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THE
IDEA OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN WESTERN THOUGHT
From Antiquity to the Reformation

by
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian
National University

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Except where specifically stated, the work in this
thesis is my own

Signed.....

A ma fortune muable;
comme je prie qu'elle revienne!

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Even today it is commonly held that history repeats itself. The idea of historical recurrence has a long and intriguing history, and this thesis concerns the period of time in the western tradition when its expressions were most numerous and fervent. As we shall show, this idea is not to be confined to its cyclical variety, for it also entails such notions as re-enactment, retribution, renaissance and such like which belong under the wider umbrella of 'recurrence'. Moreover, it will be argued that not only the Graeco-Roman but also the biblical tradition contributed to the history of this idea. The old contrast between Judeo-Christian linear views of history and Graeco-Roman cyclical views will be seriously questioned. Beginning from Polybius, we examine the manifold forms of recurrence thinking in Greek and Roman historiography, but then turn our attention to biblical pictures of historical change, arguing that in the work of Luke-Acts and in earlier Jewish writings there was clearly an interest in the idea of history repeating itself. Jewish and early Christian writers initiated and foreshadowed an extensive synthesizing of recurrence notions and models from both traditions, although the synthesis could vary in accordance with different contexts and dogmatic considerations. In the Renaissance and Reformation the interrelationship between classical and biblical notions of recurrence reached a point of consummation, yet even in the sixteenth century some ideas distinctive to both traditions, such as the Polybian conception of a 'cycle of governments' and the biblical notion of the 're-enactment of significant events', were revived in stark separation from each other. We find ourselves dealing with a continuing, but not always fruitful 'dialogue' between the two great traditions of western thought, a dialogue which did not stop short in the days of Machiavelli, but which has been carried on to the present day. In all, this study represents the first half of a long story which I intend to continue in a work on the idea of historical recurrence from Giambattista Vico to Arnold Toynbee.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CSHB	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae</i>
ERE	<i>Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics</i>
MGH	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i>
OCD	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i>
PG	<i>Migne's Patrologiae cursus completus; Series Graeca</i>
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus; Series Latina</i>
RCAW	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>

INTRODUCTION

The idea of historical recurrence has played an important rôle in the development of western historiography, especially from Antiquity to the Reformation. The view that 'history repeats itself' is commonly seen as characteristically Greek, and especially associated with a general belief in cosmic and social cycles. It is natural, therefore, to begin our investigations with the Greek *cyclos*. The idea that history repeats itself, however, is wider than its cyclical formulation. It includes such notions as retribution, rebirth, re-enactment and even imitation. The present thesis is an attempt to trace the progress of the idea of historical recurrence, from Antiquity to the sixteenth century, in its richness and variety; to draw out the various, often competing, models and paradigms used by those who speak of historical recurrence. In considering non-cyclical as well as cyclical ideas of recurrence we need to look beyond classical or Graeco-Roman writers to Hebrew and early Christian literature. We will also see that some of the relevant paradigms are present in both great traditions of western thought.

Recognizing these complexities enables us to make a more realistic comparison of 'Greek' and 'Judeo-Christian' views of history. A number of scholars have been inclined to draw too sharp a contrast between these two views. This contrast has been interesting and fruitful, emphasizing as it does the difference between Greek philosophical doctrines of eternal recurrence and biblical beliefs about history from Creation to the Eschaton. Yet it has tended to assimilate Greek views of historical repetition to cyclical views, and to limit almost all Judeo-Christian writers to a strict linear-eschatological outlook on history. This thesis attempts to correct this approach. Contributions to a reassessment, of course, have already been made; by Ludwig Edelstein, for example, in a recent book on ideas of progress in classical Antiquity; by Arnaldo

Momigliano in his denial that any extant classical historian had a cyclical understanding of time; and by a few scholars who wish to elicit cyclical notions from the Bible.

This is not an essay in the philosophy of history, however. I have only intended to write an historical account of how historians have used recurrence models to make sense of the past. I have therefore often dealt with the material exegetically rather than philosophically, and special attention has been paid to the historical writings of Polybius, Luke and Machiavelli. Polybius has usually been regarded as a theorist of cyclical recurrence, but in fact he made use of a variety of recurrence paradigms. Luke has been taken to hold a linear view of history, but a number of recurrence notions, if not directly cyclical ones, are also present in his work. Luke's narrative reflects the impact of hellenization on Judeo-Christian thought and sets the stage for the subsequent interlacing of recurrence ideas from two major traditions. The history of these ideas from later Antiquity to the early Renaissance is interesting in its own right, and it also helps us to understand the sixteenth century, when ancient and mediaeval ideas of recurrence were either transmuted or revitalized, most remarkably in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli and of the radical Reformation.

In emphasizing the number and variety of paradigms which enter into the notion of historical recurrence, we are not saying that they can always be sharply distinguished or logically opposed. Some views of recurrence prove more difficult to disentangle than we might assume; some are not easy to relate because the languages used in expressing them arise from different areas of discourse. Before proceeding, it would be helpful to set out in a preliminary way the major views and paradigms which form the subject-matter of this thesis.

- (i) the cyclical view: the belief that history or sets of historical phenomena pass through a fixed sequence of at least three stages,

returning to what is understood to be 'an original point of departure' and beginning the cycle again.

- (ii) the alternation (or fluctuation) view: the view that there is a movement in history wherein one set of general conditions is regularly succeeded by another, which then in turn gives way to the first.
- (iii) the reciprocal view: the view that common types of events are followed by consequences in such a way as to exemplify a general pattern in history. The doctrines that departures from a mean are continually rectified, and that good and bad actions recurrently evoke their appropriate desert, are two particular and important varieties of this view.
- (iv) the re-enactment view: the view that a given action (usually taken to be of great significance) has been repeated later in the actions of others. The imitation view, which acknowledges recurrence because a person has consciously copied the actions or habits of another, is a variety of this one.
- (v) conceptions of restoration, renovation and renaissance: these entail the belief that a given set of (approved of) general conditions constitutes the revival of a former set which had since been considered defunct or dying.
- (vi) the view that certain kinds of social change are typical and are to be described by a recognized terminology. The recurrences of these changes do not necessarily belong within a cyclical, alternatory or reciprocal process. An example of this would be conventional metabolē theory (See pp. 184ff).
- (vii) the view proceeding from a belief in the uniformity of human nature. It holds that because human nature does not change the same sort of events can recur at any point of time.

(viii) other minor cases of recurrence thinking include the isolation of any two specific events which bear a very striking similarity, and the preoccupation with parallelism, that is, with resemblances, both general and precise, between separate sets of historical phenomena.

(ix) connected with almost all the above is the view that the past teaches lessons for present and future action. When this view is espoused, it is commonly (though not automatically) presupposed that the same events or sorts of events which have happened before are recurring and will recur again.

The idea of exact recurrence, we may note, was rarely incorporated into any of these views, for in the main they simply presume the recurrence of *sorts* of events, or what I have termed event-types, -complexes and -patterns.

* * *

The thesis begins with a case study, that is, with an analysis of a crucial and intricate model of recurrence in the ancient history of Polybius. This model will initiate us into many of the major preconceptions, paradigms and views occupying our attention through the whole work; and it serves as an excellent introduction to the methods and sensibilities of those who interpret the past in recurrence terms.

CHAPTER ONE

THE POLYBIAN ANACYCLOSIS OR CYCLE OF GOVERNMENTS

By the middle of the second century BC, Rome had subjugated almost all of the then known world, including such formidable powers as Macedon and Carthage. Polybius of Megalopolis wrote to explain how this had happened. The thirty-nine books of his *Historiae* received their final form after 146 BC, yet he probably began writing before he was exiled from Achaea to Rome in 170. He was at first interested in Greek affairs, but his experience of Rome and her rapidly expanding empire dramatically altered his perspective. He attempted what he called universal (rather than ethnic, 'national' or local) history, the kind of history which Rome's new world dominion had made possible. A one-time official of the Achaean League, a celebrity in the circle of brilliant Romans surrounding Scipio Aemilianus, and an intrepid traveller, Polybius was better equipped to write of Rome's rise to power than most of his contemporaries. He wrote with confidence, believing his work to be of immense practical value for the politician and the student of history.¹ He is best known for the sixth book of this history, the book where he considered the merits of Rome's

¹ For Polybius' career and its background, see esp. E Täubler, *Tyche; historische Studien*, Leipzig, 1926, pp.76-84; M. Gelzer, "Die Archaica im Geschichtswerk des Polybios", in *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Philosophische-historische Klasse*, No 2, 1940, esp. pp.8-31; K. Ziegler, in *RECA*, vol.21,pt.2.,cols.1444 ff.; K.von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity; a Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas*, New York, 1954, ch.1.; F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, Oxford 1957, vol.1, pp.1-6; cf. A.E.Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus*, Oxford, 1967, esp.pp. 294ff. For Polybius on universal and pragmatic history, see esp. *Historiae*, I, iv, 6; xxxv, 9; cf.P.Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe*, Paris 1966, pp.26ff.

constitution, and argued that a crucial factor in her success was the stability of her political institutions. The opening sections of that book will occupy most of our attention in this chapter, for there he sketched a model of historical change which he termed ἀνακύκλωσις πολιτεῶν ('the cycle of governments'¹). The *Anacyclōsis* forms an excellent beginning-point for our investigations into the idea of historical recurrence. It is a key example of cyclical thinking about history, so commonly associated with the Greek view of life. What is more, it reflects the attempt to bring into systematic relationship several ideas of recurrence so as to form a coherent theory.

According to Polybius, the *Anacyclōsis* was the natural course or order (οἰκονομία φύσεως) in which constitutions change, are transformed and return again to their original stage (*Hist.* VI, ix, 10).

Identifying six² types of constitutions, he tried to show how they followed one another in a fixed sequence. The first type, kingship or *basileia*, was the just reign of one man by hereditary succession. This *politeia* degenerated into tyranny, an unjust hereditary rule which is the vicious form allied to kingship (and sometimes called monarchy).³

¹ Or better still, the process whereby constitutions move in recurring cycles. See *Historiae*, VI, ix, 10, cf. iv, 6-ix, 9. The texts used include those reproduced and edited by J. Schweighaeuser, *Polybii Megalopolitani Historiarum*, Leipzig, 1795, 8 vols.; J.L. Strachan-Davidson (ed.), *Selections from Polybius*, Oxford, 1888; W.R. Paton (ed.) *Polybius; the Histories*, (Loeb Class Lib.), London, 1922, ff. 6 vols.; T. Büttner-Wobst (ed.) *Polybius; Historiae*, (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Stuttgart, 1962-7, 5 vols. For lexical aids, see esp. Schweighaeuser, *op.cit.* vol 8, s.v. 'Index Graecitatis Polybianae sive Lexicon Polybianum' (following pp.i-lxxx); A. Mauersberger, *Polybius Lexicon* (im Auftrage der Wissenschaften zu Berlin), Berlin, 1961-8, three parts, (unfinished).

² In VI, iv, 6, Polybius refers to six γένη πολιτειῶν, yet in 6-10 appears to consider seven; for the explanation, see *infra*, pp. 39-40.

³ Polybius can use τυραννίς and μοναρχία interchangeably; so VI, iv, 6; cf. esp. iii, 9; VIII, viii, 4-7; see also F.W. Walbank's discussion in 'Polybius on the Roman constitution', in *Classical Quarterly*, XXXVII, 1943, p.76 and ff. Μοναρχία can be used of the primitive rule preceding the establishment of βασιλεία, cf. VI, v, 9, or of one man rule in general, so iii, 10; iv, 1-2. Paton erroneously takes μοναρχία rather than βασιλεία to be the subject of iv, 8.

Tyranny was replaced in turn by aristocracy, the worthy rule of a few influential citizens, but this also lapsed into its degenerate counterpart, oligarchy - the régime of the irresponsible and greedy few. Democracy, an orderly rule by the whole people, arose on the destruction of oligarchy, but it, too, changed into its vicious complement, mob-rule (*ochlocratia*)¹, thus completing the series. Polybius presented two accounts of this process in summary form (VI, iv, 7-10, v, 4-ix, 9) and in the second he attempted to isolate the causes of the transformations from one type of government to another. He also made it clear that the whole series began and ended with the same socio-political order - an elementary form of *monarchia*. This monarchy preceded kingship in the first instance and followed mob-rule in the last, and it was understood to be the natural rule over men when their behaviour and conditions of existence are the most animal-like.² With this at the beginning and end of the sequence, the whole natural process appears capable of continuous repetition, even if Polybius has bequeathed us no historical example of such a recurrence in the life of a given political entity, and even though he spent remarkably little time on the theoretical idea of an orderly, cyclical process continuing *ad infinitum*.³

Thus the *Anacyclōsis* covers a series of stages, including a zig-zag line of change (or *metabolē*) between worthy and unworthy *politeiai*, as well as a return to an original point of departure where the fixed sequence of stages begins again. According to

¹ VI, iv, 7-10. *Ochlocratia* is interchangeable with *Cheirocratia*, cf. ix, 8-9; lvii, 9.

² VI, v, 9; ix, 9, cf. iv, 2; 7.

³ VI, ix, 9-10 is the key passage in this respect, but cf. also v, 4-6 and discussion *infra*, p. 11ff..

Polybius one could therefore prognosticate not only the most likely immediate destiny of a given constitution, but also the eventual reversion of all political societies to a primitive state, a state which he associated with bestiality or the vulgar herd, and with the emergence of a strong 'monarchical' master.¹

Such a comprehensive picture of recurring political processes is unique in classical literature. Amongst Greek and Roman writers whose works have survived, Polybius is left as the most advanced theoretical exponent of historical recurrence. He had imbibed enough of the specialist's world of academicians, peripatetics and Stoics to formulate abstract philosophical principles of his own, and nowhere more ostentatiously than in the *Historiae* Bk. VI. Whether he created or reproduced² the theoretical model of *Anacyclōsis*, it enabled him succinctly to combine numerous traditional lines of Greek thinking about ordered change, growth and decay, the nature and fate of all things, into one systematic *Übersicht*.

Polybius, however, was primarily interested in human affairs rather than in the general laws of nature or in metaphysical questions about changing phenomena. Our investigations into his important anacyclic model and his ideas of recurrence can best begin by discussing the implications of his decidedly historical interests. We will then proceed to subject the *Anacyclōsis* to a careful dissection.

¹ See esp. VI, iv, 11-12; ix, 10-11. On bestiality, cf. ix, 9 (ἀποτεθριωμένον), and on herds, cf. v, 7-9.

² VI, iv, 7-10 could well be based on a source, for example; cf. esp. H. Ryffel, *METABOLH ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΩΝ; der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen (Noctes Romanae II)*, Bern, 1949, p.202, cf. pp.185, 195, but as we have no comparable theoretical statement of *anacyclōsis* before Polybius, we must regard this view as an unhelpful *argumentum ex silentio*.

A) Polybius as a theorist of historical rather than cosmological recurrence.

Book VI of the *Historiae* is largely devoted to Rome and her mixed constitution, and it is important to recognise that Polybius delineated his cycle of governments as a preface to a much longer discussion. His conceptual framework was evidently set up for the sake of this subsequent exposition. As we shall see, Rome's special achievements, including her constitutional soundness, were assessed in the light of the anacyclic process (pp. 51ff.). That certainly establishes the paramountcy of his socio-political concerns. On the other hand, the *Anacyclōsis* itself contains a sufficient number of features which, while confirming his special interests, also invite us to reflect upon the differences between Polybius' approach to recurrence and the approaches of those before him.

In the second, more complex delineation of his model, Polybius attempted to relate the *Anacyclōsis* to actual facts,¹ and began by a rather guarded appeal to the traditional idea of societies originating from among the remnants of a long-past disaster. At this point (and it is the only point in his whole work where he does so) Polybius showed himself aware of what may be termed Greek 'catastrophe-theory', that is, those theories which postulate great periodic upheavals interrupting the life of the whole *cosmos*, including one of its most significant components, the human race. But he was careful in this respect, to avoid philosophical contention; he began his treatment by asking 'what are the beginnings of *politeiai* and where do they first emerge?' and answered that they spring from those who survive a great destruction of the human species such as has been and will 'many times again' be caused by 'flood,

¹ VI, v, 2 (πρὸς τὴν πραγματικὴν ἱστορίαν) .

famine, crop failure or similar cause' (v, 4-5). The vexed question whether humanity, or even the whole cosmos, had a fixed *archē* was handled carefully, with an eye to both of the main contending parties of the time, the upholders of *aeternitas mundi* on the one hand and those who had believed in a fixed beginning and end of the existing universe on the other. Polybius' position on the beginning of human life was ambiguous: there is no evidence that he ever committed himself to anything like the peripatetic view that the cosmic order was ageless or to the traditional Stoic doctrine, which saw the whole universe, with *all* its inhabitants, as undergoing periodic dissolution and reconstitution (*ecpyrōsis* and *palingenesia*). He did once write that time was infinite,¹ but even an Epicurean could have declared that. Polybius was no cosmologist. It is admittedly unlikely that he was ignorant of the relevant debates, especially since the leading Roman Stoic, Panaetius of Rhodes, the philosopher who has claims to being Polybius' closest colleague, was famous for rejecting the notion of cosmic *ecpyrosis*.² Nevertheless, Polybius considers catastrophe-theory only from an historical point of view; he is a theorist of historical rather than of cosmological recurrence.

¹ Cf. IV, xi, 5.

² On this rejection, see esp. *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta*, (ed. M. van Straaten) (*Philosophia Antiqua V*), Leiden, 1952, Frgs. 64-69. On Panaetius' connections with Polybius, Frgs. 2, 15-6, 21, Cicero, *De Re Publica*, I, xxi, 34, (although the evidence that the two actually met and taught together is slender, since it is not known whether Panaetius arrived in Rome before Polybius returned to Greece; cf. C.O. Brink and F. Walbank 'The Construction of the Sixth Book of Polybius' in *Classical Quarterly*, N.S., IV, 1954, p. 103, n.3.).

This last distinction is hardly an insignificant one, and it is necessary to elucidate it by placing the *Anacyclōsis*, especially Polybius' approach to catastrophe-theory, against the background of Greek cosmological thinking. Since Thales, Greek philosophy had never ceased to reflect an interest in questions concerning *genesis*, *metabolē* and *phthora*. When Polybius commented briefly (towards the end of Bk. VI), that 'all existing things are subject to decay and change', and that this was 'a truth scarcely needing proof' (lvii, 1), he put himself in line with the main stream of Greek philosophical speculation on these matters. But when Greek philosophers speculated about change and decay, and in terms of recurrence or periodicity or *cycloi*, they were almost invariably concerned with the 'material' universe, its constitution or components, and its overall destiny. The early Eleatic Xenophanes (sixth century BC), for example, is supposed to have contended that the earth was being continually mixed with the sea, that in time, it would be dissolved into moisture, becoming a mud in which all mankind is destroyed, and that 'then there is another beginning of coming-to-be (πάλιν ἀρχεσθαι τῆς γενέσεως), this foundation applying to all worlds'.¹ In this he may have drawn much from his Ionian predecessor Anaximander, who probably held a similar view,² and certainly his speculations set the stage for the more elaborate Empedoclean cosmic cycle. According to Empedocles

¹ *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz), Berlin, 1952 edn., (henceforth Diels-Kranz), vol. 1, Frg. B33.

² For discussion see esp. G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers, a critical history with a selection of texts*, Cambridge, 1969, p. 140 (henceforth Kirk-Raven), and note the difficult parenthesis in Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum*, ix, 21, which makes Xenophanes a pupil or 'hearer' of Anaximander.

the world underwent a continual but very slow alternation between tendencies which integrated and tendencies which separated the four elements, between the formation of 'whole-natured creatures' and the appearance of bodily aberrations (monsters, separated limbs), between the forces of harmony and the principle of evil, or, in the most all-embracing terms, between the powers of Love and Strife.¹ Basically those who saw cosmic processes in this way assumed that the primary substances of the All were indestructible, so that the world was only temporarily transformed through great elemental processes or the agency of Strife. Beneath persistent *metabolē* lay an awesome 'agelessness' (the Greek philosophers were no less fascinated by duration than by change)², and this quality of the *athanaton* was reflected in the recurring succession of states through which the *eosmos*/world came to be and passed away. By Polybius' time, the chief proponents of this type of approach were the Stoics, yet they adopted this way of viewing the universe only with interesting modifications, because on the surface their doctrine of *ecpyrōsis* prescribed a much more definite end and dissolution of the existing world than seems to have been envisaged by Xenophanes or Empedocles. Yet although this doctrine must have been used as a weapon to

¹ The best recent studies of Empedocles' cosmic cycle are in English, cf. esp. D. O'Brien, 'Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle' in *Classical Quarterly*, N.S., XVII, 1967, pp.29ff; *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle; a reconstruction*, (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge, 1969, pp. 1-3 et passim; cf. C.H. Kahn, 'Religion and natural philosophy in Empedocles' doctrine of the soul', in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XLII, 1960, esp. pp.15-24.

² J. Burnet's insistence on this point hardly needs reinforcing, cf. *Early Greek Philosophy*, London, 1930 edn., p. 9.

contradict Platonists and peripatetics who were teaching the eternity of the world,¹ the Stoics who propounded the idea of world conflagration did not understand it as a total destruction - certainly not as a destruction of 'matter' and 'acting force' (ἄποια ὕλη, πνεῦμα). That would have meant defecting to another position equally if not more disturbing, the view upheld by the atomistic-Epicurean tradition that there was not one world, but an infinity of worlds, each single world living out its separate and relatively short existence, then to be lost forever in an endless, meaningless void. For the Stoics, conflagration and restoration were, rather, *mundi aeternae vices*,² and Chrysippus (third century BC) with his followers put much emphasis on the cyclical or periodic return of the same world and the same people,³ so that in fact they shared much in common with those pre-Socratics who had talked about an alternating succession of cosmic states. Even what was peculiarly their own was claimed by them to have pre-Socratic antecedents, for concerning the world's reversion to elemental fire they appealed to the early Ionian Heraclitus,⁴ and their notion of an exact (or, as it was called,

¹ There is surprisingly little evidence, however, to show that the doctrine was used polemically in this way. A passage in Polybius' *Hist.* (XXXIII, ii, 8-10 = Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, VI, xiv, 8-10) is significant in this connection.

² To use the term employed by J. von Arnim, (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Stuttgart, 1964, re-issue of 1902/3 edit., vol.2, p.183, cf. esp. Philo Judaeus, *De Aeternitate Mundi*, viii.

³ See Chrysippus (and others), von Arnim, Frgs. 623, 625-8, etc. (vol.2, pp.189-91), cf. Zeno, Frgs. 98, 109 (vol.1, pp.27, 109), and note Panaetius, Frgs. 65-9 (van Straaten, p.19).

⁴ On the probably erroneous interpretation of Heraclitus, cf. von Arnim, Frg. 430 (Chrysippus), Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. Philos.*, ix, 8, Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, civ, 1 (from a Stoic source), cf. Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 106 E-F, Marcus Aurelius, *Meditationes*, III, iii, etc.

'numerical') repetition of all things may well have been derived from the Pythagorean stock of ideas.¹

For the Stoics and those who foreshadowed them, regular cosmic *periodoi* were described in terms of *archē* and *telos*, and of momentous events which radically altered the condition of the universe; for the Platonists and peripatetics, however, it was the ever-moving circular courses of the planetary bodies which formed the basic image of periodicity. The world was eternal; that was a fundamental Aristotelian doctrine opposed to any belief in total transformation and re-creation². And in his so-called *Politicus* myth Plato implicitly satirized the Empedoclean cycle by depicting a cosmos which, once it had passed through a three-staged process (and a process Plato significantly calls *anacyclēsis*), was established by its divine Maker as immortal and free from decay (*ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήραος*).³

¹ See von Arnim, Frgs.624, 627 (Chrysippus) and on numerical repetition amongst the Pythagoreans, cf. Eudemus of Rhodes (in *Die Schule des Aristoteles; Texte und Kommentar*, F. Wehrli (ed.), vol.8, Basel, 1969), Frg.88 (p.41); cf. Porphyry, *Vita Pythagorae*, xix. See also E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, (E.T.), New York, 1962 re-issue of 1897 edit., p.166, n.2.

² See esp. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, I, 280a-284b, Eudemus, Frgs.38-40 (Wehrli, pp.27-8), Theophrastus, *apud Philo Judaeus, De Aeternitate Mundi*, xxiii, 117, Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Commentaria*, esp. on p.227b.21 ff. (cf. edit. by H. Diels, in *Commentaria in Aristotelē Graeca*, vol.10, Berlin, 1895, pp.884 ff.) Cf. also Dicaearchus, Frg.47 (Wehrli, vol.1, p.22), Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliothēke*, I, iv, 3.

³ See Plato's *Politicus* 273E for the phrase; cf. *Timaeus*, 29A. On Plato's partial use but ultimate rejection of the Empedoclean system, cf. esp. J.B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues*, Cambridge, 1942, pp.21-7 and ch.4. On the term ἀνακύκλησις in Plato, cf. *Politicus* 269E. Despite his apparent satire, it does not follow that Plato excluded the idea of the cosmos turning in opposite directions over great *περίοδοι* (so *Politicus*, 270B); only three identifiable stages, however, can be detected in the ἀνακύκλησις of the *Politicus*. To take the second first, there is the Age of Kronos and the Earthborn (the Age of the 'Great Reversal') (269D-E, 270D ff, 273Aa), the third Age being the present one (273Ab-E) - the continuing degeneration of which God managed to forestall (273E) - and the first being the normal rotating state before the Great Reversal (269C, 270A, 272E).

In a cosmos without real genesis (if Plato wrote of creation it was only concessively and mythologically),¹ and in which *phthora* never attained to the extremity of a total conflagration, large-scale changes affecting man became a matter of outside astral influences which caused more confined, yet nevertheless catastrophic, events on an indestructible earth. Transformations at the cosmic level were replaced in Platonic and Aristotelian writings by limited cataclysms and regional disasters by fire.² Cyclical thinking about cosmology was thus in a special sense transferred to the realm of 'history' or of the human species. One should be careful here, of course. After all, it was Plato who glorified the circular revolutions of the seven heavenly bodies, who conceived time in cyclical terms as the 'moving image of eternity' and who also accepted the great truth that all things grow and die.³ The altered stress, however, had to do with those great time-lapses which certain pre-Socratic cosmologists had understood to be cycles, *periodoi* which they divided into stages and took to end and begin again with the same or similar conditions. For some, it was the All that had undergone great cyclical processes, but, Plato, with his incontrovertibly eternal universe, simply focussed his attention on parts of the cosmos. Concerning man he wrote of those many great eons of time, separated from one another by the fact that, in each, human existence was bounded by cataclysm and extensive

¹ So P. Friedländer, *Plato* (III: *The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods*) (E.T.) London, 1969, vol.1. pp.198 ff. Aristotle took the *Politicus* myth too literally in *Physica*, VIII, 251b and *De Caelo*, 280a.

² Plato *Leges*, III, 677A; *Timaeus*, 22D, 23A; *Critias*, IIIA, 112A; Aristotle, esp. *Meteorologica*, I, xiv, 351b, *Politica*, 1269a4 ff; Fragments (cf. *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* (ed. W.D. Ross) Oxford 1955, frg.8. (R²², R³¹³, W8). Note also the context of *Protrepticus*, Frg.53 apud Iamblichus, *De Communi Mathematica Scientia*, III, 26, cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle; Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, (E.T., R. Robinson) Oxford, 1948, pp.71-2.

³ See esp. *Timaeus*, 37C-39E, 80D-81E, *Respublica*, 546A.

destruction (cf. *Leg.*, III, 677A). It was Plato who first popularized the idea, later to appear in Polybius, that political societies emerged from the remnants of such disasters.

Significantly enough, however, Plato did not insist that the process governing the development and destruction of human groups and civilizations reproduced the kind of formal patterning, regularity and alternation found in the normal movements of the heavens or in such a system as Empedocles'. Admittedly he stressed the virtual innumerability of the cataclysms,¹ and reading the third book of his *Laws* one is left with the impression that, in every immediately post-cataclysmic situation, men must start on the same slow journey from the simple-mindedness of the mountaineering herdsmen who survive a deluge, to the establishment of the *polis* (677B-680E). But, in contrast with the slow reversion to mud or the steadily increasing influence of Strife, Plato's cataclysms come unexpectedly; they are effected through planetary deviation rather than representing the completion of an even, uniform movement in the heavens (*Tim.* 220E). And Plato consciously created room for variation. Although the idea of continual recurrence is suggested when he asks,

'Have not thousands upon thousands of *poleis* come into existence, and on a similar computation, have not just as many perished? And have they not in each case exhibited all kinds of constitutions many times everywhere?' (*Leg.* III, 676B-C),

his sense of multiformity and of the differing possibilities of *metabolē* in human affairs, was remarkably strong.² He did not advance

¹ On their multiplicity, cf. *Leg.*, 676B-C, (as well as the previous reference), *Timaeus*, 23B.

² Cf. C. Mugler, (*Deux Thèmes de la Cosmologie Grecque; Devenir Cyclique et Pluralité des Mondes (Études et Commentaires, XVII)*), Paris, 1953, esp. pp.93-7), who argues that Plato consciously cultivated this variation to counter previous cyclical cosmologies he disliked, and to strengthen the notion of directional as against cyclical time.

the teaching that each inter-cataclysmic period was a simple repetition of the other. By implication, perhaps, the same sorts of *politeiai* were understood to arise during each grand time-lapse, as well as parallel historical situations, but if we can take his description of antediluvian Athens and Atlantis seriously (and Plato seems to wish us to)¹ then we realize that he has drawn out the essential differences between one period of civilization and another.² If anything, Plato advanced the view that the earliest is best; whether one considers the blissful Age of Kronos, or the time when the gods invented the arts and divided the lands, or even the period when ancient Athenian heroes thrust back Atlantid aggrandisement, those ages prior to the present one were closer to a state of perfection.³ This view complemented Plato's picture of the material universe as a 'creation' lacking the perfection of the divine One lying behind all reality, and of the ideal *politeia* (the 'Republic') which eventually comes to slide into the mire of self-interest, false freedoms and tyranny.⁴

Aristotle in turn evidently took the essentials of Plato's

¹ Cf. *Critias*, 110A-B, and *Tim.*, 22E-23C, 25E, where Plato places a peculiarly historical stress on the fact that Egypt, which escaped the regional deluge last affecting Hellas, held documents relating to the ancient era of the Atlantids - documents which the Athenian Solon had been able to examine (cf. R. Weil, *L' 'Archaeologie' de Platon*, (*Études et Commentaires XXXII*), Paris, 1959, pp.14 ff.).

² On Plato's idealization of the ante-diluvian Athenians, see esp. B. Knauss, *Staat und Mensch in Hellas*, Darmstadt, 1940, edn., pp.39 ff., cf. Friendlander, *op.cit.*, vol. 3, pp.385 ff.

³ *Politicus*, 269C ff, cf. *Leg.* IV, 713C-D, (Kronos, the earthborn creatures); *Polit.*, 274B-D, cf. *Philebus*, 16C (gods and arts); (cf. *Politicus*, 273B, *Gorgias*, 523B, on the Age of Zeus); *Critias*, 110C-E, *Tim.*, 23C-25C, (period of heroes).

⁴ So, *Tim.*, 27C ff (on 'Creation' and the Demiurge, cf. *Politicus*, 273C-D), *Resp.* VIII-IX (543-92) (on the decline of the ideal *politeia*).

catastrophe-theory for granted, occasionally alluding to cataclysms when he discusses very early societies.¹ For Aristotle, cataclysmic eruptions formed part of the world's fixed and natural operations; they were not the result of heavenly deviation. But although he wrote of a Great Winter or inundation, for example, as if they coincided with the special positioning of the heavens (at the end of the Great Year),² he still took their incidence to be unexpected because one could not be sure which region they would affect.³ The important point remains, however. For Plato and Aristotle great upheavals were not cosmic; they became regionalized or confined geographically, or (as in the case of the Great Winter) were treated as specifically meteorological rather than as general cosmological events.⁴ And although the evidence is scattered, Aristotle apparently concurred with Plato in assuming that various periods of civilization

¹ Esp. *Meteorol.*, 351b 24-8, cf. 7-14, *Politica*, 1268b-1269a, *Fragm.*, (Ross), No. 8 (R²2, R³13, W8).

² The Great Year was the period required for the heavenly bodies to return to their original positions, cf. Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, in *Frg.19* (R³, 2S, W19). I. Dühring, in *Aristotle's Protrepticus; an attempt at reconstruction*, (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*), Gothenburg, 1961, excludes this fragment from his reconstruction of *Protrepticus*; for discussion on the crucial passage from Censorinus, see F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World; a Comparison with his predecessors*, Ithaca, New York, 1960, p.426 and n. 136. Quite apart from the question whether Aristotle did propound the idea of a Great Year or not, it is not easy to prove this from *Meteorol.*, 352a31-4. On the Great Year in Pythagoras, see esp. J.A. Philip, *Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism* (*Phoenix; Journal of the Classical Association of Canada, Supp. Vol. 7*), Toronto, 1966, p.74; in Heraclitus, see esp. Mugler, *op.cit.*, pp.28-9; in Aristarchos and others, cf. T. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos; the Ancient Copernicus*, Oxford, 1913, pp.314 ff. cf. 132 ff. 286ff. Cf. also, Plato, *Tim.*, 39D, etc. and see *infra*, pp.110ff., 348f..

³ Aristotle, *Meteorol.*, I, xiv, 352a30-2 within the context of 352a 17-353a31, on slow changes.

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, esp. *Meteorol.* I, xiv, 352a33-5; 352b16-21; 25ff; Plato, esp. *Critias*, IIIB. See also R. McKeon 'Plato and Aristotle as Historians; a Study of Method in the History of Ideas', in *Ethics*, LI, 1940, p.92.

saw repetition only in a very general sense, the earliest men in each post-cataclysmic situation having to form the groups and rediscover the skills on which future *politeiai* would be based.¹

Polybius thus basically inherited two traditions of speculation concerning violent disruptions to human life. One, the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, was more historically oriented than the other. For Plato and Aristotle there was really only one 'history', stretching back into time immemorial² even if cut off from human knowledge by the wastage of flood and fire; and catastrophes were primarily important for their effect on mankind. The Stoics and some of their pre-Socratic predecessors, by contrast, placed far greater stress on the cyclical processes undergone by the whole cosmos. For the Stoics further, there was more than one 'history', or better still, there was one 'history' which was repeated over and again an infinite number of times.³ The cyclical element is not absent from the Platonic-Aristotelian position, however, since it was possible for them to speak of cataclysms occurring 'periodically', and since for them, such regional disasters demarcated cycles of civilization. But the Stoic view is nevertheless much more impressively circular in its impact.

¹ Aristotle's notion of learning scientific skills over and again (see *Metaphysica*, 993b; 1074a38-b14, *Politica*, 1329b, cf. Plato, *Leg.* III, 677D, and see *infra*, p. 419) should probably be linked with catastrophe-theory. Cf. Also Plato *Leg.* III, 677C, 678D, 679D on the re-acquisition of skills after a deluge.

² For Plato's heightened perception of immense past time, see esp. *Leg.*, III, 678B, cf. 676AB, BC: and A.E. Taylor's significant comments about its originality in *Plato; the Man and his Work*, London, 1948 edn., p.472. For Aristotle on infinite time, cf. esp. *Physica*, IV, xff, (217bff) and n. 1 on the following page.

³ I am thinking of the older Stoics: on later modifications of the Stoic theory of conflagration, see esp. *infra*, pp349f. and note Zeller, *op.cit.*, p.169.

Their grand cycle included every single event in world history, and the return of the cosmos to an original point of departure, with the consequent repetition of exactly the same events and conditions as before, was clearcut.

The *Anacyclōsis* possesses certain features of both these approaches, yet it also reflects Polybius' caution. On the one hand, the Polybian cycle operates strictly within historical bounds. This historicization is more in agreement with Plato and Aristotle than the Stoics.¹ On the other hand, it is curious how the unexpected cataclysm is no longer the key focal point from which cyclical movement in 'history' is defined. In Polybius, catastrophes and the bare facts of survival become no more than a stage-setting; once men start along the road towards civilization, it is, according to the *Anacyclōsis*, their own collective career and what happens to their own socio-political creations which inscribe the circle. And if, after alternating between good and bad constitutions, a society returns to its first state, that is not the omen of an imminent down-pour, or a physical catastrophe, it is just the signal for a political, social, human and therefore essentially historical process to begin again.² Neither Plato nor Aristotle touched on the return to social primitivism in solely political terms, but they had only regional *cataclysmoi* in view.³ What is more, the *Anacyclōsis* is more heavily

¹ See also Polybius' peripatetic-looking comments in IV,x1,4-10; xlii, 1-5 on the infinity of time in connection with the silting-up of the Pontus. Cf. Aristotle's *Meteorol.*, 351a19ff, 352a (land-sea transformations), and on the infinity of time in this connection, 353a15-24, cf. 351b8-13).

² It should be noted how Polybius starts with general state of early civilization in *Hist.* VI,v,4-vi,12, and yet on referring to the beginning of a new cycle in ix,9, seems to be assuming that recommencement only applies to one given society.

cyclical in the sense that its stages and its renewal-point are much more historically definite than with Plato's inter-cataclysmic periods. Polybius' position is rather unusual, for he seems to have carried some of the theory of cosmic cycles and alternatory processes into the domain of history. As the *Anacyclōsis* is not closed off by a catastrophe, it conveys the impression of an alternation between the 'primitive' and the 'civilized' (as well as between good and bad constitutions), rather than a model grounded in catastrophe-theory. Despite these shades of pre-Socratic theory, however, Polybius actually emancipated himself even more convincingly from cosmology than either Plato or Aristotle, since the two philosophers' ideas of recurring civilizations continued to have some real ties with quasi-cosmological beliefs, with the notion that extra-terrestrial movements have great consequence for the destiny of mankind.

So much for an initial assessment of the anacyclic model *vis à vis* classical cosmology. But it should also be recognized that there was reflection on the relationship between cosmology and 'history' right up to Polybius' day. Efforts to amalgamate some of the older pre-Socratic cosmological systems with Platonic and Aristotelian structures form part of the more immediate theoretical background to Polybius. Stoic thought was not without syncretistic elements, of course, but most relevant to Polybius' case is a piece of popularist, Hellenistic philosophy on 'the nature of the Universe' by the so-called 'Ocellus Lucanus' (second century B.C.). This writer upheld the eternity of the world like any good peripatetic, yet he inclined to the view that there were alternating processes in the life of elements and plants,¹

¹ Alternation is probably not the best term to describe the cyclical interpenetration of the elements, or what Ocellus called ἀντιπερίστασις, but it suits his cyclical notions concerning plant life (ἐπανόκαμψις). For the terms, cf. *De Universi Natura*, I, xiv, 20-1, (R. Harder [ed.], *Neue philologischen Untersuchungen I*, Berlin, 1925, p. 14, sect. 16), and cf. xii, 6-xiii, 19 (p. 14, sects. 14-6). For a discussion of the above terms, cf. also Ryffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-7.

and in his understanding of man, Pythagorean and some Stoic tendencies clearly get the better of him. He taught catastrophe-theory rather than cosmic *ecpyrōsis*, cataclysms marking a clear line of demarcation between the separate, great periods of humanity.¹ Significantly enough, however, each great period was understood to see the recurrence of exactly the same events. Thus, in Athenian history, there were reappearances of the ancient Inachos, and with successive cycles came repetitions of the same barbarian invasion of Greece.² Without requiring the conclusion that Ocellus directly influenced Polybius, we may note how similar tendencies of thought were important for the formulation of the *Anacyclōsis*. Plato had hinted at historical regression, at an increasing isolation of man from his earliest, most perfect condition. A teleological aspect was revealed in his thinking; history had overall direction. But both Ocellus and Polybius made the cycle of civilization decisively non-teleological;

¹ Cf. III, iv, 4-7 (Harder, p.21, sect.41) and see Harder's notes, esp. pp.115-9.

² So III, iv, 4-v, 14 (Harder, p.21, sects.41-2); on Inachos and on the Barbarian invasion, v. 9-12. (Inachos the Argive, was sometimes represented as a river god, yet also quite often as a mortal ancestor of the Argive Kings, and therefore the earliest figure in Greek legend). Harder considers that Ocellus' use of catastrophe-theory is primarily peripatetic (*ecpyrōsis* is bypassed), and he concludes much the same about Ocellus' interest in early man (on Inachos, pp. 118-9). On the other hand, he does recognize Pythagorean influences at work (cf, esp. pp. 149 ff). Early testimonia link Ocellus with Pythagoreanism, (so, Censorinus, *De Dies Natalis*, iv. 3, Philo; *De Aeternitate Mundi*, xii, 66; Lucian *Slip of the Tongue*, v. cf. Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorae* 167 (Diels-Kranz, *FVS*, i, pp. 344-5), (all in Harder, *op.cit.*, p. 3 as sects. 2, 3, 5 and 1), but it is preferable to take these to refer to the 'authentic' pre-Socratic Ocellus.

taken as a whole their models were axiologically 'objective',¹ rather like the universe of the Stoics in which every phase of the great cycle was natural, necessary and a mark of eternal cosmic stability. Both Plato and Aristotle had written of catastrophes as regional, and although Ocellus and Polybius did not take issue with this, they rather stressed the effect of these upheavals on the human race as a whole.² Thus certain features of the *Anacyclōsis* seem related to more recent reflection on cosmic *cycloi* and the overall patterns of human existence. On the other hand, Polybius made his cycle so essentially historical that it ceased to be a mini-cosmology as in Ocellus. And although the anacyclic process was taken to recur, Polybius nowhere propounded a doctrine of exact recurrence. Only the general configurations, the shifts from one form of constitution to another (as well as the causal factors operating these *metabolai*) undergo repetition, even if his acceptance of a fixed historical pattern is in part a concession to Pythagorean and Stoic lines of thought. Furthermore, Polybius went beyond Ocellus in treating catastrophe-theory as a secondary issue for historical study. That stance actually

¹ In Ocellus' words the human condition or φύσις 'did not get (ultimately) better or worse, but forever more new' (οὐ μείζονος οὐδὲ μείονος αὐτῆς γινομένης ἀλλὰ καινοτέρας αἰεί). Polybius has a limited teleology in connection with Rome (see *infra*. pp. 114, 176ff. (and pp. 100ff), but, amongst other things, his insistence on the fact that Rome would decline like any other state (VI, ix, 13; lvii, 1 ff, etc.) and his idea that Fortune (τύχη) is 'ever making things new' (πολλὰ....καινοποιούσα), (I, iv, 5), bring him close to Ocellus on this point.

² So Polybius VI, v, 5 (quoted *supra*, p.9), and by implication, Ocellus (in discussing general φθορά in III, iv, 7 and humanity in general in v, 12). That wider, less regional concerns interested the middle and later Stoics, see esp. *infra*, p. 319n.

accords well with what is known of other tendencies to historicize and demythologize the traditional 'deluges' by ranging them, as did Dicaearchus in the early third century, alongside all those other forces which brought about the destruction of men.¹ When Polybius briefly mentioned catastrophes, he wrote of 'floods, pestilences, crop devastations and other such causes' destroying the human race. Whether or not he was quoting here some of Dicaearchus' very words,² his intention was to affirm quite simply that catastrophes were common amongst mankind, that they were hardly to be limited to deluges or conflagrations, and that they were in no special sense removed from, but on the contrary, very much a part of the province of ἱστορία πραγματική. The weight of recurrence was consistently thrown upon political rather than on more 'naturo-historical' events.

Polybius, it appears, did not take his anacycltic model lightly; he was careful with words and impressions. It is interesting that, in referring to the *archai* of political societies and to *cataclysmoi*, he did not commit himself to an identifiable philosophical position concerning either. The issue of an absolute beginning of mankind was shelved, and catastrophes were treated as though they had no effective bearing on any given cosmological position. Was Polybius deliberately electing to follow a mediating path between opposing philosophical camps? Was he attracted by the possibilities of a model syncretistic enough to placate the members of different schools? The rest of his description of the so-called *Anacyclōsis* suggests as much. Polybius

¹ So Dicaearchus (in *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, ed. F. Wehrli, vol. 1, Basel, 1967), Frg. 24 (= Cicero, *De Officiis*, III, v, 16); Pseudo-Hippodamus, in Stobaeus, *Anthologia*, IV, xxxi, 71, cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, XV, 240ff. Not that either Plato or Aristotle had disregarded types of human destruction other than great flood and great fire, cf. Plato, *Leg.* III 677A, V, 740E-741A, (see *infra*, p. 68); Aristotle, *Meteorol.*, 351b14-16, Frg. 8 (R²², R³¹³, W8) (Philoponus).

² Polybius, VI, v, 5, (ὅταν ἢ διὰ κατακλυσμοὺς ἢ διὰ λοιμικὰς περιστάσεις ἢ δι' ἀφορίας καρπῶν ἢ δι' ἄλλας τοιαύτας αἰτίας...), Dicaearchus, Frg. 24 (*apud* Cicero) (*qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudines, ...*).

may have recognized the recurrence of catastrophes, thus recalling before all else Plato's *Laws*, yet it was not Plato's sense of a virtually immeasurable past¹ that he stressed (and so by implication the eternity of man)², but the future likelihood of the destruction of men many times again.³ One might well assert at this point that it is typical of Polybius to be concerned about foreseeing the future, because sound prognostication certainly formed a crucial part of what he took the study of history to entail (p.147), but since he was at this point talking less about political realities than about theoretical possibilities, it is feasible to infer that he chose words both to acknowledge the Platonic view, and to safeguard the position of the Stoics and others who taught that history had restricted boundaries.⁴ Consciously avoiding philosophical subtleties, Polybius understood his model to suit the 'common intelligence' (ἡ κοινὴ ἐπίνοια) (*Hist.* VI, v, 2), and thus the suspicion that he was attempting to combine differing outlooks and to pay respect to the major 'traditions' of Greek thought generally conceived, is not ill-founded. Polybius was no

¹ See esp. *Leg.*, III, 676AB;BC; 677A;D; 678B on great lengths of time. Polybius may have quoted Dicaearchus on the types of catastrophes (see previous note, and cf. Plato, *Leg.*, 677A (κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς), but the idea of recurrence in connection with upheavals certainly reminds us of the *Leg.* III, (677A(πολλὰς...μῆραν τῶν πολλῶν) 676C (πολλάκις ἐκασταχοῦ), and cf. Walbank, *Commentary*, *op. cit.*, vol.1, p.650).

² See Plato, esp. *Leg.*, 676B.

³ The emphasis, more on πάλιν πολλάκις ἔσσεθ' ὁ λόγος ἀφρεῖ than on ἤδη γεγονέναι (VI, v, 5).

⁴ It is noteworthy that most of Stoic talk about the eternal recurrence of the same world was inevitably directed towards future repetition (largely because of its implications for the moral life) rather than towards the innumerable recurrences of the past. So see Chrysippus, *Frg.* 596 (von Arnim, vol.2, pp. 183-4), Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis*, vii, 23; *De Natura Deorum*, ii, 118; Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, iii, 30, etc. Also note Polybius' use of the apparently Stoic phrase: ὁ λόγος ἀφρεῖ in v, 5a; but one should be careful, cf. Walbank, *op. cit.*, vol. 1. p.651.

great philosopher, of course, and there were also historians before him who had appealed to the idea of a *cyclos* in human affairs. Yet he is the first historian known to have formed a coherent theory of cyclical recurrence. We have seen something of his powers of synthesis in achieving this; but his concern to accommodate different viewpoints was hardly limited to the area of cosmology, as one discovers by examining his anacyclic model still further.

B) The Polybian 'Anthropology'

According to Polybius, those who survived a *cataclysmos* were naturally weakened and clung together for self-protection. Like animals, they placed their trust in the strongest and bravest of their number, and so there arose a rule best called *monarchia*, the physical prowess of the ruler being the sole *rationale* behind this most 'primitive' of social arrangements (v, 9.). Men had children, however, and taught their young ones a sense of 'duty' (τὸ καθήκον) (vi, 7; cf. v, 10-vi, 9). Soon they obeyed their overlord no longer 'through fear of his force, but rather their judgement approved him' (vi, 11). They now chose and rallied around rulers not on account of their 'brute courage' but of 'their intellectual and reasoning capacities' (vii, 3). Hence *basileia* replaced *monarchia* (vi, 12-vii, 1; 6) because men had naturally acquired feelings of sociability and learnt notions of 'goodness, justice and their opposites' (v, 10), and because rationality, a faculty peculiar to humans (vi, 4), had instructed men's offspring to preserve rather than to reject these first principles of noble conduct.¹

¹ vi, 2-9. This was done by approving agreeable and condemning ignoble behaviour.

The connection between the above transitions and the destined return of a political society to its primal condition is not explicitly forged here, yet, looking at the whole model, we are clearly expected to believe that the beginning and the end of the *Anacyclōsis* have something in common. This point was an awkward one for Polybius, however, since in carefully describing a situation immediately following a catastrophe, he was dealing with a social *archē* far more fundamental than any 're-commencement' of the anacyclic process. Had Polybius delineated in more detail the savage, elementary state of affairs *between* two separate anacyclic moments, the one concluding with mob-rule and the other beginning once more with a primitive monarchy, he probably would not have emphasized all those features which applied to a post-diluvian crisis. There would be no question of a few survivors, for example, and arts and crafts would not necessarily have perished amidst socio-political chaos as they did upon the vast devastation of a cataclysm.¹ This tension between two different kinds of *archai* remains unresolved, and yet Polybius' lack of tightness and consistency has largely arisen out of his eclectic, accommodating attitude towards well-established, yet often competing opinions about man's origins and destiny.

The Two-Staged 'Anthropology' and its background.

The idea of mankind progressing from a state of primitive helplessness to the civilized condition of flourishing politics and sophisticated technics was not foreign to Greek thought.² Before

¹ See v, 6. In his description of the barbarous tribes in northern Italy, however, we may have a hint that the two situations were roughly comparable, cf. II, xvii, 10, and note especially II, xvii, 12 cf. IV, v, 7-8.

² See esp. L. Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity*, Baltimore, 1967, *passim*, cf. A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, (A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas, vol. I), Baltimore 1935, esp. pp. 192ff; E.A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, London, 1957, esp. pp. 52ff.

Polybius it had been advanced in a variety of different ways and by thinkers as dissimilar in their interests as the atomist Democritus and the rhetorician Isocrates. Some had stressed man's productive use of gifts, such as fire, which the gods had originally bestowed on him;¹ others preferred to think of his progressive emancipation from superstition and his arrival at true knowledge concerning the order of things.² Some had highlighted humanity's painfully slow upward path towards political organization and civilization,³ whilst others concentrated their attention more on the general circumstances or on the psychological and educational factors which made the life of the *polis* possible.⁴ On the other hand, there is a more pessimistic outlook to be reckoned with. Perhaps surprisingly few Greeks painted a picture as indelible as Hesiod's description of the five ages of mankind, with its gloomy inauspicious view of the contemporary condition and its idealization of both the heroic Age and the primeval reign of the god-king Kronos.⁵ Yet there was a widespread

¹ Cf. Protagoras, *apud* Plato, *Protagoras* 320D ff., Aeschylus, *Prometheus Vincit*, 101 ff.

² Xenophanes, Frg.B18 (Diels-Kranz) = Frg. 191 (Kirk-Raven); Prodicus, Frgs.B2-4 (Diels-Kranz); Critias, Sisyphus Frg.B25 (Diels-Kranz), and see M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists* (ET), Oxford, 1954 pp.209-211, 333-5. And on Democritus and Hecataeus behind Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliothèque*, I, vii, 8 and ff., cf. K. Reinhardt, 'Hekataios von Abdera und Demokrit', in *Vermächtnis der Antike; Gesammelte Essays zur Philosophie und Geschichtsschreibung* (ed.C. Becker), Göttingen 1960, esp. pp. 114-7. Cf. also Theophrastus, *Peri Eusebias*, Frgs.2ff (W. Pötscher), etc.

³ Anaxagoras, esp. Frgs.B21b; A102 (Diels-Kranz); Democritus, Frgs. B144; 154 (Diels-Kranz); Hecataeus (?), *apud* Diod. Sicul., I, viii, 7; Plato, *Leg.*, III, 676A ff; Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, xxxii; Evagoras, vii, Dicaearchus, Frg. 49 (Wehrli, p.24); etc..

⁴ So Protagoras, *apud* Plato, *Protagoras*, 322 on the early learning of *ἀρετή*; Polos, *apud* Plato, *Gorgias*, 448C on learning techniques by experience, cf. Hecataeus (?), *apud* Diod. Sicul., I, viii, 7; (in viii, 9, *ἀνδρῶν* is the teacher of early men, cf. Aristotle, *Politica*, 1329b on *ἀνδρῶν* as 'the mother of invention'). On the importance of self-protection, see variations: Protagoras (322B), Hecataeus(?), (viii, 5), Plato, *Leg.* 678C, etc..

⁵ *Works and Days* (hereafter WD), 110 ff.

sense of *phthora* overtaking all things. Permanency was impossible and decay inevitable, so every human structure, like all living organisms, had to suffer an end - even if a relative end - to its 'life' (pp.122ff). These different threads of Greek anthropological thought show up in the *Anacyclōsis*, stuffed as they are into Polybius' creation to be a reflection of the 'common intelligence'. Since Polybius concentrated on socio-political rather than on general cultural developments, moreover, he managed to retrieve some of the traditional theories of progress whilst recognizing the inexorability of transience at the same time. To begin with, his apparent dissociation of the history of science from the history of *politeiai* removed the necessity of discussing arts and crafts as if they were subject to continual, periodic cessation and return (so Aristotle),¹ and of putting too much store on technical improvement as a prerequisite for the social life (a tendency of some 'Sophists').² The important idea of continuing technological progress was thus allowed to retain a right to independent credibility.³ In handling the formation and fate of the *politeia* Polybius fastened primarily on to the moral condition of man, so that questions of progress and regress, or of growth and decay, became questions of whether mankind was enlightened by rationality or overcome by bestiality, not whether it had acquired skills in the general sense.

¹ Who probably linked such cessation and return with catastrophe-theory; see *infra*. p.419, and *supra*, p.19 and n.1, cf. A. Stigen, *The Structure of Aristotle's Thought; an introduction to the study of Aristotle's writings*, (Universitetsforlagets Trykningssentral), Oslo, 1966, pp. 64 ff.

² There are difficulties associated with the word Sophist. I am at the mercy of convention; cf. Philostratus, *De Sophistis*, proem.479; I, 480-1. And see esp. Protagoras (esp. 322A-B), Prodicus; for both, cf. Untersteiner, *op.cit.*, pp. 61, 210.

³ And see *Hist.* IX, ii, 5; X, xlvii, 12; cf. III, lviii, 5; II, xvii, 10.

Even concerning this moral issue, however, Polybius seems consciously ambivalent so as to do justice to divergent standpoints of anthropological thought. On the one hand, neither the journey to rationality, when man discovered 'goodness, justice and their opposites', nor the establishment of a 'true kingship' (βασιλεία ἀληθινῇ)¹ was accomplished without a struggle. Not only was the primitive monarchy contrasted with this kingship as a rule of 'ferocity' which yielded to the supremacy of reason (VI, vi, 12),² but the forces of violence lurk in the background behind the whole *Anacyclōsis*, and though temporarily restrained, they re-emerge in their fulness at the end of the cycle, when men's renewed search for a *despotēs* or *monarchos* coincided with their degeneration back into bestiality (ix, 7b;9). Looked at from this viewpoint, man's early animal-like condition was not the subject of idealization. Men had to progress out of it to acquire reason and morality. On the other hand, Polybius made concessions towards the more primitivistic vein in Greek thought, for it was in this early situation that a sense of 'duty' took root, and in fact he suggested that the very same ruler who was a *monarchos* became by degrees a *basileus* (vi, 10-12; vii, 1). What has emerged here, then, is that for Polybius there were two stages of the elementary, pre-constitutional life of mankind, the earliest and first being marked by man's fragility and beast-like instinct for self-preservation (cf. v, 8), and the second being the stage when moral awareness was strong enough to

¹ For both the natural formation of virtue and true kingship, cf. VI, vii, 1, and on the background element of violence in the *Anacyclōsis* note first vi, 26 (the rejection of parents), 6a (personal violence), 11b (conspiracy to overthrow the *monarchos*), and then the evil forces which produce tyranny (vii, 8), oligarchy (viii, 4-5) and mob-rule (ix, 5-7; cf. lvii, 5-9).

² ὅταν παρὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος μεταλάβῃ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὁ λογισμὸς.

establish a *politeia*, and one which, through the excellency of the ruler's judgements, provided security and abundance for the people (vii, 3-4). It is this second phase which reflects those more primitivistic features in Greek thought. Both stages taken together suggest the idea of a progress towards the social life, but with the second, traditional notions of early man's pure virtues and of an ideal primeval king, show up beneath the surface. Thus Polybius' anthropology, in the cunning of its construction, neither completely excludes human progress nor openly disallows the view that in the 'earliest' we may discover the 'best'. We are somehow persuaded that both notions can be accommodated even if neither is openly espoused.

Polybius' so-called 'anthropology' may be appreciated in greater depth if one explores his possible use of sources. In so doing, however, we will be forced to widen our attention and begin to re-examine the anacyclic framework as a whole. It is both natural and profitable to begin with Plato. After all, Plato was the one philosopher Polybius actually named in connection with the *Anacyclōsis*, and if anything would have come to the reader's mind first in pondering his treatment of catastrophe-theory, it would certainly have been the rather seminal dialogue in Plato's *Laws* Bk. III. Polybius significantly admitted that the subject of the natural changes of societies into their different forms (ὁ περὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν μεταβολῆς τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰς ἀλλήλας) had been treated with more precision and subtlety by Plato and certain other unnamed philosophers (v, 1). One immediately asks whether Polybius understood Plato to have taught a doctrine of *Anacyclōsis*. Aristotle had concluded that in the *Republic* Bk. VIII Plato conceived a *cyclos* running from his ideal *politeia*, through different constitutional forms to tyranny, and back to the

ideal again. Was Polybius familiar with this interpretation? Probably not. He does not seem to have read Aristotle's *Politica*,¹ and Plato's *Republic* itself contains no reference to such a cycle, nor to the sort of early and elementary human conditions found in the Polybian *Anacyclosis*.² What is most likely, however, is that Polybius conceived two quite separate items of Plato's social and political theory, namely the account of societal growth (*epidosis*) in *Laws* III, and the analysis of degeneration (*phthora*) in *Republic* VIII, as two parts of the same nexus of ideas. It is not hard to imagine a mind as unphilosophical and historically-oriented as Polybius' assimilating the 'progressive' and 'regressive' elements of Plato's work into one consistent system, without realising that *Republic* VIII had more to do with the psychological motivations behind ethico-political decay than the facts of history,³ and without

¹ Polybius seems to have read Aristotle's lost *Constitutions* (cf. *Hist.* XII, v-xvi), but it is probable that the influence of the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. Walbank, *op.cit.* vol.1, p.643) was only indirect. On Aristotle's interpretation, *supra*, p. 20, n. 3.

² *Resp.* II, 369B-374E should be noted, of course, but this is quite clearly separated from the analysis of Bks. VIII and XI, and in its form and preoccupations markedly dissimilar from Polybius' *Hist.* VI, v, 4 - vii, 1.

³ See *Resp.*, esp. 548E ff, 553A ff, 558D ff, 571A ff, see esp. J. Gould, *The Development of Plato's Ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 183 ff. Cf. also R.G. Bury 'Plato and Progress' in *Philosophical Review*, LV, 1946, pp. 651 ff; J. Luccioni, *La Pensée Politique de Plato (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres D'Alger XXX)*, Paris, 1958, ch. 1, for an effort to give some historical content to *Rep.* VIII, by referring to background events. It is not impossible that in recounting the steps from timarchy to tyranny, Plato was offering a very general picture of what he took to have happened in Hellas, despite variations in different *poleis*. Put in another way, he may well have been affirming that the age of the great legislators was decidedly past, and that now in his time, the Greeks were experiencing nothing but 'false' constitutions (cf. *Leg.*, VIII, 832B, *apud* A. Diès, Paris, 1956 edit. (*Platon; Oeuvres Complètes*, vol.12 p.71), and changes not into pure constitutional forms but into τυραννίδας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας (*Epistulae*, VII, 326D).

appreciating that the *Laws* were written by a very much older Plato, who had come to disregard earlier Socratic positions.¹ Indeed it is necessary to reckon with this probability if one is going to make any sense of Polybius' association of the *Anacyclōsis* with Plato's name, for in the *Laws* the philosopher had narrated how the various yet familiar *politeiai* of the Hellenic world had emerged, with no more than a few, albeit suggestive hints concerning their eventual decay as a whole set of phenomena,² whilst in the *Republic* one finds no relevant, historical-looking treatment of conditions preceding the ideal polity, and no allusion to catastrophe-theory. We shall see later that, granted that Polybius did effect this conjunction between the *Laws* III and *Republic* VIII, it was easy for him to derive from Plato the order of constitutional types which one finds in his anacyclic model (pp.68ff.). At this stage, however, it suffices to note but two crucial facts. First, that in the *Laws* Plato explained how groups of mountaineering herdsmen who survived the last cataclysm slowly gained enough courage to establish relationships with one another, to form clans and migrate to lower terrain where, on the analogy of the family, each clan accepted a one-man rule of power (*dynasteia*), or 'a kingship which of all kingships was the most just'.³ And secondly, that in the *Republic* the line of degeneration eventually stops short at the worst kind of government, tyranny, a despotism which is the result of the mob clamouring for a champion.⁴ Polybius betrayed an ignorance of

¹ See esp. O. Wichmann, *Platon; ideelle Gesamtdarstellung und Studienwerk*, Darmstadt, 1966, pp. 532ff.

² Though note *Leg.* 701B-C, cf. *infra*, pp. 70-71, and on tyranny, p. 69.

³ *Leg.* III, 677B (mountaineering herdsmen); 678C-D, 678E-699A (their increased relations); 680D (on clans and households); 678C, 682B-C (movement to the plains); 680B (*dynasteia*); 680E (just kingship).

⁴ Cf. *Resp.* 562A ff on tyranny in general, 569C as *despoteia* and see 565C-566C, 575C, cf. 576D, *Politicus*, 302E for tyranny as the worst form of government.

distinctive aspects of Platonic thought when he treated *Republic* Bk. VIII as the downward curve in a cycle, although, unlike Aristotle, he did not find it necessary to assume that from the tyranny at the end of Plato's series there re-emerged the ideal Republic. For Polybius the ideal Republic was irrelevant to the facts of history (cf. VI, xlvii, 7-10), so that in taking Plato to be teaching some more 'complicated' version of *Anacyclōsis* he apparently took the Platonic picture of degeneration into tyranny to mean a reversion to an elementary human condition, one partly analogous to a post-cataclysmic situation and one in which people had to learn all over again the ethical foundations of political life. On this reading, Plato's tyrant, set up by the furious mob, can be equated with the *monarchos* at the beginning and end of the Polybian cycle,¹ and Plato's 'just king' identified with Polybius' 'true king' who replaces the rule of brute force by the power of reason. At the *archē* and *telos* of Polybius' cyclical process lay the same situation in which no *politeia*, in any conventional sense, existed, and if Polybius owed to anyone the *double* truth that mankind both climbed out of and degenerated into these circumstances, it was to Plato.

Polybius, of course, distorted Plato. He made him more of a cyclical theorist of history than he actually was. Furthermore, not all the details of Plato's 'anthropology' suited Polybius. The philosopher's herdsmen were more virtuous than Polybius' early men. They were not brutish or violent so much as 'more simple, brave, temperate and in every way more righteous' than succeeding generations, and they thus established the justest of *basileiai*.² Besides, Plato

¹ On *monarchos* and *tyrannos* as synonymous in Polybius, see *supra*, p. 6, and n. 3.

² On non-violent aspects, cf. *Leg.* III, 678E, 679D; for the quotation, 679E, and the 'just king' (again), 680E.

made no explicit reference to their submission to any *monarchos*, that is, to one who either preceded or changed into the 'just king', whilst their establishment of the first *politeia* had more to do with the results of familial and group organization than with the growth of a sense of duty.¹ On the other hand, Plato gave an account of the Cyclopes, and if taken seriously, one could easily read into his rather abstruse phrases the idea of a 'savage' one-man rule existing prior to the emergence of a patriarchal kingship (*Leg.*III, 680B; D).² The general implications of the Platonic *epidosis* for Polybius' 'anthropology' can hardly be ignored, moreover, for discussion of herd-like behaviour, early virtues, parental training and the bravery of the younger generation all connect the two. But it is not likely that Polybius had a text of the *Laws* in front of him - he was probably relying on his good memory - and one should also remember his readiness to accommodate conflicting traditions.

Polybius' eclectic tendencies suggest that he was not likely to reproduce Plato, certainly not those aspects of Platonic thought which conflicted with other well-settled anthropologies. Plato had placed emphasis on the painful slowness of growth towards organized political life, and forged a close connection between the progress of *technē* and the growth of *polis*-consciousness (cf. *Leg.*III, 677C-D, 678D, 679D, etc.). Polybius could retain neither component because they vitiated his concept of a continuing cycle. Along with others, Plato emphasized such slowness to confirm the immensity of past time,³ but we have already

¹ *Leg.*III, 680D-E; cf. Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1257a-19ff, etc.

² Plato connects the *οἰκία* of the Cyclopes with the barbarian *dynasteia* (III, 680B), and on the primitivism of the Cyclopes, note *ἐν σπέσσι* (680B) and *ἀγριότητα* (D).

³ *Supra*, pp. 10ff., cf. Isocrates, *Paneg.*, xxxii; Dicaearchus, *Frg.* 47 (Wehrli, p.22).

seen how on such disputable cosmological matters, Polybius compromised with diversity. And despite the apparently impressive influence of Plato, this leaning still remains present in his 'anthropology'. We might say that to treat Plato as so decidedly cyclical a thinker was if anything, Aristotelian; and certainly the idea of mankind's upward path from natural weakness to political (and more highly developed technological) life was a well-known 'Sophistic' teaching, linked with the Sophists' doctrines about man's capacity to learn by experience.¹ The idea that early man had begun his career in weakness could also be said to be Sophistic, and it is not, strictly speaking, present in Plato. Polybius, incidentally, spoke very generally of this *astheneia*, allowing for the idea of war or of problems with strong animals (or in other words different lines of interpretation) to be covered.² On the other hand, the notion of one-man rule as the first kind of social control was neither peculiarly Sophistic nor Platonic; its roots go back to earlier teachers of wisdom and it had wide currency since their time. The divine King Kronos continued to lurk in the background of speculation about the first men,³ and there was a frequent tendency to idealize the ancient *basileis*.⁴ Polybius'

¹ See *supra*, pp. 27ff. ; cf. also Isocrates, *Evagoras*, vii.

² Note esp. Protagoras (322B.C) (early 'war'), cf. Hecataeus (?), *apud* Diod. Sicul., I, viii, 5-7, cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, V, 1419ff (Atomist source?), Prodicus (Untersteiner, 210). See Polybius, *Hist.* VI, v, 7; yet cf. Plato, *Leg.* III, 678E-680E. Note also Panaetius, *Frg.* 118 (van Straaten).

³ See esp. Hesiod, *W.D.*, 110 ff., Pindar, *Pythian Odes*, III, 4, etc., as background. Zeus' attributes as both king and father were also important in this connection. Cf. Xenophanes, *Frg.* B12 (Diels-Kranz), Plato, *Politicus*, 271C ff, *Leg.*, IV, 713C-D, etc..

⁴ See esp. Plato, *Leg.* III, 680E; Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1285b4ff, Isocrates, *Panathenaicus*, cxxi ff, Panaetius, *apud* Cicero, *De Officiis*, II, xii (van Straaten, *Frg.* 120); Sallust, *Catiline*, I, 2, Cicero, *De Re Publica*, I, xxxv, 54 (Stoic source?), *De Legibus*, II, ii, Lucretius, *Rer. Nat.*, V, 1105ff., Tacitus, *Annales*, I, 2, Poseidonius, *apud* Seneca, *Epistulae* XC, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Archaeologiae*, I, lxxvff, Trogus, *apud* Justin, *Epitome*, I, 1. cf. Gorgias, *Frg.* B11a, (Diels-Kranz, vol. 2, p. 297, 19 - 26), Diodorus Sicul., I, ix, 2ff. (Hecataeus?), etc..

image of the first rule was stark by comparison, and a clever semantic and institutional distinction between monarchy and kingship entered into his discussion. Hints of this distinction may be found in Alcmaeon, Critias and the 'anonymous' Iamblichus amongst the pre-Socratics,¹ but it was the architect of the *Anacyclōsis* himself, in my view Polybius, who was the innovator at this point, and this was largely because he sought to render his theory both acceptable and convincing.² His colleague Panaetius may have depicted the ancestral king as an honest man able to protect the weak from the violent and the poor from the rich; but for Polybius the ruler was brave first and morally excellent afterwards. Polybius had the cycle of governments to contend with. On his view, a social condition with no real polity, with absence of custom, and with a susceptibility to lawlessness and animalization, was the key concept which linked the two ends of his cyclical process and confirmed its continuity. Once that link was made, Polybius found it easy to be concessive about others' idyllic images, although it is nevertheless true that the second stage of his 'anthropology' was not simply meant to reflect traditional views about the reign of a 'just king'. Moral training also occupied Polybius' attention. He evidently argued (with the Sophists?) that civic virtue could be taught.³ In a special sense he also held that man was by nature a political animal;⁴ man in his elementary state

¹ Alcmaeon Frg.B4; Critias, Frg. B25; Anon. Iamblichus Frg.7 (all Diels-Kranz; the last reference in vol. 2, p. 404).

² Plato (in *Politicus* 291E) and Aristotle (*Ethica Nicomachea*, VIII, x, 3) consider *monarchia* as one-man rule with kingship and tyranny as its two aspects (cf. Polybius' *Hist.* VI, iii, 9). Isocrates, in *Panath.*, cxxi, comes closer to Polybius.

³ See esp. A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece; from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century*, London, 1972, pp. 99ff.

⁴ So esp. Aristotle, *Politica*, 1253a3.

was a creature inclined to self-propagation like other animals, yet he possessed the power of reason to guide the conduct of his progeny for his own future well-being and the welfare of the group. On that point Polybius was significantly close to Stoic Panaetius.¹ Training for duty and training to destroy brutishness were important ideas for Polybius, and his interest in the way the forces of 'bestiality' were restrained by education, and in the growth of morality (as distinct from skills, beliefs, even purely civic virtue) in its primitive setting, probably have their closest connections with certain Stoic preoccupations.²

It is apparent, then, that more than one traditional anthropology lies behind Polybius' description of how man attained to a polity.

¹ *Hist.*, VI, vi, 1-3; cf. Panaetius, *apud* Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, iv, (van Straaten, Frg.80, and cf. Frgs. 79,81). Note also Aristotle, *Polit.* 1253a10ff, and cf. E. Graeber, *Die Lehre von der Mischverfassung bei Polybios (Schriften zur Rechtslehre und Politik LII)*, Bonn, 1968, p.55, on the Stoic understanding of man as a political animal.

² Outside Bk.VI, when Polybius treated archaic Arcadia, some of the features of the second stage of his anthropology make their appearance. Training in music from childhood had strengthened the political institutions of the Arcadians from ancient times, whereas by neglecting such an institution, the Cynaethenans had increasingly succumbed to bestiality (IV, xx, 1-xxi, 6, cf. ἀρεθροπιδόθησαν in xxi, 6, and see this verb's use in VI, ix, 9). Although related ideas pervade Greek educational thought in some form or another (see W. Jaeger, *Paideia; the Ideals of Greek Culture*, (ET), Oxford, 1946-7 edn., esp. vol 2, pp.224ff, cf. esp. Antiphon, esp. Frg.B61 (Diels-Kranz) (Antiphon's ideas were later adapted by Stoics), Protagoras, (324B), Plato, *Resp.* II-III, Aristotle, *Politica*, 1331b24ff., pseudo-Hippodamus, Frg.94, *apud* Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, (O. Hense edn.), Berlin, 1950edn., vol 4, pp.31, 33, etc.), the connections with Stoicism remain crucial: note *Hist.*, VI, vi, 2 (on sexual intercourse), vi, 4 (on the faculty of reason); (cf. Panaetius, Frg. 120, cf.79-81 (van Straaten), Seneca, *Epistulae*, VII;) and see v, 10; vi, 8 (on the learning of moral opposites); (cf. Graeber, *op.cit.*, p.62 on the Stoic element here, and for further background, Isocrates, *Epistulae*, V, 4). Also, on the rôle of self-interest in moral education in both Polybius and Lucretius, see M. Taylor, 'Progress and Primitivism in Lucretius', in *American Journal of Philology*, LXVIII, 1947, pp. 187-8.

The shadow of Plato is the most definite, but Polybius wished his general truths to be based on a range of existing, even if divergent theories. His readjustments to others' thoughts were not merely for syncretism's sake, however, but were governed above all by his aim of producing a coherent, convincing rule of thumb concerning historical recurrence. Not a few thinkers interested in anthropology remained unconcerned with cyclical or recurrence ideas, speaking as they did of either progress or regress; yet Polybius still used their varying opinions to fulfil his aim.

The 'Anthropology' and the Three-Stationed Biological Principle.

The special nuances of the Polybian 'anthropology' aside, we now need to reflect on its implications for the general shape of the *Anacyclōsis*. In his first, brief account of the sequence of constitutions, Polybius made a significant distinction between the coming-to-be of primitive monarchy and that of the kingship which followed. The former's emergence came 'unaided and naturally' (ἀκατασκευῶς καὶ φυσικῶς), whilst the latter's was 'with (artificial) preparation and the rectification of defects' (μετὰ κατασκευῶς καὶ διορθώσεως) (VI, iv, 7). Reviewing what we have already said about his more elaborate outline, it is feasible to characterize the two stages of his 'anthropology' to be in the first instance *physikōs*, and in the second (moral) preparation.¹ One may detect the implication, then, that Polybius' *Urmonarchie* belongs to a special category, distinct from the six constitutional forms following it. Although he wrote of the whole *Anacyclōsis* as a natural order of events, he clearly wished to

¹ VI, v, 4-9, as first part, yet cf. VI, v, 9-vii, 1 as second part. For *physis* in the first instance, V., v, 8 (φύσεως ἔργον), cf. vi, 2 (κατὰ φύσιν); and on preparation in the second, vi, 5 (i.e. parents who train their children are found προῤᷰρωμένους τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογίζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει.

assert that the changes between the six major constitutions were effected by human will, aim, preparation, political self-interest and so on; but the grounds upon which the primitive monarch arises were those of unreasoning instinct, necessity, brute force, and the elementary laws of *physis*.¹ We will soon be discussing Polybius' suggested reasons for political change along the zig-zag line from kingship to mob-rule, but at the moment it is sufficient to note his efforts to expose the emphatically *natural* basis of the primitive monarchy and its emergence. Moreover, although this monarchy provided the historical basis for the kingly and tyrannical *politeiai* (VI, iv, 6-7), he nevertheless associated it with a situation in which the ordinary conditions for civic life did not exist. It will be appreciated that the word *politeia* carries a certain ambiguity, since it can mean both a specific constitution as well as 'polity' or 'the state', that is to say, the conditions under which civic life, as against non-civic life, exists. Polybius implied that conditions of polity did not really come into being until men attained to the necessary degree of ethical awareness. Thus his 'anthropology' and his treatment of the early monarch hang very closely together and both have been appended to the constitutional zig-zag, telling us still more about the 'composite character' of the *Anacyclōsis*.²

Quite clearly, the monarchy of force does not relate readily to the major sequence of constitutional change in the *Anacyclōsis*; it tends to modify the zig-zag line from *baseleia* to *ochlocratia*. It

¹ Ἀδοξοποιήτος (VI, v, 8), ἀνάγκη (v, 7), βίη (vi, 11, cf. ix, 7), θυμός (vi, 12), (and see vi, 7; 9). On φύσις, see previous note.

² Cf. C.H. Cole, 'The Sources and Composition of Polybius VI', in *Historia* XIII, 1964, p. 455. On the ambiguity surrounding *politeia*, cf. J. Schweighaeuser, *op.cit.*, (vol. 8, Index), p. 486.

is too simple, for instance, to speak of the passage from *monarchy* to *kingship* as a transference from a 'bad' to a 'good' constitution, and it is difficult to see the zig-zag applying in the case of mob-rule degenerating into a state of bestiality. What is equally important, however, is that there are other analyses of constitutional change still extant, and these conform to a six-part rather than a seven-part series. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Bk. VIII, for example, Aristotle introduced three forms of *politeiai*; kingship, aristocracy and timocracy (or a 'constitutional form of government'), with their corresponding perversions and corruptions (παρεκβάσει καὶ φθορά), tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (VIII, x, 1-3). Although all these constitutions were not linked in a developing chain, Aristotle nevertheless listed them in an order similar to Polybius'. He at least noted how kingship degenerated into tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, timocracy to democracy (the last nomenclatures being altered in the *Anacyclōsis*), even if he made no mention of any passages from tyranny to aristocracy nor from oligarchy to timocracy (let alone from democracy to a 'returning' kingship).¹ Furthermore, Plato had discussed three lawful (*ennomoi*) constitutions and their three lawless *paranomoi* deviants in the *Politicus* (although he could find no appropriate political terms to distinguish good from bad democracy), and again the material follows the order: one man rules / minority rules / majority rules.² After Polybius, one finds Arius Didymus, Emperor Augustus' teacher, with a six-part framework that recalls the *Anacyclōsis* (cf. p. 309).

¹ Aristotle's aim in this connection was to draw analogies between political forms and the structures of family life; see *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, x, 1-6; cf. *Ethica Eudemia*, 1241b25-33, *Polit.*, 1279a17-b10.

² *Politicus*, 291C-292A; 300E-303C; and on lack of terminology, 291E-292A.

In none of these presentations, however, does a primitive monarchy make an appearance. Thus our suspicions are confirmed that Polybius combined two sets of material derived from separate areas of theoretical speculation; he wedded an 'anthropology' to a hexadic framework of constitutional change, and his 'anthropology', with its *monarchos*-figure, was intended as the basis for understanding conditions at either end of the major constitutional sequence. These conditions became the *termini ad quem et a quo* of the cycle, and it is justifiable to write of them as conditions of 'non-polity', because with them the normative life of the *polis* has either been dissolved or has not yet come into being.

We may now begin to see that the anacyclic model contains a far more significant synthesis of ideas than we have brought out so far. Since the work of Heinrich Ryffel scholars have come to acknowledge that Polybius actually appealed to two 'laws' of constitutional change which *prima facie* excluded each other.¹ The first was the 'law' of a fixed sequence and course, involving the path from one-man rule to ochlocracy, whilst the second was more simply and conventionally structured:

'Every body or state or action has its natural stage of growth (*auxēsis*), then of prime (*acmē*), and finally of decay (*phthisis*), and..... everything in them is at its best at the zenith'

(VI, 11, 4).

Ryffel termed the first the law of *Anacyclōsis* - it comes so very near to the heart of Polybius' model as it is best remembered - and the second, he termed the 'biological' or 'three-station' principle, taking the three stations to be growth, acme and decline.² The apparent contradiction between these two theoretical formulae resides

¹ Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp. 186-221; cf. esp. Walbank *op.cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 645-7, Pédech, *op.cit.*, pp. 308-9.

² *Op.cit.*, see pp. 209 ff.

in the fact that the *Anacyclōsis* has no identifiable acme, but rather the three 'highpoints' of kingship, aristocracy and democracy. One might be tempted to conclude that it is not necessary to resolve the tension here, that for Polybius the three-station theory applied to the general development of states like Rome and Carthage, whereas the *Anacyclōsis* was concerned strictly with changes in the forms (*eide*) of constitutions. Yet such an interpretation blurs the extent to which Polybius integrated different ideas. Granted that the *Anacyclōsis* has no clear zenith, we have already discovered at least one way in which the biological principle may nevertheless be reflected in the anacyclitic process as a whole. The rise from primitivism to *basileia* and the decline from mob-rule into bestiality are so much more decisive than the other types of change within the model that the largest of his cycles in the *Anacyclōsis* emerges as the passage from conditions that are *urpolitisch* to the state of polity, and then back to the elementary situation once more. As we shall see, there are other, smaller cases of growth and decay within the *Anacyclōsis*, and when discussing the place of the mixed constitution in Polybian thought, one will find another crucial way in which the so-called zig-zag and the biological principle may be integrated. But this very general 'curve' also demands the recognition it has not yet received, and the space Polybius devoted to his 'anthropology', which confirms the importance of this cycle, cannot be taken lightly. And in it one finds Polybius' skill in incorporating yet another traditional theme of Greek thinking into his synthetic frame, in this case the old belief that the life of a polity only became a reality when the people removed a violent, and arbitrary tyranny. This viewpoint emerged from the 'democratic' (especially

Athenian) tradition,¹ and it is reflected in his early attempt to explain Achaea's more distant past.² Normally tyranny was taken to be replaced by the constitutional rule of the people, but Polybius was forced to sacrifice this aspect of the tradition to a view with a wider currency which saw the first rule of *nomos* and *logismos* in the hands of a wise king. He wrote too much under the shadow of the great fourth century critics of democracy to accept the earlier 'Athenian' ideological position. On the other hand, one notable aspect of the democratic tradition remained, for concerning the *monarchos*-figure he managed to create the dual impression that the monarchy of force was both a necessary stage in the development of political life and a thing unwanted by those who knew what a polity was really like.

In review, then, the *Anacyclōsis* appears to be reducible to a simple cycle. In Polybius' presentation of the model, animal-

¹ Cf. esp. Attic Scolion (Scolia Anonyma 10 and 13), Alcmaeon, Frg. 24B4 (Diels-Kranz); Democritus, Frg. 68B251; Demosthenes, *Philippics*, II, 21; Isocrates, *Paneg.*, xxxix; cf. also Aristotle, *Polit.* V; (W.L. Newman in *The Politics of Aristotle*, Oxford, 1887-1902, vol.1, p.521, contends with justification that the monarchy-polity dichotomy underlies Book V). On the paradigm case of the Cleisthenic settlement following upon the Peisistratid tyranny in Athens, see esp. Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia*, xx-xxiii, cf. Herodotus, *Historiae*, V, 61 ff., and also Aeschylus, *Suppliants*, esp. ls. 694 ff., (cf. esp. V. Ehrenberg, 'Origins of Democracy' in *Historia*, I, 1950, pp. 517-24). Cf. Lucretius, much later, *Rer.Nat.*, V, 1120-1147.

² See *Hist.* II, xli, 3-5, cf. IV, i, 5, on how the Achaeans put a stop to the unlawful and despotic (μὴ νόμῳ, δεσποτικῶς) rule of the sons of Ogygus, and changed their polity to a democracy. The sequence, unlike that of the *Anacyclōsis*, was simply kingship/tyranny/democracy (= polity), cf. esp. xli, 1). See esp. Cole, *loc.cit.*, p. 454 and ff. on this tradition in Polybius' thinking (his 'Tradition B'), and on Polybius' early omission of the oligarchic, Spartan-dominated phase of Archaean life in the fourth century, note Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII, i, 41-4, ii, 18; iv, 17; v, 1-3; v, 18; Diod. Sicul., XV, 75; cf. Walbank *op.cit.*, vol. 1, p.230.

like conditions stand at the beginning and at the renewal-point, so that the model may be characterized in terms of organic growth out of and eventual return to those conditions.¹ Let us be cautious, however. It is not unfair to represent the cycle in the three (biological) stations: growth (towards a polity), acme (a polity), and decay (away from a polity). Yet there are alternative ways of expressing the more general changes of the anacycl̄ic process. One could speak, for instance, of an alternation between the general conditions of non-polity and those of political societies. Having finished his account of the *Anacycl̄ōsis*, moreover, Polybius significantly wrote of the reversion to an original state of affairs as a return to 'opposite' conditions (πάλιν εἰς αὐτὰ καταντῶν τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας) (VI, ix, 10), alluding to the antithesis between civic life and its absence and in such a way as to reinforce the impression of an alternatory process. Circular movement and alternation were not hard to bring together - that had certainly been done before, perhaps most remarkably by Empedocles - but the combination adds yet another aspect to Polybius' eclectic tendencies. The inter-connexion between cyclical and alternatory motion becomes still more important when we turn to examine the most memorable and prominent feature of the *Anacycl̄ōsis*, the zig-zag line between worthy and unworthy constitutions.

¹ Attempts to explain the disparity between the zig-zag (or *Anacycl̄ōsis*) and the biological principle in terms of Polybius' use of a source for VI, iii - ix, or of different stages in his intellectual development (see Ryffel, *op.cit.*, p. 185, 195, 202: cf. for example O. Cuntz, *Polybios und sein Werk*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 40 ff; G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, Florence, 1907-23, (1953 re-issue), vol. 3, pt. 1, p.206 ff) merely tend to multiply hypotheses. Cf. esp. Walbank, *op.cit.* vol. 1, p. 646; Pédech, *op.cit.*, pp.310-1.

C) The Anacyclic Zig-Zag.

The zig-zag may be considered both as one block of material or as three separate units. It is more rewarding to be analytic first and synoptic afterwards. Although Polybius first introduced his six types of constitution as two triads, the three constitutions 'on everybody's lips' and their three counterparts (τὰ συμφορῇ κακὰ) (VI, iv, 6; 8; Cf. x, 7), he in effect treated them as three pairs strung together. One is thus reminded of Aristotle's dyads in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and elsewhere)¹ even though the philosopher did not place them in the one extended sequence. With this consideration of kingship and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, democracy and ochlocracy as twins, one enters that amorphous field of Greek political speculation best described (again in Ryffel's useful term) as *metabolē* theory.² This encompasses, perhaps a little too unconditionally, a great variety of reflections which go back at least to the sixth century, on the causes and major types of political change, especially degenerations from 'good' into 'bad' government. With the *Anacyclōsis*, however, one has to reckon with other features not fully developed in early *metabolē* theory, namely, the rather peripatetic preoccupation with classifying constitutions into different types (although Aristotle would have wished for a more exhaustive enquiry and a greater awareness of historical variety than Polybius allowed for), and as well the interest in tracing a long, even if not factually defensible, line of constitution development which hails, above all, from Plato (*Leg.*, III, *Resp.* VIII). It will be profitable to proceed through the anacyclic model stage by stage

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 41 and n. 1, cf. *Eth. Eud.*; 1241b27-32; *Polit.*, 1279a28-66. Cf. Arius Didymus also (*infra*, p. 309).

² Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp. 23-79 on the emergence of *metabolē*-theory.

to isolate the peculiarities of Polybius' position and gauge the influence of background ideas.

One would naturally begin with Polybius' treatment of kingship and its breakdown into tyranny. He contended that true kingship was based on goodness and justice, and that power in the state was really maintained by the people, who chose their kings for life and harboured no ill-will towards them because of the security and provisions they bestowed. But once kings received their office by hereditary right and gained a certain inviolability, their living habits became far less frugal and more licentious.

'Those habits having given rise in the first place to envy and injury, and in the second to an outburst of hate and hostile resentment, the kingship became a tyranny.'

(VI, vii, 8; cf. vii, 1-7).

Now much thinking within the compass of *metabolē* theory was concerned with tyranny. The 'traditional' and most widely supported approach ascribed the causes of despotical régimes to the shift in the attitude of kings towards their offices, their refusal to care for the subjects of the state, and their efforts to establish the lawless, self-seeking rule of absolute power.¹ The emphasis on the

¹ For the background importance of Pindar, Aeschylus, the Sophists, etc. see esp. K.F. Stroheker, 'Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik', in *Historia*, II, 1953-4, pp.387ff. Note also the Herodotean picture of the tyrant; *Hist.* III, 80 (general); III, 16 and ff. (Cambyzes), V, 61ff (Peisistratidae), VII (Xerxes), cf. I, 86ff (Cyrus, not a tyrannical dynast). See Plato, *Leg.* 694A-696B (Cyrus, yet cf. Darius), *Gorgias*, 483D-E; 525C ff, *Menexenus*, 239D ff. Also note Plato's use of Dorian traditions about the first Heraclidae kings (*Leg.* III, 685C-686C, 691A-D, cf. 692B (for the term *tyrannis*)), although others put the blame for the downfall of these kings upon the recalcitrant *demos*; see Isocrates, *Archidamus* xxii; Ephorus, *Frsg.* reflected in Pausanias' *Descriptio*, II, xix, 2 and *Frsgs.* 116-7 (from Strabo). in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin 1926, (hereafter *FGH.*, pt.1, vol.2a, pp.72-3, cf. A. Andrewes, 'Ephorus book I and the Kings of Argos', in *Classical Quarterly*, N.S., 1951, pp. 39ff.. Note also Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, VIII, x, 2-3, and the

on the misuse of authority was present in alternative approaches, but with these the element of degeneration from *basileia* was excluded. A predominantly Athenian line of explanation, for example, took tyranny to arise because the masses backed a champion to redress wrongs inflicted by oppressive oligarchs, whilst others wrote of the pre-political rule before the establishment of genuine *politeia* as *tyrannis*.¹ Polybius adopted the first approach, (the last had already been catered for by the ambiguity surrounding the *monarchos*); yet he evidently intended to account for a range of one-man rules and to recognize different bases of monarchical power (force, reason, benefaction, popular consent, courtly splendour, personal aggrandisement).

tradition behind *Politica*, 1310b18-20 (tyrants as ambitious kings antedate tyrants as popular champions in Aristotle). A similar line of thinking lies behind Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, xiii, 1, pseudo-Hippodamus (apud Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, IV, i, 95, Hense ed. vol.4, p.36, ls. 2-4), (cf. next note); Euripides, *Frags*, 282; 24ff; cp. 200 (cf. Plato, *Rep.* 568A-B), Isocrates, *De Pacis*, cxi-cxiii, *Helen*, xxxii; Theophrastus, apud Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Archaeol.*, V, lxxiv, 1-2; cf. also Tacitus, *Annales*, III, 26; Lucretius, *Rer. Nat.*, 1144, etc., and on Roman interpretations of the downfall of their early kings, see *infra*, pp.309ff.(cf.pp. 94ff.). See also *infra*, pp.185f. for Polybius on kingship and tyranny outside Bk. VI. One should also note here the attempt of T.S. Brown (in *Timaeus of Tauromenium* (University of California Publications in History LV), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958, p. 58), to reconstruct from Timaeus the sequence of governments in early Syracusan history to the reign of Theron (488-72BC). If Brown is right, Timaeus' account in skeletal form runs: the barbaric despotism of a tyrant/overthrow of that tyrant by the 'people'/the strong, beneficent rule of one man/ the prosperity of this rule symbolized by the monarch's costly attirement/popular agitation associated with Empedocles the philosopher/and evil days, ending with a beneficent rule (of Theron). Brown's reconstruction is very speculative, but Polybius may have reckoned some of these developments to confirm the *Anacyclosis*. In view of his evident resentment of Timaeus' reputation (cf. F.W. Walbank, 'Polemic in Polybius', in *Journal of Roman Studies*, LII, 1962, pp.7-11, esp.10), it is not unlikely that he believed his expositions in Bk. VI to give him superiority as a theoretician over his influential predecessor.

¹ See, on the first line of approach, Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 58 ff; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, xiii-xiv, Aristotle, *Politica*, 1286b16-7 (tyranny here follows oligarchy), cf. 1305a7ff; 1310b15-6; pseudo-Hippodamus (Hense, *op.cit.*, p.35, ls. 17-8), with the passing comment: τυραννίδος γάρ οὐδεμία χοῦρα ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ μὴ πόκα τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπὶ βραχύ. For the second line, see esp. Cole, *loc.cit.*, p.456, and *supra*, p.44, n. 1, cf.; against both approaches, Xenophon, *Hiero*, i, 1 ff.

In fact this concern is comparable with an attempt by Aristotle to classify kingships into five types. Although Polybius mapped out the types and stages of monarchical rule a little differently,¹ he was hardly uninterested in and certainly not ignorant of the variety of possible political forms. Yet, if we take only his anacyclic model, he was quite unlike Aristotle (and the peripatetics) in neglecting the variety of contexts in which different kinds of governments and μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν could manifest themselves. The facts of history taught Aristotle that various forms of kingship could exist in quite separate contexts, that kingship was capable of changing into aristocracy, and both democracy and oligarchy of being removed by a popular tyrant,² but the *Anacyclosis* had no provision for such changes, narrowing as it

¹ In the *Politica* Aristotle's types run: hereditary kingship with limited functions exercised through popular consent in the heroic Age; the barbarian type, hereditary and despotic but constitutional; an elective tyranny or dictatorship; Spartan hereditary generalship; and the absolute sovereignty of one enjoying authority over the *politeia* as a father does over his household (1285a-1286b, esp. 1285b20-34). Polybius' implications concerning the 'non-hereditary' nature of 'true' kingship, and the basis of its power in popular consent, recalls Aristotle's first and third types; the change to hereditary succession and to luxurious habits, suggests Aristotle's second type -hereditary, despotic but κατὰ νόμον. Some features of Polybius' primitive monarchos may be connected with Aristotle's concept of a king as 'household' ruler (his last type) (cf. *Politica*, 1285b 30ff, *Eth.Nic.*, VIII, x, 4, cf. *Polit.*, 1252b 16ff., *Ath.Pol.*, xli), and notice Aristotle's comments on the ancient 'right to superior force' when referring to early Spartan *basileia* (*Polit.*, 1285b 9-11, yet cf. 1295a22 on the 'unwelcome force' of absolute tyranny). For Polybius and Aristotle on the different bases of monarchical power, see Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, vi, 12 (force, cf. Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1285b 9-11, though notice the different context), VI, vi, 12; vii, 3 (reason, cf. Aristotle on the rule of nous, *Polit.* 1287a30-1, which is in fact compared to the passions of kingly rule); VI, vii, 4-5 (benefaction), 2-3 (general consent) (cf. Aristotle for both, 1285b4-9, 1286b10-12); VI, vii, 6-7 (courtly splendour, cf. Aristotle, 1285a17-29); VI, vii, 6-9 (personal aggrandisement, Aristotle, 1285a17-29), 1295a19-24). Although there is no evidence that Polybius read the *Politics*, it is evident that he knew the *Constitutions* (*supra*, p. 32, and n.1).

² *Polit.* 1286b10-14 (*basileia* to *aristocratia*), 1305a7 ff (*democratia* to *tyrannis*), 1286b14-17 (*oligarchia* to *tyrannis*).

was with its fixed sequence and cyclicism. On the other hand, by limiting history's possibilities Polybius was able to capitalise on other approaches and traditions, and chief among these were the ideas of Plato, who significantly took over much conventional *metabolē* theory. *Prima facie*, Plato does not look so useful for Polybius on kingship and tyranny, for although in *Laws* III he wrote of the lapse of kingship into tyranny, he also placed a tyrant at the end of his series in *Republic* VIII. But assuming the likelihood that Polybius equated the *tyrannos* of the *Republic* with his *monarchos*-figure, it is the former source which becomes important at this point. And in effect the only really impressive statement Plato ever made about the recurrence of constitutional change has to do with kings degenerating into tyrants. Commenting on two sons of Heracles, early Laconian kings who failed to live up to expectation and became tyrants because of their depravity and not their want of skill he averred

'that this was the course of events then, and is so still; and whenever such events occur, will be so in the future'

(*Leg.*, 688CD, cf. 683D ff).¹

Not only Plato but Aristotle also made use of this basic model of *metabolē* theory (cf. *Eth.Nic.* VIII, x, 3), so that Polybius' concern for the decay of kingship into tyranny largely tends to the mainstream line of thought about regular change and one-man rules.

In connection with one-man rules, however, there are some special syncretisms which still have to be reckoned with. These have

¹ 'ταύτ' οὖν ὡς οὕτω γέγονε περὶ τὰ τότε καὶ νῦν, εἴ που, γίγνεται, καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὐκ ἄλλως συμβήσεται, etc... On *κακία* (depravity) as an ethico-political term, cf. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp.52, 82 (Sophistic literature).

to do with the relationship between Polybius' monarchy and his tyranny. On the one hand, he wished his *monarchos*-figure to symbolize the condition of non-polity, even if, on the other, there was a point at which the primitive monarchy marked a necessary stage in the growth out of utter bestiality. Now this meant that the tyrant referred to in the *Anacyclōsis* as the depraved type of *basileus*, had to be someone less brutal and more innocuous than the *monarchos*: and that is precisely what he was. Within the zig-zag, the real sting has been taken out of the most unpleasant of all governmental forms. Apart from the traditional labelling of tyrants as men of *hybris* (political insolence) (VI, vii, 9),¹ Polybius tells us little more than that they were over-indulgent, sexually licentious and provoked resentment and conspiracy. General political lawlessness (*anomia*), or any stress on the unwelcome rule of force, or above all, enslavement (*douleia*), are absent.² It would be too facile, however, to construe Polybius' treatment as a whitewash. After all, his treatment of kingship and tyranny relied on age-long categories of thought about luxury as the cause of a régime's dissipation. 'First there comes to the *polis* dainty effeminacy', runs an old saying ascribed to Pythagoras, 'and thereupon petulance, insolence and after that, destruction', and Polybius was telling essentially the same story

¹ On *hybris* in Herodotus especially, see *infra*, pp. 165ff.. Cf. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18.

² For the importance of these terms in classical *metabolē* theory, *ibid*, pp. 17 ff, 50 ff. On the Great King as the bearer of *δουλοσύνη* or *δουλεία* to Greece, Herodotus, *Hist.*, VII, 102; IX, 90, etc., Plato, *Menexenus*, 239E-240E, Isocrates, *Paneg.*, xcvi, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, XXVIII, ii, 1-4 (rather Isocratean). The Great King came to symbolize the arch-tyrant, cf. Plato, *Leg.*, III, 695D-E, Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, x, 4, Isocrates, *Paneg.*, lxxxviii-xc.

about kings and tyrants.¹ It remains true, however, that he ranked tyranny as a *politeia*. Perhaps that was in accord with more favourable or lenient attitudes towards tyranny,² but it simply suited Polybius here to consider it as the bad side to kingship and not the utter ruin of political life. And his point about *tyrannis* as a specific constitution was clinched by his next telling point - that aristocracy originated at the very onset of tyrannical power.

The passage from tyranny to aristocracy was effected by noble-minded, brave men of the *polis* who could not tolerate the *hybris* of the tyrant (VI, vii, 9). When they conspired against tyranny they did so in the interests of *hoi polloi* (who continued to be a determining background factor) and the 'nobles' became the new leaders of the people. Monarchy in the sense of one-man rule was abolished, and aristocracy grew up (viii, 1-2). The descendants of the aristocrats, however, were unable to keep up a paternal concern for the common interest, and gave themselves over to grasping selfishness (*pleonexia*), to avarice (*philargyria*), convivial excess and sexual violation (cf. the *hybreis* of VI, viii, 5), thus producing oligarchy

¹ So according to Stobaeus (IV, 1, 80, Hense ed., vol 4, p. 26); Πυθαγόρας εἶπεν εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰς πόλεις πρῶτον τρυφήν, ἔπειτα κόρον, εἶτα ὕβριν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὄλεθρον. For the association of κόρος and ὕβρις into sixth and fifth century literature cf. esp. Liddell, Scott and Jones, s.v. κόρος, and note Plato's use of τρυφή concerning Persia's tyrants in *Leg.* III, 695B, C, D. Polybius used none of Pythagoras' four terms except ὕβρις, but the drift of his argument is the same in vii, 6-9, and cf. viii, 1 on the 'utter abolishment' of one-man rule.

² Tyranny and tyrannical power could be looked at phenomenologically rather than with a view towards condemnation, so see esp. Plato, *Leg.* IV, 712D, *Epistulae* VII, 326D (in the context of Dion's *tyrannis*) Aristotle, *Politica*, esp. 1314a15-1315b-39 (where Aristotle actually gives 'objective-political' advice to tyrants), Isocrates, *Evagoras*, xlv (on the τυραννικὸς element of Evagoras' rule), *Nicocles*, xxi, *Archidamus*, xlv-xlvi, etc., cf. also Thucydides, I, 17; and note a purely mathematical assessment of tyranny *vis à vis* the other forms, (erroneously?) attributed to Archytas of Tarentum, (Stobaeus IV, 1, 137 [Hense ed., vol. 4, p. 84] *om. Diels*).

(4-5). Concerning 'minority rule' Polybius was rather sketchy: one might be tempted to characterize his account as a mere doublet of the analysis on one-man rule.¹ That would be to over-simplify, however, for even though Polybius did not have as much traditional material to play with concerning aristocracy and oligarchy as with monarchical and majority rules, he still remained concerned to reflect established lines of interpretation and to use them for his own purposes. A passage from Aristotle is most pertinent in this connection. In the *Politica* Bk.III he contended that kings ruled in early times because 'it was rare to find men who greatly excelled in virtue'. When men with comparable virtues appeared in great number, however,

'they would no longer submit (to one-man rule), but sought to set up a community in the form of a 'political society' (κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν). When men became worse, however, and began to make money out of the *koinon*, wealth became the road to honour, and so, we may reasonably say, oligarchies sprang up.'

(1286b9-16).

Here we see a three-part frame: virtuous men not submitting to one-man rule (or *basileia*)/virtuous men establishing a *koinon* and a *politeia* (aristokratia not named)/then oligarchy. The Polybian structure is quite close: noble men intolerant of tyranny/their establishment of an aristocracy/oligarchy. However, for those democratically-inclined writers who had argued that a genuine *politeia* followed upon kingship or tyranny, 'polity' was distinguished from the 'pre-political conditions' by the existence of a magistracy, and aristocracy presupposed magistrates just as readily

¹. So, Cole, *loc.cit.*, pp.458-9.

as democracy.¹ Plato reflected that line of approach when he referred to aristocracy after the 'just king' (*Leg.* III, 681D)². And his shadow falls on the scene further yet, since Polybius' picture of the oligarchs' greed and love of money has an important precedent in the philosopher's analysis of oligarchy in *Republic* VIII (550C-555A),³ and since both Plato and Polybius, unlike Aristotle, do not appear to associate oligarchy with a decrease in the number of those ruling.⁴ Thus once more the historian wrestled with notions of regular *metabolē* and synthesized different lines of approach.

What of the next segment of the *Anacyclōsis*? The oligarchs meet the very same disastrous end as the tyrant. At first supporting anybody brave enough to oppose their greed and lechery, the people finally overthrow them. Through fear of tyranny, however, the people do not revert to one-man rule as an alternative. They make the *politeia* a democracy, 'taking public affairs (τὰ κοινὰ) to be a matter of their own responsibility and conduct' (VI, ix, 3, cf. 1-2). This new constitution lasts only so long as its many participants place a high value on equality (*isēgoria*) and freedom of speech (*parrēsia*), but once later generations fail in this, then

¹ Cf. esp. A.Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution*, London, 1953, esp. pp.107-11 on the jealous preservation of the *Patrios politeia* and its magistrates.

² For complications, however, see *supra*, p.69.

³ Cf. 551A; E; 553C; E (on men who are φιλοχρήματοι), cf. 550B (ὕψηλόφρων). Polybius also spoke of anger and ἀδικία in connection with oligarchy (VI, iv, 9), cf. *Resp.* 551B; 552C; D; 553C, etc..

⁴ Cf. Polybius, VI, viii, 4-6; ix, 2 (πλείοσιν in this passage only signifying 'more than one'); and on oligarchy in Plato with concern for moral issues, yet without concern for decreased numbers, see *Resp.* 550D ff., *Politicus*, 291E (both aristocracy and oligarchy are rules ὑπο ὀλίγων); 292C; 301A; cf. 303A, but cf. Aristotle, *Politica*, esp. 1293a11 ff..

bad men of means 'tempt and corrupt the people' in 'their senseless mania for reputation' (ix, 5-7). Democracy then turns into its bad counterpart which, in his first, briefer sketch of the *Anacyclōsis*, Polybius called an *ochlocracy*, but which in his second account he termed a 'rule of force and the strong hand' (βία καὶ χειροκρατία) (iv, 10; ix, 7; cf. 8b). Now in isolating the faults of both oligarchy and mob-rule, Polybius appealed to traditional language about degenerate states (*adikia*, *hybris*, *paranomia*, *pleonexia*), and about a weakening of the polity through loss of civil equality and free speech;¹ and in writing about *metabolē* from aristocracy to oligarchy and from oligarchy to democracy, he invoked notions of political change well known from great texts of Greek political theory.² Nevertheless, his discussion of the downfall of democracy was rather special. Earlier writers had approached democracy, as they had approached monarchies, from differing viewpoints and Polybius was here forced to do justice to greater variety. Not only that, he was also confronted with the fact that the cycle of governments, in his rendering of it, was about to arrive at its *terminus ad quem*.

¹ Ἀδικία, cf. iv, 9; viii, 5 (oligarchy); ὕβρις, viii, 5 (oligarchy), iv, 10 (ochlocracy); παρανομία, iv, 10 (ochlocracy); πλεονεξία, viii, 5 (oligarchy). See esp. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp.13-82 on the background of these terms in 'Sophistic' *metabolē*-theory. Note also ἰσότης, viii, 4 (oligarchy); ἰσηγορία, ix, 4-5 (democracy and ochlocracy), παρρησία, viii, 4; ix, 4-5 (all three).

² On aristocracy changing to oligarchy, note esp. the three-staged scheme of the career of minority rules just discussed (*supra*, pp.53 - 4), but on this two-staged *metabolē* in particular, see Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, VIII, x, 3; cf. *Politica*, 1307a22-3, 34-35 (but note exceptions in 1307a as a whole), Plato, *Politicus*, 301A, and (with variation), Herodotus, *Hist.* III 82. On oligarchy to democracy, cf. esp. Plato, *Resp.*, VIII, 555Bff., Aristotle, *Politica*, 1301b5ff., cf. *Ath.Pol.*, v-xiii (Solon's 'democratic' bulwark against oligarchy).

It is well known that the two great fourth century philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, had been democracy's critics, not its supporters.¹ On the other hand, Polybius was not unfavourably disposed towards effective democracy, and those virtues he ascribed to it in his *Anacyclōsis*, namely *isēgoria* and *parrēsia*, were the qualities for which he praised the very Achaean constitution he lived under and knew so well (cf. II, xxxviii, 6). As an Achaean, he naturally prized liberty and associated the security conferred by liberty with democracy.² Yet it is not necessary to conclude that democracy represented the *acmē* of the *Anacyclōsis* any more than did kingship or aristocracy. And although a zenith in terms of the people's involvement, democracy preceded the complete degeneration of political society.³ In highlighting liberty on the one hand, then, and the great dangers of corrupt democracy on the other, Polybius paid his deference to the pro- and anti-democratic positions in Greek political theory.

¹ Plato, *Polit.*, 303A, Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, VIII, x, 1; 3, on democracy as the least preferable of the good constitutions, though Aristotle used the terms *politeia* or *timocratia*. Cf. Plato, *Resp.*, 555Aff (where oligarchy sinks lower into democracy!) On the other hand, Aristotle's democracy (as the corruption of timocracy) was for him the least harmful of the degenerate forms (*Eth.Nic.*, VIII, x, 3), and in the *Politicus* (303 A-B, cf. *Resp.*), Plato saw good democracy in this way, too. To this extent both preferred democracy to tyranny, and with Plato's inconsistency recognized, democracy to oligarchy; so see *supra*, cf. Solon, *apud* Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.*, xii(3); Thucydides, *Hist.*, III, 62 (Theban speech), Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, lxxix-lxxx, etc. On Plato and Aristotle as the critics of Athenian democracy, see A.H.M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, Oxford, 1957, ch. 3.

² See esp. II, xxxvii, 6-xxxix, 5; esp. xxxviii, 6 on καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς; cf. M. Gelzer, 'Die Archaische', *loc.cit.*, pp.5-6 on both Polybius' democratic sympathies and his fear of demagogy.

³ Cole (*loc.cit.*, p.464), tends to take the view that democracy represented the anacyclic zenith; but aristocracy, being in the very centre of the process, has as strong a case (see Walbank, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p.646).

According to Polybius, there were three stages in the decay of the democratic constitution. First, the rise to influence of men of means who in their lust for reputation and power entice and lead the commons astray through bribery (VI, ix, 6-7). Secondly, the rise of a party leader (*prostatēs*) who is without means, and whom the masses themselves push to the fore. Having become over-dependent on the gifts of the opulent, the masses bring about 'a rule of the strong arm', and assemble *en masse* 'executing, banishing and redistributing land' to their own gain (ix, 8-9a). Finally, there is the degeneration of all these violent men into a state of bestiality 'until they once more find a *despotēs* and a *monarchos*'. (ix, 9b).

Various accounts of the failure of democracy seem to be absorbed into this picture. One recalls, for example, the famous debate in Herodotus about the best constitution. Darius argued that democracy does not last because corrupt men mutually support one another to the detriment of the state. The disorder they produce persists until there arises a champion of the people (*προστάς τις τοῦ δήμου*), and he puts an end to the troubles, soon being instated as monarch (III, 82). This statement is admittedly polemical and in defence of monarchy,¹ but it remains true that Darius' words were not so far away from the assessed facts of the past. Peisistratus had been understood to be in the first place an extreme democrat (to take widely

¹ Is comparable to the defence of monarchy in *Nicocles*, where Isocrates claimed that, unlike the state of one-man unity, oligarchies and democracies produce men who 'injure τὰ κοινά through their mutual rivalries' (xviii, cf. xvii-xxi as a whole).

known Athenian history), the people voting him a bodyguard during the turmoil which followed Solonic 'democracy'.¹ And although Aristotle recognized more than one means by which democratic *politeiai* might change, he fastened on demagogy as the chief factor, and at least generalized (with Peisistratus partly in mind) that 'in ancient times, when a single man was both demagogue and general, *dēmokratia* tended to change into *tyrannis*' (*Polit.*, 1305a7ff; 23ff). These lines of thought seem to lurk behind Polybius' analysis, even if he did not explicitly identify the *prostatēs* as a demagogue, nor claim that either kind of figure became the monarch at the end of his cycle.

The phases in the Polybian treatment, however, have their most obvious connections with Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates isolated three groups important for democracy's downfall - energetic politicians already engaged in public business, a small group who have arisen out of the masses and become rich, and the masses themselves, who become active once they realize they can acquire 'a share of honey' from the second group (*Resp.* 564D; E; 565A). The leaders (οἱ προεστώτες) of the third group rob the rich, keep most of the proceeds and distribute the rest to the people (565A). Once this has been done, the roots of tyranny have been laid, for the populace eventually places its hope in one particular leader (προστάτης, ὁ προεστώς).

This leader obtains

'control of an utterly beguiled *ochlos* and does not withhold his hand from shedding blood... Exiles, murders, hints of debt cancellation and land division follows, until the man who instigated them is necessarily destroyed by his enemies or else changes from man to wolf and becomes a tyrant' (565E - 566A).

The Polybian and Platonic accounts admittedly differ. Polybius made

¹ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, xvii-xiv, cf. A. Andrews, *The Greek Tyrants*, London, 19-6, pp.106-7.

more of demagogy, one rich, the other poor.¹ That was natural enough. In a post-Thucydidean world it was almost universally held by Greek theorists that demagogues destroyed the foundations of democracy.² Again, the causal chain between demagogy and tyranny is less direct in Polybius than in Plato. If Plato found it easy to see how one of his popular *proestōtes* could become a tyrant, Polybius found that conception awkward. The *Anacyclōsis* was certainly moving towards a return to one-man rule, but only *via* the degenerate form of democracy - mob-rule. Thus in Polybius' picture, although the demagogue figures seem to dwindle in number, the masses increase in power at the same time. It is they who effect the new rule, the *συμφυές κακόν* of democracy, the 'constitution' of ochlocracy. It is the people as a mass who succumb to bestiality, and then once more *find* a master and a monarch.³

¹ Plato has not forgotten demagogy in his analysis of Book VIII, but it emerges from his 'third group' only and does not seem to be identified with the second, so *Resp.* 565A; Bb.

² So, the famous passage on Pericles' successors in Thuc., *Hist.*, II 65, cf. (for related historical work) Theopompus, (Jacoby, *FGH.*, pt. 1, vol. 2B, Frgs. 90-96 (parts of a section of his *Philippica* called 'On the Demagogues' which probably also include Scholion BD on Aelius Aristides, *On the Four*, 46, 118, 13, text printed in W.R. Connor, *Theopompus and fifth-century Athens*, Washington, 1968, pp. 36-7); Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, xxviii, (which has affinities with Theopompus), and see Aristotle, *Politica*, 1304b19-1305a10. cf. 1292a5-26, Isocrates, *De Pacis*, cxxvi-cxxxi, etc. Polybius' acquaintance with Theopompus' work should be noted, see *Hist.*, VIII, ix, 1; x, 12, XVI, xii, 7, though none of these references are at all favourable, or relevant. For his fear of demagogy, however, see esp. XX, vi, 3; XXIV, vii, 2-3, cf. VI, xliv, 9; IV, lxxxi, 13, XIII, vi, 3.

³ If Polybius at one point even confused mob-rule or *cheirocratia* with bestiality (ὁ θηριώδης, VI, x, 5, cf. x, 2-6), it was because he wished to make a double point. Mob-rule was a constitution, the *συμφυές κακόν* of democracy and the station of decay in the life-cycle of majority-rules (VI, iv, 6; 10; x, 5; 7, cf. ix, 7; 8b; lvii, 9); and yet it could aptly be called the 'worst condition of all human (political) affairs' (τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ χεῖριστον, τὴν ὀχλοκρατίαν, lvii, 9b), because through it political societies slid into the state of non-polity.

Despite these differences, however, Plato's general approach is akin to the historian's. In his own special way Plato would have agreed that demagogy was just one aspect of a more general process of socio-political decline. For both Plato and Polybius 'exiles', 'murders' and hints of 'land division'¹ were a prelude to one-man rule, a rule associated with bestiality and the veritable collapse of civic life. We should recall that Polybius apparently took the tyrant at the end of the Platonic series as the *monarchos*-figure standing at the renewal-point of the anacyclic course. It is of crucial importance that at one point in the *Historiae* he went out of his way to insist that the Platonic 'bestial' ruler was not to be confused with the conventional tyrant, or, as we may say, the εἶδος πολιτείας which followed kingship (VII, xiii, 7).² Thus Polybius evidently made use of the picture in the *Republic*, but modified it. Above all, he was bent on making a statement of recurrence at this stage, and on explaining how human affairs returned to an original point of departure.

We have gone far enough now to reflect on the Polybian zig-zag as in one block of material. It certainly draws our attention to the complexities of recurrence thinking in Polybius. Many of the special changes within the *Anacyclōsis* fall within the rubric of *metabolē* theory. They involve the idea of historical recurrence in the sense that they are *typical* changes (kingships, for instance, often become transformed into tyranny), and are described by a recognized termin-

¹ Plato, *Rep.*, 566A (ἀναδρηλάτης/ἀποκτίννυη/ὑποσημαίνη [χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ] γῆς ἀναδασμόν,) (apparently the work of the tyrant); Polybius *Hist.* VI, ix, 9 (σφαγὰς/φυγὰς/γῆς ἀναδασμούς) (apparently the work of the masses). Cf. Thucydides' comments on tendencies in Athens towards savagery, *Hist.*, VI, 60.

² i.e. on Philip V of Macedon and his changing character; οὐ λύκος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν, μῦθον ὥς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ τύραννος ἐκ βασιλείας ἀπέβη πικρός.

ology (for example, words exposing the moral inadequacy of a régime). By comparison, the zig-zag from kingship to ochlocracy taken as a whole suggests fluctuating process. One might be hesitant about overplaying the element of recurrence within the zig-zag, since no two of the constitutions it contains are the same. Polybius nevertheless meant to convey the impression of alternation; there is a shift, by turns, from a worthy to an unworthy constitution. Furthermore, he endeavoured to integrate this alternatory element with the three-stationed biological principle as applied to particular constitutions. He clearly wanted to apply the three stations of growth, acme and decay to each, individual (*hekastos*) major constitution,¹ and how he then interrelated the biological paradigm with the whole zig-zag² becomes an interesting question. His integration is not easy to represent accurately. We could be deceived into thinking, for instance, that primitive monarchy marked the growing-stage of one-man rule, with kingship its acme, and tyranny its decay. Concerning one-man rules, however, Polybius' most important appeal to biological notions was in connection with true kingship. Once the people have acquired a moral sense, kingship has its ἀρχὴ καὶ γένεσις (vii, 1). As a *politeia* it grows to its maturity from this point, not from an earlier stage, and its decay and dissolution come with tyranny. A similar pattern arises with the rules of the few and the many. Perhaps one might anticipate aristocracy being born in the conspiracies of the noble-minded against the tyrant,

1. For Polybius' general interest in the life-cycle of each single (major) constitution, cf. esp. VI, iv, 11 (περὶ τούτων), 12 (ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὡς φύεται and τὴν μεταβολὴν ἑκάστων καὶ τὸ τέλος). A skilful analysis of these references and of 'Einzelverfassungen' in this connection is given by K.F. Eisen, in *Polybiosinterpretationen; Beobachtungen zu Prinzipien griechischer und römischer Historiographie bei Polybios*, Heidelberg, 1966, pp. 42-3. Notice how interest in the biological principle, as applied to the types of rules, is absent in Aristotle's *Eth.Nic.*VIII, x.

2. Not the whole anacyclic model, cf. *supra*, pp.39 ff.

yet only after one-man rule is abolished does aristocracy have its ἀρχὴ καὶ γένεσις (viii, 1b). And it is only when oligarchy, the decayed form of aristocracy, has been eliminated, that democracy emerges (ix, 1-3). On this reading, then, two kinds of symmetry lie behind the 'backbone' of the *Anacyclōsis* (see Diagrams I and II), even if they cannot be put together so readily in plastic terms (see Diagram III).

But there is still more to be said. The above interpretation leads one to the view that the various moments of alternation within the *Anacyclōsis* are clearly demarcated, one biological cycle having its beginning at the end-point of another. It remains true, however, that Polybius brought these paradigms still closer together by characterizing the historical preparations for the three major constitutions of kingship, aristocracy and democracy. These three *politeiai* result from reactions against defective governments, or, in the case of kingship, arise after socio-political dissolution. As a Marxist might have put it, one major form of constitution was conceived in the womb of another, although this extension of the biological analogy is not worked out in Polybius.¹ Again, one should not overlook Polybius' interest in human generations. His position is not clearcut, but the tendency towards decay in the careers of the three major constitutions within the *Anacyclōsis* seems to come always with second generation politicians, that is to say, with those who inherit rather than create the *politeiai* of kingship, aristocracy and democracy. Generations, just as organic development from birth to death, had often been conceived of as cycles (cf. p. 122), so that yet another notion of

¹ For a variation on this theme, see p. 378, (Joachino di Fiore).

Diagram I

Diagram II

Diagram III

cyclical recurrence was covered by his framework.¹

The anacyclic zig-zag, therefore, sees a complex interweaving of both cyclical and non-cyclical models of recurrence. Polybius' ingenuity lies as much in his combination of conceptual structures as in his accommodation of various opinions. Although the complex passage from *basileia* to *ochlocratia* certainly has an interest and importance of its own, however, one hardly needs reminding that it is wedded in the *Anacyclōsis* to an 'anthropology', and it is now time to gather up the numerous threads we have followed and to discuss the grand framework as a whole.

D) The *Anacyclōsis* viewed synoptically and the importance of Plato.

Apart from the *Anacyclōsis*, were there other self-contained and summary manuals on the changes and cycles of government? The debate in Herodotus' *Historiae* Bk. III is the earliest one extant. Its peculiar unity lies in the reasonably balanced recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of the three major constitutional types, as well as in the accumulative effect which comes into play when Darius defends monarchy against oligarchy and democracy and against his two opponents, who argue for the abolition of one-man rule.² This treatment of the good and bad sides of *politeiai*, as well as Darius' arguments

¹ See esp. VI, vii, 6: viii, 4; ix, 5. Polybius does not appear to be concerned about the precise number of years in a generation. Hesiod's Age-theory entailed five γενεαί which were clearly longer than the twenty-five to thirty years of a conventional generation; Polybius may well have been vague to give deference to pictures of history based on his widely-known schema (cf. *WD*, ls. 106ff). Cf. also Plato, *Leg.*, VII, 798C-D, *Meno*, 93Eff, though note Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1367b29ff.

² On strengths and weaknesses; *Hist.* III, 80, 2-5; 81, 2a (weakness of kings and monarchs), 80, 6 (strength of democracy), 81, 2 (weakness of democracy, 3 (strength of oligarchy), 82, 3-4 (weaknesses of both oligarchy and democracy), 2; 5-6 (strength of monarchy), Darius' speech occupying sect. 82. On the abolition of monarchy; 80, 2-5 (Otanes), 81, 1a; 2a (Megabyzus).

that either oligarchy or democracy eventually leads to a 'champion' and a monarch, have significant affinities with the zig-zag and *terminus* of the *Anacyclōsis* (although whether Polybius had read Herodotus or not remains an unresolved question).¹ Again, the arrangement of constitutions in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* may be called to mind. Although it contains no governmental form akin to primitive monarchy, and although the terms describing majority-rule constitutions are different, Aristotle's three pairs of 'right' and 'deviant' *politeiai*² generally match the anacyclic zig-zag, and Polybius could have inherited his hexadic classification from an interim Aristotelian writer (Dicaearchus?), who changed his master's *syntaxis*.³ A parallel ordering of material, however, was not enough to form the basis of the *Anacyclōsis*. There had to be some understanding of a dynamic, historical relationship between all the forms before the Polybian model became possible. Despite at least one false claim that Aristotle did

¹ See III, 82, 3-4. Herodotus also refers in this debate to the *hybris* of a tyrant, and his violation of women, 80, 2; 81, 1b: 2a; 80, 5 (cf. Polyb. VI, vii, 7 and 9), and to the *hybris* of the masses, 81, 2a (cf. Polyb. VI, iv, 10). For Herodotus, *hybris* and *phthonos* (envy) are the roots of all evil, 80, 3 (and for *phthonos* in Polybius, see *Hist.* VI, ix, 1 on the jealousy of the oligarchs). But Polybius never mentions Herodotus' name in his *Historiae*.

² In the *Nic. Ethic.*, Aristotle wrote only of εἶδη and παρεκβάσεις but, in *Politica*, 1279a 30-2 he wrote of ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and their παρεκβάσεις.

³ Here we are in the realm of speculation, for we know little about the contents of Dicaearchus' *Tripoliticus* (cf. esp. Frgs. 70(a)-72), Wehrli, pp. 28-9). On Polybius knowledge of the works of Dicaearchus, see *supra*, p. 24, cf. *Hist.*, XXXV, v, 11.

once develop such a relationship, and depict a cycle of governments,¹ it is undeniable that no long-term historical thrust appears in the relevant portion of his *Ethics*. And where he did actually consider chains of development in the *Politics*, the parallel with the whole sequence of the anacyclic 'backbone' falls down. The Herodotean debate, indeed, has more of that 'overall thrust' we are seeking, although it was concerned with a limited number of *politeiai*, as were those arguments by others about the eventual emergence of democracy after unpopular forms of constitution.² In any case, if that element of directionalism was an essential prerequisite for the *Anacyclōsis*, so was the idea of a fixed sequence of constitutional change, which hardly comes out in any of these authors. In fact, because Aristotle

1. Concerning *Politica*, 1285b38-1286a2, R. Nisbet, (in *History and Social Change; Aspects of the Western Theory of Development*, New York, 1969, p.40) argues that Aristotle analysed a sequence of constitutions from kingship to aristocracy to democracy and back to kingship again. Nisbet, however (cf. p.306, n.25), was following B. Jowett's incorrect translation, (cf. *The Works of Aristotle translated into English*, [ed. W.D. Ross], vol.10, [cited by Nisbet as III, xv, 11, which is a very inadequate citation of III, xv, 10-40 [= III, x, 2-7a in most other editions]). Jowett's translation gives the impression that after considering the expediency of the rule of one man, Aristotle considers the rule of the best men (which derives from the ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρες of 1286a39 and 1286b5), then democracy (cf. esp. 1286a33 - 1286b2), and finally kingship again when the majority split into factions (1286b3). But although Aristotle does distinguish aristocracy from an ordinary rule of the multitude by defining it as 'the rule of the majority when these are all good men', (τὴν μὲν τῶν πλείονων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν ὁ ἀνδρῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον), he nowhere clearly describes the sequence and cycle as he is alleged to have done by Nisbet.

2. See esp. pseudo-Hippodamus, *apud Stobaeus, Anthol.*, IV, i, 95 (Hense, vol.4, pp.35-6) (usually taken to be a forgery based on Aristotle's *Politica*, 1267b23 ff). See also Polybius, *Hist.*, IV, xli, 5-6 (based on a 'traditional' line of interpreting the 'Achaean' past?).

envisaged such a great variety of possible *metabolai*, he really excluded it (*Polit.*, V). Insofar as Polybius actually allowed for divergences in the expected course of events when writing narrative, and insofar as he nowhere reckoned the anacyclic sequence to be inexorable (rather than 'natural') (see *Hist.*, VI, iv, 11; v, 1; ix, 10, cf. li, 4), he may not have been so far away from Aristotle's position. Yet the *Anacyclōsis* involved only six or seven forms of constitution (Aristotle's *Politics* included various others), and it was still presented as a continuing line of political development with a given order of events. What is more, it was conceived as a cyclical process.

We have to take stock and we are drawn back to the tentative suggestions offered beforehand. Was the *Anacyclōsis* constructed primarily (though not exclusively) from two dialogues of Plato, that is, from those important 'historical' analyses of political change found in the *Laws* Bk. III and the *Republic* Bk. VIII? If Plato was the one explicitly acknowledged author connected with the *Anacyclōsis*, if Polybius had certainly read the *Republic*,¹ and if it is quite clear that Plato analysed μεταβολή πολιτεῶν in terms of relatively fixed sequences², one cannot avoid reckoning seriously, if cautiously, with this hypothesis.

In the *Laws* (III), Plato began his account of socio-political development with catastrophe-theory; he touched on questions of early

1. See *Hist.*, VI, xlv, 1; xlvii, 7-10; VII, xiii, 7; XII, xxviii, 2-3. VI, v, 4 ff; xlviii, 2, represent the clearest indications of his reading of the *Laws*.

2. The apparent rigidity of which significantly drew the fire of Aristotle in *Polit.*, 1316a20-25.

morality, he hinted at a savage social order in the time of the Cyclopes, and he wrote of the first *politeia* as 'the most righteous of kingships'. All this, in general structure, runs quite parallel to the Polybian 'anthropology'. Yet what of Plato's treatment of transformations from one constitution into another? In the *Laws* he 'discerned a first, a second and a third *polis*' (III, 683A). The first was the patriarchal kingship, the second was a rule, founded on magistrates and legislation, called *aristocratia* (though Plato conceded that *basileia* could be another name given to it) (681C-D), whilst the third was a *politeia* 'blending all varieties and *eide* of constitutions', and founded, not in the highlands, but on the plain (681D-682D). These succeeding one another, there then appeared a 'fourth *polis*, or, if you wish, a nation (*ethnos*)' (683A). Treating the early Dorian community as such an *ethnos*, Plato then showed that of the three related Dorian *poleis*, Argos, Messene and Lacedaemon, only the last managed to survive. *Kakia*, *hybris* and *tyrannis* manifested themselves in the rulers of the other two city-states,¹ but they were avoided in Sparta by a blending of political forms in the right measure (σύμμικτος γενομένη καὶ μέτρον ἔχουσα) to save the polity (692A). Following all this, Plato turned his attention to what he termed the 'two mother forms of constitutions', one 'properly called monarchy and the other democracy', (693D).² He made it plain how the former, as in the case of Persia, was liable to bring despotism and political deterioration in succeeding generations (694A-696B). The latter, by contrast, as in the instance of Athens,

¹ *Leg.*, 684A-692C, see 688C (κακία), 691C (ὑβρις), 692B (τυραννίς).

² In this part of his work Plato was probably paying deference to the traditional dichotomy between one-man rule (not strictly a polity), and magisterial rule (the state of polity). It stands as a variant to 681C-D.

began with a workable aristocratic πολυτεία παλαιά, with magistrates and with the *dēmos* as willing slaves to the law, but eventually ended with license or disorder, or with teatrocracy, as he ironically called it.¹ After this last analysis, moreover, the philosopher made further comments still, and these in a strangely neglected passage:

'Next, after such *eleutheria*, comes the condition in which there is a refusal to be subject to rulers, and then a shirking of submission to one's parents and elders, and their pronouncements, and near the final stage (ἐγγὺς τοῦ τέλους) comes the effort to disregard laws, the last point (τῷ τέλει) being marked by an absolute loss of respect for oaths, pledges and gods, whereby men display and reproduce the φύσις of the ancient Titans of tradition, returning to their original state once more (ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα ἀφικομένους), bearing a hard existence with never a rest from evil.' (701B-C).

Curiously enough, Plato then put a 'bridle upon his discourse' (701C) and resorted to another theme, but in this short passage he had offered a subtle, perhaps prophetic utterance about the decline and collapse of the *polis*.

In the *Laws* Bk.III, then, lies a great deal of material relevant to the political changes of the *Anacyclōsis*. This material could easily be linked, moreover, with Plato's discussion in the *Republic* about imperfect societies degenerating in a series; that is, from the ideal state (= *aristokratia*),² through timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, on to the 'champion' of the *demōs* who becomes a tyrant.

Polybius himself noted that Plato's analysis was most 'intricate', stated at great length, and by implication, more precise or accurate than his own (*Hist.* VI, v, 1). The historian, less in keeping with his 'profession' than we might expect, sought a greater coherency and symmetry than the philosopher, and encapsulated Plato's less inter-

1. *Ibid*, 698D (πολυτεία παλαιά, magistracies), 700A, cf. 699C (*dēmos* as slaves), 701A (πολυτεία παλαιά as aristocratic, by implication, and also the transition aristocracy/democracy/theatrocracy, by implication), and see 699E-701B.

2. *Resp.*, 544E, 545D, 547C, *aristokratia* here meaning the 'rule of the best', but his *Republic* has no ordinary aristocratic constitution.

connected musings in a tightly compacted model of his own. The unmistakable correspondences clinch this line of argument. In the *Laws* Plato's treatment began and ended with what Polybius could readily understand as savage, primitive rule (Cyclopes, Titans), and in both the *Laws* and the *Republic*, the *telos*-points of the 'historical' analyses were both marked by the breakdown of ordinary political life, by complete social deterioration. Plato's and Polybius' first *politeiai* are one-man rules; both accept as normative the breakdown of kingship into tyranny, and democracy into a rule of license and excess of liberty. In the *Republic* Plato discussed the transition from oligarchy to democracy, as well as the factors weakening democracy and laying the foundations of the worst of all régimes. Thus in preliminary outline we may sketch the correspondences as follows:

<u>PLATO</u>	<u>POLYBIUS</u>
catastrophes (<i>Leg.</i>)	catastrophes
early moral notions and the growth of skills (<i>L</i>)	growth of moral notions (and implicitly of skills)
<i>Cyclopes</i> (<i>L</i>)	primitive monarchy
just kingship (<i>L</i>)	kingship founded on reason
(monarchs/kings degenerate into tyrants, <i>L</i>) ¹	tyranny
<hr/>	
oligarchy (<i>Resp.</i>)	oligarchy
democracy (<i>L</i> and <i>R</i>)	democracy
breakdown of democracy to rule of license (<i>R</i>) or theatrocracy (<i>L</i>), leading to <i>proestôtes</i> of the people (<i>R</i>)	ocholocracy/cheirocracy leading to the <i>prostates</i>
degeneration of the polis (<i>L</i>) ²	degeneration of <i>politeia</i> as political society
tyranny (<i>R</i>), cf. the rule of Titans, with the notion of a reversion to an original condition. (<i>L</i>)	Monarch and despot, with the notion of a reversion to an original condition

¹ In *Leg.* III, 693D-696B (on the Persian rule), Plato does not clearly distinguish between 'monarchy' and 'kingship', but we may assume Polybius to have taken the Persian ruler to be 'the great king', cf. Plato's reference in 685C.

² Cf. also *Rep.* 560D-562E. Plato's description of the disintegration of values, esp. in *Leg.* III, 701B-C, may be taken as the breaking-down of the moral standards Polybius considered in *Hist.*, VI, vi.

The run of parallels is not so neat at one point, of course, since Plato was vague about his second *polis*, or about the precise constitutional form which followed upon the true kingship. He simply emphasized that this *polis* was magisterially-based, yet that it could be either aristocratic or kingly. Polybius could take this looseness as much as he pleased. He did not follow the philosopher's analyses for every single special point he desired to make. When one considers his *Anacyclōsis* more synoptically, perhaps, he emerges as less eclectic than when his model is taken apart to get behind appearances. But in forging a link between 'just kingship' and oligarchy, Polybius simply had to be freer than usual with his chief mentor. Committed to the idea of a fixed sequence, he assumed that kingship had to degenerate before the establishment of aristocracy, and thus transposed some of Plato's more readily acceptable material about the transformation of kings into tyrants.

It should be recalled, however, that Plato considered a third and fourth *polis*, and not just a second. Following 'magisterial' government, he isolated the 'mixed polity of the plain', and then the *ethnos*, which, because of the weaknesses in Dorian kingship, resulted in the 'mixed' constitution of Lycurgus, a *mixis* Plato claimed enthusiastically as divinely inspired (*Leg.* III, 691D-E). Leaving aside the problem of Plato's ideal republic (for Polybius himself disregarded it as historically irrelevant), it was this Spartan constitution, this 'half-way house between aristocracy¹ and oligarchy', this Platonic

¹ In the *Republic* Plato took *aristocratia* to be the best form of government, (see *supra*), but the *ἐν μέσῳ* in the quotation just given could also be taken in its context either as an affirmation that the Spartan polity was a mixture of aristocratic and oligarchic forms (a most unlikely proposition for Plato? Cf. *Leg.* IV, 712D-E) or else that (in spatial sequence) the Spartan polity, the 'historical', non-ideal mixed form, lay between aristocracy and oligarchy (cf. the skeleton outline immediately *infra*). Polybius seems to have interpreted Plato according to this latter alternative.

'timocracy', which begins the series in the *Republic* (cf. 544C, 545B-500C), so suggesting the link between the analyses of the two Platonic dialogues. The complete sequence extracted from these dialogues may thus be represented as follows:

primitive monarchy
 kingship
 tyranny
 aristocracy

mixed polity (L)
ethnos with mixed
 constitution (Sparta).
 (L & R)

oligarchy
 democracy
 mob-rule
 breakdown of *politeia*
 reversion to primitive
 monarchy

Here, with the mixed polity and the *ethnos*, we have isolated an aspect of Platonic thought which does not seem to fit into the *Anacyclōsis*. This special feature is of great interest, however, since immediately after outlining the anacyclic framework, Polybius proceeded to deal with the question of a mixed constitution, the formation of which was not taken to invalidate his model, but rather as a means of forestalling the natural processes of political change.¹ Polybius discussed not only the Spartan, but also the Roman *politeia* as a mixed constitution, and one of his most central points in the *Historiae* Bk. VI is that Rome, although it came to possess such a *mixis*, still developed constitutionally 'according to nature'. It was this state, in fact, to which the anacyclic model best applied.

¹ See esp. Walbank, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, p. 648.

But this is another side to the story which will be considered later.

In review, we may claim that it was Plato's 'historical' and 'archaeological' discourses which provided the general super-structure for the *Anacyclōsis*. The historian discovered how, to his own mind, Plato actually succeeded in picturing a cycle of governments, even if Aristotle had contemptuously accused his teacher of failure. Plato himself was hardly bent on any such cycle, yet Polybius detected one. Despite his more orderly, more peripatetic-looking classifications, moreover, Polybius also leaned towards Plato in describing the zig-zag as transformations of the three well-known πολιτεῖαι into their συμφυῇ κακὰ (cf. *Rep.* 608E-609A),¹ and not, in Aristotelian terms, as ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι changing into their παρεκβάσεις. And he was likewise decidedly Platonic in showing that certain important political changes were due to the supplanting of an older generation by another, since the idea that succeeding generations undo or modify the work of their elders is a distinctive feature of *Republic* VIII.² Those who characterize the *Anacyclōsis* as mainly derivative from Plato are thus very much on the right track, although to ascribe the anacyclitic model to an intermediary platonizing source is to hypothesize unnecessarily.³ On the other hand, it is hardly necessary to

¹ See also Empedocles, *Frg.* 31B26, 7; B81, (Diels-Kranz); the Sophist Antiphon, *Frg.* 87B15 (Diels-Kranz); cf. also A. Roveri, *Studi su Polibio (Studi Pubblicati dall 'Istituto di Filologia Classica XVII)*, Bologna, 1964, p. 181.

² Cf. *Esp.* 549C-550B, 553Ab-554C, 558Cb-561Aa, 572Bb-537A, and see *Meno*, 93E ff., cf. *Protagoras*, 326D, and note also 'Ocellus Lucanus' IV, 4 (sect. 45), (Harder edit. p.22). So see Polybius, *Hist.* VI, viii, 4 (by implication, the πάλιν refers to vii, 6), ix, 5; cf. vi, 2-3.

³ See esp. E. Mioni, *Polibio (Problemi d'Oggi III)*, Padua, 1949, pp.66ff, and on a platonizing source, cf. esp. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp.201, 360; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechisches Lesebuch*, Berlin, 1906-13, vol. 2, sect. 1, p.119. On rather unsuccessful arguments attempting to show that Polybius was well acquainted with the *Republic* at least, see esp. R. von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios*, Stuttgart,

suppose that Polybius had Platonic texts 'unmittelbar vor Augen',¹ when constructing the *Anacyclōsis*, and it is important to remember that Plato's dialogues were not his exclusive source; they provided the catalyst for his own more accommodating and popular vision of history and political change. Polybius had his own purposes to fulfil, to satisfy as wide an audience as possible, and that included Romans as well as Greeks (cf. esp. I, iii, 7; VI, xi, 5), and to distil the essential truths of Greek 'anthropological' and historico-political speculation into one systematic statement. That meant for him the enunciation of a doctrine of historical recurrence, and that did not come easily from Plato for one; even though the materials were there, it had to be forced out. Polybius was only partly controlled by Plato, and his freedom to execute his own intentions is evident. It is worth recalling how the Achaean felt bound to play down both the enormous lapses of time which were an important feature of the platonic 'anthropology', and Plato's historical pejorism. If one reflects upon the views of Dicaearchus in the *Bios Hellados*, moreover, it will be perceived how much more platonizing even a peripatetic could become than Polybius. Dicaearchus not only stressed the painful slowness of man's progress (προϊόντος δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω τοῦ χρόνου),² but resurrected the Hesiodic myth of early bliss, and the age of Kronos

1890, pp.97ff; von Fritz, *op.cit.*, p.68 and p.412, n. 32; cf. Mioni. On our interpretation we are not looking for verbal dependences of Polybius upon Plato (though these would be helpful), so much as similarities of 'structure' in their analyses of political change. A comparison of phraseology and allusion may only lead to the conclusion that Polybius recalled some of Plato's expressions after reading his discourses, and that he ripped them out of their proper context (so, for example, *Hist.* IV, xxxv, 15, cf. *Resp.* 363D, and cf. C. Wunderer, *Citate und geflügelte Worte bei Polybios*, Leipzig, 1902, pp.71-3), but structural comparison yields far more.

¹ So Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

² Frg. 49 (Wehrli edit., p.24, ln.34).

so idyllically portrayed in Plato's *Politicus*. Besides that, he conformed closely to a decidedly Platonic picture of early communal life, describing a nomadic, pastoral existence without war or *stasis*, lived out by men with simple virtues, before moral decay brought the need for strongholds, and *technē* brought the art of agriculture.¹ Polybius did not go this far; he was an eclectic before he was a Platonist.

Briefly reflecting on all the traditions of thought lying behind the *Anacyclōsis*, Polybius emerges as a populariser.² Surveying his model as a whole (see the schematic outline of Diagram IV), we may grasp not only his remarkable accommodation of several and often competing lines of thought, but also the way he packed different

¹ *Ibid*, ls.3-8 (Hesiod's 'Age of gold'), 9-11 (Kronos), 11-14 ('natural' beginnings), 20 (no war or *stasis*), 26-7 (nomadic, pastoral existence), cf. also Frg.48, Wehrli, p.22, ls.29-31), 23 (simple virtues), 29-30 (moral decline) 28 (building of strongholds), 35ff (agricultural phase,)(pp.24-5,) cf. Frg.48, pp.22-3, ls.36(p.22)-3(p.23).

² One might even rank Polybius as a worthy forerunner of the better known 'Eclectics' to come after him; i.e., with such men as Antiochus of Ascalon (late second, early first Century BC) and the most important men Antiochus influenced, Cicero and Arius Didymus. All these men maintained the essential agreement of the Academic, peripatetic and Stoic philosophies, and Polybius was probably acquainted with (and in a certain sense can be rated amongst) those philosophers who made their enterprise a possibility, with Carneades of Athens and Panaetius of Rhodes. The former, together with Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and peripatetic Critolaus, was the Academic representative in the famous Athenian delegation to Rome in 156-155 BC. Polybius, who was in Rome at the time, reported on this visit with enthusiasm (XXXIII, ii, 8-10), although we have no knowledge that Polybius saw the (albeit anticipatory) significance of Carneades' criticism of all three major philosophical systems on the same level. Certainly Polybius shared in common with Carneades a hatred of over-subtle paradoxes, (see Carneades *apud* Cicero, *De Legibus*, I, xiii, 39; cf. *De Re Publica* III, vi, 8-9; Polybius, *Hist. esp.* XII, xxvi, c, 2), even if the paucity of evidence does not allow us to isolate any other obvious points of agreement (cf. Pédech, *op.cit.*, pp.97-8). The latter, Panaetius, was a more positive thinker seeking to reconcile the Stoic position with his 'favourite', Aristotle. Arriving in Rome in 144BC, he tutored Scipio Aemilianus just as Polybius had done and was possibly still doing, but that the philosopher and historian were actually colleagues is still a matter of dispute. With the present amount of information, we can do little else than acknowledge the significance of the intellectual *milieu* in which Polybius was writing (on literature, cf. p.10, n. 2).

CONDITIONS OF POLITY

Diagram IV

models of recurrence into the one framework. The large cycle, which can also be described as an alternation between polity and non-polity, included within it the smaller biological cycles undergone by autocracy, and by the rules of the few and the many, as well as the process of fluctuation between good and bad constitutions. If the paradigm of alternation is virtually lost within the wider cycle, it retains its identity in the case of the zig-zag between 'opposite' kinds of *politeiai*. It does not stand alone, moreover, as a non-cyclical paradigm. Also present in the *Anacyclōsis* are the 'typical changes' of *metabolē* theory, and the idea of change into opposites (cf. VI, ix, 10). Polybius even utilized the principle of change from less to more and from more to less. The constitutional development within the *Anacyclōsis* proceeds from the rule of the one to the rule of the many,¹ and then, with political dissolution, back to the one again. As his model was partly framed by catastrophe-theory, there is also the implicit sense in which the human species alternates between virtual (though regional) elimination and multiplicity. It is not too much to claim that this particular Polybian motif was drawn from a Stoic background. If the Stoics pictured cosmic 'history' as bounded by dissolution into elemental Fire, yet recurrently re-

constituted in all its diversity, Polybius consciously historicized

¹ Notice how Polybius does not claim the oligarchs to be fewer in number than the aristocrats, cf. *supra*. p. 54, n. 4. On the other hand, the three major constitutions emerge and settle with the active consent of the people. Even though the people's sphere of influence naturally widens in the passage from one-man to majority rules, one point of Polybius' not to be overlooked is that the people were operating politically even if they disliked the régime (responsible governments being 'conceived' during the degeneration of irresponsible ones), or else, as with ochlocracy, they were themselves the cause of an 'evil' state of affairs, (so VI, vii, 2-3; viii, 1-3; ix, 3-4 [on consent and the three better constitutions], and viii, 1 [people against tyranny], viii, 6 [against oligarchy] ix, 6-8 [on ochlocracy]).

this vision, conceiving human affairs to reflect not only large-scale oscillation between fewness and numerousness in both political leadership and population, but between societal definition and unstructuredness as well.¹

The *Anacyclōsis* was not just held together by a fusion of competing anthropologies or of recurrence paradigms, however, and we cannot conclude this part of our discussion without acknowledging Polybius' important stress on the naturalness of the anacyclīc course. We have already noticed how one set of developments in the cycle, namely the stage of elementary, animal-like existence, and the rule of brute force and the growth of morality, seems to be more 'natural' than developments in the course of the zig-zag. This contrast between pre-political and political conditions remains valid, yet it is also

¹ The notion of change from less to more and vice versa seems inextricably bound up with the cyclo-alternatory processes of the *Anacyclōsis*, yet there is certainly room for looking at it in its own right. It is also interesting that when 'Ocellus Lucanus' made his over-ambitious generalizations about *metabolē* on all levels of the cosmos, he named it together with qualitative and organic change. In *On the Nature of the Universe* he elicited two kinds of *metabolē*, yet in fact, each kind had three aspects: change from less to more, worse to better, γένεσις to ἀκμή, and change from more to less, better to worse, from ἀκμή to φθορά and διάλυσις (dissolution) (cf. *De Univ. Nat.*, Sect. iv (Harder edit., p.11). According to Ocellus even 'the whole' (the Universe conceptually extrapolated from its separate parts, [sect. ix, p.12]), does not change, being self-subsisting, living out an eternity through symmetrically ordered time periods, and betraying none of the perceptible alternations undergone by its components (esp. sects. vii-x, xvii, xlii, [pp.12, 15, 21]). Having affirmed this, the writer proceeded to demonstrate the nature of change at different and lower levels, those of the elements, plant-life, of 'men and other forms of animal life', again stressing however, that even the parts of τὸ ὅλον could be spoken of as eternal since they conformed to cyclical patterns of *metabolē* (sects. xv - xvii [p.14], xxxviii [p.20]). Ocellus had evident difficulty in integrating the more determinative biological notion with the ideas that an increase in number should be both a betterment and a prerequisite for an acme, and that a decrease should mark the bad and the decayed. In fact, after connecting quantitative change with the elements, he dropped this aspect of his early model, and dealt with plants and animals mainly in biological (and secondarily in qualitative) terms. Cf. *ibid.* sect. xv (p.13) and ff..

true that Polybius wrote about the whole cycle as natural, in fact both ἀναγκάτως καὶ φυσικῶς (VI, x, 2). Over the causal principles lying behind the cyclical process there is a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, the *metabolai* from kingship to ochlocracy result from the passions and reactions generally characteristic of civic life, and they all imply a series of efficient causes. On the other hand, by presenting a fixed sequence of *metabolē*, by emphasizing the changing attitudes of new generations towards their predecessors, and also by suggesting that the lives of political societies were recurrently in danger of lapsing into bestiality and oblivion, Polybius reveals himself to be more necessitarian. This broad vision of a necessary dispensation smacks of Stoicism,¹ yet as we shall see, Polybius admitted that the anacyclic path could be forestalled or even severed. Paradoxically enough, therefore, its progress was inevitable only if it was not prevented from running its natural course. But this leads us to the next stage of our analysis, and also looks forward to a wide investigation into Polybius' aetiology and to the way he related different causal explanations (cf. pp.147ff.).

¹ The Stoics attempted to hold the doctrine of inevitability (or necessity) concurrently with the belief in the freedom of the ethical will (to consciously conform with the 'laws of nature', cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. Philos.*, vii, 85 ff) and see Graeber, *op.cit.*, pp.75-6; Aristotle considered teleological causation in a different light, however, his 'final' cause being that which brings anything, inert or living, to its proper fulfilment (cf. esp. *Eth.Nic.*, I, i). The use of the biological principle in political interpretation, however, may not be Aristotelian (as against peripatetic), since in *ibid.*, VIII, x, and in the *Politica*, Aristotle appealed to *metabolē* theory rather than to the three-stationed principle. We lack the *Constitutions* to tell us more, though his disciples probably helped in the compilation of this work. For important peripatetic background to Polybius, however, see esp. Dicaearchus, *Frags.* 24, (Wehrli, pp.17-8), and on the phrase κατὰ φύσιν in Aristotle, note *De Gen.et Corrupt.* 336611, *De Generatione Animalium*, 777b17ff, etc.

E. The Application of the *Anacyclōsis*.

The Problem of Mixed Constitutions.

It is on Polybius as a theorist of historical recurrence that our attention has and will continue to be focussed, yet it is not possible to shelve another central and difficult issue of Polybian studies which is really worth exhaustive study for its own sake. I refer to Polybius' notion of the mixed constitution, of a *politeia* with three evenly balanced power elements. These elements, it was said, corresponded to the three most basic εἶδη πολιτεῶν, kingship (or monarchy in its most widely used, least technical sense), aristocracy and democracy. Now if Polybius faced some patent difficulties in attempting to interweave different models into the one far-reaching anacyclīc schema, and in formulating a statement with the widest possible appeal, the greatest difficulty of all arose when he endeavoured to forge a connection between the *Anacyclōsis* and a special constitution combining three of the very *politeiai* belonging to his set sequence. In neither of his two outlines of the *Anacyclōsis* does there appear to be any provision made for the natural emergence of a *mīxis*, and despite Fritz Taeger's rather ingenious efforts to argue that the anacyclīc model contained a 'mixed' kingship and a 'mixed' aristocracy (because Polybius' 'true *basileia*' and 'high minded' *aristocratia* were based on popular support) this truth still has to be firmly emphasized.¹ Yet the Achaean went out of his way to make some bold yet problem-raising statements about the relationship between the *Anacyclōsis* and that one constitution he was most concerned to examine in sixth book,

¹ Cf. *Die Archæologie des Polybios*, Stuttgart, 1922, esp. pp.43-45. This view cannot be accepted simply because explicit references to *basileia* and *aristocratia* cannot be taken to be implicit references to 'mixed' kingship and aristocracy.

the mixed constitution of Rome. Book VI of the *Historiae* actually begins with expressed intentions to examine the Roman constitution (or 'state') (cf. esp. ii. 3; 9; iii, 4), and the outline of the anacyclic process only formed its early parts. Inferring from its extant remains, this book was concerned with the peculiar genius and intricacies of Rome's *politeia*, (xi, 3-xviii, 8), her military system (xix, 1-xlii, 6), her constitution's background history (cf. xi, 1-2), and her comparative internal strengths *vis à vis* other constitutions such as those of Athens, Thebes, Crete, Sparta and Carthage (xliii, 1-lviii, 13; cf. x, 1-14). Perhaps one could argue that the *Anacyclōsis* merely forms a conceptual prelude to these subjects, yet it remains true that Polybius considered the application of the cycle of governments in his subsequent discussion.

