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Sub-thesis

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Evatt and the Manus Negotiations
THIS SUB-THESIS IS ENTIRELY THE WORK OF
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Introduction

Most histories of Australian-American relations in the period immediately after the war mention, at least in passing, the curious phenomenon of Australia attempting to bargain with the United States over the US' rights to use a base which the Americans themselves had built on Australian mandated territory in the process of beating back the Japanese from Australian shores. Manus Island, previously shrouded in obscurity, became the focus of an extended debate both in parliament and in the press over the state of Australia's relations with the USA and whether or not Dr. Evatt's 'wheeling and dealing' on the matter had contributed to a perceived deterioration in the Australian-US relationship, considered to have been so close during the war. The matter was often brought up by the Liberal and Country parties in parliament throughout the remainder of the forties and even in the fifties when they had ousted the ALP from the government benches. For in parliament it was regularly asserted to be the case that Evatt had damaged Australian-American relations by throwing the Americans out of Australian controlled territory and had squandered a golden opportunity to involve the United States in Australia's regional defence.¹

Some accounts have looked quite closely at the negotiations between Australia and the US regarding the island considering the incident a significant example of Evatt's work as Minister for External Affairs in this
crucial period of Australian history. Professor R.N. Rosecrance's book, *Australian Diplomacy and Japan: 1945-1951*, devotes a chapter to examining the facts of the case and T.R. Reese and J.G. Starke both examine the episode in some detail. The most comprehensive accounts are, however, those of John Dedman, in his 1966 article in *Australian Outlook*, and R.J. Bell in his book, *Unequal Allies*, as one might expect since the first is the account of a man who was a member of the Australian Cabinet at the time and the second (unlike previous academic accounts) is based on extensive research using original documents. As this essay will show both of these renditions are fairly accurate tellings of the story of the Manus negotiations. The need existed, however, to examine the Australian record, firstly to establish that Dedman's account was not subject to political bias, as has been hinted at, and, secondly, because the American and British records, which Bell relied on, provide an incomplete picture, if an interesting and valuable one, of the way in which the negotiations were conducted. He concluded that "the absence of confidential Australian and American documents relating to these discussions has precluded a thorough investigation of the relationship suspected to have existed between (negotiations over base rights on Manus and a Pacific regional arrangement)".

The research upon which this essay is based concentrated primarily on a series of "Top Secret" files of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) dealing with the
negotiations in question. Defence files and Prime Minister's files were also consulted, however, to corroborate the DEA files and whenever lacunae appeared in the record. Occasionally, it would appear that such lacunae derive not from the sorts of bad habits (with regard to the keeping of records) which Peter Edwards has recorded as afflicting the official documentation of the 1930's and 1940's, but from the errant policy formulation often conducted by Evatt which has been noted by Sir Paul Hasluck. In the latter case no amount of searching through other departments' files will bring to light relevant material.

What emerges from this account of the Manus negotiations are several differences from the previously published histories of the affair. Firstly, the extent to which Evatt had the full support of the Australian Services' decision-makers in his approach has never before been brought out. Secondly, Manus, for a considerable portion of the time in which Pacific bases were being discussed, was only one of many British bases scattered around the South Pacific which were being negotiated over. Consequently, although the US tried to approach Australia (and New Zealand with regard to Samoa) on a bilateral basis, the negotiations were conducted much more on a footing of their being US-British Commonwealth discussions. Indeed, Australia, New Zealand and the UK cooperated very closely on the matter and co-ordinated their responses to a large extent. The fact that Australia's policy on Pacific bases was finally adopted
by the British Commonwealth as a whole was another indication that the Commonwealth was heading (if briefly) where Evatt wanted it to go, namely in the direction of increased Dominion direction of Commonwealth affairs in the Dominion's particular area of interest. Most significantly, though, crucial negotiations which Evatt believed had swung the issue his way are here documented for the first time. Whether they are evidence of Evatt's powers of personal persuasion or of his capacity for self-delusion is an issue that is not as clear-cut as the final result might suggest.
Chapter 1: Developments in the Pacific in the Closing Years of the War

The defeat of Japan in the Second World War came about by means of a two-stage operation which involved conducting a "low-pressure war" in the South-West Pacific until the defeat of Hitler had been secured in Europe followed by a two-prong thrust towards the Philippines from the south and towards Japan itself from the east. During the first phase which lasted until the end of 1943, the USA established and maintained bases on many islands in the South-West Pacific region. Most of these were on islands which were at that time the territory of members of the British Commonwealth or France. As the war drew to a close and the "rolling back" of the Japanese proved so costly in human lives concern over the post-war fate of these bases and of those established en route to the Philippines or Japan grew both in the US and in the British Commonwealth. In particular, the issue of sovereignty over the islands upon which bases had been established was in question not only because of the prolonged "occupation" by the American troops but also because the US had in August, 1939, laid claim to a number of Pacific islands "including some previously assumed to be under British sovereignty and some lying within the jurisdiction of New Zealand". Moreover, pressure developed from 1943 on within the US Congress and in the American press for the US to be recompensed for the spent "blood of American boys" by the gift of sovereignty.
The more aggressive of these went so far as suggesting not giving them back. While the British considered briefly at the end of 1943 the notion of handing over a particular island, either Betio or Tarawa, (a suggestion which the Australians strongly disapproved of as setting a bad example for the cession of British territory)³ the surrender of all those islands upon which the US had built bases was never a possibility.

Australians followed these developments with some concern not only because of anxiety over the possible diminution of Commonwealth power in the Pacific but also because from early 1944 she had a more direct interest in the issues at stake. For in February 1944, as part of General MacArthur's thrust north to retake the Philippines, Manus Island, one of the Admiralty group to the north-east of Papua-New Guinea, had been recaptured from the Japanese. A huge naval base was subsequently established in the island's vast natural harbour. Most importantly, Manus lay within the limits of Australia's PNG mandate. The post-war fate of mandated territory was yet to be determined but the island was still considered to be under Australian control (although this entailed only a token administrative presence on the island during the war) and any bid for its sovereignty by the US would have to be carefully considered. Thus the Australian Department of External Affairs monitored closely the attitudes towards Pacific bases developing in the US.
It was evident from quite early on in the Pacific War that the bases would be a matter of contention. Negotiations were conducted in March 1943 between the representatives of the governments of the UK, the US and free France in the New Hebrides regarding the implications for post-war sovereignty over the New Hebrides of the base constructed there by the US Navy. The representatives of all those governments arrived at a draft agreement which laid down the principles that "the establishment of bases by the United States does not affect the sovereignty of the New Hebrides" and that "the ownership of any immovable installations made will be relinquished by the expiration of this agreement". The agreement was never formally entered into, however, and this indicated that the US State Department was really unwilling to concede any such principle and anxious to avoid establishing any precedents which might prejudice their claims at the end of the war. The UK attitude on the subject was one of emphatic opposition to US 'expansion' in the Pacific, as the following extract from a UK Air Ministry Memorandum of September, 1943, indicates:

1. Certain circles in the United States consider that United States expenditure on the provision of war facilities or airfields in territory under United Kingdom administration or control confers on the United States Government prescriptive right to post-war user. The State Department has tentatively suggested that airfields jointly provided should be regarded as international air ports for post-war civil air transport purposes.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept these claims as valid. Their policy as stated by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air in the House of Commons (Hansard 17th
December, 1942, column 2153) is that "all bets are off at the end of the war".\(^5\)

By the end of the war, though, after several years of something like occupation the Americans were not going to be so easy to shift.

At the same time as American expansionist aspirations were being aired in the US, Australian officials were noting the opportunity that the redistribution of power certain to follow the war might provide for Australia to expand its role in the Pacific. W.D. Forsyth, the Australian official who monitored the Anglo-American debate on colonialism and trusteeship during the war,\(^6\) put before Evatt, in July, 1943, a paper entitled "Pacific Islands - Current Position and Future Possibilities". This paper, based on discussions with senior US service representatives in Melbourne indicated that certain sections of the US services favoured an Australian administration rather than a British one in the Solomon Islands after the war.\(^7\) Also, at the next Pacific War Council meeting held after the Cairo Conference, at which Roosevelt was no doubt attempting to assuage his Allies' annoyance over their exclusion from that conference, the American President informed Owen Dixon, Australia's representative on the Council, of his interest in having Australia and New Zealand replace France as the administrators of New Caledonia.\(^8\) Thus when Evatt convened his 'antipodean Cairo' from the 17th to the 21st of January, 1944,\(^9\) in Canberra to discuss Pacific post-war issues, the possibility of an increased Australian role in the Pacific
was no doubt uppermost in his mind. Indeed New Zealand were hard put to it to prevent him from including in the Anzac Pact a statement about the possible transfer to Australia and New Zealand of the administration of the Solomons and the British share of the New Hebrides.¹⁰

It seems strange then, that, given evidence of the US's support for an increased Australian role in the Pacific, Evatt should push through an international treaty, the "inner significance" of which was to keep US expansion North of the Equator.¹¹ The treaty asserted the necessity of consulting Australia and New Zealand over any territorial readjustments in the Pacific [Article 26] and the intention of the two governments to establish a "regional zone of defence in the South West and South Pacific areas" [Article 13]. More overtly, the document sought to limit US influence in the area by stating that bases would not "afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities" [Article 16]. Evatt's concern here was to preserve British sovereignty and power in the South-West Pacific and had no specific reference to Manus which was still in Japanese hands. The question arises as to why Evatt did not let the British fight their own battles over sovereignty in the Pacific and avoid affronting the Americans who at that time seemed well disposed towards aiding Australian aims for greater involvement in the administration of the Pacific. As we shall see, at this time Evatt still very much identified Australia's post-war prospects of power with
those of the British Commonwealth as a whole.

There is no doubt that the State Department did not take kindly to Dr. Evatt's declaration, yet the official response was not particularly sharp. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, confined himself to rejecting Australia's call for a conference of all interested parties on the problems of the Pacific in the post-war environment [Article 34] on the grounds that it was too early to consider the issues. He did, however, invite Curtin to the United States to discuss the issues on a bilateral basis with he and the President. Evatt's reply, while accepting the offer (on Curtin's behalf), made it clear that Australia felt it should have some say in whether or not she increased her responsibilities in the Pacific and that the most effective way for her to be heard would be at such a conference of all parties with territory in the South-West Pacific. Evatt, a little tactlessly, pointed out that such a conference would not be premature because it was evident from the pronouncements being made by the US about the Pacific's future, that decisions were being taken in which Australia should be involved.

