USE OF THESESES

This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author.
ERRATA

A. In the text there are several typographical errors, the main one being:

p. 333: the word "begun" was accidentally deleted from the end of the second line from the top, which should have read:

"g) the position has strengthened of private-ownership layers, who have begun to subjugate to themselves ..."

Other typographical errors in the text are:

p. 323: eighth line from top, "the" left out before "third world"

p. 297: seventh line from bottom, "camouflaged"

fifth footnote number on page should have been "172"

p. 288: tenth line from bottom, "implanting"

p. 278: tenth line from bottom, first "of" should have been deleted

p. 231: fifteenth line from top, "a" left out before "mechanism"

p. 213: seventeenth line from bottom, first "by" should have been deleted

p. 203: fifteenth line from bottom, "intriguingly"

p. 185: bottom line, "in" should have been deleted

p. 183: second line from top, "of" should have been deleted

p. 158: thirteenth line from bottom: "Aziia i Afrika ..."

p. 137: twelfth line from bottom: should have been ",," after "one".

B. In the footnotes there are a number of typographical errors:

p. 41, n. 5: first "Macmillan"

p. 46, n. 45: the dates in Remnek's title should have been "1947-1971"

p. 53, n. 130: "identifies"

p. 54, n. 136: "Society"

n. 140: "from" should have been deleted in the quotation

p. 84, n. 13: "eyes"

p. 85, n. 36: "Sotsial'nye"

p. 87, n. 46: pp. for Orlov article should have been "pp. 125-31."

n. 52: "Khrushchev"

p. 88, n. 63: "as" left out after "also"

p. 90, n. 94: dates in Remnek's title should have been "1947-1971"

p. 91, n. 110: first "S'ezd"

n. 112: "Meliksetov"

p. 92, n. 130: "Friendship"

p. 160, n. 10: dates in Remnek's title should have been "1947-1971"

p. 161, n. 19: "osvoboditel'nykh" ; "intriguing"

p. 162, n. 26: "prerequisites"

n. 39: "Ulianovskiy"
p. 164, n. 60: "skilfully"

p. 166, n. 89: "Klassovaia"

p. 168, n. 116: "discussion"

n. 117: "maintaining"

p. 171, n. 161: "Klassovaia"

p. 172, n. 188: "Razvivaiushchiesia"

p. 173, n. 195: second last line, "had" should have been "have"

p. 175, n. 226: "Volobuev"

p. 176, n. 228: "aggression"

p. 253, n. 54: "Kolontaev"

p. 256, n. 138: "razdelenie"

p. 262, n. 238: "Metodologicheskie"

p. 264, n. 281: "pokazateli"

p. 265, n. 300: "Cheshkov"

p. 268, n. 357: first "social science" should have been deleted

p. 269, n. 373: "dialektika" left out after "sotsial'naia"

n. 375: "teoriia"

p. 270, n. 384: "foreign" left out before "economic"

p. 345, n. 20: the date for Afanas'ev's article should have been "19/6/88"

p. 346, n. 43: "1976" left out after "Moscow"

p. 352, n. 164: full reference for Hough should have been given here rather than in n. 293 on p. 359.

p. 353, n. 184: "by" left out after "suggested"

p. 357, n. 252: "Vospominaniia"

n. 261: the page reference to Simoniya should have been "229"

p. 359, n. 292, no. 294 and n. 300: "no. 8" left out after "Kitai!"

p. 360, n. 308: one "receive" should have been deleted

p. 375, n. 10: "Gorbachev's 27th ..."

C. In the bibliography some typographical errors are:

p. 381 (Cheshkov): "Marksovo ... teoreticheskoe"

p. 382 (Fundulis): "soobshchesvtom"

p. 384 (Krylov): "filosofii"

p. 386 (Martyshin): "Osvobodivshiesia ... review"

p. 387 (Pletnev): "srez perestroiki"

p. 391 (Spandar'ian): "vneshneekonomicheskikh"

p. 391 (Tarnovsky): "Problema ... sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh"

p. 393 (XXVII s'ezd): "uchebnykh" left out after "vysshikh"

p. 401 (Remnek): "toward India, 1947-1971".
Recent Soviet Development Debates: 
the 'third world' and the USSR

Roderic D.M. Pitty

April 1989

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the Australian National University
Statement

This thesis is the result of my independent research.

Roderic Pitty
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Note on references and abbreviations

The references use a modified Oxford format with the full citation being given on the first occasion in a chapter and subsequent citations in that chapter giving a recognisable shortened form of the title. The references for each chapter are treated separately, so that if a source has been cited in a previous chapter the full citation is still provided for the first reference to it in a new chapter. In references for the first two, theoretical chapters, titles of key Soviet journals are not abbreviated, but in the last three, empirical chapters they are, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
AAS &= \text{Azia i Afrika Segodnia} \text{ (issued monthly)} \\
MEMO &= \text{Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia} \text{ (monthly)} \\
NAA &= \text{Narody Azii i Afriki} \text{ (bi-monthly)} \\
RKSM &= \text{Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir} \text{ (bi-monthly)}
\end{align*}
\]

The Library of Congress transliteration of Russian is used for all reference titles, but not for proper names, since some Soviet scholars prefer otherwise (e.g. Simoniya) and an alternative version of other names is common (e.g. Trotsky, Levkovsky). Within reason, I have sought a blend of simplicity and consistency. A scholar's first name or initial is given at the first reference in the text, but subsequent references use only the surname. Two Vasil'evs are referred to in the text, Vladimir F. in chapter three and Leonid S. in chapter five; otherwise, only one scholar with the same surname is discussed in the text. Apart from common abbreviations like CPSU, two specific acronyms are used throughout the thesis:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IMEMO} &= \text{Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezdunarodnykh Otnoshenii} \\
\text{IVAN} &= \text{Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk}
\end{align*}
\]

(The Institute of World Economy and International Relations is also part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but this usage is common in Moscow.) Throughout the thesis, original emphasis is designated by \textit{italics} and my emphasis by \underline{underlining}. 

Abstract

This thesis investigates three layers of Soviet debate since the mid 1960s about problems of development. A protracted debate about the importance of 'socialist orientation' in the third world is considered principally as a dispute between conservative officials and liberal critics about the significance for Soviet foreign policy of dependent allies in a global struggle with imperialism. A parallel debate about the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the third world is evaluated mainly as the first phase of a substantial discussion amongst leading scholars searching for an adequate theory of the developing world. A subterranean debate about the nature of modern Soviet society is presented as an example of the profound criticism of Brezhnev's regime which some leading scholars were able to make in print during the 'years of stagnation'. These empirical interpretations are based on two theoretical arguments, which establish the main historical contexts of Soviet development debates and the position of an outside reader as someone necessarily concerned with the same questions as the participants in the debates. The thesis demonstrates the intellectual achievements of a group of committed Soviet scholars, whose thought was not constrained by a dogmatic system of censorship. By showing the openness of Soviet discussions to a foreign interpreter, it questions the view that 'Marxism-Leninism' has constituted the language of recent development debates in the USSR.
one sees by experience in our times that the princes who have done great things are those who have taken little account of faith and have known how to get around men's brains with their astuteness; and in the end they have overcome those who have founded themselves on loyalty. ... But it is necessary to know well how to colour this nature, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple and so obedient to present necessities that he who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived. ... For the vulgar are taken in by the appearance and outcome of a thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar;


all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided.


The error often committed in historico-political analyses consists in having been unable to find the correct relationship between what is organic and what is occasional: thus one succeeds either in expounding as directly operative causes which instead operate indirectly, or in asserting that direct causes are the only effective causes; in the one case there is an excess of 'economism' or pedantic doctrinairism, in the other an excess of 'ideologism'; in the one case an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the other an exaltation of the voluntarist and individual element. The distinction between 'organic' movements and events and 'incidental' or occasional movements and events must be applied to all types of situations, not only to those where one sees a reactionary development or an acute crisis, but to those where one sees a progressive or prosperous development and to those where one sees a stagnation of the productive forces. The dialectical nexus between the two kinds of movement, and, therefore, of research, is difficult to establish; and if the error is serious in historiography, it is still more serious in the art of politics, where we are dealing not with reconstructing past history but with building present and future history; one's own inferior and immediate desires and passions are the causes of error, insofar as they are substituted for objective and impartial analysis, and this happens not as a conscious 'means' to stimulate action but as self-deceit. Here also, the snake bites the charlatan, or rather the demagogue is the first victim of his demagogy.

Introduction

The word, if it is not an acknowledged falsehood, is bottomless.

(Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, p. 127.)

This thesis began within a comer of one of the two basic language-games for writing about the USSR, but has finished toward the centre of the other game. The first game is called Sovietology, and involves reading Soviet sources in order to disclose the Soviet state's policy in various domains. The second game might be called 'anti-Stalinism', and involves a dialogue with an "intellectual opposition" in the USSR. Both games can be played in parallel, since they share a concern for "what is manifest in the text" of Soviet political discourse, and have basically "the same method: measurement of the deviation of a current statement from the traditional cliche." What initially distinguishes these games is the texts they consider worth reading. Sovietologists value documents which either express or might influence the behaviour of the Kremlin, while 'anti-Stalinists' value documents which expose the inadequacies of Soviet society. Glasnost' has brought these games closer together but by no means merged them into one. Some of the interpretations presented herein belong to the first game, while others belong to the second. Since the leading Soviet scholars discussing problems of development have played both games from 'inside the whale', I have followed suit.

The main originality of this thesis is in demonstrating that some key documents can be read in terms of both these language-games. What is manifest in the key texts of Soviet development debates is not one meaning but several complementary meanings, which exist at different 'levels' of analysis or conceptual 'depth'. Three broad layers of Soviet debate about development were revealed in a process of empirical discovery which roughly corresponded to the argument presented in a recent article entitled "Once More About the Problem of Socialist Orientation". First, the official view of the third world from the early 1960s until the early 1980s, which declared 'non-capitalist development' to be a widespread alternative to peripheral capitalism, was considered as the object of a
critique by some leading scholars who were dissatisfied with quoting Marx and Lenin out of context in order to affirm a simplistic account of social change in the developing countries.\textsuperscript{6} This critique was investigated as the most significant part of a broad debate about Soviet policy toward the third world, the key question of which was gradually discerned as the importance or marginality of dependent allies. Second, behind this critical response to the ruling dogma of 'socialist orientation' there lay a more complex and intellectually substantial debate about the prospects for capitalist development in post-colonial societies. This discussion was viewed as part of a broad settling of accounts with the official slogan of capitalism's 'general crisis', which many Soviet scholars seem to have engaged in since at least the early 1960s. While some of the ideas expressed in this debate reinforced the orthodox view of 'socialist orientation' and most supported the emerging critique of it, the scope of the questions at issue clearly transcended the immediate priorities of Soviet foreign policy, involving a consideration of the objective force of capitalism and the limitations of possible alternatives to it in backward countries without the necessary prerequisites for a transition to socialism.\textsuperscript{7} Third, beneath this consideration the most critical scholars were found using the logical power of comparative analysis in order to reflect upon key historical situations in which the basic structures of Soviet society had been forged. At this level, problems of development oriented toward socialism were being earnestly reconsidered in the profound context of twentieth century world history, rather than treated sophistically in terms of the subjective requirements of "ideological struggle in the international arena".\textsuperscript{8}

These three broad layers of Soviet debate about development are distinguished by the participants involved and the resonance of the ideas discussed, as well as by the scope of the questions at issue. At the top layer, debate about the significance of states of 'socialist orientation' for Soviet foreign policy tended during the 1970s and early 1980s to involve a growing number of prominent liberal critics attacking a conservative orthodoxy which was affirmed by senior officials and supported by a decreasing band of lesser scholars. The influence on Soviet policy of the liberal critique of dependent allies was limited during the Brezhnev period
precisely by the fact that the main objects of criticism were key officials like Rostislav Ul'ianovsky. By the same token, the influence of this critique under Gorbachev has been greatly extended as a result of the rejuvenation of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus. At the middle layer, debate about the prospects for peripheral capitalism developed in the 1970s and 1980s mainly through arguments amongst leading Soviet scholars themselves, rather than between prominent scholars and current officials. The resonance of this debate amongst specialists has grown gradually in accordance with the increasing sophistication of the arguments elaborated, not sharply as a result of a change in the political climate, although the new atmosphere of open discussion has allowed the arguments to be taken further and encouraged more participants to join in debating a complex topic. At the bottom layer, esoteric debate about the nature of Soviet society had from the late 1960s until recently involved only a relatively small group of the leading scholars, whose implicit meanings would have been largely restricted, by small publication runs and the apparently foreign subject matter, to themselves and any fortunate and perceptive onlookers. Here the effect of glasnost' has been quite dramatic, opening up the most critical level of Soviet development debates to a wider audience. Ideas elaborated in a cramped code have been allowed to breathe the fresh air of rhetorical suasion, and this together with the topicality of debate about the nature of Stalinism will have increased significantly the influence of that criticism which accurately named its referent.

Fortuitously, the top and bottom layers of Soviet development debates have just finished in the form that they have taken since the late 1960s, while the middle layer has reached a new peak of all-round discussion, from which previous arguments can be evaluated with the benefit of hindsight. The debate about dependent allies finally ended last year with a complete victory for the critics, both on the specific question of foreign policy priorities involved and on the general issue of the legitimacy of relatively independent scholarly input into policy-making. The attempt by old officials to restrict scientific discussion largely to an endorsement of the official line failed slowly but surely, and a new period of quite open proposals for improving Soviet third world policy has
clearly begun. A more interdependent division of labour between scholars and policy-makers is reflected also in the effervescence of debate about the prospects for capitalism in the third world. While the empirical difference between remaining states of 'socialist orientation' and various types of peripheral capitalist development is still recognised, automatic consideration of the former as more reliable partners for the USSR has been dropped. Consequently, the distinction between the top and middle layers of debate has recently become less marked, since while a new liberal orthodoxy has emerged, it has the support of most leading scholars, and criticism of this orthodoxy is predominantly a continuation of arguments between specialists, not scepticism toward the new line. The opening up of the bottom layer of esoteric debate about Soviet society has also reduced its distinctiveness as a separate discussion, and in some cases enabled straightforward confirmation of inferences about meanings which might hitherto have seemed incongruous to an informed sceptic.

This thesis focuses on debates amongst leading Soviet scholars not on actual policies conducted by the Soviet state, but it assumes that the arguments of the former shed some light on the actions of the latter. Ideas or 'perceptions' are an inalienable part of any action, so Soviet policies cannot be understood by ignoring the dominant beliefs of decision-makers and interpreting only the use of hard and fast capabilities. And since the beliefs of those responsible for policy do not exist in a social vacuum, the evidence available for illuminating these beliefs is not limited to statements by decision-makers themselves. In broad terms, the tenor of Soviet scholarly debate about third world development was considered as a response to the prevailing concerns of the Soviet leadership. Many different particular responses were analysed in terms of a hierarchy of basic policy objectives, derived from a directive speech to Soviet orientalists by a leading foreign policy official of the Brezhnev regime and an interpretation of Soviet actions in the third world. The general tone of the response from leading scholars to official concerns changed from increasing criticism in the late Brezhnev years to enthusiastic support after the proclamation of 'new political thinking', which suggests a basic change in the dominant beliefs of the new Soviet
leadership compared to the world view of their predecessors in the Politburo. From this perspective, the process of conceptual change or learning in Soviet foreign policy has been more like a 'spiral' creeping up a bureaucratic pyramid than a 'curve' expressing the depressed expectations of incumbent officials. Since the topic of the thesis is limited to scholarly debates, statements of the new leadership have not been studied in order to work out the new hierarchy of basic Soviet policy objectives toward the third world, but some broad hypotheses about the extent of conceptual change are suggested in the conclusions. At the bottom layer of debate about the nature of Soviet society, the contrast between scholarly arguments and official concerns is considerably starker, and the lag of policy behind theory much more evident. Although Gorbachev complained at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that the "moving forces and contradictions" of Soviet society had "not become the object of profound scientific investigations", it is clear that this statement was not entirely accurate.11 Whereas most of the critical liberal arguments about understanding the third world advanced by Soviet scholars in the 'years of stagnation' have readily been accepted as part of the re-evaluation of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, many of the radical criticisms of Stalinism made in the esoteric debate about the nature of Soviet society disputed the existence of a 'socialist order' in the USSR, and so cannot be embraced without a more substantial revision of dogmas than has yet occurred.

A principal concern of the theoretical section of this thesis is to elucidate the nature of 'Marxism-Leninism' as the milieu of Soviet development debates. Since the empirical research was informed by a sceptical attitude toward the view that 'Marxism-Leninism' constitutes the conceptual framework of Soviet discussion, it seemed necessary to substantiate this through an alternative explanation of 'Soviet ideology'. Rather than a coherent and believable theory, official Soviet dogma was interpreted as an idiom of censorship, the 'revisions' of which in the post-Stalin era were adjustments to accommodate social pressures for reform, not concessions to the unrealisability of a liberating utopia. This materialist approach to the dominant form of Soviet political discourse was initially supported largely
with accounts by emigres and dissidents of life within the Soviet intelligentsia during the Brezhnev years, then confirmed by an interpretation of the one text in the esoteric debate about Soviet society which analysed the problem of 'mass consciousness', and buttressed with some recent statements by liberal Soviet intellectuals published as a result of glasnost'. Viewing 'Marxism-Leninism' as a loyalty test rather than a belief system did not mean discounting the role of Marx and Lenin as sources of ideas for some leading participants in Soviet development debates. On the contrary, this approach highlighted cases in which these theoretical sources were used in order to explain features of third world development or Stalinism, particularly where competing arguments were presented by scholars relying on different views expressed by Marx and Lenin, without discounting the presence in Soviet debates of a variety of ideas deriving from other sources.

The basic problem in interpreting the political meaning of Soviet development debates was not to find the key to a hidden 'operational code', but simply to find some questions with which to pass through an open door by means of an "actual dialogue in the field". The sign 'Marxism-Leninism' did not mark a threshold of debate, but rather a mirror of narcissism, whose "pretentious" claim to a monopoly of self-truths effectively precluded the "mutual outsideness" presupposed by all dialogue. By denying the contingency of its own context, this sign obscured the questions which participants in Soviet development debates were trying to answer. Finding these questions involved assuming that some key problems were perceived in broadly the same terms by these participants and the outside reader. The basic task was to find the most interesting common problems, as opposed to either viewing Soviet problems as a reason for Western self-satisfaction or focusing on unproblematic commonalities. In this sense, "the person who understands inevitably becomes a third party in the dialogue", a 'superaddressee' "whose absolutely just responsive understanding" mediates between the author and the immediate audience from outside and after the fact. The position of this third party is not objective but interested, so that justice in interpreting a debate is achieved not by adopting a neutral, uncritical attitude but
by exhausting one question after another. Finding meaning in a text requires not only reading it, but asking what it sought to do for whom. Such understanding responds to the text by incorporating it into a new language-game in which the dialogue between author and audience is re-awakened. The polysemy inherent in the key texts of Soviet development debates shows that the different outside perspectives represented by Sovietology and 'anti-Stalinism' are founded upon different questions rather than different documents.

My research is presented in two short theoretical chapters and three long empirical ones. The first chapter endeavours to resolve some fundamental methodological and epistemological problems involved in understanding the broad practice of 'esoteric communication' in the Soviet context. The main features of policy debates amongst the Soviet intelligentsia are characterised through a review of previous Western studies, then the process of interpreting Soviet political discourse is shown to depend upon the outside reader making a bridging assumption of some common meanings. The second chapter establishes such meanings through an investigation of the three general contexts of Soviet development debates. The first context is a broad 'loosening' of ideological censorship in the post-Stalin era, while the second is the renewal of serious comparative research which occurred in the theoretical field of Soviet oriental studies gradually from 1956 onwards, reaching a 'critical mass' by the late 1960s.* The third context is the hierarchy of basic Soviet policy objectives toward the third world during the Brezhnev years, which forms the main period covered by the empirical research. The third chapter presents an analysis of the most significant arguments in the long-running Soviet debate about 'socialist orientation', known initially as 'non-capitalist development'. The main theme of this debate is revealed as the declining significance of dependent allies for Soviet foreign policy in the opinion of an increasing number of leading scholars. The fourth chapter presents an account of the first twenty years of Soviet debate about the prospects for capitalism in the third world, which began in earnest in the late 1960s. The main theme of this debate is revealed as a change from initial scepticism about such prospects to more recent optimism, although it is shown
that some key issues have not been resolved and substantial dispute is likely to continue amongst the leading scholars for some time to come. The fifth chapter presents a reading of a subterranean debate in which a select group of scholars critically reconsidered the nature of Soviet society while ostensibly only discussing the 'third world'. This reading reveals the existence within the Soviet intelligentsia of a diversity of radical and liberal responses to the legacy of Stalinism, at a time when this wounded heart of Soviet history was apparently forgotten. The conclusions highlight the key points of the thesis concerning Soviet politics in general and Soviet views of development in particular.
Introduction, Footnotes:


2. Ibid., p. 188; Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The XXVII Congress - a case study of the shaping of a new party ideology", Soviet Studies, vol. XL, no. 1, January 1988, p. 14. Urban, pp. 188-9, criticises both these approaches for being "confined to what is manifest in the text", arguing that semiotics "isolates the text from its sociopolitical context" and aims "to allow the text to speak for itself, as it were, without encumbering it with our own interpretations and interests". If the former abstraction is unwise, the latter is simply impossible, as Aron Gurevich, "Istoricheskaia nauka i istoricheskaia antropologiia", Voprosy filosofii, 1988, no. 1, p. 58, has stressed: "The first condition of scientific understanding is the 'outsideness' of the interpreter, the recognition by him that he belongs to another time, to another culture, than the people whose works he wants to understand."


6. Ibid., pp. 22-4.

7. Ibid., pp. 24-6.

8. Ibid., pp. 25-6.


12. V.P. Lukin, "Ideologiiia razvitiia' i massovoe soznanie v stranakh 'tret'ego mira'", Voprosy filosofii, 1969, no. 6, pp. 35-46.


15. Ibid., pp. 126-7.
Chapter 1: Interpreting the Political Meaning of Soviet Debates

The central task of the interpreter is to find the question to which a text presents the answer, to understand a text is to understand the question [it addresses].


Many students of Soviet foreign policy toward the third world have implicitly assumed that the political meaning of Soviet sources is self-evident.² This assumption may be questioned theoretically by attempting to formulate some guidelines for interpretation that elaborate the old adage, 'read between the lines'. An elaborate theoretical approach is in itself no guarantee of producing significant empirical results. Archie Brown has warned about the "danger ... of merely presenting familiar knowledge in a less familiar framework. Even this may not be entirely devoid of interest, but the change of approach can be really justified only if its different conceptual framework leads the researcher into somewhat less familiar territory, the exploration of which produces new knowledge and a refinement of our understanding of Soviet political life."³ The task of theoretical questioning is to establish where a new area of research exists, and to suggest how it is best investigated. In this sense, theoretical and empirical work are complementary not opposed; they are simply different aspects of a process of asking the most pertinent questions. As C. Wright Mills succinctly said: "'Method' has to do, first of all, with how to ask and answer questions with some assurance that the answers are more or less durable. 'Theory' has to do, above all, with paying close attention to the words one is using, especially their degree of generality and their logical relations. The primary purpose of both is clarity of conception and economy of procedure."⁴

**Identifying Political Perceptions**

The topic of policy debates amongst the Soviet elite about various foreign and domestic problems has emerged during the past two decades as a significant area
of research. Many detailed studies have been undertaken, but the methodological difficulties of this research have not always received sufficient attention. These difficulties exist principally because of the strict censorship which has existed in the USSR over what could be said publicly to selected audiences, and increasingly also because of "the vastly greater organisational complexity of the Soviet polity and policy-making process." Central control over information and public expression together with more diverse inputs into policy formation mean that it is difficult to determine at first glance what is politically significant in Soviet sources. Yet, as Mary McAuley said in a recent debate about Soviet political culture, "if we are to analyse political perceptions and to try to explain them, we must first be able to identify them." Any such identification must proceed by a method of inference from Soviet sources, so the problem of correctly identifying political perceptions amongst the Soviet elite is essentially one of avoiding errors of inference when interpreting Soviet sources. Elaborating an adequate method of inference from Soviet sources is difficult, as shown by the fact that such methods have usually been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly argued for. Explicit inferences may not be intrinsically superior to implicit ones, but it is important to specify the assumptions upon which certain expressions in Soviet discourse are considered more significant than others as indicators of political belief. At least, as Erik Hoffmann suggested in 1966, "a rudimentary but important piece of advice would be to infer carefully the meaning of communications, and not to take the stated meaning or contents literally."

The carefulness of inference from Soviet sources depends fundamentally on a preliminary assumption about the existence of political argument within the Soviet elite. If it is assumed that no significant political differences exist, whether because of the supposed "unifying dynamic of common ideology" or because of strict censorship, then careful inference is not necessary, since every source will equally be "an index of real perceptions". But "censorship is introduced by those who fear public opinion, [so] the very existence of censorship is a sign that oppositional thought is alive and cannot be eradicated." Significant political differences have been shown to exist even at the topmost level of the Soviet elite, so the need for careful inference should not be avoided by simply assuming the
uniformity of all opinions expressed (this would logically negate the purpose of any detailed and sophisticated investigation of Soviet sources, since if two different Soviet "schools of thought" are found, the only conclusion consistent with the initial assumption is that there is no effective political difference between them). Once the existence of political argument is recognised, a number of interpretative difficulties must be resolved. The first problem is understanding the forms or methods of public debate within the Soviet elite. Without this understanding it is impossible to avoid making false inferences about the policy implications of particular Soviet statements. A consideration of the forms in which policy debate occurs is also the best way of approaching perennial problems of interpretation, like distinguishing between genuine perceptions and propagandistic affirmation, and identifying the link between scholarly debates and the making of foreign policy decisions.

Public debate within the Soviet elite has been restricted by three different forms of censorship. Specifically, the central censoring body Glavlit "checks to ensure that numerous types of concrete information, primarily military or economic, are not included in the manuscript." Banning of particular subjects prohibits direct mention of sensitive political issues which might offend foreign governments, but mainly affects the provision of information rather than the extent of debate allowed. Generally, the main political and ideological restrictions on debate are instituted principally by editorial boards of newspapers, journals and publishing houses, who control the expression of political arguments in print. This institutional form of censorship sets the tone of discussion in particular fields, defining the extent of self-censorship which scholars must use if they wish to present their views publicly. Both central and institutional forms of censorship can shift in scope, markedly as a result of new policies and appointments made from above, and marginally as a result of persistent struggles by authors and editors to open a crevice for thought. Socially, these two directly political forms of censorship have been reinforced by a third: the "influence on culture as a whole" of Soviet ideology, which, as Andrei Sinyavsky pointed out, "forbids silence." A degree of silence is necessary for clear thinking, so an 'ideology' which makes people listen to and participate in a monologue of noisy
lies can best be understood as part of a comprehensive system of censorship.

The result of these forms of censorship, as Jerry Hough pointed out several years ago, has been that in the USSR "foreign policy is almost impossible to discuss [openly] in any sophisticated manner." This limitation has affected different types of Soviet sources in quite different ways, so that distinguishing between the kinds of discussion possible in Soviet sources is an important requirement for any careful method of inference. As Ronald Hill has suggested, there are three basic types of political literature in the Soviet Union: first, the 'official' literature ... including the speeches and writings of politicians, together with official handbooks and commentaries; second, 'propagandistic' literature, written in a popular style, for home or foreign consumption, and designed to present the accepted view, revealing no secrets, no serious problems; and, third, 'heavy' political science, published by academic or provincial presses or in specialist journals, often by scholars whose work also appears in more popular format or in the periodical press. This literature tends to be more revealing, more realistic in its assessment ... more willing to discuss problems in a serious manner. It relies much less on pure assertion, more on the results of detailed study, backed up with argumentation and judgement. There is also a concern for methodology that immediately raises such work to a level of respectability that few would accord the unsophisticated accounts.

Soviet sources in the 'official' category are the most difficult to characterise, since their nature depends on the position of the official(s) whose views they represent, as well as on the subject matter discussed and the context of the audience addressed. The distinction between academic and propagandistic literature was confirmed by a leading Soviet foreign policy official, Boris Ponomarev, who, in a speech to the Institute of Oriental Studies (hereinafter IVAN), informed Soviet scholars that they were required to undertake "scientific-research and popularising work". The meaning of this distinction is essentially that serious discussion with implications for policy occurs only in the scientific-research work performed by Soviet scholars, not in their propagandistic work, which simply endorses official policy. But the demands of the latter for a long time restricted the influence of the former, leading a prominent reformist scholar to claim in July, 1987, that it was "necessary to establish a clear line between scientific
publications and publications reflecting the official position", so that scholars can work out answers to current problems and not waste time defending old policies.20

Most errors of inference from Soviet sources result from attempts to deduce political perceptions from propagandistic statements, thus confusing the two most different types of Soviet sources. While central and institutional censorship ensures that all Soviet sources avoid direct discussion of sensitive issues, propagandistic material must in addition provide a lot of noise affirming the "postulate" that the USSR "may conduct only such a foreign policy which, by definition, is from the beginning correct, free from mistakes and answering the interests of all progressive forces."21 Because of this, most direct comment in the USSR on Soviet foreign policy is mere polemical affirmation, the purpose of which is not to discuss problems or suggest changes, but simply to persuade all that this policy is being conducted in the best possible way. Moscow Radio foreign language broadcasts are crucial for a study of Soviet propaganda, but of little or no interest for investigating Soviet perceptions. Even articles in New Times and International Affairs, while more nuanced and informative than most radio broadcasts, consisted until recently almost entirely of statements trumpeting Soviet policy.22 These "obligatory polemical banalities", as Neil Malcolm has aptly termed them, also exist in Soviet academic discourse, but there they are usually ritual emendations from which "the author's real meaning has to be carefully disentangled".23 The dividing line between these two types of Soviet discourse is rarely clear-cut -- the same article can include both types of discourse -- but it nevertheless exists. If any article by a Soviet foreign policy official is simply read as a literal expression of the beliefs impelling complex Soviet actions, then an error of inference is the most likely result.24

While the danger of confusing propagandistic affirmation with genuine perceptions affecting Soviet foreign policy formation can be minimised by considering the contexts of particular statements, this assumes that Soviet specialists themselves manage to keep their affirmatory and explanatory activities separate. Ronald Pope has argued that the optimistic character of much Soviet
academic discourse might make many analysts in Moscow "the victims of their own propaganda."²⁵ Such an effect should not be ruled out as impossible, but it is necessary to specify the type of situation in which it could occur. This is where a specialist or official has no access to information that casts doubt on the accuracy of a purely affirmatory view of events, and also will not seek such information because the responsibility for making ill-advised decisions does not rest with them. These conditions are definitive at most only of John Steinbruner's category of 'grooved' thinkers, who, as Robert Cutler has suggested, in the Soviet context "are the low-level functionaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."²⁶ Situating Steinbruner's two other categories institutionally, Cutler comments that: "The 'uncommitted' policy-makers are the chief political decision-makers in the country: the Politburo and the Secretariat, and to some degree the Central Committee Departments. The 'theoretical' policy-makers are the institute-based advisors and ministerial consultants."²⁷ Both these groups would be very unlikely to mistake propagandistic justification for actual perception (the accuracy of their perceptions is another matter). The former receive much classified information at odds with a purely affirmatory view, including special summaries of foreign political commentary; they are also responsible for the general supervision of political propaganda, a task which requires the ability to distinguish justification from perception, or words from deeds.²⁸ The latter have access to fairly diverse sources of public information, and are able to discriminate readily between the requirements of policy affirmation and the opportunities for genuine articulation of opinions since, as Franklyn Griffiths has pointed out, they have regularly "said different things to different audiences at about the same time."²⁹ When unorthodox scholars put forward conventional arguments at certain times, they are consciously making concessions to tradition in some areas in order to advance other opinions of a more controversial nature.³⁰ Rather than an effect of propaganda, this is simply one of many techniques which Soviet specialists regularly use in order to get around the restrictions on open discussion.

Several other techniques regularly appear in Soviet academic literature as forms of esoteric communication and debate, using Aesopian language that does
not infringe what Hough has called the two basic "rules of the game". These rules are: 1) that Soviet policy itself cannot be discussed directly in any critical manner; and 2) that certain postulates, like the consistently peace-loving nature of Soviet policy, the ultimate irreconcilability of the two social systems and the absence of a third way between them, must be accepted without question. The consequence of the first rule is that, instead of an open debate about policy options for the USSR, "published discussion of foreign policy takes place within the framework of a discussion of the 'objective situation' in the outside world." And since, in accordance with the second rule, "any change in Soviet policy, when acknowledged at all, is described as the natural response of a perfectly consistent program to differences in conditions", the focus of public debate must always be on the nature and implications of those conditions. The techniques of conducting such debate vary, depending on the scope and sensitivity of the matter at issue. Relatively open discussions became more regular after the fall of Khrushchev, when "the collective leadership adopted a comparatively detached approach in which specialists were evidently given greater freedom to resolve their own differences and to carry out research and analysis." These open discussions usually focus on broad questions, rather than on what is occurring in a particular country, but, as Hough has pointed out, "the more abstract the debate, the more sensitive the real issue is likely to be." While broad questions may be debated with some openness, this is not possible for particular sensitive issues, on which "a controversial position is presented in a straightforward manner, without any indication that it is controversial or that another position is being attacked." Sometimes points of criticism are made esoterically through commentaries on historical or foreign surrogates, or by means of a "false denial", when a new interpretation is raised and apparently rejected, simply in order to circulate it. An important example showing the context of esoteric criticism is cited by Malcolm, who notes that "when the head of the USA Institute's Department of Internal Politics delivered the opinion in 1981 that American officials ignore valuable analyses submitted by foreign policy brains' trusts because of their own narrow-minded and blinkered attitudes, their 'bureaucratic inflexibility' and their attachment to 'stereotyped habits of thought established during the Cold War', it was surely clear to his readers that he had in mind targets closer to home."
An important methodological implication of such esoteric forms of debate is that an accurate and sophisticated understanding of the political meaning of statements by Soviet specialists requires much more than a translated exposition or content analysis of the arguments put forward. Such an exposition, used by Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, effectively obscures from view significant differences amongst Soviet specialists by focusing on general, self-serving statements which have few implications for policy. The brief account which Hoffmann and Laird provide of Soviet writing about the third world does not mention any controversial points at all, while their conclusion only discusses different Soviet statements in terms of the general categories of "conservatives and modernisers". There are fundamental differences between conservatives and modernisers, but this is only the most immediate level of debate. If the conservatives lose ground, then differences amongst modernisers become more significant, and understanding these differences requires a detailed interpretation of the issues at stake. Significantly, Hoffmann and Laird rely more on popular Soviet publications than on academic works, and when they do refer to the latter material it is not in a sufficiently thorough way to extract the main explanatory, not affirmatory, frameworks of interpretation used by Soviet scholars. Their superficial form of content analysis lumps together a lot of apparently similar statements without considering whether, in view of the specific terms used and the audience addressed, similar meanings were being communicated. In short, the method of translated exposition, by not defining the basic categories of Soviet debates, fails to recognise that "it is not the significance of repetition that is important but rather the repetition of significance."

The problem of interpreting the significance of Soviet debates is not limited to defining the political meaning of key words, although that is very important and also difficult because often "it is the variation in the definition or in the emphasis that constitutes an important part of the debate, not just which word to choose." An equally important and difficult task is to specify the place of specialist debates in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. The significance of a particular debate will depend both on its intrinsic meaning and on its resonance within the Soviet elite. This does not mean that both these qualities must be fulfilled to a certain
arbitrary limit before a debate should be considered worth investigating. After all, a discussion carried on in rather crude terms may be important if the participants have some political influence, and a debate which is known only to a select group of scholars may be significant if its terms are politically insightful. What is required theoretically is an adequate conceptualisation of both these aspects of significance. Since the question of how to define and investigate the political meaning of a debate raises fundamental philosophical problems of interpretation, it will be considered after discussing the task of understanding how academic debates within the Soviet elite connect with the policy-making hierarchy.

**Political Debate is Transactional**

In the first section the character of political debate within the Soviet elite was specified largely in negative terms, noting a number of difficulties which must be overcome in making careful inferences from Soviet sources. This section attempts to characterise such debate positively, in terms of the concept of "transactional perceptions" originally developed and effectively used by Franklyn Griffiths in his study of changing Soviet images of the United States. This concept focuses on the significance of publicly articulated political arguments between informal groups in the Soviet elite concerned with foreign affairs. It does not deny the importance of the largely hidden views of particular Politburo members for the taking of major policy decisions, but emphasises that, even in such an extremely centralised political hierarchy as exists in the USSR, these leaders do not exist in a social vacuum, forever unaffected by the arguments occurring between less celebrated mortals of the Soviet elite beneath them.

Dimitri Simes has pointed out that it is "a mistake to assume that debates among academics and experts necessarily mirror disagreements at the top." While existing policy or previous decisions may be subjected to esoteric criticism, a major, open debate amongst specialists usually indicates that policy-makers have yet to decide, or have decided only provisionally and are unsure about the
implications. Scholarly arguments may delineate the range of policy options which might be under consideration, but they do not normally show whether some group of Politburo members supports one position rather than another (and the positions of opposed specialists are likely to be further apart than those of divergent leaders). Whether certain Politburo members are "sponsoring" particular specialist views is usually an almost impossible question to answer. It is not the most important question, because the leadership and academic specialists operate at quite different levels of analysis and action, having vastly different limits of responsibility. The latter spend most of their time researching and writing, publicly and in classified reports, about the implications of particular foreign issues, from an academic and policy point of view. The former, excepting the Foreign Minister, the Secretary of the Central Committee's International Department and to some degree the General-Secretary, devote relatively little time to international affairs, only ever spend a relatively short amount of time on any one foreign issue, and when so engaged as individuals are principally concerned with policy implementation (negotiating and signing agreements). The mediation between these different levels is undertaken by institute directors and senior Central Committee or Foreign Ministry officials, not by regular foreign policy bureaucrats, who operate at the level of day-to-day policy. Although some channels for direct scholarly input exist (such as informal personal contacts, classified reports and ad hoc committees), these are usually restricted to senior specialists and constitute a supplementary rather than an essential part of the policy-making process. Georgy Arbatov defined the role of academic institutes in the making of government policy as "to study long-term problems and trends, and to develop fundamental research that can contribute to understanding more deeply and reliably the countries we study." As Hough has stressed, the major contribution of specialist debates lies in affecting gradually the assumptions current within the Soviet foreign policy establishment about how various foreign issues should be interpreted.

This primarily indirect and long-term nature of scholarly influence on foreign policy formation within the Soviet elite needs to be conceptualised as a political process. Such conceptualisation is absent from the method of inference used by
Richard Remnek, who tried to "extract policy-relevant analyses and concrete recommendations from Soviet scholarly literature and determine whether they were later reflected in Soviet policy". Remnek's conclusion "that scholarly influence is limited mainly to areas where the requirements of expertise are high", such as economic aid and trade, is based on a very narrow definition of direct influence which makes it difficult for anything but purely technical advice to qualify. This limited conclusion results from reading the influence of academic specialists back to front, i.e. considering the implementation of policy before analysing scholarly debates, and downplays the more interesting and substantial results of Remnek's analysis, such as the finding that debates among Soviet experts on India in the late 1950s and early 1960s generally undermined some assumptions on which Khrushchev's aid programme was based, although the focus of Soviet policy did not change toward trade rather than aid until after Khrushchev was ousted. This example suggests that a major function of scholarly debates amongst Soviet specialists is to get new issues or new interpretations of old issues onto the agenda of senior bureaucrats and policy-makers, to initiate new policy options as well as discuss the appropriateness of current policy. To understand this feature of Soviet policy formation, empirical research must be undertaken from the perspective of a moving picture rather than a snapshot. This perspective is necessary because of the long-term nature of specialist debates themselves. As Hough has pointed out, not only does the meaning and importance of particular terms change over time, but the "implications of concepts are often much more evident as they are first explained and criticised than when they come to be taken for granted". Therefore, "reading the debates cannot be limited to a brief period", but must be undertaken extensively and with "a clear perception of the historical background against which the changes occur." It is primarily as a means of conceptualising the long-term influence of scholarly debates upon Soviet foreign policy that Griffiths' concept of "transactional perceptions" is useful. The key contribution of this concept is to elucidate the nature of a topical scholarly debate in the USSR as "a foreign policy discussion in disguise", in which "stated perceptions ... derive not so much from
cognition as from political considerations." Some of the features which Griffiths emphasises are basic to political argument in all societies, especially those with large state bureaucracies, but have special importance in the USSR because of the severe restrictions on debate noted above. Griffiths' most general point is that Soviet foreign policy formation should be conceptualised dynamically as a process of "social learning", not statically as the isolated application of certain doctrinal postulates by individual leaders in particular international situations. Although this contrast may seem artificial, it is remarkable how many accounts of Soviet intentions assume that they exist in an immutable form in the ideological silverware, or 'operational code', of the Politburo. Important principles of Soviet policy certainly exist, most clearly in the military sphere, but the key question, as Hough and Seweryn Bialer have both emphasised, is to investigate how these principles change. Such principles are perhaps best seen as definitions or images of an objective situation, which imply a certain Soviet response. Griffiths' study shows that the dominant Soviet image of the United States changed significantly in the 1960s toward a more positive evaluation of the American state's independence from monopoly control, and that during the same period the USSR developed a more collaborative arms control policy toward the United States. He provides much evidence showing that these changes in the terms of debate and policy were interconnected in a mutually reinforcing way (the former increased the advisability of the latter, which in turn increased the credibility of the new definition), and concludes that those responsible for Soviet policy learnt to apply new and improved principles in relation to the USSR's main international adversary.

The one type of evidence conspicuously absent from Griffiths' study is the Kremlinological sort, which attempts to divine the individual subjective views of Politburo members by means of isolated analysis of their few public comments about a particular subject. Griffiths' conceptualisation of Soviet foreign policy formation suggests that Kremlinology has been looking in the wrong place for substantial debate about the basic images or principles informing Soviet policy. The top officials who ultimately take decisions lack the time and specialist expertise required for evaluating, through a detailed consideration of particular
problems, the adequacy of their definition of an objective situation. Usually, they will simply assume such adequacy, but in so doing they will rely on information processed and discussed at lower levels of the hierarchy. In other words, while policy debate is resolved at the top, it is not concentrated there. Some disagreements are no doubt expressed at the top, but as the complex result of what Griffiths terms a broad "politics of perception and learning" involving many subordinate officials and specialists, not as a simple effect of the different ways in which Politburo members subjectively perceive an objective situation. Griffiths suggests that "individual cognition" on the part of those ultimately responsible for Soviet foreign policy is actually "of relatively little importance in the making of policy", except in crisis situations. Even then, when the very short-term nature of decision making would limit influence on policy from lower echelons of the hierarchy, key officials would rely heavily on their personal advisors, who would be aware of different views amongst the Soviet foreign policy establishment. These advisors might choose to ignore unorthodox views rather than pass them on for consideration, leaving an agenda with only different versions of one option rather than different options. But in this case, as academic bosses Evgeny Primakov and Leonid Abalkin argued at the recent CPSU Conference, mistakes would have resulted not just because of the ignorance of leaders, but because of a "process of preparing decisions" which relied on a conservative apparatus instead of a variety of think-tanks.

Griffiths takes as given the strict hierarchical control subordinating bureaucratic policy organisations like academic institutes, the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee's International Department to the top bosses of the Politburo, and looks at how this affects the type of political debate possible within the Soviet elite. While top officials cannot decide everything, and thus depend upon discussion of policy principles and implications occurring beneath them, they can ensure that such discussion does not undermine their authority as stewards of the state. In practice, as George Breslauer has shown, this authority must be strenuously built up and carefully reinforced in relations with subordinates. One important means for this is the control which top officials exert over the relative openness of official Soviet language, a power deriving not
only from the restrictions of central and institutional censorship, but also from
the homogenised character of official Soviet discourse itself. This remains an
unusually impersonal language, repressing subjectivity beneath layer upon layer
of what Alexander Yanov has termed "reinforced-concrete phraseology". The
statements of leaders themselves in this discourse are characteristically given
objective force as repositories of truth rather than subjective force as expressions
of opinion. This ritualised character of official Soviet language provides top
officials with a position of assured semantic superiority over their subordinates.
They can safely elaborate and justify their policies publicly in order to maintain
legitimacy amongst the elite as a whole, while the various opinion groups which
comprise the latter can openly express only views about the adequacy of existing
policy that do not call into question the tenure of current leaders. Top officials
concern themselves with being authoritative leaders, but their subordinates are not
entitled to assess publicly anything beyond the appropriateness of certain
policies.

One consequence of this structure of official Soviet discourse is that discussion
amongst subordinates about the images or principles guiding Soviet policy occurs
through what Griffiths terms "a struggle to arrange the official perceptual
screen". Contributors to a debate do not just express their own views using the
various techniques of esoteric discussion noted above; they express their views in
ways which will seem the most credible in official circles. The term transactional
perceptions refers essentially to the articulation of policy-relevant images "in a
context where participants in a controlled debate seek not so much to express their
own perceptions as to alter the cognitive and instrumental orientations of others"
involved in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. Griffiths has stressed that
political debate within the Soviet elite is not conducted simply over the question of
what is true about an objective situation, but rather over what can legitimately be
said to be true about it in terms of the basic principles of Soviet policy, which can
be somewhat differently defined. In this sense, the elaboration of different
images of an objective situation is "accomplished by screening out or letting
through certain kinds of information and evaluations on which arguments for
policy could properly be based." This dominance within the Soviet elite of an
The idiom of official rather than subjective perception is expressed in the rarity in Soviet publications of the qualification, usual in most bureaucratic environments, that the views expressed are merely those of a work's authors, not the institution they work in. Even books which openly acknowledge the controversial nature of their ideas are written in an idiom which seeks to show that the views put forward are perfectly legitimate. The meaning of this idiom is not that only official views are allowed to exist, since in a modern, complex and very contradictory society like the USSR it is quite impossible to subdue critical attitudes even with totalitarian control over means of communication. Rather, this idiom signifies that here political debate takes a more extremely transactional form than in other bureaucratic hierarchies. In a society where it is good advice to "think what you want, but keep your tongue behind your teeth", people are unlikely to state their private views openly, and in print they will usually take care to see that challenging interpretations criticising current policy are "buried in otherwise routine professions of orthodoxy."

Thus the language of public debate within the Soviet elite has been politicised in a restricted, paradoxical way. Affirmatory parts of official Soviet discourse constitute ritual chaff in the guise of political commentary, while definitions of the outside world represent a "subtext" of conflicting political arguments formulated by different opinion groups in the Soviet elite. The difference between propaganda and genuinely political debate corresponds to an important distinction, highlighted by Maria Markus, between "overt and covert modes of legitimation" in Soviet-type societies after Stalin. The language of 'Marxism-Leninism' "has been restricted to definite public occasions alone", where, in the words of Eugene Varga's 'Political Testament', "it is confined to the pronouncement of dogmatic, abstract slogans which do not succeed in making a profound impression on anyone." Markus suggests that, having proven quite inadequate as a mode of legitimation, this overt ideology was transformed "into a kind of verbal ritual, serving ... the merely repressive function of monopolisation of 'public speech'", i.e. the "depoliticisation of the masses". While the ritualisation of overt ideology has been widely noted, she argues that it has been "accompanied by the ever-growing weight of 'covert' legitimating practices",
including the practice of tolerating a limited heterogeneity of political opinion within the elite, in order to legitimate policies "which otherwise could not be stated clearly." This is not a voluntary 'de-ideologisation' but rather a necessary 're-ideologisation', in which new, covert rhetorical arguments have been quietly incorporated into official Soviet discourse, because, unlike the dogmas of 'Marxism-Leninism', they help top officials justify their rule to the elite as a whole. While not reducing the depoliticisation of the masses, this extension of official vocabularies has increased the linguistic scope for debate within the Soviet elite, facilitating a greater variety of views and the gradual emergence of a competitive specialist environment. This environment did not blossom until the Gorbachev era, but it was growing before then, and many of the new policy initiatives introduced under Gorbachev would have been inconceivable without the concepts elaborated in previous discussion at lower levels of the policy-making hierarchy.

Griffiths suggests that key participants in Soviet debates form "highly informal coalitions of officials and specialists," who "struggle to influence party policy by securing support for a definition" of the objective situation which implies that their preferred policy is the best. Such coalitions include interpersonal relations based upon friendship and shared experiences, but are not limited to these; given the highly atomised nature of Soviet society, two scholars may be informal members of the same opinion group while meeting only rarely if at all. What links these like-minded "individuals from a variety of institutions and different political levels into informal groups" is simply their common support for particular perspectives, since such groups can only consult indirectly, through the aggregation of their public statements. Regular foreign policy bureaucrats may decide minor matters, but they would not usually be members of what Brown has termed the key "issue networks -- made up of people who can expect to get a hearing on a particular issue or policy area because of their relevant knowledge." The concentration of long-term debate in academic institutes is indicated by political directives from top officials in the post-Stalin era, and by the failure of an attempt in the mid 1960s to establish a "special Directorate for Foreign Policy Planning" within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, incorporating
The most famous directive was a statement at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 by Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan, who, in reference to the operational inactivity of IVAN, said that: "If the entire East has awakened during our time, then this institute still dozes until the present day." Brezhnev's instruction at the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 that "it is necessary to put an end to the notion, current among part of our cadres, that the social sciences have a merely propagandistic significance," reflected the growing importance of academic institutes, although their expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not accompanied by a lightening of the dead weight of propaganda. Institute directors have been particularly important in coordinating policy-relevant research, but during the 'years of stagnation' some of them were inclined to impose views of "an instructive-directive character", which, as Anatoly Butenko noted in 1983, "contradict the very nature of scientific research". In late 1988, the first deputy director of IVAN admitted that science had been "reduced to the task of a propagandistic service defending the latest turn-around of the political course", adding that "in order to benefit the international activity of the state, ... orientalist politology must be 'autonomous' from practical authorities in posing research tasks and in determining its conclusions." Yet, in the 1970s leading Soviet orientalists had 'leapt ahead' with their own work, despite not being encouraged at the time.

As well as conceptualising political perceptions and debate within the Soviet elite as transactional rather than subjective, Griffiths suggests two reading techniques for interpreting empirical material. First, he argues that the lack of a clear doctrinal framework encompassing contrasting specialist views "suggests that a more specific designation of the various images should await an examination of the policy objectives involved." Conceptualising such objectives is notoriously difficult, because actual policy is usually determined by trade-offs between conflicting goals, but it is still crucial. Griffiths himself discusses the objectives and general conduct of Soviet policy after considering in detail the images constructed in specialist debates, endeavouring to demonstrate a "broad correspondence between the diverse tendencies in Soviet policy toward the United States and the diverse arguments expressed in inner-party debate on the nature of
the adversary". His account of Soviet policy tendencies is very general and not closely tied with his previous analysis of policy-relevant images, which suggests that basic Soviet policy objectives should be considered briefly before an analysis of specialist debates, and reviewed later in the light of the particular views discovered. Second, he suggests "the desirability of sacrificing some empirical material in order to bring out the theoretical and incipient policy dimensions of contrasting Soviet images", but qualifies this later by saying that: "A wider sample of the available literature, particularly if it emphasised quality and included press and radio reports, might yield somewhat different images, and would certainly be far richer in empirical references than is true of the constructs to be discussed here." This remark fails to distinguish theoretically between a practice of 'sacrificing' empirical material, which if it included quality sources rather than the chaff of policy affirmation would be a mistake, and the absolutely necessary process of abstracting certain material in order to focus on the most important connections, before considering the rest of the relevant material altogether again, though "this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations". If Griffiths had included press and radio reports in his analysis, then the result would have been not empirically richer but poorer, because of the inherent nature of such material. The key problem of interpretation is to determine precisely which parts of a discourse are the richest, and to know what they mean. This problem raises fundamental philosophical questions, which must now be discussed.

The Interpretation of Political Meaning

The preceding two sections have considered the forms and character of foreign policy debate within the Soviet elite, but not the most important theoretical problem of analysis, which is how one can gain accurate knowledge of the content of such debate. Practically, this problem is solved by extensive, well-informed reading, but the theoretical question remains: what is a well-informed reading? What methodological assumptions are necessary in order to know that one interpretation is more accurate than another? This
question must be faced, since even intuition and guesswork are based on prior knowledge and assumptions. Philosophically, this question concerns epistemology, or the practice of knowing Soviet debates, whereas the issues discussed in the two previous sections were largely matters of ontology, or the existential characteristics of these debates. These two aspects of knowledge are interdependent but distinct. While the relevance of this distinction may not be immediately apparent, it is arguable that many errors of inference from Soviet sources have partly resulted from insufficient attention to epistemology leading to overly general ontological assumptions. The point of a philosophical discussion is to clarify conceptual puzzles, so that empirical work can proceed in a clearer and more fruitful manner. Such discussion is not an end in itself, merely a means of making implicit assumptions explicit, and hence more clearly effective and open to greater scrutiny. As Hanna Pitkin has summarised Ludwig Wittgenstein's advice to political scientists: "You already are using philosophy, but in blind, fragmented, distorted forms of which you are only dimly aware. These forms control your thought more than you know, impose themselves on you, and prevent rather than promote the accurate perception of reality."

This injunction to philosophise about problems of interpretation forms part of a critique of the key assumption of a positivist or empiricist methodology, which is that the facts speak for themselves. In Western studies of Soviet foreign policy, this assumption has often obscured the provisionality of fundamental, bridging assumptions about the semantic content of 'Soviet ideology'. Many analysts, when faced with a lot of dense doctrinal rhetoric which appears unrelated to either the empirical parts of Soviet writing or the general trends of Soviet policy, have seen such material as simply legitimating Soviet 'national interests', which are calculated within the time-honoured framework of Machiavellian realism. The problem with this essentially pragmatic view is not that the lack of importance which it accords to Soviet doctrinal discourse is necessarily wrong, but that no clear methodological arguments are given for considering this an appropriate approach to interpreting Soviet sources. This empiricism is accompanied by one revealing assumption highlighted by Vendulka Kubalkova, who notes that unargued dismissals of Soviet doctrinal discourse
"imply that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is no more than a fig leaf that conceals a quite ordinary Realpolitik that denies to the Soviet mind any separate existence and, by implication, leads us at one and the same time to believe that the Western mind and modes of thought might boast of an essentially universal nature."^102

The pragmatic view, which assumes that Soviet writing only makes sense in Western terms, was most evident in 'convergence theory', which saw the separation of Soviet economic and political analysis as a positive step because such separation is prevalent in the West.^103 A clear indication of the methodological disorientation of this view is its continued use of the terms 'left' and 'right' to denote different political positions within the Soviet elite. If these terms are meant to signify fundamental differences about the nature and objectives of the Soviet state, then they have not been clearly applicable to the USSR since the Left Opposition was purged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When they are applied, it is revealing that their analytical usage in pragmatic Western discourse about Soviet perceptions is actually the reverse of their political usage within the USSR. In the former, 'left' persons in the USSR are considered orthodox and dogmatic, i.e. neo-Stalinist, but within the Soviet elite itself, as Alexander Zinoviev has reported, someone who articulated clear criticism of Stalin and a toleration of Yugoslav and Chinese views was thought to have gone "so far to the left that I constantly had to restrain him."^104

Against the pragmatic assumption of a dialogue in Western terms, many analysts have maintained that, in the doctrinal parts of Soviet discourse, the USSR's hostile foreign policy "intentions are actually laid bare before us" through the framework of Marxism-Leninism.^105 The main problem with this essentially idealist view is simply that it never answers its own basic question: what is Marxism-Leninism?^106 This view considers Marxism-Leninism as an 'operational code' which motivates Soviet actions, but all attempts to specify this postulated doctrinal code have used terms so banal and general that they apply to most other states as well as to the USSR.^107 The reason for this vagueness has been highlighted by Rachel Walker, who argues that Western interpretations of Marxism-Leninism have been based on erroneous assumptions about its nature. She points out that "in Soviet terms Marxism-Leninism effectively means
"everything and nothing" — from whatever the CPSU has ever said, to specific doctrines like 'histmat' and 'diamat', to traits of desirable Soviet citizens such as 'ideological dedication' and a 'spirit of collectivism'. The implication of this variety of usages is that Marxism-Leninism is not an ontologically independent body of ideas, but "an inclusionary/exclusionary device" signifying what in a particular context is politically permissible behaviour. As Yuri Afanas'ev recently said:

The basic features of [Marxism-Leninism] remain till now in the same form in which they crystallised in the 1930s. Precisely then Marxism-Leninism hardened in the capacity of a dogmatic scholastic ideology, and became an obstacle to, not an aid for, understanding the contemporary world.

Since then, the words 'Marx' and 'Lenin' in most Soviet discourse have not been references to real people whose ideas provide a guide for action, but symbols of authority which have been used to legitimate any point of view. In this light, the substantial amount of doctrinal rhetoric present in Soviet sources is evidence not of a common framework of analysis, but of the presence of underlying debate which has to be kept within strict limits. As Malcolm has aptly pointed out, "the coin of central party control and ideological uniformity has two sides to it. To put it crudely, the forces of order are arrayed so impressively only because the forces of anarchy confronting them require it." The bridging assumption of the idealist view, that Soviet perceptions and policy are directly observable in highly ritualised official Soviet discourse, contains a double omission. Not only is the supposed conceptual framework of Soviet ideology left undefined, but the doctrinal passages which this view highlights as of great conceptual importance are in fact indications of something else, which most versions of the idealist view discount: serious public discussion within the Soviet elite about different policy perspectives.

Both these traditional Western responses to the problem of doctrinal rhetoric in Soviet sources have led to conceptual confusion because they have not engaged dialogically with the depth and complexity of political meaning implicit in these sources, in spite of strict censorship. Methodologically, each view has emphasised one type of Soviet discourse while disregarding another, thus assuming that one
aspect alone of this discourse contains the full meaning of the whole. Yet, it is fundamental to the practice of interpretation that parts and wholes should be read together, not separately. In order to understand the parts of a discourse they must be read in the context of the whole, while the whole itself can only be read through interpreting its parts. As Charles Taylor has expressed this interconnectedness of readings, known as 'the hermeneutical circle': "we are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole."\textsuperscript{112} This circle cannot be broken, only recognised and moved within in a process of "continual checking and re-checking".\textsuperscript{113} Taylor points out that an interpretation can never be grounded in 'brute data' which are themselves beyond question, unable to be read in another way. The criteria for evaluating the adequacy of conflicting interpretations of the political meaning of a particular statement always involve other, generally-agreed meanings, not pure facts which exist in a pre-meaningful state. Hermeneutics, as the art of interpretation, is essentially concerned with clarifying unclear meanings by reference to meanings which are relatively clear. As Taylor notes, the aim of interpretation is "to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense" in meaningful material "which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory -- in one way or another, unclear."\textsuperscript{114} While this aim is present wherever the art of interpretation is used, understanding another conceptual world requires that several methodological points be recognised, so that the gap between the interpreter and the foreign material can be bridged in a clarifying rather than a confusing way.

The basic problem facing any analyst who begins reading foreign material is to be able "to tell an interesting fact from a bad translation."\textsuperscript{115} As Martin Hollis has helpfully pointed out, this abstraction of significant material from commonplace statements must be made initially on the basis of an \textit{a priori} assumption that the discourse containing this material is rationally constructed.\textsuperscript{116} Without such an assumption there would be no common referent from which an interpretation could begin. In order to understand foreign statements, the analyst
must not only consider the relations between terms in them, but also establish "definitive interpretations of enough terms to restrict possible renderings of others," by assuming to begin with that, where some terms refer to situations known also to the analyst, then the author of the foreign statements "perceives very much what [the analyst] perceives and says about it very much what [the analyst] would say." In other words, the analyst must assume that the statements in question were made by someone with a similar capacity for perceiving rationally the logic of an objective situation. This *a priori* "bridgehead" of common rationality is necessary in order to identify the operative rules of communication with which the discourse was constructed, since "even at the empirical stage irrational utterances are to be interpreted by knowing when it would be rational to utter them."  

While this initial bridgehead is not an empirical but an *a priori* assumption, i.e. a belief which is logically necessary in order to interpret evidence, not simply a belief about particular evidence, it needs supplementing by beliefs of the latter type. Where the analyst is unsure of the meaning of terms used, an *a priori* assumption of some common meanings has to provide a basis for interpreting the consistency of a discourse, and hence its coherent meaning as a whole. Hollis points out that when we are familiar with the stock of terms used, "we ask the meaning of a token before asking whether it was rationally uttered. But, where the stock is in doubt, the relation is the other way. If the utterance seems outrageous, there is an automatic case for finding it another meaning". While some common meanings are needed *a priori*, which meanings, and how extensive they are, is a matter for empirical clarification. In other words, a bridging assumption is unavoidable, but it must take the form of an empirical specification or delimitation of the meaning of key terms, achieved "by identifying certain fundamental issues which must be addressed in any language and imputing rationality ... in the treatment of those issues by the 'Other Mind'." Once a bridgehead's common meanings have been established *a priori*, the empirical hypotheses coming from it must be revised in the light of the evidence discovered. This revision may extend retrospectively to aspects of the bridgehead itself, "but there are wholly crucial limits' to the extent of such changes tolerable without the
effective abandonment of the decoding proposal defined by that particular bridgehead." This is a limited but essential function, enabling an analysis of the political meaning of Soviet statements to be more than simply a descriptive or speculative translated exposition. As Hollis has written, "the point ... is not that the same plain facts stare everyone in the face, but that the Enquirer has to assume an overlap, since, where everything is a hypothesis, nothing could count as evidence."

Since rationality is socially and historically variable as well as logically uniform, empirical investigations of a bridgehead's hypotheses can proceed "only after the Enquirer has imputed the right degree of the right sort of rationality." As Colin Sumner has argued in commenting on the decoding assumption proposed by Hollis, "to assume rationality a priori is vacuous unless it has empirical viability", because "to discover the rationality of a statement in a particular social context one would need to know the details of the social context, broadly defined." This implies that the rationality of a foreign discourse "should not be located solely within the practitioner's mind" as a series of "normative or ideological codes", but considered as the "internal logic of a social practice", through which the meaning of the discourse is expressed. This point follows also from a recognition of the social rather than personal nature of meaning itself, and the fact that the meaning of terms is not fixed in relation to definite objects but rather consists in their referential use. Both these points were clarified by Wittgenstein, who stressed that "nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity!" A particular meaning is not a private mental experience, but an element of social communication, which can only be understood in the circumstances of its expression ("the meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it"). Wittgenstein used the term 'language-game' to emphasise that meaning is active and practical, not reflective and contemplative. "Just as the significance of a piece of chess is determined by its role in the game, so too the meaning of an expression is dependent upon its use in the language-game wherein it occurs." Language-games cannot be
understood apart from the forms of life in which they exist, so the meaning of words cannot be separated from how they are used. The upshot of this has been stated by Mihailo Markovic as one of the rules or conditions of effective communication: "In order to be adequate, an interpretation should take account of the context as a whole."\textsuperscript{130}

The importance of considering the context of a text when interpreting it has been a major theme in the methodological writing of a leading historian of ideas, Quentin Skinner, who argues that the meaning which an author conveys cannot be adequately inferred by simply reading a text over and over again, without relating it to the "context of prevailing conventions and assumptions" through which the meaning was expressed.\textsuperscript{131} He claims that understanding an author's intentions in writing something is crucial, because the point or immanent meaning of a text is essentially characterised by what an author tried to do in communicating the ideas expressed in a text.\textsuperscript{132} This conception of writing as an activity makes it possible to understand an author's intended meaning, since the latter is seen as something made public in a text itself, not as a private aim which is inaccessible to others.\textsuperscript{133} Skinner suggests that "the idea of studying what a writer is doing is a crucially and I think a fruitfully ambiguous one -- ambiguous as between the study of what the writer has done intentionally and what we may correctly say he has achieved, whether or not all the effects were intentionally brought off."\textsuperscript{134} Sometimes a text may be expressed poorly, so that its meaning is less than the author intended. Alternatively, Skinner notes that an author's text may sometimes achieve far more than he can possibly have intended or may be disposed to say he meant. We may wish to argue, in the case of avowed intentions, that he seems uninterested or incompetent in giving a full or accurate characterisation of what he has done. Or we may wish to invoke the well-known fact that, in the case of any complex action, an alert and dispassionate observer may often be in a better position than the agent himself to discern the subtlest patterns of meaning underlying what has been done.\textsuperscript{135}

In cases where an author intends more than he can admit to mean, Skinner agrees with Hollis that a characterisation of the author's intentions requires also an account of the author's motives, both for intending something other than is
apparent and for covering this with certain professed principles, which, as Skinner points out, will constrain what can possibly be meant. Particularly where writers are forced to use "oblique strategies" in order to get their message across, an investigation of a text's social context is essential for deciding which interpretation best captures "what conventionally recognisable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate." Skinner rejects the simplistic view that the contents of any text can be deduced from its social context, but insists that, where there is doubt about the meaning of a text, "the context itself can be used as a sort of court of appeal for assessing the relative plausibility of incompatible ascriptions of intentionality." If this court is not summoned, there is what A.P. Simonds has termed the "great danger" of isolated textual analysis becoming "a license for parochial interpretation", in which "the interpreter slips easily into the assumption that the text mandates whatever meaning he (the reader) finds familiar."

Given Wittgenstein's conception of the acquisition of language-games as "an eminently practical process ('the mastering of a technique'), guaranteed only by participation in the appropriate form of life", knowledge of the context of a text appears possible only from inside that context itself, not by means of theoretical clarification by an outside interpreter. Assuming the inaccessibility of a form of life to non-participants leads to a relativist regress, in which the world can only be made up of isolated language-games which have meaning only for their players and are untranslatable for foreigners. Wittgenstein never bothered to define the limits of a form of life, because there are no strict limits; forms of life interact and hence are commensurable to some degree, not isolated. As Roy Bhaskar has argued, every genuine communicative act or episode requires some overlap in context for it to be possible, and some diversity in beliefs and practical interests for it to be necessary; therefore, a language-game is by definition open to outside interpretation, including critique, since views held by participants in a form of life can be wrong. This implies that an interpreter cannot be a "detached observer", but must be a sort of semi-participant, in order to understand the context for interpretation. As Taylor has suggested, "you
understand the key terms to the extent that you have some grasp of what would be
the appropriate thing for a participant to do in certain situations. ... Some degree
of participant's know-how, some ability to 'call' the right responses, even if for a
host of other reasons, including insufficient command of the language, you could
not actually wade in there and participate, is an essential part of
understanding."

Such understanding is achieved through a mediation of language-games, which
Hans-Georg Gadamer has described as a "fusion of horizons" between interpreter
and interpreted.145 The presence of "two 'minds'" in an interpretation was
stressed by Bakhtin, who argued that "any true understanding is dialogic in
nature."146 Yet the problem with written texts, as Paul Ricoeur has emphasised,
is that they are not simply dialogic means of communication, since writing
establishes a separation in time and space between the author and reader. Ricoeur
terms this separation a "distanciation", in which "the work decontextualises itself,
from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, and is able to
recontextualise itself differently in the act of reading." In contrast to speech, a
written text is open to all sorts of readings. He argues that "distanciation is not
the product of methodology and hence something superfluous and parasitical;
rather, it is constitutive of the phenomenon of the text as writing", so that it
conditions any interpretation, and constitutes "what understanding must
overcome". In other words, the text does have its own questions, but they are not
referred to, as in speech; indeed, "the task of reading, qua interpretation, will be
precisely to fulfill the reference", i.e. to spell out the questions to which a text
presents its answers, saying why they are important for the reader as well.
Ricoeur insists that this appropriation of a text's frame of reference must be
achieved not by imagining what the author wanted to say, but by understanding
the "objective meaning" or "proposed world" evident in "the kind of things the
text is about." He suggests that, in appropriating the meaning of a text, "what we
want to understand is not something hidden behind the text, but something
disclosed in front of it." Here, the hermeneutical circle operates not between the
reader and author as two subjects, nor as the projection of the subjectivity of the
reader into the reading, but rather between the reader's horizon of understanding
and the kind of world opened up by the text itself.\textsuperscript{147}

While this suggestion is useful, its sense needs to be specified, because Ricoeur is ambiguous about whether a text has any intrinsic meaning, connected with the context in which it was written, or whether its meaning is determined, not merely discovered, by its reader. The latter view leads to a relativist regress, in which different readings cannot be judged as more or less adequate fulfilments of what Ricoeur terms "the injunction of the text", but merely considered, tautologically, as 'different'.\textsuperscript{148} As Bhaskar argues, it is necessary to consider the object of interpretation as meaningful in itself, for otherwise there would literally be nothing to understand apart from oneself. Priority must be given to the meaning of a text for a particular audience, usually the original audience for whom the text was written, and "to this extent it is salutary to remember the old hermeneutic dictum that meaning must be read out of, not into, a text."\textsuperscript{149} What the interpreter reads out of the text is the particular world, or horizon of concerns, projected to its audience by the author. As Bhaskar notes, the author's intentions in writing the text must be referred to -- they are after all the reason for the text -- but they are not the object of interpretation by themselves; rather, this object comprises the questions of practical life which the author addresses in the text, and by means of which the text finds its readers.\textsuperscript{150} The world of texts is not made up only of the history of ideas, as Skinner and Collingwood claim.\textsuperscript{151} The clash of ideas which texts constitute should be investigated not on a rarefied plane, but "in the light of knowledge of material circumstances to which the contested ideas relate".\textsuperscript{152} An author's public views about such circumstances constitute the 'objective meaning' which is 'in front of' the text. And by understanding such circumstances, as well as an author, the interpreter best advances knowledge of the society in question. In this sense, an open, 'dialogical materialist' framework can accommodate Ricoeur's definition of the art of textual interpretation as "the sort of inquiry concerned with the power of a work to project a world of its own and to set in motion the hermeneutical circle, which encompasses in its spiral both the apprehension of projected worlds and the advance of self-understanding in the presence of these new worlds."\textsuperscript{153}
The most important general consideration for assessing the adequacy of
different interpretations of political meaning is that understanding a text is
complemented, not contradicted, by explaining how it came to be written, i.e.
identifying the basic questions or practical issues which occasioned it.\textsuperscript{154} Since,
as Bhaskar argues,

judgements about beliefs cannot be separated from judgements about activity,
judgements about meaning -- again presupposing a two-way resolution (in the
shape of a dialogical fusion of horizons) -- are inseparable from judgements
about explanatory adequacy. Thus the so-called 'problem of the indeterminacy
of translation' ... can only be resolved in practice by selecting that translation
which is \textit{explanatorily most adequate} (whether or not it is most charitable) in
the context of what is already known about the organisation of the particular
society in question (and of societies in general) -- a context which may well of
course be modified by the explanatory choice. The most adequate explanation
will save the maximum of significant phenomena in the subject-matter at issue,
showing in that subject-matter precisely the degree and type of irrationality
that does so. ... Some social practices are vague, others are ambiguous and
they should be described accordingly. ...The only general rules to follow are:
(i) engage dialogically with one's subject; (ii) maximise total explanatory
power; and (iii) make one's analysis as precise, but only as precise, as
'the nature of the subject permits'.\textsuperscript{155}

These general rules of interpretation express what Michael Slote has termed the
"Principle of Unlimited Inquiry", which is the most basic procedure of scientific
inference. According to this principle, it is unreasonable for an interpreter to put
forward an "inquiry limiting hypothesis", which rules out the possibility of
further warranted explanations of the subject-matter at issue.\textsuperscript{156} When reading a
text, it is unreasonable to assume that all the words are being used to mean exactly
what they should literally mean, or even that the significance of a topic is just
what it appears to be and nothing more, unless it can be shown that it would be
irrational for anyone to play other, oblique language-games, because this would
so disrupt the stock of terms as to make communication itself impossible. Of
course, what games are actually being played is an empirical question to be
determined by reading the material in question, and there are no special
procedures for generating plausible readings. As Eric Hirsch has written, "the act
of understanding is at first a genial (or a mistaken) guess and there are no
methods for making guesses, no rules for generating insights".\textsuperscript{157} The art of
textual interpretation must rely on what Sumner has called our five ordinary ways of reading: "Repetition, assumption, inconsistency, neglect and substance are all read routinely as significant discursive phenomena." These everyday forms of insight are powerful, but naturally they cannot guarantee the adequacy of an interpretation. For, as Bhaskar reminds us, it is characteristic of the practice of interpreting meaning that it is "a skilled, and only contingently successful (if and when, indeed, it is) achievement".

The difficulty of this achievement in Soviet studies has resulted partly from the dominance of monological rather than dialogical views in Soviet society itself, and partly from an interpretative shallowness which has seen the ideological 'braking mechanism' of Marxism-Leninism as a ready-made set of answers rather than an obscure set of questions. The cacophony of noise which constitutes Soviet ideology has either been seen as something peripheral to understanding Soviet debates, or as something which explains the insignificance of such debates, when it is precisely this noise itself which needs to be explained, so that the specific features and content of discussion within the Soviet elite can be better understood. Whereas, according to the careful methodological advice of Hollis, "the Other Mind ... is to be made rational where possible, irrational, where necessary, and never non-rational at all", in much Western discourse about Soviet foreign policy the non-rational category has slipped in through the back door in the form of an implicit 'too hard' basket. Manifest absurdities in Soviet discourse have been passed over, rather than taken as indications of the social complexity shrouding public political argument within the Soviet elite. When an interpreter has noticed significant absurdities, the analysis has usually stopped half-way instead of being taken to its logical conclusion. Morton Schwartz, having documented the increasing pessimism of Soviet commentary about the third world in the early 1970s, remarked perspicaciously that "it is difficult to take Moscow's theoretical pronouncements regarding the 'non-capitalist path of development' seriously", and added that, given the economic backwardness of developing countries, Soviet "talk of the transition to socialism becomes patent nonsense." Yet, while of the opinion that "Soviet attitudes and policies regarding leftist regimes in the third world are solely a function of raison d'état", he did not ask what the implications
of such an assessment are for the political meaning of key terms in official Soviet discourse, such as 'socialism', 'non-capitalist development' and the like. His pragmatic interpretation of Soviet ideology had found a new stock of terms, but he appeared not to appreciate the need to revise the empirical content of his bridgehead.\textsuperscript{161} The lesson of this is that a bridgehead should be carefully and firmly established in the first place, so that the interpreter can be fairly sure of which question an author is attempting to answer, and for what audience. As Hollis has written:

The pass mark must be high enough to help us decide whether he believes what he seems to say or means what he seems to believe. The more secure the bridgehead, the lower is the score which has to be imputed. Interpretative charity is a virtue in moderation, a vice in excess.\textsuperscript{162}

Moderation in imputing rationality depends on knowing the questions of practical life which particular Soviet authors writing about development are likely to have been interested in answering. The next chapter considers the historical contexts of Soviet development debates, in order to establish these questions at a general level, before investigating in detail the various answers which different scholars have given.
Chapter 1, Footnotes:

1. Cf. a passage of R.G. Collingwood's *Autobiography*: "I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer" (cited in A.P. Simonds, "Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge", *Cultural Hermeneutics*, vol. 3, no.1, May 1975, pp. 91-2).


4. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp. 134-5. Mills notes that: "For the classic social scientist, neither method nor theory is an autonomous domain; methods are methods for some range of problems; theories are theories of some range of phenomena. They are like the language of the country you live in: it is nothing to brag about that you can speak it, but it is a disgrace and an inconvenience if you cannot." (Ibid.)

5. Robert Marc Cutler, *Soviet Debates over the conduct of foreign policy toward Western Europe: four case studies, 1971-1975*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan, 1982, p. 42. This greater complexity of Soviet policy making in the post-Stalin era led to the development by Western political scientists of 'pluralist' and 'corporatist' images of Soviet politics, to replace the 'totalitarian' image, which by the 1960s was seen by many scholars as "very unsatisfactory" (Brown, loc.cit., p. 38). If these new images have not provided an explanation of power relations within the Soviet elite, they have allowed questions to be asked about the extension of policy debates within the Soviet elite since Stalin. In this sense, as Hough and Brown have suggested, there is little to choose between them (Jerry Hough, "Pluralism, Corporatism and the Soviet Union" in Susan Gross Solomon ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union*, Macmillian, London, 1983, p. 49ff; Archie Brown, "Political Power and the Soviet State: Western and Soviet perspectives", in Neil Harding ed., *The State in Socialist Society*, Macmillan, London, 1984, p. 87; cf. also Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas C. Remington, *Politics in the USSR*, 3rd ed., Little Brown, Boston, 1986, pp. 253-4). Donald Kelley, after a quite extensive discussion of two relatively sophisticated models which elaborate the 'pluralist' and 'corporatist' images (namely, the group interaction or bureaucratic pluralism model similar to Hough's model of 'institutionalised pluralism', and a "systems model of policy planning and evaluation"), concludes that "the models thus far offered by students of Soviet politics have proven to be far too simplistic to deal with an ever-increasing degree of social and institutional complexity" ("Group and Specialist Influence in Soviet Politics: in search of a theory", in Richard Remnek ed., *Social Scientists and Policy Making in the USSR*, Praeger, New York, 1977, p. 133).

6. Mary McAuley, "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps
7. Cf. Michael Scriven, "Causes, Connections and Conditions in History", in W.H. Dray ed., *Philosophical Analysis and History*, Harper and Row, New York, 1966, p. 251: "There is no magic about explicit inferences that makes them any more reliable than trained immediate diagnosis, and the empathists and *verstehen* theorists were right to recognise the peculiar virtues of the human instrument in diagnosing human behaviour." Scriven is here criticising the positivist method of subsuming historical explanations beneath deductive laws (the poverty of which is carefully demonstrated by Alan Donagan, "The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered", in *ibid.*.) and his point does not imply that the assumptions upon which empathetic inferences are made should be left in the dark.

8. Erik P. Hoffmann, "Methodological Problems of Kremlinology", in Frederic J. Fleron ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: essays on methodology and empirical theory*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1969, p. 136. This insight is difficult to combine with Hoffmann's adoption of Carl Hempel's "covering law" model, which assumes "that empirical generalisations are an essential component of any explanation" (*ibid.*, p. 130). The term 'generalisation' is used very often in a loose manner, but empirically helpful rather than misleading generalisations can only be made by abstracting the essential characteristics of something and then looking for similarities with other things. Sensible generalisation is therefore dependent upon some prior explanation of the nature of a thing, not *vice versa*. See Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science: a realist approach*, Hutchinson, London, 1984, pp. 90-5, 218-9.


12. As Breslauer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 14-5, argues, public speeches and debate are very significant in themselves, even if they do not exactly reflect the private discussions of Soviet officials, which of course are closely guarded.


14. An order of the Polish censoring body in the mid 1970s said: "Do not permit the publication of information concerning possible limitations on the freedom of movement of political activists or Communist parties in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, Iraq, Libya or Syria" (reprinted in Jane Leftwich Curry ed., *The Black Book of Polish Censorship*, Vintage, New York, 1984, p. 140). It is most likely that a similar order existed in the USSR at the same time, although in mid 1987 Georgy Mirsky, the leading Soviet expert on the Arab world, openly described Iraq as a "Bonapartist" regime, with "two terrorist faces", one directed against the feudal past and the other "against a democratic alternative" (in "Evoliutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1987, no. 3, p. 159). While Gorbachev has much reduced political censorship, Anatoly Strelyany, a member of the editorial board of *Novy Mir* in mid 1987, reportedly told students at Moscow University that "an enormous book of what is not allowed" still existed then (quoted in Iain Elliot, "How Open is 'Openness'?", *Survey*, vol. 30, no. 3, October 1988, p. 13).


17. Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolution in the Soviet World View", *World Politics*, vol. XXXII,
18. Ronald Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1980, p. 18. Hill's descriptive term "'heavy' political science" would perhaps be better as "'heavy' social science", since the discipline of political science has yet to be formally accorded independent institutional status in the USSR, and serious scholarly work there is by no means limited to the type of research which would be considered political science in Britain or the USA. The case for an "institute of political theory" was recently re-stated by the President of the Soviet Political Sciences Association, Georgy Shakhnazarov, "Nauka o Politike", *Pravda*, 26/9/88, p. 6.


23. Neil Malcolm, *Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics*, Macmillan, London, 1984, p. 17. The number of copies printed (tirazh) may be used as a general guide-of-thumb concerning whether a particular source is predominantly academic or popular. As Jerry Hough (The *Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, p. 200) has noted, there "tends to be a strong relationship between the number of copies printed of a book or journal and the conventionality of the ideas published in it" -- of those Soviet works published between 1965 and 1969 which presented a new view of the American political system, 67% appeared in editions of less than 5,000 copies, and none in editions of more than 10,000.

24. A clear example of such an error is the assertion of R. Judson Mitchell (Ideology of a Superpower*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1982, p. 85) that the following statement in late 1979 by long-time International Department Secretary Boris Ponomarev was an extension of a doctrine of "revolutionary violence" to "areas where Soviet power has not yet been established", "particularly in countries around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf". Ponomarev said: "Soviet people are not indifferent to the socio-political orientations reflected in the various trends within the developing world. The devotees of scientific socialism have no intention of denying their spiritual closeness to the progressive forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Sympathy with fighters for true freedom is natural for Marxist-Leninists and internationalists. Where such fighters exist and are struggling, they have the right to depend on our solidarity and support" ("Neodolimost' osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia", *Kommunist*, 1980, no. 1, p. 23). Although taken from an article in the CPSU's main ideological journal just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there is nothing at all in this statement (or in the rest of the article) to suggest that the substantial military action which the USSR had undertaken would be generalised "around the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf". The article emphasises another piece of standard Soviet rhetoric, that the USSR and its allies "have always been against the export of revolution", and asserts that current day revolutions in Asia "must have deep internal causes", as well as disclaiming Western propaganda about the "hand of Moscow" being behind changes in the third world. The only explicit mention of Afghanistan is one paragraph about the "April revolution" in a chronological survey of recent political transformations in the third world from Ethiopia to Nicaragua and Iran. The paragraph before the affirmative piece which Mitchell quotes explicitly limits the discussion to "revolutionary movements directed against pro-Western elites which arise from time to time in this or that country", i.e. situations where
pro-Western elites are overthrown because of social or political contradictions which they cannot control, not as a result of intervention from without. In asserting that one rhetorical gesture of general support for unnamed "progressive forces" is an argument for Soviet military action in countries well beyond its southern borders, Mitchell has completely ignored the complex process through which Soviet policy is formed, as well as distorted into sensational terms the meaning of a fairly regular piece of ideological affirmation. According to the careful research of Franklyn J.C. Griffiths, *Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behaviour toward the United States*, Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1972, pp. 282, 170, 251, Ponomarev has in the post-Stalin era been a moderate conservative rather than a reactionary one.


28. Cutler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15-6, suggests that in the Soviet propaganda-making hierarchy it is 'theoretical' thinkers who are on top and 'uncommitted' thinkers who are in the middle, but his distinction between these two groups is unclear, and he does not consider the role in this hierarchy of top officials, who must surely be ultimately as responsible for Soviet propaganda as they are for major policy decisions. Soviet dissident Valentin Turchin (*The Inertia of Fear*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981, pp. 37-8) argued in response to Robert Conquest that the top bosses in the Politburo clearly distinguish between dogma and interest, or in other words propaganda and policy; his view that, having made their decision "on a strictly political plane", then "they told some *apparatchiik* to formulate that conclusion 'in the most scholastic terms'; and round up the requisite quotations" suggests that in the propaganda hierarchy the 'theoretical' thinkers must still be in the middle. This view is supported by L. Gudkov, Yu. Levada, A. Levinson, L. Sedov, *"Biurokratizm i biurokratiiia: neobkhodimost' utochnenii"*, *Kommunist*, 1988, no. 12, pp. 77, 80, who borrow the title of Turchin's book as part of their description of Stalin's bureaucratic system.


30. Hough, *Struggle*, p. 30; Griffiths, p. 225: "Innovating interpretations were frequently buried in otherwise routine professions of orthodoxy."

31. Hough, *Struggle*, p. 16. Hough's classification of debating techniques is very clear, but his third rule ("that the Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis must never be challenged") is hardly a strict constraint, because it is altogether doubtful whether such an analytical framework actually exists within the Soviet foreign policy establishment, as Hough recognises when he notes that "it is possible to find a quotation to support almost anything", and that "Marxism-Leninism contains fundamental ambiguities" (p.18).

32. Hough, "Evolution of Soviet World View", p. 509. Shevchenko, p. 87, reports Gromyko's reaction when queried about the Soviet about-face on nuclear testing in early 1958: "Frowning, he added, 'No explanation of the change is necessary. The crux of the matter is that our decision will have tremendous political effect. That's our main objective.'"

33. Griffiths, p. 304. The word relatively must be used since even in open discussions and review articles the 'exchange of opinions' has not been as clear as in a less censored discourse.


35. *Ibid.*, p. 22. Markedly different interpretations of Iraq were published in two different Soviet books during the 1970s, but neither appears on the surface to be anything but an orthodox account of a friendly country, though the more pessimistic work, G.S. Shakhbazian, *Gosudarstvennyi sektor v ekonomike Iraka*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, was published when Soviet-Iraqi relations were at their most cordial point, while the optimistic account, F. Zevarov, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia v Irakskoi respublike 1958-1976*, Nauka, Moscow, 1979 (written by a non-Soviet citizen under a pseudonym but with a senior Soviet expert on Iraq, Sergei Alitovskii, acting as
responsible editor) was published just as Soviet-Iraqi relations were deteriorating markedly. For an account of this specific debate see Roderic Pitty, "Soviet Perceptions of Iraq", Middle East Report, no. 151, March-April, 1988, pp. 23-7.

