

THE POLITICAL ADAPTATION OF SECOND-GENERATION AUSTRALIANS

by

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree. It is the result of my own independent investigation, and all authorities and sources which has been consulted are acknowledged in the references and notes.

Signed Mine Mustilo



Dedication

For Kia who believed in the study,
for Evan who became proud of it, and
for Anna who may someday understand it.

Contents

Acknowledgements	viii
Abstract	x
Quote	xi
Chapters	
1. Introduction	1
2. Theory of Adaptation	6
3. Frame of Reference, Method, Data	19
4. Economic Integration	63
5. Educational Achievements	79
6. Partisanship	94
7. Participation and Efficacy	131
8. Conclusion	166
Appendix	
I Relevant Questions from NSSS	174
II Relevant Questions from Census	180
III Classification of Occupation	181
IV Classification of Religious Denomination	186
References	187

Table Index

Figure No.	Title	page
3.1	Origin of Adult Second-Generation Australians, 1981	26
3.2	Birthplace of Adult Immigrants, 1981	28
3.3i	Representativeness of Generational Groups	30
3.3ii	Origin of Adult Second-Generation Australians, 1981 Census and 1984 NSSS	31
3.3iii	Birthplace of Adult Immigrants, 1981 Census and 1984 NSSS	32
3.4	Birthplace of Fathers of the Second Generation and Birthplace of Adult Male Immigrants, 1981	33
3.5	Correspondence of Mother's and Father's Birthplace for Second-Generation Adults, 1981	34
3.6	Age and Origin of the Adult Australian Population, 1981	36
3.7	Age and Origin of the Adult Australian Population, 1981	37
3.8	Age and Origin of the Whole Australian Population, 1981	38
3.9	Predicted Age and Origin of Adult Australian-born Population, 1999 and Age	40
3.10	Gender and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	41
3.11	Religion and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	43
3.12	Geographic Area and Origin of the Australian Population, 18+, 1981	45
3.13	Nature of Occupancy and Origin of the Australian Population, 18+, 1981	46
3.14	Highest Level of Education Attained and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	49
3.15	Labour Force Participation and Origin Adult Australian Population, 1981	52
3.16	Occupational Status and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	53
3.17	Occupational Prestige and Origin of Adult Population, 1981	55
3.18	Industry Sector and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	58
3.19	Income and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981	60
4.1	Tertiary Education Institution Attendance and Origin of Australian Population, 18+ years, 1981	67
4.2	Age and Origin of the Sample, 18-60 years, 1981	68
4.3	Age Adjusted and Observed Average Annual Income, 18-60 years, and Origin of Australian Population, 1981	70
4.4	Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin, 1981	72
4.5	Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin of Males, 1981	73

4.6	Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin of Females, 1981	74
5.1	Educational Levels and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981 by Gender	83
5.2	Educational Qualifications, Tertiary Institution Attendance and Origin of Australian Population, 18+, 1981	84
5.3	Tertiary Education Level and Origin of the Australian Population, 18 to 22 years, 1981	85
6.1i	Federal Party Identification and Parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	96
6.1ii	Federal Party Identification and Parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984, By Age	97
6.2	Strength of Federal Party Identification and parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Partisan Population, 18+, 1984	98
6.3	Father's and Mother's Party Identification and Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	102
6.4	Parents' Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	103
6.5	Federal Party Identification and Year of First Federal Election by Origin Australian Population, 18+, 1984	104
6.6	Electoral Registration and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	105
6.7	Registration to Vote and Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	107
6.8	Partisanship and Registration to Vote by Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	108
6.9	Father's and Mother's Partisanship and Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	109
6.10	Mother's Partisanship and Mother's Birthplace by Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	111
6.11i	Federal Partisanship and Birthplace of Australian Female Urban Population, 18+, 1984	112
6.11ii	Federal Partisanship and Birthplace of Australian Female Urban Population, 18+, 1984	112
6.12	Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	113
6.13	Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18-30 years, 1984	114
6.14	Parent's party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984.	116
6.15	Strength of Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	117

6.16	Liberal-National and Labor Party Identification By Origins of Urban Australian Native-born Population, 18+, 1984	120
6.17	The Relative Importance of Religious, Occupational, Father's Occupational, Father's Party Identificational, Age Cohort & Origin Effects on Party Identification of Urban Native-born Liberal-National and Labor Identifiers, 1984	128
7.1	Attitude to Trade Union Power and Origin of the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	137
7.2	Attitude to Trade Union Power and Origin of the Urban Australian Population, 18-30 years, 1984	138
7.3	Ancestry of Australian Population, 18+, 1984	138
7.4	Attitude to Immigrants Retaining their Ethnic Identity and Origins of the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	139
7.5	Ethnic Identification of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	145
7.6	Ethnic Identification of Age of Other Australian-born in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	146
7.7	Likelihood of Writing to a Newspaper and Ethnic Identification of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	146
7.8	Political Participation: Variables which were not Statistically Significant	148
7.9	Political Participation of Younger and Older Age Cohorts Compared to 31-50 Year Cohort in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	149
7.10	Political Participation by Age and Origin in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984: Selected Measures	150-151
7.11	Political Efficacy: Variables which were not Statistically Significant	153
7.12	Political Efficacy of Age Cohorts Compared to 31-50 Year Cohort in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	155
7.13	Extent of Political Efficacy By Age and Origin in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	156
7.14	Ethnic Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	158
7.15	Political Participation and the Role of Ethnic Identification by Origins	159
7.16	Political Efficacy and the Role of Ethnic Identification by Origins	160
7.17	Likelihood of Attending Meeting and Ethnic Identification of Second-Generation NES in Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984	161

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Abstract

The study systematically analyses the location of second-generation Australian adults (defined as those born in Australia of an immigrant father) in the economic system, it investigates their educational achievements, and examines the nature of influences on their political behaviour by specifying relations among certain variables and by comparing them to first-generation immigrants and to the native-born of a native-born father. The one per cent person's sample file of the 1981 Australian census on population and housing is used for analyses of income and education; the 1984/1985 National Social Science Survey (urban preliminary sample) is used to investigate partisanship, participation and felt efficacy. The study draws mostly on American literature for its theoretical underpinnings.

The conceptual basis of this study involves a three-fold distinction: the socioeconomic system, the cultural, or 'ethnic', dimension and the political system. The socioeconomic system is explored largely in the economic domain in terms of individual income and educational achievement, the ethnic or cultural dimension in terms of the extent of economic and educational integration and in terms of influences on political behaviour. Ethnicity is defined mainly in terms of father's birthplace. The political system is examined through extent and strength of, and influences on, partisanship, through political participation and through felt political efficacy.

The model which best describes the political life of second-generation Australians in the early 1980s is partial assimilation. Their pattern of political adaptation is piecemeal, complex and at times puzzling. Political adaptation appears to be a function both of location in some important sociocultural systems and of cultural differentiation. Ethnicity permeates political adaptation, although its effects vary across the major subsystems of society. In short, a dual explanation - economic and cultural - is required.

Many features parallel the adaptation of the second generation in the United States half a century ago, perhaps the most general being that adaptation and ethnicity are interwoven in concept and reality. But unlike what appears to be the American experience, most second-generation Australians have been assimilated into the economic system by virtue of their success in gaining incomes which are at least the equivalent of those earned by other native-born Australians.

The end or purpose of every art and science is some good. That of the most authoritative, that is, of political science, is the greatest and most eagerly desired good - justice, or, in other words, the common welfare.

Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III

Chapter 1

Introduction

... 99 per cent of us are, in Aboriginal terms, 'recent arrivals' - whether we arrived on a flight from Birmingham or Bangkok last week, or whether we can trace our roots back to the First Fleet in 1788 (Shergold, 1984:47).

European settlement of Australia began in 1788 with the arrival of the first fleet to establish a penal colony for Great Britain in New South Wales. Before that time, Australia's population consisted of about three hundred thousand Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (Jupp, 1984A:2). There were no towns or villages. Now, two hundred years later, Australia's population exceeds 16 million persons and is one of the most urban in the world; and only one per cent of it is descended from the indigenous people.

This great transformation resulted from periods of great migration from Great Britain and continental Europe, and from a wide diversity of places on every other continent. Australia remains a nation of continuing migration. Today, about two out of five in her adult population are immigrants or the native-born children of immigrants.

Because the British dominated the early waves of migration, Australian society until the second World War had a strongly British character. Contrary to conventional wisdom in Australia until the end of the 1960s, it is now conceded that recent immigrants have *not* assimilated into Australian society, that is, they have not acquired the general behavioural patterns and beliefs of their adopted country (Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, 1982). And interestingly, research on second and later generations of immigrants in the United States reveals a complex pattern of political adaptation. In the Australian context, Bottomley (1979:ix-x) has suggested that, in other spheres of life,

... second generation studies reveal a complex process of adjustment and active adaptation ... The process of change ... is complicated.

Does the political life of the second generation in contemporary Australia suggest a complex pattern of adaptation or is assimilation complete by the second generation? Most immigrants arrive in Australia as adults, and their political and other attitudes have been formed in the context of a different society, which may influence the beliefs and attitudes of their native-born children. Nonetheless, the second generation in their

early formative years are exposed to powerful 'Australian' influences such as the school and the media. So the extent to which the values of the second generation are associated with the national background of their parents (which may be thought of as their culture or their ethnicity) rather than with those of other native-born Australians still influences them, is a matter which requires exploration. Factors associated with the migration process may be important in the adaptation of second-generation Australians to the political as well as to other spheres of life.

Political behaviour cannot be studied in isolation, because it results from the interaction of people's location in important socioeconomic systems in society, their individual values, attitudes and beliefs (their culture), and the political environment. Culture and location in socioeconomic systems interact to influence political behaviour because culture influences educational achievement, which in turn is associated with occupational status and linked to income; and socioeconomic status is an important consideration in political behaviour. Even so, political behaviour may be modified by the contemporary political environment.

This thesis concerns the political adaptation of contemporary second-generation Australians and focusses on aspects of partisanship, political participation and political efficacy. It aims to establish a framework within which political adaptation among the second generation may be evaluated. It suggests that there is a dual explanation for the political adaptation of second-generation Australians. Two dimensions of life, the economic and the cultural, interact to influence the nature of political adaptation. Ethnicity permeates the whole of political adaptation but its effects vary according to the area investigated.

It could be argued that since the available survey data are not adequate for the task, a study such as this should be delayed until comprehensive data are available. Unfortunately, given the limitations on funding for research in the social sciences in Australia today, the likelihood of better data being available in the near or even distant future remains uncertain, to put the most optimistic view. But the available data are adequate for the investigation of *broad* patterns of political behaviour in the second generation, an area not previously researched in Australia. The findings are therefore useful, not only for their intrinsic value, but also because they point to areas of future research and more specific data requirements.

Indeed, there are important reasons for studying second-generation Australians. Immigration has always been a crucial factor in the size, composition and distribution of the Australian population, and a major influence on the nature of Australia's

development and her capacity to achieve national objectives. It is therefore important to study how immigrants and their descendants are absorbed into the political and social and economic systems of our society. As most migrate to provide a better future for their children, the 'success' of their migration may be largely measured by the social, political and economic location of their Australian-born children. In 1981, the second generation constituted about eleven per cent of the adult Australian population.

There has been much public discussion about the costs and benefits of immigration in Australia, especially during the current economic downturn. Unfortunately, in the last several years

The immigration debate ... has been marked by wild accusations and unsubstantiated assertion. Reasoned argument has been hidden beneath screaming headlines and sensationalist television titles (Shergold, 1984:29).

So it is important to investigate the second generation also to discern whether or not the immigration policy has been successful. In other words, we need to assess the extent to which immigration is useful for Australia by investigating the incorporation of the second generation into the main spheres of life in Australia.

Any debate on immigration in Australia inevitably involves explicit or implicit judgments about the kind of immigrants Australia should aim, and should have aimed in the past, to attract. This study provides some information on this issue because it sets out some important aspects of settlement patterns in the second generation, and groups within it (based on the country of origin of their immigrant parents). In consequence, the thesis has important policy implications. For example, is the second generation of English-speaking origin more likely to do well economically in terms of income compared to those of non-English-speaking origin? Do different second-generation groups achieve similar levels of education? Is the second generation of non-English-speaking origin a disadvantaged minority in terms of its socioeconomic position?

The policy implications of this study extend beyond that of immigration issues as such to other areas of government policy and current public expenditure. In 1986, I gave two seminars from the chapter on educational achievement. Unfortunately, my findings which were more comprehensive than any previous research, were used to fortify arguments that ethnic support and equity programmes in education represent pointless expenditure. The papers became the subject of an intense, acrimonious and quite emotional debate in the area of educational policy. Immigration has always been, and is likely to remain, an issue of powerful emotional force for newcomers and earlier arrivals alike.

Contemporary Australia is distinctive in having a population rapidly and recently expanded due to migration. As large numbers of the second generation have now entered the political arena, it is timely to study their political behaviour. Their parents, the immigrants, have not yet attained equality in terms of political participation. Does that inequality continue into the second generation to any extent?

A study of this kind raises questions about what kind of polity exists in contemporary Australia, and the capacity of its political institutions to respond to the profound changes in its population brought about by immigration. There is much evidence to suggest that many immigrants' participation in, for example trade unions, is relatively slight (Martin, 1978; Nicolaou, 1986). Are Australian political institutions open to the second generation? How have they adapted to their publics in the special circumstances of a rapidly growing population? Are some groups more active than others in some political institutions?

Moreover, the last decade or so has witnessed the rise in ethnic conflict in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and in islands nearer Australia in the Pacific region. Is there political alienation amongst any second-generation groups? Does the adaptation of second-generation Australians, or groups within them, suggest separatism? Is ethnic conflict in the political arena likely to occur in Australia amongst its recognised ethnic communities?

In the United States, second-generation Americans earlier this century were sometimes seen as a source of political instability for the party system because they were uncommitted to it and thus available for mobilisation by a party (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976:76-77). Are second-generation Australians a source of political instability? Or do they identify with Australian parties to much the same extent as other native-born Australians? Amongst those who are partisan, are important influences on the partisanship of the second generation similar to those for other native-born Australians? To what extent do members of the second generation share aspects of their parents' political behaviour and beliefs?

Finally, while the literature exploring immigrant settlement in Australia in the economic, educational, occupational and political sphere has grown over the last decade or so, little has been written about the adaptation of their native-born children. Most of the literature about later generations of American immigrants relates to an earlier era, half a century ago. Are there differences in the incorporation of the American as opposed to Australian second generation? If so, do they relate to differing social, economic and political environments in the two countries?

These are important questions. Often my answers will be incomplete or inferential. Nonetheless, this thesis investigates several main spheres of life among contemporary second-generation Australians, namely the economic, educational and political systems. The project aims to contribute to knowledge about political adaptation among a later generation of immigrants in contemporary Australia by illuminating aspects of their partisanship, participation and efficacy. It also provides an understanding of the adjustment of some Australian political institutions to their contemporary publics. While it is not a comparative study of the Australian and American experience, it does point to some differences in adaptation of the second generation in these countries. Finally, it provides insights into the relevance of ethnicity in the Australian political arena.

Australia has an interest in the adaptation of later generations of her immigrants, the investigation of their location in socioeconomic systems and how that translates into their political behaviour. The relevance of the study of this later generation of immigrants, the contemporary second generation, remains of importance in Australia today. I can do no better than cite the words of the present Minister for Immigration, Mick Young, in a parliamentary debate in 1987:

At the moment we are inundated with applications from people who would like to live here. We estimate that we get 1.2 million serious inquiries a year from people who would like to migrate to Australia. As we stipulate an intake, of all categories, of 120,000 it means we are saying no to 9 out of 10 people. Australia can be proud of what has happened here since World War II, in particular, in regard to the settlement of migrants. We have learnt a lot. Many of the settlement services we now have in place were not in place those earlier years. We no longer see migrants as just being fodder for the factories or in terms of the work they might be able to do but also for the contributions they can make. Almost every walk of life, whether it be academia, politics, trade unions or business has been affected by the fact that people have come from all over the world to live in this country. It is a lesson for all to observe: we can go on building this country in the way we have done with the continuation of these programmes (Young, 1987:2554).

As long as Australia remains a land for immigrants, the questions explored in this thesis will remain central to Australia's success as a modern social democracy.

Chapter 2

Theory of Adaptation

Sir Francis Bacon ... has made a judicious parallel in many particulars, between the Body Natural and the Body Politic, and between the arts of preserving both in health and strength: and as its anatomy is the best foundation of one, so also of the other: ... to practice upon the politics, without knowing the symmetry, fabric, and proportion of it, is as casual as the practice of old women and empirics.

Sir William Petty

Political Anatomy of Ireland, 1672

Most contemporary societies contain subgroups with subcultures more or less distinguishable from the rest of the population. In this dissertation I examine how an historically recent group, second-generation immigrants in Australia, has adapted to an established political system. Because dynamic interaction between groups cannot be understood in isolation, but must be seen in the context of a total society, I focus on the Australian political system as a whole, that is, on the macrosociological level (Schermerhorn, 1978:9-11).

Ethnicity is one basis for defining subcultures and subgroups, and adaptation and ethnicity are interconnected concepts. Ethnicity is defined as the culture associated with national background or ancestry of the group or individual. Culture encompasses

...distinctive values, customs, beliefs, language or dialect, heritage and history (Abramson, 1980:155; see also Schermerhorn, 1978:15).

Although the literature on the political behaviour of immigrants in Australia has increased recently, little has yet been written about the political behaviour of second-generation Australians. So potential problems relating to the way in which the second generation has adapted to the Australian political system may be indicated in part by reference to American and other foreign literatures. Fortunately, there is a considerable body of pertinent American literature. Although often inconclusive, it serves as a useful point of departure.

Even so, the Australian literature on first-generation immigrants cannot be ignored in any study of the second generation, if a coherent body of knowledge in the general research area is to be built. Nor can the second generation be studied in isolation

from immigrants. Moreover, while there may be broad consistencies in political adaptation or behaviour of the second generation in many countries, comparative studies do not necessarily translate to Australian conditions because of the differing political and social system to which the second generation is exposed and into which it is incorporated. Also, the historical period during which the second generation entered the political arena is more recent in Australia, where the great waves of immigration peaked some half-century after those of the United States and Canada.

For all these reasons, the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation stem largely from two sources: literature on second and later generations of immigrants in the United States, and literature on first generation immigrants in Australia. The study draws particularly on the American literature to identify important questions and to develop hypotheses. It modifies these borrowings in the light of previous Australian research on immigrant political behaviour. In this way, we can gain insights into the political adaptation of second-generation Australians, by drawing on American experience and modifying it to the Australian.

This chapter does not document the history of government policies towards immigrants. But it is acknowledged that in Australia, the post World War II era witnessed a change in public policy in relation to the desirability of assimilation for immigrants. Successive governments came to recognise

both the sterility and cruelty of assimilationism and the impossibility of its application (Wilton and Bosworth, 1984:25).

By the early 1970s, multiculturalism had replaced assimilation as the basis of a national immigration policy.¹

The literatures in Australia and the United States are concerned with what might be described as 'old' immigrant cohorts. As will be show in Chapter 3, the most recent immigrants to Australia are drawn more from Asian countries than was the case earlier this century. Similarly, in the United States, recent immigrants are more Hispanic in origin than earlier. So second-generation Australians and Americans described in the literature and investigated in this study can be defined as part of 'old' waves of the immigrant influx in the twentieth century.

It is not proposed to enter into the general debate about ethnicity in the Australian context because that is beyond the frame of reference of this chapter. The role of

¹A summary of government immigration policy from 1949 to 1983 may be found in Wilton and Bosworth (1984).

ethnicity is analysed in relation to education in Chapter 5, to political participation in Chapter 6, and to migration processes throughout the thesis and in Chapter 8, the conclusion.

In the United States, many studies have focussed, on or discussed, aspects of the nature of ethnicity in various groups or communities, for example Thomas and Znaniecki (1918/1958), Park (1928/1952). Handlin (1951), Gans (1962), Glazer and Moynihan (1970) and Greeley (1976). Ethnicity appears to maintain its salience among later generations of immigrants and in the suburbs where they are dispersed (Newman, 1973:77; Gordon, 1964:25). As Abrahamson (1980:160) has put it:

American society, through history and fiction, is revealed as a composite not only of many ethnic backgrounds but also of many different ethnic responses...change and diversity within distinctiveness. There is no one single response or adaptation... Ethnicity is as complex as life itself.

In thinking about subcultural differences, I have drawn on the concept of culture used in the anthropological literature. The anthropological concept of culture has been one of the most important and influential ideas in twentieth century thought:

Culture is all those means whose forms are not under direct genetic control...which serve to adjust individuals and groups within their ecological communities (Binford, 1968:323).

Goodenough (1961) has suggested a distinction between patterns *of* and patterns *for* behaviour. The term culture may refer to the

pattern of life within a community - the regularly recurring activities and material and social arrangements (Goodenough, 1961:521)

that is, characteristic of a particular human group. It comprises, in other words, the realm of observable sociocultural phenomena. But culture may also refer to the organised system of knowledge and beliefs whereby a people structure their experience and perceptions, formulate acts, and choose between alternatives: the realm of ideas or the ideational aspect of culture. In this sense culture means what humans *learn*, as well as what they do and make. No culture, including Australian culture, is monolithic.

To emphasise this duality in the concept of culture, I will use the term sociocultural systems (Beals et al., 1977:30). Sociocultural systems then are adaptive mechanisms whereby humans adapt to their environment; for example, modes of economic organisation, social groupings, political organisation, settlement patterns, and religious beliefs and practices.

The major components of a cultural system include a group, an environment, a national culture, a cultural tradition and human activities and behaviours (Beals et al., 1977:46).

In what follows, I shall treat the concepts of cultural and sociocultural systems as equivalent.

Reference is often made to social 'structure', political 'structure', occupational 'structure', and religious 'structure'. Social structure used thus means:

the totality of patterns of collective human phenomena that cannot be explained solely on the basis of human heredity and/or the non-human environment (Udy, 1968:489).

In this sense it approximates the sociocultural system defined above.

But the term 'structure' can also be used to denote the form taken by the acting-out of the ideational aspect of a particular culture - the *patterns of behaviour* mentioned above.

Culture is the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action; social structure is the form that action takes, the...network of social relations. Culture and social structure are...different abstractions from the same phenomena (Geertz 1957:33-34).

This sense of 'structure' is equivalent to the term social system.

The Australian social system can be conceptualised as a sociocultural system, an adaptive mechanism representing the collective means by which the Australian population has adapted to various aspects of its environment: economic, educational, political, religious and so on. In this sense, the Australian social system is a collection of subsystems of adaptation.

A central element in the sociocultural system is the economy and aspects of social organisation directly tied to production. Adaptive changes in this subsystem ramify into other parts of the social structure.

Economies and their social correlates are in some sense primary and ideational systems - religion, ritual, world view...(are) secondary, derived or epiphenomenal (Keesing, 1974:76).

Ideational components of sociocultural systems may have adaptive consequences. Though often subtle, these consequences need to be traced. Any analysis of adaptation must therefore consider the *total sociocultural system*.

Whether analysis begins with religious practices, social organisation or some other sector of a cultural complex...it will...reveal functional relationships with other categories of behaviour that are adaptive (Meggers, 1971:43; see also Keesing 1981:75).

Types of Adaptation

Studies of cultural adaptation among immigrants and their descendants, have produced theories, analytical schemes, goal systems or ideologies that are generally centred on three main categories, or directions: assimilation, amalgamation, and pluralism.¹ Assimilation means the engulfing of the minority by the majority so that the former becomes indistinguishable from the latter. In short, it means conformity to the majority by acculturation. Amalgamation means the merging of minority and majority groups whereby each maintains some distinguishing features but also adopts some of the others to form new cultural patterns through the 'melting pot'. Pluralism occurs when there is separation of groups, each maintaining a high degree of distinctiveness (see also Abramson, 1980:150).

The term 'assimilation' has been applied to a multiplicity of cultural, social and identificational processes and phenomena, and mostly to groups rather than individuals. Gordon (1964) made a significant contribution to the nature of group life by providing some important new concepts of assimilation. According to Gordon, assimilation is not one single process but has several dimensions, the most important being culture and structure.

Cultural assimilation (acculturation or behavioural assimilation) is the process by which minority groups acquire the cultural 'norms' of the majority or dominant society. He suggested that among second and later generations of American immigrants, acculturation has been massive.

Over the generations ...acculturation in America has been, if not complete, then numerically and functionally overwhelming (Gordon, 1964:78).

In contrast to this cultural dimension, structural assimilation of minority groups has not taken place so rapidly or so completely. Gordon asserts that structural pluralism or separation in America has occurred (or rather persisted) on the basis of race and religion. For example, American Catholics as a group were, at least until 1964, concentrated in the lower part of the occupational structure (Gordon, 1964:208).

¹Towards the end of the 1970s, and because of the focus of government attention and government funded research by academics, the debate in the United States about adaptation changed from later generations of immigrants to recently arrived groups, especially Hispanics. Consequently, the adaptation of later generations was not developed further (Almond, 1984).

American society, structurally, has become composed of a number of 'pots' or subsocieties, three of which are the religious containers of Protestant, Catholic, Jews; others are substantial remnants of the nationality background communities (Gordon, 1964:130).

He continues:

the United States is a multiple melting pot in which acculturation for all groups beyond the first generation is massive, but in which structural separation on the basis of race and religion - structural pluralism - emerges as the dominant sociological condition (1964:234-5).

Gordon concludes:

once structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all other types of assimilation will naturally follow (Gordon, 1964:81).

Thus, for Gordon, the key to *complete* assimilation lies in structural change.

Nonetheless, the probability of structural assimilation leading to complete assimilation appears to reflect a value-laden interpretation rather than an objective conclusion capable of being drawn from Gordon's empirical data. We can see his position as reflecting a certain conventional wisdom in American society at large.

Opinions, statements, propositions and systems of ideas...are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them...the specific character and life situation of the subject influences his opinions, perceptions and interpretations... As long as the particularity of the conventional framework remains unquestioned we will remain in the toils of a static mode of thought which is inadequate to our present stage of historical and intellectual development (Mannheim, 1936:50;79-80).

In fact complete assimilation had not occurred for most immigrants or their children, and Gordon presents no evidence that some forms of assimilation led 'naturally' or even inevitably to further cultural or structural assimilation. For example, Gordon (1964:209) notes that upper middle and upper class Catholics have developed Catholic institutions or organisations

paralleling the social structure at these class levels already developed among Protestants and Jews respectively.

So assimilation into one part of the social structure may be associated with increased separation elsewhere. In short, assimilation may vary according to the question.

This consequence is partly due to resistance to full incorporation by older-established majority groups.

Few Catholic families, mostly of English and French descent, have participated in the 'general' American upper class from the very beginning...

The rise in social and economic position of families of Irish, and most recently Italian descent, created a whole new set of conditions - conditions which the established institutions of the Protestant upper class were either unwilling or unable to meet (Gordon, 1964:211).

Gordon (1964:220) also notes that Lenski (1961:291) found significant attitudinal differences between white Catholics and white Protestants of the same social class, some of which were greatest in the middle class and the third generation. So Gordon's evidence does not suggest that structural assimilation necessarily or eventually leads to cultural assimilation. Rather it indicates that structural assimilation in some areas can co-exist with a duplication by minority groups of other majority social structures, an inability or unwillingness of older established majority groups to accommodate the 'new' groups, and a persistence of inter-group cultural distinctiveness to some recognisable degree.

Gordon (1964:51) suggests that the

portion of social space created by the intersection of the ethnic group with social class is fast becoming the essential form of the subsociety in America.

Yet he disregarded this salient feature of American society in making assumptions about its nature, assumptions upon which his assimilation theory rests. Structural assimilation did not appear to have occurred in America, at least by 1964. Gordon viewed contemporary American society in terms of his perceptions of past history; and he conflated goals or ideologies with social processes and observable group relations in society. In a sense, his assimilationist approach was a predictable response to a recently changed social situation.

As well, his failure to delineate *types* of structures prevented him from grasping that acculturation was not so 'massive' as he presumed. Structures that maintained group culture existed, indeed flourished, often paralleling those of the dominant groups in society. So some of the structural pluralism he observed was in fact a manifestation of cultural pluralism.

The question arises as to whether any one theory of assimilation can adequately describe American society. The alleged lack of assimilation in some structures, which are arguably the most important, may indicate the inadequacy of such an approach in understanding and describing majority-minority or inter-group relations in a given society. In essence, while Gordon's conceptual delineation of assimilation was an advance useful in understanding assimilation phenomena or processes, it is limited as an analytical tool for deeper analysis because it can accommodate only one type of adaptation, a type which is not apparent, or descriptive of, the more important spheres

of American life nor in those structures which reflect, maintain, and service the cultural needs of groups.

An intermediate theoretical position is amalgamation, the least frequently discussed and encountered model. Perhaps this is because a necessary condition of its occurrence is that both majority and minority groups aim for and facilitate it. Such a condition is rare, in part because it entails the dominant group relinquishing at least some of its power. Inter-marriage between racial, religious or ethnic groups is not necessarily an index of, nor does it necessarily lead promptly to, amalgamation between (or indeed assimilation of) individuals or groups, either in the cultural or structural dimensions of their life (see also Newman, 1973:162-4; Abramson, 1980:158).

A contrast to the assimilation model is provided by the pluralistic model. Like assimilation theory, it has been used to describe a wide variety of social situations. Pluralism may refer to the arrangements between different cultural groups or different social systems.

In *Bonds of Pluralism*, Laumann (1972) analysed the diversity in urban social structure, evidenced in a sample of about 1,000 native-born white men aged between 21 to 64 years, living in the greater metropolitan area of Detroit in 1966 (1972:17). For Laumann (1972:2), 'structure' means a persisting order or pattern of relationships among some units of sociological analysis: individuals, groups, or behavioural patterns. His study focussed on friendship patterns. By identifying the underlying dimensionality of micro- and macro-structures, Laumann describes how the pattern of social relationships is structurally differentiated along different dimensions. Laumann (1972) analysed differentiation of ethno-religious groups in terms of their distinctive religious beliefs and activities, political, economic and work orientations, modes of social participation (primary social networks), and material success. He concluded that several dimensions of differentiation were needed to account for heterogeneity in contemporary American cities (1972:206). A tripartite division of Protestant - Catholic - Jew (first axis), socioeconomic status (second axis) and 'ethno-religious' differences (third axis) were the basic dimensions in terms of which he differentiated social structure (1972:19). Occupation was further differentiated by status and a bureaucratic/entrepreneurial dimension (1972:10).

Of particular relevance for my dissertation is Laumann's evidence on the persistence of ethno-religious differences in the material success of third and later generations of American immigrants. He concludes that, although his results should be treated with caution because of small numbers, subcultural differences in some attitudes

and behaviour persist among groups which 'should' (in Gordon's view) be assimilated completely into the host society.

The importance of Laumann's contribution lies in his defining the form of social networks among white urban men and later generations of immigrants. He focussed on groups of (white male) individuals to determine the extent of pluralism in the holding of certain values and attitudes. But he did not consider these groups in their relation to other important structures of society, such as the economy or the occupational division of labor. In other words he did not distinguish between structural and cultural pluralism. For Laumann, structure means networks of groups and individuals, and pluralism means cultural pluralism. Because he focussed on intra- and inter-group relations, he did not explore links between cultural and structural pluralism, that is, this linkage between the form and substance of social networks on the one hand and structures (economic, occupation) of the wider society on the other.

Apart from this theoretical limitation, it must also be remembered that his sample was not representative of the adult American population in terms of race and gender: non-whites and women were not included. So its value may be more limited and his results should be treated with some caution. A sample more representative of the urban adult population might not generate the same results and conclusions.

By way of contrast, Newman (1973) addressed in his *American Pluralism* some basic issues and topics in the sociology of majority-minority relationships, by attempting to evaluate and reformulate existing conceptual and theoretical tools. He defined minority groups so that the study of majority-minority relationships were placed within the context of social stratification in particular, and the overall social structure in general.

Newman (1973:41) suggested that the pattern of majority-minority relationships takes a distinctive form in pluralistic societies, defined as societies with a high degree of economic and political differentiation and an open stratification system. Stratification implies ranking, and an open stratification system implies a high degree of social mobility based on achievement (Newman, 1973:25). Differentiation refers to the degree of diversity between and within social institutions, for example the religious, political and economic spheres (1973:24). The

degree of overall social differentiation in a society may be viewed as an important variable affecting the nature of group relations (Newman (1973:27).

And again the United States is an

extremely differentiated society in which achievement, mobility and competition are the dominant trends

according to Newman (1973:31).

So far as theoretical perspectives for understanding social processes in a pluralistic society are concerned, Newman suggested that, whether assimilation or cultural pluralism was occurring in American life, the process is not necessarily linear. Moreover, different groups may not seek the same type of assimilation. Newman maintains that the United States is a pluralistic society, and he focussed on cultural pluralism in the context of social conflict theory and the consequences of inter-group conflicts.

Newman's theoretical approach is narrow insofar as he focusses on the cultural pluralism of groups and individuals, and he did not consider the most important aspect of pluralism: stratification and differentiation in political and economic institutions and the relative location of different groups. Nor does he explore how cultural pluralism inter-relates with these structures. Newman asserts that America is a culturally pluralistic society, but to what extent?

Such issues are not addressed, even though Newman (1973:23) asserts that

majority-minority relationships must be viewed in terms of social stratification or ranking... The two social resources, power and status, provide basic descriptive information about the positions or ranks of different groups. The third social resource, class (wealth), is often the first important reward over which groups fight... Wherever there are societies and stratification systems within those societies, groups can be understood on the basis of their location in those social structures.

Newman's failure to locate minority groups in the stratification system of American society therefore greatly limits our ability to understand those groups and their position in American society as a whole. Moreover, Newman did not attempt to explore the relationship of cultural pluralism to social differentiation and stratification.

Summary and Discussion

Gordon's assertion that massive cultural assimilation (or acculturation) combined with structural pluralism typified American society may have been premature. Indeed Laumann, although discussing only white males, clearly shows that the form and substance of social networks with friendship patterns are differentiated by cultural groups. Moreover, cultural pluralism in attitudes and behaviour partially persists

among later generations of immigrants. Thus Laumann indicates both the extent and persistence of cultural pluralism, while Gordon (unknowingly) reinforces this position by discussing pluralism in structures, some of which reflect the cultural differences in American society. If we accept that ethnic groups wish to, and do, maintain their culture, then it follows that they will organise, either formally or informally, to maintain it.

That cultural pluralism persists among immigrants and later generations of immigrants, in spite of partial assimilation, has been obvious even to most casual observers. Indeed, Park, writing in the 1920s observed that:

our great cities turn out, upon examination, to be a mosaic of segregated peoples - differing in race, in culture, or merely in cult - each seeking to preserve its peculiar cultural forms and to maintain its individual and unique conceptions of life. Every one of these segregated groups inevitably seeks to maintain the integrity of its own group life, to impose upon its member some kind of moral isolation. So far as segregation becomes for them a means to that end, every people and every cultural group may be said to create and maintain its own ghetto (Park, 1928, 1952:99).

Even so, Bottomley (1979:13) has asserted that:

this emphasis on a common cultural life has encouraged the measurement of assimilation according to the presence or absence of cultural differences, ignoring the importance of political, economic and ideological systems, social interaction and group membership.

Moreover, as Newman emphasised, groups can only be understood on the basis of their location in the stratification systems of the wider society. Taking this position a step further, we cannot presume that cultural pluralism is necessarily associated with structural pluralism. In other words, the existence of 'minority groups' does not necessarily entail a similarly defined rank either high or low, in the occupational, economic or political orders.

