AUSTRALIA AND THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM:

THAI PERSPECTIVES

BY

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Needless to say, all the errors in this sub-thesis are my own full responsibility.

KIATTIKHUN CHARTPRASERT

DISCLAIMER

Except where otherwise acknowledge, this sub-thesis is my own original work.

In addition, the views expressed in this sub-thesis are my own, and are not necessary to be interpreted as representing the official views and policies of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

KIATTIKHUN CHARTPRASERT.
Throughout recorded history, Indochina has experienced conflict, turbulence and violence. One of the first recorded conflicts was in the first century A.D. when the Hung Sisters led a revolt in Northern Vietnam against Chinese domination. Ever since, relations with China have included long periods of peace and stability broken by conflict, invasion and resistance. But it was not until the United States directly participated in Vietnamese affairs following the French withdrawal after the battle of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Settlement of 1954 that the region has been the scene of "superpower rivalry". The wars which have engulfed the Indochina states over the past 30 years have brought untold human suffering and misery. When hostilities finally ceased as a result of the communist victories in Indochina in mid 1970s, the world looked forward hopefully to a long period of peace in which the well-being of the people of the region could be advanced and assured. Unfortunately, conflicts and instability have broken out anew.

Instability and conflicts in Indochina especially since 1975 have been of major significance for the five countries which together make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), since they

1 The term "Indochina" is taken to incorporate the countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia).


3 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed on 8 August 1967 by the five countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, initially to work in a small way towards greater regional co-operation in the economic, social and cultural field. Brunei became the sixth member in early 1984.
can be affected easily and directly by any tension that arises from internal instability and inter-state conflict in the region. As a middle power located close to Southeast Asia, Australia could also be affected by regional conflicts. Like ASEAN, Australia is therefore concerned with problems of insecurity and major power competition in Indochina.

There seems to be little doubt that from the very beginning the ASEAN states regarded as potentially dangerous developments the victory of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front over the government in the South and the subsequent reunification of the country, as well as the 1975 communist victories in Laos and Kampuchea, taking place as they did in the context of diminishing U.S. role and uncertain guarantee to the region. Clearly, the possibility of Vietnam becoming, as termed by one veteran observer of regional affairs, "a twentieth century Prussia in Southeast Asia" was much feared by the ASEAN countries.

At that point, however, the Vietnamese threat seemed largely a putative long term rather than an actualised and immediate one. For a brief period from early 1976 to mid 1978 a process of detente seemed to be underway between ASEAN and Vietnam. In that period, Australia had also pursued a conciliatory policy towards Vietnam. The Fraser government saw some prospects for expansion of Vietnam's international

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4 PCA, Report from the JCFAD, Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984) p.50, and see also the statement made by the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations on Kampuchea on January 15, 1979 in Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, No. 169, p. XIII.

contacts as it emerged from the Second Indochina War. The Australian government emphasized the desirability of trying to prevent the isolation of the Indochina states through diplomatic contacts and a modest aid programme.

But during the period 1978 - 1979, two interrelated developments in particular transformed the threat emanating from Vietnam into a concrete, tangible and pressing danger to the ASEAN states, especially Thailand. The first was Vietnamese invasion of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) in December 1978 and January 1979. When Vietnamese leaders "advanced their calendar, perhaps against their own wishes, in asserting political domination over the full extent of territory controlled by the former colonial ruler", the ASEAN countries in general and Thailand in particular were forced to find ways and means of coping with the presence of about 40,000 and 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and Kampuchea respectively.

The second development was the growing Soviet - Vietnamese connection which was strengthened and formalised by Vietnam's membership of the COMECON in June 1978 and the November 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The danger for ASEAN lay in the fact that this took place in the context where the United States was perceived to be still suffering from the "Vietnam Syndrome" and lacking self-confidence while

6  Australia and ASEAN, p.43.

the Soviet Union was regarded as dynamic and aggressive in its global projection of power.

Moreover, an important by-product of recent political changes and conflict in Indochina has been the creation of the very large problem of refugees and displaced persons in Southeast Asia. Far from solving it, the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea has aggravated the existing problem. The influx of the Indochinese refugees poses to ASEAN a "security threat" since it carries the danger of subversion along with the socio-economic burden, which includes a particularly strong ethnic dimension.

In the face of this danger, the ASEAN states have firmly set their sights on pressuring the Vietnamese to end their occupation of Kampuchea by all possible means short of a direct armed confrontation with a militarily stronger adversary.

As for Australia, Vietnam's behaviour in Kampuchea brought about a change in attitude and policy towards Vietnam. Since 1979, Australia has shared ASEAN's opposition to the violation of Kampuchean sovereignty and joined with ASEAN in calling for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. To demonstrate its disapproval of the

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Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, Canberra has terminated its A$ 6 million aid program (initiated in 1976) to Hanoi since January 1979.

During the period 1979 - 1982, although Australia's policy towards Indochina had generally been in close accord with that of ASEAN, public and official reservations about maintaining any association with Khmer Rouge caused the Australian government to pursue a different policy regarding the recognition of DK. Since the Khmer coalition agreement, Australia has reaffirmed support for a political solution in line with the declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) but has not extended recognition to the coalition government. The government, however, declared that it would support neither Pol Pot's DK nor the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime. This caused concern among the ASEAN's leaders about Australian policy in relation to the region.

In March 1983, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) won the national election and took power. The new government still shares ASEAN's opposition to Hanoi's policy towards Phnom Penh. However, its strong opposition to the Khmer Rouge remains and it is clearly stated that the ALP will not give any recognition, bilaterally or multilaterally, to any coalition or regime which includes Pol Pot forces. In addition, according to the Labor Party Platform, the government should resume its commitment to the aid projects in Vietnam suspended in January 1979. The government was also urged to resume cultural exchanges

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Australian Labor Party Platform, Constitution and Rules, approved by the 35th National Conference, Canberra, 1982, p.84.
so as to promote greater understanding between the two countries. Moreover, unlike the previous government, though the Labor government voted for the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea at the 1983 and 1984 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), it did not co-sponsor the resolution. These ALP initiatives and attitudes in relation to Indochina in general and the Kampuchean problem in particular produce strong criticism from the ASEAN countries and cause disturbance in the relationship between Australia and ASEAN, especially Thailand.

This sub-thesis examines the Australian attitudes and policies towards the conflict over Kampuchea between 1979 and 1984. This particular topic is chosen because it is a matter of regional concern. Therefore, it may well be appropriate to examine the implications of the Australian role in the Indochina conflict, especially that of the ALP, from the point of view of Thailand, the "front-line state", whose interests and policies are greatly deferred to by its ASEAN partners and thus constitute one of the most crucial dimensions of this conflict. In order to make this sub-thesis more interesting, the author will attempt to suggest a possible solution for the Kampuchean problem.

\[\text{Ibid., p.83.}\]
PART I

Australian attitudes and policies towards

Indochina since World War II
CHAPTER 1

Australia and Indochina: 1940 - 1978.

In order to examine Australian attitudes and policies vis-a-vis the conflict over Kampuchea, it is useful to survey first the background of Australian attitudes and policies towards Indochina, particularly Vietnam, since the end of World War II.

According to Dr. Frank Frost, a specialist on Vietnam and ASEAN, Australia had little interest in Indochina before the Second World War. Serious Australian attention to Indochina, therefore, dates from World War II and particularly from the early post-war period and the development of a communist-led nationalist, anti-colonial movement in Vietnam.

In 1948 - 1949, a series of events, such as the subjection of Czechoslovakia, communist insurgencies in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, the continuing struggle against the French in Indochina, and the communist victory in China, convinced the Liberal and Country parties, then in opposition, that a world-wide communist conspiracy was being organized and promoted. Within Australia, communist-dominated Trade Unions disrupted key industries, and threatened to disrupt joint-defence co-operation with Britain. The December 1949 election brought the Liberal-Country Party Coalition (LCP) to power, and of course the communist threat was a matter of great concern to the new government. The North Korean invasion of

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the South in mid-1950 appeared to give dramatic proof of the communist conspiracy and its aims.

With respect to the region, Percy Spender, the then Minister for External Affairs of the Menzies government, saw the needs of Southeast Asia as being both economic, in raising living standards, and military, in resisting communism. To do something about the former would help with the latter:

The consolidation of communism in China and the evident threat of its emergence as a growing force throughout South and Southeast Asia, underline the urgency of international efforts to stabilize government and to create conditions of economic life and living standards under which the false ideological attraction which communism exerts will lose its force.

Spender also expressed his sentiments about the spread of communism and the "domino theory" when he stated in March 1950 that a communist regime in Vietnam would be scarcely distinguishable from the communist satellite governments, and that if Vietnam came under the heel of communist China, Malaya would be in danger of being out-flanked and together with Thailand, Burma and Indonesia would become the next direct object of further communist activities.

In keeping with this orientation, Australia gave all possible support to the French position in Indochina from 1950. This support

3 Ibid.

4 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 251-252.

5 Ibid.

extended to what R.G. Casey, called "an appreciable gift of military and other equipment". According to Casey, France was fighting a great battle in Indochina on the successful outcome of which depended the security of many other countries, including Australia. However, the French situation did not improve. The key question in Western minds was whether or in what circumstances communist China might intervene, as it had done in Korea. Casey argued that armed intervention by Western forces in Vietnam could well provoke the Chinese, in turn, to intervene. In the event, a conference on Indochina was convened in Geneva in June 1954.

The 1954 Geneva Agreements resulted in a temporary division of Vietnam and secured the withdrawal of the French forces, but they failed to bring a lasting peace. Armed conflict subsided for five years as both the regime in the north (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam-DRV) and that in the south (the Republic of Vietnam-RVN) attempted to consolidate their control.

Partly because of the "communist paranoia" (although the major reason was defence against a resurgent Japan), Australia signed a Security Treaty with the United States and New Zealand on 1 September

8 Joint Communiqué and statement issued on 11 and 12 March 1953, Current Notes on International Affairs (hereafter CNIA), March 1953, pp.165-166.
9 Millar, op. cit., p.254.
1951 (ANZUS Treaty). And in the same month three years later, Australia, joined the United States, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, in signing the Manila Treaty. The principal clause of the Treaty outlined the circumstances in which its members would act against aggression:

Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. (11)

The fact that the American obligation was specifically limited to cases of communist aggression clearly revealed the anti-communist nature of the Treaty. A subsequent statement by Casey gave added confirmation of this fact and of Australian intentions. He stated that "resistance to communism is the immediate objective of the Treaty, and it is for this principal purpose that the Australian government is prepared to commit itself to this treaty". In the same statement, Casey further elaborated that

The main thrust of the Treaty for Australia has been Article 4 which states that

Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article 4 (1) of the SEATO Treaty.

Statement to the House of Representatives made on 27 October 1954, see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD) House of Representatives (H of R), 27 October 1954, p.2387.
It might be asked why Australia need concern itself with what happens in Southeast Asia......If the whole of Indochina fell to the communists, Thailand would be gravely exposed. If Thailand were to fall, the road would be open to Malaya and Singapore. From the Malaya Peninsula, the communists could dominate the northern approaches to Australia, and even cut our life-lines with Europe.(13)

To Australia, perhaps the greatest advantage of both the ANZUS and SEATO Treaties was that the U.S. committed itself to assist in the defence of the area against any armed aggression. Suffice it to say that this attempt at collective security was to supply Australia with the rational and legal justification for its later involvement in Indochina.

Between the 1954 Geneva settlement and 1961, however, Australia took relatively little interest in South Vietnam. Its policy was predictable: support for the Diem regime against international communism through diplomatic and economic aid. The renewal of widespread fighting in southern Vietnam in 1959 and 1960 produced from 1961 onwards a new phase in Australian policy. In the 1960s, Vietnam came to occupy a major part of Australian foreign policy attention. There was increasing official concern at the conflict in Vietnam in the belief that a seizure of power by communist-led political forces in Vietnam would be a major threat to Australia's security. There were also particular and growing concerns that the U.S. should play an active role in preserving peace and security in Southeast Asia, and

13 Ibid.

14 Renouf, op.cit., p.251.
that it was in Australia's interests to support such an American role.

The first stage of Australian involvement in Vietnam followed a request from President Ngo Dinh Diem of the RVN for Australia's military aid. On 24 May 1962, the Menzies government decided to send thirty military instructors to South Vietnam. Such a decision, eventhough it was only a small contingent of army personnel, represented a national or politico-bureaucratic willingness to take part in the fight to halt communist insurgency in South Vietnam. After this minimal beginning, American and South Vietnamese requests steadily increased for a greater Australian contribution to the war efforts. Accordingly, on April 29, 1965, the Australian government announced that it would commit a battalion of troops to Vietnam, and the first battalion was sent to South Vietnam in the following month. Since then until late 1967, Australia's military presence was increased in four stages - in August 1965, March and December 1966 and October 1967. The Australian force at its peak strength amounted to 8,300 men and was two-thirds larger than that committed to the Korean War. Australian casualties in the conflict totalled 494 killed and 2,398 wounded. The direct financial cost to Australia was at least A $ 218.4 million (according to official estimates) and possibly as much

16 Menzies's statement to the House of Representatives on April 29, 1965.
as A $ 500 million.

It has been argued that the major factor behind Australian involvement in the Vietnam War was fear of China. Throughout the 1960s, Chinese expansionism was regarded as the principal danger to Australian security. Indeed many Australians had been worried about the "yellow peril" for a long time. But the new dynamism imparted to China by communism had made the threat seem more real. China's intervention in the Korean War, and Tibet, incidents on the Sino-Indian border, China's support for North Vietnam, and Mao Tse-tung's statement (made in 1938) that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", were seen as further proof of Chinese aggressive intentions. An official document issued by the Australian Foreign Ministry in May 1966 pointed out that

Communist China's attempts to assert its influence over the whole of Asia have been a central feature of post-war history in this region, from the Korean War to the armed oppression against Indian territory. It is vital for the peace and stability of the area that communist China should realize that attempts to extend its domination—whether by direct aggression, by subversion, or by pressure—will meet determined resistance. (22)


21 Ibid.

The Australian interpretation of events in Indochina was predicated on the assumption that North Vietnam was under China's control. As Paul Hasluck, then Minister for External Affairs, stated:

There is no doubt that...part of this (the insurgency in South Vietnam) is the determination of communist China to establish hegemony throughout Southeast Asia, working in the first place through the agency of her North Vietnamese puppets.(24)

Menzies' statement to the House of Representatives on 29 April 1965 clearly demonstrated the government's obsessive fear of China:

The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.(25)

From the statements cited above, one can see that Australian leaders at that time had uneasy feeling and negative attitude towards China, and they regarded it as a potential threat to the region. To preserve national security, Australian leaders considered it necessary to commit their country to the U.S. since the latter was seen as the only power which could provide the region with effective protection. This was explicitly demonstrated by Prime Minister Harold Holt when he said in 1966 that "without the American shield, most of us who live in Asia and the South Pacific would have a continuing sense of insecurity". In this respect, American actions elsewhere had

23 J.A. Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, second edition (Brisbane: The Jacaranda Press, 1975) p.76.

24 Cited by Clark in King (ed), op.cit.,p.18.

25 For the full statement, see Camilleri, op.cit., pp. 118-120.

therefore to be supported for the sake of maintaining the U.S. alliance.

