AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS
CONSTRAINING JAPAN'S CAPABILITY FOR CONTRIBUTING
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE
POST-COLD-WAR ERA

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Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is entirely my own work

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Introduction

The cold war which dominated the foreign policies of most of the world's industrialised nations has ended. Japan, as an economic superpower, one of the three economic poles of the post-cold-war world, with a huge interest in its stability and prosperity, has a foreign policy approach inappropriate to a country of such regional and global prominence.

In the first major foreign policy crisis of the new world order, the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, Japan was immobilised by deficiencies in its political system, a lack of appreciation among its leaders and populace of where its national interests lay, and the peculiar constraints of its national Constitution.

This sub-thesis explores the way in which Japan's capability to contribute to the new world order is constrained by its political structure, national strategy, constitutional limits, and regional conditions.

Chapter One examines the way in which Japan's political structure constrains the country's capability for contributing to the new world order by producing a diffusion of power, a diffusion of responsibility for policy development and implementation, and an absence of competition for power on the basis of policy difference.

Chapter Two examines the way in which Japan is hindered from contributing to international order by its pursuit of short term economic goals at the expense of bringing to its dealings with the external world a well-defined sense of national interest.

Chapter Three examines the limitations that the Peace Constitution places on Japan by excluding a security role from its international contributions.

Chapter Four examines the factors constraining Japan from greater involvement in the increasingly interdependent Asia-Pacific region.
2.0 Japan's political structure

Japan's political structure constrains the country's capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period by producing a diffusion of power, a diffusion of responsibility for policy development and implementation, and an absence of competition for power on the basis of policy difference.

2.1 A diffusion of power

Japan's ability to contribute to the new international order is hindered by what commentators have referred to as "an extreme diffusion of political power"\(^1\), its 'doughnut-style' power structure\(^2\) or an enigmatic 'System' of power relations possessing "no shape or form"\(^3\) where "nobody is boss, but everybody, in some way or other, has leverage over somebody else [so that] ... power in Japan is thus diffused over a number of semi-self contained, semi-mutually dependent bodies which are neither responsible to an electorate nor, ultimately, subservient to one another\(^4\).

The diffusion of power causes capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period to be constrained by providing weak executive leadership and allowing the power of the nation's political representatives to be subordinated to that of a divided bureaucracy.

2.1.1 A weak executive leadership subordinated to a divided bureaucracy

Although power is constitutionally concentrated in the office of the prime minister, prime ministers typically provide only nominal leadership, the role being variously described as "nothing more than a master of ceremonies"\(^5\), "little more than figurehead"\(^6\), possessing the ability only to "subtly effect a small shift in priorities among the administrators"\(^7\), and (even) "like a portable shrine , carried from place to place for solemn display, while the real gods wield power from behind the scenes"\(^8\). When held by the leader of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) (as it was until the end of the 1955 system in 1993) the office is subordinate to the party's factional power structure. Prime Minister Kaifu's role, for example, was to provide "a support system for the Takeshita faction", at the beck and call of factional heavyweights, his appointment constituting part of a twenty-year-long concentration of power in the Tanaka-Takeshita camp\(^9\).

\(^1\)Ozawa, 1994, p23
\(^2\)Takeuchi, Japan Echo (Fall1991), p38
\(^3\)Van Wolferen, 1990, p65
\(^4\)Van Wolferen, op. cit., pp54-56
Van Wolferen contends that Japan's possession of all the institutions considered indispensable for a parliamentary democracy is largely "a façade hiding an unseen power" structure" (pp37-38).
\(^5\)Ozawa, op. cit., p25
\(^6\)Kitaoka 35
\(^7\)Van Wolferen, op. cit., p42-43
\(^8\)McGregor, The Australian, 1 July 1994, p15
\(^9\)Morita, Japan Echo (Fall 1991), p29. Quoting Masayuki Fujio, a senior leader of the LDP.
Rather than provide a central locus of power and authority, the central task of prime ministers in Japan has been the distribution of wealth and favours, requiring a sense of mutual dependence and compromise. The general theory of Japanese group behaviour requires that leaders do not attempt to act and make decisions on their own. Actual power depends on consensus characterised by a bottom-up approach. Starting from the premise that Japan's parliamentary government resembles the standard corporate group (with parliament, cabinet, and prime minister analogous to stockholders, board of directors and chief executive officer), Takeuchi argues that the Japanese corporate management style is inevitable in its political leadership.

While the cabinet under the prime ministerial leadership nominally governs the country, its horizontal division in parallel to the divisions of Japan's bureaucracy (with the ascendant power held by the bureaucracy), relegates cabinet ministers to the role of merely rubber-stamping policy decisions made by senior bureaucrats. Cabinet ministers have little or no influence within their ministries and cabinet meetings are accordingly only ceremonial affairs for the purpose of endorsing policy adjustments already agreed upon by administrative vice-ministers. One insider of Japan's powerful bureaucracy provides substance to the "authoritarian bureaucratic state" model of Western critics, describing bureaucratic power over the state as "totalitarian" (even "perverted").

Van Wolferen, noting that "to try and pinpoint just who among the bureaucrats is in charge is to get lost again at once" contends that "intense rivalry among officials has long prevented their achieving a general dominance over Japanese policy-making" and that the bureaucracy is beset by "territorial jealousies among ministries and agencies, which frequently turn into well-publicised wars". He concludes: "The essential fact is that none of them (elected officials, bureaucracy, top business functionaries) can be perceived as forming the apex of the Japanese power hierarchy".

Inamori, likewise, laments the "sectionalism" which runs deep in the Japanese administrative system:

"the whole bureaucracy, the respective ministries, and the bureaus within each ministry all jealously guard the areas over which they have jurisdiction, keeping a firm hold on their powers and budgets. It has even been said that Japan has no national government but only a group of ministries, and that it has no ministries but only a plethora of bureaus.".

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10Takeuchi, Japan Echo (Special Issue, 1991), p75
11Hartcher, Financial Review, 12 September 1994, p1. Miyamoto puts the proportion of power wielded over the state by Japan's bureaucracy at 90%.
12Van Wolferen, op. cit., p46
13Inamori, Japan Echo (Spring 1993), p66.
2.1.2 Japan's isolation and victimisation

Japan's capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period is diminished by the diffusion of its power structure. The deprivation of a national conduit for communication with and adjustment to the international community (in accordance with Japan's own national interests) isolates the country and causes it to be a victim of a changing external environment rather than the involved participant that its interests would require.

Japan's leaders are:

"incapable of delivering on political promises they may make concerning commercial or other matters requiring important adjustments by one of the components of the System. The field of domestic power normally leaves no room for an accommodation to foreign wishes or demands. Such accommodation is only made with a great show of reluctance and very late in the day, when angry outsiders resort to coercion." 14

With the government incapable of "making and implementing the kind of decisions associated with sovereignty and international agreements that are routine in other countries" 15:

"Japan is a problem for itself because the way Japanese power is exercised results in conflicts with, and isolation from, other countries ... the political give-and-take among the System's components interferes with the nation's need to deal with the rest of the world." 16

Such an "anachronism", Van Wolferen declares

"might have fitted a poor and isolated Japan, but it is unsuitable for Japan as an international partner. Its finely meshed all-Japanese components are glaringly deficient in providing the country with an efficient means to establish a modus vivendi with a potentially very hostile world." 17

Lacking leadership in the political system, Japan continues to be vulnerable to "simply being dragged along by events" as it was in the years leading to World War II 18, and more recently during the Gulf Crisis when the powerlessness of Japan's leadership left it unable to adjust to the world's expectations.

2.1.3 Establishing a coherent power structure

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14 Van Wolferen, op. cit., p7
15 Van Wolferen, op. cit., p54-57:
16 Van Wolferen, op. cit., p30
17 Van Wolferen, op. cit., p64
18 Ozawa, op. cit., pp25-26
Reformist politicians like Ozawa would strengthen the power of the prime minister, clarifying "both at home and abroad, who is in charge, what he is thinking, and what his objectives are"\(^{19}\) and in general providing a greater concentration of power and accountability in the hands of the political leadership.

Takeuchi even recommends the adoption of a presidential system, with the president receiving the clear mandate of the people to allow Japan to escape its standard style of leadership and permit sovereign power to reside with the people (as the Constitution demands)\(^{20}\).

In his blueprint for a new Japan, Ozawa (rather optimistically) calls for a "scalpel" to be taken to the bureaucratic machinery, with its structure to be largely decentralised\(^{21}\)

### 2.2 a diffusion of responsibility for policy development and implementation

The diffusion of power in Japan not only directly hinders the country's relations with the rest of the world by presenting a leadership deficiency, but also causes a diffusion of responsibility for policy development, including that of foreign policy. The diffusion of leadership ensures that "no-one has final responsibility for national policy or can decide national questions in emergencies"\(^{22}\). Japan affords itself an "impermissible luxury" in avoiding responsibility for framing "active, comprehensive, long-term, dynamic, and consistent policies"\(^{23}\).