For example in the political sphere, Dahl (1961:34-36) hypothesised that each ethnic group passes through three stages of assimilation on the way to political assimilation. Each stage is *not* clearly delineated and indeed:

One stage merges so imperceptibly with the next that it would be foolish to attribute much significance to precise dates (Dahl, 1961:36).

In the first stage, members of the ethnic group are almost exclusively proletarian, low in status, income and political influence. They tend to have a high degree of political homogeneity. In the second stage, the group is more heterogenous in socioeconomic status; a significant proportion is middle class; and some gain considerable political influence. Although political homogeneity declines, there is still much sensitivity to

ethnic origins. In the third stage, the group is socioeconomically heterogeneous, and large segments are assimilated into the middle and upper strata. Political attitudes become a function of socioeconomic characteristics not ethnicity as such (Dahl, 1961:34-36).

On the other hand, Wolfinger (1965) noted the persistence of ethnic voting patterns in spite of apparent socioeconomic assimilation. Parenti (1967) accepted that there were changes in ethnic social patterns, but also argued that ethnic groups had *not* assimilated into the Anglo-American social structure.

What is the significance of these analyses and perspectives for the political behaviour of later generations of immigrants in Australia? First, such groups, however internally defined, must be understood on the basis of their location in the functional systems of the wider society. Second, the degree and extent of cultural pluralism, that is differentiation of political values, attitudes and behaviour, needs to be analysed. Third, the inter-relationship between location in sociocultural systems and cultural differentiation must be explored.

Applying these notions to the political life of later generations of immigrants, I explore the relationships between the economic, cultural, and political systems. The importance of the economic lies not only in its primary role for adaptation generally, but also in its centrality for *political* adaptation in terms of socioeconomic status. Since economic status largely derives from occupation, which in turn connects with educational attainment, the educational domain is also an important concern. Even so, the cultural dimension is not less important: ideational components may have adaptive consequences. Political adaptation for the purposes of this thesis, then, is function of location in important sociocultural systems and cultural differentiation.

In focussing on the cultural and economic dimensions I follow recent developments in the field of American political history:

The result of the absorption of the concept of culture into historians' thinking has been the appearance in their writings of a historical scene far more complex than that which preceded it. Two dimensions of life, cultural and economic, share the stage formerly occupied by economics alone... We must make room...for an avowed dualism of explanation in which neither the cultural nor the economic dimension is the product (that is, an epiphenomenon) of the other, although the two dimensions are interactive (Kelley, 1979:12-13).

To the extent that links between anthropology and political science are not yet well established, my conceptual framework serves to widen conceptions of what is relevant for studying political adaptation in Australia (see also Cohen, 1969).

I set myself the challenge in this thesis to assess the nature of political adaptation of second-generation Australians in the early 1980s. In a sense I am exploring to what extent ethnicity is a salient influence in the political sphere. If differing groups strike a differing balance in economic performance and political behaviour, how are these differences to be explained? Does the evidence suggest assimilation, integration or separatism? These are the main questions that motivate my empirical analysis.

Chapter 3

Frame of Reference, Method, Data

The structure of the social sciences combines two separate elements, theory and empirical evidence. Both are necessary for successful social understanding; one without the other is barren (Bulmer, 1984).

Frame of Reference

The central concerns of this study are empirical generalisation and political theory. Other concerns are methodology and comparisons with other countries (mainly the United States of America) with large immigrant populations. The study systematically analyses the second generation's location in the economic system, its educational achievements and the nature of influences on the political behaviour of its members by specifying relations among certain variables and by comparing them to first generation immigrants and the native-born of a native-born father. In other words, it aims to develop an empirical model of political adaptation of second-generation Australians and ultimately a theoretical model of their political adaptation.

There are three distinct areas of analysis: the sociocultural dimension, the cultural or 'ethnic' aspect, and the political system. The sociocultural dimension is explored largely in the economic domain in terms of individual income and educational achievement, the ethnic or cultural in terms of the extent of economic and educational integration and *patterns* of political behaviour. Ethnicity is defined mainly in terms of father's birthplace, but second-generation subgroups can be further disaggregated on the basis of the respondent's identification with a particular culture. The political system is examined through partisanship and political participation and efficacy.

The study is *not* directly concerned with discrimination, prejudice (Schermerhorn, 1970:6-8) or conflict theory (Newman, 1973). Nor for several reasons is it a study of majority/minority relations. First I make no assumption that the second generation, or groups within it, is subordinate in regard to distribution of political power, or the roles and activities central to the economic and political institutions of society, and that the historically more continuous group in society is politically dominant. Second, members of the second generation are not necessarily designated a lower status than more established Australians. Third, members of the

second generation, or groups among them, are *nominally* constructed according to father's birthplace or ethnic identity rather than being defined in terms of community or along the lines set out by the Australian Census Ethnicity Committee:

...that the group regarded itself - and was regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics ... a long shared history, language, a common literature, a common religion, being a minority..., being racially conspicuous (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1984:4).

There are three generational groups in this study: immigrants, the second-generation and other Australian-born (defined by their own and their paternal ancestors' birthplace). Immigrants are defined as overseas-born with permanent residence in Australia, the native-born children of immigrant fathers as second-generation Australians, and the native-born of native-born fathers as descended from earlier generations of settlers (the other Australian-born, hereafter OAB). These three generational groups do *not* have familial inter-generational links in the data, nor are such linkages implied in this study.

The study does *not* focus on *processes* of political adaptation among the second generation, although such pathways may be implied. Nor is it longitudinal. Apart from an analysis of respondent's partisanship in respect to his/her father's partisanship, it does *not* examine familial intergenerational adaptation. The work focusses on the *second generation* in 1981 and 1984/1985 in contrast to other native-born and occasionally to immigrants.¹ Of course, the familial association of these latter respondents' with the second generation is unknown.

The study addresses 13 specific questions:

1. Where are second-generation Australians located in the economic system relative to immigrants and the OAB?
2. Is there any marked economic differentiation based on ethnic origin among the second generation?
3. How is the economic location of the second generation in relation to that of the OAB to be explained?
4. Is differentiation in educational achievement associated with ethnicity among second-generation groups?
5. What are the implications of the educational achievement of the second generation for its political behaviour?

¹1981 and 1984/1985 are the dates of the two data sets analysed in the dissertation.

6. What is the degree of differentiation in partisanship between the second-generation and the OAB in the influence of familial inheritance, religion, occupational class, and ethnic background.
7. What is the extent and nature of political participation and felt political efficacy among the second generation in the wider political process?
8. Is there differential incorporation into the political system of second-generation English-speaking (hereafter ES), and non-English-speaking (NES)¹ groups, or of the second generation as a whole compared to other native-born?
9. How do location in sociocultural systems and the pattern of political behaviour for the second generation inter-relate to determine the nature of their adaptation to the political system?
10. Is ethnicity an important influence in the political sphere?
11. Do ES and NES groups of the second generation enter the political arena in the same way as the OAB?
12. Is political assimilation complete by the second generation, that is, is the migration process no longer an important influence on their political behaviour?
13. What theoretical model of adaptation best describes the political life of second-generation Australians?

Method

The underlying method of analysis is the interplay between empirical research and theory building. Both the degree of ranking in the economic system and the extent of similarities in political behaviour are used as measures of differential adaptation between the second generation, or groups therein, and other native-born and at times immigrants.

Australian society is not culturally monolithic even within a generational group. Certainly, native-born Australians of native-born fathers are not one homogenous group

¹'ES' and 'NES' here refer to those respondents whose father was born in an English-speaking or non-English-speaking country respectively.

When referring to immigrants 'ES' and 'NES' mean born in an English-speaking or a non-English-speaking country, so that, for example, ES immigrants refers to those respondents born in an English-speaking country.

When referring to a country 'ES' and 'NES' mean English-speaking and non-English-speaking respectively.

in terms of political behaviour. Nonetheless analysing how far and in what ways the second generation differs from the OAB allows us to evaluate the nature of their adaptation to the political system.

Analyses were limited to adults 18 years of age or older. The OAB are identified by their response to questions on their own and their fathers' birthplace, both being Australia. Immigrants were defined as those born abroad, for example in Great Britain, Italy or Greece, who permanently reside in Australia and may or may not be naturalised Australians, and identified by their non-Australian birthplace. This writer does not endorse the view which is gaining currency in contemporary Australia that immigrants are those born in non-English-speaking countries alone (see Martin, 1978).

As stated earlier, second-generation Australians are defined as those born in Australia of overseas-born fathers. This second generation is disaggregated into different groups on the basis of birthplace of their father. Birthplace of father, rather than birthplace of mother, or of both parents, was used for two main reasons. First, where it differs from that of the respondent's mother, a choice has to be made in assigning national origin. In terms of determining life chances of the second generation, father's income, occupation, and economic position are arguably more important than those of their mother (to the extent that the two can be separated). Second, fathers are more likely to have been born abroad than mothers as fewer women emigrate. Using father's birthplace rather than mother's maximises the number of second-generation respondents in survey data.

The second generation was disaggregated into at least two groups, according to limitations of data. With census data, ten subgroups of second-generation origin were available for statistical analysis with reasonable confidence. These were:

1. second-generation British: those born in Australia whose father was born in the United Kingdom or Ireland;¹
2. second-generation Italian: those born in Australia whose father was born in Italy;
3. second-generation New Zealanders: those born in Australia whose father was born in New Zealand;
4. second-generation German: those born in Australia whose father was born in Germany;

¹It is recognised that Ireland is not 'British'.

5. second-generation Dutch: those born in Australia whose father was born in the Netherlands;
6. second-generation Greek: those born in Australia whose father was born in Greece;
7. second-generation other Northern European: those whose father was born in other Northern European countries, for example Sweden, Norway or Finland;
8. second-generation Polish: those born in Australia whose father was born in Poland;
9. second-generation other non-English-speakers: those born in Australia whose father was born in Malta, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Hungary or many other non-English-speaking countries; and
10. second-generation other English-speakers: those born in Australia whose father was born in the United States, Southern Africa, or Canada.

With the National Social Science Survey (hereafter NSSS) data, only two second-generational groups could be usefully distinguished. These were:

1. second-generation English-speaking: those born in Australia whose father was born in an English-speaking country, namely Great Britain, Republic of Ireland, Southern Africa, United States of America, Canada or New Zealand; and
2. second-generation non-English-speaking: those whose father was born in a non-English-speaking country, for example Italy, Germany or Greece.

The statistical tools of analysis used are multiple crosstabulations, crossbreak analysis standardising for age structure, and logistic regression. There are three main dependent variables, namely income, education, federal party identification, and a number of variables indicating political participation and efficacy. Political participation is a summary measure of various questions on active and passive participation relating to political behaviour such as contacting officials, electoral involvement and interest in politics. Political efficacy encompasses various questions related to attitudes to certain political institutions and to political power.¹

In this chapter, I present a demographic profile of the second generation, OAB and immigrant groups. Following are three empirical chapters analysing economic integration, educational achievement, federal partisanship, and political participation

¹See appendix for NSSS questions.

and efficacy respectively. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the dissertation, drawing out the wider implications and broader meaning of the study.

Data

Two main sources of data have been analysed in the study. Income and education data are derived from the 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing (one per cent Persons Sample File). This is a random sample of unidentified individuals, the first individual record file released from the Australian Census, and it is a splendid source of data. The relevant questions can be found in the appendix.

Federal party identification and political participation and political efficacy are analysed using the NSSS of over 3000 respondents conducted in 1984 and 1985. Unfortunately only the urban sample of the survey was available for analysis: the rural sample was completed too late for use in this study. The urban sample covers persons in Australia aged 18 years or more in all urban localities of 10,000 or more persons as of the 1981 Census, capable of being interviewed in English. Some 76 per cent of the total Australian population lives in these urban areas. This incompleteness posed some difficulty regarding the national coverage of the survey, particularly for the other Australian-born cohort, who are more likely than the second generation or immigrant cohorts to be non-urban. Nonetheless the NSSS provided the only data available for this period which included the questions, 'Where was your mother/father born?', necessary to identify the second generation.

2197 respondents were interviewed in the NSSS urban survey, selected from an area cluster sample of the Australian population.¹ Relevant questions can be found in the appendix.

In the remainder of the chapter, the twelve origin groups are systematically analysed for some important socioeconomic characteristics, using the one per cent person's sample file of the 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing. It is recognised that many of the characteristics described (for example age distribution) reflect the history of *immigrant* settlement; others such as occupation may reflect a complex interaction of many factors, including settlement patterns.

The findings report a *broad* picture of the group's profile; details which reflect the situation, for example, in a particular state or locality, are lost in this approach.

¹See National Social Science Survey Newsletter 1986 for further details.

Nonetheless, in many instances, there will be meaningful inter and intra group differences which even these broad analyses cannot obscure.

The demographic profile is divided into five sections. The first relates to the origin of the second generation and immigrants, and their representativeness compared to the NSSS data. The birthplace of the fathers of the second generation and of immigrants are compared, and the correspondence of mother's and father's birthplace for the second generation is reported. The second section reports the age distribution of groups and predicts that of all native-born Australians at the end of this century. The third looks at various characteristics - gender distribution, religious affiliation, geographical area of residence and the nature of housing occupancy. Section four investigates aspects of education and occupational life - the highest level of education attained, labour force participation, occupational status and prestige and industry sector. Finally, section five reports the average gross income for each group.

1 *Origin*

The second-generation cohort constituted about 11 per cent of the adult respondents in the 1981 Census data (slightly more than one million adults in the Australian population). Classification of the second generation according to father's birthplace is listed in Table 3.1. There were 38 census codes of countries of origin and three codes (United Kingdom and Ireland, Canada and the United States, Indonesia and the Philippines) contained two countries each; eleven contained at least several (for example, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; other Southern European countries).

Historically, Australia's major source of immigrants has been Great Britain, with other sources from many mainly European countries. We would therefore expect the British to be the largest origin subgroup of the second generation and the remainder to be from a variety of countries. Indeed, the second generation was unevenly distributed across the very diverse origins of its members. In all, slightly more than three-fifths of the second generation had origins in ES countries, though the majority and by far the largest origin subgroup (three-fifths) consisted of second-generation British-Australians;¹ the second largest was second-generation Italian-Australians, almost one-tenth of all the second generation. These two groups constituted altogether seven-tenths of the second-generation cohort, and seven per cent and one per cent respectively of the whole adult Australian population.

¹It was not possible to distinguish in the census or survey data between English, Scots, Welsh or Irish origins, but it is recognised that these may be regarded as distinct ethnic groups.

Table 3.1

Origin of Adult Second-Generation Australians, 1981

Coded Country	Sub-group	Birthplace of Father	Relative Frequency (%)	(n)
1	1	UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND	60.0	6593
2	2	ITALY	9.9	1086
3	3	NEW ZEALAND	3.3	361
4	4	GERMANY	3.1	342
5	5	NETHERLANDS	2.8	304
6	6	GREECE	2.8	304
7	7	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPE	2.8	310
8	8	POLAND	2.4	265
	9	OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
9		YUGOSLAVIA	1.8	199
10		MALTA	1.5	167
11		USSR	1.0	115
12		HUNGARY	.8	85
13-36		remainder*	6.2	699
		<i>TOTAL OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:</i>	11.3	1265
	10	OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
37		CANADA AND USA	.9	100
38		SOUTHERN AFRICA	.5	55
		<i>TOTAL OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:</i>	1.4	155
TOTAL			100.00	(10,984)
* CHINA .7 SOUTH ASIA AND IRAN .2				
INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH .6 OTHER AFRICA .2				
CYPRUS .6 MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND .1				
LEBANON .6 SRI LANKA .1				
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT .4 OTHER ASIA .1				
CZECHOSLOVAKIA .4 SPAIN .1				
AUSTRIA .4 SOUTH AMERICA .1				
OTHER OCEANIA .4 HONGKONG .1				
OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE .3 CHILE -				
FRANCE .3 PORTUGAL -				
OTHER AMERICA .3 TURKEY -				
INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES .2 VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA -				

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Census of Population and Housing

The third largest groups, each about three per cent of all the second generation, had origins in New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece or other northern European countries. After them were those with origins in Poland, Yugoslavia or Malta, each about two per cent of the whole second generation, and those whose father was born in Canada and the United States, Southern Africa, the Soviet Union, Hungary, China, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Cyprus or Lebanon, each about one per cent of all second generation. Finally, a few hundred respondents were thinly spread across the remaining 20 country codings, representing countries on all non-Australian continents.

The second generation was disaggregated into ten subgroups (Table 3.1, column 3), listed and described above in the method section. The maximum number of subgroups which numbers allowed for analysis with statistical confidence were formed for individual countries (Italy, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Poland) or individual census codings (United Kingdom and Ireland, other northern European countries). The remaining countries were subgrouped according to whether they were non-English-speaking or English-speaking (subgroups nine and ten respectively).

It is important to note that distribution by father's birthplace will change in the foreseeable future due to the age structure of second-generation-origin subgroups in the Australian population who will soon reach adulthood (see Table 3.10 below). As a consequence, any findings about a second-generation grouping with more than one national origin in 1981 may well need modification in the future.

Immigrants constitute about 27 per cent of adult respondents in the 1981 Census data. Their birthplaces in at least 38 different countries are listed in Table 3.2. In all, more than half of all immigrants (about 55 per cent) were born in NES countries, though the largest single group was born in the United Kingdom or Eire (about two-fifths). The second-largest birthplace group was Italy (one in ten of all immigrants). These two groups constitute about ten per cent and three per cent respectively of the whole Australian adult population.

The third largest groups were those born in Greece, Yugoslavia and New Zealand, each about five per cent of the immigrant group, followed by those born in Germany and the Netherlands (each about four per cent). Immigrants born in Malta, Poland, other northern European countries, Lebanon and the Indian sub-continent, each constituted about two per cent of all immigrants. The remaining one-fifth of immigrants were born in at least 25 countries, overwhelmingly NES, on all other non-Australian continents.

The representativeness of the OAB, second-generation and immigrant groups in the NSSS compared to the 1981 one per cent Sample File of Census Data is shown in

Table 3.2
Birthplace of Adult Immigrants, 1981

Coded Country	Birthplace	Relative Frequency (%)	(n)
1	UNITED KINGDOM AND EIRE	38.7	10014
2	ITALY	10.1	2614
3	GREECE	5.3	1381
4	YUGOSLAVIA	4.8	1239
5	NEW ZEALAND	4.6	1188
6	GERMANY	4.0	1031
7	NETHERLANDS	3.6	943
8	MALTA	2.1	532
9	POLAND	2.1	540
10	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPEAN	2.0	322
11-38	remainder*	22.7	5849
TOTAL		100.00	(25,853)

* LEBANON	AUSTRIA
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SOUTH-EAST ASIA	TURKEY
NORTH AMERICA	SRI LANKA
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT	OTHER ASIA
INDO-CHINA	OTHER SOUTH AMERICA
HUNGARY	OTHER MIDDLE EAST
UKRAINE, USSR	SPAIN
CHINA	PORTUGAL
OTHER AFRICA	FRANCE
OTHER OCEANIA	HONG KONG
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	CHILE
INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES	OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE
CYPRUS	OTHER AFRICA

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.3i to 3.3iii below. It should be noted that there is at least three years' difference in time between the 1981 Census and the 1984/1985 NSSS which could account for some dissimilarities of distribution.

As mentioned earlier, the immigrant group in the study should not be seen as the 'parents' of the second generation. Indeed, there are substantial differences in distribution of birthplace groups between male immigrants and the fathers of the second generation, as Table 3.4 shows.

The most substantial difference in distribution is related to the United Kingdom and Ireland: these countries constitute the birthplace of three-fifths of the fathers of the - generation, but less than two-fifths of the adult male immigrant cohort. The distribution related to Italy was slightly less for fathers of the second generation than for immigrants; it was similar for other northern European countries and Poland.

There were other differences in distribution for individual countries, though minor in comparison. In all, the distribution for the Middle East, all Asia and South America showed a lower frequency for fathers of the second generation than for male immigrants. Most of the fathers of the second generation were born in the United Kingdom and Ireland, whereas amongst immigrants these countries, though still the largest immigrant source, were only a large minority. In sum, the second generation is much more likely to have ES origins and less likely to have non-European origins than adult male immigrants.

Even though father's birthplace determines the subgroups of the second generation, it is of interest to note mother's birthplace for each second generation respondent and the extent of similarity for both. Table 3.5 shows the extent of correspondence of mother's and father's birthplace for the second generation.

Parents' birthplace for the second generation ranged from a similarity of only one twenty-fifth for those with Canadian or United States-born fathers, to a similarity of about four-fifths for those with Greek-born fathers. Among the ten subgroups identified earlier, those with origins in ES or northern European countries (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Southern Africa, Canada and the United States, Germany, or other northern European countries) had a minority of similarly-born parents whilst NES countries other than northern European (Italy, the Netherlands and Poland) had a majority. Where parents were born in dissimilar countries, mothers in all groups, except Polish-Australians, were more likely to be born in Australia than in another country. Within the other NES origin subgroups, members of groups in the four largest countries of origin (Yugoslavia, Malta, the Soviet Union and Hungary) were more likely to have

Table 3.3i
Representativeness of Generational Groups

Generation		% 1981 Census ¹	NSSS ²
1	Immigrant		
i	ES BIRTHPLACE	12.8	
ii	NES BIRTHPLACE	13.8	
	<i>TOTAL IMMIGRANT</i>	26.6	25.2
2	SECOND-GENERATION origin:		
i	UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND	6.7	
ii	ITALY	1.1	
iii	NEW ZEALAND	0.4	
iv	GERMANY	0.3	
v	NETHERLANDS	0.3	
vi	GREECE	0.3	
vii	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPEAN	0.3	
viii	POLAND	0.3	
ix	OTHER NES COUNTRIES	1.3	
x	OTHER ES COUNTRIES	.2	
	<i>TOTAL SECOND GENERATION</i>	11.2	12.9
3	<i>TOTAL OTHER AUSTRALIAN-BORN</i>	62.2	62.0
TOTAL		100 (97,755)	100 (2,178)

¹1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Census

²National Social Science Survey, 1984/85

Table 3.3ii
Origin of Adult Second-Generation Australians, 1981 Census and 1984 NSSS

Coded Country	Sub-group	Birthplace of Father	Census 1981 %	NSSS 1984 %
1	1	UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND	60.0	56.6
2	2	ITALY	9.9	13.2
3	3	NEW ZEALAND	3.3	3.9
4	4	GERMANY	3.1	2.5
5	5	NETHERLANDS	2.8	2.1
6	6	GREECE	2.8	3.2
7	7	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPE	2.8	1.1
8	8	POLAND	2.4	1.8
	9	OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
9		YUGOSLAVIA	1.8	2.8
10		MALTA	1.5	-
11		USSR	1.0	3.8
12		HUNGARY	.8	1.1
13-36		remainder*	6.2	5.3
		<i>TOTAL OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:</i>	11.3	13.0
	10	OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
37		CANADA AND USA	.9	1.5
38		SOUTHERN AFRICA	.5	1.1
		<i>TOTAL OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:</i>	1.4	2.6
TOTAL			100.00	100.00
(n)			(10,984)	(281)

Census NSSS				Census NSSS			
* CHINA	.7	-		SOUTH ASIA AND IRAN	.2	-	
INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH	.6	.7		OTHER AFRICA	.2	-	
CYPRUS	.6	.4		MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND	.1	.4	
LEBANON	.6	.4		SRI LANKA	.1	-	
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT	.4	1.1		OTHER ASIA	.1	-	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	.4	.4		SPAIN	.1	-	
AUSTRIA	.4	.7		SOUTH AMERICA	.1	-	
OTHER OCEANIA	.4	-		HONGKONG	.1	-	
OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE	.3	-		CHILE	-	-	
FRANCE	.3	-		PORTUGAL	-	.4	
OTHER AMERICA	.3	-		TURKEY	-	-	
INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES	.2	.4		VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA	-	-	
				SYRIA	-	.4	

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing;
Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Sample Preliminary

Table 3.3iii

Birthplace of Adult Immigrants, 1981 Census and 1984 NSSS

Coded Country	Birthplace	(%)	(%)
1	UNITED KINGDOM AND EIRE	38.7	41.2
2	ITALY	10.1	8.9
3	GREECE	5.3	5.3
4	YUGOSLAVIA	4.8	3.6
5	NEW ZEALAND	4.6	4.7
6	GERMANY	4.0	4.0
7	NETHERLANDS	3.6	3.4
8	MALTA	2.1	2.0
9	POLAND	2.1	.4
10	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPEAN	2.0	.2
11-38	remainder*	22.7	26.3
TOTAL		100.0	100.0

* LEBANON	AUSTRIA
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SOUTH-EAST ASIA	TURKEY
NORTH AMERICA	SRI LANKA
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT	OTHER ASIA
INDO-CHINA	OTHER SOUTH AMERICA
HUNGARY	OTHER MIDDLE EAST
UKRAINE, USSR	SPAIN
CHINA	PORTUGAL
OTHER AFRICA	FRANCE
OTHER OCEANIA	HONG KONG
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	CHILE
INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES	OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE
CYPRUS	OTHER AMERICA

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing;
 Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Sample Preliminary

Table 3.4
Birthplace of Fathers of the Second Generation and Birthplace of Adult Male Immigrants,
1981

Coded Country	Sub- group	Birthplace	Relative Frequency (%)	
			Fathers of Second Generation	Male Immigrants
1	1	UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND	60.0	38.3
2	2	ITALY	9.9	10.7
3	3	NEW ZEALAND	3.3	4.3
4	4	GERMANY	3.1	3.7
5	5	NETHERLANDS	2.8	3.8
6	6	GREECE	2.8	5.4
7	7	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPE	2.8	2.3
8	8	POLAND	2.1	2.1
	9	OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
9		YUGOSLAVIA	1.8	5.0
10		MALTA	1.5	2.0
11		USSR	1.0	.9
12		HUNGARY	.8	1.2
13		CHINA	.7	1.0
14		INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH	.6	1.3
15		CYPRUS	.6	.8
16		LEBANON	.6	1.7
17		ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT	.4	1.2
18		CZECHOSLOVAKIA	.4	.8
19		AUSTRIA	.4	.9
20		OTHER OCEANIA	.4	.9
21		OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE	.3	.4
22		FRANCE	.3	.4
23		OTHER AMERICA	.3	.2
24		INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES	.2	.6
25		SOUTH ASIA AND IRAN	.2	.6
26		OTHER AFRICA	.2	.8
27		MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND	.1	1.3
28		SRI LANKA	.1	1.3
29		OTHER ASIA	.1	.7
30		SPAIN	.1	.5
31		SOUTH AMERICA	.1	.7
32		HONGKONG	.1	.4
33		CHILE	-	.4
34		PORTUGAL	-	.4
35		TURKEY	-	.6
36		VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA	-	.7
	10	OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:		
37		CANADA AND USA	.9	1.3
38		SOUTHERN AFRICA	.5	.7
TOTAL			100 (10,984)	100 (13,289)

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.5

Correspondence of Mother's and Father's Birthplace for Second-Generation Adults, 1981

Coded Country	Sub- group	Birthplace	% Mother's Birthplace			(n)
			Same as R's Father	Aust.	Other	
1	1	UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND	35	62	3	6545
2	2	ITALY	77	20	3	1018
3	3	NEW ZEALAND	9	78	13	356
4	4	GERMANY	38	50	12	339
5	5	NETHERLANDS	65	26	8	302
6	6	GREECE	79	16	5	304
7	7	OTHER NORTHERN EUROPE	27	52	21	306
8	8	POLAND	53	16	31	264
	9	OTHER NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:				
		YUGOSLAVIA	57	17	26	197
10		MALTA	78	17	5	167
11		USSR	56	14	30	112
12		HUNGARY	58	21	21	83
13-36		remainder*	(About) 40	45	15	692
	10	OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES:				
37		CANADA AND USA	4	82	14	99
38		SOUTHERN AFRICA	6	89	5	55

n=10902

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>* CHINA
INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH
CYPRUS
LEBANON
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AUSTRIA
OTHER OCEANIA
OTHER SOUTHERN EUROPE
FRANCE
OTHER AMERICA
INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES</p> | <p>SOUTH ASIA AND IRAN
OTHER AFRICA
MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND
SRI LANKA
OTHER ASIA
SPAIN
SOUTH AMERICA
HONG KONG
CHILE
PORTUGAL
TURKEY
VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA</p> |
|---|---|

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Census of Population and Housing

parents born in a similar country, whilst most of the rest, except Cyprus, Lebanon and Portugal, were less likely.

II *Age Distribution*

Before describing other patterns of distribution of socioeconomic and demographic variables I should draw attention to the marked differences in age distribution of the generational cohorts and within second-generation subgroups. These distributions are important to bear in mind because differences in the following description of variables can often be explained after adjusting for age, an adjustment not made in this chapter. The age distribution of second-generation subgroups, of course, largely reflects the timing of arrivals from various countries of male immigrants.

Table 3.6 shows that the OAB adult group is evenly distributed across the three age groups: 18 to 29 years, 30 to 49 years and 50 or more years, with some over-representation in the middle-aged group. The second generation of ES origins were older than the OAB, especially those with origins in the United Kingdom or Ireland, more than half of whom were at least 50 years old.

Most second-generation adults of NES origins are relatively young, with only small proportions over 50 years of age. The exceptions are those of German or other northern European origins, with large proportions both under 30 and over 50. These bimodal distributions probably reflect both the substantial presence of immigrants from these countries in the early part of this century and immediately after World War II, and the reduced migration in the 1930s and 1940s. Other second-generation NES subgroups with origins in the Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Italy or other NES countries had a small proportion aged 30 to 49 years, and an even smaller proportion over 50 years.

By far the youngest adult subgroup was that with origins in the Netherlands, almost nine-tenths of whom were under 30 years old, compared with a range of almost two-thirds to four-fifths for the others. In all, as Table 3.7 shows, almost two in three of the second generation of NES origins compared to about one in three of OAB or one in five of the second generation with ES origins and of immigrants were younger than 30 years: there were few immigrants from NES countries in the Australian population before and immediately after World War II.

Table 3.8 shows the proportion of minors as opposed to adults in each origin groups. Second-generation other northern European- and Polish-Australians had similar age distributions, about two-thirds being adults. Second-generation New Zealand- and those from other English-speaking countries also had a majority of adults. Each of the other subgroups had a minority of adults, ranging from about two in five for

Table 3.6

Age and Origin of the Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Age in Years:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Netherlands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
18-29	32	22	19	72	21	46	89	70	43	78	65	19
30-49	35	44	29	21	33	13	7	20	18	18	20	41
50+	33	35	52	7	46	41	3	10	39	4	15	41
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(60769)	(26002)	(6543)	(1086)	(361)	(342)	(303)	(304)	(310)	(265)	(1265)	(155)
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

n=97755

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.7
Age and Origin of the Adult Australian Population, 1981

Age in Years:	[Per cent]		
	Origin		
	Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries
18-29	32	22	67
30-49	35	44	18
50+	33	35	15
TOTAL	100	100	100
(n)	(60769)	(26002)	(3875)
%	62	27	4
			n=97755

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.8

Age and Origin of the Whole Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Age in Years:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
0-17	33	11	31	60	44	58	65	74	35	30	68	42
18+	67	89	69	40	56	42	35	26	65	70	32	59
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(90485)	(29280)	(9529)	(2724)	(647)	(818)	(866)	(1174)	(478)	(378)	(4003)	(265)
%	62	21	7	2	-	1	1	1	-	-	3	-

n=140647

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

second-generation Italian- and German-Australians, through about one in three for second-generation Dutch- and other non-English-speaking Australians to only one-quarter for second-generation Greek-Australians.

It is therefore likely that the relative distribution of the origin cohorts is unique to 1981. Indeed, if we use these data to predict the distribution of the *Australian-born* groups in 1999 by including minors and excluding those 50 years or older, certain changes are implied. Table 3.9 shows the predicted distribution in origin of Australian-born adults. (Immigrants are omitted as their numbers for 1999 are uncertain.) No allowance is made for mortality.

Second-generation other northern European-, other English-speaking- and Polish-Australians were identical for both 1981 and 1999, whilst second-generation New Zealand-Australians had similar proportions. Of the remaining subgroups, the OAB may be slightly reduced for 1999, and second-generation Italian-, German-, Dutch, Greek- or other non-English-speaking Australians increased in proportion. So in 1999, the second generation of ES origins may represent eight per cent of the Australian-born population, a slight decrease compared to almost one-tenth now, whereas the second generation of NES origins may more than double to over one-tenth.

III *Other Characteristics - Gender, Religion, Locality and House Occupancy*

Regarding gender, most subgroups were equally divided between males and females, or nearly so (see Table 3.10). The exceptions were second-generation other English-speaking Australians, who had relatively more males (54 per cent), and second-generation Dutch-Australians who had more females (55 per cent). These two differences could reflect non-response to census forms for various reasons, absence from Australia, or differential mortality rates.

Before discussing religion it is important to note that almost one-tenth of all adults exercised their right *not to state* their religious affiliation in the 1981 census and were excluded from the analysis below. The distinct category of those who stated they had *no* religious affiliation is included.

Religion was disaggregated into four categories: protestant, catholic, other and none. 'Protestant' includes Uniting Church and other protestant denominations whilst 'catholic' included both Roman and non-Roman catholics. The 'other' category consisted of all other non-protestant and non-catholic christian denominations, and all non-christian religions. Almost half of the 'other' category were orthodox (for example Greek, Russian or Serbian orthodox), whilst Hebrew and Muslim were each slightly less

Table 3.9

Predicted Age and Origin of Adult Australian-born Population, 1999 and Age and Origin of Adult Australian-born Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Years:	Father Australian- born	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:										TOTAL (n)
		Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether- lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English- speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada	
1999	81	7.2	3	.6	.8	1	1.3	.4	.4	4.3	.2	100 (90083)
1981	84.7	9.2	1.5	.5	.5	.4	.4	.4	.4	1.8	.2	100 (71753)

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.10

Gender and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Gender:	Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether- lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English- speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Male	48	52	47	51	47	50	46	50	50	51	49	54
Female	52	49	53	49	53	50	55	50	50	49	52	47
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(60769)	(26002)	(6593)	(1086)	(361)	(342)	(303)	(304)	(310)	(265)	(1265)	(155)

n=97755

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

than one-tenth of this category (nine and seven per cent respectively; see appendix for further details.)

About one-tenth of adults stated they had no religious affiliation, but this proportion varied greatly amongst origin subgroups from about one-quarter of second-generation Dutch-Australians to a minuscule proportion (four per cent) of second-generation Italian-Australians (see Table 3.11). Why the extent of no religious affiliation should vary so much is unclear. About one-tenth (eleven per cent) of OAB stated they had no religious affiliation, whereas one-fifth of second-generation other English-speaking Australians had none. The remaining origin subgroups were similar to OAB in proportions with no affiliation.

About three-fifths of the OAB, second-generation New Zealand-, German-, British-, other northern European- and other English-speaking Australians were *protestant*, with a significant though smaller proportion (one-fifth or higher) of catholics but very few (less than seven per cent) with other religions. Second-generation British-Australians had the greatest proportion of protestants (about seven-tenths). Immigrants were almost equally likely to be protestants or catholics (about one-third each) and had a relatively large proportion (almost one-fifth) of other religions.

