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**SECURITY ISSUES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE IMPETUS
FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN THE 1990s**

by
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


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Declaration

I declare that this sub-thesis is my own work and that all sources used have been
acknowledged



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBMs: Confidence Building Measures

CSBMs: Confidence and Security Building Measures

DLP: Democratic Liberal Party

DJP: Democratic Justice Party

DMZ: De-Militarised Zone

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GNP: Gross National Product

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

KAL: Korean Air Lines

LDCs: Less Developed Countries

LDP: Liberal Democratic Party

MIAs: Missing in Action

NCND: Neither Confirm Nor Deny

NDRP: New Democratic Republic Party

NIEs: Newly Industrialised Economies

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA: Negative Security Assurance

OSI: On-Site Inspection

PRC: Peoples Republic of China

ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

RDP: Reunification Democratic Party

SSOD: Special Session on Disarmament

UNC: United Nations Command

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

Introduction

This dissertation sets out to examine the prospects for security and peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula. It must be noted that the research for the main points of this dissertation was largely completed in 1989-1990, and was based largely on materials available at that time. Since then, the world's political picture has changed substantially. The fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and the great changes in Eastern Europe have therefore meant that some of the assumptions, particularly those concerning North Korea and its external support, are no longer as valid as they were when the research for this dissertation was undertaken. In spite of this, the internal engine of North Korean policy on the Korean peninsula remains almost unchanged and may remain that way until the end of Kim Il Sung's regime.

Security on the Korean peninsula is still volatile and, to some extent, unstable. Politically, economically and militarily, both the the South (the Republic of Korea: RoK) and North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: DPRK) are facing uncertain times. As in the past their leaders (both North and South) are still inclined to exploit the threat posed by the other for domestic, political purposes, and this tendency will continue to impede South -North dialogue and reconciliation.¹ One example of this can be seen in the great differences in the basic positions of the two Korean governments, over the South's proposal for the 'Korean National Community Unification Formula,' and the North's 'Comprehensive Peace Proposal'. They have their own positions in the 'South-North Prime Ministers' Talks', from which they find it difficult to reach agreement. Kim Il Sung's two-pronged strategy toward South Korea, to continue intermittent negotiations through official channels and to make a direct approach to the divergent political groups in South Korea, has the effect of a double-edged sword.² While it may help strengthen South Korean public opinion against the South Korean government and against the presence of US forces in South Korea, its

official contacts and agreements could potentially backfire upon the North. Meanwhile, South Korea's diplomacy has achieved considerable success in enhancing security through establishing economic and political interests throughout the world.³ Thus, it has enhanced the confidence of the South's leadership.

The South's economic growth seems certain to contribute to shifting the military balance decisively in its own favour.⁴ Given this fact and the North's previous behaviour, it is realistic to assume that there is the potential for the North's leadership to feel tempted to launch at least limited military strikes to cripple the South's economy.⁵ The Korean peninsula is highlighted as 'one of the world's military flash points'.⁶ The De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) has become more militarily fortified than ever and is now the most densely militarized area of the world.⁷ As little progress has been made toward easing tensions between the two Koreas, the outlook for peace on the peninsula is not promising. That is to say, given the difficulties in resolving these many destabilizing factors, there seems little chance for a near-term breakthrough agreement on concrete mechanisms for stability between the two Koreas.

If this is so, can we say that the radical changes in international politics and the Eastern European countries in particular have no effect on the peninsula at all? To examine this more closely it is worth considering the context in which North Korea finds itself. Despite a slow pace of reform, mainly due to its highly closed and centrally controlled society, the Kim Il Sung regime may not, in the end, be able to resist the main stream forces of change. It can neither remain aloof from internal and external pressures nor ignore the need to resolve its long standing political and military problems.⁸

Kim Il Sung frankly acknowledged the seriousness of the international political changes that had developed in spite of North Korea's steadfast design to bring about a unified communist *chuché* (self-reliance) republic in the peninsula.⁹

In the face of these unfavourable changes, he looks set to induce socio-political changes slowly.¹⁰ As history shows, the key to change in North Korea would be a leadership change, either through the death of Kim Il Sung or the decay of his grip on power.¹¹ Even without this, there are some negative trends emerging such as the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union in particular, North Korea could not but decide to change its foreign policy, especially toward Japan, even though it internally continues to keep his *chuché* option open.

As the importance of ideology in determining the international orientation of countries continues to decline, South Korea's pragmatic approach seems to have been more effective.¹² Despite the success of its economic development South Korea continues to tread carefully when it comes to its 'northern policy.' It has asked North Korea and the major powers to acknowledge 'cross-recognition' and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. It has continued to consolidate its growing international standing and to gain greater access to the Soviet Union and China (the People's Republic of China: PRC). Now, more than ever, it has a compelling interest in avoiding war through the easing of tensions on the peninsula.¹³

There are limited attempts to improve South-North relations, proposing, for example, a summit between Roh Tae Woo and Kim Il Sung.¹⁴ But North Korea, even though it has a need to break out of its economic and political isolation,¹⁵ remains defensive, falling back on previous negotiating positions. In this sense, there remain many stumbling blocks to progress in the South-North dialogue which obstruct the way for peaceful coexistence and eventual reunification. Therefore, the effects of the recent dramatic changes in international superpower and European politics on the security of the two Koreas can be read as either positive or negative. This complicates any attempt to analyse the security picture on the Korean peninsula, and renders any attempt at prediction problematic.

The need for war-avoidance and peaceful coexistence on the peninsula has increased in recent times, particularly from South Korea's point of view. To sustain their economic interdependence, the Western-oriented countries (South Korea, Japan and the US) have come to consider peaceful strategies crucial. The US and Japan have common interests in the security and economic development of South Korea,¹⁶ although Japan has reason to be wary of the economic power of a unified Korea. These countries seem to share a range of fundamental interests in regional stability that will endure after the confrontation between North and South is resolved.¹⁷ Since the Carter Administration, the US has hoped that the major powers' influence on the Korean question could open the way to persuading the North to accept the situation and to learn to live peacefully with the South.¹⁸ The Soviet Union and China also are coming to recognize the reality of the Korean peninsula's composition, increasing their economic relations with South Korea and dissuading North Korea from military adventurism.¹⁹ An important development is China's growing interest in encouraging both Koreas to pursue dialogue and to seek ways of reconciling their differences.²⁰ China's reasons for wanting stability in Korea are obvious. A military conflict there would draw it in as North Korea's ally and would severely damage its important relations with the US and Japan.²¹ Thus China's own interest in gaining access to Western technology and capital for its economic modernization has prompted it to look for ways of easing tensions between the two Koreas.²² With the Gorbachev-Deng Summit in May 1989, Sino-Soviet détente may have influenced North Korea's foreign policy decision-making, possibly resulting in moderate moves from the North.²³ In September 1990, the two foreign ministers, Shevardnadze and Qian Qichen, agreed that tensions on the peninsula should be eased and South-North dialogue should be encouraged.²⁴ Another important development is the Soviet position, which went further to the way to establishing formal ties with the South. The Soviet Union has pledged to work with South Korea to reduce tensions in Asia and create conditions for the eventual reunification of Korea. Thus, the present development in the major

powers' foreign policy toward the two Koreas is most likely to contribute to conflict reduction in the peninsula, providing prerequisite conditions for the solution of the Korean problems by political means, not by military means.²⁵

More importantly, the two Koreas have strongly expressed their concern about a second Korean war. South Korea, in its 'White Paper on National Defence' in December 1988, argued that a mechanism for peaceful coexistence should be provided to avoid another war in the peninsula. Seoul has set out a policy to build a Korean National Community with Pyongyang in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity.²⁶ The justification for the peoples of both Koreas to 'seek some ways for dialogue and peaceful coexistence' lies in the argument that 'we must once again renew our determination to prevent the peninsula from turning into a battleground and demonstrate our intelligence for the sake of the nation's survival'.²⁷ North Korea insisted in the editorial of its state news agency, *Rodong Shinmun*, on 23 July 1988 that the two Koreas should open the road to peace and the peaceful unification rather than intensify confrontation and tension. Subsequently, it agreed to hold the South-North Prime Ministers' Talks, which are regarded as a *de facto* recognition by itself of the South Korean government. In fact, North Korea has intentionally tried to avoid any dealings with the South Korean government, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of it.²⁸ But with this recent development peaceful coexistence seems to be possible, if North Korea follows further moderate policies and demonstrates an intention to cooperate with the South in improving inter-Korean relations. Thus, the external and internal drives and impetus to avoid war and establish the system for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas have become stronger than at any previous time.

While North Korea will have little choice but to accept or obstruct the economic and military superiority of the South, the possibility cannot be ruled out completely that North Korea will act rashly order to counter rivalry with South Korea.²⁹ South Korea has successfully handled difficult global economic

circumstances. Moreover, it has also successfully attracted prestigious international gatherings. Inevitably North Korea would be concerned about these developments. In this context it seems difficult to predict either if or when North Korea will adapt itself to the new trend of international politics and the South's advancement and develop new policies to solve the inter-Korean behaviour issues peacefully.³⁰ This uncertainty in North Korea's behaviour could also be analysed in terms of the fact that military tensions still remain high, because the two Koreas have been locked in a mutually destructive (and in the 1990s, anachronistic) arms race since the Korean war.³¹ With its history of previous military adventurism,³² it could have been argued until recently that North Korea's considerable arsenal raises the prospect of renewed conflict in the peninsula involving major powers.³³ With the breakdown of Communism in the Soviet Union, that prospect seems less likely. But facing severe domestic economic problems and reduced foreign policy achievements, intentional or inadvertent provocations could be sparked off unilaterally by North Korea. Until now, the North has attached great importance to their insistence on the removal of all American forces including nuclear weapons from the South, linking this to its justification for the development of its nuclear program, and has intensified its propaganda over US-South Korean *Team Spirit* exercises.³⁴ Furthermore, North Korea charges that the present South Korean leadership is privately disposed to the consolidation of the status quo as a permanently divided peninsula.

Taking these into account, North Korea seems set to continue to point to the lack of South Korean leadership's nationalistic credentials in the competition for legitimacy and try to realise the desire for reunification under a *chuché* communist republic, by force if need be, given favourable circumstances.³⁵ Thus, as the North Korean future policy and intentions are not clear,³⁶ the possibility of abrupt running off the normal track into military adventurism cannot be entirely ruled out. While these may be the driving features of the perceptions of the North

Korean leadership, the domestic economic problems may prove to be the biggest stumbling block to North Korea's military adventurism. An army must have popular support beyond any initial attack. This support will be quickly eroded if there are domestic shortages of basic items.³⁷

The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the political, security environment in and around the peninsula, to examine the security prospects for the 1990s based on the context up to the end of 1989. Who could have predicted that the changes since that time could have been so dramatic? Since that time, the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and the continuing changes in the European political landscape render some of the assumptions underlying this dissertation problematic. Nevertheless this dissertation sets out to review the possibility for peaceful coexistence between South and North as an interim system before achieving final unification. Judging the degree of stability on the peninsula may be possible through analysing the extent to which the requirements for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas are met. We cannot say that the security in and around the peninsula is either certain or stable, if there are at least no common security mechanisms in the region, no visible progress in South -North dialogue and no concrete agreements between the two Koreas on some sensitive issues such as a peace treaty, a non-aggression agreement, disarmament and arms control, etc. With these points in mind, I will examine and evaluate three major factors that will form the basis of separate chapters in this dissertation:

- i) **External Security Issues:** Recent changes in the policies of the four major powers toward the peninsula and the issue of cross-recognition and two Koreas' UN membership will be evaluated.
- ii) **Internal Security Issues:** Progress in South-North dialogue will be examined through an analysis of the obstacles and difficulties in undertaking Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

iii) **Military Security Issues:** the issue of inter-Korean arms control and disarmament, including the issues of US forces stationed in the South, will be evaluated.

Security cooperation on the peninsula could be divided into two classes: political measures and military measures. The former comprises two methods:

- 1) the external powers' efforts to encourage South-North Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and guarantee these results, which I will examine in chapter II, and
- 2) both Koreas' mutual CBMs through South-North dialogue, particularly high-level talks aiming at the conclusion of non-aggression and peace treaties, which I will examine in chapter III.

The latter comprises some agreements on arms control and disarmament that cover both operational and structural measures:

(a) Operational measures mainly through arms control, which South Korea generally prefers³⁸; to inform the other, in advance, of its own special operations, to make the prospects for future military activities foreseeable, to regulate the provisions for On-Site Inspection (OSI), to prohibit a certain scale of uninformed military operations, to exchange information and materials, etc., and

(b) Structural measures mainly through disarmament, which North Korea generally prefers, these being: to reduce the existing forces of both sides, to withdraw US forces from the South under agreed plans, to ban nuclear weapons from the peninsula, etc. Most of these measures are proposed by the two Koreas,³⁹ whose positions I will analyze in chapter IV.

II External Security Issues

South Korea, as it becomes a medium sized power, is now pursuing the policy of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. This policy is based on a growing sense of self-confidence resulting from a number of propitious changes.⁴⁰ In particular, it has achieved a sustained high economic growth through export-orientated economic policy during the last three decades. Thanks to this economic and technological achievements, it also attaches great importance to the northern policy.⁴¹ The prospect of their policy is cautiously optimistic, because the entire world is likely to be more concerned with economic and technological issues than with the traditional issues of military expansion and war-making.⁴² As the overall balance of advantage - economic, diplomatic and military- swings in its favour,⁴³ South Korea has been taking the offensive with a great deal of self-confidence, requesting North Korea and the major powers to acknowledge the system for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas as an interim measure until final reunification has been realized.⁴⁴ However, feeling this South Korea's request as a threat toward itself, North Korea is resisting the acceptance of this concept, mainly on the pretext that it at best results in justifying the two Koreas policy. In addition to the inter-Korean differential, the difficulties involved in constructing a common security system in East Asia also needs to be taken into account.