In addition to "holding the line against Communist China", Australian military commitment to Vietnam was at the same time perceived as supporting American policy in order to secure, in return, a future American commitment in the event that Australia's own security came (28) under threat. It was also evident that the Australian Embassy in Washington recommended a positive response to any American request for a greater Australian military role in Vietnam so that Australia could obtain credit with the U.S. and put the U.S. in its debt should Australia (29) require help in the future.

Additionally, it has been argued that Canberra's decision to send troops to Saigon also favoured the "Forward Defence" strategy. That is to fight a war as far as possible from Australia's shores. Ian McNeill, a former Australian military advisor in Vietnam, elaborates that

.....the deployment of advisors and later troops suited the Australian strategy of "forward defence" which meant holding a line in Southeast Asia against communism and at the same time providing depth to Australia's defence. (30)

Indeed, in a de-classified document -"Selective Service"- dated 19th March 1964, Australia's official policy of forward defence read as follows:


29 Renouf, op.cit., p.254.

30 McNeill, op.cit., p.5.
Australian defence policy is soundly based on the principle that the security of the Australian mainland and its island territories is best achieved by a forward defence strategy to hold Southeast Asia; thus providing in depth for Australia. For this reason, Australia has participated fully in collective defence arrangements, thereby contributing to the security of more immediately threatened areas in Southeast Asia, and in turn attracting the support of powerful allies, particularly the United States. (31)

In sum, despite official justification that the Australian military involvement in Vietnam was based on its commitments to the two collective security arrangements—the ANZUS and SEATO Treaties—underlying beliefs and fears such as those discussed earlier were to dominate Australian government thinking until at least 1971, and to find wide acceptability within Australian community that felt itself increasingly vulnerable as a result of the turmoil in the Asian neighbourhood.

However, from 1971, hostility between China and the U.S. which had been a key influence in post-war Asia began to dissipate as diplomatic communications were reestablished, and the prospect began to emerge of a reduction in tension in Southeast Asia even without a decisive outcome favourable to the U.S. in Vietnam. Moreover, Nixon's policy of phased withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, in addition to the "Guam Doctrine" in 1969, advocating self-reliance in coping with communist insurgency foreshadowed a substantial diminution in America's commitment to maintain ground troops in Indochina. These


32 For Example, see an official assessment of the Australian military commitment prepared at the direction of Prime Minister Whitlam and presented to the House of Representatives on 13 May 1975, in Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam, pp.2-3.
developments necessitated a reexamination of the basis for Australia's Vietnam policy and its military involvement.

Having used the Vietnam War as a political weapon against the opposition for so long, the LCP government had become a captive of its own rhetoric and found it difficult to adjust to the changed situation. Pressure from its own right wing, which adhered strongly to a Cold War view of the world, increased its difficulties. Moreover the LCP Government's 1972 Australian Defence Review in effect renounced the forward defence policy and restricted Australia's area of security interest chiefly to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) and secondarily to Malaysia and Singapore. In addition, it also became clear at the beginning of the 1970s that the U.S. was pulling out from Southeast Asia. As a result, following the American second cutback, Prime Minister John Gorton announced on 22 April 1970 that one Australian battalion and some supporting personnel would be withdrawn, but stated that the timing of the withdrawal had yet to be decided.

It was not until August 1971 that Mr. Gorton deemed it opportune to initiate the total withdrawal of Australian troops from


35 CPD (H of R), 22 April 1970, pp. 1456-1458.
South Vietnam. In November, the withdrawal of the last Australian (36) combat troops was announced. However, a small 128-man Australian Army Advisory Group was to remain in a training capacity.

The election in December 1972 of the first Australian Labor government for 23 years brought a new phase in Australia's foreign policy. One of the most important differences between the Labor government's approach to foreign policy and that of its predecessors was its perception of Australia's strategic environment. Prime Minister Whitlam repeatedly made clear that he felt that Australia's security would not be affected by the political coloration of the (37) regimes in Saigon or Phnom Penh. The ALP basically accepted the analysis that Australia faced no serious security threat for 15 years. (38)

Another major assumption distinguished Labor's foreign policy from the previous LCP government's concern with the Vietnam War. To the ALP, the war was primarily a domestic conflict (39) which had been aggravated by foreign intervention. In all the campaign, the Labor Party was popularly identified as opposed to LCP government's previous commitment to the Indochina War. In his reply to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. McMahon, in April 1970, Mr. Whitlam, then Leader of the Opposition, attacked the government's policies

36 Ibid., 20 November 1971, p.4480.
39 Ibid.
in Indochina as part of "our continuing failure to recognise and identify with the national aspirations and expectations of the people of the area". This was a criticism he was to make continually of the government's perception of events in Southeast Asia.

After its election, the Labor government therefore immediately ended Australian interventionist role in Vietnam by withdrawing the entire Australian Army Advisory Group and by terminating all forms of military assistance to the RVN.

In accordance with past policies, the Labor government stressed the fundamentally important nature of maintaining its alliance with the U.S. Nevertheless, when President Nixon ordered the resumption of U.S. bombing of Hanoi in late December 1972 in order to force the North Vietnamese to negotiate in Paris, Mr. Whitlam deplored this action in a letter sent to President Nixon. Dr. Cairns, the Minister for Overseas Trade and Secondary Industry, also accused the Nixon Administration of using the negotiation for election purposes. The approach of the new Australian government obviously annoyed Washington. The dilemma of the Labor government which offended the "great and powerful ally" was however eased by the Paris Agreements of January 1973, which were welcomed as a major step towards a lasting political solution of the conflict in Indochina. The Australian government stated its support for the full implementation of the

40 CPD (H of R), 7 April 1970, p.746.
41 Thayer, op.cit., p.6.
42 Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 1972.
Paris Agreements and supported any initiative which might bring the war to an end.

The Paris Agreements, like the 1954 Geneva Accords, rejected the idea of North and South Vietnam as two separate countries and explicitly stated that "the military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary. It soon became apparent, however, that the Saigon government would not implement the crucial provisions of Article 12 that called on "the South Vietnam parties to hold consultations in order to set up a national council of reconciliation and concord of three equal segments". The failure of the ceasefire in Vietnam, as in Cambodia, was to a large degree the result of the American policy. The principal function of the ceasefire arrangements, in fact, was to provide the U.S. with a face-saving device for the withdrawal of its troops and its air forces from the conflict. The arrangement nevertheless did not bring to an end the massive American program of military and economic assistance to the Thieu regime.

Australia, for its part, was content to maintain a low profile, calling for the full implementation of the Paris Agreements but being careful not to take any initiative that might incur the displeasure of the U.S. The Australian efforts towards Vietnam, both North and South, over the implementation of the Paris Agreements can be

43 See Ministerial Statement on Indochina by Mr. Whitlam in CPD (H of R), 8 April 1975.

44 Article 15 of the 1973 Paris Agreement.
shown by Mr. Whitlam's letters of 31 March 1975, one to President Thieu and one to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV, Nguyen Dug Trinh. In those letters, the Australian government expressed its concern to both sides at their failure to implement the political and military provisions of the Paris Agreements, and indicated its support for the resumption of the peace talks at La Celle-Saint Cloud and Saigon without pre-conditions.

In order to balance its relations with Hanoi and Saigon, the Australian government recognised and established diplomatic relations with the DRV at the ambassadorial level (Australia was among the first western countries to recognise North Vietnam). Australia, while maintaining informal contacts with the PRG, opposed recognising it on both technical and pragmatic grounds, but still recognised the government of the RVN headed by President Thieu. To the Whitlam government, recognition of the PRG would mean severance of relations with Saigon.

The ALP's decision to recognise the DRV reflected its concern to set aside the ideological divisions of the Cold War period, and as such was a further step towards the government's objective of establishing diplomatic ties with other communist states, especially in Asia, in order to develop a more balanced and sympathetic appreciation of their interests and attitudes. Hence, diplomatic relations with a


number of communist countries were established in this period for example China, North Korea and East Germany.

While the ALP could be seen as providing "new directions and (47) new definitions" to Australian foreign policy, particularly towards Indochina, one could argue that what the Labor government had done was to bring Australia into line with the new trends in American diplomacy. After all, it was the American President and not Mr. Whitlam who had enunciated the Nixon Doctrine, and stressed the need for greater regional self-reliance. The ALP leader had applied the principle to Australia's situation. The decision to terminate all military involvement in Vietnam was the logical continuation of the American "Vietnamization" policy, and had, in any case, been initiated by the (48) previous LCP government.

During 1973 - 1975, Australia committed itself to contribute to post-war reconstruction of Indochina. In 1973 - 1974, Australian aid to South Vietnam amounted to A$ 3,727,684. Aid to North Vietnam (49) was also provided to the amount of A$ 659,657. In the financial year 1974 - 75, the Australian government provided some A$ 5.7 million (50) of aid to Indochina through international organisations. In this period, Australia also moved to develop a constructive relationship


48 Camilleri, op.cit., p.82.

49 Department of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report 1974, p.64.

50 Ibid., 1975, p.53.
with North Vietnam. Besides the provision of aid, bilateral links between Canberra and Hanoi were strengthened in the areas of trade and culture as well.

The dramatic collapse of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments in April 1975 once more opened deep fissures in Australian society on the Indochina War. As the Phnom Penh and Saigon government collapsed, the Australian press coverage became increasingly emotional, and raised again all the old fears and prejudices about Southeast Asia and the communist threat. The Australian government tried to take a calm approach to the outcome of the Indochina War. In the Ministerial Statement to the House of Representatives on 8 April 1975, Mr. Whitlam argued that, in the government's view, "who rules in Saigon is not, and never has been, an ingredient in Australian security. Our strength, our security, rest on factors and relationships ultimately unchanged by these events". He implied that his government's policy was to recognise whoever controlled a country's capital as the legitimate government. It followed this policy with regard to Vietnam and Cambodia. Despite urgings from within the government to give early recognition to the PRG, the government refused to withdraw recognition from the Thieu regime, as well as the Lon Nol regime, until Saigon and Phnom Penh had been captured by their opponents.

51 CPD (H of R), 8 April 1975, p.1260.

The domino theory reappeared and the specter was constantly raised of the imminent communist victories having dire consequences for the rest of Southeast Asia and ultimately for Australia. However, for the government, the end of the fighting in Indochina was a healthy thing since it meant the end of carnage and also brought to an end myths about the alleged importance to Australia of who governed in Indochina. From now on, Australia could concentrate on its vital interests and sources of security interest. The end of the conflict reduced the great power competition in the region and enhanced the regional stability. (53)

The Opposition, on the contrary, saw the outcome of the Indochina War as a destabilizing event. The outcome meant that the power and prestige of communism generally were raised whereas the American and the anti-communist nations' prestige was weakened. Hence the communist nations would have the potential for spreading undermining effects across Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the manner of an oil slick. (54)

In May, one month following the fall of the Saigon regime, Foreign Minister D.R. Willesee announced that Australia had decided to recognise the PRG in South Vietnam. In a major address delivered to the National Press Club in Washington in the same month, Mr. Whitlam explained that his government was "not going to be panicked" by the military outcome in Vietnam, and it

53 Albinski, op.cit., p.132.
54 Ibid.
was intent upon reaching a modus vivendi with Vietnam in 1975. He wanted the U.S. to reach such a modus vivendi as well. Mr. Whitlam also looked forward to the future of Southeast Asia in which the U.S. and Australia would be able to co-operate in influencing the new communist governments in Indochina.

With regard to Cambodia, when Prince Sihanouk was overthrown as Head of State in a coup d'etat in 1970, the Australian government, in accordance with the realities of the situation, recognised the new government in Phnom Penh and the subsequent government under President Lon Nol—the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR). However, the realities of the situation by mid-April 1975 were such that there was clearly no point in Australia's continuing to recognise any longer the GKR. The government therefore decided to give recognition instead to the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK), but did not at the time enter into formal diplomatic relations. This was because of Australian disquiet over its actions and policies in flagrant violation of human rights. Contacts with the Kampuchean government since 1975 had been through the Australian and Kampuchean embassies in Beijing and through their missions at the United Nations in New York.

The Labor government was dismissed from office in November 1975, and was replaced by the LCP government headed by Mr. Malcolm Fraser. Shortly after the 1975 election, the DRV and the RVN (or the PRG)

55 Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record (hereafter AFAR), May 1975, pp.265-267.

were reunified under the name Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). This reunification made Vietnam the third strongest communist state in its military capability. Surprisingly, the Fraser government not only continued the basic thrust of its predecessor's policy in relation to Vietnam during this period, but, as a result of prodding by Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock, adopted conciliatory and friendly policies towards Vietnam. The LCP government believed that the Indochinese states should not be ostracised or alienated because if they felt isolated, they might be forced into further dependence on other communist states. This theme was reiterated by Mr. Fraser in August 1977. He stated:

The Australian government does not want to see Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea isolated. We believe that nothing will be gained by ostracising, ignoring or setting out to alienate these governments. In the case of Vietnam in particular, it would be dangerous to place it in a position where it feels that it can only maintain cordial relations with other communist states. (57)

In accordance with this view, during 1975 - 1977, Australia had attempted to work for the entry of the Indochinese states into the international community. In addition, the Australian government

57 Quoted in Thayer, op. cit., p.7.

58 After the fall of Saigon in 1975, both the DRV and RVN applied twice for separate admission into the UN. Each time the U.S. vetoed these applications. In 1976, the SRV attempted once more to secure admission. In the face of a public announcement that the U.S. would once again exercise its veto, Australia stated its intention to support Vietnam's membership bid. In November 1976, the U.S. in fact exercised its right of veto. Australia then joined 123 other nations in the General Assembly to approve a motion supporting Vietnam's admission (only the U.S. vetoed; there were 17 absences and 3 abstentions). Subsequently the Carter Administration changed its mind and Vietnam was finally admitted in 1977.
announced in 1976 that it had approved a A$ 6 million three year bilateral aid program to Vietnam. In March 1978, Canberra pledged to continue its financial support for the Mekong Committee of ESCAP, a project of undoubted benefit to Vietnam. And in October that year, as a result of flooding in Vietnam, Australia contributed 500 tonnes of rice. Trade between the two countries was also continued. The government's longer-term perspective for Australia's role in the reconstruction of the countries in Indochina derived from a recognition that this was an unparalleled situation in the region. The massive problem of reconstruction would need to be undertaken with generosity and imagination, so that outmoded ideological barriers would not impede a truly co-operative effort.

