On 22 April the Privy Council of Scotland sent to both King and Parliament letters recommending that they seek a reconciliation. They particularly urged Charles not to risk his life in Ireland when he was urgently required in England. But this Scottish impartiality and

64. Both Houses received the King's notification of his intent for Ireland on 11 April 1642: C.J., ii, 522; L.J., iv, 709-10; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 463.
65. C.J., ii, 527-8; L.J., iv, 719-20; Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, v, 64.
66. R.P.C.S., vii, 249-51. These papers were presented in the Lords on 7 May 1642: L.J., v, 53-4.
preference for mediation did not suit Parliament. Especially in the Commons, the Scots’ unsolicited advice (read on 9 May) was ignored except where they also advised Charles to return to Parliament. For this alone did they thank the Scots. Moreover, the Commons resolved to reiterate their case to the Scots by sending them a further declaration relating all that had passed between King and Parliament, and to ask of the Scots an account of what information they had received from the King about Parliament’s actions. Evidently Parliament believed that if the Scots only properly understood the real state of affairs in England they would abandon their apparent impartiality and wholeheartedly adopt the parliamentary cause. Nor did they doubt that the Scots were being influenced by communications from Charles. His arguments had to be met and answered. Hence the extraordinary demand that Charles’ correspondence with the Scots be revealed to Westminster.

Because the Scots had not openly taken part with Parliament, the rebels feared that they did not understand the justice of the parliamentary case. In fact the Commons thought that the impartial content of these letters could only have been founded upon misinformation provided by the King.

67. C.J., ii, 265.
68. Ibid.
69. On 11 May the Commons reported to the Lords their observations on the Scottish paper read in the lower House on 9 May. It is clear from the report that the Commons did not like the tone of the papers and thought them mistaken in their impartial view of events because the Commons informed the Lords of a resolution to ask the Scots upon what information supplied by the King did they base their paper: L.J., v, 59.
In these circumstances, while the King's accusations went unchallenged, they wondered whether the Scots, labouring under misapprehension, might not be inclining towards the Crown. On 18 May the declaration to the Scots passed the Commons, and, on the following day, the Lords. It was sent to the Scots, protesting that Parliament had never given the King any cause for offence, and requesting intelligence of Charles' correspondence with the Scottish Privy Council. There was also a strangely expressed, almost threateningly worded, desire that the Scots

Suppress Attempts of those who, upon causeless Pretences and Suggestions, shall persuade them to interpose in those unhappy Differences, in such a Manner as may weaken the Confidence or endanger the Peace of the Two Kingdoms...71

This expression made it clear that Parliament thought the Scots were being seduced by the royalists, and felt that the Scots needed to be warned against endangering the defences that had been raised against mischief in church and state by the late treaty. Given this fear that the Scots were growing cooler toward Parliament it is not surprising that a few days later a committee was established to meet constantly to secure payment of the debt to the Scots so that 'public Faith' might be kept with that people.

The Parliament was not mistaken in suspecting that things were going awry in Scotland. In late May Baillie was writing to Lady Montgomery of his fear that

70. C.J., ii, 578. The paper did not pass without opposition, but all we know about the opposition is that Sir R. Duke spoke against it: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 515.
71. L.J., v, 74-5.
72. ibid., 78.
...these whom the King and /Scottish/ Parliament has entrusted to be our Counsellors, will be loath to engage in a new warre with our best friends... for we believe, that none can be so blind but they see clearly, /if/ the courtiers, for anie cause, can get this Parliament of England overthrown by forces, either at home or abroad, that all, either they have done, or our Parliament has done alreadie, or whatever anie Parliament should mint to doe hereafter, is not worth a figg.73

Apparently he was referring to plans afoot in Scotland to force the Privy Council to declare for the King. A few days later a petition was delivered to the Privy Council of Scotland in the name of nobles, gentlemen, burgesses and ministers, protesting against the meeting of 'Incendiaries' in Edinburgh, as also against conducting negotiations with the King that might lead Scotland into conflict with the English Parliament.

For the moment it seemed that Charles was having the greater success with the Scots. He sent from York (9 May) to the Scottish Privy Council an order that they should study all the messages that had passed between himself and Parliament so that in Scotland they would rightly understand the issues disputed in England. When the Scots knew this, intimated the King, then they would know how they were obliged to his service. Charles also rebuffed their attempts at mediation. The Scottish Privy Council, for the moment, bowed to Charles and replied to Parliament's request for the King's letters with a refusal. This answer must have

73. Baillie, ii, 34.
75. Ibid., 256. His Majesty's wishes were strongly reiterated in another letter from York dated 20 May 1641: ibid., 257-8.
76. L.J., v, 135.
confirmed all Parliament's fears that the Scots might yet lend their support to the Crown. It seemed that Charles and his supporters in Scotland had gained the upper hand. There was only one course. Parliament must appeal from the Scottish Privy Council directly to the Covenanters themselves. Both Houses, therefore, sharply protested against a pamphlet entitled 'A Letter sent from the King's Majesty to the Lords of the Privy Council of the Kingdom of Scotland.'

They also declared that the difficulties between King and Parliament were not of their doing, nor had they calumniated His Majesty, but had only blamed his evil advisers. Moreover, they thankfully appreciated the work of those Scottish petitioners who had protested to the Privy Council against aligning with the King, saying that the petitioners showed genuine affection for England, and that their petition was a firm foundation for the unity of both Kingdoms. This declaration was not only to be sent to the Privy Council, but was to be printed for the information of the 'whole Kingdom of Scotland.' Parliament was striving for some kind of commitment from the Scots because it wanted to deal with the King without fear of intervention on his behalf. Parliament calculated that their hope of concluding the conflict by negotiation depended in part on keeping Charles weak through lack of Scottish support.

Whilst Charles and Parliament struggled for the

77. Reported in the Commons on 14 June 1642: C.J., ii, 623-4.
79. C.J., ii, 624.
advantage and vied for Scottish support, the treaty being negotiated with the Scots for the relief of Ireland was neglected. Nevertheless, despite the fact that it was not concluded until 6 August 1642, Scottish soldiers, paid and supplied by England, were already in combat with the rebels. On 7 June the Scots informed Parliament that the bulk of their forces was in Ulster. That Parliament was able to organise with Scotland the complex task of conveying an army into Ireland, as well as maintaining it, without there being any formal treaty arrangements, suggests that a certain degree of confidence and co-operation had been established between the two. It must be remembered, though, that in 1642 the Irish rebellion became a secondary concern for Parliament, while the attitude of the Scots to the struggle in England was the crucial and unresolved issue between Parliament and Scotland. As the parliamentarians at first feared, and then beheld, the marshalling of royal arms, Ireland diminished in importance: Parliament itself was

81. On 13 May 1642 Parliament resolved to begin paying the 10,000 Scots for a period of three months beginning 1 June: C.J., ii, 570. However, as early as January and February 1642 arrangements were made for sending an advance party of 2,500 into Ulster. On 24 January the Scots Commissioners agreed to approach Edinburgh to consent to this proposal, and Parliament agreed to propositions concerning their payment and supply: L.J., iv, 530, 532; C.J., ii, 392. By 4 February Parliament completed arrangements for handing over Carrickfergus to the Scots as a base of operations for the advance party and the rest of the Scottish force: L.J., iv, 562-3; C.J., ii, 412-13. By 24 February an agreement was completed for supplying the English and Scots' forces in Ulster at Carrickfergus: C.J., ii, 453. For an account of Scottish operations see A True Relation of the Proceedings of the Scots and English Forces in the North of Ireland, London, 8 June 1642.
82. L.J., iv, 115.
directly threatened. In these circumstances, when England was unable to do much for Ireland, Parliament was only too pleased that Scotland should step into the breach. On the other hand, the Covenanters, and especially Argyll, preferred to fight the Irish threat in Ulster than in the western highlands. This exemplary co-operation over Ireland can be explained, then, in terms of the limited mutual interests involved and the crisis of the moment. As I have said, the real issue between Parliament and the Scots was still in doubt. The Scots were not committed to Parliament's cause by an agreement with the Kingdom of England to defend its Irish settlement.

Understanding that the Scots Covenanters could more readily be won by proof of Parliament's religious credentials, Nathaniel Fiennes, on behalf of the Committee of Safety, recently formed to direct Parliament's defence, reported that as the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland was due in a few days to meet, Parliament ought to send the Assembly a declaration to satisfy it how much Parliament wished not to spill Christian blood. He presented just such a declaration to the House, which above all gave

83. The Committee of Safety was formed on 4 July 1642 about a fortnight after the King put into execution his Commissions of Array: C.J., ii, 651; L.J., v, 178. Initially, the following men were appointed by the Commons to the Committee: Holles, Stapleton, Marten, Fiennes, Hampden, Pym, Pierrepont, Glyn, Sir William Waller and Sir John Merrick. The Lords appointed were: Northumberland, Essex, Pembroke, Holland and Saye. However, as Lotte Glow points out, the despatches of the Committee reveal that many more members than those originally appointed served on it: Lotte Glow, 'The Committee of Safety', The English Historical Review, lxxx, 1965, 299-300.
evidence of Parliament's zeal to reform religion. But merely to assure the Covenanters that Parliament was resolved to settle matters in church and state 'by the Advancement of the true Religion, and such a Reformation of the Church as shall be most agreeable to God's Word', was not the way to win the firm friendship of men who were fiercely certain of their peculiar brand of religion. Parliament might silence vociferous vicars for preaching against the Scots, and permit presbyterian English ministers to declare to the Assembly in Scotland their zeal for a perfect union with that Kirk, but this was no real encouragement to the Scots. The Covenanters wanted something more definite from Parliament itself. Parliament was not going to obtain cheaply a commitment from the Scots. They understood how much Parliament needed them, and were prepared to exert pressure on their would-be allies to get the things they wanted.

When Parliament at last received the General Assembly's reply to their declaration they did not discover in it any offer of support. The Scots sent only the conditions for an understanding. From the Privy Council and the General Assembly of the Kirk came the advice that the

84. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 669v; C.J., ii, 683.
85. On Saturday 30 July 1642 the Commons sent for Mr. Barrell, Vicar of Maidstone, as a delinquent. He was accused of making 'scandalous' utterances against the Scots on the previous Sunday: ibid., 698.
86. Also on 30 July Baillie records that the General Assembly of the Kirk received from some presbyterian ministers in London letters expressing 'their desyre of Presbyterian Government, and a full union with our Church.' Baillie, ii, 50.
only way of preserving the unity and peace of both Kingdoms was to establish 'One Confession of Faith, One Directory of Worship, One Public Catechism, and One Form of Kirke Government...' What hope, they asked, was there of Unity in Religion, of One Confession of Faith, One Form of Worship, and One Catechism, till there be one Form of Ecclesiastical Government? Yea, what Hope can the Kingdom and Kirke of Scotland have of a firm and Durable Peace, till Prelacy, which hath been the main Cause of their Miseries and Troubles... be plucked up Root and Branch...?

Without episcopacy it would be easy to establish in England the government of 'reformed Kirks by Assemblies'. In short, the basis of an understanding between Parliament and the Covenanters was a Presbyterian Church settlement in England. One newsbook noted that in Parliament the Scots' offer of assistance (which was never made) was not liked because it came upon conditions.