The sustained economic growth of South Korea, which is the 10th largest trading country and has the 15th largest GNP in the world, has contributed to bringing about changes in the four major powers' policies towards the peninsula. South Korea has good prospects for continued high rates of economic growth. Despite all the gloomy predictions it maintained a substantial growth even in 1990, fuelled by strong domestic demand and sluggish but continuous export increases.⁴⁵ In fact, there were some domestic and external problems such as severe labour disputes and US pressure to open up its markets. As an example, the failure to

reform its backward financial system threatened to weaken its industrial competitiveness, already under stress from rising inflation, plummeting stock prices and soaring imports.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, the fundamentals of the Korean economy are becoming sound and its foreign investments will increase according to less developed countries' (LDCs') demands for economic cooperation, particularly in such fields as technological transfer, direct or joint investments in development projects, etc. Korean big businesses had their confidence restored and started to invest both at home and abroad.⁴⁷

Inevitably, because of its increased size in trade volume and its subsequent influence on the world economy, the Korean economy has changed from being a passive object in the past to an active subject in the present. It has been possible for South Korea to achieve economic growth through export-orientated industrial policies under the international free trade regime without any severe resistance from outside.⁴⁸ The impact of Korean economic policies on the global economy is beginning to be more extensively felt. Accordingly, Korean economic policies should eventually be readjusted to the world's requirements in order to avoid severe trade frictions. Feeling that the Korean economy is a challenge to the global economy, the advanced countries do not want to permit it a further 'free ride.' They do not only think of Korea as an object of cooperation in macro-economic policies, but also request that Korea take some cooperative measures for the increase of domestic consumption. These requests made it more difficult for South Korea to retain its formal status as a developing country protected by the provisions of the GATT.⁴⁹ As a major country among the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), it has to bear some responsibilities for the development of the LDCs, taking into account advanced countries' pressure and LDCs' increasing demands for technical, capital cooperation.

This advancement of the South Korean economy to a medium sized power has been a major engine to developing its diplomacy. Its economic power

has contributed both to consolidating and improving its relations with friendly or neutral countries, and to establishing its formal ties with communist countries through its northern policy. Consequently, this steady progress on the diplomatic front has made it possible to take the initiative to join the UN with North Korea this year (1991).

South Korea's security relationship with the US and Japan has been changing from the earlier vertical relations to a more horizontal, mature partnership.⁵⁰ In particular, the security system between South Korea and the US tends to be transformed from that of narrowly-defined military security, to one based on comprehensive security.⁵¹ Comprehensive security highlights the importance of a 'total' strategy of diplomatic, political, economic, and social policies, besides military means, to ensure national survival.⁵² Therefore, political, economic, diplomatic, social and psychological factors are and will be of greater importance than before.⁵³ For example, enormous economic expansion and interdependence between the US and South Korea which ranges from trade to banking relations and equity investment is closely linked to security issues.⁵⁴ The US, while promising security cooperation with South Korea in changing or reviewing its strategy on the peninsula, is increasingly giving greater weight to opening up the Korean markets.⁵⁵

As for Japan, the peace and security of the Korean peninsula has been regarded as essential to the peace of the Northeast Asia, including Japan itself.⁵⁶ For this reason Tokyo agrees with the US moves to promote security there. This is so, despite its fears of being drawn into a conflict under its security commitment to the US 'to provide all support short of military forces to the broad deterrence equation'.⁵⁷ Japan's concern for the maintenance of peace and stability in Korea is underlined by its efforts to encourage South-North dialogue and to gradually improve its unofficial links with North Korea.⁵⁸ Accordingly, for Japan as well as the US, it would be of great importance to make the two Koreas avoid any severe

conflicts and to keep the future united Korea economically robust, which will be essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, there are increasingly, many problems between South Korea and the US that are proving difficult to negotiate, such as trade friction,⁶⁰ military security issues, newly rising Korean nationalism, etc. The US administration has several times threatened South Korea with use of section 301 of the US *Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act*, because the latter had not lowered import barriers. Since 1987, South Korea has experienced serious new US efforts to get it to reduce tariffs on more US products.⁶¹ Moreover, in relation to South Korea's austerity campaign in 1990, there were allegations of US 'meddling' in South Korea's domestic affairs. The South Korean government announced in June 1990 that its 'growth-first' policy was reverting to an economic policy orientated towards greater stabilization. New measures were taken to discourage importation of 'luxury goods' through a media-led 'anti-consumption' campaign.⁶² Inevitably, the US argued that imports should not be targeted and that promoting austerity already resulted in restrictions to market access. In this regard, Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economic Planning Board, Seung Yoon Lee, announced at a press conference on November 23, 1990 that:

While the Korean government supports the campaign, it does not support any anti-import movement in Korea. The Korean government maintains that consumers should base their purchasing decisions on the price and quality of goods and that they should not refrain from purchasing goods simply because they are imported.⁶³

Nonetheless, this was viewed more as declaratory policy and US doubts about the Korean government's real intention were not clearly resolved. Indeed now under a system of comprehensive security it is more likely to be the case that security collaborators are at the same time economic competitors, which can make for some extremely complicated political relationships.⁶⁴

Inevitably, the US-South Korean security relationship has many latent issues which have a bearing on the US security presence in East Asia. Their relationship, which began in the aftermath of World War II, has been evolving only slowly, showing continued resistance to change.⁶⁵ The US and South Korea continue to stick to the position that as long as North Korea remains a serious threat to peace in Northeast Asia, their mutual defence treaty will remain intact.⁶⁶ In an address to the Korean National Assembly in February 1989 President Bush reaffirmed the US security commitment to South Korea, allaying the latter's fear of an early US troop withdrawal.⁶⁷ Last year through a series of negotiations South Korea agreed with the US to pay \$US 150 million in 1991 as its share of the cost of US military forces stationed in South Korea. Much of this share of the cost, South Korea maintains, is clearly aimed at sustaining, even enhancing, US involvement, even though it shares the greater economic burden for maintaining US troops on the peninsula.⁶⁸

Recent Korean nationalism and US skepticism about the ties suggest that a significant US military presence may not persist into the next century.⁶⁹ Even while wanting to find a secure niche in East Asian alliance system, many South Koreans worry that South Korea's own security should remain so dependent on the US.⁷⁰ As populist sentiments are asserting themselves after a long period of authoritarian rule, there arises a new wave of nationalism and anti-Americanism in particular, among the elite and the students.⁷¹ Thus, the problem of reconciling the South Korean national aspirations with the requirements of alliance arrangements is central to the dilemma confronting US security efforts in South Korea.⁷²

In contrast to previous, somewhat unilateral patterns, there are increasing calls for a more equal partnership and greater spirit of cooperation needed to tackle the problems. Naturally South Korea's diplomatic focus this year will be on Korea-US relations, which have been left unattended in the wake of trade friction and the 'northern policy'. South Korea's foreign minister, Lee Sang-

Ok, in his first news conference on 19 January 1991, expressed his strong intention to avoid trade friction between the US and South Korea. He also said that:

Putting a bigger share of diplomatic stress on Korea-US relations will bring balance and harmony in the northern policy.⁷³

In this regard, the July 1991 Summit between Roh and Bush appears to have contributed, to some extent, to the consolidation of their existing relations both in economic and security areas.⁷⁴ Thus, no matter how irritated or frustrated officials of either side become with the ally's behavior, they remain firmly convinced that for the sake of fundamental long term national interests, the alliance must be preserved.⁷⁵

Second, thanks largely to the South Korean 'northern policy' and the Soviet *perestroika*, diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union were established on 30th September 1990.⁷⁶ President Roh Tae Woo expressed in several speeches his intention to improve relations with the northern communist countries.⁷⁷ What is to be pointed out here is that the northern policy of the sixth Republic is in some aspects different from the northern policy of the previous ones. During the eras of Presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, South Korea aimed to compete with and isolate North Korea in the name of the 'northern policy.' However, since the sixth Republic in February 1988, the basic principle has been refined.

While continuing its previous diplomacy of the 'northern policy' to improve relations with the communist countries, in principle it no longer wants to isolate North Korea but tries to encourage North Korea to foster constructive economic relations with the US and Japan.⁷⁸ South Korea has often expressed its intentions regarding cooperation with North Korea and on assisting North Korean efforts to improve its relations with South Korea's allies.⁷⁹

Opportunely, this northern policy was well matched by the Soviet new policy towards the Asia-Pacific countries that was revealed in Mikhail Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk. Gorbachev said in Vladivostock in July 1986 that:

There is a possibility for not only relieving the dangerous tensions in the Korean peninsular, but also for beginning to solve the national problem of the entire Korean people, as part of the overall regional settlement.⁸⁰

Subsequently, in his September 16, 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev called for 'arranging economic ties to South Korea' and for 'diverse forms of cooperation'.⁸¹ With the Seoul Olympics, above all, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries became more aware of South Korea.⁸²

Consequently, South Korea reaped a spectacular success in its northern policy toward the Soviet Union.⁸³ With the Summit between Roh and Gorbachev in San Francisco in June 1990, the two countries actively continued to exchange their delegations. When a South Korean delegation, led by presidential economic advisor Kim Chong-In, visited the Soviet Union for trade talks in August and September 1990, the Soviet side proposed a list of economic and technological areas for bilateral cooperation. These close contacts and the overall marriage of the two countries' mutual interest finally resulted in signing a joint communiqué on fully formalizing their diplomatic ties between the two foreign ministers, Shevardnadze and Choi Ho Joong.⁸⁴

This growing relationship eventually culminated in President Roh's visit to the Soviet Union in December 1990 and President Gorbachev's visit to South Korea in April 1991. During the December Summit, the two countries have not only pledged to work together to reduce tension in Asia and create conditions for eventual reunification of Korea, but also agreed to a dramatic expansion in economic cooperation.⁸⁵ The two Presidents agreed in their Moscow Declaration

that the threat or use of force to settle international disputes and regional conflicts was inadmissible.

In the second round of Korea-USSR economic consultations in January 1991, South Korea agreed to furnish \$US 3 billion in economic cooperation to the Soviets. South Korea, for which market diversification is imperative,⁸⁶ will supply electronic and other household goods and receive resources and specialized technology from Moscow. Meanwhile, Soviet officials clearly hope that economic agreements signed on this occasion will pave the way for massive Korean investment in the Soviet Union's crisis-ridden economy, providing a rapid injection of consumer goods and technological expertise.⁸⁷ They predicted that trade between the two countries, which stood at less than \$US 600 million in 1989, could soar to more than \$US10 billion a year by the mid-1990s.⁸⁸ Thus, on the face of it at least, it appeared that Gorbachev and Roh had successfully begun the long arduous task of transforming their respective societies toward the twenty first, Pacific, century.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, this new momentum between the Soviet Union and South Korea has been crucial in changing North Korea's external as well as inter-Korean relations. With the first Roh-Gorbachev Summit, North Korea reacted angrily to the Soviet Union.⁹⁰ Kim Il Sung refused to meet with Shevardnadze who visited Pyongyang in September 1990 to inform North Korea of the Soviet Union's decision to establish formal relations with South Korea.⁹¹ North Korea reacted even more angrily to the second Roh-Gorbachev Summit, to the extent to which it decided to close the Pyongyang branch of the Soviet news agency, *Pravda*. However, North Korea really does not have any other alternative but to regard the new Soviet-South Korean relationship as a *fait accompli*. It cannot expect Soviet support for its military adventurism any longer if it seriously takes into account the Moscow Declaration. In the face of this North Korea,

1) needs to adjust its foreign policy, particularly toward China and Japan, in order to break out of its self imposed isolation, to reduce the impact of the Soviet policy-change on its nationals, and to overcome its economic backwardness,⁹² and

2) as a gesture or by calculation, appears to have decided to positively participate in the South-North dialogue. These trends will be analysed later.

Third, recent South Korea-China relations, particularly in economic areas, have developed rapidly. In 1989, South Korea's exports to China recorded \$US1.43 billion with a 28.3% increase in comparison with the previous year, and imports from China showed \$US1.7 billion with a 38.1% increase.⁹³ In addition, their exchange of large delegations to the Asian Games in Seoul in 1986 and in Beijing in 1990 provided a good opportunity to improve their relations. South Korea has used the 11th Asian Games to enhance relations with China, offering cash, advertising fees and the lure of tourists to boost the Asiad, taking account of the urgent Chinese need for Korean experience, technology and investments.⁹⁴

China, which seeks to avoid any possible disruption of its economic modernization, also wants to develop economic as well as political ties with South Korea.⁹⁵ The 13th Chinese Communist Party Congress confirmed the Deng Xiaoping statement that:

Economic development is our primary objective and everything else must be subordinated to it.⁹⁶

Thus, Chinese foreign policy is beginning to place more emphasis on economics.⁹⁷ China is well aware that South Korea's economic transformation has had an impact on the configuration of power in the region.⁹⁸ In view of this, China regards South Korea as one of important partners for its economic cooperation, which culminated in the agreement in October 1990 on establishing trade offices in Beijing and Seoul.⁹⁹

However, China's traditionally friendly relationship with North Korea, together with its domestic problems, sets limits on the extent to which it can normalise its ties with South Korea for the time being. China has adhered to its policy of maintaining its political alliance with North Korea.¹⁰⁰ The new Chinese leadership reacted positively to Kim Il Sung's visit to China in November 1989. At that time China committed itself to defending socialism in the face of recent changes in Eastern Europe.¹⁰¹ Thus, China has demonstrated a firm political commitment to good relations with North Korea.¹⁰² Therefore, future development in Sino-South Korean relations will depend on whether the Chinese resume their economic reforms and soften North Korea's objection to normalizing Sino-South Korean ties.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, South Korea's northern policy has had some success. The increasingly important roles played by China and South Korea in the world can explain in large part the decline in North Korea's ability to prevent China from expanding contacts with South Korea.¹⁰⁴ The establishment of the trade offices in 1990 reflects this trend.