36. Hough, Struggle, pp. 25-6. Hough notes that the technique of false denial was very common "in the early 1960s when restraints on the expression of unorthodox ideas were tighter. A number of scholars who wrote articles in which the arguments did not seem to correspond with the conclusion later wrote other articles that reversed the conclusion in whole or in part. The practice still seems to be going on but it is necessary to wait for confirmation." One area where the false denial method could easily be used was in discussions of Western Sovietology, like the account of Alec Nove's views of the Soviet economy in Yu. Ol'sevich ed., Kritika anti-marksisstskikh vzgliadov po problemam NTR, Nauka, Moscow, 1987, pp. 85-8.

37. Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Experts and Foreign Policy Making in the USSR", paper presented to the British Association for Soviet and East European Studies Annual Conference, 1984, pp. 11-2. Another example is in Kuznetsova's review article cited in n. 19 above. After pointing out, through a lengthy historiographical summary of events in Iran in the early 1920s, that "Lenin warned about the harmfulness of the idea of exporting revolution, hastily recolouring the national-revolutionary and liberation movement into a communist one, thus distorting policy on the question of organising a united front", Kuznetsova commented cryptically that "contemporary events in Iran and Afghanistan indicate that these factors maintain their significance in some countries in the Orient and now, despite large socio-economic, political and cultural changes, are occurring in these countries" ("Leninskoe nasledie", pp. 18-19). Since this was the only reference in the article to a country other than Iran, it can reasonably be read as a complaint from a senior academic specialist about the negative consequences of the Soviet invasion.


39. A symptom of Hoffmann and Laird's failure to carefully infer the meaning of the material they discuss is their use of ritual Soviet terms for chapter headings.

40. Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the Marxist theory of ideology and law, Academic Press, London, 1979, p. 69. Cf. Brown, Soviet Politics, pp. 41-2: "The promise of content analysis has been greatly exaggerated, for the mixture of strict censorship and esoteric hints emanating from Soviet published work is such that the experienced and perceptive individual reader is likely to glean more of significance from this material than a coder for a computer". It should be added that Scriven, who accords with this view, has used the term 'content analysis' in a completely different sense, to describe the analytical tradition of conceptual analysis. Indeed, his definition of 'content analysis' (quoted in William Outhwaite, Concept formation in social science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1983, p. 41) reads like the exact opposite of the behaviorist version which Brown appropriately dismisses: "Content analysis is undertaken in the belief that the meaning of terms or concepts or logical problems can only be thoroughly understood if we include a meticulous examination of the circumstances in which they occur, rather than relying on a relatively rapid extracted formalisation of their apparent internal logical features." Since this definition was originally published in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science in 1958, it is a pity that the flagbearers of the 'behaviorist revolution' were not better read in the philosophy of science.

41. Hough, Struggle, p. 27.

42. Griffiths, pp. 2, 115-6, 228-9, 469-70. In his published articles, Griffiths expounded the rather obscure idea of 'tendency analysis', which is criticised by Brown, Soviet Politics, pp. 72-3, and his key focus on transactional perceptions has only been highlighted relatively recently, by

44. Most Politburo decisions are reportedly made by consensus, with the General-Secretary often mediating differences that tend to be "predicated almost exclusively on contradictory functional interests" (Dimitri K. Simes, "The Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Limits of Kremlinology", Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. VIII, nos 2 and 3, Spring-Summer 1975, pp. 179-80; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1979, p. 447), whereas scholars do not usually have to agree to decide anything, except speeches or reports written for politicians.

45. The term "sponsoring" is used by Richard B. Remnek, The Role of Soviet Scholars in the Formulation of Soviet policy toward India, 1941-1947, Ph.D dissertation, Duke University, 1973, p. 94. Oded Eran, The Mezhdunarodniki: an assessment of professional expertise in the making of Soviet foreign policy, Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 1979, pp. 269-71, suggests that the direct involvement of senior officials as sponsoring patrons in Soviet scholarly debates reached its height in the Khrushchev period and has declined since. Griffiths, pp. 304-6, expressed the same view somewhat earlier.

46. According to Shevchenko, p. 210, Arbatov's USA "institute is essentially excluded from participation in the making of Soviet policy toward the United States. No one in the institute is really consulted by the Foreign Ministry or given access to its proposals to the Politburo on Soviet-American relations." While he reports, p.160, that "long-term policy planning is almost nonexistent", this is not the same thing as long-term debate about the "global political goals", which he says "are obvious to the top echelon of the Foreign Ministry". According to Ellen Jones, "Committee Decision Making in the Soviet Union", World Politics, vol. XXXVI, no. 2, January 1984, p. 168ff., the use of policy committees became increasingly important during the Brezhnev era, and with the restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus under Gorbachev the opportunities for direct scholarly input into policy formation are likely to have increased significantly. Still, Soviet scholars no doubt find it frustrating to see Western analysts credit them with direct influence on decisions of state made by the Politburo, not because they are not concerned to influence such decisions, but precisely because they usually lack direct means of making their views heard.

47. Georgi A. Arbatov and Willem Oltmans, The Soviet Viewpoint, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1983, p. 22. The statement quoted in the text is the last part of Arbatov's answer to the question: "Surely the reports of the institute go to the government?"; the earlier part of his answer was: "Well, if we have any bright ideas, we have no problem bringing them to the attention of the government. The main thing is to have the bright ideas in the first place. If people in the government ask us questions in fields we are familiar with, we have no secrets. But I would like to emphasize that our institute has not been created for a day-to-day service in foreign policy. That is the business of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our embassy in Washington."


49. Remnek, loc. cit., p. iii. Remnek's definition of "policy-relevant analyses" is restricted in time and scope because he considers policy largely in terms of the implementation of actions rather than the formation of the intentions which motivate decisions to act. Yet, as William Potter has recently pointed out, implementation is only the last of four sequential stages of policymaking considered as a process -- the prior states being initiation, controversy and formal decision. Since implementation "often involves the modification and distortion of policy objectives intended by the formal decision makers", an analysis which only compares scholarly debates with this stage is likely to overlook the very important preliminary aspects of policy formation such as agenda setting and arguing about alternatives ("The Study of Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security: what is to be done?", in Valenta and Potter eds, Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, pp. 299-303).

Macmillan, London, 1986, p. 172, has pointed out that the influence of scientific advisors within the Soviet elite rests "on the leadership's realisation that their own objectives -- remaining at the head of a militarily and economically powerful and politically stable state -- make it essential that notice be taken of the views of those with specialised knowledge." While Fortescue notes that the influence of natural scientists has been greater than that of social scientists in the past, Gorbachev's statement at the January 1987 Plenum that "the contradictions and real state of society have not become the object of profound scientific research" (Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 27-28 Ianvaria 1987 goda, Politizdat, Moscow, 1987, p. 8) suggests that the influence of the latter is rising, while an article by Tatiana Zaslavskaja about raising the role of sociology in Soviet policy making, Pravda, 6/2/87, pp. 2-3, attacks bureaucratic opposition to this general task, about which it was said at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that: "A decisive turn-around is necessary, toward the real, practical tasks which life has put in front of our society. Social sciences, in the same measure as natural sciences, must become an effective aid to the party and the whole people in resolving these tasks" (quoted in E.M. Primakov, "Aktual'nye zadachi sovetskogo vostokovedeniia", Narody Azii i Afriki, 1983, no. 5, p. 15).

51. Remnek, loc. cit., pp. 86-7, 373. Remnek's first chapter considers policy implementation, and his subsequent chapters analyse scholarly debates; his aim of determining whether specialist views were later reflected in policy was sound, but his method for achieving this was not.

52. The snapshot approach is intentionally adopted by Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: the ideological basis, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1985, p. xii, with the result that much of his empirical analysis is inaccurate and misleading. On pp. 64-5, in one of the few passages in which he looks at differences between Soviet scholars rather than viewing them simply as "the Kremlin's spokesmen", p.77, he suggests that, regarding revolutionary democrats, Veniamin Chirkin and Nodari Simoniya supported a more adventurist policy, while Georgy Kim and Evgeny Primakov were more cautious. In fact, as Hough, Struggle, p. 141, suggests, Chirkin and Simoniya are usually at opposite ends of the policy spectrum; Kim lines up with Chirkin at the adventurist end and Primakov was mediating in between, at least until the mid 1980s, when his position drew closer to that of Simoniya. S. Neil MacFarlane, Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 144, 173, also identifies Soviet scholars as official spokesmen rather than specialist advisors with their own different views.

53. Hough, Struggle, p. 32. By historical background Hough means the fundamental issues of debate, not the implementation of policy which Remnek's methodology puts as the background.

54. Griffiths is intriguingly ambiguous about the time-scale in which transactional debate is effective. On pp. 302-3, he notes that in studying the influence of specialists "we are primarily concerned here with the understanding of long-term learning processes in Soviet behaviour", and this broad perspective constitutes the basic logic of his approach. Yet on pp. 471-2, he states that "in the long term, it may be suggested, the subjective perception of situational variables was of primary importance in determining the direction of Soviet policy toward the United States. But for the more immediate time span, transactional perceptions were of greater influence than individual cognition in the formation of policy outcomes."


56. Ibid., pp. 6-7 and passim.

57. Cf. the literature review provided by Cutler, Soviet Debates, chapter 1, especially the table on p.8. Three out of the four basic Western theories of Soviet foreign policy reconstructed by Cutler are based on the premise that "Marxist-Leninist doctrine, institutionalised as totalitarianism, is the mainspring of Soviet behavior".

58. Hough, "Pluralism, Corporatism and the Soviet Union", p. 58: "we need to understand the debates and politics that are occurring within the Soviet Union, we need to understand the Soviet options, we need to know how the debates are evolving, we need to try to understand how the ideology is shifting"; Seweryn Bialer, "Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions, Trends", in idem. ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Westview, Boulder, 1981, p. 422: "The question is not whether their beliefs have changed but which beliefs, how much, and in what direction; not whether they have an ideology but to what ideology they subscribe; not whether
ideology makes any difference but what kind of difference it makes for the shaping of their intentions, policies, and behavior." Bialer, loc. cit., p. 424, makes an important distinction between the "practical ideology" of the Soviet elite and their "pure ideology" or "doctrine", which I have referred to as "ideological silverware". In discussing official Soviet discourse I follow his use of "doctrine", although noting that the word has been used in a different sense to refer to basic policy principles in an excellent account of fundamental change in Soviet military policy by Michael McCGvrire Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1987.

59. Griffiths, pp. 466-9 and passim.

60. Peter M.E. Volten, Brezhnev's Peace Program: a study of Soviet domestic political process and power , Westview, Boulder, 1982, pp. 18-9, has noted that Kremlinology is like the 'totalitarian' model in restricting policy initiative to the top oligarchy and like the interest group approach in ignoring the political process of debate. The essential mistake of Kremlinology is to reify the top of the Soviet political hierarchy, ignoring the fact that they rely structurally on subordinates as well as vice versa. Such reification is not unique to Soviet studies; Marx once criticised a similar error by French intellectuals who complained that Louis Bonaparte and his accomplices had taken their nation by surprise: "It remains to be explained how a nation of thirty-six millions could be taken by surprise by three swindlers and delivered without resistance into captivity" ("The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in Surveys from Exile, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 152).

61. Gorbachev's repeated statements about the need for debate (e.g. Pravda, 15/7/87: "we still do not have enough political culture, not enough culture of how to conduct discussions, how to respect the point of view even of our own friend or comrade") do not make sense within a narrow Kremlinological framework, since he can hardly be calling for opposition in the Politburo.


65. Primakov, Pravda, 2/7/88, p. 8; Abalkin, Pravda, 30/6/88, p. 4. Kremlinology assumes that top officials maintain consistent policy choices over time, whereas Griffiths' broad approach allows that, when options are presented, "the high-level policy maker, beset with uncertainty and sitting at the intersection of a number of information channels, will tend at different times to adopt different belief patterns for the same decision problem. Since his own experience does not commit him to a particular belief pattern, he will adopt several competing patterns, not at once, but in sequence." (Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, p. 129.) The point is not that top officials automatically alternate between different solutions, but that they are in a position to do so.

66. For an insider's account see Shevchenko, pp. 77-81.

67. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, passim.


69. The discussion has used the terms "top officials" and "subordinates" in a general sense, since the phenomena are relative throughout the hierarchy. In relation to the General-Secretary, the straightforward discursive possibilities open for other members of the leadership are still limited to endorsement or silence, as the removal of Yeltsin made clear. For senior academics, even the adoption openly of an idiom of policy prescription has not been encouraged, at least until recently.

70. Griffiths, p. 297.

71. Ibid., p. 123. For some general comments on the nature of argument as a transaction between

72. Griffiths, pp. 4, 6, 106, 113, 310, 471.


74. A classic example is A.P. Butenko ed., *Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoi ekonomikoi*, Nauka, Moscow, 1983. As Archie Brown, "Political Science in the Soviet Union: a new stage of development?". *Soviet Studies*, July 1984, p. 333, has described the situation of political science in the USSR: "The very conditions of its existence force its practitioners to attempt to present their ideas in a form acceptable to the party leadership."

75. This is one important point of agreement in the debate about the significance of Soviet political culture between Mary McAuley and those like Brown and Stephen White who she terms "the subjectivists" (Brown ed., *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, p. 35). Cf. G.G. Diligensky, "Perestroika i dukhovno-psikhologicheskie protsessy v obshchestve", *Voprosy filosofii*, 1987, no. 9, p. 5.

76. Shevchenko, p. 65. The person who gave this advice was a high-ranking KGB officer.

77. Griffiths, p. 225.


81. Markus, *loc. cit.*. The phrase "depoliticisation of the masses" comes from an article by Soviet scholar R.G. Landa, "O spetsifike sovremennykh usloviy klassovoi i politicheskoi bor'by na vostoke", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1971, no. 1, p. 47, which is ostensibly only about the third world, but partly applicable to the USSR as well; although Landa argues that such depoliticisation is a more or less necessary by-product of overcoming backwardness, Viktor Il'in and Aleksandr Razumov, "Dogmatizm teorii -- defisit otvetstvennosti: filosofii i nekotorye uroki proshlogo", *Kommunist*, 1988, no. 12, pp. 61, 72, who refer to "apolitical-ness" as a negative aspect of Soviet society, suggest that this resulted from a ruling class interest rather than a general need for a strong state. Markus, *loc. cit.*, says that ritualised Soviet doctrine also serves "partly the function of the legitimation of these regimes", but this is doubtful in view of Varga's assessment, made in the early 1960s, at least in terms of popular legitimation. An important distinction, made by T.H. Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems", in *Political Legitimation*, p. 16, is between the functions of legitimation within the ruling group itself, with respect to the relations between the latter and the 'administrative staff', and with respect to the relations between both of these and the population at large." The quote on the title page of this book ("A legitimate government has no need of propaganda") indicates that, as Rigby suggests, it is most fruitful in the Soviet context to investigate legitimacy within the elite.

82. Markus, *loc. cit.*, pp. 88, 92, fn. 11.

83. Cf. Brown, "Political Science", pp. 332-3; and Michael E. Urban, "From Chernenko to Gorbachev: a repoliticization of official Soviet discourse?", paper presented at 3rd World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies, Washington, 1985. The content of 're-ideologisation' within the Soviet elite has been the subject of different evaluations; Varga's view, *loc. cit.*, p. 41, that "the majority of those conscious citizens who are devoted to the regime have a vision of the world that goes by the name of 'Marxist-Leninist', but is in fact petty-bourgeois", is supported by L. Okunev (Len Karpinsky), "Words Are Also Deeds", in Stephen Cohen ed., *An End to Silence: uncensored

84. Hough, *Soviet Leadership*, pp. 118-30, stresses the change which this new generation of specialists constituted for the character of the Soviet foreign policy establishment.


86. As Ferenc Feher, "Paternalism as a Mode of Legitimation", in Rigby and Feher eds, *Political Legitimation*, p. 74, has noted: "It is an ironical turn of history that a system that calls itself Marxist drives to the extreme what Karl Marx so much hated in capitalism: the atomisation of the individual, for the sake of its political stability."


89. Shevchenko, pp. 160-1, reports that while "Gromyko initially displayed an interest in the work of the Directorate, ... he soon lost it" because "its lengthy assessment papers with different options for policy proved to be a 'scholastic and unrealistic academic exercise' ... Gromyko put the Directorate's products on the shelf and reverted to running his ministry on the basis of day-to-day priorities, along with a few short-term goals", while the Directorate gradually "became a haven for diplomats approaching retirement" so that "people in the ministry began calling it the garbage can."


94. Griffiths, p. 220.


96. *Ibid.*, pp. 264ff., where Griffiths uses terms like "marginal anti-imperialist", "activist middle marginalism", "analytic middle marginalism" and "marginal anti-militarism".


99. The need to consider both these aspects of knowledge was noted by several participants in a recent 'round table' between Soviet philosophers and historians, although there was some debate about which aspect had been weakest; V.M. Mezhevik, "Filosofia i istoricheskaia nauka", p. 24, suggested that ontological consideration of history as a process had been most lacking, while Aron Gurevich and Eero Loone, pp. 22, 42, argued that the practice of historical theorising had been lost amidst abstract slogans and isolated facts.

100. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice: on the significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein*
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for social and political thought, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p. 21. Cf. Il'in and Razumov, p. 70: "If a sociologist, psychologist or physicist thinks about the foundations of their science, and defines the ontological and epistemological meaning of its founding concepts, then they are also philosophers."

101. Pitkin, p. 22. Since, as a matter of fact, facts cannot speak, only be interpreted, what this assumption effectively means in the practice of interpretation is taking appearances at face value.


104. Zinoviev, Radiant Future, p. 13. This usage is clearly identified by Kagarlitsky, p. 141; and by Hough, Struggle, p. 34, with respect to Genrikh Trofimenko's "pilgrimage to the right", but even Griffiths, pp. 277 and 298, referred to the same Soviet evaluation of the capitalist system as both 'conservative' and 'left'. Such a coincidence may occur on a particular issue (e.g. support for dependency theory from the 'left radical' Kiva Maidanik and the conservative Nikolai Petrov noted in chapter four) amongst scholars whose general political perspectives are quite different.


106. Kubalkova and Cruickshank's discussion of "Soviet Marxist-Leninists" (ibid., pp. 158-232) might be thought to answer this question, but it "remains at the level of generality which is at the level of propaganda" (this phrase comes from Hillel Ticktin, "The Contradictions of Soviet Society and Professor Bettelheim", Critique, no. 6, p. 19, but seems apposite, since Kubalkova and Cruickshank's discussion is very general and is based largely on policy affirmation sources rather than specialist literature). Specifically, the Soviet model of international relations which Kubalkova and Cruickshank construct and claim to be derived from Marxism-Leninism (loc. cit., pp. 199-201) contains only a series of assumed "axiomatic parameters", which are either directly contradicted by some leading Soviet mezhdunarodniki (e.g. no. 3, "an absolute dependence of foreign policy on domestic (i.e. class) structure") or are vague enough to be axiomatic for all analysts of international relations (e.g. no. 2, "the assumption of mutual interconnections between and among all international events"). Moreover, two recent articles about international relations research by leading Soviet specialists contain no mention at all of the supposedly basic "participant determined typology of international relations" ('proletarian internationalism' etc.) which Kubalkova and Cruickshank have deduced from Soviet propaganda. Indeed, the very term "Marxism-Leninism" is only mentioned once in passing in each article, either as essentially a synonym for Soviet (D.V. Ermolenko, "O Sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniakh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii", Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1983, no.2, p. 40) or as a conception which needs to be subjected to "elaboration" or "development" with the "key" of a new "theoretical approach to international relations" provided by systems analysis (F.M. Burlatsky, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii", Voprosy filosofii, 1983, no. 9, p. 38).

107. The 'operational code' view was first expounded by Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism, Free Press, Glencoe, 1953, and forms the basis of the crudest of the four theories reviewed by Cutler; it is introduced in a slightly modernised form by Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, chapter 16, who posits some general 'operational principles' governing Soviet behaviour which no self-respecting rational actor would ignore (e.g. 'do not embark on forward operations against an opponent which are not carefully calculated in advance and move forward only after careful preparation'); cf. Roderic Pitty, "Review article: Soviet foreign policy", Politics, vol. 20, no. 2, November 1985, p.116.
108. Rachel Walker, "Ideology: on hermetics, hermeneutics and pneumatology" (Mimeo, 1985), pp. 18, 20-2; idem., Soviet Marxism-Leninism and the Question of Ideology: a critical analysis, Ph.D dissertation, University of Essex, 1987, chapter 2. The same point was made by Alexander Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights, Bodley Head, London, 1979, pp. 288-90: "An Argument about Ideology ... 'From one point of view,' said Chatterier, ideology plays an enormous role in the life of society. From another point of view it plays none at all. It has influence on everything, but it can never be pinned down." Cf. Il'in and Razumov, p. 63: "Practically, there was no doubt that 'Marxist-Leninist theory', 'scientific-political ideology' and 'a scientific world-view' were in essence synonyms. In practice this led to harsh control over the working out of mainly social and philosophical problems." Significantly, the reference for "Marxism-Leninism" in the Kratkii Politicheskii Slovar (short political dictionary for Soviet journalists), 2nd revised ed., Moscow, 1980, pp. 223-4, is very bland and brief, indeed only 3 times as long as the next on "Marcuseism".


110. Nodari Simoniya criticised such a "pragmatic" use of Marx and Lenin as "an instrument for a polemic of quotations", arguing that this "leads to a practical negation of the historical significance of [their] teaching" (N.A. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, p. 5).


114. Taylor, "Hermeneutics", p. 153. Cf. Sayer, p. 186: "Ideas are assessed and disputes resolved by finding out which of the contested ideas is compatible with (or better, presupposed by) those agreed by all contending parties to be our most reliable ideas and practices."


116. Ibid., pp. 146-55. The same fundamental point is made by Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Beacon Press, Boston, 1984, pp. 131-8, 53-67. Walker, "Ideology", p. 24, argues similarly that it is crucial to "begin any analysis with the assumption that the Soviets make sense".

117. Hollis, Models, p. 147. Cf. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", History and Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, 1969, p. 6: "We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar."

118. Hollis, Models, p. 154. Cf. an earlier passage from Hollis' argument, p. 147, quoted in John Fitzpatrick, Soviet Conceptions of Coexistence and Detente: a study in international theory, Ph.D dissertation, Australian National University, 1983, p. 141: '[The Enquirer's] only access to the Other Mind's experience is through interpreting behaviour and utterance. If he had to get at the phenomena before he could interpret and had to interpret before he could get at the phenomena,
there would be no way into the circle. He assumes a single world being described in two languages less because there is than because there will have to be. On any other assumption he cannot begin at all."


120. Fitzpatrick, p. 141.


129. Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics*, p. 18. According to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (quoted in Nicolas F. Gier, "Wittgenstein and Forms of Life", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, 1980, p. 242).


132. Quentin Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts", *New Literary History*, vol. III, 1972, pp. 403-5; cf. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding", pp. 45-6, where he agrees with the strict distinction held by J.L. Austin (on whose conception of "illocutionary force" the idea of writing as doing is based) between the meaning of an utterance and the understanding of what has been done with it. However, as David Boucher, *Texts in Context: revisionist methods for studying the history of ideas*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 210, has pointed out, in his subsequent articles Skinner collapses this distinction, and identifies the intrinsic meaning of an utterance with its illocutionary force.

133. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding", p. 45, distinguishes between the prior intention of a writer to do x, and a writer's "intention in doing x, which ... is logically connected with it in the sense that it serves to characterise its point." This distinction seems to be reinforced rather than nullified by Skinner's later identification of meaning and doing. Interestingly, Griffiths, p.228, bases his concept of transactional perceptions on a similar, albeit implicit, conception of meaning: "What individuals thought and perceived did not appear to be as significant as what they said and did with the evidence in advancing their cause in debate."

135. Ibid., p. 219.


139. Simonds, "Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge", p. 88; cf. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding", p. 27: "The other form of conceptual parochialism which particularly masks the history of ideas is that the observer may unconsciously misuse his vantage-point in describing the sense of a given work. There is always the danger, that is, that the historian may conceptualize an argument in such a way that its alien elements are dissolved into an apparent but misleading familiarity."

140. Gyorgy Markus, Language and Production, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 17; cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics", Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXXIV, no. 1, September 1980, p. 12: "According to the ontological hermeneutics of both Heidegger and Wittgenstein when we understand another culture we come to share its know-how and discriminations rather than arriving at agreement concerning which assumptions and beliefs are true. This coordination comes from about not by making a translation, or cracking a code, but by prolonged everyday interaction; the result is not a commensuration of theories but what Heidegger calls 'finding a footing' and Wittgenstein refers to as 'finding one's way about'."


142. Ibid., pp. 67-8. While Gellner is hardly sympathetic to Wittgenstein, his main object of criticism is Peter Winch's cultural relativism. Gier, "Wittgenstein and Forms of Life", pp. 246-7, argues that Wittgenstein does not, like Winch, reduce all reality to linguistic phenomena, while Pitkin, pp. 261-4, is also critical of Winch but sympathetic to Wittgenstein.


148. Ricouer, pp. 192-3. John Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics*, p. 194, notes the inconsistency in Ricouer's argument concerning how one validates an interpretation, particularly his confusing attempt to incorporate Karl Popper's objectivist stricture about falsification within an inhospitable (to it) subjectivist problematic, as a means of resolving the problem of which meaning to choose. Ricouer, p. 212, is correct to suggest that the logic of validation is one of "qualitative probability", or as Sayer, p. 187, puts it, "judgements of superiority and inferiority", but not to suggest that such judgements can be made irrespective of the human subject(s) in question, since, as Taylor, "Hermeneutics and Politics", p. 154, points out, hermeneutics itself presupposes "the notion of a subject for whom these meanings are. Without such a subject, the choice of criteria of sameness and difference, the choice among the different forms of coherence which can be identified in a given pattern, among the different conceptual fields in which it can be seen, is arbitrary."

149. Bhaskar, *Possibility of Naturalism*, p. 201. To the extent that Ricouer, in talking about "self-understanding", is referring to literature, i.e. statements of fiction rather than fact, then his ambiguity about the subject of meaning may be fruitful, but his remarks are broader than this, and it is necessary to remember that "a text is written for an audience and the anticipation of its reception by that audience is part of the conditions of the production of the text itself" (John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984, p. 195).


153. Ricouer, p. 171.

154. Traditionally within hermeneutics understanding was seen as opposed to explanation, but this is no longer common. Cf. Ricouer, pp. 215-221.


158. Sumner, *Reading Ideologies*, p. 192.


Chapter 2: The Historical Contexts of Soviet Development Debates

the key point - is to take up substantive problems on the historical level of reality; to state these problems in terms appropriate to them; and then, no matter how high the flight of theory, no matter how painstaking the crawl among detail, in the end of each completed act of study, to state the solution in the macroscopic terms of the problem.


The contexts of Soviet development debates are threefold. First, there is the social and historical context of serious public debate as a new phenomenon in the USSR in the post-Stalin era. It is an important historical fact that widespread public discussion about complex topical questions began to re-emerge into Soviet life to a significant extent only after the death of Stalin in the first instance, and together with the first de-Stalinisation campaign launched by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 in the second. Since most leading participants in Soviet development debates wrote their first articles and books when Khrushchev was trying to reform the Stalinist system, it is important to read their work in the light of how the expectations which they then formed were depressed during the more conservative and prolonged Brezhnev regime which followed. The first section of this chapter reviews changes in ideological censorship in the USSR since Stalin, to outline the basic problems of everyday work which such members of the Soviet "party intelligentsia" have faced.

Second, a more specific context of Soviet development debates is given by the political significance for Soviet scholars of studying comparative social progress. Although the Soviet system has, at least until recently, been excluded as a subject for serious comparative discussion, the comparative method itself cannot be artificially limited, especially for scholars working under a harsh state presenting itself as the leading force of humanity in the contemporary world. The second section of this chapter considers the renewal of comparative scholarship in the USSR since 1956 in the field of oriental studies, which, because of its relative distance from ideological supervision, proved a fruitful haven for substantive debate about basic issues of comparative social development in the modern world. Finally, the most apparent context of Soviet development debates for Western
observers is the foreign policy context, defined by the basic objectives of the Soviet state in its relations with the developing countries of the third world. The third section of this chapter presents an assessment of these objectives, since their relative priority forms the key political issue of the Soviet debates about third world development which are analysed in the subsequent two chapters.

**Ideological Censorship in the USSR**

An interpretation of Soviet debates which restricts the fundamental issues in question to mere differences within a hegemonic belief system derived from Marx and Lenin underestimates the diverse usages to which apparently similar words can be put. This limitation is evident in the assumptions of James Scanlan's book on modern Soviet philosophy, notwithstanding his initial recognition that "in practice people will invest whatever words they have with the meanings they find necessary in order to make sense of their experience." First, Scanlan argues that just "because Marxist-Leninist philosophy is so inconsistent with reality" as perceived by outsiders, we should not assume that Soviet leaders and philosophers do not believe in "faiths that defy rational explanation." He suggests that statements by Brezhnev and his subordinates affirming the unified, non-antagonistic nature of Soviet society in contrast to capitalism should be taken at face value as substantive beliefs, rather than viewed with suspicion as propaganda exercises. Second, Scanlan claims that "if there is any bad faith in the leaders' relation to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, it consists not in the failure of those leaders to mean what they say, but in their failure to recognise the extent to which their ideological pronouncements simply establish by stipulation what they purport to describe." Thus Soviet officials are credited with the ability to think irrationally, but not with the capacity to realise that all their public thoughts take the form of "stipulative truth making" within an idiom of censorship. In fact, Scanlan's assumptions are plausible when reversed, and placed carefully in relation to the historical development of Soviet society. The one thing we can be sure of is that Soviet officials have consciously used Marxism-Leninism to
stipulate acceptable beliefs, since views not couched in this idiom have been systematically repressed. The extent to which officially-sanctioned statements are believed by Soviet officials and the population at large is a very complex question, which should be approached with a recognition that the answer, even for the same statement, may vary substantially across time as well as between people. However this empirical matter is investigated, it is unwise to adopt a theoretical stance which pre-judges the answer as always affirmative, since then interpretation ceases to be a critical search for meaning and becomes instead a hostage to various nonsensical views which, although their appearance is rationally explicable, are not actually held by the subjects in question.

The importance of a critical concept of ideology has been stressed in general terms by John Thompson, who argues "that to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination", by legitimating, concealing the nature of, or reifying ahistorically the transience of a particular regime. To understand the historical specificity of this nexus between ideology and power in the USSR, one can follow Martin Heidegger's hermeneutical injunction, according to which "what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way". The circle of interpretation here is centred around a paradoxical 'unity of opposites' at the heart of modern Soviet ideology: ambiguity and exclusiveness. Many interpreters have tried to annul this paradox on the rarefied plane of isolated ideas, without considering whether its origins lie deeper, in the very contradictory nature of Soviet society since the rise of Stalin. Precisely because "Marxism-Leninism is, after all, the official 'language game' of the Soviet system", it should not be viewed apart from the extremely hierarchical structure of power in the USSR, as a separate and incorrigible set of principles upon which the latter either rests or was established. Marxism-Leninism is not so much an ideology in power as an ideology of power, or the ideological garb of a peculiar concentration of power which is both enormous and insufficient, both apparently unchallenged and intrinsically unstable. The discursive content of this ideology is significant, but it should be investigated together with the social relations characteristic of Soviet
society during and after its codification, not deduced in the first instance from an altogether different subject, the history of ideas.\textsuperscript{13}

While 'Marxo-Leninism' was coined by Comintern chief Grigory Zinoviev in 1925, the enforced domination of Marxism-Leninism as the framework of public belief in the USSR dates from 1930, when, as Scanlan notes, philosophers of the view that "dialectical materialism is a crying absurdity" were deprived of an audience by the nationalisation of all publishing activity.\textsuperscript{14} Two crucial historical facts about this establishment of a unique system of ideological censorship at the time of Stalin's emerging autocracy should be recognised. First, as Michal Reiman has emphasised, "the key consideration in any attempt to understand Stalinism ... is that it was not a product of positive social development or the positive development of a social doctrine or conception, but the result of a deep and all-embracing crisis; it evolved as a special kind of instrument or means of finding a way out of this crisis."\textsuperscript{15} Stalin's solution comprised callous policies imposed from above without discussion, necessitating the total elimination of public criticism, through direct repression, propaganda against 'deviants', and a loss of individuality as all authors become 'writers in uniform' parroting 'Agitprop Pidgin'.\textsuperscript{16} As Boris Kagarlitsky has pointed out, Stalin's power stifled free thought so much that he did not need an elaborate system of censorship.\textsuperscript{17} Fear and devotion worked wonders for 'the chief', who increased his authority by overseeing "a contradiction between word and deed, and the appearance of a special political language when it is necessary to 'read between the lines', according to indirect signs having an almost ritual significance, in order to understand the real sense of that which is spoken and done".\textsuperscript{18} Second, Stalin's codification of Marxism-Leninism and elevation of his name to "a synonym for the party, the revolution and socialism" constituted an attack upon the ideological heritage of the Bolshevik Party.\textsuperscript{19} This, in a materialist framework, is the meaning of Markovic's notion "that Stalin advanced through gaps in Marx's argument"; it is folly to suppose that better arguments by Marx and Lenin could alone have prevented Stalin's advance, but important to note that his rise signified the degradation of their ideas.\textsuperscript{20} As a young member of the new Soviet elite in
the early 1930s answered a question about how Stalin's policy of forced collectivisation stood in relation to Marx's critical analysis, in *Das Kapital*, of the expropriation of the peasantry: "You don't expect me to study Karl Marx or to understand his true meaning. You old Bolsheviks are studying Karl Marx and Lenin without Stalin; that is why you will never get a clear idea about anything." 21

In a recent analysis of the Stalinist system published in *Kommunist*, four liberal Soviet sociologists stressed the patently instrumental nature of Marxism-Leninism, arguing that "the bureaucratic system is only in appearance ideocratic ... the mode of its spiritual existence is the transformation of any living thought into a dead formula for the conjuring away of reality, not for an orientation within it". They interpreted acceptance by subordinates of top officials' "monopoly of truth" as "a demonstration of complete loyalty", adding that "the system of vertical loyalty was supported by a system of universal uncertainty and dread." 22 A similar view was expressed in the 1970s by Lev Kopolev, who suggested that "the actual ideology of the Stalinists ... is an ideology of authoritarian bureaucratic party discipline, of superstate chauvinism, of unprincipled pragmatism in the interpretation of history, the contemporary world and economic or ethical questions." 23 The pure form of Soviet ideology was not doctrine or mere dogma, but an idiom of censorship marked by an "inferiority complex in respect to culture as such." 24 As Alexander Zinoviev pointed out, the position of Soviet ideology in relation to diverse spheres of knowledge was always "familiar -- a position of control, supervision, tutelage, censorship". 25 This policing function, which "serves as a kind of military uniform distinguishing the in-group from the outsiders", necessarily became more complex in the post-Stalin era. 26 Zinoviev remarked that, whereas "during the Stalin epoch ideological communism attained a level of striking clarity, which threatened to strip bare its essence and reveal it to the broad masses of the population", "criticism of the Stalinist 'vulgarisation' of Marxism-Leninism had the practical aim of returning it to its former (pre-Stalin) confused state which was more in accord with the nature of the ideology", and "achieved such significant success that now no trace remains
of the former (classic) Stalinist clarity. This process was seen by many subordinate CPSU members as a 'return to Leninist norms', but for top officials much more than a revision of Stalin's 'Leninism' was at stake. To absorb the 'rejection energy' of dissatisfied Soviet citizens, new dead formulas had to be found, and to stifle the fresh air of criticism from below, a new corps of professional censors had to be created. The upshot of this was that the "divorce between private conviction and public utterance", which had emerged under Stalin, widened considerably in the post-Stalin era, embedding 'dualist thinking' in a combination of private cynicism and public conformism.

The best broad analysis of the metamorphosis of Marxism-Leninism remains a 1969 article in Voprosy filosofii by Vladimir Lukin, who presented "some isolated notes" about the role of ideology in the social transformation of a backward but independent "society of an anti-colonial, peasant-statocratic type." Initially, "the role of ideology is exceptionally large, maybe larger than in many other social structures", because in an unstable situation the "state and ruling party" must rely on a "unified and 'strict' ideological system of ties", in order "to orient the masses in the chaos and confusion of the first post-revolutionary years ... to install in them a feeling of pride and optimism in conditions when an objective and unprejudiced view of things might give rise to an atmosphere of disappointment, decomposition and growing dissatisfaction." An 'ideology of development' in which "adherence to principle is manifested in the form of personal devotion to the chief, the leader", helps "rescue the disintegrating system." Since "the central point of ideological conceptions ... has become a tendency toward the legitimation of state power ... the confirmation of a halo around its sanctity, its highest and unquestionable integrity in comparison with any other form of loyalty", Lukin suggested that the message of this ideology was as old as the "Confucian-Buddist socio-ethical dogmas" according to which "man is essentially good, but has many bad aspects" that the authorities must correct, as parents instruct children; the "ideal government is a government of wise and saintly people, the pious life of whom is an obligatory example for the whole society and each of its members." Quoting Clifford Geertz's view of ideology as
bridging the "emotional gap between things as they are in reality and as they ought to be", he focused on the role of metaphor as the "cement, fastening separate elements into" a dogmatic "new system of cultural symbols", facilitating "firm spiritual solidity, purposefulness and disciplined behaviour." Since the short term efficacy of a political symbol "does not depend upon ... how adequate it is to the real position of things, ... the ruling elite frequently cannot resist the temptation to use the prestige of a scientific world-view, taking advantage of its external features and transforming them into a metaphorical, optimistic scheme, with the purpose being to legitimise the existing power and offer the masses 'radiant horizons', frequently by means of an open break with the 'uncomfortable' objective reality." Lukin concluded that:

Only in the very long term, in the process of long and painful experience are the masses all the more exposed to the non-correspondence between their everyday collective and individual practice and the systems of metaphorical symbols implanted in their consciousness. There begins a process of the loosening of such a type of ideology, which is accompanied by a gradual lowering of its intensity and effectiveness. Bit by bit the formerly mighty factor of social orientation is turned into an obligatory, although very tedious ritual, the use of which indicates the observance by the society's members of an already old tradition of the 'rules of the game', not established by them, rather than any identification of their internal aspirations with an obsolete dogma. But, just as the erosion of a pre-scientific ideology may not be accompanied by qualitative changes in the cultural level of society and correspondingly deep shifts in the basic mechanisms of mass consciousness, so this matter is frequently confined to the replacement of one metaphorical system by another -- sometimes an 'anti-system', but more often a 'repaired' variant of the preceding one. With this, the building material and the mechanism do not undergo any essential changes.32

The paradox of exclusive ambiguity marks a language-game where the words have been warped through misuse, so that they no longer bridge the gap over which their sense was stretched. In terms of the metaphorical persuasiveness of the apologetic ideology, there has been a great change, almost 'from infinity to zero', to borrow a phrase of Zinoviev's.33 But the 'eroded' ideology remains on stage like a mummy, since its function as a 'mechanism' of social exclusion is still required by the elite. And there is no essential change in the content of this ideological carcase, since Lukin points out that its "overwhelming trend" was
always composed of "different kinds of nationalist conceptions", comprising "sufficiently wide, diffuse stereotypes that could render admissible any concrete programme if only it was embodied in a dynamic, strong and distinct leader unambiguously indicating the 'only correct path'." What remains is a tragically ironic autonomy of words in a society where "any aspiration toward collective or individual autonomy is considered as sabotage of the state".34

This loosening of what Stephen Cohen has called "the terroristic ideology of the Stalin years" formed the main historical context for Soviet development debates.35 The extent of liberalisation from above was an issue in the struggle for power within the post-Stalin leadership, which had to address the demands of society at large, in particular the impossibility of managing the economy through political coercion, and the general discontent of the intelligentsia, the social layer which, next to the elite itself, had benefited most from Stalinist industrialisation.36 A gradual de-Stalinisation was under way before Khrushchev took the bull by the horns at the 20th CPSU Congress, consolidating his authority within the elite by deflecting criticism away from the basic structures of power, toward the villain who had been a deity only three years before. For those below, this exposure rocked the system of ideological censorship centred around Stalin. Claude Lefort noted in 1956 that "the monopoly of truth built up by Stalinism has been broken, whatever the new leaders do to restore it", while Yuri Karyakin recently stressed the suddenness with which "a whole world-view was smashed in one moment", contrasting this shock with the gradual evolution of world-views "from theism to deism and further" that took centuries in Europe.37 Khrushchev endeavoured to cover this breach in the fortress of censorship, by fostering his own cult while restraining the intelligentsia's enthusiasm, so that the 'flood' of criticism did not burst its banks and drown responsible officials on high ground.38 But his populist attempt to 'repair' the ideological stability of Soviet society while trying to reform its administrative structure alienated the powerful 'moderate-conservative' faction of the Soviet elite and the reformist part of the intelligentsia simultaneously.39
The most important aspect of Khrushchev's liberalisation was criticism of the terror, which lessened the atomised 'inertia of fear' characteristic of Stalinism, and led to "a partial but important re-politicisation ... amongst the intelligentsia." Already in the late 1940s and 1950s, as Andrei Amalrik has pointed out, "a lively ideological movement began to make itself felt ... somewhere on the borderline between the de-ideologised masses and the ritual ideology of the elite, in the shape of underground Marxist groups aiming to re-invest Marxism in Russia with its old, revolutionary (instead of its present, conservative) character." This trend was predominant in the youth movement that emerged after the 20th CPSU Congress, some of whose "theoreticians" later became leading Soviet writers on third world development. With the repression of their organisations, and a broadening of cultural contacts between the USSR and the West in the early 1960s, this radical trend was outstripped by the growth of a liberal reformist opposition amongst the party intelligentsia. Practical comparisons with the West showed even privileged Soviet intellectuals that they were poorer in material terms than their counterparts in advanced capitalist countries, who also had more independent conditions of work, relative freedom of speech and better careers for their children. Together with the optimism which resulted from a brief but significant opening of the archives following the 22nd CPSU Congress, such comparisons raised the expectations of some Soviet intellectuals about possible improvements in their position through political and economic reform. This liberal trend was publicly expressed in the prominent literary journal Novy Mir, and became so influential that "the liberal epoch", as Zinoviev terms it, did not end with Khrushchev's fall, but lasted broadly for another four years, and in some respects for longer.

During the 1960s Marxism-Leninism became stretched, in order to cover up a differentiation of genuine political belief within the elite, extending from social democratic reformism on the liberal left to Slavophile nationalism on the extreme right. Zinoviev has highlighted the cynicism with which many senior officials regarded Marxism as their private property, and Victor Zaslavsky has pointed to the "counterpropaganda organisations that emerged ... in the mid 1960s" in order
to distort Marxism as an ideology of social change, blocking "the potential role of Marxism as a doctrine capable of generating some kind of workers' movement". But that "mass of ambiguity" which made the official language-game more elastic also made it easier for critics to communicate their thoughts in public, so long as they took sufficient care to dress them up in ritual uniform. The art of outwitting the censorship was developed most skilfully by the liberal reformists, whose basic attitude of changing the system gradually from within suited esoteric rather than outspoken criticism. Zinoviev, a well-known member of this milieu, reports that:

They talked in such a way that no-one could fail to read between the lines. There was never a word about the Ism. All it got was winks and nudges and little sly grins. Some young genius from somewhere or other would stand up and start sounding off without pause for breath. ...The main thing was to say as much as possible, as vaguely as possible, using dozens of incomprehensible terms, and references to dozens of Western names. The best to choose were those who had just published one small article. This was the latest word in science. Just two or three words to say that nothing in this was a contradiction of the Ism, just to keep the authorities happy. So everyone knew what was going on. That was essential.

Many varieties of 'liberal Marxism' were developed by those who, on the basis of "social democratic principles", considered the USSR to be in "a transitional phase developing from the dictatorial (totalitarian) pseudo-socialism of Stalin's type, toward a more democratic and just society with a real respect for human rights and universal moral values." Kagarlitsky has shown the increasingly radical analysis of Stalinism to which these believers in 'true Communism' turned during the 1960s, while continuing to struggle in legal rather than underground forms. Perhaps, it was just this combination of potentially systemic criticism and an unpunishable form of agitation which frightened the conservative party of order into a new reaction.

In the early Brezhnev years, the prospect of reform still hung in the air as the new leadership moved to incorporate specialists in the formation of government policy. Amalrik observed of this time that: "The regime is not on the attack but on the defence. Its motto is: 'Don't touch us and we won't touch you.'" But
the liberal critics wanted to change rather than stabilise the Stalinist system. Demands for fundamental reform were subject to mounting conservative criticism within the Soviet elite following the 23rd CPSU Congress, culminating in August 1968 with the 'decisive rebuff' signalled by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This event was a shock to 'true Communism', for clearly it now "was not a matter of 'the excesses of Stalinism' but of the system itself." When Aleksandr Tvardovsky was forced to resign in January 1970 from the chief editorship of Novy Mir, the 'liberal epoch' in the USSR, a time when it was occasionally possible for intelligent critics "to publish a small booklet on a subject which it was still too early to write about and which afterwards became too late", ended without satisfying any of the basic demands of the reformist intelligentsia. As Igor Kon foresaw, a historically temporary "process of disintegration" ensued. Many liberals changed their spots in order to remain upwardly mobile during the 'years of stagnation'. The best reformist scholars maintained their own views, but it was more difficult for them to encourage students to think in the same way.

The Highest Qualification Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education was given more red tape in 1971, when "it became obligatory to reconsider all degrees and titles, independently of their 'level', and confirmation of the most common Candidate degree stopped being routine." New regulations about research degrees and scientific titles were introduced in 1975, specifying that successful applicants had to follow "in all actions the principles of Communist morality." Such "vigilance at the gates of paradise" led to a decline in the general standard of Soviet social science, as those whose "education is a matter of cultivated ignorance" came to the fore. In contrast to the Stalin era, "the cream of the intelligentsia" was not eliminated, just left "in complete isolation even within their own sphere." The best description of this phase of ideological censorship was given in 1982 by Boris Slavnyi, who borrowed Collingwood's phrase "the corruption of consciousness" to refer implicitly to the changed orientation of most Soviet theory, which had passed "from demanding radical reform (both outside of and within the national economy) to a defense of the status-quo."
Many observers have fetishised Marxism-Leninism as a body of ideas, thus "paying far too much honour to a dogmatism that borders on idiocy", at the cost of ignoring what Moshe Lewin once highlighted as "a subterranean political reality, presenting in potentia, and even at the present time, a large spectrum of opinion." During the post-Stalin era, this subterranean culture has grown stronger as the gulf between "official and popular Russia" has widened, with official discourse vainly stretching itself so as to hem in alternative beliefs, and succeeding only in providing more space for such beliefs to be expressed and engendering more cynicism from which they may be born. Kagarlitsky has stressed that implicit debates within censored Soviet publications have often mirrored open disputes in samizdat, with the difference that the arguments of the former tend to be better while their nominal conclusions seem worse, from a reformist viewpoint. Ferenc Feher's judgement that, after "oppositional Marxism missed its great historical moment" in 1968, it succumbed to a 'negative dialectic' and was reduced "to impotence and humiliation", is exaggerated, at least if 'Marxist' is taken liberally. Not all thoughts that were golden glistened, and not all those who wondered were lost. Because Brezhnev's culture of censorship could only check for external obedience, not internal belief, more than a few scholars were able to respond to their "general scientific context" consisting "precisely of the 'accursed' questions of our time, the most acute and painful social problems," knowing that they had only to present their opinions in general terms, since life itself provided the backdrop for communication. As Efim Etkind has said, "Soviet people know how to read and they know how to listen." Zinoviev presents a dialogue between a cynical but relatively orthodox Soviet sociologist and the sculptor Neizvestniy, about a general analysis of a society characterised by tendencies of decay:

When he had read this extract from Schizophrenic's manuscript, Sociologist said to Dauber that Schizophrenic would get into really hot water for it. 'Whatever for?' asked Dauber in surprise. 'What do you mean, what for?' replied Sociologist, no less surprised. 'This is all about us and our society.' 'There isn't a word here that says it's all about us,' observed Dauber. 'Our bosses are no fools,' said Sociologist. 'Hypocrisy, oppression, disinformation, waste and so on - a babe in arms would recognise who all that's about.'
But Soviet society is so complex that critical analysis is not so easy to produce, especially if it endeavours to explain what is going on, not just redescribe the familiar in scientific language. Such analysis requires abstract thought, and so would tend to occur most fruitfully in an area of study based on historical comparison, like Soviet theoretical work on third world development.

**The Political Significance of Comparative Development**

As Nodari Simoniya has stressed, comparative analysis is vacuous if done without a dynamic, historical framework. To study comparative development is essentially to investigate how societies change in relation to one another. And, as Scott Meikle has recently argued, a coherent historical framework must distinguish between changes which are necessary, in the sense of being developments of the essential nature of something, and changes which are accidental to that nature. Determining the inherent nature of social entities by abstract comparison is part and parcel of an adequate historical method. And such comparison cannot be amoral, because, as Aron Gurevich has emphasised, cultural 'mentalities' are an inalienable part of history, including the researcher's historical present. History is made and understood through dialogues between people, which may be openly progressive or narrowly closed, and recognising the specific quandary of others may serve as a basis for criticising one's own civilisation, just as much as vice versa. These basic methodological principles have often been ignored in liberal societies, but in the USSR under Stalin they suffered an explicit, demagogic attack. It is not an accident that, as Lion Chernyak states, "Marxism-Leninism suffers from total amnesia when it comes to history." Any apology for the present must abolish the past.

The classic Stalinist apology was quite dissembling, providing the appearance of history on a grand scale, while asserting that no more changes would follow, since the last of five 'stages' (primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism) had already arrived in the USSR, the execution of many
tens of thousands of committed socialists notwithstanding. As Lewin notes, the Stalinist regime "controlled Marxism ... by adopting, nationalising and freezing it into a boring and ineffectual catechism." Bukharin warned about this in Aesopian language, saying that "Marxism ... has nothing in common with its pitiful social-fascist caricature which goes back ideologically to Lasalle, growing with all its shoots into the ideology of the fascist 'National', 'caste' and 'corporative' state, with the proletariat completely enslaved to capital and its terroristic dictatorship, offered up under the pseudonym of the 'nation' and the 'whole'." Stalin was aware of the significance of analogies, having banned Marx's concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' in 1931 because of its critical implications for understanding the Soviet present. Discussion of the historical blind-alley of the 'Asiatic mode' was subversive because it showed the difficulty and contingency of any transition from one structure of society to another. By implication, the Russian Revolution need not lead straight on to socialism; it could lead rather to a period of resurgent absolutism and economic stagnation, and perhaps eventually a return to capitalism. Obscuring this required the ending of sophisticated analyses of all transition periods, not just the Soviet case, since the concepts used for the former could also be applied to the latter. The patent instrumentalism of Stalin's 'piatchlenka' was recently pointed out by Marat Cheshkov, who revised the "five-step formational 'ladder'" in Europe to have the 'asiatic' mode as its beginning and capitalism as its "peak", implying that such a scheme could equally be used to justify the immortality of the bourgeoisie. His view of world history is based on Marx's broad concept of a bifurcated "second macro-formation", covering organic class societies in the West and "unarticulated" class societies in the Orient, with the modern USSR a special case of the latter.

Conceptual dissonance caused by "strict ideological control" has weighed very heavily on Soviet social science. Confusing conjurations like 'non-antagonistic contradictions' muddled those Marxist categories which had not been appropriated as slogans, and, given the limited access to alternative theories, impelled most conscientious scholars toward pedestrian research on "more peaceful" subjects.
unaffected by imposing interests of state. The result was recently characterised by Viktor Il’in and Aleksandr Razumov as a double loss in the form of "ideologised scholastics and positivist empiricism under the flag of the same scholastics." As Eero Loone suggests, the loss of historical theory caused by Stalin’s reduction of scholars to fact-finders supporting his grand slogans was exacerbated by a farcical craze for ‘topicality’ imposed under Brezhnev, when, as Gurevich pointedly remarks, many historians vigilantly proceeded “to re-write history not on the basis of new knowledge, but according to conjunctural communiques, in the spirit of an Orwellian ‘ministry of truth’.” In areas which did not involve comparative study and had obvious sensitivity, like Soviet history, the “stormy discussions of the 1960s” were aborted amidst “conditions of a lowering of the general tone of creative thought, and increasing showiness and wordmongering”. Stalinist historiography has been called a “contemptuously-cynical eclectic ... naturalisation of historical knowledge”, according to which social development was governed by ‘iron laws’ determined from on high in a voluntarist way by those “‘big’ people ‘having the right to take decisions’.” As Mikhail Gefter has stressed, Stalinism effectively abolished the concept of historical choice, which is a central condition of 20th century life. But such nihilism could not destroy the critical ‘feedback’ of comparative research, even where "scientific development proceeds not according to the laws of science itself, but with the aid of an administrative-political mechanism." As N.S. Zlobin has put it, the "splash of philosophical thought" with which some Soviet scholars responded to Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ continued to trickle through the years of ‘stagnation’, with serious scholars "considering the same problems on more neutral material." L.V. Danilova claims that even the theory of socio-economic formations has been relieved in recent years of some of its "distortions" as a result of historical research "in such an area as oriental studies". One leading liberal historian of Russia, Pavel Volobuev, ventured into oriental studies in the early 1980s to discuss "the problem of the choice of paths of social development", and recently restated the view that the Soviet state under Stalin degenerated into a dictatorship similar to "medieval oriental despotism".
In oriental studies, the need for historical comparison was recognised earlier and more fully than in most areas of Soviet social science, but even here this did not occur until the mid 1960s and thereafter affected only the leading scholars. After 1956, Stalin's "mistaken views on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the liberation movements of the Orient" were revised, but editorials in the Orientalist journal *Narody Azii i Afriki* in the early Brezhnev years criticised "time-serving, incompatible with real science", and urged an end to "such negative phenomena, still often appearing in our research, as timidity and indecisiveness in the posing of sharp problems of contemporary development". Overall, Soviet oriental studies remained pedestrian until 1979, when IVAN began "restructuring" its work into "new scientific directions"; even this did little to develop research of an "interdisciplinary character", because "strengthening specialisation" and an "absence amongst orientalists of a taste for methodological questions" meant that the discipline's leading scholars largely shouldered the weight of "enlarging its theoretical baggage" themselves. But the qualitative work of these scholars proved fruitful, particularly in developing the implications of Lenin's idea that Russia in 1917 "stood on the border between Europe and Asia, West and East". This "thesis of Russia as a model of the world at the beginning of the 20th century" provided an opening for feeding the insights of comparative historical research about the third world back into an understanding of Soviet history. Simoniya quoted this idea of Lenin's in order to justify devoting "great attention to the problem of the transitional period in the conditions of Russia" in a book entitled *Strany Vostoka*. Aleksei Levkovsky, whose discussion of third world 'multistructurality' paralleled applications of this concept to pre-revolutionary Russia, argued in a 1976 discussion of this book that Simoniya had demonstrated "the objective necessity of using the experience of Russia and Western Europe in resolving the problems of the 'third world'", so that "the isolated study of the Orient has now gone into the past." This point is crucial for establishing a bridging assumption which accommodates all the political meanings that Soviet theorists of development can communicate. If the third world cannot be understood in isolation, then neither can the USSR, and serious debates about the former must have implications for understanding the latter.
When Gefter announced at a symposium in early 1964 that "universality is the edict of the times", he implicitly called for an end to the forced isolation of Soviet society from world developments, in culture as well as in technology. While the course of the next twenty years tempered Gefter's optimism, neither he nor other serious Soviet scholars discarded their "concern to obtain scientific truth and serve the cause of progress". V.M. Mezhuev recently argued that a philosophy of history based on a humanist concept of development is not only theoretically necessary to make sense of the past, but also practically necessary to orient oneself in the present, as a way of understanding that history "has still not finished". Progress is only humanly possible, not naturally inevitable, since social contradictions may be controlled positively or negatively, the latter leading as Marx said to "the common ruin of the contending classes". Therefore, any account of progress or development is value-dependent, as Viktor Sheinis observed:

In the concept of progress there are clearly or implicitly contained ideas about values, since the value orientation of the researcher need not coincide with the values accepted (or even dominant) in one society or another. It is important in this matter to avoid the extremes of a normative-teleological approach, in which the researcher too simply correlates the facts of a contradictory reality with his own ideas about what is 'necessary' and 'better', and a relativist approach, which either denies the concept of progress in general, or defends a thesis about the incomparability of progress in different societies, accomplished as if according to different criteria. ... 'In Marxism', wrote V.I.Lenin, 'there is nothing in common with 'sectarianism' in the sense of a closed, ossified teaching, arising apart from the highway of the development of world civilisation.' The values of Marxism are a development, a socio-historical specification and realisation of the values advanced and 'tested'on the long historical path of world civilisation. The aetiology of Marxism is inseparably connected with a scientific analysis of the development of those societies which are situated in the centre of its attention, the circle of which has continually broadened.

This perspective implies that serious comparative research into problems of social development cannot but ask critical questions about relative progress in all societies of significance, particularly where a state, using Marxist phraseology, asserts itself superior to the outside world without daring to take the test of an open dialogue. While Gorbachev and his supporters in the Soviet elite are now
endeavouring to reintegrate the USSR into a modern world civilisation, it is clear that many leading Soviet intellectuals have been concerned for most of their working lives to end what Afanas'ev recently called the "intellectual self-isolation" of Soviet society.105

The conditions of life in the USSR during the liberal epoch and after suggest that, at least for critical Marxist scholars researching comparative development, the topical issues requiring public discussion must have included the state of Soviet society itself. Serious comparative research began to return to Soviet social science under Khrushchev, both in response to official recognition of the complexity of the modern world, and in the context of the Soviet intelligentsia's demand for reforms to bring their livelihood closer to Western standards. During the 1970s the official recognition of complexity remained, while the intelligentsia's dissatisfaction with Soviet life grew yet found less opportunity for expression. Gurevich recently observed that "periods of economic progress and political ascent or regress are not directly connected with periods of cultural prosperity or decay."106 In 1976, as the 'years of stagnation' set in, Lev Reisner wrote: "One could say that the marginal state of an economic system, its greatest degree of approaching entropy, is precisely what serves in certain conditions as a stimulus for maximal theoretical activity".107 If a harsh environment concentrates the mind, one specific reason given by Georgy Mirsky for the relative prosperity of Soviet oriental studies is that during the 1970s the third world changed so much that "a mass of aphoristic, indisputable truths from above was not successfully collected", so here "the space for independent scientific thought was incomparably greater than, say, in the study of the problems of contemporary capitalism."108 Soviet debates about the third world have concerned real problems, not scholastic jousts. As Yuri Ostrovitianov suggested in 1968, after noting the need to explain 'barracks communism': "The point of the theoretical compass all the more insistently points at the former colonial periphery as a ferment exciting scientific thought, as a source for new conclusions and generalisations."109 Another reason was that the field of oriental studies found itself "miles away from ideology", subject to less direct political control
than other areas of Soviet social science. When the Central Committee's wardens of censorship claimed in 1976 at a major discussion of *Strany Vostoka* that comparative analysis was unnecessary for understanding the third world, they were met with a united response from leading scholars in the field who asserted the contrary. Thus two key pre-requisites for sophisticated esoteric discussion of the USSR, a comparative historical approach to development and relatively little ideological interference from above, formed in the theoretical field of oriental studies when the basic imperative for such discussion, the decline of Soviet society in comparison with the West, became more pressing.

It is an important social and linguistic fact that any comparison can be read back to front, so that comments made by Soviet scholars ostensibly only about the third world can be understood as applicable also to the USSR, provided that the particular discussion makes sense in terms of that referent. By taking seriously the view that the USSR is still in many respects a 'developing country', it is possible to read Soviet theoretical debates about third world development at a subterranean level, as analysis of Soviet society written through the mirror of analysis of general trends in the 'developing countries' or the 'Orient'. The interesting thing is that here the same words can be used to communicate meanings about two different subjects, one apparent and the other submerged but at least as significant for the authors concerned. It is clear theoretically that interpreting political meaning depends upon recognising the questions at issue, not on defining the significance of key terms in isolation, since the same terms can have different meanings when viewed with different questions of practical life in mind. Leading Soviet theorists about development have had to write seriously at two levels in order to participate fully in an unrestricted debate. Both levels of analysis are intrinsically important, since the subterranean level of political meaning could not exist in a sophisticated form by itself, if not supported by officially required analysis of third world development. As Arlen Meliksetov, a professor at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Relations, said in the published discussion of *Strany Vostoka*, 'Soviet oriental studies is a science closely connected with practice ... and it is this connection with practice which
compels orientalists to turn to questions of general theory." It is now necessary to provide an assessment of the foreign policy issues which have given Soviet theorists of development an enhanced political position, and hence more opportunities to use their knowledge to communicate esoterically the political meanings which they have deemed most significant.

**Basic Objectives of Soviet Policy Toward the Third World**

To the extent that Soviet debates about third world development concern issues of Soviet foreign policy, they reflect different political responses within the Soviet elite to the dilemmas of working out a hierarchy of policy objectives guiding Soviet relations with the many developing countries. Policy makers need some principles to order their information and experience, even if all they wish to do is muddle through. The contingency of such 'guides to action' in the outside world creates space for political debate about the relative importance of different objectives, but scholars questioning the accuracy of particular foreign policy assumptions must have the 'national interests' of the Soviet state at heart, albeit in an improved form. Significantly, members of the Soviet party intelligentsia tend to be less critical when evaluating the character of Soviet foreign policy than when assessing the plight of Soviet society, and identify much more with expanding the Soviet state's influence abroad than they do with the same thing domestically. Reasons for this difference, which is far from peculiarly Soviet, range from the more realistic nature of the Soviet elite's propaganda about its performance abroad than its 'leading role' at home, to the indirect advisory role in foreign policy formation of leading Soviet scholars, which incorporates them politically in a way distinct from domestic affairs, where they are inclined to more cynical attitudes concerning officialdom. Another factor is certainly Soviet state nationalism, which in a pragmatic form is a staple ideology of the Soviet elite, although, as Yanov has stressed, this is different from the messianic Russian nationalism of those who would return all to the dark ages in order to save the Soviet state from the ills of civilisation. Acceptance of the need for a Soviet 'power centre' does not make most Soviet scholars support rash adventures which
waste scarce domestic resources on aid of doubtful political utility, but it does mean that their first concern is often not the interests of the oppressed majority of poverty-stricken people in the third world.\textsuperscript{114}

Since censorship and the norms of diplomacy preclude direct discussion of the basic objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world, any attempt to identify them must be somewhat speculative. Two different types of evidence are available for interpretation in order to work out the general aims of Soviet policy toward the developing countries. First, there are statements by Soviet officials, a key example of which is an important directive speech made by Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee for over thirty years until early 1986, to IVAN on October 10, 1980, outlining the major "topical problems" requiring clarification from scholars.\textsuperscript{115} This speech surveys the basic issues which the institute is required to research, and constitutes the nearest thing in Soviet sources to an official account, relatively unmuddied by propaganda, of the basic concerns of Soviet policy makers regarding the third world. Second, this source can be read in the light of the historical record of Soviet actions concerning the developing countries. This record is open to different interpretations, but it is remarkable how rarely the question of Soviet objectives is explicitly discussed at length in Western writing about Soviet foreign policy. As Craig Nation has noted with reference to Soviet Middle East policy, most Western accounts have been "pre-occupied with the tactical dimensions of Soviet conduct", rather than considering the fundamental reasons for Soviet involvement with countries of the third world.\textsuperscript{116} Yet interpreting the historical record in order to assess the basic objectives of Soviet foreign policy is not as difficult a task as it might first appear. Richard Herrmann has pointed out that, while some scholars claim the practice of attributing aims to Soviet foreign policy to be too speculative or difficult to attempt, in fact "the task is not impossible; it is done all the time", because it is a necessary part of making any interpretative sense of Soviet policy at all.\textsuperscript{117} Most Western literature on Soviet third world policy has relied on a generalisation that the USSR, like other states, exploits opportunities to expand its influence where
feasible. This generalisation begs the question of Soviet policy objectives, by not defining what situation constitutes an opportunity for what goals, and by failing to investigate how Soviet leaders actually perceive the context of influence-building in the third world. As Simes has said, saying that Soviet leaders "exploit opportunities as these arise ... is irrelevant if you fail to establish how they actually define opportunities and then proceed to exploit them."118

The first item on Ponomarev's research agenda concerned the problems posed for the USSR by the economic, political and military power of the major Western states. He said that "a very important direction of the research work of orientalists has been and remains the all-sided study of the strategies and tactics of imperialism in the countries of the Orient, and also the active opposition to it." Noting the power of multinational corporations, he expressed concern about the "new approaches" imperialism was using to force the liberated countries into a military alliance under the pretence of a 'Soviet threat'. And, given that the United States had just declared itself to have 'vital interests' far from North America but close to Soviet borders, he raised the ever-present danger of confrontation escalating to major war by adding: "here hotbeds of conflict and local wars are being inflamed".119 The two principal Soviet policy objectives toward the third world implicit in these comments are to remove a Western military presence from as many countries as possible, and avoid any risk that Soviet involvement could escalate to a war with other major powers.

These goals derive from what Michael MccGwire has called the "first-order objectives" of the Soviet state: "retain independence of action", "avoid world war" and "retain power by Communist Party".120 He argues that "the primary tension among the three first order objectives lies between 'avoiding world war' and 'preserving the capacity for independent action', since the latter could itself lead to war. World war is, therefore, a continuing possibility and should it be inescapable then the objective must be 'not to lose'". This objective of not losing a major war is a second order national objective, which supports the higher objectives of retaining power by the CPSU and retaining independent action in international relations.121 Preserving a capacity for independent action is
enhanced by removing threatening Western military capabilities, as is the imperative of not losing a major war. But the destruction of any such war would be so great that avoiding it must take precedence, so the objective of removing Western military forces is limited by an equally important objective of avoiding any risk of a conflict escalating to the level of a major war. The historical record shows that removing a Western presence has consistently been the most basic positive incentive of Soviet policy toward the third world, and that avoiding escalation has consistently been the most basic negative factor constraining Soviet involvement. Since its formation the Soviet state has pursued a policy of "strategic denial" toward nearby developing countries, encouraging them through pressure and inducements to restrict their military ties with the West.\textsuperscript{122} While unsuccessful at the start of the Cold War, because of Stalin’s heavy-handedness and the economic and military weakness of the Soviet state, in the mid 1950s this basic policy succeeded toward extensive areas of the third world, such as the main Arab countries and India, though not toward Turkey and Iran.\textsuperscript{123} During the Brezhnev period, the objective of removing, and consolidating the removal of, a Western military presence remained predominant, but in all cases when there was even a remote danger of conflict escalating to a major war (Egypt in 1973, Somalia in 1977-78 and Iran in 1978-80) the USSR was careful to avoid this at all costs, even acquiescing to the return of a US military presence in states that had formerly been 'staunch' Soviet allies.\textsuperscript{124}

One consequence of the tension in Soviet policy between the positive objective of removing a Western military presence and the constraining objective of avoiding escalation has been that the USSR has devoted substantial attention to assessing the domestic evolution of third world states, checking the prospects in particular cases for attaining the former objective without prejudicing the latter. After commenting on particularly recent or worrying matters, like the political role of contemporary Islamic ideology and the emergence of an "open union of Peking with imperialism" (leading toward a "military partnership with the United States" which would have drastically outflanked the main positive objective of Soviet policy toward the third world), the second broad issue addressed by
Ponomarev in his speech was the need for a clear definition of Soviet allies and their problems. He said "the significance of a scientific elaboration of the problems inherent in the countries of socialist orientation should be especially emphasised", and noted that these countries have to "resolve very complex problems connected with a shortage of resources and qualified specialists, the opposition of internal counterrevolution, and uninterrupted pressure from the forces of imperialism, who often proceed right up to open intervention." While regarding the 'Soviet model' as "in essence, universal", he stressed that "the conditions in each of these countries ... distinguish them from situations which occurred earlier in other regions and countries of the world, and are very heterogeneous in themselves in our time." As well as focusing on close allies, Ponomarev informed Soviet scholars that "the movement of non-aligned states deserves special and continuing attention. An analysis of its development, and the struggles of progressive anti-imperialist forces in it against those who would have it clash with positive positions, these are questions of big political importance." In contrast to the directive about studying the problems of 'socialist orientation', which concerned the internal stability of Soviet allies, this research task focused on understanding "the important mobilisation of the foreign policy activity of those countries participating in the non-aligned movement," their "struggle against the arms race, against military threats and against all the aggressive policies of imperialism." Such comments suggest that the main tactical objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world in 1980 were to encourage both radical and moderate forms of 'anti-imperialism', as manifested in dependent Soviet allies (states of 'socialist orientation') and independent non-aligned countries, but that the first tactic was still considered superior to the second.

The objective of defending Soviet allies where feasible is important not just to strengthen the removal of a Western presence, and but also to facilitate a military objective of securing future war-related requirements. McCGwire has pointed out that "acquiring and exploiting base rights will usually consume influence rather than preserve it", so having substantial influence with dependent allies is a crucial part of preparing not to lose a major war. But the objective of defending
Soviet allies is constrained by the higher objective of avoiding escalation, since the loss of an ally is less threatening to the well-being of the Soviet state than the consequences of an avoidable, major war. The less demanding objective of supporting non-alignment may reinforce the removal of a Western presence, particularly if attained through the instrument of arms sales, but it conflicts with securing war-related requirements. The historical record shows that the USSR has been careful to use military power only to defend a non-contiguous third world state, not to force a change in regime. McCwire claims that through 1984 (with one minor exception), the Soviet Union had not used actual or latent military force to coerce a state outside its national security zone. The Soviets exercised restraint even when base rights were at stake, and they had significant forces on the ground and control of air terminals in that country. Similarly, when the Soviets have applied supportive military force, either directly or through proxies, it has been defensive and not punitive, since it is counterproductive to generate unnecessary hostility.

This policy of defending but not creating or forcibly holding on to allies, and not unusually punishing enemies, is sensible in view of the higher objective which it serves, since one consequence of a substantial use of Soviet forces in the third world would be to encourage threatened regimes to invite a Western military presence in response. But such a policy places a premium on defining just which third world countries are reliable Soviet allies, and this is the context of the USSR's evident interest in signing formal 'Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation' with anti-Western third world states. Given that the first such treaty, signed with Egypt in May, 1971, proved not worth the paper on which it was written, a key question for Soviet policy toward the third world during the 1970s must have been whether there was a nationalist limit beyond which any developing country would not 'strengthen' its relations with the USSR.

The final research directive in Ponomarev's speech concerned the need to find ways of expanding trade and other bilateral arrangements between the USSR and particular third world countries. He said "serious demands are put before Soviet oriental science regarding the prospects for political, economic and cultural cooperation of the Soviet Union with the countries of the Orient. Here there is a
need for profound summaries of past experience, and an elaboration of scientifically based conclusions and suggestions which may assist the search for optimal solutions in the mutual interests of the parties concerned, and which contribute overall to the joint struggle against imperialism and the threat of war." This directive clearly reflected a basic Soviet policy objective of trading with any state which is interested, and a supplementary aim of endeavouring to use such bilateral cooperation where possible to further the more important political objectives of Soviet third world policy which Ponomarev had outlined. During the post-Stalin era the USSR has endeavoured to improve economic relations with all third world states, even those with which it has substantial political differences. The main connection between trade and other, higher priority political objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world has been that matters of trade have tended to become more important bilaterally when the more demanding objectives are clearly unattainable, as has often been the case in Soviet relations with Iran, since the USSR has been concerned to prevent the West from completely dominating any area of the third world. But during the Brezhnev period Soviet economic involvement with the third world became increasingly commercial, and focused mainly on neighbouring countries, with whom trade was geographically more feasible.

Ponomarev's speech and the historical record suggest that, in rough order of importance, the six basic objectives guiding Soviet policy toward the third world have been: remove Western influence, particularly a Western military presence, while minimising the risk of involvement in the third world escalating to a situation of confrontation which could portend war; defend reliable allies where feasible; support moves of non-aligned third world countries to become more independent of the West; trade with anyone who can pay; and secure war-related requirements in order not to lose a major war. These objectives are limited, yet sufficiently complex to create big problems for Soviet policy makers. The temptation to use a simple category, like the 'non-capitalist path', to differentiate reliable Soviet allies is perhaps understandable from the viewpoint of a seasoned conservative decision maker, though hardly effective in terms of expanding Soviet
influence. Ponomarev concluded his address by stating that: "The Party and the Soviet people expect from orientalist scholars fundamental works, summarising new phenomena and tendencies in the struggle of the peoples of the Orient, and also prompt analysis of current events." While he complained that "the timeliness and exactness of analyses is not always secured", observing that "it would be an exaggeration to affirm that the analysis of socio-economic development and political processes in the countries of the Orient is now fully satisfactory", the more distinguished members of his audience no doubt thought that 'exactness' in the conduct of current Soviet policy was even more lacking. 134
Chapter 2, Footnotes:

1. Cf. G.I. Mirsky, "Sotsialisticheskaia Orientatsiia v ‘tret’em mire’ (nekotorye problemy issledovaniiia)", Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir, 1988, no. 4, p. 120. Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet debates and American options, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1986, pp. 15-6, 43-4, points out that "despite Stalin’s power, he was not able to bring published debate ... under complete control", but notes that debate within the Soviet elite in the post-Stalin era has far surpassed, not just quantitatively but more importantly qualitatively, anything which occurred under Stalin.

2. Archie Brown, "Political Science in the USSR: a new stage of development?", Soviet Studies, July 1984, p. 322, uses the term "party intelligentsia" to designate the social group of intellectuals capable of influencing elite policy through informal opinion groups. Fedor Burlatsky, "Posle Stalina: zametki o politicheskoi ottepeli", Novy Mir, 1988, no. 10, p. 156, recently remarked that "the children of the 20th Congress" are still the main proponents of restructuring.


4. Ibid., pp. 13-5, 257.


6. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed.by C.B. Macpherson, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, p.165: "Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words be detected." That such understanding requires investigating the pertinent social contexts has not been appreciated by Seweryn Bialer, "Soviet Foreign Policy: sources, perceptions, trends", in idem. ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Westview, Boulder, 1981, p. 439, n. 17, in his criticism of William Taubman for holding the view, derived from Solzhenitsyn, that in the USSR "ideology is both dead and as influential as ever; few in the top elite really believe in much of it anymore, but all must act as if they do." Bialer complains that this view does not take Soviet ideology seriously, for two reasons: "First, if people act as if they do believe in the ideology, then what is the significance, if any, of their alleged lack of belief? Second, it conflicts with the experience of human behavior and the findings of social psychology, and especially the tested idea of ‘cognitive dissonance,’ to argue that for prolonged periods people will act out ideas without coming to believe them." Apart from the fact that not all authorities agree with this view of human behaviour (Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince is based on contrary assumptions) and the fact that not all social psychologists regard theories of ‘cognitive dissonance’ as true (see Edward E. Sampson, "Cognitive Psychology as Ideology", American Psychologist, July 1981, p. 736), Bialer’s view underestimates the duplicity of the Soviet elite, which like any ruling group is skilled at promising the population more than it knows it can provide them, while securing its privileges.

7. John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984, pp. 130-1; Thompson argues against "the way in which contemporary theorists conceive of ideology in a neutral sense, regarding it as a system of symbols or beliefs which pertain, in some way, to social action or political practice."

8. Quoted in ibid., p. 133.

9. Cf. Boris Groys, "The Problem of Soviet Ideological Practice", Studies in Soviet Thought, vol. 33, no. 3, April, 1987, p. 191: "The impression is created that Soviet ideology is capable of combining the clearly defined and dogmatic with the totally elusive and undefined. This ability has a structural character and, even, in a certain sense, constitutes the very nature of Soviet ideology."

10. The contradictory nature of Soviet society has been stressed particularly by Hillel Ticktin, "The

12. As Hillel Ticktin, "A Critical Evaluation of Marxist Theories of the Soviet Union", paper presented to the Canadian Association of Political Science, May 1981, p. 43, has observed, "it should be obvious that any society that must atomise its population is inherently unstable."

13. As Alec Nove, "History, Political Culture and Economics", in Hans-Hermann Hohmann et. al. eds, Economics and Politics in the USSR, Westview, Boulder, 1986, p. 6, has noted: "It would indeed be extreme idealism to attribute the emergence of a new social order, which Stalinism surely was, to the power of ideas alone." The absurdity of an idealist interpretation of Soviet history was sarcastically pointed out by Aleksandr Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights, Bodley Head, London, 1979, p. 181: "The life of Ibansk came to a decisive turning point. It was officially recognised that this very life which, by an act of genius, had been planned out on high more than a hundred years ago, which had been prepared for by the whole development of matter throughout the latter half of eternity, and which had been brought into being in complete conformity with its own most fundamental laws and formulae under the eye of the secret police - that this very life was revealing occasional oversights by certain malefactors." Studying the history of ideas is important, but the number of valuable ideas in Stalin's Russia was reduced to a bare minimum.


15. Michal Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism: the USSR on the eve of the 'second revolution', Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1987, p. 115. It is significant that Stalin said little or nothing of importance in the industrialisation debates of the 1920s; even the notion of 'socialism in one country' was Bukharin's progeny. As Reiman concludes, "Stalin's independent political conception was one result of the crisis, which influenced the direction and ultimate form that Stalin's thought would take". Ferenc Feher, "Crisis and Crisis-Solving in the Soviet System Under Gorbachev's New Course", Thesis Eleven, no. 21, 1988, p. 9, points out that Stalin successfully defined 'the crisis' as one of NEP, rather than something else, like bureaucratism.


21. Cited in Boris Silver, The Russian Workers' Own Story, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1938, p. 91. For the social composition of the new Soviet elite see T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, p. 197: "During the 1930s ... 'Socialism', far from completing the triumph of the working class, begot a new class of technically trained administrators. The Revolution passed from the destruction of old bonds to the creation of new ones. Nationalism, the family and 'the classics', disdained in the 1920s, were now put to use to cement the new bonds of society. The party which Stalin had shaped and wielded against all and sundry in his earlier struggles, a party run by Civil War veterans and made up of workers and peasants with at best a thin veneer of training and experience, became in these circumstances an anachronism and ceased to be appropriate to the new purposes of the
dictator. The violence which the party had used against society was now turned against the party itself. Between 1933 and 1938 it was purged from top to bottom, and restocked by 1941 with new members drawn predominantly from the new 'intelligentsia'.


31. V.P. Lukin, "Ideologiia razvitiia i massovoe soznanie v stranakh 'tre't'ego mira'", Voprosy filosofii, 1969, no. 6, pp. 46, 36. Recognising that "ideology is just one of the components of an extraordinarily complex social reality, which in the final analysis can only be understood as a totality," Lukin tried simply "to raise, but by no means resolve, a series of important questions". His article was written soon after returning from Prague, where he had opposed those who, as he recently recalled, had arrogated to themselves "the right to decide for the others" ("August 1968: 20 years later, eyewitnesses tell about what happened in Czechoslovakia", Moscow News, 28/8/88, p. 7).


34. Lukin, "Ideologiia ...", pp. 42-4; 41-2, n. 1.

35. Stephen F. Cohen, "The Stalin Question since Stalin", in idem. ed., End to Silence, p. 44.

Kagarlitsky, pp. 137-40).


40. Michael Cox, "The Politics of the Dissenting Intellectual", *Critique*, no. 5, 1975, pp. 25-6. An important material factor in the re-emergence of widespread political discussion in the USSR was Khrushchev's crash housing programme, which provided many members of the intelligentsia with separate, non-communal apartments, creating a social enclave beyond the secret police.


42. Kagarlitsky, pp. 144-7.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 148. The prevalence of pro-Western views within much of the Soviet intelligentsia was stressed by Hillel Ticktin, "Political Economy of the Soviet Intellectual", *Critique*, no. 2, 1974, pp. 8-9. Cf. Zinoviev, *Yawning Heights*, p. 476: "Everything here was denigrat ed. Everything from Over There provoked raptures." Shtromas, pp. 18-20, argues against using the term "opposition" to refer to the dissident movement in the USSR, because "they represent a moral force, speaking out upon humanitarian issues and attempting to involve the Russian population, Soviet authorities and world public opinion in these issues, but not a political force seeking to change the government and obtain power for themselves or any other groups. Should there exist now, or be formed in the future, a real political opposition in the USSR, it will certainly not appear on the social surface until it is ready to strike a death-blow to the regime. And the only relation between such an opposition and the overt dissident movement would be one of ideas rather than organization and personnel." However, non-dissident reformists within the Soviet Establishment can be seen as oppositional to conservative leadership, in the same sense that formally recognised oppositions in liberal capitalist societies present alternative policies within a given political system.

44. Cox, "Politics of Dissenting Intellectual", p. 29. Cf. Zinoviev, *Radiant Future*, p. 57: "when I compared my own position with that of foreign professors, I considered my own way of life as one of penury and servitude"; and Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 71: "In present conditions westernizer political views also are sustained by intensive propaganda coming from the West, which in many cases achieves its purpose. The average Soviet citizen receives only inadequate and superficial information about all that is going on in the world. No educated person could possibly be satisfied, and the Soviet intelligentsia has a real hunger - there is no other word for it - for information."


47. Zinoviev, Radiant Future, pp. 179-80, 82, 169, 237; Zaslavsky, Neo-Stalinist State, pp. 82-90. Cf. Chalidze, Budushchee Rossii, p. 166: "Is it not strange that the rulers of a monopolistic state cite their main enemy - Marx, that dictators repeat words about freedom? Not only is it not strange, but for them it is even very useful and neutralizing."


49. Ibid., pp. 475-6; cf. p. 171: "In order to attack some particular aspect of the Ism you must look like someone who's defending it."


52. George Breslauer, Khruschev and Brezhnev as Leaders, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, p. 171. Cf. Cox, "Politics of Dissenting Intellectual", pp. 30-1: "the general extension in the range and freedom of debate for the intelligentsia for at least a year after Khrushchev's fall, followed in September 1965 by Kosygin's announcement of economic reform, all seemed to point towards a continuation of de-Stalinisation, rather than a retreat from it. In other words, in the year after Khrushchev's fall, the elite was making a renewed attempt to win over the intelligentsia, while at the same time trying to overcome the Soviet Union's deep economic problems."


54. Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates, Pluto Press, London, 1975, p. 269. Spechler, Permitted Dissent, pp.214-8, describes the build up of conservative attacks on liberal writing in Novy Mir in the year before the 23rd CPSU Congress in early spring 1966; Cohen, loc. cit., p. 43, suggests that "the decisive battle in officialdom was over by early 1966", as shown by the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel and the expulsion of Aleksandr Nekrich.


56. Zinoviev, Yawning Heights, p. 178; Cox, "Politics of Dissenting Intellectual", pp. 32-4. Jerry Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 118-9, notes that while the opportunities for specialist debate continued from 1970 onwards to be fuller than under Khrushchev, "the increase in freedom of within-system expression has been less than many intellectuals anticipated - or hoped for - in 1965".

57. Quoted in Kagarlitsky, p. 209.


60. Ibid., 178-80. Lloyd G. Churchward, The Soviet Intellectuista: an essay on the social structure and roles of Soviet intellectuals during the 1960s, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 144, noted that since the early 1960s "the KGB has been steadily expanded, especially the 5th Section. There is active recruiting of agents from within the intelligentsia and most intellectual organisations contain police agents." Ilya Zemstov, Soviet Sociology, Hero Books, Arlington, 1985, p. 57, reports that a new sector in the Central Committee was set up in the mid 1970s to supervise the social sciences.

61. Zh. Medvedev, loc. cit., Zinoviev, Radiant Future, p. 39; cf. p. 210: "In the past, we had a
certain tradition which had been established despite the formal bureaucratic system. Of course, a lot of villains made a good thing of it. But once in a while something decent managed to get through. It's a fact that over this period, we've published a few dozen books and articles which were entirely up to world standards. And out of all the people who upheld their doctoral dissertations you might choose thirty or so who could form a first-class Institute, incomparably more productive than ours with its staff of five hundred. This new system means that the tradition of the Sixties will be crushed. The frauds will still get published and win their doctorates as they used to. But now there will be no point in decent people even dreaming of publishing or submitting their theses."


63. B.I. Slavnyi, Nemarkisitskaia politekonomia o problemakh otstalosti i zavisimosti v razvivaiushchemsia mire, Nauka, Moscow, 1982, p. 227. This comment was ostensibly applied only to third world dependency theory, but in view of the espousal of this theory by conservative Soviet economists like Anatoly Dinkevich and particularly former radicals like Vladimir Krylov, it can be read also a bold comment on the state of Soviet theory in the last 'years of stagnation'. For Slavnyi's open criticism of the "progressivist" view in Soviet social science of the role of the state, see "Evoliutsiia vostochnykhh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo", Narody Azii i Afriki, 1987, no. 3, p. 158.

64. Chernyak, review of Scanlan, p. 83; Lewin, Political Undercurrents, p. 262.


66. Kagarlitsky, pp. 212-5; 283.


68. Feher et. al., p. 292.


71. Zinoviev, Yawning Heights, pp. 56-7. Cf. Zinoviev, Radiant Future, p. 36, about an exchange with the KGB regarding a manuscript entitled 'Communism - Ideology and Reality': "There is one thing which worries us particularly in this case,' said the comrade from There. 'We have read the book very carefully. It seemed completely Marxist to us. But at the same time there is something deeply hostile in it, and we non-specialists find it very hard to see exactly what. That's why we asked you...'. If they only knew that even for me it's not too easy to sort out the answers."


75. Chernyak, review of Scanlan, p. 88.


77. Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents, p. 259.
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80. Meikle, *loc. cit.*, p. 155. In a recent article, Nodari Simoniya, "Leninskaia kontseptsiia perekhoda k sotsializmu i strany Vostoka", *Azia i Afrika Segodnia*, 1988, no. 4, p. 4, argued that, rather than 'primary socialist accumulation', 'it would be more correct to consider Stalinist total collectivisation as a rebirth on a contemporary basis of isolated elements of the 'asiatic mode of production' (the system 'state-commune'), about the possibility of which G. Plekhanov spoke in his time." For references to the 'asiatic mode' in *Strany Vostoka*, see pp. 162, 191-2, 244, 259.