#### 2.2.1 diffusion of policy development is a concomitant of the consensus-building process

Diffusion of policy development is a concomitant of the consensus-building process between the system's various power-holders: major political parties (the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, itself a collection of special interests with committees divided along the lines of government departments, operating in cooperation with their bureaucratic counterparts), LDP factions (achieving an institutionalisation of decision-making with the ministries in what Kitaoka labels "the 'bureaucratisation' of Japanese politics"\(^{24}\)), the ministries (dis-unified entities with respective senior bureaucrats determining policy decisions), and business federation leaders. Ozawa concludes:

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\(^{19}\) Ozawa, *Japan Echo* (Spring 1993), p11

\(^{20}\) Takeuchi (1991), op. cit., p78

\(^{21}\) Ozawa (1993), op. cit., p11

\(^{22}\) Van Wolferen, op. cit., p55

\(^{23}\) Ozawa (1994), op. cit., pp21-22

\(^{24}\) S. Kitaoka, *Japan Echo* (Spring 1994), p71
In point of fact, it is nor entirely clear just where decisions are made. It is hard to surmise how the various policies of the relevant offices are integrated, who is making what decisions, or where they are made. Policy, in other words, is decided without anyone's taking responsibility for it.\(^2\)

Responsibility is spread even more broadly within the supporting hierarchies of the power-holders in accordance with the general principle that the weak must adapt (or show 'understanding') to the wishes of the strong in a series of "complex calculations concerning the interpersonal obligations that are part and parcel of the \textit{jinmyyaku} system of each individual involved.\(^2\)

That the Diet's competing minor parties have also been included in the consensus-driven policy process (either by the LDP while holding majority power, or in the Grand Coalition that followed) has been criticised as inappropriate to national politics where "national interest demands reasoned debate, defined positions and leadership".\(^2\) Unanimous consensus, rather than boosting democracy, diminishes it by allowing disproportionate power to minority-supported parties, frustrating the passage of legislation proposed by a party with popular mandate, and as ex-prime minister Tsutomu Hata (1994) notes, hindering the electorate from ascertaining where individual legislators stand on the issues.\(^2\)

2.2.2 An insular and sluggish consensus-driven policy process unable to meet the policy demands of the external world

With responsibility for policy development thus diffused, the ability to change policy to cope with external requirements, especially of a crisis nature, is compromised, with elected representatives the least capable of effecting policy change. Van Wolferen notes:

"it would be extremely difficult for foreign governments to proceed without the assumption of a Japanese government that can cope with the external world, as other governments do, simply by changing its policies ... Unless the relative lack of governmental responsibility in Japan, the fundamental cause of mutual frustration [between Japan and other countries] is recognised, relations with Japan are bound to deteriorate further."\(^2\)

\(^{25}\)Ozawa (1994), op. cit., p24
\(^{26}\)Van Wolferen, op. cit., p442
\(^{27}\)Utagawa, August 1994 paper presented at ANU, p6
\(^{28}\)The Message of Reform Forum 21, \textit{Japan Echo} (Spring 1993), p41
\(^{29}\)Van Wolferen, op. cit., p6
More recently, the ability of the LDP government to come up with a policy response to the Gulf Crisis was severely hampered by its consensus-seeking approach in the Diet during the passage of its PKO Cooperation Bill in the period 1990-1992. Despite concessions made to minority parties sufficient to obtain majority approval in both houses of the Diet, the LDP was forced in order to obtain the support of the JSP (postwar Japan Socialist Party) to water the bill down to the point where the country would be limited solely to such activities as overseeing elections. Ultimately, by the time the support of every political party had been obtained to produce an acceptably inoffensive policy, the chance to implement it and respond to the immediate demands on Japan was lost.

As Tsurutani observes, the consensual mode of decision making generates "a powerful pressure to avoid a problem of (sic) that sharply divides the group as long as possible or until it becomes palpably dangerous to do so". The style of national leadership also suffers, with the prime minister becoming a 'consensus builder' rather than an advocate for action

Japan's "self-centred" style of consensus-based policy-making is further criticised for its tendency to favour insiders of the Japanese system, with little account taken of outside effects.

2.2.3 Internationalising the policy-making process by asserting the policy-making role of the legislature, establishing majority-rule politics and a two-party system

Ozawa, tracing consensus politics to Japan's traditional unanimity-seeking village culture, seeks to convert Japan to a 'a nation of self-reliant individuals', reducing the role of the bureaucracy and asserting the popular will through Japan's democratic institutions. He would prefer to see the Diet assume its duties implicit in its constitutional role as the sole law-making organ of the state.

The assertion of the majority rule principle and the introduction of a two-party system would do much to end the traditional Japanese process of unanimous consensus-seeking among all stake-holders that diffuses the responsibility of policy-making.

2.3 an absence of competition for power on the basis of policy difference

The process of consensus-building not only suits weak leadership and diffuses responsibility for policy development, but also produces an absence of competition for power on the basis of policy difference. Consensus politics emphasises the avoidance of any harm to the feelings of the participants; debate, logical argument, clear statements of opinion, indeed any form of the normal competitive cut-and-thrust of democratic politics are consequently avoided. Instead, accommodation is

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30 Tsurutani, op. cit., p123
31 Kitaoka, op. cit., p71
reached behind closed doors, often without reaching a settlement which effectively deals with the issue.

2.3.1 traditional cooperative norms producing a lack of policy competition between and within parties

Japanese politics in the post-war era came to be characterised by a lack of competition, both at the inter-party level and at the intra-party level. From 1960, the LDP avoided controversial issues which might provoke the opposition and upset the status quo (such as constitutional revision), concentrating instead on economic policy and ensuring its continuing electoral success. The opposition parties too abandoned competition, making behind-the-scene deals with the LDP, and providing only a theatrical show of their independence. In the LDP, since 1980, an abundance of funds has made competition for their disbursement unnecessary and cartels have developed with unanimous agreement becoming standard on all policy issues (so-called 'harmonious politics'), making high profile politics and explicit and visible political leadership a risky proposition. The LDP's internal factionalism by "its dynamics and logic caused a powerful compulsion to avoid disputes within the party itself as well as with the party opposition".

The post-war multi-seat electoral district system, too, provided both LDP and opposition parties with a "cosy, undemanding structure" that allowed them to avoid real inter-party competition on the basis of policy. With the LDP simply fielding several candidates in each electorate, party policy became irrelevant to the contest. Opposition parties could also avoid competitive electioneering on the basis of policy, always expecting to acquire something like 130 seats simply by relying on the 20% of voters critical of the establishment who always vote for the opposition candidate. A weak and uncompetitive opposition allowed the LDP to become comfortable and immobilised with its semi-permanent status.

The abandonment of the 1955 system with the splitting-off from the LDP of new parties and the assumption of office by coalition government in 1993 and another coalition government in 1994 have not appeared to generate a great deal of competition in policy. Koosaka observed in late 1993 that the new non-LDP government had "simply taken over the LDP line" and that "the planks of this [LDP-style] platform are no longer a matter of contention". Shortly after assumption of power by the three-party coalition in a parliamentary coup in July 1994 (LDP heavily outnumbering SDP (Japan's post-cold-war socialist party, the Social Democratic Party) and Sakigake), LDP President and Foreign Minister Kono likewise assured the people that "we have to try to maintain continuity in our diplomacy". The SDP abandoned all pretence of differing on controversial issues with the LDP.

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32Koyama, Japan Echo (Special Issue 1991), p72
33Tsurutani, op. cit., p24:
34Koosaka 45
35Thurber, Daily Telegraph Mirror, 1-7-94, p23.
issues from its coalition partner, accepting the legality of Japan's military and declaring its support for the Japan-U.S. security treaty\textsuperscript{36}. The alliance with the LDP that could (in an ironic sense) be said to have commenced in 1955\textsuperscript{37} had finally arrived.

The 'demand-led politics' argument (that the beliefs, behaviour and actions of politicians are determined by the needs of the electorate, or, 'people get the politicians they deserve'), that the Japanese people do not really want competitive politics or politicians finds some support in the way the Japanese have traditionally structured their company and social lives. The Japanese village-type view of cooperation prompts Ozawa to contend that "Japan's most pressing need is a change in the consciousness of our people"; liberation of the individual, he claims, is the most important issue facing politics today\textsuperscript{38}. Fellow traveller Tsutomu Hata concurs, writing that "meaningful political reform must essentially be a social reform"\textsuperscript{39}.

2.3.2 distortion of democracy and the role of parties in policy formation, dilution of policy by minority parties, and mediocrity of politicians

In the absence of competition for power, democracy becomes distorted with politicians abandoning much of their role to unelected bureaucrats (not only in policy formation, but even to the point of leaving Diet interpellation to the bureaucrats). The 1955 system saw politicians of both parties abandoning the role of developing their own bills and generating real policy debate in favour of pursuing "internecine power struggles and personal rivalries"\textsuperscript{40}. Utagawa describes the entirely different and essentially undemocratic and money-and-favours based process which predominated:

"Bureaucrats would determine new policies, in some cases after negotiating with the zaikai, and then would go to the LDP to get support for those decisions. In return for LDP support, bureaucrats gave politicians pork barrel projects that would aid their constituencies (business or voters). Sometimes, in return for substantial political contributions, politicians took up the demands of the zaikai and would negotiate with the bureaucrats (the so-called backroom deals) to amend legislation before the Parliament. Such a process reduced the Diet to a

\textsuperscript{36}McGregor, \textit{The Weekend Australian}, 23-7-94, p16. Earlier that week, in his maiden speech to parliament, PM Murayama accepted the legality of the SDF, accepted the national anthem and the national flag, agreed to Japanese troops joining UN peacekeeping operations overseas, and dropped his opposition to nuclear power plants. The following day he ditched "unarmed neutrality, declaring his support for the US-Japan security treaty. McGregor commented that voters will now find difficulty distinguishing the SDP from the LDP.