There is little doubt, however, that the news­mongers reported Parliament's feelings accurately. Parliament had rebuffed the Scots in the previous year on the same issue; and, as historians have never tired of pointing out, the English did not know what religious settlement they wanted. For that matter, they were even at loggerheads over what they did not want. According to Gardiner, this is why many members finally broke with Parliament and went over to Charles. However, though the onset of civil war had drawn from Parliament the vehement

87. L.J., v, 324.
88. A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages, no. 4, 25-30 August 1642, 3.
episcopalians, this did not mean that Parliament was become more sure about what it wanted so far as religion was concerned, and, in particular, did not make Parliament more prepared at this time to accept Presbyterianism. As Charles himself pointed out to the Scots, Parliament was so far from desiring unity of religion that he was confident 'that they who make the fairest pretences to you of this kind will no sooner embrace presbytery than you episcopacy.' However, as war loomed up more threateningly, Parliament's need to keep the Scots friendly increased. Something had to be done urgently; and although Parliament might not be ready to commit itself to a Presbyterian recasting of the English church, they certainly could indicate a willingness to abolish the bishops. On 26 August the Commons received the Scots' declaration on uniformity in religion; and on 1 September they unanimously resolved that the episcopal government of the Church of England would be abolished. Whatever other factors contributed to the making of this decision, it was, in part, a war measure. However much Parliament was convinced, on other grounds, of the necessity to abolish episcopacy, the timing of the decision suggests that it was designed to keep the Scots friendly towards Parliament and hostile to the royal cause.

Although the foreshadowed abolition of episcopacy was inspired partly by the exigencies of war, Parliament was

90. C.J., ii, 747-8; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 698. It was further resolved that the decision should be one head of a reply to the Scottish declaration.
91. C.S.P.V., xxvi, 163.
not frightened by the prospect of war into yielding everything to the Scots. Parliament's declarations to Scotland were models of circumspection. Episcopacy was to be abolished as a witness to their desire for reform; but Parliament refused to yield an inch on Presbyterianism. Parliament rejected any attempt by the Scots to dictate a religious settlement in England. To the General Assembly Parliament replied that reform would be secured 'punctually and exactly', but that they would reform the Church where it was 'offensive to God, or justly displeasing to our Neighbour Church and other Reformed Churches, in all substantial parts of Doctrine, Worship and Discipline...'. For this purpose Parliament proposed to consult with an assembly of divines to which some Scottish clerics were invited. With this advice they would settle religion in such a way as to be not only 'agreeable' to the word of God and conducive to unity with Scotland, but also 'most apt to procure and conserve the Peace of the Church at home'. In religion they might yet decide that Presbyterianism was unsuited to England. Parliament, a secular body, by reserving to itself the final decisions on religious reform, was exemplifying an erastian concept of the church hostile to Presbyterianism, which claimed for the Kirk an independent authority reminiscent of that claimed by the Roman Church. Such a statement of English principles of reform could hardly have consoled the Covenanters. Moreover, Parliament was not interested in a religious but in a political alliance. Thus it wrote to the Privy Council of Scotland that as those who were inciting the King against Parliament were the same
men who had incited him against Scotland, they might be as
careful of England's peace as they were of Scotland's. They
did not ask the Scots to show their 'Brotherly Kindness' by
entering into an alliance with them, but that they might
only suppress those ill-disposed persons in their midst
'that they may not foment our Troubles.' So Parliament
only desired a political alliance, an agreement that the
royal party was dangerous to the interests of both
parliamentarians and Scots. So long as the Scots stayed
benevolently neutral Parliament would remain satisfied.

It was now early September, almost exactly a
year since England had celebrated the withdrawal of the
Scots. Throughout that time the active party (now the
parliamentary party) had been attempting to construct a
basis for co-operation with the Scots. They had been
educated during the months of Scottish occupation to the
fact that the Scots pursued a policy which did not necessarily
correspond with the interests of the reform party in England.
It was conceivable, in the minds of parliamentarians, that
the Scots might go so far as to give their support to
Charles. However, they believed that the Scots were crucial
to the success or failure of the parliamentary cause. Hence
the effort to consolidate an understanding with them. The
understanding they sought to establish consisted in the

92. For these declarations in reply to those of the General
Assembly and the Privy Council of Scotland see L.J., v,
348-50. They were agreed to by the Lords on 10
September 1642. The declarations were delivered to the
Lord Maitland at 5.00 p.m. the same day, before he set
out for Scotland the following morning.
recognition by both parties of their mutual interest in co-operating to defeat certain forces. These forces were said to be threatening reforms established in Scotland and being established in England. Furthermore, the parliamentarians said that the Scots were bound to assist England in this work according to the treaty of pacification.

This policy was not without its opponents. There were men (like Sir John Hotham, Lord Falkland and Sir John Culpepper) who did not see that England needed to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Scots. Even if there was some enemy threatening the reform or the peace of England or her dominions, they did not see that it was necessary to have the support of the Scots. It was dishonourable for England to seek the support of a nation which had humiliated her. This resistance persisted longer in the Lords, but eventually it, too, was forced to yield. The Peers feared to be blamed for neglecting the colonists of Ireland.

As the crisis deepened and parliamentary reform was threatened in England by the growing military power of the King, Scotland became more important. The enemies who were said to be threatening the peace of both Kingdoms now openly had drawn the sword in England. Parliament strove to counter the royal threat not only by military preparations but also by arguments designed to persuade the Scots that Parliament had been wronged. Parliament did not seek an alliance with the Scots. They only sought that the Scots should understand the 'real' position in England so that
they would not be deceived by the King's arguments. Parliament thus decided to abolish episcopacy partly in order to convince the Scots that Parliament's cause was genuine. However, Parliament was not prepared to let the Scots dictate the model of church reform in return for their support. The parliamentarians were determined that they and they alone would decide the nature of religious reform. By promising to abolish episcopacy the Parliament intended to offer the Scots a hope of Presbyterian reformation sufficient at least to secure their benevolent neutrality and to keep them out of the King's camp.

As the crisis of 1642 developed there was not, until November, renewed opposition to closer ties with the Scots. This is not surprising. As members drifted away from Parliament, betaking themselves to a country seat or to the royal camp, the most outspoken opponents of the Scots would have been leached from Parliament. Guided by the example of the Commons, where a man's hostility to the Scots was usually indicative of his royalist inclinations, we can conclude that it was likely that, as royalists gathered around Charles at York, both Houses were emptied of the more resolute opponents to friendship with the Scots. Thus it was that those who remained supported the policy of attempting to prevent Charles from turning Scotland against Parliament.

However, the temporary unity within Parliament on this particular issue did not survive the shock of Edgehill.
Many who remained at Westminster were amazed when the conflict between King and Parliament developed into a full-scale war. They were completely surprised, too, by the strength of the royal forces. In this moment of extreme danger something more was needed of the Scots than their goodwill and understanding. The obvious conclusion, for the more stalwart rebels, was a military alliance.
Chapter V

Close Contest
The battle of Edgehill transformed the parliamentary attitude to the Scots. Whereas before Parliament had been united in its attempt to keep the Scots well-disposed towards it, now the reality of war began to weaken that unity. Now the attitudes taken toward the Scots began to differ between parties according to whether they were more or less fierce in prosecuting Parliament's cause. It was one thing to convince the Scots of the rectitude of the cause and to keep them from the clutches of the King; it was another to invite them into England as allies. In this chapter I will argue that, whereas the Middle and War Parties (for convenience I will refer to them as the Military Party) tried to establish a military alliance with the Scots from the very first days of the civil war, the Peace Party resolutely resisted the plan, even after commissioners had been dispatched to negotiate the alliance in 1643; so that Parliament engaged itself to the Scots despite the unwillingness and reservations of nearly half the parliamentary party.

Not long after Edgehill Parliament quickly divided between those who sought to resolve the conflict by peaceful negotiation, and those who believed that only the defeat of the royal forces would induce the King to come to terms with Parliament. Those who supported negotiation saw

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1. I have adopted the new term as both these groups supported an alliance with the Scots. It was probably proposed by Pym, the leader of the Middle Party; see J. H. Hexter, The Reign of King Pym, London, 1941, 29-30. Hexter is more definite about the authorship of this proposal than I think the evidence permits.
the development of a military alliance with Scotland as an extension of a policy that already had proved disastrous. These men of the Peace Party did not believe that the issues between King and Parliament could be resolved by continuing that intransigent policy which so far had prevailed in the Commons and had contributed much, it was thought, to precipitating the disaster of war. On the other side were men who believed only firm measures would induce the King to return and submit to Parliament's advice: this was the Military Party. They saw the Scottish alliance as necessary to the successful defence of the Parliament's position.

During the attempt to settle matters by negotiations (which stretched from November 1642 to May 1643) the Peace Party strove to combat what they regarded as the uncompromising spirit of the Military Party, and sought to delay the proposed league with the Scots because they believed it harmful to the cause of negotiated peace. Meanwhile, the Military Party awaited the collapse of the peace negotiations to implement fully their own policy of calling in the Scots.

Only six days after the battle of Edgehill a proposal was made in the Lords which upset Parliament's recent agreement over Scottish policy. On Saturday 29 October 1642 the Lords voted to consider how to prevent further bloodshed, and to find 'some Means to beget Peace.'

On 31 October the more pacific members of the Commons—Waller, Bagshaw, Rudyard and others—moved that the Commons should join with the Lords in seeking negotiations with the

The motion, however, was opposed chiefly by the more warlike of Parliament's leaders, who at this time dominated the Committee of Safety. According to Whiteacre, the committee, having notice of Waller's motion, sent the younger Vane to the Commons to dissuade them from so rash a proposition. Vane told the House that the committee itself was considering this very proposal, but

they did assure us that there was no cause of feare, as we might conceive; for y' y' Parlt Army was in a very good condition.../so/ they desired we would not yet enter into debate of y' business...

Strode supported Vane, saying that the proposal to send a peace petition to the King would only be a discouragement to the Lord General and to the Army. For the moment the tide of opinion was still running in favour of the tougher measures advocated by the Commoners on the Committee of Safety, and the peace proposal was dropped.

It was clear by 2 November that this difference between the Houses over peace negotiations had serious implications for the future of Parliament's Scottish policy. Having rejected the peace proposal, the Commons voted instead to accept the Committee of Safety's proposal to engage a Scottish army to quell forces being raised by Newcastle in the North. Pym, one of the Vanes (probably the younger), Whitelocke and Glyn—all at this time associated

3. A Perfect Diurnal of the Passages in Parliament, no. 21, 31 October-7 November 1642. The news item is given under the date 31 October 1642. See also Whiteacre, B.M. Add. MSS. 31,116, f. 5.
4. See above, 156, Note 83.
with the war policy—were sent to deliver this resolution at a conference with the Lords.

At this conference the policies of the Military and Peace parties clashed. Whereas the Military Party, presently in control of the Commons, wanted to strengthen Parliament's position by an alliance with Scotland before Parliament contemplated an attempt to negotiate with the King, the Lords were reluctant to accept this constraint and wished to open talks with Charles immediately. Thus the Lords, in exchange for the declaration to the Scots, delivered to the Commons a petition to His Majesty 'for composing the Differences and Distractions of the Kingdom.'

The Lords' action had pre-empted the plans of the Military Party, which did not intend, as Vane had indicated, that Parliament should consider a peace treaty at this time. In an attempt to reaffirm their strategy, the Military Party induced the Commons to accept the peace proposal only on condition that all appropriate defence measures should proceed without hindrance. This broad declaration clearly included the proposal to seek military assistance from the Scots. The Military Party in the Commons was reluctantly prepared at this stage to negotiate, but only so long as it was from a position of strength. The difficulty, however, was to persuade the supporters of negotiation also to support the

6. C.J., ii, 832. For the declaration itself see L.J., v, 430-1.  
8. Ibid.
extremely unpopular suggestion of calling in the Scots. Nevertheless, the Military Party did persuade their opponents, for the moment, that they must proceed with the request for Scottish aid to make Parliament's power formidable, and thereby to obtain better conditions in any negotiations. The Lords accepted this condition; but their agreement did not mean that they had suddenly adopted the war policy. Probably they accepted the condition to ensure that the peace petition would reach the King and negotiations begin. At least this is what one might conclude from the Lords' resolution that debate on the proposal to request Scottish aid 'be respited for a time.' So, while the policy of the Military Party was held up in the Lords, Parliament selected peace commissioners to the crown.