83. V.Zh. Kelle, in "Filosofia i istoricheskaia nauka", *Voprosy filosofii*, 1988, no. 10, p. 27.


86. E.N. Loone, in "Filosofia i istoricheskaia nauka", p. 42; Gurevich, "Istoricheksaia ...", p. 61.

87. V.A. Kozlov, "Istorik i Perestroika", *Voprosy Istoriik KPSS*, 1987, no. 5, pp. 118 (I owe this reference to Elizabeth Waters).


91. Zlobin, in "Filosofia", p. 35.


93. P.V. Volobuev, in *ibid.*, p. 41. For a review of Volobuev's recent book which discusses the "significant losses" for Soviet historiography resulting from the official attack on Volobuev and his colleagues in the 1970s, see R.Sh. Ganelin, Yu. V. Egorov and A.N. Tsamutali, "Istoriia kak


95. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Ordena Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni Institut Vostokovedeniia [brochure of the Institute of Oriental Studies], Moscow, 1986, pp. 6, 7. The key personnel change leading to this restructuring was the appointment of Evgeny Primakov as Director of the Institute in 1978. Primakov, "Aktual'nye zadachi", pp. 4, 5, 15; Anatoly Kutsenkov (chief editor of Narody Azii i Afriki, 1976-88), in "Zasedaniia uchenykh sovetov institutov afriki i sostokovedeniia AN SSSR", Narody Azii i Afriki, 1984, no. 5, p. 113.

96. This quote is a paraphrase of Lenin by P.N. Fedoseev in 1967, quoted in K.N. Tarnovsky, "Problema vzaimodeistvii sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh ukладov imperialisticheskoi rossi i sovremennom etape razvitiia sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki", in V.V. Adamov ed., Voprosy Istori Kapitalisticheskoi Rossii: problema mnogoukladnosti, Sverdlovsk, 1972, p. 41, n. 47. Tarnovsky gives a similar quote from a speech by Volobuev at the same time, p. 41, n. 48.

97. Ibid., p. 41; Gefter concludes his chapter in this book, "Mnogoukladnost' -- kharakteristika tselogo", p. 99, with the same point.


99. A.I. Levkovsky, "Obsuzhdenie knigi N.A. Simoniya 'Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia'", Narody Azii i Afriki, 1977, no. 3, p. 55; Levkovsky's work was cited by Tarnovsky, p. 27, and by Adamov in his preface to the controversial book about multistructurality in Russia, p. 5.

100. Gefter, in "O metodologicheskikh voprosakh istoricheskoi nauki: obsuzhdenie voprosov metodologii istorii na rasshirennom zasedanii Sektsii obschestvennykh nauk Presidiuma AN SSSR 3 i 6 ianvaria 1964 goda", Voprosy istorii, no. 3, p. 47.


108. G. Mirsky, "K voprosu o vybore puti i orientatsii razvivaiushchikhsia stran", Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenii, 1987, no. 5, p. 70. Mirsky added that: "It is true that in recent decades from time to time attempts have been made by a 'circular path' to forbid, for example, use of one term or another. This relates, in particular, to the very term 'third world'." Cf. V. Gel'bras, "Impul's dlia razmyshlenii i nadezhd", Aziiia i Afrika Segodnia, 1988, no. 9, p. 2.

110. Zinoviev, Radiant Future, p. 130. In the report of Soviet Academy of Sciences Vice-president P.N. Fedoseev to the major meeting of social science chiefs in September 1976, there was only one sentence concerning the third world, apart from its demographic situation, "XXV S'iezd KPSS i Zadachi Nauchnykh Issledovanii v Oblasti Obschestvennykh Nauk", in XXV S'ezd KPSS i Zadachi Kafedr Obschestvennykh Nauk. Materialy Vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia zavediushchikh kafedrami obschestvennykh nauk vysshikh uchebnih zavedeni. Moskva, 21-23 sentiabria 1976 g., Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, pp.86-127, especially p. 115.

111. See the comments of Aleksei Levkovsky, Boris Koval', Georgi Mirsky, Arlen Meliksetov, Semion Agaev, Aleksandr Chicherov and particularly Gleri Shirokov in "Obsdzhdenie knigi N.A. Simoniyu 'Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia'”, pp. 55, 57, 59-60, 61, 63, 64.

112. Meliksteov, in ibid., p. 59.

113. Yanov, Russian Challenge, passim.

114. This generalisation applies to some Soviet scholars, like Reisner, less than others, like Lukin, whose recent espousal of a fairly orthodox Western 'realist' view of 'power centres' in world politics, "Tsentry Sily": konseptsi i real'nost', Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenii, Moscow, 1983, would probably have been dismissed as 'technocratic' by the author of "Ideologiya razvitiiia".


118. Dimitri K. Simes, "Commentary", in Nimrod Novik and Joyce Starr eds, Challenges in the Middle East: regional dynamics and western security, Praeger, New York, 1981, p. 52. Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, Brookings, Washington, 1985, p. 931, concludes his analysis of the motives for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 by responding to the prevalent generalisation of Soviet opportunism: "The Soviet leaders did not see their decision to intervene militarily as an opportune option but as a security imperative; not as an opportunity for expansion but as a reluctant necessity to hold on; not as something they were free to do but as something they were regrettably bound to do. It was a decision forced by events, not an opportunity created by them."


121. Ibid., p. 39.

122. Nation, "Sources of Soviet involvement", p. 44.

123. Cf. Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev and Chernenko, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, p. 184: "George Kennan, the American Ambassador to Moscow and at that time the architect of western containment of the Soviet Union, wrote to Washington 'that the basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not the need for oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area'.
124. Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After: the Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 11-12, has pointed to the objective of avoiding a military confrontation with the United States as an "overriding negative factor" in Soviet calculations. For detailed accounts of Soviet caution regarding Egypt and Somalia see William Quandt, "Soviet Policy in the October Middle East War", *International Affairs*, vol. 53, nos 3 and 4, 1977, pp. 377-89 and 587-603; and Richard B. Remnek, "The Soviet-Somali 'Arms for Access' Relationship", *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique*, vol. 10, part 1, pp. 59-81. It is also arguable that Soviet caution towards Iran, because of concern to avoid any risk of escalation, may eventually contribute to the re-establishment of a Western military presence there in the long-term; at least, Soviet scholars have for some time been expressing concern about increasing Western economic involvement in Iran, which can only develop further once the war ends: see A.Z. Arabadzhian and D.S. Rozhdestvenskaia, "Evoliutsiia ekonomicheskikh sviasei SShA s Iranom", in Yu.V. Gankovsky ed., *Blizhnii i Srednii Vostok: ekonomika i istoriia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p. 19.

125. "Rech ... Ponomareva", pp. 6-7.

126. Ibid., p. 8.


128. Ibid., pp. 221-2.

129. For McCwire's reconstruction of the hierarchy of basic Soviet foreign policy objectives see the diagram on p. 93.

130. The existence of a formal 'Treaty of Friendship' between the USSR and a certain third world country has not in itself indicated that that country is a reliable Soviet ally, as the example of Iraq's most imprudent, from the Soviet viewpoint, attack on Iran in September 1980, showed. See Roderic Pitty, "Soviet Perceptions of Iraq", *Middle East Report*, no. 151, March-April 1988, p. 26.


132. An indication of the increasingly commercial nature of Soviet economic relations with the third world is the fact that, although the USSR vociferously supported the OPEC oil boycott during and after the October 1973 war, it actually "continued to sell oil, and reportedly even some Middle East oil, to Western Europe and the United States", Karen Dawisha, *Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt*, Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 107.

133. McCwire, *Military Objectives*, pp. 218-9, suggests a decrease in the importance of the military objective, as distinct from the use of military instruments for political objectives such as defending allies or supporting non-alignment through arms sales, in Soviet third world policy during the 1970s.

134. "Rech ... Ponomareva", pp. 9, 5.
MccGWIRE'S HIERARCHY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES


Figure 1: Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives

Arms Control

Contain Regional Wars

Avoid World War

Avoid Crises

Limit Superpower Confrontation

Promote the wellbeing of the Soviet State

Retain Power by Communist Party

Retain Independence of Action

Do Not Lose a World War

Do Not Lose a Regional War

Increase Share of World Influence

Increase Soviet Economic Efficiency

War-related Requirements

Remove West

Defend Client

Support Client

Trade with Third World

Trade with West

Source: Author's estimate incorporating suggestions by Roderick Pitty
Chapter 3: The Decline of Dependent Allies

Summing up the results of the discussion, Doctor of Economic Science S.I. Tiul'panov (Leningrad State University) drew some conclusions. We all depart, he noted, from the position formulated in the theses of E.M. Primakov, that the developing countries are a part of the world capitalist economy, that the world capitalist economy includes not only countries going along the path of capitalism, but also countries of so-called socialist orientation. ... Speaking about the non-capitalist path of development, Professor Tiul'panov noted that today this is not that path which we imagined to ourselves 20-25 years ago. This does not mean, however, that the pre-requisites for such development do not ripen in current times. Therefore, besides a general typology, a particular-country approach is very important.

("Problemy i tendentsii razvitiia osvobodivshikhsia stran", Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir, 1979, no. 4, pp. 159-60.)

During the first postwar decade the USSR, because of its internal weakness and shortage of foreign policy personnel, remained almost completely isolated from the vast areas of the globe which were of no direct concern to Soviet security. Despite Molotov's claim, in February 1946, that "important problems of international relations cannot nowadays be settled without the participation of the Soviet Union or without heeding the voice of the country", it was not until the second postwar decade that the USSR emerged to participate fully in world affairs.¹ This was symbolised at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when Khrushchev publicly replaced Zhdanov's 'two-camp' view of the world with a more relaxed and optimistic perspective, in which the USSR could reduce Western pressure through a policy of 'peaceful co-existence', and put pressure on the main capitalist states in turn by supporting anti-imperialist states and liberation movements in the third world.² These latter were important because the USSR's traditional instrument for pressurising the West, loyal Communist Parties, had been marginalised by the Cold War system.³ As John Fitzpatrick has pointed out, this "sea-change" of Soviet policy in the mid 1950s was largely a response to new objective circumstances, not a product of foresight on the part of Stalin's successors.⁴ Nevertheless, the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy toward support for non-aligned states in the third world involved a substantial reformulation of Soviet doctrine. Whereas under Stalin the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries, especially its reformist elements, had been
"denounced as lackeys of imperialism", now this class was considered to have essentially anti-Western interests, even if only for a certain period of time.  

Given Khrushchev's inexperience in foreign affairs, it is not surprising that his policy toward the new sovereign states was erratic. He often made decisions on the run, with little concern for evaluating broader implications, using a method of trial and error which in due time produced more failures than successes. While some of Khrushchev's achievements in the third world, such as greater Soviet influence with India, reflected good policy, others, such as greater Soviet influence in several Arab states and particularly in Cuba, were more the result of good luck. While it lasted this luck led to the belief, later acknowledged by a leading Soviet expert on the third world as an "illusion", that "within the briefest period of time the overwhelming majority of former colonies would allegedly take, if not the socialist, then at least the non-capitalist, path of development". The strength of this illusion reflected the backwardness of most Soviet writing on the developing countries under Khrushchev, which simplistically transformed Lenin's suggestion about the possibility in special circumstances of 'non-capitalist development' "into a hypothesis about the inevitable break with capitalism of the majority of liberated countries during the course of a national-democratic revolution". Thus, during the second postwar decade, changes in objective conditions established some basic parameters of Soviet third world policy, but the Soviet leadership in general and Khrushchev in particular were not well-informed enough to know where and when to stop.

Several Western observers have noted that Soviet disillusionment with the prospects of the 'non-capitalist path' began soon after the fall of Khrushchev, when in 1965 and 1966 some self-styled 'progressive' regimes were overthrown. Yet the "sobering effect" of setbacks in Indonesia, Mali, and Ghana did not produce a return to the dogmatic 'two-camp' view, since the situation in the third world was still evidently in flux and by no means hopeless from the Soviet viewpoint. Rather, as Richard Remnek has noted, "the immediate impact was to broaden the discussion of the national liberation movement for the expression of
widely divergent views." Soviet interest in improving relations with third world countries remained high, but policy formation began to occur in a more considered way. As a Soviet article reviewing the history of CPSU statements about the third world later pointed out, "the resolutions of the XXIII Congress were the first ones in the practice of Party congresses in which recommendations for further strengthening the USSR's foreign policy links with developing countries were specifically expressed." Some top officials responsible for Soviet third world policy started to listen a little more carefully to the opinions of academic specialists, who in turn devoted more attention to topical problems. An article on the "tasks of Soviet orientalists" at the end of the third post war decade claimed that: "In recent years an important qualitative change has occurred in Soviet oriental studies. There has been implemented a reorientation of research activity toward the primary study of contemporary problems", such as "disclosing the laws and basic tendencies of development of the countries of the Orient". But, particularly during the fourth postwar decade, any disclosures which upset the assumptions of existing policy were not welcomed by those in power, who preferred the stability of steady decline to the uncertainties of changing course. Concerned scholars had to wait till the beginning of the fifth postwar decade before "the arrival of a new generation of leaders, in the consciousness and personal experience of whom traditions and the imperatives of today are related otherwise than for their predecessors," provided the prospect of a genuine "division and cooperation of labour" between "researchers and politicians".

The significance of countries on the 'non-capitalist path', renamed from 1968 onwards as 'states of socialist orientation', was a key topic of Soviet debate about third world development during the Brezhnev years, but the view which gained increasing acceptance amongst scholars in the 1970s had little influence on Soviet policy until some old officials were replaced by Gorbachev to make way for 'new political thinking'. This debate may be broadly divided into four periods. Initially, in the mid and late 1960s, many Soviet scholars offered general definitions of the difference between a 'state of national democracy', proceeding gradually on the 'non-capitalist path', and 'actually existing' but still backward
'socialist' states like North Korea. While most thought the difference substantial, some almost identified the two, reflecting widespread optimism about the "first generation" of developing countries to take the 'non-capitalist path'. The second period, in the early and mid 1970s, involved more detailed and critical analysis of some problems with these 'states of socialist orientation', such as the nationalist basis of their anti-imperialism, the instability of their political leadership, and the constraints imposed on them by their economic backwardness and marginal position in the world capitalist economy. By 1975, 'socialist orientation' was categorised by a few leading Soviet scholars as socially contradictory and historically limited, not as a wave of the future. Together with the emergence of such "negative phenomena" as "regressions in the socio-economic development of Egypt, Somalia and some other countries", this deeper analysis led to the third period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when many scholars who had been optimistic about the 'non-capitalist path' reconsidered their views. The change of mood was so marked by 1982 that Georgy Kim, the senior deputy director of IVAN, concluded an academic conference by criticising the manifestation "in some speeches of pessimism in evaluating the development of the national liberation movement after 1975." Although the "second generation" of countries which took the 'non-capitalist path' in the mid and late 1970s were ideologically more reliable than the "first generation" of the 1960s, many participants in this debate in the early 1980s openly questioned whether these more dependent allies were worth paying for. The fourth and last period of Soviet debate about 'socialist orientation' occurred after the 27th CPSU Congress, when a relaxation of censorship enabled many critics of former officials to set the record straight, justifying the superiority of doubt over dogma.

The Historical Character of National Liberation Revolutions

The issue of the character of contemporary national liberation revolutions is an appropriate place to begin an examination of Soviet development debates, since
it provides the broader context for a number of specific controversies and gives an indication of the general trend of debate over time. All Soviet scholars work within a general conceptual background different from standard Western concerns about securing investment, preventing instability and providing aid in order to make the third world safe for capitalism. The major difference is that the colonial period is viewed as an important historical factor rather than as something best forgotten. A related difference is that the years after the Second World War are seen as a period when the colonised peoples transformed themselves from objects of oppression into subjects of history through a national liberation struggle. It has been a standard assumption of Soviet analysis that the beneficiaries of decolonisation were the leading actors in the achievement of political independence, not the metropolitan powers, who were forced to give up their colonial possessions, and who even now continue their efforts to re-establish control over areas of the third world with a neocolonialist policy. The attainment of economic development, overcoming the backwardness produced by colonialism, has generally been seen as the central issue of developing countries' continuing struggle with imperialism, but Soviet scholars have expressed substantially different views about the historical nature of this struggle for economic independence and full national liberation. While most assumed that this nationalist struggle has an inherent tendency to develop in an anti-capitalist direction, from the mid 1960s this key assumption began to be rejected by some who viewed contemporary national liberation revolutions as essentially similar to the bourgeois democratic revolutions which consolidated capitalism in Europe before the industrial revolution.

This debate opened in late 1966 with a highly polemical and erudite article by Simoniya, then a promising young scholar at IVAN. Simoniya explicitly attacked the idea, propounded among others by Viktor Tiagunenko, the leading specialist on the third world at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations [hereinafter IMEMO], that the distinguishing characteristic of contemporary national liberation revolutions was their tendency to "grow over" [pererastat'] from a "general-democratic" to a "socialist" phase. Tiagunenko claimed that:
In the contemporary epoch there is occurring not only a further growing together but also an intertwining of the tasks of national liberation and national democratic revolutions with the tasks of socialist revolutions. Criticising this proposition, Simoniya advanced three basic arguments. First, he denied any basic historical difference between European bourgeois democratic revolutions and contemporary national liberation revolutions, since the latter were directed against colonialism in much the same way as the former had been directed against absolutism. Indeed, he argued that there was an essential similarity between these types of revolutions, since the latter, which were directed not against "imperialism in general but only one of its features", usually had the effect of fostering the development of national "capitalist tendencies" in countries liberated from foreign oppression. It was therefore incorrect to claim, as Tiagunenko did, that contemporary national liberation revolutions were generally of a "new type" because of the "special significance" of the "very favourable international conditions" in which they were occurring (by this Tiagunenko meant the USSR's support for third world national liberation movements). Instead, Simoniya argued that all that could be said generally was that these conditions "made possible a choice between capitalism and socialism", the outcome of which depended on the internal struggle within a particular country.

Second, in addressing the factors determining this internal struggle, Simoniya questioned the primary role which Tiagunenko had accorded to economic reforms before political changes. While it was correct to argue that objective economic demands for development might lead to significant political changes, Simoniya asserted that a policy of economic reforms as such could only follow the latter. This was especially true of countries proceeding on the 'non-capitalist path', to which Tiagunenko was referring. In other words, the decisive factor in determining whether a particular national liberation revolution turns into a socialist one is not the general task of economic development standing before it, but rather whether or not "revolutionary class changes in the political position of the government" occur, making the implementation of progressive socio-economic reforms possible. Simoniya argued that without such changes,
the tasks of national liberation revolutions and socialist revolutions were separate, with the former limited to the attainment of political independence.\textsuperscript{25}

Third, Simoniya pointed out that actually, of the 28 Asian countries which had attained independence in the twentieth century, only 4 had 'grown-over' from a national liberation revolution into a 'socialist' one, and only 2 others had taken the 'non-capitalist path of development'.\textsuperscript{26} He stated frankly that: "In all the remaining countries of Asia right up to the present there occurs -- in some cases quickly, in others slowly -- an evolution along the capitalist path."\textsuperscript{27} In other words, the tendency of 'growing-over' existed only in a few cases. In commenting on the historical limitation of this tendency, Simoniya pointed to "the fact that national liberation revolutions can be completed before the emergence of a situation in which a growing-over would be possible." In this case, "we already have to speak simply about the maturing (possibly, very prolonged) of a socialist revolution, and not about the growing-over of a democratic national liberation revolution into a socialist one."\textsuperscript{28} To emphasise the limitations of the growing-over perspective, Simoniya concluded his article by discussing some countries where the bourgeoisie had come to power as a result of national liberation revolutions. In such places as India and Turkey, the only kind of popular revolution possible now was a separate, anti-capitalist one. The idea of an "uncompleted" national liberation revolution waiting to 'grow-over' into a socialist one "does not consider the fact that the transition to the second stage of a national movement for economic liberation far from always signifies, and, to be precise, in a majority of cases does not signify, a transition to the second stage of a [national liberation] revolution."\textsuperscript{29} Hence, the "very favourable international conditions", which Tiagunenko thought contributed substantially to the process of "growing-over", could also contribute to its opposite, since "the representatives of the bourgeoisie of a series of countries have very successfully used these conditions for strengthening the political sovereignty and economic independence of their countries."\textsuperscript{30}

The political meaning of this debate for the priorities of Soviet policy toward
the third world was quite clear. The general implications of Simoniya's position were more cautious than those of Tiagunenko's. Whereas Tiagunenko explicitly referred to national democratic revolutions as constituting "a component part of the world socialist revolution", Simoniya cited Lenin to affirm his view that these revolutions were just "an independent moving force of the world revolutionary process, which in their anti-imperialist tendency will assist the world socialist revolution."\(^\text{31}\) Tiagunenko was saying quite clearly that contemporary national liberation revolutions should lead to the emergence of a host of reliable Soviet allies worth defending, while Simoniya was saying that the number of such countries was small and would remain so for a long time to come. After quoting Lenin to the effect that the countries of the Orient were generally developing in the European, capitalist pattern, Simoniya conceded this did not mean that they had to pass "through the full cycle of capitalist development." He then wrote boldly: "Following on from K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin regularly indicated the possibility of these peoples by-passing capitalism after the victory of socialism in the advanced countries of the West."\(^\text{32}\) Since it was received opinion amongst the Soviet elite that, to use Brezhnev's words, "the Communist movement in Western Europe ... won't amount to anything for fifty years", Simoniya actually conceded nothing.\(^\text{33}\) As the conclusion of his article clearly indicates, he was saying that the USSR should devote more attention to its relations with substantial capitalist states in the third world, since they were more numerous and were already benefiting indirectly from Soviet support. Since reliable allies would be few and far between, it was important to do everything possible to support the independence from the West of non-aligned capitalist countries, even if there was no likelihood of their 'growing-over' to a 'socialist revolution'.

Despite the quality of Simoniya's arguments, it took a long time before his view about the character of national liberation revolutions gained wide acceptance. This was because he was challenging the dominant orthodoxy on the most important theoretical issue of third world development. In an understatement at the start of his article, he noted that Tiagunenko's view was "one of the most widespread".\(^\text{34}\) In fact, the idea that contemporary national
liberation revolutions were in some sense of a 'new type' was supported by almost all Soviet scholars and officials in the late 1960s. Thus Karen Brutents, a deputy head of the International Department who was one of the first to note publicly the difficulties of the 'non-capitalist path', asserted in 1966 that "the historical mission of contemporary national liberation revolutions consists not in that they clear the ground for the consolidation of capitalist relations, but in that during the course of the liquidation of the political and economic supremacy of imperialism they make a path toward the struggle for a socialist reconstruction of society." He stressed the "enormous significance of the international factor for the non-capitalist path of development", whereas Simoniya had previously stated that the "internal factor" had an "unusually growing role" in the third world.\(^{35}\) Brutents saw capitalist development in the former colonies as regressive, constituting "not only a movement from feudal and pre-feudal orders, but also a falling back from the non-capitalist and socialist perspectives, which are real already today."\(^{36}\) A similar view had been expressed in 1965 by Sergei Tiul'panov, who suggested that "at a definite stage of development the developing countries, participating in the international division of labour and being, as such, part of the world economy, may take up their own kind of intermediate position between the capitalist and socialist systems, and so form a particular sector of the world economy -- still not socialist, but already no longer capitalist."\(^{37}\) These views were essentially reformulations of the 1961 CPSU Program, which had confidently asserted that capitalism could not solve the basic problems of the underdeveloped world, so that "in the contemporary epoch the objective course of events is such that it is impossible to go forward without going toward socialism", i.e. the USSR.\(^{38}\)

The main significance of Simoniya's criticism of Tiagunenko was that, for the first time, a scholar had openly challenged the direction of Soviet third world policy in the broadest possible terms. When support for Indian non-alignment had been voiced in the late 1950s, it was by scholars such as Rostislav Ul'ianovsky, appointed in July 1958 as a deputy director of IVAN, who generally supported existing Soviet policy from a conservative perspective.\(^{39}\) As Brutents'
opposite number in the International Department, Ul’ianovskiy became the chief proponent of the 'non-capitalist path' when it was subjected to criticism from leading Soviet scholars during the 1970s. Before 1966, innovative scholars like Mirsky had questioned the application of traditional Stalinist categories to the third world, emphasising the importance of new subjective factors like the anti-Western political attitudes of influential parts of the military and intelligentsia. But Simoniya's criticism focused on the objective character of social change in the developing countries, and so was much more sweeping. His concern was that the concept of 'growing-over', notwithstanding its Comintern pedigree and the institutional authority of its propounder, involved a basic misreading of contemporary history in the third world. The point of his arguments, which were republished in a booklet in 1968, was to take advantage of the new space for within-system criticism to alert the Soviet foreign policy establishment to the inaccuracy of a key assumption -- the possibility of consolidating a significant group of dependent and hence reliable allies in the form of 'non-capitalist' developing countries.

The course of the debate about the character of national liberation revolutions in the late 1960s and early 1970s shows that Simoniya's view was too novel to be accepted in official circles then, partly because it was based on a serious rather than sophistic understanding of Lenin's writings about the issue of 'growing-over'. Although Simoniya was seconded to the editorial board of *Narody Azii i Afriki* shortly before his critical article appeared, the conceptual inertia which he attacked was still politically influential. Conservative dogmatists even implicitly accused him of having "petty-bourgeois-populist views on non-capitalist development". Tiagunenko's authority was such that, in the second edition of his book on contemporary national liberation revolutions published in 1969, he saw no need to refer explicitly to any of Simoniya's criticisms. He reprinted the parts of his book concerning 'growing-over' almost entirely unchanged, merely inserting a few cautious statements in recognition of the fact that the 'non-capitalist path' was not without "temporary setbacks".
Apart from the power of authority, Tiagunenko's view remained dominant for some time because it was vague enough about basic issues to appeal to all scholars who generally favoured a perspective of historical optimism about Soviet allies. The practical flexibility of Tiagunenko’s eclectic view is evident in his definition of the 'non-capitalist path' as "a series of intermediate steps" through which a national liberation revolution 'grows-over' into a 'socialist' one. Combining optimism about the anti-capitalist outcome of national liberation revolutions with the usual criticism of Stalin for excluding the national bourgeoisie from participation in a national front strategy, he admitted that Western investment was needed for third world economic development, and noted that agrarian reforms would facilitate the development of capitalism. He asserted that the pressure of foreign capital was forcing the national bourgeoisie to join the struggle for economic independence, and that this struggle was taking the form of a "further development of the anti-imperialist, national democratic revolution to new stages", which were contradictory views, since the Soviet concept of a 'national democratic revolution' referred to emerging anti-capitalist tendencies, and the further these develop the more they must impinge on the interests of the national bourgeoisie. Such contradictions were not peculiar to Tiagunenko, but rather inherent in the loose definitions of 'non-capitalist development' prevalent amongst Soviet scholars and officials at this time. Tiul'panov, in his textbook on the developing countries published in 1969, referred to contemporary national liberation revolutions as both the "starting point" for 'non-capitalist development' in the third world and as opening up two possible paths of development there, the other path being capitalist; he left the reader to puzzle out how the "special" character of successful national liberation revolutions could lead in two divergent directions at once. The most ludicrous contradiction of the time occurred in the speeches to the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, when "patriotic minded representatives of national capital" were included amongst forces supporting the 'non-capitalist path of development'! This was testimony indeed to the fact that ideas may be perpetuated long after they have been shown inadequate, provided they have sufficient social support. The authority of the support in this case was made clear during Brezhnev's report to that Congress, which included an explicit
endorsement of Tiagunenko's key concept of 'growing-over': "The main thing consists in the fact that the struggle for national liberation in many countries has practically grown-over into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist." 49

This official endorsement of the 'growing-over' perspective was undoubtedly a setback for Simoniya, whose clear criticisms had apparently been ignored. The debate seemed to have been resolved squarely in favour of Tiagunenko, particularly since the next major book on the subject, by Brutents, quoted Brezhnev's statement in its introduction and responded to Simoniya's criticisms. Brutents maintained the view that contemporary national liberation revolutions differed historically from bourgeois democratic revolutions during the rise of capitalism in Europe, highlighting the phrase "Democratic Revolutions of a New Type" as the title of the first part of his book. 50 But, although Brutents reaffirmed his difference with Simoniya about the importance of the international factor, his actual contribution was a subtle one, which, rather than ending the debate in Tiagunenko's favour, helped focus attention on the specific problems of 'states of socialist orientation'. 51

The key section of Brutents' book for this debate was chapter five, which carried an almost identical title to Simoniya's article, and consisted largely of an implicit response to his criticisms. Brutents' main criticism of Simoniya's argument was that he had falsely identified revolutions which were occurring in two different epochs as similar. He argued that, although most of the formerly colonised world remained capitalist, "more than a quarter" of it had "acquired an anti-capitalist tendency" as a result of national liberation revolutions, and this constituted a major historical difference with the epoch of bourgeois democratic revolutions in Western Europe. 52 The possibility of 'growing-over' did then definitely exist, and in view of the policy advantages of having reliable allies it could not simply be "ignored" because it concerned only a minority of countries. But with regard to the crucial question of 'growing-over', Brutents raised a "serious qualification". He said that, while there were close links between the
'national democratic' and 'socialist' revolutions, "the border between them -- though sometimes very thin at the point of transition or growing-over -- has a fundamental significance, and it is incorrect and dangerous to ignore it." Moreover, he stressed that even a 'national democratic revolution' was not the inevitable result of every national liberation revolution. It existed "only as a possibility", as one of the "two antagonistic tendencies of social development" (capitalist and anti-capitalist) which were struggling with each other in the course of a national liberation revolution. While attempting to set the record straight about the character of contemporary national liberation revolutions, Brutents added some new questions to old problems. In addition to repeating his former statements that "capitalism possesses definite internal reserves" and that the victory of the anti-capitalist tendency "is not predetermined", he concluded by noting the existence of "enormous obstacles for the development and especially the practical realisation of anti-capitalist tendencies" in the third world.

Brutents' arguments changed the focus of Soviet debate from the historical character of national liberation revolutions to the dominant orientation of social developments in the third world. The former issue was not resolved or considered less important, but all leading participants in the debate recognised that it could not be discussed adequately in isolation from other questions upon which the answer to it depended. Tiagunenko, in the introduction to his posthumously published book on the international division of labour, said that while the character of national liberation revolutions was "the central question of the socio-economic development of the 'third world'", the answer to it depended crucially on the prospects for capitalism overcoming the gap between developing countries and developed countries in the world capitalist economy. He claimed that only if this gap was closed would those who viewed contemporary national liberation revolutions as bourgeois democratic be proven correct. While this particular argument would have been seen by Simoniya as an attempt on Tiagunenko's part to shore up his increasingly tired arguments about 'growing-over' by changing the terms of the question, in a general sense this change was widespread and transcended definitional differences. Although
Brutents differed from Simoniya in extending the concept of national liberation revolutions to cover the struggle for economic as well as political independence, this became secondary once he clearly identified the main feature of this struggle as being "above all around the question of the path of social development" which a particular country was to follow.58

Significantly, in a discussion in November 1976 of Simoniya's book Strany Vostoka, the only point of agreement between an ideologist from the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in this case V.N. Egorov, and Simoniya concerned the latter's criticism of Tiul'panov's attempt to deny the bourgeois democratic nature of contemporary national liberation revolutions.59 Apart from pointing out the inconsistency of Tiul'panov's position, Simoniya questioned his assertion that internal conditions, such as the extent of class formation, new tendencies in the evolution of petty-bourgeois democracy and the growing role of the subjective factor, were more advanced in the contemporary third world than they had been in Western Europe during the era of the consolidation of capitalism. He claimed that:

although this point of view is still very widespread, until now we have not met one adequately based and empirically confirmed argument in its favour. The matter is usually limited to simple declarations of the special character of these revolutions, references to the really different character of international conditions and the fact of borrowing definite ideas from outside, without any serious analysis of internal socio-economic conditions.60

This judgement reflected Simoniya's dissatisfaction with the slow progress of a debate about the dimensions and prospects of the 'non-capitalist path' which had begun after the 23rd CPSU Congress, but some arch conservatives thought new ideas were already out of control. Reviewing Brutents' book, Ul'ianovsky's right hand man, Arkadi Kaufman, objected strongly to what he labelled as "extreme" views expressed "in recent times", which tried "to nullify or ignore the big political and practical significance of the processes occurring in the countries of socialist orientation."61 The object of this attack was Simoniya, who had emerged by the mid 1970s as the leading critic of the illusions of consolidating
dependent allies on the so-called 'non-capitalist path of development'.

The Dimensions of 'Non-Capitalist Development'

Soviet debate about the significance of 'non-capitalist development' has been hamstrung by the crudely normative nature of official Soviet discourse, based on "the coalescence of the Stalinist regime ... with a general idea of the organisation of socialist society."\(^{62}\) Stalin's principle that "an internationalist is one who is ready to defend the USSR ... unconditionally" was not rejected or forgotten by his successors.\(^{63}\) The lopsided language necessitated by this premise instrumentally tied debate about 'non-capitalist development' to the strategic imperatives of Soviet policy, ruling out by definition any analysis reflecting the independent interests of 'non-capitalist' movements themselves, apart from or opposed to the interests of the USSR. In the early 1960s, two dramatic changes made 'non-capitalist development' topical from the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, Fidel Castro aligned Cuba with the USSR in spite of not being a loyal communist, while, on the other, the widening Sino-Soviet split confirmed Stalin's principle that a powerful but independent communist movement could hinder rather than help the USSR. The political function of the term 'non-capitalist development' was to work out whether other developing countries might, like Cuba, become reliable Soviet allies, whose 'communism' would be secondary to their dependence on the USSR, rather than vice versa, as with China.\(^{64}\) This focus on dependent allies has been reflected in the only officially acceptable discourse which Soviet officials have had for criticising 'states of socialist orientation', namely, arrogant and hypocritical statements that their leaders have only an 'unscientific' knowledge of socialism.\(^{65}\) In 1969, Lukin thought it was "obvious, that the causes of the 'unscientific nature' of one or other 'national socialism' ... are rooted not so much in the mistakes or illusions of its authors, or in an inadequate analysis of reality and the prospects of class contradictions in the society, but in the very peculiarities of social relations and social psychology in the social system concerned."\(^{66}\) A peculiar feature of Soviet
debate about 'non-capitalist development' has been the prolonged resistance of state voluntarism to widespread scholarly criticism. As Slavnyi recently suggested, this debate has been conducted through a language in which "ought has priority over is" apologetically, reducing "objectively conditioned characteristics of a process of development" to "synonyms for a special capacity to reform socio-economic reality, peculiar to some figures by virtue of their social position and the progressiveness of their world-view". Despite increasing criticism, the conservatives, whose words were "an echo of those 'absolutely correct' positions" of past policy, held the semantic high ground.67

The first period of debate concerned not the viability of the 'non-capitalist path', but the question of how precisely to define it, and hence implicitly how much support the USSR should give to states adjudged to be on it. Before the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, almost all Soviet scholars were optimistic about the growing dimensions of 'non-capitalist development' in the third world. The leading optimist was Mirsky, who predicted at a conference in early 1964 that the 'non-capitalist path' "will be manifested all the stronger" in the years ahead. He thought that, because of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in most developing countries, socially independent nationalist leaders like Nasser would come to power, and try to overcome backwardness with economic reforms that increased the role of the state and prevented the formation of a national capitalist class.68 Mirsky was not dissuaded by colleagues at IMEMO who thought he had exaggerated reforms introduced in Egypt since 1961, or by criticism at this conference from another colleague for a tendency "to substitute what we wish were the case for what really exists".69 Mirsky suggested that, as a result of the USSR's "colossal influence on the course of events" in the third world, there was "opening in front of the young states an exit from the world capitalist economic system".70 He was more outspoken than others in support of 'non-capitalist development', but this suggestion was quite widespread (both its aspects were supported by Tiagunenko and Tiul'panov, while the predicate at least was affirmed by Brutents).71 Scepticism about the 'non-capitalist path' was expressed by those who favoured relying on loyal communists to take power, but Mirsky
dismissed this position by identifying it with the Chinese leadership, who had an "old scheme" of a "quick socialist revolution in the liberated countries" through "armed struggle in any conditions." Even after the removal of Khrushchev, scholars cautious about 'non-capitalist development' because they doubted the significance of the 'international factor', i.e. Soviet aid, still expressed their view quietly. Some "difficulties" of the 'non-capitalist path' were noted in early 1966 by Brutents and others, but they were simply being careful about the complexity of the situation, not recommending an alternative strategy to support for states like Algeria, Burma and Egypt in the hope that they would become reliable allies of the USSR. The dominant view remained that expressed in mid 1964 by Ostrovitianov, who asserted that the 'non-capitalist path' had emerged as "the main tendency of our time" amongst the "kaleidoscope of events" occurring in the third world. This optimistic opinion about the new trend in the developing countries was expressed in a resolution of the 23rd CPSU Congress, which referred to the "improving conditions of life with the non-capitalist path of development."

After the 23rd CPSU Congress, Soviet scholars were informed that defining the limits of 'non-capitalist development' was "an extraordinarily important task", and were allowed to express some "serious disagreements" about it. Three different views about the dimensions of 'non-capitalist development' were expressed in the pages of *Narody Azii i Afriki* during the second half of 1966. The key questions distinguishing these views were: whether the 'non-capitalist path' for contemporary developing countries was essentially similar to that taken by Soviet Central Asia, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam; and when the 'non-capitalist path' should be considered decisively undertaken. The issue underlying the first question was how much aid the USSR should provide, and that underlying the second was when such resources should be committed. One A.K. Bochagov, whose chief claim to fame was having helped storm the heights of victory in the steppes of Kazakhstan during collectivisation, argued stridently that the answer to the first question was clearly yes and the answer to the second clearly now.
rehabilitation of Stalin, he implied that the main difference between collectivisation in Kazakhstan and contemporary Egypt was the latter's lack of strong fatherly direction from the USSR. Explicitly criticising some officially-connected Soviet scholars, like A.I. Sobolev and Tiagunenko, for suggesting that the 'non-capitalist path' was merely an "intermediate stage", during which developing countries formed the "prerequisites" for "growing-over" to "socialist construction", he asserted that countries like Burma and Algeria were "already moving along the path of socialism." While his view seemed akin to Mirsky's opinion that reforms in Egypt had already acquired a "socialist character", it was more adventurist, notwithstanding common assertions about the "enormous influence of the Soviet Union" amongst countries on the 'non-capitalist path'.

Whereas Mirsky focused on the fluid class structure of most developing countries, Bochagov simply generalised from what had previously happened elsewhere. But his voluntarist view, that states proclaiming themselves 'socialist' would readily become dependent Soviet allies if only they were given adequate directive support, was of marginal political significance. Anyone reduced to lecturing Tiagunenko that "the very possibility of non-capitalist development ... appears as a result of the growing over of a democratic revolution into a socialist one" clearly did not contribute much.

A second view, put forward by Kim and three colleagues, also answered the first question with a clear yes, but argued that certain strict criteria had to be met before it was worth making a commitment to any state professing the aim of 'socialist construction'. These authors thought that the first view was correct in principle but too simplistic in practice. They nominally agreed with Tiagunenko that "a series of transitional steps" were necessary, but thought these steps had to be successfully completed before a 'non-capitalist path' similar to that undertaken by North Korea could be embarked upon. The key step in their view was the transformation of nationalist, petty bourgeois leaderships "into parties expressing the ideology of scientific socialism", i.e. loyal to the USSR. These authors argued that the current situation in all the countries concerned, irrespective of their level of socio-economic development, was one of continuing political struggle which
could result in a choice of either the capitalist or 'non-capitalist' path. They emphasised the importance of "all-sided" Soviet aid in ensuring that a particular "revolutionary-democratic regime" took the right path, but also made a prophetic warning about not mistaking "the development of state-capitalist tendencies, accompanied by a limitation of private capitalist activity, for the non-capitalist path". Their basic point was that third world allies would be reliable only once they had become politically dependent upon the USSR, and no longer occupied an "intermediate" position internationally. They were optimistic about the political consolidation which had occurred in North Vietnam and Cuba, but downplayed the inconclusive reforms introduced in Egypt and Burma. The sharp criticism which Kim and company made of the third view, in which 'non-capitalist development' was seen as an "intermediate stage" from whence a country may even "return back to capitalism", suggests that they were reacting against the 'non-party' orientation about political change in the third world, which was prevalent under Khrushchev and remained influential through the writings of Mirsky and Tiagunenko.81 While Simoniya was about to expose the contradictions of the dominant 'growing-over' perspective itself, these authors merely thought the "international links" between the USSR and carefully selected allies in the third world required a perfectly traditional "strengthening".82

The third view was advanced in an article entitled "Once More About the Non-Capitalist Path of Development" by Robert Landa, whose answers to the key questions were the reverse of Kim's. Landa, like Kim, was a senior scholar at IVAN and a member of the editorial board of Narody Azii i Afriki, but, unlike Kim, he was a specialist on one of the new states on the 'non-capitalist path' (Algeria), not one of those consolidated in Stalin's time (North Korea). Criticising the "schematic definitions" of the two previously expressed views, Landa differentiated his own opinion somewhat from the optimism inherent in the 'growing-over' perspective. His basic point was that "the practice of recent years" had shown several cases of "non-capitalist reforms" being implemented in countries which did not initially have "close ties" with the USSR. Therefore, rather than use an "a priori definition of the non-capitalist path" which simply
equated it with previous cases that occurred in different conditions, it was better
to define 'non-capitalist development' as an "approach" toward the path of
'socialist development', which proceeded "gradually through a series of
intermediate stages", and during which the possibility of changes back toward
capitalism remained as a result of economic backwardness. Because of this
possibility, Landa suggested that more attention be given to the general level of
socio-economic and cultural-political development of states on the 'non-capitalist
path'. He also noted some real reasons why leaders of such states "adhere to their
own kind of middle position", and pointed out that they were not about to "break
off all ties with the states of developed capitalism". Then, having emphasised the
diverse difficulties facing such countries, he wrote in response to Kim:

Obviously, a definition of the non-capitalist path of development must be
more flexible and all-sided, enlarging not narrowing the opportunities
to understand all the complexities, peculiarities, specific forms and stages
of this social process.

Landa viewed 'non-capitalist development' as a fortuitous "continuation" of some
national liberation revolutions, which if supported carefully could lead to the
consolidation some time in the future of new third world allies that presently
could be nothing but unstable. The point of his article was to defend the dominant
eclectic approach to 'non-capitalist development' from Kim's dogmatic criticism,
and simultaneously to add a voice of caution to this perspective in order to correct
the exaggerated optimism of its more prominent supporters.⁸³

The debate about the dimensions of 'non-capitalist development' which began
in earnest so quickly after the 23rd CPSU Congress did not lead to the working
out of an adequate answer to the question of the reliability of new third world
allies. Instead, it merely confirmed the authority of the most politically
convenient definition, which, as Hough has pointed out, was that which considered
the 'non-capitalist path' as "transitional", without specifying either the precise
nature of the transition being undertaken or its likely duration.⁸⁴ The
'transitional' view was expressed at conferences by both Brutents and
Ul'ianovsky, although the latter implied in one article that if states on the
'non-capitalist path' continued to develop successfully for another 10-15 years then their orientation toward the USSR would have become "irreversible". Both these officials stressed the importance of loyal communists "rallying" together with radical nationalists such as Nasser, a view supported by Mirsky and also by Simoniya. This tactical consensus about "not discrediting a progressive regime, but offering constructive criticism of its mistakes" in addition to general support, made for a reasonable strategy while events were going well, particularly in the Arab world, but it still begged the question of the reliability of radical nationalist leaders in the third world. The problem was that answering this question convincingly required more theoretical clarification than the dominant eclectic view of 'non-capitalist development' could provide. The need for a more serious theoretical approach had been recognised by some participants in a discussion about the 'non-capitalist path' held in May-June, 1966, but this was easier said than done, particularly since the existing level of work on the subject was so low.

The theoretical weakness of the dominant view was evident in the third volume of IMEMO's first collective work on the developing countries, published in 1968. It presented 'non-capitalist development' generally as a "necessity which is dictated by the failure of attempts to attain quick and effective results within the limits of capitalism", but then suggested that the main basis of this 'necessity' was the "enormous" importance of personalities. The possibility that in some countries "revolutionary democratic", i.e. 'non-capitalist', reforms "may only clear the path for capitalism", was noted but not examined, because of an assumption that "revolutionary democrats" as such were "not the bearers of capitalism. On the contrary, they strive to restrain capitalist elements". As a description of Nasser at the time this may have seemed adequate, but it was not a convincing theoretical analysis. Unsurprisingly, Simoniya's review of this volume was almost entirely critical. Regarding the 'non-capitalist path', he disclosed several contradictions and ambiguities in this book's analysis. While 'non-capitalist development' was said theoretically to be "in the final analysis incompatible with the ruling position of the petty bourgeoisie", the actual analysis
of Syria stated: "facts have shown" that the Ba'th party, while "remaining petty bourgeois nationalist, has the capacity to implement serious socio-economic reforms, objectively leading the country onto the non-capitalist path of development". Simoniya thought this idea that a bourgeoisie could take the 'non-capitalist path' was incredible. He criticised the volume for avoiding the crucial question of 'transitional to what?', adding it was no help to be told that the political regime of a country on the 'non-capitalist path' was a 'state of national democracy', since this created "only one more conditional symbol, also demanding to be deciphered." When varieties of 'non-capitalist development' were said to include backward regions of the USSR, he commented that "it is not difficult for this to present itself as a final confusion for the unskilled reader." 

Ironically, the issue of Narody Azii i Afriki prior to the one carrying Simoniya's review included a selection of "materials received by the editor", in which some provincial scholars presented more "a priori definitions of the non-capitalist path", without any consideration of actual cases in the third world. These pieces largely supported Kim's view that the model for any 'non-capitalist path' was Soviet Central Asia or North Korea, but politically they were of little more than curiosity value. Ul'ianovsky had already stated that contemporary countries on the 'non-capitalist path' "still may not completely break away from the system of the world capitalist economy", adding that "this circumstance defines the essential, specific peculiarity of their development, which was not definitive of either the Soviet republics of Central Asia or Mongolia." This point was emphasised by Gleb Starushenko in his contribution to a review conference on the aforementioned IMEMO volume. Noting that the problem of the 'non-capitalist path' demanded "further research", he pointed out that securing 'non-capitalist development' in the contemporary third world was "more difficult" than it had previously been in the Far East, and hence required "different methods" if it was to succeed in the new conditions. He specifically said that while Soviet aid to 'non-capitalist' countries in the third world could be of some importance, it could never be anywhere near as significant as it had been in Mongolia. He added that the problem was even more serious because
contemporary "countries of socialist orientation", as he termed them, had an advancing superstructure but a still backward base. He stressed the need both to "strengthen the national-democratic state" by "creating a stable vanguard party", and pursuing both "a realistic economic policy" and "a flexible national policy". Since Starushenko noted that such measures had received "little attention" in the IMEMO volume, which was undoubtedly the leading Soviet work of its time, it is clear that by the late 1960s not much had been achieved by Soviet debate about the dimensions of 'non-capitalist development'.^94

The first period of debate about the 'non-capitalist path' ended in mid 1972, with the publication of a book by Ul'ianovsky which affirmed the dominant eclectic view by asserting that objective conditions had "brought to life a transitional epoch of non-capitalist development, when a wide and contradictory bloc of social forces is rendered capable of implementing some preparatory steps toward socialism." The two main themes of Ul'ianovsky's analysis were the peculiarities of contemporary 'non-capitalist development' compared to previous cases of this path, and the crucial need for a "prolonged union" between loyal communists and 'national democrats' like Nasser, in order for 'non-capitalist development' to succeed. In Ul'ianovsky's view, a 'non-party orientation' toward potential allies in the third world was the only sensible approach, since in the developing countries "the prospects for socialism [i.e. the USSR] depend on the correlation of forces within the limits of national democracy." His rejection of the approach of Kim and Bochagov was summarised by a sympathetic reviewer:

R.A. Ul'ianovsky emphasises that the non-capitalist path for 'third world' countries is not that path which was taken by Mongolia and Soviet Central Asian republics, and also not a growing-over of a bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist one, but a transitional period for preparatory steps toward socialism in countries where there are not sufficient objective pre-requisites for its direct implementation. In the book are analysed the economic, political, social and ideological contradictions which, in the opinion of the author, form the basis of non-capitalist development as a transitional epoch.95

The significance of this definition was not just in asserting that it would take a
long time (an "epoch") before the USSR's allies in the third world could become integrated into the Soviet bloc, or that, as an article elaborating Ul'ianovsky's position subsequently put it, "it would be profoundly wrong to present the non-capitalist path as a universal, to canonise it, and turn it into an ossifying dogma that itself blocks the further creative elaboration of the paths of revolutionary development in the 'third world'". Ul'ianovsky's definition also explicitly acknowledged the "contradictions" inherent in the 'non-capitalist path of development'. These contradictions were such a feature of reality by the early 1970s that, as Mirsky pointed out in a review, Ul'ianovsky's book contained some "terminological cloudiness" regarding the boundary between a 'national liberation' revolution and a 'national democratic' one. Ul'ianovsky's intention in noting the presence of contradictions in the development of states of 'socialist orientation' was definitely not to downplay the importance for the USSR of developing countries following the 'non-capitalist path'. He was merely recognising their complexity, partly so that the politically dominant but theoretically weak eclectic view would still appear to most Soviet observers to be in tune with events. But by opening the way ideologically for "a special analysis" of the obstacles to the consolidation of the USSR's new allies, Ul'ianovsky unwittingly made it easier for leading Soviet scholars to question the dominant view from a new angle, although when they did so he was the first to complain.

Nationalism and the Foundations of 'Socialist Orientation'

The second period of Soviet debate about 'socialist orientation', which, as Ul'ianovsky pointed out, was now to be used as a "synonym" for the 'non-capitalist path', involved more substantial and fruitful debates, which effectively exposed the weakness of the established view. Whereas, except for Simoniya's critique of Tiagunenko, criticism had previously come from reactionaries like Kim, now it came from open-minded 'liberal Marxists' such as Levkovsky, Mirsky and particularly Simoniya himself, while Ul'ianovsky became the "representative of the rearguard". And, whereas the early debate had been
confounded by dogmatic, *a priori* assertions, during the mid 1970s some crucial empirical problems of third world development began to be discussed in a more serious, scholarly way. This second period of discussion witnessed an important widening and deepening of debate in both academic and political terms, so that leading scholars in the field of oriental studies were no longer mere suppliants expressing ideas for consideration by the almighty apparat. Their knowledge gained them some independence within the bounds of Soviet officialdom, so that their standing within the party intelligentsia increased and they were able to determine more fully the character of their fields of study. It is very significant that, whereas in the first period Simoniya criticised a leading scholar at the rival institute and effectively lost the argument in terms of political influence amongst his colleagues at that time, during the second period both Simoniya and Levkovsky engaged openly in polemical debates with a senior official, Ul'ianovsky, and achieved in the first instance a draw, which, with the subsequent pruning of the apparat under Gorbachev, was effectively recognised as a victory. Since the major discussions of the mid 1970s constituted a turning-point in the trend of Soviet evaluations of the significance of dependent third world allies, it is necessary to analyse them in some detail. This section focuses on Simoniya's contribution to the emerging critique of the dominant view, while the next section will consider Levkovsky's different but politically complementary arguments.

The political background to Simoniya's work in the mid 1970s was formed by two related factors. First, it was now widely recognised that 'non-capitalist development' in the third world faced serious difficulties. As Yuri Krasin, a minder of the 'world revolutionary process' attached to the Central Committee, wrote in an authoritative book in late 1972:

> The non-capitalist path, the possibility of which has been made clear in documents of the international communist movement, is not a path of automatic development, but a historical tendency, which strengthens with the strengthening of the world socialist system. Yet it confronts economic backwardness, social underdevelopment, and political instability. It is not surprising that on this ground strong counteracting tendencies arise, often opening real chances for the occurrence of derelictions (in an extreme degree for a temporary period) by virtue of the weakness of the subjective
factor of the revolutionary process. ... All this does not signify that the possibility of non-capitalist development is unreal or too narrow. It is entirely real and prospective. ... We speak only about the fact that the realisation of this possibility is accompanied by many more difficulties than could have been thought earlier, by processes of the regrouping and struggle of social forces in different directions.102

Second, these difficulties created more space than before for a serious theoretical approach to the prospects of 'socialist orientation'. Krasin made some pertinent comments about the need to develop theory through debate, which Simoniya would cite to legitimate his own more critical book published three years later. Krasin quoted Lenin to point out that those who attempt to solve partial questions without considering the general issues at stake will inevitably confront the general problems at every step "blindly, and in each particular case this means they doom their policy to the worst vacillation and lack of principle."103 He claimed that the only sensible way to achieve a resolution of general questions was "precisely through the counterposition of views, and discussions, in the course of which onesidedness is overcome, imprecision is eliminated, and the full scope of the dialectics of living reality inherent in Marxism-Leninism is attained."104 No doubt other members of the Soviet elite had a less liberal interpretation of the limits of censorship, but it is significant that a relative bigwig amongst the intelligentsia like Krasin was still able to legitimate scholarly debate in the early 1970s.105 The difficulties which had arisen on the 'non-capitalist path' provided leading Soviet orientalists with an opportunity to use this twilight of liberalism to the fullest effect.

The increasing vulnerability to criticism of the dominant Soviet view of 'socialist orientation' in the mid 1970s is apparent from an article published in early 1974 by Ruben Andreasian, then a leading expert on the Arab world at IMEMO (he later moved to IVAN).106 Andreasian supported Ul'ianovsky's view, but emphasised the "peculiarities and contradictions" which characterised the "complex and quickly changing reality of the 'third world'". After stressing the difference between contemporary 'socialist orientation' and cases like Mongolia, he downplayed the importance of the 'international factor':
Despite the big influence of the correlation of forces in the world on the genesis and development of non-proletarian revolutionary regimes, it should be especially emphasised that they have directly arisen from internal contradictions, carry the imprints of their level of development, and present their own objective reality. Their originality is in a certain sense a 'surprise of history'.

This was an important concession to Simoniya's view, first advanced in 1965, but rejected then even by cautious writers like Brutents and Tiul'panov, that "the non-capitalist path is characterised by a fundamentally different, unusually growing role of the internal factor". Andreasian said that, while countries of 'socialist orientation' generally developed closer ties with the USSR, this process, like their domestic evolution, was marked by many peculiarities. He classified the social base of such regimes as "not purely petty bourgeois", but added that, because of the weakness of loyal communists, the main political force was the petty bourgeoisie, which was "nationalist in its very nature". In analysing the nationalism which was the main motivation of 'non-capitalist development', Andreasian used the traditional distinction between its "patriotic" and "reactionary" aspects, but emphasised the latter rather than the former. He focused on nationalist "aspirations to isolate the popular movement in the liberated countries from the world revolutionary process", observing that "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community is considered in some non-capitalist countries in no small degree from the position of petty bourgeois nationalism -- they support the struggle against imperialism and at the same time fear a strengthening of the might of the socialist camp."

This was a frank admission that some states of 'socialist orientation' "pursue on the world arena a policy of non-alignment", rather than a policy oriented principally toward the USSR.

Andreasian's sober evaluation of the prospects of 'non-capitalist development' clearly reflected an appreciation of the changes occurring in the most important state of 'socialist orientation' at that time, Egypt. He noted that "it is impossible to consider, as any particular formal indicator of a non-capitalist country, the declarations of its leaders about an intention to construct socialism. It is known
that the leaders of many countries in the 'third world' speak about this." Instead, he said it was necessary to work out a "system of criteria" for assessing 'socialist orientation', although "this is difficult to do, since non-capitalist development as a phenomenon is transitional in its social essence." Citing Ul'ianovsky, Andreasian defined "the first and most fundamental criterion as the type and character of political power." Evidently responding to scholars who had suggested a different primary criterion, like level of socio-economic development, Andreasian wrote:

Regarding the non-capitalist type of development, the character of political power is of really fundamental significance. In order to understand this, it is sufficient to compare the level of socio-economic development of countries which have begun on the non-capitalist path and states where the socialist revolution has been completed. May one really affirm that between such countries as Algeria and North Vietnam, Syria and North Korea, on the eve of their entrance onto the progressive historical path, there existed any substantial difference relating to the level of development of the productive forces or the character of relations of production? I think not. But meanwhile these countries have passed toward social progress on different paths.

This was an important statement clarifying the nature of 'socialist orientation', which Ul'ianovsky would soon reinforce in his polemic with Levkovsky. However, the character of the economic base still had to be considered, and on this matter Andreasian was both more hesitant and somewhat pessimistic. He affirmed the IMEMO view that "in countries of non-capitalist development the state sector plays the decisive economic role, ... [and] does not have a state-capitalist character, since it does not serve as a support for the big national bourgeoisie". Yet, despite suggesting that "the base, as itself a part of non-capitalist development, has a transitional character", he recognised the "non-correspondence between the base and superstructure of a non-capitalist society" as a "significant criterion" of 'socialist orientation'. This recognition implied that the base was more problematic than the character of political power, an impression which Andreasian's analysis of particular economic problems confirmed. He noted that "the presence of the private sector at a given stage of non-capitalist development is objectively necessary, and this sector fulfills a definite positive role". "But", he continued, "private-ownership elements possess,
as is known, the capacity to engender capitalism, to infect revolutionary cadres and make them degenerate, to promote the manifestation and growth of a new bourgeoisie." He also pointed out that a "national democratic regime" which rested on the petty bourgeoisie could not avoid the growth of kulaks in the countryside and some "corruption of state officials". This implied that the 'non-correspondence' between base and superstructure would, eventually, take the form of a social contradiction which could be resolved only by a change in the character of one or the other, not a compromise.¹¹¹

In this respect, Andreasian was rather pessimistic about the objective prospects for 'non-capitalist development', saying that "revolutionary democrats, especially in the Arab countries, who acknowledge and encourage small private property, do not have any real means available to withstand the growth of private-ownership elements." He added that they do not want to give private enterprise "full space" in which to move, but implied that the reason for this was mainly negative -- "it may seize them, eliminate them from power and transfer the rudder of administration to openly pro-capitalist elements." In spite of the strong tendency of such authorities to monopolise political power, he suggested that "the presence of a growing private sector -- in the town or countryside -- will sooner or later inevitably lead to the creation of an independent centre of political activity."¹¹²

This analysis, implying that if the superstructure determined which path a country took, developments in the base determined how far this path went before meeting with insurmountable obstacles, had been applied to Egypt in 1973 by Mirsky. He observed "two tendencies of the development of national-democratic regimes, which one may relatively call radical and conservative", distinguished by whether the threat of embourgeoisement is repressed or succeeds in creating a system based on "state capitalist elements."¹¹³ Andreasian likewise concluded that a "differentiation of national democracy" was already occurring, with some forces moving closer to the USSR and others "toward a bourgeois-bureaucratic rebirth". But he maintained faith in the 'growing-over' perspective, refusing to limit the possibility of the 'non-capitalist path' to the more backward developing countries. This, together with his admission that everything depended on whether there
existed favourable or unfavourable conditions, showed that the dominant eclectic perspective was not easily revised.114

With one significant exception, Andreasian's analysis of the 'non-capitalist path' corresponded almost exactly with the analysis published at the same time in chapter sixteen of IMEMO's collective work on the developing countries, written, or at least edited, by Mirsky. The exception, Andreasian's unusually negative evaluation of petty bourgeois nationalism in states of 'socialist orientation', was significant for two reasons. First, the IMEMO book presented "anti-imperialist nationalism" as the "primary impulse" motivating some third world leaders' "aspirations to overcome dependence and backwardness" by choosing the 'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky had no illusions that such leaders would align themselves with the USSR for ideological reasons, but he thought the "pragmatism of their policies" would push them in that direction when faced with Western pressure. It was in these terms that he drew a parallel between Cuba and Egypt, though he noted that contemporary "countries on the non-capitalist path have still not broken the thousands of threads which tie them with the world supremacy of private property." Suggesting that "subjective factors of development play a much bigger role at all stages of the non-capitalist path, than with development along the capitalist path", he added that "this to a significant degree determines the insufficient political stability of regimes of non-capitalist development, and facilitates attempts at counter-revolutionary restoration." But, while noting a tendency toward bourgeois rebirth domestically, he did not refer to what Brutents had recently called the "nationalist manoeuvrings" of 'revolutionary democrats' in international relations.115 Mirsky explained the poor economic performance of most states on the 'non-capitalist path' as resulting largely from the costs of protecting themselves from imperialist aggression, which suggested that they could be sounder and more reliable allies if the USSR gave them more support.116 While Andreasian did not explicitly reject this perspective, his evaluation of anti-imperialist nationalism in states of 'socialist orientation' was more critical, and suggested implicitly that too much support might backfire, since third world nationalists were inherently suspicious of all outside powers.117
The second reason why this more pessimistic evaluation was significant is that it offered a new perspective on a debate about the positive and negative aspects of third world nationalism recently published in the IMEMO journal. It began in early 1972 with two articles by Simoniya, who suggested that, after the acquisition of political sovereignty, third world nationalism tended to lose its anti-imperialist character and exacerbate conflicts between different domestic forces struggling to determine the nature of "national-state construction". He argued that the positive aspect of third world nationalism was counterbalanced not merely by conflicts engendered from irrational boundaries imposed by colonial powers, but also by "new waves of nationalism and inter-ethnic frictions and conflicts, both within given state-territorial conglomerates and between different African and Asian countries." Simoniya ended his second article with a call for new research, but the response of most Soviet scholars was to criticise his reformulation of the 'national question'. The leading critic was G.S. Akopian, who had recently claimed that "a negative attitude to all kinds of nationalism of the oppressed and developing nations may lead only to a loss by the proletariat [i.e. the USSR] of possible allies in the liberation and anti-imperialist struggle." A firm adherent of the 'growing-over' perspective, he thought Simoniya's approach "underestimates the chances and significance of nationalism in the period of struggle against neocolonialism", and hence "places under doubt the possibility of the participation of national-democratic and revolutionary-nationalist movements in a united anti-imperialist front." After dismissing the "separatist movements of national minorities", he affirmed the "enormous significance" of such fronts of "progressive and patriotic forces" in Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Chile, saying they were indications of a "sharp turning-point" in the political rapprochement of "progressive nationalists" and loyal communists.

In view of Akopian's strident defence of the orthodox view about third world nationalism, it is not surprising that other scholars did not support Simoniya, especially since ardent nationalists like the Ba'th in Iraq seemed at the time to be as anti-Western as ever. The leading Soviet expert on national movements, M.S.
Lazarev, considered that bourgeois nationalist movements still possessed some "progressive significance", while Mirsky repeated the traditional formula that "it is impossible to consider the anti-imperialist potential [of nationalism] to be completely exhausted." Simoniya conceded this in an article the following year, but still emphasised that a "new type of nation" had not been formed in states of 'socialist orientation', which had yet to solve the essentially "bourgeois democratic" task of attaining national-state integration, and could not solve it in "'one stroke', by means of forced state-administrative measures". Simoniya’s main message was that, in terms of the growing negative side of third world nationalism, there was no general difference between states of 'socialist orientation' and states on the capitalist path, the implication being that, in terms of domestic political-ethnic stability, the former would be no more reliable as allies than the latter. This view was rejected in a subsequent article by Aleksei Kiva, a colleague of Simoniya's at IVAN. He agreed with Simoniya against Akopian that the internal aspect of third world nationalism required more study, but presented a quite positive evaluation of the situation in states of 'socialist orientation', even citing Somalia as a case where "the struggle with nationalist ideology, in particular with tribalism," was proving successful. The actual course of events in the Horn of Africa in the next few years would have led many Soviet scholars to a belated acceptance of Simoniya's warning, but it is significant that already in 1974 Andreasian, a specialist from the rival institute, had expressed a complementary, although less sweeping, note of caution about the reliability of apparently pro-Soviet nationalists. This shows the heterogeneity of Soviet debate in the mid 1970s about the significance of the 'non-capitalist path', even though at precisely this time the two major institutes had polarised over the question of the type of capitalist development possible in the third world.

Simoniya's book Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia, published in 1975, has been recognised by several Western writers as the key text in the internal Soviet critique of the 'non-capitalist path'. It was also one of the few erudite books published in the USSR for nearly half a century which used Marxist theory to explain important developments in the outside world, and even certain aspects of
Soviet history. In his introduction Simoniya criticised the "pragmatic approach" of many colleagues, who avoided serious thinking since they knew "one may find in the classics any 'needed' citation for any case." He lamented the "inertia" of scholars content with old positions, and quoted a December 1962 speech by Ponomarev calling on Soviet historians to overcome the "legacy of the cult of personality".126 It is no surprise that at a discussion of the book in November 1976 several senior Party demagogues expressed strong objections to its contents, and Bobodjan Gafurov, the ageing director of IVAN, which had recommended the book for publication, concluded by noting "with disappointment that a similar airing of views [sotrudnichestvo, which literally means "collaboration" or "cooperation", was the word used, but it was evidently ironic, if not euphemistic] did not take place at a much earlier stage in the period of preparing the manuscript for publication."127 But if some disciplinarians were concerned that the censorship system had slipped up, many more real scholars must have given serious consideration to the comprehensive critical evaluation which Simoniya presented about the prospects for states of 'socialist orientation' becoming reliable Soviet allies.

In a previous article Simoniya had defined the specific feature of 'non-capitalist development' as being "an original 'revolution from above'," led by "a narrow layer of revolutionary leaders at the top who are compelled to rest on a stratum of the old bureaucratic state apparatus, in order to implement their reforms in the interests of the lower strata". He noted that in such a situation the problem arises of unavoidable "corrections, adapting a superstructure to the real base", and concluded that while 'socialist orientation' could begin easily and in different forms, it could only succeed through the "ideological and political consolidation of the supporters of the non-capitalist path of development" into a "vanguard party", a process facing "gigantic difficulties".128 In his book, Simoniya developed this by considering 'socialist orientation' in terms of a theoretical clarification of the categories of 'social' and 'political' revolution, 'base' and 'superstructure', and a historical analysis of the legacy of colonialism for countries of the Orient. His general point was that third world countries were
still in the era of a modified bourgeois social revolution, in which their economic structures comprised a colonial synthesis of traditional and capitalist relations. In this situation, which differed from the "weak link" of imperialism characteristic of Russia in 1917, the accomplishment of a socialist political revolution through a process of 'growing-over' was impossible, although "leaps forward" toward it would be made. The success of such leaps ultimately depended upon the creation of a new economic base, which Simoniya specifically characterised as "a real economic socialisation of production (i.e. a transformation of productive relations), not a juridical statocratisation, that is nationalisation (changes in the relations of property)." Until such a transformation was accomplished, the danger of a political "recoil" backwards remained, although this could be reduced by two factors: internally, by carefully uniting social and private property interests, so that the latter, which could not be eliminated because of the incomplete nature of the bourgeois revolution, served the former; and externally, by using Soviet support and learning from Soviet experience. Within this framework, Simoniya briefly suggested a materialist explanation of Maoism's "military-bureaucratic superstructure", and openly re-stated the fact that Lenin thought the victory of socialism in one country impossible, but his critical analysis of the limitations of 'socialist orientation' included five main arguments.129

First, he doubted the view of Ul'ianovsky and scholars at IMEMO that the 'non-capitalist path' remained open for countries such as India, Turkey, the Philippines and the major Latin American states, where capitalist social relations had been forming for some time, during the colonial period as well as after the victory of a bourgeois democratic national liberation movement. Simoniya asserted that, in these countries:

> the thesis about a non-capitalist path of development is turned into a multifarious tactical slogan about a united national (or national democratic) front. Then doubt arises concerning the advisability of using the term 'non-capitalist path of development'.130

This point followed directly from his general argument that capitalism had
already established itself as a leading socio-economic structure in most of the
third world, a view which Ul'ianovsky supported without drawing the same
conclusion about its possible political consequences. Simoniya's difference with
Ul'ianovsky concerned the implications of the colonial implantation of capitalist
relations in the third world. Whereas Ul'ianovsky saw the national bourgeoisie as
a weak opponent of imperialism and hence a potential, albeit short-sighted,
participant in a 'national democratic front', Simoniya did not. His emphasis on
the 'internal factor' in third world development focused on the national
bourgeoisie's class nature as the basis of its anti-imperialist potential. He
explicitly criticised Ul'ianovsky for suggesting that the national bourgeoisie could
form part of the "social base" of a country embarking on the 'non-capitalist path'.
He emphasised that this question of political support was quite different from the
existence of the national bourgeoisie as part of the objective "economic basis of a
revolutionary superstructure in a transitional period", adding that to admit "a
thesis about the multi-class essence of a state of socialist orientation" because of
the presence in its apparatus of bourgeois specialists would mean implying the
same thing about the USSR in the 1920s.131 Hence, because of the strong
position of the national bourgeoisie in more developed third world countries, the
geographical extent of 'socialist orientation' was limited to countries too
backward to have developed along the capitalist path.

Second, Simoniya argued that the problems facing 'socialist orientation' in
these backward countries were immense precisely because capitalist social
relations had hardly developed there. Having noted that in post-revolutionary
Russia there was, as a result of the "multistructural" nature of economic life, a
"pre-determined necessity for a more or less prolonged, special historical period
of transition to socialism", "through a particular type of state capitalism",
Simoniya pointed out that such a period for less developed third world countries
would have to encompass "an even greater quantity of transitional steps."132
This meant that the possibility of a "recoil" to the capitalist path would remain in
these countries for a very long time. Simoniya pointed to the "concentration of
the specifics of the non-capitalist path in the superstructural region" not the
economic base of states of 'socialist orientation'. He added that this "explains the relative ease with which a start on it can be made (it is sufficient, for example, to have a military coup at the top and a proclamation of socialist orientation), and also the quickness with which a 'de-railing' from this path occurs (as a result of a counter-revolutionary coup or simply a change of persons in the leadership of a country)." In short, where 'socialist orientation' was feasible because of the slow development of capitalism and the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, it was also unstable and reversible because of the prolonged period of state capitalist economic development necessary to make up for this backwardness.

Third, Simoniya divided the states of 'socialist orientation' into two groups, according to how they had taken this path. For one group, 'socialist orientation' had been chosen as the result of an "ascending" revolutionary movement which went beyond the limits of a bourgeois democratic liberation struggle. Simoniya viewed Algeria as the main example in this category, but also listed Syria and, to a limited extent, Iraq. The second group of countries had started on the 'non-capitalist path' "as a consequence of 'revolution from above'" in the form of a "military coup". Simoniya listed Burma and Egypt as the main examples of this variant, characterised by the "absence of a social base" and an attraction of foreign models to the civilian intelligentsia, which formed the main administrative apparatus. Simoniya's characterisation of the latter group of states as generally less reliable stalwarts of 'socialist orientation' than the former would prove inaccurate in particular cases (Burma remained on the 'non-capitalist path' slightly longer than either Iraq or Syria). However, his main point was that even the first variant lacked enough mass support to maintain course on a stable path of 'socialist orientation' for a long time, and he quoted Lenin to point out that this resulted from an "insufficient development of capitalism" in such countries.

Fourth, Simoniya argued that, as a result of this underdevelopment, popular protests against capitalism in states of 'socialist orientation' tended to be directed "only against the negative aspects" of it, not against it as a system of commodity production. Consequently, movement toward a different system along the
'non-capitalist path' depended almost entirely on the character of the political authorities in charge of the state apparatus. On this point of the crucial importance of political power, Simoniya was in agreement with Ul'ianovskiy, most of the IMEMO scholars except Vladimir Krylov, and indeed almost all Soviet scholars apart from those who supported Levkovsky's optimistic interpretation of state capitalism. But Simoniya's evaluation of 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships of states of 'socialist orientation' showed that he thought this a cause for pessimism rather than optimism. Indeed, he thought the prospects so bleak that he wrote: "the problem of recoil has itself become a stumbling-block, on account of which sharper contradictions are now already breaking out amongst revolutionary democrats." In his view, the 'differentiation' occurring amongst 'revolutionary democrats' derived not from the question of whether to move closer to the USSR, but rather from whether such leaderships should take the objective possibility of returning to a capitalist orientation when a new bourgeoisie was emerging. Whereas the dominant eclectic view implied an outcome of this 'differentiation' in which the USSR would consolidate some allies while losing others, Simoniya suggested that none of the countries on the 'non-capitalist path' could become reliable Soviet allies.

After stressing negative features of leadership in states of 'socialist orientation', such as the "charismatic magnification" of the top-most leader in the manner of Mao Zedong, Simoniya distinguished two types of leadership in such states, reflecting "two predominant types of social structure." The first was characterised by "authoritarian forms of administration" and existed in countries where capitalism had developed to an early stage. Here 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships focused on "state capitalist measures which, if consistently put into practice, will enable" both quick economic construction and a disappearance of petty-bourgeois illusions. Simoniya was careful to phrase this in the future tense as a possibility, and pointed out that, because of the more developed social structure of such countries, there was "a big possibility of the strengthening of rightist tendencies (a most evident example of this is the social development of Egypt in recent years)." The second type existed in countries
with "an overwhelmingly traditional or neotraditional structure", where 'revolutionary democrats' tended toward utopian conceptions of advancing quickly to socialism "without an adequate development of the modern productive forces corresponding to it." Here the main concern was not so much tendencies back towards capitalism, but "sharp problems of overcoming stagnant tendencies in the economy." Simoniya's point was not that either type was somewhat better in one minor respect, but that both were problematic as archetypal stable allies for the USSR. He stressed the "weaknesses and nationalistic vacillations" characteristic of the former type, and the "utopianism in outlooks" characteristic of the latter. While remarking that "the only guarantee of real, and not imaginary, socialist orientation" was an appropriate synthesis of national characteristics and "borrowings from the attainments of the progressive world" (a euphemism for Soviet aid), he was careful not to identify any existing state of 'socialist orientation' which had managed to achieve such a synthesis. This comprehensive critical analysis of 'revolutionary democrats' was very significant, since when Soviet scholars, including Simoniya himself, had previously offered cautious warnings about 'revolutionary democrats', they had always singled out some positive features to balance their critical remarks. In Simoniya's analysis such features were conspicuously absent.

Simoniya's fifth argument concerned the importance of loyal communists for ensuring that a state of 'socialist orientation' stayed on course throughout its prolonged transition period into full membership of the Soviet bloc. This may seem strange for someone considered a 'moderate' by Western commentators, but in fact it followed logically from his previous points and supported his overall argument about the "historically limited" character of "the phenomenon of socialist orientation." Given the long time required to consolidate a proclaimed 'socialist orientation', and the objectively determined negative features of 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships, it was natural for Simoniya to conclude that "any dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie [i.e. a 'revolutionary democratic regime' without loyal communist support] can only be a step toward the complete authority of the bourgeoisie." Unless 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships
began to evolve, under the influence of loyal communists, toward unwavering support for the USSR, then they would sooner or later "begin to express a tendency of not socialist, but bureaucratic-capitalist orientation, covered by pseudo-socialist phrases." The point of this argument was not that more efforts should be devoted to bolstering the position of loyal communists in states of 'socialist orientation'. Simoniya had been the first Soviet scholar to assert the "unusually growing role" of the "internal factor" in deciding the social development of a particular country, and his extensive criticisms of Maoism showed that he retained that opinion without reservation. Rather, in concluding that "the success of progressive development and the possibility of socialist orientation depends on the union of revolutionary democrats and communists", he was pointing out the objective limits of a policy of seeking allies only amongst states blessed with such a union, since every responsible member of the Soviet elite knew that the situation of loyal communists in the third world, as elsewhere, was one of steady decline.

Having shown the foundations of 'socialist orientation' to be shaky even in the best of circumstances, Simoniya was quite explicit in his conclusion about the "historically limited" nature of this phenomenon in the contemporary third world. He stated that: "as a result of changes that have taken place in the socio-economic development of the majority of countries of the Orient, they have passed beyond that historical border after which socialist orientation (the non-capitalist path) has already no chance of attaining success." The main political message of his book was the same as that of his early article, to point out to the Soviet diplomatic establishment that most countries of the third world, including all the largest and most developed ones, were well and truly on the capitalist path, or bound sooner or later to return to it, so that a policy which did not seek to develop stable relations with them would fail the test of increasing Soviet influence in the developing world. He now reinforced this point by stressing the inherent problems of 'states of socialist orientation', the message being that supporting them could cost more than it was worth. He was even bold enough to assert that his analysis "leads logically to the fact that the international prospects of socialist
orientation will, obviously, be considered in the future above all not so much in the plane of a further world-wide broadening of its geographical zones, but rather in the plane of a deepening of social processes and a strengthening of the effectiveness of economic development in the already existing group of countries." 150 In this respect, he quoted the Director of the Institute of Africa, V.G. Solodovnikov, saying that economic growth in 'socialist oriented' countries of that continent (which, because of its greater backwardness, contained most such countries) was "much slower" than in capitalist oriented ones. 151 Generally, as Hough has pointed out, a major implication of Simoniya's book was to draw attention to the fact that the Russian Revolution, and especially its subsequent denouement, was a specific historical development which could not be easily repeated in other areas of the globe. 152 Since Simoniya argued that the "wave of popular-democratic revolutions" after World War II was limited to parts of East Asia, and the attempts to take the 'non-capitalist path' from the early 1960s had proven very limited in their achievements, the overall policy implication was that capitalism as a system was still strong, so it would be foolish to cherish 'utopian' or 'petty bourgeois' illusions about the extent to which the USSR could challenge this system from a position of weakness, without suffering a diplomatic rebuff. 153

The Implications of 'Multistructurality' and Backwardness

The reception which Simoniya's arguments received in various quarters of the Soviet foreign policy establishment provides a good insight into the complex course which discussion about 'socialist orientation' took during the late Brezhnev period. Broadly speaking, three different responses may be delineated. The first response came from authoritarian spokesmen for the Central Committee, such as Ul'ianovsky and some demagogues from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, who asserted that Simoniya's views were heretical. When the 'loss' of Egypt had demonstrated the practical deficiency of the orthodox eclectic view, Ul'ianovsky was in no mood for an objective, scholarly debate about the implications for the
future of the 'non-capitalist path'. He recognised that Simoniya's approach was an attack upon the Stalinist tradition of voluntarism in matters of state, as well as a rejection of the priority of 'socialist orientation', and replied by attempting to dismiss his critic as an apologist for capitalism:

We have already written about the fact that N.A. Simoniya, sharply protesting against voluntarism, looks at growing-over as an act of will. It might be added that, if we follow his logic, the peoples of the developing countries now must not and cannot consider a way out on the non-capitalist path -- under the leadership of revolutionary-democratic forces -- as a real possibility at once for two reasons: because of the immaturity of capitalist relations, and because of how far capitalist development has proceeded (and this relates, in essence, to any one of the majority of liberated countries). N.A. Simoniya's point of view amounts to this: the developing countries have only one path - a path of capitalist development, with the farthest prospect of a socialist revolution. Consequently, the negation of socialist orientation, of the non-capitalist path of development as some voluntarist variant, leads to the view that the only path of transition of the liberated countries to socialism lies through a full development of capitalism itself, concluded with the very remote prospect of a socialist revolution.154

Ul'ianovsky did not bother to discuss the development of capitalism in the third world, because, as his simultaneous polemic with Levkovsky showed, he thought Simoniya's evaluation of that was substantially correct. Instead, he directly attacked the legitimacy of Simoniya's theoretical presuppositions, adding a few superficial attempts, such as the counterposition of the 'two reasons' above, to dismiss his critic's argument as contradictory.155 Politically, Ul'ianovsky endeavoured to rule Simoniya's criticism out of court as unconstitutional, according to the current conventions of debate within the Soviet elite.

Ul'ianovsky's reaction did not convince the leading Soviet orientalists who participated in the published discussion of Simoniya's book soon after Ul'ianovsky's review had appeared. The second response to Simoniya's arguments consisted of their gradual endorsement by many leading colleagues, including some like Mirsky who had previously been optimistic about the prospects of the 'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky considered that "while some of the solutions offered by N.A. Simoniya are very debatable, they are still interesting
and will be thought about." Semion Agaev, who subsequently wrote a theoretical book on Iran with Simoniya as responsible editor and a journalistic book on Iran with Ul'ianovsky in that role, agreed with Simoniya about the specific historical prerequisites of 'growing-over', merely adding that "the author has been unnecessarily categorical in speaking about the geographical limitedness of the non-capitalist path." This qualification was not considered justified by two senior specialists on India, Aleksandr Chicherov and Glery Shirokov, who fully endorsed Simoniya's limitation of 'socialist orientation' to the least developed third world countries. Chicherov suggested that Simoniya had not devoted enough attention to countries on the capitalist path, while Shirokov (who was a responsible editor for Simoniya's book) pointed out that "in Asia there are countries where it is already impossible to by-pass capitalism, and we may speak only about what can interrupt its development." The limited applicability of the 'non-capitalist path' was the first element of Simoniya's critique to undermine the dominant eclectic view. An article published in October 1976 by Kiva, who supported the idea of 'growing-over' for more backward countries, asserted that "the conception of socialist orientation presupposes either an absence or a weak development of capitalism."

The third response, taken by many Soviet authors writing about 'socialist orientation' in the late Brezhnev period, was simply to repeat the orthodox view as if nobody had ever challenged it. This was done partly in deference to the greater political clout of the first response, and partly because the appearance in the late 1970s of a 'second generation' of 'socialist orientation' seemed to belie Simoniya's critique of the basic assumption that the most reliable Soviet allies in the third world are states whose domestic situation and external orientation make them dependent upon the USSR for support. This response was essentially an apology for existing policy, in the form of "books with no independent positions, brochures without a thought, and articles without ideas", which allowed top officials to ignore the expression by leading Soviet orientalists from 1975 onwards of "a sceptical attitude to the very idea of non-capitalist development". When the plight of new 'revolutionary democratic regimes' like Angola, Mozambique,
Ethiopia and Afghanistan worsened, writers adopting this response became defensive. They avoided rather than clarified the difficulties besetting existing policy, and were unable to reply seriously to new criticism in the early 1980s which focused on the costs of attempting to retain states of 'socialist orientation' (by the mid 1980s, the main defenders in Moscow of these states were 'left radicals' like Kiva Maidanik whose internationalism did not defer to Stalin). The theoretical abstinence of those endorsing the orthodox view ultimately facilitated the relatively quick emergence of a new consensus about the limits of the 'non-capitalist path', once the officials who had preserved the authority of the old view were finally freed from their duties. Since, with hindsight, the second response to Simoniya's arguments was the most important, this discussion will focus on it, after considering Ul'ianovskiy's attack on Levkovsky.

The sensitivity of the foreign policy issues at stake in the polemic about the significance of "multistructural" economic relations in the third world, which occurred in the journal Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir from late 1974 until early 1977, is evident from Ul'ianovskiy's decision to present his key arguments under a pseudonym. The source of his concern was the possibility that Levkovsky's concept of "multistructurality" (mnogoukladnost') might become an influential generalisation of the idea, sponsored by Ul'ianovskiy, about a 'transitional epoch of non-capitalist development'. In other words, Levkovsky's analysis, which appeared in the key first section of IVAN's major collective work on the third world published in early 1974, might change the meaning of this newly recognised 'epoch' by specifying an alternative definition of the all-important word 'transitional'. When expounding his theory in 1969, Levkovsky had described 'multistructurality' as "the concrete content of the concept of 'transitionality'", adding that it was "a transitional period that encompasses the time of change from one social formation to another." This view, which accorded with the logical meaning of the word 'epoch', was endorsed by Yuri Rozaliev in a major article in 1974 reviewing Soviet ideas of state capitalism in the developing countries, but it had some implications for Soviet foreign policy which Ul'ianovskiy could not accept.
Apart from dropping the dogma that history was made up of only five definite 'stages', Levkovsky's concept of 'multistructurality' was controversial because it challenged the two key premises of most Soviet writing about the third world. First, he argued that now the main obstacle to economic development in the third world was not the continuing opposition of imperialism, but rather the complex, multistructural nature of economic relations -- particularly the absence of a dominant structure of production relations -- which had resulted from the period of colonial oppression. This point implied that anti-imperialist nationalism would not by itself be a sufficient generator of economic and social development in the third world, and hence of reliable allies.163 Second, Levkovsky downplayed the independent political role of the state in third world countries, saying that it was more "eclectic" than elsewhere, since it was determined by an economic base comprising several contradictory structures of production.164 This implied that economic changes determined political prospects not vice versa, a view consonant with Marx and Lenin but not with most Soviet scholarship since the 1930s.165 Whereas the orthodox view of 'non-capitalist development' assumed that political power was the crucial factor determining the direction of social developments in the third world, Levkovsky and his supporters argued that it was the multistructural nature of economic relations which provided the very possibility of more than one capitalist direction in the first place.166 Levkovsky repeatedly stressed that third world multistructurality was qualitatively different from the multistructurality which existed in previous periods of transition between formations, because there were now more different economic structures interacting, and two alternative formations (not one, as previously) to which a transition could lead.167 The implication of defining 'transitionality' in economic rather than political terms was that it would be a long time before any third world country could approximate the Soviet formation domestically, and hence become a stable ally of the USSR.

