ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE --WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD 1941-59.

by

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This thesis is the result of my own research and all sources have been acknowledged.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.F.	--	Australian Imperial Force
A.I.F.F.	--	Australia in Facts and Figures
A.I.I.A.	--	Australia Institute of International Affairs
A.O.C.	--	Air Officer Commanding
A.R.P.	--	Air Raid Precautions
Bde.	--	Brigade
B.P.D.	--	British Parliamentary Debates
Brig.	--	Brigadier
C.I.D.	--	Committee of Imperial Defence
C-in-C	--	Commander-in-Chief
C.O.S.	--	Chief of Staff
C.P.D.	--	Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
Div.	--	Division
G.O.C.	--	General Officer Commanding
F.M.S.V.F.	--	Federated Malay States Volunteer Force
F.R.A.C.S.	--	Fellowship of the Royal Australian College of Surgeons
H.M.A.S.	--	His Majesty's Australian Ship
H.M.S.O.	--	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
Inf.	--	Infantry
J.M.B.R.A.S.	--	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Malayan Branch
Lt.-Gen.	--	Lieutenant-General
N.S.W.	--	New South Wales
P.P.	--	(Commonwealth) Parliamentary Papers
R.A.F.	--	Royal Air Force
R.A.A.F.	--	Royal Australian Air Force
R.A.N.	--	Royal Australian Navy
R.I.I.A.	--	Royal Institute of International Affairs
R.N.Z.A.F.	--	Royal New Zealand Air Force
S.S.	--	Straits Settlements
S.S.D.A.	--	Secretary of States for Dominion Affairs
S.S.V.F.	--	Straits Settlements Volunteer Force
Y.B.C.A.	--	Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia

EXCHANGE VALUES

June 1948	£1	Australian =	$7	Malayan
Nov. 1949	£1	=	$6.85	
May 1951	£1	=	$7	
Apr. 1953	£1	=	$6.66	
Sept.1954-1960	£1	=	$6.8	

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Introduction:

Very few writers have attempted to write anything about the relations of these two countries despite the fact that very close relations have existed throughout their history. Beside the reason that sources on this are extremely scarce, a more important reason is that Singapore is a comparatively new nation. Singapore attained full independence only on 9 August, 1965; and the history of Singapore before this is somewhat obscure especially to many Australians. This thesis will, however, attempt to reveal the various contacts and relations between these two countries from the early 19th. century, and will place particular emphasis on discussing and analysing the development of economic and military relations. The relations between these two countries can be broadly divided into three periods; before 1900; 1901-41; and 1941-59--before the federation of the Commonwealth of Australia; from the beginning of the Commonwealth of Australia to the eve of the Pacific War; and from the beginning of the Pacific War to the attainment of self-government of Singapore respectively. The thesis will however fo cus upon the last period, which represents the most dynamic and important period of Australia-Singapore relations.

There are some important points to be made clear before the author proceeds with the various chapters. Firstly, Singapore had undergone a few stages of development before 1959; it is therefore necessary to give a brief history of Singapore. Singapore was founded by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. It was incorporated in the Straits Settlements in 1826, which was an administrative unit of the East India Company.

Control over the Settlement passed from the Company to the Indian Government in 1858, and then to the British Government in 1867. The original constituents of the Straits Settlements were Singapore, Malacca and Penang; Christmas Island, Cocos Keeling Islands and Labuan were added later. Prior to the Second World War, Malaya was organised politically into three subdivisions--the Straits Settlements; the Federated Malay States; and the Unfederated Malay States. On 1 April 1946, when the Straits Settlements were dissolved; Malacca and Penang were absorbed into the newly formed Malayan Union, which comprised all of Malaya; Labuan became part of North Borneo; and Singapore, Christmas Island and Cocos Keeling Islands became the Colony of Singapore. In February 1948, the Malayan Union was reorganised into the Federation of Malaya, which became fully independent on 31 August 1957. On 23 November 1955, Cocos Keeling Islands were administered by Australia as a separate territory and on 1 October 1958, Christmas Islands became part of Australia. On 2 June 1959, Singapore obtained self-governing status after a general election won by the People's Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew.

Secondly, due to the historical background of Singapore, there were few or no statistics recorded independently between Australia and Singapore before 1946. The statistics of Singapore were incorporated under Straits Settlements before 1921 and British Malaya after 1921. Where there are no other sources available, these statistics are used in order to discuss Australia-Singapore's relations.

Thirdly, due to the geographical proximity and intimate relationship Singapore had with Malaya, Australia's activities in, and relations with, Malaya are also discussed when they have important bearing on Australia-Singapore relations.

Lastly, due to the fact that Singapore attained self-government only on 2 June 1959 and during the whole period under study Singapore was under the British colonial administration, relations between Australia and Singapore tended to be one-sided and development of relations was almost totally due to Australias initiative.

The thesis mainly based on materials available in Australia. The main sources are from the Commonwealth Archives Office, the Melbourne Archives, the Australian War Memorial, the National Library, the Australian National University Libraries, and various government departmental libraries in Canberra. Some information was, however, obtained through interviews and correspondence.

CHAPTER 1

AUSTRALIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS BEFORE 1900

Singapore sits at the southern tip of the Malayan Peninsula and on a vital nexus between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It was acquired by the British during an era of sharp international competition for economic and political rights in the Far East. The position of Singapore was able to control the main shipping route between Europe and Asia, and dominate strategically, and to a large extent economically, that rich area comprising Malaya and the East Indies. Singapore was thus looked at, by the British, not only as a strategic base to protect her interests in the East, but also as an important trading post to increase her wealth.

Although from the beginning Singapore and Australia shared a common heritage of being British Colonies, there was a great distinction between these two Colonies, and the British experience in Singapore was very different from that in Australia. Australia could be termed a 'settlement colony' where British subjects, culture and society were transplanted in a vast alien land. The British had responsibility to look after and rehabilitate her penal settlements in the early days, and to take full charge of the administration and defence of the Colonies as their economy began to develop. The British colonists had to face great hardships and sacrifices to explore the resources and build up the economy in Australia. Singapore, on the other hand, could be termed an 'exploitation colony'. The British did not settle in Singapore as they settled in Australia. They did not live in Singapore permanently. They

ruled, they traded, and they and a large part of the wealth they helped to create returned to Britain; and more young men came out to become government officials and traders.[1] The settlements in Singapore were drawn largely from China[2] and a lesser amount from India and the Malay Archipelago. The Chinese, Indians and Malays were the ones who strove and toiled to build up the colony under the British administration.

Singapore did not produce or manufacture anything of her own. But by virtue of her superior geographical position; her free port status; and her magnificent deep and safe habour, she sprang up to be the most important trading centre of the East soon after her establishment.[3] The largest and most valuable portion of Singapore's trade was the entrepôt trade. Singapore provided a market-place for the exchange of goods, which were services no less important than the actual physical creation of the goods themselves.[4] It provided a centrally situated, easily accessible and cheap place for goods--both Western and Asian--to be collected and exchanged. In Singapore, there was available a great variety and wide selection of goods which were stored until required. The multifarious small items of the trade in Southeast Asian produce were collected, stored,

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1. Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1968), p. 10.
2. Political unrest and economic deterioration in China during the 19th century forced a large number of Chinese from the South-east coast of China to migrate to Southeast Asia in search of better fortune. Singapore became one of the most popular place for the Chinese migrants.
3. See Hai Ding Chiang, 'A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870-1915', (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1963), p.p. 6-10 for more reasons why Singapore became an important trading centre.
4. Chiang, p. 51; see also E. Szczepanik, 'The Gains of Entrepot Trade', Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 17, December, 1954, p. 771.

graded, processed and bulked for re-export to western countries, while the large consignments of western manufactures were broken up into smaller and more convenient parcels for re-export to various consuming regions in Southeast Asia.[1] The entrepôt trade of Singapore depended largely on the intermediary services provided by a large number of specialised firms, who had close links with other entrepôt countries. As early as 1836, there were twenty mercantile houses in Singapore, most of them British owned. There were also a number of Chinese merchants and a few Arab and American ones, and these were included when the Chamber of Commerce was formed in 1837.[2] A number of European Banks and Insurance Offices also had their headquaters in Singapore.[3]

Singapore's main trading partners were Britain, Europe, China, India, the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula. Siam, Cochin-China, Cambodia and the Philippines also sent their junks and praus to trade in Singapore. In addition Singapore had a small amount of trade with North America, Arabia, Mauritius and Australia.[4] In the early days of the development of the Australian Colonies, convict ships

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1. Chiang, p.p. 51-2; see also 'Malaya and Singapore Commercial Markets', Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 17, October 1954, p.p. 466-8.

2. Helen Hughes, Poh Seng You, Foreign Investment And Industrialisation In Singapore (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969), p. 5; T.J.Newbold, Political And Statistical Account Of British Settlements In The Straits Of Malacca (London: John Murray Press, 1839), vol. 1, p.p. 391-4; C.B.Buckley, An Anecdotal History Of Old Times In Singapore (Singapore: Fraser and Neave Press, 1902), vol. 1, p.p. 313-4.

3. Makepeace, Walter et al. (ed.), One Hundred Years Of Singapore (London: J. Murray Press, 1921), vol. II, p.p. 174-180; Lin Ken Wong, 'A Study of the Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Malayan Branch (JMBRAS), vol. 33, Pt. 4, no. 192, December 1960, p.p. 168-9.

4. Wong, p. 160.

on their way back to Britain used to touch at Singapore to take on loads of cargoes for European markets, Square-rigged vessels from Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide also called at Singapore to purchase a small amount of tea, cigar, dyes, pepper and spices. [1] Table 1 and 2 will give an idea of the number of square-rigged vessels arrived from and departed for Australia, and the proportion compared with various countries between 1829 to 1854:

Table 1

Square-rigged Vessels Arrived From And Departed For Australia

Year	Arrived		Departed		Total	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
1829-30	1	424	3	928	4	1,352
1832-33	9	3,000	3	559	12	3,559
1835-36	6	1,657	2	394	8	2,051
1838-39	30	12,338	nil	nil	30	12,338
1841-42	82	27,684	10	2,655	92	30,339
1844-45	15	2,282	8	1,223	23	3,505
1847-48	23	4,093	27	3,461	50	7,554
1850-51	23	6,923	19	3,573	42	10,496
1853-54	87	33,172	68	21,958	155	55,130

Source: Wong, p. 293.

1. Wong, p. 161.

Table 2

The Proportion of Shipping of Vavrious Countries in the Habour of Singapore: 1829-30 to 1853-54

	1829-30 Tonnage	%	1835-36 Tonnage	%	1841-42 Tonnage	%	1847-48 Tonnage	%	1853-54 Tonnage	%
Great Britain	13,283	4.3	12,806	3.2	32,965	5.3	29,673	4.5	51,550	6.0
Continental Europe	2,722	0.9	2,630	0.6	7,195	1.2	16,948	2.6	13,326	1.6
India	74,650	24.3	104,937	26.0	157,499	25.4	120,722	18.3	117,124	13.6
Malay Archipelago	106,089	34.5	130,787	32.5	177,716	28.6	234,980	35.6	301,655	35.1
China	72,357	23.5	111,920	27.8	160,941	25.9	159,373	24.1	180,899	21.1
Siam	14,604	4.7	13,171	3.3	20,860	3.4	23,511	3.5	34,233	4.0
Cochin-China	10,644	3.5	6,669	1.7	6,745	1.1	29,083	4.4	nil	nil
Australia	1,352	0.4	2,051	0.5	30,339	4.9	7,554	1.1	55,130	6.4
North America	1,179	0.4	2,856	0.7	15,690	2.5	3,851	0.6	23,397	2.7
Other Countries	10,911	3.5	14,921	3.7	10,518	1.7	34,834	5.3	81,032	9.5
Total	307,791	100.0	402,748	100.0	620,468	100.0	660,529	100.0	858,346	100.0

Source: Wong, p. 301.

Until the early 1850s, trade between Australia and Singapore was sporadic and of little significance. Apart from trade, there were virtually no other contacts. This situation could be appreciated if we look back at the history of Australia within this period. For a long period after the first penal settlements were built in Australia, she was involved in the struggle for mere survival. The real development of Australia began with the pastoral industry and export of wool in the early 1820s, and it was not until the mid-1840s that Australian wool began to play a significant part in British manufacturing economy and provide Britain with its largest source of supply. Any disposable resources of Australia for trade were almost totally absorbed by Britain, and any items Australia needed, from the supply of labour and capital to consumer goods, were provided by Britain. [1] Even worst was the fact that Australia was away from any shipping route and her only close contact with Britain was through the irregular arrival and dispatch of sailing vessels. Australia was thus virtually isolated from the rest of the world. The small amount of trade Australia did have with Singapore was confined to goods which the motherland could not supply. It should also be noted that the population of Australia until 31 December 1850 was only 405,356. [2]

Following the discovery of gold in Australia in the 1850s [3], her economy began to boom, and an increasing number

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1. See K. Douglas, 'Transportation and Colonial Income', Historial Studies, no. 3, 1944-49, p.p. 297-312.
2. Encyclopaedia of Australia, vol. 7, p. 189.
3. For a detailed account of the gold discovery, see 'Retrospect of the Australian Gold Discovery', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 and 15-5-1852.

of immigrants, many of whom were men of substance and culture, began to settle in Australia. Australia's economy began to develop in many directions and her trade with foreign countries rose sharply. The increasing importance of the Australian Colonies led to the establishment of a regular steam communication branching off from Singapore in 1852, thereby putting Australia in regular communication with Britain, Europe, India and East Asian countries. [1] The request for this service had been ventilated in both the government and public circles in Australia and Singapore, and also among merchants in Britain, since the 1840s. [2] The Straits Times editorial discussed the extension of this service in 1846 as follows:

> ...Apart from the importance which will result to Singapore by an extension of the present Straits and China line of steamers to the Australian Colonies, the subject is one of so great advantage to our fellow countrymen in the far South that, we should do violence to our own feelings and injustice to the spirit of the age did we not lift up our voices to hail with joy so desirable a boon. The present means of communication from India, the Straits and China, with Australia and New Zealand are so irregular that it not only unfortunately happens that, for six months in a year, no opportunity offers for despatching letters; commercial and domestic intercourse being kept up dependent on chance opportunities via Manila or Mauritius--it, moreover, sometimes happening that our latest intelligence from Sydney is derived from the English journals after the news has performed a circuitous route of 24,000 miles or equal to the circumference of the earth, and yet the direct distance from Singapore to Sydney does not exceed

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1. Before 1852, Singapore already had shipping communication with Britain, Europe, India, East Asia and North America. Singapore wanted only an extension of the chain to Australia to render its shipping communication network complete throughout the world.

2. In 1850, evidence was given at a Parliamentary enquiry in England that it frequently took ten months for the sender of a letter to receive a reply from Australia. See B. Cable, A Hundred Years History Of The P. & O. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson Press, 1937), p.p. 118-32 for information on Australia's request for the opening of this service.

Graph 1

Australia's Total Overseas Trade 1825-1900



> 4,000 miles!
> It is impossible even for a moment to contemplate this measure without being impressed with the number, variety, and magnitude of the advantages which could arise from it. Our empire in Australia contains two millions of souls, and subjects or dependent allies of Great Britain. By the present means of communication, their distance from England is not less than three fourths of the circumference of the globe. By the proposed measure that distance would be reduced in less than one half of its present amount: a virtual change of geographical position would be effected.
> A commerce amounting (exclusive of the Straits trade), to two millions annually, would receive that stimulus which commerce always receives from increased facility of communication. [1]

In 1847, the Legislative Council of New South Wales granted a sum of £500 a month for three years to defray expenses of establishing steam communication between Singapore and Australia. [2] However, the efforts of Australia and Singapore to call upon Britain to open this service did not meet with success until 1852. On 26 February 1852, a tender by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (hereafter P. & O.) for this service was accepted, which was contracted to begin in 1853. [3] On 15 May 1852, the P. & O. sent out their newly built steam vessel Chusan from Southampton for Sydney to inaugurate an experimental service for the purpose of learning about the route. The vessel arrived at Sydney on 3 August 1852 [4] and in October the same year the line between Sydney and Singapore was inaugurated following the arrival of Chusan in Singapore. [5]

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1. Quoted in D. and J. Moore, The First 150 Years Of Singapore (Singapore: Tien Wah Press, 1969), p.p. 254-5.
2. Sydney Morning Herald, 4-8-1852, Cable, p. 118.
3. Cable, p. 119.
4. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 and 4-8-1852, Cable, p.p. 124, 129.
5. C.M.Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, 1826-67 (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), p. 178; Buckley, vol. 2, p. 566.

The P. & O. agreed to undertake the carrying of mails between Singapore and Sydney, one each alternative month, running via King George Sound, Adelaide and Melbourne. The average speed of each vessel throughout the voyage was required to be not less than $8\frac{1}{2}$ knots. [1] The opening of this line brought about great hopes for a flourishing trade between Singapore and the Australian Colonies. These hopes were, however, frustrated when the line was terminated towards the close of 1854. The urgent requirements of the British government for the means of conveying troops to the Black Sea and the Baltic on the outbreak of the Crimean War obliged the P. & O. to discontinue the line from Singapore to Australia. The closure of this line created a large amount of discontent amongst the merchants in England and Singapore connected with trade, and still more with the Australian colonists.

In 1866, regular steam communication was re-established when the Netherland Steam Navigation Company extended its operation from Singapore to Batavia and principal ports in the Dutch East Indies and thence through Torres Straits to Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. [2] In 1869, the P. & O. had four vessels working between Ceylon and Western Australia via Singapore. [3] The establishment of regular steam services aroused the greatest enthusiasm throughout both Australia and Singapore. It was a long delayed triumph for those who

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1. W.S.Lindsay, History Of Merchant Shipping And Ancient Commerce (London, 1876), vol. IV, p.p. 393-5; Sydney Morning Herald, 4-8-1852.

2. Wong, p. 171.

3. G. Bogaars, 'The Effects of the Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore', JMBRAS, vol. 28, no. 169, Pt. 1, March 1955, p. 107, fn. 25.

had fought for years. This line of service undoubtedly paved the way for Australia's flourishing overseas trade.

Another technological advance which was altering the mode of commercial transaction in the world was electric telegraphy. On 31 December 1870, when a submarine cable was successfelly laid from Madras, Singapore was placed in telegraphic communication with India, Europe, Britain and North America. From Singapore, the line branched off to China and Java.[1] The submarine cable which linked Darwin and Singapore via Batavia was completed in November 1871.[2] On 22 August 1872 the construction of a cable line from Darwin to Adelaide was accomplished.[3] These achievements afforded Australia with instantaneous communication with every part of the globe, and revolutionized the method of trade. Telegraphic communication made it possible for direct and immediate contact between buyers and sellers, thereby eliminating uncertainty and reducing risks; goods were able to be bought and sold while they were in transit across the ocean; and orders were able to be transmitted much more quickly. The advent of steam and of telegraphic communication put Australia closer in touch with the world, and was responsible for Australia's increasing overseas trade in the following decades.

Before 1861, there were large shipments of gold from

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1. Wong, p. 172; Chiang, p.p. 68-9; Makepeace, vol. II, p.p. 167-8.
2. Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia (hereafter Y.B.C.A.), no. 1, 1901-07, p.p. 630-1; T.A. Coghlan, A Statistical Account Of The Seven Colonies Of Australasia (Sydney: G.S.Chapman Press, 1891), p.p. 240-1.
3. Y.B.C.A., no. 1, 1901-07, p.p. 630-1.

Australia regularly made to the East, pricipally to Singapore and Ceylon, but the export of gold to these two places greatly diminished in the later period. [1] From 1 May 1862 to 30 April 1863, Singapore's imports from Australia were valued at £32,006. Australia furnished chiefly horses, breadstuffs, coals from the mines of New South Wales and sandalwood fro Western Australia. Exports to Australia were valued at £21,138 and consisted mainly of tea, coffee, sugar, pepper and spices. [2]

It is interesting to note that there were growing numbers of destitute Australians in Singapore before 1863. Many of them were in charge of shipments of horses and were discharged in Singapore where they were unable to find work. The position became so bad that the Secretary of the Straits Settlements had to write to the Australian Colonial Governments and suggest that they warn Australians not to go to Singapore unless they had made pre-arrangement for employment.

After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Singapore increasingly became a coal supply depot for steamers plying between Europe and Far East. While the bulk of the coal supply

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1. Coghlan, p. 35.
2. J. Cameron, Our Tropical Possessions In Malayan India (London: Oxford University Press, 1865), p.p. 181-2, 187-8.
3. Letters from the Secretary to the Government of Straits Settlements to the Secretaries to the Government of Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria, 2-3-1863, Straits Settlements Records, 'V' series, vol. 37, p.p. 52-3.

came from Britain, Australia also supplied a small amount.[1] A comparison of the total amount and value of coal imported from Britain and Australia for the years 1870 to 1879 is illustrated in the following table:

Table 3

A Comparison of Britain and Australia's Supply of Coal to Singapore

Year	Great Britain		Australia		Total	
	Tons	Value	Tons	Value	Tons	Value
1870	56,833	486,727	1,473	8,069	62,835	530,905
1871	82,309	734,078	1,782	10,985	90,038	791,477
1872	109,216	1,036,530	253	1,880	113,885	1,068,225
1873	95,923	1,283,551	10,605	100,185	108,140	1,404,508
1874	230,260	1,429,667	nil	nil	251,720	1,524,339
1875	189,385	949,903	3,591	28,336	193,607	983,445
1876	124,834	1,181,872	5,447	41,357	130,939	1,227,905
1877	197,889	1,717,617	4,679	32,631	203,427	1,757,361
1878	148,993	1,338,211	5,110	36,848	155,788	1,383,079
1879	142,098	1,240,234	9,373	76,129	156,424	1,351,908

Source: Bogaars, p. 142.

The import of coal from Australia fell away in subsequent years and her share of this item passed to Japan and Bengal.[2] Australia's trade with the Straits Settlements[3] after 1886 is shown on Table 4.

Although Australia's trade with Singapore did not ex-

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1. Lindsay, vol. IV, p. 472.
2. Bogaars, p. 107.
3. Since Singapore's trade formed the preponderant proportion of total Straits Settlements trade and the fact that no separate statistics for Singapore are available, statistics for Straits Settlements can be used as rough signposts to understand the trend and fluctuation of trade between Australia and Singapore.

Table 4

Australia's Trade With The Straits Settlements

1886-1900

Year	Import Value £	Australia's Total Import £	%	Export Value £	Australia's Total Export £	%	Total Trade £	Australia's Total Trade £	%	Excess of Imports(-) or Exports(+)
1886	79,323	34,178,743	0.23	17,120	21,700,383	0.07	96,352	55,879,126	0.17	- 62,112
1887	98,897	29,572,497	0.33	90,475	23,420,876	0.38	189,372	52,993,373	0.35	- 8,422
1888	110,696	36,880,967	0.30	78,976	28,900,008	0.27	189,672	65,780,975	0.28	- 31,720
1889	115,997	37,577,218	0.30	92,740	29,522,999	0.31	208,737	67,100,217	0.31	- 23,257
1890	129,365	35,168,171	0.36	124,283	29,321,331	0.42	253,648	64,489,502	0.39	- 5,082
1891	178,501	37,711,053	0.47	151,143	36,042,550	0.41	329,644	73,753,603	0.44	- 27,358
1892	127,218	30.107,339	0.42	183,680	33,370,284	0.55	310,898	63,477,623	0.48	+ 56,462
1893	109,559	23,765,085	0.46	92,647	33,225,265	0.27	202,206	56,990,350	0.35	- 16,912
1894	95,869	21,897,114	0.43	81,571	32,131,113	0.25	177,440	54,028,227	0.32	- 14,298
1895	122,368	23,195,101	0.52	74,557	33,644,332	0.22	196,925	56,839,433	0.34	- 47,811
1896	235,271	29,658,197	0.79	92,745	32,963,522	0.28	328,016	62,621,719	0.52	-142,526
1897	230,386	31,958,126	0.72	136,482	37,782,593	0.36	366,868	69,740,719	0.52	- 93,904
1898	239,187	31,481,144	0.75	79,438	40,164,600	0.19	318,625	71,645,750	0.44	-159,749
1899	249,558	34,329,687	0.72	88,813	48,599,033	0.18	338,371	82,645,720	0.40	-160,745
1900	365,397	41,388,030	0.80	100,451	45,956,883	0.21	465,848	87,344,912	0.53	-264,946

Source: Compiled and calculated from : Australia's Overseas Trade Bulletin, no. 1, 1903, Coghlan, 1891, Y.B.C.A., no. 1, 1901-07.

Graph 2

Australia's Trade With The Straits Settlements
1886-1900



ceed £1 million in value and 1% of the total trade of Australia towards the close of the 19th century, the items imported from and exported to Singapore had become more consistent. The principal items imported by Australia were tapioca, pepper and spices, apparel and textiles, grain rice, bags and sacks, machines and machinery. The principal items exported to Singapore were soap, butter, cheese, preserved meat, coal, sandalwood, hay and chaff, and biscuits. [1] It should be noted from Table 4 that the balance of trade was in favour of the Straits Settlements, and trade between the two colonies increased considerably in the later part of the century.

Towards the close of the 19th century, Australia also entered the tin and gold mining industries in Malaya. In 1883, Australia formed the Sandhurst Tin Mining Company Limited and the Melbourne Tin Mining Company Limited. But by 1884 both companies had failed, despite official encouragement and favourable treatment by government. The one really successful Australian venture in Malaya was the Australian Gold Mining Company established at Raub in 1889. Raub survived as the main gold mining concern in the Malay States, accounting for three-quarters or more of Malayan gold production. The Australian Company in Raub was closed down only in 1962 when it became uneconomical. [2]

If we look at the relations between Australia and Singapore from the beginning, we may notice that the origin of

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1. See Australia Overseas Trade Bulletin, no. 1, 1903, p.p. 594-5 for more particulars.
2. J. Kennedy, A History Of Malaya (London: St. Martin Press, 1970), p. 190.

contacts was due mainly to two facts: that Singapore was, like Australia, a British Colony, and that Singapore lay at a natural geographical position which Australia's close links with Britain and Europe could not by-pass. As Singapore developed into a centre of a network of communications that reached out all over the world, Australia came in closer touch with her. Singapore provided the Australian Colonies with her superb trading facilities and experience, which helped greatly in promoting Australia's overseas trade. Although the trade with Singapore was not in great volume or value, this could be understood since Britain and the European markets had traditionally dominated Australia's trading outlook. Under the safe shield of the mighty Royal Navy in the 19th century, Australian Colonies were content to develop their country in peace and stayed away from any international affairs as much as possible. If they paid any attention to events outside their continent, they paid it to European events. They felt a sense of foreign danger only if it threatened Great Britain. As regards Asia generally, Australia had neither sympathy nor particular hostility; they wanted no Asian immigrants, goods or culture; they wanted to be left alone.[1] If Australia-Singapore relations are considered against this background, it may be noticed that Singapore was the closest in contact with the Australian Colonies amongst all Asian countries in the 19th century.

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1. See Z. Cowen, 'Australian Traditional Attitudes' in J. Jordens (ed.), The Generation Gap And Australia-Asian Relations (Melbourne, 1969), p.p. 7-14; W. Levi, Australia's Outlook On Asia (London: Angus and Robertson Press, 1958), p.p. 1-28.

CHAPTER 2

AUSTRALIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS 1901-41

This chapter deals with Australia-Singapore relations from the beginning of the Commonwealth of Australia to the eve of the Pacific War. In the pre-Pacific War period, relations between Australia and Singapore were linked mainly by trade and defence. This period saw a rapid expansion of Australia's economy and change in the world's economic and political situation. These factors had a catalytic effect on the development of Australia-Singapore relations. In trade, efforts were made by the Australian government, although rather haphazardly, to increase its exports to Singapore. In defence, Australia was 'forced' into accepting Singapore as the pivot of her defence after it was decided to build a naval base in Singapore.

I. Trade Relations:

Development of Australia-Singapore Trade Relations

Trade between Australia and Singapore-Malaya[1] increased substantially in absolute value and as a proportion of Australia's total trade. In 1911, Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya exceeded £1 million in value and 1% of Australia's total exports for the first time. Although the value of Australia's exports fell below £1 million after 1912, due to the unstable economic condition prior to and during the first world war, the export value exceeded £1 million again in 1918 and did not fall below that point again until 1941-42, except for the years 1930-32 during the great depression.[2] Austra-

1. Australia's trade with Singapore was included in the Straits Settlements (S.S.) up to 1920 and included in British Malaya from 1921 to 1945. No statistics recorded independently on Singapore is available. As Singapore composed in average more than 70% of S.S. and British Malaya's trade, the statistics on S.S. and British Malaya are used to understand the trend and fluctuation of trade and composition of imports and exports between Australia and Singapore.

2. See Tables 2 and 3.

Table 1

Balance of Trade between Australia and Singapore-Malaya

Year	Imports From Singapore	Exports To Singapore	Excess of Exports (+) or Imports (-)
	A£	A£	A£
1901	320,584	113,528	- 207,056
1902	116,187	118,674	+ 2,487
1903	116,028	107,657	- 8,371
1904	169,784	149,658	- 20,126
1905	104,104	190,295	+ 86,191
1906	136,849	481,777	+ 344,928
1907	176,550	559,402	+ 382,852
1908	158,603	575,911	+ 417,308
1909	160,360	444,611	+ 284,251
1910	164,792	544,815	+ 380,023
1911	189,343	1,205,258	+1,015,915
1912	174,911	1,017,335	+ 842,424
1913	256,457	958,761	+ 702,304
1914-15	190,721	541,714	+ 350,993
1915-16	265,657	536,340	+ 270,683
1916-17	201,132	744,800	+ 543,668
1917-18	475,269	882,913	+ 407,664
1918-19	339,162	1,563,056	+1,223,894
1919-20	354,179	6,216,398	+5,862,219
1920-21	284,886	2,121,090	+1,836,204
1921-22	571,544	1,876,648	+1,305,104
1922-23	272,759	1,343,029	+1,070,270
1923-24	494,930	1,549,220	+1,054,290
1924-25	612,314	1,528,303	+ 915,989
1925-26	1,701,508	2,131,211	+ 429,703
1926-27	2,025,757	1,920,956	- 104,801
1927-28	1,804,602	2,027,724	+ 223,122
1928-29	1,133,963	1,978,084	+ 844,121
1929-30	812,513	1,399,321	+ 586,808
1930-31	274,894	818,917	+ 544,023
1931-32	276,654	919,827	+ 643,173
1932-33	271,639	962,060	+ 690,421
1933-34	328,720	1,015,315	+ 686,595
1934-35	563,246	1,315,822	+ 752,576
1935-36	489,484	1,263,526	+ 774,042
1936-37	853,991	1,727,956	+ 873,965
1937-38	1,023,602	2,063,740	+1,040,138
1938-39	902,419	1,911,207	+1,008,788
1939-40	1,530,402	2,941,691	+1,411,289
1940-41	2,117,279	4,158,474	+2,041,195
1941-42	1,538,017	3,966,657	+2,428,640

Note: 1. Before 1921-22 values were recorded under Straits Settlements, from 1921-22 onwards, values were recorded under British Malaya.
2. Values of import were value of goods which were produce or manufactured by S.S. or British Malaya.

Source:
Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1903-41.
Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1901-41

lia's exports to Singapore-Malaya reached a record of more than £6 million in value and 4.5% of Australia's total exports in 1919-20. [1] However, it must be pointed out that the exports in that year included approximately £3.5 million of gold specie, which formed more than 55% of the total exports. [2] Australia's imports from Singapore-Malaya did not exceed £1 million until 1925-26, and that was mainly due to the import of more than £1 million of rubber and rubber manufactures. Australia's imports dropped sharply during the great depression years and did not exceed £1 million until 1937-38. [3] Australia's highest imports from Singapore-Malaya were recorded in 1940-41 when the value was £2.12 million, which was 1.9% of Australia's total imports. [4]

The first Australian commercial agency to be established in the East was in December 1903 when J.B. Suttor was appointed as New South Wales Commercial Commissioner in the East. His headquarters were established in Kobe, Japan. [5] Suttor retained his position until 30 June 1922. [6] Although his sphere of operation also included the Straits Settlements and British Malaya, [7], his main influence was in Japan. Only very occasionally did he report on trade matters about the

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1. See Tables 3 and 4.
2. Ibid.
3. See Tables 2 and 5.
4. See Table 2.
5. Letters from Suttor to the Prime Minister dated 15-3-1922 and 30-3-1922, Trade Representation Abroad--J.B.Suttor, CRS A457, Item no. 306/5/14.
6. Letter from Premier of N.S.W. to Prime Minister, 16-3-1922, Commercial Agent N.S.W. In The East 1922-23, CRS A457, Item no. X306/3, Suttor's service was terminated because the N.S.W. Premier felt that the appointment of Commercial Commissioner should be a Federal responsibilty.
7. Suttor's sphere of operation also included Korea, Manchuria, Eastern Siberia, Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Hong

Table 2

Australia's Trade With Singapore-Malaya 1901-1941

Year	Import From Singapore £	Australia's Total Import £	%	Export To Singapore £	Australia's Total Export £	%	Total Trade With Singapore £	Australia's Total Trade £	%
1901	320,584	42,433,011	0.75	113,528	49,696,172	0.23	434,112	92,130,183	0.47
1902	116,187	40,675,950	0.29	118,674	43,915,087	0.27	234,861	84,591,037	0.28
1903	116,028	37,811,471	0.30	107,657	48,250,112	0.22	223,685	86,061,583	0.26
1904	169,784	37,020,842	0.45	149,658	57,485,915	0.26	319,442	94,506,757	0.34
1905	104,104	38,346,731	0.27	190,295	56,841,035	0.33	294,399	95,187,766	0.31
1906	136,849	44,744,912	0.31	481,777	69,737,763	0.69	618,626	114,482,675	0.54
1907	176,550	51,809,033	0.34	559,402	72,824,247	0.77	735,952	124,633,280	0.59
1910	164,792	60,014,351	0.28	544,815	74,491,150	0.73	709,607	134,505,501	0.53
1911	189,343	66,967,488	0.28	1,205,258	79,482,258	1.52	1,394,601	146,449,746	0.95
1912	174,911	78,158,600	0.22	1,017,335	79,096,090	1.28	1,192,246	157,254,690	0.76
1913	256,457	79,749,653	0.32	958,761	78,571,769	1.22	1,215,218	158,321,422	0.77
1914-15	190,721	64,431,837	0.30	541,714	60,592,576	0.89	732,435	125,024,413	0.59
1915-16	265,657	77,744,566	0.34	536,340	74,778,321	0.72	801,997	152,522,887	0.53
1916-17	201,132	76,228,679	0.26	744,800	97,955,482	0.76	945,932	174,184,161	0.54
1917-18	475,269	62,334,449	0.76	882,913	75,035,222	1.18	1,358,182	137,369,671	0.99
1918-19	339,162	102,335,159	0.33	1,563,056	113,963,976	1.37	1,902,218	216,299,135	0.88
1919-20	354,179	98,974,292	0.36	6,216,398	149,823,509	4.15	6,570,577	248,797,801	2.64
1920-21	284,886	163,801,826	0.17	2,121,090	132,158,912	1.61	2,405,976	295,960,738	0.81
1921-22	571,544	103,066,436	0.55	1,876,648	127,846,535	1.47	2,448,192	230,912,971	1.06
1922-23	272,759	131,757,835	0.21	1,343,029	117,870,147	1.14	1,615,788	249,627,982	0.65
1923-24	494,930	140,618,293	0.35	1,549,220	119,487,164	1.30	2,044,150	260,105,457	0.79
1924-25	612,314	157,143,296	0.39	1,528,303	161,311,440	0.94	2,140,617	318,454,736	0.67
1925-26	1,701,508	151,638,178	1.12	2,131,211	146,209,387	1.45	3,832,719	297,847,565	1.29
1926-27	2,025,757	164,716,594	1.23	1,920,956	144,084,597	1.33	3,946,713	308,801,191	1.28
1927-28	1,804,602	147,944,970	1.22	2,027,724	141,205,941	1.44	3,832,326	289,150,911	1.33
1928-29	1,133,963	143,647,881	0.79	1,978,084	141,632,589	1.40	3,112,047	285,280,470	1.09
1929-30	812,513	131,081,320	0.62	1,399,321	125,127,148	1.12	2,211,834	256,208,468	0.86
1930-31	274,894	60,959,633	0.45	818,917	102,103,336	0.80	1,093,811	163,062,969	0.67
1931-32	276,654	44,712,868	0.62	919,827	109,034,065	0.84	1,196,481	153,746,933	0.78
1932-33	271,639	58,013,860	0.47	962,060	121,264,109	0.79	1,233,699	179,277,969	0.69
1933-34	328,720	60,712,926	0.54	1,015,315	124,003,402	0.82	1,344,035	184,716,328	0.73
1934-35	563,246	74,119,496	0.75	1,315,822	113,523,334	1.16	1,879,068	187,642,830	1.00
1935-36	489,484	85,252,458	0.57	1,263,526	136,963,887	0.92	1,753,010	222,216,345	0.79
1936-37	853,991	92,640,462	0.92	1,727,956	162,376,784	1.06	2,581,947	255,017,246	1.01
1937-38	1,023,602	113,975,060	0.89	2,063,740	157,580,120	1.31	3,087,342	271,555,180	1.14
1938-39	902,419	102,156,352	0.88	1,911,207	140,496,312	1.36	2,813,626	242,652,664	1.16
1939-40	1,530,402	119,796,175	1.27	2,941,691	170,433,058	1.73	4,472,093	290,229,233	1.54
1940-41	2,117,279	111,917,514	1.89	4,158,474	157,163,867	2.65	6,275,753	269,081,381	2.33
1941-42	1,538,017	152,004,900	1.01	3,966,657	168,977,284	2.35	5,504,674	320,982,184	1.71

Source: Compiled and calculated from: Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1903-42, Quarterly Summary Of Australian Statistics, 1912-41, Y.B.C.A., 1901-1942.

Malayan area [1]; thus he did not contribute much in the improving of Australia's trade relation with Singapore-Malaya.

Australian government interest in the Malayan region was first shown in 1906 when Senator Staniforth Smith was appointed in February that year as a Commissioner to report on government and legislation; administration; economic conditions; development; and plantation industries of the Federated Malay States and Java [2]. Senator Smith spent five weeks in the Federated Malay States and Singapore and on his return made a detailed and extensive report to the Australian Senate. [3] His report was to form the basis of a developmental policy in Papua [4], which was a new possession acquired by Australia. The report did not, however, create any impact on Australia's trade with Singapore-Malaya. Before 1917, with the exception of one or two progressive and large firms, neither the Australian government nor manufacturers and merchants had paid much attention to trade matters in the Malayan area.

During the first world war, Australia's trade with European countries were hampered for the first time and the government's attention was at once turned to the more peace-

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7. Kong, Siam, Burma, India, Ceylon, Dutch East Indies, Borneo and the Philippines; see letters from Suttor to the Prime Minister, 15-3-1932 and 30-3-1922, Trade Representation Abroad--J.B.Suttor, op. cit.

1. See Report by Suttor on Trade with the East, Ibid.
2. Senator S. Smith's Report on The Federated Malay States and Java, Parliamentary Papers, vol. II, 1906, p. 1161.
3. See Senator Smith's Report, Ibid., pp. 1157-1230 for detail.
4. Ibid., pp. 1161, 1219.

ful neighbouring countries. Australia's eagerness to increase her trade in the Malayan region was best reflected by the appointment of Senator James Joseph Long, on 7 February 1917,[1] as a Commissioner to inquire into and report upon matters of trade between Australia and Java, the East Indies, Singapore and the Straits Settlements and particularly in reference to --(a) existing conditions of such trade; (b) prospects of development; (c) methods of improving shipping facilities with a view to the opening up of new markets for Australian produce; (d) trade matters generally.[2] In Singapore, Senator Long took the opportunity to meet government officials and prominent businessmen and discussed trade matters in pursuance of the commission.

Senator Long's report, which was tabled in in Senate on 15 September 1917, had a great influence on Australia's subsequent trading activities. In his report, he asserted that the trade carried from Australia to the Straits Settlements 'is but a very small proportion of the possible'. He added

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1. W.M. Hughes, Labour Prime Minister from 27-10-1915 to 9-2-1923, 16-8-1917, C.P.D. (Senate), vol. 82, p. 1150.
2. Senator Long's Report on Java, the East Indies, Singapore and the Straits Settlements, Parliamentary Papers, vol. V, 1917-19, p. 1069; see also the Governor General's letter to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore, 7-2-1917, CRS CP78/22, 1917/95; Senator Long's Mission was of a very secret nature; see The Age (Melbourne), 'Senator Long's Disppearance; The Mystery Unveilded; A Secret Commission', 17-8-1917; only the Minister for Defence Senator Pearce and the Prime Minister seemed to know the truth of the Mission, replying to questions put to them in the Senate in this aspect, Senator Pearce on 22-8-1917 said: 'the Prime Minister and myself were anxious to obtain certain information which we had been unable to secure through the ordinary channels', C.P.D. (Senate), vol. 82, p. 1252; Hughes on the same date said: 'reasons of state', Ibid., p. 1301; quite apparently the mission was also to look into defence problem for the government.

that 'if Australian merchants could only make an attempt to develop the existing small and totally inadequate trade connextion, I am confident that the bulk of Straits Settlements' trade awaits them'. He also pointed out that businessmen in Singapore had complained of the absence of Australian trade and business literature, and the difficulty they had experienced in obtaining addresses of Australian merchants, Chamber of Commerce publications, catalogues, price lists, etc. He singled out foodstuffs and fresh fruits as the items which could be increased in great volume to the Straits Settlements. [1]

In order to encourage existing trade relations and bring about an expansion of the volume of trade between Australia and the Straits Settlements, Senator Long made the following recommendations:-(a) greater activity on the part of Australian merchants and manufacturers; (b) provision of additional cold storage facilities in Australian enterprise; (c) establishment of a commercial agency; and (d) increased shipping facilities, equipped with adequate refrigerating space. [2] These recommendations later served as the guidelines of the Australian government's trading policy in the Malayan area as well as other Asian countries.

After Senator Long's report was published, greater activity in securing the Malayan trade was shown in Australia than during any previous period. There was a marked increase in the export of flour, milk and cream, butter, frozen meats,

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1. See Senator Long's Report, p.p. 1074-6, 1079.
2. Ibid., p. 1080.

fresh fruits, machines and machinery to Singapore-Malaya. [1]

In November 1921 when no response was made by the Australian government to an invitation given by the Governor of the Straits Settlements to participate at a Trade Exhibition in Singapore [2], an article appeared in the Melbourne Herald urging the government that 'if Australia is not to lose its chance for a useful display at Singapore, prompt action will have to be taken'. [3] This reflected the public's concern during this period over the improvement of trade relations between Australia and the Malayan area. In fact the article did set the government to work. The Prime Minister and the Premier of Western Australia strongly supported Australia's participation and it was decided in January 1922 that Australia would take part. [4]

The Trade Exhibition was held at the Raffles Reclamation Ground from 31 March to 8 April 1922. [5] America, Japan, France, Netherland and China were among the participating countries, and the scope of the exhibition included forestry, agriculture, minerals, commerce, arts and crafts. [6] E.T.

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1. See Tables 3 and 4.
2. The Governor's invitation was contained in a letter from British Trade Commissioner in Melbourne to the Prime Minister, 2-11-1921, Singapore Exhibition 1922, CRS A457, Item no. E116/3. The Exhibition was organised in honour of a visit by the Prince of Wales.
3. Melbourne Herald, 29-11-1921.
4. See Conference between Commonwealth and State Ministers, January 1922, p.p. 28-58, Singapore Exhibition 1922, op. cit.
5. Letter from British Trade Commissioner in Melbourne to the Prime Minister, 2-11-1921, loc. cit.
6. Ibid.

Sheaf [1] was responsible for organising Australia's Exhibit and A. Macartney, Secretary to the Council of Industrial Development, Perth, was appointed as Australia's official representative at the Exhibition. [2]

This was the first time Australia had ever participated in a trade exhibition in Eastern countries. Australia's participation provided Singapore's businessmen with the first opportunity to establish direct contact with its manufacturers, merchants and business firms, and to clarify many uncertainties. These in no small way contributed to the trade relations of the two countries.