\textsuperscript{38}Financial Review (unidentified author), 25-10-93, p28 (supplement)

\textsuperscript{39}Hata, op. cit., p42

\textsuperscript{40}Hata, op. cit., p41
rubber stamp and the opposition parties to the role of unconstructive critics"41.

Koosaka speculates that it was the inter-party agreement to adopt a passive external stance in an effort by the two major parties of the 1955 system (LDP and SDP) to obtain compromise on internal issues that resulted in "a foreign policy [which] in the real sense of the term never got of the ground"42.

Faced with an absence of policy competition and LDP pragmatism, the JSP became robbed of its raison d'etre43, leaving it to became a party occupying only an "opposition-for-opposition's-sake" role. "Offering limited resistance and seeking modifications of the LDP's policies", the JSP continued to embrace hopelessly radical policies such as scrapping of the security treaty and dismantling of the SDF (Self Defence Forces)44. One thesis holds that the opposition parties came to resemble pressure groups, adopting strategies of harassment to pursue political objectives45. Van Wolferen characterised the JSP as a "Grecian chorus": "like the chorus in the Greek tragedy ... its monotonous comments on the state of the nation and lamentations over the sins of the LDP are ritualistic and harmless"46.

Minority power holders preferred the benefits that accrued from the LDP's desire for unanimous consensus over policy competition, succeeding in effecting delays and a dilution of PKO Cooperation Bill in 1990-1992, at great costs to their country's national interest.

The LDP's substitution of factional manoeuvring for genuine internal policy debate over normalisation of relations with Russia succeeded in the 1950s in "intra-party bickering of the most disruptive and disadvantageous kind [which] ultimately dominated discussion of the substantive issues", drawing Prime Minister F u k u d a into supporting in an anti-Soviet document ultimately damaging to Japan's interests47.

The 1955 system deprived the National Diet of the role of developing and debating policy and deprived voters of any real electoral choice. Without the demands of having to develop and debate policy with an opposition similarly under-challenged, unceasing power struggles, and nothing else, came to define Japanese politics with one LDP insider claiming that LDP politicians spend 80% of their time looking for money with which to fight each other in their constituencies48. With the fundraising capability of a politician's support group more important to his/her fortunes, the situation arose where 37% of the Diet consisted of second generation

41Utagawa, op. cit., p2
42Koosaka, op. cit., p50
43Koosaka, op. cit., p46
44Kitaoka, op. cit., p34
45Van Wolferen, op. cit., p40 notes, "the JSP's advocacy of unarmed neutrality and its long-standing anti-US stance [seemed] almost designed to make the party unattractive to the general voter."
46Van Wolferen, op. cit., p40
47Van Wolferen, op. cit., p545
48Van Wolferen, op. cit., p571, citing televised statements by a political insider, ex-Prime Minister Tanaka's private secretary Shigezo Hayasaka
politicians. LDP factional power base building required that large amounts of money were required to be raised and spent on assisting faction-tied candidates seeking office in multi-seat electorates in order to enhance prospects for factional bosses to acquire top positions (in cabinet or as such posts as chairperson of the LDP's Policy Research Council).

A deterioration in the quality of politicians under such a system has been lamented by Kitaoka, crediting the elimination of inter-party and intra-party competition for its cause. He suggests that a two-tier system operates in the LDP, representing the two types of politicians: the powerful-but-dirty and the clean-but-impotent.

Such a sad situation leads critics to question whether the people are being provided the chance of participating in democracy. Rejecting the principle that politics is demand-led, Takeuchi cites an imperfection in democracy that Plato first wrestled with: is it real democracy if the people are only given mediocre candidates from which to select as their political representatives? He believes that only a process of competition in which politicians present a range of alternatives to the people (what Joseph Schumpeter's criticism of the classical view of democracy, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), identified as the essence of democracy will allow potential leaders to demonstrate their abilities and allow the people to have their say in providing the political representatives of their choice with a policy mandate.

Kitaoka, drawing on Weberian theory (Parliament and Govt in a Reconstructed Germany, 1917), observes that the primary virtue of parliamentary politics must be "to breed leaders competent in the field of foreign affairs". Those who emerge at the helm of government have successfully led their parties in competition, he asserts, and can be expected to be capable in international competition.

2.3.3 Electoral reform and party realignment introducing Diet and bureaucratic reform to open the way for genuine policy competition by elected representatives

The electoral reforms instituted by the Grand Coalition government of 1994 and the ongoing party realignment which started with the 1993 collapse of the 1955 system offers potential on a revolutionary scale for genuine policy competition between political parties. Further reform, particularly of the national legislature and the national bureaucracy would only accelerate the process, allowing a more policy-focussed Japan to pursue the development of an expanded capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period.

A system of single-seat electoral districts, rejected in its pure form in 1994 in favour of a combined proportional representation system (a dual list system combining

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49Obuchi, Japan Echo (Spring 1993), p16. Many of the rest are ex-bureaucrats and former labour officials.
50Kitaoka, op. cit., p 35-38
51Kitaoka, Japan Echo (Special issue, 1991), p63.
52Takeuchi (Fall 1991), op. cit., p37
53Kitaoka (1991), op. cit., p67
lists of representatives selected on a first-past-the-post basis with those selected on a regional basis), could inject competition into Japanese politics in several important ways ("fundamentally changing the political set-up\textsuperscript{54}") in Japan: re-establishing the principle of majority rule in Japanese politics (at least in the electoral process, by awarding seats to their respective candidates winning the most votes), forcing opposition candidates to compete on the basis of policy in order to gain sole representation for a single electorate, and forcing major parties to field just one candidate who will need to compete on the party platform rather than have several candidates competing against each other on the basis of the fundraising capabilities of respective support groups.

If successful, Japan's "most sweeping political reforms since women were given the vote in 1945" may indeed, as the Sydney Morning Herald announced at the reform's passage into law, represent "the final steps ... to root out its pernicious electoral system, which has been held responsible for political paralysis and endemic corruption for nearly 50 years\textsuperscript{55}.

If the new dual system is able to produce the results expected to accrue from an electorate entirely based upon single-seat electoral districts, the continuation of the party realignment process should be sufficient, predicts Morita, to put a competitive two-party system in place\textsuperscript{56}, perhaps realising Utagawa's optimistic scenario (which he labels the "heaven" scenario) of a two-party system transforming Japan to a state that is capable of independence in its foreign policy decision-making, a "real player" in the world, assuming "a full leadership role on the international stage, contributing to the development of international public goods such as institutions like APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Conference), the WTO (World Trade Organisation), and Asia-Pacific confidence building networks for security [and, together with other nations, assuming] the burden of ensuring the spread of democracy and freedom worldwide\textsuperscript{57}. Utagawa predicts that Japan has only a 50% chance of developing such a scenario, given the enduring tendency for parties in Japan to shun political competition in favour of a traditional system where weaker groups bid for power by playing the swing vote\textsuperscript{58}.

With Ozawa's December 1994 success in merging ten of the opposition parties into a 187-strong "super party", the Shin Shin-to (ie, New Advance Party), Prime Minister Hosokawa's 1993 prediction that it would take three or four elections before Japan's politics stabilises may not be overly optimistic as a two-party system with clearly differentiated policies (and perhaps with no socialist component) begins to

\textsuperscript{54}Hata, op. cit., p42
\textsuperscript{55}Hills, Sydney Morning Herald, November 3 1994
\textsuperscript{56}Morita, op. cit., p33
\textsuperscript{57}Utagawa, op. cit., p 9
\textsuperscript{58}Utagawa, op. cit., pp 5-6

This scenario contrasts with his hellish forecast of Japan's predicament in 10 years time should it fail to achieve a two-party system: Japan as a second class state possessing a stagnant economy, subordinate to and manipulated by other countries, especially China.
materialise. Given the grouping's favouring of a more vigorous role for Japan in United Nations peacekeeping operations (which also has the support of the "rebel" socialists), their electoral success would guarantee the placement on the agenda of a more active foreign policy stance for Japan.

A two-party system with the parties differentiated by their respective stances on a national-international axis would allow the people to determine the degree of involvement in external affairs desirable for Japan. Kitaoka even suggests that both major parties which materialise under such a system may endorse international cooperation.

Diet reform could also introduce policy competition into Japan's political system. Reformists suggest establishment of the principle of majority rule in the Diet rather than behind-the-scenes dealing, having parliamentary vice-ministers rather than bureaucrats respond to Diet questioning, all-year Diet sessions to allow quicker responses to changes in external circumstances, even debate courses for Diet members to enhance their performance in the Diet (perhaps realising Kooyama's dream "of a time when the chambers of the Diet will ring with great debates").

Reformists also predict that a greater concentration of power and accountability in the hands of the political leadership would encourage decisions on policy to be made by the people's representatives elected for their stands on the issues.

One critic who remains pessimistic about the prospects for change of the above nature is Van Wolferen, who opines that "turning the System into a genuine modern constitutional state, and Japanese subjects into citizens, would require realignments of power akin to those of a genuine revolution". He continues:

"As Japan enters the 1990s ... the politicians have been relegated to such a politically marginal position that a transfer of political power to a different political party would not lead to significant changes, unless more profound transfigurations in the relations among power-holders took place."