Things at first went badly for the Peace Party. The King rejected Sir John Evelyn as a peace commissioner, Evelyn being one whom Charles had declared traitor. The Commons responded that now it was clear that Parliament had tried every means to procure peace, and yet Charles had refused to grant a treaty. There now seemed only one course

10. ibid., 103.
11. L.I., v, 431.
12. ibid., 430-1.
13. Peace commissioners were named on 3 November. For the Lords were the Earls of Northumberland and Pembroke (L.I., v, 432); and for the Commons, Lord Wayman, Pierrepont, Sir John Ashley, Sir John Evelyn and Sir John Hipsley: C.I., ii, 834. For the events of 2-3 November see England's Memorable Accidents, 31 October-7 November 1642, 69-70; Special Passages, no. 13, 1-8 November 1642, 107-8.
15. ibid.
open to Parliament, and that was war and a military alliance with the Scots. The Commons sent to the Lords to expedite the declaration to the Scots. The Lords agreed. They probably thought that in the circumstances they had no choice. For the moment it looked as if the war policy had triumphed. The treaty would not begin and Parliament would still call in the Scots.

However, the Military Party did not exercise decisive control in the Commons. Sir John Evelyn was very reluctant that an opportunity for peace should be lost on his account, so he voluntarily withdrew from the peace commission on 9 November. The objections of the Military Party suddenly disappeared. There was now nothing to prevent the peace petition being sent to the King. It was sent on 11 November. However, on the following day Rupert attacked Brentford, decimated the parliamentary force there and looted the town. Charles was accused of deceiving Parliament. It seemed that the peace policy had crashed again. There was every sign that the war policy was in the ascendant.

Preparations for an appeal to the Scots went ahead. On 15 November Parliament declared all intercourse between England and Scotland 'shall be open'. On the seventeenth the Commons began hunting up the Merchant Strangers who had

16. ibid., 838-9; L.J., v, 437.
17. Special Passages, no. 14, 8-15 November 1642, 115-16; C.J., ii, 841. Sir John Evelyn was a firm supporter of the Peace Party in the Commons until the negotiations collapsed. Then he switched allegiance to the War Party.
18. The petition was delivered to Charles at Colnbrook on 11 November: Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vi, 130-1.
promised to lend £40,000 toward payment of the 'Brotherly Assistance'. Finally, on 18 November, Mr. John Pickering was chosen to deliver the declaration to the Scots. The Military Party also was sharpening up its arguments ready for the Scots and for the opponents of the Scots in Parliament. The Commons renewed the claim that the Scots were obliged by the Treaty to assist Parliament, by resolving:

That such Officers, and other Soldiers, of the Scots Nation, that are come to the Assistance of the Army raised by Parliament...have done nothing but according to their Duty; and what is agreeable to the Articles of the Treaty...

Yet the momentum of the war policy and of bringing in the Scots was not sufficient to resist the widespread yearning for peace. There was an unwillingness to advance the war policy and to compound the evil of civil war by negotiating the support of an allied military force—a measure which Clarendon tells us 'was as unpopular a thing as could be mentioned...' The Venetian embassy also echoed the worry that very likely was preoccupying many parliamentarians:

If the Scots are disposed to declare themselves and to take the side of Parliament it is not possible to escape the fear that prolonged and deplorable calamities are in store for these states...

On 21 November the Commons voted, despite the Brentford affair, to consider the King's reply to Parliament's peace

21. Sir William Armyrn was also chosen to deliver the declaration to the Scots Commissioners in London: C.J., ii, 854; L.J., v, 451.
24. C.S.P.V., xxvi, 199.
message. Having done so, the Commons began to debate peace propositions to be made to the King. The House was very full that day. There were near 200 members at times sitting in the Grand Committee, which sat all that day until 7 p.m.

D'Ewes observed a profound change in the Commons:

Mr Denzill Hollis, Mr Whitelocke, Mr Perepoint & Mr Glyn amongst others who had formerlie been verie opposite to an accomodation...did now spake earnestlie for it. Mr Hollis was much cooled in his fierceness by that great slaughter made in his regiment at Brainford...25

This changed mood in Parliament was implicitly hostile to further engagements of a military kind with the Scots. As the days passed and the Houses preoccupied themselves with peace propositions their readiness for the alliance diminished.

If Parliament had been anxious to enlist Scotland's assistance it would not have waited long in making a request. But in fact Parliament did delay. It was 2 November when the Commons delivered to the Lords the request for Scottish help. Yet the Commons waited five days before they asked the Lords to expedite that declaration. Moreover, the Commons did not appoint a messenger to the Scots until 18 November; and the messenger (John Pickering) was still in London on 8 December. Meanwhile the Commons had voted that the Earl of Lindsey, one of the Scots Commissioners, recommend the declaration to the kingdom of Scotland, and

that Mr. Weldon accompany Pickering on his mission to Scotland. Neither business was finalised by the Lords until 29 December. As Baillie observed:

There was a great word of commissioners coming from them to our Council, and it was a great wonder, if they desired any help, that they denied not to use some better means for its obtaining.

But such was their, (as I take it,) oversight, that they used no other means but a declaration of their desire to have our help according to the late Treatie.30

After Lindsey had received the declaration, the Scots heard no more of it until the Earl of Lanark came to the Scottish Privy Council bearing the declaration, together with the King's letter attacking it —it was 20 December and still Pickering had not prosecuted Parliament's cause before the Privy Council of Scotland.

The whole business appears very curious. The declaration is an unmistakeable request for military aid. Therefore, the fact that Pym's agent-at-large in Scotland, Pickering, did not press the matter, suggests that Pym and the leaders of the Military Party appreciated that Parliament was not yet prepared to accept such an arrangement.

Pickering's task, then, seems to have been to sound out the Scots as to their intentions, and to counter the influence

31. Ibid.
33. On 6 December the Commons resolved that Weldon assist Pickering 'in Delivery of the Declaration...and in the Prosecution of all business there concerning the Parliament. And that it may be left to Mr. Pickering to return home when he shall think fitting...' C.J., ii, 878. This commission was approved by the Peers on 8 December: L.J., v, 483.
of royalist propaganda until that time when Parliament would be prepared to enter into a military alliance.

Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the Military Party was ceasing to press Parliament to commit itself to an alliance with the Scots. On 14 December a committee was established in the Commons to consider how a force could be raised out of the counties to oppose Newcastle's army—the very task for which a Scottish army had been requested earlier. The committee consisted of leading figures from both the Military and Peace parties. Clearly, both factions in the Commons were inclined not to commit the northern defences to the Scots. Scotland, of course, might not wish to engage itself in Parliament's struggle, but, more importantly, Parliament might decline to press its request for Scotland's active intervention. Indeed, the previous weeks had indicated just this possibility to the Military Party. Its strong representation on this committee, to raise an English army for the North, can be seen as a further admission that, for the time being, Parliament must look within England itself for the solution to its military problems. Furthermore, Parliament seemed to be turning away from the prospect of a Scottish alliance at the very time its military position was rapidly deteriorating. Alarming news flooded in from every front. By this time it was known at Westminster that the Lord Fairfax had been

beaten from Tadcaster by the Earl of Newcastle; that Lord Herbert was raising a second Welsh army; that the Earl of Stamford was in retreat from Hereford to Gloucester; and that Hopton was threatening Exeter. There was a motion for a Scots army; but it did not recommend itself to the House. On 16 December the Commons settled simply for a declaration of their preparedness to receive Scottish volunteers. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude, given that Parliament was ignoring the proposed alliance with the Scots at the very time when its defences were crumbling, that it must have discarded the Scottish policy, at least for the moment; and that the Military Party was compelled to suffer a setback.

The reluctance of Parliament to recall the Scots reminds us of the resistance of the Lords to the Scottish assistance for Ireland. Just as the Lords, late in 1641, had been unready to admit that the plight of Ireland and the mutual interests of England and Scotland were sufficient grounds for sending into Ireland a Scottish army, so also now. Even though Parliament itself was threatened by powerful forces, it was in no mind to grant a mutual interest with the Covenanters in crushing these forces within England. Parliament did not see at all that the pacification had

35. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, i, 76.
36. Yonge, B.M. Add. MSS. 18,777, f. 956-96. Because of the extreme difficulty of reading this MS. I relied upon extracts taken from Yonge by Dr. Patricia Crawford of the University of Western Australia. I am most grateful to Dr. Crawford for her help in this matter.
37. L.J., iv, 496; C.J., ii, 891.
rendered the Scots their firmest ally in this dangerous time. It is naturally difficult to tell just how much simple native hostility or pragmatic considerations played in this evaluation of the Scottish alliance. Gardiner says that it would have been a confession of weakness to call upon the Scots; and this, of course, would have been something parliamentarians were loath to admit. It is very probable that many could not stomach calling again upon the help of those who had once humbled them. Could they be trusted again on English soil? What temptations might not civil war provide them? Had not the Scots already indicated that the price of their support was a Presbyterian reform of the English Church? Doubtless these were questions members asked themselves. But in addition to these considerations there was, for men who wished that matters might be settled by negotiation, another factor.

The Peace Party probably realised that to call in the Scots would be to endorse a strategy which would undermine their peace policy before negotiations could begin. It would be a provocative act of war which would make the King all the more intransigent, and negotiations futile. Of course, if there were to be negotiations, Parliament would attempt, if it were able, to negotiate from strength, lest all the reforms recently gained be thrown away. Therefore Parliament could raise an English army to oppose Newcastle; and it could organise county associations for self-defence; but to call in a foreign army was too aggressive an act. It

38. Gardiner, op. cit., i, 76.
was the last expedient should all else fail. As the weeks went by some of these considerations emerged in the words and actions of Parliament.

Fortunately, at this point in the story of the Long Parliament Sir Simonds D'Ewes played his most prominent part. He was one of the leading spokesmen for the Peace Party. Therefore his views might suggest something of the opinions held by that group.

Sixteen peace propositions, having passed the Lords, were taken into consideration by the Commons on 22 December. Gardiner rightly observes that these proposals, though the work of the Peace Party, called for a settlement of church and state to which Charles could not have agreed. 'No wonder,' Gardiner writes, 'that those who kept their heads clear in the Commons thought it useless to engage in negotiation on such terms.' The younger Vane was first among the opponents of the peace propositions. He argued that by entering into negotiation, Parliament would neglect its defence and bring itself to 'utter ruin and desolation....' Gardiner claims, however, that Vane's clear reasoning was overmatched by a general desire for peace. Even so, clear reasoning was not the exclusive province of the Military Party. When D'Ewes replied for the Peace Party, his speech

\[39.\] For the peace propositions see \(L.J., v, 504\). They were communicated to the Commons on 20 December, 1642: \(G.J., ii, 897\); D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1067-1067v.

\[40.\] G.J., ii, 899-901.

\[41.\] Gardiner, op. cit., i, 79.

\[42.\] D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1070.

\[43.\] Gardiner, op. cit., i, 79.
was not without its logic. He argued that there was every reason to attempt to negotiate peace, especially when one contemplated the dire consequences of war. In particular, he contended that negotiation must be tried before the war policy inevitably escalated the conflict beyond the point where reconciliation was possible, and after which the country would be subject to unimagined ravages. He pointed out that prosecution of the war policy contained four great dangers for England. The fourth and greatest of these was a military alliance with Scotland:

...For certainly if we shall call in our neighbour nation the Scotts to our aid on the one side we cannot doubt but that the other nation /Ireland/ will also be called in on the other side and we have already just cause of fear to be visited both by the Danes and the French...