On 18 January 1922 E.T. Sheaf was appointed as Australian Trade Commissioner in the East with headquarters at Singapore. [3] This marked a great step forward in Australia-Singapore trade relation. Sheaf was offered a three years engagement and the cost of establishing this service was shared four-fifths by the states and one-fifth by the Federal Government. [4]

The headquarters in Singapore served the Straits Settlements, the Malay States, Siam, the Netherland East Indies and North Borneo [5], and its main functions were:-(a) the collection of trade information such as oriental trading customs,

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1. E.T. Sheaf was Australia's first Trade Commissioner in the East.
2. Memorundum from Minister for Trade and Customs to the Secretary, Prime Minister Department, 24-1-1922, Singapore Exhibition 1922, op. cit.
3. Conference between Commonwealth and State Ministers, 18-1-1922, p. 58, Appointment of E.T.Sheaf, CRS A458, Item no. G510/2/143.
4. Ibid.,see also Rogers, 29-6-1922, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 99, p.p. 45-6.
5. Memorandum Re--Australian Trade Commissioner Service In The East, by E.T.Sheaf, 10-2-1922, Appointment of E.T. Sheaf, op. cit.

new markets, goods in demand, advertising mediums, transport etc.; (b) propaganda in the East designed to create a demand for Australian goods; and (c) propaganda among Australian merchants and manufacturers designed to rouse their interest in the markets of the East. [1]

A Resident Commissioner was posted in Singapore while Sheaf engaged himself from one country to another, covering almost every Asian country. [2] By working in such a wide area where there were different languages, governments, laws, administrations, customs and cultures, the efficiency of his service was destined to fail. As early as July 1923, The Melbourne Age had commented that 'there is no evidence that Australian exports to Singapore and Dutch Indies have increased since he [Sheaf] assumed office, or that any more active inquiries for Australian goods have come from that quarter...' [3] His service and the offices in Singapore were finally terminated and closed on 28 February 1925. [4]

The failure of Sheaf's service was an example of the haphazardness of the Australian government's trade promotion policy in the East during the early period. At the outset Sheaf was told 'to discover the simplest and--without sacrificing efficiency--the least costly manner of establishing propaganda machinery in the East'. [5] The very little spent

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1. Memorandum from Sheaf to A.S.Rogers, Minister for Trade and Customs, 10-2-1922, Ibid.
2. See Addresses of Trade Commissioner In The East 1922, CRS A457, Item no. R306/3.
3. The Age (Melbourne), 26-7-1923.
4. Circular from the Prime Minister to State Premiers, 19-2-1925, Appointment of E.T.Sheaf, op. cit., see also The Age, 9-12-1924, Melbourne Herald, 18-12-1924.
5. See letter from Sheaf to J.B.Lawson, Premier of Victoria, 1-12-1921, Appointment of E.T. Sheaf, loc. cit.

was expected by the government to bring a boom of Australia's trade in the East. Such efforts could only end up in failure.

The failure of Australia's Trade Commissioner Service in the East could not be attributed to the inability of Sheaf. [1] In fact he had made a very useful contribution to the Singapore business community by organizing, at very short notice [2], an exhibition for Australia at the 1922 Singapore Trade Exhibition. During his term of service, he had also familiarised the Malayan people with Australia and its products by carrying out numerous press activities and distributing pictures of Australia and various trade materials. To Australia, he had made a valuable contribution especially to commercial enterprises in Western Australia by regularly forwarding useful first hand trade information, which helped to build up its trade to Singapore-Malaya. The Premier of Western Australia expressed great disappointment in the press over the termination of Sheaf's service. [3]

During the first year of the establishment of a commercial agency in Singapore, an Australian manufacturing company called Singapore Hume Pipe Company Limited was formed to operate the Hume processes in Singapore-Malaya. [4] The parent

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1. Sheaf was a very successful senior executive of the Kodak Company, one of the largest firm in Australia, before he took up the appointment of Trade Commissioner. He had twelve years experience working in almost every Asian countries; see Rogers, 29-6-1922, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 99, p.p. 45-6, and Conference between Commonwealth and State Ministers, 18-1-1922, op. cit.
2. Sheaf had only nine weeks to organise an Australian Exhibit at the Singapore Trade Exhibition.
3. See letter from P. Collier, Premier of Western Australia to the Prime Minister, 16-12-1924, Appointment of E.T.Sheaf, op. cit.; Argus (Melbourne), 18-12-1924.
4. Historical Retrospect, Report of 35th. Annual Meeting of Shareholders held at (Hume) Company's registered office, Kinnean House, Melbourne on 4-10-1955.

company Hume Pipe Company (Australia) Limited was incorporated in Victoria in August 1920. They were the original manufacturer of the centrifugally spun reinforced concrete pipe which was a revolutionary method of manufacturing concrete pipe on account of its wire reinforcement, density, greater strength and lighter weight which enabled them to be used for a much greater variety of purposes. [1]

High transport costs ensured the Singapore Hume Pipe Company a measure of local monopoly, and it later added asbestos cement board, which they did not manufacture in Australia, to take advantage of the Singapore and Malayan markets.[2] Hume carried on a prosperous business in Singapore, and during the years 1923 to 1939 other plants were formed in Manila, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Rangoon, as well as Malayan branches in Petaling and Prai. [3] The company in Singapore was renamed Hume Industries (Far East) Limited in 1938. [4] Although Hume was forced to close down its business during the Japanese occupation in February 1942, the company was re-opened and expanded after the war. [5]

Hume was the first Australian manufacturing company ever to establish a subsidiary in Singapore and it was among the largest and most successful firms operating in Singapore. The establishment of this firm resulted in the direct sale of

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1. Ibid.
2. Hughes, Foreign Investment And Industrialisation In Singapore, p. 63.
3. Ian Shannon, 'Australian Non-Governmental Investment In Asia', Australia's Neighbours, 3rd. series, July-August, 1961, p.p. 119-20.
4. Singh Bal, Param Ajeet, 'Economic Relations Between Australia and Malaya, 1946-60', (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 1963), p. 214.
5. Historical Retrospect, op. cit.

Australian manufactured goods in Singapore-Malaya. This coupled with the cheap labour cost in Singapore, allowed the company to make huge profits. The development of the firm after the war and its economic significance to Singapore will be discussed in Chapter 4.

After the termination of Sheaf's service, Australia mainly relied on the British Trade Commissioner in Singapore for trade information and assistance in other trade matters. Before the depression years, Australia enjoyed a very favourable trade with Singapore-Malaya, and her primary products especially flour, milk and cream, butter, frozen meats and fresh fruits had established a firm market in the area.

During the world economic slump there was a drop in Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya. [1] Immediately after the depression years Australia began to take a more positive interest in enlarging her exports to Singapore-Malaya. This was mainly due to the introduction of the Imperial Preference system at the conclusion of the Ottawa Agreement in 1932, which provided for tariff concession between Australia and Singapore-Malaya [2], the effects of the depression upon the country's economy, and trade restrictions imposed by European countries upon her goods. [3] In 1933 the Minister for Customs convened a conference on Eastern trade which urged the government that a Trade Delegation be dispatched to the East at an early date in order to promote Australia's

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1. See Table 3.
2. See Commonwealth of Australia: United Kingdom and Australia Trade Agreement no. 57 of 1932, 20-8-1932 (Canberra: Government Printer, 1932), Schdule E and G for more details about the system.
3. D.F.Nicholson, Australia's Trade Relations (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire Press, 1955), p. 6.

trade in the area. [1] As a result a Trade Delegation was dispatched on the Ship S.S. Nieuw Holland to the Straits Settlements and other Eastern countries to display Australian goods and to gather first hand information. [2]

Since 1933 there was also an increase in freight and cold storage accommodation in ships plying between Australia and Singapore and this enabled shipment of a large volume of perishable fruits and foodstuffs from Australia to Singapore. [3] In 1933, Australia also began to enter the wine markets in Singapore and Malaya. [4] This led to a sharp increase in the export of spirituous and other alcoholic liquors to Singapore-Malaya. Australia was especially successful in the sale of brandy; by 1937-38 Singapore-Malaya had become Australia's best export market for brandy. [5]

In 1934, J.G.Latham--Australia's Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-General, Minister for External Affairs and Industy--led a goodwill mission to the Dutch East Indies, Singapore and other Asian countries. [6] This was the first mission of a diplomatic character Australia had sent overseas. Although it was emphasized that the purpose of the mission

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1. J.G.Crawford, 'The Development Of Trade With Netherlands India And British Malaya', in I. Clunnies Ross (ed.), Australia And The Far East (Melbourne: Halstead Printing Co., 1935), p. 235.
2. Singh Bal, p. 24.
3. Crawford, p. 235; see also Tables 5 and 6.
4. See Sale of Australian Wines, CRS A981, Item no. Commercial Relations 21.
5. Report by Australian Trade Commissioners, Parliamentary Papers, vol. II, 1937-40, p. 895.
6. The party consisted of Latham's wife and daughter Freda; E.E.Longfield Lloyd as Adviser; A.C. Moore as Information Officer; H.A.Standish as Secretary; M.M. Grosvenor as Stenographer; see Latham's Report on The Australian Eastern Mission 1934, Parliamentary Papers, vol. IV, 1932-34, p. 440.

was to foster good will, it in fact also look for Australia's trading prospects in the area, and certain aspect of the defence problem. [1]

The significance of this mission in the improvement of trade relations between Australia and Singapore-Malaya was that it emphasized the need to establish Trade Commissioners in various Eastern countries. The mission recommended that a Trade Commissioner be posted in Batavia. As for Singapore, after a careful survey and consultation with official representatives and business executives, it was suggested that the British Trade Commissioner at Singapore be paid to act for Australia. [2] The result was a Trade Commissioner, C.E. Critchley, being appointed to Batavia in June 1935; [3] he also looked after Australia's trade interests in Singapore-Malaya. [4] Critchley made a valuable contribution to the increase of Australian brandy and sheep to Singapore-Malaya. He also made an intensive butter advertising campaign in Singapore and Malaya during his term in office. Critchley's appointment had also stimulated greater Australian business interest in the Malayan region. [5]

One great advance in communications between Australia and Singapore during the 1930s was the advent of civil avia-

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1. See Courier Mail (Brisbane), 15-3-1934, Star (Melbourne), The Herald (Melbourne), The Age (Melbourne), 17-3-1934, Latham's Confidential Report July 1934, Secret Report To The Prime Minister 3-7-1934, CRS A981, Far East 5 Pt. II; the defence aspect will be discussed at p.p. 53-4.
2. See Latham's Confidential Report 1934, Ibid.
3. Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia (Y.B.C.A.), no. 29, 1936, p. 247.
4. See Report by Australian Trade Commissioners, op. cit., p.p. 895-7.
5. Ibid.

Graph 1

Australia's Trade With Singapore-Malaya 1901-41



tion. Air communication between Australia and Singapore was formally established when Qantas Empire Airways was awarded the Brisbane-Darwin-Singapore service in April 1934. [1] The service was operated with four engined landplanes of the D. H. 86 twelve-seater type with a cruising speed of 145 m.p. h..[2] From Singapore, Australia was air linked with London via Rangoon, Calcutta and Karachi. The service between Australia and Singapore was on a weekly, in each direction, basis. [3]

The Australia-Singapore air service was established to carry mails and essential goods and passengers. [4] This service permitted speedy and easy communication between Australia and Singapore, and was an important factor in the development of Australia's trade relations with Singapore. The service to Singapore was one of Qantas's earliest extensions to foreign countries. The service was terminated during the Japanese invasion of Malaya but was quickly re-opened in April 1946. [5]

Composition of Australia's Exports to and Imports from Singapore-Malaya

An examination of the composition of Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya reveals that from 1904 to 1910, and 1912 to 1916-17 tin ores were the leading single item of

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1. Hudson Fysh, Qantas Rising (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1965), p.p. 261-3; Cablegram from the Prime Minister to the British Consular General, Batavia, 4-5-1934, CRS A981, Item no. Aviation 51.
2. Cablegram from the Prime Minister to the British Consular General, Batavia, 4-5-1934, Ibid.
3. England-Australia Civil Air Transport Service, report presented by the Secretary of State for Air to the Parliament, CMD 4315, May 1933, CRS A981, Aviation 51.
4. There were also some military significance in the establishment of this service, see p. 54.

Table 3: Australia's Exports to Singapore-Malaya 1901-40 — by Value

Year	Foodstuffs of Aminal Origin					Foodstuffs of Vegetable Origin			Spirituous & Alcoholic Liquors	Living Animal		Sandalwood	Lard and Refined Animal Fats	Coal	Tin Ores	Gold-Specie	Leather & Leather Manufactures	Machines & Machinery	Drugs & Chemicals	Soap	Total Exports
	Butter	Bacon & Hams	Preserved by Cold Process: Beef	Preserved by Cold Process: Lamb & Mutton	Milk & Cream	Hay & Chaff	Flour	Preserved & Fresh Fruits		Horses	Sheep										
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1901	9,863	—	—	—	—	1,300	13,363	—	—	15,513	2,160	15,341	—	26,611	4,111	121	—	7,248	—	2,362	113,528
1902	7,210	—	—	—	—	2,133	3,985	—	—	7,530	2,358	12,119	—	27,521	11,726	300	—	1,625	—	1,490	118,674
1903	9,120	—	—	—	—	1,841	918	—	—	8,618	84	6,727	—	31,969	27,352	406	—	497	—	2,171	107,657
1904	7,842	—	—	—	—	2,304	6,770	—	—	11,195	1,533	2,264	—	13,961	79,345	—	—	2,136	—	4,307	149,658
1905	10,303	354	7,553	4,514	—	1,671	47,203	569	339	15,107	1,320	4,479	—	34,775	38,466	—	—	1,552	1,212	3,598	190,295
1906	11,323	725	8,080	2,579	—	1,620	130,689	490	312	18,022	2,022	3,721	—	96,171	91,743	80,055	—	7,570	877	3,585	481,777
1907	25,648	907	11,515	5,711	—	2,785	145,401	1,146	816	26,952	949	2,542	—	66,940	187,702	10,000	—	6,958	988	3,353	559,402
1908	17,344	724	9,820	5,261	—	2,145	52,518	1,027	129	15,491	56	589	—	111,770	205,114	—	—	10,202	406	4,296	575,911
1909	20,536	801	11,899	5,488	—	1,332	64,653	1,550	217	10,339	348	5,036	—	78,201	186,191	—	—	4,517	541	4,331	444,611
1910	23,400	4,312	12,452	7,407	—	2,831	113,921	2,236	325	21,185	4,344	3,319	—	72,578	194,066	—	—	5,089	1,688	6,149	544,815
1911	29,047	4,930	21,065	9,781	—	4,169	179,001	1,949	281	12,939	8,284	5,967	—	69,655	277,961	501,997	—	14,606	2,385	5,005	1,205,258
1912	35,914	3,881	20,141	13,387	—	5,016	133,054	2,859	74	11,322	11,082	1,034	—	62,005	387,524	227,292	10,903	11,633	1,551	8,432	1,017,335
1913	33,840	5,410	25,576	11,841	—	3,500	187,499	3,071	263	11,614	16,794	5,931	—	81,771	447,875	100	16,350	21,406	1,668	7,553	958,761
1914-15	25,137	7,290	33,447	18,553	—	2,611	32,998	2,707	77	555	5,859	9,854	—	44,751	179,962	—	8,914	49,309	2,084	13,764	541,714
1915-16	26,234	5,233	28,040	18,713	523	1,396	63,780	1,835	244	3,755	2,428	6,410	—	25,206	239,457	—	17,432	51,846	2,230	7,892	536,340
1916-17	30,968	6,516	34,397	25,534	123,309	1,155	128,420	2,253	3,903	6,427	2,020	6,504	—	28,035	222,281	—	21,789	31,910	2,822	14,598	744,800
1917-18	78,350	26,452	31,819	23,885	78,514	668	357,443	4,253	6,670	900	7,259	12,236	—	8,595	28,385	—	14,082	56,577	8,724	15,462	882,913
1918-19	90,520	36,381	33,284	20,796	372,609	1,598	374,839	5,271	13,605	5,915	8,817	22,063	—	25,174	—	50,000	36,916	154,073	21,140	14,418	1,563,056
1919-20	162,096	41,242	53,363	30,599	478,420	4,345	1,319,493	11,727	13,397	15,192	13,839	71,522	—	98,368	—	3,433,586	45,497	43,706	16,840	21,773	6,216,398
1920-21	78,862	46,421	71,099	36,980	669,134	3,302	186,268	16,524	8,477	6,406	11,549	35,191	—	192,328	2,735	264,166	37,465	163,193	19,712	14,869	2,121,090
1921-22	76,752	43,450	44,687	24,750	726,624	4,327	301,390	11,943	2,335	5,070	18,304	3,935	—	70,803	—	47,060	21,568	266,319	7,540	18,467	1,876,648
1922-23	98,877	23,724	34,552	28,531	356,398	5,129	404,952	10,896	348	5,285	22,259	5,322	2,814	48,065	—	39,765	35,077	100,302	3,702	17,331	1,343,029
1923-24	67,523	20,208	28,980	25,067	492,116	3,946	393,035	11,627	606	4,380	18,601	45,118	3,596	76,913	—	34,790	23,762	167,636	5,468	23,242	1,549,220
1924-25	75,814	17,528	32,496	34,548	511,077	2,154	444,257	16,019	213	6,130	1,417	27,321	7,970	43,881	—		28,868	126,647	7,108	43,894	1,528,303
1925-26	100,730	26,369	33,927	27,964	869,098	3,516	712,710	29,019	337	11,738	15,649	18,340	10,595	12,196	—	18,000	45,292	30,613	13,570	42,480	2,132,016
1926-27	104,884	27,044	38,866	24,260	665,351	4,657	569,551	30,554	221	10,030	24,732	10,784	16,294	32,096	—	13,000	27,389	47,350	12,052	42,942	1,930,250
1927-28	106,454	24,752	36,795	32,299	822,942	5,625	517,862	34,517	950	11,466	23,432	13,010	18,264	27,525	—	23,000	17,801	53,144	8,549	38,374	2,027,724
1928-29	113,339	26,426	50,867	42,731	780,999	6,418	585,952	36,990	491	7,635	24,822	4,418	19,135	13,200	—	10,000	30,465	21,716	8,513	30,144	1,978,084
1929-30	119,132	25,756	53,304	32,118	344,028	6,287	556,317	27,216	670	4,370	22,915	1,716	12,401	6,865	—	10,000	15,646	11,519	8,924	25,783	1,399,321
1930-31	59,722	16,515	47,542	23,503	145,330	5,425	302,053	29,854	722	6,450	10,886	770	10,341	13,901	—	—	8,926	3,936	8,296	19,644	818,917
1931-32	74,436	15,311	36,424	40,279	260,280	6,830	277,761	27,130	2,451	7,432	13,709	3,370	8,880	26,993	—	—	17,560	4,175	6,475	14,920	916,462
1932-33	53,920	13,001	24,516	16,890	311,913	6,437	292,894	30,504	8,668	15,427	17,363	2,623	6,111	13,786	—	—	17,612	5,303	9,087	12,776	963,970
1933-34	48,824	15,461	27,583	18,755	304,510	6,657	317,857	40,056	35,173	6,155	12,877	5,115	6,782	13,147	—	—	21,521	2,730	12,736	13,545	1,015,315
1934-35	67,733	16,902	26,545	25,084	394,172	7,329	409,210	48,488	59,478	11,602	21,863	3,409	9,394	12,746	—	—	21,695	5,609	18,355	9,867	1,315,822
1935-36	90,041	18,181	29,474	29,024	319,474	7,328	410,764	45,509	59,400	3,842	22,800	2,997	13,162	12,099	—	—	14,198	3,840	15,678	9,409	1,263,526
1936-37	98,502	18,054	30,345	32,937	436,931	8,285	656,717	51,178	67,510	11,357	27,593	4,283	13,841	12,400	—	—	18,535	7,246	21,494	14,497	1,727,956
1937-38	106,533	18,124	45,660	38,031	564,541	7,523	634,441	73,331	92,913	8,297	35,135	3,578	13,749	22,426	—	—	17,051	12,670	29,134	10,633	2,063,740
1938-39	106,195	21,680	66,527	40,638	385,404	6,194	438,072	64,108	65,239	9,018	36,044	3,149	9,486	8,023	—	—	16,988	44,760	23,444	14,264	1,911,207
1939-40	149,417	46,889	101,078	38,135	605,328	8,395	589,827	90,059	85,690	11,186	31,795	6,340	14,427	7,677	—	—	36,330	159,458	52,165	26,944	2,941,691
1940-41	186,765	76,150	145,976	55,566	684,283	10,870	874,557	97,780	158,711	16,990	56,243	14,015	13,229	9,646	—	—	60,302	354,251	115,616	26,524	4,158,474

Source: See Table 2.

Table 4: Australia's Exports To Singapore-Malaya 1901-40—

By Percentages

Year	Foodstuffs of Animal Origin					Foodstuffs of Vegetable Origin			Spirituous & Alcoholic Liquors	Living Animals		Sandalwood	Lard & Refined Animal Fats	Coal	Tin Ores	Gold Specie	Leather & Leather Manufactures	Machines & Machinery	Drugs & Chemicals	Soap	Others	Total
	Butter	Bacon & Hams	Preserved by Cold Process		Milk & Cream	Hay & Chaff	Flour	Preserved & Fresh Fruits		Horses	Sheep											
			Beef	Lamb & Mutton																		
1901	8.69	—	—	—	—	1.15	11.77	—	—	13.67	1.90	13.51	—	23.44	3.62	0.11	—	6.38	—	2.08	16.68	100.00
1902	6.08	—	—	—	—	1.80	3.36	—	—	6.35	1.97	10.21	—	23.19	9.88	0.25	—	1.37	—	1.26	34.25	100.00
1903	8.47	—	—	—	—	1.71	0.85	—	—	8.01	0.08	6.25	—	29.70	25.41	0.38	—	0.46	—	2.02	16.66	100.00
1904	5.24	—	—	—	—	1.54	4.52	—	—	7.48	1.02	1.51	—	9.33	53.02	—	—	1.43	—	2.88	12.03	100.00
1905	5.41	0.19	3.97	2.37	—	0.88	24.81	0.30	0.30	7.94	0.69	2.35	—	18.27	20.21	—	—	0.82	0.64	1.89	9.08	100.00
1906	2.35	0.15	1.68	0.54	—	0.34	27.13	0.10	0.07	3.74	0.42	0.77	—	19.96	19.04	16.62	—	1.57	0.18	0.74	4.60	100.00
1907	4.58	0.16	2.06	1.02	—	0.50	26.00	0.21	0.15	4.82	0.17	0.45	—	11.97	33.55	1.79	—	1.24	0.18	0.60	10.55	100.00
1908	3.03	0.13	1.71	0.19	—	0.37	9.12	0.18	0.02	2.69	—	0.10	—	19.41	35.62	—	—	1.77	0.07	0.75	24.12	100.00
1909	4.62	0.18	2.68	1.23	—	0.30	14.54	0.35	0.05	2.33	0.08	1.13	—	17.59	41.88	—	—	0.93	0.31	1.13	12.75	100.00
1910	4.30	0.79	2.29	1.36	—	0.52	20.91	0.41	0.06	3.89	0.80	0.61	—	13.32	35.62	—	—	0.93	0.31	1.13	12.75	100.00
1911	2.41	0.41	1.75	0.81	—	0.35	14.85	0.16	0.02	1.07	0.69	0.50	—	5.78	23.06	41.65	—	1.21	0.20	0.42	4.66	100.00
1912	3.53	0.38	1.98	1.32	—	0.49	13.08	0.28	—	1.11	1.09	0.10	—	6.10	38.07	22.34	1.07	1.14	0.15	0.83	6.94	100.00
1913	3.53	0.56	2.67	1.24	—	0.37	19.56	0.32	0.03	1.21	1.75	0.62	—	8.53	46.71	—	1.71	2.23	0.17	0.79	8.00	100.00
1914-15	4.65	1.35	6.17	3.43	—	0.48	6.09	0.50	—	0.10	1.08	1.82	—	8.26	33.22	—	1.65	9.10	0.39	2.54	19.17	100.00
1915-16	4.89	0.98	5.23	3.49	0.10	0.26	11.89	0.34	0.05	0.70	0.45	1.20	—	4.70	44.65	—	3.25	9.67	0.42	1.47	6.26	100.00
1916-17	4.16	0.88	4.62	3.43	16.56	0.16	17.24	0.30	0.52	0.86	0.27	0.87	—	3.76	29.84	—	2.93	4.28	0.38	1.96	6.98	100.00
1917-18	8.87	3.00	3.87	2.71	8.89	0.08	40.48	0.48	0.76	0.10	0.82	1.39	—	0.97	3.21	—	1.60	6.41	0.99	1.75	13.62	100.00
1918-19	5.79	2.33	2.13	1.33	23.84	0.10	23.98	0.34	0.87	0.38	0.56	1.41	—	1.61	—	3.20	2.36	9.86	1.35	0.92	17.64	100.00
1919-20	2.61	0.66	0.86	0.49	7.67	0.07	21.22	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.22	1.15	—	1.58	—	55.23	0.73	0.70	0.27	0.35	5.54	100.00
1920-21	3.72	2.19	3.35	1.74	31.55	0.16	8.78	0.78	0.40	0.30	0.54	1.66	—	9.07	0.13	12.45	1.77	7.69	0.93	0.70	12.09	100.00
1921-22	4.09	2.32	2.38	1.32	38.72	0.23	16.06	0.64	0.12	0.27	0.98	0.21	—	3.77	—	2.51	1.15	14.19	0.40	0.98	9.66	100.00
1922-23	7.36	1.77	2.57	2.12	26.54	0.38	30.15	0.81	0.03	0.39	1.66	0.37	0.21	3.57	—	2.96	2.61	7.47	0.28	1.29	7.46	100.00
1923-24	4.36	1.30	1.87	1.62	31.77	0.26	25.37	0.75	0.04	0.28	1.20	2.91	0.23	4.97	—	2.24	1.53	10.82	0.35	1.50	6.63	100.00
1924-25	4.96	1.15	2.13	2.26	33.44	0.14	29.07	1.05	—	0.40	0.09	1.79	0.52	2.87	—	—	1.89	8.29	0.47	2.87	6.61	100.00
1925-26	4.73	1.24	1.59	1.31	40.76	0.17	33.43	1.36	—	0.55	0.73	0.86	0.50	0.57	—	0.84	2.12	1.44	0.64	1.99	5.17	100.00
1926-27	5.43	1.40	2.01	1.27	34.47	0.24	29.51	1.58	—	0.52	1.28	0.56	0.84	1.66	—	0.67	1.42	2.45	0.62	2.22	11.85	100.00
1927-28	5.25	1.22	1.82	1.59	40.58	0.28	25.54	1.70	0.05	0.57	1.16	0.67	0.90	1.36	—	1.13	0.88	2.62	0.42	1.89	10.39	100.00
1928-29	5.73	1.34	2.57	2.16	39.48	0.33	29.62	1.87	0.03	0.39	1.26	0.22	0.97	0.67	—	0.51	1.54	1.10	0.43	1.52	8.26	100.00
1929-30	8.51	1.84	3.81	2.30	24.56	0.45	39.76	1.95	0.05	0.31	1.64	0.12	0.89	0.49	—	0.72	1.12	0.82	0.64	1.84	8.18	100.00
1930-31	7.29	2.02	5.81	2.87	17.75	0.66	36.89	3.65	0.09	0.79	1.33	0.09	1.26	1.70	—	—	1.09	0.48	1.01	2.40	12.82	100.00
1931-32	8.12	1.67	3.97	4.40	28.40	0.75	30.31	2.96	0.27	0.81	1.50	0.37	0.97	2.95	—	—	1.92	0.46	0.71	1.63	7.83	100.00
1932-33	5.59	1.35	2.54	1.75	32.36	0.67	30.38	3.16	0.90	1.60	1.80	0.27	0.63	1.43	—	—	1.83	0.55	0.94	1.33	10.92	100.00
1933-34	4.81	1.52	2.72	1.85	29.99	0.66	31.31	3.95	3.46	0.61	1.27	0.50	0.67	1.30	—	—	2.12	0.29	1.25	1.33	10.39	100.00
1934-35	5.15	1.29	2.02	1.91	29.96	0.56	31.10	3.69	4.52	0.08	1.66	0.26	0.71	0.97	—	—	1.65	0.43	1.40	0.75	11.09	100.00
1935-36	7.13	1.44	2.33	2.30	25.28	0.58	32.51	3.60	4.70	0.30	1.81	0.24	1.04	0.96	—	—	1.12	0.30	1.24	0.75	12.37	100.00
1936-37	5.70	1.05	1.76	1.91	25.29	0.48	38.01	2.96	3.91	0.66	1.60	0.25	0.80	0.72	—	—	1.07	0.42	1.24	0.84	11.33	100.00
1937-38	5.16	0.88	2.21	1.84	27.36	0.37	30.74	3.55	4.50	0.40	1.70	0.17	0.67	1.09	—	—	0.83	0.61	1.41	0.52	15.99	100.00
1938-39	5.56	1.13	3.48	2.13	20.17	0.32	22.92	3.35	3.41	0.47	1.89	0.17	0.50	0.42	—	—	0.89	2.34	1.23	0.75	28.87	100.00
1939-40	5.08	1.59	3.44	1.30	20.58	0.29	20.05	3.06	2.91	0.38	1.08	0.22	0.49	0.26	—	—	1.24	5.42	1.77	0.92	29.92	100.00
1940-41	4.50	1.83	3.51	1.34	16.46	0.26	21.03	2.35	3.82	0.41	1.35	0.34	0.32	0.23	—	—	1.45	8.52	2.78	0.64	28.86	100.00

Source: Calculated from Table 3.

exports . They formed 53% of Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya and 44.6% in 1915-16. [1] These tin ores were were smelted at Pulau Brani--an island south of Singapore--where the world's largest tin-smelting works existed. Tin ingots were then re-exported to various parts of the world. Tin ores from Malaya and Netherland East Indies were also smelted in Singapore. Australia's export of this item diminished after 1916-17, and from 1921-22 onwards totally vanished. [2] Australia dropped this export item because of her own ability to process the ores and also because the increase of production in Malaya rendered it unprofitable.

Coal was the next important export item to Singapore-Malaya during the early period. Large amounts of coal were used in the tin-smelting works in Singapore and for the supply of steam vessels. Coal was the leading export item from 1901 to 1903. It formed a major proportion of Australia's exports between 1904 to 1910. The export of coal dwindled from 1925-26 and became very insignificant in the subsequent years. [3]

The export of gold specie was most inconsistent. It formed as much as 41.7% and 55.2% of the total export in 1911 and 1919-20 respectiviely, but formed less than 1% during most other years. The export of gold specie to Singapore-Malaya vanished from 1930-31 onward. [4]

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5. Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (London: Heinemann Press, 1964), p. 248.

1. See Table 4.

2. See Tables 3 and 4.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

From 1917-18 onwards, except in 1919-20, foodstuffs dominated Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya. Flour, milk and cream were the leading items. Flour had consistently been an important export item throughout 1901 to 1941. From 1922 to 1937-38, it formed about one-third of Australia's total exports to Singapore-Malaya. [1] However, the most remarkable increase of Australian products was the export of milk and cream. Since 1916-17, milk and cream had become Australia's most important export items along with flour. Milk and cream accounted for about one-third of Australia's exports to Singapore-Malaya from 1920 to 1937-38. [2]

Butter was the next most important item of foodstuffs and Singapore-Malaya was Australia's best market in South-east Asia for this item. There was a substantial increase in the export of butter after 1917-18. However, this item did not form more than 10% of Australia's total exports to Singapore-Malaya. Beef, lamb and mutton were the main type of meats exported . There were gradual increases in these items after the great depression years. Bacon and ham, hay and chaff and fruits were the other foodstuffs exported. The export of these items was both small in value and percentage. However, there were increases in the export of fruits after 1933-34. [3]

Horses and sheep were the two main types of livestock exported to Singapore-Malaya. The export of these two items

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1. See Tables 3 and 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

although they remained constant throughout the period 1901 to 1941, did not form an important proportion of Australia's exports. However, Australia supplied all the needs for these two items in Singapore-Malaya. Sheep were mostly exported from the north-west coast of Australia. [1]

The export of spirituous and alcoholic liquors became important only after 1933-34. The main items were brandy, port and sherry. Australian brandy was popular in the Singapore-Malaya market and by 1940-41, Singapore-Malaya had become Australia's best market for brandy. [2]

The export of machines and machinery fluctuated most unevenly. It formed an important proportion of Australia's exports from 1913 to 1918-19; 1920-21 to 1924-25; 1939-40 to 1940-41; but during other years, these items were not substantial. [3] Tin-mining machinery was the most important item under this category. It should be noted that Australians were the first to introduce dredging machines to the tin mines in Malaya.

Other items exported to Singapore-Malaya included soap, drugs and chemicals, leather and leather manufactures, sandalwood, lard and refined animal fats. The export of these items were all small in value. [4]

An examination of the composition of Australia's imports from Singapore-Malaya reveals that in most years be-

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1. Report by Australiam Trade Commissioners, op. cit., p. 895.
2. Ibid.
3. See Tables 3 and 4. for details.
4. Ibid.

Table 5: Australia's Imports From Singapore-Malaya—By Value

Year	Sago and Tapioca	Pepper and Other Spices	Rubber, Leather and Manufactures thereof etc.	Oils, Fats and Waxes	Wood and Wicker	Gums and Resins	Apparel and Textiles	Preserved Fruits and Vegetables	Kapok	Grain Rice	Tea	Tin Ingots	Total Imports
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1901	35,614	39,135	—	827	12,516	—	20,516	7,742	5,840	29,222	—	—	320,584
1902	20,800	28,026	—	33	5,628	—	1,753	1,625	3,641	11,307	—	—	116,187
1903	20,051	28,507	—	13,767	6,432	—	1,402	2,873	1,409	7,281	—	—	116,028
1904	27,603	36,923	—	16,715	7,198	—	7,321	6,707	5,561	19,595	—	—	169,784
1905	27,551	32,010	156	693	9,065	—	1,481	1,601	2,696	14,485	—	—	104,104
1906	42,691	36,591	2,501	18,019	11,903	—	1,646	4,330	1,502	10,162	—	—	136,849
1907	66,998	40,316	4,695	20,578	9,956	—	3,223	2,372	405	20,423	—	—	176,550
1908	42,012	27,114	10,275	42,213	10,493	—	3,806	2,686	404	11,502	—	—	158,603
1909	42,991	29,021	33,605	27,880	8,046	—	2,708	6,018	461	1,731	—	—	160,360
1910	45,431	32,850	42,822	7,722	13,474	—	2,791	5,606	1,838	—	—	—	164,792
1911	67,919	49,085	28,113	1,801	13,628	—	5,209	6,278	5,485	—	—	—	189,343
1912	70,014	49,599	21,720	597	12,571	—	2,560	3,535	49	—	—	—	174,911
1913	57,284	59,760	95,901	1,002	16,601	—	3,636	4,979	1,824	19	—	—	256,457
1914-15	44,626	56,167	35,796	795	12,034	—	3,262	928	4,999	1,345	—	—	190,721
1915-16	77,170	64,071	55,837	25,745	13,088	—	3,896	811	1,006	609	—	—	265,657
1916-17	73,088	42,454	51.012	5,276	11,784	—	2,047	489	312	312	—	—	201,132
1917-18	106,964	49,760	156,511	2,806	10,163	—	1,250	176	2,322	2,409	—	—	475,269
1918-19	63,268	33,393	187,774	1,955	8,794	—	3,215	50	3,499	12	—	—	339,162
1919-20	102,090	62,608	49,501	66,588	19,126	—	3,202	4,399	2,001	1,373	—	—	354,179
1920-21	54,469	37,529	120,086	5,647	18,439	—	1,810	1,172	4,057	141	—	—	284,886
1921-22	56,329	49,297	153,910	255,699	16,994	8,798	3,471	56	1,688	3,970	31	—	571,544
1922-23	90,359	45,579	79,888	808	16,996	7,388	2,498	948	2,428	572	1,436	—	272,759
1923-24	82,682	42,718	319,459	2,019	8,780	7,966	2,781	331	5,875	233	2,676	—	494,930
1924-25	63,204	87,203	398,852	1,024	11,031	9,809	2,327	1,387	2,346	454	10,939	—	612,314
1925-26	38,707	91,062	1,517,785	724	9,688	8,404	1,733	3,321	1,563	368	2,365	—	1,701,508
1926-27	49,913	140,432	1,724,713	9,897	10,040	11,622	2,045	16,492	5,492	297	4,879	—	2,025,757
1927-28	37,850	139,722	1,544,537	909	7,668	8,687	3,220	11,487	4,775	181	2,796	—	1,804,602
1928-29	30,152	155,182	850,633	10,164	7,952	7,228	3,441	7,670	3,935	185	3,504	27,071	1,133,963
1929-30	35,863	138,902	545,161	13,472	8,064	6,148	2,148	5,447	1,200	4,009	3,289	35,231	812,513
1930-31	25,729	59,901	162,089	1,725	3,081	775	714	—	235	939	818	11,042	274,894
1931-32	30,989	56,984	163,347	1,509	2,305	1,439	196	96	106	81	325	7,788	276,654
1932-33	26,043	45,528	174,705	1,367	2,776	2,432	101	—	12	269	—	—	271,639
1933-34	36,279	18,684	240,524	37	2,260	2,828	441	64	—	124	3	—	328,720
1934-35	40,960	27,895	434,371	310	2,985	3,394	260	152	—	14	14	—	563,246
1935-36	37,013	26,514	402,458	475	3,301	5,444	215	2,522	—	19	294	—	489,484
1936-37	33,129	28,451	768,467	326	3,172	6,301	136	92	—	18	183	—	853,991
1937-38	34,778	29,733	913,249	1,396	5,118	5,489	603	861	—	3,110	93	12,220	1,023,602
1938-39	27,648	23,248	819,643	1,040	3,753	3,597	306	195	—	44	101	6,866	902,419
1939-40	41,794	34,786	1,344,116	41,124	7,161	10,276	2,498	224	—	34	10,120	15,073	1,530,402
1940-41	64,885	32,067	1,876,657	63,691	12,567	10,637	632	195	—	36	895	22	2,117,279

Source: See Table 2.

Table 6: Australia's Imports to Singapore-Malaya—By Percentages

Year	Sago and Tapioca	Pepper and Other Spices	Rubber, Leather and Manufactures thereof etc.	Oils, Fats and Waxes	Wood and Wicker	Gums and Resins	Apparel and Textiles	Preserved Fruits and Vegetables	Kapok	Grain Rice	Tea	Tin Ingots	Others	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1901	11.11	12.21	—	0.26	3.90	—	6.44	2.42	1.82	9.12	—	—	52.72	100.00
1902	17.90	24.12	—	0.03	4.72	—	1.51	1.40	3.13	9.73	—	—	37.46	100.00
1903	17.28	24.18	—	11.87	5.54	—	1.21	2.48	1.21	6.28	—	—	29.95	100.00
1904	16.26	21.75	—	9.85	4.24	—	4.31	3.95	3.28	11.54	—	—	24.82	100.00
1905	26.47	30.75	0.15	0.67	8.71	—	1.42	1.54	2.59	13.91	—	—	13.79	100.00
1906	31.20	26.47	1.83	13.16	8.70	—	1.20	3.16	1.10	7.43	—	—	5.48	100.00
1907	37.95	22.84	2.66	11.66	5.64	—	1.83	1.34	0.23	11.57	—	—	4.28	100.00
1908	26.49	17.10	6.48	26.62	6.62	—	2.40	1.70	0.26	7.25	—	—	5.08	100.00
1909	26.81	18.10	21.00	17.39	5.02	—	1.69	3.75	0.29	1.08	—	—	4.87	100.00
1910	27.56	19.93	25.99	4.69	8.18	—	1.69	3.40	1.12	—	—	—	7.44	100.00
1911	35.87	25.92	14.85	0.95	7.20	—	2.75	3.32	2.90	—	—	—	6.24	100.00
1912	40.03	28.36	12.42	0.34	7.19	—	1.46	2.02	0.03	—	—	—	8.15	100.00
1913	22.34	23.30	37.40	0.39	6.47	—	1.42	1.94	0.71	—	—	—	6.03	100.00
1914-15	23.40	29.45	18.77	0.42	6.31	—	1.17	0.49	2.62	0.71	—	—	16.12	100.00
1915-16	29.05	24.12	21.02	9.69	4.93	—	1.47	0.31	0.38	0.23	—	—	8.80	100.00
1916-17	36.34	21.11	25.36	2.62	5.05	—	1.02	0.24	0.16	0.16	—	—	7.94	100.00
1917-18	22.51	10.47	32.93	0.59	2.14	—	0.26	0.04	0.09	0.51	—	—	30.06	100.00
1918-19	18.65	9.85	55.36	0.58	2.59	—	0.95	—	1.03	—	—	—	10.99	100.00
1919-20	28.82	17.68	13.98	18.08	5.40	—	0.90	1.24	0.57	0.39	—	—	12.22	100.00
1920-21	19.12	13.17	42.15	1.98	6.47	—	0.64	0.41	1.42	0.05	—	—	14.59	100.00
1921-22	9.86	8.63	26.93	44.74	2.97	1.54	0.61	—	0.30	0.70	—	—	3.72	100.00
1922-23	33.13	16.71	29.29	0.30	6.23	2.71	0.92	0.35	0.89	0.21	0.53	—	8.73	100.00
1923-24	16.71	8.63	64.55	0.41	1.77	1.61	0.56	0.07	1.19	0.05	0.54	—	3.91	100.00
1924-25	10.32	14.24	65.14	0.18	1.80	1.60	0.38	0.23	0.38	0.07	1.79	—	3.87	100.00
1925-26	2.28	5.35	89.20	0.04	0.57	0.49	0.10	0.20	0.09	0.02	0.14	—	1.52	100.00
1926-27	2.46	6.93	85.14	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.10	0.81	0.27	—	0.24	—	2.49	100.00
1927-28	2.10	7.74	85.59	0.05	0.43	0.48	0.18	0.64	0.27	—	0.16	—	2.36	100.00
1928-29	2.66	13.69	75.01	0.90	0.70	0.64	0.30	0.68	0.35	—	0.31	2.39	2.37	100.00
1929-30	4.41	17.10	67.10	1.66	0.99	0.76	0.26	0.67	0.15	0.49	0.41	4.34	1.66	100.00
1930-31	9.36	21.79	58.96	0.63	1.12	0.28	0.26	—	0.09	0.34	0.30	4.02	2.85	100.00
1931-32	11.20	20.60	59.04	0.55	0.83	0.52	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.12	2.82	4.14	100.00
1932-33	9.59	16.76	64.32	0.50	1.02	0.09	0.04	—	—	0.10	—	—	6.77	100.00
1933-34	11.04	5.68	73.17	—	0.69	0.86	0.13	—	—	0.04	—	—	8.39	100.00
1934-35	7.27	4.95	77.12	0.06	0.53	0.60	0.05	0.03	—	—	—	—	9.39	100.00
1935-36	7.56	5.42	82.22	0.10	0.67	1.11	0.04	0.52	—	—	0.06	—	2.30	100.00
1936-37	3.88	3.33	89.99	0.04	0.40	0.74	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.62	100.00
1937-38	3.40	2.91	89.22	0.17	0.50	0.54	0.06	0.08	—	0.30	—	1.20	1.62	100.00
1938-39	3.06	2.58	90.82	0.12	0.42	0.40	0.03	—	—	—	—	0.76	1.81	100.00
1939-40	2.37	2.27	87.83	2.69	0.47	0.67	0.16	0.02	—	—	0.66	0.99	1.51	100.00
1940-41	3.07	1.52	88.64	3.01	0.59	0.50	0.03	—	—	—	0.04	—	2.60	100.00

Source: See Table 2.

fore 1919-20, sago and tapioca, and pepper and other spices were the leading items imported by Australia. On average, they formed about half of Australia's total imports from Singapore-Malaya. Although the leading position of these items was overtaken by rubber in the later years, they still formed an important part of Australia's import from Singapore-Malaya. [1]

Rice and oils [2] also formed a major proportion of Australia's imports before 1909, Import of rice dropped to very insignificant proportions from 1909 onwards; and the import of oils dropped sharply after 1910, except in 1915-16 when they formed 9.7%, in 1919-20 18.8% and 1921-22 44.7% of Australia's total imports from Singapore-Malaya. From 1922-23 onwards , import of oils became negligible. [3]

Australia began to import rubber and rubber manufactures from Singapore in 1905. Since then, the import of rubber rose sharply. Rubber was the leading import item in 1913, 1917-18, 1918-19, 1920-21 and from 1923-24 onwards formed between 59% to 90% of Australia's total imports. Since 1933-34, rubber has not formed less than 73% of Australia's imports. In the later years, rubber almost dominated the whole of Australia's imports from Singapore-Malaya. [4]

Wood and wicker [5] were imported by Australia quite

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1. See Tables 5 and 6.
2. Petroleum spirit and benzine were the most important types of oils imported by Australia.
3. See Tables 5 and 6.
4. Ibid., the percentages of rubber included a small percentage of leather and leather manufactures.
5. Bamboo and cane were the two main items.

substantially before 1922-23, but they became unimportant after this. Other imported items of lesser importance were gums and resins--imported by Australia only after 1921-22--apparel and textiles, preserved fruits and vegetables and kapok. The import of tea and tin ingots were both sporadic and insignificant. [1]

A comparison of Australia's trade with Singapore-Malaya between 1900 and 1940-41 reveals some interesting figures. Import value increased from £365,397 to £2,117,279; and import percentage against Australia's total imports increased from 0.88% to 1.89%. Export value increased from £100,451 to £4,158,474 ; and export percentage against Australia's total exports increased from 0.21% to 2.65%. Total trade value increased from £465,848 to £6,275,753, and percentage from 0.53% to 2.33%. [2] Another fact worth noting was that the balance of trade which had favoured Singapore-Malaya during the last century became greatly in favour of Australia from 1905 onwards, except in one year, 1926-27, where it was slightly in favour of Singapore-Malaya. [3]

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1. See Tables 5 and 6.
2. See Table 2.
3. See Table 1.