Fourth, relations between the Eastern-oriented countries (the Soviet Union, China and North Korea) have also shifted their emphasis from military objectives to focus more on economic interests.¹⁰⁵ The Soviet Union has, until recently, armed Pyongyang with advanced aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. North Korea has had little choice but to rely on the Soviet Union as its principal source of economic and military aid and as the guarantor of its survival.¹⁰⁶ Since Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in 1984, North Korea has equipped its forces with such weapons as MIG-23, MIG-29, SCUD, SA-3 missiles, etc., while it permitted Soviet aircraft to fly over its air-space.¹⁰⁷ Previously, through its many statements the Soviet Union endorsed unreservedly North Korean initiatives toward resolving the situation on the peninsula.¹⁰⁸ By doing so, it had tried to exert some influence inside the North Korean political system. But the Soviet Union has now become an important player with both Koreas. Through improving its relations with Seoul,

Moscow seems to gradually cut off Pyongyang, whose sagging economy is a drag on Moscow's treasury.¹⁰⁹ During the foreign ministers' talks between the Soviet Union and North Korea in September 1990, Shevardnadze reportedly supported the North Korean position on South-North arms control and disarmament. But he expressed his hope that South-North dialogue be successfully brought about through their efforts to find some points of common understanding. He made it clear that any problem between the countries should be solved by peaceful, non-military means.¹¹⁰ Consequently, Moscow has relegated Pyongyang to the status of symbolic ally,¹¹¹ as we see from this brief remark of Vladimir Li, a professor with Moscow's Far East Institute:

We still possess the structure of a military alliance, though that structure originated in the cold war period and doesn't fit in with today's reality. ¹¹²

With the shift in its policy toward the peninsula, the Soviet political payoffs, from Moscow's viewpoint, have been relatively marginal. For example, the Soviet Union has experienced real limitations to the extent of its influence over North Korea's behaviour. Accordingly, the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship could be described as 'bittersweet.'¹¹³

Thus, despite the down grading of economic and security assistance, from one of its major allies, North Korea seems to lack an effective alternative. It has attempted to draw closer to China, emphasising their traditional solidarity, through many more extensive and high-level Sino-North Korean exchange visits.¹¹⁴ North Korea made it clear that it will move away from Moscow and turn to Beijing, which seems to be the only remaining ally willing to support Pyongyang's adherence to *chuché* communism.¹¹⁵ In his speech for Ziang Zemin, who visited Pyongyang in March 1990, Kim Il Sung stressed that the North Korean party and its people would join the 'brotherly Chinese People' in continuing to march for the construction of socialism.¹¹⁶ But under a Sino-Soviet *détente* China also seems to be neither a real supporter of North Korean

provocation, nor a source for economic and technological assistance.¹¹⁷ China is growing weary of supporting its insolvent satellite which requests to continue subsidies of nearly \$US 1 billion a year.¹¹⁸ To make North Korea more unfavourable, even China pursues a de facto two Koreas policy.¹¹⁹ North Korea now may have fewer options than before in pursuing its diplomacy toward its two allies.¹²⁰

In this fast changing scenario in which the external environment seems to be shifting in favour of South Korea, North Korea has seen the need to open its doors to the outside for its needed capital and technology in particular.¹²¹ North Korea is actively trying to counter-balance its losses by developing ties with the US and Japan. Examples of this can be seen in its decisions in May 1990 and June 1991 to return the remains of Missing in Actions (MIAs), and the visit of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) delegation, headed by Shin Kanemaru, former Deputy Prime Minister, to Pyongyang in September 1990.¹²²

North Korea is trying to increase its trade volume with Japan. It had peaked at 125.9 billion yen in 1980, but it decreased to 68.3 billion yen in 1989, largely because it failed to pay for goods it was getting from Japan. Therefore with the subsequent visit of Yoichi Tami, an LDP member of the Diet's lower house, to Pyongyang in November 1990, North Korea and Japan agreed to exchange trade and economic missions.

These talks eventually culminated in the first round of formal talks on establishing diplomatic ties in Pyongyang in January 1991. Thus, relations between Japan and North Korea have improved dramatically as a result of high-level talks. This increases the chances that North Korea will retreat further from its 45 years of isolation from the rest of the world.¹²³ For North Korea, like the Soviet Union and China, economic necessity has also led to dramatic changes in its foreign policy.¹²⁴

But in formalizing their ties, one of the most difficult issues concerns North Korea's nuclear program. Japan is also considerably concerned about it. Japan is expected to engage in close consultation with Seoul and Washington prior to normalizing its relations with Pyongyang, particularly in view of the January 1991 Summit between the President Roh and the Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. Japan clearly shares China's concern about Korea's potential to disturb the regional balance in East Asia and drag it into an unwelcome war. Therefore, it is in Japan's interests to help end the isolation of North Korea.¹²⁵ It does not see a 'gang up' of Western interests against the North as helpful. In fact, the historical relationship and Japan's diverse economic, political and security interests in East Asia are likely to ensure that the two Koreas will continue to exercise Japanese diplomatic skills for the foreseeable future.¹²⁶

In brief, North Korea has been increasingly trying to establish or improve its relations with Western-orientated countries in order to improve its image and to revive its stressed economy.¹²⁷ There seems little doubt that this is due in part to South Korea's success in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, and in commencing normalization with China, as reviewed above.

In economic terms, Pyongyang could no longer rely on favourable aid and barter terms from its two allies. Last year the Soviet Union demanded that North Korea pay in hard currency, such as US dollars and Japanese yen, for its crude oil (40% of North Korea's crude oil comes from the Soviet Union) from the 1st January 1991.¹²⁸ This is one of the major factors that has made North Korea broaden its trade and aid relations. Kim Il Sung has suggested that Japan compensate his country for its 36-year occupation before World War II and for losses since.¹²⁹ Certainly this prospect would be one motivation to normalize relations with Japan.

Effects of external changes

These recent changes in the relations of the external powers towards the peninsula would affect peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas in both positive and negative ways.

Positive factors

On the positive side, if North Korea accepts the major powers' pressure to avoid military adventurism, the way could become clear to solve South-North conflicts through peaceful means. In relation to the North's continuous resistance to the signing of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, which will be discussed later in detail, the major powers have increasingly pressed North Korea to follow through on its international obligations. North Korea's recent decision to sign the Safeguards Agreement represents an important step to the way for peaceful coexistence. Furthermore if North Korea fully accepts the IAEA's OSI, it would contribute to improvements in its relations with Japan and the US as well as to the negotiation on South-North disarmament and arms control.

Cross-recognition would be another positive step. The ultimate goal for each Korean government has been its recognition by the world, particularly by the major powers, as the sole legitimate government of Korea.¹³⁰ Until now North Korea has argued that cross-recognition would freeze the division of Korea, preventing reunification.¹³¹ It has claimed that South Korea is a puppet of the US, unworthy of recognition as a legitimate state.¹³² This claim has, however, been weakened by Pyongyang's own willingness to conduct official negotiations with the South Korean government and by South Korea's rising prestige and influence in the world.¹³³ Accordingly the Eastern European countries, Mongolia and the Soviet Union established diplomatic ties with South Korea. China has also signaled a desire to encourage acceptance of the status quo on the peninsula.¹³⁴ Thus, North

Korea's own friendly countries have repealed the validity of Kim Il Sung's contention that 'it would be a crime before history if we approve of two Koreas.'¹³⁵

Meanwhile, since the renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine¹³⁶ on 23 June 1973, one of the South Korean diplomatic aims has been this cross-recognition, setting a target to establish diplomatic ties with the major powers. As of March 1991, South Korea has diplomatic relations with 148 countries, North Korea with 105.¹³⁷ There are 90 countries with whom both Koreas have diplomatic relations. Thus, South Korea has almost achieved its diplomatic purpose in upgrading its relations with communist countries from de facto to de jure cross-recognition.¹³⁸

The near universal acceptance of the legitimacy of the two Koreas would weaken the inclination of each to question the legitimacy of the other, creating a sounder basis for dialogue and interaction.¹³⁹ Certainly, cross-recognition would improve understanding of each other's attitudes and policies and reduce the scope of miscalculation, at least through the major powers' diplomatic missions in Seoul and Pyongyang.¹⁴⁰

Negative factors

On the negative side, there are other fundamental problems which can not be easily overlooked on the way to peaceful coexistence. Even if North Korea signs the Safeguards Agreement this year, it is still doubtful whether or when it will ratify the agreement. Furthermore, the IAEA inspection system is not sufficient to completely control any scheme to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA does not have without consent any right to inspect every nuclear facility in a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT). Therefore, as the Iraq case has demonstrated, even under the NPT regime, there is still a possibility of North Korea's continuing to develop nuclear program.

As a second example, the relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea are not yet fully formalised, although there is some promise for the future. As the August 1991 coup attempt showed, Gorbachev has been under pressure in the Soviet Union. With hardliners in the ascendant on the one hand, there was potential for a reversal of his earlier liberal policies. Really due to their influences, Gorbachev could not have authorized significant changes in the Soviet force structures and strategy in the Pacific.¹⁴¹ The anti-reformist forces in the Soviet communist party, state security service and army attempted a coup d'état in August 1991. They had aimed to end steps toward pluralism, a market economy and multi-party system, and to return to authoritarian and dictatorial power structures. In terms of domestic economic reform, Gorbachev has also been pressed by radical reformists on the other. The backwardness of civilian technology, the low productivity, the bureaucratic rigidities have continuously challenged him.¹⁴² With the failure of the attempted coup, the direction of Soviet foreign and domestic policy seems to be all the more uncertain and unpredictable. Therefore, despite internal divisions it cannot be guaranteed that in the remnants of the Soviet Union Gorbachev's perestroika toward the peninsula could advance in the future.

Even if cross-recognition is assumed, it is far more important for the two Koreas to reach agreement on the basic relations between them. But this is very difficult and strenuous work to achieve, as discussed later. Also the UN membership has been one of the thorniest issues hindering significant progress in the inter-Korean political talks.

Building on the favourable external environment, South Korea has moved to join the UN with North Korea simultaneously if possible. On 19 November 1990 President Roh said in a budget address that South and North Korea should join the UN side by side and declare that it is a temporary measure

until the halves of Korea are a united nation, lessening the likelihood of armed conflict on the peninsula and ensuring sincere discussions on reunification.

South Korea and the UN

From January 1949 to September 1975 South Korea submitted its applications for UN membership several times, in view of both the UN's role in the birth of the South Korean government and the UN's participation in the Korean war, and South Korea's desire to improve its status through joining the UN.¹⁴³ To review briefly the development of UN-South Korea relations, in November 1947 the UN decided to set up the UN Temporary Commission to support the composition of a new government in the peninsula. Second, in December 1948 the UN declared the ROK government to be 'a lawful government' over that part of Korea to which the UN Temporary Commission had had access.¹⁴⁴ Third, in June 1950 when the Korean war began, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution calling on North Korea for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of its forces from South Korea. Subsequently, the UN sent its forces composed of 16 nations to South Korea. In June 1973 President Park announced a new policy, withdrawing opposition to the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the UN, as an interim measure pending unification.¹⁴⁵ But South Korea's each application was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Therefore, in order not to repeat the past unsuccessful experiences, South Korea might well have to cooperate with the Soviets and China in advance. South Korea worked hard to dissuade the Soviet Union from using its veto power, through emphasis on the principle of universal membership and the Soviets' previous revised proposal for the two Koreas' joining the UN. In 1956 and 1958 the Soviet Union, objecting to South Korea's application for UN membership, submitted a revised proposal for the two Koreas' respective membership.¹⁴⁶ The Soviet Union argued in November 1967 that the UN should be the international

organization which really respects the principle of universality. Moreover, in October 1989, the Soviet Union also distributed a memorandum on the universality principle of international organizations. Taking this into account, South Korea has believed that if the Soviet Union, whose position has been that South and North Korea should first reach consensus on this matter, stands by the South Korean position, China, too, would have no pretext for opposing this, in view of its improving relations with South Korea and the UN's principles. As for this long quarrel over membership in the UN, the Chinese have at last conveyed the message that they will no longer block South Korea from taking a seat there.¹⁴⁷ Thus only North Korea's refusal to accept dual representation for Korea has prevented the two Koreas from entering the UN as separate states.¹⁴⁸

However, in May 1991, through an official statement of its foreign ministry, North Korea announced its decision of submitting its application for UN membership. Until then North Korea had insisted on the option of the two Koreas sharing a seat in the UN. Negotiations between South and North on the possibility of this option have started since the North-South Prime Ministers' Talks in September 1990. But Seoul and Pyongyang had shown no sign of compromise. In this context, there was a possibility of South Korea applying for separate UN membership. Therefore, North Korea's decision can be regarded as a great tide that will change the world's politics as well as inter-Korean relations. Parallel UN membership of both Koreas could greatly contribute to easing tension on the peninsula and also facilitate the process of peaceful reunification.¹⁴⁹ Nonetheless, from the other point of view there would also remain a possibility of UN becoming the place for both Koreas' political propaganda.