Immediately after he presented the cycle of governments, Polybius made three very significant affirmations with Rome in view. He first contended that the method which the *Anacyclōsis* provided for assessing the constitutional situation of any given state was most of all suitable for the study of the Roman *politeia* (iv, 13a, cf. ix, 11-12); secondly, that this was the case because, more than any other *politeia*, the Roman one developed κατὰ φύσιν (iv, 13b; ix, 13; cf. x, 13-14); and thirdly, that the Roman *politeia* at the time of the Hannibalic War, at its prime, preserved within itself an equilibrium between monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements of power (xi, 1-2, 12, etc). Impressive points. Yet how, in Polybian terms, could a state experience both the anacyclic process and a *mixis*? That is a problem which has frustrated numerous classicists, and it is hard not to believe it was a problem for Polybius also. Yet one must be wary of supposing his difficulties to be identical with those of modern scholarship. In our case, we are frequently prone to

ask whether Polybius' assertions were logically consistent, because a sufficient degree of inner contradiction might persuade us that the writer changed his mind and that his work lost consistency through his own attempts at redaction.¹ Yet this tends to make the last resort of interpretation what with Polybius of all people should have presented itself as the first likelihood, that the writer was struggling to marry two sets of ideas which were not the happiest of bed-fellows, and that he saw the necessity to do this because he wished to pay deference to, and to interrelate, the traditionally stated, most widely accepted truths of Greek political theory. It is reasonable to assume that the *Anacyclosis* and the idea of a mixed constitution represented for Polybius two key political *Formprinzipien* derived from Greek theory, both of which he took to be essential for understanding Rome's constitution, and her unparalleled success.² Concerning the second 'basic framework' it may be fairly claimed that Polybius looked at Rome with Greek presuppositions, that he foisted a Hellenic face upon her *politeia*, describing it in terms of the tripolitical structure so commonly appealed to by his fellow countrymen.³ The question naturally arises, did

¹ On recent discussion of source questions, see esp. Walbank, 'Polybius on the Roman constitution', *loc.cit.* pp.79ff., and Pédech, *op.cit.* pp.333-5 (with reference to Cuntz, Von Scala, etc). Note that R.Von Scala (*op.cit.* pp.248ff.), and E.K.Kornemann, (in 'Zum Staatsrecht des Polybios', in *Philologus*, LXXXVI, 1931, pp.183-4) argued that the *Anacyclosis* hails from Panaetius' lost book 'On the State'.

² On the idea of two such *Formprinzipien* see E.Graeber, *op.cit.*, p.85 and ff.

³ For background, see esp. Ion of Chios, *apud* Isocrates, *Antidosis*, cclxviii; pseudo-Hippodamus, *apud* Stobaeus, *Anthol.*, (Hense, ed., vol.4, Frg.95, pp.35-6); Aeschines, *Contra Timarchum*, iv; *Contra Ctesiphon*, vi; Archytas the Pythagorean, *apud* Stobaeus (Hense, vol.4, Frgs.135-8, pp.82-5); Dicaearchus, *Tripolitikos* (cf. Frgs.70-2, Wehrli, pp.28-9); Theophrastus, *apud* Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.Philos.*, v, 45; Panaetius, *apud* Diogenes, vii, 131; Diogenes himself, vii, 66; 131 (cf. also, Chrysippus, Frg. 700 (von Armin, vol. 3, p. 175). Cf. also Herodotus, *Hist.*, III, 80-3; Xenophon, *Cyropaedeia*, I, 1; Agesilaus, I, 4; cf. *Memorabilia*, IV, iv, 12; (pseudo-) Plato, *Epistulae*, V, 321D; Isocrates, *Panath.*, cxix, cxxxii, etc, and see J.de Romilly 'Le Classement des Constitutions d'Hérodote à Aristotele; in *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, LXXII, 1959, pp.81 ff.

Polybius understand this special combination of *politeiai* to arise within the anacyclic process? And (as we are not considering the idea of a mixed constitution for its own sake), what was the significance of the *mixis* for his views of historical recurrence?

According to a passage primarily centred on Sparta (VI, x), the triadic mixed constitution forestalled the natural *Anacyclōsis*.

Polybius contended that Lycurgus

'well understood that each of the above changes [in the anacyclic sequence] take place necessarily and naturally, and realized that every constitutional form which was simple and based on one principle was unsound.... and foreseeing this, he did not make the *politeia* simple and uniform, but united in it all the best and distinctive features of the worthy *politeiai* so that they would not grow unduly, falling into their perverted counterparts, but that each power being checked by the other, might neither outbalance nor be subject to one another'. (x, 2; 6-7).

Thus a condition of equilibrium (*isorropia*) was preserved in the state, Polybius noting how the *basileia* of Sparta was prevented from arrogance through fear of the *dēmos*, how the commons feared the elders too much to be contemptuous of the (two) kings, and how the elders were always on the side of justice because they were elected¹ from the best citizens (x, 7-9).² The mixed constitution brought the anacyclic process to a standstill.³ Now like Sparta, Rome also possessed such a constitution to check *metabolē*, balancing the monarchical-consular, the aristocratic-senatorial and the democratic powers within itself, so that only after the *politeia* (*qua* state or *mixis*) 'has attained to

¹ οἱ κατ' ἐκλογὴν ἀριστίνδην.

² On Spartan institutions, cf. esp. K.M.T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta; a Re-examination of the Evidence*, Manchester, 1949. pp.397ff. Cf. also Plato, *Leg.*, III, 691D ff.

³ See Graeber, *op.cit.*, ch. 3, sect. B.

an uncontested sovereignty', does it begin to show the weaknesses brought on by too much prosperity (*eudaimonia*) (xi, 11-xviii, 8; lvii, 5). For Polybius the Roman constitution was nearest to perfection during the second Punic War (221-202BC) (xi, 1). A *status quo* prevailed and a relative immortality secured; all power-sources zealously acted in concord during times of external danger, and none became corrupted in periods of good fortune and prosperity (cf. xviii, 1-8).

If the mixed constitution 'held up' the *Anacyclōsis*, how could it properly be considered as part of the latter's οἰκονομία φύσεως? It seems more a new growth grafted upon the normative line of development. Yet if Lycurgus was able to create such a mixed constitution by virtue of his foresight and reasoning powers,¹ thus legislating at one special point in Spartan history, Rome, by contrast, arrived at the same result, not διὰ λόγου, but through many trials and troubles (διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων),² always choosing the best in the light of changing circumstances (ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις ἐπιγνώσεως) (x, 13-4). In the cases of both states, Polybius refers to special qualities required to effect the extraordinary, but, concerning Rome, he placed a special insistence on the slower, natural growth of a mixed polity. We have already admitted that the 'natural economy' of the *Anacyclōsis* did not exclude the exercise of the human will in effecting political change. It should not puzzle us, then, that for Polybius both the *Anacyclōsis* and Rome's mixed constitution took shape κατὰ φύσιν (and that meant at least 'not interfered with by any

¹ Cf. συννόησας, συλλογισάμενος (x, 2), προῖδόμενος, (6), λόγω τινὶ προῖδόμενος, (12), προνοήσθαι, (xlviii, 2), etc.

² The term πράγματα is here being used in a pejorative sense. Cf. Liddell, Scott and Jones.

outside, or artificially imposed influence').¹ Not that Polybius claimed Rome to be undergoing the anacyclic process *tout simplement*, that is, in accordance with the way the process was outlined in *Hist.* VI, iv-ix. His meaning was much more complex than this, and his expression of the relationship between the natural cycle of governments and the natural Roman *politeia* was especially subtle.

One may recall that after his first description of the zig-zag from *monarchia* to *ochlocratia*, he commented on the need to attend to the stages undergone by *each* individual constitution, for each had an ἀρχή καὶ γένεσις, each experiencing ἀΐξεις, ἀκμή, μεταβολή and a τέλος (iv, 12). He was there thinking of the three basic forms of constitution (cf. pp. 60 ff.), but then he proceeded further by asserting

'it is above all to the Roman *politeia* that this type of *exēgesis* may successfully be applied, because from its beginning, its formation² and growth have been natural'.
(iv, 13).

¹ On the distinction between inner development of a constitution as the realm of *physis* and the outer more variable relations between states, the realm of *tyche*, see esp. *infra*, pp.127ff. On the effect of external relations upon the constitutions of Athens and Thebes, cf. VI, xliii, 2-xlix, 9, cf. *infra*.p 123, and on the relative abilities of the mixed constitutions of Lycurgus and Rome to maintain constitutional stability at a time of great external pressure, cf. esp.xlviii, 5; 1, 1-6, cf. xviii, 2-3. Each of the more worthybasic constitutions (kingship, aristocracy, democracy) was also understood to possess the capacity of checking external threat, but not to prevent inner 'natural' *phthora*,cf. x, 3-4 and as an example, xlviii, 8 (Athens). By implication the rational legislation of Lycurgus, untaught by real experience, is taken to be less natural and thus more artificial than the slowly learnt results of the Romans, cf.x, 12-13; 1, 1-6, though the forms of both the Spartan and Roman constitutions were equally κάλλιστα (cf. x, 14; 1, 2 and ff).

² I.e. Σύστασις, which was used at least twice to suggest the temporal process whereby a constitution was formed or composed before the attainment of its zenith. See the next quotation (cf. ix, 12-13). For its more Platonic use as a 'settled system', however, cf. 1i, 5b.

Again, after setting out the second more elaborate statement of constitutional change, he reflected on the usefulness of the anacyclic model for assessing the stage of growth or decay any *politeia* had reached (cf. ix, 11), and added

'especially concerning the Roman *politeia* will this 'model' be of use, providing us with the knowledge of its₁ formation, growth and acme, and likewise its *metabolē*¹ towards the reverse of these in the future. For, as I said, this *politeia*, more than any other, has undergone natural formation and growth, and will undergo a natural change to opposite conditions in the future'. (ix, 12-13).

One cannot but be struck by the fact that in order to discuss the Roman *politeia* in relation to the *Anacyclōsis*, Polybius had been forced to talk far less about his grand model in general and much more about the biological principle in particular. That was an important shift, yet the reasons for it, upon close examination, become fairly obvious.

For Polybius the Roman constitution attained to a zenith, but as already observed, the *Anacyclōsis* reflected no clearly defined point of acme, even though he appears to have reckoned the general condition of polity as a highpoint in the large-scale cycle of his model. Moreover, whereas three specific constitutional forms had their life-cycles and zeniths within the *Anacyclōsis*, he wrote of the Roman mixed *politeia* as if it had several constitutional developments both in preparation for it and in decline away from it. As an *individual* constitution, of course, with a more limited span of life, the *mixis* had a biological cycle of its own. But Polybius wished to say more than just that. The beginning and formation of the mixed Roman *politeia*, and its future decay, were bound up with the careers of the separable *πολιτεῖαι* which preceded and succeeded it.

¹ *Metabolē* is here used in the classical pejorative sense made popular in Sophistic circles, cf. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, esp. pp.23 ff. The same applies in connection with VI, iv, 12 (see previous page).

Viewed in this broader light, it is easier to grasp why, according to Polybius, Rome had the most natural of *politeiai*. At its constitutional *archē* there was no *mixis* in sight. That had to be developed by the Romans in response to numerous difficulties, and it arose, not through one piece of legislation, nor by any artificial means, but what was claimed to be the *natural* even if wilful responses to circumstances. At Rome's constitutional *telos*, by contrast, the mixed constitution would have long passed. What are we to make of Polybius' approach here? Was his strong appeal to the biological principle in connection with Rome simply a way of linking his two great 'basic frameworks', so enabling him to affirm that both the anacyclic process and Rome's constitutional course were natural, even if they could never be truly integrated? It may seem realistic to answer in the affirmative, but the available evidence compels us to investigate further, and to consider whether Polybius actually held that Rome in some sense, experienced both the *Anacyclōsis* and a *mixis*. Closely interrelated with this area of enquiry, however, is an even more problematic question; whether or not it is possible to reconstruct what he wrote about the early history of Rome.

The Constitutional Development of Rome.

Polybius stated explicitly in one place and implied in another that he described the formation of the Roman *politeia* (in Bk. VI),¹ but almost all the relevant material has been lost. The methods used in the so-called Roman 'Archaeology' may be reflected in his short historical accounts of Sparta after the establishment of the Lycurgan constitution, and of the Achaean state before and after it adopted

¹ See VI, xi, 1-2 (especially διὸ καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς σωστάσεως αὐτοῦ λόγον ἀποδεδωκότες), ix, 12 and 14.

democracy,¹ but probably only in a very pale way since these were states with constitutional forms settled in the more distant past. With Rome it was apparently a matter of explaining (at what length one cannot tell) how the Roman *politeia* reached a state of perfection during the relatively recent second Punic War. Polybius evidently began his background presentation with the early Roman kings;² that naturally enough leads one to ask whether he also treated the reign of Tarquinius Superbus, the tyrant who succeeded the sixth king and brought on the downfall of Roman one-man rule,³ and whether he even considered Romulus as the primitive monarch of Rome's political society, since the career of her founder was so strongly associated with animal-like existence and with physical strength. This is not unlikely (and Taeger was not unjustified in arguing that it was more than a possibility),⁴ so that the search for an historical interrelationship between the Roman *mixis* and the *Anacyclōsis* may not be in vain. One should tread warily, however, for so many pitfalls await those attempting to reconstruct the non-extant parts of any ancient text.

We may recall, at this point, how Polybius apparently combined

¹ So VI, xlviii-xlix (Sparta), II, xl, 5-xliii, 6 (etc.), IV, i, 4-6 (Achaëa); Eisen argues (*op.cit.* p.38) that further material concerning the Greek constitutions has been lost.

² Cf. Cicero, *De Re Publica*, II, xiv, 27, Polybius Frg.VI (6,2) (a and b) (following the order of E. Hultsch). Taeger (*op.cit.* pp.55 ff) discusses the fragment (from book VI) at length (a fragment conveniently rendered into English on p.544 [vol.2] of E. Shuckburgh's edition of Polybius).

³ Cf. Cicero, *Re Pub.*, II, xxiii, 43-xxix, 51; Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*, I, 49 ff., Tacitus, *Annales*, III, 26, etc..

⁴ See *op.cit.*, pp.38 ff..

Plato's *Laws* Bk.III, and the *Republic* Bk.VIII. Plato's account of socio-political development included a reference to the formation of the 'third polis' of the 'plain' which blended all forms and conditions of constitutions¹, and which followed the appearance of an *aristocratia*.² In the *Laws* Plato had gone on to describe the establishment of the Spartan mixed constitution as one manifestation of his fourth polis³; in the *Republic* he diagnosed the weaknesses of Sparta's form of government (547B-550B). Polybius' *Anacyclōsis*, on the other hand, by-passed such developments, assuming a direct passage from aristocracy to oligarchy. Now given that the general course of the Polybian cycle of governments was based on Plato's dialogues, and presupposing that Polybius actually allowed for the appearance of a mixed constitution within the *cyclos*, at least in Rome's case, the most likely place for such an appearance was after aristocracy and before oligarchy.

A crucial passage toward the end of Bk.VI bears on this line of thought. In chapter lvii Polybius spent time describing how a *politeia* fell into decay. Clearly he had Rome in mind and although *politeia* was used as both 'state' and 'constitution' in this context, the passage is more easily understood if one takes it to mean *mixis*. When such a *politeia* overcomes many perils and eventually achieves an uncontested sovereignty, presumably in both external and internal affairs), then long established prosperity engenders extravagance

1. (εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτεῶν), so *Leg.*, 681D. The use of the term παθήματα implies an imperfect mixed constitution, certainly one without the divine inspiration of the Spartan *politeia*.

2. Or, as Plato would have it, 'possibly a βασιλεία (*Ibid.*), but Polybius, we are supposing, overlooked this complication, perhaps deliberately.

3. ('or *ethnos*, if you wish'), so, *Ibid.* 683A (which includes the small quotation) - 693C.

(*polyteleia*) among the citizens, and excessive rivalry for office (*philarchia*) between those of them most ambitious or most afraid of falling into obscurity. There follows the rise of the *dēmos*, motivated both by its grievances against the obvious *pleonexia* of certain people, and through its pride built up by flatterers (lvii, 5-7).¹ The *dēmos*, no longer wishing to obey their old leaders, demand 'the lion's share for themselves' (8b)² and set up a constitution with the finest-sounding of all names, *eleutheria* and *dēmocratia*, which changes for the worse into mob-rule (9). This analysis, one may contend, largely parallels the second half of the anacyclic zig-zag, though it is a special version of it. In this case Polybius gave more details about the rise of the people to complete supremacy than in ix, 1-3,³ yet the *pleonexia* of the (oligarchic)⁴ leaders, the

¹ See 6, cf. 5, (πολυτέλεια); 6 and 7 (φιλαρχία), 7 (πλεονεξία).

² 'πάν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός'. Is this an allusion to Plato's phrase in *Resp.* 565A6 (τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοῖ ἐχειν)?

³ W.R. Paton's translation (vol. 3, p. 399) of lvii, 6-7 takes the people to be responsible for the general μεταβολή ἐπὶ τὸ χειρόν in the state, but one must be careful about subtleties here and about the meaning of the crucial phrase in 7a: λήψεται δὲ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς ὁ δῆμος. ἐπιγραφὴ appears to be deliberately ambiguous here, and the probable reason for this is because two lines of analysis were brought together in the whole passage 5-9. Adopting one interpretative course, we may take the people to 'bear the stamp' of this change in the sense that they were involved in the two stages which brought about democracy; they felt unjustly dealt with on the one hand (μὲν) and they were flattered on the other (δὲ). Taking another course, which presupposes a discussion yet to come (cf. *infra*, pp. 99ff.), it is probable that, if in 5-9 Polybius was describing the line of *phthora* from a mixed constitution to mob-rule, he was thinking of the relevant sequence of constitutional forms as: *miktē* with a heavy popular bias (cf. li, 6)/oligarchy/democracy/mob-rule. Thus with the emergence of oligarchy in this process of decline, the *dēmos* 'bear the mark' of a change to oligarchy, because it was due to their rise to influence in the *miktē* that oligarchic policies were possible, and because, since oligarchy in this case emerged between two popular rules, the *dēmos* was of crucial consequence in all the developments related in 5-7 (let alone in 8-9).

⁴ That *oligarchia* is meant (though not mentioned by name) in lvii, 5-7, cf. esp. V. Poschl, *Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero; Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De Re Publica (Neue Deutsche Forschungen Abt. Klassische Philologie V)*, Darmstadt, 1962 (reissue of Berlin, 1936 edit.), pp. 62-4.

resulting grievances amongst the *dēmos*, the people's support for anyone backing their cause, as well as the sequence of democracy and mob-rule, are all central features shared by both accounts.¹ There are, it is true, noticeable differences. His attitude towards *dēmocratia* in lvii, 8-9 (cf. viii, 3-4 !) was quite derogatory; the comparative objectivity of the *Anacyclōsis* has been swept away for talk about a *dēmos* 'puffed up' by flattery, filled with 'fury' and 'passion', and instituting what is ironically called 'liberty'.² Oligarchy, democracy and ochlocracy thus appear to form a chain of decay, the zig-zag of the *Anacyclōsis* being apparently (though not indisputably) forgotten. The reason for this shift in axis is apparently due to the fact that in lvii Polybius was considering decline from a mixed constitution, and therefore from an acme that overshadows the three zeniths of the normative zig-zag. The pattern emerging then, has the mixed constitution at the very centre of the *Anacyclōsis*, Polybius evidently holding that the first stage of the anacyclīc process from monarchy to aristocracy saw the formation and growth of the Rome's mixed constitution, whilst the stages from oligarchy to mob-rule (at least) represented its decay. On this

¹ πλεονεξία is a key term linking the oligarchs of viii (5) with the suspected oligarchs of lvii (7b), since Polybius did not employ this term in analysing the degeneration of other constitutional forms in either ix-ix or lvii. On grievance against the (oligarchic) 'leaders', VI, viii, 6; ix, 1b, cf. lvii, 7-8. (Polybius refers to the plural οἱ προεστώτες in both cases [ix, 1; lvii, 8] not to be confused with the προστάτης of viii, 9, which is in the plural in comparable Platonic passages). On those stirring the people, see ix, 1, cf. lvii, 7.

² lvii, 7, (χαυνωθῆ), 8 (ἐξοργισθεῖς καὶ θυμῷ), 9 (τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ κάλλιστον ἢ πολιτεία....ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν). These last phrases are probably meant to recall Plato's *Respublica* 557C (of democracy: καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι, a comparable passage of irony, and cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, III, 80, 6, (πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον πρώτα μὲν ὀνόμα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην), which, however, lacks the tone of irony common to both Plato and Polybius.

reading, Roman constitutional development followed both the anacyclic line (from primitive monarchy to mob-rule) and a drawn-out biological path (to and from an acme-point). On this reading there is no reason to wonder why Polybius claimed that, of all *politeiai*, the Roman one developed most naturally.

In deciding whether the above explanation is satisfactory, a brief glance at possible alternatives would be helpful. It has been argued by Fritz Taeger that Polybius' 'Roman archaeology' can be recovered from the pages of a later document which bears the signs of his influence, namely Cicero's *De Re Publica* (mid first century BC).¹ In Bk. II of this work, Cicero sketched the history of the Roman constitution from the time of Romulus at least as far as ^{the} dictatorship of Lucius Quinctius (458BC) (II, ii, 4-xxxvii, 63b). Scipio Aemilianus, chief narrator in the second book, dealt in turn with Romulus (his origins, his founding of Rome and his creation of both the auspices and Senate), with the period of *regnum* which ended with the *tyrannis* of Tarquinius Superbus, and then with the constitutional developments that followed - senatorial, aristocratic-looking government (yet not without the *consules* and *dictator* as crucial offices), the creation of the plebeian *tribuni*, and the unfortunate rule of the *decemviri*.² The rest of Scipio's

¹ Cf. *op.cit.*, pp.16 ff..

² Scipio first eulogizes the achievements of Romulus. Of divine origin (II, ii, 4a), suckled by a wild beast from the forest, and growing up with bodily strength far superior to his companions (ii 4b), Romulus conceived the idea of founding a new city (iii, 5-6). With wisdom he chose an inland rather than a maritime site - the latter sort was susceptible to a certain *corruptela ac demutatio morum* (iv, 7 and ff., see also Plato, *Leg.* III, 682E-F, *Critias*, 113E ff, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, lii), but Romulus had to defeat the Aborigines to acquire it, and to share his kingdom with the Sabine Tatius, until his co-ruler's death. With Tatius, and more decidedly after his death, Romulus had come to respect the advice of a council composed of eminent men - the *patres* of Rome - and thus 'perceived and

narrative only survives in fragmentary form, but Taegeer detected a sequence which parallels the *Anacyclosis*, namely: *Urmonarch*/kingship (but mixed)/tyranny/aristocracy (but mixed)/oligarchy.

approved the principle which Lycurgus had discovered at Sparta a short time before', that a kingly state would be better governed 'if the influence of the state's most eminent men (*optimi*) is joined to the ruler's absolute authority' (II, ix, 15; cf. xxviii, 50). Romulus was responsible for the establishment of the auspices (offices appointed for divination in the interests of public security), and for the Senate, whose original members he called *patres* and their children *patricii* (X, 17-8; xii, 23; cf. viii, 14). After his death this patrician senate dispensed with the kingship, but the people protested, and eventually the Sabine Numa Pompilius, a foreigner, was chosen as *rex* (xii, 23 - xiii, 25). After discussing the achievements of Numa and his successors - to Servius Tullius - all of whom reigned with popular consent (xiii, 25; xvii, 31; xviii, 33; xx 35; xxi, 37-8a), Scipio spent time contending that although the kings had a senate and their rules were sanctioned by the people, they were still supreme, such a government being nothing else but a *regnum* (cf. xxiii, 43; '... ut fuit apud nostros reges tamen illud excellit regium nomen, neque potest eius modi res publica non regnum et esse et vocari'). Of all *formae civitatis* this kind of rule was most likely to undergo change (*mutabilis maxime*), because one man's vices could bring about its destruction (cf. 43; 'quod unius vitio praecipitata in perniciosissimam partem facillime decidit'). This happened under Tarquinius Superbus, the *tyrannus* (cf. xxvii, 49), who overthrew the *regia civitas* (xxix, 51, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, viii, 1 where it is the people not the tyrant who abolish βασιλεία and μοναρχία). Tarquinius was banished, the title of king (*regale nomen*) became hated (cf. Polybius), and the *constitutio Romuli* was totally abolished (xxxi, 5). The government which followed was understood to be primarily aristocratic, the *senatus* possessing supreme power (cf. xxxii, 56; so 56b; 'sed tamen omnia summa cum auctoritate a principibus cedente populo tenebatur', etc., cf. xxxvi, 61; 'cum summa esset auctoritas in senato populo patiente atque parente'), but the *consules*, even if elected on a yearly basis, and the *dictator*, even if appointed only in times of great emergency, represented important new offices, with a monarchical genus, to be reckoned with. After some time the *populus* claimed more rights in the state, plebeian *tribuni* being chosen to counterbalance both consular and senatorial power (xxxiii, 58 - xxxiv, 59). This government broke down when the consuls and tribunes resigned their offices to allow a board of ten, better known as the *decemviri*, to draw up a law-code for Rome. A third year of this decemvirate saw its members continuing in office, 'unwilling to have others elected in their stead', and framing unjust laws (xxxvi, 61, xxxvii, 62). The result was a *maxima perturbatio et totius commutatio rei publicae*, and this small group (which Cicero nowhere calls an oligarchy) was removed from power (xxxvii, 63). Scipio's narrative apparently continued but only the fragmentary reference to Lucius Quinctius' dictatorship remains (cf. 63b, *apud Philargyrius ad Vergil Georg. III*, 125). It is possible that material on the increase in the people's power may have been included in those parts of Bk. II now lost; cf. on Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *infra*. p. 312.

Although recognizing more than one tradition behind *De Re Publica*, he endeavoured to reconstruct the Polybian archaeology on the supposition that Cicero employed Polybius as his key source. Taeger's thesis is provocative but tenuous. Admittedly a mention of Polybius in the dialogue establishes him as one of Cicero's sources (cf. II, xiv, 27b), but if there is a seminal work behind *De Re Publica* Bk. II it was not Polybius' history but rather, according to Cicero's own admission, the *Origines* of Cato the Elder (i, 1-3). In matters of fine detail, moreover, disparities between Polybius and Cicero are sufficiently stark and numerous. For one of Taeger's more important critics, Viktor Poschl,¹ they actually preclude both the likelihood of decisive Polybian influence on Cicero and the possibility of reconstructing Polybius' early history along Taeger's lines of approach.¹ It should be noted that Taeger took Polybius to expound an 'accumulative' view of Rome's constitutional development. Cicero claimed Romulus to have founded the Senate, and the post-monarchical senate to have created the consuls and tribunes. He was thus describing a process whereby Rome, despite temporary setbacks, gradually accumulated the components of its *mixis*. Mixed kingship (that is, kingship with the counsels of the Senate, and based on popular assent), and mixed aristocracy (senatorial government with checks imposed by *consules* and *tribuni*) replace what have been simply referred to as *basileia* and *aristocratia* in the *Anacyclōsis*, and after experiencing decemvirate oligarchy, the mixed constitution realizes its peak.² According to Taeger, this account derives from Polybius. Despite a certain persuasive symmetry, however, Taeger's argument has obvious weaknesses. He has tended to read into the normative *Anacyclōsis*

¹ *Op.cit.*, ch. 2, esp. pp. 47 ff..

² See *op.cit.*, pp.26 ff; cf. also von Fritz, *op.cit.*, p.419.

'mixed' phenomena that are not really present. Not only is there no evidence to show that Polybius wrote of mixed kingship, aristocracy, or even democracy in connection with Rome, but it is also most likely that he placed the Roman *mixis* within the normative anacyclic zig-zag between aristocracy and oligarchy, and not between oligarchy and mixed democracy, as in the 'accumulative' schema.¹ We have already given reasons for this conclusion, and we may add how improbable it is that Polybius considered oligarchy as part of the *formation and growth* of the complex Roman *politeia*. On top of this, Taeget takes Polybius to have too much knowledge of Roman constitutional history; Cicero, who was eclectic in tendency, followed more than one line of Roman tradition. Besides, Cato's *Origines*, his chief source and a crucial work on the subject of Rome's constitutional history, probably saw daylight only after Polybius had written his sixth book.² Coupled with the fact that the Achaean's facility with Latin is suspect, this should make one wary of ascribing to him anything more than a general, certainly non-technical acquaintance with the Roman past. Fabius Pictor, whose history of Rome in Greek was utilized by Polybius in treating the second Punic War (cf. *Hist.* I, xiv, 1; xv, 12; lviii, 5; III, viii, 1; ix, 1-3), was in all likelihood the main source for the archaeology. There is evidence that Fabius considered Roman

¹ See Poschl, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 63-5, Eisen, *op.cit.*, pp. 84-5.

² The *Origines* are usually dated sometime between ca 168 and 149 BC, and the first six books of Polybius' *Historiae* to ca 150BC (although these could have received revision in Greece after 146BC). Cato's *Origines* included an account of the Punic Wars in Cannae (Bk. IV), yet Polybius does not seem to have made use of this work as a source (he consistently mentions and criticizes his key sources). It is thus fair to assume that, although he knew something of Cato's life and attitudes (cf. *Hist.* XXXI, xxv, 4 ff), Polybius had not read his work.

history from Aeneas to the Gallic Wars very discursively, and it is by his more annalistic, less legalistic approach that one can best give some definition to the limits of the Achaean's knowledge.¹

The surviving evidence from Bk. VI of the *Historiae* suggests that Polybius' account of the growth of the Roman *politeia* was in narrative rather than analytic form.² In prefacing his description of Rome's polity at its height, moreover, he admitted that Roman readers might well find his approach far too selective, insisting rather defensively that his omissions, which included omissions about the origin of certain matters his readers might have thought crucial,³ were deliberate and not due to ignorance (VI, ix, 3-9, cf. iii, 3). In addition, he was not interested in pinpointing any basic constitutional *metabolē* in Rome after the time of Xerxes' invasion of Greece near the beginning of the fifth century, because by that time Rome already had a *politeia* meriting special study by the Greeks, and he therefore went straight on to describe its structure during the second Punic War, at the time of its very zenith (xi, 1).⁴

¹ See Jacoby, *FGH*, Frgs. 1ff (vol.2, pt. 3C, pp.848 ff), and note Cicero's preference for Cato over Fabius, whom he had also read, *De Legibus*, I, ii, 6. Cf. also J.P.V.D. Balsdon, 'Some Questions about Historical Writing in the Second Century BC', in *Classical Quarterly*, XLVII, 1953, p.161, where it is cogently argued that Polybius' predecessors in the field of Roman history seem to have known little about events between Rome's monarchical period and the Punic Wars.

² So Frgs. V (6,2) VI (6,2), *Hist.* VI, liv, 6-lv, 4 (Polybius' account of Horatius). The moralisms in Frgs. VI (6,1 both a and b), VII (6,2) can be explained as pithy statements included at the end of narrative pieces, so Frg. VI (6,2) *finis*, *Hist.*, VI, lv, 4.

³ Cf. VI, xi, 5; '....τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ συνέχοντα τῶν πραγμάτων'.

⁴ This probably means that Polybius believed Rome to possess a mixed constitution from about 480BC until his own day, an extremely long period of time! It is unlikely, according to my line of argument, that he knew in any detail the constitutional history of Rome over those centuries. Even his treatment of the history of Rome from ca 390 to 216 in books I - V reflects a certain vagueness as to the actual workings of the constitution.

All this points to conclusions radically different from those of Taeger and the 'accumulative' view.

Our limited knowledge of the Polybian archaeology confirms the pattern we have been arguing for. We know that Polybius dated the origins of Rome (Frg. 2 [6,2]); we know that he betrayed a keen interest in the ethical basis of Roman life (probably in an 'archaeological' context,¹ and his reproduction of the story about Horatius Cocles upon the bridge, even if not in such a context, is relevant here);² we know that he presented a narrative of Rome's early kings and taught that close to the beginning of the fifth century, Rome possessed a mixed constitution. It is difficult to imagine that the lost parts of his work did not fill in the gaps, that he said nothing about Romulus (even as a *monarchos* figure! though the proof is lacking), and that he said nothing about the renowned tyranny of Tarquinius Superbus. And Tarquinius was banished towards the end of the sixth century (conventionally 510 BC), whilst Rome acquired its *miktē*, according to Polybius, at about the time of Xerxes' invasion (480BC); can we not suppose, even if very tentatively, that the time in between was occupied by a senatorial-aristocratic order, out of which the mixed form of government emerged?³ That would certainly be a convenient means of

piecing the jigsaw puzzle together, and both the way in which Polybius

¹ Frg. IV, (6,2). I take the only authentic Polybian section of this fragment elicited by Hultsch et al to be: 'παρὰ Ῥωμαίους δὲ... ἀπεφρονται γυναιξὶ πίνειν οἶνον· τὸ δὲ καλούμενον πάσσον πίνουσιν', the rest to be ascribed to Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* X, 440E-F). In an archaeological context Polybius' observation would have concerned the growth of Romans' discipline and their sense of τὸ καθήκον. Note also VI, iii, 3; xlvii, 16 on Polybius' interest in customs, laws, etc., as a socially consolidating factor.

² *Hist.*, VI, liv, 6-1v, 4, cf. lii, 7-11, etc..

³ According to Polybius twenty-eight years elapsed between the removal of Rome's tyranny and the invasion of Xerxes (when the *miktē* became settled), cf. III, xxi, 1-2. Dionysius (*Archaeol.* V, i, 1) and Appian (*Historia Romanorum*, proem. 6) may well have been following Polybius in placing an aristocratic rule after Tarquinius Superbus.

evidently interpreted the Platonic sequence of *politeiai*, and the evidence requiring the *mixis* to be inserted between an aristocracy and an oligarchy, make this conclusion very attractive. To take this view, of course, means to say that Polybius did not treat the Decemvirs (451 BC on) as oligarchs; their rule merely formed part of the ἀγῶνες καὶ πράγματα which were undergone by the *mixis* itself in the attainment of its highest perfection.¹

This raises crucial questions, of course, concerning the career and life-cycle of the mixed constitution in particular. Once it was established, it apparently was understood to undergo a three-staged process of change. When Polybius compared the constitutions of Rome and Carthage at the time of their contest during the Hannibalic War, he took both to be structurally triadic, combining the regal, aristocratic and popular powers (li, 1-2). Declaring that everybody, state or action must needs experience growth, acme and decay (li, 4a), he went on to make some of the most interesting observations of the *Historiae*:

'It was for this reason that the difference between the two states (πολιτεύματα)² then showed itself. For by as much as both the power and prosperity of Carthage had been earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage had already begun to decline. Rome was at its zenith by this time, at least so far as the *systasis*³ of its *politeia* was concerned.

¹ Cf. VI, x, 14. As a whole, this passage implies that the ἀγῶνες καὶ πράγματα were περιπέτεια in general, and not exclusively, not even primarily, institutional or internal crises. In VI,iii, 3 Polybius described the Roman πολιτεία as a ποικιλία (something complicated); this term may cover for him some of the constitution's more intricate aspects which he did not handle, the omission of which, he suspected, might call forth criticism (xi,3ff). On the basis of VI,xi,1, we may conclude that Polybius brought his 'Roman archaeology up to the time of the second Punic War; cf. F.W.Walbank, 'Polybius and the Roman state', in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, V, 1964, p.248.

² Polybius makes no distinction between πολίτευμα and πολιτεία, cf. Walbank's justifiable criticism against B.Shimron in his article 'The Spartan Ancestral Constitution in Polybius', in *Ancient Society and Institutions* (V.Ehrenberg Festschrift) (edit.E.B.), Oxford 1966, pp.305-6.

³ 'settled system', cf. Plato, *Rep.* 546A; *Leg.* VI, 782A, cf. other Polybian usages (*supra*, p. 86, and n. 2)

Consequently the *dēmos* had already acquired the most power in deliberating amongst the Carthaginians, whilst at Rome the Senate was on top (ἀκμὴν εἶχεν)¹. Hence in one case the many were the advisers and in the other the most eminent men (ἀριστοί). The Roman decisions on public affairs were thus superior, and although they met with disaster, they were eventually able to overpower the Carthaginians in war by the wisdom of all their deliberations.' (11, 4b - 8).

In this passage Polybius simultaneously identified the final zenith of Rome's constitutional development as a whole and the acme of Rome's mixed *politeia* in particular (when taken as a separate constitution with its own life-cycle). From either perspective the zenith lay with a *mixis* in which the senatorial-aristocratic power was pre-eminent. Moreover, according to the passage, a *mixis* in which the popular power was most decisive was a decline away from this apex, whilst by implication a mixed constitution dominated by monarchical elements represented a growth towards it.

This interpretation accords well with the different emphases reflected in Polybius' treatment of Roman politics before and after the battle of Cannae, that great military defeat suffered by Rome in the very middle of the second Punic War (216BC). For Polybius, the factor in Rome's politics which enabled her to avoid defeat and become master of the world was the Senate. The Senate gave the 'wise counsels' to save Rome from disaster.² It was the Senate which more and more came to sanction key negotiations and the submission of conquered territories, *consules* and other military appointees awaiting

¹ It is probable that here Polybius' choice of the phrase ἀκμὴν εἶχεν here in 11, 6b, which recalls its use immediately before in 5b, is governed by his desire to affirm that both the acme of senatorial power within the mixed constitution and the acme of the life-cycle of the mixed constitution, coincide.

² As background, cf. esp. III, lxxxv, 10. In III, cxviii 9 and VIII, ii (iv), 7-9, Polybius' references to governmental machinery which stabilized the state and made correct decisions at moments of crisis may be taken, in the light of VI, 11, 6, to refer primarily to the rôle of the Senate. Cf., however, IX, vi, 5-8; yet cf. XVIII, xxxv, 2.

senatorial decisions on the most vital matters.¹ Although great power was wielded by such eminent individuals as Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus, these men were understood to have lived under a mixed constitution, the chief voice of which was *aristocratic*.² On the other hand, Polybius portrayed pre-Cannae politics as though the consuls were more important in the conduct of both military and foreign affairs than the Senate.³ Significantly enough, he was only too willing to highlight the deficiencies of Roman politics operating under these earlier conditions. In general, the Romans were unable to defeat the Carthaginians;⁴ in particular, to take central examples, consul Regulus's attempt to undermine the constitution by prolonging his appointment in North Africa, brought disaster upon his fellow countrymen (I, xxxi, 4 - xxxiv, 9), and consul Gaius Flaminius's betrayal of demagogic policies, was the first step 'in the demoralization of the populace' (τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς) (II, xxi, 8).⁵ Unhealthy rivalry among the consuls during Hannibal's invasion of Italy (cf. III, lxxx, lff), and the curious appointment of two dictators, with such wide-sweeping powers that they merely competed with each other (III, clii, 4-8 and ff), added to the Carthaginians'

¹ See esp. XVIII, x, 1-2; xi, lff; (cf. xxxix); xlii; xlvii, 9; XXI, ii-iii; xviii, 1-2 and ff; xxxi, 1-2; xliii, 2; XXII, vi; XXIII, i; etc.

² *Hist.*, XXIII, xiv, 1 (*apud* Suidas *Lexicon* [ed. A. Adler], Stuttgart, 1928, vol. 4, p. 173 [s.v. Πόπλιος]). 'Ὅτι Πόπλιος φιλοδοξήσας ἐν ἀριστοκρατικῷ πολιτεύματι, etc.' cf. VIII, i (iii), 3-ii (iv), 11 esp. ii (iv), 7-10.

³ Cf. I, xvii, 6-7; xxvi, 4-9; xxxi, 6-8; xxxviii, 5-7; xxxix, 1-2; xlix, 3-4; lv, 2; lxxxviii, 8; III, lxxxvi, 6-7, etc. Cf. However, I, xx, 1-11; lii, 5; lix, 8. Note also IX, vi, 5-8.

⁴ See *infra*. p. 157 especially for Polybius' stress on the balance between the two powers in Bk. I.

⁵ Cf. III, lxxx, 3. Although Flaminius' 'demagogy' (i.e. his popular land reforms) should be dated before his consulship, Polybius rather significantly makes no such fine point. Cf. also Roveri, *op.cit.*, p. 186.

advantages. Thus it appears to have been Polybius' intention to contrast the inadequacy of a mixed constitution biased towards consular authority before Cannae (the *mixis* at a stage of *auxēsis*), with the emergence of greater senatorial influence from about the time of that disaster onwards (the mixed constitution at its *acmē*).¹ Yet, if this senatorial influence marked Rome's highest constitutional zenith, Polybius noted that within his own life-time the best stage had passed, and problems of luxury, pomp and moral breakdown had revealed themselves, (cf. pp. 125f). It is not necessary to suppose that Polybius thereby isolated the symptoms of a decline into oligarchy. In Bk. VI, lvii he placed such a breakdown in the rather distant future (5; cf. iii, 3). Thus it is more likely that when he noted these contemporary tendencies he was referring to the danger of the popular power usurping the authority of the Senate, that is, to the kind of 'democratization' within the *mixis* which marked a decline from the highest point of Rome's constitutional life. When this third and last stage in the life-cycle of the mixed constitution was passed, then its death as ^{an instance of} a specific εἶδος πολιτείας would be settled, and Rome's return to the normative anacyclic path, to oligarchy and the *metabolai* following it, would be the 'natural' consequence. This reversion is precisely what is covered in VI, lvii, with its downhill movement from a 'democratized' *miktē* to mob-rule.

Thus the Polybian archaeology or Polybius' comprehension of Rome's whole constitutional career may be set out briefly as follows, (the bracketed sections indicating reconstructions by inference):

¹ Roveri (*ibid.*, p.187), comes very close to stating this position.

Growth	{	Origin of Rome	}	'trials and troubles'
		[Romulus, along with material about the growth of moral values.]		
		Early Roman kings [tyranny]		
		[Senatorial-aristocratic government]		
Zenith	{	The Mixed constitution ¹ [consular role more decisive]	}	
		Senatorial role more decisive		
		Popular role more decisive		
		: growth		
Decay	{		}	

As the line parallels that which Polybius extracted from Plato's *Laws* and the *Republic*, and as the natural biological and natural anacyclic paths of development are both accounted for, we may fairly take this interpretation to satisfy all the available evidence, to complement our analysis of the anacyclic model and its theoretical background, and to give intelligibility to Polybius' special claims about the Roman *politeia*.

Not that this interpretation is without its problems. Quite apart from our reliance on inferences and the overshadowing doubt that one might have read too much into Polybius, there are other even if minor complications. We may single out at least three of them. First, if Polybius derived his general pattern of constitutional development from Plato, then we must admit that he applied to the career of one particular *politeia* what Plato applied to a whole cultural area, and not to any specific *polis*, such as Sparta or Athens. Why he chose to

¹ The factors making for the transition between the three stages in the life-cycle of the *mixis* are not analysed anywhere in the available evidence, but the passage from the mixed constitution (with popular power pre-eminent) to oligarchy was analysed in VI, lvii, 5-7.

use Plato in this way is not easy to answer; that he did so best makes sense of his analyses. Secondly, there is an apparent contradiction between his statement that Rome's mixed constitution was moving through the three stations of a life-cycle, and his exposition of the *mixis* in static terms as a constitution of checks and balances (cf. VI, xi, 11-xviii, 8). He nowhere used the language of absolute balance in connection with mixed constitutions, however,¹ and he even wrote of the monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements in the Roman constitution as if they were separate *politeiai* themselves, separate though capable of *harmogē* (coming together).² Thus the contradiction is not a real one; a constitution was mixed as long as the three elements neutralized each other's powers to a sufficient (yet unspecified) degree, and it did not cease to be such when one or other of the elements played a more dominant rôle. We may add a third problem - the difficulty of not being able to possess anything more than a very general Polybian explanation for the emergence of Rome's *mixis*. The Romans learnt from awkward circumstances to choose 'the best', but from which particular circumstances? Perhaps Polybius' assertion that the Lycurgan constitution was set up *without* the experience of any adversity (*ablabōs*), (X, 12) provides a hint. According to Plato, the Lycurgan *politeia* staved off the kind of tyranny which had emerged in Lacedaemonia's sister *poleis* of Argos and Messene (*Leg.* III, 683C - 688D), whereas according to the reconstructed Polybian archaeology Rome actually experienced a tyranny, that of Tarquinius Superbus.³ But there were many *ἀγῶνες καὶ πράγματα* faced by the Romans,

¹ See esp. VI, ix, 11; xviii, 2.

² VI, xi, 12; xii, 9, xiii, 8; xiv, 11, xviii, 1 (*ἀρμολή*). Cf. Graeber's important comments on the separateness of the three constitutional components of the *Mischverfassung*, (*op.cit.*, pp. 78-80, cf. pp. 33ff).

³ Aristotle significantly claimed that Carthage had never been subject to a tyranny; cf. *Polit.*, 1272b32-3.

and this one instance of crisis hardly makes up for the information we lack, including details as to the precise manner in which the Roman *politeia* 'departed' from the anacyclic course and experienced a quite new kind of growth. The least one may say is that Polybius took Rome's mixed constitution to be very complex (*poikilē*), and that he bypassed many intricate changes and trials appertaining to the formation of the Roman *mixis* itself, and to the 'natural' processes by which the normative *Anacyclōsis* was forestalled as a result. Complexity made it difficult to explain Rome's present character and to prognosticate its future (VI, iii, 3), yet Polybius was still able to relate its growth, pinpoint its zenith, suggest the manner of its decline, and declare it the most natural of all *politeiai*.

These problems, whatever their solution, do not prevent us from drawing conclusions about the application of the *Anacyclōsis* to the recognizable facts of history. With characteristic eclecticism, Polybius combined two great *Formprinzipien*. Roman history illustrated, first, his cycle of governments, and second, the stability of a mixed constitution. Concerning the cycle's applicability to Rome, he simplified her pre-Cannaeen constitutional development to suit his model, and he could do little else than theorize about her future. As for the *mixis*, he over-simplified the facts when considering not only Rome, but also Sparta and Carthage, as mixed constitutions with tri-political frameworks.¹ But for his own purposes he believed he had grasped the

¹ It was convenient for him to declare all three *politeiai* to contain a monarchical, aristocratic and democratic element. Certainly admiration for the constitutions of Sparta and Carthage could be considered 'traditional' by this time; they were (together with the Cretan *politeia*, which Polybius vehemently withdrew from all comparisons, VI, xlvii, 6), the mixed constitutions meriting examination alongside Rome (xlvii, 9; cf. esp. Aristotle, *Politica*, 1269a29 - 1273b27; Isocrates, *Nicocles*, xxiv; Archytas the Pythagorean *apud* Stobaeus [Hense, vol.4, Frg.138, pp.85ff]). Yet Polybius, who teaches us much about the shallowness of

truth about Rome. He felt able to explain how and by what form of constitution Rome managed to conquer the world (VI, ii, 1-10; cf. I, i, 5;) and to show why the Roman polity was superior to others (VI, xliii, 1-lvi, 15; cf. III, cxviii, 11-12).¹

Hellenistic political theory, put popularism before careful qualification. In the instance of Sparta, the whole constitution was ascribed to Lycurgus (a late, post-fourth century understanding (cf. Plato, *Leg.* III, 691DE; 692A, yet cf. Plutarch, *Vita Lycurgi*, v, 6-8;) and Polybius chose to neglect the office of the ephors, mentioning only the *demos* as the third power element (VI, x, 8-9), presumably to expose a neat correspondence between Sparta and both Carthage and Rome (see li, 1-2; 6; cf. xi, 12b; xiv, 1-12, xv, 9; xvi, 1-xvii, 9, and then note the way the rôle of the Tribunes, as against assemblies, is not highlighted, xvi, 4). In the case of Carthage, *basileis* were mentioned (li, 2a), but whether the reference is to the Carthaginian *suffetes* or to military generals is not made clear (cf. Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1272b37-8). With both Sparta and Carthage, there was no attempt to isolate any complicating factor. If Plato could write of the tyrannical features of the Spartan ephors (*Leg.* IV, 712D), Aristotle of the predominantly oligarchic characteristics of the Carthaginian *politeia*, (*Polit.* 1273a21-1273b24), and Archytas of Tarentum for a more complicated division of powers (*apud* Stobaeus, *Frg.* 138 [Hense, vol. 4, p.85]), Polybius was too busy trying to draw parallels. As for his analysis of the Roman constitution, his claims concerning the power of the commons were too far-reaching (the Senate being virtually supreme in his time) and his general approach was governed by the desire to view the *politeia* within the theoretical, triadic model which had become so popular in Hellenistic political writing. Such special problems as the patrician/plebian status distinction, the precise nature of popular institutions, and important offices other than consul, tribune and various military posts, were by-passed. Cf. esp. von Fritz, *op.cit.*, ch.7; A.H.M. Jones, *A History of Rome through the Fifth Century* (vol.1, *The Republic*), London 1968, pp.176ff. Note also Ernest Barker's instructive comments that the 'fashion-setting' *Tripolitikos* of Dicaearchus was the last word in the political theory of the fourth century, and yet, 'a barren formula'. The 'tripolity is only a mechanism, a doctrinaire mechanism at that', and Barker adds that it 'never existed' (so, 'Greek political thought and theory in the Fourth Century', in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Cambridge 1927 (64), vol. 5, p.534).

¹ According to Polybius, Rome did not succumb to the weaknesses made evident in the histories of other well-known states. If Athens had an anomaly in her nature (*ἀνωμαλία τῆς φύσεως*), since her quarreling populace produced *stasis* in times of tranquillity (VI, xlii, 2; 8), Rome's inner checks and balances forestalled the corruption and idleness which so often accompanied peace and good fortune (xviii, 5-6). If Carthage had employed mercenaries and had concentrated on mastery of the sea, Rome maintained her own soldiery, and though placing priority upon land-warfare, produced men equipped and brave enough to win the sea also (lii, 1-11). If the Spartans had not failed to learn by experience, and if they had known (from the time they enslaved Messene to their attainment of Hellenic hegemony) how to maintain control over foreign

What can we say, in review, about the general relationship between his analysis of the Roman *politeia* in Bk.VI and his grand statement of anacyclic recurrence? The first thing to be said is that according to Polybius, Rome, by the latter half of the second century BC, had only partly illustrated the *Anacyclōsis*. Polybius had certainly not documented a full recurrence of the anacyclic path, even if it is possible that he took the Platonic representation of Greek history in general to be a precedent for Rome's constitutional development.¹ The limited degree of application is very disappointing. But then we are here requiring a 'vertical' confirmation of his recurrence model, one taken from events in the same region over a long lapse of time, when in fact Polybius was primarily interested in recent affairs. One needs to be aware of the 'horizontal' dimensions of Polybius'

conquests with moderation and efficiency (xlvi, 1 - xlix, 10), Rome by contrast, made good use of experience, and in her war-machine and restrained policies was 'better constituted for the acquisition of power (I, 4-6; cf. xix, 1-xlii, 6). Both Sparta and Rome shared claim to ἡ καλλίστη πολιτεία (x, 14b; 12 and ff), but the Spartan constitution was created by reason, whereas the Roman *politeia* was the superior product of the most natural of histories.

¹ One should also remember that Polybius began writing history as a strong Achaean nationalist and as the supporter of the Achaean League's πατριον ἐλεύθερον (see esp. M. Gelzer, 'Die hellensiche ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΗ in Zweiten Buch des Polybios', in *Hermes*, LXXV, 1940, pp. 27-37, Täubler, *op.cit.*, pp. 78ff., Graeber, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 15-21, cf. M. Treu, 'Biographie und Historie bei Polybios', in *Historia*, III, 1954, pp. 219ff, K.E. Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung (Vestigia IX)*, Munich, 1969, pt. 2). He wrote then about the unexpected rise of Achaean power in the same kind of way he later wrote about Rome's rise to greatness (so II, xxxvii, 6b - 11, cf. xlii, 2, IV, 1, 4, etc.), offering a discursive 'archaeological' account of Achaea's constitutional development. Some constitutional *metabolai* were referred to (kingship to tyranny, tyranny to democracy, cf. pp. 185ff.), but, although the notion of a developing political thrust was present (as it later was in his treatment of Rome), the complicated sequence of the cycle of governments was as yet unformulated and the element of recurrence, whether in terms of the biological principle or the reversion to original conditions, not added.

recurrence thinking, that is, his concern to illustrate his models from happenings in different regions within a 'modern' and relatively limited period. For this concern, one should look beyond his sixth book to the *Historiae* as a whole.

The *Anacyclōsis*, though, remains immensely important as a special, self-contained statement of historical repetition. Key paradigms, some hailing from the discourse of cosmic recurrence, are interwoven into a complex theory of political change. Not only do we encounter these paradigms and some of their applications, but we discover how one seminal writer sought to interrelate them, the difficulties he found in doing so, and how his preconceptions affected both his reading and his written interpretation of the past. The *Anacyclōsis*, moreover, introduces us to a rich and complex strain of western intellectual history, a strain which begins behind Polybius and persists to our own day.

CHAPTER TWO

POLYBIUS AND THE ELEMENTARY MODELS OF HISTORICAL
RECURRENCE IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION

The Polybian *Anacyclōsis* is like a figure *en papier mâché*; simpler, more basic paradigms of historical recurrence lie beneath its complex exterior. Less sophisticated, more fundamental notions of recurrence, moreover, are scattered throughout the *Historiae* as a whole. That should not surprise us: when Polybius affirmed that the study of history provided a sound training for politics (cf. *Hist.*, I, i, 2), he presupposed that past events reflected various paradigmatic movements and patterns which would re-emerge in current and future affairs. Now it is the more elementary paradigms and their interrelationships which interest us in this chapter, but we will delve back into the classical (especially Greek) heritage and not just attend to Polybius' work alone. What will become apparent is that dominant concern in classical historical thought with 'processes of change'. Deeds and events lose their singularity and fall into recognizable configurations which appear again and again; and so past circumstances provide the clue not only to future occurrences but to future action also. This is the binding factor behind the rich variety of recurrence paradigms which lie before us, and which we seek to present in a logical order.¹

¹ For related comments, but from a broader perspective, see A. Momigliano, 'Tradition and the Classical Historian', in *History and Theory*, XI, 1972, pp. 284, 286, 291. In concentrating on Greek models of recurrence in this chapter I must make it clear how unwilling I am to make pretentious claims about the common assumptions of large human groups. Certainly the *cyclos* and notions of eternal return have been taken to be very close to the heart of the Hellenic 'consciousness' (cf., for various examples, O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, Munich, 1923, vol. 1, p. 11, cf. pp. 173 ff., M. Eliade, *Cosmos and History; the Myth of the Eternal Return*, (ET), New York, 1959, esp. pp. 87 ff.; S.G.F. Brandon, *History, Time and Deity*, Manchester, 1965, pp. 66 ff., J. Needham, 'Time and Knowledge in China and the West', in *The Voices of Time*, (ed. J.T. Fraser), London, 1968, pp. 129, 622; etc.), but I am only too conscious that there are other, non-recurrence strands of Greek thought. For views of progress, for example, see esp. Havelock, *Liberal Temper*, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 52 ff., L. Edelstein, *Idea of Progress*, *op.cit.*, *passim*. On historical pessimism, cf. esp. F. Nietzsche,

A) Cyclical and Alternatory Paradigms of Recurrence

When the paradigm of a *cyclos* or of circularity was first applied to human affairs is a matter of sheer speculation. The early 'Greeks' met the ordinary circle as part of their everyday concrete experience; it could be found in the human eye, in pots, carts, dances, shields, and eventually in skilfully executed pillars, military formations and the like. There was magic and wonder in its perfect symmetry, its endless perimeter. It was pregnant with figurative value as an image of both revolving movement and of stability, of both alternation and continuousness. Besides, day and night were facts simple and usual enough to associate with circularity; the shapes and paths of the sun and moon, the incessant alternation of light and darkness, waking and sleeping, working and resting, were no less rhythmic than a cart-wheel nor less everlasting than a circumference. These facts provided the conceptual basis for *periodoi* (lit. 'ways around'), for thinking in periodic terms about the seasons, years, festivals, and even more abstractly about the generations of men or the psychic destinies of individuals. Early Greek reflection on the seasonal cycle and human generations (which goes as far back as Hesiod),¹ and speculation about the career of the *psyche* as a continuing procession through different, even animal, existences (which reaches back to so-called 'Orpheus'),² were both built upon and enriched by cosmologists.³ Eastern astronomers taught the Greeks to observe the whole heavens, and they also broadcast the doctrine of a Great Year, of the immense period

in *Gesammelte Werke*, Schlechta edit., Munich, 1966, esp. vol.2, pp.245-6 (sect. 370), 1102-3, vol3, pp.353 ff., J.B. Bury, *Idea of Progress; an enquiry into its Origin and Growth*, London, 1924, pp.10 ff; cf. E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*, Leipzig, 1876 ed., esp. p.201, n.2. And on less theoretical notions of time and history, cf. esp. Z. Barbu, *Problems of Historical Psychology*, London, 1960. pp. 70 ff., cf. C. G. Starr, *The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit*, New York, 1968, esp. pp.57 ff..

¹ Esp. *Works and Days*, (=WD), ls. 383-821 (the seasons), ls. 107-184 (the generations of men).

² See esp. W.K.C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion; a study of the Orphic Movement*, London, 1952, edn., pp.156 ff. Note also Herodotus, *Historiae*, II, 123.

³ Note esp. P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde; histoire des doctrines cosmo-*

of time taken for all the known planets to return to their original positions.¹ And with general cosmology came not only visions about the shape and structure of the cosmos, but also a fascination for the processes of composition and decomposition, or the stages of birth, growth and decay in plant and animal life.² What of cyclical thinking about history? The language of the cosmologists certainly informed it, yet, as with the cyclical strain in early philosophy itself, this kind of thinking goes back still further. It evidently derives from ancient intuitions about the human round, about the way men's lives were regulated by season and custom, and the manner in which generations came and passed away. The gnomic saying κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ('human things are a circle')³ probably has its roots in the early agricultural communities of Hellas, and yet it was the sort of profound truth which could be filled out by those who contemplated the fate of souls, or who were struck by complex regularities in urban life, or fascinated by dramatic changes in the careers of notable individuals or *poleis*. It was this last interest in the remarkable alteration of circumstances which saw the development of what was, in all likelihood, the earliest conception of specifically *historical* recurrence in the West - the cyclical idea of fortune's wheel.

Fortune's Wheel

i) General

Applied to human affairs, fortune's wheel was a revolving *cyclos* of human life in which 'the same man was never allowed to continue in

logique de Platon à Copernic, Paris, 1954-9, vol. 1, pp.65 ff; M.L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, Oxford, 1971, pp.34 ff et *passim*. Cf., with caution, Eliade, *op.cit.*, pp.87 ff.

¹ See esp. Hesiod, *Theogonia*, 793 ff., Heraclitus, Frg.22 (Diels-Kranz), (cf. West, *op.cit.*, pp.155 ff), Empedocles, Frgs. 115, 118, 121, (Diels-Kranz), cf. Kirk-Raven, *op.cit.*, p.352; Plato, *Timaeus*, 39D; Censorinus, *De Die Natali*, XXI, 3 (Jahn edit., p.63).

² Cf. Kirk-Raven, *op.cit.*, pp. 87 ff; 139 ff; 176 ff; 385 ff; etc.

³ See *Corpus Pseudoepigrammorum Graecorum*, (ed. E.L. Leutsch), Göttingen, 1851 (1958 re-issue), vol.2, p.492; cf. the Erechtheum Inscription, which refers to τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα not just ἀνθρώπινα (*Epigrammata Graeca*, (ed. G. Kaibel), Berlin, 1878, No. 1092).

prosperity' (or to experience an uninterrupted measure of happiness),¹

The notion was most usually applied to the fortunate - the sad fate of the astoundingly lucky king Polycrates of Samos is a famous example² - but the transience of ill-luck was sometimes implied as well, and there arose a popular fancy of a rotation between the two opposite conditions.³

The wheel was alluded to by moralists and men of religious sensibility when they warned their fellows not to over-test good fortune, or reminded them that the gods were jealous of success.⁴ More significantly, however, it gained coinage among those who wished to understand the passage of momentous historical events. It was employed to endow events with a 'shape' and a peculiar coherence. Perhaps fortune's operations in these events were conceived quite variously, especially in the extent to which they were theologized or integrated with religious ideas about inevitable destiny;⁵ yet there remains the one basic theme of 'reversal',

¹ I.e. *Eudaimonia*, (or *tychē* [= fortune]) Cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 207 (ὡς κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων περιφερόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἐκ αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐτυχεῖν - surely a pre-Herodotean principle). Note also Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, x, 7 (μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς). In Latin authors, cf. esp. Tibullus, *Corpus Tibull.*, i, 5; 70; Ovid, *Epistulae ex Ponto*, II, iii, 56; Cicero, *De Finibus*, V, viii, 23; Pseudo-Seneca, *Octavia*, ls. 388-91, etc. The term *orbis* is generally used. Cf. also παλίνδρομος ἔλλαβε πένθος, (Chios) (*Epigr.Graec.*, No.233-7).

² Herodotus, *Hist.*, III, 39-45, 120-6.

³ Cf. for example, Anonymous poet; τροχοῦ περιστρίχοντος ἄλλοθ' ἡτέρα/ἀπὸς ὑπερθε γίγνεται ἄλλοθ' ἡτέρα (the wheel goes round and of the rim now one, and now another part is at the top) *apud* Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* (*Moralia*) 103F (= W.T. Bergk (ed.), *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, Leipzig, 1843, vol. 3, p.740); cf. Theognis, 157, Pindar, *Olympian Odes*, II, 9-23, 35-40, etc..

⁴ Homer, *Iliad*, V, 436 ff., etc.; Theognis, 129-30; Herodotus, *Hist.*, III, 40, Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, I, x, 6-7, etc.

⁵ For critical discussion see esp. G. Herzog-Hauser, in *RCAW.*, vol.VIIA, cols. 1643 ff. On *Tychē* as an early deity, note esp. Hesiod, *Theog.*, ln. 360; Theognis, 360; cf. also F.M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy; a Study in the Origins of Western Speculation*, London, 1912, p.98. On fusing *tychē* with destiny, see, for useful examples, Euripides, *Alcestitis*, ln. 780; Menander *apud* Plutarch, *Consol.ad Apoll.*, 103C-E; cf. Plutarch, *Vita Caii Marii*, xxiii, 1. Note also the special and objective treatment of fortune by Aristotle in *Physica* II, 195b30-198a13, although there is 'theology' in 196b6-7. On *tychē* in Hellenistic historiography, see Herzog-Hauser, *loc.cit.*, cols. 1662-1665, and on *Fortuna* in Roman beliefs both before and after Greek influence, see esp. I. Kajanto, *God and Fate in Livy (Annales Universitatis Turkuensis LXIV)*, Turku, 1957, pp. 66ff., cf. W. Jaeger, 'Horaz C.I. 34', in *Hermes*, XLVIII, 1913, pp.443ff.

and because of its suddenness or unexpectedness, such reversal appeared to be the product of the incalculable. For some, it is true (and these people tended to personify and divinize *tychē*), fortune's mysterious ways had ethical meaning, since the proud could be deservedly brought low, and the deprived but worthy man suddenly find riches. At this stage, however, we may concentrate on the more simple idea of a twist or revolution from one state of affairs to another and then back again. Fortune, whether hypostatized or left impersonal, was mutable. There was more a tendency towards resignation and far less theodicy when *tychē* was looked at this way; if left impersonal it could be no more than blind chance, if personified she could be accused of capriciousness and cruelty.¹ Death and setback could fall upon the apparently blessed, war and social distress upon the flourishing *polis*, and the very opposite upon the distressed or backward.

The Greeks imagined that these shifts for either good or ill formed two sides of the one circle-like movement. Such an intuition was not only based on the observation of remarkable change, but also on the truism that favourable and adverse conditions must succeed each other by turns. We discover here, once again, the difficulty of disentangling the cyclical from the alternatory, and the idea of changing fortune is hardly far removed from notions of a shifting balance in human affairs or of 'change into opposites'. But the cyclical image still predominated in connection with *tychē*, and there is a pervasive assumption that men must learn how fortune's wheel inscribed its path and be prepared for unexpected (though not unrecognizable) change.

ii) Polybius

One does not have to look far to locate the basic notion of fortune's mutability in Polybius. Surprisingly perhaps, he made no reference to a

¹ Cf. for example, Theognis, 129-30; Philemon (in A. Meineke, *Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum*, Berlin, 1839-57 vol.4, p.31). Diphilus, (in *ibid.* vol.4, p.424), Menander Frgs. 417; 630 (A Koerte ed.). Cf. proverb, *apud* Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliothēke*, IX, x, 3. On the idea of accusing *tychē*, note, for example, Polybius, *Hist.*, XVI, xxxii, 5; Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes*, lxiv. On fortune's cruelty, cf. esp. Demetrius of Phalerum Frg.81, (in *Schul.Aristot.*, ed. Wehrli, *op.cit.*, pp.22-3).

cyclos of historical events, and the phrase ἀνακύκλωσις πολιτειῶν in Bk. VI is the only relevant instance of cognate terminology.¹ However, simple cyclical models were frequently presupposed in his interpretations; he did not stop to theorize about their intrinsic qualities but rather utilized them as the means of extracting significance from given events. It is quite evident that he was interested in types of events or event-complexes, and in the characteristic 'shapes' with which they were endowed. While any specific reference to a *cyclos* of human affairs is absent, the belief that events can fall within the ambit. of fortune's circling wheel, or of a process in which prosperity succeeds adversity by turns, was still of great thematic importance for his 'history of the world' from ca. 220 to 145 BC.

There are admittedly certain difficulties surrounding Polybius' approach to *tychē*. His most common tendency was to divinize fortune, treating it not as a mere impersonal contingency, not as the accidental or the haphazard, but as a quasi-personalized force, which moderated and even took direct control of human affairs. On occasions, however, personification is absent and there were other times when he insisted that certain events did not occur, as some had pretended, through the agency of fortune, but rather in accordance with human will and judgement.² Moreover, even if Polybius paid his acknowledgements to *tychē* as director of affairs (as a crucial factor responsible for the success of Rome, for example!)³ this tendency jars somewhat with a number of his assertions that

¹ On κύκλος as a circle, encirclement, circumference, etc., see A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexicon, op.cit.*, vol.1, pt. 3 (1966), col. 1443.

² See esp. the treatment and distinctions in E. Mioni, *Polybio, op.cit.*, pp.140-147; and for Polybius on the accidental, see esp. *Hist.* xii, 6-10, (cf. ix, 3; xvi, 3) and note X, xxxii, 3 where Polybius simply treats the hazards of military projects *in vacuo*, but cf. X, xxxiii, 7 in the context of 5-7 where a link is forged between *tychē* and this sort of *peripeteia*. On Polybius and the 'Epicurean' historians, see *infra* p.172, n.3. Also note I, lxiii, 9; III, cxviii, 6-9; VII, viii, 1; X, v, 8 (cf. IX, xxii, 6-9, X, ii, 5-6); XI, xiv, 2; xvi, 4-5; XVIII, xii, 2; xxviii, 4-5; XXXI, xxx, 3; XXXII, viii, 4; XXXVI, xvii, 10 (on skill and purpose instead of fortune); and I, xxxvii, 3-6; II, vii, 2-3; X, xxxii, 7-12; XV, xxi, 3; etc. (on error and lack of skill instead of fortune).

³ So esp. I, iv, 1; 4-5; (cf. III, xxxii, 7; IV, ii, 4); VIII, ii, 3-4; XXXIX, xxvii, 11-13 (on Rome); and for fortune as a preserver of the moral

fortune was capricious.¹ Yet despite these by no means insoluble problems (cf. pp.171ff), Polybius' understanding of Fortune was still largely dominated by the primary model of expiring prosperity and adversity. Moralizing about the career of Philopoemen, his Achaean hero, he quoted 'the popular aphorism' that 'it is possible for a human being to be fortunate, but impossible for him to be constantly so' (*Hist.* XXIII, xii, 3-4),² and then went on to contend that the happiest men were those to whom *tyche* was kind for most of their lives, and who finally met with only moderate mishaps (5-7). At the end of his own labours, Polybius prayed to avoid fortune's typical envy against all those who seem to have had too happy and too successful a career (XXXIX, vii, 2). Thus, seeing *eutychia* (good fortune) predominate in the private lives of certain men, seeing such a skilful general as Hannibal reach the point of almost conquering the whole of Italy, or such a virtuous soldier-statesman as Epameinondas virtually unite the Peloponnese under Achaea, it was appropriate for him to remind his readers that these men suffered under *tyche*'s blows (IX, viii, 13-ix, 1, cf. XV, vi, 6; XXIII, xii, 3). But fortune was not always adverse; individuals suffering under *atychia* (misfortune) could meet with the opposite extreme (cf. XII, via, 2-3; XV, ii, 13-15), and Polybius noted that the world was replete with instances of both exaltations and abasements of men involved in public affairs (V, xxvi, 12).³ And as with private careers, so it was with groups and nations. He cited the predictions of the peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum that as cruel *tyche* had once destroyed Persia so she would eventually bring the downfall of Macedon (XXIX, xxi, 1-6).⁴ *Tyche*, the philosopher had said, was lending good things to Macedonia until she wished otherwise, and

order, see *infra*, pp.161ff..

¹ See esp. XI, xix, 5-6; XV, vi, 8; (Hannibal's speech which is here, however, in keeping with Polybius' own sentiments), vii, 3-4 (attributed to Scipio), xv, 5; XXV, iii, 9b; XXIX, xxi, 5-6 (from Demetrius of Phalerum, with whom Polybius concurs), xxii, 2; XXX, x, 1; XXXV, ii, 14; etc.

² So, εὐτυχῆσαι μὲν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα δυνατόν, δειτυχῆσαι γε ἄδύνατον.

³ So, ὁψοῦσι καὶ πάλιν ταπεινοῦσι; note, too, the general lesson: VIII, xxi(i), 11.

⁴ (= Demetrius of Phalerum, Frg.81 (Wehrli, pp.22-3) = Diodorus, XXXI, x, 1-2.

Polybius concurred with such judgements as though they were divine utterances. The Roman victory over Perseus (167BC) was a substantiation of them,¹ and Polybius brought a similar principle of interpretation to the fate of other nations he examined. Once again *tychē* willed to work either for decline or prosperity. He remarked concerning the Boeotian *poleis* that, although they had been lucky enough (*eutychōs*) to scrape through the critical times posed by Macedon's Philip V and the Seleucid Antiochus the Great, they eventually found *tychē* to be against them (XX, vii, 1-2). On another occasion, however, he asserted that because Thebes had suffered so severely at the hands of Alexander the Great, fortune changed in her favour and made reconstruction possible (XXXVIII, ii, 3 - iii, 2). Of more significance is his treatment of the Roman-Carthaginian conflict in these terms. He stressed Hannibal's victory at the battle of Cannae as a high-point in Carthaginian affairs, yet as the worst of disasters for Rome; it was after treating events up to the date of Cannae that he paused to consider the Roman *politeia* and its institutions, because it was of some wonder that a virtually conquered state became a world power.² With this emphasis we may perceive how he integrated the image of fortune's wheel with a central purposes of the *Historiae* - to explain Rome's amazing success.³ Hannibal's remarkable achievements brought the eventual reversal of fortune's favour, whilst Rome, since she faced near destruction, suddenly found the wheel running in quite the opposite direction.⁴ This alone could not account for the rapid rise of

¹ *Loc.cit.*, 7-9, cf. xxii, 2 (for his concurrence), and see esp. XXIII, iii, 5; x, 1-2; cf. XXII, xvii, 1-2 on the foreshadowing of Macedonia's fall.

² See esp. III, cxviii, 1-2 (and cf. in preparation for book VI: V, cv, 10; cx, 10; cxi, 8), VI, xi, 2; cf. I, xii, 7; VI, ii, 6-7. K.F. Eisen justifiably defends the notion that VI, xi, 2 suggests Polybius wrote much more about Cannae and its consequences; *Polybiosinterpretationen; op.cit.*, p.36.

³ See I, i, 1-6; cf. xii, 7; III, i, 4-iv, 12; and *supra*, pp.172f., 176ff..

⁴ See esp. *Hist.*, IX, xxi; cf. vi, 5; viii, 13-ix, 1, etc. on the turn of Carthage's fortunes, yet cf. VI, ii, 7; IX, xxi, xxiv, 2-3. See also VI, li, 7-8 on Rome's new *εὐτυχία* (especially in the light of III, cxviii, 6a). Polybius may well have omitted certain defeats suffered by Hannibal before

Rome to world dominion, but these principles nevertheless have their appropriate place in his understanding of world events and his *Weltanschauung*.

Such evidence (and there is more besides) demonstrates Polybius' willingness to share in common Greek, and by that time Roman assumptions about the vicissitudes of private and public fortunes. His approach presupposes no special source; popular notions about 'turns' or 'ups and downs' in human affairs are sufficient to account for it.¹ He simply utilized the stock notion of a common transference from *eutychia* to *atychia* or vice versa. And what was taken to recur were types of events which reflected the wheel-like movement from one set of conditions to another. Outside an interesting piece of parallelism drawn between the careers of Hannibal and Philopoemen, who experienced fortune's recalcitrance in 'the very same way' (τὸ παραπλήσιον), nothing approaches the repetition of particulars. Furthermore, Polybius considered the relevant phenomena 'horizontally' rather than 'vertically', so that he gave no instance of the wheel's complete circuit (*atychia*²/*eutychia*/*atychia*, for example) in the case of one individual or group. His way of narrating events in recent world history tended to preclude this, and found him passing quite rapidly from one

the rise of Scipio to accentuate the picture of changing fortune; cf. Plutarch, *Vitae*; Pelopidas and Marcellus Compared, I, 4-5.

¹ Reminders about fortune's wheel no doubt formed part of the world of aphorisms he was steeped in (cf. his use of proverbs, see XII, xiiA, 1; xxvA, 1; xvi, 3; xvii, 2; XXXI, xiii, 12-14; xvi, 3; XXXIII, iv, 3; v, 3; xxi, 1; XXXIV, ii, 2; XXXVIII, x, 8b; xvi, 11; xvii, 12; xxii, 3; XXXIX, iii, 2; etc.). It was part of the moralists' stock in trade at the time to encourage personal resilience when fortunes altered. (So, esp. Epicurus, *Frgs.*, 76-7 (Bailey edit., pp.136-9) (3rd century BC), Epictetus, *Dissertationes*, I, ix, 1-8; III, xxvi, 1-36 (1st century AD), Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes*, esp. XXIV, 19-24; XXV (1st century AD) for Epicurean, Stoic and Cynic views which best reflect philosophical attitudes closest to Polybius' time. Dio alone amongst this triad, however, endows *tyche* with a personification similar to Polybius'). And we know at least one philosopher whose works Polybius read - Demetrius of Phalerum - who dwelt on the inconstancy of wealth, the overthrow of the mighty, the fall of empires, and who quoted suitable classical passages to support his conclusions (cf. Demetrius *apud* Plutarch *Consol. ad Apoll.*, 104A-B - *Frg.* 79 (Wehrli, p.22), cf. *Frgs.* 81, 121 (pp.22-3, 27); and for Polybius on unexpectancy in *tyche*'s movements, especially in wartime, see *Hist.*, esp. XV, vi, 8; viii, 3; xv, 5; XXIX, xxi, 5; xxii, 2; XXX, x, 1; cf. XI, xix, 5-6; XXV, ii, 14, etc. and see *infra*.

² Or *dystychia*.

region or subject to another. Yet he still succeeded in conveying general guidelines for the student of politicians who wished to learn how historical events should be interpreted. One could assess through others' experience, moreover, how far fortune could be trusted and how her reversals could be borne. This notion of history's usefulness also raises important questions about Polybius' special treatment of Rome, whose ways and achievements merited emulation. Did Polybius take fortune to be singularly less fickle and far more favourably disposed towards the Roman empire than to other nations? At one significant point he praised the judgement of Scipio Aemilianus who, when watching flames engulf Carthage, admitted his personal forebodings about a similar doom for his own country in the future. However, if this suggests that the wheel would eventually turn against Rome, as against others, Polybius made a point of declaring just how wise this Roman general was to reflect on fortune's mutability (ἡ τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλεια) at the very height of success.¹ He attempted to expose certain qualities in Roman actions, policies and institutions which dissuaded or forestalled *tyche* in her normal operations, but these qualities were primarily moral, and we must await an analysis of his understanding of history's moral order before clarifying this matter.

The Biological Principle

i) General

The truth κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπινα must have been pregnant with meaning for Pythagoreans and others who philosophized upon the 'mystical' significance of numbers or shapes, and upon metempsychosis. Although it is difficult to reconstruct their early beliefs, the Pythagoreans probably enunciated a doctrine of exact recurrence. Objecting to their teaching, Eudemus the peripatetic disputed the possibility that one could find oneself in exactly the same situation, as a teacher with the very same

¹ On both Scipio's words and Polybius' observations, *Hist.* XXXVIII, xxi, 1-3. Unfortunately, however, XXXVII, xix-xxi are now only found in Plutarch's *Apophthegmata*.

pupils and with rod in hand, for example, at some future long-distance date.¹ Unlike Stoics, however, Pythagoreans evidently refrained from talk of any cosmic conflagration. One may therefore assume that they took such recurrence to take place within the one continuing historical order, and that this repetition was made possible by the eventual return of souls to the same bodies and circumstances.² There are in fact two distinct cyclical models entwined together in this teaching; recurrence is on the one hand tied in with the processes of the birth, death and re-birth of life-forms, and on the other with the passing of huge lapses of time, such as a Great Year, or an 'Age' (*aiōn*).³ We are here conveniently introduced to two important notions now bearing our careful attention - the ideas of recurring life-cycles and of successive Ages.

Graeco-Roman speculations about psychic transmigration are peripheral to our concerns, there being no extant attempt to show how the re-embodiment of souls affected historical events.⁴ The idea of recurring life-cycles, however, and the application of the three-stationed biological principle to human affairs, is clearly of great relevance. That all bodies come into being and pass away, or are born, grow and die, was a truth widely held and frequently reflected upon.⁵ Aristotle was a thinker who exploited this truth most consistently in his studies of sub-lunary *metabolai*, and he successfully fused the life-cycle principle with the more widely applicable idea of periodicity. His fellow countrymen, he once claimed, habitually conceived of human *pragmata* in terms of

¹ Cf. Pythagoras, Frg.58 (Diels-Kranz) = 272 (Kirk-Raven), (*apud* Eudemus of Rhodes, see p.14, n.1. See also Porphyry, *Vita Pythagorae*, xix.

² Cf. esp. Frgs. 268-270 (Kirk-Raven).

³ On the problems of establishing whether Pythagoras spoke of a Great Year, however, see esp. J.A. Philip, *Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism*, *op.cit.*, p.74, cf. B.L. van der Waerden, 'Das Grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr,' in *Hermes*, LXXX, 1952, pp. 129ff.

⁴ I.e., excluding the odd asseveration, such as Alexander the Great's claim to be Achilles (see Quintus Curtius, *Historiarum Alexandri Magni Macedonis*, IV,vi,29, cf. Arrian, *Anabasis*, VII,xiv,4;) and see *infra*, p.397.

⁵ See Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.Philos.*, I, proem.iii, Plato, *Resp.*, 546A, Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, lvii, 1, Stato, *apud* Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I, xiii, 35, Seneca, *Epist.*, LXXI, 15, Epictetus, *Dissert.*, III, xxiv, 9ff, for a wide range of examples.

circular motion. Concurring, he asserted that such affairs proceeded 'periodically',¹ though he pictured these 'natural' movements² as undulatory or cycloidal, quite distinct from the heavenly courses. Because earthly motions were rectilinear they did not see any return to exactly the same point; human events were not repeated 'numerically',³ then, but they recurrently took on the same *eide*, or fell into the same genus (so that certain types of μεταβολή πολιτεῶν, certain types of temperaments, and so forth, became evident).⁴ Whether he also understood human events to recur on a regular periodic basis is not clear. He admittedly taught that

'the time-periods or the lives of each kind of living thing have a number and are thus distinguished, for there is an order (*taxis*) for everything, and every life and span is measured by a *periodos*' (De Gen. et Corr., 336b11-14):

but only in the *Problemata*, in a section which was probably not executed by Aristotle himself, does one find a general statement suggesting a periodic, indeed eternal, return.

'Just as the turning of the firmament and each of the stars is circular, why should not also the coming-to-be and decay of perishable things be the kind of process in which the same things come into being and pass away? This agrees with the saying κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπινα. Yet to demand that those things (recurrently) coming into being should be numerically identical is foolish; on the other hand, one could more readily accept the theory of the identity of species (*eidos*) ... If human life is a circle, moreover, and a circle has neither beginning nor end, we should not be 'prior' to those who live in the time of Troy, nor they 'prior' to us by being nearer the beginning' (916a 24-38).

Quite apart from the true authorship of this passage, the West owes that distinctive understanding of the cycle of growth, zenith and decay in human affairs to the Aristotelian school before all others. Perhaps Aristotle and his followers were reiterating something already commonly

¹ (κατὰ περίοδον) *Physica*, 223b24-31, esp. 25. Probably an allusion to the proverb discussed above.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, 223b26-9: τῶν κινήσεων ἐχόντων φυσικῇν..... δοκεῖ κύκλος τις, and for undulations in Aristotle, A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and related ideas in Antiquity*, op.cit., p.173.

³ I.e., The Greek expression connoted exact recurrence, or even the repetition of numerical identity (κατ'ἀριθμὸν).

⁴ See *De Generatione et Corruptione*, 338b 11-14; cf. pseudo-Aristotle,

held, yet their simple equation of three-staged¹ *cycloi* with *periodoi* (or with time-lapses covering the existence of recognizable phenomena), provided a workable frame rich in possibilities for historians. This was done, we must insist, at the expense of slightly modifying the seminal image of a circle, since organismic change, with its *archē* in birth and its *telos* in death, registers more as a cycloid with three basic stages, than a movement which sees the return to 'an original point of departure'. To be old and dying was a long way from being a child, whilst to have been once poor, then rich, and then unexpectedly poor again was more obviously a process which saw a return to the same circumstances; so stands on important difference between the biological cycle and (in this instance) the wheel of fortune. Even if turns of fortune appear more as a fluctuation between two states, the impact of a reversion is more decisive. Either conception, however, was reckoned cyclical, and it was even assumed that they both involved an alternation between the same kinds of dualities - between good and evil, the desirable and undesirable, the favourable and unfavourable.

But we have only been pursuing one avenue of thought, and there is another to consider. The extent to which the biological paradigm conveyed a strong cyclical impression depended on the sphere to which

Problemata, 916a18-38; Eudemus, Frg.88 (Wehrli ed., *Schule Arist.*, vol.8, p.41).

¹ Cf. Ryffel's expression 'drei-Stationen-Prinzip or Weg' (ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΩΝ *op.cit.*, pp.209-15, etc.) for the biological model (growth/acme/decay). On the wheel of fortune notion as reduced to two alternative movements, (ἀ - or δυστυχία/εὐτυχία/δυστυχία, or εὐτυχία/δυστυχία/εὐτυχία), cf. *supra*. Changes in fortune were sometimes identified with 'natural change', however; cf. for example, Thucydides, *Historia* II, 64 (3); 'πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι'. Incidentally, it may also be stated that, from the viewpoint of conceiving the elementary plastic shape of events, the half-circle or arch was as much rooted in common experience as the circle. There was admittedly very little theorizing about the half-circle in classical literature, but one should note Seneca, *Epistulae Morales*, XC, 32-3 where he reports that Poseidonius credited Democritus with the discovery of the arch (*curvatura*). Objecting to this theory Seneca goes on to claim that the curve was to be found in such as objects as bridges and gateways long before Democritus existed.

it was applied. With the vegetation *cyclos* the sense of continuity was easily strengthened, because growth and death were tied to the ever-recurring seasons, and because the death of seeds and old vegetation often foreshadowed, on the very same ground, new life. Animal and human death, however, was more irregular and disparate; and it was not the norm that the death of one bespoke the birth of another. When viewed more macro-cosmically, however, matters looked different, and one can respect how natural it was for Plutarch (in the late first century AD), for instance, to write of the seemingly endless progression of human generations as an *anacyclēsis*.¹ Yet of even more interest is the fact that, in comparison to the coming-to-be and passing-away of living organisms, changes in human affairs could be more easily represented as inscribing a cyclical course along the one unbroken continuum. The individual human being at the end of a cycle, died, and the cyclical processes were usually carried on by reproduction (the creation of a 'new branch' as it were) long before death. On the other hand, death was more a relative thing with *pragmata*, and because deeds could be re-enacted, ideas and schemes revived or continually renewed, and the human species and nations only partially destroyed, one is justified in contending that, in a special logical sense, the life-cycle was more usable and appropriate in the 'historian's' hands than in those of the 'biologist.'

ii) Polybius

As with fortune's wheel, the biological principle was an important tool of interpretation for Polybius. It has already been observed how the doctrine that all existing things are subject to *phthora* and *metabolē*, and that every body, *politeia*, and action has its natural stages of growth, prime and decay, affected his formulation of the *Anacyclōsis*, (pp.76-8).

¹ *Consol.ad Appol.* 106F, cf. 106E-107A. See also *supra*, p.14, n.3, and for variations on the idea of successive γένεα[see Hesiod, *WD.*, ls. 110, 127, 140, 157, 180; Plato, *Leg.* III, 679D; Isocrates, *Antidosis*, clxxiv-v, etc.

Polybius apparently assumed most of the major states he considered to have undergone growth (*auxēsis*) and to have attained to an acme-point of prosperity or success. Perhaps this language seemed inappropriate for some states - for permanently disrupted Crete, let us say, and for *politeiai* stunted early on by destruction or foreign occupation.¹ Yet he was committed to it as a means of describing relatively unimpeded, relatively natural developments in the lives of political societies.² States such as Macedonia and Rhodes experienced *auxēsis* just as Rome did, even though he took the development of the Roman state, with its mixed constitution, to be among the most 'natural'.³ In considering the non-Roman scene, moreover, he could expose some of the variations attending the operation of the biological principle. In Achaea's case, for example, whatever small growth had accompanied the earliest appearance of the League,⁴ Macedon's temporary dissolution of the confederation ended it, until the cities effected a beginning once more (ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἐγένετο) and until new and surprising *auxēsis* brought it to 'maturity' (*synteleia*) just before his own day.⁵ Again, Athens and Thebes underwent such *auxēsis* and reached points of prime, but in both instances the growth was not κατὰ λόγον (not following the most rational course open?)⁶ and the acme was short-lived (VI, xliii, 2ff).

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 144, (on Crete) and note, for example, VIII, xiv, 8-10 (on Illyria). The normal development of such states as Macedon and Carthage was also disrupted by Roman imperialism.

² The biological growth and decay of individuals as *homo sapiens* was, of course, taken for granted, but was not expressed. He also alluded to the model when characterizing developments in the life of an individual who had political power or whose work in itself constituted a *politeia* = monarchy. On Philip V, for example, see *infra*, p. 185. Outside Bk. VI, incidentally, Polybius paid little attention to the application of the biological principle to individual constitutions; yet cf. pp. 61-2.

³ *Hist.*, VI, ix, 13. On Macedonia (as a state), Rhodes (its *πολίτευμα*) III, iii, 7. On Rome, cf. *supra*, pp. 96ff.

⁴ See II, xxxviii, 10 - xxxix, 12, cf. xli, 6; IV, i, 5b.

⁵ Esp. II, xl, 5b for the first expression; xli, 9, for the effect of Macedon; and see xxxvii, 8, xl, 5-6; xlv, 1; IV, i, 6-7; cf. XVIII, xiii, 9; XXIV, x, 10a for Achaea's growth.

⁶ Φύσις (nature) and λόγος (reason) were never opposed to one another in the *Historiae*; here, however, they are implicitly identified, since Polybius

If we wonder about the pragmatic aspect of the biological principle, the *Historiae* affords some key insights. For Polybius, the study of the past taught one how to assess the condition of any political society, whether it was in a process of growth or in decline. Now concerning growth, in the first instance, we may well ask if Polybius held general political growth to be dependent on a measure of soundness in a given state's constitution, and on the persistent existence of such soundness. He certainly argued that the secret of Rome's success lay in her 'natural' *mixis*, a phenomenon which represented Rome's constitutional acme after a long time of 'growth and formation'. It was because Rome eventually achieved a special internal balance that she was able to 'grow' into a world power. The splendour of Athens and Thebes, by contrast, was due not to their constitutions, but to their great men (VI, xliii, 5 - xliv, 2), and with Macedonia Polybius placed emphasis on the energy of her royal leaders rather than on the stability of her εἶδος πολιτείας as the 'growth factor.'¹ Despite Rome's case, then, political *auxēsis* and constitutional stability were not rigorously interdependent.² That is, however, only half the story. We must turn from *auxēsis* to decay.

could just as easily have referred to an ἀβησις κατὰ φύσιν xliii, 2. The Stoics also fused the two concepts in the spheres of cosmology and ethics.

¹ So V, x, 1-8 (Philip II and Alexander), XXV, iii, 9 (Philip V). (Αβησις is common to the work of all these rulers even though Polybius might have been more favourably disposed towards the work of the first two than the last).

² In VI, ii, 9 Polybius may have contended that the chief αἰτία of success or its opposite in all πράγματα is the σύστασις (the constitution) of the *politeia*, but here he is being rather theoretical, and he is stating for students what *should* happen because it did happen with the *best* state, namely Rome. If Athens and Thebes are the best Polybian examples of growth without sound constitutions, pre-fourth century Sparta and pre-Philippian Achaea are the best of examples of sound constitutions with a minimum of political growth (VI, xlviii, 1-5; II, xxxix, 5; 9-10). Rome, for Polybius, experienced a sound constitution and *auxēsis*, (though not simultaneously), and this *auxēsis*, unlike growth undergone by either Athens or Thebes, was far more permanent because of the constitutional factor.

In an important passage (VI, lvii, 1-2), Polybius theorized about political *phthora* and identified two agencies by which every *Constitution* was susceptible to decay, the first being an external factor, the second something naturally developing within *politeiai* themselves,¹ the first being an uncertain thing, with which 'science' could do little, the second being orderly.² If Polybius seemed to begin in this passage by discussing *politeiai* as forms of constitutions (γένη, VI, iv, 6), it was the eventual collapse of *politeiai* as political societies which soon became uppermost in his mind (lvii, 5a). Although one must keep in mind the possible interrelation between these two senses, it is fair to conclude that Polybius ascribed the fall of states to either outside forces (war, aggrandizement, etc.) or to internal dissipation (extravagance, discord, etc.)³. The regular biological curve is the appropriate model for inner changes, but not those between conflicting nations. Thus in Bk. VI, lvii, where he was still engaged in his examination of constitutions, he concentrated only on the inward changes which cause a state's downfall - extravagance and rivalry for office amongst the powerful, resulting grievances amongst the commons, the emergence of democracy and eventually mob-rule (5b - 9). Even if he was here primarily concerned with the Roman future (which he believed would ultimately undergo a natural decline [cf. ix 12-13]), the passage may still be said to stand as a blanket statement about political degeneration. Concerning Rome, Polybius gave numerous hints that the first stages of decay - extravagance and rivalry amongst the *optimates* - were underway. Rome had passed the highest point of its constitutional (which is not to be confused with its imperial) line of development. He quoted the elder Cato's speech against the vices

¹ lvii, 2; δυνάμιν δὲ τρόπων ὄντων, καθ' οὓς φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε πᾶν γένος πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἑξωθεν, τοῦ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς φυομένου. Cf. also, x, 3.

² 26; τὸν μὲν ἐκτὸς ἄστατον ἔχειν συμβαίνει τὴν θεωρίαν, τὸν δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τεταγμένην. . The meaning is 'uncertain' and 'orderly' *methodologically*.

³ On the peripatetic background to the idea of distinction between internal changes within bodies and external changes upon them, see esp. Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1312a39ff., Critolaus *apud Philo, De Aeternitate Mundi*, 20-1, 74, Ocellus, *Univ. Nat.*, I, xi, 13 (Harder, p. 14), cf. W. Theiler, 'Schichten im 6. Buch des Polybios', in *Hermes*, LXXXI, 1953, p. 296.

of Roman youths and against the current tendency to prize pretty boys and caviar above fields and ploughment. Agreeing with Cato, he claimed that deterioration had begun to manifest itself¹ with the display of public and private wealth in Rome after the fall of Macedon.² The appropriation and misuse of *objets d'art* from conquered territories troubled him,³ as did the dissonance and chaos of a very peculiar triumphal march in the capital following Lucius Anicius' capture of Genthius, King of Illyria.⁴ If these were the indications of Roman decay, however, other states were closer to collapse. Take Achaea, for example. Admittedly difficulties surround Polybius' contentions that democracy was a stage in the process of *phthora*. When he originally set out to write history, his as yet unsurpassed ideal was the democratic *politeia* of the Achaean League, with its basis in *ισογορία καὶ παρρησία* (cf. II, xxxviii, 6; xlii, 3), and with certain constitutional safeguards.⁵ But Polybius was eventually forced to reckon with Achaea's weaknesses. He criticized the excessive love of liberty among Achaeans in his own day (V, cvi, 5; cf. IV, xxxi, 4; XXXVIII, ix, 8), and on referring to the influence of the pro-Roman Callicrates on the League in 181 BC, insisted that Achaea's acme had passed and the turn for the worse begun (XXIV, x, 10; cf. 8-9). Equality and free-speech were socio-political goals Polybius never shelved (cf. XXVII, iv, 7), yet it remains true that he frequently associated the

¹ lvii, 10 suggests that the *akmē* of Rome is already a matter of historical reflection (*διὰ θεοῖς* in this passage just meaning 'condition' or 'situation', rather than 'present condition' as in Paton) and so does li, 5. Also, the heading provided by Codex Urbinas before xi may be derived from a non-extant part of the text; (on the state of F, see J.M. Moore, *The Manuscript Tradition of Polybius* (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge, 1965, pp. 56-8 etc.).

² Hist., XXXI, xxv, 4; 7, and on the decline of honour note XVIII, xxxiv, 7 - xxxv, 4.

³ XXXIX, ii, 1-3, cf. IX, x, 1-13, XXI, xxx, 9, XXXIX, iii, 3-11.

⁴ XXX, xxii, 1-12, cf. T.R. Glover, 'Polybius at Rome' in his *The Springs of Hellas and other Essays*, Cambridge, 1945, p. 118.

⁵ XXIII, xii, 8 (*ἐν δημοκρατικῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ πολιτεύματι*) implies that the Achaean constitution was not a pure democracy. His (Thucydidean?) stress on its guiding statesmen (eg. II, xxxix, 12) implies that he thought of it as in some sense 'mixed', and that his Greek experience as an Achaean politician thus prepared him for grasping the significance of the Roman constitution, cf. E. Graeber, *Die Lehre von der Mischverfassung*, op. cit., pp. 13ff.

enfeeblement of certain states with the irresponsibility of popular government. Carthage was at a disadvantage against the Romans because the *dēmos* had acquired a greater voice and thus not only constitutionally but in power and prosperity, she passed her prime earlier than Rome (VI, li, 4-6). Both Athens and Thebes lost supremacy in Greece because good leadership was succeeded by headstrong *ochloi* (xliv, 3-9), and numerous other Greek democracies were treated as though they had degenerated with the increasing factions of the populace.¹ Should we draw the conclusion, then, that Polybius understood the decay of a *politeia* as a state to be co-terminous with excessive growth in the power of the people? That is not an unfair judgment. When, to continue, he described the effect of popular government on such Greek centres as Cynaetha, second century Thebes and the Boeotian *poleis*, on Aetolia, Tarentum in Sicily, Cius in Bithynia and the like, he was analysing their decline as states, not just the decay of their democratic constitutions in particular.² This interpretation is justifiable, moreover, even whilst recognizing the distinction between states with a *mixis*, which begin their decline with an excess of the popular element (so VI, li, 6; lvii, 5-7), and states tending to follow the normative anacyclic path, which decay towards dissolution after the 'third acme' of democracy (ix, 1-9). In either case, popularism was a special symptom of general political decay.

But we need further clarification here. If popular influences tended to bring *phthora* to the state, it was only to the state looked at from the viewpoint of its internal history. External factors were quite another issue, even though Polybius would have admitted that internal strengths and weaknesses affecting any state's ability to withstand

¹ See *infra*, pp. 187ff. (on *metabolē* within democracy).

² Cf. IV, xvii, 4 (Cynaetha), XX, iv, 1ff; vi, 1-3; vii, 3-4; XXII, iv, 1 ff; XXVII, i, 9 (Thebes and Boeotia), XXVIII, iv, 13b (cf. 9); XXX, xi, 1-6 (cf. Livy XLI, xxv, which was probably based on Polybius), etc. (Aetolia), VIII, xxiv, 1-3 (introd.) (Tarentum), XV, xxi, 3 ff (Cius in Bithynia), XXX, xii, 1-3 (Epirus); and cf. XI, xxix, 8-10 (more general, but connected to Rome).

outside pressure or consolidate possessions.¹ The question now arises as to the difference between the interpretative models Polybius employed in analysing internal history on the one hand, and external relations on the other. Methodologically, he argued, one could be scientific about inner transformations; they were predictable, regular and cyclical.² But by what method could one put order into the external relations, which largely consisted in conflict *between* states? The fact that 'the external' (*exōthen*) involved separate entities, rather than the continuous life of one, was a problem sizeable enough, even without the hopeless prospect of reducing diplomatic and military interchanges to law-like generalizations. Yet although Polybius theorized more about internal rather than external politics, it cannot be said that he turned his back on these difficulties. Significantly enough, external conflicts were worked out largely under the aegis of *tychē*. To win victories or to be worsted was to experience either good or bad fortune,³ and although skill, opportunism, discipline, courage, *aretē* and their opposites could never be neglected by the historian, external conflict was the realm in which human illusions, the unexpected and the incalculable played a very crucial

¹ Thus Athens and Thebes may have had ephemeral moments of great power, but their constitutions could not make these gains permanent. Sparta too, did not possess as sound a *politeia* as Rome for consolidating and controlling external possessions. One is still not required to affirm however, that *growth* and constitutional soundness are interdependent.

² It is interesting that in the more theoretical of his own sources (the writings of Plato and the peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum) an analogy between biological *cycloi* and human or political developments can be found. For Plato, esp. *Resp.* 546A, Demetrius *apud* Plutarch, *Consol. ad. Apoll.*, 104B, (Plutarch treated Demetrius as quoting from Euripides' *Ino* in both cases, 104A and B, and as interposing his own comments between the two parts of the quotation, so that Wehrli unjustifiably excludes 'κύκλος γὰρ αὐτὸς καρπίοις τε γῆς φυτοῦς/γένει βροτῶν τε,...etc.' from frg. 79 of Demetrius' work (cf. his p. 22). The peripatetic had quoted a larger Euripidean passage than he allows. That Polybius was decisively and more generally influenced by Demetrius' *Περὶ Τύχης*, the line of argument adopted by R. von Scala *Studien des Polybios op.cit.*, pp.159 ff, esp. pp. 179-81), does not bear the weight of the evidence. For Polybius' further use of Demetrius, however, see *Hist.*, XXXVI, ii, 3.

³ So esp. II, lxx, 2; III, cxviii, 6; IX, viii, 13; xii, 10; xxi, XI, xix, 5-6; XII, xxv, 5-6; XV, vi-vii, etc., for a good variety of examples.

part.¹ With Rome, to take a central example, the strong interdependence between the acquisition of empire and the stability of her internal politics has to be admitted (cf. III, cxviii, 5-9; VI, ii, 6-7; lii, 8 ff). Nevertheless, Rome suffered obvious misfortune despite her splendid institutions, so that it was still justifiable to claim that, when matters improved after Cannae, it was *tychē* who gave her world dominion.² In general, therefore, Polybius' approach reflects a reasonably clear working distinction between inner constitutional developments proceeding κατὰ φύσιν and the uncertainties of fortune-dominated external relations. The three-stationed biological principle and the model of changing fortune operated in different spheres; and even if they were capable of close complementarity, the distinctiveness of their respective applications should be recognized.³ It remains true, however, that Polybius endeavoured to draw both these explanatory devices closer together, and the extent to which he did so bears assessment. Returning to his idea of 'growth' the term *auxēsis* (used indiscriminately for 'constitutions' and 'states' alike) was practical in describing both the inner and outer relations of politics. So assertions that such 'states' as Athens, Achaea or Rome 'grew' merely complemented, even reinforced

¹ On illusions in warfare, cf. I, xxiii, 5; lxvi, 12; II, iii, 5ff; III, lxxii, 2-3; IV, x, 7; lxii, 4-5; V, ci, 9-10; civ, 7-8; X, xiv, 1 ff, etc.; on the unexpected, see esp. (on τὸ παράδοξον, etc), II, i, 3; iii, 3; iv, 1; 5; xviii, 6; xxv, 6; xxxv, 8; xxxix, 8; lxi, 10; III, ii, 2; VIII, xxi, 6, etc. On skill vis à vis fortune, note esp. I, lxiii, 9; VII, viii, 1 ff; X, ii; xxxiii, 4-8; XI, xiv, 2 (important); XVI, xxviii, 2; etc.

² For references, see *infra*, pp. 172ff. The view that Polybius downgraded Fortune's rôle half way through his writing, so as to place increasing stress on Roman virtue, I take to be inadmissible. Yet cf. esp. R. von Scala, *op.cit.*, pp. 159, 183; O. Cuntz, *Polybius, etc, op.cit.*, pp. 43 ff.

³ We cannot so oversimplify matters as to assume with Walter Rehm, that 'die Verfassung ist für Polybios die wichtigste Ursache für Glück und Unglück eines Staates überhaupt'; *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken, (Das Erbe der Alten XVIII)*, Darmstadt, 1966 reissue of 1930 ed., p. 10. 'Growth', 'acme' and 'decay' certainly affected the external sphere, but they still primarily described internal developments, whilst the course which led to the accumulation of *eutychia* or prosperity and then to misfortune, or vice versa, belonged to persons or states in their respective relations to other people or political societies around them. Put differently, Polybius distinguished between the sphere of natural change and that of altered circumstances (συμφοραί, περιπέτεια).

statements that their emergence to power was the work of *tychē*.¹ On the other hand, at no point does Polybius write of *tychē* governing their inner constitutional *auxēsis*. Concerning 'decay', moreover, the important passage VI, lvii indicates that, whilst natural processes govern inward corruption, 'decay' could also involve *res externae* (2). Thus since the language of adverse fortune was appropriate to outside pressures impinging upon a state, it could to that extent be harmonized with the model of a downward biological curve. Polybius' concern to associate decay with *atychia* becomes increasingly accentuated in the later books of the *Historiae*. Before every state falls to Rome it has undergone some kind of inner degeneration; Macedon's *basileia* becomes the tyranny of Perseus,² the *poleis* of once democratic Greece become harassed by the passion of the masses,³ and on the eve of the submission of all Greece, Polybius observes a prevalent disintegration of moral and mental health amongst her inhabitants.⁴ With other areas one detects similar patterns. Carthage having conceded excessive power to the populace, eventually ended its career in horrific distress under a brutal tyrannos-figure,⁵ and in the Middle East there was a regional conflict along with *metabolai* to ochlocracy and tyranny.⁶ From the viewpoint of external relations, however,

¹ So *Hist.*, VI, xliii, 2-3 (Athens), II, xxxvii, 6b-8 (Achaëa), I, i, 5; iv, 1; 4-5; etc. (Rome).

² Esp. XXXVI, xvii, 13, cf. XXVIII, x; XXIX, v, 1 ff, etc. (yet cf. XXV, iii, 3-8, XXVII, ix, 1-x, 5).

³ See esp. *supra*, p. 127, n. 2, (excepting Cynaëtha, although she 'decays' before both Achaëa and Aetolia take her).

⁴ See XXXVI, xvii, 6 ff (this concern for the break-up of family life became an important Roman theme), XXXVIII, i, 5; iii, 5-iv, 2; xii, 5; xvi, 7-8, xvii, 7-12.

⁵ I.e., XXXVIII, viii, 11-14 and see XXXVI, vii, 3-5, XXXVIII, vii, 1 ff; xx, 1 ff.

⁶ On his general treatment of the Middle East, see esp. X, xxvii-xxxix; xlix; XI, xxxiv; XIV, xi-xii; XVI, i-xii; xxi-xxii; xxxix; XVIII, xla-xli, xlix-lv; XXI, vi; x-xxi, 17; (this includes an account of the battle of Magnesia concerning which Polybius claims that, by fortune, Rome had now become masters of the whole world, xvi, 8), XXI, xxxiii-xlv; XXII, xvi-xvii; xx-xxii; XXIV, xiv-xv; XXV, ii; XXVI, ia-i; XXVII, xiii; xvii-xx, XXVIII, xvi-xxiii, XXIX, xxiii; xxvii, 12 (on fortune directing the fate of Asia Minor); XXX, xxv-xxvii; XXXI, vi-ix, xvi; xxxii-xxxiii; XXXII, viii; xi-xii; xv-xvi; XXXIII, iv-vi; xi-xiii; xix; XXXVI, xiv-xv;

Polybius went out of his way to invoke fortune and her participation in military conflicts. It was *tychē* who turned against Macedon and who favoured Scipio Aemilianus in the Third Carthaginian War (XXIX, xxi; XXXVIII, xxi, 3);¹ it was *atychia*, which befell all the cities of Hellas (XXXVIII, iii, 5-10, cf. xviii, 8; III, v, 6). Thus two kinds of *phthora* could operate in conjunction, and two of the most basic cyclical models were brought into unison. The old doctrine of fortune's unstable, wheel-like movements, a doctrine applied to historical events by the renowned and developed in Hellenistic historiography, was brought into partnership with the biological principle. With this cunning harmonization (yet another of Polybius' 'eclectic' achievements), he felt permitted to proffer his rather awesome generalization about the whole line of development in 'world history' from 220 BC onwards: that fortune (clearly conceived as a providential overlord) guided all the *events* of the world towards one and the same *telos* - the dominion of Rome.² He also felt able to formulate an explanation for the success of Rome in both her inner and outer relations, and in this he treated Rome as what one may term 'the great exception'. Neither the wheel of fortune nor the biological principle, according to Polybius, had their most typical consequences for the Romans. Fortune had been more liberal than usual with her permissions, but above all the secret of Rome lay in her mixed constitution. When any external threat or misfortune was imminent, her remarkable institutions united the people in defence, and when *eutychia* and outward peace prevailed, they forestalled the natural decay brought on by idleness and corruption. (VI, xviii, 1-6).³

and note his analysis of the disorder in Cius of Bithynia, XV, xxi, 3 ff (ochlocracy). See also XIV, xii, 3 (Cf. Ptolemy Philopator's degeneration), with XXVI, i and XXXI, ix (on the curious behaviour and death of Antiochus Epiphanes), etc.

¹ The passage is a difficult one, of course, since it is difficult to distinguish Plutarchan from Polybian elements.

² *Hist.*, I, iv, 1; 3-5; cf. IV, xxviii, 3; VIII, ii (iv), 4; XXI, xvi, 8.

³ The phrases in 5b (καὶ ὑποκολακευόμενοι καὶ ῥαθυμοῦντες τρέπωνται πρὸς ὕβριν καὶ πρὸς ὑπερηφανίαν) look ahead to lvii, 5-10, which similarly treats decline after a period of εὐδαιμονία (so xviii, 5, lvii, 5; and note the

All this implies a special didacticism. To disclose the correct application of cyclical paradigms, to estimate the point of *auxēsis* or *phthora* reached by any state, or to gauge the tendencies of *tychē*, all this was to teach men how to choose the best courses of action in future situations (see VI, ii, 8; ix, 11-12, cf. III, cxviii, 12). That kind of preconception, of course, could affect the relating of events. Admittedly Polybius insisted that the historian's duty was to recount the true facts (ἀληθὲς ἔργα) and he criticized others for over-dramatizing events and for showing a patriotic partiality.¹ But to grant him relatively modern ideas about 'real facts', or about *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*, would be false.² He was bound to subvert the 'actual' and the 'true' he so dearly wished to see preserved, for to tell what happened was at one and the same time to tender a preferred understanding of the events, which above all meant to grasp their paradigmatic and utilitarian qualities.³

πολακευόμενος of lvii, 7b).

¹ For the phrase; *Hist.* II, lvi, 11-12, cf. 2 and see XII, v; xii, 2-7; x, 4ff; XXV, i, 1; XXXVIII, iii, 5, etc. for his criticisms.

² One must remember that 'the claim to write honestly is more or less standard in ancient historians (for example Thucydides, Polybius, Sallust, Josephus), indeed a cliché, as Seneca's parody of it indicates' (cf. *Apocolocyntosis*, i, 1); so sensibly, F.R.D. Goodyear, *Tacitus (Greece and Rome; New Surveys in the Classics IV)*, Oxford, 1970, p.29. (Cf. also Cicero, *De Oratore*, ii, 62; *Legibus*, i, 4-5, not mentioned by Goodyear).

³ It is hardly within the scope of this study to detail the likely inaccuracies in the *Historiae*; suffice it to say that some do show up, not in the form of fiction, but as a recognizable tendency to recast evidence, colour and select material, in the interests of methodological preconceptions. Apart from his exaggerations concerning the structure of the Roman *politeia* (cf. *supra*, p.105, n. 1) which impinge on this question, we may note other important signs of the effect of his preconceptions. Although he contended (in VI, li, 6) that the populace gained excessive power in Carthage, he did not offer any consistent evidence to confirm his point. (Note esp. I, xi, 1-2; XV, i, 5; ii, 4; iv, 8; which suggest that the populace had equal power with the Senate, (the first reference perhaps hinting at their greater power?), yet cf. XV, xix, 9, and XIV, vi, 9, where the work of the Carthaginian senate appears to be far more central). On the degeneration of other states before their downfall to Rome, Polybius clearly misrepresents the facts. Perseus' achievements were minimized, yet not because he followed a partisan version of the events (so A.H. McDonald, in *OCD.*, s.v. 'Perseus', who implies that Polybius' attitude towards Macedonia and Perseus is reflected in Archo's speech against Callicrates, see Livy, XLI, xxiii-xxiv; cf. Livy's treatment of Perseus, esp. in Bks. XLI-XLIII, and note XXXIX, xxiii, 5), but rather, it would appear, because he felt committed to a view about the emerging pattern of events. Macedon had to experience *degeneratio* before it fell. On Polybius' understanding,

Age theory and the Rise and Fall of Empires

i) General

In the Pythagorean teaching of exact repetition we detected another vision of cyclical recurrence. I refer to the idea of the successive macro-ages of human existence, according to which the 'generations' of men assume far wider proportions. The division of 'world history' into vast segments was a very ancient procedure, probably motivated by the need to put present events or circumstances into context, although not so much in their purely historical as in their *theologico*-historical or mythological context. In the mythologies of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, at least to the sixth century BC, man's present relationship with the divine was often held to have been foreshadowed (or even determined) by long-past, primeval events of great moment. The time and setting in which these awesome happenings took place was usually radically distinguished from the contemporary Age, yet they were understood to have a crucial bearing on man's current situation.¹ What relevance does this approach to the past have for recurrence? A superficial glance at two seminal Greek descriptions of great time-lapses, the one in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, when he considered the five races of mankind, and the later enunciation of catastrophe-theory in Plato's *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, could easily provoke a

Philip V had managed to put some check on his own tyrannical tendencies (see XVII, xxxiii, 4-8, cf. XXV, iii, 1-4), so that it was left for Perseus' rule to make the significant point of decline. (Diodorus Siculus' treatment of Perseus in *Biblioth.*, XXX, x, 1-xi, 2, may well derive from Polybius). Moreover, his own *parti-pris d'hostilité* had its part to play in this case, as well as in his severe treatment of Boeotia as a state in general decline from as far back as 245 BC (see esp. M. Feyel, *Polybe et l'Histoire de Béote au III Siècle avant notre Ere (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome CLII)*, Paris, 1942, pp. 302-305), and in his excessively adverse judgements against the enterprises of the Aetolian League (Cf. esp. *Hist.* II, xliii, 9; IV, v, 9-10; vi, 8 - vii, 4; xv, 11; xvi, 4; xxxvi, 2-3; lxii, 1-5, lxxix, 2-3, IX, xxxv, 1-8; v, 5-9; XIII, i, 1-ii, 2; XVIII, v, 3; xxiv, 1-2; xxxvi, 3-9; xxxviii, 6; xlv, 6; XXI, xxxi, 7; XXX, xi, 1-6; more sympathetic references being for didactic purposes (IV, xi, 4-8; xviii, 7) or because certain Aetolian generals fought with Rome (XVIII, xix, 11; xxi, 5)). For a more complete study of Polybius' reliability, see esp. G.A. Lehmann, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybius*, (*Fontes et Commentationes V*), Münster, 1967, *passim*.

¹ See esp. *Genesis*, vi-ix (as part of Israel's 'prehistory', cf. G. von Rad *Genesis; a Commentary* (ET), London 1963 ed., pp. 112 ff.), J. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament*, (Princeton, 1955, (henceforth ANET), pt. 1, and on Zoroastrian texts, *infra*, p. 202, n. 1.

negative response. The Hesiodic generations are all different, and with the exception of the fourth or heroic one, represent a steady worsening of the human condition; whilst Plato, in considering numberless inter-cataclysmic periods and the political societies formed within them, placed great stress on the enormous variety of human phenomena.¹ On the other hand, the relatively biological terms *genea* and *genos* were used to characterize Hesiod's stages, and for both him and Plato each grand stage concluded with the general removal of all protagonists from 'the historical scene', or as in the philosopher's case, all but very few.² Thus the barest structures of these eons - their coming-to-be, life-career and death - recurred as great 'cycles of human existence',³ and both Hesiod and Plato took their mode of initiation, and with some exceptions, their end, to be virtually the same.⁴ We have here, after all, notions of periodicity, and whether these Ages were imagined to be curved, rectilinear or simply to be lapses of time, they form the kind of *periodoi* Aristotle would have been happy to call 'cycles'.

One should admit, however, that Hesiod and Plato leaned towards pejorism, assuming that the glorious epochs of old were irretrievable. Their tendency had no lack of support amongst later poets and moralists,⁵

¹ Hesiod, *W.D.*, 109-184 (cf. 156-76 on the heroic Age). On Plato, see *supra*, p. 16.

² In Hesiod, general catastrophic death hits those of the second, third and ultimately the fifth Age (*WD*, 138-9, 153-5, 180), whilst those of the first and fourth Age, it is implied, attain to an ethereal, yet essentially extra-historical, state of bliss (140-2, 167-76). For Plato, see *Leg.* III, 677A-B.

³ For this phrase cf. W.C.K. Guthrie, *In the Beginning; some Greek views on the origins of Life and the early state of Man*, London, 1957, p. 63.

⁴ On the divine creation of the Ages in Hesiod, see *WD.*, 109-10, 127, 143, 156-7, 176-7 (Zeus alone creates the last three), and on the rôle of the hill-dwellers in initiating the upward growth towards civilization, Plato, *Leg.* III, 677B-679C, etc. On destruction of the Ages in Hesiod, see n. 1 *supra*, and on either destruction by fire or flood in Plato, see *Tim.*, 22D, 23A, cf. *Leg.* III, 677A. It may be seriously asked whether Plato's schema was a conscious demythologization and historicization of the tale in *WD.*, 109-184, despite his reference to another source (in *Tim.*, 21D).

⁵ So for example, Aratus, *Phaenomena*, 96-136, Ovid, *Amores*, III, viii, 29-44, *Metamorphoses*, I, 76-215, cf. Seneca, *Epistulae Morales*, XC, 36ff, Juvenal, *Satires*, xiii, 26ff., and for the pejorism of the 'primitivistic' tradition in general, see Lovejoy and Boas, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 41 ff.

yet there were also writers who turned the stories they told into something of even greater interest from the viewpoint of historical recurrence.

I mean those who spoke of the Golden Age rather than of the golden race,¹ and who anticipated the return of the Ages. Amongst the Stoics, for instance, theories of three or more intermediate Ages of the world gained currency.² Outside their barest lineaments, admittedly, these Ages were only envisaged as recurring on 'the other side' of cosmic conflagration, and so this recurrence was 'cosmological' rather than 'historical'.

However, the Stoics' special cyclical emphasis acquired a new significance when popularists and syncretists combined the beliefs of different philosophies, and when ancient Pythagorean conceptions were revived. As such a popularist, Pseudo-Ocellus Lucanus (third century BC), adopted a thoroughgoing cyclical view of cosmic and human events, yet declined to believe in such an extremity as *ecpyrōsis*. He thus suggested that past Ages would return in one and the same historical order.³ Over one hundred years later, Cicero, in his *Somnium Scipionis*, recalled Platonic catastrophe-theory and its stress on vast stretches of time and set this in the context of the recurring Great Year, when - after the lapse of *multa hominum saecula* - the planets would eventually return to their original positions.⁴ Roman poetry in the early days of the empire, moreover, flourishes at least three

¹ On the Golden Age as a creation of Latin poets, see H.C. Baldry, 'Who invented the Golden Age?' in *Classical Quarterly*, (XLVI), N.S., II, 1952, pp. 83ff.

² For the four Ages, see esp. Chrysippus, Frg. 413 (von Arnim, vol.2, p.136) cf. Zeno, Frg. 98 (von Arnim, vol.1, p.27), Seneca, (last note 5); for five cf. pseudo-Seneca, *Octavia*, ls.402-7, and for three, cf. *infra*, p. 319n. on Seneca and Poseidonius. See also K.J. Reckford, 'Some Appearances of the Golden Age', in *Classical Journal*, LIV, 1958-9, pp.80-1.

³ *Univ.Nat.*, III, i, 42, (Harder edit., p.21).

⁴ *Somnium Scipionis*, vii, 23-24 (A. Ronconi's edit., pp.53-4). The reference to 'eluviones exustionesque' (23) cannot be taken to mean ἐκλύψεις, but these terms, and the mention of the many Ages of Man, recall Plato, *Leg.* III, 676B-678B. It is justifiable to assume that for Cicero one Great Year was succeeded by another, and the Ages with them (cf. 'totius caeli descriptionem longis intervallis rettulerunt'/'... ab eadem parte sol eodemque tempore iterum defecerit....' (24). Cicero's phrase 'Quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris' (25) was part of his exhortation against an over-eager expectation of longlasting fame.

passages concerning the imminent re-emergence of the Saturnian Age, the Latin equivalent to Hesiod's golden reign of Kronos.¹ Whether such notions were derived from the Sibylline Books, Etruscan lore concerning the *saecula*, or other literature now lost,² they gained a reasonably wide currency among Romans, and the idea of a macrocosmic recurrence of the Ages within the one history of mankind probably received its most fulsome articulation in the work of the Sicilian astrologer Firmicus Maternus (fourth century AD). Firmicus maintained (whilst still a pagan) that each of five Ages he isolated operated in accordance with the influence of the five planets, apparently recurring in sequence forever.³ As with most extant writings anticipating the return of a former Age, it seems that Firmicus expected an exact recurrence, not merely the reappearance of the general qualities or the central features of former Ages. Stoic (or more correctly neo-Pythagorean) ideas thus had their impact, although one can never be sure how literally such poetic effusion as one finds in Virgil's fourth Eclogue should be taken, with its vision of a second Argo, *atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles*.⁴ Be that as it may, it remains important that the older conceptions of successive Ages were often cast into more directly cyclical moulds. The newer approach is even partly

¹ The passages are to be found in Virgil's *Eclogue* IV, esp. ln.5; Calpurnius Siculus, *Eclogue* I, 42-5; Anonymous (mid first century AD), in *Anthologia Latina*, (ed. F. Buecheler and A. Riese) No.726, 22-24 (did these last two writers imitate Virgil?). There are other indications of this belief: so Ablabius (4th century AD) *apud* Sidonius, *Epistulae*, V, viii, 2 ('Saturni aurea saecula quis requirat?'), and cf. Horace (first century BC), *Odes*, II, xii, 1-9, both passages seeming to amount to a satirical comment against those who were as optimistic as Virgil.

² See esp. *infra*, pp. 351-2.

³ Firmicus, *Mathesis*, III, i, 15; cf. Lovejoy and Boas, *op.cit.*, p.77, G.E. Cairns, *Philosophies of History; Meeting of East and West in Cycle-Pattern Theories of History*, New York, 1962, pp.225-6 on the cyclical implications of Firmicus' system. If Firmicus acknowledged five Ages, their natures nevertheless differed from those suggested by the Hesiodic framework, the first form representing progress until the last Age of degeneration (i, 11-15). According to this schema, incidentally, the first Saturnian Age could hardly be Golden!

⁴ *Eclogue*, IV, 34-36, and cf. 46-7, yet cf. the (less deterministic?) language of his successors (cf. *supra*, n.1).

reflected in the Polybian *Anacyclōsis*, where the idea of a large cycle, containing within itself a procession of separate and significant stages, also manifested itself.

What mattered for philosophers and poets, however, did not always concern conventional historians. Historiography did not go uninfluenced by cosmology, yet the contours and periods elicited by Greek historians and their Roman successors were decisively grounded in the political. They usually prescribed boundaries for history, going back to the Trojan era, or to ancient Egypt, or the Middle East, but only rarely back to the Ages of the gods or antediluvian times.¹ Interestingly enough, however, their researches into the more distant past forced them to consider the relative antiquity of foreign cultures, and this factor was crucial for the emergence of ideas about the rise and fall of empires. These ideas, which blossomed under Rome and which advanced by comparisons of the Greek and Roman achievements, had their proper seed-bed in Age theory rather than in scientific efforts to apply the biological principle to history. Older Age theory had involved mythological cultures and empires, but in the more recent, especially Hellenistic enquiry, historians only wrote of past glories for which these seemed real evidence, or else tried to place renowned mythological figures (such as Saturnus) into an acceptable historical context.² Born out of Age theory, the vision of imperial rise and fall was still further evidence that history was the mirror of recurring configurations. Rise and fall, moreover, whether conceived as alternation between highpoint and lowpoint, or else as a three-staged process of emergence, flourishing and dissipation, could be tied in with a

¹ On the heroic Age as conventional background for classical historians, cf. esp. Hecataeus, Frg. 300 ff., *FGH.*, pt. 1A pp. 38ff; Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 1-6; Thucydides, I, 1, 3; Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1285a 11-14; and on the importance of Egypt, see esp. T.S. Brown, 'The Greek sense of Time in History as suggested by their accounts of Egypt' in *Historia*, II, 1962, pp. 257 ff. For Hellenistic writers on the ANE., see *infra*, pp. 321ff.

² On Saturnus, Belus and Ninus, cf. *infra*, pp. 321, n.2, 322, 364, etc.

cluster of cyclical notions - of growth and decay, mutable fortune, or of regular heavenly influences upon human affairs (pp.349ff.). Together with the idea of successive Ages, however, it could throw men's history into very broad relief, so that current affairs tended to lose some of their immediacy within the vast convolutions of time.

ii) Polybius

What bearing do the schematization of world history into 'Ages' and incipient doctrines of rise and fall have on Polybius and his *Historiae*? One should begin by stating that Polybius was very much a functionalist in matters of religion.¹ Without committing himself to any belief in deities, prodigies or even in a post-mortem existence,² he attacked historians who appealed to the more traditional theological explanations.³ Homer's mythopoeic world was foreign to his rationalistic outlook, and the time of the Trojan War was a mere preface to history, not a transition-period between the Ages dominated by gods and the more mundane events of the present (cf. XXXIV, ii; XXXVIII, xxii, 2Bb). Although Polybius apparently appropriated Plato's references to the Cyclopes and the Titans for his own purposes (pp. 70-71), he did so without a mention of names and with an even greater degree of demythologization than Plato had managed. On the other hand, that special Polybian curiosity-piece, the *Anacyclōsis*, covered a whole range of phenomena which together constituted something like an 'Age' of mankind, or a 'civilization'. Even if the Homeric period would only form an early segment of this great cycle with (Agamemnon and Priam as early *basileis* perhaps), its *archē* was not so closed nor its *telos* so open that agreement with both Plato and Hesiod about periodic

¹ Popular superstitions had public benefits, but could be transcended by the knowing intellectual. On Polybius' account of religion in Arcadia, *Hist.*, IV, xxi, 1; 3-4, cf. F. Walbank, 'The Geography of Polybius', in *Classical et Mediaevalia (Revue Danoise de Philologie et d'Histoire)*, IX, 1947, p.181. On Roman religion, see esp. VI, lvi, 6-15, and on the use of superstitions in war, IX, xix, 1-4; X, xi, 7-8; xiv, 11; XXIX, xvi, 1-3.

² We may take XXXIX, viii, 2 to be a mere literary formality (cf. III, v, 7). Concerning prodigies note VII, vii, 1 and life after death VIII, xii, 8.

³ See III, xlviii, 8; XVI, xii, 7 and cf. VIII, ix, 13; XII, iv^c, 1, xxvi, 1 ff.

destruction, or about history's tendency towards 'the worse', was precluded. The difficulty remains of course, that although Polybius began describing the *Anacyclosis* in terms of general human development towards the political life, he ended up by considering the career and eventual dissolution of one given political entity. We can only infer, therefore, that through his clever eclecticism, and with his concern to accommodate a variety of traditional viewpoints, Polybius was concessive towards Age theory.

Turning to the issue of rise and fall, however, one finds Polybius' position rather different. He lived at a time when Hellas was in a state of conflict and there were severe pressures of Macedonian expansionism from the north. It was also a time when much depended on the outcome of the struggle between Rome and Carthage, and Polybius, more than any of his predecessors who interpreted western affairs to the Greeks, was able to grasp the unprecedented nature of Rome's imperialist enterprise and its significance for the future of Greece.¹ His context is important. If Herodotus, a man of comparable interests writing some three centuries before him, could analyse the emergence and weakening of various kingdoms, it was only with a more limited chronological perspective. Possessing little adequate documentation beyond the middle of the sixth century BC, Herodotus knew next to nothing about Assyria and Media, and made little conceptual distinction between the emergence and fall of small realms like Samos and Lydia and the rise and weakening of Persia, as though one was an analogue of the other.² He was not able to envisage the long sequence of great imperialisms which Polybius, with the rise of this new and awesome threat to Greece,³ found himself able to reflect upon. How long he conceived this sequence to be, though, remains a special problem. We have it on

¹ For the (largely fragmentary) literature (including Fabius Pictor), see esp. Eisen, *op.cit.*, pp.9-11. Also, cf. *Hist.*, XXXIX, vi, 3 (*apud* Plutarch) for the absoluteness of Rome's control over Greece, and see viii, 1 (epilogue) on πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοία, V, 1-6 (*apud* Plutarch).

² See esp. H.R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (*Philological Monographs XXIII*), Ohio, 1966, pp.153 ff. On Assyria and Media, *Hist.*, I, 9s; 130. Cf., on these empires also, Ctesias of Cnidus and his Περσικά.

³ *Hist.*, XXXVIII, i, 1-2; cf. III, v, 6; XXIV, x, 8.

Appian's authority that, upon beholding the destruction of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus shed tears and wept for the enemy.

'After being wrapped in thought for long, and realising that all cities, nations and empires, just like men, must meet their doom, that this was what the once fortunate city of Troy suffered, as did the mighty of the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians, and the very recent and brilliant empire of Macedonia, he uttered, whether voluntarily or otherwise, the words of the poet; 'The day shall come when sacred Troy shall perish. As also Priam, with the people over whom spear-bearing Priam rules.' ¹

Appian went on to report a conversation between Scipio and Polybius soon after; Scipio revealed that he feared the downfall of his own patrimony after a similar fashion to the collapse of these great empires, and Appian noted that Polybius had recalled these words in his *Historiae*.² It would be interesting to know whether Polybius actually mentioned such a long string of fallen empires in the closing stages of his work. The list is probably Appian's rather than his, however, since the former prefaced his *Roman History* by contrasting the enduring Roman dominion with the short-lived empires of the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians and Macedonians - those very régimes Scipio was taken to reflect upon in the passage under discussion.³ On the other hand, Polybius did present a similar though more limited overview in his introduction when he compared the extent of the Roman empire to the earlier powers of Persia, Lacedaemon and Macedon (I, ii, 1-5). Moreover, it is even possible to extract from the *Historiae* a very relevant skeletal plan of what he understood to be the key world

¹ Appian, *Punica*, XIX, 132 = Polybius, *Hist.*, XXXVIII, xxii, 1-2.

² *Punica*, XIX, 132 = *Hist.*, XXXVIII, xxii, 3. A passage from Plutarch also refers to Scipio's forebodings, and may reflect the lost Polybian text more reliably. So, xxi, 1; note the tell-tale phrase λαβόμενός μου τῆς δεξιᾶς.

³ See *Hist. Roman.*, proem. (I, 9-10, cf. 8). It is worth observing that Polybius nowhere (else) mentions the Assyrian empire and identifies the ancient Median with the Persian empire (see *Hist.* XVI, xxii, 4). F. Taeger, *Archäologie*, *op.cit.*, pp. 114 ff., W. Siegfried, *Studien zur geschichtlichen Anschauung des Polybios*, Leipzig, 1928, pp. 100 f., Rehm, *op.cit.*, pp. 12-13, were too enthusiastic about accepting too much of this passage as Polybian.

events between the sixth century and his own day.

The earliest empire which mattered was the Persian, yet its attempted invasion of Greece under Xerxes had failed (XXXVIII, ii, 1 ff),¹ and its downfall was sealed by Alexander (XXII, xviii, 10a; XXIX, xxi, 4). Athens dominated Hellenic affairs after the Persian Wars, but her effort to conquer Sicily ended in disaster,² allowing Sparta to succeed to hegemony. Sparta, however, though stable at home, proved incapable and overbearing as an imperial power (VI, xlviii, 1 - xlix, 10, XXXVIII, ii, 6-7), and was replaced by a new military factor, Thebes (XXXVIII, ii, 8; cf. VI, xliii, 2-6). But Philip destroyed Theban power (XXXVIII, ii, 13-14) (as well as overpowering Athens and the Peloponnese) (V, x, 1; cf. II, xli, 9), and built up the Macedonian kingdom which was eventually to remove the middle eastern sway of the Great King himself.³ This same Macedon, though, in fulfilment of Demetrius' almost divine prophecy, was overcome by Rome (cf. XXIX, xxi, 9). Unlike Athens, Rome was successful in her conquest of Sicily,⁴ and before taking all Hellas and extending her control to the Middle East (cf. XXI, xvi, 8; XXIX, xxvii, 12), she was victorious over a still more ferocious contender for world domination, Carthage. All this reveals the peculiar advantages of a second (and post-second) century perspective; Polybius could view over three hundred years in terms of *Grossreiche*, and see a certain 'lawlike rhythm of their rise and fall'.⁵ Whether or not Polybius knew of Assyria and Media, his grasp of a longish succession of empires reveals him as an important watershed figure. Herodotus and Demetrius had dwelt upon the waxing and

¹ Cf. II, xxxv, 7; VI, xi, 1a, XVI, xxia, 4 and note IV, xxxi, 5.

² VI, xliii, 2-3; xliv, 1-9; XXXVIII, ii, 4-5 and IX, xix, 1-4, cf. XII, xxvk, 5 - xxvi, 9.

³ V, x, 1-8, cf. III, vi, 9-13, XVI, xxia, 5 and cf. XXII, xviii, 10a; XXIX, xxi, 4.

⁴ That Polybius consciously contrasted 'defensive' Rome with 'aggressive' Athens in Sicily, see esp. Eisen, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 156-165, and see *infra*, p. 176 (but note I, ii, 6). For the fall of Macedon, *Hist.*, XXIX, xxi, 4 ff. is central, cf. III, iii, 8.

⁵ See Rehm, *op.cit.*, p.13 for the terms.

waning of great kingdoms, Thucydides had analysed the growth and defeat of the Athenian régime, and Dicaearchus had formulated generalizations concerning 'war, sedition, and other misfortunes' which befell all powers.¹ Polybius, for his part, drew these older threads together and provided at least one sound basis for better known Graeco-Roman theories of 'rise and fall' to come.²

For Polybius, we can see, rise and fall meant the 'biological' growth and decay of the greater powers. The processes of *physis* were chiefly operative within internal politics, but they could also be manifest on a broader scale. Thus a fall, a process of corruption and a severe turn of adverse fortune could be alternative expressions for the same phenomenon. That raises the interesting question, of course, as to whether degeneration in accordance with closing stages of the *Anacyclōsis* could amount to the fall of a great and long enduring power. I think of Rome. Was Rome to fall victim to a superior and exterior force like previous empires, or was she destined for a natural decline? Polybius was in no position to be definite, but it is unlikely that, as some argue, he approached this issue as a vehement Achaean 'nationalist', either yearning for Rome to be weakened by democratization, or anticipating that the Roman conquest of Greece would redeem his beloved Achaea from constitutional and political *degeneratio*.³ It is perhaps less unlikely for him to have

¹ On Herodotus and Demetrius, *supra*, pp. 115 and 139; cf. Thucydides, *Hist.* esp. I, 97 ff; VII; Dicaearchus, *Fr.* 24 (Wehrli, pp. 17-8) = Cicero, *De Officiis*, II, v, 16.

² Cf. pp. 322 ff., etc. On the other hand, so little of Ephorus has survived that this claim may seem incautious, cf. G.L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* Cambridge, 1935, pp. 17 ff.. Also, on Sura and Ctesias, see *infra*, p. 321, although it is hardly proven that Polybius' picture of past empires was derived from a pro-Roman ideology which placed Rome at the end of a succession of world-empires, an ideology usually traced to Sura, 189-171 BC (cf. Walbank, 'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', in *Journal of Roman Studies*, LIII, 1963, p. 8). In not mentioning Assyria, Media or Babylon, Polybius' position looks independent.

³ See esp. E. Taubler, *Tyche*, pp. 92-4 *op.cit.*, pp. 92-4, and for Gelzer on the idea of Achaean democracy following both Macedonian monarchy and Roman aristocracy, see his 'Die Archaische, etc.' *loc.cit.*, p. 31. On this sort of interpretation the phrase ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης παραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως in *Hist.*, III, iv, 12b, could imply that at the very point of his writing he held the rot to have set in for Rome. Cf. also N.G.L. Hammond,

believed that, because Rome controlled the whole world, its decline would mean a *Weltverfall*. Fascinating enough, not only did he suggest that the Roman polity would experience the whole cycle of governments (VI, xi, 12-13; lvii, 5-10), but he also emphasized that Rome had virtually taken control of the whole world (even before the Middle East and Egypt had been taken!) As he endowed Rome's path to sovereignty with a structurally distinct beginning and duration (ἀρχὴ καὶ χρόνος), and with an end marked by supreme power,¹ it is not inconceivable that he took Rome to be the coping-stone for a whole macrocosmic era, for something like an 'Age' or inter-cataclysmic *periodos*. Certainly his almost Stoic stress on the universal proportions of the new empire could carry the implication that the destiny of Rome was the destiny of the human species.² But Polybius simply opened up possibilities for the more speculative; nearer to the historian's heart was a simple truth and practical lesson to be learnt - that, whether by nature or force, empires recurrently come into being and pass away.

These then, are the basic cyclical models of recurrence in Graeco-Roman historical thought. There are, of course, some interesting minor variations. When Tacitus translated κύκλος τῶ ἀνθρώπων into Latin, for example, he sought to apply the image of an *orbis* to the altering social attitudes and habits of Roman families, affected as they were by changes in the temper of Rome's rulers (III, 55).³ For Tacitus the cycle of fashion and attitude could be paralleled with the movement of seasons, and this particular idea

¹ 'The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in other parts of Thucydides I', in *Classical Quarterly*, NS.II, 1952, p.132. Walbank, *Commentary*, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 302.

² See esp. III, i, 4-5, and compare the *telos* of the Macedonian empire in i, 9!

³ On Polybius' 'Stoicism' here, cf. Graeber, op. cit., pp.54-5, cf. Taubler, op.cit., p.92.

⁴ '...rebus cunctis inest quidam velut orbis' is an apparent rendering of the Greek aphorism. Tacitus' version is broad in its implications, but cautiously worded (viz. 'quidam', cf. Aristotle's εἶναι δοκεῖ κύκλος τις, *Physica*, 223b29.)

seems to be a curious and weak variation on the model of growth and decay. It comes nearest to the Aristotelian doctrine that techniques of cultural importance could recurrently disappear yet experience revival,¹ but it concerns fashions and habits rather than skills. Yet another cyclical notion hard to place emerges from Polybius' analysis of Cretan society, a society he consistently despised.² Of events in 181 BC he wrote:

'At this time there arose in Crete the beginning of troubles, if it befits to talk about a beginning of troubles in Crete,³ for owing to the constancy of civil wars and their excessive savageness towards each other, beginning and end are the same in Crete, and what seems a paradoxical way of speaking to some, can there be seen to be continually a matter of fact' (XXIV, iii (iv)).'

This is a picture of brutish turmoil, and by alluding to the truth that *archē* and *telos* are the same on a circle,⁴ Polybius was suggesting that the Cretans experienced a constant 'round of instability,' so that their politics never inclined in any recognizable direction.⁵

¹ Cf. *supra*, p.19, n.1, and *infra*, pp.418-19.

² On his antipathy, cf. IV, viii, 11; liii, 5; VI, xlvi, 1-6; xlvii, 1-5; VII, xi, 9; VIII, xix, 5; XIII, viii, 1-2; XXVIII, xiv, 1-2; XXXIII, xvi, 5. On his exclusion of the Cretan *politeia* from constitutional comparisons, see esp. VI, xlvii, 6; cf. xlvi, 1-5; 9-11, xlvii, 1-5. In xlv, 1, Polybius listed authors he had read on the subject - Ephorus, Callisthenes and Plato. It is important that he disagreed here with Plato on that vexed question of *timocratia* (cf. *Rep.*, 544C).

³ Sic. ἀρχὴ πραγμάτων. Πράγματα can have a pejorative sense (cf. *supra*, pp. 85, 104), yet Polybius probably plays on the words' ambiguity here.

⁴ Having written ταύτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, Polybius probably thinks of philosophers who said the same; cf. Alcmaeon, *Frg.* (Diels-Kranz) = 288 (Kirk-Raven) = (pseudo-) Aristotle, *Problemata*, 916a33; and see Heraclitus, *Frg.* 126 (Diels-Kranz) = 39 (Bywater) = 232 (Kirk-Raven).

⁵ The shadow of the *Anacyclosis* could be lurking behind these comments; i.e. Cretan conformed to both the beginning and end of the anacyclis process. In other words, the Cretan's turmoil saw only the vestiges of democracy (VI, xlvi, 4; cf. lvii, 9), with undesirable customs or laws (cf. xlvii, 1), with a pervasive *pleonexia* (xlvi, 3; 9; cf. lvii, 7), and thus in the type of situation from which a *monarchos*-figure might be expected to emerge. (The term ἀμότης is significant in XXV, iii (iv), cf. also XXXVIII, xiv, 1-2). One must remember that in the *stasis* marking the end/beginning point of the *Anacyclosis*, Polybius does not preclude the possibility of rivalry between potential *monarchos*-figures; there is an ill-defined pipeline between the *προεστώτες* who break up the *politeia* and the herd leaders who eventually emerge supreme to lay the foundations of *basileia*. Also, on Polybius' willingness to describe the behaviour patterns of men living in *stasis* and the recurring alternation between

There are two other conceptions, more suggestive of alternation than cycles however, which deserve noting here: the idea of an interchange between the One and the Many, and the notion of change into opposites. The former has great relevance for cosmology, of course, but is only of marginal importance for historiography. Certainly the Stoic picture of a great World Age ending in the reduction of all things into elemental fire had its implications here, and we have already observed how Polybius seemed to describe a path between the rules of one and the rules of the many (pp. 78-9). He also made something of the idea of one world, almost under one government, with many cultural, political and geographical aspects. His continuator, 'Stoic' Poseidonius (ca 135 - ca 50 BC), apparently went on to draw an analogy between the diversity and unity of τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα at his own time and the one and the many of the universe in general (cf. pp. 318ff.). For Poseidonius, then, and for Polybius to a more limited extent, Roman world dominion appears as a fulfilment of human unity. It was as though the forces of the universe leant towards a political integration and one might be tempted to conclude that in Polybius' mind, the breakdown of this unity would mean a return to multiplicity.¹ These comments, however, must remain tentative.

The idea of μεταβολή εἰς ἐναντίον has a greater relevance for historical interpretation. Though its real home was within natural philosophy, this principle of change was often applied to human affairs. Aristotle, for example, contended that political εἶδε were likely to be transformed into their opposites because human reactions tended to produce

ethico-political 'health and disease', see (on Crete) esp. VI, x, 2-4, cf. IV, viii, 11; liii, 5 (φιλοτιμία, cf. Plato, *Resp.*, on the timarchic/Cretan character, 548E ff), XXXIII, xvi, 5, and (on other societies), I, lxxv, 8; lxxxi, 7; 10; II, xxx, 4; IV, xxi, 5ff; XV, xxi, XXXII, iii, 6-8, etc. The question of the general ethical condition of a people is also raised in the 'anthropological' side of the *Anacyclosis* (cf. *supra*, pp. 30ff).

¹ With Poseidonius the position is not clear. Did he believe that the one world under one dominion would degenerate as a prelude to *ecpurosis*? Probably.

the converse to a disliked state of affairs.¹ One popularist position associated such change with the reversal of fortune or with the emergence of what was quite contrary to expectation.² Still another was nicely expressed by Cicero:

'everything which is in excess - when, for instance, either in the weather, or in the fields, or in men's bodies, conditions have been too favourable - is usually changed into the opposite (*in contraria fere convertuntur*); and this is especially true with states (*in rebus publicis*), where such excess of liberty either in nations or in individuals turns into an excess of servitude.'³

Polybius, too, revealed this kind of change in natural, internal politics - in the zig-zag between *politeiai* of opposing value and in the alternation between polity and non-polity.⁴ He also saw it at work in external relations, where it stood as an equivalent to reversed fortune and thus as a supplement to a cyclical frame (IV, lxxxi, 12; IX, xxi; VI, ii, 6; xliii, 3; xliv, 2).⁵

Considering the major cyclical or cyclo-alternatory models, however, together with these variants, we may now reflect on the common preconceptions which lie behind them. In appealing to a *cyclos*, or to movements

¹ Cf. *Polit.*, 1316a18 ff. Note also *De Generat. et Corrupt.*, 319-38, on an early association of biological change with change between contraries, cf. Melissus of Samos, *Frg.* 8 (Diels-Kranz), = 392, (Kirk-Raven). See also Aristotle, *Polit.*, 1307a6 ff., cf. 1301b27 ff., 1304a34 ff., 1307b26 ff. etc.

² Especially on Philo, see ch. 3. Cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, VII, 52 (from a source): 'the τέλος is not always to be seen in the ἀρχή'. Note also pseudo-Heraclitus (first century AD), *Allegories from Homer*, esp. liv, 1 (Buffière edit., p.62) and interestingly enough, Alexander (third century AD), *In Librum De Sensu Commentarium*, clxxxi (P. Wendland edit., in *Comm. Arist. Graec.*, vol.3, pt.1, p. 86, l.19), did not consider the notion of change between opposites, to be a cyclical one (cf. ἔτι ὅτι τῷ κύκλῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον).

³ *De Re Publica*, I, xliv, 68. On the importance of excess, *infra*, pp. 309f.

⁴ See *supra*, p. 45 on *Hist.*, VI, ix, 10; 14. In the case of one state other than Rome, Polybius noted a natural, internal μεταβολή εἰς ἐναντίον, i.e., with Boeotia (following her rise to power after Leuctra) (XX, iv, 1-3). Note also VII, xi, 10 on the μεταβολή εἰς ἐναντίον of Philip V's personality and policy.

⁵ Polybius frequently used the term ἐναντίος (τοῦναντίον, etc) to describe how events in international conflict so often turned out to be the opposite to the protagonists' expectations. Cf. esp. A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexicon*, *op.cit.*, vol.1, pt.2, s.v. ἐναντίος, col. 795 ff.

either rotating or fluctuating, men were decoding the complexities of human life. And it was not just that elicited rhythms or patterns made history more intelligible as a spectacle, but more significantly that the understanding of change added much to man's measure of self-determination. It bears recalling that *KYKΛΟΣ ΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ* stood before the Athenian public on the walls of the Erechtheum. Men, it implied, ought to anticipate the most likely changes, and either bear with their consequences or turn them to an advantage.¹

This ancient pragmatism, however, raises some difficult conceptual problems, especially in relation to causation. It presupposed that historical agents need not be subjected to fortune's wheel, growth and decay, changes of fashion and the like, but that they were actually capable, not only of modifying or forestalling recurrences but of adopting effective courses which turned necessitarian-looking processes to their positive favour. Now none of the types of *cycloi* we have disclosed were intrinsically causal factors themselves, but they implied causal agencies behind them. These agencies, whether personified (as *tyche* often was), or left as principles of change (μεταβολή εἰς ἐναντίον, etc.) were more than often reckoned as extra- or supra-human. They created an 'environment' in which man had to struggle, adapt and occasionally control. It was only within the limits of a pre-determined stage that man could act out his 'free' or 'purposeful' rôle. His possibilities for self-determination, then, could only be increased by coming to terms with pre-existing influences, unless he was understood to be inexorably bound by fate. Thus history imparted wisdom, because it showed men both in varying relationships with each other and with extra-human causes.

¹ For distant background see Hesiod, *WD.*, 218, and then note esp. Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, 22; Lucian, *Πῶς δεῖ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν*, 42. Cf. Tacitus, *Annals*, III, 5 ('.. nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit. Verum haec nobis in maiores certamina ex honesto maneant.') For Polybius on learning from history, see esp. *Hist.*, VI, ix, 1-11; x, 2; cf. ii, 8; iii, 2-4, III, cxviii, 12, (and on bearing with *tyche*), esp. XVIII, xxiii, 4-5; XXV, iii, 9 (Philip V's handling of declining fortune); XV, vi, 8 (and ff.), (Hannibal's preparedness for adversity), yet cf. I, xxxv, 2-6 (Regulus).

Because he used such a variety of causal explanations, Polybius and his *Historiae* have a real interest for us in this connection. Unfortunately, however, even if Polybius offered sophisticated distinctions between the cause (*aitia*), the pretext (*prophasis*) and the beginning (*archē*) of a given event-complex, especially a given war (cf. III, vi, 1-vii, 3, XXII, xviii, 6),¹ he nowhere adequately defined the relationship between such agencies as *tychē*, *physis* or men. They were treated as separate *aitiai*, and it is left to us to suggest their probable interrelationship, or to identify the distinct spheres to which they applied. By and large, to distinguish supra-human, natural and human (or purposive)² causes adequately accounts for his levels of explanation. Fortune, sometimes impersonal and capricious yet often personal and providential, was almost always conceived as an 'outside' factor breaking across the 'normal', 'expected' course of events, by producing surprise situations (τὸ παράδοξον) (p. 156). *Physis*, by contrast, implied a set path along which all things would pass unless interrupted by some external factor; in the *Anacyclosis* Polybius also envisaged natural processes working themselves out in accordance with a tightknit causal chain, each state being dependent on what had gone before.³ We have seen, moreover, that fortune and nature generally operated in separate spheres of human affairs, and as causal agencies they were not meant to exclude one another logically (cf. pp. 125ff). As for rational human beings, they had their wills to exercise and they were quite capable of being the causes of their own actions. Men execute their decisions

¹ A relatively late formulation? Cf. II, xxxviii, 5ff; IV, xiii, 6.

² Cf. R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, Oxford, 1939, pp. 285 ff.

³ Rehm, (*op.cit.*, p. 11) makes an interesting and worthwhile comparison between Plato and Polybius in this connection by noting that such constitutions as democracy or tyranny, to take big examples, do not represent 'symptoms' for Polybius as they did for Plato, but rather 'causes'. This distinction between *Symptom* and *Ursache*, although not without limitations, at least serves to remind one that Polybius offered a more adventurously naturalistic (even 'mechanistic') account of constitutional *metabolē* than the author of his most important sources. On the problem of purposive causes in the *Anacyclosis*, however, cf. *supra*, pp. 39ff.

'from what propels their judgements and opinions most in a given situation, that is to say from our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about matters, and everything through which we make decisions and effect projects' (III, vi, 7).

In this last causal sphere, then, come the positive reactions of men to the circumstances created by fortune, nature or other governing principles. Thus on the level of human volition, men may hinder nature or let it be, they may seduce *tychē* or succumb to her recalcitrance. Such purposive behaviour or decision-making was obviously of central importance to a historian who for the most part had to recount agents' actions, and to give reasons why they behaved as they did. Yet it was insufficient for Polybius to confine historical explanation to the study of motives and rationality, and despite the fact that his characteristically eclectic combination of explanatory devices was not clearly thought out, there is a certain brilliance in his view that history is often beyond human control.

B) Reciprocal Paradigms of Recurrence

It should be clear by now that the belief in cyclical recurrence is not equivalent to the belief in exact or even near-exact repetition. Certain Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean views aside, cyclical recurrence only required that configurations or types of events be repeated, the degree of particularity varying. It was not Polycrates and his career which recurred, for example, but turns of fortune similar to those experienced by Polycrates; nor was it the same Roman families whose tendencies Tacitus so perceptively described, but the same sort of behaviour. Early observers of τὰ ἀνθρώπινα learned to recognize or elicit the 'shape' of a given event-complex, and to demonstrate that similar shapes manifested themselves at other points in time, or even at fairly regular intervals. Cyclical structures were not the only ones to be exhibited, however, and we may now profitably turn to those relevant notions and models I name 'reciprocal'. With these common types of events are simply followed by consequences in such a way as to exemplify patterns in history. To examine

these reciprocal ideas will help confirm our early claim that talk about historical cycles does not exhaust talk about historical recurrence (p.1).

The Rectified Mean

i) General

'Reciprocity' is a handy term for covering a multitude of sins, though its very convenience should make one cautious.¹ Two important varieties of the reciprocal view of recurrence, the doctrines that departures from a mean are continually rectified, and that good and bad actions evoke their appropriate desert, demand most of our attention in this context.

Concerning the idea of a rectified mean, it is useful to reflect once more on pre-Socratic cosmologies. In these cosmologies alternation between two (usually opposing) states, whether between order and chaos, unity and multiplicity, or between cosmic degeneracy and cosmic purification, were common themes. The basic components of the universe, moreover, were often said to be in continual flux; the four elements might become slowly mixed (into Xenophanic mud, for instance) and then separated; or 'contrary' conditions (hot and cold, wet and dry) might replace one another unceasingly. Such oscillating processes could be taken to function κατὰ κύκλον as with the Empedoclean cosmic cycle, but the cycle was not always the paramount image of change. Consider, for example, the fragments of the late sixth-century philosopher Heraclitus. According to his most renowned dictum, 'all things flow' and 'come into being and pass away', and yet they do this through what Heraclitus does not hesitate to call 'strife' (eris), that is, by a process of continual warfare between the opposing states and variant tendencies in the universe.² Without eris the cosmos was unable to perpetuate itself. This strife was paradoxically

¹ My usage has been largely inspired by H.J. Rose ('World Ages and the Body Politic', in *Harvard Theological Review*, LIV, 1961, pp. 132-3).

² See Frgs. 218-9 (Kirk-Raven and their discussion, pp.196-7) on the first quotation, and Frg. 80 (Diels-Kranz) = 62 (Bywater) on the other two. For background, Hesiod, *W.D.*, 804.

identified with harmony, since 'all things', including opposites, were ultimately 'one' (being reducible to the one attunement),¹ and because strife and the changes it effected never produced an imbalance. Fire, to Heraclitus, was apparently the very well-spring and physical paradigm of cosmic energy, yet although the world was 'always an ever-living fire', it was something moderated, 'kindling in measures and going out in measures.'² In the last analysis, no one factor had final dominance over the universe, and this was not because there was an endless process of cycles, but because the principle governing the cosmic flux - God, *logos*, *physis*, fire, psyche, call it what you will - consistently rectified imbalance.³ The processes of rectification were complex and apparently not understood to occur or recur in a fixed sequence; an imbalance could emerge at any point in time, thus inducing the appropriate consequences.

Now what bearing does this kind of thinking have on the interpretation of human affairs? What Heraclitus said about moderation, we may note, nicely complements much Greek ethical theory, in which balance and restraint were extolled. The Delphic Oracle, for instance, enjoined against excess; metaphorically the Pythagoreans made the same point in the *logion*: 'do not step across the beam of a balance'; Aristotle taught a middle way between excess and defect.⁴ Man was often advised against

¹ Frg. 50 (Diels-Kranz) = 199 (Kirk-Raven) = 1 (Bywater) for the first quotation, and cf. esp. Frg. 51 (Diels-Kranz), 43, 45-6 (Bywater).