II. Defence Relations:

Australia's defence became related to Singapore after the 1921 Imperial conference when it was decided that a Naval Base would be built in Singapore for the British Far Eastern Fleet. Australia's defence had always relied on the might of the British navy; the decision to station a British Far Eastern Fleet in Singapore naturally led Australia's defence thinking to become closely associated with Singapore. This indeed was a breakthrough in Australia's traditional attitude towards the East. Hitherto Australia had stubbornly adhered to its regionally isolationist policy and had wanted nothing to do with any Asian countries except in terms of trade. The increasing importance of Singapore's position for the defence of Australia especially since the 1930s made Australia realise the strategic value of neighbouring countries for her survival and forced her to have close co-operation and foster goodwill with Asian countries.

The Singapore Naval Base

The plan to build a Naval Base in Singapore originated in a report submitted by J.R. Jellicoe [1] to the British government in 1921 as a result of a tour in the Far East. In that report he recommended that a British Pacific Fleet should be based at Singapore for the defence not only of the Empire's Far Eastern interests, but also of Australia, New Zealand and India. A Far East Fleet, said Jellicoe, was an absolute necessity if Britain wished to retain her prestige in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Such a fleet, he thought, should consist of at least sixteen capital ships: that is, eight battleships and eight battle cruisers, with forty destroyers and thirty-six submarines attached, to-

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1. Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe.

gether with the necessity of store ships, transports and oilers. [1]

The decision to build a Naval Base at Singapore was made in June 1921 at the Imperial Conference. [2] From the outset the decision was strongly opposed in the British parliament. [3] Nevertheless, the government accepted the advice of its naval authorities and work on the base began in 1923. [4] During the initial stage, the progress of the base was delayed several times due to the conflict of opinion between Labour and Conservative governments over building it. It was not until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which created a crisis in the Far East, that the construction of the Naval Base was hastened.

In December 1936 after the Japanese had given notice of terminating the Washington Agreement and its intentions in the Far East were clear, steps were taken to complete the base and to strengthen the fortifications in Singapore.[5]

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1. The Singapore Naval Base Supplement, Singapore Free Press, 14-2-1938; W.M.Hughes, Labour Prime Minister from 27-10-1915 to 9-2-1923, 30-7-1923, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 104, p. 1781.
2. See Imperial Conference 1921, CRS A981, Imperial Relations 106-8; W.C.Bridgeman, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 12-6-1923, British Parliamentary Debates (hereafter B.P.D.), House of Commons (hereafter H. of C.), vol. 163, col. 249.
3. B.P.D. (H. of C.), vol. 166, G. Lambert, 19-7-1923, col. 2542-5, 1-5-1923, col. 1234-5 for instance.
4. It was not until 1 May 1923 that a sum of £11 million appeared in the Navy Estimates 1923-24, read by L.C.M.S. Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, 12-3-1923, B.P.D. (H. of C.), vol. 161, col. 1099; see also Amery, 25-4-1923, Ibid., vol. 163, col. 432; G.C. Marks, 27-11-1923, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 104, p. 1744.
5. See C.N. Parkinson, Britain In The Far East--The Singapore Naval Base (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1955), p. 30.

On 14 February 1938 the focal point of the Naval Base, the giant 1,000 feet graving dock, 130 feet wide at the entrance with a depth of 35 feet at low water and capable of accommodating the largest vessel afloat, was officially opened. [1] However, the construction of the Naval Base was not fully completed until 1941, just before the outbreak of the war with Japan. [2]

The Naval Base was fully equipped with water supply, rail-roads, heavy cranes, workshops, power stations, ammunition depots, a torpedo depot, underground fuel storage tanks, storehouses, hospitals and living quarters. Beside the graving dock, there was also a large floating dock, capable of lifting a 45,000 ton warship. In addition, there was an air base a few miles away. [3]

The fortifications at Singapore included a garrison of British and Indian troops as well as squadrons of the Royal Air Force. In addition there was the Malay Regiment and local naval, military and air volunteer forces. The fortifications built in Singapore comprised coastal artillery grouped into two Fire Commands, one centered in Changi,

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1. The Singapore Naval Base Supplement, op. cit.; The Sunday Times (London), 30-1-1938.
2. Parkinson, p. 31, D. and J. Moore, The First 150 Years Of Singapore (Singapore: Tien Wah Press, 1969), p. 569.
3. Defence of Singapore, Secret 336-C, Copy no. 48, Report by the British Chief of Staffs Sub-Committee, 15-7-1929, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 1; Latham's Secret Report To The Prime Minister, op. cit.; Earl Stanhope, 18-12-1929, B.P.D. (H. of Lords), vol. 75, col. 1480-4; B.P.D. (H. of C.), vol. 237, Rear Admiral Beamish, 25-3-1930, col. 358-9, G.H.Hall, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, col. 363; vol. 241, A.V.Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, 9-11-1930, col. 405, F. Montague, Under Secretary of State for Air, col. 406-7; vol. 345, G.Shakespeare, 22-3-1939, col. 1283; Ian Morrison, Malayan Postscript (London: Faber and Faber, 1942), p. 12, L.A.Mills, British Rule In Eastern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 19.

covering the approaches to the Naval Base, and the other centered on Mount Faber, covering the approaches to Keppel Habour and the western entrance to the Straits of Johore. There were three 15 inch, four 9.2 inch and four 6 inch batteries and search lights. These gun positions were strengthened by the addition of anti-submarine and anti-torpedo net, beach defences, concrete machine-gun emplacements and wire. [1] Everything was there, except the British fleet.

The cost of constructing and equipping Singapore as a Naval Base and a fortress up to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in September 1939 was approximately £18,234,000. The following contributions were received by the British government towards the cost of the work:

Grant from New Zealand	... £1,000,000
Grant from Hong Kong	... £ 250,000
Grant from the Federated Malay States	... £2,000,000
Gift from the Sultan of Johore	... £ 500,000
Total	... £3,750,000

In addition to these contributions, the Straits Settlements government presented the 3,000 acres of land for the site of the Naval Base and aerodrome which amounted in value to approximately £146,000. [2]

The Naval Base lay in the Johore Straits on the

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1. Defence of Singapore, Secret 336-C; Department of External Affairs (Australia) Record, 26-11-1929, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 1; Pakinson, p. 31; Mills, p. 19.
2. CID (Committee of Imperial Defence) Paper, Secret 352-C, July 1930, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 2; B.P.D. (H. of C.), Amery, 11-7-1923, vol. 166, col. 1327-8, H.F.C.Crookshank, Financial Secretary, Treasury, 24-6-1942, vol. 380, col. 1992-3; W.F.Massey, Prime Minister, 3-7-1923, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 200, p.p. 598-9. Australia's contributions will be discussed on p.p. 52-3.

northern side of Singapore Island, and to the east of the causeway [1] connecting the island to the mainland by road and by rail. The water frontage was about 4½ miles and the position made the base impervious to direct bombardment from the sea. Singapore was chosen for the Naval Base because 'It stands at the western gateway to the Pacific. It flanks the route from Eastern Asia to Australia and covers the main entrance to the Indian Ocean from the eastward'. [2]

Significance of the Singapore Naval Base to the Defence of Australia

From the outset two of Britain's most authoritative naval personnel had made clear the importance of a Naval Base in Singapore for the defence interest of Australia. Jellicoe asserted that 'Australia and New Zealand could not be effectively defended unless there was a base at Singapore'. The other authority D.F. Beatty [3] stated 'a fact which I think will be fairly obvious to honourable members if they will look at a map--that if it /the Naval Base/ is not there, Australia will be hopeless if attacked'. [4]

When the construction of the Naval Base began in 1923, the Australian government were told that Australian territorial integrity depended upon the successful functioning of the base. The British Chiefs of Staff emphasized in 1923 that 'the security of the United Kingdom and the security of Singapore would be the keystones on which the survival

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1. The causeway, 3465 feet long, was officially opened on 1 October 1923; see The Age, 13-2-1942.
2. Beatty, 14th Meeting of Principal Delegates at the Imperial Conference, 4-7-1921, quoted in Ian Hamill, 'The Imperial Commitment: the Singapore Strategy in the Defence of Australia and New Zealand', (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 1974), p.p. 17-8.
3. Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty.
4. See Hughes, 30-7-1923, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 104, p. 1781.

of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend'.[1]

Why was the Singapore Naval Base so important to Australia? Perhaps an appreciation by the Australian Army Department provided the best answer:

> Australia's main interests are her trade [2] and the integrity of her territory...The presence of a British Naval Base at Singapore...would force back the Japanese main concentration 3,000 miles from our trade routes in the Indian Ocean. As regards the protection of Australian Territory, with a strong British naval concentration at Singapore lying on the flank of the route between Japan and Australia, it is unlikely that any raids [on Australia] would be attempted, unless provided with strong escort, and even so, our forces based at Singapore would be in a position to intercept the enemy en-route, which in itself would be a deterrent to any such attempt being made, not to mention the invasion of Australia. 3

Australia's Contribution towards the Singapore Defence Strategy

Indeed a powerful Naval Base in Singapore was the best protection for Australia's maritime life-line and national integrity. The Australian government and public opinion had welcomed the British plan from the beginning. [4] But Australia's policy towards the construction of the Naval Base was perhaps best reflected by the words of A. Blakeley, Minister for Home Affairs, when he spoke in the House of Representatives on 31 July 1923:

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1. Cab. 24-268 'Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the CID' (COS 560), 22-2-1937, p. 5, quoted in John McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-42', Australian Outlook, vol. 25, no. 2, August 1971, p. 165.
2. The value of Australian import and export trade using the Indian Ocean in the course of one year was estimated to be about £200 million. Security for this was therefore vital to the existence of Australia. See An Appreciation of the Value of Singapore to Australia 1930, by the Australian Army Department, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 2.
3. An Appreciation of the Value of Singapore to Australia 1930, Ibid.
4. See Bruce, 24-7-1923, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 104, p. 1487; The Singapore Naval Base Supplement, op. cit.; The Argus

> I have nothing to say in opposition to the establishment by Great Britain of a base at Singapore. I know, however, that if Australia approves it, or advocates it, she will be expected to contribute a small portion of the initial cost and subsequent cost of upkeep. I am not prepared to help in establishing that base, or maintaining it. The defence of Australia in my opinion, should be carried on in Australia by Australians. 1

Throughout the construction of the Naval Base Australia declined to contribute a penny towards its cost. Instead, the Australian government had decided to provide an alternative form of contribution. During the years 1923 to 1928, she had taken on the responsibility to provide two first class cruisers and carry out a five year programme of naval expansion. After 1928 Australia had taken on other defence programmes with advice and supervision from the United Kingdom. [2]

Latham's Secret Mission

Australia's anxiety over the progress of the Naval Base at Singapore was first shown in 1934 when Latham undertook a secret mission during his goodwill tour of Asia. The secret mission was mainly to report upon the progress of the Naval Base; the possibility of co-operation with the Dutch Navy in the Netherland East Indies; and to assess the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Australia. [3] Latham

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4. (Melbourne), 4-12-1926; Air Staff Note on Singapore, 30-7-1930, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 2.

1. Blakeley, 31-7-1923, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 104, p. 1849.

2. See CID Paper no. 444-C, no. 463-C, undated, CRS A981, Defence 331, Pt. 2, The Singapore Naval Base Supplement, op. cit.

3. See Latham's Secret Report to the Prime Minister, 3-7-1934, CRS A981, Far East 5.

also explained to the Dutch authorities in the Netherland East Indies the Australia-Singapore air service in relation to defence. He mentioned that:

> Although the service to be estblished would be a civilian air service, the experience gained by the personnel would be most valuable in time of war; the effective air liaison between Darwin and Singapore would be of the first importance in time of war...it was very desirable that the personnel of the air service...should be British in character. 1

Clearly Australia had the need to help provide eventual air defence for Singapore in mind. On Latham's return to Australia, he told the parliament that:

> It is important that we should endeavour to develop and improve our relations with our near neighbours, whose fortune are so imprtant to us, not only in economic matters, but also in relation to vital issues of peace and war. 2

Royal Australian Air Force In Singapore

The question of sending R.A.A.F. squadrons to protect Singapore was first raised in 1932 by the United Kingdom Air Staff who argued that: 'Speedy reinforcements /of Singapore/ by fully trained Australian air squadrons would provide a powerful weapon against the Japanese fleet pending the arrival of our navy'. 3 In 1934 a further suggestion

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1. Ibid.
2. Speech by Latham on Australian Eastern Mission Report, 6-7-1934, CRS A981, Far East 5.
3. Air 9-56 (22), 'The Most Effective Apportionment of Monies Aviailable in Australia for the Purpose of Defence', Air Staff Memorandum, 31-5-1932; quoted in McCarthy, p. 169. The Far East situation until 1937 was based on the assumptions that :-(a) any threat to British interests would be sea-bourne; and (b) the British could send to the Far East within three months a fleet of sufficient strength to protect its Dominions and India and give cover to communications in the Indian Ocean. See cablegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London (hereafter S.S.D.A.), to the Prime Minister, 11-8-1940, CRS A2671, Item no.156/1940:

was made that R.A.A.F. units could exercise with the R.A.F. based at Singapore. [1] There was no Australian response. The Minister for Defence, A. Parkhill made it clear at the 1937 Imperial Conference that: 'Air Force units will only be despatched to Singapore provided they are not required for operations in Australia itself'. [2]

Towards the close of 1937 when H.V.C. Thorby succeeded Parkhill as Minister for Defence, he found a new and serious situation had developed in the Far East. Japan had declared war on China on 7 July 1937 and in December sank the American gunboat Panay by air bombing in the Yangtze River. [3] Awareness of international tension was becoming more and more noticeable. There were indications that Australia began to be more willing to co-operate in reinforcing the Singapore Base. This was reflected in H. Gullett's [4] statement:

> It must be an elementary matter for us in this country, no matter to what party we belong, to realise that it is to our advantage to co-operate with great Britain in our defence, to allow our navy to co-operate with Britain's Eastern Navy and for our air force to co-operate with the air force of Great Britain in the East, an air force which could move freely over the intevening islands and seas in event of danger. Surely it is better that we should act in this way than that we should merely wait in this particularly vulnerable land for the arrival of our enemy. 5

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1. Air 9-56(4), Notes on the R,A.A.F., Air Staff, 28-7-1934, quoted in McCarthy, p. 169.
2. Air 8-221, Imperial Conference 1937, Australian Delegation Paper no. 11, 8-3-1937, p. 2, Ibid.
3. D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962), p.p. 46, 147.
4. Henry Gullett, Australia's Minister for Trade Treaties 1934 to 1937, for External Affairs and Information, 1939-40.
5. Gullett, 1-12-1937, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 155, p. 90.

In September 1938, E. Ellington, the Inspector-General of the R.A.F., visited Australia to report on the efficiency of the R.A.A.F.. In his report to the Australian government he advocated that the local defence of Australia was intimately connected with the defence of Singapore. He was surprised to learn that no plans existed for Australian Air Force units to operate there. The Lyons government acted promptly on his advice and the Air Force was instructed to prepare plans to reinforce Singapore. [1]

The actual despatch of Australian Air Force units to Singapore was delayed by the outbreak of war in Europe. In September 1939 the Australian government, excited by this sudden turn of world events, decided to offer six squadrons --four bomber squadrons and two twin-seater fighter squadrons--to the United Kingdom for service in Europe. [2] It was not until the end of May 1940, when the fall of France was imminent and Japan's southward expansion became apparent, that the Australian War Cabinet agreed to despatch a squadron [3] of Hudson aircraft to Singapore to replace a R.A.F. Blenheim squadron. [4] This squadron (no. 1 General Reconnaissance Squadron) commanded by Wing Commander A.L. Walters

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1. See 'Report by Ellington, together with the Comments of Air Board and the Civil Aviation Board and the Decisions and Observations of Commonwealth Government', Copy 36, September 1938, CAO Assn. no. AA63/39, Item 37/301/360.
2. Menzies, 20-9-1939, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 161, p.p. 840-1.
3. Each squadron had 12 aircraft plus 6 in reserve.
4. Telegram from the Prime Minister to Australia's High Commissioner in London, 28-5-1940, CRS A1608, Item no. D17/2/1; Report by the Chief of Air Staff, CRS A2671, Item no. 136/1940, War Cabinet Agendum no. 139/1940, Ibid.

arrived at Singapore in July. [1]

In June, following the advice of the Chief of Air Staff, the government approved the transfer of a further squadron of Hudsons (No. 8) and a squadron of Wirraways (No. 21 General Purpose) to Singapore. The two squadrons commanded by Wing Commander P.G.Heffman and Squadron Leader F.N.Wright respectively arrived at Singapore in August. [2]

All the three squadrons of R.A.A.F. were stationed at the Sembawang Air Base. Air Commodore R.J. Brownell and a team of Australian technical and administrative staff formed a station headquarters at Sembawang to administer the R.A.A. F. squadrons. This headquarters later established itself as a R.A.A.F. station within the R.A.F. Far East Command. The three Australian squadrons each contained a nucleus of regulars supplemented by members of the Citizen Air Force of Australia. All were equipped, maintained and paid by Australia. The Hudson aircraft were lightly armed defensively and had a bomb capacity of 1,000 pounds. [3]

Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.) In Singapore-Malaya

The strengthening of the garrison in Singapore began in August 1939 and during that stage the despatch of Australian troops to Singapore had already been envisaged.[4] However, before the close of 1940, Australia had contributed only to

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1. Telegram from British Consulate Surabaya to S.S.D.A., 4-7-1940, CRS A1608, Item no. D17/2/1.
2. Telegram from the Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 26-6-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 136/1940; War Cabinet Agendum 139/1940 and War Cabinet Minute no. 360, 25-6-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 139/1940.
3. Gillison, p. 142, Paul Hasluck, The Government And The People 1939-41 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), p. 215; War Cabinet Minute no. 360, Ibid.
4. See The Times (London), 1-8-1939.

the joint defence planning without acceding to the sending of her troops.

On 28 June 1940, with the fall of France and Britain facing a direct threat from Germany, the United Kingdom sought Australian help by requesting the immediate despatch of a division to Malaya. [1] This proposal was rejected by the Australian government. [2] Australian attention at this stage was focussed chiefly upon the struggle in Europe rather than upon defence against Japan. Menzies believed that 'as long as Great Britain is unconquered, the world can be saved!. [3]

Towards the end of July Japanese warships and troops advanced to Indo-China and on 29 July Japan had forced the signing of an agreement on the Vichyite Government which allowed her to base forces in Indo-China. [4] This development created anxiety in Britain as well as Australia. On 11 August, the United Kingdom again requested the Australian government to consider the early despatch of a division to Malaya. [5]

In a report by the Australian Chief of Staff on the Appreciation of the Far East position on 23 August 1940, they stressed that Australia 'should strain all efforts and resources to co-operate in the actual defence of the

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1. Telegram from S.S.D.A, to the Prime Minister, 28-6-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 156/1940.
2. Telegram from Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 3-7-1940, Ibid.
3. Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 14.
4. Gillison, p. 169, J.R.M.Butler, Grand Strategy (London: H.M.S.O., 1957), vol. II, p.p. 339-40.
5. Telegram from S.S.D.A. to the Prime Minister, 11-8-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 156/1940.

area [Singapore-Malaya] as, strategically, it now becomes, as far as Australia is concerned, of greater ultimate importance than the Middle East'. [1]

In accordance with the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations, Menzies assured Britain in a telegram of 29 August 1940 that Australia was willing to co-operate by the despatch of the 7th Division. He stated that '7th Division should be despatched to Malaya. This it is considered, would provide the most effective contribution towards the ultimate defence of Australia'. [2] Late in September, however, after the Italian army had invaded Egypt, it was decided that the 7th Division would be despatched to the Middle East. [3]

On 27 September 1940 Japan had concluded a tripartite pact of alliance with Germany and Italy. [4] In the meantime she was able to consolidate her position in French Indo-China and penetrate into Thailand. In view of the serious situation a Defence Conference was held in Singapore from 21 to 31 of October 1940, [5] attended by members from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, Netherland East Indies

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1. Report by Australian Chiefs of Staff on United Kingdom's Appreciation of Far East Situation, 23-8-1940, MP 729, Item no. 17/401/341.
2. Telegram from the Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 29-8-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 156/1940.
3. Wigmore, p.p. 25-7.
4. Butler, p.p. 339-40.
5. Wigmore, p.p. 40-1; Vice-Admiral G. Layton chaired the Conference.

and an American naval attaché from Thailand as observer. [1]

The Conference concluded that the forces and equipment available in Singapore-Malaya were totally inadequate to meet a major attack by Japan. The first and immediate consideration therefore had to be to ensure the security of Malaya against direct attack. In the absence of a British Fleet, the Army and Air Force, both in numbers and equipment, were far below requirements. The Conference urged that the deficiencies be remedied immediately and requested further co-operation from India, Australia and New Zealand. [2]

The Australian Chiefs of Staff were in entire agreement with the conclusion of the Conference that the security of Singapore, which was of vital importance to Australia, depended largely on the defence of the whole of Malaya, and reiterated the view expressed in their appreciation of 23 August 1940 that 'we should strain all our efforts and resources to co-operate in the actual defence of the area'. [3] On 18 November, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that a brigade group of 8 Division be despatched to Singapore [4]. Ac-

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1. The Australian delegates were Captain J. Burnett (Deputy Chief of Aust. Naval Staff), Major-General J. Northcott (Deputy Chief of General Staff), and Air Commodore W.D. Bostock (Deputy Chief of Air Staff); Staff Officers who accompanied them were Lieut-Commander G.C. Oldham, Major C.H. Kappe, and Squadron Leader W.L. Hely; see Telegrams from the Prime Minister to Governor of Straits Settlements, 12-10-1940, and 15-10-1940, see CRS A816, Item no. 11/301/273.
2. See Report of Singapore Defence Conference, October 1940, and Report by Australian Delegate on Singapore Defence Conference, October 1940; CRS A2684, Item no. 135.
3. Report by Australian Chiefs of Staff on Singapore Defence Conference October 1940, Ibid.
4. Report of Australian Chiefs of Staff, 18-11-1940; War Cabinet Agendum 254/1940; CRS A2671, Item no. 254/1940.

ting on this advice, the Australian government cabled London on 1 December and announced that a brigade group and necessary maintenance troops with a modified scale of equipment would be made available at an early date as Australia's contribution to the deficiencies of land forces in Malaya. [1]

The original plan to send a brigade group to Malaya, where it would be directly under Malaya Command, had later given way to a decision by the General Staff in Australia to send also part of the divisional headquarters, on the ground that the staff of a brigade was insufficient to handle an Australian force in an overseas country. Major Kappe left Australia on 31 January 1941 with a small advance party, and Major-General Gordon Bennett, the Commander of 8 Australian Division, left by air on 4 February to set up the headquarters at Sentul, a suburb of Kuala Lumpur. [2]

On 2 February, 22 Brigade of 8 Division A.I.F. and attached units, some 5750 men boarded the 81,000 ton Queen Mary at Sydney Habour to set off for Singapore. The liner arrived at the Singapore Naval Base on 18 February, receiving a huge reception. [3] The Governor of the Straits Settlements, S. Thomas, said in a broadcast in Singapore on that day that 'Never before has such a force of Dominion [Australian] troops landed in this country...It is one more link forged in the chain which links Australia to Singapore'. [4]

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1. Telegram from the Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 1-12-1940, CRS A2684, Item no. 135.
2. Wigmore, p.p. 60, 62.
3. The Herald (Melbourne), 19-2-1941; The Argus (Melbourne), 20-2-1941; Australian Contingent To Malaya, CRS A816, Item no. 56/301/66.
4. The Argus (Melbourne), 20-2-1941.

Before nightfall on the day of arrival, most of the troops were packed into railway carriages and on their way to barracks at Port Dickson. The brigade group came to Malaya complete with artillery, engineers, transport, supply and medical services. [1]

Towards the end of March Army Headquarters in Australia arranged for the whole of Bennett's divisional staff, with some administrative and base units to join him as a result of his request. The build-up of an Australian force in Malaya thus began. In mid-August a further Australian force, 27 Australia Brigade, arrived in Malaya. [2] The Straits Times believed that the arrival of this brigade 'is an indication of the determination of Australia to play her full part in the prevention of agression by any power in the southern Pacific.' [3] Earlier when 27 Brigade was on their way to Malaya, Menzies had stated that 'while we desire peace in the Pacific, we are not disposed to run away from the geographical fact that Singapore is part of Australia's frontier'. [4]

With the arrival of 27 Brigade, Percival gave the 8 Australian Division the responsibility for the defence of Malacca and Johore. Bennett moved his headquarters to Johore Bahru at the end of August. Before the outbreak of war, the 22 Australian Brigade was deployed in the Endau-Mersing area and 27 Australian Brigade in central and north-western Johore. [5]

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1. The Argus (Melbourne), 20-2-1941; Wigmore, p. 62.
2. The Straits Times, 15-8-1941.
3. Ibid.
4. The Straits Times, 12-8-1941.
5. Wigmore, p.p. 69-70; S.W. Kirby, Singapore: The Chain Of Disaster (London: Cassell and Co., 1971), p. 72.

Map 1

A.I.F. Locations, December 1941



Source: Wigmore, p. 99.

The sudden influx of Australian troops to the Malayan towns and villages caused some panic to local inhabitants at the beginning. An Australian Information Officer in Malaya, L. Wigmore noted 'there was a puzzling absence of women and children in villages and towns through which the Australians passed in the early days of their travel in Malaya.' [1] However, as the Australians began to mingle cheerfully with the Asians, friendships were cultivated, and Asians were quick to show their liking for them. By the time the 27 Australian Brigade arrived in Malaya, Bennett was able to declare in a broadcast message to Australia that 'we have made very strong friendships in Malaya--friendship with units from Great Britain and India and friendship with the

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1. Wigmore, p. 62, R.J.D. Turnbull, 15-3-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p.p. 884-5 also gave a similar account.

civil population not only British and Australians, but also Malays, Chinese and Indians'. [1] The generous spending of the Australians especially delighted many local people. Most Australians were able to pick up some Malay language from little children, and real friendships were made between some of the men and these boys. [2] One of the Sultans (who wished to remain anonymous) had given a bungalow, fully furnished, to the A.I.F. headquarters. The Sultan in question also made available to the Australians his private polo ground to be used for sports and gave an allowance of $250 a month to pay for refreshments for those playing on the ground. [3]

The Royal Australian Navy and Britain's Promise of the Fleet

The main purpose for the construction of Singapore Naval Base was to accommodate a powerful British Fleet. The whole Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia were based on the assumption that the fleet would be present.

Before the outbreak of war in Europe, Australians had, in general, taken for granted that the British battle-fleet would automatically arrive in Singapore in time of hostility. Thorby confidently told the Prime Minister in 1938 that:

> ...it was the basis of British strategy to establish at Singapore at the earliest possible moment after the outbreak of hostilities a fleet whose strength as minimum would enable it to act on the defensive and to serve as a strong deterrent against any threat to British interests in the Far East. [4]

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1. The Straits Times, 16-8-1941.
2. G. Mant, You'll Be Sorry (Sydney: Frank Johnson Press, 1944), p. 81; Wigmore, p. 62.
3. The Straits Times, 15-8-1941.
4. Memorandum from Thorby to the Prime Minister (undated), Singapore Naval Base, CRS A816, Item no. 14/301/88.

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, it began to cause Australia great concern over the ability of Britain to provide a fleet strong enough to defend Singapore. Australia's concern over the defence of Singapore was reflected by the dispatching of the cruiser Hobart and five destroyers--Stuart, Vendetta, Waterhen, Vampire, and Voyager to Singapore in October. [1] These ships were sent to the Mediterranean in November at the request of the United Kingdom. [2]

After the fall of France in June 1940, British naval power was pinned down in Europe and facing a direct threat from Germany. Under the most serious situation at home, the British Chiefs of Staff declared that 'we must retain in European waters sufficient naval forces to match both the German and Italian fleets, and we cannot do this and send a fleet to the Far East'. [3]

With the Japanese forces threatening from Indo-China, Churchill gave an assurance to the Australian Prime Minister on 11 August 1940 that:

> If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest except only the defence position of this island on which all depends. 4

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1. C.H. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-42 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p.p. 74-5.
2. Ibid., p.p. 75-7.
3. New Zealand Documents, vol. 1, no. 214, p.p. 158-9; Nicholas Mansergh, Survey Of British Commonwealth Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 86.
4. Telegram from Churchill to Menzies, 12-8-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 156/1940; see also W.Churchill, The Second World War (London: Cassell Press, 1949), vol. II, p.p. 385-6.

This telegram was to ensure the continued co-operation of the Australians with Great Britain. On 29 August 1940 Australia announced its policy regarding naval contribution to Singapore, in a telegram to S.S.D.A. the Prime Minister stated that the Australian naval forces remaining in its waters were the minimum required for trade protection and no further direct Australian naval support could be offered to Singapore until a British fleet had arrived. [1]

In the following months no British fleet was forthcoming. In July 1941 F. Forde [2] observed that Singapore was like an empty garage and considered the position to be very grave. [3] In August Menzies made a demanding statement to London:

> My collegues and I have given anxious consideration to the Far East position. We have, as you know, always regarded Singapore and Malaya as our vital outpost...We have also assumed that in the event of war with Japan, naval reinforcements...with a necleus of five capital ships, would be sent to the Far East. We now say and emphasize that an early despatch of capital ships east of Suez would itself be the most powerful deterrent.4

It was not until October 1941 that the Admiralty in London agreed to send the Prince of Wales, Repulse and an aircraft-carrier Indomitable to Singapore. The two British battleships together with their attendant destroyers berthed at the Naval Base on 2 December 1941, only a few days before

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1. Telegram from the Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 29-8-1940, CRS A2671, Item no. 156/1940.
2. Opposition member of the Advisory War Council and subsequently (1941-45) Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for the Army, and briefly Prime Minister in July 1945 following the death of John Curtin.
3. Advisory War Council Minute, 29-7-1941, Agendum no. 102/1941, Review of International Situation, CRS A2680, Item no. 102/1941.
4. Telegram from the Prime Minister to S.S.D.A., 11-8-1941, CRS A981, Item no. Pacific 8.

the outbreak of war with Japan, Indomitable unfortunately ran aground in Jamaica during a training cruise on 3 November and no other carrier could be spared by Britain. [1]

Excited by the arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Australian government allowed four R.A.N. destroyers to provide an anti-submarine screen for the two capital ships. [2] However, before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, only one of the four destroyers, Vampire, had taken up duty in Singapore. Another destroyer, Vendetta, was refitted at the Naval Base. The only other Australian ship in Singapore was an armed merchant cruiser Manoora. [3]

Australian Official Representation and other Representatives In Singapore

With the arrival of Australian forces and the increasing significance of Singapore as a focal point of imperial communications and a clearing house for political intelligence, an Australian Official Representative [4], V.G.Bowden, was appointed on 30 August 1941. [5] This was the first time an Australian diplomatic officer had been appointed to a South-east Asian country.

Bowden opened his offices in Singapore towards the end of September. His staffs included A.N.Wotton, as Commercial

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1. Wigmore, p.p. 92, 103; Churchill, vol. III, p. 524.
2. War Cabinet Agendum 390/1941, CRS A2671, Item no. 390/1941; Gill, p. 460.
3. S.W. Kirby, The War Against Japan (London: H.M.S.O., 1957), vol. 1, Appendix 14, p. 518; Gill, p. 460.
4. Singapore was at that time administered as a Crown Colony, it would be inappropriate therefore if Australia were to appoint a High Commissioner in Singapore.
5. The Malayan Tribune, 5-11-1941; The Straits Times, 5-11-1941.

Secretary and J.P. Quinn as Political Secretary. [1] Some clerical staff and peons were appointed locally. [2] Bowden's appointment put Australia in direct contact with the local British authorities, and allowed for the carrying out of a variety of functions, including the collation and despatch of items of political intelligence [3] which were previously reaching Australia at second hand [4]; the maintenance of liaison between the Singapore civil authorities and Australian troops stationed in Malaya; the handling of arrangements for Commonwealth officials using the air route to the Middle East and the United Kingdom; the supervision of Australian publicity and propaganda; and the fostering of commercial relations between Australia and Singapore-Malaya. [5]

The appointment of Bowden met with a good response both in Australia and Singapore. In Australia, the government's decision was described as a 'good move' [6] and in Singapore the

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1. Press Statement by the Department of External Affairs, 5-9-1941, CRS A981, Item no. 227B; The Malayan Tribune, 30-9-1941; Singapore Free Press, 29-9-1941; Current Notes, no. 5, vol. II, 1941, p. 141.
2. See Australian Representation In Singapore--Staff, CRS A981, Item no. 232.
3. The principal justification of viewing Singapore as a centre for political intelligence arouse from the existence of the Far East Combined Bureau; see Appendix 1 for detail.
4. Before the appointment of an Official Representative, Australia had relied on British officials in Singapore, Batavia and Surabaya for political intelligence; much of the available information did not in fact reach the Commonwealth Government in up-to-date form thus hampered the works of External Affairs Department and doubtlessly some other Departments.
5. See Draft for Cabinet Re: Australian Representation at Singapore, and Secret Memorandum Re: Australian Representation at Batavia and Singapore, CRS A981, Item no. 227; also F.H. Steward, Minister for External Affairs, 17-9-1941, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 168, p. 301.
6. See Singapore Fress Press, 30-9-1941.

The Malayan Tribune wrote:

> We welcome him [Bowden] very cordially. His presence is an indication of the closer contact between the Commonwealth and this country, which has grown so rapidly during the last two years, and an earnest of the desire of the two governments to maintain the present friendly relations. 1

In Quinn's confidential letter to the External Affairs Department, he mentioned that "all circles in Singapore with which I have so far come in contact, official and unofficial, British, Australian and Asiatic have expressed approval of the appointment and the general impression is that it is a 'good show'".[2]

Before the outbreak of war with Japan, other Australian government representatives in Singapore included Major W. Tebbutt, who was an Army Headquarters Intelligence Liaison Officer attached to the Far East Combined Bureau at Naval Base; L.G. Wigmore, Information Officer of the Australian Department of Information who had offices at the Cathay Building; and Lieut-Commander J.C.R. Proud, who was also an Information Officer. [3]

There was also quite a corps of Australian journalists, evidence of the keen interest which Australia was taking in this northern outpost of her own defence. Among them were I. Morrison who worked for The London Times; H. Standish of the Sydney Moring Herald; I. Fitchett, the offical Australian ob-

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1. The Malayan Tribune, 5-11-1941.
2. Letter from Quinn to Department of External Affairs (undated), CRS A981, Item no. 227B.
3. Memorandum from Department of Army to Department of External Affairs, 22-12-1941, Ibid.; see also Publicity In The Far East, CRS A981, Item no. Australia 56B, Pt. 1; Defence Of Malaya, CRS A663, Item no. 066/1/582; Defence of Malaya And N.E.I., CRS A981, Item no. Far East 16.

server; [1] B. Knox of the Sydney Mirror; T. Fairhall of the Sydney Telegraph; R. Maley of the Australian Associated Press; C. Fraser of the Sun-Pictorial of Melbourne; D. Wilkie of the Murdoch group of papers and H. Stokes of the Australian Broadcasting Commission. [2]

Clearly, the years 1901 to 1941 represented an important period of transition in the development of Australia-Singapore relations. This period saw Australia beginning to take a positive interest in trading with Singapore-Malaya and her goods, especially foodstuffs, became familiar to the Malayan public; the first Australian manufacturing firm was established in Singapore and carried out flourishing business; air-links, which represented an important milestone in the communication between the two countries, were established; the Australian armed forces arrived in Singapore-Malaya; the first diplomatic office was established in Singapore; and there was an influx of Australian journalists and other representatives.

It was apparent that trade and defence were the two main factors linking Australia and Singapore. On close scrutiny, it is worth noting that defence was a far more important factor than trade in the promotion of Australia-Singapore relations. The increased trading intercourse between Australia and Singapore-Malaya was in fact conducted between certain business sectors or at governmental level by

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1. See The Times (London), 2-2-1942.

2. Morrison, p. 72.

the two countries. The importance of Singapore as a defence outpost had since 1921, to a large extent, dominated Australia's defence thinking and planning. The despatch of Australian armed forces to the area, though forced by circumstances and historical events, were especially instrumental in the building up of Australia-Singapore relations. For this was the first time the Australian and Malayan people had come into direct contact. It provided the Australians with the opportunity to learn the Malayan language, to understand the culture, customs, habits, and social structure of the Malayan people. For the first time the two peoples had to work and live together and both had the same enemy in mind. All these factors helped to foster friendship and create a better mutual understanding.

It was the increasing importance of Singapore's position that caused the first Australian diplomatic post to be established, another milestone in relations between the two countries. Further, there was an influx of Australian newsmenand other representatives. Although all these occurences were mainly due to the development of war, it nevertheless helped to promote Australia-Singapore relations.

Another point worth noting is the fact that Australia-Singapore relations during this period were entirely a one-way affair. Efforts to improve the relations of the two countries were all initiated by Australia.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE-MALAYA 1941-59

In this chapter I will discuss Australia's military relations with Singapore-Malaya from the outbreak of the Pacific War until Singapore achieved self-government. This period saw Australians standing together with Malayans for the first time, in an effort to combat a common enemy, more than ten thousand Australians becoming prisoners-of-war in Singapore, and the resumption of Australia's military presence in Singapore-Malaya after the war. Australia's military presence had a great significance not only in enhancing the friendly relations of the two peoples, but also in helping Singapore and Malaya achieve independence and in contributing to the economy of the two countries.

I. Background

Prior to the outbreak of hostility, Australia's contribution to the defence of Singapore-Malaya comprised two A.I.F. brigades, three R.A.A.F. squadrons, two R.A.N. destroyers, and one armed merchant cruiser. The largest part of the Australian forces, the A.I.F., was given the state of Johore to defend, which in Bennett's words 'is the most important area to be defended in Malaya. It is the barrier closing the backdoor to Singapore'. [1] An Australian correspondent wrote in the Straits Times that 'a threat to Singapore is a threat to Australia, that a backdoor entrance to Singapore means a front door entrance to Australia'. [2] Such was the closeness of Australia's defence aim

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1. Telegram from Bennett to P. Spender, 22-9-1941, CAO A2663, Clasn. no. 553/2/3.
2. The Straits Times, 3-12-1941.

with Singapore-Malaya.

It is important to note that apart from the Australian contribution, forces were also drawn from Britain, India, Nepal and New Zealand. In addition, there were the Malayan Regiments; the Federated and Unfederated Malay States Volunteer Forces; the Straits Settlements Volunteer Forces; and the Malayan Volunteer Air Force. [1] Thus before the outbreak of war with Japan, the garrison in Singapore-Malaya had increased substantially, although still far from the recommended strength. [2]

The commanders of the three forces stationed in Singapore-Malaya were Air Vice-Marshal C.W.H. Pulford, Lieut-General A.E. Percival and Admiral T. Phillips. Pulford succeeded Air Vice-Marshal Babington as A.O.C. Far East Command on 24 April 1941. [3] Percival took over as G.O.C. Malaya in place of Major-general Bond on 16 May 1941. [4] Phillips assumed command of the Eastern Fleet on 3 December 1941. [5] All three commanders were under the supreme command of Air Chief-Marshal R. Brooke-Popham, who was the C-in-C in the Far East since 14 November 1940. [6]

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1. See Appendix 2 for detail.
2. See Appendix 3 for detail.
3. Wigmore, p. 77.
4. A.E. Percival, The War In Malaya (London: The Empire Press, 1949), p. 28; Wigmore, p. 78.
5. Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 3-12-1941; Kirby The War Against Japan, p. 171.
6. Brooke-Popham served as C-in-C in the Far East up to 27-12-1941, from then to 15-1-1942 Henry Pownall succeeded him, and from 15-1-1942 Archibald Wavell became the C-in-C of the newly formed A.B.D.A.(see p.p. 79-80 of this chapter); Atlee, 13-4-1942, B.P.D. (H. of C.), vol. 379, col.47; The Straits Times (Singapore), 27-12-1941.

The tension of war began to mount in Malaya at the end of November 1941 when there was increasing concentration of Japanese sea, land and air forces in Southern Indo-China. [1] On December 1, reports were received in Singapore that the Japanese intended to land troops in Southern Thailand and that a strong Japanese naval force was sighted east of British Borneo. On the same day, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Singapore by the Governor and all Volunteers were called up. [2] There were wide-spread precautions taken throughout Singapore-Malaya against an imminent Japanese attack. Additional allied aircraft were moved to Northern Malaya and daily air reconnaissance was carried out by R.A.A.F. Hudson aircrafts. [3]

II. Defence of Malaya

The first sight of the Japanese convoys steaming towards the Malayan territory was obtained by Australian reconnaissance aircraft in the evening of December 7. However, no immediate action was taken against the enemy convoys due to bad weather condition and very low clouds. Between midnight on the 7th and early hours of the 8th Japanese troops landed at Kota Bahru in full force, [4] Thus began the invasion of Malaya.

Within the first fourteen hours on the 8th, Singapore

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1. Wigmore, p. 121.
2. The Straits Times, 1 and 2-12-1941; Daily Telegraph, 2-12-1941.
3. Gillison, p. 205; Bulletin (Sydney), 11-2-1948.
4. The Straits Times, 8-12-1942; The Age, 9-12-1941; Daily Telegraph, 9-12-1941.

Malaya, Hawaii, Thailand, the Philippines, Guam Island, Hong Kong and Wake Island were all attacked by Japanese bombers. [1] On the 9th, Australia, America and Britain formally declared war on Japan. [2] The Japanese lightning and unexpected action created mixed feelings in Australia. Firstly, there was a great concern over the power of the Japanese forces, and secondly, there was a gladness that America was forced into the war. [3] In Singapore-Malaya, the locals, especially the Chinese, gave whole-hearted co-operation to the defending forces. Fine gestures were shown by various Chinese organizations by raising war funds and recruiting more volunteers. The A.R.P. and all other auxiliary services set out to work for the first time enthusiastically. [4] As a war correspondent in Singapore at that time described it, the Japanese action 'served as a spur to galvanize all the civil defence organizations into wartime activity.' [5]

From the beginning of the Japanese landing at Kota Bahru, the R.A.A.F. was in action. Seventeen sorties were carried out by the R.A.A.F. stationed at Kota Bahru during the early hours of the 8th, inflicting some losses on Japanese troops and vessels. All Japanese vessels were forced to withdraw from Malayan waters at full speed by the R.A.A.F.