The answer to why Evatt should choose to try and chase the US out of the South-West Pacific just at a point when cultivation of US support might have seemed to be more in Australia's interest lies in Evatt's developing conception of the new role he perceived for the Dominions in the post-war world. In March, 1946, in the House of
Representatives, Evatt would outline the function which he considered that the Dominions should perform in the modern British Commonwealth:

...an entirely new concept in British Commonwealth cooperation is now emerging. This concept tends to reconcile full Dominion autonomy with full British Commonwealth co-operation. The same principle involves the possibility of a Dominion's acting in certain purposes on behalf of the other members of the British Commonwealth, including the United Kingdom itself. This is evidence that the machinery of co-operation between nations of the British Commonwealth has now reached a stage where a common policy can be carried out through a chosen Dominion instrumentality in an area or relation to a subject matter, which is of primary concern to that Dominion. 14

Although this represents the mature enunciation of Evatt's views on the role Australia could play in the British Commonwealth, Evatt was stressing throughout the war the equal status of all members of the Commonwealth and as early as May, 1943, was pointing to the existence of a "new recognition of the need of complete cooperation among the British Commonwealth of Nations, with flexible machinery to ensure such co-operation, especially in matters of defence". 15 Evatt's conception of "flexible machinery" in 1944 and 1945 may even have stretched to Australian leadership of a South-West Pacific regional defence arrangement relying substantially on British forces, although it was unlikely that British notions would ever have proved so elastic. Certainly it is difficult to conceive of how Australia and New Zealand could have defended the South-West Pacific region proposed as the basis of a defence pact in Article 13 of the Anzac Pact relying
solely upon their own forces. The aspirations so brazenly announced in the Anzac Pact were, then, as much statements of what Australia hoped to be able to do on behalf of the British Commonwealth as what she would do on her own.

It is thus ironic that Evatt, so often labelled with an anti-British tag because of his determination that Australia should be prominent in her own right, was nevertheless powerfully aware, during the war, of the opportunities which membership of the British Commonwealth provided for the advancement of Australia's interests. With regard to the US bases in the Pacific it was in Australia's interests to guard jealously British sovereignty over those islands which Evatt planned to use as the basis for the post-war defence agreement he hoped to negotiate. Restricting American influence South of the Equator was a corollary of this plan in that too strong a US presence would spoil the logic of Australian leadership in the South-West Pacific.

Throughout 1944, however, Evatt softened his tone with the US, encouraging cooperation with the United States in the Pacific. It would appear that Evatt as well as Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, were more complacent about the US presence in the Pacific as they considered the ANZAC Pact to have been successful in chasing the US out of the South-West Pacific. They agreed at the November, 1944, ministerial talks in Wellington that "Cordell Hull had dismissed any notion of changes in the
sovereignty or system of control in the Pacific Islands without general consultation". Moreover, at the San Francisco conference of April, 1945, Evatt had worked to ensure that his concept of an Australian-based South-West Pacific pact would be compatible with the international security organisation to be established after the war. Thus, in mid-1945, Evatt was amenable to the consolidation of US power in the Northern Pacific as the US advanced toward Japan as he did not see it as incompatible with continued British and particularly Australian power south of the equator. He did not foresee the extent to which American nationalism would reveal itself in certain sections of the US administration in the latter half of 1945.
August, 1945, marked the beginning of a new phase in the enunciation of US aspirations for control of the post-war Pacific. President Truman announced that although the U.S. wants no territory ... out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire.¹

Prior to this announcement it had been unclear whether the more vocal and acquisitive elements of the US administration, particularly the services, would find official recognition of their sentiments.

The suggestion that bases built on territory of countries other than the defeated Japan might not be handed back gained substance in the next few months. In August a sub-committee of the US House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee toured the Pacific in order to assess the extent of US expenditure and the importance of the various bases to US strategic requirements. Its findings were that acquisition to "full title" to a number of bases, including Manus, was essential.² Perhaps the most sinister development as far as Australia was concerned came to light at the end of August when General MacArthur dissolved the Southwest Pacific Command which he had been in charge of. When MacArthur conveyed to Chifley his intention to hand over to the British and Australian Command on 2nd September, 1945, he indicated that the Admiralty Islands would be excluded from the transfer of power. This was the first
notice that the Australian Government had received of the US intention to retain military control in the area. Moreover, Chifley had expressly stated in letters of June and July that control of Australian Mandated Territories should revert to the Government upon the dissolution of the Southwest Pacific Command. It suddenly appeared that far from being prepared to negotiate over any transfer of sovereignty which might be under consideration (about which Evatt had been so confident in Wellington the year before) the US might be prepared to resort to the tactics advocated by the most strident of her nationalists in order to achieve her aims.

Further official support for the US's annexation of Manus Island along with various islands in the Northern Pacific came shortly after with a cable from F.W. Eggleston, then Australian Minister to the U.S.A. in Washington. He gave details of a speech made on September 5, by Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. H. Struve Hensel, whose statements had been supported by Navy Secretary James Forrestal. The Navy wanted a minimum of nine major bases in the Pacific: Hawaii; Kodiak and Adak in the Aleutians; Balboa on the Pacific side of the Canal Zone; Guam, Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas; Iwo Jima in the former Japanese Volcano Islands; Okinawa in the Ryukus; a base in the Phillipines; and only Manus in the Southern Hemisphere. These were the bases which the Navy regarded as essential, although Forrestal acknowledged that more bases might be added later. Thus at this stage of the proceedings, Manus
had been singled out by the US Navy as the only base below the Equator which they considered vital to US security.

The first week of September, 1946, saw Evatt depart for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in London. He would be away until January, only returning after spending November and December in the US and Canada. While in Washington Evatt gave a speech at the National Press Club in which he outlined conditions under which Australia would be prepared to grant the use of the Manus base to another country. The Australian Minister for External Affairs' speech established the line which he was to follow throughout the course of the negotiations, namely that decisions concerning Pacific island bases should be made within the framework of a regional defence arrangement with reciprocal undertakings for joint use of bases. He had also discussed the situation with US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, while at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in London. There he had complained of the US ambitions to monopolise all major Pacific bases and put forward Australia's desire to acquire bases in, at least, New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. Thus it is clear that at this stage Evatt still cherished hopes that Australia would be able to expand her influence in the South-West Pacific although it is far from clear whom he might have expected to pay for it. A report prepared in the Defence Department's Post-Hostilities Planning Committee Office expressed doubts about the viability of Australia's maintaining the Manus Island base, let alone two or more others. Evatt was living beyond his means in suggesting
that Australia could maintain bases in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides as well as Manus in New Guinea unless he envisaged Britain contributing to the upkeep of bases that Australia would administer. To get Britain involved in any negotiations that developed on the matter of Pacific bases would therefore be a policy imperative for Evatt. At this stage, no official approach had been made on the issue by the US, however.

The very first approaches by the US on the matter of the South Pacific island bases were in fact handled by officers of the Department of External Affairs in Evatt's absence. The first official approach was made by the Americans in mid-November but not directly to Australia as might have been expected if Manus had been as important to the US as its singling out (by Struve Hensel and Forrestal) had appeared to indicate. On November 22nd, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Addison, had cabled the Prime Minister, Chifley, to notify him of an approach made by the US Secretary of State to the UK with a view to securing "Long-Term Military Base Rights in territories (mainly in the Pacific) administered by the United Kingdom". Addison also indicated that Byrnes was anticipating making separate approaches to Australia and New Zealand but that the UK had made it clear to him that they would be contacting the Dominions over the matter. He stressed to the Australians that the UK was anxious "to keep in closest touch on this". 
While Evatt was out of the country a series of communications passed back and forth between Britain, Australia and New Zealand in an attempt to establish preliminary views on the matter. These are particularly interesting as they represent departmental views on the situation before Evatt had any input. It turned out that the extent of US interest in the South Pacific was considerably greater than the speeches mentioned above had indicated. It certainly was not the case that Manus was the only pacific base south of the Equator to which the US wanted access. On the 11th December Lord Addison sent to Chifley a list of the bases which the US had expressed interest in as well as the UK's preliminary views on the matter. There were two types of demands being made. Firstly, the 1939 claims relating to sovereignty of a series of islands in the Line, Phoenix and Ellice Islands (as well as some between Western Samoa and the Phoenix group administered by New Zealand) were revived. Secondly, a list of eleven bases was submitted which outlined the nature of the rights being sought in each case. The bases concerned were: Ascension Island (in the Atlantic), Canton Island (one of the Phoenix Group), Christmas Island (in the Line Islands), Funafuti (in the Ellice Islands), Guadalcanal and Tulagi (in the Solomons), Manus, Tarawa (in the Gilbert Islands), Upolu and Viti Levu (one of the Fijian Islands). Of these, only Manus and Upolu (administered by New Zealand in Western Samoa) were of direct interest to the Dominions. Strangely, Canton, Christmas and Funafuti appeared on both lists. Also the US sought exclusive base rights on these
islands whether or not they gained sovereignty. On the other seven Pacific islands they sought only joint rights to use the bases built there. What "joint rights" would entail was not explained and the nature of the US offer would not be apparent until this had been clarified, some time later.

The initial UK reaction to the American approach bore a striking similarity to the views expressed by Evatt while in Washington in November. While the prospect of getting the USA involved in British Commonwealth defence in the Pacific was very attractive, it was felt that the UK should "take the opportunity to secure reciprocal support from the United States for our own requirements including the right of joint user of such United States bases as might be thought desirable". In 1966, John Dedman was to defend Evatt's attempts to bargain with the United States over Manus on the grounds that the notion of reciprocity was first suggested by the UK and these preliminary views were obviously the basis of that claim. It is clear, however, that Evatt's views on reciprocity for the use of Manus as they were expressed in Washington on 16 November pre-dated the UK attitude. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the UK was influenced by Evatt in this matter at this stage and so Evatt would have been encouraged by this apparent similarity of views.

The UK was, however, anxious about the likely effect that such negotiations might have on the fledgling UN. The security organisation's efficacy was vital to their military
plans. Theirs was a military commitment as well as a political one and any action which might prejudice the likelihood of the UN achieving success, such as bilateral military negotiations in advance of the Security Council's military arrangements under Article 43, was regarded with apprehension. Thus the negotiations conducted over the next few months were kept under the strictest secrecy as, indeed, the US had requested they be.