### 3.0 Unclear definition of the national interest

Ozawa borrows an analogy of early pre-World War II America as a dinosaur, with huge power and influence over the world but with an insufficient sense of national interest to guide that power (the dinosaur's tiny brain) to make the point that, despite possessing an economy accounting for 16% of the world's GNP and being

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59Morita, op. cit., p30
60S. Kitaoka, op. cit., p71
61Kooyama, op. cit., p72
62Matsuzaki, Japan Echo, (Spring 1994), p30 (a review of Ozawa, I, Blueprints for Building a New Japan)
63van Wolferen, op. cit., p567
64van Wolferen, op. cit., p572
"a nation so powerful that its every action carries international ramifications", Japan continues to develop "only policies that are passive, partial, and short term" 65.

3.1 Japan's national interests and guiding principles and the state's effectiveness in their pursuit

Despite the confusion over Japan's national interests and guiding principles, Japan pursued clear national interests and principles during the post-war period with varying effectiveness. The task for Japan is to adapt to a new set of standards to enhance Japan's capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period.

3.1.1 confusion over national interest and guiding principles

In large part Japan's lack of appreciation of its national interest on the world scene is a consequence of the insularity of the people, who cling to the traditional desire to avoid participation in international society. Accustomed to their government serving private interests, the citizenry are unconditioned to their government taking an active foreign policy role, viewing international contribution as a response to foreign pressure. The "little Japan" idea in which the defeated populace sought refuge following World War II has persisted even while Japan has grown strong, with one writer, after the pressures placed on Japan during the Gulf Crisis, observing among his fellow citizens a longing to return to small-country status66.

Some critics contend that Japan is lacking in the concept of national interest67 or overall grand strategy68. Utagawa contends that Japan does not even recognise that it has a national interest or even a real concept of "state". He asserts that, in order for Japan to develop the necessary political system which can provide an independent foreign policy, politicians need to assess what the country's national interest is and stake out their positions accordingly.

Some contend, furthermore, that Japan lacks guiding principles69 or has only mercenary principles70. This apparent lack of real principle has been traced to Japan's vulnerability as an island country71, an "absence of a tradition of

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66Ijiri, Japan Echo (Autumn 1991), pp56-57
67Utagawa, op. cit., p7
68van Wolferen, op. cit., p552: Contrasts the tactical skill with which the Japanese have managed the post-war relationship with the US, always ensuring that they have the advantage, with the inability to manage the relationship from a long-range perspective.
69van Wolferen, op. cit., p548: notes that while "the day-to-day tactics and medium-range strategies of the more capable administrators ensure further economic growth ... these tactics are not part of an overall grand strategy.
70Blaker, 1993, pp27-35: Blaker notes that a silent, passive Japan has come to viewed as "an unprincipled bystander", "a masterful procrastinator", "a reluctant ally", "an irresponsible partner" and "an unfair trader". He observes that "Japan will never risk its economic interests in the lives of its citizens, on behalf of some principle or cause, another country or ally in need, or the international community".
71McQueen, 1991, p328: "since the 1960s Japan's dominant values have been those of a department store"
appealing to transcendental truth or universal values\(^{12}\), the norms of the people\(^{73}\), the blending of two Japanese traits (traditional 'passive optimism' and post-Restoration 'self-uncertainty')\(^{74}\), Japan's defeat in World War II and the collapse of its ethical code\(^{75}\), a consciousness of the World War II memories of neighbouring countries\(^{76}\), Japan's desire to 'coordinate' its foreign policy with the United States\(^{77}\), and an emphasis on postwar economic reconstruction.

Even in ODA (overseas Development Aid), where the United States bases its program upon an urge to spread democracy and the European program is based upon maintenance of post-colonial ties, Japan professes to a lack of a philosophical basis to its disbursement, instead maintaining that Japanese aid is used to assist those countries and communities most willing to help themselves\(^{78}\).

3.1.2 Japan's pursuit of clear national interests and principles during the post-war period

Japan's post-war goals were encapsulated in the Yoshida Doctrine, with its three central goals: economic reconstruction and growth, avoidance of political involvement and minimisation of defence capability, and cooperation with the United States. All three are quite clearly related to the pursuit of peace and prosperity for the people - a not unreasonable definition of national interest for any nation.

The emphasis on the central goal of economic growth was compatible with the people's traditional expectations of the government's role as (in Ozawa's words) a "corporate lawyer", functioning to enable private interests to pursue their profits to the maximum. Ozawa sums up the his perception of the whole of Japanese politics in the phrase 'consultation on allotments', ie the obligation on the part of

\(^{72}\)van Wolferen, op. cit., pp317-320: Describes the mental backdrop to the Japanese political tradition as the "absence of a tradition of appealing to transcendental truth or universal values. All other extant civilisations have developed religions and systems of thought that acknowledge the existence of a truth transcending socio-political concerns". Describing the Japanese as "ideological chameleons", van Wolferen identifies one reason for Japan's relatively easy entry to the modern industrial world (compared with other Asian nations) as laying "in the very lack of strongly held precepts, based on transcendental beliefs, to block the changes in mentality that were required". "The key to understanding Japanese power relations is that they are unregulated by transcendental concepts ... in short Japanese political practice is regulated by 'might is right'".

\(^{73}\)McQueen, op. cit., p264: notes the popular perception in countries such as Australia that Japanese lack principles: "A 1984 poll reported that 89% of Australian executives found their Japanese counterparts unethical and untrustworthy."

\(^{74}\)Tsurutani, op. cit., p118 Tsurutani explains the tendency for Japan to skirt the issue of defence and security in Japan in terms of Japan's post-war poliophobia, i.e., the prevailing sentiment that "political aggressiveness as well as its concomitant, ideological contention, should be scrupulously avoided" in favour of the notion "that things will turn out well only if we patiently waited".

\(^{75}\)Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p, 1993, p207: Quoting Ogura: "due to defeat in WW2, and the collapse of a code of previously held ethics, the Japanese have shied away from projecting their beliefs and ideals internationally. Indeed, even now, almost fifty years after defeat, they still appear to be apprehensive of even expressing one."

\(^{76}\)Okazaki, op. cit., p61: Japan is limited in its application of principles by neighbours' memories of WW2. Japan cannot talk about democracy, say South Korea and China, given its WW2 history.

\(^{77}\)Ueki, 1993, p325: the "dichotomy of dependence and autonomy" makes it difficult for Japan to disagree with the US on fundamental security and disarmament questions. It tends to vote affirmative at the UN when the US does and abstain when the US votes negative."

\(^{78}\)Iida , Japan Echo (Autumn 1991), p44
government to hear the views of the opposition and to allocate budget funds as fairly as possible.  

Prime Minister Kishi internationalised Japan's national interests in his 1957 address to Parliament in which he revealed that "the basic policy of Japanese diplomacy should be to contribute to world peace and prosperity." Again, given Japan's emergence as a major global trading nation, the extension of Japan's national interests to cover peace and prosperity for the world would not seem unreasonable. Japan's post-war contributions to world peace (guided by the principles of one-country pacifism, non-involvement in arms trading, support of the United Nations, assumption of the three non-nuclear principles) and prosperity (though ODA) have been consistent with Japan's national interests.

3.1.3 measuring the success of Japan's post-war strategy

While the consensus is that it "basically worked," criticism of the Yoshida Doctrine revolve around its apparent lack of principle, its abdication of sovereign rights to a foreign power, and its over-emphasis on economic growth (all potentially harmful to Japan's national interests).

The apparent lack of principle implicit in the labels applied to the series of postwar diplomacies ('equidistant diplomacy', 'multi-directional diplomacy', and 'omnidirectional diplomacy') has been criticised as a "friends with everyone" or 'value-free diplomacy' foreign policy. Rather than attracting respect for its even-handedness, Ueki believes that Japan's value-free diplomacy hindered the country's ability for clearly "coming down on one side or another " in international disputes such as the Palestine question since the 1973 oil shock and North-South confrontation in the 1970s over the new international economic order.

With the choice made to side with the West, Japanese foreign policy became handled largely outside the country, with "all those tasks by which a state is internationally recognised taken care of by United States proxy". Critics point to the costs as: an over-reliance on the United States for its defence and foreign policy, the retarding effect on Japan's ability to develop its own foreign policy, etc.

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79Ozawa (1994), op. cit., p62
80Ueki, op. cit., p348
81Yasutomo, 1993, p323
82Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p204: "Susan Pharr contends that "Japanese foreign policy continues to be built around a low cost, low risk, benefit-maximising strategy that, in the eyes of the conservatives, has served Japan's national self-interest well in the past and that continues to do so today". Ueki, op. cit., p367 characterises Yoshida diplomacy as "successful and yet, in the long run, untenable"
83Blaker, op. cit., p6. Blaker is particularly scathing in his criticism, declaring Okita's omnidirectional diplomacy "tantamount to a white flag of surrender".
84Tsurutani, op. cit., p118 quoting unidentified Japanese foreign minister
85Blaker, op. cit., pp29 -31:Referring to Japan's handling of issues such as UNCLOS3 and the Gulf Crisis, he notes that "despite attractions to Japan of independent, looser associations, in the crunch it sided with the United States in both cases ... [Japan] seems to rely on anticipated external, particularly American, advice to set its foreign policy environment". Blaker blames "Japan's recurring diplomatic woes" on "anticipated external, particularly American, advise to set its foreign policy environment, to frame its options and actions, as well as to appraise its own diplomatic performance".
lack of an independent track record creating mistrust among the countries of the Asian region, creating resentment overseas for its reliance on its wealth to avoid the dirty work of meeting international obligations as in the Gulf Crisis and for treading too softly in international crises where Japan has the power to assist in the preservation of the new international economic order, Japan's relinquishment of sovereignty, and the cost to Japan's standing in the region as a trusty and responsible member-state.