In brief, D'Ewes declared that the policy of negotiation excluded the Scots, since the intention of negotiation was not to escalate but to end the war; whereas to call in the Scots would deepen the struggle. D'Ewes' speech ended amid applause, some calling out 'well moved, well moved.' We can assume that the applause was in part an indication of the strength of opposition to an alliance with the Scots, as well as of support for the peace propositions. These latter were carried on the voices — an indication of that strength of opinion which obliged the Military Party to relax its efforts for a Scottish alliance.

Two days later D'Ewes gave further evidence of,
and reason for, the strong opposition to the alliance. Two papers were delivered from the Scots Commissioners representing the plight of their army in Ireland. They desired the prompt payment of £30,000 of the 'Brotherly Assistance' due at midsummer last. During the debate on these papers some of the radical members, like Bond of Dorchester, proposed that Parliament should tell the Scots that Parliament could not pay because of the 'army against us & the papists ioning them...'. Thus they proposed that the Scots be invited to come in and aid Parliament and satisfy their needs out of the estates of 'Papists' and 'Malignants' in the North. The suggestion horrified D'Ewes:

But in this there is not only hazard of the expense of monie but of blood alsoe. Now wee know what we owe Scotts; but if we shall call them in againe, we must bear the charges, & to what a vaste expense that may amount unto we cannot foresee or calculate: soe as if we be not able to pay them what is now due, we shall be much much lesse able to satisfie them when our charge is growing to a greater encrease...& whereas it is said that they should levie this money upon papists and delinquents: but I must desire this house to consider, that warre is justly called a destroying monster, & cann scarcely distinguish betweene friends & foes: for when the Scottish army shall have advanced into this kingdome they must have foode for themselves & meate for their horses, wth they must have from such as cann afford it, & soo those who are innocent & whom we desire to protect shall be undone as well as the malignants...

D'Ewes had in mind the problems created by the recent Scottish occupation of the North, and how these problems would be aggravated by war. He did not wish to see the misfortunes of the past amplified and superimposed on those of the present. Contrary to Bond's suggestion, D'Ewes proposed that

47. E.J., ii, 901.
...we return answere to the Scotts, that the present payment of this monie is rendered impossible in respect of the present distractions... but that wee were now advizing about a way of peace & accomodation by which we did assure ourselves that we should be enabled within a short time to pay them & this I am confident will be a very welcome message to them. 

The Commons did not see fit to accept Bond's advice, and made a committee from men of every opinion, including D'Ewes, to prepare an answer to the Scots' papers. The answer they proposed was much as D'Ewes had suggested. The Military Party had yielded again to the unwillingness of the Commons to engage themselves with the Scots.

D'Ewes' speeches of 22 and 24 December are important. They give us an indication of the reasons why the return of the Scots to England was resisted; and the favour with which these speeches were received is an indication of how widely accepted were the ideas they contained. The speeches tell us that the Scottish alliance was disliked because of its threat to the effectiveness of the peace policy, and because of the difficulties that paying and controlling such a force would present. Furthermore, the favourable reception granted these speeches suggests that opposition to the alliance was closely related to the strength of support for the peace policy. The Military Party would not be able to proceed with its proposal to treat with the Scots for

49. The committee consisted of Pym, Holles, Sir William Army, Wilde, Sir Peter Wentworth, Sir Henry Heyman, Marten, Grimston, Cage, Sir Henry Vane, Goodwin, Holland and D'Ewes: C. J., ii, 901.
50. The answer was reported in the Commons and approved on 29 December 1642: C. J., ii, 906. It passed the Lords on 3 January 1643: L. J., v, 524-5.
The success of the Military Party in its policy toward the Scots depended ultimately on the outcome of the treaty negotiations. While Parliament was discussing the peace propositions and, then, actually negotiating with the King, the Peace Party would not hear of negotiations with the Scots. For instance, on 3 January 1643 Pym attempted to revive the Military Party's plan for an alliance with Scotland, calling for a 'nationall association between us an Scotland as the papist ptie beyonde sea did unite themselves against the protestant to overthrow our religion.' Nothing, however, came of this proposal. While negotiations were still in the air the House was unwilling to adopt the measure. Holles stated the case of the Peace Party that 'the best means of peace is to suppress that which hynders yt.' The fact that the Peace Party did not, in the end, yield ground on the Scottish issue until after it was clear that the negotiations had failed, emphasises that the Scottish alliance was considered an extreme measure incompatible with the peace policy.

Negotiations began on 1 February 1643 and continued in a desultory way until 15 April 1643. They broke down ostensibly because Charles and Parliament could not agree on the terms of a cessation that was to precede the negotiations. Although discussions were to continue for a few days more, it was clear by the end of March that no

51. Yorke, B.M. Add. MSS. 18,777, f. 112.
agreement could be reached. On 3 April the Commons resolved that their commissioners should return on Saturday 8 April unless the King had given a satisfactory answer to Parliament's proposal for a cessation. In the event the vote was reversed, and the commissioners granted an extension. But despair of the negotiations had struck the Peace Party. It was only now that it began to yield to the Military Party's policy of a Scottish alliance. Thus on 7 April a committee was formed out of the leaders of both factions in the Commons to select, and to prepare instructions for, agents to go into Scotland. The next day the Parliament rejected finally the King's terms for a cessation. As the negotiations were ended the Scottish policy was re-asserted.

Charles replied to Parliament's rejection of his terms for a cessation on 12 April with a declaration of his conditions for a peaceful settlement. He demanded that his revenue be restored; that his ships, forts and magazines be commanded by his nominees; that the members expelled since January 1642 be restored; that Parliament adjourn itself to some place twenty miles from London to be free from the threat of mob violence. These were terms that Parliament

52. C.J., iii, 28; L.J., v, 687.
53. The extension was agreed to by the Commons on 6 April: C.J., iii, 33. It was agreed to by the Lords on 7 April: L.J., v, 695.
54. The Committee was made up, on the one hand, of Holles and Glyn; on the other, of Pym, the younger Vane and St. John: C.J., iii, 34.
55. The Parliament rejected the King's terms and demanded that he give an answer to their original proposal that there should be a disbandment of both armies before negotiation: Rushworth, v, 191; L.J., v, 704.
could not accept. They were rejected on 14 April and the peace commissioners were ordered to return. The treaty came to an end on 15 April. The policy of the Peace Party seemed discredited. The success of the parliamentary cause now appeared to rest upon the strength of its arms. It was time to execute the war policy and summon the Scots.

The Military Party, which now held sway in the Commons, was eager to begin the work. The Commons sought a conference on 1 May to desire that both Houses send members to Scotland. Their task would be to 'acquaint that State how affaires stood heere & to desire ther aid...' Pym himself was to manage the conference. But the Lords were not so eager. In the upper House the Peace Party still dominated. The Peers were going to prove a determined opposition to the Scottish alliance. It was chiefly their intransigence which delayed the making of the treaty. Meanwhile, the Covenanters were readying themselves to meet with the commissioners from England who seemed as if they would never arrive.

For some time now the Covenanters had been aware of the necessity to come to some arrangement with Parliament. They had been concerned to see a peaceful settlement of differences in England, but so far their efforts had been

57. C.J., iii, 56.
58. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 161*, f. 1181. The conference was actually held on 2 May: C.J., iii, 66; L.J., vi, 6.
59. C.J., iii, 66. Sir Henry Mildmay went up to the Lords with the message desiring the conference: ibid; L.J., vi, 6.
rebuffed by the King. The Covenanters, however, did not wish to see Charles triumph in England, for then he would doubtlessly turn his victorious arms against Scotland to settle old scores there. If Charles continued to refuse their mediation they would be obliged to take Parliament's side. But the Covenanters remained quiescent until shocked into action by the growing influence of royalists on the Privy Council in Scotland.

On 20 December 1642 the Privy Council of Scotland received from the King his reply to the Parliament's November declaration to Scotland, together with that declaration itself. It had been delivered by the Earl of Lanark. The same day the Council resolved not to print the Parliament's declaration. However, they ordered that the King's reply be printed. This decision awakened the Covenanters to the growing influence of the royalists, and made them fear an attempt was afoot to raise a levy of soldiers for the King. But by February the Covenanters had won back sufficient ground to return to their former policy of attempting to restore peace in England by mediation. To this end they sent commissioners to the King at Oxford, in their final bid to settle the affairs of England peacefully. Charles, however, rejected their overtures to make peace between King and Parliament on the basis of a Presbyterian church settlement, and refused to let them present these

61. Baillie, ii, 58.
62. ibid.
proposals to Parliament. After this rebuff the Scots returned home in a very discontented state of mind. Now that Charles had rejected both Presbyterianism and the offer of conciliation itself, the Covenanters had no alternative but to seek an agreement with Parliament.

To prepare themselves for this crucial step the Privy Council of Scotland sent a letter to Charles on 12 May 1643 advising him that it was necessary to call a Convention of the Estates. The Council claimed that the neglected condition of their army in Ireland, and the inability of the English Parliament to provide for it, required that Scotland itself take steps to maintain that army. More ominously, though, the Council added a suggestion that it was disturbed also by a 'sense of the danger of religion, of your Majesties royall person and the common peace of your kingdoms...'. Charles would not assent to the meeting of the Estates. However, the continuing war in England, with its attendant dangers for Scotland—dramatically emphasised by the recent discovery of the Earl of Antrim's invasion plan—moved the Scots to defy Charles and call the Estates. The declaration proclaiming this decision represented the triumph of the Covenanters, and expressed their willingness to take action against the forces which they feared were about to destroy both Kingdoms.

64. C.S.R.V., xxvi, 262.
66. Ibid., 444; A Declaration of the Lords of His Majesties Privie Council in Scotland and Commissioners for the Conserving of the Articles of the Treaty, London, 27 June 1643.
The Scots were willing to discuss an alliance with Parliament. The Military Party was eager that Parliament should send to the Scots. But the Lords, dominated by a desire for peace, were not.

Although the Commons requested the Lords on 1 May to join with them in sending commissioners into Scotland, it was not until 30 May that the Lords agreed to appoint a commissioner—the Lord Grey of Wark. In the meantime the Commons sent up a stream of messages urging the Lords to hasten their answer to the resolution of the Commons. But the Lords gave no reply. They were unmoved also by the pleas of Lord Fairfax who, under increasing pressure in the North, was urging Parliament to secure a Scottish army. On 17 May the Lords even agreed to instructions to Mr. Weldon to inform the Scots, among other things, that parliamentary commissioners were on their way. Yet it still took another conference and a further thirteen days before the Lords appointed a commissioner. This month's delay is a measure of the degree to which the Lords were opposed to

67. C.J., iii, 66.
68. ibid., 109-10; L.J., vi, 69-70.
69. For example, messages went to the Lords on 5 May (C.J., iii, 72; L.J., vi, 32), but there was no reply. There were also messages on 11 and 13 May about expediting a narrative of the recent treaty with Charles to be sent to the Scots: L.J., vi, 142, 144.
70. See his letters of 1 and 6 May from Leeds, as reported by D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1184-5.
71. L.J., vi, 49; C.J., iii, 90.
72. 20 May 1643. The Commons resolved on 19 May to seek a further conference: C.J., iii, 92. On Saturday 20 May the Lords resolved to vote on the Tuesday following whether commissioners should go to Scotland: L.J., vi, 55-6. Presumably the conference preceded this second vote.
extending the alliance with the Scots. And when the Lords did yield, it was thought they had done so not out of genuine agreement with the Commons, but because they feared the Commons would proceed without them in this and all other business.