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1. The Age, 9-12-1941; Daily Telegraph, 9-12-1941; Sun (Melbourne), 13-12-1941; Singapore Free Press, 9-12-1941; The Straits Times, 9-12-1941.
2. The Straits Times, 9-12-1941; Current Notes, vol. 2, no. 10, 1941, p. 278-9.
3. See Morrison, p. 48.
4. The Straits Times, 9-12-1941.
5. Morrison, p. 49.

sorties. However, the Japanese troops were able to establish themselves on the Malayan shore under the cover of darkness. [1]

The first few days of battle were disastrous to the defending forces in Malaya. The Japanese army was able to land a strong invasion force and make rapid advances. With its far superior air force it was able to force all Allied airfields in Northern Malaya to be abondoned. On 10th, the only two British capital ships in the Far East, Repulse and the Prince of Wales, were sunk by Japanese bombers off Kuantan. [2] Admiral Phillips went down with his flag ship. ith them disappeared all prospect that the Japanese landings in Malaya might be seriously impeded by British naval action. The value of the Singapore Naval Base at this stage, and all that it meant to Australian security, had virtually vanished. The general effect of the disaster, with other reverses suffered on land and in the air, was grave in the extreme. [3]

It was against this dark background that a Far East War Council was formed in Singapore on 10 December with Duff Cooper as Chairman. Other members of the council included the Governor of the Straits Settlements; the C-in-C Far East, the C-in-C Eastern Fleet; the G.O.C. Malaya; the A.O.C. Far East and V.G. Bowden representing Australia. General Bennett as Commander of the Australian forces in Malaya was at liberty

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1. The Straits Times, Singapore Free Press, Daily Telegraph, -12-1941; The Age, 9 and 12-12-1941; Bulletin, 11-2-1948; Gillison, p.p. 206-212; Wigmore, p.p. 125, 137.
2. For a detailed account of the attack on the two capital ships; see 'Story of the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse', The Straits Times, 15-12-1941.
3. John Curtin's comments on the sinking of the two capital ships, The Straits Times, 11-12-1941; Wigmore, p. 145.

to attend meetings if and when he wished to do so.[1] Australia had requested to be represented because she felt her survival as a nation might well depend on decisions taken by the War Council.[2] Although the War Council was designed to be a consultative and co-ordinating body for the war effort in the Far East, in practice, as the war progressed, its attention was mainly on events in Malaya.

Within a week of battle in Malaya, the Japanese were able to clearly demonstrate the absolute superiority of sea, land, and air forces over the Allies. Heavy reverses were continuously experienced by the defending forces. The principle reaction in Australia was a strong resentment against Britain over the reinforcement of Singapore-Malaya. There was an outcry in Australia to call back squadrons in Britain and divisions in Syria to serve in the Malayan area where Australia's survival was so closely threatened.[2] As a result of consistent pressure from the Australian government, Britain promised that reinforcements would be sent to strengthen the position in Singapore-Malaya; however, the Australian forces in Britain and Syria should continue to remain as they were.

As the position in Malaya further deteriorated, Brooke-Popham made an urgent appeal to Australia on 20 December for

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1. Gillison, p. 255; Kirby, The War Against Japan, p.p. 202-3.
2. See Amour, 17-12-1941, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 169, p. 1145; A. Calwell, 16-12-1941, p. 1129.

additional reinforcements. [1] Due to the urgency of the situation, the Australian War Cabinet approved on 23 December the despatch of 2/4th Australian Machine-Gun Battalion, comprising 942 all ranks, and 1,907 reinforcements for the 8th A.I.F. Division. [2] This announcement was followed by a telegram from Curtin to Churchill [3] and Roosevelt seeking support in the reinforcement of Singapore-Malaya. Part of the telegram read:

> At this time small reinforcements are of small avail. In truth the amount of resistance to Japan in Malaya will depend directly on amount of assistance provided by governments of United Kingdom and United States. Our men have fought and will fight valiantly. But they must have support. ... 4

On Christmas day Curtin received a telegram from Bowden stating the serious situation in Malaya:

> I must emphasise that deterioration of our position in Malaya defence is assuming landslide proportions and in my firm belief is likely to cause a collapse in whole defence system. ...In my belief the only thing that might save Singapore would be immediate dispatch from the Middle East by air of powerful reinforcements, large numbers of latest fighter aircraft with ample operational personnel. Reinforcements of troops should be not in brigades but in divisions and to be use they must arrive urgently. ...As things stand at present fall of Singapore is to my mind only a matter of weeks. ... Need for decision and action is a matter of hours not days. 5

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1. Telegram from Brooke-Popham to Sturdee, 20-12-1941, Australian War Memorial File (A.W.M.), CAO A2663, Classification (Clasn.) no. 285/3/10.
2. Telegram from Sturdee to Bennett, 24-2-1941; War Cabinet Minute, 23-12-1941; War Cabinet Agendum, 24-12-1941; A.W.M. CAO A2663, Clasn. no. 285/3/10; the Machine-Gun Battalion and reinforcements arrived in Singapore on 24th January 1942.
3. Churchill was then at the White House in the United States having a defence conference with the U.S. C.O.Ss.
4. Telegram from Curtin to Casey, Australian Minister in Washington, 25-12-1941, for communication to Roosevelt and Churchill; quoted Gillison, p. 266.
5. Telegram from Bowden to Curtin, 25-12-1941; quoted in Wigmore, p.p.182 and Gillison, p. 267.

The text of Bowden's telegram was sent to Bruce, Australian High Commissioner in London, and he was instructed by Curtin to do whatever he could without any delay. [1]

Britain did provide additional air squadrons and troops to reinforce the Malayan defence during the following month [2], but the United States decided to stay out of the Malayan scene. The furthest the Australian and British Governments had gone to draw United States' interest in the defence of Singapore-Malaya was the establishment of a South-West Pacific Command (know as the A.B.D.A.), in which American, British, Dutch and Australian were members. [3] Talks on the establishment of this Command had began 5 days after the outbreak of war with Japan between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, but it was not until 3 January 1942 that a supreme commander, General Archibald Wavell, was formally announced. [4] Wavell assumed command on 15 January with headquarters at Lembang, near Bandung. General Pownall, by this time C-in-C Far East, became his chief of Staff, and his headquarters at Singapore was abolished. [5]

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1. Gillison, p. 267.
2. See Gillison, p. 331.
3. In general term the territories of the A.B.D.A. Command covered Burma, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Malaya-Singapore, the Netherland East Indies, the Philippines, Christmas and Cocos Islands. After 24 January 1942, the Southern limit of the A.B.D.A. also included the north-west coast of Australia, northwards from a line running from Onslow on the West Coast to the south-east corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria; see telegram from Churchill to Curtin, 4-1-1942, Formation of the A.B.D.A., CRS A816, Item 31/301/176; Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 267
4. See Formation of the A.B.D.A., Ibid.
5. The Straits Times, 15-1-1942; Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 267.

A.B.D.A. Command was an organisation hastily created to meet a desperate emergency caused by the Japanese hostility. It was of necessity understaffed and its forces were entirely inadequate for the tasks placed upon it. In the short period of its existence it did not have a chance to fulfil its proper functions. Before forces could be assembled to defend the vast area it embraced it was overwhelmed by the tide of Japanese advance. Nevertheless it served one useful purpose. It was the first unified command of the war in Southeast Asia and provided a pattern on which Australia, United States and other Allied forces were able to co-operate in their war effort against the Japanese.

It is important to note here that the locals, especially Chinese, in Singapore-Malaya had also made contributions towards the defence of their country. On 25 December 1941 sixty Chinese representative from all sectors in Singapore-Malaya met the Governor and told him that they had decided to wipe out all their past feuds and differences of opinion and to form a united front with the sole purpose of resisting the invader. [1] Similar assurance of co-operation were also given by the Indian communities. [2] Tan Kah Kee, leader of the Chinese community in Singapore-Malaya, accepted the Governor's invitation to form a Chinese Council to mobilise all the resources of Chinese communities in Malaya to help in the fight against the Japanese. [3] On 26 December, eight Chinese publications in Singapore and Malaya issued a joint manifesto exhorting all Chinese in Malaya to unite and defend their country. [4]

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1. The Straits Times, 26-12-1941.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The Chinese Consul General at Singapore, Kao Ling-pai, supported the new move and called upon the Chinese in Malaya 'in order to defeat the invader, every Chinese should do their utmost to assist the government'. [1] The first meeting of the Chinese Anti-Agression Mobilisation Council was held on 28 December 1941. It was resolved at the meeting that a nine person standing committee be formed, under which there were seven departments to carry out the various business of the Council. The seven departments were (1) the General Affairs Department which was in charge of secretarial work and the economic and financial business of the Council; (2) the Propaganda Department; (3) the Volunteer Police Corps which looked after life and property; (4) the Labour Service Corps which enrolled workmen for employment by the local government; (5) the Recruiting Department which undertook to gather money, material and manpower; (6) the Women's Department which mobilised Chinese women in Malaya and (7) the Arms Department which was in charge of arming volunteers.[2]

The Chinese were trained for a multitude of tasks, notably police work, espionage and counter-espionage, guerilla fighting, propaganda, labour corps work and A.R.P.. [3] It is important to note that the Chinese, at that time, formed about half of the Malayan population (including Singapore) and had an intimate knowledge of the country. Further, they were inspired by something which nearly all the fighting forces in Malaya lacked, a personal venom against the Japanese

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1. The Straits Times, 26-12-1941.

2. The Straits Times, 30-12-1941, 16-1-1942, 17-1-1942.

3. Herald (Melbourne), 29-12-1941; Argus (Melbourne), 29-12-1941; Courier Mail (Brisbane),29-12-1942; Churchill, 13-4-1942, B.P.D. (H.of C.), vol.379, col.47.

who for over four years had been killing their fellow-countrymen in China. Their participation in the war effort in Malaya invariably made a valuable contribution to the Allied Forces. Even more important, it laid the ground for the Australians and the local population to fight together against a common enemy and to co-operate in many other ways. These were important factors in promoting friendship and creating a better understanding between the two people.

The first contact of the A.I.F. with the enemy was at Gemas on 14 January 1942. [1] The Japanese fell into a well-planned ambush by the A.I.F. and a few hundred were killed. [2] This was one of the greatest blows the Japanese had suffered in their Malayan campaign. A speaker over Singapore Radio declared exultantly on that evening that the tide of battle was on the turn,'with the A.I.F. as our seawall against the vicious flood. '. [3] Bennett declared in the Straits Times on the next day that 'the Australians were confident that they would not only stop the Japanese advance, but would put them on the defensive.' [4] He was also quoted as saying 'the Japanese are getting the hardest blow they have had in this

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1. An interview with S.J. (Bill) Desmet, ex-serviceman of the 2/30th Battalion, 27 Brigade and ex-P.O.W. in Changi. He had served in Gemas during the first A.I.F. encounter with the Japanese. After the fall of Singapore, he was sent to Thailand to work on the railway project and on completion returned to Changi where he remained until the end of the war. He left for Australia in October, 1945; The Age, 17-1-1942; Melbourne Sun, 9-12-1955; Wigmore, pp. 212-215.
2. According to Bennett, the Japanese killed were conservatively estimated to be 800; 5 or 6 tanks were destroyed, and A.I.F. casualties were under 100; Telegram from Bennett to Sturdee, 17-1-1942, A.W.M. file, CAO A2663, Clasn no. 553/2/3.
3. Wigmore, p. 222.
4. The Straits Times, 16-1-1942; see also Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down (Singapore: Jitts and Co. Press, 1946), p.8.

war, and there are a lot more coming to them. ... the Australian can outmarch, outfight and outwit them.' [1] The Australians' victory over the enemy at their first encounter certainly served as a tonic to the defending forces as well as the local population. However, it was not before long that the newly found hope in the A.I.F. to repulse the Japanese attack was shattered, as they found themselves outnumbered and outflanked. On 19th Bennett was reporting to Sturdee that the city of Muar and its habour had fallen to the Japanese and Gemas was isolated, 'Further withdrawals contemplated in view of threat to communications from coast between Muar and Batu Pahat.' [2]

It must be noted though that the A.I.F. had fought most heroically for Muar and the first Victoria Cross was in fact awarded to an A.I.F. officer, Lt.-Col. C.G.W. Anderson, in the battle of Malaya. [3] Percival has written:

> The battle of Muar was one of the epics of the Malayan campaign. ... the award of the Victoria Cross to Lt.-Col. Anderson of the A.I.F. was a fitting tribute both to his own prowess and the valour of his men. [4]

On the same day when the Japanese were encountered at Gemas, the A.I.F. at Endau also made contact with the Japanese army. [5] As at Gemas, the A.I.F. was able to hold off the Japanese attack during the initial stage, but on 26 after the

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1. The Times (London), 17-1-1942.
2. Telegram from Bennett to Sturdee, 19-1-42, A.W.M. File, CAO A2663, Clasn. no. 553/2/3; see also The Times (London), 20-1-1942.
3. The Sunday Times (Singapore), 15-2-1942, for more detail on the battle of Muar, see Wigmore, pp. 222-249, Melbourne Sun, 9-2-1955.
4. Percival, p. 233.
5. Contact was made by a 2/19 Battalion patrol of the 22nd Brigade, thus constituted the first encounter with the enemy on the east coast of Johore; see Wigmore, p. 255 fn 7.

Japanese had landed there in full force, the defence at Endau and Mersing began to fall apart. [1] On 31 January, only 55 days after the landing at Kota Bahru, the Japanese had occupied Johore Bahru, [2] the whole of Malaya thus fell onto enemy hands. All defending forces in Malaya had retreated to Singapore Island by the morning of 31st, except for the Chinese guerillas who were still fighting behind the enemy lines[3], and the causeway was blown up behind them. [4]

The A.I.F. casualties in the Malayan campaign as announced by the Army Minister, F. Forde, were 1187 men. These included 183 confirmed dead, 645 missing and 359 wounded[5]. The greatly reduced strength of the two Australian brigades was however brought to strength by the Australian reinforcements which arrived in Singapore on 24 January and their losses of equipment were replaced. [6] It should be pointed out, though, that the reinforcements were largely untrained and inexperienced troops; a large portion had not even qualified in small-arms training. [7]

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1. The Straits Times, 27-1-1942; Wigmore, p. 267.
2. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1960), pp. 211-213; The Age, 2-2-1942.
3. According to Bennett over 1,000 trained Chinese Guerillas were passed behind and were still fighting the Japanese; see 'Report on Malayan Campaign', AWM File 417/1/1, Clasn. no. 553/5/16.
4. 'Report on Malayan Campaign', op. cit.; The Age, 2-2-1942; Directory of Singapore and Malaya, p.23.
5. The Age, 9-2-1942. Of the number missing, Bennett later reported to Forde that a very great majority managed to retreat to Singapore. See The Times (London), 7-2-1942.
6. Wigmore, p. 258; Melbourne Sun, 12-2-1955; Frank Owen, The Fall Of Singapore (London: The Quality Book Club, 1960), p. 145.
7. Melbourne Sun, 12-2-1955; C.G.W. Anderson, 13-3-1960, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 26, p. 818.

Map 1 : The Japanese Conquest of Malaya



Source: Wigmore, p. 280.

III. Defence of Singapore

After crossing the causeway, all military formations were moved straigth to the areas they had been alloted for the defence of Singapore Island. Percival's dispositions were as follows: [1]

Map 2

Disposition of Forces In Singapore
7 February 1942



Source: Wigmore, p. 286.

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1. See Collier, p. 191; Percival, The War In Malaya, p.p. 262-3 for detail .

The 8 Division A.I.F. and 44 Indian Brigade were given the Western Sector of Singapore Island to defend. This sector stretched from Woodlands right round the twenty miles of coast to Sungei (River) Jurong. Bennett was placed in charge of this sector, where it was highly probable that the Japanese would make their initial assault. Percival recorded that when the dispositions were made he regarded the Western Sector of the island as the danger area, adding 'I had specially selected for it the A.I.F. ...because I thought that, of the troops which had had experience of fighting on the mainland, it was the freshest and most likely to give a good account of itself'.[1] This was a notable tribute to the fighting qualities of the Australians by a man who had employed them in action. Bennett set up his headquarter at Hillview Estate, in Jurong Road, about 1,400 yards north-west of Bukit Timah Village.[2]

In detail, Bennett's disposition of his forces in the Western Sector was as follows:[3]

> Causeway Sector: 27th Australian Brigade, Brigadier Maxwell (2/26th, 2/29th, 2/30th Battalions) with 13th Anti-Tank Battery, 2/12th Field Company, 'B' Company 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion, and 2/9th Field Ambulance under command; 2/10 Field Regiment, less one battery, in support.
>
> North-west Sector:22nd Australian Brigade, Brigadier Taylor (2/18th, 2/19th, 2/20th Battalions) with 15th Anti-Tank Battery, 2/10 Field Company, 'D' Company 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion, 2/10th Field Ambulance under command; 2/15th Field Regiment, less one battery, in support.
>
> South-west Sector; 44th Indian Brigade, Brigadier Ballentine (6/1st, 7/8th, 6/14th Punjab Regiments) with 16th Anti-Tank Battery, a field Company of Indian sappers and miners, 'C' Company 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion under command, 19th Battery 2/10th Field Regiment and 65th Battery 2/15 Field Regiment in support.[4]

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1. Percival, The War In Malaya, p. 262.
2. An interview with Bill Desmet; see also Wigmore, p. 297.
3. See Maps 3 and 4.
4. Bennett, 'Report on Malayan Campaign', op. cit.; Wigmore, p. 297.

When the Allied Forces retreated to Singapore, a force of Chinese Volunteers was organised to join the defence of the Island. This force, known as Dalforce, [1] expanded rapidly with the encouragement of the government and Percival himself.[2] The first group of Dalforce, 1,000 strong and fully armed, left for the front on 1st February. [3] The position alloted to them was between Sungei Buloh Kechil and Sungei Buloh Besar (see map 3), in the Western Sector held by the A.I.F. On the 5th. there were more lorry loads of newly trained Chinese volunteers moving to the front. [4] The participation of the Chinese volunteers marked the first occasion on which Singaporeans had been armed. They co-operated closely with the A.I.F. in the defence of Singapore.

The possibility of holding Singapore was looked upon as hopeless even before the Japanese had begun their invasion of the island. The only question then was how long Singapore could hold out. As early as 21 January, the Chiefs of Staff in London had been concerned about demolitions. Percival was instruted that 'should the worst come to the worst, nothing which could be of any use to the enemy should be omitted from the general scorched-earth scheme.' [5] After

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1. The name Dalforce derived from its cammander Lt. -Col. J.D. Dally, an officer of the Federated Malay States Police Force, who took charge of the Chinese Volunteer Force since it was organised in Malaya. The men of the Dalforce in Singapore were called 'Dalcoes'; see The Times (London), 6-2-1942.

2. Percival, p. 263; Smyth, p. 21-26, 3,000 Chinese volunteered for service during the first few days of February; see Directory of Singapore and Malaya [Chinese edition] (Singapore: The World Book Co., 1959), p. 23.

3. The Times (London), 4-2-1942.

4. The Times, 6-2-1942; Morrision, p. 171; Daily Telegragh, 9-2-1942; The Age, 9-2-1942.

5. Telegram from the Cs.O.S. to Percival, 21-1-1942, quoted in Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 83.

the fall of the entire Malay Peninsula, the general view was that nothing in the world could save Singapore. [1] In Churchill's cable to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee of 2 February, he stated:

> What is indispensable is: first, the naval base should be completely wrecked, so that the docks and workshops are rendered utterly useless for at least eighteen months; and secondly, the fortress guns should be destroyed and rendered unusable for a similar period. Thus Singapore will lose its value to the enemy as an effective naval base.[2]

Bennett was even more pessimistic about the possibility of defending Singapore. He was quoted as saying 'when we cross to the Island, we will be like rats in a trap.' [3]

The Japanese plan of invading Singapore included deception on a large scale. The Japanese Guard Division created an impression that the landings were to be made in the northern sector. From 3 February to 8th the defences and installations in that sector were subjected to heavy shelling and intensive air attacks which were easily mistaken as 'softening up' before an attack. Meanwhile the 5th and 18th Japanese Divisions were making secret preparation to attack the western sector held by the A.I.F. The deception plan reached its height on the night of 7th when a landing was made on Pulau Ubin, an island opposite Changi. Everything possible was done to divert attention from the west to the east of the island. [4] The Japanese plan was however not very successful as an Australian patrol crossed to the mainland on the night of 4/5 February and returning on the night of 6/7, reported that

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1. See Percival, 'Notes on Malayan Campaign', op. cit.
2. Telegram from Churchill to Ismay, 2-2-1942, quoted in Churchill, vol. IV,p.83.
3. Melbourne Sun, 9-2-1955.
4. Ibid., 12-2-1955.

Map 3

Dispositions of 22 Brigade at 10 p.m. on February 8



Source: Wigmore, p. 310.

there were large concentrations of Japanese force between Sungei Perpat and Sungei Skudai opposite the Australian front. [1] Thus the Australians were fully aware that the Japanese were going to invade Singapore on their sector.

The Japanese invasion of Singapore began at about 10.30 p.m. on February 8, when assault troops of the 5th and 18th Japanese Divisions began to land in the sector held by 22nd Australian Brigade. The first contact of the two armies was made at 10.45 p.m. to the west of Kranji River. [2] Thereafter the A.I.F. and Dalforce were engaged in heavy fighting with the Japanese. Many of the Japanese initial landings were repulsed but the defending forces were thin on the ground and the Japanese were able to get ashore at many points during the early hours on the 9th. Once ashore, the Japanese infiltrated steadily between the widely scattered defence areas. By 9 a.m., on the 9th, the Japanese had gained control of the Ama Keng neck, [3] which was essential for them to debouch into the Tengah airfield region and to gain control of the road which led to the heart of the island.

The obvious place for the A.I.F. to organise a stop line was the narrow neck of land between the headwaters of Kranji and Jurong Rivers. [4] The 22nd Brigade and the 44th Indian Brigades were ordered back to this position, and reinforced by two battalions from the command reserve. The Japanese advance was halted temporarily at this line on the 9th. [5]

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1. General Bennett, 'Report on Malayan Campaign', op.cit.
2. The Straits Times, 9-2-1942; Singapore Free Press, 9-2-1942; The Age, 10/11-2-1942; 'Singapore Assignment', Nippon Times, 24-5-1943; Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 86; Wigmore, p.p. 308-320.
3. Kirby, Singapore, p.p. 234-5; Owen, p.p. 169-72; The Age, 10-2-1942.
4. The line of defence was known as the Jurong line, see Map 2.

Map 4

Causeway Sector at 8 p.m. on February 9



Source: Wigmore, p. 328.

Throughout the day time on the 9th, the causeway sector was under heavy artillery and air bombardment. Although no serious casualties were caused, the Japanese bombardment cut off the communication lines of the 27th Australian Brigade. At 8.30 p.m. the Japanese launched their assault on the front of 27 Australian Brigade, between the causeway and Kranji River. [1] Although suffering considerable losses during the initial stage of landing, the Japanese manage to get ashore and drove the Australians back to Kranji village. Here the Australians held the Japanese attack stubbornly and no further grounds were lost. [2]

About midnight, after communications between 27 Brigade headquarters and the forward battalions were re-established, Brigadier Maxwell, completely out of touch with the real situation on his front, gave the commander of his left-hand battalion authority to pull back both his own battalion and the battalion on his right if he saw fit to do so, [3] The result was that at about 4 a.m. on February 10 both battalions withdraw to the angle of the Mandai and Woodlands Roads, uncovering the stretch of road and railway south-west of the causeway. Neither the Northern Area headquarters, nor even the Western Area headquarters, knew that they had marched out of the vital causeway region until after day had broken on the 10th. [4]

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5. Churchill, vol. IV, p.p. 86-7.

1. The Straits Times, 11-2-1942; Singapore Free Press, 11-2-1942; The Times (London), 11-2-1942; Wigmore, p.p. 328-33; Churchill, vol. IV, p. 87.

2. Wigmore, p. 332.

3. Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. I, p.p. 381-2; Collier, p. 196,

4. Kirby, Ibid., p. 383; Owen, p. 179.

The grave military consequence of this unnecessary and unauthorised evacuation was that it suddenly exposed at least two miles of the left flank of 11 Division in the Northern Area and also exposed the right rear of the 22nd Brigade. The Japanese were able to gain free access to the main road from the causeway into Singapore. At this stage, the Japanese were virtually in command of the island. A further consequence of the withdrawal was that the commander of the 12th Brigade, finding no Australians to the north of him and recognising that there was nothing to stop the Japanese from driving straight down the main road in his rear, decided on his own initiative to withdraw his brigade from the northern end of the Jurong Line to the Bukit Panjang cross-road, from where he could prevent the Japanese from Kranji sweeping down on Bukit Timah. Thus by noon the northern part of the Jurong switch line had been abandoned. [1]

At the southern end of the Jurong switch line 6/15 and 44 Brigades were in position astride the Jurong road during the day on the 10th. Although their position had been heavily bombed and subjected to machine-gun fire during the morning, neither brigade had been attacked. But during the night when the Japanese sent forward patrols, both brigades withdraw towards the inner ring of defences in the neighbourhood of Reformatory Road. [2] Thus by dark on the 10th, the Jurong switch line on which the security of Singapore Island depended had been entirely abandoned.

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1. Melbourne Sun, 15-2-1955; Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. I, p. 385; Wigmore, p. 339; Collier, p. 196.
2. Kirby, Singapore, p. 238.

Map 5

Western Front at 7 p.m. on February 10



Source: Wigmore, p. 344.

After dark on February 10, the 5th Japanese Division supported by tanks began to advance east along the Choa Chu Kang Road, while the 18th Division moved up the Jurong Road. The advancing 5th Division overwhelmed 12 Brigade at Bukit Panjang and by midnight, Japanese tanks and infantry had reached Bukit Timah, where fortunately for the defence they halted. The 18th Division having met 22 and 44 Brigades, reached Reformatory Road during the early hours of 11th, and at dawn, after a good deal of confused fighting, also stopped. The difficulty of getting ammunition and supplies across Johore Straits precluded a resumption of offensive from this point before the 13th. [1]

February 11 was a day of confused fighting on the whole front. In the Western Area, Bennett had ordered a counter-attack in order to retake Bukit Timah and Bukit Panjang. However, due to the lack of co-ordination and fresh formations, no progress was made. In the Northern Area, Heath knowing that his corps was in an extremely dangerous position, decided to withdraw the entire corps from the north coast. By 6 p.m. the final demolition of the Naval Base area was completed and the 11th Division withdrew to a line running north-west covering Sembawang airfield and Nee Soon. [2] During the night, the Japanese Imperial Guards crossed the causeway and approached Nee Soon Village. On the same day, a Japanese aircraft dropped copies of a letter addressed to Percival, proposing that the garrison should surrender and providing the means by which

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1. Kirby, Singapore, p. 240; Wigmore, p.p. 345-350.
2. The Times (London), 12-2-1942; Singapore Free Press, 13-2-1942.

Percival could notify that he accepted the offer. [1] However, Percival decided to ignore the proposal.

Shortly before dawn on the 12th., the Imperial Guards Division attacked 11 Division in its position covering Nee Soon, while 5th Division attacked the Race Course Area. [2] By the afternoon, the Australians were forced to withdraw to the general line of Adam-Farrer Road. When Percival received this news, he saw that there was a very real danger that the Japanese might break through on the axis of Bukit Timah Road and reach Singapore City. He therefore decided to abandon Changi and the North-east Coast and to concentrate the whole garrison in a twenty-eight mile perimeter round the city proper. [3] The 2nd Malay Brigade was on the right covering Kallang Airfield; on its left 11 Division covered Woodleigh to Bukit Timah Road; the 8th Australian Division held a sector from Farrer Road to Tanglin Halt, and the 44th Indian Brigade held the rest of the line to the coast. [4]

The Japanese made little ground during the 13th. The Malay regiment holding the Pasir Panjang ridge stubbornly repulsed the Japanese 18th Division. [5] The Australian Brigades held their ground south of Bukit Timah Village firmly and the enemy was unable to dislodge them. [6] On 14th the Japanese 18th

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1. See Appendix 7 for contents of the letter.
2. The Straits Times, 12-2-1942; Kirby, Singapore, p. 244.
3. Kirby, Ibid.; Singapore Free Press, 13-2-1942; The Straits Times, 14-2-1942.
4. Ibid.
5. Churchill, vol. IV, p. 89.
6. Kirby, Singapore, p. 244.

Map 6

Last Line of Defence at Daybreak on 14 February 1942



Source: Wigmore, p. 374

Division having found that it could not crack the Australians in its sector, moved south and launched an offensive parallel with the coast. The attack was carried out at 8.30 a.m. supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. At 4 p.m. an attack supported by tanks eventually succeeded in breaking through the Buona Vista part of the Perimeter. [1] By the morning of 15th February, 44th and 1st Malay Brigades were forced back to the outskirts of the city in the vicinity of Mount Faber.

As early as 13th February, Percival had assembled a meeting where all his principal staff officers and formation commanders were present. The possibility of organising a counter-attack to recapture Bukit Timah area was discussed but every one of the formation commanders stated that such an operation had no chance of success. Both Heath and Bennett advocated capitulation to save the population of the city from disaster. [2] Despite the gravity of the situation, Percival decided to continue the struggle in accordance with orders from General Wavell. [3] On February 15 the situation was further aggravated; in addition to the continuous shelling from the enemy, there were a number of air attacks on the city which caused heavy casualties to the population. Ammunition, fuel and food supplies were running low, and the essential water supply was expected to last no more than 24 hours. [4]

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1. Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 1, p. 141.
2. Bennett, 'Report on Malayan Campaign', op.cit.
3. See Wavell's telegram to Percival, 13/15/15-2-1942, Churchill, vol. IV, p.p. 91-4.
4. The Times (London), 17-2-1942; Percival, 'Notes on Malayan Campaign', op. cit.; Secret Story of Singapore's Occupation, A.M.W. File 1351 (3rd Series), Clasn. no. 181.1; Percival's telegram to Wavell, 15-2-1942, Churchill, vol. IV, p. 94; Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 1, p.p. 412-3.

In view of the hopeless situation and fearing that the Japanese might break into the crowded town with disastrous consequences for the inhabitants if he continued the defence, Percival decided to surrender. The terms of surrender were signed at 6.10 p.m. on February 15 at Ford Motor Factory north of Bukit Timah Village. It was agreed that hostilities would cease at 8.30 p.m. [1] and that Percival's troops, with the exception of a thousand men who would be allowed to retain their arms until further notice as guardians of law and order, should disarm themselves where they stood. [2] The control of Singapore thus passed smoothly from Britain to Japan. The fall of Singapore reverberated throughout the world as one of the greatest disasters in British history.

According to official sources, the total Australian casualties in the campaign in Malaya and Singapore were 18,490 [3]--the majority of these became prisoners-of-war in Singapore after the capitulation--of which 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, [4] 1,138 members of the A.I.F. managed to leave Singapore between 12 to 16 February. Of these, 131 were nurses and the rest included escapees and deserters. [5]

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1. Percival, The War In Malaya, p. 292; The Time, 16-2-1942; Kirby, Singapore, p. 250.
2. The Times (London), 16-2-1942; The Age, 17-2-1942; Collier, p. 198.
3. According to a telegram from the Australian High Commissioner in London to the Prime Minister, 19-2-1942, there were 17,000 A.I.F. personnel in Singapore prior to the Japanese invasion; see 'Prisoners of War and Internees in the Far East', CRS A816, Item 67/301/79.
4. Wigmore, p. 382.
5. A.W.M. File, CAO A2663, Clasn. no. 553/6/2.

Map 7

The Japanese Conquest of Singapore



Source: Churchill, vol. IV, p. 93.

General Bennett escaped from Singapore at about 1 a.m. on February 16 by a native boat. By various means, he returned to Melbourne on 2nd March. [1] Bowden was less fortunate; he escaped on board Mary Rose on February 15, but the vessel was intercepted by two Japanese patrol vessels before dawn on the 17th. He was later murdered by Japanese guards on Banka Island after he had tried to insist on his diplomatic rights.[2]

When the war in Malaya was still progressing a small number of refugees from Malaya and Singapore were allowed into Australia. The number was limited because of strict restrictions placed by the Australian Government. On 19 January 1942, the Straits Times stated that only 50 evacuees were allowed to be admitted into Australia, and each evacuee was required to have enough funds for two years stay, although they were permitted to reside not longer than an initial period of twelve months. As such only a small number of the more wealthy, especially businessmen and their families, were able to take refuge in Australia in the beginning. [3] Australia's policy on refugees from Singapore and Malaya were later relaxed as the whole of Malaya was about to fall to the Japanese. The numbers of refugees were not limited but each evacuee was still required to pay their own passage money to Australia. The cost of the passage might be repaid by working in Australia. As a result, about

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1. Wigmore, p.p. 381-4, Kirby, Singapore, p. 246.
2. Wigmore, p.p. 385-6. It may be interesting to point out that on 11-2-1942 Bowden received a telegram from the External Affairs Department instructing him that 'if worst comes, you and your staff are to insist on receiving full diplomatic immunities, privileges and courtesies'; see CRS A981, Item Australia 237B.
3. The Straits Times, 19-1-1942; The Age, 14-1-1942, 'Civilian Refugees from Malaya', MP151/1, Item no. 466/201/30.

14,000 Malayan refugees made their way to Australia during the second world war. [1]

The fall of Singapore involved a completely new situation for Australia. Curtin declared that 'the fall of Singapore was Australia's Dunkirk--the opening of the Battle for Australia.' He urged that 'our honeymoon is finished, now we must fight or work as never before.' [2] He told Australians in a national broadcast that:

> ...everything they had must be mobilised. No longer was there a time factor on which complacency could place its anaemic reliance, no longer could they allow the stultification of their efforts by depending on external support. The protection of Australia was no longer a contribution to the world, but a resistance to the enemy threatening to invade her own shore. 3

The fall of Singapore also spelt the end of one phase of the Australian connection with, and massive dependence on, Britain. In its place, another connection emerged in the 'full blooded alliance' [4] with America. [5] Indeed, without the aid of America, Australia did not stand a chance to defend itself, and the efforts put in by the A.I.F. in delaying the Japanese in Singapore-Malaya were truly the most important time gained in order for America to send help to Australia.

Perhaps the most significant part of Australia's

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1. Boyce, 'Twenty-one Years of Australian Diplomacy in Malaya', p. 96.
2. The Times (London), 17-2-1942; The Age, 17-2-1942.
3. Ibid.
4. See Menzies, 16-12-1941, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 169, p. 1096.
5. V. D'Cruz, 'Menzies's Foreign Policy, 1939-41', The Australian Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 3, September, 1967, p.44.

participation in the Malayan campaign was that it was the first time so many Australians had gone to Singapore-Malaya. This provided the base for mutual understanding, appreciation and co-operation, and thus created better friendship. Doubtless, Australians had gone to Singapore-Malaya with the sole purpose of defending their own country, but in doing so they also contributed to the defence of Singapore-Malaya. In the minds of the local population, the Australians were friends and were there to protect them from enemy intrusion.

On the other hand, the local population also did all they could to co-operate with the A.I.F. as well as other defending forces; from actual fighting to all aspects of civil defence works which involved the whole population, young and old.[1] Such co-operation had never taken place in the history of both countries. In Bennett's report on the Malayan campaign, he fully appreciated the co-operation given to the A.I.F. by the Chinese, Indians and Malays. He recorded that he had not received even one report of unfriendliness from the natives.[2] Bennett also paid tribute to the white population in Singapore and Malaya for their devotion to duties and heroism. All white men residing in Singapore-Malaya of military age, except those engaged in essential services, were in the volunteer forces.[3]

IV. Prisoners-of-War In Singapore

Following the Japanese victory in Singapore, a large

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1. See The Times (London), 31-1-1942.
2. Bennett, 'Report on Malayan Campaign', op. cit.
3. Ibid.

number of Australians became prisoners-of-war. According to official sources, 15,384 Australians were taken in Singapore; [1] this figure was by far the largest number of Australians ever taken prisoner in a single operation. [2] At 2 p.m. on February 17 the Australians were moved by route march to Changi, which was the Prisoner-of-War Headquarters on Singapore Island for the rest of the war. [3] The A.I.F. area of Changi until June 1944 was the Selarang Barracks.

Map 8: Changi Area



Source: A.S.Walker, Australian In The War Of 1939-45--Middle East and Far East (Canberra: Australian War Memrial, 1953), p. 526.

1. See p. 100, fn. 3.
2. The figure was estimated by the Central Army Records Office, Melbourne. According to Lt.-Col. Galleghan's 'Interim Report--PW Camps, Singapore', the number of Australians were 14,972, see Wigmore, p. 511.
3. Interviews with Desmet and Harry Ballans. Ballans was a

The Australian prisoners of Japan were at the outset in the unique circumstance of being responsible for their own administration. [1] Bennett was replaced by Maj-Gen. Gallaghan in command of the A.I.F. as soon as he escape from Singapore. From the beginning the Australians organized themselves energetically. All ranks were warned of their liability to military discipline as prisoners of war, and strict supervision of the issue of food and clothing was instituted. [2] A comprehensive education scheme was commenced within the camp, and by 1 March three departments--Agriculture, Business Training and General Education--directed by Brig. H.B. Taylor, were functioning. Other departments or faculties such as Languages, Engineering, Law, Medicine and Science soon followed. Thus there was a period of lectures during the first few months in Changi. [3]

The Australians had their own hospital within the Barrack. Both preventive and curative medicine were performed by the Australian medical staff. The most common diseases dealt with by the hospital were typhus, malaria, dysentery, disorders of the skin and digestive ailments. The hospital had its own operation theatre, X-ray equipment, dental and physiotheraphy centre. [4]

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3. Staff-Sergeant of 2/18 Battalions, 22 Brigade. He was first a P.O.W. at Changi, but later served at Pulau Blakang Mati, where he remained until the end of the war. Ballans is now a Secretary of a R.S.L. at ANZAC House, Sydney; see also D. Griffin, 'The Changi Backdrop', Stand To, February 1952, p. 5.

1. Griffin, p. 5.

2. Griffin, p. 10; Wigmore, p. 512; Smyth, p.p. 268-9.

3. Wigmore, p.p. 516-7; The Western Australian (Perth), 21-2-1953.

4. Prisoners of War and Civilians in Far East, CRS A816, Item no. 37/301/277A; see also Walker, p.p. 535-45.

The prisoners were issued with limited rations of rice, meat, dried fish, flour, vegetables, milk, sugar, salt tea, and cooking oil. However, the Australians were able to supplement themselves with more food when the A.I.F. Gardening Scheme, Poultry Farm and Fishing Group began to yield produce. [1]

During the night a black market business was run through the wires at Changi. The business flourished as time progressed and it was the only time the prisoners had any contact with the outside world during the initial period of confinement. [2] It was on these occasions that goods were bought or exchanged, and more important, the Australians were able to find their contacts. Frequently these contacts were able to offer the prisoners the best price for goods; they also help obtain essential items such as tools and medical supplies.[3]The black market was illegal, but due to the high incidence of graft among those charge with its suppression, it continued to flourish. [4]

Within a week of the Australians' arrival in Changi, the Japanese had begun to appreciate the value of the enormous labour potential that had fallen into their hands, and work parties were formed to perform a variety of tasks in war damaged Singapore and the adjacent mainland. [5]

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1. An interview with Ballans; see also Wigmore, p.p. 513-7, Walker, p. 554.
2. The Western Australian (Perth), 21-2-1953.
3. An interview with Desmet.
4. The Western Australia, 21-2-1953.
5. Wigmore, p. 519.

These included mainly road and construction works; moving freight at railway stations, wharves and godowns; and the removal of mines which had been planted by the Australians.[1] The jobs were all arduous but were welcomed by the prisoners because they freed them from the monotonous living within a restricted area in Changi. Prisoners were given accommodation at their places of work, some of which had much better facilities than those in Changi. They were also able to buy extras from the canteens when in June working pay became available.[2] Working parties also had opportunities to loot dumps and raid godowns. Some local Chinese passed food, money and messages to the prisoners at the risk of their lives.[3] One ex-prisoner re-called that when the Australians were first let loose from Changi, the Chinese, even little girls and boys, passed food to them whenever they could, a gesture which all prisoners always remembered and appreciated.[4] The first work party, 750 strong, left Changi on 22 February; by May the number had increased to 8,200.[5]

From May 14, 1942 large Australian work parties began to leave Singapore for overseas appointment. The details were as follows:

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1. Wigmore, p. 519, Walker, p.p. 554-6.
2. Griffin, p. 12.
3. Wigmore, p. 519; D. Russell-Roberts, Spotlight On Singapore (London: Times Press, 1965), p. 281.
4. An interview with Desmet.
5. Wigmore, p. 519, Walker, p.p. 554-6.

Table 1

Australian Work Parties Departed From Singapore

Unit	Number	Date Departed	Destination
		1942	
'A' Force	3,000	May 14	Burma
'B' Force	1,496	Jul. 8	N. Borneo
'Senior Officer' Force	All Officer above the rank of Lt.-Col.	Aug. 16	Formosa
'C' Force	563	Nov. 30	Japan
		1943	
'D' Force	2,242	Mar. 14-18	Thailand and Burma
'E' Force	500	Mar. 31	N. Borneo
'F' Force	3,600	Apr. 18-26	Thailand
'G' Force	200	Jun. 26	Japan
'H' Force	600	May	Thailand
'J' Force	300	May 16	Japan
'K' Force*	230	Jun.	Thailand
'L' Force*	115	Aug.	Thailand
Total ...	12,647 (excluding 'Senior Officer' Force)		

Note: *'K' and 'L' Force consisted of medical officers and orderlies.

Source: Prisoners of War and Internees in Far East, CRS A816, Item no. 67/301/79, Encyclopedia of Australia, vol. 9, p.p. 487-8, Wigmore, p.p. 519-31, 541-92, 600-2, 612, Walker, p.p. 621-25, Smyth, p. 271, Griffin, p.p. 11, 13-4.

The departure of these large work parties greatly reduced the number of Australians in Singapore. However, some prisoners who had been sent to Burma and Thailand returned to Singapore after they had completed the projects there.[1] Some Australians taken prisoner by the Japanese in the East Indies were also transferred to Singapore before the

1. An interview with Desmet.

end of the war.

During the Japanese occupation, the main contacts between Australia and Singapore were the Australian government's efforts to help the prisoners. Various diplomatic means were taken by the Australian government to protect and seek better treatment for their servicemen. Food and medical supplies were sent to Singapore through the Red Cross, although these seldom reached the prisoners. Negotiation on P.O.W.s were held but they were abortive. [1] In 1943, the Australian government successfully persuaded the Japanese authorities to broadcast messages from the prisoners to people in Australia. [2] However, the broadcasts were not frequent and many prisoners in Singapore did not know of their existence. [3] From March 1943, the prisoners began to receive letters from home, although this again was not frequent. Most prisoners received only three to four letters from home throughout the period of their captivity. [4] In fact the only direct means by which the prisoners got in touch with world events were through secret wireless sets hidden in their camp. [5]

Although the Australian government had put in every effort to help its servicemen, the Australian prisoners in

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1. Exchange of Civilian Prisoners of War with Japan, CRS A518, Item no. EQ16/2/1, Exchange of Prisoners of War and Internees with Japan, CRS A1608, Item no. AJ20/1/1.
2. Broadcasting to and from Japanese Area, CRS A1608, Item no. A020/1/1, P.S.Ryan, 6-10-1943, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 176, p. 213, Griffin, p. 11; only a limit of 25 words were allowed to be broadcasted.
3. Interviews with Desmet and Ballans.
4. Ibid., Wigmore, p.p. 525-6, Griffin, p. 11. A limit of 25 words were allowed to be written.
5. An interview with Ballans, Wigmore, p. 635.

Singapore in general suffered a long ordeal of hardship, sickness and malnutrition. An ex-prisoner recalled a load that normally took two persons to carry in the beginning of the captivity required six persons to carry by the end of the war. [1] This perhaps is the best way to describe the amount of strength lost by the prisoners during their captivity. Many of the prisoners' lives were save only by the considerable help given by the local population in the way of passing food, essential goods and medicines.