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59 Thayer, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
CHAPTER 2

Australia and the Kampuchean Problem.


It should be repeated that the Australian government was among the first in the international community to recognise the governments installed in Democratic Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) and Vietnam, following the victory of the communist forces in both countries in April and May 1975 respectively. The Australian government at that time also committed itself to the reconstruction of these countries and pursued relations with them in the interests of maximising their international contacts.

After the communist victories in Indochina in 1975, differences in national interests and ideologies of Vietnam and DK led to a deterioration in relations between them. Increasing both


sides resorted to arms. This deteriorating relationship between Hanoi and Phnom Penh was noted by Canberra in 1978, but official reactions were low-key. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Andrew Peacock, rejected the notion that the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict derived from Sino-Soviet rivalry when he stated in March 1978 that

I think that the present dispute between Vietnam and Kampuchea must be seen primarily as a dispute between the two countries. It is something that traces back to the historical suspicions between the two countries rather than to ideological questions or matters of Sino-Soviet rivalry. To see the conflict in any other terms does not really make for a better understanding of it.(3)

Two months later, after hostilities had reached new heights, he explained present policy in these terms:

The government naturally regrets this outbreak of conflict and supports the concept of a peaceful, negotiated settlement. We do not take sides in a dispute which is primarily the result of long-standing mutual suspicions.(4)

However, the increased scale of refugee flight from Indochina, especially from Vietnam from early 1978, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 were followed by a change in Australian policy. Despite good relations for many years, Vietnam's regional policies abruptly curtailed the potential for growth of friendly relations between Canberra and Hanoi. To demonstrate its disapproval of Vietnamese policies with regard both to refugees and to Kampuchea, the Fraser government decided on 24 January 1979 to suspend the Australian $6 million aid program, adopted in 1976, and all

3 Cited in Thayer, op.cit., p.8.
4 Ibid.
cultural exchanges with Vietnam. This was the first time, according to Carlyle Thayer, that the Australian government used aid as a political instrument. Vietnam's military intervention in Kampuchea was criticised strongly in Australia and the government also adopted a strongly condemnatory position on the Vietnamese action. According to Foreign Minister Peacock, although the policies pursued by the Pol Pot government had resulted in human hardship and suffering on a massive scale, this could in no way justify Vietnam's action against it.

The subsequent Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in February 1979, however, drew a rather different response from Australia. While Canberra condemned the Chinese action, it did not, as it did to Vietnam, take a strong line of opposition to China. Australian statements on China's invasion of Vietnam were always linked with a condemnation of Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea. In brief, the Fraser government gave the impression that while Vietnam had provoked the conflict, China had merely reacted to it. In other words, the Australian reaction to China's "punitive" limited invasion of Vietnam was noticeably milder. This was simply because of the fact that Australian-Chinese relations at that time were very close, and to Canberra, in the situation in which the American influence and

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5 Ibid., p.9

6 See Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, No.173, 14 February 1979, p.V.

7 See for example the news release on "China-Vietnam" issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peacock on 14 February 1979, in Ibid., pp.V-VII.
interests in Southeast Asia were declining, China was a country which could best balance the Soviet influence in the region.

In general, up to 1980, Australia offered full diplomatic support to the ASEAN stand on the Kampuchean issue. In keeping with ASEAN's approach, Canberra maintained its recognition of the ousted DK regime, both bilaterally and in the United Nations (UN), by voting in support of DK credentials in 1979 and 1980. Canberra also co-sponsored the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea which basically calls for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea and an act of self-determination by the Khmer people. It could be said that Australian policy on Kampuchea between 1979 and 1980 was a positive contribution towards harmony in relations with ASEAN.

The Fraser government's policy, however, was not universally supported domestically. There was widespread public antipathy particularly towards the policy of continued recognition for the DK regime, irrespective of whether the policy was in accord with ASEAN's wishes. The issue became a matter of considerable domestic controversy. This was because of the general abhorrence in Australia of the so-called "Pol Pot genocidal regime". Pressure was exerted for the withdrawal of Australian recognition from such a regime, not only by the public, but also by the Opposition Labor Party and from within the government's ranks. The Age perhaps best summarised the case against

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8 Australia's concern about the increasing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

9 The question of recognition of a Kampuchean regime after the invasion presented a difficult problem to the government. The issue led to strong disagreement in Australia not only between government and opposition, but also between the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. For detail, see for example, Australian, 14 July 1980; Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 1980.
Australian policy of continued recognition of the Pol Pot regime when it commented that

In withdrawing recognition from Pol Pot, the Australian government would simply be recognising the odiousness of the Pol Pot regime and the fact that it does not have effective control of Kampuchea. At the same time and with emphasis, the Australian government could state its opposition to the Vietnamese invasion, call for the withdrawal of foreign troops, withhold recognition of the Heng Samrin regime and urge supervised election in Kampuchea so that the tragedy-ridden people can vote for a government. It is such a government that Australia should recognise, not a discredited rump or a regime installed by an outside force. Recognition of the Pol Pot regime does nothing to assist humanity in general or the people of Kampuchea in particular.(10)

As a result, on 14 October 1980, the Fraser government announced that recognition of the DK regime would be withdrawn and this was put into effect on 14 February of the following year. According to the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. MacKellar, in his statement on 14 February 1981, "Australia now does not recognise any regime in Kampuchea. Australia has no intention of recognising the Heng Samrin regime, condemns Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and calls for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that country". A few months later, Foreign Minister Tony Street expressed his hope for a regime which would be truly representative of the Khmer people when he stated:

The government hopes that a coherent and effective regime truly representative of the Khmer people will emerge from current diplomatic activity. If it does, we will be prepared to reconsider our position in the light of circumstances at the time the issue comes up for a voted.(12)

10 The Age, 30 November 1979.

11 News Release issued by the Acting Foreign Minister, the Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar, on 14 February 1981.

12 Ibid., issued by the Foreign Mininster, the Hon. Tony Street, on 28 May 1981.
He also reiterated that

This is no way lessens the government's total opposition to the Heng Samrin regime which is kept in power only by the Vietnamese army which installed it. (13)

The policy of derecognition was demonstrated by the Australian delegation at the UNGA on 18 September 1981; Australia abstained in the vote on the question of DK credentials. However, Australia still co-sponsored the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea. This indicated that Australia's opposition to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea still remained.

Australia's negative feeling about Pol Pot made the government react cautiously to the inauguration of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. Although Canberra indicated that it welcomed moves to establish a coalition, it has been concerned that such a process should not lead to a situation in which the Khmer Rouge could regain power in Kampuchea. In December 1981, when moves to conclude a coalition agreement were actively underway, Mr. Street stated that Australia would reconsider its policy on recognition if a "loose" coalition was formed, but added that it would not regard a coalition truly representative of the Khmer people as one which in practice was the Khmer Rouge with another face. The coalition government was finally formed in August 1982. Unfortunately, the Khmer Rouge has joined the coalition. As a result, although Canberra

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13 Ibid.
14 Frost, op.cit., p.33.
15 The Age, 14 December 1981.
welcomed the participation by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, it resisted ASEAN's suggestion that recognition should be extended to the CGDK. Prime Minister Fraser reaffirmed that Australia would not support the new coalition if it was used merely as a front for a reemergence of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. He stated:

\[\text{I put the view very strongly that if international support is wanted for the coalition, it is going to be much easier to obtain if the figure of Pol Pot is not part of it.}\]

Australian policy on Kampuchea at that time was demonstrated by its actions in the UN. In relation to the recognition issue, Australia did not accede to the ASEAN's request for a change of policy; Australia again abstained in the UNGA vote on the credentials question on 26 October 1982. However, Australia made clear its support for ASEAN's overall stand on the Kampuchean conflict by co-sponsoring the ASEAN resolutions on Kampuchea on 28 October 1982.

With regard to the coalition government, the Fraser government pursued a clearly selective policy: no contact was maintained with the Khmer Rouge, and it was indicated that Khmer Rouge representatives would not be welcomed in Australia. However, Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (KPNLF) were viewed more favourably. Mr. H.D. Anderson, the then Australian Ambassador

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17 The Age, 10 August 1982; The Times, 6 August 1982.

18 In his 5 October 1982 speech, Mr. Street said that "We welcome in particular the participation in this coalition of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, proven patriots who deserve support for their aim to restore Cambodia to the sovereign and independent status it enjoyed when they were in power". Cited in Frost, op. cit., p. 35.
to the UN, stated on 15 January 1979 during the course of the Security Council's consideration of the Kampuchean issue:

> Whatever differences our governments have had in the past, Australia has never questioned the sincerity, the ardour of Prince Sihanouk's patriotism or the depth of his devotion to the independence of Kampuchea and the well-being of its people. His words must carry great weight with us all.(19)

And according to Mr. Fraser, "there is fairly general acceptance that an independent, non-aligned government under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk would be the best final outcome". (20)

It was evident that, in September 1982, one month before the UN's consideration of the Kampuchean question, Australia provided some humanitarian support to the non-communist resistance parties by specifically directing some aid to camps on or near the Thai-Kampuchean border occupied by KPNLF and Sihanouk forces. (21)

As previously mentioned, one significant outcome of events in Indochina, especially since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978, has been the outflow of refugees into the neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia. The refugee problem has been a vital concern in Australia's bilateral relationship with the countries directly involved, particularly Thailand. As a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

19 AFAR, January 1979, p.40.
20 The Age, 19 August 1982; The Times, 6 August 1982.
21 See Frost, op.cit., p.35.
and as a member of the High Commissioner's Executive Committee, it must be said that Australia has a special responsibility towards refugees. Australia has therefore maintained its program of humanitarian assistance relief to Thailand and the international agencies to help them cope with the enormous task created by the presence of displaced Khmers along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Indeed, the Indochinese refugee problem directly involved Australia as well. Like many countries in Southeast Asia, Australia undertook to take refugees from the overflowing interim emergency camps set up in Southeast Asia. In addition, Australia had to cope with the boat people who found their way directly to Australia. Despite some opposition in Australia to the acceptance of refugees, especially the boat people, and despite the seriousness of the unemployment problem at the time, their assimilation came to be widely accepted as necessary to meet Australia's international obligations and as a humanitarian responsibility.

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The March 1983 election swept the ALP into government. It also brought some significant changes in Australian policy towards Indochina. Before examining the present government's attitude and policy in relation to the Kampuchean question, it is useful to touch briefly on Australian threat perceptions in the 1970s and 1980s since this will create better understanding of the ALP's moves.

Clearly, the prevailing Canberra strategic perspective throughout the 1950s and 1960s held that communist China was a potential threat to Southeast Asia and Australia. However, events in the 1970s, especially the U.S. rapprochement with China in 1971-1972 and the increased Soviet support for subversion in both the Third World and the West, made Australian governments see things very differently. After twenty years of hostility, Australia has downplayed the saliency of the Chinese threat. By the beginning of the 1970s, China was no longer, if it ever was, the "aggressive, expansionist" power. Nor could China credibly be considered as the motive force behind the "downward thrust" of communism. To demonstrate its shifting attitude towards the Chinese, and also to adapt Australia to the new world situation, the Whitlam government therefore initiated the establishment of diplomatic relations with the government in Beijing in December 1972.


Instead of China, the Australian world-view by the mid 1970s had increasingly been dominated by the perception of a threat posed to its security by the Soviet Union. Central to Mr. Fraser's view of the world situation was his notion of the Soviet capacity to upset the balance of power and its inclination to expand its influence throughout the world in order to achieve Soviet primacy. Soviet actions - during the 1973 Middle East war, substantially assisting the North Vietnamese to take over South Vietnam, and the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola - in addition to its massive arms build up, its establishment of military bases at strategic points around the world and its naval expansion especially in the Indian and Pacific Ocean throughout the last two decades, could be adduced as evidences of its sinister designs and as signs for Australians that the Soviet threat was no longer a remote and intangible one. Fraser concluded that "the Soviet leaders now have a strategic and political reach - a capacity to influence and even intervene well beyond the periphery of the established zones of Soviet security interests".

The implications of this analysis were clear: China was no longer an enemy but a potential "ally" to be used to balance Soviet influence in the region. Indeed, upon a tour to China in 1976, Fraser was reported to have proposed an anti-Soviet United front to

29 Cited in Girling, op.cit., p.9.
consist of China, Japan, the U.S. and Australia.

Up until now, awareness of Soviet expansionism persists in Australia. The Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan deepened Australian mistrust of Moscow. Despite the opposition to the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, concerns about the increasing Soviet influence and the growth of its military power in Southeast Asia resulting from the prolonged conflict in Kampuchea led to some major changes in Australian policy towards Indochina.

It is clear that signature of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in November 1978, one month before Hanoi invaded Phnom Penh, was not only a formal sign of the end of Vietnam's policy of maintaining a balanced relationship between Beijing and Moscow, but also a sign that any Vietnamese action in Kampuchea was likely to be underwritten by the Soviet Union. From all the reports, Vietnam's economy has been drained by pursuit of its military and political objectives in Kampuchea (and Laos). Therefore, in order to achieve such objectives, Vietnam has no choice but to rely on Soviet support. It is believed that Soviet aid to Vietnam has been running at between US$ 2.5 million and 3 million a day.

For the Soviet Union, this huge assistance is justified mainly by the extent to which its political and strategic interests are advanced. Politically, the close Soviet - Vietnamese relationship results in the increase of Soviet influence in Indochina. Strategically, in return for its support for Vietnam, Moscow obtains the right to use

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30 Thayer, op.cit., p.9.
facilities in Kampuchea (Kampong Som and Riem) and former American base facilities in Vietnam (Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, etc.). This has significantly augmented the Soviet ability in deploying forces further afield to encompass Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and even the South Pacific.

