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THE INTIFADAH AND THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE:
A LABYRINTH OF RHETORIC

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August 1990

A sub-thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (International Relations),
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I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material submitted for a degree or diploma in any university, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by any other person except where due reference is made in the text.

Shelley J. Pellegrino

The Australian National University
August 1990
TO MY PARENTS
Victor and Wallette Pellegrino

TO MY FAMILY
Angela Terese Mahinamalamalamama Mei-lyn
Christopher Joseph Bailey Hoku-ao Wu-wei
Blue Bear and Anzac
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Wherever we are, we are dogged by our past, but we have also created new realities and relationships that neither fit simple categories nor conform to previously encountered forms.

Edward Said

Notions of 'History' seem all-pervasive and intractable when exploring perceptions of Palestinian and Israeli identity. The entrenchment of their beliefs leaves little, if any, scope for understanding or compromise, particularly when the two communities identify so closely with a common piece of land. Yet from within this circumscribed milieu, the intifadah has shaken these 'Histories' and loosened the strictures by which communal and individual identity are formed. It has allowed new identities to form around new myths and new myths to form around new identities. This genesis has delivered an unrivalled opportunity for the Palestinians in the occupied territories to create the new realities and relationships to which Said alludes. For the Israelis, too, the intifadah has provided challenges and opportunities which have fractured their whole social fabric, to the point that one wonders if political and social harmony could ever prevail.

This sub-thesis explores the complexities of the intifadah, but more importantly it examines the 'fateful' relationship that the Palestinians and Israel have with the United States. The U.S. government has always played a heavy hand in the Middle East, though its sentiments toward Jewish history, in conjunction with its financial leverage, impinge upon the structure and vista of any viable or lasting peace settlement. As such, it is important to study not only the constraints of 'History' on any outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also the influence of the United States as a critical determinant of whether it could ever be a negotiator for 'peace' or merely a catalyst for further generations of suffering.

The first section of the sub-thesis provides a general overview of the perceptions of history and identity that the Palestinians and Israelis have of themselves and of each other. These perceptions have circumscribed the horizon of possibility for a settlement of which both parties would be amenable. The second section develops the notion of the intifadah as a unifying symbol of Palestinianization, and a force for the solidarity of a new generation of Palestinians. The third section looks at Israel's reaction to and management of the intifadah, including the divisiveness and fracturing of its domestic politics. The fourth section includes a discussion of U.S. affinity for Israel, its policy towards Israel and the Palestinians, and its attempts at assisting in a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Finally, the last section recapitulates the milieu in which 'the fateful triangle' finds itself enmeshed, and ends on a discouraging note, concluding that the intifadah will end in tragedy for both Palestinians and Israelis alike, whereas it will leave the United States primarily untouched.

July 1990

ADDENDUM

Events can change rapidly in the Middle East, with the most recent 'crisis' involving Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and the deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia by the United States and its 'allies.' This sub-thesis was completed before these events, and does not seek to incorporate any such new information. Perhaps it is tenable to say, however, that the Saddam Hussein's venture will merely strengthen the United States' relationship with Israel, while leaving the Palestinian-Israeli 'peace' process in its always-protracted 'not-yet.'

August 1990
States can change their policies, [but not the PLO], whose whole justification for existing is hatred of Israel and the desire to wipe it out, whether at once, or in stages.

Yitzhak Shamir

... [T]he readiness of the Palestinian people to endure tremendous sacrifices and its determination to persevere in its 'intifadah' have proven without any shadow of doubt that the rights of this people and its manifest will to achieve independence and establish its own state on national soil cannot be ignored.

Yasir Arafat

The United States' special commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unshakable.

Ronald Reagan

We are friends, strategic partners, and allies. And the mutual interests that bind together the people of the United States and Israel are broad and deep. I reassured the Prime Minister that the fundamental basis of our approach to a Middle East settlement has not changed. . . . I reaffirmed . . . that we do not support an independent Palestinian state. . . .

George Bush

I

PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS:
A CONFLICT OF 'HISTORIES'

The Middle East has long been a region which evokes images of anguish, fanaticism, paroxysm, 'irrationality,' passionate emotion, helplessness, malaise, and a fervent religious fundamentalism - where the gods of history seem to meet in gladiatorial combat for the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world. One witnesses the volatility of people struggling to 'survive,' to maintain their identity - not unlike others - but in a region particularly contingent upon its geography, history, culture, religiousness, leadership, and sensitivity to influence from the

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1 As cited in Robert Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," World Policy Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1989, p. 359.
outside world. Although attempts have been made to quell the multiplicity of conflicts (whether perceived or otherwise) which seem to arise in ceaseless fashion, the passion with which people live their lives is real and not something which can be dissipated easily, if at all.

Such is the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli situation; both Israelis and Palestinians perceive themselves as being highly vulnerable, and do their utmost to maintain their national identity - which is manifest in the continued existence of the group. Themes of destruction, physical annihilation, and nonexistence play a predominant role in their self-images. These existential concerns envelop the lives of both peoples, such that an ageless, nagging fear of 'the Other' pervades not only their historical memories and contemporary realities, but appears unlikely to wane with the seemingly inherent unpredictability of the morrow.

The image of the Jew, plagued with a collective psyche which agonizes over its two thousand years of pogrom, is well known:

I am named after my father's brother, who fell in the ranks of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw. This happened in 1920. My father was named after the brother of his father who was murdered in the Ukraine during a pogrom by rampaging peasants. This was in 1891. . . . Are we now still at the beginning of the road? At the middle? At the end? I only know this: in this half-century in which I live and breathe, fear of death has never left our house.

A genealogy of identity, such as that recounted above, has bound generations of Jews together into an empathetic atemporal communion of suffering. In the late nineteenth century, Jews, weary of the oppression of European anti-Semitism and marred by generations of diaspora, became galvanized by Herzl's dream of a Jewish

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7 Bill and Leiden add, however, that "anti-Semitism was less a religious movement than a racist one. Anti-Semites found their targets not merely in Jews per se, but in people they did not like or whom they feared or envied. They often identified these people as Jews. . . ." James Bill and Carl Leiden (eds.), Politics in the Middle East, 2d ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 327.
homeland. From this, the Zionist movement was formed and constituted around the idea that Palestine, the ancient land of the Jews as textualized in the Old Testament, was the telos of their new home. Their catch-cry, "A land without a people for a people without a land," epitomized the belief that most of Palestine was relatively empty, or inhabited by 'natives' thought by most Europeans to be culturally if not physiologically inferior - and thus cemented the foundation of an intractable security dilemma for future generations.

By 1914, about 85,000 Jews had wandered from the wilderness to settle in the promised land of Palestine - joining the 600,000 Palestinian Arabs already inhabited there - but deteriorating conditions, including harsh treatment of the Jews by the Ottomans in World War I, wartime dislocations and a failed harvest, prompted a decline in the population to 55,000 within a few years. By the late 1920s, Jewish immigration had dwindled to a mere trickle.

With the emergence of fascism in Europe, there came a conscious, systematic annihilation of the Jewish people that transformed a late nineteenth century Zionist dream into a mid-twentieth century Jewish necessity. Notions of security, self-determination, a Jewish identity, as well as a national homeland, became entrenched within the exhausted, yet determined, psyche of the diaspora. Farganis explains:

9 James Bill and Robert Springborg (eds.), Politics in the Middle East, 3d ed., (Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990), p. 316. Bill and Springborg also cite (p. 317) the following passage by a European intellectual of that period: "It is no exaggeration to say that throughout these long centuries the native inhabitants of Palestine do not appear to have made a single contribution of any kind whatsoever to material civilization. It was perhaps the most unprogressive country on the face of the earth. Its entire culture was derivative." Also see Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
11 Bill and Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, p. 333.
Before the holocaust one could debate with the Zionists whether theirs was the most reasonable solution to the treatment accorded the Jews in Europe; after Hitler there was no longer a place in the debate for the assimilationists. . . . The question facing Jews, as actors in history, was not whether to be Zionists but how best to realise the Zionist dream of a homeland in Palestine.12

Within the dynamically changing context of an emerging 'international system,' however, a national homeland would not suffice for the Jews, for it lacked both the legitimacy and security which they perceived only a state could provide. In 1947, upon the recommendation of the newly formed United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly, Palestine was partitioned into Jewish and Arab states, with an international zone encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The following year, on 14 May 1948, Israel declared its statehood. The Jewish people, however, found no consolation, let alone any sense of security, in its newly created state; incessant Arab hostility and conflicts in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 contributed to the further entrenchment of Jewish xenophobia - which resolves that the Jew is condemned to indomitable abuse and oppression - or what Goldmann coins "a persecution mania."13 The personal experience of Arie Eliav, former General Secretary of Israel's Labor Party, demonstrates the perpetuity of these symbols of destruction and genocide, despite the creation of an apparatus (the State of Israel) which was designed to mollify such insecurity:

A Jew born in Russia to refugees from violence in the midst of a bloody civil war; a man whose Zionist parents brought him to the Land of Israel as an infant and planted him in the golden sands of Tel Aviv; . . . a Jew who, after fighting as a youth in the battlefields of the Western Desert and Europe in World War II, was among those who opened up the Nazi death camps and helped to save the survivors; a man who went on to fight in the War of Independence and the wars of Israel that followed, until he was sent back to the rear; a father whose son continued to fight in the Yom Kippur War, while he himself was called to serve in the most terrible unit he had ever known, whose task it was to tell the parents about the deaths of their sons. . . .14

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13 As cited in Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 124.
The Israeli appropriation of this strong symbolism of 'the persecuted Jew' has allowed those within the current community to maintain a unilinear and unbroken perception of themselves, such that their reality becomes one of "utter loneliness," of a people surrounded by implacable enemies, ... and of a world coldly indifferent to the tribulations of the Jewish people." Nevertheless, the creation and maintenance of a particular Jewish 'history' has served to legitimate and recursively entrench (for itself, the diaspora and the West) Israel's existence as a symbol of collective Jewish identity.

Palestinians, on the other hand, have been unable to draw on any "vast historical tragedy of apocalyptic proportions" such as that identified with the Jews. Palestinians perceive themselves as being less 'understood' by those in the West, and deplore the disdain and 'negativity' often associated with them. Gilmour explains: "To millions of people the word Palestinian conjures up the picture of 'The Terrorist,' that uncouth, shifty figure with a gun, prepared to kill people of any age, sex or colour, without apparent reason." Contrary to such notions, Palestinians, too, bear ardent existential concerns.

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15 Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East*, p. 123.
16 Avineri explains, "... to be Jewish today means, in one way or another, feeling some link with Israel... it is the State of Israel that united more Jewish people all over the world than any other factor in Jewish life." Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State*, (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 219.
17 Said continues, "The Palestinian disaster (or nakba) is human: the destruction of a society, the dispossession and painfully secular, mundane exile that followed, the loss to Zionism of the right even to have a history and a political identity. Most of all the Palestinian has suffered because he or she has been unknown, an unacknowledged victim, and worse, a victim blamed not only for his or her disasters, but for those of others as well. Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (eds.), *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, (London: Verso, 1988), p. 6.
18 David Gilmour, *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians*, (London: Sphere Books, 1980), p. 15. Chomsky also argues that "Palestinians and their organizations... have been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and uncompromising refusal to come to terms with the existence of Israel or to accept the norms of decent behaviour." Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1983), p. 5.
For Palestinians, the "land without a people . . . " slogan proclaimed by the Zionists could not have been more of a misnomer, for not only was the land inhabited, it was (and still is) an integral element of Palestinian identity and culture. Land, or el ard, is expressed through literature, song, folktales, rhetoric, and political theory; it endows the Palestinian community with meaning and continuity. Turki expresses this communal affinity below:

Land. El ard. Everything . . . came to be seen as emerging from the womb of el ard: the origin of our mythology of hope, the vivid immediacies of daily life, metaphoric meditations on meaning, associative context of reference, as well as acoustic and tactile sensations. At every point of development, from childhood to old age, Palestinians lived on the land. Lived on it. Lived with it. Lived off it. From it they acquired their memories and their moods and their ego ideal and their core concept of their place in existence. The land always contained the actuality of the past and the potentiality of the future, and hence the intimate center of the present. Without it, very simply, a Palestinian could not establish his or her identity.19

From within this worldview, el ard - the land, and el umma - the community - are interdependent; they are woven into a single fabric, and form the basis for a simple Palestinian cry, "Ardi hiya hawayati," or "My land is my identity."20 Accordingly, Palestinians felt an estrangement from their land (i.e., their identity) as they witnessed an increasing Zionist presence and the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.21 The eventual loss of the West Bank and Gaza only exacerbated the feelings of an already disenchanted, dispossessed, and dispersed community. Said reflects on this faceless existence:

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20 Turki, Soul in Exile, p. 66.
21 "Since 1948 Israel has bulldozed 385 of the 475 Palestinian villages that were inside the 'Green Line' and wiped their names from maps, in many cases replacing them with Hebrew names. Officially, Palestinians in Israel are known as Israeli Arabs. Prime Minister Golda Meir declared in 1969 that there was no such thing as the Palestinian people - 'they did not exist.' In that same year Menachem Begin warned an Israeli audience of the consequences of allowing the term Palestine to be used. He said, 'If this is Palestine, then it belongs to a people who lived here before you came.'" Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, pp. 340-341.
How rich our mutability, how easily we change (and are changed) from one thing to another, how unstable our place - and all because of the missing foundation of our existence, the lost ground of our origin, the broken link with our land and our past. There are no Palestinians. Who are the Palestinians? 'The inhabitants of Judea and Samaria.' Non-Jews. Terrorists. Troublemakers. DPs. Refugees. Names on a card. Numbers on a list. Praised in speeches - el pueblo palestino, il popolo palestino, le peuple palestinien - but treated as interruptions, intermittent presences.22

Within such varied contexts, historical memories can be tenacious forces when unleashed into the realm of the present arena. Wallerstein argues that memories such as those imbued within the Israeli and Palestinian psyche have a primordial quality about them that circumscribe the shape and structure of future possibilities:

Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is an essential element in the socialisation of individuals, in the maintenance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness therefore is preeminently a moral phenomenon.23

Both the Israelis and the Palestinians, infused with the anxiety associated with their 'lessons of history,' are ever more adamant that the destruction of their group is inherent in 'the Other's' ideology. To Israelis, the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) attempt to liberate Palestine is synonymous with liquidating

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Turki, too, recalls: "I was just another eight year old growing up in the refugee camps. All around me people talked about Palestine as if it were the center where all the impulses of their human identity intersected. And everybody was angry. Their anger tangled in the hair of the tents and the muddy lanes of the refugee camps. The men and women were angry because they had to count their years without the harvest. The children were angry because, as they began to acquire a past, moment by moment, touch by touch, encounter by encounter, they discovered that a sense of otherness governed their lives . . . . A sense of ennui, of resignation, ruled the camp, our lives." Turki, *Soul in Exile*, pp. 18-19. Also see Fawaz Turki, "To Be a Palestinian," in Uri Davis, Andrew Mack and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), *Israel and the Palestinians*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), pp. 188-197.

Israel; and to Palestinians, Israel, as part of an inherently expansionist Zionist ideology, is prepared to eliminate Palestinian communities that hamper the achievement of its vision of a greater Israel.  

As such, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by exclusionary attitudes, whereby not only existential survival, but also the survival of one's history, identity, and legitimacy are intimately bound into a belief that the dispute can only be resolved in zero-sum terms. Thus, with both groups displaying a profound reluctance to accept and recognize 'the Other,' any suggestions to either party to make any effort even resembling a first step have been simply anathema to their physical and spiritual being. Amidst such vistas - where the brush strokes sweep broad and rich textures beyond the horizon, and where communal suffering and angst loom large, does the \textit{intifadah} represent a new beginning, or is it, too, condemned to the dictates of the 'Past'?  