The Commons might threaten to go on without the Lords, but that step was one for which the lower House, as yet, was not prepared. So while the Military Party was leading the Commons and was eager to forward the request to the Scots, they had patiently to bear with the resistance of the Lords. The unwillingness of the Lords and the Peace Party in the Commons had forced the Military Party in November 1642 to postpone making a request to the Scots. Now, in June 1643, when the Scots were waiting for Parliament's commissioners, the Military Party was obliged to suffer further delay.

It is difficult to tell what was behind the backwardness of the Lords. Were they simply resisting the dictatorial Commoners? Was it a longing for peace? Was it an intense dislike of the Scots? Or a question of honour? Was it all these? Whatever the Lords thought of the Scots themselves, there is much in addition to suggest that their hostility to an alliance was connected with their desire for a negotiated peace. On 23 May the Lords received a message from Charles which seemed to hold out the hope of further negotiation. Yet even when the royal messenger,

73. C.S.P.V., xxvi, 277.
Alexander Hampden, was discovered a party to the Waller Plot, the Lords remained unmoved. Though the Waller Plot had unmasked the fraud in the royal peace offering, still the Lords did not budge in their preference for negotiation, and in their refusal to call in the Scots. Moreover, the Military Party well appreciated just how chary the Peers were. Though the Lords had appointed finally a commissioner on 30 May, and though the Waller Plot was exposed publicly on the thirty-first, the Commons did not bother to send again to the Lords about the Scottish business until 9 June. The Military Party seemed to be relaxing its pressure on the Lords, even though the recent plot had provided an opportunity to exert more. When the Commons did send again to the Peers they only desired that the Lords name another commissioner to match the extra two appointed by the Commons. There was nothing significant in this, nothing to commit the Lords further. It was a mere administrative detail. The following day the message was reiterated by conference. But the Lords were dogged, and they gave no reply. By 16 June the Commons was getting agitated. Sir Henry Mildmay (a frequent messenger in this business) went again to the Lords requesting that they consider that, as the time for sending the commissioners had long passed, they would appoint that day another Lord. The Peers replied that they would send an answer by their own messenger—a parliamentary way of saying they might send him, and when

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74. C.J., iii, 121.
75. ibid., 124.
76. ibid., 131; L.J., vi, 97.
77. C.J., iii, 131.
they did, it would be in their own good time. The following day the Commons sent another message. This time the Lords gave the obstreperous reply that they would appoint an Earl. In fact they did not name him until 11 July.

Apparently not even disaster would shift the Lords. On 18 June Rupert routed a parliamentary force of cavalry on Chalgrove field, where John Hampden received his fatal wound. On the nineteenth the Antrim plot to invade Scotland was known in London; and on the twentieth Charles declared that Parliament was no longer free. According to D'Ewes, the news of Antrim's plans did more worke upon most men then anything that had happened during these miserable calamities and civil warres...because it seemed now that their was a fixed resolution in the popish party utterly to extirpate the true Protestant religion in England, Scotland and Ireland. Presumably he did not include the Lords in this. On the same day that the Antrim plot was discussed in the Commons (27 July) the Lords agreed to another declaration to the Scots excusing Parliament's failure so far to send commissioners. A commitment someday to send commissioners to Scotland was the best the Commons could extract from the Lords even in this moment of drama.

This latest declaration to the Scots epitomised

78. ibid., 132; L.J., vi, 97.
79. ibid., 128; L.J., iii, 162. They appointed the Earl of Rutland.
80. He died on 24 June 1643.
82. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1199.
83. C.J., iii, 146; L.J., vi, 111.
the restraint under which the Military Party's policy
towards the Scots laboured on account of the Lords. Though
it had been clear for some time that the Military Party
wished for the succour of Scottish arms, yet even at this
late hour of deepening crisis Parliament was unable directly
to make the request. Although this declaration was
accompanied by that of November 1642—perhaps by way of
providing a very broad hint—the most Parliament actually
asked for in the new declaration was that the Scots
consider what aid they could give Parliament in suppressing
its enemies in England. The Military Party was straining
for a Scottish army, the need for which the Lords was
refusing to admit.

This stubborn resistance by the Lords was not
limited to the Scottish issue alone. It was manifest in
other areas of disagreement, and, in particular, was
reinforced by a dispute over the proposed new Great Seal
which occurred about this time. On 15 May the Commons
decided, after what Whiteacre described as 'a very Long &
Solemn Debate', that a new Great Seal should be made 'to
attend the Parliament, for the Dispatch of the Affairs of
the Parliament and the Kingdom.'

Since the Lord Keeper Littleton had spirited away
the Great Seal to York in May 1642, Parliament was deprived

84. Ibid., 112-13.
86. C.J., iii, 86.
of the authority which that Seal might have lent to their ordinances and commands. Instead, the seal of royal authority was now endorsing the acts of 'Papists' and 'Malignants'. Not surprisingly, the more conservative rebels opposed the idea of a new Great Seal from the time it was first mooted. It seemed to them an attempt to dethrone the King on whose behalf they were fighting, a grab for sovereign power itself which they ought only to be defending against the wiles of evil counsellors. As Maynard said in a speech against the proposal: 'it was all one as to desire another King: because the K did not speak but by his Grt. Seale...'. It was a very serious business. When the Commons finally voted on the question (15 May) it was the Peace Party which led the opposition.

The issue of the Great Seal was closely connected with the proposed alliance with the Covenanters. To make an alliance was an act of sovereignty; and for Parliament to make one without the King was to deprive him of that same authority which Parliament claimed to defend. In order to make the proposed pact with the Scots legal and binding, the Military Party required the stamp of the Great Seal, or at least some pseudo-Seal, to lend the alliance the semblance of legality. Altogether it looked as if some new principle of authority was being formulated. Of course there was none--it was the dilemma of a conservative rebellion. However, the

88. When the question of the Great Seal was put the House divided. The vote was: Yeas (Clotworthy and Goodwin), 86; Noes (Holles and Evelyn), 74.
irrepressible Henry Marten was bold enough to suggest one. On 1 May, when the Commons was debating a request to the Lords to join the lower House in sending emissaries to Scotland and Holland, Marten proposed that Parliament could not send ambassadors 'in the condition wee were now in: but that wee should give our selves power to send as from ourselves, & to declare publiclie that we will take the people into our protection...!' He made, in effect, a revolutionary proposal that Parliament assume the sovereignty which such a sovereign act required. The idea was anathema to the Commons, and, as D'Ewes observed, Marten was even 'slighted by Pym himself & other violent spirits as tending to the utter subversion of this Monarchie.' Marten, however, had emphasised the serious implications of making an alliance with the Scots. The twin problems of the Scottish alliance and the new Great Seal provided reasonable grounds for the more fearful members to believe that continued military struggle could send the Parliament hurtling toward revolution.

In these circumstances, the Lords, who certainly were no revolutionaries, furiously resisted the Commons on the issue of the Great Seal. On 19 May the Commons requested the Peers to agree to the making of a new Seal. After a week the Lords voted unequivocally to reject the Commons' proposal. Moreover, the Commons were not able to elicit an answer from the Lords for another fortnight; but when it

89. D'Ewes, B.K. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1181.
90. C.J., iii, 92; L.J., vi, 55.
91. C.J., iii, 127.
Realising that the Lords were adamant, the Commons let the issue drop for a month. Then the King's declaration (20 June) that Parliament was unfree renewed the efforts of the lower House, which sent again to the Lords on 27 June to agree to the new Seal. A week later the Lords replied that they would adhere to their former resolutions. The Peers seemed unshakeable. Confronted with such opposition, the Commons dropped the matter until October when the Lords, weakened by desertions to the King, had accepted the Solemn League and Covenant. Since by making a treaty with Scotland Parliament, in effect, had assumed de facto sovereignty, there was no longer left much reason to object to the new Great Seal. However, during those months from May to July, when the Lords were still resisting the Military Party over the Scottish alliance, they opposed also over the Great Seal; not only because it was an extreme policy which threatened to convert the parliamentary cause into a revolutionary one, but also because the problem of the Great Seal stressed that the proposed alliance with the Scots assailed the royal sovereignty in a manner nearly as revolutionary.

What was it, then, that the Lords wanted, if the parlous state of the Parliament's cause did not persuade them of the necessity for Scottish military assistance? If

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92. *ibid.*, 130; *L.J.*, vi, 96.
93. *ibid.*, 111-12; *C.J.*, iii, 146.
95. The Lords agreed to the proposal for a new Great Seal on 11 October: *ibid.*, 253; *C.J.*, iii, 275.
the crisis of Parliament's predicament was not teaching the Lords the need for arms, it was teaching them the need for peace. Historians traditionally argue that Parliament at last resolved to call upon Scottish aid only upon the verge of defeat. This is too simple a view of affairs. The Military Party had decided on an appeal to the Scots soon after Edgehill, because they believed firmly that the Scots held a key to Parliament's victory. As for the rest of Parliament, they did not share this conviction; rather, the plots and defeats of 1643 were driving them in a different direction, towards peace. The trail of disasters from Adwalton Moor to the fall of Bristol did not induce the Peace Party to call in the Scots. It convinced them, instead, of the necessity for negotiation. The Peace Party accepted the inevitable alternative of a Scottish army only after the Military Party (aware that Parliament was in too weak a condition to negotiate favourable terms, and believing that even the Peace Party's proposals would be unacceptable to the King) had deprived the Peace Party in August 1643 of the option of negotiation. Even in Parliament's darkest hour the Peace Party struggled against the advent of the Scots because it represented a permanent commitment to a military solution which so far had brought Parliament nearly to ruin.

Adwalton Moor was fought on 30 June 1643. News of the Hothams' attempt to deliver Hull to the Queen was reported in Parliament on 3 July; and by the sixth the

defeat of the Fairfax was being published abroad in London. It was on the fifth that the Commons renewed the Military Party's resolution

That the Scots be forthwith desired to send in Aid and Assistance for the Preservation and Maintenance of the Religion and Liberties of the Kingdom; and that the Lords concurrence be desired herein...98

The Lords were to be pressed at a conference to nominate their committee for Scotland and to appoint immediately a day for their departure. Instructions were to be prepared in haste. At the conference the Commons emphasised to the Lords the extreme danger of the times. They read a letter describing the defeat of Fairfax, and a narrative of an attempt to blow up the magazine at Lincoln. Reeling under the shock, the Lords yielded, directly voted their agreement with the resolutions of the Commons, and resolved that their committee for Scotland should set out on 12 July, or sooner. But were the Lords really reconciled to calling in the Scots? Their actions during the next month suggest the contrary. Under pressure of defeat the Peace Party in both Lords and Commons was rejuvenated, and it attempted to pre-empt the proposed talks with the Scots by renewed negotiations with Charles.

Inspiration for a new peace endeavour came from a

98. C.J., iii, 156.
99. Ibid.
100. L.J., vi, 121.
101. Ibid., 122. Actually, instructions for the committee were not delivered from the Commons until 13 July (C.J., iii, 165), and not finally agreed to by the Lords until 15 July, when the Lords also resolved that the committees should set out on 20 July.
powerful quarter: the Earl of Essex, Lord General of the parliamentary armies. Although various parliamentary commanders—like Fairfax and Sir William Brereton—had been urging Parliament to bring in the Scots, the Lord General did not appear to agree. In his famous letter of 9 July to the Speaker of the Commons, in which he recommended to Parliament his solution to the civil war, he supplied no place for the Scots. The alternatives were either negotiation or a trial by battle between royalist and parliamentary armies. There was no room in this romantic scheme for Scotland. It is not surprising that Essex saw the settlement of the civil war in simply English terms. Apart from anything else, he was a man very jealous of his honour. He was especially determined that his authority and dignity as Lord General should not be diminished by the multiplication of armies. He was presently engaged in an acrimonious dispute with Waller, whose increasing popularity and relative success threatened Essex's position. No doubt he regarded the prospect of a Scottish alliance similarly—as a reflection on his competence and vigour.