An Asian Helsinki process?

Lastly, as an ultimate external security requirement, what is to be pointed out is the lack of a common cooperative security system in North East Asia.

The two Koreas' security system would continue to be based on a bipolar military approach with their respective allies.¹⁵⁰ South Korea has a bilateral treaty with the US concluded in 1953, while North Korea has two bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and China, both concluded in 1961.¹⁵¹ In addition, both the superpowers and other allies pour billions into maintaining the two Koreas' security. Furthermore, security on the peninsula should be considered under the overall security strategies of the major powers in Northeast Asia. The ideal condition of international politics would be harmonization of the interests of all parties. It is evident that policies of confrontation and polarization cannot create artificially a sense of common security interest.¹⁵² In this respect a Helsinki type process is needed in East Asia as well. But in reality the Asian countries have always been concerned with each other as with the Soviet Union. There is not a coherently felt external threat, in contrast to Europe, nor are all the countries prepared to cooperate with each other. This region is too diverse in its politics, economics and culture, and too strongly nationalist in its outlook.¹⁵³ Consequently, Gorbachev's call for an Asian Security Conference and Shevardnadze's subsequent proposal in September 1990 to hold an Asia-Pacific region foreign ministers' meeting in 1993 have not obtained any explicit endorsement from the major regional countries such as China, Japan and the US.¹⁵⁴ These countries know very well that the Soviet proposal is designed to counter the superior military capability of the US in the region. The Soviet Union regards the capability not merely as a threat to its Far Eastern territories but also as an obstacle to a greater Soviet political and economic role in the Asia Pacific.¹⁵⁵ Thus, the situation in Asia is quite different from that of Europe, making it difficult to reach a consensus on common security mechanism. Therefore, given the lack of an overall security structure in East Asia the external security factor on the peninsula remains uncertain and unstable.

III. Inter-Korean Security Issues

In addition to the external factors in the security, substantial improvements in inter-Korean relations are really crucial in avoiding war and maintaining peace on the peninsula. The only way to bring about such improvements and ultimately to reach a condition of a stable peaceful coexistence is through South-North dialogue.¹⁵⁶ The political pressures on both Koreas to continue the dialogue are considerable. As reviewed above, the Chinese and Japanese have firmly supported the dialogue. Solving inter-Korean conflicts and recovering mutual confidence lost are, however, much more difficult and need time and a Copernican shift in attitude on both sides. Due to these difficulties, South-North dialogue has not yet resulted in substantial progress even though it is useful in helping the North to offset its isolation and to try again access to capital and technology from Japan and the West.¹⁵⁷ In this chapter I will analyse destabilizing factors on the security which are obstacles to progress in South-North dialogue and then evaluate some possible prospects for substantial progress and peaceful coexistence.

To begin with, among the destabilizing factors in the security there are many structural problems in both Koreas' political, economic and social areas. In the North, the leadership transition, pressures on scarce resources and declining international prestige could prove destabilizing.¹⁵⁸ Its structures on political participation are far more blatant. Kim Il Sung wants his *chuché* idea to continue to underpin every aspect of the North's society.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, he has been positioning his eldest son, Kim Jong-Il, to succeed him. This scheme is, however, unlikely to put an end to uncertainty and political rivalry in the North, even though it seems likely to be successful.¹⁶⁰ After succeeding the presidency, Kim Jong Il will face challenges by the military, on the one hand, and the technocrats who are in favour of modernization programs and reforms, on the other.¹⁶¹

Meanwhile, even the economic growth of South Korea has a considerable potential for instability. Although this has buoyed the self confidence of its leaders and the public, South Korea has had until now little prospect for a strong foundation of mutual trust and common purpose between them.¹⁶² The extant political and social questions in South Korea are likely to be about the distribution of wealth, levels of unemployment, whether expectations can be adequately met, etc. Moreover, economic differential between the two Koreas could at best provide an opportunity to ease South-North tensions; or at worst it could heighten them.¹⁶³ Thus, South Korea's economic growth could have a negative effect on the relations between its leaders and the public as well as on the inter-Korean relations.

In brief, both Koreas tend to maintain highly personalized and autocratic regimes, buttressed by faction-ridden, hierarchical elites, corruption-prone bureaucrats and strong military forces.¹⁶⁴ There are other disagreeable, even disturbing, possibilities such as military coups and civil chaos in both Koreas.¹⁶⁵ The rapid social change also tends to generate a sense of insecurity. These internal and inter-Korean security issues will be analysed in detail.

Inter Korean relations

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to progress in inter-Korean relations is the difficulty in resolving both Koreas' deep distrust and hostility towards each other, and in reining in their rivalry. The two Koreas, which are divided into opposing political systems and ideologies, have respectively regarded each other as a devil, a puppet regime and a fundamental enemy.¹⁶⁶ They suffered a fratricidal war and still hope to absorb each other into their own systems to establish a united Korea, if the situation allows.¹⁶⁷ The unification formulae of the two Koreas reflect their objectives and strategies to fulfil their respective goals.¹⁶⁸

On the one hand, while pursuing political unification within the framework of a federal scheme prior to societal integration,¹⁶⁹ North Korean politicians fear that the South might try to topple their communist system through personal and material exchanges. They view the South's step by step approach of cross-recognition and consolidation of the status quo as the South's way of buying time, while gaining economic, political and military strength.¹⁷⁰

They are concerned that the hawks in the South see Korea as a second Germany, following the model whereby West Germany absorbed East Germany on 3 October 1990.¹⁷¹ They want to push North Korea into a corner and isolate it from the international community in order to make it yield. In this regard, North Korea however, has repeatedly expressed its determination never to accept German-style unification of the peninsula.

On the other hand, South Korean leaders, who emphasize societal integration prior to political unification,¹⁷² are also concerned that the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement in accordance with the North's demands will lead to a demand for the removal of all US troops stationed in South Korea, which is seen as part of the North's consistent strategy to communize the South.¹⁷³ They see the North's proposal for a confederation of the two Koreas as an interim step to their eclipse.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, in this situation, recent gestures toward reconciliation from each side may be considered to be little more than a war of words.

Internal legitimacy

Rivalry between the two Koreas revolves largely on the question of legitimacy, which mainly depends on nationalistic credentials and international recognition.¹⁷⁵ In contrast to the North's greatest possible independence, for the last four decades the South had found itself on the defensive in the contest over nationalistic credentials. This is mainly due to the consequences of its alliance on American military protection.¹⁷⁶ That is, South Korea had maintained a defensive

posture against North Korea's such contentions as the withdrawal of all US troops from the South and the conclusion of peace treaty with the US.

South Korea's alliance with the US has thus weakened the nationalistic credentials of its successive leaders. But in more recent years, the South's superior economic performance has weighed in its favour and in this sense the South is regaining the initiative.¹⁷⁷ Since the early 1980s, South Korea has begun to have more psychological confidence in competition vis-a-vis North Korea. It tried to change its defensive role in South-North interactions toward a more active one.¹⁷⁸ Thus the contest over legitimacy has clearly been an effective stumbling block to serious dialogue. The two Koreas will continue to be locked in a relentless propaganda war, taking into account such prospect that a sense of Korean nationhood which is now newly arising would remain both the key to South-North confrontation and the determinant of the kind of Korea emerging from reunification.¹⁷⁹

North Korea's political and economic structure

A second stumbling block to progress concerns North Korea's rigidity arising from the 'unique thoughts' and closed society, which has driven the Kim Il Sung regime during the last 45 years. ¹⁸⁰ He has had difficulty altering his ideological stance. Tumultuous events in Eastern Europe intensified this difficulty.¹⁸¹ North Korean politicians may fear that once such a process has begun, it will become a flood engulfing their regime. Glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union pose a direct challenge the aging North Korean Stalinist hierarchy.¹⁸² Fearing this, they had to stiffen political control to keep their people from 'contamination' by mood of openness and reconciliation in the outside world.¹⁸³ They have recalled their students from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung has thus become more strident in his defense of confidence in the socialist model.¹⁸⁴ He has made it clear that he would pursue the road toward

building one socialist Korea, and he called upon the entire North Korean people to escalate their revolutionary struggle to protect their socialist society from imperialist invasion.¹⁸⁵ Outside pressures from the Soviet Union and China could simply result in a stronger resolve to pursue an independent and self-sufficient course, stimulating paranoid and isolationist tendencies.¹⁸⁶ Thus, North Korea has never undertaken significant reform and liberalization of its highly controlled, Stalinist system. In fact, North Korea is making concessions in its foreign relations, while exerting efforts to keep its *chuché* utopia intact.¹⁸⁷

A third obstacle concerns the North Korean economy. In contrast to the trends of the Soviet Union and China, which have been actively participating in regional economic cooperative organizations, North Korea has, on the contrary, tried to build a self-reliant economy. But this attempt has only resulted in economic backwardness and isolation from the world economy, particularly from the dynamic network of economic relations among East Asian and Pacific Rim countries.¹⁸⁸ Consequently, in order to induce Western investments and technology, North Korea adopted the 'Hapyoung' (joint venture) law in September 1984. Under this 'equal and mutually beneficial treatment' law, foreign companies can invest in North Korea. But this law lacks detailed subsidiary provisions such as concrete terms of joint venture, the rate of foreign investments, etc. There are also additional reasons why this law could not induce foreign investments: There is less possibility of social reform or openness in North Korea, there being some friction between this law and North Korea's original, self-sufficient economic policy, and the rigidity of their political structure. As a result, by September 1989, the total amount of foreign investments in North Korea is only \$US 520 million with the number of joint venture projects about 100. Thus, economic conditions in North Korea were not favourable enough to lure foreign investment, even though through this law North Korea hoped that joint ventures with foreign companies would stimulate growth in the North Korean economy.¹⁸⁹

North Korea is now suffering most from shortages of energy, raw materials and food.¹⁹⁰ It urged its nation to boost the production of electricity, coal and steel as the main link in socialist economic construction.¹⁹¹ Despite this, its economic condition has not improved, mainly due to serious constraints on the importation of oil.¹⁹² Furthermore, North Korea's dilemma has become even more serious when examined in the context of the widening gap in the economic race with the South.¹⁹³ As North Korea's crop output has not increased since 1984, food shortages reportedly continue.¹⁹⁴ In order to meet its nation's basic desire North Korea urgently needed food aid or imports to the extent that North Korea decided to accept 800 tons of rice from a South Korean church group in July 1990.¹⁹⁵ Thus its economy suffers much hardship due to the severe burden of military spending, the shortage of foreign exchange and technology, poor performance, etc., which emerge as the most threatening factors for its socialist political system.¹⁹⁶ Realizing these problems, North Korea appears to be shifting its economic course toward a more 'open door' approach, as reviewed.¹⁹⁷

South Korea's domestic problem

A fourth problem rests with the limitations of South Korea's domestic and inter-Korean policies. South Korea is now experiencing democratization with a sense of accomplishment and concern.¹⁹⁸ The political stalemate has continued with a visible slowdown in its transition to democracy.¹⁹⁹ The search for political cohesion in 1990, via democratic reforms, would remain as elusive as ever and an unresolved dilemma for politics in South Korea.²⁰⁰ Its national opinions are widely divided, ranging from radical to conservative and anti-communist positions. Radical groups, who increasingly take to the streets, want permanent and fundamental change in political, economic, social and reunification policies, even if it produces temporary disorder, while the other moderate groups are tired of, and opposed to, these radical movements and their continuous demonstrations. Under this situation of confrontation, the government's declaratory policies are recognized

to be, to some extent, inconsistent and different from operational policies. The highly fragmented approach and personalized style of leadership make it difficult for policymakers to design coherent national strategies.²⁰¹ For example, despite the announcement of the '*Korean National Community Unification Formula*' in September 1989, in which the concept is included that North Korea is a real partner in constructing a Korean National Community,²⁰² South Korea in reality still regards North Korea as an enemy, as shown by the lack of the proportionate revision of the *National Security Act*. The government continues to jail people who make unauthorized contact with the North.²⁰³ Thus, South Korea has had difficulties in switching from its previous confrontational strategy to a cooperative strategy.²⁰⁴ Inevitably the South Korean government reveals its duality between declared and actual policies, through its difficulty in accommodating divergent national opinions. In other words, the government has committed some perceived blunders in its policies on the domestic front as well as on the inter-Korean relations.

This has led to violent street demonstrations and to bringing about trends of the public's discredit in governmental policies.²⁰⁵ Mainly because of these problems above reviewed, progress in inter-Korean relations has been stumbling, which makes the security continuously unstable and uncertain.

Possibilities for improved inter-Korean relations

There are some possibilities of inter-Korean relations being improved toward the middle of the 1990s. To begin with, North Korea could feel that there are limitations on continuing to avoid substantial progress in South-North dialogue either through tactical proposals or for superficial reasons. It is sometimes argued that the North has only sought a 'breathing space' in order to cope better with its economic problems and general transfer of power. Several overtures to the South might have been designed to persuade Japan and the West to provide the necessary

capital and technology for the North.²⁰⁶ As another example, North Korea argued that the US and South Korea should remove 'artificial barriers', regarding them as one of the obstacles to its call for high-level political-military contacts.²⁰⁷ This contention was at best coolly and formally supported by the Chinese President Li Xianmian speech during Kim Il Sung's 1987 trip to Beijing.²⁰⁸ These kinds of tactical proposals or superficial reasons have now become inappropriate for persuading South Korea and the West.