Levkovsky's view supported Simoniya's scepticism about backward states of 'socialist orientation', despite his quite different evaluation of the extent of capitalist development which had occurred in the third world. Levkovsky's main
message politically was to stress the importance of the USSR's allies in the third world having a sound domestic economy, implicitly questioning the significance of backward allies such as Laos, which had just "passed into the world socialist system" as a result of the 'primacy of politics' but which hardly possessed a homogenous economic base. Yet, as Hough has noted, in defining most of the third world as still multistuctural rather than capitalist, Levkovsky was optimistic about the long-term prospects for the USSR to consolidate substantial 'non-capitalist' allies, especially since he emphasised the deepening crisis of capitalism as a reason why imperialism was now less of an obstacle to economic development. The main focus of Levkovsky's long-term optimism was the tendency he discerned in multistuctural societies for a necessary expansion of the state capitalist economic structure, which, he suggested, could function as an "incubator" of the material and social prerequisites for constructing an economically viable socialism. While maintaining faith in the future, Levkovsky did not ignore the political difficulties which in the short-term could complicate the manifestation of this "immanent" trend in multistuctural societies toward 'non-capitalist development'. Indeed, he stressed the fluidity of political struggles by claiming that "different groups of the bourgeoisie are often found on different sides of the barricades", and arguing that the large role of the petty bourgeoisie in multistuctural societies made class coalitions and national fronts an objective necessity. A similar point about the need for a 'non-party orientation' had been made by Ul'ianovsky in 1964, but whereas he viewed this as a step toward the political consolidation of reliable allies, Levkovsky simply saw no significant alternative in the short-term to unstable relations with independent nationalist regimes. The cautious foreign policy implications of Levkovsky's view are clear from his main concern, which, as he stated in a rejoinder to Ul'ianovsky, was to see that "the false problem of the 'export of revolution' for the purpose of creating the internal conditions for a movement toward socialism does not arise".

Ul'ianovsky's two articles explicitly attacking Levkovsky's interpretation of multistucturality were separated chronologically by Levkovsky's rejoinder, by
an attack on this from one of Ul'ianovsky's staunchest supporters, I.L. Andreev, and by a contribution from one "E.P. Konoplev", who generally supported Levkovsky while trying to resolve the debate from an intermediate standpoint.\textsuperscript{174} The latter's effort at compromise was squashed by Ul'ianovsky's second article, which rebuked Levkovsky even more sternly than his first. Ul'ianovsky disagreed with Levkovsky about three key issues, arguing strongly for opposite political implications. First, he criticised Levkovsky for ignoring the continuing importance of the international aspect of economic development in the third world, especially East-West competition. Ul'ianovsky asserted that "the struggle of the two world systems has enveloped the third world," and optimistically claimed that a "stabilisation of an anti-imperialist social structure" was apparent in the developing countries. Asserting that "direct aid from the USSR" was a key factor assisting progressive developments in the third world, he stressed that the other key factors likewise "lie in general and as a whole outside, beyond the bounds of the influence of a multistructural economy and any 'immanent' inclination toward socialist development existing in it."\textsuperscript{175} His view implied that Soviet aid could be crucial in determining the historical evolution of a particular third world country, and thus raised to an issue of practical importance the 'false problem' which in Levkovsky's opinion should not arise.

Second, both Ul'ianovsky and Andreev directly attacked Levkovsky's ideas that multistructurality was the distinguishing characteristic of developing countries, and that it rather than political power determined the possibilities for 'socialist development' in the third world. Andreev accused Levkovsky of "a hyperbolisation and even some mystification of the role of multistructurality in the development of the liberated countries", and concluded by claiming that: "the conception of multistructurality, while evidently useful at the country and even regional level of analysis of specific-historical situations forming in the sphere of socio-economic relations of the liberated countries, may not pretend -- as to an extreme degree in its current form -- to the role of a conceptual scheme disclosing a fundamentally new vision of the specifics of development of the liberated countries."\textsuperscript{176} Ul'ianovsky criticised Levkovsky's thesis about
multistructurality as a general transition period or "chronological space" between formations characterising all developing countries, arguing that, if countries did not take the 'non-capitalist path', then they had to be on a capitalist one and not somewhere in between. This implied that politics not economics was crucial in determining social developments in the third world, a point which Ul'ianovsky and Andreev stressed repeatedly. Andreev claimed that Levkovsky's "absolutising of the role of multistructurality" had led to his "underestimation" of the influence of the political-ideological superstructure and his "incorrect overestimation of the place and role of the petty bourgeoisie", which anyway exists "only in those confines in which the laws of capitalism operate." Ul'ianovsky claimed that "everything depends on the class nature of the political authorities," and said it was the "very large role of the state superstructure, which everyone recognises," not the nature of economic relations, which determines the path that a particular third world country takes. His view was that there were definitely two possible directions of social evolution for third world countries, but that if political power was not taken by those interested in 'socialist orientation', then economic forces would make an evolution along the capitalist path inevitable.

Third, Ul'ianovsky strongly criticised Levkovsky's idea that the presence of a state capitalist structure in the heart of a multistructural economy constituted the main objective foundation of 'socialist orientation' in the third world. Their difference of opinion was expressed most clearly in a paragraph in Ul'ianovsky's second article:

Obviously, if the possibility of socialist orientation exists, then it has a definite objective foundation. The whole question is what comprises this foundation: the economic base of a transitional society, as A.I. Levkovsky suggests, or socio-political conditions lying outside it, although, of course, conditioned by it to a greater or lesser degree. Here is the subject of the debate. ... does the economic structure of multistructurality in itself contain socialist potential, or must a socialist orientation rest on prerequisites outside the base and advance on its way in spite of the spontaneously acting laws of a multistructural economy? Ul'ianovsky's answer to this question was clear and unequivocal. In his first
article he had argued that "multistructurality in itself ... is capable of giving rise only to capitalism and nothing else." He restated this emphatically in his second article: "multistructurality has never before created, and in any case does not now create the material foundations of socialism, but it still gives rise every day and every hour to small owners, petty bourgeois, and capitalists. In truth it is difficult to know how it is that a multistructural base immanently has an inherent socialist potential." According to Ul'ianovsky, the effect of the state sector on social development in third world countries depended entirely on the nature of the political authorities controlling it. In multistructural countries on the capitalist path, the state sector could not be an 'incubator' of 'socialist orientation', since it would develop in the same way as it had in developed capitalist countries, where it "not only does not lead to socialism, but opposes it and strengthens capitalism". In Ul'ianovsky's view, the opportunity to avoid or short-cut capitalist development resulted not from any special combination of economic structures, but only from "the competition of the two world systems and the growing influence of the socialist community of nations on the whole course of social progress in the young states." This meant that developing countries would not proceed toward 'socialist orientation' as a result of their own nature; they had to be attracted to such a position, and once attracted they had to be retained or consolidated so that they would not lose this orientation.

Ul'ianovsky rejected the idea of "multistructurality or a transition period in general" applying to all developing countries, because he thought that "the overwhelming tendency in the majority of liberated countries is still capitalist." He argued that the concept of multistructurality was not applicable to third world countries "where the capitalist tendency already dominates and the capitalist formation is fully determined (the countries of Latin America, many countries of South and South-East Asia, and some countries of the Arab Orient)." Moreover, he added that in most places "where there is no dominant capitalist structure, it is the leading structure, and it determines most strongly the socio-economic and political tendencies which are forming." With this assessment Ul'ianovsky effectively conceded Simoniya's first point, that only those
countries which had not advanced far on the capitalist path could readily be candidates for 'socialist orientation'. Now his overriding concern was with the fact that the number of such prospective close allies was small and unlikely to increase substantially. But since Ul'ianovsky, unlike Simoniya, thought the quality of these allies was less of a problem for the USSR than their quantity, his view implied a definite willingness to consolidate the support of any potential, albeit economically dependent, Soviet ally in the third world, because of the expectation that generally such close allies would be few for the foreseeable future. Ul'ianovsky indicated the political significance of this debate at the end of his second article by saying that it was unfortunate that Levkovsky has discussed important issues in his rejoinder "largely for rehabilitating the basic positions of the fatalistic 'theory of multistructurality'." Ul'ianovsky thought Levkovsky's view was 'fatalistic' because it might prevent the attempted consolidation by the USSR of the only close allies in the third world which it was likely to have for a long time. In other words, the USSR could not afford to wait for better allies to develop in the future, since that was most unlikely. At a time when a lull in the usual belligerence of imperialism allowed the USSR more room to intervene without risking a confrontation, Ul'ianovsky asserted that anyone who suggested a more relaxed perspective about developments in the third world should be treated with contempt.

While Ul'ianovsky used his position of power to have the last word in the open polemic, most leading Soviet scholars supported Levkovsky about the implications of multistructurality and backwardness for a critical understanding of 'socialist orientation'. In his keynote address to a January 1975 conference, Sobolev, the editor of Rabochii Klass, said clearly that:

Above all the question consists in whether it is possible at the current stage to overcome multistructurality? Does there exist in the liberated countries the material basis and economic mechanism for overcoming multistructurality? It is clear to anyone that the answer is no. ... Multistructurality will remain for a long time the real condition in which social development occurs, even for those countries where the state sector plays a very big role.
It is possible that Sobolev wrote the article by "Konoplev", which expressed this view clearly, noting that "in contemporary conditions even the most progressive superstructure in countries of socialist orientation cannot abolish the operation of structures connected with private enterprise, since such an economic form still exists as an economic necessity." 186 In any case, this article firmly defended the concept of multistructurality, criticising Andreev for ignoring the "priority" of economic relations in determining a country's social evolution, and for having "absolutised the importance of the external factor of development". 187 While Ul'ianovsky's main support came from Krylov, who linked the priority of economic relations precisely with the paramount importance of external relations, references to the domestic importance of multistructurality in the third world were made by leading scholars outside IVAN, such as Tiul'panov and Mirsky. In a review article published in mid 1975, Tiul'panov and his Leningrad colleagues directly responded to Ul'ianovsky's attack on Levkovsky, claiming that, "precisely" in order to understand "the class structure of the developing countries", "the very study of a complex multistructural structure, which is by no means static and exists in a dynamic, transitional state, is very important". Meanwhile Mirsky, who like Tiul'panov had recognised multistructurality as a feature of developing countries in the 1960s, continually repeated a passage which described the third world as "distinguished by multistructurality", evidently unimpressed by Ul'ianovsky's high-handed attempt to belittle this phenomenon. 188 Levkovsky repeated his view essentially unchanged in a major book published in 1978, although a supportive reviewer noted that the "political aspects of multistructurality" were now given a "more significant role". 189 Discussing this book in late 1979, Ul'ianovsky repeated his criticism of Levkovsky for exaggerating the third world's uniqueness, but with less certainty about the rise of a "mighty tendency of socialist orientation". 190

The debate about multistructurality highlighted the limits and problems of the 'non-capitalist path' if it was open only, as Ul'ianovsky now implicitly admitted, for countries with backward economic structures. Only two supporters of Levkovsky, Vladimir Yashkin and A.I. Medovoi, still argued for the existence of
"an objective tendency toward non-capitalist development", based on the growing role of the state structure "in a wide sense, for a significant part of the 'third world', independently of the degree of maturity there of capitalist relations." Considering capitalism incapable of transforming the "prolonged crisis of multistructural structures" in the third world, Yashkin and Medovoi agreed with Krylov that "one should not identify the non-capitalist path only with the coming to power of revolutionary democrats, since its economic basis may be formed with an old political superstructure that is at the stage of national-democratic reforms." 191 This view was rejected by "the overwhelming majority of conference participants" at a symposium in February 1979, but Yashkin was no more optimistic in the short-term than Tiul'panov. 192 In the conclusion to his Doctor's thesis in 1981, he argued that the "prerequisites" for 'socialist orientation' would still grow because of the sharp contradictions of most multistructural societies, adding that this did not always bode well for the USSR:

But with definite conditions (the weakness of the socialist alternative), a deepening of the crisis of capitalism in these countries and the growing variety of forms rejecting it may lead to the manifestation of non-capitalist forms of a conservative or even reactionary type, which, maintaining their anti-capitalist direction, do not make a move toward socialism, or, more than that, if extremist forces are found in power, succeed themselves in checking social progress. 193

Such pessimism accorded with Simoniya's critical evaluation of anti-imperialist nationalism, although Yashkin disputed his view of capitalism's steady growth in the third world. The most sophisticated economic analysis of 'socialist orientation' was presented by Shirokov, in a 1979 article about three variants of the transformation or deepening of multistructurality. He argued that in very backward countries with traditional elites multistructurality tended to broaden, while in countries like India where capitalist relations had developed significantly during the colonial period it was transformed by a relatively strong national bourgeoisie into a "dual" structure of a dominant capitalist sector and a subordinate traditional one. Where capitalism had developed to some degree but the national bourgeoisie was weak, a "growing disintegration" of the economy resulted, giving rise to an "unusually important role of the state in the
reproduction process". The consequence of this 'socialist orientation' was "to obstruct the transformation of private-enterprise capitalism into a ruling, system-forming structure", so that "the state-capitalist structure becomes the leading one". Shirokov argued that, while multistructurality had already been transformed in countries of the second variant, so that they were moving "toward the group of states of a medium level of capitalist development", in countries of 'socialist orientation' only "with a further transformation of the social structure there can arise pre-requisites for a final overcoming of multistructurality." His analysis, which combined the insights of Simoniya and Levkovsky, clearly implied that 'socialist orientation' was primarily a by-product of economic backwardness, not a progressive short-cut, as the orthodox eclectic view had repeatedly asserted.

The Cost of Dependent Allies

A common implication of the arguments of Simoniya and Levkovsky was that dependent allies would cause more problems than they were worth. This view was not readily acceptable to those responsible for Soviet foreign policy, whose political experience predisposed them to accept the orthodox perspective about third world development, based on a crucial distinction between states with which the USSR had some common interests and states which simply could not exist without Soviet support. The optimism of this view had derived from an expectation that some of the former would in due time 'grow-over' into the latter, thus raising not only the quantity but more importantly the quality of Soviet allies in the third world. The course of events in the late Brezhnev period showed this perspective to be inadequate, particularly in the Afghan case where a wilful 'growing-over' did occur. The orthodox view remained authoritative due to the inertia characterising Soviet policy formation at this time, but, even before the official discovery of 'new political thinking', its spokesmen became noticeably defensive in asserting the importance of the 'non-capitalist path'. An article in 1979 by Ul'ianovsky mentioning the difficulties of 'socialist orientation' was cited
by his critics to stress the limitations of the orthodox view, while an article by Primakov clarifying the status of 'socialist orientation' after the 26th CPSU Congress devoted substantial attention to the dangers of voluntarism, now evident in Afghanistan. Primakov criticised some scholars for suggesting that the reproduction and broadening of capitalist relations signified a "departure" from 'socialist orientation', but his reliance on the simple rhetorical device of mediating two "extremes" to assert that economic difficulties would not force states of 'socialist orientation' toward capitalism showed the defensiveness of the dominant eclectic view. The pessimistic 'extreme' was expressed by Tiul'panov, who, referring to "countries of so-called socialist orientation", suggested that "in the final analysis, objectively all these very backward countries need to complete that which has not yet been made by capitalism, and for this they have to create the most satisfactory forms for capitalist development in the future."

The broadest reason for increasing pessimism was the widespread recognition by Soviet scholars of an important negative factor not emphasised in Simoniya's book, though implicit in his definition of the third world as experiencing an unfinished bourgeois social revolution. This factor was the continuing dependent position of states of 'socialist orientation' within the world capitalist economy. Significantly, the scholar who expressed this point most strongly was Mirsky, who had predicted in 1964 a possible 'way out' for such states from the world capitalist economy in the near future. Mirsky was not a dogmatist, so his reconsideration of this issue is not surprising. His change of mind was so total that, at a conference in January 1975, he referred to the dependence of states of 'socialist orientation' on the world capitalist economy as a "serious external contradiction of the non-capitalist path of development", labelling it as the "number one contradiction", which "predetermines the special sharpness and the difficulties of the tasks standing in front of the countries of socialist orientation." This general point had been noted in 1967 by Ul'ianovsky, but Mirsky was the first to spell out clearly the implications of limited Soviet aid for the crucial internal political struggle occurring within countries on the 'non-capitalist path'. He said clearly: "But we now see that this aid, in terms of its
physical volume, is much less than the current amount which is provided by world capitalism, and it would be naive to suppose that this amount will render only an economic influence on the development of the countries of Asia and Africa." Referring to states of 'socialist orientation', he remarked pessimistically that "it cannot be excluded that the dependence of some of these countries on world capitalism will not be reduced, but rather will grow in accordance with the establishment in them of modern economies", and concluded that, while Soviet aid can "weaken capitalist influence, it cannot paralyse it so long as" this objective dependence lasts.\textsuperscript{199} Although the logic of this situation was not discussed as directly by other Soviet scholars, it soon became widely accepted as something which "negatively affects the tempo and stability of economic and social progress in the states of socialist orientation."\textsuperscript{200} Even scholars who were still optimistic about the 'non-capitalist path' began to stress the objective necessity for countries on this path to attract Western investment, in order to avert "big economic difficulties which could lead to unfavourable political and social consequences."\textsuperscript{201} A broad consensus about this point is evident from Kim's statement in 1982 that "many revolutionary-democratic regimes are compelled not only to support, but also to broaden their foreign economic links with the capitalist world."\textsuperscript{202}

The most important aspect of Simoniya's analysis of 'socialist orientation' which was gradually endorsed by other leading scholars in the late Brezhnev period was his pessimistic evaluation of 'revolutionary democrats'. Again, Mirsky was the first leading optimist to reconsider the situation, although it was some time before he fully accepted Simoniya's view. In 1975, Mirsky said that the domestic problems of states of 'socialist orientation' "may be summarised as manifestations of the main internal contradiction of non-capitalist development, which is precisely between objective tendencies toward the restructuring of society on socialist principles, and the character of the subjective factors, i.e. the non-proletarian character of the leading political forces." He added that "this contradiction is natural, for we speak here about an attempted transition onto the path leading toward socialism, with the absence of a dictatorship of the
This re-evaluation was significant for two reasons. First, whereas the initial basis for Mirsky's optimism in the 1960s had been the progressive potential of the subjective factor, and precisely its 'non-proletarian', i.e. nationalist not loyal communist character, now he thought this potential was intrinsically limited. Second, Mirsky's very cautious terminology ('an attempted transition onto the path leading toward...') was a noticeable change from the previous decade, when he had been criticised for ascribing a 'socialist character' to Nasser's reforms in Egypt. Pessimism about resolving the internal contradictions of 'socialist orientation' became widespread amongst supporters of the orthodox view in the late Brezhnev period. An article reviewing conservative Soviet books about 'socialist orientation' in early 1979 noted the presence of "subjective errors" as one of the "characteristics of non-capitalist development", and said that all scholars recognised that this path, while "objectively leading toward socialism, contains within itself serious contradictions, so that in unfavourable conditions it may be interrupted." This recognition was reflected in Kim's subsequent "few words about the causes of a departure from the course of socialist orientation" in Ghana, Mali, Egypt and Somalia, which listed "subjectivism", a "strengthening of neo-bourgeois strata" and a "sharp strengthening of nationalist tendencies" as respectively the key internal factors leading to the "defeat of a national-democratic revolution".

In the context of this growing pessimism about the reliability of 'revolutionary democrats', one important feature of Soviet discussion about 'socialist orientation' in the late 1970s was a recognition of Mirsky's distinction between two different subgroups of states on the 'non-capitalist path'. This distinction was made most clearly by Kiva, who in a 1978 book discussed "countries of socialist orientation in the wide and narrow (or strict) sense of the word." He claimed that "it is impossible not to see an essential difference in official ideology, policy and practice between such countries as South Yemen and Syria, Congo and Tanzania, Angola and Burma." Kiva also distinguished three stages of 'socialist orientation': its beginning, its stabilisation, and its concluding stage, "about which until now one may speak only in the theoretical plane". He suggested that the first subgroup
had reached the second stage, "marked by the growing-over of a national-democratic revolution into a popular revolution", of a kind similar to Vietnam and Laos. His optimism about the political evolution of "countries of socialist orientation in the narrow sense of the word", which "largely have a low initial level of economic and socio-class development", was qualified by a remark that even at this stage of stabilisation there is still a "great reversibility of socialist orientation". Meanwhile, states in the economically more developed subgroup were unlikely to consolidate their orientation toward the USSR, since they had been on the 'non-capitalist path' twice as long as their backward fellow-travellers but were still at the beginning of a prolonged transition period. This implication was made clearly by Mirsky in a discussion with Kiva and Simoniya, when he argued that "if we 'subtract' from the liberated countries on the one side regimes of the 'Angolan-Mozambiquean type', and on the other side those states which really have the chance to create an independent, strong capitalism, then we see that the remaining developing countries have greater similarities than differences." Noting that the term 'state of national democracy' was now "little used", he transferred his remaining optimism about the third world to the 'second generation' of countries attempting the 'non-capitalist path', since they appeared to possess the "key point ... an all-round strengthening of the leading force of the regime -- a vanguard party." The need for a 'vanguard party' to guarantee success on the 'non-capitalist path' had been noted by Brutents as early as 1966, but it did not become prominent in Soviet writing until the late 1970s. Some Western commentators have interpreted this as part of an optimistic 'forward policy' toward the third world in the late Brezhnev period, but such a reading ignores its context in Soviet discussion, which had increasingly focused on the unreliability of 'revolutionary democrats', given the continuing dependent position of states of 'socialist orientation' within the world capitalist economy. Galia Golan has pointed out that encouraging dependent allies to build-up a 'vanguard party' was a tactic rather than a strategy of Soviet policy, which was applied only where a pro-Soviet regime was evidently unstable or threatened with intervention from outside
Given the distinction between genuine and passing states of 'socialist orientation' introduced by Mirsky and Kiva, such stress on the importance of a 'vanguard party' may also be seen as part of an attempt to apply the lessons of the 'first generation' of countries on the 'non-capitalist path' to the more backward regimes of the 'second generation', before they succumb to pressure and recoil toward capitalism. In other words, the fact that, "in recent years, the viewpoint about the necessity of creating a vanguard party has become all the more confirmed", indicates not optimism on the part of Soviet proponents of the 'non-capitalist path', but rather a reversion to 'administrative measures' in order to resolve the social contradictions which life itself so incessantly provides.

This much is clear from a paragraph in a review by Agaev of Brutents' 1979 book on the liberated countries:

Interpreting the factors which are complicating the realisation of anti-capitalist tendencies in the liberated countries, K.N. Brutents writes in particular: "Socialist orientation, with all the significance of the already conducted social reforms, is at the current stage above all determined by 'political will'. It is this which affects the economic base, which here, especially in the rural economy (and its role in the developing countries is enormous), continues to be marked by processes of spontaneous development leading to the growth of private ownership, capitalist relations, and which in many of its features remains similar to the base in countries on the capitalist path." In as much as "the choice of socialist orientation still does not guarantee the victory of socialism and does not exclude movements backward, returning onto capitalist rails", then there is an urgent necessity for making come to pass the creation of a vanguard party and for strengthening the collaboration of communists and revolutionary democrats.

Agaev's agreement with Brutents showed that Ul'ianovskiy's sharp criticism of Simoniya a few years before, for viewing 'growing-over' as 'an act of will', had not convinced scholars capable of thinking for themselves.

After twenty years of recruiting around the 'non-capitalist path', the USSR had succeeded by the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 in gathering a host of seventeen or so allies, many of whom were small, poor and backward, and less than half a dozen of whom could be considered reliable in anything more than a very short-term and extremely relative sense of that word. It is not surprising
therefore that Brezhnev's report to that gathering was less optimistic than his speech of five years before.\textsuperscript{213} Supporters of the orthodox view could trumpet the emergence after 1975 of a few radically pro-Soviet regimes in places of some strategic importance, but the instability of these dependent allies raised the question of the costs of stopping a backward country from eventually following the capitalist path. Against the background of Soviet losses in Afghanistan, some admirably impatient scholars started in the last months of Brezhnev's existence openly to question the whole idea that dependent allies were worth the price. Yuri Novopashin pointed out quite frankly that, since the USSR was experiencing the "growing difficulties of a transition toward an intensive type of development", it was in no position to assist selflessly a whole group of states of 'socialist orientation' whose total population, approximately 220 million people, was almost as much as its own. He criticised the tendency in such states "to force progressive social-political and socio-economic reforms", and suggested that, given "the presence of a food problem in a series of countries" of the Soviet bloc, it was sensible for the USSR and its European allies to trade agricultural machinery in exchange for rural produce from states of 'socialist orientation' on an economically beneficial basis.\textsuperscript{214} But far from all these states had a surplus of food. Butenko, a colleague of Novopashin's at the institute studying the Soviet bloc, recommended the experience of NEP to the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and hence to more backward regimes of the 'Angolan-Mozambiquean type', pointing out that such countries had to focus precisely on "the formation of their own factors of economic growth", particularly satisfying the "needs of the rural economy", since "without the presence of a food fund one may hardly speak in general about a real socialist policy."\textsuperscript{215}

By the mid 1980s, the 'first generation' of countries on the 'non-capitalist path' had clearly been de-railed by the combined pressures of the world capitalist economy and a maturing national bourgeoisie. Landa quaintly observed: "Regimes of socialist orientation are not insured from military-bureaucratic tendencies of a bourgeois kind."\textsuperscript{216} Reviewing the destiny of 'national democratic revolutions', Mirsky clearly spelled out the implication, that such
states would inevitably remain unreliable allies for the foreseeable future: "The state of national democracy ... has either crashed down or degenerated. In Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Burma and Tanzania, where so-called revolutionary democratic forces came to power, this power is being consolidated, but it displays no tendencies toward a transition to the ideological positions of scientific socialism". Vladimir Khoros responded by saying that in countries like South Yemen and Ethiopia "one may speak about features of 'growing-over', the transition from a national-democratic revolution to a popular democratic one. ... But I agree that the concept of 'growing-over' here does not signify any cardinal movement, just quick changes of a subjective order -- in the views of leaders, in the organisational principles of party construction, etc." This assessment was far from the 'revolutions of a new type' perspective which Brutents had supported a decade or so earlier. After the ascension of Gorbachev, former officials like Ul'ianovskiy, and latecoming supporters of military expansion like Zakeria Gafurov, rose to "defend the attainments" of dependent Soviet allies, but even Ul'ianovskiy now acknowledged the problem of "voluntarist mistakes", and cautioned against making any form of 'growing-over' general and universal at a time when, in his view, the only reliable strategy remained a "broad national front of a left orientation".

The only substantial response to Simoniya's critique of 'socialist orientation' was offered in a 1986 book by Maidanik, who paid "a debt to the anti-dogmatic pathos" of Strany Vostoka, saying that he shared "many of the author's positions (especially concerning the posing of the problem), [but could] not agree, however, with a number of his conclusions." Stressing the "inverted development" of social revolutions in the Orient, which Lenin had noted in 1921, Maidanik argued that the backwardness and dependence of post-colonial societies made a "socialist choice" easy to take, but hard to fulfill without the prerequisites which capitalism had developed in Europe. He thought Simoniya's view about "the prospect of a 'natural' maturation of a socialist revolution" through Oriental capitalist development was "significantly more utopian, than the course 'from anti-imperialism to socialism', since a "dependent-capitalist modernisation" of
third world countries could only "block" and "deform" revolutionary aspirations, not create objective prerequisites for socialism.\textsuperscript{220} He claimed that "the national-liberation processes of the 20th century, considered together, cannot be ascribed to an epoch of bourgeois social revolution", because their key task, "overcoming the structure of dependence and historical backwardness", was quite new and required a struggle against capitalism "as a world system".\textsuperscript{221} Maidanik defined the present stage of liberation in Asia and Africa, where the capitalist mode of production was not yet dominant, as "national-democratic", but he could not find one "national-democratic revolution" that had been anti-capitalist, rather than "anti-neocolonial" (Egypt, Syria and Iran), "anti-colonial" (Algeria) or "anti-feudal" (Yemen).\textsuperscript{222} This gap belied his strategic claim that the space for "intermediate variants" of national capitalist development was "gradually narrowing", and his tactical advice that "a single anti-imperialist front" uniting reformist as well as revolutionary forces was outdated, at least as advice for Soviet diplomacy.\textsuperscript{223} Maidanik's defence of "the independence of left forces" in the form of a plurality of 'left radicals', as against the "mistakes" of Stalin's "traditional vanguard" approach and the "illusory nature" of the subsequent 'non-party orientation', suggests that he may have been concerned principally about the fate of socialists in the third world themselves, rather than the "foreign policy considerations" of "one of the blocs".\textsuperscript{224} However, his pessimistic conclusion that a new revolutionary wave is "improbable" before the end of this century, together with Mirsky's conclusions that the prospect of new states of 'socialist orientation' arising is "now very limited", and that "the positive features of popular-democratic regimes still do not guarantee their political stability" or prevent "instability in the foreign orientation of some of them", just complemented Simoniya's analysis.\textsuperscript{225}

After the 27th CPSU Congress endorsed a new Party Program downplaying the significance of the 'non-capitalist path', discussion about the lessons, problems and prospects of 'socialist orientation' continued, becoming more frank and widespread than before. In an article published in mid 1986, the respected liberal Soviet historian Pavel Volobuev noted some large obstacles facing peripheral
capitalist development, then made a clear and unequivocal evaluation of the past twenty years: "As experience shows, non-capitalist development, in creating a modern economic base and an advanced political superstructure, has come up against even bigger difficulties of an external and internal order than development along the capitalist path."\textsuperscript{226} Such an opinion is not now limited to leading scholars. In an article in late 1986 reviewing the well-known contradictions of the 'non-capitalist path', the senior Soviet specialist on Burma, Vladimir Vasil'ev, noted that, due to their economic backwardness, states of 'socialist orientation' "do not have sufficient internal natural-historical impulses in order to determine a movement in the direction of socialism." He said such impulses must "come from the global historical process", but admitted that the USSR had not demonstrated its economic superiority on this scale, and concluded that "the primary responsibility for progressive development along this path must lie with the very peoples and leadership of these countries."\textsuperscript{227}

The extent of Soviet support for states of 'socialist orientation' was the first empirical issue debated by Mirsky and Vladimir Li in a discussion published in August 1987, opening a flurry of articles on the subject in \textit{Aziia i Afrika Segodnia}. Mirsky claimed that the concept of 'non-capitalist development' worked out under Khrushchev was a "substitute" for, not an extension of, Lenin's nominally similar idea, which had referred to backward, pre-capitalist areas, not countries where capitalism had begun to develop, like Egypt and Syria. He noted that economically such countries "largely depend until now on world capitalist 'centres'", adding that the Soviet bloc, "because of its economic and technical difficulties ... cannot fully give 'mighty support' to' 'socialist orientation', "except in the military-political sphere, which is important in the most critical points of struggle with imperialism but far from decisive at the stage of construction." Li thought this was "still more debatable" than the suggestion of a theoretical decline since Lenin, but Mirsky pointed out that, following Li's logic, the difficulties of 'socialist orientation' must derive "precisely from unfavourable tendencies in the development of the external factor", rather than from internal causes. While Li defended "a 'revolution from above' in countries of non-capitalist development"
merely stressing the low level of mass political culture which the authorities had
to cope with, Mirsky argued that domestic problems in state capitalist regimes
with socialist pretensions were more serious, including an inefficient state sector,
"bureaucratism, nepotism, corruption ... social apathy, and distrust in the
leadership." When Li repeated, without acknowledgement, Simoniya's criticism
of the equally "ruinous" mistakes of 'revolutionary democrats' (fostering market
forces in less backward countries and "ignoring the laws of commodity-money
relations" in more backward ones), Mirsky responded that "the basic causes of the
difficulties of socialist orientation" would not be disclosed by "a special accent on
the errors" of leaders, since the "downfall or overthrow" of the 'first generation'
of these countries had been "entirely natural". Li claimed that "the degeneration
of national-democratic revolutions is not so much a regularity as an anomaly," but
Mirsky suggested that, despite some "pluses", the 'second generation' of states of
'socialist orientation' were clearly "not far behind" the 'first generation' in terms
of bureaucratism and a need for Western investment, with which "a local private
sector will grow, and a parasitical, neocomprador layer will appear." He
concluded that, while the odd state of 'socialist orientation' might yet arise, for
almost all developing countries "the prospect of a break with capitalism (which
will already be not a 'non-capitalist path', but a socialist revolution) is still
completely unclear."228

Mirsky's suggestion that 'socialist orientation' will at best encompass less than
10% of the third world was criticised as too pessimistic in an important article in
the IMEMO journal by his department head, Rachik Avakov, who was scathing
about supporters of the eclectic view like Li, claiming that, due to their
"schematicism and triviality", work on 'socialist orientation' constituted "the
weakest part of third world studies". As well as making some unprecedented
remarks about obvious matters, such as the fact that "the quantity of publications
on the problems of socialist orientation is in obverse proportion to the level and
quality of the research", Avakov stated that: "nothing may justify the fact that
there are no open objective researches and no profound scientific publications on,
for example, the Afghan question. Policy may hardly calculate on an effective
decision on this or that problem if science does not participate in the explanation to the public of its essence and complexities, and in the creation of public opinion itself around this problem, based on deep and all-sided research." Noting that "the matter consists not only in the existence of 'restricted zones' and not only in the fact that here is found a far from optimum character of relations between science and policy", he added:

It is necessary to emphasize another, no less important aspect — the theoretical-methodological. Socialist orientation is not only an object of research in third world studies, but also part of the scientific tendency occupied with an analysis of the problems of world socialism. This would seem obvious. However, judging by the works of Soviet authors, socialist orientation is studied only in the bounds of research on the developing world. ... And if to this is added the fact that, in their turn, a series of socialist countries, which have grown from national-liberation revolutions -- China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea and Laos -- have been excluded from third world studies, then both the methodological confusion and the fragmentation of research on the problem of socialist orientation becomes clear. 229

This nod toward Marx, who in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* scorned that "kind of democratism which keeps within the limits of what is permitted by the police and not permitted by logic", was significant in legitimating a new angle for criticism of Soviet 'socialism', but Avakov's call for an open discussion of foreign policy issues was more readily heard and accepted. 230 In an article entitled "The Developing Countries and New Political Thinking" in July, 1987, Sheinis had called for a revision of the old, 1961 view that the third world contains "two equivalent directions of socio-economic development", and questioned the "significant burden" which the USSR has to shoulder in order to retain states of 'socialist orientation' in its orbit. 231 Agaev responded that, while "quite serious", this "question, obviously, is only about the volume in which such aid and support should be expressed", not whether it should be given at all, but Sheinis in his next article stressed the problem by suggesting that "new countries of socialist orientation" would emerge just in the "lower horizon" of the developing world, which is still "primarily a non-capitalist (and therefore significantly different) branch of the world capitalist formation." 232 His view predominated in a seminar on "The USSR and the Third World" held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry in late
July 1988, where the head of the Middle East and North African Directorate, Vladimir Polyakov, began by remarking that the USSR had lost "both politically ... and in the form of unjustified economic expenditures" because of the eclectic "concept of 'non-capitalist development'", which was "used for artificially linking together dissimilar processes which took place in the third world in the sixties and seventies." After some speakers supported a call for reducing Soviet arms shipments to third world allies, recently expressed in the IMEMO journal by Andrei Kolosovsky, Kim Tsagolov, a Military Academy Professor, said "we need to thoroughly rethink the entire theoretical concept of socialist orientation without delay", and concluded by observing that: "Until we attain superiority over capitalism in the decisive sphere, material production, ... we can forecast in the group of socialist oriented countries and in the third world as a whole growing trends toward a capitalist model of development."

A broad settling of accounts with the eclectic view was undertaken by Yuri Aleksandrov and Vladimir Maksimenko, who suggested that "the most destructive thing for science is not the naive sloganeering dogmatism of the recent past, but a lack of understanding its epistemological roots." Due to "scholastic word-splitting about whether revolutionary democracy is a partial case of national democracy, whether one of them is a left wing of the other, whether one should identify socialist orientation and the non-capitalist path, and so on", the "essence of the problem" had been obscured: "can socialist orientation become an alternative to capitalism (and if it can, with precisely what conditions)?" They carefully reviewed statements by Marx, Engels and Lenin which linked the possibility of by-passing capitalism in the Orient with the victory of socialism in the West, then explained Soviet illusions about 'non-capitalist development' as a consequence of "an uncritical surely in the swiftness of capitalism's general crisis under the influence of the loss of its colonial periphery", before endorsing Simoniya's definition of a 'socialist oriented' national democratic revolution as just "a revolutionary process of the emancipation of labour from all forms of pre-capitalist and colonial exploitation, solving the tasks of a bourgeois social revolution in conditions of the existence of two world systems." Repeating
Levkovsky's argument about the objective limits of multistructurality, and Mirsky's point about the influence of the world capitalist economy, they concluded by criticising the "unconscious Eurocentrism" of those who viewed "state property in countries of socialist orientation as the highest type of property in general," in dogmatic opposition to Marx's view of socialism as "the liberation of labour, understood as a transition from an elemental division of labour and growth of productive forces to their cooperation and real, direct socialisation on a civil basis, eliminating alienation of the product of labour and power from the human being as a creator of social relations."236

With this perspective, the debate about one power centre's dependent allies was transcended by a more important discussion about the possibilities of socialism in a world still marked by a "growth of capitalism" as well as its decaying old forms.237 Ul'ianovsky and Kaufman fulminated against their defeat, but were reduced to ad hominem attacks on Simoniya and Mirsky, plus a claim about economic obstacles to reversing 'non-capitalist development' that would have made Levkovsky smile from heaven.238 Their defence of "an idea formulated in our science already in the 1960s" was dismissed as a legacy of stagnation by one moderately conservative scholar, Yu. Ivanov.239 The editors of Asia Afrika i Segodnia declined to print Ul'ianovsky and Kaufman's reply to a letter of Simoniya's, which held Ul'ianovsky partly responsible for the tragedy of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and exposed his "false modesty" in ascribing his "critical campaign" against Strany Vostoka to unnamed "Moscow scientific journals" (Simoniya added that Ul'ianovsky had used "his official position" to prevent Simoniya replying to Ul'ianovsky's review article, which he thought had not given readers a chance to assess adequately the arguments of Strany Vostoka).240 Kim proved more able than Ul'ianovsky to ride the wave of restructuring, protecting himself by emphasising that in considering 'socialist orientation' "one should not fall into extremes".241 Simoniya resorted to the same rhetorical trick, but for a different purpose. In outlining a "Leninist conception of the transition to socialism in the countries of the Orient", he openly described Soviet society as still undergoing such a transition, and now criticised
"bourgeois scholars and officials" (implicitly including Soviet marketeers like L. Popkova) who hoped that "in the course of restructuring our country will renounce socialism." Simoniya's defence of 'socialist orientation' as an important topic for debate, which showed that his criticism of dependent allies had triumphed, was complemented by the arguments of Antonina Sterbalova, who disagreed with him about the prospects for Oriental capitalism, but was equally forthright in raising for consideration "three variants of reactionary or stagnant non-capitalist development." She pointed out that in the USSR during the 1920s "the concept of 'non-capitalist development' was directly identified with socialism", thus replacing the limits of censorship with the openness of logic.
Chapter 3, Footnotes:


3. See Michael Cox, "The Cold War and Stalinism in the Age of Capitalist Decline", *Critique*, no.17, 1986, pp. 44-5, for an analysis of why "the USSR was forced to seek some lowering of the costs of the Cold War before the United States."


5. Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet debates and American options*, Brookings, Washington D.C., 1986, p. 149ff. Hough, p. 152, stresses the importance of defining the key term in this case: "Khrushchev's supporters spoke of the national bourgeoisie with enthusiasm and excluded from their definition only those persons whose economic interests were directly associated with foreign countries and imperialism. ... Those who were pessimistic about the progress of countries headed by the national bourgeoisie narrowed their definition of the group, retaining all the negative words to describe those whom they did not include in it."

6. According to Jonathan Steele, *Soviet Power*, revised edition, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, pp. 163-4, in October 1964 "Mikhail Suslov told the Central Committee in Khrushchev's presence that he had been indiscriminate and profligate in the promises he had made to other nations."


14. As Hough, p. 159, n. 52, has noted, the change of term from 'non-capitalist development' to 'socialist orientation' was first suggested in 1968 by Gleb Starushenko, because of dissatisfaction amongst pro-Soviet Africans with the purely negative connotation of the former. The phrase...
"orientation to the side of socialism" had previously been used by Karen Brutents, "Osobennosti sovremennogo natsional'nogo-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya", in S.N. Grigorian ed., Ideologiia sovremennogo natsional'nogo-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, p.33, but the main point is that the two terms were used synonymously from the late 1960s onwards. Sewerny Bialer, Stalin's Successors, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, chapter 14: "The Third World and the Translation of Power into Influence", p.270, is therefore incorrect to highlight "the abandonment of the formula of the 'non-capitalist' path of development as a criterion of Soviet policy" in the late Brezhnev period, since the 'socialist orientation' formula was still very prominent at this time. In the last years of the Brezhnev period, some conservative writers distinguished between these two formulas, essentially in order to sidestep criticism by leading Soviet scholars about the historically limited and economically backward nature of states of 'socialist orientation'. Cf. M. Akhmedova, "O suschchnosti, etapakh i granitsakh nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiia", AAS, 1982, no. 4, pp. 25-7. Mirsky, in K.L. Maidanik et. al. eds, Razvivaushchiesia Strany v Sovremennom Mire: puti revoliutsionnogo protsesssa, Nauka, Moscow, 1986, pp. 133-4, distinguished 'socialist orientation' as a subset of 'non-capitalist development' while stressing the backwardness of the latter as a whole; in a recent article, "Sotsialisticheskaia orientatsia v 'tret' em mire' (nekotorye problemy issledovaniia)", RKSM, 1988, no. 4, p. 121, he observed that the change of term at the end of the 1960s was purely semantic, since "the meaning of the phenomenon itself was not changed."


16. This identification of the 'two generations' of 'socialist orientation' emerged in the late 1970s. The distinctness seems to have been introduced first, although in terms of two 'echelons' rather than 'generations', by N. Simoniya, "Osvobodivshiesia strany i mirovoe razvitie", AAS, 1978, no. 1, p. 7; he subsequently referred to 'generations' of 'socialist orientation', since the word 'echelon' became used to distinguish three main variants in the world-historical development of capitalism.


19. N.A. Simoniya, "O Kharakteere natsional'no-osvoboditel'nikh revoliutsii", NAA, 1966, no. 6, p. 5ff. This article contains extensive citations from Marx and Lenin which do not simply have a ritualistic character. On p. 12 Simoniya argues that Lenin did not argue the case for 'growing-over' until his famous April Theses of 1917, i.e. when Russia was in a revolutionary situation. He does not add that Trotsky argued that case before then, although an intriguing phrase from another article of his ("Leninskaia ideia revoliutsionno-demokraticheskoi diktatury i nekapitalisticheskii put' razvitiia", NAA, 1968, no. 2, p. 4: "Marx's theory of permanent revolution") suggests as much. The novelty of Lenin's idea of 'growing-over' in April 1917 is shown by the fact that it was not only considered "depraved" by Plekhanov, but rejected as "unacceptable" by Kamenev in an editorial in Pravda. Lenin's revision of the orthodox Marxist precept that Russia was ripe for only a democratic revolution began to develop in late 1914, when he considered the implications of imperialism after a study of Hegel's dialectic (see Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought, volume two, Macmillan, London, 1981, pp. 145-51; and Michael Lowy, "From the 'Logic' of Hegel to the Finland Station in Petrograd", Critique, no. 6, 1976, pp. 5-15).

20. Quoted in Simoniya, "O Kharakteere", p. 5. While Simoniya criticised mostly Tiagunenko and two colleagues of his at IMEMO, Georgy Mirsky and T. Pokateva, almost all Soviet scholars then supported Tiagunenko's view. Cf., for example, G. Dadashev, "Marksistskaia politicheskaia ekonomika i razvivaushchiesia strany", Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [hereinafterMEMO], 1965, no. 2, p. 90; and S.I. Tili'panov's remarks at a conference reported in NAA, 1966, no. 5, p. 225. It was significant that Simoniya chose to explicitly attack Tiagunenko and Mirsky rather than less important scholars, especially since Tiagunenko was by no means the most mistaken from Simoniya's viewpoint, having criticised some of his IMEMO colleagues for thinking "that most of the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolutions have already been resolved and that these countries now stand already in front of a socialist revolution. It is hardly possible to
agree with such opinions. Such an approach may lead to the danger of leaping forward too quickly, which we should always watch out for when studying the characteristics of contemporary national liberation revolutions", in "Sotsializm, Kapitalizm i Slaborazvitye strany", MEMO, 1964, no. 6, p. 78. The dispute between Simoniya and Tiagunenko has been noted by some Western analysts (particularly Remnek, p. 344, n. 40; and Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes toward Developing Nations since Stalin", in idem. ed., The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, pp. 42, 50), but only briefly.

22. Ibid., p. 13.
23. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
24. Ibid., p. 11.
25. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 17-18.
26. Ibid., p. 16. Strictly speaking, Simoniya said that only one country, Burma, had so far taken the 'non-capitalist path', with the other, Syria, currently forming the "prerequisites" for taking it.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 17.
29. Ibid., pp. 19-21.
32. Ibid., p. 15.
34. Simoniya, "O Kharaktere", p. 3.
37. S.I. Tiul'panov, "Osnovnye problemy politikekonomii razvivaiushchikhsya stran", MEMO, 1965, no. 6, p. 72. At a conference soon after this article appeared Tiul'panov discussed state intervention in the third world in terms suggesting that if it evolved in a capitalist form, this would be a step backwards from the current situation, NAA, 1966, no. 5, p. 224.
38. Quoted in V. Tiagunenko, "Tendentsii obshchestvennogo razvitiiia osvobodivshikhsya stran v sovremenniuu epokhu", MEMO, 1962, no. 3, p. 22 (emphasised in original).
39. Remnek, pp. 216-220; Oded Eran, The Mezhdunarodniki, Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 1979, p.175. Remnek, p. 218, points out that Ul'ianovsky's opponents were mainly trying to gain space for independent discussion: "At stake in the dialogue between Ul'ianovsky and his critics was the question of whether research was to proceed deductively on the basis of current Party directives (which, of course, would preclude the possibility of an independent input by Soviet scholars into
the decision-making process), or inductively with conclusions drawn from concrete research."

40. For a good summary of Mirsky's view see Hough, pp. 121, 131, 161-2.


42. The complexity of 'growing-over' in Russia was subsequently stressed by K.N. Tarnovsky, "Problema vzaimodeistvii sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh ukladov imperialisticheskoiRossii nasovremennom etape razvitiia sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki", in V.V. Adamov ed., *Voprosy Istorii Kapitalisticheskoi Rossii: problema mnogoukladnosti*, Sverdlovsk, 1972, pp. 43-5.


51. Brutents, *ibid.*, pp. 29, 39, stated clearly that contemporary national liberation revolutions went beyond the bourgeois democratic limits of the capitalist revolutions in Western Europe. A review of the book by Georgy Kim, *MEMO*, 1974, no. 9, pp. 144-6, thought that was all that needed to be said, since it omitted any mention of the most interesting chapter of the book.


53. *Ibid.*, p. 148. The relative slightness of Brutents' influence on general Soviet third world policy in the Brezhnev period is shown by the fact that this warning was unheeded in Soviet policy toward Afghanistan from April 1978, and the fact that Brutents was not dismissed after the ascension of Gorbachev.

55. Ibid., pp. 548; "Osobennosti", p. 28.


57. From Simoniya's perspective, the issue of 'growing-over' was a question of the character of national liberation revolutions, not the extent of economic dependence of third world countries after they had attained political independence. The tiredness of Tiagunenko's arguments is shown by the fact that most of his chapter on contemporary national-liberation revolutions in the 1974 IMEMO book on the third world reprinted an article published early the previous year under a pseudonym: cf. "V. Liusinov", "O formakh revoliutsionnogo perekhoda k sotsializmu v razvivaiushchihskih stranakh", MEMO, 1973, no. 2, pp. 16-26, with "Sovremennye natsional'no-osvoboditel'nye revoliutsii i perekhoda k sotsializmu", in R.M. Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy, Moscow, 1974, pp. 440-53.

58. Brutents, Sovremennye, p. 149. N.A. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, pp. 266-7, quoted Brutents about the possibility not inevitability of anti-capitalism in the third world, after quoting a qualification by Tiagunenko, who said that 'growing-over' depended "above all on the correlation of internal political forces in a country".


60. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka, pp. 231-5. In a footnote on p. 231 Simoniya pointed out that: "the success of a growing-over was secured not by the fact that the leadership of the revolution considered it from the very beginning as not bourgeois-democratic, i.e. as socialist, but on the contrary by the fact that the leadership did not deceive itself in calculating the genuine character of the revolution and skillfully saw the internal and external conditions which allowed them to implement a growing-over. In those cases where the leaders attributed to a revolution a different character and correspondingly ignored the really existing correlation and arrangement of class-political forces, not only did the leaders fail, but at times even a bourgeois-democratic revolution (let alone the attempt at socialist orientation) suffered a defeat, despite the proclaimed slogans and intentions."


63. Stalin, quoted in Fitzpatrick, p. 439.


66. V.P. Lukin, "'Ideologiia razvitiia' i massovoe soznanie v stranakh 'tret'ego mira'", Voprosy filosofii, 1969, no. 6, p. 36.

67. B.I. Slavnyi, reviewing A.I. Dinkevich ed., Strategiia sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia osvobodivshikhskia stran Azii, NAA, 1988, no. 4, pp. 185-6. Slavnyi's complaint about the ritual language of debate is borne out by a Freudian slip in Tiul'panov's textbook, Ocherki Politicheskoi Ekonomii, p. 194, referring to 'non-capitalist development' as "the path of socialist organisation".


71. Tiagunenko, "Sotsialistichekskie doktriny obschestvennogo razvitiia osvobodivyshikh stran", MEMO, 1965, no. 8, p.85, emphasised the popularity of different versions of 'socialism' as a slogan in the developing countries, adding that "as shown by the experience of the development of Egypt, Burma, Mali and some other countries, revolutionary practice outpaces ideological doctrines". Tiul'panov, "Osnovye problemy", p. 75, even suggested that in countries on the capitalist path the "struggle for non-capitalist development ... comprises a large content of the socio-political struggle." For Brutents, see n. 35.


74. Cf. K. Ivanov, writing in International Affairs in early 1966, quoted in Remnek, p. 344: "problems of the underdeveloped countries' progress towards socialism, avoiding the capitalist stage, are today practically much more involved than they seemed a short time ago. To people who live only by past concepts and experience they might even appear insoluble inasmuch as many of the conditions which existed, say, after the revolution in Russia or in Mongolia are absent." The second sentence implied that the 'non-capitalist path' was still considered viable, a point made clear by the same author in a book published a year later: "now moving along the progressive path of development are countries -- the United Arab Republic, Burma, Mali, Guinea and others -- which are already resolving the problems of non-capitalist development ... There is no debate that this is a difficult and prolonged path, but it is lighter and shorter than the capitalist path, which leads only to a dead end." K. Ivanov ed., Razvivaiushchiasia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnaia Politika, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, Moscow, 1967, pp. 35-6. For Brutents see n. 55.

75. Yu. Ostrovitianov, "Sotsialistichekskie doktriny razvivaiushchikh stran: formy, sotsial'noe soderzhanie", MEMO, 1964, no. 6, p. 87. Cf. V.V. Rymalov, Raspad kolonial'noi sistemy i mirovoe kapitalisticheskoe khoziastvo, Mysl', Moscow, 1966, p. 35: "It is characteristic that the majority of the young sovereign states have in one form or another proclaimed their goal as the non-capitalist path of development."

76. Materiały XXIII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Politizdat, Moscow, 1966, p. 184.


81. Kim et. al., "Teoriia", pp. 47-9, 51-3, 56, 57. This article expressed what Hough, pp. 162-3, terms the 'second model' of revolutionary change in the third world, distinct from Tiagunenko's 'first model' and Simoniya's 'third model'.

83. R.G. Landa, "Eshche raz o nekapitalisticheskom puti razvitiia", NAA, 1966, no. 6, pp. 37-8, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36-8. In view of the debate about the character of national liberation revolutions which Simoniya had just launched, it is significant that Landa preferred the rather unusual term "continuation" (продолжение) to the commonplace "growing-over" (перерастание), presumably because he agreed with Simoniya's criticism about the false implications of the latter.

84. Hough, pp. 158-9, quoting Simoniya: "In the words of one critic, 'not proletarian and not petty bourgeois, but "transitional". That is not an answer, but a retreat from an answer, for, in reality, the question is not whether they are transitional or nontransitional, but what kind of transition they are undergoing.' Claims that most third world countries had not yet chosen their path were made by Tiul'panov, Ocherki, pp. 243-5; G.F. Kim and A.S. Kaufman, "Nekotorye problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii v svete leninskikh idei", NAA, 1969, no. 5, p. 17.

85. K.N. Brutents, in "Mehdunarondnaia nauchnaia konferentsiia 'piatidesiatileti otkiabria i rabochii klass'", NAA, 1968, no. 4, pp. 234-5; R.A. Ul'ianovsky, in "O edinstve progressivnykh sil osvobodivshikhsia stran", NAA, 1972, no. 6, p. 211; R.A. Ul'ianovsky, "O nekotorykh chertakh sovremennogo etapa natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia", NAA, 1967, no. 5, p. 23. On p. 35 of this article he call for a "rallying" of all anti-imperialist forces in identical terms to Brutents.

86. Simoniya, "Leninskaia ideia revoliutsionno-demokraticheskoi diktatury i nekapitalisticheskii put' razvitiia", pp. 13-4; Mirsky's report, entitled "Problems of the unity of revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces of the developing countries", at a conference in April 1972, summarised in NAA, 1972, no. 6, pp. 216-7. Tiagunenko and most other speakers at this conference supported the general need for a 'united front' between loyal communists and radical nationalists, but Kim, ibid., p. 217, expressed implicit scepticism about this, and "emphasised the importance of specific study of the policies of regimes of revolutionary democracy, both in the socio-economic and in the political and ideological regions".


88. Mentioned in Simoniya, Strany Vostoka, p. 3. For example, Veniamin Chirkin, Formy gosudarstva, perekhodnogo k sotsialisticheskomu tipu, Iuridicheskaia literatura, Moscow, 1966, pp. 204-16, made isolated criticisms of other scholars for suggesting that the 'state of national democracy' already constituted "one of the forms of transition to socialism", but himself failed to clarify the historical difference between this type of state and the so-called 'popular-democratic state' characteristic of Eastern Europe and the USSR's close allies in East Asia.


90. N.A. Simoniya, "Po povodu monografii 'Klassy i Klasssovaia Bor'ba v Razvivaiushchikhsia Stranakh'", NAA, 1969, no. 3, p. 52.

91. Ibid., pp. 52-4.


98. Cf. Ul'ianovsky, "The Third World", p. 34: "The only way to solve the contradictions of non-capitalist development is to consolidate the country's anti-imperialist stand in alliance with the socialist community and unswervingly to strengthen the revolutionary-democratic, socialist trends."

99. Andreasian, "Protivorechiia", p. 49. Andreasian quoted Ul'ianovsky against Kim et. al., and called for a detailed analysis of the contradictions of particular states of 'socialist orientation' instead of generalised definitions.

100. Ul'ianovsky, Sotsializm, p. 450.


103. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

104. Ibid., p. 11.

105. Krasin's book was largely an attempt to hold the line against Euro-communist revisionism, which is ironic in view of his recent calls for loyal communists to undertake "a constructive dialogue with those who support other views and positions" (in I.M. Kliamkin, "Za teoreticheskoe osvoenie sovremennykh real'nostei (zametki s vsesoiuznogo simpoziuma obschestvovedov)", RKSM, 1987, no. 2, p. 162). Because of the propagandistic message of his book, Krasin did have to concede to the current Stalinist tradition of rejecting an equal dialogue with foreign comrades, although this did not prevent him suggesting the need for a diversity of Soviet views.

106. Andreasian, "Protivorechiia".

107. Ibid., pp. 39, 43; Simoniya, in Kommunist, 1965, no. 9, p. 123.

108. Andreasian, "Protivorechiia", pp. 39-41. Andreasian assessed such non-alignment positively, but this cautious definition was less orthodox than his later affirmation, p. 46, that the USSR's aid "strengthens the political union between socialist and non-capitalist countries".

109. Ibid., p. 44.


112. Ibid., pp. 48.


114. Andreasian, p. 49.


116. Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: zakonomernosti, pp. 409, 412, 410, 416,
Mirsky is identified as the author of at least pp. 408-15 by an IMEMO colleague in a later review article: V. Kollontai, "Issledovanie problem sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii", MEMO, 1979, no. 3, p. 138, n. 4. For Mirsky's clear recognition of the nationalist character of 'revolutionary democrats' see his contribution to the discussion of a report by Ul'ianovsk at a conference in early spring 1972: "O edinstve progressivnykh sil osvobodivshikhsia stran", NAA, 1972, no. 6, p. 214.

117. Mirsky, in Avakov ed., Razvivaishchiesia Strany: zakonomernosti, p. 414, stressed that 'revolutionary democrats' were authoritarian because "the logic of maintaining political power demanded the destruction of the bases of potential opposition", but he considered this largely as an anti-bourgeois phenomenon, which, because of the pressure on such forces from imperialism, would be maintained in the foreseeable future.

118. N. Simoniya, "Natsionalizm i politicheskaia bor'ba v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh (stat'ia 1)", MEMO, 1972, no. 1, p. 97. Simoniya's critical evaluation of third world nationalism was quite different from the crude Stalinist rejection of national independence which was resurgent after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: for an example, see V.V. Zagladin and F.D. Ryzhenko eds, Sovremennoe Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie i Natsionalizm, Politizdat, Moscow, 1973.


120. G. Akopian, "O politicheskoi bor'be i roli natsionalizma v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh", MEMO, 1972, no. 8, pp. 100-1, 104, 105.

121. G. Akopian, "O politicheskoi bor'be i roli natsionalizma v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh", MEMO, 1972, no. 8, pp. 100-1, 104, 105.


124. For a cautious evaluation of 'non-capitalist development' by Landa in the 1974 IVAN book, see B.F. Gafurov ed., Zarubezhnyi Vostok i Sovremennost', volume one, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, pp. 379-80. For an overview of the differences about capitalist development in the third world see the review of IMEMO's 1974 book by a scholar at IVAN: A.V. Kiva, "'Tretii Mir': protivorechiy tendentsii", NAA, 1975, no. 4, pp. 40-54. On p. 44, Kiva criticised the IMEMO authors for assuming that all capitalist development in the third world was dependent upon imperialism; this constituted a re-evaluation of the view he expressed in his article on nationalism, p. 107, that "on the capitalist path it is impossible in the foreseeable future to attain real independence".

125. Valkenier, The Soviet Union and the Third World, p. 87, gives a good overview of Simoniya's position, although her view of his book as separating the political from the economic oversimplifies his methodological stance.


127. "Obsuzhdenie knigi N.A. Simoniya", p. 65. The importance of Simoniya's book is shown by the composition of the discussants for this published symposium (some other formal discussions of the book were organised, but not published). Apart from Gafurov and Kim (who introduced the discussion), there were seven senior scholars (who supported Simoniya on all the key issues), five disciplinarians from the Central Committee institutes (who unsurprisingly took the
opposite view), and two senior scholars from the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Relations (who sided with Simoniya against the second group).


130. Ibid., pp. 268-9.

131. Ibid., pp. 308-10.

132. Ibid., p. 358.

133. Ibid., p. 265.

134. Ibid., pp. 312-32, especially pp. 327-9 for the argument about 'revolution from above'. Simoniya's previous expression of this argument, in the article with his East German colleague, was criticised in a review by the conservative scholar I.L. Andreev, Voprosy Istorii, 1975, no. 4, p. 17, but Simoniya continued with it into the 1980s, cf. "Ekonomicheskie protsessy i evoliutsiia politicheskikh sistem v stranakh vostoka", in idem. and G. Kim eds, Strukturnye sdvigi v ekonomike i evoliutsiia politicheskikh sistem v stranakh Azii i Afriki v 70-e gody, Nauka, Moscow, 1982, pp. 23-4.


136. Ibid., p. 333.

137. Cf. "Problemy gosudarstvennogo kapitalizma v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh", NAA, 1973, no. 4, p. 41: "V.V. Krylov said it would be mistaken to interpret the non-capitalist path of development only as a change in the area of superstructural phenomena, denying the presence of purely economic forms of a way out beyond the bounds of the laws of a capitalist economy. In a series of countries an anti-capitalist tendency in the evolution of superstructural institutions was caused by a preceding change in the economic structure of state property."


139. Ibid., pp. 348, 349.

140. Ibid., pp. 349-51.

141. Ibid., p. 351.

142. Ibid., p. 352.

143. Cf. Simoniya, "Leninskaia ideia revoliutsionno-demokratcheskoj diktatury", p. 14, where the example of Egypt is contrasted positively with that of Indonesia. But in his 1973 article Simoniya thought it was "still too early to give a conclusion about the relative effectiveness and success" of the Egyptian regime's efforts to form a vanguard party, "Osobennosti formirovaniia partii", p. 48.

144. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka, p. 354.

145. Ibid., p. 356.

146. Ibid., pp. 360-2.

147. Ibid., pp. 345-6 for the criticism of Maoism. For the growing 'internal factor' see n. 107.
148. Ibid., p. 364. Simoniya had the pleasure of quoting Ul'ianovsky about the importance of such a union in his second last paragraph, knowing that attentive readers would appreciate the irony in view of the very different perspectives which Simoniya and Ul'ianovsky had about the prospects of 'socialist orientation'. For a frank statement about the declining influence of real socialism on the revolutionary process” since the Second World War, see Yuri S. Novopashin, “Vozdeistvie real'nogo sotsializma na mirovoi revoliutsionnyi protsess: metodologicheskie aspekti", Voprosy filosofii, 1982, no. 8, p. 16: "For example, the structure of the 'demonstration effect' of the development of real socialism appears now to be more complex than in the pre-war period, in all relations, and in particular from the point of view of the perception of the process of socialist and communist construction by revolutionaries and all toilers of the non-socialist world."

149. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka, p. 354.

150. Ibid., p. 355.


152. Ibid., p. 164.


155. Ibid., pp. 61-81.

156. "Obsuzhdenie knigi N.A. Simoniya", p. 57.

157. Ibid., p. 61.

158. Ibid., p. 63.

159. A. Kiva, "Sotsialisticheskaia orientatsiia: nekotorye problemy teorii i praktiki", MEMO, 1976, no. 10, p. 21. Kiva had expressed the same view a year or so earlier in his review of the IMEMO book, "Tretii Mir': protivorechivye tendentsii", p. 52: "the authors consider in principle possible a movement onto the non-capitalist path of development of countries with sufficiently developed capitalist relations -- Turkey, the Philippines, the countries of Latin America, etc. It seems to me that such a position (although it is often espoused by Soviet scholars) contradicts the very concept of 'non-capitalist development'." He suggested that the 'non-capitalist path' was possible only "in conditions of the supremacy of pre-capitalist production relations", and doubted whether a return to this path was possible for "those countries, which in the past were oriented toward socialism, but in which a bourgeois-bureaucratic degeneration is occurring? This question, of course, demands special consideration."

160. A.P. Butenko, "Theoretical Problems of Perfecting the New Order", Soviet Studies in Philosophy, Spring 1988, p. 31 [originally in Voprosy filosofii, 1987, no. 2]. O. Martyshin, "Osvobodivshiesia strany: real'nye usloviia progressa" (review of R.A. Ul'ianovsky, Sovremennye problemy Azii i Afriki, Nauka, Moscow, 1978), MEMO, 1980, no. 8, p. 141. Ul'ianovsky's response in this book to the sceptics was fairly lame. Noting that some states of 'socialist orientation' had turned back to capitalism, he merely said this "does not in itself indicate that socialist orientation under the leadership of revolutionary democrats is in principle impossible". The vulnerability of Ul'ianovsky's position to Simoniya's critique is evident from the fact that he was forced to adopt the rhetorical device of presenting a 'middle position' in order to re-state beliefs he had held for some time. He cautioned against an "idealisation of non-capitalist development sometimes met in Soviet historical literature" (i.e. Kim's identification of it with the Mongolian experience) and listed some general "dangers" to 'socialist orientation' like "underestimating" both feudal and capitalist forces and "ignoring" ethnic peculiarities, but he did not address the inherent contradictions of the 'non-capitalist path' which became prominent during the 1970s (Ul'ianovsky,
Sovremennye problemy, pp. 87-88, 41).

161. A.I. Levkovsky, "Mnogoukladnye strany: dva kompleksa problem", AAS, 1969, no. 8, p.16; Gafurov ed., Zarubezhnyi Vostok, volume one, 1974, "Obshchaia kharakteristika sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh aspektov mnogoukladnosti", pp. 19-34. Support within IVAN at this time for Levkovsky's theory of "comparatively persistent multistructurality" is clear from the reference to it in the introduction to this volume, and in Bobodjan Gafurov, Aktual'nye problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, pp. 16-18. The term 'multistructurality' had been used descriptively along with 'backwardness' by many Soviet scholars, e.g. Klasy i Klassovais Bor'ba, volume 3, p.259, but Levkovsky made it the key theoretical concept for explaining third world development.

162. Yu.N. Rozaliev, "Problem y gosudarstvennogo kapitalizma v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh", Voprosy istorii, 1974, no. 8, pp. 66-7. Cf. Hough, pp. 57-60 for the development of Levkovsky's view, and the reaction to it from senior Brezhnev ideologues such as Sergei Trapeznikov, who threatened supporters of the concept of 'multistructurality' (especially those such as Mikhail Gefter who applied it to post-revolutionary Russia) with a call for strict "partyness" against "apologists of capitalism". On p. 60, n.87, Hough points out that Roslavlev is Ul'ianovsky's pseudonym.


165. V.I. Maksimenko, review of A.I. Levkovsky, Sotsial'naia struktura razvivaiushchikhsia stran, NAA, 1979, no. 1, p. 209, points out that Levkovsky achieved not so much an "introduction" of the categories 'structure' and 'multistructurality' into Soviet science, as a "restoration" of them.


170. Levkovsky, "O real'nykh", pp. 149-50.


181. Roslavlev, "O klassovom podkhode", p. 112; idem, "Eshche raz o 'teorii' mnogoukladnosti", p. 143 (original emphasised).
184. Ibid., p. 145. Cf. Bialer, Stalin's Successor's, p. 272, for an assessment of the implications of narrowing 'growing-over' to backward third world countries which captures the "apprehension over lost opportunities once revolutionary turmoil is permitted to yield to a stable pattern" that animated Ul'ianovsky.
185. A.I. Sobolev, "Rol' proletariata osvobodivshikhsia stran v sotsial'nom progresse obshchestva", in G.F. Kim ed., Rabochee dvizhenie v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh, Nauka, Moscow, 1977, p. 44.
186. E.P. Konoplev, "O dvukh podkhodakh", p. 142. Following this sentence in Konoplev's article there was a footnote: "See A.I. Sobolev, 'Proletariat osvobodivshikhsia stran i sotsial'nyi progress', Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir, 1975, no. 3, p. 17." While "Eduard Konoplev" is identified as a provincial scholar (cf. E. Konoplev (g. Bryansk), "Spetsifika protsessa vosproizvodstva v mnogoukladnoi ekonomike", MEMO, 1975, no. 2, pp. 101-6), this article concluded with some editorial-type comments about the "purpose of this discussion", which he said "must consist not in the counterposition of different conceptions in analysis, which would pretend to the role of a 'conceptual scheme', but in the joint working-out of the complex 'mechanism' of socio-economic processes. From this point of view the counterposition of multistructurality or the class content of socio-economic structures to that of a socio-economic formation would be incorrect. It would appear more fruitful to study the specifics of class struggles in conditions of a multistructural economy, the concrete processes of the change of social structures, the character of which should be judged not according to the declarations of the leaders of parties or governments, but according to the conjunction of production relations existing at any given point, and according to the tendencies of their further development." (Ibid., p. 143.) The tone of these comments suggests that the author thought he was concluding the debate, but the implication of this negative reference to 'the declarations of the leaders of parties or governments' as well as the unwillingness of the "supporters of multistructurality" (ibid.) to surrender their position would have made it impossible for Ul'ianovsky to let the matter rest.
criticised for not identifying the leading economic structure in third world countries; Simoniya's similar criticism, Strany Vostoka, pp. 170-1, is quoted in Hough, p. 59. Mirsky, "Tretii Mir", p. 356, thought the leading structure was state capitalism. Krylov's view is discussed in chapter four.

189. Levkovsky, Sotsial'naia Struktura, reviewed by Maksimenko, NAA, 1979, no.1, p. 214.

190. R.A. Ul'ianovsky, "K voprosu o spetsifike razvitiiia stran vostoka", NAA, 1979, no. 5, pp.58-74. Levkovsky had repeated his view in the previous issue of this journal: A.I. Levkovsky, "Protsessy klassoobrazovaniia v stranakh Azii i Afriki", NAA, 1979, no. 4, pp. 94-110.


195. R.A. Ul'ianovsky, "O stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii", Kommunist, 1979, no. 11, pp. 114-23, whose reference to "negative lessons of non-capitalist development" was highlighted in V.L. Sheinis and A. Ya. Eli'ianov eds, Razvivaishchiesia Strany: ekonomicheskogo rost i sotsial'nyi progress, Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p. 583; E. Primakov, "Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii: trudnyi, no real'nyi perekhod k sotsializmu", MEMO, 1981, no. 7, pp. 15-6, implicitly accepting Simoniya's warning about "the danger of leaping forward too quickly in the matter of implementing social reforms", and noting "the fact that for developing countries starting on the non-capitalist path, multistructurality of the economy is not a transitory but a long-term factor of development." This analysis was repeated in a major book published the following year, E.M. Primakov, Vostok Posle Krakha Kolonial'noi Sistemy, Nauka, Moscow, 1982, pp. 108-14, with the addition of some more warnings about the "elements of subjectivism and voluntarism which had manifested themselves in a series of countries of socialist orientation regarding attitudes to the tempo of economic development and the conduct of industrialisation."


197. "Problemy i tendentsii razvitiiia osvobodivshikhsia stran", RKSM, 1979, no. 4, pp. 159-60.


199. Ibid. For Ul'ianovsky, see n. 93.


201. Kiva, "Sotsialisticheskaia orientatsii", p. 29; Primakov, "Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii", p. 8. Hough, p. 77ff., has shown that the need for Western investment started to be accepted by some scholars in the mid 1960s, but the effect of this on the stability of 'socialist orientation' only seems to have become an issue during the 1970s.


204. Kollontai, "Issledovanie", p. 139.

205. Kim, Ot Natsional'nogo, p. 170.

206. A.V. Kiva, Strany Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii: osnovnye tendentsii razvitiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1978, pp. 46, 47, 74-81; G. Mirsky, in "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie: nekotorye voprosy differentsiatsii", AAS, 1978, no. 6, p. 32. As Hough, pp. 168-9, has noted, Simoniya disagreed in no uncertain terms with this positive evaluation of the more backward states of 'socialist orientation'. Kiva, in "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie", p. 32, essentially agreed with Mirsky, though he said it was possible to speak "only about elements, features, indications of a popular-democratic revolution" in countries such as Angola and South Yemen.

207. Kiva, Strany Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii, p. 62, 29, 78. Kiva's analysis of the stages and tendencies of 'socialist orientation' was reprinted in K.N. Brutents, An.A. Gromyko, A.V. Kiva et. al., Sotsialisticheskaia Orientatsiia Osvobodivshikhsia Stran: nekotorye voprosy teorii i praktiki, Mysl', Moscow, 1982, pp. 141-56. Although there is no note in this book about who wrote which parts of it, that is not difficult to work out, since most of it simply reprints old material within a new cover. The first part, pp. 8-40, about "conceptions of socialist orientation" is largely scholastic and clearly the work of Kim; the second, pp. 41-77, about the "conditions" of entering the path of 'socialist orientation' is Mirsky's moderate re-evaluation, concentrating particularly on the Egyptian experience; the third, pp. 78-103, is taken from Primakov's book about the fall of the colonial system published in the same year; the fourth, pp. 104-140, about the problems of 'revolutionary democracy' is by Brutents; the fifth on "some peculiarities of socialist orientation" is by Kiva; the sixth and longest part, pp. 157-232, on economic policy is by two less prominent authors, G.V. Smirnov and V.F. Stanis; the seventh, pp. 233-54, is an uncritical account of foreign policy by Gromyko; the eighth, pp. 255-91, is by G.B. Starushenko, a proponent of 'socialist orientation' from the Africa Institute who, in Sotsialisticheskaia orientatsiia v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh, Politizdat, Moscow, 1977, p. 36 and inside cover, had even classified Peru as such a state; and the conclusion, pp. 292-304, is by Ul'ianovsky, who, p. 299, said "it is necessary to recognise that the countries of socialist orientation as a whole have still not been able to display all the superiorities of their methods of economic management over the methods of the countries of capitalist development. For this has passed still too short a period of time."


211. Kollontai, "Issledovanie", p. 139.


213. Cf. the optimism about "profound progressive changes" in the third world in XXV s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: stenograficheskii otchet, volume 1, Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, p. 35, with a recognition of "complex conditions" in states of 'socialist orientation' in XXVI s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: stenograficheskii otchet, volume 1, Politizdat, Moscow, 1981, p. 29.

214. Novopashin, "Vozdeistvie real'nogo sotsializma", pp. 8, 12, 13-14. Novopashin, p. 5, quoted from the speech at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 of the 'General Secretary of the Puerto Rican Communist Party Kh. Batista Peres, who emphasised that 'the very existence and might of the Soviet Union, and also the whole socialist community, presents itself today as the surest guarantee that peace, freedom and social progress will be secured', perhaps as an ironic way of pointing out the marginality of the USSR's ideological influence in the world then. Cf. Yu.S.
Novopashin, "Problemy teorii i praktiki razvitiiia sotsialisticheskogo sotrudnichestva", in idem. ed., Mezdunarodnaia sfera sotsialisticheskikh obshchestvennykh otnoshenii, Institut Ekonomiki Mirovoi Sotsialisticheskoi Sistemy, Moscow, 1986, pp. 15-6: "there is still a strong tendency to consider contradictions of the socialist world as something painful and transient, a kind of thing that would not exist if we didn't yield in policy for one iota from Marxist-Leninist principles and foresaw all the troubles of social development. Evidently, this is connected with the appearance sometimes of an aspiration - if the matter concerns contradictions of socialism not in a habitual, non-commital abstract-theoretical form, but in a concrete political form - to speak about them only confidentially, behind the tightly closed doors of the offices of different officials, assured of the invincibility of their 'guiding directions'. In reality it is still often the case that attempts to 'solve' social, and particularly international, contradictions with administrative measures bring, as a rule, little benefit, not resolving in reality one or another contradiction, but deepening it."

215. A.P. Butenko, "Nekotorye teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoi ekonomikoi", NAA, 1982, no. 5, pp. 70-9, especially p. 75. This article summarises Butenko's 1983 book, which is discussed in chapter five.


217. In "Revolutsiia i reforma v natsional'nom razvitii stran Vostoka", AAS, 1985, no. 9, p. 28.

218. Z.Sh. Gafurov, Natsional'no-Demokracheskaia Revoliutsiia: zashchita zavoevanii, Nauka, Moscow, 1987, pp. 275-9, where the author emphasises the importance of "international relative and absolute guarantees" of 'socialist orientation' in order to "strengthen [its] superstructure, and in the first place its military part", so that pressures of backwardness do not force a return to the capitalist path. Gafurov, p. 99, clearly distinguishes between countries like Syria, Algeria and Iraq, where "not a socialist, but a state capitalist system is gradually being created" and genuine countries of 'socialist orientation' like Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, which in an earlier book, Z.Sh. Gafurov, Natsional'no-Demokracheskaia Revoliutsiia i Armiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p.53, he had said "might be called countries of scientific-socialist orientation". He clearly supported continuing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, so the marginality of his view in the general debate is significant. For the recent view of "Honoured Scientist of the RSFSR" and "Professor", but not Academician or even Corresponding Member, R.A. Ul'ianovsky see idem. ed., Politicheskie Sistemy v Stranakh Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii, Nauka, Moscow, 1985, p. 6; and idem., "Aktual'nye problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia i sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii",NAA, 1986, no. 6, p. 12.

219. Maidanik ed., Razvivaushchiesia Strany: puti revoliutsionnogo protsessa, p. 372, n. 35. The two other editors listed for this book, Aleksandr Bovin and Ernest Obminsky are liberals not left radicals (cf. Hough, pp. 99, 222), whose role in the book's production seems to have been minor.

220. Ibid., pp. 30-2, 13, 325, 34-5, 313-6.

221. Ibid., pp. 41, 37, 36.

222. Ibid., pp. 26-7, 29, 305; cf. p. 47.

223. Ibid., pp. 41, 17, 320, 334, 335.


225. Ibid., pp. 321, 320, 168, 166, 156.


229. R.M. Avakov, "Novoe myshlenie i problema izucheniiia razvivaiushchikhsia stran", MEMO, 1987, no. 11, pp. 52-6. Cf. V.L. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchesia strany i novoe politicheskoie myshlenie", RKSM, 1987, no. 4, p. 81: "The logic according to which Laos is a socialist country and Kampuchea a developing one is indeed quite inconceivable."

230. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Progress, Moscow, 1960, p. 27.

231. Sheinis, loc. cit., pp. 79-80, 82.


236. Ibid., pp. 22-6.

237. M.A. Cheshkov, "Rost kapitalizma i obshchaia teoriia razvivaiushchegosia mira", NAA, 1988, no. 4, p. 150. While Cheshkov, pp. 153-4, notes the key role of Strany Vostoka in replacing the 1960s "stress on the prospectiveness of non-capitalist development" with "the idea of unilinear formationity in its capitalist variants", his suggestion, pp. 150-1, of renewed Soviet scepticism in the early 1980s about peripheral capitalist development seems a little ingenious.


240. "Sotsialisticheskaia orientatsia: osmyslenie teorii i praktiki", AAS, 1988, no. 10, pp. 18-9. N.Simoniya, "Chestno vesti nauchnuiu diskussiiu!", AAS, 1988, no. 6, pp. 17-18. Noting, p. 16, that "the euphoria and illusions of the 1960s and part of the 1970s" about 'socialist orientation' had "largely expired", Simoniya quoted the Pravda editorial dismissing Nina Andreeva against Kaufman and Ul'ianovsky, stressed that he was not sceptical of the existence of 'socialist orientation', but claimed that his view about its limited scope had been "completely confirmed by the practice of the past 13 years".


243. A.A. Sterbalova, "Nekapitalisticheskoe razvitie: gorizonty i tupiki", RKSM, 1988, no. 2, pp. 141-1, 140, 134. Sterbalova's "new approach" was endorsed by Mirsky, "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiia v 'tret'iem mire'", p. 118, who concluded his article, pp. 128-9, by arguing that the decline of 'socialist orientation' was not a cause for pessimism, since it lessened the risk of Soviet involvement in the third world leading to a confrontation with the United States. A recent article by Paul Bellis, "The Non-Capitalist Road and Soviet Development Theory: a critique of some recent accounts", Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, September 1988, conveniently ignores Mirsky's endorsement of Simoniya against Ul'ianovsky, reflecting a desire to demonstrate at all costs what Bellis, p. 271, superciliously calls "the confusion that characterises Hough's entire account of Soviet views on the non-capitalist road". Because of an anachronistic distinction between 'permanentist' and 'stagist' views of 'non-capitalist development', which is not related to Soviet policy objectives, Bellis claims, p. 264, that Mirsky and Ul'ianovsky have consistently had "diametrically opposed conceptions" of 'socialist orientation' and, pp. 271, 275-6, that Simoniya's view has not been widely endorsed. The first claim is belied by Andreasian's 1974 article, as well as Ul'ianovskaya's attack on Mirsky for changing his mind, while the second is belied by Vasil'ev's 1986 article, which Bellis, p. 281, cites, as well as the observation of the editors of Azia i Afrika Segodnia, "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiia: osmyslenie", p. 19, that the dominance in the past of a "dogmatic approach to the theory of non-capitalist development" had "inevitably led to the fact that our action in the international arena was not always carefully balanced and thoughtful." Bellis' own 'confusion' is shown by his claim, pp. 269-70, that Simoniya's view is "located firmly within the stagist paradigm", the chief representative of which is Ul'ianovsky.
Chapter 4: The Prospects for Capitalism in the Third World

Abstract-theoretical models of a developing society were constructed in the '60s and '70s either by a method of the generalisation of direct observations, which drew close to the level of empirical generalisation (as, for example, the conception of multistructurality), or by a hypothetico-deductive method, starting from pre-given 'idealised' (mentally purified, or speculative) model-images and principles of a real process (the conception of dependent development), or by a combination of both these logical methods (the conception of transitionality). But all these approaches were too partial or, on the contrary, too general and a priori, in order to secure the necessary unity of empirical observations and theoretical constructions.


Evaluating the survivability of capitalism as a social formation has always been a topical task for Soviet scholars and officials, but new aspects of this question have arisen during the history of the USSR. In the mid and late 1920s debate focused on the prospects for 'capitalist stabilisation' in Western Europe and the United States. Bukharin argued forcefully that capitalism was more 'organised' than before the First World War, suggesting "it is by no means out of the question that in certain countries ... the productive forces of capitalism will grow with extraordinary rapidity."\(^1\) The alternative view, developed principally by Varga and adopted by Stalin, saw capitalism as increasingly "cramped in the framework of the present markets", with its 'stabilisation' becoming "more and more rotten and unstable".\(^2\) As Richard Day has demonstrated, this view was based theoretically on Rosa Luxemburg's idea that capitalist economic crises are caused by a shortage of external markets, rather than by growing disproportionalities of production within a business cycle, as Marx and Lenin had argued.\(^3\) Whereas the 'classics' foresaw several increasingly serious crises of capitalism, Stalin asserted at the 15th CPSU (B) Congress in December 1927 that "the general and fundamental crisis of capitalism ... is becoming deeper and is shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism".\(^4\) Stalin's only brilliance was in the realm of organisational politics, not theory, as his differences with Trotsky and Bukharin showed. Like most dogmas, the 'general crisis of capitalism' originated as a clever but superficial exaggeration of events. While completely barren as a source of insight into the survivability of world capitalism, it helped stabilise Stalinism, by justifying breakneck industrialisation
and forced collectivisation. Having removed Bukharin from the party leadership, Stalin told the 16th CPSU (B) Congress in late June 1930 that the 'third period' of wars, revolutions and economic collapse had finally arrived for the capitalist world, which would not be saved by any amount of "venomous hissing about the necessity of punishing 'that country' that dares to develop its economy when crisis is reigning all around."5

With Stalin's consolidation of supreme authority in the early 1930s, Soviet discussion of the West largely degenerated into inane statements about capitalism's inevitable demise, and crude justifications for the Comintern's opportunist policies. The last substantial scholarly work on the subject, by Evgeny Preobrazhensky, was quickly dismissed in late 1931 as "Trotskyist contraband", with one reviewer asserting that his theory of the monopolistic business cycle contained a "social-fascist essence".6 Such crass commentary contributed to the Comintern's disastrous strategy in Germany, where the Nazis were considered a 'lesser evil' than the Social Democrats, since the latter were seen as representing the only possible bourgeois solution to the economic crisis, in the form of 'organised capitalism'.7 This tragic episode showed clearly the level of ignorance to which Soviet political economy had swiftly sunk. Only Varga and a few colleagues continued to publish serious assessments of the prospects for capitalist recovery. Ironically, after prevaricating during the 1930s, Varga ended the decade by suggesting, like Keynes, that the capitalist state could alleviate the 'problem of markets' through investment in non-productive employment such as armament construction.8 After the war, Varga emphasised the positive implications of his new theory of 'organised capitalism', arguing that planning economic reconstruction had become a central political question in Western Europe.9 But Stalin, in the context of an intensifying Cold War and his need to renew strict ideological control, rejected this perspective as 'revisionist'. In 1952 he asserted that capitalism's 'problem of markets' had worsened because it had lost control over Eastern Europe and China; capitalism's 'general crisis' had now reached its 'second stage', in which, he proudly claimed, "their industries will be operating more and more below capacity."10 In substance, this view simply repeated the old orthodoxy of twenty years before, which Varga had
then supported. Evaluations of capitalism remained subordinate to ideological justifications of the supposedly superior character of Soviet society. Neither 'planning' nor 'progress' could be said to exist in any form in the capitalist West or the developing world, since these features were officially required to serve as marks distinguishing the USSR and its allies from the 'non-socialist world'.

In the mid and late 1950s differences reappeared amongst Soviet scholars about the nature of the business cycle in developed capitalist countries, but the overall perspective regarding capitalism's longstanding 'general crisis' was not revised. Indeed, at a meeting of loyal communists in 1960 it was announced that the 'third stage' of this prolonged crisis had already begun, though all concerned recognised that "new links of the imperialist chain have still not fallen." This proclamation of another 'deepening' of capitalism's 'general crisis' resembled Stalin's edicts on the subject in concentrating on the apparent success of the USSR rather than the contradictions of contemporary commodity production. But, whereas Stalin's supporters in the 1930s could point to the Great Depression as evidence of capitalism's collapse, the next generation of Soviet propagandists could only suggest that the fall of the colonial system would lead to a further "intensification of the problem of markets for capitalism." This idea was hardly new, having been argued by Stalin and Varga in the mid 1920s debate about appropriate Comintern strategy toward the Chinese revolution. Since it was disproven in practice then, its repetition three and a half decades later only testifies to the destruction of Soviet theory in the interim and the USSR's continuing need for some anti-capitalist legitimation. In the early Khrushchev period, the fact of capitalist 'stabilisation' in the heartlands of Europe was downplayed by focusing instead on the crisis of colonialism, a change of perspective which reflected the Soviet search for new allies in the South. Many Soviet scholars retained Varga's 1925 view that "it appears as if the fate of world capitalism is going to be decided in Asia", because they saw the world capitalist economy as a consequence, not a cause, of the colonial division of the world. The struggle for economic independence and the development of heavy industry in countries like India and Indonesia was viewed as "the strongest strike [yet] on the whole capitalist system of the world economy." Since it was
considered "impossible to suggest" that Western monopolies might assist the industrialisation of underdeveloped countries, the prospects for capitalist development in the third world seemed slight. Even scholars who would subsequently become champions of the market, like Nikolai Shmelev, argued at this time that "the development of the state sector facilitates the creation of a many-sided industrial complex, which is necessary for the resolution of the basic national-economic problems of backward countries."21

By the mid 1960s, many Soviet scholars had discarded their previous assumption that capitalism would be crippled by its loss of colonies as wishful thinking. As Hough has shown, from 1963 onwards a number of intelligent scholars argued that Western investment now facilitated rather than prevented economic development in third world countries, and that nationalisation or a disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry would produce economic problems rather than achieve independence. Optimism about the general relevance of the state-directed, 'administrative' form of industrialisation undertaken by the USSR soon gave way to a recognition of the great variety of economic strategies appropriate to particular national conditions. Vladimir Kollontai even suggested in 1964 that the term 'underdeveloped countries' was no longer valid, because it obscured the "unevenness in both political and economic development" which characterised different groups of countries in the third world. This suggestion was rejected then by both Viktor Rymalov and Ul'ianovsky, who argued that all the countries concerned were still backward in world terms and still "really have common regularities of development." Thus began a long debate about whether the third world still existed as a common group of countries, or whether it had been 'differentiated' into several qualitatively distinct groups.