To the Hawke government, the longer the current situation in Kampuchea continues, the greater will be Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union and the more obtrusive Soviet military power will be in the region. Given these serious concerns and in order to break down the isolation in which the Vietnamese leaders find themselves, the ALP therefore raised the question of resuming economic (or development) aid to Vietnam. Since it has always been argued that the suspension of Australian aid to Vietnam has resulted in Vietnam's increasing reliance on Soviet support which would heighten the risks associated with the consolidation of Soviet interests in Indochina, the major assumption behind the ALP's thinking is that the resumption of aid, even if more symbolic than substantial, would encourage other countries to take a similar stand, and would help to lessen Hanoi's dependence on Moscow and, as a consequence, would reduce the prospect of Soviet expansion in the region.

With regard to this issue, the Australian Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, in an official publication entitled Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities, stated that


32 This policy has produced strong criticism both domestically and abroad. It had been pushed by the left wing of the Labor Party, particularly in Victoria, but has been opposed by the right wing.
ASEAN has been able to demonstrate political cohesion on Cambodia, opposing military expansion by Vietnam and the spread of Soviet influence in the region. We see Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union, with the danger that carries for the region, as resulting in part from its continuing isolation (following its Cambodia invasion) from regional and western countries. (33)

As for Mr. Hawke, he reportedly said that he saw no merit for ASEAN, the U.S. or Australia in a situation which left the Soviet Union as Vietnam's only ally. Mr. Bill Hayden, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hawke government, is also of the strong opinion that Vietnam should be eased away from its stifling dependence on the Soviet Union. Indeed, even Mr. Peacock, when he assumed the position of Foreign Minister in the Fraser government, did not see Vietnam as having deliberately chosen to join in an alliance with the Soviet Union. Rather, he had sympathy for the view that the Vietnamese had been drawn somewhat unwillingly into the alliance with Moscow by the increasingly hostile attitude being shown towards them by the Chinese, and by the refusal of the Americans to give effect to their promises to normalise relations and to provide a substantial measure of aid to assist the country's recovery from 35 years of war. To Mr. Peacock, the government's decision to cut off aid was of little material significance to the Vietnamese, but it was indicative of one type of action which had helped bring about the Vietnam - USSR alliance. (35)

33 Australia and ASEAN, p.46.

34 Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, No.86/2525, 8 May 1983.

In addition, there are two other major arguments which favour the ALP's policy of resuming aid to Hanoi. One argument holds that it is entirely honorable for Australia, as one of the countries which sent soldiers to Vietnam, to try to help the long-suffering Vietnamese people. According to Mr. Gordon McIntosh, an ALP senator for the state of Western Australia, the whole purpose of aid is to provide some civil and humanitarian relief. He went on to say that Australia (36) did have a moral obligation to provide aid to Vietnam. A rather different argument is that by cutting off aid to Vietnam, the government (37) has forfeited its ability to put pressure on that country.

For these reasons, the Labor government has attempted to review the aid policy. In its campaign the ALP had used this policy on aid as one of its instruments against the Fraser government.

A paragraph in the ALP Platform, Constitution and Rules as approved by the 35th National Conference in 1982 read as follows:

The Government should resume its commitment to the two aid projects in Vietnam suspended in January 1979. We should also resume cultural exchanges so as to promote greater understanding between our countries.(38)

In the following paragraph, the Platform stated that

The level of any future humanitarian and development aid should be consistent with our United Nations commitments and also should acknowledge our involvement in the

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36 "Should Australia Aid Vietnam?, Asiaweek, 13 July 1984, p.78.


Vietnam War and the subsequent need for rehabilitation in the interests of the Vietnamese people. (39)

With regard to the first proposal, Mr. Hayden made it clear that aid would not be conditional on a favourable Vietnamese response, but that he expected Vietnam to show some interest in reaching accord with its neighbours, especially Thailand, over the Kampuchean situation. But shortly after the ALP came to power, Hanoi launched the first of its savage blows on the Kampuchean coalition camps along the Thai border, which resulted once again in thousand of homeless Kampuchean refugees flowing into Thailand. In this circumstance, the idea of resuming aid to Vietnam might seem to be inappropriate unless the Australian government wished not only to affront the feeling of the ASEAN countries but also to risk Chinese and American opposition since all these countries strongly disapproved such a policy as proposed by the Labor government. (40)

Because of strong objections, especially from ASEAN, the ALP government found itself in a dilemma. Any further step towards the resumption of aid to Vietnam, no matter what the real intention is, would certainly upset its friends, ASEAN in particular, and might result in a deterioration in relationships between Canberra and the capitals of those countries. But if Australia would not initiate any move which could break down the division between Vietnam and other regional countries, then Vietnam - Soviet relations will become much

39 Ibid., p.84.
40 On how Thailand feels about the aid issue, see chapter 4.
closer and hence the Soviet influence in this area would gradually increase. However, at this stage, the Labor government preferred to maintain good relations with the ASEAN countries.

In April 1983, Mr. Hayden made a trip to the ASEAN capitals to discuss the Kampuchean issue in general and the ALP's policy on aid to Vietnam in particular. After the talks with the Thai Prime Minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, Mr. Hayden told reporters that his government had postponed indefinitely plans to resume aid to Vietnam. He also said that Australia would consult with the ASEAN countries, China and the U.S. on the issue during a meeting of their foreign ministers scheduled to be held in Bangkok the following June.

Seven months after Mr. Hayden's visit, Mr. Hawke paid an official visit to Thailand. During his visit, he reiterated that Australia would not consider direct development aid to Hanoi without first consulting ASEAN, China and the U.S. He also added that Australia was not making a choice between ASEAN and Vietnam, and that his government would maintain the closest consultation with, and seek the understanding of ASEAN in any step it may consider appropriate to take towards a political solution to the Kampuchean problem.

It should also be noted that, unlike the previous one, the present ALP Platform which was approved by the 36th National Conference in July 1984 does not mention the resumption of aid to

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Ibid., No.21/83, 30 November 1983, pp.2-3.
Vietnam. On the situation in Indochina, the 1984 Platform only outlines six principles on which the ALP thinks a Kampuchean settlement could be based. These principles are:

a. the acceptance by Vietnam of an appropriate accommodation with its neighbours;

b. phased withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia matched by an effective arrangement to prevent Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge forces going back into Cambodia;

c. a form of self-determination for Cambodia;

d. the creation of conditions for the peaceful return of displaced Cambodians to Cambodia;

e. the acceptance by all parties of Cambodia as a neutral, independent and non-aligned country; and

f. the restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam with China, ASEAN and the West. (43)

According to Mr. Fraser, Mr. Hawke is unlikely to resume aid to Vietnam as long as the Vietnamese troops occupied Kampuchea. He also said that "Mr. Hawke wants policies which would co-operate with ASEAN but there are problems inside the Labor Party which he still has to work out". However, this does not mean that the notion of resuming aid to Hanoi totally disappears.

In addition to the aid issue, there is another Australian move which represents its shifting attitude and policy towards the Kampuchean problem. That is the Labor government's decision not to co-sponsor the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea. For the previous LCP


44 The Age, 19 February 1984.
government, even if it abstained from voting on the DK credentials at the UNGA, fully supported ASEAN's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Kampuchea by co-sponsoring the resolution. But the present ALP government, while continuing to oppose the Vietnamese military action in Kampuchea, neither voted for the DK credentials nor co-sponsored the ASEAN resolution at both the 1983 and 1984 UNGA sessions.

Explaining the Australian government's decision, Mr. Hayden, in a statement to the Parliament on 8 March 1984, said:

...We did not co-sponsor because we had reservations about two aspects of it......The resolution proposed acknowledgment of the increasing effectiveness of the coalition with Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea. We do not recognise the coalition..............

We had some reservations about the portion of the resolution which referred to demographic changes within Kampuchea, in short, the proposition that a Vietnamisation program has been implemented. Should the evidence amassed in support of this point of view be presented to us and its nature in our assessment is so convincing that it persuades us that the assertion is correct, we will very quickly condemn what has happened.....At this point we feel the case is yet to be proved.(46)

Two months later, when asked whether the fact that the government did not co-sponsor the resolution reflected in part the

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During the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's visit to Canberra in March 1984, Mr. Hayden, in a speech at a dinner for his Vietnamese counterpart, stated:

The continued Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia remains internationally unacceptable. There can be no doubt of Australia's condemnation of that presence, nor of our desire for Vietnam to withdraw.

In AFAR, March 1984, p.181.

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Statement to Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, on 8 March 1984, in Ibid., p.240.
government's refusal to support in any way the genocidal forces of Pol Pot, he replied:

We have some reservations about that as a statement of fact. More than that, we have some concern that in diplomatic terms to identify and endorse that in the way in which the Opposition has, may extend recognition to the Pol Pot elements of the coalition forces. We would not propose to be party to that. The Prime Minister has made that clear. I have made it clear. (47)

Although it did not co-sponsor the resolution, nevertheless to demonstrate its support for ASEAN's efforts to reach a political and peaceful settlement in Kampuchea and to confirm its opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, Australia still voted for it. To some observers, however, the Australian government voted for such a solution simply because it still wants to keep in touch with ASEAN. The government may be afraid that if it does not support the resolution, then ASEAN may cut Australia out of further joint consultations (48) on the issue. This view seems reasonable since it was evident that despite the Australian vote for the resolution, ASEAN demonstrated its displeasure at the Australian policy of not co-sponsoring by postponing its 1983 annual Ministerial meeting with Canberra.

The Hawke government hopes that Australian diplomatic initiative with regard to the situation in Indochina will contribute to dialogue among the parties to the conflict. Since 1979, the two principal groups concerned, the ASEAN and Indochina countries, have issued


a series of proposals for a Kampuchean settlement. So far, these moves have not succeeded in bringing the two sides to the conference table. In this regard, Australia finds itself in a special position as a country in the region on good terms with the ASEAN countries, China and the U.S., as well as being in contact with Vietnam. This has been the basis of Australia's initiative to encourage dialogue between the interested parties and break the stalemate which prevents a solution to the Kampuchea problem. Australia remains convinced that the only solution to this problem is through peaceful negotiations.

Mr. Hayden signalled on many occasions that Australia would try to play an intermediary, peacemaking role in Indochina. He also said that if Australia was to contribute to a peaceful settlement, talks must be held with all participants, including the Vietnamese. "We may even be confronted by the situation where we may have to talk to the Russians", he said.

With regard to the Australian attitude towards Vietnam, it is argued that having close relations with Hanoi does not mean approval for all of the Vietnamese actions. Indeed, it is only through more productive relations based on mutual respect that Australia can ensure that it is listened to responsively when it presses its point of view to Hanoi. For this reason, Mr. Hayden does not accept a

49 Peter Howarth, "Vietnam and Australia: the Cambodian situation and bilateral relations", AFAR, March 1984, p.176.

50 The Age, 25 April 1983.

policy of isolation and punishment of Vietnam. To him, the latter substitutes a policy of frustration for one of positive action. Moreover, punishing Vietnam simply will not work. "The Vietnamese, as a proud and resilient people, want to be treated with dignity and will deal only on that basis", Mr. Hayden said.

With regard to the CGDK, Labor's policy is unchanged. It is clear that the Labor government, like its predecessor, will not take any action which could be seen as recognising the claims to legitimacy of the Khmer coalition resistance. According to the Foreign Minister, Australia cannot support any strategy based on the Pol Pot forces, whose ruthlessness and disregard for democratic values and human rights are virtually unrivalled. To some extent, given the abhorrence of Pol Pot's brutal regime, many Australians prefer a Vietnamese presence to a return to power of the Khmer Rouge.

In addition, Mr. Hayden believes that using the coalition to try to get the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea might not work. He could not see the Vietnamese willing under the pressures which are being applied to them, whether political, economic or military pressure. He also feels that time may be working in favour of the Vietnamese. As a result, the Hawke government has proposed some new approaches to deal with Vietnam, while the government claims its Indochina policy to be an independent, flexible and innovative one.

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 804.
54 Tim Huxley, op.cit., p.42.
55 The Age, 28 June 1983.
Clearly, since it came to power the Hawke government has, in effect, sought to act as a mediator between the parties concerned in the Kampuchean conflict. In 1983 and 1984, the government pursued its policy in relation to Indochina through a series of discussions with ASEAN, Vietnam and other major interested parties.

In sum, to Canberra, the stalemate over the situation in Kampuchea would only lead Vietnam to more dependence on the Soviet Union which would result in the increase of Soviet influence in the region. The continued conflict in Kampuchea would also intensify Sino-Soviet rivalry and it might unintentionally contribute to military escalation in the region. All of these situations are not in Australia's interest. Therefore Australia will continue to pursue efforts to open a dialogue between ASEAN and the Indochinese countries. Without a dialogue, it is believed that a peaceful settlement in Kampuchea could not be reached.
PART 2

Thai perspectives
CHAPTER 3
The Kampuchean Problem: Implications for Thailand.

Why should Thailand involve itself with the Kampuchean problem? This is a question which should be clarified since, at a glance, such a problem should in no way be connected with Thailand. However, a closer examination reveals that there are many reasons which compel Thailand to involve itself with this problem.

Ever since the Second World War, it has always been perceived that external threat to Thailand's security will come from communist countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Thais saw China as their potential threat. However, since 1975 the threat against Thailand's security and independence has been believed to come from neighbouring Indochinese states. The Indochina factor, once viewed simply as mere conspirational communist movements, was later revealed in its true complexity.

The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea since the end of 1978 has presented to Thailand a new dimension of the nature of the communist threat. Events in Kampuchea have wide-ranging implications for the security of Thailand and the other states in Southeast Asia as well as for the pattern of international politics in the region. For one thing, the presence of about 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea has posed a threat to the region. For another, the crisis over Kampuchea has accentuated the rivalry among the great

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1 One of the publications which represent Thai official views on the Kampuchean problem is Thailand's Policy Towards the Vietnam-Kampuchean Conflict (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, 1985).

powers, namely the Soviet Union and China. In February 1979, the Chinese People's Liberation Army crossed the Sino-Vietnamese frontier and engaged in a brief war with Vietnam to "teach Vietnam a lesson". The clashes demonstrated Beijing's readiness to use force to back its expression of displeasure at Hanoi's military intervention in Kampuchea. The Sino-Soviet dispute drives Beijing and Moscow to view Indochina as mere background for their own rivalry. With Chinese active involvement and Soviet support for Vietnam, the conflict in Kampuchea is no longer a regional issue and has become the principal destabilizing factor to the peace and security of Southeast Asia as a whole. Since Thailand is the frontline state which has an 800 kilometer border with Kampuchea, it is more directly affected by such a conflict than other states.