Although the Lords had voted to send to Scotland an appeal for help, many Peers agreed with Essex's call for negotiations and his implicit exclusion of the Scots from English affairs. They had been in contact with the Earl and

102. Some of Sir William Brereton's letters to this effect were intercepted by the royalists and were reported in 'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 27, 2-9 July 1643, 358-9, Newsbooks, I, Oxford Royalist, 371-86.
had received a letter from him similar to that sent the Commons. These Lords moved that peace propositions be sent to the King; but the House rejected the proposal by nine votes to seven. However, the vote showed that the House of Lords was by no means firmly committed to a Scottish alliance. Four days later, on Saturday 15 July, the Lords acted to cross the intentions of the Military Party. In the instructions to the English commissioners to Scotland was an article which bound the English never to make peace with the King without the consent of the Scots. The Lords had no intention to allow the proposed alliance to interfere with possible peace negotiations, so they amended the instruction accordingly.

If one accepts the traditional interpretation that Parliament's call for Scottish aid was made in response to military disaster one might suppose that another defeat would have been sufficient to cast out the last inhibitions of the Peace Party, and particularly of the Lords, against a Scottish alliance. Exactly the opposite happened. Rather than hasten their embassy to Scotland, the Peace Party turned about and sought to beg the King for peace. The decision to send committees to Scotland did not represent a strengthening of parliamentary will to resist the royal power.

Certainly there were a few members of Parliament,

104. ibid., f. 1230.
105. ibid., f. 1231.
whose names have not reached us, who seemed to have little confidence in Parliament's resolution for tougher policies. Despite the fact that the Lords had voted to send a committee into Scotland and had agreed on instructions for them, there were some who still did not think that defeat would force the Peace Party to embrace the war policy. They knew how reluctantly the Lords had made this decision, and feared that further bad news would unfix their resolution. And on 13 July the worst did happen. Caught between Hopton's army in Devizes and Wilmot's relieving cavalry upon Roundway Down, Sir William Waller was routed. His baggage and ordnance were taken and his infantry cut down. D'Ewes' diary indicates that there were many members who feared what the effect of this news upon Parliament might be. He recorded that he knew of many men who were carrying about letters in their pockets from Bristol and Shaftesbury relating Waller's defeat. Yet, even as late as 17 July, the matter was ignored in the Commons, which fell instead upon 'ordinary business'.

Clearly there were men at Westminster who believed that Parliament's cause could not be advanced unless Parliament pretended that Roundway Down had not happened.

Pretences, however, were not going to save the policy of the Military Party. In the Lords there were signs that the war policy was coming unstuck. The Lord Grey of Wark was sent to the Tower for refusing the order of his House to go into Scotland; and on the following day (18

106. *ibid.*, f. 1232.
July) the Lords informed the Commons that their committee for Scotland should leave without the Lords as Grey was in the Tower and Rutland was too ill to go. They promised to appoint another Lord in the place of Grey and to send their committee as soon as possible. In fact the Lords did not appoint another peer, and their committee never set out.

Despite the protests on behalf of their health, Grey and Rutland were suspected of hostility to the Scots alliance. To outsiders there appeared to prevail in Parliament not only a thirst for peace, but a dislike of the Scots as foreigners, involved in this reluctance to align with Scotland. According to Clarendon, the request for Scots' aid was considered such a desperate measure that

...the Lords naming the earl of Rutland and Lord Grey of Warke for that embassy, the earl upon indisposition of health procured a release, and the other, who never declined any employment they would confer on him, so peremptorily refused to meddle in it that he was committed to the Tower, and in the end they were compelled only to depute commoners to that service...upon which they who sent them were so far from being confident, and so little satisfied that they should be driven to bring in foreign forces...that there was, (some few desperate persons only excepted) even a universal desire of peace...109

109. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vii, 135. According to Mercurius Aulicus, the Scots alliance was of 'so odious and base a nature, that the Lords who were designed for the same employment, viz the Earle of Rutland and the Lord Grey of Warke, resolving to decline the infamy and dishonour of it, pretended only a regard for their bodily health which might have been endangered by so long a voyage. But now the Lord Grey doth not sticke to say, that he deserted the employment for no other reason, but because he could not have it stand upon record to succeeding ages, that he had a hand in so foule a business, as to bring in a foreign Nation to invade his Country.' See 'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 34, 20-26 August 1643, 464-5, Newsbooks, i, Oxford Royalist, i, 479-94. Agostini, the Venetian Secretary, reported
It was this widespread yearning for peace that the Military Party set out to stem. Both the twenty-first and the twenty-sixth of July were fast days; and on both days the preachers turned on fierce sermons propounding the necessity for the most ruthless measures. Thomas Hill throughout his sermon of 21 July developed the theme that the 'Church shall not be delivered from the servitude of Egypt, but by violence and force, and with the bloody sword.' Five days later Sidrach Simpson maintained that the disasters had not deprived Parliament of ultimate victory:

You have many ways before you for our safety, as the speedy execution of justice on offenders...the vigorous prosecution of the war; the taking hold of all advantageous opportunities...

These militant sermons were designed to stir up spirits that were flagging. But the attempt to galvanize the waning parliamentary cause only served to provide evidence that Parliament was deeply divided on the issues of war and peace; and over whether the Scots should be called or not.

Even in Scotland, where now men were anxious to take Parliament's side, the Covenanters grieved that so many parliamentarians were hostile to them and feared the supposed

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110. See the 'Epistle Dedicatory' to his sermon 'The Militant Church Triumphant over the Dragon and His Angels', *Fast Sermons*, vii, 228-65.

111. See the epistle to his sermon, 'Reformation's Preservation', *Fast Sermons*, vii, 359-94.
disadvantages of Scottish help. Baillie wrote on 26 July, in wonder at the delay of Parliament's commissioners:

Yet the most thought the greatest cause of their irresolution to flow from division. The House of Lords was said to be opposite to the Commons conclusion of craveying our help. Their fear if they did begin to employ strangers, that hereby the King should be excused to fetch in Irish, French and Danes; their foresight of impossibilitie to get our armie maintained, and most of all, the constancie of most of them to doe the Queen better service at London than they had been able to do at Oxford or York, made them peremptorilie resolve to send no commissioners to us at all. It had been a pitie matters had been so carried, for I saw in all our nation at this time, a very good will to the Parliament's cause...but this unexpected neglect of the Parliament hes made other thoughts begin to arise in the hearts of manie; yet what the event shall be, I know not.112

And in the postscript to this letter Baillie further observed:

The jealousie the English have of our nation, much beside all reason, is not well taken. Alwayes the report of Fairfax's defeat has been a spurr at last to that Parliament, much as it is thought against the stomackes of many, to send message on message to us of their Commissioners...Their slowness in all their affaires is marvellous.113

To Daillie it was clear that the ultimate conclusion of the war policy--alliance with the Scots--was highly unsatisfactory to many parliamentarians. It was apparent, too, in Scotland that men at Westminster did not relish the thought of Scots' arms, not only because they were Scots' arms, but also because the alliance would be costly and more likely to confirm than finish the war. The sentiments of the Peace Party as propounded by D'Ewes were well understood in Scotland. To take up arms in self-defence was a measure drastic enough for men who wanted peace; but to declare war

113. Ibid., 80-1.
on the King with the help of an ally, mistrusted and
resented, was unthinkable. War was not driving the
Parliament into the arms of the Scots. As the delay of the
commissioners to Scotland showed, the bent of the Lords was
for peace. They recently had attempted to make a peaceful
address to the King, and had nearly succeeded. Another
military disaster was not going to assist the plans of the
Military Party, but hinder them. Another defeat in fact
produced a revolt in both Houses against the policy of the
Military Party, and with it the Scottish alliance.

On 26 July 1643 Prince Rupert captured Bristol.
It was the same day that the commissioners from the Commons
set out for Scotland. However, the Lords and the Peace
Party in the Commons did not intend that they should be
committed to war by this departure. As the parliamentary
cause was crumbling about them, the members of the Peace
Party could not but doubt the efficacy of the war policy,
and seek once more the solution in peace. It was 31 July
when the Houses received news of the surrender of Bristol;
and on 2 August the Lords appointed a committee to consider
propositions to the King. The committee reported its
propositions on the fourth, and they were accepted.

114. 'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 31, 30 July-5 August, p. 410,
Newsbooks. I. Oxford Royalist, i, 431-46. According to
the Commons' Journal the commissioners were to set out
on 27 July: C.J., iii, 174.
116. The Earls Northumberland, Holland, Pembroke, Bedford,
Sarum and Lord Viscount Saye and Seal were the
committee: L.J., vi, 163.
117. ibid., 171.
In the Commons some of the 'violent spirits' of the Military Party—Denis Bond and Cornelius Holland chief among them—moved that the House refuse to confer with the Lords about the peace proposal. But they were strongly opposed by the Peace Party, so that after a long debate the House resolved to meet the Lords at 9.00 a.m. on 5 August. It was the same day that the English commissioners arrived at Leith. But while Parliament's embassy was preparing to negotiate war, voices at Westminster clearly cried for peace. For instance, Benjamin Rudyard opposed the radicals in plain terms:

\[
\text{when we were first drawn to undertake this warre, we were told that we should neither want men nor money, but now we saw to what a passe we were groven; & that we wanted not bloud.}
\]

The next day the hope of peace was registered in votes and victory for the Peace Party. The Scots alliance took a battering. There was a desire to take refuge not in the Scots, but in peace.

On the fifth, when the peace propositions were reported in the Commons, one of the chief objections of the Military Party was

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\text{that we had lately sent to the Scots to come in & assist us and therefore we should abuse them in making a Treaty without first acquainting of them with it.}
\]

This argument was opposed by many, including D'Ewes. He said that the claim did not hold. He called upon men to consider

118. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1240v-1241.
119. ibid.
120. ibid., f. 1243v.
how farre wee have engaged ourselves to the Scotts but onlie to satisfie them for their expenses & service: wch doubtless we will be better able to satisfie them now & make them greater gainers then if we proceed with the warre, & make ourselves less able to recompense them.121

It is clear the Peace Party wanted nothing to do with the Scots if alliance with them was going to bind them to war. There was no doubt in their minds that if the Military Party won on this issue, then Parliament would be committed to a war that the Peace Party did not wish to fight. When it came to the vote whether the House consider the propositions further, the Peace Party won. The vote went against the war policy and the Scots alliance 94/65.