A key question which now arose was the extent of capitalist development that the metropolitan powers could foster in their former colonies. The first speaker at a major conference in 1965 argued that:

One should not underestimate tendencies of capitalist development in countries of the 'third world', which exist together with tendencies of the non-capitalist
path of development. Imperialism is still strong enough to support these [capitalist] tendencies from outside. ... Contemporary neocolonialism cannot but strive for the development of capitalism by a path of reform from above. This matter concerns not only the economic interests of imperialism. The metropoles, as experience shows, can economically exist without colonies. ... But capitalism as a whole, as a world system, cannot maintain itself without attempts to retain its supremacy over the 'third world'. And the imperialists understand this very well. For them this is a question of the extended reproduction of capitalist relations. This is a question not only of economics but also of politics.\textsuperscript{26}

The extent of this change in the nature of imperialism was subject to different evaluations. Tiagunenko saw Western 'aid' as merely the export of capital in a new guise, while Lev Stepanov (who also supported the theory of 'unequivalent exchange' between third world countries and developed capitalist states) considered it a new, political phenomenon which arose because of the challenge to capitalism presented by cheap Soviet aid.\textsuperscript{27} But no Soviet scholar was yet able to assess the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the periphery. This had to await the development of a new theoretical debate about the historical situation of the third world, which began to unfold in Soviet oriental studies from the late 1960s.

Soviet scholarly debate about the third world has been more fruitful in the past two decades than Soviet discussion of the West. Whereas discussion about changes in Western capitalism had to proceed through the tortuous path of providing new meaning to the old concept of 'state-monopoly capitalism', debate about the prospects for capitalist development in the third world began with attempts to establish new conceptions of the common features uniting post-colonial societies on the periphery of world capitalism.\textsuperscript{28} Since the established orthodoxy about capitalism's need for colonies had been fully undermined by events, the ensuing debate here was quite open and substantial. A new Soviet theory about the evolution of the third world was clearly required, and a number of younger scholars were eager to elaborate it in a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal way. Reflecting the still enthusiastic spirit of many Soviet intellectuals at this time, Lukin polemicised in 1969 against those who had adopted a "technocratic" approach to the problems of development, and called
attention to the "advantages of a really scientific, theoretical, Marxist method of analysis over a pragmatic method." But resuscitating of the former method was more easily suggested than achieved, particularly when the increasing conservatism of the Brezhnev years encouraged some scholars, such as Lukin, to adapt their concerns little by little to the dominant Machiavellian tradition of Soviet politics. By the mid 1970s, the two leading institutes had affirmed different explanations of the third world's continuing backwardness, but neither the concept of 'multistructurality' (developed at IVAN) nor that of 'dependent development' (fostered at IMEMO) adequately answered the question of the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the periphery. While the differentiation of post-colonial societies into a variety of sub-groups then led some Soviet scholars to reject the possibility of a comprehensive theoretical approach in favour of an empiricist one, increasing emphasis on the peculiarities of capitalist development in the third world also became a feature of Soviet theoretical discussion from the late 1970s. Finally, the promise of a broader approach, espoused but not realised in the late 1960s, began to be fulfilled in the early 1980s, when some major works interpreting 'peripheral capitalism' in world-historical terms provided the focus for a new level of scholarly debate.

Sources of Backwardness and Economic Independence

In Soviet terms, the key problem facing post-colonial societies has been how to overcome backwardness and achieve some significant economic independence. Different Soviet conceptions of the 'commonality' of developing countries as a group of states apart from the 'two world systems' have constituted competing interpretations of the meaning of backwardness in the contemporary world. The primary issue of debate has been whether the main source of third world backwardness lies in the 'multistructural' domestic economies of developing countries, i.e. the existence of several contradictory structures of production within these countries, or in their 'dependent' position in the world capitalist economy. According to the latter view, overcoming backwardness and achieving economic independence are possible only by escaping from the confines of
capitalist exploitation along a 'non-capitalist path'. To the contrary, supporters of the former view argue that significant economic independence is attainable for less developed countries within the world capitalist economy, provided that they restructure their economies and make use of modern productive forces. These opposing positions, which crystallised in the early 1970s, have clearly divergent implications for Soviet foreign policy, but their significance as theoretical reference points extends beyond the narrow world of diplomacy. Soviet debate about the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the third world has raised broader questions, such as the role of the state in economic development and the different historical trajectories of Europe and the Orient. Indeed, the generally higher quality of Soviet writing about peripheral capitalism than about 'socialist orientation' is partly a consequence of the impossibility of limiting discussion of the former subject merely to what satisfies the current interests of the USSR.

During the 1960s, Soviet scholars classified developing countries principally in terms of "their activity in the anti-imperialist struggle", even when considering this not simply as a reaction against economic dependence and poverty. Toward the end of the decade debate focused on the implications of what Stepanov termed "indications of an 'ascending movement' of capitalism in the third world." Two scholars from IVAN, Aleksandrov and Simoniya, criticised their counterparts at IMEMO for arguing in an "emotional" way that independence from imperialism was attainable only on the 'non-capitalist path'. They claimed that countries like India, which was achieving "serious successes" in "resolving the problem of economic self-sufficiency", were just as independent economically from the West as Egypt, Burma or Syria, and hence just as reliable in the future as loose but stable Soviet allies. Significantly, both these views were incorporated in Tiul'panov's 1969 textbook, and in Ul'ianovsky's book published in 1972. This juxtaposition of conflicting opinions confirms Stephen Clarkson's comment that Soviet discussion of the third world constituted "a school without a theory ... leading in divergent directions" at once. But this situation did not last. Even with the "repeated transfer of particular countries from one path to the other" which Tiul'panov noted, his eclectic combination of three tendencies of development (increasing dependence upon imperialism;
accelerated growth of national capitalism; and the 'non-capitalist path') was soon regarded by leading Soviet scholars as inadequate.\(^{37}\)

Tiul'panov's emphasis on a "vicious circle" of third world dependence and economic backwardness, which could be broken only by a "weakening of the position of the imperialist states on the world arena", was elaborated by scholars at IMEMO in their concept of 'dependent development'.\(^{38}\) Against this view, some economists like Shmelev and Sheinis focused, together with Simoniya, on Tiul'panov's observation that "the prevailing tendency in the economic development of the liberated countries remains a movement along the capitalist path and the establishment of the capitalist mode of production."\(^{39}\) They assumed that, precisely because of the third world's backwardness compared to the West, the main task for the former was "of necessity to catch-up" with the latter, and suggested that some developing countries were already closer in their "level of development" to some developed capitalist countries than to other parts of the third world.\(^{40}\) Both these views were rejected by Levkovsky and his supporters at IVAN, who developed Tiul'panov's general proposition that "movement from an existing multistructural economy toward socialism and toward capitalism has in many respects a series of analogical manifestations, and proceeds through the same intermediate points." Levkovsky was more cautious than Tiul'panov in asserting the "objectively anti-imperialist" nature of the state sector throughout the third world, but he agreed that with this progressive foundation even foreign capital could serve as "one of the means for overcoming economic backwardness and dependence."\(^{41}\) This proposition was accepted by those who focused on the rise of capitalism in the periphery, but not by exponents of dependency theory. While Levkovsky was sceptical about the prospects for capitalist leaps forward out of third world backwardness, he supported Tiul'panov's general conclusion about the importance of "market criteria in all sectors, including the state economy", and thus opposed the dominant IMEMO view more than the marginal liberal view outlined by Simoniya and Sheinis.\(^{42}\)

In the early 1970s, the theories of multistructurality and dependent development competed to fill a large conceptual gap in concerning the specific
features of the third world. This task was urgent, because a mass of empirical material had been collected by the mid 1960s, but the abstract categories essential for analysing this data were noticeably lacking. As Landa pointed out in 1971, it was not possible to deduce such categories from the "general regularities of world development", or from conditions "existing in the countries of developed capitalism." Phenomena typical of the third world, such as the persistence of "traditional forms of relations between people" and the "particular complexity of the influence of economics upon politics", needed to be understood in their own context, so as to "allow one to correctly evaluate the prospects for social progress in the Orient." In other words, a 'middle-level' or 'regional' theory of the third world was required. This need was stated directly in the second paragraph of IMEMO's 1974 book on the developing countries, which, reviewing the extent of recent changes in the third world, noted the "necessity of a more profound analysis of these changes in a period when new processes have more or less 'established themselves' and the tendencies of further social development have been defined more distinctly." The clearer and apparently stable nature of common features of development in post-colonial societies at this time was a significant factor in the emergence of competing Soviet theories of the third world. As Igor Sledzevsky has reported in retrospect, these theories "began to form in a period of the undebatable predominance of features of similarity and kinship in the sphere of reproduction and development amongst peripheral societies of world capitalism over features of their differentiation, when centripetal processes were clearly stronger than centrifugal processes." This circumstance contributed to a certain resistance of the theories of multistructurality and dependent development to conceptual revision, once they had taken shape.

The idea of multistructurality as the key to understanding the peculiarities of the third world did not arise in a social vacuum. Significantly, the first extensive conceptualisation of the third world as multistructural was made by a scholar from Poland, the country of the Soviet bloc with the most heterogeneous socio-economic structure. Jerzy Kleer suggested that out of eight economic structures existing in the third world only two were capitalist (one national and
one foreign), and claimed that only in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were these structures likely to subjugate petty-commodity and other pre-capitalist structures to the extent necessary for expanded reproduction in the form of the capitalist mode of production. He thought that elsewhere a multistructural economy would remain for a long time "one of the basic objective obstacles on the path of a quick transition of third world countries to industrial civilisation", and concluded that as a whole these countries formed an "intermediate system" in the modern world, characterised by a "strengthening of elements of neutralism" and efforts to "maintain a mixed type of economy." Reviewing the Polish edition of Kleer's book, Mirsky questioned whether neutralism necessarily resulted from a multistructural economy, but noted that countries on the 'non-capitalist path' faced the same difficulties of overcoming backwardness as other parts of the third world. The implication of this, that multistructurality could not be overcome by political force, would have been clear to those Soviet scholars who in the mid 1960s were showing a "growing interest" in the question of historical transition periods between socio-economic formations. Maksimenko has pointed out that "the conception of the developing countries' multistructurality, being elaborated in the numerous works of A.I. Levkovsky, arose in the course of the wide academic discussions of 1964-1968, including the discussions about pre-capitalist formations and about the 'asiatic mode of production'. The basis of Levkovsky's theory of multistructurality, which in many respects resembled the conception outlined by Kleer, was the idea that post-colonial societies were in a "transitional state", which Levkovsky termed "an inter-formational stage of social development." By defining the key feature of the third world as "persistent multistructurality", Levkovsky emphasised both the long duration and complexity of a "transitional society", and contributed to a regeneration of serious historical theorising within the Soviet intelligentsia, pioneered in the 1960s by anti-Stalinist scholars like Gefter and Gurevich.

The concept of multistructurality appealed particularly to scholars interested in classifying the variety of domestic economic relations existing in the third world. This topic was sufficiently new in Soviet oriental studies for Levkovsky to suggest a key change of terminology. He pointed out that the current term for
the former colonies -- the 'developing countries' -- was taken from the West and failed to distinguish this part of the globe according to the same criterion (relations of production) that distinguished the 'two world systems'. He argued that classifying regimes according to their productive forces would not disclose their class nature, and remarked that in terms of economic growth the former colonies were "still very slowly developing countries." Once the existence of several contradictory economic structures in the third world was recognised, another, albeit more complex and transitory 'world system' emerged: "states are divided, if we apply a single criterion, into capitalist, socialist and multistructural." This general classification was used in the 1974 IVAN collective work, particularly in its first section on problems of socio-economic development, although when speaking outside his institute Levkovsky reverted to using the term 'developing countries', despite having argued that it was merely a "variant" of the inadmissible division of the world into 'rich' and 'poor' states.

Whereas Kleer had seen local capitalism in developing countries as a single structure, Levkovsky emphasised the "fragmentation of capitalism" into competing economic, and hence political, structures as the principal peculiarity of third world multistructurality. The conservative, retarding effect of merchant capital during colonialism was widely recognised, but Levkovsky focused on a "differentiation of the bourgeoisie" within multistructural countries after the attainment of political independence. He particularly stressed the importance of the petty bourgeoisie, which he viewed as possessing "in the overwhelming majority of countries an enormous potential for development", capable of leading a class coalition against the national bourgeoisie as well as against foreign capital. While noting that the "concentration of production and capital" in the developed capitalist structure of the third world was often "very high", he argued that only a small proportion of the population worked in these "capitalist 'skyscrapers'", which still depended to a significant degree on surrounding, backward structures of production. In Levkovsky's view, this national capitalist structure (which he termed "developed capitalist enterprise") had strengthened its position in the post-colonial period, but it remained too weak to overcome multistructurality and transform itself into a capitalist mode of production. In the countryside there
was little prospect of petty proprietors growing into capitalist farmers, while in the cities modern industry was concentrated in the state sector and flanked by a multitude of small traders and "pre-industrial" enterprises. Moreover, the "state-capitalist structure", which formed the basis of third world countries' struggle for economic independence, tended to be used by competing private capitalist interests against each other, particularly by the petty bourgeoisie to restrict developed capitalist enterprise. Here, in the struggle "within the bourgeoisie" over the variants of capitalist development, Levkovsky discerned "the boundaries of capitalism in the transitional society of the 'third world'". He suggested that the state-capitalist structure was like the proverbial genie which, once enlivened as an instrument for other structures, would seek an "independent existence for itself" at the expense of local (as well as foreign) developed capitalist enterprise. He concluded that "the paradox of the socio-economic development of a multistructural economy consists in the fact that it itself, in particular under the influence of the specific development of capitalism, inevitably raises, especially in moments of social crises, the problem of the earnest restraining or even liquidation of a certain capitalist structure."

One key implication of the concept of multistructurality was to downplay the significance of proclaimed foreign policy orientation in classifying third world countries. Levkovsky pointed out that there was no simple way for multistructural countries to achieve economic self-sufficiency, since their backwardness resulted principally from contradictory domestic structures of production, which could not be integrated into a system of expanded reproduction by decree. He argued that, in order to survive in the short-term, even the most radical regimes would be forced to pursue a flexible and careful policy in relation to foreign and national capitalist enterprise. To stress this, Levkovsky quoted Lenin's suggestion that, compared to pre-capitalist relations of production, capitalist enterprise was an advancement which should be controlled but could not be eliminated. The international significance of this point was noted in a review article on the 1974 IVAN collective work, which formulated "one of the central ideas of the whole work" as follows:
Liberation from exploitation and onesided dependence, and economic and social progress in the countries of the Orient may be attained not by the path of a rupture of their ties with the world capitalist economy, but by a consistent and flexible strategy aimed at changing the character of these relations.64

This assessment of the crucial importance of the international division of labour for each and every country was expressed most clearly in the chapters of the IVAN work written by Simoniya. While reaching broadly similar conclusions about economic independence to Levkovsky, Simoniya did not accept his theses about 'persistent multistructurality' and the limited prospects for capitalism in the third world. As the introduction to the work proudly explained, since 'even within the authors' collective there is no full agreement about some essential questions (for example, about the character of multistructurality ... )', it was thought better to "retain in the book the existing points of view", rather than subject them to "editorial 'levelling', which would have meant either their loss from the text or the 'imposition' of the opinion of some upon others."65

Simoniya distinguished between pursuing an "independent economic policy", which politically annulled a situation of imperialist "economic discrimination" (*neravnopravie*), and achieving "economic self-sufficiency", which defined a state that, by means of accelerated economic growth and increased labour productivity, had overcome an objective "economic inequality" (*neravenstvo*) formed during a previous historical epoch.66 He suggested that, while for "the majority" of third world countries, of both orientations, there had "opened a real possibility already now to pursue an independent economic policy, using it as a mighty lever for attaining economic self-sufficiency", if such a policy ignored "objective regularities of economic development" (as in Indonesia in 1957-1963) it would result in "a general disorganisation of the national economy."67 He stressed that attaining economic self-sufficiency, in contrast to simply pursuing an independent economic policy, "demands a very prolonged historical period" and "the participation of economically underdeveloped countries in the international division of labour, in particular with highly-developed capitalist countries".68 His conclusion that the "process of the internationalisation of the world economy" was "irresistible" no doubt reflected a reading of Soviet history, since he emphasised that the general demands of economic self-sufficiency were similar
for all countries, though realisable in different forms. As Hough has noted, Simoniya was particularly concerned to dispel the illusion that 'socialist orientation' constituted a short-cut to economic development for third world countries. In this respect, Simoniya's view was similar to Levkovsky's in bothering to address the "contradictoriness" of post-colonial socio-economic structures. But, whereas Levkovsky viewed 'persistent multistructurality' as the main obstacle to economic growth, Simoniya saw this obstacle as an unavoidable "period of internal socio-political stabilisation and national consolidation." Pointing to the potential benefits of "reverse order' economic modernisation" for countries on the capitalist path, Simoniya suggested that, although now "quantitatively traditional structures still predominate in them", it is "entirely possible" that toward the end of the century they will "overcome their backwardness" and begin to attain economic self-sufficiency.

The relative influence in 1974 of the different views of Simoniya and Levkovsky about the prospects for national capitalist development in the third world can be judged from the conclusion to the IVAN collective work, nominally written by Kim. While Levkovsky's classification of contradictory economic structures was not summarised, two key implications of his analysis -- the "serious role" of the petty bourgeoisie and the "enormous significance" of class coalitions -- were fully recognised. In contrast, Simoniya's two key categories -- an independent economic policy and economic self-sufficiency -- were mixed up in an assessment implying that 'socialist orientation' remained, even with the "internationalisation" of economic life, the best "initiator" of the "struggle for the attainment of economic self-sufficiency". This formulation reflected the eclectic argument of the part of the work written by Li, who, partly upon the authority of Brutents, viewed capitalist development in the third world as largely dependent upon imperialist support. Brutents was nominally a member of the authors' collective for the 1974 IVAN work, but expressed his view fully in his book about national liberation revolutions published in the same year. He stressed the "deformed character" of 'colonial capitalism' in the third world, which had "arisen as it were 'from above'," as a result of the expansion of imperialism, "not as a result of the normal development and consistent change of
socio-economic forms, having their roots in the economic life of a given country, in local economic structures.\textsuperscript{77} He implicitly criticised one aspect of Levkovsky's theory by suggesting that "with the broadening of its economic functions the state sector has a tendency to step beyond the limits of state capitalism", but his rejection of Simoniya's view was more substantial.\textsuperscript{78} Brutents emphasised the weakness of the national bourgeoisie as one of the "unprecedented difficulties on the path of the development of capitalism" in the third world, and suggested that peripheral capitalism was undergoing a "narrowing of its social potential, especially as a factor of the creation of a national economy and the attainment of economic self-sufficiency."\textsuperscript{79} He claimed it was still correct to view capitalist development in the liberated countries as stimulated "largely and often primarily" by tendencies originating in the former metropoles, and said this "conditions the special, and to a significant degree dependent (and 'backward') character of capitalism" in the third world.\textsuperscript{80}

The idea that third world countries on the capitalist path were stuck in a continuing situation of 'dependent development' was the main thesis of the 1974 IMEMO collective work on the developing countries. As Hough has noted, leading scholars at IMEMO up-dated the crude dependency theory prevalent during the Stalin period by borrowing ideas from the Latin American dependencia school.\textsuperscript{81} Compared to Levkovsky's theory of multistructurality, the theory of dependent development elaborated at IMEMO was more orthodox in Soviet terms, and somewhat less original in terms of international debate about the character of third world capitalism. These features, together with the force of inter-institute rivalry, resulted in a paradoxical polarisation of Soviet debate in the mid 1970s between two views which stressed in different ways the limitations of peripheral capitalist development. Because of this common conclusion, which accorded with the view of Brutents, the difference of perspective between the proponents of 'multistructurality' and 'dependent development' may seem to have been of limited political significance. But the rhetoric of the 1974 IMEMO book suggests otherwise. Despite similar arguments about the "limited possibilities for a transformation of petty production into private capitalist elements," the IMEMO scholars clearly demarcated their own "global approach" from
Levkovksy's "narrow-country approach", which, they asserted, could not disclose the 'general tendencies of evolution' of third world countries, and reduced "regional peculiarities to a 'lowest common denominator'" of social development such as multistructurality. From their 'global' vantage-point, multistructurality was a derivative phenomenon, not a key determinant of post-colonial development. The IMEMO scholars interpreted multistructurality "as a deformed reflection of the development of the world capitalist economy ..., as a result of the involvement of countries with backward socio-economic relations in the system of world-wide economic and political ties." They agreed with Levkovsky about the "growing role of the state" in organising a multistructural economy, but focused on the "leading role of modern structures outside the 'third world' itself", which Levkovsky considered only of limited significance for understanding why developing countries remained backward.

The concept of dependent development highlighted a historical conflict between the "organic" and "spontaneous" emergence of capitalism in Europe and the "partial, sporadic character" of capitalist development in the third world. The basic idea was that the success of the former in creating a world capitalist economy had established a 'vertical' limit upon the type of capitalism which could now emerge in the rest of the world. While countries of the third world were 'horizontally' at different levels of economic development, they all remained backward compared to countries of state-monopoly capitalism, with "qualitatively different social structures" and substantially less developed productive forces. Relations between these two parts of the world capitalist system were "characterised by asymmetry" to such an extent that "the dependent countries receive the most important impulses of their development from outside; in the final analysis, changes in the productive, economic, social and superstructural spheres of these countries are conditioned by corresponding changes in the development of the metropole." The IMEMO scholars noted that the terms 'metropole' and 'periphery' were "relative" rather than precise, but proceeded to use them nevertheless. This terminology implied that no basic changes had occurred in the economic structures of the third world since the fall of colonialism, other than a deepening of the economic dependence of countries on
the capitalist path upon imperialism, as a result of the increasing gap in levels of production between these groups of countries. Indeed, the IMEMO scholars asserted that, given technological development in the West, even industrialisation in third world countries now "does not in itself lead to a weakening of relations of dependence. Only the forms of these relations change." According to IMEMO's 'global' viewpoint, third world backwardness was a consequence of these relations of dependence, and as such "a natural product of the basic tendencies of the capitalist system". Dependent development had "retarded the development of the productive forces in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", leading to an "inversion" of the material and social elements of the productive forces, with demand growing much faster than slowly changing systems of work. While leading IMEMO scholars like Tiagunenko noted an "increasing economic differentiation" occurring amongst developing countries, they thought that "even the most advanced of these countries will, in all probability, be characterised in the year 2000 as underdeveloped."

In contrast to the approaches of Levkovsky and Simoniya, the IMEMO view logically reinforced the "superstructural" distinction between third world countries developing on the capitalist and 'non-capitalist' paths. Notwithstanding different 'horizontal' levels and structures of development in the third world, the IMEMO scholars asserted that "in the final analysis all this variety of situations amount to two basic tendencies of development:" dependent for countries remaining within the world capitalist system, and independent for states of 'socialist orientation'. Thus, IMEMO's 'global' viewpoint subsumed the tendency of national capitalist development in the third world noted by Tiul'panov beneath his generalisation of dependence. Peripheral capitalism could expand in a state of dependent development, but only in backward forms. It would therefore remain a crisis-ridden type of society, continually engendering revolutionary protests in search of an anti-capitalist alternative. The IMEMO scholars concluded that in the third world "the capitalism having prospects to develop ... is primarily dependent, deformed, parasitical, and speculative-bureaucratic". Labelling this variant of post-colonial society "state capitalism", they used this term in a quite different sense from Levkovsky, to
refer to regimes which "easily collude with neocolonialism and fully provide for foreign exploiters." They considered a "cardinal contradiction" of dependent development to be that economic growth, which creates "potential possibilities for greater economic self-sufficiency," is "connected with the maintenance and widening of a variety of contacts with foreign state and monopoly capital", thus reproducing the dependence of third world countries upon imperialism. Such "dependent capitalist development" was most evident in Latin America, and the IMEMO scholars claimed it was "incontestible, that Latin America shows to Afro-Asian societies definite elements of their future" (they regarded India, which was Levkovsky's prototype for the third world, as "an exception rather than a rule"). The basic point about this future, according to the IMEMO book, was that "in current conditions the growth of national private capital does not reduce, but on the contrary increases its dependence" upon imperialism. The implication of this point for Soviet foreign policy was clear: even the most 'horizontally' developed states on the capitalist path such as Brazil would remain 'vertically' dependent upon Western capitalism for their economic development, and so (unlike anti-capitalist movements in these countries) could not become stable allies of the USSR in its geopolitical struggle with this system.

The main difference between the concepts of multistructurality and dependent development concerned the relative importance of internal and external factors in determining social change in the third world. A related difference concerned the time-scale of such change, particularly the likelihood of anti-imperialism 'growing-over' into anti-capitalism in the foreseeable future. Levkovsky's theory of multistructurality focused on domestic factors of development, and his definition of post-colonial societies as transitional in an epochal sense emphasised the long-term character of progressive change in the third world. In contrast, the 'global' viewpoint adopted at IMEMO highlighted external sources of change, and implied optimism about the prospects for anti-capitalist movements forcing concessions from imperialism in the short term. This difference of perspective is most evident in an article by Vladimir Krylov, the main Soviet initiator of the concept of dependent development, published in Voprosy filosofii in 1976. After repeating the 1974 IMEMO book's criticism of Levkovsky for ignoring the
question of the leading economic structure in the third world, Krylov proposed his own answer. Ironically, he also suggested that there was no leading structure within a particular developing country, but his reason was that "all the local structures ... present themselves as a dependent, subordinated complex of structures and as such cannot determine the formational type of a society." 103 According to Krylov, this complex (and hence the "main lines of the development of the whole 'third world'") is "formed by economic structures ruling elsewhere, by the correlation of their forces and the forms of their confrontation." 104 He distinguished between "the development of a society under the influence of capitalism from without (or a capitalist orientation in the development of peripheral societies) ... and the development in this society of a properly capitalist structure". 105 He argued that the "basic contradiction of 'dependent capitalist development'" consists in its lack of a solid domestic base, and stated the implications of this quite clearly:

The deciding factor here becomes, so to speak, the 'external aspect' of multistructurality, and precisely the heterogeneity of socio-historical orders in the most developed countries. The struggle of world systems henceforth determines the basic strategic paths of development of 'third world' countries, and new forms of peaceful competition in conditions of the relaxation of international tensions create possibilities earlier unforeseen for the evolution of backward countries in the direction of progress. 106

While Krylov, unlike Ul'ianovsky, did not criticise Levkovsky for underestimating capitalist development in the third world, his immediate recommendation for Soviet policy was similarly optimistic and adventurous. 107

Although IMEMO's 'global' view about the nature of peripheral capitalism was the most influential in Moscow in the mid 1970s, some scholars expressed doubts about it. When introducing a discussion in Leningrad, Tiul'panov remarked prophetically that "the IMEMO monograph somewhat underestimates the possibilities which imperialism still possesses [for fostering capitalist development] in a series of countries of the 'third world', despite the profound contradictions and enormous opposition which it meets here." 108 The main direct criticism of the concept of dependent development came from scholars at IVAN, firstly in a review article by Kiva. He explicitly criticised the IMEMO
book’s basic assumption "that any development on the path of capitalism is dependent development" by pointing again to countries like India, "which are proceeding on the capitalist path but at the same time pursue an independent foreign policy course". Kiva argued that the existence of "economic and scientific-technical backwardness" in the developing countries is not itself an indication of their continuing dependence upon imperialism, since in this case Portugal, Spain and Ireland would have to be considered countries of "dependent development" as well. Moreover, writing when the energy crisis was affecting the capitalist world after the oil price rise of 1973-1974, he pointed to the "reciprocal dependence of the countries of developed capitalism on the supply of raw materials from the developing countries." In this context, Kiva claimed that:

the aspiration toward full independence immanently exists in every liberated country irrespective of its social orientation, and the struggle for its attainment (of course, with different degrees of consistency) is led by a wide bloc of socio-political forces, from the proletariat to the national (including the large) bourgeoisie. In the current conditions of the correlation of forces in the world this struggle has big chances of success.

This view was also optimistic, but about the prospects for national capitalism rather than the chances of radical change. In response to IMEMO’s proposition about the growing dependence upon imperialism of developing countries on the capitalist path, Kiva identified "two tendencies" in struggle: on the one side, liberated countries' efforts to strengthen their political sovereignty, and, on the other, imperialist endeavours to undermine this by exploiting their "sharp need for capital and modern technique". He was sure that "the first tendency dominates: there is occurring a weakening of the dependence of 'third world' countries on the leading capitalist countries, and on world capitalism as a whole." For Soviet diplomacy, this meant that serious objective prospects existed for the USSR to improve substantially its relations with some countries on the capitalist path.

The issue of whether particular countries on the capitalist path could become loose but stable Soviet allies depended ultimately on the nature of their capitalist
development. If third world capitalism had strong domestic roots, then a new layer of 'inter-capitalist contradictions' would naturally develop. Kiva disagreed strongly with the IMEMO view that expansion of the state structure in developing countries signified a "crisis of peripheral capitalism' and the decay of private property", with a weak local capitalism requiring imperialist support in order to survive. He disputed the implication of this, that everything depends upon the political forces holding state power, since, the IMEMO book claimed, in the chaotic situation of the third world such power "appropriates for itself an incomparably greater independence than was the case in the countries of the classical path of the development of capitalism". Speaking about countries of capitalist orientation, Kiva suggested that private capital would use the state to establish its own dominance -- "as this occurred in Japan" -- and concluded that "before us there is not a unique phenomenon, not a special variant of socio-economic development, but one and the same capitalism, well-known in the West, the East or in any other region of the world." This view about the "natural-historical process of capitalist evolution in the countries of the Orient" was argued most forcefully by Simoniya, whose book Strany Vostoka presented in embryonic terms an alternative to the theories of multistructurality and dependent development. Simoniya did not at this time rebut the latter theory (since the IMEMO volume was published only when his book was in press), and was careful not to criticise Levkovsky by name, in the manner in which he dissected the views of Tiul'panov and others. Nonetheless, by questioning the "adherence of many orientalists to a one-sidedly modernised, or its mirror-opposite traditionalised, scheme" for understanding the contemporary third world, Simoniya implied that existing Soviet approaches to studying post-colonial societies were methodologically inadequate. The "illogicality" of the modernist (IMEMO) scheme consisted in applying the categories of a developed capitalist society to backward countries, and hence failing to notice that the weakness of the bourgeoisie as a class in the third world was "a natural not a specific" phenomenon. Meanwhile, Levkovsky's "traditionalist approach" ignored the effects of colonialism by falsely considering "'remnants' of traditional social structures" as the moving forces of contemporary, post-colonial societies. Neither scheme abstracted the "essence" of third world
development, which Simoniya viewed as first a colonial "synthesis of traditional and contemporary elements" and then the subsequent "processes of the modification of this synthesis ... into one or other modern forms." 121

Simoniya distinguished three phases of colonialism, and argued that the "main change" of the last phase "consists in the formation of a national capitalist structure." 122 He claimed this structure negates the "colonial character of the synthesis" established with the expansion of Western industrial capital during the second phase, and suggested that after independence the consolidation of local capitalism becomes the "leading tendency" determining the evolution of multistructurality in most third world countries. 123 His essential point was to define post-colonial societies as undergoing an "early-capitalist evolution" similar to that which occurred in Europe before the industrial revolution. 124 Whereas Levkovsky's view implied that developing countries would remain predominantly pre-capitalist for a long time, and IMEMO's that they were already as capitalist as they could become, Simoniya suggested that much of the third world was on the threshold of independent capitalist development. 125 Methodologically, he criticised the "conception of an absolute opposition of the Orient to the West, denying the fact of the capitalist evolution of the former" just because substantial "non-economic compulsion" in developing countries did not correspond to an "organic, integral model of a capitalist society". Pointing out that, as Marx had emphasised, establishment of the capitalist mode of production in Europe was due in no small measure to non-economic compulsion, he concluded that the specificity of the third world "should be found in the peculiarities and variability of the establishment of capitalism, not in a more or less full negation of this very process." 126 Simoniya suggested that "ignoring the real tendency of capitalist development in the countries of the Orient" had been facilitated by "the circumstance that the germs and first shoots of local capitalism quite often appear in old traditional forms"; he implicitly criticised Levkovsky for seeing small-scale capitalist enterprise as an independent structure of production rather than an element of either the private or state capitalist structures. 127 He also criticised Cheshkov's idea that local capitalism in the third world was a "dependent" product of modern state-monopoly capitalism, arguing instead that it
had derived "from the backward, 'black-hundreds--octoberist' form of metropolitan capital" dominant during the era of colonialism. Simoniya thought such backward forms of capital (which, he agreed, could not transform the social structures of colonial countries) had been superceded by modern national and international forms of capital which could re-make the traditional structures of the third world in their own image.

The Uneven Growth of National Capitalism

Ironically, during the second half of the 1970s the concepts of multistructurality and dependent development had to adapt to an "unforeseen" change in the character of the third world -- strengthening processes of socio-economic differentiation amongst post-colonial societies, particularly those oriented toward capitalism. The phenomena which came in the West to be called "the end of the third world" were noticed quite early by some leading Soviet orientalists. As Sledzevsky has pointed out, Soviet theories about the commonality of the third world had "hardly arisen" when they "confronted the problem of the further maintenance of their object as something integral." At a conference in March 1975 Simoniya emphasised that it is incorrect to speak about some 'united Orient.' Of course, all countries of the Orient as a whole lag socio-economically from developed capitalist countries of the West. But their commonality ends with this. The internal social structure of the countries of the Orient is distinguished by significant multiformity, so that it is a question not about specifics in the limits of homogeneous structures, but about fundamental differences.

Simoniya suggested that insufficient attention had been given to "Bonapartist forms of rule", which endeavoured simultaneously "to resolve tasks, in their essence relating to different historical epochs". His general comments implied that the dominant Soviet conceptions of dependent development and multistructurality needed re-defining, but this was easier said than done. Sledzevsky has shown that the various attempts by Soviet scholars to perfect these conceptions led to logical contradictions, particularly concerning the problem of
whether 'peripheral capitalism' could develop in different forms.\textsuperscript{135} He has also suggested that increasing differentiation amongst third world states "created the objective conditions for the manifestation of an empirical typology of developing countries", worked out by scholars of an 'anti-theoretical' persuasion who considered a "quantitative analysis of the degree of commonality and differentiation of these states" as the key to understanding the prospects for capitalist development in them.\textsuperscript{136} The next two sections will endeavour to chart the emergence of what Sledzevsky has called a "crisis of the theory of the developing world", first by reviewing the continuing Soviet debate about economic independence, and second by looking at the discussion of state capitalism in the third world.\textsuperscript{137}

Both the political influence and theoretical weakness of the concept of dependent development derived from its simplicity, resembling in a more sophisticated form the original dogma of capitalism's steadily worsening 'general crisis'. A view which had empirical accuracy for particular countries at the time -- such as Argentina and Chile -- was generalised to define the situation of all third world countries. This method would have convinced many senior Soviet foreign policy officials, who, as a result of the practice of 'stability of cadres', were naturally averse to more novel ideas like the implications of multistructurality or Simoniya's concept of a historically changing synthesis. Tiagunenko firmly maintained the authority of IMEMO's 'global approach' in his last work, rejecting "opinions in which the commonality of the developing countries' problems is questioned" as examples of "the danger of an absolutisation of specific features of separate countries and regions." He asserted that the basic dilemma for third world leaders remained: "either a development of capitalism with the attraction of foreign capital in every possible way, and consequently increasing dependence upon imperialism, or an active struggle for economic independence against the force of imperialism in the economy, which means against capitalism." But, in an afterword to this posthumously published book, his colleagues questioned whether this "differentiation of developing countries in relation to the two world systems" was still more important than "an increasing divergence of developing countries within the capitalist economic system."\textsuperscript{138}
While the theory of dependent development held sway in official circles at least until the end of the 1970s, amongst the scholarly community, and particularly at IMEMO, it was increasingly on the defensive.

Already in 1973 Pavel Khvoinik, an economist at IMEMO, had presented figures to show "convincingly" that the demand from imperialist countries for third world resources had reduced during the past decade and would continue to do so. Sheinis claimed in 1974 that this "strategic" change in the character of neocolonialism had created new prospects for peripheral capitalist development, but the issue was so controversial that he relied on the authority of Avakov (Tiagunenko's deputy at IMEMO) to assert that "the very model of backwardness and dependence is changing" for countries on the capitalist path. Avakov's position was in fact more orthodox, as he made clear in his book published in 1976. Responding to Khvoinik, he argued that a quantitative "reduction in the scale of exchange [of resources] does not necessarily entail a weakening of dependence or a lessening of the interest" of imperialism in exploiting the developing countries, because acquiring a lesser quantity of resources from the third world after independence could be a "much more complex and hence no less important" matter for the West than colonial exploitation had been. Avakov re-affirmed that "strict limits" existed for peripheral capitalist development, and strongly re-asserted the main IMEMO thesis that "dependent development determined underdevelopment" from "outside", as a "direct, natural result of the establishment of world capitalism". The strict tone of these remarks suggests that Avakov was promptly rebuffing critics of the IMEMO book like Kiva, but he made some noteworthy concessions to the liberal IVAN view. He rejected autarky as a basis for attaining "scientific-technical self-sufficiency" and hence economic independence, and was lukewarm about the prospects of the 'non-capitalist path'. He even exposed the inconsistency between the 1974 IMEMO book's economic and political analyses, by stating that a "dependent type of development" is "peculiar to all developing countries irrespective of socio-political orientation". After suggesting that the OPEC price rise reflected only a "temporary tendency", not a basis for escaping from dependent development, he concluded by suggesting that the issue of the relative strength of
Kiva's 'two tendencies' "demands special investigations for countries and groups of countries", i.e. less of a 'global approach' than was usual at IMEMO.146

One such investigation of relations between African countries and the EEC, by Khristos Fundulis and Emel'ian Popov, argued extensively against the policy recommendations implicit in the concept of dependent development. As well as emphasising the "now widely recognised" point that foreign capital and aid "plays a positive role" in the economic development of the third world, they claimed that the past decade had seen a "transformation of the established system of neocolonial supremacy", as a result of "processes weakening the dominant role of the USA in the capitalist world."147 In an editorial footnote, Leonid Goncharov acknowledged that the section of the book concerning economic independence, written by Popov, was "published in the form of a discussion", meaning that his "polemic with other economists" was controversial.148 While Popov strongly attacked 'egalitarian' strategies of development like the conception of 'basic needs', his critique of the orthodox IMEMO view was not limited to its autarkic economic implications.149 He disputed the basic thesis of the 1974 IMEMO book by repeatedly defining the current relationship between developed capitalist states and the third world as growing "economic interdependence".150 His views largely coincided with those of Simoniya, although intriguingly he did not refer to the latter's work, even when calling for a "terminological delimitation" regarding economic self-sufficiency.151 Labelling IMEMO's "radical" alternative to 'dependent development' as "not realistic", Popov re-defined the choice as fundamentally economic rather than political:

either rely for big support on one's own forces, on a great integration of society and economy, and then for a long time slow your economic progress and without reason complicate the resolution of social problems, or obtain, by using external resources on a more independent and non-discriminatory basis, the goal of economic growth - while only minimally admissible because of its painfulness, this then opens possibilities for a gradual subsequent raising of the living standard of the labouring masses.152

Emphasising economic growth as an "important internal pre-requisite for the implementation of an independent political course", Popov considered that a "gigantic leap" toward greater economic self-sufficiency had been achieved by
many third world countries in recent years. He argued that a strengthening of national sovereignty is "characteristic now not only for countries of socialist orientation, but also for a whole series of states which are still firmly integrated in the world capitalist economy and actively encourage in themselves the development of a capitalist structure." And he added a very optimistic prediction about the West's acceptance of detente and limitation of its former policy of "direct diktat" toward the third world, implying that the USSR should relax its own policy and endeavour to compete in economic rather than military terms.

This expectation proved hopelessly wrong in the short-term, but deteriorating East-West relations in the late 1970s did not prevent increasing criticism of the concept of dependent development amongst Soviet scholars. Sheinis emerged as the most important critic of the orthodox IMEMO view, particularly after his move to that institute in 1975, where he joined forces with already existing sceptics such as Khvoinik, Andreasian, Georgy Skorov and Anatoli Elfianov. Developing the concept of 'medium-developed capitalism', Sheinis endeavoured to synthesise the 'internal' and 'external' approaches of the major 1974 works produced by IVAN and IMEMO. He considered the concept of multistructurality correct "as a starting point for research" on the developing countries, but thought that "external factors" like the importance of foreign capital needed more attention. Having described the orthodox IMEMO approach as "more fruitful" in this respect, he proceeded to develop an interpretation which reversed its basic postulates about third world development. Whereas Krylov and Maidanik thought Latin America showed the inevitably dependent and deformed nature of peripheral capitalism, Sheinis argued that local "capitalism here appears as one, and not several structures", so that it has a "system-forming role" and constitutes the "ruling mode of production". He defined countries of 'medium-developed capitalism' like Mexico as no longer multistructural, and, transposing Kleer's terminology, described them as an "intermediate group" between the "highly-developed capitalist states" and the "basic mass of the 'third world'". Sheinis agreed with the IMEMO book and Levkovsky that the state structure tended to expand in
order to integrate a multistructural economy, but he viewed this as both temporary and characterised by "reactionary potential". He quoted Marx's famous statement about more industrially developed countries showing the future of less developed ones to suggest the significance of 'medium-developed capitalism', which he considered to be in most cases dominated already by "monopolistic capital on national ground". Sheinis recognised that 'medium-developed capitalist' countries were not repeating the "stage" of "classical capitalism", but instead constituted a "part of the system of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism." His data showing basic socio-economic similarities between Latin America and Southern Europe were meant to prove that independent development within this system was still possible, i.e. that a 'vertical' limit upon the character of peripheral capitalism did not exist.

Sheinis presented a sophisticated system of criteria for classifying developing countries at the same time as he disputed the orthodox IMEMO view about dependent development. Sledzevsky has called Sheinis an empiricist, but this seems to be an incorrect (or at least onesided) evaluation. While relying on quantitative categories of analysis such as gross national product, Sheinis noted that statistics about foreign trade and capital movement "in themselves do not give rise to propositions about the character of dependence of one or other country." Such figures need to be interpreted in the light of definitions, which form a crucial part of any debate. Sheinis directed most of his criticism against two assumptions contained in the orthodox IMEMO viewpoint: that involvement in the world capitalist economy is an indication of a third world country's dependence upon imperialism, and that overcoming backwardness or underdevelopment effectively means 'catching up' with the advanced capitalist countries. He argued that 'catching up' (i.e. economic growth) remained a necessary goal for all developing countries, although "even in the most favourable cases (with high tempos of socio-economic growth and low demographic growth) a convergence of the level of economic development with the most developed capitalist countries is in the historically foreseeable prospect most improbable, and for the majority of medium-developed countries practically
excluded. But, implicitly criticising Tiagunenko's 1973 statement, Sheinis disputed the view that a continuing and even widening gap between highly-developed capitalist and quickly-developing third world countries means that the latter are not successfully overcoming backwardness. He suggested that "the politico-economic categories of economic dependence, interdependence and self-sufficiency need a definite re-thinking", and, having previously supported Simoniya's distinction between an independent economic policy and economic self-sufficiency, he now applauded the concept of "asymmetrical dependence" (introduced by Primakov to define the 'special place' of some developing countries in the world capitalist economy) as "a significant step forward in comparison with abstract oppositions of dependence-independence or the thesis about onesided dependence." Sheinis concluded that the "top level" of the third world comprised "countries, the economic dependence of which already has not so total a character as before".

The prevalence of the idea of dependent development amongst Soviet foreign policy officials in the mid to late 1970s is clear from the fact that Simoniya chose to question its basic methodological assumptions openly in a pointed article published in early 1979. He began by repeating a point made by Reisner, that the 1974 IMEMO book's quantitative correlation of comparative backwardness and increasing dependence was "simply mistaken in the socio-economic sense", because it ignored the qualitative fact that some countries on the capitalist path were "restructuring existing economic structures and creating fundamentally new productive forces." According to Simoniya, the "decay of old production relations of the colonial type" and the onset of industrialisation in some developing countries meant that "qualitative, essential changes of dependence" itself had occurred, not merely changes in its forms. He argued that these changes had to be understood dialectically:

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economic self-sufficiency grows up inside relations of economic dependence and at a definite stage of its maturity breaks through (in some places, though at present only to a small degree, it has already begun to break through) these relations of dependence.  
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Simoniya suggested that agricultural backwardness in many developing countries
was "a manifestation of the objective regularities of a growing capitalism, its unevenness and stress on industrialisation." He pointed out that "periodic slumps and crises are in general natural not only for dying but also developing capitalism", and mocked a "persistent aspiration" on the part of some Soviet scholars to mistake "every conjunctural slump" as signifying "the fall of capitalism in the liberated countries". By classifying developing countries into several groups, Simoniya emphasised the "extreme unevenness" of socio-economic and political development in the third world, particularly "in the limits of capitalist orientation itself". He stressed that "the problem consists not in the fact that countries of capitalist orientation cannot but confront serious economic difficulties (here there is no place for doubt) but in the fact that these difficulties are not always and not everywhere critical or insurmountable in current conditions. It is precisely this circumstance which appears decisive in evaluating the prospects of their socio-economic development." Implicitly, he claimed that the orthodox IMEMO view was outdated, since it did not help work out which countries on the capitalist path would become economically self-sufficient enough to be potentially stable allies of the USSR in its struggle with imperialism. In a published discussion at this time Simoniya singled out India as such as prototype, because of its "greater stability of national capitalism" and the "lesser dependence of its fate on such a prop as foreign capital is for Iran or still remains for Indonesia."

While the idea of dependent development lost ground in IMEMO during the late 1970s, it maintained adherents amongst some scholars located elsewhere. Krylov, who moved to the conservative Institute of Africa, conceded that the task facing developing countries was "not a struggle for economic autarky", but still defended the orthodox view against the implications of multistructurality and new ideas about "'statocratic' and other structures." The greatest range of opinion was expressed in IVAN, where Levkovsky's view (which had never been as dominant there as the idea of dependent development had been in IMEMO) received qualified support from most scholars but criticism from others. Support for the importance of multistructurality came from Nikolai Dlin, who presented an empirical typology of most countries on the capitalist path, and Elena
Aref'eva, who focused on the significance of foreign economic relations for a "capitalist transformation of multistructural structures" in countries like India and Iran. This qualification, about the need to focus specifically on the "transformation of multistructurality" rather than on its general persistence, was accepted by Levkovsky in the introduction to the second edition of IVAN's volumes on the Orient, and reflected the influence of Shirokov's argument about the formation of a "dual economy" in countries developing on the capitalist path.

Shirokov considered that political independence had transformed the developing countries "into an autonomous part of the world capitalist economy", in which the internal dynamics of multistructurality largely determine a particular country's path of development. Like Levkovsky, he thought the "integrating potential" of the "local capitalist structure" had not been strong enough to prevent a "disintegration of inter-structural ties" after the downfall of colonialism. This had enabled "intermediate structures, above all the petty-commodity structure", to grow up in isolation, without becoming a source of capitalist accumulation as in Western Europe. But Shirokov claimed that this "strengthening of disintegrating processes" only persisted in very backward countries like Nepal, where "there occurs not an overcoming of multistructurality, but its extension." He argued that in countries like India, where the national bourgeoisie had come to power, a "re-establishment of inter-structural ties" had been achieved by relying "on a strong state capitalism", as well as "on the broad support of the world capitalist system". This process had "significantly accelerated the development of capitalism", leading to "a marked decomposition" of traditional economic structures, but had not involved most of the population in capitalist production, because of the capital-intensive nature of modern technology. Consequently, here "the comparatively quick dissolution and elimination of multistructurality" results in a "dual" economy, composed of a modern sector integrating "the different forms of a capitalist economy", and an independent traditional sector in which "an enormous mass of lumpens, paupers and partially or temporarily unemployed are concentrated." Shirokov suggested that while multistructurality might be reproduced in the foreseeable future in
countries like Thailand and Malaysia, which could afford to use "extensive methods" of economic development because of their natural resources, this would be not the "stagnant retention of multistructurality" characteristic of Nepal, but rather "only a moment in the course of the mastering by capitalism of the economy as a whole." He concluded that the consolidation of a dual economy "will occur all the more clearly" with "the growth of population and the exhaustion of relatively accessible natural resources" in third world countries undergoing capitalist development.¹⁸⁴

Whereas Shirokov thought IMEMO's version of dependency theory unworthy of serious consideration, Anatoli Dinkevich, another senior economist at IVAN, presented an account of the "crisis of capitalism in the developing countries" which was very similar to the orthodox IMEMO view. He considered the socio-economic differentiation of countries on the capitalist path as a reason for rejecting Levkovsky's view about peripheral capitalism entirely. Like Simoniya, Dinkevich defined most of the third world as 'already part of the capitalist formation, not as still 'transitional'. But he emphasised the "increasing gap in the levels of economic development of the industrial capitalist states and the liberated countries", and argued that "immature" national capitalism in the third world was incapable of using the possibilities opened up by the 'scientific-technical revolution'.¹⁸⁵ While Dinkevich qualified this by claiming only that peripheral capitalism was "not able to secure the liquidation of backwardness and economic modernisation for all developing countries", and by noting an "insufficient maturity of the subjective factor of revolution as a whole in the countries of the 'third world'", his view was implicitly the object of Slavnyi's comprehensive theoretical critique of dependency theory.¹⁸⁶ Yet scepticism about this ostentatiously 'global' approach did not necessarily impel belief in the 'natural-historical process' of capitalist development suggested by Simoniya. Reisner, who was Slavnyi's supervisor and IVAN's leading liberal economist, implicitly criticised Krylov for seeing only the external "results", not the internal "causes" of technical backwardness in the third world, and Levkovsky for giving traditional factors an "absolute significance", but he remained sceptical in the late 1970s about whether the capitalist mode of production could become dominant
throughout the third world. An attempt to integrate the ideas of dependent development, multistucturality and transitional period into a unified conception was made in the late 1970s by Yashkin, but his view gained little support, highlighting the fragmentation of Soviet opinion about third world development at this time. Yashkin considered the link connecting these partial ideas to be an "inevitably" growing role of the state as the integrating force in post-colonial societies. He distinguished between "two big groups" of developing countries: those already "forming a peripheral branch" of one or other 'world system', and those representing a "non-formational branch of the world economic system". The latter group was larger, comprising countries experiencing "a frequent change in the orientation of development", because of their "lack of a dominant mode of production" and the greater importance in them of superstructural and external factors.

Yashkin's main claim was that in "the majority" of third world countries "capitalism has still not attained a formation al [i.e. systemic] stage of maturity", since it is split into "lower branches" tied to pre-capitalist structures and "higher branches" tied to foreign monopoly capital. He asserted that even for countries on the capitalist path a transition to independent development and a transformation of multistucturality pre-supposed the "growth and strengthening of the state structure ... which leads in essence to the undermining of capitalism as a system". He criticised Simoniya for reducing this "crisis of the capitalist formation" in the liberated countries "to a crisis only of one of its particular stages (early capitalism) or particular forms (dependent capitalism)", but his own view that the state structure now headed the "hierarchy" of multistucturality in most of the third world was rejected as "naive" even by Dinkevich. In a review article on Soviet conceptions of the Orient Nikolai Illarionov singled out Yashkin's arguments for special criticism. Claiming that countries of the 'periphery' belonged by virtue of the direction of their historical development to one or other formation, Illarionov supported Simoniya's view that the more developed countries of the Orient were systemically capitalist even before the capitalist mode of production had fully established itself in them.
The beginning of the end for the conception of dependent development came in 1979, when two key officials dismissed it as an inadequate interpretation of capitalism in the third world. Since Brutents had held that interpretation five years before, his new view about the importance of distinguishing between "dependent" and "national" capitalism in the liberated countries was quite significant. He suggested that "for a significant number of developing countries it will soon be necessary to speak not about absolute, but about relative backwardness in an economic sense", and stated the implication of this clearly:

One cannot deny the possibility of a transition from dependent to national capitalist development. The widespread idea that, with a certain swoop of fatalness, dependence will in all cases inevitably become deeper and deeper seems to be not entirely true.  

While conservatives like Kim still asserted the "permanent dependence upon world capitalism and transnational corporations" of national capitalism in the third world, Brutents' point was reinforced by Primakov in his keynote address to a major conference in February 1979, when he said there was a "need for specifying the character of dependence, which should be considered not universally, but at different levels." In an authoritative article published the following year Primakov explicitly criticised the "outdated" concept of dependent development for leading "to a certain underestimation of the role of internal forces, which in a series of cases were considered only as agents of external forces", and "an underestimation of the new conditions of the development of capitalism and its growing unevenness in different liberated countries". He said that while "one-sided dependence on the capitalist centre" still characterised many developing countries, "two-sided dependence" or "asymmetrical interdependence" now characterised the more self-sufficient third world countries, some of whom could even "draw near to the level of 'usual' interdependence [between developed capitalist countries] without leaving the world capitalist economy." He also criticised Levkovsky's 'inter-formational' definition of multistucturality, endorsed the 'multicriterial approach' to studying the third world developed by Sheinis, and called for further research into "the peculiarities of the development of capitalism in the liberated countries". While asserting that the "differentiation of developing countries in economic relations" did not signify a
"liquidation of the basic qualitative characteristics peculiar to the community of liberated states", Primakov relied on "objective" anti-imperialism as the key such characteristic, in an ahistorical manner similar to Tiul'panov, the originator of the 'multicriterial approach'. This attempt to reach an acceptable compromise was more authoritative and eclectic than Yashkin's solution, but hardly more successful. When reviewing Primakov's subsequent book, Sheinis and El'ianov asked politely whether the third world is now "a community or a conglomerate?", while Sledzevsky later directly charged Primakov with "denying the formational commonality of the developing countries".

The Problem of State Capitalism Unresolved

The theoretical problems of Soviet oriental studies during the 'years of stagnation' may be highlighted by focusing on the discussion of state capitalism, which was sometimes lengthy but seldom profound. Clarkson has suggested that "the central concept for the Soviet view of the state in the third world is state capitalism, a concept re-furbished for application to the ex-colonies during the post-stalinist re-evaluation of development theory." It is more accurate to say that state capitalism has been the main unresolved problem of Soviet development debates, since there has not been one common concept but rather a number of competing concepts, which have often been vague. The enormity of the problem of state capitalism for understanding third world development is perhaps why much Soviet discussion of it has been muddled. Cheshkov has recently reasserted the view, attributed to Lenin, of the "nature of state capitalism as a general 'station' on the path of movement both toward capitalism and toward socialism", and noted the rarity in Soviet oriental studies of a "fundamentally theoretical analysis of the basic element of a [developing] society, precisely that which is called, depending on the position or point of view, the state-sector, the state-structure, or state-property." This lack of development in most Soviet views about state capitalism has occurred in spite of one particularly intensive discussion published at the end of the 1970s.
As a result of "the persistent and almost universal growth of the state sector in the 1960s, and in particular the mighty wave of nationalisation which swept through in the beginning of the 1970s," any "last doubts" that Soviet scholars had about the long-term significance of 'state capitalism' in the third world were discarded by the mid 1970s. Two conferences on this topic were held in 1972, the larger of which involved nearly fifty speakers. Levkovsky, who gave the main report, was criticised by several speakers for suggesting that "the state sector is in the majority of 'third world' countries first of all the state-capitalist structure", which comprises "not one, but several structures, forming successive phases of the development of state capitalism", from regimes dominated by the national bourgeoisie, through those "where political power is in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie and the direction of development has not been finally determined", to countries of 'socialist orientation'. Answering criticism that this characterisation of state capitalism was too broad, Levkovsky conceded in a concluding speech that "one should not identify all forms of state intervention in economic life with state capitalism", but defended his view by "enumerating a series of questions, about which a common opinion was not attained." This discord was emphasised by in an article the following April by Mirsky, who noted that 'state capitalism' had become a very wide and flexible term, which may be understood differently, depending upon which word - state or capitalism - is stressed. It has happened that the term 'state capitalism' designates both a state-sector and a state-structure, and simply everything that is not included in the concepts of 'capitalism' and 'socialism' in a pure sense. One may ask: how correct is it to equate state-sectors in such countries as Iran and Iraq, Algeria and Afghanistan, Indonesia, Ethiopia and Israel - only on the basis that the state in all these countries ever more actively intervenes in the economy - and unite them all under the word 'state capitalism'? It is easy to note that with such a wide usage this term already designates and explains little.

Mirsky agreed with Levkovsky that the "state-sector" was "only a form", the content of which depended on the "class character of political power", but said his view about state capitalism existing in countries of 'socialist orientation' was "theoretically impossible" and conceptually "absurd". Yet, remarking that "in practice, of course, everything is more complex", Mirsky presented an account
of the possible "conservative" evolution of countries like Egypt toward a system "founded upon state capitalist elements", which "probably, will not be essentially different from that system, the establishment of which we now observe in the countries of so-called capitalist orientation". He thought the inconsistent political character of "national democracy" gives rise to a situation where "in many countries 'traditional' private-enterprise capitalism is limited, but there flourishes capitalism of a recent type -- state capitalism."

Mirsky's article implied that Soviet theoretical discussion was lagging behind events, a point reinforced in a review article by Rozaliev and in the relevant chapter of the 1974 IMEMO book, evidently written by Cheshkov. Rozaliev said that, regarding the "potential prospects of state capitalism" in the third world, "many problems have still not been studied, and some general questions have still not been raised." While supporting Levkovsky against Ul'ianovskiy on the need for caution about the chances of 'socialist orientation', he emphasized that "state capitalism is above all capitalism, with all the consequences flowing from this", and thus agreed with Simoniya about the potential for capitalist development in the Orient. This basic weakness of Levkovsky's view was noted by the Leningrad scholars in their review of the 1974 IVAN work. They thought it strange to "express great doubts about the capacity of capitalism to transform the 'third world' and become a system-forming structure", and simultaneously "consider the state structure only as collective bourgeois property." Instead, they suggested that "more accurate here would have been the term 'state structure'", which Cheshkov had introduced in order to eliminate "the uncertainties and contradictions arising from the application of the concept 'state capitalism' to the specific material of the 'third world'".

Cheshkov began by claiming that the 'leading role of the state-sector' was now apparent not just in countries on the 'non-capitalist path', but in "the whole complex of developing countries," a view accepted by Levkovsky but not by Simoniya. Cheshkov then suggested that it was "logically incorrect" to reduce this matter to a "strengthening of the superstructure's influence on the base", which anyway would not explain the "obvious fact, that in contemporary
conditions the state becomes a direct participant in basic relations." He argued that if the increasing role of the state in economic life was considered as "something qualitatively (historically) new", i.e. not "just a peculiarity of a purely quantitative order", then it had to be "analysed starting from the unity of superstructural and basic relations", in terms of a 'single mechanism' of the type characteristic of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism. This meant "that the formulation of the question about the 'leading role' [of the state] is correct in a scientific sense only when it is connected with the category 'structure' (understood as a unity of productive forces and production relations)."

Cheshkov considered that "the idea of the leading, system-forming role of the state-structure has still not found a sufficiently clear and comprehensive substantiation", because hitherto research had focused on "relations existing outside the state-structure itself", and the main method of argument had been negative, incorrectly deducing the state-structure's leading role from the "incapacity of all remaining structures to assume such a role". He argued that, on Levkovsky's view, the "progressive and anti-imperialist character" of state capitalism in the third world must either be "limited only to the political sphere" (i.e. be subjective, not objective as Tiul'panov had claimed) or "represent a quality of the same order as, say, the anti-monopolist actions of groups of the middle bourgeoisie." In both cases, "the growing-over of anti-imperialism into anti-capitalism cannot have a basis in the objective nature of the state sector." Hence, according to Cheshkov, Levkovsky had to either follow Simoniya and return to "the traditional explanation" of anti-imperialism as showing "the progressive potential of the 'national bourgeoisie'" with the rise of capitalism in the periphery, or, if he doubted this potential, adopt IMEMO's thesis about dependent development and explain "the anti-imperialism of new ruling groups" by reference to the 'non-capitalist' potential of their state property, rather than as a by-product of their previous careers as individual members of the 'petty bourgeoisie'.

Although Levkovsky was fully occupied responding to Ul'ianovsksy's attack, and was subsequently ill, it is not accidental that neither he nor Landa, his main associate, responded to Cheshkov's critique of the definition of state property in
the third world as both 'leading' and state capitalist. Cheshkov's attempt to
establish the "common points in the historical function of state-structures in all
developing countries" was promptly questioned in Kiva's review article, but with
arguments taken from Simoniya, not Levkovsky. In the second edition of
IVAN's volumes entitled The Foreign Orient and Our Time, Levkovsky's
position that "in a multistructural economy the state sector is nothing but state
capitalist" was merely repeated, as two reviewers from IMEMO noted with
chagrin:

The position contained in the first edition is reproduced in the new work
without any changes, and the opinions defended by others in a series of
scientific publications are ignored. It is possible to dispute these opinions,
but it hardly does to avoid them to one side.

Levkovsky's introversion about this matter was not unique; indeed, one of these
reviewers, Oksana Ul'rikh, previously dismissed Cheshkov's reconceptualisation
in a footnote, relying on an uneasy combination of Levkovsky, Tiul'panov and
Tiagunenko. But Levkovsky's silence was a significant indication that the
main debate about third world capitalism now occurred between liberals like
Simoniya, Popov and Sheinis, who thought the national bourgeoisie was up and
running, and 'left-radicals' like Maidanik and Cheshkov who, paradoxically
together with conservatives like Kim and Dinkevich, thought it was only limping
along with help from outside. Many observers had not made up their minds,
whether because, like Mirsky, they were not yet convinced that local capital in the
periphery could profit from independence, or because, like Shirokov, they
doubted its ability to do more than a lopsided walk, or simply because they
thought all these possibilities could exist at once. The fact that the Soviet
textbook about the state sector in developing countries was written from the last
'viewpoint' only reflected the increasing gap between the advanced scholars and
their backward academic environment.

The one exceptional discussion of state capitalism was a round-table review of
a book on Kuomintang China by Meliksetov, Cheshkov's strongest supporter.
The thread of this discussion was the role of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in
either accelerating or holding back peripheral capitalist development. This term
had been used in a rather loose, descriptive manner since the mid 1960s to refer to corrupt administrators in various third world countries, but Meliksetov's book included the first extensive, theoretical discussion of its application to a particular group. He defined the Kuomintang elite in power as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, since it was based on nationalised state property and hence economically opposed (as a 'primary' corporate owner) to the weak private bourgeoisie, while remaining "a social community of a capitalist type" because the state sector which it created "bears a state-capitalist character", with the same "type of production relations -- capitalist" as private enterprise, but a "different path of evolution". Meliksetov labelled Kuomintang China as an original variety of "state capitalism without the political supremacy of the bourgeoisie." He argued that "the evolution of the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan" demonstrated the long-term viability of this form of 'bureaucratic capital', since "despite the really boisterous development of private enterprise, thanks to which the economic face of this Chinese province has significantly changed, the genuine 'master' of economics and politics remains as before the Kuomintang elite, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who are not yet preparing to renounce their dominant position and not yet merging with the rest of the bourgeoisie." From this analysis, which he suggested might apply to Turkey and Mexico at around the same time and "many countries of the 'third world"' since the 1950s, Meliksetov concluded that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was an independent group whose "social function does not amount, as might have been suggested previously, only to preparing the conditions for the supremacy of a 'normal' bourgeoisie.".

The most important difference of opinion in the discussion of Meliksetov's book occurred between Cheshkov and Simoniya. Cheshkov did not doubt Meliksetov's account of the development of bureaucratic capital in Kuomintang China, but questioned the logic of his analysis when used "for the interpretation of contemporary material" in the third world. Cheshkov's first point was to highlight the inconsistency in Meliksetov's definition of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This group was "in essence not a bourgeoisie", because it personified state-property as a primary community opposed to private enterprise; but in so far as this property appeared as bureaucratic capital then "the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, being the personification of capital, is a genuine bourgeoisie", albeit of a strange sort.

In this case, apparently, the reference to the party-bureaucratic elite as a non-bourgeoisie may mean only an aspect of its existence as a secondary, derivative social community (a ruling elite, or, according to the author's definition, a new ruling layer). However, the simultaneous recognition of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the economic plane as a bourgeoisie and in the socio-political plane as not a bourgeoisie is not provided for in the conception of A.V. Meliksetov and, moreover, is impossible, since he insists on the primacy of this [non-bourgeois] social establishment. Cheshkov argued that "the cause of this contradiction should be found not in the thesis that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is a personifier of state-property, but in that state-property is expressed through the concept of 'bureaucratic capital'. In other words, the root of this contradiction lies in the identification of the concept '(state-) property of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie' with its specific historical form, expressed by the category '(bureaucratic) capital'", in the case of Kuomintang China. He suggested that, while particular social factors might account for the capitalist nature of the Kuomintang economic administration, "if we want to go beyond the specific situation to broader conclusions, we must raise the question of the significance of bureaucratic capital's own dynamic in the course of industrialisation." Judging from Meliksetov's evidence, Cheshkov claimed that logically "we must come to the conclusion that bureaucratic capital not only does not generate private capital in its development, but, on the contrary, subjugates or even eliminates such. If this is true, then the application of the concept 'capital' to characterise state property of the considered type seems still more doubtful." He then argued that to identify a society dominated by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as a form of state capitalism is "still less meaningful", since whereas the concept 'bureaucratic capital' might refer to "one or other lower form of capital", the concept 'state capital' "in essence characterises the means and resources which the state sector disposes of." Here Meliksetov had relied on a widely-held but unproven assumption "that the movement of state resources occurs according to the laws of the movement of capital." Cheshkov said that "this point of view ... has until now not been convincingly corroborated by any specific research", and concluded that Meliksetov's ambiguity about the
historical function of different forms of capital was apparent in his reference at one point to 'bureaucratic accumulation'.

While Cheshkov criticised the inadequacies of Meliksetov's definition of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, he thought it "more profound than the approach of those who see in bureaucratic capital only parasitical forms of personal (and illegal!) enrichment (N.A. Simoniya, M. Andreev)." Simoniya thought Cheshkov correct in exposing Meliksetov's inconsistency, but considered the source of the problem as an "insufficiently justified excessive broadening of the limits of the categories 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' and 'bureaucratic capital'". Simoniya argued that the chief characteristic of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was neither the personification of state property, nor simple corruption as a means of personal enrichment, but the massive and systematic use by senior bureaucrats of nominally state resources as private capital. His resolution of Meliksetov's contradiction was historical rather than logical, defining a profit-seeking bureaucratic elite as "a fraction of the bourgeoisie" differing "from other entrepreneurial layers according to the specific features of its genesis". His main point was that bureaucratic capital constituted an alternative path of peripheral capitalist development in countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia and Pakistan, "where private enterprise capitalism did not strengthen itself sufficiently widely and deeply on a nation-wide scale, and where the bourgeoisie as a class is not able to directly subjugate to itself the state as a whole and the bureaucratic estate in particular." Whereas Cheshkov doubted the capitalist potential of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', Simoniya considered it unambiguously as a "system-forming factor of capitalist development." According to Simoniya, bureaucratic capital could perform this historical function "in conditions of the absence of developed state-property (Thailand) ... leading in the final analysis to the formation of monopoly and, in prospect, state-monopoly capitalism." In such cases the growing state sector has "not simply a state-capitalist, but a bureaucratic state-capitalist character". Simoniya argued that, whereas in India capitalism had developed with private enterprise as the leading economic structure, now in many third world countries "the following chain of transformation is more probable: bureaucratic capital \( \rightarrow \) bureaucratic
state-capitalism → bureaucratic state-monopoly capitalism", so that "bureaucratic state-capitalism fills up the 'historical gap' between the phases of early and late dying capitalism" in backward countries. Moreover, Simoniya thought this was not capitalism's only trick in the third world, since he considered that in Iran and Mexico one could already observe "elements of state-monopoly capitalism, the formation of which has occurred not through the phase of the establishment of bureaucratic capital, but by another path."232

The principal issue of debate between Simoniya and Cheshkov concerned the character of monopoly tendencies in developing countries. Simoniya thought that variants of a "specific (not only according to its genesis, but according to several important features) state-monopoly capitalism" were forming because of objective economic and subjective political factors in many capitalist countries of the Orient. He argued that capitalism as a formation was historically broader than the 'classical model' of private enterprise, pointing out that "Germany, Italy and Japan already gave examples of the significant scope of direct state intervention in processes of monopolisation and the establishment of state-monopoly capitalism." 233 Implicitly, Simoniya suggested that bureaucratic capitalist monopolies in the third world would function, like state monopolies in the West, as a sizeable historical reserve for the slowly but surely dying capitalist formation.234 In contrast, Cheshkov thought there was an "essential difference" between the historical paths of the West and the Orient, particularly concerning "the interrelation of the processes of statisation and monopolisation, and hence private and state monopolies."

If in the West state monopolies were engendered by the logic of development of private monopolies ... then in the developing world bureaucratic capital arose in conditions when statisation preceded the creation of national private monopolies. The development of the latter was a result of the growth of 'their' state monopolies, which from immature, formal, non-economic structures became mature economic relations. Of course, the course of this process depended upon and was corrected by the role of foreign private monopolies, but, in any case, at the current stage the development of local private monopolies is determined to a significant degree by the development of state monopolies (Brazil, Iran). This reverse in comparison with the West genotype of ties between private and state monopolies determines, in our view, the specific features of the forms of state-monopoly capitalism arising
Cheshkov interpreted these forms of monopolisation in the periphery as a "more complex" case of that 'negation of capitalism in the limits of capitalism' noted first by Marx and then by Lenin. Cheshkov's immediate conclusion seemed similar to Shirokov's view of state capitalism as a key element of a 'dual' economy, since he regarded the Chinese material as showing "that even the most radical variants of development in themselves cannot be alternatives to bureaucratic capital ... [but instead are] forms of the establishment of democratic and anti-imperialist varieties of bureaucratic capital." But Cheshkov limited the concept of bureaucratic capital to "the economic relations of that state-sector which is based on transitional forms of labour and, correspondingly, the production and appropriation of surplus product at the juncture of pre-industrial relations and relations of an industrial type." By stressing the reverse order of monopolisation in the Orient, he implied that the backward (if not dependent) forms of capitalist development in the third world were increasingly unable to cope with the demands of modern industrial production, let alone with the 'ideal productive forces' which Krylov saw on the horizon. Hence, rather than a historical reserve of the capitalist formation, local state monopolies which did not operate according to the laws of capitalist production were symptoms of the progressive decay of capitalism as a world system.

An intermediate position between the views of Cheshkov and Simoniya was presented by Mirsky and Sheinis, who argued that in the third world there now "occurs the establishment of state-capitalism of a new type, distinct from historically known forms." They identified this original system as bourgeois, capitalist, ... [but] at the same time it is not a classical bourgeois system and not even of the same mould as the society of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism, since the correlation here of state and private property is different, private capital, as a rule, has not acquired significant positions, and the laws of the market (in any case, the internal market) do not determine economic development. The reproduction of collective social capital and the social groups personifying it is implemented with such modifications that sometimes doubt arises about whether it is correct to name this system capitalist (even with essential qualifications - state, statocratic).
Looking at the example of Brazil, Mirsky and Sheinis suggested that, "in the socio-political sphere", a backward bourgeoisie "without experience" might prefer "to live 'under the shade' of a harsh authoritarian regime, getting in return a guarantee against a workers', democratic, left movement". They also claimed that "in the economic development of Latin American countries two imposing forces stand out: the state sector and the multinational corporations, but not national private-enterprise capitalism." They then raised some very important questions about the most probable policy of imperialism toward backward countries where "capitalism in its more or less well-known, 'Western' or 'Japanese', forms does not seem a sufficiently realistic prospect", evenhandedly presenting first the view that multinational corporations must "undermine here the regulating role of the state and state-sector", and then the opposite view that "the state in developing countries is for the monopolies a much more reliable, stable and promising contractor and partner than the private sector." While noting that such questions "may today only be raised" not answered, they were sceptical about Simoniya's claim that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in the third world could serve as an alternative driver of capitalist development. Conceding the possibility of its national capitalist dynamic, they doubted that it could really reach a point comparable to Western monopolies: "Even allowing that state property and funds operating in the command of the state function as a special form of capital (though this may occasion doubt), it is necessary to recognise that the disposer of this capital, according to its genesis, mode of reproduction, social functions and many other parameters, essentially distinguishes itself not only from the traditional figure of the bourgeois, but also from the state-monopolistic elite of developed capitalist countries."  

Rather than inspiring a higher level of debate, this remarkable discussion was followed by a 'retreat from an answer' amongst Soviet scholars to the question of the socio-economic content of state capitalism. This retreat is clearly noticeable in a one-volume IVAN work produced under Primakov's editorship and Shirokov's influence at the turn of the 1980s. The introduction states that modern economic structures in Asia and Africa are "above all state capitalism and national capitalism", and mentions some negative phenomena associated with the
former in both states of 'socialist orientation' and countries on the capitalist path. But in the whole book there are only a few isolated paragraphs about state capitalism, considering it in superstructural terms as an economic policy, not as a structure of production relations. The role of state capitalism is reduced to "establishing socio-political stability", "mitigating the contradictions of 'dualist' development" by "regulating" the growth of the national capitalist structure, which, being limited to the demographically smaller 'modern' sector of the economy, leads to "ruptures in the mechanism of reproduction" and a "growth of economic and social disproportions in the whole process of development". This conception of state capitalism as "a policy of compromise between the interests of all groups of the bourgeoisie" was similar to Levkovsky's view of the "changing social content of the state capitalist structure", though Shirokov supported Simoniya regarding the historically limited prospects of 'socialist orientation', and hence implicitly turned Cheshkov's criticism of Levkovsky (for reducing the progressive character of state-capitalism to anti-monopolist politics) into an empirical statement about the broad objective limits of social change in the third world. In Shirokov's opinion, the most important domestic changes in the developing countries occur within the bounds of various forms of state capitalist "compromise", not from one 'formational' plane to another. These forms may range from a relatively orderly "regulation of the economic process" as in India, to a revolutionary upheaval as in Iran, which is "an example of the extreme intensification of disproportions of social development". This view remains vulnerable to Mirsky's point about a broadened concept explaining less. Such appears to have been the main concern of Sheinis, who, reviewing Shirokov's book about Oriental industrialisation, argued that "the specifically capitalist character of the economic and social antagonisms which, apparently, are contained in the state-sector remains questionable." This is certainly Cheshkov's opinion, since in 1983 he repeated almost word for word a statement from the 1974 IMEMO book that, while the "technical-economic" aspects of the state-sector in the developing countries have been studied extensively by Soviet scholars, its socio-economic nature has not.
A New Liberal Orthodoxy about Oriental Capitalism

By the end of the Brezhnev period, the significance for Soviet foreign policy of differences amongst capitalist developing countries was widely recognised. Soviet interest in doing business with national bourgeoisies in the post-colonial world was not new, but had grown as the limited scope of 'socialist orientation' became more evident. A 1983 textbook on The Foreign Policy of Developing Countries considered it "very important to follow up the combination of anti-imperialist and pro-capitalist tendencies in the foreign policy of a number of developing countries." India was highlighted as an "ally" of the USSR despite being "connected with world capital by many economic threads"; on Simoniya's authority, this resulted from the greater "degree of development of national capitalism" in India, compared to other Asian and African countries on the capitalist path. Mirsky, in the key chapter of this book, distinguished several types of capitalist developing countries according to foreign policy: 1) regimes like South Korea and Pinochet's Chile, whose alliance with the United States is a "decisive condition" maintaining their power; 2) 'sub-imperialist' powers like Brazil, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser degree Indonesia, who can pursue "an independent course" despite their common strategic interests with imperialism; 3) generally pro-Western countries like the Philippines, Nigeria and Argentina, who avoid "a clear position in disputes between the great powers", but not in regional conflicts; 4) India, "the clearest example of genuine non-alignment"; and 5) countries with no consistent foreign policy, because of domestic instability (Bangladesh) or disputes with neighbours (small countries of Tropical Africa). Mirsky claimed the second type of policy "essentially differs" from the first type, perhaps implying that the USSR could encourage these 'power centres' to become more independent of the West, closer to the 'ideal type' of capitalist developing country approximated by India. Lukin made this point more directly, by defining India as a 'power centre' whose consistently independent foreign policy and stable "cooperation" with the USSR is based on "the coinciding interests of both states in a whole series of areas." His Machiavellian advice, that the USSR should outdo the West in devoting "selective attention to large developing powers", was not fully supported by other liberals like Sheinis and El'ianov, who
warned that "'sub-imperialist' tendencies in the developing world appear at all levels of development", particularly where a strong state with an undeveloped civil society has accumulated the material resources and armaments necessary to satisfy its "own ambitions ... in relation to weaker neighbours." Would the "spontaneous ... growth of capitalism" in the third world produce more cases of 'genuine non-alignment' like India, or merely "a growth of conflict situations" that could "grow-over into global" disasters?

Opening a discussion in the early 1980s on "The Prospects for Capitalism in the Developing World", Mirsky noted that first the West and then the USSR had mistakenly expected the third world to develop in a straightforward direction. Events had shown things were "not so simple", and the resulting "complex, undefined situation has, naturally, engendered debates and discussions in our scientific midst." Mirsky summarised two main views about "whether capitalism can become a 'system-forming factor' in the developing countries." One view doubted this, stressing the incapacity of capitalist development to involve most of the population in modern production; "the inevitably growing role of the state"; and "the unproductive, and often simply parasitical character of the national bourgeoisie". Another view thought such factors would not stop the establishment of a specific, non-European form of the capitalist mode of production in Asia and Africa. Even without the presence of Shirokov, at least nine of the fourteen speakers supported his conclusion, based on the former view, that "the spreading of capitalism onto new territories not so much strengthens it as a socio-economic system, but rather intensifies its internal contradictions, weakening its very stability." Reisner stressed a "barely surmountable investment barrier on the path of class formation of a capitalist type", while Yashkin argued that "without a relative growth of the proletariat amongst the working population, a broadening of capitalist relations is unthinkable." The "structurally different" character of peripheral capitalism from past and present Western capitalism was emphasised by Maidanik and Cheshkov, who saw the "growth of capitalist relations" in the third world only in "deviant forms", reflecting a situation in which "capitalism has lost its absolute character". Kollontai and Medovoi thought "the formation of capitalism in
the developing countries" was still obstructed by multistructurality, as did
Pokataeva, who claimed that "in the formation of the capitalist structure here the
essential role is played by foreign capital, particularly international
monopolies." Sterbalova and Ostrovitianov argued that only "with difficulty,
painfully" can one perceive capitalism in Oriental societies dominated by "a
special variety of state monopoly, which has rested on a fusion of power and state
ownership with the absence of any developed bourgeois private property." Only four speakers clearly expressed the second view, and two of these, Sheinis
and Leonid Fridman, disagreed with Simoniya's idea, entertained also by Mirsky,
that "a few groups" of developing countries could leap forward to state-monopoly
capitalism, "by-passing the cycle of the flourishing of 'free' private
enterprise." Concluding the discussion, Mirsky warned of "the danger of an
identification of capitalism with that manifestation of it ... in the history of
Western Europe."263

One noticeable feature of Soviet debate about peripheral capitalism in the
1980s has been a polarisation of opinion within IVAN and IMEMO more so than
between them. The IVAN book edited by Primakov presented two dominant
ideas beneath the slogan that capitalism had entered "into an epoch of chronic and
deepening crisis". First, while noting that most third world countries in the
1970s had experienced "quite a broad growth of capitalism from below", it
considered this limited to the 'modern' sector, and argued that, without "a
fundamental breaking up of former, traditional, pre-capitalist relations in all
spheres of social life", the conditions did not exist "for the development of
productive forces in the scope and degree which the capitalist mode of production
needs." While Shirokov viewed India as a country "which has already
attained or is approaching medium-developed capitalism," he claimed that the
'duality' now present in its national economy "inevitably grows according to the
growth of the capitalist structure itself, and above all according to the growth in
its limits of a modern system of productive forces." Second, this pessimism
about the domestic maturity of the national bourgeoisie was accompanied by a
view of its external position within "a new structure of 'centre' -- 'periphery'
relations" which repeated the old IMEMO argument that the developing
countries' increasing "role in the world economy has been accompanied not by a liquidation of dependence upon imperialism, but by changes in its character and forms." Dinkevich claimed that growing trans-national investment in the third world not only stimulates the development of local capitalism, but "strengthens the dependence", especially technological, of these countries upon world capitalism; he thought the economic interests of new "sub-imperialist centres" would remain "closely tied with imperialism" and hence could not be a foundation for a more independent foreign policy. In opposition to these views, and to a statement which counterposed India's "independent national development" to the generally "conservative character" of "authoritarian power" in other countries on the capitalist path, Simoniya in his chapter of this book distinguished between two broad types of capitalist development in authoritarian third world countries. He contrasted the instability and greater dependence upon imperialism of elements of "reactionary-bureaucratic state-monopoly capitalism", emerging in such backward monarchies as the Shah's Iran and Saudi Arabia, to the relative stability and lesser dependence of nationalist "bureaucratic state capitalism" in "neo-Bonapartist dictatorships" like Thailand and Indonesia. This analysis of different types of Oriental capitalism did not fit easily with either Shirokov's general characterisation of a chronically 'dualist' economy or Dinkevich's rendition of dependency theory.

While Simoniya edited the most influential book published under the banner of IVAN during the 1980s, the comparable book at IMEMO was edited by Sheinis, who tried to combine a largely quantitative analysis of economic growth in the developing world with a fundamentally qualitative approach to social progress. This strange combination derived from his basic assumption that the main measures of humanity are the enrichment of needs and the broadening of choices for the masses. In defining the development of productive forces as only a prerequisite for, not a criterion of, social progress, Sheinis started from the presuppositions "that economic growth may not in any society be a goal in itself, [but] the size of the product entering the sphere of personal and social demand ... most adequately expresses the possibilities and effectiveness of a given economic system." He attempted to provide "a complex analysis of economic and social
processes in the developing countries," considered not as a homogeneous group but as "a motley conglomerate of countries" at different levels of development. 271

Sheinis disputed simultaneously the major Western, third world and Stalinist orthodoxies about development. In opposition to the usual bourgeois view that the task for backward countries was simply to 'catch-up' with the developed West, Sheinis argued that this focus on tempos of growth was "a phantom", because most developing countries had inevitably established "an essentially different variant of economic growth" from that of classical capitalism. 272 In opposition to nationalist reactions which reject modern civilisation as superfluous to 'basic needs', Sheinis insisted on the universality of human development, claiming that the unprecedented problems of the third world cannot be solved on a piecemeal scale, "outside the basic course of contemporary technical progress and the forms of social organisation dictated by it.‛ 273 And against the pretentious voluntarism of state-directed 'great leaps forward', he emphasised the destructive consequences of authoritarian control over economic, political and cultural life by new leaders fluent principally in "anti-imperialist declarations". 274 He ridiculed the view that the developing world's huge problems could quickly be solved by nationalisation, and stated directly that "definite elements of positive social development ... have been observed in countries of capitalist orientation, even those with a clearly expressed dependent path of development." 275 While conservative scholars like S.A. Bessonov celebrated a hypocritical declaration by President Marcos that classical capitalism (with its cynical exploitation of labour and enormous profits) was not good enough for the Philippines, Sheinis investigated the actual development of capitalist production in the periphery and considered its implications for established views of the third world. 276

In order to disprove finally the "canonised dogmas" of dependency theory, Sheinis constructed a typology of the levels of economic development of all third world countries. 277 For this, his basic assumption was that the scope and character of economic dependence was determined by "the degree of
backwardness of the productive forces," which could roughly be measured in terms of per capita GNP. He divided the developing world into seven groups, the top three forming an "upper echelon", the middle two an "intermediate echelon", and the bottom two a "lower echelon". Sheinis argued that the capitalist mode of production was already established in his first group, the mostly Latin American countries of 'medium developed capitalism', which were closely connected with the world capitalist economy and had managed to "reproduce, although in a strongly modified form, the experience of cultural-historical development of European peoples." He claimed that, "strictly speaking", these countries formed an "intermediate" area of the world capitalist economy, together with "the backward periphery of Western Europe" and the oil-rich developing countries, which constituted his second group. Noting that the second group was historically very backward, Sheinis suggested that "forms of modern socio-economic life, such as a capitalist organisation of the economy, are quickly penetrating here", developing productive forces quicker than in the rest of the third world and leading to the formation of "new power centres in the world capitalist economy". His third group comprised tiny states with a highly-productive export sector. Sheinis bothered with them in order to illustrate the diversity of the third world, and to emphasise that economic growth for small countries results from being "deeply enmeshed in the international division of labour". He claimed that the prospects for poor small states, including many countries of 'socialist orientation', improving their economic position will depend upon whether they can develop "similar variants of international specialisation."