The first important Allied attack on Japanese-occupied Singapore was on 5 November 1944 when about 40 American aircraft raided the island. On 1 January 1945 there was a similar air raid. Thereafter the appearance of Allied aircraft became more frequent and by July Allied air raids on Singapore had become a daily affair.[2] In the meantime, Allied air raids on Japan itself were also intensified from the beginning of July 1945. On 6 August the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by an American B-29 bomber, on 9 August a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. By then there were only two paths the Japanese could take--one was unconditional surrender; the other amounted virtually to self-imposed destruction. [3]

On 10 August Tokyo Radio announced that Japan was willing to surrender and on 14th the Japanese formally

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1. An interview with Ballans.
2. Wigmore, p. 531.
3. G. Odgers, Australian In The War Of 1939-45--Air War Against Japan, 1943-45 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 491; Churchill, Triumph And Tragedy, vol. VI, p. 558.

agreed to surrender. President Truman of the United States at once announced the end of the war on the same day. The formal signing of the surrender document took place aboard the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. [1]

In Changi a secret wireless permitted the prisoners to follow the events which were taking place. The following words recorded by a young soldier in Changi on 10 August reflected the jubilant feeling of the prisoners when the wireless set received the news that the Japanese were willing to surrender:

> It's right, I tell you. I heard it myself. The Nips are going for the Parker. 2 You are free, Diggers. Think of it; free. 3

On 17 August the Japanese officially confirmed that the war was over at Changi. Thereafter working parties from all parts of Singapore and Johore began to return to Changi. [4] In early September, it was estimated that the Australian civil and military internees held in Changi were 186 and 5,516 respectively. [5]

The Allied landing at Singapore began in early September. By 7th, Allied occupation of Singapore was completed; 85,000 Japanese troops, 85 Generals and 6 Admirals were removed to Johore. [6] On 12 September the surrender

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1. Odgers, p. 493, Gill, p. 680, The Age (Melbourne), 3-9-1945.
2. This was one way of say the Japanese were reaching for a pen to sign the surrender document.
3. Griffin, p. 19.
4. Wigmore, p.p. 636-7.
5. The Western Australian (Perth), 5-9-1945.
6. Ibid., see also Courier Mail (Brisbane), 8-9-1945, Mercury (Hobart), 8-9-1945.

document was formally signed in Singapore. [1]

Following the surrender of the Japanese, a large scale evacuation of Australian servicemen from Singapore was conducted by air and by sea. The R.A.A.F. No. 2 Medical Air Evacuation Transport Unit was largely responsible for the air evacuation of Australians. Members of this Unit arrived Singapore on 12 September, and the following day some 95 sick prisoners were evacuated from Singapore to Labuan hospital. On 14 September, the Unit began flying Australian prisoners from the Malayan peninsula, Sumatra, Burma and Thailand into Singapore. As prisoners were recovered and flown to Singapore, some other Australians were evacuated to Australia in Dakota and Catalina aircraft. [2]

The greater number of Australians were however evacuated by sea. On 12 September the Australian frigate H.M.A.S. Hawkesbury with the inter-state liner Duntroon entered Singapore Straits; Hawkesbury became the first ship of the R.A.N. to enter Singapore habour after the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific. On 20 September Hawkesbury escorted Duntroon and a British troopship Arawa loaded with 8 Australian Division troops and released civilian internees back to Australia. [3] There was

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1. The Straits Times, 13-9-1945.
2. Odgers, p. 494, Forde, 29-8-1945, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 184, p. 4966.
3. Forde, Ibid., G.H.Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942-45 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968), p. 692.

a very touching scene as the ships sailed away from the Singapore habour. Duntroon signalled the following words:

> The little Chinese girls in their immaculate slack will remain always in their [the Australian prisoners'] memories, as will the kindness of the Chinese to the prisoners. 1

These perhaps were truly the words every Australian prisoner wished to say to the Chinese population in Singapore who throughout the captivity had consistently shown their concern and done their utmost to assist the Australian prisoners. [2]

By the end of September, the majority of Australian prisoners recovered in Singapore, Java and Sumatra had been evacuated to Australia, either by air or by ship from Singapore. [3] In October, all Australian prisoners, including those recovered in various parts of Southeast Asia and taken to Singapore, were evacuated. According to a report by the Australian High Commissioner in London, the number of Australian military and civilian internees evacuated from Singapore were 5,119 and 128 respectiviely. [4] This was more than one-third of the total number of Australians evacuated from all parts of South-East and East Asia. [5]

The three and a half years Japanese occupation of

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1. Gill, p.p. 692-3; these words are also exhibited at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
2. An interview with Ballans.
3. Other vessels responsible for the evacuation were Manunda, Oranje, Largs Bay and Esperance Bay, see Telegram from the Australian High Commissioner in London to the Prime Minister, 6-10-1945, P.O.W. in the Far East, CRS A816, Item no. 37/301/277A.
4. Telegram from the Australian High Commissioner in London to the Prime Minister, 6-10-1945, Ibid.
5. The total number of Australians evacuated from South-East and East Asia were 13,872, see Wigmore, p. 642.

Singapore had without doubt strengthened the friendship between the Australian and the Malayan people. The Chinese more than any other race risked their lives in aiding the Australian prisoners and internees. Australian recognition of this friendship in peril was expressed in the entirely non-official 'A.I.F. Malaya Chinese Nursing Scholarship Fund' sponsored by senior 8 Division officers and supported liberally by every returned 8 Division man. [1] The fund was the first ever given by Australians to the people in Singapore-Malaya. Many Australians who returned home still correspond with their friends in Singapore-Malaya; while those who did not correspond always retained in them an unforgettable memory of friendship and everlasting gratitude to the Malayan people. [2] Recognising the kindness of the Malayan people and standing on humanitarian ground, the Australian government also made their first ever donation--£750,000 worth of cloth, food and medical supplies--to the Malayan people as soon as the war was over. [3] So Australia's participation in the campaign in Singapore-Malaya had indeed served as a stimulus to the radical development of Australia's relations with Singapore-Malaya during the post-war period.

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1. R.J. Gilmore, 'Britain In The Near North: Malaya', in R.J. Gilmore and D. Warner (ed.), Near North (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1948), p. 157; an interview with Ballans.
2. See Turnbull, 15-3-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p.p. 884-5; an interview with Ballans.
3. Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), 1-10-1945.

V. Post-War Military Relations

The surrender of Japan marked the end of a war in which more Australians had been directly involved than on any previous occasion. For the first time in its history, the continent of Australia had suffered aerial bombardment and naval shelling, while nearly six thousand Australians had died in the defence of Australian territory in Papua, the Mandated territory of New Guinea, and the adjacent islands. [1] The war fully exposed Australia's vulnerability and heightened radically an awareness of the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to Australia. [2] The war also imparted to Australia a more vigorous and independent international outlook. Immediately after the war, Australia began to take an active part to ensure and promote international peace; and in searching for regional security in Southeast Asia.

Notwithstanding the disastrous experience of Australia's servicemen and the many differences Australia had with the British authorities during the war with Japan, Singapore-Malaya was still considered to be very much the front line of Australia's defence. No other military base in Southeast Asia or in Australia was considered by the Australian government to be of greater strategic importance than Singapore. As such, Australia's representation in Singapore was resumed as soon as it was liberated from the Japanese

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1. H.L.Anthony, 1-3-1949, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 201, p. 742.
2. K.H. Bailey, 'Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An Australian View', Foreign Affairs, vol. 24, no. 3, April 1946, p. 494; W. Levi, Australia's Outlook On Asia (London: Angus and Robertson, 1958), p.p. 170-9.

occupation. Proud superintended Australia's interest in the area until March 1946 when he was succeeded by K. Officer. On 26 March 1946 C. Massey commenced duty in Singapore as the first Australian Commissioner for Singapore-Malaya; [1] thus began Australia's diplomatic relation with the area in the peacetime.

In May 1948 following the outbreak of a communist insurrection in Malaya and a visit of Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery [2] to Australia, the Australian government authorized strategic planning to be developed on the official level, through the Australian defence machinery in conjunction with representatives of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, for the regional defence of the South-West Pacific area, the boundaries of which included Singapore and Malaya. [3] This was the formal beginning of what came to be known as ANZAM. [4]

ANZAM was not a treaty or written agreement but a term used to denote consultative arrangements for co-ordinating the defence interests of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. No formal document of any kind about ANZAM exists and its precise nature, standing and scope has never been made clear to the public. [5] It was clear

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1. The Straits Times, 27-3-1946; see also Boyce, 'Twenty-one Years of Australian Diplomacy In Malaya', p. 95.
2. Field Marshal Viscount B.L. Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
3. T.B. Miller, Australia's Defence Policies, 1945-65 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967), p.p. 9-10; Menzies, 31-5-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 208, p. 3465.
4. ANZAM stands for the Australian, New Zealand and Malayan Area.
5. A. Watt, Australian Defence Policy, 1951-63 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1964), p.p. 53-5; A. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy (London:

however that defence matters in Singapore-Malaya were dealt with by ANZAM. The establishment of ANZAM thus became the first agreement which involved Australia in the defence matters of Singapore-Malaya.

In June 1948 Britain decided to transfer headquarters of the British Pcific Fleet from Hong Kong to Singapore. Commenting on this decision, the Singapore Free Press predicted that 'Australian and New Zealand aircraft and troops are expected to play an active role in garrisoning Singapore'. [1] When the Emergency was declared in Malaya on 18 June 1948, [2] the sending of Australian forces to Singapore-Malaya became a subject of much discussion in Australia. [3] However, the Labor Government under J.B. Chifley decided to refrain from any direct military involvement in Singapore-Malaya. Chifley argued that the trouble in Malaya was 'a great upsurge of nationalism', adding 'it is a rebellion, in many respects an economic

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5. Cambridge University, 1967), p.p. 163-6; J. Slessor (et. al.), Collective Defence In South East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 20; T.B. Miller, Australia's Defence (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p.p. 69-76.

1. Singapore Free Press, 10 and 11-6-1948.

2. The declaration of a state of Emergency applied initially only to certain areas of Perak and Johore, but on 18 June, it was extended to the entire Federation of Malaya. Singapore had experienced communist-inspired industrial disturbances in the early months of 1948, and on 24 June a state of Emergency was also declared; see Statement by P.C.Spender, Current Notes, no. 21, 1950, p. 887; The Straits Times, 18, 19 and 25-6-1948; H. Miller, Jungle War In Malaya (London: Arthur Baker Ltd., 1972), p. 37.

3. It should be noticed that the Malayan Communist Party was organised on a Malaya-Singapore basis. See R. Clutterbuck, Riot And Revolution In Singapore And Malaya 1945-1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), for example. Successful pacification of the communist activities in Malaya was crucial in permitting Singapore to move towards political independence under a non-communist leadership.

rebellion, against conditions under which the people are living'. [1] Thus during the Chifley regime, apart from the supply of food, arm and ammunition, and other essential items, [2] no Australian forces were sent to Singapore-Malaya.

In 1949 came a startling accession to power of some communist parties. In Asia, a Communist Government was established in Peking; Mongolia became a communist state and North Korea a Soviet satellite. In Vietnam the communists were engaged in a revolutionary war against the French; and in Singapore-Malaya the communist terrorists [3] increased the scope and intensity of their activities. With the new situation also came a new government in Australia. In December 1949, a coalition of Liberal and Country Parties came into office with R.G. Menzies as Prime Minister. The new government took a determined and positive approach to deal with the new situation. Compulsory military service was introduced to strengthen and hasten Australia's defence preparation; the Colombo Plan was formed, which according to Spender was specifically designed 'to draw the teeth of Communist imperialism by carefully applied measures of economic assistance'. [4]

On 31 May 1950, following a request by the British

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1. A. Barcan, 'Australia and Malaya', Eastern World, vol. IX, no. 9, September 1955, p. 20.
2. Explosive Stores for Singapore 1944-48, MP Navy Series, Accsn no. 1810/2/403; The Age (Melbourne), 31-5-1950.
3. An official term used by the British; see for example Federation of Malaya Annual Report 1956, where Chapter XVI is entitled The Campaign Against the Armed Forces of the Malayan Communist Party, who are then referred to as Communist terrorists or terrorists. The term 'communist terrorists' is used in this chapter for convenience.
4. Spender, 9-3-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 206, p.p. 629-30.

Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, who visited Australia in early 1950, Menzies announced to the House of Representatives that the government had agreed to provide a transport squadron of Dakota C47 aircraft (No. 38 squadron) to Singapore for supply dropping and general transport service in connection with the campaign against the communist terrorists in Malaya. It was also announced that the R.A.A.F. crews and ground staff accompanying the squadron would total about 168. [1] Menzies' announcement marked Australia's first direct military involvement in Singapore-Malaya after the war.

In a statement he made on 30 May, Menzies emphasized the seriousness of the position in Malaya and pointed out that Australia had a vital interest in the situation in Malaya because of the relation of inescapable geographic and strategic facts to its security. He also explained that although the defence of Malaya was a responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, it was also part of the regional defence problem in the Pacific, which must be shared by Australia with the United Kingdom and other countries with interests in the area. [2]

On June 27 following discussions with the United Kingdom, Menzies made a further announcement that a second R.A.A.F. squadron (No. 1 Licoln Bomber Squadron) will be sent to Malaya. [3] The two R.A.A.F. squadrons were based at Tengah

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1. Menzies, 31-5-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol.208, p. 3464; The Age, 1-6-1950; Miller, Australia's Defence Policies 1945-65, p. 23; Australia In Facts and Figures (A.I.F.F.), no. 27, 1950, p. 31; New Zealand had maintained a flight of Dakota aircraft in Singapore since September, 1949.
2. The Age, 1-6-1950; A.I.F.F., no. 27, 1950, p. 31.
3. The Age, 28-6-1950; A.I.F.F., Ibid.; Barcan, p. 20.

Airfield in Singapore. The R.A.A.F. Dakotas beside dropping supplies such as ammunition, food, medicine and clothing to the ground forces fighting the terrorists in Malayan jungle, also lifted passengers over routes ranging from Ceylon to Japan and flew wounded and sick soldiers from various parts of Malaya to base hospitals in Singapore. [1] In December 1952, with the approval of the United Kingdom authorities, the Australian Government withdrew the Dakota squadron from Malaya because of Australia's very large transport commitments in the Korean War and because R.A.F, transport squadrons were able to cope with the requirements of the Malayan campaign. [2] The R.A.A.F. Lincoln bombers continued to be involved in a heavy schedule of bombings in the Malayan jungle until July 1958 when they were replaced by R.A.A.F. Canberra Jet Bombers. [3]

In January 1953 a R.A.A.F. officer, Air Vice Marshal F.R.W. Scherger, who was Head of the Australian Joint Services Staff in Washington, became the first Australian to be appointed as Air Officer Commanding Malaya. [4] His appointment came about as a result of discussion and agreement between the United Kingdom and Australian government. [5] Menzies

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 36, 1952, p. 23.
2. Ibid.
3. A.I.F.F., no. 59, 1958, p. 76; F.M. Osbourne, Minister for Air, 13-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p. 283; Osbourne, 7-8-1958, Ibid., p. 146.
4. His appointment was for a period of two years.
5. A.I.F.F., no. 35, 1952, p. 31.

stated that Australian government welcomed the opportunity of making an appointment of this nature, because of the undoubted benefit to the R.A.A.F. of the operational experience, which would be of particular significance in the present instance because the Command consisted of both R.A.A.F. and R.A.F. squadrons and because of Australia's strategic interests in Malaya. [1]

In 15 November 1953, as a result of Australia's increased responsibility and involvement in Singapore-Malaya and Southeast Asia as a whole, Casey announced the appointment of a senior External Affairs Officer, A. Watt, to Singapore as Australian Commissioner for South-East Asia. Watt, with the personal rank of Ambassador, arrived at Singapore on 23 March 1954 to take up his position. [2] His function were not limited to the representation of Australian interests in Singapore, Malaya, and the Borneo Territories; they also involved a degree of co-ordinating responsibility for Australian diplomatic posts in South-East Asia as a whole. [3]

In 1954 there were a series of military staff talks between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand on the defence of Singapore-Malaya, other British Territories in the region and Australia and New Zealand themselves. Means of strengthening the forces in the region were exten-

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 35, 1952, p.31.
2. R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, 8-8-1954, C.P.D. (H. ofR.), vol. 4, p.439.
3. Casey, 27-4-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 6, p. 209; A. Watt, Australian Diplomat (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1972), p. 203.

sively discussed. Following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in January 1955, it was announced that Britain, Australia and New Zealand would all contribute to a British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve based in Singapore-Malaya. Each country would supply an infantry battalion plus naval and air units.[1] On 1 April 1955 Menzies made a public announcement that Australia's contribution to the Strategic Reserve would comprise two destroyers or frigates, an aircraft carrier on an annual visit, a fighter wing of two squadrons, and an infantry battalion group. He stated that:

> These [Australian forces] are not in themselves massive forces. But taken in conjunction with forces to be provided by our sister countries, they will be some proof of the seriousness with which we take the Communist threat and will, I have no doubt, serve as some guarantee to the people of Malaya that their present orderly progress towards democratic self-government, a progress which enjoys the deeply sympathetic interest of Australia, will not be interferred with by dictatorial Communist agression.2

On April 20 Menzies explained in the House of Representatives that 'the Malayans welcome such a military arrangement as will help to preserve their present and future freedom. It so happens that the interest of Malaya and the interest of Australia on this point completely coincide'. [3] He further added that 'Australian troops in

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1. See A.I.F.F., no. 45, 1954-55, p. 5; Miller, Australia's Defence Policies 1945-65, p.p. 31-2. Apart from the strategic reserve, substantial amount of overseas forces have also served in Malaya in the campaign against the communist terrorists. They have been provided by Fiji, Rhodesia, and Kenya; see A.G. Townley, Minister for Defence, 1-9-1960, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 28, p. 773.
2. Menzies, 20-4-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 6, p. 51, Statement by Menzies, 1-4-1955; Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 279; A.I.F.F., no. 45, 1954-55, p. 5; Nanyang Shang Pau, 2-4-1955.
3. Menzies, 20-4-1955, op. cit., p. 49.

Malaya will represent not only a true defence in depth for Australia itself, but will represent also a source of strength to our Asian friends'. [1]

Before and after Menzies' announcement to send armed forces to the Malayan region, much discussion was aroused in Australia about the range of purposes of the Australian component in the Strategic Reserve. [2] Although Menzies made it clear in a statement of June 16 that Australian forces would be used in operations against the Malayan communist terrorists and that 'this decision allowing the use of Forces against Terrorists will not permit their use in relation to any civil disturbances or in the internal affairs of the Federation or Singapore', [3] the precise purposes were never made clear by the government. For instance, it was not clear whether the Australian forces would be used in the S.E.A.T.O. region, although Australian forces in the Strategic Reserve had participated in several S.E.A.T.O. exercises. [4] Nevertheless, Australia's contribution to the Strategic Reserve had added to the strength of the Malayan government in their effort to suppress the communist activities in Malaya.

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1. Statement by Menzies, 20-4-1955, Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 287; Menzies, 20-4-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 6, p. 50; Watt, Australian Defence Policy 1951-63, p. 56.
2. See Sydney Morning Herald, 11-2-1955; The Age (Melbourne), 5-7-1955; Watt, Ibid., p.p. 55-58; Miller, Australia's Defence Policies 1945-65, p. 32; Barcan, p. 20; A. Barcan, 'Australian Policy in S.E. Asia', Eastern World, vol. IX, no. 4, April 1955, p. 21.
3. Statement by Menzies, 16-6-1955, Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 419.
4. See The Age (Melbourne), 13-2-1956.

In January 1955, the Australian Chief of General Staff, Lt.-Gen. H. Wells visited Malaya and Singapore to study the latest development in jungle warfare and the tactics employed in the anti-terrorist campaign, and had talks with British military authorities. Obviously he was making preparation for the Australian forces before they were sent to Singapore and Malaya. During the same month twenty members of the R.A.A.F. Air Training Corps left for Malaya on a goodwill tour for three weeks. At the same time 19 Malayan cadets were sent to Australia for training. [1]

On 31 May 1955 Brigadier I.T. Murdoch arrived Singapore to take up the appointment of Brigadier, General Staff, General Headquarters Far East Land Forces. He became the first Australian army officer assigned for duty in the Malayan region after the war. [2]

In June 1955 the first ANZAM sea and air exercises were carried out. R.A.N. destroyers Arunta, Warramunga, Anzac, and the anti-submarine frigate Quadrant joined ships of the British Far Eastern Fleet and R.N.Z.N. and aircraft of R.A.F., R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. in exercises in the area between Darwin and Singapore, off the eastern coast of Malaya, and in the South China sea. After the exercises, Arunta and Warramunga remained in the Malayan waters as part of the Australian contribution to the Strategic Reserve. [3] These exercises were later conducted periodically and were instrumental in providing a good co-

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 44, 1955, p. 10.
2. A.I.F.F., no. 46, 1955, p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 17.

ordination of the three nation defence network in the region.

At the end of June, the First Naval Member of the Australian Naval Board, Vice-Admiral R.R. Dowling, attended a conference of naval and air force officers of the British Commonwealth countries in Singapore. It was announced on June 30 that an R.A.A.F. advance party of 30 officers and airmen would fly to Malaya in July. They were from No. 2 Airfield Construction Squadron (hereafter A.C.S.), Townsville, which was the first air unit to go to the Strategic Reserve. [1] The mission of the No. 2 A.C.S. was to extend the airstrip and construct facilities at Butterworth for the R.A.A.F. fighter and bomber squadrons to be stationed there. [2]

On 12 September 1955 an advance party of 456 officers and other ranks of the Australian forces arrived in Penang on board New Australia. The party included 263 officers and men of No. 2 A.C.S.; 187 officers and men of the Second Royal Australian Regiment (hereafter 2nd R.A.R.); and 6 officers of the Royal Australian Nursing Service. Their tasks were to complete the administrative and other arrangement for the main force. [3] The tour of duty of all Australian personnel posted to Malaya was two to two and a half years, and wives and families were permitted to accompany them at government expense . Arrangements were also made for

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 46, 1955, p. 17; Announcement by Townley, The Age (Melbourne), 1-7-1955; The Straits Times, 1-7-1955.
2. A.I.F.F., Ibid.; The Straits Times, 13-9-1955.
3. A.I.F.F., no. 47, 1955, p.p. 46-7; The Straits Times, 13-9-1955.

the education of children and medical care of wives and families; in addition, married couples were provided with domestic servants. [1]

Early in October 1955 the No. 2 Battalion, R.A.R., arrived in Penang on board the Georgic. [2] The Battalion received a warm reception by local people in Penang and the Australians were keen to be posted there. After intensive training at the island, they were moved to Kedah on 1 January 1956 for duty against the Malayan terrorists. [3]

The despatch of Australian troops to Malaya was strongly attacked by the Opposition Labor Party in Australia. The Leader of the Opposition, H.V. Evatt, considered it was a blunder on the government's part. [4] Labor's policy was to oppose the use of armed forces in Malaya. The Opposition believed that if the money spent on the troops in Malaya were spent in providing food or some form of education for the Malayan people, it would promote more sincere friendship and good feeling in Malaya. [5] J. Cairns M.P.,

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1. Ibid., J. Francis, Minister for Army and Navy 1949-55, 29-9-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 7, p. 1080; an interview with Jim Courtney, an ex-serviceman of the HQ28 Commonwealth Independent Infantry Brigade Group, who served in Malaya from September 1955 to November 1957. In April 1955, an Australian Services Treasury team went to Malaya to examine conditions of service and the pay and allowances for the Australian forces; see A.I.F.F., no. 46, 1954-55, p. 16.
2. An interview with Courtney; see also A.I.F.F., no. 48, 1948, 1955, p. 62.
3. Ibid.
4. Evatt, 22-2-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p. 122.
5. C.P.D. (H. of R.), G.W.A. Duthie, Opposition Whip in the House of Representatives, 8-3-1959, vol. 9, p. 656; G.M. Bryant, 13-3-1956, p.p. 718-9; Evatt, 22-2-1956, vol. 12, p. 901; P.E. Lucock, 8-3-1956, vol. 9, p. 663, C. Chambers, 14-3-1956, p. 769.

while addressing a conference of the Asian Students Federation at Cowes in March 1956 stated that Malaya wanted to get rid of all foreign troops, including Australians. He said that Malaya wanted to replace them with a national force in its march towards independence, He further added that Australia must recognise that Malaya was almost independent, and see its problem in a new light. It was no longer just an appendage of British colonial administration.[1]

The government in defending its decision pointed out that the Malayan people had welcomed the Australian troops.[2] Casey extracted two speeches made by the Chief Minister of Malaya, Tengku Abdul Rahman, to substantiate this fact. In the first, made at a meeting of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference on 8 February 1956, the Tengku stated:

> I say that as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations the Federation must make her contribution to the peace and well-being not only of the Commonwealth but also of the world. I feel that if the Federation is not able to provide the armed forces, then the least we should do is to agree to provide the facilities and bases for the stationing of British and Commonwealth forces in the Federation.

In the second, made at the Federal Legislative Council of Malaya on March 14, the Tengku stated:

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1. Melbourne Herald, 24-3-1956, see also R.J.D. Turnbull, Tasmania Treasurer 1948-59, Minister for Health 1956-59, 10-4-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p. 1177.
2. See Turnbull, 23-2-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p. 195 for instance.

> If we are to get help from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in maintaining our defence, we should welcome it...I am taking a realistic view of the situation in Malaya and I am certain that a majority of the people will accept my view particularly because of the Communist and other enemy activities even from within our own territory which in itself requires a very large force constantly occupied. 1

The Chief Minister of Singapore, David Marshall, faced with serious labour unrest and communist threat, was also agreeable to the sending of the Australian troops. 2

The government believed that Australian troops were not in Malaya as trespassers or for some purpose hostile to the self-government of Malaya. On the contrary, they were to assist the constitutional growth of Malayan people upon a democratic line. 3 The Minister for Defence, P. McBride, in defending the large expenses incurred by Australia in sending troops to Malaya explained that:

> The value of this expenditure in the international sphere is the goodwill generated by the way in which we honour our obligations in combating cold-war agression. In military sphere, considerable benefits accrue to the services in the experience that they acquire. 4

The most important factor that affected the government's decision to send troops to Singapore-Malaya was perhaps Australia's traditional attitude of fighting the enemy away from its own shores. Menzies said at a press conference in 1955 that 'I call upon all Australians to realise the drastic truth. That truth is not that we can de-

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1. Casey, 11-4-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p. 1189.
2. Lucock, 29-9-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol 7. p. 1133.
3. The Governor General's speech, 15-2-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 9, p. 18.
4. McBride, 11-9-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 6, p. 369.

fend Australia by force or guns or battalions around the shores of Australia, but that if there is a war for our existence, it should be carried on as far from our own soil as possible.' [1] An article entitled 'We Must Help Malaya Until It Hurts Us' published in the Herald (Melbourne) on 15 February 1956 also supported the government's decision of sending troops to Malaya. The article believed that the government's decision was in the best interest of Australia under the circumstances at that time. [2]

The sending of Australian troops however had aroused some public criticism in Malaya. The Labour Party of Malaya demanded that the Australian troops should be sent home just after they had landed in Malaya. It believed that:

> The stationing of Australian troops in Malaya is an attempt not only to prolong colonial rule in this country by unnecessarily interferring in our internal affairs, but also to use this country as a battlefield for the defence of Australia. 3

The Labour Party also criticised the Malayan government for not instead accepting the Communist terrorists' offer of ending the Emergency by negotiation. [4]

The Secretary-General of U.M.N.O., Inche Senu, also protested against the arrival of the Australian troops. He believed that the presence of Australian troops in Malaya at that moment might be considered by the communist terrorists as an indication that the government's amnesty offer, which was carried out at that time, was not sincere. He was also against efforts by outside powers to turn Malaya

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1. The Straits Times, 2-4-1955.
2. The Herald (Melbourne), 15-2-1956.
3. The Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), 1-10-1955.
4. Ibid., see also Nanyang Shang Pau (Singapore), 2-10-1955.
5. United Malays' Nationalist Organisation.

into a war base. [1]

At the fourth delegate conference of the Singapore division of U.M.N.O. on 2 October 1955, the Tengku supported the stationing of Australian troops in Malaya; he argued that the Australian troops had a right to be in Malaya, that the Australian soldiers were to help Malaya. He added that the Emergency was costing Malaya $250 million a year; when it ended, the money could go towards improving living conditions. The Tengku also asked: 'If you want to protest against the Australians, what about the British, Fijians and Gurkhas?'. [2]

Indeed it may seem rather strange that criticism was only directed against the Australian troops. In fact, the criticism was mainly a kind of retaliation against Australia's White Policy. After the war, a large number of Malayan refugees were deported by Australia. It sparked off wide-spread hostility against Australia in Singapore and Malaya when a few Malay seamen who had married Australian women and had families in Australia were also deported. [3] It was such a background that created resentment at the stationing of Australian troops.

On 11 September 1956 McBride announced the number of Australian personnel serving in the Strategic Reserve as follows: Navy, about 500, Army, about 1,400 and air force, 600. [4] He also announced the estimated cost to Australia of

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1. Utusan Zaman (Kuala Lumpur), Editorial, 18-9-1955, the Singapore division of U.M.N.O. also expressed its views against the stationing of Australian troops, see Utusan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur), Editorial, 15-11-1955.
2. The Straits Times, 3-10-1955.
3. The Straits Times, Editorial, 4-6-1948.
4. McBride, 11-9-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 12, p. 369.

the programme of capital works for the Strategic Reserve in Malaya was approximately £2,400,000. [1] On September 26 he announced that the annual cost of maintaining the Australian forces in Singapore-Malaya was £2,380,000. This figure did not include normal pay and allowances for personnel. [2]

No. 2 Battalion R.A.R. remained in Malaya until October 1957 when it was relieved by No. 3 Battalion R.A.R.. [3] In October 1959 No. 1 Battalion R.A.R. arrived in Malaya to relieved No. 3 Battalion. [4] The R.A.N. had become involved in Malaya since September 1951 when the Australian government agreed to lend four General Purpose vessels to the Royal Navy for duties in the Malayan area. [5] The R.A.N. were later involved in several large scale ANZAM sea-air exercises in Malayan waters. Ships which had served in the Malayan area included aircraft carrier Melbourne; destroyers: Arunta, Warramunga, Anzac, Tobruk, Quiberon and Voyager; anti-submarine frigates: Quadrant, Queenborough and Quickmatch. [6] Before of the end of 1959, the Australian government agreed to make available a senior R.A.N. officer to command the Royal Malayan Navy for $2\frac{1}{2}$ years at the request of the Malayan government. He was

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1. Ibid.
2. McBride, 26-9-1956, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 12, p. 901.
3. J.O.Cramer, Minister for Army, 3-9-1957, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 16, p. 187, A.I.F.F., no. 56, 1957, p. 87.
4. Cramer, 1-10-1959, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 24, p. 1631, A.I.F.F., no. 63, 1959, p. 61.
5. A.I.F.F., no. 31, 1951, p. 27.
6. A.I.F.F., no. 48, 1955, p. 63, no. 49, 1956, p. 58, no. 53, 1957, p. 51, no. 58, 1958, p. 78, no. 61, 1959, p. 26, The Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), 7-10-1955.

Captain W.J.Dovers, who had commanded Voyager since January 1958. [1]

At the end of March 1958 No. 2 A.C.S. of the R.A.A.F. completed the construction work at Butterworth Air Base and on 1 July No. 2 Bomber Squadron, equipped with Australian-built Canberra Jet-bombers, arrived at the newly reconstructed Base. [2] With the arrival of this squadron, five Lincoln Bombers of No. 1 Squadron based at Tengah Air Base in Singapore returned to Australia on 7 July after eight long years of service in Malaya. [3] On 11 November, No. 3 Squadron, equipped with Australian-built Avon-Sabre supersonic Jet-fighters arrived at Butterworth to join the Strategic Reserve. [4] In February 1959 No. 77 Squadron, also equipped with Avon-Sabre Jet-fighters, arrived at Butterworth, thus completing the Australian obligations in the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. [5]

It is worth noting here the development of Australia's representation in Singapore-Malaya. In 1955 Singapore and Malaya were moving in separate ways towards self-government and independence. The first election in Singapore was held on 2 April 1955. [6] The election in Malaya was held on 27

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 64, 1959, p. 34.
2. Ibid., no. 57, 1958, p. 21, no. 59, 1958, p. 77, No. 2 Squadron was flown from Amerly, Queensland.
3. Ibid., no. 59, 1958, p. 76, F.M. Osbourne, Minister for Air, 7-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p. 146, 13-8-1958, p. 285.
4. Ibid., no. 60, 1958, p.p. 29-30, Osbourne, 28-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p. 850, No. 3 Squadron was flown from Williamtown, New South Wales.
5. Ibid., no. 61, 1959, p. 28, Osbourne, 2-9-1958, Ibid., vol. 21, p. 1551.
6. Nanyang Shang Pau, 3-4-1955, The Straits Times, 3-4-1955.

June in the same year.[1] After the elections in Malaya, Casey announced on 11 November 1955 the appointment of T.K. Critchley as Australia's Commissioner to Malaya. Critchley, head of the Pacific and American Branch of the External Affairs department before his appointment, opened a new office at Kuala Lumpur.[2] By the end of 1955, SEATO was in existence and functioning and D.O. Hay, Australia's Ambassador in Thailand was well qualified to carry out the functions of Council Representative at the SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok. It was therefore no longer necessary for the post of Australian Commissioner for Southeast Asia held by A. Watt with offices in Singapore. In January 1956 Watt was transferred to Japan as Australian Ambassador while R.L. Harry[3] became Australia's Commissioner in Singapore. He also looked after Australia's interests in Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. On 31 August 1957 the Federation of Malaya became a fully independent country and the rank of Critchley was upgraded to High Commissioner.[4]

On 12 October 1957 a Defence Agreement[5] was signed between the United Kingdom and the Malayan government.[6]

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1. Nanyang Shang Pau, 28-6-1955, The Straits Times, 28-6-1955.
2. Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 777, Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 234, A.I.F.F., no. 48, 1954-55, p. 33.
3. R.L.Harry was formally Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations and Counsul-General to Switzerland, see A.I.F.F., no. 49, 1956, p. 67.
4. 'File on Diplomatic Representatives in Singapore-Malaya', Department of External Affairs' Library, Canberra, Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 242, A.I.F.F., no. 49, 1956, p. 67, no. 56, 1956, p. 57.
5. See Watt, Australian Defence Policy 1951-63, p.p. 79-82 for contents of the Agreement.
6. Menzies, 31 August and 1 September 1960, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 28, p. 668.

Under Article I of the Agreement 'The Government of the United Kingdom undertake to afford to the Government of the Federation of Malaya such assistance as the Government of the Federation of Malaya may require for the external defence of its territory' and under Article III ' The Government of the Federation of Malaya will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to maintain such naval, land and air forces <u>including a Common wealth Strategic Reserve</u> as are agreed between the two Governments to be necessary for the purpose of Article I ...'.[1] The Australian forces based in Malaya formed part of the Commonwealth strategic Reserve and the Australian Government although not a party to the Defence Agreement itself, had exchanged letters with the Malayan Government to associate itself formally with those provisions of the Agreement which were applicable to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.[2] A paragraph of the letter by the Australian government dated 24 March 1959 was as follows:

> As you know,the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve referred to in the (Anglo-Malayan) Agreement, ...includes Australian forces which are or may from time to time be serving in the Federation. Accordingly, the various provisions applicable to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, in particular the provisions dealing with the status of forces, apply in respect of these Australian forces.

On 21 April 1959 the Prime Minister of Malaya replied as follows:

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1. Watt, <u>Australian Defence Policy 1951-63</u>, p.p. 79-82.
2. Menzies, 31 August to 1 September 1960, <u>C.P.D. (H. of R.)</u>, vol. 28, p. 668.

> I confirm that your letter correctly sets out the understanding between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Australian Government and, in accordance with the suggestion contained in your letter, agree that your letter and this reply to be regarded as placing that understanding on record. 1

In September 1960 the Minister for Defence A. Townley, announced the strength of the Australian forces serving in Singapore-Malaya as part of the Strategic Reserve as follows:

> Navy: two destroyers or frigates, total complement approximately 500;
> Army: one infantry battalion and supporting units, total strength 1,240;
> Air Force: one light bomber squadron and two fighter squadrons with supporting element, total strength 800. 2

The total annual cost of maintaining the forces, excluding pay and allowances for the servicemen, was £2.5 million. [3] The Australian army and air force personnel were mainly stationed at Penang and Butterworth, while the naval personnel were mainly in Singapore. Singapore served as the base for Commonwealth military, air and naval supply and was the Headquarters of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. [4]

Australia's military presence after the war continued to create better understanding and a kind of inter-dependence between Australian and the Malayan people. It was strategic and security considerations that made Australia decide to send its forces to Singapore-Malaya; and Singapore-Malaya needed Australian forces to add to its strength to curb the

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1. See Appendix 8 .
2. Townley, 1-9-1960, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 28, p. 773.
3. Ibid., notice the slight increase from the amount announced by McBride in September 1956, see p.132 .
4. See Sydney Morning Herald, 23-5-1958.

terrorists' activities. So as Menzies said, 'the interest of Malaya and the interest of Australian on this point completely coincide'. [1] Although Australia's military contribution to the Malayan area was small in monetary terms compared with the United Kingdom's contribution, it had its political, economic and cultural significance to Singapore-Malaya:-(1) The Australian forces have played a useful part in reducing the incidence of communist terrorism in Singapore-Malaya, thereby restoring social order and allowing Malaya to progress towards independence in 1957, and Singapore to self-government in 1959, upon democratic lines.[2] (2) It helped to reduce the burden of defence expenditure of Singapore-Malaya which could be used on economic development and other social services. (3) It helped to create employment for the local populatien. This included white collar, blue collar and domestic service jobs. The higher spending power of the Australians also stimulated housing, furniture, transport, tailoring, laundry, retail and entertainment businesses and industries in Singapore and certain towns in Malaya. [3] (4) The presence of Australian forces after the war also broadened the base of social contacts and cultural exchange between Australian and the Malayan people. Friendship between the two peoples had been established

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1. Menzies, 20-4-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 6, p. 49.
2. McEwen, 5-9-1957, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 16, p. 343.
3. An interview wih Courtney.

during the war. So both nationals were able to accept each other more readily when the Australians returned to the Malayan scene. The decision to allow wives and children of personnel to accompany them provided a wider base for contacts. Wives and children of Australian servicemen easily made friends with the local people; friends and relatives of Australian servicemen also became more acquainted with Singapore-Malaya through visits or correspondence. All these activities helped to create a far better understanding and appreciation between the two peoples.

CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE 1946-59

Australia had greater and more diversified economic interests in Singapore during this period. Trade between the two countries increased sharply and Australia increasingly became a natural source of supply for Singapore; more Australian manufacturing firm were established in Singapore; and technical assistance was provided by Australia to assist the economic and social development of Singapore.

I. Trade Relations:

Historical Development

During the Japanese occupation, Singapore was in a period of acute shortages and depressed living standards. All trading activities were cut off and its economy suffered the worst ravages ever known. Because the population in Singapore was predominantly Chinese [1] and the country lacked a self-sufficient agricultural base, Singapore had suffered more than any other part of Southeast Asia. The Japanese occupation was replaced by British Military Rule until the end of March 1946 when Singapore became a Crown Colony, separated from other Straits Settlemnts and Malay States. [2] From April, separate trade statistics for Singapore were maintained.

The recovery of Singapore's economy immediately after the war was slow, mainly due to the destruction of much plant and facilities--those machines which were not

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1. Because the Chinese had a strong sense of resistance against the Japanese, they had suffered the worst treatment during the Japanese occupation. The ethnic composition of Singapore's population in 1947 and 1957 respectively was as follows: Chinese, 77.61%, 75.5%; Malays, 12.30%, 13.6%; Indians and Pakistanis, 7.33%, 8.6%; Europeans, 0.99%, 0.7%; Eurasians, 0.97%, 0.7%. See C.A. Fisher, South-East Asia: A Social Economic And Political Geography (London: Methuen Press, 1964), p. 64.

2. See The Straits Times, 2 and 4-4-1946.

destroyed had become worn out owing to lack of maintenance for a long period of time. [1] The same experience having been undergone by European, and especially Southeast Asian countries, exacerbated the problems of the Singapore economy. However, between April and October 1946, there was a remarkable recovery in Singapore's trade--during which period its total trade value quadrupled [2]--due mainly to the resource and ingenuity of the local merchants and European business houses in re-opening old, and establishing new, overseas trade connections under difficult economic and political conditions. [3] Singapore quickly re-established its position as the main commercial centre of Southeast Asia.

Singapore's trade increased rapidly after it became a separate Colony and reached the record year in 1951 when there was a great demand for, and sharp increase in the price of rubber, tin and other primary products after the outbreak of the Korean War. [4] Table 1 shows the total value of Singapore's trade from 1947 to 1957.

The most important features of trade relations between Australia and Singapore after the war were the great imbalance of trade in favour of Australia; the increase of manufactured goods in Australia's exports to Singapore;

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1. See A.G. Donnithorne, 'Economic Developments Since 1937 In Eastern And South-Eastern Asia And Their Effects On The United Kingdom', (London: R.I.I.A., 1950), p. 22.
2. Total trade value in April and October were $45.0 million and $173.6 million respectively; see Singapore Annual Report, 1946, p. 56.
3. See Singapore Annual Report, 1946, p. 57.
4. Singapore Annual Report, 1950, p. 57; see also Nanfang Wan Pau (Singapore), Editorial, 29-9-1952.

Table 1

Singapore's Trade 1947-59

(Gross Value in Million Malayan Dollars)

Year	Imports	Exports	Total Trade
1947	1,045.8	813.2	1,859
1948	1,300	1,113	2,413
1949	1,305	1,055	2,360
1950	2,125	2,483	4,608
1951	3,625	4,095	7,720
1952	2,849	2,543	5,392
1953	2,341.9	1,978.5	4,320.4
1954	2,330.1	2,054.3	4,384.4
1955	2,865.4	2,781.8	5,647.2
1956	3,098.3	2,732.8	5,831.1
1957	3,277.4	2,773.1	6,050.5
1958	3,100.6	2,481.2	5,581.8
1959	3,105.5	2,720.7	5,826.2

Source: Singapore Annual Report, 1947-59.

and the sharp decrease of Australia's imports from Singapore in value and items after 1950-51. The details of these developments will be dealt with later in this chapter.

During the period immediately after the war, Australia's exports of foodstuffs to Singapore, were mainly of a relief nature. C. Massey, the first Australian Commissioner to Singapore after the war,[1] in referring to Australia's exports of foodstuffs to Singapore and Malaya in March 1946 stated the fact that 'In order to make these supplies available to countries suffering from food shortages, Australia is curtailing severely supplies to her own civilians.' [2] He believed that Australia's supplies would cause a fall in the cost of living in Singapore and Malaya. [3]

In March 1946 trade relations between Australia and Singapore achieved a milestone when the Australian government decided to appoint a Trade Commissioner, J. Payne, to Singapore. [4] Payne had his offices at the Union Building, Collyer Quay, together with Massey. [5] The general advantages derived from the appointment of a Trade Commissioner were as follow:- (a) fostering goodwill, (b) correction and avoidance of misunderstandings, and (c) dissemination of knowledge concerning the respective countries. [6] His functions were briefly as

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1. Massey took up his appointment in Singapore on 26 March 1946. He was joined in April by a trade assistant, H.J. Remond, and a Press Information Officer Roy Mitchel; see The Straits Times, 27-3-1946, 10 and 13-4-1946.
2. The Straits Times, 28-3-1946.
3. Ibid., 24-4-1946.
4. Ibid., 27-3-1946; Y.B.C.A., no. 37, 1946-47, p. 1222; Overseas Trading, no. 1, vol. 2, 1948, p. 24.
5. Y.B.C.A., Ibid.; Overseas Trading, Ibid.; the offices were shifted to Crosby House at Robinson Road in 1955.
6. See Y.B.C.A., no. 37, 1946-47, p. 396.

follows:-(a) to inform as to present and prospective demand for goods, (b) to inform as to foreign and local competition, (c) to advise as to best selling methods, (d) to report as to the standing of buyers, (e) to specify articles in demand, (f) to deal with trade inquiries, (g) to advise and assist commercial visitors regarding trade matters, (h) to settle difficulties between exporters in Australia and buyers abroad, and (i) to furnish information as to foreign import requirements, customs duties, trade regulations, etc.[1] In addition to the foregoing particular trading functions, a Trade Commissioner also had the duty to watch and advise the Government regarding any developments in his territory affecting not only trade and commerce, but any other matters of concern to his home government.[2]

The appointment of a Trade Commissioner in Singapore was important considering the fact that during the period immediately after the war many misunderstandings and unhappy feelings had existed between Singapore and Australian businessmen. On 9 November 1946 The Age reported that Australian fruit juices from the Disposal Commission were flooding the Singapore market at two-thirds the price paid by Singapore importers. In consequence, thousands of pounds worth of orders had to be cancelled. One importer bitterly commented that 'it seemed as if the Australian government was giving the final blow to Australia's trade reputation'.[3]

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1. Ibid.; see also R.T.Pollard, Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, 19-2-1948, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 196, p. 79.
2. Example of Reports by Trade Commissioners can be seen in the journal Overseas Trading, published by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture.
3. The Age, 9-11-1946.