Further criticism concerned the over-emphasis on economic concerns. While the doctrine left Japan free to pursue its economic goals as a neo-mercantilist economic power throughout the cold-war period (impossible, also, without United States forbearance and protection, most succinctly expressed by Prime Minister Yoshida's 'let the United States look after us until we are rich'), critics contend that a set of goals based "solely on economic expediency and not political principles" are inappropriate to a nation of such immense resources as Japan.

Japan's success in sticking to its principles of one-country pacifism, assumption of the three non-nuclear principles, and the non-involvement in arms trading has been evaluated by critics.

While the constitutional renunciation of force to solve international disputes (one-country pacifism), for example, labelled "the flesh and blood of the nation" has been well adhered to, some have criticised it as a desperate gesture to the occupation forces to make the retention of the emperor acceptable, an expression of the short-term need to make "sincere contrition" for WWII, a gesture to appease "the legacy of suspicion" in neighbouring countries which suffered from Japanese aggression in WW2, or simply freeloading on Pax Americana.

Ueki, op. cit., p325: Ueki notes that the "dichotomy of dependence and autonomy" makes it difficult for Japan to disagree with the United States on fundamental security and disarmament questions. It tends to vote affirmative at the United Nations when the United States does and abstain when the United States votes negative.

Tsuturani, op. cit., p126: Japan's "politophobic" posture in external relations caused little trouble for Japan "so long as it could count on the US to protect it from potential external political and military danger".

Okazaki, op. cit., p60

Morita, op. cit., p33

Ijiri, op. cit., p61

Ueki, op. cit., p351

Van Wolferen, op. cit., pp542-544: It is the "uncomfortable level of dependence" which prompts Van Wolferen to declare that Japan is not even a state, and that this lack of sovereignty ("the most fundamental attribute of the state") arises from its limited ability to maintain independence in external relations.

Okazaki, op. cit., p55 notes that if Japan had pursued a normal military policy within the context of its post war foreign policy framework, it would, by now, have a responsible track record and be trusted by its neighbours.

Hanami, 1994, p398

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The 3 non-nuclear principles -not to possess nuclear weapons, not to produce them, or permit their introduction into Japan - formulated in 1967 (strengthened in 1976 and 1978, then weakened for the United States in 1983), encapsulate Japan's "special sense of mission" in its appeal for nuclear disarmament. Labelled a "mere accident of history" by Katzenstein and Okawara98 the "two-and-a-half non-nuclear principles"99 are mainly criticised for the inconsistency of their application.

In particular, the entry to Japan of United States ships equipped with nuclear weapons and the restrictive extension of territorial limits in 1977 to leave the straits around Japan excepted, directly contravening the intent of the non-nuclear principles are presented as evidence that the Japanese non-nuclear policy contains "elements of flexibility" which allow bureaucrats to interpret and to backtrack if political reaction is encountered100.

Ueki also notes Japan's pragmatism, since its 1961 vote for a declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons on moral grounds, in bending to United States pressure by abstaining or voting against similar resolutions and stressing the importance of nuclear deterrence. He also questions whether, given its Constitution, and domestic and external constraints on its military power, it is not just pragmatism for Japan to see its future security as lying in gradual global disarmament101.

A further major reason he cites for not developing a nuclear capability is the "pragmatic reasoning of ... leaders in Japan who see that military nuclearisation will cost Japan much more than it gains in its dealings in the international system"102.

While Japan's possession of "the most restrictive export ban on weapons adopted by any of the industrial states"103 and its steady non-involvement in the international trade in weaponry (of which the five members of the United Nations Security Council are said to hold an 80% market share104) are a reflection of Japan's principled stand on disarmament and world peace, loopholes employed by some Japanese companies, in particular in the critically important field of dual use high-technology electronics products105, and the lack of official monitoring of such exports106, mean that this principle is also less-than-completely adhered too.

98Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p166
99Söderberg, Japan Forum (October 1993), p224
100McQueen, op. cit., p185 McQueen asserts that the 3 non-nuclear principles have been reduced to fiction in order to keep the US defence shield in place.
101Ueki, op. cit., p352
102Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p171
103Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p188
104Diplomatic Bluebook (1991) p3
105Söderberg, Japan Forum (October 1993), p224 . Multipurpose exports such as electronics make up 79% of the cost of missiles.
106Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p190

Ueno, Reuter News Service, January 19, 1994, reported that Tokyo police raided several Japanese firms as part of an inquiry into the alleged sale to North Korea of Japanese-made spectrum analysers (perhaps for use in guiding Rodong-1 ballistic missiles). He also referred to a statement issued a week earlier by the publisher of
As the world's largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) since 1991, Japan's substantial contribution to the prosperity of developing countries is consistent with Prime Minister Kishi's principled commitment. Although the ratio of ODA to GNP is relatively low (0.32% compared to the 20-country Development Assistance Committee average of 0.34%), it is considerably higher than the United States ratio (0.17%) and comparable to the figure for Australia (0.38%)\textsuperscript{107}.

Identified by the Blue Book as 'the main pillar of Japan's foreign policy*\textsuperscript{108}, ODA is provided on a pragmatic rather than principled basis: aid is tied to economic cooperation with Japan. Half of aid goes to ASEAN (Association of South-east Asian Nations) members who straddle the two sea-lanes through which oil from the Middle East and iron ore from Australia, commodities essential to Japan's survival, pass. Moreover, overseas aid is an integral part of Japan's comprehensive security and represents the means by which Japanese administrators are merely "seeking to protect their economic interests without taking up the gun"\textsuperscript{109}.

3.1.4 a new set of standards to enhance Japan's capability for contributing to the new world order in the post-cold-war period

Japan's national goals have become out-dated for a country of Japan's stature. Yasutomo postulates that Japan is in a "transitional era" undergoing a "painful search for new national goals to lead the nation into the next century\textsuperscript{110}.

The Yoshida Doctrine, which started out as "an expedient doctrine slapped together for a war-ravaged nation" became a permanent element of Japan's external stance for most of the post-war period\textsuperscript{111}. Both politicians and bureaucrats, Ozawa claims, lost sight of what constitutes the national interest. By defending short-term, largely economic aims, Japan's leaders neglected their obligation to protect Japan's long-term interests. Eda concurs that Japan's "single-minded obsession with economic affairs" has constrained its development of an independent foreign policy\textsuperscript{112}. Until recently politics has only needed to direct the management of the economy (what Eda labels "politics for producing\textsuperscript{113}) rather than addressing social and external concerns.

Creating a federal system of government and moving a lot of the responsibility for government regulation of everyday life to local governments, as recommended by
Ozawa\textsuperscript{114} and Kitaoka\textsuperscript{11b}, would free up the national government for attending to more weighty matters that directly impinge on the national interest. Spelling out clearly Japan's current national interest and the strategy underlying its foreign policy would not only ease the suspicion of its neighbours and diffuse misunderstandings but would generate debate within the country to allow political and public input to the process. Discovering the national interest and developing a national strategy requires open debate between political parties in the Diet.

Perhaps motivated by the removal of cold-war imperatives which forced Japan to match its foreign policy to the stance of the United States\textsuperscript{116}, recent signs of Japan breaking from its dependence on the US for providing the direction of its foreign policy include pro-activism in challenging the United States for a vote-share increase in the ADB (Asian Development Bank) and in moving ahead of Washington in opposing Russian aid and favouring Chinese aid. Japan's foreign policy is increasingly pragmatic; its policy in G-7 is dictated by Japan's own national interests (although echoing the U.S.'s) and it has clashed with the United States over aid strategy for Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{117}.

Japan's ability to develop new goals will benefit from greater activeness and involvement in multilateral organisations. Japan's claim to follow a United Nations-centred foreign policy (and given credence to by its 11\% share of the United Nations budget, second only to the United States contribution\textsuperscript{118}) needs to be augmented by a greater level of non-financial participation. Japan's non-recognition of the right to collective self-defence and its introverted pacifism isolate it from the rest of the world and prevent it from being a full contributor.

Japan's ability to assume a diplomatic role in the nineties is limited by a lack of political resources and poor direction of expertise within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and academic circles\textsuperscript{119}. Japan lacks an intelligence-gathering organisation comparable with America's CIA for providing information on which to base foreign policy and crisis management.

The Security Treaty with the US (and the wider US-Japan relationship) advances Japan's interests in Asia in a number of ways: enhancing Japan's ability to build stable relations with the other countries of the Asia-Pacific region where "nobody's going to want to deal with a Japan that's become cut off from the U.S. "\textsuperscript{120} and preventing misunderstanding and fear associated with Japan's economic strength and history (bestowing an "internationally valid certificate of [Japan's] non-

\textsuperscript{114}Ozawa, op. cit., p76
\textsuperscript{115}Kitaoka, op. cit., p67
\textsuperscript{116}Kitaoka, op. cit., p66
\textsuperscript{117}Yasutomo, op. cit., p 336
\textsuperscript{119}Okabe, Japan Review of International Affairs (Fall 1992), pp236-237
\textsuperscript{120}Ozawa (1994), op. cit., p123

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expansionist intentions\(^{121}\); providing a powerful stabilising influence on the entire region ("a cornerstone that cannot be removed without causing the entire structure to crumble\(^{122}\)); protecting Japan from 'loose canons' in the region such as a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea or potentially unstable China and the general post-cold-war increase in the levels of armament and tension in the region\(^{123}\) (with Japan needing American protection more than America needing a vast military base on the northern rim of Asia); and substituting for the lack of an alternative security framework in the region (Japan's basic security dilemma\(^{124}\)).