Sheinis stressed the decreasing commonality of the third world in two ways. First, he claimed that the two main groups of the upper echelon possessed more "general-economic and industrial potential", and faced less serious social problems, than poorer countries without deep-rooted or dynamic capitalist development. Second, as well as dividing the remaining countries horizontally into different groups, he argued that the intermediate echelon was tending to split apart, with some countries likely to move forward into a higher group while others lagged behind. Significantly, the "verticals" which Sheinis
noted, uniting countries at different levels with similar prospects of economic development, focused on capitalist oriented countries that encouraged much foreign investment. In his fourth group he highlighted South Korea and Taiwan as moving toward 'medium developed capitalism', characterised in Asia by Singapore and Hong Kong not India, while in his fifth group he suggested that this type of development was occurring at a lower level in Thailand and the Philippines. Sheinis included states of 'socialist orientation' in his rankings, but devoted little specific attention to them in terms of economic growth, which he correlated largely with local capitalist development. As well as demonstrating that many developing countries were not locked into a vicious circle of dependence and backwardness, his typology apparently provided a rough measure of the degree to which multistructurality still characterised the third world. Only his seventh group of poorest countries, together with the least developed countries in his fifth group, were not marked by a strong growth of national capitalism. While Sheinis placed his sixth group, comprising three "very populous countries with a low income level" (India, Pakistan and Indonesia) in the lower echelon on the basis of per capita GNP, he admitted the "provisionality of such an association", since in terms of "a series of essential relations" these countries "stand 'higher' than many other countries of not only the lower, but possibly also the intermediate echelon". Sheinis argued extensively that most developing countries had established an effective mechanism of expanded reproduction, which operated autonomously from business cycles in developed capitalist states and was increasingly less fractured into contemporary and traditional structures of production. He recognised that these countries still faced big structural economic problems, particularly the disproportion between relatively high-value industrial production and relatively small industrial employment which Shirokov had stressed, but tended to suggest that the economic constraints of multistructurality were now markedly less significant than legacies of the past in the socio-cultural sphere.

The response from a variety of Soviet scholars to Sheinis' analysis was positive, particularly concerning the question of peripheral capitalist development. Several participants in a review discussion compared the 1983
IMEMO book edited by Sheinis and El'ianov favourably with its 1974 predecessor. Like Evgeny Rashkovsky, Khoros congratulated the authors for making "no small step forward in comparison with the preceding conceptions of 'multistucturality' and 'dependent development'," by showing convincingly that "the problems of the developing countries cannot be reduced only to backwardness and dependence." Reisner agreed that the economic section of the book had demonstrated the autonomy of national capitalist development in the periphery from business cycles in the centre, although he doubted whether the authors' subsequent criticism of Krylov for a "hypertrophied accent on dependence" was correct in counterposing internal to external factors. L.S. Miksha of Moscow State University thought the argument of the economic section, particularly the chapter on economic crises, confirmed his "conclusion about the capitalist transformation of a multistructural economy." A.E. Granovskiy of IVAN similarly endorsed the book's "systematic macro-economic analysis", particularly its thesis about the formation of mechanism of reproduction in many developing countries "which has been able in the course of a prolonged period to support tempos of economic growth at a level higher than in the developed part of the world capitalist economy". He also criticised some confusion in the book resulting from the authors' "contradictory" and unsuccessful "attempt to consider type of economic development, not speaking yet about social development, as a function of level of development". Granovskiy suggested that sometimes Sheinis and his colleagues had tended to reduce different types of socio-economic development to different levels as measured in aggregate statistics. He argued that, despite this, their actual analysis "convincingly shows that the qualitative differentiation of the developing countries according to type of development is much deeper than that according to per capita GNP, so that the developing countries are not simply situated at chronologically different steps of a single process of development, but largely proceed on qualitatively different paths of structural development." This criticism, while questioning the adequacy of a typology constructed largely on a quantitative basis, added strength to Sheinis' overall point -- that third world countries have less in common than the name implies.
Another point of supportive qualification was made on a broader scale by A.M. Petrov of IVAN, who doubted the meaning of comparisons by Sheinis of levels of economic growth between contemporary developing countries and Western Europe a century ago. Petrov suggested that Sheinis had falsely abstracted in his economic analysis from the different historical contexts of capitalist development in the third world and in 19th century Europe, allowing the reader to interpret his figures about comparative growth rates as evidence for reviving the 'catching up' viewpoint. However, Petrov noted that Sheinis had subjected this perspective to a "ruthless critique" toward the end of the book, showing "the existence of a completely special model of capitalism" in the liberated world. Maksimenko likewise considered this conclusion about a structural "dissimilarity of the capitalist 'East' to the capitalist 'West'" as "extraordinarily important", although he thought that the specific place of post-colonial societies in global history had not been sufficiently established in the second half of the book on social development. He criticised the authors for "uncritically" repeating the widespread thesis about a growing role of the state in developing countries, without adequately considering the state as "a strategically important sphere of a fierce social struggle for dominant positions in the power bloc." 

This absence from the book of a specifically political analysis was reflected in some ambiguity about the problem of state capitalism. In his macro-economic analysis, Sheinis suggested that the leading structure in most developing countries was national capitalism, either in a private or state form. But in his historical overview of social structures in the third world he endorsed Cheshkov's opinion that the state sector, even in countries of capitalist orientation, is not reducible to the state capitalist structure, and generally emphasised the large social obstacles facing peripheral capitalist development. Surprisingly, in their conclusion Sheinis and El'ianov downplayed somewhat the significance of economic differentiation, and expressed a view remarkably similar to that of Shirokov. They stressed the economic disintegration of third world economies, and remarked that:
the capitalist ... restructuring of backward multistructural social structures, their adaption to completely different, incomparably higher ... forms of social life is exceptionally complex. Therefore, it would be an illusion to suggest that serious economic and social disproportions may be fully (or even largely) overcome already in the life of current generations. In the developing world there exist - and, apparently, will exist for a long time yet - completely different systems: the criterion of economic and social efficiency of one of these is the relation of income to expended resources, and of the other, the absolute magnitude of the product produced and productive employment. 299

Earlier, Sheinis suggested that, considered historically rather than synchronically, post-colonial societies are "hybrids", which "it is hardly reasonable" to identify as bourgeois or socialist. Like Cheshkov, he thought their specificity as "transitional multistructural structures consists in being as it were simultaneously situated at all stages" of human progress, combining legacies of early class societies with elements of an advanced structure of demand, derived from European capitalist development and socialist aspirations to overcome class contradictions. 300 While criticising the theories of multistructurality and dependent development as "rigid a priori schemes", Sheinis did not, through either his empirical, macro-economic analysis or his general discussion of social backwardness, provide an alternative to existing theories of the third world, and consequently he reproduced the now dominant 'dualist' view in a less rigid form. 301 As Sledzevsky observed, "strictly speaking" Sheinis himself proceeded, like anyone else, "not from the facts, not from the specific features of real development, but from a preliminary logical break-down of the subject -- a break-down, it is necessary to say, based not only on categories, but on taking the problems of social development only in one, earlier selected logical field (in the plane of an earlier established combination of the factors of development)." 302 By focusing on quantitative and qualitative aspects of development largely ignored by other Soviet scholars, Sheinis managed to produce "more questions than answers", but not a theory of capitalist development in the periphery. 303

In a review article Simoniya criticised Sheinis for not fully overcoming the "deeply pessimistic conception" of 'dependent development', despite disagreeing with Krylov and, as Slavnyi pointed out, with Dinkevich. 304 Simoniya endorsed the economic analysis of Sheinis and his colleagues, but suggested that the
simplicities of dependency theory could only be overcome by a qualitative explanation of differentiation amongst developing countries, not by Sheinis' quantitative typology. Simoniya strongly criticised the concept of 'medium developed capitalism', which Sheinis used to associate the economically most developed third world countries with the least developed countries of Western Europe. Understood qualitatively as the middle or mature phase of the capitalist formation, Simoniya argued that "the term 'medium level of capitalism' is suitable only for the 'primary model' of capitalism, that is for a small group of countries of the West, and relates only to their historical past." He claimed that in backward countries, where elements of competitive and monopoly capitalism are superimposed through the state on the process of early capitalist development, it is "senseless to speak of 'medium developed capitalism', the more so because this first phase in the absolute majority of developing states carries a symbiotic character, that is, here there are present essential structural elements of preceding formational structures, and also a colonial synthesis, left over from the recent past." Simoniya suggested that, by failing to distinguish between economic growth and economic development, Sheinis had tried to evaluate peripheral capitalism according to measures suitable only for classical capitalism. Consequently, despite his intentions and because of his inadequate methodology, Sheinis had not fully transcended the 'catching up' perspective.

Simoniya argued that the only sense in which leading third world countries resembled backward countries of Europe was in terms of the common features of delayed capitalist development. The structural similarities between 'secondary' capitalism in Russia and Japan and 'tertiary' capitalism in most developing countries had been noted by Khoros, but he initially viewed the latter through dependency theory. Simoniya's theory of Oriental capitalist development was meant to supercede this supposedly 'global' perspective, as well as the more down to earth generalisations of 'multistructurality' and 'dualism' put forward by Levkovsky and Shirokov. The basic problem addressed by Simoniya was how to evaluate the "formational maturity" of capitalism in the developing states. He assumed, like Sheinis, that such an evaluation must refer to previous capitalist development, but argued that only the 'secondary'
capitalism typical of Eastern Europe was structurally similar to, and hence an appropriate measure for, the extremely unnatural or "synthesised" capitalism developing in most of the third world.\textsuperscript{312}

Simoniya began his theory by constructing a 'classical' scheme of the natural emergence of capitalism from a decaying feudalism, the essential structures of which were overthrown in a successful bourgeois revolution. He claimed that this "endogeneous" form of capitalist development, characterised by "a consistent transition from one phase to another", occurred only in countries of 'primary' capitalism, principally England and France.\textsuperscript{313} Only in these countries did an organic synthesis of traditional and modern elements during the first, 'Bonapartist' phase of capitalist development lead to the second, 'bourgeois democratic' phase, in which capitalism existed in a mature form, before beginning to negate itself in its third phase through the emergence of private and state monopolies.\textsuperscript{314} In contrast, 'secondary' capitalist development in countries like Germany, Italy and Russia arose in a deformed way, under the influence of an absolutist state trying to maintain its feudal structure and compete internationally with the 'Bonapartist' or even 'bourgeois democratic' states of 'primary' capitalism.\textsuperscript{315} Simoniya suggested that the first phase of 'secondary' capitalist development was characterised by "a complex synthesis, or symbiosis, of absolutist and Bonapartist state organisations", which reflected the "unfinished" nature of the bourgeois social revolution.\textsuperscript{316} This mixture of feudal and capitalist structures did not produce a mature capitalist society, characterised by an organic civil society and so cyclical but not structural crises.\textsuperscript{317} Instead, countries of 'secondary' capitalism leapt from the first to the third phase of capitalist development, experiencing great social tensions as a result. Monopolies here emerged quickly "from above", but were socially weaker than in countries of 'primary' capitalism.\textsuperscript{318} Simoniya argued that 'secondary' capitalism's key feature is that "all its phases have a transitional character", i.e. are formed from a synthesis of structures from different socio-economic formations.\textsuperscript{319}

Simoniya viewed such a continually changing 'complex synthesis' of opposing traditional and modern structures as typical, in more diverse forms, of the
'tertiary' capitalism developing in most post-colonial societies. The distinguishing feature of 'tertiary' capitalism is its genesis out of a 'colonial synthesis', i.e. "as a result not of intra-state evolution, but of inter-state conflict and the forced orientation of the mode of production in a bourgeois direction by capitalist elements of foreign origin." Simoniya identified two related points in which 'tertiary' capitalism is significantly more 'synthetic' than the structurally similar 'secondary' variety. First, "the contemporary bourgeois states in countries of the Orient (irrespective of their concrete form) appeared not from heaven, but all the same from above -- either as a result of political national liberation revolutions, or thanks to a deal of the former metropole with the elite of the dominant classes." Simoniya suggested that these new states found themselves after independence "on the completely inadequate base of a compounded real society, which if it contained isolated, primarily potential, elements of a modern, bourgeois, civil society, then in the majority of cases they were insufficient for securing the stability, firmness and effective activity of a genuinely contemporary state." Second, the emerging national capitalist structure in this largely pre-bourgeois society was contradicted by two traditional elements (the 'colonial synthesis' and archaic, pre-colonial structures) not one, as in countries of 'secondary' capitalism. Facing such opposition, the new national state in countries of 'tertiary' capitalism had to synthesize or integrate these traditional elements while introducing modern elements of civil society "largely from above". Simoniya argued that this task could only be fulfilled by one or another form of 'Bonapartist' state, which uses "crude methods and forms of centralisation" and "a large proportion of traditional authoritarianism" in conducting "a policy of social (bourgeois) modernisation." He claimed that "in the first phase of social development in the countries of the Orient this centralisation acquires with objective inevitability the character of authoritarianism (sometimes open, sometimes masked in different forms of parliamentarism)." In a discussion with Sheinis, Simoniya suggested that there is no alternative in the third world to a 'stalactite' form of capitalist development, although he added that within this type there is "an enormous diversity of concrete-historical models, conditioned in particular by different correlations in them of the elements of democracy and reaction."
Simoniya grouped capitalist developing countries according to their "level of formational development", as manifested in the character of their post-colonial synthesis of conflicting social structures, particularly the capacity of the national capitalist structure to play "a leading role in relation to the remaining components of the social structure".\textsuperscript{328} In contrast to Sheinis, he considered Saudi Arabia to be at a qualitatively lower level of development than India, because it was characterised by only a "formal synthesis", in which traditionalists borrowed some fruits of modern civilisation in order to strengthen an original "neocolonialist absolutist state organisation".\textsuperscript{329} Simoniya viewed India as one of the most advanced bourgeois states in the developing world, with an essential synthesis observable "practically at all levels and in all spheres of life", particularly in the remarkably stable "authoritarian parliamentary" form of state organisation.\textsuperscript{330} He explained this largely in terms of the "comparatively high level of maturity of the national capitalist structure", which enabled the national bourgeoisie to maintain its supremacy with relative ease and flexibly work out reformist solutions to social crises.\textsuperscript{331} Simoniya argued that as a rule crises of social structures in the developing world are more profound "at very early stages of capitalist modernisation", particularly in cases of exceptionally accelerated development such as Iran under the Shah.\textsuperscript{332} He thought an Iranian-type revolution from below unlikely in "neo-Bonapartist regimes" like Indonesia, where traditional structures are more integrated into the process of national capitalist development.\textsuperscript{333} He viewed such regimes as Thailand, Egypt, and even Pakistan under military rule as "characterised by a relatively high level of political stability", based on the development of a bureaucratic state-capitalist economic structure; in the Philippines, where this foundation is weaker and "a crisis of social structures is objectively inevitable", he thought "a resolution of it by reformist means seems entirely possible."\textsuperscript{334} While asserting that state-monopoly tendencies would arise in a variety of third world countries, Simoniya argued that their effects would differ according to the level of capitalist development attained. Particularly in India, but also in Thailand, the resulting social tensions would not threaten the existing political system, while such capitalist development would tend to strengthen these countries' economic independence from imperialism.\textsuperscript{335} But in countries with a weaker post-colonial
synthesis, a social crisis could result in representatives of traditional structures coming to power and pursuing a "very high level" of a very low form of "anti-imperialist independence" (remember, for example, Iran 1980-1982)." Like Sheinis, Simoniya thought that such "reactionary anti-imperialism" was not worth supporting. 336

Simoniya's approach to the phenomena of Oriental capitalism was widely endorsed by other Soviet scholars as a big step forward, although several participants in a review discussion criticised his theory for some rigidity. 337 A.S. Agadzhanian of IVAN characterised Simoniya's idea of a continually changing synthesis as "an answer to the more radical and ... more pessimistic theoretical tendencies characteristic of the 1970s [in] the conceptions of 'dependent development' and 'dualism'." 338 The same point was made by Aleksandrov, who regarded Simoniya's focus on the "integrating character" of post-colonial states as "an important step forward in the development of a general methodology for studying ... the developing countries" in a non-Eurocentric way. 339 Significantly, the most complete endorsement of Simoniya's interpretation of Oriental capitalism came from Mirsky, who was one of the main contributors to the 1974 IMEMO book. He agreed with Simoniya's central thesis that a 'Bonapartist' state organisation was necessary for countries of 'tertiary' capitalism after independence, saying it "allows one to draw a very strict, logical, convincing picture of the post-colonial development of Asia and the Near East, to give an answer to many questions which until now remained unclear." 340 Mirsky agreed with Simoniya's characterisation of 'secondary' capitalism as lacking a mature phase, but considered his thesis about a decline of bourgeois democracy in the central countries of state-monopoly capitalism as "very debatable". 341 Sheinis also doubted this point of Simoniya's 'classical' scheme, and together with Khoros criticised both Simoniya's "broadened rendering of the concept 'Bonapartism' into a spirit of authoritarianism in general," and his classification of Germany as a country of 'secondary' rather than 'primary' capitalism. 342 However, they fully supported Simoniya's serious comparative-historical approach to the prospects for capitalism in the third world, in opposition to the "widespread routine approach" of ignoring or paying
lip-service to theories about formational development. Sheinis endorsed Reisner's view that the backwardness of Oriental societies in the modern era resulted partly "because of their distance from the West", and suggested that Simoniya's general 'synthesis' conception of history contained "elements of a new scientific paradigm, the need for which is felt quite sharply."

This idea was spelt out by Slavnyi, who credited Simoniya with overcoming an "invisible barrier" to understanding "the essence of social processes in the Orient." Slavnyi argued that this barrier consisted of an *a priori* generalisation of the "regionally limited experience" of countries of 'primary' capitalism into "the essence of a universal process" of capitalist development. He suggested that Simoniya had clarified the limits of this generalisation in relation to Oriental capitalism, by "emphasising the irrelevance of the classical model for countries which have embodied the secondary and tertiary models". He considered the main innovation of Simoniya's theory to be an "affirmation of the special significance of civilising factors in social evolution", particularly the emergence of civil society as an integrating prerequisite for capitalism. From this, Slavnyi concluded that "the development of capitalism in the liberated countries was not provided for precisely by civilising, and not by economic or any other prerequisites", and agreed with Simoniya that developing countries like India, rather than Saudi Arabia, had established a "synthesised" civilisation that potentially "creates the conditions for a transition to bourgeois civilisation." Slavnyi also viewed Simoniya's theory as an alternative to the "technocratic approach" of "the supporters of the conception of 'dualism'." While the latter saw capitalist development in India as limited to a technologically advanced but socially narrow modern sector of the society, Slavnyi argued that this was not necessarily so. He suggested that capitalist production could develop in third world countries using labour-intensive technology, which is more profitable here than in developed capitalist countries because of the existence of huge masses of cheap labour. He noted that such a "synthesis" had emerged first "in the sphere of production organised by the trans-national corporations," leading to "a strengthening of dependence on the centres of the world capitalist economy." But he argued that this non-classical "technological mode of production" would
spread via the "enormous mass of small producers", broadening the social base of Oriental capitalism.\textsuperscript{348} Slavnyi even suggested that Simoniya's approach was "so new" that he had not fully transcended the technocratic perspective himself, when defining India as advanced in third world terms because of its "highly-developed technology", rather than owing to the proportion of its population involved in capitalist relations.\textsuperscript{349}

The shift in the terms of Soviet debate about capitalism about in the third world was noted by Levkovsky in one of his last articles, about a "new stage" in the formation of the national bourgeoisie. He dismissed even moderate dependency theorists for understating "the significance and weight of the bourgeoisie" in the periphery, which had increased in the last two decades when "a growth of capitalism from below strengthened sharply". Levkovsky noted the "strengthening of local monopolies" in countries like India that Simoniya had highlighted, and agreed with him on the capitalist potential of merchant capital, suggesting that "lower shoots of capitalism have managed to come up, so to say, from under the asphalt of large and middle business, owing to the fact that this 'asphalt' does not cover the whole economy, is strewn with cracks and is not always stable, especially politically."\textsuperscript{350} Conceding that "the degree of disintegration" of a multistructural economy had been "exaggerated and even absolutised", Levkovsky noted a growing "tendency toward the involvement in the general process of reproduction of an ever greater number of social segments", and "a tendency toward the consolidation, intertwining and even partial coalescence" of the three upper kinds of capitalism (the private-capitalist structure, state capitalism and foreign monopolies). He still stressed the "transitional state" of the national bourgeoisie as a class which could not exist economically "without contacts with the state sector and foreign capital", or politically "without cooperation with other social forces", but he now considered its potential in quite similar terms to Simoniya.\textsuperscript{351} Landa contributed to this coalescence of views by arguing that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the Orient is historically "transitional", constituting "a stage in the formation and development of such an 'old' community as the private-enterprise bourgeoisie."\textsuperscript{352}
In an article in late 1986, Sheinis tried to deal with any "survivals" of the old orthodoxy about special 'boundaries' or 'limits' for capitalism in the developing countries. He argued that, despite the economic downturn in the early 1980s, the development of capitalist production in the third world had not stopped, and had already attained an "irreversible" position, preventing a return to "enclave capitalism". Disputing Shirokov's 'dualist' view, he thought the widespread "growth of 'lower' capitalism, not only in the cities but also in the countryside", showed that the "spontaneous-market mechanism" remained, as Shmelev had insisted, a powerful, 'system-forming' factor of capitalist development. Sheinis criticised Simoniya's view that original forms of state-monopoly capitalism were already appearing in some developing countries, but his main argument was with those who considered any anti-Western reaction in the third world as 'progressive':

If such movements attain success, then they shatter not capitalism (for they have no realistic socio-economic alternative, and the inertia of commodity-capitalist relations earlier set in motion has its effect), but those attainments of real social progress which accompany it. Iranian society is paying a significantly dearer price for the 'islamic revolution' than for the bourgeois modernisation of the Shah.

Sheinis implied that dependency theory had failed the Iranian test, a point directed against conservative officials like Nikolai Petrov, who viewed the whole third world as still "subjugated" by and rebelling against "the imperialist policy of diktat and exploitation", and also the left-radical group in IMEMO headed by Maidanik, who stuck to the "position that on the path of capitalist development the dominant tendency is a continual reproduction not only of the relations 'dominion - dependence', but also a situation of 'high-development - backwardness' and, as a rule, the disintegrated nature of development." Maidanik considered that a "dependent economy" is not "doomed to stagnation", or prevented from industrialising, but thought "the possibilities of capitalist development in the states of Asia and Africa are organically tied to the retention and deepening of these countries' cooperation with state-monopoly capitalism of the imperialist centres." He claimed that without these ties capitalism could not become the leading structure in the periphery, and the local bourgeoisie could not become the
dominant class.\textsuperscript{358} In Maidanik's book, the section on the Iranian revolution saw it as "a most serious strike on the 'model' of dependent capitalist development", praising the Khomeini regime's "undebatable anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism" even after its brutal repression of leftists "already in 1979-1980".\textsuperscript{359} Another view was presented by Simoniya, who not only criticised loyal communists for siding with Khomeini, but provided an explanation of the latter's victory in terms more profound than the role of an unfortunate subjective factor.\textsuperscript{360} Significantly, Mirsky applauded Simoniya for seeing that capitalism would still develop in anti-Western Iran, at a time "when the specificity of the Islamic regime had aroused in many of our scholars illusions, engendered by the mass, liberating character of the revolution, and by the authorities' peculiar tactics, their anti-capitalist rhetoric."\textsuperscript{361}

The new liberal orthodoxy about oriental capitalist development has become significantly more influential amongst Soviet scholars as a result of the relaxation of censorship following the January 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Even as this liberalisation began, a cogent article by Mirsky, who noted that any denunciation of a particular view as "heresy" would mean that "the opportunities for scientific research are in general closed", summarised Simoniya's argument that the initially weak position of the national bourgeoisie in post-colonial societies was both "natural" and temporary. Mirsky stressed that objective and subjective "contradictions" between 'neo-Bonapartist' dictatorships and private bourgeoisies were "secondary", because the former forces, including the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' which administers the state sector, "historically act in the interests of the bourgeoisie" by securing stable conditions for "capitalist development as a process".\textsuperscript{362} The necessity of this process as a condition of progress for backward countries was soon argued in a controversial article by Sheinis, who attempted to demonstrate the short-sightedness of old political thinking, which had been "falling off a conveyer" with "onesided and at times simply primitive interpretations of complex problems," based on "dogmatic prejudices" that obstruct the development of theory.\textsuperscript{363}

Sheinis used the new atmosphere of openness to state frankly some points
"implicitly already existing in a number of scientific publications." First, he asserted that the "existing gap between North and South" resulted not principally from the effect of colonialism on the latter, but from the historical maturation in the former of dynamic "economic and social mechanisms of development". He linked "the genuine tragedy of the 'third world'" with the legacy of pre-capitalist structures rather than the consequences of capitalist development, claiming that "the essence" of

backwardness consists not in the type of capitalism which began to penetrate here already during colonialism, but in the type of social milieu where it acts and which it has not managed in the majority of developing countries until now to reconstruct in its own shape and image, owing to causes rooted not so much in the immanent contradictions of capitalism as in the characteristics of this very milieu.\textsuperscript{364}

Second, Sheinis argued that "the prospects for a resolution of many economic and even social problems" in the third world are "tied with a capitalist transformation of the economy, which is gathering tempo and spreading wide and deep, although it often takes on unusual, 'non-classical' forms." He outlined a necessary "economic mechanism" for overcoming backwardness which emphasised the "flexibility" of state regulation, an expansion of market relations, a modernisation of traditional structures, and paying for not expelling the "advantages" of foreign enterprise.\textsuperscript{365} Third, Sheinis counterposed the "quite harsh demands" of this mechanism to the inefficient, short-term stability of economic independence. Noting that there must be a trade-off between these choices, he now turned Maidanik's admission that dependence does not mean stagnation around, by claiming that a focus only on independence does result in "a deepening of backwardness and an atrophy of the mechanisms of development."\textsuperscript{366} At a conference of young scholars in April 1987, Sheinis asserted that "a country's capacity to adapt to the demands of the world capitalist economy largely determines the successes and pace of its development."\textsuperscript{367} The following month, at a conference of established scholars, he called for a rejection of "frozen stereotypes" about the socio-economic development of the third world, arguing that changes in the world capitalist economy must "modify the category of economic independence as a basic priority for the developing countries."\textsuperscript{368} In
his article he attacked the 'general crisis of capitalism' as such a stereotype, remarking that "a crisis, i.e. an extreme aggravation, an inflaming of all social contradictions, which is prolonged for tens of years -- this is a nonsense, a devaluation of the concept."  

Sheinis explicitly rejected the old assumption that the priority of Soviet policy must be "to broaden as much as possible an 'anti-imperialist front'", saying this had led "politically to a union with anti-democratic, anti-progressive and simply irresponsible forces", subordinating research to "a pre-given, simplified, purely dichotomous vision of today's very complex and heterogeneous world."  

He emphasised that "democracy is not only an instrument," but "an inalienable element of social progress" with "an invariable core -- social initiative and autonomy 'from below', the self-organisation of citizens possessing a certain freedom of choice." He proposed a more relaxed and open policy toward the West. Given "the sensitivity of social opinion in the West to the USSR's policy toward conflicts" in the third world, it was necessary to "actively form a zone of the coinciding interests of East and West in the South", keeping the inevitable "periodic aggravations" of conflict here "within the limits of civilised social conduct." He claimed that "in the North there are influential forces who are interested in increasing the level of economic development of the South, resolving the most urgent social problems there, and reducing the potential for conflict." Recognising that he might be accused of "wishful-thinking, not considering today's political realities", Sheinis argued that:

> overcoming the inertia of established approaches may not spread in some spheres and avoid others. Conservatism and extraordinary caution in some areas of politics, ideology and science may seriously weaken the effectiveness of restructuring which unfolds in other directions.

Such boldness raised the ire of Agaev, who thought Sheinis had gone beyond the pale by questioning the absolute priority of the broadest possible 'anti-imperialist front'. Asserting that Sheinis had re-written the party line by emphasising the interdependence of states in the modern world rather than their opposing natures, Agaev taunted him with having succumbed to 'the convergence hypothesis', but to little avail, since the official line had shifted noticeably in this direction and, in
any case, the legitimacy of what Sheinis called "an uncompromising counterposition of different points of view in the course of scientific discussion" was now established.\(^3\) The same issue of the journal carrying Agaev's riposte included an article by Yuri Shishkov, IMEMO's leading liberal economist, who asserted that "the economy of the Soviet Union and the economy of the developed capitalist countries, with all the differences in their material-technical base, are founded upon one and the same technological mode of production."\(^4\) This Western orientation is supported now by Primakov, and by German Diligensky, the new chief editor of the IMEMO journal, who gave "moral support" to Sheinis and El'ianov during the 'years of stagnation' and recently called for an end to "the influence on theory of apologetic tendencies".\(^5\) The task he set of "re-thinking our scientific and political language" was performed with zest by Nikolai Karagodin, a contributor to the book by Sheinis and El'ianov, whose damning review of a conservative book about trans-national corporations in the third world appeared in June 1988 under the title: "Analysis or Myth-creation?"\(^6\) Six weeks later the new liberal orthodoxy was enshrined at a special conference in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where Shevardnadze noted a recent improvement in the level of scientific advice and stated clearly that: "The struggle of two opposing systems is not the most determining tendency of the contemporary epoch."\(^7\)

Sheinis claimed in early 1988 that, while "inertia" kept the "formerly prevailing" approach to peripheral capitalism alive, the issue "consists already not in whether there is on the path of capitalism in the developing countries an insurmountable boundary, a 'barrier of underdevelopment' and so on, but in what type of capitalism is being consolidated in the economy and society of these countries".\(^8\) Accepting Simoniya's criticism of his quantitative typology, he now viewed the "comparative maturity" of capitalism in the third world qualitatively, depicting "upper", "middle" and "lower" "horizons" of countries at broadly similar levels of capitalist development which were quite different from his previous classification. The main change was that the oil-rich countries were placed in the middle horizon behind India, which together with Pakistan and Indonesia had been 'moved up' from the least developed group. This change
reflected a more historical view of Oriental capitalism, but Sheinis criticised Simoniya for overestimating the chances of accelerated capitalist development in India, whose "comparatively stable and balanced variant of economic and social development" he thought "almost unique in the developing world". Placing Taiwan and South Korea in the upper horizon because of their "dynamic development", based on a "flexible economic mechanism, quite keenly reacting to shifts in world production and trade", he considered that the "key question" of whether Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines would follow this path "remains open." Yashkin had recognised the leading position of 'newly industrialising countries' in the "upper echelon" of the third world, but this change has been viewed differently. Urging "a rejection of excessive generalisations" about "the periphery of the world capitalist economy", B.F. Kliuchnikov criticised "the assertion about a crisis of the 'catching-up' model in relation to a group of developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region", arguing that the "geo-economics and geo-politics" of an "impulsive capitalist transformation of this region" made "doubtful" Shirokov's new thesis "about a reduction of the role of the liberated countries in the world capitalist economic system, and a weakening of the interest in them of the imperialist centres." Kollontai agreed "in general" with Shirokov, but claimed that "a series of states, and also separate branches of economic systems at a country level remain able to move up to the level of medium developed capitalism", if they create "a flexible and maneuverable economic mechanism". This prospect was denied by Avakov and by Dinkevich, who criticised "an exaggeration of spontaneous-market relations" by scholars who make an "absolutisation" of export-oriented development, and S.A. Byliniak's view that "the debt problem and protectionism hardly leads to a catastrophe" for capitalist developing countries.

The now dominant Soviet view that Oriental capitalism is still progressive has not emerged from a new synthetic theory of the developing world. Avakov in his authoritative overview of Soviet third world studies claimed that the specific features of 'peripheral capitalism' had not yet been properly analysed, and even remarked that Eurocentrism had left Soviet scholars "practically deprived of scientific tools adequately accounting for the specificity of the object of
research. His evaluation suggests that the persuasiveness of the new liberalism derives more from undermining old conceptions than successfully establishing new ones. At a recent conference, Aleksandrov pointed out that the recent growth of third world capitalism "was not foreseen by the theoretical ideas of the 1960s and 1970s", but V.G. Rastiannikov and E.V. Kotova's "model of Oriental capitalism" which stressed the absence of free competition was rejected by Granovsky and A.P. Kolontaev, who thought it "incorrect to identify a disruption of the value proportions of commodity production with a deformation of the mechanism of market relations." The specificity of Oriental capitalism was stressed by Sledzevsky, who criticised Simoniya and Sheinis for still using an implicit concept of dependent or at least 'catching-up' capitalist development. Sledzevsky welcomed Simoniya's historical approach, but claimed he had not successfully explained the reproduction in third world countries of contradictory social structures, i.e. not established that an essential capitalist synthesis had occurred, rather than just a formal "symbiosis of systemically different elements". Sledzevsky argued that Simoniya's "typology of state organisation" ('Bonapartism', bourgeois democracy, monopolism) was just an "ideal type" of 'primary' capitalist development, and hence not applicable even heuristically to developing countries that derive historically from "different phasal forms and mechanisms of development." Cheshkov made a similar point, claiming that the very idea of a 'nationally-organised capitalist synthesis' in the third world was contradictory. Concerning the evolution of a 'compounded society' after independence, Cheshkov suggested that "there is good reason to consider that a systemic diversity of structures excludes one-directional ... development", so a capitalist synthesis is not inevitable. While Simoniya had recognised this in stressing the crucial role of the post-colonial state, Cheshkov argued that this raised doubts about the "unconditionally 'capitalist' nature" of most developing countries. He also questioned the validity of Simoniya's 'tertiary' model of capitalist development:

This model, peculiar to the developing countries, differs from the primary, as by the way from the secondary, model in the leading role of external factors. If it 'works' in the post-colonial period, then the question arises: how 'national' or 'synthesized' is the capitalism being established in the developing countries? It seems that before us there is rather some branch
of world capitalism, or a variety derived from its centres, even though on
an internal foundation. Consequently, it is necessary to choose between the
model of 'nationally organised capitalism' and the tertiary model of
capitalist formationality. The authors, apparently, are inclined to retain both,
which creates a problem for the general theory of formations.389

Indeed, Simoniya more often contrasted post-colonial, 'tertiary' capitalism with
'Europe', i.e. 'primary' capitalism, than with 'secondary' capitalism, showing a
hidden identification of 'tertiary' and 'secondary' capitalism, which gives some
substance to Sledzhevsky's claim and to Avakov's apparently belated criticism of
Eurocentrism.390

In responding to the thesis of Sheinis and Simoniya that capitalism in the third
world now has a 'logic of self-development', Sterbalova argued that the
"traditional social milieu" (that "mysterious sphinx of the third world") had
adapted capitalism into "'hybrid' forms of production", characterised by "only
the formal, not real subsumption of labour to a new mode of production, which
may become a capitalist mode of production only \textit{in union} with production
relations, i.e. with bourgeois social relations, resting on developed bourgeois
private property and being reproduced by a bourgeois civil society and a
bourgeois state".391 While calling for "further elaboration" of Brutents' old idea
about 'revolutions of a new type', she relied mainly on Cheshkov's thesis that
post-colonial societies have been constituted "as a conglomerate, determined by
the struggle of two social 'principles' -- private and collectivist -- and developing
in many equivalent directions".392 Cheshkov did not simply undermine the
concepts of multistructurality and dependent development like Sheinis and
Simoniya; he tried to incorporate their partial insights in a broader approach,
constructed, as Sledzhevsky pointed out, "not only on the level of empirical
generalisations in the scope of the capitalist formation, but on the level of general
formational theory."393 Cheshkov suggested that the conception of third world
dependence "has a place in explaining the origin of a developing society", as a
historical product of capitalist disruption during colonialism, while
multistructurality appears as the form of a society where "different modes of
production have been placed on one another, but not one of them has been
articulated and acquired formational fulfilment".394 In contrast to Simoniya's
theory of "capitalism as a world system", he argued that "the real growth of
capitalism" has intensified its "internal contradictoriness", as an incomplete
formation split by a double "dualism": the retention of non-capitalist forms in the
East, through an unstable "symbiosis" rather than a progressive "synthesis",
creates two types of social system in the modern world, not one.395 Cheshkov's
view that "the great variety of a developing society across countries and regions,
and also the heterogeneity of its component elements, does not allow one to mark
out a single main path of its evolution", should benefit from the open
consideration of countries like China as part of the third world, but it is doubtful
whether his 'macro-formational approach' will succeed in "setting right the
conceptual views now existing in Soviet science about the developing
countries."396 Despite his call not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, it is
more likely that the important "culturological" study of Oriental civilisations will
proceed "beyond the bounds of the theory of formations" entirely, not parallel
with it toward the "higher level of generalisation" characteristic of 'big
science'.397
Chapter 4, Footnotes:


2. Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 110-11.


4. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 144.


14. *Ibid.*, p. 9, claiming it was possible to "scientifically determine" when the USSR will surpass the USA in economic growth. Cf. E. S. Varga, *Kapitalizm posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, chapter VI, for Varga's 1960 characterisation of the 'third stage'. The suggestion by Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 23, that the 'third stage' "effectively removed the issue of the collapse of capitalism from the historical present to a distant and ever receding future" may capture Varga's intended meaning, but the concurrent predictions of cyclical "Western economic troubles" noted by Hough, pp. 73-4, suggest that the apparent meaning of capitalism's worsening crisis would have been common. Arzumanian, p. 5, focused on a crisis of politics and ideology, more than economics, in the West.


19. Arzumanian, p. 11.


21. N. P. Shmelev, "Burzhuaznye ekonomisty o roli gosudarstvennogo sektora v slaborazvitykh stranakh", *MEMO*, 1962, no. 4, p. 91. By 1970, in a review of a book by A. El'ianov, Shmelev thought that creating such an industrial complex was "irrational" for "the majority of young states",
NAA, 1970, no. 5, p. 183; N.P. Shmelev, Problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta razvivaiushchikhsia stran, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 68: "the developing countries can now use the benefits of the international division of labour to avoid themselves creating an excessively many-sided industrial complex."

22. Hough, pp. 77-81. Cf. K.N. Tarnovsky, "O sotsiologicheskom izuchenii kapitalistichekogo sposoba proizvodstva", review of A.I. Levkovsky, Osobennosti razvitii kapitalizma v Indii, 1963, Voprosy istorii, 1964, no. 1, p. 131: "In particular, one should emphasise the main conclusion flowing from A.I. Levkovsky's whole account. The influx of foreign capital as such does not in itself automatically entail the loss of a country's economic and political independence."


29. V.P. Lukin, "Ideologiiia razvitiia' i massovoe soznание v stranakh 'tret'ego mira'", Voprosy filosofii, 1969, no. 6, p. 36.

30. The characterisation by Boris Kagarlitsky, The Thinking Reed: intellectuals and the Soviet state from 1917 to the present, Verso, London, 1988, p. 284, of Lukin as "an example of a technocrat" is correct from the late 1970s, but not before then. The Machiavellian mode of Soviet politics has been stressed by Hillel Ticktin, "The Year after the Three General Secretaries: Change Without Change", Critique, no. 17, 1986, p. 118; his view is supported by a foreign delegate to the 20th CPSU Congress, Vittorio Vidali, Dictionary of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Journeyman Press, London, 1984, p. 63: "By now it is clear that Stalin himself taught people to be cynical, unscrupulous without any limit, Machiavellian in the most subtle manner, hypocritical. Didn't he use Gorky's death in order to send his own enemies to execution, accusing them of having poisoned Gorky? Today Stalin is useful, He is being dumped overboard in order to give the impression that the regime is becoming democratic". John H. Miller, "The Communist Party: trends and problems", in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser eds, Soviet Policy for the 1980s, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 1, argues that while Stalin ("and Stalinists!") was a Machiavellian, his successors have been "thoroughgoing Hobbesians ... because they seek the bulwark against social breakdown in an institutional arrangement, ... and not in the personal qualities of the sovereign"; his view is more helpful than the standard description of Soviet leaders as 'Leninists' (a vacuous term invented by Stalin to fool the faithful), but implies an unbelievable break in the tradition of Soviet politics, rather than propaganda, after Stalin, and a narrow reading of Machiavelli, who advised the general Prince to be strong but subtle, or dissembling.


33. L. Stepanov, "Posleslovie", in E. Kleer, *Analiz obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskikh struktur stran "tret’ego mira"*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, pp. 204-5. Stepanov, pp. 210-3, still argued that the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the third world were slight.


41. Tiul’panov, *Ocherki*, pp. 13, 115, 139, 192, 198. For the difference between Tiul’panov and Levkovsky, whose view is analysed below, see Yu.N. Rozaliev, "Problemy gosudarstvennogo kapitalizma v razvivaushchikhsia stranakh", *Voprosy istorii*, 1974, no. 8, p. 58, n. 18.

42. Tiul’panov, *Ocherki*, p. 372.

43. Cf. A.I. Levkovsky, "Mnogoukladnye strany: dva kompleksa problem", AAS, 1969, no. 8, p.15: "Now in science there is ripening an obvious contradiction between an essential advancement in disclosing isolated social phenomena (or their definite aspects) in the third world and the need for a complex understanding of the general state and quality of social development in this region".


50. V.I. Maksimenko, review of A.I. Levkovsky, *Sotsial'naia struktura razvivaiushchikhsia stran*, *NAA*, 1979, no. 1, p. 209. In the preface to this book, p. 5, Levkovsky said that his 1963 book on India had led him toward the idea of multistructurality, without expressly formulating it.


53. Levkovsky, "Mnogoukladnye strany: pochemu?", pp. 5-6. Levkovsky did not ignore the key difference in level of productive forces between capitalist and multistructural countries; indeed, his argument about the implications of multistructurality for understanding Soviet history, considered in chapter five, was based on the importance of this difference.


55. Levkovsky, "Spetsifika i granitsy kapitalizma", p. 117. Hough, p. 57, points out that a similar view had been expressed by G.A. Dadashev in 1965.


57. *Zarubezhnyi Vostok*, pp. 27, 179; Levkovsky, "Spetsifika i granitsy kapitalizma", p. 117.


68. Ibid., pp. 477, 483-4, 486.
69. Ibid., pp. 488, 480-3.

70. Hough, p. 88. N.A. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, p. 251, repeated his distinction between an independent economic policy and economic self-sufficiency as part of an argument against the view that national liberation revolutions were continuing.

72. Ibid., p. 265.
73. Ibid., pp. 268-73.
74. Ibid., volume 2, p. 670; cf. Hough, p. 134, n. 94.
75. Zarubezhnyi Vostok, volume 2, p. 668.
76. Ibid., pp. 437-8; cf. pp. 427, 469, 473.
77. Brutents, Sovremennye Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nye Revoliutsii, pp. 175-6.
78. Ibid., p. 182.
79. Ibid., pp. 179-80; cf. pp. 188-90.
80. Ibid., pp. 177-8.
81. Hough, p. 87; Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, p. 22.
82. Ibid., pp. 167, 25, 27, 21.
84. Avakov et. al eds, Razvivaiushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, pp. 157, 28-30, 328.
85. Ibid., pp. 171-2, 168-9, 41.
86. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., pp. 23, 31.
89. Ibid., pp. 48-9.
90. Ibid., pp. 36, 37; cf. p. 456.
91. Ibid., pp. 38, 17.
92. Ibid., pp. 38, 42-3.

95. Ibid., pp. 320-4, 357. Cf. M. Volkov, "Sovremennye prizvoditel'nye sily i osobennosti razvitiia kapitalizma v 'tret'em mire', MEMO, 1974, no. 10, p. 125: "Capitalist development in the liberated countries may only be dependent development, above all because of the colossal economic and technical gap existing between the liberated and industrial capitalist states."


97. Ibid., p. 457.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 64.

100. Ibid., pp. 175-6, 323, 21, 333; Levkovsky, Sotsial'naia struktura razvivaiushchikhsia stran, p. 39; cf. Hough, pp. 89-91, for the two basic Soviet views about Latin American capitalism.


102. V.V. Krylov, "Kharakternye cherty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh protsessov v obshchestvakh razvivaiushchikhsia stran", Voprosy filosofii, 1976, no. 9, pp. 94-106; B.I. Slavnyi, in NAA, 1985, no. 5, p. 164.


104. Ibid., p. 98.

105. Ibid.


107. M.A. Cheshkov, "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza gosuklada: tip obshchestvennogo vosproizvodstva i sotsial'nyi nositel'", in L.I. Reisner ed., Ekonomika Razvivaiushchikhsia Stran: teorii i metody issledovaniiia, Nauka, Moscow, 1979, p. 339, criticised Krylov's "idea of the decisive role in the development of young states of the influence on them of the world systems", while relying heavily on his thesis of new intellectual productive forces which require collective forms of appropriating surplus product; Cheshkov noted that the first "idea has as its prerequisite an image of the young states as some kind of tabula rasa, and this quite naturally calls forth a nationalist reaction."


109. A.V. Kiva, "'Tretii mir': protivorechivye tendentsii", NAA, 1975, no. 4, p. 44.

110. Ibid., p. 45.

111. Ibid., p. 44.

112. Ibid., pp. 45-6. Hough, pp. 91-2, notes that Andreasian expressed this view in 1974, but was less certain three years later.

113. Kiva, "'Tretii mir'", p. 49.

114. Ibid., p. 48.


117. Cf. Ibid., pp. 200-1.

118. Ibid., pp. 253-4.

120. Simonya, Strany Vostoka, pp. 253, 171.

121. Ibid., pp. 253, 167-8, 193; cf. pp. 188, 204, 206.

122. Ibid., pp. 173-4, 195. Cf. Avakov et al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: zakonomernosti, p. 229, n. 1: "colonial exploitation was accompanied, as is known, in much greater degree by the destruction of pre-capitalist classes than the establishment of capitalist ones".


124. Ibid., pp. 217-8; on p. 216, Simonya referred to "colonial absolutism".

125. Cf. ibid., p. 169.

126. Ibid., pp. 196-7, 171.

127. Ibid., pp. 171, n. 12; 200. In the published discussion of Strany Vostoka, Shirokov claimed that Simonya had gone to the "other extreme" from Levkovsky in suggesting that "there is no petty-commodity structure, because it is practically already capitalist", "Obsuzhdenie knigi N.A. Simonya", NAA, 1977, no. 3, p. 64.


130. Sledzevsky, reviewing Aleshina et al. eds, edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, p. 155.


132. Sledzevsky, reviewing Simonya and Reisner eds, Evoliutsiia vostochnyh obshchestv, p.159.


135. Sledzevsky, reviewing Aleshina et al. eds, edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, p. 156.


137. Sledzevsky, reviewing Aleshina et al. eds, edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, p. 156.


139. P. Khvoinik, "Ekonomicheskoi zainteresovannost' imperializma v 'tret'em mire' - tendentsii i

140. *Ibid.*, p. 69; Sheinis did not consider this conclusion contradicted by the fact that, p. 63, "in the coming decades the economic structure and industrial potential of the majority of 'third world' countries will seriously lag from the level of countries which have entered the field of the scientific technical revolution."


143. Avakov's book was sent to be typset in September 1975, a month or so after Kiva's review article had appeared; Avakov's strong defence of IMEMO's dependency theory, pp. 117-20, was inserted after a separate discussion of Western criteria for assessing underdevelopment.

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 278-81, 222, 283; cf. p. 51: "The whole question is how to use world-economic exchanges with developed capitalist states for the purpose of overcoming dependence."


147. Fundulis and Popov, *Assotsiatsii razvivaiushchikhsia stran s evropeiskim ekonomicheskim soobshchestvom*, pp. 121, 117-9, 123-5; 143, 140-1, 105, 191, 202-3. The last section, by Popov, pp.155-99, was entitled "Problemy razvitiiia i ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti".


158. Sheinis, in "Ob'ekt issledovaniia - 'tretii mir'", p. 156.


162. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", pp. 64-5.

163. Ibid., pp. 56-7; "Strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", pp. 115-7, 123.

164. Ibid., p. 123.

165. Ibid., pp. 112-4, 150-7; "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiiia", pp. 104-5. While Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", p. 54, praised the 1974 IMEMO book's 'horizontal' typology, he showed, "Strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", p. 153, that the "widespread conviction" that Turkey "is close to the South European medium developed type" has "insufficient foundation".

166. Sledzevsky, reviewing edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, pp. 155-6, 157.


168. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", pp. 68, 64.

169. Ibid., p. 70; "Problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta i nakopleniia razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh (nauchnaia konferentsiia v IVAN SSSR)", NAA, 1976, no. 2, pp. 231, 232.

170. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma", pp. 69-70.

171. Sheinis, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiiia", p. 100; "Ob'ekt issledovaniia - 'tretii mir'", p. 156. As well as arguing that "relations of interdependence are characteristic of the world capitalist economy in general", Sheinis, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiiia", p. 100, suggested that "in the economic ties between developed capitalist states and a large group of developing countries dependence has a two-sided character, although the influence of the main 'centres' of world capitalism undoubtedly predominates."

172. Ibid., pp. 100, 101.


174. Simoniya, "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza ekonomicheskogo razvitiia", p. 188.

175. Ibid., p. 189.

176. Ibid., pp. 193-4.

177. Ibid., p. 195.

178. Ibid., pp. 203, 208, 209-10.

179. Ibid., pp. 197-8.


181. V.V. Krylov, "Osobennosti razvitiia proizvodiitel'nykh sil i vosprodvizhestvennego protsessa


188. V.A. Yashkin, "Gosudarstvennyi uklad v mnogoukladnoi ekonomike", AAS, 1979, no. 3, pp. 41-2; idem., "Krizis kapitalisticheskoi formatssii i obshchestvennoe razvitie osvobodivshikhsia stran", in Byliniak ed., *Razvivaiushchiesia strany*, p. 9. Yashkin presented his view as a return to Tiul'panov's basic ideas, but he largely ignored Tiul'panov's second tendency, the accelerated growth of national capitalism.


192. Yashkin, "Osvobodivshiesia strany", p. 112; "Krizis kapitalisticheskoi formatssii", pp. 13-6; Dinkevich, "Krizis kapitalizma", pp. 35-6; Dinkevich, "Formatzionnoe razvitie", pp. 27, 30. The term "hierarchy" of multistructurality was coined by Shirokov, "Mezhukladnoe vzaimodeistvie", p. 111, but he considered the national capitalist structure dominant in most third world countries.


196. E.M. Primakov, "Osvobodivshiesia strany: problemy obshchnosti", NAA, 1980, no. 5, pp. 19-22. Primakov, pp. 19-20, cited Sheinis supportively, but added a twist to his terminology, referring now to "asymmetrical interdependence" (rather than "asymmetrical dependence") as characteristic of those developing countries not still burdened by "one-sided dependence". The new
term was picked up by V. Yashkin, "Periferinoe zveno mirovogo kapitalisticheskogo khoziastva: puti razvitiia", AAS, 1981, no. 1, pp. 26-7; he noted that a transition to independent development was now possible on the capitalist path, but suggested that the "asymmetrical" nature of such interdependence with developed capitalist states would continue to be reproduced.

198. Ibid., pp. 25-8; cf. I. Zorina, "Razvivaishchiesia strany v politicheskoi strukture sovremennoi mira", MEMO, 1982, no. 8, p. 84.


201. Cf. A.I. Levkovsky, "Novyi etap v formirovaniy i evoliutsii burzhuazii stran zarubezhnogo vostoka", in idem., ed., Burzhuaziia i sotsial'naia evoliutsii stran zarubezhnogo vostoka, Nauka, Moscow, 1985, p. 11: "In Soviet orientalist science study of the problem of state capitalism began in the second half of the 1950s. Several discussions were conducted, and a fair number of individual and collective monographs and many articles were published. Several approaches to the problem crystallised"; and Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaishchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, p. 178: "In countries of the 'third world' there universally develops a process of the strengthening role of the state in all spheres of national-economic, political and cultural activity. This has long been noted by researchers, who display uniformity in stating this tendency, but interpret its nature differently."


208. Ibid., p. 37.


211. Veits, Maretin, Tiul'panov and Sheinis, "Aktual'nye problemy stran Azii i Afriki", p. 36; Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaishchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, p. 185.

212. Ibid., p. 179.

213. Ibid., pp. 179-82.
214. Ibid., pp. 182-3.

215. Ibid., p. 186; on pp. 189-90, Cheshkov agreed with Levkovsky that the "internal contradictions" of the state structure determine "the reversibility of its 'non-capitalist' character".


217. Cf. Levkovsky, Sotsial'naia struktura razvivaiushchikhsia stran, pp. 21, 149, 160-71. In a wider context, Levkovsky, "Mesto i rol' gostusardstvennogo sektora v ekonomicheskom i sotsial'nom razvitiy stran Vostoka", in idem., ed., Gosudarstvennyi kapitalizm i sotsial'naia evoliutsiia stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka, Nauka, Moscow, 1980, pp. 16-7, subsequently rejected the new term 'state structure' as "unfortunate, since it may create an impression about the existence of some new state production relations, a new state mode of production", but the chapter of this book by Landa repeated, p. 224, an earlier criticism (from Zarubezhnyi Vostok, 1974, volume 1, pp. 307-11) of a 1970 article by Cheshkov, without noting his later work.


220. O.D. Ul'rikh, "Tretii Mir": problemy razvitiia gostusardstvennogo sektora, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, pp. 234, n. 2; 12-3, 24, 29.

221. V.P. Kolesov, Gosudarstvennyi sektor ekonomiki razvivaiushchikhsia stran, Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1977, pp. 13, 128, 133, 143, 144-5. For a response to Kolesov's superficial assertion, p. 132, of "the commonality of state capitalism in the 'third world' with state capitalism in conditions of constructing socialism", see Yu.N. Rozaliev, "Gostusardstvennyi kapitalizm i razvivaiushchaisia ekonomika", NAA, 1980, no. 1, pp. 72-83. Rozaliev basically supported Levkovsky (whose sophisticated understanding of 'the commonality of state capitalism' in the contemporary third world and the USSR during the 1920s is discussed in chapter five), but did not refer to Cheshkov's argument.


223. Ibid., pp. 256-60, 250, 304-5.


225. Ibid., p. 194.

226. Ibid., p. 195.

227. Ibid.


230. Ibid., p. 200; Simoniya, "K voprosu o sud'bah kapitalizma", pp. 18, 20.

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232. Ibid., pp. 200, 202; cf. Simoniya's comments on a 1974 conference paper by Cheshkov, in "Diskussii: osobennosti sotsial'noi struktury i rol' biurokratii v stranakh Vostoka" NAA, 1975, no. 1, pp. 75-6; in the same discussion Meliksetov, p. 74, supported Cheshkov's thesis "about 'statocracy' as a 'primary' social community, personifying the state structure", while arguing that the example of Taiwan "demonstrates precisely the capitalist potential of 'statocracy'."


234. Simoniya, in "Obsuzhdenie: Biurokraticheskaia burzhuzhia", p. 200. Cf. "Obsuzhdenie knigi N.A. Simoniya", p. 64: "N.A. Simoniya noted that the book being considered is Partyist not only in spirit and tendency, but in the motives for its emergence - a series of defeats for communist parties of the Orient in recent decades, left extremism and its influence in the national liberation movement - these and many other factors have made obvious the untenability of some existing schemas, worked out exclusively with reference to the specifics of the highly-developed countries of Europe." Cf. N.A. Simoniya, Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient, Progress, Moscow, 1985, pp. 118-38 for Simoniya's basic argument about the rise of capitalism in the periphery, and p. 251 for a pro forma denial that this implies "the 'rejuvenation' or strengthening of world capitalism."


240. Ibid., pp. 204-5.


244. Ibid., pp. 72, 119, 92-3, 137.


246. Shirokov, Promyshlennaia revoliutsiia, pp.77-9. Shirokov, "Mezhukladnoe vzaimodeistvie", p. 121, supported Levkovsky's view that the state sector in states of 'socialist orientation' remains state capitalist.


248. V.L. Sheinis, NAA, 1982, no. 6, p. 162.

249. "Gossektor i gossobstvennost' v formatzionnom razvitiiz", chapter 7, section 4, in I.V. Aleshina et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia strany v sovremennom mire: edinstvo i mnogoobratie, Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p. 217; Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti,
p.177. In a footnote to the 1983 book, p. 292, n. 31, Cheshkov claimed that while his chapter on
the 'state structure' in the 1974 IMEMO book had "occasioned a critical attitude from a number of
researchers, until now no convincing arguments have been counterposed to it, as far as we know."

250. G.I. Mirsky ed., Vneshniaia politika razvivaiushchikhsia stran: obshchie problemy i
metodologii issledovaniia, Mezdunarodnye Otmosheniiia, Moscow, 1983, pp. 17-8. Cf. Hough,
pp. 238-9; and N. Simoniya, in "Traditsii i sovremennost' v obshchestvennom razvitiu stran
Vostoka", AAS, 1983, no. 7, p. 40: "The question of the variety of specific models of capitalist
development of countries of the Orient acquires today (especially in the light of the documents of
the 26th CPSU congress) not only theoretical, but also practical significance".

251. "Osobennosti vnesheii politiki razvivaviushchikhsia stran razlichnoi sotsial'no-politicheskoi
orientatsii", in Mirsky ed., Vneshniaia politika, pp. 147-52.

252. V.P. Lukin, "Tsentry sily": kontseptsii i real'nost', Mezdunarodnye Otmosheniiia, Moscow,
1983, pp. 135, 148. Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia were featured as 'power centres'.

253. I.D. Ivanov ed., Razvivaiushchikhsia strany v sovremennom mire: novaia sila v mirovoi
politike i ekonomike, Nauka, Moscow, 1984, chapter 10, by V.P. Lukin and V.A. Kremeniuk,
pp. 197-8, presenting the "doctrine of 'multipolarity'" as a successful strategy used by the USA to
recover influence after the Vietnam debacle; Hough, pp.239-40, suggests that Lukin has advocated
a similar doctrine for the USSR; Sheinis and El'ianov, reviewing Primakov, Vostok posle krakha,
frankly in the case of Iraq, but that country's place as a prominent state of 'socialist orientation' in
the 1970s confirmed his realpolitik advice.


255. G.I. Mirsky, in "O perspektivakh kapitalizma v razvivaiushchemsia mire", NAA, 1985,
no.1, pp. 81-2.

256. Ibid., p. 82.

257. Shirokov, Promyshlennaia revoliutsiia, p. 200.


260. V.M. Kollontai, A.I. Medovoi, T.S. Pokataeva, in ibid., pp. 89, 90, 92.


262. V.L. Sheinis, L.A. Fridman, N.A. Simoniya, Mirsky, in ibid., pp. 87, 91, 84-5, 82. The
other speaker, M.Ya. Volkov, pp. 91-2, also pointed to peripheral capitalism's "capacity for
growth", but as Hough, p. 101, has noted, he is a conservative with similar views to Ul'ianovsky.

263. Mirsky, in "O perspektivakh kapitalizma", p. 93.


265. Ibid., pp. 20-1, 63, 59.

266. Ibid., pp. 54, 58, 60, 92, 140.

267. Ibid., pp. 118, 22, 114, 115.


269. Ibid., pp. 155, 159, 163, 169, 173. Simoniya's point was that while India was closest to an
'ideal type' of capitalist developing country, other countries could approximate this state as well.


271. Ibid., pp. 5, 601.

272. Ibid., pp. 37-9, 32, 599; cf. pp. 514, 535, 540-2, 575-6. This book included a section on "ecological problems" by N.A. Karagodin, pp. 236-47; Sheinis himself, pp. 573-4, called for serious attention to this question, criticising the "comforting optimism" of some Soviet works.

273. Ibid., pp. 40, 547-8, 553, 554, 600-1; "Ekonomicheskii Rost i Sotsial'nyi Progress", pp.252, 264; V. Sheinis, in "Traditsii i sovremennost'", pp. 35, 37-8, 39-40. Cheshkov, in Aleschina et. al. eds, edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, pp. 12-3, similarly attacked "modern epigones of 19th century economic romanticism, who see the alternative in a movement not forward but back, in a return to the ideals of pre-capitalist society or in an artificial conservation of social progress".

274. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 550, 579-83.


279. Ibid., p. 33; Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 50-1.

280. Ibid., pp. 34, 53-4.


282. Sheinis, "Differentsiatsiia, statia pervaiia", pp. 34-5; Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 54-8.


288. Sheinis, "Differentsiatsiia, statia pervaiia", p. 35; Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 30, 297-301, 598.

289. L.I. Reisner, A.V. Meliksetov, in "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i


292. L.S. Miksha, in "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", no.6, p. 138; cf. p. 136: "In contrast to many other works the authors' conclusions are based on rich factual material". Miksha was a long-standing member of the editorial board of Narody Azii i Afriki until mid 1988, when a new board was selected, with the respected Indologist L.B. Alaev as chief editor, and Aleksandrov, Meliksetov, Sledzevsky, Khoros and Sheinis amongst the new members; of the old board, only the former chief editor, Anatoly Kutsenkov, remains - cf. NAA, 1988, no. 3 and no. 4.


297. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 52-63, 385.


299. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 592; cf. p. 506. The topic of differentiation, which occupied the second chapter of the book, was mentioned only on the second last page of a thirteen page conclusion, the content of which was largely not pro forma. Rashkovsky, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", no.6, p. 159, noted that Sheinis and El'ianov were more critical of the Eurocentrism of "the conception of 'peripheral' capitalism" than of Levkovsky's "conception of 'multistructurality'", and tried (like Shirokov) to provide some explanatory content to the latter view. In the 1970s, El'ianov, "Genezis sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi otstalosti", MEMO, 1974, no. 8, p. 97, had referred to a "dualism in the economy" of developing countries, and was criticised by Yu. Aleksandrov, "Osobennosti agrarnoi evoluiusi Aziatskikh stran", MEMO, 1975, no. 5, p. 123.


301. Sheinis, "O spetsifike", p. 27; Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 500-1.


303. E.S. Popov, in "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", 1985, no. 6, p. 139; cf. Sheinis and El'ianov eds,ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, p.45.


305. Simoniya, "Dialetikta", pp. 125-32. Simoniya particularly endorsed the fourth chapter on economic crises, written by N.S. Bolchek of Leningrad, adding, pp. 129-30, a qualification about
the importance of structural rather than cyclical crises in capitalist developing countries.

306. Ibid., pp. 132-3. In the same issue, A. Shapiro, "Eshche raz k voprosu o teorii vsemirnogo khoziaistva", MEMO, 1985, no. 3, p. 101, described some oil-rich countries and Asian states exporting manufactured goods as "in essence, countries of medium developed capitalism". Simoniya, "Biurokraticheskaya burzhuazia", p. 200, had previously used the concept 'medium developed capitalism' with reference to the third world, applying it, like Shirokov, to India, and before then, Strany Vostoka, pp. 128, 144, to early 20th century Russia. His subsequent criticism of this concept seems to have been ignored in recent discussions of Russian history; Evgeny Plimak, in "'Kruglyi stol': Sovetskiy Soiuz v 30-e gody", Voprosy Istorii, 1988, no. 12, p. 5, disputed V.P. Danilov's claim "that in 1913 'from the point of view of industry Russia was a medium developed capitalist country"', while Roy Medvedev, ibid., p. 10, considered Danilov's characterisation correct and disputed Stalin's claim that Russia had to make up a lag of 50-100 years in 10, a claim which Plimak, pp. 5-6, thought "historically correct"; Plimak, p. 5, referred to "the position of P.V. Volobuev, I.F. Gindin, K.N. Tarnovsky, V.G. Khoros about Russia as a country of delayed capitalist development, a country of the 'second echelon' of world capitalism" but not to Simoniya.

307. Simoniya, "Dialektika", p. 132; the companion review article by N. Shmelev, "Nasushchhnye problemy i strategii razvitiia osvobodivshikh stran", MEMO, 1985, no. 3, pp. 116, 117-8, argued that an "approach, striving to use the positive elements but rejecting the extremes of both the conception of 'catching-up development' and 'an alternative path' is, undoubtedly, the most fruitful", and specifically claimed that 'catching-up' was still viable for countries in Sheinis' upper echelon of the developing world. Cf. Reisner, Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta, pp. 4-5, for an earlier criticism of mixing up 'economic growth' and 'economic development'.

308. Simoniya, "Dialektika", p. 128.


311. Ibid., p. 8.

312. Ibid., pp. 18, 19, 5, 248, 258, 262; cf. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, p. 540.


314. Ibid., pp. 198, 226, 234; cf. idem., Strany Vostoka, p. 58.


316. Ibid., pp. 238, 246.


321. Ibid., p. 271.

322. Ibid.; cf. p. 549, n. 1, where Simoniya distinguished a 'compounded society' from a 'multistructural society' by including in the former embryonic, dying or "splintered" structures.

323. Ibid., p. 272.

324. Ibid., pp. 273, 275.

325. Ibid., pp. 275-6, 278.


334. Ibid., pp. 390, 383, 389.

335. Ibid., pp. 355-6, 383, 389; N.A. Simoniya, "Voprosy formatcionnogo perekhoda v antagonistichekikh obschestvakh sostoka v sovremennuiu epokhu", NAA, 1983, no. 2, pp. 64-5; idem. in 'O perspektivakh kapitalizma', pp. 84-5.


338. Agadzhanian, p. 146.


341. Ibid., pp. 159-61.


345. Slavnyi, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnyh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo", no. 3, pp. 148-9; cf. Sheinis, in ibid., no. 1, p. 158; Sledzevsky, in ibid., no. 2, p. 162. Gefter, "Mnogoukladnost' - kharakteristika tselogo", p. 86, n. 4, pointed out that transforming the classical characteristics of a mode of production "into some standard, directly superimposed on 'non-classical' conditions, contradicts the evidence of history, and logic."


347. Ibid., pp. 152-3.


350. Levkovsky, "Novyi etap v formirovanii i evoliutsii burzhuazii", pp. 6, 10, 17, 22.

351. Ibid., pp. 9, 16, 25, 28.


354. Ibid., pp. 53, 55-6, 59-60, 62-3.

355. Ibid., pp. 64, 55-8; N. Shmelev, "Nasushchnye problemy", p. 124, criticised Sheinis' 1983 book for claiming that the 'universal role' of the market is historically 'exhausted', saying "it is impossible not to see that such a judgement is a very unhelpful orientation for resolving the current, vital problems of the developing countries."

356. Sheinis, "Osobennosti i problemy kapitalizma", pp. 57-8, 64-5.

357. V. Petrov, Internatsionalizatsiia monopolisticheskogo nakopleniia i razvivaiushchiasia strany, Nauka, Moscow, 1986, pp. 253-4, 257-8, 221; Petrov is identified as a social science professor at the Central Committee's institute of social sciences in NAA, 1986, no. 6, p. 213, but the responsible editor of his book, Leonid Fridman, is a liberal. K.L. Maidanik et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiasia Strany v Sovremennom Mire: puti revoliutsionnogo protsess, Nauka, Moscow, 1986, p. 12. Significantly, Maidanik did not refer at all to Slavnyi's critique of dependency theory, despite noting, p. 8, that defining the third world in terms of the 'theory of dependence' already "presupposes that a series of the positions of the monograph will call forth disagreement".
358. Ibid., pp. 370, n. 8; 24, 14.
359. Ibid., pp. 192, 196-8.

360. Simoniya, "Stanovlenie kapitalizma", p. 60. He stressed the influence of "traditionalist peasant psychology" of the new ranks of the Iranian proletariat as the social context of Khomeini's victory, but argued that this would not have been inevitable if not for the theoretical disorientation of the left: "Many revolutionaries still stood in the thick of a roaring struggle with the beaten Bonapartist-monarchist counter-revolution when an orthodox-islamic counter-revolution was already knocking at the door." For a recent analysis of capitalist development in the Middle East see V.A. Isaev et. al. eds, *Razvitie kapitalizma v Arabskom mire*, Nauka, Moscow, 1988.


363. V.L. Sheinis, "Razvivaishchieia strany i novoe politicheskoie myshlenie", p. 77.

364. Ibid., pp. 82, 78-9.


368. "Nauchnaia konferentsiia 'ekonomicheskie problemy stran vostoka - sredina 80-x godov (novye tendentsii)'", NAA, 1988, no. 3, p. 115.


370. Ibid., p. 79.

371. Ibid., pp. 87-9. Cf. "IV Vsesoiuznaia shkola molodykh sostokovedov", pp. 138-9: "Differentiation in the developing world is growing, and intensifies social problems. A reduction of the level of conflict in these countries must assist all countries. From this there follows a need for new political thinking and a rejection of a series of stereotypes which have formed in policy, based on a confrontational approach to evaluating events occurring in the developing countries."

372. Sheinis, "Razvivaishchieia strany i novoe politicheskoie myshlenie", pp. 89-90.

373. S.L. Agaev, "Politicheskie real'nosti razvivaishchegosia mira i sotsial'naia", RKSM, 1987, no. 6, pp. 88-90; Sheinis, "Razvivaishchieia strany i novoe politicheskoie myshlenie", p. 90. In an article just previously, S.L. Agaev, "Perestroika v svete istoricheskogo opyta sotsial'nykh revoliutsii", RKSM, 1987, no. 5, p. 71, Agaev followed the official stress (*Materialy XXVII s'ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza*, Politizdat, 1986, p. 21) on "a contradictory but interdependent and largely integral world," so it was he rather than Sheinis who was misinterpreting 'new political thinking'.


376. Ibid., p. 18; N. Karagodin, "Analiz ili mitovorchevstvo?", MEMO, 1988, no. 6, pp. 141-4. While Miksha, in "Razvivaishchieia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", no. 6,
p. 139, noted that the question of multinational corporations was not specifically considered in the book by Sheinis and El'ianov, a recent book by Karagodin was devoted to this: *Mezhdunarodnye korporatsii i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy razvivaushchikhsia stran*, Nauka, Moscow, 1981.

377. "Vneshniaia politika i diplomatia", Pravda, 26/7/88, p. 4. In the conclusion to their book, Sheinis and El'ianov, *ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress*, pp. 592-3, had included an affirmation of the old view that the "determining element" of the epoch is "the competition and struggle of the two systems”. The new perspective is outlined in E. Pozdniakov, "Natsional'nye, gosudarstvennye i klassovye interesy v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh", *MEMO*, 1988, no. 5, pp. 3-17.


379. Ibid., pp. 14-5, 16-25. On p. 20, Sheinis still agreed with Cheshkov about the presence of substantial "non-capitalist elements" in the contemporary sector of some prominent capitalist developing countries, in which the economic nature of the state "cannot be simply viewed as state capitalism."


381. B.F. Kliuchnikov, in "Nauchnaia konferentsiia 'ekonomicheskie problemy stran vostoka - sredina 80-x godov (novye tendentsii)'", pp. 114-5. Cf. ibid., p. 112, for Shirokov's view, which seems broadly similar to that expressed by Khvoinik in the early 1970s. A brief review by Granovsky of Shirokov's new book is in AAS, 1988, no. 6, pp. 62-3.

382. V.M. Kollontai, in "Nauchnaia konferentsiia 'ekonomicheskie problemy ...'", p. 112.


385. Aleksandrov, in "Nauchnaia konferentsiia 'ekonomicheskie problemy stran vostoka - sredina 80-x godov (novye tendentsii)'", p. 114; Rastiannikov and Kotova, in ibid., p. 115; Granovsky and Kolontaev, in ibid., pp. 115-6. Granovsky thought this 'Oriental' model was "applicable to capitalism of an Italian or Latin American type", a point reinforced by O.V. Maliarov, in ibid., who argued, in opposition to Shirokov, that "by assisting the capitalist transformation of the economy, the state-capitalist structure objectively creates conditions leading to a weakening of its place and role in the economy." Kolontaev claimed that India after independence had been "passing through a phase of free competition", adding that "without the operation of elemental market forces a mass base of capitalism could not have arisen."

386. Sledzevsky, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovreumnogo", no. 2, p. 165; idem., reviewing edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, pp. 157, 158. In a recent discussion, "Problemy razrabotki kontseptsiia sovreumnego sotsializma", Voprosy filosofii, 1988, no. 11, p.57, Simoniya considered the 'catching-up model' as an axiom for the USSR as well as the third world.


388. Ibid., pp. 164, 165.

389. Cheshkov, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovreumnogo",
no. 2, pp. 166-7; M.A. Cheshkov, "Rost kapitalizma i obshchaia teoriia razvivaushchegosia mira", NAA, 1988, no. 4, pp. 162-3.

390. Simoniya, "Sintez", pp. 268-78. Khoros, in "Razvivaushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", no. 6, pp. 142-4, included Brazil and Argentina in his second echelon of capitalist development along with Eastern Europe and Japan, saying that these countries were distinguished by backwardness in comparison with advanced capitalist countries, while third world countries were marked also by dependence; he noted "a series of common features" between these two groups, but stressed new difficulties for the third world "connected with the demographic and other global problems of the 20th century."


393. Sledzevsky, reviewing edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, p. 159; cf. p. 154.

394. M.A. Cheshkov, "Marksovo poniatie 'vtorichnaia formatsiia' i teoreticheskoe izuchenie razvivaushchegosia obshchestva", in Yu.K. Pletnikov ed., Smena stadii obshchestvennogo razvitiiia: problema perekhodnykh periodov i perekhodnykh form obshchestvennykh otnishenii, Moscow, 1982, p. 39; Cheshkov, "Sushchnost' i predposyalki alternativnosti", in edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, p. 66. Cf. Sledzevsky, reviewing edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, pp. 160-4, for serious criticism of the "completely a priori" way in which Cheshkov considered "a developing society as an integral (!) and evolving social organism (!) with its own logic and socio-genetic 'code' of such evolution", while simultaneously considering it as a 'conglomerate' of one socio-economic structure upon another; Sledzevsky still concluded that Cheshkov's approach had more theoretical potential than Simoniya's. Slavnyi, who with Aleksandrov, NAA, 1986, no. 5, pp. 166-9, had criticised the "ahistorical character" of Cheshkov's two 'principles', recently, reviewing A.I. Dinkevich ed., Strategiia sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiiia osvobodivshikhsia stran Azii, NAA, 1988, no. 4, p. 184, n. 5, admitted not having fully recognised "the scientific significance of that attained" in edinstvo i mnogoobrazie. Meanwhile, Cheshkov, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez tradicionnogo i sovremennogo", no. 2, pp. 168-9, has admitted the ahistorical character of his outline of an 'unarticulated second formation' in edinstvo i mnogoobrazie, and recently, "Rost kapitalizma i obshchaia teoriia", p. 162, n. 34, said he now "completely disagree[s] with the conception of a socio-cultural code, at the bottom of which lies a socio-economic structure upon another, while feeling led to into the world view of the classical Marxist theory of historical development based on Western Europe has proven incapable of developing a general theory of the third world, so that it must be "relativised, turned from an instrument of universal perceptual force into a partial mode of perception." At a recent round table, "India i Kitai: dve tsivilizatsii - dve modeli razvitiia", MEMO, 1988, no. 8, p. 87, he claimed that "the formational approach to the developing countries may be adopted only as a partial explanation of their genesis and does not work in explaining their development."
Chapter 5: The Nature of Soviet Society Reconsidered

In a situation where old scientific conceptions have to a significant degree ceased 'to work', utopia as one of the ways of 'stirring' the imagination may enable the development and new orienting of scientific research.


It is reasonable to presume that different Soviet views about the developing countries have domestic as well as foreign policy implications, particularly where these views interpret the dilemmas of third world development in world-historical terms. When considering the domestic implications of recent Soviet development debates, it is necessary to sort out different levels of political meaning. Generally, the decline of the 'non-capitalist path' must reflect badly on supporters of the status quo in the USSR, who previously linked the consolidation of their camp with "the successes of those developing countries which are rejecting the capitalist path of development." This negative implication is objective and uncritical for conservative scholars, since it occurs in spite of their efforts to downplay the significance of setbacks abroad, and depends on an appreciation by others of broad similarities between the third world and the USSR.

This point has been highlighted by the liberals in their effort to institutionalise open scientific enquiry. Sheinis, in his article on new political thinking about questions of development, directly stated that studying "the genuine tragedy of the 'third world'" within "a broad comparison of the world-historical order might allow us to look in a new way at our own problems, although they stand in a fundamentally different context." Avakov included a similar statement in his less radical but more authoritative article. Before concluding that studies of the third world should "give a supplementary creative impulse to the development of Soviet social science", he noted that "an objective study of the developing world, of 'third world' society, may provide much material for elaborating the theory and practice of socialist restructuring, for enriching new social and politico-economic thinking." Such statements are attempts to legitimise and extend a genre of implicit, critical discussion of Soviet society that survived at the
margins of Soviet academia during the 'years of stagnation'. In this discussion, an analysis of third world problems was meant to apply also, and often especially, to the USSR by a small group of Soviet scholars who conducted a subterranean debate "by proxy", in a broadly similar way to those who criticised the Stalinist system by extolling the general virtues of NEP. At this particularly esoteric level of meaning, direct points about the nature of Soviet society have been implied critically, by authors relying on their readers' intelligent discretion in order to communicate cryptically. While it is difficult to evaluate the political impact of such criticism, it is clear that a healthy diversity of unorthodox views has been expressed, some of which certainly venture far beyond mere "criticism from within the system."

It is much harder to define the main issues and trends of this subterranean debate than to evaluate the more open discussions about third world development. Implicit commentary on the problems and prospects of Soviet society has occurred in a quite unregulated way, like voices competing for a hearing in the dark, rather than identifiable speakers at a public forum. The fact that scholars participating in this deep discussion are not easily grouped into opposing 'teams' is useful as well as difficult for an outside interpreter, because, as Chernyak has argued, classifying Soviet scholars merely in terms of whose side they are on in a debate can create a "simplistic opposition" which overlooks the content of different conceptions and places professional routinists on a par with serious and original thinkers. Often the most meaningful differences of opinion occur amongst scholars who support each other as members of a reformist 'team'. A big problem for the interpreter is how to judge such differences in terms which would make sense for the scholars concerned. Chernyak has stressed that to understand the hidden turmoil of Soviet philosophy "an outside observer must have very well defined philosophic positions of his own." Understanding from the situation which Bakhtin has termed 'outsideness' necessarily involves a questioning of and by one's own conception of the topic being discussed. "One meaning discloses its depth when it has met and come into contact with another, strange meaning: between them there begins a kind of dialogue, which overcomes the seclusion and onesidedness of these meanings". To distinguish different
voices in the dark, the interpreter must have some conception theoretically of what they could be saying. This initial approximation of the sense of a statement depends on evaluating it in general terms like radical, liberal and conservative, and is then refined by suggesting the shades of meaning which such labels cover in the particular situation. The amorphous but substantial nature of the subterranean debate about Soviet society resembles what Oakeshott called 'the conversation of mankind', in which what matters most is not that a clear answer is reached, but that important issues are raised.9

The distinguishing feature of clever and significant use of Aesopian language is a coherent theoretical orientation. Without some clarity about which questions are most important, a critic risks merely pointing out the obvious. If esoteric argument remains confined within a descriptive mode, conveying meaning only by referring to similar phenomena in another context, then its explanatory force will be severely limited because of the historical difference between the open and implied subjects of discussion. Sheinis and El’ianov have emphasised that the actual problems of the third world are "so unprecedented in terms of scope and character, that all attempts to describe, let alone resolve them 'by analogy' are certainly doomed to failure."10 The same point applies to 'bureaucratism' in the USSR, but this does not vitiate a mirror-like analysis of the 'braking mechanism'.11 It is possible even descriptively to suggest the nature of a problem without adequately defining its specific features. Toward the end of the first of two articles entitled "Ideals or Interests?", Andrei Nuikin quoted, with clear analogical intent, some passages from a 1974 Soviet work on elites in the Orient about "the parasitical character of bureaucratic capital" in Indonesia, as part of a broad argument about the strength of bureaucratic opposition to restructuring in the USSR.12 His remarks can be viewed as marking the shallow end of esoteric criticism, since they lack a critical theoretical dimension at a basic conceptual level, by just attributing bureaucratism to Parkinson’s Law and likening it to radiation.13 Towards the deep end are scholars like Cheshkov, who in a paper published in an appendix to the volumes quoted by Nuikin, endeavoured to theorise the possible nature of that which could not be mentioned empirically, knowing that this task was both safer (censors and editors are usually sure what
Reflections Upon the Transition to Socialism

Once upon a time a big but poor country managed to lift itself by its bootstraps through several historical stages to the threshold of a classless, 'radiant future' all in the space of a few years, thanks largely to waves of popular enthusiasm inspired by an unmentionable man of steel. Such was the authoritative mythology of Soviet history until recently. In a very conspiratorial reading of history, Stalin asserted that the main obstacles to building Russian socialism in one backward empire were personal, in the form of the so-called 'Bukharin-Trotsky Gang of Spies, Wreckers and Traitors to the Country'. The most arrogant assertion in the Short Course is a simple proclamation that "the Soviet people approved the annihilation of the Bukharin-Trotsky gang and passed on to next business." While the next and last agenda-item in this fantasy-history was to ensure "in an organised way" that "90,000,000 persons, in their unanimous vote, confirmed the victory of Socialism in the USSR", in the memory of many Soviet people the 'next business' was the mass terror which became known as 'Yezhovshchina' or simply 'the year 1937'. This gulf between official and private stories of the past is one reason for the recent claim by Afanas'ev that "there is not, perhaps, in the world a country with so falsified a history as ours." He argued that those responsible for this were not professional historians, let alone the Soviet people as a whole, but rather those bosses ("Trapeznikov and his assistants") who conducted "pogroms" against original scholarship. Afanas'ev identified the main feature of Stalinist historiography as its "monopoly" on interpretation, thus echoing Igor Kliamkin's forceful complaint that: "Here [in the study of Soviet history] until now everything is monological in the most primitive sense. The voices of the participants are not listened to. Besides
the victors, all are deprived of a word." But whereas Kliamkin himself rejected a full dialogue with those opponents of Stalin who doubted the possibility of genuine socialism in one country, Afanas'ev managed somewhat later to express frankly the view of "very many" who "do not consider the society we have created as socialist, even in a 'deformed' sense." One of these many is Sheinis, who in a round table discussion in 1983 pointed out that:

a socialist society cannot be constructed on a primitive material base, in international isolation and on the basis of ascending toward the patriarchal character of collectivism. If there exists an alternative, opposing both a movement toward socialism and capitalist modernisation, then evidently this alternative is not development but stagnation, not the resolution but the forcing together of problems. 

From this viewpoint, the transition toward socialism is not a textbook topic but a contemporary imperative, necessary in order to prevent "the collapse of this, our last historical attempt to find a way out of a terrible dead-end." 

The three main victims of Trapeznikov mentioned by Afanas'ev (Tamovsky, Volobuev and Gefter) all endeavoured to reconsider the established, linear version of Soviet history by drawing comparisons with other countries and periods. Tamovsky emphasised the complexity of the social conflicts which led to the Bolshevik revolution, and was the first Soviet scholar to point out the structural similarities between capitalist industrialisation in pre-revolutionary Russia and contemporary developing countries. Volobuev also presented a complex account of 1917, arguing against the common view "that history is fatally pre-determined, i.e. that everything could have happened only as it did"; he reminded his readers that Lenin "was a decisive opponent of the idea about a 'programmed character' of one-line-only development, and about the pre-determination of the victory of a socialist revolution in our country."

While both these authors drew attention to the objective importance of 'multistructurality', the most profound exponent of this concept was Gefter. In 1969 he edited a book on the historiography of revolutions that has been called a "manifesto of legal Marxism" in the modern USSR, then during the 'years of stagnation' he contributed to the underground socialist journal Poiski,
recently returning to the liberalised legal arena of debate with some profound comments in an interview entitled "Stalin Died Yesterday...".29

In 1972 Gefter suggested that "the problem of the wholeness of the Russian historical process," which had received only a formal solution since the mid 1930s, was best conceptualised in terms of "the changing of one kind of multistructurality into another."30 He noted that "it would be naive to find an answer in a definition," and cautioned against viewing multistructurality in a static, descriptive way as just the existence of 'many structures'. He focused on "the interpenetration and conflict of different socio-economic forms," which "in specific societies differs, sometimes very essentially, from ... the sequence of the change of formations in a world-wide process."31 He emphasised that a period of transition involves both the possibility of progressive change and the danger of a reactionary, 'hybrid' development, in which "the old is able to assimilate the new, to turn it into a source for itself."32 While Gefter used these categories to explain the backward and uneven development of capitalism in pre-revolutionary Russia, they are evidently applicable to the Soviet period. Indeed, he began by noting the lively contemporary interest in the question of multistructurality, and had previously referred to the "'multistructural' social transformations begun by October."33 A cryptic sentence of Gefter's subsequently quoted by Sheinis encapsulates the critical import of his view: "It is a paradox of history: the onesided, accelerated growth of a new formation 'returns' it again and again to the stage of genesis."34 The gap between this conception and the orthodox assertion that multistructurality was quickly overcome by the beginning of the Second Five Year Plan would have been clear to many Soviet readers.35 At least, Gefter's critical meaning is now so clear that I.K. Pantin, the chief editor of Rabochii Klass, concluded a recent discussion about the 'braking mechanism' by repeating this sentence without reference, as if everyone knew the source.36

While Gefter was dismissed from his senior academic post soon after his paper on multistructurality appeared in Sverdlovsk, later that year Levkovsky published in Moscow his two most significant articles on the same theme.37 In these discussions of state capitalism in the 'third world', Levkovsky presented an
original version of the orthodox Trotskyist idea that in a backward country the transition to socialism degenerates into a bureaucrat's paradise. He based his view on Lenin's analysis of multistructurality in post-revolutionary Russia, a fact which shows the narrowness of Kliamkin's claim that there was "not one case" where the publication under Khrushchev of stenographic reports including Trotsky's speeches "turned the reader into a Trotskyist." The key word for understanding Levkovsky's view is "the prerequisites for preparing the construction of socialism." Unlike Stalin and his followers, Levkovsky assumed that socialism could not be built anywhere just by nationalising private property. He saw "development in a socialist direction" for backward countries as a long-term process, stressing "the enormous complexity and contradictoriness of the first steps toward socialism in a contemporary multistructural society". He distinguished fundamentally between such a society and a developed capitalist society, in which the productive forces have matured enough for socialism and the proletariat has the potential to become a class ruling for itself throughout the society. Interpreting Levkovsky's view as Trotskyist depends upon understanding post-revolutionary Russia as the former not the latter type of society, an understanding based firmly on Lenin's post-1917 analysis, the only theoretical source referred to by Levkovsky, and supported by both Gefter's interpretation of Russian backwardness and Reisner's statement that Soviet Russia in the 1920s "must be considered as an economically backward, underdeveloped and developing state." A short paragraph contrasting "the historical paths of creating of a socialist structure" in Russia and in a multistructural society of the 'third world' seems to contradict this understanding, but this can be interpreted as a defence clause inserted by Levkovsky to answer any accusation of heresy from the thought police. Indeed, it must be so interpreted if Levkovsky's argument is not to be rendered theoretically incoherent. Suggesting the need for such a clause is not fanciful, since Ul'ianovsky in attacking Levkovsky did make such an accusation, albeit without being fully aware of the evidence for it.