Monday 7 August saw the decision reversed, but narrowly. On the sixth the Military Party stirred up their city friends, and from pulpit and placard defamed the Peace Party. The 'well-affected' citizens were urged to besiege Parliament on Monday and oppose the passage of the propositions. There was even supposed to be a plan to seize the leaders of the Peace Party if they successfully steered the propositions through Parliament that day. The Earls of Northumberland and Holland, together with Holles, Pierrepont, Sir William Lewes, Sir John Evelyn, Grimston and Maynard, were marked out for violence. As planned, the

121. ibid., f. 1245v-1246.
122. ibid., f. 1247; C.J., iii, 96.
123. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1250v; Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vii, 170. See also L.J., vi, 173, where it is recorded under 8 August that Richard Ward (minister), Samuel Pickering (clerk), and Thomas Underhill (stationer) were examined for printing and publishing bills urging people to come to Westminster on 7 August.
mob arrived; while in the House Pym was foremost in attack. The main reason he gave against the new propositions was that Parliament had sent for the Scots. He argued, as it was argued on Saturday, that Parliament could not enter honourably into a treaty without first informing the Scots. Again the Peace Party answered this argument, D'Ewes among them. He stated clearly the priorities of the Peace Party and their attitude to the Scots alliance. He argued that Parliament should attempt to make peace before resolving on war. This would save the Scots 'much danger and hazard'. If Parliament gained by negotiation what it had previously fought for, it would not have departed from any of the propositions sent to the Scots. Parliament, he argued, had not committed itself to seeking first their consent. For D'Ewes and the Peace Party, the Scots alliance and peace negotiations were incompatible policies. And since they preferred peace, they now refused to grant that they were committed to the Scots. The Military Party, however, had done their work well. The House came to the question whether the propositions be considered in detail. This time the Noes carried it 88/81.

This was the last serious stand of the Peace Party before the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant. There was now no choice left for them but to accept the Scottish alliance. The Military Party had committed Parliament to war, so Parliament could not be without the

125. ibid., f. 1252v-1253.
126. ibid., f. 1253; C.J., iii, 97.
aid of Scotland. The Military Party had won.

It is important to remember, however, that Parliament had not been driven by defeat to call for Scotland's aid. This is too simple and inaccurate a view. The Military Party had decided upon the Scottish alliance as early as October 1642, when the parliamentary cause was in good heart; and the Military Party continued to prod Parliament in that direction until the Covenant was signed. On the other hand, the Peace Party from the time of Edgehill preferred negotiation to war. When negotiation collapsed the Military Party was able to revive the proposal for a Scottish alliance. However, the continuous success of royal forces throughout the summer of 1643 did not assist the Military Party to execute that policy. Contrary to the view normally taken of these months, the collapse of Parliament's armies rather persuaded men of the necessity for negotiation and made them disinclined to protract the war by importing foreign armies. So disagreeable was the idea of a Scots army to the Peace Party that when negotiations for it were about to begin an attempt was made to settle things by negotiation. Parliament did not go to the Scots with a united conviction of the need for an alliance. On Saturday 5 August more than half the Commons was opposed to extending the war effort; while on the seventh the peace proposals were rejected only by dint of threat, and then only by seven votes. 127

127. D'Ewes said that Sir Christopher Yelverton, Sir William Waller and Mr. Jepson changed their votes from what they had been on Saturday 5 August to vote with the opponents of the peace proposals on the Monday. Several other members were deterred from coming to the House: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1253v.
Technically, Parliament had chosen the war policy and the Scottish alliance. In reality it was deeply divided, and entered into the Scottish alliance with profound misgivings.
Conclusion
This thesis draws to its conclusion at the point at which historians usually begin seriously their treatment of Parliament's relations with the Scots, that is, with the formation of the Solemn League and Covenant. As I observed in the Introduction, historians, prior to discussing the Solemn League, usually content themselves with a sketch of English attitudes toward the Scots. They note that the reformers happily greeted the Scots in 1640, but that by 1643 it was not friendship so much as military circumstances which pushed Parliament into alliance with Scotland. All this is true as far as it goes. However, by filling in the history of parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots, as I have attempted to do in this essay, and by showing that Scottish policy was a divisive subject in Parliament from the first, we begin to appreciate that Parliament's problems with the Scots did not begin in late 1643. Indeed, the differing attitudes toward the Scots had been an important item in the factional politics of Parliament for nearly three years before the Covenant. During that time Parliament had grappled continuously with the problem of its relations with the Scots and their part in the success, or failure, of the reforming cause. This long debate issued ultimately in the conclusion that, whatever the native regard of Englishmen for the Scots, their support was crucial for the parliamentary party. In a sense, the Solemn League and Covenant merely registered the triumph of this policy; the League was the natural culmination of a strategy upon which John Pym and his supporters had been operating since November 1640, if not from even earlier.
The debate concerning what part, if any, the Scots should play in the conflict between King and Parliament was, then, a debate over strategy. It was a strategic issue with such profound implications that it contributed markedly to creating and accentuating divisions within the parliamentary ranks. This issue gives us an insight into one of those curiosities of political life, especially of movements for reform, where procedural matters can develop into issues as important as those for which the reform was undertaken; or, to put it in other words, the very process of reforming, not just the content of reform itself, can make its own significant impression upon political conflict. For three years prior to the Solemn League and Covenant, Parliament had been disputing the role, if any, which should be allowed the Scots in the parliamentary reform of England; and the debate had contributed, firstly, to the dividing of royalists from rebels, and, later, to a sustained struggle between the peace and military factions of the rebel party itself.

As I suggested in the Introduction, the debate over the Scots had begun even before the Long Parliament met. At one extreme there were those who supported the King's policy toward Scotland; who were appalled by the Treaty of Ripon; and who were eager to do battle with the Scots. At the other extreme were those who welcomed the Covenanters for giving England the chance to transform its spiritual and temporal government. But when the conflict appeared in Parliament itself, it did not begin as one
between easily discernible groups of Court supporters and ardent reformers. When Parliament first met such clear divisions were not at all evident. In fact, there was a widespread feeling of relief that a prospect of change had dawned; and many of the later prominent royalists, at this time, were supporters of reform. However, despite the general inclination for reform, one of the first divisive issues in Parliament was that one already being debated: that of the Scots.

Whereas some members wanted to exploit the presence of Scottish forces to assist the process of reform, there were men who thought it dishonourable to treat an invader as a friend. Even if a man was a reformer this did not exclude him from the ranks of those hostile to, or at least concerned about, the Scots. In many minds the Scots raised a question of honour; and this sense of aggrieved honour was something shared by men who later served the parliamentary side as well as by those who served the King. There were men, both future parliamentarians and future royalists, who were glad enough that the Scots had given them a Parliament, but who were not prepared to countenance the highest flights of pro-Scottish feeling. These men were ready to join the more vehement enemies of the Scots in attempts to secure the speedy evacuation of their army from England. This opposition to attempts at delaying the treaty conflicted with the plans of the active party to use the Scottish occupation as a means of exerting pressure on the King. It involved a large party both of future royalists and of
future parliamentarians which was strong enough at times to exercise considerable influence in the House, and which even threatened briefly to topple the leadership of the foremost reformers. The existence of this anti-Scottish group is, I believe, of considerable importance. It indicates not just that there was a Court group which opposed the soft treatment the Scots were receiving, but, more importantly, that there were many reforming parliamentarians who believed that, however desirable was change, Parliament should not employ the Scottish occupation as a support to that policy. Two other features of the anti-Scottish group are also worthy of comment:

Firstly, it was led by men who later became prominent royalists: Digby, Capel, Hyde, Hopton, Culpepper and the Strangways. All these were moderate reformers during Parliament's early days, a fact emphasised by their attitudes to the Scottish question. They favoured reform, but were not prepared to prosecute it by what they saw as the dishonourable means of cultivating the Scots. They wished simply that the reform should proceed 'constitutionally', and should not be exacted from the King by the use of threat. It was not surprising, then, that the anti-Scottish group was able to attract the support of other cautious men who, like Sir John Holland and Sir Robert Pie, were later parliamentarians. It is not unworthy of comment that these two gentlemen supported the Peace Party which in 1643, by opposing the Scottish alliance, sought to restrain the more extreme reformers just as the anti-Scottish faction
had attempted to do in 1640-1641. The issue which troubled the opponents of the Scots in these early days was similar to that which troubled the Peace Party in 1642-1643.

The second important feature of the anti-Scottish faction was that its hard core seemed to be made up of Straffordians. As I argued in Chapter II, the active party reasserted its threatened leadership in April and May of 1641, and the treaty went forward for the moment, but under the auspices of that group. This reassertion of leadership reduced the strength of the anti-Scottish faction. However, clashes over the treaty were renewed, and there was further delay in concluding it. These events refined the anti-Scottish group so that its strength and character depended now upon its most reliable and most conservative supporters. Finally, the proceedings against the Earl of Strafford consolidated the core of the anti-Scottish party which, with the passage of the Attainder, became the embryo of the Court party. The Attainder had this effect because, to the satisfaction of some, it illustrated perfectly the same extremism that they already had seen at work in the attempt of the active party to wring concessions from the King with the help of the Scottish army. The Straffordians could with reason argue that these attempts to coerce the King and to despoil him of his chosen minister by such an unrelenting campaign was an unparliamentary proceeding which concealed an attack upon Monarchy itself. In these reactions to the Scots and to the Attainder we observe a gradual shift from a sensitivity to dishonour to a suspicion of treason. In men
of conservative instincts such a development was natural—what after all is treason if not to dishonour the King?

Before the Militia Bill and proposals to control the choice of Privy Counsellors, the Scottish issue, emphasised by the Attainder, had filled some men with the fear that a constitutional revolution, more radical than they had contemplated, was under way. It was this belief that alienated the Straffordians from the reforming party.

However, as I have pointed out, the active party's attitude toward the Scots also underwent a change. By August 1641 the active party had become openly distrustful of the Scots, fearing that they might take the King's side against them. Yet, even though awakened to the Scots and increasingly sceptical about their reliability as allies, the active party did not change its view of the strategic and tactical importance of the Scots in the struggle between Crown and Parliament. On the contrary, as fear increased that the Scots might desert Parliament, so the active party's perception of their importance became more acute. Thus Parliament moved quickly to counter in Scotland any adverse interpretation of Parliament's conduct originating from Charles and his Court. Both in late 1641, when Charles was in Scotland, and in 1642, when he had withdrawn from London, Parliament strove to check the influence of royalist propaganda in Scotland, and to keep the Scots at least benevolently neutral. The reformers' discovery that the Scots might prove a fickle people did not cause them to lose interest in the Covenanters, but rather increased
Parliament's attention to Scottish affairs, which now appeared more important than formerly, when Scottish hostility to the Crown had been assumed.

This concern to strike up an understanding with the Scots was illustrated by the 1641-1642 negotiations to send a Scottish expeditionary force into Ulster against the rebels there. What is important in this business is not so much that Parliament sought Scottish aid but, rather, the reason for seeking that aid. It was argued that the Scots were obliged, on account of the late treaty of pacification, to assist in preserving the peace of the Protestant Kingdoms against all enemies. This was not just a statement that the Scots were a useful and convenient ally to have against the Irish rebels. Rather, it was an expression of general policy, directed at opponents of any Scottish connection by those who believed that the Scots had an important part to play not only in crushing this particular Irish threat, but in defending the Kingdoms against enemies in general. This was a statement of the strategic principle upon which the active party had been working since November 1640, and which it would continue to employ for some time to come.

I do not think that the House of Lords, which at this time expressed the most frankly anti-Scottish sentiments, ever accepted this strategic doctrine—not even later, when its numbers were depleted by the revolt against the King. The discussions over the Scottish expeditionary force served to highlight the natural inclination of the leading
reformers to look for support from Scotland, as well as to underline the natural reluctance which moved other members, especially in the Lords, to avoid entanglements with a people they did not trust. Later in 1642 the dwindling House of Lords joined with the Commons, likewise shrinking, in a campaign to keep the Scots at least favourable, if not openly allied, to Parliament. This does not present us with an interpretative difficulty: after all, keeping friendly with an old and suspect enemy is not the same as letting him loose with one's treasured possessions.