In the Thai view, the root cause of the Kampuchean problem is the fact that Vietnam dispatched about 200,000 troops to invade and occupy Kampuchea. It is evident that as soon as the U.S. withdrew its forces from Indochina in 1973, Hanoi sought to expand its influence into Laos and Kampuchea. Desire for overlordship in Indochina, geostrategic considerations, suspicion of China's intentions and designs, security concerns stemming from border clashes between Vietnamese and Kampuchean forces, and belief in "manifest destiny" all are prominent among the reasons propelling Hanoi to extend its political control into Laos and Kampuchea. Hanoi, in the process, was able to arrange a relatively smooth "takeover" of Laos through the acquiescence and collaboration of a pro-Hanoi indigenous regime. In July 1977, Hanoi signed with Vientiane a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

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However, control over Kampuchea was a different matter. Hanoi had to invade and occupy Phnom Penh due to vehement opposition from the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot - a regime which is friendly to and supported by China. It should be noted that it was not until Hanoi had obtained the Soviet assurance of support under the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on 2 November 1978 that Vietnam began military operations in Kampuchea. One can therefore argue that the underlying cause of the Kampuchean problem indeed lies in the great-power involvement since it is believed that without Soviet support Hanoi could hardly maintain its troops in Kampuchea. (4)

The border conflicts, the anti-Vietnamese stance and the brutal excesses of the Pol Pot regime provided Hanoi with convenient excuses for its intervention. Hanoi's public justification for its continued occupation is that it must ensure against a possible return of the Khmer Rouge regime for the benefit of the Kampucheans. Hanoi also made propaganda about the Chinese threat to justify its action in Kampuchea. (5)

In order to establish complete control of Kampuchea, Vietnam set up a puppet regime headed by Heng Samrin and began to eliminate DK's forces as well as those of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. These forces have therefore been compelled to retreat and scatter themselves all over the country. The DK's forces withdrew westward towards the

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4 It is estimated that Moscow has given more than one billion U.S. dollars annually to sustain Vietnam's economy and military.

5 Vietnam initially talked about "the Chinese threat" to its security from the frontier with Kampuchea; a threat that had first to be removed before it could withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.
Thai-Kampuchean border to wage guerrilla warfare against Vietnamese invading forces which have since then occupied Kampuchea.

To the world at large, despite condemnation of Pol Pot's genocidal policy, the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea is unacceptable for it constitutes flagrant violation of both international law and the UN Charter. The then Thai Foreign Minister, Mr. Uppadit Pachariyangkun, expressed the following view:

"The events in Kampuchea have created a dangerous precedent in Southeast Asia where the cardinal principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state have been violated..."

Dr. Khien Theeravit, a professor of international relations, Chulalongkorn University, also stated that

"the Vietnamese interest and ambition in Kampuchea (and Laos) are not legitimate...it has blatantly violated the international principle of a sovereign country. Its version of a "special relationship" among Indochinese states means nothing less than the imposition of the Vietnamese will on smaller neighbours by military means. The Vietnamese objective in Laos and Kampuchea are clear and yet there are naive people who believe in the Vietnamese sincerity in getting rid of the so-called "Pol Pot genocidal" regime. Was there any Pol Pot in Laos when Vietnam sent its troops into that country and where it still maintains 40,000 - 50,000 Vietnamese troops? Was there any "Chinese threat" before Vietnam embarked on the expansionist road? The so-called "Chinese threat" is a clever diplomatic ploy to sow discord among ASEAN member countries..."
From a standpoint of principle, Thailand - a member of the UN and a peace-loving country - has no alternative but to repudiate such a violation of international norms. To demonstrate its disapproval of Hanoi's action in Kampuchea, Thailand, along with other ASEAN countries, issued on 12 January 1979, five days after the installation of the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, a statement which strongly deplored armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchea. ASEAN also launched in September 1979 a coordinated effort at the UN to secure DK's seat in the General Assembly. Subsequently, ASEAN submitted a proposal for a general draft resolution for a peaceful settlement to the Kampuchean problem. This proposal called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Kampuchea and the holding of UN supervised elections to allow the Kampuchean people an act of self-determination. Additionally, the proposal called for the convening of an international conference on Kampuchea (ICK) as a means for implementing the resolution. Despite some opposition, these ASEAN efforts were generally successful. The resolution also became the basis of the official Thai stance on the Kampuchean conflict.

Moreover, Thailand maintained its recognition of the ousted Pol Pot regime. It is important to note that Thailand continued to recognise such a regime not because of its love of the barbarous regime or because of its hatred of Vietnam but because that regime was the internationally recognised government of Kampuchea illegally overthrown by the Vietnamese forces. To the Thai government, a derecognition of the Pol Pot regime would imply an acceptance of the
Vietnamese behaviour and a recognition of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime. Despite the ruthless Pol Pot regime, Thailand cannot accept that the internal policies of any government, no matter how reprehensible, can justify a military attack on it by another government. Therefore, when the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was established in mid 1982 under the presidency of Prince Sihanouk, the Thai government joined the majority of the world community in supporting and welcoming it. At the UN, Thailand has maintained its support for the DK's credentials in order to preempt Vietnam's tactical move in proposing a "vacant seat formula" which would eventually lead to the subsequent demand for Heng Samrin's representation in the UN.

The Thai position with regard to the Kampuchean problem clearly demonstrates that Thailand can never accept the Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea as a "fait accompli". In a survey on the Thai elite's perceptions of national security, more than 98% of the respondents reject in one way or another the notion of acquiescence to the Vietnamese military domination of Kampuchea as an acceptable outcome. Thailand's positions on other major international issues such as the Afghanistan problem, the question of Namibia and the situation in Lebanon are also in accordance with a similar set of principles, namely respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of other nations; non-interference with internal affairs of other nations and peaceful coexistence.


10 See statement by Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at the 39th UNGA on 2 October 1984.
In addition to such considerations of principle, Thailand's opposition has also been based on a definite perception of its basic security interests. The invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by some 200,000 Vietnamese troops has posed a direct and immediate threat to Thailand's security in several ways. Obviously, it has caused the massive influx of refugees into Thailand. Domestically, the refugee movements have resulted in displacement and disruption of normal livelihood for the Thai villagers at the border. The refugee influx has also imposed great strain on Thai economy since scarce resources have to be mobilized to look after the security and humanitarian aspects of the problem. Even the UNHCR funded camps entail administrative, security and social welfare costs to the Thai government. Moreover, it is widely believed that the camps are heavily infiltrated by enemy agents, and hence a security threat. It is estimated that, up until April 1985, there are about 210,000 Kampucheans living in the refugee camps in Thailand.

Fighting between Vietnamese troops and the resistance forces during the past six dry seasons has also caused cross-border shelling and frequent armed incursions into Thai territory, resulting in losses of Thai lives and property, dislocation of village population and the violation of Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Given the fact that Hanoi's forces made deliberate incursions into Thai territory many times, there is a possibility of direct armed conflict between Thailand and Vietnam if such incursions escalate.

Furthermore, Vietnamese actions have been perceived by the Thai leaders as the first step towards Hanoi's ultimate goal of forming a Confederation of Indochina. The presence of about 40,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and 200,000 in Kampuchea is a testimony to Hanoi's longstanding aim to dominate Laos and Kampuchea. From Laos, it is believed that Vietnam is working on the subversion of Thailand. This must therefore be interpreted as Vietnam's intention to undermine Thailand's security since it was discovered that Vietnam has a plan to annex the 17 northeastern provinces of Thailand to the Indochinese Federation. It was also discovered through the confessions of several high-level former Thai communist insurgents that Vietnam intends to send troops into Thailand. This proves to the Thai leaders (12) that Hanoi has not abandoned its expansionist policy.

The fear of Vietnam's intention to undermine Thailand's security also stems from the fact that the Thai-Kampuchean border is only three hours' drive directly to the east of Bangkok. At that point, the Vietnamese have the capacity to invade the Thai central plains, which is the heartland of the Thai people. This is the most serious military threat to Thailand, but that is not all. Vietnam also has troops in Laos. This means Thailand is facing Vietnam on all the eastern border, which runs for some 2,000 kilometres.

All these have generated a sense of uneasiness and insecurity among the Thai government and people. Vietnam's demonstrated readiness to use force to impose its will on another state, as well as its

continued refusal to heed the international resolutions for withdrawal have increased the Thais' apprehension over Hanoi's regional hegemonistic designs, especially when Vietnam has chosen to lean on the Soviet Union to promote its aims. Thai fear and suspicion of Vietnam are revealed by the same survey on the Thai elite's perceptions of national security. Concerning Thailand's Indochinese neighbours, it is found that in general almost all respondents (98%) see Vietnam as a threat in one form or another and that Vietnam ranks high in many forms of threat such as direct military invasion, political subversion, undermining of ASEAN's regional solidarity and support of military aggression by other country(ies). More specifically concerning the present problem in Kampuchea, there is near unanimity in the elite's opinion that the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea has affected Thailand's security.

In sum, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea clearly violate the UN Charter and international law, which call for respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries. These principles are vital to the peace and security of the world. Thailand therefore has to co-operate with other peace-loving countries to uphold such principles otherwise it could be interpreted that the use of force against a weaker country was justifiable


14 Kramol Tongdhammachart and others, op.cit., pp.17-23.

15 The majority (close to 60%) feel that the adverse effect is grave, while some 38% indicate a lesser degree of intensity. Ibid., p.51.
and could be seen as a dangerous precedent for the future. In addition, the conflict in Kampuchea has posed a direct threat to Thailand. It has also caused profound effects on the morale of the Thai public as well as damages and delay in the process of national development. As a result, the Kampuchean problem has been given high priority in Thai foreign policy considerations.

Judging from past Vietnam's acts of aggression, including the invasion of Kampuchea three months after Pham Van Dong's solemn pledge not to use force to interfere with internal affairs of neighbouring countries, there is no effective guarantee that the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and Laos would not pose a long-term threat, openly as well as covertly, to Thailand's security. Thailand therefore cannot remain inactive in the face of this regional situation. What Thailand has been doing is to support the Kampuchean nationalists' resistance groups, namely the CGDK, in a cause it believes to be a just one. That is to restore as rapidly as possible the conditions which will enable the Kampuchean people to live in peace and prosperity without external interference. In doing so, Thailand hopes that it would contribute to a peaceful and stable future for Southeast Asia as a whole.

The Thai government is convinced that Thailand has so far maintained a correct stance in its Kampuchean policy, since such a stance has been shared by the majority of the world for the past 6-7 years. Given its security concern and adherence to the international norm, it is likely that Thailand will not change its policy towards

16 For the votes on DK credentials and ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea at the UNGA, see Appendix 2.
the Kampuchean problem, as reaffirmed by Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda when he stated in January 1985 that

Thailand will continue to support the noble endeavours of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to restore sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea in accordance with the wishes of the Kampuchean people and the world majority, for a political solution to the Kampuchean problem is an essential step towards the realisation of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.(17)

Having considered both the Australian and the Thai attitudes towards the conflict in Kampuchea, this chapter draws the Thai perception of Australia's Indochina policy since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

In general, it could be said that Australian policy towards the Kampuchean problem has been in close accord with that of ASEAN, especially during the first two years after Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. From the beginning, Australia has shared ASEAN's opposition to Hanoi's action. The suspension of aid program to Vietnam was a major reaction taken by the LCP government to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Between 1979 and 1980, Australia maintained its recognition of the DK regime and also co-sponsored the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea which basically called for a Vietnamese withdrawal from that country and an act of self-determination by the Kampuchean people. Certainly, such Australian policy had been welcomed by the ASEAN countries and was seen as a positive contribution towards harmony in Australian-ASEAN relations.

From 1981, however, Australian policy has significantly changed. In February 1981, the LCP government announced its withdrawal of recognition from DK. It also refused to give recognition to the CGDK. Subsequently, when the ALP came to power in 1983, it raised the question of resuming economic or development aid to Vietnam. Unlike the LCP, the ALP government has decided not to co-sponsor the ASEAN resolution. These Australian initiatives clearly upset ASEAN and caused disturbance in the relationship between ASEAN and Australia. They also caused concerns among the ASEAN states. An article of the Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies, entitled "Australia and ASEAN : Down the Road of Disengagements?"
stated that "Australia's present policy tack does more than do no good in terms of contributing to a peaceful and viable political resolution of the Kampuchean question. It does positive harm; and directly undermines the efforts of the ASEAN states towards this end. It contributes to the strengthening of the hand of the hardliners in Hanoi. It contributes to the Vietnamese strategy of divide and rule". The article also suggested that "there are today perceptions in the ASEAN countries of a reduction in the level of Australian psychological engagement in the area, a reduction of Australian interest in the ASEAN countries". It cited Australia's position on the Kampuchean issue as one factor in what it saw as "...the turning away from ASEAN and a downgrading of the Australian-ASEAN relationship". To demonstrate its displeasure of the Australian moves, ASEAN postponed its 1983 annual Ministerial Meeting with Australia.

Among recent Australian policy initiatives, it could be said that the ALP proposed policy of resuming economic aid to Vietnam caused greatest concern to Thailand since it would have far-reaching implications and adverse effects on the security of Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. To many Australians, the resumption of development aid would be a step towards encouraging Hanoi to lessen its dependence on Moscow. But to many Thais, Australian aid is of little material significance to the Vietnamese and it would not wean Vietnam from totally depending on the Soviet Union. It could be argued

1 Cited in Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities, p.50.
2 Ibid, p.51.
3 Haxley, op.cit., p.39.
that the ALP's assumption on its policy of resuming aid is not borne out by experience. The thousands of millions of dollars given in credits by the West to Poland led to no loosening of the Warsaw Pact.