\footnote{Kelman, "Creating the Conditions," p. 150.}  
\footnote{"Because each community, Palestinian and Israeli, denied the other's legitimacy as a collective, 'perpetual conflict' would prevail. 'This delegitimization is vital for both sides, for it enables both to believe in the exclusivity of their claim and in the absolute justice of their position.'" See Don Peretz, \textit{Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising}, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 27-29.}
INTIFADAH:
PALESTINIANS AND PALESTINIANIZATION

In the first section, the conflict was characterized specifically as one between Palestinians and Israelis, and not as an "Arab-Israeli" conflict. It is perhaps pertinent at this point to allude more fully to this distinction. Although the early twentieth century dispute over Palestine essentially affected an indigenous 'Palestinian' population, the subsequent "Arab-Israeli" conflict became one of various hostilities at both a regional and 'Superpower' level: first, between the new State of Israel and surrounding Arab countries; and second, between the Soviet Union and the United States. Within this milieu, the salient feature of these variously constituted rivalries is that the indigenous Palestinians always played a secondary role.

With the emergence of a "Palestinian-Israeli" impasse, it becomes necessary to highlight the explicit Palestinianization of the conflict - a process which has become symbolized by a different genesis to that of the broader notion of an "Arab-Israeli" conflict. This genesis manifest itself in late 1987, and became known as the intifadah - whereby indigenous Palestinians 'revolted' against the social contract they were apportioned, or, more substantively, 'revolted' against the lack of one.27 Kelman contends:

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been . . . increasingly transformed from an interstate conflict between Israel and its neighbouring states to an intercommunal conflict within the post-1967 borders of Israel. . . . The events [of the intifadah] both reflect and contribute to an intensification of the process of Palestinianization.28

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27 Ibid., p. 33.
Peretz adds, "Now the Arab states [are] the secondary participants, with Palestinians again in the lead."

This process of Palestinianization has remained a central strand of the uprising's tenacity and durability, so it is important to establish its validity within this section, which therefore allows one to explore the possibilities that have arisen (and will arise) from this starting point. Thus it becomes crucial to probe the recursive interaction between the possibility of new paradigmatic 'histories' being created from a generic situation (the intifadah) - which could result in a 'peace' settlement - and the pressures of 'past' identity, as outlined in section one, which vitiate such possibilities.

The intifadah has demonstrated a new resolve among Palestinians, despite the fact that prior to this spontaneous uprising, the Palestinian 'cause' seemed to be waning: analysts spoke of the disappearance of the Green Line, of the apparent apathy of Palestinian youth, of the fragmentation of a PLO consensus in both the occupied territories and the diaspora, and of the increased rejection of PLO policies and leadership. PLO offices closed in Jordan and Egypt. In the United States, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which sought to close the PLO's information office in Washington, D.C. and its United Nations observer status, was in the process of being approved overwhelmingly in Congress. Finally, media reports from the November 1987 Arab summit in Amman presented the meeting as:

an historic turning point in the course of Middle Eastern politics ... [and] ... were told that it signified the Arab world's long-awaited disengagement from the Palestine issue in favour of concentration on the Gulf war; the return of Egypt to the Arab fold without any concessions regarding its peace with Israel; "moderate" Jordan's taking on a pivotal role in the Arab world; and the PLO's imminent eclipse.

Contrary to popular analyses, however, the PLO and the Palestinian cause festered more than waned. The killing of four Palestinian workers in Gaza by an Israeli on 8 December 1987 became the impetus sparking an uprising which has continued for more than two years, claiming the lives of almost 1000 Palestinians, and injuring more than 80,000. "The intifadah took Israel by surprise, creating political turmoil within the country; it raised Palestinian national consciousness, created a new sense of solidarity, and once again focused world attention on the Palestinian problem." Nightly television images portrayed stone-laden youth, their faces covered by kufiyahs, confronting heavily-armed Israeli defense-force soldiers. The media capitalized on this apparent reversal of David and Goliath lore, whereby Israel is portrayed as the Leviathan reigning down upon some 'impure stock' - often deemed the "Jews of the Jews." The essence of the intifadah has reflected unprecedented support for and participation in civil resistance, which has cut across socio-political boundaries of the Palestinian community. Most notable has been the current generation of young Palestinians - cognizant only of life under occupation - who reject Israeli control as profoundly as their elders, but are less dependent on the Arab world, more willing to take risks, and unfettered by the fear of confronting, virtually unarmed, the

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33 As of 31 June 1990. PLO Information Office, Canberra, Australia, 24 July 1990.  
36 Forty-eight percent of Gazans and 46% of West Bankers were under 14 in 1987; A December 1988 study concluded that 76.9% of Gaza was under the age of 29. See Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestine Question," p. 497-498, and Aaron Miller, "Palestinians and the Intifada: One Year Later," *Current History*, vol. 88, no. 535, February 1989, p. 74.
weight of the Israeli army. Thirty-seven percent of those killed have been 16 years of age or under. The uprising's spontaneity and pervasiveness have become symbolized by these 'children of the stones.' Kuttab, who profiled these stone-throwing youth, observes: "To throw a stone is to be 'one of the guys'; to hit an Israeli car is to become a hero; and to be arrested and not confess to having done anything is to be a man." Kuttab also notes that despite the seeming spontaneity of such activities, a consistent pattern of organizing demonstrations could be discerned.

The seven to ten year olds roll tires into roads, pour gasoline on them, and set them afire; the eleven to fourteen year olds block traffic by placing large rocks in the road; and the fifteen to nineteen year olds, the 'veteran stone throwers,' inflict damage on passing cars with their homemade slingshots.

Many of these youths - some 50,000 to 60,000 since 1967, according to some estimates - have already seen the inside of Israeli jails; but instead of tempering the anger and frustration these Palestinians feel, the jails have become their universities and serve as sites for the 'indoctrination of Palestinian youth.' Highly

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37 Ann Lesch, "Uprising for Palestine: Editorial Commentary," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 11, no. 4, Summer 1988, p. 4-5. Lesch also provides the following example (p. 5): "To cite one case, on February 8 [1988] Khader Tarazi, the 19 year-old son of a prominent Catholic family in Gaza, came across a demonstration in the city. He was chased into a house by soldiers, who beat him with clubs and gun butts until blood poured from his mouth and nose. Then his limp body was tied to the hood of a military jeep and he was beaten further. The soldiers drove off, still carrying the body on the hood. During Khader's funeral the next day, soldiers surrounded the church and tear-gassed the 600 mourners. Nevertheless, the funeral procession down the main street bore an air of defiance, the casket draped with the Palestinian flag and mourners carrying flags and photos of the youth."


41 Peretz, *Intifada*, p. 84.


organized networks of leadership, education, and communication have weaved their way through prison cracks and crevices, and directed the population from within. Secretly-elected committees mediate disputes between political factions, stage hunger strikes, and transmit appeals. An extensive educational system includes classes in national politics and history, debates on current affairs, literacy programs, and instruction in specialised areas. Benvenisti observes, "Graduates' of Israeli prisons are accorded honoured status by their peers and gain easier terms for West Bank university admission and for university examinations." Furthermore, communication between detainees is unparalleled. Radwan Abu Ayash recalls:

The communications were superb. If you wanted something to be known, you hid a note in a cigarette box - God, the cigarettes were awful - and passed it from cell to cell, then from ward to ward, and then it was transported by labourers from yard to yard. Within five minutes the whole prison can know anything you want. I wrote a long song about the guards watching us and our living in the sun. In a few days everybody in the prison knew the words, and they would sing it all the time.

These 'cadre schools' have maintained an impressive reputation; so much so that some 'activists' claimed to have deliberately violated Israeli law so as to gain entry into the system. Abu Ayash continues, "We had a very well-organized society, and if you compared it with the outside, you found you were in a real school of thought. It was a school of uprising, a school of spirit, a school of hope." Similarly, a young Palestinian noted, "If someone goes in blind, he comes out with a hundred eyes."

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45 Ibid. A former detainee explains, "We read a lot and had lessons; people who wanted to learn English or Hebrew or physics would find one of the prisoners to teach them. And we would have political discussions at night." John and Janet Wallach, *Still Small Voices*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 5.
50 Kifner, "Settlers in West Bank Kill," p. 3.
Women, too, have played a prominent role in the intifadah. With a vacuum created by the incarceration of thousands of men, women have emerged from their 'behind-the-scenes' roles to tackle responsibilities traditionally associated with their male counterparts. Not only have they been active leaders in the neighbourhood committees, and political and communal organizations, but they have also participated in medical, educational and social work operations. They organized emergency teams to treat those wounded, child care during school strikes, and supplies for those hampered by a lack of funds or simply unable to shop.\textsuperscript{51} Most notably, women were often found amongst those active in civil unrest, supplying demonstrators with necessary 'ammunition,' food and water. During the first ten months of the uprising, they accounted for 20-25\% of all casualties incurred.\textsuperscript{52}

Activism also cut across social class, with the middle class - merchants, professionals and small industrialists - assisting in the maintenance of the intifadah. Merchants adhered to strike calls, professionals reduced or cancelled client fees or offered free advice to the community, and industrial employers retained their employees at normal salaries regardless of fluctuating market conditions.\textsuperscript{53}

Accordingly, economic resistance has been a primary facet of the intifadah, one which is rarely alluded to in the media. Prior to the intifadah, the Palestinian economy had become heavily dependent on Israel for trade and employment; military regulations required permits for all forms of economic endeavours, down to the planting of a single tree.\textsuperscript{54} Palestinians were allowed to sell selected products to Israel, but only if they met Israeli standards and/or did not compete with Israeli products; this practice eliminated most goods, except for produce - such as olives - which were not cultivated in commercial quantities by Israel. Palestinians were also

\textsuperscript{51} Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, pp. 96-97.
\textsuperscript{52} Sayigh, "The intifadah continues," p. 28.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.
curtailed from exporting goods to the European market, lest it compete with similar Israeli products.\textsuperscript{55} Consequently, in 1986 Israel maintained a trade surplus of $491 million with the West Bank and Gaza. This represented 10.9\% of total Israeli exports and 89.4\% of the territories' imports, making the territories Israel's second-largest export market after the United States.\textsuperscript{56} In 1987, Israel's trade surplus with the West Bank and Gaza was $802 million.\textsuperscript{57}

By the mid-1980s, more than half of Gaza's work force and one third of West Bank labourers earned their livelihood from across the Green Line. Moreover, because agricultural labourers were attracted to work opportunities in Israel, land under cultivation decreased and Palestinian agriculture lost one-third of its share of GNP. This had a profound effect on the Palestinian community, for "uncultivated land is subject to confiscation. Israel has taken 51\% of the land and 70\% of the water in the West Bank and Gaza since 1987."\textsuperscript{58}

The \textit{intifadah} has encouraged \textit{all} sectors of the community to identify economic hardship with \textit{sumud}, or \textit{steadfastness} against the occupation.\textsuperscript{59}

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\item \textsuperscript{55} McDowall, \textit{Palestine and Israel}, p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Benvenisti, \textit{1987 Report}, pp. 10-11.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Mendelsohn, \textit{A Compassionate Peace}, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 18; Gharaibeh, \textit{The Economies of the West Bank}, pp. 59-82. Raja Khalidi expounds: "More than any other issue of Arab development in Israel, that of agriculture has been the focal point for conflict and controversy, even from before 1948. The crucial issues of ownership and access to land and water have placed the 'agrarian question' at the forefront of the concerns of generations of Zionist and Palestinian policy makers, activists and farmers. For the Zionist movement and Israel, the acquisition and exploitation of the land was a major element in the successful establishment of the state, and agriculture represented a significant growth centre in the economy for many years. For the predominantly peasant Palestinian Arab population, agriculture was historically their main pillar of subsistence. The land has since become the basis for maintaining an existence in their country as well as a highly emotive symbol of national identity. . . . The appropriation of land previously owned by Palestinian Arab peasants, either refugees or new Israeli citizens, provided Jewish agriculture with a vast resource that otherwise would have been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain." Raja Khalidi, \textit{The Arab Economy in Israel: The Dynamics of a Region's Development}, (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 65-66.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Grossman explains, "\textit{Sumud} expresses tenacity and stamina, and a sort of passive combativeness, gritting one's teeth to keep from giving in, and to keep from losing one's mind. \textit{Sumud} means to bow one's head and live, somehow, until the storm
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has been placed on self-reliance, a willingness to accept austerity, and an adjustment to lower living standards to demonstrate solidarity for the Palestinian cause. With notable success, Palestinians have boycotted Israeli products, from cigarettes to clothes to cars. "It became a point of honour for shopkeepers to reject stocks of Israeli items and for customers to demand Palestinian replacements for them." Luxury items - such as video-cassettes and televisions - as well as commodities that had become basics - such as soap, candy, soft drinks, and meat - have declined from household use. In addition, Palestinians have been encouraged to increase local production (i.e., become self-sufficient by growing vegetables and/or raising animals) to replace boycotted goods and to attempt to stem the 'taking' of land by Israel. Clearly, some efforts have been more successful than others, but Peretz argues that these measures have contributed to increased morale and national consciousness more than to any self-sustaining 'alternative economy.'

As a result of this new Palestinian economic consciousness, sales of Israeli products fell from $928 million in 1987 to $650 million in 1988, and Israel's balance of trade with the territories plummeted to $42 million from $802 million. Furthermore, since 1987 farmers in the occupied territories have been allowed to make direct sales to European markets at the insistence of the European Economic Community (EEC).

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Binur, too, notes, "... *sumud* is a more basic form of resistance growing out of the idea that merely to exist, to survive and remain on one's land, is an act of defiance, especially when deportation is the one thing the Palestinians fear most." Yoram Binur, *My Enemy, My Self*, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 177. Also see Bill and Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, p. 307.