Accordingly, North Korea appeared to realize the close links between progress in South - North dialogue and change in the attitudes of Japan and the West toward itself. Kim Il Sung signaled a major change in his attitude toward South-North relations by announcing his acceptance of the principle of coexistence.²⁰⁹ He recognized in September 1988 the need to have 'high-level talks' to adopt a non-aggression declaration and to discuss matters of setting up a 'confederal government' and a committee for peaceful unification.²¹⁰ Subsequently, when the South-North Prime Ministers' Talks were held in 1990, Pyongyang expressed its willingness to have a summit between Roh and Kim, if certain considerations are met. Kim Il Sung said on 18 October 1990 that he would meet with Roh if the Prime Ministers' Talks bore 'more substantive and visible results'.²¹¹ The South Korean government steadily tries to make the Prime Ministers' Talks lead to the summit, in a narrow sense, for enhancing the president's prestige.²¹² Therefore, visible progress in South-North dialogue could lead to a summit in the near future to discuss 'sensitive' questions such as a non-aggression pact and a peace agreement.

Secondly, it is realistic to suggest that despite little sign of bottom-up reform or Kim Il Sung's initiating reform, North Korean technocrats are likely, in so far as they can, to try to open up and reform their society gradually, through professional policy advice to Kim Il Sung. Some technocrats around Kim Jong Il

would support perestroika and apparently want North Korea to open up, so that they will push for Pyongyang to change its stance on inter-Korean dialogue.

In view of North Korea's political and generational circumstances, an interest in turning outward has been reinforced. Personnel changes are generally favouring a new professionally trained generation more inclined toward technological solutions. The international backlash of the Rangoon bombing²¹³ has brought about institutional and personnel changes. A decision of the November 1983 Party Plenum ended the party's exclusive control over external economic relations and trade, and set up an economic commission within the administration.²¹⁴ The former Premier, Kang Song-San, was a technocrat with considerable business talent, who initiated economic reform including the adoption of the law on joint venture in 1984, even though this initiative had little success in luring foreign investment. The technocrats including the extant Premier, Yon Hyung-Muk, have become aware that progress in technology and management methods are the solution and this progress can only be acquired in a timely form from outside sources.²¹⁵ In the end, this awareness has provided a stimulus for the North to open its doors to outside influence.

Despite the increasing role of the technocrats in devising and implementing policies, progress will be slow and resistance within the Party circles and other elements of the leadership is likely to continue. As long as Kim Il Sung remains in control, the opportunity for radical departures from existing policies is likely to be constrained. In brief, it remains uncertain how far Kim Il Sung will be prepared to go in introducing incentives for developing the backward economy and easing tensions on the peninsula into the North Korean system.²¹⁶

South-North dialogue and CBMs

Thirdly, now both Koreas have been aware that South-North dialogue is the only way to eventually undertaking CBMs to reduce inter-Korean tensions

and to live peacefully with each other, even though it has been suspended intermittently. At the national level, the success of the North-South dialogue could end the energy-consuming self-destructive animosity between South and North and provide an opportunity for both sides to concentrate on enhancing the level of prosperity for both the individual and the nation.²¹⁷ It is therefore important for each side to recognize the other's real existence.

The South Korean government has already announced that it understands the existence of North Korea: In reality, there exists in the North of the Korean peninsula a de facto regime in authority as an object of unification and as a counterpart in dialogue for unification.²¹⁸ Until now North Korea has resisted recognition of the existence of the South Korean government, but the Prime Ministers' Talks could be regarded as a de facto acknowledgement by the North of the South Korean government. For substantial improvements such basic principles as non-interference in the other side's internal affairs also need to be declared. Regarding the North Korean demand to release South Korean dissidents now in prison for unauthorized visits to Pyongyang, the South Korean Prime Minister, Kang Young Hoon, said it is not desirable for the future development of inter-Korean relations to interfere with the other side's internal matters. Also political propaganda and antagonistic activities should be avoided. There is an argument that South Korea should refrain from pointing out the problems of North Korean society, and from pushing North Korea into a corner. In this regard, the remarks of the South Korean Foreign Minister, Choi Ho Joong, on 5 November 1990 are pertinent to the effect that:

South Korea's northern policy should from now on be pursued with its emphasis being placed on concerns for the inter-Korean reconciliation. South Korea should take actions necessary to make sure that North Korea does not feel isolated any more with a view to advancing unification.²¹⁹

Taking these points into account, South Korea has already begun to provide aid to the North Korean economy. It must be strong to convince the North that military

means alone cannot secure peace and prosperity for all of Korea.²²⁰ Since October 1988, through the publishing of a list of new measures on economic exchanges with the North, South Korea has regarded trade with North Korea as domestic trade in order to increase South-North trade volumes, which amount to \$US 32.5 million from October 1988 to July 1990.²²¹ As South-North economic cooperation would be considered relatively easy to negotiate, South Korea also considers joint ventures and development in North Korea and Siberia. In his visit to North Korea and the Soviet Union in 1988, the founder of the Hyundai Company, Chung Joo Young, agreed in principle with the North Korean authority to jointly develop Mt. Kumgang and other natural resources. He also announced a joint venture with the Soviet Union to develop the Siberian timber industry, a move that would employ a labour force including both Koreans and ethnic Koreans in China.²²² Therefore, South-North economic talks are important to bring about substantial outcomes. One step in this direction has already been taken by South Korean Prime Minister, Kang, who offered to buy \$US 1.7 billion worth of natural resources (coal, iron ore, timber) from North Korea. Subsequently, President Roh asked the North Korean Premier Yon to convey to Kim Il Sung an offer of an economic aid package.²²³ South Korea thus intends to give North Korea many economic incentives, with reference to the German experience.²²⁴ By doing so, if the two Koreas overcome their mutual distrust through high and low level contacts, there will be an agreement in the middle of the 1990s on political and military issues as well as on family reunions and economic exchanges. If Pyongyang accepts Seoul's idea, relations will improve more rapidly than expected. But as mentioned earlier, realising even economic exchanges needs more time and a considerable political resolve from the North. Therefore, substantial improvements between the two Koreas are at the moment expected to develop slowly .

IV Military Security Issues

In parallel with those external environments and moves toward South-North dialogue, it is becoming increasingly important to construct a political and military environment for the negotiation of an agreement on South-North arms control and disarmament.²²⁵ There exist a common interest in creating a negotiated environment which minimizes or even eliminates the destabilizing influences of certain military technologies or strategies.²²⁶ Some degree of recent détente could give an impetus to both Koreas' negotiation on disarmament and arms control. The two Koreas should negotiate and conclude certain frameworks based on either or both of disarmament and arms control, which not all strategists will see as distinct and incompatible with one another.²²⁷

Disarmament, which always involves arms reduction, is felt to make so many unrealistic assumptions that negotiations are doomed from the start.²²⁸ Moreover, some strategists argue that it is better for stability if parity were maintained at high rather than low levels.²²⁹ Beyond a certain point, arms reductions are, therefore, seen as increasing the likelihood of war, in particular from South Korea's point of view in relation to the North's radical disarmament proposal. Reductions are seen by the South as being worthy of pursuit, in so far as they do not threaten stability.²³⁰

In contrast, arms control, which may involve reductions, but need not necessarily do so, is generally felt to be more realistic and desirable.²³¹ In particular, specific arms control deals might be so, because they are relatively easy to negotiate and pave the way for further agreements.²³² According to the arms control approach, wars begin in the minds of men, and peace and stability are as much a function of intentions as they are of military capabilities.²³³ If each side possesses through arms control agreements better information about what the other side is doing and thus gets a high degree of 'military transparency,' the arms race

might be dampened and the stability, which is the sine qua non of the arms control exercise, will be much greater.²³⁴

Therefore, in view of the purpose of disarmament and arms control and of both Korea's extant military capabilities and deep-rooted distrust, both Koreas urgently need to negotiate disarmament and arms control in order to ease tensions on the peninsula. Despite their recognition of this necessity, however, there has been no sincere attempt at political or military CBMs to support it, even though recent developments throw light on the future of arms control in the peninsula, in particular from their economic perspectives.²³⁵

In brief, from the perspective of political and military environments for disarmament and arms control, the security of the peninsula is still unstable and uncertain, as yet far away from a formal system of peaceful coexistence. For this conclusion, I will analyse both Koreas' arms race and military confrontation, their proposals on disarmament and arms control, the issue of US forces stationed in South Korea and then the nuclear issue as one of the biggest stumbling blocks.

Korean peninsula arms race

The two Koreas have built up their military forces to abnormally high levels, which should be controlled through taking political and military measures to ease tensions. The peninsula has been one of the most militaristic and militarized regions as a result of the fierce arms race-both conventional and nuclear.²³⁶ North Korea's offensive forces and systems near the DMZ have given South Korea a pretext for reinforcing its defence forces, resulting in a further impetus for North Korea to react.

For example, South Korea's purchase of US F-16s spurred the transfer of Soviet MIG-23s to the North.²³⁷ That is, although the purchase of F-16s strengthened the South, it also raised the ante in the South-North arms race and

may have helped cause the subsequent expansion in Soviet military aid to North Korea.²³⁸ To a degree, now, the military equation on the peninsula concerns the question of quality versus quantity. The South would appear to have technological superiority in the air and in some field weapons systems, while the North remains ahead in numbers of weapons systems.²³⁹ In this delicate situation, the likelihood of major conflict erupting either inadvertently or intentionally is enhanced. Misunderstanding or miscalculation between opposing military forces on the DMZ would be most plausible, in the context of heightened security precautions.²⁴⁰ Therefore, even simply to reduce this likelihood, the need for negotiations on the South-North disarmament and arms control is crucial to stability on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's comprehensive peace proposals seem to be too unrealistic to be accepted by South Korea, because it contains the thorny issue of the Rok-US alliance.²⁴¹ North Korea's major proposals are:

- i) the withdrawal of all US forces stationed in the South,
- ii) the conclusion of a peace agreement with the US, and
- iii) the reduction of each side's military forces to the level of 100,000 troops.²⁴²

As to the first demand, North Korea argued that 'the forcible occupation of South Korea by US troops impedes the peaceful reunification, intensifies tensions on the peninsula and is a constant cause for creating the dangers of war.'²⁴³ This argument reflects the North's standpoint that it regards the presence of US forces in the South as the principal obstacle to reunification.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, North Korea has elaborated several justifications for its position: 'occupation of South Korea by US troops violates not only the principles of international law for national integrity, but also those of self-determination set by the UN charter, the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué and the Armistice Agreement.'²⁴⁵

In this regard, South Korea has taken a position that it has to maintain military balance with the North on the basis of the Korean-US military cooperation, until either the threat from the North no longer exists or its defence capability becomes self-sufficient.²⁴⁶ The South believes the presence of the US forces as the UN Command (UNC), which implement the residual obligations which formally at least rest on the 16 UN members, have provided dependable deterrence to the constant threat of invasion from the North.²⁴⁷ Therefore, the South argues, only when a stable state of peaceful coexistence has evolved between them can the US forces be withdrawn with a reasonable assurance that war will not result.²⁴⁸

Regarding the replacement of the Armistice Agreement, North Korea argued that a peace treaty should be settled by talks between the US and North Korea. They called for tripartite talks, with possible representation from South Korea as an observer.²⁴⁹ North Korea argued that in tripartite talks a non-aggression 'declaration' and unification would be discussed. But it insisted on a bilateral peace treaty with the US, excluding South Korea, not only because the South is not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, but also because the US plays the formal role of the UNC. Another reason is that the US 'controls' the South's armed forces and therefore a treaty with the South would be meaningless.²⁵⁰ Thus the current North Korean leadership still tends to reject the South as a counterpart in negotiation for a peace treaty and is mainly interested in finding a way of negotiating directly with the US.²⁵¹

Meanwhile, resisting this argument, the South has criticised the North's proposal as a tactical scheme to aim at alienating the South from the US, disregarding the realities on the peninsula. It contended that naturally it should be party to a peace treaty, regardless of the technical problem arising from its non-party status to the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, the South has maintained the position that present arrangement will have to remain intact unless the North gives up its intention to exclude the South in the negotiation. But it is clear that

adjustments will have to be made in the South Korea-US security relationship, at least in order to avoid the North's propaganda. The US should allow South Korea equality and independence in strategy formation and command structure, including operational control over the Korean army.²⁵²

In the matter of the South-North arms reduction, the North insists that both Koreas should aim at drastic cuts to military power, because their main distrust and the danger of war originate from military power itself. But due to the radical scope of this disarmament proposal, North Korea's purpose is considered by the South to be to communize the peninsula, given the fact that North Korea arguably could more easily mobilize its forces and reserve troops than could the South, mainly due to the North Korean Four Military Guidelines:

- i) the armament of all nationals,
- ii) the fortification of all territory,
- iii) the transfer of all military troops to officers, and
- iv) the modernization of all military forces.²⁵³

Inevitably, the South has maintained the view that tension reduction must come first before any such talks ever begin. As a matter of fact, the South asked on numerous occasions to discuss CBMs in the existing Armistice Commission in Panmunjom.²⁵⁴

Meanwhile, South Korea, which basically follows the model of the European arms control approach, prefers political and military CBMs to drastic structural disarmament. South Korea's major proposals are:

- i) the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement,
- ii) the abandonment of unification by military aggression, and
- iii) the easing of tensions.