Yet on 21 May 1947 Senator Cooper quoted in the Senate a report by the Sydney Daily Telegraph that Australian exporters were sending 'muck' to Singapore and Malaya, giving Australia a bad reputation. The report stated that in a consignment of rolled oats sent to Singapore, purchasers could not find 1% rolled oats and that another consignment sent as 'Australia's best woollen socks' consisted of army stocks sewn in pairs, often in different sizes. [1] A trade Commissioner could investigate problems such as these and report to the Australian government which could in turn have the problems solved.

The significance of appointing a Trade Commissioner in Singapore lay not only in the resolving of differences and misunderstandings; the office in fact played an important role in increasing Australia's exports to Singapore and promoting Australia's interest in investing in manufacturing and other industries in Singapore and Malaya.

Australia's organised trade promotion in Singapore began in 1948 when the first Singapore Trade Fair was held. [2] Here again the Trade Commissioner played the primary role in organising Australia's exhibits. Australia took part in the exhibition enthusiastically and its presentation was so good that a silver trophy was awarded to Australia by the organiser. Subsequently, Australia took part in the Singapore Trade Fair every year and won the silver trophy for the sixth consecutive year in 1953. [3]

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1. See W. J. Cooper and B. Courtice, Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, 21-5-1947, C.P.D. (Senate), vol. 192, p. 2611.
2. See The Straits Times, 5-8-1953.
3. Overseas Trading, no.1, vol. 6, 1953, p.p. 16-7.

The Trade Fair provided the opportunity for Australia to introduce new products each year and the local businessmen to get to know the range of products which Australia could offer. The range of products exhibited by Australia increased each year. During the 1953 Trade Fair, which was held between August 1 and 16 at the Happy World, products from eighty-five Australian manufacturers were displayed at the Australian Pavilion. [1] The range of products was probably the most comprehensive ever displayed in an Australian overseas exhibition. Marine engines, electric mators, hand tools, kerosene stoves, plastic ware, garage equipment, air compressors, power chain saws were some of the manufactured items displayed. Foodstuffs were displayed on thirty-seven circular stands. Over 320,000 people attended the fifteen days Trade Fair, which perhaps was the best publicity for Australian products; and a lot of Australian goods were sold and business negotiated during the occasion. [2] The using of Trade Fairs to promote Australia's export sales to Singapore was very successful as could be seen from the marked increases in Australia's exports value in Table 3.

Australia did not, however, take export promotion seriously before 1954 as there were world-wide shortages of primary products [3] and strong demand for them until the ear-

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1. The Straits Times, 5-8-1953.
2. Ibid.; see also Overseas Trading, no. 1, vol. 6, 1953, p.p. 1, 16-7.
3. About 90% of Australia's exports consisted of primary products, see R.F. Holder, 'Australia's Trade Relations with the Far East', in G. Greenwood (ed.) Australian Policies Towards Asia (Melbourne: A.I.I.A., 1954), p. 7.

ly part of the 1950s. The problem for Australia was then less how to sell her products than how to distribute them among different consuming countries. When the war ended, the immediate objective in trade was to relieve distress and devastation, and exports from Australia were practically all of a relief nature through UNRRA or various disposals schemes. [1] When acute shortages were disappearing towards 1950, Australian products were still assured of a market in Britain and European countries. [2] Australia not only had no problems in selling her goods, she could also demand high prices for them. It therefore enjoyed a most favourable balance of trade during this period.

Australia's favourable balance of trade reached a record of about £238 million at the close of the financial year on 30 June 1951. [3] However the balance of trade slumped to a record adverse balance of about £378 million in 1951-52, due mainly to the enormous flood of imports [4] as a consequence of the record exports of the previous year. The situation changed entirely in 1952-53, when the favourable balance of trade reached a new height of £357 million as a result of a drastic restriction on imports, which was announced by the government on 8 March 1952. [5] After 1952-53, Australia's

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1. Holder, p. 10.
2. Nicholson, p.p. 49, 83, 112.
3. See Table 2.
4. See Estimates of 1952-53, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 218, p.p. 19-29.
5. W.H.Spooner, Minister for National Development, C.P.D. (Senate), vol. 218, p. 28; J. I. Armstrong, 30-9-1952, vol. 219, p. 2274.

Table 2

Australia's Overseas Trade (Including Gold)

£'000 (A)

Year	Imports	Exports	Total	Excess of Exports (+) or Imports (-)
1946-47	209,485	309,029	518,514	+ 99,544
1947-48	339,746	409,954	749,700	+ 70,208
1948-49	415,194	546,330	961,524	+127,479
1949-50	538,069	613,697	1,151,766	+ 75,628
1950-51	743,871	981,796	1,725,667	+237,925
1951-52	1,053,423	675,008	1,728,431	-378,415
1952-53	514,109	871,272	1,385,381	+357,163
1953-54	681,609	828,332	1,509,941	+146,723
1954-55	843,742	774,164	1,617,906	- 69,578
1955-56	821,008	781,864	1,602,952	- 39,224
1956-57	718,991	992,906	1,711,897	+273,915
1957-58	791,940	817,946	1,609,886	+ 26,006
1958-59	796,599	811,463	1,608,062	+ 14,864
1959-60	926,393	937,682	1,864,075	+ 11,289

Source: Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1946-60; Y.B.C.A., 1946-60; Economic And Financial Survey Of Australia, 1947-60; A.I.F.F., 1946-60.

favourable balance of trade was down the slope again [1] and by 1954, as Australia's traditional markets' demand for her goods began to weaken, due to the economic recovery of these countries, and the rapid growth of Australia's primary and manufacturing industries after the war. It became increasingly evident that Australia's products were in excess of effective export demands. This was a completely new situation for Australia, and it became necessary for her to look for more export markets.

Australia's secondary industry expansion in the war and post-war period was so rapid and her virtual neglect of export opportunities in the post-war era had served to emphasize the fact that Australia as a supplier of manufactured products was almost unknown in overseas markets. [2] The Federal Export Advisory Committee [3] recognising the changing conditions and urgent need to develop export outlets, decided that only a dynamic approach to overseas selling would assist Australia to recover some ground lost in her late start. All positive means of trade promotion were considered, and it was decided that the most practical method to aid Australia overcome her initial disadvantages was to send Trade Missions overseas. Such Missions would fulfil Australia's need to sell her products abroad, and create awareness at consumer, commercial and governmental levels of

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1. See Table 2.
2. Statement by the Acting Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, G. McLeay, 31-10-1954; Current Notes, no. 25, 1954, p.p. 745-6.
3. A body acting as liaison between the Commonwealth Government and various manufacturing and commercial interest throughout Australia.

Australia's ability to provide secondary products also.[1]

Countries where Australia might conceivably benefit from sending a Trade Mission were carefully studied and investigated. It was finally decided to send a Trade Mission to Singapore, Malaya, Thailand and Burma in November 1954.[2] Singapore was a natural choice for the Trade Mission due to its dominant position along trade route: its concentration of facilities; its extensive entrepôt trade and ties with the neighbouring countries; and the existence of regular shipping and air communications. The leader of the Trade Mission to Singapore, W.H.Hudspeth, in reply to a question why the Trade Mission had chosen Singapore to promote trade said '...Singapore is a focal point of the whole world. Everyone buys and sells in Singapore'.[3] The rapid increase of population and spending power of the people in Singapore since the war also provided great opportunities for Australian secondary products as well as her already popular foodstuffs.[4]

Before the arrival of the Trade Mission to Singapore, more than 90 Australian firms took part in the 1954 Singapore Trade Fair which lasted from July 31 to August 15. The Australian Pavilion at the Trade Fair was 50% larger than in

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1. Statement by McLeay, 31-10-1954, op. cit.; 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', Supplement to Overseas Trading, vol. 7, no. 4, December 1954.
2. McEwen, 4-8-1954, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 4, p.p. 17-8; Overseas Trading, vol. 6, no. 8, 1954, p.p. 1, 16. In February 1954, an Australian Trade Mission was sent to Africa; see 'Trade Mission to Africa', Supplement to Overseas Trading, vol. 6, no. 7, June 1954.
3. The Straits Times, 3-11-1954.
4. See T. Molony, 'Advertising in the East', Overseas Trading, vol. 5, no. 12, 1953, p.p. 1-8.

1953 and was the largest exhibition of Australian products ever staged in Singapore The 1954 Trade Mission was to follow up the publicity and promotion efforts of the Australian Pavilion at the Trade Fair. [1]

The Trade Mission of 1954 consisted of thirty members [2] led by W.R.Hudspeth, Australian Government Trade Commissioner. [3] It was the largest post-war Trade Mission Australia has sent abroad and was also the largest Trade Mission ever sent to Southeast East Asia by any country. [4] Beside representatives of manufacturers and import-export houses, who sold such varied commodities as flour, grain, fresh fruits, tinned provisions, pharmaceuticals, processed milk, tallow, hardware, building materials, automotive parts, telecommunication equipment, earth-moving equipment, paper, welding electrodes fountain pens, refrigerators and heavy engineering equipment, the Mission also included representatives from Australia's leading banks and Qantas Empire Airways Limited. [5] All the members of the Mission were briefed by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture before leaving Australia.

The Trade Mission took off from Sydney on November 1 and arrived at Singapore on the 2nd. [6] The Mission remained in Singapore from 2nd to 9th and 14th to 17th of November. [7]

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1. Overseas Trading, vol. 6, no. 8, 1954, p. 16.
2. See Appendix 9 for the names of each member and the trade they represented.
3. A.I.F.F., no. 44, 1954-55, p. 37
4. The Straits Times, 5-11-1954.
5. 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', p.p. 7-8.
6. See Appendix 10 for the itinerary of the Trade Mission.
7. Overses Trading, vol. 7, no. 2, 1954, p. 1.

During their stay overseas they were in the care of the Department of External Affairs and the News and Information Bureau. [1] But once in Singapore, the full services of the Australian Trade Commissioner, G.S.Anderson, were freely used for recommending contacts, arranging group meetings and supplying market information. The Assistant Trade Commissioner, J. Gothe, acted as Secretary of the Mission and attended to miscellaneous requirements by the leader of the Mission and individual members. I. Hamilton acted as Public Relations Officer. He assisted in the on-tour publicity, often moving a couple of days in advance of the Mission throughout the visit. [2]

The size and composition of the Mission created a considerable publicity impact. The business communities in Singapore were fully aware of their visit. Special newspaper supplements describing the Mission, its aims and objectives, and giving background information about Australia's industrial development, as well as listing the firms taking part and the goods and services they had for sale, were published in Singapore. [3] There was also extensive press and radio coverage during the Mission's visit. Individual businessmen and agents, various trading groups and the government were all targets of the Trade Mission and they were most hospitably received wherever they visited. [4]

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1. Statement by Casey, Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p.p. 576-7.
2. 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', p. 9.
3. W.H.Hudspeth, 'Australian Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', Eastern World, vol. 9, no. 2, 1955, p.p. 50-1.
4. 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', p.p. 10-11, see also The Straits Times, 5-11-1954.

The Trade Mission was very successful not only in creating the impression of the ability of Australia to provide secodary goods--beside their already popular primary products--it was also successful in consolidating existing agencies and appointing new ones for specific products. There was a significant increase in the export of secondary products to Singapore after the visit, as can be seen from Table5 and 6. The negotiation of business was so successful that when the Trade Mission officially disbanded in Rangoon on December 1, most members returned to Singapore to continue talks on business. [1] The fact that more than one-third of the Trade Mission's itinerary was spent in Singapore also showed that Singapore was considered as an important trading partner by the Australians.

The visit of the Trade Mission in 1954 was the first time Australian traders had gone to the Singapore market personally, to examine requirements at first hand, to explain their products, to negotiate prices and get to know their customers at close quarters. They succeeded admirably in gaining prestige for Australian products and fostering goodwill and friendship. [2] After 1954, there was a flow of Australian traders going to Singapore on their own initiative to continue business negotiation and examine the possibilities of selling their new products. There was also keener study and extensive reports on the Singapore economic condition, market requirements and business of investments prospects. [3] The success of

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1. Overseas Trading, vol.7, no. 3, 1954, p. 1.
2. Hudspeth, op. cit.
3. See the various reports on Singapore-Malaya published in Overseas Trading since 1954.

the first Trade Mission to Southeast Asia also affected the Australian government's decision to send further trade missions overseas. Menzies announced in the House of Representatives on 27 September 1955 that 'We are prepared to send strong missions overseas with special tasks to develop new markets. ...we will be prepared ourselves to subcribe money liberally for this purpose.' [1]

After Malaya had gained independence and Singapore was on the eve of acquiring self-government, a second Trade mission visited Singapore to follow up the publicity impact created by the previous Mission and to seek more outlets for Australian products. The Minister for Trade, J. McEwen, announced on January 15, 1958 that the Federal Government would sponsor a Trade Mission to Singapore, Malaya and Thailand in April 1958. [2] This was the second time the government had worked closely with the business community in an effort to promote Australia's export trade to Southeast Asia. The announcement was welcomed by commercial sectors and strongly supported by the press all over Australia. [3]

The Trade Mission of 1958 consisted of twenty-two members, which included leading industrialists, bankers and commercial executives. It was led by R.W. Swartz M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Trade. [4] Singapore was the first country visited by the Trade Mission. It

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1. Menzies, 27-9-1955, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 7, p. 973.
2. The Melbourne Herald, 16-1-1958.
3. See The Melbourne Herald, 16-1-1958; The Mercury (Hobart), 17-1-1958; The Western Australian, 17-1-1958; The Adelaide Advertiser, 17-1-1958.
4. See 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', Supplement to Overseas Trading, vol. 10, no.12, June 1958; also Appendix II for the names of each member and their trade.

remained in Singapore from 16 to 26 April and disbanded in Bangkok on May 8. [1] Like the previous Mission, the Australian government and Trade Commissioner in Singapore had supported and supplemented the publicity efforts and arranged contacts for individual members. During this visit, the Department of Commerce and Argriculture arranged a special edition of 'Austral News'--Australia's trade promotion newspaper--in English, and for the first time, a vernacular edition in Chinese. [2] The Chinese edition was published for those Chinese businessmen who were unaquainted with English, in view of the prominent part they play in Singapore's economy. A ten page Supplement also appeared in the Singapore Straits Times. [3]

The Trade Mission was featured on the local radio stations as well as Radio Australia and the B.B.C. short wave service during their visit. Members of the Mission not only visited the Chief Minister, various Chambers of Commerce, businessman and agent, they also attended the legislative assembly meeting and gave two press conferences. [4] This Mission was very successful in selling Australia's manufactured goods and strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries. Even more important, this Trade Mission successfully persuaded the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to send a similar mission to Australia.

In October 1958, for the first time, a Trade Mission from Singapore visited Australia. This Mission was sponsored and organised by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce as

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1. See Appendix 12 for the itinerary of the Trade Mission.
2. 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', 1958, p. 11.
3. The Straits Times, 17-4-1958.
4. 'Trade Mission to Southeast Asia', 1958, p. 10.

a result of an invitation by the leader of the 1958 Australia's Trade Mission. [1] Although it was strictly a private organisation, it had great support and encouragement from the government. The Director of Information and Services, G. G. Thomson, assisted greatly in planning and advising the Trade Mission. The Australian Trade Commissioner in Singapore, R.W.Hoberton, provided valuable assistance and information. [2] The Singapore Trade Mission consisted of 19 members, all of whom already had some sort of business connections with Australia, with Tan Siak Kew as the leader. [3]

The main aims of the Mission were as follows:-(a) to cement existing trade relations and to explore avenues of increasing and expanding trade with Australia, (b) to study market conditions in Australia and try to induce her to buy more from Singapore in order to redress the great disparity between imports and exports [4], (c) to enhance friendship and goodwill between the two countries. [5]

The Trade Mission left Singapore on October 4 and arrived at Sydney via Melbourne on the next day; it remained in Sydney until October 9, then left for a one week visit to New Zealand. The Mission returned to Australia on October 17

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1. See 'A Message from the Acting Australian Government Trade Commissioner, Singapore', Chinese Chamber of Commerce's File.
2. 'Report by the Singapore Trade Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1958', Ibid.
3. See Appendix /3 for the names of each member and the trade they represented.
4. The disparity was at its height in 1956-57 when the balance of trade was £13.2 million in favour of Australia; in 1957-58, it was £11.8 million in Australia's favour, see Table 3 for more details.
5. 'Report by the Singapore Trade Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1958', 'Message from the leader of the Trade Mission', Chinese Chamber of Commerce's File.

and remained until the end of the month before returning to Singapore from Perth. [1] Whilst in Australia, a senior member of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture accompanied the Mission throughout the visit to arrange for contacts and entertainments. [2] The Trade Mission visited most of the major factories in nearly all the capital cities in Australia: Brisbane, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth. [3]

The Singapore Trade Mission was very warmly received by the Australian government and public functions were put on for its members almost every day either by the government or certain commercial and industrial bodies. Local radio stations and newspaper gave a good coverage of the Mission's activities. Two television companies interviewed the leader of the Mission, and special reports were televised. [4] This visit had given the Singapore businessmen a better understanding of Australia's market condition and requirements and it certainly consolidated trade relation and paved the way for further trade development between the two countries.

It is important to note that from 1932 to August 1958 trade relations between Australia and Singapore-Malaya had been conducted within the general framework of the Ottawa Agreement and later G.A.T.T. (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The Ottawa Agreement established reciprocal and

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1. See Appendix 13.
2. 'Report by the Singapore Trade Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1958'.
3. See Appendix 13.
4. 'Speech by Tan Siak Kew made at the Perth Council Hall, October, 1958', Chinese Chamber of Commerce's File.

preferential concessions between Australia and the colonies and protectorates of the United Kingdom including the Straits Settlements and Malay States. [1] In November 1956, Australia and the United Kingdom negotiated a new Trade Agreement which superseded the Ottawa Agreement. Article 10 of this Agreement ensured the continuation of reciprocal tariffs between Australia and the British colonies and protectorates as granted under the Ottawa Agreement. [2] On August 26, 1958 a Trade Agreement was signed between Australia and the Federation of Malaya [3], while Singapore's trade relations with Australia were still governed by the G.A.T.T. and Article 10 of the 1956 Trade Agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom.

Composition of Australia's Trade With Singapore

Australia's trade with Singapore increased most rapidly as soon as the war was over. Total trade value exceeded £10 million in 1948-49 and reached a record of over £21 million in 1950-51, which was more than a three-fold increase over Australia's trade with Pan-Malaya in any pre-war period. [4] After 1950-51, Australia's trade with Singapore began to drop, and by 1959-60, total trade value was £12.5 million. [5]

The decrease in the value of trade was mainly attributable to the sharp fall in Australia's imports from Singapore.

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1. Commonwealth of Australia: United Kingdom and Australian Trade Agreement (Canberra: Government Printer, 1932), Article 7 and 15, Schdule E and G.
2. Commonwealth of Australia: Trade Agreement between Australia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Canberra: Government Printer, 1956), Article 10.
3. A.I.F.F., no. 59, 1958-59, p.32; A.Townley, 26-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20. p. 707; Swatz, 28-8-1958, vol. 20, p. 900; Trade Agreement between Australia and the Federation of Malaya, Australia Treaty Series, no. 24, 1958.
4. The highest value of Australia's trade with Pan-Malaya during the pre-war period was £6.6 million recorded in 1919-

Table 3

Australia's Trade with Singapore 1947-60

(Value in A£'000)

Year	Import from Singapore	Export to Singapore	Excess of Exports (+) or Imports (-)	Total Trade
1947-48	392	6,481	+ 6,089	6,873
1948-49	4,655	7,362	+ 2,707	12,017
1949-50	7,308	8,071	+ 763	15,379
1950-51	10,502	10,875	+ 373	21,377
1951-52	8,764	11,810	+ 3,046	20,574
1952-53	5,858	12,794	+ 6,936	18,652
1953-54	8,529	11,288	+ 2,759	19,817
1954-55	2,492	11,600	+ 9,208	14,092
1955-56	1,453	12,100	+10,647	13,553
1956-57	873	14,129	+13,256	15,002
1957-58	912	12,685	+11,773	13,597
1958-59	1,322	9,855	+ 8,533	11,177
1959-60	1,560	10,948	+ 9,388	12,508

Source: Compiled and calculated from Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1947-60, Y.B.C.A., 1947-60, Economic And Financial Survey Of Australia, 1947-60.

Graph 1

Australia's Trade With Singapore 1947-60

The value of Australia's imports reached the peak of £10.5 million--1.4% of Australia's total overseas imports--in 1950-51, due mainly to the large increase in Australia's imports of oils and rubber; [1] but slumped to merely £873,000--0.1% of Australia's total overseas imports--in 1956-57. [2] After 1956-57, Australia's imports from Singapore recovered very slowly, and although the value in 1959-60 reached £1.6 million, it still formed only 0.1% of Australia's total imports.[3]

The single most important reason for the sharp fall in Australia's imports from Singapore was due to Australia's decision to import rubber, which formed the dominant part of Australia's imports from Pan-Malaya, directly from Malaya. This coupled with the economic recession and the stagnation of Singapore's entrepôt trade--as the neighbouring countries became less reliant on Singapore to sell their produce--in the 1950s [4]; and the fact that there were no trade agreements to oblige Australia to buy from Singapore, and the failure of Singapore's businessmen to conduct exports promotion in Australia before October 1958, all contributed to the sharp decrease in Australia's imports from Singapore.

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4. 20, see Table 2, Chapter 2.
5. See Table 3 and Graph 1.
1. See Tables 3, 4, 5 and 14.
2. See Tables 3 and 14.
3. Ibid.
4. See Statement by J.M.Jumabhoy, Singapore's Minister for Commerce, quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald, 6-3-1958; Wee Meng, Cameron Chua, 'An Inter-Industry Study of Singapore's Economy', (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1971), p. 7.

Table 4: Australia's Imports From Singapore 1947-60—By Value

Year	Oils, Fats and Waxes					Rubber-Latex	Rubber--Crude & Waste	Unground Spices	Other Vegetable Foodstuffs	Yarns & Manufactured Fibres, textiles & Apparel	Total Imports
	Aviation Spirit	Other Petroleum Spirit	Kerosene	Residual--diesel etc. oil	Others						
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1947-48	—	—	—	132,935	46,172	1,972	1,628	18,597	13,997	10,821	391,678
1948-49	132,803	1,866,447	221,497	1,883,237	402,630	2,528	21,444	22,918	963	6,183	4,655,364
1949-50	1,011,906	4,086,649	454,457	1,277,380	211,503	403	8,075	29,294	8,718	112,081	7,307,809
1950-51	468,212	4,923,493	394,971	1,822,493	383,802	3,460	2,050,293	67,583	15,026	164,627	10,502,112
1951-52	185,998	2,927,738	376,458	1,671,710	587,809	45,404	2,161,439	70,400	22,203	104,618	8,764,171
1952-53	426,264	2,429,507	605,626	2,088,740	29,880	5,627	12,950	29,695	40,066	7,170	5,858,197
1953-54	603,592	4,088,333	506,229	3,159,398	61,274	4,183	1,538	26,815	8,465	6,729	8,598,754
1954-55	227,409	757,647	298,985	953,956	110,811	29,897	4,315	25,938	3,413	2,725	2,492,373
1955-56	296,974	592,138	13,435	286,024	109,219	31,516	5,624	9,800	7,476	1,759	1,452,608
1956-57	226,464	82,286	80,915	63,573	236,813	394	66,236	23,333	661	116	873,407
1957-58	301,446	67,874	26,394	96,188	219,462	—	—	36,633	3,959	—	912,000
1958-59	433,035	44,737	236,194	78,858	165,554	—	—	21,951	933	—	1,322,000
1959-60	289,373	32,463	447,969	52,486	325,850	—	—	38,376	1,450	—	1,560,000

Source: Overseas Trade Bulletin Of Australia, 1946-60,
Y.B.C.A., 1946-60, A.I.F.F., 1946-60,
Economic and Financial Survey Of Australia, 1946-60.

Table 5: Australia's Imports From Singapore 1947-60—By Percentage

Year	Oils, Fats and Waxes					Rubber-Latex	Rubber—Crude & Waste	Unground Spices	Other Vegetable Food-stuffs	Yarns & Manufac-tured Fi-bres, Tex-tiles & Apparel	Miscel-laneous	Total
	Aviation Spirit	Other Petroleum Spirit	Kerosene	Residual—diesel etc. oil	Others							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1947-48	—	—	—	33.94	11.79	0.50	0.42	4.75	3.57	2.76	42.27	100.00
1948-49	2.85	40.09	4.76	40.45	8.65	0.05	0.46	0.49	0.02	0.13	2.05	100.00
1949-50	13.85	55.92	6.22	17.48	2.89	—	0.11	0.40	0.12	1.53	1.48	100.00
1950-51	4.46	46.88	3.76	17.35	3.65	0.03	19.52	0.64	0.14	1.57	2.00	100.00
1951-52	2.12	33.41	4.30	19.07	6.71	0.52	24.66	0.80	0.25	1.19	6.07	100.00
1952-53	7.28	41.47	10.34	35.65	0.51	0.10	0.22	0.51	0.68	0.12	3.12	100.00
1953-54	7.02	47.55	6.52	36.74	0.71	0.05	0.02	0.31	0.10	0.08	0.90	100.00
1954-55	9.12	30.40	12.00	38.28	4.45	1.20	0.17	1.04	0.14	0.11	3.09	100.00
1955-56	20.44	40.76	0.93	19.55	7.52	2.17	0.39	0.68	0.52	0.12	6.02	100.00
1956-57	25.93	9.42	9.26	7.28	27.11	0.05	7.58	2.67	0.08	0.01	10.61	100.00
1957-58	33.00	7.35	2.85	10.53	24.01	—	—	3.95	0.33	—	17.08	100.00
1958-59	32.75	3.33	17.85	5.90	12.48	—	—	1.59	0.07	—	26.03	100.00
1959-60	18.53	2.05	28.65	3.33	20.83	—	—	2.43	0.06	—	24.12	100.00

Source: Calculated from Table 4.

Australia's exports to Singapore, on the other hand, increased steadily from £6.5 million in 1947-48 to £14.1 million in 1956-57. Export figures dropped after the peak year in 1956-57; the value of exports in 1959-60 was £11 million.[1] Singapore was the largest market in Southeast Asia for Australia's exports from 1948-49 to 1957-58; in 1958-60 Singapore's leading position was exceeded only by the Federation of Malaya.[2] Australia's exports to Singapore formed approximately 1.4% of Australia's total exports to overseas countries;[3] the lowest being 1.1% in 1950-51 and highest 1.8% in 1951-52.[4] Australia's ability to remain steady in her exports to Singapore when there was strong international competition for the Singapore market, and despite higher rates and costs for her products, was greatly due to her post-war efforts in carrying out a series of positive promotion campaigns in Singapore.

Australia's Imports From Singapore

A study of the composition of Australia's imports from Singapore reveals a rather ironical fact that oils formed almost the whole of Australia's imports. In 1953-54 oils formed as much as 98.5% of Australia's imports from Singapore;[5] on average oils formed about 81% of Australia's imports from Singapore.[6] The important types of oils imported

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1. See Table 3.
2. See Table 14
3. Calculated from Table 14.
4. See Table 14.
5. Calculated from Table 4.
6. Calculated from Table 6.

by Australia were aviation spirit, petroleum spirit, lighting kerosene, gas and diesel fuel oil, and crude oil. Petroleum spirit and gas and diesel fuel oil formed approximately three quarters of the oils imported by Australia between 1948-49 and 1954-55. [1] Aviation spirit became increasingly important for Australia after 1954-55, [2] since Qantas Empire Airways increased its flights to Singapore following the opening of the new Paya Lebar Airport. [3] In 1953-54 Singapore supplied 11.5% of Australia's total oils requirement and was the third largest--behind Indonesia and Bahrein--supplier. [4] Imports of oils from Singapore dropped sharply after 1953-54 as Australia began to import directly from oil producing countries; but they still remained as the major import items for Australia. The following table shows the value of oils imported from Singapore and its percentage of Australia's total imports from Singapore:

Table 6 *

Year	Value £	%
1947-48	179,107	45.7
1948-49	4,506,614	96.8
1949-50	7,041,895	96.4
1950-51	7,992,971	76.1
1951-52	5,749,713	61.3
1952-53	5,580,017	95.3
1953-54	8,472,826	98.5
1954-55	2,348,808	94.3
1955-56	1,297,790	89.2
1956-57	690,051	79.0
1957-58	711,364	77.7
1958-59	958,378	72.3
1959-60	1,148,141	73.4

Note: Calculated from Table 4.

1. See Tables 4 and 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Paya Lebar Airport was built in September 1952 and was in used in 1954, although it was not officially opened until August 1955. This Airport was built to cope with the density of air-traffic which had increased rapidly after the war; see 'Shipping and Aviation of Malaya and Singapore', op. cit.; see also Sin Chiew Jit Poh (Singapore), editorial, 20-8-1955.

It should be noted that although Singapore did not produce any oil, it possessed the largest oil refineries in South-east Asia. The large installations on Pulau Bukom and Pulau Sebarok served as bulk terminals for the refineries in Indonesia and Sarawak from whence the major portion of all oil supplies was derived. [1] Singapore also provided storage installation for the Shell Company of Australia Limited, whose subsidiaries were expanding fields at British Borneo and Sumatra. Crude oils were blended in Singapore before shipment to Australia for refining. [2]

Rubber formed the dominant part of Australia's imports from Singapore-Malaya during the pre-war period. After the war, the import of this item from Singapore became very insignificant; Singapore's share of this export item passed almost totally to Malaya. During the post-war period, rubber formed significant proportions of Australia's imports from Singapore only in 1950-51 and 1951-52, when they formed 19.5% (value £2.1 million) and 24.6% (value £2.2 million) of the total imports respectively. [3] The sudden increase during those two years was caused mainly by the Korean War, when there was a strong demand for rubber and high prices paid for it. From 1958 onwards Australia did not import rubber from Singapore; this was a direct result of a trade agreement signed between Australia and the Federation of Malaya. The main objective of that agreement was to safeguard

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4. Economic and Finacial Survey of Australia, 1953-54, p. 25.
1. See Singapore Annual Report, 1956, p. 88.
2. Holder, p. 4.
3. See Tables 4 and 5.

Australia's export of wheat flour to Malaya, and Malaya's export of rubber and tin to Australia. [1]

Australia's import of spices from Singapore also dropped substantially during the post-war period. These commodities formed less than five per cent of Australia's total imports from Singapore. [2] Pepper was the main type of spices imported from Singapore. Singapore's share of the export of spices to Australia had almost totally passed on to Indonesia. Vegetable foodstuffs, yarns, manufactured fibres, textiles and apparel were the other commodities imported from Singapore. However, the import of these items by Australia became increasingly insignificant during the post-war period. Onions, sago and tapioca were the main types of vegetable foodstuffs imported by Australia. [3]

An examination of the contents of Australia's imports from Singapore reveals that beside oils, there was a very limited variety of other items. This perhaps can be explained by the fact that most of Singapore's exports were directed to neighbouring countries. Singapore did not face difficulty in selling her goods; therefore sales promotion was not considered urgent by the Singapore businessmen. On the other hand, the improvement in shipping facilities and other communications after the war made it much easier for Australia to import goods directly from the producing countries.

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1. See 'Trade Agreement between the Federation of Malaya and Commonwealth of Australia', Singapore Trade, September, 1961, p.p. 33-4; A.I.F.F., no. 59, 1958-59, p. 32 for further details.

2. See Table 5.

3. See Tables 4 and 5, also Australian Exports, no. 1, 1958-59, p.p. 138-145, no. 2, 1959-60, p.p. 131-7.

Contents of Various Classes of Exports

Class I -- Foodstuffs of Animal Origin:
Butter, Butter Substitutes, Cheese, Eggs in Shell, Infants' and Invalids' Foods, Bacon and Hams, Beef and Veal, Lamb and Mutton, Pork, Poultry and Game, Rabbit and Hare, Canned Meats, Milk and Cream, othe Animal Foodstuffs.

Class II -- Foodstuffs of Vegetable Origin:
Fodders, Fruits (fresh and preserved), Wheat, Flour, Jams and Jellies, Fresh Vegetables, other Vegetable Foodstuffs.

Class III -- Spirituous and Alcoholic Liquors.

Class V -- Live Animals and Birds:
Horses, Sheep, other Live Animals and Birds.

Class VII -- Vegetable Substances and Fibres, Cork and Manufactures, Synthetic Fibres.

Class VIII -- Yarns and Manufactured Fibres, Textiles and Apparel.

Class IX -- Oils, Fats and Waxes:
Lard and Refined Animal Fats, Residual Oils, Diesel Fuel Oil, Solar Oil (Gas Oil), other Oils, Fats and Waxes.

Class X -- Pigments, Paints and Varnishes.

Class XI -- Rocks, Minerals and Hydrocarbons (in solid and semi-solid form).

Class XII -- Metals, Metal Manufactures and Machinery:
Iron and Steel Plate and Sheet, Motor Cars, other Metal and Metal Manufactures, Dynamo Electrical Machinery and Electrical Appliances, Engines and Parts, other Machines and Machinery.

Class XIII -- Rubber and Leather and Manufactures thereof:
Rubber Manufactures, Leather, Leather Manufactures.

Class XIV -- Wood and Wicker (raw and manufactured).

Class XV -- Earthware, Cement, China, Glass and Stoneware.

Class XVI -- Pulp, Paper and Board, Paper Manufactures and Stationery.

Class XVII -- Sporting Material, Toys, Fancy Goods, Jewellery and Timepieces.

Class XVIII-- Optical, Surgical and Scientific Instruments and Appliances and Photographic goods.

Class XIX -- Chemical, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products, Essential Oils and Fertilizers.

Others -- Military, Naval and Air Force Stores and Equipment, and all other articles.

Table 7: Composition of Australia's Exports to Singapore-Malaya—
By Classes and Value

Year	Class I	Class II	Class III	Class V	Class VII	Class VIII	Class IX	Class X	Class XI	Class XII	Class XIII	Class XIV	Class XV	Class XVI	Class XVII	Class XVIII	Class XIX	Others	Total
1947-48	1,955,936	2,481,636	18,929	200,075	5,301	121,512	41,844	23,429	5,837	765,493	90,441	26,732	49,005	36,506	10,011	30,565	255,414	362,817	6,481,483
1948-49	2,626,192	2,567,123	17,581	212,370	5,690	112,472	34,728	13,779	4,968	659,753	188,542	17,721	18,546	37,870	7,912	22,548	232,788	581,789	7,362,372
1949-50	3,344,398	2,464,674	21,877	258,550	16,296	43,307	26,345	18,364	4,904	923,279	166,430	20,624	78,262	39,031	17,032	17,231	202,243	408,522	8,071,369
1950-51	3,451,897	4,089,807	50,829	353,965	38,576	248,664	76,740	36,628	21,683	1,079,203	286,238	28,329	180,537	27,428	17,073	15,822	243,513	628,353	10,875,285
1951-52	4,676,811	4,356,994	39,207	350,350	29,496	90,320	33,768	43,490	15,780	857,298	151,497	33,271	56,997	53,777	4,285	36,471	212,614	767,990	11,810,416
1952-53	5,061,080	5,049,264	26,323	313,847	8,623	30,292	292,415	32,506	7,713	656,132	131,475	32,414	43,327	46,338	30,535	26,829	176,952	827,824	12,793,889
1953-54	4,189,899	4,601,609	34,485	353,720	6,488	7,538	93,834	27,874	3,222	1,087,721	121,267	35,168	17,925	31,476	28,059	31,786	113,571	501,911	11,287,513
1954-55	4,450,046	4,638,322	40,596	374,921	2,564	13,515	515,412	21,570	3,623	805,556	139,441	13,020	8,721	43,419	34,295	26,786	110,307	357,514	11,599,628
1955-56	4,265,553	3,538,605	41,876	384,947	1,582	14,503	1,868,830	25,166	9,016	639,043	123,710	7,880	23,878	56,767	11,265	16,151	143,283	928,200	12,100,255
1956-57	4,951,943	3,418,761	33,545	527,631	370	11,807	1,843,030	35,366	49,475	1,539,170	164,045	14,335	20,051	44,993	16,391	20,175	197,400	1,240,826	14,129,314
1957-58	3,735,467	2,762,573	30,456	553,005	—	10,220	2,309,446	15,431	15,897	1,099,669	74,425	11,784	1,529	51,280	12,019	10,555	99,976	1,754,385	12,548,117
1958-59	3,450,070	2,662,403	37,429	409,454	—	10,471	1,055,043	20,569	64,217	786,140	42,832	5,614	824	55,076	28,106	7,327	69,402	1,149,653	9,854,930
1959-60	2,898,501	2.233,647	49,373	509,353	—	12,173	2,824,803	28,028	28,707	746,355	63,637	9,651	5,334	52,714	10,616	6,043	160,429	1,308,259	10,947,623

Source: Overseas Trade Bulletin Of Australia, 1947-60,
Australian Exports, 1958-60.

Table 8: Composition of Australia's Exports to Singapore--
By Classes and Percentages

Year	Class I	Class II	Class III	Class V	Class VII	Class VIII	Class IX	Class X	Class XI	Class XII	Class XIII	Class XIV	Class XV	Class XVI	Class XVII	Class XVIII	Class XIX	Miscel-laneous	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1947-48	30.18	38.29	0.29	3.09	0.08	1.88	0.65	0.36	0.09	11.81	1.40	0.41	0.76	0.56	0.16	0.47	3.94	5.58	100
1948-49	35.67	34.87	0.24	2.89	0.08	1.53	0.47	0.19	0.07	8.96	2.56	0.24	0.25	0.51	0.11	0.31	3.16	7.89	100
1949-50	41.44	30.54	0.27	3.20	0.20	0.54	0.33	0.23	0.06	11.44	2.06	0.26	0.97	0.48	0.21	0.21	2.51	5.05	100
1950-51	31.74	37.61	0.47	3.26	0.36	2.29	0.71	0.34	0.20	9.92	2.63	0.26	1.66	0.25	0.16	0.15	2.24	5.75	100
1951-52	39.60	36.89	0.33	2.97	0.25	0.77	0.29	0.37	0.13	7.26	1.28	0.28	0.48	0.46	0.04	0.31	1.80	0.49	100
1952-53	39.56	39.47	0.21	2.45	0.08	0.24	2.29	0.25	0.06	5.13	1.03	0.25	0.34	0.36	0.24	0.21	1.38	0.45	100
1953-54	37.12	40.77	0.31	3.13	0.06	0.07	0.83	0.25	0.03	9.64	1.07	0.31	0.16	0.28	0.25	0.28	1.01	4.43	100
1954-55	38.36	39.99	0.35	3.23	0.02	0.12	4.44	0.19	0.03	6.95	1.20	0.11	0.08	0.37	0.30	0.23	0.95	3.08	100
1955-56	35.25	29.24	0.35	3.18	0.01	0.12	15.45	0.21	0.08	5.28	1.02	0.07	0.20	0.47	0.09	0.13	1.18	7.67	100
1956-57	35.05	24.20	0.24	3.73	0.00	0.08	13.04	0.25	0.35	10.89	1.16	0.10	0.14	0.32	0.12	0.14	1.40	8.79	100
1957-58	29.80	22.02	0.24	4.41	—	0.08	18.40	0.12	0.13	8.76	0.59	0.09	0.01	1.41	0.10	0.08	1.80	13.96	100
1958-59	35.01	27.02	0.38	4.16	—	0.11	10.71	0.21	0.65	7.98	0.44	0.06	0.01	0.56	0.29	0.07	0.70	11.64	100
1959-60	26.48	20.40	0.45	4.65	—	0.11	25.80	0.26	0.26	6.82	0.58	0.09	0.05	0.48	0.10	0.06	1.47	11.94	100

Source: Calculated from Table 7.

Table 9: Australia's Exports to Singapore 1947-60—By Items and Value

Year	Foodstuffs of Animal Origin										Foodstuffs of Vegetable Origin				Metals, Metal Manufactures & Machinery			Sheep	Residual Oils Diesel Fuel Oil etc.	Leather & Leather Manufactures	Drugs & Medicinal Preparation	Military Naval & Air Force Stores & Equipment	Total Exports
	Butter	Cheese	Infants' & Invalids' Food	Eggs In Shell	Bacon & Hams	Beef & Veal	Lamb & Mutton	Pork	Canned Meats	Milk & Cream	Fodders	Fresh & Preserved Fruits	Flour	Wheat	Metals & Metal Manufactures	Electrical Machinery & Appliances	Machines & Machinery						
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1947-48	139,425	34,485	194,591	—	133,208	241,007	79,547	15,312	94,583	720,639	11,238	870,214	166,459	—	345,362	68,811	351,320	131.715	—	85,299	255,414	—	6,481,483
1948-49	271,913	99,607	237,824	—	134,631	287,270	108,725	55,510	140,964	826,809	10,659	803,470	600,162	—	265,826	48,045	345,882	178,030	—	186,141	232,788	—	7,362,372
1949-50	360,225	121,595	278,661	—	175,297	374,695	148,914	59,643	169,771	1,100,027	28,395	751,309	752,148	—	296,998	81,848	544,433	204,756	—	150,508	202,243	—	8,071,369
1950-51	386,948	64,095	212,513	—	217,454	522,529	143,251	72,455	210,966	914,223	60,074	804,319	2,319,556	—	391,225	89,253	598,725	303,448	—	276,818	243,513	—	10,875,285
1951-52	314,715	73,139	282,898	—	269,941	834,512	224,861	136,188	156,846	1,543,008	50,065	1,168,027	2,289,665	—	393,138	66,410	397,750	313,681	—	147,018	212,614	—	11,810,416
1952-53	527,437	96,211	364,590	—	253,281	1,014,356	206,628	139,555	255,393	1,433,255	273,466	901,382	2,914,517	119,076	318,978	64,402	272,752	247.776	212,014	116,291	120,647	609,451	12,793,889
1953-54	513,141	86,666	304,141	—	277,746	596,972	303,791	124,528	46,849	1,045,329	353,754	894,396	2,560,229	127,637	743,524	95,164	249,003	277,915	—	106,425	47,555	272,032	11,287,513
1954-55	613,737	103,283	380,987	—	161,843	798,789	248,694	93,744	64,740	1,147,954	177,429	878,649	2,509,529	154,622	391,283	219,494	194,779	300,200	290,969	131,831	59,904	178,188	11,599,628
1955-56	602,264	134,857	331,957	298,616	105,582	862,190	217,343	92,580	69,634	1,089,187	204,323	729,585	1,689,998	177,712	316,734	159,491	162,818	299,153	1,776,018	112,614	74,953	302,809	12,100,255
1956-57	675,330	107,397	499,071	334,756	93,845	925,013	273,293	45,438	111,802	1,431,610	359,718	920,073	1,449,589	112,955	1,248,017	74,788	216,437	427,616	1,506,327	121,743	101,732	476,067	14,129,314
1957-58	423,361	67,278	431,134	260,647	29,961	727,149	231,522	71,725	48,568	1,101,536	122,489	655,729	1,226,523	107,718	853,430	148,288	97,951	377,128	2,083,453	56,093	60,209	272,991	12,548,117
1958-59	385,695	79,316	364,569	123,326	20,721	819,179	180,437	64,354	50,659	1,082,359	230,098	583,931	1,246,043	100,214	532,141	155,700	98,299	287,379	280,685	37,002	47,948	243,365	9,854,930
1959-60	348,693	95,400	526,255	99,721	15,275	692,540	191,846	25,444	59,423	558,393	116,147	490,109	1,069,942	98,822	439,122	114,289	192,944	375,400	1,789,708	53,510	129,099	231,397	10,947,623

Source : See Table 4.