62 Rouhana, "The Other *Intifada*," p. 20.

The final facet of broad-based support for the *intifadah* has been exemplified by its leadership, for although the uprising manifest itself spontaneously, an organized grassroots leadership soon emerged. Initially, local neighbourhood committees were established to assist with the immediate needs of the *intifadah*. Emergency care was arranged for rising casualties, food and other supplies were organized for those people who had their homes sealed or destroyed, and child care was needed following school closures. Increased responsibility soon followed, including caring for public hygiene, providing alternative education, distributing agricultural produce, and maintaining 'guard duty' against approaching Israeli troops or settlers. These committees became "... the backbone of the uprising, comprising as many as a hundred small committees in each of the major cities and up to ten in every refugee camp and village. The process of leadership developed from the base up."\(^64\)

The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) subsequently developed to synthesize and coordinate activities between the various communities; it soon demonstrated adroitness as well as authority in directing the uprising. So as to avoid arrest, the UNLU has refused to disclose its identity, and thus far, its members have been successful in eluding Israeli authorities. By far the most tangible evidence of UNLU leadership has been in the production and distribution of periodic leaflets, or *bayanat*. These leaflets represent the primary source of information regarding the uprising, and instruct the various Palestinian communities on their roles in sustaining the intensity of the *intifadah*.\(^65\) For example, *Communique no. 16* of 13 May 1988 articulates:


\(^{65}\) For a brief discussion of the leaflets, see Helena Cobban, "The PLO and the *Intifada*," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 44, no. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 208-211.
To the Masses of our People, forty years have passed since the eviction of our people from its homeland. . . . The current national revolution and the sacrifices that it has entailed have succeeded in obtaining international recognition of our legitimate national rights. . . . We salute the heroic role the people of the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip have played in escalating the uprising. . . . We urge the intensification of strikes against the police and collaborators. . . . We urge the escalation of the refusal to pay taxes. . . . We call upon our people to intensify the boycott against Israeli goods for which there are no [sic] local substitutes or with which they can dispense. . . . We call for complete adherence in all areas to the commercial strike and to the schedule permitting the opening of places of business between 9 a.m. and 12 noon. . . . At a time when we commemorate the painful anniversary of our dispersion and mark, along with the Muslim world, the Feast of al Fitr we call upon our people to hold prayers in memory of the martyrs of the uprising. . . . May the banner of the Uprising flutter over the path of liberation and independence. Long live our glorious uprising! We shall be victorious!66

The ascendancy of the UNLU is significant because it manifests a new development in the self-determined and self-reliant efforts of the Palestinian community. Prior to the *intifadah*, some disquiet was vocalized with respect to the PLO leadership having "become the property of the Palestinian middle classes in the diaspora and that many of the leadership led relatively luxurious lives, insulated from the realities of nation building as these were experienced under occupation."67 With the realization that the *intifadah* represented more than another passing phase in the "Arab-Israeli" conflict, the UNLU has maintained its autonomy, and has proven its capabilities as a new force to be reckoned with, in that it was established from *within* the territories. Many analysts note the UNLU's important stature as frontline combatants in the struggle for a Palestinian state in relation to what could be accomplished by a factional leadership of Palestinians abroad.68

Nevertheless, such new leadership was not meant to discount the importance, involvement, or commitment of the PLO in the uprising. A partnership evolved between the two, whereby decision-making processes could be accomplished with

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67 McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, p. 121.
the consent of both. Accordingly, UNLU communiques have remained emphatic in their recognition of the PLO, as well as unequivocal that all Palestinians, both inside and outside of Palestine, are represented by the PLO.

In effect, most analysts agree that the intifadah has become a symbol of the 'maturing' of Palestinian national consciousness, of a new self-confidence and sense of unity of purpose. Walid Khalidi notes:

After four decades since the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians have been pushed and pulled together by a multitude of shared experiences which have created a sense of national community rare in the Middle East. . . . [It] has transcended geographic dispersion, village, clan and sectarian loyalties, as well as the pressures of Arab host governments and Israeli occupiers. The Palestinians . . . are irreconcilable to living in a limbo of permanent statelessness. As Israel is here to stay, the Palestinians are here to stay, too.

Porat, an Israeli scholar, agrees that "this is the first time that there has been a popular action, covering all social strata and groups. . . . The whole population is rebelling, and this is creating a common national experience." Indeed, the intifadah has reflected an increased Palestinianization of the conflict, whereby all Palestinians have been actively engaged in a national struggle for their self-determination, for an acknowledgement of their history and identity, and for the validity of their homeland - manifest in a Palestinian state.

Yasir Arafat, himself, recognized this new dimension of Palestinianization:

. . . [It] should be emphasized that the present situation of Palestinians does not differ from their past in terms of the gravity and complexity of problems. However, it should be pointed out that what has changed in this sense are, in fact, the Palestinians themselves.

69 Sahliyeh states: "This . . . should not be taken to mean that the Palestinians in the occupied territories are about to abandon the PLO. On the contrary, the vast majority of these Palestinians envisage the PLO as a symbol of Palestinian national unity. Many West Bank youths strongly identify with the ideology of Palestinian nationalism, [and] are firmly committed to finding a solution to the problem of the Palestinians in and outside the occupied territories. Such attitudes lend more support to the PLO. . . ." Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership, p. 184.
As such, just as the Palestinians in the occupied territories have maintained their resolve to continue the *intifadah*, Arafat and the Palestine National Council (PNC) have attempted to refine their disposition toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In June 1988, a statement calling for accommodation with Israel was first presented at an Arab League summit, and then printed under the authorship of Bassam Abu Sharif (special advisor to Arafat) in the *New York Times*; it was considered to be a first step toward conciliation by Arafat.\(^7^3\) The text included the following passages:

> Israel's objectives are lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security are also the objectives of the Palestinian people. No one can understand the Jewish people's centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it means to be stateless and the object of the fear and prejudice of the nations. . . . [We] know what it feels like when human beings are considered somewhat less human than others and denied the basic rights that people around the globe take for granted. We feel that no people - neither the Jewish people nor the Palestinian people - deserve the abuse and disenfranchisement that homelessness inevitably entails. We believe that all peoples - the Jewish and the Palestinian included - have the right to run their own affairs, expecting from their neighbours not only non-belligerence, but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure. . . . The PLO . . . does accept Resolution 242 and 338. What prevents it from saying so unconditionally is not what is in the Resolutions, but what is not in them . . . the national rights of the Palestinian people.\(^7^4\)

At its November 1988 meeting in Algiers, the PNC proclaimed its Palestinian Declaration of Independence, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) by a majority of 253 to 46, recognized Israel's right to exist, and renounced terrorism.\(^7^5\) Arafat then detailed this new policy for the U.N. General Assembly in Geneva in December.\(^7^6\) The primary goals of the Palestinians have remained clear - negotiations at an international conference, which will include


\(^{75}\) For an 'insider's view' of the PNC meeting, an interview of competing groups within the PLO highlights the spectrum of opinion of Arafat's initiative. George Stein, "The spectrum of Palestinian opinion," *The Middle East*, no. 173, March 1989.

\(^{76}\) Note also that because the United States would not provide Arafat (deemed a 'terrorist') with a visa to enter the country, the General Assembly moved temporarily from New York to Geneva for the first time in history to enable Arafat to set out the fundamentals of the initiative.
the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, leading to an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. The PLO initiative, however, introduced a 'revolutionary' understanding of its historical objectives. Palestinians have confronted their 'reality' - i.e., that coexistence, better known as the 'two-state solution,' can be a viable alternative to the violence and 'homelessness' they have endured for so many years. The Palestinians' attempt at 'peace' necessarily involves giving up its long-cherished goal of a unified secular democratic state of Arabs and Jews in the whole of Palestine.77

77 "It's all up to George now," The Middle East, no. 170, December 1988, p. 13.
III

ISRAEL:
'MANAGING' THE INTIFADAH

Israel, conscious of its history and genealogy of identity, has remained wary of the intifadah and Palestinian intent. Life in Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza is viewed through the lenses of security and territorial depth, which Palestinians have disrupted with their acts of 'violence.' For Yitzhak Shamir, the intifadah is the latest ruse by Palestinians in their mission to annihilate the Jews. For Yitzhak Shamir, the intifadah is the latest ruse by Palestinians in their mission to annihilate the Jews.78

Any discussion of the 'Palestinianization' of the conflict or of an increasingly moderate PLO has been dismissed as mere folly. Shamir asserts: "The basis of the conflict has remained the same. The change has been one of tactics."79

International legal opinion maintains that Israel is an occupying regime in the territories and, therefore, that its administration is subject to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the protection of civilian populations under military occupation.80 In their view, residents of the West Bank and Gaza are "in the hands of an occupying power of which they are not nationals."81 Israel has continued to reject provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and instead bases its claims on the borders set during the British mandatory period (1920-1948). Israel insists that neither Jordan nor

78 Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," p. 359.
79 Ibid. Note also, however, that Shamir refused to support the Camp David Accords. Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 36.
Egypt can uphold legal claims to the land of Palestine, because the West Bank and Gaza are not 'enemy territory,' and as such, Israel maintains exclusive legal and moral rights to the whole of Palestine.\(^8\) "This common perception thus vitiates any rights of the [Palestinians] . . . to establish an independent political entity within the borders of former mandatory Palestine because all the country belongs to the Jewish people."\(^83\)

Despite dismissing the applicability of the Geneva Convention, Israel contends that it does abide by the Convention's 'humanitarian' provisions, whereby the occupying power is accountable for the protection of persons under occupation.\(^84\) Actions prohibited under such circumstances include: any measures of brutality, whether applied by military or civilian agents; collective punishments and reprisals against protected persons or their property; forcible transfers or deportations; and unlawful confinement or deprivation of rights of fair and regular trial.\(^85\) However, Israeli policy has seemed to demonstrate otherwise. In 1987, for example, Israel requested that ex-Supreme Court President Landau head a special judicial commission to examine alleged human rights abuses in the occupied territories. The Landau Commission confirmed, among other human rights violations, that the \textit{Shin Bet} (Israel's Internal Security Service) had "for many years illegally used physical and psychological pressure to obtain confessions from security suspects."\(^86\) Nonetheless, the report recommended that, in appropriate

\(^8\) Israel maintains that Jordan's prior annexation of the West Bank was illegal. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.
\(^83\) Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, pp. 5-6. Benvenisti adds, "The remaining one-and-a-half million Palestinians are citizens of a foreign state (in the West Bank) or stateless altogether (in Gaza). They are deprived of all political rights, ostensibly because they are under military occupation, though even their rights under international conventions governing military occupation are not assured since the government of the republic does not recognize the application of these conventions to the territories." \textit{Benvenisti, 1987 Report}, p. 71.
\(^84\) Israeli and Ehrenfeld, "Between the Peak and the Pit," p. 424.
\(^85\) Mendelsohn, \textit{A Compassionate Peace}, p. 45.
circumstances, limited 'physical and psychological pressure' should be allowed to continue. The Israeli cabinet voted to accept the Commission's recommendations, and such pressure continued unabated.

Likewise, Israel has maintained an obstinate position with respect to its 'management' of the *intifadah*. In January of 1988, Defense Minister Rabin declared a new policy of employing "might, power and beatings" to quell the unrest and to restore 'order.' In September 1988, Rabin introduced the use of 'plastic bullets,' stating, "it is our intention to wound as many of them as possible . . . inflicting injuries is precisely the aim of using plastic bullets." Subsequent reports of Israeli human rights violations abound: houses have been sealed or demolished; prisons are overcrowded; and former West Bank Palestinians, who were not present in the territories at the time of the 1968 census conducted after the June war, have been refused their requests for reunification. Palestinian children have been held by Israeli authorities for long periods without charges; they have been beaten, kicked, hung by their wrists, forced to stand hooded, denied adequate sleep, food, water, medical care, or baths. Tear gas is often thrown into homes, and accounted for

88 *Middle East International*, no. 335, 7 October 1988, as cited in McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, p. 15.
sixty-seven deaths by October 1988.\textsuperscript{93} Shin Bet employed perjury on a routine basis to convict those who claimed their confessions were coerced.\textsuperscript{94} Most have been arrested for suspected "Hostile Terrorist Activities," that include writing slogans on walls, singing 'nationalist' songs, possessing literature that is 'nationalist' in content, raising a flag, making a 'V' (victory) sign with the hand, or displaying colours of the Palestinian flag in any form.\textsuperscript{95} Many Palestinian deaths have resulted from the use of high velocity bullets by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during attempts to halt incidents involving stones or fleeing suspects.\textsuperscript{96}

Israeli authorities have also attempted to dissipate the tide of Palestinian economic resistance. Customs regulations have been tightened; telephone lines cut; fuel supplies halted; and shops have been forced open during strikes, and conversely welded shut during trading hours. The circulation of funds (i.e., the amount of cash allowed in the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan) has been significantly curtailed, so as to restrict daily business and commercial transactions, but more importantly to cut the flow of PLO funds into the territories.\textsuperscript{97} The activities of Palestinian farmers have been also impeded in the hopes of undermining the territories' economy. In October 1988, exporting olive oil to Jordan was blocked. Farmers were prevented from irrigating, spraying, or harvesting during the imposition of curfews, resulting in

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Middle East International}, no. 336, 21 October 1988, as cited in McDowall, \textit{Palestine and Israel}, p. 267.\
\textsuperscript{94} Gaza Bar Association, "The Imprisonment . . . of Children," p. 120.\
\textsuperscript{95} Said notes that "Father Gabin of Gaza, an artist, was given a six-month prison sentence for using black, green, red, and white in one of his works. Said, \textit{After the Last Sky}, p. 20.\
\textsuperscript{96} U.S. Department of State, \textit{Country Reports . . . 1988}, p. 1377. Israel often discounts such 'stories' of violence, despite 'evidence' to the contrary. For example, in December of 1989, ABC News showed a videotape of Israeli troops in Bethlehem who fired - without warning - directly at fleeing Palestinian demonstrators. One Palestinian was killed after being hit in the back of the head. While showing this tape, it simultaneously aired a translation of an army spokesperson's account of the incident, saying the soldiers had "merely yelled warnings and fired into the air, or at the legs of the demonstrators." "An Israeli Rights Group Fights for Palestinians," \textit{New York Times}, 19 January 1990, p. A9.\
\textsuperscript{97} Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, p. 72.
significant crop losses. In Beit Omar, residents were denied permits to market their plums and forced to leave them to rot, costing the village an estimated 90% of its annual income.98

The refusal to pay taxes as a form of civil resistance has managed to confound the Israeli government, with tax collection having decreased by 30% in two years (1988-1989).99 In response, the military authorities have imposed a plethora of punitive measures in an attempt to fracture such resistance. Palestinians crossing the border to work in Israel must pass a computerized tax checkpoint. Those who owe back taxes find their cars, boats, produce, or equipment impounded, as well as accrue daily fines until they pay. In June of 1989, Gazans were required to obtain magnetic ID cards (for $10), described as "an honesty card, given to anyone who is cleared by the security forces or tax authorities."100 Thirty-thousand Gazans failed to qualify.101 Any Palestinian who wishes to travel abroad, or register for a driver's license, construction permit, import-export permit, or birth or death certificate must apply in person, and present certification from several different offices proving that taxes have been paid.102 In 1989, Israel introduced a tax in the territories, in which not only cars must be licensed (from $250 to $1000), but donkey carts ($250) and bicycles ($15) as well.103

In one of the most well-known efforts to break a tax revolt, military authorities 'laid siege' to the village of Beit Sahur, a predominantly middle-class Christian community, for forty-two days in 1989. Telephone and road links were cut, and a nightly curfew was imposed. Few craftsmen and merchants paid their

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100 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 19.
101 *Ibid*.
103 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 20.
taxes - a mere $25,000 was collected - whereas an estimated $1.5 million in personal property from shops and homes was confiscated.\(^{104}\) Furthermore, Israeli officials stated that forty merchants were arrested, thirty-five were indicted on criminal charges and four had been tried and sentenced to fines of $2000 or 180 days in jail.\(^{105}\) Nonetheless, this particular effort to break a tax revolt was largely unsuccessful, further cementing a common Palestinian identity:

> The Israeli crackdown here was intended to liquidate one of the most concentrated centers of resistance in the *intifadah*, . . . and discourage the spread of massive acts of civil disobedience. Yet while the operation severely damaged the economic base of the town, . . . it had succeeded only in making Beit Sahur into a symbol of peaceful resistance that could help revive the *intifadah* elsewhere.\(^{106}\)

In light of the visible 'failure' of the Beit Sahur effort, and the ostensible successes of others, Israel has suffered extensive economic costs. Reserve duty has been extended from forty-five to sixty days, and the number of soldiers in the territories has been increased by five times, accounting for at least $120 million per month, or almost $1.5 billion annually in increased military and police expenditures.\(^{107}\) With approximately two-thirds of its employees from the territories, the construction industry has suffered immense losses. As a result, housing prices rose by nearly a third during 1988-1989.\(^{108}\) Citrus growers, too, are dependent on workers from the territories. Textile and shoe industries have also suffered. Tourism declined by approximately 15-25%.\(^{109}\) Moreover, insurance rates have increased in response to the large number of fires, often attributed to

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\(^{104}\) Diehl, "Israel Lifts Siege," p. A35.