² See Frg. 30, cf. 31, 90 (Diels-Kranz) = 220, cf. 221-2 (Kirk-Raven) = 20, cf. 21-2 (Bywater).

³ Whether Heraclitus wrote of the restrained heat of the sun, of one element living upon the death of another, of warm things becoming cold, of alternating seasons, of the ocean as both the purest and impurest water, of the way up and the way down being identical, or of the same point as *archē* and *telos* of a circle, he was reaffirming his central teaching that all movement was controlled by a principle which regulated and balanced the strife between opposites, not allowing one force to gain control against another, and perpetuating a swirl which in its very vitality suggested the one *physis*, the one essential motivation behind the universe. (Cf. Frgs. 60, 61, 67, 76, 94, 126 (Diels-Kranz) = 69, 52, 36, 25, 29, 39, (Bywater) and (omitting the third) 202-3, 207, 229, 232 (Kirk-Raven), and on the meaning of *physis* as the inner potency of things, see esp. W. Veazie 'The meaning of φύσις in early Greek philosophy', in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, (Dept. of Philosophy, Columbia University), New York, 1918, pp.27-42.

⁴ On the Delphic maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν, see Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliothēke*, IX, x, 3; cf. Theognis, 335; Pindar, Frg.235, etc; for the Pythagorean rule,

aspiring to what he could not be, like a god, or the possessor of excessive power over others, because that meant violating the boundaries of one's allotted position in life (or *moira* as it was sometimes expressed), and could only bring disastrous consequences.¹ Significantly, Heraclitus joined others in warning against *hybris* and excessive desire,² and so his other assertions suggesting that no one factor could dominate the cosmos were supplemented by ideas about proportionateness of law in the specifically moral and human spheres.³

Comparable admonitions against excess had their special place in Greek historiography, although historians were generally not interested in the total cosmic order, and unlike the moralists, they were more concerned to describe actions and consequences rather than to formulate abstract truths. Ancient historians, moreover, were in the best position to document how the principles of reciprocity were recurrently actualized in human affairs. At this point we are especially interested in the idea that when an imbalance is created in τὰ ἀνθρώπινα there is a kind of 'gravitational pull' in history which tends towards the reclamation of an ordered, balanced and morally better state of affairs. The recurrences of unevenness and correction were taken to be diversified in space and time, occurring at irregular intervals, with interim events being irrelevant.

Anonymous Pythagorean, *apud* Anaximander, *Akousmata kai Symbola*, Frg.6, (Diels-Kranz, *FVS*, vol.1, p.465, ln.23), and Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, II, ix, 1ff.

¹ On violating the boundary between men and gods; Homer, *Iliad*, V, 4-44, Pindar, *Olympian Odes*, II, 35-42, Theognis, 653ff., Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 206-7; Timaios, Frg. 155 (*FGH.*, pt. IIIB, p.644), etc.. On excessive power over men; Theognis, 605ff, etc., Herodotus, *Hist.*, esp. VIII, 99ff.; Thucydides, *Hist.*, III 82(8), etc..

² Cf. Frgs. 43, 110-1, 112, 116, cf. 118 (Diels-Kranz) = 103, 104-107, cf. 73-6 (Bywater).

³ On νόμος in Heraclitus, cf. Frgs. 44; cf. 33 (Diels-Kranz) = 100, 110 (Bywater). Presumably Heraclitus believed social law to function as a necessary restraint against moral excess. It is important to grasp that the terminology of cosmological theory often complemented or was even intertwined with the (earlier) language of religion and morals. The central extant fragment of Anaximander, one of Heraclitus' immediate predecessors, is of great interest in this respect: '... some other *ἄπειρον* nature,' it begins, 'from which came into being all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens, 'according to necessity' (κατὰ τὸ χρεών), for they

Why men succeeded or failed in their enterprises, or why certain societies triumphed or faltered, were problems fascinating enough for ancient historians. Herodotus and Thucydides, to take important examples, were both seeking to answer the same sort of question; why did the most powerful of two opposing states fail to gain victory in the contest? Why was the Persian giant sent home in shame, and why was Athens, the school of Hellas, eventually overcome by Sparta, the most isolationist of all the major Greek *poleis*? A good part of each man's explanation was in terms of requited excess and checked imbalance. An immoderate degree of power, political insolence (*hybris*) or tyranny, ultimately brought downfall,¹ and to touch on the cyclical side to this way of thinking, they flew in the face of fortune's changeableness, or provoked the envy of the divine.² And in Herodotus' *Historiae* in particular, one finds the strong (almost Heraclitean) implication that the transgression of geographical boundaries was a violation, not only of human law, but of the divinely ordained order of things.³

pay penalty and retribution (δίκη καὶ τίσις) to each other for their injustice (ἀδικία) according to the assessment of Time'. (Frg.1 (Diels-Kranz) = 112 (Kirk-Raven), 50, Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria*, I, 2 (πονητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων), (edit. H. Diels, in *Arist.Graec*, vol.9, Berlin, 1895, p.24). On the 'Indefinite', see esp. P. Seligman, *The Apeiron of Anaximander, a study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas*, London, 1962, pp.24-49, 111-148). In general, see esp. G. Vlastos, 'Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies,' in *Classical Philology*, XLII, 1947, pp.156 ff, (on the perpetuation of cosmic justice as conceived by the pre-Socratics).

¹ Herodotus, *Hist.*, VII, 16; VIII, 17; cf. VII, 49-50; 57; Thucydides, *Hist.*, V, 85 and ff..

² Esp. Herodotus, VII, 10; Thucydides, V, 102-5.

³ The violation demanded requital. Croesus presumptuously crossed the Halys and became a slave to Cyrus (I, 51-6; 73; 89); Cyrus was killed upon traversing the Araxes (I, 202-214), (for although he had been moderate and not the aggressor in the case of the war with Lydia (cf, I, 86-7), his crossing of the river Gyndes (I, 189-90) signalled a change); the just end of Cambyses was associated with his unwarrantable entrance into Egypt and Lybia (III, 1-3; 13-68), and the failures of Darius with his passage into Europe and across the Danube (IV, 89ff). The ultimate assault on time-honoured boundaries came with Xerxes' aspirations for a 'Universalmonarchie', (cf. VIII, 8; γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδείξομεν τῷ Διὶ αἰθέρι ὁμοῦρέουσιν. οὐ γάρ δὴ χώραν γε οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὁμοῦρέουσιν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ, etc., and see esp. K. Reinhardt, 'Herodots Persegeschichten', in *Von Werken und Formen*, Bad Godesberg, 1948, pp.222-3. On Heraclitus and Herodotus, note the

The basic image common to these lines of explanation is that of a shifting 'beam-balance' or *rhōpē*; there were movements in history on either side of a mean. Admittedly, such tendencies could be considered in cyclical or alternatory terms, as a 'hybristic cycle',¹ for instance, or as fluctuation between balance and imbalance. One might even take the reclamation of a *rhōpē* to be a return to original conditions. Nevertheless, descriptions in these terms do not account for certain subtleties and complications. To recount past events was rarely a matter of describing easily conceived imbalances followed by simple rectifications; more than often one deviant tendency was joined with others to form a 'colligation' of imbalance; a given imbalance or instance of immoderacy on one side might be followed by immoderacy on the other; a perfect balance might never be attained but only occasional approximations of it in the endless flux of events and the constant action and reaction of opposing forces. Thus insofar as the model of a recurrently corrected mean defies representation as a series of cycloids or as a simple process of alternation between two sets of general conditions, it is most satisfactorily characterized by the word 'reciprocal'. Its basis lies more in a recognition of typical actions followed by typical consequences, rather than in the intuition of a cyclical or alternatory process, even if a relative interlacing of different conceptions was possible.

ii) Polybius

The notions of balance and *rhōpē* in human affairs were part of the stock of useful ideas which Polybius inherited.² In his special context the Achaean was more than interested in the fact that the balance of

over-adventurous chapter in C.N. Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture*, New York, 1944, pp. 456ff. Note also Zosimus (*Historia Nova*, I, ii, 1) (fifth century AD), who, following Herodotus' description of the Persian Wars, understood the conflict to be affected by a tendency towards a *θεία τις ῥοπή* (L. Mendelssohn edit., p.2).

¹ i.e. a turn of fortune which brings the downfall of the proud, or in other words, the downfall of one who having benefited and gained power through *εὐτυχία*, over-tests his luck with evil.

² Cf. for example, Alcaeus, Frg. 31, (E. Lobel and D. Page edn.); Thucydides, *Hist.*, V, 103; cf. VII, 71; Plato's *Resp.*, 556E; cf. Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1295a36-9.

history had been tipped in the favour of Rome. He evidently understood the normative historical processes to contain 'shifts and turns of circumstances' (ῥοπαὶ καὶ περιστάσεις, cf. XVI, xxviii, 6), (which included alternations between success and failure, and wheel-like turns between favourable and unfavourable conditions). These processes, however, had been upset by the remarkable achievement of Rome. Before her expansion, the Mediterranean scene was not so far removed from the traditional Greek world of fairly well defined boundaries and equal political chances. When still part of that kind of world, Carthage and Rome were poised for combat at the beginning of the First Punic War. They were both 'still uncorrupted in morals, receiving moderate help from *tyche*, and equal in strength' (I, xiii, 12); and when the war was in progress its outcome was continually in doubt. Using both pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian sources,¹ Polybius traced a constant shifting of advantages from one side to the other (cf. esp. I, xx, 7). Elsewhere he could evoke the concept of a balance whenever two military forces faced each other for battle; he commonly remarked upon the even matching of arms or men and presented counterposing speeches, so heightening the reader's sense of expectation as to how the issue would be decided.² In Bk. I on the First Punic War, however, he gave the idea of balance his special attention. If we may reflect on the general trends in the *Historiae*, the events immediately preceding and including Cannae weighed heavily in favour of a Carthaginian success (esp. III; IX), and those after on the side of an expanding Roman *imperium*; yet the First Punic War ended only very slightly in Rome's favour (lxxxviii, 5-12), and was marked throughout by fluctuating fortunes. The initial stages of the war over Sicily saw matters hanging in the balance (I, xx, 5, cf. ἐξυγροσσεύετ' αὐτοῖς), but by contesting the Carthaginian command of the sea (xix, 9-11), the Romans upset the *isorropia*

¹ See I, xiv, 1 ff; cf. lviii, 5-6.

² Cf. for example, XI, xiii, 1-2; XV, iii-xiii; cf. XI, xxviii-xxix, etc.

and set in motion a struggle which at times appeared to proceed in see-saw-like fashion, and at other moments witnessed the reclamation of stability (see Diagram V). In this battle between 'game cocks' (cf. lviii, 7), new advantages and victories were ascribed to skill, courage and spirit,¹ and reverses either to lack of preparation and foresight,² or to an inability to adjust to the 'unexpected' (*paradoxon*) in events.³ *Tychē* also played a crucial role; she lay behind the contest 'like a good umpire' (cf. lviii, 1), and she also participated in it by contributing to the outcome of battles, determining their location, and by generally preserving the balance.

Thus a recognizable pattern of recurrence underlies most of the *Historiae* Bk. 1. Easily recognizable conditions or event-types recur (victories, defeats, accidents etc.), as do those important 'tendencies' towards either balance and imbalance. Polybius' pattern was to a large extent imposed, of course, and in extracting it he was not strictly fair with the 'facts'.⁴ His line of interpretation probably had much to do

¹ Eg. I, ix, 6ff; xi, 15 - xvi, 3; xvii, 11-12; xviii, 9-10 and ff., xx, 11ff; xxiii, 6; xxvi - xxvii, xxxvi, 2-3, etc.

² Eg. I, xxi, 5-9; xxiv, 3-4, xxxv, 1-2, xxxvii, 3-4, etc.

³ Note esp. xxiv, 1 (cf. xxiii, 5ff), xxviii, 9; xliv; lxxi, 2; lxxv, 10; lxxvi, 7; lxxii, 3ff., yet cf. xxv, 3-4.

⁴ To take central examples. The Roman decision to contest maritime sovereignty was harnessed too strongly to Rome's success at Agrigentum (see I, xix, 15 - xx, 12, cf. Walbank *Commentary*, *op.cit.* vol.1, p.73); Polybius took a noticeable amount of pain to counterbalance Rome's surprising progress in besieging Panormus with a curious stress both on her forces' inability to accomplish anything of importance in Libya (οὐδὲν ἐξολόγον πρᾶττοντες, xxxix, 2) and on the way her navy's departure from the shoals of Meninx was 'similar to a flight' (5), (ὁ γὰρ γενομένου φυγῆ παραπλήσιον ἐποίησαν τὸν ἀπόπλουν; cf. the more appropriate use of such a picture in II, xviii, 8: φυγῆ παραπλήσιαν ἐποίησαντο). He also probably exaggerated certain numbers; his estimate of the number of ships lost near Panormus (cf. I, xxxix, 6) may well be too high, for instance (on W.W. Tarn's assessment, see Walbank, *op.cit.*, p.100), as also the number of prisoners taken after the battle of Drepana (lxvi, 8b; cf. Diod.Sicul. XXIV, xi, 1). He treated Hamilcar and L. Junius Pullus as two perfectly trained boxers fighting one another for the prize (lvii, 1-2) and yet consul Junius 'had probably left the scene before Hamilcar arrived', (Walbank *op.cit.*, p.121). Polybius was clearly concerned with effects; his all-too structured account of military history as a long line of successive exchanges, his pauses to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides, his heavy stress on the unexpected circumstances they both encountered, and his 'balance imagery', all reflect his pre-occupation with fluctuation and reciprocal principles in Bk. I.

D I A G R A M V

Advantages to Romans (now Roman presence
in Sicily, cf. xi,14 - xii,5)

Advantages to Carthaginians (assumed
domination of the seas)

BALANCE (xx,5;7)

The crossing of Roman forces to Messene
(xx,13-15) after the capture of Agrigentum
(xix,14-15)

Sea battle at Lipara (xxi,3-7)

The defeats of Hannibal off the Cape of
Italy (xxi,11) and near Mylae (xxiii,2 -
xxiv,1)

Romans defeated near Panormus on land
(xxiv,3-5)

Hannibal blockaded in Sardinia (xxiv,5-7)
and Regulus wins a sea battle off Tyndaris
(xxv,1-4)

BALANCE (xxv,5-6)
both sides make preparations
for a battle at Ecnomus (xxv,
7 - xxvii,2, cf. xxviii,4-5).

Rome wins the battle of Ecnomus (xxviii,13)
and successfully establishes herself in
Libya (xxix-xxx)

The Spartan Xanthippus retrieves the sit-
uation for Carthage in a land battle (xxxiv,
6). The *hybris* of Regulus was a contributing
factor (cf. xxxi,4; xxxv)

Roman victory near Hermaecum (xxvi,11-2)

Disaster to the Roman fleet off Camarina (by
storm) (xxxvii,1-3). The Carthaginians encour-
aged (xxxviii,1)

Successful siege of Panormus (xxxviii,
7-10)

Roman 'failures' (xxxix, 1-8) with brighter
Carthaginian prospects (9)

Romans' successful defence at Panormus
(xl, 14-6), and their siege of Lilybaeum
(xlii,6 - xliii,8)

Hannibal brings relief to Lilybaeum (xliv,7)
and the Romans are put under severe pressure
there (xlv,12b-13)

The Romans capture 'the Rhodian' (xlvii,
9) at Lilybaeum

The Roman siege-works are destroyed there and
Lilybaeum's garrison is re-built (xlviii)

Events at Lilybaeum undecided (xlviii,
11), a new exchange of Drepana in the
BALANCE (li,2, cf. xlix,4 -
li,1)

Carthaginians win the battle of Drepana (li,3-
lii,3); they regain control Lilybaeum (liii,
13, -lv,1), and Roman fleets are shipwrecked
off Camarina (liv)

Junius occupies Eryx (lv,5-10)

Hamilcar Barcas ravages the Italian coast
(lvi,1-11)

BALANCE (cf. lvii,1 -
lviii,1;7)

Romans win the battle of the
Aegatis Islands (lx-lxi)

Treaty and end of war (lxiii,4-5)
BALANCE (cf. lxiv,5-6)

Both sides experience a civil war (cf. lxv and ff.), but the
perils of Carthage's war with the mercenaries in Libya gives
Rome a slight advantage (cf. lxxxviii,5-12)

with the opposing claims of his sources, and these also appear responsible for a certain confusion in Bk. I over differing levels of causation. His aetiology there is perhaps best looked at in terms of a simple spectrum. On the one hand, the First Punic War was a battle of wits, and on the other it was supervised by *tyche*, yet between these two levels of causation seems to lie the area of the *paradoxon*, for the unexpected could either be created by human cunning,¹ or else be a product of a force beyond human control². The categories were not effectively interrelated, however, and it is not unlikely that they were in large measure derived. Philinus, a key source for Polybius on the First Carthaginian War, evidently appealed to similar causal principles (if it is safe to assume that he lies behind Diodorus Siculus' treatment of the Syracusan-Mamertine War).³ On the other hand, the accentuated see-saw effect in Polybius I and some of the books more theoretical statements about *rhope* probably bear on the Achaean's originality,⁴ and have much to do with his efforts to characterize the normative processes of history, especially military history, before Rome's emergence as the greatest of all world-powers.⁵

¹ Cf. esp. I, xx, 13; xxiv, 1; xxv, 3; xxviii, 9; xxxiv, 11; xxxvi, 11; xxxvi, 3; xliv, 5, xlix, 7; lix, 9; lxxv, 3; lxxxiv, 8; etc. Cf. I, i; liii, 12, lviii, 3; lxxi, 2.

² Cf. esp. I, xxi, 11; lxi, 7, cf. xxxix, 4, liv, 8, lxii, 1, etc.

³ Polybius gave far less detail on this war than Diodorus (cf. *Hist.* I, ix, 1 - x, 1, cf. Diod.Sicul. XXII, xiii, 1-9) and does not refer to his causal apparatus in connection with it. Diodorus' report on a battle at Messana is significant; it began with an even balance (ισόρροπος), contained unexpected eventualities (cf. παραδόξως, παράδοξος), and saw the intervention of *tyche* to avert the utter collapse of Mamertine affairs (XXII, xiii, 4b; 6; 7). The interpretative manner is probably both pre-Polybian and pre-Diodoran, and it is not unlikely that Polybius' acceptance of *tyche* as 'stage manager' and 'stage producer' derives from Philinus, as well as his account of Regulus' *hybris* and downfall (in xxxv, 1-7); cf. Walbank, 'Polybius, Philinus and the First Punic War' in *Classical Quarterly* XXXIX, 1945 esp. pp. 8-9, cf. 5.

⁴ His use of Philinus as a counter-balance against Fabius' history is important here; see esp. xxx, 1-xxxv, 10 (cf. Walbank, *Commentary, op.cit.* vol.1 pp.89-93) xlvi, 3-11.

⁵ These characterizations were to some extent carried into his analyses of Hellenic affairs in Bks. II and IV, though in this case Polybius lacked conflicting sources to play off against each other.

This understanding of shifting and rectified balance is well worth disentangling from other, even if integrally related, notions of historical recurrence (such as the idea of fortune's wheel), and this also remains true for an important Polybian preconception more widely evident in the *Historiae*. As a general rule, Polybius held that external threat to a state or region produced internal, defensive consolidation, yet that the absence of such a threat engendered internal disorders. Peoples, such as the fifth century Athenians and the Carthaginians in Spain (ca. 230-210 BC) could gain respite from war (after success against competitors), yet experience the same internal instabilities known in far weaker political entities.¹ Those states well enough constituted to control the worst domestic disorders, moreover, could still be enervated by a long peace (XXXI, xxi, 3-4; cf. VI, lvii, 5), thus becoming susceptible to defeat from without. By contrast, the disadvantages of war and grave peril often consolidated the resources of a state so that it was able to achieve far more than a mere recovery. This happened in Rome's case in consequence of the Gallic and Hannibalic invasions and the Mercenary War.² Thus Polybius identified the 'forces of compensation' in play during either conflict or peace. Broken down, his interpretation reflects two alternations, one between war and peace, the other between unity and discord (and this is with the life of one particular state in view). The combination of factors made for a greater

¹ See *Hist.* VI, xviii, 6b (general), xliv 6-7 (Athens), IX, xi, 1-2; cf. X, vi, 5 (Spanish Carthaginians) and for weaker states note, eg. IV, xxxi, 1-xxxii, 3; XV, xxi, 3-5, and on the special situation with internal divisions of mainland Hellas, see *infra* pp. 174, ns. 1-2, 188. See also II, xix 2-4 (on the Gauls).

² I, vi, 13-14; II, xxxiii, 1 ff; cf. xxi, 8b (Gauls); III, lxxv, 8, cf. VI, li, 7-8, etc. (Hannibal), I, lxxxvii ff (Mercenary War).

complexity, however, and more than one state could be under consideration. In that case the word 'reciprocal' fits better. Moreover, that term covers the exceptional - the remarkable development of Roman supremacy. According to Polybius, the Romans possessed a constitution of such excellence and equipoise that those working within it acted in zealous concord before an outside foe, and were saved from the corruptions of idleness, *hybris* and selfish competition in prosperity (VI, xviii, 1-8). Rome's political resilience was unique, then, yet the same reciprocal principles still applied.

In so analysing recurring political interactions, then, Polybius created a methodological tool for interpreting both internal and external relations at the same time. This tool was probably intended to complement his line of thinking on altering fortune in external affairs and on natural inner changes, yet despite his apparent originality here, Polybius failed to make all the relationships clear. We may presume that, if states could stem imminent disaster, this was parallel to a turn from bad to good fortune, though the levels of causation were different. In the case of disunity in prosperity, he seemed to treat this tendency as natural and belonging to the inner life of the state. It was thus more akin to constitutional decay *κατὰ φύσιν*, though it has more to do with the notion of a general moral degeneration, a notion not convincingly integrated with his anacyclic theory.¹ Whatever the difficulties here, however, Polybius did not encapsulate the above understanding of internal-

¹ Except perhaps in Rome's case, with its most natural of constitutions (VI, lvii, 5). We ought to note that the distinction between constitutional history and the moral history of a people was to be drawn and treated more ably by Machiavelli, see *infra*, pp. 453f, etc. In the description of the *Anacyclosis*, Polybius nowhere claims that the three 'bad' constitutions imply susceptibility to defeat, yet he does depict Rome defeating other powers suffering from 'political sickness' (*supra*, pp. 130ff.). On the other hand, these defeated states had not in fact had respite from war, and such respite seemed only possible for powers which had attained to supremacy (cf. VI, xliv, 8; lvii 5). Also, on the possible Stoic background to Polybius' notions of moral *degeneratio*, cf. *infra*, pp. 318ff.

external relations in a cyclical model. Whereas basic cyclo-alternatory models (such as growth and decay or rise and fall) were unilinear, Polybius took his special reciprocal principles to operate between states and not just within the separate courses of given political societies. Moreover, the idea of deviations from a 'mean' is absent from simple cyclical frames. That difference continues to apply even when one compares the most elementary 'wheel of fortune' model (p. 112) with the idea of a requited immoderacy (or of the so-called 'hybristic cycle') in Graeco-Roman historiography. Although these two conceptualisations could be to some extent blended, the latter can still be distinguished from the former in respect of a mean. In the case of the 'hybristic cycle', one does not simply talk about the impermanence of fortune or the alternation between *eutychia* and *atychia*, but about the consequences of excess, usually moral excess, committed against moderation. Reference to *hybris* introduces us to those ideas of interaction and compensation to do with history's 'moral order'. It was held by certain ancient historians, and Polybius was not least amongst them, that immoderateness brought adverse retribution, and that historical events confirmed the inexpediency of servility on the one hand, and of arrogance on the other. Such opinions may be included in a wider view of reciprocal principles - the view that good and bad actions consistently evoke their appropriate desert - and these principles could be recurrently actualized in history without the regularity and fixed stages associated with cycles and alternation.

Principles of Retribution

i) General

For those upholding it, the 'moral order' of affairs was maintained by principles of retributive justice. To commend the ways of justice was typical amongst the Greeks, and they were comforted when it was satisfied, whether by men, or by the gods, or by the natural order of

things¹. Thus certain interpreters of history were bent on demonstrating how the good were rewarded and the evil punished in the events of the past. Variables in the enunciation and defence of this crucial idea, however, ought to be acknowledged. Four problem areas come to mind. First, although these retributive principles were usually considered divine, the degrees to which retributive *dike* was associated with traditional deities, or naturalized into an inviolable law of the universe, differed from historian to historian.² In much Hellenistic and Roman historiography, of course, the agent of justice was a heavily 'hypostatized' fortune, though God or fate, or even just men, could also suit the case. Secondly, judgements as to good and evil could very well vary, and often depended on the measure of a given historian's patriotism. Greeks might rail against the imperialism of Xerxes, for instance, yet countenance the glorious achievements of Alexander. Much depended, moreover, on what incidents a writer chose to

¹ On various commendations of justice, see esp. Hesiod, *WD.*, 213-8, 256-70; Theognis, 202ff., Anaximander, *Frg.1* (Diels-Kranz) = 112 (Kirk-Raven) (cf. Seligman, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-110), Heraclitus, *Frgs.* 80, 94; cf. 23 (Diels-Kranz) = 214, 229 (Kirk-Raven) = 62, 29, cf. 60 (Bywater); Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 754ff., Herodotus, *Hist.*, esp. VIII, 77 (oracle), 106; Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, V, i-ix, Isocrates, *Archidamus*, xxxv-xxxvi, Demosthenes, *Orationes*, XXV, xi; xxxv, etc.. Traditionalists could insist that the rewards and punishments of the gods were well apportioned, (cf. Hesiod, *WD.*, 213-341; Xenophon, *Cyropaideia*, I, vi, 1-7; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditationes*, II, iii; IX, i-XII, x; xii; cf. Epictetus, *Dissertationes*, III, xxiv, 48; etc.), others could envisage types of post-mortem existence appropriate to one's present moral condition (cf. Pythagorean *Frgs.* 263 *finis*, 268 (Kirk-Raven); Empedocles, *Frgs.* 468-71, 476-86 (Kirk-Raven) (cf. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1965, vol.2, pp.244-65); Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248-9; *Resp.*, 608C-620; yet cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 29-33 (Solon's dialogue with Croesus about happiness); Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, I, v-xiii, *De Anima*, 430a10-25); and others again paralleled the consequences of human actions to the 'impersonal' yet ultimately moderating effects of physical and biological interactions (cf. esp. Anon.Pythag. *Frg.5* (Diels-Kranz, vol.1, p.452, ls. 30ff); Heraclitus, *Frgs.* 57, 67, 80, 102, 119 (Diels-Kranz) = 57, 36, 61-2, 121 (Bywater); Epicurus, *Frgs.* 69, 72, 74-7; 82 (Bailey edn. pp.136-9; on the Stoics cf. esp. Zeller, *Stoics, etc.*, *op.cit.*, pp.173-93; cf. also Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, VIII, viii, 7.

² So, in Herodotus, esp. VIII, 106; cf. 77 (a reflection, even attribute of 'God'); in Thucydides, III, 67; IV, 118; VI, 61 (requital in human hands); in Polybius, III, x, 1; XXXI, xvi, 2; cf. XXIII, x, 3; (an aspect of the moral order, personification of secondary interests), etc..

be sensitive or make moral observations about. Take the case of reporting on deaths, for example. It was a common presupposition that, on the battlefield, good men died as heroes and bad men obtained their just deserts, that the murder of a good man was a perfidy requiring repayment, but that of an evil man was an outcome befitting his crimes. Some authors went to excessive lengths to confirm the evidence for appropriate retribution by presenting a list of the ultimate fates of the impious in given incidents, and others theologized about the brave end of good men.¹ Yet the deaths overlooked were numerous, and they were generally omitted because they were not morally 'pointed', or because they did not fit the conventional view, or simply because they were forgotten.² Thirdly, seemingly vulgar expectations of 'quick' rewards and punishments can be contrasted with the minimizing of popular supernaturalism and the removal of any emphasis on immediacy, and yet historians were quite capable of flirting with both approaches. They were bound to inherit accounts of hastened divine visitations upon the presumptuous - of the thunderbolt falling on King Scylas, for instance, who dared as a Scythian to become an initiate into the Dionysian mysteries³ - yet in the main they would demonstrate, from a complex disarray of less spectacular events, how in the end, irregularly or slowly, justice won. Finally the difference between a moral order dependent upon will - on the will of the gods, *tychē*, men - and one operating according to inexorable destiny, or to a pre-determined, unalterable plan, should be grasped, although historians could follow both lines by assuming

¹ For such a list, see Diodorus Siculus, *Biblioth.*, XVI, lxi, 1-4 (on the various fates of those who outraged the Delphic oracle); on theologizing about death, cf. esp. Plutarch, *Vit. Cat. Min.*, lxvii, 1ff; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi (Dialog.)*, xvi, 1-4; and note Herodotus, I, 31 (on Cleobis and Biton), cf. Arrian, *Anabasis*, vii, 17.

² Polybius, *Hist.*, II, lxx, 4-7 is an interesting case in point; Polybius was favourable to Antigonos the Great (cf. 7), and yet he did not elicit any particular significance from his nasty death on the battlefield, nor transform it into the death of a hero.

³ So Herodotus, IV, 79. For other interesting examples, cf. Timaios, *Frgs.* 19 (23), 119a, 155 (*FGH*, IIIB, pp. 585, 634, 644), and note Xenophon, *Anabasis*, V, iii, 13. Cf. of background importance, Theognis, 197-208.

different levels of causation.¹ Whilst admitting all such variables, however, the appeal to a moral order in Graeco-Roman historiography still implied an idea of historical recurrence, an idea that is, of the repeated actualization of retributive principles.

These principles manifested themselves in distinctive types of situations, one might even say dramatic situations.² 'The humbling of the arrogant', 'the chastisement of the impious', 'the effectiveness of the wise', etc. were invariably integral to such situations. Such being the case, the interest rests not on the recurrence of particulars or of strikingly similar circumstances, but on the continuing reappearance of event-types, -shapes, and -patterns, and on the operative principles they betoken. The recurrence of these configurations, moreover, need not be represented as curves and alternations; it involves rather a complex interaction of forces which sees that moral behaviour and attitudes have their fitting consequences.

A Heraclitean *logion* provides us with a fitting image; all existing things

¹ See, for example, Herodotus, I, 46 (Δίκη), VII, 10 (fortune, nemesis and God), I, 210; II, 120, III, 40; VII, 10; 139; IX, 100, etc. (the divine), III, 108 (τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ προνοία), I, 91; IX, 16 (destiny). Note Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, cxlvii-clii; (Isocrates doubts the existence of the gods (cf. *Nicocles* xxvi), yet in *Paneg.* he implies, on the one hand, that the Persians were punished for their offence against the gods (cxlvii) and on the other, that their downfall was due to a natural degeneracy (cl ff.). Another approach relevant here is the view that the gods, though acceptable as agents, were subject to a higher, inexorable set of laws; cf. Homer *Iliad*, xvi, 433; Simonides, *apud* Plato *Leg.*, V, 741A, Aeschylus, *Prometheus Vincetus*, ls. 515-21; Herodotus, I, 91. Incidentally, terms for fate and destiny vary in classical and Hellenistic literature (ἡ μοῖρα, ἡ πεπωμένη, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, *fatum*, *vicis*, *retributum*, etc.). Other cases of referral to different causal levels may be noted; in Thucydides (cf. esp. F.M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, London, 1907, ch.6; in Polybius, cf. *infra*, pp. 168ff. Concerning fate, one needs to be careful here, moreover, about conventions - a reference to fate or destiny might simply be a way of making the point, for instance, that historical protagonists were deluded about themselves or their circumstances, that they were neither able to perceive what the writer, by hindsight, saw them heading towards, nor capable of understanding the moral principles of history the writer was busily exposing. (Cf. esp. Herodotus, *Hist.*, esp. VII, 7; 18; 37; 52; 237; VIII, 75; 99; 101).

² I.e., considering the fact that tragedians' plots and rhetoricians' *inventiones* were not infrequently associated with history-writing; cf. Aeschylus, *Persae*, esp. 1-154; Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1393a25ff., 1360a 34-6, Cicero, *De Inventione*, I, xix, ff., etc. Polybius attacked Phylarchus (in II, lvi, 7-13), and Timaios (in XII, xxiv-xxva) on confusing history and rhetoric. See also J.B. Bury, *Ancient Greek Historians*, London, 1909, pp. 124, 165-176, 209, etc. For famous cases of morally-pointed situations in Greek historiography, see Herodotus, *infra*, pp. 166-7; in

are likened to the stream of a river, but no one stepping into it a second time can expect to find it the same.¹ In uttering this, Heraclitus hardly abandoned his belief in the consistent preservation of cosmic balance, yet so many were the eddies, the whirl-pools, the quite by-passed waters in the rushing river, that mere talk of wave-like undulations hardly sufficed to account for its many-sided ferment. And so historians, although it is illusory to imagine them engaging in relentless philosophical exercises *pari passu* with their narratives, sought to elicit the actualization of these principles where they willed, as they passed from career to career, state to state.

It cannot be pretended, of course, that the historiographical tradition upholding belief in the moral order was without its competitors or its agnostics. Epicurean writers tended to denigrate retributive notions in their appeals to 'mere chance',² and one should remember such a restless soul as Tacitus, who, despite his references to divine chastisement, to the fitting exposure of crimes, as well as to the need 'to confront evil words and deeds with the menace of posterity's reprobation', was nevertheless attracted to the Epicurean view that the gods remained aloof from mankind, unconcerned with the prosperous wicked and the suffering good.³ But Antiquity's defences of the moral order remain numerous and fascinating.

The moral order in Herodotus' work is especially worth our attention. His great *Historiae* have their climax in the invasion of Hellas by the notorious Xerxes, whose defeat was largely accounted for in terms of a

general, cf. S. Bernardete, *Herodotean Enquiries*, The Hague, 1969, pp. 4, 209), Thucydides, IV, 18; Xenophon, *Hellenika*, V, iv, 1; Polybius, *infra*, pp. 171ff., Poseidonius, *apud* Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, X, 439E; 542B, etc.

¹ Frgs. 41-2 (Bywater) = 218 (Kirk-Raven).

² Note esp. the evidence from Polybius, see *infra*, p. 172, n.3.

³ See esp. his *Annals*, VI, 22, cf. also *Historiae*, IV, 26 for his questioning moods, but cf. *Hist.* I, 3; IV, 26, *Annals*, IV, 1; XVI, 16 (on divine punishment), XIV, 5, (1) (on the divine exposé of Nero's crime against his mother), and III, 65 (for the quotation indicating his desire to instruct future generations). On the idea of posterity's favour and reprobation as a later (medieval) theme, see *infra*, pp. 416-7.

divinely ordained retribution. Xerxes was immoderate in good fortune, arrogant in his pretensions and his use of power, outrageous against the ways of *dike* and blind to fate. He produced an unnatural imbalance in the world by daring to lead his forces across the Hellespont to enslave Greece.¹ This significant case of Xerxes did not stand alone, of course; it was informed and prefigured by preceding, if less significant events. Other kings, Croesus and Polycrates, for example, suffered for being over-fortunate, the former because he was too proud, the latter because destiny could not be evaded.² Divine retribution or the satisfaction of justice was instanced repetitively - Croesus was defeated for his ambitious attempt to extend Lydian territories and for seeking revenge against Cyrus (I; 73-91); Cambyses met with a bitter end for his uncontrolled outrages (III, 13-68); there were fitting deaths for Oroetes the murderous Persian, for Scylas the presumptuous Scythian, Pheretima the vengeful Egyptian, for Aristagoras the unworthy Ionian, for the Spartan Cleomenes who committed crime against Demaratus, and so on.³ A man of geographical interests, moreover, Herodotus made his point about traditional boundaries. Whenever they were crossed with hostility - the Halys, the Araxes, the Nile, the Danube, the Hellespont - then acts of immoderacy had been performed and the established balance upset.⁴ Such violations ultimately stand in marked contrast with

¹ On Xerxes' immoderacy in good fortune, see esp. VII, 10; 49-51, on his ὕβρις and ἀσεβεία, see esp. VII, 16; 24; etc. VIII, 109, 115-7, etc.; on fate, note esp. VII, 140; 220; IX, 16, and for a combination of most of these ideas, cf. the oracle in VIII, 77 (Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον, ὕβρις ὑλόν). On the issue of balance and boundary-crossing, see VII, 8; 33-4; 54-7, and *supra*, p. 153, n.3.

² Cf. esp. I, 34 (and ff.), (though Croesus' sufferings also expiated the crimes of his blood-guilty ancestor, I, 91); III, 40-43, cf. 120ff. Note also II, 161 (Psammetichus), V, 92 (Cypselus), VII, 158 (concerning Gelo and the Greek envoys).

³ III, 120-128 (Oroetes), IV, 76-9 (Scylas), 205 (Pheretima), V, 49-51, 124-6 (Aristagoras), VI, 75-84 (Cleomenes, and note that from the alternative explanations for Cleomenes' death, Herodotus opted for τῶς).

⁴ Cf. esp. p. 153, n.3 (and p. 154). According to Herodotean geography, the isthmus provided a certain line of demarcation between the Peloponnese and mainland Greece (cf. VIII, 49-50), the Hellespont cut off Hellas from Asia (VII, 30-38), the Danube and the Araxes represented the frontiers of Thrace

the Greeks' indifference to territorial expansion (cf. V, 49-51), and with their lawful restraint at the end of the Persian War in merely creating the conditions for Ionia's final liberation.¹ Herodotus also suggested that revenge (*timōria*) frequently provided the awful motivation for political imbalance, or for invasion and war;² in fact Darius' fury over the Athenian sack of Sardis (V, 105), and Xerxes' effort to vindicate Persian power after Marathon (VII, 8), fit within a longstanding pattern of *ὅσα πρὸς ὅσα* ('tit for tat') going back beyond the Trojan War (cf. I, 1-5; II, 112-130).³ And if Herodotus was conscious that revenge could mother crimes, he recognized as well that unrequited evildoing could accumulate at the hands of a person or nation, until it reached a turning-point.⁴ When retribution resulted from any of these immoderacies, however, it was not merely effected by human will and reaction. The appropriate punishment for evil (*tisis*), the alterations of fortune, the eventual re-establishment of traditional (or natural) boundaries, as well as the flourishing and waning of régimes⁵ were all ultimately secured at a higher causal level. Events did not have a merely humanistic meaning, then, and we find him appealing to victorious *dike*, to the providential divine (*τὰ θεῶν, τὸ θεῶν*), to *tisis* as if it were a natural process, even

and Matieni (IV, 92 ff, I, 202), the Halys divided Ionia-Lydia from Persia (I, 28, 72), whilst the outer edges of the Nile delta separated Egypt from Asian territory to the north and Libya to the West (cf. II, 16). Yet another boundary was the river Gyndes, between Assyria and regions further east (I, 189).

¹ On the Herodotean concept of νόμος, cf. VII, 102-105, and on Greek, particularly Athenian restraint and avoidance of outrage, cf. IX, esp. note 77-80.

² Herodotus hated war (cf. esp. VIII, 3, cf. I, 88) and did not extol ἔργα (cf. I, 82 (2); V, 88; VI, 129; IX, 33; both facts set him apart from the philosophy of Heraclitus (cf. p. 150)).

³ For the quoted phrase, cf. I, 2; and for Herodotus on the causes of war see also R. Sealey, 'Thucydides, Herodotus and the causes of war', in *Classical Quarterly*, N.S., VII, 1957, pp. 1-12.

⁴ Cf. esp. II, 124-134 (Egypt), VII, 8 (and ff) (Persia), and see n. *supra* on Croesus.

⁵ Cf. esp. H.R. Immerwahr, *op.cit.*, pp. 153ff. The flourishing and waning of Lydia (I, 28-95), Samos (III, 39-60, 120-125), and Egypt (II, 124-182 III), are cases in point prefiguring or informing the rise and belittling of Persia.

to the old gods.¹ The Ionian, of course, could afford to be enthusiastic about the final issue of the Persian Wars. It was different for his more disillusioned successor, Thucydides, who witnessed the subsequent struggles within Hellas, and who was forced to be far more sober about the essentially human, psychological nature of power-conflict and social malaise.²

ii) Polybius: Key Lines of Approach

Herodotus, it is clear, believed that history reflected the recurrent operation of moral principles, and by both his own explicit interpretation and his representation of the views of sage-like advisors in key dialogues (especially those of Croesus and Artabanus, who were understood to have learnt the major lessons of history),³ he suggested that different event-complexes could be connected and paralleled. Departing from the earlier annalistic-genealogical approach to recording the past, he used not only dialogues but pre-existing *Novellen* (such as the story of Solon's conversation with Croesus about happiness I, 31-33) to endow his material with a universal character, and to raise questions about τὰ ἀνθρώπινα in general.⁴ The work of Polybius has much in common with the achievement of Herodotus. Polybius' *Historiae* are studded with ethically-pointed *paradigmata*, and they illustrate the recurrent operation of retributive principles. Like Herodotus, Polybius acknowledged a moral governance over human affairs, except that his pragmatism made him more interested in causality at a mundane level, and his concessions to voluntarism (as against determinism) were

¹ On the Ionian's appeal to more traditionalist religious conceptions as they pertained to major events, cf. esp. II, 120 (αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν) VI, 117 (τὸ φάσμα); on the divine as impersonal, esp. IX, 100 (τὰ θεῶν) ὅσον τοῖς applied to nature, and thus, by implication, being an all-pervading cosmic principle, note III, 108-9, cf. Cochrane, *op.cit.*, pp. 460ff.

² See *infra*, pp.189ff.. Cf. A.G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the nature of power* (Martin Classical Lectures XXIV), Camb., Mass., 1970, and P. Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de l'Analyse Psychologique dans l'Oeuvre de Thucydide*, (Études et Commentaires LXIX), Paris, 1968, pp. 9ff.

³ Cf. esp. I, 86-91; 207; III, 36 (cf. 14) (Croesus); VII, 10-12; 15-18; 46-7; 50-3 (Artabanus).

⁴ On background developments (with special reference to Hellanikos and the Croesus *Novelle*)⁵ E. Taubler, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-65.

therefore greater.¹ With Herodotus one often feels that fate governs all and that human effort is merely its handmaiden; Polybius, however, despite his talk of nature and *tyche*, gave more weight to human beings as fundamental historical agencies. His fortune was never so inexorable as destiny, and men seem to have a greater chance of saving themselves from the adverse side to extra-anthropological forces. On the other hand, we must remember, Polybius saw human activity bounded by a finite number of possibilities and still played out within a recognizable ambit. Human affairs reflected classifiable situations and event-complexes. Despite their contextual individuality, the general forms with which these situations came to be endowed and the recognizable types of issues they involved, were recurrent, and a basis on which one could learn from the past. Most of these situations had a strong ethical aspect, and in drawing attention to them in his narrative, Polybius was only too willing to point the moral. Such didacticism was an essential part of his whole pragmatic programme. Not only was there more than one kind of guide for rational action to be learnt from history, but he understood ethical attitudes to be closely intertwined with political policy - a point manifest enough if one considers the dual connotations of the Greek term *aretē* and the Latin *virtus*. Polybius could convince himself more readily than a modern that in drawing morals he was imparting to his readers political wisdom.

Whether Polybius distorted the facts in his search for moral meaning in human affairs, or whether he simply highlighted what was already implicit in the events themselves, is a matter for debate. What is more relevant for us is that his preoccupations with moral lessons and retribution reflect an important type of recurrence thinking - and one which has not yet been

¹ On war, for instance, his distinction between 'cause', 'beginning' and 'pretext' reveals him to be more concerned with the pragmatic significance of details and contingencies than with loftier ethical themes; cf. Pédech, *op.cit.*, pp. 75ff (cf. 54ff on background).

properly recognized as part of a whole body of ideas. Perhaps, when 'crime does not pay', we might be persuaded that history has repeated itself, but Polybius gives us reason to believe that this kind of approach to historical repetition can be filled out with some sophistication and intricacy. If the overall effect of his work was to show that justice was satisfied, we still have to say something about the variety of crimes, requitals, situations and relevant causal explanations in the *Historiae*. Important matters to be raised here are his treatment of the so-called 'hybristic cycle' (and its relation to the role of *tyche*), as well as the ethical front to his accounts of defeat and death.

That the *hybristai* were brought low was an old truth going back beyond Herodotus, and it was a convention Polybius was only too happy to retain and exemplify. Regulus, for instance, became too harsh in his moment of victory. He should have both corrected his behaviour and distrusted *tyche*, and for not doing so he paid dearly for his mistakes (I, xxxi, 4-7; xxxiv, 8; xxxv, 1-10).¹ Prusias II of Bithynia, an effeminate man with unchecked passions, sacked temples not only in neighbouring regions but in his own country, and in view of his *hybris* and these misdeeds (or *aitiai*, as Polybius significantly called them), it seemed like heavenly vengeance (*ἐκ θεοπέμπτου δοκεῖν*) when he lost his entire infantry (XXXII, xv, 7-8, 13-14). To turn from individuals to states, Polybius remarked that the *hybris* of the Galatian Gauls had been suppressed by the Romans in the cause of freedom (III,

¹ Walbank argues that 'there is no trace in Polybius of the notion that Regulus' *peripateia* was due to his arrogance' (*Commentary, op.cit.*, vol.1, p.93, cf. J.P. Balsdon, 'Some questions about historical writing, etc.', *loc.cit.*, p. 159 n.2), but this is to emphasize one aspect of Polybius' causal methodology to the detriment of another. Although arrogance could have a temporarily profitable effect, it fell almost automatically into a conventional *hybris-nemesis* syndrome, and arrogance thus took on a causal significance. To take an interesting example, Philip V's *hybris* formed part of his period of prosperity (XVI, i, 1-4), and although Polybius gives the impression that Philip, through his moderation in a subsequent period of adversity, might have saved himself (XVIII, xxxiii, 4-8, XVI, i, 9-10), he still made sure that he considered the king to have been punished eventually (XXIII, x, 1-3). So Walbank was surely not entirely wrong the first time, cf. 'Polybius, Philinus, and the First Punic War', *loc.cit.* p.10, although caution is nevertheless clearly warranted against identifying Polybius' approach with that of Diodorus Siculus (in *Biblioth.*, XXIII, xv, 1-6).

iii, 5), and he foreshadowed forthcoming difficulties for the Aetolian confederation by placing an all too pejorative stress on their insolence.¹ In these cases he was just developing a common classical preconception that *hybris* led to eventual punishment and *nemesis*. Taken as the simple complex: 'evil → requital', 'pride → fall', it is not easy to reckon this preconception 'cyclical'. Yet tied to the idea of fortune's wheel, as it often was, and so endowing that idea with an ethical content, this retributive model may be more justifiably referred to in terms of a 'hybristic' cycle. Polybius, of course, was interested in an inter-connection between the role of *tychē* and the operations of retributive principles, and it is important to observe how he achieved this, especially as he was playing with at least two apparently contradictory pictures of fortune, one which highlighted her capriciousness and another her function as a mistress of the moral order.

The key issues here are exposed in an interesting passage in Bk.XV. Philip V, and Antiochus the Great had committed shameful deeds against Ptolemy Philopator's infant son, and in commenting on the treaty between the Macedonian and the Seleucid in 203BC, Polybius wrote:

'Who can look into this treaty, as into a mirror, without fancying that he sees reflected in it the image of all impiety towards God and all savagery towards men, as well as the unbounded covetousness of these two kings? But at the same time who among those who reasonably find fault with *tychē* for her conduct of human affairs, will not be reconciled to her when he learns how she afterwards made them pay the due penalty (τὴν ἀμόχουσαν δίκην), and how she exhibited to their successors, as a warning for their edification, the exemplary chastisement she inflicted on these princes. For ... she raised up against them the Romans, and very justly and properly visited them with the very evils which, contrary to all law, they had designed to bring on others ...' (xx, 4-6).

Here Polybius first alludes to the idea of fortune as indifferent to

¹ So II, iv, 6 (cf. Roveri, *Studi*, op.cit., p.129); IV, iii, 5; 10-13; xvi, 4; lxii, 4-5; IX, xxxv, 6; cf. XXX, xi, 1-6.

morality yet as enamoured of change, an idea not foreign to some of his own procedures.¹ Not openly rejecting that conception, he went on to contend, however, that what appeared at first to be an unreasonable permission on fortune's part, was in the end not so, that her superficial amorality actually laid the basis for, or preceded, actualizations of the moral order.² He thus attempted to remove the conflict between her ethical neutrality and her providence, (incidentally revealing yet another of his eclecticism).³

The passage contains another important Polybian notion: that fortune's support of Rome represented exemplary punishment against Rome's

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 114ff.. For occasions on which *tychē* comes to be treated as mere neutral luckiness, cf. esp. IX, xxix, 10; X, xxxvii, 4; xl, 6; XI, xix, 5; XXXI, xxix, 3 (in these cases ταυτόματον might have been used just as easily, cf., for example III, xcvi, 5; XV, xxix, 5; XVIII, xii, 2; XXII, iv, 3; XXXI, xxv, 10). Note also VI, xliii, 3.

² Cf. Seneca, adapting Epicurus, on the view that though *fortuna* could afford temporary protection to an evildoer, he could not have the security of ever going unpunished (*Epistulae Morales*, XCVII, 13-14). With Polybius fortune is no mere protector, she is the one who also metes out punishment.

³ Some writers considered that if man was at the mercy of fortune then it would be difficult to see how justice could be satisfied (for some interesting examples, Aeschines, *On the Embassy*, 118; 183; Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, XCVIII, esp. 5, cf. 1-6; cf. also VIII, 3-4; LXIII, 7-11; CXIII, 27-8, (derived from Poseidonius), *De Tranquillitate Animi*, (*Dialog. IX*), xvi, 3; Fronto, *De Eloquentia*, I, 9; and for further references see Pédech, *op.cit.*, p. 74 and ns. 105ff; cf. pp. 331-2. There were certain 'Epicurean' writers, referred to by Polybius, who ascribed eventualities to chance on the supposition that there was no moral order.

Although it is true that there are times when Polybius referred to τύχη with an article as the 'blind chance' of 'Epicurean' historiography (cf. X, iii, 7; vii, 3; XXXI, xxx, 3), it is clear that even in these cases he is attacking a false notion of fortune, certainly one to which he himself does not subscribe. Polybius paid deference to these lines of approach in that he accepted the incalculability of fortune's behaviour, and even her *prima facie* ethical neutrality, but he also felt bound to account for the alternative view of *tychē* as a mediator, even moral governor. Polybius is surely likely to have inherited the alternative view. Some writers had already heightened *tychē's* role as a key determinant in history (cf. Anaximenes of Lampsacus, *Frg.* 11b, sect. 15 (*FGH.*, vol. 2A, p. 120), and on the peripatetics Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum, cf. Pédech, *op.cit.*, p. 332), but obscurity surrounds their approach to a moral order. Note, however, Theophrastus, *Frg.* 73 (Wimmer edit.), and on Philinus, see *supra*, p. 158, and n. 3.

enemies, in this case the arrogance of Philip and Antiochus. Now, its ethical implications aside, the rise of the Roman dominion was unprecedented and defied reason. It was a product of *tychē* as the incalculable. With these implications duly acknowledged, however, its occurrence said something both about Roman virtues and about a fitting retribution against peoples who lacked their victor's sense of honour and justice. On the defeat of nations before Rome, or before Achaea, as in the earlier stages of the *Historiae*, it strikes one that all the peoples opposing these two 'righteous' powers have moral guilt imputed to them. A curious mixture of bias and hindsight surround his analysis of the downfall of nations or rulers who were guilty of *asebeia* (godlessness) or *paranomia* (lawlessness), and who paid for their deeds by defeat and therefore punishment. The desecration of sanctuaries, the shedding of innocent blood, beast-like behaviour and the betrayal of pre-fixed arrangements form the major categories of outrage, and in their turn Illyrians, Gauls, minor Greek states which oppose Achaea, Aetolia, Sparta, the Carthaginians, the kings of Macedon, Egypt and other eastern nations are accused of one or other of these transgressions.¹ And each is requited for such deeds. For their aggressions against Rome, the Illyrians and Gauls suffer in defeat (II, xi-xii, (cf. I, vi, 5-6; vii, 5); III, iii, 5, (cf. II, xx, 7)); the Mantineans, for their betrayal of Achaea, experienced the fitting enslavement of their males (II, lviii, 4-10; 12); the savage Cynaethans received a deserved 'fate' (cf. *ἡτυχημένοι δολιχότατοι*) at the hands of the Aetolians (IV, xix, 13 - xx, 3). For their unscrupulous policies, quite unworthy of imitation, the Aetolians and the Spartans bore the greatest calamities (xxvii, 8, cf. 1-10), especially through Philip and then through Rome; and Philip V himself, who rivalled even the Aetolians in his *asebemata* (cf. V, xi, 1), was

¹ See esp. II, viii, 13; xix, 9; IV, xvii, 10-12; xviii, 10; xxv, 4 ff; xxxv, 3-4, lxii, 2 and ff., V, ix, 1-4; x, 8; VII, xiv, 3; XIII, xi, 1 ff., XV, i, 7-8; XXII, xvii, 5; XXX, xxvi, 8-9 for a useful variety of examples.

eventually punished by *tyche* or heaven after he declared war on the Romans (XXIII, x, 2; 4; 12-15). Before Philip's kingdom fell, however, the Carthaginians had paid dearly in the Hannibalic War. In the words of Cornelius Scipio's speech after Zama, the gods had given victory to the defenders, not to the unjust aggressors or treaty-breakers, and *tyche* had quite changed affairs since Hannibal's invasion of Italy (XV, viii, 1-5; cf. 9, xv, 1).

Polybius applied this kind of interpretation to individuals as well as states,¹ although the individuals concerned were frequently powerful representatives of whole groups. In many cases moral worth or unworthiness hinged on such representatives. Certain men, for instance, were capable of infecting a whole group. The case of Lysicus the Aetolian is memorable; after he was slain the Aetolians were able at last to live in concord,

'so great it seems is the power exercised by men's natures (ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεσιν) that not only armies and cities, but national groups and in fact all the different peoples which compose the whole world, experience the extremities of either misfortune or prosperity, owing the good or bad character of a single man' (XXXII, iv, 2). 2

With individuals, of course, retribution most frequently took the form of an appropriate death. Justice was satisfied in the ugly death of evil men, as in the case of the Ephors who unlawfully placed Lycurgus on the Spartan throne (IV, lxxxi, 5),³ or of Apelles the Macedonian and others who, for their outrageously false charges against Aratus, were forced to commit suicide (IV, lxxxvii, 10-1; V, xxvii, 5-9;⁴ cf. IV, lxxvi, lxxxii-vii). To the list we may add Agathocles, friend of Ptolemy Philopator, who

¹ Even the fall of Greece as a whole is reckoned with in these moral terms, XXXVIII, iii, 7-11, cf. XXXVI, xvii. Note also I, lxxxiv, 10; cf. lxxviii-lxxxiv (on the Numidians).

² Cf. Hebrew notions of representatives, *infra*, pp. 270ff. It should be added that Polybius was not averse to making social-psychological observations about whole groups, cf. I, lxv, 8; lxxxii-ii (Numidians); II, xxx, 4 (Gauls); IV, xxi, 4ff (Cynaetheans), lx, xxxiv, 5-11, etc. (Aetolians); XXXVIII, i-xx (Greece and Carthage)

³ So, '...τῆς τύχης τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθείσης δίχην'; etc.

⁴ So, 'οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρμοζούσης τυχόντες καταστροφῆς ἐξέλιπον τὸν βίον,' etc. (9).

had engaged in reckless and murderous intrigue (XV, xxvi^a, 1-2);¹ Scopas the Aetolian, who had perpetrated so many of the Aetolian League's impious and lawless policies, and who had transferred his criminal activity to the Middle East (XVIII, liv, 6-12,² cf. XIV, v, 1; xiv, 4; XV, xxv^a, 15, XVI, xxxix, 1-2, etc); and Orophernes, king of Cappadocia, who lost both his kingdom and his own life on account of his passion (XXXII, xi, 1). Losses other than death, admittedly, could be experienced by the guilty, but the actualization of the same retributive principles was implied.³

In a variety of other ways the lines of individuals disclosed the workings of a moral order. Once, when discussing treachery, Polybius enunciated the rule that

'not a single man ever betrays a town or an army or a fort without being found out, but even if any be not detected at the actual moment, the progress of time discovers them all in the end' (XVIII, xv, 7).

Here he skirted around the difficulty of a seemingly inoperative moral order by making a standard qualification: on occasions one had to wait for justice to be satisfied. The obvious difficulty surrounding the idea of fitting deaths also drew a stock solution: the unfortunate deaths of valorous men were inspirational and glorious (cf. III, cxvi, 9-13; XVI, ix, 1-2; XXX, vii, 3-4; XXXVIII, i, 7). Still another loophole he accepted was that resort to violence by worthy men need not constitute *asebēma*, but a work of correction and discipline meriting admiration (II, lvi, 14-15).

For Polybius, therefore, the historian had the onerous task of locating the worthy and unworthy in human affairs. He had to interpret how the outcome of events was in keeping with, or causally connected with,

¹ So, '...διδὸ καὶ παραντίκα τυχῶν τῆς ἀρμοζούσης τιμωρίας μετέλλαξε τὸν βίον' (2). Cf. XV, xxv^a.

² So, 'διδὸ καὶ δοκεῖ μοι τυχεῖν τῆς ἀρμοζούσης δίκης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ [παρ] ἀνθρώπων, etc. (11).

³ Cf. esp. XXIII, x, 12-16 on Philip V; XXXI, 1-4 on Antiochus Epiphanes; XXXII, xv, 1-14, cf. XXXIII, vii, 1-3 on Prusias II of Bithynia. Note also XIII, v, 4-6 on Heracleides, the messenger of Philip V.

given moral conditions. And this work was not simply taken on for the sake of ethics, but mainly for the cause of political success; the lessons of history taught both goodness and effectiveness, for these were part and parcel of one and the same virtue.

iii) Polybius on the Special Case of Rome

What of the remarkable accomplishments of Rome? According to Polybius, what is their full bearing on the recurrent operation of retributive principles? First we must reassert that régimes could collapse on account of their moral unworthiness, not just because of natural *phthora* or reversed fortune. Not only were Carthage, Macedon and Hellas 'punished' when they were conquered by Rome, but Polybius considered long-past downfalls in this light as well. He evidently accepted traditional interpretations of Xerxes' failures and Alexander's achievements as punishments against Persian outrages (V, x, 8; cf. XXXVIII, ii, 1-5), and on two occasions he associated Sparta's loss of Greek hegemony with her over-ambitious aggressiveness (VI, xlviii, 8; XXXVIII, ii, 7). On the other hand, the Romans had achieved an unprecedented greatness where others had failed, and for Polybius that had much to do with their *aretē*. Now he wished to insist that Rome came only very slowly to imperial overlordship,¹ that initially she had no designs for world but only for an Italian supremacy (VI, 1, 6), and that her search for greater power emerged from the necessity to defend herself against intense foreign aggression (cf. I, xii, 7; cf. iii, 10; lxiii, 9; III, cxviii, 9). We have noted how Polybius highlighted the condition of balance between Rome and Carthage during the first Punic War; it was part of his message in Bk. 1 to affirm that the Romans in Sicily were not there as aggrandizers (and there may be an implicit contrast here with Athenian aggression and the Sicilian Expedition).² This same theme was carried still further. Hannibal

¹ *Apud Zosimus, Hist.Nova, I, i, 1* (Mendelssohn edn., p. 1). Was there inclusion of a statement about this slow development in the Polybius 'Archaeology'?

² See Eisen, *op.cit.*, pp.156 ff for discussion; cf. also Frg. XXVIII (157).

was characterised as the aggressor who invaded Italy (Bk. III), whilst Rome had to defend her very existence at Cannae (III, cxviii, 5-6). Philip V was culpable in declaring war on Rome (cf. XXIII, x, 2-4), whilst Rome was justified in condemning his outrages (XXII, xiii, 6-xiv, 9).

Rome was the 'great exception' once again, this time from the ethical point of view. That assumption is nowhere more evident than in Polybius' treatment of Cornelius Scipio, whom he deemed comparable to Sparta's Lycurgus (cf. X, ii, 9-13). Scipio had subjected the greater part of the world to Rome and could have obtained royal power anywhere he chose, but he excelled all others in greatness of mind (*megalopsychia*), and put loyalty to his country before the enticements of fortune (X, xl, 7-9, cf. 6). According to Polybius, Scipio deserved admiration for his incredible foresight (cf. esp. X, v-xvii), but especially for his moderation in power, for he neither committed outrage nor succumbed to *hybris* (cf. XV, iv, 7-12; v, 8; xvii, 4; XXXI, xxv, 8). In his treatment of the battle of Zama, the *megalopsychia* of Scipio's Roman policy and the guilt of Carthage were heavily contrasted (XV, xvii, 3-4; 6).¹ But in any case, Scipio was a product of a virtuous polity. Just moderation dictated Rome's international dealings (cf. XVIII, xxxvi, 5-xxxvii, 12); there was a persistent adhesion to duty amongst her soldiers (VI, xxxvii, 12; liv, 4-lv, 4, cf. I, xvii, 1; III, lxxv, 8; IX, iii, 6, etc.), she had the ability to adapt and recover in times of vicissitude (esp. VI, ii, 5-7, cf. III, lxxxv, 10; cxviii, 9, etc.), and she was even the liberator of enslaved states, a rôle which, when Greece and Asia Minor were involved, recalled the time-honoured cause of *eleutheria* from the third Persian War (XXI, xxii, 5-xxiii, 12). Polybius was even prepared to condone Rome's exhaustive killing of the enemy (at least during the

¹ We may add that the stress on Scipio's foresight and resulting success contrasts with the approach of other, non-Roman generals (cf. I, lxxiv, 1-3, II, vii, 1-4; XV, xxi, 4-4), though for a Roman general, Marcellus, cf. X, xxxii, 7-12. On *μεγαλοψυχία* and Rome's greatness in general, cf. VI, ii, 6.

Hannibalic War), accepting it as a realistic means of inspiring terror (X, xv, 4). So the outstanding *aretē* of the Romans (and their institutions included) made a vital contribution to their success. It could not be said that their achievement was the product of blind chance (*tychē* as mere luck or coincidence) but of merit and national purpose. Perhaps *tychē*, as a rational, directing, even if unpredictable governess, was their supporter, but Roman leaders significantly learnt to be moderate in good fortune and to recover well in adversity.¹ On the other hand, it would be false to conclude that Polybius sided with the traditionalist patriotism which extolled Roman *virtus* as supreme over *fortuna*, and which opposed the way Graecizers ascribed Rome's imperial accomplishments to an incalculable force (cf. pp. 335ff.). As usual Polybius was eclectic, and it was no contradiction for him both to acknowledge Roman merit before blind chance and yet marvel at the ways of intelligent *tychē*. Thus such apparently conflicting ideas as fortune, human purpose, and the overriding moral order of human affairs were loosely, and to Polybius' mind satisfactorily, accommodated to each other.

Here one may also reflect on Polybius' approach to boundaries and their violation. Certain passages remind one of Herodotus on such matters. Before Zama, for instance, Hannibal was made to salute Scipio:

'Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa, for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits! (ὥς ἂν εἰ περιωρισμένας ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως) (XV, vi, 5).

Rome was exceptional however; and because of fortune's special permissions, because of Rome's superior institutions, because of the *aretē* of her men, she was granted what was unprecedented - ἡ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀρχὴ καὶ δυναστεία (cf. XXI, xvi, 8). Polybius did not withhold an ethical justi-

¹ Polybius would certainly have agreed with Dio Cassius that Scipio, as the greatest exemplar of military virtue, 'never trusted fortune unthinkingly for anything'. So, *Hist. Rom.*, XXI, xxvii, 5, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, X, ii, 5-6; 13, iii, 1; XV, xvi, 6 (in the light of X, xxxiii, 1-3), etc., yet cf. *Frg. XC* (161).

fication for this special situation. If the Carthaginians, for example, had been the aggressors in crossing the Ebro, a crucial Iberian boundary, Rome, by contrast, was guiltless in traversing and acquiring control beyond it, in defence.¹ If Antiochus the Great had been the aggressor in Asia Minor (cf. esp. XXI, xiv, 7), Rome was justified in a restrained entrance into Asia.² In fact, the aggressive expansionism of the three major powers of Carthage, Macedonia³ and Seleucia was sufficient pretext to bring Rome well beyond Italy to Africa and Asia. From a moral point of view, then, Roman imperial activity was analogous to Alexander's chastisement of Persia (cf. V, x, 8). But that was not his only way of looking at the boundary question. As a man with geographical interests he gave a fascinating account of the Euxine Sea, contending that it would eventually be silted up and become a shallow, fresh-water lake (VI, xlii, 4; 6; cf. xl, 5; 10). Was there a special reason for his preoccupation with this curious matter, as well as with the silting up of the Palus Maeotis (xl, 8-9; xlii, 4)- or in other words with the geographical point at which Europe and Asia almost met (cf. xliii, 2) ? Did he believe that even the processes of nature were denying Rome's world dominion to be a violation of established boundaries? That is a speculative but not unwarrantable suggestion, especially since Polybius was interested in natural as much as in purposive and supra-human *aitiai*.

We must protest that the great moral exception of Rome did not deny the normative and recurrent processes of retribution. The same principles operated with worthy states just as with unworthy ones, so that Roman virtue still formed part of the intricacy of moral reciprocities.⁴

¹ Cf. III, vi, 2-3; xv, 5; xxix, etc. on the Carthaginians, cf. III, xcvi, 5 on Rome.

² See esp. XXI, xiv, 3-7 (cf. Livy *Ab Urbe Condit.*, XXXVII, xxxv, 5-7), xvi, 8, cf. xi, 2 ff.

³ Cf. XXIII, x, 3-4 on Philip V's aggression.

⁴ In an interesting passage (V, lxxxviii, 3), he indicated that although virtue and lack of virtue brought a different measure of control over life, that was in accordance with the same reciprocal principles: 'So great is the difference both to individuals and to states between carefulness and

Moreover, Polybius understood virtue to be an important factor in the establishment of a great régime, whilst moral degeneration was crucial for its decline. If there had been a time when the great Macedonian monarchs Philip II, Alexander the Great and Antigonos III had conspicuously avoided outrage against those whom they conquered (cf. V, ix, 8 - x, 8), that was not true of the impious Philip V (x, 9 - xi, 2), and thus the downfall of Macedon was commensurate with the ethical decline of her rulers.¹ This same notion of μεταβολή εἰς χεῖρον was applied to Rome, though placed more in the future. Polybius hinted that certain changes in his own day foreshadowed a more general Roman decay and collapse (cf. pp.125-6). He scarcely managed to exonerate the Romans for appropriating the riches of Syracuse (IX, x, 9-13), and towards the end of his work suggested that earlier Roman moderacy was disintegrating. Those who upheld the virtues associated with the Scipionic tradition were decreasing in number (cf. XVIII, xxxv, 1-2; 6; XXXI, xxv, 5a - xxvi, 10), and Rome's eventual conquest of Macedonia and Carthage carried new and disturbing implications for the future.

'For at first they had made war with every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders. But they struck the first note of a new policy by their conduct to Perseus [Philip V's successor], in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. For [at the beginning of the *Third Punic War*] the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, even though they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders (XXXVI, ix, 6-8, cf. also XXXVIII, xx, 3).

wisdom on the one hand and folly with negligence on the other, that in the latter case good fortune actually inflicts damage, while in the former disaster is the cause of profit'. Note also X, xxxiii, 2-7, cf. Frg. XXX (184).

¹ By assigning words of praise to Hannibal for his skill and adaptability in vicissitude (cf. esp. X, xxxiii, 1-3; XV, xvi, 1-5; cf. IX, xxii, 1-10), Polybius both explains the degree of his success and shows sympathy for his eventual defeat at Zama which, after all, marked the end of the second Punic War, not the downfall of Carthage. This approach is therefore not inconsistent with the one towards the Macedonians immediately above (and the Romans immediately below).

As with other great régimes which had been created by virtue but which over-tested fortune, the albeit exceptional Rome would pay for her immoderacies. His view, then, that Roman greatness was produced by both *virtus* and *fortuna* was skirted by fatalism, by the foreboding that, as Rome continued towards her end, virtue would diminish and *tychē* hold sway.¹

The defender of the moral order was inevitably didactic in his approach to events; history taught how men ought to behave, and what were the recurrent consequences of evil and virtue. Before Polybius, however, various Hellenistic historians had taken the working of retribution to absurd or quasi-mechanical lengths. Polybius himself is important for having such a relatively critical approach. He boldly attacked Timaios for contriving punishments to suit the men he reckoned evil (XII, xii^b, 1-3), and insisted that Timaios had made these men more guilty than either the facts or the nature of their deaths indicated (xiii, 1-xv, 7).² Against Phylarchus he protested that the historian must praise good conduct and not just dwell on evil (and its consequences) (II, lx, 3; 6; cf. also II, lvi, 3-5; lix). For his own part, the Achaean strove to establish canons of interpretation which did justice to the available data yet which were at the same time paradigmatic and instructive. If the facts did not seem to accord with his presuppositions about the moral order, he either suggested possible solutions or simply raised questions. One way of providing a solution to a difficulty was to put it in its proper context, or, as we have said before, to reckon with the fact that subsequent events put an entirely different complexion on earlier situations. Thus the reader might be stunned that the evil Perseus defeated the Romans

¹ For post-Polybian discussion of these issues, see *infra*, pp. 334ff. On their possible pre-Polybian origins in Roman historiography, in Fabius Pictor, for example, cf. Kajanto, *op.cit.*, pp. 92 ff.

² (On Demochares and Agathocles of Syracuse). See also, P. Pédech, 'Introduction' to *Polybe, Histoire Livre XII*, Paris, 1961, pp. xxii, xxxi, on critical questions.

whilst defending his throne (in 169 B.C.), but Polybius eagerly pointed out that the wrath of the gods ($\mu\eta\gamma\iota\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\chi \theta\epsilon\omega\tilde{\nu}$) was destined to fall on Macedonia (XXXVI, xvii, 14-15).¹ Unlike some of his cruder predecessors, furthermore, Polybius did not insist on a 1 : 1 ratio between the crime of any protagonist and the recognizable punishment. He readily acknowledged that some men died deaths not adequate to their evildoing, such as Hermeias the Seleucid (V, lvi, 13) and Agathocles, friend of Ptolemy Philopator (XV, xxxiii, 6).² In these particular cases, nevertheless, he went out of his way to stress that the kindred (and associates) of these men perished with them (V, lvi, 14-15; XV, xxxiii, 7-13), so that events were still left endowed with moral intelligibility. Again, on one occasion he discussed a most unfortunate victim of treachery. Achaeus the Seleucid satrap had provided against every contingency and yet he failed to escape death. Polybius felt bound to extract a moral meaning from this awkward case:

'the event created a general feeling of pity and pardon for the victim, while his betrayers were universally condemned and detested' (VIII, xxx, 9, cf. 1-8).

Polybius was therefore more cautious and subtle in his ethical interpretations than those before him. There were even times when he virtually admitted that he did not have the answers (cf. XVI, xxxii, 5 and XXXII, iv, 3!). Perhaps he was not so 'unflagging in his production of evidence for heavenly justice' as such a writer as Diodorus Siculus,³ but that has much to do with his rather profound insistence that the ethical meaning of events should be interpreted as much as possible from

¹ Polybius may well have ascribed Perseus' momentary victory to *tyche*, that is, if Diodorus Siculus reflects him as a source in his *Biblioth.*, XXX, x, 1.

² Note $\mu\eta \tau\upsilon\chi\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\rho\mu\omicron\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\phi\eta\varsigma$, cf. the citations on p.174, ns.3-4, p.175, ns.1-2.

³ Cf. R. Drews, 'Diodorus and his sources', in *American Journal of Philology*, LXXXVIII, 1962, p. 385, for the quotations, and see *infra*, pp. 400-1. Interestingly enough, Diodorus developed Polybius' notion of renown and infamy in posterity as it was connected with the moral order of history, see esp. *Biblioth.*, XIV, i, 2-3; XXIX, xviii.

the reasons (*aitiai*) and purposes (*prophaseis*) of the doers, and not represented as if history was simply at the mercy of external, super-human agencies (II, lvi, 16, cf. 13-15).

Despite the complicated nature of Polybius' approach, it is hard to deny that to elicit the continual manifestation of moral governance was one important means of asserting that history repeated itself. Whilst recognizing his interest in the considerable variety of human experiences,¹ one must return again and again to his presuppositions about the general face of events, about types of dramatic situations and about governing principles. Polybius was probably trained as a rhetorician, and though placing truth before rhetorical embellishment (XII, xxv^a, 5- xxv^b, 4, cf. also II, lvi, 10 ff), he had feeling for incidents possessing universal and paradigmatic qualities (and thus having affinities with the rhetorician's stock of 'pertinent examples').² He did not write just to edify, however, but to affirm something of practical importance about the nature of history.

All the reciprocal models we have discussed, indeed, either carry utilitarian implications or simply presuppose that behind variety and particularity lie the typical and the similar. With Polybius above all, however, we find that they fall into a whole body of dogmata about historical recurrence which undergirds his work. In the *Historiae*, we have seen, cyclic and reciprocal frames, moral teaching and political analysis, even a variety of causal explanations have become interrelated in a complex, imaginative methodology.

¹ Cf. such passages as I, i, 1ff; xxxv, 9-10; III, iv; XII, xxvb; 2-3, etc., and see esp. *infra*, on Diodorus and Livy.

² On the probable 'Isocratean' education of Polybius, Pédech, *Méthode*, *op.cit.*, pp. 42-3, and for rhetorical training in the use of important historical examples, note esp. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1360a30ff., Cicero, *De Inventione*, I, xix, ff., and esp. Valerius Maximus, *Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium*, cf. III, iv; VI, ix (on examples concerning personal fortunes).

³ It was not so easy to relate *physis* to the doctrine of the moral order, though note IX, xii, 10; XXXVIII, v, 4 (cf. *supra*, p.179).

C) Other Models of Historical Recurrence

There are some conceptions of historical repetition in classical historical thought which cannot be termed either cyclo-alternatory or reciprocal. Chief amongst these are conventional *metabolē* theory, and the appeal to the permanent traits of human nature.

Conventional *Metabolē* Theory

i) General

A widely adopted approach to *metabolē* in human affairs was probably born in Sophistic circles (pp.46-7), and it was largely used to explain political change, especially the degeneration of *politeiai*. The descriptions and explanations of deterioration were couched in ethical terms, and a 'vocabulary' of *metabolē* gained currency. According to *metabolē* theory, the causes of erosion usually lay with rulers. It was they who turned an order of lawfulness and political responsibility into a regime of *adikia* (injustice), *anomia* (lawlessness) and *kakia* (depravity). The attitudes of unworthy rulers were frequently characterized in terms of arrogance (*hybris*), impiety (*asebeia*), or greed (*pleonexia*). Deterioration in the form of civil disorder and faction-fighting was often termed *stasis*.² This way of thinking, this gnomic combination of the moralistic and the phenomenological, has persisted even to our own day, although it has become inter-mixed with biblical and Christian beliefs about sin and injustice. As it presupposes typical factors and conditions in political decline, this is a form of recurrence thinking. Furthermore, doctrines emerged as to the typical forms of constitutional *metabolē* - from kingship to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, popular government to mob-rule (to recall our previous analyses, pp.47ff.) The recurrence of such changes, however, was not necessarily tied to

¹ See esp. Ryffel, *op.cit.*, pp.49, 70, 82, etc..

cyclo-alternatory or reciprocal processes. In the Polybian *Anacyclōsis*, admittedly, constitutional *metabolē* was clearly understood as part of a cyclic movement, and there is no gainsaying that the emphasis on civic deterioration could be associated with the idea of *phthora* and of an upset balance. As a notion of recurrence in its most basic form however, nothing more was implied but that certain changes, separated in space and time, were similar and subject to the same kind of delineation.¹

ii) Polybius

We have previously discussed how, in his sixth book, Polybius analysed natural *metabolai* from one *politeia* into another, and placed constitutional changes in a set causal chain (pp.68 ff.). In Bk. VI, however, he spent little time in justifying his thesis factually, that is, in annotating typical constitutional transformations in different states and historical contexts. In any case, he probably lacked the relevant data to effect such a systematic 'apology'. It still remains true, though, that elsewhere in the *Historiae*, he did cite separate instances of μεταβολή πολιτεῶν, mainly those belonging to the period 220 - 145 B.C. Perhaps the changes were considered in parallel rather than lineally, but almost every case is significantly reconcilable with the *Anacyclōsis*, or with the assumed relationship between internal processes of change and the fluctuations of external politics (pp.125 ff.). To begin with kingship; he took pains to point out that where this constitutional form persisted, it did so through the natural kingly qualities of the rulers.² Thus when Philip V underwent a moral

¹ One should be wary of ascribing to the Greeks or Romans any doctrines of 'historical laws'. Their methodological assumptions are important background for, but were hardly the same as, those of a Comte, a Marx or a Hempel. Reference to rules, general truths, or to the recognition of reappearing or recurrent general conditions is more appropriate.

² So, Philip II and Alexander of Macedon, VIII, x, 10; Agathocles of Sicily, xi, 1, Cavarus of Gaul, xxii, 1, Ptolemy VII of Egypt, XXVIII, xxi, 4-5. For the Macedonians and Agathocles, cf. esp. the phrase ὡς περὶ βασιλέως εὐφροστάτου in VIII, xi, 1, and for the others see βασιλικὸς δπάρχων τῇ φύσει in xxii, 1, and διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα πράξεων ἡ φύσις ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀπελογήθη in XXVIII, xxii, 5.

metabolē for the worse, he lost the good characteristics natural to a king (cf. X, xxvi, 7-8; XIII, ii, 1),¹ and became something else - a tyrant (cf. IV, lxxvii, 4; V, xi, 6; VII, xi, 1; 10).² The change from kingship to tyranny, the most widely known form of political *metabolē*, was hardly forgotten in the *Historiae* outside Bk. VI. Philip occupies most of the attention and it is his change of garb-style and habits (cf. X, xxvi, 1-4) which especially recalls the picture of royalty's degeneration in VI, vii, 7, cf. 5.³ There are other cases (cf. II, xlvii, 3; VIII, xxii, 3, XIV, xii, 3-6) of this transformation as a typical one. Even with Perseus' succession to Philip by hereditary right and with the former's apparent continuation of the Macedonian monarchy, Polybius seemed bent on avoiding a vitiation of his anacyclic theory. His solution was that tyrannies could quite easily become entrenched (XIII, vi, 2, cf. VIII, xxxv, 6), and also that at the beginning of their reigns, men who become tyrants often appear to offer the hope of good things (so XV, xxiv, 4 (xxiv^a, 1) on Philip; XXV, iii, 1-8, cf. XXXVI, xvii, 14, on Perseus).⁴

Outside the case of Rome, however, one looks in vain for the example of a state which undergoes a number, let alone a whole series of *metabolai* along the anacyclic path. In his narrative Polybius almost invariably mentioned one kind of transformation at a time. Perhaps he referred to multiple political change in Spartan history from Cleomenes III to Nabis. Yet the sequence of *metabolai* only partially followed the *Anacyclōsis*

¹ *σο ἀγαθὰ φύσει περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπάρχει* in X, and *ἦν δὲ βασιλικὴν μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἶναι φήσειεν*, in XIII, cf. Walbank, *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, vol.2, p. 231.

² Notice the expressions *τῆς εἰς τοῦμαλιν μεταβολῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ χειρὸν ὁρμῆς καὶ μεταθέσεως* in 1, quote similar to the language used in foreshadowing Rome's future turn for the worse, so *καὶ τῆς εἰς τοῦμαλιν ἔσομένης ἐκ τούτων μεταβολῆς*, VI, ix, 12, cf. Walbank, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p.638.

³ Cf. also XXIX, xiii, 1-2 on Genthius of Illyria.

⁴ Cf. also p.132,n.3 (and 133) on XVIII, xxxiii, 4-8 and XXV, iii, 1-4. One implication of these passages is that although Philip turned his kingship into tyranny, it was not as extreme a tyranny as Perseus'.

because the external intervention of Antigonus Gonatas in Sparta's affairs complicated matters, and because in this case Polybius was considering a rather special line of change - the degeneration of the Spartan mixed constitution into tyranny.¹ As for other, individual changes in the *Historiae*, concrete examples of *metabolē* from tyranny into aristocracy and from aristocracy into oligarchy are lacking (even within Bk. VI as it now stands). The replacement of oligarchy by democracy also seems to be forgotten.² Before he had settled on a theory of constitutional change, moreover, Polybius put Achaean democracy after the tyranny of Ogygus' sons (II, xli, 5), and democracy in Greater Hellas after a period of *stasis*.³ However, when one examines *metabolai* covered in the tail-end of the *Anacyc-lōsis*, matters become different. In keeping with both his anacyclic scheme and Thucydidean diagnosis, he ascribed the dissolution of Athenian democracy to the contentiousness of the *dēmos*, and it was the same with the downfall of the Theban constitution (VI, xliv, 3-6; 9). And in commenting on the Tarentine affairs of 213-2 B.C., Polybius came close to describing the multi-staged path from democracy to ochlocracy and on to the rule of the *monarchos*-figure:

'Whenever freedom has long predominated', he wrote, 'then there is a feeling of satiety (*koros*) towards the present conditions, and next comes a search for a *despotes* (cf. VI, ix, 9), who, once found, becomes a thing shortly hated again because the *metabolē* is to the worse'. (VIII, xxiv, 2 (xxvi, 2)).

Here one discovers a picture of general constitutional decay which supplements the analysis of VI, lvii, 6-9, with its sequence oligarchy/democracy/ochlocracy (pp.90ff). On the other hand, a different principle of change was invoked the idea of an insidious reaction to surfeit which had its background in early *metabolē* theory, although it was voiced commonly

¹ See Excursus 1.

² It is possibly referred to in VII, x, 1 (Messene).

³ This latter case could have been explained away by appealing to the unexpected (external) destruction of the Italian cities' leading citizens (II, xxxix, 2, cf. 5-6).

enough near his own time.¹ Concerning mob-rule, Polybius' handling of Cynaetha in 220 B.C. is interesting. He depicted Cynaetha as an 'ochlocratic' state with 'constant massacres, expulsions, robbery of goods and confiscation of lands' (σφαγάς, φυγάς, ἀρπαγάς, γῆς ἀναδάσμούς, IV, xvii, 4; cf. xx-xxii), thus using language reminiscent of the crucial passage in VI, ix, 9 about the 'eve' of complete constitutional breakdown.² As Polybius took constitutional decay to be prevalent amongst states conquered by Rome, one justifiably expects his references to mob-rule, demagoguery, *stasis* and despotism to come more and more frequently from his pen. Take Molpagoras, demagogue of Cius; he flattered the populace,³ incited the *ochlos* against the rich,⁴ killed some of the latter,⁵ banished others whose property he confiscated and distributed among the people,⁶ and then speedily attained to autocratic powers (μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν), (XV, xxi, 1-2).⁷ Polybius also remarked on internal troubles in the democracies of Boeotia (XX, vi, 3; vii, 4; XXII, iv, 1-3; XXVII, i, 8-9), Aetolia (XXVIII, iv, 13; XXX, xi, 6; cf. XXI, xxxi, 8-11), Achaea (XXIV, x, 10), the rest of Greece (XV, xxi, 3-8; XXII, vi, 7; cf. XXXVIII, xii, 5-6; xvi, 7; xviii, 7ff),⁸ and, in accordance with analysis of Bk. VI, Carthage.⁹

¹ Cf. for example, *infra*, p.166, 1, and for later references to change due to satiety and boredom, see, for example, Lucretius, *Rer. Nat.*, V, 170-3; 1412-5; Velleius Paterculus, *Historiae Romanae*, I, xvii, 7. Note Polybius himself: 'Ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει φιλόκαινον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἱκανὸν ἐστὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν μεταβολήν (XXXVI, xiii, 3). The notion of *metabolē* brought about by a succeeding generation (cf. Bk. VI) is distinguishable from the above conception, though not entirely unrelated (cf. II, xxi, 1-2).

² Cf. Walbank, *Comment.*, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p.657.

³ Cf. VI, ix, 6 (δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαίνόμενοι τὰ πλήθη).

⁴ Cf. VI, ix, 8 (τὸ πλήθος...ὅταν λάβῃ προστάτην μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν, ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τιμῶν, τότε δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ..., the implication being that the people turn, on behalf of the penurious demagogue, against the rich).

⁵ Cf. VI, ix, 9 (σφαγάς).

⁶ So τινὰς δὲ φυγαδεύων καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τὰς τούτων δημεύων καὶ διαδιδούς τοῖς πολλοῖς; cf. VI, ix, 9 (φυγάς, γῆς ἀναδάσμούς).

⁷ Cf. Walbank, who seems to misplace Molpagoras' demagoguery and 'monarchy' in terms of Polybian constitutional theory (cf. 'The Spartan Ancestral Constitution, etc.', *loc.cit.*, pp. 304-5).

⁸ The analyses in the last two references are reminiscent of the diagnoses in Thucydides, *Hist.*, III, 77 ff, 83.

⁹ See *supra*, pp.99-100, cf. XXXVI, vii, 3-5; XXXVIII, viii, esp. 11-15.

The tendency towards decay within democracies is invariably connected with the unruliness of the masses, and a *stasis* results from factionalism and demagogic ambition.

In review, then, the constitutional *metabolai* analysed in the *Anacyclosis* were occasionally isolated in the Polybian narrative. Not that the individual transformations found outside Bk. VI were only elicited to confirm anacyclic theory. *Metabolē* theory comprised an independent body of historical explanation, and when Polybius employed its ethical language, when he alluded, for example, to the excessive pride of the Tarentines, the *pleonexia* of Molpagoras, the *hybris* of Hasdrubal, and so forth,¹ he was using ideas of recurrence which stood in their own right, even if he desired to relate them with consistency to his natural cycle of governments, as well as to his belief in the repeated actualization of the moral order.

The Appeal to the Permanent Traits of Human Nature

This second non-cyclical, non-reciprocal approach to historical recurrence has a renowned *locus classicus*. Towards the beginning of his history, Thucydides boldly asserted that his creation was written to last forever. It was not just for the benefit of the immediate public but for any who wanted

'to understand clearly what has happened and what will happen, when, in accordance with human nature (or things) (κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), events like this and of this kind will occur again. (*Hist.*, I, 22 (4)).²

By τὸ ἀνθρώπινον Thucydides did not simply mean the personal characteristics and dispositions of men. In another famous passage, when analysing the civil disorders which convulsed the Hellenic world, he contended that

¹ Tarentines; 'Ὅτε οἱ Ταραντῖνός τε διατῆς εὐδαιμονίας περὶ ἑαυτοὺς ὑπερήφανον ..' VIII, xxiv, 2a (xxvi, 2a); Molpagoras; δημαγωγικός καὶ πλεονέκτης, 'XV, xxi, 1b; Hasdrubal; 'ἐνυβρίζων', XXXVIII, viii, 13; cf. on certain Thebans, XX, vi, 2-3.

² The whole passage: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ἀφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει, ... (*Hist.*, I, 22, (4)).

'many calamities fell upon the cities on account of this *stasis*, as will always be the case while human nature (*φύσις ἀνθρώπων*) is what it is, although whether the situation remains at rest or admits of variation depends on what is brought to hard by each change of events.' (III, 82 (2)).¹

In this second passage 'human nature' appears to denote general patterns of political behaviour, and in fact Thucydides' interest in group psychology or the general *physis* of human kind outweighed his concern for the inner personalities of individuals.² What, then, are we to make of these two significant quotations?

Even if he guarded himself against any position approaching the doctrine of exact repetition, Thucydides was surely affirming the recurrence of historical phenomena. History repeated itself because certain enduring factors governing group behaviour continually reasserted themselves; as human nature does not change, even if its historical expressions vary, the same sorts of event-complexes can recur at any point in time. The central implication of his statements then, is not so much that 'human nature' is repeated but that event-types are. Such event-types were taken to recur because, in accordance with a stable *ἀνθρωπεία φύσις*, intentions were executed and changing circumstances handled in characteristically typical ways - with self-interest, fear, suspicion, and so on. But what did Thucydides mean when he contended that events like those in his own *Historiae* would occur again? Was he referring to portentous situations between the last date treated in his *magnum opus* (411 B.C.) and the time it was ready for circulation? Or was he of the opinion that the particular

¹ *Hist.*, III, (2): καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν, ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἢ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ τοῖς εἰδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὥς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχῶν ἐφιστῶνται. Cf. also, Ixxiv, (2) on ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις.

² See esp. *Hist.*, I, 88, ff (Spartan fear of Athenian power), II, 48-54 (on the affects of the plague) III, 36-49 (debate on Mitylene), 82-4, and general Hellenic *stasis*), V, 85-113, (Melian debate), VI, 61-2, (suspicion against Alcibiades), VII, 71 (warriors' feelings about the great battle over Syracuse), cf. I, 76; IV, 61; V, 105 (the tendency of the stronger to rule over the weaker), etc. Note however, C.N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History*. London, 1929, p.19.

conflict he was handling, or at any rate a conflict rather like it, would recur in the distant future? Did he assume, furthermore, that there were no recurrences to be sighted among the very historical events he spent so many pains in recounting?¹ It is not easy to offer answers to such questions with confidence. What remains important, however, is that he put a special premium on the study of human nature. Social behaviour patterns and psychological characteristics were treated as separable phenomena, not just as reflections of a moral plan in history. After Thucydides, psychological observations became the stock in trade of the historian, and even if many of his successors were more interested in placing psychological responses within the context of the moral order, the appeal to the permanent traits of human nature merits independent consideration as a form of recurrence thinking. No notion of regular recurrence, though, seems entailed in Thucydides' position. If anything, his line has its best analogy in diagnostic medicine, and even if not wishing to lend unreserved support to C.N. Cochrane's thesis about the relationship between the 'scientific' historian Thucydides and the Hippocratic school,² I think it fair to assert that Thucydides' work is dotted throughout with what may be called 'case histories', useful for any *unspecified* and therefore *relatively unpredictable* time in the future.

In its special Thucydidean form this kind of recurrence thinking made little or no appearance in the pages of Polybius. However, in that the

¹ We know Thucydides intended to carry his *Historiae* as far as 404 B.C.; if he was writing as late as that, or even later, would he have been in a position to forecast yet another major struggle, emerging this time out of Greek fear of Spartan domination? (Cf. Diodorus Siculus, XIV, vi, 1-3 on the year 404 BC). Most commentators, however, refer the comment to the distant future; see esp. A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Oxford, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 149-150 (note his comments on the Second World War!), cf. P.J. Fliess, *Thucydides and the Politics of Bi-Polarity*, Baton Rouge, 1966, *passim*, (note his comments on the Cold War!). G.B. Grundy (in his *Thucydides and the History of His Age*, London, 1911, p.8) ascribes to Thucydides a belief in historical cycles, yet although this view is not entirely without warrant, Thucydides did not employ the appropriate cyclical terminology.

² Cochrane, *op.cit.*, *passim*.

Achaeon extracted practical lessons from history which he considered to be applicable for the future)cf. esp. IX, x, 13; XII, xxv^b, 2-3; cf. xxv^e, 5-6),¹ in that he made general observations about human nature (about the psychology of men under stress, for instance,² or the animalization of men under certain extreme conditions),³ and in that he presented patterns of social behaviour paradigmatically,⁴ he appealed both to the permanency of human nature and to the recurrence of characteristic behaviour patterns. This was in keeping with his constitutional theory (for human motivations are distinguishable from naturo-biological operations in the *Anacyclōsis* even though they were bound up in the same process),⁵ and it also remained in keeping with his approach to altered fortunes and the moral order (since these matters involved assessments of character).

The classical heritage, we may therefore reaffirm, contained a rich store of recurrence paradigms, and it is certainly false to generalize about them as cyclical when so much else remains. Polybius' history best

¹ I have selected the examples most closely connected with the stance of Thucydides, but note also numerous other cases of pragmatic didacticism for students, politicians and soldiers, cf. I, lxxi, 7; II, iv, 5; ix, 6; lvi, 9-10; IV, xi, 7f.; xxxiv, 2, etc..

² See esp. II, xxxv, 8-10; IV, viii; xxi; XI, ii, 10-11; xxv, 7; xxviii, 2; XVI, x, 2-4; and of some relevance, IV, xxx, 4-6; xxxviii, 10; xxi, 6, etc..

³ See esp. I, lxv, 8; lxvii, 6; lxxx, 7-10; II, xxx, 4; X, xli, 7; XIII, vii; XVI, xxiv, 4; XXXII, iii, 7, cf. also VI, v, 6-9; ix, 9; xxi, 6.

⁴ Cf. esp. A. Roveri, *op.cit.*, pp. 112-140 for an excellent discussion, though he has tended to neglect Polybius' social psychological interests as they are reflected, for example, in I, xxxi, 6; lxv, 8; II, xix, 4; xxxv, 8, for these are passages which Roveri discusses (on pp. 112, 119, 121, 122) more in terms of ethical and military lessons, cf. also his p. 124. Also on proverbs, aphorisms, etc. about human nature and behaviour in Polybius, cf. esp. XXIX, xvii, 2; XXXI, xiii, 12-14; xvi, 3; XXXIII, iv, 3-4; v, 3-4; xxi, 1, etc..

⁵ On distinctions here, cf. *supra*, pp. 39ff., and see K.E. Petzold, a review of Eisen's *Polybiasinterpretationen*, in *Gnomon*, XLII, 1970, p. 389.

⁶ Views i, ii, iii, vi, vii, ix, as presented in the Introduction have already made their appearance; on views v and viii (two kinds), see addendum *infra*.

illustrates the genuine diversity of recurrence conceptions. At the risk of appealing to a notion of recurrence myself, one might rank his writings as a high-point or maturation-point of this kind of thinking, since he has drawn such a variety of ideas together. Moreover, although the *Historiae* hardly contain allusions to every known and every possible node of relevance, they reflect a distinctive Graeco-Roman concern to put intelligibility into historical change and thus equip men for action. And we have found still more than this about classical historical thought. Especially (though not exclusively) in connection with ethics, appeals to recurrent configurations or operative principles afforded a way of disclosing 'the meaning of history.'¹ Images of recurrence, in the main, were used reflectively in historiography; events were coloured by these images through 'hindsight' more than by the judgement of immediate involvement. An historian would usually survey a broad complex, such as a great war or the emergence of a great power (happenings which have a certain 'recognizability' themselves), and he was then left to elicit the profiles, the special meanings and causal factors in more particular events and situations within his chosen compass. And it is unsatisfactory to describe Graeco-Roman historical thought as 'humanistic', for the ancients could emphasize more than one kind of *aitiai*, and were commonly preoccupied with extra-human or even divine principles as the key to history's *logos*. In this crucial respect Graeco-Roman historiographical preconceptions were not dissimilar to those of the other 'intellectual tradition' which has had such a decisive impact

¹ Cf. K.Löwith, *Meaning in History*, Chicago, 1949, pp.4-9, who implies that the Greek historians were not capable of grasping the exceptional and the unique. This over-contrasts Greek and Christian approaches to uniqueness, for the recognition of the unique in classical and Hellenistic Greek historiography, see esp. Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 60; VII, 20; VIII, 105; 135; IX, 64, cf. 60; 78 and see III, 160; IX, 35; 78, etc.; Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, i (3); 21; 138; II, 8; IV, 40; Theopompus, *Frsg.* 19, *FGH.*, pt.2b, pp.529-30; Polybius, *Hist.*, I, i, 51; lxiii, 4-8; lxxxviii, 7; II, xxxv, 2; xxxvii, 6; III, ciii, 4; cvii, 9; VI, ii, 3; VIII, ii, 4; XIV, v, 13-14, etc..

on western thought - the biblical tradition. If we are accustomed to the forced Greek-cyclical/Judeo-Christian-lineal dichotomy, it may well come as a surprise that, in the biblical tradition also, history was commonly endowed with intelligibility and theological significance in recurrence terms. Thus we may now turn both 'backwards and sideways' to the complex world of biblical and ancient Near Eastern literature.

ADDENDUM

Special Cases of Recurrence

There is a motley of Graeco-Roman recurrence ideas which do not fit neatly into any of the previously stated categories, but which form a miscellany concerned with very particular instances of recurrence. An historian may have perceived, for example, that two events possessed

something *special in common* to warrant his own pointed comments, as did Florus (second century AD) when he noted that the assassination of Caesar by Brutus was like the earlier Brutus' expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus.¹ Again, the historian could describe one agent's behaviour as a conscious *imitation* of the acts of another, like Theseus duplicating the labours of Heracles.² A related preoccupation here would be the historian's encouragement of his readers to emulate the noble deeds of the past,³ and so effect recurrence by such re-enactment. To take a third case, there might be at least two parallel sets of phenomena which both teach the same lesson and which even share special similarities. Some of Plutarch's observations in the renowned *Vitae* may be noted. Not untypical of Plutarch are those lessons he drew from a comparison of Demetrius I and Mark Anthony, when he concluded that 'both were insolent in prosperity, both abandoned themselves to luxuries and enjoyments', and so both 'had only to thank themselves for their final disasters.'⁴ He occasionally became much more specific, however, as in a fascinating passage where he compared the careers of Demosthenes and Cicero:

¹ *Epitome*, II, xvii, 7. Another example of interest with a mixture of Jewish and Hellenistic presuppositions may be found with Josephus' assertions (in the first century AD) that the Jerusalemite temple fell to Titus in 70 AD 'on the very day of the very month on which the former times the temple had been burnt by Babylonians' (*Bellum Judaicum*, VI, 267-8; cf. also his *Antiquities* at XII, vii, 6, where it is said that Antiochus Epiphanes' desecration of the temple and the restoration of sacrifices under Judas Maccabees occurred on the same date, but with three years in between). Also, concerning parallel occurrences on the very same day, cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, VII, 166; Timaeus, *apud* Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Arch.*, I, lxxiv, 1; Ennius, *Annales*, Frg. 501 (Vahlen edit.)..

² Cf. Diodorus Siculus, *Biblioth.*, IV, lix, 1, cf. I, ii, 4; and see XVI, xliii, 3, cf. XII, ix, 6, and Plutarch, *Vit. Thes.*, xxix, 3, for other imitations of Heracles. Cf. also, *ibid.*, Poplicola and Solon Compared, i, 1.

³ Note *ibid.*, esp. Timoleon, i, 1, Livy, *Ab Urbe*, I, proem. 10, etc., and amongst the rhetoricians, of course, Aspasia (?) *apud* Plato, *Menexenus*, 246D ff., Isocrates, *Paneg.*, xxi, ff., Aeschines, *Contra Timarchum*, xxv-xxvi, etc..

⁴ Plutarch, *Vit.*, Demetrius and Antony compared, iii, 1ff..

'The divine power seems originally to have designed Demosthenes and Cicero upon the same plan, giving them many similarities in their natural characters, such as their passion for distinction and their love of liberty in civil life, and their want of courage in dangers and war, and at the same time also to have added many accidental resemblances. I think there can hardly be found two orators, who, from small and obscure beginnings, became so great and mighty; who both contested with kings and tyrants; both lost their daughters, were driven out of their country, and returned with honour; who, flying from thence again, were both seized upon by their enemies, and at last ended their lives with the liberty of their countrymen.' (*Vit. Demosth.* iii, 2-3). ¹

There remains a concern here for overriding principles, yet at the same time the interest in striking resemblances between particular events and characters, and in resemblances elicited for their own sake, comes out very forcefully. Such parallels could be drawn between more normative event-complexes as against biographical details, as when Thucydides subtly likened the Persian invasion of Hellas to the Athenian expedition to Sicily as two cases in which the diminishment of supplies was a crucial factor (*Hist.*, VI, 33 (5-6)). ²

This miscellany does not merely include the obvious forms of parallelism. Two events may have some similarity yet be antithetical in relation to each other, but recurrence may still be suggested. When Herodotus, for example, reported how Xerxes lashed the unpredictable Hellespont, the reader was immediately meant to be reminded of a similar act by Cyrus, who, on preparing for his victory over Babylon, 'punished' the river Gyndes, which had drowned his horse, yet by rather sensibly dividing it into hundreds of passable channels (cf. *Hist.*, I, 189-90; VII, 34-36). Again, an idea of historical repetition may be conveyed by depicting history's

¹ See also *ibid.*, Aristides and Marcus Cato Compared, i, 1. On the 'general structure' of Plutarch's *Bioi* and on the background to some of Plutarch's conceptions in Aristotle, see D.A. Russell, 'On Reading Plutarch's Lives', in *Greece and Rome*, Ser. 2, XIII, 1966, pp. 144-9.

² i.e. in the proleptic speech of Hermocrates, where there is the suggestion that, if during the Persian War, the Athenians were the liberators of Greece, now during the Peloponnesian War, it was the Syracusans who were liberating Hellas. On speeches in Thucydides, cf. I, 22 (1). Cf. Aspasia (?) *apud* Plato, *Menex.*, 239B, Isocrates, *Paneg.*, lxxvii-lxxii on Athens as the 'recurrent' liberators of Hellas.

protagonists as special human types. Take some comparable personality-types in Herodotus, such as King Croesus, who became adviser to Cyrus, and Artabanus, who counselled Xerxes. Both mentors held to parallel values, and both were faced with the same kinds of situations (esp. I, 207-8; VII, 10; 16; 46-51). In Thucydides, Pericles (the ideal democratic politician) and Cleon (the demagogic *bête noire*) find their counterparts in the two different approaches of the Sicilian politicians, Hermocrates and Athenagoras.¹ And in Xenophon one should note recurrent references to those good *stratēgoi* who share in common a concern for strong military discipline.²

Finally, there remains the rather complex area associated with such notions as restoration, renewal, rebirth and the like.³ Such conceptions could be integrated with cyclical frameworks - with doctrines of returning Ages, for instance - but they can be placed in greater isolation. When these ideas are taken as a separate bundle, of course, not all of them have real significance for us. Aristotle's assertions that Theramenes (at the end of the fifth century BC) wished to restore the old Solonian constitution in Athens (*Ath. Pol.*, xxiv), or Augustus' claim that he himself restored many of the customs of his ancestors (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, viii), do not strictly disclose presuppositions or views about historical recurrence. On the other hand, occasional passages concerning restoration, renewal, re-establishment, etc., persuade us that the writer does harbour relevant preconceptions, such as with Dio Cassius' (*flor.* 194-205 AD) claim that, upon Julius Caesar's arrival in Rome (43 BC), 'everything once done in the days of Sulla occurred also at this time',⁴ and with the contentions of

¹ See esp. *Hist.*, I, 107; II, 13; 22; 65; (concerning Periclean policy); III, 36-40; IV, 21; 27 ff (Cleon), cf. VI, 32-34; 76-80, 99, etc (Hermocrates' policy), VI, 35-40 (Athenagoras). See also, J.H. Finley, 'The Unity of Thucydides' History', in *Athenian Studies* (to W.S. Ferguson), Cambridge, Mass., 1940, pp. 284-9.

² See H.D. Westlake, *Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History*, Manchester, 1969, p.207 for Xenophon on Hermocrates, Agesilaus, Teleutias, Ephicrates and Jason.

³ The Latin language is replete with relevant words: *restauro*, *instauro*, *renovo*, *nascor*, *revirisco*, *reparo*, etc.

⁴ Especially the effecting of extreme measures: *Τά τε ἅλλα, ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῦ*

'Vopiscus' (fourth century) that Augustus restored (*reparata*) Rome's old greatness after a period of 'wasting away' (*Vita Cari*, III, 1).

Some of these miscellaneous ideas find a place in Polybius. Certainly he was fascinated by parallelism or close similarity (τό παραπλήσιον). He drew out the remarkable similarities between Epameinondas' march on Sparta and Hannibal's march on Rome, both of these strategies being unexpectedly thwarted when the moment of victory was nigh (IX, viii, 1 - ix, 4). He paralleled Philip II and Alexander with Philip V and Perseus by contending that what each father had planned, each son put into effect (XXII, xviii, 10). And to take a 'horizontal' rather than a 'linear' case, he remarked on the extraordinary likenesses between those men who controlled the destinies of Carthage and Hellas at the moment of their ruin - Hasdrubal and Critolaus (XXXVIII, viii, 14-15).¹ In view of the connections forged between the Spartan and Roman *politeiai* in Bk. VI, it was natural he should stress the resemblances in the characters and principles of Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Lycurgus the legislator (παραπλησίαν ἐσχηκέναι φύσιν καὶ προαίρεσιν) (X, ii, 8), and he noted other such parallel sets of political behaviour (cf. XV, xxxv).² And if he gives no example of any protagonist emulating a great man from the past, he clearly fosters the idea that 'virtuous' deeds (both in the pragmatical and ethical sense) should be imitated, at least by the politically active.

Σύλλου πρότερον ἐπέπρακτο, καὶ τότε συνεφέρετο, i.e. everything that went with murders by proscription, except that only two white tablets were posted, one for senators and one for others (*Hist. Rom.*, XLVII, iii, 2; cf. iii, 1-v, 1)

¹ We may assume Critolaus is meant by this passage, thus the phrases τοῦτο δ' ἔσται δῆλον, ὅταν ἐκ παραθέσεως τὸν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ποιησάμεθα λόγον (15), look to xi, 3 - xiii, 9.

² Cf. also I, xxxi, 4-5 (Regulus), XVIII, xxxix, 4 (Flaminius), XXXVIII, viii, 4 (Scipio Aemilianus) on the recurring apprehension of consuls about their replacements.

³ See esp. II, lxi, 3; X, xxi, 4 (xxiv, 4); XI, viii, 7; XV, xxxvi, 3-4, XXII, (XXI), xvi, 3, etc.

CHAPTER THREE

NOTIONS OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN LUKE AND THE BIBLICAL TRADITION

In editing documents from the period 336 BC - AD 337, Sir Ernest Barker compared the Polybian *Anacyclōsis* with chapter vii of the contemporaneous Jewish tract *Daniel*. Whilst admitting that both writings shared in common 'a scheme of world history,...a doctrine of change and a succession of epochs', Barker still noted obvious differences. The anonymous author of *Daniel* certainly conceived external history as a succession of empires - four to be specific - but he looked ahead to 'the true end and consummation of history', the 'divine cosmic event', rather than to the constant perpetuation of *metabolai* 'based on a principle'. For the Jew history itself has no 'inner logic', and Barker considers his doctrine of succession to be 'merely temporal', a doctrine which, being influenced by the Zoroastrian idea of fixed time periods, was 'stamped on to historical vicissitudes rather than elicited from them'.¹ As *Daniel* was no piece of history-writing, this comparison is somewhat unfair, but at least it sets one thinking about the historical outlook of the monotheistic world behind our 'western tradition'. That world has not generally been celebrated for its ideas of historical recurrence, and one might well ask why we are considering the biblical heritage at all. Barker's allusions to succession and periodicity provide the first clues, but the detailed analysis of Jewish and early Christian historiography that follows will disclose many others.

We should begin, however, with the admission that there exists a widely accepted contrast between the 'Graeco-Roman cyclical' and the 'Judeo-Christian linear' approaches to time and history.² It is often contended

¹ From *Alexander to Constantine; passages and documents illustrating the history of social and political ideas 336BC - AD337*, Oxford, 1956, p.104, cf. pp.103-128. *Daniel* is almost unanimously dated to the late 160's BC.

² See esp. E. Franck, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, London,

that one great legacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition was the 'straight-line' view of history, the view that history ran from Creation and God's first covenants with man to the future, eschatological fulfilment of his promises. The 'Greeks' or Graeco-Roman ancients, by contrast, even when they wrote of catastrophes and cosmic conflagrations, are taken to acknowledge no such final and unrepeatable events. It is often supposed that theirs was a cyclic view of history, even time, that they insisted on the eternal return of what had been before, whilst the Hebrews 'thought the sequence of historical events' to be 'a purposive movement towards a goal', something 'non-recurrent, non-reversible and unique'.¹ As we shall see, such a contrast should be eyed with caution. There also remains a related dichotomy between Hebrew linear thinking and non-Hebrew cyclicism, one created by those studying Near and Middle Eastern literature written prior to the movement of Hellenization. Yahwist rejection of nature worship and mythology, and of a time-view heavily influenced by beliefs in the annual and cyclical rejuvenation of the world order, has been highlighted by such leading writers as Mowinckel and Noth.² Their comparisons between biblical

1945 (52), pp. 67ff., A-H. Chroust, 'The Metaphysics of Time and History in Early Christian Thought', in *The New Scholasticism*, XIX, 1945, esp. pp. 329ff.; R. Niebuhr, *Faith and History*, New York, 1949, pp. 42ff.; K. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, op. cit., pp. 4ff.; J. Baillie, *The Belief in Progress*, London, 1950, pp. 52ff.; T. Boman, *Das hebräische Denken in Vergleich mit dem Griechischen*, Göttingen, 1954 edn., (ET, 1960), ch. 3; R. Bultmann, *History and Eschatology*, (Gifford Lectures 1955), Edinburgh, 1957, esp. pp. 5, 15; P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, London, 1964, vol. 3, pp. 374ff.; J. L. Russell, 'Time in Christian Thought', in *The Voices of Time*, (ed. J. T. Fraser), op. cit., pp. 68-69. Cf., also C. Dawson, *Progress and Religion; an historical enquiry*, London, 1929, pp. 142ff., etc. For one effective criticism of this contrast, see A. Momigliano, 'Time in Ancient Historiography', in his *Quarto Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico (Storia e Letteratura CXV)*, Rome, 1969, pp. 13ff., cf. also P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Temps des Dieux et Temps des Hommes; Essai sur Quelques Aspects de l'Expérience Temporelle chez les Grecs', in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, CLVII, 1960, pp. 55ff (on the complexities of Greek thinking about time from Homer to Plato), and W. Eichrodt, 'Heilserfahrung und Zeitverständnis im Alten Testament', in *Theologische Zeitschrift*, XII, 1956, pp. 103ff. (for a critique of Boman's special position).

¹ See J. Barr, *Biblical Words for Time (Studies in Biblical Theology XXXIII)*, London, 1962, p. 140, for the quotations and an excellent criticism of prevailing views.

² See S. Mowinckel, *He That Cometh*, (ET), Oxford, 1959, pp. 151-2; M. Noth, 'God, King and Nation', in *The Laws in the Pentateuch and other Essays*,

and 'foreign' conceptions concern a special and early context, yet they have strengthened the wedge between 'Greek' and 'Hebrew' views of history.

The real strength of this wedge, though, depends on Jewish eschatological ideas, and one should stress that expectations of an imminent end to history arose with post-exilic Judaism, early Israelite historiography not being known either for its apocalypticism or for broad schematizations of world history.¹ Now certainly anyone expecting an utterly decisive end to history would be precluded from speculating about the perpetual return of previous conditions,² but more limited teleologies - anticipations of a future restoration or establishment in power, for instance³ - offer less support for a strong contrast between Hebrew and non-Hebrew conceptions. And taking the more apocalyptic positions themselves, just because a given approach to history may entail belief in the coming of an all-important end-time, it does not automatically follow that it will be non-cyclical. The

(ET), Edinburgh, 1967, pp. 145-154, 164-7. Mowinckel sought to include the Greeks amongst peoples who 'conceived the course of history as a circle corresponding to the annual cycle of the life of nature', and thus virtually committed himself to a very broad generalization about the non-Hebrew outlook on history. Noth, in his essay, attacked 'the myth and ritual school', arguing that Hebrew attitudes under the monarchy were not dominated by cyclical conceptions; yet cf. his *History of Israel*, (ET), London, 1960 edn., pp. 220-1. On the 'myth and ritual' or 'Pan-Babylonian' school, see esp. S.G.F. Brandon, 'The Myth and Ritual position critically considered', in *Myth, Ritual and Kingship; Essays on the Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and Israel*, (ed. S.H. Hooke), Oxford, 1958, pp. 284-288; H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods; a study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the integration of society and nature (An Oriental Institute Essay)*, Chicago, 1948, esp. pp. 337ff; Noth, loc. cit., pp. 149-172; G. von Rad, *The Message of the Prophets*, (ET), London, 1968, pp. 83-8.

¹ The concern of the 'Deuteronomic historian', for example, (pp. 270 ff.) was to account for the circumstances facing Israel in his own day, at the time of the Babylonian exile. Even the 'Chronicler', writing during the restoration period (pp. 276 ff.), does not seem to look ahead to any conclusive occurrence, or to any 'Day of Yahweh' that had the eschatological ring of a later age. (Cf. Mowinckel, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-3, 142-154, etc.; G. von Rad, *op. cit.*, ch. 8, on the 'Day of Yahweh' and its complicated history).

² To that extent the arguments of O. Cullmann in *Christ and Time; the primitive Christian conception of time and history*, (ET), London, 1962 ed., pp. 51-60, have to be taken very seriously, and note the literature cited there.

³ Cf., e.g., II Sam., vii, 13; 16 and its implications concerning the future re-establishment of the Davidic kingdom.

Zoroastrian picture of world (or cosmic) history is a case in point. Here the doctrine of the future, final victory of Ahura Mazda over Ahriman is coupled with a notion of history's twelve successive Ages, each equal in length - and this notion Barker, for one, has no compunction in calling cyclical.¹ Despite early Christian eschatology, moreover, Joachim Jeremias is happy to accept 'for the New Testament the conception that world history proceeds in circular movements', since it contains so much talk of Ages (*aiones*).² Such comments as these naturally cast a shadow of doubt over a well-worn distinction.

On the other hand, there is some value in differentiating here between views of time or cosmic process and views of historical change. The ancient Hebrews and early Christians were clearly opposed to the belief in an 'eternal return'. Admittedly, the Israelites participated in yearly festivals, and they could speak of the 'return', the 'coming around' or the 'circuit' of seasons and natural periods.³ But it is remarkable how they still managed to think historically when, for their immediate neighbours at any rate, human life saw its 'Verhaftung im geschichtslosen Naturmythus, in zyklischen Kreislaufvorstellungen und magischen Schicksalsbestimmungen'.⁴ Furthermore,

¹ *Op.cit.*, p.104, and on the Zoroastrian picture of history, see esp. Pahlavi texts (trans. E.W. West), in *Sacred Books of the East*, (ed. F.M. Müller), vol.1, pt.1, (Oxford, 1880), *Bundahish*, I, III, XXX, XXXIV esp.; cf. H. Corbin, 'Cyclical time in Mazdaism and Ismailism', in *Man and Time; Papers from the Eranos Year Books*, London, 1958 (fr. *Eranos-Jahrbücher*, XX, 1951), pp.115ff..

² For the quotation see Cullmann, *op.cit.*, p.52 (in n.3, fr.p.51). Because of his strictly linear interpretation, Cullmann was quite confused by Jeremias' views; but the fact remains, NT talk about Ages is in some sense talk about cycles and recurring historical processes, though without denial of the eschatological goal of history (which is just how Jeremias sees the matter in *Jesus als Weltvollender*, Gütersloh, 1930, pp.8ff.).

³ Cf. J. Barr, *op.cit.*, p.141 on *II Sam.*, xi,1; *I Kgs.*, xx,22, *Isa.*, xxix,1 and *Job*, i,5; and T. Boman, *op.cit.*, (ET) (SCM Lib.Hist.Doc.), p.135 on *Exod.*, xxxiv, 22, *I Sam.*, i,20, *II Kgs.*, xx,26, *I Chron.*, xx,1, *II Chron.*, xxiv,23 and xxxvi,10; cf. also *Ps.*, civ,29-30. On neo-Babylonian chronicles, *ANET*, pp.301ff.; on Aristotle, see *supra*, pp.119-20.

⁴ So V. Hamp, 'Geschichtsschreibung im Alten Testament' in *Speculum Historiale; Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung*, (ed. C. Bauer, J. Boehm, M. Müller), Munich, 1965, p.134. The 'Canaanites' and the 'Phoenicians', as they are loosely called, have left no historical works.

when late Jewish and early Christian thinkers came under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy, they refused to abandon themselves to the cyclical cosmologies and quasi-cosmological catastrophe theory of the time.¹ Such reactions against cyclic time and cosmology was bound to affect biblical historiography. And after all, there are distinctive biblical attitudes towards key events and covenants in the past. The special achievements of heroes and rulers, or the curiosity value of certain incidents counted far less for the monotheists of the Bible than the ways by which Yahweh had established a relationship with his people. To this extent at least, then, the 'Judeo-Christian-linear'-'Greek-cyclical' contrast still has worth. We are going to maintain in this chapter, however, that paradigms of recurrence, including cyclo-alternatory ones, were certainly not foreign to Hebrew and early Christian interpretations of historical change.

To clarify important issues, it is useful to reflect on some recent arguments put forward by B. Albrekston. Surveying historiography in the Ancient Near East, Albrekston is not prepared to ascribe any cyclical views to those Mesopotamian records so often compared with OT histories. Putting aside the Babylonian New Year Festival and its parallels as of no real relevance to ancient attempts at interpreting historical events, he refuses to consider Mesopotamian notions of historical 'undulations' (alternating fortunes, rise and fall, etc.), or schematizations into periods, as cyclical notions.² One wonders, then, what he would consider to be a cyclical notion, and whether he would restrict it to an idea of exact cyclical repetition, appealing to Stoic or neo-Pythagorean systems, or to views of history with the strong implication

¹ *Ecclesiastes*, for instance, the cyclical aspects of which we will treat later (on p.285), confines itself to historical, terrestrial existence; and for the entrenchment of eschatological ideas (particularly those concerning the final Judgement of God) in the late Judaism and early Christianity of Alexandria, see esp. G.W. Trompf, 'The conception of God in Hebrews 4:12-13', in *Studia Theologica*, XXV, 1971, pp.125ff.. On Origen, see *infra*, ch.4.

² *History and the Gods; an essay on the idea of historical events as divine manifestations in the Ancient Near East and Israel (Coniectanea Biblica, OT Ser.I)*, London, 1967, pp.93-5.

of an eternal return. My contention is that this unduly restrictive approach is not very useful.¹ As we have shown, the minimal expectation from a cyclical view is simply the recurrence of the same stages of development, together with the idea of a return to an original set of general conditions. The exact or detailed repetition of events or characteristics is not a necessary prerequisite, and it does not square with ancient presuppositions to rate alternatory or undulatory conceptions as non-cyclical (so, ch.2). Albrekston's position nicely demonstrates how definitions can affect interpretation, even though he is handling the same data available to others. Furthermore, his argument not only reflects weaknesses in the linear-cyclical contrast, but also encourages us to reinforce our early claim that notions of historical recurrence are not exhausted by cyclical ideas (p.1). Interestingly enough, Albrekston correctly argued that the search for law-like principles underlying historical events was 'not in itself equivalent to a cyclic view of history',² but drew the misleading conclusion that what he considered to be non-cyclical

¹ One might be tempted to level the same criticism against Barr, who, on quoting Aristotle (it should have been pseudo-Aristotle) on 'human things are a circle', denied that this statement reflected 'a cyclic view of time', but that the writer was only making 'a rather obvious judgement from the fact that human realities come to be and pass away' (*op.cit.*, pp.140-1). Barr, however, (who seems to appeal to the Pythagoreans and Stoics as the paradigm cases of cyclicism on p.140, n.2), is discussing views of time and not history (cf. his classifications on p.142), though how he can get away with contending, on the one hand, that Aristotle's statement 'can hardly be called a 'cyclic view of time'', and on the other, that Qoheleth, who made 'exactly the same point' (p.141), reflects 'in some sense a cyclic view of time' (p.140), is beyond me. Concerning Aristotle's statement about the *cyclos* of time (fr. *Physica* 223b28f, a reference Barr misses), Boman makes a similar judgement to Barr's on pseudo-Aristotle, mainly against Cullmann (*op.cit.*, p.125), yet he is prepared to contrast the Hebrew 'rhythmic' and the 'spatially determined' Greek views of time (*op.cit.*, pp.122-137), an approach which does not do justice to the richness of Greek notions at least, and which is based on too many lexical and folk-psychological inferences difficult to substantiate. On the background to Boman's treatment, cf. esp. E. von Dobschütz, 'Zeit und Raum im Denken des Urchristentums', in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XLI, 1922, pp. 212ff.. Another of Albrekston's arguments is not sufficient: that it was not so much a different understanding of history as a different conception of the deity which separates Israel from her neighbours, 'the possible difference in the view of the divine purpose' being 'only a corollary' (*op.cit.*, p.96). Whether as corollary to a special idea of God or not, I think the distinctive features of biblical approaches to the historical order still have to be reckoned with.

² *Ibid.*, p. 94, n. 87.

approaches were merely linear, when in fact at the very least, and without involving the label 'cyclical' at all, they might tell us something about the preoccupation with recurring historical phenomena. On considering recurrence (rather than specifically cyclical) ideas, one is by no means left with that cut-and-dried issue bequeathed to us either by Albrekston or other espousers of the linear-cyclical dichotomy. This applies no less to the later biblical material than to the earlier, and it is a central purpose of this chapter to establish this very point. In the early Christian work *Luke-Acts*, (once described by Eduard Meyer as the greatest historiographical achievement between Polybius and Poseidonius),¹ there lies an impressive variety of recurrence ideas, and many of these have their background in Hebrew as well as Hellenistic historical thought.²

¹ *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, Berlin, 1921, vol. 1, p. 2.

² Mindful of R.G. Collingwood's premature observations on Hebrew historical thought (for he argued that the Israelites and their neighbours only succeeded in writing 'theocratic' or 'quasi-history', whilst 'humanistic' or 'scientific' history was achieved by the Greeks [*The Idea of History*, Oxford, 1946, pp. 14-31]), this study considers Israelite-Jewish works where we have the least difficulty in calling historical (the Deuteronomistic history, the books of the Chronicler, *I Maccabees*, Josephus), works about which more favourable claims have been made. It has been asserted by biblical and oriental scholars, moreover, that the author of the so-called Succession Narrative (*II Sam.*, ix-*I Kgs.*, ii within the Deuteronomistic history) was the 'father of history' before Herodotus (see esp. L. Rost, *Die Überlieferung von der Thronnachfolge Davids*, Stuttgart, 1926, *passim*; G. von Rad, *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays* (= *Gesammelte Studien zum AT*) (ET), Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 176-204; R.N. Whybray, *The Succession Narrative; a study of II Sam.*, 9-20, *I Kings* 1 and 2, (*Studies in Biblical Theology*, N.S. IX), London, 1968; cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, Berlin, 1921, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 227ff.. On Herodotus, cf. J. Myres, *Herodotus, Father of History*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 60ff; Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 17ff. On the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler, see esp. M. Noth, *Überlieferungsgeschichte Studien I, die sammelnden und bearbeitenden Geschichtswerke im Alten Testament*, Halle, 1943 (1957 rev.), pp. 3ff; 110ff.; G. von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, (ET), Edinburgh, 1962, vol. 1, pp. 334-354; A.S. Kapelrud, 'The Question of Authorship in the Ezra-narrative - a Lexical Investigation', in *Skrifter utgitt av det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi*, Oslo, 1944, esp. pp. 95-7. For the rest, it is hardly unimportant that *I Macc.*, Josephus' *Antiquitates* and *Bellum Judaicum*, as well as *Luke-Acts*, were written under the influence of Hellenistic historiographical canons. Other examples of Israelite-Jewish historical thinking will be touched upon. The *Genesis-Exodus* narrative will not be subjected to close examination, but I refer to the Priestly writer's schematization of history on p. 301. Also, on apocalyptic theories of history, see pp. 302ff, and for the views of Philo Judaeus, pp. 286ff.. With respect to Collingwood, whilst admitting that the subject of Israelite historiography was often Yahweh, the Hebrews were hardly uninterested in psychology or human achievement; and whilst acknowledging that much of the content of biblical narrative might not pass, given modern critical standards,

A) Luke-Acts and the Re-enactment of Significant Events

The Gospel of *Luke* and the book of *Acts*, conventionally ascribed to one of the travelling companions of Paul (cf *Col.*, iv, 14; *II Tim.*, iv, 11), comprise two volumes of a famous (late first century?) New Testament work. I am arguing that these volumes have an important and interesting place in the history of recurrence ideas. They reflect notions which derive from both Hebraic and Graeco-Roman *milieux*, leading us to look back into the OT world whilst at the same time allowing us to continue our story from Polybius.

Luke-Acts has been described as the 'burning issue' or 'storm centre' of NT scholarship.¹ After prolonged discussion on Luke's reliability, as well as his special christological and eschatological positions, there is now a pressing need to examine Luke's relationship to Israelite-Jewish and Graeco-Roman historiography. One useful way of doing this is to trace notions of historical recurrence in his writing. Despite all the doubts surrounding the real authorship of *Luke-Acts*, as well as its date and provenance,² one can

for 'history' (as distinct from 'legend', 'saga', 'anecdote', 'genealogy' or even 'theology'), Israelite writers should first be judged here by their intentions to recount what actually happened, and only secondarily by our presuppositions about the nature of historicity.

¹ So E. Käsemann in *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen*, Göttingen, 1960, vol. 1, p. 8, and W. van Unnik, 'Luke-Acts, a storm center of contemporary scholarship' in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, (P. Schubert Festschrift) (eds. L. E. Keck and J. L. Martyn), London, 1968, p. 15.

² On key questions of reliability note esp. F. J. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity* (vol. 4, London, 1933); M. Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles*, (ET), London, 1956, esp. ch. 6; E. Haenchen, 'Tradition und Komposition in der Apostelgeschichte', in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LII, 1955, pp. 205ff., cf. his 'Das "Wir" in der Apostelgeschichte und das Itinerar', in *Ibid.*, LVIII, 1961, pp. 329ff.; E. Trocmé, *Le Livre des Actes et l'Histoire*, Paris, 1957; H. J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts*, London, 1958 edn., esp. pt. 1 (and *The Book of Acts in History*, London, 1955); R. Bultmann, 'Zur Frage nach den Quellen der Apostelgeschichte' in *New Testament Essays*, (T. W. Manson Festschrift), (ed. A. J. B. Higgins), Manchester, 1959, pp. 68ff.; J. Dupont, *Les Sources du Livre des Actes*, Bruges, 1960; C. K. Barrett, *Luke the Historian in Recent Study*, London, 1961; W. W. Gasque and R. P. Martin, (eds.), *Apostolic History and the Gospel*, (F. F. Bruce Festschrift), Exeter, 1970 (various contributions); cf. Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Book of Acts*, Manchester, 1969. On dating, note esp. J. C. O'Neill, *The Theology of Acts*, London, 1971 edn., ch. 1, for the possibility of an early second century placing. Concerning provenance, Eusebius of Caesarea's association of Luke with Antioch is seminal (*Ecclesiastica Historia*, III, iv, 6, and for discussion, esp. M. Wilcox, *The Semitisms of Acts*, Oxford, 1965, pp. 178-9).

be now more definite about Lukan presuppositions and intentions. The debate over Luke's status as theologian or historian notwithstanding, it may be fairly contended that Luke, before all other NT writers, saw himself to be writing history. Discussing the central section of the Gospel elsewhere, I have argued that Luke arranged and interpreted Jesus' teaching and activity so as to make plain 'l'essence du message de Jésus', to show 'quel genre de maître était Jésus et quelle sorte de *didachê* il donnait'.¹ In this section the 'kerygma' was only allowed to persuade in terms of a 'factual' narrative, and the same may be said of *Luke-Acts* as a whole. It is an important premise of this present study that Luke respected and criticized sources more like a historian than an evangelist, and that his primary concern was to demonstrate for enquirers what Jesus was really like as an historical personage, and how the Christian message spread rapidly beyond Galilee and Judaea, eventually reaching the hub of the Roman empire (see Excursus 2). However, this is not to deny that Luke was a believing historian, thoroughly sympathetic towards the chief protagonists of whom he wrote, and also a child of ancient, modern historiography. This meant that he inevitably brought theological presuppositions to bear on his picture of Jesus and the early Christians, and was hardly unconcerned to gauge the persuasive effect of his writings on the unconverted and suspicious. Now it is of paramount importance that, amongst the theologically significant notions behind his account, or amongst the conceptions of historical change he brought to his task, there lie forms of recurrence thinking.

It has been rightly contended that in *Acts* one finds the church re-enacting the life, death and resurrection of (Luke's) Christ, but this claim has so far been poorly or else over-imaginatively defended.² The general argument of M.D.Goulder, for example, fails to convince. According to his

¹ Trompf, 'La Section Mediane de l'Évangile de Luc; l'Organisation des Documents', in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses*, LIII, 1973, p.144.

² See M.D.Goulder, *Type and History in Acts*, London, 1964, esp. pp.34ff, et passim. On the work of Morgenthau also, see *infra*, p.208.

Type and History in Acts, certain cycles and patterned structures are evident in both *Luke* and *Acts*, and Goulder even sought to work out elaborate parallels, catena by catena, between the first and second volumes.¹ On the whole, he has foisted frameworks upon a *Luke* whose all-too rich and complicated handiwork cannot sustain them, and in the end they appear more like the figments of Goulder's creative typologistic imagination than the ingredients of Lukan theology.²

Central Cases of Re-enactment

We begin our examination of *Luke-Acts* by considering some significant parallels between both volumes, parallels which disclose *Luke's* interest in the re-enactment of Jesus' life, death and resurrection by the apostles and missionaries of the earliest church, or more generally, his interest in the

¹ *Op.cit.*, esp. pp. 16-17, 22, 26, 40, 61, 72-4, 83-4, 101, 138, etc..

² For an important review of Goulder's book, see J.L. Houlden, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, XVII, 1966, pp. 143-5. It is not easy to write in the wake of Goulder's attempts, one may add, since on the one hand, some of our more basic points will be reminiscent of his, and on the other, our claims for *Luke* as a 'historian of recurrence' will seem far less dramatic. While I do not intend to engage in any detailed criticism of Goulder's analyses, the most pertinent issues are as follows: Goulder does not make it clear what he means by *Acts* as a cyclical book, and appears to confuse an understanding of cycle in terms of recurrence and the idea of a literary (or epic) cycle (*op.cit.*, pp. 16ff., cf. *infra*, pp. 218f). In his efforts to trace parallels between various sections of *Acts* (i, 1 - ii, 42; iii, 1 - v, 12; iv, 23(!) - vi, 7; on p. 22), between the telescoped cycles in vi, 1 - viii, 18; ix, 32 - xii, 20, on p. 26 (and see p. 74), and between parts of *Acts* and parts of *Luke* (see pp. 16f., cf. pp. 58, 72f), he has been forced to leave blanks in his diagrams where parallels do not exist, or to treat pieces of evidence as though they form parallels, even though little evidence, outside his intellectual superstructure, suggests as much. As a result, Goulder too frequently looks for loopholes to save face. When one of his so-called cycles is found to be quite incomplete, for example, he writes of it as 'fragmentary' (p. 124), and at the foot of one of his numerous diagrams lies the tell-tale qualification: 'references underlined [there are five in all!] show deviations from the cyclical order' (p. 101). In general, his search for parallelism has been justified, but he is excessively enthusiastic, and some of his claims about OT bases for certain passages in *Acts* seem very hazardous guesses. For further criticisms, *infra*, pp. 211ff.. The work of R. Morgenthauer, *Die lukanische Geschichtsschreibung als Zeugnis*, Zurich, 1949, 2 vols., also draws comment at this point, yet whereas Goulder searches for parallels or similar cycles, Morgenthauer writes of *Zweigliedrigkeit* in *Luke-Acts*, that is, the heavy doubleting of material, which he traces to the early Christian (and Deuteronomic) view that testimony is valid when received from two or three witnesses (see esp. vol. 2, pp. 23ff). On the whole, however, Morgenthauer treats Lukan doublets as artistic devices, not as the result of a particular historiographical outlook. His presuppositions about artistry here may be seriously questioned; note my alternative explanation (*loc.cit.*, p. 154), (and on the case for proto-*Luke*, V. Taylor, *The Formation of the Gospel Tradition*, London, 1935 edn., pp. 191-201).

re-enactment of significant events (cf.p3). Placing them in the order most useful to us, the Cases I have in mind are;

- a) The deaths of Stephen and of Jesus
- b) The prison-release of Peter and the resurrection appearance of Jesus
- c) The farewell speeches of Paul and Jesus
- d) The journeys of Paul and Jesus to Jerusalem
- e) The trials of Paul and Jesus

a) The work of Stephen, his famous defence of Jesus' messiahship before the Sanhedrin, and his subsequent death, occupy two well known chapters in Acts (vi-vii). Although Luke clearly distinguished between the ministries of Jesus and the church, and wrote about the emergence of early Christian communities as a development in consequence of Jesus' work,¹ it is evident that he wished to portray Stephen's death and its circumstances as a re-enactment of Christ's passion. Admittedly, Stephen was a quite individualistic teacher and figure for Luke, and his death as the first Christian martyr was a special one. On the other hand, Stephen's final words ('Lord Jesus, receive my spirit', 'Lord, do not hold this sin against them', Acts, vii,59;60), bear a remarkable correspondence to two important *logia* of the crucified Jesus ('Father, forgive them for they know not what they do', 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit', [Lk.,xxiii,36;46]). Significantly, these two sayings are unique to the Lukan Gospel account, and to the rather independent Lukan passion narrative. It is noteworthy, too, that both Jesus and Stephen witness to the Son of Man before their passions (Lk.,xxii,69; Acts,vii,56), and Stephen's reference to the ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is the only such reference in Acts (and only one of three references

¹ Concerning Stephen, for example, we may note how Luke recognized a central difference between the pre-ascension and post-ascension situations, for whereas Jesus avers at his trial and before his accusers: 'from now on the Son of Man shall be seated at the right hand of God' (Lk., xxii,69) Stephen, by contrast, confirms that Jesus is actually installed in power (Acts,vii,56). See H.J.Cadbury, 'Acts and Eschatology', in *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology*, (eds.W.D.Davies,D.Daube), Cambridge, 1965,p.305, although it is not necessary to make the stress that Luke's eschatological schema was simply the result of his own creative theologizing, cf.H.Flender, *St.Luke; Theologian of Redemptive History* (ET), London, 1967, pp.37ff.

outside the Four Gospels).¹ Furthermore, the same Jewish court tries both figures; both victims were led (ἀπ/ ἡγαγον) to the Sanhedrin (Lk., xxii,66 (and ff.), (cf.Mk.,xiv,53; Mt.,xxvi,57); Acts, vi,12), and both were put to death outside the city.² Also, although Luke curiously omitted all mention of false witnesses at Jesus' trial, along with the accusation that Jesus intended to destroy the temple (cf.Mk.,xiv,56-9), μάρτυρες ψευδεῖς accuse Stephen instead, and level a charge concerning his threat to the temple (Acts,vi,13-14).³ Besides this, Luke reported that both Jesus and Stephen were condemned as disturbers of the existing socio-political order, a quite independent view.⁴

b) A comparison of the story of Peter's prison-release in Acts xii with the most basic resurrection traditions of Luke's Gospel (xxiv,1-11 (and 12?),36-43)⁵ supports this understanding of the Evangelist's approach.

¹ Cf.Rev.,i,13; xiv,14. Stephen confirms what Jesus foreshadows; cf.esp. R.Pesch, *Die Vision des Stephanus; Apg.7,55-6 im Rahmen der Apostelgeschichte* (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien XII), Stuttgart, 1966,esp.pp.66-7.

² That the Jewish Sanhedrin dealt with both cases seems natural enough, but the details must also be noted, especially the terms used of the people involved in the trials; cf.τὸ πρέσβυτέριον τοῦ λαοῦ, ἀρχιερεῖς τε καὶ γραμματεῖς (Lk.,xxii,66,cf.ἀρχιερέως,vs.54), τὸν λαὸν καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς γραμματεῖς (Acts,vi,12,cf. ἀρχιερεῖς,vii,1). Cf. Mk.,xiv,53 ≠ Mt.,xxvi,57, for slightly different expressions and no mention of the people. On execution outside the city, cf.Acts,vii,58a. Luke (significantly?) leaves out the details of Golgotha's whereabouts (cf. esp. Jn.xix,20,Heb.,xiii,12, but see Lk.,xx,15 (and cf.also, on Paul, Acts,xiv,19), and see G.Stählin, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (Das Neue Testament Deutsch V), Göttingen, 1936(62),p.114.

³ The charge that Stephen claimed Jesus would destroy the temple recalls how, not long before his passion, Jesus made a very public prediction (Lk., xxi,5-37, yet cf.Mk.,xiii,3; Mt.,xxiv,3) about the future ruin of the temple. It might be claimed that in making the contents of Lk.xxi public, the accusations of those taken to be false witnesses in Mk.xiv,56-9 (and Mt.,xxvi,60-1) would become true, and that this is why Luke omitted reference to such witnesses in the Gospel. But both Mark and Matthew probably intended to say that, out of all the pieces of false witness at the trial, this accusation came somewhere near the truth. Of relevance to all this, note Lk.,xxii,2 following xxi.

⁴ See the terms διαστρέφοντα in Lk.,xxiii,2, and ἀλλάξει τὰ ἔθνη in Acts, vi,14.

⁵ On the Emmaus story as a special 'insertion' skilfully woven into more 'received' narrative, i.e.,xxiv,1-11(12),36ff.,see Trompf, 'The First Resurrection Appearance and the Ending of Mark's Gospel', in *New Testament Studies*, XVIII,1972,p.325,cf.308-9; cf.A.A.Ehrhardt, 'The Disciples of

Imprisoned by Herod, Peter had but small hope of escape, for John the Baptist and James the apostle had already been executed by the Herodians (Lk.,iii,19-20, ix,9, Acts,xii,1-2). Yet Peter was miraculously released, and this, significantly enough, at a time near the Passover (Acts,xii,4, cf.Lk.,xxii,1ff,xxiii,54)¹ and at the hands of an angel (Acts,xii,7,cf. Lk.,xxiv,23,cf.4).² Of course the differences between the resurrection proper and Peter's release are evident enough, but we are not meant to miss similarities. The description of Peter's return is most intriguing. As with the resurrection, women are associated with his re-appearance (Acts,xii,12-13,cf.Lk.,xxiii,55 - xxiv,10;22), yet as in the case of the women and their tale in Luke's special version of the empty tomb tradition, the claim of the maid Rhoda that Peter is free and at the door is not believed by the others (Acts,xii,13-15,cf.Lk.,xxiv,11; but cf.Mt.,xxviii, 8;10;16, Jn.xx,18). Only the actual appearances, which in each instance were terrifying (Acts,xii,16 (ἐξέστησαν),cf.Lk.,xxiv,36 (πτοηθέντες καὶ ἔμφοβοι)), prove both Peter and Jesus to be humans in the flesh and not spiritual beings (Acts,xii,15b (ἄγγελος), cf.Lk.,xxiv,36;39 (πνεῦμα)). In assuring the company of his safe return, moreover, Peter gives a charge to 'tell this to James and the brethren' (Acts,xii,17b). The very presence of this charge is suggestive of the resurrection, even though its form is closer to Jesus' post-resurrection commands in other Gospels than in Luke's.³ All these 'resurrection' and 'appearance' elements in

Emmaus' in *ibid.*, X, 1963, pp.182ff..

¹ Luke places the crucifixion just before the high Sabbath Day of Preparation, but cf. Jn.,xviii,28, xx,31, cf.M.H.Sheppard, 'Are both the Synoptics and John correct about the Date of Jesus's Death?' in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXX, 1961,pp.123ff.. Was the detail of Mk.,xiv,2 ('Not on a feast day lest there be an uproar of the people') which Luke had in his key source, left over in the Gospel for Acts,xii,46? Possibly. Goulder, however, is too definite (*op.cit.*,pp.43-4).

² Goulder curiously appeals to the Matthaean guards outside Jesus' tomb as parallel to Peter's guards (p.44), but did Luke know Matthew's Gospel? In assuming so, Goulder is a true yet incautious disciple of A.Farrer (cf. 'On Dispensing with Q' in *Studies in the Gospels*, (ed.D.Nineham), Oxford, 1954, pp.55ff.). See also Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VIII,xxx, on the opening of gates as a release from death.

³ See Excursus 3, Exegetical Note A.

Acts xii, then, claim due attention. The events of Peter's deliverance came to repeat (to a degree Luke considered sufficient for both his readers and his purposes as a historian), the events of Christ's all-important *anastasis*. Luke hardly wished to deny that the deeds of the apostles formed fresh, distinctive episodes in history, but for him, many of their acts only acquired their full meaning through crucial events which preceded them. As we shall see, he was fundamentally preoccupied with the *relatedness* of historical events, and the existence of special connections between key incidents represented for him a form of authentication, confirming that the events he treated had a superior significance. The instancing of the church's 're-enactments' of Christ's life was the chief means by which this significance could be conveyed.

c) A third important example of Luke's interest in such re-enactment can be found in Paul's farewell speech at Miletus (to the Ephesian elders) (*Acts*,xx,17-35). This statement is no Pauline proclamation of Christ to the unconverted; it stands as Paul's warning of forthcoming trials both for himself and the church, and it is his reflection upon his own ministry. Significantly enough, Paul here reminds his listeners of warnings issued by Jesus, and the reader is meant to recall Jesus' ministry. Not only that, as Luke is alone amongst the Synoptists in recording a farewell discourse by Jesus at the Last Supper table (*Lk.*,xxii,24-38),¹ and as he took Paul to be a central figure of his church history, it is likely that Luke deliberately sought to organize a correspondence.² Like Jesus during

¹ Mark, and Matthew following him, give the place of Jesus's warning about backsliding and about Peter's denial at (the side of?) the Mount of Olives (*Mk.*,xiv,26-31 ≠ *Mt.*,xxiv,30-35), whereas Luke consciously placed all the sayings and dialogue of xxii,14-38 at table (cf.xxii,39). In presenting a sizeable discourse in this context his work has something in common with John's (cf.*Jn.*,xiii,21 - xviii,1).

² Luke appears to have interlocked two separate but related sayings from Mark in xxii,24-27. *Mk.*,ix,34-5 and x,42-44 thus become one, though Luke retains something of the pericope *Mk.*,ix,33-37 in *Lk.*,ix,46-48. In any case, neither saying from Mark is from a Last Supper context, and has been shifted there by Luke. *Lk.*,xxii,28-30 may be 'treated' by Luke, yet seems

his progress towards Jerusalem, Paul is ready to journey to the holy city (Acts, xx,22,cf. Lk.,ix,51, xiii,22;33-34, xvii,11, xviii,31, xix, 11),¹ like Jesus he foretells the dangers ahead of him (Acts, xx,23,cf. Lk.,ix,22;44, xvii,25, xviii,31-2), like Jesus he is preparing to accomplish (*telein*) his work (or as with John the Baptist, finish his *dromos* or course).² Like Jesus in the farewell discourse of Luke, Paul foretells betrayals and falling away in the church (Acts,xx,29-30, cf. Lk., xxii,21-2;31-2),³ reminds his listeners of his past trials (*peirasmoi* in both Acts, xx,19, Lk.,xxii,28), and enjoins them both to sacrificial service and alertness.⁴ In Luke all the final references to Jesus'

derived from so-called 'Q' tradition, cf.Mt.,xix,28, though Matthew, significantly enough, does not present it in a Last Supper context. Lk., xxii,31-34 closely relates to Mark's foreshadowing of Peter's denial, cf. Mk.,xiv,27-31 ≠ Mt.,xxvi,31-35, but Luke seems to have special material, which he alters slightly in deference to his Markan source(cf.*infra*,p. 263). That vs.32 (at least) is pre-Lukan is suggested by parallels with Jn.,xvii,15, xxi,15-17. Concerning xxii,35-38, however, scholarship moves in the dark because there are few helpful parallels. >xxii,35-36 may appear to refer back to the mission charge given the disciples in ix,3 ≠ Mk.,vi, 8, and yet the list:'purse, bag, sandals' rather than 'staff, bag, bread, money', belongs not to the apostles' mission but to that of the seventy(-two) in Lk.,x,4! The Isaianic quotation, although it probably reflects on the suggestive Mk.,xiv,49b, is characteristically Lukan (cf.xxiv,26-7;46, Acts, viii,32-3,etc.). It could be contended that xxii,36b;38 look ahead to vss.49-51, yet the offering of weapons on Olivet and the ambiguous answer of Christ ('ἡμῶν ἐστὶν) have an interesting parallel in Slavonic Josephus (Bell.Jud.,II,between 174 and 175). On the whole, the conclusion that Luke constructed Lk.,xxii,24-38 out of pre-Lukan material which did not originally belong to a Last Supper context, is warranted. He organized his material for special reasons; was it because he sought to make the whole passage complementary with Paul's speech in Acts,xx,18-35? That, we are suggesting, was a key reason and see also *infra*, pp.263-5.

¹ Cf.also Acts,xx,16, xxi,11-14.

² Acts, xx,24 (τελειώσω τὸν δρόμον μου),cf.Lk.,xiii,32b (τελειοῦμαι) for Jesus, and Acts,xiii,25 (ὥς δὲ ἐπλήρου ἰωάννης τὸν δρόμον) for John.

³ Although Luke appears to have inherited a warning against Peter in particular, which he preferred to use instead of the general warning to all the disciples (so Lk.,xxii,31-2 instead of Mk.,xiv,26-27), Luke retains the less specific Markan element by using the plural ὑμᾶς in vs.31 to cover all the apostles, whilst focussing on Peter in vss.32-34. Note also Acts, xx,29 and Lk.,x,3.

⁴ See Acts,xx,33-35 and Lk.,xxii,24-27,cf.35, on service without regard for earthly security, and see Acts, xx,31, Lk.,xxii,35;36,cf.40, on alertness.

forthcoming suffering are confined to the supper context (*Lk.*,xxii,15;22; 37, yet cf. *Mk.*,xiv,21;41;49, *Mt.*,xxvi,24;45;56), and in that setting they are made much more explicit than in the other Synoptists.¹ It is interesting that Paul enacts the Lord's Supper not long before his farewell speech is delivered (cf.*Acts*, xx,7;11), and quite apart from this speech, when Paul is on the verge of reaching Jerusalem, he is taken to face the same decision Jesus faced in Gethsemane, whether to avoid or accept great danger (xxi,10-14, cf.*Lk.*,xxii,39-46). Both Paul and Jesus resolve to face their respective crises in a similar way, by asking God's will to be done (*Lk.*,xxii,42 ≠ *Mk.*,*Mt.*, *Acts*,xxi,14b).² Granted the special nature and circumstances of Paul's speech, the impression remains that Paul's preparations for his forthcoming ordeal re-enact those made by Jesus before the crucifixion (cf.*Acts*, xx,20-1;25-27).³

d) We may now turn to a fourth, still more important case, to the journeys of Paul and Jesus to Jerusalem. It is well known, on the one hand, that *Acts* is largely concentrated on the voyages and missionary career of Paul (xiii,1 - xxi,17, xxvii - xxviii), and on the other, that one of the most distinctive features of *Luke* is the so-called 'great omission', that is, Luke's departure from his key Markan source so as to portray Christ's great journey from Galilee to Jerusalem (ix,51 - xix,58).⁴

¹ Although, in both *Mk.*,xiv,25 and *Mt.*,xxvi,29, Jesus anticipates the Coming of the Kingdom and, by implication, an interim period in which Christ will not be present on earth, (and cf.*Mk.*,xiv,17-21 ≠ *Mt.*,xxvi,20-25), Luke's πρὸ τοῦ με παθεῖν in xxii,15, the semi-fatalism of vs.22, and the quotation of vs.37, represent a much more explicit foretelling of disaster.

² *Lk.*,xxii,42; μὴ τὸ θέλημα μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω; *Acts*,xxi,14; Τοῦ Κυρίου τὸ θέλημα γινέσθω. The Gospel passage derives from *Mk.*,xiv,36, the one in *Acts* seems to form part of a contrived statement, a significantly short one, put into Paul's mouth.

³ Parallel hints of self-justification, moreover, lie behind *Acts*,xx,26-27 and *Lk.*,xxii,35. For both protagonists, God's work has been done.

⁴ Goulder insists, without any real justification, that Jesus undergoes two journeys in *Luke*, and this results from an over-concern to match matters up with Paul's two main missionary expeditions (cf.*op.cit.*,pp.135-9).

Without doubt, the 'journey element' is one of the crucial unifying factors in the whole work *Luke-Acts*, and it is probable that Luke's special organization of material in this connection was governed by a characteristic concern to disclose re-enactment and recurring profiles. One need not insist on anything like exact parallels to defend this point, but it was clearly important for Luke that there were event-complexes in the lives of both Jesus and Paul which corresponded. He turned Jesus into a traveller of some consequence, engaged in something like a great missionary journey. This was a relatively easy and not entirely 'unhistorical' thing to do, though certain incidents or pericopai in his central section do sit rather artificially in a travel narrative.¹ By doing this, of course, Paul's journeying comes to re-enact Jesus', despite the enormous geographical differences. Their ministries of healing and of preaching God's Kingdom bear a special relationship,² and when it is time for Paul to travel to Jerusalem for the culminating ordeal (Jerusalem really seems less perilous for him than other places, but Luke intended the events of *Acts*, xxi, 27 - xxvi, 32 and their consequences to be climactic),³ the lineaments of

¹ What is conventionally called the 'central section' of *Luke*, (but which I later treat as the third division of the Gospel, *infra*, p. 226), covers Jesus' journeying. Mark, Luke's crucial source, left a small picture of such travelling (see esp. *Mk.*, viii, 27a, ix, 2a; 9a; 30a; 33a; 34a, x, 1a; 17a; 32a; 46a; 52b, xi, 1; 11, and cf. D. Gill, 'Observations on the Lukan Travel Narrative and some related passages', in *Harvard Theological Review*, LXIII, 1970, p. 218). In Mark, of course, Jesus visits the region near Tyre and Sidon, and returns via Decapolis (vii, 24-37). Luke omits the two stories here (they do not suit a journey from Galilee to Jerusalem!), but nevertheless develops the impression of Jesus as a traveller. Cf. also *Lk.*, viii, 26-39 ≠ *Mk.*, v, 1-20, though Luke does not mention the Decapolis here, cf. *Mk.*, v, 20. Luke may well have got the journey motif from Mark, but in general terms his method was to add editorial comments to a disparate body of free-floating material so as to achieve the impression of travel. Cf. ix, 51; 57, x, 38, xi, 53, xiii, 22; 32b, xvii, 11, xviii, 35, xix, 1; 28ff.. On material not suited to a journey context, see esp. xiii, 10-17, xiv, 1-24, and note xi, 14ff. (cf. *Mk.*, iii, 19b ff.), xviii, 15-17 (cf. *Mk.*, x, 13-16 and esp. 17!)

² On connections between the healing miracles in *Luke* and *Acts*, cf. Excursus 3, Exegetical Note B. On preaching the Kingdom of God, see esp. *Lk.*, iv, 43, viii, 1, ix, 11, xvi, 16, *Acts*, xix, 8, xx, 25, xxviii, 23; 31, cf. xiv, 22.