The New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, also expressed anxiety over the US approach, of which he had been informed at the same time as Chifley. Whereas Chifley left the matter for Dr Evatt to deal with on his return from North America, Fraser who was also New Zealand Minister for External Affairs sent off a reply to the Dominions Office in mid-December, and sent a copy to Canberra seeking comments. Fraser's views were very strongly expressed and (while they were generally supportive of a continued US presence in the Pacific) indicated his perturbation at the attitude of the US towards the British possessions they desired to obtain. In his view "islands under the sovereignty of the British Commonwealth anywhere should not be given up lightly". At all costs, though, no action was to be taken on the matter unless New Zealand had the fullest part in the discussions, and Fraser felt sure that Australia shared his views on the matter.

The Department of External Affairs replied to Fraser's cable on the 26th December, despite a last minute
injunction from Evatt to hold everything until he got back. Before doing so, however, the Defence Committee, comprising the Chiefs of Staff and Frederick Shedden, or his representative, the Secretary for Defence, was consulted. There are significant differences in the views the two departments held on the matter. The External Affairs views did not touch upon the question of reciprocity. They stressed agreement with New Zealand on the question of Dominion participation in any discussions on the matter and the desirability of American involvement (although bearing in mind the British caveat about pre-empting the security council). The Defence Committee convened especially to consider the matter on the 24th December. Their views, which were ultimately reflected in the reply sent off to the New Zealand Prime Minister on the 27th, strongly supported the UK's that any agreements of the kind envisaged by the US would endanger the establishment of an international security system. Nevertheless, "the continued co-operation of the United States is so important from the point of view of Imperial Defence that everything possible should be done to achieve it". Thus the Australian Service representatives advocated preliminary and non-committal talks taking place to establish an overall plan for the Pacific which might lead to a more formal military alliance. The assessment of the British Commonwealth's bargaining position was that the Empire had "strong bargaining counters in the islands desired by the United States."
he found substantial agreement in his own department's traditional rival, Defence,\textsuperscript{21} with his views on the approach Australia should take in response to the Americans. For Evatt had support for the notion that the islands in the South Pacific presented an opportunity for negotiating a broad regional agreement which would guarantee security in the Pacific. No-one questioned the genuine nature of American interest in the region. Evatt, however, had doubts about the genuineness of the particular approach made by Byrnes in London. The first direct communication between the British and Australian governments on the matter, in early January 1946, conveyed Evatt's feelings that the US approach was substantially a "try-on"\textsuperscript{22}. By this he meant that the US was looking to see what the British Commonwealth would be prepared to concede in the Pacific, particularly with regard to sovereignty of the islands which had been under dispute since before the war. Evatt had also gathered from discussions with Byrnes in London in October that the US administration was still very much split over the issue of Pacific Islands. The most vital issue, of course, was the fate of the previously Japanese Mandated islands in the Northern Pacific, which the Navy wanted to see annexed outright but which the State Department wanted to see handed over as a trusteeship to the UN. The matter had been one of considerable dispute within the US administration the previous April when the San Francisco conference to formulate the Charter of the new international security organisation had been held. There a compromise had been reached with the inclusion of provision for a trusteeship to
be nominated as a "strategic area". This would entail its administration being monitored by the Security Council rather than the Trusteeship Council, thus ensuring that the US still had the power to veto any attempts to wrest control of the territory from her hands. Despite this compromise there was still considerable friction over the issue and perhaps the State Department felt that by giving the Navy sovereignty over some of the Pacific Islands (if it could be acquired from Britain) they might be prepared to go along with State Department plans for the Northern Pacific. Thus Evatt conveyed to Britain his impression that the US claims to sovereignty were not serious. This view was considered to have some substance shortly afterwards at the first meeting of Commonwealth heads of mission in London to consider the matter.23

The unanimity of opinion which had characterised the initial reactions of the UK, New Zealand and Australia was very shortly to fray at the edges, however. Whereas the UK had indeed suggested that reciprocity with respect to US bases be the rationale for allowing the US to obtain joint rights to bases in the South Pacific, it had not become a hard and fast plank of their negotiating stance as had been the case in Australia (for Cabinet had endorsed on January 19th Evatt's line that British South Pacific bases should only be made available to the US on a strictly reciprocal basis)24. The US had been evasive and non-committal when the British had first brought up the notion in discussion with Byrnes in December, saying only that there would be no
objection to Britain initiating discussions with the Philippines over use of American bases in their territory. Thereafter the British line softened somewhat and they simply sought an informal arrangement with the US whereby they would preserve the status quo on an informal basis until such time as specific provisions could be established for an arrangement under Article 43 to make the bases available to the UN Security Council. In particular, they hoped that the US would be satisfied with civil aviation bases on some islands rather than military bases.

It was unfortunate for Australia that Evatt should not have been in London at this time to represent Australia on the Security Council as he had hoped. For, in that case a united Commonwealth viewpoint might have been established and Australia would have perhaps been able to use the greater diplomatic muscle of the Commonwealth to achieve some of her goals in the Pacific. In fact, Norman Makin, was representing Australia, both on the Security Council and in the discussions which were conducted with US representatives in January until the end of the month when Defence Minister, Jack Beasley, replaced Bruce as Australian High Commissioner in London and represented Australia thereafter. Peter Fraser, on the other hand, was in London at the time and able to speak with authority for New Zealand. The result of Evatt's absence was rather embarrassing for Australia in that Makin had agreed to participating in a joint commission comprising Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US to consider the question of
the bases in accordance with the following terms of reference:

1) The future status and use of the bases established by the United States during the war in territory administered wholly or partly by the Governments of the British Commonwealth. The consideration of future status and use should cover in appropriate cases the establishment of joint civil aviation facilities in lieu of military bases.  
2) The examination of American suggestions affecting possible transfer of sovereignty in the case of certain Pacific Islands.27

These terms of reference were not satisfactory to Evatt, however. His reply made it clear that the terms of reference of the joint commission would have to empower it to consider and formulate "a security arrangement in the Pacific in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which would cover the principle of reciprocity and joint use of bases." When the UK and New Zealand made it clear that they felt that this was too broad a basis for discussions and that they intended to carry on with what they regarded as fairly low-level preliminary talks Chifley, presumably acting on both Evatt's and Shedden's advice, rather petulantly had Beasley withdraw Australia's participation in talks to which Makin had committed her. He made it clear that Australia would only be prepared to discuss the issue in the context of an overall plan. Furthermore, he expressed a desire to see the matter thrashed out at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London which was by then only a matter of five weeks away. Thus, after initially demanding that Australia be included in any discussions about the question of bases Australia ended by saying only a few weeks later that she would not attend discussions which were organised expressly for that purpose.
unless they were held on her terms. Consequently Australia received only second hand accounts of vital sets of talks held in Washington at the end of February and in the second week of March, 1946.

On his way back to New Zealand at the end of February, Peter Fraser stopped over in Washington and held bilateral discussions with representatives of the US State Department over three days. From these discussions there emerged a more detailed picture of what sort of arrangements were envisaged by the Americans. Firstly, it was frankly admitted that they were trying to "hedge" against the failure of the Security Council to establish satisfactory arrangements in the Pacific by having an agreement between themselves and New Zealand already established. Secondly, that the US wanted to see New Zealand's mandate in Western Samoa, or at least that part of it on which their base was established, Upolu Island, declared a strategic area. This would increase the influence of the United States over the area as New Zealand's administration of it would then be accountable to the Security Council over which New Zealand would have little sway rather than the Trusteeship Council, which New Zealand, having had a strong influence on the formation of the Trusteeship system, was anxious to support. Thirdly, the Americans were not prepared to comment on any question of reciprocal provision of base rights in return for New Zealand's agreement to grant them rights. Fourthly, the US was anxious to keep other countries out of the agreement although they admitted
reluctantly that Australia and the UK might be allowed to use the facilities at Upolu. Finally, and most importantly, the State Department handed over a draft agreement which they said they wanted to serve as a model for agreements with Australia and the UK, and which bore a close resemblance to the draft agreement which Australia finally received some three weeks later. Certainly there was no difference in the essentials which proved to be unacceptable to both New Zealand and Australia. Various clauses made it clear that the United States was looking for the rights that sovereignty would endow without any of the responsibilities (or expense) that sovereignty would bring.

The text of the proposed New Zealand agreement was not received in Canberra until 12 March and so it is likely that its content affected Dr Evatt's statement on international affairs which he delivered the next day in the House of Representatives. Evatt was still working on the assumption that the US was serious about co-operation in the South Pacific and so made an emphatic statement of Australia's policy on the need to co-operate with both the United States and Britain to ensure security in the Pacific. He also summarised Australia's position on the bases as it had developed over the previous few months:

*The government will enter into no commitments which will lessen the control of the Australian people over their own territories. Any consideration of plans for the joint use of any bases in Australia's dependent territories should be preceded by an over-all defence arrangement for the region of the Western Pacific, including the islands formerly mandated to Japan. As an incident of any such arrangement, Australia should be entitled to reciprocal use of foreign bases in*
the region thus providing for an over-all increase in the security both of Australia and of all other United Nations with interests in the region.

The detailed means of implementing a security policy for the Pacific have yet to be decided, but this much is already apparent: Australian security is very largely dependent on our closest co-operation with the British Commonwealth and the United States of America. Any hindrance to the maximum degree of co-operation with either is contrary to the interests of all these countries.33

Having made it clear that Australia would not enter into any agreements which would diminish her sovereignty over her own territories yet having pledged co-operation with the United States in the Pacific was going to be a tall order to fill as the nature of the US proposal eventually made clear.

The proposal, which included a draft agreement and several proposed clauses which the US felt should be included in any trusteeship agreement Australia made with the UN, was handed to the Australian Minister in Washington who sent it on to Canberra where it was received on 20th March, 1946.34 It was accompanied by a memorandum from the US State Department, dated 14th March. This was the source of the confusion over the date on which the offer was made which Casey, in the debate in the House of Representatives in February, 1952, used as a justification to exonerate Spender, or at least the Department of External Affairs, over the release of the Top Secret documents connected with the Manus controversy.35

The memorandum accompanying the US proposal made it clear that the draft agreement and the proposed clauses to be included in the trusteeship agreement were informal
working papers and "not to be considered as expressing at
this time the final views of the United States
Government". The State Department sought to enter into
informal conversations with representatives of the
Australian Government at an "early convenient opportunity".
The preamble to the draft agreement specified that "the
Government of the United States should share jointly with
Australia the rights and obligations specified in Annex A of
this agreement". It was readily apparent, however, that the
rights referred to were those of the United States and the
obligations solely Australia's. Under the terms of the
agreement Australia (despite being the administering
authority of the trusteeship) could not make the facilities
at Manus available to the Security Council, nor to any other
country, without the consent of the United States. Annex A
contained the crucial clauses:

5. With respect to the already existing military
installations in the Admiralty Islands, all of
which have been built by the United States with
the approval of the Australian Government at the
expense of the United States, the Australian
Government undertakes to maintain at its own
expense such of these existing military
installations as are necessary in the opinion of
the appropriate military authorities of the two
countries.