By contrast, the vast majority (nine-tenths) of second-generation Italian-Australians were *catholics*, as were most (three-fifths) second-generation Polish-Australians. Second-generation Dutch- and other non-English-speaking Australians were more likely to be catholic than protestant. The majority (four-fifths) of second-generation Greek-Australians were in the *other* category, presumably Greek Orthodox.

In summary, almost all second-generation Italian-Australians were catholics and the vast majority of second-generation Greek-Australians were Greek Orthodox. Six origin subgroups - OAB, second-generation British-, New Zealand-, German-, other northern European- and other English-speaking Australians - were predominantly protestants, with significant minorities of catholics. Most second-generation Polish-Australians were catholics, but likewise had significant minorities of protestant or other religions. None of the remaining three origin subgroups had a majority affiliated to any particular religion. Second-generation Dutch- and other non-English-speaking Australians had somewhat more catholics than protestants, and the latter subgroup also had a significant proportion of other religions. Immigrants were the most evenly distributed, being equally as likely to be protestant or catholic with a significant proportion affiliated to other religions.

Table 3.11

Religion and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Religion:	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:											
	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
None	11	13	11	4	14	16	26	8	16	11	13	20
Protestant	62	36	69	3	60	62	31	9	57	12	25	56
Catholic	25	34	18	92	23	18	40	3	19	60	46	18
Other	2	17	2	1	3	5	3	79	8	17	16	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(54520)	(23687)	(5929)	(1029)	(329)	(307)	(271)	(280)	(279)	(241)	(1155)	(137)

n=88170

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Insofar as locality may influence life chances including educational attainment and political activity, it is important to examine where the various origin subgroups live. Limitations of data made it possible only to analyse geographical distribution of residence in capital cities or outside them, within each state or territory. Slightly more than half (54 per cent) of the OAB lived in a capital city. The other subgroups varied considerably in their geographic area of abode, but all were more likely than OAB to live in capital cities. Second-generation Dutch- and German-Australians were similar to OAB (57 per cent and 58 per cent respectively). About two in three of second-generation British-, other English-speaking-, New Zealand- or other northern European-Australians lived in capital cities, whilst about three-quarters of immigrants, second-generation Italian-, other non-English-speaking or Polish-Australians did. Second-generation Greek-Australians had by far the highest proportion living in capital cities (more than four in five), which was 30 percentage points more than OAB. All these proportions can be found in Table 3.12.

Further disaggregation of these data (not shown) indicated that the largest proportions of most subgroups lived in Sydney or Melbourne. There were three exceptions: OAB were, after Sydney, equally likely to live in the rest of New South Wales or in Melbourne; second-generation Dutch-Australians were most likely to live in Melbourne or in the rest of Victoria and second-generation German-Australians were most likely to live in Melbourne or in Queensland outside Brisbane. This last distribution probably reflects the remnants of German settlement at the turn of this century, when there was a substantial proportion of German immigrants in rural Queensland on farms or in country towns (see Borrie, 1954; Harmstorf and Cigler, 1985:26-40). Indeed, three in ten of second-generation German-Australians were over 60 years old (born in 1920 or earlier).

These results may be misleading for second-generation Dutch youth at least who, within capital cities, may reside predominantly in outer suburban rural-urban areas. For example, in 1966, when at least 90 per cent of the cohort were 15 years old or younger and therefore likely to live at home, 63 per cent of Dutch immigrants in Sydney and 74 per cent in Melbourne, resided in those outer suburbs (Henderson, 1975:98).

Of further interest is the type of housing in which the various origin subgroups lived. In contrast to disparity in geographic areas of abode, the nature of occupancy varied only slightly between the subgroups (see Table 3.13). The majority (about seven-tenths) of most subgroups lived in homes which they, their families or their fellow-occupiers owned or were purchasing, whilst the rest rented from government or other landlords. Second-generation Dutch-Australians were the least likely (about two-

Table 3.12

Geographic Area and Origin of the Australian Population, 18+, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Geographical Area:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Capital Cities	54	77	64	74	66	58	57	84	68	77	75	64
Rest	46	23	36	27	34	42	43	16	32	23	25	36
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(60769)	(26002)	(6593)	(1086)	(361)	(342)	(303)	(304)	(310)	(265)	(1265)	(155)

n=97755

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.13

Nature of Occupancy and Origin of the Australian Population, 18+, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Nature of Occupancy:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Owner	34	32	42	50	36	43	23	45	41	36	35	30
Purchase	38	38	33	29	38	28	41	37	31	38	36	40
Gov't tenant	6	6	6	3	8	7	5	2	5	4	5	5
Other tenant	16	19	13	8	12	17	27	10	19	20	18	17
Not stated tenant	6	6	6	10	7	6	4	8	4	2	7	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(57968)	(24964)	(6199)	(1069)	(338)	(326)	(293)	(294)	(293)	(257)	(1226)	(152)

n=93379

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

thirds) to occupy homes which were owned or being purchased, whilst second-generation Italian- and Greek-Australians were the most likely, about four in five of each subgroup. So apart from these three subgroups, there was little variation in the nature of home occupancy of the various subgroups, most being similar to OAB (about seven in ten).

The results of the first three sections point to complex patterns to demographic characteristics for the one million adults defined as second-generation Australians in 1981. It is true that all second-generation subgroups were relatively urban, but they varied in size, similarity of parents' birthplace, age distribution, locality, and religious affiliation, and, to a lesser extent, in nature of house occupancy.

Some second-generation groups possessed distinctive characteristics. Second-generation British dominated in size, and were older; second-generation Italians and Greeks were virtually single-religious groups, had parents who were born in similar countries and a high rate of home ownership. Second-generation Germans had a minority of parents with similar origins, a significant proportion lived in rural Queensland and were either very old or very young, with few middle-aged. Those with origin in the Netherlands were very young, more female in gender, less likely to hold any religious affiliation and tended to live in Victoria and in rented homes.

Without anticipating the remaining results which relate primarily to analyses of education, occupation and income, the results so far suggest that differences will outweigh similarities for these characteristics.

IV Education and Occupation

To continue with the analysis of demographic characteristics it is widely recognised that

Education gained prior to entering the workforce affects not only initial placement within the occupational structure but also later occupational mobility (Broom et al., 1980:32).

Accordingly, to analyse educational qualifications, the various origin subgroups were first disaggregated into categories according to highest level of education attained, namely, those with bachelor or higher degrees or a diploma, those with trade or other certificates, those with high school graduation and those with partial high school education or less. These latter two groups were respectively defined as those who left

school aged 17 years or older and those who left school at 16 or younger.¹ Those who were still at school were included in high school graduation, because they were at least 18 years old, this was probably imminent.

Australian school retention rates of respondents with NES origins may be biased upwards by those repeating years initially through poor English. But when a cut-off of 16 years or older is used to define high school graduation, there is no difference in ranking.

Disaggregation into *types* of post-school education rather than number of years of post-school education was considered more appropriate for the purposes of this dissertation than into estimated years of post-school education because of the links between type of education and occupation on the one hand and political activity on the other. For example, bachelor degrees in law and electricians' trade certificates may require equal numbers of years of post-school education, but such qualifications differ in their association with social status and in their implications for political behaviour.

Table 3.14 shows significant differences in highest education attained, that is, bachelor degrees, higher degrees, diplomas and graduate diplomas. The actual range is not great because few in the population are highly educated, but differences are important socially. Indeed at least twice the proportion of second-generation Polish- and other English-speaking Australians (sixteen per cent and nineteen per cent respectively) were highly educated compared to second-generation German- and Italian-Australians (eight and seven per cent respectively). Second-generation British-, immigrants and OAB had the same rate (each nine per cent), and the other five subgroups had a greater proportion in this category.

In contrast, those with trade or another certificate were much more evenly distributed across origin subgroups: there was little significant difference between the highest and lowest. Indeed immigrants and five second-generation subgroups had one in five respondents in this category a very similar rate to that of the OAB (19 per cent).

These results do not accord with from those of Sloan (1985) or Ainley and Clancy (1983) who reported fewer apprentices of NES origins for trade certificates. Examination of trade occupations alone (in contrast to including other certificates) still

¹The compulsory number of years of high school lengthened by one year about 20 years ago. Analyses using 16 years old or over as the indication of the age leaving school showed no relative differences in ranking, though, of course, more respondents left school at 16 or over.

Table 3.14

Highest Level of Education Attained and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Highest Level of Education:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
1. Bach. or higher degree, graduate diploma, diploma	9	9	9	7	15	8	11	13	11	16	12	19
2. Trade or other certificate	19	20	20	20	20	17	19	18	18	20	18	20
3. High school graduation	12	16	10	29	14	19	32	40	20	29	27	10
4. Partial high school or less	60	55	62	44	52	57	38	30	50	36	43	50
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(55877)	(23823)	(6033)	(1003)	(342)	(307)	(283)	(270)	(288)	(255)	(1165)	(144)

n=89790

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

supported my findings though, of course, those classified thus would include apprentices, tradesmen and those working as tradesmen who were neither qualified or apprenticed. Also immigrants were not disaggregated according to an ES or NES birthplace.

However there were great differences and a large range in the rates of the various origin subgroups whose highest educational level was high school graduation. Second-generation Greek-Australians (almost two-fifths) were *three times* as likely as the OAB, second-generation British- and other English-speaking Australians (each one-tenth) to be in this category. All other subgroups had a *higher* rate than these latter subgroups.

Similar proportions of OAB and second-generation British-Australians (about three-fifths) had the lowest educational attainment, that is, incomplete high school or less, and slightly fewer second-generation German-Australians (57 per cent). All other subgroups had a smaller rate for this category. Half of second-generation other northern European- and other English-speaking Australians and slightly more than half of immigrants and second-generation New Zealand-Australians had little education. The remaining four subgroups ranged down to about three-tenth for second-generation Greek-Australians who were thus half as likely as OAB and second-generation British-Australians to be poorly educated.

Perhaps the most significant findings of these data are that with respect to tertiary education qualifications, most second-generation-origin subgroups had a rate similar to or higher than the OAB. This is also the case for most subgroups in the most highly educated category (except for second-generation Germans and Italians) indicating that the educated and highly educated (both in the sense of post-school qualifications) in contemporary Australian society are not the enclaves of any particular origin subgroups. Rather, they are ethnically mixed. Moreover, except for second-generation British-Australians, the second generation had smaller proportions than the OAB with only incomplete secondary education or less.

To summarise educational qualifications, it appears that *most* second-generation groups were more likely than OAB to have graduated from high school or possess some post-school educational qualification. Second-generation British- and German-Australians were the least well-educated of all second-generation subgroups, and their qualifications and educational attainment are marginally lower than the OAB. The most highly educated, in terms of having some post-school qualification, or at least a bachelor degree or diploma, were second-generation Polish- and other English-speaking Australians; second-generation Greek-Australians were the most educated in terms of

high school graduation or some qualification. So with respect to the educational factor of human capital, the second generation is well endowed. Of course, in their absolute numbers, the OAB remain predominant.

To discuss the occupational lives of different groups, I have examined four factors: labour force participation, occupational status, type of occupation and industry sector. So far as labour force participation is concerned, two broad categories can be distinguished, namely those working or unemployed on the one hand, and those not in the workforce on the other. Common reasons for not being in the labour force include school or tertiary education participation, retirement and household duties.

The distribution in this last category (see Table 3.15) ranged from almost half the second-generation German- and British-Australians to about one-fifth of second-generation Italian-, Polish- and Dutch-Australians. Slightly more than two-fifths of second-generation New Zealand and other northern European-Australians were not in the labour force, and slightly less than two-fifths of second-generation other English-speakers, OAB and immigrants. About three-tenths of second-generation other non-English-speakers and second-generation Greek-Australians were not in the labour force. These distributions may reflect age differential, insofar as origin subgroups with the highest proportions aged 50 years or more (shown in Table 3.6) are also least likely to be in the labour force, presumably through retirement. They did not appear to reflect differential distribution in groups for male and female labour force participation.

In terms of occupational status, there was also a substantial range in the proportions of each origin subgroups who were unemployed (see Table 3.16). Few OAB (five per cent) and second-generation British-Australians (four per cent) were unemployed, but all other subgroups had higher rates, ranging from a high of ten per cent for second-generation other northern European-Australians, and about nine per cent for second-generation Dutch-, German- and other English-speaking Australians. Next were second-generation other non-English-speaking and Greek- (eight per cent) and Polish-Australians (seven per cent). Second-generation New Zealand- and Italian-Australians and immigrants (each about six per cent) were slightly more likely than the OAB to be unemployed.

Even though all these frequencies are numerically low, differences within this category are socially significant. For example, the rate of unemployment amongst second-generation other northern European-Australians is double that of the OAB and second-generation British-Australians; unemployment in all second-generation subgroups except British-Australians is proportionately higher than the OAB.

Table 3.15

Labour Force Participation and Origin Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

		Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:											
		Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether- lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English- speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Labour Force Participation:	Not in labour force	37	36	46	22	43	48	19	30	41	21	31	38
	In labour force	63	64	54	78	57	52	81	70	59	79	69	62
	TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(60769)	(26002)	(6993)	(1086)	(361)	(342)	(303)	(304)	(310)	(265)	(1265)	(155)	

n=97755

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 3.16

Occupational Status and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Occupational Status:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Unemployed	4.8	6.3	4.4	6.1	6.4	9	9.4	7.6	9.9	6.7	7.9	9.4
Wage or salary	80	80	81	80	76	80	84	80	81	84	82	77
Employer, self-employed	16	14	15	14	18	11	7	12	9	10	10	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(38039)	(16513)	(3520)	(841)	(204)	(178)	(244)	(211)	(181)	(208)	(871)	(96)

n=61106

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

There was very little variation in proportions of wage and salary earners amongst the various origin subgroups. Four-fifths of OAB were wage and salary earners, and the other subgroups were all within three to four percentage points of this figure.

Apart from second-generation New Zealand-Australians (about one-fifth), all origin subgroups had fewer employers or self employed than the OAB (16 per cent). The subgroups with the smallest proportions of employed or self employed were second-generation Dutch- and other northern European-Australians (each seven per cent), a proportion less than half that of OAB and second-generation New Zealand-Australians.

In contrast to occupational status, analyses of the type of occupation, in the sense of prestige, in which respondents worked also showed wide dispersions within only one category, the highest. Occupation was coded from census occupational classification into four categories of prestige according to the ANU status code (see Table 3.17) - professional or semi-professional (category one and two of ANU code), clerks, skilled workers and semi-skilled or unskilled workers (the latter two categories five and six of the ANU code). Those who inadequately described their occupation, were unemployed or not in the labour force, were excluded.

The first category also includes teachers, nurses, managers, owners, wheat farmers, wheat and sheep farmers, market gardeners, and fruit (not grape) and vegetable growers, whilst the second, 'clerks', included graziers, dairy and mixed farmers, members of the armed forces, typists and bookkeepers. The 'skilled' category included electricians, plumbers, carpenters and mechanics, whilst 'semi-skilled and unskilled' included most shop assistants and salespersons, foremen, all road transport drivers, storemen and packers and cleaners. (See appendix for details.)

As mentioned above, there was a wide dispersion in the highest category of occupational prestige. Second-generation other English-speaking Australians had by far the highest rate (about two-fifths) whereas second-generation Italian-Australians had the lowest (less than one-fifth), a difference of 20 percentage points. In other words, second-generation other English-speaking Australians were more than twice as likely as second-generation Italian-Australians to be professional or semi-professional. Second-generation New Zealand-, Greek-, and Polish-Australians had the next highest rates (about three-tenths), followed by second-generation British-, other northern European- and other non-English-speaking and Dutch-Australians (about one quarter) and OAB, second-generation German-Australians and immigrants (less than one-quarter).

Table 3.17

Occupational Prestige and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:												
Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa	Canada
Occupation:												
1. Prof, semi-prof.	23	21	26	18	30	22	24	28	26	28	25	38
2. Clerk	29	20	30	32	27	23	24	31	29	30	28	21
3. Skilled	11	16	11	15	10	14	17	8	11	12	13	8
4. Semi- & unskilled	36	43	34	35	34	41	34	33	34	29	34	33
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	63	27	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(34940)	(14941)	(3247)	(748)	(185)	(154)	(213)	(185)	(154)	(187)	(768)	(86)

n=55808

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

So relatively fewer OAB had high prestige occupations. Apart from second-generation German-Australians and immigrants, both of whom were slightly less likely than OAB and second-generation Italian-Australians who were somewhat less likely, all second-generation-origin subgroups were more likely than the OAB to have the most prestigious occupations. This was particularly so second-generation other English-speaking Australians.

In contrast to the professional or semi-professional category, rates in the second most prestigious category, 'clerks', were not very widely dispersed, and second-generation Italian-Australians who were the least likely origin subgroups to be professional and semi-professional were the *most* likely (almost one-third) to be in the 'clerks' category. OAB and second-generation other northern European-Australians had the same rate (29 per cent) whilst second-generation Greek-, British-, Polish- were slightly higher and second-generation other non-English-speaking and New Zealand-Australians were slightly less. Immigrants were the least likely (one-fifth) to be clerks, and the range from highest to lowest is 12 percentage points. Second-generation Dutch-, German- and other English-speaking Australians had rates slightly higher than immigrants.

If we combine the first two categories, a pattern of similarity to the OAB in rates of non-manual occupations of all second-generation subgroups emerges. Immigrants have the lowest non-manual rate - about two-fifths - and all second-generation-origin subgroups are seven percentage points more or less than the OAB, who are almost equally divided, the highest being second-generation Greek- and other English-speaking Australians (almost three in five), and the lowest second-generation German-Australians (about nine in twenty).

Of course, the fact that few immigrants are non-manual workers reflects past government preference for skilled and unskilled manual workers. Indeed, immigrants have a relatively high rate of skilled workers (16 per cent) and the highest rate of unskilled and semi-skilled occupations (43 per cent).

Even though the distribution of origin subgroups does not vary greatly for skilled workers in absolute terms (a range of nine percentage points), second-generation Dutch-Australians and immigrants were about twice as likely to be skilled workers as second-generation Greek- and other English-speaking Australians (eight per cent). All other origin subgroups were similar to the OAB (about one-tenth). In all, a smaller proportion was in this category compared to the other three.

Apart from immigrants mentioned above and second-generation Polish-Australians who had the lowest rates (almost three-tenths) most second-generation subgroups varied only slightly (up to five percentage points) in rates of semi-skilled and unskilled workers from OAB (36 per cent). It is worth noting, however, that all origin subgroups except second-generation other English-speaking Australians had more unskilled and semi-skilled workers than professionals and semi-professionals.

Finally I present data on the industry sector (in Table 3.18). The public sector includes local, state and federal levels. All subgroups were much more likely to work in the private sector: about seven-tenths of most did. Second-generation Italian-Australians (about four-fifths) and second-generation Greek-Australians and immigrants (almost four-fifths) had the highest rates of private sector employment, while second-generation Polish-Australians and other northern European-Australians were the lowest (slightly more than three-fifths)

Whether or not these first three subgroups were more entrepreneurial in motivation or simply found the public sector unattractive or difficult for employment and promotion is unknown. In respect of the two lowest subgroups, it is puzzling why they are the least likely to work in the private sector. Possibly their relatively low rates are associated with their types of occupations, their preference for the public sector or the cultural traditions of their father's country of origin, which allowed for little private sector employment, particularly in a communist country such as Poland. Whatever the case, almost one-third more second-generation Italian- than second-generation Polish- or other northern European-Australians worked in the private sector.

In summary, there was a great range in labour force participation, but the distribution may in part reflect differential rates of retirement - half the second-generation British and German were not in the workforce. Save for second-generation British-Australians, second-generation Australians are more likely than the OAB to be unemployed. Once in the workforce, except for second-generation German- and Italian-Australians, they are more likely to be in the professions or semi-professions, and, apart from second-generation German-Australians, less likely to be unskilled or semi-skilled workers. So, compared with the OAB almost all second-generation subgroups are disadvantaged in obtaining employment, but have occupations with higher prestige.

V *Income*

Finally, the distribution of gross annual income was ascertained for all origin subgroups by analyses of all those who reported their income. Those who did not (about

Table 3.18

Industry Sector and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Industry Sector:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Private	71	77	71	81	72	73	73	77	63	64	72	73
Public	29	23	29	20	28	27	27	23	37	36	28	27
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	63	27	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(34927)	(14877)	(3244)	(740)	(185)	(153)	(215)	(184)	(155)	(185)	(764)	(85)
n=55714												

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

eight per cent) were excluded, and were probably low income earners (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982:1). Those who reported their income as 'none' constituted a separate category and were included. The income variable was divided into four categories - none, low (\$1 to \$8000), medium (\$8001 to \$18000) and high (\$18001 or higher).

'Income' consisted of income from all sources, for example pensions, salaries, part-time or second jobs, property. The income variable may be incorrectly reported by respondents. However, there is no evidence that any particular origin subgroups has a greater likelihood of inaccuracies, so that both ranking and *broad* results may be treated with confidence.

About one-tenth of all origin subgroups except second-generation German- (only six per cent) and Greek-Australians (16 per cent) stated they had no income (see Table 3.19). This latter result is probably associated with participation in tertiary education. Rates of low income ranged from about a staggering three-fifths of *second-generation German-Australians* to about one-third of second-generation Greek- and Polish-Australians. About half of *second-generation British- and New Zealand-Australians* had low incomes and the remaining subgroups were similar to OAB (about two-fifths). These three (italicised) subgroups with the greatest rates of low incomes also had the highest rates of adults over 60 years old (about three-tenths, compared to one-fifth of OAB and not shown in any table), suggesting that their rates of low income may at least partly be associated with retirement.

Medium incomes ranged from about half of second-generation Dutch-Australians to about three-tenths of second-generation New Zealand-, German- and other English-speaking Australians. Relative to the OAB (38 per cent), immigrants, second-generation other northern European- and British-Australians had similar rates of medium incomes whilst second-generation other non-English-speaking Italian-, Greek- and Polish-Australians all had somewhat higher rates than the OAB.

In the high income category, almost all subgroups were again similar to the OAB (almost one-tenth). Exceptions were second-generation other English-speaking Australians, almost one-sixth of whom had high incomes, whereas fewer second-generation Italian- (five per cent) or Dutch-Australians (four per cent), had high incomes.

So in terms of gross annual income, second-generation Germans were most likely to have a low income, whilst second-generation Greeks and Poles were the least likely; second-generation other English-speakers were most likely to have the highest income.

Table 3.19

Income and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:										
		Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether- lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English- speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada	
Income:												
None	11	13	9	11	9	6	9	16	10	11	11	8
Low	42	39	48	40	48	59	40	33	45	32	39	46
Medium	38	41	34	44	31	29	48	44	37	46	43	29
High	9	8	9	5	12	6	4	7	8	11	7	17
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(58393)	(24915)	(6355)	(998)	(347)	(329)	(288)	(273)	(301)	(251)	(1182)	(152)

n=93784

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Although there was a great range in income levels for the extremities in each category, most groups varied little from the OAB.

To summarise these last two sections on education, occupation and income, the results again suggest complex patterns of similarities and differences between the second-generation groups and compared to the OAB. The second-generation groups varied in education achievement, labour force participation, rates of unemployment and being an employer or self-employed and in the extent of professional or semi-professional occupations. But compared to the OAB, most groups were equally likely to work in manual as opposed to non-manual occupations; all were more likely to work in the private sector and for incomes levels, similarities outweighed differences.

Nonetheless, once again some groups possessed distinctive characteristics. Second-generation Germans were poorly educated, the least likely to be in the workforce but most likely to be unemployed, had few professionals or semi-professionals, were most likely to be manual workers and had a very low income. Second-generation British and Germans were similar in some of these characteristics, but the former were the least likely to be unemployed. In marked contrast to second-generation British and Germans, the other ES were very highly educated, were most likely to have professional or semi-professional occupations and had a very high income; but curiously, they were very likely to be unemployed.

It was not the purpose of this chapter to account for differences using more sophisticated statistical analysis, rather the aim was to provide a demographic profile of some important characteristics of the origin groups, as background information for subsequent chapters. Examination of origin, age distribution, gender, religion, locality, nature of occupancy, education, occupational life and income revealed a complex pattern of similarities and differences, both between the three generational groups and within second-generation subgroups. In all the analyses, ethnicity was defined for the second generation by father's birthplace.

Compared to the OAB, most second-generation groups tended to live in a similar type of house, be equally likely to have a manual job, to earn a salary or wage, to work in the private sector and to have a similar income. The second generation was relatively well educated and more likely to have professional or semi-professional jobs, compared to immigrants and the OAB, and was more urban than the OAB. They differed markedly in size of group, in age distribution, their religious affiliation as well as the extent to which they professed that affiliation. They were more likely to be unemployed.

There were also many intra-group differences. For example, whilst the OAB were evenly distributed in age, second-generation Germans and other Northern Europeans had few middle-aged. The other ES second generation were very highly educated, but had a very high rate of unemployment. Second-generation Germans tended to live in Melbourne or in Queensland outside Brisbane.

The findings of this chapter suggest a complex pattern of characteristics for each second-generation group, and between the three generational groups. Perhaps, also, the findings point to a complex pattern of political adaptation for second-generation Australians in the early 1980s, a pattern that cannot be readily explained.

Chapter 4

Economic Integration*

Australia and its people are extremely fortunate. We have a vast land area with a low overall population density, a large share of the world's mineral resources, stable and efficient administrative systems, a high level of personal prosperity and material security, an extensive system of social services and a spirit of egalitarianism which promotes an exceptional level of social and economic mobility (MacKellar, 1978:11).

Introduction

Immigration to contemporary Australia may be viewed in part as a complex piece of social engineering in which there is an attempt to match the occupational skills and ethnicity of newcomers to the perceived needs of the host country. The location of immigrants in, for example, the economic, social or political sub-systems will be affected at least initially by how much in demand those skills and backgrounds were. In other words, the place that immigrants take in various institutions of society will to an extent be determined by government selection processes. And the one perhaps the most directly affected by these processes will be their location in the economic system, which is largely associated with their occupation.

One indication of location in the economic system is income, and in terms of income, immigrants as a group rank lower than the native-born in contemporary Australia (Chiswick and Miller, 1985:7). Nonetheless there is great variation according to country of origin. In general, immigrants from English-speaking countries have been thought to earn more and immigrants from non-English-speaking countries to earn less. Indeed Zubrzycki (1969:36-38), commenting on 1961 Census data analysis, stated that

ethnicity is related to socioeconomic status

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with immigrants from non-English-speaking countries

constituting a disproportionate share of Australia's industrial proletariat (see also Miller, 1982:240-241).

Most persons emigrate for economic reasons, to provide a better future for themselves and for their children. But whilst social engineering may well in the short-term determine immigrants' rank in society, the location of second-generation Australians in the economic system becomes an important indicator of the longer-term 'success' of their migration. During the 1970s it was recognised that some immigrant groups in certain localities were still poor, even a decade after settlement (Henderson, 1975). This indicated that they had not 'assimilated', contrary to government expectation. And the reality of non-assimilation implied that

equality would not automatically flow to the Australian-born children of non-English-speaking immigrants (Jakubovicz, 1984:19).

So speculation grew as to their material position in society.

Three patterns are intuitively possible. First, the pattern of disadvantage resulting from selection criteria applied by the Australian government could persist to the second generation. Their parents' struggle to establish themselves in their adopted country, their rank in terms of income relative to the native-born, and discrimination by employers against their group might all combine to affect adversely the second generation's entry into the labour market and their subsequent economic progress. In other words, the second generation might suffer economically because of their parents' occupational skills and their ethnic origin.

Second, and in contrast, the motivation of immigrants to establish a better life for their families could assist their children's progress in Australian society and the immigrant self-selection process itself might advantage their Australian-born children. The availability of free education at primary and secondary level, and free or government-assisted education at the tertiary level, could facilitate equality of opportunity in education and thus equality of opportunity to attain higher status occupations and high incomes.

Finally there might be an intermediate position whereby both sets of influence co-existed so that the second generation became economically similar to, or even indistinguishable from, the OAB. In what direction does the evidence point?

Very few analyses of the socioeconomic attainment of second-generation Australians have yet appeared in the literature. Zubrzycki's examination of four birthplace groups revealed

a pattern of striking similarity of occupational profiles (Zubrzycki, 1984:370).

The most recent analysis of the income levels of second-generation Australians appears to be that of Chiswick and Miller (1985), who found differences amongst native-born in income according to nativity (overseas/Australian-born) of parents. However, these authors did not distinguish between different ethnic groups in terms of birthplace of the father.

This chapter attempts to take the matter further, and it focusses on two questions:

1. Where are second-generation Australians located in the economic system relative to first-generation immigrants and to the OAB?
2. Is there any marked economic differentiation based on ethnic origin among the second generation?

Data

The data used in this chapter are derived from the 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing Persons Sample File.

Persons attending a tertiary institution full-time were excluded. The proportions of those attending full-time varied markedly according to origins, from 17 per cent for second-generation Greek-Australians to two per cent for other Australian-born, second-generation New Zealand-Australians and second-generation British-Australians (see Table 4.1). Respondents who were unemployed or who were not in the labour force were also excluded. For all the second generation except the British the higher rate of unemployment noted in Chapter 3 (Table 3.16), may be a function of age or education differences. But it may be that some prefer 'better' jobs to mere employment. In other words, they may be unwilling to compromise high occupational aspirations effected by the educational qualifications and/or by their seeking identity or status in the wider community for less prestigious jobs. This view is supported by Young et al. (1983) in their study of transition from school to workforce of some Melbourne youth though, of course, their sample included youth *without* post-school qualifications. Nonetheless they found that:

Greeks and Italians and Anglo-Australians all hold different concepts of employment and unemployment, the Anglo-Australian generally being less

concerned with the type of job than with having a job (Young et al., 1983:257).

Unfortunately, the limitations of census data do not allow any analysis of motivation or preferences.

The various groups differed markedly in age distribution and slightly in gender. Both these characteristics affect level of income, because earnings peak among males aged between 31 and 40 years of age. Table 4.2 shows the age distribution of the sample. Relative to the OAB (58 per cent), immigrants, second-generation other English-speaking Australians and second-generation British have a higher proportion over 30 years of age (72 per cent, 75 per cent and 68 per cent respectively), while second-generation Dutch-Australians, second-generation Polish and second-generation Italian-Australian cohorts have a smaller proportion (7 per cent, 11 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). It is important to note the very small numbers of respondents in the 41 to 50 and 51 to 60 years age cohorts for second-generation Dutch-Australians and second-generation Polish, which may affect the reliability of results.

Method

For the analysis I have calculated the mean annual income for each origin group, standardising age to the age structure of the other Australian-born (see Table 4.2, column 1). There has been no adjustment for human capital (educational qualifications, for example), number of hours worked, or for other variables which may affect income (locality, marital status, gender, occupation, for example). Even so, the analysis was repeated for males and for females to discern the extent to which gender differences accounted for the results. Age has been subdivided into only six categories to 60 years, as there were too few older respondents in some cohorts. The Census data classify income, the dependent variable, into fourteen categories, from 'none' to 'over \$26,000'. It should be noted that a significant proportion of persons reported their *net* income instead of gross income as requested, and that most non-respondents (approximately 8 per cent) were probably low-income earners (Australia Bureau of Statistics,

Table 4.1
Tertiary Education Institution Attendance and Origin of Australian Population, 18+ years, 1981

[Per cent]

. Origin

Tertiary Education Institution:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	New Zealand	USA Southern Africa Canada	Germany Nether-lands	Poland	Greece	Italy	Other Northern European Countries	Other non-English-speaking Countries	
Not attending	94	94	95	95	93	90	81	84	74	83	89	85
Attending full-time	2	3	2	2	4	7	10	5	17	8	6	8
Attending part-time	4	4	3	2	4	3	9	11	9	8	5	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
(n)	(57446)	(24862)	(6204)	(346)	(144)	(325)	(300)	(257)	(289)	(1047)	(300)	(1217)

n=92737

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 4.2

Age and Origin of the Sample, 18-60 years, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Age in Years:	Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:										Other		
			Britain Ireland	New Zealand	USA Southern Africa Canada	Germany	Nether- lands	Poland	Greece	Italy	Other Northern European Countries	Other non-English- speaking Countries			
18-20	10	5	8	7	3	22	29	15	25	27	15	21			
21-25	17	10	12	10	6	30	44	22	34	35	24	32			
26-30	15	13	12	10	17	17	20	52	12	14	20	23			
31-40	26	31	22	27	33	9	4	9	10	11	14	12			
41-50	18	24	24	28	23	9	1	1	13	9	15	7			
51-60	14	17	22	17	19	12	2	1	7	4	12	5			
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
%	63	27	5.6	.3	.1	.3	.4	.3	.3	1.4	.3	1.4			
(n)	(33951)	(14463)	(3026)	(175)	(79)	(149)	(209)	(181)	(184)	(738)	(150)	(747)			

n=54052

1982:1).¹ The mid-point of each category was used as the mean income of all persons falling in that particular category.² This is, of course, only an approximation.

Results

Table 4.3 shows that the older cohorts (immigrants, second-generation British-Australians, second-generation New Zealand-Australians and second-generation other English-speaking Australians) have, as expected, an adjusted income less than their observed income.³ The adjusted annual incomes range almost \$4,000 from about \$15,000 for second-generation other English-speaking Australians to \$11,000 for second-generation Dutch-Australians. Almost all second-generation Australians (except second-generation Italian-Australians and second-generation Dutch-Australians) have a higher income than either the OAB or immigrants. Three groups have an income below that of the OAB: second-generation Italian-Australians and immigrants, both of which groups have a very slight difference of about \$400, and second-generation Dutch-Australians, who have a larger difference of \$1,200.

¹The question was 'What is the gross income (including pensions and/or allowances) that each person usually receives each week from all sources?'

²The average annual individual income used in each category was:

	Census Category	± \$
(01)	None	0
(02)	Less than \$1000	500
(03)	\$1000 - \$2000	1500
(04)	\$2001 - \$3000	2500
(05)	\$3001 - \$4000	3500
(06)	\$4001 - \$6000	5000
(07)	\$6001 - \$8000	7000
(08)	\$8001 - \$10000	9000
(09)	\$10001 - \$12000	11000
(10)	\$12001 - \$15000	13500
(11)	\$15001 - \$18000	16500
(12)	\$18001 - \$22000	20000
(13)	\$22001 - \$26000	24000
(14)	Over \$26000	

³Observed income is expected to be higher in 'older' cohorts because income peaks between 31-40 years of age. 'Younger' cohorts had proportionally fewer respondents in that age category.

Table 4.3

Age Adjusted and Observed Average Annual Income, 18-60 years, and Origin of Australian Population, 1981

	Father Australian- born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:										Origin		
			Britain Ireland	New Zealand	USA Southern Africa Canada	Germany	Nether- lands	Poland	Greece	Italy	Other Northern European Countries	Other non-English- speaking Countries			
Adjusted X ¹	11.7826	12.5457	12.8646	14.7662	12.5857	10.9696	12.5521	13.0693	11.7699	12.7887	12.7090				
Observed X ²	12.1745	12.1287	12.7837	13.2486	15.6076	11.5503	10.6818	12.1934	11.3696	10.6104	12.4767	11.5482			
(n)	(33951)	(14463)	(3026)	(175)	(79)	(149)	(209)	(181)	(184)	(738)	(150)	(747)			n=54052

¹The adjusted mean income for each origin group was the calculation of its average annual income standardising age to the age structure of the OAB reported in Table 4.2, column 1.