³ In Jerusalem the real possibility of death is accentuated (xxi, 31, xxiii, 12ff), because Paul is made the object of a plot (compare the more spontaneous reactions of xiv, 19ff., xvi, 19ff., xviii, 12ff.). The detail given

recurrence become obvious. It may be objected, of course, that in Acts Paul journeyed not only to Jerusalem but eventually to Rome as well, and that this hardly compares well with the events of Jesus' passion and resurrection; yet Luke does conceive of these consummating events in his Gospel as a 'journey' (so *Lk.*,xxii,22 (*poreuetai*),cf.*Mk.*,xiv,21 ≠ *Mt.*,xxvi,24),¹ and he alone amongst Evangelists placed a resurrection appearance in a journey context (*Lk.*,xxiv,13-35, though cf.*pseudo-Mk.*,xvi,12), the account of this appearance bearing clear signs of Luke's style and imagination.²

e) Our last introductory example, a comparison of the trials of Jesus and Paul, conveys a similar impression. Although the trials of both figures preserve their uniqueness, and their outcomes are quite different, Luke nevertheless attempted to connect them. Most significant are certain peculiarities in the Lukan description of Jesus' trial. It is only in the third Gospel that Herod makes an appearance as a judge (*Lk.*,xxiii,6-12).³ Whereas the other Evangelists wrote of only two tribunals, a Jewish and a Roman, Luke added a third, and one cannot but wonder whether this third Herodian element, which is so sketchily treated and looks all-too 'secondary',⁴ arose from Luke's effort to expose correspondences

to Paul's final Jerusalem visit and his resulting Judaeian imprisonment (six chapters), also requires recognition, see *infra*, p217.

¹ That the *πορεύεται* in *Lk.*,xxii,22 relates back to Luke's frequent use of *πορεύεσθαι* during his travel narrative is argued ably by D.Gill,*loc. cit.*,p.215, cf.pp.201-17.

² *Pseudo-Mark* probably follows Luke, cf. Trompf, 'The Markusschluss in Recent Research', in *Australian Biblical Review*, XXI,1973,pp.20-21. On the Emmaus road account and Luke's special points about the resurrection, see Excursus 3, Exegetical note A.

³ Prepared for by ix,9, xiii,31, and note the later reference in Acts, iv,27. The use of *poreuomai* also enters Luke's picture of the ascension; see Acts,i,10-11, (on this passage and *Lk.*,xxii,22, cf.J.Navone,*Themes of St.Luke*, Rome,1970,p.67).

⁴ In Luke, it is Herod who clothes Jesus in gorgeous apparel (11b), and it is Herod's soldiers who mock him (11a), cf.*Mk.*,xv,16-20, where such deeds are done by the Romans. Luke probably wished to avoid offending Roman sensitivities here, and puts contempt upon the Herodians instead, by using traditional material that originally belonged to the context of the Roman trial.

in the careers of Jesus and Paul. Interestingly, Paul was presented before the judgement-seats of the Jews (Acts,xxiii,1-10), the Romans (xxi,37 - xxii,29, xxiv,1-23, xxv,6-12) and the Herodians (xxv,23 - xxvi,32, cf. xxiii,35b). He was also the butt of a condemning crowd shouting 'away with him!' (αἶρε τοῦτον, xxi,36, cf.xxii,22),¹ a phrase Luke alone puts in the mouth of the hostile mob calling for Christ's crucifixion (Lk., xxiii,18).² There were three distinct stages in the Roman trial of Paul (cf. Acts, xxi,33 - 40; xxiv,1-2; xxv, 6), just as there were, according to Luke's unique arrangement, in the case of Jesus (Lk.,xxiii,1;13;22),³ and in addition, both Jesus and Paul were consciously portrayed as innocent, as victims of a Jewish hatred alien to the ways of Roman justice (cf.vs.47b,(yet cf. Mk.,xv,39b),⁴ Acts, xxvi,32).⁵ Though differences can hardly be neglected (for Paul utters lengthy apologies at his trial, for example, whilst Jesus says so little), intimations of re-enactment are once again present.

¹ In xxii,22 the phrase is Αἶρε ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τὸν τοιοῦτον.

² Cf.the Σταύρωσον αὐτόν of Mk.,xv,13;15, and the Σταθραθήτω of Mt., xxvi,22;23. John is closest to Luke with his Ἄρον ἄρον, σταύρωσου αὐτόν in xix,15. Luke retains the cry to crucify Jesus in xxiii,21 (Σταύρου σταύρου αὐτόν).

³ Cf. Mk.,xv,1b-15, Mt.,xxvii, 11-26, Jn., xviii,28 - xix,16. John is again closest to Luke.

⁴ It is remarkable how Luke skipped over such an important point of Markan theology; this may well be a real sign of both how seriously his view of history affected his work, and how seriously he took that view.

⁵ Mounting troubles both for Jesus and Paul were bound up with their activities in the temple (Lk.,xix,47 - xxii,2, Acts,xxi,17-27;28b [note special Lukan emphases in xix,47, xx,1, xxi,37]), and a Jewish plot was laid against both of them (Lk.,xix,47, xxii,3-6, Acts,xxiii,12-15). Moreover, Paul had almost the same accusations levelled against him as against Stephen, the man whose passion seems to have been deliberately paralleled to Christ's (so Acts,vi,13-14 [ῥήματα κατὰ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἁγίου τοῦτου καὶ τοῦ νόμου/ λέγοντος ὅτι 'Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος οὗτος καταλύσε τὸν τόπον τοῦτον καὶ ἀλλάξει τὰ ἔθη ἃ παρέδωκεν ἡμῖν Μωϋσῆς], Acts, xxi, 28: [κατὰ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦτου πάντας πανταχῶ διδάσκων, ἔτι τε καὶ Ἑλλήνας εἰσήγαγεν εἰς τὸ ἱερόν καὶ κεκοίνωκεν τὸν ἅγιον τόπον τοῦτον])).

There are similar cases of re-enactment - the raising of Dorcas and the raising of Jairus' daughter, the healing of Simon's mother-in-law and the healing of Publius' father - and although minor, they show the same interests.¹ A consistent tie-up in the miracle Novellen of both books, however, can hardly be expected. Perhaps we could add to our list of re-enactments certain miracle types, such as the curing of paralysis,² or the fact that the early missionaries performed τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα just as Jesus had done,³ but these stand as much looser parallels. The search for patterning in *Luke-Acts*, moreover, must have some reasonable limits imposed on it. Mr. Goulder, for one, has been quite unrestrained in such a search. He attempts to educe, for example, a cyclical series of 'deaths and resurrections' from Jesus, through such early disciples as Stephen and Peter, to Paul (and including the imprisonment and miraculous release of Paul and Silas at Philippi).⁴ As we have seen, however, Luke focussed

¹ See Excursus 3, Exegetical Note B.

² So, *Lk.*, v, 18-26, *Acts*, ix, 32-5, or the raising of dead youths (*Lk.*, vi, 11-16 (om. *Mk.*, *Mt.*), *Acts*, xxi, 7-12), or the exorcism of demons which cry out concerning the Most High God (*Lk.*, viii, 28b, *Acts*, xvi, 17 [cf. *Lk.*, iv, 34b, *Acts*, viii, 7]). Numerous other points of correspondence bear noting, especially the links between Jesus and Paul. Both begin their preaching ministries with dramatic statements in a synagogue setting (cf. *Lk.*, iv, 16ff) (esp. ἀνέστη ἀναγνῶναι, vs. 16/ἐκάθισεν, vs. 20), *Acts*, xiii, 14ff; (esp. ἐκάθισεν/ἀναγνώσθην, vss. 14-15). Cf. also *Lk.*, iv, 16 (τὸ εἰσθῆναι, yet cf. *Mk.*, vi, 1, *Mt.*, xiii, 54), *Acts*, xvii, 2. Both Jesus and Paul complete their ministries by significant statements about the implications of the Law of Moses and the prophets (*Lk.*, xxiv, 25-27; 44, *Acts*, xxvi, 22-23, xxviii, 23). There are other connections, less conspicuous and therefore less easy to substantiate, such as the heavily Semitic atmosphere surrounding *Lk.*, i-ii and *Acts*, ii (with ideas of fulfilled divine promises, and God's rule over all peoples), the temporary loss of senses in the cases of Zechariah (*Lk.*, i, 20ff; 64) and Saul (*Acts*, ix, 8ff), parallel themes concerning Christian 'poverty' (*Lk.*, vi, 20ff, vii, 44 - viii, 3, xii, 32ff, xiv, 12ff, etc., *Acts*, ii, 44ff, iv, 34ff, xi, 27ff, etc.), and on serving at tables (*Lk.*, x, 38-42, *Acts*, vi, 1-6, cf. Gill, *loc. cit.*, p. 205), etc.. In addition, the events of *Acts*, x, 44ff. may represent a second (gentile) Pentecost, cf. ii, 1ff..

³ Luke evidently had far less miracle-story tradition for *Acts* than for the Gospel (yet note *Lk.*, x, 17-18, where, within the Gospel, Jesus' followers cast out demons.

⁴ So Goulder, *op. cit.*, ch. 3.

primarily on the death of Stephen, with no hint of resurrection; he concentrated on the 'resurrection' characteristics of Peter's release, and expended no effort to parallel his prison cell with a garden tomb; he was interested in the elements of re-enactment in Paul's trial, without wishing to pretend either that Paul's journey across the great sea to Rome, and the shipwreck, represented his 'death', or that his arrival at the last port of call amounted to his 'resurrection'.¹ Moreover, to use the word 'cycle' in connection with such examples is to use it inadvisedly.² In view of distinctions already drawn, it would be more accurate to talk about notions of re-enactment. The re-enactment also carries with it a sense of recurring event-shapes and profiles, since we have not only been concerned with similar actions, but parallel situations - deaths, journeys, trials - as well.

The Question of Typology

It should be acknowledged that some scholars have understood Luke's methods and interests to be typological.³ If we wish to define his historiographical frame of mind more precisely, this view needs to be reckoned with. One must be cautious here about what is meant by typology and whether it can be clearly distinguished from a concern for re-enactment. First let it be said that typology can be applied to a whole set of notions not readily assimilable to the idea of 'repeated history'. The great Flood, for instance, could be taken as *typos* of Christ's redemptive passion and death;⁴ we may also recall here how Paul conceived Adam as a

¹ Against *ibid.*, pp.36ff.. Cf. C.F.Evans, 'The Kerygma', in *Journal of Theological Studies*, VII, 1956, p.32.

² Goulder gives the word no clear definition, and on his apparent confusion of 'historical' with 'literary' cycle, see *supra*, p.208. Incidentally, lectionary cycles (which also interest Goulder) have no real bearing on our present discussions. Cf. L.Morris, *The New Testament and Jewish Lectionaries*, London, 1964, and works cited there.

³ So, e.g., Goulder, *op.cit.*, ch.1; C.F.Evans, 'The Central Section of St.Luke's Gospel', in *Studies in the Gospels*, (ed.Nineham), *op.cit.*, pp.37ff; G.W.H.Lampe, (with K.J.Woollcombe), *Essays on Typology (Studies in Biblical Theology XXII)*, London, 1957, p.25, etc..

⁴ So, e.g., in modern writing, Thomas Merton, *Bread in the Wilderness*,

type of 'the one who was to come' (Rom., v,14b), and how the *Epistle of Barnabas* saw Isaac as a type of Christ sacrificed (vii,3). Such typological lines of thought, very Jewish in background, border on allegorization,¹ and are distinguishable enough from Luke's general approach, for he was less concerned with symbolic relationships than with the more direct grasp of similarities and parallels between sets of historical happenings. In those typological illustrations just cited, moreover, there is an underlying emphasis on the prefiguration of Christ in earlier occurrences, whereas in Luke's writings happenings are so described as to recall prior deeds and events.² One need not exclude Luke's methods from the compass of typology, perhaps, for certain brands of typological pre-occupation evidently constitute forms of recurrence thinking. To suggest Christ to be a new David or a new Moses, for example, is to make at least a minimal claim that some past aspect of God's dealings with his people has been restored and reappropriated in the present. Nevertheless Luke's rather special position requires isolating. It is unfortunate that the recent debates about typology within the Bible have been overly concerned with the subtle differences between typology, allegory and prophetic fulfilment,³ and it has generally been assumed that an interest in historical repetition is foreign to biblical, especially NT literature. As a result, Luke's position *vis à vis* other NT methods and interpretations has not been fully appreciated.

London, 1953, pp.58-59, and for its ancient background, see, e.g., Ambrose, *De Sacramentis*, II,1, *De Mysteriis*, x; xxiv.

¹ Allegory is usually distinguished from typology, however, although their merging is possible, cf. J.Barr, 'Typology and Allegory', in his *Old and New in Interpretation; a study of the Two Testaments*, (Currie Lectures 1964), London, 1966, pp.103-117.

² Our prior analyses have confirmed this, yet see also *infra*, pp.222ff.etc.

³ So *ibid.*, and pp.117ff; Woollcombe (with Lampe), *op.cit.*, p.42; Lampe, 'Hermeneutics and Typology', in *London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, N.S., XXXIII, 1965, pp.17-25; etc.. For a different issue, however, see O.Cullmann, *Salvation in History* (ET), London, 1965, pp.132-3, where Cullmann claims that typology 'threatens to destroy the salvation historical character of development he takes to be essential to Christian theology, because it places such a strong stress "on repetition".'

In recounting the deeds of Jesus and the early missionaries, Luke did not just wish to make fleeting yet pointed allusions to past parallels, as if to show his incomparable artistry in a series of subtle asides. Nor was he merely demonstrating how Jesus, even though he ultimately superseded them, embodied the major categories of the OT heritage - lawgiver, king, prophet and sage.¹ Furthermore, Luke was not interested in arranging his material as order *midrashim* (or commentary) upon long sequences found in the scriptures,² nor was prophecy fulfilment for him only a way of authenticating Jesus or showing the ancient oracles to be right.³ Luke was fundamentally interested in more directly historical connections *qua* historian of the Hellenistic period. He wrote as though established historical events, which were for him divinely guided,⁴ had their own inner relatedness, connections between events amounting to the virtual re-enactment of special happenings, or the repetition of an earlier stage of history in a later one, or even to the recurrent operation of certain 'laws' or principles. By the time Luke wrote his *magnum opus* many connections between Jesus and the OT, and between the work of the church and Jesus' ministry, had already been forged. Luke appears to have interpreted this inheritance under the influence of his historiographical assumptions. As with Polybius, these assumptions were bound to affect the reliability of his account.⁵ But the point is, he emerges as a historian comparable to Polybius (who, after all, managed

¹ Cf. Matthew's line of approach here, esp. Mt., v, 1; 17-48 (lawgiver), xxiii - xxiv (prophet); xi, 19b, xii, 42b, xiii, 54 (cf. 52) (sage).

² So against Evans, *loc.cit.*, pp. 42ff. on the running connections between Lk., x, 1 - xviii, 14, and Deut., i-xxvi. In personal communication, Professor Evans has since expressed serious hesitations over this article.

³ So esp. Mt. (Excursus 2), cf. Jn., esp. xix, 24; 28.

⁴ Cf. esp. Lk., xxi, 22 (ἀπομένον), (yet cf. Mk., xiv, 21, Mt., xxvi, 24), and see Acts, iv, 28, xvii, 24ff.. On the Holy Spirit as an agent of history, cf. *infra*, pp. 298-9.

⁵ See Excursus 3, Exegetical Note C.

to infuse a 'theological' significance into his work), rather than as someone concerned to make a series of evangelistic and theological assertions under the form of narrative.¹

But to state the case thus is, once more, to look ahead to further analysis.

Lukan Geography

To this point we have been concentrating on the more obvious cases of re-enactment in *Luke-Acts*, but there are other associated yet distinctive links between the two volumes. These are present in Luke's handling of geography. The peculiar geographical emphases and modifications in the Gospel have already been analysed in detail by Hans Conzelmann, and they have been ascribed both to an ignorance of the Palestinian region and to theological preoccupations.² These kinds of explanations, however, are open to question, as I shall now seek to demonstrate. As I see it, the clue to the Gospel's geography lies in *Acts*. In *Acts*, i,8, Jesus states that his followers will witness to him in 'Jerusalem, in all Judaea and Samaria, and to the end of the earth'. Luke thus prepares his readers for remarkable developments to come. It does not follow, however, that the four above-mentioned areas were treated in four separate stages of *Acts*. In fact the most preferable way of dividing the book is as follows:

¹ It is unwarrantable, of course, to overstrain the distinction between the 'historian' and the 'theologian' in Luke's case, and some scholars insist on the compromise phrase 'theologian of history' (see E.Lohse, 'Lukas als Theologe der Heilsgeschichte', in *Evangelische Theologie*, XIV, 1964, pp.256ff., K.M.Flender, *op.cit.*, pp.1ff., and I have also noted this phrase in an unpublished work-paper by R.Maddox (for F.Hahn's NT seminar, Mainz, 1969-70) in advance of a monograph). However, it is Luke's self-understanding, or his conscious appropriation of a recognized literary role, that is crucial here.

² *The Theology of St.Luke (= Die Mitte der Zeit) (ET)*, London, 1960, pp.18ff..

The Jerusalem ministry of the disciples (*Acts*, i,12 - viii,1a)

Work in the regions immediately around Jerusalem (a kind of Palestinian or Levantine region) which includes Judaea (with Caesarea), Samaria, (Galilee?) Syria, Phoenicia, and even Tarsus (the frontier?) (*Acts*, viii,1b - xii,25).

Missionary work abroad under Paul (xiii,1 - xxi,16) including an interlude at Jerusalem to settle policy concerning the gentile mission (xv,4-29), and the eventual journey back to Jerusalem (xx,1 - xxi,16).

Events, to do with Paul, which occur mainly in Jerusalem and Caesarea but which eventually result in Paul's voyage to Rome and his settlement there (xxi,17 - xxviii,31).

Admittedly, scholars have suggested that brief summaries in the early parts of *Acts* (ii,47, vi,7, ix,31, xii,24 even v,11-12) count for something in dividing off different stages of development,¹ yet it is more sensible to take these as a way of covering events that remain unnarrated, just as Luke's generalizations about the disciples' 'signs and wonders' imply the performance of more miracles than those described. The four sections outlined above speak for themselves, although the second remains somewhat controversial. It is an embarrassment to exegetes who put much store by the apparently programmatic statement of i,8, or by summaries, since a mission to Samaria precedes any to Judaea (cf. viii,5ff.) and because the summary of ix,31 hardly emerges as concluding a stage of geographical expansion.² But a close look at viii,1b - xii,25 (this second section), reveals that Luke's attention fastened on the Levantine regions around Jerusalem and that he consciously projected an intermediate stage of missionary expansion before the wider work of Paul.³ Perhaps he

¹ See, e.g., Goulder, *op.cit.*, pp.14ff., and note RSV paragraphing.

² The first efforts towards expansion are put under the shadow of the great persecution with Saul as the chief *bête noir* (viii,3). It is with his acceptance into the church (ix,26-29), and his mission to Tarsus (30b, cf. xi,25), that peace and comfort come to the Christians of Judaea, Galilee and Samaria, the summary referring to these blessings in ix,31 marking the end of certain adverse conditions, not the end of a stage of geographical spread (so, ix,32ff.).

³ The material in viii,1b - xii,25 is prefaced by a reference to persecution and the scattering of the church throughout Judaea and Samaria, although the apostles are (curiously?) exempted from the dispersion (viii,1b). Even though the apostles are still based in Jerusalem, Philip and

was historian enough not to paint an over-geometric picture of the church's growth, but his preconceptions clearly had their influence. Even when he inserted material at the end of this stage on James' martyrdom and Peter's imprisonment (xii,1ff.), material which could have been directly linked with Jerusalem, he gave his accounts hardly any geographical definition. Herod seems to control extra-Jerusalemite regions (cf.xii,19b;20b),¹ he does not imprison Peter within the city where haven can be found (xii,10, cf.4b), and he dies in Caesarea, resplendent before shouting Phoenicians (vss.20-23). By the end of ch.xii (vss.24-25), then, the reader is confronted with a movement affecting the whole region to the far east of the Great (Mediterranean) Sea, and converting both Jews and non-Jews (cf.esp.x, xi,19-20). The conditions are thus ripe for expansion to the west.

Having conceived the geographical pattern of Acts in this way, it is profitable to reflect on the geography of the Gospel. The Gospel also appears to fall into four sections:²

Peter, to name the obvious two, extend their work out into surrounding regions (viii,5;14b-15;28;40; ix,32;36, x,24, cf.xii,17b). The persecution of Paul follows, but his conversion soon introduces us to the Damascene Christians (ix,2;10;19b-22), and to the prospects of the church spreading to Tarsus (ix,30b). Following Peter's justification of gentile conversion (xi,1-18), moreover, one finds mention of missions and churches in the upper Levantine area, not only in Tarsus, but 'Phoenicia, Cyprus and Antioch' (vss.19-30) (cf.also xxi,7 (Ptolemais), 3-4 (Tyre), xxvii,3 (Sidon). Whilst Luke records this expansion, the central importance of Jerusalem was certainly not lost (cf.viii,14;25, ix,26-29, xi,2-18;27, xii,25, cf.viii,26b, ix,2b, xii,10a), but it was the regions around her which bore the real attention.

¹ Did Luke confound (consciously or unconsciously) Herod Antipas with Herod Agrippa? If so, this may explain their association with extra-Jerusalemite regions; see *infra*, p. 297 (with n.1).

² Conzelmann writes only of a threefold division, see *op.cit.*, pt.1, sect. B; and W.C.Robinson, although dividing Luke into four parts (iv,14 - ix,50; ix,51 - xix,27; xix,28 - xxi,38; xxii,1 - xxiv,53), offers an outline different to the one below, and excludes consideration of Luke's early chapters. Cf.Robinson (who follows K.L.Schmidt), *Der Weg des Herrn - Studien zur Geschichte und Eschatologie im Lukas Evangelium (Theologische Forschung XXXVI)*, Hamburg, 1964, pp.23ff.. On questions of the genuineness of the early chapters, see the literature cited on p.225, n.3.

Background and introduction to Jesus' ministry, with a geographical emphasis on Jerusalem and Judaea (Lk., i, 1 - iii, 13).

The Galilean ministry of Jesus, but taking in the regions immediately around Galilee, including Judaea (iii, 15 - ix, 56).¹

Jesus' journey from Galilee to Jerusalem (ix, 51¹ - xix, 44).²

Jesus in Jerusalem, his teaching there, the trial, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension (xix, 41² - xxiv, 53).

It will be obvious by now that the divisions of *Luke* suggest a parallelism of 'stage-scenery' with *Acts*, although some analysis of the distinction between these four parts is required.

Concerning the first section, (and I am assuming Lk., i-ii to be genuinely Lukan),³ the prominence of Jerusalem and Judaea should be recognized. Luke freely admitted Jesus' Galilean upbringing (ii, 39-40; 51-52, cf. i, 26, ii, 4a, iv, 22b; 24), but he did everything possible to relieve Jesus' background of cultural obscurity, and to focus the beginnings of his story on better known geographical areas, especially on Jerusalem, cultural centre of the Jewish religion, a place steeped in history both ancient and recent.⁴ The second section, covering Jesus'

¹ Lk., ix, 51-56 may be included in both sections or either. It may well constitute a transition-piece from one stage to another.

² Lk., xix, 41-44 may be included in both sections or either.

³ On the special characteristics of i-ii, note R. Laurentin, *Structure et Théologie de Luc 1-11*, Paris, 1957, and see P. S. Minear, 'Luke's Use of the Birth Stories', in Keck and Martyn (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp. 112-8.

⁴ The coming birth of Zechariah's son is announced in the Jerusalem temple (i, 9), Mary goes quickly from Galilee to a city of Judah after Gabriel's news (i, 39; cf. 26), rumours spread through the Judaeian hill country when Zechariah regains his voice (65b), Mary and Joseph travel from Galilee to Bethlehem of Judaea, where Jesus is born (ii, 4), Joseph, and thus Jesus, are of the lineage of David (king of Judah and founder of Israelite Jerusalem) (ii, 4, iii, 31b), Jesus is taken to Jerusalem for the rite of purification (ii, 22-38, yet cf. Mt., ii, 13-21), and as a young lad, he disputes with the teachers in the Jerusalem temple (cf. ii, 41-51). On the eve of his ministry, Jesus experiences a special baptism in the Jordan (a Judaeian setting is most probably meant), and he even receives his final temptation at Jerusalem (iv, 9-12, yet cf. Mt., iv, 5-7 within 1-11). These points may be made despite Conzelmann (*op.cit.*, pp. 18ff.), whose arguments are somewhat tortuous over Lk., iii, 3 and iv, 4, yet not to be rejected in their entirety. Cf. also J. Dupont, *Die Versuchungen Jesu in der Wüste (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien XXXVII)*, (GT), Stuttgart, 1969, pp. 64-66 on the temptations in *Luke* and *Matthew*. Incidentally, information about Jerusalem and Judaea was available to literate gentiles in such works as Polybius, *Hist.*, XVI, xxxix, Josephus, *Antiq.*, (esp. XVIII), Tacitus, *Annals*, XII, 54-55.

Galilean ministry, also reflects special Lukan stresses of a geographical and ethnological nature. On the one hand, Jesus does not travel far from the Galilean region (cf. *Mk.*, vii, 24-31),¹ yet on the other, he does visit nearby areas - the land of the Gerasenes (*Lk.*, viii, 26-39), the 'mixed' city of Bethsaida-Julius (ix, 10), even parts of Samaria (ix, 51-56),² cf. *Mk.*, *Mt.*, x, 5) and Judaea (iv, 44, cf. *Mk.*, i, 39).³ Certainly the ministry, when it is not localized near the Sea of Galilee, is made to face to the south or east, and away from either the north or the sea-board (or, in other words, the future mission fields).⁴ As for the third section, it was deliberately contrived as a journey to Jerusalem, without any specific geographical locations on the way (cf. xiii, 22, xvii, 11),⁵ that is, except at the very beginning (ix, 51-56) and at the approach to Jerusalem, when geographical details suddenly acquire surprising detail (xviii, 35, xix, 1; 11; 29; 37; 41; 45) (cf. also p. 214). With the

¹ According to *Lk.*, vi, 17 the multitudes come to him from such regions as Tyre and Sidon, he does not go to them.

² Conzelmann (*op.cit.*, pp. 65-6) is surely wrong in objecting to the consensus position that according to Luke, Jesus did go into Samaria (so, explicitly, ix, 52).

³ Note also *Lk.*, xxiii, 5, cf. iv, 36-7, v, 17b, vi, 17b, vii, 17b, and see *Acts*, x, 37! The harder reading of *Lk.*, iv, 44 is to be preferred.

⁴ Thus there is no reference to Caesarea-Philippi in *Lk.*, ix, 18-22 (cf. *Mk.*, viii, 27-30, *Mt.*, xvi, 13-30), and the story of Jesus' visit to Tyre and Sidon, and his encounter with the Syro-Phoenician women is omitted (cf. *Mk.*, vii, 24-30 ≠ *Mt.*, xv, 21-28). In this section, moreover, Jesus' activity is primarily for Jews and in a Jewish context, although gentiles both Roman and non-Roman hear him and believe (see vii, 1-10, viii, 26-39, vi, 17b and iv, 26). Jerusalem lies well in the background until it is revealed on the mountain that Jesus will accomplish something there (ix, 31). Soon Jesus himself foretells trouble (vs. 44), and sets his face to go to Jerusalem for his *analempsis* (ascension?) (vs. 51). (On ἀναλήψις, cf. W.F. Arndt and C. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (and other early Christian literature)*, Chicago, 1957, p. 56b., cf. also *Acts*, i, 2; 11; 22 on ἀναλαμβάνω).

⁵ The curious expression διήρχετο διὰ μέσον Σαμαρίας καὶ Γαλιλαίας in xvii, 11 should thus be interpreted as a deliberate piece of indefiniteness. It is a circumlocutory way of saying over again that Jesus was on his way from where he began his journey in Galilee, to Jerusalem. Διὰ μέσον does not require the translation 'between' here, but simply 'through the middle of' (so, against Conzelmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 68ff) ..

fourth section, finally, the special geographical features primarily concern Luke's emphasis on a longer period of Jesus's teaching in the temple (xix,47 (καθ'ἡμέραν), xx,1, xxi,37a (τὰς ἡμέρας), cf. Mk.,xi, 27 - xiv,1, Mt.,xxi,14;23, xxvi,1-5),¹ and his confining of the resurrection and ascension to Jerusalem or nearby (xxiv,13;35;50-53, cf. Mk.,xiv,28, xvi,7, Mt.,xxviii,7;10;16-20, Jn.,xxi,1-23, Evang.Petr., xiv,58-60).

Scholars usually explain such Lukan peculiarities in terms of Gospel comparison, referring to special sources, the relative inadequacy of Luke's geographical knowledge, and the theological factors motivating his modification of the Jesus tradition. This kind of approach has been fruitful, but as *Luke* and *Acts* form a single work, it is imperative that these two volumes should also be viewed 'synoptically'. The comparable division of each into four sections points to a more far-reaching explanation of the special characteristics of *Luke*, and one which comes to grips with the Evangelist's historiographical methodology. The great cultural centres which matter for his history figure prominently at the beginning and end of each volume, so that each has its geographical complements. In *Luke* the coming of Jesus has much to do with Jerusalem, the religious capital of Israel, and the comparable movement in *Acts* lies with Paul's return, after many travels, to Jerusalem, city of the mother *ecclesia*, the consequence of this return being his last voyage to Rome, political capital of the world. In *Luke*, towards the end, Jesus spends some time within the complex of temple life, and the early church at the beginning of *Acts* 're-enacts' that special Lukan dimension of his ministry (*Acts*,ii, 46 (καθ'ἡμέραν), iii,1;8-9;11, iv,1, v,20-21;25;42 (πᾶσάν τε ἡμέραν), cf. *Lk.*,xxiv,53).² The second sections of each volume, moreover, correspond to each other. Both suggest a limited expansion of activity foreshadowing

¹ Though note *Lk.*,xxii,53a ≠ *Mk.*,xiv,49a ≠ *Mt.*,xxvi,55b - all καθ'ἡμέραν.

² See also *Acts*, xxi,26, cf. *Lk.*,ii,22;46, xix,45-7, etc..

the more extensive travelling to come; both show the good news to be preached in a mainly Jewish setting, yet still reaching beyond the Jews to the gentiles (the centurion of *Lk.*, vii, 2 and ff., and the centurion Cornelius in *Acts*, x, 1ff., represent part of the Evangelist's efforts to forge a connection),¹ and the mission activity extra *Jesum* in both sections is focussed primarily on the twelve (*Lk.*, v, 10, vi, 12-16, viii, 1b; 51b, ix, 1-10, cf. viii, 9-15, *Acts*, viii, 1b; 5; 14b; 26, ix, 26; 32, x, 9 - xi, 18, xi, 22). Luke takes pains, nevertheless, to ensure that there was no doubling-up of Jesus's regional ministry by the apostles; he mentions no apostolic mission to Galilee, apparently assuming the area had already been handled (cf. *Acts*, ix, 31),² he has Jesus preach only to the villages of Samaria (*Lk.*, ix, 52; 56) but has Philip in the city of Sebaste(?) (*Acts*, viii, 5; 9; 14, cf. 25b), and he faces Jesus's ministry away from the seaboard and northern centres tackled by the early church (cf. *Acts*, viii, 40, ix, 19b ff.; 32b; 36, x, 24, xi, 19, cf. xxi, 3-4; 7, xxviii, 3). Despite establishing the differences, however, the regional ministries of *Luke* iv, 14 - ix, 56 and *Acts*, viii, 1b - xii, 25 are both limited developments (before the thrust towards Jerusalem in *Luke* [cf. *Acts*, x, 37, xiii, 31],³ and towards the west and Rome in *Acts*).⁴ These thrusts, of course, were covered in the third sections, a parallel between the journeys and adventures in *Luke* and *Acts* being intended. Interestingly, the more far-reaching gentile mission of *Acts* depends on the selection of non-apostolic evangelists (cf. xiii, 1-3),

¹ Concerning *Lk.*, vii, 2ff., note Luke's efforts to emphasize the piety of the Roman, vss. 4b-5 (cf., on Cornelius, *Acts*, x, 2), yet cf. *Mt.*, viii, 5ff., *Jn.*, iv, 46ff..

² Yet cf. *Mk.*, xvi, 7, *Mt.*, xxviii, 7; 10; 16-20. See esp. C.F. Evans, 'I will go before you into Galilee', in *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S., v, 1954, pp. 11ff., L.E. Elliott-Binns, *Galilean Christianity (Studies in Biblical Theology XVI)*, London, 1956, esp. ch. 4. Cf. also Excursus 3.

³ It is unlikely that Roman readers would have appreciated why the Son of God should have ministered primarily to Galileans. Yet Luke accounted for this.

⁴ On the westward thrust in *Acts*, see esp. H. Cadbury, *Acts in History*, *op.cit.*, pp. 26ff., etc..

whilst Jesus's journey in *Luke* begins with the commission of the non-apostolic seventy(-two) (x,1-12;17-20).¹ By introducing this larger assembly in the Gospel, Luke created the impression of a far wider group of disciples than had been suggested before,² and in this so-called 'central section' Jesus' teaching becomes increasingly directed beyond his followers.³

In *Luke-Acts*, then, the church comes to re-enact Christ's activity by undergoing similar 'stages of development' and by working in parallel geographical contexts. Thus more broadly conceived colligations in *Luke*, and not key actions or incidents alone are repeated in the second volume. Whilst this could be regarded as the approach of a 'typological theologian', there seems less reason for saying that Christ's life is a prefiguration of apostolic Christianity than for concluding that Luke has organized both volumes so as to disclose patterns of re-enactment. Eliciting recurrences was the prerogative of the ancient historian, and the exercise of this prerogative does not come unnaturally from one who sought to introduce Christianity to the Graeco-Roman world.⁴

¹ Greek MSS diverge on the precise number. See Trompf, 'La Section, etc.', *loc.cit.*, p.154 on these passages. Notice also *Lk.*, x,19, cf. *Acts*, xxviii,3-6.

² Numerous passages before the journey begins in ix,51ff., reflect the special position of the twelve (cf. iv,38, v,1-11;27-32, vi,12-16, viii,1, ix,1-12 and ff.;28ff.;49ff.) and numerous other general references to the disciples suggest the involvement of the twelve only (esp. vi,20ff., viii,22ff., ix,18ff., and cf. also v,33ff., vi,1ff., viii,9ff., ix,43bff. [on this last reference, cf. xviii,31]). After x,1-20, however, the μαθηταί seem to be less confined (xi,1, xii,1 (cf. the setting in *Mk.*, viii,14-15); 22, xvi,1ff., xvii,1ff.;22ff., xviii,1ff.;15, yet note xvii,5, xviii,31, cf. x,23).

³ See esp. x,25ff., xi,15ff.;27ff.;37ff., xii,13ff.;41ff.;54ff., xiii,1ff.;10ff.;22ff.;31ff., xiv,1ff.;15ff.;25ff., xv,1ff., xiv,14ff., xvii,11ff.;20ff., xviii,18ff.;35ff., xix,1ff..

⁴ Luke's special stresses on Jerusalem and Judaea should be appreciated in this light. Also, he avoided specialist connections between the OT and Jesus (unlike Matthew), although he was prepared to 'generalize' about the relationship, to create a Semitic atmosphere when it suited him, and to recount early sermons that appealed to the ancient prophecies and scriptures (in *Acts*), see *infra*, eg., p.292. Debates between Jesus and the Jewish leaders over legal technicalities were relieved of their obscurity by special clarifications or simplifications (see Trompf, *loc.cit.*, pp.146ff., cf. also H. Marshall, 'Tradition and Theology in Luke (Luke 8:5-15)', in

Old Testament Background

One may well ask whether this kind of approach belongs to a recognizable historiographical tradition. Ancient Israelite histories come to mind, since Luke made extensive use of OT quotations, and scriptural phraseology underlies much of his narration. As notions of re-enactment formed one important ideological basis for the great Israelite festivals,¹ it is only natural that they should have been transferred to and re-developed in historiography. We may reflect at the outset on important examples of re-enactment in the Deuteronomic history. The Jordan-crossing under Joshua, for instance, was consciously likened to the Exodus and the traversing of the Red Sea (*Josh.*, iv, 23 and see 6; 7; 21, cf. *Deut.*, vi, 20, *Exod.*, xii, 26-27), and Joshua came to possess the attributes of a 'second' Moses.² The first Jordan-crossing, moreover, seems to be 're-enacted' later by Elijah and Elisha who both strike the waters with a mantle (*II Kgs.*, ii, 8; 14).³ The Captivity-Exodus motif also makes an appearance. This motif was present in prophetic works at the time of the Exile, when a disaster comparable to

Tyndale Bulletin, XX, 1969, p. 73), and at one significant point by omission (cf. *Mk.*, vii, 1-15, *om. Lk.*, though note xi, 37ff.). Jesus' teaching on Law in Luke tends to be more direct and non-disputative than in Mark and Matthew, and Luke concentrated on well-known legal matters - the sabbath law especially (vi, 1-5; 6-11, xiii, 10-17, xiv, 1-6). In general, he wished to give the origins of Christianity a recognizable cultural setting, but at the same time to pinpoint its own special features as a cultural phenomenon, for he wished to stress that it had universalist implications (*Lk.*, ii, 29-32, *Acts*, ii, 7-11, viii, 26-38, x-xi, xv, 6-31, etc.), that it was superior to Judaism (cf. esp. Flender, *op. cit.*, pp. 117ff.), and that Christians did not form a politically subversive group (as the Jews did during the Jewish War?) (*Lk.*, xx, 20-26, xxiii, 4; 14b; 22, 41b; 47b, (cf. *Mk.*, xv, 39 ≠ *Mt.*, xxvii, 54), *Acts*, x, xvi, 21-40, xvii, 6-9, xviii, 12-17, xxi, 30-39, xxviii, 7-10, etc.). (And on current attitudes, Tacitus, *Annals*, XV, 44)

¹ See esp. von Rad, *Message*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78ff.. In observing the passover, for example, the Israelites were not only commemorating their liberation, they were doing again what the ancestors of the Exodus had done.

² See esp. D. Daube, *The Exodus Pattern of the Bible*, (*All Souls Studies II*), London, 1963, p. 11; and on Joshua as a second Moses, cf. *Josh.*, iv, 5-7 (again recalling events before the Exodus) 14; v. 15 (cf. *Exod.*, iii, 5), xxiv, 25; and note viii, 31b (cf. *Deut.*, xxvii, 4, *Exod.*, xx, 25). Both Moses and Joshua were taken to be warriors by the Deuteronomist(s).

³ By comparison, note *II Sam.*, xvii, 22, cf. xix, 15; 31.

the Egyptian bondage had occurred.¹ It was rather subtly appropriated by the Deuteronomist (cf. *Deut.*,xxviii,68),² and he alone amongst biblical writers made the Egyptian experience a time of punishment for Israel (preceding deliverance), just as the exile to Babylon was.³

Aside from these very obvious cases, and without elaborating on the well-known ground plan and basic theological standpoint of the Deuteronomist, there are other suggestions of re-enactment which throw light on Lukan methods and assumptions. The Deuteronomist saw Moses, for example, not just as the dispenser of the Torah but as a prophet or 'prophetic covenant mediator' who, despite his unique greatness (*Deut.*, xxxiv,10), was 'the first in a series of prophets' (cf.xvii,15-22).⁴ Thus 'what Moses did in Deuteronomy so also did the prophets during the course of Israel's history', for like him, they delivered the covenants and warnings of Yahweh.⁵ Of all the prophets, Elijah is the one most strikingly presented as a new Moses, mediating a new covenant between Yahweh and

¹ See esp. W.Zimmerli, 'Le Nouvel 'Exode' dans le Message des Deux Grands Prophètes de l'Exil', in *Maqqêl Shagêdh* (W.Vischer Festschrift), Montpellier, 1960, pp.216ff.. Cf.also C.Chavasse, 'The Suffering Servant and Moses,' in *Church Quarterly Review*, CLXV,1964,pp.162-3, on Hebrew terms for redemption in *Exodus* and Deutero-Isaiah's oracles.

² This crucial phrase looks ahead to the Exile (with xxviii,36ff.) and the phrase *וְהָיָה יְהוָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל* may be taken to refer either to the whole exile as a 'second Egyptian Captivity', or to refer specifically to one of the important historical consequences of the Exile (cf. *Jer.*,xliv).

³ Cf. *Deut.*,vii,15 (Yahweh was the inflictor), xxviii,36ff (*supra*), *Josh.*, v,9 (cf. *וְהָיָה יְהוָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל*), yet cf.the older credal material incorporated into *Deuteronomy*, (xxvi,6, cf.von Rad, *Deuteronomy; a Commentary* (ET), London, 1966, pp.157ff). Note also *Deut.*,xxviii,27;60 (within xxviii,15-68) where it is promised that the diseases inflicted on Egypt, and which terrified the Israelites, will fall upon them if they disobey. See also *I Sam.*,vi,6.

⁴ The coming prophet and false prophet are written of in the singular (this is why they encouraged later 'messianic' expectation of a great prophet to come), yet vss.20 and 22 handle the marks of any prophet who was to come. Cf.also *II Kgs.*,xvii,23 (*וְהָיָה יְהוָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל*).

⁵ For the quotations, see E.W.Nicholson, *Deuteronomy and Tradition*, Oxford, 1967,pp.117-8 (in the context of pp.113-8); for obvious examples, see *II Sam.*,vii,8-17 (Nathan and the Davidic covenant), *I Kgs.*,xxi,20-24 (Elijah against the house of Ahab).

his people from a mount, destroying his enemies with a curse, actually seeing God pass by, handing his work on to a successor, and being eventually taken up by God.¹ And there is another feature of interest partly connected with Moses, although it represents more a special parallel between two stages of development than a simple re-enactment. According to the Deuteronomic frame, the wilderness wanderings bore unfavourable comparison with the actual possession of the land, because although Yahweh's commandments were delivered outside Canaan, the wilderness period was a time of grave disobedience.² When Joshua completed the work of Moses, however, Israel was obedient and worthy enough to find 'rest' (נַחַם) before her enemies.³ Now a parallel seems to have been purposely drawn between this early situation and a later one under David and Solomon. Of the two monarchs, David was the great and seminal figure comparable to Moses, and was the recipient of a new covenant (II Sam., vii, 8-17), yet in his time there was great turbulence, both internal and external. It was only under his successor that the people found complete *nuaḥ* before their enemies, and the temple was built.⁴

¹ I Kgs., xviii, 30-40, cf. Deut., iv, 10ff.; Exod., xix, 16ff (mountain); II Kgs., i, 9-16, cf. Num., xiv, 26-34 (J?) (curse); I Kgs., xix, 9-14, cf. Deut., xxi, 10b, Exod., xxiv, 10, xxxiii, 11; 17-23 (J), (visible encounter); I Kgs., xix, 16-21, II Kgs., ii, 1-15, cf. Deut., iii, 21-22, xxxi, 23, xxxiv, 9 (successor); II Kgs., ii, 11, cf. Deut., xxxiv, 6 ('translation'). Elijah also appears to 're-enact' the wilderness wandering after the dramatic scene on Mt. Carmel (see xix, 8, cf. 'forty days and forty nights'), and he then sees God (vss. 9ff.). It must be acknowledged that Mosaic elements in the Elijah stories may have been already in the (Gilgal) traditions about Elijah and Elisha as the Deuteronomist received them (cf. J.N.M. Wijngaards, *The Dramatization of Salvific History in the Deuteronomic Schools* (*Oudtestamentische Studien XVI*), Leiden, 1969, p. 61, cf. pp. 60-63). Yet be this as it may, the redactor's deliberate selection of this material should also be stressed.

² Cf. esp. Deut., i, 26-27; 34-35; 43-45, ii, 14-15, xxxii, 51, Josh., v, 4-12.

³ Cf. Josh., xxi, 44, xxii, 4, xxiii, 1, cf. xi, 23b, xiv, 15b, cf. Jud., ii, 10. Note also Heb., iv, 8.

⁴ See esp. I Kgs., v, 5, viii, 56 on *nuaḥ*. On the other hand, II Sam., vii, 1 places a time of rest in David's reign, and II Sam., vii, 11a appears to look ahead to one (though the beginnings of Solomon's reign within David's lifetime, cf. I Kgs., ii, 1-12, may be meant here). Cf. also iv, 25. On the parallelism, (without reference to *nuaḥ* theology, however), see G. Østborn, *Yahweh's Words and Deeds; a preliminary study into the Old Testament representation of history* (*Uppsala Universitets Åarskrift VII*), Uppsala,

To elicit the re-enactment of significant events, then, to suggest how a given figure or set of conditions recalled prior developments, was hardly foreign to OT historiography, and such preoccupations do not stop short at the Deuteronomic historian.

The Chronicler's four volumes are also extremely pertinent. It is well known that his account of Israel's history from David to the Exile diverges somewhat from the Deuteronomic history,¹ and the differences imply a good deal about special notions of recurrence in his work. The Chronicler's handling of geography and general cultural atmosphere, and his effort to expose similarities between certain event-complexes throughout his work are of special relevance here. Geographically, the Chronicler focussed very heavily on Jerusalem. Apart from the fact that the northern kingdom and its centres gained so little of his consideration,² what

1951, p.32. On the temple, *I Kgs.*, v, 15ff [MT]. A form of re-enactment not treated above involves the succession of evil Israelite kings in *I-II Kings*, who do evil in the sight of Yahweh after the fashion of Jeroboam I (*I Kgs.*, xv, 26; 34, xvi, 19 (xxi, 22 as an interesting sidelight), xxii, 52, *II Kgs.*, viii, 27 (after Ahab, not Jeroboam, however), xiii, 2, xiv, 24, etc.). We may also note the Judaeans who followed David's footsteps (*II Kgs.*, xviii, 3, xxii, 2) or who did right, but were not quite up to David's standard (xiv, 3, xvi, 2).

¹ The Chronicler's narrative begins with the early stages of David's reign (*I Chron.*, x, 1ff.), and the events covered by the Deuteronomist in *Deut.*, *Josh.*, *Jud.*, and *I Sam.*, were therefore automatically omitted, though in i-xi the Chronicler presents a formidable genealogy reaching back beyond Moses to Adam. With the Chronicler, both the reigns of David and Solomon mark the highpoint of Israelite national history. No internal difficulties shake the foundations of David's monarchy (cf. *II Sam.*, xiv-xx, *om. Chr.*), and both kings are whitewashed, David over the affair with Bathsheba (*II Sam.*, xi-xii, *om. Chr.*) and Solomon with regard to his wives (*II Chr.*, viii, 11, cf. *I Kgs.*, viii, yet cf. also *Neh.*, xiii, 26). Both kings make their vital contribution to the temple (so *infra*, p. 234), and although Solomon's death sees a decline, the degree of its entrenchment is noticeably lessened by the Chronicler's omission of almost all the affairs of the Northern Kingdom and his not unsympathetic concentration on the post-Solomonic Judaeans line to the Exile (*infra*, pp. 277ff.). *II Chr.* ends at the point where *Ezra* begins, and both *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* deal with the Restoration - the rebuilding of the temple (*Ezra*, iii, 10, iv, 12, v, 2; 15, vi, 14, etc.) and the walls of Jerusalem (iv, 12b, *Neh.*, ii, 3ff., vi, 15, etc.), and the consolidation of the new community (esp. *Ezr.*, iii, 8ff., viii-ix, *Neh.*, viii-xiii).

² Cf. *II Chr.*, x, 1-19, xiii, 3-20, xvi, 1-6, xviii, xx, 35-36, xxv, 17-24 for the only significant references.

happens in Jerusalem, where 'Yahweh, the God of Israel, dwells forever' (cf. *I Chr.*,xxiii,25),¹ represents his central preoccupation. For a post-exilic writer, the fate of the Jerusalem temple and its cultus, and the restoration of community life in Jerusalem and Judaea were of crucial importance. There was a continuous story to be told from David's capture of 'Jebus' (*I Chr.*,xi,4ff.) to the restoration period; and within that story, the holy temple had first been built, eventually destroyed, and then rebuilt and restored - a point of great relevance to the idea of recurrence. According to the Chronicler, David was less a warrior and defender of his realm than a builder, architect and cult organizer,² and Solomon was treated far less as one wise beyond compare than as a king building and ordering the temple.³ Now in the books of *Ezra* and *Nehemiah*, significantly, we find an intense interest in both the architectural history of the Second Temple and of the restored Jerusalem, and it is an interest which noticeably complements the characteristic treatment in the earlier (?) volumes.⁴ The Chronicler apparently selected and organized his material to draw parallels between religious life under the righteous Judaeen monarchs and life under the restored community. To isolate the obvious ones, not only were David and Solomon both concerned with building

¹ From a passage peculiar to C, a particularly interesting verse which appears to clash with the Chronicler's notion of Yahweh's habitation of the heavens (cf. esp. R.E.Clements, *God and Temple*, Oxford, 1965, p.128 on *II Chr.*,vi,18;21,etc.), yet it is clear that the Chronicler does not abandon the belief in the temple as a place for Yahweh to dwell in, cf. *II Chron.*,vi,2, xxxvi,15 and note the 'parallelism' developed over the first and second temples in *I Chr.*,xxii,19 and *Ezr.*,i,3.

² On David as builder, cf. *I Chr.*,xiv,1-2 (≠ *II Sam.*,v,11-12), xv,1; as a planner, xvii, xxi,18 - xxii,19, xxviii, xxix,1-5 (von Rad, [*OT Theology*, op.cit.,vol.1,p.351]), suggests that in the respect that David produces a 'pattern' (תבנית) for Solomon, he was portrayed as a 'new Moses', cf. *I Chr.*,xxviii,11;12;18;19, cf. *Exod.*,xxv,9;40. On David as cult organizer, see esp. *I Chr.*,xiii,1ff.,xvi,4ff.,37ff..

³ Note esp. *II Chr.*,ii,5 - viii,16 (cf. *I Kgs.*,v - viii), though note *II Chr.*,i,7-13 ≠ *I Kgs.*,iii,3-14; *II Chr.*,ix,1-12 ≠ *I Kgs.*,x,1-13.

⁴ It may well be that the writer produced *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* before *I-II Chronicles*, and that he intended the former two to be read before the latter, cf. esp. Goulder [unpublished work on *Chronicles*, ch.9, pp.1ff.][by courtesy].

projects and temple officialdom, but the more meritorious of their successors have a degree of involvement also, an involvement which looks ahead to the restoration situation.¹ It is also noteworthy that the northern kingdom becomes a real defence hazard in *II Chronicles* just as the 'province beyond the river' (= Samaria) was to the restored Judaeans.² Material concerning the religious organization of the righteous kings of Judah, moreover, much of which is peculiar to *Chronicles*, forged yet another connection between the pre- and post-exilic situations,³ and the priestly and levitical *leitourgiai* were taken to be organized by monarchs - David, Solomon, and Hezekiah in particular - in a manner similar to restoration arrangements.⁴ There are even signs that the Chronicler actually forced a post-exilic levitical organization on the kingly period (esp. *II Chr.*, xxiii, 2-11, cf. *II Kgs.*, xi, 4-10).⁵ As for the form and

¹ King Joash collects money and restores the house of Yahweh (*II Chr.*, xxiv, 1-14, cf. *II Kgs.*, xii); Jehoida carries on this work (*II Chr.*, xxiv, 5 ≠ *II Kgs.*, xii, 5); Uzzah (=Azariah) builds towers in Jerusalem and elsewhere (*II Chr.*, xvi, 9 (and 10; 6b), cf. *II Kgs.*, xv, 1ff.); Jotham builds part of the temple complex and engages in other projects (*II Chr.*, xxvii, 3-4, cf. *II Kgs.*, xv, 32ff.); Hezekiah repairs Jerusalem's wall so that the Assyrian foe may be faced (*II Chr.*, xxxii, 5, cf. *II Kgs.*, xviii, 33ff.); Manasseh erects a massive outer wall for the city (*II Chr.*, xxxiii, 14, cf. *II Kgs.*, xxi); and Josiah organizes the repair of the temple (*II Chr.*, xxxiv, 8b-12a ≠ *II Kgs.*, xxii, 3-7) - all activities which look ahead to Jerusalem's second temple and her new fortifications. On Manasseh, too, see *infra*, p. 236.

² Note esp. *II Chr.*, xi, 5-12 (om. *I Kgs.*) (in the context of *II Chr.*, xi, 1-4 ≠ *I Kgs.*, xii, 1-2), xvi, 1ff. (≠ *I Kgs.*, xv, 16ff.), xvii, 1 (om. *I Kgs.*) (yet xviii ≠ *I Kgs.*, xxii), xxv, 7 (om. *II Kgs.*); 20-2 (≠ *II Kgs.*, xiv, 11-12), xxviii cf. *II Kgs.*, xvii). And see *Ezr.*, iv, 9ff, v, 3ff., *Neh.*, ii, 9-10, iv, 1ff., etc..

³ Asa orders the people to take an oath of obedience to Yahweh, over which all Judah rejoices (*II Chr.*, xv, 12-15, cf. *I Kgs.*, xv, 9ff.); similarly, under Ezra and Nehemiah, the people take oaths to walk in God's way (*Ezr.*, x, 5b, *Neh.*, x, 29, cf. xii, 43; 44b, v, 12-13). The law of Yahweh is taught under Jehoshaphat and under his royal jurisdiction (*II Chr.*, xvii, 7-9, xix, 9-10, cf. *I Kgs.*, xxii, 1ff.), and the book of the Law found in the temple is read by king Josiah before the people (*II Chr.*, xxxiv, 30-32 ≠ *II Kgs.*, xxiii, 1-3); so too, Ezra reads the Torah before the restored community (*Neh.*, viii, 1-4).

⁴ See *I Chr.*, xv, xvi, 4, *II Chr.*, v, 5-13, vii, 6, viii, 14-15, xxxiv, cf. xix, 8ff., xxiv, 5ff.. For discussion and some documentation regarding C's levitical interests, see esp. A.C. Welch, *The Work of the Chronicler; its purpose and its date* (Schweich Lectures 1938), London, 1939, ch. 3, von Rad, *OT Theol.*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 351-2.

⁵ For more conservative views, that most of the Chronicler's special material relating to cultic organization under the monarchy derives

content of religion in the two 'eras', his work suggests a variety of correspondences - in the form of temple dedications, for example (with their accompanying grand sacrifices), the keeping of the great feasts under righteous rulers, as well as purifications, exhortations, prayers and psalms.¹

The evidence overwhelmingly supports the view, then, that the material peculiar to *Chronicles* has been incorporated into those books of their relatedness to the restoration scene. The events of the monarchical and (immediately) post-exilic periods have been consciously paralleled. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the writer's treatment of the two important kings Hezekiah and Manasseh. The former reigned after a time of 'captivity' (cf. מִבְּלִיַּת) inflicted on Ahaz by the Assyrians (*II Chr.*, xxviii, 20-22, xxix, 9, *om. II Kgs.*); he also performed a work of restoration with regard to the temple (xxix, 3; 35b, *om. II Kgs.*), and was later forced to build up the broken walls of Jerusalem in defence against Sennacherib (xxxii, 5, *om. II Kgs.*). The latter actually experienced a 'Babylonian exile', a punishment for his wickedness, but in his distress 'he entreated the favour of Yahweh', and so humbled himself that God 'brought him again to Jerusalem into his kingdom' (*II Chr.*, xxxiii, 12-13, *om. II Kgs.*). On his return, Manasseh significantly built outer walls for Jerusalem (vs. 14a) and restored (*kūn*) Yahweh's altar in the temple (vs. 16)². Thus the actions of both kings foreshadow and are re-enacted in the work of the restoration community.

largely from ancient pre-exilic sources, see esp. W. Rudolph, *Chronikbücher* (*Handkommentar zum AT. XXI*), Göttingen, 1955 edn., introd.; J. M. Myers, *I Chronicles and II Chronicles* (Anchor Bible), New York, 1965, (1), pp. xlv ff..

¹ Dedications: *II Chr.*, v, 1 - vi, 11, vii; *Ezr.*, vi, 16-18, cf. viii, 35; (the number of beasts offered varied enormously though! *II Chr.*, vii, 5, cf. *Ezr.*, vi, 17. Feasts: esp. *I Chr.*, xxiii, 30-31 (*om. II Sam*), *II Chr.*, viii, 12-13 (*om. I Kgs*), xxx, 13; 23 (*om. II Kgs.*), xxxv, 1ff (≠ *II Kgs.*, xxiii, 21ff.), *Ezr.*, iii, 3-5, vi, 19-22, *Neh.*, ix, 1 (Tabernacles), x, 33. Purifications: esp. *I Chr.*, xv, 12; 14, *II Chr.*, v, 11, xxix, 15; 34, *Ezr.*, vi, 20, cf. *Neh.*, xii, 47. Exhortations: *I Chr.*, xxii, 7-16, cf. xxviii, 2ff. (David), xiii, 4-12 (bijah), xxix, 5-11; 31 (Hezekiah), xxxv, 3-6 (Josiah), *Ezr.*, viii, 28-9, *Neh.*, viii, 9; 10; 11; 15 (Ezra). Prayers: esp. *II Chr.*, vi, 14-42 (Solomon), *Ezr.*, ix, 6-15, *Neh.*, ix, 5b-37. Psalms: esp. *II Chr.*, v, 13b, vii, 3b, xx, 21b, *Ezr.*, iii, 11a.

² Parallel to: *Ezr.*, ix, 7, *Neh.*, ix, 27ff., *Ezr.*, vi, 3, *Neh.*, i, 3bff.. On 113 see G. Lisowsky, *Konkordanz zum hebräischen Alten Testament*, Stuttgart, 1958, p. 672.

Foreshadowing, perhaps, may be deemed typology, but I am taking it to be an inevitable outcome of the Chronicler's historiographical organization. Thus if the Chronicler, or even Luke, wished to suggest that older actions or activities were re-enacted in more recent times, their description of older events was often adjusted to strengthen the desired impression.¹

Admittedly one should be cautious here. It is all very well to write of parallelisms, correspondences or even re-enactment in the Chronicler's history, but was he really concerned with historical recurrence? Were his chief concerns really rather different - to legitimate certain post-exilic cultic offices (von Rad), or to illustrate religious continuity between the monarchical and restoration periods (Ackroyd), or to write a series of *midrashim* on the Hexateuch (Goulder)? Certainly his sense of precedence and continuity cannot be denied, but this does not automatically exclude notions of loose, non-exact recurrence, which shine through the Chronicler's arrangement of material. G.Östborn, although he has been over-eager to uncover patterns of cyclical thinking in the OT, rightly noted that the Chronicler's general schema - a new and good order established under David

¹ In neither great OT historian, significantly, nor in Luke, does this foreshadowing border on allegory.

² For G. von Rad, who is fond of emphasizing linearity in Israelite historiography, the Chronicler wanted to prove the legitimacy of cultic offices which, supposedly founded by David, were maintained after the Exile (*op.cit.*, vol. 1, p. 352 (cf. p. 330, n. 6); cf. also his *Das Geschichtsbild des chronistischen Werkes*, Stuttgart, 1930). For P. Ackroyd, continuity is the important issue, and he has recently developed his line of interpretation by tracing 'prophetic' and 'monarchical' motifs in Ezra and Nehemiah ('The Age of the Chronicler; the great Reformers, 1' [Lecture to the Australian and New Zealand Society for Theological Studies, Melbourne, 17/8/1970]), and see 'History and Theology in the Writings of the Chronicler', in *Concordia Theological Monthly*, XXXVIII, 1967, pp. 508ff., 'The Temple Vessels - a Continuity Theme', in *Studies in the Religion of Ancient Israel* (ed. not known) (*Vetus Testamentum Supplement XXIII*), Leiden, 1972, pp. 166ff., cf. *Continuity*, London, 1962. Goulder, who has recently entered the OT field, holds the Chronicler's work to contain a series of special commentaries on the Hexateuch, these being designed to follow the liturgical pattern of the Jewish Year (cf. 'The Chronicler, etc., *op.cit.*, [ch. 9]).

and Solomon, in accordance with the law of Moses / disturbances of this order through the disobedience of kings / a new and good order established under Ezra and Nehemiah, in accordance with the law of Moses - also points in the direction which interests us.¹ And there remains the special emphasis on two key protagonists at both the beginning and end of the whole narrative. David and Solomon are brought into closer relationship than in the Deuteronomic history (*II Chr.*,xxii,6 - xxiii,1, xxviii,1 - xxix,25, cf. *I Kgs.*,ii,1-9), and the originally quite separate careers of Ezra and Nehemiah are telescoped together (esp. *Neh.*,viii,9, cf. *Ezr.*,ix - x, *Neh.*,ix - x).² The most unqualified approval of these four, in contrast to evident reservations about the other rulers in between, even the more righteous ones,³ clearly calls for a re-evaluation of the Chronicler's historiographical presuppositions. Whilst we have yet to examine his approach to retribution (pp.276ff.), it may be affirmed that his redaction indicates an interest in recurrent patterns, in both the re-enactment and foreshadowing of key religious practices, and in a special paralleling of spiritual conditions under the united monarchy and the restoration community.⁴

¹ So *op.cit.*,p.41, cf.pp.36ff..

² On the debate about the chronology of *Ezra* and *Nehemiah*, see esp. H.H. Rowley, 'Nehemiah's Mission and its Background', in *Men of God; Studies in Old Testament History and Prophecy*, London, 1963,pp.229ff., and the literature cited there; cf.D.N.Freeman, 'The Chronology of Israel and the Ancient Near East', in *The Bible and the Ancient Near East*, (W.F.Albright Festschrift), (ed.G.E.Wright), London,1961,pp.213ff..

³ See *infra*, pp.278f., and note esp. *II Chr.*,xix,2-3, xx,33 (reservations over Jehoshaphat), xxiv,17ff. (Joash), xxxii,25 (Hezekiah), xxxv,22b (Josiah).

⁴ Admittedly, the Chronicler was not contemplating human affairs as though history had its own internal logic; he tended, rather, to view events *sub specie aeternitatis*, because they informed the reader just as much about Yahweh's present demands as about the past. But it is still both permissible and advisable to search for inherited historiographical preconceptions which the writer carried with him to his task, preconceptions, for example, about the sorts of configurations and eventualities that constitute a sign of God's providential control of all things.

The Re-enactment of Old Testament Events within Luke-Acts

The redactions of the OT historians and the connections they made between key events in Israel's history obviously form an important intellectual background to *Luke-Acts*. Luke was well acquainted with the OT (LXX), and both his use of the text and his re-creation of ancient atmosphere surrounding the scriptures, persuades one that he sought to forge special links between the momentous happenings of more recent times and the history of Israel behind them. Was he merely trying to establish a certain continuity between the old and the new, or to indicate the fulfilment of ancient predictions in the events of the 'last era', or to allude to the *τύποι Χριστοῦ* in the Hebrew writings? Or are we justified in pressing our earlier line of argument yet further, to contend that Luke saw re-enactment of the old in new times? Certainly he did not hesitate to admit Christianity's Jewish origins, and even if he stressed the Jewish rejection of Jesus (pp. 291ff.), he acknowledged Israelite-Christian continuity. It is true, too, that he interested himself in the fulfilment of ancient prophecy (cf. esp. *Lk.*, iv, 21, *Acts*, ii, 15ff.), and what is conventionally deemed typology is not entirely absent from his work (cf. pp. 250f.). Luke's employment of the OT and its atmosphere, however, was quite distinctive over and against other early Christian treatments. How is it to be characterized?

Five relevant features may be singled out:

Luke's implicit claim that all the law and the prophets refer to Jesus,
his special approach to scriptural fulfilment,
his attempts to forge links between the old and the new orders
by suggesting the re-enactment of certain events,
by paralleling the general atmosphere of both orders,
and by making some more decidedly 'typological' connections
between the OT and both Jesus and his church.

First, the strongly Lukan references to the law and the prophets in *Lk.*, xxiv (vss. 25-27; 44-45) (cf. also *Acts*, xxvi, 22-23 and xxviii, 23b) merit attention.¹ In xxiv, 25, Jesus rebukes the two disciples on the Emmaus road for not believing all that the prophets had spoken; he then asks whether it

¹ On *Lk.*, xxiv, 25-27; 44-45 as Lukan, see esp. Conzelmann, *op.cit.*, p. 202.

was not necessary that the Christ should suffer and enter into his glory (vs.26, cf. *Mk.*, ix, 12b), and beginning from Moses and all the prophets, he explains or interprets to them all the scriptures about himself (vs.27). To the disciples not long after, and by way of a reminder (cf. xviii, 31, xxii, 37), Jesus asserts that it has been necessary for all that was written about him in the law of Moses, the prophets and the psalms to be fulfilled (*plērōthēnai*) (vs.44), and he then opens their minds to the *graphai* (vs.46). The stress on the exhaustive witness of scripture is intriguing. Although Luke has selected OT quotations throughout his work, he here appears to reject the search for 'purple passages' to legitimate Christological claims. This apparent rejection implies that Christ did not fulfil the scriptures just by actualizing various proleptic visions (the number of which was limited in the OT), and leads us to ask whether, for Luke, the events of the OT could be fulfilled by being 're-enacted'. The use of the verb *plērōthēnai* in xxiv (vs.44), perhaps, may at the onset seem to count against this alternative view, but we must probe further.

To take the second feature, what did Luke understand by fulfilment of the scriptures, and how distinctive was that understanding? His use of *plērōn* and *plērōthēnai* (apart from instances where the meaning has nothing to do with fulfilment),¹ offer rather meagre evidence for clarifying semantics. In three cases the verb indicates that a foretold state of affairs has come to pass (*Lk.*, i, 20, *Acts*, i, 16-17 [cf. 20], iii, 18 [cf. 25]),² and on other occasions, although Luke did not use the verb in question, he

¹ Cf. *Lk.*, ii, 40, iii, 5, *Acts*, ii, 2; 28, v, 3; 28, xiii, 52.

² The last two cited references may be taken to reflect pre-Lukan notions of fulfilment, and concerning a source behind *Acts*, iii, 12-26, cf. esp. Wilcox, *op.cit.*, p. 145, n. 8. Luke was freer as an editor in i, 16 - 22, though the parenthesis in vss. 18-19 is likely to have been based on an aramaic tradition (cf. *Mt.*, xxvii, 5; 8-10, G.D. Kilpatrick, *The Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew*, Oxford, 1946, p. 45), and on the psalm references in vs. 20 (= early Christian testimonia about the betrayal?).

implied that proleptic statements about the new Age were being realized.¹ Yet such popular phraseology as: 'in order that the scriptures might be fulfilled' does not seem to have suited Luke as it did the other Evangelists.² Perhaps the best clue to a more characteristically Lukan understanding of fulfilment lies in *Lk.*,xxii,16, where criteria are provided by synoptic parallels (cf. *Lk.*,xxii,18 ≠ *Mk.*,xiv,25 ≠ *Mt.*,xxvi,29).³ There *plērōthēnai* (om.*Mk.*,*Mt.*) carries a definite sense of re-enactment: the passover is now being kept, yet it will also be 'fulfilled' in the Kingdom, that is, it will be re-enacted in a more complete and decisive way at a later stage. This passover itself was Christ's re-enactment of a Mosaic institution, but a re-enactment so as to give it a completeness and a newer significance which the earlier ordinance lacked.⁴ The future meal in the Kingdom, or at the eschatological banquet,⁵ will be both a re-enactment and final completion of the Last Supper. It is typical of Luke that atonement theology should be only vaguely if at all present in his account of the pre-crucifixion supper (cf. esp. *Mk.*,xiv,24, *Mt.*,xxvi,28);⁶ his

¹ So *Lk.*,iii,3-5, vii,27, xix,38 (cf.xiii,35), xx,17;42-4, *Acts*, ii,16-21;25-28;34-35, iii,18, iv,25-28 (the psalm seems to be understood in a predictive sense only), vii,52b, viii,32-35, etc..

² See W.F.Moulton and A.S.Geden, *A Concordance to the Greek Testament*, Edinburgh, 1906edn.,p.816.

³ The οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ φάγω αὐτὸ ἕως ὅτου πληρωθῇ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ of vs.16 may well be a Lukan insertion emphasizing what Luke already found in his Markan source (*Mk.*,xiv,25), and repeated in the οὐ μὴ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδιν ἀπὸ τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου ἕως οὗ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔλθῃ of vs.18.

⁴ On the idea of a link between Moses's and Christ's passover, cf. esp. G.B.Caird, *Saint Luke* (The Pelican Gospel Commentaries), Harmondsworth, 1963,pp.34-35.

⁵ Cf. esp. *Lk.*,xiv,15-24. Jesus does not eat and drink the passover with the two who walked with him on the Emmaus road, cf.xxiv,30-31, and for Luke the Church partakes of the Lord's Supper until once more Christ is able to be with the disciples in person (cf.xxii,16;18b once more, and see *Acts*, ii,42;46, xx,7;11).

⁶ *Lk.*,xxii,19b-20 probably consists of non-Lukan interpolations (Westcott and Hort) designed to place the giving of blood after the giving of Christ's body. In the *Didache* the blood precedes the body (ix,1, and cf. F.C. Grant, *The Gospels; their origin and growth*, London,1957,pp.46-7), and this order may be the more primitive (unless Luke follows the OT order? cf. *Exod.*,xii,7-8). If vss.19b-20 are secondary, then the one significant atonement motif of Luke's Eucharist disappears, and the stress becomes one

chief concern was with 'stages of development' - the original passover, Christ's new passover (located at a specific time before and thus clearly distinct from the time of the passion),¹ and the passover to come. This approach to *plērōthēnai* in *xxii,16* enables us to give a constructive explanation for other strongly Lukan usages. At times the verb was utilized to convey the 'completion' of an act or time-span, and was thus quite comparable to *τελεῖν/τελεσθῆναι*,² yet key passages make it evident that, for Luke, scripture could see fulfilment by a special and potent re-enactment of OT events. In *Lk.,ix,31*, at the scene of the Transfiguration, to take a most important example, Moses and Elijah appear and speak to Jesus about his *exodos* 'which he was going to fulfil (*plērōun*) in Jerusalem' (*om. Mk.,Mt.*). By allusion, the scriptures, and the book of *Exodus* in particular, come to refer to Jesus, and yet he actually re-enacts the *Exodus* supersessively by journeying to Jerusalem and by overcoming the powers which temporarily bind him there. And in *Luke* the ascension or the *anālēmpsis* (*cf. Lk.,ix,51a*) represents the culmination of Christ's personal victory and the attainment of his glory; if the appearance of Moses on the mount points to the new *exodus*, the simultaneous appearance of Elijah looks to the ascension (so *sumplērōusthai* in *ix,51a*, and *cf. LXX II Kgs., ii,9;10;11b*),³ and thus the Lukan Jesus comes to re-enact two important

of performing an action with corporate meaning before Jesus undergoes his greatest trial, and before his return in glory. The saying over the bread is cut short at the *τοῦτο ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα μου* of *vs.19a*, and forms a mere preface to Christ's announcement that he will be betrayed and go as it has been determined (*vss.21-22*). On the virtual omission of atonement theology in *Luke*, *cf. esp. Flender, op.cit., pp.157ff*, and the literature cited on *p.157,n.2*.

¹ *πρὸ τοῦ με παθεῖν*; *xxii,15b, om. Mk.,Mt.* *Cf. Mt.,xxvii,15a, Jn.,xviii,39.*

² The understanding of fulfilment in the other Gospels was generally confined to prophecy fulfilment; yet for Luke on 'completion': *Lk.,vii,1,xxi,24, Acts, ii,1 (συν-), vii,23;30, ix,23, xii,25, xiii,25, xiv,26, xix,21, xxiv,27*. On *τελεῖν/τελεσθῆναι* in *Luke-Acts*, see *Lk.,ii,39, xii,50, xviii,31* (though this may carry a sense close to scripture fulfilment) (*cf. Mk.,x,33*), *xxii,37 (cf. Mt.,xxvi,56), Acts, xiii,29.*

³ I.e., *cf. ἀναληφθῆναι, ἀναλαμβάνόμενον, ἀνελήφθη* in these OT verses respectively. Luke clinches the connection by referring to this *ἀνα-*

highpoints in the OT. The implications of fulfilment in ch.ix, moreover, are similar to those in xxii,16 on the passover.

When one turns to that crucial passage in Luke iv which introduces Jesus' Galilean ministry, this same sense of fulfilment emerges again. Jesus reads from the scroll at Isa., lxi,1-2 (with lviii,6b!), announcing that 'today' this passage had been 'fulfilled' (*peplērōtai*) (iv,21). Luke evidently wished to stress Jesus' teaching more than his deeds in this context,¹ since it was the words of good news in the *graphē*² which were being fulfilled. Yet neither Luke nor his readers would have denied that Isaiah himself, in uttering his oracle, had proclaimed this good news to the poor, to the prisoners, and to those waiting the Lord's acceptable year;³ it was simply that Christ had also preached these things, although his proclamation was the final one, the one which completed the preaching of all God's messengers in Israel's past. Fulfilment here entails re-enactment. It is thus significant that Jesus, through his additional remarks (in iv, 25-27), is then likened to the prophets Elijah and Elisha who were sent to others rather than to a disobedient Israel. Once more Jesus does what has been done previously, yet the consequences of his actions, by comparison, were all decisive. Such evidence indicates, then, that Luke did not wish to confine the OT witness about Christ and the last times to prophetic prediction, and that he fostered a special understanding of fulfilment based on the historical relatedness between one age and another. It is

λήμψις at the beginning of a passage reminiscent of an Elijah story (ix, 52-56; cf. II Kgs., i). On *Elias-Christologie* in Luke, cf. K.Rengstorf, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas (Das Neue Testament Deutsch III)*, Göttingen, 1962, p.125.

¹ The quotation in vss.18-9 is deliberately constructed to give this emphasis, cf. *εὐαγγελίσασθαι, κηρῦξαι, ἀποστεῖλαι* (by verbal instruction), and note vs.15.

² ἡ γραφή should be translated 'the passage of scripture', yet cf. αἱ γραφαί, 'the scriptures'; cf. K.Lake and H.J.Cadbury, 'The Acts of the Apostles; English translation and commentary', pt.1, vol.4 of *Beginnings*, (eds. Foakes Jackson and Lake), *op.cit.*, p.12.

³ Isa., li,1ff. was treated by the Jews as concerned with the Messianic Age (cf. H.L.Strack and P.Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, Munich, 1924 edn., vol.2, p.146), but the prophet himself was not forgotten (cf. *Isaiah Targum*, [ed. J.F.Stenning], Oxford, 1949, p.172, ln.3. Cf. also Lk., iii,18 on John as 'a preacher of good news'.

true that Luke connected the fulfilment of prophetic utterances with Jesus' suffering (*Lk.*, xviii, 31-34a, xxii, 37, *Acts*, iii, 17-18, xiii, 27; 29, cf. *Lk.*, xxiv, 25-26, *Acts*, viii, 32-33), but on the other hand, we could hardly expect him to have fastened on to the very small number of prophecies about a suffering (even a resurrected!) Messiah in the name of all the prophets, and on the other hand, one of his key emphases was that Jesus was in line with the ancient prophets, that like them (though as the final actor in the whole drama of Israel's history) he encountered, warned and was put to death by the same rebellious people (cf. *Lk.*, iv, 24-39, xi, 49-51 [*≠ Mt.*, xxiii, 34-36], xiii, 33-35, xx, 9-18, [*≠ Mk.*, xii, 1-12], *Acts*, vii, 52-53, cf. xxviii, 25-27).¹ On the understanding that Jews still rebelled against God's commandments even when confronted with the Messiah, and that Jesus carried the corrective yet despised work of God's servants to a finale, then the whole of the law, prophets and Bible refers to Christ. But the special sense of re-enactment in Luke's approach to scripture fulfilment brings us to third feature of his work worthy of examination, his attempt to forge links between the old order, the time of the law and the prophets (ending with John the Baptist), and the new Age of salvation (beginning with Jesus's baptism),² first, by suggesting the re-enactment of certain events.

We have covered some of the relevant ground already, and it may be reiterated how for Luke Jesus repeated the deeds of Moses (in his passover and exodus) and of the great prophet Elijah (both in not being sent to his own at a time of crisis, and in his ascension). In some other respects

¹ In *Acts*, xxviii, 25-27, it is the church (rather than Jesus) which now warns rebellious Israel.

² *Lk.*, iii, 2-6; 16-18, vii, 24-30, xvi, 16, xx, 1-8, *Acts*, i, 22, xiii, 24-25, xix, 3-4. A very hard and fast line cannot be drawn between the two Ages, for in *Lk.*, iii, vii, 26; 28, *Acts*, xiii, 25a John seems to be placed mid-way between the two. It is noticeable, however, how Luke notes the completion of John's ministry in *Lk.*, iii, 19, before recounting Jesus's baptism (vss. 21-22) and lineage (23-38) (cf. *Mk.*, i, 9; 14, *Mt.*, iii, 13, iv, 12, *Jn.*, i, 19-36, iii, 22-24. Conzelmann puts excessive weight on *Lk.*, xvi, 16 to extract a three-staged view of history in *Luke-Acts*; see *infra*, p. 300, n. 2.

Luke's Jesus appears as a new, though better Moses. He authorized twelve tribal representatives and seventy others to perform special tasks for him;¹ like Moses and Elijah he receives a special revelation on the mountain (and in the waters);² he is a great teacher of God's Word,³ (even if he is less a legislator in Luke than 'the prophet like unto Moses' who was to come, cf. vii, 16b, xxvi, 19, Acts, iii, 22-23, vii, 37),⁴ and like Moses he performs τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα, only to face the rebelliousness of his own people (Acts, vii, 35-43; 52-3, cf. ii, 22-23). As for the other prophets, we have already argued that Luke's Christ re-enacts their careers as a whole, though the work of Jesus (and even John) represented a special culmination-point in Israel's history (Lk., xi, 32b, vii, 26b; 28). It was not possible that a prophet should die 'away from' (exō) Jerusalem (xiii, 33), which may simply mean that none died clear of Jerusalem's influence,⁵ but most probably means that Luke was simplifying matters unduly in his effort to convey the impression of re-enactment (cf. Neh., ix, 26). Even the special details of John's

¹ See Lk., vi, 13-16, ix, 1-6, xxii, 29-30 and x, 1ff.; 17ff. with Num., i, 44, Deut., i, 23 (cf. Exod., xxiv, 4), Num., xi, 16-17; 24-25. Some might prefer the harder reading of ἑβδομήκοντα δύο for Lk., x, 1 and 17 (so Kilpatrick), yet the manuscript strength does not support this alternative, and it may have arisen out of ignorance of the seventy in Numbers, and through a simple multiplication of the apostolic kernel (12 by 6).

² So Lk., ix, 30-31; 35, cf. Exod., xxxiii, 21-23, I Kgs., xix, 8; 11-12, and see Lk., iii, 21-22, cf. Exod., xiv, 21-22, II Kgs., ii, 8; 11b; 14b (with Jesus the heavens open rather than the waters dividing).

³ Lk., iv, 4; 8; 12, v, 14; 23; 30-31; 33-35, vi, 3-5; 9; 20-49, x, 26-37, xiii, 15-17, xiv, 4, xx, 21-47 are all relevant passages, but a close exegesis of them would show how little Luke was interested in Jesus as an interpreter of the Torah (cf. Mt.). We await the work of R.J. Banks (*Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition* (Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series), Cambridge), on this subject.

⁴ Cf. Deut., xviii, 15 (and IQTest., 5-8, Test. Benj., ix, 2 (cβς), I Macc., xiv, 41b, etc.). The Deuteronomic Moses rather than the heavy legislator of Exodus and Leviticus is closest to Luke's Christ. The blessings and cursings of Lk., vi, 20-26 are reminiscent of Deut., xxvii-xxx, cf. Mt., v, 3-12. Although Jesus preserves the true law (Lk., iv, 4; 8; 12 (cf. Deut.), xvi, 17-18), Luke acknowledged that 'by him everyone who believes is freed from everything from which you could not be freed by the law of Moses'; Acts, xiii, 39, cf. Rom., vii, 4-25.

⁵ For biblical background: Neh., ix, 26, II Chr., xxiv, 21, Martyrdom of Isa., etc..

death are omitted in Luke (iii,20, vii,19, ix,7b, Acts, vii,5a [cf.Mk.,vi, 14-29]), so that this general impression comes the more easily.¹ Statements about imminent doom for the house of Israel, moreover, are more frequent and more widely spread in Luke than in the other Gospels (cf.esp. xi,50, xiii,35, xix,41-44, xxi,6-24, xxiii,29-30, cf.Mk.,xiii,2-23, Mt.,xxiii,36 - xxiv,28), and thus Jesus emerges as a prophet of coming destruction like those of old, such as Jeremiah and Ezekiel, who predicted Jerusalem's earlier captivity and downfall.² Jesus' and John's call to repentance (*metanoia*) receives a sharper focus in Luke than with other Evangelists;³ Luke therefore characterized Jesus's teaching as a recalling to God in line with the old prophetic message - but at a higher level and at the beginning of the last Age (cf.vii 28, xvi,16). For Luke Jesus is 'sent' as any prophet was.⁴ Furthermore, he consciously fostered parallels between Jesus and both Elijah and Elisha. The miracle story cycles associated with these two figures were the most obvious biblical precedents for Gospel Novellen,⁵ and Luke has developed the connect-

¹ See also *supra*, p.213 for Luke on the two 'courses' or 'careers' of John and Jesus.

² Note Luke's significant use of the term αἰχμαλωτισθήσονται in xxi,24 (om. Mk.,Mt.), a technical term recalling the earlier captivity of the Jews and the fall of Jerusalem, cf. LXX II Kgs.,xxiv,14 (αἰχμαλωσίας, αἰχμαλωτίσας). And for prophecy of Jerusalem's fall, cf.esp. Jer.,viii - xxii, Ezek.,iv - viii, and note Deut.,xxviii,64 (cf.36ff.), since, according to the Deuteronomist, Moses also foresees the Exile.

³ On Jesus, Lk.,v,32b (cf. Mk.,ii,17, Mt.,ix,13), x,13b (≠ Mt.,xi,21), xi, 32 (≠ Mt.,xii,41), xiii,3;5 (om.Mk.,Mt.), xv,7;10, (om.Mk.,Mt.), xvi,30 (om. Mk.,Mt.), xxvi,47 (om.Mk.,Mt.), Acts, xvii,30. On John: Lk.,iii,3 (≠ Mk.,i, 4, cf.Mt.,iii,2), iii,8 (≠ Mt.,iii,8), Acts,xiii,24, xix,4.

⁴ See G.W.H.Lampe, 'The Lucan Portrait of Christ', in *New Testament Studies*, II,1955-6,p.169, cf. ἀπεστέλλην in iv,43b, cf. ἐξῆλθον in Mk.,i,38b.

⁵ Cf. B.Lindars, 'Elijah, Elisha and the Gospel Miracles', in *Miracles: Cambridge Studies in their Philosophy and History*, (ed.C.D.F.Moule), London, 1965,pp.66-76.

ion variously with miracle stories and special utterances.¹ Like Elijah, Jesus is capable of calling down fire on his rejectors (but he declines!) (Lk., ix, 52-56, cf. II Kgs., i, 10; 12), and in the same context hears an excuse from a potential disciple similar to one heard by Elijah from his eventual successor (Lk., ix, 61, cf. I Kgs., xix, 20). The ascension clinched the parallelism. Perhaps Luke did not wish to identify Jesus with Elijah (that identification was actually reserved for John),² yet Jesus' words and deeds resurrect the greatest work of the prophets - their pronouncements of judgement, their call to 'return' (*shūv*) from evil, and their miracles, which were, after all, recorded in the historical books forming part of the *n^ebi'im*. To reiterate, all the prophets referred to him and were 'fulfilled' through him.

We may now turn from Jesus to the early Christian communities. Luke wished to demonstrate that God's new instrument, the Church, encountered

¹ On ch. iv, see *supra*, p. 243; to this we may add: a) the bringing of two young people to life (vii, 11-17, viii, 49-56, cf. I Kgs., xvii, 17-24 (the women of Zarepheth and Nain are both widows, and note how Lk., vii, 15: καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτοὺς τῇ μητρὶ αὐτοῦ recalls both I Kgs., xvii, 23 and II Kgs., iv, 36), II Kgs., iv, 32-37); b) the healing of lepers (Lk., v, 12-15, xvii, 12-19, cf. II Kgs., v, 1-27, for the one leprosy healing in the OT, Luke's reference to the faith of a Samaritan 'foreigner' (rather than of the Jews) in xvii, 16-18 (om. Mk., Mt.) recalling the case of Naaman the Syrian in II Kgs., v, cf. Lk., iv, 27!); and c) the feeding of a multitude (Lk., ix, 10-17, cf. II Kgs., iv, 42-44) (Luke placed this scene near βηθσαῦδα (ix, 10, cf. Mk., vi, 32, Mt., xiv, 13). Why? He was bound more strongly to his Markan source than the briefer account of the feeding in II Kgs., and yet Mark was evidently not interested in the appropriate OT *Novelle*, so to effect a connection, Luke mentioned a place-name reminiscent of βεθσαῦδα, a 'foreign' city referred to in LXX II Kgs., iv, 42a at the beginning of the relevant story). On utterances, note Luke's adoption of 'what have you to do with me?' in exorcism healing stories derived from Mark (Lk., iv, 34 ≠ Mk., i, 24, Lk., viii, 28 ≠ Mk., vii, 7, cf. I Kgs., xvii, 18).

² Lk., vii, 27 (cf. Mal., iii, 1), yet cf. Mk., ix, 11; 13 ≠ Mt., xvii, 10-12, xi, 14 (om. Lk.). It is true that, for some Elijah, would restore the twelve tribes (cf. Ecclus., xlviii, 9-10, esp. 10b; Lampe, *loc. cit.*), but there is no evidence that Luke was interested in that tradition (in Lk., xxii, 29, for example), or that he identified Christ and Elijah on that basis.

the same Israelite rebelliousness which not only Jesus, but God's servants of old, had met with. According to Stephen's protracted address, the same people who would not listen to Moses in the past did not heed the proclamations of the Church either (*Acts*, vii, 39-43; 51-53, cf. also *Lk.*, xvi, 31). For Luke, then, (and this was hardly out of line with a key OT theme), disobedience was a recurring phenomenon in Jewish history. At the end of *Acts* there lies a significant Isaianic quotation (from vi, 9-10) which makes this very point as a finale to his volumes (xxviii, 26-27). Whereas Matthew places this oracle on the lips of Christ, treating it as a fulfilment of a predictive statement about the last times (cf. *Mt.*, xiii, 13-15), Luke, by contrast, conveys the impression that both Isaiah's original listeners and the Jews of Paul's own day were 'dull in heart', 'heavy of hearing' and with 'closed eyes'.¹ In Paul's opinion the Holy Spirit was right in saying these words πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ὑμῶν (xxviii, 25b), and so the present disobedience is taken as a repetition, though a more guilt-incurring repetition, of former violations. Thus this passage of scripture is fulfilled in the special Lukan sense already discussed. Other OT references in *Acts* may be interpreted along similar lines. Luke wrote after the fall of Jerusalem, and yet he appears to be quite aware of the earlier ravaging of Jerusalem and the temple (at the hands of the Babylonians).² In two quotations the two destructions of Jerusalem appear to be presupposed. When Stephen quotes from *Amos*, v, 25-27, the prophet's predictive judgement is not that the disobedient, idol-worshipping Israelites will be 'carried away beyond Damascus' (so *LXX*, v, 27a), but ἐπέκεινα βαβυλῶνος (*Acts*, vii, 43b).³ By implication,

¹ It is likely that Matthew's usage of this passage comes closest to the earliest Christian appropriation of it, and that Luke has his own special point to make. Luke's special treatment, all the same, throws some doubt on whether *Isa.*, vi formed part of early Christian *testimonia* (cf. T. Holtz, *Untersuchungen über die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Lukas (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur CIV)*, Berlin, 1968, pp. 35-36.

² Cf. p. 246, n. 2.

³ We must reckon with the serious possibility

then, there will be a second punishment for the Jews both parallel to yet far more extreme than the Babylonian Exile. When James quotes from three prophets (mainly from Amos, ix, 11-12) in Acts, xv, 16-18, the second fall of Jerusalem is assumed, and the second restoration, which is the eschatological restoration, is announced (cf. p. 303).¹ In Acts, therefore, particularly in connection with Jewish disobedience and its consequences, Luke reflects his interest in historical recurrence as he specially understood it, and without going beyond the permissions of evidence, the Church comes close to being the 'righteous remnant' and the 'new Israel' who, like the rebuffed holy ones of old, bear the true message of salvation.²

In two other ways Luke forged links between the old and new orders: by paralleling the general atmosphere of both orders, and by 'typological' connections. We may comment briefly on each. Luke, proficient in Greek, was able to infuse a heavily biblical (or, if one prefers, Septuagintal), atmosphere into some parts of his work. There are both stylistic touches and whole scenes which were intended to invoke the OT world. They indicate his working knowledge of the ancient scriptures, more particularly of the historical works they contained, since Luke was, after all, writing a history which was meant to carry on the narrative of divinely guided affairs to the

that βαβυλωνίος represents a Lukan redaction of the source from which Stephen's defence was derived. W.L. Knox, in *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (Schweich Lectures 1942), London, 1944, pp. 14-15 considered that Luke 'merely wanted to substitute rhythm for a metrical jingle, and had no deep theological motives' in mind here, but Knox has worked on the false premise that Luke's was 'an apparently pointless alteration of Amos, v, 27'. Cf. also Lk., xxi, 22.

¹ This restoration belongs after the 'time of the gentiles'? (see vs. 17b, Lk., xxi, 24b, yet cf. Mk., xiii, 20, Mt., xxiv, 22). On Luke's 'historicization' of the Little Apocalypse, see *infra*, pp. 256, n.1, 293.

² Cf. Acts, ii, 43-47, iii, 21; iv, 24-31, vii, 48-49, xiii, 16-43, xv, 15-21, xxi, 17-26, etc., and see esp. R.J. McKelvey, *The New Temple; the Church in the New Testament*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 86ff., though note P. Richardson, *Israel in the Apostolic Church* (Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series X), Cambridge, 1969, who argues that it was not until Justin Martyr that the Old/New Israel distinction was clearly made (pp. 31ff.).

climax of the last days.¹ In the main, the more archaic qualities in Luke's narrative are influenced by *I Samuel-II Kings, I Chronicles-Nehemiah*. The career of Jesus and the acts of the apostles recalled the ancient historical accounts of God's champions, especially the prophets.² Both the beginning and end of *Luke-Acts*, moreover, have striking affinities with the opening and closing chapters of the great OT histories. The *Magnificat* of *Luke* i and the genealogy of ch.iii have strong associations with the prayer of Hannah in *I Samuel* ii and the genealogy of *I Chronicles* i. One may also note the parallels both between the decree of Augustus (*Lk.*,ii,1) and the decree of Cyrus (*Ezr.*,i,1b-4), and between the chronological procedures of *Lk.*,i,5, iii,1-2 and *Ezr.*,i,1a. And scholars have overlooked the similarity between the ending of Luke's work (*Acts*, xxviii,30-31), and the conclusion to the Deuteronomic history at *II Kings*, xxv,27-30. Both Jehoiachin and Paul were captives away from their fatherland, and yet allowed relative freedom and the economic means to live comfortably. The strange ending of *Acts* is no longer strange; it has the special touch of OT history upon it.

There remains the Evangelist's more directly typological approach to the ancient scriptures. This concerns his appeal to traditional motifs and categories which were not developed in terms of re-enactment, but by which he nevertheless characterized Jesus (and his church). The most important of such categories was the Davidic-monarchical one, which related to Jewish expectations of the Messiah. It is admittedly true that once Jesus was raised and glorified, his kingly power was unmistakably assured, and in his universal dominion the Davidic rule finds restoration and re-enactment, but on considering the 'Jesus of history' Luke was only able to evince the re-enactment of some of the most significant events of the OT

¹ See Excursus 3, Exegetical Note D.

² See Excursus 3, Exegetical Note E.

in a rather shadowy way.¹ It was not easy to depict the earthly Jesus in a monarchical rôle, like Simon Maccabeus, for example, whose rule was presented as a return to the ideal conditions of the Davidic-Solomonic era in *I Macc.*, xiv, 4-15; 37-41.² Consequently, Luke's Davidic theme is less concerned with re-enactment than with suggesting David and his kingdom to be the type and prefigurement of the glorified Christ and his dominion.³ Furthermore, despite his special 'recapitulation' of the old order,⁴ Luke's Christ was ultimately a unique figure. We should put our study of recurr-

¹ In Luke's opening chapter Jesus was acknowledged as the one who would receive the throne of his father, David, and thus reign over Jacob's house forever (*Lk.*, i, 32-33, cf. esp. *II Sam.*, vii, 10-16). Luke also reminded his readers of this kingship later (cf. *Lk.*, xx, 38, xxiii, 2-3; 38), and of the Spirit's anointment of Jesus as the Messiah in David's line (iii, 22; 31b, *Acts*, ii, 30-31, xiii, 22-23, cf. *Lk.*, iv, 18a, iv, 27, x, 38 [on iv, 18a, cf. *Ἐχρίσεν* με and note *II Sam.*, xxiii, 2 which is an important verse in connection with *Acts*, i, 16, iv, 25, also]). On the other hand, these Lukan verses do not convincingly link Jesus's anointment by the Spirit with his Messiahship as conceived in strongly monarchical terms (cf. esp. *Acts*, x, 38). For Luke and the church of his time, incidentally, 'Messiah' had more than merely monarchical connotations. And for other references to the Messiah or *Χριστός*, *Lk.*, iv, 41b, ix, 20, xxiii, 35b; 39b, xxiv, 26; 46, *Acts*, ii, 36, xvii, 3, etc.). But Luke found little in Jesus' earthly life which allowed him to develop the idea of Jesus re-enacting a monarchical rôle (though note *Lk.*, ii, 8, vi, 3-4 [on ii, 8, see K. Rengstorff, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1]). Certainly it has been argued that Luke's Gospel mainly concentrated on the kingly aspects of Jesus's work (see A. R. C. Leaney, *The Gospel according to St. Luke (Black Commentaries)*, London, 1966 edn., pp. 34-7 on 'royal procession' and 'enthronement'), but such arguments presume that Jesus's Messiahship in *Luke* was strongly attached to the Davidic-monarchical frame, and neglect the fact that, by the end of the first century, *Christos* had become conceptually standardized, and had come to embody a whole range of derivative categories. For references on Christ's kingship through glorification, however, cf. *Acts*, ii, 24-25, iii, 20-21, v, 31, x, 42, xiii, 32-36, xvii, 31, and esp. see *Lk.*, xxii, 69 (*ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*), *Acts*, i, 6, ii, 30-31, xiii, 22-23.

² Cf. also ix, 21 (≠ *II Sam.*, i, 19; 25) for the lament over Judas Maccabeus, cf. Goulder, *Type*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³ The typologies of Christ and the Teacher of Righteousness as the new or second Moses in *Matthew* and Qumranite literature respectively thus carry a stronger implication of recurrence (cf. esp. W. D. Davies, *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount*, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 25ff., N. Wieder, 'The Law Interpreter' of the Dead Sea Scrolls; the Second Moses', in *Journal of Jewish Studies*, IV, 1953, pp. 158ff.), though Luke's Davidic theme should be viewed within the context of his other, more relevant preoccupations.

⁴ Luke's approach foreshadows that of Irenaeus, but should not be confused with it, cf. *infra*, p. 362, n. 2.

ence notions in Luke into proper perspective by emphasizing that his Christ was the unique harbinger of final salvation, and the church of *Acts* was bent on proclaiming this special saviourhood.¹ The genuine individuality of Jesus, however, was not in spite of, but because of, his re-enactment of OT word and deed. There are certainly theological stances in *Luke-Acts*, but we still rest on the position that they lie behind rather than overcome or substitute for Luke's conscious attempt to write a sympathetic narrative, to write a history, which, in terms of his intellectual inheritance, was meaningful.

In review, Luke emerges as one not only preoccupied with inter-relating the events and situations within a first century arena, but also between the old and new orders as well. Thus his protagonists, particularly Jesus, re-enact the most significant events of the OT, and the spiritual quality of their recent activity resuscitates what was outstanding in the Israelite past. In establishing these latter connections, Luke was deeply influenced by the OT sacred histories, and it was not just their contents which were important for him, but the manner in which they, too, interrelated occurrences and circumstances from different periods, and suggested instances of a later return to former conditions. It should be observed, moreover, how Luke's special approach to the Holy Spirit enabled him to reinforce the impression that the spiritual vitality of Israel's past great ones had recurred in his own time. Though the Spirit was manifest in greater fulness than ever before with the coming of Jesus (*Lk.*, i, 35; 41, iii, 22a, iv, 1; 18, x, 21), and with the ongoing mission of the Church (*Acts*, ii, 4, iv, 31, viii, 17, x, 44, xi, 15, xiii, 2; 9, xvi, 7, etc., cf. *Lk.*, xi, 13, xii, 12), it had also been at work in OT times (*Acts*, i, 16, iv, 25, cf. xvii, 25b, *Lk.*, i, 17).² As usual the events of the new time reflect both re-enactment and uniqueness.

¹ See esp. I.H. Marshall, *St. Luke, Historian and Theologian*, Exeter, 1970, chs. 4-8.

² Yet note *Lk.*, xx, 42, cf. *Mk.*, xii, 36 ≠ *Mt.*, xxii, 43!

Luke-Acts and the Re-enactment of Significant Events in Gentile History.

Naturally, Luke's interconnections between the old and the new would have been best appreciated and understood by those who had already pored over the pages of the Septuagint, but what of his gentile readers? Now Luke was never so technical nor so Semitic in his approach that his work would have fallen on deaf ears amongst non-Jews. The links he disclosed between latter-day events and Israelite history, we should hasten to add, were through brief and not particularly subtle allusions. Yet a writer who, on the one hand, presents himself as an historian and informer for a wider public, yet who on the other expects his readers to bear with the Septuagintalisms of Luke i-ii, might seem something of a paradox. It is surely worth enquiring how interested he was in the special problems of his gentile readers, and to what extent he accommodated himself to their non-Jewish understanding of history. Luke never assumed the rôle of a theoretician in his work, one who expounded his view of historical processes in a series of parentheses. To that extent he was rather more firmly entrenched in the Hebraic (and earliest Christian) rather than the Graeco-Roman historical tradition. Yet his work seems like a circuitous voyage from one cultural milieu to another, and as the narrative continued, 'Hellenistic' readers would have felt more and more at home amongst details of Roman administration, pagan folk-lore and the great cultural centres of the Empire. Put simply, the shift from Jerusalem to Athens and Rome was more a matter of interest to gentiles (particularly the Greeks and Romans) than to Jews or inhabitants of the Middle East. Luke could have expanded on the more local, Levantine and Syrian thrust of the church, or considered missionary work east of Jordan and south of Gaza.¹ After all, there were other stories to be told,

¹ Acts, i, 9-10, viii, 26ff. are important indications that Luke could have been led in different directions. Gal., i, 17 mentions early Pauline

and we have no reason to believe that he was incapable of looking in other directions. But to depict a westward thrust was a very relevant ploy for the benefit of readers living under the Roman aegis. In any case, the literary cohesion of *Luke-Acts* was facilitated by this approach, and the movement west nicely heightened the significance of recent developments, suggesting a workable pattern or contour. This very last point can stand more emphasis. It was the apprehension of a clear shape acquired by a whole series of events which so commonly motivated history-writing amongst the ancients and many after them. A 'great war' (so Herodotus, Thucydides), a process of 'decay' (the Deuteronomist, Poseidonius, p.319), or 'surprising new developments' (Polybius), constituted the most easily recognized configurations. It is important, moreover, that biographies were in vogue in Luke's time, that they recounted the sometimes startling, sometimes edifying accomplishments of well-known personalities.¹ In his day, too, the unparalleled imperial success of Rome was being extolled. Polybius' history, naturally enough, was a popular one, and on reading how he held fortune to have directed affairs towards Roman supremacy (*Hist.*, I, iv, 2), and how the great Scipio Africanus, out of *megalopsychia* and loyalty to Rome, refused the opportunity of subjecting the whole world to himself (X, xl, 7-9), one might well be pardoned for characterizing Polybius' general thesis as 'the gospel of Rome'. Certainly both Luke and Polybius shared a common interest in expansion and widening influence, in the breakdown of traditional geographical boundaries and in the virtues required in achieving these things,² al-

work in Arabia, but Luke does not seem to be aware of Paul's early movements, cf. *Acts*, ix, 23ff.. Cf. also Eusebius, *Eccles. Hist.*, I, xiii; IV, lff..

¹ For the relevant literature, see esp. F.W. Walbank and D.A. Russell in *OCD.*, s.v., 'Roman Biography' (pp. 167-8).

² On Roman loyalty as virtue, cf. *supra*, pp. 177f.; note *Acts*, v, 1-11, cf. *Lk.*, xii, 8-12 on the idea of absolute loyalty to the faith. On *Lk.*, xii, 10, cf. Trompf, 'La Section, etc.', *loc. cit.*, p. 148.

though they differed radically over the permanent consequence of the events they described. It is remarkable how Polybius could readily predict the fall of something so apparently immovable as the Roman empire, and yet how Luke could acclaim the final durability of a movement which had merely thrown confusion into diaspora synagogues and captured the attention of a few Roman officials!

Enough has been written to persuade us that Luke did not write exclusively under the influence of the biblical tradition. In fact it has already been fairly popular to consider his work in connection with Graeco-Roman histories, lives and romance literature,¹ and so much so that the relationship between *Luke-Acts* and OT historiography, on which we have partly commented, has been neglected. The Hellenistic side of the coin, however, still requires a re-examination - with questions of historical recurrence in mind. The knowledge of Israelite historiographical procedures is indispensable for grasping Luke's working assumptions and methodology, yet his procedures are not explicable wholly in such terms. Certainly the parallelisms of the Deuteronomist (between the two periods of *nuah*, for instance), or of the Chronicler (between the Davidic-Solomonic and restoration eras), bear comparison with his links between the OT, Christ's life and early church history. Re-enactments of special events (as in *Josh.*, iv, *I Kgs.*, xix and *II Kgs.*, ii) may certainly be likened to those we first elicited from *Luke-Acts*, and the Evangelist's geographical patterning is comparable to the Chronicler's top-heavy concentration on the destiny of Judah. And if we have found 'updating' in the Chronic-

¹ Esp. since Cadbury, *Making*, op.cit., (esp.pt.2), Dibelius, *Studies*, op.cit., (esp.chs. 8-9). Cf. A. Ehrhard, 'The Construction and Purpose of the Acts of the Apostles', in *Studia Theologica*, XII, 1958, pp.45ff., cf. Barrett, *Luke the Historian*, op.cit., esp.pp.26ff., E. Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller; Studien zur Apostelgeschichte (Studien zum Umwelt des Neuen Testaments IX)*, Göttingen, 1972, ch.1, etc..

ler's work, we have also detected it in Luke's 'farewell discourse', in the Herodian trial of Jesus, and in his referral of the visionary predictions of the Little Apocalypse to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD.¹ But the intensity with which Luke heightened history's significance by inter-connections, re-enactment and the 'return' of prior conditions suggests an eclectic tendency, a conscious effort to bridge the gap between the sensibilities of Jews and gentiles by educing significances which were meaningful to both. We may well ask whether Ulrich Wilckens was not right when he broadened the sense of 'Salvation History', and asserted that 'the *Heilsgeschichte* of Luke is that of the Hellenistic historian'.² Without dilating on difficult German terms, however, we may now consider Luke's approaches to historical recurrence, especially to re-enactment, *vis à vis* Graeco-Roman historiographical preconceptions.

Luke did not refer explicitly to the major events of gentile history, but that was natural enough, for these events did not belong to the ethnic and religious tradition which lay behind Jesus and his first followers, and the history of 'the nations' was so much more diffuse than the story of God's people. However, concerned as he was with gentile readers and, amongst other things, their suspicions towards Christianity,³ we

¹ On the last matter, cf. esp. C.H.Dodd, 'The Fall of Jerusalem and the Abomination of Desolation', in *Journal of Roman Studies*, XXXVII, 1957, pp.47ff., cf. also R.Maddox, *op.cit.*, [pp.4-5].

² 'The Understanding of Revelation within the History of Primitive Christianity', in *Revelation as History*, (ed.W.Pannenberg) (ET), London, 1969, p.98.

³ The methodological stance of Josephus on these matters is not dissimilar to Luke's. When Josephus placed stress on the great variety of *politeiai* and of constitutional *metabolai* experienced by the Jewish nation (*Antiq.*, I, 13), he no more than hinted at an analogy between Graeco-Roman and Israelite political life, and devoted almost his entire labours to Jewish antiquities and affairs themselves. Though he insisted on the uniqueness of Jewish traditions and institutions, however, (see *Adversus Apionem*, II, 164-6, cf. *Antiq.*, I, 14; 20, III), he was significantly accommodating towards his foreign readers in describing socio-political changes in the language of Greek constitutional theory. (On human origins, and

should not be surprised to find subtle allusions to the great events and achievements of the pagan past.

We may reflect first on imperial, and especially Roman history. Judaea was one of the far corners of the Roman empire, and with striking speed, as Polybius had averred, the Roman standards had penetrated as far as Egypt and the Levant. Luke's was a comparable success story on a quite different plane. Christianity moved in the reverse direction, and the provinces first affected were those which Rome took last. When the crucial Hellespont boundary had been crossed or by-passed, the missionary work extended to European centres riddled with history and past glory. The country and its capital which was once the starting-point of Alexander's great military expedition to the East, and an important springboard for Roman intervention into Asia, namely Macedonia and its city of Philippi,¹ now actually 'needs' Paul(!) according to the divine vision (Acts, xvi,9, cf.7-12). Athens, once a city of splendour and great learning, has the trivial speculations of its intellectuals (xvii, 21), and its worship of gods made with hands (vs.29, cf.24-25), exposed by a message with a superior revelation. Corinth, the city whose destruction above all marked the real defeat of traditional Hellas and of the great Achaean League before Rome,² was the place in which God announces he has

the intrusion of Greek conceptions about early pastoralism and science, and about the growth of ethical consciousness, cf. esp. *ibid.*, I,52-53; 60-61;64-66,69 and 70, and on political *metabolai*, cf. esp. IV,223, V, 132ff.;234, VI,83-85, XI,111-113, XIV,90-91, XX,229-30,etc.. In a comparable manner, Luke both conveyed the uniqueness of the affairs and tradition he was dealing with, and yet revealed his desire to appease gentile sensitivities. It has been generally accepted that his emphasis on Christianity's righteous innocence and its reception amongst influential Romans, represents a key element in such appeasement (see esp., of seminal importance, Cadbury, *op.cit.*, pp.308ff.. Of relevance, esp. *Lk.*, vii,1ff., xx,20ff., xxiii,4;13ff.;47, Acts, x,44ff., xiii,7-12, xvi,12; 27-40, xviii,12-17, xix,37, xxv,11; and by implication, against Roman (or any) persecution against Christians, v,34ff.,ix,4-5, xxii,7, xxvi,14, cf. *Lk.*,xxiii,2, Acts, xvii,7, on false charges).

¹ Cf. P.Lemerle, *Philippes et la Macédoine Orientale à l'époque Chrétienne et Byzantine*, Paris, 1945. On the importance of the Hellespontine boundary in ancient Greek historiography, cf. *supra*, pp.153, n.2,166,179.

² Polybius, *Hist.*, XXXIX,iii,3 = Plutarch, *Vit.Philopoem.*,xxi,(cf.also

'many men' (xviii,10b); and Rome, the imperial hub itself, comes to hear the unhindered proclamation of the Kingdom (xxviii,28-31). It is not unfair to infer that Luke consciously likened Christian expansion to a 'conquest'. He took extreme care not to identify the Romans as the 'opposition', yet there is opposition to missionary progress in *Acts*, and Luke concentrated mainly on the Jews, almost to the point of creating a stereotype, as those who persistently worked for the 'defeat' of the Christians (see pp.247ff.). Clearly a most powerful theme of *Acts*, however, is that whatever the obstacles, whether they were disturbing Jews, unruly mobs (xiv,11ff., xix,23ff., cf.vii,54ff.), erring administrators (xiv,5, xvi,19ff., xxii,23ff.) or even natural disasters likely to be ascribed to the recalcitrant hand of *tychē* (xxvii,14ff.), the Christians were ultimately (and in Paul's case invariably) successful.¹ The 'Way' was not reckoned as a substitute for the Roman *imperium*, of course, but its successes were, by implication, a replay of the Roman accomplishment on a quite different level. Christianity may not have been a political movement (and certainly not an insurrectionary one) according to Luke, but it had significance for all aspects of life, since the whole world would be judged by the coming Lord (*Acts*, x,42, xvii,31).² It had to have the appearance of changing the world, therefore, and at this point in the history of the contemporary imperial monolith, nothing could be more convincing than the appeal to an ever-widening influence comparable to that of the momentous and belauded Roman expansion. And such an appeal was not unJewish at that, for the Bible also looked to the universalization of

Orosius, *Historia adversus Paganos*, V,3, and see P.N.Ure and N.G.L. Hammond, in *OCD*, s.v., 'Corinth' (p.290).

¹ On Paul, note ix,23ff.;29-30, xiii,8-12;45-48, xiv,19-21, xvi,25-34, xvii,6ff.; 32-34, xviii,6-11, xix,28 - xx,1, xxii,22-29, xxv,6-12, xxvii,39-44, xxviii,4-6;30-31. The picture painted by Luke of resilience in the face of great odds was an important persuasive point for Greek and Roman readers.

² This point is made in sermons for gentile listeners, but cf.ii,30, iii,26, vii,52;56, xiii,33ff. for the Jews.

God's direct rule. The sending of Yahweh's messengers to the nations had been prophesied in *Isaiah* lxvi in a way that could be reckoned a brief summary of *Acts*, and Luke probably believed that the 'time of the gentiles' ended with a rebuilt temple in which the nations would participate (*Acts*, xv, 16-18, cf. *Lk.*, xxii, 24, *Isa.*, lxvi, 23).

As well as the imperial motif, there other signs that Luke utilized very general patterns and renowned incidents of Graeco-Roman history, and did so to soften the alien Jewishness of Christianity's earliest setting, and to render events more congruous to the assumptions and historical reflections of literate gentiles. Jesus did not come into the world unannounced; for non-Jewish readers the 'portents and oracles' of Luke's opening chapters, the divine disclosures concerning the nativity, the virgin birth(?), would all have been persuasive of greatness.¹ And this may be asserted despite the Septuagintalisms of *Lk.*, i-ii, which would have had an effect similar to archaized Greek, a literary throwback becoming popular in the first century.² Details of Jesus' youthful genius, together with Luke's comments on what was customary at the time of his infancy and upbringing, fit well with preoccupations reflected in Hellenistic biographies.³ Jesus was a wonder-worker who 'amazed' with his healing and teaching,⁴ who effected *paradoxa* (v, 26b; cf. Polybius!),⁵ who, despite the

¹ See esp. Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 108-120 (Cyrus); Plutarch, *Vit. Thes.*, ii, 1ff., *Numa Pomp.*, iv, 1ff., *Pericl.*, iii, 2ff., etc.; cf. Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, III, v, 7 (Oedipus), Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, I, 5, etc.. On the virgin birth of Romulus and Remus, cf. Plutarch, *Vita Romul.*, iii, 1ff., Sextus Aurelius (?), *De Viris Illustribus Urbis Romae*, i, 1; and on Luke's probable interest in Romulus, see *infra*.

² Pausanias, Galen, Arrian and Lucian are all noted for their tendency to archaize Greek.

³ The stories of the young Moses, Samuel and David form important biblical background here, yet note Plutarch, *Vit. Thes.*, v, 1, for example ("ΕΘΟΥΣ ΔΕ ΘΥΡΟΣ....).

⁴ Cf. esp. Philostratus, *Apollonius*, esp. II; IV, Lucian, *Alexander the False Prophet*, 26ff..

⁵ Luke is the only Evangelist who used this term, which denotes 'surprising turns of event', and which, we have seen was employed in Hellenistic historiography, (cf. *supra*, p. 156). Cf., on Josephus's more Jewish reactions to

Jewish context of his work, was recognizably an extraordinary instructor, disputant and 'peripatetic',¹ who enjoined his followers, as did Epictetus (for one), to lead a simple and disciplined life,² who faced his destiny bravely and 'stoically' (cf. xxii, 42-44; 67; 70, xxiii, 3b; 9),³ whose death was a 'spectacle' (cf. xxiii, 48a),⁴ whose return to life was decidedly miraculous in character (at least in terms of the Synoptic tradition [cf. xxiv, 15-31; 36-43, cf. Mk., xvi, Mt., xxviii, 9-10; 17]), and whose ascension was given a concreteness suitable to the Hellenistic mentality (Acts, i, 9, om. Mk., Mt., Jn.).⁵ No specific, well known events of Greek or Roman history are mentioned, but Jesus has absorbed into himself what the gentiles, in their writings and opinions, expected of human greatness, virtue and the criteria for divinization. This may not quite convince one of Luke's interest in re-enactment and parallelism (as against his concern to be intelligible), but it remains true that the allusions become more specific at the climax of the Gospel story.

the idea of miracles as *παράδοξα*, G. MacRae, 'Miracle in the Antiquities of Josephus', in *Miracles*, (ed. Moule), *op. cit.*, pp. 136-8.

¹ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. Philos.*, i, 17, v, 2, and see Philostratus, I, 18 (Apollonius contemplates making a great journey), II, III, 1; 14, IV, 5, etc..

² Note Epictetus, *Dissert.*, III, xxii, 2: 'I wear a rough cloak now, and I shall wear it then; I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep so then. I will take to myself a wallet and staff, and I will begin to go about and beg, and to reprove everyone I meet with; and if I shall see one that plucks out his hairs, I will censure him, etc.'. It is important that Luke stresses the earliest mission charges of Jesus (with their references to an almost ascetic discipline) three times (cf. Lk., ix, 1-5 (≠ Mk., Mt.), x, 2-12, xxii, 35, cf. 36 (om. Mk., Mt.)). Perhaps Luke was thereby suggesting that early Christian rigour excelled that of any competing philosophical school (cf. also Lucian, *The Passing of Peregrinus*, 24). Note his use of the term *ἐπιστάτης* for Jesus (Lk., v, 5, viii, 24; 45, ix, 33; 49, xvii, 13, om. Mk., Mt.). Was it employed because, in contradistinction to the softer *διδάσκαλος*, and for 'Greek' readers, it carried a greater sense of demand and rigour? For the term's use in a teaching context, cf., for example, *Die Inschriften von Priene*, (ed. F. H. von Gaertringen), (*Inscriptiones Graecae*, vol. 12, pt. 1), Berlin, 1906, Nos. 112, 73ff..

³ Cf. *infra*, p. 262 for references.

⁴ Yet cf. Mk., xv, Mt., xxvii, Jn., xix. The term *θεωρία* used here recalls references to unusual sights and eventualities in Greek histories, cf. for example, Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 30, Polybius, *Hist.*, I, ii, 1, cf. i, 6.

⁵ See *infra* on Romulus' ascension, cf. also Philostratus, VIII, 30-31; though note II Kgs., ii, 11-12 (cf. Gen., v, 24, Deut., xxxiv, 6).

A well known tradition about the founder of Rome, for instance, and about events at the end of his reign, may well lie behind Luke's account of Christ's death and resurrection. Romulus, so it was believed, 'died' or disappeared when the 'face of the sun was darkened, and the day turned to night'¹ (cf. *Lk.*,xxiii,44-45a, with his special τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλιπόντος, *om.Mk.,Mt.*). He was taken to heaven² (cf. *Lk.*,xxiii,43),³ returned to meet a close friend, Julius Proculus, as he 'was travelling on the road'⁴ (cf. *Lk.*,xxiv,13-17), announced that he had originally come from and was returning to heaven⁵ (cf. *Lk.*,i,35, xxiv,26, *Acts*,i,9-11), and ordered Julius to tell the Romans 'that, by the exercise of temperance and fortitude, they shall attain to the height of human power' (δύναμις)⁶ (cf. *Lk.*,xxiv,49b, *Acts*, i,8a on δύναμις from on high). The parallels with Luke are hardly tenuous; it is quite plausible that Luke treated the end of Jesus' earthly career so as to recall a tale about significant events which Romans knew from childhood. That Luke himself believed the account of Romulus' ascension and return is unlikely, but he took contemporary beliefs into consideration, gearing his narrative to prove, not just that Jesus' glorification re-enacted the heavenly elevation of Rome's first king and founder, but that Jesus out-classed him, as it were, in being the exalted king of the Universe.

This kind of hidden polemic, this representation of events as subtle re-enactments of widely acclaimed actions of greatness, also surrounds the

¹ So Plutarch, *Vit.Romul.*,xxvii,6 (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡλίου τὸ φῶς ἐκλιπεῖν).

² So *ibid.*,xxvii,7 (ὡς ἀνερπασμένον εἰς θεοῦς).

³ Cf.H.J.Cadbury, 'The Eschatology of Acts', in Davies and Daube (eds.), *op.cit.*,p.305, who supposes that Luke considered Jesus to have descended into Hades during the period between his death and resurrection; but it remains true that Luke deliberately used the term παράδεισος in xxiii,43b.

⁴ So Plutarch, *Vit.Romul.*,xxviii,1 (ὡς ὁδὸν αὐτῷ βαδίζοντι); cf. Cicero, *Re Pub.*, II,x,20, *Somm.Scip.*,vii,24, Livy, *Ab Urbe*, I,xvi,5-8, for Romulus' death and ascension in general.

⁵ So Plutarch, xxviii,2 (καὶ πόλιν ἐπ' ἀρχῇ καὶ δόξῃ μεγίστην κτίσαντας αὐτοὺς οἰκεῖν οὐρανόν).

⁶ So *ibid.*, (φράζε 'Ρωμαίους ἔτι σαρροσύνην μετ' ἀνδρείας ἀσκοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρωπίνης ἀφίξονται δυνάμει).

Lukan treatment of the crucifixion in particular, and its prelude. Luke was only too well aware that the forms of dying most praiseworthy amongst gentiles were death in battle, or suicide as liberation from the troublesome world.¹ An honourable man, moreover, was expected to kill himself if failing in the course of his duty (so, *Acts*, xvi, 27).² Luke was doubtless sensitive to the fact that the crucifixion was 'utter foolishness' to the gentiles (cf. *I Cor.*, i, 23b): Jesus let himself fall into the hands of sinful men and let them kill him. To take the best comparative example in common currency, Cato the Younger killed himself by the sword to avoid submission to Caesar's tyranny.³

Jesus, by contrast, allowed himself to be taken (*Lk.*, xxii, 47-53, cf. *Mk.*, *Mt.*). Yet in that he was resigned to his 'destiny' (xxii, 22a [τὸ ὁρισμένον], cf. *Mk.*, xiv, 21a ≠ *Mt.*, xxvi, 24a), he re-enacted the heroism of the great Stoics, and faced his 'fate' with immense courage (xxii, 42-44, cf. *Mk.*, xiv, 36, *Mt.*, xxvi, 39; 42).⁴ And Luke took pains to prove that the trial, mocking, crucifixion and death of Christ were in the foreknown plan of the divine (cf. esp. xviii, 31b, xxii, 22a, *Acts*, xiv, 28, xiii, 29), and that it was necessary (*dei*) for him to suffer before entering into his *doxa* (*Lk.*, xxiv, 26). On the one hand, therefore, a gentile might protest his 'righteous innocence' (xxiii, 47, cf. *Mk.*, xv, 39βb ≠ *Mt.*, xxvii, 54βb), as one unjustly condemned like Socrates,⁵ and still claim on the

¹ See esp. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, XXIV, 24-25, XXX, 15-17, *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, xx, 6ff., etc.; Plutarch, *Vit. Cat. Min.*, lxvii, 2, lxxi, 1-2, cf. notes *infra*.

² See also the case of Cassius Longinus, cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Brut.*, xliii, 5-7, and note the analysis of Luke's account of Judas's death, *infra*, p. 296.

³ Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Cat. Min.*, lxvii, 1 - lxx, 6.

⁴ So Plutarch, *Vit. Brut.*, lii, 1 - liii, 5 (Brutus and Porcia), *Vit. Cic.*, xlviii, 1-4 (Cicero); Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, CII, 26ff., etc., yet cf. also *I Sam.*, xxxi, 4ff. (Saul).

⁵ It is interesting that there is some evidence for an early association of Christ with Socrates, in the gentile church; cf. Lucian, *Pereg.*, 11.

other that he died magnificently,¹ even if Jesus' release differed in quality from the deaths that the gentiles traditionally held most meritorious. It is remarkable how Luke educated his gentile readers for acceptance of an execution on the most despicable of scaffoldings.

It is not unwarrantable to conclude, moreover, that the famous departure of the Stoic Cato Minor has had its impact on the writing of Luke xxii. On the evening of his suicide at Utica, Cato went to a supper with his close friends, and the wine engendered an agreeable discourse on Stoic dogma, during which he made it plain that 'as good men only are free, and wicked men slaves' he was about to end his life and find complete liberation.² His companions and servants became dejected, and after walking with his friends outside, he eventually wished to perform the deed. His son and his servants were slow to respond to his requests for a sword, but at last he acquired one, and after some sleep, he stabbed himself.³ When the news was out, according to Plutarch, the people of Utica acclaimed Cato as their *eugetēs* and *sōtēr*, the only free and undefeated man.⁴ In Luke Jesus also supped with his chosen companions and foreshadowed death inevitable for him during a discourse at table (xxii,16;22;36-37 [cf. *Mk.*,xiv,21;25;27 ≠ *Mt.*], cf.xviii,31-34). His followers became confused and dejected (xxii,23 [*om.Mk.*], 45b [cf. *Mk.*,xiv,40 and *Mt.*,xxvi,43!]). By this stage in Luke's account, many gentile readers would have been as confused as the disciples themselves about Jesus' attitude to his own death. Luke skillfully, and with subtle apology, anticipated their reactions. In the supper discourse, gentile assumptions about greatness are contrasted with Jesus' own understanding of the matter (Luke significantly transplanted a *logion* from another context in *Mark* to this new setting, xxii,24-27, cf. *Mk.*,x,42-44,cf.p.

¹ According to the Lukan account, there are no cries of anguish from the cross, cf. *Mk.*, xv,34 ≠ *Mt.*,xxvii,46, *Jn.*,xix,28.

² So Plutarch, *Vit.Cat.Min.*,lxvii,1-2.

³ *Ibid.*,lxviii,1 - lxx,6.

⁴ *Ibid.*,lxxi,1.

212),¹ and there remained ambiguity as to what Jesus intended to do with the two swords offered to him, if he was 'to be reckoned amongst the criminals' (Lk.,xxii,37b, cf. Mk.,xv,28, etc.). Jesus made a crucial decision in a state of *agōnia*,² as though his was the hardest of all courses of action (vss.41-44, yet cf. Mk., ≠ Mt.), and allowing himself to be taken, he neither committed himself to suicide nor to self-defence. His friends hardly responded ably to the hour of crisis (xxii,23;45;50, 55-62, cf. Mk.,xiv,37ff.;47;66ff., Mt.,xxvi,40ff.;51;69ff.), though Luke, with gentile predispositions about manliness, avoided highlighting the disciples' cowardice (yet cf. Mk.,xiv,27;49b-50 ≠ Mt.,xxvi,31;56, *om.* Lk.). Thus Jesus' death re-enacted great deaths amongst the gentiles, at least in a loose sense. In spite of appearances, the crucifixion did not clash with such deaths, but it transcended and was ultimately superior to any death. In Luke, to reiterate, little or no atonement value was attached to Christ's passion; his is the death of a great one, directly in line with the martyrdom of the prophets but also sufficiently in line with the deaths of virtuous innocents amongst the nations. Even hanging both condemned by disobedient Jews and upon a gentile cross, his greatness is paradoxically supreme.³ Luke was not unconcerned, then, with historical parallels from non-Israelite history. Admittedly, the pagan past

¹ Lk.,xxii,24-30, significantly enough, sits rather artificially within vss.14-38; its deliberate insertion has to be accounted for not only in terms of the Gospel's structure (so, cf. *supra*, on the parallel drawn between Jesus' and Paul's farewell discourses), but also of content. The Emmaus road story had a similar function in fulfilling more than one purpose (cf. pp. 210, n.5, 216).

² Luke's use of *ἀγωνία* in this context must be contrasted with Mark's *ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι* and *ἀδημονεῖν* (xiv,33b-34; cf. Mt.,xxvi,37b-38); Luke's Christ is less emotionally disturbed than Mark's. The issue becomes one of an inner contest in which Christ has to be reconciled with the divine decision to the exclusion of other alternatives.

³ On Luke's reference to Jesus' greatness and his use of *μέγας*, cf. esp. Lk.,i,32a, vii,16 (normative classical greatness), cf. ix,48-9, xxii,24-27, (true, spiritual greatness).

could only remain on the fringe of his considerations (unless he had been prepared to wax theoretical), yet this was natural enough, since the preserving of former deeds did not have the same deep significance for Greeks and Romans as it did for Jews. Hence from the non-Jewish tradition(s), Luke could only appeal to those renowned incidents, developments and motifs which were in common talk.

We have spoken more of the first than the second volume in this connection, yet in Acts our impressions are further confirmed. In Hellenistic literature 'the story of the travelling-teacher and wonder-worker was a favourite theme' from Diogenes Laertius to Philostratus.¹ Wilfred Knox has asserted that, for Luke, Paul's journeys may have been a 'mere framework', not being 'intended as a detailed itinerary',² yet points of debate aside, the Evangelist may well have concentrated so heavily on a wondrous expedition in almost half of his second volume in order to invoke the great journeys of the pagan past. For Luke, surely, Paul was not merely in line with travelling teachers and thaumaturges; he was the brave apostle of the new and final Age in world history. But he was also an heroic figure (braving perilous paths like Theseus, suffering shipwreck like Ulysses, (cf. Acts, xxviii, 3-6),³ and as suggested already, the thrust of his missionary enterprise recalled the penetration of great imperialisms and the heroic protagonists who made them possible.⁴ Perhaps

¹ See esp. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formen-Geschichte religiöser Rede*, Stuttgart, 1923, pp. 34ff., E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*, op.cit., p. 327, W. Knox, op.cit., esp. p. 13.

² See *ibid.*, p. 13.

³ See also Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.*, VII, 2ff., Aristides, *Hieroi Logoi*, II, 65ff., etc., for other instances of shipwreck adventure in Hellenistic literature. Voyaging from island to island (Acts, xxvii, 7-8; 16, xxviii, 1) has something of the atmosphere of the *Odyssey* about it.

⁴ For Hellenistic literature on Alexander, see esp. L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great (Philological Monographs XX)*, Ohio, 1960, *passim*, and on Scipio Africanus, see esp. Polybius, *Hist.*, X, iv - xx.

it is natural to assume that the missionary enterprise of Acts is likened most of all to the broadcasting of a new philosophy. Like the philosophers, the disciples opposed superstition (viii,9ff.,xiv,14ff.,xvii,23-24; 29, xix,26, cf.xv,20;29); like Socrates, Paul was accused of 'preaching strange gods' (xvii,18),¹ like Stoicism, Christianity was cosmopolitan and universalist (x,42, xiv,15-17, xvii,26ff.,cf.ii,5ff., etc.), and it preached a monotheism congruous with many eminent Graeco-Roman spirits (esp. xvii,24-29, cf. xiv,15-17). The Christians, however, were the harbingers of an entirely new historical era, and this era not only had consequences for people's beliefs, but was the culmination of world history, the periods of régimes and the boundaries² of their habitations being in God's cognizance and plan (xvii, 26-28, cf.30-31). Thus gentile history acquires a background importance for Christianity's emergence,³ even if the Jewish setting counted for more in terms of divine authentication. Both Jew and gentile had to learn that God did not dwell in temples made with hands (vii,48, xvii,24-25), and that the new Kingdom involved Jew and 'Greek'⁴ together, for the barriers of Jewish exclusivism were broken down (x,9 - xi,18, xv,12ff.,cf. Ephes.,ii,12-22), and the nations were no longer left to wander in their own ways (Acts,

¹ Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I,1ff; and see esp. Conzelmann, 'The Address of Paul on the Areopagus', in Keck and Martyn (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.219. Conzelmann takes the reference to the Agora and the use of the term διαλέγεσθαι to recall Socrates also. On Lukan opposition to Gnosticism, see C.H.Talbert, *Luke and the Gnostics; an examination of the Lukan purpose*, New York, 1966, esp.pp.111ff., where, however, the case is over-stated.

² On their importance in Greek historiography, see *supra*, esp.p.166, yet also note Deut.,xxxii,8-9, Gen.,x (P), on the boundaries of the nations in OT histories.

³ Luke's lenience towards the pagans may be taken as foreshadowing the later apologists (cf.,for e.g., pseudo-Justin, *Hortatory Address*, xv - xxi, xxxvii, yet cf.xxii ff), although some, such as Athenagoras (see *Apologia* xvii ff.), had far less sympathy for the pagan tradition.

⁴ For Ἕλληνες as gentiles in general, Acts, xiv,1, xix,10, xx,21, (cf. I Cor.,i,22-24).

xiv,16, xvii,30a, yet cf. Deut.,iv,19b, xxxii,8-9). The new movement was unique, then, and the recent events carried their own marks of providence, though they were countersigned by special re-enactments, patterns and connections.¹

B) The Recurrent Actualization of Retributive Principles in Luke-Acts and the Biblical Tradition.

Reference to Lukan ideas of divine providence brings us back to those notions of reciprocity we examined in Graeco-Roman histories (pp. 149 ff.). The belief that retributive principles were continually operative in human life is writ large in biblical historiography, and this belief now requires analysis.

The Deuteronomic Historian

It is significant that the Israelite-Jewish writers came closest to stating a cyclical (or alternatory) view of history through interpreting the laws of rewards and punishments. *Judges* ii, as part of the Deuteronomic history, is a central case in point. There one finds a pattern of events which may be described either as a four-staged sequence capable of repetition or as an undulatory process. The generation of those who possessed the land had passed, and the Deuteronomist introduced the new period of the Judges. The new generation did not know Yahweh's past work for Israel, and they 'did what was evil in the sight of Yahweh', 'forsaking' him and 'serving the Ba'als' and other gods. They provoked Yahweh's anger, so that

'whenever they marched out, Yahweh's hand was against them for evil, as he had warned and had sworn to them [cf. Deut.,xxviii, 15ff.], and they were in sore straits'. (ii,10-15)

Then Yahweh raised up Judges to save them, yet they did not listen to them and did not obey God like their predecessors:

'whenever the Lord raised up Judges for them, the Lord was with the Judges, and saved them from their enemies all the days of the Judge',

¹ For providence in general in Luke, see esp. E.Haenchen, *Die Apostelgeschichte (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament III)*, Göttingen, 1965, pp. 86-7.

because he was moved to pity by their groaning under oppression. But 'whenever the Judge died they turned back and behaved worse than their fathers', and Yahweh, in his anger, said he would not drive out the nations left unconquered by Joshua, but let them test Israel (ii,16-22).¹

Christopher North justifiably contended that the Deuteronomist (whose editorial work in these and subsequent passages is clear enough),² took the period of the Judges to be

'marked by a monotonously recurring cycle of Israelite apostasies from Yahweh, their oppressions at the hands of enemies, their sorrow for their perilous plight and their cries for deliverance Yahweh's response in raising up Judges, the deliverances effected by the Judges, the periods of peace and order that followed, until at the death of the Judge the process was set in motion all over again'.³

On the one hand, the four stages of defection, oppression, prayer (the importance of which becomes obvious after ch.ii), and deliverance,⁴ suggest a recurring sequence not unlike the *Anacyclōsis*, or else a more straightforward alternation between a low-point (oppression brought on by disobedience) and a high-point (liberation and security brought on by obedience under a Judge). This second frame is actually reminiscent of other Near Eastern theories in which 'national' fortune and misfortune follow one another in undulatory succession.⁵ The schema of *Judges* ii, however, remains uniquely Israelite, and it does not stand in its own right either, but only as one of a number of ways in which retributive laws were mani-

¹ My italics in the preceding quotations.

² On the redaction criticism of *Judges*, see esp. C.A.Simpson, *Composition of the Book of Judges*, Oxford, 1957, pp.133ff..

³ North, *The Old Testament Interpretation of History* (Fernley Hartley Trust Lectures), London, 1946, pp.96-97.

⁴ For the expression of the sequence in these terms, see J.M.Myers, the exposition of *Judges* in *The Interpreter's Bible* (ed.G.A.Buttrick, et al.), New York, 1953, vol.2, p.701.

⁵ See esp. M.G.Güterbock, 'Die historische Tradition und ihre literarische Gestaltung bei Babyloniern und Hethitern bis 1200 (pt.1)', in *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, XLII, (NF.8), 1934, pp.13ff., E.A.Speiser, 'Ancient Mesopotamia', in *The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East*, (ed.R.C.Denton), New Haven, 1955, pp.55-56, H.Gese, 'Geschichtliches Denken im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament', in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LV, 1958, p.134.

fested in Israelite history. Admittedly the Deuteronomist applied the pattern of *Judges ii* with fair consistency in subsequent chapters.¹ In succession Israel was oppressed for her disobedience by Mesopotamians, Moabites, Canaanites, Midianities, Ammonites and Philistines,² and each time the Israelites cried to Yahweh, so that he gave them Othniel, Ehud, Deborah, Gideon, Jephthah and Samson to gain victory and times of security.³ And this pattern was carried to the 'rule' of Samuel, who was considered the last Judge.⁴ With the defection of the sons of Gideon, of Eli (also one who 'judged' (שפוט) Israel) and of Samuel,⁵ the Deuteronomist reinforced the cyclo-alternatory process with a theme about the repeated disobedience of 'second generation rulers'. However, it is not strictly true that *Judges ii* 'states succinctly the Deuteronomic conception of history',⁶ for it merely approaches one aspect of it, and only speaks to a specific period of Israel's history. Certainly *Judges* makes those traditional distinctions between Israelite-Jewish and Graeco-Roman views of history look simplistic, even though the notion of the *cyclos* can hardly be read into a chapter deriving from an ancient Near Eastern milieu. But to be over-eager about cyclical thinking in *Judges ii* would in any case be to miss the point that, for this part of his account,⁷ the Deuteronomist specially

¹ Problems exist with *Jud.*, iii, 31, x, 1-5, xii, 8-15, xvii - xxi, but they may well be secondary interpolations later than the Deuteronomic redaction cf. Simpson, *op.cit.*, pp. 142ff.).

² *Jud.*, iii, 8; 13-14, iv, 2 (cf. 7ff.), vi, 1-6, x, 7-9 (the reference to the Philistines in 7b is surely post-Deuteronomic), xiii, 1.

³ iii, 9-11; 15-30, iv, 4 - v, 31, vi, 11ff, xi, 1ff., xiii, 2ff.. The verb שפוט and not רָחַץ is used for 'rest' in iii, 11; 30b, v, 31b.

⁴ See *I Sam.*, ii, 22-31, iii, 1, iv, 1 - iii, 2, vii, 2 (a lowpoint), vii, 3-17, (a highpoint).

⁵ So, Abimelech, son of Jerubbaal (= Gideon), *Jud.*, viii, 33 - ix, 57; Eli's sons, Hophni and Phinehas, *I Sam.*, ii, 12-17; 34, iv, 11 (and cf. iv, 18b for Eli as a judge); Samuel's sons, Joel and Abijah, viii, 1-3.

⁶ So Myers, in *Interp. Bible*, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

⁷ The Babylonian-exilic provenance of the Deuteronomic history may help to explain the use of such a model (cf. M. Noth, *Überlief.-Studien*, *op.cit.*, pp. 96ff., 107ff., though for discussion, P. Ackroyd, *Exile and Restoration; a study of Hebrew thought of the sixth century BC*, London, 1968, pp. 65ff.).

appropriates a current model to strengthen his more general thesis about the recurring operation of retributive principles in the Israelite past. Besides, as we have already shown, notions of historical recurrence can not be confined to cyclical notions. ~~Either to~~ over-exaggerate cyclical thinking in the OT or ~~to~~ exclude it altogether (especially on principle!) is to ride rough-shod over a vital distinction.¹

Within the Deuteronomic history, admittedly, the writer's belief in recurrent retribution is most vividly conveyed in *Judges* ii. Although the rest of the work lacks the symmetry of *Judges*, however, the Deuteronomist was remarkably consistent in proving for his readers that transgression (that is, disobedience against the law delivered to Moses, [which prefaces the history in the form of *Deuteronomy*], and rejection of Yahweh's *dēbarim* uttered through the prophets), must needs be requited by God, and faithfulness, in turn, be rewarded. The cardinal message of his history, of course, is that the fall of Samaria (721 BC) and of Jerusalem (586 BC), and the exile in Babylon, were divine punishments against a people whose persistent sin became too monstrous for serious disaster to be avoided. There was a sense in which an accumulation of transgressions brought such extreme consequences, although he certainly took the heinous crimes of Jeroboam I of Israel in erecting golden calves at Bethel and Dan (*I Kgs.*, xii, 25-31, cf. *Deut.*, v, 7-10, ix, 16),² and of the Judaeen Manasseh in both building altars to false gods and shedding 'much innocent blood' (*II Kgs.*, xxi, 2-9; 16, cf. *Deut.*, xxi, 1-9, cf. xii, 23, xix, 10; 13), to be of decisive importance for the eventual collapse of both the northern and southern

¹ Östborn (*op.cit.*, pp. 60ff.), extracts too much of the cyclical from OT literature in his over-reaction against the consensus view. For pertinent comments, see von Rad (in *OT Theology*, *op.cit.*, vol. 1, p. 330, n. 6).

² Cf. *Num.*, xxxiii, 52.

kingdoms (*II Kgs.*,xvii,21-23, xxi,10-15, xxiii,26-27, xxiv,3-4).

However, the Deuteronomist documented Yahweh's rewards and punishments before those terrible days. Rewards, or 'recompenses (בְּתוֹקָם) for good',¹ are instanced less frequently, and are taken as being received within the lifetime of individuals, who were usually 'representatives' of the nation. Thus, to take slight variations, peace was secured under the Judges and threatened on their deaths (*supra*), Solomon reaped the reward of his faithfulness with the building of the temple (*I Kgs.*,iii - x, yet cf.xi), and Josiah, despite his bitter end at Megiddo, was saved from worse troubles to come by being 'gathered to his fathers' (*II Kgs.*, xxii,20, xxiii,29-30). With punishments, on the other hand, matters are more complex. Some requitals are immediate (on the disobedient Israelites in *Judges*, for example, or on Achan, whose sin quickly resulted in Israel's defeat at Ai and his own exposure [*Josh.*,vii,2-26]), whilst others were only relatively so (as with certain disobedient post-Solomonic rulers who die violent deaths or whose lineages suffer extinction,² or who, if blood-guilty men, must have their crimes paid off).³ By contrast, some requitals are only effected after a long period. This is not only true in the case of Jeroboam's idolatry, which determined the eventual destruction of the northern kingdom, but we may also note, for example, how the passing of

¹ (rather than for evil), esp. *I Sam.*,xxiv,19, *II Sam.*,xxii,21 = *Ps.*, xviii,20. This last passage may well be 'Deuteronomistic' (so G.W.Anderson, yet cf. Mowinckel).

² *I Kgs.*,xvi,10, xxii,34-35, *II Kgs.*,i,15-17, ix,30-37 (cf. *I Kgs.*,xxi, 22-23, *II Kgs.*,ix,7-10), x,27, xi,16, xiv,19, xv,25;30, xxi,23, xxv,25, on violent deaths (yet cf. *II Kgs.*,xxiii,29-30 on Josiah), and see *I Kgs.*,xiv, 10, xv,29 (cf. *II Kgs.*,x,1-11), for the end of a monarchical line, and *I Kgs.*,xiv,21-22;25-26, *II Kgs.*,x,32, xiii,22-23,etc. on resultant disasters.

³ So, for e.g.,Abimelech, who killed his seventy brothers (*Jud.*,ix,56, cf. ix,1ff.); Ahab, who murdered Naboth (cf.*I Kgs.*,xxi,1-16). Manasseh was made to suffer no personal evil (yet cf. *II Chr.*,xxxiii,10-11!) but his crimes were significantly close to the Exile. On Joab, see *infra*, p. and note the special case of Hiel, rebuilder of Jericho, who lost his youngest son in accordance with the ancient curse of Joshua (*I Kgs.*,xvi, 34, *Josh.*,vi,26).

the high priesthood from the men of Anathoth to Zadok's line (cf. *I Kgs.*, i,39;45) was traced back to the impurities of Eli's sons (*I Sam.*,ii,34, cf. 17;34),¹ and how the Israelites who forced Samuel to appoint them a king (*I Sam.*,viii,4-22) only bore the full cost of their foolishness with eventual captivity (esp.vs.18, cf. *Deut.*,xvii,14-17).² Thus the Deuteronomist took pains to illustrate the recurrent experience of appropriate recompenses, to show that retributive principles had been in operation long before the terrible Exile. Moreover, whilst he recognized that the Israelites were now paying for their sins with a heavy penalty, in looking back to previous occasions of dire trouble, he was reminding Israel that, if she sought God, her guilt would be paid off and her fortunes alter.³

The Deuteronomist also considered retribution in connection with the stages of Israelite history. If the period of the Judges witnessed fluctuations, there were two great periods of righteousness, one under Joshua, when only Achan's sins marred the bright picture of excess, and when the whole land (אֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן) was taken and the twelve tribes given settlement,⁴

¹ Although the complete transference did not take place until Solomon's reign (*I Kgs.*,ii,26-27).

² It may well be that the Deuteronomist, who was writing just after the transportation to Babylon, still saw hope for the return of a righteous Judaeen monarch (cf. *II Kgs.*,xxv,27-30) (see esp. M.Noth, 'La Catastrophe de Jérusalem en l'an 587 avant Jésus-Christ et sa Signification pour Israël,' in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses*, XXXIII,1953, pp.87ff., P.Ackroyd, *Exile*, op.cit.,pp.78ff.), yet he may nevertheless have reckoned with the possibility that Yahweh intended to take Israel's monarchy away from her, perhaps temporarily, perhaps permanently (cf. *Deut.*, xxviii,36, *I Sam.*,viii,18, *II Kgs.*,xxii,16-17, xxiv,20). This would have meant that the promise of eternal kingship in the Davidic-Solomonic line (cf. *II Sam.*,vii,16, *I Kgs.*,ii,45) would have been abrogated, and yet these promises were probably understood to be covenantal, thus being conditional upon the faithfulness of one or other of the two parties (*Deut.*, xxix,12-13, yet cf. *II Sam.*,vii,11ff.).

³ As with the repentance of the Israelites in *Judges* (ii,18b, iii,9, iv,3 etc.), and with the prayers of Hezekiah (*II Kgs.*,xix,14-37). God acts against Israel's enemies once guilt has been paid off (so, *I Sam.*,iv,10 - vi,21, against Philistia, and *II Kgs.*,xvii,21-28, against Assyria).

⁴ On the two periods of *nuaḥ*, see *supra*, p.232. The whole land is taken in accordance with Moses's words (*Josh.*,xi, 23 [yet cf.xiii,1b, which is probably pre-Deuteronomic, and does not express D's understanding of the matter]). On the settlement, *Josh.*,xiii,8 - xxii,34.

and the other under David. David conspicuously committed no outrage or sin of bloodguiltiness.¹ He was forgiven by Yahweh for despising the divine word in taking Bathsheba and in numbering Israel,² although a price is paid in each case - trouble upon the kingdom, with the violation of his wives and the loss of Bathsheba's son, in the first instance (*II Sam.*, xii, 9-14, cf. xv - xviii, xvi, 21ff., xii, 18a), and pestilence over the land, in the second (xxiv, 11-16). If the requital of David's sins did not go unnoticed, however, much more attention was given to the punishments which fell on those who threatened such a righteous king - on Saul and later contenders for David's position.³

Such requital came upon individuals during David's reign, but in other times of general disobedience or as a result of evil kings, the whole people experienced them. The Deuteronomist did not paint an idyllic picture

¹ He does not kill Saul, God's anointed, either at Engedi (cf. *I Sam.*, xxiv, 6) or on the hill of Hachilah (xxvi, 9-10, cf. 23-25); he is restrained from wreaking vengeance on Nabal at Maon (xxv, 26; cf. 33, 37-39); he is impeccably blameless in his dealings with the Philistines (xxix, 6; 8; 9); he executes Rechab and Ba'anah, the slayers of Saul, to avoid bloodguiltiness (*II Sam.*, iv, 11-12a); he permits the last of Saul's sons to eat at his table, for Jonathan's sake (ix, 3-8), and saves him from Gibeonite vengeance against Saul's house (xxi, 7, cf. 1bff.). To requite bloodguiltiness, even his greatest warrior, Joab, is put to the sword (*I Kgs.*, ii, 31-33, cf. *II Sam.*, xix, 13). In general, he exercised care against incurring guilt (cf. also xix, 22b, xx, 3b, xxiii, 17), obeyed the voice of Yahweh or his prophet (*I Sam.*, xxii, 5, *II Sam.*, v, 25, xxiv, 18-19, cf. also xii, 13, xxiv, 10, etc.), and he committed no outrages so odious as those of Absalom (cf. xiii, 1-14, xvi, 21-23).

² See *II Sam.*, xi, 21-27, *I Kgs.*, xv, 5b on the Bathsheba issue, and *II Sam.*, xxiv, 7ff. on the census (cf. *Num.*, i, 47-48 [J])

³ In *II Sam.*, iii, 1 the Deuteronomist deliberately divaricated the fortunes of Saul and David, David's house getting stronger (cf. v, 10), and Saul's weaker. Saul may have begun well (cf. *I Sam.*, xi, xiii, 4), but his neglect of Yahweh's word (xiii, 13-14, xv, 19; 22-23; 35, xxviii, 3ff.), coupled with the visitation of an evil spirit (xvi, 14, xix, 5-10), saw sin piled upon sin until the loss of his kingdom (esp. xxviii, 17, cf. xv, 28, xxiv, 20), and his own and Jonathan's life (xxxii, 2ff.), was inevitable (Jonathan's death is fitting in the light of xiv, 24-30). During David's reign, moreover, crimes were continually and appropriately paid for. Abner was slain because he killed his brother (*II Sam.*, iii, 30), and his death was foreshadowed following his failure to guard God's anointed (*I Sam.*, xxvi, 16); the Amalekite who killed Saul was put to the sword (*II Sam.*, i, 13-16); Absalom died for his treachery (xviii, 9-15); Joab was executed by David for impetuously killing first Abner, then Amasa (Absalom's general), and even Absalom himself (*I Kgs.*, ii, 31-32, cf. *II Sam.*, iii, 30, xx, 10, xviii, 15); Shimei was struck down for not complying with terms of punishment imposed on him and for cursing David (*I Kgs.*, ii, 46, etc.), and Yahweh smote Uzzah (*II Sam.*, vi, 6).

of the wilderness wandering, to take a key example, but held it to be a rebellious period. When disobedient, the Israelites were defeated by enemies (*Deut.*, i, 26; 43, cf. 19-46), and not until the warriors who transgressed had died off (ii, 14b-16) could progress be made (ii, 21; 33-36, iii, 6). Even Moses was punished for his disbelief (*xxxii*, 48-52, cf. 2-13 [J], *xxvii*, 12-14), and it was Joshua who was the hero of the almost transgressionless period of settlement which followed. As for post-Davidic times, Solomon's rule saw *nuah* only as long as his faithfulness lasted (cf. *I Kgs.*, xi, 14-25), and deterioration in his reign foreshadowed the general decline treated in *I Kings* xii - *II Kings* xxv, when there was such great evil that only a great disaster could requite it.

Thus the Deuteronomist's work was a history of the recurring execution of appropriate recompenses, and Israel's past was viewed as though the same principles operated time and time again. Implicitly the nature of rewards and punishments were in accordance with the degree of merit or of incurred guilt, but these operations were ultimately dependent on Yahweh and not upon natural or 'mechanical' laws. The main point is, however, that the writer bequeathed an account of about six centuries in which history, in a special sense, repeated itself. His picture of the repeated acts of transgression against God's commandments, and the repeated consequences of such disobedience, his characterization of recurrent 'event-shapes' - typical transgressions,¹ typical warnings,² fitting deaths and recompenses - all reflect a preoccupation with historical recurrence. There is, of course, no exact repetition, and the cyclo-alternatory model

¹ So, idolatry and religious defection, *Jud.*, ii, 13; 19, iii, 7, etc., *I Kgs.*, xii, 28-30, xiv, 23, xvi, 31, xxi, 3ff. (etc.), (and note the short judgements with which each king was introduced); bloodguiltiness, *Jud.*, ix, 5ff., *II Sam.*, i, 6ff., iii, 30, xx, 10, xviii, 5, *I Kgs.*, xxi, 13ff., *II Kgs.*, xii, 20ff. (cf. xiv, 5-6), xxi, 16, etc..

² See esp. *Jud.*, v, 7ff., *I Sam.*, xv, 22ff., *II Sam.*, xii, 1ff., *I Kgs.*, xiii, 20ff., xvii, 1ff., *xxii*, 19ff., *II Kgs.*, iii, 13ff..

of *Judges* ii is only confined to one part of the history. Yet so much of what we previously uncovered from Graeco-Roman historiography on recurring principles in history, and on lessons learnt for the future from the past, is present in a distinctively Hebraic form. The Deuteronomist almost certainly assumed that event-patterns similar to those he recorded would happen in the future, if the same kinds of transgressions and deeds were effected. By reviewing their chequered past, then, the Israelites had much to learn for the future consolidation of their nation and their faith.

It remains true that the Hebrew language lacked the conceptual tools to convey the idea of historical recurrence more lucidly.¹ But the genuine interest in repeated instances of retribution is undeniable, as well as that special concern to document the re-enactment of events and re-appropriation of former conditions. Such preoccupations persuade one that the otherwise eccentric Chevalier Bunsen was correct when he once asserted that the Hebrews, just as much as the Greeks, had a clear perception of 'the moral law ruling human affairs', holding 'that the divine principle of truth and justice....will prevail'.² And this is all the more confirmed by the development of retributive ideas in the Chronicler's work, which in *I-II Chronicles* overlaps with *II Samuel-II Kings*.

¹ The verb *שׁוּב*, which has much usage in OT historical books (cf. Lisowsky, *op.cit.*, pp.1408ff.), sometimes carried the sense of a 'return' to a state of either righteousness or wickedness (the former: *Deut.*, i,45, iv,20, xiii,18, xxx,2ff., *I Sam.*, vii,3, *I Kgs.*, viii,33ff., etc.; the latter: *Jud.*, ii,19, viii,33, *I Kgs.*, ix,6, etc.), and occasionally meant 'to repeat' in a way which should interest us (of significance: *I Kgs.*, xiii,33, *II Kgs.*, xxi,3 (= *II Chr.*, xxiii,3), *II Chr.*, xix,4). But there was a general dearth of verbs denoting recurrence. *שׁוּב* was rather confined to the immediate repetition of an act by one and the same person: cf. esp. *I Sam.*, xxvi,8, *II Sam.*, xx,10, *I Kgs.*, xviii,34 (twice), etc., and for the use of *שׁוּב* in this more confined sense, *I Sam.*, iii,5;6, *I Kgs.*, xix,6b, *II Kgs.*, i,11;13. On *שׁוּב* (which can also carry the sense of 'doing again'), see F.Brown, S.R.Driver, C.A.Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Oxford, 1907, (59), p.415. As a result of this dearth, resort to repetitious phraseology ('he did evil (or right) in Yahweh's sight'), or to *שׁוּב* (*Jud.*, ii,18;19, cf. 15) or *שׁוּב* was virtually inevitable.

² So, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Universal History*, London, 1854, vol.1, pp.5-6.