6. The Government of the United States shall have
the right, if in its judgement conditions at the
time make such action necessary, to assume control
upon due notification to the Australian
authorities, of any or all of the military
installations and facilities in the Admiralty
Islands, such control to continue for such time as
the United States considers necessary.

7. The United States is not hereby committed to
maintain military forces or facilities in the
Admiralties Islands when in its judgement such
military forces or facilities are not necessary.

Moreover, in the clauses which the US had suggested for
inclusion in any trusteeship agreement, the US had requested
that they be drawn up to make it clear that "the United States possesses no responsibilities, rights, or powers with respect to the administration of the territory and its inhabitants." John Dedman, who was Minister for Post-War Reconstruction and for Defence from January 1946 on, characterised the US proposals at the time, as savouring "of the kind of 'suggestions' that one might expect the USSR to make to one of its satellites". Certainly this is overstating the case, as he himself later acknowledged, but there is no doubt that there was some dismay at the arrogance of the United States in expecting Australia to pay out a substantial portion of her entire defence budget in order to maintain a base which the US might or might not return to in time of need.

The proposal to New Zealand had been of the same nature and so, it soon became apparent, would be the proposals to the UK. A meeting was held in Washington between representatives of the US and the UK on March 13, and the minutes of this meeting were passed on to Canberra a short time afterwards. When the question of maintenance arose it became clear that the US was hoping that the Commonwealth would assume full responsibility for maintaining some of the bases. "A lot of American money had been spent on existing installations and the basic idea was to arrange for these facilities to be maintained so that all these bases could be activated if the need arose". At last the cards were on the table - the British Commonwealth would have to balance its desire to involve the US in the
defence of the South Pacific (for this was never in doubt) against the expenditure which that would involve and which, it now was clear, would be considerable. Against this backdrop the British request that the proposals be considered in terms of reciprocal rights in American controlled territory hardly seems unreasonable and yet the US was never prepared to entertain the notion. When the UK raised the question the US begged them not to pursue it "saying that the issue does not arise in view of the fact that we established no wartime bases in American controlled territory".40

Both the sets of talks, between the US and New Zealand and between the US and UK, had been informal exploratory talks which had not involved any commitment on the part of either the US or the Commonwealth countries. Despite Australia's non-participation she had been kept closely informed of the substance of the dialogue. What had been exchanged had simply served to clarify that the nature of the US proposal was, perhaps, even more of a "try-on" than Dr Evatt had first surmised. Both the UK and New Zealand had emphasised to the US in the course of their discussions in Washington that they were unhappy with US attempts to conduct the negotiations as a series of bilateral approaches and would prefer an arrangement whereby the Commonwealth as a whole could negotiate with the US. Although Evatt had contributed directly to the 'bilateral' nature of the discussions up to this point he, too, was anxious that the Commonwealth should establish a viewpoint
on the matter. Indeed Chifley had urged that the discussions in Washington be put off until after the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in April so that a Commonwealth viewpoint could be agreed upon. Evatt and Chifley therefore set about establishing the line they would maintain when discussing the issue in London the following month. The US draft agreement was submitted to the Defence Committee for its views in the first week in April and there was general agreement with the direction which Evatt had given to Australian policy up until that point. The Committee recognised that although the American draft purported to recognise Australian sovereignty in the Admiralties, there were serious limitations placed upon that sovereignty. It concluded that "the question of bases in the Pacific must be related to an overall plan for the security of the British Commonwealth as a whole" and that therefore Australia should decline to conduct any negotiations with the United States of America in regard to the Admiralty Islands, until an agreed plan of Empire Defence had been determined. The Defence Committee laid out the bones of a three-tiered defence-plan which they put forward as the basis for discussion about reciprocal arrangements for bases. This involved having:

i) Advanced bases on the line Shanghai-Okinawa-Iwo Jima-Wake-Midway

ii) Intermediate bases on the line Formosa-Philippines-Carolines-Marshalls-Midway-Dutch Harbour

iii) Rear bases in the vicinity of the line Hainan-North Borneo-Admiralties-Solomons-Fiji-Pearl Harbour.

This plan was in fact endorsed by Cabinet on 8th April, as
well as the Council of Defence (the apex of the defence decision-making structure) the next day.

Thus the issues which had emerged in the first few months of negotiations and which would be discussed at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London were clear. The British Commonwealth would have to weigh up the immediate cost of financing the bases and the potentially much greater cost of undermining confidence in the United Nations security organisation (by embarking on bilateral military arrangements counter to the spirit of the Charter) against its desire to retain a US presence in the South Pacific. Australia would be pushing for a regional arrangement covering the entire Pacific as a solution firstly because this would be entirely in accord with Chapter VIII of the UN dealing with regional arrangements (which Evatt had had a large part in framing at San Francisco) and secondly because the enhanced security that such an arrangement would provide for Australia would be well worth the financial outlay.
Chapter 3: The Manus Negotiations, Phase 2

The 1946 PMs' Conference opened in London on 23 April 1946 and Evatt and Chifley attended for Australia. It quickly became apparent that there was in fact still substantial agreement between Britain and the Dominions on the subject of the Pacific bases. At the conference a UK Chiefs of Staff report on the matter was presented which examined in detail the request for exclusive rights to the bases on Christmas Island, Canton Island and Funafuti (islands to which the Americans had also claimed right of sovereignty) as well as the seven islands on which joint rights were sought by the US. Firstly it did not advocate bargaining with the sovereignty of the three islands for advantages in the Northern Hemisphere as an initial Chiefs of Staff report of the previous November had. This removed one possible source of contention as Australia and New Zealand had consistently opposed the cession of British territory in the South Pacific as a matter of principle. Secondly, the report advocated adopting "the Australian Government's proposal that base requirements should be considered on a regional basis" as the logical method of dealing with the problem. Moreover, the UK Chiefs of Staff still considered that the Commonwealth should press for reciprocal rights in US territory despite the cold reception the notion had received from the Americans. Nevertheless they were careful to point out that the negotiations should not be allowed to break down on that point. Most importantly, the UK view provided an opportunity for Evatt
to fulfill his ambitions for Australia's increased role in the Pacific. As the following clauses make clear, however, it would only be if Australia was prepared to foot the bill as well:

a) ...from the Commonwealth point of view we do not require to maintain facilities in these islands with the possible exception of Manus.
b) From a military point of view we do not wish to pay for facilities which are not of direct importance to our defence.
c) Unless, therefore, the Dominion Governments are prepared to pay for the maintenance of certain of these bases...we consider that we should make clear to the Americans that it will be necessary for them to maintain such facilities as they require.3

With the Americans unwilling to continue to pay for the upkeep of the island bases which they had built and the British equally reluctant to assume responsibility for doing so, the Australians were suddenly thrust forward into the limelight. At considerable expense, an opportunity lay open for Australia to take the initiative in the South Pacific.

Certainly the rhetoric continued to reflect Australian desires to have a greater role in the area. Chifley, (on the 19th June), when reporting to Parliament on the conference proceedings, conveyed rather sombrely (considering it had been one of the goals of Australia's foreign policy for some years) the news that Britain sought a greater contribution from Australia towards ensuring the security of the Pacific:

As a principal Power and member of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, we must also be prepared to shoulder greater responsibilities for the defence of that area, including the upkeep of our bases which are essential to the strategic plan.4
This would have been the realisation of Evatt's most ambitious aspirations for Australia in the post-war world. Complementing perfectly W. McMahon Ball's role as British Commonwealth representative on the Far Eastern Commission Australia would have been the focus of British strength in the Pacific. Yet, as T.B. Millar points out, there was considerable hesitancy in Chifley's attempt to elaborate on how Australia might fulfill this role: "he was not prepared to shift onto Australian shoulders much of 'the burden of armaments' resting on Britain." Australia might have been able to make contributions of the order mooted at the conference had her citizens been prepared to continue to make the sorts of sacrifices which had not proved easy to extract from them even in wartime. In peacetime with Japan well subdued it was unlikely that the 'guns vs butter' equation was going to allow Chifley and Evatt to back their promises with pounds. Thus it was that the only genuine form of regional defence cooperation which came about was through the 'back door' of the British suggestion that British and Dominion liaison officers be created in each other's capitals to consider regional security problems. This ultimately led, in May 1948, to the formal beginning of what came to be known as ANZAM, an arrangement for joint planning and operations in the Pacific and Malayan areas. Even this, though, would turn out to be a case of Britain wanting Australia to take a greater role and Australia being reluctant to do so.

Although it would be unjust to conclude that Chifley
was necessarily insincere in his statements about Australia's willingness to take up the slack in the Pacific (especially as it coincided with a cherished foreign policy goal) the lack of action in the subsequent few years certainly invites one to draw a parallel with Evatt's swaggering stance on New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in discussions with Byrnes the previous October. In both cases Australia sought 'power by association', attempting to involve herself in regional arrangements in the Pacific which might lend greater authority to her by virtue of her role as 'the Principal Power' (which meant little more than that she was 'the local power') in the region. Evatt's attempts to gain 'reciprocity' were of the same ilk: attempts to buy added prestige at bargain rates. In essence the move was a political manoeuvre designed to enhance Australia's and Evatt's standing in the world. For it is nowhere evident that Evatt sought to establish the utility for Australia of having access to US bases in the Northern Pacific. T.R. Reese makes the good point that it is not clear what Australia would have done with such access had the Australian terms been agreed to. It was, inevitable, given Britain's economic circumstances after the war, that British military power in the Pacific should recede in the late forties but it was not a necessary consequence that Australian power should expand to fill the vacuum despite Australia's comparatively healthy economic position. The expansion of a country's sphere of influence probably has as much to do with (for want of a better phrase) 'national psychology' as anything else and although Evatt perhaps had
enough ambition for a thousand men even ambition on that scale could not carry a nation to greatness singlehandedly.