²The observed mean for each origin group was its average annual income.

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

This latter result may reflect sampling fluctuations in the 41-50 years category which held only 1 per cent of second-generation Dutch-Australians, but 18 per cent of OAB. Given this, it is possible that second-generation Dutch-Australians' adjusted income is higher (around \$12,000) than the amount shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. On the other hand, if this income is indeed low, it may be associated with family size, for

the larger is the size of a man's family of origin, the lower are his later achievements. Coming from a large family constitutes a barrier to later attainment (Broom et al., 1980:27).

This, combined with a smaller per capita inheritance due to family size, would reduce individual income. Their family of origin was probably larger than for any other cohort in the sample because, in 1971, Dutch-born women aged 40-64 years had the highest fertility levels of any nativity group in Australia (Day, 1984:460-463). These differences appear to have persisted, though they have narrowed (see also Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1983:107-111).

The ranked order in the various groups is shown in Table 4.4 with the second-generation other English-speakers having by far the greatest difference in income from that of the OAB (21 per cent higher). This very small group of respondents probably comprises the Australian-born children of immigrants who had

superior occupational qualifications readily recognised at the point of entry into Australia (Zubrzycki, 1969:34).¹

Next in rank order are second-generation Greek-Australians, second-generation New Zealand-Australians and second-generation other Northern European-Australians who have an income 7 per cent, 6 per cent and 5 per cent (respectively) higher than the other Australian-born.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the adjusted income for males and females respectively. The male distribution differs from that of the population in the lower ranking of second-generation Greek males and the higher of second-generation Polish males; otherwise the patterns are very similar. In the female distribution second-generation German women are ranked much lower than in the whole population; also three NES second-generation groups - Polish, other northern European and German women - are ranked below the OAB, unlike for the whole population. So the male distribution closely approximates that for the whole population.

¹High occupational status is associated with parents' occupational level. Fewer second-generation Australians of non-English-speaking background have parents with such qualifications: their non-recognition deters immigration.

Table 4.4

Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin, 1981

Rank	Origin		Adjusted Annual Income ¹ $\bar{X}^2$ \$	Percentage Above or Below Other Australian-born Income
1.	Second-generation other English-speakers		14,800	+21
2.	"	Greeks	13,100	+7
3.	"	New Zealanders	12,900	+6
4.	"	other Northern Europeans	12,800	+5
5.	"	other non-English-speakers	12,700	+4
6.	(	Germans)	12,600	+3
	(	Polish)		
8.	"	Britain and Ireland	12,500	+3
9.	Other Australian-born		12,200	**
10.	(	Overseas-born)	11,800	-3
	(	Second-generation Italian)		
12.	"	Dutch	11,000	-10

¹Adjusted to nearest \$100, in contrast to Table 4.3 which adjusted to nearest decimal point.

² $\bar{X}$ = average

Table 4.5

Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin of Males, 1981

Rank	Origin	Adjusted Annual Income ¹ $\bar{X}$ ² \$	Percentage Above or Below Other Australian-born Income
1.	Second-generation other English-speakers	17,700	+26
2.	" " Polish	15,900	+14
3.	" " other Northern Europeans	15,500	+11
4.	" " New Zealanders	15,000	+7
5.	(" " Britain and Ireland) (" " other non-English-speakers)	14,600	+4
7.	" " Germans	14,300	+2
8.	Greeks	14,100	+1
9.	Other Australian-born	14,000	**
10.	Second-generation Italians	13,600	-3
11.	Overseas-born	13,500	-4
12.	Second Generation Dutch	13,400	-4

¹Adjusted to nearest \$100, in contrast to Table 4.3 which adjusted to nearest decimal point.

² $\bar{X}$ = average

Table 4.6

Ranked Age Adjusted Annual Income and Origin of Females, 1981

Rank	Origin	Adjusted Annual Income ¹ $\bar{X}^2$ \$	Percentage Above or Below Other Australian-born Income
1.	Second-generation other English-speakers	10,900	+20
2.	" " Greeks	10,400	+14
3.	" " other non-English speakers	9,600	+5
4.	" " Britain and Ireland	9,200	+1
5.	(" " New Zealanders) (" " Other Australian-born)	9,100	**
7.	(" " Polish) (" " Other Northern Europeans) (" " Overseas-born)	8,900	-2
10.	(" " Italians) (" " Dutch)	8,800	-3
12.	" " Germans	8,400	-8

¹Adjusted to nearest \$100, in contrast to Table 4.3 which adjusted to nearest decimal point.

² $\bar{X}$ = average

Discussion

These results show that for the most part economic differentiation based on ethnic background does not appear to persist in the second generation: almost all the second-generation cohorts had a higher income than both other native-born Australians and immigrants. As a group, the second generation of non-English-speaking origins are not disadvantaged in the economic system, nor are most of the second generation from English-speaking backgrounds greatly advantaged. These results are consistent with, though much more detailed than, those of Zubrzycki (1984) and Chiswick and Miller (1985) in Australia, and for Chiswick (1977) in the United States of America.

Second-generation Australians from non-English-speaking backgrounds do not appear to be incorporated into the economic system, in terms of income, in ways which are associated with their parents' occupational level, given Zubrzycki's analysis of 1961 data mentioned earlier. In Australia, it appears that at least the marketplace allows for, and can accommodate to a great extent, ethnic differentiation amongst the second generation. Moreover, as the sample excluded full-time tertiary students, a higher proportion of whom were of non-English-speaking background, the income of these groups is probably understated for the longer term: their economic location should be higher in the future.

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that these results do not 'show' an absence of discrimination in the labour market towards second-generation groups, nor do they 'show' how groups are ranked given their educational qualifications and other characteristics which affect income. These are separate, and most interesting, questions to explore. The analysis examines merely the extent of differentiation among various generational cohorts in terms of income, after adjusting for age.

Useful as they are, these data have nothing to say about a number of important questions: whether the location of second-generation cohorts in the economic system (as indicated by their income) is associated with economic conditions at the time of their parents' arrival or their own entry into the labour market, the factors associated with the migration experience mentioned earlier which may influence their progress in Australian society, the extent to which their particular talents can find fulfilment in contemporary Australia, or the ways in which these factors combine. Much more research must be done in this area before a clearer understanding of migration processes in later generations can be reached.

We can reason, though, as to why second-generation Australians have such relatively high incomes. They are more likely than other native-born to live in large

urban rather than rural areas. Their grandparents had higher occupational status in the country of origin than their parents have in Australia (Mistilis, 1984:80). Those from non-English-speaking origins may seek high status occupations to counteract feelings of alienation in our 'Anglo' society. The favourable self-selection of immigrant parents, insofar as they are highly motivated and particularly future-oriented in their view of life, may advantage their Australian-born children through environment, lifestyle and inheritance. The availability of 'free' or relatively low-cost education provided the means for advancement.¹ The post-World War II expansion in capitalism facilitated economic gain. Finally the nature of the Australian economic system allows for cultural differentiation through a wide distribution of its resources and in part by determining opportunities for advancement.

Of further importance are the implications of these findings for the political behaviour of the second generation. For later generations of immigrants in the United States, Gordon (1964:81) has suggested that

once structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all other types of assimilation will naturally follow.²

We do not know what is the case in Australia. Are second-generation Australians similar in political behaviour to other native-born? What effect does their economic location have on their political behaviour? Are the second generation completely assimilated in political terms?

Moreover, these findings signal possible changes in the longer term in respect to Australia's political actors. The higher status indicated by the economic position of second-generation Australians may be accompanied by, or lead to, a higher profile in politics. Given the relative youthfulness and the foreseen higher income of those with non-English-speaking origins, that impact will become clear in the next few decades. Perhaps then Australia will be politically truly multicultural.

¹Immigrants from non-English-speaking countries are probably more likely to choose a school from the independent system for their Australian-born children. They value a more disciplinary system, seek greater 'protection' for their daughters in a single gender secondary school and are willing to allocate more financial resources to schooling, better to ensure their educational attainment. Many choose the Catholic parochial system which has relatively low fees and good retention rates.

²Cultural assimilation, acculturation or behavioural assimilation is the process by which minority groups acquire the cultural 'norms' of the majority or dominant society.

Conclusions

The results presented in this chapter strongly suggest that, if the location of second-generation Australians in the economic system is the criterion, then the immigration of their parents was successful. It also points to the relative advantage in the longer term for Australia in selecting immigrants from non-English-speaking countries.

There are implications in the findings of this chapter for the validity of the association between class and ethnicity in Australia. First, for the second generation ethnicity in terms of origin, does not appear *closely* related to economic status. Second, the findings point to a weakening of any association between class and ethnicity in Australia. Third, it appears unlikely that in later generations of immigrants ethnicity will fracture proletarian solidarity. Fourth, the relationship between ethnicity, class consciousness and class mobilisation must be questioned in the light of the economic position of the second generation. All these elements are important in any theoretical interpretations of class and ethnicity in Australia.

This analysis of income does not indicate that the second generation, or groups amongst them, are influential in the contemporary Australian pattern of economic power, for example in banking, mining or large companies, or that some belong to the few influential families with very great accumulated wealth. Even so, some immigrants, both ES and NES are prominent amongst the 'new' wealthiest Australians of the last decade or so, for example, Misters Bond, Holmes A'Court and Ables, who were born in Great Britain, South Africa and Hungary respectively and all of whom arrived in Australia in the post-World War II period. Perhaps in the future, Australian families with great inherited wealth will include their descendants.

The favourable economic location of the second generation may indicate the degree of their adjustment to the labour market, and the converse. If this is so, then it provides optimism in Australia in terms of the social implications of large-scale migration. After all, the influx of large numbers of immigrants from diverse sources could be accompanied by segmentation in the labour market, a necessary condition for increased social tension and conflict as witnessed in certain other countries. Perhaps in Australia the economic location of the second generation reduces such a possibility and provides the basis for a socially cohesive society.

Of course, one concern is that the remarkable success of certain birthplace groups itself may engender resentment in some older established Australians whose economic position is overtaken by 'new' groups. This in turn could lead to antagonism towards

some of the second generation. However it is unlikely that this would develop into a dangerous situation: there is also widespread goodwill towards and support for these birthplace groups (mostly of non-English-speaking origins) in society at large. In short, Australia is unlikely to experience the developments in Malaysia from the 1970s and currently in Fiji where the indigenous people have taken dramatic steps aimed at entrenching their political supremacy over 'new' groups who are economically very successful - later generations of Chinese Malaysians and Indian Fijians respectively.¹

Yet we cannot assume that since the marketplace allows for and can accommodate to a great extent ethnic differentiation in the second generation, the Australian political arena shows similar capacities. Indeed we do not know whether political differentiation based on ethnic background persists to the second generation. Certainly, the favourable economic location of the second generation shown in this chapter will not impede their participation in the political life of Australia, and may well enhance it. But what the links are between that location and the nature of their political behaviour remains an interesting question to explore.

¹The Malaysian Government is now assisting the Fijian to develop such programmes (Williams, 1987:13).

Chapter 5

Educational Achievements¹

The present batch of graduates has a tremendous number of 'foreign' surnames. There will be more still. They'll also make the political scene, a political scene which has so far dared to do absolutely nothing new, a lilliputian political scene that's waiting for godot ... (Bosi, 1972:68).

Introduction

Although 'migrant education' has been researched and publicly discussed for some years now, little is known about educational achievement of the second generation. Indeed, any such discussion is most likely to be piecemeal, with little empirical analysis and differing definitions of what is meant by 'migrant' or 'second generation'. Educational research in this area has classified students by their birthplace, by that of either parent or both parents, by length of residence in Australia, by the language spoken at home, or by some combination of these criteria (see Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983:96).

Despite the paucity of empirical data, *theories* abound about the educational progress and lack of progress of the second generation, those on the left being perhaps foremost amongst them. They typically assert that social inequalities predetermine the second generation's future place in the Australian class structure. The low income of parents from NES countries, which results from their occupational class position and residential concentration in poorer localities, denies them equal access to educational resources and thus perpetuates disadvantage in the next generation (Jakubowicz, 1984:19). Institutional discrimination in the education system towards NES migrant children further limits their educational progress.

¹An earlier draft of this chapter entitled 'Destroying Myths: Second-Generation Australians' Educational Achievements' was delivered at the Centre for Migrant and Intercultural Studies at Monash University, Melbourne, in June 1986. I thank Dr. Michael Clyne, the convenor, and other participants for their helpful comments. A later draft was given as a seminar in the Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, in November, 1986. I am indebted to Professor Don Anderson, the discussant, and other participants for their incisive comments.

Other theories, not confined to the left, suggest that the NES migrant experience is 'stunting' (Meade, 1984:2). Migrant children suffer identity crises, lack of cultural identity, lack of cultural continuity and (during adolescence) culture conflict, all of which contribute to their apparently poor educational performance. In other words, NES migrant children have not assimilated and they are unequal in educational attainment. Girls, particularly from Greek or Italian origins, allegedly suffer the added disadvantage of cultural forces among parents which prevent the realisation of their educational potential.

Those with NES origins allegedly suffer from linguistic deficiencies insofar as English is their *second* language. For example, their average IQ, at least as measured by schools, is demonstrably lower than that of the ES subgroup. So, teachers could argue, these personal characteristics militate against high educational attainment.

Implicit in these arguments is that the second generation of ES origins, not being the victims of all these circumstances, will equal the Anglo-Australian average in educational performance. After all, there is no institutional discrimination in the educational system directed towards it. Its parental class position, which is higher than that of the NES cohort, does not push it towards poorer localities and schools. Its members do not suffer the same migrant experience, nor should their personal characteristics retard educational progress.

For all these reasons we have in contemporary Australia some common assumptions about the educational achievement of second-generation Australians. First, second-generation persons of NES origins have low educational attainments, especially females, compared with their native-born peers. Second, second-generation persons with ES origins are educationally similar to the Australian average, including females. Both subgroups have higher educational attainments than those of the NES cohort.

Recently, in discussing the educational achievement of immigrant and second-generation children, Birrell and Seitz (1986:33) hoped that:

the future will witness a liberation from the theoretical/ideological determinism so evident in this area, and that instead research will be directed toward providing a more objective, fact-based analysis.

This chapter aims to fulfill these hopes in two main ways: first, by providing analyses of the kind Birrell and Seitz called for; and second, to use these analyses as a basis for developing alternate theories. More specifically I focus on eight questions:

1. Do second-generation persons from NES origins have lower educational attainment relative to the OAB?

2. Do second-generation persons from ES origins have higher educational attainment relative to the second generation of NES origins?
3. Do second-generation women of NES origins have lower educational attainment compared to other native-born women?
4. Do second-generation women of ES origins have higher educational attainment compared to those of NES origins?
5. Are locality and age cohort associated with educational attainment?
6. What are the theoretical implications of the findings? Do they suggest alternate theories of educational progress amongst later generations of immigrants?
7. Is ethnicity important for educational attainment?
8. What are the implications of the findings for political behaviour?

Method

Three more specific analyses of educational qualifications were made in addition to those in Chapter 3. First, the data were disaggregated according to gender. Because fewer females compared to males have obtained tertiary education in the past it is of interest to determine these ratios in the various subgroups. Also, it may be that relatively fewer females of NES origins, or more specifically, of Greek or Italian origins, have post-school education compared to OAB and those of ES origins.

Respondents were further disaggregated according to whether they were participating in or had completed tertiary education or not. Given the youthfulness of some subgroups and the participation of mature-aged students, especially women, in higher education, it is possible that a significant number of respondents without qualification may be attending a tertiary education institution. A clearer picture of educational levels is therefore seen by analysing proportions of each subgroup who have some qualifications or who are attending a tertiary institutions, as well as the proportions who have no educational qualifications and who are not attending a tertiary institution, either full-time or part-time. Finally, it is recognised that age distribution has an important impact on education levels, but not all subgroups were analysed. It was not possible to examine with statistical confidence *all* the cohort aged 18 to 22 as some subgroups had very low numbers (second-generation other English-speaking-, other northern European-, Polish- and New Zealand-Australians).

Data analysed in this chapter are once again from the one per cent Person's sample file of the 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing, and the statistical tools of analysis used are simple crosstabulations.

Results

In Table 5.1 the percentages and ratios of women to men were analysed for some post-school qualification and for highest level of education attained. Results did not support the speculations mentioned earlier. Compared to the OAB, whose female/male ratio was 55 per 100, all second-generation NES subgroups had similar, or if anything higher, female/male ratios for some tertiary education qualification. Also, second-generation Italian- and Greek-Australians had higher female/male ratios than both OAB and second-generation British-Australians.

Moreover, whilst the female/male rate for the most highly educated OAB was 80, all NES origin subgroups had higher ratios; second-generation British-Australians were slightly lower (64). In other words, there is no evidence in these data that women of NES origins or more specifically those with Italian or Greek origins are educationally disadvantaged compared to OAB women or to most women of British origins. Arguably, the reverse is the case.

As expected, more respondents had qualifications or were attending a tertiary institution (Table 5.2) than those who merely had qualifications (Table 3.14 categories one and two). But differences between those with qualifications and attendance and with merely qualifications (Tables 5.2 and 3.14 respectively) were most marked for second-generation Greek-Australians (16 percentage points), and quite marked for second-generation Italian-, Dutch-, Polish- and other non-English-speaking Australians (each about ten percentage points), and German- and other northern European-Australians (each seven percentage points). The other subgroups were only slightly higher.

About three-tenths of immigrants, OAB and second-generation German- and British-Australians were either attending a post-school institution or had already obtained qualifications; all other subgroups were more likely to have some qualifications or to be attending a tertiary institution. Second-generation Greek-, Polish-, and other English-speaking Australians were almost equally divided between the two categories and about two-fifths of second-generation Dutch-, Italian-, New Zealand-, other northern European- and other NES Australians had qualifications or were attending.

Table 5.1
Educational Levels and Origin of Adult Australian Population, 1981, by Gender

		[Per cent]											
		Origin											
		Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:											
Educational Levels:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa	Canada
Percentage with some tertiary qualifications:													
	20	19	19	23	28	17	27	28	23	29	23	34	
	36	39	39	32	42	32	36	33	27	43	37	45	
Females per 100 males	55	49	49	72	67	53	75	85	85	67	62	76	
Percentage with Diploma, Bachelor or higher:													
	8	8	7	8	16	8	11	13	11	16	12	20	
	10	10	11	7	14	7	11	13	12	16	12	19	
Females per 100 males	80	80	64	114	114	114	100	100	92	100	100	105	
												(male) n=44351	
												(female) n=45439	

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 5.2

Educational Qualifications, Tertiary Institution Attendance and Origin of Australian Population, 18+, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Education Qualifications and Tertiary Institution Attendance:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	Italy	New Zealand	Germany	Nether-lands	Greece	Other Northern European Countries	Poland	Other non-English-speaking Countries	USA Southern Africa Canada
Some qualification or attendance	31	32	31	38	37	32	42	47	37	46	39	45
No qualifications, not attending	69	68	69	62	63	68	58	53	63	54	61	55
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	27	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
(n)	(54887)	(23611)	(5917)	(966)	(333)	(302)	(279)	(256)	(284)	(247)	(1133)	(139)

n=88354

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

Table 5.3

Tertiary Education Level and Origin of the Australian Population, 18 to 22 years, 1981

[Per cent]

Origin

Tertiary Education Level:	Father Australian-born	Born O/seas	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:									
			Britain Ireland	New Zealand	USA Southern Africa Canada	Germany	Nether-lands	Poland	Greece	Italy	Other Northern European Countries	Other non-English speaking Countries
No qualification, not attending	65	65	64	*	*	58	63	*	46	55	*	59
Tertiary qualification or attendance	35	35	36	*	*	42	37	*	54	45	*	41
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(7465)	(1879)	(489)	(25)	(12)	(84)	(130)	(53)	(121)	(399)	(51)	(364)

n=11072

n=11072

* too few respondents for analysis with statistical confidence

Source: 1% Persons Sample File, 1981 Australian Census of Population and Housing

These results give a clearer picture of educational levels. Of course, differences in rates may in part reflect age distributions as the second generation of non-English-speaking origins tend to be younger and therefore more likely to be participating in tertiary education. With respect to the low educational levels of second-generation British-Australians, a plausible explanation is their age distribution: a large proportion was over 50 years old and such people were less likely to be well-educated given historical changes in the educational system. But analysis of the 18-22 years cohort of some subgroups (see discussion of education in Chapter 3) revealed that second-generation British-Australians had a relatively *low* rate of tertiary qualifications or attendance. Indeed more than half (54 per cent) of second-generation Greek-Australians and at least two in five of second-generation Italian, German and other NES had a tertiary qualification or were attending a tertiary institution compared to only just over one in three of second-generation Dutch, British, OAB and immigrants. So their low educational attainment does not appear to be entirely a function of age.

To summarise, even allowing for age distributions, relatively few of the second generation had no post-school qualifications or were not currently attending a tertiary institution. These results are consistent with, though much more detailed than those of Williams (1986).¹ The second generation of NES origins did not have lower educational attainment than the ES second generation or OAB. Nor did most of the ES second generation have greater educational achievement. This was true for both women and men. Nonetheless, there are differences amongst the second generation, so it is interesting to canvass possible explanations for them.

Discussion

The low educational attainment of second-generation German-Australians may be associated with the high proportion living in Queensland outside Brisbane (see discussion in Chapter 3 concerning geographical distribution, Table 3.12). Certainly, a more detailed analysis controlling for age reveals that a large minority (two-fifths) of second-generation German-Australians aged 50 years or older lived in Queensland outside Brisbane.

Many German immigrants to Queensland came from a rural background to farm in their adopted land. So to the extent that locality is associated with the realisation of this

¹Williams analysed groups according to father's birthplace, thus combining immigrants with the second generation.

aspiration, it does not in itself explain lesser educational attainment of second-generation German-Australians. Rather their educational levels may be associated with the priority of education within their families of origin, within farming communities rather than the poor availability of higher or further education facilities in rural Queensland.

Similarly, the overwhelmingly rural or urban-rural geographic location of second-generation Dutch youth (see Chapter 3) may limit their tertiary education because of familial attitudes to education, rather than availability of facilities. But this remains speculative until further research is available.

Those with fathers born in South Africa, Canada or the United States of America (other ES subgroup) had very high educational levels and their fathers had:

superior occupational qualifications readily recognised at the point of entry into Australia (Zubrzycki, 1969:34).

So it appears that class differences in families of origin do not translate into educational disadvantage for *all* the second generation of ES origins (see below). Also differences in familial background in terms of similar or dual ethnic origins do not appear to be important: most of the second-generation British and the other ES subgroups had dual ethnic origins, but they experienced different educational outcomes.

The educational attainments of most second-generation persons of NES origins were higher compared to those of the OAB and second-generation British-Australians. This result could not have been anticipated on the basis of their greater likelihood of having fathers in manual jobs (Price, 1981:31), and the link between father's occupation and a person's own educational attainment mentioned above. One explanation may be that a greater proportion of immigrants from NES countries are underemployed as they work in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs but have qualifications obtained overseas (Australian Population and Immigration Council, 1976:12, cited in Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983:103). In these circumstances, educational levels of parents could slightly strengthen these links, but they would remain fairly weak.

Interestingly, in examining school retention rates (albeit in a study more limited in terms of locality and origin subgroups), Meade (1984) found that:

In the Sydney study when the influence of SES is controlled higher proportions of most NES¹ origin groups remained to the HSC² in comparison with the groups of students of non-NES³ origin (1984:121).

Moreover in their discussion of participation in higher education of ethnic minorities, Anderson and Vervoorn (1983:103)⁴ assert that:

it would be a serious mistake to fail to consider factors other than occupational or socioeconomic background when investigating participation in higher education.

They also maintain that:

values and attitudes which are culturally acquired are just as important in determining attitudes towards education (1983:114).

Indeed Poole (1985) has suggested that three interacting factors - factors associated with cultural background, gender and socioeconomic status of parents - are important primary influences on educational attainment of ethnic youth. These largely determine parental aspirations for their children's education aspirations, which to a great extent are associated with the individual's aspirations. Such interaction in turn is an important influence on educational achievement. To the extent that the act of migration itself is an anticipation of social mobility, for immigrants' children if not for themselves, immigrants may value education as a means of mobility more than the native-born.

Certainly the educational aspirations of youth from working-class families with NES origins tend to be higher than those of both such OAB and ES youth (Anderson and

¹'NES' here refers to those students both of whose parents were born in an NES country. About two-thirds of these students were second-generation Australians (see Meade, 1984:6).

²HSC means higher school certificate, the qualification obtained in some states at the end of high school.

³'Non-NES' refers to students whose parents were born in Australia or in an ES country.

⁴For the most part, Anderson and Vervoorn examined 'migrant students', whom they defined as those born abroad or having a parent born abroad. They thus combined immigrant and native-born students of immigrant parentage, only some of the latter being second generation students in terms of this chapter.

Vervoorn, 1983:114);¹ youth of NES origins who are participating in or have higher education are relatively more likely to have working-class fathers than are OAB or ES youth. So it is possible that factors associated with cultural background or even migrant status itself combine to influence educational attainment.

An alternate explanation of cultural background may be submerged in the question of universal applicability of Anglo-Australian working-class values and attitudes to all such nationality groups. Class attitudes to educational participation are not determined by socioeconomic status in itself, but rather by values and attitudes associated with that status. Indeed for most second-generation youth of NES origins, class attitudes to education do not appear overwhelmingly determined only by those assigned to 'mainstream' Australian socioeconomic status groups (see Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983:114; Poole, 1985:193-194): where origins differ, so may attitudes.

In other words, the class attitudes of persons of NES origin may not be determined according to the socioeconomic status of Anglo-Australians, but by the values and attitudes associated with the particular cultural background of a group within a given socioeconomic stratum. If this is so, then cultural background is not another, separate influence from that of socioeconomic status. Rather, the culture associated with a particular group in a socioeconomic strata is an important determinant of its educational outcomes.

Why British-Australians have comparatively low rates within the second generation is puzzling, and these analyses do not offer ready explanations. Perhaps the cultural factors associated with their background are an important consideration, especially those of the British working-class: the (occupational) class position of the fathers of second-generation British-Australians may be more manual than the OAB though it also has more professionals (Price, 1981:31).² Indeed British working class attitudes to education appear to differ from those in many NES countries.

Parents who refuse to allow their children to take up scholarships are not always thinking of the fact that they would have to be fed and clothed for much

¹Educational aspirations of youth from working-class families of NES origins are still lower than those of such youth from middle-class families (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983:100-101).

²Unfortunately the data used in this paper did not contain information on father's occupation. The occupational distribution of British immigrant fathers is probably bimodal with more professionals and skilled workers than the OAB, a reflection of earlier government selection processes for immigrants.

longer; at the back is this vaguely formulated but strong doubt of the value of education. That doubt acquires some of its force from the group-sense itself: for the group seeks to conserve, and may impede an inclination in any of its members to make a change, to leave the group, to be different (Hoggart, 1959:71-72).

The above discussion indicates that predictions of educational outcomes based on those expected for Anglo-Australians will be understated amongst most of the second generation with NES origins compared to second-generation British-Australians. Also they will be more understated than the established 'norm' for the Australian population.

The analyses suggest that explanations of educational levels must be considered separately for each subgroup, and that factors which are important for some may not provide useful explanations for others. Analyses do not show universally equal educational attainment amongst the second generation and nor do explanations of its determinants appear to be universally applicable.¹

Insofar as these findings are a function of the particular combination of second-generation subgroups, and given the age distribution in the sample, they may well be modified in the future in several ways. First, since second-generation British-Australians will constitute a smaller proportion of the second-generation cohort and since those of NES origins will constitute a greater proportion, the educational levels of the whole second-generation cohort should increase in the future. Second, those educated to the point of having some post-school qualification will probably be even more disproportionately NES in origins in the future. Third, second-generation Germans may be better educated in the future, as a higher proportion of 18 to 22 year olds have a qualification or are attending a tertiary institution.

In terms of political implications, perhaps some analogy can be made with immigrant political behaviour. The notion of the weaker relevance of occupational class amongst immigrants compared to native-born Australians with respect to their partisanship has already been noted (Mistilis, 1984). I found a *weaker* association between occupational class and partisanship for all immigrants - from ES and from NES countries - than for the native-born. I further suggested that:

most Australian research into immigrant political partisanship has given primacy to socioeconomic characteristics, and has ignored cultural and other factors which distinguish immigrant from native-born electors and may effect their partisanship (1985:266).

¹Some of these findings and explanations relating to the second generation are consistent with those of Anderson and Vervoorn (1983), although their population was different, as mentioned earlier.

So possibly factors associated with culture cannot be ignored in their influence on the *various* aspects of social life of immigrants. If such attitudes which are culturally acquired are transmitted to their Australian-born children (the second generation) within the context of family, their influence could extend beyond that which appears to be the case for education to political behaviour.

Conclusions

The notion that structural and institutional factors in society, the migration experience and personal characteristics of the second generation produce a (low) occupational class position or militate against reasonable educational progress for those of NES origins is not supported in the light of the findings of this chapter. Although there may be some substance in these theories, at best they paint an incomplete picture, at worst they severely distort the reality of educational experiences of the second generation.

Whatever forces interact with each other to determine educational outcomes for the second generation, their sum has a negative effect for most with ES origins and a positive one for most with NES origins and a few with ES origins. So the results do suggest alternate theories of educational attainment amongst the second generation by which most of NES origins and some of ES achieve relatively high levels, whilst most of ES origins do not. Certainly the findings signal a liberation from the theoretical/ideological determinism previously evident in this area of research.

If we begin with the assumption derived from the above analyses that most of the second generation with NES origins do succeed educationally, then we must examine the Australian educational system, the attitudes of different origins groups within an occupational class, the migrant experience and personal characteristics of the second generation and then the ways in which aspects of them interact to determine educational outcomes. For example, parents' aspirations for the education of their (second-generation) children, which in turn appear to be associated with the cultural background of the parents and the degree of motivation to achieve of the students themselves, may require more consideration than previously recognised at least by theorists of the left. In short, it appears that ethnicity is an important factor in educational attainment.

Of course, assumptions that each subgroup has similarly important influences are not supported by the findings in this chapter, even though it is conceded that some attributes may be shared. The cultural background of the second-generation groups, as shown above in terms of their own birthplace or in terms of their father's birthplace, is

too varied to permit generalisations about the effects of immigration on educational attainment. In other words, influences may often be explained by specific cultural background rather than by the effects of immigration. Also influences of cultural background on the second generation may be more visibly forceful in some subgroups than in others; within some subgroups it may be stronger in specific aspects of social life than in others. Apparently we must delineate what influences are important for a particular group and explain why they are important.

Indeed the results indicate that little can be assumed about the educational attainment of the second generation from that of other native-born Australians. Some previous studies have assumed that the nature of influences of second-generation groups as opposed to other native-born Australians is identical within an occupational class: assimilation was assumed to be complete. This assumption is not supported in the light of the findings of this chapter.

The fact that many students of NES origins appear to equal or better other Australians in educational outcomes does not necessarily indicate that their potential is fulfilled. Indeed some evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, Williams (1986:58) in a recent report states that there are:

some disadvantaging effects of ethnicity in school, probably due to language problems

for those students of NES origins. Yet as mentioned earlier, studies have suggested that educational aspirations of most students of NES origins and of their parents are higher than those of OAB, particularly when controlling for socioeconomic status. This may indicate that for some students of NES origins both their potential and aspirations remain unfulfilled.

In terms of implications for political behaviour, if the links between educational qualifications and political activity hold true for those with NES background, these results suggest a higher profile in the wider political arena. Although their full impact has not yet been felt, it is already evident in some key areas of government concern, for example welfare, education and immigration, where public servants and activists of NES origins articulate needs not previously fully recognised as 'Australian'. Their incorporation into some mainstream political structures illustrate that the changing nature and composition of the Australian population has occurred at not just one level. The personnel themselves ensure that these concerns will remain on the political agenda at least until their resolution.

Attempts to obtain a proportionate share of resources allocated by government are underway, and will continue. This evolving struggle is a relatively recent phenomenon, of the last decade or so. The educational dimension discussed here has at least facilitated the entrance of these political actors from so-called new groups, even if it has not determined it to a significant extent. Indeed, only by denying the reality of its education achievement can the second generation of NES origins be accorded disadvantaged minority group status.

Chapter 6

Partisanship: Extent and Strength of Partisanship and Nature of Influences

...What about succeeding generations? Does the importance of ethnicity diminish rapidly with more general acculturation and occupational differentiation? (Wolfinger, 1965:906)

What influences partisanship in second-generation Australians? For the United States of America during the 1920s, Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976:76-77) suggested that immigrants and their children, second-generation Americans, were a source of political instability insofar as they had not inherited a party loyalty from their parents, were 'uncommitted' and thus available for mobilisation by a party. Certainly there is evidence to suggest that some *immigrants* in Australia:

represent a floating sector of the electorate who are prepared to support the party which will best further their interests (McAllister and Kelley, 1984:66).

What was the case for second-generation Australians in 1984?

This chapter first explores the extent and strength of partisanship for all respondents; it then analyses influences on party identification amongst Liberal-National and Labor partisans. But, in contrast to earlier chapters, the data used represents the *urban* Australian population. Also the second generation is disaggregated into only two subgroups (ES and NES), defined mostly by father's birthplace. In this and the following chapter patterns of *political behaviour* and the ethnic or cultural dimension are investigated.

I *Extent and Strength of Partisanship*

The most important influences on both the extent and strength of partisanship of voters are probably the partisanship of their parents. Indeed Aitkin (1982:296) found, in analysing 1979 survey data for party choice that, compared to 1967, there was

no weakening evident in the fundamental role of parents in the shaping of party preference.

Whether or not people are partisan, especially in the early voting years, appears to be associated with the extent to which their parents were partisan. Partisanship in youth is greatest amongst those who have two partisan parents, is lower among those with one

such parent, and still lower for those with two non-partisan parents. Also, respondents with two partisan parents are more likely to be *strongly* partisan (Aitkin, 1982:296-297).

These broad patterns remained true in 1984, at least among urban respondents. Table 6.1 shows that they display less partisanship if they had only one partisan parent, and still less if neither parent was partisan, compared to those both of whose parents identified with some Australian party (Table 6.1). For younger respondents (18 to 30 years), the rates are 88, 82 and 70 per cent respectively whereas for the older (51 years or over) they are 92, 87 and 81 per cent respectively. So a slightly higher proportion of older than younger respondents with partisan parents identified with a federal Australian party (see Table 6.1ii). Moreover, Table 6.2 suggests that urban respondents in 1984 who had two partisan parents were slightly more likely to identify *strongly* with a federal party than those who had one, and were much more likely to do so than those whose both parents were not partisan (32, 28 and 22 per cent respectively).

In view of the clearly fundamental role of parents in shaping the extent and strength of respondents' party identification, the partisanship of the parents of the second generation will be the focus of extensive analysis. But insofar as immigrant partisanship differs in some important respects from that of most native-born (see below), perhaps the most significant differences between the parents of all the second generation and those of the OAB arise from the fact that at least the fathers of the former groups were immigrants. These distinctions may be important for any discussion of how partisanship is transmitted from immigrant parents to their native-born children.

There seem to be several important differences. The extent to which immigrants take up Australian partisanship appears to be a function of their *time in the electorate* (Mistilis, 1980:69-70; Aitkin, 1982:334). As most migrate as adults, immigrant partisanship necessarily occurs later in their life cycle than the native-born, who typically inherit Australian partisanship during childhood and adolescence.