South Korea argues that political CBMs such as opening of trade, communications and travel should come first, pointing out that the tendency to

reinforce military power results from mutual distrust.²⁵⁵ It has emphasized the importance of political confidence building before getting into military confidence building.²⁵⁶ Since 1974, it has continued to call for a non-aggression agreement, whereas the North has insisted on a non-aggression declaration, a less-binding form of agreement. Moreover, South Korea has consistently asked for a North Korean abrogation of its terrorist activities and of its attempt to communize the entire peninsula.²⁵⁷ As a next step it emphasizes the importance of CBMs before getting to any substantive arms control and reduction measures,²⁵⁸ on the grounds that in the absence of political and military CBMs it is very difficult to put any disarmament measure into effect. Whenever the North made disarmament proposals, the South responded by stressing that 'tension must be reduced before arms and peace must be achieved before unification.'²⁵⁹

Thus both Koreas have revealed quite considerable differences in their purposes, perceptions and interpretations regarding the proposals for disarmament and arms control. These mainly result from their divergent aims for unification: North Korea's intention towards unification through communism and South Korea's intention towards unification through liberal democratization.

As a means of firming up socialism and potentially communizing the peninsula entirely, North Korea called on its nationals to increase revolutionary capabilities in the areas of ideology, technology and culture.²⁶⁰ Kim Il Sung exhorted his people to stick to the socialist road, saying that 'the road to socialism is an untrodden path.'²⁶¹

South Korea, on the other hand, has significant fears that the Kim Il Sung regime remains intent upon reunifying the peninsula by force, in view of several aspects of the North's force structure and behaviour.²⁶² It regards North Korea's reinforcement of the 'three revolutionary capabilities' as a major engine of distrust. Inevitably it insists on political and military CBMs as top priority for the

disarmament and arms control negotiation. In this context substantive progress in South-North disarmament and arms control negotiations could not have been expected.

Briefly, what is to be pointed out here is that just as some of the proposals in South-North dialogue were for primarily propaganda purposes, so too were the majority of the proposals for disarmament and arms control. As a result, neither of the two Koreas succeeded in building mutual trust. Many proposals are difficult to negotiate. Some of them are purely self-righteous, idealistic and unrealistic. Furthermore, in the context of a cold war system with bilateral military alliances, it has been difficult to establish and formalise a mechanism for arms control and disarmament on the peninsula. In the future it seems unlikely that the two Koreas will easily find any effective measure for mutual political and military CBMs.²⁶³

Nonetheless, there is a growing possibility of searching for improved directions on the road to disarmament and arms control through the development of some positive factors. For example, there are similarities among the two Koreas' proposals, such as the easing of South-North tension, substantial demilitarisation of the DMZ and the composition of the South-North joint military committee. Until now the two Koreas have paid the price in heavy defence expenditure: money that would have been invested in the civilian sector.²⁶⁴ South Korea, facing US troop cutbacks and growing pressure to open up its domestic markets, will find itself increasingly strained if it tries to increase military spending while reforming the economy. Every country which competes with South Korea tries to reduce its military burden of defence expenditure.²⁶⁵ North Korea also needs to reduce the cost of maintaining its large army and to redirect its resources to the civilian economy.²⁶⁶ It is also being squeezed by the Soviet Union and China, which are cutting back on the aid lifeline that keeps the North Korean economy afloat.²⁶⁷

In this context, the South-North Prime Ministers' Talks would contribute to understanding each other on the necessity of arms control and disarmament, even though these talks are just a first step and are made at a snail's pace. While South Korea agreed to the North's demands that political and military affairs be on the reunification agenda from the earliest stage, North Korea accepted the South's wishes that exchanges of people and goods also be given top priority.²⁶⁸ In the future it is cautiously expected that the two Koreas would agree to conclude a non-aggression agreement as a prerequisite for peace in the peninsula. The major powers also play a positive role, while supporting South-North dialogue in every field. In December 1990, Gorbachev promised to take all the steps within his power to work toward the unification of Korea. He said that:

[I]t is necessary to be patient and carry on dialogue between North and South and create an atmosphere of mutual trust.²⁶⁹

The US would reportedly consider some drastic measures toward North Korea to improve bilateral relations if inter-Korean high-level talks turn out successfully and North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement.

On 31 October 1988 the US took measures to ease some restrictions imposed on the North following the Korean Air Lines (KAL) bombing incident involving Kim Hyon-Hi in November 1987. Among these were: easing of restrictions for Americans to travel to North Korea, permission for exchanges in non-political areas, permission for trade in humanitarian goods, easing of restrictions in issuing entry visas to North Koreans, permission for informal contacts with North Korean diplomats, etc.²⁷⁰

But still the US insists on the following as a precondition for change in its policy towards North Korea: progress in South-North dialogue, South-North confidence building in the DMZ, the return of the remains of the MIAs, guarantee of the renunciation of terrorism, the signing of the IAEA safeguards agreement, etc.

On the other hand, North Korea insists on the following towards the US: the withdrawal of US forces stationed in South Korea, the reduction of both Koreas' military forces, the transformation of the truce agreement into a peace agreement, the suspension of the *Team Spirit* exercise, direct dialogue between the US and North Korea, the formation of a committee for the return of the remains of the MIAs, etc. So far, North Korea-US contacts remain cautious, but they will become warmer, if and when North Korea and Japan agree to establish diplomatic relations.²⁷¹

US forces in South Korea

In relation to US forces stationed in South Korea, one of the hot issues is that of their withdrawal from the South. If the two Koreas do not agree to limit their forces, there remains the possibility of a South-North arms race after the withdrawal. Pointing out that North Korea has deployed over 65% of its offensive forces near the DMZ, South Korea has tried to achieve self-defence. Therefore, in order to avoid a South-North arms race, South Korea and the US should positively examine on a mid-to-long-term basis North Korea's position regarding a linking of the withdrawal to arms control negotiations. South Korea and the US should aim to induce change in North Korea's attitude. For example, as a concession on the withdrawal, they could request that the North redeploy its forces to the rear and reduce its offensive forces.

Regarding US forces' withdrawal, there are actually three possible positions: unilateral and immediate withdrawal, gradual partial withdrawal, and opposition to the withdrawal. With the April 1990 Pentagon report that is based on a phased approach, the US decided to withdraw 5,000 troops from the 43,000 stationed in South Korea by 1992.²⁷² In the second phase of 1993-95, the US would aim at the additional reduction and reorganization of forces, but its basic position is to link the additional reduction to the extent of the threat from North

Korea. In the third phase of 1996-2000 the US would keep its forces at the lowest level consistent with its subsidiary role and the Korean forces playing the lead role. Seoul reacted to this US plan in an increasingly self-confident and accommodating manner.²⁷³

Role of US forces for peace-keeping

As a second issue, it is timely that South Korea and the US seriously consider the role of US forces for peace-keeping in the peninsula and readjust it appropriately. It has been assumed that US forces have contributed to security on the peninsula deterring the North from any attempt at reunification by force.²⁷⁴ The presence of US forces, particularly the US Second Division stationed between the DMZ and Seoul, has been a powerful deterrent to the invasion by the North Korean army.²⁷⁵ But considering East-West reconciliation and their new-found cooperative spirit, it would be necessary to readjust the US forces' role. It is required that South Korea regain the right to control its military operations and reorient the role and position of the US troops, for establishing a more equal relationship with the US.²⁷⁶ It would undercut the North's main propaganda and have a positive impact on the South's domestic political environment, on the climate of US-Korean relations, and on the prospects of South-North dialogue.²⁷⁷ Thus it is desirable and realistic that the role of US forces should be focused on real peace-keeping and symbolic war-avoidance rather than on war-fighting capability. The US can make a public pronouncement that its troops will serve as a buffer between the two Koreas while the Koreas work out their differences.²⁷⁸ Pyongyang and Seoul could also be aware that US troops on the peninsula have multiple roles to play, some of which are advantageous and some of which not in their national interest. Only from this changed perspective can concrete steps be taken toward the constructive disengagement of US troops, thus building the foundation for mutual trust and cooperation between the two Koreas.²⁷⁹

US nuclear policy on the peninsula

A third issue concerns the US nuclear policy on the peninsula. North Korea increasingly requests that the US remove nuclear weapons from the South, proposing to make the peninsula a nuclear-free zone.²⁸⁰ The Soviet Union also often presses for reduction or elimination of the US nuclear umbrella protecting South Korea. At the Roh- Gorbachev Summit in December 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, repeated to his South Korean counterpart, Choi Ho Joong, Soviet proposals to remove nuclear weapons from the peninsula, alluding to the US presence in the South, saying that:

Who are these weapons directed against? Against your brothers in the North? This is senseless. Against the Soviet Union? This also has no logic.²⁸¹

Meanwhile, until now, due to its 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND)²⁸² policy, the US has been restricted in its willingness to discuss the existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea. But given the rising South Korean nationalism and the controversial debate surrounding the NCND policy, this issue will continue to be raised. In this context it is necessary to devise realistic means to resolve the controversy, to stop up the North Korean propaganda and to prohibit North Korea's nuclear proliferation.

Therefore, the US should seriously consider the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The reason is that nuclear deterrence would appear to be adequately met by US off-shore deployment, in view of the fact that unlike the situation in Europe, North Korea has no nuclear weapons and that the balance of conventional forces is more equal in Korea than in Europe.²⁸³ Furthermore, the political cost of the first use of nuclear weapons against the

conventional forces would be extraordinarily high.²⁸⁴ It must be kept in mind that, in the event of war on the peninsula, both sides' conventional weapons would inflict heavy losses on both Koreas. There would be no winner, but only two losers.

In this situation, any nuclear weapons to further assure huge damage are redundant. Thus, the nuclear factor on the peninsula would not materially support South Korea for either war-fighting or deterrence. This is the case, because the quantities of conventional weapons held by both Koreas are very high. And, due to the extent to which these are enough to have foreseeable catastrophic effects, it could be argued that they would be sufficient in themselves to deter a war.²⁸⁵

In view of the regional factors, drastic reduction in these conventional weapons is less plausible, even before or after unification. As a result, nuclear weapons are not indispensable either in a conflict or as a deterrent.²⁸⁶ Therefore, it is conceivable that if North Korea abandoned its attempts to develop its own nuclear weapons, the US could either relinquish its redundant nuclear umbrella in the peninsula or at least withdraw its nuclear weapons from the South²⁸⁷. At some point in the South-North negotiations the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the South could possibly be traded for important concessions by the North.²⁸⁸ Thus, nowadays given the insistence that the value of tactical nuclear weapons is obsolete, as argued and proved by E. P. Thompson²⁸⁹ and the 1987 INF Treaty respectively, the application of nuclear weapons to Korean security would likely be of little or no use, but only regarded as a stumbling block to arms control.

Furthermore, if North Korea has a nuclear option, it could use it as an 'equalizer' towards South Korea.²⁹⁰ North Korea is falling steadily behind the South, politically, economically and militarily. It may see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the only way of turning the tide. Therefore, in a situation in which it is difficult to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, proportionate

change in the US policy on nuclear weapons, could be used as a bargaining chip. By doing so, if North Korea decides to completely suspend its effort to develop nuclear weapons, this measure would to that extent contribute to security on the peninsula as well as to the inter-Korean arms control negotiation. Otherwise, does the US really have practical alternatives to overcome North Korea's drive to develop nuclear weapons?

North Korea and nuclear weapons

Of particular security concern, North Korea's nuclear program, which could support the development of nuclear weapons, is certainly regarded as a threat to the security of Northeast Asia and to the NPT, and a potential proliferation issue of concern to all countries. Adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1985, North Korea accepted the obligation of placing all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards within 18 months.²⁹¹ But it has failed to conclude the IAEA safeguards agreement for more than 5 years, while operating an unsafeguarded reactor since 1987.²⁹² Thus North Korea is reportedly devoting considerable resources and efforts to an unacknowledged nuclear program not covered by IAEA safeguards. By doing so, North Korea attempts to justify its position through shifting responsibility to the US, while using the prospect of its nuclear-weapons capability as a lever for the removal of US nuclear weapons from the South.

However, the basis of US policy towards North Korea is quite clear. Rejecting this North Korean assertion, the US argues that it is inappropriate to give bilateral assurances to induce a country to comply with its NPT obligations. Since to do so would undermine the very principles of the NPT regime, North Korea's treaty obligation to accept safeguards should, the US argues, be without condition. The US maintains that it issued a general negative security assurance (NSA), stating that:

The US will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the US, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.²⁹³

The US has also stated that it would apply to North Korea if it meets the criteria stated therein. It repeated this NSA at the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) and more recently at the September 1991 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. On this occasion, US representative, Richard T. Kennedy, publicly repeated the text of the NSA, adding that 'we stand by this assurance as a firm and reliable statement of US policy.'²⁹⁴ Thus the US made it clear that it will not issue a specific security assurance to North Korea.

Despite this US position, it is really difficult to persuade North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all countries that North Korea concludes and implements the IAEA safeguards agreement. Therefore, many western countries, in cooperation with the US and South Korea, are now advised to take up this issue as a precondition against North Korea's recent drive to build a wider range of diplomatic and economic ties. The US and South Korea requested their friendly countries that the latter's relations with North Korea should not be fully formalized, nor should economic benefits be permitted to flow to North Korea until Pyongyang complies with its NPT obligations and places all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards by signature and implementation of an NPT safeguards agreement. Thus, the issue of North Korean acceptance of IAEA full scope nuclear safeguards has become a primary condition for such improvement, both politically and economically.