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.


'nationalist arson.' In 1988, inflation rose to 32%, and in June 1990, unemployment in Israel reached 9.3%, the highest in years. Approximately 500,000 Israelis were classified as living below the poverty line in January 1990. In effect, with a debt to GDP ratio of more than 100%, Israel cannot afford the 2-4% losses in GDP that it has incurred since the beginning of the intifadah.

Public attitudes and perceptions regarding the intifadah have indicated an increased polarization across the broad Jewish community. For some who have reflected upon the uncanny parallels between Palestinian 'history' and Jewish 'history,' continued occupation over and hostility toward another people is perceived as an aberration of the 'democratic' society Israel so desires. Accordingly, they have expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment with the government's handling of security in the territories. 'Peace' groups have emerged with prodigious regularity, and at least seventy-five groups have been identified, some of which have become quite influential. Included in this list is the Council for Peace and Security, formed in 1988 by ex-general Aharon Yariv, a former chief of military intelligence. The Council, which boasts the membership of more than two hundred retired senior officers of the Israeli Defense Forces, asserts that Israel's security

110 Peretz, Intifada, p. 150.
112 Drew Harrison, "Deadlock on all fronts," The Middle East, no. 183, January 1990, p. 7.
116 Included in the Council are 36 retired or reserve major-generals, 84 retired brigadiers, and more than 100 retired colonels. Peretz, Intifada, p. 139.
does not depend on the continued occupation of the territories, and furthermore, that such occupation may indeed be detrimental to security.\textsuperscript{117}

The number of conscientious objectors has also increased. In 1989, several reserve units demonstrated against "their illogical and immoral burden of reserve duty in the territories."\textsuperscript{118} Such apprehension with suppressing the \textit{intifadah} is exemplified by an IDF reservist - an immigrant from England who had been the national secretary of a Zionist youth movement while at Cambridge - following his experiences in the unit that occupied Kabatiya:

The troops moved into Kabatiya's school to 'administer' things. Desks, textbooks, school materials - all are discarded, dumped in a big pile, as the school seethes with sweating bodies. . . . The battalion commander tells us that [the inhabitants] remain under curfew until they are 'broken,' whatever that means. . . . An obscene situation as I chase down a side road after a nine-year-old who had spotted a piece of bread in the gutter. . . . The roughness of the commands as we scream maniacally at women to shut their curtains. Bear in mind, 11,000 residents, an average of ten people to a family, confined to boiling, cramped living quarters twenty-four hours a day. . . .

I've been branded as soft-hearted. . . . Remarkable moment as soldiers steal vegetables from Arab fields, and can't understand when I say that you can't do that. You can't arrest ten-year-olds for picking tomatoes after curfew (their \textit{own} tomatoes), and then laughingly take them yourself.

The biggest disillusion for me are the officers. I think they actually enjoy it: the power, the control and, above all, the humiliation.

The humiliation goes on all the time. . . . Humiliation of old men who are trying to sneak into the fields at night to save two kilos of rotting peppers, caught by my officers and sent to Jenin for 'correction.'

Tonight my first view of dehumanization. I escorted a group of teenagers to Jenin detention centre. Supposedly they had stepped into their yards during curfew. On arrival in Jenin the guard asked me, 'How many dogs have you brought?' Once the man opposite you is a dog, anything goes. . . .

Among the soldiers, a depressing routine of almost wild abandon. Everybody here makes up their own rules. The younger officers see our job here as some kind of game, and their behaviour ranges from callousness to pure sadism. . . .\textsuperscript{119}

In contrast to such 'dovish' views above, a substantial majority of the Israeli population has tended to gravitate toward the other end of the spectrum, where historical memories of annihilation still reign strong. For example, Israelis surveyed

\textsuperscript{117} Mendelsohn, \textit{A Compassionate Peace}, p. 30.
in March 1989 believed that, if the opportunity arose, the 'Arabs' would indeed "commit a holocaust against the Jews in Israel."\textsuperscript{120} Although 58\% were amenable to conducting a dialogue with the PLO, a mere 18\% believed the PLO was ready to make concessions for peace.\textsuperscript{121} In another survey, 89\% did not believe that "Arafat was interested in peace."\textsuperscript{122} A poll conducted in August 1988 revealed that 49\% of Jewish Israelis favoured population 'transfer' as the preferred means to preserve "the democratic and Jewish nature of the state."\textsuperscript{123} Similarly, a February 1990 survey demonstrated a further hardening of opinion against the intifadah. More than half said they believed "security agents investigating Palestinian activities should be allowed to use techniques that would be illegal if used against Jews."\textsuperscript{124} More than fifty percent also believed that "the press should be prohibited from writing about or photographing mistreatment of Arabs by soldiers."\textsuperscript{125}

Such surveys, though never completely able to provide a definitive answer, do serve as useful indicators for analysing long-term trends within Israeli public opinion; and with the intifadah now well into its third year, it seems evident that the fracturing of Israeli society has become acute. For a significant portion of the

\textsuperscript{121} Note that the question regarding an Israel-PLO dialogue is qualified by the clause, "if the PLO officially recognizes Israel and ceases terrorist activities." More importantly, however, is the fact that the survey was conducted after Arafat and the PLO had recognized Israel and rejected the use of terrorism.\textsuperscript{122} Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.} It is also interesting to note that "most Israelis perceived the uprising only in terms of its violence and were unaware of its nonviolent aspects. Like the world at large, they saw the uprising through television images of petrol bombs, the masked \textit{shabab}, and the confrontation between Israeli soldiers and screaming, stone-throwing youths. Few were aware that the Palestinian resistance involved nonpayment of taxes, boycott of Israeli products, and mass organization for communal social action. Despite the wide press coverage of IDF actions in the territories, most Israelis believed that the occupation was beneficial to the Palestinians, that it raised their living standards and taught them democracy, perhaps at the cost of some occasional discomfort." Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, p. 121.
population, historical memories of pogrom and holocaust buttress their perception that the *intifadah* is yet another threat to the future existence of the Jewish people. Yet, they have had to recursively validate such experiences within the context of an uprising which has consciously disclaimed the use of armed force.

Within this framework of Palestinian civil resistance, quelling the uprising has remained elusive for the Israeli government, but the number of Jewish lives lost has been nominal,\(^\text{126}\) so 'management' has thus far seemed to be an 'acceptable' manner in which to deal with this reality. Peretz states:

\begin{quote}
The fact that few had suffered led to acceptance of the situation, reinforced by persistence of the national self-image: Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East; 'purity of arms' in the IDF; equality of all citizens; the Arabs against peace and the Jews for it.\(^\text{127}\)
\end{quote}

Regardless of whether the *intifadah* is 'quelled' or 'managed,' however, Israeli public opinion has hardened, and shows no sign of abating.\(^\text{128}\) With this in mind, McDowall aptly concludes, "the message for Palestinian citizens is that they are generally unwelcome."\(^\text{129}\)

This polarization (or 'paralyzation') of Israeli society was further mirrored by Israel's dilemmas over its leadership during the first half of 1990. Because the electoral process is such that members are elected at large - that is, any party

\(^{126}\) Such tallying of lives lost should seemingly remain irrelevant in the context of the whole 'Jewish experience.'

\(^{127}\) Cohen labels such a response as the "psychology of self-deception," whereby "many Israelis find it literally impossible to believe that their own people - sons, brothers, husbands, friends - could do something like drag a fifteen-year-old boy from his home, blindfold him, line him up against a wall and break his arms and legs. This information is threatening, so it slips into the black holes [of the mind]. Or else, it is repackaged in a more acceptable way, so that we insist that these cases are few and isolated, that they are being stopped now; that the media always emphasize and exaggerate these sorts of occurrences; that the army is being provoked beyond all endurance... The point of neutralization or repackaging is not to deny responsibility, but to deny reality." Peretz, *Intifada*, pp. 157-158.

\(^{128}\) In an unusual twist of irony, more than 150 angry Israelis mobilized around the home of a Jewish legislator; they threw stones and chanted "Arab lover!" and "Death to the Arabs!" in response to his founding of an organization which monitors 'human rights' abuses in the territories. "An Israeli Rights Group Fights for Palestinians," P. A9.

receiving one percent of the vote obtains representation in the Knesset - no party has ever taken more than 38% of the vote, and it follows that no party has ever been able to form a government without taking other parties into coalition. This structural 'weakness' "reached a climax in 1984 when neither Labor nor Likud could form a government without being heavily compromised between constituent ideologies and with only the narrowest of majorities in the Knesset." The National Unity Government (NUG) - a national coalition between Labor and Likud - was subsequently formed. Due to such an arrangement, though, fundamental divisiveness between left and right resulted in numerous altercations, and few accomplishments. The growing polarization of Israeli society further manifest itself in the 1988 election in which fifty-two days of negotiation brought merely a reprise of a divisive NUG. Six years after its inception, Diehl notes:

... [N]ational unity has become a political institution to which Israel is both enslaved and addicted, an unhappy marriage of left and right that has served to postpone rather than implement painful decisions. It is a union that the country's politicians have professed to loathe yet have hesitated to dismantle, fearful of the forces of internal conflict that may be released.

Ever-cognizant of the uprising's tenacity, Labor and Likud could agree on little from within this framework. This internal paralysis created ambiguous policies and an indefinite postponement of a means to 'deal with' the Palestinians. Peres favoured compromise, Shamir advocated suppression. In March 1989, however, Shamir did offer an initiative during his visit to the United States; though unlike the 'two-state solution' proposed by the PLO, Shamir reaffirmed that Israel "cannot

130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
134 The Shamir Plan will be discussed more fully in the next section.
lend [itself] to any steps that will result in a Palestinian state, which is a prescription not for peace but for war."\textsuperscript{135} Shamir later avowed that "the intifadah will never force Israel to change its policies and it will never do so even if [the uprising] lasts for ten years," and added that he would rather meet with the devil than with the PLO.\textsuperscript{136}

In turn, the PLO expressed its reservations with the 'Shamir Plan' because it deems itself the legitimate representative of the Palestinian community. Indeed, a 1988 study of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip concluded that 75.2% supported Yasir Arafat and the PLO as their preferred leader.\textsuperscript{137} For Palestinians, then, being separated into factions would defeat the essence of Palestinian unity achieved through the intifadah. This Palestinianization of the conflict, in conjunction with a fractured (and fracturing) Israeli leadership, resulted in an increasingly mercurial, unstable and provisional Israeli regime. One year after the 'Shamir Plan' was introduced, the National Unity Government collapsed.\textsuperscript{138} Thus, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continued unabated, and the 'peace process' remained elusive.

\textsuperscript{135} Yitzhak Shamir, "Remarks Following Discussions," p. 492.
\textsuperscript{136} Harrison, "Deadlock on all fronts," p. 7.
\textsuperscript{138} Shamir became the first to fail a vote of confidence in Israel's history. Drew Harrison, "What peace process?" \textit{The Middle East}, no. 186, April 1990, p. 12.
IV

THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE

The tangled tale of varied historical memory and identity that claims right over the same geographical site is further complicated by a third party which regards itself as a 'necessary' interlocutor in the "historic conflict over what they [the Israelis and Palestinians] perceive as absolute imperatives - territory, security, and political legitimacy." Chomsky describes the United States as this party, and goes on to argue that it represents the third leg of what he aptly coins "the fateful triangle." This triangle, however, can be depicted as more isosceles than equilateral, for Americans display no reservation in acknowledging their 'special affinity' toward the Jews, and in embracing their 'special relationship' with Israel. With respect to the intifadah, the question arises as to whether this uprising has spawned a more critical appraisal of Israeli actions and Palestinian claims, or whether Americans have remained loyal with their 'compeers' and merely ambivalent to Palestinian aspirations. By examining the nature of American support for Israel, it can be concluded that despite the rhetoric of a 'hope for lasting Palestinian-Israeli peace,' U.S. affinity with Israel remains paramount, and dictates the structure and limits of the vista in which any such 'lasting peace' could be negotiated.

140 Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, p. 441, comments: "The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians [are] three national entities so disparate in power that it seems absurd to link them in a single phrase."
141 Jimmy Carter, for example, stated: "We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist in peace. It's a special relationship." Cited in Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 206. Also see Abraham Ben-Zvi, Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence: The Case of the U.S. and Israel, 1975-1983, (Israel: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 9.
Any general discussion of the tradition of American support for Israel must necessarily cover notions of historical consciousness, religion, democratic values, and residual guilt feelings about the fate of European Jewry. These sources of identification shape the foundation of the U.S.-Israel relationship, and contribute to the underlying continuity of the United States' 'indulgence' with Israel.142

The U.S. reflects on and empathizes with Israel's historical plight and democratic desires, and perceives Israel as mirroring its own struggle against oppression and subsequent desire for a 'homeland,' where "all men [sic] are created equal." Reich notes:

There is a historical affinity and similarity of national experience, which includes the immigrant and pioneering nature of the two states and their commitments to democracy. The U.S. experience in striving to escape persecution and establish an independent national homeland has a parallel in a Jewish state in Palestine that appears to reaffirm these ideals through absorption and integration of immigrants in distress.143

Likewise, the 'historical-religious' collective memory of the American populace - cognizant of childhood 'Sunday-school stories' - identifies Jews with the Holy Land, and perceives Israel as the manifestation of the prophesy that the Jews would return to this promised land. Truman, for example, taken broadly as an expression of this 'collective memory,' stated, "... that [Palestine] is one part of the world that has always interested me, partly because of its Biblical background."144

Johnson, too, remarked to members of the American Jewish community:

144 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 186. Note that Truman was President when Israel became a state. He gave de facto recognition to this newly created Jewish state within eleven minutes of its proclamation. George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 26.
Most, if not all of you, have very deep ties with the land and with the people of Israel, as I do, for my Christian faith sprang from yours. The Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into our souls.  

Reagan, as a more contemporary president, had an even more fervent millenarian belief that Israel was a necessary outpost to be maintained if the Armageddon prophesy was to be fulfilled.  

Furthermore, in an effort to assuage the guilt engendered by its contextual ambivalence to the Holocaust, the U.S. feels a particular moral responsibility toward Israel, and toward the survival of the Jewish community. Safran states:

Support for Israel was seen as a kind of amends by the world, the Western nations, and the Christian people to the people who suffered that terrible ordeal and as providing a refuge for the individuals who survived it.  

Thus, Israel is perceived as a 'like-image state,' with a similar outlook, and 'progressive nature' - one conducive to a world the United States envisions. Ford commented:

The American people have a great deal of understanding and sympathy and dedication to the same kind of ideals that are representative of Israel. And, therefore, I think we in America have a certain rapport and understanding with the people of Israel. . . . We have mutual aims and objectives. We have the kind of relationship that I think, if expanded world-wide, would be beneficial to all mankind.  