That ambition was, however, sufficient to win the day for Australia at the Prime Minister's Conference. For, although the UK and the Antipodes had commenced the discussions with broadly similar points of view the UK reservation that the discussions should not be allowed to break down over the issue of reciprocity ultimately caused dissension. During the course of the conference the UK Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, had conducted talks with his US counterpart, Byrnes, in Paris on the matter of the bases and Byrnes had expressed the US's implacable opposition to the notion of reciprocity. Atlee, anxious to avoid scaring off US interest in the South Pacific, which the UK Chiefs of Staff had assessed as being in the wider political interests of the UK, advocated abandoning the request for reciprocal rights to US bases and in this he was supported by the South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts. Evatt, now on his own as Chifley had returned to Australia two weeks after the opening of the conference cabled Chifley that he had fought hard to retain the "unanimous decision agreed upon when you were here". The final result was that the matter was to be further discussed by Evatt and Nash, the New Zealand Defence Minister, with Byrnes in Washington the following month. This rather anti-climactic conclusion is, nevertheless, of interest in view of the fact that Evatt managed to carry his point of view in the face of considerable opposition from the UK Prime Minister and that
the Conference was prepared to delegate Evatt and Nash as representatives of the Commonwealth as a whole in the continuing dialogue with Byrnes over the matter of reciprocity. It is perhaps indicative of the strength of Britain's desire that Australia should truly take up a more representative role in the South Pacific that this should have been the case.

Evatt, however, would appear to have been attempting to play rather a deep game at this stage of the negotiations. As well as pushing the need for British Commonwealth solidarity he was secretly conducting bilateral talks. Roger Bell, in his account of the Manus negotiations based primarily on US sources, has shown that at the same time as the British Commonwealth viewpoint was being honed in order to negotiate from a stronger united position, Evatt was also broaching the subject of a tripartite regional arrangement in the South-West Pacific involving only Australia, New Zealand and the US:

The tripartite arrangement was to be modelled on the Canadian-US permanent joint board of defence, which after its inception in 1940 had developed a system of close voluntary co-operation in regional defence planning for the northern half of the western hemisphere, but did not include a specific assurance of armed military support in the event of either power becoming involved in a war with a third power.14

Bell's evidence is drawn from a series of cables between Byrnes and the US ambassador in Australia at the time, John Minter, and between Dennison, a less senior official at the US embassy in Canberra, and John Hickerson, the State Department official in Washington handling Pacific affairs
(including Australia and New Zealand). These cables refer to approaches Evatt had made in the month before he left Australia for the Prime Ministers' Conference but there were also several others sent on 25 April 1946 (two days after the conference opening) by the US charge d'affaires in London, Gallman, to Byrnes in Paris. Perhaps Anzac Day stirred anti-British sentiments in Evatt's heart and moved him to undermine secretly a position which he was publicly advocating at the conference yet it would appear to have been, in fact, a policy which Evatt had been developing for some time. Minter had informed Byrnes that it was "Evatt's pet plan for keeping the US and Australia in closest association. He has mentioned it to me many times." It was a plan which he kept very much to himself, however.

There is no mention on the Australian records dealing with the Manus negotiations of the discussions which the US officials documented. Indeed it is unlikely that Chifley would have approved of such an approach himself and was probably unaware of it. Later on when Evatt was discussing the matter in Washington and appeared to be veering towards a more bilateral role than the one representing the Commonwealth as a whole which he was supposed to be playing, Chifley pulled him into line and instructed him to make clear to the US that any reciprocal rights offered to Australia would have to be offered to the UK and New Zealand as well. Thus, it would appear that Chifley not only did not endorse Evatt's private approaches to the US on the subject of an ANZUS-like agreement but also was possibly completely unaware of them. More interestingly, in view of
Evatt's reputation as something of a diplomatic ingenu, the British do not appear to have been any the wiser.

Paul Hasluck has commented on the difficulties that historians of this period of Australia's foreign policy were likely to face because of Evatt's tendency to distort the official record both by what he did and did not report of his activities as Minister for External Affairs.¹⁸ Certainly the abovementioned would appear to be an example of the latter type of distortion. Consequently one must wonder whether his reporting of his discussions with US officials while in the US in June and July to chair the UN Committee on Spain does not constitute an example of the former sort of distortion. For the attitudes of US officials both before and after these talks would not appear to support Evatt's version of the story. There are, however, more junior officials' supporting accounts of some of the discussions which lend some weight to Evatt's claims that he made great steps towards achieving his hopes in the course of these discussions.

Evatt arrived in the US towards the end of May and he had his first discussion with Byrnes some two weeks later. He told Chifley that Byrnes had been sympathetic and had come to appreciate Australia's position on the matter. The upshot was "Byrnes' suggestion that Chiefs of Staff and an Officer of State Department should explore the position"¹⁹ with Evatt. Over the next six weeks Evatt had meetings with President Truman as well as several State
Department officials and service representatives. In his discussion with the President, Evatt was assured that an insuperable obstacle to a strict treaty outlining any US defence obligations in exchange for access to South Pacific bases would be the extension of America's obligations "to an area far outside their present hemispherical sphere of influence, meaning North and Latin America." Evatt, often accused later of being inflexible over the issue of reciprocity, then argued that an informal statement of policy making it clear that the defence of Australia and New Zealand was involved in the American use of Manus would be sufficient. This, in fact, proved to be further than Chifley was prepared to go in sacrificing the goal of a regional defence agreement and the principle of reciprocity. A week later he instructed Evatt that "an informal statement of policy would need to be supplemented at least by staff conversations and the preparation of a plan".

In the meantime, however, Evatt had held informal discussions with Hickerson of the State Department and various Navy and Army representatives at which W.D. Forsyth, the External Affairs Department's trusteeship expert, was present. The differences between the Minister's account and the report from the Washington Legation is illuminating:

A further suggestion, however, came out during the discussions, namely that without any formal treaty it might be arranged for the United States to use not only Manus but facilities in other Australian ports, providing the Australian services in turn were given the right to use United States facilities in United States and allied bases north of the Equator, which might include, for example, Truk, Guam and Manila.
Minister.....turned the talk in the direction of a regional scheme bringing out the fact that the significance of a base like Manus depended on its position in a network of bases and facilities....Minister was able to lead discussion in the direction of a possible series of arrangements by which all the interested parties would be able to make use in peacetime of a wide selection of bases covering South and South-West Pacific and islands north of the equator such as Truk, Guam and other United States possessions.25

Forsyth did indicate that the talk had succeeded in putting the problem in a new light and that the US might be inclined as a result to consider the question in a new perspective but it would seem from the differences in the two accounts that Evatt was doing much of the suggesting while portraying the situation as being far more one of general agreement than it was.

The next four weeks saw Evatt holding further talks with firstly Admiral Nimitz, US Secretary of Navy at the time, senior State Department officials and finally with Byrnes whose absence in Paris for some weeks had meant that Evatt's talks had been a little inconclusive despite their being with men of weight such as Nimitz and Dean Acheson, who was then Acting Secretary of State. Evatt reported having made great headway in advancing his 'alternative plan' (to a formal defence arrangement) which the US officials had said was out of the question for domestic political reasons. Nimitz was supposed to be particularly enthusiastic and it was in discussion with him that the 'alternative plan' attained its most precise formulation. The United States and Australia would informally agree that use of Manus and other bases (to be specified) would entitle
Australia to access to various US bases (also to be specified). Which bases were to be involved would be a matter for the Service Authorities of each country to work out together. Evatt saw this as having great potential for future collaboration in the Pacific, as well as avoiding "any suggestion whatever of interference with Australian sovereignty", which indicates the concern which he felt over the terms of the original US proposal on Manus. Furthermore, he triumphantly reported, on the 19th July, that "the Secretary of State now favours an acceptance of the principle that there should be reciprocal use of facilities." 

Evatt also claimed to have overcome another potential problem in these discussions. Forsyth had earlier reported that in conversation with State Department officials it had emerged that the difficulty about reciprocity was not in relation to Australia and New Zealand, but to the UK. The US could not commit herself to such arrangements as a large section of American opinion would feel bound by the situation to come to Britain's aid if trouble arose and consequently would not support it. Although Evatt might have been happy to exclude the UK as we have seen above this certainly was not the case back in Australia. Chifley had queried Evatt's use of the expression "Australian Services" in negotiating possible terms in Washington while reminding him of the common viewpoint on the matter which had been established with New Zealand and the UK at the Conference in London.
Defence Committee had given its endorsement to the new plan (which they, along with Evatt now considered to be sufficiently like a regional arrangement not to endanger the UN Security Council's prospects of success) only on the basis that Evatt was keeping the UK informed and that he had made it clear to the US that there would have to be UK participation in any such arrangement. Now it is not at all certain from the accounts of his activities in Washington that Evatt had in fact conformed with these requirements. He did, however, bring up the subject in his final talk with Byrnes who, according to Evatt, did not appear to be at all non-plussed:

I pointed out to Byrnes, quite frankly, our arrangement with Britain and New Zealand, and he was quite understanding of the position. He will communicate with Bevin on the general principle in the expectation that at Paris the three of us will be able to carry the proposal forward to a further point of practical completion.30

It was on this basis that Evatt's apparent tour de force in negotiating what appeared to be a great deal for Australia and the rest of the British Commonwealth was approved in principle by Cabinet and that the approach he had been taking in the course of these discussions was endorsed.

From here on the negotiations spiralled downwards towards the conclusion which the history books have all recorded. Unfortunately, at this crucial point in the official account of the Manus negotiations there is a virtual hiatus in the record of communications received. Evatt returned to Paris via London for the opening of the Peace Conference (to decide the fate of the lesser Axis
allies) on 29 July and then was summoned back to Australia on the 24th August to assist in winning the elections of 28 September. During that period he did not send a single communication on the subject of the talks with Bevin and Byrnes which had been envisaged. Nor do the months of September, October and November prove any more revealing as to the course of the negotiations (if indeed any were still being conducted) in this period. Either we must conclude that the hectic pace of diplomatic activity at Paris precluded Evatt's pushing through the negotiations to a conclusion and that the demands of electioneering on his return proved equally time consuming or we must conclude that Evatt deliberately avoided notifying the Department and Cabinet of what had been discussed in Paris. Hasluck has asserted that Evatt "did not scruple to destroy or withhold papers which might contradict his own story" and we may well ask whether something of the sort did not go on in this case. Certainly something that had occurred in Paris had induced him to change tactics in dealing with the US on this issue.

Indeed, they were now the tactics of a somewhat desperate man. Hasluck reports (although again there is no record of such activity on file) how Evatt would ring him in New York during this period and instruct him to maintain opposition to the US application for a strategic trusteeship over the Caroline and Marshall Islands. This was primarily with a view to bargaining with the US on this issue in order to get them to make a commitment to maintaining defence
installations on Manus. No doubt some of the anxiety which caused him to fail to recognise Australia's hopeless bargaining position here derived from the pressure of elections and possibly from a desire to be able to make a statement about Manus' fate before the populace went to the polls. For there had been a substantial amount of pressure building up in the press throughout 1946 advocating that the Americans be kept in the South Pacific at all costs and a statement indicating that the Manus issue had been resolved favourably for Australia would certainly have been of great value in the election campaign. Evatt was more probably anxious for a more obvious reason, however, and was angry over a rebuff he'd received in Paris. In this case he possibly feared the long-term electoral effects of a failure to secure some kind of American involvement in Manus and, as it turned out, with good reason.