As already mentioned in the latter part of chapter 2 (page 42), Mr. Hawke reportedly said that he saw no merit for ASEAN, the United States, or Australia in a situation which left the Soviet Union as Vietnam's only ally. Here lies the misapprehension of the ALP government. Given historical, ideological, and strategic considerations, the Soviet Union is not an accidental ally for Vietnam but an indispensable one since no other power is likely to back it against China. According to Dr. Buszynski of the National University of Singapore, ASEAN countries tend to reject the notion that Vietnam's attitude towards the Soviet Union could be influenced by grants of aid. He sees the Vietnamese-Soviet alliance as a factor which is independent from external influence as long as the Sino-Vietnamese dispute continues unabated. It should be reminded that it is not the rest of international community that chose to leave Moscow as Hanoi's only ally. But it has been all along Vietnam's own preference to have the Soviet Union as its only collaborator since well before it invaded into Kampuchea at the end of 1978.

It is also argued that the priorities of the Vietnamese government are towards the needs of its military machine, not for

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4 Coral Bell, "The Hawke Government and Australian Foreign Policy", a seminar paper. (Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, 3 November 1983) p.7.

5 Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities, p.50.
the needs and welfare of its people or for the development of the nation. In addition, Hanoi, faced with its own political and diplomatic failures in Kampuchea, has chosen to pursue its goals militarily without heed for the integrity of other nations or the suffering of innocents caught in the crossfire. Given this argument, a resumption of Australian aid to Vietnam would be unlikely to have any effect on Vietnamese policy except to enhance Vietnam's military capability and encourage its aggressive behaviour, hence prolonging the conflict in Kampuchea.

Taking all these views, it is hard to imagine that a resumption of aid by Australia alone could wean Vietnam from the Soviet Union. Instead, it would give a wrong signal to Vietnam. According to Thailand's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Bhirabhongse Kasemsri, the Vietnamese have refused to discuss the invasion with their neighbours, and the granting of Australian assistance would let them think they are gaining ground by their stance of no negotiation.

In addition, it should be asked whether the Vietnamese deserve any aid from Canberra. The answer should be "no" since by illegally occupying another country for over six years, Hanoi not only violates the universally accepted principles of international law, but also pronounces itself as a criminal detested by the world community. A resumption of aid to Vietnam would only lead to the conclusion that Australia condones the Vietnamese aggression. It would also set a precedent that if any country chooses to start an unjust war, it need

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6 This argument was made by David MacGibbon, a Queensland State senator for the opposition Liberal Party, see Asiaweek, 13 July 1984, p.78.

7 Cited in Australia, 17 March 1983.
not worry about the consequent economic difficulties back home as the so-called "humanitarian aid" will always come to its request.

It is argued that a resumption of aid to Vietnam under present circumstances would obstruct and undermine the common efforts and progress so far successfully gained through the adoption of the ICK (8) declaration and UN resolutions. Moreover, aid will allow Vietnam to divert its resources to its military activities and its occupation of Kampuchea. Although Thailand has also worried about Hanoi's increased dependence on Moscow, since Vietnam shows no intention to reach political and peaceful settlement in Kampuchea, Thailand has strongly opposed to the resumption of any Australian aid to Vietnam and regarded it as premature for it would harm the prospects of peace in the region.

Facing strong opposition not only from Thailand but also from other ASEAN countries as well as China, the United States and Japan, the Hawke government decided to put off giving aid to Vietnam until Vietnam withdraws its troops from Kampuchea. Prime Minister Hawke also confirmed to his ASEAN counterparts that Australia will not take any further action on giving aid without having close consultation with ASEAN.

Besides the aid issue, Australian decision to withdraw recognition from the DK regime also caused serious concern to ASEAN. Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Rajaratnam, criticised Australian policy on derecognition as one which "will certainly damage the foreign-policy interests of Australia, seriously question its credentials as a reliable ally of those who have taken up the Soviet

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8 For the texts of the ICK declaration and UN resolutions, see Appendix 3 and 4 respectively.
challenge in Southeast Asia and bring comfort to the Vietnamese”.

And at the time of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in June 1981, the Philippines Foreign Minister described Australia as being "recalcitrant" on the issue. Reservations were also reported to have been expressed by U.S. and Chinese officials. As to Thailand, Australian derecognition of DK could be interpreted as endorsing Vietnam's action in Kampuchea. This would not assist ASEAN's aim for a political settlement to the Kampuchean conflict.

It is clear that abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge is the cause for Australia's decision not to recognise the CGDK. The Thais indeed share Australian view about the Khmer Rouge. Thailand also suffered from their atrocities and does not want them to return to power. However, one could also argue that the question of Pol Pot is not the question for outsider to decide. It is for the Kampuchean people to decide themselves, after the Vietnamese leave their country. Moreover, the Thais, in common with other Khmer nationalists, believe that what is at issue today is not the Khmer Rouge, but the Vietnamese occupation and Kampuchean independence.

Thailand views the CGDK as Khmer nationalist groups which have strongly resisted the Vietnamese occupation of their country. Therefore, it deserves to be supported. As the ICK declaration emphasised, Kampuchea, like all other countries, has the right to be independent and sovereign, free from any external threat of armed aggression, free

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9 Canberra Times, 1 June 1981.
10 Frost, op.cit., p.32.
to pursue its own development and a better life for its people in an environment of peace, stability and full respect for human rights.

In early August 1982, Thailand's Foreign Minister, Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, said in an interview with Australian journalist Peter Hastings that Australia's refusal to recognise the DK coalition government was a "strong disappointment" to ASEAN. He added that

I am aware that your government does have a domestic issue over Pol Pot. But the coalition is not Pol Pot...
What we ask of Australia is that even if it will not recognise the coalition politically then it at least support Sihanouk and Son Sann forces with food, medicine and supplies".(12)

Support for the two nationalist, non-communist factions would strengthen them vis-a-vis the Khmer Rouge and could also prevent the Khmer Rouge from regaining power.

The ALP government's decision not to continue to co-sponsor the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea at the United Nations since 1983 has not been welcomed by Thailand, as well as other members of ASEAN. It is appreciated that Australia took part in the ICK. Together at the UNGA, Australia and ASEAN have refused to recognise the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea as a fait accompli. Both Australia and ASEAN have also pushed for a comprehensive political solution for Kampuchea. This is why ASEAN was so very disappointed when Australia did not join it in co-sponsoring the resolution on Kampuchea at the UNGA.

Finally, it should be noted that the maintenance of the coalition of states ranged against Vietnam is crucial for ASEAN's

12 Cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 10 August 1982.
strategy. That is why there is strong resentment against any breaking of the ranks on Australia's part. Thailand always welcomes any move to bring about a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. Australia's recent moves, however, affect Thailand and ASEAN. They help prolong the Kampuchean problem because Vietnam may think it can exploit the differences between ASEAN and ASEAN's friends. Dr. Khien Theeravit summarised well the Thai perception of recent Australian initiatives when he wrote:

The move on the part of the Australian Labor Government to change its policy towards Southeast Asia has caused anxieties among ASEAN governments' leaders. They have valued highly Australian support; they could understand the Australian government's position with regard to the non-recognition of the "Pol Pot Government", but they would never forgive Australia if this country were tilted towards Vietnam vis-a-vis ASEAN.(13)

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13 Khien Theeravit, "Australia and ASEAN", p.6.
PART 3

On Solution
Since the eruption of the Kampuchean problem in late 1978, the international community and the government of DK have tried to end the conflict in Kampuchea in a peaceful manner and within the institutional framework of the United Nations. During the past six years (1979 - 1985) most countries have given their support to the UN resolutions aimed at resolving the Kampuchean problem, proposed by Thailand and other members of ASEAN.

In its renewed efforts to seek a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem, ASEAN issued in September 1983 an appeal for the independence of Kampuchea. The Appeal stressed that the total withdrawal of foreign forces, the exercise of self-determination and national reconciliation are essential elements for the survival of an independent and sovereign Kampuchea.

It was in this appeal that ASEAN responded to the declared intention of Vietnam to conduct partial troop withdrawals by proposing that such withdrawal should take place on a territorial basis and could begin with withdrawal from the Thai-Kampuchean border. Vietnam claimed that partial withdrawals were annually undertaken. ASEAN and the international community in general discounted it as mere troop rotations. The Phnom Penh communique of August 1985 stated that Vietnam would totally withdraw its troops by 1990. But "in case these withdrawals are taken advantage of to undermine the peace and security of Kampuchea,

1 For the full text of the ASEAN Joint Appeal, see Appendix 5.
the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will consult each other and take appropriate measures”.

"The language is clever", commented Prince Sihanouk, "But does it really bring anything new? Total withdrawal by 1990? May be because by then there will be so many Vietnamese in the Heng Samrin army or just living in Kampuchea that Vietnam will be able to withdraw, leaving behind the Vietnamese...” (3)

So far, despite the fact that many solutions were proposed to settle the problem, the conflict in Kampuchea still continues. This is simply because such solutions did not gain unanimous acceptance by the parties involved in the Kampuchean conflict, namely ASEAN and Vietnam. While ASEAN maintains that the problem in Kampuchea should be solved peacefully through a negotiated political settlement and that the most important factors to be considered in any resolution are the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the right to self-determination of the Kampuchea people, Vietnam, on the contrary, chooses to solve the problem through military means and it maintains that it will completely withdraw its troops from Kampuchea only after the Khmer Rouge has been eliminated. Hanoi also talks about self-determination for the Kampuchean people but with the exclusion of the "Pol Pot gang". Moreover, the Vietnamese proposal has called for the establishment of a zone of peace along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

2 For the full text of the 1985 Phnom Penh communique, see Appendix 6.

3 Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem: 1979 - 1985 (Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich Press, 1985) P.VII.
ASEAN, and Thailand in particular, cannot accept such a Vietnamese condition with regard to the elimination of "Pol Pot and his gang" since it would imply that ASEAN chooses to ignore the principle of self-determination. The official Thai view has held that the Pol Pot issue has to be settled by the Kampucheans through a free and open general election. Outsiders have no right to pre-determine who should or should not be included in the Kampuchean government.

The Vietnamese demand for the so called safety zone along Thai-Kampuchean border is also unacceptable to Thailand. It is an infringement on the sovereignty of Thailand who is no party to the conflict and has no quarrel with Kampuchea. Thai troops always have legitimate right to guard their frontier, while Vietnam have no right to station its troops in Kampuchea.

One can see that Vietnam's proposals have ignored the root cause of the problem which is the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. Hanoi has always tried to shift world attention to other issues, i.e. the problem of the Khmer Rouge and the so-called "Chinese threat".

Although the ICK framework provides a forum for negotiation in which all concerned nations and parties could participate, including Heng Samrin, given differences in proposals between ASEAN on the one hand and Vietnam on the other, negotiations between these two sides have not materialized.

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4 Institute of Asian Studies, Thailand's Policy towards the Vietnam-Kampuchean Conflict, p.35.

5 For the comparison between ASEAN and Indochinese proposals towards the Kampuchean problem, see Documents on the Kampuchean Problem: 1979-1985, pp.1-72.
ASEAN is convinced that to arrive at a peaceful and political settlement of the Kampuchean question, serious and meaningful negotiations are necessary. In continued efforts to break the deadlock in Kampuchea, ASEAN therefore presented "proximity talks" proposal to Vietnam in July 1985, calling Vietnam to enter into indirect talks with the CGDK for the purpose of discussing the basic elements of a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Kampuchean problem. The reason why ASEAN made the proposal is logical. As Vietnam is the aggressor and Kampuchea is the victim, the two sides should meet because they are directly involved in the conflict. The proposal was fully endorsed by the CGDK. Unfortunately, it was questioned by the Vietnamese. The Communique of the Eleventh Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Indochinese states on 16 August 1985 states that

After having seriously studied the proposal made by the ASEAN states regarding direct or indirect talks with a view to reaching a settlement of the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the "Kampuchean problem", the conference holds that it is important to know who would be the interlocutors who can do so and that this question can be discussed between the ASEAN States and those of Indochina.(7)

The present situation in Kampuchea is one of the stalemate. It is often said that the conflict over Kampuchea is "endless"; that there is no solution. Is this really true? According to Prince Sihanouk there is no solution as long as there are preconditions. But according to Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, there is a solution. In their

6 For detail the ASEAN proximity talks proposal, see Appendix 7.

7 See Communiqué of the Eleventh Conference of the Foreign Minister of the Indochinese states on 16 August 1985 (Appendix 6).

8 Quoted in Documents on the Kampuchean Problem : 1979-1985, p.VIII.
article on "Why the Kampuchean fighting drags on", they suggested that

A realistic settlement of the Kampuchean conflict must recognise the strategic interests of the Vietnamese, as well as the Thais. The best Thailand and the West can expect is to negotiate the withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Kampuchea. In exchange for this, they will have to recognise the PRK and stop supporting Pol Pot's attempts to return to power. (9)

In the present circumstances, it is hard to see the Thai government accept this solution. For one thing, the recognition of the PRK will affect the credibility of the country as well as the present Thai leadership. For another, it would bring Thailand into conflict with China. In addition, the Thai government believes that time is on its side and not on Vietnam's. It also believes that Vietnam will withdraw its troops from Kampuchea only under pressure. As a result, it is likely that the Thai government will not change its stance on the Kampuchean issue until the Vietnamese show their willingness to solve the problem by political means.

Another solution which is more possible is that there should be a phased withdrawal of Vietnam's troops from Kampuchea and a substantial reduction of Chinese troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border. It is assumed that when the process of troop withdrawal was actually under way China could begin to normalize its relations with Vietnam and therefore end the so-called Chinese threat. This would bring about an immediate reduction of tension and so provide opportunities


10 Sarasin Viraphol, op.cit., p.28.
for concerted efforts to find solutions leading to lasting settlements.

The Soviet role is also of great importance for the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. It is evident that the Soviet Union has supported Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by giving economic assistance and military aid to Hanoi. It is believed that without Soviet assistance, Vietnam can not maintain its soldiers in Kampuchea. Therefore an end of the Soviet support would force Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea and hence end the conflict in that country.

Thus, superpowers' willingness to see an end to the conflict in Kampuchea is the most important prerequisite to any workable solutions to the Kampuchean problem. An end of Soviet support to the Vietnamese occupation in Kampuchea and a guarantee of Vietnamese security by the United States and China would put Vietnam in a position to seriously consider withdrawing from Kampuchea.
APPENDIX I

JOINT STATEMENT
SPECIAL MEETING OF ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE CURRENT
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN REGION


Determined to demonstrate the solidarity and cohesiveness of ASEAN in the face of the current threat to peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region, and recalling the Vietnamese pledge to ASEAN member countries to scrupulously respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to cooperate in the maintenance and strengthening of peace and stability in the region, the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN Member Countries met in Bangkok on 12–13 January 1979 and agreed on the following:

1. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the Statement issued in Jakarta on 9 January 1979 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the Escalation of the Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

2. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea.

3. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their rights of self-determination.

4. Towards this end, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory.

5. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed the decision of the United Nations Security Council to consider without delay the situation in Indochina, and strongly urged the Council to take the necessary and appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the area.
**APPENDIX 2**

**VOTING RECORDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

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**Yes (Y)**
- 71 74 79 90
- 91 97 100 105 105 110

**No (N)**
- 35 35 36 29
- 21 23 25 23 23 22

**Abstain (A)**
- 34 32 30 26
- 29 22 19 20 11 18

**Non-participation NP**
- 11 12 10 12
- 9 11 12 9 19 8

† name changed to Burkina Faso in 1984
APPENDIX 3

ICK-DECLARATION ON KAMPUCHEA

Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and to General Assembly resolution 35/6, the United Nations convened the International Conference on Kampuchea at its Headquarters in New York, from 13th-17th July 1981, with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchea problem.

2. The Conference reaffirms the rights of all States to the inviolability of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and stresses their obligation to respect those rights of their neighbours. The Conference also reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion and coercion.

3. The Conference expresses its concern that the situation in Kampuchea has resulted from the violation of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in international relations.

4. The Conference takes note of the serious International consequence that have arisen out of the situation in Kampuchea. In particular, the Conference notes with grave concern the escalation of tension in Southeast Asia and major power involvement as a result of this situation.

5. The Conference also takes note of the serious problem of refugees which has resulted from the situation in Kampuchea and is convinced that a political solution to the conflict will be necessary for the long-term solution of the refugee problem.

6. The Conference stresses its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting solution to the Kampuchea problem.

7. The Conference regrets that foreign armed-intervention continues and that the foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus making it impossible for the Kampuchean people to express their will in free elections.

8. The Conference is further convinced that a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict is vital to the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia.

9. The Conference emphasizes that Kampuchea, like all other countries, has the right to be independent and sovereign, free from any external threat of armed aggression, free to pursue its own development and a better life for its people in an environment of peace, stability and full respect for human rights.

10. With a view to reaching a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, the Conference calls for negotiations on, inter alia the following elements:

   (a) An agreement on ceasefire by all parties to the conflict in Kampuchea and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible, under the supervision and verification of a United Nations peace-keeping force observer group;
   (b) Appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections, or intimidate or coerce the population in the electoral process; such arrangement should also ensure that they will respect of the free elections;
   (c) Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free elections, following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country and before the establishment of a new government resulting from those elections;
   (d) The holding of free elections under United Nations supervision which will allow the Kampuchean people to exercise their right to self-determination and elect a government of their own choice; all Kampucheans will have the right to participate in the elections.
11. The Conference appreciates the legitimate security concerns of all States of the region and, therefore, deems it essential for Kampuchea to remain non-aligned and neutral and the elected government of Kampuchea to declare that Kampuchea will not pose a threat to or be use against the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States especially those sharing a common border with Kampuchea.

12. The Conference also deems it essential for the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; all States of Southeast Asia as well as other States concerned to declare, in conjunction with paragraph 11 above, that:

(a) They will respect and observe in every way, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea and recognize its borders as inviolable;
(b) They will refrain from all forms of interference direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;
(c) They will not bring Kampuchea into any military alliance or other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with its declaration under paragraph 11 nor invite or encourage it to enter into any alliance or to conclude any such agreement;
(d) They will refrain from introducing into Kampuchea foreign troops or military personnel and not establish any military bases in Kampuchea;
(e) They will not use the territory of any country, including their own; for interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;
(f) They will not pose a threat to the security of Kampuchea or endanger its survival as a sovereign nation.

13. The Conference expresses the hope that following the peaceful resolution of the Kampuchea conflict, an international committee will be established to consider programmes of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction its economy and for the economic and social development of all States of the region.

14. The Conference notes the absence of Vietnam and of other states and urges them to attend the future sessions of the Conference.

15. The Conference expresses the hope that Vietnam will participate in the negotiating process which can lead to a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem and to the restoration of peace and stability to the region of Southeast Asia. This will enable all the countries of the region to devote themselves to the task of economic and social development, to engage in confidence-building and to promote regional cooperation in all fields of endeavour, thus heralding a new era of peace, concord and amity in Southeast Asia.

New York, 17 July 1981
APPENDIX 4

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
34/22. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

The General Assembly,

Noting with great concern that the armed conflict in Kampuchea has escalated and is seriously threatening the peace and stability of South-East Asia,

Deeply regretting the armed intervention by outside forces in the internal affairs of Kampuchea,

Gravely alarmed that the present conflict may spill over to neighbouring countries and increase the danger of further involvement by outside Powers,

Deeply distressed by the widespread hardship and deprivation and the large-scale famine being suffered by the people of Kampuchea,

Seriously disturbed that these developments have resulted in a continuing large exodus of people from Kampuchea to neighbouring countries, thereby causing them severe problems,

Noting with deep appreciation the roles played by the United Nations and other national and international humanitarian organizations in rendering relief assistance to the civilian population of Kampuchea, and the initiative of the Secretary-General in convening the Pledging Conference for Emergency Humanitarian Relief to the People of Kampuchea held on 5 November 1979, as well as the pledges made by the various countries at that Conference,

Convinced that a political solution which will ensure the sovereignty and independence of Kampuchea is essential for bringing about durable peace and stability in the region,

Reaffirming the right of all people to determine their own future free from outside interference,

Emphasizing that all States shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any State, and strictly adhere to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States,

1. Strongly appeals to all States and national and international humanitarian organizations to render, on an urgent and non-discriminatory basis, humanitarian relief to the civilian population of Kampuchea, including those who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries;

2. Calls upon all States to take urgent measures to resettle from these countries the displaced Kampucheans;

3. Welcomes the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General to co-ordinate relief assistance and to ensure its distribution to those for whom it is intended;

4. Urges all parties to the conflict to co-operate in every possible way to facilitate the humanitarian relief efforts;

5. Calls upon all parties to the conflict to observe fully the fundamental principles of human rights;

6. Further calls upon all parties to the conflict to cease all hostilities forthwith;

7. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea and calls upon all States to refrain from all acts or threats of aggression and all forms of interference in the internal affairs of States in South-East Asia;

8. Urges all parties to the conflict to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

9. Appeals to all States to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea in order to enable its people to decide their own future and destiny free from outside interference, subversion
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or coercion, and to respect scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Kam­puchea;

10. **Resolves** that the people of Kampuchea should be enabled to choose democratically their own government, without outside interference, subversion or coercion;

11. **Requests** the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem;

12. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to explore the possibility of holding an international conference on Kampuchea as one of the means for implementing the present resolution;

13. **Further requests** the Secretary-General to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

14. **Decides** to include the item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session.

Date: 14 November 1979

Vote: 91–21–29 (recorded)
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

The General Assembly
Recalling its resolution 34/22 of 14 November 1979,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/22,

Deeply regretting that the foreign armed intervention continues and the foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus seriously threatening international peace and security,

Gravely concerned that the hostilities in Kampuchea have not ceased, but have on several occasions spilled over into Thailand, thus violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country,

Greatly concerned that the deployment of more foreign troops and weapons in Kampuchea near the Thai Kampuchean border has heightened tension in the region,

Recalling the conclusions reached at the Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance and Relief to the Kampuchean People, held at Geneva on 26 and 27 May 1980, as contained in the report of the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly,

Recognizing that the assistance extended by the international community has reduced the widespread food shortages and health problems of the Kampuchean people but that, despite such assistance, hunger and disease continue to afflict them,

Gravely disturbed that the continued fighting in Kampuchea has forced large numbers of Kampucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean border in search of food and safety, and that actions by outside forces in Kampuchea to seal the border have disrupted the cross-border flow of international relief aid,

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable right of the Kampuchean people who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries to return safely to their homeland,

Emphasizing further that no effective solution to the humanitarian problems can be achieved without a just and lasting political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,

Convinced that, to bring about durable peace and stability in South-East Asia, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem which will ensure the sovereignty and independence of Kampuchea and the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future free from outside interference,

Convinced further that, after the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question through peaceful means, the countries of the South-East Asian region could pursue efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia so as to lessen international tensions and to achieve lasting peace in the region,

Reaffirming the need for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse to the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 34/22 and calls for its implementation;

2. Decides, taking into account paragraph 12 of resolution 34/22, to convene early in 1981 an international conference on Kampuchea which should involve the participation of all conflicting parties in Kampuchea and others concerned, with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem;

3. Decides further that the conference should negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on, inter alia:
(a) Total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea within a specific time-frame to be verified by the United Nations;

(b) Measures by the United Nations to ensure law and order and the observance of the fundamental principles of human rights in Kampuchea;

(c) Measures by the United Nations to ensure non-interference by outside Powers in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;

(d) United Nations-supervised free elections in Kampuchea;

(e) Guarantees against the introduction of any foreign forces in Kampuchea;

(f) Guarantees to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kampuchea;

(g) Guarantees that an independent and sovereign Kampuchea will not be a threat to its neighbours;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps for the convening of such a conference;

5. Calls for, pending the settlement of the conflict:

(a) The stationing of a United Nations observer team on the Thai side of the border in order to observe the situation along the border and to verify that only civilian Kampucheans obtain international relief aid;

(b) The establishment of safe areas under United Nations supervision in western Kampuchea for the uprooted civilian Kampucheans encamped near the Thai-Kampuchean border and those in Thailand who wish to return to their homeland;

6. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

7. Expresses its deep appreciation to donor countries, the United Nations and its agencies and other national and international humanitarian organizations which have rendered relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to them to continue on an urgent and non-discriminatory basis such assistance to the civilian population of Kampuchea, including persons who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries;

8. Deeply appreciates the efforts of the Secretary-General in co-ordinating relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution, and requests him to strengthen such efforts so as to ensure that the assistance reaches all those for whom it is intended;

9. Calls again upon all States to provide settlement for the displaced Kampucheans who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries and who do not wish to return to their homeland;

10. Urges all parties to the conflict to co-operate fully in facilitating humanitarian relief efforts and in ensuring that the cross-border flow of international relief aid continues uninterrupted;

11. Reiterates its appeal to all parties to the conflict to observe fully the fundamental principles of human rights;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

13. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea".

Date: 22 October 1980
Vote: 97–23–22 (recorded)
36/5. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 November 1979 and 35/6 of 22 October 1980,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/6,
Welcoming the convening of the International Conference on Kampuchea, held at United Nations Headquarters from 13 to 17 July 1981, as a step forward towards a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem,
Noting the joint statement issued in Singapore on 4 September 1981 by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Mr. Son Sann and Mr. Khieu Samphan concerning their agreement, in principle to form a coalition,
Bearing in mind the Declaration on Kampuchea and resolution adopted by the Conference on 17 July 1981, as contained in the report of the Conference,
Deploring that foreign armed intervention continues and that foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in that country and seriously threatening international peace and security,
Greatly concerned that the continuing deployment of foreign forces in Kampuchea near the Thai-Kampuchean border has heightened tension in the region,
Gravely disturbed that the continued fighting and instability in Kampuchea have forced more Kampucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean border in search of food and safety,
Recognizing that the assistance extended by the international community has continued to reduce the widespread food shortages and health problems of the Kampuchean people,
Emphasizing that it is the inalienable right of the Kampuchean people who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries to return safely to their homeland,
Emphasizing further that no effective solution to the humanitarian problems can be achieved without a just and lasting political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,
Convinced that, to bring about durable peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem which will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination free from outside interference,
Convinced further that, after the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question through peaceful means, the countries of the South-East Asian region can pursue efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia so as to lessen international tensions and to achieve lasting peace the region,
Reaffirming the need for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse to the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22 and 35/6 and calls for their full implementation;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting resolution to the Kampuchean problem;
3. Approves the report of the International Conference on Kampuchea and adopts:

(a) The Declaration on Kampuchea, which includes four elements of negotiations for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem;

(b) Resolution in which the Conference, inter alia, established the Ad Hoc Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with, to assist and to provide the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee with the necessary facilities to carry out their functions;

5. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to convene during regular sessions of the General Assembly in order to carry out its tasks;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to undertake a preliminary study of the possible future role of the United Nations, taking into account the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and the elements of negotiations for comprehensive political settlement as set out in paragraph 10 of the Declaration on Kampuchea;

7. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for taking appropriate steps in convening the Conference;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement;

9. Decides to reconvene the Conference at an appropriate time in accordance with Conference resolution;

10. Urges all States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference;

11. Requests the Conference to report to the General Assembly on its future sessions;

12. Expresses its deep appreciation to donor countries, the United Nations and its agencies and other national and international humanitarian organizations which have rendered relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to them to continue to assist Kampucheans who are still in need, especially those along the Thai-Kampuchean border and in the holding centres in Thailand;

13. Deeply appreciates the efforts of the Secretary-General in co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution, and requests him to continue such efforts as are necessary to deal with the situation;

14. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

15. Expresses the hope that, following a comprehensive political solution, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all States of the region;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

17. Declares to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea".

Date: 21 October 1981
Vote: 100–25–19 (recorded)
37/6. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 November 1979, 35/6 of 22 October 1980 and 36/5 of 21 October 1981,

Further recalling the declaration on Kampuchea and resolution adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea, held at United Nations Headquarters from 13 to 17 July 1981, which offer the negotiating framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/5,

Noting the recent developments resulting in the coalition with Sandech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea,

Deploring that foreign armed intervention and occupation continue, and that foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in that country and seriously threatening international peace and security,

Greatly concerned that the continuing deployment of foreign forces in Kampuchea near the Thai-Kampuchean border has maintained tension in the region,

Gravely disturbed that the continued fighting and instability in Kampuche have forced Kampucheaans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean border in search of food and safety,

Recognizing that the assistance extended by the international community has continued to reduce the food shortages and health problems of the Kampuchean people,

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable right of the Kampuchean people who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries to return safely to their homeland,

Emphasizing further that no effective solution to the humanitarian problems can be achieved without a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,

Convinced that, to bring about durable peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem which will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination free from outside interference,

Convinced further that, after the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question through peaceful means, the countries of the South-East Asian region can pursue efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia so as to lessen international tensions and to achieve lasting peace in the region,