The Chronicler

Beside the Deuteronomic work, the Chronicler's treatment of retribution looks crude and almost mechanical. We have already noted how he extolled the two periods of the united monarchy and the restoration. He over-idealized both David and Solomon; they were virtually without sin, and in consequence, were more decisively supreme in war and prosperous at home.¹ The time of restoration was also one of righteousness, with both Ezra and Nehemiah working assiduously to avoid transgression and thus the punishments of the past.² The interim period, however, was tainted with

¹ To remark on the crucial points: David has no trouble with the house of Saul from the time he took Jerusalem (*I Chr.*, x, 6; 13-14, and see xi, 4ff., yet cf. *II Sam.*, iii-iv, vi, 16ff., ix, 1ff., xxi, 1bff., and see v, 6ff.); his sons do not rise up against him (yet cf. *II Sam.*, xv, 10ff., *I Kgs.*, i, 5ff.); the Bathsheba-Uriah incident is overlooked (cf. *I Chr.*, xi, 41a! cf. *II Sam.*, xi, 2ff.); it is Satan who incites David to number Israel (*I Chr.*, xxi, 1, cf. *II Sam.*, xxiv, 1); and besides, even if the king still has to repent (*I Chr.*, xxi, 8 ≠ *II Sam.*, xxiv, 10), the tribe of Levi was not included in the numbering (*I Chr.*, xxi, 6, cf. *II Sam.*, xxiv, 9b and see *Num.*, i, 47-49). On the other hand, although David is rather newly depicted as an architect of the temple, an explanation for his not having constructed the building is given in retributive terms. David admits that Yahweh told him directly that he had 'shed much blood' and 'wages great wars', and that his son, a man of peace (the consonants שְׁלֹמֹה , from which the name Solomon was compounded, are played on here) would build it instead (cf. *I Chr.*, xxii, 6-10, xxviii, 3, cf. *I Kgs.*, v, 17b-18 [MT]; 3b-4 [LXX]). In both the census sin and the blameworthy warfare, the heinousness is eventually sidestepped, however, since in the former case David learnt where the site of the temple should be located (*I Chr.*, xxii, 1, cf. xxi, cf. *II Sam.*, xxiv), and in the latter David is still able to give directions to Solomon about the future project (cf. p. 234). Solomon's reign is one of peaceful prosperity (cf. *I Chr.*, xxii, 9b; 13a, xxiii, 25, xxix, 23, *II Chr.*, ix, 26-28), he righteously settled his Egyptian wife away from the places holy to Yahweh (viii, 11, cf. *I Kgs.*, xi, 1ff. and see iii, 1), his corruption by his foreign wives is temporarily forgotten (though note *Neh.*, xiii, 26), and thus no harassments, whether external or internal, affected his kingdom (yet cf. *I Kgs.*, xi). On the whole, then, the reigns of David and Solomon see the rewards of righteousness.

² Care is taken to preserve a fine priesthood (*Ezr.*, ii, 62-63, viii, 15-30, *Neh.*, xiii, 21-22, cf. esp. *II Chr.*, v, 11, viii, 14), to honour the feasts (*Ezr.*, vii, 20, *Neh.*, viii, 14-17, ix, 2ff., x, 33, cf. *II Chr.*, viii, 12-3), organize the temple service (cf. esp. *Neh.*, x, 34-39, xiii, 30, cf. *I Chr.*, xxiii, 13-26, xxiv-xxvii), dedicate the temple (*Ezr.*, vi, 16-22, cf. *II Chr.*, vii, 1-10, cf. *II Chr.*, viii, 11), to ensure that nobles and officials walked blamelessly (*Neh.*, v, 9, cf. 6-13; 15b (cf. *II Chr.*, xxx, 24, xxxv, 8), xii, 31, cf. *I Chr.*, xxviii, 1-2; 21b), and to pray for faithfulness and succour (*Neh.*, ix, 6-37, cf. *II Chr.*, vi).

evils which make the Exile inevitable. Whilst he was far less severe on certain of the monarchs of Judah,¹ the Chronicler's post-Solomonic pre-exilic history still remains one of repeated disobedience. Although Yahweh persistently sent messengers to the kings, they had kept despising them, and the priests and people had also acted unfaithfully, until no 'remedy' was left (*II Chr.*, xxxvi, 14-16). Recurring disobedience marked the pre-Davidic period also. The Chronicler provides an insight into his understanding of early stages of Israelite history in the famous prayer of Nehemiah (in *Neh.*, ix). Although the Davidic-Solomonic era is not mentioned, Nehemiah reflects on the whole period from the patriarchs to the possession as a time of close relationship with Yahweh - the disobedience in the wilderness being glossed over quickly (ix, 16-19, cf. *Deut.*, i-ii, etc.) - and within the restoration situation, Nehemiah sought a return to that relationship (vss. 32-38). The times in between possession and restoration, however, (though we may exclude the high-point under David and Solomon), were disobedient and rebellious days. In a manner reminiscent of *Judges* ii, the prayer refers to the Israelites' rejection of both the law and the prophetic warnings, so that Yahweh gave them 'into the hands of their enemies'.

'But in the time of their suffering they cried to thee and thou didst hear them from heaven; and according to thy great mercies thou didst give them saviours who saved them from the hands of their enemies. But after they had *nuah*² they did evil again before thee, and thou didst abandon them to the hands of their enemies,....yet when they turned and cried to thee, thou didst hear them from heaven, and many times ('ithim) thou didst deliver them' (*Neh.*, ix, 26-28).

¹ The Chronicler had nothing adverse to say against Abijah (*II Chr.*, xiii, 1ff.) or Jotham (xxvii, 1ff.). It is also true that, although he noted their shortcomings (cf. xix, 1-3, xxxii, 25, xxxv, 22b), he wrote very favourably of Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah and Josiah (xvii, 1-20, xxix-xxxii, xxxiv-xxxv), and that despite their serious transgressions (xvi, 1-3; 9-10, xxvi, 16-20) he still claimed Asa and Uzziah to have done *ḥayim* rather than *ḥayim* in the eyes of Yahweh (xiv, 1 [MT] ≠ *I Kgs.*, xv, 11, xxvi, 4 ≠ *II Kgs.*, xv, 3).

² The Chronicler uses this term indiscriminately of untroubled and righteous times under the rules of judges and kings.

Once more Israel's disobedience heads a sequence, and is followed by defeat, supplication and Yahweh's succour (vss.29-31). Hence an undulatory model makes its appearance, with national misfortune (caused by disobedience) and deliverance (due to reliance on Yahweh) succeeding one another in turn. We may therefore assume that, even accounting for the special period of 'saviourhood' under David and Solomon, the Chronicler took not only the period of the Judges to be one of fluctuation (on the basis of *Judges* ii), but also the monarchical period as well, from Saul to Zedekiah.¹ What we anticipate from Judean *kingly* history, then, is an impression of alternation not strictly present in the Deuteronomic account. The Chronicler was admittedly bound to pay deference to the formal judgments of his major source as to the righteousness or wickedness of different monarchs, yet even in doing that, he certainly managed to create a more symmetrical, alternatory pattern than his predecessor. For the purposes of simplification, the Deuteronomist's picture may be construed as in Diagram VI. The Chronicler modified these classifications, however, in order to ease certain transitions from high-points to low-points, thus creating the effect of a zig-zag line of development between two sets of general conditions. He both altered and added to his main source, and isolated different stages in the careers of certain kings along the way.²

¹ In this connection, note the Chronicler's special emphasis on crying to Yahweh in distress in *II Chr.*, xx, 9, xxix, 8-10, xxxii, 20ff., xxxiii, 12, cf. vi, 24ff., xii, 7.

² To create this new impression Saul is treated as a disobedient king only (*I Chr.*, x, 13-14, cf. *I Sam.*, ix-xvi); the latter, less promising period of Solomon's reign is shelved (yet cf. *I Kgs.*, xi); Rehoboam becomes blame-worthy and reckoned as evil only after a period under the shadow of Solomonic prosperity (*II Chr.*, xii, 1b-5; 8; 14, cf. xi, 12-17, xii, 1a; 12b, yet cf. *I Kgs.*, xiv, 21ff.); Abigal becomes a good ruler rather than a bad one (xiii, 1-23 [MT], cf. *I Kgs.*, xv, 3); Asa, although he begins faithfully (*II Chr.*, xiv, 1 - xv, 19, so *I Kgs.*, xv, 11-15), eventually enters an alliance with Syria, commits cruelties against the seer who condemned him for it, pays for his crime by contracting a disease, and dies seeking physicians rather than Yahweh (*II Chr.*, xvi, 2-3; 7-10; 12-13, cf. *I Kgs.*, xv, 16-24, there being little sense of retribution in vs. 23b); Jehoshaphat's reign is then idealized (*II Chr.*, xvii-xx, cf. *I Kgs.*, xxii, 41-60) (that sharpens the contrast between his and the preceding rule), but a misdemeaner at the end of his

The overall result has been characterized in Diagram VII, and this diagram neatly shows how the Chronicler actually concerned himself with a process of historical recurrence.

reign (*II Chr.*,xx,35-37, cf. *I Kgs.*,xxii,47-49) foreshadows a low-point which comes with the accession of Jehoram. Jehoram killed his brothers and led Judah astray (*II Chr.*,xxi,4;6b;11, cf. *II Kgs.*,viii,18-19). For this he faced internal revolts (*II Chr.*,xxi,8-10, *II Kgs.*,viii,2-22), the vehemence of a letter from Elijah (*II Chr.*,xxi,12-15), the incursions of enemies (vss.16-17) and an incurable disease (vs.18) (all *om. II Kgs.*). Ahaziah succeeded him, but as he reigned for only one year (xxii,2), and was killed according to God's will (xxii,7;9), it did not disturb the Chronicler to consider him in close conjunction with Jehoram (*II Kgs.*,viii,20-27 and ff.), and to treat him as the end of a blameworthy stage (cf. *II Chr.*,xxii,9 β b). Joash's rule saw a return to faithfulness, whilst Jehoida was high priest (xxiv,2;4ff., cf. *II Kgs.*,xii,2;4ff.), but the relevant difficulty then facing the Chronicler came with the fact that the Deuteronomist had listed three kings immediately following Joash who did Δ W in the eyes of Yahweh - Amaziah, Azariah (=Uzziah) and Jotham (*II Kgs.*,xiv,3-6, xv,3-5;34). He solved this problem first by disclosing that there had been transgression during Joash's reign, which was largely the fault of the Judaeans after the high priest's death (*II Chr.*,xxiv,17-19). The princes died violently for their sin (vs.23b), and Joash, who listened to them, was eventually murdered (vs.25, cf. *II Kgs.*,xii,20, which lacks a sense of retribution). Secondly, the Chronicler painted an increasingly gloomy picture of Amaziah's rule. Amaziah did certain things that were right before Yahweh (xxv,2a'4-13, cf. *II Kgs.*,xiv,3a), but he was blameworthy (*II Chr.*,xxv,2b, cf. *II Kgs.*,xiv,3b); he then turned from Yahweh (cf. *II Chr.*,xxv,27) and worshipped the gods of Seir (vs.14), for which heinous sins he received an oracle of doom (vss.15-16), was captured, with great cost to Jerusalem, by Jehoahaz of Israel (vss.23, cf.20;23-24, cf. *II Kgs.*,xiv,8-10), and killed by conspirators as Lachish (vs.27 $\neq$ *II Kgs.*,xiv,19). Finally, having portrayed Amaziah's reign as a low-point, the Chronicler conceived of Uzziah's and Jotham's rules as a progression upward. Uzziah did well (*II Chr.*,xxvi,4, *II Kgs.*,xv,3-5), but, puffed up with pride, he desecrated the temple and so contracted leprosy (*II Chr.*,xxvi,16-21), whilst his son Jotham followed in his footsteps but did better by not falling into his errors (xxvii,2, cf. *II Kgs.*,xv,34). Thus there is a return to a more righteous rule (yet note the foreboding: *II Chr.*,xxvii,2 β b). The transitions from Jotham to Ahaz and on to Hezekiah as they stood in D suited the Chronicler's predispositions, but he re-wrote the reigns of Manasseh and Amon, making Amon's rather than Manasseh's rule the next extreme point of departure from God's ways. Hezekiah was amongst the most prosperous of post-Solomonic rulers (*II Chr.*,xxxii,23;27-30), and this because he was amongst the most righteous (xxix,1 - xxxii,1), although C has reservations about his pride (xxxii,25-26, cf. *II Kgs.*,xx,1b), perhaps in anticipation of new, more terrible developments under his successors. The first of these, Manasseh the idolater, committed dreadful crimes, and yet in his temporary exile, he repented, returning to restore God's altar and city (xxxiii,10-16, cf. *II Kgs.*,xxi,10-15). His reign, then, contrasted quite favourably with Amon's, who did not humble himself like his father, but who 'incurred guilt more and more', and was eventually murdered (*II Chr.*,xxxiii,22-24, cf. *II Kgs.*,xxi,20-24). From then on, C followed the Deuteronomic precedents, with the reforms of Josiah, and the cluster of wicked kings who removed all 'remedy' from the situation.

Good Kings: Saul(1)⁺ David
Solomon(1) Asa Jehoshaphat Joash Jotham Hezekiah Josiah

Azariah (= Uziah)

Evil Kings: Saul(2) Solomon(2)
Rehoboam Jehoram Amaziah Ahaz Manasseh Jehoahaz
Abijah Ahaziah Amon Jehoiakim
Zedekiah Exile

DIAGRAM VI

The Deuteronomic picture of monarchical rule from Saul to Zedekiah (Judaea)

DIAGRAM VII

The Chronicler's picture of monarchical rule from Saul to Zedekiah (Judaea)

+ Bracketed numbers denote identifiable stages in certain kings' reigns

* The Chronicler does not inform us whether this king did or evil or right before Yahweh

This patterning was reinforced by the Chronicler's somewhat shallow analysis of retributive principles. Every illness, for instance, had to be accounted for in terms of requital, the violent deaths of kings seen as punishments (even that Josiah), and every defeat as a sign of disobedience.¹ By contrast, material prosperity accompanied almost blameless rule (p.276, cf. esp. *II Chr.*, xvii,5, xx,20 [*om. I Kgs.*], xxxii,27ff. [*cf. II Kgs.*, xx,12ff.]), and except for the murder of the prophets, the violent deaths of those who did not deserve them were overlooked (cf. esp. *II Kgs.*, xxv,18-21, *om. II Chr.*). In the *Chronicles*, moreover, oracular activity manifests itself with greater regularity than with the Deuteronomistic work,² and in all, then, we find in this later history an eclectic intertwining of relevant themes - of re-enactment, continuity, retribution, and of alternation between two sets of general conditions.³

Retributive beliefs were very old both in and near Israel, and they were bound to persist beyond the exilic and restoration periods into later phases of Judaism's life. Aside from wisdom writers, apocalypticists and midrashic commentators (who all had much to say about the consequences of sin and righteousness),⁴ our attention is drawn to late Jewish interpret-

¹ *Illness*: *II Chr.*, xvi,12-14, xxi,18-20, xxvi,21, xxxii,24-5. *Death*: cf. esp. previous note. *Defeat*: xii,5-12, xiii,15, xiv,12, xxi,16-17, xxii,7ff., xxv,20-22 (note the heavy determinism), xxvi,27, xxviii,5ff., xxxii,21, xxxiii,11, xxxvi,5-6. Most of these verses reflect the Chronicler's special material and preoccupations.

² Note esp. *II Chr.*, xii,7-8, xiii,5-12, xv,2-7, xvi,7-9, xix,6-7;9-11, xx,6-12;20-21, xxi,12-15, xxiv,5-6;20, xxviii,9-13, xxix,5-11;31, xxx,6-9, xxxiv,24-29, xxxv,3-6, for the words of God's servants, kings included. Cf. von Rad, 'The Levitical Sermon in *I* and *II Chronicles*', in *The Problem*, op. cit., pp.267ff..

³ Whether the Chronicler was 'true to the facts', and whether his message and procedures indicate a decline in spiritual insight, are deep questions entailing other studies. With regard to the second query, it may be affirmed that his special approaches cannot be effectively traced to the growing influence of Hellenism in the post-exilic life of Judaism, and that historiographical presuppositions indigenous to the Near East in general and Judah in particular are sufficient to explain their presence. On background, cf. esp. W. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament* (ET), London, 1961-5, vol.1, pp.263ff., vol.2, pp.177ff., North, *OT Interpretation*, op. cit., pp.66-72.

⁴ There was much crude moralizing about rewards and punishments in post-

ations of retribution applied (in a straightforward manner) to significant historical events. Key writers illustrating the development of these notions to the time of Luke include the authors of *I-II Maccabees*, Flavius Josephus and Philo Judaeus.

Later Jewish Writing

The brilliant successes of the Maccabean brothers, as commemorated in *I Maccabees* (ca.120-100 BC), should be regarded in the light of Antiochus Epiphanes' great sin against the temple (i,54-59), and the zeal of Mattathias' house to purge Israel of Hellenes and of Israelites succumbing to Greek ways (cf.ii,20-29, iii,4-6;8, vii,24, ix,73b,etc.). Significantly enough, warriors not true to the Maccabean cause met with military disaster (v,55-61), (Alcimus the anti-Hasmonaean high priest dying a terrible death [ix,54-55, cf.vii,12-14;21-25, ix,1;54]), whilst the Maccabees themselves were able to build up Jerusalem (iv,60, x,11, xiv,37, xvi,23). In *II Maccabees*, by comparison, the disasters experienced by Israel before the emergence of the Hasmonaean saviours were ascribed to her disobedience (vi,12; viii,32), yet when the worst of misfortunes befell her (with Antiochus's desecration and murders), the Israelites cried to the Lord in their oppressed state (viii,2-4) and his anger was turned to pity (vs.5b). As a result, the oppressor died a hideous death (ix,1ff.;28), and Judas Maccabeus won stupendous victories against the next Seleucid (viii,24, x, 31, xi,11, xii,27-28, xiii,15, xv,15-34). In this second work, then, Yahweh's act of deliverance ranks among similar acts of the past (cf. viii,19-20),

exilic works which amalgamated mainstream legalism and international wisdom (see esp. R.H.Pfeiffer, *History of New Testament Times; with an Introduction to the Apocrypha*, London,1949,pp.334ff.,377ff. (esp. on *Ecclus.*)). For the apocalypticists, note esp. *Zeph.*,ii-iii, *Isa.*,lxv,11-12, *Dan.*, vii,26, cf.xi,45, *IQH.*,10, *IQW.*,16, *I Enoch*, lxii,12, cx,18, xci,11, cf. *Rev.*,xix,21,i,16,ii,12. On midrashic writing, see *Gen.Rabba*,xliv-lx (cf. P.R.Weis, *Midrashic Selections (II)*, (Semitic Studies Series), Leiden,1955, p.vii). Cf.also *Judith* (second century BC), which is of passing interest: Judith punishes Israel's enemies for God, and her deeds suggest a re-enactment of two figures in *Judges*, Jael above all, and Ehud (*Jud.*,ix,10, xiii, 15-18, xiv,18, xvi,6ff.,etc., cf. *Judth.*,iv,9, v,24, cf.iii,15ff.).

the general situation being conceived as another instance of the sequence: defection/oppression/prayer/deliverance (as best reflected in *Judges* ii and *Nehemiah* ix). Although the format of *I-II Maccabees* conformed slightly to Hellenistic tastes,¹ the understanding of God's justice behind historical events was still essentially Jewish. It is different with the later works of *IV Maccabees* and of Josephus (both first century AD), into which Graeco-Roman conceptions of the moral order have infiltrated. In the former, the cruel tyrannos Antiochus Epiphanes suffers appropriate punishment through the divine pronōia (ix,24, xvii,21-22, cf.xviii,5;22), and he is never really victorious over the andreia and aretē of Israel's martyrs (xvii,23, cf.ix-xiii).² As for Josephus' volumes, there one finds a rather more complex attempt at interrelating Greek and Hebraic notions of divine justice, an attempt requiring separate attention.

Josephus, whilst acknowledging with regret the recurrent suffering of the Jews under the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Macedonians and Romans (*Antiq.*,XX,259-60), went so far as to contend that ἡ τύχη was on the side of imperial Rome in the Jewish War (XIX,77, cf. *Bell.Jud.*, IV,622), and that inescapable fate (τὸ χρεών) had led the Jews on to the destruction of 70 AD (V,355;572, VI,314, cf. IV,622-3, VI,267-8). Whereas one can merely suppose that the author of *IV Maccabees* saw both the wreaking of divine vengeance on Antiochus, and the vindication of the martyr-heroes, as one typical set of events exemplifying the providential order, Josephus actually treated Jewish history as a whole, and was even more open in his willingness to combine Hebrew and gentile notions of recurrence. He traced the beginning of Israel's real misfortunes to Jeroboam I, who, after the

¹ Note esp. *I Macc.*,iii-iv, vi, on preparations for and details about military exchanges; x, xv, on diplomacy, and *II Macc.*,ii,19-32, xv,37-9 on literary organization and 'scientific method', cf.(on the last aspect), H.Cancik, *Mythische und historische Wahrheit; Interpretationen zu Texten der hethitischen, biblischen und griechischen Historiographie*, (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien XLVIII), Stuttgart, 1970,pp.110ff.

² On further Hellenism, cf.i,1 - iii,19, vii,1-15, xiii,27 - xvi,5, etc.

great and prosperous reign of Solomon (cf. *Antiq.*, VII, 337-8), transgressed the Law with his golden heifers. If we interpret Josephus correctly, Jeroboam's sin was 'the first of evils' which resulted in defeats and *aichmalōsia* that went on not just to the Babylonian exile (as the Deuteronomist had it), but to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD as well (VIII, 229, cf. IX, 282). Thus the event of 70 AD, ordained in advance by God, was a recurrence of the earlier destruction (in 586 BC) foretold by the prophets (*Bell. Jud.*, VI, 250, cf. 109, *Antiq.*, X, 142, cf. 139-141). In both cases the Jews were culpable (*Bell. Jud.*, VI, 110, cf. V, 572, VI, 251; 314-5, *Antiq.*, X, 78-81; 103-4; 139, cf. 183),¹ and both destructions occurred on the same date (*Bell. Jud.*, VI, 250) so that Josephus marvelled at the 'exactness of periodicity' (τῆς περιόδου τὴν ἀκρίβειαν) (VI, 268, cf. also *II Macc.*, x, 5). These preoccupations were not unJewish, and yet Josephus went a long way towards integrating the recurrence models and conceptions of two cultures.²

This conclusion is supported by his handling of *tychē*. It has already been shown how the cyclical notion of fortune's wheel, of the unexpected tumbling of the over-successful, was used in Greek historiography to confirm the moral order (pp. 70ff.). Josephus found it easy to take over this elementary idea. When discussing the situation after Solomon, he averred that 'many times' (*pollakis*) (cf. pp. 9, 16)³ the causes of men's evil ways and lawlessness lay in the greatness of their affairs and in the improvement of their personal position (*Antiq.*, VIII, 251a). On account of their strength they become *δδίκου καὶ δσεβεῖς* (carrying their subjects with them [251b-252]), and once such men act outrageously, they cannot elude the punishment of *dikē* (cf. XI, 274-5, I, 14; 20). So Josephus rather neatly combined gentile doctrines of both changing fortune and retributive justice

¹ In this last reference, Josephus openly associated the fall of Samaria with Jerusalem's fall, both events being divine punishments, cf. IX, 281.

² Note also his Hellenistic-looking comments on the idea of learning lessons from history, cf. esp. *Antiq.*, VIII, 418-20, cf. I, 3.

³ This term, denoting recurrence, appears in Polybius, VI, v, 5, Plato, *Leg.*, III, 676C.

with the Hebraic belief in the fall of the proud and the divine punishment of the transgressor. The Hebrews did, after all, have their counterpart to the notion of *hybris*; the prophets had raged against the overweening pride of both Israel's rulers (cf. esp. *Isa.*, ii, 12, ix, 9, xiii, 11, xxxiii, 9, etc., *Jer.*, xiii, 9; 15-17, etc.) and Israel's enemies (*Isa.*, xvi, 6, *Jer.*, xlviii, 29, 1, 29-32, etc.), the Chronicler had noted more than once that a monarch's greatness was a prelude to his unfaithfulness or arrogance (*II Chr.*, xii, 1, xxvi, 16, xxxii, 23-25, cf. xxxii, 9-19 [*II Kgs.*, xviii, 17-35]), and Ben Sirach, to take a wisdom writer from a later century, had philosophized about the downfall of proud rulers (*Ecclus.*, x, 6-18). With the use of *hybris* and *hybrizein* in the *LXX*,¹ and the general permeation of Hellenistic ideas, the sort of conceptual link evident in Josephus was only natural.

Not all men of Hellenistic sensibility were convinced about a moral order, of course, and we should make more than a passing reference to that fascinating document *Qoheleth*, written some three centuries earlier than Josephus, and by a much more questioning soul. For a Jew, the writer makes a remarkably extensive use of the cyclical conceptions of his day - both those used in his own cultural milieu to reflect on the processes of nature (*Eccles.*, i, 4-11, iii, 1-8), and those applied to human affairs by his 'Greek' contemporaries (cf. v, 13-14, vii, 14; 16-17, xi, 9, xii, 1ff.). Pessimistic in inclination, the original writer (whose position may be isolated from redactional layers),² not only insisted that prosperity could easily pass (xi, 6, cf. vii, 14),³ and that wealth could be quickly

¹ Cf. E. Hatch and H. A. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint*, Oxford, 1897, vol. 3, pp. 1379-80.

² On literary criticism of *Eccles.*, see esp. W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson, *An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*, London, 1934, pp. 209ff.. One should be more cautious than these two authors in seeking the background of *Qoheleth*'s attitudes in Greek as against Egyptian and Mesopotamian pessimism, however. Cf. R. B. Y. Scott, *Proverbs, Ecclesiastes*, (The Anchor Bible), Garden City, 1965, esp. pp. 197-8.

³ Or else it has an ultimate futility about it (ii, 1-11), or cannot be

lost in 'a bad venture' (v,13-15) (so musing on the vicissitudes of fortune), but drew the more far-reaching conclusion that all human activity was ultimately futile since *migrēh* (= *atychia* rather than *heimarmenē* or fate?)¹ and death come to all (cf.ii,14, iii,19, ix,2;3). Man must be moderate and astute in the days of his life,² and yet he lives in a world where there is really no moral order (iii,16-22, vii,15, viii,12-14,ix,2-6), despite God's ultimacy (ii,24b, iii,14a, v,19b, xii,1-8). It is a world in which anything can happen unexpectedly both for good or ill (ix,11-12, cf.xi,6), and by way of a climax, the treatise finishes with a majestic and poetic statement about the futile end of human toil and the death of all men (xii,1-8). *Qoheleth* lies on the fringe of our investigations, however, because the writer dilates upon the human condition in general and not on man's history in particular. On the other hand, the work clearly shows that historical linearity was not the automatic draw-card of every OT writer, and it reveals how the Greek concept of *cyclos* as applied to human things made its entrance into later Judaic thought. It is significant that the likely provenance of *Qoheleth* is Alexandria,³ and if so, it provides important background to that ancient Jewish scholar who, before all other Jewish writers, had no compunction in appropriating Greek cyclical frames for the interpretation of historical events. I mean Philo Judaeus (ca.30 BC - 45 AD).

Philo could not only write about retribution as though the operations of the Jewish God and of *dikē* amounted to the same thing, but also of the divine lordship over history in terms of *tychē* and of classically conceived

fully enjoyed (vi,1-13). Comments directed against those who accepted a 'necessary' correlation between prosperity and righteousness?

¹ Cf. O.Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament; an Introduction* (ET), London, 1965, p.498 on this. For a comparable mood, cf. Marcus Aurelius, *Medit.*, IV, xxxii, 1f.

² iii,1-14a, iv,17 - v,12, vii,1-7, viii,1, ix,16, x,1-20, xi,10, cf.ii, 24-25, iii,22, v,18-20, ix,9.

³ See esp. E.H.Plumptre, *Ecclesiastes* (Cambridge Bible Commentary), Cambridge, 1887, pp.44ff., 228, and Eissfeldt, *op.cit.*, pp.497ff., for relevant problems.

metabolē.¹ Not only did he reckon with the breeding of arrogance amongst the prosperous,² he actually claimed that *tychē* moved human affairs 'up and down' (ἄνω καὶ κάτω) on the world's draughtboard, so that 'many times' (*pollakis*) the lofty were pulled down and the lowly raised, even in the space of one day (*Vit.Mos.*, I, 31). For Philo, *tychē* was an agency of God, the mediating *Logos* in its rôle as the distributor of all things and as preserver of 'la loi immuable de l'équilibre'.³ All levels of human life reflect this distributive activity; the biological processes, the unexpected and sudden loss of great wealth, even the overthrow of an empire (*De Iosepho*, 128-9; 131-2). Because the world tends to maintain a certain equilibrium - as Heraclitus had taught⁴ - it was likened to a *rhopē*, or in other words, to an inclining from one side to the other (132, cf. 139-140).⁵ All things moreover, change into their opposites, (μεταβάλλειν πρὸς τάναντία) (to elicit another Heraclitean doctrine which Philo even injected into the teaching of Moses), and this was supremely true of *anthrōpeia* with all its instability (*Vit.Mos.*, I, 41). Thus human history became a matter of altering distribution. The empires, which Philo enumerated from Egypt onwards, move up and down in a 'ceaseless flux' (ἀεὶ ῥέων) (cf. p. 150) since 'the divine *Logos* - which most people call *tychē* - dances circlewise' (χορεύει ἐν κύκλῳ) from one nation to another.⁶ Under such a dispensation, the whole world may be characterized as a *dēmocratia*, since what some nation or city had once, others have now, and in time all share the benefits

¹ On God and *dikē*, cf. e.g., *In Flaccum*, 115; *De Vita Mosis*, I, 326; *De Praemiis et Poenis*, 29; 169, etc., cf. E.R. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, New York, 1962 ed., p. 45.

² Cf., for e.g., *Vit.Mos.*, I, 30; 160-1.

³ So, E. Bréhier, *Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1950, p. 89. Cf. also H.A. Wolfson, *Philo; foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, vol. 2, p. 422 on the indistinguishability of *Logos* and fortune in Philo.

⁴ For other allusions to Heraclitus, cf. J.W. Earp's indices to the Loeb Classical Library edn. of Philo (vol. 10, pp. 322, 456).

⁵ Cf. *De Ios.*, 144-5 (and on Heraclitus, previous note).

⁶ *Quod Deus Immutabilis sit*, 176, cf. 173-5, *De Ios.*, 134-7.

of fortune (*Inmut.*, 176b).¹ God is therefore Lord over the 'general direction of human material affairs' even though every state 'organized by men' was 'the product of their fallen nature'.² In general terms, Philo managed to theorize not merely about undulations, about the 'upward and downward' tendencies in the career of his own or any ethnic group, but also about movements which, in space and time, were spread between peoples. In this respect, his succinct yet probing statements remain both unique in the ancient world and, in the history of recurrence ideas, extremely important.

Philo sought only too enthusiastically to accommodate much of Greek philosophy and political theory to his stock of essentially Jewish commitments. In his eclecticism he far excelled any of his near Jewish or Christian contemporaries, Luke included. With regard to historical processes, his way of intertwining Greek ideas of political change with Jewish beliefs about Israel's uniqueness, adds to this impression. On the one hand, he pictured the recurring rise and fall of human phenomena. Such alternations or cycles (and the two, incidentally, are interchangeable for Philo) represented a normative instability amongst the nations. And this unstableness was not simply perpetuated by the overriding law of distribution (Greek necessity/the Jewish idea of cosmic theocracy), but also by the recalcitrant wills of individuals (Greek *metabolē* theory/the Jewish insistence on human responsibility for deeds). So Philo not only wrote of a 'necessary' flux, but also of 'kingdoms set among men, with wars and campaigns, and numberless *kaka* which men ambitious for power inflict on their fellows' (*De Abrah.*, 261).³ As for his concept of the rise and fall

¹ For democracy as a theological order, see *De Abrahamo*, 242.

² So, Goodenough, *op.cit.*, p.68.

³ Or of rulers degenerating into profligates (*Vit.Mos.*, I, 160-1), and of the licentiousness, womanizing and adultery which, by producing a *stasis*, destroying the choicest men among the Greeks and barbarians, i.e. non-Jews (*De Ios.*, 56-7).

of peoples, this clearly owes much to Hellenistic notions of change, but not everything. Philo may have been the first Jewish writer to make so much of a 'ceaseless flux' outside Israelite history, yet we must remember that biblical literature contains numerous references to the emergence and disappearance of certain foreign powers. Apart from assertions that Yahweh ruled over all historical events,¹ or that régimes were as impermanent as mere stubble before his tempest (cf. *Isa.*, xl, 23-24), one should note apocalyptic pictures of successive empires. And if some apocalyptic works, such as *Daniel*, contained only a bare outline of how such empires rose and fell, others, such as the *Egyptian Sibylline Books (III)*, openly ascribed their fall to God's retribution upon tyranny and outrage.² Interestingly, these notions of rise and fall, Philo's included, were not presented in *biological* terms. Philo's conception of recurrent instability amongst the gentiles, then, had its basis in both traditions.

On the other hand, despite Israel's own troubles, Philo consistently contrasted the normative precariousness of gentile politics with the soundness of Jewish statesmanship. Abraham rises above the inferior machinations of politics, Joseph possesses insight into the nature of *anthrōpeia*, and Moses is both disciplined in prosperity and supremely perceptive in legislating for a polity.³ Beside the wars, tyrannies, mishaps of fortune and iniquities of the gentiles he placed the 'venerable and godlike' Torah - a symbol of permanence.⁴ It had been unchanged by political turbulence, and

¹ E.g.: *Amos*, ix, 7, *Isa.*, x, 5-15, xliv, 1-7; 22ff., etc..

² On *Daniel*, cf. ii, 37-43, vii, 2-8, xi, 2 - xii, 45, though cf. iv, 33, v, 21-22, etc., and for the *Sib. Bks. (III)*, cf. III, 182; 199-210. See also pp. and on the Egyptian origin of the last work cited, note Eissfeldt, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

³ Cf. *De Ios.*, 107-150, esp. 143a; 148-150, *Vit. Mos.*, I, 32; 162, cf. 41, and see *De Abrah.*, esp. 217ff..

⁴ On gentile societies, note Philo's phrases in *Vit. Mos.*, II, 13-14: ἡ νεωτερισμῷ τύχης κατασκήπτει / ἐξυβρίζοντων / ὕβρις δ' ἀωτίπαλον νόμον. See also *De Ios.*, 143, cf. 145, on ταραχή, ἀταξία, ἀσφαεία amongst the nations. Unlike Josephus, Philo did not analyse the μεταβολή πολιτεῶν within Israel's history, even if he recognized that his own nation had experienced many vicissitudes (*Vit. Mos.*, II, 15).

for Philo it even came to incorporate within itself the cosmic laws of the philosophers, so that he could proceed to make the extraordinary claim that it was honoured by all peoples (*Vit.Mos.*, II, 16-19).¹ Like Polybius, Philo distinguished the norm from a 'great exception', and even claimed a special naturalness for Mosaic institutions, as Polybius had done for Roman constitutional development. In view of the Diaspora, moreover, he placed weight upon the geographical spread of Jewish practises over the whole *oikoumenē*,² and thus joined Polybius and Luke in treating geographical breadth as a mark of heavenly approval.

If Judaism transcended the normative processes of recurrence then, and if Israel had received a revelation from the eternal heavens which cut across typical earthly discordance, it also represented for Philo the religious focal-point through which the whole of human history would acquire its ultimate meaning. The cycles of history would not run on unceasingly; Philo was too Jewish to abandon the concept of a Messianic Age. In the end there would come a reign of peace in which Israel would find prosperity, the dispersed Jews would be re-united in their homeland, and those gentiles who abandoned their own peculiar customs would avoid judgement and become obedient servants of God's law.³ This is of great significance. Philo inherited a Judaism in which the expectations of the last Age of the Messiah had wide currency. In this respect he may be considered to be in a different position from the Deuteronomist or the Chronicler, who, despite the fact that certain eschatological-looking affirmations were uttered near their

¹ Cf. also, on the widespread adoption of the Sabbath law, *Ibid.*, II, 21-22, and on respect for the LXX by Ptolemy Philadelphus, 25ff..

² See esp. *Legatio ad Gaium*, xliv, 349ff., and note Wolfson, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 417-20. Wolfson's claim that Philo was influenced by Polybius is not unconvincing, though Philo was not the Achaean's disciple so much as one who appealed to those familiar with Polybian ideology.

³ See *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 408-17 for references. That Philo may have questioned the belief in the world's end (*Doxographi Graeci*, (ed. H. Diels, rev. W. de Gruyter), Berlin, 1958, p. 107, n. 1, cf. *De Aeternitate Mundi* (Philo's?) does not rule out the fact that his Messianic Age would bring an end to the patterns of the present historical order.

time, did not seem to have shared the opinion that all history, as against significant stages of history, reached a point of completion. Yet Philo, even in committing himself to a rather loosely-formulated eschatology, was still able to enunciate a cyclical view of normative historical events. Nothing could be more damaging to the case of anyone arguing that an eschatological outlook on history requires thoroughgoing linearity, or in turn, that a cyclical view requires an eternal process. Whilst Philo's eschatology must needs reject the idea of an *eternity* of social and cosmic *cycloi*, his interesting eclecticism still remains.

Luke

We return to Luke, having identified the main elements and shifts in Israelite-Jewish retributive thinking. Luke, too, concerned himself with the issue of retribution, in fact it is one of his cardinal themes. There is much material in *Luke-Acts* on the Jewish repudiation of the Kingdom of God. The rejections run in a long series from the time of Jesus' ministry up to Paul's encounter with the Jewish leaders at Rome,¹ As with the Deuteronomist, disobedience becomes almost monotonous, and sin seems piled on sin until the final and implicitly divine renunciation of Judaism (at *Acts*, xx-viii). Luke consciously paralleled the pattern of Jewish disobedience in his own time with the pattern in the OT, according to which the Israelites would listen neither to their great lawgiver (cf. vii, 35ff.), nor to the

¹ It is unfair, incidentally, to single out diaspora Jews as Luke's chief *bête noir* (so, cf. esp., *Acts*, vi, 9, ix, 29b, xxi, 27) in the light of *Acts*, iv-v, xxiii, 12ff., and, of course, *Luke* in general. Time and again in *Acts* the Jews counter the spreading of the gospel. They verbally oppose the new preaching in Jerusalem (iv, 18; 21, v, 40), at Antioch in Pisidia (xiii, 45, cf. 50), Thessalonica (xvii, 5-7), Berea (vs. 13), Corinth (xviii, 6; 12-13) and Ephesus (cf. vs. 19b). And they do so both on his return to Jerusalem (xxi, 27-28, xxii, 22) and during his trial (xxiv, 9, xxv, 7, cf. xxiii, 2), let alone on his arrival at Rome. It is the Jews who take John and Peter into custody (iv, 3, v, 33; 40), kill Stephen (vii, 54-60), persecute the Judaeans Christians (viii, 1b-3, cf. ix, 1), hope that Herod would execute Peter (xii, 11βb), and try to kill Paul in Damascus (ix, 23, yet cf. *II Cor.*, xi, 323-33! - a sign of special Lukan emphasis), in Jerusalem (vs. 29), Lystra (xiv, 19), Macedonia (xx, 3) and during his trial (xxiii, 12-22). Also, it is certain Jews who create division within the church in xi, 1, xv, 1.

prophets (esp.vii,52, xxviii,25bff.). Expressions of man's alternating relationships with Yahweh, to be found in OT histories (as in *Judges* ii and *Nehemiah* ix), have also had their slight impact, especially in the speech of Stephen (*Acts* vii). In both this speech, and Paul's sermon in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch, there is the suggestion that God repeatedly revealed himself to, and acted for, his people (vii,2-3;9-10,30-33;38;45-47;52, xiii,17-22), and repeatedly established covenants for their future well-being (vii,5;34 (cf.6-7), xiii,23).¹ In Stephen's special interpretation of Israelite history above all, however, the inner contradiction between Israel's reception of revelation and her transgressions becomes most apparent. Here we are not far from the older pattern of successive obedience and disobedience, the good works of God's servants being consistently undermined by 'resistance to the Holy Spirit' (cf.vii,52). The progress of the patriarchs was marred by the jealousy of Joseph's brothers (vss.9-10,cf.3ff), the promising upbringing of Moses by the earlier rejection of his people (vss.21-9), the Exodus by the idolatry in the wilderness (vss.38-43), and the eventual erection of the Temple by a wrong spiritual understanding (vss.44-50). If angels had once delivered the Torah, it was not kept (vs 53); the prophets were persecuted and killed (vs.52). The function of this speech, then, quite apart from questions of its pre-Lukan elements,² was to instance the accumulating guilt of the Jews in terms of their own religion and their own outstretched past, let alone in the light of recent events. Thus the patterns of the new history were essentially the same as the old. Perhaps Luke's approach was not so simplistic that he sidestepped Christ-

¹ Note, as more recent background than *Judges* or *Nehemiah* here, *Ecclus.*, xliv ff., *Taan.*, ii,4, and note *Zad.Doc.(MSA)*, i, iii.

² Luke probably inherited this statement, though he seems to have modified it slightly. It has been asserted that the non-Palestinian diaspora geography is important for understanding this sermon (cf. esp. J. Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (ET), London, 1959, pp.222-4), but on my reading, it is less important for Luke than for the original writer behind *Acts*, vii.

ianity's Jewish origin, or failed to mention either conversions amongst the Jews or hindrances caused by gentiles,¹ but there is a strong anti-Semitism nevertheless, and it may well owe more to Luke's historiographical predispositions than to the facts themselves.

It was with Paul's arrival in Rome that Luke chose to disclose God's rejection of the Jews in favour of the gentiles (*Acts*, xxviii, 26-28). That is significant, for it was the Romans who destroyed the holy city of Judaism. Unlike Mark (and even Matthew?) Luke had concrete information about the fall of Jerusalem and the events of 68-70 AD (*Lk.*, xxi, 20, cf. 24, xix, 43, yet cf. *Mk.*, xiii, 14, *Mt.*, xxiv, 15). Certainly all the Synoptics quoted Jesus' saying that 'not one stone [of the temple] would be left upon another' (*Mk.*, xiii, 2b $\neq$ *Mt.*, xxiv, 2 $\neq$ *Lk.*, xxi, 6),² yet only Luke was in a position to give real substance to that statement, to see that it was not just another 'desolating sacrilege' (cf. *Dan.*, ix, 27b, xi, 31, *I Macc.*, i, 54), like the desecration of Epiphanes, but something far more disastrous (cf. esp. *Lk.*, xix, 43-44, *om. Mk., Mt.*). Its only precedent lay in the calamity effected by Nebuchadnezzar. The coming event of horror, however, was no longer the symbol of the eschaton's eventual arrival, which was to occur after the gospel had been preached to all nations (cf. *Mk.*, xiii, 10; 14, *Mt.*, xxiv, 14; 15), but it was a thoroughly historical event, and a known one, which happened between the 'time of witness' (*Lk.*, xxi, 13) (or in other words, the period covered by *Acts* to ca. 63 AD),³ and the 'times of the gentiles' still awaiting completion before the cosmic indications the eschaton (*Lk.*,

¹ So *Acts*, ii, 5; 41; 47, iv, 36, vi, 7, xi, 19ff., xiii, 43, xiv, 4b, xvii, 4, etc., (on Jewish converts), xvi, 22ff., xvii, 32, xix, 24ff., etc. (gentile hindrances).

² On whether this saying is authentic, see W.G. Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfilment; the eschatological message of Jesus* (*Studies in Biblical Theology XXIII*) (ET), London, 1957, pp. 99ff., cf. also L. Gaston, *No Stone on Another; Studies in the Significance of the Fall of Jerusalem in the Synoptic Gospels* (*Supplements to Novum Testamentum XXIII*), Leiden, 1970, esp. chs. 1-2.

³ Following H. Metzger, *St. Paul's Journeys in the Greek Orient* (*Studies in Biblical Archaeology IV*) (ET), London, 1955, p. 73.

xxi,24b,cf.25-38, *Acts*, xv,16-17).¹ This event of 70 AD was thus viewed by Luke less in terms of world crisis than as a specific occurrence in Israel's history which marked the fall of God's wrath upon the contumacious Jews (*Lk.*, xxi,22;23b). For Luke it is therefore another Babylonian captivity (though worse), and he used the biblical word for being 'dragged into exile' to express its bitterness (p.246,n.2). The second fall, indeed, fulfilled the scriptures (*Lk.*, xxi,22b,cf. *plēsthēnai*,² *om.Mk.,Mt.*), and by this Luke did not just mean prediction-fulfilment. Pondering on his remodelled quotation of *Amos* in *Acts*, vii,42-43, one is hardly unjustified in concluding that he took 70 AD to see a fulfilling completion of what had already happened to the Jews centuries earlier.³ The devastation was not merely a recurrence, however. If Judah had once paid for her disobedience by exile, she now paid with real finality, because this time she rejected the *Christos* and his messengers. The Christ himself foretold that the temple would be reduced to rubble (see *Lk.*, xxi,6,cf. *Acts*, vi,14a, verses which look ahead to a city levelled by Titus),⁴ and Paul had pronounced an oracle of coming vengeance upon its high priesthood (so, *Acts*, xxiii,3, which foreshadows Ananias' assassination by bandits).⁵ Whilst Luke saw a parallel between the earlier and later destructions, then, the punishment of 70 AD was directly related to the recent coming of Jesus and whether he had been accepted or despised.

¹ Cf.also Conzelmann, *op.cit.*, p.129, cf.pp.125-135.

² The verb is *πλήσσει*, which Luke usually employed in the sense of filling or completing a time-period, but here it suggests fulfilment. On this special sense: W.F.Arndt and F.W.Gingrich, *op.cit.*, p.663b,cf. *Lk.*, i,20,DWY21.

³ On the quotation and the idea of fulfilment as the further completion of what had already been actualized, see pp.248-9.

⁴ Cf. Josephus, *Bell.Jud.*, VII,1-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II,441f.

As I have suggested elsewhere, Luke organized the Jesus tradition, especially in the 'central section' of the Gospel, to demonstrate the sort of teacher Jesus was, the essence of his teaching, and the kinds of situation he faced.¹ It is significant that out of the three areas he highlighted in the Travel Narrative - security, discipleship, and the retributive consequences of rejecting or accepting the divine intention - the last receives the most space. In any case, Luke acknowledges the retributive implications of Jesus' coming almost from the beginning. John the Baptist anticipates imminent judgement and wrath (*Lk.*,iii,7-9), and the mightier man he expects to follow him is a judge-like figure (iii,16b-17). Other suggestions of retribution foreshadow the relevant material in the Travel Narrative,² but it is there where the real challenge to the 'evil generation' intensifies, and the Jews, especially their leaders, are attacked for unbelief.³ As a recompense, Israel's house is forsaken (xiii,35,*om.Mk.,Mt.*), (here the quotation from *Jeremiah* contributes to the parallel between the new situation and the events of 586 BC),⁴ and the blood of all the murdered prophets requited (xi,50 *≠ Mt.*,xxiii,35). With the Jerusalem ministry it becomes clearer that Jesus is not only the herald of an *ekdikosis* which finds its concrete embodiment in the city's destruction; his work also foreshadows a far wider judgement associated with his *Parousia*, which, for Luke, I maintain, was not far off.⁵

¹ 'La Section, etc.', *loc.cit.*, pp.143 ff.. Cf. B. Reicke, 'Instruction and Discussion in the Travel Narrative', in *Studia Evangelica I (Texte und Untersuchungen LXXIII, 1959)*, pp.206 ff. on alternating audiences (between the disciples and outsiders).

² See esp. iv,29, v,21;30;33, vi,2;7-8;45-49, vii,31-35, ix,5, x,10-12.

³ Esp. Trompf, *loc.cit.*, pp.147 ff.

⁴ *Jer.*,xxii,5b, a prophecy unequivocally related to the earlier destruction.

⁵ On the *Parousia*, note esp. *Lk.*,xxi,34-36, xxii,29-30, cf. xii,40, xvii,26, xix,13-27. I have a suspicion that close work needs to be done on Luke's understanding of the Last Judgement, but this awaits a future project. In any case, I do not concur with Conzelmann (*op.cit.*, pp.131-2), that the *Parousia* is indefinitely deferred. Even if the final events are not quite so near as expected (*Lk.*,xvii,22-25, xix,11, xxi,9, *Acts*,i,6-7), God would

All these retributive ideas are more decidedly Jewish than Graeco-Roman, even if they were hardly alien to prevailing Hellenistic mentalities. Luke, however, betrays a more eclectic bent in his handling of recompenses applied to individuals. Judas's death is an important case in point. Matthew may have related how Judas 'repented', returned the blood-money and hanged himself in remorse (xxvii,3-5), but Luke claimed that Judas bought a field from the reward of his *adikia* and then unwittingly died a hideous death (Acts, i,18). As an instance of divine retribution, Luke's account would have been far more compelling for both Jews and 'Greeks' (the Jews acknowledging its basis in biblical prophecy (ii,16;20), the Greeks seeing it foreshadowed in ancient 'oracles' and by Jesus himself (vs.20, cf. Lk.,xxii,22b), and both intuiting it as a fitting end for the one who betrayed the *Kyrios*).¹ For another case, we may turn to the death of Herod (Agrippa I) as recounted in Acts, xii,20-23. In contrast to Luke, Josephus found much to admire in Agrippa (*Antiq.*,XIX,328-342, cf. XVIII,144, XIX,300-11), and he tried to show that, although the king died so suddenly, he was consciously self-reproachful about the sin of omission which brought death on (XIX,343-350, cf.XVIII,200). Luke, for his part, saw his sudden end as direct retribution upon an unrepentant king who

soon be vindicating his elect (Lk.,xvii,7-8), and all the major happenings of the eschaton would transpire within a generation from the time of Christ's ministry (xxii,32, cf.ix,27). Even Christ's first coming was an eschatological event (cf.xi,20, xvii,21, Acts,ii,17Aa [cf.22ff. see Luke's edited ἐν ταῖς ἑσχαταῖς ἡμέραις (om.LXX), and cf.also G.Klein, 'Die Prüfung der Zeit (Lukas 12,54-56)', in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, LXI,1964,pp.375-8]). Jerusalem's fall, moreover, was a turning-point in the last stages of world history, even if turned into a chastisement belonging very much to the (ancient) historians' history (for see Lk.,xx,16 ≠ Mt.,xii,9). Neither the first coming, nor 70 AD, however, are to be confused with the *Parousia*; cf.Conzelmann,*op.cit.*,p.134.

¹ To illustrate how Luke's treatment is more characteristically Graeco-Roman than Jewish at this point, Matthew's comments on Judas' end may be compared with Polybius' description of the suicide by hanging of Archias the betrayer of Cyprus in *Hist.*,XXXIII,v,2-4. For individuals and the moral order in Hellenistic historiography, see *supra*, pp.163,170,etc..

persecuted the Christians and refused to give 'the glory to God' (Acts, xii,23, cf.2-3). Luke's explanation was easier and more readily acceptable to Jew and gentile alike. Admittedly, the language of retribution is heavily biblical (23b [p.559], cf. Josephus' *heimarmenē*, *Antiq.*,XIX,347), yet it may well be that the Evangelist deliberately blurred the distinction between the evil Herod of Luke and the evil Herod of his second volume, so that, at the very least, the hideous death of Acts xii stood as a symbol of retribution against 'Herodianism'.¹ It is important, moreover, that no requital of any kind is actually effected in his Gospel, as distinct from Acts (note *Lk.*,ix,54), and that chastisement was reserved for the time between the resurrection and the eschaton. Here we may have alighted on one key motivation for Luke's writing of a second volume. What Jesus had warned about was becoming actualized, and those who rejected him had to face their deserts. In this sense the foretold doom of Ananias (in Acts, xxiii,3) points to retribution upon the high priesthood which sentenced Jesus to death. Luke's relative indefiniteness about individual culpability at the crucifixion and at Stephen's martyrdom² allowed him to suggest that the murder of Ananias stood as God's wrathful visitation upon the heads of the Jewish religion in general, a punishment sealed in 70 AD.

¹ If Luke saw a distinction between Herod ὁ βασιλεὺς (Acts,xii,1a) and Herod ὁ τετράρχης (*Lk.*,iii,19a, ix,7a, cf.iii,1), most of his readers, being ill-informed on Palestinian affairs, could have been excused for confusing the two. The Herod of the Gospel had imprisoned John (iii,19-20), sought to kill Jesus (xiii,31), mocked Jesus before his death (xxiii,11,cf.8, yet note 15a) and contributed to that death (11b-12,Acts,iv,27-28); yet within the Gospel there was no indication of the fate of so wicked a ruler. Did Luke wish to suggest that justice was satisfied and so blur the distinction between the two Herods? His very use of the name Herod for Agrippa I (in Acts,xii) implies so (cf. Josephus' usages, and note Luke's references to Agrippa II, for whom he shows some sympathy (xxv,13;23-26, xxvi,1-2,cf.24-32). The Herod of xxiii,35b is uncertain, and the verse may confirm our suspicions about a lack of distinction between Antipas and Agrippa. On anti-Herodianism in the Gospels, note H.Braunert, 'Der Römische Provinzialzensus und der Schätzungsbericht des Lukas Evangeliums', in *Historia*, VI, 1957,pp.192ff..

² Significantly, Luke did not single out Caiaphas as the high-priestly culprit of the pre-crucifixion scene (*Lk.*,xxii,66-71, yet cf. *Mt.*,xxvi,57; 59-68 (cf. *Mk.*,xiv,53;55-65), *Jn.*,xviii,13-14,etc.), only once referring to him, and even then after Annas (a name hardly like Ananias) in *Lk.*,iii,2. Cf.also Acts, vi,12, vii,54ff..

There are other instances of requitals for individuals in Acts - the cases of Ananias and Sapphira, Elymas, and the sons of Sceva, for example¹ - and again the sins and appropriate penalties have paradigmatic qualities. There is thus a theme in the book that the enemies of God's new ways must suffer penalties befitting their recalcitrance. Even Saul pays for his sins as a persecutor, although along with Jesus and the other disciples, he eventually came to suffer as an 'innocent', thus representing a 'great exception' in terms of divine retributive principles.²

A *propos* of Christianity's uniqueness, if certain man-made movements might have sprung up in the same part of the world and during roughly the same time-period, they came to nothing, even to disastrous ends, and did so, as it were, recurrently. These included the insurrections of Theudas and of Judas the Galilean (cf. Acts, v,35-39),³ as well as the Sicarii movement and one of their revolts under the 'Egyptian' (xxi,38).⁴ But Christianity was neither typical nor politically harmful; it was, as Gamaliel unwittingly admitted, ἐκ θεοῦ (v,39). It may be fairly argued, moreover, that Luke appealed to the Holy Spirit as the special 'agency of support' for Christianity, an agency comparable enough to personified *pronoia*, *heimarmenē* or *tychē* to be intelligible to 'Greeks', yet indistinguishable from the 'Spirit of the Lord' in the OT to preserve the continuity between new and former times.⁵

¹ See Acts, v,1-11 for the deaths of Ananias and Sapphira; xiii,6-12 for the temporary blindness of Elymas; xix,13-17 for the possession of the sons of Sceva by an evil spirit.

² On the background to NT ideas on innocent suffering, see *II Macc.*, esp. vi,28, vii,32-33;37, *IV Macc.*, i,11, vi,28ff., etc., cf. J. Downing, 'Jesus and Martyrdom', in *Journal of Theological Studies*, XIV, 1963, pp.281-5. For Luke, Paul apparently paid for his persecution by blindness (Acts, ix,8-9; 18), an infliction not mentioned by Paul himself (cf. Gal., i,15-18, I Cor., ix,1, xv,8-9, though note Acts, xxii,18a).

³ Luke puts these movements in the wrong historical order, cf. esp. Trocmé, *op.cit.*, pp.193-4.

⁴ Cf. Josephus, *Bell. Jud.*, II, 261ff..

⁵ In Acts, of course, the Holy Spirit's activity has everything to do with the special emergence of the last times (cf. ii,17), and with Jesus' attainment of his *doxa* (Lk., xxiv,49, Acts, i,8, ii,3-4), but the Spirit also cont-

Luke, then, apparently shared basic presuppositions about the recurring actualization of retributive principles in history along with other ancient Mediterranean historians. And he was happy to convince both Jew and gentile; retribution in *Luke-Acts* is what was commonly expected of it in two major cultural heritages, and his work - dotted with identifiable and recurrent event-shapes and situations - was not so out of line with precedents in either Hebrew or Graeco-Roman historiography *as to be an* unwanted compromise.

c) Notions of Rise and Fall and of Successive Ages, especially in Luke

Other elements in Luke's history corroborate his interest in recurrence, although they belong more decidedly to the Jewish than to any other tradition. I think of his assumptions about rise and fall, and his understanding of Age theory. Concerning rise and fall, one should note the Lukan implication in the Areopagus speech that divine Providence ruled over the *kairoi* of the nations, that is to say, the times in which they flourished (*Acts*, xvii,26b). Luke, however, was committed to a Judeo-Christian eschatological view that the world powers would eventually be supplanted by a divine rule. Although cautious with his Roman readers, the broad vision in *Luke* xxi sees all the nations reduced to conflict and confusion before the final redemption.¹ He therefore took the impermanence of

trols the direction of historical events (cf. ix,31, xiii,4, xvi,6-7 [an important example], xix,21, xx,22, cf. viii,39, xv,28, xix,1), and Luke's special stress here was less suited to Jewish than to 'Greek' notions of mediation in history, whereas other approaches - the reference to Philip being gathered up and re-located by the 'spirit of the Lord' like Ezekiel, for example, (viii,39, *Ezek.*, iii,12, xi,24), and divine oracles with the words 'thus saith the Spirit!' (cf. *Acts*, xxi,11) appeal more to the Hebraic tradition. In general, C.K. Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*, London, 1947, pt. II; cf. J.K. Parratt, 'The Holy Spirit and Baptism', in *Expository Times*, LXXXII, 1971, pp. 234-5, F.F. Bruce, 'The Holy Spirit in the Acts of the Apostles', in *Interpretation*, XXVII, 1973, pp. 166ff., and for the purposes of comparing Luke and Paul, note B. Lindars, 'The Holy Spirit in Romans', in *Church Quarterly Review*, CLXI, 1966, pp. 416-9.

¹ (vss. 10;25). So also, cf. the *πρὸ δὲ τούτων* of vs. 12a, cf. *Mk.*, xiii, 7ff., esp. 8βb, *Mt.*, xxiv, 7ff., esp. 8; the trouble occurring between the resurrection and the ultimate ἀπολύτρωσις (cf. vs. 28b). On Luke's caution, see also Conzelmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 138ff..

man-made empires for granted; even the fall of the Jewish nation was objectified as a key illustration of socio-political transience. The issue of imperial fluctuation, perhaps, is secondary for Luke, and he has nothing so theoretical on this matter as Philo. However, something tantamount to a doctrine of rise and fall is implicit in his writings.

And what of Age theory? Like most Jewish and Christian writers of his time, Luke accepted the idea of two great *aiōnes*, both 'this Age' and 'the [Messianic] Age to come' (*Lk.*,xviii,30 ≠ *Mk.*,x,30). For Luke the Messianic Age was yet to come in fulness, even if it had already begun with Christ's ministry.¹ The completion of 'this Age', moreover, saw a final generation from the Incarnation to the eschaton, a few men thus being privileged to see both the passing of the old order and the full arrival of the new.²

¹ The conventional dividing-line between the two Ages was the time of the Messiah, when God's final rule would be ushered in (e.g., *I Enoch*, xvi,1b, *II Baruch*, lxix,4-5, lxxxiii,7). The Messianic Age was to be preceded by crises, and for most, its coming would make possible the resurrection of the dead (*Sanh.*,ix,5, x,1, *Sotah*, ix,5 *finis*). This dividing-line continued to be drawn by the early Christians (cf. *Mt.*,xiii,39;40;49, xxiv,3, xxviii,20, *Mk.*,x,30-31, *Lk.*,viii,30, *I Cor.*,ii,6-8, iii,8, *Ephes.*,i,20-21, *Heb.*,vi,5,etc.), and yet because the Messiah had already come, a 'realized eschatology' was engendered, to use C.H.Dodd's phrase, according to which Jesus's first coming was at the συντελεία τῶν αἰώνων broadly conceived (*Heb.*,ix,26, yet cf. *Mt.*,xiii,39ff.,xxiv,3,etc. on this Greek phrase) (cf. *I Cor.*,x,11b, cf. *Gal.*,iv,4).

² Cf. *Lk.*,xx35 (οἱ δὲ καταξωθέντες τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκείνου) (*om.Mk.,Mt.*), ix, 27, xxi,32. Conzelmann's thesis, incidentally, that Luke understood Christ's first work to be in 'die Mitte der Zeit', and that he had a three-staged view of history, must be seriously questioned. According to Conzelmann, the first of Luke's three stages is the time of the law and the prophets, lasting until John (cf. *Lk.*,xvi,16). The second and middle stage was Jesus' earthly work, which had a definite *archē* (the annunciation and birth) and a definite *telos* (the ascension, cf. *Mk.,Mt.,Jn.*, though note the Lukan-influenced *pseudo-Mk.*,xvi,19 discussed by Trompf, in 'The *Markus-schluss*, etc.', *loc.cit.*,p.20). The third stage was the time of the Church or the apostolic deeds. Although Conzelmann perceives Luke's stress on the suddenness of the *Parousia*, he under-estimates the Evangelist's expectations of an imminent end to the known order (*op.cit.*,esp.p.132, yet cf.*supra*, p.295). He also forced a distinction between the 'Satan-free' time of Jesus and the difficult period of the Church (cf.esp. S. Brown, *Apostasy and Perseverance in the Theology of Luke*, (*Analecta Biblica XXXVI*), Rome,1969,pp.6ff), and put too much weight on the isolated verse *Lk.*,xvi,16, which in context has to do with the new demands of the Kingdom that Jewish rejectors are unable to meet (cf.xvi,17-31, Trompf,

Now referrals to successive Ages, naturally important in the history of recurrence ideas, came late in Jewish thought. It stands to reason that with the lengthening of known Israelite history, it became necessary to describe it in terms of stages. If the Deuteronomist had conceived such stages as marked off by 'lifetimes' or 'generations' (דורות), or by periods of obedience and disobedience, and if such writers as the 'Priestly' redactor and the Chronicler also wrote of theologically significant epochs,¹ authors reflecting on Jewish history in a post-restoration context found it difficult to reduce chaos to order. Significantly, apocalyptic periodization was based on the 'times' of those empires which had subjected Israel, from a given writer's own day back as far as Nebuchadnezzar, or even to ancient Egypt. As Barker rightly observed, this periodization was artificial and usually governed by special theological considerations, including the belief in the Age to come (an Age, incidentally, when original sinlessness would return).² The notion of an old and

'La Section, etc.', *loc.cit.*, pp.151-2). W.J.Harrington's acceptance of Conzelmann's thesis (in *The Gospel according to St. Luke*, London, 1968, pp.19-20), and his view that whereas the Jews put the mid-point of time with the coming Messiah, Luke placed it with Jesus' first coming, distorts both the Jewish and Lukan positions. Neither Luke nor the Jews were concerned with special 'mid-points'.

¹ For the Deuteronomist, see esp. *Deut.*, i,35, *Jud.*, ii,10 and see *supra*, pp.273f. (cf. also *Josh.*, v,12, *Jud.*, ii,11ff., *I Sam.*, xiii,1 for special means of demarcating periods; cf. also Noth, *Überlief.Stud.*, *op.cit.*, pp.23-26. On P, cf. esp. North, *op.cit.*, pp.110-1, and for the Chronicler, (esp. on the united monarchy and restoration eras), *supra*, pp.238,276.

² On apocalyptic periodization, see esp. D.S.Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 200 BC-AD 100*, London, 1964, pp.224ff.. On late Jewish idealization of the Adamic state, see esp. the pseudepigraphical Adam books, cf. *I Cor.*, xv,42-52. In passing, we may note the claims of some scholars concerning a biblical doctrine that throughout Israel's history, Yahweh's 'Creation' has overcome 'Chaos' (i.e., through the covenant with Noah after the Deluge, the Exodus after the Egyptian oppression, restoration after the Exile), and that his victory at the eschaton is the final victory over the worst of all sins and disorders. See J. Jeremias, *Jesus als Weltvollender*, *op.cit.*, pp.204-5, esp. on *Isa.*, xiii,10, xxxiv,4, *Mk.*, xiii (and $\neq$), *II Thess.*, ii,1-12 (an important passage), cf. N.L.A.Tidwell, 'A Biblical Concept of Sin', in *Church Quarterly Review*, CLXIII, 1962, pp.416-7. The theoretical statement of such a process of recurring victory, however, has been the achievement of twentieth-century theology, not of any known biblical writer. At most, we can say that the notion of liberation and restoration following subjugation certainly had

new *aiōn*, which may well have had its place in Jesus' teaching, was quickly assimilated into Christian theology, and some early Christians were prepared to accept the more elaborate apocalyptic frameworks.¹ Such ideas of succession, as we have contended already (p.202), were recurrence notions, even though the time-lapses or the imperial efflorescences were very roughly conceived (cf.pp.133ff.).² Moreover, insofar as apocalyptic schemes presupposed that empires emerge, expand and dissolve, or that great time intervals, even without a return to former eons, are repeated in their basic configurations, then reference to 'cyclo-alternatory rise and fall' or to 'periodic cycles' is admissable. Just because apocalyptic writers believed themselves to be living near the end of time, that did not prevent them from reflecting on the outstretched past in these terms.

What of Luke in this connection? Whilst he acknowledged the two major *aiōnes*, Luke wrote of other time divisions only in terms of *geneai* (Acts, xiii,36, xv,21, cf.viii,3), *kairoi* (xvii,36, cf.i,7, Lk.,xxi,24) or *chronoi* (Acts, iii,21, xvii,30, cf.i,7). In one interesting passage (Lk.,xvii,26-32), admittedly, he seems to have 'Hellenized' a Jesus *logion* (better

a place in Jewish historical thinking, and it informed later beliefs concerning the supplanting of one Age by another. In the light of prevalent views about divine retribution, it was natural that great sin should be understood to precede great eschatological judgement and universal peace (see esp. Dan.,xi,31;45, Mk.,xiii,14;22, I Thess.,ii,3, I Jn., ii,18, Rev.,xvii), so that the Last Judgement was in line with (though much later than) prior instances of Yahweh's chastisements.

¹ II Esdras and I Enoch, for example, experienced Christian redactions, cf. Eissfeldt, *op.cit.*, p.625 and 620.

² On the emergence of empires (as beasts), cf.Dan.,ii,38-41, vii,3-8, II Esd.,xi,1-46, xii,10ff.. On successive Ages, see esp. I En.,lxxxv,1 - xc, 20 (and note xciii,3, where there are seven 'generations' represented by their leading figures) (cf.also lxxxix, 41 on the alternation of Jud,ii, and xc,1 on time-periods); II Esd.,xiv,11-12, IV Esd.,iii,4ff.(on six Ages), xiv,11 (twelve Ages); II Bar.,iii,5ff (on periods mixed with good and evil); Test Abrah.,xix; Ass.Moys., i,2, x,12 (cf. Sanh,97b),etc., and cf. *infra*, p.358 n.2 .

preserved in *Matthew*) so as to treat the eschaton as a final retributive disaster in line with great upheavals of the past, that is, with the Flood and with the destruction of Sodom.¹ But his intriguing concessions here to Greek theory about recurrent catastrophes see no reference to inter-cataclysmic *aiōnes*. Again, in *Acts*, iii,21, he has Peter foretell the 'restoration of all things', but if recurrence is implied, it is not that of *palingenesia* but the return to an original Eden-like perfection.² Moreover, there seems to be no obviously cyclical element in his approach to periodicity. If the later Jewish *Sibylline Books* (III) could put the rise and fall of empires within the context of 'the circling years of time' (158-60;289;563,649;728), and the writer of *II Esdras* speak of the biological senescence of the present order (xiv,10, cf.11-12;16, even *Heb.*,viii,13b), Luke, for his part, simply conveyed the impression of one great Age merging with another. In this, nevertheless, he was still betraying the hand of a Hellenistic historian. If Polybius, to take a central example, saw that

¹ In *Luke* (xvii,26-32), Jesus likens the coming of the Son of Man to the days of Noah, where the licentious people of the earth were destroyed, and to the days of Lot, when Sodom was covered with fire and brimstone. Now it is of considerable interest that Philo (and Origen following him) treated these two renowned events as the biblical alternatives to Greek catastrophes, the first being a deluge and the second a conflagration. These writers consciously diverged from pagan views, however, by contending that the two great upheavals demonstrated God's periodic punishments of evil men (cf.p.354 and n2. It is precisely this element which is highlighted by Luke as also by the author of *II Peter* (late first century), the latter prefacing the three major examples of retribution - the Flood, Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Last Day - by a reference to the fall of angels (ii,4-10). W.L.Knox (in *St.Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, Cambridge,1939, p.6,n.2) rather convincingly argued that Luke's treatment represents a Hellenization of Jesus's words (cf.*Mt.*,xxiv,37-39, where there is no mention of Lot or Sodom), to suit Greek interests. Unlike *II Peter*, moreover, Luke's statement is significantly concerned with *historical* instances of retribution, and thus with historical recurrence.

² See E.Dinkler, 'The Idea of History in Earliest Christianity', in *Signum Crucis; Aufsätze zum Neuen Testament und zur christlichen Archaeologie*, Tübingen, 1967, p.327. The term used is *apokatastasis* (so, *Acts*, iii,21), which was a Stoic term for cosmic rejuvenation (cf. *Stoic.Vet.Frag.*, (ed. von Arnim), vol.2, Frgs. 599,625 (vol.2,pp.184,190)

Rome's rise to supremacy was contemporaneous with the decline of opposing powers, Luke reckoned the breaking-in of God's Kingdom to coincide with the downfall of the old elect, and with a troubled conclusion to the *καὶ ποὶ ἐθνῶν*.

Like the Polybian *Historiae*, Luke's work is important for reflecting a large variety of recurrence notions and models, even if many of the individual conceptions received clearer definitions elsewhere in biblical and related literature. Like Polybius, too, Luke had eclectic tendencies. Although many of his historiographical presuppositions and methods derived from the Hebraic tradition, Luke went out of his way to accommodate gentile tastes - like many writers in that tradition before him. On the other hand, Luke was concerned to bridge the conceptual boundaries between two quite different cultures, whereas Polybius' syncretism has to do with apparently conflicting lines of philosophical and historical thought within the world of the Hellenistic schools.

There are, however, significant differences between the approaches of Polybius and Luke. There is no theoretical statement about historical processes in *Luke-Acts*; unlike Polybius, Luke made known his ideas of recurrence through allusion and much more through the special organization of his material. Moreover, whilst cyclical and alternatory ideas are the major component in Polybius' historical interpretation, for Luke the idea that incidents and stages are re-enacted is primary. The cycles and alternations of the *Historiae* are conceived to be fairly regular and predictable (except in the case of fortune's wheel), whereas Luke's re-enactments are either events which could happen at any point in time, or stages within sequences which reflect a divine plan.¹ One of Polybius' chief aims was

¹ The parallel 'stages of [geographical] development' in *Luke-Acts* (pp. 222ff.) represent two sequences with four divisions, but each sequence cannot be termed a cycle except in the loosest sense, since the implication of any return to an original point of departure is so weak. The recurrence of 'stages of development', then, best describes this aspect of Luke's interpretations.

to give explicit predictive guidance on human affairs, and the *cycloi* of human life persuaded him that such an intention could be realized. The re-enactment notions of Luke, however, are oriented far more towards the past than the future, and instead of bearing pragmatic implications, they simply speak of God's purposes behind human activity. Again, although Polybius does not seem to have believed (any more than Luke) in the repetition of precisely the same event-conjunctions, he sensed that contours and event-complexes would recur in an apparently limitless future. Of Lukan re-enactments, by contrast, we can posit no such re-appearances, since he expected the eschaton to alter earthly existence so drastically.

This comparison of cycles and re-enactments, however, does not give a complete picture. After all, cyclical conceptions (Age theory, rise and fall) have some airing in *Luke-Acts*, and Polybius appealed to notions of recurrence which did not presuppose regularity. Besides, the differences are very much less pronounced when one compares their approaches to retributive principles. In Hebrew historiography, the nearest thing to the formulation of historical laws came with the doctrine of recurrently actualized recompenses, and in such writers as the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler these recurrences teach men how they ought to behave in the future. Luke inherited this understanding of historical processes, and even though he looked forward to the Messianic Age, he could still imply that men should continue to make similar spiritual preparations for days ahead. In both Polybius and Luke, moreover, the workings of the moral order reveal divine or supra-human causation. But for monotheistic Luke, of course, God lay behind all the patterns of recurrence in his history; the different levels of causality in Polybius' approach do not make their appearance. That is not to say that Luke cannot be regarded as 'a genuinely classical historian', for the way he has elicited paradigmatic incidents, the way he has not reproduced everything with 'photographic fidelity', but

displayed 'only what is typical and significant',¹ indicates otherwise.

If this comparison suggests anything wider it is that, of the two great traditions behind western thought, the classical was not the exclusive bearer of recurrence ideas. Admittedly, the Jews and early Christians were averse to certain doctrines of cosmological recurrence. They would have accepted neither the eternity of the world nor the possibility of exact repetition.² But they had not been uninfluenced by cosmological cyclicism, for Middle Eastern astronomy lies behind their Age theory. In any case, we have not located a classical *historian* who believed in exact recurrence.³ Biblical scholars have tended to contrast cyclical views in Greek philosophy with Judeo-Christian positions; they have not paid enough attention to the methods of Graeco-Roman historiography. Above all, however, one has to reckon with the rich stock of conceptions we have just been analysing. They stand together with Graeco-Roman models and ideas as contributors to western historical thought, though whether both sets of ideas became assimilated or were held in relative separation requires our further investigation.

¹ So J. Rohde, *Rediscovering the Teaching of the Evangelists (Die redaktions-geschichtliche Methode)*, (ET), London, 1968, p.154, on the views of Dibelius.

² Origen's interpretation of *Ecclesiastes* might suggest otherwise (*De Principiis*, I,iv,5, III,v,3, cf. I,vii,5 (and see *infra*)), but it is not conclusive that Origen ascribed either of these views to the Preacher.

³ On middle-Stoic Poseidonius, however, note *infra*, pp.318ff.

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM LATER ANTIQUITY TO EARLY RENAISSANCE

Despite Christianity's rôle as *tertium genus* in the garden of Greek and Roman civilization, and despite the decisive victory of Christian theology over the older Hellenistic schools, there was an extensive synthesizing of biblical and gentile ideas from the fourth century AD on. Much has been written about Graeco-Roman influence on Christian thought, but there has been little work on the merging of historiographical preconceptions, models and methods in the patristic and subsequent periods. The making of a sharp distinction between Christian linearity and classical cyclicism has undoubtedly hindered rather than facilitated careful investigation in this area. Yet if a study of NT and late Jewish literature shows certain weaknesses in this dichotomy, a look at subsequent developments reveals even more. In the patristic and mediaeval periods, the interrelationship between Graeco-Roman and Middle Eastern ideas of recurrence becomes still more interesting and complex.

There were some notions of recurrence in both traditions (and I am resigned to calling these Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian) which could be bound closely together. These included ideas of retribution, rise and fall, and Age succession. The more decidedly political, pragmatic concerns of Graeco-Roman historiography, however, contrast quite dramatically with a greater concentration in Hebrew and early Christian writing on theological issues, and on very broad questions

about human existence. This contrast helped to set the tone for a dialectic between 'secular' and 'sacred' history, and certainly prevented the settlement of a uniform, integrated interpretation of history's processes and significance. Nevertheless, if we may generalize about the movement of historiographical ideas from the Augustan period to the early Renaissance, classical pragmatism and 'secularism' were progressively overridden by the avowedly Christian search for theological meaning in history.¹ Christianity's triumph however, hardly ended preoccupations with historical repetition, and the fate of any particular recurrence idea was not simply determined by the supremacy of one ideology over another. Matters were complex, and we must turn to detail.

One may first ask what happened to the central models and conceptions which have held most of our attention so far - the Polybian cycle of governments and Luke's understanding of re-enactment. Interestingly enough, both sets of ideas undergo a further development which neatly conforms to the conventional ancient/mediaeval/renaissance schematization. The Polybian *Anacyclōsis* (together with the concern for variegated patterns of constitutional change) disappears from view after the emergence of a Caesarean non-Republican Roman dominion, only to return much later in the pages of Machiavelli's *Discorsi* (1513-7). As for Luke's special understanding of re-enactment, it became obscured behind the typology and allegory of *mediaevalia*, only to make a reappearance with certain Reformation emphases on the return to primitive Christianity.

¹ I use G.J. Holyoake's coinage loosely, and mean by 'secularism' here 'the interpretation of affairs without resort to (or with a minimum of resort to) theological explanations.'

To take the fate of the *Anacyclōsis*. As Polybius contrived such an elaborate model, one would hardly expect him to produce a spate of would-be successors ready to apply it to the facts. Certainly Cicero (106-43 BC), who knew the *Historiae* Bk. VI, was happy to write of 'orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum' (*Re Pub.* I, xxix, 45; cf. II, xxv, 45; III, xxiii, 34), but in this general comment he seems much more flexible about constitutional cycles than the architect of the *Anacyclōsis*.¹ Arius Didymus, Cicero's contemporary seems to have accepted Polybius' six-constitution classification, yet he wrote only of the degeneration of each ὁρθὴ πολιτεία into its φαύλη counterpart, not of a fixed sequence of change.² Cicero himself was just as reserved on this matter if not more so. The three simple, primary constitutions were liable to decline into their perverted forms,³ but he was only prepared to suggest 'what commonly happened' rather than endorse any fixed course, and so permitted a greater variety of change. Furthermore, he placed a greater stress on the principle of μεταβολὴ εἰς ἐναντίον; linking it with notions of reversal and requited immoderateness, he generalized that 'everything in excess (*nimia*)... is usually changed into its

¹ Taeger (cf. *supra*, pp.93-4) and von Fritz (*Mixed Constitution*, *op.cit.*, pp. 419-21) were too eager to argue that Cicero was decisively influenced by Polybius.

² *Apud Stobaeus, Anthol.*, II, vii, 26 (Hense ed., vol. 2, pp. 150-1) cf. μεταβάλλειν δὲ τὰς πολιτείας πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Arius used the term *ochlocratia* for degenerate democracy; cf. also Philo, *De Agricultura*, 45.

³ 'In contraria vitia', cf. *Re Pub.*, I, xlv, 69, where the phrases 'ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio' might be said to recall Polybius' classifications. Cf. I, xxxii, 48-xxxvi, 56; xlii, 65-xlv, 69; II, xxix, 51; xxxix, 65 (of importance).

opposite' (*Re Pub.*, I, xliiv, 68, cf. p. 146). In this he once again showed his wariness of determinism ; matters are stated so broadly that alternatives and exceptions in political change are covered. An eclectic in his own right, he was not committed to the simplistic analyses of either Plato or Polybius, and he preferred to appeal to more popular, less restrictive models of recurrence. He certainly used cyclical language very loosely. Any cycle of constitutional change was confined to a simple process of *metabolē*, a *commutatio* in which a constitution could give way to its opposite form or 'pay' for its imbalance. Sensitive to the number of possible changes in these terms, he probably disagreed that the *Anacyclosis* corresponded with realities, and it is not likely that he based his own history of the Roman constitution (in *Re Pub.* II) on the stages in Polybius' lost 'archaeology'. He declined to conceive of Rome's constitutional development as anything like an anacyclic process, and although he admitted that Rome had been born and grown to its maturity (p. 326) he actually maintained that her state was eternal. On the other hand, his views on

¹ For the phrase 'quod ferme evinit', I, xlii, 65. According to both xlii, 65 and xliiv, 68, a tyranny may be overthrown either by the *optimates* or by the people, and their rules respectively could be replaced by oligarchic *factiones* and a *tyrannis*. In 68 the phrases 'tyranni ab regibus, ab iis autem principes aut populi, a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni', are reminiscent of Polybius VI, yet Cicero allows for variation, and his assertion that oligarchies follow aristocracies and tyrannies follow democracies may also be taken as an accommodation of Polybius (*Hist.*, VI, viii, 3-6) on minority rules and Plato (*Rep.*, VIII, 562 Aff) on the emergence of tyranny.

² See esp. I, xlvi, 70; II, xxxix, 65-66.

³ See esp. Pöschl, *Römischer Staat*, op.cit., pp. 99-105, cf. p. 83, and on Rome as the *exemplum* of the ideal state, *De Rep.*, I, xlvi, 70; II, xxxix, 65-6. It might be said, incidentally, that Cicero failed to appreciate Polybius' stress on the anacyclic path as 'natural', constitutional life being capable of deviation through 'non-natural' (or external) causes. But absence of evidence makes these very tentative comments. For Cicero himself on political change by *natura*, cf. *Re Pub.*, II, xxxiii, 57.

Rome's *mictē* are comparable to those of Polybius. Such a constitution could forestall decay and corruption, since this was what 'commonly happened' (*ferme!*) with constitutions so *moderate permixta* (*Re Pub.*, I, xlv, 69). Moreover, if one understood the cyclical tendencies of constitutional change, Rome's stability could be indefinitely preserved, 'every citizen being held in his own station' to maintain the balance.¹

If Polybian frames of reference had only a slight impact on Cicero, matters were different with the author of the *Archaeologiae Romanae*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*flor.*, 30-8 BC). Dionysius apparently wanted to demonstrate how Rome's constitutional history did in fact follow the normative anacyclic path of Polybius VI, iv-ix. Perhaps he discarded Polybius' 'anthropology' and also subscribed to the current opinion that the Senate was an important institution as early as the monarchical period,² yet he nevertheless drew on the anacyclic zig-zag in his record of major constitutional *metabolai* from Romulus to the fall of the Decemvirate. From founder Romulus to Servius Tullius, Rome was ruled by kings (despite the creation of other non-monarchical bodies); Tarquinius Superbus then converted the βασιλικὴ πολιτεία into a tyranny; this, when overthrown, was replaced

¹ See *Ibid*, II, xxv, 45 (*cuius naturalem motum atque circuitum*), and cf. I, xlv, 69 for the translated quotation.

² On 'anthropological' matters, note the fierce *monarchos*-figure(?) of Cacus the barbarian in *Archaeol.*, I, xlii, 2, yet notice how Dionysius wrote of the settlement of Latium and the battles between heroes and their armies in a vein only appropriate to later ages (cf. E. Cary, 'Introduction' to Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, p. xxi). On the Senate in Romulus' time, see *Archaeol.*, II, xiv, 1-4; VI, lxvi, 3 (cf. Cicero, *Re Pub.*, II, viii, 14-x, 17), and for Dionysius on other peculiarities in Rome's constitutional career, see V, lxx-lxxiii; VI, lxxxix, 4 on the dictator and tribunes.

by an aristocracy, and despite the establishment of such non-aristocratic institutions as the dictator and the tribunes, the state remained in that form until the *oligarchia* of the Decemvirs.¹ Democratic-plebeian pressure then removed the oligarchs; but the subsequent constitutional settlement was not characterized as a democracy so much as a compromise between patrician and plebeian elements in the state - a compromise that was to the advantage of the patrician (or senatorial) sector.² Dionysius has his special touches, yet the *Anacyclōsis* clearly lies behind his interpretations.³ Unlike Polybius, however, he placed the settling-down of a balanced polity *after* the oligarchic Decemvirs. Why? Because the failure of Polybius to use the Decemvirate interlude in support of anacyclic theory was so surprising? Or because it was not clear to Dionysius where oligarchy fitted into Polybius' analysis of Roman constitutional development? Both factors probably contributed. Polybius seems to have located oligarchy between the future decline of Rome's *mictē* and the emergence of democracy (so, p.91 and n. 3), not as the prelude to a balanced constitutional order. Dionysius, for his part, put oligarchy in the past, and living a century after Polybius, could analyse Roman decay differently. As a Greek he was certainly

¹ See esp. VI, i, 1 (from monarchy to tyranny to aristocracy), cf. II, iv, 1ff; IV xli, 1-4 etc., and see esp. XI, ii, 1-iii, 1 on the Decemvirate as an oligarchy.

² See XI, i, 6, xlvi, 1, I, 1-liii, 3, etc. on popular-Plebeian tendencies after the Decemvirate, and lv, 1-lxii, 3 on the compromise. Dionysius' identification of patrician with senatorial interests is misleading.

³ Though his approach cannot be said to support F. Taeger's thesis that the Polybian archaeology sketched the course: mixed kingship/tyranny/mixed aristocracy/oligarchy/mixed democracy (*Archaeologie*, *op.cit.*, pp. 123 ff). It may be claimed, moreover, that the special treatment of the Senate by both Cicero and Dionysius was owed to a senatorially-oriented interpretation of Roman history that did not affect Polybius in the same way (though note p.180).

not committed to a doctrine of *Roma aeterna*. Since the fall of Carthage, he maintained, old Roman virtues and former times of internal order were eclipsed by rapacity amongst the people, by extravagance and by the undermining of the constitution through those aspiring to tyrannical overlordship.¹ At the time when Gaius Gracchus took tribunician power (in 121 BC), the old *ἀρμονία τοῦ πολιτεύματος* which had kept the citizens from mutual slaughter for 630 years, was ended by 'ceaseless slaying and banishment' and Dionysius characterized this disintegration in the same sort of language used by Plato and Polybius when they described complete constitutional breakdown.² Perhaps it is hard to decide whether he took Rome's dissolution to be imminent, or simply forecast the eventual decay of what was, after all, just another human institution. However, the evident influence of anacyclic theory remains, although the fact is that Dionysius' work seems to contain the first and last application of Polybian theory in Antiquity.

The cumbersome nature and artificiality of the *Anacyclōsis* was not, as we have already suggested, the sole explanation for its submersion. Another important cause lay with the end of the Roman

¹ See IV, xxiv, 3 on the common debasement of Roman traditions, V, lx, 2 on the presumption of office-holders, and II, xxxiv, 2-3 on contemporary ostentation at triumphs, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, XXX, xxii, 1-12. And cf. XII, i-xii on Spurius Maelius, and V, lxxvii, 4-6 on Sulla. Dionysius would probably have put Tiberius Gracchus into this same category of those tyrannically subverting the constitution.

² For the quotation, II, xi, 2-3, so: ἐξ οὗ δὲ Γάιος Γράκχος ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατικῆς ἐξουσίας γενόμενος διέφθειρε τὴν τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀρμονίαν οὐκέτι πέπαυνται σφάττοντες ἀλλήλους καὶ φυγάδας ἐλαύνοντες ἐκ πόλεως καὶ οὐδένοιο τῶν ἀνηκέστων ἀπεχόμενοι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν (3); σφάττοντες ἀλλήλους καὶ φυγάδας, cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, ix, 9 (ποιεῖ σφαγὰς, φυγάς), Plato, *Rep.*, VIII, 566A (ἀποκτινύῃ, etc.)

Republic and the institution of an hereditary *imperium*, from Julius Caesar onwards. The consequences of Caesar's acquisition of supreme power presented an exception too great for older constitutional theory to continue standing. The fascination with μεταβολή πολιτεῶν, of which the *Anacyclōsis* had been but one, albeit significant expression, was left without *raison d'être*. That does not mean that the entrenchment of the Principate brought on an intellectual crisis, as if cyclical and recurrence thinking became questionable and linear views acquired a new validity.¹ For a start, at least, the old interest in the relationship between monarchy and tyranny still persisted, and for some the Principate was like a return to early Roman kingship.² However, the effect of long-term absolutism was to shift the issues of historical recurrence away from former questions about instabilities and curving courses in constitutional history, on to questions about the life-cycle of the whole state and about the rise and fall of whole empires. Constitutional variety lost importance; instead new attention was given to absolutist

¹ So, against the thesis of R. Häussler, *Tacitus und das historische Bewusstsein* (Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften N.S. II), Heidelberg, 1965, pp. 180-3 et passim, which my subsequent pages call into question. For A. Momigliano's critique of Häussler's book, cf. his 'Time and History, etc.', in *Quarto Contributo*, op. cit., p. 41, n. 47.

² Cf. esp. Tacitus, *Annales*, III, esp. 55 ff., V, 5ff., XV-XVI, etc., Suetonius, *De Vita Caesarum*, (Tiberius, 49 ff., Nero, 27 ff., Galba, 12 ff.), etc., on tyranny. On the apparent return to the early monarchy, cf. [uncertain author] *De Vita et Moribus Imperatorum* (*Epitome de Caesaribus*), i, 1 (F.R. Pichmayr edit., Leipzig, 1961, p. 133) ('mos Romae repetitus uni prorsus parendi, etc.'), and on Seneca, Florus and Ammianus, pp. 326ff. On glimmers of the old interest in three constitutions and their perversions, note writers as far apart as Plutarch (*De Unius in Republica Dominatione*, *Populari Statu*, et *Paucorum Imperio*, (*Moralia*, 826 ff.) (first century AD), and Sallustius, *De Deis et Mundo*, xi (A.D. Nock trans. and ed., p. lxxvii) (fourth century AD).

monoliths both preceding and including Rome (pp.137f).¹

Turning now to Luke's special achievement, what was the fate of his particular understanding of re-enactment? The more obvious connections made in his work, between Jesus' journey and the Exodus, for example, and between the deaths of Jesus and Stephen, were picked up from time to time in patristic and mediaeval commentary, but in general his historical outlook was obscured behind new kinds of exegesis and theology. Elements of thinking akin to Luke's certainly manifested themselves - with writings of rabbinic Judaism, for instance (in which the deeds of Moses and the coming Messiah were sometimes paralleled,² Rome referred to as Edom, and the biblical בְּיָמֵינוּ updated to apply to contemporary nations)³ or with such a Christian intellectual as Lactantius (ca. 240-ca. 320), who once averred that the Church was living in a second (though greater and non-localized) 'Egyptian Captivity', awaiting a second Exodus.⁴

¹ On the noticeable preoccupation with Alexander's accomplishments during the first three centuries of the Roman emperors, see esp. Quintus Curtius, *Historiarum Alexandri Magni Macedonis* (first century BC), Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna and Virtute* (first century AD), Arrian, *Anabasis* (second century AD), cf. *supra*, p.265, n.4.

² See esp. J. Jeremias 'Μωϋσῆς', in G. Kittel (ed.) *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, (ET), Grand Rapids, 1967, vol. 4, p. 860 for an excellent discussion of such parallels. Jeremias also suggests the Qumranite call to the wilderness (in the Damascus Document), and a similar appeal among late Jewish insurrectionaries (Theudas, 'the Egyptian', etc.), were motivated by the desire to re-enact the wilderness wandering of the Pentateuch (pp. 861-2).

³ Cf. esp. *Sanhed.*, (Seder Nezikin, *Babylonian Talmud*, vol. 3), I, Epstein edn., London, 1935, p. 52 and n. 8.

⁴ *Divinae Institutiones*, VII, xv (Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, henceforth PL or PG for *Series Graeca*, vol. 6, cols. 284 f.); cf., as background, Mt., ii, 15.

But such elements were never drawn together to form a comprehensive understanding of history in terms of re-enactment and 'fulfilment' (in the peculiarly Lukan sense). Luke's original views suffered from typological and allegorical interpretations of the Scriptures, or even from exhortations to *imitatio Christi*. In the Middle Ages there was a continuing interest in the relationship between the Old and New Testaments, of course, but the prevailing tendencies were to ransack the Old Testament for *prefiguring* types of Christ, or to elicit allegorically (more than historically) conceived correspondences.¹ Patristic and mediaeval ideas of imitation, moreover, though capable of being 'educated' into a recurrence view (pp.195, 535), were predominantly expressed within the context of moral and spiritual encouragement.² Even if certain spiritual giants (such as St. Bernard and St. Francis) were extolled for walking in the footsteps of Jesus,³ their achievements were not associated with a view of history as a complex story of re-enactment. To be sure, we have discovered Luke to be a more unexpectedly canny writer than

¹ For relevant primary literature and discussion, see R.P.C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture*, London, 1959, esp. pt. 3; K.J. Woollcombe, 'Patristic Typology', in *Essays on Typology*, op. cit., pp. 69-75; cf. R.L. Wilken, *Judaism and the early Christian mind; a Study of Cyril of Alexandria's Exegesis and Theology*, Yale, 1971, esp. pp. 93-161, B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1952, esp. pp. 83 ff., 196 ff., etc.. For classic examples of typology, note John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Joannem*, lxxxv, 1 ff. (PG, Vol. 59, cols. 459 ff.) on Isaac as a type of Christ, or Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis*, xiv, 20, (PG, vol. 33, col. 849) for Jonah as such; and in general see Ambrose, *De Sacramentis*, I, v. 13 - II, 1, etc.. For a later, more highly developed expression of typological connections between the OT and Christian history, see esp. Bonaventura, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, XVI 23-29.

² It may also be traced to the Bible itself, cf. esp. E.J. Tinsley, *The Imitation of God in Christ* (SCM Library of History and Doctrine), London 1960, *passim*. The best known monument of imitationism is Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ* (1418).

³ Cf. William of St. Thierry, proem. to *Vita Prima Bernardi* (G. Webb and A. Walker edit.), London, 1960, p. 9. On St. Francis, note S.G. Coulton, 'The Story of St. Francis of Assisi,' in Foakes Jackson and Lake (eds.), *Beginnings*, etc., op.cit., vol.2, pp. 438 ff.. Athanasius (in *Vita S. Antoni*, 2), places Antony in line with the 'Saints' (rather than Jesus).

others have imagined, and one whose methods and basic ideas were extraordinarily difficult to reproduce. But it is important that post-biblical intellectual climates were not suited to their development. Re-enactment became 'liturgicalized' in the sacraments and the ecclesiastical year, and a relatively non-historical hermeneutic prevailed, one which was influenced by classical philosophy and which put priority on the stable, eternal qualities of divine truth, as if the biblical books, whether old or new, expressed truths which were valid for all time.¹ As shall be shown, however, biblical notions of re-enactment were not without importance for nurturing the idea of a 'renaissance', and they were revived and adapted most interestingly by the 'Radical Reformers' of the sixteenth century.

Although the Polybian *Anacyclosis* and Lukan ideas of re-enactment faded from the scene for some time, simpler conceptions of historical recurrence continued to enjoy a rôle in historiography, and some have even persisted to this day. Admittedly, we have long been asked to believe that Christianity effected a decisive triumph for historical linearity over cyclical modes of thought. And certainly the Judeo-Christian understanding of history excluded any doctrine of eternal recurrence, whether of worlds or inter-cataclysmic periods. Theologians as far removed in sensibility as Origen and Augustine

¹ Cf. esp. G. Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy*, London, 1945 edit. pp. 243 ff.; H.E.W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth; A Study in the Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church* (Bampton Lectures 1954), London 1954, pp. 442-470.

are renowned for having remonstrated against Stoic world-cycles or the doctrine of man's eternity.¹ But that only tells one part of a complicated story. Cyclical conceptions, some of which we detected in biblical literature, do have a place in Christian interpretations of history from the patristic period to the Reformation. Moreover, we must remember that we are dealing with notions of historical recurrence in general and not cyclical views in particular and our broader approach should constrain us against over-labouring the distinction between the two great traditions.

A. Beliefs about the Decay of Rome

From the time of Polybius onwards, the question of whether the greatness of the Roman empire would dissipate became increasingly important for historians. Cato the Censor and Dionysius were amongst the earliest to treat the matter. They shared the view held by Polybius that new luxuries had an adverse effect on Rome's virtues and institutions.² The idea of a Roman *degeneratio*, however, was more complex than we might suspect. Middle Stoics such as Poseidonius and Seneca, for instance, placed it in the wider context of a three-staged cosmic cycle. The universe was undergoing the cycle's third phase - one of *déchéance* - and for Poseidonius Roman decline was part

¹ So, Origen, *Contra Celsum*, IV, 67-8; V. 20-1, cf. IV, 12; Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 10-13.

² Cato, *apud* Plutarch, *Cat. Mai.*, xix, 3 (τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἐγκεκλιμένην καὶ ῥέπουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρόν... εἰς ὀρθὸν αὖθις ἀποκατέσθησε). For Polybius and Dionysius, cf. *supra*, pp. 125f., 313.

of a world wide abandonment to the passions.¹ Poseidonius was

¹ During the first stage of the cosmic cycle, according to Poseidonius and Seneca, men lived close to nature, being hardly distinguishable from animals. They were primitive technologically, and although conforming to moral rules, they did so from 'une attitude naturelle et spontanée' (as Verbeke puts it), not out of real conscience. The second stage represented the zenith of human development. Though capable of wickedness, men clearly differentiated between good and evil, and at this time seven sages gave their legislative guidance to mankind. That time had long passed and a third degenerate Age in which men succumbed to the passions, especially avarice, had crept in. (See G. Verbeke, 'Les Stoïciens et le Progrès de l'Histoire', in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, LXII, 1964, pp. 20-27, cf. pp. 12, 15 and p. 18 for the quotation above.) Seneca and Poseidonius differed on some important points. Their positions are best reflected in Seneca's *Epist. Mor.* XC. There Seneca seems to postulate two primitive ages (*saecula*) (see sects. 35-38, yet cf. 4-5, where he follows Poseidonius more closely). He was also reluctant to say that any age was free from blame (XCVII, i, yet cf. XC, 6 ff. 38b). The most important aspect of debate between the two concerned whether inventions emerged from the work of sages (Poseidonius), or from the avarice of more ordinary or baser men, (Seneca), (cf. XC, 10b - 20, etc.). On this question of technological progress, incidentally, (which is an exceedingly complicated subject), a few observations on L. Edelstein's posthumously published work *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity* (*op.cit.*) are called for. Edelstein has too frequently evaded the classical distinction between moral and technological progress, and whilst documenting so many beliefs concerning the latter (in Plato and the Stoics, for example, pp. 102 ff., 166 ff.), he failed to see the significance of moral pejorism for the whole question. (That both Seneca and Poseidonius believed in the possibility of continuous technical progress within world history, see esp. Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones*, VII, xxv, 4-5; xxx, 5; *Epist. Mor.*, XC, 7-33.) Concerning Poseidonius in particular, it may be argued that he was 'the first historian' of cosmic *degeneratio*. The Poseidonian *Weltanschauung* is admittedly not settled (cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonius*, Munich, 1921, *passim*, G. Pfligersdorffer, *Studien zu Poseidonius* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften; Philosophische-historische Klasse CCXXXII/5), Vienna, 1959, esp. pt. B, M. Laffranque, *Poseidonius d'Apamée; Essai de Mise au Point* (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Science Humaine de Paris XIII), Paris, 1964, esp. pp. 215 ff, 369 ff., L. Edelstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-9, 177-80; cf. also E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, Oxford, 1913, pp. 85 ff.), yet it stands true that for all his beliefs about technical progress and about the commonwealth of mankind within the Roman empire, he seems above all an analyst of decay (see esp. Reinhardt, 'Philosophy and History among the Greeks', in *Greece and Rome*, XXIII (NS.1), 1954, p. 85, whence the above quotation, cf. Pfligersdorffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 ff). Athenaeus correctly ranked Poseidonius with Cato and Polybius as one disturbed about Roman luxuries in his day (*Deipnosophistae*, VI, 274F-275A),

also amongst those arguing that the dissipation of the old Roman virtues followed the removal of the Carthaginian threat.¹ This was

although Poseidonius went further than either of these predecessors by both developing the contrast between the decadent Roman living of the present with the virtuous simplicities of the past (Jacob, *FGH*, vol. 2A, Frgs. 5; 18; 24; 27, cf. Athenaeus, VI, 273D - 274A), and by placing Rome's moral degeneratio in a wide context (*FGH*, vol. 2A, Frg. 36 (on demagoguery at Athens - an important Thucydidean-like passage); 4; 6; 9 (on Middle East) 48 (Sparta), cf. 8, 35 etc.)

On Poseidonius' modification of older Stoic fatalism, however, note M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa; Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, Göttingen, 1948 gg., esp. pp. 101 ff., and for an outright denial that he was a theorist of degeneration, see M.L.W. Laistner, *The Great Roman Historians (Sather Classical Lectures XXI)*, Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1947, p.21).

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On Diodorus and Florus, cf. *infra*, pp.340, 343 (and on certain qualifications in Florus' position, see W. den Boer, 'Florus und die römische Geschichte', in *Mnemosyne; Bibliotheca Classica Batava*, Ser. IV, vol. XVIII, Fasc. 4, pp. 375-6 on the *Epitome*, I, xxviii, 1; xl, 4 and ff.). Valerius Maximus (*Fact. Dict. Memorab.*, IX, i, 3) and Dio Cassius (*Hist. Rom.*, II, viii) also have something to say about decline brought on by the post-Punic War period. When Livy stressed that Rome's strength was tested by foreign pressures in the early stages of her career (cf. *Ab Urbe*, III, x, 8 (on the yearly recurrence of such pressures), X, vi, 3; VII, i, 7), he touched on this theme. Cf. also Sextus Aurelius Victor (fourth century AD), *Historiae Abbreviatae (Liber de Caesaribus)*, xiv, 5, etc..

In addition, it became popular to ascribe decline to the corrupting influence of populists, such as the Gracchi (135-2, 123-2 BC). Opinions about the Gracchan 'revolutions', however, varied somewhat. See Dionysius (esp. *Arch.*, II, xi, 2-3), who is a writer of pro-patrician, anti-democratic tendencies; Sallust (*Bellum Jugurthinum*, xli, 1-xlii, 5, cf. *Bell. Catilinae*, ii, 6; v, 1; x, 2-5; xxxvii-i) who comments cynically on the power-seeking of the nobility and popular pretensions; Diodorus and Florus (*Bibliotheca*, XXXIV/V, v, 1-x, 1; xxviii, 1-xxix, 1; xxxiii, 5-6, *Epitome*, I, xlvi, 8) who, both writing under imperial patronage, are wary of offering support to the Gracchi; Livy (*Ab Urbe*, LVIII summ.,) who is pro-senatorial; and Valerius Maximus (*Fact. et Dict.*, IV, i, 8) who is favourable to the Gracchi on humanitarian grounds.

On linear-looking notions of degeneratio, moreover, note esp. Livy, *Ab Urb.*, I, proem., IV, iv, 12; VI, i, 2, and see D.W. Packard, *A Concordance to Livy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, s.v., 'more maiorum' and 'more antiquo'. (Cf. P.G. Walsh, *Livy; His Historical Aims and Methods*, Cambridge, 1961, pp. 10-19, W. Liebeschuetz, 'The Religious Position of Livy's History', in *Journal of Roman Studies*, LVII, 1967, p. 55). Note also Sallust, *Bell. Cat.*, II, 1-6; *Bell. Jug.*, xli, 9, Cicero, *De Rep.*, II, ii, 4-xxiii, 43, esp. xxi, *De Offic.*, II, viii; cf. Tacitus, *Germania; Annals*, I, 3, yet cf. III, 55, and Cochrane, *Christ. Class. Cult.*, op. cit., pp. 162-3 (on Seneca, Lucan and Juvenal). Such notions, of course, could be accommodated to middle Stoic views of cosmic dissipation.

a line taken up by Diodorus Siculus (*flor.* 60-21 BC) and Florus (*flor.* 120-130 AD), although none of these writers developed the external/internal theme which had interested Polybius (a theme to be picked up again and developed by Machiavelli much later (pp.501 - 4)).

Concentrated as they are on the decline of a single political society (or on world decay generally conceived), these preoccupations have limited relevance to our investigations. Yet the notion of Roman decline naturally became linked with the past decay of other great régimes. To place Rome's career in line with previous imperial achievements, however, required information about the great empires of the distant past. Now although the Greeks had some acquaintance with the emergence of Egypt, Assyria, Media and Persia (through the writings of Herodotus and Ctesias (p.139, n.2)), and although Alexander's conquests suggested a developing imperial lineage, especially in the Middle East, it was apparently not until after Sulla's time that Roman readers became interested in the ancient Orient, or began to see the significance of an imperial succession in which Rome had taken a latter-day position.¹ Certainly, the obscure Aemilius Sura and the poet Ennius (239-169 BC)² both implied that Rome was a true successor of former world powers, but it was only with a greater spread of Middle Eastern ideas that succession-theory gained wide currency at Rome. Antiquarian accounts of eastern lands (Diodorus

¹ See esp. J.B. Swain, 'The Theory of the Four Monarchies; Opposition History under the Roman Empire', in *Classical Philology*, XXXV, 1940, pp. 1-13.

² Aemilius Sura *apud* Velleius Paterculus, *Hist. Rom.*, I, vi, 6 [gloss] who lists the Assyrians (with their first King Ninus), the Medes, Persians, Macedonians and Romans as the great 'races' holding power. For Ennius, see *Annales*, Frg. 501 (Vahlen), cf. Swain, *loc. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

Siculus on ancient Egypt, for instance, or Josephus' *Jewish Antiquities*) had their impact, and a most crucial ideological acquisition was the belief in four world-monarchies followed by an eternal fifth (a belief that may well have derived from anti-Hellenistic Persian sources rather than from *Daniel*).¹ Admittedly, notions of the successive emergence and dissipation of empires could be variously manipulated, and writers as far apart as Appian (b.116 AD) and the poet Claudian (d.404 AD) were not prepared to assert that the fifth monarchy of Rome would decline like others.² But pessimists were certainly about, and some were even anti-imperialistic in bent. Dionysius, whilst praising Rome at the expense of her inferior predecessors - Assyria, Media, Persia and Macedonia (*Arch.*, I, i, 2-4) - nevertheless anticipated her eventual decay (pp.313,320). He thus implied the idea of recurring decay in the history of world-empires, an idea developed by Diodorus Siculus and by a man most unpopular amongst the Romans, Pompeius Trogus (*flor.* 30 BC - 10 AD). Diodorus, as we shall show, placed the altering fortunes and moral degeneration of late Republican Rome within the context of the great movements of rise and fall (pp.338ff, pp.401f). Trogus, for his part, wrote a history from Ninus, the first Assyrian king, to Augustus, arranging his books around the four great empires

¹ So Swain, *loc. cit.*, pp. 8-9 (who also holds that this acquisition may be dated to 190 BC, when Scipio Africanus and his soldiers passed through the Persian colony of Hiera Kome, pp. 11-12), cf. E. Meyer, *Ursprünge, op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 189 ff. on passages in the Pārsi texts *Bahman-yasti* and the *Dinkard*, ix, 8. Incidentally, Swain is not so convincing on the references to pre-Roman empires in the pre-faces of Dionysius and Appian (cf. pp. 13-14), for he fails to explain why one should take these as part-acceptances of a four world monarchy ideology rather than a body of inherited historical facts.

² Only Claudian, however, hailed Rome as eternal. For both, cf. Appian, *Hist. Rom.*, proem., I, 8 ff.; Claudian, *De Consulate Stilichonis*, iii, 159-66. Cf. also Plutarch, *De Fortuna Romanorum*, 317F, and Claudius Ptolemaeus (second century AD), cf. E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, Leipzig, 1908, p.74.

of Assyria, Persia, Macedon and Rome, with other great régimes as satellites. Trogus deemed all four great empires unworthy and over-aggressive, and in consciously representing Rome as the fourth world-power and monarchy, he apparently believed that she was to go the way of the ruined monoliths before her, a preferable, fifth kingdom being yet to come.¹

These men of foreboding, however, wrote centuries before anything like the actual dissolution of the Roman empire. Later historians, by contrast, could be less prophetic and more diagnostic about Roman decline.² One, the 'proto-Gibbon' Zosimus (late fifth century), a man in a quite different context from Diodorus or Trogus, and well situated to see the writing on the wall, formulated an even more coherent theory of rise and fall which included Rome. Perhaps Zosimus lacked intellectual flair, and his pragmatic approach to such big questions looks somewhat pale beside the imposing edifice of alternative explanations for Roman decline in *De Civitate Dei*, the great monument of a Christian near-contemporary. However, it was Zosimus' claim that, if Polybius had shown how Rome in a short time attained to its greatness, he was in a position to show how rapidly it decayed.³ In introducing his *Historia Nova*, he asserted that

¹ For an excellent analysis, cf. Swain, *loc. cit.*, pp. 16-18, Trogus' work, of course, being bequeathed by the abbreviation of Justinus. Swain also mentions the background importance of oriental (including Jewish) oracles which look to Rome's collapse (first centuries BC/AD), (pp. 15-16).

² Justinus abbreviated Trogus in the third century, and for Aurelius Victor on 'the decay of a civilization', see the cautious remarks of W. den Boer, *Some Minor Roman Historians*, Leiden, 1972, pp. 93 ff..

³ I, lvii, i (Mendelssohn edn.); 'Πολυβίου ὅπως ἐκτῆσαντο 'Ρωμαῖοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διεξεληθόντος, ὅπως ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν αὐτὴν διέφθειραν ἔρχομαι λέξων ; (in the context of his treatment of Aurelian's Palmyran wars).

empires fell through internal division and disunity. Thus whilst the Greeks had been a match for the Persian giant at Artemisium, Salamis and Plataea (480-79 BC) (I, ii, 3), their power was drained through the contest for hegemony between Athens and Sparta, so allowing Philip of Macedonia to seize Hellas at the battle of Chaeroneia (iii, 1-2). Under Alexander, the Macedonian empire expanded enormously, but at his death it, too, became politically divided, and was therefore too weak to withstand the forces of Rome (iv, 1-v, I). In the case of each empire, then, *auxēsis* resulted from consolidation against an enemy, and Rome herself, in response to that fearful threat posed at Cannae, rose to be a great power within fifty-three years.¹ With world dominion, however, her aristocracy was replaced by a monarchy, which in turn, tended to decay into tyranny (v, 2-3). After Augustus, good laws alternated with tyrannical ones (vii, i), and proceeding on, Zosimus told his tale of an empire which became a battleground between power-contestants in the eastern and western sectors, and which was sapped of its internal virtue through the *asebeia* of Christianity.² Outside powers were fast acquiring the advantage. In Rome's *phthora* history was repeating itself, not in its details but in its general movements, and Zosimus was also ready to develop a more ethico-theological side to his analysis. He insisted that a 'certain divine providence' ruled affairs, and that it both effected appropriate retributions and

¹ I, i, 1. Zosimus considered himself to be developing Polybius' line of interpretation, cf. *supra*.p.131, etc.. On consolidation by war and the other empires, cf. II, ii, 3; iii, 2; iv, 1.

² See II, viii-xxxiv, esp. xxix, 3-4; xxxi 1-3; xli-xlix; IV, xxix-xxxiv; lixff; V, lix, 1 ff; etc.

controlled those movements of destiny or *Moirai*, which, connected with astral orbits, brought all periods of efflorescence to an end.¹ In the decline of Rome, therefore, he saw both the reappearance of a general event-shape and the recurrent actualization of moral principles (so cf. pp.399ff).

B. The Body-State analogy applied to Rome

One might suppose that the continuance of outside pressure and internal turbulence intensified the expectancy of Rome's downfall. Yet to refer to Rome as the *urbs aeterna* was commonplace as early as the fourth century AD,² and Rome's very durability could allay pessimism. If some continued to dilate upon the decay or overturning of all things, the extraordinary and prolonged history of the Principate engendered modifications to traditional recurrence views. One model of recurrence, probably of ancient origin, has an important bearing on the tension between pessimism and optimism in the Roman empire. We name it 'the body-state analogy'.³ Perhaps it is no more than a special version of the biological principle applied to history, but it is detachable and appears much more in Roman than in mainstream Hellenistic writing.⁴ If the common terms appertaining to

¹ Cf. esp. *Hist. Nov.* I, i, 2 (θελατις πρόνοια) and see II, vi-vii, etc..

² Note, for example, Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum Gestarum Libri*, XIV, vi, 1; XXVIII, i, 1; XXIX, vi, 17 etc.. In literature, the idea of the *urbs aeterna* may be traced as far back as Tibullus (first century BC) (*Carmina*, II, v, 23).

³ In German scholarship the term *Lebensaltervergleich* is current.

⁴ It does seem to have a Hellenistic background. Before Seneca, it was probably employed by Dicaearchus and then Varro; see R. Häussler, 'Vom Ursprung und Wandel des Lebensaltervergleichs', in *Hermes*, XCII, 1964, pp. 322-3, and on further background, pp. 324 ff..

the biological principle were: genesis, growth, acme and decay, those belonging to the body-state analogy were more specifically human, and even psychological, in connotation: birth, infancy, childhood, youth, maturity and senescence. When Cicero asserted that he would describe the Roman state at its birth, and its times of growth, adulthood and robustness,¹ he was developing traditional biological language into an analogy between the life-cycle of an individual and developments undergone by political societies.² Nearly a century later, Seneca applied the analogy more rigorously. Rome's infancy he placed with Romulus and her boyhood under the subsequent kings.³ Her growth (*adulescentia*) ran from the banishment of Tarquinius to the end of the Punic War, when the state was confirmed in its manly strength (*confirmatis viribus coepisse juvenescere*). In stretching herself over the whole world, however Rome abused her strength; the state made ready its own destruction and entered its first old age (*prima eius senectus*). This period evidently involved the civil strife which arose before the establishment of emperors, whilst the imperial *regimen* itself was taken, not only as further agedness, but as an apparent reversion, a revolving-back to a second infancy (*quasi ad alteram infantiam revoluta*).⁴ This second childhood should

¹ 'et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam' (Re. Pub., II, i, 3). Cf., on old age, V, *apud*, Augustine *De Civitate Dei*, II, 21.

² On the comparable yet different analogy between the body and the whole cosmos, especially in Stoic cosmology and Christian theologies of history, cf. pp.370f., etc..

³ *Apud* Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, VII, xv (PL., Vol. 6, cols. 788-9). These first stages evidently correspond to the early, naturalistic phase of general human development as Stoic Seneca had conceived it, for the kingship ended with Tarquinius' tyranny, and the result was a preference for laws rather than kings; or in other words, there was a social *mutatio* which was probably placed at the beginning of the middle and supernal phase in mankind's overall moral career. (See *ibid.*, VII, xv (col. 789), cf. Seneca's *Epist. Mor.*, XC, 6).

⁴ *Apud* Lactantius, VII, XV (col. 789).

probably be located at Augustus' reign.¹

It is unlikely that Seneca used this model to express hopes for Roman rejuvenation; certainly Christian Lactantius did not interpret him this way later on,² and it makes sense that a Stoic who mused over world-wide decay would only refer to a second childhood with irony. A century after, however, the epitomizer Florus, certainly appealed to the idea of a genuine revivification of Rome after temporary senescence. The breakdown of Florus' body-state analogy is close to Seneca's. Roman *infantia* (there is no mention of boyhood) ran from Romulus to the downfall of the kingship, and her *adulescentia* from the consulships of Junius Brutus and Collatinus Tarquinius³ to the time of the Second Punic War. But Florus had a longer history on his hands. Between this war and the death of Augustus he placed Rome's *iuventus* or *robusta maturitas*,⁴ and after Augustus came old age.⁵ Under the rule of Trajan, however, old age was averted and *quasi reddita iuventute reviruit* (*Epit.*, I, proem. 8).

¹ Note esp. *Dialog.*, XI, xii, 3-5, cf. VI, ii, 3-4; xv, 1-3; X, iii, 2-3, etc.. Whether Seneca associated the beginning of Rome's senility with the Gracchan revolutions is hard to say (cf. *ibid.*, VI, xvi, 3-4; X, vi, 1, etc.). Certainly Julius Caesar's reign should be ranged under this period (see *Epist. Mor.*, XCVII, 2-10).

² So, *Div. Inst.*, VII, xv (cols. 789-90) (Lactantius quoted Seneca in the fourth century, but unfortunately he does not allow us to see Seneca's statement in its original context). If, incidentally, one dates Seneca's use of the body-state analogy to his exile (41 AD on), we might fairly expect him to have harboured gloomy views. In any case, however, our previous interpretation of Senecan Stoicism reveals a pejorative understanding of world events (see p.319). Cf. also M. J. Rose, 'World Ages, etc.', *loc. cit.*, p. 139.

³ The Post-Monarchical founders of the Republic.

⁴ The choice of the term *robusta* recalls Cicero, cf. *supra*, p. 326, n.1.

⁵ See Florus, *Epit.*, I, proem. 4-8; cf. also I, ii, 1 (*prima aetas*), xvii, i, (both 22, 1 and 25, 9) (*secunda aetas*), xviii, 1 and cf. xlvii, 1 (*tertia aetas*).

Here is a rather less cynical approach to the imperial destiny and one important in the history of ideas. What are its implications?

For an abbreviator, Florus' understanding of Roman history is remarkably complex and not unoriginal. First, he subscribed to a *degeneratio* theory. Rome's newly found interest in Asia, after the fall of Carthage and the Numantine War, formed the key turning-point in her history.¹ Up to the point when the subjugation of Africa, Macedonia, Sicily and Spain had been completed, the *populus Romanus* had been *pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus* (I, xxxiv (19, 1, cf. 2)), and despite her momentary setbacks, Rome's path from Romulus to the war against Numantia was one of steady growth.² Up to the Numantine war, the body-state analogy and a more wide-sweeping moral interpretation of Roman history could be mutually accommodated, but from then on complications arose. In the middle of Florus' *tertia aetas* of 'young manhood', conditions of moral *vitium* manifested themselves. These not only involved internal disorders and civil war (from the Gracchan revolutions to the contest between Pompey and Caesar) (cf. I, xxxiv (19, 3-4) xlvii, 5), but also a zenith of Roman military might (xxxiv (19, 3)). This zenith was in fact an excess - *nimia felicitas*³ - and it inevitably brought domestic strife and ruin to the state (xlvi, 3-13, cf. II, xiii, 8). Florus

¹ So *ibid.* I, xxxiv, (sect. 19, 1-3) (cf. sect. 18, 1 ff.) and I, xlvii, 8. Den Boer takes Florus to place the turning point at 130 BC, cf. 'Florus, etc.', *loc.cit.*, p.374.

² Cf. esp. I, vii, 3; xii, 1; xvii (22, 1 and 25, 9); xviii, 23; xxii, 31; 43; xxiii, 1, etc.. The point about moral degeneration following the conquest of Asia derives from Livy (cf. *Ab. Urb.*, XXXIX, vi, 7) whom Florus mainly, though not exclusively, abbreviates.

³ *Felicitas* may be considered synonymous with εὐτυχία in this and similar contexts.

skilfully wove together the theme of a change in fortune, the biological model (including its acme of psycho-physical development), and the popular idea of a Roman degeneration after the Gracchi. On the other hand, although he reckoned further victories from the Numantine War to Phasalia as immoderateness, and as an arming for self-destruction (cf. II, xiii, 2), he still generalized about the third stage of Roman history as *iuventus*. The first half of this stage was of moral worth, and the whole stage also ended with the great *pax Augusta* (II, xxxiv, 64, cf. xxxiii, 54, xxxiv, 61 ff.), so Florus was still able to assert that the 'manly' empire spread peace throughout the known world (I, proem., 7). In a special sense the Augustan *saeculum*¹ marked a reversion to the standards of better days - *mala* and *luxuria* being checked - and Augustus, in founding the new *imperium*, appeared like a second Romulus (II, xxxiv, 65-66). Following Augustus, however, from Tiberius to Nerva, came senescence. Yet how did Florus view his own time; and in what sense was the reign of Trajan a form of historical recurrence? What, too, of Hadrian, Trajan's successor, under whom Florus was writing? We must first acknowledge that Trajan's reign was not described as a second infancy but as renewed *iuventus*. That thought contrasts with the pessimism of Seneca, who probably understood Rome's second childhood as a prelude to real senility.² Florus was implying that Rome could actually recover her

¹ Florus normally used *aetas* for a stage in the life cycle.

² So, Lactantius' conclusion with the words: *Quodsi haec ita sunt, quid restat nisi ut sequatur interitus senectutem?* in *Div. Inst.*, VII, xv, (PL., vol. 6, col. 789).

vigorous manhood even after a period of agedness. Thus he was not far from the *Roma aeterna* view, and he emerges as a virile nationalist, convinced that the period of old age, and not Rome's entire career, was but a temporary affair.¹ As Paul Jal has shown, Florus joined voices with those other writers who had acclaimed Trajan to be the restorer of imperial energy.² For Florus, Trajan overcame both idleness and *inertia* (which were reckoned as key evils in the post-Augustan empire by certain stoicizers), and the reign of Hadrian, pacifistic though it was, carried on the renewed Roman *iuventus* in Trajan's tradition.³ Rome, it appears, had not succumbed to the ordinary processes of the life-cycle. She had renewed her manhood, so experiencing a special kind of recurrence by which the norms of the biological principle had been eluded. Seneca had stuck with the original ^{model of} *Lebensalter*; his special recurrence had been the return of monarchy, which he associated with *infantia*. Florus, however, with a curious piece of eclecticism, with an optimism that departed from the middle Stoic philosophy of history, had made a harmony possible between Rome's prolonged endurance and her experience of a natural, 'organic', development. One might be tempted to infer that this harmonizing derived from a spiral model, as if Rome's cyclical development had reached a higher plain; but it was the empire's

¹ Cf. esp. Den Boer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 386-7.

² See his 'Nature et signification politique de l'oeuvre de Florus', in *Revue des Études Latines*, XLIII, 1965, pp. 372-4, esp. on Pliny the Younger's *Panegyricus* and Tacitus' *Annales*. Cf. also Sextus Aurelius Victor, (*Hist. Abbrev.*, xiii, 6), who picks up this theme in the fourth century.

³ Jal, *loc. cit.*, pp. 371-2, 375 ff., cf. Florus *Epit.*, I, proem. 8 on '*inertia Caesarum*'. The books in which Florus treated Trajan's (and perhaps Hadrian's) reigns are not extant.

unusual forestalment of inevitable decay which is the basis for Florus' approach, not a doctrine of spiralling progress.

In the second half of the fourth century, Ammianus Marcellinus, a pagan who wrote history under an empire fast becoming Christian, took these harmonizing tendencies somewhat further. He evidently held that talk about an eternal city did not conflict either with the use of the body-state analogy or recurrent *degeneratio* notions. The phrase *Roma aeterna* comes frequently from his pen,¹ yet in vividly describing the luxury, gluttony, and the loss of old virtues amongst Romans, he still appealed to the image of the life-cycle - in *Rerum Gestarum* XIV, vi, 3-6.² Rome had undergone childhood (*pueritia*), which was a period of wars with immediate neighbours.³ Her adulthood consisted of overseas expansions, and in 'old age' she entered a quieter time, and one during which, like a thrifty, wise and wealthy parent, she entrusted her patrimony to the Caesars (4-5). Interestingly, Ammianus wrote neither of a second infancy nor of a revitalized manhood; he simply commented:

¹ On the background development of *urbs aeterna* ideas in the politics of the late Roman empire, note the literature cited in G.B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform; its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p.18.

² On *Roma aeterna* in Ammianus, see *supra*, p.325, n. 2, and cf. esp. *Rer. Gest.* XIV, vi, 3 ('victura dum erunt homines Roma'); for his description of decay, cf. XIV, vi, 7 - vii, 1, cf. vi, 1-2, and *infra*. Incidentally, no books before the fourteenth have survived.

³ Ammianus considered the period of childhood to last 300 years (sect. 4); cf. Florus on the period of *infantia* as 400 years and of youth 150 years = 550 (cf. *Epit.* I, proem., 5-6). Florus was not particularly good with such large tallies; between the consulship of Brutus and Collatinus and that of Appius Claudius and Quintius Fluvius, for example, at least 246 rather than 150 years elapsed! Cf. also Häussler, *loc.cit.*, pp.318-9 on these questions.

'although for some time the tribes (of Rome) have been inactive (*otiosae*),...yet the composure of Numa Pompilius' time has returned (*Pompiliani redierit securitas temporis*), except that throughout all the parts and regions of the earth, Rome is looked up to as mistress and queen. Everywhere the white hair of the senators and their authority are revered and the name of the Roman people respected and honoured.' (XIV, vi, 6).

We have come some way from Seneca and Florus, although some of the latter's eclectic tendencies seem taken to their logical conclusions. On the one hand, Rome's old age brought a certain declining and slackness¹ - thus far Ammianus made concessions to *degeneratio* theory - but this *senium*, on the other, meant stability and venerableness. Ammianus so stated his position that he combined the idea of the world's *aeternitas* with the middle Stoic vision of history. And what of his invocation of king Numa? To return to the conditions of Numa's reign was perhaps like a return to childhood (since the early monarchs belonged to this stage), and Ammianus might seem to be implying that Roman growth had begun again, perhaps on a new plane, with Augustus its second Romulus and his successors like the good Roman Kings. However, it sufficed for Ammianus to imagine an enduring old age. Rome now possessed a glorious and permanent empire, an *imperium* 'destined to live so long as men shall exist' (XIV, vi, 3), and this appeal to an enduring old age was a convenient (and not unprecedented)² way of preserving the unmodified version of the

¹ The term *discessit* in vi, 4, is noteworthy. So also is *otiosae* in vi, 6, a term Ammianus may have deliberately chosen to replace the concepts of *inertia* or *desidia*.

² On this loophole, cf. Martial, *Epigrammata*, VI, 3 (3-4), 'Vopiscus', *Vita Cari*, III, 1 ff (cf. *infra* p.346), cf. Prudentius, *Contra Symmachum*, II, 309-323 (Prudentius being a contemporary of Ammianus, cf. *infra* p.359).

Lebensalter model. By recalling Numa, besides, he could still educe a special kind of recurrence in his own time.

The seriousness with which these authors took the body-state analogy may startle us, but to put such general meanings upon the events of the past was a perennial, even responsible concern of historians. The march of events naturally affected the meanings put upon them, and both the special contexts in which authors were writing, as well as their differing presuppositions, fostered a variety of interpretative pictures. Seneca, for example, was naturally more pessimistic in the earlier, more uncertain days of the Principate, whereas by his day, Ammianus was more ready to see a parallelism between the ancient line of Roman kings and later imperial lineages. It was not just optimism which allowed Ammianus to perceive this parallelism; he believed he saw it in the facts, as did Florus when he connected the two key periods of youthful, imperial expansion under the Republic and Trajan. However, all these altered perspectives did not involve just one recurrence frame. We have been concentrating on the body-state analogy, but behind it there still lies the conventional biological principle with its three stations.¹ What the *Lebensalter* allowed historians to do was to integrate biological imagery with alternative tools for interpreting Roman history, with the doctrine of *degeneratio*, for instance, or of imperial rise and fall. Even 'historical optimism', as reflected in Florus and Ammianus, was tied in with the model of a life-cycle. We could claim, in fact, that a tension we first located in Polybius (p.180), between the praise of Rome as the most natural and excellent of empires (and therefore

¹ In Seneca, *iuentus* was not singled out as clearly preferable to earlier phases (a fact which fits in well with his most general framework of history, p.319,n1). In both Florus and Ammianus, it must also be admitted, the last phase competes with 'manhood' as the status of zenith. Incidentally, *iuentus* also means the age of military service.

'the great exception'), and the resigned acceptance of her inevitable future decay, recurs in the special compromises and disagreements of later historians.¹ Yet another frame of interpretation, of course, was fortune's wheel. Not only could this conception be tied into *the notion of* the *Lebensalter*, but it too, could be integrated with a variety of other recurrence ideas and its continuing history . . . after Polybius' time thus deserves special consideration.

B. The Roman Principate and Fortune's Wheel

After Polybius, though not simply because of him, Romans found it more respectable to ascribe their state's achievements to fortune as well as 'virtue'.² For lovers and respectors of traditional *virtus*, however, the popularly conceived, unpredictable, even malicious *tychē* was no satisfactory explanation for the Roman triumph.³ Polybius and Dionysius, Greeks sensitive to Roman values, severely

¹ On Rome as exceptional note, for example, Florus, *Epit.*, I, xxxiv, 2; 13-14; also, on Plutarch and Ammianus in this connection, see *infra.*, pp. 336, 325, n.2.

² With reserve, Cicero acknowledged the new idea that *fortune* (as a governess of history) made a contribution to Rome's greatness, cf. *De Rep.*, II, xii, 30 (cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus' more ready acceptance, *Arch.*, I, iv, 2). On the later idea of a pact between *virtus* and *fortuna* as a means of explaining this greatness, see esp. Florus, *Epit.* I, proem. 2, Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rer. Gest.*, XIV, vi, 3; cf. Plutarch, *De Fortuna Romanorum*, 317C.

³ Note esp. Livy, XX, liv, 10-11; lxi, 13-15, XXVI, xli, 9, cf. III, lviii, 4; V, xix, 8; XXX, xxx, 10 (on *virtus* and *consilium* supreme over *fortuna*), cf. I. Kajanto, *God and Fate in Livy*, *op.cit.*, pp. 34, 62, 92-5, etc., C.P.T. Naudé, 'Fortuna in Ammianus Marcellinus', in *Acta Classica*, VII, 1964, pp. 75-76. Note how middle Stoics (such as Seneca and Poseidonius) emphasized the strength of virtue in overcoming fortune's blows, cf. esp. *Epist. Natur.*, XCVIII and note *supra*, p. 172, n. 3.

criticized those of their Greek-writing predecessors who had appealed to 'mere chance' or 'luck' in great events. Against the Epicureans Polybius had injected moral meaning into *tychē's* ways. The ravine between *fortuna* and *virtus*, he suggested, could be bridged (pp.176ff). Not all the Latins took the cue, of course. If some treated fortune as a morally defensible goddess, most saw her only as capricious.¹ Be that as it may, there came a natural and important coalescence of Hellenistic *tychē* and Roman *fortuna*. *Fortuna*, it seems, had originally more to do with individual destiny and with a special form of protection accruing to the state, but she was soon elevated to be an arbiter of greater magnitude.² Her new rôle in the Roman context, moreover, was acquired during the decline and fall of the Republic, and the question soon arose as to how the emergence and persistence of the Roman Principate was related to *tychē's* normative fluctuations. Even Polybius had agreed, we saw, that fortune would not smile on Rome

¹ On Polybius, *supra*, p.172, on Dionysius, *Arch.*, I, iv, 2, yet cf. II, xvii, 3-4. Cf. also Diodorus' development of the Polybian theme (*infra*). On a philosophical level, Plutarch attacked those (Epicureans) who placed weight on a malicious, ethically meaningless *tychē* (in *De Fortuna*, 976 ff). Of Latin writers, Livy appears to take up a Stoic-looking line (though for the difficulties, see Kajanto, *op.cit.*, pp.63-100, yet cf. Walsh, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-9). On fortune's fickleness in Latin writing, note Seneca's and Poseidonius' reluctance to credit her with worthy accomplishments (*supra*, p.172, n.3), and see also Cicero, *De Amicitia*, liv (cf. *Consolatio*, *apud* Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, III, xxvii), Curtius, *Historiarum Alexandri Magni Macedonis*, III, viii, 39, Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia*, II, 22, and both Caesar and Sallust (cf. Kajanto, *op.cit.*, pp.16-7). Note also Cicero, *De Offic.*, I, vi, 19, Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 22, (etc.)!

² On the religious background of *fortuna*, cf. Otto, in *RCAW.*, vol. 7 (1), pp.12 ff. (sv. 'Fortuna'); cf. K. Kerényi, *Die griechische-orientalische Romanliteratur*, Tübingen, 1927, index, sv. *τύχη*, A.J. Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks*, Berkeley, 1954, pp.73 ff; and on *fortuna* as the protective force of the state, see esp. Naudé, *loc.cit.*, pp.77 ff. The whole question of the relationship or apparent contradiction between the ideas of fate (necessity) and fortune, and the implications of such a relationship for historiography, represent a vast and complex area for discussion. I have discussed some pertinent issues on pp.169, 320; other references to the issue should be noted along the way, pp.33 (and n.4), 411-14.

forever, and subsequent *degeneratio* views reinforced such a stance. On the other hand, Polybius had entertained the view that fortune's treatment of Rome had been special, that she had permitted Rome alone to succeed to world dominion. That was a point to be seized on by the optimists.

Perhaps the most famous statement both about the work of *tychē* and the accomplishments of Rome was made by Plutarch, probably during his sojourn in the capital (ca. 70's AD), in *De Fortuna Romanorum*.¹ Plutarch was much more rhetorician than historian in this piece (and his exuberance can be traced to a desire to please Roman ears),² yet he made some important distinctions nevertheless. He was struck by Rome's durability (316D). Whereas *tychē's* support of previous empires had been temporary, she made an exception of Rome (314F-318A, 324B). Now what were the marks of this exception? Not just succour in times of adversity, nor simply the achievement of world dominion in such a marvellously short space of time, but rather the creation by fortune of a singularly different set of conditions - for Rome's special benefit. The normative situation under fortune's hegemony was 'the turning, drifting and changing of all peoples continuously' (317B),³ a general process of recurring change. Rome, however, was endowed with a *cyclos* of exception.

¹ The statement was probably made during the early stages of Plutarch's sojourn in Rome (70's AD).

² Plutarch's greater stress on fortune rather than Roman merit in this probable oration (cf. *De Fort. Rom.*, 318D, 319B,E, 320A-322C (and ff), 323E-328C) would not have inspired criticism, since his main point is that Rome was specially blessed and chosen by fortune to accomplish what she had. Besides, ἀρετή was not entirely neglected (316C, E, 317C).

³ ἡ φορὰ καὶ πλάνη καὶ μεταβολή πᾶσα πάντων.

She had actually acquired the supreme dominion for which others had striven in vain,¹ and increasing in strength and vastness, her 'unfaltering dominion was brought within an orderly and single cycle of peace' (317C)² - a cycle of self-perpetuation.

For Plutarch, this statement was quite extreme. In other works he sought to justify fortune's ways as ethically defensible, as operations which both curbed excess or insolence, and tested human resilience.³ That was an approach very characteristic of the 'Cynics' - though it had the favour of others - and it appears in Plutarch's more definitely historiographical writings.⁴ But in the above oration the deeds of fortune tend to be disconnected from the moral condition of men. Usually such a dissociation led to a stress on fortune's incalculable whims, a stress adding little new to the continuing history of fortune's wheel. More interest lies, however, with views concerning the moral appropriateness of fortune's ways, or in other words, with developments of the more complex approach we

¹ So, ὑπὸ τοῦ μηδένα κρατεῖν βούλεσθαι δὲ πάντας, 317B, and note Plutarch's point that Alexander the Great would have conquered had not fortune willed that his life be taken; cf. 326A-C. Cf. Trogus *apud*, Justin, *Epit.*, XII, xiii, 1.

² εἰς κόσμον εἰρήνης καὶ ἕνα κύκλον τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀπταίστου περιφορομένης.

³ See esp. Plutarch's *De Consol. Apoll.*, esp. 102E-103F, cf. esp. Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.*, LXIII-LXV.

⁴ Dio Chrysostom considered himself a Cynic, and significantly enough, whilst sojourning in Rome, he taught Favorinus, Plutarch's closest philosophical companion. On the special nature of Cynicism in the Rome of the early Principate, see D.R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century*, London, 1938, pp. 119ff. For similar views to the above held by later Cynics, see P.M. Camus on Julian (pp.176-7, and *infra*, p.346, n.2 for full citation), and Sallustius (taken as a Cynic by Suidas and Damascius), *Concerning the Gods and the Cosmos*, ix (ed. A.D. Nock, p.lxxxiv). For others taking this kind of line, note Diodorus Siculus, *Biblioth.*, XVIII, lix, 6, (and see *infra*); Seneca, *Epist. Moral.*, LXIII, 7; 10 (where his other position on *fortuna* is modified), and Marcus Aurelius, *Medit.*, II, iii, XII, xxiv.

located earlier in Polybius. According to that position, *tychē's* operations made some ethical sense; she recurrently supported those whom she considered worthy, or who were resilient under her blows; she turned against those who took too much advantage of her in their immoderateness, even if she was ultimately free to change conditions as she willed. Her moral overlordship and her incalculability were intertwined. In his oration, Plutarch did not depart radically from this line. For some ultimately incomprehensible reason, perhaps, fortune had created a special cycle, so that, in Rome's case, other cyclical processes could be forestalled. Part of the Polybian explanation for Rome's special situation, we will remember, lay with the natural emergence of the *mictē* and with the virtues of Roman discipline, yet Plutarch, by contrast, focussed on the supreme rôle of *tychē*. Nevertheless, he hardly avoided giving the impression that the Romans deserved their lot, so that fortune's unpredictable actions still remained morally congruous.

Plutarch justified fortune's ways with some optimism for the future of the Roman Principate. Others could be backward-looking. Diodorus Siculus deserves some comment. Writing his world history in the century before Plutarch, Diodorus conceived the passage of great events to be a continual process of alteration between prosperity and adversity. His views are popularist, they reflect some of the syncretistic tendencies of his day. If Philo, for example, that exponent of Hellenized Judaism, had conceived fortune to shift through time, moving the empires *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* (pp287f), Diodorus had a comparable picture:

'Human life, as if some god were at the helm, moves in a cycle through good and evil alternately for all time'.¹
(*Biblioth.*, XVII, lix, 6.)

¹ '...ἐναλλάξ ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ κακοῖς κυκλεῖται πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα.
Note Polybius' more limited use of the term ἐναλλάξ with reference to fortune, *Hist.*, I, lxxxvi, 7; IX; xxi.

'The divine power sees that fair and ugly conditions, good and evil, succeed one another in turn' (XXXIV/V, xviii).

Like Philo, Diodorus made no distinction between the cyclical and alternatory moments of history; and like Philo, Diodorus identified *tychē* with providence (*pronoia*) and both with the divine.¹ If fortune still remains forever shifting and fickle, and always willing to alter the balance,² no blind impersonalness remains in her character and she leans

'towards what is morally fitting, to involve those who have contrived any injustice against others in the same *symptōmata* themselves' (XXXVII, xvii).

Changes in personal fortune occupy most of his attention, but Diodorus also conceived *tychē* to govern the great régimes, (although these powers were still dependent upon the skills and attitudes of individuals).³ What, then, of Rome? Certainly, she was a great exception. Like any other dominion, however, she was bound to experience (and ultimately crumble before) the vicissitudes of fortune. An unalterable Necessity governed all, even if Diodorus was not so fatalistic as to deny that *aretē* could postpone adverse change.⁴ Now

¹ Cf. esp. XX, xiii, 3 (τό δαυμόνιον = ἡ τύχη), lxx, 1-2 (ἡ θεία προνοία = ἡ τύχη), XXXIV/V, ii, 47 (δυστυχήματα due to τό θεῖον), xvii (τό δαυμόνιον = ἡ τύχη), etc. Fortune, providence and the gods all participate in the work of requiting evil and rewarding good, see *infra*, pp. 400ff. This may be taken as part of Diodorus' popularism, evidence for popular conceptions being also provided by Plutarch in *De Fort. Rom.*, 316D.

² See esp. XXXI, xii, cf. XI, lxxi, 5; XIII, xxi, 5; XIV, xx, 3; lxxvi, 1-4; XVIII, xli, 6; xlii, 1; XX, xxxiii, 3; XXIV, xiii, 1; XXVI, vi, 2; xvi, 1; XXVII, xv, 3 etc. Note his use of a stereotypic formula τό παράδοξον τῆς τύχης, so XVII, xlvii, 6; lix, 7; cf. lxvi, 2, etc.

³ On régimes, see esp. XIII, xxi (on Athens), XXVI, xx (on Syracuse), XXXI, x (on Persia and Macedonia, following Polybius and Demetrius of Phalerum), cf. XXVI, xxiv, 2 (on the struggle between Rome and Carthage).

⁴ In Diodorus ἡ πεπωμένη is to be identified with fortune, providence and the divine, since fate operates similarly, cf. esp. XVII, cxvi, 1-4; XXXIV/V, ii, 24b (Walton-Geer edn., vol. 12, p. 83, etc.)

according to this interpretation, the remarkable growth of the Roman empire had the support of *tychē* as the providential overlord (cf. esp. XXVI, xxiv, 2; XXXI, iv). The Romans succeeded, moreover, because they were more virtuous than their arrogant enemies (XXVIII, iii),¹ especially in being so moderate in great prosperity (cf. XXXI, iv; vi). After Rome had defeated her enemies, however, the situation altered, and from an ethical viewpoint, quite dramatically. Not only was Roman imperialism more severe (cf. XXXII, iv, 4-5), but with no external threat, civil disorder broke out (XXXIV/V, xxxiii, 5-6). Furthermore, this most powerful people were given over to a soft, undisciplined way of life, with an excessive love of wealth (XXXVII, iii, 2; xxx, 1-2), and when they were plunged into the disaster of civil war, the remnant of the virtuous Romans was murdered (ii, 14; xxix, 1-5, esp. 5, cf. v-vi). Thus

in the days of old, the Romans, by adhering to the best laws and customs, little by little became so powerful that they acquired the greatest and most splendid empire known to history. But in more recent times, when most nations had already been subjugated in war *and* there was a long period of peace, the ancient practices gave way at Rome to pernicious tendencies (iii, 1).

Under the surveillance of fortune or providence, it was Rome's turn to face the possibility of decline.

Espousers of Roman *degeneratio* would have concurred. Diodorus, of course, had not just confined his study to Rome, and he had actually treated her changed circumstances as one, albeit special illustration of moral governance throughout all history.²

¹ Note esp. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δικαίους ἐνιστάμενοι πολέμους καὶ πλεῖστον ὅρων καὶ σπονδῶν ποιοῦμενοι λόγον οὐκ ἀλόγως συμμάχους εἶχον τοὺς θεοὺς ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς.

² Cf. XXXVIII/IX, V (*finis*) with comments *infra* pp. 400ff. That Diodorus himself foresaw the fall of Rome is uncertain, yet it is implied by his albeit cautious reporting (from Polybius) of Scipio Aemilianus' words at the razing of Carthage (XXXII, xxiv).

For many of the pessimists, this simply meant that Rome's decay could be placed in a wider perspective. On the other hand, when they reflected on the awful collapse of the Republic, some writers found it more difficult than Diodorus to extract ethical meaning from the passage of events. They pictured *fortuna* as amoral, cruel and difficult to bear.¹ Livy, for one, tended to waver between two approaches. Caught between popular Hellenistic ideas about fortune's caprice and the justifications of Polybius, and nurturing his own special brand of pessimism, he achieved a vague compromise in which fortune's moral neutrality and her retributive activity, and her support of and malice against Rome, play their different parts.² And in keeping with his *degeneratio* theory, the divine, supportive activity of *fortuna* was stuffed mainly into the first decade of his huge chronology.³ In Livy's case, the longevity of the empire had not yet had its full impact on historiography.⁴ When it did, however, writers were forced to reconsider which way the wheel had turned. By

¹ See esp. Sallust, *Catil.*, viii, 1-5; li, 25, and cf. R. Syme, *Sallust*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, pp.242-3, 245-8, cf. *supra*, p.325, n. 1. Curtius is an important case; though at times personifying *fortuna*, he was generally cynical about her ways, cf. *Hist. Alex. Mag. Maced.*, III, ii, 17, viii, 20; xi, 23; xii, 19-21; xiii, 12, IV; i, 29 etc. On Tacitus cf. p.165.

² See esp. Kajanto, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-100, and on the extent to which Livy's usages are 'Greek', cf. esp. pp.79 ff., yet cf. H. Erkell, *Augustus, felicitas, fortuna; lateinische Wortstudien*, Dissert., Göteborg, 1952, pp.171 ff.

³ See Kajanto, *op.cit.*, pp.99-100, cf. p.63.

⁴ Note, for example, Curtius' hope: 'Absit modo invidia, excipiet huius saeculi tempora eiusdem domus utinam perpetua, certe diuturna posteritas' (*Hist. Alex.*, X, ix, 6), a hope with qualification because of fortune's uncertainties.

the second century there was a tendency to annotate and analyse the changes of fortune *within* the history of a Rome whose extinction could not be foreseen, or who had far out-distanced her predecessors and rivals. Of most interest here are the *Epitome* of Florus, to which we must return, and the work of so-called 'Flavius Vopiscus', a biographer writing almost two centuries after Florus, very early in the fourth century.¹

Florus inherited more than one stock interpretation of Roman history. Amongst the options there lay the doctrine (stemming from Polybius, but fully articulated by Diodorus) that the changed habits of the Romans, and their harsher imperialistic policies, had put fortune 'to the test'. Florus appropriated this doctrine in his own way. Superficially, in his *Epitome*, the height of Rome's good fortune and the acme of her 'youthful' power run together, and he reinforced this impression when, in Bk. I, he recounted the victories of Rome up to those of Pompey and Caesar (40's BC).² For Florus, on the other hand, the special dispensations of *fortuna* had been curtailed after the

¹ Between both, also, lies Dio Cassius who, unlike Florus and 'Vopiscus', yet partly in keeping with Diodorus' approach, concentrated his attention on the way fortune affected the individual lives of great Romans, and devoted occasional rhetorical interludes to such matters. He tended to treat alterations of fortune, however, as intrinsic to human affairs, and not supervised by higher principles. See *Hist. Rom.*, esp. V, xxi, 2; VIII, xxxvi, 25; IX, xxxix, 3; XXI, lxx, 5; XLIV, xxvii, 3-4, etc., though note XXXIX, xv, 1-3, on τὸ θεῖον. The idea of 'the Roman exception' *vis à vis* vicissitude creeps in; note esp. VIII, xxxvi, 12-13 (Rome), XXI, lxx, 4-9 (Scipio Africanus), XXXVII, xx, 3 (Pompey), etc. Note also Marcus Aurelius' reflections (in the third century also) on the passing of Roman régimes and cultures; cf. *Medit.*, IV, xxxii, 1 - xxxiii, cf. xlviii, 2.

² Cf. *Epit.*, I, xxxv-xlv. In xlvi the Parthian War, a serious blow and misfortune for Rome, foreshadows the more sobering elements of Bk. II. We may remark, in parenthesis, that Florus' *Epitome* is not meant to be taken as strictly chronological and Bk I on the whole considers Roman victories in external wars, whilst Bk II treats major civil disorders and conflicts.

Numantine War (133 BC) (cf. I, xxxv, 1).¹ It had been by their own *virtus*, though with the help of *fortuna* and the gods, that the Romans had achieved genuine greatness,² but they exceeded the limits allowed by fortune's permissions, only to discover that 'fortuna, after all, was so much more powerful than virtue!' (II, xvii, 11).³ This theme was also explored in terms of territorial boundaries. Before the Numantine turning-point Rome's imperial expansion across pre-established boundary-lines could be condoned, even acclaimed as a positive work of fortune (I, xxiv, 1-3, cf. 13-14); but when immoderateness was evident it required asking whether Rome should have grasped even beyond Italy, let alone to have passed from Europe into Asia (I, xlvii, 6-7). According to Bk II, the dissensions which begin with the Gracchan revolutions and continue to Julius Caesar's day are the product of *nimia felicitas*, since fortune could not but envy so apparently inviolable a power (II, xiii, 1; 8). But declining morality, brutalities under Marius and Sulla, and the vices of Pompey, Caesar and Antony, afforded good ethical reasons for her altered disposition.⁴ So fortune was adverse from ca. 130 BC (though

¹ Although individuals could be favoured by fortune after this curtailment, cf. I, xi, 21 (Pompey), xlv, 1 (Caesar).

² Cf. I, proem. 2 (*virtus et fortuna*), iii, 9 (*quasi instinctu deorum*), vii, 1-3 (gods and fate), xviii, 8 (miracle), 22 (*fortuna and virtus*), xxii, 20 (fate or Hannibal's mistakes), xxii, 30-31 (*virtus, fortuna etc.*) etc.

³ The idea of drawing too much on fortune's favours only to find serious repercussions for oneself later is interestingly exploited in Curtius' *Hist. Alex. Mag. Maced.*, III, xii, 19-21.

⁴ On Marius and Sulla, cf. II, ix, 12-25; xiii, 2; on Pompey and Caesar, cf. II, xiii, 9-14 (note the 'Pro Nefas!' in 14); and on Antony, xviii, 2; xx, 2, xxi, 1. Fortune busily worked out the outcome of events according to the extent of each great individual's luck and each man's excess. Pompey, for example, had experienced an inordinate measure of *fortuna* before Pharsalia (cf. esp. I, x, 21), and when *fortuna* brought Pompey and Caesar together (cf. II, xiii, 35), this

that did not bring the loss of world hegemony), and she remained that way until the change for the best under Augustus, who ended civil war and beat off external threats (II, xxi, (12), 1-3, cf. xxii-xxxiii). We have lost the later portions of Florus' work, but it can be safely inferred that he took Rome to experience two further turns of fortune - one adverse, the other favourable. If, then, one combines his body-state analogy with his interpretation of changing fortune, a model of recurrent rotation in Roman history emerges (Diagram VIII). Moreover, he implied the probability of Rome's further endurance, and thus the future experience of similar alternations.

Florus's position foreshadows the much more elaborate yet comparable analysis of Rome's career by so-called 'Vopiscus'. In his biography of the emperor Carus and his sons, 'Vopiscus'¹ contended that the Roman state was by turns 'raised up and thrown down by diverse commotions' (*variis vel erecta motibus vel adflicta*; *Vit.Cari*, I, 2). He appealed to the body-state analogy, first rather idiosyncratically, when stating that Rome had suffered all the *variata* that human life may suffer in the case of a single mortal,² but also conventionally, when conveying the impression that Rome reached old age in the civil wars, before being restored by

measure was cut off (45; 51). Before finally seizing power, Julius Caesar wondered whether he, too, had an excess of prosperity (*nimia prosperorum*, 79) but he won the battle which gave him dominion only to meet the *fatum* of assassination in Rome (94-4). With Florus' treatment of Octavius and Antony, we are meant to accept that the former's success (in the light of his worthiness) (cf. xiv, 5) and the latter's end (xxi(11), 1-11, esp. 1; 3; 10), were fitting. Note esp. xiii, 78 on the notion of *fortuna* making up her mind on such weighty matters.

¹ The *Vita Cari* (in *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*) is usually ascribed to 'Vopiscus', yet cf. P.White's recent defence of H.Dessau's contention 'that one man composed the *Historia Augusta*, not six as the collection itself attests' ('The Authorship of the *Historia Augusta*', in *Journal of Roman Studies*, LVII, 1967, pp.115ff., cf. R.Syme, *Ammianus and the Historia Augusta*, Oxford, 1968, pp.178ff. for related problems.

² cf. *viguit, adolevit, crevit, consenuit*, in II, 4; 5, III, 1, and on Augustus, III, 1.

D I A G R A M V I I I

Romulus to the End of the Numantine War (ca.130 BC)	Support of <i>Fortuna</i>	Infancy to Manhood (first stage)	
From ca.130 BC to the End of the Civil Wars	Adverse Fortune	Manhood (second stage)	territorial expansion
From Octavius' successful campaigns to the <i>Pax Augusta</i>	Good Fortune	The Transition from Manhood to Old Age (= full Manhood? cf.I, <i>proem.</i> ,7-8)	
Tiberius to Nerva	[Adverse Fortune] ¹	Old Age	imperial <i>inertia</i>
Trajan, [Hadrian] ²	[Good Fortune] ³	Renewed Manhood	[territorial expansion] ³

Bracketed Sections indicate safe inferences

¹ The comment by Florus in II, xiii,8 that: '*Causa tantae calamitatis* [the Civil Wars] *eadem quae omnium, nimia felicitas*' suggests Florus to be foreshadowing conclusions drawn outside Bks.I and II. We may surmise that the internal dissensions after the '*nimia felicitas*' (made inevitable by Augustus' achievements), were written about as part of a time in which *fortuna* was adverse to Rome

² See *supra*, p.330.

³ Territorial expansion under Trajan - the annexation of Dacia, Armenia, parts of Numidia and Parthia, etc. - was well known, and must surely have come under the heading of fortune's favours.

Augustus (cf. Seneca). His analysis, however, was dominated by an interest in alternating fortune, and may best be represented as in Diagram IX (see II, 1 - III, 8). With 'Vopiscus' there is no suggestion of an overall Roman wane (though he hints at moral decline),¹ and leaving other empires unmentioned, he simply utilized the model of fortune's wheel for the one continuing imperial history. His treatment nicely illustrates how recurrence conceptions could alter with the remarkable longevity of the Principate. The empire persisted; in 'Vopiscus' history becomes the history of her recurrent vicissitudes.