Immigrants who have *not enrolled* are unlikely to be partisan, given the association between voting and partisanship for immigrants. Until recently, immigrants who were British Commonwealth citizens could enrol without becoming naturalised Australians, whereas non-British Commonwealth immigrants could not. The proportion of immigrants who are naturalised Australians differs according to birthplace (see Price, 1979); naturalisation also appears to be strongly associated with age: as retirement age approaches naturalisation rates increase (McAllister and Kelley, 1982).

Table 6.1

Federal Party Identification and Parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Population,
18+, 1984

		[Per cent]			
		Parents' Partisanship			
Federal Party Identification: ^a		Both Same ^b	Divided ^c	One Partisan ^d	None ^e
1	Yes	90	89	83	76
2	None, DK	10	11	17	24
TOTAL		100	100	100	100
%		52	5	13	30
(n)		(1079)	(112)	(261)	(619)

n=2071

chi square = 63.4902 with 3 d.f. $p < .0000$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

^aRefers to Australian parties only; foreign party identification was included in 'No'.

^bBoth parents identify with the same Australian party, namely Liberal-National Party, Labor, Democrat or DLP.

^cEach parent identifies with a different Australian party as in (b).

^dOne parent identifies with an Australian party, the other identifies with a foreign party, or has no partisanship or it is unknown.

^eBoth parents do not identify with an Australian party, both parents identify with a foreign party, both parents partisanship is unknown, or each parent falls into one of these 3 categories.

Table 6.111

Federal Party Identification and Parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984, By Age

[Per cent]

Age

Party Identification: ^a	18-30 Years				31-50 Years				51+ Years			
	Parents' Partisanship				Parents' Partisanship				Parents' Partisanship			
	Both Same ^b	Divided ^c	One Partisan ^d	None ^e	Both Same ^d	Divided ^c	One Partisan ^d	None ^e	Both Same ^b	Divided ^c	One Partisan ^d	None ^e
1 Yes	88	84	82	70	90	94	81	75	92	91	87	81
2 No	12	16	18	30	10	6	19	25	8	9	13	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	53	7	15	25	50	6	12	32	54	3	10	11
(n)	(329)	(43)	(96)	(155)	(394)	(47)	(97)	(247)	(354)	(22)	(67)	(213)

chi square = 23.8203 with 3 d.f. p<.0000 n=623

chi square = 28.3715 with 3 d.f. p<.0000 n=785

chi square = 15.3098 with 3 d.f. p<.0016 n=656

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

^a Refers to Australian parties only; foreign party identification was included in 'No'.

^b Both parents identify with the same Australian party, namely Liberal-National Party, Labor, Democrat or DLP.

^c Each parent identifies with a different Australian party as in (b).

^d One parent identifies with an Australian party, the other identifies with a foreign party, or has no partisanship or it is unknown.

^e Both parents do not identify with an Australian party, both parents identify with a foreign party, both parents partisanship is unknown, or each parent falls into one of these 3 categories.

Table 6.2

Strength of Federal Party Identification and Parents' Partisanship of Urban Australian Partisan Population, 18+, 1984

		[Per cent]		
		Parents' Partisanship		
Strength of Federal Party Identification:		Both Parent Partisan	One Parent Partisan	Neither Parent Partisan
1	Very strong	32	28	22
2	Fairly strong	44	48	48
3	Not very strong	24	24	30
TOTAL		100	100	100
%		61	12	48
(n)		(1067)	(217)	(466)

n=1750

chi square = 16.5213 with 4 d.f. $p < .0024$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Since some immigrants would remain unregistered until approaching retirement, more would be unregistered during the politically formative years of their native-born children, the second generation.

Finally, a significant minority of immigrants may retain their identification with a *non-Australian party* from the polity of their country of origin into which they were socialised before emigration. Moreover, there may be distinctions in rates of Australian party identification between parents of the second generation of ES and NES origins. Immigrant mothers and fathers of ES origins may identify with a foreign party - for example, British Conservative or New Zealand Labour. But fewer parents of the NES second generation may identify with a foreign party because they were born in a country which is now a totalitarian state (for example Poland) or grew up in a country which was then a totalitarian state (for example, pre-World War II Italy). Such parents may be less inclined to identify with a contemporary party in their country of origin.

A further distinction in rates of Australian partisanship between the parents of the second generation of ES and NES origins may occur among those with an Australian-born mother but overseas-born father. The maternal origins of the second generation are complex: the ES and NES groups differ insofar as mothers of the ES second generation are more likely to be native-born Australians than are mothers of the NES second generation (see Chapter 3). If more native-born than immigrant mothers are partisan, possibly some differences in rates of partisanship between the ES and NES second-generation groups are associated with the extent of their mother's Australian nativity.

For all these reasons, compared to the OAB

a significant proportion of second-generation electors may have non-partisan parents during their politically formative years and at the time they first vote (Mistilis, 1984:93).

If this is so, the relationship between parents' and respondents' partisanship leads to the expectation that the second-generation cohort aged under 30 years is less likely to be partisan than young OAB voters. Parental influence is strongest in a voter's early years and is likely to diminish in importance thereafter. But perhaps, like immigrants (see below), their rate of partisanship increases with time in the electorate to equal that of the OAB.

This section investigates whether parental party identification differs for the second generation compared to that for the OAB. It explores the association of parent's partisanship in terms of its differential influence on the extent and strength of party

identification for the second generation, and compared to that for the OAB. More specifically, it asks seven questions arising from the above discussion:

1. What influences distinguish parents' partisanship of the second generation compared to those of the OAB?
2. Are the parents of the second generation less partisan than those of the OAB?
3. Are there differential influences on rates of partisanship for the parents of ES and NES second generation?
4. Is the second generation less partisan in its early voting years than young OAB voters?
5. Is strength of partisanship associated with parents' partisanship for the ES and NES second generation?
6. Is the second generation assimilated in terms of its extent and strength of partisanship, that is, is the migration process still influential in these terms?
7. Is ethnicity an important consideration for the second generation in the extent and strength of its partisanship?

Method

Although some aspects of *immigrant* partisanship are analysed, it needs to be remembered that immigrant groups are not necessarily the parents of the second generation, nor do registration or non-registration and time in the electorate give a *precise* account of the likelihood that fathers, or immigrant mothers, provide a source of party identification for the second generation in their teens (their politically formative years). A more precise account can be ascertained from rates of father's and mother's partisanship when respondents were 14 years old, as recalled by respondents during the survey interview. The question in the survey was:

Did your father/mother have any particular preference for one of the parties when you were young, say about 14 years old? (Which party was that?)

The data used in this chapter are from the NSSS; simple crosstabulations were the method of analysis for this section.¹

¹See Appendix II for questions.

Results

What do the data show for contemporary urban respondents in 1984? Table 6.3 shows that the ES and NES second generation were less likely than the OAB to have had a father who identified with an Australian party when they were 14 years old (73, 70 and 81 per cent respectively). In mother's Australian partisanship, the rates for the OAB and NES second generation were similar, while the ES second generation had a slightly lower rate (75, 74 and 71 per cent respectively). The two immigrant groups had very few mothers or fathers with Australian partisanship. So the major difference between the three native-born groups in terms of mother's and father's partisanship was the relatively small rate of fathers', but not of mothers', Australian partisanship for the NES second generation, and the smaller rate for fathers and for mothers of the ES second generation. Unravelling the reasons for these differences requires further work beyond the scope of present analysis.

Nonetheless, the *combined* influence of both parents, rather than their individual influence, is important in determining the extent of partisanship for respondents. Table 6.4 (categories 3 and 4) shows that a higher proportion of both the ES and NES second generation (36 and 39 per cent respectively) compared to the OAB (30 per cent) reported that at least one parent had not identified with an Australian party. Also fewer ES and NES second-generation respondents (58 and 56 per cent respectively) had parents both of whom identified with the same party, compared to the OAB (64 per cent).

Table 6.5 sets out partisanship according to years since first voting in a federal election. As expected, after a long time in the electorate (21 years or more) there is no difference in rates of partisanship between immigrant and native-born cohorts. Any differences were slight and not statistically significant. But there were differences in rates of partisanship amongst 'newer' voters, those who had been in the electorate for 18 years or less. Amongst 'newer' voters both second-generation cohorts were less likely to be partisan than the OAB, whereas after 21 years in the electorate they appeared to be similar. (The NES second generation had too few respondents for analysis.) Interestingly, rates for ES and NES immigrant 'newer' voters corresponded to the rates for ES and NES second generation respectively. All these groups were somewhat less partisan than the OAB.

Table 6.6 shows the rate of non-registration to vote by origins was more than one-tenth for immigrants born in ES countries and almost twice as high for those born in NES countries. As expected, both ES and NES younger immigrants (aged 18 to 30 years)

Table 6.4

Parents' Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

		[Per cent]			
		Origin			
Parents' Partisanship:		Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-generation Australians</u>
			English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	<u>whose fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries
1	Both same ^a	64	25	17	58 56
2	Divided ^b	7	3	1	7 6
3	1 Partisan ^c	15	6	5	15 21
4	Both none, DK, foreign ^d	15	67	77	21 18
TOTAL		100	100	100	100 100
%		62	13	13	8 5
(n)		(1282)	(259)	(258)	(170) (102)
		n=2071			

chi square = 589.6724 with 12 d.f. $p < .0000$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

^aBoth parents identify with the same Australian party, namely Liberal-National Party, Labor, Democrat or DLP.

^bEach parent identifies with a different Australian party as in (b).

^cOne parent identifies with an Australian party, the other identifies with a foreign party, or has no partisanship or it is unknown.

^dBoth parents do not identify with an Australian party, both parents identify with a foreign party, both parents partisanship is unknown, or each parent falls into one of these 3 categories.

Table 6.5

Federal Party Identification and Year of First Federal Election by Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Year of First Federal Election

1966 or Later
18 or Fewer Years Ago

1963 or Earlier
21 or More Years Ago

Federal Party Identification: ^a	Origin									
	1966 or Later 18 or Fewer Years Ago					1963 or Earlier 21 or More Years Ago				
	Father Australian -born	Born Overseas In: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Father Australian -born	Born Overseas In: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries ^c
1 Yes	86	79	76	80	78	88	89	87	89	
2 None, DK	14	21	25	20	22	12	11	13	11	
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
%	57	14	17	5	7	70	9	7	13	2
(n)	(662)	(160)	(196)	(59)	(76)	(607)	(80)	(60)	(112)	(15)

n=1153

n=874

chi square = 15.2299 with 4 d.f. p<.0042

ns^b

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

^aRefers to Australian parties only; foreign party identification was included in 'No'.

^bNot significant

^cToo few respondents for analysis.

Table 6.6

Electoral Registration and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Origin

Registered to Vote:	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>	
		English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries
1 This address	87	76	73	89	76
2 Another address	10	11	7	9	18
3 Not registered	3	12	19	2	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	12	13	8	5
(n)	(1347)	(263)	(283)	(176)	(103)

n=2172

chi square = 37.8632 with 8 d.f. $p < .0000$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

were more likely (25 and 32 per cent respectively) to be unregistered than are immigrants over 60 years old (0 and 15 per cent respectively); but immigrants from NES countries were more likely in both age cohorts to be unregistered (see Table 6.7). The slightly higher proportion of the NES second generation who were unregistered (Table 6.6) is probably a function of their relative youth. A control for age shows that the three native-born cohorts were almost identical in this characteristic.

Moreover, Table 6.8 indicates a much smaller rate of partisanship for unregistered ES and NES immigrants compared with those who were registered (about two in three compared to almost four in five respectively), a pattern which all groups showed. If this association between registration and partisanship holds true for immigrant parents, we would expect to find a reduced rate of partisanship for the second generation, given the links between parents' partisanship and that of respondents'. In other words, for the second generation, there appear to be strong links between parents' registration to vote, parents' partisanship, and their own partisanship: non-registered parents are less likely to be partisan and this in turn is associated with reduced partisanship in the second generation.

Whether a foreign party identification among parents translates into partisanship of a 'corresponding' Australian party among their native-born children, or it functions the same as 'no parental partisanship', we do not know. For example, is British Labour Party identification of British-born parents or New Zealand Labour Party identification of New Zealand-born parents transmitted to their native-born children in the form of Australian Labor Party identification? Unfortunately, there are too few respondents to pursue this further.

Partisanship for all immigrants cannot be analysed in terms of foreign party identification, as the question relating to respondent's partisanship was asked in terms of *Australian* partisanship. But it is possible to ascertain foreign party identification from questions relating to mother's and father's partisanship. Unfortunately, although about one-fifth of the fathers of the ES second-generation cohort were born in Northern Ireland, Eire, New Zealand, Canada, the United States of America, the Republic of South Africa and not in Great Britain, only British parties were individually categorised. All other parties were grouped together under 'other foreign'.

Almost all (8 per cent) second-generation respondents whose father or mother identified with a foreign party were of ES origins. As expected, very few (1 per cent) fathers or mothers of the NES second generation identified with a foreign party (see Table 6.9, columns five and ten). Nonetheless, about two-fifths of the mothers and

Table 6.7
Registration to Vote and Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984, By Age

		[Per cent]									
		Age									
		18-30 Years					60 and Over Years				
Registration to Vote:		Origin					Origin				
		Father		Born Overseas in:			Father		Born Overseas in:		
		Australian -born	English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Australian -born	English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries
1 This address	69	55	55	61	69		100	93	82	99	100
2 Another address	24	20	13	32	22		-	7	3	1	-
3 Not registered	7	25	32	8	8		-	-	15	-	-
TOTAL		100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
%		63	11	6	11		62	13	9	16	1
(n)		(406)	(69)	(38)	(72)		(274)	(39)	(57)	(70)	(3)
chi square = 45.3543 with 8 d.f. p<.0000		n=645					n=443				
							chi square = 76.8851 with 8 d.f. p<.0000				

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 6.8
Partisanship and Registration to Vote by Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

		[Per cent]									
		Origin				Registration to Vote					
Federal Party Identification:		Father Australian-born		Born Overseas in:		English-speaking Countries		non-English-speaking Countries		Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
1	Yes	87	66	84	59	84	60	87	67	84	50
2	None, DK	13	34	16	41	16	40	13	33	17	50
TOTAL		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%		97	3	88	12	80	20	98	2	17	50
(n)		(1306)	(41)	(233)	(32)	(226)	(55)	(173)	(3)	(97)	(6)
		n=1347 chi square = 14.3279 with 1 d.f. p<.0002		n=265 chi square = 9.69 with 1 d.f. p<.0018		n=281 chi square = 14.2118 with 1 d.f. p<.0002		n=176 ns ¹		n=103 ns ¹	

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

¹Not significant

Table 6.9

Father's and Mother's Partisanship and Origin of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

	Father's Party				Mother's Party			
	Origin		Origin		Origin		Origin	
	Father Australian-born	Born Overseas In: English-speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English-speaking Countries	Father Australian-born	Born Overseas In: English-speaking Countries	Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in: English-speaking Countries	Father Australian-born	Born Overseas In: English-speaking Countries
1 Australian Pty	80	32	21	73	70	75	29	20
2 British Conserv	-	15	-	1	-	-	17	-
3 " Liberal	-	4	-	-	-	-	3	-
4 " Labour	-	15	-	-	-	-	13	-
5 Other foreign	4	10	40	8	1	4	10	34
6 None, DK	16	24	39	18	29	21	28	46
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	13	13	8	5	62	12	13
(n)	(1297)	(262)	(266)	(172)	(103)	(1329)	(265)	(267)
							(171)	(103)

chi square = 1168.314 with 20 d.f. p<.0000 n=2100 chi square = 1054.1432 with 20 d.f. p<.0000 n=2135

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

fathers of both ES and NES immigrants had identified with a foreign party, presumably while living in their homeland.

Perhaps surprisingly, identification with a *British* party (Conservative, Liberal or Labour) was virtually negligible among the parents of the ES second generation. It is possible that parents identifying with a foreign non-British party were born in one of the non-British countries mentioned above. Although numbers are very small, more detailed analyses reveal that, for the second generation, higher proportions of mothers and fathers born in Northern Ireland, Eire or New Zealand identified with a foreign non-British party than did those from England, Scotland or Wales. None from Canada, the United States or South Africa identified with a foreign party.¹

In the survey data, about three-fifths of mothers of the ES second generation were native-born, whereas only about one-fifth of those of the NES second generation were (see Table 6.10). But although native-born women were more likely to be partisan or at least to identify with an Australian party, than were immigrant women (88 and 80 per cent respectively, see Table 6.11), among both ES and NES second-generation groups, native-born mothers are *not* more likely than overseas-born mothers to be partisan. The differences were not statistically significant (Table 6.10).

A plausible explanation lies in the results reported in Table 6.11ii, which shows that in the over-40 years age groups, there was no statistically significant difference in partisanship between immigrant and native-born women. In other words, by the time respondents reached their politically formative years, when their mothers would be at least about 40 years old, there would be no distinction in extent of partisanship in the second generation arising from the birthplace of mothers.

What were the actual rates of partisanship for each origin group? Table 6.12 shows that the OAB and ES second generation had similar rates of partisanship, but they were higher than each of the three other groups. Nonetheless, rates of non-partisanship for the *youngest* second-generation respondents (18 to 30 years) were almost mid-way between those for the OAB and overseas-born (14, 22, and 28 per cent respectively for OAB, second-generation and overseas-born, Table 6.13). When analysed in greater

¹An unexpected finding was the small but significant proportions (each 14 percent) of mothers and fathers of the OAB who identified with a foreign party. Examination of more detailed analyses (not shown) revealed that for these respondents the foreign party was rarely the British Conservative, Liberal or Labour Party. What parties constitute 'foreign' are unknown. Indeed how the native-born parents acquired non-Australian partisanship remains unanswered, and data limitations preclude further investigation.

Table 6.10

Mother's Partisanship and Mother's Birthplace by Origins of Urban Australian Population,
18+, 1984

		[Per cent]					
		Origin					
Mother's Partisanship:	Father Australian-born		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>				
	<u>Mother's Birthplace</u>		English-speaking Countries		non-English-speaking Countries		
	<u>Overseas</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Mother's Birthplace</u> <u>Overseas</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Mother's Birthplace</u> <u>Overseas</u>	<u>Australia</u>	
1 Australia	77	75	66	75	72	81	
2 Foreign	6	4	11	7	1	-	
3 None, DK	17	21	23	18	27	19	
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	
%	5	95	42	59	80	20	
(n)	(64)	(263)	(71)	(100)	(82)	(21)	
	n=1327		n=171		n=103		
	ns ¹		ns ¹		ns ¹		

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

¹Not significant

Table 6.11

Federal Partisanship and Birthplace of Australian Female Urban Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Birthplace

Federal Partisanship:	Australia	Overseas
1 Yes	88	80
2 None, DK	12	21
TOTAL	100	100
%	78	22
(n)	(896)	(254)

n=1150

chi square = 10.3166 with 1 d.f. $p < .0013$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 6.11ii

Federal Partisanship and Birthplace of Australian Female Urban Population, 18+, 1984,
By Age

[Per cent]

Birthplace

Federal Partisanship:	<u>Age</u>		<u>Age</u>	
	Australia	Overseas	Australia	Overseas
	18-40 years		41+ years	
1 Yes	86	76	90	84
2 None, DK	15	24	10	16
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
%	77	23	79	21
(n)	(470)	(140)	(423)	(111)

n=610

n=534

ns^achi square = 6.7779 with 1 d.f. $p < .0092$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

^aNot significant

Table 6.12

Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Federal Party Identification:	Origin				
	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries	
1 Some	87	81	79	86	81
2 None, DK	13	19	21	14	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	12	13	8	5
(n)	(1349)	(268)	(282)	(177)	(104)

n=2180

chi square = 15.4590 with 4 d.f. $p < .0038$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 6.13

Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18-30 years,
1984

[Per cent]			
Origin			
Federal Party Identification:	Father Australian-born	Overseas born	Second-generation Australians
1 Some	86	78	72
2 None, DK	14	22	28
TOTAL	100	100	100
%	63	17	20
(n)	(407)	(110)	(130)
n=647			

chi square = 13.0775 with 2 d.f. $p < .0014$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

detail, numbers were small for ES and NES second-generation groups, but each had a similar likelihood of being non-partisan.

Analysis for older respondents in the ES second generation revealed a rate of non-partisanship much lower than the younger cohorts, and similar to older OAB. So rates of partisanship for the NES second generation might increase in the oldest groups if their partisanship approximated that of the ES second generation and all immigrants. Unfortunately, there are too few cases to explore this speculation.

As mentioned earlier, generally respondents whose parents both identified with the same party were more likely to be strongly partisan (see Table 6.2). But Table 6.14 shows that, for the second generation, there is no statistical significant association between strength of partisanship and parents' Australian party identification, although there is among the OAB. Nonetheless strength of party identification is also associated with age: older partisans have stronger party identification. Because the NES second generation is much younger than the ES second-generation group, we would expect members of the latter group to identify more strongly with a federal party. Table 6.15 shows that a much higher proportion of the ES second generation identifies very strongly than the NES second generation (40 and 23 per cent respectively). A surprising finding is that the ES second generation are also much more likely to hold strong party identifications than are the OAB (40 and 28 per cent respectively). Why this is so is unclear, though it may in part be a function of their older age.

It would be worthwhile and perhaps illuminating to explore partisanship and its strength more closely through party membership, but unfortunately no question relating to party membership was included in the survey. Nonetheless, an approximation can be attempted through three variables relating to participation in political party activities: talking to people to influence their voting choice/direction; attending political meetings, rallies, fund raising dinners; or working for a party or candidate. However, to anticipate the findings for these analyses reported in Chapter 7, no differences in rates of participation between the origins groups were statistically significant either absolutely or after controlling for age differences.

Summary and Discussion: Extent and Strength of Partisanship

This chapter so far has explored influences on the extent of party identification by distinguishing that of parents of the second generation as opposed to those of the OAB. It examined differential influences on party identification between parents of the ES and

Table 6.14

Parents' Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Origin

Strength of Federal Party Identification:	Father Australian-born			<u>Born Overseas in:</u> English-speaking Countries			<u>Born Overseas in:</u> non-English-speaking Countries		
	Both Parents Partisan	One Parent Partisan	Neither Parent Partisan	Both Parents Partisan	One Parent Partisan	Neither Parent Partisan	Both Parents Partisan	One Parent Partisan	Neith. Par. Part.
1 Very strong	31	25	17	36	29	20	21	55	29
2 Fairly strong	44	52	49	39	43	53	50	18	40
3 Not very strong	25	24	35	25	29	27	29	27	31
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	74	14	13	29	7	64	21	5	74
(n)	(818)	(151)	(142)	(61)	(14)	(133)	(42)	(11)	(151)
			n=1111			n=208			n=204

chi square = 16.3016 with 4 d.f. $p < .0026$

ns

ns

Strength of Federal Party Identification:	<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u> English-speaking Countries			non-English-speaking Countries		
1 Very strong	44	46	25	25	18	17
2 Fairly strong	39	46	61	47	35	42
3 Not very strong	17	8	14	28	47	42
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	64	17	19	65	21	15
(n)	(93)	(24)	(28)	(53)	(17)	(12)
			n=145			n=82

ns

ns

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 6.15

Strength of Federal Party Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+,
1984

[Per cent]

Origin

Strength of Federal Party Identification:	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>	
		English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries
1 Very strong	28	25	29	40	23
2 Fairly strong	46	49	41	45	44
3 Not very strong	26	27	30	15	33
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%	63	12	12	8	5
(n)	(1166)	(214)	(225)	(152)	(84)

n=1841

chi square = 21.0936 with 8 d.f. $p < .0069$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

NES second-generation groups, and it analysed how parents' partisanship is associated with the extent and strength of partisanship for the second generation.

If the findings for immigrants (who of course are *not* the parents of the second generation in the survey data) hold true for the immigrant parents of the second generation, then compared to the OAB, the extent and similarity of their parents' partisanship is probably reduced through association with a lower rate of partisanship in their early voting years, a degree of non-enrolment, and the extent of their identification with a foreign party. Whatever the case, the parents of the second generation are less partisan than those of the OAB.

Differential influences on rates of partisanship for parents of the ES second generation, compared to those of the NES second generation, may be associated with more widespread identification with a foreign party among ES immigrant parents, and with greater non-enrolment among NES immigrant parents. There were also real though unexplained differences in rates of partisanship between mothers and fathers. Compared to the OAB and the ES second generation, fathers of the NES second generation were less likely to identify with an Australian party, whilst mothers of the ES second generation were also less likely to identify than those of the NES second generation and the OAB. Interestingly, nativity (overseas-born versus native-born) was not associated with rates of party identification for mothers of the second generation.

Whilst actual rates of partisanship for each origin group were similar in extent for the OAB and the ES second generation, but lower for the NES second generation, rates of partisanship for all the second generation under 30 years old were below that for the corresponding OAB group, and almost midway between those immigrant and OAB rates. The OAB and ES second generation were equally partisan after 21 years in the electorate, but we have no comparable data for the corresponding NES second generation. So it appears that the fundamental role of parents in shaping the extent of partisanship is associated with the rate of partisanship for the second generation, at least in their early voting years.

There appears to be no association between strength of second-generation partisanship and the extent of both their parents' Australian party identification, though there was for that of the OAB group. Even so, a much higher proportion of the ES second generation identified very strongly with an Australian party than any other group. The relatively lower strength of party identification for the NES second generation may be a function of their youth.

The findings suggest that the second generation has not assimilated in terms of its extent and strength of Australian partisanship, for the former at least in its early voting years. The reasons for this incomplete assimilation appear to be inextricably bound to familial inheritance of partisanship: the role of parents' partisanship is fundamental in the process of their identifying with a party.

For the second generation, factors related to immigration appear to complicate and delay their father's and perhaps their mother's party identification, and this in turn directly bears on their own. So insofar as significant differences arise from the fact that at least their fathers were immigrants, the migration process still influences the extent of their partisanship. Ethnicity, in terms of parents' birthplace, is important as it delineates influences on parents' partisanship according to country of origin.

II *Nature of Influences of Partisanship*

Although differences were found in extent of non-partisanship, among those who did identify with an Australian party there were *no* statistical significant differences between the origin groups in rates of Liberal-National Party, Labor, Democrat or other party identification (see Table 6.16). Nonetheless, because origin groups differed in some important socioeconomic variables (income, occupation, religion), it is necessary to explore *influences* on their partisanship.

In the United States one source of continuing influence on political behaviour in later generations of immigrants is religion. Religion is seen here as a phenomenon more inclusive than mere church membership, or church attendance, and beyond faith as such. Rather, religion forms part of a broader belief system, intertwined with tradition and culture in the individual. Its influence may persist even among only nominal adherents.

Every culture has certain core elements which represent its heartlands and act as identifying values for its members (Smolicz, 1982:5).

Religion is linked with, and may be located in, the core culture of an individual. For these reasons, religion may also reflect and indicate broader culture values of respondents. If so, the influence of religion may be shared with other variables and be difficult to ascertain. There is still disagreement among sociologists whether national origin or religion is the more significant variable in the experience of minority groups in the United States of America (Newman, 1973:19).

Some authors have examined effects of religion compared to other characteristics on partisanship and other political attitudes. For example, Miller (1968) suggests that religion appears to explain more about party identification than ethnicity. Knoke and Felson (1974) suggest that religion has a slightly larger effect than ethnicity on party

Table 6.16

Liberal-National and Labor Party Identification By Origins of Urban Australian Native-born Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]				
Federal Party Identification:	Origin			
	Father Australian- born	<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>		All
		English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	
1 Liberal-National	42	46	46	43
2 Labor	58	54	55	57
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
%				
(n)	(1123)	(147)	(77)	(1347)
n=1347				
ns				

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

preference. 'Ethnic' is used here to identify culture, or more specifically political culture, associated with national background (Hechter, 1974).

Knoke and Felson (1974) conclude that they cannot say if religion is more important than ethnicity after controlling for parental political behaviour, as there is so much variance in common. Controls for father's party or respondent's religion decrease the net effect of ethnic prestige. This, they suggest, supports the model of 'cultural lag':¹ effects of ethnicity on political behaviour persist via inter-generational socialisation and traditional ethnic group loyalties.

These findings may also reflect inter-relationship between religion, father's party and ethnicity. Since their effects are inter-correlated statistically, it is difficult to disaggregate them into more narrowly defined sources of influence.

If religion does reflect broader cultural values, we would expect a large common variance. So Knoke and Felson's findings do not necessarily support a model of 'cultural lag'. Rather they may support the persistence of ethno-religious effects and their inter-relatedness with father's party as influences on individual political behaviour.

Nonetheless, the fact that religious effects are intertwined with 'ethnic' effects is recognised by these and other authors. Miller (1968) further suggests that ethnic and religious factors regarding political variables should be looked at concurrently. Laumann (1972:19) asserts that a

much more parsimonious multidimensional interpretation is possible when one combines ethnic and religious criteria to consider the structure of ethno-religious groups.

Knoke and Felson (1974:638-639) also argue that

much of the variance explained by ethnicity and religious must be jointly allocated. Since ethnic and religious affects on party preference are so confounded, it may be more accurate to refer ... to 'ethno-religious' effects.

Ethno-religion appears to be an important influence in American political behaviour, but its effects are not identical for all groups so defined. Some authors have pointed to distinct differences in aspects of political behaviour within ethno-religious groups in contemporary America. Laumann and Segal (1971) found significant interaction effects involving particular ethno-religious groups indicating persistent sub-cultural differences in their political orientation patterns. Also, Greeley (1974)

¹When material conditions change, the culture may require time to adjust to the new situation.

found diversity among American religio-ethnic groups in respect to aspects of their political participation. He suggests that cross-cultural research can be done *within* large nations such as America. In a later paper (Greeley, 1979) he asserts that Irish Catholics are the most politically liberal Gentile ethnic group in America and the most pro-intergration.

Ethno-religious effects may override other effects. For example, Greeley (1974) found that ethno-religious background was a useful predictor of political participation in America even when social class was held constant, at least in some groups. In an earlier paper Wolfinger (1965:907) noted that:

even when mobility does produce changes in political perspectives, these changes do not obliterate all hitherto existing predispositions. Social change begins from a 'base point' of previous habits. In some groups and circumstances, social mobility may heighten the importance of religion as an independent variable.

In another study, Laumann and Segal (1971) could not detect any interactive effects of education by ethno-religious groupings in orientation to their political and economic views (see also Borhek, 1970).

In sum, the effects of religion are intertwined with those of ethnicity. Ethno-religious effects are also an important influence on partisanship and political behaviour. These effects sometimes override those of other variables, for example social class, occupational mobility, and (perhaps) higher education. Such effects on political behaviour may differ among ethno-religious groups. Finally, father's party, religion and ethnicity share a common variance in their effects on partisanship and political behaviour. These findings may indicate the persistence of ethno-religious effects rather than inter-generational socialisation alone.

In Australia, religion appears to be an important influence for at least some immigrants. Among contemporary Australian immigrant electors grouped according to birth in an ES or a NES country, religion was the strongest measured influence on partisanship (Mistilis, 1984). Moreover, its relative importance distinguished immigrant from native-born electors in terms of influences on partisanship: occupation (manual versus non-manual) was more important among the native-born.

The declining role of religion itself (as opposed to churchgoing) as an influence in Australian politics and political behaviour is well-documented (Mol, 1971 and 1985; Aitkin, 1982:336-340, Jones and McAllister, forthcoming). Indeed, Jones and McAllister point out that in Australia:

during the formation of the party system at the turn of the century, class and religion intersected. Anglo-Irish quarrels were reproduced in Australia through the migration of large numbers of working-class Irish and middle-class English... During the emergence of the party system, these cross-currents left a strong imprint of religion on politics.

Moreover:

in the late 1940s the Australian electorate was strongly divided along class and religious lines... But the importance of the Catholic/Protestant division declined by half between 1949 and 1966 (Jones and McAllister, forthcoming)

possibly because of increasing numbers of continental European-born Catholics in the electorate who were not pro-Labor (see below). Indeed, by the early 1980s the religious cleavage between Protestant and Catholic had virtually disappeared. Perhaps more importantly, in the immediate post-World War II period almost everyone reported some religious affiliation, but by the 1980s, according to the census, about one-tenth of the Australian population professed *no* religious affiliation.

For these reasons, the Australian social environment in the 1980s differs from earlier years and from the social environment of the American second generation, where religion in the 1950s was still important, at least socially. These differences may point to a declining role of religion in partisanship for second-generation Australians simply because religion itself had declined in relation both to effects on partisanship and to the rate of religious affiliation.

There has been little empirical research in Australia on the influence of religion on the political behaviour of individual national groups. Nonetheless, the slight evidence we do have points to differences among immigrants associated with national background. For example, eastern European immigrants' pro-Liberal stance has been attributed to their anti-communism (Aitkin, 1977:159; McAllister and Kelley, 1983:105), and lack of partisanship among Italian immigrants to the alienating nature of Italian political culture (Wilson, 1973:111). Moreover, there are theoretical reasons to expect religio-ethnic influences as well as empirical evidence of them. For example, ES Catholics (mostly of Irish background) are pro-Labor, whilst NES Catholics are marginally anti-Labor (Mistilis, 1984:82-83). So ethno-religious groups may exist in contemporary Australia also.

If so, ethnicity, religion and inter-generational socialisation (implicit in father's party) may be inter-related in their effect on political behaviour amongst the second generation. Such a situation would preclude any definitive statement as to how effects have been transmitted to the second generation. But insofar as these influences are

intertwined in the effects on individual political behaviour, their separation may be possible only at the conceptual level. Empirically, they reinforce one another very closely. Indeed, Laumann (1972:20-21) states that ethno-religious group differentiation appears to persist among the third and later generations of Americans who 'should' be completely assimilated to the 'host' society.

How important is the influence of religion on partisanship for second-generation Australians and relative to the OAB? In America religious effects are intertwined with ethnic effects. In Australia there is some evidence of ethno-religious effects among immigrant electors. So it is important to analyse how important these effects are. In terms of certain aspects of political behaviour are there ethno-religious groups among second-generation Australians? How important for partisanship are these effects, relative to occupational class?

Finally, the question of the importance of inter-generational socialisation relative to ethno-religious effects needs examination. Do religion, ethnicity and father's party share a common variance in their effects on partisanship and other aspects of political behaviour among the second generation? What processes are important in the transmission of effects to the second generation: persistence of ethno-religion effect rather than familial inheritance alone?

The declining role of occupational class as an influence on partisanship in Australia has been widely, and often acrimoniously, debated in recent years. Kemp (1978:348-360) has asserted that in the post-1945 Australian electorate, there has been a convergence in the party political behaviour across 'old' occupational cleavage, but his thesis rests on questionable statistical evidence (see Mistilis, 1982:54; Jones and McAllister, forthcoming). Critics of the Kemp thesis, such as Connell and Goot (1979:3-24), dispute his interpretation of class in contemporary Australia and its relationship to political parties.

Aitkin (1982) argued for a decline

in the solidarity of non-manuals, while manual workers have become rather more strongly Labor.

More recently, Jones and McAllister (forthcoming) have suggested a continuing, though weaker, influence of occupational class. They argue that:

...despite a loss of support among manual workers in the 1950s largely as a result of the issue of communist influence in the unions and in the party, at the beginning and at the end of the period our data cover the ALP enjoy comparably high levels of electoral support among manual workers. But they made considerable gains among non-manuals. These gains reflect not only the

changing nature of non-manual work (including greater unionisation) but also an attempt, apparently successful, by the ALP to broaden its electoral appeal. The decline in the electoral importance of class results, not from loss of support among manual workers, but from increased support among non-manuals.