Table 10: Australia's Exports to Singapore 1947-60—By Items and Percentages

Year	Foodstuffs of Animal Origin										Foodstuffs of Vegetable Origin				Metals, Metal Manufactures & Machinery			Sheep	Residual Oils Diesel Fuel Oil etc.	Leather & Leather Manufactures	Drugs & Medicinal Preparations	Military Naval & Air Force Equipment	Miscellaneous	Total
	Butter	Cheese	Infants' & Invalids' Food	Eggs In Shell	Bacon & Hams	Beef & Veal	Lamd & Mutton	Pork	Canned Meats	Milk & Cream	Fodders	Fresh & Preserved Fruits	Flour	Wheat	Metals & Metal Manufactures	Electrical Machinery & Appliances	Machines & Machinery							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1947-48	2.15	0.53	3.00	—	2.06	3.72	1.23	0.24	1.46	11.12	0.17	13.43	2.57	—	5.33	1.06	5.42	2.03	—	1.32	3.94	—	39.22	100.00
1948-49	3.69	1.35	3.23	—	1.83	3.90	1.48	0.75	1.92	11.23	0.15	10.91	8.15	—	3.61	0.65	4.70	2.40	—	2.53	3.16	—	34.34	100.00
1949-50	4.46	1.51	3.45	—	2.17	4.64	1.85	0.74	2.10	13.63	0.35	9.31	9.32	—	3.68	1.01	6.75	2.54	—	1.87	2.51	—	28.11	100.00
1950-51	3.56	0.59	1.95	—	2.00	4.81	1.32	0.67	1.94	8.41	0.55	7.40	21.33	—	3.60	0.82	5.51	2.79	—	2.55	2.24	—	27.96	100.00
1951-52	2.67	0.62	2.40	—	2.29	7.07	1.90	1.15	1.33	13.07	0.42	9.89	19.39	—	3.33	0.56	3.37	2.66	—	1.25	1.80	—	24.83	100.00
1952-53	4.12	0.75	2.85	—	1.99	7.93	1.62	1.25	2.00	11.20	2.14	7.05	22.78	0.93	2.49	0.50	2.13	1.94	1.66	0.91	0.94	4.76	18.06	100.00
1953-54	4.55	0.77	2.70	—	2.46	5.29	2.69	1.10	0.42	9.26	3.13	7.92	22.68	1.13	6.59	0.84	2.21	2.46	—	0.94	0.42	2.41	20.03	100.00
1954-55	5.29	0.89	3.29	—	1.40	6.89	2.14	0.81	0.56	9.90	1.53	7.58	21.64	1.33	3.37	1.89	1.68	2.59	2.51	1.14	0.52	1.54	21.51	100.00
1955-56	4.98	1.12	2.74	2.47	0.87	7.13	1.80	0.77	0.58	9.00	1.69	6.03	13.97	1.47	2.62	1.32	1.35	2.47	14.68	0.93	0.62	2.50	18.89	100.00
1956-57	4.78	0.76	3.53	2.37	0.66	6.55	1.93	0.32	0.79	10.13	2.55	6.51	10.26	0.80	8.83	0.53	1.53	3.02	10.66	0.86	0.72	3.37	18.53	100.00
1957-58	3.37	0.54	3.44	2.08	0.24	5.80	1.85	0.57	0.39	8.78	0.98	5.23	9.78	0.86	6.80	1.18	0.78	3.01	16.60	0.45	0.48	2.18	24.61	100.00
1958-59	3.91	0.81	3.70	1.25	0.21	8.31	1.83	0.65	0.51	10.98	2.34	5.93	12.64	1.02	5.40	1.58	1.00	2.92	2.85	0.38	0.49	2.47	28.82	100.00
1959-60	3.19	0.87	4.81	0.91	0.14	6.33	1.75	0.23	0.54	5.10	1.06	4.48	9.77	0.90	4.01	1.04	1.76	3.43	16.34	0.49	1.18	2.11	29.36	100.00

Source: Calculated from Table 9.

Australia's Exports To Singapore

The shrinkage of Australia's imports from Singapore was in great contrast with Australia's exports to Singapore. There were steady increases in the value of exports and variety of export items. The most significant feature of Australia's exports to Singapore after the war was the great increase in secondary goods. They formed more than one-third of the total exports after 1955. Residual oils, diesel fuel, metal and metal manufactures, electrical machinery and appliances, machines and machinery, leather and leather manufactures, pharmaceutical supplies, military, naval and air force stores and equipment were the main items.

An examination of the composition of Australia's exports to Singapore reveals that foodstuffs of animal origin (Class 1) and foodstuffs of vegetable origin (Class 2) were the leading export items. The following table shows the value of these two Classes and the percentages they formed against Australia's total exports to Singapore:

Table 11*

(Value in A£)

Year	Class 1	%	Class 2	%	Total %
1947-48	1,955,936	30.2	2,481,636	38.3	68.5
1948-49	2,626,192	35.7	2,567,123	34.9	70.6
1949-50	3,344,398	41.4	2,464,674	30.5	71.9
1950-51	3,451,897	31.7	4,089,807	37.6	69.3
1951-52	4,676,811	39.6	4,356,994	36.9	76.5
1952-53	5,061,080	39.6	5,049,264	39.5	79.1
1953-54	4,189,899	37.1	4,601,609	40.8	77.9
1954-55	4,450,046	38.4	4,638,322	40.0	78.4
1955-56	4,265,553	35.3	3,538,605	29.2	64.5
1956-57	4,951,943	35.1	3,418,761	24.2	59.3
1957-58	3,735,467	29.8	2,762,573	22.0	51.8
1958-59	3,450,070	35.0	2,662,403	27.0	62.0
1959-60	2,898,501	26.5	2,233,647	20.4	46.9

Note: * Calculated from Table 9.

Milk and cream were the leading export items in Class 1; and Singapore together with Malaya were also the principal markets in Asia for Australia's export of these items. [1] They formed the highest percentage of Australia's exports to Singapore for a single item in 1948-49 (11.2%) and 1949-50 (13.6%); they average about 10% during other periods. [2]

Beef and veal were the next important export items in Class 1. The export of beef and veal increased substantially from 1951 onwards. They fluctuated between 5.3% to 8.3% of Australia's total exports to Singapore from 1951 to 1959. [3] Other meats exported to Singapore included lamb and mutton, pork, poultry and game, rabbit and hare--preserved by cold storage--bacon and ham, and tinned meats. In 1955, about 85% of Singapore's meat requirements were met by locally slaughtered animals; the remaining 15% of requirements were mainly imported from Australia. [4]

The other Class 1 items were butter, cheese, eggs in shell and infants' and invalids' foods. Eggs began to be exported to Singapore in substantial amounts from 1955, but the export of eggs declined in subsequent years due to the increase of production in Singapore and exports from China. Australian eggs were mainly consumed by the European community; the Asian population normally bought locally laid eggs. [5]

Flour was the leading export item in Class 2. It was also the leading export item to Singapore from 1950 to 1954

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1. See Holder, p. 8; R.L.Dean, 21-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p. 690.
2. See Table 10.
3. Ibid.
4. Singapore Annual Report, 1955, p. 80.
5. Dean, 21-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p.p. 690-1.

and 1958-59. [1] Flour formed approximately 17% of the total exports between 1950 and 1959, [2] and earned more than £2.5 million annually between 1950 and 1954. [3] The leading position of flour was overtaken only by the export of petroleum products subsequently. Singapore and Malaya were the largest markets for Australian flour in Southeast Asia.

The most significant increase in Class II during the post-war period was the export of fresh fruit to Singapore. Fruit was the leading single item of exports in 1947-48, [4] when it formed 13.4% of Australia's total exports to Singapore. [5] It formed about 8% of Australia's total exports to Singapore between 1947 and 1959. [6] The exports of fruit fluctuated and decreased towards 1959 because of a challenge from America and South Africa and also because Australia only shipped fruit to Singapore when the home market was not agreeable to the growers. When the price fell, then the growers decided to ship their fruits to Singapore. This attitude of the Australian growers was criticised in the House of Representatives in August 1958. [7] Other Class II items included fodders, wheat, fresh vegetables, jams and jellies. The export of these items to Singapore were not in substantial volume. [8]

The most significant increases in the export of secon-

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1. See Tables 9 and 10 for detail.
2. Calculated from Table 10.
3. Calculated from Table 9.
4. See Tables 9 and 10.
See Table 10.
6. Calculated from Table 10.
7. Dean, 21-8-1958, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 20, p. 690.
8. See Tables 9 and 10 for detail.

dary goods were the export of metal, metal manufactures and machinery (Class XII) and oils, fats and waxes (Class IX). Class XII included metals and metal manufactures, electrical machinery and appliances, and machines and machinery, The total value of Class XII and the percentages against total exports were as follows;

Table 12*

(Value in A£)

Year	Class XII Value	%
1947-48	765,493	11.8
1948-49	659,753	9.0
1949-50	923,279	11.4
1950-51	1,079,203	9.9
1951-52	857,298	7.3
1952-53	656,132	5.1
1953-54	1,087,721	9.6
1954-55	805,556	7.0
1955-56	639,043	5.3
1956-57	1,539,170	10.9
1957-58	1,099,669	8.8
1958-59	786,140	8.0
1959-60	746,355	6.8

Note: *Calculated from Table 9.

It is worth noticing that Australian assembled motor cars were first exported to Singapore in 1956. By the end of 1959-60, a total of 387 motor cars were exported to Singapore for a total value of £260,253. [1] Residual oils and diesel fuel oils formed the main part of Class IX; they also formed the highest percentage of exports from 1955 to 1957 and 1959-60. [2] It should be pointed out that the exports of these items were negligible before 1952-53. [3] Other Class IX items included

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1. Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1959-60, p. 619.
2. See Tables 9 and 10.
3. See Table9.

lard and animal fats, solar oil and waxes. The export of solar oil (gas oil) to Singapore increased quite substantially from 1958. The value of solar oil in 1958-59 was £708,212 and in 1959-60 was £893,087. [1]

There was a gradual increase in the export of living animals (Class V) to Singapore during the post-war period. Living animals accounted for more than 4% of Australia's exports to Singapore after 1957. [2] Horses and sheep were the two main animals exported to Singapore. While the export of horses dropped after the war, there was a quite substantial increase in the export of sheep to Singapore. The value of sheep increased from £131,715 in 1947-48 to the peak of £427,616 in 1956-57; the value in 1959-60 was £375,400. [3] All the requirement for sheep in Singapore was supplied by Australia.

The export of military, naval and air force stores and equipment accounted for 1.5% to 4.8% of the total exports from 1952-53 onwards. [4] Before 1952-53 these items were not exported by Australia. The export of drugs and medicinal preparation decreased from £255,414 in 1947-48 to the lowest level of £47,555 in 1953-54. The export of these items recovered gradually after 1953-54 and the value in 1959-60 was £129,099. [5] Although the value of these items was small, they were of importance to Singapore. The export of leather

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1. Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1959-60, p. 618; Australian Exports, no. 1, 1958-59, p.p. 138-145, no.2 1959-60, p.p. 131-137.
2. See Table 8 for detail.
3. See Table 9.
4. See Table 10.
5. See Table 9.

and its manufactures fluctuated unevenly and decreased sharply after 1956-57. These items varied between 2.6% to less than 1% of Australia's total exports to Singapore.[1] The export of spirituous and alcoholic liquors, which increased quite substantially before the outbreak of war, did not form more than 0.5% of the total exports after the war.[2] Other items which formed less than 1% of the total exports included pigments, paints, varnishes, wood and wicker, earthware, cement, china, glass and stoneware, paper manufactures and stationery, pulp, paper and board, sporting material, toys, fancy goods, jewellery and timepieces, optical, surgical and scientific instruments and appliances, photographic goods, vegetable substances and fibres, yarns and manufactured fibres, textiles and apparel, rocks, minerals and hydrocarbons.[3] Almost every type of Australian product could be found in Singapore.

The very wide range of export items indicates the importance of Singapore to Australia for her sales outlet. With a large entrepôt trade, Singapore offered great opportunities for the Australian exporters to market their products, with no restrictions such as import licensing or currency problems.[4] With the same colonial background and English as the official language in Singapore, there were also no problems in communication between the two countries. This added to the ease of trading intercourse and was an important factor in Australia's increased exports to Singapore. The influx of Australian products to Singapore created

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1. See Table 10.
2. See Table 8.
3. See Tables 7 and 8.

Table 13: Australia's Trade With Major Southeast Asian Countries

In Value And Against Australia's Total Imports And Exports

Year	Borneo (British)				Burma				Indonesia				Malaya				Singapore				Thailand			
	Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
1947-48	3,414	0.1	390	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,863	1.1	7,785	1.9	392	0.1	6,481	1.6	—	—	—	—
1948-49	4,145	1.0	362	0.1	—	—	—	—	11,097	2.7	1,285	0.2	4,028	1.0	6,101	1.1	4,655	1.1	7,362	1.4	—	—	—	—
1949-50	4,692	0.9	411	0.1	—	—	—	—	14,750	2.8	507	0.1	4,926	0.9	5,566	0.9	7,308	1.4	8,071	1.3	—	—	—	—
1950-51	5,673	0.8	661	0.1	—	—	—	—	21,788	2.9	3,243	0.3	20,647	2.8	8,214	0.8	10,502	1.4	10,875	1.1	—	—	—	—
1951-52	6,903	0.7	904	0.1	—	—	—	—	25,638	2.4	3,967	0.6	18,632	1.8	8,532	1.3	8,764	0.8	11,810	1.8	—	—	—	—
1952-53	5,998	1.2	778	0.1	9	0.0	920	0.1	21,544	4.2	5,064	0.6	5,798	1.1	9,344	1.1	5,858	1.1	12,794	1.5	37	0.0	1,224	0.2
1953-54	8,439	1.2	960	0.1	18	0.0	1,689	0.2	21,792	3.2	6,585	0.8	8,721	1.3	9,143	1.1	8,529	1.3	11,288	1.4	35	0.0	1,723	0.2
1954-55	15,522	1.8	927	0.1	11	0.0	1,788	0.2	22,529	2.7	3,702	0.5	12,797	1.5	8,410	1.1	2,492	0.3	11,600	1.6	76	0.0	1,157	0.1
1955-56	9,801	1.2	1,042	0.1	60	0.0	2,040	0.3	22,401	2.7	6,705	0.9	16,230	2.0	9,337	1.2	1,453	0.2	12,100	1.6	167	0.0	1,432	0.2
1956-57	15,224	2.1	1,027	0.1	14	0.0	2,467	0.2	26,356	3.8	6,820	0.7	10,875	1.5	9,088	0.9	873	0.1	14,129	1.4	242	0.0	1,632	0.2
1957-58	13,222	1.7	1,231	0.2	16	0.0	1,525	0.2	28,089	3.6	4,051	0.5	10,708	1.4	12,266	1.5	912	0.1	12,685	1.6	198	0.0	1,627	0.2
1958-59	13,000	1.7	996	0.1	51	0.0	1,448	0.2	31,475	4.0	2,137	0.3	11,482	1.4	13,167	1.6	1,322	0.2	9,855	1.2	207	0.0	1,783	0.2
1959-60	15,830	1.7	1,350	0.1	9	0.0	1,888	0.2	29,438	3.2	3,221	0.3	17,828	1.9	12,681	1.4	1,560	0.1	10,948	1.2	421	0.0	2,378	0.3

Note: % denotes the percentage it formed against Australia's Total Overseas Imports or Exports.

Source: Compiled and calculated from Overseas Trade Bulletin of Australia, 1946-60, Y.B.C.A., 1946-60, A.I.F.F., 1946-60, Economic And Financial Survey Of Australia, 1946-60.

a very unfavourable balance of trade to Singapore as can be seen from Table 3 . From that Table it may be observed that Australia had always enjoyed a very favourable balance of trade with Singapore and at its peak the export excess was more than £13 million. It must be pointed out however that as a considerable part of Australia's exports to Singapore was destined for re-export to neighbouring countries, the balance of trade was less unfavourable than the figures in Table 3 would indicate. Among Southeast Asian countries, only Indonesia and British Borneo have always enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with Australia. [1]

II. Australia's Investment In Singapore

Due to the paucity of investment statistics and other relevant information, it is not possible to give an exhaustive or complete account of Australia's investment in Singapore. This section will however give a historical account of the important manufacturing companies which were established in Singapore after the war and the nature of their business.

The late 1940s and 1950s represented a period of rapid industrial expansion in Australia. The war acted as the springboard to the growth of manufacturing activities, while in the post-war period, increase of population and higher average incomes continued to stimulate an unprecedented growth of foreign investments in Australia. With continued internal expansion there has been little stimulus for Australian companies to seek investment opportunities abroad.

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4. See Singapore (Country Survey: Asia Series), Department of Trade, Australia, p. 7.

1. See Table 14 for detail.

Returns on new capital invested within Australia have been quite high compared with most other countries of the world. For this and other reasons inflow into Australia has exceeded capital outflow by many multiples. For instance, in the five years ending 1958-59, the average inflow of non-governmental investment into Australia was £110 million compared with an average outflow of £8 million. [1] Of the above annual outflow, by far the greater proportion had gone to New Zealand, and to a lesser extent to the United Kingdom and South Africa. Only a very small proportion of Australian foreign investment had gone to developing countries in Asia. However, Singapore and Malaya were the most important of these countries, and Australia's investment in Singapore manufacturing was the largest block of Australian investment in developing countries. [2] Although Australian investment in Singapore was small compared to other countries' investment, Australian factories were among the first to be established in Singapore and were also among the largest. [3]

Australian investment in Singapore could be traced as far back as the 1920s. However, it was after the war and particularly in the 1950s that Australia's investment in Singapore began to be expanded. Increasing Australian business interest in Singapore after a vigorous policy of export

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1. Ian Shanon, Australian Trade With Asia (Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 1962), p.p. 32-3.
2. Estimated by Helen Hughes, who conducted a survey on Australian investment in manufacturing in Southeast Asia and the islands of Southwest Pacific; see Helen Hughes, 'Australians as Foreign Investors: Australian Investment in Singapore and Malayasian Manufacturing Industries', Australian Economic Papers, vol. 6, June 1967, p.p. 57-76.
3. Hughes, Foreign Investment and Industrialisation In Singapore, p. 62.

promotion initiated by the Department of Trade was a main factor in Australia's growing interest in investing in Singapore. Singapore, as has been pointed out, was also favoured by Australian investors because English was the official language of business and government; there was also little competition and few restrictions on foreign ownership of business enterprises; and above all there was Singapore's dominant position as a trading centre.

Hume Industries was the earliest Australian manufacturing firm to be established in Singapore. [1] This firm was forced to close down during the Japanese occupation but was re-opened as soon as the war was over. Although the major interest of Hume Industries (Far East) Limited had always been in reinforced concrete pipes, since 1946 the factory had expanded into new manufacturing activities. Steel pipes, tanks, fabricated buildings, asbestos cement sheets and pressure pipes, polythene film and tube, and pre-stressed concrete building components were added to its production. [2] The company also had an electrical engineering department and it was one of the largest electrical contracting firms in the Malayan archipelago, undertaking the insulation of important power stations in Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, and Thailand. [3]

Hume was one of Australia's most successful manufacturing firms to be established in Singapore, making hugh

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1. See Chapter 1, p.p.
2. Historical Retrospect, Report of 35th Annual Meeting of Shareholders held at (Hume) Company's Registered Office, Kinnean House, Melbourne, on 4-10-1955.
3. Ian Shanon 'Australian Non-Governmental Investment In Asia', Australia's Neighbours, 3rd. Series, July-August 1961, p.p. 119-20; Shannon, Australian Trade With Asia, p. 34.

profits annually. [1] Its products were exported to Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Brunei, Burma, Philippines and Hong Kong; [2] and were well-known in these countries at public and governmental level. Hume also held a fifty per cent share in Rheem-Hume (Far East) Limited, the other fifty per cent being owned by the Rheem Manufacturing Company of America. This company manufactured steel drums, water heaters, aluminium ducting and steel metal fabricators. [3]

Australian Consolidated Industries Limited of Melbourne was the first Australian manufacturing company to establish a subsidiary in Singapore after the war. This subsidiary was formed in 1948 under the name Singapore Glass Manufacturing Company Limited, which was wholly Australian owned. This company employed 700 hundred workers when it was in full swing and manufactured a wide range of products including bottles, glass containers, latex cups, tumblers and glass tableware, applied ceramic labels and ceramic decorations, caps and bottle closures of plastic and tinplate, and corrugated fibre-board boxes. Beside meeting the requirements of the Singapore and Malayan markets, products of this company were also exported to other Southeast Asian countries, Pakistan, India, and even East Africa. However, the products of this company had to meet very fierce international competition. [4]

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1. Historical Retrospect, op. cit.
2. The factories at Hong Kong and Philippines were closed during the Japanese occupation and were not re-opened due to the extent of damage to their facilities.
3. Shannon, 'Australian Non-Governmental Investment in Asia', p.p. 119-20; The Straits Times Directory of Singapore and Malaya, 1964, p. 183; 'Australian Commercial and Professional Establishment in Singapore', compiled by Department of Overseas Trade, Canberra.
4. Ibid., The Straits Times Directory..., p. 201.

The Kiwi International Limited, also of Melbourne, established a very modern factory under the name Kiwi Polish Company Private Limited at Singapore in 1953. The company employed about fifty local staff and a sizable range of products was produced. These included shoe polish and cream, white shoe cleaner, floor polish, disinfectants and detergents. This company supplied the requirements of Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Ceylon. The company extended its business into the Federation of Malaya in 1959 through the establishment of a new factory at Johore Bahru.[1] Kiwi was very successful in Singapore and Malaya, and their products were very popular in both countries.

In mid-1957, ARC Industries of Australia and Hall Engineering Industries of the United Kingdom jointly took over an established Singapore-based manufacturer of weld meshes to form B.R.C. Weldmesh (Malaya) Limited. The Singapore factory was re-equipped to make it effective and competitive. As a result of the increased efficiency obtained in this reorganization, the company was able to develop export markets in other nearby Southeast Asian countries.[2]

A very large part of the capital of Cold Storage (Singapore) Limited was Australia. The Australian and Oriental Trading and Holding Private Company of Brisbane held most shares in Australia's investment in this company. The

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1. 'Australian Commercial and Professional Establishment in Singapore', op. cit.; Shannon, Australian Trade With Asia, p. 35; The Straits Times Directory..., p. 121.
2. Ibid.; The Straits Times Directory..., p. 15, Shannon, 'Australian Non-Governmental Investment in Asia', p.p. 119-20.

Cold Storage had the biggest cold storage facilities and conducted the largest chain of grocery outlets throughout Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. It also conducted a major wholesale and ship's stores business and ran a diary farm in Singapore. This company was the first to open a self-service supermarket in Singapore. [1]

Beside the abovementioned large and influential companies, some Australian capital had also been channelled into a number of small importing, exporting, retail, accounting and advertising companies.

During the early part of the 1950s, most Australians who were interested in investing in Singapore also investigated the possibility of investing in the Federation of Malaya. However, most Australians were initially inclined to choose Singapore because it offered better port and other public and urban facilities. Towards the end of the 1950s, Australian interests in Singapore were seriously hampered by labour unrest and political instability in the country. Some firms abandoned their interest in Singapore altogether and switched their interest to Malaya which appeared to be more favourable to foreign investors by means of the 1958 Pioneer Industries Ordinance. It seemed to offer much better long-term domestic market prospects. [2] A manufacturing firm established in the Federation of Malaya not only enjoyed a degree of protection from foreign competitors; it also had free access to both the Malayan and Singapore markets. On

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1. Overseas Trading, vol. 5, no. 12, 1953, p. 3, Singapore (Country Survey: Asia Series, undated), Department of Trade, Canberra, p. 4.
2. Hughes, Foreign Investment And Industrialisation In Singapore, p. 65.

the other hand, a manufacturing firm establishing a subsidiary in Singapore might not get any tariff protection and at the same time its exports to the Federation would be subjected to duties. However, within a short period after the People's Action Party was elected to power in June 1959, the new government was able to improve the political climate in Singapore and stimulate foreign investment. Manufacturers of new products could obtained under the Singapore Pioneer Industries Ordinance 1959 complete tax exemption on profits for five years from the day production began--normally a company would have to pay 40% on profits. This helped to make Singapore attractive again to Australian investors.

It may be noticed that investment has been altogether a one-way affair; that is, from Australia to Singapore. This is quite natural as Singapore, throughout its history, has been principally a capital importing country. Australian investment in Singapore was mainly in the manufacturing industries, and the establishing of manufacturing companies in Singapore was beneficial to both countries. In the case of Singapore, it provided employment; easy access to products which were useful to the improving of the society and living standards; it also brought in advanced skills and technology which were useful to a developing country. In the case of Australia, cheap labour and saving on freight rates lowered the cost of production and this allowed Australian goods to be more competitive and ensured higher profits. The excellent facilities in Singapore also allowed Australian manufacturing industries to expand to Asian markets much more easily.

III. Australia's Technical Assistance To Singapore Under The Colombo Plan:

In 1950 the Colombo Plan was born to undertake a massive task of improving the economic condition of South and South-East Asia through the co-operative effort of its members. The richer, higher developed participating countries were to assist the poorer and less developed countries by contributing both resources and their knowledge and skills. Singapore, among other Colombo Plan countries, has received invaluable technical assistance from Australia since the inception of the Plan. This part will discuss Australia's contribution to Singapore up to 30 June 1960, which was the third year of the second term of the Colombo Plan.

Development, Components and Function of the Colombo Plan

The Colombo Plan was formulated as a result of a conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950. During this conference, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, P.C.Spender, took the leadership in proposing the creation of a Consultative Committee to consider problems of economic aid and development in South and South-East Asia. [1]

On 15 May 1950 the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan held its first meeting in Sydney. [2] It was agreed at the meeting that India, Pakistan, and Ceylon together with the British territories of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo

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1. R.G.Casey, Friends And Neighbours (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1958), p. 125; R.H.Barett, 'Australian Policy Towards S.E. Asia', Eastern World, vol. 9, no. 8, August 1955, p. 21; A.I.F.F., no. 27, 1950, p. 53.
2. Spender, 28-4-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 207, p. 2034.

and Sarawak should each proceed at once to draw up a six year programme of economic development so that the Committe could have some idea of resource requirements. [1] The Plans were put to function in July 1950. The meeting also decided to create a Technical Co-operation Scheme, which included provision for a continuing Council for the Technical Co-operation Scheme, and a small Bureau of full-time staff to be located in Colombo.

The original representatives of the Colombo Plan were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the British territories of Malaya, Singapore [2], North Borneo and Sarawak. The United States agreed to assist the Plan in 1951. Other members and the years when they joined were as follows: Cambodia, Vietnam (1951); Burma, Nepal (1952); Indonesia (1953); Japan, Philippines, Thailand (1954); Laos (1955). [3] On 30 June 1956 the Colombo Plan completed its 6 year term, But at Singapore in 1955 the Consultative Committee had agreed that the Plan should be extended from July 1957 to 30 June 1961 and that the future of the Plan should be considered in 1959. [4]

The external aid component of the Plan had two interrelated parts. Firstly, the Technical Co-operation Scheme which was concerned with the training of students, the loan of experts, and the provision of equipment that might be

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1. A.H.Boxer, Experts In Asia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969), p. 1; Spender, 6-6-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 208, p. 3724.
2. Malaya and Singapore became full and independent members in 1958 and 1960 respectively.
3. Technical Co-operation Under The Colombo Plan--Report For 1959-60 (Ceylon: The Government Press, 1960), p. 69.
4. The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme--Report For 1955-56 (Ceylon: The Government Press, 1956), p. 10.

needed for local training purposes or to enable experts and the people trained to carry out their functions properly. Secondly, the Economic Development Programme which was mainly concerned with aid to public investment projects such as irrigation, power, communications, railways, roads and other basic services. It also included social development in the spheres of health, education, housing etc. Both parts were designed to fit, together with the much larger component of national effort, into the national development programmes of the countries of the Colombo Plan area. [1]

The Consultative Committee was to carry out advisory functions. It was to meet once a year to review the efforts of the countries in the region in stimulating production; the amount of external aid they had received from all sources; and their plans and requirements for the future. The Committee was also to issue an annual report to publicise these reviews. [2]

The Technical Co-operation Scheme which had been an integral part of the Colombo Plan since July 1950 was to provide a framework for the exchange of technical assistance between member countries. The Council for Technical Co-operation was to co-ordinate the supply anddemand for technical assistance. It was to hold meetings regularly in Colombo. The Bureau for Technical Co-operation was a secreta-

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1. R.G.Casey, 'Address to the New South Wales Branch of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand', delivered on 22-1-1954 at the Stawell Hall, 145 Macquarie Street, Sydney, File On The Colombo Plan (Parliament House Library, Canberra); The Colombo Plan Report For The Technical Co-operation In South and South-East Asia 1957-58, p. 5.

2. R.G.Neale, 'Australian Interests In and Attitudes Towards Economic Assistance To Asia', in G. Greenwood (ed.), Australian Policies Towards Asia (Melbourne: A.I.I.A., 1954), p.p. 4-6.

riat to the Council. All requests made and agreements reached in the field of technical assistance were recorded by the bureau. The Information Unit, which was created after the 1953 Consultative Committee meeting in New Delhi, [1] had the responsibility for spreading information about the whole of the Colombo Plan, including capital aid as well as technical assistance. [2]

Australia's Attitude And Contribution To The Colombo Plan

Few major policies in Australia had received a more unanimous support and encouragement from the government, the opposition, and the press as did the Colombo Plan. The motives behind the creation of the Colombo Plan were complex, but for Australia it was primarily a security measure, a defence precaution. This may be observed from Australia's attitudes to the Plan.

Although it was recognised that the Colombo Plan involved a certain degree of humanitarianism, the Australian participation was looked upon in terms of 'enlightened self-interest'. This was mentioned in Evatt's statement in the House of Representatives when he quoted the words of Pandit Nehru, India's Prime Minister: '...it is a question of an enlightened self-interest realising that if some parts of the world do not progress, and remain backward, they have an adverse effect on the whole economy of the world and they tend to break down those parts that are at present prospe-

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1. The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report For 1955-56, p. 5.
2. Ibid., p.p. 5-9.

rous'. [1]

Spender's statement in the House of Representatives on 9 March 1950 clearly advocated the government's stand of support for economic assistance to, and co-operation with, countries of South and South-East Asia. He stated that:

> No nation can escape its geography...we live side by side with the countries of South and South-East Asia, and we desire to be on good neighbour terms with them. Above all it is in our interest to foster commercial and other contacts with them and give them what help we can in maintaining stable and democratic government in power, and increasing the material welfare of their peoples. In doing so, we take the long view. We will be helping to provide them and ourself with the best defence against the effective penetration of communist imperialism. [2]

The opposition's attitudes to the Colombo Plan were best represented by Evatt's statement on 16 March 1950. He believed that the government's general policy of providing assistance to improve living standards and help to check the spread of communism or other extremist influences in South and South-East Asia 'is not only just, sound and acceptable in itself, but it was also the firm and accepted policy of the previous Government'. [3] Chifley, leader of the opposition, also stated that '...what we can give in the way of technical equipment and education facilities we should give. By giving it we should render a service to ourselves and to humanity'. [4]

The belief that economic aid from Australia would be an effective method of building goodwill towards Australia

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1. Evatt, 16-3-1950, 16-3-1950, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 206, p.p. 905-6.
2. Spender, 9-3-1950, Ibid., p. 628; see also Current Notes, no. 21, 1951, p. 160.
3. Evatt, 16-3-1950, Ibid., p. 906
4. Chifley, 23-3-1950, Ibid., p. 1177.

and safeguarding its national interests were recurrent themes in most discussions in the Australian press after the introduction of the Colombo Plan. For example, The Age in a special article of 27 March 1952, emphasised that Australia should 'do everything in her power to win the friendship and co-operation of Asians'; 'Even if the cost were to be multiplied by ten', the plan would still be a good investment for it was 'one of the most constructive attempts ever made towards improving relations with our Asian neighbours'. [1]

Australia's aid to South and South-East Asian countries was in the form of capital aid and technical assistance. Capital aid provided by Australia comprised Australian-made machinery, farm equipment, transport vehicles and fertilisers. It also included commodities such as wheat and flour, condensed milk, coal, copper etc., which were sold in recipient countries to raise counterpart funds for selected developmental activities. Technical assistance included training of students; provision of experts, advisers and technical equipment.

By 30 June 1960, Australia's total contribution to the Colombo Plan amounted to £35.2 million. The bulk of Australia's contribution was in the form of capital aid . Seventy-six projects in twelve countries were assisted by Australia at a cost of £27.7 million. [2] The main feature of Australia's contribution towards technical assistance was the provision

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1. The Age (Melbourne), 27-3-1952.
2. The Colombo Plan Consultative Report For 1960, p. 185; See Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, Parliamentary Papers, vol. IV, 1959-60, p. 313 for details of the type of projects assisted by Australia.

of 3076 awards for training. The cost of the training programme, excluding the efforts of voluntary helpers of many kinds, had reached £4.3 million. [1] 1,998 awards were granted under the Correspondence Scholarship Scheme, which was inaugurated by Australia in 1955. [2] The Scheme was designed to assist those unable to leave their job or country for various reasons to be able to get additional training. [3]

The Colombo Plan training programme had also stimulated the interest of private Asian students to study in Australian schools, colleges, and universities, By 30 June 1960, the number of private students in Australia had reached 7,918. [4] A total of 492 experts were provided by Australia at the request of Asian governments at a cost of £1.2 million. [5] The duration of the loan of experts ranged from a few weeks to as long as six years. 252 requests for equipment were met by Australia at a coat of £1.3 million. A break up of Australia's contribution up to 30 June 1960 is shown on Table 14.

Singapore's Attitude Towards Australia's Economic Assistance

Australia's economic assistance to Singapore could be traced to the period immediately after the war when Australia

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1. See Table 1 and Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 313 for details of the field of training provided by Australia.
2. Main fields of study of the Scheme included accountancy, engineering and various clerical courses. Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Malaya, North Borneo, the Philippines, Sarawak, Singapore and Thailand were members of the Scheme.
3. See Casey, Friends And Neighbours, p. 129; Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 313.
4. Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 313.
5. See Table 14.

Table 14

Australian Contribution up to 30th June 1960

(Thousands of Australian pounds)

	Economic Development		Technical Co-operation Scheme							TOTALS
			Training			Experts		Equipment		
	Expenditure	No. of Projects	Expenditure	No. of trainees	Corres-pondence	Expenditure	No. of experts	Expenditrue	No. of Projects	Colombo Plan Expenditure
Brunei*	—	—	15.1	15	10	.4	4	—	—	15.4
Burma	494.7	3	373.2	290	163	23.5	23	148.0	29	1,039.7
Cambodia	683.0	4	13.8	9	—	52.8	13	70.9	7	820.5
Ceylon	2,823.4	9	236.4	221	221	168.5	61	114.9	35	3,343.3
India	11,274.4	12	455.9	396	227	38.2	37	153.9	17	11,922.3
Indonesia	1,704.5	8	1,067.6	576	279	238.0	44	171.6	20	3,181.7
Laos	267.3	1	6.4	1	—	18.5	8	25.5	8	317.7
Malaya	439.2	2	558.8	397	638	239.0	90	41.0	21	1,278.1
Nepal	58.8	1	20.2	13	—	2.7	3			81.8
North Borneo	—	—	180.8	111	101	39.1	17	39.4	22	259.4
Pakistan	8,931.1	20	361	288	—	174.6	58	182.5	23	9,649.1
Philippines	.1	1	199.4	176	67	13.2	14	46.0	11	258.7
Sarawak	—	—	142.6	108	67	36.7	18	17.0	15	196.4
Singapore	—	—	334.8	190	174	80.8	51	58.0	16	473.6
Thailand	299.0	4	248	185	51	19.4	27	88.5	12	655.0
Viet Nam	712.0	11	127.7	100	—	67.7	24	162.4	16	1,069.8
Totals	27,687.5	76	4,341.7	3,076	1,998	1,213.1	492	1,320	252	34,562.5
Miscellaneous Expenditure										594.1
Total Expenditure										35,156.6

* Outside the Colombo Plan.

Source: The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Report For 1960, p. 185.

took part in several international relief organisations such as the International Emergency Food Council, UNRRA etc., which provided food, medicine and other emergency supplies to a large number of Asian countries. [1] These were provided solely on humanitarian grounds, to reduce hardship and avert wide-spread starvation. Every recipient country had reason to be thankful to Australia's altruistic contributions.

In 1947 however, the Australian government seemed interested in reaffirming its historical White Australia Policy. In March 1947 Evatt strongly asserted in the House of Representatives that 'The White Australia Policy is absolutely basic to the economy and politics of this country'.[2] This was followed by a mass deportation of refugees from Australia. During World War II, an estimated 14,000 Malayan refugees were received in Australia; as a result of the deportation only 800 were permitted to remain in Australia on renewable five-year exemption certificates. [3] This action had already created ill-feelings in Singapore-Malaya towards Australia. Then in 1948 the deportation of a few Malay seamen--pearl divers in Western Australia--who had married Australian women and had families in Australia, immediately sparked off wide-spread hostility against Australia. The Straits Times editorial stated on 4 June 1948 that:

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1. The Colombo Plan For Co-operative Development In South And South-East Asia, Report by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee (London: H.M.S.O., 1950), p. 5, Neale, p. 1.
2. Evatt, 12-3-1947, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 190, p. 527.
3. All the refugges were deported under the Wartime Refugees Deportation Act; see K.E.Beazley, 17-6-1948, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 197, p.p. 2210, 2221-6; Boyce, 'Twenty-one Years of Australian Diplomacy in Malaya', p. 94.

> It is not the barrier maintained by Australia against Asian settlement that causes the trouble...but when Mr. Calwell [Minister for Immigration] suddenly decides that a few respectable Asian or Eurasian individuals who have been living in Australia for years must be uprooted, forced to give up their jobs, break up their homes and families, and go back to Asia, that is when the White Australia Policy offends racial pride in Malaya, for in acting thus, Mr. Calwell seems unreasonable, harsh and provocative. 1

Early in June 1948 when W. Macmahon Ball[2] led a goodwill mission to Singapore and Malaya with the purpose of discussing with officials any relief supplies that the two countries might need, and conveying Australia's decision to provide 25 scholarships or fellowships, [3] the Singapore Free Press bitterly remarked: 'until the Australian Government changes its policy towards Malayans and other Asians, any mention of goodwill is a mockery'. [4] There were also other strong reactions against the mission. The Malaya Nationalist Party remarked that 'The visit of the Australian goodwill mission is merely to cover up Australia's contemptible acts in deporting Asians from their country'. [5] Budh Singh, President of the Indian Congress Party in Malaya stated that 'Australia's recent actions had been so much against the spirit of good will towards Asians and Malayans in particular that there was no sense in that country sending a goodwill mission to this country at present'. [6] The Straits Times also reported that Australia's intention of providing scholarship had come at a

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1. The Straits Times, editorial, 4-6-1948; see also J.P. Abbott, 9-6-1948, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 197, p. 1855.
2. Professor of Political Science at Melbourne University who represented Australia on the Allied Occupation Council in Japan after World War II.
3. The Straits Times, 4-6-1948; Evatt, 3-6-1948, C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 197, p. 1608; 8-6-1948, p.p. 1713-4.
4. Singapore Free Press, 2-6-1948.
5. The Straits Times, 4-6-1948.
6. Ibid.

wrong time as Singapore was having its own university. [1]

Notwithstanding this background of ill-feeling against Australia, when the Colombo Plan was introduced and functioning smoothly, attitudes towards Australia began to change. On 4 February The Straits Times editorial wrote 'Thanks Australia' and that 'Singapore is grateful' for her contribution. [2] The Chief Minister of the Singapore government, David Marshall stated in a statement to the Australian government in May 1955 that:

> Singapore is indebted to Australia for its hospitality and assistance to hundreds of students and for the very real contribution she has made and is making through the Colombo Plan to our welfare. Not only do I hope that your assistance under the Colombo Plan will continue but it is my earnest desire that you will find it possible to intensify your assistance. 3

The Malay Mail editorial on 17 October 1955 also strongly supported the Colombo Plan; it went to the extent of saying that the Plan was 'one of the most outstanding conceptions of real co-operation which man has yet devised'. [4] So by the time the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held its meeting in Singapore in 1955 to consider a further extension of the Plan, there were no doubts that the government and people of Singapore had fully recognised the value of the Plan and grateful for whatever contributions Australia had made to Singapore.

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1. The Straits Times, 4-6-1948. The visit of the goodwill mission to Singapore and Malaya also led to a controvesy between the opposition and the government in Australia. See C.P.D. (H. of R.), vol. 197, Abbott and Evatt, 3-6-1948, p.p. 1607-8; E.J. Harrison and Evatt, 4-6-1948, p.p. 1713-4; Abbott, 9-6-1948, p.p. 1855-6; Harrison, Evatt and Abbott, 11-6-1948, p.p. 1919-20; Evatt, 16 and 17-6-1948, p. 2123; W.J. Hutchinson and Evatt, 17-6-1948, p. 2169, 2207; T.P.Burke, 17-6-1948, p. 2218-9.
2. The Straits Times, editorial, 4-2-1954; see also Courier Mail (Brisbane), 5-2-1954.
3. Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 344; Nanfang Wan Pau (Singapore), editorial of 22-10-1955 also urged that appeals

Australia's Contribution To Singapore

Singapore, like all South and South-East Asian countries, had suffered heavily from the Second World War. The majority of Singapore's post-war restoration and reconstruction were mainly carried out through Britain's aid and rehabilitation programme. [1] When the Colombo Plan was introduced, Singapore requested the following list of projects and technical assistance for the first six years of the Plan:

List Of Projects Required Assistance From Abroad

Number of Projects	Description	Estimated Cost (M$ million)
1	Establishment of an international civil airport	40.0
2	Schemes for the construction of a new graving dock and extension of wharves	14.3
2	Schemes for road development	5.5
1	Power station and ancillary works	81.0

Technical Assistance Required From Abroad

Number of Experts	Type of Experts	Time for which required
1	Airport adviser	varying
1	Electrical Engineer	
2	Mechanical engineer	
6	Civil engineer	
5	Gas engineers	
*	Architects	
*	Structural engineers	
*	Draughtsmen	
*	Town planners	
*	Engineers	
*	Planners	
1	Master fisherman	
2	Surveyors	

Note: * number not stated.

Source: The Colombo Plan For Co-operative Economic Development of South and South-East Asia--Report By The Commonwealth Consultative Committee, 1950, p.p. 93, 96.

3. should be made to the Colombo Plan to extend its aid to Singapore-Malaya.

4. The Malay Mail, editorial, 17-10-1955.

1. Neale, p.p. 2-3.

The most important part of Australian aid to Singapore under the Colombo Plan was in the form of technical assistance. Although in monetary terms, technical assistance had accounted for only about 20% of Australia's total contribution under the Colombo Plan, it by no means reflected the true relative contribution to the economic development of the recipient countries. Technical assistance, although a relatively inexpensive form of aid, could nevertheless be a highly effective one. This result was achieved in part by its flexibility, which enabled a small but significant amount of skill and knowledge, in the form of an expert or a returned trainee or crucial technical equipment, to be applied with precision at some critical point in the national economy where it could have a catalytic effect. Its effectiveness was further due to the pervasive influence of properly directed technical assistance, which had a direct effect on the forward movement of the society and economy of a country. [1]

Australia was by far the most important country providing training places and experts to Singapore under the Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme. At the end of the first term of six years of the Colombo Plan on 30 June 1956, out of 102 training places given to Singapore, 95 places [2] or 93% was provided by Australia. At the end of the same pe-

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1. See The Colombo Plan--Report of The Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia for 1957-58, p. 6.
2. See The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report for 1955-56, p.p. 52-53.
3. Calculated from Ibid., p. 53.

riod, the United Nations and other Specialised Agencies had provided only 14 fellowships for training to Singapore. [1] Out of 12 Colombo Plan experts provided to Singapore, 9 were provided by Australia. [2] The United Nations and other Specialised Agencies provided 28 experts to Singapore. [3]

By the end of the third year of the second term of the Colombo Plan on 30 June 1960, Australia had provided 190 or 76% of the 249 training places given to Singapore. The United Nations had provided 47 training awards. [4] Out of 55 experts provided to Singapore, 44 or 80% were provided by Australia. In addition, Australia also provided 7 advisers to Singapore. The United Nations provided 66 experts to Singapore. [5] A break-up of Australia's technical assistance to Singapore from July 1950 to June 1960 was as follows:

Table 15

Australia's Contribution to Singapore
July 1950 to 30 June 1960

Description	Number	Expenditure
Training Awards	190	£ 334,704
Correspondence Awards	174	
Experts	44	£ 80,761
Advisers	7	
Equipment Projects	16	£ 58,000
	Total ...	£ 473,465

Source: Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 320.

1. See The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report For 1955-56, p. 59.
2. See Ibid., p.p. 52-3; Current Notes, no. 27, 1956, p. 431.
3. See The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report For 1955-56, p. 59.
4. See Table 15 and Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 312.
5. Ibid.

A comparison of Australia's technical assistance to Singapore and to other South and South-East Asian countries was as follows:

Table 16

Australia's Technical Assistance Expenditure under the Colombo Plan as at 30 June 1960 (Valau in A £)

Country	Expenditure	Percentages*
Brunei	15,493	0.23
Burma	544,966	7.93
Cambodia	137,495	2.00
Ceylon	519,887	7.56
India	647,894	9.42
Indonesia	1,477,206	21.49
Laos	50,449	0.73
Malaya	838,871	12.20
Nepal	22,955	0.33
North Borneo	259,399	3.77
Pakistan	718,019	10.44
Philippines	258,682	3.76
Sarawak	196,374	2.86
Singapore	473,465	6.89
Thailand	355,947	5.18
Vietnam	357,848	5.21
Total ...	6,874,950 @	100.00

Note: *calculated by the author;
@figure does not include miscellaneous expenditure.
Source: Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 322.