We could go on, but essentials suffice. Roman historians, we have seen, joined the Greeks in considering fortune as an arbiter of human affairs. Moreover, the belief in fortune's providential overlordship became steadily entrenched among them, though it had to be accommodated to a resigned acceptance of her mutability. If Livy had struggled to intertwine the two outlooks on fortune, the older problems were hardly alive by the time of Ammianus Marcellinus,² and it was eventually possible for such a Christian historian as Procopius (sixth century) to attribute the responsibility of events 'à Dieu et à *tychē* en même temps, sans apparemment y voir de contradiction'.³ By Procopius' days, *tychē* the capricious, or the Epicureans' blind chance, were outlawed; but the same great empire held on to its existence, and thus fortune, taken as divine and as responsible for the feats of Rome, still lingered in the minds of men.

¹ 'Vopiscus' does not refer to Diocletian, Maximian, Constantius or Galerius (he gets the last two back to front in XVIII, 3) in his initial analysis of Roman history. For his favourableness towards Diocletian, see esp. XIII, 1-2, XV, 6, XVIII, 3ff..

² On Livy, see *supra*, p. 341, and on Ammianus Marcellinus, see esp. Naudé, *loc.cit.*, pp. 77-88, P.M. Camus, *Ammien Marcellin; Témoin des courants culturels et religieux à la fin du IV^e siècle*, Paris, 1967, pp. 176-186.

³ See M.A. Elferink, 'TYXH et Dieu chez Procope de Césarée', in *Acta Classica*, X, 1967, p. 133, and see *infra*, p. 411.

D I A G R A M I X

- 1 The Punic Wars are taken as a period of calamity (partly following a line laid down in Polybius, *Hist.*, III, cxvii, lff., Livy, *Ab Urbe*, XXII, liv, 10-11; XXIII, xxii, 1; xxiv, 6; XXV, xxxviii, 10, etc. on the withdrawal of fortune's support of Rome), with no reference to the idea of internal strength under the pressure of adversity (see *supra*, pp. 160, 320n). A not unpopular view? cf. Lucretius, *De Rer. Nat.*, 830-37.
- 2 'per Augusta deinde reparatora'.
- 3 'Tot Neronēs' refers to the line of Tiberius Claudius Nero - Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius.
- 4 i.e., Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, Pius, Marcus Aurelius.
- 5 The successors of Commodus being Pertinax, Didius, Julianus [Severus], Caracalla, Geta, Macrinus, Elgabalos.
- 6 So, Gordian I and II, Balbinus, Pupienus, Gordian III, Philip, Decius, Trebonianus, Aemilianus, Valerianus, Gallienus (these last two being referred to in III,5).
- 7 Aurelian, Tacitus (both referred to in III,7), Florianus, Probus (cf. III,7); with the sons of Carus being Carinus and Numerian. 'Vopiscus' disliked Carinus (cf. XV,7 - XVI,7; XVIII,1), and could only see misfortune in Numerian's career (see XI,1 - XII,1). Note also the general summary of the Carian reigns in XX, lff., although 'Vopiscus' described Carus as a 'bonum principem' in IX,4.
- 8 i.e., Diocletian, Maximian, Constantius, Galerius.

C) Age Theory; from Later Antiquity to the Early RenaissanceLater Pagan Views

Almost all the conceptions we have just examined - the body-state analogy, models of growth and decay, of changing fortune, and the like - fall within the ambit of cyclical or cyclo-alternatory thinking. Other modes of thought may also be justifiably placed in this category, even if with greater caution. I have doctrines of successive Ages in mind, and the ongoing history of these doctrines (cf. pp.133ff., pp.138ff.), now requires consideration.

Both 'classical' catastrophe theory and the Stoic doctrine of periodic *ecpyrōsis* were still being aired as late as the fifth century AD, although the two positions were often integrated into a neo-Pythagorean solution (pp.135f.).¹ Whatever the dominant school of thought, however, world history had to receive some intelligible demarcations, and from the first century BC on, Greek and Roman intellectuals show an increasing concern to divide it into stages and epochs. The more ancient means of making such

¹ On the continuing history of 'classical' catastrophe theory, cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Meteorologicorum Libros Commentaria*, (third century AD), I, 89 (esp. 11-15), 90 (esp. 12-17), cf. IV, 126 (M. Hayduck ed., *Comm.Arist.Graec.*, vol.3, pt.2, pp.60-2, 181); Proclus, *In Timaeum*, 36D (fifth century); Olympiodorus, *In Aristotelis Meteora Commentaria* (fifth century), I, xiv, 26, II, ii, 31, cf. I, vi, 13, etc. (G.Stüve ed. *Comm.Arist.Graec.*, vol.12, pt.2, pp.119, 143, cf.56, etc.. Note also Simplicius's important re-statement of Aristotle's notion of recurrence 'in form' rather than 'according to number' (sixth century), in *Aristotelis Physicorum* (V,4, p.227b21) (H.Diels ed., *Comm.Arist.Graec.*, vol.10, p.886, ls. 3-6, 19-20). Cf., earlier, Cicero, *Somm.Scip.*, vii, 23. On the persistence of Stoic doctrines of cosmic conflagration, see, for e.g., Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 13; Sallustius, *apud* Nock, *op.cit.*, p.lxii; Latin Asclepius in *Corpus Hermetica*, III, 26a (ed.Nock, trs. A.J.Festugière), vol. 2, p.331; Chalcidius, *Platonis Timaeus* (ed.T.J.Wroebel), clxviii; Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, xxxviii (PG., vol.40, cols.757-60). On neo-Pythagorean solutions, see 'Ocellus Lucanus' (*supra*, pp. ff.), cf. also Eudemus, (*apud* Simplicius), *Frg.*88, (Wehrli, vol.8, p.41); Porphyry, *Vit.Pythag.*, xix; Synesius, *De Providentia*, (cf. PG., vol.66, col.1277); Origen, *Contra Celsum*, V, 21. On the neo-Pythagorean revival in the Latin west during the reign of Theodosius I, cf. Ladner, *op.cit.*, pp.18-19. One also notes with interest how Plutarch (in *De Fato*, 569A-B) transformed Plato into a neo-Pythagorean by supposing him to have taught the exact recurrence of all things once the Great Year had been completed.

divisions - the Hesiodic Ages, models of a Great Year or of successive human generations - were still available, but new tendencies and new forms of syncretism manifested themselves.

Of growing importance was the belief in a 'sympathetic' connection between the movements of the heavenly bodies and the changes in terrestrial affairs.¹ Continuing Roman interest in predictive prophecy and portent, the westward spread of oriental astrologies, and the Poseidonian doctrine of 'sympathy' between all parts of the universe, were all symptomatic of this tendency. In fact, Poseidonius 'had opened up the possibility of a single, readily intelligible principle or Intelligent Mind which ordered and brought into unison all the various aspects of the cosmos'.² As a result, an astronomical basis for historical periodization became available, and could be referred to as a means of harmonizing or supplanting older, apparently contradictory positions. If classical theories about regional cataclysms, for example, did not accord with the Stoic picture of an ever-recurring cosmic cycle, and if neither of these positions neatly harmonized with beliefs about successive Ages, new astronomical models provided the opportunity for synthesis and compromise. Catastrophes were readily connectable with heavenly movements. As Plato himself had admitted, such upheavals could be caused by planetary deviation (*Tim.*, 22D). And probably under the influence of the Babylonian Berossus, Stoics felt less inhibited than their older representatives in speculating about the intermediate stages of world history, whether inter-cataclysmic or periodic in a more historical sense.³ For others, moreover, nothing precluded the

¹ Esp. note Poseidonius, *apud* Strabo, *Geographia*, III,v,8; Plutarch, *Platonicae Quaestiones*, ii,9;3; Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, xv, 40, cf. pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo*, v-vi.

² See the skilful treatment of this issue by W.L.Knox, *Saint Paul, etc.*, *loc.cit.*, pp.63-4, cf. also F.Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (ET), New York, 1911 (56), ch.7. The quotation comes from Knox.

³ For Seneca, world dissolution came in two stages, the first being the deluge (which had passed), *Nat.Quaest.*, III, xxix, 1. Cf. also Celsus (second century AD), *apud* Origen, *Contr.Cels.*, I, 19; IV, 67; and for

probability that the Ages of Hesiod were based on planetary periodicity.¹

In one fascinating product of syncretism, four metal Ages of world history saw the successive dominance of the four elements and of the four influences Saturn, Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto.²

The referral to astronomical principles, however, was not a means of harmonization only. More significantly still, it enabled the reckoning of large time stages to be dissociated from momentous physical occurrences, such as conflagrations or floods. As a result, although undoubted attention was given to such vast periods of time as the Great Year (variously computed) or the major Zoroastrian cycles,³ there was also increased interest in shorter time stages more directly relevant to the ken of the historian rather than the cosmologist.⁴ I think primarily of that intriguing unit the *saeculum*, which, deriving from Etruscan lore came to be interpreted as a period of just over 100 years,⁵ and which took an important place in

relevant middle Stoic ideas behind Cicero, cf. his *De Nat. Deor.*, II, xlvi, 118, *Somn. Scip.*, vii, 23. Cicero's lost *Hortensius*, based on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, may well have referred to the Great Winter and Summer of the latter work, cf. Censorinus, *De Die Natal.*, XVIII, 11.

¹ Plato had suggested a connection between the end of the Age of Kronos and heavenly movement in *Politicus*, 271B-C; but see Hyginus (first centuries BC/AD), *Poetica Astronomica*, II, xxv, and, of course, Firmicus, *supra*, p. 136.

² See Nigidius Figulus (Pythagorean, first century BC), *De Diis*, iv (apud Servius on *Eclogue* iv, 10, cf. K.F. Smith, 'Ages of the World' (Greek and Roman), in *ERE.*, vol. 1, p. 198b, and 199b. Four Ages rather than five were referred to by the Cumaeian Sibyl, cf. Hesiod's five.

³ In the first century BC, Varro collected Hellenistic estimates of the Great Year's length, apud Censorinus, xxi, 3; cf. Cicero, *Somn. Scip.*, vii, 24. Dio Chrysostom apparently encountered Zoroastrian cyclical conceptions in Rome, cf. *Orat.*, XXXVI, 42. Cf. also, in this connection, R. van den Broek, *The Myth of the Phoenix according to Classical and Early Christian Traditions (Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain XXIV)*, Leiden, 1972, esp. pp. 67-76, 98-108 where, amongst other things, the author discusses Roman interest in the life-span and appearances of the Phoenix, and in the Sothic period (or Egyptian Great Year).

⁴ Note that historians, of course, tended to dispel a sense of time's vastness. Varro, for one, made an important distinction between more recent 'historical' man and the shadowy personages of ancient and ante-diluvian times (apud Censorinus, XX, 12 - XXI, 1-2), whilst Cicero once claimed that, even in his own time, only one-twentieth part of the Great Year had been traversed (*Somn. Scip.*, vii, 24).

⁵ According to the Etruscans, as reported by Varro through Censorinus, the age of the oldest in the community at the time of the state's foundation = the length of the first *saeculum*, the length of the next being determined by the age of the oldest person living when that time-lapse had passed (Censorinus, XVII, 5-6, cf. also 9-11).

speculations about the destiny of Rome. *Saeculum*, of course, figures as an alternative expression for an 'Age' (*aetas*, *aevum*), and in its barest form *saeculum* theory amounted to little more than a doctrine of successive time-lapses, even the sequence of stages within a Great Year.¹ But it was susceptible to some interesting developments nevertheless. Seneca, for instance, used the term *saecula* of the stages in Rome's 'bodily' transformations, and he propagated the view that the life-cycle of a state consisted of five human generations or (significantly) *saecula*.² Others were interested in the transition from one *saeculum* to another, assuming a coincidence between some special planetary position and a momentous happening on earth. Cicero placed such a transition - possibly the beginning of a Great Year - at the time when Romulus ascended into heaven and the sun was eclipsed (*Somm.Scip.*, vii, 24).³ Some interpreted the civil war period as a *saeculum* of woe brought to a conclusion by Octavius. The *Pax Augusta*, it was held, marked a transition from one passing Age (which required correction) to another of a new and special nature.⁴ Virgil's optimistic musings in the *Fourth Eclogue* come to mind, with his combination of the Hesiodic frame and the great line of *saecula* (cf. ls.4-5).⁵ According to Etruscan lore, as distinct from *Works and Days*, there were at least nine Ages, and more than one writer took the period of the civil wars as the last in the series.⁶

¹ So Cicero, *Somm.Scip.*, vii, 24 '...tum ille vere vertens annus appellari potest; in quo vix dicere audeo quam multa hominem saecula teneantur'.

² *Apud* Lactantius, *Div.Inst.*, VII, xv (*PL.*, vol.6, col.788), cf. Rose, *loc. cit.*, p.139.

³ See *supra*, p.261 on the connections made by Luke between this event and Jesus' death. Did Luke imply that Jesus' death marked the end and beginning of a Great Year?

⁴ Livy, *Frg.*56 (from Bk. CXXXVI of *Ab Urbe*) *apud* Censorinus, XVII, 10, Florus, *Epitome*, II, xiv, 5-8, etc..

⁵ cf. also Florus, II, xxxiv, 65.

⁶ See Diodorus Siculus, *Biblioth.*, XXXVIII/IX, v (Walton and Geer eds., vol. 12, p.241), Lucan, *Pharsalia*, vii, 387 (following Housman's emendation), cf. Juvenal, *Satires*, xiii, 28, which may, however, be a piece of sarcasm implying that the age of the early Principate was no return to the earliest or best Age, but a continuation of Ages of decline. That the Etruscans be-

Evidently sharing this opinion, Virgil considered that both the Hesiodic *geneai* and the (Etruscan) *saecula* had run their courses, only to be renewed again.¹ Others were rather more cavalier with such concepts, however. Florus, for one, is a later writer with a different approach. He divided Rome's third bodily *aetas* into two century-long periods, calling the first Golden (since it saw the subjugation of Africa, Macedonia, Sicily and Spain) and the second Iron, with its terrible civil wars (*Epit.*, I,xxxiv(19),1-3, cf. xlvii,2-3).² There were other interpretations. The revived Golden Age (whether as *aetas* or *saeculum*) was placed in the reigns of Augustus' successors, those of Caligula and Nero for two,³ and for those who were disappointed at developments under the Principate, less optimistic epithets from the same stock of ideas were applied.⁴

What remains crucial about the appeal to *saecula*, however, is that key contemporary historical events, and not just distant, momentous physical changes came to give substance to Age theory, even though wider perspectives were not submerged. Moreover, the recurrence of *saecula* usually entailed more than the mere succession of bare temporal structures; it could even involve the renewal of whole epochal sequences, or, less

ieved each Age was worse than former ones, and of less concern to the gods; cf. Diodorus, XXXVIII/IX, v (Walton and Geer, p.243).

¹ On Virgil's neo-Pythagoreanism here, see esp. J.Carcopino, *Virgile et le Mystère de la Quatrième Églogue*, Paris, 1930, pp.30-105.

² Cf. B.Gatz, *Weltalter, Goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vorstellungen*, (*Spudasmata XVI*), Hildesheim, 1967, p.105 for further discussion.

³ So, e.g., Philo, *Legatio ad Gaium*, II,3 (Caligula), Seneca, *Apocolocyntosis*, IV, 1 (Nero), Martial, *Epigrammaton*, IV, 3 (Domitian), Anonymous, *apud* Spartianus, *Pescennius Niger* (*Script.Hist.Aug.*), XII,6 (Pescennius Niger), Symmachus, *Orationes*, iii,9 (Gratian,) etc.. For further related references, Gatz, *op.cit.*, pp.138-40, and for imitations of Virgil's optimism, p.136,n.1. Coins for Hadrian in 121/2 AD bore the symbol of the Phoenix and the legend of *saeculum aureum* (cf. van den Broek, *op.cit.*, p.105).

⁴ Cf., e.g., Anonymous, *apud* Suetonius, *Tiberius*, lix (against Tiberius), Ablabius, (fourth century), *apud* Sidonius, *Epistulae*, V,viii,2, for his ironical references to the 'diamond' Ages of Nero and Constantine.

dramatically, the return of general conditions associated with any stage in a pre-established sequence of Ages. Oftimes, though, it was simply the signs of a transition between *saecula*, rather than general conditions internal to them, which mattered. According to Zosimus, to take a late, fifth century example, the end of an 'Age which the Romans call *sekoula*, could be marked by disease, famines and *phthorai* (as happened during Diocletian's reign), and could also witness war, strange portents and divine retributive intervention.¹ In this particular version of recurring *saecula* the catastrophic indications of a passage from one large time-lapse to another still remain rooted in 'real' historical events. One is reminded of both Dicaearchus and Polybius, of their efforts to rank war, famine, disease and such like, along with the more widely acknowledged upheavals by flood and fire (p.24). By Zosimus' time, nevertheless, more unhistorical preoccupations with astronomy and its periodizations were winning the day.² The endless but computable journeys of the heavenly bodies provided the key to man's past and future. And so the planets dictated the dimensions of an Age. It was not surprising that a model so all-encompassing and self-contained as that of Firmicus Maternus should make its appearance. According to Firmicus, the five Ages of man (now too Romanized to be recognizably Hesiodic) and the movements of the five planets, combined to produce a sequence of eons which recurred forever.³ And so, also, the basis was laid for our common century, a workable unit perhaps,

¹ See *Hist. Nov.*, II, i, 1, cf. 2; 3, iii, 2-3 (Mendelssohn edn., pp. 54-5). Zosimus refers to thunderbolts, phantoms, the elevation of an altar, the drying up of the Tiber, all of which remind us of the Roman interest in portents and auspices before a momentous happening. Cf., e.g., Livy, *Frg.* 68, Florus, *Epit.*, II, xvii, 5-9, cf. Silius Italicus, *Punica*, IX, lff., etc..

² See Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 179ff., cf. esp. Nock on the literature of sidereal fatalism and its opponents, in his prolegomena to Sallustius, *Concerning the Gods and the Universe*, Cambridge, 1926, p. lxxii. Cf. also Macrobius, (*fl.* 400 AD), *Saturnalia* (esp. I, xvii-xxii), *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, I, xix, 19; 27, etc..

³ Esp. *Mathesis*, III, i, 11-15, cf. *supra*, p. 136. The system of seven Ages corresponding with seven cosmic epochs dominated by seven planets was a variant more influential in the east of the empire; cf. F. Cumont, 'La Fin du Monde chez les Mages Occidentaux', in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, XLII, 1931, esp. p. 48.

but a mere extrapolation of time which, even in our own day, so often obfuscates the interpretation of human things.

But the history of Age theory was not just a pagan history.

Patristic Writers

The idea of successive Ages had infiltrated into Judeo-Christian circles via apocalyptic literature. On the other hand, both Jew and early Christian tended to react against mythopoeically conceived schematizations and against astral determinism. If the clue to Zoroastrian successionism lay in the protracted Mazda-Ahriman conflict, the Jewish writers appealed to eons in connection with their own (albeit sacred) national history and the emergence of the great Near Eastern empires.¹ Ancient catastrophes, moreover, such as the Flood and Sodom's destruction, spoke of God's personal control over history, and his concern to destroy evil, rather than of planetary influences.² However, Jewish and early Christian thinking was certainly affected by *cyclical* conceptions of historical recurrence, and it was so in the areas concerned with the emergence and disappearance of empires, and with the classification of human history into Ages or epochs. The point can be nicely illustrated from the writings of the Christian Fathers.

It has been established that models of rise and fall, as well as Age schematization, were not foreign to biblical literature, and it was from a Middle-Eastern stock of ideas that patristic speculations about history gathered most momentum. Already within biblical writings, however, there was a convergence of traditions (pp.282ff), and if Diaspora Jews like Philo,

¹ See *supra*, cf. pp.301f, cf. Knox, *op.cit.*, pp.6-9, and on Greek background, cf. Xenocrates, *apud* Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I, xiii,34.

² See *supra* pp.302f on Philo and Luke; see also Origen, *Cont. Cels.*, IV,11-12, 20-21, cf. *infra* p.357n1. Note also Tertullian, *Apologia*, xviii, 3; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, II,xi.

or Christian converts like Luke, could not go untouched by Hellenism, this is no less true of most early Church Fathers, who, so commonly bred in the world of gentile beliefs, were forced to write in the philosophical language of the doubters they sought to convince.

At this point, however, an old Shibboleth emerges - the rigid dichotomy between 'Greek' and 'biblical' views of time and history - and we should assess its bearing on patristic studies. Scholars in this field have quite naturally been led to accept it, and not without reason, since many Fathers made a mockery of cyclicism (especially Stoic versions of it), and not the least amongst them was St. Augustine.¹ More than one modern scholar has highlighted a contrast between the Greek view of time 'as above all cyclical or circular, returning perpetually on itself, self-enclosed, under the influence of astronomical movements which command and regulate its course by necessity', and the Christian view of time as 'irreversible', neither external nor infinite in its duration', proceeding in a straight line from creation to the eschaton in accordance with the divine plan of salvation.² This way of stating the case does have substance. Insofar as this contrast makes clear that an ultimately directionless history was repugnant to any orthodox Christian committed to *creatio ex nihilo* and the Last Judgement, and insofar as it elucidates the Christian rejection of astral fatalism, of melancholia towards the perpetual and necessary round of all things,³ it has validity. This contrast also points out the

¹ See esp. *De Civ. Dei.*, XII,xiii, cf. Origen, *De Principiis*, II,iii,4, *Cont. Cels.*, V,20-1, etc., Tatian, iii; Eusebius, *Theophaneia*, II,21; Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, 38, et al..

² The quotations derive from H.C.Puech, 'Gnosis and Time', in *Man and Time; Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*, London 1958 (ET fr. *Eranos-Jahrbücher*, XX, 1951), pp. 39 and 46; cf. also Cochrane, *Christ. Class. Cult.*, op.cit., pp.483-4; K. Löwith, *Mean. Hist.*, op.cit., pp.160 ff., G. Quispel, 'Time and History in Patristic Christianity', in *Man and Time*, op.cit., pp.95-8, R. Bainton, 'Ideas of History in Patristic Christianity', in *Early and Mediaeval Christianity*, London, 1965, pp.8-9, etc..

³ Note Marcus, Aurelius, *Medit.*, IV,xxxii-xxxiii (and see *supra*, p.342,n.1), X,xxxiv;XII,xxxii, etc., cf. Puech, loc.cit., p.45, E.R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, Cambridge, 1965, chs.1-2.

'contempt for history' in Greek *philosophy*, in which the events of human affairs, considered ever-moving, ever-becoming and recurring, had little significance of their own 'apart from the world of intelligible essences' set over against them. That contempt differs radically from the Christians' stress on the historical rootedness of their faith.¹ However, when scholars so confuse cosmological and historical conceptions that all linearity is removed from Graeco-Roman historiography and all cyclical conceptions from early Christian interpretations of world history, neat distinction has over-stretched the facts. When Gilles Quispel wrote, to take a useful example, that

whereas Herodotus, the first important historian among the Greeks, spoke of a cycle of human events, the last great historian of ancient times (Augustine) leads his readers from the *falsus circuitus* to the *trames recti itineris*, the straight line of history,²

he simply missed two basic points. First, compared to Empedoclean, Stoic or neo-Pythagorean cyclical theory, Herodotus' narrative concerned historical movements over a limited period of time, and this (together with his understanding of retributive principles) makes his position relatively innocuous if not even conducive to a Christian outlook. Secondly, although Augustine condemned the *falsus circuitus* of cosmology, he nevertheless subscribed to a doctrine of imperial rise and fall and of the successive Ages of human history.

¹ The quotations derive from H.E.W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth; a Study of the relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church*, (Bampton lectures 1954), London, 1954, p.424, cf. also 425. On the anti-historical tendency in the great classical philosophers, cf. esp. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, *op.cit.*, pp.20-25 (with caution), and for later material relevant to the above observations, note Celsus, *apud* Origen, *Contr. Cels.*, IV,58 ff., Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI,ix,8, Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Phaedo*, (cf. W. Norin, ed., Leipzig, 1913, pp.192 (lines 4-6), 195 (27) - 196 (9), 197 (4-5), 236 (9-11).

² *Loc.cit.*, p.98. Cf. also F. Châtelet, 'Le Temps de l'Histoire et l'Évolution de la Fonction Histoire', in *Journal de Psychologie (Normale et Pathologique)*, LIII, 1956, pp.365-72.

Certainly, the Fathers almost invariably dissociated historical patterns from planetary movement,¹ and history's course was always referred to the will of the personal *Pantocratōr*. According to the new *Heilsgeschichte*, moreover, the ultimate meaning of history no longer resided with recurring conjunctions of physical or human events, but with unique, unrepeatable acts, with Creation, the atoning crucifixion and the eschaton. This outlook lessened 'the grip of the past'; it undercut the assumption that it was recurrent, normative event-complexes which constituted history's essential message for man, and it gave hope to those bowed in resignation towards a determined or unforeseeable future.² Yet the story would not be complete were we to overlook the fact that notions of generation and corruption, of bodily processes, changing fortunes, Age succession, rise and fall - all of them cyclical notions - could be absorbed into Christian historiography and Christian philosophies of history. Neither would the tale be told if one failed to mention how 'pragmatic' Christian historians found lessons for the future in their own

¹Origen, who of all early fathers was susceptible to developing this sympathetic principle, since he propounded a doctrine of the 'rise and fall of souls' (cf. *De Princip.*, III,i,23), was only too cautious about the connections between metempsychosis, fatalism and the eternity of the world (cf. *Commentaria in Matthaeum*, XIII,i (edit. E. Benz, E. Klostermann and L. Früchtel, *Origenes Werke*, vol.II (1935) in *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*, vol.35, Leipzig, 1897- , p.176, ll.5-15, cf. Pamphilus, *Apologia for Origen*, x (Benz, et.al., vol. 12 (1941), p.9, ls 43-50. One Eastern theologian, however, is famous for his enthusiastic concessions to astral fatalism. I refer to Bardesanes (early third century) who is reputed to have contended, amongst other things, that 'Christ was born at the hour of Jupiter, died at the hour of Mars, and was resurrected, again at the hour of Jupiter' (cf. Gregory bar Hebraeus, *Concerning Christological Heresies*, (*Patrologia Orientalis* (ed. F. Graffin and F. Nau), Paris, 1903ff., vol.13, p.256 [146])). Cf. also Bardesanes' *Coniunctiones Astrorum* (in *Patrologia Syriaca* (ed. R. Graffin), Paris, 1894-1926, vol.2, pp.614 ff., and the MS on Fate (*ἡ τύχη*), (published as *Le Livre des Lois des Pays*, ed.F.Nau, Paris, 1931). Also, on Lactantius, *infra*, p. 365.

² See B.A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past; Essay on an Aspect of Greek Thought* (*Philosophia Antiqua VI*), Leiden, 1953, *passim*, and esp. pp.109-120 on attitudes to the future (where, however, not enough emphasis is placed on the Greek historiographical interest in learning for the future from the past).

day, just as their pagan predecessors had done,¹ and how even the more theologically-inclined, in characterizing the vicissitudes of *civitas terrana*, could appeal to pagan recurrence models. And what if we extend our search beyond cyclical thinking to historical recurrence in its broader aspects? As we shall see, Christians made no mean use of their Graeco-Roman heritage.

Admittedly, their special touches were distinctive enough. The Christians drew many of their facts from the biblical past, and to the extent that they divorced historical processes from the extra-historical and the mythopoeic, they furthered the historicization of recurrence thinking. And such historicization did not spring in a direct line from the neo-Pythagorean anti-Stoic insistence on the one endless world history (cf. pp. 22, 348). It was more the historians' historicization, the confining of recurring patterns within the one circumscribed history, the beginning of which was known (from the Bible) and not unknown (like the shadowy eons of Plato's *Laws*), and the first stages of which devolved around men, not around the gods.² It is also justifiable to contend that the Christian

¹ See, for an important example, Procopius, *Huper tōn Polemōn*, I, i-ii (cf. Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, 22). On the idea of history's usefulness in mediaeval historiography, cf. *infra*, pp. 415-8.

² Origen seems to have compromised with Plato's profound sense of far-distant time by presupposing many other Ages before the *aion* of this world, cf. *De Princip.*, II, iii, 5 (though for some background in unorthodox Jewish literature, *Pes.*, 54a, *Shab.*, 88b, *Hag.*, 13b, 14a; *Gen. Rab.*, I; *Ab. R.N.*, xxxvii, cf. Adler, *loc. cit.*, p. 203a). The orthodox limited the age of the world, and fought against the authenticity of the ancient Egyptian records (supposed to lie behind Plato's accounts of ante-diluvian life) (cf. Julius Africanus, *Chronographia* (Frgs.) (*P.G.*, vol. 10, col. 65a)), and also against the calculations of the 'Chaldeans' (e.g. Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* VII, xiv, (*PL.*, vol. 6, cols. 780b-781a)). S. Toulmin and J. Goodfield (in *The Discovery of Time*, Harmondsworth, 1967, pp. 67 ff.) argued that Christians lost a sense of enormous lengths of time by accepting the limited life of the cosmos. It should be acknowledged however, that Plato's appeal to the countless inter-cataclysmic periods of the past had little grounding in historical facts (cf. p. 17 *supra*), whereas the Fathers, and especially the mediaevals, were in a better position to survey a great and lengthy stream of *historical events* from their own day back to the first king of Assyria or beyond. To that extent the judgements of Toulmin and Goodfield are questionable.

attack on pagan cosmology tended to place a restraint upon cyclical thinking in general. But we are still compelled to agree that cyclical models were not excluded from Christian historical thought. It was not heterodox for a writer such as Lactantius to accept the commonplace that human affairs and lives experienced generation and decay;¹ or for Basil to agree with Theognis, that God inclines the scale to men 'now one way and now another' so that they experience alternation between prosperity and adversity;² or for Prudentius to employ the body-state analogy in explaining Rome's late reception of Christianity.³ Such cyclical conceptions, however, are nowhere near as prominent in patristic and mediaeval thought as ideas about the Ages of man and the successive emergence of great empires. The history of these ideas can be afforded some detail.

As we have seen, doctrines of successive Ages were not confined to the Middle East, yet the Fathers, committed to the primacy of Scripture, leaned

¹ Cf. *Div. Inst.*, II, xi (PL., vol. 6, cols. 315a, 316a). On the other hand, Greek arguments that, despite the processes of *genesis* and *phthora*, the conserving forces of the universe rendered matter ultimately indestructible, and ensured that the 'single nature of all bodies passes through changes into many forms and returns again to what it was' (Celsus), was obviously incompatible with the Christian notion of a created universe (cf. Origen *Cont. Cels.* IV, 60). One may also note how Christian concentration on the creation of Man (as Adam) in his perfection, as well as on the personal immortality of the human soul, tended to place mortality as the essential characteristic of humanity in the background (cf., e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio*, III-XXI etc.).

² *Homily*, xxii (here referring to Theognis 157), cf. B. Jackson, *Prolegomena to Basil's De Spiritu Sancto (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church) (2nd Ser.)*, Grand Rapids (reprint of 1894 edn.), vol. 8, p. lxvi. Cf. also Tertullian, *Apologia*, xxvi, 1 on imperial rise and fall within an ordained *corpus temporum*.

³ *Contra Symmachum*, II, 309-323. L.G. Patterson (in *God and History in Early Christian Thought, (Studies in Patristic Thought)*, London 1967, p. 91), is surely wrong in finding a pessimistic outlook towards Rome in this passage, for one should note the clearly optimistic application of the analogy in I, 589-90; and see I, 21-41 for his optimism towards Rome in general (though we must assume he believed in the coming End of all things; cf. G. Boas, *Essays on Primitivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages, (Contributions to the History of Primitivism)*, Baltimore, 1948, p. 184. In his tone and outlook Prudentius should be seen as developing the body-state analogy in a quite forward-looking way - in the tradition of both Florus and Ammianus (cf. *supra* pp. 328ff.); yet cf. Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, VII, xv, and see also Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, I, 23.

heavily towards the schematizations of *Daniel* and other apocalyptic writings, and to the NT treatment of the 'new *aiōn*'. In the first century AD, the idea of the millennium gained currency. According to the Christian Apocalypse (xx, 4ff., cf. *II En.*, xxxiii, 1; *II Esd.*, vii, 28), Christ and his martyrs would reign over the earth for a thousand years before the final defeat of Satan, the cosmic transformation, and the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem. For apocalypticists, a thousand years was 'a day in God's sight' (cf. *Ps.* xc, 4; *Jubil.*, iv, 29-30; *II En.*, xxxii, 1; *II Pet.*, iii, 8), and for many it was significant that Adam's lifetime just fell short of a thousand years.¹ With the circulation of such beliefs, coupled with expectations of a final millennium, there emerged very early in Christian literature the model of world history as a Great Week, divisible into at least six millennial days, with a final (eschatological) day of rest (*Epist. Barn.*, xv, 3-8).² The first attempts to apply this model to the facts were not uniform, even if based on the obvious stages of Israelite history, but one account came to acquire renown and recognition above all. It appears in the last pages of St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*. The first aetas was from Adam to the Flood, the second from the Flood to Abraham, the third from Abraham to David, the fourth from David to the Babylonian captivity,

¹ For background; *Gen.*, v, 5; *Jubil.*, iv, 29-30. Cf. also, Justin Martyr, *Dialogus*, lxxxi; Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses*, V, xxiii, 2; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, VII, xiv.

² For this model in rabbinics, as background see *Sanh.*, 97a (R. Katina); cf. W. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, Strasbourg 1884, vol. 1, pp. 133 ff. cf. E. N. Adler, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 204a. For a model following Barnabas, cf. Julius Africanus, *Chronographia*, I, 1. On the final millennium in early patristic thought, see esp. Papias, *apud* Eusebius, *Eccles. Hist.*, III, xxxix, 12; Justin, *Dial.*, lxxxi. An eighth and extra-historical *aiōn* was sometimes appended to the seven millennia but to refer to an eighth day was merely to clinch the metaphor for a reign of eternity to come. See esp. Irenaeus, *Cont. Haer.*, V, xxiii, 2 (following Côtelier's reading, which is defended ably by J. Daniélou, 'La Typologie Millénariste de la Semaine dans le Christianisme primitif', in *Vigiliae Christianae*, II, 1948, p. 10). Cf. also Tertullian, *De Anima*, xxxvii, and later, Augustine, *De Civ. Dei.*, XXII, 30. For those holding a more definitely seven day model, of course, the seventh 'day' of history was the eternal day of rest, cf. Hippolytus, *Commentaria in Daniele* (*Fragmenta*), iv, (PG, vol. 10, col. 645A).

the fifth from the Exile to Christ, the present time seeing the sixth Age, and the future a seventh (and an eighth!) (XXII,xxx).¹ A tidy vision indeed; and it nicely reflected both Christian soteriology and basic Christian expectations of history. But what has it to do with the idea of history repeating itself? Was it in any sense employed as a model of historical recurrence, or is it safer to concur with the kind of interpretation summed up in Roland Bainton's neat phrases: 'not cycles but successive creations'?²

Let us clarify the issues. It needs conceding that the Christians' conception of history, and even of the eons comprising it, was progressionist. Events were moving towards a perfect telos. Thus numerous patristic writers could invoke the Great Week to arouse hope in the coming fulfilment of God's ancient promises, such as those to Abraham.³ It also bears remarking that the dividing of history into stages did not automatically produce an interest in recurrent patterns.⁴ On the other hand, certain

¹ Cf. also *De Gen. cont. Manich.*, I,xxiii (see *infra* p.370, for discussion), *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, xxii,39; *De Trinitate*, IV,iv,7. It is hard to know whether Augustine was the creator of this particular model. F.E. Robbins (*The Hexaemeral Literature*, Chicago, 1912, p.72) thinks so. It may well be derived, however, from Augustine's Donatist friend Tyconius, the source of the idea of 'Two Cities'.

² So, his 'Ideas of History', *loc.cit.*, p.8. By using the term creation, Bainton isolates important causal assumptions in much Christian theology; God was forever actively responsible for the patterns of history, and they are not left to come into being naturally. These causal assumptions, however, do not logically preclude the possibility of historical recurrence.

³ Cf. Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem*, III,24 (early third century); Gregory of Elvire, *Tractatus Origenis*, viii (Battifol edn., p.95) (fourth century); St. Ephraim of Nisibis, *Commentarius in Genesim*, i (fourth century); Aphraates, *Demonstratio*, II,14, etc..

⁴ Note, for example, Julius Africanus, *Chronographia*, (Frags. cf. PG., vol. 10, cols 63ff.) (third century), and (using Julius) Eusebius, *Chronicorum*, (edited by Jerome), see esp. A. Schoene ed., Frankfurt, 1875, vol.1 (vol. 2 = *Chronicorum Canonum*), cols. 71-131 (fourth-fifth centuries). For a later example, Joannis Malalas, *Chronographia*, III, parag. 74A ff. *et passim* (in *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, henceforth CSHB), edit. L. Dindorf, Bonn, 1831, pp.61 ff.) (sixth century).

ideas did develop from the adoption of the Great Week Schema which we may fairly rank among the manifold forms of recurrence thinking. Both Irenaeus and Lactantius, for instance, taught that the first (and fallen) Man Adam, virtually occupied the first millenium, whilst Christ, the perfect Man, was given rule over the sixth.¹ If that conception looks all too typological,² others were less so. Augustine, who took the first *aetas* beyond Adam to the Flood,³ detected a symmetrical pattern of generations (and not of years!)⁴ over the first five Ages. The first two *aetates* were each ten generations in length, and the next three (following *Mt.i*, 17) fourteen generations (*Civit. Dei*, XX,xxx). Such a pattern may seem of little import to us moderns, but for mediaevals it spelt a divine control over the whole world.⁵ Perhaps the recurrence of generation figures may seem incidental to this whole suggestion, but it was present nevertheless, and was susceptible to some interesting and relevant elaborations, as when Orosius, for instance, an Age-theorist so influential upon mediaevals, contended that Abraham was born on the 25th December in the forty-third

¹ *Cont. Haer.* V,xxxiii, 1-2. According to Irenaeus, Adam and Christ both died on a Friday (cf. *PG*, vol.7, col.1185b).

² For Irenaeus it was also definitely theological, since in the passage cited (in the last note) he wished to develop the notion of Christ's 'recapitulation' of Adam (see *ibid.*, 2 (*PG*, vol.7, col.1185b-c), cf. also *ibid.*, III,xix on recapitulation in general). As typology, the 'new Man' concept here parallels the idea of events in the last days being the 'new Exodus' (cf. Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* VII,xv, (*PL*, vol.6, cols.784-5) or of the Church being the 'new Eden' (*Irenaeus, Cont. Haer.*, V,xx,2).

³ The Adam-Noah period was a more natural division in the Bible (*Gen.*, iv, 1-vi,13), as well as in the early chronologists (Julius Africanus, *Chron.*, iii-iv, Eusebius, *apud* Jerome (Schoene, cols.79-84). And note Jerome's reference to this and subsequent biblical periods as 'singulorum aetates tempora' (*ibid.*, col.75).

⁴ Discovering patterns in accordance with years was complicated by the divergences in the figures given for the age-lengths of biblical personages in the *LXX* and *MT*. The *LXX* for example, places Noah 1,000 years after Adam.

⁵ On Western mediaevals noting the genealogical pattern, see for example, Gregory de Tours, *Decem Libros Historiarum*, I,iv; vii; xii; xv-i, (sixth century), Bede, *De Temporibus Liber*, XVI (*PL*, vol.90, col.288) (eighth century), Rabanus Maurus, *Liber de Computo*, xcvi, (*PL*, vol.107, cols.726b-727a (ninth century)). On interest in these genealogies in the East, note *infra*, p.363, n. 3, and on Jewish background, see Pirge Aboth, v,2, where it is noted that there were ten generations from Adam to Noah, and ten from Noah to Abraham.

year of the reign of that Ancient Assyrian King Ninus,¹ and that Christ was born on the same date in the forty-second year of the Roman Principate.²

We could argue, admittedly, that there were many events covered by the Great Week which belonged to the future. In part at least, it was 'a survey of history in future form',³ and so seems to lie on the fringe of our investigations, like theories of cosmological recurrence. If we are reminded here that our primary concern is with recurrences elicited from the past, however, it remains true that only the more daring and chiliastic of Christians were specific about events to come.⁴ And whilst Age schematization certainly encouraged thinking about recurrence in eschatological terms, with hopes of a 'new Exodus' or with the vision of a path 'from God to God' through history as a totality,⁵ the whole story is surprisingly more complex. Take, for instance, Christian appeals to a returning Golden Age. Clearly the earliest instances of this notion in Judeo-Christian literature were 'millenarian', the Golden Age being

¹ See p.321, n2 *supra*, cf. Pompeius Trogus, *apud* Justin, *Hist.*, (cf. Sura's chronology, *apud* Velleius Paterculus, I,1; I,vi,6, earlier) (as the monarch from whom to begin world-history), and note the interest of Thallus (*apud* Lactantius, *Epitome Institutionum Divinarum*, xxiv) in Belus, Ninus' father, though unfortunately Thallus' history is lost, cf. *FGH.*, pt. 2B, p.1156. Cf. also Eusebius-Jerome, *Chron.*, (Schoene edit.), col.53.

² So Orosius, *Historia*, VII,2 (*PL.*, vol.31, col.1064), cf. Gregory of Tours, *Dec. Lib. Hist.*, I,vii; xviii.

³ To borrow some useful terms from E. Hennecke (from his *New Testament Apocrypha* (edit. W. Schneemelcher, trans. R. McL. Wilson), London, 1965, p.584)

⁴ Cf. F.L. Griffith, 'Ages of the World' (Christian), in *ERE.*, vol.1, p.191a; N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, London, 1957, pp.8-12, *et passim.*, etc.. Concerning future recurrences, we should comment, first, that future events were often envisaged to be recurrences of past events, so that secondly, this is not so far from the pragmatic concern for the future we located in such pagans as Thucydides and Polybius (*supra*, pp.190ff).

⁵ For the last quotation and idea, as applied to Augustine's theology of history, cf. G.E. Cairns, *Philosophies, etc.*, *op.cit.*, p.255, and on 'the new Exodus', *supra*.

identified with the divine eschatological rule.¹ But there were later shifts away from a purely futurist outlook. In this connection, Lactantius is most interesting.² He was both affected by the eschatology of Sibylline literature and the inheritor of a Great Week schema. Combining these with anticipations of a Golden era, he contended that, in the seventh millennium, the rule of Saturn would return (*Div. Inst.*, VII,ii; xxiv). That had been no primeval or mythopoeic reign, however, for Lactantius used all his powers to prove that Saturn was a post-diluvian monarch, a friend and contemporary of Belus (the father of King Ninus),³ and that he was a king before mankind had abandoned itself to polytheism and idolatry.⁴ His had been a reign of gold and of monotheism, only to be followed by the *miserum calamitosumque saeculum* of iron, in which false religion prevailed and in which there lived but seven wise men.⁵ From the Age of iron history had undergone *degeneratio* down to the present (cf. VII,xv). Lactantius was re-writing world history, then, apparently modifying the Age theories of Hesiod, Plato,

¹ According, for instance, to the *Sibyl Tiburtina*, cf. Cohn, *op.cit.*, pp.15-16.

² On Lactantius' knowledge of the literature, cf. esp. *Div. Inst.*, VII, xxiv.

³ Cf. *Epitome*, xxiv, and see *Div. Inst.*, I, xiii. Cf. also Justin, *Historiae*, xliii,1 and Thallus (see *supra*), and see Augustine, *Civ. Dei.*, XVIII,xv.

⁴ *Epitome*, xxv, cf. *Div. Inst.* V,v. and see II,xiv on an ante-diluvian, pre-Noaic Age before Saturn. It would be false, however, to conclude that Lactantius was the first to 'historicize' the Golden Age so strongly. One should also recognize that Seneca, for one, had already treated it as a 'social era' (see *supra*, p.319n, cf. A.T.Y. Serra, 'The Idea of Man and World History from Seneca to Orosius and Saint Isidore of Seville', in *Journal of World History*, VI,1961, p.702).

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI,i (PL., vol.6, col.450b for quotation and on seven wise men, and also see cols. 449c-450b as a whole). In this chapter Lactantius appears to by-pass ante-diluvian times, and it might also appear that what he refers to as 'priorem illum generis humani statum' (col.449a) is to be identified with Saturn's time, but he covered himself by talking about the *felicitas* of ancient Ages, (*saeculorum veterum*, 449a also).

the middle Stoics and the Sibyls to suit a new case.¹ Now Lactantius knew of the seven day schema, but he neither documented it from biblical history, as did Augustine, nor interwove it carefully into his more classically-derived model. Each of his seven great days were millennia, the sixth not yet being completed (VII,xiv), but the length of these days was dependent upon the movements of the seven planets and - selling out somewhat to astrology - he simply comments that these 'differing and unequal' movements 'are believed to cause the varieties of circumstances and times'.² That was a cautious statement and deliberately so. It was vague as well, since the millennial stages could not be readily justified by known historical facts. Lactantius certainly noted Adam's millennium (the interval which

¹ Hesiod's five Ages, except for the fourth, were associated with metals, so also were the four Ages in the Cumaean Sibyl (*apud* Servius) and in Ovid (Golden, Silver, Bronze and Iron). Lactantius mentioned only two metal Ages; this position is closer to Plato as well as to some of Ovid's emphases drawn from Plato, since these two distinguished the ancient Age of Kronos = Saturn and the present Age of Zeus = Jupiter (cf. *supra* p.17,n.3). Lactantius, however, most definitely demythologized Saturn and Jupiter as (Greek) kings of the decidedly historical past, and he appealed for support to the testimony of the Erythraean Sibyl (*Div. Inst.*, I,xiv, *PL.*, vol.6, cols.191a-192a). Lactantius' picture of the Saturnian Age corresponds to the first Stoic Age under the law of nature, yet the Age of the Seven Sages, instead of representing a zenith, as in Stoic theory (cf. *supra*, p.319n), becomes a calamitous iron Age with only seven men in its favour. In the final analysis, there is something to be said for Lactantius using a four-stage schema to describe human history, similar to the four Ages of the Sun extracted from the Sibylline literature by Bede (cf. his *Sibyllinorum Verborum Interpretatio* (*PL.*, vol.90, col.1182b-c)). There the first *generatio* of men are 'simplices et cleri, amantes libertatem, veraces', etc. the second were 'splendide viventes, crescentes multum', and these partly correspond with Lactantius' ante-diluvian and Saturnian Ages. With the third, one sees 'exsurget gens contra gentem, et erunt pugnae multae in Roma' (this, in the Lactantian frame, would be the iron Age of world history between pre-idolatrous times and the Incarnation). With the fourth *generatio* there are 'homines quod verum est abnegantes', they reject Christ, and imperfectly, they correspond to Lactantius' picture of the Age after the Incarnation, though, for him, the coming of Christ began to reactualize the conditions for a Golden Age.

² 'et inaequabiles motus, rerum ac temporum varietates efficere creduntur' (VII,xiv, *PL.*, vol.6, col.782a). Cf. also Bardesanes on the 6,000 years of world history and planetary movement (*Coniunct. Astr.*, *Patrol. Syr.*, *op.cit.*, vol.2, pp.614-5).

Augustine replaced by his first ten generations) and, following a line best seen in Hippolytus, he implied that the sixth millennium neared completion¹ (a position which the anti-chiliastic Augustine found distasteful).² On the other hand, Lactantius looked to his other framework when considering the Incarnation of Christ. Here his historicization of the Golden Age becomes still more interesting, for he claimed not only that the conditions of Saturn's Age would return in the last millennium, but that the *species* (appearance? image? semblance?) of that *aureum tempus* had already returned (*rediit*), and justice already seen restoration (*reddita*) in the coming of Christ. As a result of this coming, there was once more the 'pious religious worship of the one God' - at least among a few.³ The Golden Age had been substantially, though not completely, deeschatologized; or at least, it was both present and future.

Lactantius' musings are something of a landmark in Christian thought. If the great Virgil had once announced the return of the Golden Age under Augustus, later (and non-Christian) interpreters had either pushed the Age further on into others' reigns (p.352), or had been happy to conclude that there was no exact recurrence at Augustus' time, but only the restoration

¹ *Ibid.*, VII,xiv (PL.,vol.6, col.781a), cf. Hippolytus, *Comm. in Daniel.*, iv (PG., vol.10, col., 655), and cf. Daniélou, *loc.cit.*, pp.12-13.

² Augustine avoided this position by supposing the *beginning* of the sixth Age to be marked by the Incarnation. Although he contended that history was not yet 6,000 years old, *De Civit. Dei.*, XVII,xl, he avoided making the definite assertion that the *aetates* of history were 1,000 years in length, and stressed the unknowability of the final Age's duration, cf. esp. *De Gen. Con. Manich.*, I,xxiv (PL.,vol.34,col.193) and on his anti-chiliasm in general, see Cohn, *op.cit.*, p.14. Cf. his follower, Orosius, *infra*, p.389 (and n.3).

³ *Div. Inst.*, V,vii (PL., vol.6, col.570a). By this claim Lactantius appears to have forgotten about Israel and the history of its beliefs, but in his argumentation he is, after all, vitally concerned to convert the pagans. On his later claims about Constantine's time also cf. *infra*, p.388, and p.367, n.2.

of similar conditions.¹ It was not unnatural, then, that classical rhetoric should soon combine with Christian anticipation. For, Christian hopes of a future Age of Gold notwithstanding, Virgil could be ascribed with an inspired vision of the Incarnation and of the new Christian order, and men could continue to attest the return of the Golden Age with the reigns of later, faithful protectors they admired. Claims of such a return came to be made of rulers as widely separated as Theodosius the Great in the fourth century (by Claudian), Charlemagne in the eighth (Modoin), Henry VII in the fourteenth (Dante), and Pope Julius II in the sixteenth (Giles of Viterbo) - to take obvious examples.²

It is evident, then, that although early Christian outlines of history's Ages were framed with soteriology and the Last Things in mind, they contained important elements of recurrence. Moreover, to speak of 'successive creations' cannot dispel our previous conclusions that Age theory represents one form of recurrence, in fact of cyclical, thinking (even when Ages are conceived in the barest forms). It is hardly insignificant that Irenaeus should refer to the Great Week and its inner proportions as cycles,³

¹ Cf. Servius (fourth century), for example, *Commentarius in Virgilium* (or *in Bucolica, Georgica et Aeneidem*, Strasbourg, 1468 edn. (Melb. Pub. Library) [p.7, col.2; p.8, col.1], and for other references to *aureum saeculum* in Servius, see J.F. Mountford and J.T. Schultz, *Index Rerum et Nominum in Scholiis Servii et Aelii Donati Tractatorum*, New York, 1930, p.152. Servius derived much of his material and ideas from Donatus, the most famous fourth century grammarian and commentator.

² For Claudian, cf. *In Rufinum*, I, 50 ff. (in *Claudii Claudiani Carmina*, ed. J. Koch, Leipzig, 1893, p.12). And earlier, of Constantine, cf. *Oratio ad Sanctos*, a work usually ascribed to Eusebius, but Lactantius has the better claims; (cf. E. Barker in his *From Alexander to Constantine*, *op.cit.*, p.218, cf. 210-220). For Modoin, cf. *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Poetae*, vol.1, p.390, ls. 24-7 (Nasonis Ecloga). For Dante, see *Epistolae*, VII,1, cf. *De Monarchia*, I, xi (and for a similar conception in Petrarch, cf. *infra*, p. 376). For Giles, see *infra*, pp. 521ff. On projections of a returning ruler who would usher in such an Age, see Cohn, *op.cit.*, esp. ch.5.

³ *Cont. Haer.*, V, xxiii, 2 ('secundum autem circulum et cursum dierum', 'Secundum hunc circulum dierum').

or that Lactantius should take each millennium (connected as each was to planetary revolutions) to be a *circulus*.¹ And the ninth-century Byzantine chronographer Syncellus, to take another example, even when he treated time sequences in the Bible which bore no symmetrical relationship, had no compunction in referring to them as *cycloi*.²

But let us return to more central issues.

Mediaeval Writers

Augustine's Great Week model (outlined briefly in the last pages of *De Civitate Dei*) had a long history through the Middle Ages. That it lasted longer than those schemes which confined world history to 6-7,000 years was due to the eminence of the bishop himself (at least in the West), but above all to its relative flexibility.³ The length of the sixth Age was left unspecified, Christ's nativity was placed near its beginning rather than its end, and chiliasm was decried. Augustine's structures did not bridle all, perhaps,⁴ but his open-ended framework provided a basic standard for mediaeval Age theory, and it held on even to the Reformation. The model often appears in theological writings, yet it is also found in

¹ *Div. Inst.*, VII,xiv (PL., vol.6, col.782a).

² *Chronographia* (in CSHB., Parag. 16D., p.29).

³ The belief that the 6,000th year of history and the beginning of the Age of Sabbath rest were relatively near, a view which presupposed that the beginning of the sixth millennium preceded the Incarnation by some hundreds of years, was suggested not only by the *Epistle of Barnabas*, (xv, 4-5), Irenaeus (*Con. Haer.*, V,xxviii,3), Hippolytus, and Lactantius (see *supra*), but also by Clement of Alexandria (*apud* J. Malalas, *Chronographia*, CSHB., Bk.,X,p.228). Such authorities were highly influential upon Byzantine chronological speculations, cf. esp. V. Grumel, *La Chronologie (Traité d'Études Byzantines I*, ed. P. Lemerle et al., Bibliothèque Byzantine), Paris, 1958, p.3 et *passim*; cf. A. Vasiliev, 'Mediaeval Ideas of the End of the World', in *Byzantion*, XVI, 1942-3, pp.462 ff..

⁴ See esp. Cohn, *op.cit.*, pp.13 ff., et *passim*; cf. F.L. Griffith, *loc. cit.*, p.191a, and on Joachimism, see *infra*.

annals and other historiographical works as background material,¹ and even seeped through to the histories of the Byzantine East.²

There were also developments on the norm, however, and some are important in the history of the recurrence idea. To begin with, Augustine himself presented a more elaborate account of the Great Week. In this

¹ For *Theological literature*: see esp. Eugyppius, *Thesaurus*, lvii (PL., vol.62, col.668) (fifth-sixth centuries), Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, V,xxxviii-ix (PL., vol.82, cols.223-4) (sixth-seventh centuries), Julian of Toledo, *De Comprabatione Aetatis Sextae*, III, (PL., vol.96, col.569c-d) (seventh century), Bede, *De Temporibus Liber*, xvi (PL., vol.90, col.288) (eighth century), Alcuin, *Disputatio Puerorum* (PL., vol.101, col.1112) (eighth century), Rabanus Maurus, *Commentaria in Genesim*, I,x (PL., vol.107, col.469b), *Liber de Computo*, xcvi (PL., vol.107, cols.726-8) (ninth century), Honoré d'Autun, *De Imagine Mendis*, II,lxxv (PL., vol.172, col.156c-d), Peter Abelard, *Expositio in Hexaameron*, (*Moralitas*), (PL., vol.178, col.772a-d), Rupert of Deutz, *In Librum Ecclesiastes*, i, (PL., vol.168, col.1200b-c), Hugh of St. Victor, *De Scripturis et Scriptoris Sacris*, xvii (PL., vol.175, col.24) (all twelfth century), Bonaventura, *Collationes in Hexaameron*, XV,12-18 (thirteenth century), Henry of Cossey, *Super Apocalypsim* (Oxford,Bodleian Library, MS. Laud Miscellanea 85) (fourteenth century), etc.. And on Philipp van Karenz, see *infra* p372, Joachim, p373, and early Renaissance writers, pp376-(7), n.2, etc.. Taio (seventh century) has a special version in which he involves the model of the Great Hours rather than the Great Week (*Sententiae*, III,iv, PL., vol.80, cols.854a-a55a). For *historiography*: see esp. Gregory of Tours, *Dec. Lib.Hist.*, I,i-xvii (sixth century); Ado of Vienne, *Chronicon in Aetates Sex Divisum* (in PL., vol.123, cols.23 ff.) (ninth century); Marianus Scotus, *Chronicon*, I,xi-xxi (in abbreviated form in PL., vol.147, cols.623b-624a, but complete in *Germanicus Rerum Quatuor Celebriores Vetustioresque Chronographi*, Basel, 1559) (eleventh century), etc. Bede's interest in the Great Week schema as a historian should be noted, cf. C.W. Jones, 'Bede as early mediaeval historian', in *Medievalia et Humanistica*, VI,1946, p.32. Other historians followed the stages of biblical history as suggested by Augustine and Eusebius-Jerome without extracting a Great Week model; so Sigebertus of Gembloux, *Chronica* (PL., vol.160, cols.57 ff.), Otto of Freising, *Chronicon seu Historia de Duabus Civitate*, esp. I-II (both twelfth century), Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, I (thirteenth century) etc.. The Division of historical works into seven books is more a literary device suggested by the Great Week model rather than an historical application of it; so, for example, Orosius, *Historia*, I-VII (fifth century), Ranulf Higden, *Polychronicon*, i,26 (fourteenth century), cf. J. Taylor, *The 'Universal Chronicle' of Ranulf Higden*, Oxford, 1966, p.36, as against F.L. Griffith, *loc.cit.*, p.190b. See also, on Brunetto Latini's *Il Tesoro* (1268), cf. F.J. Carmody, 'Latin sources of Brunetto Latini's World History', in *Speculum*, XI,1963.

² So, for example, Ducas, *Historia Byzantina* I, (CSHB paras. 1A;2A;D;3A, pp.10,11,12). Ducas significantly wrote his history from 1204, the year of the Latin occupation of the East.

second version each *aetas* is not only associated with seven creative Days (cf. Gen. i), but with stages of the bodily life-cycle as well. Appropriating the body-cosmos analogy of the Stoics and the body-state analogy of the Roman historians, he reinterpreted world history for a new intellectual cause. Ante-diluvian times were represented as *infantia universi saeculi*; from the Flood to Abraham came mankind's *pueritia* (for we remember our childhood not our infancy); from Abraham to David, *adolescentia* (when a people of God were 'begotten'); from David to the Exile, *iuventus* (the kingly period); and from the Exile to the Incarnation, *senectus* ('an Age weakened and broken').¹ In the sixth Age humanity approaches the end of its life, especially with the temple, but a special situation arose in this *aetas*, and as in a man's old age, a new man is born who lives spiritually.² How skilfully has Augustine turned Roman ideas about rejuvenation into a new theology! On the surface, perhaps, this elaboration looks like the body-state analogy applied to biblical as against Roman history, but it was world history which was actually being envisaged, or better, the history of those theologically significant events which ultimately mattered for mankind's destiny.³

In this elaboration, however, rejuvenation implies recurrence only in the sense that the old spiritual vitality of God's city had been re-acquired in the Church, at a time when Israel had fallen and Rome declined.⁴ There is less vagueness in subsequent commentary on Augustine's

¹ See *De Gen. Cont. Manich.*, I,xxiii (PL., vol.34, cols.190-3, and col. 192, for the quotation.

² *Ibid.* (col.192).

³ See esp. R.L.P. Milburn, *Early Christian Interpretations of History* (Bampton Lectures 1952), London, 1954, pp.76-88, cf. also J. Chaux-Ruy,, *Saint Augustin, Temps et Histoire*, Paris, 1956, chapters 5-6.

⁴ Concerning 'secular' or terrestrial history, Augustine made noticeably little of the Roman high-point under Augustus at the time of the Nativity, and dwelt on the inevitable decay to befall the empire (see *Civ.Dei.*, XVIII,xlvi (on the brief reference to the *Pax Romana* at Christ's birth), and cf. esp. W. Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms, etc., op.cit.*, pp.22-27). On

primary model of seven¹ Ages. In the twelfth century, for example, Philipp van Haveng transformed this model into one of 'undulation from periods of good to periods of evil and back.'² On considering the great and composite idol of *Dan. ii* (32-35),³ he linked each of its substances to the *aetates* of the world, and dilated on the relative merits of each Age (see Diagram X). Whilst overly allegorical and lacking inner consistency, his picture shows a creative departure from the Augustinian standard,⁴ and reflects an attempt, however unwitting, to write a special pattern of recurrence into *Heilsgeschichte*. The Ages have been tied in with what we shall soon find to be a popular mediaeval conception (though with a classical background), that history consists of vicissitude, or of fluctuations between favourable and adverse conditions.

Philipp was not tampering with the most momentous of *doctrinae fidei*, perhaps, for interest in the *aetates mundi* was relatively peripheral in mediaeval theology. On the other hand, by the end of the twelfth century the traditional Augustinian frame had received such a serious re-interpretation and questioning that the theology of history, as a debatable issue, moved somewhere nearer the centre of the stage. The figure chiefly

the other hand, if one is considering the City of God and its career within world history, the sixth Age, though senescent and witness to the downfall of the Jews, contains within it the Incarnation, as well as the growth of God's City in history's final phase (cf. *Gen. Cont. Manich.*, I, xxiii (PL., vol. 34, col. 192).

¹ Augustine's eighth Age (referred to in *De Civ. Dei.*, XXII, xxx (Migne PL., vol. 41, col. 804) was rather infrequently referred to in mediaeval literature, cf. for example, Rabanus Maurus, *Liber de Computo*, XCVI (PL., vol. 107, col. 728a).

² To use the words of G. Boas, *op.cit.*, p. 181. The passage is in Philipp's *De Somno Regis Nabuchodossor* (PL., vol. 203, cols. 586-8).

³ Philipp neglected the interpretation given in *Dan.*, ii, 36-45.

⁴ Taio, an earlier writer, felt quite free to make considerable modifications which were less easy to make after the relative 'fossilization' of Augustinianism in Carolingian times (on Carolingian Augustinism, cf. esp. H. von Schubert, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Frühmittelalter*, Tübingen, 1921, pp. 447 ff.), see *supra*, p. 319, n. 1. Of the writers listed there only Honoré d'Autun, Peter Abelard and Bonaventura used the body-history analogy along with the great week model.

D I A G R A M X

Ages	Metal Parts of the Image	Qualities of each Age
1 Adam to Noah	Gold (head)	GOOD (‘glorious and excellent, knowing only the <i>lex naturae</i> to love God and man)
2 Noah to Abraham	Silver (breast and arms) ¹	BAD (because of its evil, it received the Deluge) ²
3 Abraham to Moses (modifying the Augustinian scheme) ³	Bronze (stomach, thighs) ⁴	GOOD (an Age of ‘patience and fortitude’, of the patriarchs’ faith) ⁵
4 Moses to David (modifying the Augustinian scheme) ³	Iron (legs)	GOOD (with illustrious men)
5 David to the Advent (modifying the Augustinian scheme) ³	Mud and Clay, trying to be conjoined with Iron (feet)	BAD (no concord between gentiles and Jews)
6 Advent to the end of the apostolic mission	The shattering of the statue by a stone	GOOD (the preaching of the Gospel)
7 The time of the AntiChrist	(feet of iron and clay again!) (iron = strong Church, yet clay = eschatological troubles)	BAD (great tribulation)

- 1 Philipp actually separated the symbolic significance of the breast and arms, and though the latter belongs to the silver part of the image, applies the arms to the third Age of Abraham to Moses.
- 2 He seems to be in difficulties here! He fastens on to events at the beginning of this Age; thus the punishment for its evil is curiously at its commencement.
- 3 In Augustine's primary model, Moses is not mentioned and the third Age runs to David; in Philipp's schema the Exile is omitted.
- 4 Philipp actually considered the bronze stomach to symbolize the men of that time-lapse which ran from Moses to apostolic times, i.e., from the third to the sixth Age.
- 5 This Age must be taken to include Abraham's wanderings, whilst the second Age is probably meant to end at his calling.
- 6 Philipp here may be thinking more about the latter half of this aetas as against the former, which saw the continuation of the Davidic monarchy. It is probable that this Age begins with David's death, however, and that Philipp understands most of the post-Davidic kings to be compromisers with gentile ways, and thus creators of tension within Judaism.

responsible for this shift was the theologian of the *Spiritualis Intellectus*, the breakaway Calabrian ascetic Joachino di Fiore (ca. 1132-1202).

Like most theologians of his day, Joachim was not concerned with history for its own sake; yet if his deepest desire was to comprehend the mystery of the Trinity,¹ he thought he saw his hopes being realised by using an historical exegesis. Joachim, as is well known, divided world history into three periods, the three status or great Stages of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. What is not always realised, though, is that his triadic schema was a serious modification, rather than a replacement, of the Augustinian seven Age model. With the triadic framework, moreover, he propagated the idea of a 'providential progress towards an historical eschaton',² and Joachim certainly held this view more convincingly than Augustine, since he so firmly located the future eschatological happenings in the known historical order.³ Joachim, then, historicized eschatology. If, under the first dispensation of the Father, God's faithful ones had been slaves to the Law, and if, under the second, or under the *Ordo clericorum*, they were more nearly, though incompletely, spiritual, the passage of history prefigured a new, free, and de-institutionalized and imminent Age of the Spirit. How much easier was it for an Italian monk to make such a claim in the twelfth century than for an African bishop who had just heard disturbing news about Alaric's sack of Rome in 410!

¹ On Joachim's personal struggle to understand the Trinity, and on his assault against Peter Lombard's view of the matter, see esp. M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Late Middle Ages; a study in Joachimism*, Oxford, 1969, pp.23-26,30.

² So, K. Löwith, *Meaning*, op.cit., p.146 (and ff.), cf. also N. Cohn, op.cit., p.101.

³ Augustine suggested the *Civitas Dei* was only fully realisable upon 'death' of the known historical order. Note how the term *mors seculi* was employed by Augustinians when referring to the end of the *aetas sexta*, cf., for example, Bede, *De Temp.*, xvi (PL., vol.107, col.1112d), Rabanus Maurus, *De Comput.*, xcvi (PL., vol.107, col.728a). On Augustine and progress in temporal history, see esp. T.E.Mommsen, 'St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress; The Background of *The City of God*', in *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* (ed. E.F.Rice, Jr.) Ithaca, 1959, pp.265 ff.

However, it has been little stressed that, within Joachim's treatment of known, past history, and quite apart from his anticipations of the coming *Ordo contemplantium*, there is an evident interest in recurring as well as in linear patterns. History progressed stage by stage as if along a pathway,¹ but that did not mean that certain stages or sub-stages failed to share common elements, so authenticating God's *providentia*. Let us first explore how Joachim modified the basic Augustinian schema, and then turn to features of recurrence in his theology of history as a whole.

Joachim did not dispense with the Great Week model, but he divided the sixth Age into six *etatae* and is reported to have taken his own times to be at the end of the fifth *etata*.² The first five *aetates* ran, as conventionally, from Adam to Christ, and beginning from Abraham they also formed the status of the Father. The real problem arose with the present Age. That problem was quite naturally a pressing one for an exploratory mind in the twelfth century. The last hopes of a 6,000 year old historical order were dying after 1,000 A.D.,³ and the sixth *aetas* of the Augustinian scheme was already top-heavy with the most momentous events, including the establishment of curial *plenitudo potestatis* in the West. Old ideas, then, were crying out for readjustment. Joachim met the chall-

¹ Cf. esp. Joachim's important diagram in *Concordia Novi ac Veteris Testamenti*, II,1 (Venice, 1519 edn., reissued Frankfurt 1964, p.14, cols. 3-4).

² See Robert of Auxerre; 'Dicit enim, quia, sicut scripturae veteris Testamenti quinque etatum seculi ab Adam usque ad Christum decursarum hystoriam continent, sic liber Apocalypsis etatis sexte a Christo inchoate cursum exponit...[see Rev., vi,1-17]. Dicit quoque, haec revelata fuisse in fine etatulae quintae...', *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, hereafter *MGH. Scrip.*, vol.26, pp.148-9, and cf. Joachim, esp. *Concord.*, III,1 (p.25, [col.1]). Note also Reeves, *op.cit.*, p.40-1 on Robert's special views.

³ It was under question in the West as early as the ninth century, cf. Rabanus Maurus, *Enarrationem in Epistolas Beati Pauli* (PL., vol.112, col. 657d). For Eastern writers on the 6,000 years of world history, cf. *supra*, p. 368, n. 3; and for the idea in the West, see Augustine's position, *supra*, p. 368, cf. Sulpicius Severus, *Sacrae Historiae*, I,2; Taio, *Sententiae*, III, 4 (PL., vol.80, esp. col.855a).

enge. His ultimate optimism towards future temporal events was hardly Augustinian, and the same may be said of his approach to the 'middle stage' of history. The traditional picture of Christian phenomena at the end of history was reoriented, Christ's coming being placed more in the centre of world events than towards their culminating point. This is true for Joachim, however, much more in the sense that the present Age (either *aetas* or *status*) was 'the Son's Age' and much less in the sense that Christ's first coming was in the middle of chronological time, or formed *die Mitte der Zeit*, to use Conzelmann's (false) characterization of Lukan theology.² In any case, this new perspective, together with Joachim's extensive

¹ Joachim did, of course, reckon with an eschatological crisis time and the Antichrist, before the *status* of the spirit truly came into being.

² So, against O. Köhler, 'Der Neue Äon', in *Saeculum*, XII, 1961, pp.188-190, who places too much emphasis on the connections between Joachim's schema and the BC/AD interest of the chronologists. Joachim's position, incidentally, did not simply represent a reappraisal of Augustine. If Luke, for instance, had identified the 'time of the Church' with the time of the Spirit, Joachim placed the full plenitude of the Spirit's work in the final seventh Age, although he pushed the foreshadowing of that Age back as far as Elisha. (On background ideas of Trinitarian modalism, ie., doctrines of three successive revelations, the third being associated with the outpouring of the Spirit, see P. Lehmann, 'Mittelalter und Klöcherlatein', in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXXVII, 1928, p.204, though Rupert of Deutz, important here, is not discussed; and on Elisha at the 'lay' representative of the Spirit in the OT, see *Concord.*, II,1 (Venice-Frankfurt edn., p.10, cols.1-2). Also, Joachim developed the important idea that the sixth Age had watched the emergence of a special clerical order quite different from the synagogal order of the Old Testament. (For background to this, cf. esp. John Scotus Erigena (ninth century), see F.L. Griffith, *loc.cit.*, p.191a) and Rupert of Deutz (1070-1129), *In Librum Ecclesiastes Commentarius* (PL., vol.168, col.1200c). The distinction between two such orders foreshadows Joachim's general separation of the Ages of the Father (OT) and of the Son (NT), not just his separation in terms of *Synagoga et Ecclesia Romana*). In passing, one should comment that the 'economic Trinitarianism' of Marcellus of Ancyra (fourth century) has, upon close inspection, only superficial parallels with the Joachite scheme of salvation history. On the other hand, it bears remarking that commenting that Aquinas' more static conception of the angelic order as an *aevum* between *tempus* and *aeternitas* (cf. F.H. Brabant, *Time and Eternity in Christian Thought*, (Bampton lectures 1936), London, 1937, p.75) could be of background importance in the emergence of a triadic conception of history.

historicization of eschatology,¹ suggested ways of reconceptualizing historical periodization in keeping with the changing scene. One may even claim that it was a seminal development behind the now ever-present distinction between ancient, mediaeval and modern times. Joachim's status of the Son, for instance, was something of a theological prototype of the secular, cultural concept of an *intermedia aetas*. When Petrarch emerges in the Trecento, extolling Antiquity, lamenting post-Roman times, and occasionally anticipating a coming Age of Gold, we might almost be persuaded that he has appropriated a Joachite framework for new purposes, and that his projected aureum saeculum is the secular paradigm of an *Ordo contemplantium*.²

¹ Joachim is himself not that specific about coming 'political' events in the last Age, but at least he refers to the conversion of the Jews cf. Reeves, *op.cit.*, pp.6, 47 etc.. Could we expect more details? The seventh Age is to be without the political institutions of the old order - unless monasteries are to be counted among them.

² To make brief comments in this connection on important developments in periodization from Joachim to the early humanists. Bonaventura (1221-74), who was to some extent influenced by Joachimism, felt no inhibitions about expounding other Age-schematizations over and above the Great Week scheme, and although some of his models were heavily allegorized, he presented others with five, four and three stages. (Cf. *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, XV,19 (five Ages, the first to the Fall, the second to Noah, the third to Moses, the fourth to Christ, the fifth to the end, based on Gregory the Great's use of the five summonses in the parable of the hired labourers [*Homil in Evangel*, xix,1]), *Collat.*, XIV, 12-15, (four orders of time, *tempus ante legum* or *naturae* (Creation, Patriarchs), *tempus legis* (Moses), *tempus prophetiae* (from Samuel on), *tempus gratiae* (NT times), each order containing three mysteries, cf. also Reeves, *op.cit.*, pp.179-180), *Collat.*, XV,20 (three times of Nature, Scripture and Grace; [from Ambrose, *Epistolae* lxxiii, Augustine, *Epist.*, clvii (lxxxix) etc.]). Concurring with Joachim, he placed the eschatological events within history, even suggesting that the seventh Age in the Augustinian model ran simultaneously ('as a repose of the soul after Christ's passion') with the sixth (cf. Köhler, *loc.cit.*, p.186, on the last events within history; and on the simultaneity of the sixth and seventh Ages, see *Collat.*, XV,18 (whence the quotation); cf. Joachim, *Expositio in Apocalypsim* (Venice, 1527 reissued Frankfurt 1964) p.9 (esp. col.4), Vincent de Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale*, XXX,40). Bonaventura also agreed with Joachim in supposing the final Age would be prefaced by a period of tribulation. But such theologically-orientated pictures had a lessened attraction for those who came to find the discipline of the schoolmen too logically cut-and-dried and disagreeable to newer literary and historical sensibilities. Although the notion of *medium aevum* between Antiquity and recent times neither received full expression nor gained a wide currency until the seventeenth century (cf. esp. H. Spangenberg, 'Die Perioden der Weltgeschichte', in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXVII,

Joachim may seem a mediaeval with modern implications, but there are a great many traditional qualities about his work. What gives him a special flavour is his historical exegesis; and the elaborate patterns he extracted from the biblical and ecclesiastical past are of particular interest to us. The future Age of the Spirit set aside, he elicited recurrences from both within and between the first two (definitely historical) status of the Father and the Son.¹ To begin with, because Joachim held orthodox views about the *processus Spiritus Sancti* and the begetting of the Son, he attempted to detect the operations of the three Persons within each status. Here the rôle of historical personages becomes important. The first status strictly began with Abraham, from the second *aetas*, and seeing the

1923, pp.10-11 and ff.) in the Trecento, one should remember Petrarch made that renowned distinction between ancient (*antiqua*) times (history to the adoption of Christianity by the Roman emperors) and modern (*nova*) times (from then until his own day), (see *Epistolae de Rebus Familiaribus*, VI, 2 (edit. J. Fracassetti, Florence, 1859), cf. esp. T.E. Mommsen, 'Petrarch's conception of the "Dark Ages"', in *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, *op.cit.*, p.127). In the succeeding century, moreover, the phrase 'Middle Ages', as used of post-Roman times, obtained some limited usage (Lehmann, *loc.cit.*, pp.200-6). With Petrarch and his sympathizers, historical divisions were based on cultural rather than on theological considerations. With them the strange passage to a secularized Age-theory was virtually traversed, though the longevity of old conceptions to the Reformation ought to be acknowledged, as well as certain traditional Christian conceptions which still lurked in the background of humanist periodizations. (On exponents of the Great Week model from the classic Renaissance, see, for example, A. Pierozzi, *Chronicon Universale*, Nuremberg 1484, cf. W.K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought, Five Centuries of Interpretation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, p.16, and (possibly) in a limited sense, Sabellicus (Marcantonio Coccio), *Rapsodie Historiarum Enneadum ab Orbe Condito ad Annum Salutis Humane 1504*, Venice 1484 ff., cf. G. Falco, *La Polemica sul Medio Evo*, Turin, 1933, p.30 on his first six *Enneades*. On *Salutati*, see *infra*, and on later writers, pp.489f. *infra*. For other Christian conceptions in early humanist historiography, note how Flavio Biondo (1392-1463) gathered the 'Middle Ages' into a millenium (415-1415), even if divisible into two periods of unequal length, cf. *Historiarum ab Inclinato Romanorum Imperio Decades* (1483), Basel, 1531, edit., p.393). For Petrarch on Antiquity and ignoble post-Roman times, see *Epist. de Reb. Famil.*, XX,8, and on his hopes, see Mommsen, *loc.cit.*, pp.176-7.

¹ Joachim's forms of recurrence thinking led M.V. Bloomfield to write about his combinations of 'cycle and pattern', cf. 'Joachim of Flora; a critical study of his canon, teachings, sources, biography and influence', in *Traditio*, XIII, 1957, p.268.

establishment of the *Ordo conjugatorum* (the union of God's people under the Law), it ended at the Incarnation. But it had its proleptic representative in Adam, the first man.¹ The second *status*, occupying the sixth *aetas*, witnesses the *Ordo clericorum*, but again, Joachim locates the real *initium* of this order as far back as Isaiah in the *status* of the Father. The third *status*, occupying the last Age, will be the time of the last order (*contemplantium* or *monachorum*), but in keeping with the doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit, it has two precursory representatives, Elisha and Benedict in the *status* of the Father and the Son respectively.² Not only do we discover an element of recurrence in the sense that with each great Stage one finds the apparent incubation of the next, as Norman Cohn has so neatly put it,³ but striking parallels are extracted at least from the first two. Elisha, who marks the first *initium* of the third Stage, lived twenty-three generations from Adam (following Matthew's genealogy of the *Ordo clericorum*), yet Isaiah, who marks the beginning of the second *status*, can also be said to live twenty-three generations after Adam (according to Luke's genealogy of the *Ordo monachorum*).⁴ From Abraham to Christ, and from Christ to the projected beginning of the last *status*, lie two intervals each spanning forty-two generations, and the same number of generations separated the two important figures of Elisha and Benedict.⁵ Elijah, (whose relationship with Elisha symbolized for Joachim the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son) returns to history as John the Baptist, to effect the

¹ Joachim's relative detachment of *Heilsgeschichte* from the Creation in dealing with the Trinity is further testimony to his historicizing tendencies.

² See esp. *Concord.*, II, 1 (pp. 8 [col. 4], 9 [cols. 1, 4], 10 [col. 1]).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 101, though he neglects the special rôle given by Joachim to Elisha.

⁴ *Concord.*, II, 1 (p. 11 [col. 3, cf. cols. 1-2])

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 1; (pp. 11 [col. 4] - 12 [col. 2]). Out of keeping with the tables of *ibid.*, II, 1 (pp. 11 [cols. 3-4] - 12 [col. 1]), Joachim argues for three sets of time-lapses, twenty-one generations in length (Adam to Jacob, to Isaiah, to Christ) in IV (p. 43 [col. 3]).

formal beginning of the second status.¹ There were other, similar recurrences besides, once again conveyed through parallels between history's great Stages. Seven persecutions against God's ancient people, for instance, were followed by seven against the Church;² Jewish kings and synagogues were paralleled by Christian emperors and ecclesiae.³ Within the first status, to take another case, Joachim also detected the alternating influence of the Son and the Spirit as embodied in the seven great prophets and the seven great kings of the OT.⁴ And so Joachim proceeded, demonstrating that significant events and characteristics in one great Stage had their counterparts in another, special recurrences which impressed a divine stamp on salvation history.

Joachim often lapsed into allegory and typology,⁵ and he had certainly not divested himself of theologically-conceived superstructures. But his methods and enthusiasms hardly extinguished an interest in real facts.

¹ See esp. *Tractatus super Quatuor Evangelica*, (Fonti per le Storia d'Italia, Istituto Storico Italiano), Rome, 1930, pp.23 (ln.21) - 24 (ln.16). For Joachim, Elijah's return as John is not a case of metempsychosis, but of special translation. On background theology in the West, cf. Tertullian, *De Anima*, xxxv. For another schema of Joachim's entailing genealogical blocks, cf. *Concord.*, (pp.17f [cols.3ff.]).

² *Concord.*, I (p.5 [cols.2-4]), and especially the earlier *Expositio Prophetiae Anonymae Romae repertae anno 1184* (MS Ant.322, fol.150c) (also cited in Reeves, *op.cit.*, p.5, n.1). In the latter tract, the seven OT persecutions are by: 1) the Egyptians, 2) Midianites, 3) other nations, 4) Assyrians, 5) Chaldaeans, 6) Medes and Persians, 7) Greeks, with Antiochus; and the seven persecutions of the Church are by: 1) the Jews, 2) the Pagans, 3) the Arians, 4) Goths, 5) Vandals, 6) Alemanni, and 7) Lombards. Joachim has departed from Eusebius' model of five or ten persecutions (cf. *Martyrs of Palestine*, I, lff., IX, lff., etc.), and from other models of ten (see esp. Sulpicius Severus, *Sacrae Historiae*, II, 33; *Vita S. Martini*, xxxiii; Orosius, *Historia*, VII, 26-7 (and later western mediaeval periodizations based on persecutions [eg., Anselm of Havelburg, St. Bernard])). For Jerome and eastern writers, see J. Moreau, 'Observations sur l'ΥΠΟΜΝΗΤΙΚΟΝ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ὩΣΕΠΙΤΟΥ', in *Byzantion*, XXV-XXVII, 1955-7, pp.263-7. On the other hand, Joachim's manner of eliciting parallels from the Old and New Testaments is hardly dissimilar to Orosius'.

³ See Reeves, *op.cit.*, p.303 for discussion. It is also interesting that Joachim places the founding of Rome at the time of king Uzziah and the prophet Isaiah, that is, at the time of the *initium* of the second status, (*Concord.*, II, 1 [col.3]). Once the third status is ushered in, the empire of Rome comes to an end with the *Ordo clericorum*.

⁴ cf. *Concord.*, III, 1 (p.17 [col.1]).

⁵ As with the allegorical relationship developed between Abraham and Zacharias, Sarah and Elizabeth, Isaac and John, cf. *Ibid.*, II, 1 (p.8, [col.1]), cf. *Tract. Quat. Evang.*, pp.24 (ln.27) - 25 (ln.22).

Perhaps the Joachites who followed clung to their divine numbers and quaint theological models, but they could also produce some important insights. Batholomew of Pisa's division of history into seven Ages BC and seven AD, for example,¹ reflects a greater appreciation of general configurations of western history from the fall of Rome to the supremacy of *Respublica Christiana*; and in their hopes for an imperial saviour, whether Hohenstaufen or *Carolus Redivivus*, later Joachites became more specific in their historicization of the Last Things.² More impressive developments, however, came with the humanists.

Early Humanism

It is in the pages of a fascinating letter by the early humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406) that one finds a quite new perspective on traditional Age theory. His position presents itself less as a vigorous reaction against than a development of lines already suggested in 'late mediaeval' thought, although Salutati also addressed himself to new problems posed by a resurgent interest in the classics. Writing to Zonari (Chancellor of Bologna), he sought to rebuff the charge that Virgil's widely acclaimed Fourth Eclogue contained heretical cyclical notions contrary to the doctrine of Christian salvation.³ Salutati contended that

¹ Cf. *De Conformitate Vitae Beatae Francisci ad Vitam Dominis Jesu* (*Analecta Franciscana*, IV, 1906), pp.75-8. The Seven Ages or 'Seals' before Christ were: Adam-Noah, Noah-Abraham, Abraham-Moses, Exodus, David-Elijah, Elijah-Babylonian Captivity, Captivity-Incarnation (with the Chief men of each Age being Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Elijah, Simon, Onias (cf. Josephus, *Antiq.*, XIII)). The seven seals after and including Christ were: John the Baptist to Pentecost, Pentecost-Nero, Nero-Constantine, Constantine-St. Benedict, Barbarian Invasions, Age of Frederick II (1206), the chief men being Christ, Paul, St. Lawrence, St. Antony, St. Benedict, and St. Francis. The work belongs to the fourteenth century. The naming of important figures in association with the great Ages has its background in such writers as Otto of Freising, (*Chron. Hist. Duab. Civit.*, VIII,14), and Berengaudus (*Expositio super Septem Visiones libri Apocalypsis*, (PL., vol.17 [cols.934 ff.]), though these two dealt simply with a seven Age schema.

² See esp. Reeves, *op.cit.*, pp.302-392, cf. pp.170,302,327,385 for discussions of important concepts relevant to recurrence - Golden Age, *Carolus Redivivus*, etc..

³ *Epistolae*, 5/5/1379. (ET. in E. Emerton, *Humanism and Tyranny; Studies in the Italian Trecento*, Cambridge 1925, pp.300-304).

ideas close to Virgil's could be found in the oracles of the Cumaean Sibyl and in *Ecclesiastes*.¹ In defending a cyclical view of history, however, he subscribed neither to Stoicism nor to neo-Pythagoreanism - though the distinction between these two would have passed him by. He readily admitted that 'nothing returns in precisely the same form', yet somewhat analogously to nature, human affairs had a certain periodicity and 'every day', he insisted, 'we see some image of the past renewed'.² The extraordinary thing is that, instead of justifying this view from classical historiography, Salutati attempted to placate his opponent by resorting to the Great Week model.³ He accepted the basic Augustinian framework of seven Ages, but his modifications, though small, are highly significant. The beginnings of each Age were marked by 'miraculous creations', and the ends by notable slaughters, so that Salutati's picture of world history betrays a certain *alternatio*⁴ (see Diagram XI). Historical processes were cyclical enough for the defence of Virgil, or at least the Virgil who announced the return of general conditions, the Virgil of Servius and the mediaevals, not the neo-Pythagorean who anticipated the veritable recurrence of Achilles and Troy. But of supreme importance here is that the Great Week model comes to confirm rather than weaken the case for historical cyclicism. It is Salutati who demonstrates so clearly why a cyclical view of history or one which conceives of cyclical movements within a history delimited by Creation and the End, was neither logically

¹ *Ibid.* (pp.303-4).

² Cf. *ibid.* (p.305). He quoted *Eccles*, i, 10 (see p.304), the passage which Augustine argued had been misused (by Origen), see *De Civ. Dei*, XII, xiii, cf. Origen, *Cont. Cels.*, IV, 12.

³ Domenico Silvestri, to whom Salutati had turned over previous correspondence with Zonari, effected too violent an attack against the Bolognese on the question of Virgil (cf. B.L. Ullmann, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati (Medioevo e Umanesimo IV)*, Padua, 1963, p.54), thus Salutati probably sought to be more temperate.

⁴ So Emerton, *op.cit.* (p.306).

D I A G R A M X I

	<i>Ages</i>	<i>Miracles</i>	<i>Slaughters</i>
1	Adam to Noah	Creation of Man	The Deluge
2	Noah to Abraham	The Preservation of Noah	Sodom and Gomorrah
3	Abraham to David	The Preservation of Lot before Abraham's journey	Saul's death (= Gilboa)
4	David to the Exile	Preservation of David from Saul's fury	The Babylonian Exile
5	Exile to Incarnation	Preservation of Daniel and the three children	Slaughter of the Innocents
6	Incarnation to Judgement	The New Man, Christ, Created	Roman Civil Wars* Final Conflagration

* The only entrance of secular history into the
schema

nor ideologically incompatible with the Christian *Weltanschauung*. We must insist, however, that he merely articulated what was already inherent in Christian interpretations of history. Only the self-honesty and anti-authoritarianism of an early Renaissance humanist, however, could dispel all those old anxieties about philosophers 'girling in a maize'.

Notions of successive Ages and certain subsidiary ideas of recurrence, then, were carried on in the Christian theology of history. Although stemming mainly from the biblical literature, patristic and mediaeval Age theory was enriched by related classical conceptions in the 'metal' Ages, for instance, the *saeculum*, the body-state analogy, even a special language of circularity - and it is thus a witness to the intersecting of recurrence ideas from two traditions. That is not to gloss over the limits of the integration, however, nor the distinctive qualities of Christian speculation on these matters. The cyclical side of Christian Age theory was not frequently stressed, the idea of any eternal recurrence of eons was considered anathema, and both biblical imagery and typological hermeneutic often had a heavy influence. Even with Salutati's picture we have these same Christian characteristics, although he was more undaunted than his predecessors in espousing a cyclical view of history.

D) The Rise, Fall and Succession of Empires: Patristic and Mediaeval Themes

According to *Daniel*, four kingdoms (probably the Chaldaean, Median, Persian and Greek) emerge on earth one after another. Under the influence of biblical apocalypticism, the early Christians naturally became interested in this imperial succession as a key to world history.¹ One of the earliest commentators was the Roman Hippolytus (ca.170-ca.236). In the four beasts

¹ For waning interest in history amongst the Jewish rabbis (mainly because it had degenerated into a succession of pagan empires), see J. Neusner, 'The Religious Uses of History; Judaism in First-Century AD Palestine and Third-Century Babylonia', in *History and Theory*, V, 1966, p.171.

of the sea from *Dan.*, vii,3-8, and in the multi-metallic image of *Dan.*, ii, 36-45, he saw the four great monarchies of Babylon, Media-Persia, Greece, and most significantly, Rome. And he looked to a final imperishable kingdom to come.¹

Now some pagan historians had already accepted a scheme of four impermanent world monarchies, with an eternal fifth to come (pp.322f). Christian writers, implacably opposed to a pagan empire, were only too happy to reinforce a pre-existing school of 'opposition history',² and they relied above all on *Daniel* to give their position a divine validity.³ It was of course, Jerome's *Commentarii in Daniele* which came to represent the most authoritative exegesis for the mediaevals. Though expanding earlier and simpler interpretations, and removing some of their punch with too much detail,⁴ the central doctrine remained. Human history since Abraham (whose

¹ *Comment. in Dan.*, (Frg.) I;III. Commenting on *Dan.* vii he identified the lion with Babylonia, the eagle with Persia (and Media), the leopard with Alexander and his successors, whilst the fourth and most terrible creature represented Rome. In interpreting the great image of *Dan.* ii, he held the golden head to signify Babylon, the silver shoulders and arms the Medes and Persians, the brass belly and thigh the Greeks, and the legs of iron the Romans. Interestingly enough, Hippolytus treated the four world empires in close conjunction with the Great Week Model (cf. IV), but it is a popular misconception which sees these frameworks sitting together throughout the mediaeval period, for they were in the main kept separate. They did not fit into one another neatly, and the aetates based on biblical history did not correspond with those imperial periods usually nominated when expounding *Daniel*.

² So, esp. Swain, *loc.cit.*, pp.18ff.

³ Justin, the abbreviator of anti-imperialist Trogus also provided an interpretation of Roman history conducive to the Christian outlook (cf. esp. *Hist.*, xxix,2;xxx,3;4;xxxiv,1;3, etc.). However, Swain goes too far in writing: 'The philosophy of history set forth by Jerome and Orosius was derived not from *Daniel* but from the pagans, some of whom had developed its essential features years before the Book of Daniel was written' (*loc.cit.*, p.21). That last part of the sentence may be true, but it proves nothing about the first part, and certainly *Daniel* is the important source for Jerome (cf. *infra*), even if that is not obviously true for Orosius. Cf. Gatz, *op.cit.*, p.107 on Jerome.

⁴ Like Hippolytus, he identified the four metals of the image in *Daniel* ii with Babylon, the Medes and Persians taken together, the Greeks, and Rome (I,ii,31/5) (cf. Turnholdt edit. of *S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Opera*, Pt. 1/5 (*Corpus Christianorum*, [Series Latina], LXXVA), 1964, p.794, ll.388-401), but his interpretation becomes more elaborate in the case of the four beasts. The lion is Babylon, but its various parts - the eagle's wings, its feet, its heart - are taken as the Assyrian, Chaldean and Median empires (II,vii,4).

life-time marked the foundation of the Assyrian or first Babylonian régime) experienced the successive emergence of four 'world' empires. Perhaps Jerome did not dilate either on conceptions of rise and fall or growth and decay, yet the assumption of a recurring emergence and waning of great dynasties was built into this schema, and this is no more evident than in his explicit anticipations of Rome's collapse.¹ His line reflects the weight of his biblical learning of course; rise and fall have far less to do with the curve of the biological principle than the plain fragility and recurrent dissipation of all human things.

This kind of exegesis on *Daniel* had an extensive history through the Middle Ages.² One early modification of the schema, though, bears attention. It is connected with Augustine, and it further highlights that thorny problem of distinguishing between succession and recurrence. As early as the second century BC, the poet Ennius had suggested that Rome was founded in the very year of Assyria's downfall,³ and this notion was probably reproduced in the pages of Varro.⁴ Augustine exploited it with refreshing

The second beast, the bear, is Persia, and its three elements (or ribs) are Babylon, Media and Persia (5), whilst the third represents the Greeks with its four heads going under the names of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Philip and Antigonus (6), and the fourth and most formidable beast is Rome (7a) (cf. Turnholdt edit., pp.839-42). Jerome had a far greater awareness of the complexities of dynastic history than the biblical author, and he exploited the Danielic imagery to account for sub-developments within the greater process of succession. Yet he was disadvantaged by the fact that Daniel's prophecy had to be interpreted to take in the emergence of the Roman Empire (which the biblical author had not originally foreseen). Incidentally, in revising Eusebius' *Chronicle* (at a time before his commentary on *Daniel*?), Jerome found difficulty in accommodating the Medes to the four world-monarchy schema (see Schoene edn., pp.121f., cf. Swain, *loc.cit.*, p.19). Eusebius had not adopted the four monarchy scheme in his *Chronicorum*, but did expound it in his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, XV (Frg.1) (Heikel edit., p.494), naming the empires: Assyria, Persia, Macedonia and Rome.

¹ Cf. esp. *Epistulae*, CXXVII,3;12.

² An appropriate list of references may be found in the notes of the ever-industrious H.H. Rowley, in his *Darius the Mede and the Four World Empires in the Book of Daniel*, Oxford, 1935, pp.74-6.

³ *Annales*, Frg.501 (Vahlen edit.), the year being estimated at 880 BC.

⁴ I.e., *apud* Augustine, *De Civ. Dei.*, XVIII,xxii if Swain's guess is correct (*loc.cit.*, p.14); and for Augustine's extensive use of Varro, cf. *De Civ. Dei.*, VI-VII.

vigour. He not only implied that Rome was the 'true' dynastic heir of the first great empire (a view which doubtless preceded him),¹ but he also referred to Rome as the 'second Babylon' and to Babylon as the 'first Rome'.² He thus simplified the older four part schema into two, both Babylons representing the Earthly City from post-diluvian times until his own day. This city, Augustine insisted, was built straight after the Deluge. It was not raised by Semiramis, king Ninus' mother, as Trogus had claimed; nor was it merely a very old Assyrian city, after Orosius.³ Semiramis may have repaired it (*Civ. Dei*, XVIII,ii), but its true beginnings were in the tower of Babel (= Babylon), and its originators were 'the wicked' (XVI,xi). Babylon eventually took the form of the Assyrian empire, lasting until the reign of the Judaeen Hezekiah. It endured just short of a millennium, and most significantly of all, collapsed at the very time when Romulus founded Rome (XVIII,xxii).

On the one hand, then, Augustine disclosed the continuity of the *Civitas Terrana*, yet on the other he taught the parallel rise and dissolution of the two Babylons. The relative tension between ideas of progression and repetition recalls the Chronicler, perhaps (pp.237f). In Augustine's case, however, we are not dealing with one cultural tradition, but with a special kind of succession - both a transmission of power and the recurrence of broadly conceived phenomena. Recurrent rise and fall, moreover, was reinforced by Augustine's stress on 'the mutability of the human estate' (e.g. XVII,xiii). By this second idea he did not mean to

¹ See esp. *ibid.*, XVIII,xxii;xxvii, etc..

² Cf. esp. *ibid.*, XVIII,xxii and ii. Of some (but often over-played) background importance, *I Pet.*, v,13; *Rev.*, xiv,8;xvi,19 etc..

³ Trogus, *apud Justin, Hist.*, I,2. Orosius, *Historia*, II,2. As Bks. XI-XXII of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* were written after Orosius' *Historia*, it is important to be aware of Augustine's implicit criticisms of his student's work, a work which, even if written at Augustine's instigation, was the product of an independent mind and which betrays certain unAugustinian characteristics, cf. esp. Mommsen, 'Orosius and Augustine', in *op.cit.*, pp.329 ff.

stress history's infinite variety, but its frequent turns of fortune or vicissitudes, of which the rise and fall of great empires was the choicest example. That was a view which became very popular amongst mediaevals.

The tension between progressionism and the idea of recurrence was sharpened in subsequent world-monarchy theory. Following his north African mentor, Orosius (early fifth century) contended that there had been two great empires, the Assyrian and the Roman, one collapsing and the other originating during the same 'reign'. Orosius, however, played more mysteriously with chronology. He noted, for instance, that between the first year of Ninus' reign and the restoration of Babylon by Semiramis, and between the first year of the reign of Procas, Assyria's last king, and the time when Romulus founded Rome, there were two parallel time-intervals, each sixty-four years in length (*Hist.*, II, 2). With a characteristically 'patristic' approach, then, Orosius laboured the recurrence of specified time-intervals. He took the two great satellite empires of Macedonia and Carthage to have each lasted seven hundred years. The great power of Babylon, by contrast, if one calculated its duration from its origins to its conquest by Cyrus, lasted twice that length, and a similar estimate seems to be given to the life-span of Rome. Rome according to Orosius, was almost extinguished by fire during the seven-hundredth year of its existence (53 BC?), that is, halfway through its career. It was also seriously afflicted by the Goths in the same year of its existence as that of Babylon when laid waste by the Medes, and a comparable doom to Babylon's was not far off.¹

For Orosius, all these facts made it 'clearer that God is the one ruler of Ages, kingdoms and places'. God's providence was certainly reflected

¹ See esp. *Hist.* II, 1; VII, 2. The two secondary empires of Macedonia and Carthage arose from the north and south, whilst Assyria and Rome sprang from the east and west (cf. I, 1-2). The first two came 'as protectors and guardians' whilst supremacy was being transferred to the Romans', and these empires were 'accepted by the power of time, not (as Assyria and Rome) by the law of inheritance' (II, 1).

in history's continuity, especially in the transference of rôles and properties from one empire to another, the secondary régimes included. On the other hand, it was also confirmed by patterns of recurrence, by duplicated time-lapses too remarkable to be coincidental, and by the repeated appearance and dissolution of the great states.¹

It was in fact Orosius' representation of the two supreme and two 'guardian' empires, as well as his account of the imperial inheritance, which formed the basis for what is known as mediaeval *translatio* theory. The intellectual background to this set of ideas is quite complex, however. For certain Fathers, and especially the Latins Tertullian and Augustine, Rome was wickedness incarnate, a phenomenon to be swept away by God; for such writers as Origen and Jerome it was no more than a tool for making salvation available to countless men.² Others, by contrast, contemplated the promise of a Christianized empire, and they weakened the strong stance on eschatology and Roman degeneration. The transition is nicely illustrated by Lactantius. Whilst persecuted by Diocletian, Lactantius quoted gloomy verses from the Sibylline books, Seneca and pseudo-Hydaspes without compunction, and prophesied the return of world domination to the Orient.³ On Constantine's rise to power in 312, however, his tune changed, and he prefaced a later work with rhetorical phrases about a great restoration and a divine victory for the servants of God, even about 'perpetual peace'.⁴

¹ These empires provided a structural basis for Orosius' work and its divisions. Bk.I of the *Historia* deals with Assyria, II-III with Macedonia, IV Carthage and V-VII Rome. So Swain, *loc.cit.*, p.21, and against Griffith, *ERE*, vol.1, p.190. Swain also contends that, in Book VII, we watch the fifth monarchy gradually replace the fourth, but for a different view, see *infra*. For Orosius, incidentally, Carthage and Macedon rose coincidentally with Assyria's fall, cf. VII,2.

² Cf. esp. Rehm, *op.cit.*, pp.20-26. Minor figures of interest one may link with the stronger Latin view would include Arnobius and Minucius Felix, and with the notion of providential conditions enabling Christianity to spread, Melito of Sardis (second century).

³ *Div. Inst.*, VII,xv; cf. also *De Ira Dei*, xxiii.

⁴ *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, i; cf. also lii. The quoted phrase is part of Constantinian ideology cf. Eusebius, *Eccles. Hist.*, X,iv,72.

His contemporary, Eusebius of Caesarea, waxed even more enthusiastic about the new situation. If the Incarnation had once coincided with the *Pax Romana*, a 'close parallel between the victory of Christian monotheism and the growth of the Roman Monarchy' had now become clear.¹ For Eusebius, indeed, Constantine's reign was the Golden Age returned. The first empire was the Assyrian, out of which the righteous Abraham had been called; but now patriarchal spirituality had revived under Constantine - a 'second Abraham' - even if its effect was obviously far broader, and its context, within the last empire, was different. 'The essence of Eusebius' view was that the clock had been put back, that history was repeating itself,' although this was hardly recurrence to suit any neo-Pythagorean or Stoic, for 'now the 'bright intellectual daylight' had dawned and there was no night to follow'.² With both Lactantius and Eusebius, then, hopes for the Church's bright terrestrial future did not discourage ^{them} from appealing to the idea of historical repetition.

The above tendencies towards de-eschatologization were hardly without influence. Orosius, for one, felt the need to match Augustinian pessimism with hopes about the empire's future. *Nos in ultimo tempore positi*, he certainly admitted,³ but he also believed that general human conditions were better with the steady Christianization of the Roman world (*Hist.*, IV, 12,V,1-2;11,VII,35,etc.). He could afford to be less optimistic than Eusebius, however; since Constantine there had been persecutors and not just Christians at the helm of the empire, and despite the great reign of Theodosius I, the possibility of further difficulties for the Church (and

¹ So, for the quotation, T.E. Mommsen, 'St. Augustine and the Christian idea of Progress', *op.cit.*, p.283, cf. Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.*, X.

² The quotations derive from D.S. Wallace-Handrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, London, 1960, p.183, cf. also pp.169,173-8, 182-4.

³ See Rehm, *op.cit.*, p.28 - the world is significantly 5,618 years old, and one suspects that the notion of the six millennia of history has more meaning for Orosius than Augustine, who was evasive on this point.

with the barbarian pressures, for the empire) was still present. In the main, Orosius was resigned to writing the history of vicissitudes, of 'ups and downs' in affairs, with the eschaton as the only 'end' of great moment. That was a position which took a grip on the mediaevals. It held on even when all western rulers were avowedly Christian, because it linked biblical assumptions about temporal instabilities with continuing expectations of the Last Time.

Whether pessimistic or optimistic, however, patristic ideas of world history usually reflected intense interest in the city and empire of Rome. As conqueror of 'the whole world', Rome had erected the last great imperial monolith. Yet the *caput mundi* and the western empire actually experienced a 'fall' in 476. A shock indeed! and there was still no evidence of the world's end. For those in the eastern empire, of course, at least after the partition of 395, this thought-provoking eventuality had a ready-made explanation. The Byzantine emperor was accepted as βασιλεὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων and his city as 'new Rome' or just 'Rome'.¹ In the West, however, adjustments did not come so easily, although the doctrine of Rome as the last empire was not abandoned,² and it gathered a new momentum after the 'dark ages'. As early as the *Chronica* of Marianus Scotus in the ninth century the idea of an imperial translation from the old Rome to the northern Frankish dominion makes its appearance.³ The decisive factor in giving feasibility

¹ Cf. esp. W. Hammer 'The Concept of the New or Second Rome in the Middle Ages', in *Speculum*, XIX, 1944, pp.51-2.

² The famous poetic statement: 'Quandiu stat Colisaeus, stat et Roma, Quando cadet Colisaeus, cadet et Roma, Quando cadet Roma, cadet et mundus' (seventh-eighth century), cf. (pseudo-)Bede, *Excerptiones Patrum, Collectanea, Flores ex Diversis, Quaestiones et Parabolae* (PL., vol.94 [col.543]).

³ See esp. W. Goetz, *Translatio Imperii; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsdenken und der politischen Theorien im Mittelalter und der frühen Neuzeit*, Tübingen, 1958, pp.194 ff.

and logical force to the doctrine of *translatio imperii* was, of course, the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor in 800. Aachen became the new Rome, and subsequently Ottonian Trier.¹ The translation of the Roman empire, it was at last contended, passed successively from the Franks to the Germans,² high mediaeval and later theorists viewing Byzantium as the imperial custodian between the fall of pagan Rome and 800.³ As Walter Rehm cogently argued, old patristic notions of degeneration had been transformed into a doctrine of continuity in European history, and although eschatology was still in the background, the vision of this continuity suggested the possibility of 'newness' in the historical order, of a new Rome and a new European unity.⁴ These shifts certainly force one to ask whether older notions of rise and fall had slowly become modified to a more definitely 'successionist' viewpoint to which any sense of historical recurrence does not appertain. The effect of Christian progressionism admitted, however, it cannot be proved that the idea of imperial rise and fall was either consciously modified or suppressed.

Perhaps the figure most usefully studied in an effort to clarify some of the key issues here is Otto of Freising (ca. 1110/5 - 1158), a man of royal blood and Cistercian training, bishop from 1138 on, participant in the Second Crusade, and famed author of the *Gesta Friderici* on the deeds

¹ See esp. Modoin (Naso), *MGH.Poet.*, vol.1, p.390 (esp.vss.24-7); Angilbertus (Homerus), *MGH.Script.*, vol.2, p.395 (also in *MGH.Poet.*, vol.1, p.368), on Aachen as the new Rome; and the anonymous *Vita S.Deicoli*, in *MGH.Script.*, vol.15, pt.2, p.676, the anonymous *Gesta Treverorum*, in *ibid.*, vol.8, p.135, etc. on Trier. Cf. Hammer, *loc.cit.*, pp.56-59 for other texts.

² Of the greatest importance see Otto of Freising, *Chron.Hist.Duab.Civit.*, esp. VI,24 on suggestive ideas about the transference of the empire to eastern Francia, ie., to the Germans. I used the edition of Otto in *Germaniae Historicorum Illustrium* (ed.C.Urstisius), Frankfurt, 1670, pp.1-194, as Hofmeister's edition was not available to me.

³ So Otto (cf. *ibid.*, IV,5; V prolog., (though see also *infra*)), and later, esp. Andreas von Regensburg (15th century), cf. H.Brack, 'Bayerisches Geschichtsverständnis im 15. Jahrhundert', in *Speculum Historiale* (ed. Bauer, et al.), *op.cit.*, pp.337-8, to take central examples.

⁴ *Op.cit.*, pp.28-9.

of Frederick Barbarossa. In Otto's *Chronicon* on the 'two cities',¹ which was a universal chronicle beginning as far back as Adam and finishing as far forward as the mid-twelfth century, one discovers the same tensions of thought just discussed. Otto retained the 'pessimism' towards history of one accepting the imminence of the eschaton (cf. *Chron.*, II, 13 *finis*),² but at the same time he claimed that the City of God had now progressed to the point of almost exterminating the City of Earth, history virtually becoming the history of the Church (V, *prolog.*).³ Otto espoused the theory of *translatio imperii* from the old Rome to the Franks and the Germans, so that he could still hold Rome to be the last of four great empires (following on from the Assyro-Babylonian, the Medo-Persian, the Macedonian, but not the Carthaginian régimes).⁴ The new Christian empire, however, illustrated the further diminution rather than the strengthening of the *Civitas Terrana*.⁵ On the one hand, then, the waning of the empire exemplified the recurrent and inevitable fate befalling man-made institutions, whereas the progress of the Church, on the other, reflected God's eternal strength and foreshadowed his ultimate victory.

On the nature of imperial succession in particular, lineal and recurrence notions present themselves in Otto's work without contradiction.

¹ The full title is given on p.369, n.1, *supra*. The 'two cities' are those of God and Earth conceived in Augustinian terms.

² For the eschatological emphasis amongst near contemporaries, the crusade sermon of St. Bernard (cf. Otto's *Gesta*, I, xxxvii [xxxvi]), and the works of Bernhard of Moles, Gualterus Mapes, Walter von der Vogelweide, Ekkehard of Aura, and Engelbert of Admont are important (cf. esp. Rehm, *op.cit.*, pp.34, 39-40).

³ This progress was from Augustus' day to the present, and it was despite the setback brought on by Arianism and the continuing disobedience of 'Jews and gentiles [=Muslims]'. Cf. also *Gesta*, I, xxix, cf. xlv, on his hopes for further progress through the Second Crusade.

⁴ So, cf. Orosius, see *supra*, p.387, yet cf. Justin, *supra*, p.384, and see Otto's *Chron.*, I, 6ff., II, 1ff.; 25ff.; 40ff., cf. his letter to Rainald, trans. by C.C.Mierow, in his introd. to *The Two Cities; a Chronicle of Universal History to the year 1146 AD by Otto, Bishop of Freising*, (ed. A.P. Evans and C. Knapp), (Records of Civilization), New York, 1928, pp.29-30.

⁵ See esp. *Chron.*, IV, 5, V, *prolog.*. Otto's position seems to anticipate Joachim's projected vision of a future *Ordo* in which traditional forms of earthly existence would be irrelevant, yet Otto's eschatology was no more historicized than Augustine's. *

He asserted, for example, that Rome succeeded Babylon as a son succeeds his father, and he thus took over the Augustinian view that when Babylon fell, Rome was born. Using both the body-state analogy and Orosius' idea of guardianship, moreover, he contended that the Persians and Greeks each protected and guided the Romans in turn, until, reaching robust age (*robustam aetatem*), the Romans threw off the yoke of their teachers and claimed their inheritance (II,27). Again, in Rome's extreme old age (*ultima senectute*), the kingdom of the Franks was just commencing (IV,31 *finis*; 32), and at this stage the eastern empire of Constantinople was the temporary custodian of the dominion which the Franks inherited through Charlemagne (V,31). Now there is an undeniable concern for directionalism in all this. Events form a *cursus* running towards a desirable end. On the other hand, the use of organic language invokes another way of thinking, and Otto did not fail to bring out recurrences from his long story.

In the first place, Otto paralleled stages and special points in the careers of the two great empires of Assyro-Babylonia and Rome. The origin and dissipation of these régimes were similar; they both began to subjugate neighbours soon after their foundations, and they both reached a *summum*, only to be very gradually brought low (IV, 31). In the processes of their degeneration, the taking over of the earlier empire by the Medes was just like the passing of the Roman *imperium* to Constantine (*ibid.*). Before being brought low, both empires were 'dishonoured', the first by Artabus and the second by Alaric (IV,21,cf.31),¹ and they were eventually 'possessed' by foreigners, the former by Cyrus the Persian and the latter by Odovocar the barbarian (IV,31,cf.30). The translations of power subsequent to these possessions were also paralleled (though in this case recurrence was more 'horizontal' than 'vertical'), for Otto claimed that Baghdaḍ, an old centre

¹ In referring to the dishonouring of Rome, Otto attempts to put Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* into its proper context (cf. *infra*, p.406). And on Artabus (or Arbaces the prefect), see *Chron.*, esp. I,31).

of the Turkish empire, was a part of ancient Babylon, just as mediaeval Rome was a part of the old one, and that Ecbatana, the newer royal city in the East, was comparable to the Carolingian Aachen (VI,3).¹ The careers of the great empires, then, disclosed parallel configurations, and the patterns of their rise, fall and changing fortunes were all within the divine plan.

A second way in which Otto educed historical recurrences was through repeatedly emphasizing the mutability of human affairs (*mutatio rerum*). The passing of empires was the grandest illustration of this changeableness, but it was also shown in the altered fortunes of great men,² or in recurring troubles which inflict themselves on any state.³ Otto was happy to call the changing of fortune a *rotatus rerum*,⁴ and to describe vicissitudes as *alternatione* after the manner of the sea ('which is now lifted up by the increases that replenish it, now lowered by natural loss and waste' [II,51, cf. VI, prolog.]). Such up-and-down or over-turning movements, Christian variants of fortune's wheel, lay at the heart of the historical process. Along with other mediaevals, Otto denied that men were citizens of any 'continuing city' (cf. *Heb.*, xiii, 14), and so contrasted the everlasting stability of God with a pageant of temporal flux.

To conclude, then. If the suspicion of philosophical cyclicism was endemic to patristic and mediaeval Christianity, that did not mean a complete abandonment of ancient forms of pattern-making. There are enough views concerning successive Ages and recurrent rise and wane to permit the generalization that certain cyclical notions were firmly imbedded in Christian ways of doing and interpreting history. Expressions of mutability in media-

¹ In the beginning of this passage, it is implied that the king of Egypt was the king of the Babylonians by translation (at least at the time in question, in the eleventh century).

² Cf. esp. II, 14 (on the death of Cyrus), 25 *finis* (on the death of Alexander the Great).

³ So, esp. II, 43 *finis* - 44; 51 (on Rome from the Jugurthine War to Caesar).

⁴ II, 25 (as chapter heading). In Mierow's edn. such headings are placed together on pp. 99-122, whereas in the original they took their place before each chapter. One may assume that Otto used *mutatio* and *rotatio* to convey the same sense of the continual over-turning of events, cf. VI, 31: '....de rerum mutationibus...mundique instabiles rotatus', etc..

eval historiography confirm this judgement. In the West, for example, Orosius had no compunction in describing the troubles of mankind as *bellorum orbes* (*Hist.*, III, 2), nor was Otto alone in likening historical change to tidal oscillations.¹ In the east, where politics admitted of less variation, historical change was often conceived in terms of the successive troubles affecting the Byzantine empire.² Why should it sound surprising, then, that the eminent Michael Psellus (ca.1019-ca.1078), philosopher, historian and secretary of state to two Byzantine emperors, should blithely write of the empire's troubles as ἀνομαλούς ἀνακύκλῃσεις (irregular cyclical processes), or as successive barbarian assaults which were deflected 'like the waves of the sea' (*Chronographia*, VI, 72)?³ And explicit references to cycles nicely illustrate how classical moulds of recurrence informed mediaeval historiography, without denying the fact that the Christian positions remain ideologically distinctive, and that notions of rise and fall, as well as political alternation, had already existed in the biblical tradition.

Not that our account of the penetration of cyclical ideas is complete. We have yet to deal more fully with the notion of fortune's wheel, which was tied in with doctrines of retribution (pp. 399ff)., and there are other special cases to consider.

¹ See Orosius, *Hist.*, VI, 14 for an early example, and Giovanni Colonna, *Mare Historiarum ab Orbe Condita ac Sancti Galli regis Ludovici IX temporare*, (14th century), for a later one. Important background for this conception may be found in Philo's *Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit*, 175-6.

² Procopius' *Hyp. Polem.*, (cf. I, iii, 1ff.; III, i, 1-2; V, i, 9ff., etc.), was a determinative work in this respect. In the West, cf. Augustine, *Civ. Dei.*, XVII, 13.

³ Psellus' approach is not unrelated to yet clearly distinguishable from that of certain ecclesiastics who documented the successive persecutions against God's people. On such recurrent trouble, cf. esp. Eusebius, *Martyrs*, I, 1ff., IX, 1ff., etc., John Chrysostom, *De Providentia Dei*, XVI, 1-4, cf. XIV, 2-16, in the east, with interesting background in Josephus, *Antiq.*, XX, 259-60 (cf. Theodore Metochites, *Historiae Romanae*, [in *Operum ex Recensione*, J. Meursi, ed. J. Lami, Florence, 1746, vol. 7, pp. 791-2]). In the west, cf. Sulpicius Severus, *Sacr. Hist.*, II, 33; Augustine, *Civ. Dei.*, XVIII, 52; Orosius, *Hist.*, esp. VII, and for Joachim, etc., see *supra*, p. 379 and n. 2. With these Christian writers, 'persecution' has been abstracted into a set of conditions which recurs; we are dealing with something more than a mere listing of like phenomena (as in *Heb.*, xi on faithful deeds, or in Sidonius, *Epistularum*, V, vii, 6, on tyrants). Psellus' term ἀνακύκλῃσις is not a Polybian word, cf. pp. 14, 122, (Plato, Plutarch).

E) Special Cases of Cyclical Thinking: Origen, Gemisthius Plethon, Nicephorus Gregoras

As we have already indicated, ideas of cosmic return had next to no Christian supporters. Perhaps some Christian intellectuals held terrestrial events to be determined by heavenly movement,¹ but the doctrine of an eternal recurrence based on planetary periodicity was decried. There were two important eastern figures, nevertheless, who strove to come to terms with classical cosmologies - the patristic writer Origen (ca.185-ca.254), and Gemisthius Plethon (ca.1355-ca.1450), a neo-pagan from the end of the period under discussion. Both committed themselves to the doctrine of metempsychosis and a system of cosmic Ages. Origen the Christian, however, was all too sensitive about what the Bible did not permit. His theology allowed for numerous historical orders (*aiōnes*) both before and after the present one (a view based on *Eccles.*, i, 8ff., *II Cor.*, iv, 18, *Ephes.*, ii, 7),² and he contended that, throughout all Ages, human souls rose and fell in a purificatory process which ended with union with God.³ All such developments, however, lay between the Creation and the Last Things.⁴ Plethon, by contrast, adopted a Pythagorean position, which he claimed was shared by Zoroaster and Plato. Affirming the world's everlastingness, he maintained that for all eternity 'the very same cycles of time, lives and events' would recur.⁵ All

¹ Cf., for eg., Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, VII, xiv (PL., vol. 6, cols. 780ff.); Dante, *Convivio*, XIV, 11; Villani, *Chroniche Fiorentine*, I, 60; II, 2, etc. On Bardesanes, see *supra*, p. 357, n. 1.; on Nicephorus Gregoras, see *infra*, and on such Renaissance writers as Le Roy and Bodin, see ch. 5.

² It is clear that these Ages are not conceived as 'inter-cataclysmic' periods (on Origen and catastrophe theory, see *supra*, p. 303n. 1, p. 354 and n2), but Ages beyond the known historical order from Adam to the 'end of the Age', ie., the end of the known historical order. Cf. *De Princ.*, I, vi, 2 (Latin only); 3; II, iii, 5; III, v, 3. On the biblical basis, see I, iv, 5; III, v, 3, etc., (on *Eccles.*, i, 9-10), I, vi, 3 (on *II Cor.*, and on *Isa.*, lxxv, 17), and II, iii, 5 (on *Ephes.*, and on *Acts*, iii, 21, etc.). On *Acts*, iii, 21, cf. *supra*, p. 303.

³ So *De Princ.*, esp. III, i, 23 (Latin only); 24 (Latin only); vi, lff..

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, I, vi, 1-2; III, v, 1; vi, lff., cf. II, i, 3, yet cf. esp. IV, iv, 1 on the cosmos in a wider sense.

⁵ '....τὰς περιόδους παραπλησίους καὶ βίους ἐκάστατε καὶ πράξεις'; *Nomōn Syngraphēs*, III, (Alexandre edn., [FT], ΠΛΗΘΩΝΟΣ; ΝΟΜΩΝ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ; *Pléthon; Traité des Lois*, Paris, 1858 [Amsterdam, 1966 re-issue]), p. 256, cf. pp. 252, 256 on his three authorities. It was not unusual to hear the claim that

events, he held, were determined by the divine planets,¹ and after every human life cycle the soul passed into a new body.² Plethon's cyclical theory, therefore, was naked and unashamed.

Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to assess the relevance of Plethon's views for historiography. *On the Laws*, his most important tract, is in tatters. We have one interesting clue, though. He referred to two Hercules, one the son of Amphytrion and the other of Alcmena, as the same soul. Two Bacchuses were treated likewise and he also implied that Zoroaster and Plato were the one *psychē*.³ Despite his broadly cosmological preoccupations, these brief allusions to famous personages recall the musing of a man much more interesting in the history of historical thought, one Nicephorus Gregoras (1295-ca.1359), a leading scholar of the fourteenth century Byzantine 'Renaissance'.

Nicephorus had once reflected on how historical occurrences were both continually different yet frequently similar. Rather more interested in the similarities, he argued that it was quite natural if 'resemblances should sometimes present themselves in the diversified unrolling of events'.⁴ Perhaps matter is indeterminate, he wrote, but certain 'mathematical relations' (ἀριθμητικοὺς λόγους), signs of a governing Intelligence,

Plato and Pythagoras taught the same teaching about the origin, transmigrat-
ion and immortality of souls; cf., for an important ex., Theodoros Metochites,
'Υπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ Σημειώσεις Γνωμικαί, vii (on edns. used, *infra*, p.412, n.3.

¹ *Ibid.*, III, xxxi, (pp.120-122 and ff.), cf. II, vi, (p.66). On the significance of Plethon's determinism in the history of thought, cf. F.Masai, *Pléthon et le Platonisme de Mistra*, Paris, 1956, pp.98-100, cf. p.98, n.1.

² '...τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων οὐποτε παύσεσθαι ἀξιούντων τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν θωητῇ ἐκάστοτε κοινωνούσας φύσει, ὅποτε δὴ ἐκάστη ἡ περίοδος καθήκοι (III, p.258), an argument against those (Christian) sophists who promised heavenly rewards.

³ See *Nomōn*, III (p.256 on the two men named Hercules, p.254 on the two Bacchuses, and 252 on the hint concerning the connection between Zoroaster and Plato, when he repeats the claim that just over 5,000 (significant) years separated the two). On the issue of the two men named Hercules, cf. H.J.Rose and C.M.Robertson, in *OCD*, pp.498-9, s.v. 'Heracles'.

⁴ Cf. (to Maximus): ἐπειράθη μηδὲν εἶναι θαυμαστὸν ἀποφῆναι, εἰ ταυτότης ἐν διαφόροις τῶν ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἐχόντων πραγμάτων συμπίπτει ἐξελιγμοῖς (*Epistulae*, LX (between 1330 and 1340), in *Correspondence de Nicéphore Grégoras* (ed. R.Guilland, (Collection Byzantine), Paris, 1927, p.203 [11.4-6]). This was avowedly on Plutarch's authority.

consistently 'find themselves', and even if products of different sets of conditions, they come to resemble each other.¹ More significantly, these conjunctions of events

reappear cyclically many times in a similar manner, and
periodically produce identical effects.²

For Nicephorus, reference to such recurring cycles was not heretical. Be that as it may, the last, more momentous, part of this sentence finds him in deeper water. Interestingly Nicephorus allowed for the recurrence of identical conditions! This Pythagorean element did not fit easily with his treatment of repetitions in more general terms. But he defended it from history nevertheless:

There existed, we know, two Heracles, one in Egypt and the other in Boeotia; they carried the same name and there was no difference between one and the other. Their exploits, the proof of their wisdom, were identical. Of the two men under the name of Perseus, one, it is said, fought a war against the Gorgons, dwelt in Atlanta and strengthened the Atlantids' invincible power; the other was from Macedonia, and he combatted the Romans, effecting astounding victories against them. There were two Scipios, both very powerful at Rome; the one acquired glory from devastating Africa almost in its entirety, the other from his razing of the great African metropolis, Carthage, much later.³

Nicephorus, however, was in logical difficulties. How could there be exact recurrence of any given event without the exact repetition of all its causal antecedents and subsequent effects? Identical conditions could only recur, he acknowledged, alongside of and even integrated with different or new sets of conditions. The two Perseuses, for instance, inhabited different lands and performed distinguishable if similar deeds.

¹ *Ibid.*, p.203; and on the notion of affairs ruled by a rational Mind rather than by mere automaton, see *ibid.*, pp.203-5, cf. *Epist.*, LIII (to Pepagomene) (between 1330 and 40) (p.199).

² 'καὶ πολλάκις ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦς ἀνακυκλουμένους ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ περιόδους συμπίπτειν τὴν γένεσιν εἰς ταυτότητα προξενούντας' (*Epist.* LX in *ibid.* p.203). My italics.

³ *Ibid.*, p.203. On the issue concerned with the two Hercules, see *supra*. The details about the first Perseus are from Hesiod, *Theog.*, ll. 274-81, *Buckle of Heracles*, ll. 216-31, and about the second from Polybius, cf. *supra*. The two Scipios were, we may assume, Africanus and Aemilianus.

Such compromise with Greek cosmology, then, had its awkwardness. In a later letter, however, Nicephorus managed to arrive at a more sophisticated position when discussing history as the work of a divine embroiderer or weaver. To use the illustration of a woven cloth, especially material in the making, clarifies his case with striking brilliance. On a piece of cloth one may observe 'identical conditions' in various parts of its complex patterning, yet the precise locations of these conditions differ. Thus in history there may be a continual overthrowing of resemblance by uniqueness or distinctiveness, yet at the same time conditions are persistently reuniting in characteristic ways, so that sometimes 'there are produced harmonies of identity.'¹

Nicephorus is an important figure we must return to (pp. 411ff.). His manner of reckoning with both the particular and general, the unique and the recurrent, in historical development is highly captivating. On the philosophy of history, however, he said too little, although one is probably justified in claiming him to be the most intellectually rewarding of the cyclical thinkers of the West between Hellenistic times and the Renaissance.

G) Principles of Retribution; from Later Antiquity to the Early Renaissance

Nicephorus also espoused a doctrine of divine rewards and punishments in history, and at this point we may conveniently turn to reciprocal ideas of recurrence, and to that important area concerned with the moral order.

The idea of a recurrently actualized moral order found a ready acceptance amongst Christian writers. It had a basis in both traditions; in the holy scriptures and in the Graeco-Roman culture of Mediterranean converts.

¹ 'παρὰ πλέξιν ἁρμονίας ταυτότητος'; see *Epist.* CLII (to Matthew Cantacuzenos, son of the King) (between 1340-50), in *ibid.*, p. 239. Nicephorus alluded to another illustration to reinforce the cloth image: amongst individuals, blood and facial features may reflect remarkable similarities, yet character development may produce differences.

More than either Age theory or doctrines of rise and fall, it pointed to a supernatural overlordship. Even if the name of the key agencies could be different (tychē and Yahweh are so different!) there were crucial points of intersection, particularly in the appeal to divine *pronoia* or *providentia*. And if there had been more than one reciprocal paradigm amongst the pagans, the invocation of retributive principles steadily gained the most popularity even before the Christian empire.

We may go back as far as Diodorus (first century BC). Of all Polybius' successors, he was the most thoroughgoing in his attempt to trace the recurrent operation of retributive principles in 'world history'.¹ He was, however, a populariser. Rather unsubtle, he could not sustain the different levels of causal explanation managed by his great predecessor. And too eager to justify the works of *Dikē*, he frequently misrepresented his sources.² Yet his straightforward approach remains instructive. History's eventualities, it seems, were consistently prone to be 'morally fitting' (p.339), so that changes of fortune and circumstance usually had moral explanations. To take the case of a nation, Diodorus suggested that Athens suffered the Sicilian disaster because of her extreme arrogance (cf. *Biblioth.*, XIII,xxi,1-xxiv,6). The Carthaginians, moreover, lost Sicily for similar reasons (cf. esp. XIV,lxxvii,4), and whereas Sparta and Macedonia collapsed for lack of virtue (XV,xix,4;1,1-2;XVIII,xlii,2;XXVIII,vii,cf.XXI,viii,2), Philip II and the Romans had had their moments of glory for

¹ It has been recently contended by A.A. de Miranda ('La Irreligiosidad de Polibio', in *Emerita*, XXIV,1956, esp.p.60) that Polybius' outlook on the moral order did not continue to be taken seriously after him, and that such words as νέμεσις, τύχη and μῆνις τῶν θεῶν (wrath of the gods) became mere rhetorical figures of speech; but Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* stands as a disproof of such arguments, so unflagging is he in his documentation of Justice's work amongst men.

² A useful and relevant article: R. Drews, 'Diodorus, etc.', *loc.cit.*, pp. 383-92. Unfortunately, scholars have been left trying to extract some important (yet non-extant) sources for Greek history from the anaemic popularism of the *Bibliothēke*.

possessing it (XVI,i,4-6; xxxviii,2; lx,4; lxiv,3;¹ XXVII,iii *fin.*). What Diodorus considered to be *aretē* and its absence was standard. Moderation was a priceless asset and excess abhorrent. If Athens had failed to be humble herself towards fortune and had initiated an unjust war (XIII,xxi,2-5), men could learn a better lesson from the Sicilian Gelon, who prospered by being 'so clement amid constant excess' (xxii,6, cf.4-5). Piety, as against *asebeia*, was another imperative. *Timōria* came consistently to those who flouted the gods or pillaged sacred shrines, to men like Philomenus the Phocian, Antiochus Epiphanes and the tribune Aulus.²

Now the teaching that immoderateness incurred trouble or punishment was a common theme of Antiquity.³ Diodorus is crucial in illustrating the truth so painstakingly, and in such a way as to convey the impression of recurrently operative principles. His doctrine of requited arrogance, moreover, complemented his treatment of *tychē*. Though the alternating shifts of fortune seem morally neutral and certainly unexpected, a super-

¹ Diodorus explained Philip's rise to power in terms of his assistance to the beleaguered Apollo, i.e. after the pillaging of the Delphi oracle which 'caused' the Sacred War, cf. Drews, *loc.cit.*, p.391, and *infra*.

² Philomenus and his henchman were punished for capturing the Delphic shrine and initiating the Sacred War, but only after a time (XVI,xiv,3-5; lxi,1-2). Antiochus and Aulus were both requited quickly for insulting eastern deities (XXIX,xv; XXXVI,xiii,1-3). Sometimes punishment only came with bequeathed notoriety, and with this notion Diodorus shows that the neutral death of an evil man does not cut across the moral order. 'Let no man', he concludes on this very point, 'who has gained some kind of pre-eminence, cherish the hope that, if he commits great crimes, he will escape notice for all time.' (XIV,i,2).

³ In historiographers, for example; Poseidonius, *apud* Athenaeus, X,439e; XII,542b,549d-e, etc.; Dionysius of Halic, XX,x,2, etc.; Dio Cassius, *Hist.*, I,v,4, (cf. XLIV,xxvii,3-4); IV,xvii,2; V,xxi,2; VII,xxxvi,25; IX,xxxix,3, etc.; Plutarch, *Vit.*, Alcibiades and Coriolanus compared, iii,1 ff., Pelopidas, xxxv, 2ff., Caius Marius, xxiii,1; Demetrius and Antony compared, iii, 1ff., Otho, ii, 1ff., etc.; Florus, I,vii(13),1-3; xvi(21); xviii,29-30; xlv,5-6, etc.; Ammianus Marcellinus, XIV,i,1,3; XXVI,viii,13; XXXI,xiii,17-8, etc.; 'Vopiscus', *Vit.Car.*, VIII,1-3; IX,1-3, XIII,2-3, etc.. In moralists, for example: Seneca, *Epist.Mor.*, xcvi,13-14; Cicero, *De Offic.*, III,v and ff.; Plutarch, *Consol. Apoll.*, esp. 105B; Marcus Aurelius, *Medit.*, XII,5; Athenaeus esp. XII,523c ff.; Julian, *Epist.*, xlii (388c), (cf. *Against the Galileans*, 161A-171D), etc.

natural providence lies behind all. As already hinted, even empires rise if they possess virtue (for *tychē/pronoia* will support them!) and fall for lack of it.¹ Though they did not appeal to fortune, the Christian Fathers would have been impressed. It is interesting how serious-minded pagans and early Christians sometimes talked the same language whilst drawing different conclusions. That there was a correspondence between moral behaviour and 'consequences', moreover, was defended by various historians of Rome.

Livy, for example, had ascribed Roman *degeneratio* to the decline of ancient virtues, whilst later pagans laid the blame for Rome's troubles at the feet of the sacrilegious Christians.² The same sort of general assumptions, already in biblical literature, appeared in Christian historiography, though we must reckon with different contexts and important intellectual shifts.

In times of bloody persecution, Christians could afford to question a moral order within history. After all, certain biblical writers had been uneasy about it (see Jer. xii,1, Ps., lxxiii,3 [on the prosperity of the

¹ On unexpected turns of fortune, cf. esp. XVIII, lix,5; τὰ μέρη τῆς τύχης παλίρροιαν, Diodorus exploited the notion of the παράδοξον (inherited from Polybius and Philinus) in this connection, cf. esp. XIII,xxiii,3; XVIII,liii,2;4. On the hybristic cycle, see esp. XXVII,vi,2;xv,2;xi,3,XXIII,xv,106. Concerning rise and fall, Media collapsed because of her brutality towards the Persians, Persia and Athens for their inclemencies against Hellas and Sicily respectively. By contrast, Cyrus' restraint towards Croesus (cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, I,87 ff.) is the moral paradigm explaining Persia's rise, just as Athen's successes were due to their championing of the Hellenic cause, and Rome's to her (pre-Gracchan) *aretē* (cf. XIII,xxv,1-2;xxii,103, etc.).

² See esp. Zosimus, II,viii;xlix,IV,xl (cf. xxxiii;lix), etc., Julian, *Against the Galileans*, 193C ff., cf. *Epist.*, x;xxii,lxxxi, cf. Eutropius, *Breviarum ab Urbe Condita*, X,16-17 (on favourability towards Julian's persecution of Christians, and on the Christian emperor Jovian's dishonouring of Rome), note Symmachus' refusal to honour Jovian as distinct from other emperors; cf. RCAW vol.4A, pp.1152-3, cf. Ammianus Marc., XXXI,xii,9; cf. 10-xiii,13 and see also XV,vii,6-10 (though Ammianus was remarkably fair towards the Christians, cf. XX,vii,7;XXII,x,7;xi,9-11;xiii,1-5 etc., and on his critical approach towards Julian's reign, see esp. K. Rosen, *Studien zur Darstellungskunst und Glaubwürdigkeit des Ammianus Marcellinus*, Bonn, 1970, pp.132 ff.). Cf. also A. Momigliano, 'Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century AD', in his *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, Oxford, 1963, esp. p.81.

wicked] cf. *Jn.*, ix, 2-3, *Job*);¹ and there were also some non-Christian moralists who were sensitive about relevant discrepancies by-passed by the popularisers. The divine vengeance seemed to be frequently delayed, for instance, and innocent victims more than often died before they could see retribution fall on those who afflicted them.² Questioning souls were justifiably troubled. The dogmas that, in the event of delayed punishment, the evildoer would suffer either inward torture in life or notoriety in death, and that those who suffered undeservedly would be honoured in posterity,³ came to be seen as flimsy rationalizations. Naturally enough, the belief in *other-worldly* rewards and punishments received a greater airing in later Antiquity, and increasingly so the more there was intellectual interchange between pagan and Christian.⁴ It is fair to assert that Christian beliefs about heaven and hell provided more intellectually satisfying solutions to the problems of the moral order than those offered by pagans, who often added a blind fatalism to their face-saving explanations. That is an

¹ Subsequent redaction of *Job*, however, obscures the original poet's penetrating critique of this correspondence; see esp. S. Terrien, 'The Book of Job', in *The Interpreter's Bible*, New York, 1954, vol. 3, pp. 878a-902a.

² See esp. Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, 548C-549D.

³ See esp. Diodorus, XVI, lxi, 1-4; cf. Cicero, *Pro Sestio*, lxvii, 40. For distant background, Theognis, 315-8.

⁴ Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* (cf. vii, 25) represented important background for later antique thinking about the extra-terrestrial fate, bringing together as it did views held about the soul by Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics, and applying them to Roman thoughts about *virtus*. For its subsequent importance, note esp. Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*. But for interest in other-worldly rewards and punishments in general, cf. esp. M.P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, V, 2)*, Munich, 1924, vol. 2, esp. pp. 220 ff.; and on the questioning of traditional views of the moral order, note as examples: Plutarch, *Ser. Num.*, 548B ff., cf. *Vit.*, (Pelopidas and Marcellus Compared) ii, 1-111, 4, and *apud* John Chrysostom, *De Provid.*, IX, 5 (cf. G. Soury, 'Le Problème de la Providence et Plutarque', in *Revue des Études Grecques*, LVIII, 1945, pp. 163 ff.); Aurelius, IX, 2; Sallustius, (Nock edn., p. lxxv), etc.. The evidence for pagan belief in the moral order and the principles of divine retribution, however, goes as far forward as the sixth century AD (cf. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt [eds.], *Greek Papyri*, Oxford, 1896, vol. 2, p. 84).

interesting sidelight in the history of Christianity's rise to ideological supremacy. But we must not forget the two main lines of thought amongst Christians. For Luke, and the great OT histories behind him, the moral order was reflected within history, although even within Luke speculations about the after-life and the eschaton had broadened the perspective. From as early as Nero's day on the other hand, a key problem for Christians was the agony of the martyrs, and doctrines of both other-worldly recompenses and imminent judgement endowed such tribulation with ethical meaning. However, the line of thought concentrating on the known historical order was attractive for those who sought a more direct *rapprochement* with pagan historiography, and it was also quite naturally resurgent when anti-Christian persecution diminished.

Lactantius merits consideration here. In his *De Mortibus Persecutorum* (318?), written under Constantine the Great, he placed a strong - almost pagan?¹ - emphasis on the correspondence between moral action and consequence within history. He demonstrated how consistently those emperors and imperial pretenders who had persecuted or opposed the Christians died horrible deaths, 'the adversaries of God always receiving wages worthy of their crime' (V). Lactantius' methods, then, betray his unmistakeably anti-pagan commitments; the pre-Constantinian emperors were veritable criminals paying for their evils.² Unlike Eutropius, he could hardly deem such unbelievers 'worthy to be enrolled amongst the gods', and unlike Zosimus, he took the arrogance of the emperors and not the sacrilege of the Christians to be the cause of the

¹ Lactantius had the shadow of heterodoxy cast over him more than once, cf. esp. Cochrane, *op.cit.*, pp.218 ff.

² Cf. ii (Nero), iii (Domitian), iv, Decius, v (Valerian), vi (Aurelian), xvii (Diocletian) (though cf. ix where Lactantius has to reckon with Diocletian's long and felicitous reign, which lasted 'for as long as he did not defile his hands with the blood of the just'), xxiv, xxxiii, cf. xx (Galerius Maximian), xxvi (Severus), xxviii, xxx (Maximinus Hercules, whose flight from Rome is paralleled with that of Tarquinius Superbus), xliv-1 (Maximin).

empire's troubles.¹ In a persuasive fashion, he turned popular pagan historiographical assumptions to the service of the Christian God, who propelled the recurring operation of retributive principles.² And this God not only effected requital against the persecutors, but rewarded the innocent by the restoration of his Church under Constantine.³ The delay of this victory was ascribed to the divine patience.⁴ The divine Being has no shadow of capriciousness about him. Lactantius' position heralds the mainstream Christian position on *fortuna*; the element of caprice is removed from providentialism, so that a positively ethical monotheism takes over.⁵ The punishments of the persecutors were thus viewed as a series of 'great and remarkable examples from which posterity might learn that there is but one God'. (*Mort. Pers.*, i).

Eusebius was one important contemporary of Lactantius who agreed that history was teaching men the truth of monotheism. He was less interested in recurrent instances of retribution, however, thanⁱⁿ the plan of salvation which made world Christianization possible under Constantine.⁶ It was he

¹ On divine enrolment, cf. esp. Eutropius, *Brev. Urb. Cond.*, IX,28; X,2, etc. Even Constantine and Jovian, though Christians, were enrolled as gods! (X,8;18). On Lactantius' *hybris* theme, cf. vii (Diocletian), ix (Galerius Maximian), and for Zosimus on the unacceptable Christian participation in imperial rites, see *Hist. Nov.*, esp. III-IV.

² God appears as the subject of historical action in *Mort. Pers.*, xxxi (on this issue, cf. *supra*, p. 361, n.2).

³ Cf. i, xxiv *finis*, xxxiv, xlvi, lli, cf. xviii, xlv, etc. and for further references on the vindication of the Christians against their persecutors, note *De Ira Dei*, xvi, *Div. Inst.*, V, xxii-xxiv.

⁴ Cf. esp. *Ira Dei.*, xx; *Div. Inst.*, II, xvii.

⁵ On Lactantius' 'annihilation' of fortune, see *De Falsa Sapientia Philosophorum*, III, xxviii, xxix (PL., vol. 6 [cols. 437-8, 440-2]), and see Augustine, later, in *Civ. Dei.*, IV, xviii (PL., vol. 41 [cols. 196-7]). As a result of their approaches, western mediaeval appeals to *fortuna* in history were rare. Boethius (480?-524), however, partly salvaged fortune from theological suspicion. He wrote little of her work in history, however (see *Philosophiae Consolatio* [using R. Peiper ed., Leipzig, 1871] II, pr.ii, 32A on the falls of Perseus and Croesus), and concentrated on her effect on private affairs (see esp. II, pr.ii, 27 ff., iii, 36-7, etc.). For Boethius, moreover, the element of chance in life is only motion and change on the rim of the great wheel of which God is the centre (IV, pr.vi, 21 ff.), and Christian prudence can overcome fortune's caprice. See also *infra*, pp. 412ff..

⁶ See esp. *Hist. Eccles.*, X.

above all who challenged the old pessimistic-eschatological approach to *Heilsgeschichte*. But the Eusebian vision lost its clarity on Constantine's death, with the resurgence of paganism, the Arian schism and a furthering of the split between east and west. When Eusebius' avowed continuator Socrates (ca.380-450) wrote his account of these new, disturbing events,¹ reciprocal paradigms make a re-appearance. Socrates adopted the view that the empire was only providentially supported when there was a right relationship between Church and State - an interesting jump.

'The mischiefs of the State and the troubles of the Church have been inseparably connected....They have either arisen together or immediately succeeded one another,.....so that I cannot believe this invariable interchange is merely fortuitous, but am persuaded that it proceeds from our iniquities, and that these evils are inflicted on us as merited chastisements'.²

Socrates openly adopted the principle of *do ut des* (give and be given to). History proved that the empire would be protected if Christian emperors upheld orthodoxy - an apologetic line against those who were pointing the finger at the *homoousios* party, and an approach still current in the east two centuries later.³

In the west, comparable interpretations were applied to post-Constantinian developments by Orosius. The pagans, as is well known from Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, had blamed the Christians for Alaric's sack of Rome. That imputation in itself reflected assumptions about historical retribution or the religious principle of *do ut des*. Orosius responded to the challenge, not by denying the premises like Augustine, but by working out their logic in Christian terms. His analyses of events from Constantine to Honorius

¹ Cf. *Hist.Eccles.*, esp. II, 1ff., III, 1ff., IV, 1ff..

² *Ibid.*, V, proem..

³ On Socrates himself see *ibid.*, I, 16; 18; 34, V, 10, VI, 6, VII, 20; 23. Two centuries later, the Byzantine church historian Evagrius (536-600) insisted that 'earthquakes, pestilence and other disasters' in the empire were expressions of God's wrath against heresy and disobedience (*Hist.Eccles.*, II, 13, IV, 8; 29) - a counterblast against Zosimus (cf. III, 40ff.). By Evagrius' time western events were too disorderly and east-west friction too sharp for the Byzantines to record them; cf. esp. Sozomen, *Hist.Eccles.*, III, 7, VII, 10, and see G.Downey, 'The Perspective of the Early Church Historians', in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, VI, 1965, p.66.

(*Hist.*, VII, 28-43) are especially interesting. In Bk. VII he

'set forth what persecutions of the Christians have been carried out and what retributions have followed, aside from the fact that all men are prone to sin and are accordingly punished individually' (VI, 22 *finis*).

Constantine, according to Orosius, had reversed the old order, and yet not all his successors imitated him, and taking each at a time, the historian proved that 'divine judgement ever keeps watch for a twofold purpose', to assist those who hope in the Church and punish those who condemn it (36 *finis*). Evil Constantine II, Constans, Julian the Apostate, Valero the Arian, as well as both the defecting Mascezel and Radagaisus the Goth, were all requited by horrific deaths,¹ whilst the orthodox emperors were not.² Even Jovian, whom Eutropius castigated for being the first emperor to ever cede Roman territory to an enemy,³ and who in fact died a ghastly death, received Orosius' quiet sympathy (31). On coming to the barbarian incursions into Italy, and their assaults on the city of Rome, Orosius sought to hoist the pagans with their own petard. Through the barbarians God was punishing the blasphemous city for all her past (and to some extent persistent) evils; eventualities would have been far worse, had it not been for the presence of Christians in Rome, who were protected by God (37; 39). The pagans were thus mistaken in accusing the Christians (cf. 37), just as they were mistaken earlier in believing that Roman *virtus* and not God saved Rome from Hannibal, for it was God who had done that, meting out only a partial punishment on the city because of the faithful Romans to come (IV, 17). Orosius, then, wrote history like his pagan predecessors, yet with the biblical God as the divine governor. Joining Lactantius and Socrates, he produced a type of 'official history' of momentous political events, but

¹ Cf. *Hist.*, VII, 29; 30 *finis*; 33; 36; 37, and on Stilicho and Eucherius, 38.

² Cf., *ibid.*, VII, 28 *finis* (Constantine), 32 *finis* (Valentinian), 34 *finis* (Gratian, the case of an innocent suffering death which requires the punishment of the murderer), 35 *finis* (Theodosius the Great). Afflictions borne by the Christian Church were innocent sufferings that formed a sign of Providence, and the hope of an other-worldly homeland (cf. esp. 41).

³ Cf. *Brev. ab Urb. Cond.*, X, 17.

with a Christian interpretation to counter tenaciously held pagan alternatives.

Such late patristic treatments of the moral order seem a far cry from the subtleties of Polybius. Though simplistic, however, these approaches actually expose the recurrence element in retributive thinking even more starkly than the pages of the Polybian *Historiae*. The idea of historical recurrence, they also confirm, is hardly foreign to Christian historiography.

In the west, on the other hand, there were men whose understanding of history followed a contrary train of thought. If, due to the stable succession of the Byzantine *basileia*, easterners tended to assess historical developments in terms of each emperor's reign, or historical fluctuations in the light of each emperor's moral and spiritual worth, in the west the onthrust of the barbarians, coupled with some of the peculiarities of Latin theology, made for a different outlook. Under the thoroughly pagan circumstances of the late second century, Tertullian could only foresee judgement upon iniquitous Rome;¹ in the uncertainties of immediately post-Constantinian times, Cyprian saw the sorry world in old age awaiting its Judge.² Such gloominess persisted in the thinking of Augustine and his Gallic contemporary Salvianus (ca.400-ca.480), who became only too conscious of the great barbarian threat to the empire. Both held up the threat of damnation against Rome, and their sense of an imminent Judgement cut right across any hopeful talk about alternations between good and bad amongst the emperors. Salvianus went so far as to argue that, except for certain Romans who were true to the faith, 'the others are all or almost all more guilty than the barbarians, and more criminal in their lives.'³ Now to the extent that Augustine and Salvianus saw the trouble of the empire as 'punishment

¹ See *Apologia*, xx; xxxii,1; xli,1, etc.

² Cf. *Ad Demetrianum*, ii-iv.

³ *De Gubernatione Dei*, IV,13 for the quotation, cf.12ff. The seeds of the idea of a 'new barbarism', important for the later history of recurrence ideas (Vico, Brook Adams, etc.), may be found in Salvianus.

fitting the crime', they accorded with the older representation of retributive principles.¹ Yet in the early parts of *De Civitate Dei*, of course, Augustine succeeded in launching a highly sophisticated onslaught against the pagan interpretation of retributive principles, against the notions that Rome's past successes had been due to a virtuous adherence to traditional religion, and that the deaths of her past great ones had been 'fitting'.² His appeal to a heavenly city both in and beyond this world vitiated the rather outworn doctrine that the moral order worked itself out purely within history,³ and Augustine's whole approach to grace, moreover, was alien to that more 'official' Christian philosophy of history found in Socrates or Orosius.⁴ If Augustine had requested Orosius to demonstrate how wars, diseases, sorrows and famine had always been with men, and not just in the present time, he was uneasy about his friend's rather naive applications of retributive logic.⁵ Admittedly Orosius acknowledged extra-terrestrial judgement for individuals, but he still had not achieved what Augustine prized so vehemently - the freeing of God from limiting assumptions about rewards and punishments in history. As for Salvianus, he made the somewhat 'aristocratic' view of the reciprocity between action and consequence look positively genteel, even irrelevant, since he saw no immediate hope for his contemporaries even if they did repent.⁶

¹ In fact, Augustine was not only prepared to blame paganism for calamities in Roman history, but even contended that 'if these [pagan] gods...were unknown...and [the true God] alone was known and worshipped with sincere faith and virtue, [the Romans] would have received a better kingdom here...and might receive an eternal kingdom hereafter' (*Civ.Dei*, III,1, cf.II,4-13, and see IV,28 for the quotation; note L.G.Patterson, *op.cit.*,pp.121-2.

² See *Civ.Dei*, esp.I,7-8; 14; 22, III, V,25, etc., and cf.Mommsen,'Orosius and Augustine',in *Renn.Stud.,op.cit.*,esp.pp.335ff., and see J.Chaix-Ruy,*op.cit.*,pp.71ff., and H.von Campenhausen, 'Augustine and the Fall of Rome', in *Tradition and Life in the Church* (ET), London,1968, pp.201ff. Ambrose, incidentally, had denied that crimes were always punished on earth.

³ See *Civ.Dei*, esp.XI,1, XVIII,1ff.; 46ff.,etc.

⁴ Cf. Mommsen, 'St.Augustine,etc.,' *loc.cit.*,pp.281-298. Cf.earlier, Arnobius of Sicca (in Africa, fourth century), *Adversus Gentes* (PL.,vol.5,cols.714ff.).

⁵ *Gub.Dei*, esp. VIII,3-4.

When those dark and unsettling days of the barbarian invasions in the west were over, however, Orosius' more simplistic view of providential history came back with a vengeance. But it was more confined in its applications. Mediaevals said much about how 'cruel tyrants always came to wretched ends', as John of Salisbury put it,¹ and much less about the recurring actualization of the moral order in general. And even the rule about tyrants, which was reinforced by such great intellects as Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua, became more a dogmatic 'given' about requited sin than an historical maxim to be consistently defended by facts.² Not that mediaeval historiography bridled methodical documentation; it was just that an opposing philosophy of history no longer presented itself, and there was thus little demand for Christian writers to engage in a stage by stage interpretation of the divine distributions. Perhaps there is no shortage of mediaeval allusions to retribution - to the requited wicked and the rewarded beneficent - but affirming history's moral order became less a matter of instancing recurrent operations than simply reminding the reader of God's providence. In a comparable way, notions of changing fortune and of history's alternations were absorbed into a dogmatic contrast between divine immutability and human vicissitudes.

¹ *Polycraticus*, VIII,18 (twelfth century). For background, Cicero, *De Offic.*, II, vii.

² Even in his *Chron.Hist.Duab.Civit.*, Otto of Freising, for example, who follows Orosius a good deal, makes far less of a point than Orosius in commenting on God's retribution against the wicked, cf. III,10 - IV,19, though cf., e.g., II,14 (on Cyrus) and III,7 (on Herod the Great) for more explicit comments on retributive principles. For other writers commenting on the divine judgement against wicked rulers (and support of the worthy), see, e.g., Bede, *Hist.Eccles. Gentis Anglorum* (early eighth century), III,1-2, IV,26, etc., cf. IV,25 (on Coldringham monastery), 29-30 (on Cuthbert's death); Nithard, *Histoire des Fils de Louis le Pieux* (ninth century), II,10 (Lauer edn., pp.76-8), cf.8 (p.60), 9 (p.68, cf. p.69, n.1); Eadmer, *Historia Novorum in Anglia* (twelfth century), 184 (Southern edn., pp.196-7); John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* (twelfth century), vii [15-16], etc.. For background, note esp. Eusebius, *Hist.Eccles.*, eg., II,x,1; III,vi,28 - vii,1; VII,xvi,3-4, etc., Jerome, *Comm.in Dan.*, on ix,36, etc. In the Byzantine east, writers such as Procopius, Zonaras, Attaliates, Psellus and Metochites (cf. pp.413-4) are important here, and looking to the continuance of the theme of retribution in the early Renaissance, note F.Biondo, *Decades*, (Basel, 1531edn.), esp. pp.30,108,125,365 (cf. on *Fortuna*, pp.477,483). On Aquinas' and Marsilius' teaching about tyranny, see *infra*, p.432,n.3, and p.459.