From within a milieu of such strong symbol and myth, it is instructive to note the opinion of the general American public since the uprising ensued. Initially, the intifadah sorely tested support for 'democratic' Israel as Americans witnessed nightly images of violence against Palestinian 'freedom fighters.' Yet the initial outrage against the Israeli government's 'disproportionate' response eroded, despite the

145 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 206.
148 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 185. Abba Eban, former Israeli Foreign Minister, also notes the U.S. and Israel's "harmony in democratic values, harmony of historic roots, harmony in spiritual memories, harmony of ideals, and, I am convinced, a profound underlying harmony of interests in this hard and dangerous world."
continuing depiction of Israeli militia using tear-gas and 'plastic bullets.' In April of 1989, more than a year after the intifadah began, support for Israel reached an all-time high of 69%; 74% of Americans thought the PLO renounced 'terrorism' only for political advantage; 65% declared that 'aside from a few regrettable incidents, Israel has used a reasonable and appropriate level of force in countering recent violence'; and 79% blamed the press for biased treatment of the conflict.149

A similar 'pattern' occurred following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At first, Americans were chagrined by the 'aggressiveness' of Israeli actions, and by the casualties and losses resulting from the war; but this immediate response proved to be only short-lived, as pro-'Arab' sympathy declined - despite the slaughter in Sabra and Shatila - and pro-Israel sympathy virtually returned to its prewar, pre-massacre levels.150 Bookbinder avowed:

I remember my own deep personal anguish during those early months. But it did not take long for that anguish to be eased and then overtaken, by admiration for the way Israel conducted itself at a moment of crisis, and by calmer reflection about what had caused it to take drastic, if ill-advised, action to defend its people.151

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149 Bard, "Israel: Some Surprising Polls," pp. 45-46. Similarly, referendums were placed on the ballots in four U.S. cities during the 1988 elections. In San Francisco, Cambridge, and Newton, voters were queried on U.S. support for Palestinian statehood; and in Berkeley, citizens were asked if the city should establish a sister-city relationship with a Palestinian refugee camp. In San Francisco, Proposition W was rejected by more than 2 to 1. In Berkeley, Measure J was also defeated by more than 2 to 1. The Newton resolution, too, did not receive a majority. Only the Cambridge referendum, though opposed by Representatives Joseph Kennedy II, and Barney Frank, Senators John Kerry and Ted Kennedy, and Presidential nominee, Governor Michael Dukakis, passed by a margin of 53 to 47 percent. Andrea Barron, "Referenda on the Palestinian Question in Four U.S. Cities," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, Summer 1989, pp. 71-83.


Thus, popular support for Israel is ingrained in the American psyche. Ideological and emotional interest transcend the occasional obstacle - i.e., an Israeli-committed 'terrorist act or two' - as most U.S. citizens identify with an Israel being 'forced' to resort to violence to uphold the 'democratic' ideals common to both peoples. Reich explains:

There is an element of cultural identity that sees Israel as a 'Western' state in a sea of feudal, Oriental entities and as a perpetrator of the Judeo-Christian heritage. It is perceived as sharing the concept of individual freedom and the right of all individuals to live in peace. It is seen as a free, open, and democratic society - a 'showplace of democracy' - pursuing peace. It is characterized as a brave, gallant, and young state that provides a model of courage and tenacity. Its people have been praised for their sacrifice, mettle, industriousness, dedication, determination, and spirit. Israel is seen as having achieved substantial progress, despite its precarious existence, and as worthy of emulation.152

Moreover, 'American' Jews have played a pivotal role in recursively reproducing close 'historical' ties between the United States and Israel. While making up a mere 2.7% of the U.S. population, they also represent the world's largest Jewish community, and an exceptional feeling of 'closeness' to Israel has always existed.153 Yet, the creation of the State of Israel did little to entice these Jews to "make aliyah" (literally 'ascend') to 'the promised land'154 - indeed, fewer than 1% have immigrated to Israel - but by staying in the U.S., "American Jews have ended up performing an invaluable service for the Jewish state."155 For many, Israel has become the central focus in shaping Jewish life,156 and the American Jewish community is well-organized and committed to the security of Israel, and to the

152 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 185; Andrea Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas in the United States and Their Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy," in Lukacs and Battah, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 243.
154 A 1982 survey revealed that 80% of Jewish Americans denied ever giving any serious consideration to settling in Israel. McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 167. For a further discussion of the American Jewish penchant (or lack thereof) to make aliyah, see Zvi Gitelman, Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants, (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 59-69.
155 Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas," p. 239.
maintenance of Jewish history and identity.\footnote{Furthermore, more than 2100 countrywide Jewish organizations, and over 700 local Jewish federations - almost one organization for every 2500 Jews - exist in the United States. Marshall Breger, "For Ourselves and For Others: Defining Jewish Interests," in Daniel Elazar (ed.), The New Jewish Politics, (Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), p. 57.} Wall goes so far as to claim that "Israel is the religion for a lot of American Jews; Israel is the home team, and the members of the American Jewish community are the fans."\footnote{As cited in Mohamed Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Assistance and Aid to Israel, (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 94. Elazar also comments: "For those Jews who aspired to be active in the Jewish community, politics became a participant sport." Daniel Elazar, "The New Jewish Politics," in Elazar, The New Jewish Politics, p. 9.} In addition to such moral support and identification, American Jews contribute almost $2 billion a year to Israel.\footnote{Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 86.}

As a result of this commitment, members of the American Jewish community comprise part of a larger entity simply recognized as 'the lobby'\footnote{See, for example, Edward Tivnan's aptly titled book, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).} among politicians, political analysts, the media, and any individual concerned with 'the future of Israel.'\footnote{Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 54, comments that 'The Israeli 'lobby' is not a lobby in the conventional sense. . . . It is rather a commitment to a people and a cause, a commitment rooted in powerful bonds of kinship, in the memory of a common history and the conviction of a common destiny.'} The Israel lobby plays an influential role in the formation of attitudes and the formulation of policies concerning Israel and the Middle East. Although the lobby is composed of more than eighty organizations,\footnote{Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 61.} the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is considered the principal lobbying organization on Capitol Hill. With 55,000 members, a $7 million annual budget, five regional offices, and a staff of seventy in Washington, AIPAC exists for a single purpose - it is the only officially registered domestic lobbying organization, established on behalf of a foreign government for the purpose of influencing legislation regarding U.S.-
Israeli relations. The New York Times has dubbed AIPAC as "the most powerful, best-run and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington." Over the thirty-nine years since its inception, AIPAC’s efforts have contributed to Israel’s receiving more foreign-aid concessions than any other country; to the formation of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement; to gaining Israel the status of a major non-NATO ally; and to the closing of the PLO information office in Washington. AIPAC members have even been ‘privy’ to witnessing former Secretary of State George Shultz lead the crowd in the chant "Hell, no, PLO" at its 1987 convention.

U.S. policymakers have been ever-cognizant of the influence wielded by the American Jewish community, particularly as it affects the future of their own political careers. In 1975, for example, AIPAC mobilized Capitol Hill support to reverse a decision by President Ford to delay a shipment of arms to Israelis. Seventy-six senators responded to AIPAC’s call, and sent Ford a strongly-worded letter urging him to be "responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs".

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165 Furthermore, between Fiscal Year 1970 and 1977, Congress increased the amount of foreign aid appropriations requested by the Administration by nearly 9 percent. Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 191.
166 Duncan Clarke, "Entanglement: The Commitment to Israel," in Lukacs and Battah, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 228.
170 Pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs) now contribute the second largest source of funds for Democratic Senatorial candidates. Rex Wintergerter, "The Pro-Israel PACs and the 1988 Elections," Middle East International, no. 336, 21 October 1988, p. 16. President Kennedy himself is noted as commenting to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: "I know I was elected by the votes of American Jews. I owe them my election. Tell me, is there something that I can do for the Jewish people?" Clarke, "Entanglement," p. 217.
needs. A few of these senators initially expressed reservations with the letter, but later added their signatures. One senator conceded that "the pressure was just too great. I caved." Another responded, "It's easier to sign one letter than to answer five thousand."

In contrast, incumbent representatives and senators considered 'unsympathetic' to Israel have lost reelection campaigns due to targeting efforts by the lobby. Included in this list are former Representatives Jepsen, McCloskey, and Findley, and Senator Charles Percy, former chairperson of the Foreign Relations Committee, who voted for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. Percy's opponent reportedly received $3 million - 40% of his campaign funds - from American Jews. Following Percy's defeat, Thomas Dine, AIPAC's executive director, acknowledged his organization's role: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians - those who hold public positions now and those who aspire - got the message." Elazar adds, "Support for Israel is certainly considered a moral imperative and politicians who deviate from such support are found by many Jewish activists to be morally wanting." In effect, political weight amongst the Jewish community is substantial, if not overbearing, and inevitably crosses the mind of a senator or two when milling around the cloakroom prior to a

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172 As cited in Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 67.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., p. 298; Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 88. Also see Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby, (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985).
175 Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 191.
176 As cited in Ibid., p. 191.
vote. As a congressional staff member noted, "The bottom line is if I am a congressman [sic], American Jews are in a position to hurt or help."\(^{178}\)

A concomitant effect of the lobby's unparalleled ability to mobilize its influence on Capitol Hill is demonstrated by the plethora of 'special benefits' that are accrued by Israel within the mountain of measures passed by Congress each session. Well-documented is Israel's foreign aid package of $3 billion a year - about one-third of all U.S. bilateral aid - in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ($1.8 billion) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) ($1.2 billion).\(^{179}\) Israel is one of few countries, however, which receives all of its aid in grants.\(^{180}\) Furthermore, whereas other states receive their economic aid quarterly, Israel is the only state which receives all of its economic aid at the beginning of each fiscal year; this enables Israel to save between $40-$50 million annually in interest,\(^{181}\) but costs the U.S. an estimated $50-60 million to borrow funds for the early, lump-sum payment.\(^{182}\) Similarly, since 1984, Israel has been the only government allowed to spend some of its U.S. military aid in

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\(^{178}\) Nora Boustany, "Arab-American Lobby is Struggling," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1990, p. A10. Moreover, Christison notes that "AIPAC itself has grown tremendously since Reagan's election: its budget has quadrupled, it has increased its access to Congress, and it is now evaluating the possible cabinet appointments of presidential candidates, so that no future president 'can make the mistake' of appointing policymakers who do not fully support Israel." Kathleen Christison, "Blind Spots: Official U.S. Myths About the Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, Winter 1988, p. 51.


Israel, as opposed to purchasing U.S. goods and services. Other 'special benefits' include the following:

> The government of Israel receives all ESF funds directly as cash transfers. Because U.S. economic aid to Israel is not 'tied' to any specific program, there exists no accounting of how the funds are employed.

> Israel need only set aside FMS funds for current year payments only, as opposed to setting aside the full amount necessary to meet the complete cost of multi-year purchases. Thus, remaining funds can be used by Israel for any other 'military' purpose.

> The development of the Lavi fighter plane was cancelled in 1987 after Israel had received more than $1.5 billion in U.S. subsidies. Yet, for three years, Israel has been allowed to continue spending up to $400 million of U.S. aid annually to pay for Lavi cancellation costs.

> As a result of legislation enacted in 1987 allowing foreign countries to refinance old U.S. loans, Israel is saving approximately $150 million annually by obtaining new loans on the private market at a lower rate of interest than old U.S. loans.

> The Continuing Appropriation for fiscal year 1985 (PL 98-453) stipulates that "annual economic aid to Israel must be equal to or greater than the amount Israel must spend to pay off the old military sales loans."

> Almost $180 million was included in the fiscal 1990 defense spending bill (PL 101-165) to purchase Israeli-made military equipment and to subsidize Israeli weapons research.

> In the fiscal 1990 foreign aid bill (PL 101-167), $165 million was appropriated to the Department of Defense to stockpile weapons and equipment in foreign countries for emergency use. As much as $100 million in supplies will be stockpiled in Israel.

These initiatives, as well as other less-evident programs, provided Israel with approximately $666 million in additional U.S. financial support in fiscal year 1990. In effect, the political clout wielded by the American Jewish community, in conjunction with the depth and magnitude of Congressional interest in Israel,
remains strong.\textsuperscript{192} As such, it is because of AIPAC and other Jewish organizations' interest in Israel that U.S. support for Israel has not dwindled, despite the \textit{intifadah} and regardless of concessions made by the PLO, which cater to the hope that the U.S. will assist in a 'peaceful solution' to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The genesis of the \textit{intifadah} developed at a time when U.S. support for Israel was at an all-time high. The 100th Congress was completing its first session of what came to be known as "the most pro-Israel Congress ever."\textsuperscript{193} In 1986, the U.S. and Israel voted together in the United Nations General Assembly 91.5\% of the time.\textsuperscript{194} The Reagan Administration, too, was deemed by Shamir as being "the most friendly Administration we have ever worked with."\textsuperscript{195} Spiegel comments:

Harking back to his career in Hollywood, he [Reagan] held a romantic view of Israel as a vibrant democracy. As he often told Jewish audiences, he was deeply affected by movies he had seen while still in the army of American forces entering the concentration camps.\textsuperscript{196}

Shortly after his inauguration, Reagan declared that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were not 'illegal' under international law (as had been the 'official' U.S. response since 1967), but merely 'unhelpful' and 'ill-advised'; Israel


\textsuperscript{193} Said, \textit{After the Last Sky}, p. 140; Laiipson, \textit{Israeli-American Relations}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{194} This voting record contrasted with that of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. voted with them 15.3\%, 14.2\% and 13.6\% of the time respectively. "AIPAC Policy Statement, 1987," \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, vol. 16, no. 4, Summer 1987, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{195} Lenczowski, \textit{American Presidents}, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{196} Reagan also commented to Dine, Executive Director of AIPAC: "You know, I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament, and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find myself wondering if - if we're the generation that's going to see that come about. I don't know if you've noted any of the prophecies lately, but, believe me, they certainly describe the time we're going through." Spiegel, \textit{The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict}, p. 406. Also see Gore Vidal, \textit{Armageddon? Essays 1983-1987}, (Suffolk: St. Edmundsbury Press Ltd., 1987), p. 110.
perceived this as an affirmation of its dream of settling in all of Eretz Israel.\textsuperscript{197} Following both Israel's attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, U.S. condemnations often seemed diluted or Administration officials often spoke of an 'Arab' provocation leading to an Israeli reprisal.\textsuperscript{198} Ben-Zvi comments that during the early stages of the war in Lebanon, "Reagan and his foreign policy advisors acted with marked complacency and equanimity - if not muted satisfaction - in view of the destruction of the PLO strongholds and infrastructure. . . ."\textsuperscript{199} In essence:

Although the Lebanon war . . . exposed some serious differences between short-term Israeli and U.S. policies, it did not fundamentally alter the Administration's approach to Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States.\textsuperscript{200}

Furthermore, Israel was granted its major non-NATO ally status, and the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement and Strategic Cooperation Agreement (SCA-83) were both concluded during the Reagan Administration, the latter of which needed no public hearings nor Senate approval because it took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding.\textsuperscript{201} Cases of dual Israeli-American citizenship also multiplied during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{202} For these reasons, McDowall contends, "Reagan's presidency may prove to have been the high watermark of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, combining an unprecedented commitment to military cooperation with an almost wholly uncritical view of Israel."\textsuperscript{203}

Within this context of unparalleled U.S. domestic support for Israel though, the genesis of the \textit{intifadah} ruffled the air with a sense of unease - or so it seemed.


\textsuperscript{198} Lenczowski, \textit{American Presidents}, p. 267.

\textsuperscript{199} Ben-Zvi, \textit{Alliance Politics}, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{200} Laipson, \textit{Israeli-American Relations}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{201} Clarke, "Entanglement," pp. 224-229; Lenczowski, \textit{American Presidents}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{202} Lenczowski, \textit{American Presidents}, p. 268.