It may be noted that in terms of money, Australia's contribution to Singapore up to 30 June 1960 was only £437,465 or 6.9% of Australia's total contribution. However, these figures did not in any way reveal the true value of Australia's contribution to Singapore. Technical assistance under the Colombo Plan was provided on the basis of needs, and Australia's contributions to Singapore were all directed towards the crucial needs of the country.

In training programmes, Australia made a valuable con-

tribution by providing skills and professional training to Singapore students through actual study in Australia and through the Correspondence Scholarship Scheme. The first Australian Scholarship under the Colombo Plan awarded to Singapore was in 1951; thereafter the number increased rapidly and the scholars were trained in a wide variety of fields. Until 30 June 1960, Singapore trainees in Australia were mainly in the fields of engineering (53), [1] public administration (28), medicine (27) and education (20). [2] Other fields of importance included transport and communication, fisheries, industry and trade, accountancy and statistics. [3]

By far the larger number of Singapore students trained in Australia were private students, who had gone to Australia at their own expense. There were no exact figures on the number of private students in Australia up to 30 June 1960; however, it was known that the number had exceeded 1,000 by 1957. [4] The large increase of Singapore students in Australia especially after 1950 was due to the relaxation of Australia's immigration policy by accepting private students as temporary residents in Australia, the availability of diplomatic representative in Singapore to process applications, the raising of education standards in Singapore and the proximity of the two countries. But most important of all was the news relayed back home by Singapore students about the warm reception they received in Australia; the

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1. Most of the engineers trained were for the Singapore City Council.
2. Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 320.
3. Ibid., see also The Colombo Plan Report of the Council for Technical Co-operation for 1957-58, p. 77.
4. Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p.p. 301-2.

modern and advanced facilities and technology, the easy pace of life and the affluence of the country.[1] These students certainly made an impact on better understanding between the two countries. The training of such a large number of students by Australia also contributed greatly to the national development of Singapore.

In expert assistance, Australia's greatest contribution to Singapore was in the medical area. One of the important kinds of medical assistance provided by Australia was her participation in a mass tuberculosis survey undertaken by the Singapore Health Authority. In May 1955 the Minister for External Affairs, R.G.Casey, readily agreed to a request from Singapore to send Harry Wunderly, the Australian Director of Tuberculosis, to make a preliminary survey and to advise on tuberculosis control.[2] Wunderly assisted in setting up a complete tuberculosis organisation with its own administrative staff and central case register before the mass survey was carried out in July 1958. The survey in 1958 was undertaken by Australian-trained Singapore personnel with the help of an Australian team of five experts. They were Dr. C. Rubinstein, Director of Mass Surveys of N. S.W. Anti-Tuberculosis Association; D.J.Grant, a radiographer of Commonwealth X-Ray and Radium Laboratory; G.Rodda, a bacteriologist of Melbourne and J.Saddlier, a radiographer.[3]

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1. S.Bochner and P. Wicks (ed.), Overseas Students In Australia (Randwick, N.S.W. University Press, 1972), p.p. 49-54.
2. Current Notes, no. 26, 1955, p. 575, no. 27, 1956, p.p. 296-8.
3. Current Notes, no. 29, 1958, p.p. 351-2.

The 1958 tuberculosis survey included a mass X-Ray of the population, and Australia supplied equipment needed for this project. The incidecence of tuberculosis in Singapore, as in most of South and South-East Asia, was very high, and the project was to acquire precise knowledge of the incidence in Singapore in order to conduct an effective campaign against the disease. This survey helped greatly to control and reduce the incidence of tuberculosis in Singapore in the later years. [1]

On 13 June 1956 Casey made an important announcement that medical graduates in Singapore would in future be able to undertake studies for the Fellowship of the Royal Australian College of Surgeons (Hereafter F.R.A.C.S.) without having to travel to Australia to sit for the examination. [2] This followed agreement by the R.A.C.S. to hold annual Primary Fellowship Examinations in Singapore. The new arrangement was a result of a vist to Australia in May 1956 of two senior Singapore medical officers; Dr. R.H.Bland, Director of Medical Services and C.S.Monteiro, Professor of Clinical Medicine at the University of Malaya.[3] The two men had visited Australia as special visitors under the Colombo Plan. Whilst in Australia, they conferred with the Minister for Health, Dr. D.A. Cameron, the Minister for External Affairs, R.G.Casey, and with medical authorities in several States, on ways in which Australia could help to solve some of Singapore's outstanding

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1. A.I.F.F., no. 50, 1956-57, p. 74; no. 57, 1958-59, p. 73; The Colombo Plan Report of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia for 1957-58, p. 64.
2. Statement by Casey, 13-6-1956, Current Notes, no. 27, 1956, p.p. 371-2.
3. The University was later called University of Singapore.

medical problems. [1]

That the Primary Fellowship Examinations of the R.A.C.S. could be taken in Singapore meant a substantial saving of time and money for local medical candidates. The new arrangement made it possible for the initial hurdle to be jumped locally with minimum dislocation of work and family life. [2] As a result of discussion with the two Singapore medical officers, the Australian government also agreed that Singapore medical graduates in Australia would be granted temporary appointments in Australian hospitals to gain experience of Australian medical services and hospital administration prior to returning home. Senior Australian medical graduates were also invited to take appointment for one year at Singapore hospitals. [3] Furthermore, arrangement was made for the exchange of medical registrars between the two countries. [4] All these new arrangements marked a great step forward in Australia's assistance to Singapore in the field of health and medicine under the Colombo Plan.

In January 1957 three Australian lecturers left for Singapore to coach doctors from Singapore and Malaya who sat in March for the Primary Examination for the F.R.A.C.S. The lecturers, who had been nominated by the R.A.C.S., were H.H.Eddey, a Melbourne surgeon and lecturer in Surgical Anatomy at the Melbourne University; G.S.Christie, an Asso-

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1. Ibid., see also A.I.F.F., no. 50, 1956-57, p. 74.
2. See Boxer, p. 24.
3. See A.I.F.F., no. 50, 1956-57, p. 74; Current Notes, no. 27, 1956, p.p. 371-2.
4. The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report For 1955-56, p. 26.

ciate Professor of Pathology at Melbourne University; and Dr. W.J.Simmonds, a Professor of Physiology at the University of Western Australia. [1] Four examiners chosen by the R.A.C.S. held the first Primary Examination in Singapore. They were E.S.J.King, a Professor of Pathology at Melbourne University; S.Suderland, a Professor of Anatomy and Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Melbourne University; Dr. F.C.Courtice, a Director of Kanematsu Institute of Pathology at Sydney Hospital; and P.J.Kenny, a leading Sydney surgeon and lecturer in Surgical Anatomy at the University of Sydney. [2] Fourty-one doctors from Singapore and Malaya sat for the examination and on 28 April the same year, Casey announced that 11 doctors, all from Singapore had passed the Primary Examination. The 25% success was a very pleasing result and compared favourably with the Australian and United Kingdom average of about 20% success. [3]

The first two primary examinations held in Singapore for the Fellowship were financed by Australia under the Colombo Plan. Subsequently the F.R.A.C.S, examination became an annual event and lecture courses proceeding to the Primary Examination were instituted in Singapore. [4] Previously doctors in Singapore and Malaya would have to spend a consirable time abroad to study and sit for the Primary Examination. Australia's unique plan of taking the tuition and the examination to the doctors had enabled them to seek specialised

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1. Statement by Casey, 7-1-1957, Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p. 58.
2. Ibid.
3. Statement by Casey, 28-4-1957, Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p. 334; A.I.F.F., no. 53, 1956-57, p. 60; The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Report For 1957-58, p. 181.
4. Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 320.

skills while continuing to serve their countries. This was extremely important to Singapore as doctors were very much needed in the community.

Before the end of the first term of the Colombo Plan there were two other medical experts who visited Singapore. They were Melbourne's eminent plastic surgeon, B.K.Rank, and Sydney's distinguished neuro surgeon, Douglas Miller. They provided very successful lectures and demonstrations in Singapore. [1] After Miller returned to Australia from Singapore, he performed operations on six brain disease victims from Singapore and Malaya, [2] and helped restore them to a healthy and active life. [3] Miller visited Singapore again on 16 May 1957 for one month at the request of the Singapore government. [4] By 30 June 1960, 33 Australian doctors and health experts had visited Singapore, which was 75% of the total experts Australia had provided to Singapore. [5]

In December 1956, Joan Fry, Director of Pre-School training at the Nursing School Training College, Sydney, visited Singapore. At the request of the Singapore government she spent three months making a survey of the pre-school institutions in Singapore and advising on organisation of pre-

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1. Statement by Casey, 14-5-1957, Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p. 398.
2. The hospital costs of the six victims were sponsored by the Australian Association of Ethical Pharmaceutical Manufacturers through the Rotary Club of Sydney, See Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p. 332.
3. Statement by Casey, 16-4-1957, Current Notes, no. 28, 1957, p. 332.
4. A.I.F.F., no. 54, 1956-57, p. 68; Current Notes, no. 27, 1956, p. 308, no. 28, 1957, p. 398.
5. See Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 320.

school development services and on a course of practical and theoretical training for Singapore students and staff of both government kindergartens and creches conducted by voluntary organisations. [1]

Australia also provided experts to train Singaporeans in air traffic control and aviation administration. Australia helped Singapore in its efforts to set up a Land Valuer General's Department for land assessment by lending the services of the Chairman of the Commonwealth Taxation Valuation Board. Australian experts also provided assistance in the form of training in legal aid work to the Registrar of Singapore's Supreme Court. The trainee was to draft legislation to improve the legal aid service in Singapore. Furthermore, Singaporeans had also benefited from the Australian experts in the field of labour legislation and radio journalism. [2]

Until 30 June 1960 the largest technical assistance projects undertaken by Australia were the supply of electrical engineering for the University of Malaya worth £17,332 and lathes and accessories for the Singapore Polytechnic worth £15,850. Others included technical school equipment for domestic science and trades training worth £8,000, books for schools and Universities including a book grant for the University of Malaya worth £6,590, visual aids for the Teachers' Training College worth £2,700, equipment worth £2,200 for a pilot tuberculosis survey in which Australia took part

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1. Statement by P.McBride, Acting Minister for External Affairs, 23-11-1956; Current Notes, no. 27, 1956, p. 766.
2. See The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme Report For 1955-56, p.p. 36, 47; Report For 1957-58, p. 56; The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Report For 1959, p.p. 189-90; Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 320.

and Tuberculin and B.C.G. Vaccine worth £8,897. Australia has also supplied pigs and poultry worth £3,500 for a livestock breeding programme at Lim Chu Kang Animal Husbandry Station, which was engaged in breeding stock to be distributed to small holders who made up 95% of Singapore's agriculture population. [1]

The only capital aid given to Singapore by Australia was a milk reconstruction plant at a cost of £100,000. Tenders for the supply of the plant was called in 1956. [2]

Significance Of Australia's Technical Assistance

It would be an exaggeration to say that post war economic recovery and social development in Singapore were based on Australia's technical assistance since Britain was mainly responsible for the reconstruction and development of Singapore after the war. Nevertheless, Australia did make an invaluable contribution to the national development of Singapore. The large number of Singapore students in Australia helped to improve friendship and create a far better understanding between the people of both countries. The close co-operation under the Colombo Plan also created a kind of intimacy between the two governments, thus ensured a good relation between the two countries.

The altruistic motive of Australia in providing technical assistance to Singapore was obvious, and needed neither explanation nor defence, but it should be mentioned that Australia also benefited in several ways by giving aid. Econo-

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1. The Colombo Plan Report of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia for 1957-58, p.p. 41, 51; Australia's Part In The Colombo Plan--Progress Report To 30 June 1960, p. 321.
2. The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Report For 1956, p. 155; A.I.F.F., no. 48, 1954-55, p. 38.

mically, the improvement of facilities in Singapore as a direct consequence of technical assistance benefited Australian organisations that have used those facilities. [1] For example, a number of staff from the Australian Department of Civil Aviation had helped to train Singapore personnel to run the Singapore International Airport. The Department from all accounts was only too pleased to co-operate as it was to ensure efficient stop-over arrangement for Qantas flights.

Australia's aid was also a useful way of making initial contact with new and potential profitable markets. In the particular sphere of trade, it provided a direct stimulus to the export from Australia of both consumer goods and capital goods to build up the productive capacity of the recipient country. But it meant much more than that: the association of technical aid and facilities for training technicians in many fields with Australian methods and equipment was breeding a familiarity which helped to encourage the recipient countries to import from Australia. [2] The large increase during the 1950s in Singapore's imports of machines and machinery, electrical appliances and goods were examples.

In addition, technical assistance work gave Australians the opportunity of acquiring useful job experience. This was frequently an incentive for Australians to accept appointment in Asian countries. It may be noticed that Australia's

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1. See Boxer, p.p. 31-2.
2. See Holder, p. 14.

own economic interests did not seem to tie in very closely with its aid-giving, except in some isolated cases. It was quite different in term of politics.

Politically, aid-giving ingratiated Australia with Asian countries generally. It was one effective way of showing Australia's sincere goodwill and of demonstrating its immigration policy was not based on colour prejudice or an assumption of racial superiority. [1] This was important to Australia in ensuring its national interests and security. Australia's aid also helped to stabilise and strengthen a country's economy and political situation; this in turn helped ensure Australia's security. The victory of the Allies during the second world war did not free Australia from threats to its security. Almost immediately after the war, Australia saw a new kind of threat, the threat of Communism, which was thriving in almost every South and South-East Asian country. As Casey put it to a group of journalists in Washington 'I think you could say that we feel the hot breath of international communism on our necks in Australia'. [2] Australia's assistance in the development of its neighbours' economy therefore seemed the best way to resist the spread of Communism and to free her from any fear of aggression.

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1. See Courier Mail (Brisbane), 9-7-1954.
2. Daily Telegraph (Brisbane), 13-7-1954.

CONCLUSION

The origin of contacts between Australia and Singapore was their common historical heritage as Colonies of Great Britain. As a result of this and of the vital position Singapore occupied (geographically, economically, and politically), contacts between the two countries can be traced from as early as the first half of the nineteenth century. Before 1852, Australia and Singapore were mainly linked by trade. During the days of penal settlement, ships carrying convicts to Australian Colonies on their way back to Britain used to call at Singapore to take on full loads of cargoes for the European markets. As the economy of the Australian Colonies developed, ships from large Australian coastal cities began to make sporadic calls at Singapore to sell their goods and to take home some local produce. In 1852, following the discovery of gold in Australia, regular steam communication between Australia, Singapore and Europe was established. This brought about an increase of trade and a regular mail service between the Australian Colonies and Singapore. In 1872, communication between the two countries was enhanced when they were linked by telegraphic cable. Before the end of the nineteenth century, Australians had entered the tin and gold mining industries in Malaya.

Between 1901 and 1941 Australia began to have an increasing interest in Singapore. Economically, Australia was making efforts to sell her products to, also import more from, Singapore. This was owing to Australia's economic expansion; to Singapore becoming a tin, rubber and oil refinery centre; to the improvement of the means of communication and transport; and to the change in the world economic

situation. Militarily, Singapore became a strategic centre for Australia's defence. This was owing to the decision at the 1921 Imperial Conference to build a naval base at Singapore for the British Far Eastern Fleet.

As early as the second decade of the twentieth century Australian officials were sent to Singapore to study Asian market requirements and ways in which to increase Australia's exports to the area. Official interest was further indicated by the appointment of E.T. Sheaf at Singapore in 1922 as Commonwealth Trade Commissioner. In the same year, the first large Australian manufacturing firm, Hume Industries, was established in Singapore. After the depression years in the 1930s, Australia began to take more positive steps in trade promotion in Singapore and other Straits Settlements. In 1934, there was another great advance in communication between Australia and Singapore when the air-link was established. All these events led to a substantial increase in trade between the two countries.

When the British decided to construct a naval base in Singapore, its importance for the defence of Australia became a recurrent topic of discussion for the Australian parliament and press. From 1937, as Japan continued its aggression, the adequacy of fortifications in Singapore became a source of great anxiety for the Australians. Until 1940, before Australia decided to send its forces to the Malayan area, the government was involved in a long and continuous verbal battle with Britain over the fortification of Singapore. Beginning in February 1941, Australian troops were sent to the Malayan area for the first time in history.

Between the period of the Pacific War and 1959, Australia became closely associated with Singapore and Malaya in many ways. For the first time Australians had to fight a war in Singapore-Malaya for the defence of their home land. More than ten thousand Australian servicemen were taken prisoners at Singapore and many died as a result of the war. Despite Australia's ultimate motive for fighting in Singapore-Malaya and the disastrous experience it had, the period during the war was the first occasion on which Australians and Malayans in large numbers had direct contact with each other, and had to work hand in hand to fight a common enemy.

After the war, Australia-Singapore relations developed rapidly in many ways: Australian diplomatic and Trade Commissioner posts were established in Singapore; intensive and vigorous trade promotion campaigns were carried out; technical assistance under the Colombo Plan was provided and armed forces continued to be present. The diplomatic and Trade Commissioner services provided Australia with first hand information about the area and were largely responsible for creating Australia's business interest in Singapore. There was a substantial increase in Australia's exports to Singapore; more investment in manufacturing industries and other business; and frequent visits by Australians either for business or pleasure. Australia's trade promotion campaigns were carried out in Singapore by participating in the annual Trade Fairs and visits of Trade Missions. These allowed Singaporeans to have a better understanding of Australia's products and direct contact with Australian officials and businessmen. As a result there was a sharp increase in

the exports of Australia's manufactured goods, along with the already established primary produce, to Singapore. Australia's technical assistance under the Colombo Plan was a furtherance of its economic interest in Singapore. This assistance contributed greatly in the training of personnel, providing of expert advice and necessary equipment which was instrumental in the social and economic development of Singapore. Australia's military presence after 1950, besides contributing to regional security and the internal stability of Singapore and Malaya, also had its economic significance for the area.

The first group of Singaporeans to visit Australia who created an impact on relations between the two countries were students. Private students from Singapore had gone to Australia since 1947; however the number increased sharply only after the introduction of the Colombo Plan. These students have made lasting friends for themselves and their country and have in turn given their Australian friends a greater appreciation and understanding of Singapore. The relaxing of Australia's immigration policy to allow large number of Singapore students to study in Australia was also an effective way of demonstrating that its immigration policy was not based on narrow colour prejudice or an assumption of racial superiority.

In 1955, the first group of journalists from Singapore and other Asian countries visited all states in Australia under the sponsorship of Qantas Empire Airways on their trip and were guests of the Australian government. This was certainly a friendly gesture of the Australians with the

aim of creating cordial relation with its neighbours. In 1958 a Singapore Trade Mission composed of members of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce visited Australia with the aim of increasing Singapore's exports to Australia, to strengthen business ties, and to foster better relations between the two countries. This was the first time the business community in Singapore had taken the initiative to visit Australia and they were warmly welcomed by government officials and business communities in Australia throughout their visit.

An examination of relations between Australia and Singapore from their beginnings makes it clear that the post-World War II period was one of rapid development. Australia took greater initiatives and showed a growing desire to foster closer ties with Singapore. This on the whole was due to Singapore's strategic importance to Australia's defence and its importance as a trading centre. Besides, Australia and Singapore shared a common English language medium of communication in government and common parliamentary, legal and educational traditions. This shared heritage, coupled with the fact that Singapore too was within the British Commonwealth, created a kind of intimacy between the two countries and allowed for ease of communication and understanding between the two peoples. Australia's initiative in strengthening the relations of the two countries was reflected by the one-way flow of its diplomatic representatives, Trade Commissioners, investments, technical assistance and military personnel.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

The Far East Combined Bureau

The Far East Combined Bureau was an intelligence organization set up by the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Far East, in conjunction with the C-in-C China, to combined the intelligence services of the navy, army, and air force under their respective commands and to pool the information obtained by them. Its offices were in the Headquarters Building at the Naval Base.

Beside receiving all the intelligence reports of the three services, and from the different secret service branches, it had numerous other sources of information. It received, for instance, copies of 'torch telegrams' sent out by the British Embassy at Tokyo and and also copies of all cables from the British Embassies in Tokyo and Chungking and the British Minister at Bangkok to the Foreign Office, London, transmitting information or opinions on political or military matters. The Australian, Netherland East Indies and U.S. military, naval and air intelligence services exchanged information with it as did also, in Singapore, the Governor, the Inspector-General of Police, the General Liaison Officer and the Far Eastern Representative of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. In addition, it had arrangements of its own for collecting information in Malaya and adjacent areas and received reports from the British Political Office at Shanghai and from the Governor of Hong Kong.

The Far East Combined Bureau was split during the war. Military and air operational intelligence were centered at Combined Headquarters close outside the Naval Base while naval intelligence was still at the Naval Base. In January 1942, the Bureau was moved from Singapore to Colombo, Ceylon.

Source:

Bowden's Report on Source of Political Intelligence In Singapore, Telegram from Bowden to Dept. of External Affairs, 20-12-1941, Memorandum from Dept. of Army to Dept. of External Affairs, 20-1-1942, CRS A981, Item no. 235B.

APPENDIX 2

Notes On Local Forces In Malaya

The majority of States in Malaya maintained their own defence forces--primarily for internal security duties with their respective territories.

The Government of the Federated Malay States maintaines and financed a regular Malay infantry battalion, composed of British and Malay officers and Malay other ranks. The raising of a second battalion of the Malay Regiment started on 1 December 1941. In addition, the Volunteer Forces comprised four Federated Malay States Volunteer infantry battalions, plus certain ancillary units, raised locally within the separated Federated States. Their combined establishment was 194 officers and 4,328 other ranks, about one-third of whom were Eurasians, and the rest Malays and Chinese.

The Government of the Straits Settlements maintained and financed four Straits Settlements Volunteer infantry battalions, with associated supporting formations. Their employment within the Straits Settlements was intended primarily to reinforce the defences of Singapore base but they had one detached battalion, raised from and based in Penang area.

The State of Johore maintained its own regular and volunteer military forces, composed of British and Malay personnel, but they too amounted to little more than an infantry battalion, with some light artillery in support, and a field company Royal Engineers. Others of the Unfederated States had Volunteer forces of their own but they were generally small and, in practice, represented the equivalent of an infantry company or at most a weak infantry battalion.

Finally, Malaya had a Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve formed from European officers and Malay ratings, and the Malaya Volunteer Air Force, formed from British civilians resident in the country. Both were small, but keen and enthusiastic, indeed the latter was formed from the local civil flying clubs, using their light training and communication aircraft.

The volunteer units which were mobilised consisted of:
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (S.S.V.F.);
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, Federated Malay States Volunteer Force (F.M.S.V.F.);
Armoured car company, Singapore Volunteer Force;
Singapore Royal Artillery Volunteers;
Armoured car company, F.M.S.V.F.;
Light artillery battery, F.M.S.V.F.;
Kelantan Volunteer Force;
Kedah Volunteer Force;
Perak Volunteer Force;
Sultan Indris Company;
Johore Infantry;
Johore Volunteer Engineers.

Source: Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 1, p. 517.

APPENDIX 3

Position of the Three Forces for the Defence of Malaya

Air Force

(Far East, excluding Burma)

Strength Aug. 1940	Scale Approved by C.O.S. Aug. 1940	Recommended by C-in-Cs	Strength 7 Dec. 41
Malaya, 84	Malaya ...282 Indian Ocean ... 54* Total ...336	Total...582	Malaya, 158@

Note: *the 54 aircrafts were intended for trade protection in the Indian Ocean;
@see Appendix 4 for details.

Army

(Singapore-Malaya, Regular Battalions only)

Strength Aug. 1940	Scale Accepted by C.O.S. when Air Force reached Approved Scale	Scale Accepted by C.O.S. until Air Force reached Approved Scale	Recommended by Percival until Air Force reached Approved Scale	Strength 7 Dec 41
9	Aug 1940 ...18 Jan 1941 ...26	36	48	32*

Note: *see Appendix 5 for details.

Cont. ...

Navy

(Naval Forces based on Singapore 7-12-41)*

Fleet Unit			
Eastern Fleet		China Command@	
Capital Ships	... 2	Light Cruisers	... 3
Destroyers	... 5	Destroyers	... 4
		River Gunboats	... 3
		Minesweepers	... 4

Local Defence Forces

(Converted merchant vessels manned by locally organised Volunteers)

Auxiliary patrol and anti-submarine vessels	... 18
Auxialiary minesweepers	... 17
Naval armed launches	... 12

Note: * See Appendix 6 for details;
@ On 8-12-1942 the China Command was merged with that of the Eastern Fleet and all British Naval Forces in the Far East was under the Command of T. Phillips.

Source: Memorandum by Lt.-Gen. H. Pownall, 'Singapore Defences', in Churchill, vol. IV, Appendix D, p.p. 855-9.

APPENDIX 4

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SQUADRONS IN MALAYA, 7-12-41.

Base	Unit	Type	No.
Singapore Island			
Selatar	No. 205 (FB) Sqn RAF	Catalina	3
	No. 100 (TB) Sqn RAF	Vildebeeste	6
Sembawang	No. 453 (F) Sqn RAAF	Buffalo	16
	No. 8 (GR) Sqn RAAF	Hudson	4
Tengah	No. 34 (B) Sqn RAF	Blenheim IV	16
Kallang	No. 243 (F) Sqn RAF No. 488 (F) Sqn RNZAF	Buffalo	32
Northern Malaya			
Sungei Patani	No. 21 (F) Sqn RAAF	Buffalo	12
	No. 27 (NF) Sqn RAF	Blenheim I	12
Kota Bahru	No. 1 (GR) RAAF	Hudson	12
	No. 36 (TB) Sqn RAF	Vildebeeste	6
Gong Kedah	No. 100 (TB) Sqn RAF	Vildebeeste	6
Kuantan	No. 8 (GR) Sqn RAAF	Hudson	8
	No. 36 (TB) Sqn RAF	Vildebeeste	6
	No. 60 (B) Sqn RAF @	Blenheim I	8
Alor Star	No. 62 (B) Sqn RAF	Blenheim I	11
		Total ...	158*

Reserve Aircraft

Blenheim I and IV	... 15
Buffalo	... 52
Hudson	... 7
Vildebeeste	... 12
Catalina	... 2
Total Reserve	88

Abbreviation:
B = Bomber, F=Fighter, FB =Flying-boat, GR = General Reconnaissance, NF =Night-fighter, TB = Torpedo-bomber

Note:
@ No. 60 Sqn had arrived from Burma for bombing practice, about mid-December all officers and airmen returned to Burma by sea but their aircrafts were retained in Malaya.
* There were also 3 Catalinas manned by Dutch crews at Selatar 2 Buffalo Photo-Reconnaissance Flight manned by RAF crews also at Selatar and one AHQ Special-Reconnaissance aircraft (Beaufort) at Kota Bahru, making a total of 164 first-line aircraft in Singapore-Malaya just before the outbreak of war.

Source: Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 511, Appendix 9, Gillison, pp. 204-5; Wigmore, p. 121, fn. 1.

APPENDIX 5

Formation Of The Malayan Command 7-12-1942

Northern Malaya

III Indian Corps (Lt-Gen Heath)
- 9th Indian Division (Maj-Gen Barstow)
  - 8th Bde (Brig Key: 2/10 Baluch, 2/12 FF Regt, 3/17 Dogra, 1/13 FF Rifles)
  - 22nd Bde (Brig Painter: 5/11 Silk, 2/18 Garhwal)
- 11th Indian Division (Maj-Gen Murray-Lyon)
  - 6th Bde (Brig Lay: 2/Surrey, 1/8 Punjab, 2/16 Punjab)
  - 15th Bde (Brig Garrett, 1/Leicesters, 2/9 Jat, 1/14 Punjab, 3/16 Punjab)
  - Two additional battalions (3/16 Punjab attached to 15th Bde, and 5/14 Pujab at Penang)
  - III Corps reserve--28th Bde (Brig Carpendale: 2/1, 2/2, 2/9 Gurkha)
  - One volunteer infantry battalion and fixed coastal defences (Penang Garrison)
  - Airfield defence troops (volunteers)

Johore and Malacca

8th Australian Division (Maj-Gen Bennett)
- 22nd Bde (Brig Taylor: 2/18, 2/19, 2/20 Bns)
- 27th Bde (Brig Maxwell: 2/26, 2/29, 2/30 Bns)
- (The forces of the State of Johore were also under Bennett's command)

Singapore Fortress

Maj-Gen Simmons controlled, in addition to fortree troops, the following mobile formations:
- 1 Malaya Bde (2/Loyals, 1/Malay Regt)
- 2nd Malaya Bde (1/Manchester, 2/Gordons, 2/17 Dogra)
- Straits Settlements Volunteer Force
- Two Indian State Force Battalions (airfield defence)
- Two anti-aircraft defences (Brig Wildey) included two heavy and two light anti-aircraft regiments and a searchlight regiment.

Command Reserve

12th Indian Bde (Brig. Paris: 2/A and SH, 5/2 Punjab, 4/19 Hyderbad)

Borneo

2/15 Punjab

Source: Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 512; Wigmore, p. 106, fn. 7; Percival, The War In Malaya, p.p. 98-103.

APPENDIX 6

Disposition Of Allied Naval Forces In The Eastern Thretre on 8 December 1941

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Phillips
(Succeeded by Vice-Admiral G. Layton 10-12-41)

	Singapore	Hong Kong	Shanghai
Battleship	Prince of Wales (ten 14-inch guns)		
Battlecruiser	Repulse (six 15-inch guns)		
Cruisers	Danae (six 6-inch guns) Dragon (six 6-inch guns) Durban (six 6-inch guns)		
Destroyers	Electra Express Tenedos Vampire (R.A.N.)	Scout* Thanet*	Sailed for S'pore 8-12-41
Gunboats	Dragonfly* Grasshopper* Scorpion*	Tern* Cicala Robin*	Peterel (sunk on 8-12-41)
Armed-Merchant Cruisers	Manoora (R.A.N.) Kanimbla (R.N.Z.N.) (Penang)		
Motor Torpedo Boats		Eight*	
Refitting or under repair			
Cruisers	Mauritius (East Indies Squadron)		
Destroyers	Encounter Tupiter Stronghold* Vendetta (R.A.N.) Isis (Mediterra-nean Fleet)	Thracian*	
Gunboat		Moth*	
Submarine	Rover		

Note: Unless otherwise stated ships belonged to the Royal Navy.
* Local Naval Defence.

Source: Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 518.

APPENDIX 7

Copy Of A Letter Addressed To The High Command Of The British Army, Singapore on 11-2-1942

Your Excellency,

I, the High Command of the Nippon Army based on the spirit of Japanese chivalry, have the honour of presenting this note to Your Excellency advising you to surrender the whole force in Malaya.

My sincere respect is due to your army which true to the traditional spirit of Great Britain, is bravely defending Singapore which now stands isolated and unaided. Many fierce and gallant fights have been fought by your gallant men and officers, to the honour of British warriorship. But the developments of the general war situation has already sealed the fate of Singapore, and the continuation of futile resistance would not only serve to inflict direct harm and injuries to thousands of non-combatants living in the city, throwing them into further miseries and horrors of war, but also would not add anything to the honour of your army.

I expect that Your Excellency accepting my advice will give up this meaningless and desperate resistance and promptly order the entire front to cease hostilities and will despatch at the same time your parliamentaire according to the procedure shown at the end of this note. If on the contrary, Your Excellency should reglect my advice and the present resistence be continued, I shall be oblighed, though reluctantly from humanitarian considerations to order my army to make annihilating attack on Singapore.

In closing this note of advice, I pay my sincere respects to Your Excellency.

1. The Parliamentaire should proceed to the Bukit Timah Road.
2. The Parliamentaire should bear a large white flag and the Union Jack.

(Signed) Japan's Army Commander
Lt-Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita.

Source: Tsuji, p.p. 252-3; Wigmore, p. 353.

APPENDIX 8

Text of a letter dated 21 April 1959, received by the Australian High Commissioner in Malaya from the Prime Minister of Malaya.

I refer to your letter of 24th March, 1959, the terms of which are as follows:

I wish to refer to the agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance concluded on 12th October 1957, between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

As you know, the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve referred to in the Agreement, its Annexes and the letters exchanged in connection with the Agreement, includes Australian forces which are or may from time to time be serving in the Federation. Accordingly, the various provisions applicable to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, in particular the provisions dealing with the status of forces, apply in respect to these Australian forces.

I should be grateful if you would confirm that the foregoing is the understanding between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of Australian forces serving in the Federation. If so, I would suggest that this letter and your reply be regarded as placing that understanding on record.

On behalf of the Australian Government, I take this opportunity of conveying to your Government the assurance of our continued interest in, and concern for, the well-being of the Federation and its people.

In reply, I confirm that your letter correctly sets out the understanding between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Australian Government and, in accordance with the suggestion contained in your letter, agree that your letter and this reply be regarded as placing that understanding on record.

Source: Document No. 4, in P. Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore In International Diplomacy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), p. 208; Watt, Australian Defence Policy 1951-63, Appendix E, p.p. 82-3.

APPENDIX 9

Members Of The 1954 Australian Trade Mission To Singapore

Leader: W.R. Hudspeth, Australian Government Trade Commissioner.

Name of Members	Trade Represented
C.H. Jeaves	Amalgamated Wireless (A'asia) Ltd., Sydney.
J.M. Allsop	Associated Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd., Melbourne.
T.F. Downey	Australia & New Zealand Bank Ltd., Melbourne.
C.A. Cousins	Bank of New South Wales Ltd., Sydney.
L.F. Mumford	Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd., Sydney.
A.E. Dash) A. Richards) L.C. Stedman)	Commonwelath Trading Bank of Australia, Sydney.
C. Perrett	Australian Wheat Board, Melbourne.
J.A. Zwarteveen	Borsumy (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
G.W. Coombs	The Butter Marketing Board, Brisbane.
N.D. Berrick	Cabalide (Industrial) Pty. Ltd. Sydney.
E.B. Lawson	Craig Mostyn & Co. Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
J. Bell	Gollin & Co. Ltd., Sydney.
R. Ruddle	Hadfields (W.A.) 1934 Ltd., Perth.
J.H. Scarr	Hunter Valley Co-op. Daily Co. Ltd., Sydney.
T.R. Scales	Kelly & Lewis Ltd., Melbourne.
J.W. Ramsey	Kiwi Polish Company Pty. Ltd.
D.D. Morgan	Le Tourneau-Westinghouse Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
R.L. Minifie	Jas. Minifie & Co. Pty. Ltd.
J.B. Morgan	J.B. Morgan & Co. Pty. Ltd. Melbourne.
J. Camm	National Bank of Australia Ltd., Melbourne.
K.C. MacDonald	Nicholas Pty. Ltd., Melbourne.
L.J. Bishop	Pine Ridge Packing Co. Ltd., Adelaide.
C.F. Godden	President Industries Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
H.D.G. Plant	Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., Sydney.
G. Pissarevsky	W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co. (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., Melbourne.
J.A. Sullivan	J.J. Sullivan Pty. Ltd., Sydney.
F.B. Day	W. Thomas & co. (W.A.) pty. Ltd., Perth.

APPENDIX 10

Itinerary Of The 1954 Australian Trade Mission

1954

November

Monday	1		Depart Sydney (by Qantas Empire Airways Ltd.)
Tuesday	2		Arrive Djakarta Depart Djakarta Arrive Singapore
Wednesday Monday	3 8	)	Remain in Singapore
Tuesday			Depart Singapore (by Malayan Airways) Arrive Kuala Lumpur
Thursday	11		Depart Kuala Lumpur (by Malayan Airways) Arrive Penang
Sunday	14		Depart Peneng (by Malayan Airways) Arrive Singapore
Monday Tuesday	15 16	)	Remain in Singapore
Wednesday	17		Depart Singapore (by Qantas Empire Airways Ltd.) Arrive Bangkok
Thursday Tuesday	18 23	)	Remain in Bangkok
Wednesday	24		Depart Bangkok (by Thai Airways) Arrive Rangoon
Thursday Tuesday	25 30	)	Remain in Rangoon

December

Wednesday	1	Party disbands for return to Australia Depart Rangoon (by Union of Burma Airways) Arrive Singapore
Thursday	2	Depart Singapore (by Qantas Empire Airways Ltd.)
Friday	3	Arrive Sydney

Source for Appendixes 9 and 10:
'Trade Mission To Southeast Asia', 1954, op. cit.

APPENDIX 11

Members Of The 1958 Australian Trade Mission To Singapore

R. W. Swartz, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Trade and Leader of the Trade Mission.

J.A.A. Hay, Commercial Relations Officer, Bank of New South Wales.

R.N. Harrison, Senior Trade Service Officer, Commonwealth Trading Bank.

C.R. Mckerihan, President, Rural Bank of New South Wales.

J.T. Bennett, Assistant Manager for New South Wales of the Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd.

J.E. Tamblyn, Manager, Foreign Department, National Bank of Australasia Ltd., Melbourne.

J.D. Milne, Sub-Manager, International Banking Department, Australia and New Zealand Bank.

L.D. Goodsall, Director and Secretary of Lewis Construction Co. Pty. Ltd.

C.H. Jeeves, Export Manager, Amalgamated Wireless (A'asia) Ltd.

W.L. Lober, General Manager, Safe Appliances and Equipment Co. Pty. Ltd.

R. Napier, Drilling Superintendent, Overall McCray Pty. Ltd.

L.J. Partridge, Export Manage, Gollin & Co. Ltd.

F.H. Smith, Director, Smith, Mitchell & Co. Ltd., Melbourne.

D.M. Frankenberg, Assistant General Sales Manager, B.H.P. Ltd.

F.V. Street, Department of Trade, Manager.

C.C. Murty, General Sales Manager, Hadfield's Steel Works Ltd., Sydney.

A.M. Russell, Managing Director, Milne & Co. Pty. Ltd., South Australia.

C.J. Stevens, Assistant Markets Officer of the Australian Wheat Board.

J. L'Epagniol, Exporter, Perth.

H.G. Hamberger, Managing Director, Metal Products Pty. Ltd.

G. Wallace, Representative, Federal Council of Flour Mill Owners.

N.F. Horstmanshoff, Export Manager of the Borneo-Sumatra Trading Co. Ltd., Melbourne.

Source: 'Trade Mission To Southeast Asia', 1958, op.cit.

APPENDIX 12

Itinerary Of The 1958 Australian Trade Mission

1958

April

Tuesday	15	Depart Sydney
Wednesday	16	Arrive Singapore
Thursday	17	Remain in Singapore
Friday	25	
Saturday	26	Remain in Kuala Lumpur
May		
Thursday	1	
Friday	2	Depart Kuala Lumpur Arrive Penang
Saturday	3	Depart Penang Arrive Bangkok
Saturday	3	Remain in Bangkok
Wednesday	7	
Thursday	8	Depart Bangkok
Saturday	10	Arrive Sydney

Source: See Appendix 11.

APPENDIX 13

Members Of The 1958 Singapore Trade Mission To Australia

Leader: Tan Siak Kew (陳 錫 九) of Buan Lee Seng Co. Ltd. (萬利成有限公司).

Name of Members	Trade Represented
Chuang Uming 莊 右 銘	Chung Uming Construction Co. 莊右銘建築公司
Ee Hoong Chwee 余 雲 水	Ee Hoong Chwee & Co. 余雲水公司
Ee Peng How 余 秉 浩	Architect 測繪師
Goh Chwee Leng 吳 水 龍	Kian Guan Hin Oil Mills Ltd. 建源興油較有限公司
Goh Tjoei Kok 吳 水 閣	Tat Lee Co. Ltd. 達利有限公司
Kwa Khek Tee 柯 克 智	Chop Soon Aik. 順益號
Lee Kok Han 李 國 漢	Heng Tong Realty Co. Ltd. 興東實業有限公司
Lim Kak Ngam 林 甲 岩	Lim Kak Ngam Co. 林甲岩公司
Lim Kok Jin 林 國 仁	Kong Hua Co. Ltd. 光華有限公司
Lok Chwee Heng 駱 水 興	Thong Heng Co. 同興公司
Neo Boon Lye 梁 文 來	Neo Boon Lye Construction Co. 梁文來建築公司
Ng Peng Koon 黃 炳 坤	Commercial Union Insurance Co. Ltd. 甘馬施友聯保險公司
Ong Kee Seng 王 紀 成	Malaya Construction Co. Ltd. 馬來亞建築有限公司
Ong Peng Whatt 王 丙 發	Marketing Officer, Australia Trade Commissioner Offices, Singapore. 澳洲專員公署市場貿易官
Soon Peng Yam 孫 炳 炎	Sim Lim Co. Ltd. 森林有限公司
Tan Eng Chin 陳 永 進	Aik Hoe Co. Ltd. 益和有限公司
Teo Chin Huat 張 進 發	Teck Huat Co. Ltd. 德發有限公司
Teo Hang Sam 張 漢 三	See Hoy Chan Co. Ltd. 四海棧有限公司

Source: 'Report by the Singapore Trade Mission To Australia and New Zealand', op. cit.

APPENDIX 14

Itinerary Of The 1958 Singapore Trade Mission

1958

October

Saturday	4	Depart Singapore Arrive Melbourne
Sunday	5	Depart Melbourne Arrive Sydney
Sunday Wednesday	5 8	Remain in Sydney
Thurday	9	Depart Sydney
Friday	10	Arrive Auckland
Friday Wednesday	10 15	Remain in New Zealand
Thursday	16	Depart New Zealnd (from Christchurch)
Friday	17	Arrive Sydney Depart Sydney Arrive Brisbane
Friday Sunday	17 19	Remain in Brisbane
Monday	20	Depart Brisbane Arrive Canberra
Tuesday	21	Depart Canberra Arrive Melbourne
Tuesday Friday	21 24	Remain in Melbourne
Saturday	25	Depart Melbourne Arrive Adelaide
Sunday Monday	26 27	Remain in Adelaide
Tuesday	28	Depart Adelaide Arrive Perth
Wednesday Thursday	29 30	Remain in Perth
Friday	31	Depart Perth

November

Saturday	1	Arrive Singapore.

Source: See Appendix 13.

APPENDIX 15

Details of Australia's Trade Commissioners In Singapore

Date	Name	Appointment	Offices Address
1948 June	J. Payne	Aust. Govt. Trade Commissioner	Union Building, Collyer Quay.
1949 Nov.	do	do	do
1951 May-June	do	do	do
1951 Nov.	A.J. Day	Commercial Counsellor and Aust. Govt. Commissioner	do
1953 Apr.-May	do	do	do
1953 Oct.-Nov.	G.S.Anderson	Aust. Govt. Trade Commissioner	do
1954 Sept.	do	do	do
1955 Feb.	H. Le Marchand	Aust. Govt. Trade Commissioner	do
1955 March	do	do	Crosby House, Robinson Road.
1956 Nov.	C.A. Allen	Aust. Govt. Acting Trade Commissioner	do
1957 Jan.	P.R.Searcy	Aust. Govt. Trade Commissioner	do
1958 June	R.W. Holberton	Aust. Govt. Acting Trade Commissioner	do
1960 April	J.S. Nicholls	Aust. Govt. Acting Trade Commissioner	do

Source: 'File on Australia's Representatives In Singapore', Department of Foreign Affairs' Library, Canberra; see also, Overseas Trading, 1948-60; Y.B.C.A., 1947-60.

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	R306/3	Addresses Of Trade Commissioner In The East.
	S306/3	General File Of Mr. Sheaf.
	X306/3	Commercial Agent N.S.W. In The East, 1922-23.
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	G510/2/143	Appointment Of E.T. Sheaf.
CRS A518	EQ16/2/1	Exchange Of Civilian Prisoners Of War With Japan.
CRS A663	066/1/582	Defence Of Malaya--Intelligence Report 1941.
CRS A816	11/301/273	Far Eastern Defence Conference.
	14/301/88	Singapore Naval Base.
	31/301/176	Formation Of The A.B.D.A.
	31/301/305	Far East Co-ordination Of War Plans.
	37/301/277A	Prisoners Of War And Civilians In Far East.
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	67/301/79	Prisoners Of War And Internees In The Far East.
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	235B	Singapore--Appointment Of Intelligence Officer.
	237B	Staff Arrangement During The Siege Of Singapore.
	Australia 56, Pt. 1	Publicity In The Far East.
	Australia 149, Pt. 1 and 2	Secret Documents And Reports On Australian War Activities
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	Far East 5	Latham's Mission To The East.
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