Whatever the nature of the setback which Evatt's aspirations for Manus received in Paris, its result was not a complete closing of the door to discussion on the issue despite reports towards the end of the year that the Americans were packing up and getting out of the Admiralty Islands. For Australia received a note from the US Ambassador on 12 December 1946 (pursuant to a conversation with Evatt on 12 November) to the effect that Evatt's proposal in relation to reciprocal rights in US bases north of the equator "was and is unacceptable to the United States Government". The note did, however, suggest that rights could be afforded to the Australian government at Canton.
Island and American Samoa, provided that the US government was not financially obligated at Manus. While this represented a return to a bilateral approach (suggesting that it was indeed the inclusion of the UK in the proposed plan of the previous July which had caused the project to founder) Evatt had succeeded in winning some concessions from the US government.

Why then didn't an agreement go ahead? There was one note sent in reply to the US administration's offer to discuss the matter in Washington which announced Australia's desire to have representatives appointed from each country to examine possible arrangements yet this was never followed up. The lack of interest would seem remarkable after the energy which Evatt had put into the earlier negotiations. The answer almost certainly lies in the financial realm. The Minister for Defence, John Dedman, alerted Evatt in December 1946 to the fact that the original Defence Committee estimates of July 1946, of the cost to Australia of keeping Manus as a going concern (high at an initial outlay of $730,000 with an annual net maintenance cost of $51,000) had been made on the assumption that most US equipment would remain. By the end of 1946, much of this equipment had been removed and those original estimates would have had to have been revised upwards substantially. No doubt Evatt considered that the lesser prizes of Canton and Pago Pago as quid pro quo were not worth the price that Australia would have to pay. Perhaps he would have thought again if he had realised the political capital which the
opposition would be able to make out of his failure to secure American involvement at Manus both while still on the opposition benches in the next three years and in subsequent years when they were in government.
Chapter 4: The Significance of Manus for Evatt and Australia

The final episode in the Manus negotiations followed some months after Evatt had sent off his aide-memoire to the US State Department requesting that service representatives from the two countries get together to discuss the US proposal of December 1946. Evatt sent his note in February 1947 but the US were dilatory in replying. In May Evatt spoke to the US ambassador in an attempt to expedite matters and perhaps this had some effect (though certainly not the desired one). For in the first week of June, Admiral John Denfeld, who succeeded Chester Nimitz as Commander-in-Charge, US Pacific Fleet, after the war, visited Australia and held talks ostensibly on the subject of Australia-US naval co-operation but in fact on the subject of non-cooperation. Denfeld delivered a memorandum from the State Department which made clear that the US government had decided to act on advice from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that US forces should withdraw completely from Manus and no agreement according post-war military rights to the US at Manus be concluded.

Four reasons were given for this announcement. Firstly, and obviously, Manus was now considered of slight strategic interest in view of base facilities available to the US in the northern hemisphere. Secondly, the US feared establishing an undesirable precedent to "other countries" which might offset Manus's slight strategic value for the
US: they were anxious to avoid giving any excuse to the Russians to set up bilateral pacts outside the UN. The third and fourth reasons were that the US' and Australia's common membership of the UN as well as their "identity of interests" and "excellent relations" obviated the need for a formal arrangement as it would be possible to make a special arrangement in an emergency at any time in the future.2

John Dedman, Minister for Defence from November 1946 on has asserted that the real reason for the US decision was an economic one3. Navy funds had been cut at the beginning of the '46-'47 fiscal year so severely that there simply wasn't the cash to support bases in both halves of the Pacific (unless they were on US territory as we shall see).

Evatt, nevertheless, was not prepared to abandon his hope of involving the US in a regional arrangement in the South Pacific. While New Zealand had quashed any suggestion of bilateral military agreements over base rights in Samoa (Upolu) until after the Trusteeship system had been properly established,4 the question of US rights in British Pacific Islands was still alive, though in limbo since the Prime Ministers' Conference of the previous year. Even though Evatt and Nash had been nominated spokesmen for the Commonwealth, Evatt had ended up negotiating on his own and almost on a bilateral basis. The fact that the US had treated the discussions of the previous July as if they had been bilateral discussions tends to reinforce the point that whatever discussions might have taken place subsequently
between Evatt, Bevin and Byrnes in Paris may have fallen down over the inclusion of other Commonwealth countries in the reciprocal deal that Evatt had been trying to negotiate. For no sooner had Australia been notified of the US' lack of interest in Manus than bilateral negotiations with the UK were begun over Canton, Christmas and Enderbury (all of which had been on the list of 25 islands over which the US had requested they be granted sovereignty in November 1945). The US were now prepared to drop all other previous claims to sovereignty and to shared base rights if they could be granted sovereignty in the case of these islands. Also, they'd throw into the bargain clear title to all immovable installations in the United Kingdom territories in the rest of the South Pacific.\(^5\)

Lord Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, had cabled Canberra and Wellington immediately on the matter and the US again found themselves negotiating with the Commonwealth as a whole. The UK advocated denying the Americans any sovereignty over British territory in the Pacific but to go as far as possible to accommodate their needs there by giving them exclusive control over the territory on which the bases were established, a 99-year lease in the case of Christmas Island and an extension of the already existing 50-year condominium on Canton and Enderbury to 99 years. It is interesting to note, however, that the UK again sought some sort of reciprocity, as they wanted to ask for rights to base facilities, for all members of the British Commonwealth in American Samoa. Also, an
attempt would be made to have the US acknowledge some sort of commitment to the defence of the area in any formal agreement which might be signed.

Evatt saw here his last chance to salvage a regional defence agreement for the South Pacific and still pursued the matter in a half-hearted way in communications with the UK on this subject for the remainder of the year. For discussions on the matter amongst the UK, New Zealand and Australia were protracted and it was not till December 1947 that Evatt agreed to the British proposals on how to respond on the matter with the added demand that the US should afford reciprocal rights in Guam and the Philippines. US interest in the region was rapidly declining, however, and over the next two years little occurred. The US finally wound down its base on Christmas Island on October 18, 1948, and indicated that they were quite happy with their 50-year condominium on Canton.

Thus, the negotiations, which had gone on for three years since the US' initial approach in November 1945 were almost completely abandoned. Hickerson, the State Department official who had overseen the progress of the negotiations, said later, in 1950, that the issue of South Pacific Islands was "a matter we bring up when we haven't got anything else to talk about". Dr Evatt's ambitions to see the extensive system of war-time bases in the South-Pacific converted into a post-war defence system to be used by Australia, New Zealand, Britain and the United
States had come to nought.

Evatt tried various other means to bring about this Australian-American involvement in a Pacific Pact. He had blamed the start of the war in the Pacific on the lack of such an agreement and the establishment of a post-war arrangement was of prime importance in his foreign policy. With the base negotiations having failed to provide the appropriate key Evatt began pushing for an early Japanese Peace treaty and at the conference held in Canberra in August 1947, for members of the Commonwealth, again emphasised the need for a Pacific regional security arrangement. However, the US adamantly opposed any such arrangements being formalised in the tense post-war international political environment. Certainly they did not see the need in the Pacific when international attention was focussed on events in central Europe and the Middle East in 1946 and 1947. It is ironic that throughout the period that Evatt was attempting to negotiate an arrangement incorporating the bases the US should consider regional security arrangements as "unnecessary duplication of United Nations machinery" and also as possibly leading to the intensification of disagreements already existing in the Security Council. The irony lies in the fact that the US should have such qualms about a regional arrangement which the British Commonwealth had determined was the preferable way to come to an agreement on the issue of bases within "The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". To do so by means of clandestine bilateral arrangements was
something they considered much more likely to undermine confidence in the institution of the United Nations.

In June 1948, however, the United States came round to endorsing "the progressive development of regional and other arrangements for individual and collective self-defence". Evatt again pressed for a Pacific Pact following this change of heart in the US, again unsuccessfully. The reality of the situation was that the US was preoccupied with the concerns of Europe and with the intractability of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Nothing Australia could do in the latter half of the decade was going to attract additional commitments, money or forces into the Pacific Ocean which the Americans could rightly feel was well under control.

Evatt, no doubt, tried everything he could to alter that situation and probably believed that he had succeeded for a brief space (and indeed he would appear to have won some sort of concessions from the US in the course of the negotiations) yet the logic of international politics was working against him and he was a little slow to perceive that, as his dogged persistence in attempting to induce the US to enter into a security arrangement in the South Pacific testifies to.

Evatt's unwillingness to admit defeat in these negotiations was to cost him dearly in parliamentary debate and with the press almost from the moment the issue came to
the attention of the Australian public shortly after the end of the war. Alan Dalziel, Evatt's electoral secretary for twenty years, considered that the issue of the Manus Island negotiations was one of three issues which the Opposition was able to pillory him with throughout his parliamentary career. Certainly there were many occasions both when Labor was in office and out of it when members of the Liberal and Country Parties were able to score points on the Manus issue. The assertions repeatedly cover the same ground and become more strident in their tone until in February 1949 H.L. Anthony, member for Richmond, could assert without contradiction that Evatt threw the Americans out of Manus. In 1946, it had begun with the assumption that the United States had requested sovereignty over Manus Island and at the very least was prepared to maintain the base there for her own purposes. Thus Evatt's statement in the House of Representatives on 13 March 1946, which indicated that Australia would not surrender sovereignty over any part of her territory was continually thrown back at him as having been a slap in the face for America's designs for Manus. That these allegations were wide of the mark is patently obvious now yet at the time Evatt declined to refute them. It is not that Evatt did not feel the sting of the barbs thrown his way in parliament, for Peter Edwards has documented the effect that taunts about Evatt's 'arrogant' handling of the US approach on Manus had upon him. John Burton, Evatt's private secretary for some years and Secretary of the Department of External Affairs from 1947 to 1949, considered Manus and the way it was
handled by the press as one of the issues contributing to Labor's losing the election in 1949.15

The most damning media report of the matter came, however, some two years after Labor had lost office. The *Sunday Herald*, published on 21 January 1951, a report on "Australia's Worst Defence Blunder". This article it can now easily be seen was based on confidential documents. Various descriptions tally exactly with the documents: the description of the form of the actual proposal made by the US in March 1946, as well as the sequence of events from the first approach by the US in November 1945, to the Prime Ministers Conference in London the following April are too accurate to be inspired guesswork. Perhaps the only serious error of detail (apart from the wilful ones which will be considered in a moment) is the assertion that the United States approached France at the same time as Britain to consider the fate of bases built on French Pacific territory as well. In fact, early on in the exchange of cables Britain sought clarification of this point and was told by the US that an approach to France depended on the outcome of US-UK negotiations.