\textsuperscript{203} McDowall, \textit{Palestine and Israel}, p. 47.
Both Congress and the Administration expressed their misgivings with Israeli policies in the occupied territories. In particular, U.S. leaders reaffirmed their opposition to Israel's decision not to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention, and alluded to Israeli human rights violations in subsequent *Country Reports*. Yet, many analysts wondered if this was more a mirage than genuine criticism of Israel, for when *Country Reports* were compared, one gained the sense that the Israeli report camouflaged what many deemed "flagrant denials of the right to life, [and] liberty,..." in but a single explanation: "security." The duplicity in U.S. policy is highlighted when one reflects on the subtle change in their nuance, whereby 'major violations' became 'major differences'; and the human rights situation for Palestinians is described not as 'poor' or 'bad,' but 'complex.' Even as Israeli officials braced for criticism from these reports, and a decrease in economic and security assistance, State Department officials quipped that "in any event, Israel's abuses do not constitute such a gross pattern (emphasis added)."

With regard to Israel's use of force, then, U.S. leaders seemed to be more conscious of financially influential interest groups, and of its historical, ideological, and emotional ally, than of any overt human rights violations. Kader asserts:

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205 Dallal, "Israeli Human Rights Violations," p. 120.
207 Ibid., p. 166. The critique continues (p. 161): "The report is ahistorical, inconsistent and selective in its reporting of events. It frequently assumes an official Israeli point of view. The report does document numerous Israeli human rights abuses, but within the context of the entire report, the severity of the violations documented becomes diminished."
Paradoxically, elements of domestic politics in the United States which have been at the forefront of advocating a foreign policy of human rights have at the same time avoided directly addressing the issue of the Palestinians. Domestic American political pressures stand as the only explanation for neglecting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.209

Indeed, there was no tangible decline in Congress' willingness to finance Israel's government, with Israel receiving its customary $3 billion foreign aid package each fiscal year since the intifadah began.

At the same time, the U.S. also came to realize that the intifadah was not a passing phenomenon, and prompted the Administration to increase its role as a 'Superpower' in providing a 'peaceful solution' to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Shultz Plan was subsequently articulated in February 1988. The initiative reaffirmed the United States' long-advocated policy (posited by Kissinger in 1975) that the conditions for a dialogue with the PLO would involve the PLO's acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the recognition of Israel's right to exist, and the renunciation of 'terrorism.' More importantly, Shultz's initiative highlighted the significance of the 'land for peace' formula, which would be decided through bilateral negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, as convened in an international conference.210

The Shultz Plan collapsed within a mere four months, for although Peres accepted the initiative, Shamir refused to agree on an international peace conference, and argued that the idea of exchanging territory for peace was foreign to him.211 The PLO also objected to the initiative, because it neither explicitly provided for PLO representation, nor did it mention Palestinian self-determination

211 William Quandt, "U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Quandt, *The Middle East*, p. 377. Furthermore, "he criticized the reduction of the transitional period from five (as agreed at Camp David) to three years, and reiterated his view that by returning Sinai to Egypt in 1981 Israel had fulfilled U.N. Resolution 242 and did not feel obligated to relinquish its rule over the West Bank and Gaza." Lenczowski, *American Presidents*, p. 273.
(crystallized in the notion of "Sovereignty") as an objective. Soon after, in what many consider to be an unusual move, thirty senators sent a letter to Shultz voicing their 'dismay' at Shamir's opposition to the 'land for peace' proposal, saying that "peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli Government's position rules out territorial compromise." Yet with 1988 being an election year, Congressional and Administration support for Israel continued. Khalidi reflects his disappointment not only with the plan, but with the all-too-familiar American response to it, and concludes that the Shultz Plan was an exercise in futility:

... [V]ery few authoritative voices have commented on the emperor's abject nakedness: indeed, most members of Congress, most presidential candidates, and most newspaper editorials gravely commend the 'Shultz Plan,' perhaps mentioning some minor shortcoming, but never pointing out that it is no more than a Band-Aid on a suppurating wound. Shultz has failed to accept that the Palestinians are a people and a central party to the conflict, that they must be independently represented by negotiators of their own choice if the conflict is to be resolved, and that Palestinians and Israelis must be brought to the point of mutual recognition. Instead, Shultz has hewn to the outdated American conventional wisdom on this issue: uncritical adoption of Israel's positions on the PLO and on national self-determination for the Palestinian people, combined with an almost idolatrous worship of the completely irrelevant 'Camp David process' (which has been rejected by the Palestinians. . . ).

Moreover, the notion of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, relied upon by the U.S., fell through when Hussein relinquished Jordan's legal and administrative claims to the West Bank in July 1988, and turned over full responsibility for the territories to the PLO. This had the effect of destroying one of the few delegations 'suitable' to Israel and the United States. To then add fuel to a fire already out of control, Arafat's statement agreeing to all three conditions for a U.S.-PLO dialogue further scorched the United States' Middle East foreign policy. American leaders suddenly found themselves overtly having to do the unthinkable - deal with 'terrorists.' Nonetheless, the U.S. (represented by Ambassador Robert Pelletreau) began its dialogue with the PLO, without the support of the Israeli government.

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Soon after the official dialogue with the PLO started, the new Bush Administration took shape, but from the outset Bush was oft-reminded of the fact that he was elected on the most pro-Israel platform in the history of either major party to date.214 Many in the American Jewish community voiced concern, however, that the Administration's policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict seemed largely inconsistent and confusing.215 Dialogue with the PLO continued though, and with Arafat's astonishing statement still resounding in its ears, Washington pressed Israel for a 'constructive' response. The Israelis reacted to this pressure with the Shamir Plan in April 1989. This plan involved free democratic elections among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, which would eventuate in a delegation to negotiate an interim period of 'self-governing administration' in the territories. This interim phase would "... provide a vital test of coexistence and cooperation... [and would]... be followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement."216

Nicknamed "the plan with a hole in its heart," it left many dissatisfied.217 Likud was concerned that elections would inevitably lead to a Palestinian 'state'; Labor believed Israel should go one step further and negotiate directly with the PLO. The Palestinians objected to the exclusion of the PLO, as well as to the ambiguous procedures for conducting such elections. Eighty West Bank leaders highlighted their reasons for rejecting the proposal:

217 "The plan with a hole in its heart," The Economist, vol. 312, no. 7610, 8 July 1989, p. 35. Schiff and Ya'ari comment, "... just days after returning from Washington the prime minister publicly characterized his own peace initiative as just 'an idle fancy'. . . . Shamir knuckled under to his arch-rivals in the party... by telling the [Likud Central] Committee, and thereby the world, that his conditions for holding elections were such that no Palestinian could possibly accept the Israeli initiative. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising - Israel's Third Front, trans. Ina Freedman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 319-320.
Our rejection of the election proposal does not indicate a rejection of elections as
democratic practice, but is the rejection of a project which ignores the essence of the
conflict. The elections proposed by Shamir do not constitute democratic practice
within an entire political process with clearly defined principles: this isolated
occurrence of elections does not illustrate how it will lead to the end of the occupation
and to Palestinian national independence.  

Nevertheless, Washington seemed relieved that the Israeli leadership had
taken a step - albeit a minute one - to move the peace process 'forward,' and Bush
reaffirmed the United States' loyalty and commitment to Israel and its efforts. At
the same time, such unequivocal acceptance of a plan which the Palestinians would
undoubtedly reject also led to a deterioration of its dialogue with the PLO. Nabil
Sha'ath, political advisor to Arafat, contends that following Israel's creation of an
"illusion of reciprocity" with the Shamir Plan, the U.S. truncated its dialogue with
the PLO to a "dialogue of the deaf" - implying that a veneer of superficiality hid
an uncritical acceptance of Israeli policy toward Palestinians.

In opposition to contentions which argue that the U.S. was merely uncritical
of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, Secretary of State James Baker, in a
controversial speech to AIPAC in May 1989, seemed to demonstrate the
Administration's resolve and insistence that Israel take a more 'moderate' stand:

For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a
greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza - security and otherwise -
can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242. Forswear
annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow schools to reopen. Reach out to the
Palestinians as neighbours who deserve political rights.

The repercussions following Baker's speech were overwhelming. It was
labelled an "arm-twisting" speech where AIPAC members "listened in silence as

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218 As cited in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 18, no. 4, Summer 1989, p. 156.
219 Nabil Sha'ath, "Prospects for a Middle East Peace Settlement," Department of
International Relations and Peace Research Centre seminar, The Australian
National University, 18 September 1989.
220 James Baker, "Principles and Pragmatism: American Policy Toward the Arab-
Israeli Conflict," (Current Policy No. 1176), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
State, May 1989), p. 3.
221 "Nearly there, if only . . .," *The Economist*, vol. 311, no. 7607, 17 June 1989, p. 53.
Baker recited his demands of Israel, and in which he "even-handedly treated Israel as the moral equivalent of those dictatorships and terrorist groups that have been warring on it for four decades." Senior Israeli officials voiced displeasure at Baker's remarks; Shamir called it "useless," and said that Israel "cannot accept" Baker's statements. Congress, too, was anxious to assert its authority, for fear of reprisals from the American Jewish community. Prompted by AIPAC's rather impressive 'arm-twisting' of its own, ninety-five senators wrote to Baker, praising Shamir's plan and urging the Administration to do the same. Under such sustained pressure from Israel, Congress, and the lobby, the Bush Administration retreated from its 'aggressive posturing; back to its 'officially' stated position of supporting the Shamir Plan.

Three months after it was proposed, however, the Shamir Plan stalled. Shamir and his Likud party explicitly affirmed their restrictions on the plan, which effectively circumscribed any future negotiations with the Palestinians. These four restrictions advocated the following: that Jerusalem Arabs would be excluded from elections; that the intifadah must end before elections would be held; that Jewish settlements would continue in the territories; and that Israel would never accept 'foreign sovereignty' of the territories. Shamir also reaffirmed his intent regarding the only acceptable outcome of his own plan:

We shall not give the Arabs one inch of our land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years. We won't give them a thing. . . . We have the veto in our hands. . . . The status quo of the interim arrangement will continue until all the parties reach agreement on the permanent arrangement.

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225 "Nearly there, if only . . .," p. 53.
226 Peretz, Intifada, p. 173.
The Likud party's July convention, in conjunction with Shamir's statement, resulted in a stalemate for all concerned. Egyptian President Mubarak attempted to reignite the process with a proposal for conducting elections in the territories, and entailed the following ten points:228

1. Israel commits to accept the results of the election;
2. International observers oversee the election;
3. Israel grants immunity to elected officials;
4. The IDF withdraws from the balloting area;
5. Israel commits to start talks for a final status of the occupied territories by a certain date (within 3 to 5 years);
6. Israel ends settlement activity;
7. Israel allows free election campaigning;
8. Israelis do not enter the occupied territories on election day;
9. East Jerusalem Arabs participate in the election;
10. Israel offers a commitment to exchange land for peace.

Reaction to this revived initiative was again mixed among Palestinians and Israelis.229 Some Palestinians stated that the ten points were a positive starting point for negotiations; others said the plan failed because it did not include a Palestinian state.230 The Israeli Labor party accepted the commitment for final status of the territories; participation among East Jerusalem Arabs; a halt to settlement activity; and an exchange of land for peace.231 Conversely, Likud rejected all ten points.232 On 6 October 1989, the inner cabinet split with six votes each, and therefore rejected Mubarak's invitation to meet with Palestinians and discuss the initiative.233

Baker, in a hope of reinvigorating the process, then decided to take the reigns and offered five points to clarify Mubarak's ten points regarding the Shamir Plan. These five points entailed:234

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231 Note Labor's acceptance of these points directly conflicts with earlier restrictions by Likud. Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Harrison, "All at Odds," p. 12.
(1) Israel meeting a Palestinian delegation in Cairo;
(2) Egypt consulting with, but not acting for, the Palestinians, and Egypt consulting with the United States and Israel;
(3) Israel actively engaging in a dialogue with the Palestinians after the Palestinian delegation has been worked out;
(4) Israel and the Palestinians discussing the election and future negotiations;
(5) The Egyptian, Israeli, and American foreign ministers meeting in Washington to facilitate the process.

The Palestinians, after being initially lukewarm over the amendments, seemed to resolve some of their internal differences, and verbalized a positive response. In February 1990, Arafat gave the Palestinians permission to enter peace negotiations with Israel. It was the first time Arafat had ever sanctioned such a dialogue. The 'breakthrough' was short-lived, though, as the Baker option succumbed to trenchant dissension and fracture within the Israeli National Unity Government. Labor supported the plan, but Likud refused to participate in any negotiations "with the PLO or with 'PLO men' who were part of a Palestinian delegation." Shamir further demanded that in the event of any hypothetical negotiations with an un-named, but unaffiliated Palestinian delegation, the U.S. should provide additional assurances to Israel - including unequivocal support for Israel in any disagreement. With Labor and Likud no longer able to resolve their differences, the careful edifice of ambiguities collapsed, as did the NUG when the executive of the Labor party resigned en masse.

Throughout the Administration's diplomatic tango with the PLO and Israel in attempting to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Congress was indomitable in its conviction that the Administration was undermining the future viability of Israel, and it immediately set in place a broad series of damage-control measures designed

236 Mark, Middle East Peace Proposals, p. 15.
to cushion its 'special relationship' with Israel. In June, for example, members of Congress became 'concerned' when Israeli Ambassador Arad criticized U.S. Ambassador Pelletreau for holding secret meetings with the PLO's second highest official, Salah Khalaf. Khalaf had been portrayed in the Defense Department's "Terrorist Group Profiles" handbook, and the Israeli government was upset because Khalaf had "played a primary role in setting and pronouncing the ideological course of the PLO and its terrorist activities throughout the years." Senator Connie Mack wrote to Baker calling for the suspension of further contacts with the PLO. Three House members subsequently held a news conference expressing their dissatisfaction with the expanding U.S.-PLO relationship. Representative Mel Levine said the Pelletreau-Khalaf dialogue was an example of "the PLO tail wagging the U.S. dog. Congress should play a much more vigilant role and expand its oversight activities of Administration Middle East policy."

The Administration was soon faced with a Helms amendment - drafted by AIPAC - which said that the U.S. may not negotiate with any PLO representative unless the President certifies to Congress that the Palestinian in question did not take part or conspire in terrorist activity that resulted in "the death, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen." Debate in the Senate also reflected its distrust of the Bush Administration and the State Department. Resenting such constraints on his power to direct foreign policy, Bush sent a letter to the Senate

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240 Ibid.
claiming that the Helms amendment "would interfere significantly with, if not destroy, the ability of the U.S. to promote a viable peace process in the Middle East."\textsuperscript{244} The Helms amendment was defeated by a vote of 75-23; but a compromise version was passed 97-1. It stated:

\begin{quote}
[No Federal funds may be] made available for the conduct of the current dialogue on the Middle East peace process with any representative of the [PLO] if the President knows and advises the Congress that the representative directly participated in the planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in the death or kidnapping of an American citizen.\textsuperscript{245}
\end{quote}

Ironically, the single dissenting vote came from Helms, who said the restrictions in the compromise version were not "tough enough."\textsuperscript{246}

Congress continued its criticism of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, and what they perceived to be the Administration's naivete in believing that the 'historical realities' of the PLO could ever manifest itself in something other than 'terrorism.' During a Congressional hearing on Middle East developments in September 1989, Representative Smith reflected such sentiments to Ambassador Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs:

\begin{quote}
We have now been in discussions, both formal and informal, for the last ten months with the PLO. Some of us, Mr. Kelly, are getting very tired of plowing old ground, but unfortunately we have no choice because old ground is the only ground where we can, in fact, establish our point. There is no new ground. \textit{Nothing has changed} [emphasis added].

When are we going to reject the PLO's consistent involvement in terrorism and draw a line in the sand? We have an agreement with the PLO. They have breached that agreement innumerable times and have made public statements from Mr. Arafat's mouth and from the mouth of the recognized spokesman for the PLO that are all in violation of the basic tenets of the agreement from which we entered into the negotiations or discussions.