Levkovsky began his critical discussion by raising the "cardinal question" of the extent of "disjunction" between "processes of the statocratisation of the means of production (or economy) and processes of the development of socialism."
He answered this question -- which the 'United Opposition' had posed in 1926 -- by considering the objects and subjects of statocratisation (огосударствление) in undeveloped, multistructural societies.47 Levkovsky claimed it was "impossible" to say that the productive forces of such societies were ready for socialism, stating frankly that "private ownership of handicraft and small-capitalist enterprises cannot be replaced by state ownership with a benefit for economic development."48 He argued that if such statocratisation nevertheless occurred, this was because it served the interests of a rising "bureaucratic elite", which "becomes a negative force, obstructing progressive changes" threatening "its own special, monopoly position in administration."49 Levkovsky emphasised that the political character of the forces holding state power "is in real life the key to economic restructuring and the evolution of the state sector itself."50 This topical statement implied a liberal reconsideration of the classic Stalinist slogan 'politics in command', focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of the politics in question. As Simoniya was soon to argue in a commentary on one of Lenin's phrases, "politics expresses economics in a concentrated way, but not any practical politics, only a correct one."51

Levkovsky defined the state sector in a backward, multistructural society as "state capitalist", the term which Grigory Zinoviev had used in 1925 to characterise the degenerating nature of nationalised industry in the USSR.52 Levkovsky likened this emergent state capitalist structure to a genie which the rest of society "can hardly succeed to put back in the bottle," because it provides a base for "an influential stratum of the economic, bureaucratic-technocratic and administrative elite" that has made "contacts with the new strata and people who have risen to power."53 Abstracting from specific 'details', Levkovsky focused on "an irresistible tendency toward the numerical growth" of this elite, which he considered wasteful:

it is obvious that a swelling of the state-economic administrative apparatus, not conditioned by the objective needs of a multistructural country, is, so to speak, still another confirmation of 'Parkinson's Law'. Such a malignant growth, negative in itself, is by its parasitism doubly detrimental for an economically underdeveloped society: limited state resources begin to be 'eaten away' to an often significant degree by the administrative apparatus.

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A similar point has been made by the leading Western Trotskyist Ernest Mandel, who claims that "the massive swelling of officials, controllers and state-apparatuses in the USSR devours about 30% of the national income." While Levkovsky saw the political victory of the Soviet bureaucracy as more inevitable than Mandel did, he shared the latter's long-term optimism about the "planned foundation" of a bureaucratically administered economy. He assumed that the replacement of the bourgeoisie by a ruling bureaucracy rather than by the proletariat was "another indication of the social transitionality of a multistructural society and state capitalism", not a feature of a new system of exploitation. Levkovsky's answer to the basic question of whether statocratisation presages socialism was ultimately a qualified yes. He claimed that the state capitalist structure tends "to become an ever more important 'incubator' of the material-productive and class prerequisites for preparing the construction of socialism", and suggested that although initially, during the "quite prolonged period" of rule by a bureaucratic elite, this is only "a subsidiary and socially unrecognised process", in the end it must become a consciously regulated one.

Levkovsky's basic thesis, that the USSR is still in a transition period toward socialism, was argued more extensively by Simoniya in the first part of his 1975 book. Simoniya referred directly to the early Soviet period through a detailed analysis of Lenin's post-revolutionary remarks, and was able to hint about the subsequent evolution of the Soviet state by clarifying some important matters of historical methodology. First, he re-affirmed Marx's distinction between "a social revolution as an epoch of social change (the implementation of socialism, its organising activity) and a political revolution as a partial moment of this social change (the political act of overthrowing the old power, the destruction of old relations)." He criticised a Stalinist textbook for identifying the latter with the former as "all-powerful" and ignoring the fact that a successful political revolution "needs a preliminary preparation of the basic conditions of a social revolution." He rejected as voluntarist the view "that a socialist political revolution liquidates capitalist production relations and establishes socialist ones", arguing that, while juridical forms of property could be changed by decree, the extent of the socialisation of production could not.
Second, Simoniya re-stated Lenin's suggestion that backward Russia had to pass through "a more or less prolonged special historical transition period to socialism ", which was distinct from and prior to "a properly socialist transition period" toward communism. During this preliminary transition period the Soviet state had to create a new economic base with a similar level of socialisation of production to developed capitalist countries, by fostering the development of state capitalism as the "main link" of a "mixed transitional economy". In this context, Simoniya noted that "one of the most important, decisive features of the revolutionary process in Russia ... consisted in the non-correspondence of political power -- the dictatorship of the proletariat -- to the character of the economic base." He posed three possible results of this situation:

1) the superstructure may hold out on the non-corresponding base, having adapted to it in order to guide its further development in a direction necessary for the superstructure itself;
2) the superstructure may hold out on the non-corresponding base, but at the price of such an adaption that signifies a degeneration of the superstructure itself and its reduction into correspondence with the base;
3) the superstructure may enter into a direct conflict with the base, attempting to 'abolish' it, and fall as a victim of its own foolishness.

Simoniya's key claim was that "the first two variants entail the necessity of a transition period, in the course of which a correspondence is established between the superstructure and the base." In other words, even the degeneration of a socialist superstructure does not force a country off the path to socialism, although, as one critic of this position has remarked, this path may now have "a deep ditch in it." By highlighting 'Lenin's last struggle' and questioning 'socialism in one country', Simoniya suggested that the Soviet state had degenerated, because of the "decisive role" of "objective, material conditions" in a backward country. But his scheme for understanding the course of a political revolution implied that a "recoil" could not destroy all the attainments of a preceding "leap forward". Like Levkovsky, Simoniya considered "the character of the superstructure" as the key to "a successful realisation of the tasks of the transition period", yet seemed to think that even if the door stuck fast during a hammering, a new key could be found to open it.
If ambiguity about the systemic legacy of Stalin's victory is the consequence of viewing the USSR as still transitional toward socialism, the premise of this view is "that the only possible alternative to capitalism, both in theory and in practice (at least under the historical conditions of modernity) is socialism". Otherwise, the fact that "the bureaucracy has its own (sufficiently clearly recognised) interests, in the defence and development of which it comes forth very energetically and effectively", would suggest something like a black hole, not a hiatus of maturing prerequisites. Assuming that non-capitalism means movement toward socialism downplays the negative role of the bureaucratic elite, which the thesis about Soviet society's pre-socialist character apparently highlights. Afanas'ev has suggested that those interested in rescuing Stalinism can admit that Stalin "discredited the idea of socialism", because this distracts attention from "the essence of the problem", which is: "to what extent was Stalin the creator and at the same time the product of the system which consolidated itself during his period in power"? A variant of the transitionality thesis can even have a conservative meaning, if it asserts that genuine socialism will 'mature' as the existing structure is freed from 'distortions'. But the theory of an extended transition period advanced in the 1970s by Levkovsky and Simoniya criticised Stalinism, which then traded under the slogan 'real socialism'. This criticism was liberal rather than radical in defining the prospects for change, suggesting that a future reform from above which allowed "different forms of the state capitalist structure" to operate could still regenerate movement toward socialism, in spite of the conservative reaction at the time. Yet affirming the need for another NEP begs the question of the effect on Soviet society of two generations of rule by a bureaucratic elite. At one point Simoniya questioned the logic of those seeing in China "the prolonged existence of a military-bureaucratic superstructure over a socialist base alien to it." This could be read as a criticism of Stalinism, but only by exposing an inconsistency in applying his theory of a transition to socialism to the modern USSR. If an advanced superstructure has been reduced to the level of a backward base, then a new and inherently backward system must be the result. While such a system may exist within a broad epoch of social change (an 'inter-formational period' in the widest sense) this does not imply, as Simoniya argued, that it is itself transitional toward socialism.
At first glance the arguments of Butenko, who expounded the idea of 'developed socialism' and attacked the view that a socialist society is inherently transitional, appear opposed to those of Levkovsky and Simoniya.\textsuperscript{75} In fact they are fairly similar, the main difference being that Butenko focused more on systemic obstacles to socialism in the USSR, even while nominally referring to "the consolidation of socialist democracy" and "the development of socialist production" in Brezhnev's Russia.\textsuperscript{76} Butenko's main form of argument during the 1970s was to expose the gap between the "essential features of socialism" and "very widespread" phenomena in Soviet society like "slackness, alcoholism" and social injustice.\textsuperscript{77} He presented 'developed socialism' as an ideal, and assumed that in view of the increasingly acute "problems in food supply and medical service (the Soviet Union had come to lose its attainments in matters of infant mortality, life expectancy etc.) -- it was clear that, despite official declarations, Soviet society then did not correspond to the objective criteria of constructing developed socialism."\textsuperscript{78} In opposition to "an empirical approach" which identified all aspects of Soviet society as components of "a socialist way of life", Butenko adopted "a theoretical approach" which viewed negative phenomena like "money-grubbing" as having "nothing in common with a really socialist way of life". Using as a motto "the well-known truth: 'not all that is real is rational'", he demonstrated how little existing Soviet society "corresponds to the nature of socialism, i.e. to those forms of life activity which are realised in the bounds of the principles of socialism."\textsuperscript{79}

Butenko focused particularly on the crucial questions of economic inequality and the absence of democracy. Concerning the former, he began by noting that "often discontent is stirred up by the facts of a significant difference in the material position, in the living conditions ... of one or another group of toilers".\textsuperscript{80} He then distinguished between two types of social injustice. One type comprised unequal rewards for unequal work capacities, i.e. the persistence of a 'bourgeois right' which Marx thought inevitable until the achievement of communist abundance. Another type, which Butenko pointed to as provoking "special dissatisfaction", consisted of "sharp differences in the standard of living and way of life which are not conditioned by essential differences in the
contribution of labour." In this case, citizens benefiting from either speculation or an official position "live in luxury, have their own personal swimming pools, dachas, two or three cars, etc."  

Naturally, such a situation stirs up regular resentment not only from those toilers whose material means only allow them to make ends meet, but also from every conscientious worker, whose daily strenuous toil, creating social wealth, cannot provide for them the material conditions of life which are undeservedly enjoyed by the aforementioned figures.

Searching for "the sources of such injustice", Butenko cautioned against the view of "some toilers", who "consider that all this is a natural outgrowth of material stimuli for labour, a consequence of distribution according to the quantity and quality of labour, a regular result of maintaining commodity-money relations in society". He argued that any premature attempt to eliminate such relations could only "undermine the very basis of the development of socialism, close the path to a really just equalisation of living standards and the perfection of a socialist way of life."  

Butenko implied that the second type of injustice derived from the hierarchical nature of a command economy, since it occurs "when an official position is used for personal interests, which in reality just contradicts all the norms of socialism." While calling for an end to such "distortions in realising socialism" -- "so that the way of life of all toilers may become socialist" -- Butenko recognised that these cases of "the most flagrant violation of socialist principles" resulted not simply from moral weakness, but from "the specific situation of one individual or another." There was clearly a well-entrenched, "definite and stable interest" behind this injustice, which in the short-term tended to be strengthened, not threatened, by artificially reducing inequality in rewards between differently qualified workers. After ironically citing a speech of Brezhnev's about the need to criminalise bribery, Butenko described the most serious, systemic consequence of a regime of privilege hypocritically taking that "very dangerous, pseudo-revolutionary path of levelling":  

This path would have led inevitably to undermining the basic foundation of social progress -- effective labour, since it would have deprived all toilers of
a direct interest in the quantity and quality of their labour. Such a path would have undermined the stimulus for increasing the productive qualifications of workers, it would have led to stagnation and decline in the development of education and science, which would have had as its direct result a rejection of scientific-technical progress. Without all this [interested labour and scientific progress] it would have become simply impossible to have a further growth of social production, which is the main condition for raising the living standards of all toilers, the most important means for the elimination of existing injustices in the distribution of material goods, the decisive factor in the development and perfection of a socialist way of life. It is perfectly obvious that such a path contradicts the interests of socialism, the interests of all toilers.  

While this characterisation of general stagnation as anti-socialist evidently referred to phenomena typical of the USSR at the time, Butenko has recently stressed that, "when criticising the deformations and stagnation of the Brezhnevite 1970s, it is impossible not to turn to their sources, to the Stalin years, when that mechanism which in the seventies became a braking mechanism was formed." He noted that the technical successes of the 1930s were "inseparable from the mass repressions" masked with "heartlessness, formalism and demagogy" which made the workers increasingly passive, and argued that, in spite of some different policies from Stalin, Brezhnev's power base remained "the Stalinist, nomenklaturist pyramid of administrative-bureaucratic authority" that had nothing to do with socialism, understood as "the political supremacy of the working class and its allies."  

Butenko became widely known in the West for his contribution to a discussion in Voprosy filosofii in the early 1980s on contradictions in Soviet society. Before then, in the space of a few pages in his 1978 book entitled The Socialist Way of Life: problems and opinions, he presented a radical critique of the lack of democracy in the USSR. Reviewing two poles of "possible onesidedness" in resolving "the well-known contradiction between the necessity for a development of democracy and the necessity for a development of centralism", he said the experience of socialist development had "already shown" that favouring the latter leads to "the bureaucratisation of centralism", and overemphasising the former may supplement democracy with "elements of anarchy and disorganisation." Given Brezhnev's respect for what Lukin has called Stalin's policies of
"all-pervading centralism" and "limitation of democracy", it is clear that Butenko's warning about a 'centralist deviation' was much more serious than his concern about excess democracy. He directly linked "the need for an uninterrupted growth of democracy" with "the successful development of a socialist economy" by claiming that the latter remains "impossible" without the former. After listing some general features typical of bureaucratic centralism, such as narrowing the role of representative institutions in favour of executive organs of power, and limiting the removability of the latter as the rights of the mass of toilers are reduced, he considered the consequences in productive and social activity if this "growing shortage of democracy" becomes "a stable tendency, a continual practice". In production, "the division strengthens between rulers and ruled, between the administration and ordinary workers, and there arise elements of the alienation of the isolated worker from social production, as his everyday consciousness enters into a contradiction with social consciousness and his productive and social activity is reduced." This leads "to a lowering of collectivism and a growth of individualism, to a re-birth of such vulgar principles as 'that's no concern of mine', 'everyone for themselves', and to a strengthening of a consumerist approach to life." Since Butenko characterised such a mentality as "alien to the nature of socialism", it is worth noting that, according to the Polish economist Wlodzimierz Brus, "the spirit of acquisitiveness" amongst ordinary people in Stalinist society is greater even than in the West. In the sphere of social activity, Butenko identified bureaucratic centralism as leading to:

an undermining of the toilers' faith in the real character of the implemented democracy; their social activity acquires a formal character, ... it is deprived of real content, and does not lead to a realisation of their goals; the discrepancy strengthens between word and deed, form and content, external activity and the internal emptiness of this activity.

While Butenko cited "the experience of China" as having confirmed "the truth, according to which 'the liberation of the toilers may be only their own undertaking'," and the principle "that 'democracy for the toilers' cannot be realised without the real participation in it of the toilers themselves", his words evidently meant much even if they remained only in Russian.
In terms of political effect, the rhetorical strategy of directly calling the bluff of Soviet bosses' professed adherence to genuine socialist principles may be successful, particularly after the advent of glasnost'\textsuperscript{100} However, during Andropov's time at the top, Butenko also presented a critical analysis of Soviet society in the form of a theoretical discussion about the prospects for a transition to socialism in backward countries with an undeveloped economy.\textsuperscript{101} The fact that, in an account of Lenin's post-revolutionary idea of state capitalism, he referred to "the extreme economic backwardness of Russia," identifies his argument as similar in scope to the criticism made by Levkovsky and Simoniya.\textsuperscript{102} Butenko highlighted "a disproportion in the localisation of the objective and subjective prerequisites for the transition to socialism", which "conditions the fact that subjective aspirations toward socialism in countries with an undeveloped economy exceed the objective possibilities of their realisation."\textsuperscript{103} He claimed that:

Such a situation results in the fact that not all countries with an undeveloped economy, having implemented a political revolution and broken with the supremacy of the exploiters, may successfully proceed in contemporary conditions to socialism. Precisely because of the absence of a series of objective conditions, the possibility of constructing socialism in separate countries, as historical experience shows, is not turned into a reality, a result which has been and still is manifested in breakdowns, backward movements, and in unforeseen forms of development.\textsuperscript{104}

That 'not all countries' may be read as meaning not any, because of the effect which objective limitations have had on subjective aspirations, is suggested by Butenko's open reference in 1988 to the USSR as "post-capitalist" rather than socialist.\textsuperscript{105}

The main theme of Butenko's 1983 book was the need for a careful resolution of "the contradiction between political power and the development of a multistructural economy" during the first stage of a 'reduced' transition to socialism. He focused on the dilemma of a post-revolutionary regime having to encourage economic growth through private enterprise, particularly in the countryside, without threatening its own political stability.\textsuperscript{106} In a clear reference to Stalin's 'great change', Butenko noted that an intensification of this
contradiction "gives rise to a 'temptation' to resolve it with administrative measures."\textsuperscript{107} He characterised this policy as the least successful historically of "three essentially differing conceptions of resolving the basic tasks of a transition to socialism."\textsuperscript{108} In this administrative solution, the masses are compelled "to sacrifice themselves in the name of the future," with the authorities repressing "not only the resistance of remnants of the exploiting classes, but all social forces not agreeing that sacrifices in the name of an accelerated transition to socialism and communism are necessary."\textsuperscript{109} Proclamations of success notwithstanding, this policy proves so mistaken that it "may be fatal for the prospects of socialist construction."\textsuperscript{110} Butenko summarised a second, 'market socialist' policy, according to which it is necessary "to make space for the regulating activity of the law of value," for the reason that "since socialism grows out of a society based on private property, on private interest, it must borrow some of the economic laws and mechanisms peculiar to this previous level of development."\textsuperscript{111} He then counterposed a third policy, "in which the means do not contradict the ends", i.e. do not "lead to a deformation of socialist attainments." This policy aims for a "maximally balanced" but "fundamental" transformation of society, through a careful "broadening of planned control over the development of the economy", including "the gradual and voluntary co-operation of peasant households"; it "must at all stages, with different methods and in different forms, secure the union of the working class and the toiling peasantry, and consider the interests of other social groups."\textsuperscript{112} While Butenko emphasised the dangers of a "left-opportunist strategy, using military-bureaucratic methods for implantating 'barracks communism'", his distinction between the second and third conceptions of a transition to socialism suggests that he is a radical rather than a liberal opponent of Stalinism.\textsuperscript{113}

As well as evaluating different strategies for resolving the dilemma which the Soviet regime faced during the 1920s, Butenko made some passing comments on the systemic consequences of the implementation of bureaucratic centralism by "a very broad administrative (or military-administrative) apparatus."\textsuperscript{114} Politically, this leads "to the gradual separation of this apparatus from the toiling masses, to its transformation into an independent hierarchical pyramid, functioning
according to its own laws, and confessing to a cult of personality.” Economically, this system can build factories and muster workers but it cannot "create the economic elements of socialism in an economically undeveloped country". Butenko argued that:

For this it is still necessary to attain such a mode of combining these workers with means of production acquired in other countries, so that there is trained and formed within them an 'energy of labour', an economic requirement for renewing and perfecting these means of production, and for increasing the culture of their labour. Otherwise, if a country, having entered on the path of socialism, cannot find the ways and modes of fermenting in itself this economic requirement for dynamic development, for a continual renewal of production, and cannot create the conditions for scientific-technical creativity, for a growth of productive initiative and culture, then after a number of years this technology, acquired abroad and progressive for its own time, grows old, and the country remains as backward economically as it was.

Since Butenko measured the completion of the first stage of a transition to socialism by "the destruction of stagnant forms of production", as well as by the growing involvement of the toilers in administering the affairs of society, he clearly viewed Stalinism as an 'incubator' only of bureaucrats, and so "an obstacle on the path of creating the material-technical base of socialism." This applied particularly to agriculture, because "without the presence of a food fund one can hardly speak in general about a real socialist policy." Stressing the importance of improving agricultural productivity, Butenko argued that forced collectivisation leads to "both the stagnation of collectivised production itself, in the bounds of which neither the association of labour nor the weak application of technique can compensate for a loss of interest in labour on the part of the basic mass of producers, and a worsening of the economic position of the peasantry." He directly stated that the retention of backward collective farms "has been determined at times more by political motives than by productive expediency", a point made also by Yanov. Such a policy leads "not forward to socialism, but, on the contrary, backwards, to the extremes of primitive communism, from which traditional oriental despotism grew up, assisting the conservation of an extremely low level of productive forces." Butenko argued that socialist collectivism "is directed at the maintenance and development of every individuality entering into this collective," so that "the historical
prerequisite of socialist social bonds is not a traditional patriarchal personal bond, although the former contains some elements of the latter, but 'personal independence, based on external dependence', i.e. again its prerequisite appears as a product of capitalist civilisation."122 A backward country lacking this prerequisite requires "necessary and essential aid" from socialist forces abroad if it is to avoid "either a progressive political degeneration, adapting with its own means to the economic conditions of the country, or gradual economic stagnation, also leading sooner or later to undermining the initial principles of political power, to a rejection of the proclaimed goals."123 Butenko said that if, against Lenin's advice, such forms of development are mistakenly identified as socialist, then this would "not only discredit socialism, but, especially, disorientate the masses, making it possible to inflict enormous losses on the cause of socialism."124

Butenko's critical arguments are not difficult to understand, so they may have been influential amongst critical Soviet intellectuals. How influential is difficult to judge, but conservative attacks on Butenko and his involvement with the recently formed Moscow Tribune group (saying frankly that Gorbachev's draft laws on political reorganisation are undemocratic and "will not suffice") suggest that he has attracted an audience.125 One issue of interest to a radical readership during the 'years of stagnation' must have been how to define a system which, for them at least, was evidently non-socialist and hardly transitional. The most widespread answer in these circles was perhaps that which used the term 'state capitalism' in the pejorative sense common before 1921, denoting the last leg of private property, rather than a first step toward socialism in a backward country.126 Amongst the leading scholars this view was argued principally by Sheinis, whose statement about an alternative of stagnation summed up Butenko's argument, and Mirsky.127 Sheinis first broached this subject in a paper prepared for a conference in Leningrad in October 1968, in which he discussed "a dangerous tendency of the social isolation of ruling groups, controlling the productive forces as their corporate property."128 Noting that "progressive development depends in the greatest degree on the social nature of the state", he stressed that "the consolidation of a dominant exploitative class may occur on the
basis not only of private-capitalist, but also corporate property, which state property becomes in a backward country, the majority of whose population has been removed from real participation in administration.\textsuperscript{129} Claiming that such property "in the conditions of the developing countries is, of course, not socialist, but state capitalist or, in the best case, transitional", he warned about a strengthening of "bureaucratic capital" in a regime where "the limitation of democracy by elite groups (allegedly in national interests) grows into a system of repressive measures constituting a form of their social protection."\textsuperscript{130} In 1971, Sheinis called this regime "a specific form of state capitalism", but only "because of the absence of a more accurate and generally-understood equivalent."\textsuperscript{131} He did not ignore the differences between this system and the West, arguing that "in contrast to a private ownership bourgeoisie, the links within the elite bear not a heterogeneous, but an organic character", in which "the economic situation of this or that group of the elite is determined largely by their position in the state administrative system."\textsuperscript{132} By stressing the key role of civil society in progressive social and political change, Sheinis has implied that Soviet 'bureaucratic capitalism' is inferior to its Western counterpart.\textsuperscript{133} His view is discussed in detail in the second part of this chapter.

Mirsky is probably the most significant Soviet scholar who participated in the subterranean debate. While a prominent commentator on third world events since the 1960s, he has made some pertinent observations about the general features of a 'swollen state' and 'spent society' in backward countries attempting to catch-up with late capitalism.\textsuperscript{134} In 1973, after citing Marx on Oriental despotism and Engels on the prerogatives of sovereign power, Mirsky pointed out that "multistructurality ... created a favourable situation for the rise of a central executive authority."\textsuperscript{135} He focused on "the upper strata of the administrative-governmental apparatus" which, "using the might of state power, have concentrated in their hands great economic strength, and placed under their control a significant part of the means of production."\textsuperscript{136} He disputed the accuracy of the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' as a name for such people, since they do not use these resources as capital, but "only have them at their disposal", and derive their income not from "the exploitation of wage labour, but thanks to
their special, privileged position in the system of production relations." Yet, he said "in its way of life, and often in its world-view, this social layer gravitates toward the hierarchy of values peculiar to a capitalist society." Concerning the basic interests of this group, Mirsky wrote:

On the one hand, the state sector is a nourishing environment (if not a feeding trough) for the ruling bureaucratic elite, who therefore are interested in its development and will fight against those forces (connected with elements of private-enterprise capitalism) who in their egoistic interests would like to weaken and limit the state sector. On the other hand, however, it is beyond doubt that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in favourable circumstances would by no means reject the direct possession of enterprises, and would proceed to a coalescence with the private sector (without, of course, yielding the instruments of state from their hands). In other words, the possibility of a privatisation of enterprises, which are becoming profitable as a result of the activity of the state sector, exists in principle.

Mirsky viewed factors obstructing the development of Western or Japanese-style capitalism in most backward countries as "long-lasting, if not perennial." But he thought a "conservative tendency" in the aftermath of a revolution "may lead to the supremacy of a special type of degenerated, 'thermidorean' authoritarian elites, resting on bureaucratic castes and objectively facilitating the development of capitalism, though in a specific, state-capitalist shell." Disputing Levkovsky's "absurd" view of such state capitalism as an engine of socialist orientation, he argued that it is "opposed to socialism" and "fundamentally" no different from the system being established in developing countries of capitalist orientation.

In his chapter on socio-political problems of the 1974 IMEMO book, Mirsky noted some "causes of the weakness of a legal opposition" which apply to the USSR as well as the third world. These included weak class differentiation, a dominant ideology of anti-imperialist nationalism, control of the trade unions and monopoly of the media by the ruling party. Mirsky characterised the relationship of the authorities with the masses in this system as dominated by "state paternalism". The ruling circles are concerned "not to awaken the initiative of the people", either for fear of revolution or because of a sincere belief that they know the people's needs best, while "the people have grown tired of slogans,
and promises; distrust toward words and speeches spreads; conversations about freedom and democracy are often treated with indifference. A government demonstrating the capacity to cope with inflation is more highly regarded by many than a government providing for free elections." Returning to this theme in January 1987, Mirsky observed that:

When new privileged strata appear for all to see, when there grows up a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', drawing into its 'magnetic field' the state and party apparatus, when high words about revolution, equality and social justice are made into hollow sounds, then disillusionment of the masses inevitably follows. The society is enveloped with distrust toward authority and its slogans, and social apathy spreads. These comments concerned the failure of the 'first generation' of countries to take the 'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky claimed that embourgeoisement in the USSR had been suppressed, because firstly "there was practically no pernicious influence of capitalism 'from outside''", and secondly "the dictatorship of the proletariat existed, in the society there had formed an anti-proprietorial, collectivist atmosphere (not to mention administrative 'anti-Nepmen' measures)." It is difficult to accept these affirmations as Mirsky's serious opinion about Soviet development under Stalin, since he defined a 'Soviet order' as one "awakening the independence of the masses" by conducting "a 'revolution from below', and not only 'from above'". Taking Mirsky at face value about continued proletarian power in the USSR would mean ignoring this distinction, and assuming his disagreement with Simoniya about the degeneration of Soviet power. In fact, Mirsky praised the "historicism, richness of associations and audacity of analogies" in Strany Vostoka, and demonstrated, in the discussion of Meliksetov's book, his own skill applying such attributes.

Meliksetov is one of a group of reformist Soviet Sinologists who have sought to "sharpen the reader's appreciation of similarities" between the USSR and modern China while placing "trust primarily in historical literacy." The key theoretical chapter of his book is clearly meant to provide a new overview of socio-economic development in Kuomintang China, understood essentially as "an energetic process of the monopolisation of large-scale property in the hands of a
leadership quickly and in an elitist way isolating itself from society." While Meliksetov emphasised the specific historical conditions of this process, his analysis reverberates with one possible interpretation of Stalinism, evident by analogy in a characterisation of Chiang-Kai-Shek's changing role, taken from a French researcher:

He became an all-powerful dictator gradually. In the beginning he was a simple instrument, which Chinese capitalism wanted to use for implementing a plan of capitalist construction in China and for attracting the popular masses to this construction. Gradually he became popular with these masses and from an obedient instrument was turned into one of the masters, and then into the only master of the country -- into a dictator.  

Meliksetov highlighted "the speed and intensity of the process of statocratisation of the economy, not having clear economic causes", and sought an explanation in "the social self-determination of the Kuomintang ruling layer." He argued that "the concentration of enormous property in the hands of the state changed the social being of this layer, placing an economic foundation under its independent existence, which had been conditioned above all by socio-political factors." Assuming the 'bureaucratic capitalist' nature of their state property, Meliksetov defined them "as a collective exploiter, ... a collective capitalist." Their ideology was devoted to "justifying the policy of statocratisation of large-scale property," using "traditional garments" in "ideological campaigns" aimed at "making sacred state power and, consequently, the 'chief' of this state and his programme." Quoting an article on China by Lukin, Meliksetov noted that, while "the remoteness of these campaigns from the real needs of broad strata of the population made this work in the end unsuccessful", it still "led to the maintenance and deepening of an authoritarian socio-psychological climate, in which 'any form of institutionalisation of social disagreement was completely excluded'." He also quoted Lukin's 'ideology of development' article to support his view that nationalism was the main motivation of the Kuomintang elite, who wanted "to govern a really great state, and not simply grow rich at the expense of the state treasury".  

The possibility of applying Meliksetov's analysis to the USSR is apparent in the
last three contributions to the published discussion of his book. One reason why Cheshkov stressed the specific, and not the general, basis for Meliksetov's definition of Kuomintang state property as capitalist was to dispute the accuracy of such an application. A broadly similar concern is implicit in Simoniya's response that the "flexibility" of the concept 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is its "least attractive point". Simoniya argued at length that "the simple possession of the apparatus of state economic management by any socio-political group does not yet make it a bureaucratic bourgeoisie", but "only a bureaucratic elite"; he even re-invested "the (juridical) relations of property dominant in a society" with special significance in an effort to show that a ruling bureaucracy in charge of the means of production is not ipso facto a collective capitalist. These remarks were directed against the contribution of Mirsky and Sheinis, whose argument about "the establishment of state capitalism of a new type, distinct from historically known forms", referred not just to "Afro-Asian countries of capitalist development" (a name used "for want of a more adequate term") but also to Soviet-type societies. The passage, quoted in chapter four, about a domestic reproduction of collective capital in this system outside the laws of the market suggests such a reading. Like Western exponents of this view, Mirsky and Sheinis defined "this original system" as capitalist because:

it is based on the alienation of the producer from the means of production and results of labour, on exploitation, on social inequality, on the production of surplus value, which is distributed between 'the collective capitalist' and private capitalists. It is capitalist also because it is included in the meta-system of the world capitalist economy and is subjugated to the basic logic of the latter's development. The reflection of all this in social psychology is a corresponding set of bourgeois value orientations, a proprietorial approach to life, and a dominant motive of personal success. On this ground there grow up bureaucratism, corruption and other negative social phenomena.

They argued that "this is not a derivative system, constituting an emanation of a dominant private-capitalist economy, but a self-contained structure striving to immortalise itself, arising initially as a superstructure over a multistructural economy, but subsequently penetrating all branches of socio-economic relations in the society." Growing "as an answer to the imperatives dictated by the development of world productive forces", this structure "creates some
opportunities for an economic advance, a way out from backwardness (thanks to
the primacy of the state sector in the economic structure), and the solution of a
number of urgent national problems." 162 Mirsky and Sheinis claimed that,
comparing Kuomintang policy "with contemporary Chinese reality, one inevitably
comes to the conclusion that in essentially different political and ideological
forms, sharply conflicting with each other, there have been and still are
manifested -- however paradoxically -- variants of resolving similar problems
which are very close in their socio-economic nature." 163 Clearly, in their view
the phenomenon of sharp conflicts shrouding basic similarities has characterised
not just China, but the modern world system.

This sweeping generalisation of Meliksetov's analysis was not the only
analogical form of argument open to radical scholars wishing to expose the Soviet
elite. The Chinese mirror was used more effectively by Ostrovitianov and
Sterbalova to highlight "a degeneration of regimes, which earlier embarked on
the non-capitalist path, in the direction of a modernised 'asiatic' mode of
production." 164 The Sino-Soviet split was a godsend for critical socialists within
the Soviet intelligentsia. It meant they could comment seriously on one case of a
revolution defeated, openly stating such points of significance for Soviet history
as: "the nature of the working class is alien to all kinds of despots, authoritarian
regimes, and the deification of 'strong' personalities." 165 While agreeing with
Levkovsky about the need in backward countries for "a whole historical
pre-socialist stage" of development, Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova disagreed
fundamentally with him about the historical consequences of "a transformation of
executive power into a closed, self-developing organism, reproducing a swelling
of administrative personnel as its main political support." 166 In stark contrast to
Levkovsky's 'incubator' metaphor, they argued that a "reactionary degeneration
of leading groups" results in the dominance of society by "bureaucratic castes,"
who "freeze democracy, halt the movement to a socialist goal ... and exploit the
toilers in their name, resorting to both economic and non-economic methods of
coercion." 167 Like Butenko, they thought such a regime can "only immortalise
poverty, backwardness and the oppressed position of the people, lead the nation
into the dead-ends and by-ways of history, plunge it into a state of uninterrupted
dissatisfaction and unrest." Consequently, "it is inevitable that there be a prolonged period of zig-zags, vacillations, coups at the top, and persistent and bitter struggle, which must in the end return society onto a path of movement toward the real socialist goal." 168

It is significant that Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova restated this goal in classical Marxist terms as a society in which the state first changes its character and then "withers away", with "the personal leadership of revolutionary ruling groups being gradually replaced by more widespread democratic regimes." 169 They criticised some revolutionaries for "intolerance toward all other opinions", but did not regard the discrediting of "genuine socialist ideals" by "the theory and practice of new authoritarian regimes" as irreversible. 170 Their optimism was based not on an assumption of transitionality, but on an understanding that the alternative posed by 'the classics' could never be fully blotted out, despite everything that has happened "under the name of socialism". 171 They pointed out that Engels warned decisively against identifying as socialist the "'crying anachronism'" of a society in which "chauvinism, a return to national seclusion, and the galvanisation of old despotic methods of administration leads naturally to the loss of all progressive attainments." 127 Emphasising the scale of this phenomenon, they commented that:

Such historical precedents are all the more dangerous in that they have a tendency to be repeated. In separate national states there have formed at the top authoritarian elites who play upon the backward psychology of the people, consciously erode the proletariat, deliberately disunite the masses, incite upon each other different strata of toilers, and regenerate in a modernised form outdated, archaic institutions, using them for consolidating an unlimited despotism. A true revolution ends up in a situation when, according to the characterisation of Marx, in order that society would not have attained itself a new content, the state as it were returns itself to its most ancient form. This process is masked, screened from the masses by a cascade of clanging socialist slogans, camouflaged by highly-strung, ecstatic 'revolutionary' rituals, which are called upon to cultivate in the people a mood of sacrifice and self-estrangement. In such a society empty talk inevitably becomes superior to social content, which ephemerally, fluctuatingly, slidingly, like mercury, is fully dependent upon continually changing external and internal political goals. 173

In a previous article Sterbalova suggested that the Mao Zedong group were trying
"to kill in the consciousness of the Chinese people the conception of socialism" by doing "everything possible, in order that society would accept the practice of present-day China for socialist development." She made the more serious object of her criticism clear by adding: "But history, as Marx said, repeats itself twice: the first time in the form of tragedy, and the other in the form of farce." Having described Mao and (by implication) his predecessor Stalin as creators of an "anti-utopia", she summed up the ideological role of this concoction in world history by concluding that defenders of 'state socialism' like "the Maoists would do well to remember a simple and obvious truth which is so clearly expressed in the well-known aphorism: you may fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."174

Civil Society and the Need for Reform

Not all Soviet intellectuals hoping for change would have endorsed such radical criticism of the Soviet elite. A defence of inequality presented by El'ianov in 1976 outlines the probably more influential liberal alternative to economic stagnation. Referring to radical articles by Sterbalova, Cheshkov and Sheinis, El'ianov agreed that "the extraordinarily large salaries by local standards of the upper branch of the state administration are, undoubtedly, an attribute of power and a manifestation of the relative independence of the local ruling elite."175 Noting an absence of "social and political forces able effectively to oppose the greedy aspirations of the ruling clique," he claimed that "nevertheless it is hardly possible to reduce everything to this", since "such a straightforward evaluation, in our opinion, somewhat oversimplifies the essence of the matter."176 Elianov argued that "the developing countries sharply need a fundamental improvement of the system of state administration." He viewed this as essential for securing "proper leadership" of "the modernisation of the local economy," and considered that better administration "demands a sharp rise in the qualifications of the appropriate personnel, and consequently significantly higher payment for their labour."177 He regarded some administrative sponging as inevitable "with the
current state of socio-economic and political structures", but overall thought it correct "to speak about the growth of a professional and bureaucratic layer as a concomitant component of the economic and cultural progress of the developing countries, a component which according to its material level finds itself in the position of an elite".\(^\text{178}\) This perspective on the necessary role of bureaucracy in development is basically Weberian, and so quite different from that of Levkovsky, who followed Lenin in regarding bureaucracy as first and foremost an obstacle to workers' control, and indeed a temporary obstacle which hatches the prerequisites for its own supersession.\(^\text{179}\) There are significant points of overlap between these alternative perspectives, particularly concerning criticism of statocratisation as resulting in what Erik Pletnev recently called "Soviet 'monopolism'", but an important difference remains.\(^\text{180}\) If Levkovsky implied that a socialist society is still a future possibility, most supporters of the law of value as an everlasting objective measure of efficiency regard the contemporary USSR as socialist, while implying that socialism is distinct from capitalism not according to its mode of production, but according to its pattern of distribution or political system, or simply its tragic history.\(^\text{181}\)

There have been several spurts of liberalism in Russia in the past, but the current one is arguably the most substantial to date. As Hough has suggested, the eagerness of the intelligentsia "for a relaxation of the dictatorship and an opening to the West" has connected with, but also outstripped, the recognition by a new generation of leaders that change is necessary to overcome their country's increasing relative backwardness in the modern world.\(^\text{182}\) This awareness of the need for reform was best expressed in the opening of Shmelev's famous article, "Advances and Debts": "The state of our economy satisfies nobody. Its two central, in-built defects -- the monopoly of the producer in conditions of universal shortage, and the lack of interest of enterprises in scientific-technical progress -- are probably clear to all." Shmelev said that no wise men know completely "what is to be done" to fix these defects, but offered for consideration a series of liberal solutions, including creating "a comparatively small reserve army of labour" (i.e. unemployment) as a means of "particularly economic" rather than administrative "compulsion".\(^\text{183}\) The response to these proposals from around and above
confirms the view that the commonality of perception between the intelligentsia and the new leaders is limited. While 9 out of 10 readers' letters supported Shmelev's solutions, Gorbachev in commenting on this article agreed with the diagnosis, but doubted the receptiveness of the patient, if not the effectiveness of the cure.184

Both the strength and weakness of liberal economic reform in the USSR can be judged from the fact that, in broad outline, Shmelev had already presented the policy of 'cost-accounting socialism' in a book published in 1970.185 In this book he argued against the view that there are two appropriate 'models' of socialism, a highly-centralised and autarkic type of 'extensive' development suitable for backward countries and an optimally-balanced market mechanism of economic growth feasible only in a highly-developed country. He stressed his support for 'market socialism' even in an underdeveloped country by making the strange claim that in the USSR during the 1930s "the work of the majority of enterprises was based on principles of cost-accounting and the unprofitability of separate producers was never considered a norm".187 This is an extreme case of a Soviet economist legitimating the regulating role of the law of value by declaring that it already exists.188 Shmelev likewise asserted that "in the nature of a socialist order there have not been and are not any objective regularities of development demanding autarky".189 Yet his argument about the need for a "forcing of industrial exports" implied that a tendency 'to swim against the tide' of economic interdependence still existed, and it proved so strong in the Brezhnev years that by the mid 1980s the USSR was already exporting proportionately less machinery than a number of developing countries.190 The strength of Shmelev's demand to replace a sellers' market with a buyers' market, based on the "productive and financial independence of enterprises", is that it has long since attained the status of an economic axiom amongst the Soviet intelligentsia.191 The weakness is that it has been continually ignored by responsible officials who have found resorting to 'administrative methods' easier than 'cost-accounting', if not unavoidable. Toward the end of "Advances and Debts" Shmelev repeated, in direct and more colourful terms, a claim about "a shortage of qualified personnel" which he made in his 1970 book, when he had argued that simply increasing investment does not
create "a productive economic mechanism of development." On the contrary, "an unjustifiably high rate of accumulation may lead to a negative effect because of the excessive social tension occasioned by concomitant administrative measures, the suppression of incentives to work, and the irrational allocation of the accumulation fund resulting from imperfections in the organisational structure of society and a shortage of trained personnel."  

A key problem for liberal economic reform is that the existing centralised economic system inculcates in its administrators a "'god given' right to command", so that the original shortage of qualified personnel is reproduced.

The main problem facing the development of liberalism in the USSR is that, in the short term, "everything depends upon the character of the leadership of society, upon whether or not it gives an opportunity for the manifestation of independence and variety in the thinking and conduct of the members of society." This reliance of liberalism upon reform from above does not mean that the leadership's options are unlimited. An argument for liberalism put forward by Popov in the late 1970s rested on a thesis about the "not very wide choice" facing a modernising state directing an "extraordinarily painful" process of 'development from above'. Popov defined this process as characteristic of all backward countries, in which there is "a significant gap between the might of the modernising pressure of the modern sector and the absorbent capacities of the traditional environment." He suggested that while the state had to satisfy "a need to accelerate economic development" within socially-acceptable limits, it would tend "to favour economic growth" at the expense of "traditionalism and stability", because of "the presence of available modern technique with its demonstration effect, and the already largely formed progressive orientation of the educated elite". This Westernising view assumes that backwardness in a competitive world ultimately makes some degree of liberalisation necessary, even while creating obstacles for its development. From a liberal viewpoint, the success of restructuring depends largely upon whether the imperatives for overcoming backwardness have a stronger impact on the leadership than structural legacies of the past. While Kliamkin has stressed that the absence in Russia of a suitable soil for parliamentary democracy "predetermined the failure of all past attempts at the
liberalisation of the country," he was still expectant about the prospects for the present reform from above. In a book review published in March 1985, he noted the topicality of considering those 19th Century Russian revolutionary democrats who placed their 'hopes in the top leaders', expecting them to create "more favourable conditions for the action of progressive forces".  

A key concern of Soviet intellectuals since Gorbachev's attempted liberalisation began has been to find some guarantee that this reform from above will not prove fruitless because of a change at the top. One participant in a recent discussion about "factors of the irreversibility of restructuring" said in this respect:

It seems to me that the question must be put this way. For us - beginning with the 1930s and continuing in the following decades - the state crushed civil society under itself. In essence the interests of society, the interests of specific people and social groups were replaced and supplanted by bureaucratic interests. In my view, the most important problem is whether society can control the state, and the party. 

The concept of civil society, which "includes the whole complex of relations outside the limits of the political state", has recently regained the 'right of citizenship' in Soviet social science. One article notes that "without a society freely developing under the aegis of the state, the latter gradually degrades and loses its genuine meaning and purpose." Another article suggests that a successful socialist revolution in a backward country leads to "an inversion of the functions of state and civil society", which can only be overcome by an "institutionalisation of the basic branches" of the latter. The vagueness of these open references to civil society in the USSR supports the recent opinion of V.G. Gel'bras that Soviet social scientists are "in essence, only approaching a new reading of this conception, and a translation of its rich content into the language of specific policy." He pointed out that amongst the Soviet intelligentsia the concept of civil society "was revived by orientalists," who used it for "analysing a society that has still not become civil, does not have fully formed classes, and is undergoing a difficult period of transformation, characterised by the pressing together of systemically-different components." That the orientalists concerned did not just have the Orient in mind is suggested by Slavnyi in his
review of Simoniya's conception of the key role of civilisational factors in a successful historical synthesis. Claiming "it is impossible to exaggerate the scientific and practical significance" of Simoniya's argument, Slavnyi defined its reference as "universal", and cited Gorbachev's policy of "increasing the role of the human factor in all spheres of life" to point out that implications for understanding Soviet society were included.203

While "the conception of socialism as a civil society" has recently become a key piece of reformist rhetoric amongst the Soviet intelligentsia, its two main revivers, Simoniya and Sheinis, disagreed somewhat about the possibilities for establishing civil society in a backward, state-dominated country.204 Simoniya based his view on a version of Gramsci's comparison of the organic stability of civil society in developed capitalist countries with its embryonic condition in Eastern Europe, "in particular Russia".205 Simoniya argued that "the process of the establishment of civil society and its interdependence with the official state" is "essentially different" in backward countries from what occurred in Western Europe. In the latter, "the formation of civil society was a prerequisite for the emergence of the modern bourgeois state", so that "the process of development passed in general and as a whole from below -- from the economic base and social structure to the political superstructure."206 He claimed that a modernising state in a backward country would face an "objective need" to compensate for the absence of a "cementing civil life" by introducing "political life from above". But since "political life cannot replace the whole complex of manifestations of civil life and its cementing role," the modernising state would sooner or later have to allow the development of civil society in order to solve "problems of national-state integration".207 Summarising the experience of third world countries after independence, Simoniya wrote that:

the initiating, stimulating and directing role in the establishment of civil society has belonged to superstructural elements, above all to the elite strata of the state apparatus (the nucleus of a modern state). In other words, the process of the formation of civil society here began largely from above. And only with the strengthening and taking shape of civil society may it begin to exercise increasing pressure on the official state, compelling the latter to a further evolution (a process often accompanied by crises and revolutionary situations).208
In his review published in early 1987 Sheinis agreed with the difference between East and West, but commented that:

This thought demands clarification. The state, sooner in the sphere of its economic activity than in any other, may create and really creates - in contrast to European models - certain prerequisites for the formation of civil society, although it still often blocks this process quite consciously. But civil society as a complex of independent social organisations cannot be created from above, other than only as quasi-civil society.

He stressed that civil society has "not only socio-economic, but also socio-cultural roots", which grew in Western Europe through a "prolonged cultural evolution" spanning centuries and including many forms. He warned that "far-ranging control from above obstructs the formation of an independent civil society and is fraught with catastrophes in the Kampuchean manner." While considering the market and hence private property as "the economic base of civil society", Sheinis said "already the phenomenon of fascist dictatorships in Europe has graphically shown the non-identity of bourgeois and civil society, the possibility of the existence of capitalism with a 'frozen' civil society -- in the rupture of social ties peculiar to it, the desecration of institutions etc., it also showed that society may be reconstructed primarily on the basis of state bonds." In view of his previous arguments about the 'state capitalist' nature of Stalinism, he evidently also regarded past Soviet experience as showing that a modernising state could not be relied upon to foster the development of civil society from above.

Supporting change from above does not necessarily imply satisfaction with an authoritarian political system. Shmelev, who recently stated that "a revolution from above is by no means easier than a revolution from below", concluded a 1977 paper on economic efficiency by saying that "the task of formulating a rational economic policy ... is closely connected with a renewal of the political structure and a development of democracy in all spheres of social life". The nature of a 'revolution from above' was considered by Simoniya in his historical analysis of 'secondary' capitalism in Eastern Europe. His argument is evidently not meant to be transferred altogether for understanding Soviet history, but is topical in the light of Shmelev's open statement of a common formula for
Gorbachev's restructuring. While the context of Simoniya's discussion is "the transition from an absolutist to a Bonapartist type of state organisation", he noted that the complex character of this transition in countries of 'secondary' capitalism "could not but affect the whole subsequent social development of states of this group". Khoros has suggested that, in terms of agrarian relations, the "despotic role of the state" and cultural integration, 'secondary' capitalism in Tsarist Russia was more backward even than in Japan; he concluded that "the objective problems and contradictions of the formational development of Russian society have long since made themselves known in the country constructing socialism." In 1975, when Simoniya viewed the USSR in a special transitional period composed of a reformist "synthesis of traditional and new elements" in which the former were dominant, he implied the need for a "new political revolution", but did not consider this as a 'revolution from above', except briefly and pessimistically with regard to some states of 'socialist orientation'. By 1984, when a new leadership was waiting in the wings, he claimed that "a correct evaluation of the phenomenon of a revolution from above is today exceptionally important". The fact that his analysis of this phenomenon was made before Gorbachev's restructuring began makes it more interesting, since it is unencumbered by either illusions or the obvious sensitivity of the subject.

Simoniya criticised Agaev for equating a revolution from above with "ordinary reforms, implemented by traditional ... ruling circles and not changing, in essence, either the character of social relations or the nature of superstructural institutions themselves." Simoniya argued that a revolution from above should not be viewed just as "an essential transformation of society" initiated by a "traditional ruling clique", but more deeply as a distorted "reflection" of an "incomplete political revolution from below". He criticised a Western scholar, Ellen Trimberger, for making the opposite mistake to Agaev, in equating a revolution from above with one from below by identifying the "real revolutionary potential" of the former with the internal nature of the state apparatus, rather than with objective forces pushing this conservative apparatus toward fundamental change. Simoniya thought the specific "contradictoriness" of "a revolution from above consists in the fact that the bureaucratic state apparatus,
while conservative to the core, reactionary in its subjective aspirations and counter-revolutionary in the methods which it uses to suppress progressive political opposition, is compelled by external circumstances to accomplish a "revolutionary programme" of social transformations. While regarding this phenomenon as "objectively progressive", he noted that "a revolution from above is fundamentally different from a revolution from below, according to the character of the forces participating in it (in particular the complete elimination of the masses from transformative activity), the direct tactical goals, the form of social transformations and the specific results". He concluded that a revolution from above is "a slow and half-hearted way of resolving urgent social transformations," and is marked by "the prolonged maintenance of essential elements" of the old social structure during "systemic renewal of the traditional political superstructure". This characterisation applies to Gorbachev's restructuring, although not without qualification to Stalin's 'great change', which has often been labelled a revolution from above.

Agaev recently responded to Simoniya by waving Krasin's flag to confirm the rectitude of his own approach to the phenomenon of 'revolutions from above', but the conservative nature of his view is clear from two articles published in late 1987. In the first, Agaev defined Gorbachev's restructuring as a "previously unknown" but nevertheless "natural stage of the whole epoch of socialist social revolution". He cited Ligachev to affirm that the difference between Gorbachev and his predecessors is one of "degrees of radicalism, determined by the amount of tasks to be solved", and warned of a need to guard against "left-extremist pseudo-theories" which put forward the dangerous "thesis of 'a revolution in the revolution', affecting the very essence of political power." His second article, attacking Sheinis for having committed "a nihilistic turn in interpreting the tasks of new political thinking", was entitled "The Political Realities of the Developing World and Social Dialectics". While implying that Sheinis supported taking "the path of an artificial maintenance of the social status-quo" in the third world, Agaev himself took this path with respect to Soviet history, by defending the opinion that the strictest centralisation "was inevitable in a country that was far from the most developed economically and situated face to face with the capitalist
Agaev's main concern was that "the rejection of a class approach to reality" would mean wasting the USSR's complimentary allies amongst "detachments of the international workers' movement". Implicitly, he meant that these forces would be much less corrosive of existing 'political realities' in the USSR than the effects of an opening to the West. But these realities soon shifted of their own accord. Agaev supported his concluding claim about the need for all participants in scholarly discussions to observe "the basic demands of social dialectics" (i.e. no washing of dirty linen in public) by referring to Avakov's article in the IMEMO journal. Yet within six months this journal's new editor, Diligensky, accused proponents of a 'class' approach like Nina Andreeva of expressing "nostalgia for the time of the cult of personality", and professes astonishment at the "unpardonable cynicism" with which they attributed their 'ideas' about internal enemies to Marx and Engels. Agaev is a more erudite and less celebrated cynic than Andreeva, but his use of the word dialectics has been no more than "a sophistic formula", at least concerning the nature of Soviet society. Fortunately for the "few readers" who Agaev thought might find his stance too cautious, in the next issue of Rabochii Klass Gefter re-affirmed the idea of "choice as a condition of life."

Without doubt the most unjustified of Agaev's claims against Sheinis was that his 'nihilistic turn' had led to "an essentially anti-historical concealment and smudging of the opposition between capitalism and socialism, as a result of which the necessity of a struggle for social progress is denied." Sheinis has devoted considerable attention to the problem of formulating some basic "criteria of social progress" in the modern world. Historically, his main theme has been that socialism should not be identified with mere opposition to private capitalist monopolies of "another monopoly -- the national state, as the most all-embracing organ of economic and political control." In the paper referred to by El'ianov, Sheinis argued, on Lenin's authority, that the "decisive condition" determining movement of a society toward socialism is not "the degree of statocratisation of the national economy", but whether this economy is "really turned to benefit the whole people." He suggested that "movement only in the first of these directions in the best case creates prerequisites for socialism,
elements of transitional relations, and in the worst case may place under doubt the progressiveness of this movement in general."\textsuperscript{237} Sheinis has repeatedly called attention to the "reactionary potential" of "hasty and excessive statocratisation of the economy", manifested in "the disorganisation of the economy and a 'recoil' in the socio-political field."\textsuperscript{238} In 1977 he wrote that:

The monopoly position of the state structure in the economy, which is often supplemented by a monopolisation of political power by new ruling groups, in specific social conditions contains not only the possibility of opposition to imperialism and local reactionary classes, and the possibility of a progressive restructuring of the national economy, but also those negative tendencies peculiar, as V.I. Lenin emphasised, to any monopoly: an aspiration toward stagnation and decay, onesidedness of technical progress, the fomenting of parasitical expenditure, anti-democratic tendencies in politics etc.\textsuperscript{239}

Sheinis implied then that Soviet leaders showed "a tendency to undertake decisions prompted not by a serious analysis of objective processes, but by chance impulses".\textsuperscript{240} Coincidentally or otherwise, these two criticisms were made with reference to the late Brezhnev years in speeches to the recent CPSU Conference by Arbatov and Primakov respectively.\textsuperscript{241}

Sheinis is not only significant as a precursor of some opinions about Stalinism now openly proclaimed by senior officials. More importantly, he has argued since 1968 that the "super-centralised economic and socio-political structures which were established in the USSR during the five years after the death of V.I. Lenin" can only be reformed in a comprehensive and "scientifically sound" way, not "by the method of 'trial and error'".\textsuperscript{242} And, most important of all, he has implicitly suggested that successful reform would involve the progressive development of private-enterprise capitalism in the USSR. This suggestion seems contradicted by the recent arguments of his colleague Shishkov, who has stressed the legitimacy of "socialist commodity production today and tomorrow", and by Sheinis' own criticism of "our in-grained identification of capitalism as such with economic laws of modern production that are equally obligatory for capitalism and socialism."\textsuperscript{243} But such statements are best interpreted as necessary rhetorical attempts to cast doubt upon conservative verities, not as indications of a basic agreement between all liberals and Stalinists about the socialist nature of Soviet
society. Even Afanas'ev has referred to the co-existence of "two systems -- capitalism and socialism" during "a whole historical epoch", in order to argue that the existing systems "must conduct a continual dialogue between themselves, adapt to each other, mutually-enrich each other and compete, not at the expense of, but for the good of the future."\textsuperscript{244} This basic thesis of 'new political thinking', that there must be 'an interdependent and largely integral world', was affirmed unambiguously by Sheinis in 1978. Concluding a preliminary analysis of the criteria of social progress, he asserted that all countries are proceeding "by original, unrepeatable and not short paths to the formation of a single international community, the basic features and main values of which, according to our deep conviction, cannot but be universal."\textsuperscript{245} Sheinis recently argued that no country can afford not to follow "the vector of modern historical development" -- based on an ecologically limited, industrial-scientific market economy with political democracy and a basic recognition of "the sovereignty of the individual in society" -- if it is to avoid the 'alternative' of "degradation and in the end collapse."\textsuperscript{246} His previous arguments about the class nature and historical prospects of Soviet society allow one to understand his present view as essentially social democratic, in the sense of considering social progress as a matter of 'civilising capitalism', at least until "the very distant future".\textsuperscript{247}

The critical analysis of Stalinism presented by Sheinis in 1971 was quite radical. This probably reflected an identification with Menshevism or the Western new left, particularly the 'state capitalist' school of Trotskyism, although Sheinis was sure of the "pointless" nature of the opposition 'plan or market', arguing that "practice and theoretical considerations lead to the answer: both plan and market, in the state sector and outside it -- and with this the general, most abstract posing of the question concludes."\textsuperscript{248} However, Sheinis stressed that "here it is a question of a new form, growing on the soil of the objective socio-economic needs of backward countries and possessing a double kind of potential: development toward socialism (in as much as the world socialist system exists and the transition to socialism is realised on a world scale), or the development of a special type of state-capitalist system (in as much as the influence of world capitalism has not been overcome, and the internal conditions
[for development toward socialism] are still extremely immature).\textsuperscript{249} Applying this alternative to the USSR at the turn of the 1930s clearly implies that the latter potentiality has been realised in modern Soviet society. Sheinis argued that "this form gives rise to a ruling class of a new type -- an elite, which passes through a period of social formation, has no prototype in preceding history, and possesses specific socio-economic characteristics."\textsuperscript{250} Significantly, he did not claim that this new form of society constituted "the ultimate development of capitalism", but rather argued that its specific feature consists "in the fact that the formation of an original corporative-statist structure was not prepared for by a process of the concentration of production and capital, and by other spontaneous economic processes, as this occurred in the West."\textsuperscript{251}

Sheinis listed five key characteristics of this new type of elite. First, and most important, are "the special interests peculiar to it, which oppose it to the other classes and strata of the national society." Sheinis suggested the selfishness of the Soviet elite with a very telling comparison:

In our literature it has been regularly emphasised that in the midst of the elite and around it there develops corruption, nepotism, and an aspiration toward personal enrichment, which show that its representatives do not devote themselves to concern for the common good, but hurry to grab a piece of everything devourable.... Demonstrative answers were given by some pupils of a boarding school in Mali: 'What is your goal in life?' - 'To finish learning, become a patron, have a white wife and a car of the latest model'. 'What is this socialism?' - 'It is when we drive out the colonisers and ourselves become the patrons.' The elite really strives for consumption on the level of the 'highest world standards'. The social prestige of activity in the state apparatus, even in its lowest branches, is much higher than in private enterprise, and the income is higher, more certain and more stable. Obviously, an important reserve of the accumulation fund for plans of development consists in limiting the revenue of these groups.\textsuperscript{252}

Sheinis was careful enough to add that "it would be a mistake to restrict research of the elite as a socio-economic phenomenon to the sphere of distribution and personal consumption, since its aspirations are by no means exhausted by villas and automobiles." He argued that "its interests are manifested in the most different spheres of production and social life", including "foreign policy aspirations not having any relation to real social needs" and "re-armament and
militarisation, which have undermined the national economy." He said "all these divergences in the interests of the national community and the ruling elite are immeasurably more dangerous than an excessive passion for personal enrichment." Second, Sheinis argued that the mechanism for checking the economic efficiency of this elite is "much more complex" than the rate of profit guiding "usual capitalist firms", since it "includes not only economic, but also political relations. The state may ruin the economy during a definite period and only after some time receive a more or less telling blow." Third, Sheinis noted that this new elite "has a pyramidal structure", in which "the influence, power and amount of personal consumption grows in geometric progression according to elevation from the base to the top". He also noted "the extraordinarily great role of a narrow group of chief political leaders, not having an equivalent in countries with a developed class structure", and remarked that "the properly ruling elite is numerically small: those who undertake the basic decisions, situated in 'a room with controls', are few." But Sheinis argued that "this is no basis for concluding that the elite as a whole is not a class formation: indeed, in the imperialist countries the big bourgeoisie forms only part of a class." He claimed that the organic character of political power means that the elite as a whole realises "a right of corporate property on the most important part of national revenue and national wealth", with the economic position of groups in the elite dependent upon their political standing. Fourth, Sheinis noted that "the elite has special modes of formation and reproduction: the decisive place belongs not to the institution of inheritance, but to education, service in the army, nepotism etc." Fifth, "the elite has special forms of relations with other social groups, including different kinds of non-economic coercion." Sheinis contrasted the historical path of Stalinism with that of capitalist Europe, but viewed both as different structures "through which society moves toward socialism." He argued that, while "in the classical variant political power was a realisation of economic supremacy", "here politics takes precedence over economics, though this is not only a political process (because relations of property, as was the case for example in traditional old-oriental despotisms, are intertwined and merged with relations of political power), but the formation of a
new socio-economic and political structure“. Saying that "the contradictions contained here deserve the most intent attention", he described the main contradiction ("manifested in the course of recent decades") as that, while "only the state" could oversee progressive development, in conditions of "the inertia of large social classes, the weakness and smallness of the modern working class and other social groups engendered by the scientific-technical revolution, often the state falls into the hands of self-seeking forces, who are indifferent to common national interests." He suggested that "a tendency toward a certain isolation of the interests and social positions of the state elite group will probably operate so long as the basic classes of modern society have not developed, so long as historical development has not broken up ancient traditions of peculiar absenteeism and social indifference amongst large groups of the population." Sheinis argued that progressive development requires "the formation of social counter-balances to the state apparatus, the formation of a mechanism subjugating the activity of the state to (or, at least, correlating it with) the interests of society," without which "catastrophic results" may occur. He called for "workers' control of the enterprises of the state sector," since "without this the plan-regulating activity of the state will always be subject to the danger of social deformation and economic inefficiency." Having said that "even a structure which undoubtedly contained in itself important elements of socialism maintains the internal potential for social degeneration", he concluded that "the really progressive alternative ... is in any case connected with a prolonged and difficult process of development of forms of social autonomy, formation of political democracy, social control over the activity of state organs at all levels, and the break-up of a social psychology containing elements of passivity and servility." 

The question of whether the Stalinist system could be reformed, rather than just maintained with adaptions to the demands of modern production, would have been pondered by Sheinis during the long 'years of stagnation'. The answer he offered in the early 1980s through an analogical discussion of "Marx's model of Bonapartism" was rather pessimistic. The main reason for pessimism was the way a dictatorial regime had constrained the development of modern social classes. Summarising Marx's model, Sheinis commented that: "the spike of a
Bonapartist dictatorship was directed at suppressing the independent political activity of the working class (this we remember well), at repressing, destroying and perverting the institutions of civil society, in as much as they existed independently from the state, and at depriving the democratic intelligentsia of an independent role (about this we are often inclined for some reason to forget)."  

Sheinis suggested implicitly that, while there are no "direct analogies" in history, the USSR during Stalin's rise to power contained a "specific refraction and hypertrophy" of five basic ingredients of Bonapartism. First, a mass of "de-classed elements" (who in Marx's model formed the bulk of the sovereign's "praetorian guard"). Second, a particularly backward peasantry. Third, a "motley conglomerate" of a bourgeoisie, which had grown out of a society characterised by "strict social stratification and non-economic divisions". Fourth, a working class still only a 'class in itself', "quantitatively small (especially its factory detachments)," receiving "some benefits which other social strata do not have, and situated sometimes under state patronage." And fifth, significantly weaker institutions of civil society than 19th Century France. Having thus outlined the balance of class forces which (in Marx's words) allowed "a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part", Sheinis characterised the result in terms of the following "important distinctive features" of the type of society concerned:

- a strong state, which has absorbed in itself several functions that in Europe civil society fulfilled;
- the weakness of economic and social counter-balances to the power of the state, which represents an aggregate not only of definite social, but also particular personal interests;
- a violent unification of different aspects of social and ideological life (often in a religious form);
- significant economic inefficiency, and the wasting of limited resources on prestigious and other parasitical goals;
- the consolidation of social inequality on a new basis;
- a strengthening of rigidity, with a peculiar kind of ossification of a series of social structures, complicating progressive processes of social evolution.

Sheinis said "of course, this is only one of the tendencies of social development, but a tendency sufficiently real, which is rooted in the past and present of many countries of the East and fraught with serious shocks, that may extend beyond national-state boundaries." He remarked that "today it is difficult to judge the
longevity of such structures, but they hardly seem a short-lived and localised historical episode like the Second empire in France.\textsuperscript{266}

Whether the West would prefer to do business with actually existing Stalinism, rather than risk the uncertainties of a liberal 'roll-back', was perhaps the biggest unresolved issue for Soviet scholars during the stop-start detente of the 1970s. The comments of Mirsky and Sheinis about this matter provide the best example for understanding Kagarlitsky's point, that esoteric discussion of the USSR has taken place not just through Aesopian language, but through theoretical study of "actual relations existing in other countries. The relevance to Soviet reality ... appears not in the garbling or mixing-up of some phenomena with others -- that is done by the authors of official textbooks -- not in any [special] sort of camouflage, but merely in the choice of material."\textsuperscript{267} After wondering whether growing "state regulation at the expense of the market" in the West "has its limits", Mirsky and Sheinis focused on a crucial "second question: what socio-economic system will contemporary capitalism in general and the multinational corporations in particular transplant, propagate and support in the developing countries?"\textsuperscript{268} Two contrasting answers which Mirsky and Sheinis reviewed could have appeared to insightful readers as opposing 'positions' on the issue of Western policy toward the USSR, should the latter be forced economically to open its doors. The first position was optimistic from the point of view of Soviet intellectuals concerned about establishing some 'economic and social counter-balances to the power of the state':

In as much as the capitalist oriented developing countries will to a growing degree be guided by foreign capital, Western markets, Western sources for receiving financial means, equipment, food, 'know-how' etc., and in as much as imperialism remains imperialism and cannot but use these circumstances for imposing its model of social order, all this must lead to the consolidation of private-enterprise capitalism on the periphery of the world capitalist system, and undermine here the regulating role of the state and state sector.\textsuperscript{269}

Mirsky and Sheinis said "supporters of this point of view rest upon no small number of facts of contemporary reality", but added: "their opponents may enlist no fewer facts and no less weighty theoretical considerations. They assert that neocolonialism, striving organically to integrate the developing countries into a
modified system of world economic ties, will endeavour in every way to encourage and 'feed up', 'domesticate' state capitalism. In this view, Western monopolies have already shown that they prefer to do business with an authoritarian state, rather than "support an unstable, capricious and weak private sector, which is not able in the political plane to independently secure stability and a firm anti-revolutionary order." While "liberal circles in the West" have been "distressed" by the downfall of parliamentary experiments in the third world, their conservative "opponents reply that such a kind of democracy anyway had no strong roots here, could not have secured the stability necessary for economic growth and stable relations, restrained revolutionary forces and created a suitable investment climate." This second view was pessimistic, at least from the short-term perspective of Soviet liberalism: "Considering all this, influential imperialist circles are inclined toward state capitalist, bourgeois-bureaucratic, in particular military-despotic, regimes in the developing countries -- this, maybe, is for them the main chance to prevent a transition of these countries onto the path of socialism and to retain their control in the developing world". If such regimes suit the West in the third world, then why not in the USSR as well, the hopes of dissidents and the morals of the 'free world' notwithstanding? It is significant that Mirsky and Sheinis took this 'position' seriously, in spite of optimistic predictions about the liberal prospects for detente made by Arbatov's institute and IMEMO's systems theorists at the time. This suggests concern that a selective opening to the West might exacerbate the "basic defect" of the structures of Stalinism, which "consists in their small capacity for further change, in an excessive regulatedness that leads society into a historical dead-end."

Despite doubting the internal and external possibilities for reform, Sheinis was not one of those who "had fallen into the depths of despair", mesmerised by the question: "How great is the inertia of prolonged stagnation?" His 'criteria of social progress' may be read as an attempt to specify the necessary conditions for achieving a "broadening of the class base of the state". The basic requirement was a focus on the quality rather than quantity of social production. Sheinis directed his classification of development of the productive forces as only a prerequisite of social progress against those for whom nominally high tempos of
economic growth had become "the object of an ecstatic cult". He argued that, while such tempos are "most often attained with a low initial level in conditions of a massive relocation of material resources and labour power from the countryside to the towns", economic development requires a continual adaptation to the demands of "that technological mode of production -- industrial, and then scientific-technical -- which has formed (or is forming) in the more developed countries." This Western orientation was reflected in the criteria of progress chosen by Sheinis: first, an unrestricted pattern of consumption able to stimulate economic activity; second, increasingly productive labour, comparable in discipline as well as solidarity to workers who have passed through "the harsh school of capitalism"; third, a social and international development of culture, which "must not be closed in the narrow circle of an intellectual elite"; fourth, an overcoming of social inequality which is "connected not so much with a reduction of the intensity of inequality (it is sometimes even increased), as with the transition from non-economic, personal forms of it, resting on direct violence or tradition, to primarily economic and impersonal, anonymous forms"; and fifth, greater personal freedom, "with the development of democratic control and a variety of forms of social autonomy." Sheinis supported his attack on egalitarianism with a reference to Marx's threefold scheme of the development of social independence, implying that a society like the USSR based on the "total dependence" of the individual is essentially pre-capitalist. While this attack was endorsed enthusiastically in a review by Fridman in Novy Mir soon after "the important principle of true social justice -- equal pay for equal labour and unequal pay for unequal labour" had become an official slogan of reform, not all Soviet intellectuals who favour private enterprise perceive a "direct counter-position of egalitarian aspirations and economic growth." Reisner had argued that "economic egalitarianism" is directed "against the selfish interests of elite groups amongst the ruling bureaucracy," and implies the need for "a democratisation of all spheres of social and political life and changes in the structure of power." Sheinis recently argued that the "main danger" to progressive change lies in widespread "inertia and conformism" providing opportunities for "conscious
opponents of restructuring" amongst the "central economic bureaucracies" and "especially in the provinces" to "discredit reform itself." 282 The threat of reaction is inherent in a situation where "the state, as a rule, faintly submits to influence from social classes and strata of the national community standing 'outside' and 'below' a hierarchical statist structure." 283 In 1983, Sheinis said economic development can be "choked in a stagnant social environment", when an underdevelopment of "the 'human factor' of the productive forces" results from "breaches between economic modernisation and the conservatism of important, sometimes system-forming features of the socio-cultural order." 284 This danger was emphasised by Slavnyi, who focused on the social process of 'planned anarchy', which Sheinis had shown as "engendered not so much by the incompetence of the [administrative] actors, i.e. by a shortage in their professional knowledge, as by their negative purposes regarding the economy and economic problems." 285 Slavnyi endeavoured "to listen to their anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric, in order to understand the real meaning enclosed in it." 286 He found this in the way such rhetoric had "slowed socio-class development" by forming "communities consolidated on a traditionalist basis", which are "supported by redistributive solidarity and other social institutions allowing people to live independently of the extent of their labour contribution to economic activity." 287 He suggested this state-centred "socio-cultural process", which Sheinis considered as a pre-capitalist social "integrator" based on "personal bonds" and "respect for authority", was now the main "generator of anti-capitalist and anti-market tendencies." 288 By fostering "the accumulation of enormous social energy, directed in words against capitalism and in deed against modern society and the social forces connected with it (in particular against modern detachments of the working class)", a conservative state had tried to "block the free play of political forces, and violently press against each other atomised elements" of the population, so it could preserve its traditional structure irrespective of the social consequences of "its intervention in processes of administering the economy." 289

In his 1983 book, Sheinis repeated his earlier observation that "the state may ruin the economy over a long time, ... but not feel an urgent need to correct its
318

course, since 'checking' occurs through the socio-political sphere, in which it
disposes of supplementary 'resources of survivability'", and through which
"impulses are not only delayed, but often bring distorted

i n f o r m

a t i o n .

"290 But

he now agreed with Cheshkov that such a "state economy" may "only with a great
stretching of interpretations be characterised as state

c a p i t a l i s m

" . ^

1 This

conclusion, that Soviet society has been neither capitalist nor socialist, is also
implicit in comments made by Leonid Vasil'ev and by Mirsky about the prospects
for a movement toward private ownership. Vasil'ev's main argument is that "in
all the post-primeval history of humanity there are only two formations," a
European one based on private property and a non-European one based on the
coalescence of power and property in a state mode of production (which has been
the most widespread historically, though Marx happened to call it the 'asiatic'
m o d e ) .

292 This view suggests that mature Stalinism was a modem "variant" of

the latter, which "regenerated" after a qualitative transformation of the old social
order had failed because "the attributes of capitalism (the naked cash of
private-ownership ties with a clear priority of the owner as such above the social
corporation, and with the secondary nature of the state as a servant of the ruling
class)" were "organically alien to this society from its very

b e g i n n i n g .

"293

Vasil'ev argued that "the phenomenon of privatisation" has had virtually no
chance of overcoming the state mode of production from within, but he implied
that eventually this mode could not cope with "the character of modem
production" developed by the capitalist mode, and pointed to present-day China as
a test-case of what might happen in a state economy where "the role of private
property is not only officially permitted, but encouraged".294
This last question was addressed by Mirsky, who thought Sheinis had been too
hasty in agreeing with Cheshkov that a turn to capitalism is precluded by the
continuing "relative independence of the

s ta te " .2 9 5

Mirsky hypothesised that:

The special role of the state, which unconditionally will be retained in the future
(I repeat, to me this seems undebatable), does not exclude the possibility of its
'merging' with a private-enterprise bourgeoisie. The question is how to
conceptualise such a merging. The 'big people' of the state and party apparatus,
evidently, will not yield the levers of rule from their hands and turn into
factory-owners, but what can stop them from in many ways becoming friendly


with, and moreover becoming related to businessmen, *nouveaux-riches*, brokers, speculators, or even themselves running a business on the side? The temptation of entrepreneurship is great, even with regard not to the productive sphere, but to trade, services etc. In any case this will be capitalism, albeit non-traditional, with the retention in the state's hands of the key branches of industry. 296

Mirsky noted that what is "most difficult of all to determine is the social nature of the ruling community." He depicted a basic conflict between a bourgeoisie which "sooner or later" feels the need for "one or another kind of representative system", and "a statist-bureaucratic elite striving to retain a monopoly of administering the state". He listed two possible "ways out" of this conflict: "either decisively put the bourgeoisie 'in its place', or proceed with it in a continual alliance." He noted that the first variant may only succeed with "the most energetic strike on the economic positions of the bourgeoisie, the aim being to deprive it of an independent base of existence"; "but this practically means the execution of a deep social revolution, which the ruling elite of capitalist oriented states organically cannot and does not want to begin." Mirsky considered that "the second variant amounts to virtual renunciation of the monopoly of power, to an agreement about sharing power with the bourgeoisie"; in this case, "to secure itself, to be insured, the statist elite will have to compensate for the loss of part of its political positions by a strengthening of its economic base, i.e., enter by one path or another into the sphere of private business, and to a certain degree precisely 'merge' with the bourgeoisie." Saying that "here we return to the question of the social nature of the ruling community," Mirsky suggested that now "this social nature may in general be characterised as 'pro-bourgeois' or 'quasi-bourgeois', and it is reflected in the behaviour of the ruling groups at the decisive moment of choice, toward the forcing through of their own group statist-bureaucratic interests, despite ... a tendency toward dominion over society as a whole." He concluded that "social instinct most likely prompts the ruling community with the need to proceed to compromise with the private sector, and the result is a special, unknown in previous history state-capitalist model (and in the more developed countries, possibly, that variant of 'bureaucratic state monopoly capitalism' about which N.A. Simoniya has written)." 297 The key to understanding the application of this argument to Soviet society is to recognise
that the ruling community's social nature has changed since its formation under Stalin. Then, when it was not oriented toward capitalism, the first 'way out' was taken, and this led to a dead-end. Now the conflict is brewing again, still beneath the surface, but with at least the second exit more likely, in Mirsky's view. Yet if state capitalism is now seen not as Stalinism's 'shell' but as its most comfortable shroud, what structure was created by those whom Grigory Vodolazov rebuked as "pirates", proficient principally in constructing straight lines "in the form of a system of barbed-wire fences, places of detention, prisons, concentration camps, and so on"?298

The Contradictions of 'Statocracy'

Kagarlitsky has found an answer to this question in Cheshkov's concept of 'statocracy' ('etakratiia'). A theoretician of the radical youth movement which emerged after the 20th CPSU Congress, Cheshkov was imprisoned between 1957 and 1963 for underground socialist activity, but returned to academic life from the mid 1960s, first at IVAN, under whose aegis his book on the peculiarities of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie was published in 1968, then at IMEMO.299 He has made the most original contribution to the subterranean debate about the nature of Soviet society, attempting to understand 'the interpenetration and conflict of different socio-economic forms' which Gefter pointed to, and criticising conceptions based on analogies rather than analysis. At a recent round table, he argued that Vasil'ev's "thesis about the stability of the traditional phenomenon of 'state-power--property' does not work well with a comparison of the post-revolutionary societies of China and, say, Russia." Cheshkov said that "in China, where the statist tradition is much more ancient than in Russia, 'state-power--property' has been less prolonged (approximately two decades against seven), less stable (the 'cultural revolution', for which we have no analogue) and more capable of self-transformation (the success of the course of 'four modernisations' for about a decade against the failure of reform attempts in Soviet society during three decades)."300 Schematically, Cheshkov's concept of 'statocracy', which he recently presented openly with no contraints of censorship,
is the opposite of Vasil'ev's concept of a traditional state mode of production, since it refers to a qualitively new form of state property that has arisen in the 20th century through "a process of the negative negation of capital, ... when capitalist and bourgeois structures do not simply exist together with non-capitalist and non-bourgeois structures, but cannot exist without them." Since Cheshkov's theory of 'statocracy' has been the most original and is now the most topical feature of Soviet development debates, the rest of this chapter is devoted to evaluating it. After reviewing the themes which led Cheshkov to formulate his theory in 1974, the concept elaborated then will be considered in detail, before discussing those of his ideas in the late 1970s which have been incorporated into its new formulation.

The focus of Cheshkov's work is clear from a key conclusion about the prospects for Soviet society which he had worked out already by May 1968. Commenting on a book contrasting processes of social differentiation in developing countries with the formation of capitalism in Western Europe, he highlighted the role of a ruling group which "rests not on a system of private enterprise, but on its privileged position in the socio-political structure". He suggested that:

If one attempts briefly to define the features of the special (not traditional-capitalist) path of the formation of the social structure in the 'third world', then, in my view, they look like this: the transformation of the basic mass of producers into one or other variety of wage workers, with the separation of extremely small layers of exploiters. The basic antagonism here occurs between the mass of producers and the ruling stratum (the 'bureaucracy' or 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'), which, concentrating economic and social functions in it hands and merging itself with the state apparatus, has a tendency to turn into a parasitical, extremely reactionary force. This, so to speak, is the initial model. Its further development may, of course, be very diverse. However, it is almost incredible that such a structure might transform itself into a capitalist society. Most real are the following alternatives: either stagnation, which may last very long, and a flowering of corruption, or political changes opening a period of social reforms of the initial structure, with the possible prospect of its development in the direction of socialism.

With hindsight this assessment seems remarkably prophetic, particularly since it was made before the invasion of Czechoslovakia finally dispelled the "illusions"
engendered by Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation, which, according to Kagarlitsky's chronicle, "had prevented us from perceiving the main thing -- the class nature of the regime." But here the nature of the ruling group remains ambiguous (is its basis socio-political rather than economic, or both?) and the reasons for doubting the chances of delayed capitalist development are not spelt out.

In a short article in 1970, Cheshkov raised the problem of how to "define the class base of the political top echelon of society", the 'elite' which comprises "people occupying the highest positions in the state, military and ideological apparatus." A negative answer was clear, since the "top-most groups of society ... according to their social position undoubtedly cannot belong to the labouring classes and at the same time are not representatives of the bourgeois class, if only because of the absence of a corresponding socio-economic base in the form of capitalist production relations." While not ruling out the growth of a national bourgeoisie, Cheshkov stressed its essentially "deformed" nature as a result of economic backwardness. Without a strong bourgeoisie, he claimed that "power and ownership of the basic means of production form a single, undivided complex in the shape of the state", personified by an 'elite' that "differs from the basic historical types of dominant social groups." There was only an "external" similarity with the "closed, autarkic system" of the 'asiatic mode of production', since the contemporary 'elite' "appears as a link in the chain of complex international economic and political ties", and is "frequently more closely connected with the 'external world' than with its own nation", although it "has a basic internal support -- the state." Cheshkov tentatively viewed the 'elite' as a "historically new, special type of social community", which in a contradictory way "fulfills as it were the role of a still not formed class." While insisting that this 'elite' was not merely a 'superstructural' phenomenon, he defined it as a surrogate class, and concluded by asserting that ultimately "the logic of social development inexorably leads it to become an integral part of the rising classes."304

Cheshkov developed an analysis of this independent bureaucratic elite in response to existing Soviet theories of the transition of backward countries to
socialism, particularly Levkovsky's view, but also Meliksetov's conception of '
obureaucratic capital', and Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova's idea of a resurgent 'asiatic mode of production', all of which he criticised for having "reduced the historical specifics of the state-structure to one well-known socio-economic category or another." He suggested that these views were not entirely wrong, but had taken partial aspects of the state-structure for its "socio-economic essence", a point made in the West by Hillel Ticktin and Gyorgy Markus.\(^{305}\) Cheshkov's criticism of Levkovsky referred both to the variety of state-structures in third world, which demanded "a differentiated approach" not a generalisation of state capitalism, and to "pre-socialist societies" like the USSR, in which "it would be mistaken to characterise the state-structure ... as state capitalist, on the basis of the fact that a socialist structure may not develop itself", since "from the alternative 'socialism or capitalism', 'a third perspective is not given', it does not follow that there is only possible an opposition 'socialist structure or state capitalist structure’".\(^{306}\) This debate with Levkovsky was the impulse for Cheshkov's conceptualisation of the Soviet bureaucratic elite as "primary" rather than "secondary", i.e. not itself "derivative" from a ruling class.\(^{307}\)

Cheshkov initially used "the term 'new ruling groups' (or 'dominant groups')" to refer to this "new social establishment", which comprised functionaries "embodying state property in all its basic aspects (both economic and non-economic)".\(^{308}\) He noted a "growing differentiation" of this "new social community" into 'functional' groups of "administrators, 'technocrats' (economic managers), politicians, ideologues and military men", arguing that "the wider and more diverse the state's economic function becomes, the more the group of 'technocrats' (or economic managers) grows, and the greater role its activity acquires for the existence of all the ruling groups as a whole." He suggested that "the 'technocratic' group here includes, as a rule, the heads of economic departments and their basic subdivisions, the directors of different state organisations and social corporations, and the leaders of plan organs", whose "general mood" might be characterised as 'moderately conservative national-statism'.\(^{309}\) Claiming that "the growth of the 'technocratic' group has not at all led to the disappearance of a special layer of officials realising the
classical, coercive function of the state", he viewed this group as now "very closely intertwined with the 'technocrats', so that, maybe, it is more correct to speak about them as a united administrative-economic group." While saying that "the 'technocratic' ideology has become the ideology of other ruling groups," he still considered that, "because of 'the division of labour' between separate ruling groups, emphasis on social development (sometimes even at the expense of solving technical-economic tasks) is maintained to a greater degree by groups of politicians and ideologues", despite "a definite decline in the influence of these groups on the masses, by virtue of the fact that promises made by them after the attainment of independence (or in a period of populist regimes) were not realised." Cheshkov regarded such phenomena as indications "of the insufficient maturity of all these groups as a special social community." Claiming that "their unity has been attained largely coercively", he suggested this absence of organic unity had intensified with a "crisis of the new ruling groups", which began approximately in the mid 1960s but had its roots "in the generally immature, 'formal' character of state property ... and especially its dependent character". He then linked this crisis with a decline in social mobility:

The fact is that as a whole these groups have remained extremely narrow and have been reproduced from their own social sphere or one near to them. ... Such seclusion works in contradiction to the objective necessity for a broadening of the ranks of these groups, in connection both with a growth in the functions of the state sector, and with a growth of new middle strata. As a result since the beginning of the '60s relations between the dominant groups and those strata of students, intelligentsia and office workers who might have calculated on entering their ranks have become strained.

Thus in his first extensive analysis of the Soviet bureaucratic elite, published in the 1974 IMEMO book, Cheshkov implied that the reformist call for broadening the social basis of the regime, made by Sheinis in 1971, was at present unrealistic.