In this situation, North Korea expressed at the June 1991 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors its intention to sign an agreement later this year, which that will open its controversial secret nuclear plant to international inspection.²⁹⁵ The September 1991 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors

approved the text of an agreement, which finalized through the negotiation between the North Korean delegation and the IAEA in Vienna in July 1991, and requested North Korea to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.

Therefore, if the plant is opened and weapons development stops, it will be a significant victory for the world system to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even the Soviets warned North Korea that they would cut off all nuclear cooperation and supplies unless it opened its facilities fully to inspection by the IAEA.²⁹⁶ Li Peng, the Chinese Prime Minister, has probably conveyed China's own alarm during his visit to North Korea in May 1991.²⁹⁷

Japan has firmly required full inspection of the nuclear plant at Yongbyon as a condition to normalizing its ties with North Korea as reviewed. Under these pressures North Korea is cautiously beginning to move with another great tide that seems to be changing world politics positively.

But despite the North's positive reaction, it is still, as mentioned earlier, doubtful whether and when the North Korean full compliance on this critical security issue would be brought about. North Korea still seems to stick to its previous tactics, as we see from the remarks of the North Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Young Nam, said on 20 June 1991 that:

North Korea will not accept international inspection of its nuclear program until the US permits inspection of its atomic weapons in South Korea.²⁹⁸

In brief, there would be two possible means to obstruct the North Korean nuclear program. One is to make a bombing raid on the site, following the example of the Israeli raid on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear plant on 7 June 1981, in case diplomatic efforts have little effect on North Korea. But this has the potential to precipitate a second Korean war. The other is to make North Korea comply with the NPT obligations through either political and economic pressures on North

Korea or proportionate changes in the US and South Korea's existing policy as reviewed above. If not, an action-reaction phenomenon would be inevitable.

The continued presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on the South arguably provides an incentive for the North to pursue the nuclear option, which in turn would be likely to ensure a South Korean response.²⁹⁹ Seoul, which has an advanced civilian nuclear industry and a strong nuclear technology base, had experience in deciding to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s when its confidence with the US was shaken. At the time the US pressures and reassurance dissuaded Seoul, but the option still remains available to it.³⁰⁰ Therefore if South Korea decides that North Korea is within a few years of having nuclear weapons, it may well follow suit despite US sanctions and protection.³⁰¹ Thus, as the issue of nuclear proliferation has also been one of the thorniest security issues on the peninsula since 1987, the US should be flexible and appropriately adapt its security policy on the peninsula to the fast changing situation both politically and economically.

V. New US Nuclear Policy and the DPRK's Nuclear Program

On the 27th September 1991, US President George Bush announced that the US will unilaterally abolish all tactical nuclear arsenals. This could contribute to resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Of course, this decision was made on practical grounds with regard to the global situation, based on the fact that, with the end of the Cold War system, tactical nuclear weapons are of little military value, particularly in the European theatre. Subsequently, the US administration reportedly decided to remove all short-range nuclear arsenals, including air-delivered weapons, from South Korea, with a view to bringing pressure to bear on North Korea to abandon its program to develop nuclear weapons.³⁰² This US decision was welcomed in principle by the two Korean governments. Thus the US unilaterally gave the two Koreas added momentum to resolve one of the greatest stumbling blocks to inter-Korean negotiations. Besides, while it is regarded as a concession to North Korean assertions regarding its own security in the face of nuclear-armed US forces in the South, this decision could pave the way for tougher pressure to be brought to bear on North Korea from the US and the international community, unless North Korea forgoes its plan to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.³⁰³

However, despite these moves, North Korea seems unlikely to change its basic tactical position immediately. In contrast to its June 1991 position, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister, Chon In-Chol, said on 21 October 1991 that:

North Korea does not contemplate immediately signing a [IAEA nuclear] safeguards agreement and would not allow immediate outside inspection of its nuclear facilities even if the US withdrew all nuclear weapons from the South.³⁰⁴

Moreover, North Korea places new emphasis on the need to renounce the US nuclear-umbrella policy toward South Korea. This policy, based on concerns about a possible imbalance of power, is one which the US, and South Korea in particular, have expressed their intention to maintain. Therefore, despite

the US announcement, it remains doubtful whether there will be any immediate, visible improvements in the security situation on the peninsula.

In this situation, there is a possibility of the US and South Korea trying to press North Korea to sign and ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement through taking further coercive diplomatic measures.³⁰⁵ But, if this is so, the situation could be worsened precipitately, by North Korea fiercely resisting this pressure. Thus even though the momentum has been given to resolve one of the thorniest issues, its effect on the North Korean nuclear program is difficult to predict. Therefore, until this issue has been resolved once and for all, the security on the peninsula continues to remain unstable and volatile.

Conclusion

At the regional level, the changing balance of power and interests among the superpowers make the future of Northeast Asia very unstable.³⁰⁶ A diminution of the US commitment in this region would create a security vacuum that other major players would be tempted or compelled to fill.³⁰⁷ The US role in Northeast Asia has already started to decline, mainly due to its financial burden. The 1990 Pentagon report called on Japan and South Korea to make a bigger contribution to the common defence effort.³⁰⁸ Moreover an important source of complication, the Moscow Declaration on a new security mechanism for East Asia, could have resulted in dismay on the part of the US. President Gorbachev and Roh agreed on many critical points, notably the need for collective security system in Asia. That is, Moscow and Seoul pushed the Asia-Pacific nations to assess faster the new political picture in the region and to adapt to their policies. But the US has repeatedly disapproved of a Helsinki- style system in the region for reasons of its foreseeable failure. As Richard Solomon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs, said on 30 October 1990, the US position is that:

In evaluating the various suggestions for a new security mechanism for East Asia, we should recall the unsuccessful history of collective defence arrangements in the region since 1945.³⁰⁹

In view of the maturing of the Pacific era and the rising of the Asian NIEs in the international political economy, intense economic competition in the region is another problem that will further complicate security arrangements.³¹⁰ The US continues to play a pivotal role, through its flexible military power and its capacity to offer the world's largest market for Asian exporters. Economic competition and trade friction between the US and these countries have also become acute. Besides, the Soviet Union considers the East-Asia region to be more important both geostrategically and economically than ever before.³¹¹

As a consequence, in this region unlike Europe, the lack of an economic, political framework has been accelerating the pace and complexity of competition. Therefore, due to the combination of the complex competition and the lack of a security structure, in Northeast Asia uncertainties at best or instabilities at worst are increasingly prevalent. This is a great limitation to the realization of a mechanism for the peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, in terms of the external security factors in and around the peninsula.

As to the South-North dialogue, which could decisively pave the way for peaceful coexistence, still there is no substantive improvement in inter-Korean and military security issues. The implementation of the principle of coexistence would in theory require a change in North Korea's traditional revolutionary doctrine. But North Korea's policy toward South Korea has until now shown signs that the North Korean leadership has been yet unable to resolve the conflict between these two principles.³¹² North Korea, which makes a desperate attempt to stabilise its Stalinist political system through rigid domestic control, tries to show some flexibility through participation in South-North dialogue. But its two-pronged strategy toward South Korea, which continues intermittent negotiations with the South Korean government while encouraging revolutionary movements in South Korea, has only suggested that North Korea is following the principle of coexistence without abandoning the cause of revolution.³¹³ Meanwhile, recent South Korean policies, even though they are considered to be going in the right direction, are still insufficient to get substantial outcomes.

On a mid-to-long-term basis, it is desirable that South Korea and the US seriously consider their policy on disarmament and arms control including nuclear issues. In this regard, the recent and dramatic change in US nuclear policy could well have a significant effect on the North Korean nuclear program, while contributing to South-North dialogue. In reality the progressive attitudes examined above are of great importance in reducing tension and recovering mutual confidence

lost between the two Koreas. But the possibility for a new creative policy, namely, such a change from the previous confrontational to the cooperative strategy is not clearly visible, even though there are some positive lights suggesting that the 1990s could be considered to give both Koreas an excellent opportunity for national reconciliation and reunification. Therefore, at least until this creative policy has been implemented, security on the peninsula remains as unstable as ever.

1 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.59

2 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing 1990*, p.45, Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response in the World*, p.9.

3 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing 1990*, p.38.

4 By the late 1990s, South Korea will no longer be inferior to North Korea in terms of military strength. (*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.194.)

5 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.4.

6 *The Australian Financial Review*, 10 May 1990, p.75.

7 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.241.

8 *Ibid.*, p.177.

9 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.71.

10 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.230.

11 The main event for political and social changes in the communist countries was the transfer of leadership, as we see from the examples of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping, Honecker, Ceausescu, etc.

12 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.300.

13 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.59.

14 On July 7 in 1988, President Roh Tae Woo proposed a summit talk with North Korea. (*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.271.)

15 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.59.

16 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.208.

17 A reunified noncommunist Korea would be especially laden with political and strategic significance (for details, see Pollack and Winnefeld, *US Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific*, p.16.)

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- 18 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.34.
- 19 For details see *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, pp. 186-188, Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, pp.270-271.
- 20 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.7.
- 21 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.261.
- 22 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.23.
- 23 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.184.
- 24 The *Donga Ilbo* Seoul 3 Sept. 1990, p.1.Neither the Soviet Union nor China wants to be dragged into a major conflict on the Korean peninsula which may be triggered by North Korea's military adventurism. (*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.187.)
- 25 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.190.
- 26 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.701.
- 27 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.29.
- 28 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.185.
- 29 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.28.
- 30 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.189.
- 31 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.193,p242.
- 32 For example, there has been a long litany of events: the extraordinary proportion of resources poured into the North Korean military build up, the digging of tunnels, the attempted assassination of Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, the encouragement of revolution in South Korea and the stress on reunification on North Korean terms.(For details see Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.369 and Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*,p.31.)
- 33 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.4.
- 34 For details of North Korea's criticism on the Team Spirit exercise, see the document of the IAEA, GOV/INF/603, IAEA, 13 Feb. 1991
- 35 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.44., Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.369.
- 36 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.195.
- 37 Major Steven Sudderth "Political and Economic Impacts on the North Korean Threat" *Change, Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin*. p.209.
- 38 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.207.

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- 39 For details see *Ibid.*, pp.208-212.
- 40 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, pp.698-699. For details, see Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.300, pp.305-327.
- 41 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.700.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p.705
- 43 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.56.
- 44 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.701. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.213.
- 45 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 68. In 1989 Korea's exports; \$US 62.4 billion, imports ; \$US 61.5 billion. In 1990 exports; \$US 65 billion, imports ; \$US 69.8 billion.(source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, ROK)
- 46 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.192.
- 49 Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.20. Provisions of the GATT enable developing countries to avoid exposing their vulnerabilities to free competition from other countries.
- 50 Mack Andrew and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*, p.112. Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.49. Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.13, p.15.
- 51 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.49. Mack Andrew and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*, p.113.
- 52 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.40.
- 53 Mack Andrew and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*, p.113.
- 54 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.210. p.212.
- 55 *The Donga Ilbo*, 3 July 1991, p. 3. *The Chosen Ilbo*, 3 July 1991, p. 1.
- 56 Major Steven Sudderth 'Political and Economic Impacts on the North Korean Threat', *Change Interdependence in the Security in the Pacific Basin*, p.205. Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korean Briefing 1990*, p.27. The Chun-Nakasone formulation that 'the maintainance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is important to the peace and stability of East Asia including Japan' now gets closer to the essential Japanese assessment. (Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.21.)
- 57 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.22. Meanwhile there are some Japanses who maintain that Japan 'needs to have its own global ideas' and 'we should prepare them without consulting the US all the time' (*The International Herald Tribune*, 12 aug. 1991. p.6.)

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- 58 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.22, p.57.
- 59 Jonathan Pollack and James Winnefeld, *US Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific*, p.16.
- 60 For details of the friction between the US and South Korea, see Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.215.
- 61 Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.23.
- 62 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69
- 63 Korean daily newspapers (*The Dongo Ilbo*, *The Joongang Ilbo*, *The Chosun Ilbo*, *The Korea Times*, etc.) 23 and 24 November 1990.
- 64 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.9. Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.13.
- 65 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.5.
- 66 Paul Kreisberg, *The US and Asia in 1989*, p.23.
- 67 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 72.
- 68 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.28. Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing 1990*, p.24. Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.203.
- 69 R. Manning, *Asian Policy*, p. 19.
- 70 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.69. For details see Jonathan Pollack and James Winnefeld, *US Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific*, pp.15-16.
- 71 Byung-Joon Ahn *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.699. Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.22. For details of anti-American feeling in South Korea see: Chong-Sik Lee (ed.) *Korea Briefing 1990*, pp.26-27.
- 72 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.47.
- 73 Korean daily newspapers (*The Dongo Ilbo*, *The Joongang Ilbo*, *The Chosun Ilbo*, *The Korea Times*, etc.) , 19 and 20 January 1991
- 74 The International Herald Tribune, 3 July 1991. p.3.
- 75 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.221.
- 76 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.174.
- 77 For details, see the Feb. 1988 inaugural speech of President Roh, the July 7 declaration (in 1988), his Independence day speeches, etc.
- 78 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.700.