Furthermore, the blue book notes the central position of the United States in the globally important trilateral relationship linking the democratic-capitalist nations of Japan, North America and western Europe (which account for about 60% of world GNP)\(^ {125}\). The blue book asserts the need for the U.S.-Japan relationship to undergo revision from its postwar "abstract concept" to a more substantial partnership that recognises the potential for Japan's contributions as it continues "trying to assume a major role in a new international order of the post-Cold War era\(^{126}\).

Japan needs to counter pressures from the right within the country citing US economic decline (the "crumbling giant" argument\(^ {127}\)) as undermining its usefulness to Japan's security (viewing United States troops in Japan as mere "mercenaries\(^ {128}\), or arrogantly treating Japan as a "vassal" state\(^ {129}\)).

The US-Japan relationship should continue if for no other reason than the old maxim that since no countries are permanent enemies and are eternal allies, all that lasts is national interests, and as long as Japanese interests coincide with those of the United States the relationship will endure.

Ogawa believes that the principles which Japan brought to its postwar diplomacy (ie, its non-nuclear principles, its virtual ban on arms exports, and a constitutional renunciation of force to solve international disputes) may lead to Japan becoming

\(^{121}\)Czempiel, op. cit., p310
\(^{122}\)Nakanishi, Japan Echo (Spring 1990), p41
\(^{123}\)Okabe, op. cit., p225.
\(^{124}\)Hanami, op. cit., p409
\(^{125}\)Diplomatic Bluebook (1991), op. cit., pp20-21
\(^{126}\)Diplomatic Bluebook (1991), op. cit., p261
\(^{127}\)Hamma, Japan Echo (Winter 1991), p65. Figures from 1990 show that while the US has managed to preserve its military superiority, it has become the world's biggest debtor, has the largest gap between rich and poor and has the largest number of children living in poverty among the industrial nations, ranks 14th among the 16 large industrial nations in expenditure on primary and secondary education, and ranks 19th in the world in infant mortality.
\(^{128}\)Furukawa, op. cit., p25
\(^{129}\)Ishihara, Japan Echo (Spring 1990), p32. Ishihara considers the current security arrangement also bad for Japan, with his contention that "almost no experts in [Japan's] Defence Agency thinking that today's Japan is being protected by the United States" and that Japan has become a "vassal" to the United States Nakanishi (1990), op. cit., p40: responding to Ishihara's article, quotes Ishihara in an unidentified magazine article as writing in a contrary vein that "the J-US Security Treaty will naturally continue to be essential for some time". Nakanishi also responds that almost no Defence Agency experts would agree with Ishihara on Japan's ability to defend itself without US protection.
isolated and irrelevant, inversely depending on the extent to which such values are universal ones to which Japan can realistically expect to coax the rest of the world to aspire. Only if the values are transferable, can Japan contribute to the international community by promoting them using its full diplomatic capability\(^\text{130}\).

In April 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu broke with Japan's adherence to non-interference in a nation's domestic affairs by explicitly attaching political conditions to assistance, the so-called 'Four Kaifu Principles' of democratisation, human rights, peace, and sustained development. These were later (mid-1992) codified in Japan's ODA charter: establish economic development and environmental protection as the twin pillars of ODA; prevent the use of ODA for military purposes; guard against the use of ODA for military spending, development and trade of weaponry; weigh efforts to promote democratisation, market economies, and human rights.

Criticism of the application of such principles to ODA stems mostly from its inconsistency. Yasutomo (1992) notes that the principles seem to have been worked out to apply more to aid to distant East Europe than to govern Japan's ADB arrangements with closer countries such as China or Indonesia\(^\text{131}\). Japan's apparent double standards are by no means a peculiar indictment of its behaviour; countries like Australia\(^\text{132}\) and the United States\(^\text{133}\) are also not free of such accusations.
Ueki, in noting that "Japan in general upholds the concepts and principles of human rights, but its approach to specific human rights issues has been selective and country-specific", points to the unique difficulties that Japan faces in this area; Japan can face suspicion of its motives in asserting human rights by Asians fearful of a revival of Japanese arrogance. Japan also is sensitive to its bridge role in Asia, where "Japan often gives priority to maintaining good political relations with other Asian nations over the protection of individual human rights. This is reflected in Japanese voting behaviour [in the United Nations] in the human rights area. In many contentious cases, it simply abstains".134.

In fact, the four ODA principles are considered by Japanese administrators as merely 'points to be noted', not 'conditionalities', an extension of United States human rights diplomacy rather than genuinely Japanese principles, and often "complications", as 'long term goals' and therefore not the basis for defining any course of action, "for consideration only", convenient tools allowing the Japanese government to avoid debate or criticism135, and as vaguely unfamiliar American imports ("rather like a brand new suit"), their universal imposition hardly relevant to ones' natural duty as a Japanese137.

4.0 constitutional limitations

Japan's Constitution, drafted by the Occupation Authorities in the aftermath of World War II, changed Japanese society in an almost revolutionary sense. Unamended and unrevised for almost fifty years, a section of the Constitution presents Japan with a dilemma in managing its national interests.

4.1 Japan's dilemma

The dilemma for Japan in the post-cold-war era is that, while so dependent on world peace and stability, it remains bound to a constitution that excludes a security role from its international contributions. Further complicating the problem is the need to abide by the Constitution while developing the kind of more pro-active foreign policy and security stance demanded by Japan's interests and by its allies.

4.2 Article 9 and the constraint on Japan's capability for international contribution

The section of the Constitution most constraining Japan's ability to contribute to the post-cold-war international order, Article 9, includes the two clauses which cause the most controversy and impinge the most on Japan's security capability: "the

Harries argues that Clinton's "self-indulgent and discriminating human rights policy" on China is considerably harsher than that adopted towards countries like Saudi Arabia or Syria and is, in any case, subordinate to trade opportunities. On the matter of a nation's claims to a principled foreign policy, he quotes George Washington: No nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its own interests.

134Ueki, op. cit., p351
135Okabe, op. cit., p235
136Söderberg, op. cit., pp 221-227
137Ogura, op. cit., p72
Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation" and "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained".

Article 9 is seen by some as "central to the self-definition of Japan's position in the modern world as is the First Amendment for the United States"\textsuperscript{138}, "providing none other than the philosophy on which Japan's foreign policy stands"\textsuperscript{139}.

Critics find fault with the conditions of its creation during the US occupation. The haste of its preparation (fabricated in six days and nights) and the spiritual/religious overtones lent to its creation have caused it to be viewed as too much of an object of faith, without any serious concern about Japan's future ability to function as an autonomous nation state\textsuperscript{140}.

Other criticisms include: the constraints it places on Japan's ability to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts like any other member of the Western alliance, constraining the government in a "web of Constitutional pacifism"\textsuperscript{141}; the isolation it causes Japan (one unidentified Japanese official considers it "an even greater barrier to Japan's acceptance than the structural impediments" which cause such hostility in Japan-United States trade negotiations\textsuperscript{142}); the stifling of debate on Japan's diplomatic and security policies, allowing mistaken policies to remain uncorrected, and contributing to international nervousness about Japan's intentions\textsuperscript{143}; the opportunity it gave Japan to freeload on the West, providing "an extremely effective and plausible pretext for the pattern of conduct that had in itself nothing to do with its apparent pacifism"\textsuperscript{144}; the selling short of Japan's principles by removing it from the international decision-making process and letting any valid objections to military aggression go unexpressed\textsuperscript{145}; the ease with which it was able to be manipulated by those in power ("a function of the Japanese mood") to limit its application and the ease with which it is able to be evaded by Diet legislation (eg, Defence Forces Law of 1961, United Nations PKO Cooperation Law of 1992).

The prevailing government interpretation that the right to collective self-defence is unconstitutional has been cited as a major constraint on Japan's ability to pursue policies aiming at collective defence measures in bilateral, regional, and global alliance. Kitaoka contends that Japan's renunciation of collective self-defence is an abdication of its responsibilities as a United Nations member, given the statement

\textsuperscript{138}Katzenstein and Okawara, op. cit., p207
\textsuperscript{139}Diplomatic Bluebook (1991), op. cit., p. 29
\textsuperscript{140}Etoo, Japan Echo (Autumn 1991), p65. Etoo, a PhD in comparative literature, describes the Constitution variously as "a hastily slapped together façade of a modernistic edifice" and "the bastard offspring of the US Constitution". At the time of publication of his original essay in Japanese (June, 1991) he gave the present Constitution only five more years.
\textsuperscript{141}Ueki, op. cit., p350
\textsuperscript{142}Tahara, Japan Echo (Winter 1990), p13.
\textsuperscript{143}Koosaka, op. cit., p51
\textsuperscript{144}Tsurutani, op. cit., p120: The no-war clause of Article 9 was proposed by Prime Minister Shidehara in a private meeting with MacArthur in order to make contrition for the war.
\textsuperscript{145}Kitaoka (1994), op. cit., p70
contained in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter that one of the purposes of the organisation is [quoting from the Article] "to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression"\textsuperscript{146}.

Murakami likewise points out that under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter which require member states to make forces available to take part in military actions when required by the Security Council, Japan cannot be considered a full contributor to the United Nations\textsuperscript{147}.

The ban on collective arrangements also constrains Japan's ability to join bilateral and regional alliances outside of the United Nations, advisable given doubts about whether the UN can demonstrate in the future anything like the unity and strength of purpose shown during the Gulf Crisis.