When is the United States going to stop, turn around, and say 'either get off this and stop it, or we will stop negotiating?' How many more terrorist attacks must people suffer from constituent groups of the PLO? How many more claims that Israel and its establishment is a crime? How many more remarks by other PLO recognized officials in connection with and in concert with Arafat, who claim that they will, in a two-step process, first move into Israel and destroy it?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{244} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Ibid.}
How many more, Mr. Kelly, before we decide that we are dealing with people who have never changed? How many quotes must we have? How many terrorist attacks must there be? How many times must they reject the basic agreements that we made publicly by engaging in terrorist activity?

We want an answer. I want an answer. Is there some point at which we will say, 'Stop, we've had enough,' or are we just going to go blithely on forever?

I am serious about this.247

At the same hearing, questions were raised regarding the possibility that Arafat might apply for a visa to visit the United Nations. Representative Lantos commented:

There have been a lot of intransigent remarks, with the PLO lightly calling the establishment of Israel a mistake and calling for continued armed struggle. Are we going to reward this attitude of inflammatory statements with the issuance of a visa?248

One week later, sixty-eight senators wrote to Baker, and argued that granting Arafat a visa would "undercut the peace process . . . be antithetical to American interests and threaten the security of Israel."249 Even more notable than the letter itself, though, is the fact that more senators signed this letter than a similar one in 1988, in which the U.S. did refuse to let Arafat in the country, and resulted in the U.N. General Assembly being moved to Geneva to listen to Arafat's recognition of Israel and renunciation of terrorism (which eventually led to the U.S.-PLO dialogue).250 In the end, the senators' letter was written in vain, for Arafat never made the request.251

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248 U.S. Congress, Developments in the Middle East, p. 15.
250 An advisor to Senator Mack, one of the letter's initiators, commented: "Instead of a serious transformation of the PLO, there has been a backtracking. . . . The message is that we don't trust Arafat and we trust him even less than before." Ibid., p. 47.
Congress sought to further confine the boundaries in which the U.S.-PLO dialogue could continue with its enactment of the PLO Commitments Compliance Act, which requires the State Department to report every 120 days on PLO compliance with Arafat's commitment renouncing terrorism. On 20 March 1990, the State Department submitted its report to Congress as mandated by the legislation. The report concluded:

It is the Administration's position that the PLO has adhered to its commitment undertaken in 1988 to renounce terrorism. One problem area has been some actions undertaken by Damascus-based PLO groups such as the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] and DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. We have no evidence that these actions were authorized or approved by the PLO Executive Committee or Arafat personally.252

Following the report's release, Senators Mack and Lieberman, both of whom cosponsored the legislation leading to the review, criticized the findings as reading "more like a defense of the PLO than a balanced account of the PLO's record. . . ."253 Instead of reading what he had hoped to be a more stringent account of PLO activities, Mack labelled it "close to a whitewash."254 Both Senators then circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter - with the report and a cynical editorial attached255 - urging their fellow legislators to "review the State Department report and judge for yourself if it effectively holds the PLO accountable for its actions and statements of the past year."256

255 Barry Rubin, "How Low Will We Stoop for Arafat?" Los Angeles Times, 22 March 1990.
256 Connie Mack and Joseph Lieberman, "Dear Colleague" letter regarding the PLO Commitments Compliance Act, 29 March 1990.
Other "Dear Colleague" letters have echoed similar sentiments, including one by Representative Douglas, dated 26 February 1990, who wrote:

The enclosed card speaks louder than words as to the true aim of the PLO and its constituent groups. Please see that the emblems of all the various Palestinian [sic] Liberation Organizations include not just Samaria and Judaea (the West Bank) but the entire state of Israel. This should be kept in mind in weighing the security needs of our ally Israel. None of these organizations claim anything less than the eradication of the state of Israel and their own emblems and seals back up that point.257

Attached was the following card:258

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257 Chuck Douglas, "Dear Colleague" letter regarding emblems of the PLO and its constituent groups, 26 February 1990. 258 Ibid.
With sentiments such as those illustrated above, the intifadah has been overshadowed by seemingly impermeable perceptions of 'history' held by Congressional members; and if their memory happened to lapse even briefly, the lobby stepped in to remind them of the past. Thus for many in Congress, as Representative Smith reiterated in September 1989, "nothing has changed": The PLO still - and will always - sanction 'violence' and 'terrorism'; while Israel is still "a strong, vibrant democracy . . . surrounded by hostile neighbours . . . with the United States as its only friend and ally in an otherwise hostile world."259

Notwithstanding Congress' entrenched conviction and belief in such 'historical verities,' 'History' has always cast strong counter-examples to such notions. Consider for instance the decades of U.S. intransigent belief in the unchanging nature of the 'Soviet Empire,' in light of the dramatic internal change which swept Eastern Europe. This seems to make a mockery of the belief in the notion of a fixed and unchanging 'human nature' that is essentially 'evil.' How quickly the old gods can disappear and new ones take their place, and look how such revelations ripple and reverberate throughout the whole cosmology of such a world-view. Take, for example, Senate Minority Leader Dole - anxious to assist the 'emerging democracies' of Eastern Europe - articulating an 'unthinkable,' let alone 'unmentionable' proposal - cutting aid to Israel, the "sacred cow" in Congress.260 In a 16 January 1990 editorial in the New York Times, Dole suggested a reassessment of the entrenched foreign aid process, in which Congress currently earmarks more than 80% of its economic and military aid programs.261 He further noted that earmarking

for 'the big five' alone - Israel, Egypt, the Philippines, Turkey and Pakistan - accounts for two-thirds of the foreign aid budget. Dole thus proposed a 5% cut in aid programs for the big five - "enough to respond to the needs of new democracies such as Poland, Hungary, Panama and countless needy countries that under current allocations will receive not one penny of American aid." Dole, anticipating the response he would be receiving from his colleagues and constituency regarding the specific cut of $150 million to Israel, exclaimed that:

No doubt, these proposed reallocations will raise a hue and cry. But can't we convince our friends who would 'lose' a tiny amount of their aid how much it is in their interest, too, to help insure against the failure of new democracies and free-market economies? Can't those pressure groups that have turned some of our foreign aid programs virtually into 'entitlement programs' realize that making some minor adjustments in aid allocations can simultaneously serve the countries of their special interest and serve America? And can't my colleagues in Congress, who have forced the President to swallow a few huge earmarked aid programs, stand up to domestic political pressure and resist the temptation to politicize foreign aid? Can't they instead support an amended foreign aid strategy that more completely serves the national interest?

To me, it boils down to this. Are big gains for freedom worth a small cut in a few huge foreign aid programs? I say yes.263

Needless to say, Dole's proposal did create an unmitigated clamour from Congress and the American Jewish community. Dole's 5% cut of 'the big five' was perceived solely as an attack against Israel and its lobby. An AIPAC official alleged, "Of course he's going after us." Members of Congress, with a few exceptions, publicly denounced Dole's idea: Senator Boschwitz wrote to the New York Times; Representative Ros-Lehtinen submitted an editorial to the Washington Times; Representative Hunter commended and circulated Ros-Lehtinen's piece in a "Dear Colleague" letter; and seventy-three senators wrote to Bush, opposing any cut in earmarked aid on the grounds that it would "send the

263 Ibid.
266 Ros-Lehtinen, "Israel still living . . . unfriendly neighbourhood."
wrong signals to the most extreme and violent factions in the region."\(^{267}\)

Granted, many members of Congress did privately applaud Dole for his gumption - but they were quick to add that he could not count on their vote(s); the clout wielded by the lobby remains substantial, and "sometimes the only explanation [for supporting Israel] is that for politicians the cost of opposing Israel is still greater than the cost of not supporting it."\(^{268}\) Even Dole acknowledges the reality of this conundrum:

> Whenever Israel is involved, you almost sink the boat. I mean you rock it with any other country, but their lobby is so powerful. . . . Immediately it's perceived as going after Israel. . . . It's not giving the president more flexibility, or trying to find money for the emerging democracies. It's: Someone is picking on our friend Israel.\(^{269}\)

While Congress and the lobby were hastily attempting to sweep Dole's proposal into the 'aberrations in history' closet, tempers again flared when the perceived 'Israel bashing' recommenced over the newly sensitized issue of Soviet Jewry, and settlements in the occupied territories. In 1989, more than 12,000 Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel; in the first five months of 1990 alone, under the new measures constituted in \textit{glasnost}, about 41,500 immigrated. Sources estimate that by the end of 1990, more than 150,000 will arrive.\(^{270}\)

Israel is elated with the ever-growing influx of 'compatriots,' for it reaffirms its belief in the primacy of its sacred 'homeland' - Eretz Israel.\(^{271}\) For Shamir and his


\(^{271}\) Indeed, Israel was witnessing a general decline (or \textit{yerida} - literally 'descent') in population until this new wave of immigration. Sobel notes the symbolic importance of this immigration/emigration phenomenon: "Immigration and emigration in the Israeli context - past, present, and . . . future - assume an importance that would be difficult to exaggerate . . . both on pragmatic and ideological grounds. Each immigrant is considered a victory of sorts, a kind of bodily enhancement of the vision, while each emigrant is conversely seen as a defeat for the common enterprise and not unimportantly a challenge to the inner viability or worth of the psychosocial premises of those staying." Zvi Sobel, \textit{Migrants from the Promised Land}, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), p. 17.
Likud party, though, Soviet immigration plays yet another, perhaps more important, role - that of stemming the tide of the intifadah:

The Arabs around us are in a state of panic. . . . They are shrouded by a feeling of defeat, because they can see that the intifadah doesn't help. They cannot stop the natural streaming of the Jewish people to their homeland.²⁷²

Shamir further politicized Soviet Jewish immigration when he seemed to link it with settlements in the occupied territories. He commented, "Big immigration requires Israel to be big as well," and Israel should hold on to the territories because "we need the space to house the people."²⁷³

To lure these new faces into the territories, a billboard in front of one construction area in the West Bank advertises, "garden views . . . the highest building standards."²⁷⁴ More significant, however, is a series of incentives designed to entice people - most of whom have little money - to settle in smaller towns, particularly the territories. A West Bank Data Project study prepared in February 1990, delineated such incentives, which included direct housing subsidies from $9750 to $21,600 depending on family size; land grants of 5% of the assessed value; mortgages free of interest for 65% of the loan's value, with another 25% of the loan at greatly reduced rates; Government-paid hookup charges for water, sewage and other municipal services; the ability to build homes as large as is desired without losing Government-backed mortgages; and subsidized transportation costs for settlers' children who are bused to Israel.²⁷⁵

The financial burden of assisting so many immigrants has been daunting, and Israel again turned to the American Jewish community and the U.S. government for help. American Jews have been responding to the United Jewish Appeal’s $1 billion

²⁷⁵ Ibid.
fund-raising effort, termed 'Operation Moses.' Joseph Gruss donated $20 million in late 1989 to be divided among 3,000 Soviet Jewish families who qualify for subsidized mortgages. Congress, too, quickly followed; Senators Kasten and Leahy introduced a bill in the Senate to provide $400 million in off-budget loan guarantees which would help finance as many as 30,000 housing units in Israel.

As with other forms of foreign assistance Israel receives from the U.S., the Kasten-Leahy bill included a number of 'special benefits' unavailable to other countries. $400 million is the largest amount ever guaranteed under the Agency for International Development's (AID) housing program, and to approve such aid, Congress would need to lift restrictions which currently apply to the program. These restrictions include a $100 million annual cap on guarantees issued under the program, and a $25 million limit on the amount of loans that can be guaranteed annually for any country. The Kasten-Leahy bill would also require that management fees, usually assessed on countries benefiting from the housing program, be waived by the Administration. This waiver would save Israel $4 million initially, and as much as $2 million annually thereafter. The loans would also be exempt from two standard requirements which govern the housing subsidy program: the first requires that "housing built with U.S. guarantees must be in conjunction with other development programs and must be specifically designed to demonstrate the feasibility and suitability of particular kinds of housing or financial arrangements"; the second requires that at least 90% of U.S. financed housing be targeted to families with incomes below the median level of the designated country. Neither of the aforementioned requirements would be envisioned for Israel's

278 Felton, "Congress Gearing Up to Give," p. 539.
279 Ibid., p. 541.
housing projects for Soviet Jews. Finally, AID’s authority to review Israel’s use of the housing funds would be curtailed under the bill, which would hinder any ability to determine whether the guarantees were used in the occupied territories.

Both Israel’s policies regarding the settling of Soviet Jews as well as the related Kasten-Leahy bill resulted in further conflict over the direction of U.S. policy. On 1 March 1990, Baker testified in a House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations hearing that the Administration might support the proposal to grant Israel a $400 million loan, “if there were some assurance, if the government of Israel perhaps could provide some assurances that it would not be engaging in any new or additional settlement activity . . . in the territories.” Baker’s statement “fell like a bomb,” for it was the first time that Israel found itself with the prospect of receiving ‘closely monitored’ (as opposed to explicitly ‘tied’) aid from its trusted ally.

AIPAC’s executive director, Dine, chastised the Administration for its lack of sympathy and understanding, and proceeded to rally the American Jewish community behind the Kasten-Leahy bill:

The Administration escalated the issue. Money, it said, is ‘fungible,’ so we want an assurance that you won’t put any of your own shekel resources into the territories either. Israel came back and said, in effect, ‘Don’t worry: we are not creating any incentives for Soviet Jews to settle in the territories. All our housing programs for them are elsewhere, and this covers not only your money, but ours too.’ But the Administration answered, in effect, ‘Even this is not sufficient. We would like, not only that you do not create any new programs, but also that you end the old ones as well.’

Now wait a minute! This goes beyond so-called ‘fungibility.’ This is holding housing for Soviet Jews hostage, so we can reopen an old debate about settlements. This is telling a democratic society that it must limit the freedom of movement of its people in order to get U.S. assistance. . . . This linkage is totally unacceptable to a sovereign democratic nation and to friends of Israel.

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280 Ibid.

281 Ibid.


Brothers and sisters, remember that Israel's friends in this city reside on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress need to know how Israel's supporters feel. Our friends need to know that you know and deeply care about the vital importance of resettling Soviet Jews in 1990. Ask your senators and representatives to support and vote for S.2119, loan guarantee legislation - allowing the Government of Israel to borrow $400 million...

It gives us no pleasure to be critical, but it is our duty to speak truth to power when the lives and the vital interests of our people and the Jewish state are affected.284

Two days later, Bush disappointed the Jewish community and Congress by reaffirming Baker's testimony, and further infuriated an already indignant audience by remarking that, "The foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem."285 In the past, the U.S. has always regarded East Jerusalem as an occupied territory, but most Administrations have always quietly accepted settlement-building there, while objecting to building activity in the West Bank and Gaza. When asked for their position on Jerusalem, Administration officials would usually respond that "it must be a united city, it must never be divided again and its final status should be determined through negotiations."286 As such, Bush's remark set off waves of anxiety, and elicited complaints from all sides, which perceived that his statement represented the gravest departure from standard 'Washington ambiguity' yet. Dine expounded:

[The] right of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem, the holiest site and spiritual capital of the Jewish people and the indivisible political capital of the Jewish state, has never before been questioned by any American President, certainly not publicly.287

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286 "The last time Jerusalem's relationship to the other occupied territories was raised in a contentious manner was in 1980 when the Carter Administration voted in favour of a Security Council resolution condemning all Israeli settlement activity in the territories 'including V.' This created such a furor among Israelis and their supporters in the United States, in the midst of a hotly contested presidential primary race between Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy, that the Administration eventually disavowed the vote." Thomas Friedman, "Bush Questions Israeli Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar," New York Times, 9 March 1990, p. A8.
Likewise, Congress again reasserted its support for Israel. In a "Dear Colleague" letter, Representatives Burton, Gilman, and Engel wrote, "Recently, unfortunate doubts have been raised about Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. Such doubts are gleefully being exploited by Israel's enemies, and do not help the peace process at all." Congress took such sentiments one step further, though, by sponsoring resolutions supporting Jerusalem as the "indivisible capital of the State of Israel." Senate Concurrent Resolution 106, with 86 cosponsors, passed by unanimous consent on 22 March 1990 - only two days after it had been introduced; House Concurrent Resolution 290 passed on 24 April 1990 by a vote of 378 to 34.