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- 79 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p.44. Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.178. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.193.President Roh proclaimed in 1988 that South Korea would support and cooperate with any attempts by North Korea to keep on good terms with South Korea's allies, the US and Japan. (His speech of 'Self-Existence and Unification,' delivered on July 16, 1988.)
- 80 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1289.
- 81 R. Manning, *Asian Policy*, p. 63.*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.174.
- 82 Byuing-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*,p.703. President Roh said in September 1990 at the opening of the Seoul Games: the Olympics in Seoul helped the nation to rapidly improve its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It also provided the momentum to expedite reforms in the Soviet Union and East European countries.
- 83 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 65.
- 84 *Ibid.*
- 85 *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 Dec. 1990, p.9.
- 86 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1294.
- 87 *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 Dec. 1990, p.9. For details of the prospects on the soviet-South Korea economic relations, see *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.175, pp.177-179.
- 88 In 1989 Korea's export to the USSR; \$US 210 million (42% increased annually) and imports from the USSR; \$US 390 million (77.8% increased).
- 89 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1296.
- 90 *Ibid.*
- 91 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, pp.74-75. North Korea's anger is well demonstrated in the *Pyongyang Times* October 6, 1990 "Diplomatic Relations Bargained for Dollars" in which it accused the Soviets of having sold the "dignity and honour of a socialist state and the interests and faith of its ally for \$US 2.3b. it was to receive from South Korea." See *Ibid* p.75.
- 92 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,pp.46-47.
- 93 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.301.
- 94 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69
- 95 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.57.
- 96 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.298.
- 97 *Ibid.* ,p.302.

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- 98 *Ibid.* ,pp. 301-302.
- 99 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.186, p.188
- 100 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p.33.
- 101 *Ibid.* ,p.34.
- 102 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.270. Chinese strategic interests require a friendly state across the Yalu.
- 103 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,pp.34-35
- 104 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.352.
- 105 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.296.
- 106 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.244.
- 107 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.299. Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1287. Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, pp.703-704. Ross Babbage (ed), *The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s*, p.81
- 108 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.300.
- 109 *The Australian Financial Review*, 4 June 1990, p. 16.
- 110 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, pp.74-75
- 111 Scott, Atkinson, *The USSR and Pacific Century*, p.640.
- 112 *TIME*, 17 Sept. 1990, pp.42-43.
- 113 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1268., Scott, Atkinson,*The USSR and Pacific Century*, p.640
- 114 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.75. Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1286.
- 115 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.75. Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea in 1989*, p.79.
- 116 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.75.
- 117 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.184,p.186,p.187.
- 118 An Asian diplomat in Beijing predicts: "China will no doubt write off Pyongyang. The only question is when and how."(*TIME*, 17 Sept. 1990, pp.42-43.)
- 119 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.42., p.48. James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.300, p.304.*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.186.

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- 120 For details of North Korea's relations with the two allies, see: Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, pp. 1282-86. James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, pp.299-302. Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.24. Sino-Soviet rivalry has forced North Korea's relations with the two big powers into a see-saw pattern - when relations with one are up, relations with the other are down. See Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, pp. 257-258 and *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.186, p.188.
- 121 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.74.
- 122 *Ibid.* ,p.76. *The International Herald Tribune*, 20 June 1991, p.2.
- 123 *The Australian Financial Review* , 28 Sept. 1990, p.12.
- 124 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.74.
- 125 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.57. Some Japanese intellectuals called for a policy of equidistance between the two Koreas (Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea* p.354.)
- 126 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,pp.21-22.
- 127 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.72.
- 128 *Ibid.* ,p.74.
- 129 *TIME*, 22 October 1990. p.33.
- 130 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.274.
- 131 *Ibid.* ,p.376.
- 132 *Ibid.*
- 133 Paul Kreisberg, *The US and Asia in 1989*, p.376.
- 134 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.300, p.304.
- 135 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.44.
- 136 Under the so-called Hallstein Doctrine there should be no cross-recognition of both South and North Korea by third states. Kim, Hakjoon points out that the Park government expressed the view that it should "either break off or refuse diplomatic relations with countries recognising North Korea." The ROK government has gradually become more flexible in its application of the Hallstein Doctrine, formally abandoning the doctrine altogether in 1973. (Kim, Hakjoon. *Unification Policies of North and South Korea*, pp. 234-5)
- 137 UN Security Council document, S/22455, April 9, 1991, p.4.
- 138 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p.24.
- 139 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.305

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- 140 *Ibid.* ,p.375.
- 141 Babbage, Ross (ed), *The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s*, p.85.
- 142 *Ibid.* ,p.86.
- 143 The Republic of Korea held a substantial advantage over the DPRK in establishing its legitimacy in the community of nations. Its government used the UN cachet to support its claim to be the legitimate government of all Korea. See: Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.275.
- 144 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.275.
- 145 *Ibid.* ,p.278.
- 146 *Ibid.* ,p.276.
- 147 *The Washington Post* , June 3, 1991, p.A8. *The International Herald Tribune*, 15-16 June 1991, p.3.
- 148 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.300.
- 149 In his address to the 46th Session of the UN General assembly on 24 September 1991, President Roh said that 'the seperate membership of two Koreas in the UN is an important interim step on the road to national unification.'
- 150 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.41.
- 151 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.296.
- 152 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.39.
- 153 *Ibid.*
- 154 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.172.
- 155 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.298.
- 156 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.372.
- 157 Mack Andrew and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*, p.119.
- 158 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.6.
- 159 *Ibid.* ,p.12.
- 160 Major Steven Sudderth 'Political and Economic Impacts on the North Korean Threat', *Change Interdependence in the Security in the Pacific Basin*, p.209.
- 161 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, pp.193-194.

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- 162 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.6, p.7, p.11.
- 163 *Ibid.*, p.12
- 164 *Ibid.*, p.10.
- 165 *Ibid.*, p.45.
- 166 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.192.
- 167 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.77.
- 168 *Ibid.*
- 169 *Ibid.*
- 170 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.13.
- 171 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.77.
- 172 *Ibid.*
- 173 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.13.
- 174 *Ibid.*
- 175 *Ibid.* p.12. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.195.
- 176 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.14. Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1282.
- 177 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.14, p.56.
- 178 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.213.
- 179 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.44, p.56.
- 180 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.207.
- 181 Chong-Sik Lee (ed), *Korea Briefing 1990*, p.52., Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response to the World*, p.4.
- 182 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1288.
- 183 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.72. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.207.
- 184 *The Australian*, 28 June 1990, p. 11.
- 185 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.71.

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- 186 *The Australian* , 28 June 1990, p. 11.
- 187 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.78.
- 188 *Ibid.*,p.74.,Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.702. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.194.
- 189 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.178.
- 190 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.73.
- 191 *Ibid.* Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response to the World*, p.7.
- 192 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.73.
- 193 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1289.
- 194 Major Steven Sudderth 'Political and Economic Impacts on the North Korean Threat', *Change Interdependence in the Security in the Pacific Basin*, p.209. For details, see Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response to the World*,pp.7-8.
- 195 However, North Korea said in December 1990 it would return the grain early 1991 on the grounds that South Korea reneged on its promise to keep the donation a secret.
- 196 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.73.
- 197 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.53.Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response to the World*,p.8.
- 198 For details, see Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,pp.5-21.
- 199 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 64.
- 200 *Ibid.* p.66.p.70, President Roh Tae Woo of the DJP and Opposition Leaders Kim Young Sam of the RDP and Kim Jong Pil of the NDRP announced on January 22, 1990, the merger of their political parties and the inauguration of a new political party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). (Chong Sik Lee (ed.) *Korea Briefing* 1990, p.12).
- 201 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p38.
- 202 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 71.
- 203 *Ibid.*, p.69.
- 204 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.214.
- 205 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 67.
- 206 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.55.

207 James Cotton, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea*, p.301. South Korea constructed several concrete barriers over the roads from the DMZ to Seoul in order to obstruct the North Korean invasion.

208 *Ibid.*

209 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p.43.

210 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.704.

211 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69.

212 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.229.

213 In Rangoon on October 9 1983 North Korea attempted to unsuccessfully to assassinate President Chun, but killed four South Korean Cabinet Ministers and 15 others in the President's party. (Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.11.)

214 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.53.

215 Kong Dan Oh, *North Korea's Response to the World*,p.8.

216 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,pp.53-54.

217 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.179.

218 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.55.

219 Korean daily newspapers (*The Donga Ilbo*, *the Chosen Ilbo*, *The Korea Times*, etc.), November 5&6, 1990.

220 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.179.

221 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.701.

222 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 68.

223 *Ibid.* pp.69-70. In his address to the 46th Session of the UN General Assembly, President Roh said that 'the ROK is prepared to actively pursue economic cooperation with DPRK in all areas, including trade, tourism, joint exploration of underground resources and establishment of joint venture plants.'

224 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer, 1991, p.229.

Even though the situations are quite different from each other, we could refer the process of such improvements in the E-W German relations as follows:

1) the period of exchange and cooperation (1972-1989); the agreement on transportation (May 1972), the basic agreement (Dec. 1972), two Germanies' UN membership (Sept. 1973), the establishment of permanent representatives (March 1974), the opening-up of a highway between Hamburg and Berlin (Nov.1982), West Germany's endorsement for the payment of the German

Bank's loan of 0.95 billion Mark to East Germany (July 1984), the Summit between Kohl and Honecker (March 1985), and Honecker's visit to Bonn (Sept. 1987);

2) the period of establishing a basis for unification (1989-1990); Honecker's announcement of a disarmament plan (Jan. 1989), E. Germans' demonstration and Honecker's resignation (Oct. 1989), the demolition of the Berlin Wall (Nov. 1989), the proposal of the 2+4 meeting (Feb. 1990), and the Gorbachev-Kohl meeting (July 1990), leading to full unification (Oct. 1990).

225 Michael Sheehan, *Arms Control*, p.6.

226 *Ibid.* p.8.

227 *Ibid.* pp.6-7.

228 *Ibid.* p.6. Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.196.

229 Michael Sheehan, *Arms Control*, p.9.

230 *Ibid.* p.10.

231 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, pp.196-197

232 Michael Sheehan, *Arms Control*, p.19.

233 *Ibid.*, p.7.

234 *Ibid.*, p.12, p.14. Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.197.

235 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.228.

236 Roy Kim, *Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula*, p.1273

237 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.16, p.51.

238 Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*, p.16. For details of the "action-reaction phenomenon", see L. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p.191-192, S. Wells and R. Litwak (eds), *Strategic Defence and Soviet-American Relations*, p.2, McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster*, pp.52-57, L. Freedman, *US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, p.179, *Dædalus*, Special issue on weapons in space, Vol.1, Spring 1985, p.74

239 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.17.

240 *Ibid.* p.56.

241 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.273

242 For details of North Korea's proposal, see Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69, Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.704, *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, pp.169-170.

243 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, pp.180-181

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- 244 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.369.
- 245 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.181
- 246 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990, p.24.
- 247 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.272, p.274. Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.370.
- 248 *Ibid.*
- 249 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.191.
- 250 *Ibid.*, p.181.
- 251 Mack Andrew and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*, p.121.
- 252 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990, p.24.
- 253 These guidelines were adopted in the 5th meeting of the 4th Central Committee, in Dec. 1962.
- 254 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.274
- 255 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69.
- 256 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.228.
- In his October 18 1988 address before the UN General Assembly, President Roh solemnly declared that "South Korea will never initiate the use of force against the North." He also indicated that he "is willing to discuss disarmament, arms control and other military issues in a possible summit with Kim Il Sung." (Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.178, p.184.)
- 257 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.184.
- 258 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.228.
- 259 *Ibid.*, p.275.
- 260 This was proposed in the 6th meeting of the N. Korean Workers Party in Oct. 1980.
- 261 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.71.
- 262 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*, p.15.
- 263 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.229.
- 264 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*, p.191.
- 265 *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.227.

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- 266 Because military burden has been especially painful for North Korea, a reduction in tension would have a positive multiplying effect on the North Korean economy.(Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.191.)
- 267 *The Australian Financial Review*, 5, Sept. 1990, p. 10.
- 268 *The Australian*, 6, Sept. 1990, p. 9.*TIME*, 17 Sept. 1990, pp. 42-43.
- 269 *The Canberra Times*, 17 Dec.1990, p.10.
- 270 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.11,p.76.Edward Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas*,pp.31-33.
- 271 Rhee Sang-Woo, *North Korea in 1990*, p.76.
- 272 Young Whan Kihl, *South Korea in 1990*, p. 69
- 273 *Ibid.*
- 274 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.20.
- 275 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,pp.25-26 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.369.
- 276 Byung-Joon Ahn, *South Korea's New Nordpolitik*, p.699.*The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1991, p.192.
- 277 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.52.
- 278 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.199.
- 279 *Ibid.*p.203.
- 280 Taylor, Cha and Blodgett, *The Korean Peninsula*,p.183. Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.370.
- 281 *The Canberra Times*, 17 Dec.1990, p.10.
- 282 For details, see R. Fieldhouse (ed), *Security at Sea*, R. Fieldhouse and S. Taoka, *Superpowers at Sea*, Strobe Talbot, *The Master of the Game*, etc.
- 283 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.51.
- 284 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.370.
- 285 Peter Polomka, *The Two Koreas*,p.15.*The International Herald Tribune*, 14 Aug. 1991, p.4.
- 286 Ralph Clough, *Embattled Korea*,p.370.
- 287 Andrew Mack argues that addressing the North's security concerns will require removal of Us nuclear weapons from the South. (*The International Herald Tribune*, 14 Aug. 1991, p.4.)

311 M. Nishihara, *East Asian Security*, p. 5.

312 Chong-Sik Lee(ed), *Korea Briefing* 1990,p.47.

313 *Ibid.*

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