There was, however, a consistent error of fact which ran right through the article and that was the assertion that the United States was prepared to maintain the base at Manus. It is impossible that anyone who had been able to see the actual draft agreement (as either the journalist who wrote the article or his source obviously had) could be
unaware that a principal aim of the United States in attempting to negotiate base rights was to avoid any sort of financial obligation whatsoever. The journalist or his Department of External Affairs source was thus guilty of wilful misrepresentation.

It is all the more surprising then that Evatt did not take the opportunity to clear up the matter. His reply to the Sunday Herald did not make clear that there had never been any question of the US maintaining the bases. Nor, in the disproportionate amount of time spent debating Manus in March 1982 when the bill ratifying the ANZUS Treaty was being discussed did Evatt effectively defend his part in the affair. By revealing the sorts of restrictions which the US agreement would have placed on sovereignty and the cost to Australia of entering into such an agreement (without adequate return in the form of a regional defence pact) Evatt could have demolished Casey's arguments that Australia had missed a golden opportunity in 1946.

Casey, on the other hand, was very effective in continuing to manipulate the Manus issue to yield political gain. A few months later a large headline proclaimed "Manus Island to be Restored as Major U.S. Base", though in parliament it eventually emerged that it was only a question of its being "quite possible that more American naval vessels would be using Manus Island than in the past".

It is conceivable that up until the end of 1948
Evatt felt bound by US and UK injunctions on secrecy with regard to the negotiations on the Pacific Bases as he also feared that their being revealed might place even greater strain on the United Nations organisation than it was already experiencing at that period. Why he should remain silent on the terms of the negotiations after the formation of NATO in 1949 and ANZUS some two years later cannot easily be explained. It is clear, however, that he suffered politically because of this silence when a few words of explanation could have saved the situation.

Any attempt to assess the importance of Manus as an episode in post-war Australian foreign policy is bound to consider the effect that the stalled negotiations had on Australia-US relations. Perhaps it would be better to consider the effect that it might have had on American ALP relations for it is obvious that if there had been any deterioration in Australian-American relations in the latter half of the '40's decade they were certainly back on a good footing by the time of the signing of the ANZUS treaty in 1951.

To a certain extent the whole affair is tied up in the question of Evatt's diplomatic negotiating technique. Evatt has often been accused of carrying too much of the weight of foreign policy formulation himself and not allocating the regular processes of diplomatic representation to carry on policy when he wasn't there. Certainly there is evidence in this case of his running hot
and cold on the issue and of the negotiations at times
languishing as a result. Evatt's methods did extract some
concessions from the US on the issue, however, and had an
agreement been negotiated (that is, had the US continued to
consider it necessary to have some sort of involvement in
the South-West Pacific) there is no doubt that reciprocal
access to US bases would have been involved.

From the evidence of the official record,
negotiations would appear to have been conducted on a
cordial footing throughout and the incident to have created
far less rancour towards Evatt in the USA than his later
handling of the Berlin crisis when President of the UN
General Assembly. The Americans never saw the situation as
Evatt's parliamentary opposition tended to depict it, namely
as the eviction of an unwanted interference in Australia's
domestic affairs. Evatt would have been only too glad to
have the Americans stay had they been prepared to maintain
the base and get involved in the defence of Australia, as,
indeed, the opposition believed the Americans to have been.

Perhaps the more pertinent question to ask is
whether relations between Australia and Britain were damaged
by Evatt's attempt to "cut out" the UK in negotiations over
Manus in Canberra, London and Washington. The answer must
surely be a negative one here, as Britain appears to have
been unaware of such attempts. Moreover, the UK was
prepared to go to bat with the US over reciprocal rights at
American Samoa for all British Commonwealth countries when
US interest in Manus and Upolu had lapsed and only the British Canton, Christmas and Enderbery were being considered. Indeed, one of the most interesting things to emerge from a study of the record on these negotiations is the extent to which Australia, New Zealand and Britain kept in touch on the matter and formulated a common policy on defence in the Pacific. It certainly indicates that the view of the Commonwealth which Evatt put forward in his March 1946 survey of international affairs, was substantially accurate. For the Australian viewpoint prevailed at the 1946 Prime Ministers Conference and had US interest been maintained Evatt's policy would undoubtedly have borne fruit.

The most important question, however, is whether Evatt could have retained a US presence on Manus or more generally in the South Pacific (given that this was an important goal for both parties at the time) by means of a different approach to the one of "diplomatic chutzpah" which he chose to pursue. With the US attitude being one of wanting to see their bases maintained at someone else's expense, it is unlikely that any government, either Labor or Liberal, would have been able to prevent the USA from withdrawing from the South Pacific after the war. As it was, Evatt tried and perhaps came closer to success than has ever been acknowledged. What is now clear, though, is that it is doubtful that anyone else would have succeeded.
A Note on Sources

The following archival series were consulted:

A461  Correspondence files of the Prime Minister's Department, series range 1934-50

A816  Correspondence files of the Department of Defence 1935-39, Department of Defence Co-ordination 1939-42, and Department of Defence 1942-57

A1067 Correspondence files of the Department of External Affairs, 1945-46

A2031 Agenda items for meetings of the Defence Committee 1945-1950

A6494/T1 South Pacific Top Secret (SPTS) Series dealing specifically with the Pacific Bases issue, 1943-1952

When reference to archival sources is made the document, its date, the file it comes from and the series no. which that file comes from will be identified.

CPD and DEA have been used in the notes as abbreviations for Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates and Department of External Affairs respectively.
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Edwards, Peter G., "Australian Foreign Policy in the 1930's and 1940's: Problems of Documentation" Australian Outlook, xxix, 1975, pp 335-40

__________________, "Evatt and the Americans", Historical Studies, xviii, No.73, pp 546-560

Dedman, John, "Encounter Over Manus", Australian Outlook, xx, 1966, pp 135-153

Notes

Introduction

1. Manus, as an index heading, has a string of references after it in CPD volumes 180-220 covering the years 1945-1952.


4. R.J. Bell, pp.159-172

5. A.S. Watt, Australian Diplomat, p.185

6. R.J. Bell, p.145

7. See "A Note on Sources"

8. See Peter Edwards, "Australian Foreign Policy in the 1930's and 1940's: Problems of Documentation", Australian Outlook, xxix, 1975, pp.335-40

9. Hasluck, p.31

Chapter 1

1. The phrase is C.H. Grattan's, p.168.

2. A summary of the US 1939 claims to islands in the Phoenix, Line and Ellice groups as well as those under New Zealand administration in the Samoa region was included as a note for the Minister for the January 1944 Australia-New Zealand Conference, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.

3. Filenote, 25/1/44, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.

4. The course of the negotiations is described in a "Summary of Recent Information on Pacific Islands", a file note dated 18/11/43, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.

5. A copy of the memo, sent to all overseas R.A.F. commanders, on file, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.


7. SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.
8. Cable from Dixon to Evatt, 13/1/44, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1. (Curiously R.J. Bell's account of this, based on US archival material, attributes the suggestion to Australian initiative, in direct opposition to Dixon's reporting of the meeting, p.147.)


11. Cable from Evatt to Curtin (in London for the Prime Ministers' Conference of 1944), 5/5/44, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.


13. Copies of Cordell Hull's formal response to the ANZAC Treaty and of Evatt's response to it are on file, 3/2/44 and 24/3/44, SPTS/1/2, A6494/T1.


16. T.B. Millar asserts that Australia sought "a status in post-war security arrangements for the South-West Pacific out of proportion not only to her absolute (as distinct from per capita) wartime military contribution but also to her peacetime military capacity", *Australia's Defence Policies, 1945-65*, p.1.


Chapter 2

1. R.J. Bell, p.159

2. Ibid, p.159

3. Cable from Chifley to General MacArthur, 31/8/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

4. Cable from Eggleston, at the Australian Legation, Washington, to DEA, 6/9/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

5. File note, 23/3/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

6. R.J. Bell, P.160
7. File note, 27/8/45, 7/301/71, A816

8. Cable from Addison to Chifley, 22/11/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

9. ibid

10. A departmental briefing bringing Evatt up-to-date on the communications between Canberra and Wellington and London was only given to him on 11/1/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

11. Cable from Addison to Chifley, 11/12/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1. A copy of the cable is at Annex A.

12. Cable from Addison to Chifley, 11/12/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

13. Dedman, p.141

14. Cable from Peter Fraser to Chifley, 17/12/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

15. Cable from DEA to Addison, 26/12/45, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1 and Cable from Eggleston to DEA, 27/12/45, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

16. Cable from Dunk, Secretary, DEA, to Shedden, Department of Defence, 20/12/45, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

17. Defence Committee Agendum Item No.504/1945, 24/12/45, Volume 16, A2031

18. Cable from DEA to Fraser, 27/12/45, SPTS/1/3, A6494/T1

19. Defence Committee Agendum Item No. 504/1945, Volume 16, A2031

20. ibid

21. See P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p.176

22. Evatt's actual phrase: he had formed the impression after discussions with Byrnes the previous October. Cable from Evatt to Addison, 12/1/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

23. Cable from Makin, in London, to Evatt, 19/1/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

24. Memo on file, 19/1/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

25. Cable from Makin to Evatt, 4/4/46, SPTS/1/4, A6494/T1

26. See Hasluck, p.235
Chapter 3

1. Australia's opposition to the cession of British territory in the Pacific may be the foundation of Grattan's assertion that Australia prevented the US from gaining sovereignty over Christmas Island. Otherwise the remark has no foundation, Grattan, p.201

2. UK Chiefs of Staff report. Copy on SPTS/1/1, A6494/T1

3. ibid

4. CPD, p.1559, Volume 183, July, 1946

6. Dedman describes how difficult it was to get Australians to make sacrifices for the defence effort, p.135

7. T.B. Millar, *op.cit.*, pp.9-10

8. T.B. Millar, "Anglo-Australian Partnership in Defence of the Malaysian Area", p.78

9. See Chapter 2, pp.16-17.

10. T.R. Reese, p.57

11. See Grattan, p.197

12. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 8/5/46 SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

13. ibid

14. R.J. Bell, p.165

15. ibid, pp.164-5

16. ibid, p.165

17. Cable from Chifley to Evatt, 28/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

18. Hasluck, pp.31-32

19. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 12/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

20. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 21/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

21. ibid

22. Cable from Chifley to Evatt, 28/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

23. Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats*, p.158

24. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 21/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

25. Cable from Washington Legation to DEA, 22/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

26. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 1/7/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

27. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 19/7/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
28. Memo to Evatt from Forsyth, 26/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
29. Cable from Chifley to Evatt, 28/6/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
30. Cable from Evatt to Chifley, 19/7/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
31. Tennant, pp.202-204
32. Dedman sent a note to Evatt on 17/12/46 querying what developments there had been on the Manus issue since he had informed Cabinet of his talks with Byrnes in Washington in July, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
33. Hasluck, p.32
34. Hasluck, pp.281-2
35. Sydney Morning Herald, 4/11/46
36. Copy of note on file, 12/12/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1
37. ibid
38. Note on file, 17/2/47, SPTS/1/6, A6494/T1
39. Defence Committee Agendum No.270/1946, Volume 18, A2031
40. This information was included in the Dedman note mentioned above, 17/12/46, SPTS/1/5, A6494/T1

Chapter 4

1. CPD, Vol 190, p.1996.
2. Note left by Admiral Denfield, June 1947, SPTS/1/6, A6494/T1.
4. Cable from Fraser to Evatt, 13/7/47, SPTS/1/6, A6494/T1.
5. Cable from Addison to Evatt, 11/6/47, SPTS/1/6, A6494/T1.
6. File note, 15/2/49, SPTS/1/7, A6494/T1.
7. File note, 18/6/50, SPTS/1/8, A6494/T1.
8. Starke, p.11.
9. ibid, p.20.
10. ibid, p.21.
11. ibid, p.21.
20. The phrase is Coral Bell's, p.51.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABLEGRAM.

2215
2/46

For the Prime Minister
By immediately preceding telegram.

The following is the United States description of places in territories administered by the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand where the United States Government wishes to obtain long term military base rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
<th>Nature of Rights</th>
<th>Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascension Island</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton Island</td>
<td>United States-British joint control</td>
<td>Exclusive and possession</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas Island</td>
<td>Disputed United States-British</td>
<td>Joint and possession</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation Point</td>
<td>French, British</td>
<td>Exclusive and possession</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputed United States-British</td>
<td>Joint and possession</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gualco Island</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oona</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiti</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Naval and Air</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a list of islands in regard to which the United States Government desires that British and New Zealand Governments should sign an agreement with the United States without impairing their respective claims and recognizing the sovereignty of the United States: Wake, Baker, Howland, Jarvis, Johnston, Starbuck, Johnston, Caroline, Maud, Marshall, Christmas, Canton, Aitken, Sandfly, Bukan Peku, Phoenix, Pukapuka, Sydney, Penrhyn, Hull, Rongelap, Gardner, Rakahanga, McKeen, Blinde.

Prime Minister
Mr. Forde
Mr. Beasley,
Sir W. Sheridan
E.A.
15th December, 1945
Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 514, I have the honour to enclose herewith the following documents:

(1) Memorandum from the Department of State, expressing a desire for informal conversations with representatives of the Australian Government with respect to bases rights in the Admiralty Islands;

(2) A preliminary draft of a proposed bases agreement between Australia and the United States;

(3) Draft of certain clauses which the United States feels should be included in any Trusteeship agreement covering the Admiralty Islands.

The memorandum and attachments have not been discussed in any way with the United States authorities.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Right Honourable H.Y. Pratt,
Minister for External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.,
Australia.

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State would be happy to enter into informal conversations with representatives of the Australian Government at an early convenient opportunity with respect to the desire of the United States to obtain in the Admiralty Islands long-term base rights to be shared jointly with Australia.

The United States has taken note of Australia’s expressed intention of placing the mandated territory of New Guinea within the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. The United States assumes that it is the intention of the Australian Government that Australia shall be designated the administering authority over the whole mandated territory of New Guinea in any trusteeship arrangements worked out in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The United States regards itself as a state directly concerned in the negotiation of any trusteeship agreement or agreements covering the mandated territory of New Guinea.

In line with the foregoing, there are attached two documents which express certain views with reference to long-term base rights in the Admiralty Islands, both of which documents are informal working papers and are not to be considered as expressing at this time the final views of the United States Government.

The first such document is a preliminary draft of a proposed bases agreement between Australia and the United States relative to base rights in the Admiralty Islands.
The second document is a draft of certain clauses which the United States feels should be included in any trusteeship agreement covering the Admiralty Islands. These clauses, it will be noted, relate primarily to security matters. The United States, of course, reserves the right to express its views with reference to any aspects of any proposed trusteeship agreement or agreements for the mandated territory of New Guinea.

The Department of State will welcome an early expression of the views of the Australian Government concerning the foregoing questions. It will be glad to discuss these matters informally with representatives of Australia whenever convenient.

Attachments:

Two informal documents as described above.

Department of State, Washington, March 14, 1946
In order that the United States and Australia may share responsibility for the defense of the Admiralty Islands and for the establishment, utilization and maintenance of military bases thereon, it is mutually agreed between the two Governments that:

1. The Admiralty Islands are to be declared a strategic area; the geographic limits of such area are:

   Latitude 10° 30' South and 5° 10' South and longitude 145° 30' East and 140° 10' East.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this agreement, the area defined in paragraph 1 of Annex A and the facilities therein shall not be made available to the armed forces of another government without the consent of Australia and the United States.

3. The United States, jointly with Australia, possesses rights

   (a) to occupy, maintain, improve, operate and control the naval base presently established on Manus, a military air base (Naval Base) on Les Beaufils, military air facilities at Pitylum, Ponapi, and Lonabum, and military bases at such other sites on Manus Island, Seeadler Harbor, and the adjacent land areas as may from time to time be mutually agreed upon;

   (b) to install, maintain, operate and control at locations within the Admiralty Islands to be mutually agreed upon, facilities for defense, including warning systems, weather reporting, communication and aids to navigation;

   (c) to operate military craft, including aircraft, vessels, and vehicles into, through, over and away from the Admiralty Islands without restriction except as mutually agreed upon; and

   (d) to utilize the port, transportation and communications facilities in the Admiralty Islands required in the exercise of the rights accorded, and to install and improve such as may be mutually agreed upon.

4. The United States possesses rights

   (a) to import, station, store in or remove from the Admiralty Islands, personnel, material and supplies required in the exercise of the rights accorded, free of customs, duties, taxes, and imposts of any kind;

   (b) to have exclusive jurisdiction over United States military personnel present in the Admiralty Islands in the exercise of the rights accorded. (In the United States view, this point would be covered by United States rights under international law, but the inclusion of this specific provision might be desirable.)

5. With respect to the already existing military installations in the Admiralty Islands, all of which have been built by the United States with the approval of the
Attachment I

The Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia, taking note of the expressed intention of the Government of Australia to take appropriate steps for placing the mandated territory of New Guinea within the trusteeship system in accordance with Article 77 of the United Nations Charter, and deeming it desirable in the interests of international peace and security that the Government of the United States should share jointly with Australia the rights and obligations specified in Annex A of this agreement with respect to military bases and facilities in the Admiralty Islands agree:

1. That under the terms of the Trusteeship agreement to be negotiated by the states directly concerned in accordance with Articles 70 and 81 of the Charter, Australia shall be designated as administering authority of the trust territory and that Australia shall have authority to establish and erect such military installations in the Admiralty Islands as may be agreed upon by the Governments of Australia and the United States, to make provision for the security of such installations, and to conclude such agreements with the United States as may be necessary for the exercise by the United States of the rights and obligations specified in Annex A of this agreement.

2. That under the terms of such Trusteeship agreement the areas containing these bases and facilities shall be declared a strategic area; the bases and facilities therein may be made available to the Security Council by Australia as administering authority, with the approval of the United States in each instance, in accordance with any agreement or agreements Australia may make under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

3. That the Australian Government will expedite the negotiation of such Trusteeship agreement.

4. That the Government of the United States, in view of its direct concern, will take such steps as may be appropriate to further the prompt conclusion of such Trusteeship agreement.

5. That the two Governments will reach agreement on the terms of such Trusteeship agreement, and, having done so, will agree not to consent to the termination, alteration, or amendment of such Trusteeship agreement without prior agreement between themselves.

6. That the present agreement shall enter into force upon ratification by the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, and shall continue in force for 99 years and for such further time as may be mutually agreed upon, unless previously altered, amended, or terminated by mutual consent.
Australian Government at the expense of the United States; the Australian Government undertakes to maintain at its own expense such of these existing military installations as are necessary in the opinion of the appropriate military authorities of the two countries; with respect to any additional military installations and facilities in the Admiralty Islands, the two Governments undertake to establish and maintain any such installations and facilities in accordance with plans mutually agreed upon, the costs of establishment and maintenance to be borne by the Government proposing the construction of the installation or facility concerned, except as otherwise agreed upon.

6. The Government of the United States shall have the right, if in its judgment conditions at the time make such action necessary, to assume control upon notification to the Australian authorities, of any or all of the military installations and facilities in the Admiralty Islands, such control to continue for such time as the United States considers necessary; the United States undertakes to pay the expense of the maintenance of such installations and facilities during such period of temporary control by the United States.

7. The United States is not hereby committed to maintain military forces or facilities in the Admiralty Islands when in its judgment such military forces or facilities are not necessary.
ATTACHMENT II.

1. Definition of Admiralty Islands as a strategic area with boundaries:
   - 1 30° and 2 10° south latitude,
   - 145° 50° and 146° 10° each longitude.

2. Designation of Australia as administering authority of the trust territory.

3. A clause or clauses giving Australia full legislative and administrative control in the trust territory subject only to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the terms of the Trusteeship agreement. The clause or clauses should be so drawn as to make it clear that the United States possesses no responsibilities, rights, or powers with respect to the administration of the territory and its inhabitants.

4. The administering authority may establish, maintain, and control such bases, facilities, and forces, and take such measures for their security, as it may deem necessary or desirable in the trust territory.

5. Nothing in this Trusteeship agreement shall preclude the administering authority from maintaining existing agreements and entering into such additional agreements as it may deem necessary or desirable with another member of the United Nations with respect to sharing rights of occupation and operation, and responsibility for the establishment, maintenance and control of existing or additional military bases and facilities in the trust territory (i.e. the Admiralty Islands strategic area), provided, however, that no such agreements shall preclude the offer of such bases and facilities to the Security Council of the United Nations on its call.

6. The amendment, alteration, or termination of this Trusteeship agreement shall be only by unanimous agreement of the signatories (i.e. the states directly concerned), subject to the approval of the Security Council.