Cheshkov introduced the concept 'statocracy' in a paper for a conference on "Society, Elite and Bureaucracy in the Developing Countries of the East", held at IVAN in June 1974. Broadly, he used the concept 'statocracy' to define the social nature of new dominant groups in developing societies where the local
bourgeoisie is historically weak. His "hypothesis" about 'statocracy' might apply to much of the modern, non-European world, although he specifically noted that "the most important features" disclosed by his "theoretical apparatus may in principle be fully expressed only in separate cases." This qualification did not allay "serious objections" from other conference participants, particularly Simoniya, who argued:

Cheshkov's scheme ignores one exceptionally important 'detail' of a specific historical character, which makes his abstract model of society vulnerable, namely: in such 'ideal' (from the point of view of his scheme) countries as Indonesia, Thailand and so on, the exploitation and appropriation by 'statocracy' of its fruits is realised beyond the bounds of the state apparatus, in the sphere of private-capitalist and in general market relations. While Cheshkov referred in passing to these countries and others like Mexico and India, they were clearly not the key cases at issue. This raises the question of whether Kagarlitsky is right to argue that Cheshkov "did not attempt" in his study of 'statocracy' "to analyse Soviet reality under the guise of discussing the 'Third World'", but rather, "using 'Third World' material, he constructed a model which is applicable also to our understanding of Soviet society." No model can be constructed purely speculatively, without incorporating experience from one or another realm of human life. If Cheshkov was only thinking through third world material, then why should his theory of 'statocracy' be applied to Soviet society, as it has been by Kagarlitsky? That would mean that an analogy may provide the basis, not just the background, for an analysis, which Cheshkov has disputed. The answer is suggested by Kagarlitsky in a later passage that owes much to Gurevich: "this research is objective, and precisely because of its objectivity it can lead us to some fundamental conclusions of present-day importance." Objectivity was achieved by Cheshkov through a dialectic of societal comparison, methodologically similar to Gurevich's historical dialogue of cultures, derived from Bakhtin. His analysis of the contradictions of 'statocracy' was a hypothesis about features of "the leading role of state property" which exist as yet "only in prospect" for the third world, but which have been realised more fully in Soviet type societies. If this 'prototype' had not existed, the prospect itself would be less present in the modern world, and in that case a theorist like
Cheshkov would most likely not have been able to construct a model of 'statocracy' as one possible scenario for the third world.

In the first half of his paper, Cheshkov argued that the idea of the bureaucracy as a 'secondary' group representing those controlling the means of production "clearly needs a definite correction" for a situation where top officials "rest not only on the state and political apparatus, but directly personify state property and guide the activity of an independent state sector." He rejected characterisations of these officials as a 'bureaucratic' or 'state' bourgeoisie, because such ideas were "thought up by means of an analogy" (and hence an identification) with classical capitalism, not through an analysis of the specific features of these officials, such as:

a) the ruling groups (especially administrators, i.e. the highest bureaucrats and officials) are reproduced to a very significant degree from 'their own' sphere;
b) there is an increasing commonality of features (age, education, experience) and exchange of functions between different ruling groups (bureaucrats as politicians, party leaders as bureaucrats etc.);
c) a political-ideological platform (national-statism) common for these groups is being worked out, based on a recognition of the leading role of the state sector ... in the development of a technical-economic base and in pursuing definite social reforms affecting the interests of wide strata of the toilers;
d) these ruling groups have formed certain layers of mass support (party activists, the 'rural bureaucracy').

Cheshkov said all this demonstrated "a tendency toward a certain consolidation of the ruling (political-administrative) groups, a growth of self-consciousness and a strengthening at the expense of other strata." He pointed out the unusual character of the "increasing ties" (both personal and 'organisational') between these ruling groups and a growing bourgeoisie. In contrast to capitalism, here the "hereditary assignment (transfer to son) of a career as entrepreneur is less likely, the 'larger' the entrepreneur", since "the biggest bourgeois is formed not apart from, but in close connection with the ruling political-administrative groups." He argued that in such circumstances the ruling community cannot be understood "as 'representing' the interests of a growing bourgeoisie", and claimed that "the concept bureaucracy is hardly applicable to this community, since it theoretically presupposes that division of property and state, base and superstructure
characteristic for classical capitalism." Before proceeding to analyse this "historically new variety of a dominant class -- 'statocracy'", Cheshkov suggested that Lenin, in his analysis of 'Octoberist' capitalism and the dominant classes of Tsarist Russia at the turn of the century, had faced a similar problem of conceptualising "a special type of dominant class, which is based on the unity of basic and superstructural phenomena. Noting the development of a bourgeoisie and the growing influence of its upper parts on this class, V.I. Lenin emphasised in a polemic with the 'liquidators' that the former dominant class does not disintegrate but is preserved, although it changes." Cheshkov used this quote to widen the reader's horizon so as to include the key referent of 'statocracy'. While the various views of state capitalism that he initially rejected did refer only to the third world, that was not his main concern, as is clear from his penultimate footnote, which criticised "the identification of 'statocracy' and a bourgeoisie that is characteristic for left-extremist theories in particular, and the conception of state capitalism of the Trotskyists especially." If the initial impulse for Cheshkov's theory was to resolve Levkovsky's ambiguity, its main motivation was to better the strident critique of Stalinism expressed by Sheinis.

Given this task of rebutting the view of Soviet society as state capitalist, it is not surprising that Cheshkov latched on to Krylov's idea of "a qualitatively new system of productive forces", constituted by 'ideal' (principally scientific) rather than material (industrial) processes, and leading to "the transformation of collective (state) forms of property into a leading position in relation to individual forms". This "axiom" enabled him to maintain faith in the existence of "a decaying capitalist tendency" worldwide, and retain what Kagarlitsky has termed a "neo-Communist" view of the transition to socialism, rather than adopt the sanguine or social democratic outlooks on modernity developed by Vasil'ev and Sheinis. But if Cheshkov believed that Krylov had seen the future, he still criticised him for not properly understanding the present, in dismissing as an "illusion" the view that non-capitalist administrators could be the "source of a 'new class'". He argued, against Krylov, that the performance by administrators of some "social functions does not in the least negate the fact of the development of state property on the basis of the appropriation of the direct
producers' labour." He claimed that "the leading role of state property conditions the fact that 'statocracy' is formed in the system of social reproduction as a primary social community, that is, a community whose relations with the direct producers concerning the creation (and appropriation) of the surplus product are determinant in the given society." That 'statocracy' "occupies such a place in the system of social production which allows it to appropriate others' labour, that is be a proprietor", was considered by Cheshkov as the paramount fact, which required recognition whether one conceived the content of state property "as a transitional phase of social development, a new mode of production or just a special phase in the development of contemporary capitalism on its periphery". He clearly supported the second of these conceptions, arguing for "the thesis about 'statocracy' as a special -- for the 'third world' -- variety of a dominant class and ruling social community, exploitative in its nature and based at the same time on historically new, primarily state forms of appropriation, and acquiring class characteristics according to its maturation." Yet Krylov's axiom could not be embraced without conditions, the principal one being an assumption that any 'new class' based on a post-capitalist system of productive forces must be more progressive than the bourgeoisie. If this is true then 'statocracy' and its 'new mode of production' must become a global phenomenon, not remain an outgrowth of 'third world' backwardness. Cheshkov published this conclusion only in 1979, which is presumably why Levkovsky disputed it only in the following year, but its germs appeared earlier.

Cheshkov's central argument about the contradictory historical dynamic of 'statocracy' included five points. First, "in 'statocracy' the place of the basic element is occupied by political-administrative layers (who might conditionally be called the 'elite')". The bureaucracy forms "a direct component part of the basic dominant community", but capitalists are only a "derivative" group in the society. Second, the key question about 'statocracy' is whether or not its existence "excludes the formation of the bourgeoisie as a basic class", not as a subsidiary group. Third, the answer to this question will differ in particular societies, but the determining factor is whether new productive forces are developed on a "relatively independent" basis, or old productive forces are imported in a
dependent manner and at a 'lower' level from the citadels of world capital. A transformation of the bourgeoisie into a basic class is always possible, "since 'statocracy' is based on exploitative property", but "this possibility is real only in the 'dependent' variant of state property", when "the bourgeoisie, having become a basic class in the limits of the country, remains a 'derivative' class in the system of social communities of the world capitalist system", and a historical product of 'statocracy'.

Fourth, while this dependent variant or tendency of 'statocracy' is "more widespread", the other, independent tendency is "theoretically more interesting", because "it is more 'pure' and so from it one may understand deviations (more massive than the 'ideal'), while from deviations it is difficult to derive the norm." This independent "transformation of 'statocracy' into a primary community" becomes difficult to reverse when it has "built up a system of productive forces corresponding to it". With the "continual reproduction of a unity of superstructural and basic relations", state property changes "from its formal or immature condition ... to a stage of maturity", and this "signifies a transition from an immature to a class-shaped statocracy." Here "the bureaucracy is transformed basically from a 'representative' of the bourgeoisie into only a professional-special part of the basic class (an 'elite')." Since "the possibility of such a transition is embedded in the nature of state property", it occurs "with the retention (and not withering away) of purely-superstructural relations, and their gradual filling up with 'economic' content (for example, tax as an expression initially of secondary, and later of primary production relations)." While "the formation of 'statocracy'" begins with "the fulfilment by it of definite social functions", these are directly contradicted by its separation from society as a united ruling group.

Fifth, "according to the character of the interrelations between the 'elite' and the bourgeoisie one may note two different variants of the formation of 'statocracy'." In the dependent variant, "the 'elite' leaves for the bourgeoisie its basic (historically speaking) sphere -- material production", and "'statocracy' as a whole appears more formal", i.e. not an organic change of the class structure. In the independent variant "the elite either wholly or partially (in the basic branches) subjugates material production and ousts the bourgeoisie into the sphere of
'Statocracy' here is "more mature", and the social transformation caused by its consolidation is far greater, since an "integration" of the 'elite' by ensuring "its unity with the state apparatus" is "an initial, and not a final point for the evolution of this social establishment." Cheshkov's abstract account of these two tendencies (which may have been the source of Mirsky's two 'variants') was heavily influenced by Krylov's theory of dependent development, and by his axiom of state-controlled production as a form of the future. Cheshkov claimed that the extent of an "ideal" transformation of statocratic revenue" (i.e. progress in developing new productive forces) "is determined in the first place by how much it has separated itself -- as an independent form of surplus product -- from monopoly and state-monopoly profit (in the first place foreign capital)."

Without this independence, "statocratic revenue remains -- and even becomes all the more (absolutely) -- a product of surplus pre-industrial labour", and as such does not "cease to be a simple deduction from the means of existence" realised through "a lowering of the standard of living etc." It was to question this comfortable assumption that non-capitalism means progress that Sheinis insisted, against Simoniya, on the need "to speak about two types of economic independence", one based on developing productivity but another based on an "autarkic" isolation which "dooms an economy to stagnation", so that it "cannot resolve the tasks of social progress." Ironically, in positing state-monopolies as "higher" than capitalism, so that any return to the latter would be a reversal analogous to the 'second serfdom', Cheshkov reached a similar overall conclusion to Simoniya, while basing himself on the theory of dependent development of which Simoniya has been the most trenchant opponent.

Before proceeding to discuss the independent variant of 'statocracy' in more detail, Cheshkov noted that "it is impossible to exclude the variant of 'mature' 'statocracy' in connection with a tendency toward dependent development". The 'deviation' of an independent (because 'mature') 'statocracy' from the progressive 'norm' would signify precisely that autarkic failure which Sheinis urged his colleagues not to forget. Cheshkov's subsequent analysis of the historical character of the 'elite' forming the key element of 'statocracy' makes most sense in terms of this degenerate assimilation of the new by the old, in which
bourgeois elements have not been superseded but merely reduced by the power of the state to the marginal position of small-scale merchant capital. He focused particularly on the unusual difficulty which the 'elite' has in transforming itself into a basic class. In a situation of 'all power to the state', the political-administrative 'elite' might appear to be able easily to dominate the society, but Cheshkov pointed out its weakness as a group whose "wholeness" is initially "formal" and "immature". In other words, this 'elite' has been cobbled together "from a conglomerate of political, bureaucratic etc. 'secondary' communities" and lacks a substantial social base. Cheshkov argued that at this first stage the necessary unity of this 'elite' is secured either by the authority of leaders of the liberation struggle, "or by methods of force." He said "the latter signifies that in the capacity of the integrating group in this period of immaturity of the 'elite' there most probably emerges the military", and then wrote:

Their role at this stage is already distinct from the period of the liberation revolution and, in particular, the strengthening of their union with the administrators (economic managers) shows that the 'elite' enters a phase of maturation (Indonesia after 1965), clearly displaying with this its exploitative features.

This reference to Indonesia is more enigmatic than the pieces quoted by Nuikin, but arguably more to the point. Since Cheshkov is here discussing the development of an independent, i.e. anti-monopolist, variety of 'statocracy' (whether progressive or deformed) he logically cannot be referring to Suharto's policy orientation but to something else, like his methods. Since even Nuikin has now publicly disowned Stalin as a communist after 1929, it is quite possible that the 'neo-Communist' Cheshkov was making an empirical link between what have been the two most massive slaughters of communists to date, namely the purges in the USSR from the mid-1930s (which Stalin described as a 'civil war inside the party') and the butchering of the Indonesian Communist Party 'after 1965'. If so, Cheshkov's skill as a scholar is such that he was able to make this powerful condemnation of Stalinism at precisely the time of the Soviet elite's "clampdown on overtly critical scholarship that took place between 1972 and 1974." Cheshkov noted "an original 'exchange' of functions within the reproduction
of the 'elite' and 'statocracy' as a whole", and contrasted the structure of this ruling group with a 'normal' capitalist elite that comprises "relatively stable groups narrowly-specialised according to their functions". He said "another peculiarity" of the former 'elite' "is that its wholeness is reproduced not so much through formal channels and institutions (parties, parliament), as through informal ones (social organisations), and, in particular, through the personal ties of individuals." He suggested: "Evidently, the instability of group functions, the integrating role of the military, and the primarily informal and personal character of interrelationships between members of the 'elite' -- these look like features of the transition of 'statocracy' into the phase of its maturation, a transition extremely painful and casting into crisis not only the 'elite' itself, but the dominant 'statocracy' as a whole." After defining the ideology of top officials as "national-statocratism", Cheshkov argued that the "maturation of 'statocracy'" is shown not in its greater dominance over society, but in "definite symptoms of the phenomena of a 'crisis of the leaders', especially noticeable since the mid-60s". He listed the following "changes" or "basic features" as characteristic of "the process of the formation of 'statocracy' for approximately the past two decades", i.e. since about 1953:

a) in substance 'statocracy' has formed as a social community dependent on world capitalism;
b) ruling political-administrative groups and private-ownership layers in 'the provinces' have quickly developed, intensifying the contradiction of 'statocracy' as a country-wide social community between the 'basic' and 'derivative' elements in its structure;
c) the influence and role of the technocratic group has grown, and the tendency of it toward a merger with 'the bureaucracy', and in a number of countries toward a closer union with the military, has been marked; the ideology of technocracy has been transformed into the ideology of 'statocracy' as a whole;
d) the influence of politicians (especially those connected with traditions of the national liberation movement) has declined as a factor securing the relative unity of 'statocracy';
e) the class essence of the ideology of early 'statocracy' (different conceptions of 'development', 'national socialisms', a 'mixed economy' etc.) has been manifested more clearly, which has led to a weakening of the influence of 'statocracy' (especially its 'elite') on the masses;
f) by virtue of the high degree of self-reproduction of different groups of the 'elite', and the relative limitedness of admission into them 'from below' and even from the modern middle layers, there has gradually grown a social 'isolation' of the 'elite' from these strata, part of whom are moving over into
opposition to the dominant coalition;
g) the position has strengthened of private-ownership layers, who have
to subjugate to themselves the ruling political-administrative groups of
'stateocracy' in 'the provinces'; the contradiction between these groups and the
bourgeoisie often acquires the form of conflicts between centre and
periphery.349

Cheshkov argued that this crisis of the maturation of 'stateocracy' is best
understood as "an expression of a struggle of two tendencies in its midst --
dependent and independent." He added that "concretely, the content of the 'crisis
of the leaders' consists in the fact that 'stateocracy', being formed as a relatively
integral dominant social-class community, finds itself now at a cross-roads and
stands before the problem of a choice between two pretenders to the role of the
basic element in its structure: 'elite' or bourgeoisie." This suggests that the
independent tendency of 'stateocracy' is in a historical blind-alley if it has to
'catch-up' with capitalism, which is precisely the conclusion that Mirsky presented
a decade or so later.350

Cheshkov largely ignored relations between 'stateocracy' and its workforce, but
characterised the basic position very briefly as follows: "The level of productive
forces of the 'third world', on the basis of which this crisis unfolds, and the
maturity of the 'bearers' of revolution here is such that one should speak in
substance about a crisis of growth. Therefore at this stage the 'crisis of the
leaders' is an element of a general (or objective), but not a direct revolutionary
situation."351 This implies that the independent variety of 'stateocracy' has
established its own system of productive forces, but not managed to develop it
adequately in competition with world capitalism. This is why its long-run
tendency is toward dependence upon the capitalist 'world system', without itself
necessarily becoming a component part of this system. Cheshkov's suggestion that
the maturity or qualitative growth of the working class is one reason for
slackening economic growth in a 'stateocratic' society remains enigmatic, but it
makes his view complementary to the theory of Soviet society developed by
Ticktin, who has argued that the Stalinist elite formed through a forced
mobilisation of the absolute surplus product, but subsequently has not managed to
extract a sizeable relative surplus product by developing labour productivity, so
that its social room for manoeuvre is historically shrinking. Cheshkov made precisely this point in contrasting with capitalism the "special nature of conflict, peculiar to this variety of a dominant force," characterised by "the combination within its bounds of a class community and the state." He cited Engels' thought that a "division" or "separation" of the state from the ruling economic group "evidently strengthens the position of the dominant class in the plane of its long-term interests", and then wrote:

As an opposite, one might suggest that their [ruling group and state] unification in the bounds of one social community, while strengthening its present, current interests at the same time potentially weakens the 'strategic' position already because its field of manoeuvre is sharply reduced. Having the opportunity to quickly and relatively easily resolve current conflicts (using repression, and social reforms), 'statocracy' finds itself less capable of solving fundamental contradictions. This is why here small, partial conflicts are especially pregnant with quick escalation into a deep antagonism. Conflict does not display itself, but accumulates, so to speak, and this strengthens the possibility of a way out beyond the limits of this dominant class.

By stressing the pragmatism of authoritarian regimes like Brezhnev's, both in pursuing "a policy of social reformism" at home and in balancing a variety of short-term interests abroad, Cheshkov implied that latent contradictions might have to pile up for a long time before overwhelming the holders of power. He also said the "world energy crisis", i.e. the big rise in income from oil exports, had "given a new impulse to the strengthening of state-property as the socio-economic basis of an independent 'statocracy'", providing more time for this dominant group to strengthen its "acquisition of social-class qualities".

The political conclusions which Cheshkov drew for "the attitude of left forces to 'statocracy'" highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis presented in his 1974 paper. The first two conclusions were quite clear and had been convincingly demonstrated:

a) 'statocracy' is (more accurately - has become) in its essence a dominant social-class force, and not simply a leading, ruling etc. 'superstructural' group;
b) though 'statocracy' in its historical function is analogical to the contemporary bourgeoisie, it is yet distinct from the latter in its socio-economic nature.
Cheshkov's third and fourth political conclusions were speculative if not assumed *a priori*, and closer to the view of Simoniya or Levkovsky than to that of Sheinis or Butenko. Thirdly, he claimed that 'statocracy' "represents exploitative relations of an order higher than capitalist ones", in which the "basic divide" occurs between independent and dependent variants (constituted around the 'elite' and bourgeoisie); this was simply a hypothetical deduction from Krylov's axiom which ignored the fact that bourgeois elements keep growing back. Finally, he suggested that "with a consideration of the basic contradiction in 'statocracy' [between the social functions it performs and its maturing class essence], definite groups in its midst might become more or less active allies of progressive-democratic left forces and even strategically more important temporary allies than the 'national' bourgeoisie."^57 A similar claim has been made by Kagarlitsky with reference to the Khrushchev years, but both he and Cheshkov are very vague about these possible allies within 'statocracy' for the left.^358 This basic limitation of Cheshkov's analysis derives from his leaving aside statocracy's relations with its workforce, so that although he claimed its numerical strength was no less than a bourgeoisie or aristocracy, he never specified the fractions within it, other than the tendencies of dominant 'elite' (with its circulating functionaries) and repressed or resurgent bourgeoisie. While raising the possibility of a 'way out' beyond 'statocracy', Cheshkov had no illusions about this eventuating soon. He said that, as well as enabling one "to polemicise with some apologetic conceptions ('polyarchy' and the like) advanced by bourgeois politologists as alternatives to 'oligarchy' ... the concept 'statocracy' may be useful in polemic with ultra-leftist authors, who usually identify a crisis of the dominant class with a crisis of its definite historical form ('oligarchy') and on this basis incorrectly evaluate the 'crisis of the leaders', this important element of a revolutionary situation."^359

During the late 1970s Cheshkov developed his theory in two different directions, both significantly more restricted by censorship than this relatively open conference paper. First, he elaborated the concept of a "statocratic type of production", as a "hypothesis about the state-structure in its interrelations with ideal productive forces". In a consciously speculative generalisation of Krylov's
axiom, which he described as an exercise "even not in logical futurology, but in a futurology of the imagination" in the utopian spirit of Wright Mills, Cheshkov explicitly considered statocracy "from the angle of its universal, not its particular features", presenting a "purely logical analysis" of "the highest form of production relations based on exploitation", without mentioning any "peculiarities of historical development." To justify this sketch of an "intellectualised" post-industrial society, Cheshkov quoted Marx saying "there is no need to use ... a blotch of an extraordinary character as a means for the elimination of theoretical difficulties", which meant that the history of 'post-capitalism' should not dull attempts to imagine its future. Cheshkov claimed to have left "the extremely complex problem of the correlation of early and mature features of the statocratic type of production outside the sphere of analysis at its current stage", but he could no more avoid this issue than one can consider the future outside the context of the present. Indeed, he now polemicised with "left-radicalist critics" who "absolutise the early stages of the process of the historical formation of the statocratic type of production and cannot perceive its mature state." Kagarlitsky has taken some of the statements here to refer to features of Soviet society (in particular, a form of distribution in which "wages, in essence, are no longer a price for the commodity labour power, but income"). This interpretation is correct only in isolation insofar as partial aspects of this 'model' are present, since the USSR is hardly a post-industrial society. Cheshkov was principally making the very controversial claim that some apparently backward aspects of the present, like "political relations of dominion -- submission" between statocracy and the workforce based on "direct" personal dependence, could perhaps be viewed not as necessarily pre-capitalist, but as "lower forms" of a personal yet "indirect (managerial and cultural-psychological) mechanism of appropriation and alienation" which would exist in a 'post-industrial' system of production where "the basic object of property is a non-material element -- science." This original standing of Marx on his head did not convince Sheinis, who stressed the progressive significance of an "anonymous" civil society partly in response to Cheshkov's hypothesis.

Second, in the context of a comprehensive review of Western theories about
"the 'holders of power' in the developing countries", Cheshkov raised some problems for adequately understanding "ruling and dominant groups" uniting state power and power of ownership in their hands. According to Cheshkov, the two main faults of such theories were: 1) a tendency of neo-colonialist and nationalist authors to reduce the economic base of the dominant group to "one or another variety of personal income, realised through the state apparatus"; and 2) a tendency of left-radicalist authors to define the dominant group as one or another kind of bourgeoisie, without showing that the state sector which it controls is capitalist. The unresolved issue in both cases remained the nature of the "relations between ruling and dominant groups and the labouring classes". Cheshkov suggested that the concept of "personal relations", considered "as an antipode of the concept material relations", might be useful in determining "the correlation here of the processes of the appropriation of labour and the alienation of personality" in the "bonds of dominion-subordination" between the dominant group and the masses. He added that, in terms of political economy, these are relations of "a special kind, when class nature exists, so to speak, functionally but not substantially, or, in other words, these relations, while being class relations, are not relations between classes." In terms of understanding Soviet society, Cheshkov's main message was that the conception of state capitalism, which assumed the 'holders of power' to be a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', had "lost its force", since it could explain neither "the collective nature of this phenomenon" nor the historical "causes of its definite dynamism." His distinction between "two types of relations of dominion--submission: those resigned on the basis of personal supremacy and dependence, and relations of force resulting simply from economic functions" seems to have persuaded Sheinis that a society based on the former cannot be understood as capitalist, since that would obscure the key question: "will the current variety of forms of personal dependence of the producer be gradually discarded and turned into economic relations of dominion--subordination? Or will these relations of personal dependence not only be maintained, but be reproduced in new forms?" In 1983, while still foreseeing a "world transitional epoch" (i.e. a post-capitalist future), Cheshkov focused on "processes of the deformation and degeneration of potentially socialist forms", where "the internal relations" of the "pre-dominant" state structure "rest
largely on non-economic force, on a variety of forms of personal submission and
dependence adapted to contemporary conditions." He distinguished this system
from both capitalist and pre-capitalist structures:

Dominion and submission here embody not simply non-economic force and
the alienation of the surplus product, created by the producer in the process
of more or less independent economic activity, as this occurred, say, with
feudalism, but are realised in the form of personal dependence in the sphere
of production. The boundaries in which the surplus product is extracted are
widely extended.

He noted that this apparent extension of exploitation was hardly effective, since it
was "accompanied by the conservation of a low level of social production, as the
ramified system of non-economic force inevitably blocks the development of the
'human factor' of the productive forces." Where this system "acquires final
forms", people will have "to pay colossal social and material costs" for the
privilege of being led historically "into a blind-alley".368

In 1986 Cheshkov renewed his discussion of 'statocracy', rather obscurely in
an article about its "unusual" autonomy from other social forces, and with more
clarity in a chapter on the formation of struggling classes in a non-European
developing society.369 In this chapter he defined class holistically as "an
aggregate of material and ideal relations", formed actively "in the three main
spheres of social relations -- the socio-economic, the social and the political". He
said the basic antagonism in a developing society occurs between "two macro-class
formations", comprising diverse socio-economic groups of proprietors and
labourers, which struggle socially and politically to constitute themselves as, respectively, a united "ruling community" and a "popular bloc". He noted that the
process through which these basic "conglomerates" of exploiters and exploited
become classes 'for themselves' is complex, particularly where:

By virtue of the unification of power and property in a united mechanism,
part of the proprietors occupy a specific intermediate position in the society.
Being in the socio-economic plane an integral part of the macro-class of
proprietors, they find themselves in the social plane between the two
conglomerates; with the interaction of socio-political forces, especially in
such situations as a struggle against dictatorial regimes and the like, these
proprietorial groups may become part of the 'popular bloc'.370
Cheshkov suggested that "privileged layers" of the labouring conglomerate, like "the union bureaucracy, the elite of peasant organisations, part of the office workers etc.", tend to join with part of the proprietal conglomerate ("different groups of the highest office workers, specialists") as "supporters of a reformist strategy of development." But he thought the "nucleus" of the labouring conglomerate could potentially oppose itself "to property in the capacity of the universal representative of labour," and so "has a positive-revolutionary character." Stressing the "key role" of the state as "that axis, around which the proprietors are consolidated and display their antagonistic interaction with the labourers", he argued that "monopolisation of power" by statocracy (the unified ruling groups) and "suppression by the state of even weak elements of civil society" had "engendered a deep crisis in the relations between these groups and all other classes and strata, the society as a whole. The situation appears paradoxical: having attained the peak of their might, having become almost the absolute holders of power (amongst the local pretenders) these groups have found themselves in the face of the deepest crisis".371

Cheshkov found the causes of this crisis "in the peculiarities of the ruling groups' monopoly of power," in which the state has been transformed "from a public institution into a corporate organisation, based on the unification of political and economic power" -- "i.e. a kind of private monopoly." Here "power itself has been turned into a means alienating the will, and often the national-cultural identity of society, into a force standing against society." Disenfranchised "private-ownership classes" (the 'middle class') have not managed "to abolish the leading role of the groups in power in the dominant community", "because these groups have possessed comparatively more unity and, more importantly, a greater capacity to express the most general interests of the proprietors and exploiters." Yet, while "the popular classes' have still not been able to overthrow the dominant classes", statocracy's "oligarchic type of power" had been significantly undermined by the pressure of both these forces opposing it, creating "a tendency toward a certain decentralisation of power and its deconcentration, toward increasing the number of political subjects and the introduction of elements of pluralism into authoritarian political systems". 
Cheshkov said this "process of the liberalisation of authoritarian regimes benefited society as a whole, but ... strengthened most of all the position of the macro-class of proprietors", since "the crisis of power had not become a crisis of the dominant classes." But he thought "the crisis of the leaders is today clearly not finished", and concluded by distinguishing "three basic modes (directions) of the resolution of this crisis: a redistribution of power within the ruling groups, the establishment of coalition relations between these groups and political forces directly expressing the specific interests of private-ownership classes, and revolution." The first mode occurred "where the forces of civil society were most passive", and "strengthened the influence of technocrat-managers and groups of administrators close to them". The second mode required "the working out of a long-term strategy", which was only possible (and also doubtful) because of "the very concentration of all levers of economic and political pressure in the hands of statocracy, which led the system of power into a crisis." Cheshkov implied that this direction might also be averted by the third mode's emergence in the form of a 'popular bloc':

There, where the groups in power have at times felt a growing danger from the side of such a movement, their strategy has been marked by a tendency toward social compromise. However, liberalism in relation to other fractions of the ruling classes has more than once been combined with the strengthening of a tendency of political authoritarianism in relation to the lower orders. In different situations the effectiveness of such a strategy has turned out to be different. But it already to a decisive degree has depended on the intensity and purposefulness of the reaction it has met from the popular masses.\footnote{372}

This characterisation of a third 'way out' beyond statocracy supports Simoniya's point that the success of a 'revolution from above' in restructuring a conservative society depends principally upon how well it can distortedly 'reflect', and thereby exhaust, the potential of a revolution from below.\footnote{373}

Cheshkov clarified the scope of his theory of statocracy in an open article in late 1988, which began by claiming that even Soviet critics of Stalinism had considered "the problem of bureaucracy" only (whether "implicitly or explicitly, negatively or positively") in terms of "the Weberian theory of bureaucracy as a social agent of a special type of organisation, administration and power."\footnote{374} He
said this theory did not address the problem of 'the bureaucracy' as a "practical owner" of nationalised means of production, and suggested his "broader concept of 'statocracy'" provided a way of considering the processes engendering a new type of ruling group, without positing the universal role of an 'apparatus' or reducing this historical question to the problem of defining who comprises 'the bureaucracy'.

He stressed that the growth of statocracy during the 20th century was based on "worldwide processes", such as the formation of scientific productive forces, the concentration of social production on both national and international levels, the militarisation and especially the statocratisation of modern economies and societies. If bureaucratic organisation accompanied classical capitalism, Cheshkov argued that "the genetic foundations of statocracy are formed in processes of the negation of capital", in which state property becomes 'universal private property' "in all contemporary societies". He distinguished two main forms in which "the state negates capitalist property", a "negative" (for capital) growth of the state sector "within the bounds" of the capitalist mode of production, and a "converted-positive" form arising with the degeneration of a political attempt to move beyond capitalism toward socialism. He classified Western societies as cases of the former, "partial" kind of statocracy, and Soviet societies as cases of the latter, "absolute statocracy". While emphasising that "the formation of both kinds of statocracy occurred in their most tight and direct mutual-opposition", he suggested that, whereas in the 1970s the "crisis in the world capitalist economy led to a crisis of statocracy in the societies of state monopoly capitalism, at the same time in the developing world and in Soviet society it consolidated its position." He implied that, while the crisis of statocracy in the West had been temporarily resolved through a redistribution of power "in favour of private-enterprise strata", in the East a transformation from a lower to a higher sub-type of absolute statocracy had only begun.

Leaving the "dualist" form of 'third world' statocracy aside, Cheshkov focused on the Soviet case of absolute statocracy, based on strict determination of economic relations by volitional relations of production "assuming the form of relations of dominion/submission." He distinguished "two sub-types" of absolute statocracy, according to whether economic relations "have their own logic" and "a
degree of autonomy", or whether they "function only as an economic expression of volitional relations". He called the former "a market or NEP variety", and the latter a "barracks-communist variety", saying that, while "both these sorts may transform each other", the market variety is clearly the "higher" form, characterised by the presence of other forms of property than state property and the introduction of "elements of competition" in the political sphere.\(^77\)

Characterising Stalinism as the key "case" of barracks-communism, as a "completely politicised statocracy, extending relations of dominion/submission to the personal dependence of the producer", Cheshkov suggested that while "not inevitable" it was the most probable transformation of Russian society given the internal and external circumstances of the early 1920s. He said it had fulfilled the "historical tasks" of creating "a material foundation of modern society" and surviving in a capitalist world, but had "exhausted its possibilities" since it "could not adapt to the conditions of the world scientific-technical revolution." He argued that:

functioning in the 1960s and 1970s in a form cleansed from the cult of personality, i.e. as a pure barracks-communist statocracy, it deprived the producer of his labouring function, established a planned anarchy of the economy, divided state property along departmental lines, and made alienation total. In short, in conditions of a 'pure' (cultless) barracks-communism the society lost the capacity for self-development, which allows one to consider the barracks-communist sub-type of absolute statocracy (and especially its Stalinist case) not as a transitional form, but as a dead-end branch of an interrupted (since the end of the 1920s) transition period.\(^78\)

Cheshkov suggested that this dead-end was expressed most "in the absence of forces capable of adequately transforming this society", which resulted from "the predominance of relations of dominion/submission over economic relations" of production. While dismissing identifications of Soviet society as a variety of socialism as "in essence an echo of the ideology of Stalinism", he said that some potential for "a return to the initial stage of a transition period" existed, and might be realised through a transformation of the barracks-communist variety of absolute statocracy into the market variety, "on the basis of what Marx called the positive acquisition of private property and especially through a development of the world market and modern productive forces".\(^79\)
Cheshkov's view of Soviet society is more compatible with Butenko's assessment than with either Simoniya's view of a 'Bonapartist' transition toward socialism or El'ianov's liberal view of the necessary function of bureaucratic administration in social development. According to Cheshkov, both these views are inadequate not normatively but historically, in not explaining why their prescriptions for change have been systemically obstructed in the past, why the transition to socialism has stayed on the horizon and the economic sense of reform has remained abstract. In other words, change has been prevented not just by 'bureaucratic distortions' but by statocratic interests. Considering the prospect of reform, Cheshkov commented that "in 'defence'" of "a really professional-administrative bureaucracy" one "must say that it still now does not exist", adding that "we should not forget that the general conditions of industrial production, dictating the alienation of the producer and statocratisation as a form of the socialisation of production, will facilitate a regeneration of the phenomenon of statocracy, although in new, higher forms." This question of statocracy's historical prospects is the main point of difference between Cheshkov and Sheinis. Cheshkov's idea that statocracy, by replacing the proletariat as the main "antagonist of the bourgeoisie", has become "the most substantial social agent of our epoch" is questioned by Sheinis' stress on the importance of civil society in modernity, while Sheinis' perspective of civilising capitalism is relativised by Cheshkov's claim that Westernisation is not the only highway to progress. This has also been a 'unity of opposites', since neither view would have developed without the other.
Chapter 5, Footnotes:


7. Ibid., p. 89.


10. V.L. Sheinis and A.Ya. El'ianov, reviewing E.M. Primakov, Vostok post krakh kolonial'noi sistemy, NAA, 1983, no. 2, p. 177. Cf. V. Maksimenko, "Politicheskoe zaveshchanie Lenina i nekotorye problemy sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii", AAS, 1988, no. 9, p. 24: "a direct analogy between multistructural Soviet Russia and multistructural Afro-Asian countries is methodologically unacceptable and simply anti-historical. Therefore there remains only one way to apply the ideas of Lenin's last works to the study of socialist orientation in our day: to reveal and formulate (not in the language of the '20s, but in the language of the '80s) the integral logic of that fundamental rethinking of the whole viewpoint on socialism which Lenin called for at the end of his life."

11. Cf. A. Gudkov, Yu. Levada, A. Levinson and L. Sedov, "Biurokratizm i biurokratiia: neobkhodimost' utochenii", Kommunist, 1988, no. 12, pp. 73-4: "Monarchical regimes, parliamentary democracies, revolutionary elites, political parties and social movements in different countries have undergone bureaucratisation. ... However that bureaucratic leviathan which we have to deal with today has no analogues in history."


19. In a recent discussion, "'Kruglyi stol': Sovetskii Soiuz v 30-e gody", *Voprosy istorii*, 1988, no. 12, p. 13, V.P. Danilov argued against the common "idea, associating the mass repressions only with the years 1937-1938", stressing that Stalin created a terrorist apparatus before then.


25. Afanas'ev, "Otvety istorika".


36. I.K. Pantin, in "Perestroika: faktory neobratimosti i mekanizm tormozhenia ('kruglyi stol', okonchanie)", RKSM, 1988, no. 3, p. 54. A 1973 book on socialist thought in Russia by Pantin was cited by Volobuev, loc. cit., p. 85, suggesting that some historical tendencies may be defeated politically or may be victorious "only partially".


39. Levkovsky, "Goskapitalizm", pp. 16-7; Kliamkin, loc. cit., p. 177.


41. Ibid., p. 15; idem., "Goskapitalizm", p. 17.


43. L.I. Reisner, Razvivaiushcheia Strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta, Nauka, Moscow, p. 58. Cf. Kiva Maidanik's evaluation that "the Russian revolution had broken out in a society at the second stage of development, where nascent capitalism had been intertwined with relics of feudalism", quoted in Keep, p. 19, who notes that Maidanik's "analysis was all the more formidable for being expressed in the authentic language of Marxism ... [which] rejected the idea of unilinear progress".

44. Levkovsky, "Nekotorye problemy", pp. 21-2: "As is known, in Russia and most states of Eastern Europe the socialist structure initially arose by a path of the nationalisation of largely private (large and medium) capitalist firms. In the multistructural society of the 'third world' it in most cases may grow primarily from the state-capitalist structure. These two historical paths of creating a socialist structure reflect the specifics of a transition to socialist transformation realised in different conditions." This paragraph followed Levkovsky's most critical statements about the "malignant growth" of a "state-economic administrative apparatus".

45. Cf. A.Yu. Roslavlev, "Eshche raz o 'teorii' mnogoukladnosti v stranakh 'tretego mira'", RKSM, 1977, no. 1, p. 138: "Where, in the plane of time, does this transition period lie: in a 'chronological space' that exists between formations, or already in the bounds of a communist formation in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Should we understand, as has been understood until now, that communism, or more precisely its first phase -- socialism -- arose politically, economically and socially in Russia as a socio-economic formation with the victory of the October Revolution, and in its first period carried a transitional character and was marked by multistructurality that combined elements of pre-capitalism, capitalism and socialism, or that, after the introduction of the concept of an 'inter-formation' period, we must recognise that the glorious October revolution only led to a 'special inter-formational state of society', and socialism as a formation arose in the USSR at some other time?"


47. Ibid., pp. 13-4; Lewin, Political Undercurrents, p. 39.


50. Levkovsky, "Goskapitalizm", p. 7


53. Levkovsky, "Nekotorye problemy", pp. 20-1. Cf. p. 23: "This state apparatus and its elite are not engendered by state capitalism, but by the socio-economic and political evolution of a multistructural society, part of which comprises state capitalism."


63. *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 73.


66. Simoniya, *Strany Vostoka*, pp. 106, 134-40; cf. pp. 128, 150 and especially 299, where, discussing the path forward of the Russian revolution, Simoniya wrote: "V.I. Lenin did not think of this apart from its close and direct links with the development of international events. He considered the movement forward of Russia toward socialism in the conditions of the sole authority of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship in the form of Soviets as an 'international' task, and put the very possibility of such development in direct dependence upon the victory of a socialist revolution in one or some countries of Europe. And this matter consisted not only in military-political support. For those waverind between the proletariat and bourgeois democracy the 'force of example' of a socialist Europe was especially important." This passage had been printed before in an earlier article (N.A. Simoniya, "Leninskaia ideia revoliutsionno-demokraticheskoi diktatury i nekapitalisticheskii put' razvitiia", *NAA*, 1968, no. 2, p. 6), but the methodological section of Simoniya's book about 'base and superstructure' made its logical implication somewhat clearer. Cf. V.L. Tiagunenko, *Mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda i razvivaushchiesia strany*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, p. 8, for a straightforward assertion of the basic Stalinist thesis about socialism in one country.


70. Levkovsky, "Goskapitalizm", pp. 15-6.


72. Recent comments by Vadim Medvedev, "K poznaniu sotsializma: otvety na voprosy zhurnala 'Kommunist'", *Kommunist*, 1988, no. 17, p. 6, suggest that this conservative definition of socialism is quickly losing its force.

73. Levkovsky, "Nekotorye problemy", pp. 24, 22-3; Simoniya, *Strany Vostoka*, pp. 74, 83, 89; Gefter, reported in Gleisner, p. 4.


78. A.P. Butenko, "Po povodu pisma R.I. Kosolapova", *Voprosy filosofii*, 1987, no. 12, p. 146; Butenko said "Soviet society still does not answer" the objective criteria of developed socialism.


81. Ibid., pp. 245-6.

82. Ibid., p. 246.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., p. 247.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., pp. 247-8, 355-7.


92. V. Lukin and A. Bovin, "Na poroge novogo veka", *MEMO*, 1987, no. 12, pp. 52-3. For recent references to "bureaucratic, i.e. anti-democratic centralism", see L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov, "Zerna i plevely" (razmyshleniiia o predposylkah i itogakh preobrazovаний 1930-x gg.").
RKSM, 1988, no. 2, pp. 121, 113-5; and Diligensky, loc. cit., p. 7.


94. Ibid., pp. 352-3.

95. Ibid., p. 353.

96. Ibid.


98. Butenko, Sotsialisticheskii obraz zhizni, p. 353.

99. Ibid., pp. 353-4; cf. Diligensky, loc. cit., p. 13: "Social norms and values have been estranged from the internal world of the personality, turned from a moral imperative into formal instructions, into 'the rules of the game', so strict and so weakly rooted in this internal world."


102. Ibid., p. 165.

103. Ibid., p. 40.

104. Ibid.

105. Butenko, "Mekhanizm tormozheniia", p. 122. Cf. also Butenko's comment in "Problemy razrabotki konseptsi sovremennogo sotsializma", p. 42, that "it is impossible to understand the world of socialism, not having understood what has occurred and is occurring with us."


108. Ibid., pp. 91-3, 96-7.

109. Ibid., p. 93.


111. Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, pp. 93-4. Butenko did not use the phrase 'market socialist', but it is implicit in his exposition and in the argument for this strategy by Gordon and Klopov, "Zema i plevely", p. 107.

112. Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, pp. 94-6.

113. Ibid., pp. 96-7.

114. Ibid., p. 97.

115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., pp. 112-3.


118. Butenko, "Nekotorye", p. 75.

119. Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, p. 142.


123. Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, pp. 149-50.

124. Ibid., p. 102.


126. This 'state capitalist' view, which is different from Lenin's 'state capitalist' policy as discussed by Simonya and Butenko, was presented in a book by the Soviet emigre Vadim Belotserkovsky, Svoboda, Vlast' i Sobstvennost', Akhberg, 1977, p. 17.

127. Mirsky was thanked by Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, p. 16, for commenting on the content of his 1983 book.

128. V.L. Sheinis, "'Tretii Mir' - prepiatstviia i trudnosti na puti ekonomicheskogo rosta", in idem. ed., Problemy Razvitiiia i Upravleniia Ekonomikoi Razvivaushchikhs Stran, Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii (Leningrad, Oktiabr' 1968 g.), Moscow, 1970, pp. 223-4. Sheinis preceded Levkovsky and Nuikin in noting that "the state apparatus quickly enlarges according to Parkinson's Law, engendering corruption, nepotism and other accompanying phenomena around and inside itself". A similar concept of 'corporate property' to that of Sheinis has been elaborated in detail by Gyorgy Markus, in Feher et. al., Dictatorship Over Needs, chapter 2. Cf. also V.G. Gel'bras, in "Perestroika: faktory neobratimosti i mekhanizm tormozhenii ('kruglyi stol')", RKSM, 1988, no. 2, p. 51: "In the country relations of property formed which one may call state-corporate."

129. Sheinis, "'Tretii Mir'", p. 222. Cf. p. 224: "As the example of China shows, even a country which has realised profound social transformations directed against old exploitative classes is not insured against a gradual change in the nature of power, and consequently in the character of state property."

130. Ibid., pp. 224-5.


132. Ibid., pp. 43-4.

133. Sheinis, "Ekonomicheskii Rost i Sotsial'nyi Progress", pp. 268-70, implicitly considering the state as an instrument of class control by non-bourgeois ruling groups, and stressing the need for "mechanisms of social control over the state itself".

134. Mirsky was the most outspoken supporter of Khrushchev's foreign policy in the third world,
and seems to have been radicalised domestically in the mid to late 1960s in response to the steady consolidation of conservative forces amongst the Soviet elite.

136. Ibid., p. 36.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
141. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
142. R.M. Avakov et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy, Mysl', Moscow, 1974, pp. 337-9. The other factor listed was the difficulty for a prospective opposition "to use the national-ethnic factor in a struggle for power", because of the danger of being accused of "striving to destroy the unity of the state".
144. G. Mirsky, "K voprosu o vybore puti i orientatsii razvivaiushchikhsia stran", MEMO, 1987, no. 5, p. 77; this paper was read to an IMEMO conference in January 1987, just before the Central Committee plenum at which Gorbachev announced the need for democratisation. Cf. Diligensky, "Perestroika i dukhovno-psikhologicheskie protsessy", p. 13: "The psychological climate created by the ideology and practice of stagnation, by a break between word and deed, between socially sanctioned ('sloganeering') values on the one side and real practice on the other, could not but influence the motivational and moral aspects of social psychology. This break engendered apathy, cynicism and indifference."
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
150. Ibid., p. 254, n.2. Perhaps to answer a query about the dictator's past, Meliksetov quoted, ibid., n.4, a pertinent point from Simoniya: "Everything is clear when a change in the character of power is accompanied by a change of the political groups and figures holding power. It is more difficult to understand the meaning of events when a change in the character of political power is expressed in an evolution of the thinking and programmatic goals of one and the same group of figures."
151. Ibid., p. 253.
152. Ibid., p. 257.
153. Ibid., pp. 257-8, 264.
154. Ibid., pp. 260-1.
155. Ibid., pp. 261-2.

156. Ibid., pp. 262-3.


158. N.A. Simoniya, in ibid., pp. 199, 200-2. Cf. p. 201: "if state property in a specific country appears in an envelope of private-owning juridical relations, then it bears either a state capitalist or a state monopoly capitalist character. If the same state property as a result, say, of a socialist political revolution is found in an envelope of genuinely social relations of property, then it acquires a socialist character." Apart from the very flexible concept of state property, this passage contradicts Simoniya's arguments in Strany Vostoka that 'genuinely social relations of property' cannot result simply from a 'socialist political revolution', but from a 'horizontal' (not a 'vertical') socialisation of production, to use the terminology of A.A. Sterbalova, "Nekapitalisticheskoe razvitie: gorizonty i tupiki", RKSM, 1988, no. 2, p. 139.


160. See chapter four, p. 221.

161. Ibid., pp. 204-5.

162. Ibid., p. 204.


164. Yu.K. Ostrovitianov, in "O perspektivakh kapitalizma v razvivaushchemsia mire", NAA, 1985, no. 1, p. 93. It is possible that Yuri Ostrovitianov's father was Konstantin Ostrovitianov, a leading 'moderate' economist under Stalin; cf. Hough, p. 110.


168. Ibid.


172. Ibid., pp. 216-7.


177. Ibid., p. 88.

178. Ibid. The role of “an apparatus of administration” as “one of the sources of growth” was stressed by E.A. Bragina, *Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: gosudarstvennaia politika i promyshlennost’*, Mysl’, Moscow, 1977, p. 182, noted in Valkenier, p. 95.


181. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 86. This view was expressed most stridently (or recklessly, in the opinion of some like-minded colleagues) by L. Popkova, “Gde pyshnee pirogi?”, *Novy Mir*, 1987, no. 5, pp. 239-41.


is supported even by radicals, like Sterbalova, "Nekapitalisticheskoe razvitie", pp. 139-40, 144.


193. Shmelev, "Avansy i dolgi", p. 158. Cf. Gudkov et. al., p. 76: "It is necessary to emphasise that, for the administrative-bureaucratic system itself, formalised methods of recruiting personnel necessarily lead to the reproduction and predominance of incompetence."


196. Ibid., pp. 172, 175-6, 184-5.


199. E. Pozdniakov, "Natsional'nye, gosudarstvennye i klassovye interesy v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh", MEMO, 1988, no. 5, p. 6, n.3.

200. Ibid., p. 7.

201. A.M. Migranian, "Vzaimootnosheniia individua, obshchestva i gosudarstva v politicheskoj teorii marksizma i problemy demokratizatsii sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva", Voprosy filosofii, 1987, no. 8, pp. 79, 86.

202. V. Gel’bras, "Impul's dlia razmyshlenii i nadezhd", AAS, 1988, no. 9, p. 2.


206. Ibid., p. 274.

207. Ibid.

208. Ibid., p. 275. Cf. Migranian, p. 79: "the task of the state must become the creation of a new civil society, a gradual limitation of state intervention in economic and socio-cultural life".


211. Ibid., p. 557.

212. Sheinis, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnyk obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo", no.1, p. 160; Sheinis and Ëll'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 516, 520.
213. In the recent discussion, "Perestroika: faktory neobratimosti", no. 3, p. 49, no. 2, pp. 48, 45, a scholar proposing creating a "Democratic union" from above, Boris Kurashvili, also called for recognising Stalin's "exceptionally positive" as well as negative role, while a scholar insisting on the need for "informal associations" to develop "from below", Leonid Gordon, argued that, although "saving in isolated cases, the autocracy of Stalin much more often brought the country horrific calamities." Kurashvili was trying to define the limits of what the new leadership would accept, while Gordon was more concerned with the possibilities for civil action beyond the state.


218. Simoniya, Strany Vostoka, pp. 74-5, 42. Cf. N. Simoniya, "Leninskaia kontseptsiia perekhoda k sotsializmu u strany Vostoka", AAS, 1988, no. 4, p. 3: "After the initial political revolution in 1917 a further process [of transition toward socialism] passed largely in an evolutionary way, interspersed periodically with reforms and 'revolutions from above'."

219. Simoniya, in Evoliutsiia vostochnyh obshchestv, p. 250. Cf. a report, in Russkaia Mysl', of a talk to students at Moscow University on May 15, 1987, by Anatoly Strelyany, then a member of the editorial board of Novy Mir, discussed in Iain Elliot, "How Open is 'Openness'?", Survey, vol. 30, no. 3, October 1988, p. 13-4: "Strelyany insisted that Gorbachev was organising a revolution from above. He hoped Novy Mir would publish a discussion of 'revolutions from above, from Peter the Great to Stolypin'... [soon] however, Strelyany's name was dropped from the editorial board of Novy Mir."

220. Simoniya, in Evoliutsiia vostochnyh obshchestv, pp. 248, 251-2, 249, 250, 246, 238.

221. Ibid., pp. 253-4.

222. Ibid., pp. 250, 249, 238.

223. In the recent discussion, "Problemy razrabotki kontseptsiy sovremennogo sotsializma", Voprosy filosofii, 1988, no. 11, p. 57, Simoniya referred to "'revolutions from above'" (in plural) as one means used by the USSR to catch-up with capitalism, but he did not elaborate.


226. S.L. Agaev, "Politicheskie real'nosti razvivaiushchegosia mira i sotsial'naia dialektika", RKSM, 1987, no. 6, p. 86; on p. 98, Agaev defined restructuring as "a qualitatively new type of 'revolution from above', essentially different from all previously known forms of socio-political changes", but did not bother to spell out this essential difference in plain language.

227. Ibid., p. 90.


231. Ibid.


236. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

237. Ibid., p. 40.


239. Ibid., p. 66.

240. Ibid., p. 67, quoting a speech from a pro-Soviet conference in Baghdad.


243. Yu.V. Shishkov, "Istoricheskie sud'by tovarnogo proizvodstva", RKSM, 1988, no. 6, p. 26; Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i novoe politicheskoe myshlenie", p. 82.


246. V.L. Sheinis, in "India i Kitai: dve tsivilizatsii - dve modeli razvitiia", MEMO, 1988, no. 8, pp. 87-8, 90.

247. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i novoe politicheskoe myshlenie", p. 89. According to Sterbalova, "Nekapitalisticheskoe razvitie", p. 132, Sheinis' "key conclusion" concerned "the illusory nature of a non-capitalist alternative for the developing countries"; assuming that a genuine non-capitalist alternative must be a means of development, not stagnation, this conclusion logically applies to the USSR as well as the third world.


250. Ibid.


257. Sheinis, "Ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'noe pereurostroistvo", p. 44.


259. *Ibid.*, p. 45. Sheinis cited Burlatsky's arguments about the degeneration of socialism in China, which are quoted in Kagarlitsky, *Thinking Reed*, pp. 302-3, who, pp. 266-9, gives a good assessment of Burlatsky's self-reflective "technocratic reformism", citing his warnings to the 'gerontocracy' in the manner of Machiavelli, which have now been heard by younger princes.


262. Sheinis, in "O perspektivakh kapitalizma", p. 88. Criticism by Sheinis, in "Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo", no. 1, p. 158, of Simoniya's broad application of Marx's model of Bonapartism to much of the third world suggests that his own discussion had a more specific referent.


267. Kagarlitsky, *Thinking Reed*, p. 106, noting that: "The censor is not himself a theoretician and cannot know beforehand what will be written. When the learned work is ready, it is not easy to cavil at it - especially as this would not be to the authorities' advantage, for it would mean that they recognised themselves and were the first to strip off the camouflage. As a rule they do not go that far, although there have been some cases."


271. Ibid., pp. 206-7.

272. However incredible it may seem to Western leaders to suggest that they prefer a 'bureaucratic, in particular military-despot, regime' in the USSR, the issue is whether this perception was conceivable by a radical Soviet intellectual dissatisfied with both 'his' authoritarian government and with generally increasing militarism, unrestrained by arms control agreements which, as Hough, Russia and the West, pp. 220-1, notes, were tokenistic.


274. Sheinis, in "Traditsii i sovremennost'", p. 41.


277. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 37, 546-7, 554. A different, 'objective' meaning of 'developing the productive forces' was implied by Butenko, Teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda, p. 126.

278. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp. 555-67; Sheinis, "O kriteriiakh", pp. 69-74. Maksimenko, in "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", NAA, 1985, no. 5, p. 162, implicitly suggested that Sheinis' values were too Western.


281. L.I. Reisner, in "Klassovaia bor'ba i kontseptsii egalitarizma v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh", NAA, 1978, no. 6, pp. 11-2, implicitly criticising Emel'ian Popov's view, discussed in chapter four, p. 203.


284. Ibid., pp. 572-3; cf. p. 554.


287. Ibid.

288. Ibid., p. 166; Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, pp.519-21.

290. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomiceskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, p. 582.

291. Ibid., pp. 507, 505-4, 509.


294. Vasil'ev, "Chto takoe 'Aziatskii'", pp. 71-2, 74-5; idem., in "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: ekonomiceskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress", no. 6, p. 152. Sheinis, in "India i Kitai", p. 89, said that the USSR should learn from China "in overcoming factors of retardation and creating a modern economic mechanism".

295. Sheinis and El'ianov eds, ekonomiceskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress, p. 510.


297. Ibid., p. 174.

298. G. Vodolazov, Dialektika i revoliutsiia, Moscow, 1975, pp. 79, 71, quoted in Kagarlitsky, Thinking Reed, pp. 304, 288. Cf. "Perestroika: faktory neobratimosti", no. 3, pp. 46-7, for a call by Vodolazov for most Party archives to be opened to historians "at once, in one day!" and for the publication of stenographic reports of Central Committee plenums.


300. In "India i Kitai", pp. 86-7; Sheinis, in ibid., p. 89, disputed Cheshkov's optimism on China.


304. M. Cheshkov, "Elita' i klass v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh", MEMO, 1970, no. 1, pp.85-91. Cf. Kagarlitsky, Thinking Reed, pp. 300-2, for some interesting points in a 1967 book by Cheshkov on 15th century Vietnam. In criticising this article of Cheshkov's, Landa, in B.F. Gafurov ed., Zarubezhnyi Vostok i Sovremennost', 1st ed., 1974, pp. 307, 310-11, 308, claimed that his focus on state rather than capitalist ownership did not apply to "the majority of countries of the Orient", and asserted that the objective independence from society of a ruling elite had ended in all but "the most backward countries of Tropical Africa and South-East Asia". If the first of these points supports the inference that Cheshkov was principally referring to Soviet society, the second clearly does not; but it was contradicted by Landa's view that all modernising societies have "an extreme need for strong authority", and his statement that "the significance of the army in the young states of Asia and North Africa continually grows in connection with the above-mentioned increasing need of these states for instruments of coercion and nationwide rallying", as well as his, and Levkovsky's, overall theme of the specific features distinguishing backward countries from Western Europe (ibid., pp. 289,311, 312, 277ff); Landa even concluded himself that "overall the unstable correlation of opposing classes allows the elite during a quite prolonged time to play a
relatively independent role, fortified by its control over a significant or even a basic part of the means of production" (ibid., p. 315).


308. "Novye praviashchie gruppy", p. 228. Cf. ibid., n.1: "With this approach the given social community is not reduced to the directly dominant group or 'ruling stratum'. As the personification (although in different degrees and forms) of state property these [new ruling] groups receive receive a wider characterisation, in contrast to a definition focusing on their ties with the state as an 'apparatus' or superstructure." On p. 229, Cheshkov noted the ideological pretensions of officials emphasising their role "as nation-wide leaders, representatives of the people etc.", and a tendency of some observers to either overestimate the freedom of such figures to do what they please, or consider the main obstacle to this as simply "the 'problem of cadres'."

309. Ibid., pp. 233-5.

310. Ibid., p. 235.

311. Ibid. Cf. Hough, Russia and the West, pp. 39-40, 144-5., on the conflict between the social priorities of Chernenko's faction and the economic priorities of Kirilenko's in the late Brezhnev years.


313. Ibid., p. 237.


315. Full reference in n. 14 above; hereinafter Cheshkov, "Biurokratiia i 'Etrakratiia'".

316. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

317. In "Diskussii: osobennosti sotsial'noi struktury i roli' biurokratii v stranakh Vostoka", NAA, 1975, no. 1, p. 75. This report said, p. 74, Cheshkov's paper was found to be "very debatable".


319. Kagarlitsky, Thinking Reed, p. 106.

320. Ibid., p. 299.


323. Cheshkov, "Biurokratiia i 'Etrakratiia'", pp. 5-8, 9.

324. Ibid., pp. 9-10. And "from surveys of student and academic youth the conclusion suggests itself that these strata are far from always striving toward a political-administrative career or entrepreneurship, and evaluate lowly the social prestige of one and the other occupation."
325. Ibid.
326. Ibid., p. 11.
327. Ibid., p. 30, n.33.

328. Neither Levkovsky nor Sheinis participated in the 1974 conference at IVAN. While Vladimir Li, "Diskussii: osobennosti sotsial'noi struktury i rol' biurokratii" pp. 81-2, criticised Cheshkov's theory with reference to the third world, Ksenia Mialo, ibid., p. 77, "drew attention to the theoretical untenability of left-extremist ideologues' ideas about power and elites", but it is doubtful that she had Cheshkov in mind as well as 'left radicals' abroad who "emphasise the central significance of the anti-bureaucratic struggle in the 'third world' and claim that the structure of power, and not property relations, must be the main object of revolutionary change".


331. V.V. Krylov, in "Diskussii: osobennosti sotsial'nyi struktury i rol' biurokratii", p. 75.


333. Ibid., pp. 13-4.


337. Ibid., p. 20.

338. Krylov's theory was dominant within IMEMO's department on the developing world in 1974, while Mirsky, having worked with Cheshkov and participated in the subterranean debate for over a decade, must have been aware of the principal referent of his theory.


343. Cf. ibid. with "Istoricheskaia spetsifiika", p. 191, where Cheshkov had identified 'dependent development' purely with capitalism: "the state structure may become a leading 'domestic' structure, having ousted the private-capitalist structure ... and subjugated it. With this, however, the nature of the state structure remains capitalist, if it does not secure a break in the limits of dependent development, and will in an external plane be subjugated to state monopoly capital of the developed states."


348. Ibid., p. 21. Cf. Levkovsky, "Nekotorye problemy", p. 23, on the "especially contradictory situation" in which a bureaucratic elite is formed.


350. Ibid., pp. 22-3.

351. Ibid., p. 23.


355. Ibid.

356. Ibid., pp. 24-5.

357. Ibid., p. 25; cf. p. 17.


361. Ibid., pp. 330, 326, 334; Leonid Vasil'ev's view is implicitly criticised on pp. 336, 332.


363. Ibid., pp. 330-1, 326. In the context of Soviet society at the time, Cheshkov was elaborating a general argument against despair.


367. M.A. Cheshkov, Kritika Predstavlenii o Praviashchikh Gruppakh Razvivaushchikhsia Stran, Nauka, Moscow, 1979 (otvetstvennyi redaktor V.L. Sheinis), pp. 162-3, 120. The argument of this book is so intricate, in order to present complex material and circumvent censorship, that a review by one senior scholar, Aleksandr Galkin, Voprosy istorii, 1982, no. 8, merely summarised Cheshkov's preface and conclusion, commenting, p. 155, that in the chapters "many important questions have been mentioned only as points, especially ... where the author's position is

369. M.A. Cheshkov, "Praviashchie gruppy i gospodstvuushchie klassy v razvivaushchiksia stranakh: problem avtonomii", *RKSM*, 1986, no. 5, pp. 146-60. This article characterises "the nature of the agents of state power as a primary community," based on state property and hence opposed to bourgeois forces as well as to the direct producers. Defining "the nature of state property as a special kind of private property", Cheshkov contrasts it with capitalist and pre-capitalist kinds in terms of static relations of production rather than the social dynamic of a developing or stagnating production process, outlining some differences between statocracy and a bourgeoisie in terms of interests (a more extensive "development of the so-called social sector") and ideology (a greater degree of state regulation). His comments about statocracy's internal structure are expressed in legalistic terms like "the two fundamental aspects (function and title) of state property", and do not clarify the nature of the contradiction within statocracy between agents of state power responsible for holding the system together and lesser officials in charge of state enterprises who are increasingly compelled "to act relatively independently." While doubting the threatening potential of this contradiction to the unity of the whole dominant group ("bourgeois authors now dramatise the contradiction, emphasising that state managers use the state sector for strengthening their position in relation to the ruling elite. Such a contradiction does not, however, undermine statocracy as a social community, if with this state enterprise and state property are maintained. If they are maintained, then the dualism of the subject [as a whole] is an entirely normal phenomenon, indicating the formation, and not the downfall of statocracy"), he did not consider the economic reasons for maintaining or reducing state property. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-50. Cf. footnotes in Cheshkov, "Konseptsi biurokratii", pp. 185, 187.


373. Yu. Levada, "Dinamika sotsial'nogo pereloma: vozmozhnosti analiza", *Kommunist*, 1989, no. 2, p. 36, has recently claimed that the current process of change is "significantly more complex and at the same time less clear than" a classical revolutionary situation, and suggested that a direct counterposition of "the opportunities and aspirations of the 'top people' and the 'lower orders'" ignores the possibility of a coalescence in favour of reform of diverse elements "who with another correlation of forces would be a resource for conservative resistance."


376. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-6, 187, 186, 189, 190, 191, 195, 194. In this article, a large part of one paragraph, pp. 194-5, and a footnote, p. 189, were reprinted, which probably resulted from an anxious rush for publication.


By developing inter-formational links and transitional structures embodying a historical synthesis, humanity as a generic community receives the chance to overcome the blocked socio-economic and political relations of the old social structure, which have outlived themselves on a world-historical scale, and maintain with this the most valuable accumulation of the preceding formation, necessary for further movement forward. It is no accident therefore that precisely at the most critical turning-points of the history of humanity, when the drama of social conflicts and international collisions attains its culmination -- precisely then with growing force there appears a tendency toward a historical synthesis, toward an integration of old and new, toward a widening of the area and a raising of the level and intensity of intellectual-spiritual exchange, toward an abrupt growth in the social mobility of the population of countries, regions and the whole world. 

(Lev Reisner, in N.A. Simoniya and L.I. Reisner eds, Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo, Nauka, Moscow, 1984, p. 28.)

This thesis has investigated debates amongst Soviet scholars since the mid 1960s about three broad problems of development: first, the significance of 'non-capitalist development' in the third world for Soviet foreign policy; second, the question of whether peripheral capitalism can overcome the backwardness of developing countries; and third, the nature and deficiencies of the development of modern Soviet society. These debates have been read in the light of previous studies of comparable discussions amongst the Soviet intelligentsia, and in terms of scepticism toward the literal claims of 'Marxism-Leninism'. A lot of arguments about specific aspects of these problems of development have been evaluated, showing the tenor of Soviet discussion over time about the serious issues raised by leading scholars. It is now worthwhile to return to the level of general Western discussion about Soviet politics, and suggest some answers from the present analysis to current questions.

A direct answer can be given to the question: "how open is 'openness'?" The dramatic transformation in opportunities for Soviet scholars to express critical ideas is shown clearly by chapter five, especially in the case of Cheshkov. After moving from enforced purgatory to the gates of paradise in the 1960s, he was able in the 1970s to present a radical critique of Soviet society, but only in an obscure form which few could understand. If, as Nuikin's article suggests, the scope of Cheshkov's theory of 'statocracy' was still unclear in early 1988, that cloudiness has now vanished. Not only is the sun shining, but many mirrors of
criticism are at work. "Glasnost' was granted and extended from above mainly because many below demanded it. When Sheinis recently observed that "what has already been said and written has become an indestructible fact of today's (and tomorrow's, however events have turned out) social consciousness", he meant that the doors of dialogue cannot be shut again, since the winds of change are too strong. While the new political atmosphere has been more refreshing than the forecasts predicted, because staleness had been the norm for so long, the main point is that those doors were creeping open for a long time before glasnost'. Henceforth, even a strong arm will probably only be able to moderate the gust of public controversy, not reduce it to an occasional breeze of dissent.

A deeper question concerns the prerequisites for the emergence of what Yuri Levada has recently called "real pluralism", based on an institutionalisation of different points of view. Such pluralism would mean the end of an official perceptual screen. Certain ideas would still predominate in guiding policy, but as a result of open argument rather than legitimate manipulation of acceptable evidence. In these terms, the evolution of scholarly debate about peripheral capitalism charted in chapter four confirms Aleksandr Bovin's assessment that, after the liberal epoch of the 1960s, the "strengthening of a conservative mood in the highest echelons of the Soviet leadership held back, but did not stop the process of change." Progress in this debate occurred principally in the early 1970s, when Soviet social science was suffering a reactionary backlash, and in the early 1980s, before the beginning of a reform from above engendered new hopes. An important difference between these two periods is that, whereas the initial exchange of opinions tended to polarise around the dominant 'positions' of IVAN and IMEMO, a new level of debate was reached a decade or so later largely because of a differentiation of theoretical opinion within these institutes. This change has been consummated with Simoniya's recent appointment as IMEMO's deputy director overseeing research on the developing world, where one of his tasks will be to encourage scholars to take up the challenge of general theory presented in Cheshkov's critical review article. The fact that Sheinis has been Cheshkov's main responsible editor in the past shows that leading liberal Soviet
academics have placed a high value on pluralism of ideas, encouraging those colleagues with whom they have had significant disagreements. Of course, this does not mean that top policy officials possess a similar degree of respect, but the presence of a culture of tolerance within the USSR's leading foreign affairs institute indicates the potential basis for an openly pluralist rather than monist Soviet world view. Avakov's 1987 advice that "genuine scientific ambition consists not in trying to inflict blows and defeat on an opponent, ... but in ... not being afraid to doubt the truthfulness of one's own conclusions" differed markedly from his sharp defence of the 'dependent development' view a dozen years before, and might even be read, pace Agaev, as a call for pluralism.6

The material examined in this thesis sheds some light on the conceptual change represented by 'new political thinking'. While the persistence of the orthodox view of 'socialist orientation' considered in chapter three confirmed the hierarchy of the Brezhnev regime's basic objectives toward the third world posited in chapter two, some key assumptions of Ponomarev's world view have been overturned by the new liberal orthodoxy reviewed in the last section of chapter four. There is evidence of a paradigm shift in Soviet perceptions of the third world, i.e. that a new conceptual framework has arisen because of the abandonment of old assumptions in order to make up for opportunities lost during a 'normal' period of muddling through. The phenomenon of 'reactionary anti-imperialism' was not accounted for by the old Soviet leadership, which considered the developing countries largely as an arena for pressurising the West. The context of this phenomenon as a response to the growth of capitalism in the third world suggests that the new leadership cannot simply adjust its tactical goals, giving more attention to non-aligned capitalist developing countries and being less profligate with support for isolated states of 'socialist orientation', without re-assessing its general approach of competing for influence against the centres of world capitalism. If local sources of backwardness in the third world engender nationalist ambitions that threaten global security while wasting resources for development, then international help from outside powers rather than one-eyed rivalry is a pressing imperative. Gorbachev's 27th CPSU Congress speech still
referred to the "ruthless exploitation" of developing countries by imperialism, but noted the prospects for "new capitalist 'power centres'" and called for a "moral and political isolation of American imperialism" in order to strengthen global interdependence not undermine capitalism. He said that "continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with a simple repetition of what has taken place, especially in approaches to problems that have amassed", called for "special exactness in evaluations of our own possibilities, self-control and supreme responsibility in undertaking decisions", and placed the need for "firmness in maintaining principles and positions" and "tactical flexibility" within an overall "determination not toward confrontation, but toward dialogue and mutual understanding."7

This reformation of Soviet foreign policy from above raises the question of how much conceptual change has occurred, or can occur within the limits set by the 'leading role' of the CPSU. The analysis in this thesis does not support Breslauer's conclusion that a "normative commitment to 'anti-imperialism' ... inhibits fundamental learning about the prospects for achieving denial [i.e. anti-Western] goals among third world nationalist regimes."8 Such a commitment did dominate Soviet political discourse during the Brezhnev years, but it has not held firm since then. The fact that Sheinis' perspective about the scope of change required in Soviet foreign policy was broadly accepted in the Foreign Ministry within a year after his article on 'new political thinking' appeared testifies to rapid progress not inhibition of fundamental learning.9 The main topic of a recent discussion amongst leading scholars was the possibility that contemporary capitalism could exist without exploiting the developing countries. Simoniya argued that conditions were forming which would make "militarism and the direct exploitation of other peoples not only unprofitable from the point of view of the fundamental interests of the world capitalist system, but also threatening to its existence". He stressed the influence of peace-loving forces in the West, and claimed that for leading third world countries "the attainment of economic independence with a simultaneous integration in the bounds of the international division of labour will mean the end of neocolonialism." Sheinis spelt out the
implication of this by suggesting that, if the nature of the West was re-thought under the pressure of events in the 1960s as 'imperialism without colonies', "now the time has come to take the following step" and recognise that "'imperialism' in that sense in which it was understood in Marxist literature at the beginning of the century (and as it has been interpreted until now in the works of epigones) is not at all the defining characteristic of capitalism at the close of the 20th century." Clearly, if imperialism no longer characterises the West then a basic Soviet commitment to support 'anti-imperialism' in the third world is a thing of the past. The suggestion by Hough and Valkenier that a Soviet perspective of global interdependence implies the end of a bifurcated view of the international order has been confirmed. 

The process of extensive change in the dominant Soviet view of the third world has been 'cumulative' rather than 'cyclical'. This is shown clearly by the debate about 'socialist orientation'. Criticism by leading scholars of existing Soviet policy had to build up for a long time before it became influential in official circles. The initial rejection of Simoniya's critique by Brutents shows that post-Khrushchev disillusionment amongst Soviet officials about the prospects of radical anti-Western regimes in the third world was minor. Optimism about dependent allies on the part of Ul'ianovskiy and his supporters in the early and mid 1970s was nothing new. What was new was the reconsideration undertaken at this time by a key figure in the debate, Mirsky, who appreciated the significance of state capitalist development in Egypt soon after Simoniya. His warnings were ignored by senior officials in the late 1970s and early 1980s, partly because the orthodox view was affirmed by a lot of lesser scholars who were content to think at the level of propaganda rather than analysis. But this did not signify an absence of conceptual change, since at this time it became widely recognised that 'socialist orientation' was a realistic prospect only for more backward third world countries, and even there depended upon political will rather than economic forces. The gradual exposure of contradictions in the dominant eclectic view of 'non-capitalist development' throughout the Brezhnev years contributed to the speed with which it was discarded under the new
leadership, and led to growing interest in a serious analysis of problems complicating socialist development in backward countries. While both Maidanik's left-radical rejection of the 'leading role' of loyal communist or nationalist parties and the links made by Simoniya and Sterbalova between the failure of 'socialist orientation' and Stalinism were conceived many years before, the influence of these ideas would have increased recently because of the obvious falsity of the old orthodoxy. Maidanik's standing amongst the foreign policy establishment is now marginal because of his adherence to dependency theory, but his criticism of Primakov for not noting that "the historical role of the subjective factor of revolution" in a developing society is "to neutralise objective factors of blocking and stagnation" had interesting domestic implications. The lack of substance in Ul'ianovsky's view about 'non-capitalist development' meant that heretical views accumulated in the 'years of stagnation' even amongst leading scholars who retained faith in capitalism's 'general crisis'.

A new Soviet orthodoxy about the third world has emerged not only because of the progress of scholarly debates, but also because of the new leadership's relaxation of control over political discourse. The legitimacy of an open exchange of opinions about controversial issues of foreign policy has compensated substantially for the continuing absence of a comprehensive synthetic theory of the developing world. While Simoniya's theory of Oriental capitalism has formed the basis for the new liberal orthodoxy, it has not transformed the alternative approach presented by Cheshkov, so that these competing views exist in an unstable symbiosis rather than an evolving synthesis. This situation does not contain the possibility of a return to the old orthodoxy, because Cheshkov's revision of old dogmas has been more radical than Simoniya's, and his method has been at least as Marxist. While sceptical about the progress of peripheral capitalism, Cheshkov is clearly not a supporter of barracks-communism in the third world. His main criticism of the new liberal orthodoxy's reduction of developing countries' conflict with the West "to inter-capitalist contradictions" is that it ignores the "global problems of today's world", by assuming that major progressive development is still possible within the capitalist formation if third
world countries follow the European path. He argues that "the historical time for a formational type of development has been exhausted", partly because the growing role of mental productive forces has led to "a relativisation of the primacy of material production and material mechanisms of determination in processes of social evolution", and partly because "the coexistence of world systems ... does not amount to a temporary situation of 'transition' from one formational epoch to another", since "a consecutive change of formations in the context of the military-cosmic revolution already may be not only a mode of the development, yet also a mode of the existence of humanity; it can become a path to the annihilation of humanity." In short, human development is not a matter of catching-up but of looking out. Cheshkov's view fits Gorbachev's earnest rhetoric of global disarmament almost as much as Simoniya's does. If a real "pluralisation of social structures" occurs in the USSR, and capitalist contradictions do intensify some time in the next few years, then Cheshkov's radical utopia of a way out beyond statocracy might become most influential in Moscow and elsewhere. Only if reform in the USSR is halted from above, and if Simoniya's optimism about the growth in the West of "pacifist, 'ecological' and other democratic forces" is misplaced, will a return to what Sheinin called a primitive Soviet world view be likely.

This interpretation of the actual and potential scope of 'new political thinking' is based on an extensive reading of the main works by leading Soviet development theorists over the past twenty years. The quantity and quality of dialogue possible between an outside interpreter and the arguments contained in these works shows that, although the influence on Soviet policy of the brightest scholars was minimal during the 'years of stagnation', the horizon of their concerns was not. As Hough has suggested, they were preparing for major political changes, without knowing the year when a new era would begin. While the form of the material evaluated in this thesis confirms the initial methodological point that Soviet scholars have been restricted politically in expressing their ideas, an important qualification should be noted. In general, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the meaning of arguments put forward by leading scholars was not obfuscated by
a need to concede to tradition on some points in order to advance other controversial opinions. In other words, the necessary concessions made in order to get works through the censorship did not affect the logic of the arguments advanced. Given an appreciation of the contexts of debate, the main difficulty was not the ritual silence with which sensitive issues were apparently swept under the carpet, but rather the complexity and broad scope of scholarly disputes about such issues. This conclusion is not surprising, in terms of both the existence of substantial debate during the 'years of stagnation' and the open expression of different opinions in the fresh air of glasnost'. If the dead atmosphere of tradition had been so strong as to inhibit the systematic interrelation of parts and wholes required by logical thought, then the content of implicit debate would have been less significant, as was largely the case under Stalin, and the public polemics allowed by the new leadership would have been limited by many illusions, as largely occurred under Khrushchev. The discursive structure of recent Soviet development debates confirms the general hypothesis argued in chapter two of a progressive dissolution of ideological censorship in the USSR since Stalin.

Debates amongst leading Soviet scholars about problems of development have been significant not only in changing the dominant Soviet view of the third world, but also in affecting what Kagarlitsky has termed the "cultural-political process" of Soviet society. The main conclusion in this respect is that, while conservative officials succeeded in stabilising the Stalinist system for a decade and a half from 1968, most leading liberal and radical critics of this system continued to argue for change. If some scholars like Lukin narrowed the scope of their criticism, others like Sheinis maintained a dialogue of broad dispute with the holders of power right up until the arrival of glasnost', and even to some degree thereafter. Socially, while the Brezhnev regime isolated itself from the demands and hopes of much of the Soviet intelligentsia, many leading scholars occupied themselves with the long task of creating a majority consensus about the need for radical reform. They did this largely by trying to understand the obstacles to change theoretically, since from their perspective empirical facts about the declining quality of Soviet life were as obvious as they were unmentionable. The
main difference between the internal Soviet critiques of actually existing Stalinism considered in chapter five and many Western accounts of the Brezhnev regime concerns the source of what Slavnyi called 'enormous social energy directed in words against capitalism and in deed against modern society'. All participants in the subterranean debate about Soviet society agreed with Lukin's point that poor 'socialism' derived not from mistakes by well-meaning leaders, but, as Levkovsky stressed, from the political character of the bureaucratic forces holding state power. None suggested that the main obstacle to change was an ideological attachment on the part of high officials to a theory of 'Leninism' based on "the primacy of politics over economics". Mirsky's scenario about 'the temptation of entrepreneurship' for a 'statist elite' assumed as a matter of course that adequate economic compensation would satisfy the holders of power if it proved impossible to compete with a growing bourgeoisie. The reading of Soviet development debates in this thesis suggests that official ideology has lagged far behind academic theories because of the dead weight of bureaucratic politics, not that official policies have been hamstrung by any theoretical precepts of an uncompromising ideology.

This interpretation implies that if substantial changes in the political composition of the Soviet elite occur, then the official ideology might be able to catch-up and incorporate a number of key intellectual themes. Broadly speaking, such a political liberalisation has been Gorbachev's main achievement to date, but comparing the subterranean debate about Soviet society with the current Party line shows that some themes remain outside the official perceptual screen. A recent speech by Aleksandr Yakovlev stressed the need for a rich "tradition of intellectualty", and claimed that, in terms of a transition from the "authoritarian past" to a democratic future, 1988 "was a turning-point not only for the epoch of restructuring, but for the whole of [Soviet] history." While assuming the socialist nature of Soviet society, he said "an ideology of myth-creation" had supported the elimination from decision-making of "millions of communists", but warned of a "real danger" that failure to understand the difficulty of reform could "undermine restructuring with whining and whittling, drown it in petty debates."
Certainly, the task of replacing an old dogma which said 'everything is wonderful' is much more difficult than merely loosening it. From the viewpoint of a reformist leadership, nothing could be simpler rhetorically than proclaiming 'the end of ideology', if only it was not necessary to elaborate a new historical synthesis in place of the echoes of Stalinism. What Cheshkov called "the transformation of a consciousness of restructuring into an ideology of renewal having a really scientific basis" cannot be controlled, or even directed, from above, because, as Rashkovsky has pointed out, "truth is internally inspired and dynamic", so that attempts to monopolise it lead only to the hollow inertia of dead formulas. If the voices of civil society are allowed and encouraged to speak, they will set their own agendas for change, and evaluate themselves which debates are pithy and which are trifling. While force of circumstances can lead the elite strata of the state apparatus to foster elements of pluralism, only the strengthening of dialogue from below can, as Simoniya suggested, compel the official state to a further evolution.

The 'dangerous tendency of the social isolation of ruling groups' which Sheinis highlighted at the end of the 1960s was paralleled by a foreclosing of foreign horizons for all but the privileged few. Conversely, the new liberal era of reform from above has seen official Soviet offers of dialogue with the outside world, in the first place with the West, which are at least as substantial as calls for mental renewal at home. This is partly a reaction to the relative cost of the 'years of stagnation', when the USSR marked time while some developing countries continued to catch-up with the West economically. The constraints of Soviet backwardness led one scholar to suggest recently that, even with a successful economic reform, the USSR would lack the "cruel" advantages of capitalism, so that "an excessive enthusiasm for Western technology will consolidate our position as a catching-up, dependent, 'developing' country." Genuine progress for the USSR cannot be obtained through technocratic means, but through cooperative appropriation of what Pantin called "the highest results of common human development." As Levada recently suggested, the USSR's "full and stable 'return'" to the 'highway' of world progress is connected "with the starting
up of a fundamental dialogue between cultures and socio-political traditions", the language of which "may be only common values."27 The broadest conclusion of this thesis is that such cross-cultural discussion about common global problems is quite possible and necessary, but not inevitable, since conservative forces on both sides are not interested in a "depolarisation" of 'power centres' in the modern world.28 In other words, differences of opinion expressing the interests of social institutions and groups are not determined by state boundaries. Only by talking about broadly similar obstacles to development will it be possible to substantiate "the universality of common human values, resting on which we might in a non-relativist way recreate human history."29
Conclusions, Footnotes:


5. M.A. Cheshkov, "Rost kapitalizma i obshchaja teoriia razvivaiushchego mira", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1988, no. 4, p. 152: "the subject of a general theory of the developing countries has not been clarified theoretically, and without this it is difficult (or even impossible) to solve the question of the wholeness and differentiation of this community, to presuppose, say, its disintegration in the course of differentiation, for it remains unclear what precisely is disintegrating."


9. Sheinis, in "Perestroika: faktory neobratimostii", p. 44, listed a "new foreign policy" as the first of "three main achievements" of restructuring, the others being glasnost' and a continuing renewal of official ideology.

10. "Sovremennyi Kapitalizm i Razvivaiushchiisia Mir: kharakter i perspektivy vzaimootnoshenii", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1988, no. 5, pp. 124-6. Together with Simoniya and Sheinis, other speakers at this discussion attacked the vague idea of 'unequal exchange' between the West and the third world, which had been included in Gorbachev's 26th Congress speech, *Materialy, loc. cit.*, p. 17. Issue no. 6 of *Narody Azii i Afriki* for 1988, containing the second half of this discussion, had not arrived in Canberra before this thesis was submitted.

11. Cf. Breslauer, pp. 442-3, for an accurate summary of the view of Hough and Valkenier, with which he later, p. 448, disagrees. Soviet policy now seems motivated by the "higher order" objective which Michael McGwire, "Deterrence: the problem - not the solution", *International Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 1, Winter 1985-6, p. 59, has recommended for the West: 'securing cooperative behaviour' from the other power bloc rather than competing in order to contain its influence.


13. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 429-30, 438, for a different view of the early Brezhnev years which ignores the key case of Egypt.

14. Even the article by V.F. Vasil'ev, "Nekotorye voprosy sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1986, no. 5, pp. 20-1, included over a page of comments about the domestic implications for the USSR of the decline of 'socialist orientation', citing Lenin about the crucial importance of labour productivity in overcoming capitalism.

15. K.L. Maidanik, "Kharakter i puti revoluiutsvionnykh protsessov v razvivaiushchemsia mir", in *idem. et. al. eds, Razvivaiushchiesia strany v sovremennom mire: puti revoluiutsvionnogo protsesssa,*
Nauka, Moscow, 1986, p. 325, seeking "a quite narrow crest between an abyss of rebellious voluntarism and a bog of 'procrastinating' conformism."

16. Cheshkov, "Rost kapitalizma i obshchaia teoriia razvivaiushchegosia mira", pp. 151-2, 156.

17. Levada, "Dinamika sotsial'nogo pereloma", p. 42.


22. Cf. Yuri Krasin, quoted in Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet debates and American options, Brookings, Washington D.C., 1986, pp. 180-1. The obstructing role of "utopian conceptions of implanting socialism from above" was stressed in a recent discussion by A.S. Tsipko, in "Problemy razrabotki konseptsii sovremennogo sotsializma", Voprosy filosofii, 1988, no. 11, pp. 48-9 (cf. Kagarlitsky, pp. 285-7, 304), but the next speaker, V.T. Loginov, p.50, argued: "As a historian, I cannot see, for example, those situations when in implementing one or other policy we proceeded completely from any theoretical scheme. ... there was not any Stalinist model, but, unfortunately, a naked pragmatism existed. It seems to me that any theoretical basis for Stalinism was just absent." The garbled use of a theory of liberation to justify oppression was hardly utopian, except perhaps in supposing that it was possible to not 'let history judge'.

23. "Rabotat' po sovesti, zhit' chestno", Pravda, 28/2/89, p. 2; intelligentnost' has been translated as intellectuallity in the absence of an English equivalent.


27. Levada, "Dinamika sotsial'nogo pereloma", p. 45.


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