The Lords' open hostility to the Scots was revived again, however, in the period stretching from the battle of Edgehill to the Solemn League and Covenant, during which time a military alliance with the Covenanters was proposed. This time the Lords were not alone, but were supported by a strong Peace Party in the Commons. The proposed military alliance raised again the issue which had been debated between the pro- and anti-Scots factions in 1640-1641, as to how far Parliament should go in its attempts to defend and prosecute the policy of reform. Just as the anti-Scots faction in 1640-1641 opposed using the Scots to overawe the King, so in 1642-1643 the Lords' and Commons' Peace Party maintained that Parliament should not engage the military support of the Scots to crush the King in the field. The move to bring in another Scottish army seemed to them (particularly to the Lords) to contain a veiled attack upon Monarchy, just as the attempt to delay the treaty of pacification had seemed to do in 1641. In the later period,
however, there were new factors which indicated to opponents of the alliance just how serious were the constitutional implications of an alliance with the Scots. There were, in the first place, the theoretical implications of Parliament making an alliance without the King. Such an act seemed to be an assertion of parliamentary sovereignty, an act that was truly revolutionary. Secondly, there was a political issue. If Parliament called in the Scots it would seem to have abandoned completely the way of negotiation for that of war. For the Lords and the Peace Party in the Commons this was just as serious a matter as the simply constitutional one. If Parliament chose the war policy, then not only would the King be driven finally to reject all possibility of negotiating an end to the conflict, but, more importantly, the resolution of the conflict in war (by which Parliament might force its will upon the King) would involve such a severe blow to the royal prerogative that the authority of the Crown would be diminished, if not wholly destroyed. The problem envisaged by the anti-Scottish group in earlier days had been raised once more, though more dramatically. The Scottish problem seemed throughout to illustrate the predicament of rebels who detested the idea of revolution: how could they continue to defend their cause before a hostile king without undermining the authority of the monarchy they wished to preserve?

These grave implications of the pro-Scottish policy moved a majority of the Lords to continue to resist the Military Party even after the collapse of the Treaty of
Oxford, when it seemed the anti-Scottish sentiments of the Peace Party in the Commons had weakened. The Lords maintained their resistance for nearly four months until August, when, joined by the rejuvenated Peace Party of the Commons, a great effort was made to re-open negotiations with the King. As we know, this pacific policy narrowly failed to win the support of the Commons, and so negotiations with the Scots continued uninterrupted.

General historians seem to have glossed over this drawn-out clash over Scottish policy. Because in their accounts the Scots do not become significant until after the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant, the historians usually content themselves with observing that the pressure of war gradually and inevitably forced the Parliament into alliance with Scotland. But such a simple explanation prevents us from understanding not just that Scottish policy was a divisive issue, that it was vitally important to the Long Parliament at war. If the problem the Military Party had to overcome in proposing the Scottish alliance had been nothing more than English dislike for the Scots, then the prospect of defeat would have removed that difficulty quickly. But this did not happen, because the difficulty was not just a matter of getting used to an unpleasant but necessary ally. The more defeat threatened, the more stubborn became opposition to the Scots alliance, because the apparently merely practical step of bringing in the Scots seemed to be, in fact, full of revolutionary constitutional consequences. As I have said,
the clash between supporters and opponents of the proposed alliance mirrored that which had occurred between the pro- and anti-Scots groups in 1640-1641 over the role of the Scots in the attempt to reform England by parliamentary proceedings. Like these earlier debates, the later ones over the war and peace policies saw the transformation of strategic and tactical problems into a constitutional one.

What this thesis shows, then, is that the Scottish issue was a well-established and important one for three years before the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant. Parliament's Scottish problems did not begin with the Solemn League, but rather entered a new phase. Already the Scottish issue had been significant in developing the classic antagonisms of the time: between rebel and royalist; and between proponents of the peace and war policies. Already the Scottish question had raised some of the crucial issues and problems of the Puritan Revolution: on religious matters it had shown that Parliament was not prepared to accept a Presbyterian settlement of the English Church. It had revealed, most importantly, the seemingly insoluble difficulty of attempting reform of a revolutionary character within the conservative intellectual and constitutional restraints which the reform party refused to reject. The Scottish question highlighted these restraints and acted as a warning against revolution, causing men to turn aside from, or attempt to divert, the direction of the reforming party.

When Parliament began negotiating the Solemn League
and Covenant, it had behind it a long experience of the troubles the Scottish question could bring. Hence Parliament's envoys, as we well know, attempted to avoid the avowedly religious character which the Scots wanted to give the treaty and make it, rather, a purely military alliance; and to limit the role of the Scots in England to that of mercenaries. After three years of debate and division, Parliament knew enough about the effect of Scottish issues upon its internal cohesion to wish to confine the activities of its would-be allies as much as possible. The Scots already had much vexed Parliament, and there was no reason to expect that in the future they would be any less troublesome. It was in this atmosphere that the Long Parliament negotiated with the Scots the Solemn League and Covenant.
Appendix I

The Articles of Cessation signed at Ripon

26 October 1640
1. That there be a Cessation of Arms both by Sea and Land from this present.


3. That both Parties shall peaceably retain, during the Treaty, whatsoever they possess at the time of the Cessation.

4. That all such Persons who live in any of his Majesty's Forts beyond the River Tees, shall not exempt their Lands which lie within the Counties of Northumberland and the Bishoprick from such Contribution, as shall be laid upon them for the Payment of the 850 l. a day.

5. That none of the King's Forces upon the other side of Tees, shall give any Impediment to such Contributions, as are already allowed for the Competency of the Scotch Army, and shall take no Victuals out of the Bounds, except that which the Inhabitants and Owners thereof shall bring voluntarily to them: And that any Restraint or Detention of Victuals, Cattle and Forage, which shall be made by the Scots within those Bounds for their better Maintenance, shall be no Breach.

6. That no Recruits shall be brought unto either Army from the time of the Cessation, and during the Treaty.

7. That the Contribution of 850 l. a day, shall be only raised out of the Counties of Northumberland, and the Bishoprick, Town of Newcastle, Cumberland and Westmoreland; and that the not Payment thereof shall be no Breach of the Treaty; but the Counties and Town so failing, it shall be left to the Scotch Power to raise the same, but not to exceed the Sum agreed upon, unless it be for the Charges of driving to be set by the Commissioners of the Forage.

8. That the River of Tees shall be the Bounds of both Armies, excepting always the Town and Castle of Stockton, and the Village of Eggsccliffe: And that the Counties of Northumberland and the Bishoprick of Durham be the Limits, within the which the Scotch Army is to reside; saving always Liberty for them to send such Convoys, as shall be necessary for the gathering up only of the Contributions which shall be unpaid by the Counties of Westmoreland and Cumberland.

9. If any Persons commit any private Insolencies, it shall be no Breach of the Treaty, if (upon Complaint made by either Party) Reparation and Punishment be granted.

10. If Victuals be desired upon that Price which shall be agreed upon, and ready Money offered for the same, and refused; it shall be no Breach of the Cessation, to take such Victuals, paying such Price.
11. No new Fortifications to be made during the Treaty, against either Party.

12. That the Subjects of both Kingdoms, may in their Trade and Commerce freely pass to and fro, without any Pass at all; but that it be particularly provided, that no Member of either Army shall pass without a formal Pass under the Hand of the General, or of him that commandeth in Chief.

Bedford.
Bristol.
Holland.
Berkshire.
Ed. Mandevile.
Ph. Wharton.
Ro. Brook.
J. Paulett.
Ed. Howard.
F. Dunsmore.

Dunfermeling.
Lowdon.
Patrick Hepburne.
William Douglass.
J. Smith.
William Wedderburn.
Alex. Henderson.
William Johnstown.

/Rushworth, iii, 1306-2/
Appendix II

The Eight Heads of Demands
of the proposed Peace Treaty
presented to the Lords Commissioners by the Scots,
and reported to the House of Commons
17 December 1640
First, That his Majestie will be graciously pleased to command that the last Acts of Parliament may be published in his Highness Name, as our Sovereign Lord, with the Estates of Parliament convened by his Majesties Authority.

Secondly, That the Castle of Edinburgh, and other Strengths of the Kingdome of Scotland, may according to the first Foundation be furnished and used for our Defence and Security.

Thirdly, That our Countrymen in his Majesties Dominions of England and Ireland may be freed from the Censure for Subscribing the Covenant, and be no more pressed with Oaths and Subscriptions unwarranted by our Law, and contrary to the National Oath and Covenant approved by his Majesty.

Fourthly, That the Common Incendiaries who have been the authors of this Combustion in his Majesties Dominions, may receive their just Censure.

Fifthly, That our Ships and Goods, with all the Damages thereof, may be restored.

Sixthly, That the Wrongs, Losses and Charges, which all this time we have sustained, may be repaid.

Seventhly, That the Declaration made against us as Traytors may be recalled.

Eighthly, And in the End, by Advice and Consent of the Estates of England convened in Parliament, his Majestie may be pleased to remove the Garrison from the Borders, and any impediment that may stop the Free Trade, and with their Advice to condescend to all Particulars that may Establish a Stable and well grounded Peace, for enjoying of our Religion and Liberty against all fears of Molestation and Undoing from Year to Year, or as our Adversaries shall take advantage.

\[\text{Nalson, 1, 682}\]
Appendix III

S. R. Gardiner's Treatment of Parliamentary Attitudes toward the Scots,
November 1640-March 1641
As I argued in Chapter I, by March of 1641 moderate and conservative members of Parliament had been angered by the progress of the treaty to such a degree that they threatened the leadership of the active party. S. R. Gardiner observes this conflict, but mistakes its significance. To his mind the really important event of the first months of the Long Parliament was the debate on episcopacy occasioned by the London Petition. Gardiner interpreted this debate of 8 February 1641 as the birth of the parliamentary parties—as the first occasion upon which they opposed one another.

There is no doubt that this debate was significant, for it foreshadowed conflict over church government and divisions along civil war lines. However, there was another problem just as evident and about which the angriest debates were blazing already. There was no division over the commitment of the London Petition against episcopacy, but there was one over the two additional subsidies (Saturday 20 February 1641) which were proposed to meet Parliament's obligations towards the Scots. And if the great parties were facing one another on 8 February, then they were also in opposition on 22 January and 3 February over the 'Brotherlie Assistance'. Gardiner notes the debate on the subsidies. He notes the hostility it manifested toward the Scots. But he thinks it was overshadowed by the 'momentous' debate of 8 February. He regards the issue of the subsidies

as almost an extension of the debate on episcopacy. He observes that men prominent in debate for episcopacy also argued for the subsidies. 'Naturally,' he comments, 'the episcopali ans most disliked the Scots intervention.'

It is true that those vehement against the Scots often were ardent for the bishops. It is very likely that their fervour for one charged their hostility to the other. But opposition to the Scots, though related, was quite a separate issue from, and not merely an extension of, the other. The Scots were seen as obnoxious because they were Scots; dealings with them were hateful because England's honour was involved; the active party was suspect for yielding too readily to Scottish demands; and delay of moneys to the Scots was like a naked threat to the Crown. There was no mention in the anti-Scottish speeches of episcopal government; nor was there in the pro-Scottish utterances any indication of support for Presbyterianism. The subject of the debates was whether honour or political considerations should govern Parliament's policy toward the Scots. Depending on the outcome of this debate was the reform policy as propounded by Pym and his supporters. By the beginning of March 1641 the anti-Scottish group seemed to be having the better of the argument, and in so doing threatened both the leadership and the proposed reforms of the active party in the Commons.

2. ibid., 294. It is significant that Gardiner gives his account of the debate on the extra subsidies in a chapter entitled 'The Triennial Act, and the Ecclesiastical Debates', ibid., 257-301.
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