Reaffirming the need for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse to the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22, 35/6 and 36/5 and calls for their full implementation;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting resolution to the Kampuchean problem;

3. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the International
Conference on Kampuchea and requests that the Committee continue its work, pending the reconvening of the Conference;

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to convene when necessary and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it in its mandate;

5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the Conference at an appropriate time in accordance with Conference resolution

6. Renew its appeal to all States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference;

7. Requests the Conference to report to the General Assembly on its future sessions;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to consult with and assist the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to provide them on a regular basis with the necessary facilities to carry out their functions;

9. Expresses its appreciation once again to the Secretary-General for taking appropriate steps in following the situation closely and requests him to continue to do so and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement;

10. Expresses its deep appreciation once again to donor countries, the United Nations and its agencies and other national and international humanitarian organizations which have rendered relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to them to continue existing arrangements to assist those Kampucheans who are still in need, especially along the Thai-Kampuchean border and in the holding centres in Thailand;

11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution, and requests him to continue such efforts as are necessary;

12. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

13. Reiterates the hope that, following a comprehensive political solution, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all States in the region;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea"

Date: 28 October 1982
Vote: 105–23–20 (recorded)
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 November 1979, 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5 of 21 October 1981 and 37/6 of 28 October 1982,
Recalling further the Declaration on Kampuchea and resolution adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea, which offer the negotiating framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/6,
Noting the increasing effectiveness of the coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea,
Deploring that foreign armed intervention and occupation continue and that foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in that country and seriously threatening international peace and security,
Gravely concerned that the continued deployment of foreign forces in Kampuchea near the Thai-Kampuchean border and the renewed attack on civilians by those forces, in violation of humanitarian principles, have aggravated tension in the region,
Greatly disturbed that the continued fighting and instability in Kampuchea have forced Kampucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean border in search of food and safety,
Recognizing that the assistance extended by the international community has continued to reduce the food shortages and health problems of the Kampuchean people,
Emphasizing that it is the inalienable right of the Kampuchean people who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries to return safely to their homeland,
Emphasizing further that no effective solution to the humanitarian problems can be achieved without a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,
Seriously concerned about reported demographic changes being imposed in Kampuchea by foreign occupation forces,
Convinced that, to bring about durable peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem that will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination free from outside interference,
Convinced further that, after the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question through peaceful means, the countries of the South-East Asian region can pursue efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia so as to lessen international tensions and to achieve lasting peace in the region,
Reaffirming the need for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse to the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes,
1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22, 35/6, 36/5 and 37/6 and calls for their full implementation;
2. Reiterates its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny and the commitment by all States to non-interference
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting resolution of the Kampuchean problem;

3. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea and requests that the Committee continue its work, pending the reconvening of the Conference;

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to convene when necessary and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it in its mandate;

5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the Conference at an appropriate time in accordance with Conference resolution;

6. Renews its appeal to all States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference;

7. Requests the Conference to report to the General Assembly on its future sessions;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to consult with and assist the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to provide them on a regular basis with the necessary facilities to carry out their functions;

9. Expresses its appreciation once again to the Secretary-General for taking appropriate steps in following the situation closely and requests him to continue to do so and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement;

10. Expresses its deep appreciation once again to donor countries, the United Nations and its agencies and other national and international humanitarian organizations that have rendered relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to them to continue to provide emergency assistance to those Kampucheans who are still in need, especially along the Thai-Kampuchean border and in the holding centres in Thailand;

11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution, and requests him to intensify such efforts as are necessary;

12. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

13. Reiterates the hope that, following a comprehensive political solution, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all States in the region;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea".

Date: 27 October 1983
Vote: 105–23–19 (recorded)
39/5. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 November 1979, 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5 of 21 October 1981, 37/6 of 28 October 1982 and 38/3 of 27 October 1983,

Recalling further the Declaration on Kampuchea and resolution adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea, which offer the-negotiating framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/3,

Noting the continued effectiveness of the coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea,

Deploring that foreign armed intervention and occupation continue and that foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus causing continuing hostilities in that country and seriously threatening international peace and security,

Noting Economic and Social Council decision 1984/148 of 24 May 1984 on the right of people to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation,

Greatly disturbed that the continued fighting and instability in Kampuchea have forced an additional number of Kapucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean border in search of food and safety,

Recognizing that the assistance extended by the international community has continued to reduce the food shortages and health problems of the Kampuchean people,

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable right of the Kampuchean people who have sought refuge in neighbouring countries to return safely to their homeland,

Emphasizing further that no effective solution to the humanitarian problems can be achieved without a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,

Seriously concerned about reported demographic changes being imposed in Kampuchea by foreign occupation forces,

Convinced that, to bring about durable peace in South-East Asia and reduce the threat to international peace and security, there is an urgent need for the international community to find a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem that will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination from outside interference,

Convinced further that, after the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question through peaceful means, the countries of the South-East Asian region can pursue efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia so as to lessen international tensions and to achieve lasting peace in the region,

Reaffirming the need for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse to the threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22, 35/6, 36/5, 37/6 and 38/3 and calls for their full implementation;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and
lasting resolution of the Kampuchean problem;

3. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea and requests that the Committee continue its work, pending the reconvening of the Conference;

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee to convene when necessary and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it in its mandate;

5. Reaffirms its decision to reconvene the Conference at an appropriate time, in accordance with conference resolution

6. Renews its appeal to all States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference;

7. Requests the Conference to report to the General Assembly on its future session;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to consult with and assist the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee and to provide them on a regular basis with the necessary facilities to carry out their functions;

9. Expresses its appreciation once again to the Secretary-General for taking appropriate steps in following the situation closely and requests him to continue to do so and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement;

10. Expresses its deep appreciation once again to donor countries, the United Nations and its agencies and other national and international humanitarian organizations that have rendered relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to them to continue to provide emergency assistance to those Kampuchians who are still in need, especially along the Thai-Kampuchean border and in the holding centres in Thailand;

11. Reiterates its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution, and requests him to intensify such efforts as are necessary;

12. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia;

13. Reiterates the hope that, following a comprehensive political solution, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all States in the region;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session the item entitled “The Situation in Kampuchea”

Date: 30 October 1984
Vote: 110–22–18 (recorded)
APPENDIX 5

JOINT APPEAL MADE BY FIVE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS
WHICH WAS RELEASED IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF ALL FIVE ASEAN COUNTRIES,
on 21 September 1983, at 12.00 noon Thai local time

1. The central issue in the Kampuchean problem is the survival of the Kampuchean nation and the restoration of its independence and sovereignty. The total withdrawal of foreign forces, the exercise of self-determination and national reconciliation are essential elements for the survival of an independent and sovereign Kampuchea. The continuing foreign occupation of Kampuchea and violation of Kampuchean sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity threaten regional and international peace and security.

2. The Foreign Ministers therefore call on the international community, particularly Vietnam and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as other states concerned to join them in intensifying efforts to achieve a just solution whereby Kampuchea can emerge once again as an independent and sovereign nation in fact as well as in law.

3. In order to restore Kampuchea’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Foreign Ministers further appeal to all countries concerned to refrain from all interference, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and to respect the neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, which is essential to the legitimate security concerns of all countries in Southeast Asia.

4. Moreover, following the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, the Kampuchean people must be able to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination through internationally-supervised elections in which all Kampucheans shall participate and all political groups in Kampuchea should be encouraged to work towards the goal of national reconciliation.

5. In consonance with the ongoing international efforts, the Foreign Ministers reiterate their willingness to consult with all parties concerned regarding possible initial steps that could be taken in pursuit of a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. These steps could include the following:

A. With regard to the declared intention of Vietnam to conduct partial troop withdrawals, such partial withdrawals should take place on a territorial basis, and could begin with withdrawal from the western-most territory of Kampuchea along the Thai-Kampuchean border. These withdrawals should begin as soon as possible in phases within a definite period to be worked out as part of a comprehensive political settlement.

B. In this context, a ceasefire should be observed in these areas, which should then be constituted as safe areas for uprooted Kampuchean civilians under UNHCR auspices. In addition, Peace-Keeping Forces—observer groups should be introduced to ensure that the withdrawals have taken place and the ceasefire and safe areas are respected. International economic assistance programmes should be encouraged in these safe areas.

6. The Foreign Ministers, conscious of the plight of the Kampuchean people resulting from the ravages of war and mindful of the need for the economic reconstruction of Kampuchea and the rehabilitation of the social and cultural life of the Kampuchean people, hereby appeal to the international community to mobilise resource for a programme of assistance as part and parcel of the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. An international conference for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Kampuchea should be convened at an appropriate time.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
September 21, 1983.
Communique of the Eleventh Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Kampuchea, Laos and Viet Nam, issued at Phnom Penh on 16 August 1985

The eleventh conference of the Foreign Ministers of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was held in Phnom Penh, capital of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea on August 15th and 16th, 1985.

1. The conference is glad to note that the militant solidarity and multifaceted cooperation among the three Indochinese countries have been unceasingly consolidated and deepened with a new quality. It highly appraises the major successes registered by the three peoples of Indochina in their struggle for national defence and construction, especially the resounding victories recorded by the Kampuchean people since the beginning of this year. In view of the progress in all fields made by the Kampuchean people in the last six years, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decide that Vietnamese volunteer forces will pursue their yearly gradual withdrawals from Kampuchea and will conclude their total withdrawal by 1990. In case these withdrawals are taken advantage of to undermine the peace and security of Kampuchea, the Governments of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea and of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will consult each other and take appropriate measures.

2. The conference is pleased to note that in spite of the obstacles raised by certain reactionary circles, a general understanding has emerged whereby a genuine dialogue has to be initiated so as to solve the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the “Kampuchean problem”. The five-point position put forth by the Indochinese countries on January 18th, 1985 and which was welcomed by broad sections of public opinion in Southeast Asia and the world provides a basis for substantive dialogues aimed at attaining a political solution acceptable to the various parties.

3. After having seriously studied the proposal made by the ASEAN states regarding direct or indirect talks with a view to reaching a settlement of the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the “Kampuchean problem”, the conference holds that it is important to know who would be the interlocutors who can do so and that this question can be discussed between the ASEAN States and those of Indochina.

4. The ASEAN states have nominated Indonesia as their representative while those of Indochina have selected Vietnam to represent them. The forthcoming meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and his Vietnamese counterpart offers an adequate opportunity for a discussion of problems connected to a political solution regarding peace and stability in Southeast Asia as well as Kampuchea. This meeting will mark a new step in the process of peaceful coexistence among Southeast Asian states.

5. The conference considers Malaysia’s proposal on proximity talks to be an initiative that deserves examination. For her part, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea declares her readiness to start talks with various Khmer opposition groups or individuals in order to discuss the realization of national reconciliation on the basis of the elimination of the genocidal Pol Pol clique as well as the general elections to be held following the total withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer forces from Kampuchea.

6. The conference welcomes the humanitarian policy and the efforts of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic as well as the progress made in the cooperation between the Governments of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the United States on the search for missing Americans. It hails the initiative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the opening of high-level talks with the American side aimed at reaching a fundamental settlement of the question of M.I.A. (Missing in Actions). It is convinced that the high—level Viet Nam—U.S. talks on the question of M.I.A. and other matters of mutual interest will facilitate the restoration of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The conference highly appreciates the good will of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea who has renewed her offer to contribute to the settlement of this question, although the United States Government has not given up its hostile policy toward her.
7. The three Indochinese countries stress their principled position and their good will in their relations with the People’s Republic of China. They consider that the time has come to resume the China–Vietnam talks with a view to normalizing relations between the two countries as has been proposed by the Vietnamese side on several occasions. The restoration of relations of friendship and cooperation between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on the one hand, and China on the other, would constitute an extremely important factor to ensure peace and stability in Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole.

8. The three peoples of Indochina wish and are prepared to do their utmost to establish relations of good neighbourliness with Thailand. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea support the proposal of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to start talks at government level between Laos and Thailand to solve problems in their mutual relations in the interests of both countries and of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The conference declares that the three Indochinese countries or each of them respectively are always prepared to negotiate and to sign with Thailand a treaty based on the following principles: mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within the present borders, refusal to let one’s own territory to be used against other countries, peaceful co-existence.

9. It is the conviction of the conference that if all parties concerned engage in mutual dialogue to solve substantive problems in their mutual relations, a propitious atmosphere is bound to be created for an overall settlement to be reached, thus leading to a durable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia. An international conference will be convened in order to guarantee and supervise the implementation of the agreements. The two groups of states in Southeast Asia will agree between themselves on who will participate in this conference.

10. The conference fully supports the declaration of Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union M.S. Gorbachov on July 29th, 1985 on the unilateral suspension and the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests as well as the U.S.S-R.’s new proposal on the consolidation of peace and security in Asia.

The conference highly appraises the major role played by the Non-aligned Movement in the anti–imperialist struggle. It voices its certitude that the coming conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-aligned countries in Luanda will contribute significantly to the strengthening of solidarity and cohesion within the Non-aligned Movement and will at the same time further promote the struggle for peace, national independence and a new international economic order. The conference particularly stresses its militant solidarity with and vigorous support for the struggle for independence and freedom waged by the peoples of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Namibia, Southern Africa and all Asian, African and Latin American countries.
ASEAN has consistently worked for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. In its continuing effort to propose initiatives that could help the process of a political settlement in Kampuchea, ASEAN has consulted the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on the possibility of its entering into indirect or proximity talks with Vietnam.

The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has informed ASEAN that the CGDK is ready to enter into such talks with Vietnam for the purpose of discussing the basic elements of a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Kampuchea problem.

The proximity talks between Vietnam and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which could also be attended by representatives of Heng Samrin as part of the Vietnamese Delegation, will be exploratory in nature and on a continuing basis and will be concerned with the following basic elements of a comprehensive, political settlement:

(i) withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea
(ii) UN control and supervisory commission
(iii) national reconciliation
(iv) UN-supervised election/exercise of self-determination

ASEAN appeals to Vietnam to abandon the current policy of seeking a military solution to the Kampuchean problem. ASEAN urges Vietnam to accept the reality and strength of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea under the Presidency of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and to seek an agreement with the Coalition Government in the interest of the Kampuchean people and of the peace and stability of Southeast Asia as a whole.

ASEAN calls on Vietnam to respond positively to these proposals.
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