It can be argued that the Constitution has been demonstrably incapable of limiting the power for the Japanese people to wage war and maintain land, sea and air force, as well as other war potential; the notions of individual and collective self defence have shifted over time, thus permitting incremental policy change.

While comparatively under-manned and under-equipped compared to NATO countries\textsuperscript{148}, the SDF has the largest military budget in Asia\textsuperscript{149} and its navy self defence capability, denigrated by McQueen as a mere "training force"\textsuperscript{150}, is now considered capable of threatening neighbouring states like China\textsuperscript{151}. Japan's defence industries are run by keiretsu at a high rate of self-sufficiency. The gradual shift of the Self Defence Forces toward the defence of external security is reinforced by Japan's acquisition of weapons "that blur the distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities ... as a result Japan's traditional inward focus on a 'defensive defence' has gradually given way to a more 'offensive defence' posture"\textsuperscript{152}.

Although Japan lacks amphibious assault troops, aircraft carriers, long range bombers or a capacity for mid-air refuelling and Japan's increases in offensive military capabilities are occurring in close consultation with the United States or in...
reaction to American pressure, ongoing replacement of older aircraft with new aircraft that would allow Japan to defend its sea-lanes up to 10,000 km away and the acquisition of new weapons systems such as Aegis destroyers and AWACs lead Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) to conclude that "it is clear that any clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive in Japan's security policy evaporates". They note that a shift in intent could see any of Japan's weapons converted quite easily from a defensive to an offensive posture (eg, helicopter aircraft carriers can be converted to serve VTOLs (Vertical Take-off and Landing aircraft) and mid-air refuelling capability of aircraft can be easily introduced). Furthermore:

"because of the large size of its defence budget and its strength in high technology industries, Japan's defence military capabilities must be counted among the largest and technologically most sophisticated in the world ... within the context of an expanding notion of self defence, Japan is acquiring some offensive capabilities that may be useful in the event, unlikely as it may be, it decides to play a more active part in regional security affairs in Asia"\(^{153}\).

Japan's ready stock of fuel from its nuclear power program and its technical capabilities give it, say anonymous Japanese sources, the "capability to go nuclear in a matter of months rather than years"\(^{154}\).

4.3 an historic reliance on total security and constitutional interpretation

The approach that the Japanese government has taken in the latter part of the post-war era in managing the limitations that the Constitution places on its foreign policy and security needs is to emphasise total security and change constitutional interpretations to fit its own requirements.

Expenditure on total security, pursued under government policy as "comprehensive security", and covering conventional defence expenditure (the SDF), non-military expenditure related to Japan's security (such as ODA), and non-economic military-related expenditure (such as rocket launcher technology), allowed Japan to satisfy the one-per-cent-of-GDP limit, self-imposed as an informal corollary of Article 9.

Commentators have recently suggested Japan pursue a more active role to improve its total security by become a kind of 'global civilian power', playing many international roles actively (including peacekeeping), but with a special emphasis in non-military fields\(^{155}\). Ex-Prime Minister Hata and Shaminren (USDP - United Socialist Democrat Party)) President Eda point to Japan's potential for making a

\(^{153}\)Katzenstein and Okawara\(^{185}\)


Hanami, op. cit., p381: one estimate is that by 1998 J will have 5-10 tons of plutonium. p411: Japan's plutonium-based energy program is uneconomic and less safe than alternatives. Japan is adopting the Israel-South Africa model for issuing denials and ambiguous statements. Nuclear weapons are not unconstitutional.

\(^{155}\)lokibe. Japan Echo (Spring 1994) pp60-62
sound contribution towards the solution of transnational problems which face Japan. With its cultural and technological background giving it a something of a 'competitive advantage', Japan may best make its global contribution in the fields of environment, easing world poverty, improving the educational base of the world's population and developing its capability for technological research\textsuperscript{156}, peace, human rights, and economics\textsuperscript{157}.

Unable to secure the two-thirds majority in the Diet needed to allow constitutional revision, and intent on steering clear of any provocation of 'Protect the Constitution' Socialists, the LDP traditionally handled Japan's "bitter dilemma" by modifications to interpretations and manipulation of the Constitution ('constitutional amendment by interpretation', ie, interpretation to suit the circumstances). While once deemed unconstitutional, for example, the SDF now enjoys the largest military budget in Asia and the support of all non-communist political parties. With Japan soon to have the capability to protect its sea-lanes to 10,000km even the distinction between offensive and defensive security used by the government to justify the SDF in the first place becomes further blurred. Some fear the further expansion of the SDF's arms and activities by increasingly liberal interpretations (perhaps in accordance with the proposition of the National Defence Academy that the Constitution's preamble, which concerns the people's desire to strive for the preservation for peace, be given more weight than the war-renouncing text of Article 9 thus allowing Japan to send troops on peace-keeping missions\textsuperscript{158}).

Ozawa suggests that Japan can participate fully in preserving global and regional security, while still remaining faithful to its constitution and not resurrecting fear among its neighbours or within its own people of a remilitarised Japan. He calls for a separate force centred on the United Nations to "become the means by which Japan actively works to create the strategic environment desirable for its peace and stability", moving Japan from a passive "exclusive defence strategy" to a dynamic "peace-building strategy"\textsuperscript{159}. This would entail restructuring the SDF to provide a separate peace-keeping force (in addition to the purely internal defensive force) contributing to a United Nations reserve based on Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

Ozawa sees participation in such a force as lying within the constraints of the constitution, given that its activities - unlike those deployed in Cambodia under the 1992 legislation - would be under the command of the United Nations (and hence not constitute action 'taken as a sovereign right of the nation'). Moreover, such a contribution would allow Japan to 'occupy an honoured place' in international society and help 'preserve our security and existence'. To avoid fruitless debate over constitutional interpretation and ease public concerns about interpretive

\textsuperscript{156}Hata, op. cit., p43.  
\textsuperscript{157}Eda , op. cit., p20.  
\textsuperscript{158}Shawcross,\textit{The Australian}, 22-8-94, p10  
\textsuperscript{159}Ozawa, op. cit., p p107
erosion though, Ozawa suggests adding a third clause to Article 9 or enact a special law spelling out the role of a restructured SDF operating under United Nations command.

4.4 constitutional revision

In the LDP (which still issues token assurances that it opposes revision) and bureaucracy there is now open support for constitutional revision\(^\text{160}\). In fact, pro- and con-constitutional revision forces are pretty even in the Diet, leading some to predict a degree of policy dynamism on this issue in the future (ie, radical changes in policy with slight changes in party strengths\(^\text{161}\)). Constitutional revision could become the big issue as the current realignment process takes place.

Public opinion too has shifted in favour of revision, with citizens less likely to believe in the Socialist utopia (an unarmed Japan rejecting the security treaty and leading the rest of the world to global disarmament), instead questioning how much an impotent Japan can contribute to world peace. Popular support is now split with 50% favouring constitutional revision\(^\text{162}\). Some critics go so far as suggesting a complete rewriting of the document in a more pragmatic (less spiritual) tone or else doing away with it altogether\(^\text{163}\).

5.0 Regional Limitations

Nakanishi lists three reasons why Japan in the post-cold-war era “will find it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of the ‘Asian option’”: the increasingly interdependent zone emerging in the region, the taking shape in Asia of a multipolar political order, the gradual passing from the scene of the generation of anti-Japanese Asians\(^\text{164}\).

5.1 Japan's wartime history

The humiliation of defeat in World War II still diminishes Japan's ability to maintain a foreign policy free from manipulation by neighbouring countries such as China and the two Koreas. Furthermore, mistrust of Japanese motives continues to be aggravated by incidents in Japan that indicate it still has trouble coming to terms with its record of Asian involvement in World War II\(^\text{165}\), eg textbook revisions, annual visits by government leaders to the Yasukuni Peace Shrine to venerate fallen soldiers (including Class A war criminal), last-minute back-downs from denials of official involvement in the abduction of Asian women for Imperial Army

\(^{160}\)Hanami, op. cit., p408: some in LDP and bureaucracy favour constitutional revision. LDP assurances that it is opposed to constitutional revision are mere politics.

\(^{161}\)Hanami, op. cit., p409

\(^{162}\)Kitaoka 35. Quoting figures from a March 1993 survey by the Yomiuri Shinbun showing 50% of people polled are in favour of constitutional revision, 33% are opposed. (Earlier polls showed respective figures for 1991 of 33% and 51% and for 1986 of 23% and 57% respectively.

\(^{163}\)Eto, op. cit., p65

\(^{164}\)Nakanishi, Japan Echo (Winter 1991), p60

\(^{165}\)AP report, "Japan’s PM to face anger over war", Sydney Morning Herald, 23-8-94, p11, quoting The Manila Chronicle editorial ("recipients of Japanese aid among Asian nations will continue to regard Tokyo with suspicion and dread") and Malaysia Opposition Leader L. K. Siang ("it is clear from all this that significant and influential segments of the Japanese society feel no real repentance for the war").
brothel service, and a continuing stream of statements justifying wartime actions - the August 1994 statement of the director-general of the Environment Agency that South-east Asia had benefited from Japanese wartime occupation, the fourth cabinet member in eight years to be forced to resign for expressing such unpopular (outside Japan) views.

Shawcross notes that until Japan comes to terms with its wartime past, in a world where the bi-polar structure has collapsed and cooperation between nations is essential to maintain order, "it's hard to see how it can really face the future and use its power effectively to combat world disorder."