This is not the place to enter into the debate on the nature or extent of these links. But it is worth noting that each non-manual origins group was almost equally divided between the two parties in crosstabulation analyses of the 1984 data for urban respondents.

A further consideration of influences on partisanship relates to the question of lack of familial inheritance. It appears that both second-generation groups are most likely to have had parents who do not identify with an Australian party, and also that in their early voting years the second generation is less likely than the OAB to be partisan. However, among older second-generation voters these differences tend to disappear. When familial inheritance of partisanship is weak or absent, other factors assume more importance (McAllister and Kelley, 1982:13). If this is the case for at least a significant proportion of the second generation, are influences on their partisanship similar to those for the OAB? Have second-generation partisans assimilated in terms of influences on their party identification?

Five specific questions arise from the above discussion:

1. How important is the influence of religion on partisanship among the ES and NES second generation?
2. How important is the influence of occupation on partisanship for the ES and NES second generation relative to the OAB?
3. How important for partisanship are ethno-religious effects relative to occupation for the OAB, ES and NES second generation?
4. Do religion, ethnicity and father's party share a common variance on their effects on party identification?
5. Have second-generation partisans assimilated in terms of influences on their party identification?

Method

Although there were a few Democrat or other party identifiers, the analyses excluded them from the non-Labor group for analytic clarity. Their exclusion results in slightly reduced numbers, which is unfortunate for the NES second generation. Influences on partisanship are explored for Liberal-National party (hereafter LNP) and

Labor identifiers only. Also, only the three native-born cohorts were contrasted, in order to focus on the second generation differences. So the analyses present a clear if compact picture of partisanship among the native-born only.

To test the above hypotheses, a series of interpretative models were fitted using GLIM to fit several logistic regression models. The dependent variable is the log of the odds ratio ($p/(1-p)$) where (p) is the proportion identifying with Labor and ($1-p$) the proportion identifying with the Liberal-National coalition. Because the dependent variable (party identification) is dichotomous (Labor/LNP), it is inappropriate to use ordinary least squares, since the assumptions underlying its use are not applicable to binary dependent variables (see Hanushek and Jackson, 1977: Chapter 7). In a logistic regression the effect of each independent variable on the outcome partly depends on the effects of other variables in the model. So for illustrative purposes we evaluate effects of the mean. Effects are linear and additive only in the logarithmic scale.

Logistic regression estimates the predictive power of different variables on whether a person votes Labor, given certain characteristics. For example, Table 6.16 shows that 57 per cent of the sample of Australian-born LNP or Labor Party identifiers were Labor party identifiers. So if we predicted Labor identification amongst Australian-born Labor or LNP identifiers without any background information we would be correct about three-fifths of the time. If we knew other relevant characteristics - for example that he/she was a skilled manual worker - the accuracy of prediction would increase by eleven percentage points to just over two-thirds.

The null model fits the grand mean only and gives the expected proportion of voting Labor (as opposed to LNP) in the sample as a whole (natural logarithm ($p/(1-p)$) where (p) is the expected proportion identifying with Labor. Its estimate of .2946 implies a probability of identifying with Labor of 57 per cent. For this basic model, the test statistic (scaled deviance) was 1838 with 1110 degrees of freedom.

Next the main effects of religion, occupation, work status, father's occupation, father's party, age cohort and origins group were fitted. This model has a test statistic of 1472 and 1080 degrees of freedom, or a reduction of 366 in the scaled deviance at a cost of 30 degrees of freedom. This is clearly a significant improvement over the null, or baseline, model.

In the work status variable, the category 'unemployment' and the 'residual' ('other') categories were statistically significant relative to full-time employment but they contained few cases. When a dummy variable was created to contrast them to the rest, there was no significant difference. Also, removing the work status variable from

the model, does not significantly worsen its fit. So this variable was excluded from further analyses.

The main effects model (Table 6.17) had a test statistic of 1486 and 1087 degrees of freedom (a reduction of 352 in the scaled deviance at a cost of 23 degrees of freedom). The model shows that, for religion, only the 'no religion' category is statistically significant different from the Church of England category. If we evaluate this effect at the grand mean, we find that their probability of identifying with Labor is 81 per cent.¹ Occupational effects are relative to the omitted category of professionals and semi-professionals. Skilled and semi-skilled manual workers differ significantly from them. Persons with semi-skilled or unskilled fathers were also more pro-Labor. Also, compared with those whose fathers were LNP identifiers, those with Labor fathers were significantly more pro-Labor, as were those with a foreign or 'no party' father or a father dead or absent. Negative effects on Labor identification were statistically significant among those over 30 years old, relative to all those younger.

To test effects of religion on partisanship for the ES and NES second generation relative to the OAB, the interaction between (origin and religion) was fitted to the model. The estimates indicated that only the effect of Catholicism varied across the three origin groups. So a dummy variable was defined to test specifically for this effect of religion among the ES second generation. The improvement in fit was significant at the 2 per cent level. A similar dummy created for the NES Catholic second generation did not significantly improve the fit. So, only ES second-generation Catholics differ reliably from the other groups (non-Catholic ES second generation and all OAB and NES second generation). The probability of identifying with Labor for ES second-generation Catholics was very high, 87 per cent.

Similar tests were carried out to see if occupation had different effects across the three origin groups. Only for the 'unclassified' category was there any difference in effect, and this difference has no substantive interest. The effects of occupation do not differ significantly by origin.

To assess the importance of ethnic and religious background relative to occupation, a backwards elimination of effects was undertaken and the change in the test statistic noted. The model with the ES second generation Catholic effect included had a deviance of 1479. On removing effects of origin and religion, the test statistic rose by 41 points to

¹This effect is calculated by adding the grand mean (.2946) to the log effect (1.155), 1.4496; taking its inverse log = 4.2614; and calculating (p).

Table 6.17

The Relative Importance of Religious, Occupational, Father's Occupational, Father's Party Identificational, Age Cohort & Origin Effects on Party Identification of Urban Native-born Liberal-National and Labor Identifiers, 1984

Variable	Logistic Effect	% Effect at Grand Mean	Likely Range of Estimate	% in Category
<u>Religion - C of E</u>	*	*	*	32
2 Other Protestant	-.2287	-5.67	7.89	30
3 Catholic	.3133	7.43	7.82	26
4 Other	.2422	5.79	18.62	3
5 None	1.155	23.68	22.31+	9
6 DK, refused	-.1024	-2.52	28.90	1
<u>Occupation - prof. semi-prof</u>	*	*	*	28
2 Clerk, other non-manual	-.2150	-5.32	8.48	26
3 Skilled manual	.4804	11.15	10.35+	12
4 Semi-, unskilled	.4749	11.03	10.56+	29
5 Unclassified, missing	.6281	14.25	13.14	5
<u>Father's occupation - prof. s-p</u>	*	*	*	22
2 Clerk, other non-manual	.1175	2.85	9.35	19
3 Skilled	.1903	4.58	9.08	23
4 Semi-, unskilled	.4849	11.25	10.68+	30
5 Unclassified, missing	.5704	13.06	12.52	6
<u>Father's Party - Lib. National</u>	*	*	*	32
2 Labor	2.096	34.30	33.98+	46
3 DLP, Democrat	1.016	21.45	20.66	1
4 Foreign	.8359	18.28	16.37+	4
5 None	1.119	23.12	21.09+	4
6 Father dead, absent	1.115	23.06	22.31+	14
<u>Age - 18-30</u>	*	*	*	31
2 31-50	-.6324	-15.68	15.46+	35
3 51+	-.6934	-17.16	16.90+	34
4 Missing	-1.081	-26.02	39.64	-
<u>Origin - Father Australian-born</u>	*	*	*	83
2 ES second generation	-.0457	-1.12	10.00	11
3 NES second generation	-.5437	-13.51	13.74	6
Grand mean (n of cases)	-.8587	57.31		(1347)

Note: The estimates of effect are from a logistic regression predicting the probability of voting for the Australian Labor Party rather than the Liberal-National Party. An asterisk indicates that the effects are relative to that omitted category. The likely range of each estimate is approximately plus or minus two standard errors.

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

+Significant at 5% level

1520. Relative to the total reduction from the baseline model to the final model with origin, religion and ES second-generation Catholics is 359 points, this means that 41/359 or 11 per cent of the explanatory power of the model is due to the effects of religion and origin, after controlling for other variables.

In a similar comparison for occupation, the test statistic fell by 21 points. So six per cent is due to the effects of occupation. Religion has a stronger effect than occupation. However, the religion effect is most evident among those with no religious affiliation. The difference in effect between Catholic and Protestant is similar to the difference between manual and non-manual workers.

To test whether religion, origins (ethnicity) and father's party share a common variance in their effects on partisanship, several models were fitted to ascertain whether religion and father's party overlap in terms of their contribution to an understanding of respondent's partisanship. First both the father's party and religion were excluded. This model had a deviance of 1730 points. Next a model was fitted that included religion but excluded father's party (a deviance of 1680). The fit of this model compared with the main effects model is 194 points worse ($1680 - 1486 = 194$). A model that excluded religion but included father's party compared with one that excluded both, has a fit of 212 points of deviance worse ($1730 - 1518$). The difference between 194 and 212 is slight. So we conclude that there is not much overlap between religion and father's party in these analyses. Any effects on father's party of parental religion appear to be weakly transmitted to respondent's own partisanship.

Summary and Discussion: Nature of Influence on Partisanship

These analyses suggest the following conclusions. First, the effects of religion vary only for Catholics across origin groups. In other words, only ES second-generation Catholics differ from the OAB and from NES second generation in their extent of Labor identification. Second, the effects of occupation on partisanship do not differ significantly across the three origin groups. Third, religion has a stronger effect than occupation, but it is the effect of lack of religious belief rather than religious belief itself that makes religion so important an effect. Fourth, there was little overlap between religion and father's party - that is, effects on father's party of father's religion are weakly transmitted into respondent's own party identification. Finally, apart from ES second-generation Catholics, other members of the second generation are indistinguishable from one another and from the OAB in terms of these influences on partisanship.

The analyses indicate a persistence of ethno-religious effects rather than inter-generational socialisation only for second-generation Catholics of ES origin. They constitute about one in five of the ES second generation (see Chapter 3). So the 'cultural lag' mentioned earlier appeared to be the case for them alone in the second generation. This is probably associated with the declining role of religion itself as an influence in contemporary Australian society and politics, a situation which differs markedly from the American experience in the 1950s. So the theoretical implications arising from the American literature is of little relevance to Australia in the early 1980s in this regard. In short, the contemporary Australian political environment appears to be an important consideration in at least this aspect of adaptation for the second generation.

The question of whether or not the second generation in Australia was a source of political instability cannot be answered completely from these analyses. Certainly, the partisan second generation did not appear to be a source of stability - most of it was influenced in its identification with the Liberal-National or Labor Party in the same way as were the OAB, rather than by mobilisation by some political party. But young second-generation voters may well be such a potential source insofar as they were less partisan than were the OAB. Many had not inherited a party loyalty from their parents. Unfortunately it was not possible to examine the direction of their *vote* (as opposed to partisanship), due to unsatisfactory data; we cannot discern whether or not second-generation voters were more likely to change the direction of their vote, and what influenced that vote.

In conclusion, the two sections of this chapter revealed a complex picture of political adaptation for second-generation Australians in the early 1980s. The migration process still influences the extent of their partisanship at least amongst young voters, but amongst most partisans, it did not appear to affect some of its important influences. In other words, the second generation was delayed in assimilating into the political party system in terms of its identification, but, once it identified with a party, most of its members were assimilated in terms of some important influences on the generation.

Chapter 7

Political Participation, Political Efficacy and the Role of Ethnicity

The new standard is whether political processes are equally open so that members of a protected racial or ethnic class have the same opportunity as others to participate (Forum, 1985:761).

Introduction

In the previous chapter I analysed aspects of adaptation to the party system. Central to any understanding of political adaptation is how groups in society relate to the wider political process in terms of their participation and their depth of belief in that process. This chapter focusses on the wider political realm, to explore aspects of participation and efficacy.

Political participation refers to

those voluntary activities by which members of the society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy (McCloskey, 1968:252).

Active forms of participation include party membership, working for a party at elections, attending meetings or demonstrations about some political issue, or contacting a member of Parliament or a government official. Passive forms include taking an interest in politics through discussion, or through the print or electronic media. The term political apathy is the obverse of participation and refers to a state of withdrawal from, or indifference to, such activities, whether active or passive.

Whether people participate or not is influenced by many factors which can be grouped into three inter-related sets: psychological and cognitive influences, socioeconomic characteristics, and the political environment. Participation must be learnt. It is not naturally acquired. Personality traits of dominance, self-confidence and articulateness, together with middle-age, and such socioeconomic characteristics as better education, higher income and occupational status are usually associated with *greater* participation. Participation is more likely to be found among the dominant ethnic groups of a society.

The influence of the political environment is difficult to assess, but Australian political institutions are said to be open and accessible, at least compared to many other democracies. Its structures in theory permit participation of the ordinary citizen:

At the heart of the Australian model is the belief that one person is as good as the next, and that a person's value is determined by what he or she does, not by measurements of wealth or power or bloodline (Aitkin, 1986:9).

A further aspect of the political environment relates to *issues* which may be particularly important to some voters and motivate them both to take a greater interest and actively participate in order to influence electoral outcomes or public policy. Recent examples in the Federal arena are non-state school funding, conservation, and the amalgamation of the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). It is important to note that influences between psychological and cognitive factors and socioeconomic characteristics may limit the influence of the political environment. Psychological factors will not be discussed here.

Political efficacy refers to the person's belief that:

political and social change can be effected or retarded and that his efforts, alone or in concert with others, can produce desired behavior on the part of political authorities (Prewitt, 1968:225).

Participation and efficacy reinforce each other, though neither can be readily identified as antecedent to the other:

Feelings of efficacy are conditioned by the availability of institutionalised channels for expressing demands, as well as by the creed requiring leaders to be responsible and responsive to non-leaders (Prewitt, 1968:225).

The proximity of institutions is also another important factor. Local government (being closer and more accessible) is thought more likely to promote efficacy than a more remote central government. So structural and institutional factors, as well as the attitude of leaders, are in a sense antecedent conditions of efficacy.

As with participation, political efficacy is generally greater among the better educated, those with higher socioeconomic status and members of dominant ethnic groups. Education appears to be the single most important factor associated with efficacy - the more highly educated are likely to have greater efficacy: and conversely, the poorly educated are less efficacious.

This sketch of political participation and efficacy identifies some salient influences in considering the position of the second generation. They relate primarily to the contemporary political environment and to socioeconomic characteristics of the second generation which were analysed in an earlier chapter. Of course, the former is properly discussed not in isolation but as the culmination of historical and other forces which have influenced and forged its unique dynamic in 1984. Indeed, Aitkin (1982:271-279) has demonstrated that between 1967 and 1979 in Australia there was a

substantial increase in political participation and awareness, stimulated initially perhaps by the political events of 1975, but probably sustained by the deteriorating economic climate. In Australia as indeed elsewhere, the contemporary political environment is best understood in the context of politico-historical traditions and culture. What important influences determine the contemporary political environment for the second generation?

The Contemporary Political Environment

I *Dominant Ethnic Groups*

Australia was formed by a 'charter group' (Porter, 1975:60) of English and Scottish Protestants. The early institutions of each colony were modelled largely on those of England, for example, the Westminster Parliamentary system and craft-based trade unions. Later, some of these 'British' institutions were modified by imitation of the institutions of another country. For example, at Federation in 1901 the federal system of government borrowed heavily from that of the United States of America. Elsewhere the British basis remained important but there was considerable indigenous development, for example, the State and Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration systems for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. Whatever the particular base of development, most political institutions and political culture retain much of their 'Anglo' basis and remain dominated by Protestants of British origins. Indeed Higley, Deacon and Smart (1979:78) found that persons from Protestant British backgrounds predominated in all elite groups they analysed.

Even so, the successful challenge to the domination of the charter group in Parliamentary representation by Catholics of Irish origins, who may well be considered an ethnic group, is well documented. They fought their way to political power through the Catholic church and the Labor Party. The Catholic church in Australia still retains an 'Irish' dominance and has successfully excluded 'newer' groups, mainly of NES origins (Lewins, 1978).

In the first half of the 20 century there were close links between the Catholic church hierarchy and the Labor Party in Victoria (Jupp, 1968:33; see also O'Farrell, 1977). In 1955 the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which may be categorised as an Irish ethnic party at least in Victoria and Queensland (Jupp, 1984:5) broke away from the Labor Party:

As a consequence of the split most Irish Catholics active before 1955 in the Victorian ALP joined the DLP (Allan, 1984:140).

The DLP is no longer of significance, but the right wing of the Labor Party, especially in New South Wales., still has an 'Irish Catholic' presence, both at State and Federal level, readily recognised in prominent parliamentary representatives such as Brereton, Mulock, Sheahan (State) and Keating (Federal), a representation far in excess of any demographic quota (see Table 7.3).

Interestingly, Mr Keating was recently named first Australian Irishman of the Year. He stated that it was the first time he had received a reward as an Irish Australian, a quality that had usually been a 'deadset liability', except in 'Labor Party pre-selection ballots' (Stephens, 1987:5).

To a lesser and more localised extent, non-Anglo groups, particularly Germans and Scandinavians, who formed identifiable rural communities in Queensland and South Australia at the turn of this century, have been successful in gaining political power through the National Party. Russell Hinze, a Queensland State Minister for more than a decade, and Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Premier of Queensland for nearly two decades, are perhaps the most notable examples of politically prominent persons of non-Anglo origin.

More recently, the cultural diversity of the Australian population has been publicly acknowledged. The first 'official' appearance of multiculturalism occurred in the early 1970s through the efforts of Al Grassby, then Minister for Immigration in the Whitlam Labor Government, and Mr Whitlam himself. Subsequently mainstream institutions have been required to adapt to the reality of their multilingual and multicultural publics, a slow and continuing process. The multicultural nature of the Australian population now receives bipartisan recognition, and status has been accorded to cultures that are non-Anglo in derivation. These official efforts have had some public support: by 1984 a large proportion (52 per cent) of the urban population believed that immigrants should retain their identity (see Table 7.4). Public recognition of cultural diversity may be viewed as a necessary condition if the dominance of older-established groups in contemporary Australian society is to be challenged successfully.

II Institutions

Yet there is a long way to go. Jupp (1984:7) has commented that:

Whether in Parliament, in the party machines, in the unions, the bureaucracies or the major interest groups, ethnics simply do not become leaders... Only the most limited openings have been created through the Immigration Department...or the various ethnic agencies. Australia's political institutions are rigid, in the sense of being based on partisan discipline, on complex selection processes, on security of bureaucratic tenure and on relative absence of party patronage. In marked contrast to the United States or to Canada, the party overtly appealing to the disadvantaged was reluctant to open its positions to ethnics... In the 1980 and 1983 Federal elections

women were quite successful in gaining ALP nominations but ethnics were not.

In 1987, following the election victory of his party, the Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, successfully encouraged Labor caucus factions to nominate women for ministerial positions in order to reduce gender imbalance in Cabinet. There was no mention of encouraging non-Anglo candidates and apparently no felt need to do so. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (hereafter ACTU) also appears to be following this trend of positive gender discrimination (Noonan, 1987:5), without feeling any need to generalise the move to encompass those of NES origin.

For example, in one important political institution, the trade union movement, there is acknowledged widespread under-representation of immigrants of NES origins in active participation and at shop steward or higher levels of the hierarchy (Jupp, 1984:194; Martin, 1978; Johnston, 1977). Moreover Johnston (1977:24) found that family tradition was more likely to be responsible for acceptance of membership among the native-born than among immigrants of NES origins. The second generation of NES origin were:

not likely to be enthusiastic about belonging to a Union, if their parents accumulated unfavourable experience as members (Johnston, 1977:57).

Certainly Higley, Deacon and Smart (1979:77-79) found that, among native-born trade union leaders, about three-quarters had paternal links with Great Britain, whilst just under one-fifth had paternal links with Ireland. It is important to note that 'paternal links' in this context does not mean father's birthplace, but rather ancestry. In other words, in Australian trade unions, participation by the second generation of NES origins seems relatively low compared with those of Anglo or Anglo-Celtic ancestry. Trade unions have relatively fewer second generation of NES origins in their hierarchy.

It proved impossible to locate any national data of birthplace of father for union officials (in order to identify the second generation). Nor was there a question on union membership or activity in the NSSS 1984 survey. A survey limited to New South Wales officials (Nicolaou, 1986:174-5) suggests that the second generation of NES origin is grossly under-represented and that indeed:

the picture ...among second-generation immigrants is not any different than the situation among first generation immigrants... (1986:174).

Interestingly, his results appear to show that the second generation of ES origins is also under-represented.

The second generation of NES origins are much less likely to believe unions have too much power (68 per cent compared with 82 per cent) and more likely to believe they do not have enough, compared to the OAB (see Table 7.1). This situation was even more pronounced in the under 30 age cohort (61 per cent to 82 per cent, see Table 7.2). Possibly, their parents' 'unfavourable' experience (see above) shapes a belief that unions do not have enough power, a situation that may well lead to and explain their own apparent lack of participation and interest in the union movement.

If when age and occupation have been allowed for, there are indeed relatively few second-generation persons of NES origins in the trade union hierarchy, then certain implications follow for political participation and efficacy. First, at least one important political institution is still Anglo-dominated a generation after massive NES migration. Second, an important path to the Labor Party and a Parliamentary career through the union movement is much less available to those of NES origins. Both Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Treasurer Paul Keating followed this route to Federal Parliament, together with many others (see Pilkington, 1986). In New South Wales, links between its Labor Council and Labor Party appear to be particularly strong:

The river which floated Unsworth to the premiership of NSW starts there in the basement of the old Trades Hall and it moves on to Sydney Town Hall where, every year over the June long weekend, the State Labor Party holds its annual conference. Of the hundreds of delegates, two-thirds are from trade unions, and of them more than half are from right wing unions. With this reliable base the managers of the right need to add only a minority of delegates from the suburban branches, and they have control (Edwards, 1987:41).

Third, initiatives for greater involvement of those of NES origins must come from within the union movement itself. Some have already shown the way. For example, in Western Australia the education officer, Wayne Polson, followed by the secretary, (now Senator) Peter Cook of that State's Trades and Labor Council strongly encouraged those of NES origins to become shop stewards and council delegates in that State. Sam Piantadosi, now a Member of the Western Australian Legislative Council, gained Labor pre-selection through the union movement (since he arrived in Australia when young he is not second generation). The fact that the Trades and Labor Council of Western Australia was formed in 1962, later than in other states, perhaps accounts in part for its greater responsiveness to its contemporary environment.

Fourth, a current stated cause for ACTU concern (ACTU, 1987:16-17) is the decline of the proportion of union members in the workforce in the last decade from about 51 per cent to 46 per cent (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 1987:8). The ACTU may find this decline easier to stem if it does its best to recruit new members of NES origins as

Table 7.1

Attitude to Trade Union Power and Origin of the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Attitude to Trade Union Power:	Origin				
	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries	
1 Too much	82	80	79	82	68
2 About right	17	17	17	16	24
3 Not enough	1	3	4	2	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	12	13	8	5
(n)	(1333)	(264)	(267)	(175)	(103)

n=2142

chi square = 39.2504 with 16 d.f. $p < .001$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.2

Attitude to Trade Union Power and Origin of the Urban Australian Population, 18-30 years, 1984

[Per cent]

Attitude to Trade Union Power:	Origin				
	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries non-English- speaking Countries	
1 Too much	82	74	74	76	61
2 About right	17	26	19	24	30
3 Not enough	2	-	7	-	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%					
(n)	(405)	(70)	(58)	(38)	(71)

n=642

chi square = 35.2526 with 16 d.f. $p < .0037$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.3

Ancestry of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Ancestry	
1	Australian
2	Irish
3	Other
TOTAL	100
(n)	(2180)

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.4

Attitude to Immigrants Retaining their Ethnic Identity and Origins of the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

	[Per cent]					
	Origin					
Attitude in Retaining Ethnic identity:	Father Australian- born	<u>Born overseas in:</u> English- speaking Countries		<u>Second-generation</u> <u>Australians whose</u> <u>fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries		All
		non-English- speaking Countries		non-English- speaking Countries		
1 Agree	49	52	64	52	65	52
2 Neither	18	20	15	17	14	18
3 Disagree	33	29	20	31	21	30
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	12	13	8	5	100
(n)	(1343)	(267)	(279)	(175)	(104)	(2168)
n=2168						

chi square = 93.9223 with 16 d.f. $p < .0000$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

well as retain current ones. Fifth, other career paths available to trade union officials, for example, into the Arbitration Commission, non-Parliamentary committees (see Pilkington, 1986), or to boards of statutory authorities (Labor Council of New South Wales, 1987:254-255), are less available to those of NES origin.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

I *Occupational Class Location*

Immigrants usually begin at a low level on the social scale. For immigrants of NES origins occupational class is an additional barrier to political participation and power. Most are confined to manual occupations and structural inequality is clearly demonstrable (see Collins, 1984; Miller, 1982; Evans and Kelley, 1986). Even so, in the last two decades immigrants have increased their political presence.

Nonetheless, it is generally conceded that immigrants have relatively little political power in contemporary Australia. In 1966, James Jupp, himself a British immigrant, found that immigrants in general (including the British) were inarticulate and politically impotent, and often faced some anti-migrant hostility from native-born Australians (Jupp, 1966). At that time, he asserted that:

for all the apparent influence of Australia's 2,000,000 migrants they might just as well not exist (Jupp, 1966:122).

More recently, Jupp (1987) has suggested that their situation has improved in terms of Federal Parliamentary representation.

But, as shown in earlier chapters, immigrants differ significantly in certain socioeconomic characteristics from the second generation. Most of the latter are not disadvantaged in terms of income, occupation or education relative to immigrants and the OAB. Unlike immigrants, they are not concentrated in manual occupations and indeed some second-generation groups of NES origins are amongst the most highly advantaged in contemporary Australia, both educationally and economically. In theory at least, their occupational class location should not limit their political participation or efficacy, and together with their relatively high educational levels, may well enhance it.

II *Ethnicity*

The occupational class location of many immigrants links ethnicity to class in Australia. However:

in the Australian context, the relationship between concepts of class and ethnicity have rarely been formulated (Jakubowicz, 1984:15).

Nonetheless, the idea of disadvantaged ethnic minority groups has been promoted in Australia as in America, where Gordon (1964) discussed the notion of 'ethclass'. Ethnicity is seen by many as indicating non-participation in Australian political life, though usually it refers only to cultures of NES origins.

Some authors (Smolicz, 1981; Knopfmacher, 1982) believe that dangerously alienated ethnic minorities may emerge, pushed by their unfulfilled needs and demands. Others (Kringas, 1984; Lewins, 1984) assert that such minorities should use confrontationist politics to gain greater access to the State's resources. Trainor (1986:96) suggests that:

only if ...there is ethnic stratification and structural inequality in Australia would it make practical and moral sense for ethnic groups to become highly political.

Ethnicity may also be viewed as:

a major force of class struggle, an avenue used by the dominant forces in Australia to both fragment the working class and reinforce the ranks of conservatism and class domination' (Jakubowicz, 1984:28).

Whatever the case, an earlier chapter clearly shows that, in the second generation, ethnicity (there defined in terms of father's birthplace) is not associated with a lower economic class position.

Even so, for the second-generation ethnicity may be associated with political participation or efficacy insofar as it is associated with the dominance of some ethnic groups in the Australian polity and with the nature of at least some political institutions. In other words, ethnicity may intervene between class and political participation and efficacy of groups or individuals. Moreover, the role of ethnicity may vary according to its subjective identification or objective definition.

In sum, whilst during this century the dominance of the charter group was overcome by Anglo-Celts in the Labor Party and by other groups in the National Party in some states, at present some important political institutions such as trade unions do not appear to have fully incorporated persons of NES origins. They remain Anglo and Anglo-Celtic dominated, possibly by third and later generation Australians. So in a real sense, the dominant ethnic groups in the Australian polity generally do not include those of NES origins, a situation which, as mentioned above, may limit the latter's participation and efficacy. Nonetheless, those of NES origins now probably enjoy a higher public status

than previously, due in part to the government's multicultural policy. Within the second generation, their income and education compare favourably with the OAB.

Given that political participation and efficacy reinforce each other, theoretical predictions of participation and efficacy remain uncertain. For example, some socioeconomic characteristics of the NES second generation, particularly educational levels, suggest a high level of political involvement, but their exclusion from the dominant ethnic groups in Australian society may limit it. In terms of the political environment, Anglo-dominated institutions may not facilitate involvement by the second generation of NES origins, whereas multiculturalism encourages it. In other words, the overall influence of socioeconomic characteristics and of the political environment for the second generation is unclear.

Nonetheless, ten questions arise from the above discussion:

1. Is age associated with political participation?
2. Is age associated with political efficacy?
3. Is the extent of political participation of the second generation similar to that of the OAB?
4. Is the degree of felt political efficacy of the second generation similar to that of the OAB?
5. Are there differences in political participation between the second generation of ES and NES origins?
6. Are there differences in felt political efficacy between the second generation of ES and NES origins?
7. What is the role of ethnic identification in political participation for the second generation?
8. What is the role of ethnic identification in felt political efficacy for the second generation?
9. Is the second generation assimilated in terms of political participation and felt efficacy?
10. Is ethnicity important for the second generation in terms of political participation and its feelings of efficacy?

Method

The method used was simple crosstabulation analysis using the National Social Science Survey (hereafter NSSS) 1984 urban preliminary survey data. There was a large number of variables related to political participation and feelings of political efficacy in the survey data. Results for each were reported for statistically insignificant analyses and then for significant ones. This method usefully summarises interaction

with age, origin and ethnic identification and discerns *patterns* of political behaviour. Nevertheless, such an approach over-implies the role of ethnicity in participation and efficacy outlined earlier, and the findings are therefore regarded as preliminary. Conclusions are drawn with caution and at best indicate further research areas. Multivariate analysis would take the matter further than the initial analyses of this chapter. Statistical significance was tested using standard methods. A significance level of five per cent or less indicates a significant difference.

I *Political Participation*

There were about 25 questions in the survey¹ related to political participation. They were grouped into four domains:

1. passive participation (interest in politics generally or through news in the media);
2. the likelihood of taking different political actions to influence authorities;
3. active participation by the respondent (or family members in the household) in contacting local, state or federal officials about community concerns or personal problems, with or without the respondent's cooperation of others;
4. active participation during the previous election campaign to assist a party or candidate.

Each variable was analysed by origin, by age, and by origin and age. It is important to check differences in participation rates by age since, as mentioned earlier, participation may be associated with maturity. Numbers in some age cohorts are, however, rather small.

II *Political Efficacy*

There were 19 questions in the survey related to political efficacy.²

They were grouped into five:

1. perception of the power of Trade Unions;
2. confidence in various political institutions;
3. treatment by officials;
4. satisfaction with, or importance of, various political institutions; and
5. individual's political power.

¹See Appendix II for questions 115a-g; 116a,b1-5; 117a,b1-5; 118a-d; 119a;120.

²See Appendix II for questions 71e; 86; 109b,c,d,f,g,i,j,l,n; 110a,b;113; 122a,b; 123a,b;124.

The same method of analysis was used.

III *Ethnicity: The Role of Ethnic Identification*

There were two questions in the survey¹ related to ethnic identification and ancestry. Only one was used - 'With which ethnic or cultural group do you most strongly identify with (for example, English, Greek, Polish, Irish or what)?'. The question related to ancestry was not used as it defined parents' ancestry rather than the respondent's subjective ethnic identification. Indeed, the likelihood of Australian ethnic identity was almost double that of Australian ancestry (about seven-tenths compared to two-fifths).

Table 7.5 shows the ethnic identification of the whole sample, the majority of whom (seven-tenths) identified with Australia, followed by England (14 per cent). Only a few professed no ethnic identification. The remainder were distributed across various European countries. Apart from several preliminary analyses, ethnic identification was dichotomised into 'Australian' and 'other' (that is, non-Australian) to facilitate analyses of participation and efficacy. Individual categories of the non-Australian category contained too few respondents to permit reliable analysis.

Ethnic identity was first analysed for the whole sample according to origin and age, then for each origin group according to age. Age was not a statistically significant effect for ethnic identification in any analysis except for the OAB, who showed a slight difference. Age differences were not pursued further (see Table 7.6). In other words, age does not appear to be associated with ethnic identification.

Second, each political participation and efficacy variable was analysed by ethnic identification for the whole sample and for each origin group in order to determine its association with ethnic identification. The role of ethnic identity was noted insofar as it had a positive or negative association (for example, see Table 7.7). Finally, all statistically significant results were collated for participation and for efficacy in order to determine the *pattern* of their association with ethnic identification.

Results

I *Political Participation*

There were no statistically significant differences between the five origin groups in extent of interest in politics via media news, or in the likelihood of writing to a

¹See Appendix II for questions 12a,b.

Table 7.5

Ethnic Identification of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

Ethnic Identification		%
1	None	4
2	Australian	68
3	Aboriginal	-
4	Dutch	-
5	English	14
6	French	-
7	German	1
8	Greek	2
9	Irish	3
10	Italian	2
11	Jewish	-
12	Polish	-
13	Scottish	1
14	Ukranian	-
15	Yugoslav	1
16	Croatian	-
17	Macedonian	-
18	Other not stated	-
19	Eurasian	-
20	Other	4
21	Don't know	1
TOTAL		100
(n)		(2187)

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.6

Ethnic Identification and Age of Other Australian-born in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]			
Other Australian-born			
Ethnic Identification:	Age		
	18-30	31-50	51+
1 None	4	3	1
2 Australian	80	78	77
3 Other	16	19	22
TOTAL	100	100	100
%	30	38	32
(n)	(406)	(513)	(423)

n=1342

chi square = 9.5957 with 4 d.f. $p < .0478$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.7

Likelihood of Writing to a Newspaper and Ethnic Identification of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]		
Write to Newspaper:	Ethnic Identification	
	Australian	Other
1 Yes	24	30
2 Might, might not	27	28
3 No	49	41
TOTAL	100	100
%	70	30
(n)	(1454)	(618)

chi square = 12.7049 with 2 d.f. $p < .0017$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

newspaper or attending a public meeting in order to influence authorities. As for actual contact, there were no differences between origin groups in contacting a non-Parliamentary official about a community issue, nor in contacting any official, federal member of Parliament, federal or state official or local government councillor or other official about a personal problem. Finally, no statistically significant differences emerged for origin groups in talking about politics, attending meetings or rallies or working for a party or candidate during the previous election campaign (see Table 7.8).

As for the hypothesis about greater participation in middle-age, it is interesting to note that the variables mentioned above were not statistically significant for the three age cohorts, except for attention to politics in the news media, contacting a federal member of Parliament about personal problems and talking politics during the election campaign. In addition, contact with a state official about a community issue or a state member of Parliament about a personal problem did not differ across age cohorts (see Table 7.8). Indeed, Table 7.9 shows that the young (18 to 30 years) were more likely than the middle-aged to say that they would attend legal or banned protest marches, stop traffic or disrupt a meeting or march and talk about politics during election campaigns. Older cohorts paid greater attention to politics in the media news and were more likely to state they would collect signatures for a petition.