Within the Byzantine historiographical tradition, however, both a sense of 'Roman continuity' and a stronger concern to maintain the classical tradition fostered approaches to the moral order of more interest to our theme. In important histories by Procopius (sixth century), and especially by Psellus (eleventh century) and Nicephorus Gregoras (fourteenth century), various reigns were evaluated in terms of divine retributive principles. According to Procopius, who betrayed a residual pagan fatalism, God foresaw and determined all; even occurrences without any apparent rational explanation - such as the unexpected capture of the Gothic kings Theodatus and Vittigis by the unfortunate Belisarius - could be recognized by hindsight as part of his pre-ordained purposes.¹ Psellus, striving for a *via media* between dry annalism and ebullient rhetoric (cf. *Chron.*, VI, 73), did not fail to leave the impression that the successes, failures and deaths of each emperor he treated were connected with the moral worth of their rules.² Gregoras was a more complicated thinker; he deserves to be considered in conjunction with his theoretical mentor, Theodoros Metochites (d. 1332). Both scholars sought to amalgamate the idea of recurring retributive principles, governed by God, and the ancient notion of fortune's constantly turning wheel. They maintained that the moral order was worked out within history. The other-worldly Judgement (the Judgement which John Chrysostom had once reckoned both the final resting-ground of Christian theodicy and the solution to the problem of innocent suffering) was pushed into the background.³ Interested in the revival of Hellenism,⁴ both also adopted a deterministic

¹ Cf. *Anecdota*, iv, 42-45, cf. iii, 30ff. for the case referred to, and for a study of other relevant passages, see esp. Elferink, *loc. cit.*, pp. 111ff.

² Note, e. g., *Chron.*, I, 37, cf. esp. 29; 31; 34 (Basil II), II, 10 (Constantine VIII, though any sense of retribution is weak), III, 15; 26 (Romanus III), V, 14 (Michael IV), 24 (on the exile of the empress Augusta, where some general comments about the redressing (and thus balancing) rôle of Providence is discussed), etc., though note VI, 16 for his general and restrained statement showing favouritism towards and castigating princes.

³ On heaven in Chrysostom, cf. *De Provid.*, XXIV, 1-8, where he maintained, as did Augustine, that the moral order transcended the present earthly life.

⁴ See S. Runciman, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Wiles Lectures 1968), Cambridge, 1970, esp. pp. 94-7.

outlook on affairs and one which was guaranteed to disturb any anti-fatalistic theologian.¹ Their determinism entailed a concession to the idea that seemingly impersonal factors governed the movements of history. It thus represented a reaction against the traditional Christian stress on the active, personal intervention of God in events, especially significant events. Yet neither writer abandoned his belief in providence; it was just that their *pronoia* was not strictly orthodox.² With Metochites, deterministic tendencies show up most clearly in his treatment of *tychē*. History is conceived as a theatre (*theatron*) in which one can view the constant changing of fortunes both amongst individuals and states. History is never still (*astasia*); like Philo, Metochites described its movements as ἄνω καὶ κάτω, and like Plutarch, he wrote of how fortune turned, drifted and changed within it.³ Gregoras, by comparison, placed a rather unpopular stress on connections between heavenly movements and momentous terrestrial events.⁴ Changes above portended changes below; an eclipse of the sun in

¹ On the background to the stress on the freedom of moral choice (as against the moral fatalism of certain pagans), esp. in Origen, John Chrysostom and Theodore, see H.G.Beck, *Theodoros Metochites, Die Krise des byzantinischen Weltbildes im 14. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1952, pp.96-9.

² For background to their position, see esp. M.A.Elferink, *loc.cit.*, pp.111ff. on Procopius, and J.Hussey, 'Michael Psellus, the Byzantine Historian', in *Speculum*, X, 1935, p.88 on Psellus. Also, on Agathias, Procopius' continuator, see O.Veh, 'Der Geschichtsschreiber Agathias von Myrina', in *Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht 1953 des Gymnasiums Christian-Ernestinum*, Beirut, 1954, p.26. On the more orthodox view, cf. *supra*, pp.402ff.

³ On the world as a theatre, cf. Beck, *op.cit.*, pp.106-7. On ἄνω καὶ κάτω (including change into opposites), see ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΤΟΧΙΤΟΥ, 'Υπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ σημειώσεις γωνιμαί, *Theodori Metochitae Miscellanea Philosophica et Historica Graeca (etc.)*, (eds.C.G.Muller and T.Kiessling), Leipzig, 1821, pp.197, 572-3, etc., and on constantly changing fortune, see *ibid.*, logia 67,87,115-117,119. On Metochites' admiration for Plutarch, see logion 71, cf. also *Specimina Operum Theodori Metochitae qua inscribuntur ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΕΙΣ ΓΝΩΜΙΚΑΙ*, (ed.J.Bloch), Copenhagen, 1790, p.131, an abridged edn. with annotations that I also used.

⁴ See *Byzantinae Historiae*, esp.I,1 (4-5) (PG.,vol.148, cols.120b-121a), and R.Guilland, *Essai sur Nicéphore Grégoras; l'homme et l'oeuvre*, Paris, 1926, pp.230-1. Nicephorus' approach was not unique either in the east (cf. Beck, *op.cit.*, pp.98-100), or the west (cf. *supra*, p.396, n.1 (to the list of mediaevals we may add the early humanist Biondo [*Decades*, *op.cit.*, p.392])). On the controversy over astronomy in fourteenth century Byzantium, see I.Ševčenko, *Études sur la Polémique entre Théodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choumnos*, Brussels, 1962.

1267, for example, announced victory against Byzantium by the Turks, as well as internal dissension, and one in 1342 represented a sign of impending evils - the usurpation and abhorrent hesychism of John VI Cantacuzenus.¹

Both Byzantines, however, still identified these apparently inevitable processes with *pronoia*, or God's control of the universe. Recurring fluctuations and alternations between prosperity and calamity not only conformed to what was willed by God, but illustrated the continuing operation of his retributive principles. If it is part of the pre-ordained nature of things that any man cannot 'se maintenir longtemps au sommet du bonheur',² eventualities are nevertheless not unconnected with the moral condition of history's protagonists. According to Metochites, providence gave prosperity to the good and punishment to the wicked,³ and although human affairs were forever changing, those who were moderate in good fortune could expect a success or a well-being (*eupragia*) not given to the insolent,⁴ whilst empires too proud and power-seeking, such as Athens and Carthage, justly fell before more moderate régimes.⁵ No man could expect permanent *eudaimonia*, perhaps, nor any nation permanent success, but as a general rule, providence worked for the overall good of mankind.⁶ Applying some of his mentor's doctrine to his *Byzantinae Historiae*, Nicephorus both defended the moral order and warned of *tychē's* caprice. The impious and evil were punished by divine retribution, visited by a kind of Christianized *nemesis*.⁷ Even Byzantium as a whole received punishment for its impiety

¹ So *Hist. Byz.*, IV, viii, 2 (108-9) (*PG.*, vol. 148, col. 245b-c), XII, xv, 2 (623-624) (col. 841a-c), cf. also IX, xv, 4 (385) (col. 573a), xii, 2-3 (455) (col. 649 a-b) (the eclipse seems to be connected with a change in the succession), and cf. also xiii, 2 (458) (col. 653a-b), xiv, 1 (460) (col. 656b-c), XI, iii, 1 (535-6) (col. 737a-b), etc..

² To quote Guillard on Nicephorus, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

³ *Hypomnēmatismoi*, log. 66; cf. also Beck, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁴ *Hypomn.*, esp. log. 56, cf. 52.

⁵ *Ibid.*, lg. 104-109, cf. Bloch's edn., pp. 150-160.

⁶ *Ibid.*, lg. 118-119.

⁷ See Guillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-6, cf. esp. *Byz. Hist.*, XI, viii, 1 (549) (*PG.*, vol. 148, col. 753a) (the death of Basil Trebizond), XIII, iii, 1-3 (647) (cols. 859ff.) (Cantacuzenus' death), XXIX, ix, (241) (vol. 149, col. 210) (torture of

in the crisis of 1345, when the hesychastic Cantacuzenus failed to forestall the Turkish threat.¹ Changes in fortune, moreover, were inevitable. Even such a moderate ruler as Philip of Macedon could not reign without his supremacy being threatened, and régimes, even if as worthy as Rome, could not retain control over their territories forever. Fortune's wheel ran again,² then, though her acts were bound to be morally fitting, and if she was to be at all distinguishable from God, she stood as a vaguely personified symbol of human instabilities.

Thus in Metochites and Nicephorus we detect some interesting developments. Key classical notions of recurrence were intensively re-applied, but they came to form a new version (rather than a rejection) of the ongoing Christian teaching about earthly uncertainties, and about God's ultimate control of affairs both within and beyond the historical order. These transitions of thought are vividly reflected in some of Nicephorus' letters on providence and historical repetition. In his simile of history as an embroidered or woven cloth (p.399), Nicephorus was trying to formulate a succinct statement about both the overall impact and the particular details of the past. What struck him as the mark of providential governance was the fact that, together with history's recurrent resemblances, there was a continuing freshness and rich diversity as well. The great *pronoia* 'has mixed everything up so that it surpasses our intelligence'; it is, 'as it were, like a *cyceōn*,' a word which suggests a special planetary conjunction, or a cyclone of wind, or even the maturing of cheese, but which reaches beyond these as a verbal intuition of the whole historical process. History had its cyclical side, its *γενέσεις καὶ φθοραί* as in nature, its 'alternating movements of succession, never interrupting in appearance or disappearance';

Palamas). See also VIII,iii,1-2 (293-4) (vol.148,cols.467-70), IX,ii,2 (399-400) (col.585), XXII,iv (1054-55) (cols.1332-4), cf. IV,ii,1-2 (83-84) (cols.212-3), VII,iv,1-3 (224-7) (cols.385-7).

1

Ibid., XV,ii,6 (752-3) (vol.148, cols.989-92).

2

See, e.g., *ibid.*, IV,iii,1 (89-90) (vol.148,col.221a), and on Philip and Rome, IV,iii,1-2 (89-91) (cols.221a-223b).

yet at the same time it threw up an unfathomable and ever confusing mutability.¹

Nicephorus and Metochites foreshadow some of those important intellectual shifts which mark the classic Renaissance of western Europe. Their deterministic tendencies herald the thoroughgoing Hellenism and fatalism of Plethon, who was a seminal figure behind the Platonic revival of Quattrocento Italy.² Their free appeal to fortune anticipates a similar license amongst western (and not necessarily impious!) humanists.³ Furthermore, they stressed the utility of history and attempted to reinvigorate Christian historiography with Hellenistic modes of interpretation. These latter characteristics introduce us to two important approaches to recurrence which are neither cyclical nor reciprocal, and with which we may profitably conclude this chapter.

H) History's Lessons for Future Behaviour

In recognizing the principles governing affairs, these Byzantines contended, men could act more effectively in the future and make the most preferable moral choices. Even despite Nicephorus' musings on a second Hercules and a second Perseus, however, their general pictures of recurrence did not focus on the return of identical conditions, so much as

¹ For the first quotation, see *Epist.*, LX (to Maximus) (*op.cit.*, p.205). R. Guiland translates $\chi\upsilon\kappa\epsilon\omega\nu\acute{\alpha}$ here to mean something analogous to maturation or a special conjunction (cf. *ibid.*, pp.78-9, n.1), but in *Epist.*, XIX (pre-1330), the term is discussed in connection with wind as a destructive force, and the notion of a whirling process is probably present. $\chi\upsilon\kappa\epsilon\omega\nu\acute{\alpha}$ can also denote the mixing of a drink! On processes of genesis and *phthora*, see *Epist.*, LX (p.205), CLII 9 (p.239), and for the second quotation, *ibid.*, (p.241): $\delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\iota\beta\alpha\delta\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\kappa\rho\acute{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, etc.. On mutability, see *Epist.*, LX (pp.203-5), CLII (p.239).

² On Plethon's Hellenism and fatalism, see Beck, *op.cit.*, pp.126-31, and cf. *supra*, p.397, n.1.; on his rôle in the Italian Renaissance, see esp. K.M.Setton, 'The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance' in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, C, 1956, pp.72-6, cf. A.Vacalopoulos, 'The Exodus of Scholars from Byzantium in the Fifteenth Century', in *Journal of World History*, X, 1967, pp.470ff., P.Sherrard, *The Greek East and the Latin West; a study of the Christian tradition*, London, 1959, pp.120ff.

³ Cf., for example, B.Castiglione, *Il Cortegiano* (the author's epistle); G. Vasari, *Vite* (full title, *infra*, p.489, n.1) preface, (W.Gaunt edn., vol.1, p.9), Machiavelli (*infra*, pp.492 ff.), Polydore Vergil (*infra*, p.499), etc.

on history's *hypodeigmata* (patterns), its shapes, its examples of *hybris* requited, its fallen empires, and such like.¹ The varying fortunes of great Greeks and Romans amply illustrated these patterns and students were not merely expected to admire or condemn such men, but to grasp the practical value of historical study for present and future contingencies.²

The fact remains, both Metochites and Nicephorus reacted against a well entrenched contemplative approach to history, according to which the past was to be studied so that the worthy might receive praise and the wicked blame. This line had its roots in the prologues of Diodorus and Livy,³ but whereas the former related this idea to the recurring actualization of the moral order, and the latter filled his history with *exempla* intended to possess some practical civic (as well as moral) value, the mediaevals both eastern and western tended to adopt this approach with neither historical recurrence nor political pragmatism in view. History became more a spectacle, displaying *mutatio rerum*, replete with notable deeds both valorous and ignoble, and often saying something about the nature of God. If it had something practical to offer it was in showing what ^{constituted} moral virtues and what their opposites.⁴ Ethics, perhaps, is not impractical, yet such Byzantines as Metochites and Nicephorus, and many Quattrocento humanists besides, nevertheless lamented their predecessors' lack of concern for the political usefulness of the past. For them, history's

¹ On variety, cf. esp. *Hist. Byz.*, XII, i, 4 (576) (PG., vol. 148, cols. 781-4), cf. *supra*, pp. 397-9, 414-5. On *hypodeigmata*, see esp. Metochites' *Hypomnematismoi*, log. 87-91, 112, 117, etc.

² See esp. Beck, *op. cit.*, pp. 102, 112.

³ Diodorus, *Bibliot.*, I, i, 1; 3; 4, Livy, *Ab Urbe*, I, proem. 10-12.

⁴ In the east, note esp. Procopius, *Anecdota*, i, 10, etc.; Agathias (CSHB text, p. 134, par. 21); Attaliates, (CSHB text, prefatorial letter); Nicetas Acominate (CSHB text, p. 4); Gregory of Cyprus, *Elogii* (from Andronicus II) (cf. J. F. Boissonade (ed.), *Anecdota Graeca*, Paris, 1829ff., vol. 1, p. 360); Pachymer (CSHB text, vol. 1, p. 12); Cantacuzenus (CSHB, vol. 1, pp. 8-9), etc. In the west, note, for example, William of Tyre, *Historia Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum*, preface; John Froissart, *Chronique*, I; Enguerrand of Montrelet, *Chronique*, prolog.; I, xxxix; G. de Nogent, *Histoire des Croisades*, prolog.; etc.

theatre-like spectacle came to have practical significance. In depressed Byzantium, naturally enough, the two Hellenists' emphasis was more on the need to recognize pre-ordained tendencies; in the turbulence of Italian city-state politics, however, history acquired more immediate pragmatic value, providing the guidelines for the *vita attiva*.¹

In Greek historical theory, as we have argued (ch.2), the theme of history as a guide to action bound a great variety of recurrence notions together. 'If ever again men find themselves in a like situation', wrote Lucian in paraphrasing Thucydides, 'their knowledge of what has already happened will enable them to act wisely'.² In Roman historical thought appeals to *exempla* were more typical, yet to cite outstanding examples of civic valour or 'test cases' of the past was both to encourage imitation of the good, and to pass down the benefit of others' experience.³ *Exempla* were hardly foreign to mediaeval histories, and in these we can certainly isolate the propensity to classify men, behaviour and situations into types.⁴ Even if their sights were dogmatically oriented, the mediaevals still assumed that human affairs threw up the typical along with the variable. However, it was in those 'renascences' of fourteenth century Byzantium and

¹ For various examples: D.J.Wilcox, *The Development of Florentine Humanist Historiography in the Fifteenth Century* (Harvard Historical Studies LXXXII), Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp.36ff. (on Leonardo Bruni's acceptance of Polybius' utilitarianism); M.Gilmore, *Humanists and Jurists; six studies in the Renaissance*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, ch.1; C.Trinkaus, 'A Humanist's Image of Humanism; the Inaugural Orations of Bartolomeo della Fonte', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, VII, 1960, pp.101-5; W.H.Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre and other Humanist Educators*, Cambridge, 1897, p.124.

² *Peri Hist.Syngr.*, xlii, cf. Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, 22. Cf. Polybius, (*supra*, ch.2); Procopius, *Bella*, I, 1-2.

³ Note the Roman story of Horatius Cocles used by Polybius (*Hist.*, VI, liv, 6 - lv, 4), and see Cicero, *De Offic.*, III, 4 (cf. R.Rambeau, *Cicéron et l'Histoire Romaine* (Collection d'Etudes Latines; Série Scientifique XXVIII), Paris, 1953, pp.25-54); cf. Augustus, *apud* Suetonius, *Aug.*, xxviii, 1-2, and on Livy, see W.Liebeschuetz, *loc.cit.*, p.45.

⁴ For a good discussion of *exempla* in mediaeval historiography, see J. Taylor, *The 'Universal Chronicle', etc.*, *op.cit.*, pp.40, 46. On 'types' in mediaeval historiography, note esp. R.Newald, *Nachleben des antiken Geistes im Abendland bis Beginn des Humanismus; ein Überblick*, Tübingen, 1960, esp. p.300.

Quattrocento Italy that ancient pragmatism was re-engaged. In general terms, it was re-asserted that the study of past behaviour equipped the statesman to gauge others' motives and act with foresight; yet men were often enjoined, not just to 'feel' their way from one relatively similar set of circumstances to another, but to acquire a knowledge of recurrent event-shapes, or even imitate the deeds of ancient worthies (ch.5).

H) Notions of Cultural Rebirth or Renaissance

Very famous expressions of cultural rebirth, of course, were voiced by the early Italian humanists, first, in those claims by Boccaccio and Bruni that Dante and his intellectual achievements had dispelled old darkness with new light,¹ and then with the stark Petrarchan contrast between glorious Roman antiquity and the dark middle age (p.377n). Such asseverations herald the popular fifteenth and sixteenth century view that moderns had revivified the spirit of Antiquity so long deadened in the intervening centuries.² One should recognize, however, that although such notions of rebirth seem grounded in the changes of the time, they nevertheless possess a long and fascinating background history.

Laying aside religious notions of a second birth, of resurrection, and even of revitalized and reformed spirituality, we may concentrate on the subject of 'cultural recurrence'. Different trajectories of thought lie behind the idea that the genius and vitality of a former culture could be re-kindled in a later one. We can go back as far as Aristotle; more

¹ See *Earliest Lives of Dante*, (by Boccaccio, Bruni and Villani) (ET and ed. J.R. Smith), New York, 1901, pp. 9ff., 81ff.

² See H. Weisinger, 'The Self-Awareness of the Renaissance as a Criterion of the Renaissance', in *Papers of the Michigan Academy*, XXIX, 1944, pp. 561ff., 'The Renaissance Theory of the Reaction against the Middle Ages as a Cause of the Renaissance', in *Speculum*, XX, 1945, pp. 461ff. Cf. also W.K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought, five centuries of interpretation*, op.cit., pp. 9-28. Also, on early terminology, see F. Simone, 'La Coscienza della Rinascità negli Humanisti', in *La Rinascità*, II, 1939, pp. 838ff., III, 1940, pp. 163ff.

than once he dilated on the periodic emergence, disappearance and re-emergence of ideas and techniques,¹ and he applied the biological principle to the history of artistic achievement, notably to Attic tragedy.² His disciple Dicaearchus produced the *Bios Hellados*, a study of what was tantamount to Hellenic 'civilization' in all its manifold aspects. Transcending age-old differences between Dorian, Ionian and Thracian, Dicaearchus conceived Greek manners and culture as a self-contained set of phenomena forming a giant life-cycle.³ Broader conceptions like this naturally appealed to those Romans who visualized two great efflorescences of human civilization - Hellas and Rome - succeeding one another. The Roman cultural achievement, it was maintained, was not inferior to the Greek one; there were many common elements in institutional and intellectual life, and Rome flourished after Hellas had succumbed to a general state of senescence.⁴

The notion of great men representing given civilizations is also seminal for the idea of cultural rebirth. Aristotle considered Zoroaster and Plato as pinnacles of intellectual achievement from two separate cultural contexts 5,000 years apart.⁵ Later moralists singled out men of

¹ So *Meteorol.*, 339b; *De Caelo*, 270b16; *Metaphysica*, 1074b1-14; *Polit.*, 1329b25; and see also Jaeger, *Aristotle*, *op.cit.*, pp.128ff.. For a later and Stoic expression of this idea, cf. Marcus Aurelius, *Medit.*, V, 32.

² Attic tragedy, he declared, declined from Euripides to his own day; *Poetica*, IV, 1449a14-15, cf. K. von Fritz, *Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography* (Howison Lecture 1957), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958, pp.121-2.

³ Only a few fragments of this work survive, cf. *Dikaiarkos von Messene* (ed. F. Wehrli) (*Schul. Arist.*, *op.cit.* vol. 1), pp. 47ff.

⁴ On common elements, one automatically thinks of Hellenistic sculpture and the influence of Greek writing on Roman drama (cf. also Dionysius' hope for an Atticist revival in the Roman world; and for his comments on such a renaissance in periodic terms, see *Περὶ τῶν Ἀρχαίων Πηγῶν*, 2, cf. J. B. Bury, *Anc. Grk. Hist.*, *op.cit.*, p. 206, n. 1; [εἴτε θεοῦ τίνος ἄρξαντος εἴτε φυσικῆς περιόδου τὴν ἀρχαίαν τάξιν ἀνακυκλώσης]). Also, note Velleius Paterculus' interesting remarks in the first century AD that, under both Greece and Rome, special literary achievements such as tragedy, philosophy and oratory only flourished over a short period (*Hist. Rom.*, I, xvi, 1 - xvii, 7). On paralleling institutions, note, for example, Cicero, *Re Pub.*, II, xxxiii, 58, on tribuneship, and Dionysius, *Arch.*, V, lxxiii, 3 on dictatorship. Concerning Roman civilization and Greek senescence, see esp. Cicero, *Re Pub.*, I, xxxvii, 58, Sallust, *Catil.*, li, 28-34, cf., later, Augustine, *Civ. Dei.*, II, xxi.

⁵ *Frg.* 6 (R²8, 29, R³6, 34, W. 6); see Jaeger, *op.cit.*, pp. 133ff.

comparable stature amongst both the Greeks and the Romans. Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* are obviously crucial here.¹ Not only do they contain illustrations of special and striking recurrence (as with his comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero (cf.p.196)) and not just instances of an actualized moral order, but they also parallel two great civilizations through a comparison of individuals. Not that Plutarch under-rated dissimilarities between the personalities he placed side by side, and he was also capable of admitting glaring contextual differences. Of Titus Flaminus and Philopoemen, he once significantly commented: 'the former was assisted by the power of a flourishing Rome, and the latter flourished under a declining Greece'.² Yet the richness and variety of his subject-matter conceded, he still achieved a significant set of general parallels which reached beyond the personalities themselves to the careers of two esteemed civilizations. Hellas (or parts of it) and Rome had their comparable 'founders' (Theseus and Romulus), their religiously inspired legislators (Lycurgus and Numa), their early opponents of tyranny (Solon and Publicola), their men of turbulence (Alcibiades and Coriolanus) and of supreme moral and civic virtue (Aristides and Marcus Cato). With regard to military giants, Roman generals operating before the downfall of Carthage and before imperialism to the east were paralleled with the great Athenian commanders, and the generals of the declining Republic with the warriors from Sparta and Thebes. The 'military succession' of Sulla by Pompey, for instance, was explicitly likened to that of Lysander by Agesilaus.³ And it was natural for Alexander and Julius Caesar, who each marked the end of earlier non-absolutist orders, to be placed side by side.⁴ Beyond that, parallels begin

¹ Valerius Maximus' examples were primarily Roman, yet 'foreign examples' or figures from Greek history were allowed to creep in. For a good illustration, note *Fact.Dict.Mem.*, VI, ix (foreign example, 1-3). Note also Cornelius Nepos (first century BC), *De Excellentibus Ducibus exterarum Gentium*; Aelianus (second century AD), *Varia Historia*; cf. Plutarch's *Consol. Apoll.*, 119D.

² *Vit.*, (Philopoemen and Flaminus Compared), ii, 1.

³ *Vit.*, (Agesilaus and Pompey Compared), i, 3.

⁴ No chapter of comparison survives, though cf. *Vit. Alex.*, i, 1.

to wear thin. In all, however, the total vision of two remarkable flourishings of civilization remains. Along with his sense of continuity in Greek and Roman history, Plutarch implied not only that Rome had gone much the same way as Greece - a more sobering thought - but that men had and could reappropriate the virtues and achievements of former days. An older and preferable order of things, then, could be restored.

Although Plutarch's vision held its own, *bold with* the new post-Republican developments and with the Principate's continuing durability, there arose a greater concern for Rome in her own right. If the work of Augustus and other emperors suggested the return of the Golden Age, Augustus, and, at a much later stage, Aurelian, also figured as agents of *restoratio*.¹ In the course of time parallels and recurrences were drawn from within the specifically Roman tradition,² and under a later, more decadent Rome, rhetors propagated the idea of *Roma renascens*, of Rome periodically rejuvenated.³ All these conceptions lie at the root of still later talk about rebirth and renovation. And they did not remain the exclusive property of pagan minds, but were also imbibed by the new spiritual conquerors as well.

The theme of Rome reborn did not go untouched by Christians, such as Claudian and Prudentius, together with others involved in the classicist revival in Theodosian days.⁴ The views of these men foreshadowed sixth century Christian attempts to refurbish the city of Rome with its ancient

¹ On Augustus, *supra*, p. 197, pp. 329-345-6. Aurelian (270-5), earned the title: *Restitutor orbis*.

² See *supra*, pp. 325 ff. for the growing concentration under the Principate, on the outstretched Roman past. A good example of parallel lives within the Roman tradition may be found in Ammianus Marcellinus, *Gesta*, XXI, xiii, 17-19, where Trajanus and Sebastius are likened to Scipio and Valens.

³ Cf. for example, Claudian, *De Bello Gildonico*, ll. 17-27; 204 ff., (Koch edn., pp. 38-9, 44 ff.), Novatian, *Aeneads*, cxi, etc.

⁴ See Claudian, *De Bello Gildonico*, 17, 27, 208 ff. (Koch edit., pp. 34, 44 ff.), Prudentius, *Contra Symmachum*, I, 54 ff., II, 656 ff., cf. Rutulius Namatianus, *De Reditu suo e Roma in Galliam Narbonensem*, I, 137 ff., and see Ladner, *Idea of Reform*, op.cit., p. 17 n. 5, cf. pp. 251 ff.

learning and splendour - attempts surrounding the papal court¹ - and they form an important background to the interesting reassessment of historical trends by such men as the pro-Gothic Senator Cassiodorus (ca. 485- ca. 580), who contended that, despite a 'middle age of sin' and a 'decay in spiritual discipline' (between Theodosius the Great and the hopeful reign of Theodoric), all was not lost, since the power for the Roman world to be reborn, a kind of pagan *renascibilitas*, was being experienced once more.² Such integration of recurrence and continuity, such intertwining of Roman imperialist ideology and Christian hope, shows how complex is the background history to the concept of 'the Renaissance'! The concept, it should be stressed again, is not one-sidedly pagan, but witnesses to a confluence of ideas from both the Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions.

We can turn at this point to the so-called 'Carolingian renaissance' of eighth and ninth century Francia, after the more turbulent days of the barbarian migrations. First one should appreciate the sense in which the Carolingians saw themselves as part of a Christian order, with its spiritual heritage in the faith of the Old and New Testaments; yet, secondly, one should reckon with the resurgent idea of a new Roman order, of an empire succeeding to ancient Rome and preserving a western as against an eastern imperial tradition. In short, there was a *holy Roman empire*. Alongside this dual sense of continuity, however, were conceptions of rebirth and renovation. The ravages of the barbarians had created a definite line of demarcation between the old and the new, so seriously damaged was the empire and civilization of the Caesars.³ For certain Franks, then, the reign of Charlemagne, and even of Charles the Bald, represented the restoration of a

¹ See F. Heer, *The Intellectual History of Europe* (ET), London, 1966, pp. 35-6, J. von Schlosser, *Die Kunstdliteratur*, Vienna, 1924, p.34.

² Heer, *op.cit.*, pp.26-7.

³ I have written at length on this elsewhere, see Trompf, 'The Concept of the Carolingian Renaissance', in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXXIV, 1973, pp. 3 ff.

former stability and the reappropriation of a lost culture. 'Aurea Roma iterum renovata renascitur orbe', wrote Modoin, whilst Alcuin mused over the building of a new Athens in Francia and others referred to Aachen as a second Rome.¹ In this context, of course, the cultural distinctions between 'classical', Hellenistic' or 'Roman' were quite blurred, assimilated as they were into one great former order of things which found its supreme expression in the *imperium* of the Caesars.² On the other hand, a return to the 'biblical order' was also felt after. The new Christian King was as much 'the King of Israel' and 'David's royal son' (to refer to Theodulf of Orléans' famous hymn) as Christ himself, and as Christ's King he was the new David, ruling over the new Israel, the *Civitas Dei*, the *universus populus fidelis*.³ Even Charlemagne himself conceived of his reign as Davidic, and alluded to his son Louis as Solomon.⁴ In all these efforts to forge links with what were preferable times, then, the idea of restored conditions or of *renovatio* was of paramount importance.⁵

From ^{the} Carolingian period onwards, as we might expect, writers thought about a new and better Christian order before they thought about the pagan past. Notions with important implications for the idea of cultural rebirth

¹ For Modoin, cf. *supra*, p.367 and n.2. On Alcuin, cf. *MGH. Poet.*, vol.2, No.170, p.279.

Concerning Charles the Bald's reign see esp. Heiric of Auxerre, *MGH. Poet.*, vol.3, p.429. Cf. in general, H. Fichtenau, *The Carolingian Empire* (ET), (*Studies in Mediaeval History IX*), Oxford, 1963, pp.83 ff.

² E. Panofsky's comments on Carolingian art are interesting in this respect, see esp. his *Renaissance and renaissances in Western Art; Text (Figura X)*, Copenhagen, 1960, pp.46-7, but in general see Fichtenau, *op.cit.*, pp.83-5.

³ See Trompf, *loc.cit.*, p.24 and n.96. On depictions of the new emperor as the new David one should note especially illustrations in Count Vivien's Bible and the Gospels of Lothair (cf. J. Beckwith, *Early Mediaeval Art; Carolingian, Ottonian, Romanesque*, London, 1964, esp. pp.56-60).

⁴ Cf. esp. T.M. Wallace-Hadrill, 'The *Via Regia* of the Carolingian Age', in *Trends in Mediaeval Political Thought; Essays*, (edit. B. Smalley), Oxford, 1965, p.26.

⁵ See esp. F. Heer, 'Die "Renaissance"-Ideologie im frühen Mittelalter', in *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, LVII, 1949, esp. pp.31 ff., 80.

still held on - ideas of a second Rome or a new David, interpretations of specific events as new re-enactments of ancient deeds,¹ for example, - and there were concerted bursts of cultural activity and renewed acquaintance with the classics (especially in the twelfth century) to suggest the idea of a cultural re-awakening. But Mediaevals pressed pagans to the service of the faith, and whilst their culture was self-sufficient, no one yearned for the rebirth of Antiquity. True, nostalgia for the greatness of the old Rome came quite early in the West,² but it is the early humanists' downgrading of post-Roman times, their assertions that these times were barbaric or now played out, and their evocation of ancient greats - pagan ones not the least - into the pages of their writings, which produced the mature renaissance idea. The Quattrocento humanists' sense of discontinuity, for example, stands in marked contrast to the doctrine of *translatio studii*, according to which knowledge passed *per successum* from Paradise through the great custodians of culture, the Hebrews, the Egyptians, the Athenians and Romans, finally coming to rest at Paris.³ For many of the humanists the line of the great tradition had virtually been broken, only to be re-forged in modern times.

Humanist outlooks could vary, however. Only a few joined forces with

¹ Better known examples come to mind; Dante, *Epist.*, V,1;VII,8 (on Henry VII - the new Exodus, and the new victory over the Philistines), and the later, yet traditionalist French historian A. de la Vigne, who likened Charles VIII's invasion of Italy (in 1494) to the struggle to free the Holy Land. On Florence as the second Rome and Pisa as the second Carthage, note esp. L. Bruni Aretino, *Historiarum Florentini Populi* (edit. E. Santini and E. de Pierro, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, edit. L.A. Muratori), Città di Castello, 1926, vol.19,pt.3,Bk.I,pp.3 (ll.10-12), Bk.XII,p.285 (l.27), cf.Bk.IV,p.80 (ls.12 ff.). In the East, incidentally, a comparable analogy was drawn between Byzantines and ancient Greeks, Turks and ancient Persians (cf. for example, Nicephorus, *Epist.*, XLVII [Guilland, pp.168-9] etc.).

² On Hildebertus of Lavardin (1056-1133) cf. Rehm, *op.cit.*, p.32.

³ This doctrine, which owes something to Alcuin's dream of a new Athens, was inaugurated by Notker the Stammerer (ca. 885), and received its grandest statement at the hands of Jean Gerson in 1405; cf. E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au Moyen Age des Origines Patristiques à la Fin du XIV^e Siècle*, Paris, 1947 edn., pp.193-4.

Plethon to turn back the clock, to prove that Julian the Apostate was right after all. The more impressive students of history, on the other hand, simply underlined the new cultural and political vitality of the Italian cities. Flavio Biondo (1392-1463), for one, had his conservative streak. Though maintaining that the Latins had no historians between Orosius and himself, and though on the verge of conceptualizing a *Medium Aevum*,¹ he still harboured residual sympathies for the doctrine of imperial translation when he wrote of the new and eternal empire of Christianity.² Yet along with Leonardo Bruni Aretino (1369-1444), he held that the Italian cities of his own time were re-establishing the glory of fallen Rome, and his own consciously classical style was reinforcement to his claims.³ Bruni, by treating Dante as a turning-point in Italian culture, and by considering the rise of the Italian city-states as a return to the government of free institutions which characterized Republican Rome, was first to crystallize the idea of a revived Antiquity in terms of the great movements of European history. Concerning cultural change, moreover, both Biondo and Bruni held the opinion, which stems largely from Petrarch and which continued into the sixteenth century, that between Antiquity and recent times, Europe had been lost in barbarian darkness.⁴ It was left to painters, sculptors, architects, antiquarians, rhetoricians, neo-platonic philosophers and other theoreticians of history and culture who came after them, to actualize and expand what they had sensed imperfectly about social and intellectual change. And whatever the emphases of their successors, whether

¹ Cf. *Scritti inediti e rari di Biondo Flavio* (edit. B. Nogara), (*Studi e Testi*, XLVIII, 1927), esp. pp.148-168.

² See esp. L.C. Baldeschi, *Studio critico sulle Opere di Flavio Biondo*, Macerata, 1895, p.8, cf. D.Hay, 'Flavio Biondo and the Middle Ages', in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XLV, 1959, p.109.

³ Cf. esp. *Decades*, *op.cit.*, p.30. Biondo, incidentally, took the beginning point of his history to be the fall of Rome. On Bruni, cf. *Hist.*, *op.cit.*, Bk.I, pp.7, (1.36)-13(1.29), pp.13(1.30)-16(1.34), pp.16(1.35)-22(1.26), pp.22(1.27-Bk.II, 27(1.10), pp.27 ff. (1s.11ff.) on the five periods of Italian history, and see *infra* p. 429.

⁴ On Biondo and Bruni (and both Petrarch and Villani), see W.K. Ferguson, *op.cit.*, pp.18-25; cf., in general, Weisinger, 'Renaissance Theory etc.', *loc.cit.*

they highlight the revival of pagan or of Christian antiquity, whether they put more weight on the return of former conditions or on the unique achievements of their own times, the sense of retrieval, of regaining lost dimensions in life, was all-pervasive.

Conceived in its simplest form the idea of 'renaissance' entails the belief that a given set of (approved of) general conditions constitutes the revival of a former set which had ^{Subsequently} been considered defunct or dying (p. 3). If enriched by cyclical lines of thought (by the idea of successive civilizations, decomposition followed by rebirth, the Golden Age returned, etc.), it still falls into a separate category, and its history reflects a complex interlacing of classical and Christian threads.

Christian doctrine had its great triumph. Its victory was not so complete, however, that mediaeval historiography remained unaffected by non-biblical notions of historical recurrence. A rich stock of paradigms from the Hellenistic world had already entered the Judeo-Christian tradition before the Bible was completed, and though often modified, they continued to provide useful means of interpreting historical tendencies. It is unfair to conclude that they were more in use when men sensed the decrepitude of a civilization,¹ and even if theories of cosmic recurrence were outlawed by theologians, the cycles, the alternations, reciprocities and renaissances of human life were still elicited. Not that old Hellenisms were left unsubdued; any cyclical theory as elaborately conceived as the Polybian *Anacyclosis* is absent from mediaeval literature; we see less of the biological principle, whilst the wheel of fortune was often veiled behind the doctrine of terrestrial flux; and the 'utilitarian' axis of Graeco-Roman historical investigation was sacrificed upon the altar of a loftier

¹ Even if we were to confine ourselves to the cyclical paradigm, there is little justification from this period for C. van Doren's judgement that cyclical theories of history are decay theories in disguise (*The Idea of Progress*, New York, 1967, p.174). Cf., on Florus, pp.328 f., and on Nicephorus, pp.397-9, 411-15.

spirituality. Despite Byzantine forerunners, such as Nicephorus and Metochites, it was only writers of the classical Renaissance who re-applied the cycles of *physis* and *tychē* and tried to re-capture the lost pragmatism of the ancients. It was during the early sixteenth century, moreover, that the Polybian *Anacyclōsis* makes a dramatic re-appearance in the pages of Machiavelli.

CHAPTER 5

MACHIAVELLI, THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION

It has been claimed that historians and other writers of the classic Renaissance reverted to a cyclical as against a lineal approach to history.¹ Our previous treatment of some of the Quattrocento humanists might, at first sight, seem to justify such an assertion, but one should be careful in generalizing about so rich an intellectual scene. What, in any case, could be meant by such a claimed reversion? A return to Stoic or neo-Pythagorean positions? Few intellectuals of the fifteenth and sixteenth century toyed with such views.² An

¹ So recently and with some force, J.A. Mazzeo, *Renaissance and Revolution; the Remaking of European Thought*, London, 1965, pp. 7-8, 41-3, 296; cf. also E.H. Harbison, *Christianity and History; Essays*, Princeton, 1964, esp. pp. 275-6. H. Weisinger was prepared to elicit a variety of different models of historical development from Renaissance writing, yet he still contended that 'the assumption about the course of human history which is most widely held in the Renaissance is the cyclical or tide theory' (cf. 'Ideas of History during the Renaissance', in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI, 1945, pp. 415 ff., esp. p. 426. He adduced but little evidence to support this contention, however, and made no distinction between cyclical and other recurrence views. Recent work on Renaissance notions of progress includes W.W. Ungar, 'Modern Views on the Origins of the Idea of Progress', in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXVIII, 1967, pp. 55 ff.; A. B. Ferguson, 'By little and little'; the Early Tudor Humanists on the Development of Man', in *Florilegium Historiale; Essays presented to Wallace K. Ferguson*, (ed. J.G. Rowe and W.H. Stockdale), Toronto, 1971, pp. 126 ff.

² Note the lighthearted prologue to *Clizia* by Machiavelli: 'If into the world the same men should come back (*tornassero*) just as the same events come back (*corre tornano i medesimi casi*), a hundred years would not pass before we should find here the very same things (*le medesime cose*) done as now'. (N. Conti's edn. of the *Opere*, Florence, 1818 ff., vol. 6, p. 136). (Conti's edition of Machiavelli will be cited hereafter as its pagination enables easier location of passages cited; cf. however, the better edition by M. Bonfantini (*La Letteratura Italiana; Storia e Testi* XXIX), Milan, 1963). On interest in Pythagoreanism, note esp. Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522), who in *De Arte Cabalistica* (1517) claimed to be Pythagoras re-born (cf. L. Spitz, *The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, esp. p. 67, cf. ch. 4),

application of cyclical models drawn from classical and Hellenistic historiography? That certainly would be closer to the mark. As we shall see, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) revived the Polybian *Anacyclōsis*, and many were the Renaissance appeals to the turning wheel of *fortuna* and to the rise and wane of empires. But extravagant claims are to be avoided. Joseph Mazzeo's comments on some of Leonardo Bruni's views are a case in point. He contended that Bruni was thinking cyclically because he divided Italian history into five periods and because he argued that the last one (from the new republics to his own time) was the only period of Italian *libertas* after the time of Roman republicanism.¹ Yet talk of large periods was something few mediaevals were averse to, and why should Bruni's attitude to recent developments suggest anything more than the non-cyclical idea of cultural rebirth? This case nicely illustrates the need to distinguish different paradigms of recurrence before drawing snap conclusions. To put too much under the umbrella of 'cyclical thought' for instance, instead of coming to terms with the wider ramifications of recurrence thinking, is too facile. If by a reversion to cyclical views scholars like Mazzeo mean a re-appropriation of Graeco-Roman ideas of recurrence, then a rich collection of ancient non-cyclical paradigms has to be accounted for also. Besides this, one has to gauge the continuing influence of mediaeval ideas on fifteenth

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 41, and on Bruni, *supra*. The new republics are dated from ca. 1250 on.

Footnote 2 from previous page...

and, at the end of the century note, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), who was accused of Stoicism, but who admitted only to the opinion of Pythagoras on the transmigration of souls (cf. V. Spampinato, *Vita di Giordano Bruno, con Documenti Editi e Inediti*, Messina, 1921, 'Documenti Veneti', xi, 711, xii, 720). (Zabazism, one should add, fostered re-incarnational views.

and sixteenth century historical thought, and to appreciate that cyclical notions were not entirely absent from mediaeval approaches to world history. By way of generalization, the most we can say about the fifteenth and sixteenth century at this stage is that there was a revived interest both in the pragmatic implication of the lessons of history and in a wider variety of recurrent *casi* - as Machiavelli called them - or repeated configurations, event-complexes, conditions and the like.¹ However, let us now investigate the riches of the Renaissance and the Reformation in detail.

A) Machiavelli and the Cycle of Governments

Of all the exponents of historical recurrence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Machiavelli, Florentine emissary and bureaucrat, stands out both for the range of ideas he exploited, and for the profundity with which he developed and applied them. For the most part Machiavelli concerned himself with political change and with the means of stabilizing polities; he was thus led to history, especially to the history of the greatest empire he knew - Rome - and to the history of Florence, his own famous city. In analysing Roman and Florentine affairs, he presented some of the best known models of historical recurrence of his time. His most famous statement, in the *Discorsi su Tito Livio* (1519) (I, 2), concerned the cycle of governments, and most probably derived from Polybius Bk. VI. It

¹ One is reminded here of Machiavelli's famous comment: 'tutte le cosedel mondo, in ogni tempo, hanno il proprio riscontro con gli antichi tempi' (*Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio*, III, 43, (vol. 4, p. 259).

seems a useful starting point from which to examine both Machiavelli's own views and the idea of historical recurrence amongst his contemporaries. It is enlightening, however, to examine this cycle in conjunction with another crucial model found in his *Istorie Fiorentine* (1527) V. 1.

Models in the *Discorsi* I, 2 and the *Istorie* V, 1

With the *Discorsi* I, 2 we return to themes we left off earlier; like Polybius, Machiavelli submitted that states pass through a cycle of constitutional stages. Although there are doubts about his access to a Latin translation of the *Historiae* Bk. VI,¹ it is not very likely that Machiavelli could have produced his scheme without having read either the appropriate passage from Polybius or a paraphrase of it. That is not to say, however, that the Florentine did not modify his source, and careful exegetical work is required to gauge the degree of Machiavelli's dependence. It is surprising that a detailed exposition of *Discorsi* I, 2, in these terms has not yet, to my knowledge, been forthcoming, but this may be due not only to uncertainties surrounding the accessibility of Polybius VI, v-ix, but also to the fact that it has been far from clear what relevance Machiavelli's 'cycle of government' model has for the rest of his complicated - and oftentimes disorganized - political analyses.

In the relevant chapter Machiavelli observed that some writers distinguished three kinds of *stati*: the monarchical, the aristocratic and the democratic (*Principato, Ottimati, Popolare*). Others had

¹ Machiavelli had virtually no Greek. Florentine libraries may well have been without copies of the *Historiae* in Latin until 1520, yet for a brilliant, if speculative account of how Machiavelli conceivably became acquainted with Polybius VI, v-xi, see J.H. Hexter, 'Seyssel, Machiavelli and Polybius VI, the Mystery of the Missing Translation', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, III, 1956, pp. 75 ff.; cf. however, J.H. Whitfield (*Discourses on Machiavelli*, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 191 ff.) who has reviewed almost every important article on Machiavelli (but his own) with a certain peremptoriness.

claimed, however, that these three worthy constitutional forms had bad counterparts, since monarchy could become *tirannico*, aristocracy a *stato di pochi*, and democracy *licenzioso*.¹ For the first triad Machiavelli probably thought of such ancients as Herodotus and Xenophon:² as for the second, he wrote that more than one writer was involved, yet since he shows no acquaintance with Plato's *Politicus*, and since Aristotle's constitutional categories do not fit in neatly with his vocabulary, Polybius was probably foremost in his mind.³ After all, Machiavelli was about to embark on a careful analysis of Roman constitutional history; what piece of ancient theoretical writing could

¹ (Vol. 3, pp. 235-6).

² 'Some writers' is deliberately vague. It could be a loose translation of Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, iii, 5a; on the other hand, Machiavelli may have wished to include mediaevals along with the ancients here (and cf. next note). That he read Xenophon, see *Disc.*, II, 13 (vol. 4, p. 51); III, 22 (pp. 209, 211), ch. II, 2 (p. 16), and for Herodotus, (or Herodotus behind Diodorus?), cf. II, 12; III, 6.

³ Aristotle, it will be remembered, wrote of the degeneration of 'polity' into 'democracy'. Besides, Machiavelli could well have taken Aristotle to be the perpetrator of the simple tripartite distinction (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) which was used by mediaevals in his name; cf. esp Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum*, I (A.P.d'En-trèves edn., p. 8), Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, esp. I, ix, 9; xvii, 2. It cannot be argued that Cicero was one of Machiavelli's crucial sources for the six-fold classification, for, despite the special stress they share on the brevity of any simple constitutional form's existence (cf. Machiavelli's 've lo ordina per poco tempo (vol. 3, p. 236), Cicero's 'nec diutius umquam tenetur idem rei publicae modus' (*Re Pub.*, I, xlv, 68 *fin.*)), it remains true that the key Ciceronian tract *De Re Publica* was lost to European intellectuals between the early Middle Ages and 1820. Little of relevance, moreover, lies in Augustinian quotations of *De Re Publica* (cf. H. Hagentahl, *Augustine and the Latin Classics (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XX, 1)*, Göteborg, 1967, vol. 1; *Testimonia*, p. 543); and in any case, Machiavelli does not seem to have read *De Civitate Dei*.

have served as a better preface to his theses? Just like Polybius, Machiavelli first introduced the six simple constitutional forms with a brief sketch of the zig-zag line from monarchy to a degenerate democracy, and then went on to elaborate the cycle of governments.¹ Like Polybius again, he came to contrast the impermanence of simple constitutions with the durability of those combining monarchical, aristocratic and popular elements into a *mista*.² Polybius, then, was undoubtedly his key source, though he was by no means a slavish dependent.

With Machiavelli's more highly wrought model, the world and its inhabitants have a definite beginning. All talk of cataclysm is dropped (at this point).³ On the other hand, his picture of early human life is derived far less from mediaeval theology than classical 'anthropology'. By suggesting that *caso* (chance, not fortune) gave birth to different forms of government, and that the world's original inhabitants were few in number and dispersed like beasts, Machiavelli even appears to owe something to Epicurean Lucretius.⁴ However, his comments still remain in accord with Polybius, who placed a greater stress than Lucretius on parallels between animal behaviour

¹ (vol. 3, pp. 235-6), cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, iii, 5 - iv, 13.

² *Ibid.*, (pp. 238-9), cf. Polybius, VI, ix, 10 - x, 14.

³ Though cf. *infra.*, pp. 482-3.

⁴ See Lucretius, *De Rer. Nat.*, V, 925-1104, etc., cf. esp. L. Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, p. 201. Lucretius' work was one of the more remarkable 'finds' of Renaissance humanism, cf. esp. R.R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries*, Cambridge, 1958, pp. 262-4; R. Sabbadini, *La Scoperte dei Codici Latini e Greci ne' Secoli XIV e XV*, Florence, 1905, pp. 11-12, 23-27.

and the herd-like groups which emerged after a catastrophe.¹ In any case, the Polybian *Anacyclōsis* was of decisive importance for what followed. In the primitive situation men gathered around the strongest and bravest; but they came to learn what justice is, and began looking to the wise and just rather than to men of physical prowess. Hereditary princedom became established. The heirs, however, did not possess their forebears' virtues, and tyranny soon arose. High-minded citizens, as conspirators themselves and as catalysts for a popular reaction, overthrew the hated régime and created an aristocracy. Soon it was their children who became over-ambitious and violent, however, and the resulting oligarchy suffered a similar fate to tyranny, only this time it was the whole people who seized the reins of power. Yet the popular stage was also short-lived: after a generation

'It soon ran into that kind of *licenza* which injured both public and private interests. Everyone lived for themselves, and a thousand acts of injustice were daily committed, so that, constrained by *necessità*, or directed by some good man (*buono uomo*), in order to evade such *licenza*, the community returned anew to the government of a prince, and from this went back again step by step towards a state of license in the same manner and from the same causes already indicated'.²

Up to this last passage Machiavelli was following Polybius with some care, but he deviated from his source in his treatment of degenerate monarchy and its aftermath. Polybius had postulated three stages from democracy to the complete collapse of political society: the

¹ See *Hist.*, VI, v, 6-9, yet cf. Lucretius, V, 943-972, etc., where the stress is on primitive man's relationship with the beasts.

² (Vol. 3, p. 238 - M. Lerner's translation in part). Cf. Machiavelli's typical recurrence terminology: *si ritorna di nuova al principato*; *'e da quello di grado in grado si riviene verso la licenza, ne' modi e per le cagione dette*'.

emergence of corrupting demagogues within democracy, the institution of *cheirotecratia* by the masses once they have found a *prostatēs*, and the return to bestiality, with its accompanying search for a *monarchos* or *despotēs*, (*Hist.*, VI, ix, 5 - 9). Machiavelli concurred that democracies degenerated into license, but he declined to reproduce the Polybian stages because he evidently did not accept the idea that a state reverts to conditions of savagery before the whole cycle of governments begins afresh. His *licenza* clearly stands for ochlocracy, but the state does not thereafter subside into *theriōsis*; it is rescued from license by a reversion to the government of a *principe*. On the surface of things, moreover, this last rule is that of a good, wise and just *principe*, not the physically powerful leader of a human herd.¹ Machiavelli, it appears, sought to replace a weak link in Polybius' anacyclic chain, presumably because he did not see how both ^a decline into bestiality and the re-emergence of a primitive monarch could be squared with the known facts. He took the cyclical model to cover constitutional changes only, and not the dissolution of whole political societies by natural (as against external) means. Machiavelli hence declined to adopt the Platonic-Polybian sequence of mob-rule followed by a beast-like

¹ The primitive monarch in Machiavelli's model is not referred to by the term *principe*, but by the phrases 'più robusto e di maggior cuore'; he is a man who leads the people like a herd before they elect 'uno principe, non andavano dietro al più gagliarde, ma a quello che fusse più prudente e più giusto' (vol. 3, p. 238). Concerning Polybius' *prostatēs*, it is quite possible that for Machiavelli he is the 'certain man' (*alcuno*) who leads the people's cause against oligarchy, a man for whom there is no equivalent, at least in this context, in Polybius. I hold that this is conscious modification.

tyranny or savage monarchy.¹

Now it should be clearly understood that Machiavelli called the recurring sequence of governments a *cerchio*, a circle in which governments 'rotate' (*girando*).² What is more, he made three important general comments about the process as a whole. First, as we have seen, he stressed the rapidity of the *mutazioni* involved, or the liability of all simple constitutions to decay quickly. Secondly, he maintained that states seldom remain on their feet long enough to experience all the changes of one whole cycle of governments. Perhaps, by nestling under the protection of some neighbouring and overlord state, a political society could revolve indefinitely through the cycle,³ but the life courses of most states were cut short. They could be cut short, we may infer, not only by intervention or

¹ Curiously however, Machiavelli goes on in the same chapter, when comparing the longevity of the Lycurgan constitution with Solon's (cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, xliii-1), to assert that Solon's short-lived *stato popolare* was quickly succeeded by Peisistratus' *tirannide*, though it was subsequently restored for some time afterwards (*Disc.*, I, 2 (vol. 3, p. 239)). This sequence, it will be clear, is not found in the above schema. How do we interpret it? Was Machiavelli using the term *tirannide* here in its classical conventional sense (cf. *Ibid.*, I, 25 *finis* (vol. 3, p. 306), cf. III, 26 (vol. 4, p. 218)), thus meaning that a *principe* followed license? Probably not. The Solonic state hardly broke up with mob-rule! It is preferable, as I will later justify, to take Solon's constitution in this chapter to be a democratically-inclined *repubblica* (as it is in subsequent passages), and one which was susceptible to tyranny [see *infra.*, p.462,n.2]). A republic, not being a simple constitution, does not strictly fall within the ambit of the cycle in I, 2.

² *Ibid.*, (vol. 3, p. 238). Machiavelli here refers to 'tutte le repubbliche si son governate', republics in this case meaning states or governments or political societies in a general sense.

³ 'a rigirarsi infinito tempo in questi governi' (vol. 3, p. 238).

conquest *ab externo*, but also by internal dissension (cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, lvii, 2); states could fall into distress, and without *consiglio* or *forze*, and they could no longer remain in *piedi*.¹

Thirdly, Machiavelli generalized about the zig-zag sequence as a procession verso *la licenza*. It is well known that he was frequently preoccupied with the issue of decay - Italian decay especially - and he envisaged the cycle of governments to be both moving towards and ending in the worst form of inner decay. The 'ruin' (*rovina*) of the state intrigued him. *Rovina* could occur at any point in the cycle, perhaps, either by 'foreign intervention or by civil discord', but the term most expressive of a complete internal collapse was *licenza*, the rule of *chacun pour soi* and the absence of any political effectiveness.³ The shadow of *licenza* hangs over his whole cycle somewhat as the awful condition of non-polity hangs over the Polybian *Anacyclōsis*.⁴ Along with the Polybian zig-zag line, then, stands a

¹ *Ibid.*

² See esp. F. Chabod, *Machiavelli and the Renaissance*, (ET), London, 1958, ff. 79 ff., 95 ff., on Machiavelli's concern about the decline of political and military effectiveness (or *virtù*) in the affairs of Italy.

³ For the short quotations, cf. 'Perchè se si considerrà di quanto danno sia cagione ad una repubblica o a una regno variare principe o governo, non per alcuna estrinseca forza, ma solamente per civile discordia, dove si vede come le poche variazioni, ogni repubblica ed ogni regno ancora che potentissimo, rovinano...' (vol. 1, p. 9). Cf. also on the *rovina* of states, *Disc.*, I, 6 ('Così dall' altra parte quando il cielo le fusse sì benigno, che le non avesse a fare guerra, ne nascerebbe che l'ozio la farebbe o effeminata o divisa; le quali due cose insieme, o ciascuna per se, sarebbero cagione della sua rovina'). My italics. (vol. 3, p. 523). On *licenza* again, see *infra.*, pp. 463f. esp., and note that Machiavelli credited oligarchy with some effectiveness (cf. *Il Principe*, v, 2 (vol. 4, p. 289), and even tyranny (*Ibid.*, xiv (p. 327), cf. *Disc.*, I, 29 (vol. 3, p. 313) on Julius Caesar), though tyranny could easily bring *rovina* to the state, (esp. I, 29 [vol. 3, p. 296]).

⁴ Note the reference to *licenza* in connection with tyranny (vol. 3, p. 23).

grado in grado movement towards utter disorder. This suggestion of *degeneratio*, indeed, substitutes for the conspicuous absence of the biological analogy in the *Discorsi*, I, 2. To relate the notions of growth, acme and decay to the cycle of governments had been a difficult enough task for Polybius; yet on Machiavelli's new reading of the cycle, with no reference to the recurring conditions of non-polity and with a heavier stress on overall decay, the very possibility of an effective relationship never seems to have presented itself.

These, in brief, are the basic characteristics of Machiavelli's best known cyclical model. The model deserves still further analysis, and the questions we asked of the Polybian position may also be asked about it - whether, for example, any specified state was understood to have passed through the whole cycle, or whether a mixed constitution was conceived as the best means of forestalling the cyclical process. Before going further, however, it will pay to reflect on Machiavelli's other important statement of recurrence in the *Istoriae* Bk. V. There one finds what is basically an alternatory model with hints of the biological analogy beneath the surface. About to analyse the vicissitudes of Florentine and Italian politics between 1434 and 1494, he dilated on the recurrent oscillation between 'order' and 'disorder' within states:

'for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue in a firm course, when states have arrived at their greatest perfection (*ultima perfezione*), they soon begin to decline (*scendino*). In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder and sunk to their utmost state of depression (*all' ultima bassezza*), unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend, and thus from good they gradually decline to evil and from evil mount up to good' (vol. 2, p. 125).

Accounting for this oscillation, he argued that *virtù* (valour and political effectiveness) produces peace, peace brings idleness (*ozio*), idleness disorder, and disorder *rovina*. In turn, from *rovina* springs order, from order *virtù*, and from this, glory and *buona fortuna* (p. 125).¹

Now this second model is distinctive both in its applications and its conception, even if it is complementary to the *cerchio* of the *Discorsi*. To begin with its application, this model embraces political change in the broadest terms. All kinds of states, those with or without *provincie* or agglomerate territories, fall under its rubric.² It involves states, moreover, in both their external and internal relations; although wider political conditions might be partly dependent on constitutional factors, this model does not tie the tendencies towards either ruin or good fortune to internal considerations alone. It is even possible, as Machiavelli himself suggested, that the whole cycle of governments might be experienced by a *subjugated* state; it was also possible for a state to attain supreme power externally whilst under an unworthy form of

¹ The idea of good fortune following order is foreshadowed in *Disc.*, I, 4 ('... che sia buono ordine,... che non vi sia buona fortuna' (p. 243), and see I, 11 ('... le prime cagioni della felicità di quella città, perchè quella causò buoni ordini, i buoni ordini fanno buona fortuna, e dalla buona fortuna nacquero i felici successi delle imprese', etc., pp. 271-2).

² That Machiavelli has republican Rome as much as any state in mind is indicated by his subsequent reference to Cato on the decay of Rome (vol. 2, p. 126). On the fates of particular constitutions placed within this wider context of alternation, cf. *Disc.*, I, 6 (vol. 3, pp. 252-3), cf. II, proem. (vol. 4, p. 6).

constitution, or to suffer unmitigated failure under a worthy one. That, of course, is not to deny points of intersection between the two models. The cycle of governments moved towards the low-point of 'license'; it was therefore conceivable that this license, which was certainly a form of disorder, both coincided with and indeed brought on a state of utter *rovina*. Possibly, too, a state might achieve its zenith under a good constitution, even one of the three worthy constitutions of the *cerchio*! The second framework clearly subsumes the first, however, and for this reason one may declare it to be more basic for Machiavelli's interpretations of political change.

In conception, the models share much in common. The *Discorsi* cycle has an element of alternating movement, with its fluctuation between 'good' and 'vicious' constitutions. The second frame, too, may be deemed cyclical, with its stage by stage rise and descent, and its reversion to an original point of departure. In both models, too, Machiavelli was preoccupied with decay and with the speed of change; he was interested in the overall tendency towards *licenza* in the *Discorsi* cycle, and with the implications of his broader model for the decline of valour in Italy.² On the other hand, the process of the *Istorie* V, 1 boasts a clearcut zenith which the cycle of governments lacks, and even hints at the biological analogy.³ And

¹ In the *Istorie* model, cf. 'non avende più da salire, conviene che scendine,' etc.

² See *ibid.*, V, 1 (pp. 126-7).

³ His first model might suggest three zeniths - monarchy, aristocracy and democracy - yet the second model requires the interpreter to select the uppermost point of political life and achievement prior to the debasement into ruin. Considerations other than purely constitutional ones would affect this selection.

although Machiavelli admitted that either sequence could be broken or distorted (the first *cerchio* by external pressures, the second by 'some extraordinary force', as he loosely put it),¹ the process in the *Discorsi* I, 2 is clearly more fragile and is the least likely of the two event-complexes to be fully realized.² Again, the *Istorie* model is more distinctly Machiavellian. Behind it, perhaps, lie ancient and mediaeval notions of changing fortune, rise, decay and vicissitude, yet Machiavelli has endowed it with so much more of his own character and vocabulary than with his version of the *Anacyclōsis*.

Examining the models together, however, one common characteristic deserves a special note. Neither succession of events was viewed as the result of 'natural processes'. The constitutional *cerchio* is nowhere said to follow a course *κατὰ φύσιν*, and although the second frame seems tinged with the biological analogy, nature makes no appearance. What may we infer from this? *Physis* was a key concept in Polybian anacyclic theory; why should Machiavelli pass it by? Did he have an alternative idea? One which immediately suggests itself is *necessità*, a term used in connection with both models.³ But Machiavelli's 'necessity' does not mean some inexorable fate but the weight of given (and man-made!) circumstances which demand a

¹ *Ibid.* (p. 126).

² One could readily suppose the *Discorsi* cycle to be a provisional statement, intended as orientation rather than doctrine, and one which has very little bearing on the rest of Machiavelli's analyses. But cf. the next section.

³ See esp. *1st Fior.*, V, 1 ('di necessità non potendo più scendere', vol. 2, p. 125), *Disc.*, I, 2 ('tal che costretti per necessità', vol. 3, p. 238).

response whether sufficient or inadequate.¹ Necessity certainly impels people to act, even if it is never the equivalent of such action, and whilst reason may not induce men to act, necessity certainly will.² This being the case, was necessity Machiavelli's substitute for *physis* or *nature*? Not convincingly. There is more to account for. As one constantly entering 'the ancient courts of ancient men',³ Machiavelli was capable of combining more than one classical line of explanation in his approach to historical complexity. *Necessità* features only as a background force in his two major cyclical models; at different points in the cycles circumstances arise which call for decision and action, and *necessità* describes these circumstances. By contrast, significantly, a more positive causal rôle is ascribed to human nature and motivation.

Now Machiavelli's views on human nature smack quite strongly of Thucydides (pp.189ff). Human nature was remarkably stable, steady enough for rules of political behaviour to be formulated. 'Whoever considers the past and the present' (we find early in the *Discorsi*),

'will readily observe that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same (*medesimi*) desires and the same passions; so that it is easy by diligent study of the past, to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any republic, and to apply those remedies that

¹ The appeals to 'necessity' in *Il Principe* are well known, cf. ii, 2; 5; 11; 12; etc.

² So *Disc.*, I, 6 ('e molte cose che la ragione non t'induce, t'induce la necessità', vol. 3, p. 253). Cf. also I, 3 (p. 244).

³ To quote *Lettere*, 10/12/1513 (vol. 10, p. 168).

were used by the ancients, or not finding any that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events' (I, 39).¹

Human nature being what it is, as Thucydides maintained, there will be future recurrences of present event-complexes; Machiavelli neatly coupled that doctrine with the more overtly pragmatic (even Polybian!) concern for remedying social ills through lessons from the past. It is this understanding of men and action which fills out the *rationale* of his two important cyclical frameworks. Humans respond to circumstances in a regular way. In their worthier responses tyrants are removed, or order is retrieved in the face of civic dissolution.² More commonly, however, the rule is corruption, with private ambition placed before the commonweal. Within the first cycle the powerful often became tyrannical, oligarchic or licentious; within the second men tend to lose the *virtù* which once gave their state its greatness, and they become idle and disorderly. Machiavelli's models lack a 'natural process' element, then, because his concentration centred around human motivation. That did not mean deterministic-looking features make no appearance, however; men's deeds conform to *regole*

¹ Vol. 3, p. 338, cf. Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, 22 (4); III, 82 (2); Polybius *Hist.*, VI, x (and for more phenomenological as against pragmatic statements, iii, 2-3, iv, 12-3, ix, 10-14). On the stability of human nature in Machiavelli's work, cf. esp. *Disc.*, I, proem. (vol. 3, p. 227), I, 3 (p. 241), 42 (p. 347), etc. Also on Machiavelli's use of Thucydides, cf. *Disc.*, III, 16 (vol. 4, p. 192); II, 10 (p. 44), 12 (p. 47), and esp. II, 2 (pp. 16-17) (on the condition of Corcyra).

² Removing a tyrant, could mean acting out of necessity. It was when talking about the Romans' removal of Tarquinius Superbus that Machiavelli affirmed 'che gli uomini non operano mai nulla bene, se non per necessità' (*Disc.*, I, 3 (vol. 3, p. 241)).

and there remains necessity, or decision-involving situations, which induce typical responses. Perhaps he qualified the cycle of governments more overtly than Polybius, and he also formulated his broader cycle, with its greater capacity to accommodate historical variations. Yet Machiavelli still insisted on the recurrence of event-patterns and on the constancy of the principles which made such recurrence possible. Admittedly, the principles are neither supernatural (like God) nor extra-human (like nature), but principles there are. History remains the domain of human action, and in both key models the dynamics of historical repetition lie in the interplay between characteristic circumstances, responsibilities, or pressures, and characteristic reactions. Although his eclecticism remains apparent, Machiavelli thus transformed ancient preconceptions into a persuasively fresh understanding of the human condition.

Machiavelli on *Corpi Misti* and the Constitutional History of Rome

We now focus on Machiavelli's treatment of mixed constitutions and on the application of his major models to particular state histories.

It is interesting that the absence of *natura* from Machiavelli's recurrence theory may be partly due to the fact that the term had such a wide usage amongst scholastics and theologians, both of whom he held in disfavour.¹ On the other hand, when once generalizing about mixed

¹ See esp. *Disc.*, I, 11-15 (pp. 269 ff. ; cf. Polybius, *Hist.*, VI, lvi, 6 ff.) on Machiavelli's 'shocking' utilitarian approach to religion. That he knew about equations of *Dio* and *Natura*, cf. *Istorie*, IV, 16 (vol. 2, p. 88).

bodies (*corpi misti*), that is, 'republics and religious sects', Machiavelli alluded to something like divine ordinance or even Aristotle's entelechy:

'All things of this world have a limit to their existence;¹ but those only run the whole course generally ordained *dal cielo* that do not allow their body to become disorganized, but keep it unchanged in the manner ordained.' (*Disc.*, III,1 (vol. 4, p. 127)).

The theological touch may well come from dealing with religious groups as mixed bodies, but it is significant that Machiavelli took republics - as *miste* - to be superior to simple constitutions. The constitutions of Sparta and Rome, for instance, were so much more durable for having an effective balance of power elements. May we assume, then, that states with complex constitutions, particularly republics, do not succumb to the rapid changes of his governmental cycle, even if they must ultimately descend, of course, to some *ultima bassezza*.

Rome is the test-case. Momentarily reverting to Polybius, we may recall that he forged a direct link between the natural anacyclic process and the natural development of Rome's *politeia*. On the surface, that connection augured contradiction, but a closer examination made sense of his position. On the other hand, his views became intelligible only through a careful reconstruction of fragmentary evidence (pp.97ff.), and Machiavelli, lacking our materials, can hardly be expected to have offered an identical interpretation. In any case,

¹ Again, overt reference to 'biological' or 'natural' change and decay (cf. Polybius' *φθορά* and *μεταβολή* in *Hist.*, lvii, 1) is conspicuously omitted.

Roman political history had been mediated to him by Livy and other post-Polybian authors, and he also declined to reproduce Polybius' emphasis on *physis*. How, then, did he understand the course of Rome's internal development, which is a favourite subject in the *Discorsi*?

After elaborating on his *cerchio* of constitutions, Machiavelli made a brief comparison between Sparta and Rome (*Disc.*, I, 2). *Qua* constitution, the Spartan achievement was the better one, owing to Lycurgus' special foresight (cf. Polybius, VI, 1, 21). Rome took longer to arrive at a state of good fortune, yet it did so neither through legislation nor natural processes. Polybius had written of 'many trials and troubles' in this connection (VI, x, 14), whilst Machiavelli, having read his Livy as well, appealed to the accidental benefits of a disunion between Senate and people, as well as to the background favour of *fortuna*.¹ And once the Romans attained to their *corpo misto*, we may presume, it then became a matter of keeping it 'unchanged in the manner ordained'.

Machiavelli was under no illusions, however, over the difficulties of either securing or preserving the Roman stability. That he idealized Rome's government less than Polybius and Cicero, for instance, is even implied in his disinclination to describe its course as natural, and in his willingness to ascribe ^{to} *fortuna* a rôle in Rome's internal politics.² Machiavelli's own context is all important here. He knew

¹ Cf. vol. 3, pp. 238-40, and note '... tanti gli accidenti che in quella nacquero per disunione che era intra la Plebe ed il Senato, che quello che non aveva fatto uno ordinatore, lo fece il case' (p. 239), 'e tante gli fu favorevole la fortuna' (p. 240). Yet cf. Polybius, VI, ix, 13-14; x, 12-13.

² Cicero referred to fortune's support as a mere after-thought (*Re Pub.*, II, xvi, 30).

only too well how the old Rome had declined and had fallen, and although prepared to admit that in Rome there were 'more virtues than ever had been seen in any other republic' (*Disc.*, I, i (vol. 3, p. 233)), her numerous faults could not be over-looked.¹ Livy's monument, for which the *Discorsi* was intended as a commentary, was a key factor behind this aspect of Machiavelli's realism. On the one side, he could concur with Polybius that Rome had graduated towards a state of constitutional perfection. 'Her first institutions', he could assert

'were doubtless defective, but they were not in conflict with the principles that might bring her to *la perfezione*' (I, 2 [vol. 3, p. 239]).²

On the other hand, there was Roman decline and Livian *degeneratio* theory to be reckoned with. Following Livy, he held that the Romans were less corrupt as a people whilst the Republican institutions were coming into being and when the government was less adequate. Their old virtues were gradually lost after the state's internal organisation was settled and whilst the empire grew to its height.³

Accounting for these preconceptions, then, how do we characterise Machiavelli's picture of Rome's constitutional career? To begin with,

¹ Cf. esp. *Disc.*, I, 2; 28; 29; 32; 58; II, 3, etc. (on virtues), and I, 6, 35, etc., and see II, proem. (vol. 4, p. 5 - on defects).

² Cf. also p. 240: 'feca una repubblica perfetta, alla quale perfezione venne ...'.

³ See *Disc.*, I, 17 (vol. 3, p. 289), 18 (pp. 291-3), 47 (p. 355), II, 8 (vol. 4, p. 36), III, 1 (p. 131), III, 25 (pp. 242). See also *infra*.

her internal development had a zenith, this being attained when the conditions 'for free public life' had been created (*Disc.*, I, 2). Her early course, therefore, ran towards *libertà*. The kingship founded by Romulus did not provide all the essentials for liberty, but these were acquired when the nobles and the people each gained a share of power in turn. The emergence and collapse of Roman kingship were in accord with earlier stages in the *Discorsi* cycle,¹ but after the fall of the Tarquins there came an important departure. Because Romulus had already issued laws well suited for free public life (so, Livy),² the Roman constitution quickly became complex, experiencing neither the rules of the few nor of the many in their simple forms. Once consuls replaced the kings³ the government possessed a combination of two power elements - those of the (monarchical) consulate and the (aristocratic) Senate. Then

'it remained only for the people to be given power;
this came with the insolence of the Roman nobility
which ... caused the people to rise against them, ...
the Tribunes of the People then being created
(*Disc.*, I, 2 [vol. 3, p. 240]).

Now how are we to understand this passage from a two-pronged to a three-pronged constitution? Was it a transition from aristocracy through oligarchy to democracy and thus part of an alternation between worthy and vicious constitutions? Certainly Machiavelli wished his

¹ Hence the phrase 'per le cagioni e modi discorsi' (on p. 240), which refers back to that account.

² Cf. *Urbe Cond.*, I, 8, ff. Also on Romulus' creation of the Senate, see Sextus Aurelius (?), *De Viris Illustribus*, ii, 10; cf. Cicero (not available to Machiavelli).

³ And 'che stessero nil luogo del Re, vennero a cacciare di Roma il nome', (on p. 240) refers back to 'avendo in odio il nome d'uno solo capo' (p. 23).

readers to be convinced that Rome's *corso* did somehow conform to the cycle of governments.

'Authority passed in turn to kings', he wrote, 'to the *ottimati*, and to the people, and by the same degrees and for the same reasons discoursed above [in the outline of the *cerchio*]' (p. 240).

Yet in the time between the expulsion of the Tarquins and the creation of tribunician power the cycle was not followed in its normal form. This was a period of *molte confusione, romori, e pericoli di scandali*, a time of conflict between nobles and people which, for Machiavelli, set the tone for political agitations throughout the republic's life.¹ In Rome's path towards liberty, the regal and aristocratic powers were never entirely abolished, so that on the institution of the tribuneship, Rome was no mere democracy but a republic with a balance of three power factors.

The stages in the Machiavellian account of Rome's *corso*, it may be noted, differed from those in Polybius. In our own analysis of the *Historiae* VI we established the whole Polybian sequence thus:²

'monarchy'
 kingship
 tyranny
 aristocracy
mictē (with growth
 acme
 decline)
 oligarchy
 democracy
 ochlocracy
 'monarchy'

¹ See *ibid.*, I, 4-5 (pp. 242ff.) on Rome, and on a similar conflict in Florence, see *infra*.

² See Diagram IV.

Machiavelli's solution, affected by Livy, was different:

Founder (there is no reference to Romulus as
a 'primitive' monarch)
Kings
Tyranny
Consuls and Senate as two settled power elements,
with the people and the nobles in conflict, and
with evidence of the latter's *insolentia*
Tribunician offices giving the people a voice
The 'perfect' *mista*

More follows, yet at this point we may comment on the ascending thrust of his sequence. The stages derive mainly from Livy, but they are presented to conform the *Anacyclōsis*. Livy made no reference to the aristocratic oppression of the plebs prior to the establishment of the tribuneship,¹ yet Machiavelli made a point of the nobles' *insolentia* probably because he held that, in its special way, Rome experienced a *governo di pochi* before the people acquired their voice.² Again, Livy nowhere contended that Rome achieved a constitutional *perfezione* when the people obtained their measure of power; treating 'the secession of the plebs' he simply went on to relate other troubles for Rome, both external and internal.³ In Polybius, by comparison, there was a process of growth towards an

¹ It is interesting that Cicero nowhere referred to such oppression in this context, but only to the nobles' excess of power *via* the senate and consular officer (*Re Pub.*, II, xxxii, 56 - xxxiv, 59).

² The idea of a Roman oligarchy at this stage was not in Dionysius, let alone Livy. Dionysius, probably used by Machiavelli to some extent, applied the term oligarchy to the Decemvirs, not to the aristocracy at large before the creation of the tribunes (p312). On aristocratic insolence in Polybius, however, note *Hist.*, VI, viii, 5, on *hybris*.

³ *Ab Urbe*, II, 33-53, etc.

acme - the Roman *mictē* - and it was up to Machiavelli to decide when this most admirable of constitutions had been achieved. In conformity with his view of accumulative development, Machiavelli placed the acquisition of a triadic mixed government after the establishment of the tribunician offices.¹ Significantly, his chapter on the creation of 'the Tribunes of the People', follows immediately upon the *Discorsi* I, 2. It was that creation which confirmed Rome as a republic, or a 'mixed body'; and this point granted, he could dig back historically, to the foundations of Rome (I, 9-34), and then forward, towards the rise of the Principate (I, 35 ff.).²

In review, then, Rome reached perfection, not only by experiencing kings and a tyrant, but also aristocrats who in turn became oligarchic, as well as the 'democratic' plebeian activities which produced the tribunes. All these experiences, moreover, in their accumulative effect, contributed to the full stature of Roman republicanism.³

¹ It is fascinating how the 'accumulative' view of Polybius' archaeology propounded in von Fritz's *Theory of the Mixed Constitution*, *op. cit.*, pp.126ff. and pp.434ff., is truer of Machiavelli than of Polybius, cf. *supra*, pp.93ff. In this whole area, as well, it is important to recognize that the passage of Polybius VI which dated the beginning of the *mictē* to Xerxes' invasion of Hellas, and which pinpointed Rome's constitutional acme to the time of the second Punic War, was probably not accessible to Machiavelli; cf. Moore, *Manuscript Tradition of Polybius*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 ff., 171. It can be seen in the Paton edn. of Polybius that the passage VI, xi 1-9 (from Exc. Vat. p. 372, M. 25. 30. H) has been inserted between passages from Cod. Urb. fols. 60 and 66.

² Reference to the creation of Tribunes being significantly omitted from between I, 34 and 35. Given a continuous commentary on Livy in *Disc.*, I, that is where one would expect to find such a reference.

³ It bears acknowledgement that Machiavelli took Romulus, the founder and first legislator of Rome, to be in a special sense the founder of the Roman republic, and a figure thus comparable to Lycurgus. Romulus may not have intended to institute a republic, but he and his successors created laws which 'looked forward' to the conditions of *libertà* (*Disc.*, I, 2 (vol. 3, p. 239)); and Machiavelli noted (following Livy) that it was Romulus who created the Senate (see *Disc.*, I, 9 (vol. 3, p. 263), cf. Livy, *Ab Urbe*, I, viii, ff.). In that light he could even argue that the creation of the Tribunes was a reversion to the original principles (*ritirarono ... verso il suo principio*) of the Roman constitution (cf. *Disc.*, III, I (vol. 4, p. 129)), and not just the last significant stage in its growth to perfection.

What follows? What was the fate of the Republic and did Rome return to the path of the *Discorsi* cycle? For that matter, did her experience conform to the broader socio-political moment of the *Istorie* V, I?

At one point Machiavelli actually wrote about the insolence and intimidating actions of the Tribunes, even prefacing his remarks by affirming that all human institutions have an inherent *male* (*Disc.*, III, 1 (vol. 4, p. 178)). We need not suppose, however, that their excesses were equated with the *licenza* which followed upon democracy. Even though their untoward behaviour had proleptic significance, and even though a gradual, long-term decline in morality was pre-supposed here,¹ Machiavelli located *licenza* where classical theory had generally put it - from the time of the Gracchi in the second century BC. Internal conflict over the agrarian reform issue

'led to violence and bloodshed beyond all bounds or precedent. So that, the magistrates being unable to check these disturbances, and neither party having any confidence in the public authorities, they both resorted to private remedies, and each of the factions began to look for a chief capable of defending them against the other' (*Disc.*, I, 37).²

In questo scandalo e disordine, the people looked to Marius, and in turn to Sulla, Pompey and then, of course, to Caesar, who became *primo tiranno* in Rome (*Ibid.*). Now the picture of this lawlessness

¹ Note *Disc.*, III, 1 (pp. 130-1), where he traced Rome's moral *degeneratio* back as far as Regulus (cf. Polybius, I, xxviii, ff., Livy, XVII, summ.)

² Vol. 3, p. 333 ; see also III, 24 (vol. 4, p. 213) on the importance of the agrarian law issue in connection with decline.

and the resort to private passions is clearly reminiscent of Machiavelli's description of *licenza* in the *Discorsi* I, 2.¹ This time, too, the Polybian idea that ochlocracy produced demagogy and subsequently a 'despot' or a 'tyrant' (in Plato's sense) has some look in. In the troublesome aftermath of the agrarian laws, the populace bestowed favours on their champions, and as was typical with corrupt republics, the leading men 'were more desirous of pleasing the masses than of promoting the general good' (I, 37; II, 22).² On the other hand, Machiavelli nowhere implied that, when the republic gave way to the Principate, Rome sank into a condition of bestiality or non-polity. Remaining true to his special modification of the *Anacyclōsis*, he showed that *licenza* was followed by a reversion to one-man rule. This modification may well have been dictated by the facts of the Roman past in the first place. Polybius did not foresee the emergence of the emperors; Machiavelli, by contrast, had the whole course of Roman history before his eyes. The *Anacyclōsis* was tailored to suit the facts.

Rome, therefore, passed through at least one complete cycle of governments. In the establishment of a republic the *cerchio* had been forestalled and a peak in civic life achieved, but from the Gracchan

¹ So 'E perchè gli eccellenti uomini nelle repubbliche corrotte, nei tempi quieti massimamente, e per invidia e per altre ambiziose cagioni sono inimicati, si va dietro a quello che da un commune inganno e giudicato bene, o da uomini che più presto vogliono i favori che il bene dell' universale, è messo innazi' (vol. 4, p. 86).

² Vol. 3, pp. 333-4, and cf. Polybius, VI, ix, 6-8.

period on she declined back into the anacyclic path.¹ There remain, however, vexed questions about the Principate, which in the east at least, lasted over a thousand years. To begin with, if Machiavelli named Julius Caesar as the first in a series of tyrants, he was also happy to call him *principe*,² a term, incidentally, which best accords with his account of the *Discorsi* cycle. And what of the long line of emperors? It is not clear whether they could be classified into 'kings and tyrants' (cf. *Disc.*, I, 10),³ but they were all *principi*,⁴ and to that extent were comparable to the monarchs of England or France. The continuity of ancient emperors and mediaeval kings obviously presented a problem in relation to his fast-moving cycle of governments, yet Machiavelli's apparent solution lay in a distinction between monarchs who inherited kingdoms and those who did not.⁵ If kingships remained hereditary, *rovina* would surely come, since bad sons would replace worthy fathers, and the reinvigoration

¹ Cf. '... Tanto che per tali cagioni questa legge stette come addormentata infino ai Gracchi, da quali essendo poi svegliata, rovinò al tutto la libertà Romana' (I, 37 (vol. 3, pp. 332-3, cf. 333-4). See Livy, *Ab Urbe*, LVIII-IX summ.

² Cf. esp. *Princ.*, xvi, 3-4.

³ So, 'Vedrà ancora per la lezione di questa istoria come si può ordinare un regno buono; perchè tutti gli' Imperadori, che succedono all' imperio per eredità, eccetto Tito, furono cattivi; quelli che per adozione, furono tutti buoni, come furono quei cinque da Nerva a Marco. E come l' imperio caddo negli eredi, ei ritorno nella sua rovina' (vol. 3, p. 267).

⁴ Cf. *Princ.*, xix, 8 ff.

⁵ In the passage cited in the previous note but one, the distinction is between *eredità* and *adozione*; in *Il Principe*, (cf. esp. iii, 3-4, etc.), it is between hereditary rule and those who take over power when a given line ceases to be, or is overcome.

which came with fresh pretenders would be stifled. Although Rome remained in decline under the Principate (that is, *vis à vis* her republican peak), changes in dynastic lines preserved some health in the state, and it was also true that Rome's new *principato* marked a recovery after the disorder of license.¹

All these constitutional changes, from Romulus to the Caesars, were placed within a wider context. Rome also experienced the cyclo-alternatory process between order and disorder, good fortune and ruin. The pinnacle of her success came under the republic; not only did she preserve a republican *ordine* for about three hundred years (even if with difficulty), but between the Plebeian secession and the Gracchi she acquired a great empire, and was blessed both with rulers of *virtù* and fortune's favour. Now Rome's very height as an empire was located where most classical authors placed it - after the defeat of Carthage, Macedonia and Antiochus the Great (*Disc.*, II, I).² *Ozio* came on after Antiochus' defeat, when the number of virtuous men decreased, when military commands were imprudently distributed, and agrarian troubles arose.³ What were the further stages in the decline? Did Machiavelli

¹ For important background here note Plutarch, *Vit.*, (Dion and Brutus compared); ii, 1 ff., where Caesar's rule is represented as the needed remedy for Rome's maladies. (Cf. also C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, Oxford, 1971, p. 101.) In addition, Machiavelli could have found the idea of a reversion to *regnum* (as against primitive monarchy) in Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Vit et Morib. Imper.*, i, 1.

² (vol. 4, p. 13) '... che quell' altro lo superasse, ed essere a tempo o con pace o con guerra a difendersi da lui. In modo che io credo che la fortuna che ebbero in questa parte i Romani... e fussero di quella medesima virtù che essi'.

³ Virtue flourishes up to Paulus Aemilius' day (*flor.*, 168 BC) (III, (vol. 4, pp. 194, 217, ec. "Dirò questa povertà ancora insino ai tempi di Paulo Emilio, che furono quasi gli ultimi felici tempi di quella repubblica ...')). Plutarch and Sextus Aurelius Victor are probably Machiavelli's sources for Aemilius, cf. L.J. Walker (ed.), *The Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli*, London, 1950, vol. 2, p. 178. Cf. also *Disc.*, III, 1 (vol. 4, p. 131) on the views of Cato the Censor. On the distribution of commands, III, 16, 24, (pp. 194, 213-15).

believe that, when the republic collapsed into conditions of *licenza*, the whole Roman state had descended to a low-point of *rovina* and *disordine*? In Rome's case, in other words, did the end-points of his two major cycles coincide? The Florentine, unfortunately, does not answer our questions. Either Rome passed through one general moment, the Principate simply representing further, though prolonged decay, with the Romans' *antico valore* and their religious spirit now dissipated,¹ or else she experienced two cycles, the first ending in the civil wars and disorder of the first century BC, and the second covering the rise and fall of the Caesars' empire, from Julius to the utter *rovina* of the barbarian invasions.² The first alternative suits Machiavelli's republican bias, or his apparent assumption that Roman history was basically the history of the Republic. The second possibility, however, can hardly be ruled out. Although Machiavelli described how a whole state could sink into *rovina*, this ruin did not necessarily mark complete destruction, but only an *ultima bassezza* from which ascent might begin again. Whatever the case, however, the preconception that human societies pass alternately between widely separated points of prominence and depression still remains.

¹ II, 8 (vol. 4, p. 36) '... come la virtù Romana mancò, e che quelle armi perderono il loro antico valore ...'. In I, 10, however, he does suggest that, between Nero and Marcus Aurelius, conditions in the empire were better than either before or after. On the loss of religious spirit, cf. I, II (vol. 3, p. 272), cf. also Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms*, etc., *op. cit.*, p. 54 ff.

² *Ist.*, I, 1 (vol. I, p. 2): 'fondato sopra il sangue di tanti uomini virtuosi..., ^{non una popolazione} ma molte furono quelle che nella sua rovina congiurarono'.

The Recurrent Lapse of Republics into Tyranny: Rome

Machiavelli left another major model of recurrence which was connected with constitutional history in general and Roman history in particular. Republics, as possessors of complex constitutions, were involved in a special *mutazione di stato*: the recurrent change from liberty to tyranny and vice versa.¹

Roman republican history from the Plebeian secession to the Caesars, we may assert, was conceived as a succession of breakdowns or near breakdowns into *tirannide*, each lapse being followed by the re-acquisition of an essential republicanism. In Machiavelli's view, republics had a dangerous propensity to turn into tyrannies, just as kingdoms often did,² and this could be illustrated from the case of Rome. Instead of reckoning the Decemvirate an oligarchy,³ for example, he wrote of it as the tyranny of Appius Claudius and his supporters (cf. I, 40,⁴ III, 26). From Appius he looked back to the attempt of Spurius Cassius to seize power, and interpreted it as

¹ So 'come dopo una mutazione di Stato, o da repubblica in tirannide o da tirannide in repubblica ...' (*Disc.*, III, 3 (vol. 4, p. 135)), 'che molte mutazioni che si fanno dalla vita libera alla tirannica, e per contrario, ...' (III, 7 (p. 166)), cf. 8 (pp. 169-170), cf. 49 (p. 267).

² 'E potendo fare con perpetuo loro onore o una repubblica o un regno, si volgono alla tirannide ...' *Disc.*, I, 10 (vol. 3, p. 265), cf. also I, 46 (p. 354), 58 (p. 386), III, 8 (vol. 4, pp. 167, 169-70).

³ As did Dionysius (*supra*, p. 312) (and according to Taeger's erroneous interpretation, Polybius (pp. 93-6)).

⁴ 'questa tirannide' (vol. 3, p. 343), '... subito la tirannide surge'. 'Questo modo hanno tenuto tutti coloro che hanno fondato tirannidi nelle repubbliche; e se questo modo lo avesse tenuto Appio' (p. 344).

a tendency towards the tyrannical (III, 8).¹ He even gazed back as far as Tarquinius Superbus, as if the Republic, in a special sense created by Romulus and Numa, had first suffered at his tyrannical hands.² Looking forward, on the other hand, he alighted on the pretensions of Spurius Maelius and Manlius Capitolinus (III, 28),³ on the still later attempts at tyranny by Marius and Sulla (III, 24, cf. I, 37),⁴ as well as those of Pompey and Caesar, the latter being the *primo tiranno* in a series. Brutus and Cassius tried valiantly to restore the Republic and so liberate Rome from this last *tirannide*; but they failed (III, 6, (vol. 4, pp. 142-3)). On earlier occasions, Rome had been able to overcome such slides into tyranny by removing the usurper and by restoring her ancient form of government (I, 45, (vol. 3, p. 350)), thus returning to the 'true path' (III, 28). But by Caesar's time, the Republic had become too decidedly corrupted. If the Romans had long succeeded in bringing their *corpo misto* back to its 'ordained' path, the Principate eventually dashed all hopes of that possibility.

¹ '... e gli avrebbe aperta alla tirannide quella via che gli chiuse' (vol. 4, p. 167). On Manlius also.

² On Tarquinius Superbus, cf. esp. III, 8 (vol. 4, pp. 166-7); on Romulus and the Senate, see I, 9, vol. 3, p. 263, (which also deals with Tarquinius as well); for Numa Pompilius on religion and law, see esp. I, II (p. 271-2), and on the importance of order, especially of good laws in Republics, cf. I, 58 (pp. 385-6).

³ Note esp. '... ordino il Dittatore, il quale con il braccio regio facesse tornare dentro al segno chi ne fusse uscito, come la fece per punire Spurio Melio. Ed una che di queste cose si lasci impunita, e attia a rovinare una repubblica', etc. (vol. 4, pp. 223-4).

⁴ Sulla and Marius raised up armies *contro al bene pubblico* (vol. 4, p. 215), and they emerge after the picture of *licenza* in Rome we have discussed above (cf. vol. 3, p. 333, and *supra*). See also *Ist.*, II, 2 (vol. 1, p. 64).

Thus Machiavelli infused another model of recurrence into his interpretation of constitutional history. From our Diagram XII it appears as an alternation between liberty and tyranny, though one could also deem it a form of *metabolē* theory, since we are dealing here with a propensity of one constitution to change into another. The basis for this new model presumably lay in earlier analyses of Roman history. Livy himself had already implied that Appius Claudius was a tyrant,¹ and he wrote suggestively of other relevant figures covered in the *Discorsi*.² By Machiavelli's time, in any case, the contrast between republicanism and tyranny was a well-entrenched commonplace in political theory. Aquinas had written that 'the degeneration of government into tyranny is no less frequent under a government ruled by more than one person than under a monarchy; in fact it is probably more frequent',³ and within the Florentine political tradition, Salutati had already used the examples of Spurius Maelius and Manlius Capitolinus as would-be tyrants, men who conspired against *libertas*.⁴ Mediaevals, of course, had invariably referred to corrupt kings as tyrants, yet more recently pro-republicans had so labelled the up-and-coming Italian despots, particularly the notorious Giangaleazzo Visconti, who had posed

¹ Cf. *Ab Urbe Cond.*, III, xxxvi, 2; 5, xxxvii.

² Cf. esp. *ibid.*, IV, xiii, 1-xvi, 8, etc. on Spurius Maelius. Cicero listed together Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius in *De Amicitia*, viii, 28.

³ *De Reg. Princ.*, v (d'Entrèves edn., p. 25).

⁴ *De Tyranno*, ii (see Emerton's edn., pp. 80-1, cf. 88-9, esp. p. 89 where the combined reference to Tarquinius Superbus, the Decemvirs and Nero, implies that the Decemvirs represented a tyranny also).

DIAGRAM XII

such a threat to the free civic life of the early Quattrocento.¹ Machiavelli took up these threads and developed a model for political change within republics. This model was not strictly integral to his first *cerchio*, and it is not even justifiable to call it cyclical, but it is certainly a model of historical recurrence with its own special niche in his theory of change.

Reciprocal Change within Unstable Republics: Florence

Machiavelli called states other than Rome *repubbliche*, and the one he spent most time documenting was his own beloved city-state. Florence, however, was understood to be a republic with glaring deficiencies; she merited only an unfavourable comparison with Rome. In fact, with all her vicissitudes of constitutional changes (after 1215), it could be claimed that she never really experienced republican government.² Unlike Rome, she did not enjoy any liberty from her beginnings, but only after a long period of servitude under ancient Rome and the mediaeval Emperors. Thus old, bad institutions came to be mixed with newer, more preferable ones, whilst turbulence and divisions amongst the Florentines produced a harmful factiousness,

¹ See esp. H. Baron, *Crisis*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pt. 1; *Humanistic and Political Literature*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 ff., D.J. Wilcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 138 ff. It was probably this kind of 'despotic' one-man rule which Savonarola had in mind when he defended liberty against gruesome tyranny in his *Trattato circa il Reggimento e Governo della Città di Firenze* of 1498 (III, 3 (L. Firpo edn., pp. 47-53, a passage of background importance for Machiavelli, cf. Whitfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34)).

² *Disc.*, I, 49, for the quotation ('senza ... veramente essere chiamata repubblica') (vol. 3, pp. 360), cf. *Disc. Rif. Stat. Fir.*, (vol. 5, p. 7).

rather than new laws or military valour.¹ Florence, then, was a republic of a degenerate ilk, and we may infer that, in Machiavelli's mind, her internal changes differed somewhat from Rome's. More like Athens, her power elements were not balanced evenly enough to prevent her from inclining towards unmixed constitutional forms.²

Assuming Florence to be a republic,³ at least after 1215, one expects to meet the idea of republics recurrently breaking down into tyrannies and near tyrannies. And this is just what one finds. Corso Donati pretended to *tirannide* in 1304, for instance, but met with disaster.⁴ The republic gave extraordinary powers to Jacopo Gabriegli (in 1340) and the Duke of Athens (in 1342), and in each case found tyrannies on its hands, the tyrants being removed in their turn

¹ On the first point of contrast, see *Disc.*, I, 49 (vol. 3, p. 360), and on the second, see esp. *Ist.*, III, 1 (vol. 2, p. 5), VII, 1 (p. 263), *Disc.*, I, 8 (vol. 3, p. 260), cf. I, 4 (p. 243). On Florence's servitude under the Emperors, see *Disc.*, I, xlix (vol. 3, p. 360), cf. *Istorie*, II, 2 (vol. 1, p. 65), II, 5 (pp. 69-70), and see Bk. I as a whole.

² If, in the *Discorsi* I, 2, Athens was named a *stato popolare* (*supra*), elsewhere Machiavelli called her a republic (I, 28 (vol. 3, p. 309), cf. 58 (p. 385). Conceived as the former, her constitutional course does not follow the cycle of governments, but as the latter she could be understood as a republic susceptible to tyranny (the tyranny of the Peisistratidae, for instance). Republics, moreover, could be weighted in different directions, towards *lo stato popolare* (in Athen's case), aristocracy or principedom (cf. *Discorso sopra il Reformare lo Stato di Firenze*, (vol. 5, p. 8), cf. *Istorie*, III, 1 (vol. 2, pp. 5-7).

³ The *Discorsi* cycle does not make any appearance in the *Istorie* unless one is to suppose that the period of servitude under the emperors, the period of the struggle between nobility and people, the period following the people's victory over the nobles, and the period of the Medici, represent the sequence monarchy/aristocracy/democracy/monarchy. The book divisions, perhaps, Bk. I (to 1215), Bk. II (to the utter depression of the nobility), Bks. III-IV (to just before the rise of Cosimo), Bks. V-VIII (to the death of Lorenzo il Magnifico), lend some little support to this line, but it is a tenuous one.

⁴ See *Ist.*, II, 21 (vol. 1, pp. 91-2), 22 (p. 95), cf. II, 7 ff. (pp. 71 ff.).

by popularly supported conspiracies.¹ Machiavelli described the members of the 1378 Ciompi revolt as tyrannical,² and so too, the citizens who caused the factionalism of the 1240s and the early 90s.³ To that extent, then, and since her republic 'corrected' itself in each case, the Florentine and Roman cases were comparable. Once again, the tyrannies were not necessarily focussed on individuals. On the other hand, Florence was a more poorly constituted republic than Rome. She inclined too much towards *lo stato popolare* (cf. *Ist.*, III, 1), and for this reason was susceptible to another kind of *mutazione*. In his preface to the *Istorie* IV, Machiavelli waxed theoretical about this other tendency:

'Republican governments, more especially those imperfectly organized, frequently change their rulers and the form of their institutions; yet not *between* *la libertà e la servitù*, as many suppose, but *between* *la servitù e la licenza*' (vol. 2, p. 67).

Florence, then, not only experienced a struggle between tyranny and liberty,⁴ but ^{dual} tendencies towards ^{both} tyranny and license. In this

¹ On Gabriegli, see *Ist.*, II, 32 (vol. 1, p. 110) and on the conspiracy, *ibid.* (pp. 110-1); on the Duke of Athens, II, 34-38, (pp. 117, 119, 121, 128-9, cf. III, 1 (vol. 2, p. 7); 16 (p. 43), and the conspiracies against him, vol. 2, pp. 123 ff.). Note also Machiavelli's treatment of Castruccio vis à vis Florence, (cf. II, 29 ff. (vol. 1, pp. 104 ff.)).

² See *Ist.*, III, 16 (vol. 2, p. 43), 20, (pp. 46-7), IV, 9 (p. 78).

³ So, *Ist.*, II, 9 (vol. 1, p. 75), and III, 25 (vol. 2, p. 57), and note also the comments on those causing factions in the early Quattrocento, IV, 2 (p. 69).

⁴ Machiavelli here dissociates his position from the earlier humanists who seemed to him to parallel Rome and Florence as great republics which were recurrently threatened by tyranny.

poorly constituted city-state, 'only the name of liberty was in any estimation', and neither the nobles (as the main force making for servitude), nor the people (as the chief ministers of license), 'chose to subject themselves to the magistrates or the law' (p. 67). The impression left is something like a beam-balance (cf *supra*, p. 155), whereby the state can be tipped either way, towards the harsh or unbeneficial rule of the powerful on the one hand, or towards extreme factiousness, the rule of 'each man for himself', on the other. That the balance tips alternately is certainly implied in the *Istorie* IV, 1,¹ but in view of the complexities of Machiavelli's Florentine history, it is sufficient to stress the recurrent tendency to change either way. With the absence of 'excellent laws' and institutions, the restoration of a balanced constitution was difficult and the pull towards disorder more likely.

Weak republics, however, do not always remain lost in servitude or factiousness. 'When', Machiavelli insisted, 'a good, wise and powerful citizen appears, which is but seldom,' ordinances may be established which offset contending dispositions and produce 'a government called *libera*, with its institutions firm and secure' (pp. 67-8). This is interesting. Tyranny and license take weak republics towards *rovina*, yet the suggestion here is that a saviour can redeem such a state. The saviour seems to stand alone. We have come to another thorny area of Machiavellian studies, and one

¹ In referring to poorly constituted republics, he wrote of them as 'frequently changing from *stato tirannido a licenzioso*, or the reverse' (p. 68).

still pertinent to the study of his recurrence ideas - the rôle of the prince.

The Prince and Constitutional History

Within the life of republics, princes evidently arose when *licenza* threatened the state. Taking the Roman case, although Julius Caesar illustrated the recurrent lapse of republicanism into tyranny, he also headed a series of *principi*, rulers who arose once the republic had collapsed with factional fighting. Florentine politics exemplified both types of change more fully. If ^{the city} ~~she~~ was a prey to tyranny, those times of turbulence, when her government remained wholly *nello arbitrio del popolo*, saw the rising possibility of princedom as well.¹ It was following bitter feuding between the Medici, Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Neri di Gino Capponi, that Cosimo de' Medici so took the reins of government that he convinced Machiavelli he was *principe nella sua patria*.² The resurgence of popularism in Cosimo's closing years gave Luca Pitta the opportunity of virtual princedom,³ and Lorenzo I rose to power in the wake of severe internal disruptions within Florence.⁴ Outside the *Istorie*, Machiavelli commented on events after the death of Lorenzo I in a

¹ For early cases, note that of Andrea Strozzi (1343), cf. *ibid.*, II, 29 (p. 105). Note Rinaldo degli Albizzi's speech (in 1400) concerning the possibility of a prince if the power of the people became excessive, *ibid.*, IV, 9 (vol. 2, p. 78, cf. ... sotto l'arbitrio della moltitudine, dove per una parte licenziosamente e per l'altra pericolosamente si vivrebbe, o sotto lo imperio d'uno, che di quella si facesse principe' - some very Machiavellian touches!).

² So, *ibid.*, VII, 5 (p. 269), and see VI, 23 (p. 230), cf. IV, 26 ff. (pp. 105 ff.), esp. 27 (p. 109) ('... non si faccia principe di questa città'), and see *Disc.*, I, 17 (vol. 3, p. 287).

³ Cf. *Ist.*, VII, 4 ff. (vol. 2, pp. 267 ff.).

⁴ VII, 13-19 and ff. (pp. 282 ff.). On Cosimo and Lorenzo I as princes, see *Discorso* (vol. 5, pp. 7-16), cf. *Ist.*, VII, 5 (vol. 2, p. 269), VIII, 336 (vol. 3, pp. 62-72).

consistent vein. He admitted that Soderini's government (under which he served for thirteen years) was far from being a true republic, and that, together with internal disorders, the establishment of a *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia* for life (in 1509) opened the door to a principedom - to the return of the Medici.¹ Thus important developments in his own time - especially the outstanding rule of the Medicean house - conformed to a *regola* of constitutional change, and this *regola* was meant to develop rather than contradict his previous theoretical analyses. Florence stood as a good specimen of weak republicanism and its consequences.

Machiavelli, however, did not forget other Italian powers. In the *Istorie* the pattern of republican breakdown into *licenza* and the resulting establishment of a principedom is also documented from Milanese history.² He showed that between 1447, from the death of Filippo Visconti, to the rise of Lodovico 'il Moro' in 1480, Milan passed

¹ *Ibid.*, (pp. 8-9). On Soderini's government elsewhere, see *Disc.*, I, 7 (vol. 3, p. 256), III, 3 (vol. 4, pp. 135-6), for unfavourable comments, and note that Machiavelli also wrote him an epigram, consigning him to Limbo. *Disc.*, I, 52 (vol. 3, pp. 365-6), III, 9 (vol. 4, p. 172) contain less critical observations. In the *Discorso*, Lorenzo II's rule is taken as a princely interlude (pp. 9-11).

² Concerning the decline of a republic into tyranny, one may also note the cases of Lucca (*ibid.*, IV, 24 (p. 103)), and Prato (*ibid.*, VII, 25 (p. 304) both of which seem to fit this syndrome.

alternately between a badly organized republic and the rule of a *principe*.¹ As with Florence, Milan fell into the hands of a prince on more than one occasion. Such badly ordered *miste*, then, suffered from the effects of *licenza* as much as *tirannidi*, finding it hard to maintain an even keel between the two or to follow the correct path. Princedom was an important compensating factor, since it arose in the wake of faction-fighting, and its emergence in the life of 'defective republics' needed to be accounted for. Not that princely rule was the automatic guarantor of *libertà*, however; that only came with a ruler especially endowed with the wisdom, goodness and power to turn disorder into order.

¹ On Filippo Visconti's death, the Milanese restored republican government, though its members were soon extremely fearful that Francesco Sforza would seize control of the state; *ibid*, VI, 13 (p. 213), 17 ff. (pp. 218 ff.). Sforza could be said to stand for tyranny *vis à vis* the republic; 17 (p. 219); 19-20 (pp. 223-4), but Machiavelli was only too ready to emphasise the inadequacy of Milan's republicanism and its inbred factiousness (cf. 32 on how Cosimo 'era opinione poco savia credere che i Milanesi si potessero conservare liberi; perchè la qualità della cittadinanza, il modo del vivere loro, le sette antiquate in quella città, erano a ogni forma di civile governo contrarie' (p. 231). Cf. also *Disc. Rif. Stat. Fir.* (vol. 5, p. 13). He pictured the republic breaking down into a state of utter misery, due to the rise of the lower orders, and as a result, Sforza entered the city early in 1450, not as a tyrant, but *come principe*; *Ist.*, 24, (vol. 2, pp. 233-4). On Milan as totally corrupt, cf. *Disc.*, I, 17 (vol. 3, pp. 289-90). His successor, Galeazzo Maria, 'proved licentious and cruel (and so tyrannical?) and was slain in a resurgence of republicanism which had its ideological basis in the teachings of Cola Montano (*Ist.*, VII, 32 [vol. 2, pp. 36-7]). The pattern was not dissimilar to that of Florentine history after Lorenzo I, with the incompetent Piero, the revival of republicanism (1494-1512), and the return of the Medici.

This kind of interpretation allows us to say something briefly about the famous *Il Principe*, the tract written at a time when Soderini's republic had fallen, the Spanish had restored the Medicean house, and when Machiavelli had been sent into exile. To begin with, the term *principe* was quite broad in its connotations. In relation to the true conditions of republican liberty, for instance, a prince could represent the tyrannical;¹ in the face of great inner turbulence, to take the other extreme, he could, if the right man, be the agent for placing a republic on a steady footing. Or his rôle could be conceived as lying somewhere between these two poles: as one outcome of constitutional changes within defective republics, or even as a would-be *buono uomo* who was seeking to put the state on an even keel, but whose success was only temporary.² Again, a principedom could stand at the beginning and end of the constitutional *cerchio*, or simply rate as an hereditary monarchy (for 'principalities and

¹ So, Julius Caesar, for instance, or the Medici *vis à vis* the republic of Florence more ideally conceived; cf. *ibid.*, VIII, 1 (p. 6), 11 (p. 26).

² In the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli wrote of men who, like Epaminondas, took over the reins of corrupt republics as *principi*, who made some progress against corruption, but whose work was undone by a relapse into *disordine* after their deaths. Cf. I, 17 (p. 290), and on the short-term nature of the reformation of kingdoms by such wise legislating monarchs, cf. I, 11 (p. 272). It seems that he put the Medici (at least Cosimo and Lorenzo I) in this category; so, *ibid.*, III, 1 (vol. 4, p. 128), cf. *Ist.*, VII, 1-4 (vol. 2, pp. 261 ff.), VIII, 36, *finis*. (vol. 3, p. 72). The end of the preface to *Ist.*, IV, 1, refers to this kind of ruler, or at least one who tries to bring the republic back to original principles, but whose purposes are defeated by death. Cosimo and Lorenzo I, then, did not rate as supremely successful 'redeemers' (*Disc.*, I, 55 [vol. 3, p. 376]).

republics' were the two ubiquitous forms of government in Machiavelli's own day.¹

For the Florentine, then a prince may arise in different contexts within constitutional history, and his rôle and associations will differ in accordance with those contexts. Thus if one is to make sense of *Il Principe*, dedicated as it was to Lorenzo II, one has to understand how Machiavelli estimated Florence's particular situation in 1512. Now that is not easy. Not only does he fail to insist in this work that Lorenzo's rule was a typical consequence of corrupt republicanism, the re-commencement of a *cerchio*, the means by which the Florentine state could be brought back to its original principles,² or merely the product of foreign intervention or some such other alternative, but the fact is he was as concerned about what might happen (even what might hopefully happen) as about what had already taken place. In *Il Principe*, moreover, his view was Italian-wide just as much as Florentine. We find ourselves waiting for a precise location of 'the Prince' in his analyses of political change and historical recurrence, but the possibilities of 1513 were too open, the situation too transitional, the circumstances of Machiavelli's writing themselves, too unsettled to provide a ready answer (see Excursus 4). It suffices to affirm, though, that the appearance of a one-man rule at this juncture in Florentine history was certainly in keeping with his theories of constitutional change. This was true

¹ Machiavelli was once so loose in his language^{as} to say that no constitution ever existed which could not be called either *repubblica* or *principato*; *Princ.*, i, (vol. 4, p. 275).

² On the *buono uomo* as the sagacious legislator bringing the republic back to its original principles, see *Disc.*, I, 9 (vol. 3, p. 262), 18 (p. 294). He could be a prince; I, 2 (p. 238), 58 (p. 386).

whether Lorenzo hastened the *rovina* of the state, or was a great 'man of *spirito e virtù*',¹ who could even remove the barbarian threat from the Italian peninsula. Lorenzo was installed in power after Soderini's inadequate republic collapsed; such republics bore either tyrants or princes, and on rare occasions - a sanguine thought for Machiavelli - a good, wise and powerful source of *redenzione*.

Lorenzo II died in June 1519. By that time Machiavelli was well enmeshed in pro-republican activities. And if he had once believed Lorenzo to be the potential *buono uomo* of his dreams, a new possibility now lay with a younger Medici - Pope Leo X - to whom he addressed his 1520 *Discorso* on Florentine reform. From Leo he requested, not a monarchy, but a *mista*, an evenly balanced tripartite constitution with Leo as its monarchical element. It was in the power of this most influential of men, a *buono uomo* likened to Romulus (vol. 5, p. 23), to put Florence on her feet. And in the *Discorso* Machiavelli did not fail to appeal to a model of recurring change. Referring more to *vero principato* and *vera repubblica* than to tragic realities, however, he contended:

'No firm government can be devised if it is not either a true principedom or a true republic, because all the constitutions between these two are defective. The reason is entirely evident - because the principedom has just one path to dissolution, that is to descend (*scendere*) towards the republic. And similarly the republic has just one path towards being dissolved, that is, to rise towards principedom. Governments of a middle sort [i.e., such as Florence or Milan] have two ways: they can rise towards the principedom and descend towards the republic. From this comes their lack of firmness.' (p. 13.)

¹ On the alternatives, see II, 29 (vol. 4, pp. 113-4), cf. also I, 57 (vol. 3, p. 386).

Machiavelli here acknowledged that true republics were not the only kind of stable, durable governments. Longlasting monarchies were evident in his day.¹ His interests, though, centred around the ordering of his own city-state, which had been accustomed to equality rather than autocracy (pp. 13-14). The key rôle of the legislator in this Florentine context was to forestall change, that is, to vitiate those recurrent processes which either weaken the republic or bring on its ruin. The secret of modern legislation was to gauge how and why constitutions were recurrently transformed into one form or another, and to devise means of containing the processes of change.²

By these processes, of course, I mean those major ones already elicited from the Machiavellian corpus. We have isolated at least three key models of recurring constitutional *mutazione*, and although in varying degrees they owe something to earlier theory, they all betray his special interpretative touches. The cycle of the *Discorsi* I, 2,

¹ Did Machiavelli explain why certain principalities - the Roman Caesars, the Kings of France, for example - continued in existence, when, according to *Disc.*, I, 2, they should pass away before minority rules? Matters are not clear, but at least three explanations come to mind. Monarchies may be preserved because successors gained the seat of power by adoption rather than for hereditary reasons (cf. p. 454); secondly, they may have men in power who bring them back to original principles and thus forestall tyranny, *Disc.*, III, 1 (vol. 4, p. 132); thirdly, they may be mixed monarchies. On his mission to France, Machiavelli could not escape meeting the theory of the mixed French constitution (cf. *infra.*, p. 476), and he considered it necessary for any king to possess a nobility, or middle group between the monarch and the people; *Disc. Rif. Stat. Fir.* (vol. 5, p. 15). If a monarchy were mixed, presumably it would not experience the *corso* indicated in *Disc.*, I, 2.

² Cleomenes was a good example of a man who, in the face of a Sparta tainted with *corruzione*, restored the balanced Lycurgan constitution; *Disc.*, I, 9 (vol. 3, p. 268), 18 (pp. 294-5). Another way of containing change amongst states with a defective constitutional life was to re-discover the state's 'original principles'. How much better would Caesar have done by being an imitator of Romulus; I, 10 (vol. 268), cf. 19 (p. 297).

is the most theoretical and complex. It might seem formal and unrelated to the rest of his work, even 'literally so unMachiavellian', as J.H. Hexter puts it,¹ that it does not seem to invite scholarly attention. But we have shown that, although Machiavelli did not indicate the relevance of this scheme for contemporary politics, he revived the great anacyclic model of Polybius, consciously modified it, and applied the results to the important case of Rome. A second frame, outlined most clearly in the *Discorsi* III, 3 and 7, covered the recurrent breakdown of republics into tyranny, a breakdown implicit in Livy, recognized in mediaeval and early renaissance political writing, but only consciously developed as a recurrent pattern of constitutional change by Machiavelli. He applied it to the test case of Rome, but also documented it from the lives of more defective republics in modern Italy. In a third framework, expressed in the preface to *Istorie* Bk. IV, he elaborated upon the lack of firmness within weak republics, leaving his conception of a wavering movement between servitude (under tyrants) and *licenza* (with the consequent emergence of one-man rule).² The histories of Florence and Milan (and we may include, I think, Florentine affairs between 1492 and 1527) provided the basis for this sophisticated and highly intriguing line of interpretation. Finally, lying behind all and being much less a model of constitutional change, lay the general socio-political alternation of the *Istorie* V, 1, the alternation between zenith and depression. Ancient Rome passed through one, perhaps two, such

¹ 'Seyssel, Machiavelli, etc.', *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

² The image presented in the 1520 *Discorsi* (*supra.*, p. 470), more an extrapolation and less integrated with the facts, complements his third schema.

broad movements, and finally fell to the barbarians. And Machiavelli also applied this last frame to the contemporary scene, although he made little differentiation between Italy and particular city-states such as Florence. He concurred with Bruni in connecting a revival of ancient republicanism with the emergence of the new Italian cities, and it was a crucial point for him that these cities had kept out the northern barbarians for so long.¹ *Rovina* would befall Florence in particular and Italy in general if the new barbarian threat could not be checked. This fourth model, so much more embracing than the others, and based on traditional notions of fluctuation, rise and fall, which died so hard, was the setting in which all the other processes could operate. As the most fundamental of Machiavelli's recurrence paradigms, it accounted for changes by external just as much as by internal means.

We possess here, then, a veritable cluster of interpretative frames. A cycle of governments, a regular *metabolē* from one constitutional form to another, a reciprocal relationship between pressures within the state, a cyclo-alternating pattern of rise and descent - all are indicative of the vital role of recurrence thinking in Machiavelli's political theory. And none of these *regole* are ascribed to God or *natura*. Fortune, as we shall see, had its sphere, but the dominant thrust is that of human response before changing circumstances. The mystique of 'underlying principles of change', so apparent in Polybius, has been replaced by an intense awareness that man is the only genuine

¹ Ist., V, 1 (vol. 2, p. 126); 'ed avvengachè dipoi sopra le Romane rovine non si sia riedificato cosa che l'abbia in modo da quelle ricomperata ... nondimeno surse tanta virtù in alcuna delle nuove città e de' nuovi imperii, etc.' Cf. Bruni, *Hist., op. cit.*, Bk. II (pp. 27 ff.).

subject of history, the one who produces circumstances either by active will or by default, who creates institutions yet corrupts them, and who is the key agent behind recurrent change and process.

One is struck, moreover, by the anti-eschatological axis of Machiavelli's historical thought. He did not expect an ultimate end to the present historical order; his attention centred on a continuing process and on the human factors which engendered it. As a political reformer, too, he reflected on original principles rather than on long-term goals (though concern for the former is not so un-biblical!), so that unsatisfactory political conditions could be removed by reverting to what had been preferable in the past. He did not truckle to the anti-historical tendencies of ancient philosophy or mediaeval theology, either. His models were not framed to elevate transitory human affairs to the realm of eternal intelligibility; he was not a 'substantialist', and he therefore did not believe that events were important 'chiefly for the light they throw on eternal and substantial entities of which they are mere accidents'.¹ Neither was he seeking a 'sacred model' like the theologians.² Historical patterns and recurrences were in the events, not 'educated' by them; they were taken to be empirically grounded, not as traditional truths suiting 'the common intelligence'. Not that he altogether escaped from philosophical or even theological assumptions. But he intended to arrive at his *regole* along empirical lines. All the models we have discussed (even his version of the *Anacyclōsis*, with

¹ See Collingwood, *Idea of History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3, cf. pp. 20 ff.

² Cf. G.S. Rousseau, 'The *Discorsi* of Machiavelli; History and Theory', in *Journal of World History*, IX, 1965, p. 160. (This title sees a misspelling.)

which he was least successful in evading an anti-historical tendency), are monumental illustrations of his efforts to generalize from observation, and to be a man of 'science' before a 'philosopher'. And once the rules of change were grasped, then one either conformed to or controlled the processes in accordance with one's preferred ends.¹

Theories of Constitutional Change before and after Machiavelli

Interest in patterns of constitutional change, as we have seen, was not absent from mediaeval and early Renaissance thought. However, it was generally limited in purview, focussing on the breakdown of kingship or of *libertas* into tyranny. Even Aquinas, when commenting on the three kinds of *metabolai* outlined in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* Bk. VIII, declined to explore their applications to the contemporary scene.² In the east, perhaps, a pragmatic concern for institutional life shows up in Metochites' writing. He discussed the tendencies of aristocracy and democracy to degenerate,³ and examined the comparative merits of Rome and Carthage as mixed constitutions, ascribing the latter's weakness to the absence of a

¹ Rousseau (in *ibid.*, p. 157, and cf. p. 156, n.59), contends that '... the *Discourses* can be read as a rationalization of historical recurrence and the desire to conform to it. Inherent in Machiavelli's desire to conform is the notion of revival, whereby man, by starting afresh, keeps the cycle in its path'. Apart from Rousseau's loose use of the word cycle (has he only the cycle of the *Discorsi* in mind?), these comments represent but a half-truth. Given his views on mixed government, there is no reason to suppose that he believed legislators or governments should encourage the processes of recurrence, unless such processes were presently moving towards a desirable goal.

² See *Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio*, 1672 ff. (ed., R.M. Spiazzi, Rome, 1949, pp. 442 ff.). For other mediaevals on Aristotle, see also C. Martin, 'Some Mediaeval Commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics*, in *History*, N.S., XXXVI, 1951, pp. 29 ff.

³ *Hypomnēmatismoi*, 96 ff. (viz. ff.). Note also Nicephorus Gregoras' interest in the Zealots of Thessalonika as the creators of a system of *ochlokratia*, cf. *Historia Byzantina*, XVI, ii, 796 (Migne, PG, vol. 148

monarchical element.¹ This element, possessed by Rome, was the state's salvation, and Metochites promptly defended the existing monarchical system, despite the danger of tyranny.² And in the end he did not formulate a doctrine of recurring political *metabolē*; his object, rather, was to extol kingship, the constitutional order so prevalent and so unquestionable in his day.

With an increasing circulation of classical historical texts, however, speculation on constitutional change was bound to reassert itself, even under kingships. Claude Seyssel (ca. 1450-1520), for instance, a contemporary of Machiavelli's, appears to have employed Polybius VI in defence of the French (mixed) monarchy. Referring to the three simple worthy constitutions, he argued that monarchy was the best providing the ruler possessed sufficient experience and desired to rule justly, whilst aristocracy inclined to oligarchy and democracy to a state of turbulence.³ All unmixed constitutions, in fact, 'eventually worsen due to continual growth', so that one form frequently arises from another.⁴ Seyssel appealed to the case of Rome, although his analysis of Roman constitutional history was hardly pure Polybius. For Seyssel, Rome experienced monarchical,

¹ *Ibid.*, log. 104, cf. Bloch edn., pp. 150-155.

² *Ibid.*, log. 101-103, (Muller and Kiessling edn., pp. 625 ff.).

³ *La [Grant] Monarchie de France (et deux autres fragments politiques)* (edit. J. Poujol) (Bibliothèque Elzevirienne N.S., Études et Documents, Paris, 1961) I, 1 (pp. 103-4).

⁴ *Ibid.*, (p. 104).

Footnote 3 from previous page...

col. 1045) and see *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium; from Justinian I to the last Palaeologus* (edit. and trans. E. Barker), Oxford, 1957, pp. 192-3. It is of fascination that Metochites looked upon the Italian city-states of the fourteenth century as popular, unstable, *kakoi* and tending to change, cf. *Hypomnematismoi* 96 (vis), (J. Bloch edn., pp. 138-9; Muller and Kiessling edn., pp. 625 ff.).

aristocratic and democratic phases, and these were placed with the early kings, the Decemvirs and with subsequent popular movements (a line taken by Dionysius, pp311-2). Rather inconsistently, however, he claimed that the Romans 'were for a long time governed by the consuls and the Senate under the authority of the people', and thus they were ruled by a mixed form of government. The weakness in the mixture, significantly, lay with the third component: the people were responsible for *dissensions civiles*, until the state, passing its *virilité* and having acquired the best empire ever gained by a popular state, experienced a '*derechef à la Monarchie*'.¹ As with Machiavelli, then, the emergence of the Principate had to be incorporated into the analysis and so cover Polybius' ignorance of future contingencies. If Seyssel reproduced the Polybian conception of a natural constitutional development, however, he also appropriated the post-Polybian *Lebensalter*, insisting that the passage from Romulus to the last Caesars was one from infancy to decrepitude.² His approach, in review, was muddled if interesting, a hotchpotch of classicisms made all the more unconvincing for being a defence of Louis XI's monarchy as a skilfully devised power balance.³ His Italian contemporary far surpassed him in penetrating historical analysis, in systematizing facts, in formulating both

¹ *Ibid.*, I, 2 (p. 104) on the three phases, (pp. 104-5) on the mixed powers and the successes of the popular empire, (pp. 105-7, cf. 104) on decline into monarchy due to the growing power of the populace.

² *Ibid.*, I, 3 (pp. 107-8).

³ I.e., a balance between the nobility, middle men and poor, and between the king and the institutions which checked his power. See *ibid.*, esp. II, 6-19 (pp. 113 ff.). Cf. also W.F. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century France; a study in the Evolution of Ideas*, (Harvard Historical Studies XLVII), New York, 1969, ch. 1.

adequate generalizations and coherent theory.¹

And after Machiavelli? As a theorist of recurring constitutional processes, the Florentine had no real successors. When Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) commented on the *Discorsi* I, 2 in 1531, he strangely avoided all discussion of his predecessor's recurrence theory,² although he did state his own opinion that the three major simple constitutions tended to lapse into tyranny, a mixed government best forestalling such decline.³ If Guicciardini accepted the traditional contrast between *libertà* and tyranny, he was nevertheless more sensitive than Machiavelli over variety and contingency in human affairs, and thus doubtful about any fixed constitutional *corsi*. Admittedly, he happily framed a rule that bloody factiousness among a free people invariably led to tyranny,⁴ and other great advocates of the *mista*, such as Seyssel and Paolo Paruta, would have concurred.⁵ But nothing so complex as Machiavelli's models, nor any statement of

¹ Machiavelli and Seyssel may have made contact through Lascaris the translator, cf. Hexter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 84 ff. The claim of J.W. Allen (in his *History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1957 edn., p. 275) that Seyssel was probably influenced by Machiavelli cannot be taken seriously.

² See esp. *Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (1531), I, 2 (cf. Francesco Guicciardini; *Selected Writings*, (ed. C. Grayson), London, 1965, pp. 63 ff.). V. de Caprariis' edn. of the *Opere* (*La Letteratura Italiana; Storia e Testi XXX*), Milan, 1961, was used, but it lacked some chapters of this work.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 2 (Grayson, pp. 64, 65 and 66) 10 (p. 78); 28 (where the Decemvirs are, interestingly enough, considered a tyranny) (p. 93), II, 24 (pp. 123-4) (on lapses into tyranny); *ibid.* I, 2 (p. 63), 5 (pp. 70-1) on mixed government forestalling decline.

⁴ *Considerazioni*, II, 24 (p. 123).

⁵ Both claimed that the democratic element in the Roman constitution ruined Rome, and that popular rule destroys liberty; see esp. Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 62 ff. Guicciardini's distaste for 'democracy', *ibid.*, I, 2 (p. 66); 5 (p. 71); 58 (p. 104). Cf. also J. Bodin, *Methodus ad facilem Historiarum Cognitionem* (1566) (ET, ed., B. Reynolds,) New York, 1966, pp. 183-4.

recurrence so theoretical as the Florentine's remains in their work, not even in the writing of Donato Giannotti, one-time frequenter of the Rucellai Gardens, who stopped short at asserting that all states incline to one of the three simple forms - monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy.¹ It was an age of too much diversity and turbulence to admit anything but the most general rules.

In France, Jean Bodin (1529/30-1596), the most renowned political theorist after Machiavelli, hardly fulfilled the rôle of successor. If anything, his great statement on the variations of constitutional change virtually spelt the death-knell of the cycle of governments as viable historico-political theory. In the fourth book *De la République*, Bodin listed a whole series of possible constitutional mutations, showing a multitude of combinations by which simple forms, worthy or defective, could change into each other. Any sense of a fixed series was replaced by a decisive (Aristotelian) emphasis on variability, change between any two of the six governmental types being possible.² In a very general way, perhaps, Bodin seems to outline something like a constitutional cycle or even what has been called a spiral.³ After stressing such great

¹ See esp. E. Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought*, Oxford, 1969, p. 145. Giannotti nowhere referred to nor espoused the idea of a mixed government in his *Libro de la Republica de' Vinitiani* (1540) (cf. F. Gilbert, 'The Date of the Composition of Contarini's and Giannotti's Books on Venice', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, XIV, 1967, p. 183), but appears to have more interest in and enthusiasm for it in his *Della Repubblica Fiorentina*. I have been unable to obtain either work by Giannotti.

² Cf. his *Les Six Livres de la République (avec l'Apologie de R. Herpin)*, Paris, 1583 facs., (Aalen 1961 reissue), Bk. IV, p. 507. To quote the whole passage would be tedious, even if the best way of making the point. Cf. also *Methodus*, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 212, cf. pp. 201-5, 217 ff. where the Aristotelian flavour is more obvious.

³ See Häussler, *Tacitus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 85.

variety, he proffered a potted world history of constitutions. The earliest governments were those of violent tyrants such as Nimrud (= Ninus), but their successors became either despots or kings.¹ With abuse of kingly power or the failure of a royal line, aristocracies became established, though without popular consent, and these existed simultaneously with monarchies.² Many such aristocracies and kingships, however, eventually turned into popular governments, as with Athens and Rome.

'And since that time', he continued, 'people have discovered by the experience of many centuries that monarchy is a more stable, a more desirable, and a more durable form of commonwealth than either aristocracy or democracy',

the best monarchies now so prevalent 'throughout the world', being the hereditary ones.³ Rome, commencing with Romulus, passing through stages which were royal, tyrannical, aristocratic, oligarchic, popular, ochlocratic, and finally acquiring the hereditary monarchy which lasted to 1453,⁴ nicely encapsulated mankind's general political history. Now there is certainly an admission in this survey that

¹ This is quite reminiscent of Polybius. That Bodin knew Polybius, cf. R. Chauviré, *Jean Bodin; Auteur de la République*, Paris 1914, pp. 181 ff.

² The impact of Plato's *Laws*? Note the important passage in *Leg.* III, 681 D, where either aristocracy or monarchy follow the earliest one-man rule (a passage discussed in connection with Polybius, in ch. 1).

³ *De la République*, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 510-12 for the whole analysis, and p. 512 for the quotation.

⁴ In *ibid.*, IV, p. 510 the stages are described as 'royal, tyrannique, aristocratique et populaire', (cf. p. 512 on hereditary Roman Principate), but in *Methodus* (pp. 236-7) they are filled out as: the early kingship, the tyranny of the Tarquins, the rule of the optimates and patricians, the oligarchy of the decemvirs, the lawful and moderate rule of the people and the ochlocratic anarchy of the turbulent plebs (from the sedition of the Gracchi to the time of Marius and Sulla). The Polybian categories of constitution are followed, and Bodin has interpreted Polybius VI with the aid of Livy and Machiavelli.

societies have reverted to a monarchical order and to that extent we have here an acknowledgement of recurrence. But that Bodin imagined himself to be depicting a constitutional cycle, or a grand moment of history which was liable to be repeated again, even if at some higher level, does not seem either likely or proveable.

His outline of world history was deliberately flexible to account for varieties of change. He redeemed *metabolē* theory, or the study of particular kinds of constitutional change, from the pitfalls of cyclicism. A fixed cycle of governments was just too simplistic for Bodin, and of all political theorists, he he ever so incoherent a philosopher, he did more than anyone to hasten the death of over-coherent constitutional theory.¹

B) Sixteenth Century Themes

As with the Polybian *Anacyclōsis*, we have given a separate treatment to Machiavelli's constitutional theory. A wealth of other recurrence paradigms from the sixteenth century, however, still remains before us, and we must attempt to endow this material with a semblance of order. That task is not without its difficulties, since this period is renowned for its intellectual turmoil. On the one hand, humanism and the classical revival produced a more intense intermingling of the Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian inheritances. On the other hand, the theological pull of the Reformation was away from the dangers of paganism and worldliness, leading thinkers to

¹ See also Excursus on sixteenth century '*metabolē* theory' (No.5).

extract their truths about history more rigorously from the Christian tradition, the Bible included. However, if we continue first with the syncretisms of the Renaissance, these problems and these issues will be the better sharpened and analysed.

Natural Processes, Rise and Fall

Machiavelli certainly appealed to frames of recurrences traditionally associated with the ways of *natura*, but as we have stressed, it was human nature rather than nature itself which gripped him. His approach to continual change bears this out. When he acknowledged that *le cose del mondo sono si varie*,¹ for example, he was not simply repeating a maxim of ancient philosophy that all things come into being and pass away. Change was primarily change of purpose and reaction before altered circumstances, and the circumstances themselves were mainly products of will and passion.²

Naturalistic interests are even subdued in Machiavelli's brief glance at catastrophe theory (in the *Discorsi*, II, 5). On surmising how the records of time came to be destroyed, he suggested two causes, first, the acts of men, and secondly, catastrophes such as pestilence, famine or flood, produced *dal cielo*. He implied that

¹ *Princ.*, x, 3 (vol. 4, p. 312).

² If human affairs constantly followed an 'up and down' movement, ascents were to be ascribed to 'superior abilities, descents to lack of them'; *Disc.*, II, *proem.* (vol. 4, p. 6). If governments frequently change, that had everything to do with will and passion. With Florence, he had no hesitation in emphasizing the caprice of one or other faction (III, 27, p. 221), although the state's troubles generally speaking came from ambitious desire for political control, or from the will to maintain and not lose it, or from the discontent of those who, deprived by the powerful, sought to remove an existing rule; cf. I, 5 (vol. 3, p. 247). For those in power, change usually meant difficulties and ills which required constant remedies: so, III, 49 (vol. 4, p. 267). On the importance of *fortuna*; however, see the next sub-section.

great disasters recurrently befell the human race, but regionally (as men like Plato and Polybius held), and that this was because *natura* (periodically?) underwent spontaneous *purgazione* when there was an 'accumulation of superfluous matter', or in other words, over-population. The world had to relieve itself before such *necessità*. These brief comments recall Platonic-Aristotelian views on cataclysms and even the Stoic doctrine of *ecpyrōsis*,¹ in fact Machiavelli was less interested in natural factors behind catastrophes than supernatural ones. Such disasters were referred to Heaven or God, and he took the Christian line (going back to the Fathers, even Luke) that they were designed to chastise men, so that they might 'become better and live with more convenience'.² In this whole chapter, moreover, he was still more concerned with human powers of destruction than the supernatural ones. That human beings could demolish former civilizations fascinated him, and he pondered on the labours of the Christians who had eliminated the vestiges of pagan Antiquity, and on the fact that the Romans annulled all but the memory of the ancient Tuscans (II, 5 [pp. 29-30, 31]). The stages of Italian civilization (ancient Tuscans/Roman/later Italian) were thus bounded by essentially human efforts at destruction, and not by natural disaster.

Naturalism is also absent from Machiavelli's account of rise and fall. As already suggested, he preferred to write of ascent and

¹ (pp. 29-31). Unlike Plato and Aristotle, however, Machiavelli ascribed to the world a beginning; cf. *supra.*, and on ancient catastrophe theory, see esp. chap. 1, pp.15ff.

² (p. 31). Cf. also *Ist.*, VI, 34 (vol. 2, pp. 252-4) on the 1456 whirlwind. For background in Luke, the fathers and even Philo, *supra.*, p. 303 and n. 1.

descent, with little more than a mere hint of biological growth, acme and decay. This organismic language, however, showed up with interesting variations in other writers. Guicciardini, for instance, mused on the natural mortality of all cities and states, as if they experienced life-cycles,¹ and argued that varieties and changes in human affairs were natural and not supernatural.² Polydor Vergil (1470-1555), Italian author of the *Anglica Historia* (1513) combined a muted version of *translatio* theory with the life-cycle idea. He referred to a succession of the 'British' by the Norman 'empires' within English history, taking the Danish and Norman incursions to represent pangs of old age for the 'British' order, and the coming of the Normans as a renewal of the country's *iuventus*.³ Again, Bodin was all but truistic about the *naissance*, *accroissement*, *estat fleurissant*, *decadence et ruine* of commonwealths, which slowly develop to *perfection* but which, because of the uncertainty and changeableness of human things, do not remain that way for long.⁴ Unlike Guicciardini, however, both Polydore and Bodin believed such developments to be governed by the infinite wisdom of God. For the latter there were 'eternal laws of nature, and the paths of empires, which 'seem to proceed in a circle', were actually under 'the influence of the celestial bodies, which produce a continual vicissitude of generation and corruption'.⁵ Opposed to the

¹ *Ricordi* (final redaction) 189, (Grayson edn., p. 47), cf. 160 (p. 41). Cf. also Seyssel's body-state analogy (*supra.*, and cf. *Grant Monarchie*, *op. cit.*, p. 108).

² *Ricordi*, 33 (p. 14), cf. 123 (p. 33).

³ Cf. *Angl. Hist.*, (Basel 1546 edn.), p. 62, and pp. 108 (ls. 13-26), 499 (ln. 27), cf. the edition's index.

⁴ *De la République*, IV, pp. 503-4.

⁵ The first two quotations lie in Bodin's *Methodus*, cf. Reynolds edn., p. 302; for the second, see Church, *op. cit.*, p. 213, n. 51.

apocalyptic four monarchy doctrine based on *Daniel*,¹ he reasserted the biological cycle in its full force, but as a motion controlled by God, who knew the secret numbers and time-lengths for every natural course.²

The suggestion in Bodin that earthly affairs were in flux and in a state to be contrasted with the divine stability was a commonly re-stated theme in Reformation Europe.³ However, his special and humanistic interest in biological cycles and their planetary influences is more distinctive, and was developed by a contemporary Louis le Roy (*d.* 1577), who had probably read both Machiavelli and Bodin's famous *Methodus*. According to Le Roy's *De la Vicissitude ou Variété des Choses en l'Univers* (1575), the whole cosmos, including historical phenomena within it, is conceived as subject to natural motions - to generation, change and corruption.⁴ As with Bodin, the planets influence earthly affairs and a cyclical image of the political 'growth and decay' was consciously substituted for the Danielic schema of four world empires.⁵ His approach to

¹ See *Methodus*, (*op. cit.*, pp. 291 ff., cf. 301).

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 223 ff. on 'Changes in States correlated with numbers'. In this section, Bodin also concerned himself with individuals, maintaining that people recurrently died when they attained years which were multiples of seven or nine ('unless', of course, 'nature is checked by the divine will') (p. 226).

³ Weisinger (in his 'Ideas of History, etc.', *loc. cit.*) made much of Fulke Greville (1554-1628). His poem and 'Treatise on Monarchy', see esp. stanzas 105-106 (in *The Remains*, ed. G.A. Wilkes, London, 1965, p. 61) are pertinent.

⁴ See *De la Vicissitude*, esp. I-IV (B.W. Bates' seln. and edn., Princeton Texts in Literature and the History of Thought, Princeton, 1944, was chiefly used). Cf. W.L. Gundersheimer, *The Life and Works of Louis le Roy*, (*Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance LXXXII*), Geneva, 1966, pp. 97 ff.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 96, 97, 104.

rise and fall is nicely illustrated by his *modification* of a passage in Machiavelli on imperial *translatio*. The Florentine, characteristically, asserted that 'human affairs are in a state of perpetual movement, always either ascending or descending'. He then went on to comment on the succession of former powers:

'reflecting upon the course of human affairs, I think that, as a whole, the world continues to remain very much in the same condition, the good balancing the evil; but the good and evil change (*variare*) from one country to another, as we learn from the history of those ancient kingdoms that differed from each other in manners, whilst the world at large remained the same. The only difference being, that all the *virtù* that first found a place in Assyria was thence transferred (*collocò*) to Media, and afterwards to Persia, and from there it came (*venne*) to Italy and Rome.' (*Disc.*, II, *proem.* [vol. 4, p. 7]).

For Machiavelli, then, political success depended upon special human qualities of effectiveness (or classical virtue);¹ once this was dissipated in those who maintained a political society, their power would fall to those who had it. For Le Roy's part, however, there was a strong implication that translation was affected by a cosmic process ultimately beyond human control, and the natural cycle of growth and decay was an essential part of that process. 'Virtue and vice fly by turns, passing from land to land, and ruling more in one time than another', and when virtue traversed through the empires from Assyria to Rome, she did so through 'a continual vicissitude of generation and corruption', eventually plummeting the world into a cycle of darkness.² In the case of the biological principle, therefore, the reversion to a classical way of thinking

¹ See J. Pocock, 'A Short History of Virtue' (Mimeographed Lecture at Loyola College, Montreal, 16/3/1972), esp. pp. 1, 8. Machiavelli made the quality of virtue hinge on the citizens' possession and command of arms more decidedly than most ancients.

² See esp. *Les Politiques d'Aristote*, Paris, 1567, pp. 380-1 (for the first quotation), cf. p. 267 (for the second).

is more pronounced in Le Roy than in Machiavelli, and the former seems to have consciously employed the principle as a counter to Christian dogmatism and to the shallow yet persisting condemnation of *falsi circuitūs*. On the other hand, the Frenchman had not abandoned Christianity, he was not unhappy to perceive Providence behind earthly instability or to believe in a Last Judgement. Like Salutati two centuries previously, he openly sought to establish the point that linear and cyclical views were not incompatible. He did this both by mitigating the distasteful apocalypticisms of the era, and by re-involving an old gnome, which had not gone unused by Christians, that all human things burgeon and die.¹

Neither Bodin nor Le Roy forgot that history entailed more than politics. Both wrote of general cultural history, and each was optimistic about the progress in arts, letters and institutional life in their own time.² Le Roy's position is especially interesting, since he wrote so much about cultural recurrence as a natural process.³ He maintained that past civilizations attained to their peak through a concurrence of arts et lettres, sometimes embodied in single individuals, such as Scipio Africanus and Charlemagne, who combined learning with military valour. The signs of cultural decay, on the other hand, included not only a waning of arms and letters, but also of morals and political responsibility (which are sapped by an excessive

¹ In his clear stress that pagan and Christian views of history had been over-divaricated, Le Roy is an important figure who looks ahead to Giambattista Vico, both being exponents of 'providential control over the cyclical course of history' (So, Gundersheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 102, who, however, bases this claim on different, and less convincing grounds.)

² On Bodin, see *Methodus* (*op. cit.*, esp. pp. 296 ff.). Le Roy, *Vicissitudes*, III, XI. Their position anticipates the seventeenth century *Querelle* between Ancients and Moderns.

³ The idea is not foreign to Bodin, see *Methodus* (p. 302).

love of liberty and religious dissension). Utter devastation was brought on by war and barbarism, until, as Aristotle had contended,¹ it was restored and reappropriated at a later time.² From cycle to cycle, however, there could be a progressive accumulation of technique and wisdom. Every age had something to contribute and transmit to succeeding generations, and it was coincidences of military and intellectual accomplishment - the ages of Sesostris,³ Ninus, Cyrus, Alexander, Augustus, the Saracens and of present times - that recurrently gave the greatest impetus to mankind's accumulating knowledge.⁴ The more linear outlook, however, (which certainly countered any theory of progressive degeneration), was interlocked with the cyclical one, and Le Roy persisted with his naturalism, as if, like Giorgio Vasari, and the classical tradition behind him, he

¹ Le Roy correctly associated Aristotle's name with cultural recurrence (cf. *supra.*, p.419).

² See esp. *Considération sur l'Histoire* ^{Françoise et} *Universelle*, Paris, 1567, pp. 7-9, cf. *Vicissitude*, III (Bates edn., p. 19). On the confluence of 'arts and letters', Le Roy differs from preceding and alternative positions, i.e., Machiavelli's view that 'literary excellence is subsequent to that of distinction in arms' (*Ist.*, V, 1 (vol.2 , p.127), and the doctrine of Estienne Pasquier - that when states 'begin to grow and reach their maturity, it happens frequently that culture begins to be appreciated and then, with the decline of the state, culture also declines'. A quotation (from the *Lettres*) in G. Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History; historical erudition and historical philosophy in Renaissance France*, Urbana, 1970, pp. 42-43.

³ Sesostris was an ancient (and mythical) king of Egypt, whose story is told by Herodotus (in *Hist.*, II, 102-11). In referring to such a figure, Le Roy looks beyond even Ninus (to a post diluvian figure?)

⁴ Leaving aside Sesostris' and Ninus' time for lack of information, he cited Pythagoras and Thales in connection with Cyrus; Plato, Euripides, Demosthenes and Aristotle in connection with Alexander; Julius Caesar (as historiographer), Pompey (as man of culture), cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Pomp.*, i, 2 ff.), Horace and Ovid with Augustus; Averroes, Avicenna and Abenzoar with the Saracens; and new experts in geography, warfare, languages, etc. with current times. Cf. esp. G. Budaei, *Viri Clarissimi, vita per Ludovicum Regium*, Paris, 1540, p. 47; *Le Timée de Platon*, Paris, 1551, fol. iir, *Le Sympose de Platon*, Paris, 1558, fol. 129r^o, *De l'Origine, Antiquité, Progres Excellence et Utilité de l'Art Politique, etc.*, Paris, 1567, fol. 4r^o, *Considération*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.

held that even the arts could grow, reach maturity and decline into old age.¹

Machiavelli appears rather idiosyncratic, then, for playing down a paradigm so prominent in other distinguished works of historical theory. Yet the biological principle was not invariably appealed to by those who were theorizing about rise and fall in the sixteenth century. The four world monarchy doctrine (as well as the Great Week schema), for example, still persisted, despite modifications.² And in some cases the modifications are of real interest, more particularly in their accentuation of recurrence. Expounding his special version of *translatio* theory, for instance, the

¹ Vasari (1511-75), however, considered such a cycle to have been completed through the whole of Graeco-Roman Antiquity, with a similar cycle being undergone in his own time (cf. *Le Vite de più eccellenti Architetti, Pittori, et Scultori Italiani da Cimabue insino a tempi nostri*, Florence, 1550, preface (Gaunt edn., ET., vol. 1, p. 18, cf. pp. 6 ff.)). He came to sense a decadence in his own time, with the onset of Mannerism, as the 1568 edn. of the *Vite* indicates (see von Schlosser, *Kunstliteratur*, op. cit., pp. 227-280). Other writers, however, who concurred with Le Roy in connecting the rise and depletion of arts with the rise and fall of the Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Roman and Saracen empires include: Gabriel Harvey (cf. *Letter-Book of Gabriel Harvey, AD 1573-80*, (ed. E.J.L. Scott), London, 1884, p. 87, cf. pp. 85 ff.), and Estienne Pasquier, (cf. 'Lettre V: Au Chevalier de Montereau', in *Oeuvres*, (Trévoux edn.,) Amsterdam, 1723, vol. 2, pp. 9-10).

² Thomas Müntzer (ca. 1490-1525) probably made the most famous re-statement of the world-empire doctrine in his 'Sermon to the Princes' of 1524. There he interpreted the four kingdoms of *Daniel ii* in a fairly conventional fashion (identifying the four kingdoms with Babylon, the Medes and Persians, the Greeks, and Rome), yet he rather skilfully extracted reference to a fifth kingdom from the multi-metallic image, the feet of clay and iron coming to represent a final earthly kingdom which God was about to destroy (*Sermo*, vii, cf. *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers*, eds. G.K. Williams and A.M. Mergal (*Library of Christian Classics*, XXV), London, 1957, p. 51 (and ff.)). For discussion, G.H. Williams, *The Radical Reformation*, Philadelphia, 1962, p. 54). In the sixteenth century the idea of world-empire was not uncommonly used to legitimate existing régimes rather than simply to convey the impression of a divinely governed succession; see esp. the work of Trithemius of Sponheim and Gerard Geldenhauer, cf. B.R. Reynolds, 'Latin Historiography; a Survey, 1400-1600', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, II, 1955, pp. 30, 51, cf. 20. On Age-theory in the sixteenth century, a good example of the Great Week

German Wimpfeling (1450-1528) ascribed a very great antiquity to the German empire, contending that it once warded off the Persians and Alexander, let alone Rome. Thus when Charlemagne, a German, was crowned Holy Roman Emperor, the imperial dignity was providentially restored to the Germany from whence it first came.¹ Again, Bernt Rothmann (ca. 1495-1535), an 'Anabaptist' theologian enmeshed in the 1535 Münster fiasco, makes for intriguing reading. He depicted history as a series of falls and restorations; viz. the bondage in Egypt and the return to Canaan, the Babylonian exile and the subsequent restoration, the fall of early Christianity (which

¹ See Reynolds, pp. 31-2, on the *Epitoma Rerum Germanicarum* (1505), the remodelling of a work begun by Sebastian Murrho.

Footnote 2 from previous page...

Schema (the first and last 'Ages' being taken as paradisaical) may be found with Anthony Pocquet, who was attacked by Calvin in his *Contre la Secte Phantastique* (in *Opera*, edit. G. Baum et al. (*Corpus Reformatorum*, XXXV), *L'Anvers*, 1863-1900, vol. 7, p. 237, and see also (Thomas) Cooper's *Chronicle*, London, 1560, p. 378r, and John Stow (completed by Edmund Howes), *The Annales, or Generall Chronicle of England*, London, 1615, p. 948. L. van Vives modified Augustine's chronology of the seven Ages into three 2,000 year periods (under Nature, Law and Grace), a model later picked up by John Donne. John Foxe hoped but failed, to establish four periods of persecution, 300 years in length, from Christ to the Reformation (on persecution succession, cf. *supra.*, p. 379). On all these see H. Baker, *The Race of Time: Three Lectures on Renaissance Historiography*, Toronto, 1967, p. 57, who also has some useful points to make about the Protestant stress on the emergence of the last age and the dissipation of the last world empire (*ibid.*, p. 58, cf. Williams and Mergal, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff. (Hoffman), 227 ff. (Dietrich Philips)).

For odd variations in millenarian and Age theory, see *infra.*, pp. 518-23. Secular historians as far apart as Biondo and Bodin, moreover, toyed with the millennium. Biondo's middle age between Antiquity and recent times was a millennium (450-1450) (cf. W.F. Ferguson, 'Humanist Views of the Renaissance', in *The American Historical Review*, XLV, 1939, p. 15), and Bodin argued that civilization flourished for two thousand years in southern regions (Mesopotamia, and Egypt) and for two thousand years in northern ones (Graeco-Roman and Christian civilization) (cf. Huppert, *op. cit.*, p. 95).

decayed into institutionalism and false doctrine), and the final restoration which began with Erasmus, Luther and Zwingli, and reached its height in the Münster programme of a new Zion.¹ Both these interpretations show the free re-writing of history to legitimize political and religious causes in a turbulent period, and both illustrate how the mystique of recurrence could be used as a divine stamp of authenticity. They also, however, demonstrate that it was not just the revival of neat Graeco-Roman paradigms which motivated men to cast their eyes over the great turbulence of history. In any case, we must conclude that, even if the biological principle was used more extensively in historical interpretation during the sixteenth century, we often find a *mélange* of ideas, mediaeval notions of earthly vicissitude and imperial succession continuing to have some appeal.

Feints of Fortune and Rules of Reciprocity

Unlike Bodin, Le Roy and still more theologically inclined historiographers in the sixteenth century, Machiavelli, to whom we may now return, conceded little to supernaturalism. And yet, as is well known, he frequently appealed to *fortuna*. It was a concept from Antiquity which he was prepared to contend with, one which had survived through the Middle Ages, if often intermingled with assertions about human vicissitudes and toppling tyrants.² Of course past views

¹ Cf. Rothmann's *Restitution rechter und gesunder christlicher Lehre* (1534), ed. A. Knaake, Halle, 1888, p. 17. Münster, of course, fell rapidly.

² On *fortuna* in western mediaeval historiography and literature, see esp. A. Doren, 'Fortuna im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance', in *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II, pt. 1, 1922-23, pp. 71 ff., cf. M.R. Patch, 'The tradition of the goddess Fortuna', in *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*, III, 1922, esp. pp. 186 ff. For early Renaissance connections between fortune and temporal flux, see esp.

[cont. next page]

on fortune varied, so that Machiavelli also had to make sense of a complex inheritance. Was fortune simply the agency of mere caprice or was she some quasi-divine mistress directing the course of events towards just ends? He felt obliged to face these questions, to allot some credible rôle to the uncertainty factor in affairs, yet without vitiating his understanding of human action and response.

Fortuna, putting it most generally, produced constant variation.¹

Thus

'A republic... which relies more upon the chances (*impeti*) of fortune than upon the virtù of her citizens, will experience all the vicissitudes of fortune (*varieranno col variare di quella*)' (*Disc.*, III, 31 [vol. 4, p. 234]).

and a

'... prince who bases himself entirely on fortuna is ruined when she changes, whilst he is happy whose mode of procedure accords with the need of the times' (*Princ.*, xxv, 4 [vol. 4, p. 365]).

These passages reflect Machiavelli's main emphases, which were more on the adversities of fortune than her favours. Fortuna, then, was a vivid image both for a future which is neglected by foresight and for altered circumstances which arise when men have not anticipated future contingencies. The circumstances may even go under the names of *vicissitudine* and *necessità*. In one sense, of course, unforeseen eventualities were usually the product of human activity itself, but Machiavelli was prepared to appropriate a classical device and to

¹ So 'la fortuna dimostra assai la potenza sua; e perchè la è varià, variano le repubbliche e gli stati spesso, ... dimostrare, ad ogni girare di sole, quanto ella puote.' (p. 119).

Footnote 2 continued from previous page...

Boccaccio, *Vita di Dante* (J.R. Smith, ET and edn., pp. 20, 26, 63, cf. p. 29); cf. also his *De Casibus Virorum Illustrium* (1544); Bruni, *Vita di Dante*, (*loc. cit.*, p. 95), Poggio Bracciolini, *Historia Fiorentina* (ed. L. Muratori), Milan, 1731, esp. 316D, 408B, cf. 303D, 344B; G. Dati, *L'istoria di Firenze dal 1380 al 1405* (ed. L. Pratesi), Norcia, 1904, esp. pp. 11, 39, 54, 76, (cf. Baron, *Crisis, etc.*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 508-9), etc.

extrapolate the uncertainty factor in terms of a supra-human agency. How literally one should take some of his allusions is difficult to say. *Fortuna* is usually personified, someone to be 'negotiated with'.¹ On the other hand, she is rarely so elevated as to appear as the arbiter of history's inevitable destiny. Instead of substituting for a collective exercise of human wills, she seems to summarize them, though to appeal to her was to admit that something incalculable lay beyond and above the maelstrom of human activities.