Kitaoka and lokibe, too, warn that Japan cannot expect to be active, particularly in international affairs, unless it "sincerely reflects" on past action in China and Korea and South-east Asia. No Japanese commentator appears to consider that the recent expressions of contrition by leaders such as Prime Minister Kaifu (in 1991 to South Korea, ASEAN countries, China and Mongolia), rather than reflecting the consideration shown for the sentiment of the Asian people, may indicate mere self-interest and the timing of imperial passage, rather than sincere contrition.

At times, in order to avoid upsetting China, Japan's behaviour resembles that of "a Chinese tributary" or is as if it is "under Beijing's thumb". The 'diplomacy of friendship' has produced in Japan a "diplomacy of atonement", even leading to endorsement of Beijing's Soviet policy in 1978 (as part of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship), despite its dubious benefit to Japan.

Mineo observes that China's stance toward Japan has been shifting, with Chinese officials declaring their support for Japan's emergence as a political (but not military) superpower (such support arising from China's strategy of seeking a counterweight to United States influence in the region and enhancing Chinese influence on Japan). Continuing feelings of resentment in South Korea, though, "indicate the futility of trying to make Asian regionalism the main pillar of Japan's foreign policy.

Japan faces further constraints from its neighbours in any program of remilitarisation. As McQueen notes, "the prospects of Japan as a remilitarised nation defending its sea-lanes, perhaps with tactical nuclear weapons, cannot be viewed as just another strategic option to be weighed but as unlocking anxieties that were put in a closet while Japan became [America's] principal trading partner and closest

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166 Shawcross, op. cit.
167 Kitaoka & lokibe, Japan Echo (Special issue 1993), p22
169 Mineo, Japan Echo (Winter 1992), p22.
171 Mineo, op. cit., pp24-25.
172 Kitaoka, Japan Echo (Special issue, 1993), pp3-4
North Asian ally". Even Japan's consideration of PKO involvement following the Gulf War, for example, was censured by China as a "design for resurgent Japanese militarism".

Kitaoka notes that Japan's movement to Asia is primarily to South-east Asia (which is what Japanese mean when they talk of Asia), not so much to China or South Korea. South-east Asia, while also still mindful of Japan's wartime aggression, fears domination by China or by Japan and China separately, is less critical of Japan developing its role in the region, supporting Japan's deployment of minesweepers after the Gulf War.

Even in South-east Asia, though, the isolation and suspicion that is the enduring legacy of World War II resonates in Okazaki's rhetorical question: "if Japan and the United States ever came to blows, is there any country in Asia or Eastern Europe that would side with Japan?" His answer follows in a rather gloomy style: "it would not be at all surprising if deep in their hearts they delighted in seeing Japan laid low".

Kitaoka points out the intimate relationship which ASEAN and Japan have in recent years developed, with Japanese foreign aid and investment having played a major role in promoting the development of the region. He interprets Dr Mahathir's concept of EAEC (East Asian Economic Conference) as an indication that the nations of the region are seeking closer economic ties with Japan. Japan's passive post-war diplomacy has probably assisted in the recuperation of its image in the region. As Koosaka put it, Japan in this respect "benefited from a posture of refraining from independent judgements, hesitating to take action, and in general appearing to be incompetent".

In the post-cold-war era however, as Nakanishi remarks, "some of Japan's actions [in South-east Asia] have marked a decisive break from its accustomed passivity". He lists Japan's use of its friendship with Thailand to host a peace conference of warring parties in Cambodia (June 1990), submission of an independent proposal to supplement the Cambodian peace plan advanced by the United Nations Security Council (early 1991), and a Foreign Ministerial visit to Vietnam that raised the ire of both China and the United States (June 1991). Nakanishi somewhat grandiosely lauds Japan's "first steps toward equality with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in the behind-the-scenes jockeying in South-east Asia".

Lee Kuan Yew's increasing support for Japanese participation in Asia was expressed in a Kyoto address (13-2-92) in which he asserted that "by all reason

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173 McQueen, op. cit., p270
175 Okazaki, Japan Echo (Spring 1990), p16.
176 Koosaka, op. cit., p50
177 Nakanishi (1991), op. cit., pp58-59
and logic, there should be no fear of a Japanese return to military aggression ... fear of Japan's remilitarisation is more emotional than rational"178 (backtracking from his earlier-expressed sentiment that allowing the dispatch of Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was as dangerous as "giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic"179).

Japan also needs to cope with the dark side in its contemporary relationship with Asia. McCormack refers to the unique sense of 'Japaneseness', meaning "heir to a distinct, superior and unique quality", which, in earlier times, permitted Japanese to consider cooperation with its neighbours only in terms of Japanese leadership. He notes that many observers see a similar mentality at work today in Japan, with contemporary Japan speaking of a kyosei (teacher-student) relationship180.

He suggests that only when Japan is able to "slough off" its Japaneseness (in the manner in which Inoguchi suggests Asians slough off constructed notions off what 'Asia' is) and rethink the national identity will Japan become an equal of its neighbours with the capability to cooperate effectively in its interactions with them181.

Japan's ability to contribute to stability in the region would benefit from the existence of a multilateral security framework. All countries of the region, including Japan, need to manage the United States' contraction of engagement in the region (and possible withdrawal) with some forum for promoting discussion and developing mutual trust.

5.2 a multilateral political security framework

The countries of East Asia have never tried to create a political or security framework on their own initiative, with no such organisation in Asia since the demise of the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO (South-east Asian Treaty Organisation)) and the establishment of a set of bilateral security pacts revolving around the United States, from the early 1980s the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states have begun to consider some regional security issues at its meetings.

As the countries of South-east Asia have gained economic strength, America's receding influence and "China's expansionist manoeuvring" have prompted those nations to greatly increase arms purchases. Building a security framework in East Asia, he maintains, has become "an urgent task"182, a "necessary insurance policy" for Japan, South Korea, China, and the countries of South-east Asia183.

178 Fu 46
179 Kitaoka 35
182 S. Kitaoka, Putting Old Diplomatic Principles into New Bottles, s1994, p68
183 Furukawa, Japan Echo (Autumn 1993), p46

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Katzenstein and Okawara ascribe Japan's post-Cold War interest in a sustained security dialogue in Asia to the weakening of the American military presence in Asia and "the growing fear of a serious deterioration in United States-Japanese relations". Kitaoka ascribes it to the increase in post-Gulf Crisis annoyance with the United States (kenbei). He notes that since Restoration Japan has intermittently turned to Asia in reaction to a worsening of its ties with the West. With a post-war dependence on the bilateral relationship with the United States and no experience of multilateral diplomacy, though, Japan faces some difficulty in contributing to such a framework.

Some kind of NATO-like regional structure may be unavoidable as the United States withdraws and insecurity and mistrust emerge to provide the backdrop for an arms race. While Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) perceives the Japanese government as severely constrained in pursuing policies aiming at collective defence measures in bilateral or regional alliances because of the strength of pacifism and public opinion which supports an interpretation of the Constitution which opposes collective defence, it quotes the view of Nishihara that Japan is capable of taking advantage of a concept of self defence that is basically "stretchable" and assuming the role of leading regional power by coordinating its individual self defence measures with the security measures of other countries.

The first manifestation of Japan's new interest in an Asian framework was the establishment in May 1992 of a 'Round Table Conference on Japan and the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st Century' attended by Prime Minister Miyazawa followed by the imperial visit to China in October 1992.

The inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum, bringing together the six ASEAN nations and Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, China, Russia, Laos, PNG, Vietnam, the European Union, and the United States for the purpose of discussing security and defence issues, was held in July 1994. It accorded with Japan's preference for a framework that utilises the existing cooperation mechanisms (such as ASEAN or APEC, rather than a NATO-style or CSCE-style (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) organisation) and operates "synergenetically" with the existing bilateral relationships that have evolved in the region.

Such commentators as ex-SDP vice-chairman S. Itoh, USDP president S. Eda, and Kitaoka though call for a new regional security organisation along the lines of the CSCE model centred on Asia's coastal states but also including...
Australia, Canada and the United States. Member states of such an organisation would accordingly reach agreement on respecting current borders (problematic for China), prohibit arms exports to certain countries and provide a basis for undertaking collective defence against attacks on member countries\textsuperscript{192}.

\textsuperscript{192}Kitaoka (1994), op. cit., p68
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Conclusion

Japan faces the new international order in the post-cold-war era with its ability to contribute in accordance with its own national interests and the expectations of the rest of the world constrained by a number of factors: deficiencies in its political structure and its pursuit of a national strategy, constitutional limitations on its ability to contribute militarily on security matters, and challenges to its participation in maintaining regional peace and prosperity.

With the changes that are occurring in representative politics - a realignment of parties and the introduction of reforms which may produce establish true competitive politics - the potential exists for Japan to overcome the diffusion of leadership and policy development that has hindered its ability to deal with the rest of the world.

A re-appraisal of a national strategy that emphasises short-term economic goals at the expense of Japan's national interests could see Japan taking a more active role in international affairs, rather than the passive stance appropriate to a mercantile power.

With the removal of the taboo that prevented consideration of constitutional revision, a more open approach can be made to debating the best means for Japan to manage its security and contributing to the world's security.

Changes in the perceptions of Japan's neighbours in the region to Japan's more active pursuit of its national interests and the gradual development of a political/security framework will enhance Japan's capability for contributing to the Asia-Pacific region in the post-cold-war era.