As discussed above, one of the primary reasons for questions being raised over new settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem was a reaction to the controversy over the mass Soviet Jewish exodus to Israel. Although glasnost created the possibility for vast numbers of Soviet Jews to leave the Soviet Union, a U.S. quota, enacted in October 1989, denied these Jews entry to their preferred destination - the U.S. - thus contributing to the rapid influx of these immigrants into Israel, a country which grants the automatic 'right of return' to 'its people.' Previously, Soviet Jews were automatically granted refugee status in the U.S. on the assumption that they had "a well-founded fear of persecution" in their homeland. Of the 280,000 Jews who left the Soviet Union between 1968 and 1988, little more than half traversed to Israel. The 1989 quota limited the number of Soviet

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288 Dan Burton, "Dear Colleague" letter regarding support for Jerusalem as Israel's united capital, 3 April 1990.
289 Charles Schumer, et al., "Dear Colleague" letter regarding Jerusalem as Israel's capital, 21 March 1990.
citizens allowed refugee status in the U.S. to 50,000. Pear notes that "at least 100,000 [Soviet Jews] would seek admission to the U.S. if they felt they could succeed." Consequently, the ceiling has compelled many Soviet Jews to begin anew in Israel: "although only 16.9 percent of all the Jews who left the Soviet Union in 1989 chose to live in Israel, the figure jumped to more than 90 percent in January this year, largely as a result of the new American quota."

The implications of such a policy enacted by the Bush Administration reflect the murky waters of its 'even-handed' approach to 'peace' between the Palestinians and Israel. The U.S. quota directly contributed both to Shamir's euphoria in fulfilling his hope for a "big Israel," as well as to the United States' frustration over Shamir's continued approval of settlements in the occupied territories.

Something is wrong here: the United States helps Israel to take in Soviet emigrants and thereby to fulfil its founding purpose of providing a home for Jews in need. Israel uses the influx to strengthen the Israeli position in the West Bank - a result that runs directly counter to the lagging efforts of American diplomacy to move the Middle East toward peace.

In February 1990, the Bush Administration abstained during a vote on a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution which called on Israel not to settle Soviet

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293 Pear, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Plea," p. A8
immigrants in the territories.\textsuperscript{296} Three months later, the U.S. decided not to support the text of a U.N. Security Council resolution criticizing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories because the language was too strong.\textsuperscript{297} On 26 May 1990, the U.S. blocked an attempt by the U.N. Security Council to send a mission to investigate the treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{298} Despite what seem to be firm intentions by the Administration to engender a truly even-handed approach in its Palestinian-Israeli affairs, the new U.S. quota system for Soviet Jewry, combined with its voting trend in the U.N., allude to a directionless foreign policy which is governed more by a bullish Congress and historical precedent than any commitment to an equitable settlement.

Furthermore, the structural bias that has been etched into the international system at the height of U.S. 'hegemony' has not been adjusted to nurture the possibility of a resolution that the intifadah has created. While consistently rejecting international efforts to either examine or curtail Israeli activities in the occupied territories, the Administration has continued to attempt to circumscribe the boundaries which define PLO involvement in international affairs. In May 1989, the U.S. threatened to withdraw its membership and $75 million contribution to the World Health Organization (WHO) if the agency granted membership to the PLO; convinced by the threat, WHO members deferred the PLO's application.\textsuperscript{299} Similarly, in November 1989, the U.S. warned that it would withhold its 25\% share in funding the U.N. headquarters if the General Assembly agreed to upgrade the PLO's "non-state observer" status to that of an observer state, like Switzerland or the

Vatican. The resolution was subsequently withdrawn. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), however, decided not to comply with a U.S. threat to cut its financial contribution if the FAO endorsed the PLO's role in providing technical assistance to Palestinian farmers in the occupied territories. On 9 January 1990, the U.S. announced that it would pay only $18 million of its $61.4 million bill (the U.S. was already $82 million in arrears) - just enough to allow the U.S. to maintain its vote in the FAO's governing council. The Bush Administration claimed that allowing the PLO to become involved in relief work "was an attempt to lend international legitimacy to the PLO's assertion that it represents a Palestinian state."

Thus, in examining the day-to-day policy of the United States with respect to the intifadah, the crests and troughs of interest and resolve in finding a 'solution' to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict become all-too-familiar. Dialogue after dialogue, plan after plan, resolution after resolution have yielded little in 'substantive progress,' because each leg of the fateful triangle envisions the notion of 'progress' from a different historical context. In all such dealings, a veneer of habit creates the illusion of 'something-being-done,' and hides the primacy of the United States' historical and emotional commitment to Israel. It must be realized, then, that beneath the labyrinth of rhetoric that prevails lies a foundation upon which the Administration and Congress remain committed to Israel above and beyond some form of 'Palestinian-Israeli peace.'

V

CONCLUSION:
AN ENDURING LABYRINTH OF RHETORIC

Is the intifadah, then, an exercise in futility for the Palestinians? With respect to the Palestinians' own identity, the intifadah has undoubtedly succeeded, for it has demonstrated both to themselves and to the international community that the Palestinians are a people who possess a more defined national identity. Because the uprising has made it "less practicable than before to go over, under, or around the Palestinians," it has put the 'Palestinian issue' back on the agenda. The intifadah has become an enduring symbol of 'Palestinianization' - a process which is unlikely to fade with the passing of the day.³⁰⁴

At the same time, however, the intifadah has achieved little with respect to the political quandary vis-a-vis Israel. Following the collapse of the National Unity Government, three months of back-room wrangling resulted in the establishment of the first government consisting solely of right-wing and religious parties.³⁰⁵ With Shamir at the helm, not one member of the new government has advocated pursuing the Baker plan for initiating Palestinian-Israeli talks.³⁰⁶ In fact, the three small parties who joined the Shamir government - Tehiya, Tsomet, and Molodet - advocate annexation of the territories and the forced expulsion of the Palestinians who reside there. The Molodet party was formed in response to the intifadah during 1988, and argues that "'transfer' [is] a humane and practical solution that [will] obviate Israel's need to deal with millions of Arabs within its borders."³⁰⁷ Tsomet,

³⁰⁵ For a brief discussion of the resurgence of religious parties, see Gary Schiff, "Israeli Politics: The Renewed Centrality of Religion," in Reich and Kieval, Israel Faces the Future, pp. 41-52; Stewart Reiser, "The Religious Parties and Israel's Foreign Policy," in Reich and Kieval, Israeli National Security Policy, pp. 105-122.
³⁰⁷ Peretz, Intifada, pp. 36-37.
too, was a recent addition to Israel's growing list of small parties, and was addressed by Shamir at its first national convention in 1988, who stated that Tsomet "would relay the message that the people of Israel had returned to their former land and would not trade one inch of it away."\(^{308}\) Similarly, a Tsomet supporter spoke of its party leader:

> He's the only one who can raise us up from being a bent and bowed flock, and teach us how to kill, and killing's the only way we'll ensure we stay here. Everyone's done it - the Americans killed the Indians; the Germans killed until they united their country, the British killed in the Falklands, and they weren't ashamed, they were proud to do it. It's the only way, and Raful is the only one.\(^{309}\)

Furthermore, Ariel Sharon, who resigned from the NUG cabinet in February after berating Shamir as being "weak and conciliatory," was appointed the Housing Minister of the new Shamir government.\(^{310}\) Sharon has been noted as being an outspoken proponent of increased Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, as well as of the transfer of Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza.\(^{311}\) The combination of such 'far right' factions with a comparatively 'moderate' Shamir make any notion of a resolution with the Palestinians a distant mirage.

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\(^{308}\) Ibid., p. 137.

\(^{309}\) Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1434, 7 May 1988, as cited in Peretz, Intifada, p. 137. Similar statements have been made by members of the Tehiya party as well: "... Israeli citizenship must not be granted to the Arabs in the territories, except for those who are willing to identify with the Zionist State of Israel, to be examined in Hebrew and Zionism, to do national service, and to pay taxes; thus some of the Arab population (350,000-400,000 in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza) who hold refugee documents ... will have to find themselves a permanent home. ... This home will not be here, and just as we absorbed Jews from the Arab countries, the Arab countries will have to absorb the refugees." As cited in Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Decisions, trans. Lenn Schramm, (London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1988), p. 118. For a further discussion of Tehiya, see Aaron Rosenbaum, "Tehiya as a Permanent Nationalist Phenomenon," in Reich and Kieval, Israeli National Security Policy, pp. 147-168.


Nonetheless, regardless of whether Likud, Labor or any coalition thereof was successful in forming the new Israeli government, the likelihood of securing a settlement acceptable to all concerned would have remained negligible. Existential concerns borne of a traumatic communal history still reign strong among the current generation of Israeli leaders, whatever their political leanings may be. Goodman contends:

How ironic, indeed tragic, that at this moment of genuine opportunity for talks with the Palestinians, history finds Israel at the zenith of strategic strength and at its nadir in leadership. The current generation of Israeli leaders has been too scarred by doubt and pain to believe in itself. It has no self-confidence, and consequently it will not be the generation to deliver peace. Its political agenda has been tempered more by the ideologies of the diaspora than current Israeli political realities. Memories of Palestinian terrorist barbarism continue to be more powerful than the belief, however opaque, that change is indeed possible.312

Former Israeli Intelligence Chief, Yehoshafat Harkabi, maintains that if Israel turns a blind eye to the PLO's efforts, whether from fear or otherwise, a catastrophe will result for both peoples.313

Israel does not face choices between good alternatives in dealing with the Palestinian issue. All alternatives entail some risk and some pain. But there are 'less bad' outcomes, provided that Israelis are guided by the notion of a 'Zionism of quality,' not of acreage. A smaller, more Jewish Israel, at peace with its neighbours, would be more secure than a larger Israel with a sizable Palestinian minority with second-class status.314

As with Israel, though, internal divisions have always existed within the Palestinian community regarding the direction of future relations between the Jewish community and the Palestinians. The "fundamental division revolves around those willing to accept the national identity and political existence of the other, and

312 Hirsh Goodman, "Israel: A Government Paralyzed," New York Times, 19 July 1989, p. A23. Goodman continues: "Israel's leaders can't seem to realize that they finally won the war and brought Yasir Arafat to understand that while the thought of a Jewish state in Palestine remains anathema to him, it is a reality he cannot ignore. They cannot seem to accept that perhaps the PLO has changed its tune. . . ."

313 Robert Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," p. 360.
314 As cited in William Quandt, "U.S. Policy," p. 385. Also see Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Decisions, for an in-depth explanation of his position.
those who still refuse such recognition."315 Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a division of the PLO, has not hesitated when commenting on his position with respect to proposed Palestinian-Israeli talks, nor on his disposition toward Israel.316 He maintains that "the intifadah is not the end of the armed struggle, just one of its stages. . . . We need to understand that Israel is an aggressive entity which threatens the entire Arab world."317 Islamic fundamentalist factions, such as Hamas, have proclaimed that "jihad [holy war] . . . [is] the 'personal obligation' of every Muslim, for Palestine [is] the 'soil of the Islamic trust till the end of days' and the Jews [are] an instrument of evil that turns the wheels of history."318

The popularity of such groups, in conjunction with the lack of any substantive political gains in the intifadah - despite Arafat's concessions - have resulted in increased internecine violence among Palestinians. More than 175 have been killed as Palestinians have targeted those of "questionable moral conduct."319 Furthermore, on 30 May 1990, members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a PLO faction, were thwarted in an attempted seaborne raid near a Tel Aviv beach.320 Granted, the internecine and factional violence that has occurred does not represent the attitude of a majority within the Palestinian community; nevertheless, these

more violent actions - both against Palestinians and Israelis - will escalate as Palestinians witness their efforts toward moderation lead to nothing. Kuttab explains:

Every day that Palestinians or Israelis are hurt or killed, the cycle of violence increases. Many in the PLO are trying to restrain the hardline elements. But with each day of violence, support for nonviolent resistance will fade, and calls for more violence and the use of firearms will be received with greater enthusiasm. This would bring tragedy to both Palestinians and Israelis.

The U.S. maintains a central position with respect to 'controlling' the course of a 'settlement' between the Israelis and the Palestinians. As demonstrated in Section IV, the United States' efforts toward assisting with the Palestinian-Israeli peace process reflect a strong proclivity toward its 'democratic' ally, Israel. That the U.S. maintains this regime of practice is best exemplified by its position with respect to the establishment of a Palestinian state. During his address to AIPAC, Baker may have asked Israel to lay aside the 'unrealistic vision of a greater Israel,' yet in that same speech he also reaffirmed that "the U.S. does not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state." Acknowledging the existential realities and right to self-determination of the Palestinians does not correspond with 'statehood' in the eyes of the U.S., which is ever-cognizant of Israel's 'security dilemma.' By thus advocating such a 'non-negotiable' position to a people who see a Palestinian state as the solution leaves the fateful triangle with little, if any, room for discussion, and in the end does indeed dictate the structure and limits of the vista in which any 'lasting peace' could ever be negotiated.

325 See Salah Khalaf, "Lowering the Sword," Foreign Policy, no. 78, Spring 1990, pp. 92-112.
The PLF's 30 May 1990 raid merely became the catalyst by which Arafat's astonishing concessions were finally abrogated. Pressure from Israel, the lobby, and Congress, combined with the Administration's perception that Arafat had not done enough to condemn the raid and take disciplinary action against the PLF's leader, Abul Abbas, 'convinced' the U.S. to suspend indefinitely the dialogue.\(^{326}\) Indeed, the U.S. commitment to Israel has remained unyielding. Its $3 billion (and rising) 'financial key' to Israel's present and future 'existence' is ensured by its intractable domestic political process, which has been only superficially touched by the tragedy unfolding in the territories.\(^{327}\) The U.S. government is too entangled with the Jewish lobby, too enmeshed in its own historical context, and too blindly committed to maintaining its 'ally' - financially and emotionally - than to contributing to any 'meaningful peace process.'\(^{328}\) In the end, though the intifadah has given meaning and identity to a new generation of Palestinians, one can only envision that the fateful triangle will maintain its precarious existence, and that a labyrinth of rhetoric will continue for some time to come.


\(^{327}\) Rabie goes so far as to claim that American support for Israel has "transformed the Jewish state into a vulnerable client-state that has little chance of surviving on its own." Rabie, *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, p. 94.

\(^{328}\) Khouri affirms: "No American initiative can succeed until American leaders first acquire an accurate and complete understanding about the basic roots of the overall . . . problem; the real obstacles to resolving it; and the policies which must be firmly and courageously adopted to remove these obstacles and to promote that kind of peace settlement which reasonably takes into consideration the legitimate needs and interests of all the parties. . . . Unless the United States can provide a knowledgeable, bold, and effective leadership which is so urgently and desperately needed, the Middle East will continue to face mounting tensions and instabilities and, ultimately, another war." Fred Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 3d ed., (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 523.
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