These results suggest that not all forms of political activity peak in middle-age. Perhaps some forms of political activity are more attractive to young adults (for example, street marches) or perhaps expressions of concern about issues of particular importance to the young take these forms (for example, anti-nuclear demonstrations). Insofar as many variables showed no statistically significant differences between age cohorts, the greater politicisation of the electorate mentioned earlier may have affected the young more. In any event their participation often is not generally lower than that of the middle-aged. Of course, the higher level of education in young adults may also contribute to their greater political interest and activity.¹

The *pattern* of political participation in those variables which were statistically significant is shown in Table 7.10. The results suggest that immigrants, particularly from NES countries, had had less contact with officials but were more likely to state they would participate in marches, for example, than were the OAB. Possibly, the long time taken by immigrants to identify with an Australian party plays a part making them

¹This can be investigated by holding levels of education constant and comparing political interest and age. But it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the question further.

Table 7.8

Political Participation: Variables which were not Statistically Significant

		<u>Origin</u>	<u>Age</u>
I	<u>Interest in Politics:</u>		
1	Attention to politics in media news	ns	
II	<u>Likelihood of:</u>		
2	Writing to newspaper	ns	ns
3	Attending public meeting	ns	
III	<u>Contact with:</u>		
4	Other federal re community	ns	ns
5	Other state re community		ns
6	Officials re personal	ns	ns
7	Federal MP re personal	ns	
8	Other federal re personal	ns	ns
9	State MP re personal		ns
10	Other state re personal	ns	ns
11	Local joint re personal	ns	ns
IV	<u>During Election Campaign:</u>		
12	Talking politics	ns	
13	Attending meetings, rallies	ns	ns
14	Working for candidate	ns	ns
Total not statistically significant variables		11	10

Table 7.9

Political Participation of Younger and Older Age Cohorts Compared to 31-50 Year Cohort
in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984¹

		<u>Compared to</u> <u>31-50 Years</u>	
		<u>Age</u>	
<u>Political Participation:</u> ²		<u>18-30</u>	<u>51+</u>
I <u>Activity:</u>			
1	Attention to politics in news media	-	+
2	Interest in politics	-	sim
II <u>Likelihood of:</u>			
3	Attending local protest march	+	-
4	Attending banned protest march	+	-
5	Stopping traffic	+	-
6	Disrupting meeting/march	+	sim
7	Collecting signatures for petition	-	+
8	Attending public meeting	-	-
III <u>Contact with:</u>			
9	Local councillor/official re community	-	-
10	State member of Parliament re community	-	-
11	Federal member of Parliament re community	-	-
12	Federal member of Parliament re personal	-	sim
13	Government official re community	-	-
14	Community work	-	-
IV <u>During Election Campaign:</u>			
15	Talking politics	+	-

¹Statistically significant analyses only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.

² + = higher than 31-50 year cohort
 - = lower than " " "
 sim = similar to " " "

Table 7.10

Political Participation by Age and Origin in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984:
Selected Measures¹

		<u>Compared to OAB</u>			
		<u>Origin</u>			
<u>Age Cohort</u>		<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-Generation</u>	
		English-speaking Countries	non-English-speaking Countries	<u>Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>	
				English-speaking Countries	non-English-speaking Countries
<u>Political Participation:</u> ²					
I <u>Activity:</u>					
1 Attention to politics in news media					
- great deal		+	--	-	--
- not much	31-50	sim	--	sim	sim
2 Interest in politics generally	all	sim	--	sim	--
3 Interest in politics - great deal	all	+	-	+	+
- not much	31-50	+	--	-	sim
II <u>Likelihood of:</u>					
4 Attending local protest march	all	sim	sim	-	++
5 Attending local protest march	51+	+	+	-	*
6 Attending banned protest march	all	sim	sim	-	++
7 Attending banned protest march	51+	+	++	-	*
8 Stopping traffic	all	+	sim	-	+
9 Stopping traffic	51+	+	+	sim	*
10 Disrupting meeting/march	all	sim	+	-	+
11 Disrupting meeting/march	31-50	sim	+	sim	+
12 Disrupting meeting/march	51+	+	+	-	*
13 Collecting signatures for petition	all	-	sim	-	+
14 Collecting signatures for petition	31-50	-	sim	-	+

(Cont'd next page)

¹Statistically significant analyses only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.

² * = too few respondents to permit analysis with confidence
 + = higher than OAB
 ++ = much higher than OAB
 - = lower than OAB
 -- = Much lower than OAB
 sim = similar to OAB

<u>Age Cohort</u>	<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-Generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>	
	English-speaking Countries	non-English-speaking Countries	English-speaking Countries	non-English-speaking Countries

III Contact with:

15 Local councillor/official re community	all	-	--	sim	+
16 Local councillor/official re community	31-50	-	--	--	+
17 Local councillor/official re community	51+	-	--	++	*
18 State member of Parliament re community	all	-	--	-	sim
19 State member of Parliament re community	31-50	-	--	--	++
20 State member of Parliament re community	51+	-	--	--	*
21 State member of Parliament re community	all	sim	-	-	++
22 Other state government official re community	all	-	-	-	-
23 Federal member of Parliament re community	all	-	--	-	+
24 Federal member of Parliament re community	31-50	-	--	--	++
25 Government official re community	all	-	--	-	sim
26 Government official re community	31-50	-	--	--	+
27 Government official re community	51+	-	--	+	+
28 Community work with others	all	--	--	-	-
29 Community work with others	31-50	--	--	-	-

reluctant to contact officials who are part of Australian political institutions, whereas they participated in non-institutionalised political activities such as protest marches.

Political activity is lower for the second generation of ES origins and higher for the second generation of NES origins relative to the OAB. Participation was higher for the NES than for the ES second generation. Indeed, the difference between the ES and NES second generation was striking. The NES second generation participated in non-institutional activities and, unlike immigrants, often approached a government official. Moreover, this latter activity was at local, state and federal level. But the ES second generation was much less likely to do any of these. Perhaps the greater likelihood of the NES second generation to participate in such activities is explained by their youth, since, as mentioned earlier, youth tend to be more active in these areas. However, the NES second generation's greater political activity in many other spheres as well points to additional explanations. Conversely, since the ES second generation shows a pattern of lower activity, it is unlikely that their age distribution alone explains their reduced likelihood of participating in this kind of activity. Possibly the higher educational attainment of the NES second generation and lower of the ES second generation are in part associated with their respective participation levels.

In sum, there were no differences between origin groups in the extent of their participation in many aspects of political activity, even after holding age constant. In particular, political activity during the previous election campaign to help a candidate or party was similar for all origin groups. Where there were differences in political activity, the NES second generation tended to be more active than both the ES second generation and the OAB, whereas the ES second generation tended to be less active than either. The tendency of the middle-aged to be more politically active was not supported by these data. Some political activities were either the domain of the young or the old, or not associated with age at all.

For *political efficacy*, there were no significant statistical differences between the five origin groups in terms of perceptions of how good a job trade unions were doing, or in levels of confidence in the State government, in the Liberal, Labor or National Parties or in the trade unions. Nor were there statistically significant differences in the degree of attention thought to be paid by his/her member of Parliament to the respondent's point of view, in trusting people in government to do the right thing rather than look after themselves or in the individual's political power locally and nationally. In short about half (ten) the variables related to political efficacy showed no statistically significant differences between origin groups (see Table 7.11).

Table 7.11

Political Efficacy: Variables which were not Statistically Significant

		<u>Origin</u>	<u>Age</u>
I	<u>Questions About Trade Unions:</u>		
1	How good a job done	ns	
2	How much power		ns
II	<u>Confidence in Various Political Institutions:</u>		
3	Federal government		ns
4	State government	ns	ns
5	Liberal Party	ns	
6	Labor Party	ns	
7	National Party	ns	
8	Trade Unions	ns	
9	Press		ns
III	<u>Treatment by Officials:</u>		
10	Attention by member of Parliament	ns	ns
IV	<u>Satisfaction with or Importance of Various Political Institutions:</u>		
11	People in government trusted to do right thing	ns	
V	<u>Individual's Political Power:</u>		
12	Power relative to other locally	ns	
13	Power relative to other nationally	ns	ns
Number of variables not statistically significant		10	6

A different pattern of political efficacy emerged with respect to age, which appears to be an important consideration in efficacy. Only about a third (six) of the variables showed no statistically significant differences between age cohorts: perceptions of the power of trade unions, confidence in Federal and State governments and the press and the degree of attention paid by a member of Parliament to the respondent's point of view. Finally, there were no differences between age cohorts in the individual's power nationally (see Table 7.11).

Three variables showed statistically insignificant differences in both age and origin: confidence in the State government, attention by his/her member of Parliament, and the individual's power nationally. Where differences between origins groups do exist, most may be explained by age composition, provided each origin cohort behaves similarly to the national pattern. This was the case for confidence in the police and the press, and satisfaction with democracy in Australia.

Table 7.12 shows a pattern of young people feeling less efficacious than the middle-aged, except for their belief in how good a job the trade unions were doing and confidence in trade unions and the Labor Party. There were similar degrees of confidence in the National Party and trust of people in government to do the right thing. On the other hand, the oldest cohort (over 50 years) were less likely to believe that trade unions were doing a good job, trusted people in government less but felt similar levels of felt efficacy across the other eleven variables. Compared to the middle-aged, then, feelings of efficacy are generally less for young adults and greater for those over 50 years old.

The *pattern* of political efficacy in those variables which were statistically significant is shown in Table 7.13. Interestingly, compared to the OAB, all four origin groups of young adults were more likely to believe that trade unions did not have enough power. These results suggest that all immigrants - ES and NES - feel less efficacious than the OAB no matter what their age. Amongst the second generation, felt efficacy appeared greater for those of ES origins than for the OAB in the over 50 cohort, but less in the middle-aged. In all, this group was very similar to the OAB. By contrast, the second generation of NES origins appeared to feel less efficacious than the OAB, even among young adults. In no variable or analysis was its felt efficacy higher than, or even similar, to the OAB.

In sum, even though only about half the variables suggested that origin was important in determining levels of political efficacy, there were differences between the origin groups with respect to this characteristic even when holding age constant. The

Table 7.12

Political Efficacy of Age Cohorts Compared to 31-50 Year Cohort in the Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984¹

		<u>Compared to</u> <u>31-50 Years</u>	
		<u>Age</u>	
<u>Political Efficacy:</u> ²		<u>18-30</u>	<u>51+</u>
I <u>Questions About Trade Unions:</u>			
1	How good a job	+	-
II <u>Confidence in Institutions:</u>			
2	Liberal Party	-	sim
3	Labor Party	+	sim
4	National Party	sim	+
5	Trade Unions	+	+
6	Police	-	+
7	Military	-	+
III <u>Treatment by Officials:</u>			
8	Treatment from government department	-	sim
9	Treatment by member of Parliament	-	sim
IV <u>Satisfaction with Importance of Various Political Institutions:</u>			
10	Importance of political party identification	-	+
11	Satisfaction with democracy in Australia	-	sim
12	Trust in people in government	sim	-
V <u>Individual's Political Power:</u>			
13	Locally	-	sim

¹Statistically significant analyses only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.

² + = higher than 31-50 year cohort
 - = lower than " " "
 sim = similar to " " "

Table 7.13
Extent of Political Efficacy By Age and Origin in the Urban Australian Population, 18+,
1984¹

	<u>Age Cohort</u>	<u>Compared to OAB Origin</u>			
		<u>Born Overseas in:</u>	<u>English-speaking Countries</u>	<u>non-English-speaking Countries</u>	<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>
		<u>English-speaking Countries</u>	<u>non-English-speaking Countries</u>	<u>English-speaking Countries</u>	<u>non-English-speaking Countries</u>
<u>Political Efficacy:</u> ²					
I <u>Questions About Trade Unions:</u>					
1 How much power	all	sim	sim	sim	--
" " "	18-30	-	-	-	--
II <u>Confidence in Institutions:</u>					
2 Federal Government	all	sim	+	sim	-
" "	31-50	-	-	-	*
3 Police	all	-	-	+	-
4 Military	all	-	sim	sim	-
"	31-50	-	-	-	*
5 Press	all	sim	+	+	-
III <u>Treatment by Officials:</u>					
6 Treatment from government department	all	sim	-	+	--
" " "	51+	sim	--	+	*
7 Treatment by member of Parliament	all	-	sim	+	--
" " " " "	51+	-	-	+	*
8 Attention by member of Parliament	31-50	-	-	+	*
IV <u>Satisfaction with Importance of Various Political Institutions:</u>					
9 Importance of political party identification	all	--	sim	++	--
" " " "	51+	-	-	+	*
10 Satisfaction with democracy in Australia	all	sim	sim	+	--
V <u>Individual's Political Power:</u>					
11 Locally	18-30	++	-	+	-
"	31-50	-	+	-	*
12 Nationally	18-30	+	sim	+	-

¹ Statistically significant analyses only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.

² + = higher than OAB
++ = much higher than OAB
- = lower than OAB
-- = much lower than OAB
sim = similar to OAB

second generation of ES origins feel similarly efficacious to the OAB, whereas immigrants and the second generation of NES origin tend to feel less so.

II *Ethnicity: The Role of Ethnic Identification*

The results in Table 7.14 suggest that while the OAB and second generation of English-speaking origins are similar in ethnic identity (about one-fifth identify with non-Australian ethnic or cultural groups), the second generation of non-English-speaking origins and particularly both ES and NES immigrant groups were much more likely to make a non-Australian identification.¹ But perhaps the most important pattern in these results is the decline in the Australian identity from the OAB through to earlier generations. Also, those of NES origin - whether immigrant or second generation - were more likely to profess an ethnic identification than were the ES in the corresponding origin group. Even so, a significant minority of the second generation - both ES and NES - did not identify with an Australian cultural group.

Of the 25 variables related to participation, only five were statistically significant for the whole sample when analysed by ethnic identification: likelihood of writing to a newspaper, contact with a government official, federal or state member of Parliament for personal problems and interest in politics (see Table 7.15). This last difference was inconsistent: ethnic identification was positively associated both with 'good deal' and with 'not much' interest in politics, and negatively with 'some'. For political efficacy, ethnic identification was statistically significant for the whole sample only in confidence in the Liberal Party (see Table 7.16). Nonetheless, in each analysis, ethnic identity had a positive effect: those who identified with another ethnic or cultural group had a greater likelihood of participation (see Table 7.15, column 1) and had more confidence in the Liberal Party (see Table 7.16, column 1).

A greater likelihood of participation was apparent for all origin groups except the second generation of non-English-speaking origin. Among them, 'other' ethnic identification had a negative effect in likelihood of attending a legal demonstration or meeting and collecting signatures for a petition. Indeed, the effect of ethnic identification was very strong for this origin group. For example, Table 7.17 shows that the percentage of those who stated they would *not* be likely to attend a meeting doubled amongst those who identified with another ethnic or cultural group compared to those who identified with the Australian.

¹These last three groups were about twice as likely to have no ethnic identity, compared with the OAB and second generation ES (about six and three percent respectively).

Table 7.14

Ethnic Identification and Origins of Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Origin

Ethnic Identification:	Father Australian- born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Second-generation Australians whose fathers were born in:</u>	
		English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries	English- speaking Countries	non-English- speaking Countries
1 None	3	5	7	3	6
2 Australian	79	44	32	76	64
3 Other	19	50	61	21	31
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100
%	62	12	13	8	5
(n)	(1342)	(264)	(274)	(175)	(104)

n=2159

chi square = 303.8676 with 8 d.f. $p < .0000$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Table 7.15
Political Participation and the Role of Ethnic Identification by Origins¹

	<u>Ethnic Identification</u>					
	All	Father Australian -born	<u>Origin</u>		<u>Second-generation</u>	
			<u>Born Overseas in:</u>		<u>Australians whose</u>	
			English- speaking Countries	non- English- speaking Countries	English- speaking Countries	non-Engl.- speaking Countries
<u>Political Participation:</u> ²						
I <u>Interest in Politics:</u>						
1 Interest in politics	3	+			+	
II <u>Likelihood of:</u>						
2 Writing to newspaper	+	+		+		
3 Legal demonstration						-
4 Illegal demonstration				+		
5 Attending a meeting						-
6 Collecting signatures for a petition						-
III <u>Contact with:</u>						
7 Contact community - Federal MP		+			+	
8 Contact community - State MP		+				
9 Contact community - Other state		+				
10 Contact officials - Private	+	+				
11 Contact private - Federal MP	+	+				
12 Contact private - State MP	+	+	+			
13 Contact private - Local government		+				
Total significant analyses	5	9	1	2	2	3

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

¹ Statistically significant variables only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.

² + = higher
- = lower

³ Statistically significant, but not obviously meaningful.

Table 7.16

Political Efficacy and the Role of Ethnic Identification by Origins¹

	<u>Ethnic Identification</u>					
	<u>Origin</u>			<u>Second-generation</u>		
	All	Father Australian born	<u>Born Overseas in:</u> English- speaking Countries	<u>non-</u> English- speaking Countries	<u>Australians whose</u> <u>fathers were born in:</u> English- speaking Countries	<u>non-Engl.-</u> <u>-speaking</u> Countries
<u>Political Efficacy</u> ²						
I <u>Questions About</u> <u>Trade Unions:</u>						
1 How much power		+				
II <u>Confidence in</u> <u>Institutions:</u>						
2 Federal government					-	
3 Liberal Party	+	+				
4 Trade Unions		-			+	
5 Police				+		
Total significant analyses	1	3	-	1	2	-

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

¹Statistically significant variables only, at .05 level of confidence, or less.² + = higher
- = lower

Table 7.17

Likelihood of Attending Meeting and Ethnic Identification of Second Generation NES in
Urban Australian Population, 18+, 1984

[Per cent]

Second-generation Australians Whose Fathers Were Born
in Non-English-speaking Countries

Attend Meeting:

Ethnic Identification

	Australian	Other
1 Yes	46	34
2 Might, might not	32	19
3 No	23	47
TOTAL	100	100
%	67	33
(n)	(66)	(32)
		n=98

chi square = 6.07332 with 2 d.f. $p < 0.0480$

Source: Australian NSSS, 1984: Urban Preliminary Sample

Levels of political efficacy across the individual origin groups were not affected by ethnic identification in the second generation of NES origins or in immigrants of ES origins. None of their efficacy variables was statistically significant. In the few variables for other origin groups which were statistically significant, the effects were positive except for confidence in trade unions for the OAB and for confidence in the Federal government for the second generation with ES origins (see Table 7.16, columns 2 to 6).

The pattern of association between ethnic identification and political participation suggests that ethnic identification (that is, identification with a culture or group other than Australian) is of some importance and that its effects are positive, especially for the OAB, but tend to be very negative for the NES second generation in a few activities. These activities are not related to Australian political institutions, and may indicate a tendency of ethnic identification to be associated with reduced participation in non-institutional activities for the NES second generation. Why this may be so is puzzling. In political efficacy, there does not appear to be any clear association with ethnic identification for ES immigrants and for the NES second generation. Also, ethnic identification has mixed effects for the OAB and for the ES second generation, although it is positive for NES immigrants. A clearer understanding of the association between political efficacy and ethnic identification cannot be obtained without further research.

Summary and Discussion

In sum, age was only of some importance as not all forms of political activity peaked in middle age, a few appearing to be the domain of young adults, a few of the oldest. The emergent pattern of political participation suggests only slight differences between the second generation and OAB, and, if anything, a striking tendency of the NES second generation to greater and the ES second generation to lower participation compared to each other and to the OAB. Moreover, ethnic identity had a minor role in political participation insofar as it affected very few activities. Nonetheless, where ethnic identity was important, it was associated with greater political participation for all origin groups except for the NES second generation, where its effects were associated with a tendency to much lower levels of participation.

In contrast to political participation, age was an important consideration in feelings of political efficacy: they increased with each age cohort. Moreover, there were differences between origin groups in feelings of political efficacy even after holding age constant: the ES second generation was very similar to OAB, whereas the NES second

generation felt less efficacious than either. But ethnic identification did not affect feelings of political efficacy amongst the second generation of NES origin, and had mixed effects for that of ES origin. In short, though all immigrants tended to participate less and feel less efficacious, the origin groups were more similar in political participation than in felt political efficacy.

The role of ethnicity, defined in terms of origin, had some effects on political participation and felt political efficacy, though that effect was a complex one. Defined in terms of subjective ethnic identity, ethnicity was linked to political participation; for efficacy these links were nil, firm or ambiguous.

The results suggest that in the early 1980s the second generation had almost, but not yet, assimilated in terms of political participation insofar as some differences remained for the ES and NES second generation compared to OAB. In feelings of political efficacy, the extent of assimilation was not as great for the NES second generation, but complete for the ES second generation. Even so, it must be emphasised that these results are preliminary insofar as no adjustments were made for at least one important factor - education.

Ethnicity was of some importance for political participation and felt political efficacy, but its effects differed according to its subjective or objective definition. For example, political participation for the NES second generation was lower when defined as ethnic identification, but higher according to origin.

It should be noted that the investigation of participation and felt efficacy did not include any examination of local government in areas which have a high concentration of a particular ethnic group. For example, the satellite town of Elizabeth in South Australia, inaugurated in 1955, had a very large proportion of British immigrants.¹ By 1964, the residents had successfully petitioned for severance from the Council of Salisbury, dominated by old established Australian families (Galbreath and Pearson, 1982). The first Elizabeth Council had an Australian-born mayor, but all its councillors were British immigrants.

Participation of the British in Elizabeth's local government has continued for the second generation (Martyn Evans, 1986). Moreover in Perth which has an old established Greek community, dating from the turn of this century, the Mayor and two other councillors in 1986 were second-generation Greek-Australians. Darwin, which

¹In 1971, Elizabeth had the highest proportion of British immigrants in any Australian local government area (Marsden, 1986:302).

has an old established Chinese community has a third generation Chinese-Australian Mayor whose ancestors arrived in the Northern Territory last century (Fong Lim, 1985).

Also the investigation did not include an examination of the political environment in each state or territory, the pattern of settlement of the parents of the second generation and the nature of adaptation of second-generation groups within each place. As I visited an increasing number of capital cities where I undertook fieldwork, these differences became more striking. It appeared that the first two sets of forces produced unique conditions for the context of the third. For example, the orderly development of South Australia produced a political environment which differed from Darwin, a frontier society.

This is not the place to examine the institutional arrangements of ethnic communities in each state, but the point should be made that even the most superficial observation indicates that they differ markedly. For example, in New South Wales, the Ethnic Communities Council (ECC), a voluntary organisation established more than a decade ago, recently received substantial funding from the State government to purchase its own premises (Ethnos, 1987). Its Ethnic Affairs Commission (EAC) a government body, was established a decade ago and has flourished ever since. In contrast, in Western Australia, the ECC was more recently formed (1981), mainly due to pressure of ECCs in other states. And the Western Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission, formed in 1984, was for a while threatened with extinction by the State government (Cattalini, 1986).

Limitations of data precluded any delineation of patterns of participation and attitudes in specific origin groups. We cannot investigate with these data whether types of political activity are associated with certain groups within the ES and NES second-generation samples or the extent to which such groups differ, even though the levels of educational attainment of specific groups point to probable differences in their political behaviour. These interesting and important questions will remain unanswered until appropriate data are available.

In this dissertation I cannot carry the analysis of political participation, efficacy and the role of ethnicity further. Indeed, the findings serve mainly to indicate the complexity of the issues raised, the need for more research, and the need for more sophisticated statistical analyses. Nonetheless, this preliminary exploration does suggest that there is no massive political alienation of the second generation, even if they are not yet fully incorporated into the political process. Indeed their adaptation to the

wider political realm in terms of participation and efficacy is piecemeal, complex and at times ambiguous. There appears to be a continuing influence of ethnicity in political behaviour for the second generation, and to a perhaps surprising extent, for later generations for example the Anglo-Celtic.

Possibly, the higher educational attainment of the NES second generation aids the extent of their political participation, whereas the ES second generation are restrained in participating by their lower educational levels. Whatever the case, the findings of this chapter signal greater group participation by the NES second generation who are still relatively young, whereas for the ES second generation their lower participation is likely to continue insofar as they are relatively old. This is not because of their age as such, since there was little association between political participation and age, but because the proportion of the NES second generation in the adult Australian population will increase in the next two decades, but that of the ES second generation will lessen.

Even so, participation by the NES second generation and perhaps the ES second generation in the wider political sphere is likely to be limited by the nature of some political institutions and by the attitudes of leaders, for example, in political parties. Indeed, Australian political institutions in many respects have adjusted little to their 'newer' publics. Yet if the contemporary Australian political environment is best understood in the context of its political-historical traditions, their full incorporation is possible, given the successful passage to political power of 'earlier' groups such as the Irish and German.

For all these reasons, although the progress of the second generation to complete participation and felt efficacy in Australian political life is underway, the findings of this chapter reveal a variety of responses which are complex, mixed and at times unfathomable. Hopefully future research will address at least some of the important questions raised here.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Ours is a land in transition (Kirby, 1985:xi).

I set out to establish in this thesis a framework within which the political adaptation of one category of Australians - those of the second generation - might be evaluated. The study was concerned with descendants of what may be described as *old* immigrant groups in contemporary Australia. It aimed to present a broad picture of adaptation in Australia generally, rather than that in any particular state or locality or of an individual origin group. Unlike the demographic profile, educational achievement and economic integration, political behaviour was analysed for the urban population only. It is unknown what differences, if any, in political behaviour may exist between it and the total population, particularly the OAB, who are less urban.

The project was ambitious because of the restricted availability and utility of data. I was fortunately able to carry out fieldwork in most of the capital cities in Australia to supplement the available data, but I did not have the resources to conduct my own surveys. I had to make do with data generated by others, often for quite different purposes. Consequently, some of the argument has been speculative and inferential.

The good data used in the early chapters pointed to interesting, detailed findings which could not be fully used to test hypotheses in subsequent chapters about political behaviour, where the data were more limited. Nonetheless, my procedure in reviewing adaptation has consistently been oriented towards the two fundamental distinctions introduced in Chapter 2: location in sociocultural systems and cultural differentiation. In each of the spheres I have investigated - the economic, the educational, the political - I have focussed closely on differences between second-generation Australians, immigrants, and the OAB, and between differing categories of the second generation itself, especially ES and NES.

A significant finding of this study is that, unlike what appeared to be the case in the United States half a century ago, most second-generation Australians were assimilated into the economic system in terms of their income. For most, income levels differed little from that of the OAB. Where income did differ, the second generation had mostly bettered the income of the OAB. Earlier it was shown that their rate of home ownership differed little from the OAB, a finding which points to their relatively secure personal

economic situation. Their economic location should not impede the political participation or felt efficacy of the OAB. It may well enhance these processes because economic status is an important influence on them.

The economic assimilation of American second-generation groups may have been retarded because they grew up during the depression of the 1930s. In such a situation, their parents may have been unable to support their continuing education as they themselves were struggling to survive. Unemployment levels would have precluded their working themselves through post-school education because postschool education was not free. Perhaps also the American labour market in that era did not easily accommodate 'new' groups.

Ethnic origin did not appear *closely* related to economic status. This was particularly so for most of the NES second generation, who, unlike NES immigrants, were not low in economic status. The economic location of the second generation in relation to that of the OAB may be explained by some combination of educational achievement and adjustment to the contemporary Australian labour market, as well as the extent to which the education and economic systems have accommodated 'new' groups.

In contrast to the economic domain, differentiation in educational achievement *did* appear to be associated with ethnicity among second-generation groups. There also were intra-group differences in educational levels, for example such as shown for Germans of rural Queensland as opposed to those in the young urban second generation. The association of ethnicity and education was contrary to conventional wisdom, in the sense that most NES origin persons *outperformed* second-generation British-Australians and the OAB. Nonetheless, whatever preconceptions existed about the educational achievements of contemporary second-generation Australians, the findings of this project suggest that their education performance is explained by cultural differentiation rather than migration.

As mentioned in the introduction, these findings generated an intense and often acrimonious debate in the area of public policy. The high education levels of the NES second generation may pose a threat to some Anglo-Australians who had not anticipated any challenge to, or sharing of, their status and power. Others, whatever their origin, who have consistently promoted the idea of educational and economic disadvantage among the NES second generation, may have difficulty in coming to terms with, or accepting, evidence that the opposite appears to be the case. In short, the rise in the social and economic status of some NES groups has apparently created new conditions which some

policy makers are unable or unwilling to accept. This reaction is consistent with some examples in the United States mentioned in Chapter 2.

The political participation and felt efficacy of the second generation should not compare unfavourably with the OAB insofar as its educational achievements are generally equal or better. Indeed, if education alone were the criterion, then participation and felt efficacy of the NES second generation would be high, whilst that of the British second generation would be similar to that of the OAB. But in the contemporary Australian political arena, education alone does not determine political participation and felt efficacy. So educational levels of the generational groups indicate potential more than reality.

An important finding of this study was that there appeared to be a significant delay among young second-generation voters in identifying with an Australian party. Amongst second-generation partisans, there was no differentiation in some important influences on their party identification compared to that of the OAB, except for Catholics of ES origin. For them, Labor identification was more pronounced, pointing to some ethno-religious effects. This group may well be Irish in ancestry (rather than in origin), indicating an enduring effect in this aspect of political behaviour amongst later generations of Irish in contemporary Australia - in short, the model of 'cultural lag' mentioned in Chapter 6. Indeed this finding could have been anticipated on the basis of the historical links between Irish Catholics and the Labor Party in Australia which still persist, as mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7.

There were many similarities with the OAB, but the patterns of political adaptation of the second generation in participation and felt efficacy were complex. Of particular concern was the low level of felt efficacy amongst the NES second generation, a surprising result given their occupational class location (Chapter 3) and their high educational and income levels, all of which point to high status. Possibly, their not belonging to a dominant ethnic group may have modified these socioeconomic effects. A further concern is the tendency to lower rates of participation of the ES second generation compared to the OAB, a result not fully explained by their educational achievement, which was similar to the OAB.

Even so, there was suggestive evidence that in at least one Australian political institution, the trade union movement, the NES second generation was underrepresented amongst its officials and consequently amongst those whose career paths into the wider political sphere derived from unions. This may also be the case for the ES second generation. If the second generation participated more actively in non-institutionalised

areas, it is curious that they were as active politically as the OAB during the previous election campaign, whatever their age, because their young voters were less partisan than the OAB. Perhaps factors related to both the migration process and the nature of Australian political institutions account for these differences.

There was differential incorporation into the political system of second-generation ES and NES groups, and of the second generation as a whole, compared to the OAB. The ES second generation appeared to be assimilated into the economic system in terms of their income (except for those with other ES or New Zealand origin), and education (except for the other ES origin group). They appeared to be assimilated in terms of their extent of partisanship (apart from young voters), in terms of some important influences on their partisanship (except for Catholic partisans), and in terms of their feelings of efficacy. In contrast, the NES second generation appeared to be assimilated economically in terms of income, but not in terms of educational achievements. They also appeared to be assimilated in terms of some important influences on partisanship. Even so, in aspects of political behaviour where there were significant differences, they were mostly not great. Extreme differences were confined to the educational domain. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that different groups may not aspire to the same type of assimilation, a suggestion made in Chapter 2.

Delays in full incorporation may be attributed to the complex interaction of factors associated with the migration process, the nature of some Australian political institutions and the role of ethnicity. The migration process plays a fundamental role in delaying full incorporation. Its effect is likely to continue among successive cohorts of second-generation Australians because it is inherently bound to the interrelation of the fact that their fathers were immigrants, the importance of familial inheritance and their relation to political behaviour and attitudes. That relatively fewer young second-generation voters are partisan illustrates this connection.

Such influences may be modified if immigrants are enfranchised on, or soon after, arrival rather than on naturalisation (now the case for immigrants in South Australia); and if Australian political institutions show greater willingness and ability to include immigrants and the second generation in their hierarchy, for example by affirmative action. Australian political institutions are open in the sense of having no structural limitations to participation. They are closed, however, in the sense of having adjusted little to the special conditions arising from circumstances of resettlement among immigrants and their native-born children. Economic incorporation seems to precede political incorporation for 'newer' groups in Australian society, indicating that the economic (and educational) systems have been more open than the political.

I suggested in Chapter 2 that a dual explanation of the migrant experience - economic and cultural - must be sought. Insofar as ethnicity is associated with educational attainment, which in turn connects with economic success, cultural differences inherent in ideational systems partly account for the economic incorporation of the second generation, and its component groups. Moreover, the influence of ethnicity on educational achievement, which effects political participation and felt efficacy, suggests the wider importance of ideational systems. So the ideational components of sociocultural systems have adaptive consequences that directly and indirectly lead to high economic status for most of the NES second generation and account for some aspects of political behaviour among second-generation Australians.

In terms of the role of ethnicity, there was no single response or adaptation by the second generation or its component groups, a situation that parallels the American second-generation experience. Ethnicity modifies the participation of both the ES and NES second generation through differential educational attainment. It also prevented full assimilation of some of the ES second generation because of its effects on party identification. Ethnicity, in the sense of not belonging to a dominant ethnic group, may also account for the NES second generation's partial assimilation in felt efficacy. Moreover, the role of ethnicity extends further because it is part of the migration process. Insofar as significant differences arise from the fact that at least their fathers were immigrants, the migration process influences the extent of their partisanship.

In short, ethnicity permeates the political adaptation of the second generation, although its effects vary across the major subsystems of society. As suggested in Chapter 2, ideational components appeared to have adaptive consequences that need to be traced. For the second generation in Australia in the early 1980s, political adaptation appeared to be a function both of location in some important sociocultural systems and of cultural differentiation.

Second-generation Australians do not enter the political arena in the same way as the OAB. They are less likely to be partisan; their income and educational levels differ (the latter markedly); their family had no historical ties with Australian political institutions, thereby delaying integration; and the NES group at least are in many instances considered a minority in Australian society.

Pressures towards assimilation have historically been strong in Australia, and substantial progress to complete assimilation was apparent. Nonetheless the second generation in the early 1980s had not yet completely assimilated politically. The present study indicates that the question of how long the second generation in Australia

will remain powerless is not relevant. The issue is *how much* power it, and groups within it, has. The study also points to future investigation of the importance of the economic as opposed to the political sphere in determining the power of the second generation, or groups within it. Since many of the second generation outperform the OAB educationally and economically, their socioeconomic status is no longer a cause for concern: they do not seem likely to emerge as disadvantaged minorities in the Australian population.

For all these reasons, the theoretical model which best described the political life of second-generation Australians is partial assimilation. The pattern of political adaptation is piecemeal, complex and at times puzzling. Moreover, the ES and NES second generation shared some similarities, but mostly displayed a pattern that was different to each other and to the OAB. Indeed, if educational achievement is an indication, it is likely that inter- and intra-group differential patterns of political adaptation exist within the ES and NES second generation also.

There was no evidence of separatism. The second generation in the early 1980s appeared to have integrated into the Australian political system. Even so, as suggested in Chapter 2, the stages of assimilation are ill-defined, and the process is not linear. The incorporation of the second generation presents a complex pattern, a pattern not fully accounted for by differential socioeconomic characteristics.

Many features parallel the adaptation of the second generation in the United States earlier this century. Indeed the theoretical underpinnings of the second generation's political adaptation show that the American and Australian experience had many common threads. Perhaps the most general was that adaptation and ethnicity are interwoven in concept and reality. In both nations there were many different ethnic responses. There was a persistence of inter-group cultural differentiation to some recognisable degree in both countries, though ethno-religious effects were less in Australia. Australian and American second-generation groups seem not to have sought the same type of assimilation. In neither country were the stages clearly delineated. In neither country were the established institutions able or willing to meet the new conditions created by the rise in the educational and economic position of some 'new' groups, though in America the political parties may have adjusted more quickly. But in both countries, a dual explanation of political adaptation, involving the economic and cultural dimensions is required.