In any case, to invoke *fortuna* was also a convenient way of isolating the requirements of *virtù*, and of showing how men have responded to good or ill. A man (usually a ruler) of *resilience* can either check the motions of fortune when adverse,² or make the most of an opportune situation when *fortuna* was favourable or enamoured with his boldness.³ In short, success or felicity ensued when *virtù e fortuna* were suitably combined (an observable truth, not just a concession to the *virtus et fortuna* of Latin historiography). Amongst other things, such a marriage helped explain the success of Rome and the great Medici, and it would also account for the future effectiveness of 'the prince'.⁴ However, historical episodes could

¹ *Princ.*, xxv, 9 (vol. 4, p. 367) (for 'negotiation'), yet on the idea of a necessary changeability, cf. *Disc.* II, 30 (pp. 118-9), *Ist.*, VII, 17; 18 (vol. 2, pp. 291, 292); VIII, 33, 34, (vol. 3, pp. 64, 65).

² *Princ.* xxv, 1-8, (pp. 364-8), *Disc.*, III, 31 (pp. 229-30), 39, (pp. 247-8), cf. II, 30 (pp. 118-9).

³ *Disc.*, II, 29 (p. 114), *Princ.*, xxv, 4-6; 9 (pp. 365-6, 367-8), cf. *Ist.*, IV, 5 (vol. 2, p. 73) (on opportunism); *Disc.*, I, 2 (vol. 3, p. 240), II, 29 (vol. 4, p. 114), *Ist.*, VI, 6; (vol. 2, pp. 203, 206) (on fortune's selectiveness), *Princ.*, xxv, 9 (vol. 4, pp. 367-8) (on fortune enamoured).

⁴ *Disc.*, I, 4 (vol. 3, pp. 242-3), 20 (p. 298); II, 1 (vol. 4, pp. 9-13) (on Rome) *Ist.*, VII, 5 (vol. 2, p. 271) (Cosimo), VIII, 36 (vol. 3, p. 71) (Lorenzo I), and esp. *Princ.*, iii, 8 (vol. 4, p. 287), xxv, 7 (quoting from Petrarch) (p. 372), *Disc.*, II, 29 (vol. 4, p. 115) (the prince). Cf. E. Pasquier, on whether 'fortune or policy was responsible for the greatness and durability of the French monarchy (cf. Huppert, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3 for an interesting discussion).

bear these two potent agencies for change in varying proportions. In the Roman Republic, for example, virtue outweighed and controlled *fortuna* so that Rome marched on to heights even though fortune had sorely tested her.¹

The point here is that fortune will often offer her favours and then withdraw them, so that the real test comes in adversity when, unless men are equipped, they can be brought to their downfall. In cases of personal vicissitude, Machiavelli maintained that men rarely rose from *piccola fortuna* to a high position of influence through force or fraud, although he admitted that success was easiest when *fortuna* supported human artfulness. On the other hand, he insisted that fortune applied herself with almost irresistible strength to bring about the downfall of a great man.² Thus both good fortune and adversity placed demands on *virtù*, the former requiring a will to power and the latter adaptability, the one bringing the danger of *insolenza* and the other, despondency.³ Whatever the eventualities, however, they could be prepared for as future possibilities revealed by the past, for history contained its lessons for present and future

¹ Cf. esp. *Disc.*, II, 1 (vol. 4, p. 13), cf. III, 9 (p. 171), 31 (pp. 229-30).

² See *Disc.*, II, 13; 'Io stimo essere cosa verissima che rado, o non mai, intervenga che gli uomini di piccola fortuna vengano a gradi grandi senza la forza e senza la fraude, etc.' (vol. 4, p. 50); (cf. III, 37, '... e però s'acquista il bene con difficoltà, se dalla fortuna tu non sei ajutato in modo ch' ella con la sua forza vinca questo ordinario e naturale inconveniente' [p. 106, and see context]); II, 29; ' "Adeo obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim suam ingruentem refringi non vult" (Livy) ...una rovina ed a una grandezza essere stati condotti da una commodità grande, che gli hanno fatto i cieli... Fa bene la fortuna questo..., et.' (p. 113).

³ As in the case of Venice, cf. *Disc.*, III, 31 (p. 231). And concerning individuals, see *Di Fortuna* (vol. 7, pp. 75-6) and R.M. Crawford's salutary acknowledgement of the importance of human nature in Machiavelli's approach to *mutazioni della fortuna* (in 'Per Quale Iddio': Machiavelli's *Second Thoughts* (Australian Humanities Research Council Lecture 1966), Sydney, 1967, p. 18).

situations.¹ If the knowledge of constitutional processes equipped the legislator, the recognition of vicissitude was just as important. Turns of fortune, indeed, were integral to Machiavelli's conception of political change, since states could rise to the heights of *buona fortuna* or be lost in the shifts of party strife.

Fortune, we must reaffirm, does not necessarily conjure up the image of a wheel-like movement or alternation between two conditions; its operations can also be viewed as a part of the processes of reciprocity which go to make up a 'moral order'. It is true that Machiavelli often wrote as though her fickleness was ordained and necessary, yet his fortune was hardly blind or fickle, and at times her work could be identified with the work of God.² Can it be said, then, that Machiavelli's *fortuna* maintained a moral order? Some references suggest that she requited wickedness and turned against the proud,³ but he also once remarked how 'she often holds the good under her feet and exalts the wicked'.⁴ Generally speaking, it is remarkable how he 'secularized' or 'politicized' traditional notions of a moral order, making the outcome of events due less to a supra-human agency than to the *virtù* or else ineffectiveness of men themselves. In discussing the consequences of *insolenza* (= *hybris*), for example, he did not concern himself with overriding principles of Justice or Nemesis, but with the vehement human reactions which insolence

¹ So, '...', acciochè i posterì imparino come egli abbiano in simili accidenti a difendersi' (*ibid.*, II, 30 (p. 228)), and see III, 31 (pp. 229 ff.), *Princ.*, xxv, 1-4, (pp. 364 ff.).

² *Ist.*, VII, 21 (pp. 297-8); VIII, 19 (pp. 40-1), cf. *Princ.*, xxv, 1 (vol. 4, pp. 364-5) *Disc.*, II, 29 (pp. 113-4,) cf. above note.

³ Note *Disc.*, III, 31 (pp. 231 ff.), *Ist.*, II, 29 (vol. 1, p. 107).

⁴ See *Capitolo di Fortuna* (vol. 7, p. 72).

could produce in others.¹ Again, when he advised moderation it was for purely pragmatic reasons;² and when he described the 'evils' which befell those misusing their power, he did not write of them in terms of divine retribution, but as the appropriate outcome of politically inept or unsustained courses of action.³ In a few cases there is a mixture of interpretative models; *fortuna* he once declared

'caused the hope of victory to operate so powerfully upon Niccolò Piccinino [the Milanese *condottiero*] and made him assume such a tone of unbounded *insolenza*',

that Francesco Sforza declined to support his projects.⁴ But the more essential Machiavelli was the one who was fascinated by the effectiveness or ineffectiveness, the wisdom or foolishness of given policies or courses of action, and who sought to propose principles for right procedures. The concern for the recurrent actualization of retributive principles was replaced by a humanistic concentration on the recurrent success or failure of action-types. In Machiavelli, moreover, the nature of men's deaths did not carry the same sort of significance often endowed ^{upon it} by the ancients. Death could say something about political failure, or about ruthless control required by *necessità*, but how men met their ends was not connected with a doctrine of a moral

¹ See esp. *Disc.*, I, (vol. 3, p. 247); III, 11 (vol. 4, p. 178); *Ist.*, II, 11 (vol. 1, p. 77); IV, 2 (vol. 2, p. 69). At VIII, 23 (vol. 3, p. 48) he might well have employed a concept like Nemesis to explain the nasty death of Roberto da Rumino, but he did not.

² Esp. *Disc.*, III, 19 (vol. 4, p. 201); 21 (pp. 204-5), cf. also *Princ.*, xv-xix, (pp. 328 ff.), *Ist.*, III, 23 (vol. 2, pp. 54-5).

³ *Disc.*, III, 6 (vol. 4, p. 143) on the end of tyrants; *Princ.*, viii, 6 (vol. 4, pp. 304-6), (Oliverotto); *Ist.*, II, 37 (vol. 1, p. 129) (the duke of Athens); IV, 33 (vol. 2, p. 122) (Rinaldo degli Albizzi); VI, 6 (pp. 242-4) (Stefano Porcari).

⁴ *Ist.*, VI, 4 (vol. 2, pp. 198-9).

order. All this is not to deny the importance of *fortuna*. Men, it seemed, could only act within the bounds of her (negotiable) permissions.¹ But whether men succeeded or failed (or whether they died in pleasant or unpleasant circumstances) was chiefly attributable to them, to their adaptability, perseverance, astuteness, or want of it.

The Machiavellian approach to fortune and the moral order was somewhat individualistic and atypical in its time. It may be contrasted with two extremes, the more Epicurean position (which stressed fortune's caprice and threw doubt on Divinity), and the more popular providentialist outlook. Of the doubters Guicciardini is the most interesting; not only did he take the enormously influential *fortuna* to be quite unpredictable and uncontrollable,² but he radically questioned the idea of a moral order. Unsure as he was about men's ability to predict the outcome of events with accuracy,³ he was unhappier still about traditionalist appeals to fortune's wheel and retributive principles. To relate but a single course of fortune's movements to a given individual's career was inadequate:

'One may be fortunate in one matter and not in another. I have been lucky with some gains... but in others unlucky. I have had things with difficulty when I wanted them; the same things when I no longer sought them have pursued me.' (*Ricordi*, 85 [p. 24]).

He acknowledged that *buona fortuna* could be man's greatest enemy because it caused him to become wicked, frivolous or insolent (164 (p. 42)), but

¹ See esp. *Disc.*, II, 29 (vol. 4, pp. 114-5), cf. 30 (pp. 188-9); *Princ.*, XXV, 1-2 (pp. 364-5); and on God, note esp. *Ist.*, VI, 34 (vol. 2, pp. 252 ff.).

² See esp. *Ricordi*, 30; 31 (Grayson, p. 13); 108 (p. 29); 161 (p. 41), cf. 20 (p. 10). Giovanni Pontano held similar attitudes to fortune, but more specifically in the case of war; cf. *Actius*, in *I Dialoghi di Giovanni Pontano*, (edit. C. Previtera, Florence, 1943, p. 220, ll. 9 ff.),

³ *Ricordi*, 6 (p. 7), 23 (p. 11), 58; 61 (p. 19); 71 (p. 22); 81 (p. 24); yet cf. 67 (p. 21), and see *supra*.

he left this admission as an observation about human nature rather than about history's ordered patterns. He also considered the proposition that God left no virtue unrewarded and no sin unpunished, and in this world, not just the next. Taking up the popular opinion that ill-gotten wealth was never allowed by God to pass to a third heir, he insisted both that there were many examples to the contrary, and that it was inevitable in any case that poverty should eventually succeed riches (*Ricordi*, 33 [p. 14]). To the maxim 'God helped a man because he was good, another came to grief because he was wicked', he answered that the very opposite can happen (a point most acceptable to Augustine!) and that divine decisions were quite unfathomable.¹

In some ways Guicciardini joins Machiavelli as an index to certain shifts and currents amongst Italian intellectuals. Both, that is, wrote more about the powers of fortune than of God, and they were less concerned with the moral order of history than the effective ordering of one's actions and the state. Yet many of their contemporaries made less of a distinction between God and *fortuna* than one might suppose, and most continued to defend a providential order.

'Fortune', wrote Vasari, 'when she has brought men to the top of the wheel, either for amusement or because she repents, usually turns them to the bottom';

yet on showing how this was true in the case of ancient Rome, he made no clear distinction between *fortuna* and *cielo*.² And if an element of antique fatalism remains quite strong in the classically-

¹ *Ibid.*, 92 (p. 26), and on his agnosticism in general, 123; 125 (p. 33). At least God was an agency which could offset *fortuna*, (cf. Machiavelli, whose work has no such implications). In Guicciardini, as in Machiavelli, though, *virtù* and *fortuna* can be of equal strength (see Patch, *loc. cit.*, p. 228).

² Vite, *op. cit.*, pref. (vol. 1, p. 9) (on Rome and the quotation) (p. 17) (on Heaven as apparently interchangeable with Fortune).

oriented Vasari, others were more eager to merge the pagan and the Christian. According to Polydore Vergil, men might often seem to be at the mercy of fortune's inconstant ways,¹ but any concessions to the possibility of a morally meaningless order could be matched by instances of retributive justice. He elicited some important examples of fitting punishment from English history - against Queen Margaret, Henry VI, Richard III and so forth.² He treated these requitals as recurring actualizations of God's retributive principles. Such justice was effected in accordance with Exodus xxxiv, 7, God visiting 'the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and the children's children to the third and fourth generations'.³ Biblico-Christian approaches to retribution, then, which we have identified in such writers as the Deuteronomist, Luke, or Orosius, still persisted, and in a northern milieu Vergil's work could even be said to be overly classical. In most English history-writing at the time, a moral order was commonly accepted. Some writers not only understood history to contain 'morally significant sequences of crime and punishment', but also saw its sequences as rhythmic, or as a 'register' of those rewarded and those punished.⁴ 'The metaphor of history as a wheel or

¹ *Anglica Historica*, op. cit., p. 134, ln. 39; p. 149, ln. 23; p. 355, ln. 38; p. 495, ln. 46; p. 531, ln. 17.

² The main cases: retribution against Hlothere, King of Kent (685), (*ibid.*, p. 66), against Lord Suffolk (1450) (p. 498), Margaret (1461) (p. 528), Buckingham (1483) (p. 553), Hastings (1483) (p. 543), against Henry VI for his grandfather's wicked seizure of the crown (pp. 509, 531), against Edward IV's children for the breaking of his solemn oath (pp. 524, 547), and against Richard III at Bosworth for his oppression of England (pp. 558, 564). Cf. D. Hay, *Polydore Vergil; Renaissance Historian and Man of Letters*, Oxford, 1952, 142-4.

³ *Ang. Hist.*, p. 66, ln. 33 (in both early and late editions of this work).

⁴ See esp. Edward Hall, *The Union*, op. cit., sig. Aj^v, Cooper's *Chronicle*, op. cit., sig. a2^r - a2^v, Sir Walter Raleigh, *History of the World*, esp. II, xxi, 6 (in *Works*, the Oxford edn., 1829, vol. 4, p. 613), etc.

circle', moreover, 'occurs a thousand times' in Tudor and Elizabethan literature; but accompanying such images was a strong denial that events were produced by 'chance or fickle fortune'.¹ These Christian writers upheld a 'moral contour of events', as Herschel Baker calls it, though it is significant that they could delineate this contour in cyclical or recurrence and not just linear terms. Baker cogently argues that their works frequently 'exemplify, and often explicate, the notion that history is not a string of inconsequential episodes but an intelligible design where repetition and recurrence provided the key to explanation'.² Le Roy would have heartily agreed, and Salutati before him. For all the old, irrepressible fears of Stoic gyrations, these men insisted that cyclical thinking was not un-Christian, and no denial of Beginning and End.

The model of fortune's turning wheel, then, although it could stand in its own right as a cyclical paradigm of change, was often incorporated within the reciprocities of the moral order. The vigour with which some of the sixteenth century English writers pressed fortune to the service of the moral order is reminiscent of Polybius, and especially Diodorus (pp.168ff,400-1). These Elizabethans were so much bolder than their mediaeval predecessors in stressing the circularity of fortune's movements (and in hypostatizing her), whilst they repudiated southern, non-Epicurean pictures of an utterly capricious fortune with men at the mercy of her morally meaningless ways.³

¹ See H. Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5, whence the quotations.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 63 for the two quotations.

³ For the more providentialist approach to fortune amongst Italian intellectuals, however, see H.A.E. van Gelder, *The Two Reformations in the Sixteenth Century; a study of religious aspects and consequences of Renaissance and Humanism*, The Hague, 1961, pp. 44 ff.

If the Elizabethans had recaptured some of the Polybian balance between the incalculable and the providential, or between the cycles of fortune and the reciprocities of justice, Machiavelli effected a comparable retrieval in the more specific but important area of internal and external relations. In this case, it is not the moral order but *regole* emerging from inter-state politics which are involved. We remember how the model of a shifting balance permeates Polybius I on the first Punic War (cf. Diagram V). Machiavelli's interpretation of order and disorder, war and peace, invokes a comparable paradigm, although in his case it is regulable human reactions rather than the arbitrations of fortune which maintain the pattern of reciprocity. He enunciated a key rule in this connection: peace produces idleness and idleness leads to disorder (*Ist.*, V, 1 [vol. 2, p. 125]). Rome, for example, was so continually successful abroad that consequent respite brought *ozio* and *disordine* one after another, thus heralding her *rovina* (*Disc.*, I, 6).¹ With all their victories, moreover, the Romans bestowed the consulate on candidates according to favour rather than merit, and so her army's ancient discipline was eventually lost.² Matters were similar for Florence; internal dissension was more likely when she was not threatened externally.³ And there was a second, matching *regola*: internal instability was prone to ease when a state faced an external danger or

¹ '... ne nascerebbe che l'ozio la farebbe a effeminata o divisa; le quali due cose insieme, o ciascuna per sé, sarebbero cagione della sua rovina' (vol. 3, p. 253).

² (p.251), and I, 18(p.293); III, 16 (vol.4, p.194); II, 8 (p.36).

³ *Ist.*, II, 12 (vol. 1, pp. 79-80); III, 29 (vol. 2, p. 66); IV, 15 (pp. 87-9); VI, 38 *finis* (pp. 259-60; VII, 23 (pp. 299-300); 25 (pp. 302-3); 29, (p. 308), etc.

some great *necessità*. With a threat to the state's existence, people tend to unite, provided they are not so corrupt as to make this impossible.¹ To the principles of unity in adversity and disunity in tranquillity, still another may be added: that states are best equipped to succeed in war if there is stability at home. The most praiseworthy state, of course, succeeded in both external and internal spheres. Idleness was avoided at home by keeping the citizens continually occupied, and security maintained not only in warding off outside threats, but in effectively pursuing an aggressive foreign policy.² On the other hand, as it was very difficult to unite people in secure times, a state could benefit by prolonged but controlled internal divisions. Machiavelli was not thinking of factiousness here, which was purely destructive, but ^{of} the healthy competition in the Roman state between nobles and people, a contest regulated to keep civic life on the move and to contribute towards the empire.³ This idea was not out of keeping with the reciprocal principles suggested by the first two *regole*; for as the *corso* of simple constitutions could be forestalled (by a *mista*), so too, could the processes of internal-external relations. Machiavelli never forgot about social engineering, and he was more than ready to draw out the practical implications of his theory.

¹ See *Disc.*, I, 3 (vol. 3, pp. 241-2), II, 25 (vol. 4, p. 102), *Ist.*, IV, 30 (vol. 2, pp. 117-8), V, 1 (pp. 26-7), etc., cf. *Disc.*, I, 1 (vol. 2, p. 230); *Ist.*, VII, 12 (vol. 2, p. 282).

² Cf. *Disc.*, III, 31 (vol. 4, pp. 229 ff.) (Rome, Venice secondarily), *Ist.*, V, 31 (vol. 2, p. 180) (Cosimo de' Medici), VIII, 36 (vol. 3, pp. 68-9) (Lorenzo I), on foreign policy.

³ *Disc.*, I, 4 (vol. 3, pp. 242 ff.). It is also true that for Machiavelli the special nature of Rome's political life prevented her from being despondent in defeat and insolent in victory; cf. III, 21 (vol. 4, p. 230).

That outside pressure could engender political success and idleness cause destruction was a doctrine not unknown amongst successors of Polybius nor amongst mediaevals.¹ It is important, however, that Machiavelli treated these principles as recurrently actualized, and as embodied in identifiable event-shapes which keep on emerging in human affairs. That, and the complex levels of his analysis, particularly recall Polybius. Like Polybius moreover, Machiavelli attempted to interrelate his images and his lines of interpretation. If near contemporaries contemplated alternating states in history - between war and peace (Erasmus)² or between periods of worthy achievement and those brought low by indolence, pleasure and luxury (Nicolò Contarini)³ - Machiavelli envisaged a cluster of such principles which all impinged on each other in a complex (though not always articulated) set of reciprocal relationships. Internal matters, for example, could be affected by processes of constitutional change, by the moral condition of the people, by the calibre of state leaders and the degree to which they might place their

¹ On the ancients see pp. 159f. (Polybius); pp. 320f. (others), and cf. esp. on the *Chronica de Origine Civitatis* and Villani's *Chroniche*, N. Rubenstein, 'The Beginnings of Political Thought in Florence', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, VI, 1942, pp. 198ff., Rousseau, *loc. cit.*, p. 148, and n. 27.

² So, Erasmus on 'ages rising to their flourishing state subverted by the fury of one tempest, the storm of war', *Dulce Bellum Inexpertus*, cf. 'Extracts from Erasmus on the subject of War', (taken from *Antipolemus* (1794)), in *Tracts on Moral and Religious Subjects*, (published by the Society of Friends, London, 1829, vol. 1, p. 156).

³ See esp. Cozzi, *Il doge Nicolò Contarini; Ricerche sul Patriziato Veneziano agli Inizi del Seicento*, Venice, 1958, esp. p. 309, cf. W.J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defence of Republican Liberty; Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter-Reformation*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, p. 562. Contarini used the image of shifting seas. Cf. Le Roy on alternating periods of vigour and indolence, cf. *supra.*, p. 487.

trust in *fortuna*. The external area, again, could be influenced by the relative valour of the armies, the relative degree of virtue in different states, the relative power of people to recover in misfortune or to resist corruption in times of success. What happened in both spheres, of course, depended primarily on the facts of war and peace, and it is the alternate existence of these two sets of conditions which justified Machiavelli's special rules of reciprocity.

Did the Renaissance witness other such statements of reciprocal principles? One writer comes to mind, but his conceptions and intellectual dispositions are rather different. I think of Philippe de Commynes and his claims about the beneficial rivalry between the princes of Europe. In the main, Commynes was an orthodox defender of Providence, for which he found 'recurring evidence', especially in God's punishments upon evil kings.¹ Yet one of his more interesting contentions was that, to quell the insolence and engender *crainte et humilité* amongst peoples, God had provided each ruler and state with *son contraire* (*Mém.*, V, 18 [pp. 207-8]; 19 [p. 237]). Such opposites operated at different levels, between nations (such as France and England), city-states (such as Venice and Florence), between dynastic houses (such as Aragon and Anjou) and even between principalities (as in Germany).² Commynes even

¹ See M.P. Gilmore, 'Freedom and Determinism in Renaissance Historians', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, III, 1956, p. 53, for the short quotation and general observations, and for an important chapter devoted to retribution, *Mémoires*, V, 20 (ed. J. Calmette, vol. 2, pp. 230 ff., esp. 235-6 on retribution against Richard II of England, Henry IV of Castile and the Duke of Gelders), cf. V, 19 (pp. 223-4, 227-8). See also esp. H.O. Taylor, *The French Mind* (or Bk. 3, of *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*, (1920)), New York, 1962, pp. 26-32 on ideas of retribution in Commynes' memoirs as a whole.

² At the national level also: England vs. Scotland; Spain vs. Portugal. At the city-state level also: Siena, Pisa and Genoa vs. Florence; Genoa vs. her smaller neighbours. At the dynastic level also: Visconti vs. Orléans; Austria vs. Bavaria; cf. *ibid.*, V, 18 (pp. 208-10).

guessed that a similar system of contraries applied in the other continents of Asia and Africa (pp. 210-1). On his reading of historical tendencies, men are continually inclined to do violence to each other, so that God provides constraints through both his retributive justice and the contraries; the presence of these reciprocal principles could be illustrated by the events of European history. In holding this view Commynes appears to be less ethnocentric than Machiavelli, but such is not generally the case. And besides, in the former's work the processes of history are just as much divine as human, whereas the latter achieved a secularization of mediaeval conceptions still lurking behind. Commynes' writings, and even minimized the rôle of fortune in internal-external relations.¹ Although the ancient Greek idea of change into contraries may have influenced Commynes' position, he has radically modified that idea and integrated it with Christian providentialism. Once again it is Machiavelli who shows himself to be the impressive reviver of ancient and more particularly Polybian notions of recurrence, yet with an original mind of his own. Commonly, however, we find in the sixteenth century syncretistic tendencies; fortune upholds the moral order and classically derived models of recurrence were used to reinforce a providentialist view.

¹ I referred to fortune's involvement in p. 504 *supra.*, yet cf. Polybius' position on fortune and war, *supra.*, pp. 127ff. Polybius I, incidentally, seems to have been widely read in the sixteenth century; cf. for example, the English translation: *The Histories of the most famous and worthy Chronographer Polybius*, London, 1568 (by 'CW').

Other Renaissance Themes; especially concerning Human Nature and the Utility of History

Whilst pagan ideas were being revived, then, they were susceptible to transmutation. Yet again, whilst mediaeval themes continued to press their claims, they were often tailored to suit the changing predilections and circumstances of the time. We are surveying a complex panorama; at best we can keep distinguishing the various paradigms of recurrence, the spheres to which they appertain, and also grasp a certain polarity between more thorough-going revivalists of pagan Antiquity and those who concentrated on purifying the Christian heritage. Both the richness and the tension can be helpfully, if inadequately, summed up in the terms 'Renaissance' and 'Reformation', and to conclude this work we may explore those themes which best disclose the different emphases of the sixteenth century crucible.

As a means of both supplementing and gathering up the threads already pursued, we may now reflect on uniformitarian ideas of the Renaissance, or appeals to the permanent traits of human nature. And these may be conveniently treated with beliefs about the pragmatic value of historical study. The notion that history can teach lessons for the future was a binding theme in the recurrence thinking of the Graeco-Roman ancients, and it was of equal consequence for the new champions of the *studia humanitatis*.

It is natural to return to Machiavelli, who made two renowned statements about human nature and history's practical implications for future action.

'Whoever considers the past and the present will readily observe that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the same passions; (*quegli medesimi desiderii e quelli medesimi omori*), so that it is easy, by diligent

study of the past, to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any that were employed by them to devise new ones from the similarity of events (*per la similitudine degli accidenti*)'. (*Disc.*, I, 39 [vol. 3, p. 338]).

And again,

'Wise men say, and not without reason, that whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past, for all human events always have their own counterpart, (or resemblance) in ancient (or earlier) times (*perchè tutte le cose del mondo in ogni tempo, hanno il proprio riscontro con gli antichi tempi*). This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who have been, and ever will be, animated by the same passions and thus they must, *di necessità*, have the same results. (*Disc.*, III, 43 [vol. 4, p. 259]).

The Thucydidean claim that history repeats itself because human nature does not change, and the ancient pragmatism we have taken to be most cogently expressed in Polybius are interlocked in these passages. They confirm our case, moreover, that human motivation and action form the key causal factor in Machiavelli's recurrence theory when generally conceived. If human nature remains the same (and for him men are prone to evil and corruption),¹ then the past may be ransacked for its similar situations and patterns, and from the future one may expect resemblances to past events. And history's resemblances include all the patterns, sequences, contours and actualized principles we have already elicited from his writings, as well as a wide range of more isolated parallels varying in their sharpness and significance. It goes without saying that Machiavelli's very awareness of the many

¹ Cf. esp. *Disc.*, I proem. (vol. 3, p. 227), 3 (p. 241), 42 (p. 347).

forms of historical recurrence adds to his importance in our story. He also envisaged a whole spectrum of similarities, ranging from striking likenesses between highly specific events to loose parallels between broadly conceived event-complexes. The implications of his context, moreover, are crucial; he reflected upon a long history of humankind stretching from his own day back to Moses and ancient Egypt. His advantage over the ancient historiographers was quite a decided one! He had so much more material from which to derive generalizations, and the two enormous blocks of human history - *antichi tempi* and more recent times - were just waiting to be compared, for it was not as if the movements of the heavenly bodies had somehow forged a great gulf of dissimilarity between them (cf. *Disc.*, I, *proem.* vol. 3, p. 229). Lying behind Machiavelli's sweeping vision was his deeply imbedded pragmatism. To know man and his past was to know how to act. To account for the (generally evil) nature of men, to be acquainted with their basic passions and love of novelty,¹ to avoid past errors, to imitate policies and deeds which have formerly had good effect,² to acquire both a wide political experience and a general familiarity with history,³ was to be equipped for politics. Recurrence is therefore of immediate political significance, and perhaps even more so for

¹ See *Disc.*, I, 3, III (p. 241), 21 (vol. 4, p. 204).

² See *Disc.*, II, 27, (p. 106) (on excess), more on the avoidance side, and concerning more positive lessons, see *ibid.*, I, *prolog.* (vol. 3, pp. 228-9) (imitation in general), (p. 231) (on founding cities), 5 (pp. 246-7), 6 (pp. 252-3); 7 (p. 257) (on constitutional questions), 10 (p. 267) (on empire building); 22 (p. 300) (on bravery); III, 31 (vol. 4, p. 232) (on military organization) (cf. his *Arte della Guerra*, 37 (vol. 5, p. 250)) (on a specific course of military action), etc.. Cf. on imitation, *infra.*, p. 535, and n. 2.

³ See esp. *Disc.*, I, *pref.* (vol. 3, p. 225), *prolog.* (227).

a Florentine exile who could still rally support for a practicable republican cause in his own city, than for an Achaean historiographer discoursing to foreign minds and wandering in alien lands.

No one amongst Machiavelli's contemporaries was as adventurous and as sophisticated in their handling of recurrence conceptions. He had brought such a variety of ideas and paradigms into a working compatibility, and one can even conclude that his syncretisms are more convincing than those in Polybius. Whereas the latter had worked with three levels of causation - the 'supernatural', the natural and the purposive¹ - Machiavelli fastened on to human will and response as the overriding factor. And his accounts of the different processes of recurrence were not only moulded around the assumption that it was men and not metaphysical principles which made history, but that human nature was stable and that men's limitations and possibilities were so regulable that one could frame scientific maxims about human behaviour and prescribe remedies for social ills. However, others were far from being persuaded by such far-reaching conclusions.

Guicciardini who subjected the *Discorsi* to a detailed examination is worth considering. He was quite prepared to rest on very general statements of uniformitarianism and statements which carried the implications of historical recurrence.

¹ Cf. *supra.*, pp.147f. on *tychē* and the moral order, *Physis*, and human motivation.

'Everything which was in the past and is now' he wrote in the *Ricordi*, 'will be in the future, but the names change, and the outward appearance of things, so that anyone who lacks perspicacity does not recognize them and cannot draw conclusions or form any opinion from what he observes' (76).¹

And again

'Past things throw light on things to come, for the world was ever of the same sort and all that which is and will be has been in other times, and the old things return with different names and colours' (336).²

Yet these claims for recurrence are much more restrained,³ than Machiavelli's. On the one hand, then, he was admirably critical of more doctrinaire approaches, whilst on the other, he admitted the viability of an unpretentious, loosely formulated conception of recurring situations and event-shapes, given the delimited possibilities for human behaviour.⁴ In making this concession, however, he still opposed using Rome as an instructive model for his contemporaries (*Ric.*, 110)⁵ and was suspicious both of predictions by logical inference from the past, and of fixed *regole* which supposedly governed

¹ (Grayson, p. 23).

² (1528 edit.), quoted in J.W. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 486. Note, however, Guicciardini's failure to make comments on the Machiavellian phrase 'In diversi popoli si veggano spesso i medesimi accidenti', in *Consid.*, I, 39 (pp. 99-100).

³ The view that things always remain the same is no more than an innocuous form of a general doctrine of recurrence. H. Weisinger has overlaboured the differences (although he appeals to the same authors when treating cyclical and uniformitarian ideas!), and has not grasped how they merge (*loc. cit.*, pp. 426-9).

⁴ Jacopo Corbinelli (b. 1534), the author of the *Storia delle Guerre Civilé in Francia* (1579), was an important historian who came down against Machiavelli's and for Guicciardini's understanding of continuing sameness; in his *Avvertimenti*, CXXIII (on the *Ricordi*, 76), cf. G. Procacci, *Studi sulla Fortuna del Machiavelli*, Rome, 1965, p. 177.

⁵ (p. 30). On his refusal to idealize Rome, cf. *Consid.*, I, 4 (p. 69), 49 (103).

world affairs.¹ Moreover, on human nature he was unexpectedly opposed to Machiavelli, for his stress on sameness had more to do with similar situations than permanent character traits. He insisted that men's natures varied (*Ric.*, 61 [p. 19]), implicitly criticizing his predecessor for neglecting temperamental differences and individuality in people. And if he himself was to say anything law-like about human nature, it was not that all men leaned towards evil but that they 'inclined more to good' (134, [p. 35] cf. *Consid.*, I, 3 [pp. 66-7]). Machiavelli's estimate was distasteful to the aristocrat, and to one whose responsibilities made him more optimistic about the future of Italy.²

There were others, who, although they did not address themselves to the Machiavellian enterprise, engaged in a far less ambitious programme to disclose both the nature of man and the keys to effective behaviour from the pages of history. M.P. Gilmore has argued that Erasmus held human nature to have remained substantially unchanged, and that 'the same accidents could happen to individuals as to peoples

¹ *Ric.*, 6 (p. 7). 'E grande errore parlare della cose del mondo indistintamente e assolutamente, e, perdere, così per regola, perchè quasi tutte hanno distinzione ed eccezione per la varietà della circostanze'. On prediction, see esp. *ibid.*, 23 (11), 58 (19), 81 (24), 114 (31), 182 (46), yet cf. 67 (p. 21) (concerning military foreknowledge), and cf. also esp. 71 (p. 22), where he discusses the foreseeability of decline but still shows himself to be cautious about predicting the time of events.

² It is curious how his faith in human nature was that 'all men are by nature more inclined to good than evil' 134 (p. 35), cf. *Consid.*, I, 3 (pp. 66-7), yet another anti-Machiavellian train of thought. Such optimism did not quell Guicciardini's scepticism about the benefits of popular rule or the greater involvement of *il popolo* in politics; cf. I, 58 (p. 104), whereas, for all his pejorative assertions about human nature, Machiavelli pressed for a far less aristocratic form of republicanism than his critic. For a humanist, the latter's representation of human nature was surprisingly adverse. Although his judgements have everything to do with his heightened awareness of the 'real and ruthless' in politics, it is instructive to see how much he had in common here with the Protestant Reformers. These men, of course, were not so much concerned with laws of historical recurrence as with stating eternal truths about man, and yet they were ready to instance his depravity from the pages of the past.

again and again'.¹ Integral to this view, of course, was that prevalent humanist assumption that the past instructed the present and future.² Erasmus was one amongst many who dilated on the exemplary truths of history, and harboured the general assumption that it contained paradigms, patterns or *exempla* which could shape men's response to perennially recurring situations.³ And if some still held up these *exempla* for mere contemplation, most humanists were affected by resurgent pragmatism, which came to be as important in the sphere of religious belief and practice as of civic life.⁴

With Machiavelli, of course, the case for instructive history was most boldly stated. He reinforced his claims for historical repetition from the particular as well as from general principles and rules. It was possible for almost exact recurrence to occur, though most unusual.⁵ On rare occasions, 'similar remedies could

¹ See Gilmore's 'Fides et Eruditio; Erasmus and the Study of History', in *Teachers of History; Essays in Honour of Laurence Bradford Packard* (edit. M.S. Hughes), Ithaca, (New York), 1954, p. 16.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 12-22 as a whole.

³ To paraphrase Baker (*op. cit.*, p. 16).

⁴ In France, note Seyssel, *op. cit.*, pp. 103 ff. and also Robert Gaguin (1433-1501), *Compendium de Origine et Gestis Francorum*, Paris, 1495, (in which the author sought *exempla* from French as against ancient history, although his main object was to glorify the French monarchy). Cf. Montaigne, *Essays*, III, 8. In England: Sir Thomas North's version of Plutarch's *Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, London, 1895-6 edn., vol. 1, pp. 7-11; Raleigh, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. vi ('preface'); Sir Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (in *Works*, edit. J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath), London 1857-74, vol. 6, pp. 359, cf. 327; Thomas Beard, *The Theatre of God's Judgements*, London, 1597, sig. A3^r, etc., (cf. *supra*, p. 412), and see also W.H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics, Two Traditions of English Political Thought 1500-1700*, London 1964, pp. 95 ff., esp. 109-11.

⁵ In the *Istorie*, V (vol. 2, p. 132), Machiavelli comments that, with bloodshed, the proscriptions under Cosimo de' Medici could have resembled (*avrebbe... renduto similitudine*) those of Octavius and Sulla, which possibly recalls Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.*, XLVII, iii, 2; cf. *supra*, p. 197. In VIII, 15 (vol. 3, p. 32), Machiavelli notes

avail', but it was so difficult to get a concurrence of similar circumstances.¹ On the whole, history leaves us with relative similarities. How striking was the similarity, or how inclusive the model, was never philosophized upon with precision, but often left to the empathy of the reader. Some of his minor parallels are cases in point. In one interesting passage, he likened the fates of Sparta and Venice. Both were endowed with excellent and comparable institutions, but once they made outside conquests they quickly fell.² That instance of parallelism has a definiteness which many others lack. Nevertheless, even his crudest similitudes - on the comparable rôle of the geographical factor for the success of Tyre, Athens, Venice, for example, on Moses and the barbarians as 'new occupants', and so forth³ - all contribute to his total picture. Parallels, *exempla* and precedents were a common feature of humanist writings, and the new intellectuals eagerly ransacked the documents of Greece and Rome to encourage the circulation of worthy

¹ *Disc.*, I, 32 (vol. 3, p. 320); 'Simili cagioni accaggiono rade volte'. (*Cagioni* is literally 'causes', but in context Machiavelli clearly means a series of causes together producing a given situation).

² See *ibid.*, I, 6 (vol. 3, p. 252), and on similar institutions, I, 5 (p. 245); 6 (249).

³ On the three sea-faring peoples, *ibid.*, II, 27 (vol. 4, p. 107), cf. I, 1 (vol. 3, p. 230); on Moses and the barbarians, II, 8 (vol. 4 pp. 36-7). Machiavelli also likened the expulsions of the Tarquini and the Peisistratidae; I, 58 (vol. 3, p. 385), II, 2 (vol. 4, p. 15); stressed the presence of *virtù* in both ancient Rome and modern Germany; I, 55 (vol. 3, p. 374); paralleled the institutions of the ancient Tuscans and contemporary Swiss; II, 4, (vol. 4, p. 23.); recognized Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus as comparable founders of new nations; *Princ.*, vi, 3 f. (pp. 291 ff.); joined Hamilcar the Carthaginian and Oliveretto de Fermo as rulers establishing control by a display of ruthlessness; viii, 2, 4-6 (pp. 303 ff.); even alluded to the liberating deeds of his new prince as an Exodus; xxxvi, 3 (p. 369), and so on.

Footnote 5 from previous page...

that the Florentines routed the papal forces on the very field of battle in which Hannibal defeated the Romans, but this would seem to be a case of noting one remarkably similar aspect of two distinct events.

deeds and revive the active life of civic virtue.¹

With later fifteenth and sixteenth century humanism, the enthusiasm for Antiquity reborn went on undaunted. 'Le Temps Revient' ran the devise of Lorenzo il Magnifico, and affirmations that the Golden Age ^{had} returned or that the Platonic World Year had come round were not uncommon.² Such flamboyancy continued to make its presence felt in elegant letters until religious war rendered it too sedate and the *Querelle* between ancient and modern pricked its bubble. Preoccupation with historical recurrence, then, was an indication both of the revival of ancient pagan interests and of 'Renaissance' optimism. Yet not everybody yearned for the lost days of Pericles and Scipio. There were still more elevated souls who pondered on ancient Galilee and on the distant heroes who had created the Christian world. They, too, often dreamt of a rebirth.

The Re-enactment of Significant Events and Other Reformation Themes

The sixteenth century witnessed fresh and often heated discussion over sacred history. Older interpretations of Daniel's visions were still in circulation, but if they were not muted by new

¹ Classical *exempla* were not the exclusive source of inspiration however, Note how Andre de la Vigne, for example, took Charles VIII's invasion of Naples as a Christian crusade to free the hold land (cf. Gilmore, 'Freedom and Determinism', *loc. cit.*, p. 56). Cf. however, such a writer as Robert Gaguin, a near contemporary of de la Vigne, who laboured the parallel between the conspiracies of Catiline and the revolt of Charles of Burgundy ('Fides et Eruditio', *loc. cit.*, p. 10). By contrast again, much Reformation parallelism was decidedly biblical. For a famous example: Luther's *De Captivitate Babylonica* (1520).

² On Lorenzo's de' Medici testament and the Platonic World Year, see P.O. Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters*, Rome, 1956, pp. 304 ff.; on the Golden Age, see (on the flattery of patrons), A.M. Brown, 'The humanist portrait of Cosimo de' Medici, Pater Patriae', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, XXIV, 1961, pp. 200-1; 212; E.M. Gombrich, 'Renaissance and Golden Age', in *ibid.*, pp. 306-9, cf. L. van Vives, 'In Eclogam IV, Allegoria, etc.', (in *Opera Omnia*, [ed. G. Majansio], Valencia, 1782, vol. 2, pp. 32 ff.), and, of course, Tasso's *Aminta* (1573). Such works of art as Giorgione's 'Golden Age' must also be borne in mind.

theology they were placed aside as moribund dogma. Humanists and Reformers were either more exploratory in their Age theory, or else they sought to liberate the study of the Church from world-historical schematizations altogether.¹ The four-monarchy scheme and the 'Great Week' suffered its severest blow from the pen of the early Reformer Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560). Ecclesiastical history, he insisted, should be considered in scholarship as but one, albeit important branch of general history. As part of the human past, Church history could not be ensnared within imposed, inviolable frameworks that went forever unquestioned by the secular historian. It was the history of people, and people furthermore, who had constantly erred and strayed into sin.² Such

¹ On humanist explorations, note Salutati (Diagram XI) and also Gianotto Manetti. In his biblical interpretations Manetti revived the Eusebian idea of the worthy Ages of the Patriarchs and the early church, both separated by the middle period of Law, externality and temporalism (*Contra Iudeos et Gentes* (1454), cf. C. Trinkaus, 'In our Image and Likeness', *Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought*, London, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 730-734). Later, the so-called 'Spiritualist' Caspar Schwenckfeld (1490-1561) proffered a similar doctrine - that there were Christians before Jews with the pre-Mosaic faithful (cf. G.H. Williams, *Radical Reformation*, *op. cit.*, p. 289, cf. *Rom.* iv, 11 ff., and on Eusebius, p. 389 *supra*). On the important humanists who attacked the Danielic frames, see next note.

² On Melanchthon's approach, see esp. A. Klempt, *Die Säkularisierung der universalhistorischen Auffassung: Zum Wandel des Geschichtsdenken im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (in *Göttingen Bausteine zum Geschichtswissenschaft XXXI*), Göttingen, 1960, pt. 1, cf. also A. Sperl, *Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation* (*Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus*, 3rd Ser., vol. XV), Munich, 1959, pp. 85-88. (Melanchthon also sought to place classical and New Testament scholarship on a comparable footing). The attack on the Danielic schemas was facilitated by classifying different types of history - usually into human, natural and divine (cf. Bodin, *Methodus* (p. 15), Bodin being a renowned opponent of the world monarchy doctrine, *supra*, p. 485). For later divisions, see Francis Bacon's classifications (into natural, civil, ecclesiastical and literary) (cf. *Advancement in Works*, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 183) and D. Wheare's (into divine, natural, political and ecclesiastical) (cf. *The Method and Order of Reading both Civil and Ecclesiastical Histories*, (trans. E. Bohun), London, 1685, p. 16).

a clearing of the ground was one symptom of reform, and one sign amongst many others that theologians of history in the sixteenth century, and not just humanists or neo-pagans, were reconsidering questions of historical recurrence.

It is helpful to hark back to Machiavelli for a moment, particularly to his observations on the return to original principles. Not only 'mixed bodies' alone should frequently return *inverso i principii loro*, if they were not following their ordained course, but religious sects as well (*Disc.*, III, 1 [vol. 4, p. 127]). Temporarily waiving his discussion of Rome, he dilated on religious questions:

'Now with regard to sette we shall see that revivals (*rinnuovazioni*) are equally necessary, and the best proof of this is furnished by our own, which would have been entirely lost had it not been brought back (*ritirata*) to its first principles by St. Francis and St. Dominic, for by their voluntary poverty and with the example of Christ's life, they revived (*ridussono*) the religious spirit in the minds of men, where it had almost become extinguished. (*Ibid.*, [p. 131]).

Such renewals preserved the Catholic Church, just as comparable movements strengthened régimes. These revivalists, moreover, saw the reappropriation of former conditions - though they are left vaguely delineated - and Machiavelli even bordered on the idea of recurrent revivals in Church history, *l'esempio* of Jesus being recaptured in the lives of his latter-day followers. Yet Machiavelli himself was no practical revivalist of religion. As a more dispassionate observer, he was interested in attempts at renewal from a phenomenological point of view. Other spirits, of course, were

less objective, with their concern for renewal intensely zealous.¹

It is well known that the Reformers took the true doctrines and spirit of Christianity to have been marred by mediaeval Catholicism. They were determined to prove that the hierarchical structure of the Church and the temporal power of the Pope represented a denial of biblical Christianity. Catholic sacramental doctrines, moreover, were deemed largely false, or without sufficient basis in scripture. The important debate about justification (though simmering down somewhat after 1541) had everything to do with the radical Lutheran re-appraisal of the sacramental system. And integral to their approach, of course, was the contention that true Christianity ought to be, and was being brought, back to its original foundations. This is true even though the Reformers did not view their work as just another chapter in the history of revivalism, but as something which belonged to a more decisive moment in man's life, and was even pregnant with eschatological significance.

Did the Reformers maintain, then, that the changes of northern Europe brought a recurrence of former conditions, ^{and} the return of an earlier purity and simplicity? The question is awkward. We may

¹ Hopes for ecclesiastical reform and for the renewal of Christianity's spiritual basis go back far beyond Machiavelli; they had been voiced by heretics as much as the orthodox, and nearer Machiavelli's time, by both the '*Devotio Moderna*' school in the Netherlands (see esp. A. Hyman, who, perhaps a little too adventurously, treats the idea of a 'New Devotion' as interchangeable with the idea of 'Christian Renaissance' (in *The Christian Renaissance, a history of the "Devotio Moderna"*, Hamden, Connecticut, 1965 ed., cf. esp. p. 303), and by that passionate Florentine opponent of a worldly papacy, Savonarola (see esp. D. Weinstein, 'Millenarism in a Civic Setting; the Savonarola Movement in Florence', in *Millennial Dreams in Action*, ed. S. L. Thrupp (Comparative Studies in Society and History Supplement II), The Hague, 1962, pp. 187 ff. Cf. also H.A. Obermann (ed.), *Forerunners of the Reformation; the shape of late mediaeval thought*, London, 1967, *passim*, etc.

begin with Luther's view of Church history. At points the Reformation meant for him the dawning of a new Age, the last of three Ages in Church history. The first was 'a kind of "Golden Age"' - the period of the early church - and it ended somewhere between Phocas and Boniface III¹; the second was the 'Dark Age' of the Papacy, when 'the simplicity and purity of the early church was corrupted'.² The third phase began with the Reformation, but it had its precursors - in Jean Gerson, for instance, curber of Papal pretensions, and 'the first whom our Lord God began to enlighten in this last Age of the world'.³ However, we are over-simplifying matters, for there are other sides to Luther. He likened the world to a creaking old house, on the verge of falling down for it was now hurrying towards the Judgement Day.⁴ Besides, Luther could envisage the whole of history as a scene of degeneration; the pre-diluvian Golden Age had never been recaptured, and his own era, which witnessed the third, final and most terrible persecution of the faithful, was the most

¹ I.e. between 602 and 607.

² See esp. Luther, *Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (ed. J.C.F. Knaake et al.), Weimar, 1883 - , vol. 11, p. 36; cf. E. Seeberg, *Gottfried Arnold, die Wissenschaft und die Mystik seiner Zeit*, Meerane, 1923, p. 435. Most of the quotations, however, come from Harbison's simplistic account of Luther's position (*op. cit.*, p. 278).

³ Quoted in E. Schäfer, *Luther als Kirchenhistoriker*, Gütersloh, 1897, p. 447.

⁴ See esp. *Werke*, vol. 34 (pt. 2), p. 461, cf. vol. 15, p. 32, vol. 45, pp. 336 ff. Cf. also J.M. Tonkin 'Luther's Interpretation of Secular Reality', in *The Journal of Religious History*, VI, No. 2, 1970, pp. 136-140.

despicable of them all.¹ One side to Luther's theology, therefore, played down the restorative achievements of the Reformation, and his tripartite Age theory, though not unlike the schemes of Joachim or, better still, Petrarch² was moderated by his eschatology. When Luther's Age theory appeared in Calvin, by contrast, it had stronger recurrence overtones. Calvin was less apocalyptic in his views about the third Age; the world was waiting to be conquered by the Gospel and renovated through its power.³ But not even Calvin, let alone Luther, believed that the clock could be turned back. Massive de-institutionalisation to restore the conditions of the earliest church was impossible, and they were in error who taught so.

There were, it is well known, people who did teach so. Yet first we must place the idea of a reformed, restored or renewed Church in a broader perspective. The Reformation, one should insist, was as much a product and part of the Renaissance as a reaction against it. Humanism not only fostered a conscious revival of ancient pagan ideas, but it also led to attempts at recovering Christian antiquity, especially by such northern scholars as Erasmus, Lefèvre

¹ See esp. J.M. Headley, *Luther's View of Church History*, (Yale Publications in Religion, 6), New Haven, 1963, pp. 122-3, 143-153; and for Luther and the three persecutions of the Church, M. Preuss, *Die Vorstellungen von Antichrist im späteren Mittelalter, bei Luther und der Konfessionellen Polemik*, Leipzig, 1906, esp. p. 87.

² In Luther's frame, the final Age was already in the process of actualization (cf. Joachim). *Prima facie*, Luther's tripartite Age schema has much in common with Petrarch's, since he reflected on two earlier time periods - one most worthy and the other most unworthy - to be followed by dawning of a new era which regained the spirit of the first Age, whilst adding something new and vital of its own (cf. also *supra*, p. 377n.).

³ See esp. Calvin's comments on L., xvii, 20 (*Opera, op. cit.*, vol. 45, p. 425, cf. also (on Acts xv, 9) vol. 49, p. 346). See Harbinson, *op. cit.*, p. 281 on Calvin's adoption of Luther's tripartite Age theory; Zwingli also adopted it, but dated the 'fall' of the Church at Hildebrand (cf. A. Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie*, Halle, 1885-9, vol. 2, p. 68 n.).

d'Étaples and their associates. These men were engaged in editing and understanding patristic as well as biblical texts,¹ and they were involved in a movement of cultural rebirth in the north which lacked the decidedly pagan associations of Botticelli's *Primavera* and Ficino's Platonic philosophy. The scholarly redemption of Christian antiquity was fuel to the Reformers' fire. For them, it proved how much real Christianity had been submerged under heavy scholasticism. Yet severance from the mother church was not everybody's solution to the recovery of a lost order. The notion of an ecclesiastical Golden Age, for example, was widely current amongst Renaissance catholics. Both Virgil's fourth eclogue and the important pseudo-Clementine literature placed this Age in apostolic times,² and such men as Cajetan (founder of the Theatines), longed for 'the Golden Age of the primitive church' to return, and for the Church to be restored 'according to Antiquity'.³ Yet the time of Jesus and the Acts was not the only one reflected upon. If Erasmus, for example, had his more optimistic moments, the Golden Age he projected was probably best anticipated in the patristic period, when, just as in his own time, there was some concord between theology and the search for *bonae litterae*, and a great struggle against the winds of heresy.⁴

¹ See esp. L. Bouyer, *Erasmus and the Humanist Experiment*, (ET), London, 1959, esp. ch. 12; E.F. Rice, Jr., 'The Humanist Idea of Christian Antiquity: Lefèvre d'Étaples and his circle', in *Studies in the Renaissance*, IX, 1962, pp. 126-152 (also in *French Humanism 1470-1600*, ed. W.L. Gundersheimer (Stratum Series), London, 1969, pp. 163 ff.).

² Cf. esp. pseudo-Clementine Epistle IV.

³ So, P. Sarpi, *Istorie del Concilio Tridentino*, London, 1619, vol. 1, p. 34, vol. 3, p. 332. (Cajetan 1480-1547). At Trent, incidentally, views like this met the opposition of the Curia's staunchest defenders, such as Diego Lainez, S.J. (1512-1565), who argued that the modern church should be considered as an improvement upon the ancient one (*ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 230-1, cf. vol. 2, p. 108).

⁴ For the difficulties in interpreting Erasmus' conception of history, see P.G. Bietenholz, *History and Biography in the Work of Erasmus of Rotterdam (Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance LXXXVII)*, Geneva, 1966,

A different, even more enthralling, development of this old theme is to be found in the strange writings by Giles of Viterbo (1467-1532), Prior General of the prestigious Augustinians, and a man who probably greeted young Luther on his visit to Rome, 1510-1.¹ Giles was vitally concerned to work for Church reform, dreaming as he did of a widespread renewal of poverty and sanctity suggestive of Joachim's third *status*. His understanding of history, moreover, reinforced the grounds of his hopes. Having been appointed General under Julius II, Giles delivered a protracted address before the Pope, openly asserting that Julius's Pontificate witnessed the fulfilment of that spiritual Golden Age associated with the sanctifying work of Christ. Early on, he mentioned history's four great Ages - those of Lucifer, Adam, Janus and Christ - and claimed that, in varying degrees of quality and time, each Age, or at least the last three, experienced the flourishing of the *vita aurea*, the golden life, or a life lived in accordance with the demands of reason and religion.² In the second part of his oration he proceeded to show that the reign of Manuel of Portugal, which coincided with Julius's primacy, represented a new revival of the *vita aurea*, and (in the light of Hispano-Portuguese expansion) a fulfilment of biblical prophecies about the spread of Christianity.³ He also conjured up a special parallelism

¹ See esp. J.W. O'Malley, *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform: A study in Renaissance Thought*, (*Studies in Mediaeval and Reformation Thought V*), Leiden, 1968, pp. 4 ff.

² Cf. 1507 Discourse, using O'Malley's edition of the Évora Latin MS in *Traditio*, XXV, 1969, I, 1-11, 1 (fols: 4r - 43v, pp. 280-310), and on the golden life, esp. I, 2 (fols. 8v- 9v, pp. 283-4); 3, (fol. 11r, p. 286), (fols. 13r - v, pp. 287-8), (fols. 16v - 18 r, pp. 289-91); II, 2 (fols. 47r - 51v, pp. 312-6), etc.

³ *Ibid.*, proem (fol. Iv, p. 279) I, 1, (fol. 5r, pp. 280-1); 3 (fol. 11 (a)r, p. 286); fol 23v, p. 295); II, 1 (43r, pp. 309-310); 2 (fols. 54v - 54(a)v, pp. 318-9); etc.

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pp. 28-46. Cf. Gilmore ('Fides, etc'. , *loc. cit.*, pp. 23-24, cf. pp. 9 ff.), who makes too much of recurrence elements in Erasmus' thought.

between the present Age of Christ (as it was being consummated in the sixteenth century) and the third Age of Janus, the Age of the ancient Etrurian king who was placed before Belus and Saturnus at a point just after the Deluge.¹ He made much of the idea, moreover, that the Vatican hill, on which the new basilica of St. Peter stood so splendidly, was Etruscan and deeply significant for Etruria.² Such rhetoric may seem quite idiosyncratic, yet Giles employed Age theory rather refreshingly to say something about spiritual, and not simply cultural, rebirth.

When Leo X was elected to the Papacy, he persisted with these themes, and was even more enthusiastic ^{in his use of} ~~with~~ recurrence images. In the *Historia XX Saeculorum* (ca. 1513), he tried to combine two protean teachings - the four-world monarchy doctrine and the theory of 'metal' Ages - with his own idea of world Ages recurring in groups of ten.³ There were ten Ages before and ten after the true Golden Age (which ran from Christ to Pope Silvester [314-335]), and if the first block of eons suffered a progressive degeneration up to the Incarnation, there had also been continual decay in spiritual life after it. Now, however, in the tenth Age after Christ, a new Age of Gold was breaking in, this time with Leo's hopeful rule, with accompanying signs of world-conversion (marked by the Pope's friendly treatment of the Jews), and with the expansion of Christianity

¹ *Ibid.*, I, 3 (fol. 11v, p. 285).

² *Ibid.*, I, 3 (fol. 11(a)r-v, p. 286), (fol. 23 v, p. 295); 4 (fol. 28v, pp. 298-9), II, 2 (fol. 54r, p. 318); 4 (fols. 70v - 72r, pp. 331-2).

³ Giles' interest in periods of ten Ages apparently derives from his Cabalistic preoccupations. In general, cf. O'Malley, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-8.

overseas.¹ According to this approach, the translation of empires from the Middle East to Rome belonged more to the pre-incarnational dispensation, whilst the significant movements after Christ were the migration of the Church into Europe, and the virtual succession of the old Roman empire by the Roman church.² On the same Vatican hill, moreover, Janus had once founded the ancient and pure religion of the Etruscans, before it was desecrated by the pagans, whilst Peter, the other keybearer, founded the Roman church before that long interval of spiritual decline.³ Now, however, the great St. Peter's had been raised there, a crucial symbol of cultural efflorescence and of the Church's bright future. Intriguingly, Giles had no disdain for this great monument, yet it was the ideal of hard primitivism, of the *paupertas* and destitution of the early 'Golden' church, which he continued to hold up to his contemporaries.⁴ But for all his inconsistency and curious interests, and despite the fact that his dreams were fast made illusions by tumultuous events,⁵

¹ *Hist.*, fols. 1r - 17r (on OT period), fols. 21v, 38v, 47v, 52v, 56r, etc. (Church history). On Christ's Golden Age to Sylvester, cf. Evora Ms, I, 4 (fols. 27v - 28v, pp. 298-9), (fols. 41v - 43v, pp. 308-10). On Leo X, esp. *Hist.*, fol. 316v, cf. O'Malley, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 ff.

² *Hist.*, fol. 20r - v, cf. *Scechina e Libellus de Litteris Hebraicus* (ed. F. Secret), Rome, 1959, vol. 1, pp. 189 ff. on the succession of world-empires, *Hist.*, fol. 24r on *translatio* in church history, fols. 5v, 20r - v, 183v, 189v - 190r on the Church as the successor of the Roman empire.

³ On Janus and Peter, esp. *ibid.*, fols. 7r ff.. On both as keybearers, cf. Livy, *Ab Urbe*, I, xix, 2; VIII, ix, 6, etc., and *Mt.*, xvi, 19.

⁴ See esp. *Historia* (Codex Latinus 502), fols. 33r - v, 35r - v, 37r, *Scechina*, vol. 1, pp. 165-6 on his primitivism, and on St. Peter's, *Hist.*, fols. 194r ff., 245v ff., etc.

⁵ Leo's rule did not bring all that it promised, and by 1527 the Turks were threatening Vienna and Rome had been sacked by Charles V's armies. It is interesting that Giles, in 1530, without abandoning his views about a new Golden Age, wrote more about God's punishment of his wicked people ('the new Israel') by the hands of Charles

Giles made an impressive effort to fill out a Christian philosophy of history in terms of cycles and recurrence. He did not deny the eschaton either (though history might experience another set of ten-fold Ages before it came),¹ and for him the End was a time when all things returned to the fount of their being.² But the present was his all-important preoccupation; it bore such encouraging signs, and to proclaim them was to encourage the golden life and the genuine reform for which he yearned.

Invocations of the Golden Age rarely entailed the belief in exact, or near exact recurrence, especially when they fell from the lips of churchmen. They were simply forms of 'Renaissance' enthusiasm. What was lost had been and could be reborn, but reborn nevertheless into a quite different historical context and under a different dispensation. The Reformers retained this sense of proportion. There is no gainsaying their sense of historical direction, their acknowledgement that reform meant no simple re-appropriation of primitive Christianity. Luther did not wish to see New Testament Christianity in isolation from the dogmatic decisions of the first six Councils, which he was ready to accept.³ It is thus false to conclude that his programme of revitalization had

¹ For a more eschatological tone, *ibid.*, fols. 34r - v, 51v, *Scechina*, vol. 1, pp. 101, 180, 199, etc., yet for the possibility of future Ages, *Hist.*, fol. 268v, 321v, cf. 25v.

² So, *ibid.*, fols. 14v, 30r, 306r, *Scechina*, vol. 2, pp. 279-80. (Virgil's fourth Eclogue being quoted).

³ See esp. W. Elert, *The Structure of Lutheranism*, (ET), St. Louis, 1962, pp. 185-6, 205, 219-227, 285-6.

Footnote 5 continued from previous page...

'the new Cyrus' and Suleiman. (See esp. *Scechina* (1530), vol. 1, pp. 155, 158, cf. 98, 105 etc., and on Charles and Suleiman in particular, pp. 69, 104-5, 116, 161, etc.). In *Hist.*, fols. 245v - 249r, incidentally, Giles likened St. Peter's to the Solomonic temple.

biblical patterns alone in mind. His conciliarism, and his doctrine of the Christian magistrate, owe something to post-biblical developments. And his sense of continuity and history dissuaded him from thoroughgoing 'primitivism', even if he accepted the 'early church' as 'a tentative norm'.¹ Now it was, of course, precisely over questions of the historical boundaries of primitive Christianity that essential differences between the Reformers and more 'left-wing' theological figures became exposed, and we may turn to the Anabaptists, who, amongst all the voices of the Reformation, have the greatest importance in the study of recurrence ideas.

Admittedly, Anabaptism has been notoriously difficult to define, but few would now deny that a mainstream 'orthodox' Anabaptist position can be identified.² Despite remaining differences, what was common to all Anabaptist groups was the firm acceptance of primitive Christianity as NT Christianity, as well as a conviction that the early church of the Bible, particularly as reflected in Acts, should be the model of the church in the sixteenth century. They insisted that the Reformed view of the nature and structure of the Church, was not governed wholly by scriptural considerations. Conrad Grebel (d. 1526), to take a seminal figure, felt that Lutheranism 'compromised' with the world in failing to imitate apostolic patterns.³ If the Reformers claimed that the scriptures were the final authority in matters of doctrine and order, then why had they failed to reproduce NT Christianity? Grebel was a good

¹ So, Headley, *op. cit.*, ch. 4.

² Cf. esp. G.H. Williams, *op. cit.*, esp. chs. 6-9, 14, 16-18, 26 and 32.

³ Cf. H.S. Bender, 'Grebel Conrad', in *The Mennonite Encyclopedia*, (edit. M.S. Bender et al.), Pennsylvania, 1955-7, vol. 2, p. 573.

spokesman for a typical Anabaptist point; that there should be obedience 'only to the Gospel of the Word of God',¹ and since apostolic Christianity was in the Word of God, it was that Word. The Anabaptists, indeed, believed they themselves were re-creating in their own time the past church they idealized. They worshipped and operated in groups smaller and more intimate than the large congregations of most European cities, and all trace of distinctive ecclesiastical dress or hierarchical order disappeared from their ranks. They took with utmost seriousness the Great Commission (cf. Mt., xxviii, 18-20) to preach to all and baptize in the Trinity's name;² they sought to return baptism and the Lord's Supper to their original form and significance;³ many of them were prepared to practice, and to their minds restore, the life of communalism which Luke had associated with the earliest Jerusalem church (cf. Acts, ii, 44-5; iv, 34-5);⁴ and they extolled the idea of a purified body of believers constituting the true Church, the Elect of God, separated from (even if evangelizing in) the sinful world.⁵ It was above all

¹ To use the terms of Michael Sattler, from *The Trial and Martyrdom of Michael Sattler* (cf. Williams and Mergal (edits.), *op. cit.*, p. 140).

² See esp. F. Littell, *The Origins of Sectarian Protestantism* (formerly *The Anabaptist View of the Church*), New York, 1964 ed., pp. 111-117, cf. Schleithem Confession of Faith, *conclus.*, (cf. *Baptist Confession of Faith* (edit. W.L. Lumpkin), Philadelphia, 1959, pp. 30-1).

³ See esp. J. Loserth, *Balthasar Hübmaier*, Brno, 1893, p. 122, cf. Schleithem Conf. art. i, iii (Lumpkin, pp. 25, 26).

⁴ On Anabaptist, 'communism', see esp. Pieter Rideman, *Confession of Faith* (edit. K.E. Hasenberg), London, 1950, *passim*, Anonymous, 'Mein Eifer tut mich dringen', in *Lieder der Hutterischen Brüder*, Scottdale, 1914, p. 596, cf. Williams, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 124 f., 144 f., 229 ff..

⁵ See esp. Littell, *op. cit.*, pp. 117ff; Schleithem Confession art. iv (Lumpkin, p. 26).

in these last views about election and an untainted Church (whose members were to adhere to strict personal rules for the purity of their lives, and from which waverers could be excluded by a 'ban'),¹ that the Anabaptists revealed their aspiration to re-establish the conditions of the earliest church, right down to the fine details.

Their adamancy, of course, brought them into conflict with the Reformers. Concerning the purity of the Church, the Reformers insisted that it was both proper and inevitable for believer and unbeliever to mingle in their congregations, the wheat and the tares growing up together until the Judgement day.² For the Anabaptists, the apostolic model of the Church was a body of saints, a model they believed to be amply illustrated, significantly enough, in the book of Acts (esp. i - vii). The Reformers not only accepted a *Volkeskirche*, as Luther termed it, but they also expatiated on the applicability of the old Law for those not living under the Gospel. The Anabaptists focussed more on their own relation to the Law, either subordinating it more completely to the new covenant, or in some instances, treating the two covenants as one. On the one hand, the true Church owed allegiance to the new law of faith, and the life of the whole Christian community was to be lived above and apart from the old Law.³ That was the normative position. On the

¹ See esp. *ibid.*, art. ii (p. 25), cf. Mt, xviii, 15-17.

² See esp. R.H. Bainton, 'Religious Liberty and the Parable of the Tares', in *Early Med. Christ.*, op. cit., pp. 106-121.

³ See Anonymous (Swiss Brethren), 'Two kinds of obedience' (ET) in H.E. Fosdick (ed.), *Great Voices of the Reformation*, New York, 1957 (fr. *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, XXI, 1947).

other hand, it was proclaimed by the more eccentric Jacob van Campen that all written in the OT could already be found in the NT, and would take place 'either spiritually or literally'.¹ And the consequences of this latter approach are vividly illustrated in the case of Rothmann, court preacher at Münster (1535), who, taking the Old and New Testaments as a single unit, sought to establish both the throne of David and 'true Christian Government' in Westphalia.² Such unusual views aside, it was nevertheless the idea of the NT church which provided the basis for the mainstream Anabaptist reform programme.

One should add to this account of Anabaptist primitivism some comments about their martyrological and eschatological views, as well as their attitudes towards the state. Although his case may be a little overstated, Ethelbert Stauffer has cogently argued for an 'Anabaptist theology of martyrdom',³ which involved a vital connection between the martyrs of the early church and the thousands of persecuted Anabaptists. At one level there was simply a recognition of a close similarity and a spiritual bond between the new sufferers and those scourged in early times. Thielman van Braght may have written up his famous history of martyrdom⁴ as a continuing story from the NT to the sixteenth century, yet from his account of specific Anabaptist

¹ C.W. Neff, 'Hofmann Melchior', in *Mennon. Encycl.*, op. cit., vol. 2 pp. 783 ff.. N. van der Zijpp, 'Jacob van Campen', in *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 60 (for quotation).

² See B. Rothmann, *Restitution*, op. cit., esp. p. 104. Stauffer, 'The Anabaptist Theology of Martyrdom', in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, XIX, 1945, pp. 179 ff. H.S. Bender has criticised Stauffer's use of the term *theology* in this connection.

deaths, we may note the frequent connection between the present and 'primitive' situations. 'I go the way of the prophets' (cf. *Lk.*, xiii, 33), the Dutch woman martyr, Anneken of Rotterdam, was taken to say, 'the path of the Master and the Apostles'.¹ On a different plane, one finds a sharpened awareness of an end-time. The martyr is understood to stand at the centre of a battle between two eons: such biblical words as

'... they will lay hands on you and persecute you, delivering you up to the synagogues and prisons, and you will be brought before kings and governors for my name's sake. This will be a time for you to bear testimony', etc. (*Luke*, xxi, 12 ff.),

especially within the context of Christ's forewarnings about the world's end,² became immediately appropriate, and endowed present events with eschatological significance. With the eschaton held to be nigh, the Anabaptists clearly held the present to be an utterly unique time; yet they thereby recaptured some of the real urgency of NT Christianity,³ and they still saw before them the real possibility of restoring the true Church. What is more, they sensed that the persecutors were being or were about to be, divinely punished. For many of them, in fact, a 'great battle was being fought between God and his enemies', which was

¹ 'Ich gehe auf der Propheten Weg; der Mërtreter und Apostel Steg' (quoted from *Met Offer*, in Stauffer, *op. cit.*, p. 195. Note also the interest in the ten stages of persecution in the early church as recorded by Eusebius, in *Die älteste Chronik der Hutterischen Brüder*, (ed. A.J.F. Zieglschmid), Philadelphia, 1944, pp. 32-3.

² Cf. *Mk.*, xiii, *Mt.*, xxiv, *Lk.*, xxi. I have quoted Luke because it is interesting how he has emphasized and given tighter delineation to the persecution element. On the notion of the two eons, cf. esp. R. Friedmann, 'Theology of Martyrdom', in *Menn. Encycl.*, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 520.

³ Not that their interpretation of the NT led them to admit that the early Christians (quite wrongly) expected the *parousia* in their life time (cf. *supra*, pp. 300ff.).

'... best observed in the struggle between the prophets and martyrs of the OT, then in Christ and his cross and resurrection, and finally in the martyrs of the Christian Church',¹

and so out of the biblical past figures arose which characterized the eschatological nature of the present. Cain becomes the prototype of present sin; Vienna (a place of many Anabaptist executions) becomes the new Sodom; the Catholic emperor Ferdinand of Austria the new Pharaoh; and Philip II of Spain the new Antiochus Epiphanes.² And along with these parallels came the retributive notion, that, if past tyrants could not avoid God's vengeance, the new ones would hardly escape either.³

What of Anabaptists on the State? That is certainly a key question in the whole discussion. It has been falsely claimed that they denied the State any right to exist,⁴ yet they certainly radicalized the separation of Church and State to the point of disputing the latter's power to extract taxes or military service from the members of Christ's saintly (and pacifistic) body.⁵ Inevitable conflict with their would-be governors and the Magisterial Reformers resulted, but again they defended their position by reference to the pattern of the primitive church. This church was generally defined as the NT one, of course, that says still more, for it was also understood

¹ See M.S. Bender, 'Eschatology', in *Menn. Encycl*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 247.

² See *Älteste Chronik*, op. cit., pp. 160, 236-7 (on Vienna and Philip), *Ausband* (the Anabaptist Hymnal), pp. 236, 380-3, 663 (on Cain, and Ferdinand), cf. Stauffer, loc. cit., p. 195.

³ See esp. *Ält. Chronik*, p. 239, T. van Braght, op. cit., vol. 1, esp. pp. 230-1 (cf. on *II Macc.*, supra, pp. 282f.).

⁴ As J.W. Allen contends, op. cit., pp. 41-2.

⁵ See esp. *Schleitheim Conf.*, art. vi, and subsections 2-4 under that article, cf. also vii (on oaths).

to be a pre-Constantinian church, and thus one which was in no way institutionally confused with the State. . . A line of demarcation at Constantine is important. Luther's tentative division of Church history into three Ages was hardly uncondusive to the Anabaptist views, because the idea that the time of the primitive church was followed by a period in which the original ideal had been betrayed, and that then apostolic patterns had returned, was central to, even if not always explicit in, their position. In dialogue with Reformed preachers at Bern in 1538, their members argued that the true Church had ceased for a time, but that they were giving it a new beginning, and insisted that theirs was not a new Church but a restoration of the one established by Christ.¹ The Hutterite Chronicle placed the end of the early church at Constantine because, despite the Emperor's good intentions, the disease of craft and violence crept in and 'the Cross was conquered and forged to the sword'.² Though some pushed the 'fall of the Church' a little later,³ Anabaptist interpretations were almost exclusively governed by the vital imperative to conform to NT patterns. This tendency was rather unfortunate for them, perhaps, in that they could be easily associated with the extremist (especially anti-Trinitarian) thinkers who located the fall in the pronouncements of Nicaea (325)

¹ *Acta Des Gesprächs (Inn der Staat Bern)* (1538), Goshen College Library MS, pp. 34, 49, 52. Cf. Also F.J. Wray, 'The Anabaptist Doctrine of the Restitution of the Church', in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, XXVIII, 1954, pp. 187-8 for extracts in English.

² *Ält. Chronik*, p.34. See also F. Meyer, *Der Kirchenbegriff der Schwärmer*, Leipzig, 1939, pp. 13-15.

³ Menno Simons placed the beginning of the decline early, but its completion at Innocent I's Edict in 407 which made infant baptism compulsory; cf. C. Krahn, *Menno Simons (1496-1561)*, Karlsruhe, 1936, p. 136.

under Constantine,¹ whereas the Magisterial Reformers had felt bound to push decline at least beyond the crucial decision of Chalcedon (451). But another line of argument served to dispel these associations, and this was the acceptance of Hegesippus' assertion (as reproduced by Eusebius) that the Church was² pure and undefiled Virgin until Simon, son of Clopas, the last man alive to see and hear Jesus, was put to death.² Anabaptists, then, did not hesitate to employ extra-biblical material which confirmed their interpretation of NT church life and organization,³ and most of it was designed to point to conditions which were now being restored.

Having considered the stated lines of division between the First and Second Ages, however, what of that between the Second and Third? 'The marks of the Fallen Church', as Littell calls them, were above all the union between Church and State, the limitations imposed upon individual conscience by the state church, warfare in Christendom, infant baptism and external religion,⁴ and these evils were persisting into the sixteenth century. For some Anabaptists, such as the Münsterites, no true Church existed during this middle period, but others spoke of a dispersed remnant of the persecuted

¹ So, esp. Michael Servetus (1511-1553), see *Christianismi Restitutio*, Vienna, 1553, (Frankfurt 1966, facs.), Bk. I, pp. 24 ff. Cf. also W.E. Morse, *A History of Unitarianism*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 142-3.

² See *Eccles. Hist.*, III, xxxii, 7, cf. 3-6, and esp. Littell, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 183, n. 51.

³ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 820 discusses some of the material used. It includes Eusebius, Pseudo-Clementine Epistle IV, Philo on the Therapeutae (*De Vita Contemplativa*), the Shepherd of Hermas and the Apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-76. Also on Anabaptism against the breakdown of true missionary activity after Constantine, see his 'The Anabaptist Theology of Missions', in *ibid*, XXI, 1947, pp. 10-11.

faithful, Jan Hus being commonly named among them.¹ As for the Third Age, its emergence came with the restitution of the true Church, (the rebuilding of God's temple, as David Joris (ca. 1501-1556) put it)², though some were prepared to acknowledge that its precursors included not only men like Wyclif and Hus, but Luther and Zwingli as well.³

It is more accurate to speak of the Anabaptists as 'restitutionists' rather than Reformers; that nicely highlights their desperate effort to restore the Church's apostolic pattern, though restitution did not just mean 'given a new lease of spiritual life' and *restitutio* was not deferred to some future date (as it was with Servetus).⁴ The re-establishment of Christ's Church was a conscious remodelling attempted on the supposition that a return to apostolic conditions was within the grasp of sixteenth century men and women. It was a process in the here and now which meant living and worshipping just as the early Christians had done, and dying like Jesus and his followers.

¹ For the Münsterites on this question see esp. K.W. Bouterwek, 'Zur Wiedertäufer-Literatur I', in *Zeitschrift des Bergischen Geschichtsvereins*, III, 1864, esp. p. 304; and see esp. *Ält. Chronik*, pp. 35 ff., for example, on the dispersion view.

² For his acceptance of a Three Age schema and the use of this figure, cf. his *T Wonder-boeck*, Deventer, 1542, fols. 59-60. The schema was probably influenced by Reformation suppositions, but above all by Joachim's model. In Joris' framework, each Age was introduced by a 'David' - David, Christ and himself! cf. R.M. Bainton, *David Joris: Wiedertäufer und Kämpfer für Toleranz im 16. Jahrhundert* (*Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* VI), Leipzig, 1937, p. 30) and thus the recurrence element in his Age theory is made quite explicit.

³ Wray, *loc. cit.*, pp. 192-3, cf. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 683 on the theology of history in Caspar Braitmichel's *Chronicle*.

⁴ See Wray, *loc. cit.*, p. 193 on Servetus' projected date of 1585 (cf. the title of Servetus' work of 1553, *Christianismi Restitutio*. The terms *reformatio* and *restauratio* were weaker, then, in their connotations.

Anabaptists actually understood and wrote about one another as engaged in this enterprise. They were articulating, then, a notion of historical recurrence, a belief which to their opponents seemed like the denial of time and of change. Their doctrine of *restitutio* moreover, is especially important in connection with Lukan and other biblical ideas of re-enactment. Both eschatological and linear lines of thought persist in their writings, as with Luke, yet the consciousness of their members living and dying like the characters of the Church's Golden Age is strikingly akin to Luke's picture of the early church re-enacting Christ's life, and of Christ re-enacting the most crucial events of the OT (cf. pp.206ff.). Within Anabaptism, moreover, the re-enactment of OT ways and events was not forgotten; their innocent suffering was associated with the ordeals of the prophets and faithful Israelites, as well as with the early Christians. And it is interesting to note that the Hutterites, in abandoning city-life for the wolds of Moravia, thought about themselves as escaping from an 'Egyptian' captivity, establishing a levitical priesthood of communalism and receiving manna (in the form of their new church) in the wilderness.¹ This sense of re-enactment was perhaps less concerned with the repetition of events than the re-living of conditions, but in theological reflection both were inter-woven.

With the Anabaptists the idea of imitation, especially *imitatio Christi*, was very intense, and with them it acquired a special degree

¹ See esp. P.J. Klassen, *The Economics of Anabaptism, 1525-1560*, The Hague, 1964, p. 67, ch. 68 ff. Cf. R. Friedman, 'The Christian Communism of the Hutterite Brethren', in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, XLVI, 1955, pp. 202 ff.

of historicization. It has been common, and not unwarrantable, to take the Anabaptists as a 'late mediaeval' rather than a Reformation phenomenon, for the way they organized themselves has affinities with the 'heresy' movements of the Middle Ages, or with the new mediaeval orders.¹ The radicals' stress on imitation appears as a development of an ongoing theme running through St. Francis, Thomas à Kempis, and on. Yet these radicals actually went so far as to consider themselves the true Church restored and not just a new movement; their imitation was not so much a new venture in piety, up-dated to suit the ascetic fervour of the day, but a vigorous effort to regain ancient conditions assumed to be beyond man's grasp. One lacks real proof, but this historicized 'imitationism' probably owed something to the current idea of a recoverable Antiquity or to a more sharpened awareness of historical reality which the new scholarly hermeneutic had fostered. There was also the related notion - which was very strong in Machiavelli² - that the ancients, placed correctly in historical context, ought to be imitated. For both Machiavelli and the Anabaptists, circumstances and the human condition had not changed so substantially as to make the reproduction of past worthy deeds or the reappropriation of better conditions a mere romantic fantasy.

¹ See for example, Cohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 307 ff..

² See *Disc.*, I, *proem.*, (vol. 3, p. 228), I, 5 (p. 228); 8 (pp. 268-9); 19 (p. 297); II, 4 (vol. 4, p. 28); 6 (p. 39); 23 (p. 91); III, 5 (p. 139); 22 (p. 209); *Princ.*, vi, I (vol. 4, pp. 290f).

If one may speak of two great 'trajectories' in western thought - the Graeco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian - it can also be said that they were never more adapted to each other nor yet in such sharpened tension as in the sixteenth century. From one perspective, the Renaissance is a point of consummation in the history of inter-relationships. If later biblical writers had begun the process of matching and synthesizing Graeco-Roman paradigms of recurrence with those from their own tradition, the Renaissance completed it. The cycles and recurrences of classical Antiquity often entered the discourse of the new historiography as though the pagan-Christian debate over time had never existed. That was not simply because of humanist attempts to reclaim Antiquity; despite the special bridles of Christian theology, the whole history of recurrence ideas from the first century to the early Renaissance saw the withering away of a linear-cyclical, or better still, a linear-recurrence dichotomy. As a consequence, there was not only a revival of classical ideas of recurrence during the sixteenth century, but also the continued development and modification of mediaeval conceptions, conceptions which were commonly integrated with the ancient ones. Admittedly, the more recent notions were rather susceptible to replacement in an age of anti-Gothic sentiment; both the Great Week model and the four monarchy theory fell into serious disrepute. But as we have seen, it was not only mediaeval ideas of recurrence which could be threatened by historiographical criticism. From another viewpoint, however, one perceives intellectual discontinuity and even conflict between the two traditions in the era of Machiavelli and the

Reformers. To begin with, if the humanists sought to recover Antiquity in a broad sense, the biblicists of the Reformation wanted it in a much narrower sense. The intellectually tolerant were appalled at the bigotry of religious purists, whilst to the zealous the broad road was anathema. Furthermore, the emphases and pre-occupations of the two 'schools of opinion' could be noticeably divergent. There is a difference, above all, in the humanist concern for convenient generalizations about change and the theologians' interest in the divine purpose. We detected this same point of contrast in a comparison of Polybius and Luke: in the sixteenth century it emerges most sharply in Machiavellian theory and Anabaptist theology. Although there was a concern in both for effective action in the future, Machiavelli scanned the past for recurrences so as to uncover politically useful regularities, whilst the Anabaptists sought to disclose, and above all, act out the divine plan. The differences are clear when one considers Machiavelli's cycle of governments, and Anabaptist notions of re-enactment. We are at a loss to know how these two sets of ideas could ever be related to each other. In the context of our discussions, these ancient conceptions obscured in the special imbroglio of *mediaevalia*, made their dramatic reappearance in the writings of Machiavelli and the radical Reformation respectively. Yet they still remain in stark separation. The history of ideas is never so tidy that it furnishes its own work of art, or its own inbuilt symmetries!

How shall we conclude our story? An apt means of bringing this long historical analysis to a close would be to glance briefly at a late sixteenth century figure who succeeded in bringing some classical and biblical recurrence conceptions together in a rather unusual way, and whose work saw the attempted interweaving of threads which had

hitherto remained in separation. I refer to the important Venetian historian and canonist Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623), and more particularly to his *Istoria del Concilio Tridentino*, a vast work produced early in the seventeenth century, but which had its subject-matter and its inspiration in much earlier years.¹ Sarpi was a nationalist who was as independent in his attitudes towards the Reformation and Counter-Reformation as Venice herself, with her love of *libertà*, her anomalous Patriarchate, her fear of papal domination, her bargains with Protestantism. A Servite, Sarpi mixed his criticism of the northern Reformers with obvious respect and was highly condemnatory of Trent.² Moreover, he combined southern humanism with his anti-establishment theology in a remarkably balanced way, treating his history as a purely human study, with a reluctance to appeal to Providence as a causal factor, even if with a deep, theologically grounded sympathy for the past history and future hope of the Church.³ But the interesting thing about Sarpi is that he came so close to fusing together the two major recurrence concepts which have just occupied so much of our attention - the cycle of governments and the return to the conditions of the primitive Church. Sarpi agreed with

¹ We know that Sarpi had begun writing this work at least by 1612 and it was first published, in English, in 1619. For his other works, see *infra*.

² See *Istoria*, esp. vol. 1, pp. 20-26, 397-8 (on Luther), vol. 2, pp. 192-3 (Calvin), p. 301 (Beza), yet cf. vol. 1, pp. 71, 111, 135, vol. 3, pp. 396-7, etc. And see esp. vol. 2, p. 438 (on Tridentine despotism), vol. 1, p. 305 (on the Tridentine failure to understand Protestantism), cf. *infra*, p. 540, n.1. On Sarpi's career and role in Venetian diplomacy, see esp. F.A. Yates, 'Paolo Sarpi's "History of the Council of Trent"', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, VII, 1944, pp. 123 ff.

³ See esp. *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 95-6, and vol. 2, p. 185 on God as a causal factor, and for Sarpi on history as an autonomous human study based on a kind of empirical investigation, see W.J. Bouwsma, *op. cit.*, p. 593 and ff.

the general claim of Protestantism that the Church had declined since Antiquity, but his position was idiosyncratic. On the one hand, he did not completely idealize the earliest Church, since he possessed an essentially neo-Platonic view of ideals and truth as timeless and not placeable historically, and because he held that the most ancient church could hardly serve as a model for details, particularly on the two most basic sacraments.¹ On the other hand, he assumed that the Church had declined from the NT model, and declined virtually from the very beginning. This model, then, represented the 'summit' of institutional perfection,² and despite his ambivalence, there emerged from his pen a hope of restoring the Church's original excellence. Institutional life was uppermost in his mind when he wrote:

'It is very necessary that, just as we [Christians] have arrived by stages at this profundity of misery, so we must ascend through the same stages to return to that summit of perfection on which the holy Church once existed. This cannot be done without knowing what the administration of temporal things was in the beginning, and how that good governance was lost'.³

A cyclical element emerges from this fascinating passage, and one is reminded of Machiavelli's comments in the *Istorie*, V, 1 about the inevitable path upwards after the lowest point had been reached. Above all, our curiosity is captured by the idea that set stages of decline

¹ Cf. *Istoria*, vol. 2, pp. 388-9, cf. vol. 2, p. 453.

² See esp. *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 55, and for the quotation see the passage reproduced below and thus the next note.

³ From his *Trattato delle Materie Beneficiarie* (in *Scritti Giurisdizionalistici*, edit. G. Gambarin, Bari, 1958, p. 64).

are repeated, presumably in the reverse order, so that an ascent may be made to better things.

In the pronouncements of Trent, Sarpi found the veritable low-point of known Church history. For him, the most influential of the Tridentine ecclesiastics had turned their backs on the ancient church, and deluded themselves into believing that 'the truth was now better known'.¹ But, of still more interest, Trent brought to a head all those tendencies which were turning the Church from a polity into a tyranny.² The slow process of the Church's decline was towards an extreme centralization, and it is in analysing this process that Sarpi appealed to constitutional models, contending that the earliest stage of the Church's institutional life was 'popular' (presbyteries), the second 'aristocratic' (bishops), and the third stage monarchical, with the subjection of the episcopates to the Pope.³ Each stage was 'incubated' in the other - a feature reminiscent of Joachim's *initia* - until that final phase in the sixteenth century, when the papal *monarchia* had been converted into an open *tirannide*. Paolo Sarpi, then, laid out a whole sequence of ecclesiastical decay in constitutional terms, and evidently believed that a return to good governance was only possible by experiencing

¹ *Istoria*, vol. 2, pp. 416, 501, cf. 108, vol. 3, pp. 230-1, and, for the quotation, W.J. Bouwsma, *op. cit.*, p. 602.

² See esp. *Istoria*, vol. 1, pp. 217-7, (cf. pp. 55, 78-79) and see vol. 3, pp. 47-53, 232. Cf. also his *Sopra l'Officio dell' Inquisizione* (in *Scritti Giurisd.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-7).

³ On the whole process from 'democracy' to tyranny, see *Istoria*, vol. 1, pp. 350-52, vol. 3, p. 54 and *Trattato*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 31, 41. In the 'popular' stage, 'councils' of presbyteries formed local ecclesiastical aristocracies (the aristocratic element foreshadowing the next phase); in the 'aristocratic' stage, monarchical episcopates ruled over separate areas (the monarchical element looking to the following step).

the same stages in reverse order, a difficult passage he could only expect from the remote future.¹

In short, Sarpi stands at the end of our chosen time-scale as a fascinating watershed figure. He was undeniably preoccupied with the kinds of patterns which had intrigued Machiavelli and others, and like the Florentine, he sought to perceive the law-like in the apparently irregular motions of the past.² The same sorts of basic socio-political questions confronted him:

'... how does a republic degenerate into a principate? is such a transformation to be avoided or desired? can it be reversed? what is a tyrant and how does he behave? can he be restrained? The novelty of Sarpi's thought lies in the fact that he puts these questions to the Church.'³

What emerges is his strange model of ecclesiastical history, combining into one the notion of rise and fall, a modified cycle of governments, even the idea of an eventual return to the Church's Golden Age, and the re-appropriation of biblical Christianity. How fitting to conclude with such a thinker. With him it is as though the acorn has dropped from the great tree. From one object we can reflect on the entanglements, the vastness and the richness of our whole enterprise; Sarpi's intellectual preoccupations and his relative eclecticism bespeak of many long-standing themes, whilst the individual and exploratory qualities of his mind look ahead to those subsequent giants who theorised about historical recurrence, to Vico, Lasaulx, Spengler, Toynbee and to all those others who await our research.

¹ Letter to Groslot, 25/9/1612 (in *Paolo Sarpi; Lettere di Protestanti*, edit. M.O. Busnelli, Bari, 1931, vol. 1, p. 243), cf. *Trattato*, p. 64.

² See his *Pensiero* (in *Opere*, Helmstadt-Vienna, 1761 ff., vol. 1), cxxxvi.

³ W.J. Bouwsma, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

EXCURSUS 1*

Polybius and the Constitutional Decline of Sparta

According to Polybius, the Lycurgan constitution remained more or less intact until the battle of Leuctra (371 BC), but then *tychē* turned against the Spartans (i.e. they failed internationally) and over and above that, yet, not because of that, their *politeia* degenerated rapidly within. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Λυκούργοι νομοθεσίας καλλίστην χρησάμενοι πολιτείαν καὶ μεγίστην ἔχοντες δύναμιν ἕως τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης, αὐτὶς ἐπὶ τ'ἀναντία τραπέψης αὐτοῖς τῆς τύχης, καὶ τοῦμπαλιν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν προβαινούσης, IV, lxxxix, 12; see also I, ii, 3). At the end of all the internal distress and civic discord (πόνοι καὶ στάσεις), Polybius placed the rule of Cleomenes, who *entirely* subverted the ancient constitution (ὁλοσχερῶς κατέλυσε τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα, lxxxix, 14), and who, by abolishing the ephorate, turned Sparta's traditional *basileia* (part of the *mictē*) into a *tyrannis* (II, xlvi, 3; cf. IX, xxxiii, 3; xxix, 8; xxxvi, 4; XXIII, xi, 4-5). Almost nothing was said by Polybius about Cleomenes' 'Lycurgan' social reforms, (cf. Plutarch, *Vit.Cleom.*, vi, 1; x, lff., yet cf. Polyb., *Hist.*, IV, lxxi, 2), and it was only after the intervention of Antigonus Gonatus that τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα was restored (II, lxx, 1; cf. IX, xxxvi, 4), although this restoration was short-lived and was followed by the one-man rules of Lycurgus and Nabis (IV, lxxxix, 1; 13, etc). What happened to Polybius' theory of constitutional change in this treatment? If Rome's career as examined in book VI is to be taken as a guide, one would hardly expect a *mictē* to degenerate into a tyranny, so much as to slide through oligarchy, democracy and mob-rule to more complete dissolution (cf. esp. VI, lvii). Are we to assume that Polybius narrated the history of Hellas in the third century without realizing that his references to political *metabolai* in Sparta were in blatant disagreement with the theory of book VI? If we are not willing to make that assumption, there are only two possible solutions left. The first is to suppose that Polybius, who mentioned the 'rise and decline' of Lacedaemonia before coming to write book VI, (so, τὰ μὲν οὖν πάλα καὶ τὰ πλεῖω περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ...etc., IV, lxxxix, 14), thought of Cleomenes as a 'Platonic' tyrant, the autocratic ruler who ends the process of constitutional decline and who later appears as 'the *monarchos* figure' (p.57).

* From p. 187.

At least two facts support this view; first, Cleomenes' rule was associated with policies to please the masses, 'the hope of allotments and redivision of lands' (τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς κληρουχίας καὶ τῶν ἀναδασμῶν, IV, lxxxix, 2). Revolutionary land programmes Polybius (quite conservatively) linked with demagogy or the emergence of a *monarchos* both in book VI (ix, 9) and elsewhere (XV, xxi, 2) (cf. γῆς ἀναδασμούς in VI, ix, 9, and on XV, xxi, 2, see *supra*, p. 60). Secondly, Polybius at one point referred to Sparta's constitution, after the ephorate had been removed by Cleomenes, as a *monarchia* (XXIII, xi, 4). On this reading the ultimate internal degeneration came with Cleomenes' constitutionally subversive monarchy (or, in Platonic terms, 'tyranny' cf. II, xlvi, 3), and it came following a long period of discord (possibly of degenerate democratic tendencies under the influence of the ephorate, which Polybius did not consider to be a part of the original Lycurgan constitution (*Hist.*, VI, x, 1ff) and which he treated as part of the traditional power grouping within Sparta's *politeia*; cf. Plato, *Leg.*, III, 692A, Aristotle, *Politica*, 1313a 25; Plutarch, *Vita Lycurg.*, vii, 1, *Moralia*, 779E). On the other hand, Polybius certainly knew that Cleomenes *inherited* the Spartan kingship, and that he united his *polis* in a war against Achaea and Macedonia (II, xlvi, 7 ff. etc.). Both crucial facts seem to count against the idea of Cleomenes as a '*monarchos* figure'. Before exploring the implications of post-Cleomonic events in Polybius, we may state the alternative solution. The historian claimed that of all the paths of constitutional development, the Roman one was the most natural (VI, iv, 13; ix, 13, cf. x, 12-13), and this being the case, it does not follow that for the Polybian scheme to be consistent, the Spartan *miētē* had to decline along the same line of change envisaged for Rome. In Sparta's case, it was sufficient to say that Cleomenes brought the ancient constitution to an end and under him Sparta experienced a re-establishment of her πατριον πολίτευμα after Cleomenes had been defeated at Sellasia in 222 BC and fled to Egypt. With either solution this *metabolē* was effected from the outside and was thus not κατὰ φύσιν. As for subsequent events, the first solution would see Lycurgus as *basileus* (cf. IV, lxxxix, 1) and his successor as tyrant, whereas the second merely views these reigns as a re-subversion of the ancient constitution - the use of the traditional Spartan *basileia* for a tyranny. The latter is the

most sensible interpretation of II, xlvii, 3 (cf. IV, lxxxii, 13 on Nabis, and see Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*, XXXIV, xxvi, 14 (=Polybius, probably) on Lycurgus the tyrant; cf. V. Ehrenberg, 'Sparta', in *RECA*, vol.IIIA, col. 1436). Polybius points out, incidentally, that the rulers he was prepared to dub tyrants never permitted such a name to be used of themselves (IV, lxxxii, 13). This latter approach therefore accepts that the deviation from old stabilities became even worse after Cleomenes, and that following Cheilon's attempted revolution under Lycurgus (IV, lxxxii, 1-10), there was an extreme low with the tyranny of Nabis (13-14). In conclusion, then, we may say that the former interpretation is certainly more interesting, extending as it does the range of *metabolai* (decay of τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα/μόναρχος = Platonic τυραννίς/ foreign intervention to restore τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα/ βασιλεία/τυραννίς, but compared to the latter it is forced and less convincing. Once again Polybius seems to be dealing with one kind of *metabolē*, in this case the subversion of the *mictē* by a tyrant. That is a change which he notes to have happened twice in Sparta yet which nevertheless seems of little significance for him. Ironically enough, as we shall later see, (p.457), that was the kind of *mutatio* which was of crucial importance in the interpretation of constitutional histories by Niccolò Machiavelli in the sixteenth century. We may also conclude that Polybius does not appear to have adjusted his account of Sparta's constitutional history to suit anacyclic theory, nor does it seem likely, as B. Shimron has tenuously argued, that Polybius suppressed all mention of Cleomenes' 'Lycurgan' social reforms because, in the light of the Cleomenic War, they did not suit his contentions (in Bk VI) that the Lycurgan *politeia* was unsuited for an aggressive foreign policy. (Cf. VI, xlix, 1 - 1, 5; see B. Shimron, 'Polybius and the reforms of Cleomenes III', in *Historia*, XIII, 1964, esp. pp.152-3, and for an effective criticism, F.W. Walbank, 'The Spartan Ancestral Constitution, etc.' *loc. cit.*, esp. pp.303-6).

EXCURSUS 2*

Luke as Hellenistic Historian; background comments

Luke sought to present a διήγησις (narrative), or an orderly account of *pragmata*; it was based on material handed down by 'eye-witnesses' and 'servants of the word', and was meant to be accurate (Lk., i, 2-4). [One may assume his reference to others' narratives (πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν ἀνατάξασθαι διήγησιν, Lk., i, 1), allows us to apply the term διήγησις to his own work. Cf. esp. W. Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas (Theologisches Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament III)*, Berlin, 1961, p. 1, and for the use of this term in classical historiography, see, for example, Polybius, *Hist.*, III, xxxvi, 4. Note also ἀκριβῶς καθεξῆς (vs. 3), περὶ τῶν πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων, καθὼς παρέδοσιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρεταὶ γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου (vss. 1-2). The appeal to reliable authorities is reminiscent of classical historiography, cf. esp. the prologue of Dio Cassius' *Hist. Rom.*, I, 2-3 which is quite comparable to Luke's. On dedications, see *infra*]. That Luke achieved accuracy is debatable; that his purpose was to be an historian is almost undeniable. He 'treated' his subject, 'informed' his readers, and was not obviously kerygmatic in pose, certainly not in the way that both John and Matthew were. [Cf. ἐποιοσάμην περὶ πάντων (Acts, i, 1), ἵνα ἐπυγνώσῃς περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων... (Lk., i, 4). The interpretation of κατηχέω (in its passive aorist form) could be crucial, since if catechetical teaching is referred to here, then it might be suggested that the work was written for Christians, albeit newly-fledged ones. But that is not automatically required by the verb's usage in this way, cf. D. A. Wittenbach, *Lexicon Plutarchum*, Oxford, 1830, vol. 2, s.v. κατηχέω. The author of John openly claimed to have written that men might 'believe Jesus was the Christ, the Son of God' (xx, 30), whilst Matthew systematically pinpointed Jesus' fulfilment of ancient prophecy (i, 22-3, ii, 5-6; 15; 17-18; 23, iii, 3, iv, 14-15, xiii, 35, xxi, 4-5, xxvii, 9-10, etc. (only in Lk., iii, 4 does Luke come close to Matthew's methods)]. Although his characters confess Jesus as χριστός, and although they preach not only prophecy-fulfilment but a whole message of salvation, Luke simply takes for himself the guise of a narrator. [The liberty he took to insist that the resurrection was 'factually proveable' (cf. τεκμηρίους, Acts, i, 3) was natural enough. On τεκμήριον in classical historiography, see esp. Thucydides, *Hist.*, I, 1 (5) and (12); 20; 21; 132, II, 15, etc.]. He attempted a 'life of Christ' as distinct from making a statement of τό εὐαγγέλιον (cf. Mk., i, 1), and even if one is bound to ask serious questions about whether there were ideological changes within early Christianity to make such

* From p. 207.

historical reflection possible, the simple points remain that Luke believed he had the sources to effect a narrative, that he possessed the requisite inside information and experience to write his two volumes, and that he knew of someone wishing to be informed. [For the view that such a work as *Luke-Acts* (which included, after all, a 'church history') could only be envisaged once the Parousia was understood to be delayed, see esp. H. Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (=Die Mitte der Zeit), (ET), London, 1960, pp.95ff., J. Rohde, *Rediscovering the Teaching of the Evangelists* (Die Redaktionsgeschichtliche Methode) (ET), London, 1968, pp.167-178]. In terms of classical historiography, moreover, Luke's work, executed in reasonably polished Greek, could be reckoned non-fictional, useful, and complying with the conventional canons of history-writing. And if the prologues of each volume indicate anything more, it is that *Luke-Acts* was not just directed to early Christians, but was intended as a work of history for the 'open market'. [See esp. Dibelius, *Studies*, *op.cit.*, pp.123ff.; cf. C.D.F. Moule, 'The Intention of the Evangelists', in *NT Essays* (ed. Higgins), *op.cit.*, pp.167-8. See also Polybius, *Hist.*, II,i,1, Diodorus Siculus, *Biblioth.*, II,i, III,i, Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, I,i, II,1, cf. Artemidor, *Onirocriticus*, II, proem.]. Those prologues also place limits upon the idea of Luke as a creative theological writer comparable to the other Evangelists and NT thinkers. But we must tread cautiously here, especially because recent redaction-criticism has called us to consider Luke as a theologian in his own right. [Of recent monographs, Conzelmann, *op.cit.*, (see pp.12ff.), H. Flender, *St. Luke; Theologian of Redemptive History*, (ET), London, 1967, pts.2-3, and I.H. Marshall, *Luke; historian and theologian*, Exeter, 1970, esp. chs.2-4, are crucial. See also the contributions to L.E. Keck and J.L. Martyn (eds.), *Studies in Luke-Acts*, London, 1968, pt.2]. Certainly he was sensitive over current incredulities towards Christianity (*Acts*, xxvi, 24-32, cf. xvii, 32), and he made use of much material, *Mark* included, which many scholars would call more proclamatory than historical, or material which had not been preserved with the interests of historians or antiquarians in mind, but for sermons and catechesis in the young proselytizing churches. [For background on the study of the Jesus tradition, see M. Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospel* (=Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums) (ET), London, 1934, esp. pp.25ff., etc., R. Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition* (ET), London, 1963, esp. pp.322ff. On *Mark*, and on the relative freedom with which other Evangelists presented the living *Κύριος*, see esp. J.M. Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark* (*Studies in Biblical Theology* XXI), London, 1957, esp. pp.54ff., G. Barth, *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (with G. Bornkamm and M.J. Held) (ET), London, 1963, pp.95-124, etc., C.H.

Dodd, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel*, Cambridge, 1963, introd., F.W.Beare, 'Sayings of the Risen Lord in the Gospel Tradition', in *Christian History and Interpretation* (ed.W.R.Farmer et al.), Cambridge, 1967, pp.159ff., etc. The status of Q is still in doubt. Was it a narrative work? cf. V. Taylor, 'The Original Order of Q', in *NT Essays*, (ed.Higgins), *op.cit.*, pp.246ff. In contrast to these writers, Luke most definitely takes Jesus (who is still for him the exalted, ever present *Kyrios*) in the past tense (so, Flender, *op.cit.*, p.42, for discussion, and for background in ancient Christology)]. Even if the presence of the prologues might deter us from expecting from Luke any radical, fabricating redactionism of such received material, no one would deny, in the light of synoptic and redaction-critical studies, that Luke has changed the tradition about Jesus (cf.Rohde, *op.cit.*, ch.5, for the consensus view). The case, however, must be stated clearly. On the one hand, Luke handled his sources like an historian rather than an evangelist. In the Gospel his modifications and adaptations were governed by a desire to characterize Jesus as an historical personage, rather than by any concern to erect a kerygmatically-oriented Christology. On the other hand, Luke wrote in support of Christ and the Christians, and his theological preconceptions are still detectable. As we can see from chapter 3, moreover, his historical work was not to be written without attempting to elicit patterns and truths which gave meaning to the sequence of events being examined, these attempts being so common in histories both Israelite-Jewish and Graeco-Roman (cf. esp. pp.161-183, 267-91, 399-401, mainly on the moral order in history). Such patterns and truths constitute Luke's presuppositional understanding of historical processes, that is, his working assumptions as one coming to the task of writing history. In this connection, incidentally, it is not warrantable to conclude that Luke drew a distinction between *Geschichte* (general, normative history) and *Heilsgeschichte* ('salvation-history' of Jesus and his church) [so, against Cullmann's generalizations about the NT *Weltanschauung*, in *op.cit.*, pts.2-3, cf. E.Lohse, 'Lukas als Theologe der Heilsgeschichte', in *Evangelische Theologie*, XIV, 1964, pp.256ff.]. One key reason why he wrote his narrative was because he believed Christianity and its founder had become the new and vital factor in the history of the *oikoumenē*, the world which was then ruled politically by the one supreme power of Rome (cf. pp.257f, etc.). [The editorial introductions of *Lk.*, ii,1-2, iii,1 are important in this respect, as are the small 'Pentecost' for the Roman Cornelius (*Acts*, x,44ff.), and the divine preparation of Paul for his journey to the political hub of the world (cf. xxiii,11). Luke was interested in the relationship of Christianity to the destiny of the whole world (8 out of 15 NT usages of *οἰκουμένη* belong to him, and cf. *infra*,

p.257f.). The inclusion of material with a non-Christian origin in *Acts* (eg., xii, 20-23, xix, 14-6), supports this conclusion, cf. Dibelius, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 19-20]. We can assume, then, that Luke was doing theology only insofar as he skilfully organized 'historical' materials of great significance, wrote with persuasive sympathy about the early Christians, and revealed, by both procedures, his preconceptions about the nature of history. He did not preach his theological views, but his presentation of events and of inherited traditions still enables us to gauge his position. These comments apply as readily to *Acts* as they do to *Luke*, and even if we have less corroborative evidence to check on the limits of the author's creativity in the second volume, it remains true that he emerged more a historian in *Acts* than in the Gospel, tracing as he does the beginnings and outward thrust of the church. [The bulk of *Luke* is given over to the reporting of Jesus' teaching and *logia*, whereas most of *Acts* recounts key incidents and developments in the early church, interspersed with longish sermons and proclamations, which fulfil a role in this volume not dissimilar to speeches in classical histories, and which reflect a mixture of Luke's creative and reconstructive imagination and his use of sources. (For seminal literature on the speeches, see E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos; Untersuchungen zur Formen-Geschichte Religiöser Rede*, Stuttgart, 1923, esp. pp. 3-21; C.H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments*, London, 1944 edn., ch. 1; Dibelius, *op.cit.*, pp. 138ff., U. Wilckens, *Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte: form- und traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament V), Neukirchen, 1961; Wilcox, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 158ff., E. Schweizer, 'Concerning the Speeches in *Acts*', in Keck and Martyn (eds), *op.cit.*, pp. 208ff., etc.). In the *Acts*, moreover, not only is the narration more extensive, but Luke shows a more convincing knowledge of topography, of local colour, customs and politics. The geographical vagueness in the Gospel (cf. Conzelmann, *op.cit.*, pt. 1) should be contrasted with the details given concerning Paul's journeys, esp. in *Acts*, xiii, 13-14, xiv, xvi, 6-15, xvii, 1, xviii, 18-23, xxi, 1-8, xxvii-xxviii. In the story of Paul's sea-voyage from Caesarea to Rome, the sense of reality attains to its greatest height (xxvii, 1 - xxviii, 16), even though there is some question here of whether the rich language derives from Luke's (or Paul's) own experience or from maritime tales familiar to the Evangelist (cf. W.L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (Schweich Lectures 1942), London, 1944, pp. 12ff., E. Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller; Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (Studien zur

Umwelt des Neuen Testaments IX), Göttingen, 1972, pp.14-15, and n.43)]. Acts may have more than a modicum of fabulosity, of course, but it is our contention that one should first come to Luke's work there on the supposition that he was before all else 'informing enquirers' as to the varieties of situations in which the early Christians found themselves, the sorts of message they conveyed, the sorts of τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα they performed, and still more, the different kinds of people who joined 'the Way'. [Here I am merely extending the arguments I have already put forward in 'La Section Médiane, etc.,' *loc.cit.*, pp.143 ff].

EXCURSUS 3*

Exegetical Notes on Luke

A) The charge in Acts,xii,17b runs: ἀπαγγείλατε ἰακώβῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ταῦτα. Post-resurrection charges to 'tell the ἀδελφοί' appear in Matthew (xxviii,10) and John (xx,17)(cf. my discussion in 'The First Resurrection Appearance, etc.,' *loc.cit.* ,p.322), and I have put forward the argument that Matthew's ἀπάγετε ἀπαγγείλατε τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου derives from the original (but now lost) ending of Mark (*ibid.*, pp.322-4, cf. Trompf, 'The Markusschluss in Recent Research', in *Australian Biblical Review*, XXI,1973,p.16). In Luke, on the other hand, there is no such command, the order to remain in Jerusalem (xxiv,49, Acts,i,4) being the only comparable bidding (on geographical issues here [concerning Galilee and Jerusalem], see esp. E.Lohmeyer, *Galiläa und Jerusalem*, Göttingen, 1936, *passim*, cf. R.H.Lightfoot, *Locality and Doctrine in the Gospels*, London,1938, esp.pp.72ff). Now there is at least one tradition which grants James the brother of Jesus an encounter with the risen Kyrios after an appearance to the brethren (I Cor.,xv,6-7a), but it is not reflected in the Gospels. Could it be argued that Acts,xii,17b subtly alludes to this tradition? The phraseology probably derives from the original *Markusschluss*, although whether a reference to James lay in that ending remains problematical. [In 'The First Resurrection,etc.,' *loc.cit.*,p.322, I have argued that only the charge to tell the 'brethren' lay in the Markan original, and that Mark merely alluded to a future appearance to James in a very vague way (cf. Mk.,xv,40, xvi,1); but it is also possible that Luke's ἀπαγγείλατε ἰακώβῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ταῦτα derives from Mark's lost ending. In that case Paul's list (Cephas/the twelve/five hundred brethren/James/all the apostles) would tally extremely well with Mark's foreshadowing of an appearance to:the disciples and Peter/ James and the brethren, although Paul made no mention of an appearance to women, and there seems no possibility of reconstructing any allusion to Paul's last listed appearance from the original *Markusschluss*]. To speculate, then, Luke could have deliberately transposed an inherited post-resurrection charge to a later point in his story. He could have had more than one reason for doing this, moreover. Perhaps the naming of James was one way of indicating a change of leadership in the early Jerusalem ecclesia (on leadership questions, see E.Schweizer, *Gemeindeordnung im Neuen Testament*, Zurich, 1959, sects.i ff.), and what is even more likely, he wished to make a point about the authority issue in the early church. One should be reminded that in the Gospel he went out of his way to deny the first appear-

* From pp. 211 and ff.

ance to the three women (*Mk.*, xv, 40, cf. vi, 3, *Mt.*, xxvii, 56, cf. xiii, 55, cf. Trompf, *loc.cit.*, pp. 308-13), and that he cleverly gave the priority to Peter, even though he had no story as confirmation (xxiv, 34, cf. *I Cor.*, xv, 5a). One of the key reasons for the insertion of the heavily Lukan Emmaus road story was to make the point that Simon was the first recipient of such a momentous blessing. A skilful polemic against an alternative position suggests itself. In the 'ecclesiastical politics' of early Christianity, the first appearance credited to Mary the Lord's mother (along with the other women) was probably connected with a later appearance to James, so giving grounds for the claim that special authority was given to Jesus' family (cf. Hegisippus, in Eusebius, *Eccles.Hist.*, III, xi, xx, 6, xxxii, 6, and see E. Stauffer, 'Zum Kalifat des Jacobus', in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, IV, 1952, pp. 193ff.). Luke was pro-Petrine on the authority issue, and wished to highlight the original importance of the apostles (*Lk.*, xxiv, 33, *Acts*, i, 2b-3, 6ff.), so that this later reference to James and the brethren is probably indicative of his views over church leadership. Even ^{though} his approach subordinated the role of Jesus' family, however, we are not required to believe that Luke denied an appearance to James, but in view of his treatment of the women at the empty tomb, that possibility should not be ruled out. All this, furthermore, does not detract from Luke's stance as an historian; he still believed himself to be representing facts accurately, though some of his fine points here would have only been appreciated by members of the Church.

B) a) The raising of Dorcas in *Acts*, ix, 36-43 is very reminiscent of the raising of Jairus' daughter in *Lk.*, viii, 40-42; 49-56. Both healers are entreated to come as a matter of urgency (*Lk.*, viii, 41, yet cf. 49, *Acts*, ix, 38); on arriving both have to contend with despairing mourning parties (*Lk.*, viii, 52-3, *Acts*, ix, 39b-40a); both limit the number involved in the healing (*Lk.*, viii, 51, *Acts*, ix, 40a); both call the dead ones to 'resurrection' (*Lk.*, viii, 54-5; 'Ἡ παῖς ἔγειρε... καὶ ἀνέστη' *Acts.*, ix, 40b-41; Ταβελθα, ἀνάστηθι... .. ὁὗς δὲ αὐτῇ χεῖρά ἀνέστησεν αὐτήν). There could have been, in fact, some confusion between these two stories in the early development of Christian tradition. The Aramaic phrase Ταβελθα κουμ (=ܐܝܬܐ ܡܬܝܬܐ) (cf. v, 41a), could easily, amongst those to whom Aramaic was unintelligible, become confused with a name; so Ταβελθα ἀνάστηθι (*Acts*, ix, 40b). This, along with other less specific parallels between the two *Novellen* as they have been bequeathed to us in the NT, suggests the possibility either of early confusion or of derivation from a common proto-tradition. In any case, however, there are signs that Luke endeavoured to make them more parallel

than they would have been in the forms in which he himself inherited them. *Lk.*, viii, 40-56 derives from *Mk.*, v, 21-43. In his account of the healing of Jairus' daughter, Luke differs from his source in two remarkable respects. Whereas Mark tells how Jesus allowed only three disciples to follow him, proceeding from the scene where the news about the girl's death was received to the house (so, *Mk.*, v, 37 in 35-38), Luke shows Jesus to have permitted no one but the three disciples and the parents *into the house* (viii, 51). Secondly, whereas in *Mark* Jesus put the mourners outside (αὐτος δὲ ἐκβαλὼν πάντας, v, 40a), according to Luke (and in apparent contradiction to Jesus' disallowance) there were mourners at or near the scene of the healing, perhaps even in the house (viii, 52-53, although see 56a where only οἱ γονεῖς are amazed). According to Luke, Jesus stops the mourners by orders to stop weeping, they laugh in scorn, and then seem to drop out of the picture. In *Acts*, ix, on the other hand, Peter is called by believers (vs. 38a, cf. 41b), and yet what appears to be a merely sorrowful group of spectators at the scene of Dorcas' death, turns into a more discouraging one, since Peter puts them out (note ἐκβαλὼν δὲ ἔξω πάντας, vs. 40a, cf. *Mk.*, v, 40a - ἐκβάλλω being a strong word of expulsion for Luke, cf. *Lk.*, iv, 29, ix, 40; 49, xi, 14-20, xix, 45, xx, 15, *Acts*, vii, 58, xiii, 50). Peter then heals Dorcas and shows her to the saints and widows alive. The riddle of Luke's methodology here is solved if we suppose that the tradition about Dorcas' healing had, when he received it, no elements of tension within it, but that the widows were reported to have stood beside him (παρέστησαν αὐτῷ, vs. 39) whilst he healed her. Luke may well have derived the feature of sending the discouragers outside (and the minimization of those involved in the healing) from *Mark* v, and thus drew the stories of Dorcas and Jairus' daughter closer together, though without making them virtually the same story. In *Lk.*, viii, 51-56, the minimization of participants and the contention against the mourners are both confined to the scene of the house (cf. *Mk.*, [yet ≠ *Acts*, ix, 39]), and thus again there is a subtle change of his material to effect the parallel, though once more without allowing the stories to become identical or confused. This interpretation satisfies redaction-critical considerations, and Luke's otherwise unaccountable changes of tradition.

b) Another interesting case involves the relationship between the healing of Simon's mother-in-law in *Lk.*, iv, 38-39 and the healing of Publius' father in *Acts*, xxviii, 7-8. Quite apart from the familial associations of both, these are two fever cases (*Lk.*, iv, 38b, *Acts*, xxviii, 8a), and each miracle is followed by the arrival of a whole group of people bringing their ailments (*Lk.*, iv, 40-41a, *Acts*, xxviii, 9). It is fascinating that

Acts, xxviii, 7-9 is the only NT complex comparable to *Mk.*, i, 29-34 ≠ *Mt.*, viii, 14-17 ≠ *Lk.*, iv, 38-41 (very brief miracle story/consequent general healing activity), also that Luke apparently decided to retain in his Gospel this reference to the cure of Simon's wife's mother (and thus the second of Jesus' miracles) even though he had not yet introduced Peter! (so, cf. *Lk.*, v, 1-11, cf. *Mk.*, i, 16-20, 29-34) [Concerning the miracle in *Lk.*, v, the best Luke can do is to blot out all reference to Andrew, James and John in vs. 38, yet cf. *Mk.*, i, 29! so he must have been aware of the difficulties. The retention was not simply due to the fact that he wished to preserve the integrity of the Markan complex *Mk.*, i, 21-39, but because this whole complex was useful both in introducing the healing ministry of Jesus (exorcism/cure/general statement) and in looking ahead to the disciples' healing ministries in *Acts*. Luke supplanted *Mk.*, i, 16-20 by his vss. 1-11 because he mistook a story about the resurrection (or discipleship?) (cf. *Jn.*, xxi, 1-8, *Evan. Pt.*, xiv, 58-60) to be a story about calling. Note the incongruity of 'Ἐπιστάτα in *Lk.*, v, 5 and the Κύριε in 8b, and for further discussion, see esp. R. Pesch, *Der reiche Fischfang, Lk. v, 1-11 (Jn. xxi, 1-14); Wundergeschichte, Berufungserzählung, Erscheinungsberichte* (Kommentare und Beiträge zum Alten und Neuen Testament), Düsseldorf, 1969)].

These two cases of parallelism [ie., a) and b)] should not come as a surprise. It was natural that Jesus' most dramatic miracle in the Synoptic tradition (and one so readily associated with the resurrection, cf. *Lk.*, viii, 55b, xxiv, 42-43) should have its counterpart in the work of the disciples, and whereas the small incident in *Lk.*, iv, 38-41 forms part of Luke's introduction to the healing ministry of Jesus, *Acts*, xxviii, 7-9 represents the 'conclusion' to the healing ministry of the disciples.

C) Luke's reliability is a secondary question, yet it should be noted that although there are indications of his rather free re-shaping of tradition-material, as his treatment of Jesus' farewell discourse, trial, crucifixion and first resurrection appearance well illustrate, it is difficult to understand this re-moulding in terms of any kerygmatic theology, but rather as the result of a view of history with theological implications. [In *Luke*, the trial before Herod has no special, novel Christological significance; its inclusion may have been motivated by an inference that, because Jesus was a Galilean, he had to be tried by Herod Antipas (so, F.C. Grant, *The Gospels; the origin and growth*, London, 1957, p. 137), but Luke's concern for parallelism remains the more cogent explanation. His crucifixion

narrative may well derive from a special source (note *Lk.*,xxiii,27-31;39-43), but it should be noted that the two sayings ('Father, forgive them...' vs.34 and 'Father, into your hands...'vs.46), crucial to our understanding of Lukan parallelism between Christ and Stephen, both appear in *Markan* contexts, and therefore may well be inserted into them (so vss.32-8 ≠ *Mk.*,xv,22-32; and vss.44-49 ≠ *Mk.*,xv,33-41). Moreover, although one might suspect special theological considerations to lie behind xxiii,26-31;46;47b, it remains true that three points of *Markan theology* have disappeared from Luke's account. *Ps.* xxii is no longer uttered (cf.*Mk.*,xv,34), the rending of the temple veil accompanies the great darkness rather than Jesus' atoning death (*Lk.*,xxiii,45b, cf. *Mk.*,xv,37-8), and the centurion affirms Jesus to be δίκαιος, not υἱὸς θεοῦ (cf.*Mk.*,xv,39b). In all, Luke softened the agony of the crucifixion (vs.34 replaces Mark's Ελλωι Ελλωι in xv,34; and vs.46 (cf. *Ps.*,xxxi,5) replaces Mark's ἀφείλς φωνήν μεγάλην in xv,37. Luke placed greater stress on Jesus' innocence (vss.39-43;47b, cf.4;15;22), and seems to take his suffering as a patiently borne necessity before his all-important resurrection and glorification. On the first resurrection appearance, Luke was probably driven less by theological than by other considerations, either the desire to be true to the tradition that gave Peter priority (*I Cor.*, xv,5 [+ original *Markusschluss?*], cf. *Evan.Pt.*,xiv,58-60), or else to bolster a 'pro-Petrine' position in the mêlée of early controversies about leadership and authority in the early church. As for Jesus' farewell discourse, not only do special considerations need accounting for (so, *supra*, pp.212-4), but it has to be asked whether both 'preludes' to the 'passions' of Jesus and Paul represent special pieces reflecting Luke's organization of inherited tradition, or whether they were shaped to parallel each other with considerable freedom. Paul's speech in Acts xx could well go back to an original (cf. Stählin, *op.cit.*,pp.267ff.), but it is difficult to decide. Like John, Luke may well have gained information that Jesus discoursed at the Last Supper, yet he may well have been forced to decide for himself which *logia* belonged to that context. For detailed discussion, see esp. A.Vööbus, *The Prelude to the Lukan Passion Narrative; Tradition-, Redaction-, Cult-, Motif-Historical and Source-Critical Studies (Papers of the Estonian Theological Society in Exile V)*, Stockholm,1968,p.136 et *passim*.

Were some of the traditions he received about Stephen, Peter and Paul already in a characteristic mould that recalled the Jesus tradition? It may well be that form-critics can effectively demonstrate this to be the case; but the redaction-critical point of Luke's exploitation, organization and adjustment of his materials still stands.

D) Luke seems to have used liturgical, homiletic and polemical documents already saturated with Septuagintal expressions. The poetry of *Lk.*, i-ii, for *example*, may well derive from early Jewish-Christian liturgies; cf. esp. Minear, *loc.cit.*, pp.116ff. Also, on the probability of sources behind *Acts*, vii, 2-53 and xiii, 16-41, see esp. A.von Harnack, *The Acts of the Apostles* (ET), London, 1909, pp. 219ff., 245ff., C.H.Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching*, *op.cit.*, ch.1, M.Wilcox, *op.cit.*, esp. pp.171ff., etc. On the nature of the letter in *Acts*, xv, 23-29, note the opposing views of J.C.Hurd, *The Origin of I Corinthians*, London, 1965, pp.240ff., and J.C.O'Neill, *op.cit.*, pp.94ff. On the other hand, there are clear indications that Luke was himself capable of archaicizing or of Semiticizing language for the sake of atmosphere, cf. esp. H.D.F.Sparks, 'The Semitisms of the Acts', in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, NS., I, 1950, pp.21ff., and I am also indebted here to an unpublished paper on Septuagintalisms in *Lk.* i-ii by L.Murchison (Canberra, 1970).

On scenes as well as expressions recalling the OT world, note first the strong biblicism of the infancy narratives in *Lk.*, i-ii. This is a world of oracular rhetoric reminiscent of the OT (i, 14-17; 32-34; 68-79, ii, 29-32; 33b-35, cf. *Jud.*, v, *II Sam.*, ii, 18-26, xxii, 1 - xxiii, 7), of signs and wonders delivered by angels (i, 11-20; 26-38, ii, 8-15, cf. *Gen.*, xviii-xix, *Jud.*, vi, 11-24, *II Kgs.*, i, 3, etc.), of barren women giving birth (i, 7; 13; 18; 44, cf. *Gen.*, xviii, 9-15, *I Sam.*, i, 1-20, etc.), and of longstanding Jewish tradition (i, 5; 8-9; 23; 59, ii, 21-24; 39; 42, cf. *Gen.*, xvii, 9-14, *Exod.*, xiii, 1ff., *Lev.*, xii, 7-8, etc.). Mary's prayer of thanksgiving parallels the praise of Hannah at the beginning of the books of *Samuel* (i, 46-55, *I Sam.*, ii, 1-10), and the young Jesus in the temple recalls the young Samuel, dedicated to God (ii, 52, cf. 41-51, *I Sam.*, ii, 26, cf. i, 22-28, iii, 2-21). In more general terms, the coming of Jesus meant for Luke the special outpouring of the Spirit, the return of the *Shekhinah* and the Holy Spirit of prophecy, which, according to a strong tradition, were not to be found in the second temple, and according to some had either been withdrawn from Israel or not made present in their fulness. [*Zech.*, xiv was commonly understood to be a prophecy of the returned *Shekhinah*; and on biblical and rabbinical attitudes to the withdrawal of the Presence and the Spirit (of prophecy), note esp. *Ezek.*, xi, 16, *Jer.*, xxiv, 4-7, *Targum to Haggai*, i, 8, *Yer Ta'an*, 65a (and cf. *IV Ezr.*, vii, 112, to take a Jewish writing roughly contemporaneous to Luke [for its date, O.Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament; an Introduction* (ET), London, 1965, p.626]). See also S.Schechter (ed.), *Documents of the Jewish Sectaries* (ET), Cambridge, 1910, vol.1, pp.223ff., and J.Bowman, *The Gospel of St.Mark; the New Christian Jewish Passover Haggadah*, (*Studia Post-Biblica VIII*),

Leiden, 1965, pp. 59ff.]. It was important for Luke to give the new set of events the impress of what was greatest in the old. The old is still re-enacted in the new, even if it supersedes it and produces dramatically different results.

E) To enumerate pertinent examples: i) The career proper of Jesus is prefaced by a genealogy reaching as far back as Adam (*Lk.*, iii, 23-37, cf. *I Chr.*, i, 1ff., yet cf. *Mt.*, i, 1-17) [Matthew's genealogy runs from Abraham to Jesus (cf. i, 2), and he is preoccupied with the genealogical symmetry of the fourteen generations of Jesus' line on both sides of the Babylonian exile (vs. 17). Matthew appears to follow the presentation of genealogies as laid down in *Gen.*, v, 6-28, x, 1; 15; 21 (using ἐγέννησεν), whereas Luke, significantly enough, seems to adopt a method close to that of *I Chr.*, i-iii (using υἱὸς, cf. *Lk.*, iii, 23, *I Chr.*, i, 3; 6; 7; 8, etc., though with τοῦ rather than the καὶ favoured in *Chronicles*). In the cases of both Matthew and Luke, however, the method of presentation may have been a matter of inheritance; what is of most significance is that Luke adopted a list going as far back as Adam.]

ii) Amongst the miracle stories, which frequently recall the Elijah-Elisha cycles, there are final injunctions derived from solemn benedictions in the Deuteronomic work (*Lk.*, vii, 50b, viii, 48b, yet cf. *Mk.*, v, 34b, *Mt.*, ix, 22b, cf. *LXX I Sam.*, i, 17, xx, 42. We may also note other short sayings in Luke associated with OT history, cf. iv, 34, viii, 28 (*I Kgs.*, xvii, 18), and perhaps ix, 61 (*I Kgs.*, xix, 20), x, 48b (*II Kgs.*, iv, 29b), xii, 14, (*Exod.*, ii, 14, cf. *Acts*, vii, 35).

iii) Jesus' pronouncements of woe and coming judgement are dispersed throughout the narrative (as with the historical books of the *Nebi'im*), rather than collected together (cf. *Mt.*, xxiii-xxv). [Note *Lk.*, vi, 24-26 (cf. *Mt.*), x, 10-1, along with the oracles against Israel's forsaken house, *supra*, p. 295].

iv) Jesus and his disciples are depicted as teachers in the temple and in the synagogues, apparently after the fashion of an OT model, such as Ezra. [*Lk.*, iv, 16-30; 44 (cf. *Mk.*, i, 29; 39), vi, 6 (cf. *Mk.*, iii, 1; noting Luke's διδάσκειν), xiii, 10 (cf. *Mk.*, *Mt.*), xx, 1, xxi, 37-8 (cf. *Mk.*, *Mt.*) (though see *supra*, p. 227, n. 1), *Acts*, ii, 46, iii, 1ff., v, 12ff., vi, 9, ix, 20, xiii, 14; 43, xiv, 1, xv, 21, xvii, 1-2, xviii, 4, xix, 8, xxiv, 12, cf. *Ezr.*, viii, 3; 8, *II Chr.*, xvii, 7-9, xix, 9-10, xxxiv, 30-32].

v) Jesus and his disciples conform to a frame of prayerful piety reminiscent of the Chronicler's Judaism. [*Lk.*, iii, 21 (cf. *Mk.*, i, 9-10), v, 16 (cf. *Mk.*, i, 45), vi, 12 (cf. *Mk.*, iii, 13), ix, 18 (cf. *Mk.*, viii, 27), ix, 28b-29 (cf. *Mk.*, ix, 2b), ix, 21-22 (≠ *Mt.*, xi, 25-27), xi, 1 (cf. *Mt.*, vi, 7-9, yet note *Mk.*, i, 35b), xi, 2-4 (≠ *Mt.*, vi, 9-13), xxii, 41

(*≠ Mk.*,xiv,35), xxii,44 (cf. *Mk.*,xiv,39), *Acts*,i,24-25, iv,24-30, vi,6, viii,15, x,9, xi,5, xii,12b, xiii,3, xiv,23, xx,36, xxi,5b, xxii,17. On prayer and fasting note *Acts*,xiii,3, xiv,23, yet cf. *Lk.*v,33, (cf. *Mk.*,ii,18a). From the OT.,cf. *II Sam.*,vii,18-29 *≠ I Chr.*,xvii,16-27, *I Kgs.*,viii,23-53 *≠ II Chr.*,vi,13-42, *II Kgs.*,xix,15-19, xx,2-3, *II Chr.*,xxx,18-19, xxxii,24, *Ezr.*,ix,6-15, *Neh.*,i,5-11,etc. On devoutness, cf. also *Acts*,ii,5, viii,2, x,2, xiii,43,etc. vi) The early church cries in its affliction. [Cf. *Acts*,iv,24-30 and see xii,12b, xvi,25 and in the OT, see esp. *Jud.*,iii,9;15, iv,3,etc., *I Kgs.*,xix,15-19, xx,2-3,etc., and *infra*, pp.267-8,277,283]. vii) It possesses prophets amongst its members (cf. *Acts*,xi,27-28, xiii,1, xv,32, xxi,9;10-13, cf.,*Lk.*,xi,49) (The prophets, men of God or seers in *I Sam-II Kgs.* and *Chronicles* play a central rôle as agents of Yahweh's words and will). Barr (in *Old and New,op.cit.* p.136) intelligently noted the OT atmosphere and 'throwback' surrounding *Acts*,xi,28, xxi,10ff.. There are priests to be noted also; iv,36,vi,7.

viii) Its leaders are given space to recall the mighty deeds of Yahweh in Israel's past (*Acts*,iii,24, vii,2-50, xiii,16-23, cf. esp. *Josh.*,xxiv,2-13, *I Sam.*,xii,6-18, *Neh.*,iii,6-31), and they receive signs for their callings similar to those received by God's servants of old (*Acts*,ix,3;18, x,10-22, xxii,17-18, even vii,56, cf. *Exod.*,iii,2-6, (cf. iv,11), *I Sam.*,iii,2-18, *I Kgs.*,xix,5-7, *Ezek.*,i,28b, *Dan.*,viii,17). [When Josephus wrote of Daniel's vision in *Dan.*,viii,15-17, he left a scene quite similar to Luke's account of the Damascus road incident in ix,3 (cf.,*Antiq.*,X,269). Note also the parallel between *Acts*,ix,6 (cf. xxii,10) and *LXX Ezek.*,iii,22, cf. C.Mackay, 'Ezekiel in the New Testament', in *Church Quarterly Review*, CLXII,1961,p.11].

ix) Its leaders bear the awesome responsibility of calling the people back to God (*Acts*,xx,26-27, cf. *Ezek.*,iii,18, xxxiii,3-4), and undergo like trials. [The reminiscence of *Ezekiel* has been neglected here; *Ezekiel* wrote against the princes of Israel as 'shepherds' (cf. xxxiv,5), and accuses them^{book} of being 'wolves' (xxxiv,27) and of neglecting the 'sheep' (xxxiv,8). So note Luke's ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι ἐλθε-λεῖσεται μετὰ τὴν ἀφίξίν μου λύκοι βαρεῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς μὴ φειδόμενοι τοῦ ποιμνίου in *Acts*,xx,29 straight after the other verses, 26-27 (with their background in *Ezekiel*). Concerning the trials of God's servants, note esp. *Jer.*,xxxviii,*Dan.*,vi, (cf. *Acts*,xii, xvi, etc.) on imprisonment; and on the shipwreck scene, compare *Acts*,xxvii,18ff. with *Jonah*,i,4ff. [Was it part of Luke's intentions to make Paul a more obedient and sensible servant than *Jonah*? Cf. *Jonah*,i,5 with *Acts*,xxvii,18;22;30ff.].

x) There are several other features of Luke's work with the atmospheric ring of the great OT histories about them. For example: the holy temple retains much of its traditional significance (*Lk.*, i, 9; 21, ii, 27; 37; 46, xviii, 10; xix, 45-6, xx, 1, xxi, 37, *Acts*, ii, 46, iii, 1, v, 20; 21, xxi, 26-29, xxii, 17-18); there is a frequency of speech and dialogue not so common in Graeco-Roman historiography yet typical of a book like *II Samuel*; the reference to official correspondence (*Acts*, xv, 23-29, xxi, 25, xxiii, 25-30, cf. *Ezr.*, iv, 11-22, v, 7-17, vii, 12-26, *II Chr.*, xxi, 12-15, xxxii, 17), and the fulfilment of prophecy within the historical work itself (cf. *Lk.*., i, 20 and 64, ii, 35 and xxiii, iii, 16b and xxiv, 49b, xiii, 35 and xix, 38, *Acts*, i, 8 (with xi, 16) and ii, 2ff., *Lk.*, xii, 11 and *Acts*, xviii, 6ff., xxi, 33 - xxvi, 29, *Lk.*, xxi, 16b and *Acts*, vii, 60b, xii, 2, *Lk.*, xxi, 18 and *Acts*, xxvii, 34; 39, cf. xviii, 10, and see *I Kgs.*, ii, 27, xiii, 2 and *II Kgs.*, xxiii, 16, *I Kgs.*, xxi, 21-24 and *II Kgs.*, ix, 36, *II Chr.*, xxxvi, 21 and 22, etc.). As with OT history, moreover, the Lord (=Yahweh) is frequently the agent in events (*Acts*, ii, 47b, ix, 10, xviii, 9, xxiii, 11, cf. xi, 24, etc.), cf., for example, *Exod.*, iv, 21, vii, 3, etc., *Josh.*, xi, 20, *Jud.*, ii, 15; 16, iii, 9; 13; 15, *I Sam.*, xxvi, 19, *II Sam.*, xvii, 14, xxiv, 1, *I Kgs.*, xii, 15, etc., and on most of these verses, W. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament* (ET), London, 1961-5, vol. 2, p. 178), cf. also *Jud.*, xiii, 24, *II Sam.*, vi, 11); the 'word of the Lord' is heard (*Acts*, v, 31, xiii, 48, xix, 10; 20, cf. esp. *I Kgs.*, xii, 22, xiii, 1, *II Chr.*, xxx, 12, etc.); the 'angel of the Lord' smites (*Acts*, xii, 23 (ἐπάταξεν.... ἄγγελος Κυρίου), cf. *II Kgs.*, xix, 35 (ἄγγελος Κυρίου ἐπάταξεν), *I Chr.*, xxi, 7-16); the 'hand of the Lord' is upon his ministers (*Lk.*, i, 66, *Acts*, xi, 21 (cf. xiii, 11), cf. *I Kgs.*, xviii, 46, *Ezr.*, vii, 6h; 9b; 28b, etc.).

EXCURSUS 4*

Notes on Machiavelli's *Il Principe*

Il Principe was written at a moment of great crisis both personal and general. 1512 saw the greatest of all tragedies fall upon both Italy and Florence. Significantly, Machiavelli brought his *Istorie* to a close at 1492 with the comment that:

'Soon after the death of Lorenzo, those evil plants began to germinate, which in a little time ruined (*rovinarono*) Italy, and continue to keep her that way' (VIII,36, *finis* [vol.3,p.72]).

That *rovina* entailed the collapse of the Florentine government in particular, through Spanish intervention (cf.*Disc.*,esp.I,7 [vol.3,pp.256-7]; *Disc.Rif. Stat.Fir.*,[vol.5,p.9]). It is essential for an understanding of Machiavelli's approach to these troubled times that we both account for the way he distinguished the fate of Italy from the fate of Florence, yet at the same time appreciate how he interrelated them. When the moment of tragedy came, Machiavelli found himself thinking about national issues just as much as about the future of Florence. And his national consciousness is most intense in *Il Principe*. It has cooled off somewhat in the two Discourses of 1517-9 and 1520, presumably because, by then, Machiavelli viewed the general aftermath of 1512 with greater resignation. With regard to Florence in particular, there is no reason to suppose that the man who wrote *Il Principe*, who was the very same person to be dubbed 'Soderini's man' and to write a *Discorso* on reforming the Florentine *mista*, had abandoned his republican ideals. Certainly it was written to a Florentine prince, a Medici; yet Florence was not the only, even primary concern of that little work. We would do well to heed J.H.Whitfield's healthy reminder that the last chapter of *Il Principe* was no mere after-thought (*Discourses on Machiavelli*, *op.cit.*,pp.26-28). This chapter contains not only a final, crucial appeal to Lorenzo II to liberate all Italy from barbarian overlordship, but also his pointed acknowledgement that a Medici occupied such a vital position in Italy as the Pontificate (cf.xxvi,3 [vol.4,p.369]). Read at its face value, moreover, so much in *Il Principe* constitutes advice to a prince who is expected to conquer and subject territories not formerly his own. On this last point, those scholars taking the bulk of the treatise to be a general manual for princely rule (eg., A.H.Gilbert, *Machiavelli's Prince and its Forerunners; the Prince as a typical book De Regimine Principum*, Durham, NC.,1938, *passim*), should grasp the connection between the whole work and the concluding hope that Lorenzo could liberate Italy (with the expectation that no Italian, ie., no Lombard, no Neapolitan,

* From p.469.

no Roman, etc., would withhold allegiance)(xxvi,7, '...la Italia vegga dopo tanto tempo apparire uno suo redentore', '...quale Italiano gli negherebbe l'ossequio?' etc.[p.371][texts vary here]). And they should acknowledge all that concern with occupation, colonization, maintenance of control over peoples who have experienced another kind of rule and their own laws, and about the kind of soldiery and policies requisite for effecting such enterprises (v-viii, xii-xiii, etc.). It has to be taken with due seriousness that when Machiavelli wrote of the possibility and need of *uno nuovo principe* in Italy, he was expressing the hope that Lorenzo was in the position to become what is often referred to as a 'new monarch', a ruler with as effective a territorial control as Louis XI or Charles VIII, Maximilian I or Charles V (see xxvi,1 [p.368], cf.iii,1 [p.277]). Machiavelli operated in the courts of foreign kings; he felt equipped to offer guidance on the institution of such a principality. Hence the combination of hard-headed, practical advice and soft-headed nationalism. Perhaps his hoped-for prince in this pamphlet emerges as a special case in terms of constitutional changes, since he was not treated from a purely Florentine point of view. But there remains a tie-up with the rest of Machiavellian theory.

For Machiavelli, the conquest of Italy by Spain meant the *ruina* of the Italian peninsula and not just of Florence (xxvi,1 *finis* [p.368] and see the last indented quotation). In terms of the cycle in the *Istorie* V, 1, Italy's affairs had reached *all'ultima bassezza*, and in that light it was time to think about an ascent to better things. Moreover, in considering Florence and other city-states (except perhaps Venice) as political and constitutional entities which had failed in the crisis of 1494 and 1512, his thoughts naturally turned to the *buono uomo* of his political theory, to the man who would follow the example of the great founder-statesmen and raise up a strong, consolidated state. From the constitutional point of view, men such as Romulus and Lycurgus were the best examples, as his *Discorsi* suggest, but concentrating more on the creation of a state of considerable territorial proportions, as he did in *Il Principe*, initiators such as Moses, Cyrus and Theseus automatically came to mind (so *ibid.*, xxvi,2, cf.vi,3 (where Romulus is also mentioned), cf. also *Disc.Riform.*, [vol.5,p.23]. The case of Romulus is very important, see *Disc.*,I,9 [vol.3, pp.291ff.], cf. W.Winiarski, 'Niccolò Machiavelli, 1469-1527', in *History of Political Philosophy* (ed.L.Strauss and J.Cropsey), Chicago,1963,pp.268-9). To look at his position in this way is not to transform him into a prefigurer of modern nationalism, but to take him as one nostalgic about ancient glories and stabilities, and as aware of the secrets of the contemporary foreigners' success. The peculiarities of the Italian situation in

1512 induced in Machiavelli a brash, almost desperate statement of general policy, one which by hindsight we would call unrealistic, and one which was rather out of keeping with the overly cautious foreign politics of his contemporary republican colleagues (cf. F. Gilbert, 'Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, XX, 1957, pp. 187ff.). When Machiavelli put pen to paper, however, he is unlikely to have felt there was any guarantee of Lorenzo being persuaded of his opinions, let alone being convinced that an exile should be reinstated and re-employed by the state. Machiavelli was not *that* unrealistic. He knew his manual might not be used for the *redenzione* of Italy; but it would still be of service to any individual ruler seeking a strong control over his estate.

Whatever Lorenzo's potential or policies, his presence in Florence confirmed rather than vitiated Machiavelli's theory of constitutional *mutazione*, even if some uncertainty surrounded the extent to which the Pope or Lorenzo was in control of Florentine affairs. It does not appear, however, that Machiavelli considered the restoration of the Medici as part of the cyclical process of constitutional change outlined in the *Discorsi*, I, 2, for if that were the case, Lorenzo's rule should have been preceded by *licenza*, a descriptive term Machiavelli never used of the Florentine republic 1494-1512. On the other hand, whereas one would expect him to write about the governments he worked under with a natural sympathy and loyalty, and whereas one would anticipate him to be favourable to Soderini's order as a type of *mista* - for the installation of Soderini as *Gonfaloniere a Vita* might seem to represent the addition of a monarchical element to the aristocratic and democratic institutions already existent in the state, one finds him very critical of the pre-1512 republic and its leaders, even declaring it to be 'entirely defective and remote from a true republic' (*Disc. Rif.*, [p. 9]: 'tanto manca, e discosto da una vera repubblica'; and on leaders of the Republic, 1494-1512, cf. esp. *Princ.*, vi, 6-7 [vol. 4, p. 293], *Disc.*, I, 7 [vol. 3, pp. 256-7], 45 [p. 351], 52 [pp. 365ff.], etc.). [If Soderini as *Gonfaloniere* for life represented the monarchical element, the popular Great Council and Eighty created by the Savonarolan government represented the democratic aspect, and the councils with more prescribed membership, associated with and including the *Signoria*, represented the aristocratic side. Granted this, however, Machiavelli's policies for a *mista* were quite idiosyncratic, at least in the *Discorso sopra il Riformare*. There he proposed a *Signoria* of 65 (with the *Gonfaloniere* holding only a short-term post), a Council of 200 (for the 'middle men' of Florence) and popular councils. Superimposed on the whole was the monarchical power of Pope Leo X (cf. *Disc. Rif.*, [vol. 5, pp. 15-17], cf. Donato Gianotti, who took a *Gonfaloniere*

a *Vita* to be a necessary prerequisite for a *mista*]. Outside his potential rôle^{as} *uno buono uomo*, then, Lorenzo's rule was that of a prince (or maybe a tyrant) who had arisen in a corrupt republic. That is how Machiavelli came to look at Lorenzo in the *Discorso* of 1520 (cf. [pp.10-11]), and in *Il Principe* in 1512 he had to reckon with the possibility that Lorenzo was nothing but such a ruler, despite his higher hopes. One other way of looking at the *mutazione* of 1512-3, of course, was to accept it not as part of an internal process, but as something foisted upon Florence *ab externo*, in which case consistency with his theories of constitutional change ceases to be of real relevance, because patterns of internal transformation were broken. But it is also true and important that 1512-3 could be looked at from that other quite different perspective. Florence, along with the rest of Italy, had failed to stave off the barbarians and preserve its own life; thus here was one of those turning-points which called for a return to original principles and the spirit and virtue of a good man. The Florentine people, moreover, were generally corrupt, and they required a new director. *Il Principe* was certainly written first and foremost to a potential 'good man', and one who may even resort to ruthlessness and apparent tyranny if his work was to be done effectively; yet to reiterate, it was so written to be of value to one who put Florence on the more 'conventional' pathways of principedom or tyranny. That is part of the brilliance of *Il Principe* and a key reason why it has remained a hotbed of controversy for so long. Claims about the book's purpose have rarely been entirely wrong but almost always unwarrantably exclusivist, confining its purport to one emphasis or another. Assessing the Florentine and Italian situation from San Casciano was not impossible for one so experienced as Machiavelli, but it had one serious limitation. He could not be really sure, despite his correspondence with Vettori, what kind of ruler Lorenzo was or intended to be. Yet part of the secret behind the production of *Il Principe* lies in Machiavelli's creation of the possible rôles of the tract's recipient - the task of Italian liberation remaining, however, as the most worthy of them and the one most called for by the necessity of the times. Florence was at a turning-point for either good or bad, and Machiavelli could not tell whether Lorenzo was going to be *uno buono uomo*, or going to fulfil a similar role to Cosimo's or Lorenzo I's, or even to drag the republic further towards ruin, as a tyrant. *Il Principe* was written under the shadow of possibilities, just as much as realities, and its ambiguities arise from a mixture of the Florentine's more immediate reactions to the special context of 1512-3 and the application of his theories about political and constitutional change.

Machiavelli had moments of such deep despair about his own age (cf. esp. *Disc.*, II, proem. [vol.4, pp.7-8]), that hopes of a saviour might seem far from his thoughts. Yet he harboured such hopes nevertheless, and probably even as late as 1527. It is remarkable, moreover, how Florentine-centred they were, and how, before a dying Italy, he believed in a future greatness for his beloved city. A saviour-prince might have an Italian basis of power, but it was above all a Florentine one. A key model for such a prince was Cesare Borgia, who swept with remarkable speed through the Romagna, acquiring territory as he went. Borgia was just a model, however, and not the 'good man' of his dreams and theory. [See *Princ.*, vii, 3ff.. From the point of view of republicanism, Cesare was no hero, cf. S. Anglo, *Machiavelli; a dissection*, London, 1971, pp.30ff., and see C. Clough, 'Niccolò Machiavelli and the Francesco Troche Episode', in *Mediaevalia et Humanistica*, XVII, 1966, esp. p.143. Concerning Machiavelli's hopes of a national leader emerging from Florence, Francesco Guicciardini estimated his position correctly, cf. *Considerazioni*, I, xii]. The 'good man' was required to achieve much more than Cesare if Italian *libertà* was to be preserved and the foreigners removed. With the Spanish presence in Florence and Italy in and after 1512, all the crucial turning-points in Machiavelli's chief recurrence models seem to converge. Everything - the *rovina* of Italy in general and of Florence in particular, the emergence of *uno buono uomo*, prince or tyrant, the recovery of Florentine republicanism - were all contingent on the extent and permanence of Spanish rule. Much of Machiavelli's brilliance lies in the fact that, at one and the same time, he could offer constructive, practical advice about the situation, whilst eliciting forms of political and constitutional recurrence which, despite differing possibilities, would still be confirmed in the future.

EXCURSUS 5*

Sixteenth Century 'metabolē theory'

Ideas of recurrence in constitutional history were not confined to such models as the Machiavellian *cerchio*. If few were prepared to subscribe to a cycle of governments, many were still interested in the most prevalent types of constitutional change. If Machiavelli had suggested certain parallels between Venice and Sparta (see *Disc.*, I, 5 [vol. 3, p. 245]; 6 [pp. 248, 251-2]), those Venetians concerned to extol their city-state's stability explored the connections in greater detail, and Giannotti widened the parallelism by ranking not only Venice and Sparta together but also Florence and Athens. [On parallelism in the works of Giannotti, Gasparo Contarini and Paruta especially, see Rawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-8, 150-1. For some paralleling of Athens and Florence in Machiavelli, cf. *Disc.*, I, 53 (p. 371)]. Later sixteenth century authors, preoccupied with growing monarchical centralism, wrote of a recurrent tendency in nations to find stability by submitting to a lord. [This is the line of the Florentine G. B. Guarini in *Trattato della Politica Libertà*, 1599 (Venice, 1918) who illustrated his point from the history of the Jews, Athenians, Spartans, Romans, Swiss, etc., as well as from that of Florence. This line is also strong in Bodin, of course (so, *supra*, pp. 480f.)].

For all his stress on variety, Bodin was capable of formulating rules of thumb about constitutional change. One illustration comes to mind. In the *Methodus* (*op. cit.*, p. 217), he argued that 'a kingdom has almost always been changed without force into a tyranny; aristocracy into oligarchy, democracy into ochlocracy [basically an Aristotelian line]: but the change from a tyranny into a popular form of government always has been violent, that is, the tyrant has been slain'.

It is noteworthy that the ideas of monarchy's degeneration into tyranny, and of tyranny's impermanence, remained widely held. See, for example, P. de Comynes (ca. 1450-1511) on Charles VIII, in *Mémoires* (1498, though they were compiled over a long period; cf. Calmette's edn., (Les Classiques de l'Histoire de France en Moyen Age), Paris, 1964, vol. 1, pp. xii ff.), VI, 12 (vol. 2, p. 340), cf. also *supra*, p. 504; Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince* (ET), B. 445 (ed. L. K. Born, [Records of Civilization XXVII], New York, 1936, pp. 172-3); 'Junius Brutus', *A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants* (ET), London, 1924 edn., pp. 87ff.; cf. J. Calvin in the 1536 edn. of the

* From p. 480.

Institutes (see M-E. Chenevière, *La Pensée Politique de Calvin*, Geneva, 1937, p.186);, and on such *metabolē* in Bodin, see *Methodus* (pp.215-6). Cf. also, Fulke Greville, 'On Monarchy', stanzas 80ff., (in *The Remains*, ed. G. Wilkes, London, 1965, pp.55ff.) and cf. J. Lydgate, *A Treatise showing the Falles of Sundry Princes* (from Boccaccio), London, 1554, etc. Theologians continued to insist that divine punishment awaited tyrants (even if they differed as to whether the tyrant's subjects were to be God's retributive agents!). [See esp. Luther, 'An Exposition of Psalm 101 (vs.6)', (cf. Philadelphia edn. of Luther's *Works*, 1956ff., vol.13, pp.213ff.), 'Whether Soldiers, too, can be saved' (1526) (in *ibid.*, vol.46, pp.105ff.), where Luther writes of God's punishment of the Jews through the Assyrians and of the Romans through the Goths, as key examples]; Calvin; his early commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia* is pertinent, cf. G. Beyerhaus, *Studien zur Staatanschauung Calvins*, Berlin, 1910, pp.8ff.; John Knox; see his 'History of the Reformation in Scotland', in *The Works of John Knox*, Edinburgh, 1846, vol.1, p.411; cf. also Erasmus, *op.cit.*, 44B (p.173)]. And one of the most important developments in this connection in the sixteenth century was that would-be reformers and Protestants came to write of the Catholic hierarchy as tyranny, even as opposed by God; cf. Erasmus, *Querela Pacis* (1517) (ed. W.J. Hirton), New York, 1946, p.30, etc., Luther, *Admonitio* (1522), Calvin, *Institutes*, IV, vii, 18ff., etc., and note how Paolo Sarpi considered that the Council of Trent had sanctified the conversion of the Church from a polity to a tyranny (*Istorie del Concilio Tridentino*, London, 1619, vol.3, esp. pp.47-53, 232, cf. *supra*, pp.538-40).

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¹ This spelling error is contained in the title.