This study has some important implications for policy formulation. The effects of immigration do not end with the first generation. Whilst occupational skills and English

language competency remain important criteria in the selection of immigrants, the settlement patterns of later generations must also be considered. For example, the British second generation did not perform as well in educational achievement, income level and political participation, even though they had the advantage of English as a first language. Even so, the educational and economic performance of the NES second generation should be reassuring to government in this respect.

In terms of further research, this thesis provides a more Australian, and less American, orientation for the theoretical underpinnings of the political adaptation of second-generation Australians. A more completely Australian framework will need to be developed by future researchers. Nonetheless, there is a need for a comparative study of the Australian and American experience of later generations of immigrants. This could be illuminating particularly for earlier American analyses which used much simpler statistical methods than are now available. Of course the danger is that, as in the United States, future research in Australia will be directed at more recent immigrants and the development of research on later generations of immigrants abandoned. Comparisons with other countries which have had a large influx of immigrants are also desirable, for example, Canada, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina.

The most urgent task is to replicate the analyses of political behaviour for the *whole* population, as new data become available, to provide a basis for comparisons with future second-generation groups in Australia. As shown earlier, they will differ significantly in origin. The social, political and economic environment in Australia may well differ also. An additional task would be to identify differences in salient influences on adaptation for each era.

A serious gap in the Australian literature is the absence of extensive research on aspects of the political adaptation of British immigrants (some three-quarters of a million adults), especially in areas of high residential concentration. Indeed, insights into the adaptation of the British second generation were made more difficult by this dearth. Many studies may have presumed that they assimilated quickly, so that any research would be of no practical or theoretical value. But as the British second generation have not yet assimilated politically, this assumption is false. Whatever the case, data are becoming available, though not much for localities such as Elizabeth in South Australia or Perth in Western Australia, which have high proportions of British immigrants.

Of further interest to future research are potential differences between States in how they incorporate ethnic communities into the political sphere, particularly in

capital cities, and the effects of the local political environment. For example, does the dominance of Catholics of ES origin in the New South Wales Labor Party and union movement affect the entry of NES ethnic groups into the State political arena, compared to other States where this group is not dominant?

There is also a need for research into inter-group differences within the ES and NES second generation, and the extent to which they differ in the pattern of their political adaptation. For example, do second-generation Greek-Australians participate more actively than the Dutch, who are a less well educated and less urban origin group? Are there differences in the nature of political participation between the other ES and second-generation British groups? The former had very high income and educational levels compared to the latter, and indeed to all Australians.

Finally, some important socioeconomic characteristics of the second generation need to be analysed using more sophisticated methods, to account for age and other important influences on their settlement patterns and provide a more detailed picture of adaptation. Such analyses may have important implications for the selection of future immigrants. Australia is a nation of continuing immigration. The success of its development is tied to that most valuable resource, its people, a resource that can be, and has been since white settlement two centuries ago, the result of social engineering.

SHOW CARD 1

Now I am going to read you several statements. Some people agree with a statement, others disagree. How much do you agree or disagree that (...READ OUT FIRST STATEMENT...)

Say the number which comes closest to your opinion.

(REPEAT FOR ITEMS A TO E - RECORD ONE NUMBER FOR EACH - Y FOR DON'T KNOW)

Migrants should be encouraged to keep their ethnic identities in Australia.....

SECTION 2: RESPONDENT AND FAMILY MIGRATION

I now have some questions about where you and your family were born and brought up.

Q.7 The first few questions relate to where you and your family have lived.

SHOW CARD 5

- a) In which State or Territory of Australia or overseas country were you born?
- b) Where was your Father born?
- c) Where was your Mother born?

STATE/TERRITORY/COUNTRY	Q.7a) RESPONDENT BORN	Q.7b) FATHER BORN	Q.7c) MOTHER BORN
<u>STATE/TERRITORY, COUNTRY IN AUSTRALIA:</u>			
New South Wales.....	1	1	1
Queensland.....	2	2	2
South Australia.....	3	3	3
Tasmania.....	4	4	4
Victoria.....	5	5	5
Western Australia.....	6	6	6
Northern Territory.....	7	7	7
A.C.T. (Canberra).....	8	8	8
(Don't Know).....	Y	Y	Y
<u>OVERSEAS:</u>			
England, Scotland, Wales..	9	9	9
Northern Ireland.....	10	10	10
Irish Republic (Eire).....	11	11	11
New Zealand.....	12	12	12
Italy.....	13	13	13
Greece.....	14	14	14
Yugoslavia.....	15	15	15
Germany.....	16	16	16
Netherlands.....	17	17	17
OTHER (SPECIFY BELOW).....	18	18	18
(Don't Know).....	Y	Y	Y

RECORD HERE UNLISTED COUNTRIES:

Q.7a) RESPONDENT BORN:

Q.7b) FATHER BORN:

Q.7c) MOTHER BORN:

ASK QUESTIONS 8 & 9 ONLY IF RESPONDENT BORN OVERSEAS
(OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q.12)

- Q.8a) In what year did you first arrive in Australia? (WRITE IN) 19
- b) Are you an Australian citizen now? (ASK c)) Yes..... 1
(GO TO d)) No..... 2
- c) In what year did you become an Australian Citizen? (WRITE IN) 19
- (NOW GO TO Q.9) Citizen by birth X
- d) Do you intend to become an Australian citizen? (Is that definitely or probably yes/no?)
Definitely yes... 1
Probably yes.... 2
Probably no..... 3
Definitely no... 4
(Don't Know).... Y

Q.51a) What kind of work did you do (in your last regular job)? What is (was) your occupation called? (DESCRIBE FULLY USING 2 WORDS OR MORE - AVOID INITIALS OR ABBREVIATIONS. WHERE POSSIBLE, INCLUDE AWARD OR GOVERNMENT DESIGNATION. FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, STATE RANK) ----- ----- ----- ----- -----	Q.77a) <u>SHOW CARD 31</u> Which was the first Federal election you voted in? <u>RECORD CODE FROM CARD</u> <u>OR CIRCLE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:-</u> EXACT DATE NOT KNOWN BUT:- After 2nd World War..... 28 During 2nd World War..... 29 Before 2nd World War..... 30 (SKIP TO Q.78) [Too young to vote in 1983..... 31 [Has not yet voted, although old enough..... 32 [(Don't Know)..... 33
b) (IF NOT ALREADY COVERED) Please tell me a little more about what you do (did) in that job - what were your main duties? ----- ----- ----- ----- -----	b) Which party did you vote for in your first election? IF NECESSARY ENCOURAGE A GUESS Australian Labor Party.... 1 Liberal Party; United Australia Party..... 2 National Country Party.... 3 Democratic Labor Party.... 4 Australian Democrat..... 5 Australia Party..... 6 Communist Party..... 7 Other Party..... 8 (Can't Remember/Don't Know)..... Y
c) What kind of business or industry is (was) that in? What do (did) they make or do at the place where you work (worked)? ----- ----- ----- ----- -----	Q.78a) Generally speaking, in Federal politics do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National Country Party, or Australian Democrat? Liberal..... 1 Labor..... 2 National Country Party..... 3 Australian Democrat.... 4 Other..... 5 (SKIP TO c) [None, no party..... 6 [(Don't Know)..... 7 b) How strongly (..say name of party..) do you feel - very strongly, fairly strongly or not very strongly? Very strongly..... 1 Fairly strongly..... 2 Not very strongly..... 3 (Don't Know)..... Y c) Generally speaking in State politics do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National Country Party, or Australian Democrats? Liberal..... 1 Labor..... 2 National Country Party..... 3 Australian Democrat.... 4 Other..... 5 None/no party..... 6 (Don't Know)..... Y

9 Did your father have any particular preference for one of the parties when you were young; say about 14 years old? (Which party was that?) FATHER IN AUSTRALIA AT THE TIME: Liberal -- includes Nationalist and United Australia Party (U.A.P.)..... 1 Labor..... 2 National Country Party..... 3 Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.)..... 4 Australian Democrat..... 5 FATHER IN BRITAIN AT THE TIME: (British) Conservative Party..... 6 (British) Liberal Party..... 7 (British) Labour Party..... 8 FATHER IN OTHER COUNTRY AT THE TIME: Other (SPECIFY PARTY BELOW)..... 9 DON'T KNOW & NO ANSWER & NO PREFERENCE: Father had no preference for any party..... 10 Father dead or absent when young..... 11 (Don't Know)..... Y <u>SPECIFY OTHER</u>	Q. 96 What is your religious denomination? Is it Protestant, Catholic, some other religion, no religion, or what? <u>(RECORD ONE CODE)</u>
Did your mother have any particular preference for one of the parties when you were young, say about 14 years? (Which party was that?) MOTHER IN AUSTRALIA AT THE TIME: Liberal -- includes Nationalist and United Australia Party (U.A.P.)..... 1 Labor..... 2 National Country Party..... 3 Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.)..... 4 Australian Democrat..... 5 MOTHER IN BRITAIN AT THE TIME: (British) Conservative Party..... 6 (British) Liberal Party..... 7 (British) Labour Party..... 8 MOTHER IN OTHER COUNTRY AT THE TIME: Other (SPECIFY PARTY BELOW)..... 9 DON'T KNOW & NO ANSWER & NO PREFERENCE: Mother had no preference for any party..... 10 Mother dead or absent when young..... 11 (Don't Know)..... Y <u>SPECIFY OTHER</u>	<u>(RECORD ONE CODE IN RIGHT HAND COLUMN)</u> <u>MAJOR CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS</u> Roman Catholic..... 1 Catholic - Not Roman..... 2 Church of England..... 3 Methodist..... 4 Orthodox..... 5 Presbyterian..... 6 Uniting Church..... 7 <u>OTHER CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS</u> Armenian Apostolic..... 8 Baptist..... 9 Bretheren..... 10 Churches of Christ..... 11 Congregational..... 12 Jehovah's Witness..... 13 Latter Day Saints, Mormon..... 14 Lutheran..... 15 Pentecostal..... 16 Salvation Army..... 17 Seventh Day Adventist..... 18 OTHER Protestant (SPECIFY)..... 19 ----- OTHER Christian (SPECIFY)..... 20 ----- <u>NON-CHRISTIAN AND OTHER</u> No Religion (so described)..... 21 Buddhist..... 22 Hebrew, Jewish..... 23 Muslim..... 24 OTHER Non-Christian..... 25 (No Answer/Don't Know)..... Y
By the way, are you registered to vote at this or some other address? Registered at this address..... 1 Registered at another address..... 2 Not registered..... 3 (Don't Know)..... Y	
On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Australia. Very satisfied..... 1 Fairly satisfied..... 2 Not very satisfied..... 3 Not at all satisfied..... 4 Are you... (READ OUT) (Don't Know)..... Y	

SECTION 14: INSTITUTIONS

Now some questions about this country and the people and organisations in it...

Q.109 SHOW CARD 41

Using this card as a guide, how much confidence do you have in the following institutions in this country?

How much confidence do you have in...

(READ OUT EACH IN TURN - RECORD ONE CODE FOR EACH - Y FOR DON'T KNOW)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| a) Banks and financial institutions..... | ----- |
| b) The Federal government in Canberra..... | ----- |
| c) The police..... | ----- |
| d) The <u>state</u> government here in (,SAY THIS STATE,) | ----- |
| e) Private schools..... | ----- |
| f) The military..... | ----- |
| g) The Liberal Party..... | ----- |
| h) Universities..... | ----- |
| i) The Labor Party..... | ----- |
| j) The press..... | ----- |
| k) Major Australian Companies..... | ----- |
| l) Trade Unions..... | ----- |
| m) State (government) schools..... | ----- |
| n) The National (Country) Party..... | ----- |
| o) Small business..... | ----- |

Q.113 In general, do you feel that people in Government are only interested in looking after themselves, or do you feel they can be trusted to do the right thing?

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Looking after themselves..... | 1 |
| Doing the right thing..... | 2 |
| (Don't know)..... | Y |

SECTION 15: PERSONAL COMMITMENT & ACTIVITIES

Now we would like to turn to some of the things that people do when they feel strongly about decisions made by politicians and public officials.

Q.115 SHOW CARD 43

If you felt strongly about something, how likely is it that you would do something to get the authorities to change their mind?

Using the card as a guide, how likely is it that you would...

(READ OUT EACH ITEM - WRITE IN ONE NUMBER (OR 'Y' FOR DON'T KNOW) FOR EACH)

- | | |
|--|-------|
| a) Write to a newspaper..... | ----- |
| b) Go on a <u>protest march</u> , as long as it was legal..... | ----- |
| c) Go on a <u>protest march</u> , even though it was <u>banned</u> by the authorities..... | ----- |
| d) Attend a public meeting..... | ----- |
| e) Try to block traffic..... | ----- |
| f) Help to collect signatures for a petition.. | ----- |
| g) Help others trying to disrupt a march or meeting to which you object..... | ----- |

How much interest do you generally have in what's going on in politics?	A good deal.....	1	Q.116a) Have you, or anyone in your family living here ever contacted a government official about some need or problem concerning the community as a whole?	(ASK b)) — Yes.....	1
	Some.....	2		(SKIP TO Q.117) — No.....	2
	Not much.....	3		(Don't Know) Y	Y
Do you have... (READ OUT)	(Don't Know).....	Y			
In political matters, people talk about the 'left' and the 'right'.	Strongly to the left...	1	b) IF 'YES'		
Would you say you are to the left, the centre, or to the right?	Somewhat to the left...	2	Which of the following officials have you contacted?		
	In the centre.....	3	(READ OUT - RECORD ALL CONTACTS)		
	Somewhat to the right..	4	A federal member of parliament.....	1	
IF 'LEFT' OR 'RIGHT' (Don't Know).....	Strongly to the right..	5	Some other federal government official.....	2	
Is that somewhat or strongly (left/right?)		Y	A state member of parliament.....	3	
			Some other state government official.....	4	
			Your local councillor or some other local government official.....	5	
			(None of these/Don't Know).....	Y	
SHOW CARD 45			Q.117a) Have you, or anyone in your family living here ever contacted a government official to seek help with a personal problem you or your family had?	(ASK b)) — Yes.....	1
Suppose that the right end of this scale shows the people in this town who have the greatest power to influence the politics, while the other end shows those who have no power at all.				(SKIP TO Q.118) — No.....	2
a) Where would you locate yourself on the scale?				(Don't Know) Y	Y
(WRITE IN NUMBER - 1 TO 10 OR Y FOR DON'T KNOW)					
b) And how about politics in Australia as a whole?			b) IF 'YES'		
How much power do you have?.....			Which of the following officials have you contacted?		
			(READ OUT - RECORD ALL CONTACTS)		
			A federal member of parliament.....	1	
			Some other federal government official.....	2	
			A state member of parliament.....	3	
			Some other state government official.....	4	
			Your local councillor or some other local government-official.....	5	
			(None of these/Don't Know).....	Y	
SHOW CARD 46			Q.118 We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or candidate win an election.		
a) Suppose there was some question which you had to take to a government department, concerning say, a social welfare matter or a building regulation. Do you think that you would be treated as well as anyone else or that others would be treated more sympathetically?			SHOW CARD 44		
Which statement applies?			During the last campaign did you...		
(RECORD IN LEFT HAND COLUMN)			(READ OUT EACH ACTIVITY - RECORD ONE CODE, Y FOR DON'T KNOW FOR EACH)		
b) Suppose you had a problem which needed the help of your MP. Do you think that you would be treated as well as everyone else or do you think that others would be given more attention?			a) Talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates.....		
(RECORD IN RIGHT HAND COLUMN)			b) Go to any political meetings, rallies, fund raising dinners or things like that....		
	a) Dept.	b) M.P.	c) Do any work for one of the parties or candidates, for example, making a speech putting up posters, or working in a candidate's office.....		
Others would definitely get better treatment.....	1	1	d) At any time, have you worked or co-operated with others in this community to try to solve some of the community's problems?....		
Others would probably get better treatment.....	2	2			
I would probably be treated as well as anyone else.....	3	3	Q.119a) When you read the newspaper or watch T.V., how much attention do you pay to news about government or politics?		
I would definitely be treated as well as anyone else.....	4	4	Do you pay... A great deal of attention.....	1	
(It depends) (volunteered).....	X	X	(READ OUT) Some attention.....	2	
(Don't Know).....	Y	Y	Not much attention.....	3	
			None at all.....	4	
			(Don't Know).....	Y	
4 If you were to explain your point of view to your MP, would he give it serious consideration, pay only a little attention, or ignore what you had to say?			b) By the way, on an average day about how many hours of T.V. would you watch?		
Give it serious consideration.....	1		(WRITE IN).....		
Pay only a little attention.....	2		None.....	0	
Ignore what you had to say.....	3		(Don't Know).....	Y	
(It depends) (volunteered).....	4				
(Don't Know).....	Y				

21. What is the gross income (including pensions and/or allowances) that each person usually receives each week from all sources? • If unable to estimate income on a weekly basis, tick the appropriate box to show present income on an annual basis. • Count all income, wages, salary, overtime, family allowance (child maintenance), pensions, superannuation, tips and gratuities, business or farm income (less expenses of operation), unemployment benefits, etc.. • Do not deduct tax, superannuation, health insurance, etc..		No income ☐ 1 Less than \$19 p.wk. ☐ 2 Less than \$1000 p.yr. ☐ 3 \$19 to \$38 p.wk. ☐ 4 \$1000 to \$2000 p.yr. ☐ 5 \$39 to \$58 p.wk. ☐ 6 \$2001 to \$3000 p.yr. ☐ 7 \$59 to \$77 p.wk. ☐ 8 \$3001 to \$4000 p.yr. ☐ 9 \$78 to \$115 p.wk. ☐ 10 \$4001 to \$6000 p.yr. ☐ 11 \$116 to \$154 p.wk. ☐ 12 \$6001 to \$8000 p.yr. ☐ 13 \$155 to \$192 p.wk. ☐ 14 \$8001 to \$10000 p.yr. ☐ 15 \$193 to \$231 p.wk. ☐ 16 \$10001 to \$12000 p.yr. ☐ 17 \$232 to \$288 p.wk. ☐ 18 \$12001 to \$15000 p.yr. ☐ 19 \$289 to \$346 p.wk. ☐ 20 \$15001 to \$18000 p.yr. ☐ 21 \$347 to \$423 p.wk. ☐ 22 \$18001 to \$22000 p.yr. ☐ 23 \$424 to \$500 p.wk. ☐ 24 \$22001 to \$26000 p.yr. ☐ 25 Over \$500 p.wk. ☐ 26 Over \$26000 p.yr. ☐ 27	
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Classification of Occupation, One Persons Sample File, 1981 Census

(n)		ANU Status	Census Code	Occupation
65	0.0	1	(1)	Architects, Professional
135	0.1		(2)	Civil Engineers, Professional
137	0.1		(3)	Elec. Com. Catn Engrs, Professional
97	0.1		(4)	Mechanical Engineers, Professional
86	0.1		(5)	Engineers, Professional NEC
45	0.0		(6)	Surveyors Professional
58	0.0		(7)	Other Professionals, etc.
67	0.0		(8)	Chemist, not Pharmacautical
43	0.0		(9)	Geologists, Geophysicists
44	0.0		(10)	Other Chem., Physts, Geol.
32	0.0		(11)	Med. Sc. Technologists, Professional
57	0.0		(12)	Agron, Forest., Hort., Scientist
52	0.0		(13)	Other Biol., Vets, Agron.
252	0.2		(14)	Medical Practitioners
56	0.0		(15)	Dentists
992	0.7		(16)	Nurse, Certificated, General
43	0.0		(17)	Nurse, Certificated, Psychy
51	0.0		(18)	Nurse, Cert., not General or Psychy.
133	0.1		(19)	Nurse, so described, no Cert.
186	0.1		(20)	Nurse, Prob. or Trainee
95	0.1		(21)	Pharmacists
31	0.0		(22)	Physiotherapists
22	0.0		(23)	Radiographers
103	0.1		(24)	Other Professional Medical Wrks NEC
93	0.1		(25)	Executive Teachers
2009	1.4		(26)	Lecturers, Teachers, Tertiary Quals
203	0.1		(27)	Other Teachers, no Tertiary Quals
88	0.1		(28)	Pre-School Teachers
153	0.1		(29)	Other Educ. Institutions, Teacher
154	0.1		(30)	Estab. not Ed. Institutions, Teacher
115	0.1		(31)	Clergymen, Priests
47	0.0		(32)	Religious Workers NEC
167	0.1		(33)	Law Professionals
114	0.1		(34)	Painters, Sculpts, related Artists
177	0.1		(35)	Authors, Journalists, related Workers
83	0.1		(36)	Musician, Vocalists, Music Teachers
84	0.1		(37)	Actors, Announcers, Dancers
329	0.2		(38)	Draftsmen & Tracers
209	0.1		(39)	Physical Sc. Technicians
82	0.1		(40)	Civil Engineer Technicians
163	0.1		(41)	Elect., Electronic Engr Teachers
39	0.0		(42)	Mechanical Engineer Technicians
17	0.0		(43)	Metallurgical Technicians
59	0.0		(44)	Engineering Technicians NEC
103	0.1		(45)	Medical Science Technicians
50	0.0		(46)	Other Draftsmen & Teachers NEC
390	0.3		(47)	Accountants, Auditors
73	0.1		(48)	Social Workers, Professional

84	0.1		(49)	Social, Welfare Workers, Other
66	0.0		(50)	Librarian, Archivists, Professional
41	0.0		(51)	Librarian, Archivists, Other
38	0.0		(52)	Economists, Economic Consultants
94	0.1		(53)	Personnel Specialists
99	0.1		(54)	Computer Programmers
88	0.1		(55)	Systems Analysts, Computer
34	0.0		(56)	Designers, NEC
119	0.1	1	(57)	Other Professional, Teacher, NEC
83	0.1	2	(58)	Aust. Gov. & Rep. O-S Consult. Agencies
73	0.1		(59)	State Government
44	0.0		(60)	Local Government
36	0.0		(61)	Ag. Svcs, Forest., Fish., Hunt., Min.
602	0.4		(62)	Manufacturing, Various Services
258	0.2		(63)	Building & Construction
1147	0.8		(64)	Wholesale, Retail Etc. NEC
151	0.1		(65)	Transport, Storage Communication
330	0.2		(66)	Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
214	0.1		(67)	Community, Other Services etc.
85	0.1		(68)	Entertainment, Rec., Club, Persl Sys.
187	0.1		(69)	Restaurant, Hostels, Accommodation
94	0.1	2	(70)	Other & Inad. Desc. or NS
1057	0.7	3	(71)	Book-Keepers, Cashiers, Bank Tellers
1000	0.7		(72)	Stenographers, Typists
451	0.3		(73)	Office Machine Operators
471	0.3		(74)	Receptionists, Female
2929	2.0		(75)	Clerical, Government NEC
5079	3.5		(76)	Clerical, not Government NEC
117	0.1		(77)	Valuers, Insurance Salesmen
267	0.2		(78)	Auctioneers, Valuers, Real Estate
500	0.3	3	(79)	Acmm Travelp., Manufacturing Agents
466	0.3	2	(80)	Trade Salesmen, Shop Assistants, etc.
30	0.0	5	(81)	Sales Engineers <SD>
3354	2.3	5	(82)	Salesmen, Shop Assistants, NEC
76	0.1	6	(83)	Street Venders, Canvrs, News Venders
151	0.1	6	(84)	Service Station Attendants
46	0.0	2	(85)	Buyers, NEC
71	0.0	2	(86)	Purchasing Officers
166	0.1	6	(87)	Salesmen, NEC
49	0.0	1	(88)	Wheat Farmers
118	0.1	2	(89)	Fruit Growers not Grape
97	0.1	2	(90)	Vegetable Growers, Market Gardeners
627	0.4	3	(91)	Graziers
356	0.2	3	(92)	Dairy Farmers
41	0.0	3	(93)	Poultry Farmers
240	0.2	1	(94)	Wheat & Sheep Farmers <SD>
690	0.5	3	(95)	Farmers Mixed & Fars <SD>
69	0.0	3	(96)	Nurserymen, Flower Gardeners
137	0.1	3	(97)	Farmer, Farm Managers, NEC
203	0.1	3	(98)	Other Farmers & Farm Managers
25	0.0	6	(99)	Wheat, Wheat & Sheep
86	0.1		(100)	Fruit, Grape Growing Workers
243	0.2		(101)	Station Hands, Drovers, etc
47	0.0		(102)	Shearers
40	0.0		(103)	Dairy Farm Workers

232	0.2		(104)	Gardeners, Nursery Workers
90	0.1		(105)	Ground & Green Keepers, Caretakers
34	0.0		(106)	Poultry Farm Workers
408	0.3	6	(107)	Farm Workers-Mixed Farm, F-er, F-ing
8	0.0	1	(108)	Wool Classers
6	0.0	6	(109)	Hunters, Trappers
99	0.1		(110)	Fishermen & related Workers
84	0.1		(111)	Timber, Forestry Workers
30	0.0		(112)	Miners <SD> NEC
96	0.1		(113)	Miners, Coal <SD>
12	0.0		(114)	Deputies & Supervisors, Mining
54	0.0		(115)	Labourers, Mine & Quarry <SD>
102	0.1		(116)	Other Miners, Quarry, Mining Prospectors
18	0.0		(117)	Well Drillers, Oil, Water & Rel. Workers
35	0.0	6	(118)	Ore, Mining, Treatment Workers
29	0.0	1	(119)	Deck Engineer Officers, Ship
52	0.0	5	(120)	Deck, Engineer Room Hands
36	0.0	1	(121)	Air-Pilots, Navigators, Engineers
60	0.0	5	(122)	Drivers, Firemen, Rail Transport Drivers
36	0.0		(123)	Firemen, Assistant Drivers
194	0.1		(124)	Motor Bus Drivers
177	0.1		(125)	Car, Taxi, Hire Car Drivers
1509	1.0		(126)	Other Drivers Road Transport
34	0.0	5	(127)	Guards, Conductors, Railway
36	0.0	3	(128)	Contr, Despatch, Station Masters, Railway
66	0.0	5	(129)	Ticket Collectors, Porters, Rail
36	0.0	5	(130)	Shunters, Railway
109	0.1	5	(131)	Cwth Inspectors, Sup, Traffic Cont. etc.
188	0.1	3	(132)	Telephonists, Phonogram Operators
52	0.0		(133)	Other Phone, Telegraph Telecom Operators
31	0.0		(134)	Postmasters
185	0.1		(135)	Postmasters, Post Assistants, Postal Offr
74	0.1		(136)	Messengers NEC
114	0.1	5	(137)	Worker Transport, Comm. NEC
69	0.0		(138)	Textile Factory Workers <SD>
32	0.0		(139)	Other Spin., Weav., Knitd, Dyers
41	0.0	4	(140)	Dressmaker
119	0.1		(141)	Upholsterers & related Workers
41	0.0		(142)	Cutters, Textile Prod., Leather, Glovs
116	0.1	5	(143)	Machine, Sew, Embdrs, Tx., Lth., Gmt, Glve
37	0.0		(144)	Clothing & related Factory Workers <SD>
66	0.0		(145)	Other Tailors, Cutters, Furriers
59	0.0		(146)	Sewers <Glve & Gment, Boot & Shoe Ftry>
24	0.0		(147)	Other Leather Cutters etc.
21	0.0	5	(148)	Mlder & rel Workers, Roll. Mill Operators
38	0.0	4	(149)	Moulders, Ccremakers
78	0.1	5	(150)	Other Furnacemen, Rollers etc.
61	0.0	4	(151)	Jewlr W-Makers & rel, Off. Mach. Mechs
42	0.0		(152)	Jewellery Maker Repair, Jewl Engravers
115	0.1		(153)	Precision Instrument Makers, Repair
848	0.6		(154)	Mechs, Plmbrs, Ft. Metal, Ft & Trnrs <SD>
112	0.1		(155)	Machine Tool Makers, Die. Makers, Metal
94	0.1		(156)	Machine Tool Setrs & Operators Metal
59	0.0		(157)	Vehicle Body Builders
703	0.5		(158)	Motor Vehicle Mechanics

65	0.0	4	(159)	Aircraft Mechanics
150	0.1	5	(160)	Sheet Metal Workers
156	0.1	5	(161)	Panel Beaters
321	0.2	4	(162)	Plumbers
251	0.2		(163)	Welder & Frame Cutters
322	0.2		(164)	Boiler Makers, M-Plate & S-Steel Workers
189	0.1		(165)	Engravers <SD>, not Professional, NEC
330	0.2	4	(166)	Mechanics, Servicemen <SD> NEC
129	0.1	5	(167)	Metal Workers NEC
60	0.0	4	(168)	Mach. Tl Makers, M-Mach., Mech., Plmbrs
602	0.4		(169)	Electricians, Electrical Mechanics
189	0.1		(170)	Electrical Fitters
53	0.0		(171)	Electronic Fitters
67	0.0		(172)	Radio TV Mechanics, Repairmen
163	0.1	4	(173)	Telecommunication Technicians
287	0.2	5	(174)	Linemen, Electrical, Cable Jointrs
58	0.0		(175)	Electrical, Electronic Workers, NEC
46	0.0		(176)	Electronic Workers, Electrical Mechanics
89	0.1		(177)	Assemblers, Proc. Workers Mt. & El.
382	0.3		(178)	Factory Workers Met. & Elec. <SD>
68	0.0	5	(179)	Iron Workers, Metal Workers, <SD>
128	0.1	6	(180)	Tradesmens Assts, Metal & Electrical
64	0.0	5	(181)	Inspectors etc. Metal, Electrical NEC
755	0.5	4	(182)	Carpenters, Joiners
149	0.1	4	(183)	Cabinetmakers
63	0.0	5	(184)	Woodworking Machinists
157	0.1	5	(185)	Sawmill, Timberyard Workers NEC
35	0.0	5	(186)	Woodworking Factory Workers <SD> NEC
82	0.1	5	(187)	Cwth Woodworkers
372	0.3	4	(188)	Paint Decors, Building Constr. & Maint.
128	0.1		(189)	Painters NEC
223	0.2		(190)	Bricklayers
116	0.1		(191)	Plasterers
110	0.1		(192)	Concrete & Terrazzo Workers
34	0.0		(193)	Glaziers
46	0.0		(194)	Tilers, Ceramic, Floor, Wall
99	0.1	4	(195)	Foremen, Build. & Constr., NEC
34	0.0	6	(196)	Building Trademens Assts, NEC
49	0.0	6	(197)	Pipelayers, Construction
441	0.3	6	(198)	Building & Construction Workers NEC
71	0.0	4	(199)	Compositors & Typesetters
212	0.1		(200)	Printing Machinists, Printers <SD>
30	0.0		(201)	Photo-Engravers, Engravers
52	0.0		(202)	Bookbinders
38	0.0	4	(203)	Other Printing Workers
78	0.1	5	(204)	Potters, Kilnmen, Glass-Clay
166	0.1	4	(205)	Bakers, Pastrycooks
396	0.3	5	(206)	Butchers, Meat Cutters
89	0.1		(207)	Food Preservers, Canners
69	0.0		(208)	Food & Drink Process Workers NEC
107	0.1		(209)	Other Millers, Bakers, Butchers, Brewers
184	0.1		(210)	Chemical, Sugar Paper Prodn
14	0.0		(211)	Tobac. Preprs, Tobac. Prodt.
43	0.0		(212)	Rubber Product Workers
113	0.1	5	(213)	Plastic Product Workers

28	0.0	4	(214)	Photographic Print & Developers
30	0.0	5	(215)	Paper Product Makers
131	0.1	5	(216)	Other PP, Rubber, PP Workers
244	0.2	6	(217)	Packers, Wrappers, Labellers
50	0.0	5	(218)	Stationary Engine Drivers
37	0.0		(219)	Boiler Firemen
109	0.1		(220)	Crane & Hoist Operators
64	0.0		(221)	Riggers & Cable Splicers
276	0.2		(222)	Op. Earth Movs, Other Constr. Machine
196	0.1	5	(223)	Excavating & Lift, Equipment Operators
72	0.0	6	(224)	Waterside Workers NEC
902	0.6	6	(225)	Storemen, Storemen Packer <SD>
83	0.1	6	(226)	Freight Handlers NEC
68	0.0	5	(227)	Rlwy & Trmwy Reprmen, Fetlr & Labrers
63	0.0	6	(228)	Manuf.-Txle, Cloth, Footwear
374	0.3	6	(229)	Mtl & Prod., Tpt & Ind., Equ., H-Hold Ap.
61	0.0	5	(230)	Wood, W-Prod., Furniture, Mattress
195	0.1	6	(231)	Food, Beverages, Tobacco
89	0.1		(232)	Glass, Clay, Non Metal Products
27	0.0		(233)	Chemical, Petrol, Coal Products
83	0.1		(234)	Other Manufacturing
118	0.1	6	(235)	Transport, Storage, Communications
380	0.3		(236)	Building & Construction
194	0.1		(237)	Elect., Gas etc. ASIC3500-3702, 8495
224	0.2		(238)	Wholesale, Retail Trade
566	0.4		(239)	Other Labourers, NEC
42	0.0		(240)	Apprentices <SD> NEC
116	0.1	6	(241)	Factory Workers <SD> NEC
641	0.4	5	(242)	Foremen <SD> NEC
624	0.4	5	(243)	Machinists <SD> NEC
104	0.1	6	(244)	Fire Brigade, Fire Prevention Workers
330	0.2	3	(245)	Policemen
210	0.1	6	(246)	Other Protective Services Workers
86	0.1		(247)	Housekeepers
366	0.3		(248)	Cooks, Chefs
385	0.3		(249)	Maids-Hotel, Hospital, Cabin Stewards
494	0.3		(250)	Catering & Kit. Workers, Canteen Assts
166	0.1		(251)	Domestic Workers, Private H-Hold
206	0.1		(252)	Other Domestic Service Workers
326	0.2		(253)	Waiters
342	0.2		(254)	Bartenders
49	0.0		(255)	Caretakers, Office & Buildings
986	0.7		(256)	Cleaners, Office & Buildings
348	0.2		(257)	Barbers, H-Dressers, Beauticians
151	0.1		(258)	Launders, Dry Clean, Pressers
73	0.1		(259)	Athletes, Sportsmen etc.
63	0.0		(260)	Photographer & Camera Operators
14	0.0		(261)	Undertakers, Crematrm Workers
92	0.1		(262)	Sport & Recreation Workers NEC
211	0.1		(263)	Nursing Aides & Trainees
46	0.0		(264)	Ambulance Officers
285	0.2		(265)	Attnt, Asst Hospital, Other Medical
90	0.1	6	(266)	Other Service Workers NEC
624	0.4	3	(267)	Members of Armed Services

**Classification of Religious Denomination, One Per cent Persons Sample
File, 1981 Census**

1. PROTESTANT

Baptist
Brethren
Churches of Christ
Church of England
Congregational
Jehovahs Witness
Latter Day Saints, Mormon
Lutheran
Methodist
Pentocostal
Presbyterian
Salvation Army
Seventh Day Adventist
Uniting Church
Protestant Other

2. CATHOLIC

Catholic - Roman
Catholic - not Roman

3. OTHER

Armenian Apostolic
Orthodox
Buddhist
Hebrew
Muslim
Non-Christain NEI
Christain NEI

4. NONE

No Religion, so desc.

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